School Discipline and Civil Rights: 
Education Reform in the Neoliberal Era

By

Danfeng Koon

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 
Requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Education 
in the 
Graduate Division 
of the 
University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Daniel Perlstein, Chair 
Professor Bruce Fuller 
Professor Christopher Edley, Jr.

Summer 2016
ABSTRACT

School Discipline and Civil Rights:
Education Reform in the Neoliberal Era

By

Danfeng Koon
Doctor of Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Daniel Perlstein, Chair

In the midst of intensifying income inequality, police violence, and school segregation, Obama’s Administration launched the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in 2010 to reinvigorate civil rights enforcement and eliminate the school-to-prison pipeline. Since then, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative has been touted as a success story of grassroots advocacy, philanthropic involvement in education reform, bi-partisan collaboration, and cross sector coordination between education, school psychology, law enforcement, and criminal justice. Education reformers invoke common narratives of liberal reform in this process, including bottom-up change, collaboration between strange bedfellows, and innovative policymaking through networks. Yet, this study finds that even under ideal implementation conditions, characterized by successful destabilization and educators committed to change – the social control, punishment, and policing practices in the school district didn’t change much. Instead, the district mandated the adoption of more behavioral management programs and the creation of a district-wide discipline data system, both experienced as bureaucratic and insufficient to address the school climate and culture needs in schools.

While, dominant explanations for liberal reform failure place the blame on resistant or incompetent educators, this study asks what larger political and economic interests were at stake in the creation, implementation, and outcomes of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Through social network visualization and qualitative coding of policy and advocacy reports published on school discipline between 2000 and 2014, I found that the US Department of Education and the US Department of Justice worked together to support and shape a national policy network through which education reform non-profits and for-profits co-opted the school-to-prison pipeline frame to drum up demand for behavioral management programs and other education reform products and services. Through an in-depth qualitative case study of the first two-and-a-half years of the implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in an urban school district, I find that the policy mandates, the civil rights ideals it invoked, and the current grant-dependency of urban school districts incentivized district central office administrators to compete with one another to secure funding for education reform industry products and services and to coordinate a shared managerial interest in data auditing and accountability. Thus, I conclude that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative worked largely as it was intended to, serving the interests of the education reform industry and not the interests of those concerned with the school-to-prison pipeline or creating more just schools.
For Chencho, Alani & Alejandro
CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1
Perspectives on Liberal Reform Failure 7
Critical Policy Analysis 10
A Brief History of School Discipline 20

Chapter 2
Methods 28
Social Network Visualization 30
Case Study Methods 36

Chapter 3
Strange Bedfellows 42

Chapter 4
Co-optation & Coordination 68

Chapter 5
Neoliberal Landscape & Urban School District Reform 93

Chapter 6
Conclusion 137

Bibliography 142
Appendices 152
Acknowledgments

This dissertation captures a step along my journey of thinking about schools and society. Many people have contributed to that thinking. I want to acknowledge and thank the young people I’ve worked with, students and now my own children, who have always expressed so much hope and so much indignation at injustice that they keep me focused and hopeful. I also thank the amazing people I’ve worked with in schools, organizations, and communities that keep doing the good work. I look forward to giving back to them and to the work of making the world more just.

In this later part of my journey, I want to thank my advisor Daniel Perlstein for reminding me to “tell no lies, claim no easy victories” and for the breadcrumbs of ideas that continue leading me closer to home. I also want to thank my thought partners Seenae Chong, Arturo Cortez, John Hall, Huriya Jabbar, Yoonjeon Kim, Laura Hernandez, Dinorah Sanchez Loza, and Christyna Serrano, who have given me thoughtful feedback, encouragement, and support throughout the process. I’ve also learned a great deal from the opportunities to work with my committee members Bruce Fuller and Christopher Edley, Jr., as well as, mentor and teacher Mary Louise Frampton and Cynthia Coburn. I want to thank the National Academy of Education/Spencer Dissertation Fellowship for supporting this research and other education research.

Finally, I want to thank my family - my parents Marilyn Wong and Wang Sang Koon and my sister Jidan Koon for being great models of courage and generosity, my husband Alejandro Soto-Vigil for being unrelentingly committed to justice and a great partner, and my children Chencho and Alani for being my biggest cheerleaders.
Introduction

Despite the complicated relationship between racial justice and the law throughout U.S. history, the Civil Rights Era initiated an era of faith in the ability of civil rights advocacy, policy, and federal enforcement in education to challenge racial and social inequality in society. The allure of liberal legal reform in education has existed precariously in relationship to growing social inequality and persistently unequal racial outcomes. Extensive scholarship in law and education has explored the role of civil rights in institutional reform and provided explanations for the gap between legal ideals and reality. This scholarship has largely assumed an antagonistic relationship between civil rights and education and chronicles the ways in which educational organizations have been resistant to these outside pressures to change. Actor-centered perspectives point to the incapacity of lawyers and judges to enforce remedies and the resistance of educators, legislatures, and parents to numerous equity reforms including desegregation, de-tracking, and the equalization of funding (Heise, 2002; Heubert, 1999; Oakes, Wells, Jones, & Datnow, 1997; Wells & Serna, 1996; Wilkinson, 1978). Institutional perspectives describe the durability of educational institutions and the taken-for-granted culture and routines in schools that make them impermeable to change (Meyer & Rowan, 2001; Tyack, 1994). Political interest group perspectives explain that more important than resistance or technical failing, education reforms (and equity reforms in particular) involve political values differences over the purpose of education (Labaree, 1997; Orfield, 2014).

While the actor-centered, institutional, and political interest group perspectives have provided important insights for understanding the multiple obstacles that stand in the way of creating more equitable schools, these explanations don’t entirely reflect the current educational reform landscape. Each of the dominant explanations describe an institution of education that has been quite quickly transformed over the past twenty years. For example, courts today are more likely to strike down voluntary desegregation plans designed by school districts themselves rather than enforcing desegregation orders brought by an outside group (Orfield, 2001, 2014). Additionally, in recent years, there has been little organized resistance by educators and local elites to equity reforms, at least not on the scale of Southern resistance to desegregation. By and large today’s educators have chosen to work in the schools and districts they work in and report being motivated by their desire to work with young people and make a difference. Whereas, in the 1960s, teacher unions were seen as opposed to demands for racial equity, recently, teacher unions have joined with parent and community groups to raise opposition to school closures in African American neighborhoods, in addition to bread and butter contract issues (Gutstein & Lipman, 2013).

Likewise, in contrast to scholarship in the 1990s and early 2000s that described the considerable institutional inertia - or “grammar of schooling” - that seemed to make public education impregnable to reform (Meyer & Rowan, 2001; Tyack & Tobin, 1994), recent decades have been ripe with examples of significant changes to the core features of schooling. New organizational forms of education - including charter schools, pilot schools, homeschooling, and on-line education - now make up a sizable portion of public school
enrollment and challenge the institutional legitimacy of the One Best System. Teachers’ work that had long been characterized by its autonomy and isolation, is no longer “decoupled,” as institutional theorists believed, from policy and other outside pressures (Coburn, 2004). Instead two decades of standards, testing, accountability, curricular change, and now the introduction of technology in learning have required considerable changes to the daily practice of teaching and learning (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2006; Coburn, 2004), resulting in what has been popularized in the media as teacher reform fatigue (Ravitch, 2014).

Finally, while political debate about education continues to exist, recent reforms are better examples of political agreement than political disagreement among policy makers. For example, No Child Left Behind was a bi-partisan project and pushed by civil rights organizations as well as business leaders (Peterson & West, 2003). Similarly, scholars have noted how organizations and individuals across the political spectrum, and for different reasons, have pointed to the racial achievement gap to push school-based decision-making, charter schools, testing accountability, and other contemporary school reforms (Cuban, 1990; Kafka, 2008). Thus, on many educational issues, a fairly wide range of political values find alignment, contradicting political interest group conflict perspectives. Equity and social mobility, couched as equal opportunity, dominate the policy discourse of those traditionally seen as being on the Left as well as those on the Right.

In recent years prominent political figures from President Obama to former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Gates Foundation President Allan Golston, former New York school chancellor and billionaire Joel Klein, and Reverend Al Sharpton have proclaimed that “education is the civil rights issue of our time,” centering public education as the institutional arena for achieving racial equality today and civil rights law and intervention as the mechanism. This claim has been made despite incontrovertible evidence of the greatest income inequality since 1928 (Saez, 2013), the largest racial wealth gap since 1963 (Urban Institute, 2013), the mass incarceration of more than 2 million people through a legal system that demonstrates racial disparities from the moment of police contact to time served, rampant police violence in communities of color that resulted in nearly 1,000 police killings in 2015 alone, and schools and neighborhoods that are more racially segregated than before Brown v. Board of Education. What explains this confluence of political interest in reviving civil rights rhetoric and enforcement in education and what impact will contemporary civil rights advocacy and enforcement have on schooling and racial justice given the significant changes in the context of public education?

If existing theories based on actor-centered, institutional, and political interest group perspectives cannot adequately explain the persistence of racial inequality despite bi-partisan policy making in education, declining educator resistance, and evidence of rapid changes in other aspects of education, what theoretical perspective can provide additional insights? To better understand the current education reform context and the role that civil rights currently play (and could play), in both policy creation and policy implementation, requires a perspective that recognizes the ways in which economic interests undergird the social and political dimensions of education, while not entirely determining them.
In this study, I draw on political economic perspectives that recognize the dialectical relationship between the economy and politics to explore how political interests and institutional contexts have a basis in economic conditions. First, I draw on Bourdieu’s theory of “fields of power,” which explains that in modern capitalist societies, power is wielded not by one population of elites that comprise a monolithic ruling class but by a network of positions across a diverse range of social fields in which the normal jockeying for position within and among fields secures the stability of the whole. I use this conception of “fields of power” to explore the network of economic and political interests, including but not limited to civil rights, that engage in advocacy and counter-advocacy to produce the Supportive School Discipline Initiative (Bourdieu, 1977; Wacquant, 1993). Borrowing from Fligstein & McAdam (2011, 2012), I extend Bourdieu’s understanding of fields to explain how the Supportive School Discipline policy is enacted and implemented in a series of interlocking and contentious fields that make up an urban school district. I draw on Gramsci’s conception of ideology (Gramsci; Hall, 1985) to examine the ways in which diverse social forces in the field of education policymaking and the district central office come to express a common ideology and how this ideology, instantiated into the Supportive School Discipline Initiative and the OCR Agreement shape educators’ efforts to create more just schools.

This study focuses on the creation and implementation of the Obama Administration’s “Supportive School Discipline Initiative,” an effort launched in 2010 to “reinvigorate civil rights enforcement,” and “eliminate the school-to-prison pipeline.” While activists began raising concerns about the growing influence of police, surveillance technologies, and Zero Tolerance policies in schools in the decades before, the civil rights divisions of the Department of Education and the Department of Justice draw federal attention to the issue. The resulting network of organizations and policy activity has been described as providing a “story about how transformative social change can happen” (Atlantic Philanthropies, 2015). In this story, the widespread attention on school discipline is one initiated by civil rights groups, community-based organizations, and youth organizers (Bryant, 2014), and supported and funded by philanthropies and state agencies (Preskill, Mack, Duffy, & Gutierrez, 2013). The targeted funding by federal agencies and philanthropies creates a collaborative process that garners the support of Democrats as well as Republicans, and involves the input of experts from civil rights, education, psychology, health, law enforcement, and juvenile justice (Atlantic Philanthropies, 2015; Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2014), to provide political pressure, and policy guidance for reform. This case provides a unique opportunity to study the role and impact of civil rights advocacy and enforcement within the current context of education policymaking.

The study explores the following questions:

1. What social forces comprise the “field of power” involved in the Supportive School Discipline policy at the national level? What was the role of civil rights in this field of power?

2. In the urban school district implementing the Supportive School Discipline policy, how, if at all, do the social forces that comprised the “field of power” shape the implementation process?
To address the first question, I use social network analysis to study the interests that challenged Zero Tolerance policies from 2000 - 2014, the changes in these networks over time, and the ways in which the problem of school discipline and the dominant policy solutions change over time. Education policy making, however, is just one part of the story. To understand the role that educators, especially social justice minded educators, play in education reform in the current education reform era, requires an in-depth case study of the implementation process within school districts and schools. Thus, the second half of this study explores the implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in an urban school district that enters into a negotiated agreement with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to address racially disproportionate suspensions. While suspensions in the District were consistent with national trends, demonstrating high and disproportionate suspension rates for African American students, OCR was welcomed into the district by top district leadership and community groups, and the district was perceived by many as a potential national model of implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. This case provides a unique opportunity to study the machinery behind contemporary school reforms.

Overview of Chapters

In Chapter 1, I review some of the dominant descriptions of liberal legal reform as well as the prominent theoretical perspectives that have attempted to explain the failure of liberal reform to substantially equalize educational outcomes. I discuss these theories in three buckets: actor-centered explanations, institutional explanations, and political interest group explanations. I provide a review of the scholarship in both law and education for each of these theoretical traditions, and argue that these theoretical traditions fail to explain our present education policy context because they study actors, institutions, and political contest without adequate attention to the economic conditions that shape the interests, ideologies, and allegiances playing out in education reform. Finally, I review the explanation of liberal legal reform failure from a critical perspective and review the growing literature on neoliberal education reform.

I then provide an explanation of my theoretical framework, which integrates Bourdieu’s conception of fields with Gramsci’s theoretical contributions on ideology to understand the social forces at work in the creation and implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, and the ways in which economic interests shape the political contests over how education problems and solutions are identified and framed. I end this chapter with a brief historical background of school discipline in American schools and the more recent challenges to zero tolerance policies at the national level as a way to trace the economic and political contexts, and the diverse ideological streams that emerged, that have shaped the practice of school discipline in different eras of American history.

In chapter 2, I present my research design, guided by what Burawoy (1998) has described as the extended case method. While not approaching the depth of ethnographic fieldwork typical of the extended case method, this study is guided by the reflexive approach of this method, which explores the meaning and actions in local settings as they are shaped and shaping larger economic and political forces. The use of a social network visualization and in-depth case study to explore policy creation, implementation, and impact is consistent with
the flexibility in methods that other scholars have argued is necessary in understanding the multi-level processes involved in education policy research (Ball, 1994). Drawing on this approach, this study involves two levels of analysis: one involving an in-depth case study over two-years of an urban school district implementing the Initiative; a second involving a social network analysis of the social forces that create school discipline as a national education policy priority and shape the implementation of school discipline reforms at the local level. Integrating both levels of analysis provided an opportunity to better understand the interactions within the school district as well as their relationship to the larger economic and political context of school discipline reform.

In Chapter 3, I present the findings of my social network analysis of the social forces involved in creating the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Through social network analysis I describe how diverse ideological communities, such as school psychologists, school police, character educators, venture philanthropies, and academics, advocate for solutions that increase their own influence and interests within the field of education policy. The federal attention on school discipline initiated by the civil rights divisions of the Department of Education and the Department of Justice responds to rising policy advocacy activity across these ideological communities, which coalesce into a dense national network that identifies school discipline policies and practices as problematic and in need of reform.

In Chapter 4, I examine the structure of the policy network in the last time period (2010-2014) to explore the changing structure and composition of the policy actors and the ideological co-optation and coordination that occurs after the DOE and DOJ announce the Administration’s commitment to “eliminating the school-to-prison pipeline”. I find that through the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the DOE, DOJ, and their philanthropic partners, identify and fund particular organizations to lead consensus and technical training efforts, creating a set of new core organizations in the policy network. These core organizations, in particular the Council of State Governments and the American Institutes of Research, act as gate-keepers, determining the participation and representation of organization and ideological interests in the policy network. Through this policy network process, more radical critiques of the growing carceral state that animated school-to-prison pipeline activists are co-opted to push narrow solutions aimed at improving behavioral management systems in schools. At the same time the policy network provides a location and process that permits coordination across competing reform interests that ultimately serve the interests of the professional reform industry and the public management class.

In Chapter 5, I zoom in to look at the early implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in an urban school district. I find that the Civil Rights and racial equity ideals invoked by the OCR agreement find a great deal of resonance with district and school leaders, creating a willingness, even enthusiasm, to adopt the reforms mandated by the OCR agreement as part of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. However, even in the face of what might be considered ideal implementation conditions - both strong commitment and capacity among district and school level leaders - the Supportive School Discipline Initiative creates very little change in schools amidst a great deal of activity in the district central office. Rather than a story of policy implementation failure, I argue that the policy
worked largely as it was intended to, serving the interests of the education reform industry, and not the interests of those concerned with the school-to-prison pipeline.

I find that in Green Grove, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative successfully placated growing community demands for reforms to school policing. Even as the OCR Agreement motivated a broad swath of school district central office administrators and school leaders to champion the Initiative, the larger neoliberal economic and political context exacerbated competitive pressures within the school district and strengthened professionally self-interested behavior rather than more collective efforts.

Through these mechanisms, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative constrained rather than enabled efforts at achieving more socially just schools, and fed the growth of the education reform industry. In this way, civil rights at the policy implementation stage, continued to hide racial injustice and support the privatization of the public.
In this chapter I provide some background on the rise of liberal legal reform in education, and review the prominent theoretical perspectives that have explained the failure of law and policy - whether from courts, legislatures, or public agencies - to address racial inequality in education. I discuss these theories in three buckets: actor-centered explanations, institutional explanations, and political interest group explanations. I provide a review of the scholarship in both law and education for each of these theoretical traditions, and argue that each of these theoretical traditions fails to explain our present education policy context because they study actors (in the case of actor-centered explanations), institutions (in the case of institutional theorists), and political values (in the case of political interest group theorists) devoid of any attention to economics.

I then introduce the political economic perspective on liberal legal reform failure and review the growing literature on neoliberal education reform. I hone in on two theoretical concepts, Bourdieu's theory of fields and Gramsci's theory of ideology as tools to understand both policy creation and policy implementation in contemporary times where political economic theories of stasis and change are useful.

**Literature Review**

**Perspectives on Liberal Reform Failure**

From the late 1970s on, and in the face of considerable evidence that liberal racial reforms were not working, legal and educational scholars attempted to explain the failure of these reforms. These explanations tended to fall into one of four categories: rational actor theories, institutional theories, political values conflict theories, and critical theories.

**Actor-Centered Explanations for Liberal Legal Reform Failure**

The actor-centered perspective focuses on the role of actors in failing or resisting liberal legal reforms. They point to either the technical incapacity of actors to create the changes necessary or the personal resistance of those charged with implementing the reforms. These perspectives often assume that policies are the articulation of a society’s good will and rational problem solving and look to bigger and better tools for mandating implementation. Resistant educators are seen as racist, conservative, or incapable, without examining actors within a larger historical context or within the complex economic and political context of their time.

Legal scholars have cautioned that legal actors, such as judges and government lawyers, lack the capacity to mandate and supervise educational reforms (Heise, 2002; Heubert, 1999). Critics explained that judges and lawyers lacked the expertise to facilitate effective negotiations, fashion appropriate remedies, or enforce complex structural injunctions that required large-scale institutional change (Diver, 1979; Rosenberg, 1991). Often solutions required coordination between multiple agencies or organizations, involved policies and practices of street-level actors far beyond the reach of courts, and required the support or acquiescence of administrators and staff.
Other scholars have found that legal interventions from the earliest days of desegregation to current equity-minded reforms are met with resistance of educators and local communities (Wilkinson, 1978; Yudof, 1981). Historians studying the Southern response to Brown have thoroughly documented the extreme resistance, violent backlash, and delay that Southern judges, school boards, school administrators, and communities engaged in (Klarman, 1994; Wilkinson, 1978). Education researchers, studying later desegregation efforts have similarly documented resistance of educators and local communities (Oakes et al., 1997; Wells, Holme, Atanda, & Revilla, 2005; Wells & Serna, 1996; Welner, 2001). Scholars studying desegregation efforts in six high schools in six different states around the country found that in addition to white flight, school administrators and teachers created within-school segregation through differentiated course tracks and school boards closed many schools in African American communities. Similarly, during “second generation” school desegregation efforts in the 1980s and 1990s, Oakes et al. (1997) and Welner (2001) found that privileged parents worked together with teachers and administrators to effectively resist de-tracking. These local actors shared deep seated beliefs about intelligence, race, and merit, that made it very difficult for equity-minded educators to successfully integrate within schools. This scholarship finds that desegregation and de-tracking efforts encounter powerful local resistance.

Institutional Explanations for Liberal Reform Failure

Institutional perspectives assume that individual action, beliefs, and cognition are shaped by a range of social structures that make up modern life, including law, religion, family, and markets. Each of these recognized institutional spheres are comprised of regulatory elements that dictate the rules, normative elements that shape actor’s goals, and cognitive elements that provide the categories and identities that shape thought (Scott, 2001). These institutions work together to constrain and enable particular actions. Thus, institutional theorists posit that actors act in ways to maximize their legitimacy and decrease uncertainty, and in this way mimic and reproduce the institutional structures that surround them. Institutional theories have used these insights to explain the spread of dominant structures and forms through isomorphism, as well as the permanence of current arrangements.

Even when traditional legal strategies are enforced, scholars studying reforms of other large public institutions, have found that defendant organizations that find themselves having to reconcile the competing demands of law and the organization, symbolically comply, signaling legal compliance through the creation of legal processes and entities, while masking continued violations. These scholars have found that when legal actions result in only moderate or symbolic adjustments in practices, continuing systemic injustices are, in fact, legitimized and naturalized (Edelman, 2008; Edelman, 1992; Scheingold, 1974). For example, socio-legal scholars argue that in response to equal employment law and employment discrimination litigation, employers created symbolic compliance structures that rarely impacted the core of the organization’s discriminatory behavior. Symbolic compliance structures, like offices, trainings, and internal complaint procedures, signal legitimacy and compliance, but hide discriminatory practices (Bumiller, 1987; Edelman, Erlanger, & Lande, 1993; Edelman, 2008; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). These symbolic structures often mimic
legal processes and legally accepted solutions. Since courts only review those practices that result in legal challenge, most organizational constructions of law become institutionalized and legitimated within a field as compliance or acceptable non-compliance without any formal review. In this manner, organizational interpretations of law that mask discrimination become de facto law. Not only do these interpretations of legal compliance become institutionalized in practices, rules, and roles that may not actually address the challenged behavior, these practices, rules, and roles come to define what is right and lawful (Edelman, 2008).

Institutional theorists in education describe the durability of educational institutions and the taken-for-granted culture and routines in schools that make them impermeable to change (Tyack, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 2001). These theorists have studied the ways in which graded classrooms taught by a single teacher covering one recognized subject has persisted as the accepted organization of learning even as advocates have provided reasonable alternatives and mounted challenges against it. Tyack (1994) notes that these arrangements persist because at every level and through time, teachers have been expected to “monitor and control students, assign tasks to them, and ensure that they accomplish them,” (455). More recently, institutional theorists in education find that in response to equity reforms, teachers adopt from the policies they are enacting cognitive frameworks about who students are. These frameworks often stigmatize “low performing” students and deem them unworthy of additional supports (Anagnostopoulos, 2006).

Recent decades have been ripe with examples of significant changes to the core features of schooling that extend far beyond the symbolic compliance predicted by institutional theorists. New organizational forms of education, including charter schools, pilot schools, homeschooling, and on-line education have challenged the idea that institutional inertia stands between schools and change. Instead two decades of new standards, testing, accountability regimes, curricular change, and now the introduction of technology in learning have required considerable changes to the daily practice of teaching and learning (Atchinstein & Ogawa, 2006; Coburn, 2004).

**Political Interest Group Explanations for Liberal Reform Failure**

Political interest group perspectives blame shifts between liberal and conservative political tendencies and Democratic versus Republican Administrations for failures of equity reforms in education. Scholars taking the political interest group perspective in the law have illuminated the ways in which the conservative nature of the federal judiciary since the Warren Court has made equity reforms through the law difficult if not impossible. This scholarship explains that judges are often appointed by the other branches of government and thus lack independence, and elected officials can themselves override judicial decisions by legislative action. Initially, the Supreme Court’s vague order to pursue desegregation “with all deliberate speed” encouraged Southern resistance and justified snails-pace enforcement by federal courts (Wilkinson, 1978). Legal doctrine has since been construed by the Court to bar policies that address school segregation resulting from residential segregation, discriminatory housing policies, white flight, and school choice (Chemerinsky, 2003; Frankenberg & Le, 2008). Orfield (2001) argues, “There has been little or no positive
leadership on [desegregation] for a generation, however, from any branch of government, and the courts have moved from requiring desegregation to, in many cases pressing for the elimination of desegregation plans or even forbidding voluntary action that communities wish to undertake on their own,” (p. 11). Scholars argue that the rise of the Rehnquist Court, the appointment of numerous conservative federal judges during the Nixon and Reagan administrations, and the ways these justices and judges narrowed procedural rules and available remedies under civil rights law severely limited the role of courts in furthering racial justice in education (Chemerinsky, 2003; Orfield, 2001, 2014).

In contrast to political conflict theories that situate the failure of civil rights litigation on the change in Administration or political value differences, recent education reforms are better examples of political agreement than political disagreement. Most recent education reforms from No Child Left Behind to charter schools and the current school discipline reform have been bi-partisan projects supported by civil rights organizations, business leaders, and members of both Republican and Democratic parties.

### Critical Policy Analysis Framework

To better understand the function of contemporary state-led equity reforms in education and in particular ones that invoke civil rights requires a theoretical framework that takes into account the economic interests that undergird social policy, while recognizing that the economic interests don’t entirely determine the social and political arenas of activity. Scholars suggest that this sort of analysis requires not only an understanding of the objective economic conditions that all social actors are in some way shaped by, but requires research on the changing relationships among social forces or groupings, how these changing relations are reflected in political struggles in different arenas that strengthen particular tendencies and weaken others, and the ways in which these political struggles play out on an existing ideological terrain to constrain and enable what actors think and do (Gramsci, 1971, 1995; Hall, 1985). Theories that address these different levels of analysis follow.

To achieve this analysis requires what Ball (1994) has described as a “toolbox of diverse concepts and theories.” In order to examine the macro-level functioning of education, government, and the economy, the meso-level concerns of how these policies come to be, the micro-level analyses of mechanisms that explain the behaviors of socially embedded actors, and the distributional outcomes that result from these activities at every level, requires theoretical flexibility. Rather than the parsimony of the whole, understanding education policy requires both an understanding of the whole and more fine-grained theories for understanding the mechanisms at each level.

Traditional Marxist perspectives provide important insights into the relationship between economic conditions and state policies aimed at educational reform. From this perspective, state policies, whether a product of courts, legislatures, or enforcement agencies, are not the result of reasoned and disinterested decision making. Instead, state policies maintain conditions favorable to continued capital accumulation directly and indirectly. State policies such as property laws, trade agreements, tax formulas, military funding, and law enforcement directly protect and regulate dominant economic interests domestically and internationally.
Additionally, domestic state policies maintain conditions favorable to capital accumulation by managing and legitimizing inequality through social programs that ameliorate poverty and a public education system that provides a guise of meritocracy to explain unequal life outcomes (Bowles & Gintis, 1976).

This perspective also suggests that like every earlier era of capitalism, our current economic system is sustained by the exploitation of labor for profit by those who control the means of production (Anyon, 2011). Today, these are the owners of land, and corporations and firms that provide financial services, professional services, consumer goods, healthcare, education, law enforcement, incarceration, construction, and social services. Capitalism creates distinct social classes with opposing class interests - i.e., owners desiring lower costs and higher production and workers wanting higher wages and better working conditions. The middle class, who are employed to manage businesses or professional who “own” in some sense their skill by way of professional licensure have dual interests that at times align with or oppose the capitalist class. From this perspective, conflict in the social and political spheres are a result of these opposing class interests.

Finally, this perspective posits that historical progression can be understood as the process by which contradictions between the economic base and the political and cultural institutions that emerge and linger in each time period work themselves out. In other words, as the class that owns the old modes of production exhaust their ability to extract profits, new modes of production replace them leading to both the rise of particular segments of the lower classes as well as the fall of segments of the ruling classes. Today, this theme is illustrated in the abandoning of domestic manufacturing by those who can make higher profits abroad and the rise of a primarily retail and service industry in the United States (Harvey, 2005). These fundamental changes in the economy result in political conflict. During these times, political and social structures, such as the factory-like school erected in service of the old mode of production, appears antiquated and in need of reform. Scholars in this tradition provide important insights into the economic terrain on which the current education debates arise.

The Political Economy of Education Reform

The political economic perspective of education examines the fundamental influence of economics on the social and political dimensions of educational institutions. These scholars have returned to the basic idea that the primary concern of government - or the State - is maintaining the social and political conditions that support capital accumulation and economic and military dominance in the world (Anyon, 2011; Apple, 2006; Bowles & Gintis, 1976). This requires, among other things, a differentiated labor force that meets the needs of economic production, systems that hide, mitigate or legitimate the expected inequality that comes from exploiting labor, and ways of silencing or containing questions about the fairness of this system. Law and public education are both important institutions for meeting these needs.

Decades of scholarship have demonstrated that State-sponsored public schools as well as a system of private schools play a central role in sustaining the economic and political position
of the American ruling class and the social and racial stratification that are its necessary byproduct (Anyon, 1980; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Ladson-Billings, 1995, 2006; Lipman, 2011). Scholars also argue that civil rights have only ever been recognized and enforced when these interests converged with national interests to address domestic inequality during the Cold War and the interests of wealthier whites in industrializing the South (Bell, 1980; Guinier, 2004; Rosenberg, 1991). This scholarship contributes to a structural racial analysis and illuminates the ways in which institutions like law and education structure and support the continuance of racial subordination (Crenshaw, 1988). Thus, liberal reforms targeted at addressing achievement gaps by race and income fail because they are not meant to challenge the fundamental purpose of schools to reproduce social stratification and are unable to address the fundamental economic inequalities in society.

Scholars have found that school curriculum and pedagogy differ substantially based on the social class of students and prepare students with skills, dispositions, and understandings that meet the needs of economic production and the accumulation of profits (Anyon, 1980; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). Elite private prep schools provide the children of old and new wealth with the grit, competitive spirit, skills, loyalties, and networks to sustain and strengthen their continued leadership in the private and public sphere (Cookson & Persell, 2008), while middle class children in public schools learn to manage discrete tasks, and working class children are expected to learn to complete repetitive, rote tasks (Anyon, 1980; Lipman, 2002, 2007).

These findings persist in recent policy contexts as well. Researchers studying recent testing and accountability policies, found that schools serving working class students and students of color were more likely to narrow curriculum, increase rote learning, and prepare students for basic competency in low-wage jobs in manual labor and service sectors of the economy (Leonardo, 2007; Lipman, 2002). Through concepts of meritocracy, successful students exit the educational system believing that they earned their position in society and unsuccessful students believe that their lower status is due to personal failings - that they should have tried or worked harder (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu, 1990; Dumas, 2014). Moreover, research in curriculum studies provide ample evidence that the content of curriculum tend to legitimate and naturalize capitalism and liberal democracy, and ignore or diminish the costs associated with building and sustaining America as a world power - namely conquest, genocide, slavery, war, and labor exploitation.

Research in the sociology of education have illuminated the ways in which the institution of public education perpetuate race and income inequality not only through curriculum but through notions and practices of meritocracy, segregation, labeling, and expectations (Anyon, 1997; Bowles & Gintis, 1977; Brayboy, Castagno, & Maughan, 2007; Dumas, 2013; Ladson-Billings, 2006; Leonardo, 2009). Thus, schools have been “a site of black suffering,” (Dumas, 2014). While some have noted that the research on the relationship between social class and education slowed (Anyon, 2011) in the past two decades, social class - measured by parental education level and zip code - remains the greatest determinant of academic achievement (Equity and Excellence Commission Report, 2013).
From the political economic perspective education reform is the process by which schools are transformed to meet the needs of the new modes of production - requiring high-skilled managers to lead industries, professionals to provide financial, health, and business services, workers with basic academic skills and social skills for low-skilled work in the service and safety fields, prisoners for prisons, and a general consumer orientation in every field that sustains consumption and demand for products (Anyon, 1997; Apple, 2006; Lipman, 2002).

**Contemporary Neoliberal Reform**

Scholars have found that beginning in the mid 1970s, as anti-colonial movements in the global South and popular movements in the developed world secured compromises for a segment of the oppressed, the economic elite of the developed world experienced a decline in their ability to extract profits from their colonies or from their domestic workers. In an effort to restore the wealth of the economic elite, countries, and in particular the U.S. under Ronald Reagan and the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher, experimented with a wide array of economic policies that liberalized trade, deregulated domestic industry, drastically reduced corporate taxes, privatized public services (Harvey, 2005). In the United States, these shifts in public policy were matched with aggressive policing, the War on Drugs, and the growth of the largest penal system in human history (Alexander, 2010; Gilmore, 2007; Wacquant, 2001, 2010). These policies of deregulation, privatization, and control supplanted Keynesian economics, which emerged in response to the Great Depression, the previous crisis of capitalism. Under Keynesian economics, a stable social contract created a system whereby interest rate controls moderated private accumulation of wealth and government spending provided social safety nets and jobs.

Neoliberalism - or the amalgam of political justifications for the growth of an international capital class untethered to domestic concerns - has always also been a racial project. In the “Statement of Aims” of the Mont Pelerin Society, a society of distinguished economists, historians, and philosophers including Friedrick von Hayek and Milton Friedman, who have provided the intellectual engine for much of neoliberal thought (Harvey, 2005), the society states:

> The central values of civilization are in danger…The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own…. It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline in the belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to image a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved.

Threaded throughout this statement is a palpable concern about the rise of “minority” “creeds” and the threat to private property, the market, and freedom that these changes present for the “Western man”.

13
In the United States, civil rights legislation, laws, and enforcement opened the door for a small but growing class of privileged people of color in the US. As a result, Bell (1992) argues that privileged African Americans and their white allies “united in gratitude” and remained silent as to the alignment of dominant interests. While the policies resulted in more symbolic than substantive results for a majority of African Americans, the resulting compromise divided the working class as working class whites saw civil rights legislation, laws, and enforcement as an “unearned gift” to African Americans (Bell, 1992). Intellectual and political leaders in this era, as in every era, rely on racism to re-align and stabilize the social and political institutions of society (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Omi & Winant, 2014; Mills, 1997). Lopez (2014) illustrates how conservative political leaders over the past three decades used coded, and not so coded, racial appeals to government-dependent “welfare queens” and “reverse racist” affirmative action policies to generate broad-based support for shrinking government programs and deregulating markets - policies that hurt the middle class and enriched the wealthiest. An appeal to white superiority was used to paint the public “black” and the private “white,” and has so far successfully oiled the wheels of neoliberal ascension (Goldberg, 2009; Lipman, 2013). During this same time, demands for cultural and identity recognition eclipsed demands for the redistribution of material resources (Dumas, 2009; Fraser, 1995; Fraser & Honneth, 2003), further distancing the social justice politics of communities of color and working class whites.

Neoliberal economic policies resulted in the movement of manufacturing and other modes of production abroad, disinvestment in the domestic infrastructure including government, and the gutting of jobs that had supported the middle class in developed countries. Today, income inequalities are the highest since 1928 (Saez, 2013) and a report by the Economic Policy Institute (2015) found that the top 1% of California earns more than $438,000, and the range spans from $228,000 in Arkansas to $678,000 in Connecticut. This top 1% captured 53.9 percent of the total increase in U.S. Income between 1979 and 2007 (Economic Policy Institute, 2015). Meanwhile 14.5 percent of people lived below the poverty line in 2013, making less than $11,490 a year as a single adult or less than $23,550 for a family of four (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).

Public schools in this context continue to serve the needs of capital but as the needs of capital change, the terrain on which education policy debates are made have changed. Two shifts are underway. First, the kinds of workers needed to support continued capital accumulation has changed. Today’s U.S. economy follows a bimodal pattern - high-skilled high-tech jobs on one end and low-skilled jobs on the other (Lipman, 2002). In this light, the educational system sorts and prepares children in the U.S. today for either high-skilled labor, low-skilled labor, or their place outside of economic production, joining the American underclass in heavily policed and racially and economically segregated neighborhoods (Alexander, 2012; Wacquant, 2010). In fact, Blacker (2013) and Lipman (2013) argue that we see these politics of state abandonment already as school boards across the nation respond to “economic necessity” by closing schools in working class and poor African American communities in every major city.
Scholars argue that a significant purpose for government is to secure and open new markets, thus considerable privatization of public utilities, airlines, and healthcare occurred in the 1990s. The domestic public education market became a clear and obvious new frontier. The education sector is enormous, dwarfing most other domestic industries other than healthcare and retail/service. With 76 million students and 10 million employees, the number of people who spend a significant portion of their lives in an educational building make up 27% of the total U.S. population (Picciano & Spring, 2013). In 2010, funding to education was more than $1.1 trillion dollars, 7.5% of U.S.'s Gross Domestic Product, and approximately the size of the entire Mexican economy. Rupert Murdoch, the chairman and CEO of the world's second largest media conglomerate with News Corp and Fox News, joined Jeb Bush in an education summit in 2011 explaining that the American education sector is a "$500 billion market that's largely been untapped," (Mother Jones, 2011).

Viewing the public education system as a market increased three recognized areas of commercial activity in public education - selling to schools (vending), selling in schools (advertising), and selling of schools (privatization through charter schools and charter management) (Ball & Youdell, 2008; Molnar, 2006; Picciano & Spring, 2013). Years of growing income inequality, increased racial and income segregation, and disinvestment in public institutions, created concentrated need and resource-strapped public schools in urban school districts across the country (Anyon, 1997; Kozol, 2012; Lipman, 2013; Orfield, 2014). These conditions rendered public schools, especially those serving predominately low-income communities of color, susceptible to privatizing pressures.

Scholars have demonstrated that education policy makers with the support of business roundtables and venture philanthropy created policies that further opened public education up to private interests (Ball, 2009; Lipman, 2013; Picciano & Spring, 2013). While, private giving to schools and education has always existed, the 1990s represented an era where philanthropies began to strategically fund particular social reforms, serving their parent organization’s financial interests in the process (Picciano & Spring, 2013; Saltman, 2010). Since the 1990s, venture philanthropies like Gates, Walton, and Broad, have committed themselves to remaking public education, particularly urban schools, in their own image, advocating for market-based competitive pressures to drive educational improvements, efficiency and cost-cutting practices in organizations, and a idolization of top-down innovation and change in urban schools (Hess, 2003; Saltman, 2009). A well-known example is the Gates Foundation’s $2 billion dollars of funding for small schools, which spurred the growth of charter schools (Gates, 2009). Today, hundreds of private foundations spend nearly $4 billion dollars a year to fund school reform efforts, primarily in urban school districts like Green Grove that serve low-income students of color. This increase in venture philanthropic giving to public education reform initiatives has created an environment in which “Grants from either public or private sources are part of the administrative culture for funding new programs” (Picciano & Spring, 2013, p. 123).

Often these same organizations have invoked civil rights rhetoric to push reforms (Scott, 2013). These policies have resulted in the proliferation of charter schools and a growing market of education product and services targeted at communities of color. For example, high-stakes accountability under No Child Left Behind, deemed many of Chicago's schools failing, providing the platform for a public-private partnership in Chicago dubbed the Commercial Club to institute school choice (Lipman & Hursh, 2007). In the years that
followed, one in eight neighborhood schools were closed and converted to charter or contract schools. As high-stakes accountability policies provided justification for closing and converting schools serving low-income communities of color, recent accountability policies have also vastly increased profits for curriculum publishers and testing companies. Pearson’s reported profits skyrocketed from $694.19 million dollars to $1.32 billion dollars between 1999 and 2010 (calculated in 2011 dollars), which equals almost a doubling of profits after accounting for inflation. The percentage of Pearson’s profits made in the education sector increased from 35% in 1999 to 81% in 2010. Smith (2013) notes that the Bill Gates, Eli Broad, and members of the Walton Family, "who have benefitted most from the impoverishment of an ever-growing proportion of the U.S. population… now present themselves as benefactors of the poor," (p.62).

Along with concerns that many contemporary school reforms in the name of racial equity have led to the commercialization and privatization of schools, scholars have found that a network of what have been called, “shadow elites” have disproportional influence in education policy making (Ball & Junneman, 2012; Spring, 2014). This shadow elite has considerable resources and works in and out of government to create education policies that may “do good”, but also simultaneously enrich their companies and parent companies (Picciano & Spring, 2013). This scholarship details the growing involvement of foundations, business coalitions, non-profit advocacy organizations, privately and publicly funded think tanks, and media corporations in the field of education policymaking, representing an unprecedented expansion of actors and an increasing influence of private interests (Apple, 2006; Ball, 2009; Ball & Youdell, 2008; Debray, Scott, Lubienski, Jabbar, 2014; Picciano & Spring, 2013; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). Concurrently studies demonstrate that these policies have spurred the growth of a non-profit and for-profit education reform sector that provide a slew of management services to schools ranging from teacher-proof curriculum guides, to leadership coaching, teacher trainings, consultation, and systems reform (Boyles, 2004; Picciano & Spring, 2013).

Finally, I argue that an area that has received less attention is the expansion of domestic industries like clinical school psychology, law enforcement, and education reform into education. These trends are not disconnected from the same economic restructuring that has driven other aspects of neoliberal education reform. The loss of domestic industries and the shrinkage of the welfare state created pressures for professionals - social workers, psychologists, public health workers, police officers, and others - to find stable employment. Public education, as one of the largest domestic industries, becomes an important new market for these professional services.

The existing empirical research on neoliberalism that relies on a traditional Marxist analysis provides important evidence of the economic conditions that have spurred much of contemporary education policy and the presence of an elite network of wealthy well-connected individuals who have shaped public education in unprecedented ways. The literature has tended to focus on the imposition of big business interests on the educational system and misses civil society and their role in these processes. Less is understood about the broader social and political forces that have supported these changes at the various levels of the public education system and how the new policies have obtained the support and
consent of the different sectors of society including a majority of educators. For example, education policy during this time might be expected to have just mirrored freedom of choice and efficiency arguments used to deregulate and privatize in the name of market freedom. Yet, the education policy most in line with this vision - vouchers - failed to muster enough support. Instead accountability and charters have grown and school discipline reform has gained national attention.

How do we explain how neoliberal theory, which ostensibly concentrates wealth in the hands of a small class of people who are not by and large represented in education, comes to permeate all aspects of the educational enterprise, even when this enterprise does not seem to directly benefit? Developments in critical theory that have focused on how ideological and institutional structures function to stabilize and order civil society to meet the needs of capitalism provide theories for analyzing these processes. Understood from these perspectives, neoliberal education reforms are more than the product of a elite network of wealthy businessmen, philanthropists, and politicians, or the spread of market logics to increasingly more sectors of civil society. The drivers of neoliberal reforms must be understood in the context of the every day work of a majority of Americans.

Theories of Civil Society - Social Fields & Ideology

While the theories above provide a way of thinking about the primacy of the economic context to education policy, Bourdieu and Gramsci provide theories for understanding the ways that economic conditions provide the terrain for political struggles but does not entirely determine them. Economic crisis create political moments in which new social alliances and formations attempt to remake political structures like schools into entities that serve the newer modes of production. However, theory suggests that these contradictions are never resolved entirely with one side winning out and the other disappearing. Instead, these contradictions continue to exist in the political and cultural institutions providing material resources for continued struggle. By studying the changing relationships among social forces or groupings at this historic moment and how these changing relations are reflected in political struggles in different arenas that strengthen particular tendencies and weaken others, the research provides not only a better understand of the current context but the research suggests places of least resistance to combat these changes.

Fields of power and sites of education policy creation. Bourdieu writing in a period of time where there was not large-scale upheaval explains the role of social fields in hiding larger economic contradictions behind the political conflicts within and among professions/social fields. In Wacquant's (1993) "From Ruling Class to Field of Power," Loic Wacquant explores the concept of fields and its ability to provide a more nuanced and contemporary understanding of class and class conflict through an interview with Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu explains that in advanced capitalist societies power is exercised within a system or network of positions that are "occupied by holders of the diverse forms of capital which circulate in the relatively autonomous fields" (p. 20). He explains that this conception of a "field of power" represents a break from Marxist theories about the ruling class as well as a break from liberal theories of political or economic elites. Bourdieu criticizes both Marxist and liberal conceptions of power for their understanding of power as wielded by a
population of individuals rather than structures. This point is made clear by imagining what would happen in a society where the ruling class or elites all died or disappeared one day. Without anything more fundamentally changing, it is easy to guess that a new ruling class or elite would rise to take its place rather quickly, filling the same positions and roles left by their predecessors.

Bourdieu's theory of semi-autonomous fields (1977) suggests that fields are sites of contestation between differentially resourced actors for relative position or dominance in the field (Bourdieu, 1977). Fields have an internal order and hierarchy that allow for considerable competition between actors and the possibility of rising and falling in relative stature. Yet, the existence of multiple fields and a shared agreement about how different forms of capital - whether cultural, social, or economic capital - stand in relative power to one another, allow power to be "shared." For example, Bourdieu explains that a stable advanced capitalist society requires that intellectuals, who hold varying degrees of cultural and social capital, can struggle with one another over the dominance of particular disciplines or perspectives of the world, but must accept their place as intellectuals vis-a-vis managers, the holders of economic capital. Thus, a system of differences divides the work of domination across multiple fields. Multiple winners can win simultaneously and a number of losers can still see that winning is within their reach. Their struggle against one another is contained within their field and the disruptive impact on other fields and the structure as a whole is muffled. Bourdieu (Wacquant, 1993) explains, “The existence of a plurality of partially independent principles of hierarchization sets a de facto limit to the struggle of all against all among the dominant…. The division of labour of domination being accomplished within and through the conflict which links them,” (p. 25-26).

Field theory and sites of education policy implementation. While Bourdieu speaks mainly about the ways in which the structure of these fields shape action and understanding among the highest echelons of power (Burawoy, 2012), other theorists extend these theories to all arenas of social activity (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Thus, in advanced capitalist societies like the U.S., a complex web of interlocking and nested fields distinguish corporate, public service, artistic, and intellectual fields from one another by the dominant capital in circulation, but also within each field there are other field divisions based on professions like law, health, education, police, etc. Ever smaller fields further subdivide actors, for example, based on geographic regions, organizations, and subdivisions within organizations. Within a field – such as the legal or educational fields – particular roles, goals, and acceptable practices govern, so that those who participate in the field recognize and largely “play by the rules” of their respective fields even as they challenge their position within it (Bourdieu, 1986, 1977). Within the field of education, there will also be nested fields that compete with one another, like the relationship between federal and state departments of educations, or the relationship between antagonistic roles like administrators and teachers, or between profession like teachers and school psychologists. Within each field, the stakes and the rules of the game are clear to everyone in the field, and individuals who play in multiple fields, understand and adjust their game depending on what field they are in.

Bourdieu explains that the rules of the game are neither natural nor neutral. They are the outcomes of previous struggles within the field and reflect the compromise interests of the
These dominant ideas and practices tend to constrain what embedded social actors believe is possible and appropriate in any given situation, leading to the stability of the field (Bourdieu, 1977; Wacquant, 1993). Just as the conservative nature of the game in each field secures stability within the field, the relationship between neighboring fields secures the stability of the entire structure. While other theorists emphasize that change does occur, both through incremental adjustments as actors jockey for relative position during stable times, and through opportunities for more significant change opened up when fields collide (Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Lawrence, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002). Bourdieu explains that these struggles within the field of power in advanced capitalist societies often contribute to the overall stability of the power structure (Wacquant, 1993). He says, “there is a proliferation of the agents who contribute, often unwittingly, to the work of legitimation, but only by taking their ‘cut’ of the profits, by seeking to divert to their advantage whatever quantum of power they capture, that is, by engaging in ‘palace struggles,’” (36). Within this proliferation of agents, Bourdieu names in particular the “bureaucrat, the businessman, the journalist, the professor, the bishop, the media consultant, the lawyer, the artist” (36).

**Ideology.** In addition to the ways that social relationships are ordered through semi-autonomous social fields, ideology - or the ideas that are produced and reproduced as actors make meaning of the world from their location within it - also enable and constrain thought and practice (Althusser, 1969, 1971; Hall, 1985). Rejecting conceptions of ideology as "false consciousness" or necessarily corresponding to a unitary class interest, I follow scholars who reclaim the concept of ideology as a useful and productive guide to empirically studying the connection between ideas, attitudes, and beliefs, and economic and political interests (Hall, 1985; Hunt, 1985). From this perspective, ideologies in modern societies arise from one’s relationship with production, as well as from other social and cultural institutions such as family, religion, and professions (Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu, 1986; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992). Ideologies are built from the traces of previous ideas and actors actively combine, change, and recombine ideas into new ideological formations (Hall, 1985). It is through these ideological formations that capitalism stabilizes itself through civil society as the dominant social forces secure the consent of subordinate groups through concessions and compromises (Gramsci, 1971 (Butchart, 1995)).

One of Western society's more prominent ideological structures is law, providing legitimation and reproduction of prevailing social relations (Bourdieu, 1986; Hunt, 1985). Bourdieu (1986) describes the reproduction of dominant interests through logics of law to which all within the legal field are professional trained in and must tacitly accept. These legal ideologies include universalism, or the value and practice of universal solutions that give little room for individual variation; neutral and logical deduction, or the finding of solutions within the limits of what already exists in law; legal competence and expertise that is distinct from a lay person’s common sense usage of terms or sense of justice; and adversarialism.

Unlike examining social processes solely through the lens of how actors behave as a product of their social location, examining ideologies allows us to also focus on the realm of ideas and how social actors in different locations and different times, draw on, combine, and redefine goals, identities, and interests, to bring social fields closer together or push them further apart. I utilize these conceptions of ideology to examine the economic and political
interests involved in defining school discipline and advocating reform. I also utilize ideology to examine the ways in which the ideology of law impacts implementation processes.

A Brief History of School Discipline

School discipline has been a field of struggle. In every historical era, different economic conditions and the political contradictions they created have played themselves out in debates over the purpose and appropriate mechanism of achieving school discipline. The historical account of school discipline has been explored elsewhere in more detail (Butchart, 1995; Butchart & McEwan, 1998; Kafka, 2011; Lisse, 2015). I briefly recount key themes of that history here, and argue that dominant, competing, and recombining ideologies of school discipline, like education more broadly, have largely shifted in response to economic and political conditions far beyond the walls of schools and administrative buildings. Thus, in identifying the ideologies of school discipline, their shift over time, and the diverse interests (sometimes political, sometimes professional) that have championed these ideologies, I provide context for understanding the contemporary solutions that are debated and practiced today.

Scholars note that while democratic and social control purposes of school discipline have competed with one another in the theoretical realm in each historical time period, school discipline for social control has dominated in practice. Scholars have also found that the authority to which students are subjected to and the mechanisms of control have changed over time. These changes largely trace the dominant economic forces in each time period.

Submission to Patriarchal Authority During Pre-Industrial Era

During the nation building years from the one-room schoolhouses of the American Revolution to the proliferation of common schools, prominent American leaders debated the appropriate purpose of school and school discipline. While some political leaders believed that schools needed to teach respect for authority and Protestant ethics to maintain social order in the young nation, others emphasized the importance of teaching the knowledge, skills, and character required to maintain a democracy (Kafka, 2011; Tyack, 1974). In practice, teaching students respect for authority - understood to be face-to-face relationships between headmasters and students - dominated (Butchart, 1995). The respect for authority and Protestant ethics fit well with the economic structure of the time, in which 80 percent of free men were independent property owners or professionals (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). Young people were expected to respect and work hard for prominent adults in their lives, whether they were parents, community leaders, or master craftsman under whose tutelage they would develop.

As America began to industrialize in the mid 1800s, a majority of free men became workers and as they relocated for jobs, tight-knit families, communities, and religious affinities weakened (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). Educational leaders promised that common schools would fill the void left by the declining influence of family and church over the discipline of the young. The common schools would stand in loco parentis, or in place of a parent, to teach children patriotism, obedience, chastity, cleanliness, temperance, and hard work (Tyack 1974;
Many civic leaders of this period warned that poor and immigrant children especially lacked discipline. In these common schools, spanking, paddling, and other corporal punishments were commonplace and accepted as part and parcel of the “conferred parental authority” placed upon teachers and school administrators (Kafka, 2011).

Aligned with the economic needs of slavery, enslaved African Americans were not included in the common schools movement because slaveholders believed that literacy incited and aided slave revolts and threatened both their profits and way of life. Common practice and laws prohibited the education of enslaved African Americans, punishing those who sought to read and write as well as their teachers (Anderson, 1988).

Submission to Behavioral Management During the Industrial Revolution

In the north, the Industrial Revolution replaced family farms with agri-business, and craft shops with large factories (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). Industrialization brought more than 15 million immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, Asia, and Mexico, and more than 1.6 million African Americans from the rural South to urban centers in the northern and western United States. Compulsory school laws required all children to attend school ballooning enrollment, and schools were expected to prepare all children to be productive in the new industrial economy (Tyack, 1974). In addition schools were responsible for “Americanizing” their diverse student bodies, and preventing juvenile delinquency and other anti-social behaviors that increasingly concerned the public. For Native American children, the forced assimilation purpose of school discipline was unmistakable (Adams, 1995; Anderson, 1988). Strict discipline and obedience in mission schools and government boarding schools stripped Native American children of their culture, language, and history (Adams, 1995).

The earliest reform in this era that spread across urban centers was the Lancaster Method (Butchart, 1995; Kafka, 2011). In this method, advanced students were responsible for monitoring their peers through an elaborate system of prizes, recognition, and promotion to monitor-status. Students within classes competed against one another and classes competed against other classes, creating an educational environment whereby submission to a patriarchal authority was replaced by submission to competition, surveillance by peers, and rewards.

While the Lancaster method lost influence in the second half of the 1800s, Progressive Era educators, active from the late 1800s to the 1930s, organized schools to reflect what they believed to be the efficient and scientific functioning of factories of the day, institutionalizing much of what we accept as the grammar of schooling today — bell schedules, age-graded classrooms, 50-minute class periods, the Carnegie Unit, and classifying and sorting students by ability and character (Tyack & Tobin, 1994). Success in schools would then translate into success in the modern industrial society. The Progressive Era also brought increasing bureaucratization to schools and school districts, including instituting the principal as a mid-level manager supervised by a centralized school district, and a growing number of departments and subunits responsible for measuring and treating the learning and behavioral difficulties of those children who did not fit the norm (Osgood, 2008; Winzer, 2007).
Increasingly, poor and non-white students were disproportionately labeled and placed into segregated classrooms and in schools where their behavioral issues could be managed by professional experts. The social control purpose of school discipline continued to dominate the Progressive Era with some notable shifts. Corporal punishment remained legal in most states and methods of control continued to dominate disciplinary practices in schools even as therapeutic intervention frames began to take hold in scholarly and professional discussions (Kafka, 2011). Teaching discipline for the purpose of social control in this era focused on some similar qualities stressed in the previous century, such as obedience to authority and hard work, but also stressed new ones like punctuality and silence that prepared children for their place in factory production (Kafka, 2011). Schools implemented strict routines like bells, lines, and proper posture during recitation of class material.

With increasing bureaucratization and the rise of administration science, the source of disciplinary control shifted from the idiosyncratic rules of individual teachers to more bureaucratized systems administered by principals and other technical experts that comprised the dominant education managers of this era (Winzer, 2007). These growing education managers proposed that misbehaving students could comply with school rules if given the proper treatment, guidance, or counseling (Kafka, 2011). Schools began to test, diagnose, and isolate troublesome students for treatment (Osgood, 2008; Tyack, 1974). While the segregation of students was characterized as a way of providing additional support to these students, teachers and principals often viewed these segregated educational spaces as dumping grounds for unwanted students. Poor, immigrant, and African American students were disproportionally labeled and isolated. Kafka also notes that while Progressive Era educational leaders believed that teaching discipline and maintaining order were the necessary pre-conditions for learning content and skills for mainstream students, they often advocated for explicit character teaching as a means and an end for African American students who they believed lacked positive character traits and had limited employment opportunities (Kafka, 2011).

In addition to shifting the locus of authority from educators to administrators, the shift to “Behavioral Management” also led to the exponential growth of non-academic professionals in schools such as counselors, psychologists, and psychiatrists who were needed to provide the proper diagnosis and treatment for behaviorally and cognitively abnormal children (Osgood, 2008; Winzer, 2007). School psychology as an academic and scientific discipline began during this era (Slater, 1980) and schools and school districts expanded their bureaucratic structures to include new positions and departments responsible for the social and emotional well-being of students (Kafka, 2011). While “Behavioral Management” provided treatment as an alternative to punishment, its primary objective remained social control. Proponents of this frame viewed misbehavior as an individual dysfunction, which required adjustment towards acceptable social norms.

**Progressive Education Challenged Ideologies of Social Control**

In a different model that gained increasing influence in the 1830s, powerful challengers including prominent educational leader Horace Mann, advocated for what Kafka (2011) calls Discipline Through Affection and Reason. These educational leaders opposed the use of
punishment and fear to elicit obedience as well as the use of individualized rewards and competition to encourage good behavior. They believed that if teachers fostered emotional bonds with students, developed a genuine appreciation for the subject in their students, and taught students to reason through the consequences of their actions, students would choose to behave properly out of respect for the teacher and themselves. While order in the classroom was still important to these educational leaders, developing the capacity for self-government and self-control were essential.

Challengers to the dominant social control purpose of education continued to advocate for a democratic purpose for schools and school discipline. Drawing on the importance of public education in sustaining a healthy democracy, these educational leaders including John Dewey and William Bagley, believed that order was important but teachers needed to demonstrate that the disciplinary practices he/she utilized were “dictated, not by the whims of those in authority, but by the necessities of the work that is undertaken and by the welfare and needs of the social group,” (quoted in Kafka, 2011, p. 36). In other words, these educational leaders advocated for discipline for a democratic purpose and through a democratic means. Similar to their counterparts in an earlier era, these educators also emphasized the importance of building teacher-student relationships and teaching in ways that built upon the curiosity and interest of the students. However, Kafka (2011) notes that there is little historical evidence that these practices became widespread in the Progressive Era. Instead, many vocational programs and “life adjustment” programs that taught life skills in schools became some of the more notable outcomes of this educational movement.

**International Competition and the Remaking of Education for Global Domination**

The world wars and the beginning of the Cold War heightened public concerns over American competitiveness on the world stage, increasing the traditional tension between the democratic purpose and social order purpose of school discipline. During this time, the public concern about sustaining a democracy was less about the skills that schools should teach to prepare democratic citizens and more about the threat to national security and preserving American Democracy as the natural counterweight to communism (Hartman, 2011).

The purpose of schooling became more narrowly focused on academic achievement, and school discipline became a means for sorting, removing, and fixing those children that were not meeting academic standards. The educative purpose of discipline waned in importance. Progressive education, which emphasized the democratic purposes of education as well as the importance of developing social and emotional skills, came under attack as being too soft for preparing Americans to combat Soviet Russia and for teaching anti-American values. These programs were replaced by initiatives targeted at advancing science, mathematics, and language achievement, teachers were required to take oaths of loyalty, and many teachers were fired or quit (Hartman, 2011; Kafka, 2011).

During the Cold War years, schools were blamed for not only failing to prepare children to compete academically and intellectually with their Soviet counterparts, they were blamed for the perceived breakdown in discipline and the larger crisis of juvenile delinquency. Kafka
(2011) notes, that concerns about juvenile delinquency, “along with the rising prominence of the therapeutic professions in the United States more generally, led to the rapid expansion of school guidance, counseling, and psychology departments in the postwar era,” (p. 49). School psychologists, alongside teachers and community members, advocated vigorously for more segregated schools and classrooms dedicated to the treatment of misbehaving students and for more centralized disciplinary policies that took the responsibility and onus of disciplinary decisions away from teachers (Kafka, 2011). As discipline became steadily more centralized, bureaucratized, and medicalized the role of the teacher became increasingly focused on academic content delivery leaving little room for the student-centered instruction and social and emotional development proposed by proponents of the democratic purpose of schools and school discipline.

The Civil Rights and Student Rights Movements - Bringing in the Lawyers

While school discipline in previous eras was shaped by schools’ responses to industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and war, schools in the 1960s and 1970s responded to these larger political and economic forces indirectly perhaps, but more directly responded to the widespread social and political unrest at their gates. Through the civil rights, free speech, and anti-war movements an entire generation of youth became politicized, questioning the authority and fairness of a myriad of social institutions, including public schools. In many urban centers, parents, students, and activists organized sit-ins, walk-outs, and demonstrations advocating for more democratically controlled schools and more democratic school disciplinary practices, raising grievances ranging from discriminatory exercises of discipline, to unequal resources, lack of inclusive curriculum, lack of teachers and principals of color, and increased community control over schools (Kafka, 2011; Perlstein, 2004). In response, a majority of teachers unions and other outspoken educators sided against parents, students, and activists, demanding that school district leaders and school boards discipline protestors and increase the presence of police and security officers in schools to maintain order (Kafka, 2011). These police and security officers were employed and supervised by the school district, thus were often not integrated into the school community or accountable to the principals, teachers, students or staff.

While protestors demanded more democratic control over schools and school discipline, principals, teachers, and community members demanded harsher disciplinary policies. Even as teachers and principals were pushing for more criminal justice oriented forms of school discipline including centralized discipline policies and school police, public interest lawyers were advocating through the courts for students constitutional rights in schools and the constitutional requirement of due process in school disciplinary actions (Arum & Preiss, 2009). These public interest lawyers built upon the litigation strategies of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund to create precedent through appellate court decisions. Many of these public interest lawyers were funded through new federal agencies such as the Office of Economic Opportunity, which provided funding for legal service programs. These and other federal programs arose from legislative concessions to civil unrest, and contributed to the surge of school discipline related litigation in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Arum & Preiss, 2009).
During this era, two distinct forces - educators advocating for increased law and order and lawyers advocating for increased student rights - gave birth to an increasing role of lawyers in school disciplinary processes. While attempting to protect students’ rights in school and to combat the suppression of dissident voices, these advocacy efforts also increased the sense that educational benefits were a property right held by the student. Thus, any disciplinary action (i.e., suspension or expulsion) taken by teachers or principals that deprived students of the benefits of an education required an adversarial hearing before a neutral arbiter. Moreover, the neutral arbiter was a department within the central district bureaucracy.

The increasing influence of law on school discipline fed the growing bureaucratization and centralization of school education. However, the legal standard articulated in case law ensured that the social control purpose of school discipline would trump any student rights recognized under law. Schools can forbid and punish conduct that would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." In this way, educators and civil rights lawyers, working independently of one another but in response to the same social unrest, began the legalization of school discipline. These actions further transferred responsibility for school discipline away from teachers to the criminal justice system and the district bureaucracy. In addition, these actions further eroded trust and partnership between the mostly white teaching force and the communities of color they served.

Rise of the Prison Industry and the Zero Tolerance Era - Police Push Into Schools

Scholars document the rise of the American prison industry between the 1970s and 1990s, attributing the growth to at least three interrelated economic and political factors. First, the movement of industries abroad, the loss of domestic jobs, and the neoliberal policy shift away from government spending to ameliorate economic crises, created the profit-driven motive for building and populating prisons (Gilmore, 2007; Wacquant 2010). Second, the rise of social insecurity among whites, a result of the lowered living standards of American workers and the loosening of racial hierarchies, created the political motives for Reagan-Era drug laws to re-create Jim Crow through the penal system (Alexander, 2010; Wacquant, 2001). Third, the movement of capital abroad, and legacies of segregationist social policies left low-income African American communities trapped in de-funded urban ghettos, driving some of its residents to drug use and sale (Alexander, 2010; Wacquant, 2001). As a result, the number of people imprisoned rose from 300,000 to more than 2 million between 1980 and 2000, and more than 7 million people were imprisoned, on probation, or on parole in 2007 (Alexander, 2010).

As a part of these trends, public concern in the 1980s turned to youth violence, crime, illicit drug use, and gangs in urban schools (Kafka, 2011). In 1975, a Senate subcommittee on juvenile delinquency released a report titled, "Our Nation's Schools - A Report Card: 'A' in School Violence and Vandalism," warning that "Schools are experiencing serious crime of felonious nature including brutal assaults on teachers and students" (Quoted in Kafka, 2011). The two largest teachers unions, the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) contributed to these rising concerns by regularly publicizing school disorder during this time. In response, urban school boards passed "get
tough" policies that mandated stringent punishments for weapon and drug violations, increased police presence on and around campuses, and significantly enlarged their school security forces (Kafka, 2011).

As a result, school policing also became the fastest growing field of law enforcement (Hirschfield, 2008), and a sizable professional organizing force. Seed money provided through the U.S. Department of Education's Safe and Drug Free Schools Program and the Department of Justice's Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program provided incentives for school districts to hire more School Resource Officers (SROs) (Congressional Research Office, 2013 [CRS Report]). These federal programs provided grants to school districts to launch and grow SRO programs, and a number of federal grants required the presence of SROs as a prerequisite for funding (Na & Gottfredson, 2013). While a 2005 national survey of school principals and law enforcement agencies found that a majority of school principals reported that they did not believe their schools would benefit from an SRO and a quarter of school principals reported national media attention on school violence as the primary reason for starting an SRO program (CRS Report, 2013), the number of SROs grew from 9400 to 14,337 between 1997 and 2003 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000, 2006). These statistics may undercount the number of actual security personnel on school campuses since they do not count the number of district-employed or contracted security personnel who are not uniformed police, or the officers employed by the number of school police departments that have sprung up in many urban districts. In 2007, 69% of secondary school students reported the presence of security or police officers in their schools (National Crime Victimization Survey, 2008). Similar to other professions, school police now have their own national advocacy organization whose mission is to expand the influence of school police in schools and in education policy.

The steadily increasing trend of using crime control technology, personnel, and procedures in schools continued through the 1980s, especially in schools serving children of color (Hirschfield, 2008). This era marked the temporary decline of therapeutic solutions to school discipline and the dominance of criminalization, shifting the locus of authority from education administrators and school psychologists to juvenile courts, police departments, and criminal justice lawyers. Legal processes that were meant to provide due process rights for students came to mimic the "tough on crime" elements of the criminal justice system and by and large sided against students and with the interest of school districts in maintaining order (Arum, 2009; Tyack & Benavot, 1985; Lupini & Zirkel, 2003). In addition, some scholars argue that the recognition of due process rights weakened the moral authority of educators and increased student misbehavior in schools (Arum, 2009).

In the early 1990s, several high-profile school shootings heightened public concern over school violence and led Congress to pass the Guns Free School Act of 1994, which established federal zero tolerance policies (Noguera, 1995; Skiba et al., 2002; Verdugo, 2002). These zero tolerance policies mandated severe consequences, including suspension and expulsion, for a range of misbehaviors, stating school safety as the primary purpose. Concurrently, the standards-based accountability movement increased pressures on schools to show academic progress, creating incentives for some teachers and school administrators to suspend and expel students deemed disruptive to the learning environment and who
incidentally also tended to have lower test scores (Figlio, 2006). These zero tolerance and standards-based accountability pressures fell disproportionately on schools with the highest percentages of children of color (Gregory, Skiba, & Noguera, 2010; Noguera, 1995, 2003; Welch & Allison Ann Payne, 2010), thus contributing to both the overall increase in suspensions and increasing racial disproportionality. Since the early 1970s, the national suspension rate had more than doubled, rising from 3.7% of students in 1973 to 7.4% in the latest 2009-2010 data (Dillon, 2010; Losen & Gillespie, 2012). During the same time that overall suspension rates were doubling, the racial gap in suspensions rates between African American and white students more than tripled, increasing from 3 percentage points to over 10 (Losen, 2011).

School psychology organizations, during this time, also advocated for a range of treatment and prevention programs to address school violence. Congress funded the Department of Education’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health services Administration (SAMHSA) to supervise the Safe Schools Healthy Students Initiative that funded over 350 school districts in 49 states over 10 years to make schools safer through developing interagency collaborations between schools, law enforcement, and mental health. During this same period, the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) created the National Technical Assistance Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), primarily to support the behavioral modification of students with disabilities.

**Conclusion**

As we can see from this history, social control and democratic purposes of school discipline have existed through time, even as social control has predominated in practice. Moreover, the contestation between different means of social control - whether patriarchal authority in pre-industrial times, bureaucratized and professionalized behavioral management in industrial times, or policing and criminalization during the current era - reflect the relative dominance of economic and political forces in a given time period. From this recounting, we see that key ideological components of what we call Zero Tolerance policies existed long before the passage of the Guns Free Schools Act. Similarly, the ideological antecedents to many of the advocated alternatives to Zero Tolerance have existed long before the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. These competing ideologies of school discipline linger in our institutions and social consciousness, and thus emerge in the ideological struggle over the future.
Chapter 2
Methods

This study utilized social network visualization and an in-depth qualitative case study method to analyze the creation and implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative as a case of contemporary education reform that invoked civil rights ideals and activities. While not approaching the depth of ethnographic field work typical of the extended case method (Burawoy, 1998), this study was guided by the reflexive approach of the extended case method, which explores the meaning and actions in local settings as they are shaped and shaping larger economic and political forces. Drawing on this approach, I engaged in two levels of analysis: one involving two-years of participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and artifact gathering in an urban school district implementing the Initiative; a second involving a social network analysis of the social forces that created school discipline as a national education policy priority and shaped the implementation of school discipline reforms at the local level. Integrating both levels of analysis provided an opportunity to better understand the interactions within the school district as well as their relationship to the social forces involved in school discipline reform and the economic and political context.

The case was selected for its potential to challenge and elaborate on existing theory (Burawoy, 1998). This case challenged existing liberal legal theories of education reform that tended to describe policy creation as a process of political compromise or collaboration that is thwarted at the implementation stage by educator resistance and ineptitude. This study does so by analyzing the rise of a major contemporary education reform that garnered wide political support from both racial justice advocates and conservative think tanks and by analyzing the social process of implementation by school district administrators who were both committed and capable. Not only did these conditions provide an interesting contrast to existing theories, studying this reform as it unfolded provided a unique opportunity to study the social forces that emerged to direct education reform and their relationship to one another. Scholars suggest that these social orders tend to reveal themselves in response to rupture and conflict (Burawoy, 1998; Seo & Creed, 2002).

Consistent with the extended case method, the school district level of this study explored the intricacies of social meaning making and action in a particular social setting but contextualized by external social forces. Thus, the study involved extensive participant observations and interviews conducted over two years in an urban school district undergoing reform. This data provided rich information for uncovering local understanding and usage of school discipline, civil rights, racial inequality, and education reform, as well as the material conditions - i.e., bureaucratic, hierarchical, and resource limitations - that constrained local actors. Yet, explanations of social processes at the local level would be incomplete without an analysis of their relationship with larger economic and political forces. Thus, the study included an analysis at the national level of the social forces that created the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. In dialectical fashion, the national analysis of social forces enriched the findings of the district case study to provide a more coherent explanation for the outcomes. The national level analysis of social forces utilized social network analysis of collaboration networks described in policy advocacy reports and national conferences and qualitative coding of these materials to analyze and visualize the organizations and
organizational clusters involved in the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, their relationships with one another, their ideological commitments, and the changes in these ideological commitments over time.

Finally, the findings of this study emerged through the dialectical relationship between theory and data that is at the heart of the extended case method. Theories of institutional change and maintenance first guided this study’s exploration of the social processes involved in the implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in the school district. However, institutional theories alone did not help to situate the local case within the current political and economic context - one characterized by rapid transformation of educational institutions. Educational research on neoliberalism, heavily influenced by Marxist theory, provided some insights into the changing role of education within a shifting domestic economy. Yet, the focus of this study on the everyday interpretations and actions of educators and administrators elaborated the mechanisms of neoliberal transformation of public education.

The Case

In 2010, speaking in Selma, Alabama during a commemoration of one of the bloodiest instances of state repression of the Civil Rights Movement, the U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan promised a new era of civil rights enforcement in education and increased monitoring of racial disparities in school disciplinary practices. Later on that year, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice, began a joint initiative titled the “Supportive School Discipline Initiative” targeted at “eliminating the School-to-Prison pipeline. The Initiative shifted funding towards research on the impact of school suspensions, a national consensus building process, and multiple sources of technical assistance to school districts to reduce the use of suspensions and expulsions in U.S. public schools. Under Assistant Secretary Russlyn Ali, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) opened up new cases on racially discriminatory school discipline nationwide and state legislatures revised their school discipline laws.

As a part of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative’s increased federal enforcement, the “Green Grove School District” entered into a negotiated agreement with OCR to address the suspension of African American students at rates 2.5 times that of the district average. The negotiated agreement between Green Grove School District and the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) provided a theoretically rich case for analysis because the district was identified as a potential implementation model for the rest of the nation - having both supportive district leadership as well as the necessary organizational infrastructure to carry out many of the supportive school discipline reforms. The superintendent at the time and a number of district central office administrators welcomed the OCR enforcement of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in the district, many principals shared the belief that over and disproportionate suspensions were a bad thing, and prominent community organizations, community leaders, and the teacher’s union had appeared before the School Board to voice their support for the agreement. Thus, in the eyes of some of the Initiative’s leadership, Green Grove School District presented a best case scenario for reform.
Part 1: Social Network Visualization to Analyze the Function of Policy Networks

Social network analysis has been used to visualize and study policy creation through networks. Social network analysis assumes that the structure of relationships between actors - whether people, organizations, collectives, or geographic entities - matter for enabling and constraining actors’ goals, knowledge, beliefs, and actions (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). Yet, the key advance of social network analysis is that it allows us to focus on the relationships between actors and ask two sets of questions: one, how occupying particular positions in the network shapes individual outcomes; and two, how the overall network of relationships impacts network outcomes. Particularly in a policy network setting, it permits us to analyze how indirect connections between seemingly distant parts of the network impact each other and the network itself (Borgatti et al., 2013; Daly & Finnigan, 2010; Song & Miskel, 2007).

Increasingly social network methods have been used to explore the ways in which professional, familial, and funding relationships between elite policy actors have significantly reshaped the education landscape (Au & Ferrare, 2015; Ball, 2008, 2009; Ball & Junneman, 2012; Debray, Scott, Luhienski, & Jabbar, 2014; Kretchmar, Sondel, & Ferrare, 2014; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). While these findings are important for describing the presence of a “shadow elite” in policymaking, they are less effective in exploring the broader social forces that may be involved in legitimating, spreading, or challenging the influence of this shadow elite. By analyzing the changing composition, collaborative relationships, and problem and solution frames of organizations involved in the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, I am able to look beyond the interests and relationships of individual people to examine the ways in which broader interests made visible as professional fields, organizational types, or divisions within the state interact over time to solidify an ideological “consensus” for national education policy.

In this way, the primary assumptions of social network analysis fit well with the structural theories of social action that I employed in this study and permitted me to visualize and explore the networked position across fields that Bourdieu describes as comprising the field of power.

Data Sources

In order to study the relationships between policy actors that have contributed to the development of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative I drew on archival data (Borgatti et al., 2013). I collected the data sources for this study by focusing in on the official policy documents of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. I then included three rounds of snowball sampling of cited national policy reports and briefs, and agendas from three national conferences on school discipline reform organized as part of the Initiative. I used these data sources to construct the social network of organizations and relationships in different time periods. In this study, I provided social network visualizations of the policy network in three different time periods - 2000 to 2004, 2005 to 2009, and 2010 to 2014. While social network analyses often rely on structured interviews or surveys to construct snap shots of contemporary networks, archival data permitted me to reconstruct, with some
limitations, the relationships between prominent policy actors over time. These data sources were also coded for how different policy actors defined the problems and solutions of school discipline and how the problem and solution definitions changed over time.

You will note that the level of analysis I focused on was the organization rather than the individual because Bourdieu’s theory of fields would suggest that the relationship between positions is more important than the characteristics of the individuals that move in and out of these positions. In addition, in most policy reports and conferences, individuals often write and speak on behalf of an organization. Thus, I identified the policy actors in this study to be the organizations that participate in the policy process through their representatives.

To identify the organizations in the network I started with the official policy texts and identified all of the policy reports and national conferences cited or referenced in these texts. I defined policy reports and briefs as those documents created and disseminated by an organization to identify the need for national school discipline reform or to advocate for a particular solution. I did not include reports focused on a particular state’s reform efforts, academic articles produced primarily to share research findings, or newspaper sources. I limited my search to policy reports because policy reports are key documents in the policy creation process that bring together research, data, and argumentation in formats that are readily useable by policymakers and their staff (Weiss, 1987). In addition they had the express purpose of affecting policy and in this case I limited my analysis to the policy reports that had been cited previously in the official policy or policy report, and thus had some nexus to the official policy. From this initial list of policy reports I identified all of the additional policy reports and organizations referenced. I continued this process of identifying additional policy reports from the materials I had already identified until I completed three rounds at which time few, if any, new relevant reports or conference materials were found. Only three policy reports published before 2000 were cited. I included these policy reports into my textual analysis of problem and solution frames but not in my social network analysis since the reliability of this limited number of sources for mapping the relationships between organizations was questionable. This resulted in 63 policy reports published on the issue of school climate or discipline from 2000 to 2014. All but two of these reports were available online. For the second of these reports, a later conference paper by the same author and organizational affiliation was found and coded for content. See the Appendices for a list of these policy reports.

From these policy reports and national conferences, I identified 389 organizations that were cited or referenced as having produced, funded, authored, or supported the publication of a policy report or presented, hosted, or planned a national conference. Organizations included advocacy organizations, research centers, foundations, national professional associations, commissions, task forces, and for-profit and non-profit education service vendors. Organizations that were departments or subsidiaries of other organizations were collapsed into their parent organizations and organizations that were rebranded, renamed, or merged were named by their newer names. I also collected training materials that were cited in the policy reports in order to identify the organizations that provided training for district and school level practitioners, and the problem/solution definitions they prescribed. I defined
training material as PowerPoint presentations, guidebooks, and other materials about alternative discipline practices geared towards school or district level practitioners.

Social Network Methods

Over the past several decades social scientists using social network analysis have developed numerous ways to visualize and quantify aspects of overall network structure and discrete positions within a network. The analysis here drew on three techniques: network visualization, particularly using the Lovain method to visualize embedded subgroups or organizational clusters; whole network measures of average degree, average path length, and graph density; and the actor-level measure of between-ness centrality.

Network visualization. In this study I use Gephi, an open-source social network visualization and exploration software. This software constructs visualizations based on node-lists, the focal actors in a given network, and edge-lists, the paired relationships between nodes. To explore and visualize my data I used Force Atlas, a force-directed visualization algorithm that was designed to optimize readability for medium-sized networks. Like many other graph layout algorithms, Force Atlas was designed so that nodes repel each other and edges attract (Borgatti et al., 2013; Jacomy, Venturini, Heymann, & Bastian, 2014). The benefits of graph layout algorithms like this one are that graphs are easily interpretable by readers - nodes and ties are visible and not stacked on top of one another, and the patterns of relationships between nodes are clear. The drawback of these layout algorithms is that the exact location or distance between nodes does not represent a mathematical or sociological property of the node (Borgatti et al., 2013). In order to compare networks over time, I used the same visualization settings across each time period.

To map the structure of the policy network I chose to map the collaborative ties between organizations. I considered organizations to have a two-way collaboration tie if they co-produced or co-authored a policy report, co-planned a conference, hosted an organization as a presenter, or if an organization was mentioned in an acknowledgement section of a policy report or brief as having contributed to, advised, funded, or otherwise supported the content of the report. I did not include organizations involved in copyediting or production support. For each discrete collaboration, I assigned a numerical weight to the tie so that the strength of a collaborative tie between two organizations was the sum of the ties over the time period and reflected the intensity of the collaboration. The tie strength was represented in the social network visualization by the thickness of the line between two nodes.

I assigned a weight of 1 to any loose collaboration in which individuals came into contact with one another and with each other’s ideas, but did not work together to create one product, or speak with one voice. For example, where members of a collaborative were listed in a report but had not signed on as an author or sponsor of the report, I considered these loose collaborations. However, when I included the ties that were available to me, they only further strengthened the trends I described. I assigned a weight of 2 to collaborative efforts that required policy actors to engage with one another’s ideas and resulted in a compromise product that may not have represented the perspective of all those involved in the collaboration. When one organization funded, supported, reviewed, provided comments, or
hosted the presentation by another organization I assigned these collaborations a 2. I assigned a weight of 3 to collaborative efforts that required sustained engagement between organizations in which a product representing a collective vision was created. Examples of this included hosting a conference, co-authoring a report, co-directing a campaign, and holding dual appointments as an executive officer of two different organizations. When policy reports were single-authored by an organization with out other collaborators, I designated a tie between the organization and itself so that the activity of the organization would remain visible. All other organizations within a time period that had no collaborative ties were removed from the graph.

I assigned attributes to each organization so that I could also analyze the relationship between broad categories of organizations. Initial attributes that I assigned to organizations included categories such as geographic focus (multi-national, national, state, local), professional sector (education, law, psychology, law enforcement), and revenue source (public, private, fee-for-service, mixed). Bourdieu would suggest that professions are important social fields to examine in the field of power because members share common educational backgrounds, undergo similar training, adopt and abide by professional norms, and are organized in professional associations. The prominent professional fields in my sample were education, psychology, law, law enforcement, and community-based advocacy. I defined educational organizations narrowly to represent school teaching and administration, thus school districts, teacher unions, professional associations of school administrators, and schools of education fell into this category. Similarly, the psychology sector was comprised of individuals and organizations associated with school counseling, clinical psychology, child psychology, and special education. Law enforcement organizations were primarily police departments or police advocacy organizations, but also included district attorney offices and juvenile courts. Community-based advocacy organizations tended to be foundation-funded non-profits that focused on local organizing efforts. The legal profession was a mixture of law schools and non-profit legal service agencies that often were led by lawyers and were involved in juvenile justice reform. The organizations categorized as “Other” were primarily those in the medical and pediatric fields.

While categorizing organizations by professional sector, it became clear that many of the key organizations in the policy network could not easily be identified as belonging to one profession. Instead, they either spanned multiple professions or played a particular role in the policy network, like funding or issue advocacy. Drawing on research in policy networks, I assigned attributes to the remaining organizations based on Picciano & Spring’s (2013) typology of organizations involved in policy making. I sorted the organizations into government agencies, think tanks or research and advocacy organizations, philanthropies, and for-profit or non-profit education service vendors. I included non-profit education service vendors to this final category because I found that they functioned in similar ways. They marketed their services, charged fees for their products, and contributed to policymaking in ways that furthered their enterprise. I assigned these attributes based on the information available on the organizational webpages and identified as “Unknown” any organizations that no longer existed or that I had insufficient information to determine.
Finally, I assigned a separate attribute to civil rights advocacy organizations because while they could have been considered a part of the legal profession or a policy research and advocacy organization they occupied a blended identity and were of particular interest in this study. These attributes were visualized using a consistent color scheme for easier comparison across time periods.

**Whole network measures.** Research has found that the cohesiveness of a network can impact the overall function of the network. Since ties provide pathways of information and resource flows, the structure of the overall network, and in particular its connectedness, can define the purpose and productivity of the network (Daly & Finnigan, 2011). A more tight-knit network where there are a large number of ties between organizations allows information, ideas, and resources to move more quickly (Daly & Finnigan, 2010). Additionally, in networks where the distances - or path lengths - between different policy actors with different ideas, knowledge, and skill sets, is shorter, the opportunity for coordination and the development of novel solutions is greater.

I measured the cohesiveness of the network by overall graph density, average weighted degree, network diameter, and average path length. The overall graph density was the number of ties in a network divided by the total number of ties possible. This provided a metric for the density of ties for the entire network. The average weighted degree of a network was the average number of ties that each organization in the network has, weighted by the quality and quantity of its ties. This provided a metric that took into account repeated and sustained collaboration and allowed me to compare these over the three time periods. The network diameter was the largest distance between two nodes in the network and provided a sense of the social distance between disconnected components of the policy network. Finally, the average path length was the average distance between any two nodes in the network and provided a measure for how connected every node is to every other node.

Since it was difficult to compare overall network measures, especially measures of the cohesiveness of a network when two networks were of very different sizes (Borgatti et al., 2013), I did not compare the overall network measures across each time period. Instead, I compared the connectivity of the policy network during the 10 years prior to the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, 2000 – 2009, and the network between 2010 and 2014.

**Within network analysis of subgroups.** Within a network there are often embedded subgroups or clusters of actors that interact more extensively with one another creating distinct communities (Borgatti et al., 2013). These subgroups - or in this case, organizational clusters - are likely to share goals, norms, and ideals forming what might be called ideological communities. To identify subgroups, Gephi provides an algorithm using the Lovain method, a multi-level aggregation method for optimizing modularity. It first recognizes small communities by identifying nodes that are more densely connected to one another and more sparsely connected to others. It aggregates the nodes of one community into one node and identifies ever larger communities in this way. I used this method to identify ideological communities during different time periods as well as the changes in the structural relationship between these communities. I assigned letters and numbers to these organizational clusters or ideological communities in both time periods and coded entire
policy reports by the organizational cluster represented in order to study the changes in the way these communities defined the problem and solution over time.

**Within network measures of individual actors.** To visualize the relative influence in the network, I used centrality measures to assign the size of a node. Social network analyses often utilize some measure of centrality within a network, or how well connected a node is within a network, as a proxy for power, gatekeeping, influence, authority, and other sociological characteristics. Drawing on social capital theory, more central actors in a network have greater access to information, ideas, influence, and other resources, and are better situated to create new ties (Daly & Finnigan, 2010). More central actors also influence a network by directing where ideas and resources flow (Raider & Krackhardt, 2001). Conversely, nodes - or organizations in this case - that are less central and more on the periphery have restricted access to information and resources and have been found to only receive the information and resources deemed necessary by more central actors (Borgatti & Everett, 2000). Maintaining ties within a network may also entail obligations that constrain action and access to different ideas and resources (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo & Bernassi, 2000).

While there are a number of measures for centrality, I used the between-ness centrality measure, which counts the number of times a node appears on the shortest path between nodes in the network. This is a useful measure of the importance of a node or organization to the flow of resources and ideas within a network. Organizations that tend to be on the shortest path between a large number of organizations can act as either conduits of resources and ideas or as gatekeepers. The social network diagrams presented in this paper utilize between-ness centrality illustrated by the size of the node in each diagram.

**Qualitative Coding of Policy Documents to Trace Ideological Commitments**

To understand the interests of the different policy actors and the shift in how the problem and solutions were defined, I coded the official policy text itself (i.e., the Dear Colleague letter, the Guiding Principles, the Directory of Federal Resources, the Compendium of State Laws and Regulations, and a summary of the Initiative’s activities) and the executive summaries and policy recommendations of the cited policy reports in my sample. I initially used inductive coding of the policy reports to identify the problem and solution definitions. Problem codes included “school-to-prison pipeline,” “racial disproportionality,” “teacher lack of classroom management,” “troubled youth,” and “overemphasis on academics.” Some examples of solution codes included “data collection and accountability,” “diversity teaching force,” “packaged programs,” “mental health professionals,” “professional development,” “integration with law enforcement,” and “de-policing.” Some initial codes were combined into overarching parent codes. All codes were also coded with deductive codes identified and adopted from historical accounts of how school discipline has been understood and enacted in American public schools.

To identify the patterns of problem and solution definitions posed by different ideological communities and how they changed over time, I created a matrix that mapped the relationship between organizational cluster (or subgroup) during different time periods and the problem and solution definitions that each organizational cluster espoused. Finally,
drawing on policy histories written into the official policy as well as into various policy reports, I created a spreadsheet of major activities and developments in the policy network along with when policy reports were published to flesh out the narrative.

Part 2: Case Study Methods for Examining Policy Implementation in an Urban School District

In chapters 5 and 6, I utilized an in-depth qualitative case study method to explore the implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in an urban school district. The in-depth case study method I engaged in here was rooted in a reflexive science described by Burawoy (1998) that examines the actions, experiences, and perspectives of social actors within a particular social and historical context. It permitted me to understand the ways in which larger economic trends and political ideas came to life in everyday struggles, the contradictions created, and the creative spaces where new understandings or actions were possible.

The District

Like many urban public school districts, Green Grove Unified served predominately low-income communities of color, enrolling more than 88 percent students of color and more than 70 percent students eligible for free or reduced lunch, which equated to a maximum annual household income of less than $31,000 for free lunch or $44,000 for reduced lunch for a family of four.

Green Grove Unified was located in a city that, like many urban centers, grew rapidly during industrialization, but experienced severe disinvestment in the decades following World War II. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, federal and local policies supported suburbanization, segregation, deindustrialization, declining social services, declining schools, and the deepening of urban poverty. Yet, in recent decades, this trend had reversed as major business interests, allied with local politicians and funded by federal grants, engaged in large-scale redevelopment efforts. After twenty years of slowly increasing rents, equaling 30 percent over this time span, rents have increased by 40 percent just in the six years since 2010. Housing prices have seen similar increases, leading to a severe housing crisis and the displacement of many low-income families as well as a significant portion of the African American middle class. Green Grove lost more than 50 percent of its African American residents since 1990. Amidst this rapid gentrification of Green Grove, charter school enrollment has grown to 26 percent of total public school enrollment, leading to a deepening sense of two cities – where public dollars pay for racially and income segregated schools.

Data Collection

Data sources included participant observations (Glesne, 2006), documents, semi-structured interviews (Spradley, 1979), and informal interviews. Data collection began in 2013 and continued for two years, spanning nearly the first half of the five-year agreement.
My role as participant observer. I was initially paid to take notes and provide summaries of the meetings to the district central office leadership team (the OCR Leadership Team) responsible for implementing the OCR agreement. In this role I was able to observe and take nearly verbatim notes of all regularly scheduled team meetings, retreats, strategic planning sessions, trainings, presentations, community events, and other OCR Leadership Team activities. Several months into this role, I was asked to gather materials and information for the first monitoring report due to OCR. I agreed to do so if I was allowed to continue my research. I was paid as a consultant for a month by the district legal and risk assessment office to complete the report. This material and information gathering allowed me to collect over one thousand pages of documents that reached back to the start of the OCR agreement. After completing the OCR reporting, I returned to my note-taking role. Throughout the two years of field work, I was confided in, invited to events, asked for my perspective, and generally became a regular member of the OCR Leadership Team. When asked, I shared my questions, concerns, and wonderings as they came to me. These conversations with practitioners in the field helped me to develop what would later become the findings that appear in this dissertation. And, my experience of the pressures and constraints as I moved between roles as an independent researcher and a paid consultant deepened my understanding of the social forces and processes that I describe in the findings chapters. Thus, the findings are meant to provide a critical perspective that examines the conditions that shape the actions of all involved, including my own.

Data sources - district central office. In total I conducted over 150 hours of participant observations of formal district central office meetings and activities related to the OCR Agreement and additional hours of informal observations. This involved one or two meeting or events a week during most working months during my first year in the field and fewer in the second year as momentum around the Initiative slowed overall. In two years, I missed only one or two meetings or events that I was invited to. The content of meetings and events that I missed or was not invited to was often shared with me through informal retrospective interviews or conversations. In addition to verbatim meeting notes that served as my descriptive record of what occurred, I kept audio and written memos for myself that recorded the setting, mood, and my own impressions, interpretations, and questions throughout the two years of data collection (Glesne, 2006; Lofland & Lofland, 1995).

Data sources included semi-structured interviews. I interviewed retired OCR attorneys and other legal actors involved in either creation or ratification of the negotiated agreement. I interviewed each of the 12 core OCR Leadership Team members between two and four times over the course of the study. I interviewed the other 16 district administrators once. Interviewees included all district administrators responsible for implementing the negotiated agreement. This totaled 49 semi-structured interviews. Initial interviews focused on the interviewees’ career path and motivations for their work, their work roles, their roles in relation to the OCR Agreement, their hopes and fears for the OCR Agreement, and the successes and challenges so far of implementation. These interviews provided rich text for understanding the ideological commitments of those involved and the sources of their ideologies. I want to be clear that I don’t use “ideology” here in its pejorative sense, but as a way to connect beliefs, values, and worldview with the social institutions and economic
interests that shape them, including but not limited to class upbringing, race, gender, education, profession, and organizational role.

In follow up interviews, I asked interviewees to discuss the evolving successes and challenges of implementation in more detail to understand participants’ understandings of the social processes taking place in the school district that shaped implementation (e.g., What was the source of these challenges? What was the source of the successes? What were areas of conflict and disagreement? How did these conflicts get resolved? What were areas of agreement?). As Burawoy (1998) notes, these interviews were moments where the interviewee was partially extracted from his/her world. The interviews were reflective moments where interviewees sometimes spoke from their position in the organization and at other times from their social identities outside of the organization providing rich text for exploring and explaining not only the social processes that took place but the socially embedded nature of thought and action. Interviews lasted between 60 minutes and 100 minutes and were audiotaped with permission, and transcribed.

Additional data sources included archived agendas, meeting minutes, handouts, and presentations over the first two-and-a-half years of the OCR agreement, and my own recorded thought memos taken throughout this time period.

Data sources - focal middle schools. While I collected the bulk of my observational data at the district central office because a majority of the Initiative’s impact, contestation, and interpretation occurred there, understanding the impact, if any, of the Initiative on school level disciplinary practices required data collection in schools. I chose to focus on middle school implementation because middle schools typically exhibit high and disproportionate rates of suspensions nationally as well as within Green Grove and provide an institutional setting that has elements of both elementary school and high school. Along with attending most district central office meetings of middle school principals related to the OCR Agreement, I identified a list of nine potential focal middle schools to include in my study. These schools were chosen based on having a sizable African American student population (greater than 15%) since the disproportionate rate of suspensions for African American students was a focus of the OCR Agreement and no principal turnover during the previous year so that the leadership of the school would have been present from the start of the OCR Agreement.

After reaching out to the principals of the nine middle schools that fit the criteria, three agreed to participate in the study. River Glen Middle School and Rock Point Middle School were both traditional comprehensive middle schools with roughly similar student demographics but located in different parts of the city. New Design School was a small middle and high school that was designed by educators to provide a holistic student-centered education to students and to prepare them for college. This school was not a charter school. Together these schools closely resembled the average demographics of Green Grove School District and provided a glimpse into the school level implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. While the principals in each of these three schools were unique in that they agreed to participate in my study, demonstrating an openness to sharing both their successes and challenges, their school discipline data revealed that they were not unlike
other schools. They suspended and expelled students at similar rates as other middle schools in the district and from my observation and interviews at the district central office, these schools were not considered to be either stellar or horribly chaotic - a condition characteristic of those schools with new principals and thus not initially included in my list of potential focal schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Approximate Size</th>
<th>Free &amp; Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Children of Color</th>
<th>Percent African American</th>
<th>Approx. API Base Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>River Glen Middle School</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock Point Middle School</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Design School</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Average</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the three focal middle schools, I observed school discipline and culture meetings, staff meetings, student study team meetings, and other school events related to school culture and discipline. To observe the routine disciplinary practices I spent three days at each school site shadowing school administrators in charge of discipline and observing sixth grade classrooms. During these shadows and observations, I observed the school discipline routines occurring at each school site including systems for dealing with students sent out of class, ways of monitoring hallways, lunchrooms, and yards, and how administrators engaged students around school discipline and classroom routines.

In the middle schools, I interviewed the principal and additional staff responsible for discipline, totaling seven interviews with school site administrators. Interview questions focused on the respondent’s experiences and perspectives of the negotiated agreement, including questions about their role, their experience of both the structure and process of the district central office’s implementation process, and his/her perceived tensions, successes, and challenges. Interviews lasted between 60 minutes and 100 minutes and were audiotaped with permission, and transcribed.

**Data Analysis**

I began my data analysis by first reading through all transcripts and OCR Leadership Team meeting notes to understand the chronology of the case. During this first read-through, I coded text with descriptive codes that would allow me to recount and verify my recounting of how the negotiated agreement was created and what occurred following the agreement. I then coded all interviews for the perceived impact of the civil rights enforcement action on the school district. In addition, I coded school-level observation notes for evidence of school discipline practices that were consistent or inconsistent with the OCR Agreement.
To examine the mechanisms of domination and resistance that helped to explain these outcomes I coded all interview transcripts for perceived constraints and enabling conditions. I refined these codes iteratively until I ended up with the following constraints: resource constraints, competition, leadership churn and instability, and hierarchy constraints - or what participants described as tensions between the district central office and schools and between cabinet-level district leadership and others in the district central office. I used observation notes and archival data to confirm, disconfirm, or elaborate on the constraints and enabling conditions expressed by those I interviewed. Drawing on Bourdieu's insights that political conflicts among social fields often confuse and mystify deeper economic contradictions, I looked more closely at instances of conflict and agreement within both interviews and observations of OCR Leadership Team meetings as a way to identify the deeper economic contradictions shaping the outcomes of the case.

To understand the relationship between the ideological commitments of those in the school district to one another as well as the connection between the ideological commitments of school district administrators and the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, I coded the ways in which participants in the study framed the problem of school discipline. Where they were consistent with the problem and solution frames in the policy network, I used the same codes (e.g., Teacher Incapacity, Teacher Bias, Student Misbehavior). Where they were inconsistent or new, I created new codes (e.g., AA Belonging for African American students and their families feeling they do not belong). I also coded interviews and meeting notes for discussion of particular solutions. Since many of the solutions were already articulated in the negotiated agreement with OCR, I started by identifying the most pertinent solution codes from the negotiated agreement. They included, among others: expert consultation, training, program adoption, data collection, policy change, and a re-examination of the School Security Officer program. I also created a catch-all code for all additional solutions described in interviews and meetings that were not included in the negotiated agreement.

I then coded interviews and OCR Leadership Team meeting notes with higher inference thematic codes. I found that the constraints, problem, and solution frames that district central office administrators, school leaders, and lawyers expressed could be grouped into a larger theoretical coding scheme that was not present in the same degree at the national policymaking arena - these were social justice claims made for recognition, redistribution, or both. Drawing on Fraser’s (1995) distinction between redistribution and recognition-based political claims, I coded interviews and OCR Leadership Team meeting notes for arguments that invoked either these concepts.

Once the text was coded, I used Dedoose to explore the data. I visualized the general changes in the distribution of problem and solution frames, as well as redistribution versus recognition demands, over time just as a way to understand which ones persisted and gained strength and which ones were abandoned. I also added Descriptors to each of the interviewees that included organizational role, department or subunit, race, gender, professional background. I created matrices to understand how perceived constraints, problem and solution frames, and redistribution versus recognition demands mapped onto different descriptors.
Throughout the data analysis process I continued to write analytic memos that tracked my coding schemes, emerging themes, questions, thoughts, and reflections. In these memos I compared the processes that led to different outcomes for the different major solution frames to understand the mechanisms for these different outcomes. I applied these explanations to other solution frames to determine a consistent explanation that could explain the outcomes for each solution frame.
Chapter 3
Strange Bedfellows

For years, scholars and advocates have documented the growth of the carceral state and the increasing ways in which the field of law enforcement has come to shape public education, from the presence of metal detectors to the passage of Zero Tolerance policies concerning school discipline. This trend in public education – described by critics as the School-to-Prison Pipeline – became the subject of federal policy attention in recent years. In 2010, speaking in Selma, Alabama during a commemoration of one of the bloodiest instances of state repression of the Civil Rights Movement, the U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan promised a new era of civil rights enforcement in education and increased monitoring of racial disparities in school disciplinary practices. Later on that year, Assistant Attorney General Perez of the Department of Justice addressed a room full of civil rights advocates and civic leaders and stated, “Eliminating the School-to-Prison pipeline is a top priority for the Civil Rights Division and the Administration.”

The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice created a joint initiative, the “Supportive School Discipline Initiative,” funding a national consensus building process and multiple sources of technical assistance aimed at addressing one perceived culprit of the problem - the over and racially disproportionate use of suspensions and expulsions in U.S. public schools. During the same time period, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) opened up new enforcement actions on school discipline nationwide and state legislature after state legislature revised their school discipline laws. In 2014, OCR released a Guidance Package to the nation’s schools articulating guiding principles for reforming school discipline, a compendium of state laws related to school discipline, and a directory of federal resources related to school discipline reform.

While the Supportive School Discipline Initiative was relatively new and few scholarly articles have been published on the policy, emerging descriptions of the policy process contained in policy documents and other publications suggest that the policy creation process was complex and involved a large number of governmental and non-governmental entities, representing a wide array of interests including those that would be considered strange bedfellows. Reports and accounts published by organizations involved applauded the Supportive School Discipline Initiative as a culmination of a successful bottom-up education reform – one initiated by civil rights groups, community-based organizations, and youth organizers (Bryant, J., 2014; Atlantic Philanthropies, 2015). Others touted it as a success story of philanthropic involvement in educational policymaking, one in which philanthropies targeted funding at advocacy organizations, the Federal government, and the engagement of a diverse group of stakeholders to create transformative social change (Atlantic Philanthropies, 2015; Preskill, Mack, Duffy, & Gutierrez, 2013). Finally, the Initiative is described as the product of a truly collaborative process that garnered the support of Democrats as well as Republicans and drew on the expertise of educators, psychologists, health professionals, law enforcement, and juvenile justice (Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2014).

The wide array of government and nongovernmental actors involved in the shift away from Zero Tolerance school discipline policies and practices to those called for in the Supportive
School Discipline Initiative, exemplified what many scholars have called the move towards policy making through policy networks, issue networks (Heclo, 1978; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992), advocacy-coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993) and network governance (Ball, 2009; Ball & Junemann, 2012), a trend that has characterized policy making in advanced capitalist societies over the past forty years.

A significant body of literature on the use of multi-actor, multi-organizational networks, to address complex social problems has grown over the past several decades (Agranoff and McGuire, 1998; Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; McGuire, 2006; O'Toole & Meier, 2004). Much of the existing literature often shares an optimistic perspective on the potential for networks to address complex social problems, particularly through building consensus around a common definition of the problem, problem solving across relevant issue areas, development of coordinated and multi-pronged solutions, and the reduction of implementation resistance (Agranoff and McGuire, 1998, 2001).

Much of this scholarship tends to focus on the new management skills required for those managing networks of policy actors rather than hierarchically organized state bureaucracies or the network characteristics required for successful implementation of policies. This literature has paid less attention to why public bureaucracies and institutions are in decline and how the new policy networks that have arisen function to meet or not meet the needs of the public.

Some scholars have used social network analysis to study the structure and function of these policy networks (Brandes, Kenis, Raab, Schneider, & Wagner, 1999; Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Park & Rethemeyer, 2014). These studies use social network analysis to visualize and quantify various relationships between political actors, such as support, influence, status, communication, and resource exchange with the basic assumption that this web of relationships influences policy and politics. In addition, scholarship on policy networks attend to features of the political actors themselves including but not limited to resource, interests, size, and organizational form.

However, the use of social network analysis in education policy research is relatively new (Song & Miskel, 2007). The use of social network analysis in education policy analysis has developed primarily in two lines of research. In one, scholars use social network analysis to study the network characteristics that support effective policy implementation and organizational change (Daly & Finnigan, 2010, 2012). These scholars examine the importance to the policy implementation process of particular network structures and kinds of network ties within school districts and schools. These scholars understand social networks as the system of relationships within which social capital exists. They argue that the structure of ties within and between school districts and schools determines the flow of successful policy implementation prerequisites like, information, resources, and trust. These scholars draw on organizational studies in business that have found that ties between actors in a social network provide access to knowledge, advice, and innovation, thus the distribution and quality of these ties matter not only for individuals but for the overall function of the network (Daly & Finnigan, 2010). Research has found that dense network ties within and between communities or subunits within a network tend to support higher
levels of performance and success in large-scale change efforts (Daly & Finnigan, 2010; Reagans & Zucherman, 2001).

In contrast, in a second line of research, scholars have raised concerns that education policy networks that rely on informal or unofficial relationships between decentralized and often horizontally related policy actors may reduce government responsibility and transparency, increase the power of corporate interests, and facilitate the privatization of public education by allowing private sector actors to dominate policy networks (Ball, 2009; Picciano & Spring, 2013). Scholars such as O’Toole and Meier (2004) have called this the “dark side” of policy networks. In addition, scholars have attempted to explain the relationship between the expanding use of policy networks and the changing economy (Ball, 2012; Ball & Junneman, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Ball (2012) argues that policy networks arose as a way to stabilize and entrench the new institutions and processes necessary to fill the void of a shrinking welfare state - a change that was both the purpose and effect of neoliberal policies over the past forty years.

These education policy researchers apply social network visualization techniques to understanding the funding, collegial, professional, and even familial relationships between prominent actors and organizations involved in many of the contemporary education policy reforms like charter schools and alternative teaching pathways (Au & Ferrare, 2015; Ball & Junneman, 2012; Kretchmar et al., 2014; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). These scholars explicitly or implicitly construct diagrams that unearth systems of personal and professional influence over policymaking and are concerned with the ways in which these systems of influence further enrich and empower members of a “shadow elite”.

While social network analysis research in education policy is still new and growing, scholars agree that the influence of networks on education policy making is increasing and that not enough is known about the ways in which the structure of these policy networks impacts the content and implementation of the resulting educational policies (Ball & Junemann, 2012; DeBray et al., 2014; Song & Miskel, 2005, 2007). In this chapter, I utilize social network visualization and the Lovain method to identify subgroups or clusters of organizations that likely share ideological commitments during the 10 years before the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Through qualitative coding of the policy advocacy texts published by organizations within these clusters, I describe the divergent problem and solution frames advanced by the social forces involved in the 10 years prior to the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. This chapter illuminates the range of economic and political interests involved in school discipline reform from 2000 – 2009, and acts as a comparator for the complex policy network structured in later years by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. The Supportive School Discipline Initiative provides a particularly useful policy case because in many ways it is touted as a success story of consensus building across a wide range of interests, providing an opportunity to understand the phenomenon of “strange bedfellows” in the national education policy arena and the implication for racial and economic justice of coordinating the interests of “strange bedfellows”.
Advocacy organizations and left-of-center venture philanthropies described the policy network activities that led to the Supportive School Discipline Initiative as a model of “grassroots movement building” to address the School-to-Prison pipeline and the finding of common ground across ideological divides for strategic policy gains (Atlantic Philanthropies, 2014). Consistent with advocates’ descriptions of the Initiative, I find that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative did in fact bring together a wide-array of “strange bedfellows,” or disparate ideological communities that initially defined the issue of school discipline and the appropriate solutions in ideologically incompatible ways. The issue of the School-to-Prison pipeline and racially disproportionate suspensions was initially raised by community-based advocacy organizations, racial justice organizations, and civil rights advocacy groups in the first time period (2000-2004). In the second time period (2005-2009), other social forces including clusters of organizations that represented school psychologists and special education, and clusters of education reform product and services vendors, like those advocating for Character Education, became key features of the policy field addressing school discipline. These organizational clusters defined the problem of school discipline in two different ways. Racial justice organizations named the increasing influence of criminal justice in education, racial profiling, and systemic racism, while other organizational clusters blamed student misbehavior and an over-emphasis on academics in national education policy.

The announcement of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in 2010 created a policy network that provided opportunities to construct a consensus among these “strange bedfellows” with racial justice advocates on one hand and education reform product and service vendors on the other. Together they significantly shaped school discipline policy across the nation. The policy network grew in size and complexity in the final time period, spanning the organizational clusters present in the previous time periods as well as witnessing new policy actors entering the fold, including federal agencies, state legislatures, law enforcement, local educational agencies, and venture philanthropies. However, innovative solutions that drew upon these diverse professional and social fields to address the school-to-prison pipeline failed to appear and key demands of early School-to-Prison pipeline organizing efforts were ignored.

Instead, through the Supportive School Discipline initiative the more radical critique of the growing carceral state and the growing influence of law enforcement personnel and ideologies in schools was absorbed and redefined in more narrow terms. This more narrowly defined problem, first articulated by civil rights and academics, was then tacked onto a set of solutions, a majority of which were already put forth more than a decade and a half earlier in a 1998 joint report of the Department of Education (DOE) and Department of Justice (DOJ) titled, “Early Warning, Early Response,” written in response to the problem of school shootings and “troubled and delinquent youth.” Through this process of networked policymaking, the School-to-Prison pipeline articulation of the problem and solutions that initially animated civil rights and social and racial justice oriented community-based advocacy organizations were removed from the definition of the problem as well as the solutions.
Figure 1. Policy Networks in Three Time Periods

(a) 2000 – 2004

(b) 2005 – 2009

(c) 2010 – 2014

AQUA: Community-Based Advocacy
BLUE: Research and Advocacy
BLACK: Civil Rights Advocacy
RED: Government Agencies
YELLOW: Education Reform Products & Services Vendor
GREEN: Philanthropy
PINK: Legal Services
ORANGE: Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice
LIGHT BLUE: School Psychology
LIGHT PURPLE: Education Profession

From 2000 to 2004 (Figure 1a), there were 141 organizations involved in the policy network with 197 collaborative ties to one another. In this first time period there were no clear set of core organizations, or organizations that had high centrality measures and were centrally located within the network. Rather, there were four main clusters of organizations that were organized around an organizational hub that performed research and advocacy functions for their member organizations. Using Gephi’s Lovain method, I confirmed the presence and boundaries of the embedded subgroups or clusters of organization that social network theory suggests share ideological commitments, including common goals, interests, norms, and ideals (Borgatti et al., 2013). Thus, a close analysis of the problem and solution definitions articulated by these diverse ideological communities during this and later time periods provides insights into the opposing interests of these communities, which becomes muddied in later periods as organizations actively combine and recombine problem and solution definitions in strategic ways. I found that the four ideological communities in this initial time period proffered unique descriptions of the problem and solutions related to school discipline (see Figure 2). These organizational clusters were weakly tied to one another through several boundary spanning organizations, or organizations that had ties with otherwise disconnected organizational clusters and are surmised to have important functions related to gatekeeping and/or controlling resource and information flow (Borgatti et al., 2013; other cites).

Figure 2. Social Network During Initial Time Period (2000 – 2004)
In organizational cluster A, the Applied Research Center, a racial justice research and advocacy organization (in BLUE) working closely with a national network of community-based advocacy organizations (in AQUA) locate the over and disproportionate use of school suspensions and expulsions within a larger context of racial discrimination in society and in fundamental school structures like course tracking and curriculum. This cluster was funded by several large foundations - the Ford, MacArthur, and Mott foundations. In one policy report, ARC and a consortium of collaborating community-based advocacy organizations explained that school discipline was just one point along a continuum of surveillance of communities of color:

We are beginning to understand how people of color are targeted, put under surveillance, and treated unfairly and unjustly based on race by those frequently considered well-intentioned cultural/social agents (such as police, welfare agents, medical professionals, etc.). Concepts like "driving while Black or brown" and, since September 11, "flying while Arab" are increasingly used in the media and are widely recognized. Racial profiling results in an oppressive state that creates racial inequities by denying people of color privacy, identity, place, security, and control over one's daily life; Students of color are often subjected to racial stereotyping when it comes to school discipline. (ARC, 2001).

This organizational cluster identified sources of racially unequal and discriminatory educational outcomes to be racial and income segregation in housing, unequal access to challenging coursework, the persistence of academic tracking, lack of a diverse teaching workforce, mono-cultural curricular materials, and teacher bias (Applied Research Center [ARC], 2000, 2001). Policies such as Zero Tolerance discipline policies and high-stakes testing were seen to be exacerbating these trends but not the only causes. This organizational cluster advocated for changes in policies and fundamental structures of education, including rolling back mandatory suspension requirements enacted under Zero Tolerance regimes, increasing funding to schools and districts serving communities with high needs, reducing class sizes, creating smaller public schools, and creating pipelines for teachers of color to enter and succeed in the teaching profession. In addition, this organizational cluster advocated for public access to suspension and expulsion data broken down by race, gender, age, and other demographic markers to create an accountability to parents and the immediate communities that the schools served.

A second organizational cluster (Cluster B) was anchored around two civil rights organizations (in BLACK), the Advancement Project and the Harvard Civil Rights Project. At the time, the Advancement Project described itself as a "policy, communications, and legal action organization" that "supports organized communities in their struggles for racial and social justice" (Advancement Project, 2005). The Harvard Civil Rights Project was a university-based center dedicated to civil rights action and research. It was first housed at Harvard University and then relocated to the University of California, Los Angeles and renamed the Civil Rights Project/El Proyecto de CR at UCLA in 2007. These two organizations collaborated on several publications and convened the "National Summit on Zero Tolerance" in 2000 that was cosponsored by Jesse Jackson's Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, the League of United Latin American Citizens and the National Coalition of
Advocates for Children. The Advancement Project and the Harvard Civil Rights Project brought together an organizational cluster of children's legal aid and advocacy organizations (in PINK), community-based advocacy organizations (in AQUA), and other civil rights organizations (in BLACK). The school discipline policy activities of this organizational cluster were funded by five of the top 15 venture philanthropies with active education agendas - Ford, MacArthur, Kellogg, Carnegie, and Mott Foundations (Picciano & Spring, 2013) - and other major foundations such as Levi Strauss and Rockefeller foundations, as well as smaller foundations like Open Society, Atlantic, and Schott foundations (in GREEN).

Cluster B, or the organizational cluster convened by civil rights organizations defined the problem of school discipline in two distinct ways. In one, put forth in a joint publication of the Harvard Civil Rights Project and the Advancement Project (2000), the school-to-prison pipeline was not mentioned by name. The problem was described for the first time in my sample of policy reports in the disparate impact legal frame, which explains that when schools disproportionately suspend students of color, students of color fall behind academically, increasing the likelihood of them dropping out of school and eventually becoming incarcerated. This frame draws on anti-discrimination law by referring to the racially disproportionate actions of teachers and administrators, the resulting harm on students, and the availability of other less discriminatory alternatives. While this framing of the school-to-prison pipeline provided some legal teeth under our current civil rights laws, the underlying assumption was that if teachers suspended fewer students and in a fair manner, fewer students of color would wind up in the criminal justice system. The disparate impact legal claim narrowly focused on educators’ use of suspensions, rather than on the broader concern voiced by others in this organizational cluster that focused on the growing influence of law enforcement in education and the ways in which educators have deepened partnerships with law enforcement that increased the criminalization of students.

In contrast, other organizations within the civil rights cluster, such as the Advancement Project and the ACLU, addressed the school-to-prison pipeline more explicitly, publishing reports titled, "Derailed! The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track," and "Locating the School-to-Prison Pipeline". These reports defined three tracks that led from schools to prisons: referring students to police for behaviors that once were handled by school administrators; turning schools into prison-like institutions with uniformed police, school resource officers, and metal detectors; and Zero Tolerance policies that school administrators and teachers use to suspend and expel students of color in disproportionate numbers (Advancement Project, 2003; American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2008). These organizations articulated suspensions as only one part of the criminalization of young people.

In the third organizational cluster in this first time period (Cluster C) the Learning First Alliance acted as a hub for the most prominent professional education organizations. The Learning First Alliance described itself as: “a partnership of leading education organizations representing more than 10 million members dedicated to improving student learning in America’s public schools, (www.learningfirst.org). The constituent organizations of this largely professional education cluster included the National Education Association (NEA), the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA), the National Association of School Boards
of Education, and the National Association of Secondary School Principals. In addition, this organizational cluster included a number of for-profit and non-profit education reform service vendors including the Association for Supervision and Curriculum (ASC) and the National School Safety Center. These organizations provided consulting services for school districts and schools that ranged from professional development and coaching to program evaluation, school safety assessment, keynotes, and expert witness testimony.

This organizational cluster of leading professional education organizations defined the problem of school discipline primarily as student misbehavior. Responding to the heightened public concern over school shootings, this organizational cluster argued that school shootings were just a tip of a much larger iceberg of student misconduct that detracted from teaching and learning:

The multiple shootings at schools during the past few years are a major reason school safety has become a national issue. The roughly 20 student suicides and 30–40 school-related homicides each year also capture headlines. But in our schools in 1996–97 there were also 4,000 cases of rape or sexual battery, 7,000 robberies, 11,000 physical attacks or fights involving weapons, 100,000 acts of vandalism, 116,000 thefts or larcenies, 188,000 physical attacks or fights without weapons, 300,000 incidents in which teachers were victimized, and 800,000 guns brought to school. These startling statistics do not reflect the uncounted millions of acts of bullying, teasing, and nonviolent misbehavior of every other hue…. This type of misbehavior, vastly more common than any other, ruins the school day for many students….These feelings can erupt or simmer below the surface, but either way they distract students from learning and teachers from teaching. (Learning First Alliance, 2001).

This organizational cluster of leading professional education organizations also located the problem of school discipline on the accountability movement and the overemphasis on student achievement to the detriment of school climate and safety. Their recommendations were wide ranging and expansive and described components of what researchers would call a “good school”, including challenging and engaging curriculum, opportunities for meaningful student participation, safe and clean buildings, and respectful relationships between parents, teachers, staff, and students. They also advocated for school wide positive behavioral management systems (e.g., Positive Behavioral Interventions & Supports [PBIS]), the incorporation of a number of social and emotional training programs into school curriculum, and the development of standards and measures for safe and supportive schools akin to those on academic achievement (Learning First Alliance, 2001).

This organizational cluster of leading professional education organizations (Cluster C) also advocated for the continued use of law enforcement technologies on school campuses. In addition to programs and standards, the organizational cluster of leading professional education organizations suggested that the continued use of surveillance cameras, door alarms and “access control” technology were appropriate and that “So long as guns are readily available to our children… the need for metal detectors at some schools will continue.” In several locations throughout a policy report published by the Learning First
Alliance, the use of the modifier “some” preceded particular schools where they deemed exceptional safety measures necessary.

Cluster D, visualized the activity of the American Academy of Pediatrics’ (AAP) Committee on School Health in issuing a policy statement on out-of-school suspensions and expulsions. While this cluster did not remain involved in the policy network beyond this policy statement, it was interesting to note that the definitions of the problem were similar to those of the leading professional education cluster. The policy statement rooted the problem in troubled and mentally ill youth and stated: “Children who use illicit substances, commit crimes, disobey rules, and threaten violence often are victims of abuse, are depressed, or are mentally ill. As such, children most likely to be suspended or expelled are those most in need of adult supervision and professional help,” (AAP, 2003). A central concern of the AAP was also unsupervised suspensions, explaining that unsupervised youth commit more crimes, and engage in risky sexual behaviors and drug use. The policy statement went on to advocate for alternative means of supervising young people who were suspended and school disciplinary policies that compensated health care professionals for participating in student support teams and “routinely refer a student to his or her primary health care professional for an assessment if there is a disciplinary action or a student is at risk of such action.” Thus, consistent with other professional sectors, the American Academy of Pediatrics identified out-of-school suspensions as a problem and advocated for school policies that increased the role of medical professionals in the disciplinary process.

Finally, there were also several notable research and advocacy organizations that published policy reports on the topic of school discipline and school climate but were not tied to other organizations in the network. These can be seen as the free-floating nodes in Figure 2. The Heritage Foundation, a well-known conservative think tank, advocated for the repeal of Zero Tolerance policies. It argues that Zero Tolerance policies were an example of government intrusion into individual lives and an affront to personal liberties and justice. The Heritage Foundation raised the concern that Zero Tolerance policies criminalized students who may accidentally break a school rule but did not deserve to be treated as a criminal. The Heritage Foundation stated:

No one argues that students should bring knives to school. But there's a big difference between a kitchen knife inadvertently left on the floor of a car and a switchblade concealed for use in an after school brawl. "Zero tolerance" policies permit no such distinction. Lindsay was charged with felony weapons possession. After nine hours in jail - among real criminals - Lindsay's parents bailed her out. Criminal law is supposed to be about punishing those who deserve it. "Zero tolerance" policies ignore the distinction between wrongful and innocent intent.

Here, like the organizational cluster of professional education organizations (cluster C), the Heritage Foundation argued that criminalizing behaviors for all students led to certain ridiculous outcomes such as Lindsay’s, but maintained that it was appropriate for other students, such as those who might carry a “switchblade for use in an after school brawl,” invoking only a thinly veiled stereotype of a student who would be appropriately deemed a criminal. Similarly, the Public Agenda for the Common Good, a “bi-partisan organization
whose mission is to call attention to America’s ‘lawsuit culture,’” cited survey results from teachers and parents that identified student misbehavior and fear of school disciplinary lawsuits filed on behalf of misbehaving students as the cause of deteriorating learning environments and advocated for limiting legal challenges to expulsion hearings (Public Agenda, 2004).

Thus, the cluster of leading professional education organizations (Cluster C) shared with the cluster of community-based advocacy organizations (Cluster A) and the cluster of organizations brought together by civil rights advocacy groups (Cluster B) a common problem frame that high stakes testing and accountability was contributing to poor school climate. These clusters also shared some common solution frames that advocated for resources and institutional changes that would permit more engaged teaching and learning. Yet, at the same time, the cluster of leading professional education organizations also shared a dominant problem frame with the Heritage Foundation, blaming poor school climate primarily on student misbehavior. More importantly, the leading professional education organizations, along with the Heritage Foundation, shared a common solution frame that continued to advocate for the appropriateness of punishment — and in the case of the leading professional education organizations, the use of metal detectors, surveillance, and law enforcement — for “some” schools or those deemed real criminals.


From 2005 to 2009 (Figure 1b), there was much less recognized policy activity on the issue of school discipline or school climate with only 10 published policy reports in my sample and no national conferences. The policy network in this time period involved only 67 organizations with 153 ties to one another, many of which were repeated instances of collaboration between the same organizations. Like the earlier time period there was no clear set of core organizations, organizations that had high centrality measures and were centrally located within the network, within the second time period. Instead, there were distinct organizational clusters with little or no ties with others. In contrast to the previous time period, we see only one civil rights advocacy organizations (in BLACK) and one community-based advocacy group (in AQUA). Instead, we see an increase in organizations representing the field of school counseling and psychology (in LIGHT BLUE) and education reform product and service vendors (in YELLOW). Three of the four organizational clusters (clusters E - G), share a common structure. They revolve around one or more research and advocacy organizations (in BLUE), and are comprised of academic institutions in education (in LIGHT PURPLE) or school psychology (in LIGHT BLUE) networked with government agencies (in RED), education reform product and service vendors (in YELLOW), and philanthropies (in GREEN). Each of these organizational clusters, frame the problem of school discipline as one of student misbehavior or of a lack of federal attention on non-academic measures of student success. Each of these organizational clusters also advocated for schools and school districts to purchase and adopt their particular educational program, package, or accountability system to teach, manage, or measure behaviors, or to increase the influence of their field in education.
In Cluster E, a partnership between the National School Climate Center and the Education Commission of the States, two research and advocacy organizations (in BLUE), acted as the hub for a diverse range of actors - education academics (in PURPLE), state actors (in RED) like local school districts, state departments of education, and state legislatures, and for-profit and non-profit education reform products and services vendors (in YELLOW). This partnership defined the problem as insufficient attention to school climate in policy and practice despite considerable evidence that school climate was important to academic outcomes. This cluster defined school climate as the social, emotional, ethical, and civic skills practiced within a school. This organizational cluster identified several areas of concern including the lack of state standards and scientific measures for school climate, the failure to integrate school climate measures into accountability, and the inattention to school climate in teacher preparation programs. A policy report stated:

School climate is not regularly evaluated with measures developed in a scientifically sound manner and that comprehensively assess all of the dimensions that shape experience in schools, as well as assess K-12 students, parents and school personnel. Accountability, which depends on reliable assessment procedures, is a national educational policy in the United States. (National School Climate Center & Education Commission of the States [NSCC & ECS], 2007).

This organizational cluster advocated for integrating school climate measures into school accountability and assessments and the creation of "data-driven school climate improvement systems [that]… recognize and track prosocial behavior as well as barriers to school climate improvement efforts," (NSCC & ECS, 2007). It is important to note that the Education Commission of the States was a big proponent and economic beneficiary of the academic
accountability movement and No Child Left Behind (Picciano & Spring, 2013) and the National School Climate Center later shifted its organizational focus to the development of school climate measures, which they would sell to schools and school districts. Thus, these organizational clusters advocated for solutions that they later financially benefitted from.

In Cluster F - a series of university-based research and advocacy centers and the Character Education Partnership acted as a hub for a cluster of for-profit and non-profit character development programs like Yes Pa Character Program and the Character Counts! Program, which provided curriculum, teacher training, and consultation to teachers and schools so that they could teach students character traits such as perseverance, trustworthiness, manners, work ethic, and good behavior. This collaboration was funded by more traditional charitable giving from philanthropies like the 3M Foundation and the Proctor & Gamble Foundation as well as smaller venture philanthropies like Iker Casillas Foundation. This organizational cluster defined the problem as both a decline of character in today's youth and an over-emphasis on academic achievement. In a 228-page "Report to the Nation" this organizational cluster of character education proponents stated:

If young people don't have performance character [diligence, a strong work ethic, a positive attitude, and perseverance], they won't develop their talents and lead a productive life. The nation won't have a competent, competitive workforce. If our young don't have moral character [integrity, respect, cooperation, and justice], they won't lead an ethical life. Society will be filled with people who lie, cheat, and steal. (Character Education Partnership, 2005).

This organizational cluster of character education proponents advocated for an enormous range of solutions from teaching students to not talk back to their employers to service learning and building democratic teacher communities. This cluster represented an ideology focused on an educative vision of school discipline but held wildly different purposes for that education. For some it meant teaching students to be good mannered workers and for others it meant teaching students about participating in democratic processes.

Cluster G was predominately a network of organizations associated with the professions of school psychology and special education and shared the dominant problem frame of this time period that emphasized student misbehavior. The organizational cluster was comprised of university departments of special education and school psychology, special education professional associations, the DOE's Office of Special Education Programs, the technical assistance center for Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), and the Collaborative for Social and Emotional Learning (CASEL). Along with Character Education, PBIS and Social Emotional Learning later became two of the most recognized and adopted of the school programs advocated for by the policy network. This organizational cluster of school psychology and special education defined the problem as student misbehavior and the loss of learning time consumed by "disciplinary measures intended to correct students' antisocial behaviors," (Council for Exceptional Children [CEC], 2008). The roots of the problem, as they perceived them to be, came from culturally, linguistically, and socio-economically diverse student populations that had different social skills and motivations to learn (CASEL, 2008; CEC, 2008). One report explained,
Children enter school with varying degrees of social competence. While some students are fluent in social skills and therefore able to interact appropriately with peers and teachers, others might not have learned to perform socially appropriate behaviors and, therefore, are at risk of low academic achievement and developing antisocial lifestyles, " (CEC, 2008).

While the analysis of the problem across organizations in this cluster focused on individual student misbehavior, the solutions advocated by the organizations differ. Those associated with special education tended to advocate for school-wide behavioral management systems like Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), a behavioral modification program initially designed for special education settings. Others rooted in a more community oriented perspective of school psychology advocated for engaging parents, community members, and professional mental health experts in addressing student misbehavior, understanding the psychological roots of misbehavior, and adopting programs that taught social emotional skills.

A lone organization, Community Matters, published a policy report advocating against Zero Tolerance policies during this time period, exemplifying the partnership between advocacy and increasing demand for a particular education reform product or service. Community Matters was a non-profit education product and service vendor that produced and marketed the popular “Safe Schools Ambassadors” program and provides school climate assessments, curriculum, assemblies, keynotes, parent workshops, and professional development trainings to schools and school districts for a fee. Like other education reform product and service vendors, Community Matters argued that increased surveillance and law enforcement in schools had been expensive and less effective than violence prevention programs like their own. The report stated:

Although funding was strong right after Columbine, since 2000, several of the main sources of federal funding available for violence-prevention have been significantly cut (e.g., Safe and Drug-Free Schools & Communities, Safe Schools/Healthy Students). The majority of federal funding has been disproportionately spent on costly campus security: cameras, metal detectors, security personnel, etc. Despite this allocation of resources, school safety has not significantly improved. Many innovative, violence-prevention programs and curricula have been developed (a majority in response to Columbine) and have demonstrated success in reducing school violence and improving school climate at individual school sites. However, the funding available is inadequate and applied unevenly across the country.

The organization also blamed the over-emphasis on academics driven by No Child Left Behind legislation, arguing that it had forced schools to spend less and less resources and time on school climate concerns. The organization advocated for increased federal funding for violence prevention programs like its own and policies that refocused on school climate. As exemplified by this organization, each organizational cluster sought to connect the school discipline issue to the mission or purpose of their organization and advocated for solutions that increased federal funding for their programs or increased demand for their programs
and services, whether those programs were Safe School Ambassadors, Character Counts, Yes Pa, PBIS, or Caring School Communities.

Cluster H, represented the collaborative ties between school psychology academics that served on the Zero Tolerance Task Force of the American Psychological Association. The main author of the report was also the Director of the Education Policy Center at Indiana University or what became the Equity Project. As I will discuss in more detail below, the Education Policy Center/Equity Project played an important boundary-spanning role between the cluster of community-based advocacy organizations and the organizational cluster of school psychology. Through the APA Task Force, the Education Policy Center/Equity Project effectively invoked the problem definition of the School-to-Prison Pipeline advocated for by community-based advocacy groups to advocate for solutions provided by the field of special education and school psychology.

The APA Task Force used the term school-to-prison pipeline explicitly in the report describing how “the term school-to-prison pipeline emerged from the study of this phenomenon.” The Task Force adopted the three-pronged concern raised by community-based advocacy organizations pointing to the increased use of law enforcement on school campuses, student profiling, referral to law enforcement for an increasing number of incidents, and overuse of suspensions, particularly for schools serving students of color. The Task Force married the school-to-prison pipeline definition of the problem with developmental psychology, explaining that zero tolerance policies upset “the delicate balance between the educational and juvenile justice systems,” by criminalizing youthful behavior that is consistent with the neurological immaturity of the adolescent brain, and diverting resources to high-cost law enforcement solutions rather than lower cost educational and treatment options.

[T]here is a strong body of evidence showing that preventing or treating delinquency and school failure are more cost effective than doing nothing or paying welfare and prison costs incurred by undereducated and alienated youth. Research is necessary to document the cost–benefit ratio associated with prevention and early intervention approaches when directly compared with zero tolerance policies. (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2006).

The Task Force advocated for changing zero tolerance policies, increased communication between educators and parents, and a number of solutions that require the expertise of school psychologists including the implementation of PBIS, bullying prevention, or other programs; increased training on behavioral management for teachers and law enforcement, and the integration of mental health experts into wraparound services that include juvenile justice. The report also mentions other promising programs including threat assessment and restorative justice that attempts to resolve underlying sources of conflicts and threats.

While the APA Task Force described the problem in ways similar to the cluster of community-based advocacy organizations (cluster A), the solutions that the Task Force advocated for resembled those advocated for by the special education/school psychology cluster (cluster G), and assumed the continued presence of law enforcement, and advocated
for increased partnership between schools, law enforcement, and mental health professionals. This last recommendation directly contradicted the Justice Policy Institute’s concerns that in many states,

‘Roundtables’ are convened by district attorneys, with school personnel, local police, and state social workers and probation officers meeting every 2-4 weeks. These meetings are closed, not only to counsel representing students, but their parents. The purpose of these ‘roundtables’ is admittedly to identify and discuss violent and chronic juvenile offenders…. But while the stated goal of the program is not prosecutorial in nature, the range of interventions are primarily court related, including indictment for prosecution as a youthful offender, commitment to DYS, probation revocation, court imposed sanctions, and the filing of a Children In Need of Supervision petition. The only two non-judicial options are referral to a community based programs, or referrals to services at school. (Justice Policy Institute, 2000).

Thus, the Task Force report, with the leadership and influence of the Equity Project at Indiana University, played a critical role in the transposition of the school-to-prison pipeline problem frame to motivate a set of existing solutions derived from clinical school psychology. Included in these solutions was the increased partnership between education and law enforcement that other advocates feared would only strengthen the school-to-prison pipeline.

**Boundary Spanning Organizations in the 10 Years Prior to the Supportive School Discipline Initiative**

To better visualize the relationship between organizations and organizational clusters, and the boundary spanners who connected them, in the ten years preceding the announcement of the Department of Education’s and Department of Justice’s commitment to “eliminating the school-to-prison pipeline,” and initiation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, I provide a social network diagram for the entire time period from 2000 to 2009 with subgroups identified in the same manner as the sections above.
In Figure 4 we can identify a number of organizations that had collaborative ties with multiple organizational clusters during the ten years prior to the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. As described earlier, these organizations are identified in social network theory as boundary spanners. Social network research suggests that boundary spanners can act as channels for information diffusion between otherwise separate social fields or take a more active role as a gatekeeper, controlling the kinds of information, ideas, or resources, that flow between otherwise disconnected communities (Borgatti et al., 2013). I find in this study that many of the boundary spanners during this earlier time frame became core organizations in the later policy network and data suggest that they were critical to co-opting the school-to-prison pipeline problem frame to motivate the solutions advanced by more established social forces in the field of education policy making. Thus they played an important role in coordinating across social forces and transposing problem frames onto solution frames, absorbing more radical demands.

I identify three major organizations that spanned organizational clusters from 2000 – 2009. The boundary spanners that connected disparate organizational clusters in the earlier time period and became core organizations in the final time period were the Indiana Education Policy Center/Equity Project, the American Institute of Research, and the Department of Education. The Indiana Education Policy Center, which continued its work in later years as The Equity Project at Indiana University, was located in Cluster H and acted as a boundary
spanner between the organizational cluster of community-based advocacy organizations (cluster A), several criminal justice reform organizations, and the American Psychological Association special task force on zero tolerance policies. Examining the policy reports published by cluster H, there was not a consistent problem or solution frame over time. Instead, it appeared that the Indiana Education Policy Center/Equity Project, as a university-based research center, drew on a number of researchers targeting the effectiveness of zero tolerance policies, but shifted problem and solution frames. However, the Indiana Education Policy Center/Equity Project was one of the first organizations to bring together the school-to-prison pipeline problem frame and the field of school psychology. As mentioned previously, the faculty director of the Indiana Education Policy Center led a six-member task force of the American Psychological Association to discuss the impact of zero tolerance policies that culminated in a highly cited 2006 report. Thus, as an early boundary spanner of two otherwise disconnected social fields, the Indiana Education Policy Center/Equity Project played an important function transposing the problems identified by community-based advocacy organizations with the solutions of the field of school psychology. This organization also became a central player in the final time period.

In similar fashion, the American Institute of Research (in YELLOW), which became one of the central grantees responsible for providing the coordination and technical assistance for the Supportive School Discipline initiative, acted as a boundary spanner between the civil rights cluster (cluster B) and the organizational cluster of professional education organizations (cluster C). The Department of Education (in RED), which later initiated the Supportive School Discipline policy in collaboration with the Department of Justice, acted as a boundary spanner between the civil rights cluster (cluster B in Figure 1), the special education/school psychology cluster (cluster G in Figure 1), and the professional educational organization cluster (cluster C in Figure 1). In each of these cases, the position in the social network that boundary spanners occupied provided opportunities for those organizations to strategically transpose problem and solution frames. And what we see described in much more detail in the next chapter, is that through the activities of these organizations, more radical critiques of the educational system and society were absorbed and used to push existing solutions and solutions that fed the growing education reform industry.

On the other hand, a boundary spanner that did not become a core actor in the later policy network was the Stanford University School of Education, leaving a scarcity of ties between the organizational cluster of community-based advocacy organizations (cluster A) and the cluster of professional education organizations (cluster C). This tie created by Linda Darling Hammond who published an essay titled, “Apartheid in American Education,” in a report compiled by the Applied Research Center (2001) was the only tie in nearly a decade between the cluster of leading education professional associations and community-based advocacy organizations on this issue. The scarcity of ties between the education professional organizations and the civil rights and community-based advocacy clusters persisted in every time period, and was particularly surprising given that of all the organizational clusters, these clusters shared some of the same demands during this time period including increased funding, smaller class sizes, smalls schools, increased partnership between parents and school communities, and a roll back of high stakes testing and other accountability pressures. While the problem definitions that the professional educational organizations and civil
rights/community-based organizations described differed, the more comprehensive changes
to the structure and funding of schooling that some of the educational professional
organizations and community-based advocacy groups advocated for bore resemblance to
one another, suggesting a missed opportunity for a broader collective demand for education
reform.

In summary, during the ten years before the Supportive School Discipline Initiative there
were distinct ideological communities advocating for school discipline reforms but they were
not well connected to one another. Each ideological community or organizational cluster
framed the problem of school discipline in unique ways. Racial justice organizations
collaborating with community-based advocacy organizations framed the issue as systemic
racism in education that permeated curriculum, resources, segregated learning environments,
and disciplinary practices. The civil rights organizations framed the issue using the disparate
impact framework and described the ways in which racially disproportionate school
suspensions led to academic failure and juvenile justice involvement. The other
organizational clusters generally framed the problem as student misbehavior and delinquency
and advocated for schools to adopt their favored solutions, including the hiring of more
mental health or law enforcement, or adopting a host of packaged behavioral management
programs from Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) to character
education programs like Character Counts!

Leads to Complex Policy Network & the Co-optation of Its More Radical Critiques

The initiation of federal attention on school discipline reform ignited policy actors of all
sorts and significantly changed the policy network in the last period as school discipline
became a policy priority for the Department of Education (DOE) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ). In March of 2010 U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan spoke at
Edmund Pettus Bridge for the 45th Anniversary of Bloody Sunday, commemorating one of
the most violent police attacks on the civil rights movement. At this event he promised to
“reinvigorate civil rights enforcement,” and that “working with schools, we are going to
strive to make Dr. King’s dream of a colorblind society a reality.” In his speech he outlined
the focal areas of increased civil rights enforcement for the DOE, which included an
examination of racial disparities in school disciplinary practices. The DOE’s Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) required all school districts with more than 3,000 students (and a sample of
small districts) to report suspension, expulsion, and police referral data by school and
disaggregated by race in 2009-2010. This data was released to the public in the spring of
2012. In September 2010, the civil rights divisions of the DOE and DOJ organized two
national conferences on the topic of civil rights and school discipline and announced it’s
commitment to “eliminate the school-to-prison pipeline,” further opening the federal
education policy agenda to school discipline reform. The Supportive School Discipline
Initiative was officially launched the following year.

As a result of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, I found that the policy network
grew in size and complexity in the 2010 - 2014 time period. The social network diagram
(Figure 5) and whole network measures (Figure 6) demonstrated an increase in the total
number of organizations - or nodes - in the policy network and an increase in the interconnectedness of the policy network in 2010 – 2014 as the Supportive School Discipline Initiative brought in more organizations and organizations entered into more collaborative ties. As we can see in the network diagrams (Figure 5) and the chart of whole network measures (Figure 6), there were 198 organizations with 350 ties to one another in the national school discipline policy network active in the decade before the Supportive School Discipline Initiative (2000 to 2009). This number increased to 233 organizations with 434 ties during the time period immediately surrounding and following the increased attention placed on this issue by the Obama Administration, representing a 18 percent increase in the number of organizations and a 24 percent increase in the number of ties.

Figure 5. Social Network During Final Time Period (2010 – 2014)
Table 6. Whole Network Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>2000 - 2009</th>
<th>2010 - 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Weighted Degree</td>
<td>9.24</td>
<td>10.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Diameter</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graph Density</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Path Length</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # Organizations</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # Ties</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The whole network measures provide evidence that the overall cohesiveness or interconnectedness of the network increased in the 2010–2014 time period. The average weighted degree, or the average number of ties, weighted by the quality and quantity of collaboration, for each organization in the network, increased from 9.24 to 10.46 in the final time period. The network diameter, or the furthest distance between two nodes in the policy network decreased from nine to six. This measure suggests that information and resources likely flowed more quickly through this network. The average path length between two nodes in the network also decreased from 4.38 to 3.21. This measure suggests that between organizations in the policy network between 2010 and 2014, collaborative ties were more plentiful and more intense. Network theory suggests that increased cohesiveness would lead to greater potential for ideas to flow between different social and professional fields, increasing opportunities for innovation and novel solutions.

However, the overall graph density, usually another measure of network cohesiveness, remained very low and decreased slightly in the 2010–2014 time period. This decrease in overall graph density may have simply been due to the increase in the number of potential ties with the addition of each new organization, which is included in the denominator of this measure.

Greater network cohesion, no new solutions. Proponents of network governance argue that increased overall network cohesion improves the function of the network. They argue that greater integration of organizations in different fields increases access to different skill sets, knowledge, and resources, leading to novel and multifaceted solutions to complex social problems (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998, 2001). However, the qualitative coding of the problem and solution definitions contained in the policy reports and national conference materials created over this time period demonstrate that the policy network did not result in innovative solutions geared at addressing the school-to-prison pipeline. Instead, the launch of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative led to solutions that contradicted many of the solutions advocated by community-based advocacy and civil rights groups and furthered the solutions put forth by the growing involvement of education reform product and service
vendors, school psychology professions, and law enforcement. These solutions were largely
the same solutions put forth more than a decade earlier along with Zero Tolerance policies
to address school shootings, student misbehavior, and delinquency - namely, hiring more
school psychologists, creating stronger partnerships with law enforcement, and adopting
behavioral intervention programs.

Rather than taking the more expansive definition of the school-to-prison pipeline problem
and advocating for expanding the adoption of solutions that would decrease the influence of
law enforcement personnel, technologies, and mindsets in schools, the Supportive School
Discipline Initiative narrowed the problem definition to be one about school safety and ways
of addressing student misbehavior without an over-reliance on out-of-school suspensions.
The Dear Colleague letter from the Department of Education that introduced the Guidance
Package to school districts began with, “Our goal of preparing all students for college,
careers, and civil life cannot be met without first creating safe schools where effective
teaching and learning can take place. Simply put, no school can be a great school… if it is
not first a safe school,” (2014). This introductory letter then stated, “No student or adult
should feel unsafe or unable to focus in school, yet this is too often a reality. Simply relying
on suspensions and expulsions, however, is not the answer to creating a safe and productive
school environment.” Using correlational data that demonstrated that students who were
suspended were more likely to drop out of school and become incarcerated, the Supportive
School Discipline Initiative adopted the racial disparity framing of the school-to-prison
pipeline problem but ignored the more significant concerns raised initially by community-
based advocacy and civil rights organizations that schools were becoming more prison-like
with more law enforcement personnel and surveillance technology, and that strengthening
school and law enforcement partnerships led to increased criminalization of youth,
particularly in the schools serving low-income communities of color.

As a result of the racial disparity framing, a constraint inherent in our contemporary civil
rights laws that requires equal treatment but not equal or just outcomes, the Guidance
Package issued by the Department of Education to all school districts and schools as part of
the Supportive School Discipline Initiative recommended clear and consistent exercise of
school disciplinary codes and keeping and sharing detailed disciplinary data disaggregated by
subgroups, without questioning the appropriateness of the school disciplinary codes
themselves. Thus, criminalizing teens for wearing “gang clothing” or posting sexy selfies on
social media, was acceptable so long as those criminalized matched the racial composition of
the school. In addition, the Guidance Package guided school districts to implement
evidence-based strategies, naming in particular positive behavioral interventions and
supports (PBIS) and social emotional learning programs (SEL), programs advanced by the
organizational clusters of education reform product and service vendors, school psychology
and special education researchers, and philanthropies discussed above.

Finally, the Guidance Package guided school districts and schools to hire more school
psychologists and counselors, and build partnerships between schools, law enforcement,
mental health care agencies, and child welfare agencies (DOE, 2014), partnerships that some
advocates had described as leading to data sharing that jeopardized the privacy of students
and their families, and increased the likelihood of incarceration and increased sentences
Perhaps in response to this critique or others like it, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative’s Policy Overview document explicitly provided a “myth buster” that “refutes the belief that FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act) prohibits schools from sharing records with juvenile justice agencies and provides links to additional resources and technical assistance.” Thus the Supportive School Discipline Initiative directly refuted some civil rights and children’s legal advocates’ recommendations to minimize information sharing between schools and law enforcement to combat the school-to-prison pipeline (Advancement Project, 2003; Justice Policy Institute, 2000, 2011).

Instead of innovative solutions to the school-to-prison pipeline or the adoption or adaption of recommendations put forth by those raising the school-to-prison pipeline issue, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative pushed solutions that were taken largely from a set of solutions put forth by a network of policy actors more than a decade and a half earlier. This early network, dominated by a close relationship between the American Institute of Research (AIR) and the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP), brought together eleven of the major national professional organizations of educators, seven of the major national professional organizations of school psychologists, and two law enforcement organizations. The national report that resulted from this network was published by the Department of Education (DOE) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1998. This network advocated for much of the same solutions as the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, but couched the solutions in a very different definition of the problem. The 1998 report is written in response to the school shootings in Springfield, Oregon and defined the problem as “troubled children” - not the overuse of punitive discipline or the racially disproportionate criminalization of children of color.

Throughout the report there was a strong emphasis on the importance of mental health experts, psychologists, and counselors on school campuses.

Teachers and administrators - and other school support staff - are not professionally trained to analyze children’s feelings and motives. But they are on the front line when it comes to observing troublesome behavior and making referrals to appropriate professionals, such as school psychologists, social workers, counselors, and nurses. They also play a significant role in responding to diagnostic information provided by specialists. (Early Warning, Timely Response, 1998).

The report advocated for increased parent engagement, explicit teaching of positive social behaviors, and more intensive behavioral interventions for students who exhibited a need for these interventions including referral to special education. In addition, the report advocated for the integration of law enforcement into a range of school functions including school assemblies, determining safe routes to and from school, and undergoing building safety audits. The report explained, “Effective and safe schools are places where there is strong leadership, caring faculty, parent and community involvement - including law enforcement officials - and student participation in the design of programs and policies,” (Early Warning, 1998). Thus, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative substantially narrowed the school-to-prison pipeline articulation of the problem and used it to motivate a
series of solutions that had been developed in tandem, or at least without direct conflict, with zero tolerance policies a decade and a half before.

Conclusion

Through an examination of the changing network and shifts in school discipline ideologies over time, I find that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative absorbed more radical critiques of the school-to-prison pipeline and redefined the problem to be primarily about educators’ overuse of suspensions and expulsions and the racially disproportionate impact. As we will see in later chapters, this shift, supported by federal attention and funding as well as the advocacy efforts of civil rights organizations, laid the groundwork for a national education reform effort that invoked civil rights ideals and enforcement to further the solutions already packaged by the education reform industry. The framing of the school-to-prison pipeline problem as only about over and disproportionate use of suspensions removed from the solution set any challenges to the growing influence of law enforcement in public education, and focused on providing educators with alternative modes of behavioral management and control. This framing strengthened therapeutic and social control ideologies of school discipline, and failed to challenge the increasing criminalization ideologies. Absent a more critical racial justice lens, the dominant solution to racial disproportionality proposed by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative was data monitoring. This strengthened the data auditing and accountability tendencies in schools and reframed racial justice in school discipline to be about making demands for recognition of the problem without the redistribution of resources to substantively address it. The next chapters explore the mechanisms of co-optation and coordination that create the Supportive School Discipline Initiative and the ways that these ideologies and interests play out in an urban school district.

This chapter finds that initially the ideological community comprised of community-based organizations, racial justice advocacy groups (including several civil rights organizations), and funded by venture philanthropies, framed the issue of school discipline as the encroachment of law enforcement into education, the resulting over-criminalization of youth, and racialized educational practices such as tracking and unequal funding. These organizations demanded changes to Zero Tolerance policies, the reduction of law enforcement personnel and technologies in schools, and warned of the negative impact of data sharing and partnerships between education and law enforcement organizations. On the other side of the political spectrum, Heritage Foundation advocated against the use of Zero Tolerance policies, arguing that they infringed on the personal liberty of individuals and criminalized the unintentional rule breaker, delegitimizing the entire criminal justice system. In the middle was an alliance of the leading education professional organizations that defined the problem as student misbehavior, conceded to the continued use of law enforcement personnel and technologies in “some” schools, and sought other reforms that would create more engaged teaching and learning.

In the interim time period, organizational clusters, comprised of education reform product and service vendors, researchers, and philanthropies proffered solutions that furthered their own professional interests or their share of the market of reform products and services.
While, the School-to-Prison Pipeline was initially raised as a national education policy issue by community-based advocacy groups networked with civil rights organizations, the announcement of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative by the civil rights divisions of the Department of Education and the Department of Justice, brought together education, psychology, and law enforcement professional organizations as well as think tanks, education reform product and service vendors, venture philanthropies, and research institutions. These strange bedfellows had, up until this point, advanced different and oftentimes contradictory problem and solutions frames on the issue of school discipline. I find that in the five years following the announcement of the “Administration’s commitment to eliminating the School-to-Prison Pipeline,” the new policy network absorbed the School-to-Prison pipeline problem frame, as well as some of the organizations advancing this frame, to promote pre-existing solutions.

The resulting policy and funding priorities ignored recommendations to make schools feel less like prisons by removing metal detectors, uniformed police, and surveillance cameras, particularly in those schools serving low-income communities of color. The policy and associated funding priorities also ignored recommendations to lessen information sharing and partnerships between schools and law enforcement that often led to the criminalization of youth. Finally, the policy and associated funding priorities largely left unaddressed the role of institutionalized racism in the form of racially segregated schools, racially unequal policing, racially tracked courses, and racially unequal resource allocations in the creation of disproportionate school discipline. Through networked policymaking, these broader conceptualization of the school-to-prison pipeline and the recommendations for reducing the growing influence of law enforcement in schools as one point along a continuum of the work necessary to remake schools is replaced by problem definitions that revolve around student misbehavior and lack of teacher behavioral management skills. Thus, a network of government agencies, the major national education and school psychology organizations, school policing organizations, and academics working over two decades successfully reframed pre-existing solutions targeted at “troubled and delinquent youth” as the natural response to the newly defined problem of over and racially disproportionate use of suspension and expulsions brought on by Zero Tolerance policies.

Moreover, the policy, funding priorities, and technical assistance focused on the selection and faithful implementation of a range of packaged programs, designing standards and measurements to track and evaluate programs, hiring and sustaining higher levels of mental health and law enforcement personnel in schools, and the integration of measurements into accountability and evaluation of teachers, leaders, and schools. While, it is possible that some of these solutions may improve the educational experiences of young people at the end of the policy stream, these solutions also each create a long trough that feeds a large and growing school reform industry of program designers, professional development consultants, implementation coaches, evaluators, standards and measurement developers, data system creators, data managers, and academics - this time focused on the social, emotional, and behavioral aspects of schooling rather than the academic focus of No Child Left Behind. Concurrently, the policy drove the increased share of public school budgets going to mental health, school psychology, and law enforcement. What should be of concern to the larger public is that the Supportive School Discipline initiative, and other education
policies, are created and disseminated through complex networks in which the very same industries that benefit financially and professionally also hold tremendous sway in the creation of policy.

How did this occur?

In the next chapter, I explore in greater detail the networked policy making that occurred in the years 2010 – 2014 that follow the announcement that eliminating the school-to-prison pipeline would be a policy priority of the Obama Administration.
The Supportive School Discipline Initiative has been described as a success story of bottom-up, bi-partisan education policy reform, accomplished through a national consensus building process involving a network of community-based advocacy groups, think tanks, philanthropies, academia, professional organizations, and legislatures. Consistent with elite policy maker perspectives of policy creation, the narrative surmises that the national consensus was made possible by the political shift under and Obama Administration, which raised racial disparities in school discipline as a policy concern and created a window for racial justice, civil rights, and school-to-prison pipeline activists throughout the country to shape national education policy (Education Week, May 31, 2016). The evidence certainly suggests that the attention placed on racial disparities in school discipline by the Civil Rights Divisions of the DOE and DOJ under the Obama Administration significantly shaped the network, or structure of the social field, of policy actors advocating and counter-advocating on the issue of school discipline reform. The evidence also confirms that this network included a wide array of policy actors networked with one another. However, the evidence does not support the notion that the policy network functioned as a passive conduit for information, idea, skill, and resource sharing to support the creation of novel and integrated solutions to the school-to-prison pipeline, as proponents of networked policymaking would suggest.

In this chapter I utilized social network visualization and qualitative coding of policy reports and documents to explore the networked policy making process that followed the Obama Administration’s announcement that eliminating the school-to-prison pipeline was a national education priority. I discuss the ways in which the policy network functioned in 2010 – 2014, paying particular attention to the role that the State, including federal civil rights agencies, and the civil rights advocacy organizations play in the Supportive School Discipline Initiative to shape the overall structure of the network, the structure of the ideological communities, and the relative distribution of the constituent organizations within the network.

I find that the civil rights divisions of the Department of Education and the Department of Justice, or the Offices for Civil Rights (OCR), identify the school-to-prison pipeline as an important national policy issue amidst not only political shifts in Administration but more radical policy wins of school-to-prison pipeline activists at the local level and shrinking law enforcement and corrections budgets during the Great Recession. The federal attention responded to the activity of numerous policy actors that had a stake in the issue. Through a range of policy activities that the DOE and DOJ described as comprising the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the DOE and DOJ structured the relationships and the relative influence of these ideological communities. Thus, rather than a neutral venue for information, resource, and skill sharing, which is surmised by networked policy making proponents to result in innovative solutions or a thoughtful and hard won consensus, the policy network created by the federal attention on the school-to-prison pipeline effectively manufactured a national consensus. This national consensus co-opted the school-to-prison
pipeline term, redefined the problem as disproportional punishment, student misbehavior, and educator incapacity, and advocated for solutions that augmented the growth of law enforcement and clinical school psychology in education, and drummed up demand for education reform products and services. The policy consensus created by the DOE and DOJ’s Initiative narrowed the school-to-prison pipeline critique from one that raised concerns about the rise of mass incarceration and criminalization in communities of color to one about better behavioral management in schools. Furthermore, rather than challenging the increasing encroachment of law enforcement personnel, protocols, and ideologies in education, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative ignored these concerns and even advocated for increased data sharing, collaboration, and partnership between schools and law enforcement.

I find that the DOE and DOJ shaped this national consensus in three important ways: 1) by defining a set of core organizations in the policy network through legitimation and funding, 2) controlling representation and participation in the policy network to increase the influence of law enforcement, clinical school psychology, and education reform product and service vendors, and 3) selectively funding particular “evidence-based” solutions. Through this process, the DOE and DOJ Initiative increased the number and influence of law enforcement organizations in the national policy network eleven-fold and nearly erased the participation and influence of community-based advocacy organizations. Despite some advocacy and counter advocacy efforts by organizational clusters to gain relative dominance for their favored solutions, as a whole, this configuration of social forces pushed for policies, programs, and solutions that increased data monitoring and evaluation, “expert” trainers and consultants, more school psychologists, and more coordination with law enforcement. Thus, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative created a seemingly broad policy consensus that fed the growth of the education reform industry without addressing the concerns about the growing influence of law enforcement in education that motivated the civil rights and community-based advocacy organizations in the first place.

Finally, through out the policy creation process, the civil rights framing of the issue as racially disproportionate suspensions remained important. By framing the school discipline problem as an issue of racially disproportional punishment, and thus a civil rights issue, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative invoked the enforcement powers of the Office for Civil Rights to mandate (or guide under threat of enforcement) solutions that neither addressed the growing carceral state, particularly in low-income communities of color, nor the sources of racial inequities in education that extended far beyond racially disproportionate suspensions.

I argue that this co-optation of the school-to-prison pipeline frame to mandate and legitimate pre-existing solutions that benefit the school reform industry as well as the continued growth in clinical school psychology and school-based law enforcement is not the natural outcome of a fair system of policy network innovation as policy network proponents would suggest. I find that through the consensus and technical assistance process the State responded to a radical critique of the educational and penal institutions but absorbed and distorted these demands through the networked policymaking process. This co-optation is only possible because once at the table, those organizations invited to participate in the
policy network in fact do cooperate with one another, shifting their framing of the problem and relevant solutions over time to resemble one another. Thus the policy network provided opportunities for the contestation within and between the professional and social fields competing in the arena of education policymaking to arrive at a consensus that expanded the overall demand for the expertise, products and services of those fields. I used social network visualization coupled with the analysis of policy text and policy reports to shed light on these processes.

The Context of Federal Attention

The joint initiative by the Department of Education and the Department of Justice to eliminate the school-to-prison pipeline coincided with the height of the Great Recession, which lasted roughly between 2008 and 2012. The Great Recession caused significant budget shortfalls in most states - totaling more than $500 billion dollars from 2009 – 2012 (Brookings Institute, 2012). These budget deficits impacted all public services - education, law enforcement, corrections, health, and social safety nets. At the same time, Federal grants that had been used to support police in schools declined just as school budgets plummeted. A Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools 2010 survey found that many School Resource Officer (SRO) programs were facing layoffs and cuts. In similar fashion, school counselors, school psychologists, and other support staff in schools were laid off in large numbers, along with teachers (EdSource, 2013). Moreover, the Great Recession caused states to cut correction budgets that placed financial pressures on prisons as well as criminal and juvenile courts. In many states policymakers enacted criminal justice reforms to reduce prison populations, and even discussed closing prisons (Gottschalk, 2010). For the first time since 1972, the total state prison population declined in 2009. These budget cuts and resulting increased work loads on juvenile courts and police were discussed openly in meetings held by the Council of State Government’s Consensus Project, and appeared in the Consensus Report as concerns over “strained dockets and processes” (Council of State Governments, 2014).

With these changing economic conditions, and the increasing willingness to re-examine the cost of law enforcement, civil rights advocacy groups and their community-based advocacy organization allies celebrated a number of local policy wins that included some new solutions to the school-to-prison pipeline in the years prior to the official launch of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative (Advancement Project, 2010). These local policy wins included revised zero tolerance discipline policies to restrict the use of police referrals to serious misconduct, funding alternatives to suspensions including restorative justice, and reallocating money targeted at law enforcement to more student supports. San Francisco Unified School District passed a policy that limited police involvement in schools to actions “necessary to protect the physical safety of students and staff; required by law; or appropriate to address criminal behavior of person other than students.” In addition, the policy stated that disproportionate use of police intervention “shall be cause for corrective action by the District,” a policy that placed significantly more oversight powers in the hands of educational administrators than other Memorandums of Understanding between school districts and law enforcement in other parts of the country (Advancement Project, 2010). In contrast to the policy guidance later issued by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative,
these early local policy changes, adopted by some school districts, more closely addressed the concerns of community-based advocacy organizations and civil rights groups that school partnerships with law enforcement were increasing the criminalization of youth on school campuses.

In the midst of the Great Recession and facing some local policy changes that threatened a shift from law enforcement to alternatives, the civil rights divisions of the Department of Education and Department of Justice announced the Administration’s commitment to eliminate the school-to-prison pipeline. Beyond just an opportunity opened by a change of administration, the DOE and DOJ acted in this moment in response to economic and political pressures as well. Yet these conflicts, viewed in this light, appear less to be about decriminalizing schools or improving the lives of young people and more about the inter-institutional jostling between law enforcement, schools, and social services for laying claim to declining public funds and determining responsibility for controlling misbehaving youth. The federal attention on the school-to-prison pipeline placed by the DOE and DOJ provided an opportunity for these competing interests to work themselves out.

**Federal Attention & the New Policy Network Structure and Composition**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the policy network in the last time period (2010 − 2014) increased in both size and complexity. Here, I describe the structure and composition of this network to orient the reader to the social forces active in this time period. In the next section, I explore the policymaking process and the significance of the network structure on policy outcomes. The overall structure of the policy network in the final time period changed from one of loosely connected and mutually exclusive organizational clusters connected by a handful of boundary spanners into one that was more connected especially through a subset of organizations located towards the center of the network and visibly larger in size (Figure 7). These organizations had higher between-ness centrality scores, a measure of how often these organizations existed on the shortest path between other nodes in the network. Not surprisingly, these larger centrally located nodes - or core organizations - also acted as hubs for subgroup or clusters of organizations that were not networked with other organizations. Based on social network theory, these centrally located nodes had disproportionate influence over the flow of information and resources in the network (Borgatti et al., 2013), a concept I will return to in the next section when I examine in greater detail the changing network position of the ideological communities presented in previous time periods and the new ideological communities that are networked in the later time period.

Using the Lovain method available through Gephi, I identified ten organizational clusters labeled 1-10 in Figure 7 that had more collaborative ties with one another than with other organizations and often shared ideological commitments. Many of the hubs of the organizational clusters active in the ten years before the Supportive School Discipline Initiative remained active in the new national policy network. For example, of the advocacy organizations active in the first time period, the Civil Rights Project and the Equity Project at Indiana University became the hubs of cluster 1, and the Advancement Project and the Justice Policy Institute became the hubs of cluster 2. The organizational clusters of education reform product and service vendors present in the second time period also continued to be
active in the third time period with the National PBIS Technical Assistance Center acting as a hub for cluster 3, Collaborative for Academic Social and Emotional Learning (CASEL) forming the hub of cluster 5, the Character Education Partnership acting as the hub for cluster 6, and the National School Climate Center being the hub for cluster 7.

Figure 7. Social Network in Final Time Period (2010 – 2014), With Subgroups

While most of the organizational clusters that were active in the decade prior to the Supportive School Discipline Initiative continued to be active during the 2010 – 2014 time period, the organizational cluster of community-based advocacy organizations no longer appeared in the national policy network. From the policy reports published by civil rights organizations there was evidence that community-based advocacy organizations continued to be active through this time period organizing at the local and state-level, but only six appeared in the national policy network in this later time period.

The federal attention on the school-to-prison pipeline coincided with the addition of two new ideological communities not present in previous time periods - cluster 4 and cluster 9. First, in cluster 4, a new organizational cluster appeared around the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO), a new think tank representing the interests of the growing field of school police. This organizational cluster was comprised of local police
departments (in ORANGE) and the national associations that represented school social workers, psychologists, counselors, and principals - the non-teaching staff in schools. This organizational cluster advocated for having more school resource officers on school campuses to act as safety resources for teachers and administrators and mentors for youth. In a PowerPoint presentation presented during a national leadership summit organized as part of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, a NASRO representative explained that the goal of a SRO program was to build more positive relationships between youth and law enforcement, teach the value of law and “respect for people and property,” and reducing juvenile delinquency by helping students formulate an awareness of rules, authority, and justice” (NASRO, 2014). These goals reflected a definition of the problem as students lacking respect for people, property, rules, and authority, and the solution being more law enforcement.

Additionally, in cluster 9, a new organizational cluster was convened by the New York Permanent Judicial Council, comprised of juvenile court judges, professional organizations of juvenile court staff, and children’s legal advocates. This cluster advocated for interventions that reduced the number of school-based referrals to the juvenile court system (cite), including intervening panels of school-law partnerships that determined the severity of offense and diverted students to community resources rather than the courts (Teske, 2014). These two additional ideological communities brought in law enforcement and juvenile justice organizations and ideas into the policy network, influencing the outcomes of the Initiative.

The remaining organizational clusters (clusters 8 and 10) were comprised of organizations collaborating with the five organizations directly funded through the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Thus, I would argue that cluster 8 and 10 represented the ideological communities that most closely aligned with those at the helm of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. The hubs of cluster 8 were the Justice Center of the Council of State Governments and the American Institutes of Research (AIR). The Council of State Governments Justice Center was the criminal justice reform wing of a national bipartisan research and advocacy organization made up of state leaders from all branches of government. The Council of State Governments advocated for inter-agency cooperation to reduce the number of people entering the criminal justice system and to reduce corrections spending. The advisory board of the Justice Center was largely comprised of Republican and Democratic state legislators, criminal court judges, prosecutors, and prison administrators. AIR was the largest behavioral sciences research, evaluation, and product development organization in the world. The hubs of cluster 10 were the Department of Education and the Department of Justice themselves. A majority of the organizations in this cluster were local school districts that were brought in to present in national or regional conferences or national technical assistance webinars as best practice models of the programs and policies advocated for by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. These included model implementation of school-police partnerships, PBIS, data collection, and Character Education.
Manufacturing Consensus: State Involvement in Policy Network Formation

I find that through the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the DOE and DOJ shaped the structure of relationships and the relative influence of competing ideological communities in the national policymaking network. Thus, rather than a neutral venue for information and resource sharing that leads to innovative solutions, the policy network created by the federal attention on the school-to-prison pipeline helped to manufacture a national consensus that co-opted the school-to-prison pipeline frame, redefined the problem as disproportional punishment, student misbehavior, and educator incapacity, and advocated for solutions that augmented the growth of law enforcement and clinical school psychology in education. At the same time, it created demand for education reform product and services. I find that the DOE and DOJ manufactured this national consensus by: 1) defining a set of core organizations in the policy network through legitimation and funding, 2) controlling representation and participation in the policy network, and 3) selectively funding particular “evidence-based” solutions.

Creating and funding a new policy network core. Liberal perspectives on reform would suggest that even when policy networks fail to create novel solutions, they provide a venue for political contest and compromise and result in incremental reforms. The State, in this perspective, facilitates a fair and reasoned deliberation. By examining how the structure of the policy network changed as a result of the federal attention on school discipline alongside the changing problem and solution frames, the data suggest that through the Supportive School Discipline Initiative the federal government substantially shaped the structure of the policy network and the policy outcomes by funding particular organizations to act as hubs for policy activity and funding particular solutions rather than others. These findings suggest that the organizations that comprised this new network core acted as gatekeepers rather than passive and apolitical conduits of information and resources. These organizational hubs regulated the distribution of constituent organizations and thus the kinds of problem and solution definitions that dominated the policy network.

A majority of the dedicated new funding and support from the DOE and DOJ to launch the Supportive School Discipline Initiative went to the Consensus Project led by the Council of State Governments’ Justice Center. The Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awarded $840,000 to the Council of State Governments to lead and convene a process that would result in a national consensus document. A number of venture philanthropies, including the Atlantic Philanthropies, the California Endowment, the Novo Foundation, and the Open Society Foundation, matched these funds, providing the Council of State Governments with what is estimated to be more than 1.6 million dollars (Council of State Governments, 2014; SSDI Policy History, 2014).

The Supportive School Discipline Initiative also helped to fund two national leadership summits - one organized by the New York Permanent Judicial Commission and the other organized as a collaboration of venture philanthropies and government agencies. Finally, the Initiative funded the American Institute of Research to create an online community of practice and technical assistance webinars. These organizations were either not active in the previous policy network, as is the case of the New York Permanent Judicial Commission and
the Council of State Governments, or were much less central in the previous time periods. Through its activities and its funding priorities, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative created new organizational hubs that came to occupy central positions in the policy network. Using between-ness centrality scores as a proxy for influence, six of the ten organizations with the most influence in the 2010 – 2014 time period were the federal agencies responsible for the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, such as the DOE and DOJ, or the organizations directly funded and supported by the Initiative, such as the American Institute of Research, the New York Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children, and the Council of State Governments. See appendices for a comparison chart of between-ness centrality scores between the two time periods. The Initiative’s funding and legitimation of these core organizations for the network increased the influence of these organizations and the ideological communities they belonged to on the policy network outcomes.

In the first organizational hub funded by the Initiative, the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children (Cluster 9) convened a national summit titled, “Keeping Kids in Schools and Out of Court Initiative,” in 2012 and published a compilation of 16 policy briefs. The NY Judicial Commission was a standing commission established in 1988 “to improve the lives and life chances of children involved in the New York courts,” (www.nycourts.gov/ip/justiceforchildren/). In 2012, the NY Judicial Commission convened what they called “the first national gathering of the states’ top education and judicial leaders to address the school-court connection,” (Keeping Kids in School, 2012). Within its presenting authors, the NY Judicial Commission brought together a smattering of juvenile justice reform organizations with organizations that constituted the civil rights and special education clusters, and other new hubs of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Thus, authors represented law schools and children’s legal aid organizations (in PINK), juvenile courts (in ORANGE), government agencies (in RED), professional education organizations (in PURPLE), and for-profit and non-profit education reform product and service vendors (in YELLOW).

As the NY Judicial Commission brought the juvenile justice and education social fields together, the conflicting problem definitions within the changing policy network were evident in the different definitions of the problem presented by contributing authors and presenters. The introduction defined the problem as unintended and excessive use of suspensions, as well as police presence on school campuses, and the racially disproportionate impact these policies had on students of color. In another it defined the problem as trauma-induced student misbehavior in both educational and juvenile justice settings, stating:

Youth with high-risk behaviors present a challenge to educational and juvenile justice systems. Behaviors such as fighting, running away, cutting, or substance abuse are some of the more overt challenges, but inability to pay attention, overreacting to slights, and poor self-regulation skills can be equally problematic. Although they have different mandates, schools, child welfare, mental health and substance abuse agencies often deal with youth who present with the same difficult high-risk behaviors. (Chapin Hall)
Consistent with earlier findings, organizational actors advocated for solutions that increased their influence. For example, PBIS proponents argued that PBIS should be extended to alternative education settings including juvenile justice facilities. Juvenile justice reformers argued that juvenile justice personnel and interventions should be utilized in educational settings to address the problem.

It may be time to question the efficacy of educators defining and determining the best role for justice professionals within their walls, rather allowing trained justice professionals to clarify and determine their own best role within the education system. Using restorative justice in the educational setting can be a strong vehicle for creating true partnerships between justice and education practitioners, as school police (and probation) officers can become resourceful, strategic partners in prevention and intervention efforts designed to strategically or potentially help keep youth in school and out of the justice system.

In this way, policy network activities that brought together multiple social and professional fields led not surprisingly to organizational actors attempting to expand their own influence in adjacent fields. However, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative’s deliberate funding and support of law enforcement and juvenile justice oriented organizations to act as hubs in this new policy network brought in more law enforcement, legal, and juvenile justice oriented organizations and ideas into the policy network and ultimately supported the expansion of law enforcement and juvenile justice into education. The summary of the summit recommendations published by the NY Judicial Commission supported deepening school-justice partnerships, “detect[ing] at-risk kids early and provid[ing] appropriate supports; and develop[ing] standards that hold children accountable for misbehaviors yet reserve extreme measures such as school expulsion and mandatory arrest for the most egregious cases.”

The second organizational hub funded by the Initiative was the Council of State Governments Justice Center, which appeared as one of two core organizations in Cluster 8. The Council of State Governments was initially funded by the Atlantic Philanthropies and the Open Society Foundations to partner with the Public Policy Research Institute at the Texas A&M University to conduct research on the relationship between school suspension and expulsion, dropping out, and future juvenile justice involvement. Using a large school and juvenile justice data set, the report, "Breaking Schools Rules," demonstrated in quantitative terms, the size of the problem, the presence of racial disproportionality, and the correlational relationship between school discipline, poor academic outcomes, and later arrest. It seemed to provide nearly irrefutable evidence of what became the dominant description of the problem that blamed high and racially disproportionate juvenile justice involvement on the racially disproportionate suspensions conducted by school teachers and administrators. This seminal report enjoyed broad support from both Republican and Democratic Texas legislators, an interesting fact given that Texas legislators were some of the first to advocate for and adopt zero tolerance policies in the early 1990s (Koch, 2000).

The Initiative funded the Council of State Governments to select and convene over one hundred organizations nationwide said to represent “a truly collaborative effort involving
hundreds of experts in education, behavioral health, law enforcement, and juvenile justice, as well as policymakers, parents, youth, and advocates” (Council of State Governments, 2014). Out of these hundred organizations selected to participate in the Council of State Government’s Consensus Project, a full quarter were law enforcement organizations, mostly police and school police departments (26 percent), constituting the largest single constituency in the Consensus process (Council of State Governments, Appendix A, 2014). I did not include this list of organizational participants in the social network maps because I did not have similar information for the other national conferences, but an analysis of just those organizations that were acknowledged for their particular support in the Consensus Project demonstrated that the Council of State Governments collaborated extensively with legislators on both sides of the aisle, law enforcement organizations, philanthropies, several research and advocacy organizations, and AIR, to the exclusion of civil rights groups and education professional organizations in particular but also to community-based advocacy groups.

This pattern of collaboration is confirmed in the structure of their consensus process. Through the Consensus Project the Council of State Governments created four working groups focused on the topics of conditions for learning, targeted behavioral interventions, school-police partnerships, and courts and juvenile justice. These working groups were led by representatives of the Atlantic Philanthropies, American Institutes of Research, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and the Council of State Governments respectively. Not only were no civil rights or community-based advocacy leaders given facilitator or leadership positions, no organizational hub previously active in this arena led any of the work groups. Instead the consensus process was facilitated and led by organizations representing venture philanthropy, education reform products and services, law enforcement, and juvenile justice.

In 2014, the Council of State Governments released their 436-page consensus report. In it they defined the problem as suspensions leading to a risk of dropping out and “coming into contact with the juvenile justice system.” Rather than the active school-to-prison pipeline definitions used by community-based advocacy organizations and their civil rights allies that focus on the push out of children, particularly brown and black children, from schools and the tracking of children into the criminal justice system through school-police partnerships, the racial disparity in suspension frame placed most, if not all, of the blame on teachers and administrators for suspending students. After undergoing an 18-month process that costed over $1.6 million dollars, the report concluded that:

The central thesis of this comprehensive report is that achieving these objectives requires the combination of a positive school climate, tiered levels of behavioral interventions, and a partnership between education, police, and court officials that is dedicated to preventing youth arrests or referrals to the juvenile justice system for minor school-based offenses. (Council of State Governments, 2014).

The highlighted recommendations fell into eight overarching recommendations. The first three overarching recommendations focused solely on educational practices and tended to advocate for more data monitoring of students, educators, and schools for the expressed goals of support and accountability. The last five overarching recommendations discussed
the relationship between law enforcement and schools, advocating for increasingly more integration of the two systems.

The Council of State Government’s Consensus Report recommendations focus on creating an accountability system for school climate that mirrored academic accountability. The report recommended that schools keep elaborate academic and behavioral data that acted as an early warning systems to identify students who were likely to be suspended, arrested, or incarcerated. The recommendations also included measurement and accountability of school climate measures, integration of school climate accountability into academic achievement goals, professional development on classroom management, pre-service training on school climate issues, and inclusion of school climate measures into teacher and principal evaluation. The recommendations primarily relied on strengthening the punitive and social control function of school discipline as a way to keep children controlled in school and not in other parts of communities. The recommendations suggested clarifying school rules to parent and students. The recommendations insisted that removal from school was a last resort, advocating for “on-campus options” and quality alternative education placements with mechanisms for students to return.

Rather than dismantling school-prison partnerships, the report provided recommendations for improving school-police partnerships, including suggesting that local school districts determine the appropriateness of school police through a data-driven process with relevant stakeholders, and create memoranda of understandings that articulated the responsibilities of SROs. The break out group focused on juvenile justice issues recommended that better data be kept on school-based events that end up in court in order to identify schools with abnormally high referral rates, and creating more diversion programs. The recommendation stemmed from juvenile court complaints at the volume of low-level misconduct that ends up “strain[ing] existing dockets and processes,” (Council of State Governments, 2014).

The report also recommended ways to strengthen and speed up data sharing between schools, law enforcement and courts as a means of conducting risk assessments - risk of re-offending, risk of failure to appear, etc. - of youth entering the juvenile justice system and creating treatment plans. The report recommended “electronic data systems to ensure a swift transfer of information in keeping with privacy requirements.” In addition, the report explained that while FERPA prohibited the use of information from a student’s education record for law enforcement purposes, any information kept on students that are created and kept in a separate law enforcement data system “may be used for arrest, investigation, or other law enforcement purposes and may be shared with the officer’s police agency (Council of State Governments, 2014). Finally, the report recommended integrating schools within juvenile correctional facilities into the state’s education system to ensure alignment of standards, curriculum, and information. Thus, the Consensus Report located the school-to-prison pipeline problem primarily in teachers’ and administrators’ use of suspensions, and recommended increased partnership between schools and law enforcement.

Forming the third new organizational hub of the policy network and sharing an organizational cluster (Cluster 8) with the Council of State Governments, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative funded the American Institute for Research (AIR) to provide the
implementation support and technical assistance for much of the Initiative. Each of the 16 Supportive School Discipline webinars hosted during the 2010 – 2014 time period were produced by AIR and introduced and moderated by either a representative of DOJ’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) or AIR. While the Civil Rights divisions of both agencies provided the overview for the Guidance Package on school discipline, these divisions otherwise seemed to have little involvement in the webinars that guided school districts on implementation. Out of 48 speakers during the webinars, only 1 community-based organizing group was invited to speak and no civil rights organizations presented. In contrast 6 speakers came from law enforcement and 5 were education reform product and service vendors. The webinars focused on a number of solutions including PBIS, truancy prevention, restorative justice, and trauma-informed practices. Many panels paired an education reform product and service vendor and a local school superintendent who shared his/her success with implementing the focal solution addressed by the webinar.

Finally, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative also included the issuance of federal guidance and monitoring by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Building upon increased enforcement of racial discrimination claims, particularly on issues related to school discipline beginning in 2009, DOE and DOJ’s Office for Civil Rights issued legal guidance to schools and school districts outlining principles and guidelines for improving school discipline policy and practice that would be consistent with civil rights requirements. With this guidance the DOE and DOJ also released a directory of federal resources to assist in the implementation of the policy, a compendium of state laws and regulations, and an overview of the policy and policy history. Consistent with the other components of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the Guidance Package that the civil rights divisions of the DOE and DOJ finally release in 2014, defined the problem in the racial disparity in suspensions frame, and advocated for adopting alternative interventions to suspension including PBIS and social and emotional learning, data collection and monitoring, clear and graduated discipline policies that remove students from the classroom only as a last resort, and the interagency collaboration with law enforcement, mental health, and child welfare.

**Controlling representation and participation in the policy network.** The creation of new hubs of activity centered around the New York Permanent Judicial Commission, the Council of State Governments, and the American Institute of Research (AIR) changed the overall distribution of organizations in the policy network by their choices of what organizations to include as participants in the Consensus Project, what organizational representatives to invite as speakers in the national conferences and webinars, as well as who to invite to author or co-author policy briefs. These changes in the network were evidenced in the change in the distribution of the kinds of organizations in the national policy network and resulted in the narrowing of the problem and solution definitions during this period.

By comparing a simple count of the organizational types active in the policy network during the ten years prior to the federal attention on school discipline with the count of organizations in the policy network between 2010 and 2014, I find that while the overall size of the network grew, the number of community-based advocacy organizations fell precipitously and the number of law enforcement organizations increased 11 fold (Figure 5). Additionally, the number of organizations typically associated with the education reform
industry, which included research and advocacy organizations, venture philanthropies, government agencies, and for-profit and non-profit education reform product and service vendors (Picciano & Spring, 2013) increased overall with a significant increase of for-profit and non-profit education reform services vendors (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Changing Distribution of Organizations

![Graph showing changing distribution of organizations](image)

I find that the number of community-based advocacy organizations in the school discipline policy network plummeted from 41 organizations to 7, constituting an 83 percent drop. Only two community-based advocacy organization that were active in the earlier time period were networked into the activities of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative - Padres y Jovenes from Denver, Colorado and CADRE from Los Angeles, California. Dignity in Schools, a coalition of nearly one hundred community-based organizing and legal advocacy groups nationwide organizing against school push out and zero tolerance policies since 2006, only had two instances of collaboration within this policy network, once as a co-author on a policy report with several civil rights groups and once as a speaker in the first conference on school discipline and civil rights organized by the civil rights divisions of the DOE and DOJ in September of 2010. This data suggested that the new hubs of policy network activity created by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative limited the participation of community-based advocacy organizations in the national policy network.

The data suggested two possible explanations. First, organizations that originally collaborated with community-based advocacy organizations became more central players in the policy network in the final time period and may have collaborated less with community-based advocacy organizations in this shift or may have continued to collaborate but not in as many public fora. Second, in the first time period venture philanthropies like the Mott
Foundation, Ford Foundation, and MacArthur Foundation also acted as boundary spanners between the civil rights and community-based advocacy clusters, funding activities in both clusters. In contrast, in the later policy network, these venture philanthropic dollars went primarily to national conferences and the consensus building processes, in which philanthropy staff held central positions as conference planners, facilitators, and panel moderators. Thus, funding of the national policy network may have defunded community-based advocacy organizations.

**Increasing representation of law enforcement.** Simultaneously, the number of law enforcement organizations - police departments, professional law enforcement organizations, prosecutors, and police research and advocacy organizations - involved in the policy network increase from two in the decade before the federal attention on the school-to-prison pipeline (2000 – 2009) to 22 in the final time period (2010 – 2014). This eleven fold increase of law enforcement organizations made law enforcement the third largest professional sector involved in the policy network after education and psychology.

In the final time period, these law enforcement organizations were active in the policy network by leading one of four advisory groups within the Consensus Project, speaking in national conferences, presenting in webinars hosted by the American Institutes of Research, and publishing policy reports. These law enforcement organizations explained that they were responding to concerns that the previous cycle of recession-induced budget cuts caused many schools to lay off School Resource Officers (SROs) (Council of State Governments, 2014). These law enforcement organizations advocated for the continued utility of school-police partnerships and explicitly addressed their growing concern that the negative perception of police in schools was being fueled by organizations like the Justice Policy Institute. A report published by the National Association of School Resource Officers (2012) argued,

> This school safety law model does not foster a “school-to-jail pipeline.” Interagency teamwork does not divest any participating agency of functions and duties given by law that enable its specific mission. Nor does it foster aggrandizement of the authority of other agencies. This criticism of school resource officers reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of comprehensive interagency reform.

The National Association of School Resource Officers advocated for interagency cooperation and information sharing, particularly between mental health professionals, schools, and law enforcement.

**Siloing participation.** In addition to increasing the number of law enforcement organizations in the policy network eleven-fold and reducing the number of community-based advocacy organizations by 83 percent, the policy activities of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative tended to create different silos of participation such that competing interests of racial justice and law enforcement were separated from one another. This was illustrated by the fact that the Consensus Report was created from the work of four concurrent working groups - focusing separately on conditions for learning, targeted behavioral interventions, school-police partnerships, and juvenile courts. As mentioned
previously, the four focus groups were convened by leaders of the Atlantic Philanthropies, American Institutes of Research, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and the Council of State Governments. The school-police partnerships advisory group was led by the executive director of a national police chiefs association and included a number of law enforcement. The two community-based advocacy organizations and the two civil rights organizations included in the Consensus Project were not given leadership roles. One advocate shared that his/her concerns about law enforcement were not received well in the process.

Additionally, during one of the Consensus Project meetings, a youth organizer requested that the consensus process include more youth voice (Perspectives of Youth Affected by Exclusionary School Discipline, 2013). Rather than including more youth representatives or community-based organization representatives in the Consensus Project, AIR was funded to lead a separate “listening session” with 19 youth identified by youth agencies in Washington, DC, and New York City. The findings of this “listening session” were published as a separate report, "Roundtable: The Perspectives of Youth Affected by Exclusionary School Discipline" (2013). The Report provided 16 quotes of youth who had been suspended or expelled from school and six - or 37.5 percent - of all the quotes in the report identified law enforcement in schools as the problem. These concerns were not discussed in the final Consensus Report and this AIR report was not cited within three rounds of snow-ball sampling of the official policy documents that comprised my sample for this study. One youth quoted in the report demonstrated a keen understanding of these policy processes. He/she said,

I'm talking about our governor, our president, the folks like AIR and other nonprofit organizations. They need to be inviting students, but also being real about it. Communities of low income, communities of color, we have politicians… coming in our schools, our communities every day promising the sky and above, right? And they invite us to this conversation, and the minute they get into power, we don't see their face. We don't hear from them again, and everything they said is down the drain, and we find ourselves in Washington, D.C. At an AIR conference talking about something we requested two years ago. (Perspectives of Youth, 2013, p. 7).

This process of including youth voice just further exemplified the ways in which these networked policy processes appeared to invite broad participation but did not incorporate the issues and demands of those most affected.

In summary, the organizations that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative identified and funded to act as the core of the policy network controlled the representation and participation of policy actors in the network, privileging law enforcement, school psychology, and education reform product and service vendors and diminishing the influence of community-based advocacy organizations or civil rights advocacy groups that espoused a more radical critique of the education and penal systems.

**Strengthening ties to the education reform industry and competing solutions.** While not comprising the core of the new policy network, the organizational clusters that advocated for particular packaged solutions in the previous time periods, persist in the final
time period and retained collaborative ties to the new core organizations. These organizational clusters formed the periphery of the new policy network but were networked into the policy network through speaking engagements organized by the new organizational hubs funded by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. In contrast to the previous time period in which the organizational clusters or ideological communities tended to circle around a research and advocacy organization (in BLUE), these organizational clusters came to center around for-profit and non-profit education reform product and service vendors (in YELLOW). These organizational clusters revolved around the National School Climate Center (cluster 7), the Character Education Partnership (cluster 6), the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL)(cluster 5), and the loose cluster of special education departments and organizations that were organized around the national technical assistance center for PBIS (cluster 3).

Increasingly these for-profit and non-profit education reform product and service vendors merged or expanded to provide a wider set of services that included research and advocacy for the very same services that they were selling to schools. Shopping carts and “Product and Service” tabs become a common feature on many of their organizational websites. While these organizational clusters advocated for school consumption of reform products and services, they failed to address the broader concerns of community-based advocacy organizations and their civil rights allies that raised issue with increased police presence and school-police partnerships that siphoned kids from school and into the criminal justice system.

As one example, the Character Education Partnership or character.org’s mission statement explained that it was a “national advocate and leader for character development,” publishing policy reports and providing professional development, evaluation, consultation, lesson plans, and conferences to schools. One of its member organizations explains its wide array of services:

The Center engages in research, education and advocacy to foster the development of character, democratic citizenship and civil society. Funded by grants, individual donations, and through corporate and foundation support, the Center focuses on generating and disseminating both knowledge and research pertaining to how individuals develop moral and civic character. By providing scholars, educators and social organizations with the tools they need to contribute to this development, the Center plays the role of a think tank, offering workshops, consulting, and professional development. The Center also provides resources and tool kits to assist educators, parents and scholars in character and citizenship education. (Characterandcitizenship.org).

In at least two of these organizational clusters - the cluster around CASEL (cluster 5) and the cluster around Character Education Partnership (cluster 6) - venture philanthropies fund designated academic positions, or endowed professorships, in research universities to provide the empirical foundation and legitimacy for the reform products and services that the hub organization advocated for. The academic positions published the program evaluations that deemed these products and services "evidence-based," a standard for
choosing programs that pervaded the schools and school districts. Thus, these organizational hubs were tight-knit networks of venture philanthropies, researchers, advocates, and education reform product and service vendors that worked together to push for policy and accountability systems to support their products as the privileged solution to the school discipline problem. This partnership provided further evidence of the presence and reach of the education-industrial complex described by Picciano and Spring (2013).

Reports published by each of the organizational clusters - clusters 3, 5, 6, and 7 in Figure 4 - recognized the increased interest in school climate but did not necessarily pose the school-to-prison pipeline or even the more narrowly defined zero tolerance policies as problems. Similar to their publications in the decade before the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, they continued to advocate for the appropriateness of their favored solution, however in this time period the arguments become more explicitly about why their solution was superior to others or how their solution was the larger frame under which other solutions fit, suggesting the competition that you would expect in a market for products and services.

The organizational cluster around the national Positive Behavioral Interventions & Supports (PBIS) technical assistant center run by the DOE’s Office of Special Education Programs (shown in RED in cluster 3), enjoyed what might be called the dominant share of the reform products and services market. Most other organizational clusters including those clustered around civil rights advocates (cluster 1 and 2), the National Association of School Resource Officers (cluster 4), and the new organizational hubs created by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative (cluster 8, 9, and 10) included PBIS as a recommended alternative to suspensions. The only organizational clusters that did not recommend the adoption of PBIS were clusters organized around an alternative and thus competing solution (clusters 5, 6, and 7).

Review of publications by the organizational cluster around PBIS over time showed that it continued to espouse a problem definition that centered around student misbehavior and provided highly scripted solutions aimed at creating tiered-systems of behavioral modification through positive rewards. The model built upon the capacity of existing staff and required a data-driven, team-based, decision-making model focused on student behavioral data. Enjoying a dominant share of the reform products and services market, the creators and technical assistance vendors of PBIS advocated in the later time period, 2010 – 2014, for integrating PBIS into school districts’ academic and improvement accountability plans and for following “Formal process[es]… to blend new initiatives with SWPBS using logic of systems and outcome measures necessary for implementation of the new (evidence-based) practice.” In addition, in this time period, advocates of PBIS advocated for the appropriateness of PBIS in prison settings to encourage more positive forms of behavioral control. This is evidence of the ways in which the coordination that occurred in these networked policymaking processes provided new markets for reform product and service vendors. At the same time, the advocated spread of PBIS into prison settings raises concerns about whether PBIS challenges, or merely obscures social control tendencies.

The remaining peripheral clusters, which represented alternative and competing education reform products and services to PBIS, advocated for the superiority of their solutions, often
in contrast to PBIS. For example character educators argued that in schools where there was effective character education…

Staff use methods of classroom management that foster intrinsic motivation (doing the right thing because it’s the right thing to do) and avoid adopting programs that are rewards-based. Schools and districts that integrate PBIS (Positive Behavioral Intervention and Support) with character education limit their use of behavior modification techniques and help students develop the desire to do what is right even when there is no external reward. (Character Education Partnership, 2010).

Similarly, a report by the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) in partnership with the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) and other professional organizations argued for an alternative model to PBIS - one they called MTSS or multi-tiered system of supports - which bore a strong resemblance to PBIS but required the hiring of school psychologists, school counselors, school nurses, and other support personnel rather than relying on teams of educators:

In a growing number of schools across the country, response to intervention (RTI) and positive behavior interventions and supports (PBIS) constitute the primary methods for implementing an MTSS framework. Ideally though, MTSS is implemented more holistically to integrate efforts targeting academic, behavioral, social, emotional, physical, and mental health concerns….Effective MTSS requires: adequate access to school-employed specialized instructional support personnel (e.g., school counselors, school psychologists, school social workers, and school nurses) and community-based services. (NASP, 2013).

Thus, through the policy network, education reform product and service vendors learned to distinguish themselves from other solutions or explain ways that programs worked together with other programs.

Some organizations also learned through the policy network to couch their solutions in more acceptable language. For example, the Character Education Partnership (2010) explained revisions to its new edition of “11 Principles of Effective Character Education” that “In 2009, Character.org decided to combine the Eleven Principles and Quality Standards into a single document and update its language to reflect current movements within education and better reflect the best practices being implemented in model schools.” While the 11 principles remained the same, the deficit language contained in previous publications was omitted.

Interestingly, restorative justice practices and implicit bias trainings were mentioned in passing in some policy reports and in the OCR Guidance document, but remained largely absent in the solutions advocated by the policy network. This may be related to the lack of a national restorative justice organization, or the more community-based approach of most restorative justice practitioners that differ from a more market and commodity approach to reform. Exploring the explanations for this observation requires further research.
Funding favored solutions. Finally, the impact and purpose of the Initiative was best understood by studying what was funded. In following the money, it was first important to recognize that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative as a whole provided little funding for new solutions on the scale necessary for a national shift in practices. As a point of comparison, after the high profile school shootings in the 1990s Congress created the Safe Schools/Health Students Initiative (SS/HS) that provided over $2 billion dollars in grants to incentivize cross-sector partnerships between schools, law enforcement, juvenile justice, and mental health (Modzeleski et al., 2012). This 10-year project funded over 350 school districts in 49 states. The small amounts of funding provided by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative went to the policy network process including the Consensus Project, two National Leadership Summits, and an on-line community of practice.

The official policy overview stated that the Department of Education and the Department of Justice made some efforts to integrate school discipline reform into their competitive grants programs, but these efforts appeared minimal given that they largely fund existing priorities. For example, the DOJ awarded $1.5 million in 2012 to support research and evaluation of school programs and practices that reduced “student victimization and the risk of delinquency,” and the DOE’s Institute of Education Sciences encouraged applications researching “programs, practices and policies that support academic learning by keeping students in schools and engaged in learning,” (SSDI Policy History, 2014). All in all, 70 million dollars was allocated to fund School Climate Transformation Grants, competitive federal grants administered by the DOE. These funds specifically supported efforts to expand behavioral interventions like PBIS. The description of the grants available on the DOE website explained that the purpose of the grant was to “develop, enhance, or expand systems of support for, and technical assistance to, schools implementing an evidence-based multi-tiered behavioral framework for improving behavioral outcomes,” and further defines fundable projects in the following way:

Projects should: (1) build capacity for implementing a sustained, school-wide multi-tiered behavioral framework; (2) enhance capacity by providing training and technical assistance to schools; and (3) include an assurance that the applicant will work with a technical assistance vendor, such as the PBIS Technical Assistance Center funded by the Department, to ensure that technical assistance related to implementing program activities is provided.

Thus, the little additional funding allocated to school districts and schools was substantively earmarked to fund PBIS, a solution that largely defined the problem of school discipline as one of student misbehavior and the solution to be of behavioral management through positive incentives and graduated mental health treatment.

However, the majority of funding requested and/or secured under the Supportive School Discipline Initiative went to deepening partnerships between schools, law enforcement, and clinical school psychologists, and expanding the auditing and evaluation system for teachers and principals. The Initiative suggested that the President’s 2014 budget would request $20 million in Juvenile Justice and Education Collaboration Assistance Grants and $55 million grants to raise awareness of mental health issues in schools. The Initiative also funded the
American Institute of Research (AIR) to assist states in integrating positive discipline practices and student engagement measures into teacher and principal evaluation systems, a policy mandate that educational professions had resisted. Thus the Initiative manufactured consensus behind teacher, principal, and school accountability for behavioral outcomes and measures and funded the creation of the instrument that school districts would implement.

Finally, the Council of State Government’s Consensus Report (2014) celebrated that in September 2013 the DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) provided funding to 144 local police departments to hire an additional 370 School Resource Officers (SROs). With conservative estimates of salary and benefits (equaling $90,000 a year), this would amount to over $34 million dollars a year for increased policing in schools during the height of the federal government’s attention on the school-to-prison pipeline.

Coordination and a New Field of Power

Despite jostling among organizations within the resulting policy network for relative dominance of their favored solutions (i.e., PBIS or SEL), as a whole, this configuration of social forces came to agree on the narrowed definition of the school-to-prison pipeline frame that blamed school teachers and administrators for over and racially disproportionate use of school discipline, leading to poorer academic outcomes and over-representation of black and brown youth in the juvenile and criminal justice systems. This definition of the problem was repeated again and again in almost all of the policy reports during this final time period, becoming widely accepted as common sense. This new coordinated and networked set of social forces pushed for policies, programs, and solutions that supported the growth of the education reform industry, the increasing influence of clinical school psychology, law enforcement, and research and evaluation into public education, and the continued collection of data to monitor racial disproportionality for civil rights purposes without funding any solutions directed at reducing racial disproportionality. Thus, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative created a seemingly broad policy consensus that fed the growth of the education reform industry without addressing the concerns about the growing influence of law enforcement technology, ideas, and personnel in education that motivated the civil rights and community-based advocates in the first place.

Despite disagreement within the policy network on competing programs as solutions, a more universal solution shared by organizations in multiple organizational clusters and ideological communities was increased data and accountability for behavioral outcomes for teachers, principals, and schools. Building teacher and principal evaluation systems was a policy priority for the DOE that had met stiff resistance from teachers unions and other education professionals, but enjoyed significant resonance among a number of organizational actors in the school discipline policy network. For example, the National School Climate Council and the Education Commission of the States (2007) advocated that “Effective school climate needs to be a central characteristic of school accountability and assessment systems,” and advocate for scientifically-based measures. This interest matched with a shift in NSCC’s mission in 2002 from “developing leaders in the field of social and emotional education” to “measuring and improving school climate” through their Comprehensive School Climate
Inventory, a measurement package that was marketed to schools (www.schoolclimate.org). Organizations advocated for the integration of school climate measures into the accountability system as a way to refocus schools attention and resources on their solutions.

Similarly, advocates of social emotional learning explained that “[our] goal is for all students in preschool through high school to receive high-quality social and emotional learning. Because learning standards are an important driver of current educational practice at the state level, [we are] committed to supporting the development of standards for social and emotional learning (SEL), preschool through high school, across the country,” (www.casel.org/state-standards-for-social-and-emotional-learning/, 2015). The Civil Rights Project at UCLA (2012) also advocated for the inclusion of suspension rates disaggregated by subgroups into school performance measures and the inclusion of classroom management measures into teacher evaluations, while the Advancement Project (2012), consistent with its broader definition of the school-to-prison pipeline problem, advocated that school leaders be held accountable for lowering out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, disciplinary transfers to alternative schools/programs, referrals to law enforcement, and school-based arrests. In this way, creating data and accountability systems for schools and school districts emerged as a common interest across the organizational clusters. While organizational clusters competed for relative dominance of their solutions, the network solidified a common ideology of management and data accountability across organizations in the network.

The Necessary Role of Civil Rights in the Field of Power

Analyzing the changing position within the policy network of civil rights organizations over time and the way they defined the problem and solution, I find that civil rights organizations act as boundary spanners between community-based advocacy organizations and other actors in the policy network in the earlier time period and become much more embedded in the policy network in the later time period, with fewer community-based advocacy organizations participating in the network overall. This pattern suggested that while community-based advocacy organizations were more active in the initial problem articulation stage in 2000 – 2004, the federal attention on school discipline almost completely wiped out their involvement in later years. However, civil rights organizations continued to have a seat at the table. In the boundary spanning role, civil rights groups such as the Civil Rights Project, that had more connections to academia and fewer connections to community-based organizations, translated the earlier concerns of community-based advocacy groups into legally cognizable terms, such as racial disproportionality. This frame became the dominant frame of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative.

The racial disparity in school discipline frame provided policymakers with a narrowed definition of the problem, which helped to justify solutions that did not seriously challenge the interests of any groups represented in the policy network. The racial disparity in school discipline frame narrowed the concerns of school-to-prison pipeline activists in several ways. First, it narrowed the blameworthy institution to education rather than the relationship between education and the criminal justice system, making it exceedingly difficult to address concerns that data sharing and collaboration between schools, police, and probation were
leading to increased criminalization of youth and foreclosing any solutions that would decrease the influence of criminal justice technologies and personnel in schools. Second, it narrowed the blameworthy individuals to teachers and school administrators, making professional development and training of educators a natural solution to the problem. These solutions strengthened the market for programs, trainings, and expert consultants, without any substantial changes to police practices in schools or the opportunity for teachers and school leaders to learn from one another. Third, the racial disparity frame narrowed the definition of the problem to the unequal punishment of children of color for similar behaviors. This framing left little room for challenging the fairness of having metal detectors, surveillance cameras, drug-sniffing dogs, and armed police in schools serving predominantly low-income students of color. Additionally, this framing of the problem lacked a way to address high suspension rates in schools serving all students of color where there was no white comparator. Thus, the inclusion of these civil rights organizations into the core of the resulting policy network aided in absorbing the more radical critiques of the school-to-prison pipeline activists.

It is however, important to note that in the later time period, the two most active civil rights advocacy organizations on this issue, the Civil Rights Project and the Advancement Project separate into two distinct organizational clusters, with the Civil Rights Project collaborating much more closely with the Equity Project at Indiana University, a university-based research and advocacy center at the intersection of education and school psychology, and the Advancement Project collaborating more with the Justice Policy Institute, a national non-profit advocating for decriminalization. The first cluster pursued the racial disparities frame, while the Advancement Project with the Justice Policy Institute and others continued to advocate for fewer police in schools, including publishing a report titled, “Why Police are not the Answer to Newtown Shooting,” (Advancement Project, 2013). In the final time period, the Advancement Project had collaborative ties with the Department of Education but fewer with the Council of State Governments or AIR, the newly designated core organizations of the policy network.

In the boundary-spanning role, civil rights organizations also provided some legitimacy for policy network solutions among community-based advocacy organizations. This may explain in part the increase in number of community-based advocacy organizations that included PBIS and social emotional learning in their recommended solutions in the later time period.

Through this translation process, the existence of racial disproportionality became motivation for a host of solutions proffered by education product and service vendors, many of which had no connection to the racial nature of the problem. Picciano & Spring (2013) noted the importance of the media in drumming up public pressure for education reforms, such as accountability and school choice, in their account of the education industrial complex. The data in this chapter suggested that civil rights organizations and the community-based advocacy organizations they were networked with also played a role in drawing media attention and building public support for the privileged reforms. Most significantly, racial disproportionality became a justification for exercising the coercive enforcement powers of the State - particularly through the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’ guidance package and enforcement actions that put pressure on schools and school districts to adopt accepted products and services.
While not altogether clear from the data I was able to collect for this study, there was some evidence that the initial intentions of the civil rights divisions may have differed from what would eventually be put forth in the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, providing evidence that even within the State, the presence of civil rights agencies assisted in absorbing more radical concerns. For example, as a part of the early federal efforts, the civil rights divisions of the DOE and DOJ convened civil rights advocates, researchers, government officials, and program officers of major philanthropies in Washington, DC for the Civil Rights and School Discipline Conference (CRSD Conference DC Agenda, 2010). The civil rights divisions also convene a similar conference in San Francisco later that year, and include a larger number of school superintendents, teacher union representatives, and teacher educators alongside civil rights advocates (CRSD Conference SF Agenda, 2010).

Similar to future conferences organized as a part of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, representatives of Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and the American Institute of Research (AIR) are featured. However, unlike future conferences, not a single law enforcement agency was represented in the 48 speaking slots in these early national meetings. The only organization invited to speak that was associated with law enforcement was the Center for Policing Equity at the University of California, Los Angeles, a university-based center focused on promoting “police transparency and accountability” for racial and gender equity. This organization researched and worked with law enforcement agencies but explicitly declined any fees or funding from law enforcement organizations. Curiously, a unique feature of these early national conferences organized by the civil rights divisions of the DOE and DOJ was that in bold red at the bottom of each page of the agendas it states, “Materials and information distributed by, and attributed to, speakers and panelists at this Conference do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Education or the Department of Justice.” The Supportive School Discipline Initiative was officially launched the following year.

While this chapter provided evidence that many of the “solutions” to the school discipline problem already existed and were in fact described a decade and a half earlier as addressing school shootings and youth delinquency, I argue that the new framing of the problem as racially disproportionate school suspensions, a frame advanced by civil rights groups in accordance with the current state of anti-discrimination laws, was necessary for the enforcement and legitimation of these solutions. Within the policy and the policy network itself the racial disproportionality frame as well as the civil rights organizations that advanced this frame were used to legitimate and enforce the Initiative even as the unique demands for the decriminalization of schools advocated by a number of civil rights organizations and the community-based organizations they collaborated with were ignored. Even in addressing racial disproportionality, many of the favored solutions, like PBIS, Character Education, and Social Emotional Learning, lacked any explicit conversation about race and racism, and had not been shown to reduce racial disproportionality. The racial disproportionality frame provided a moral imperative as well as the federal civil rights enforcement powers of the State to prod schools and school districts to implement the packaged programs produced by the education reform industry. Thus, the civil rights framing of the school-to-prison pipeline issue, particularly the evidence of racially disproportionate school suspensions and expulsions and their relationship to later incarceration, was an essential component of the
Initiative. Through this policy making process, the state working through federal agencies and accompanied by civil rights organizations absorbed the more radical challenges of the de-criminalization movement to successfully push for schools’ adoption of behavioral management programs strengthening the demand for education reform products and services and strengthening the social control and treatment tendencies in schools.

Conclusion

This study provided empirical evidence that through the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice created and funded a consensus and capacity building process that simultaneously invited participation by racial justice advocates and structured the process to favor the interests of growing professional interests like clinical school psychology and law enforcement, and the growing education reform industry. The DOE and DOJ accomplished this by defining and funding the organizations that would lead aspects of the Initiative - thus structuring the core of the policy network. These core organizations then controlled the relative balance of participating policy actors in the network, minoritizing in the literal sense community-based advocacy organizations, and privileging law enforcement, clinical school psychology, and education product and service vendors. Through targeted funding, the State also further defined its favored solutions. The DOE and DOJ funded the implementation of Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) to the exclusion of other programs; efforts to deepen partnerships between schools, law enforcement, and mental health; teacher and principal evaluation systems, which would include behavioral measures of student success; and additional school resource officers.

Yet, the analysis of the network suggests that the policy network was not monolithic in its demands. The demands for more law enforcement were in potential competition with the demands for more behavioral intervention programs or character education curriculum; however, through the network, these interests found a workable compromise. Thus, despite the advocacy and counter advocacy efforts of these different interests participating in the policy network, members of this network shared a common interest in defining an educational problem for which their expertise, products, and services were required. Together they supplied the demand for a growing market of education reform products and services targeted at increasing data accountability and monitoring, program adoption and the associated professional development for teachers and administrators, and the growth of both mental health and law enforcement professions in schools.

This chapter describes the ways in which policy networks work to both co-opt challengers as well as coordinate across a range of dominant social forces. In this way, the advocacy and counter-advocacy efforts in the education policy arena can be better understood as “palace struggles” between holders of different positions within the field of power (Wacquant Interview of Bourdieu, 1993). Moreover, the policy network became the mechanism and space for coordinating and advancing the collective interest of this professional class of education reformers.

Left unexplained is how the educators and district administrators whose interests would seemingly be opposed to policies that have such redistributive impacts for public education respond, resist, or
acquiesce and the ultimate impact on the school district and schools. In the following chapter I explore the enforcement of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in an urban school district largely seen by a number of individuals in the policy network, including those in federal agencies, as a potential model for the rest of the country. Top district administrators welcomed in federal enforcement of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative by entering into a five-year agreement with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR).
In 2012, Green Grove Unified School District entered into a negotiated agreement with the US Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to address the racially disproportionate suspension of African American students. Many in OCR as well as in the school district hoped that Green Grove Unified would act as one of the early and successful models of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative and lead the way for the rest of the country. Despite a great deal of destabilization and activity at the district central office, two and a half years into the OCR Agreement, the most significant impacts were declines in suspensions immediately after the signing of the agreement - declines that were widely understood to be superficial, and the implementation of a district-wide office referral form and data system that school leaders experienced as ridiculously bureaucratic. Little or no changes were made to school policing and the School Security Officers (SSO) program even in the midst of recurring incidents of violence and brutality. Few if any school staff beyond the principals knew of the OCR Agreement and most administrators agreed that very little change in schools could be attributed to the OCR Agreement.

Existing perspectives on policy implementation often take policies as an external force that enters into a local context, where lack of local capacity, know-how, or political will lead to "implementation fidelity" and the often disappointing results of large-scale policy initiatives. This process so famously described in Pressman & Wildavsky’s (1973) “How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Any Federal Programs Work at All,” assume that policies are well-intentioned, best-case-scenarios of social problem solving that unravel at the level of implementation. Even more contemporary policy implementation research that recognize the complex and often contradictory pressures on local actors and the institutional and political constraints they face, tend to focus on policy implementers to understand policy implementation failures. These perspectives blame policy implementation failures on the resistance of educators, the inertia of institutions, or the value differences among stakeholder groups (i.e., teachers and parents) or between implementers and the policymakers. I found these perspectives inadequate to explain the processes that unfolded in Green Grove.

Instead, I found that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative and the OCR Agreement secured the consent of educators to adopt reforms agreed upon by the constellation of interests that dominated the education reform field and increased the demands for education reform products and services. In this case, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative worked largely as it was intended to, serving the interests of the education reform industry, and not the interests of those concerned with the school-to-prison pipeline. Moreover, I found that the OCR Agreement actually frustrated educators' efforts to create more socially just schools. I found that these results were not easily achieved nor without alternative, suggesting lessons for those committed to creating more liberatory educational spaces.

First, while interviewees widely shared that the Green Grove Superintendent had agreed to the OCR Agreement as a way to strengthen ambitious equity reforms he had initiated in Green Grove, evidence suggests that the OCR Agreement also played an important role in distracting growing
public concern over police brutality. Thus, in Green Grove, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative was touted as an affirmative step in addressing the school-to-prison pipeline but in fact watered down advocates' principle demands for reforms to the school district police department and the School Security Officers (SSO) program.

Second, the civil rights and racial equity ideals invoked by the OCR Agreement, as well as the promise of public and private grant funding, brought more radical and moderate district central office administrators together to demand change and secured the consent of school leaders to mandated reforms. The civil rights and racial equity ideals resonated with district central office and school-site administrators, securing at minimum a willingness, if not eagerness, to comply.

Third, even as the OCR Agreement brought together a wide swath of district central office administrators to define and lead a district-wide effort to address the over and disproportionate punishment of African American boys, I found that district administrators responsible for implementing the OCR Agreement struggled to implement the Initiative within a school district central office characterized by grant dependency, reform fatigue, and constant leadership churn - each products of the neoliberal restructuring that disinvested in public education and fed the education reform industry. Additionally, I found that through grants provided by the education reform industry, competing reform product and services inscribed themselves into the organizational structure of the school district. District leaders of divisions, departments, and subunits largely defined their goals and interests by the programs they were funded to champion.

Fourth, I find that the instability and insecurity in the Green Grove school district, as well as the ways in which the education reform industry structured its interests into competing district central office departments, led to competing professional interests dominating all other personal or political commitments. As a result the OCR Leadership Team abandoned their broader demands for redistribution and recognition to improve schools for African American children for narrow demands revolving around program adoption, drumming up business for the education reform industry. In addition, the OCR Leadership Team resisted attempts to create a collective strategy to support substantive change in schools and shirked their responsibility for monitoring and reforming the School Security Officer program. Instead, the OCR Leadership Team came to agreement on increasing data surveillance over teachers' disciplinary practices, which arose as a common interest among district central office administrators as well as principals.

**The Signing of the OCR Agreement - Placating Rising Concerns About School Policing**

Rather than the oft imagined federal enforcement agency learning of civil rights violations and then punishing schools and school districts, the OCR Agreement in Green Grove resulted from the coordinated action of school district leadership and federal agencies. Those I interviewed shared a common explanation for the initiation of the enforcement action, namely that the OCR leadership and the district superintendent knew each other and hoped that an agreement would further both their professional and political commitments.
These interviewees, who were involved at different points in the creation of the agreement, believed that the OCR leadership was looking for a success story for the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the superintendent wanted a way to mandate and enforce reforms he had already launched in the district, and school district departments and community organizations believed that foundation dollars and federal grants would follow to fund implementation efforts. The promise of additional funding was particularly important for non-profit organizations and non-academic departments that were experiencing unprecedented cut backs due to the Great Recession.

Through analysis of archival data on policing in Green Grove Unified School District during this time, including media coverage, advocacy reports, and an interview with the acting School Police Chief, it became clear that another sub-story existed for the creation of the negotiated agreement - a need to respond to growing demands for reforms to school policing. I found that in the year prior to signing the OCR Agreement, the Green Grove Unified School District School Police Department and the Green Grove Superintendent had come under scrutiny when a school police officer shot and killed an African American teenager outside of a school. Not only were there allegations of unnecessary use of lethal force involved in the incident, but the Superintendent and the district legal counsel were accused of attempting to cover up the issue. A local community-based organizing group as well as other legal advocates focused in on demands for reforms to school policing.

Later that year, Green Grove Unified School District continued to increase the size of the city police force. The Green Grove Superintendent accepted a $10 million dollar U.S. Department of Justice COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) grant to hire 25 additional police officers supervised by the city police department. These federal grants incentivize the growth of law enforcement in schools, but municipalities and schools eventually would need to pick up the costs. Just the costs associated with the COPS grant itself is estimated to cost Green Grove City nearly 3.5 million dollars over three years and the full cost of these positions after the three-year grant is over. Even more troubling, these additional officers were assigned to patrol 3 middle schools, two elementary schools and 1 continuation high school in predominately African American neighborhoods. The decision for the placement of these officers was made by the Green Grove City Police Department with very little input from the Chief of School Police or other school district administrators. These 25 police officers would be supervised by the Green Grove City Police Department and would be in addition to the nearly twenty school police officers and over eighty school security officers already employed by the Green Grove Unified School Police Department.

The following year, as legal challenges alleging a cover up heightened, the Green Grove Superintendent and Legal Counsel signed the negotiated agreement with OCR, to act as a model district for the national Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Instead of the usual OCR complaint process and lengthy compliance review that can often take years, Green Grove superintendent and OCR leadership agreed to an expedited review. OCR attorneys conducted the expedited review over one summer with a handful of district central office administrators and their staff. However, rather than reigning in law enforcement activity in schools to address the school-to-prison pipeline, the OCR Agreement made no mention of law enforcement except to require the district to conduct a review of and training for the
School Security Officer (SSO) program, unarmed security personnel on campuses. The OCR Agreement required neither reviews nor reforms to policies and practices of school police officers or the city police officers patrolling Green Grove schools.

In summary, the OCR Agreement shielded the district from critiques led by community-based advocacy groups concerned with the use of force by school police. Even as the OCR Agreement provided an appearance of addressing the school-to-prison pipeline and policing in schools, the OCR Agreement contained no provisions to address school police and policing in schools continued to increase, incentivize by federal funding from the Department of Justice.

While these public concerns about school police were evident in the media coverage and the interview with the Chief of Police, these concerns were never discussed nor raised among the district central office administrators who participated in this study. Instead, district central office and school administrators saw the OCR Agreement to be about transforming disciplinary practices of teachers and school principals.

**The Agreement - Coordinating Interests of District Central Office Administrators**

The OCR Agreement brought together more radical racial justice advocates within the district central office with more moderate ones to champion the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. The civil rights and racial equity ideals invoked by OCR leadership inspired a number of racial justice oriented administrators in Green Grove.

Again, I just saw the federal government, and again, I never heard anybody talk the way [OCR Leadership] was talking and came at—shit, the way she talked at our board members, I was like, “Damn, this chick’s bad!” I mean, it was closed door, like, she got [the School Board Member] literally chair to chair, just, “This is a defining moment. Either we’re all in or this is just bullshit. You need to leverage the federal government.” It was just, you know, like, this is an opportunity to really disrupt these structures of inequity. And she converted folk, or scared folk, for the board then to actually approve it. We did a big thing that night to have the black community was able to show up. And I think if—again, my standpoint was, I felt we were doing all that, because we actually thought we could—well, we did, we did believe it.

The Green Grove superintendent and OCR leadership convinced other school district leaders that OCR involvement would hold Green Grove accountable to ambitious equity reforms the superintendent had begun several years prior, including launching two new departments, the Office of African American Student Success (OAASS), focused on supporting the success of African American students within the district, and the Family Student and Community Services Office (FSCS), an office aimed at aligning and coordinating family, academic, physical health, and mental health services for children at school sites.

Additionally, numerous district leaders, especially those within and supporting FSCS, were told that the negotiated agreement would bring new funding and resources to the district.
I mean [the Superintendent] convinced me ultimately saying, look the only really advantage of entering into the [OCR Agreement] was he thought we could raise a lot of money from foundations to implement stuff. I said, “Yeah, you’re probably right, okay I’ll do that. Okay let’s do it.”

The 5-year OCR agreement was essentially negotiated and written between the Superintendent’s office, the district legal office, and OCR attorneys, with the advice of several department heads in the FSCS division that comprised what was commonly called the non-“instructional side of the house.” The agreement included ten substantive provisions with over 70 sub-provisions. One administrator recalls how the OCR Agreement was written to encapsulate what Green Grove was already doing:

It just lined up. Like what are you guys already doing to address disproportionality? We said, this is what we're doing. Then they said, okay. Those are the schools that we're going to choose. They chose them because they were significantly disproportionate. Most of them just happened to have PBIS or RJ in them already. Then they said, you guys should align around an RTI framework and you should select at least one or more of these interventions. Then, that's how it happened. Then suddenly we were accountable to do all these things. We were. We were already doing it.

The resulting provisions in the OCR agreement mirrored many of the solutions advocated for and funded by the dominant ideological communities present in the national network discussed in previous chapters. For example, in the "General Principles" portion of the OCR agreement, the agreement requires, among other things, that the District continue to implement programs or initiatives such as Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and Caring School Communities - a packaged social and emotional learning (SEL) program - within the special education framework of tiered Response to Intervention (RTI). Moreover, the inclusion of these mandates into the OCR agreement were supported locally by district central office department heads that led departments such as the Behavioral Health Department that supervised implementation of PBIS, Restorative Justice, Trauma Services, and the district’s Anti-Bullying program - all programs already existing in a small subset of schools within the district and funded by previous federal and philanthropic grants.

Mandated reforms also included changing Green Grove’s formal discipline policies, the purview of the legal department, and creating and implementing a district-wide disciplinary referral data system that largely tracked the requirements that was believed to permit the district and the schools to conduct regular cycles of data-informed decision making about school discipline.

Interestingly, the OCR agreement also contained provisions less salient in the national policy network. These additional provisions included some of the recommendations marginalized during the national networked policy making process but had strong organizational and institutional history in Green Grove, including their own departments and funded positions. These provisions included allowing school sites to choose among competing alternatives to
suspensions, including the adoption of Restorative Justice and/or the implementation of a mentorship and empowerment course offered by the Office of African American Student Success (OASS) and other local non-profits. The OCR agreement mandated the hiring of outside equity experts to support the implementation of the agreement, which resulted in a contract between the district and a local research and advocacy organization that published a report credited with drawing attention on this issue. Finally, the OCR agreement required each school covered in the agreement to engage in annual school forums between faculty and students to discuss school discipline, drawing on the work youth development and youth leadership programs that have a long history in the city of Green Grove.

It was presented to the School Board in a closed session in which the superintendent and OCR leadership utilized both the carrot of additional funding, and the stick of a threatened compliance review to secure unanimous agreement of the Board. The School Board signed and ratified the negotiated agreement between OCR and the district in the Fall of 2012.

Thus, the OCR agreement, which was written as a collaboration between OCR, the district central office departments that comprised the non-"instructional side of the house," the Superintendent's office, and the district legal department, mandated the expansion of legality, data accountability, and the adoption of FSCS programs into all of the district's middle and high schools. Similar to what occurred in the national policy making level, a set of actors at the local level utilized the federal attention on racially disproportionate suspensions to coordinate their interests to require schools to adopt reforms that the set of local actors believed in, as well as professionally benefitted from. In this way, the particular local manifestation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative mandated activities that neatly corresponded to existing departments in the district that had been formed and funded by previous grants and policy directives.

**Hope and Destabilization - Ideal Implementation Conditions**

The signing of the negotiated agreement with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) initiated a firestorm of activity in the district. It raised disproportionate punishment to the top of the district's concerns, increased uncertainty and deliberation, and brought together administrators from a wide array of district central office departments. In other words, the OCR agreement created the destabilization and deliberation effects that policy makers intend and that researchers suggest are necessary for institutional change (Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Sabel & Simon, 2004). Additionally, those district central office administrators, school site administrators, and OCR attorneys involved in the implementation effort shared a commitment to children and ideals of anti-discrimination, creating what many would consider ideal implementation conditions.

**District destabilization.** Consistent with scholars that suggest that legal interventions work primarily through destabilizing entrenched institutions and providing the space for a more deliberation on alternative practices (Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Sabel & Simon, 2004), the OCR Agreement focused district-wide attention on school discipline, elevated the leadership of non-academic departments, and disrupted traditional hierarchies.
In response to the OCR agreement, the director of the newly formed Office of African American Student Success (OAASS) was given the role and responsibility for implementing the OCR Agreement district-wide. Initial monthly meetings were packed with over 60 attendees each from numerous district departments, ranging from Instruction, to Family Engagement, Human Resources, Information Technology, and School District Police to discuss school discipline. Five subcommittees were formed to implement the core mandates of the OCR agreement and were led by department heads within the “non-instructional side of the house.” These departments included the District Data and Research Department, the Behavioral Health Department, Disciplinary Hearings Department, the Office of African American Student Success (OAASS), and Family and Student Engagement Department. These departments provided the student, family, and community supports and services surrounding the core instructional program of the school district. None of these department heads had supervisory powers over school principals or school site level staff, who were ultimately responsible for changing their practices.

These meetings shook up normal district relations by raising the importance of school climate and culture issues vis-à-vis purely curricular and subject matter pedagogical issues. One administrator puts it this way:

At leadership level the focus has remained primarily on academics and this [“how we’re treating kids”] is just an add on because people that work in education are educators…. So, leaders are evaluated on their graduation rates. They’re not evaluated by their school climate index, but yet I think the national dialog is bringing those together. And thank god but it had to come from a civil rights side.

Initially, the OCR agreement and the threat of future formal legal action also caused uncertainty, which some respondents believed brought people to the meetings and provided an opportunity for increased deliberation.

Finally, these initial meetings destabilized existing hierarchies. This particular implementation structure for the OCR agreement placed institutionally powerful directors of operations and executive officers of instructional leadership into subcommittees led by less powerful department heads and coordinators within the Family Students and Community Services Office (FSCS). Additionally, the OCR Agreement itself destabilized the general sense that instructional issues, and thus “the instructional side of the house” held precedence over student and family engagement, supports and services, priorities led by the FSCS office. Some operational and instructional directors and executive officers never came or just came once to these initial meetings, often sending an “underling” in their place, but FSCS and OAASS administrators expressed that they shared a sense of opportunity and hope during these meetings. They felt there was momentum to shift district central office priorities towards their work. “You know, I think that there was a greater sense of urgency…. It was mobilizing people, building collective will, getting people to understand how we all have a role too,” shared a FSCS director.
Civil rights and racial equity ideals invoked by OCR resonated with district and school leaders. In contrast to notions that resistant or racist educators are the root cause of persistent racially disproportionate educational outcomes, I found that among the district central office administrators, school site administrators, and teachers, involved in the design and implementation of the OCR agreement, an overwhelming majority expressed a commitment to improving the educational experiences of children, and most had worked closely with young people, particularly children of color, for years, either as teachers, principals, therapists, counselors, youth center directors, or youth organizers before taking on their present positions. Sixty percent of those directly responsible for implementation were administrators of color, and 71 percent of the district administrators more tangentially responsible were administrators of color, predominately African American. While many of the local actors were motivated by their commitment to helping children grow, others were motivated by their sense of injustice that schools were not able to meet the needs of children. Thus, I found that district and school leaders shared a commitment to nondiscriminatory outcomes, even as they held different ideological positions about whether demands should be made for redistribution, recognition or a combination of the two (Dumas, 2009; Fraser, 1997).

Those I interviewed and observed generally shared the belief that reducing suspensions and reducing racial disproportionality in suspensions for African American children was important. This was especially true of the district central office administrators that comprised the OCR Agreement Leadership Team, who one administrator describes as “the most self-selected dedicated folks to that body of work.” Some administrators rooted the problem in individual racial bias or favoritism of educators, raising primarily demands for recognition (Dumas, 2009; Fraser, 1995). Others focused on poverty and social inequality in society as the root of the most significant problems. This expression of the problem either led to more radical demands for redistribution or for more conservative demands for improved techniques or programs. Several of the administrators in the first year Leadership Team discussed the root cause of racial disproportionality in discipline to be racism or oppression rooted in society or school systems, calling on both a politics of recognition and redistribution. Importantly, none of the district administrators in meetings or interviews rooted the problem in the nature, culture, or values of students or their families.

District central office administrators that I interviewed shared and expressed an awareness of racial disproportionality in discipline and a responsibility for addressing it. For some, the work was also deeply personal because their children attended Green Grove schools. One administrator said, “You have to have faith. And you know the reality is that my [children] are still in the public school system so I tell people like it has to happen. I don’t have ten years, shit I need change right now. Don’t tell me there’ll be change in ten years, that’s a generation.” A district administrator who was a community organizer shares, “Our district leaders are very open, they’re social justice oriented, and they’re on board with the [OCR Agreement].”

School principals, assistant principals, and other school leaders responsible for discipline in the three focal middle schools likewise expressed a personal and political commitment to the goals of addressing larger inequities through education and/or a care for young people. One
school leader describes how the experience of racism and the Rodney King verdict, in which four white police men were acquitted for brutally beating King, an unarmed African American man in Los Angeles, and the community response that followed, awakened in him the desire to address issues of social justice through education. He describes:

My very first week down in LA… we’d go to a store and everybody’s following us around, leave your bags here, this and that. It was like, all right what the fuck is this, and all my buddies who lived in LA were like why are you tripping… It just didn’t sit well with me…. I organized a protest for the store and everything. I wrote an article in the student paper…. Then the Rodney King riots happened while I was down there. Then again just being a 20 year old, that’s when you form your ideas about who you’re going to be as a person, you want to change things.

For this administrator, attention on the racially disproportionate suspensions was a good thing, “Even though it may not be an OCR thing [anymore], I still think it's something that our district’s going to continue. It should and it needs to.”

Other school administrators grew up in the neighborhood or similar neighborhoods and described their commitment to public education as a way to give back in the ways that educators in their own lives had intervened to literally change their course track from regular to college-track, changing the course of their lives. One describes the ways that “being in the know,” or their familiarity with the students’ families and community, supports students. He shares:

There’s a way in which you have a good enough relationship in which to just have conversations. We’re talking about having a real conversation about what’s going on, just asking, “Hey, how’s the thing’s on your block lately? I know about the shooting. Has it calmed down or is it still hot?”… And they’re like, “Oh my God, how did you know that?” Having that kind of knowledge to be able to bridge that gap a lot faster. Being in the know of things in the community…. That’s instant points to the kids in which, okay, he knows what he’s talking about. He knows my neighborhood. It’s not just a job… You’re not just a paycheck. I’m here for a reason.

For these educators, the problem of racially disproportionate suspensions identified by the OCR agreement resonated with their experiences and they sought more resources and supports for providing services to students, a redistributive politics.

Other administrators, even those who did not grow up in the same neighborhoods, expressed a commitment to the development and growth of their students.

My ideal kind of scenario is one where not only are teachers holding students to really high expectation in terms of their work and their behavior but also communicating in a way that kids actually get a concern and a care for their well-being. I think that there's so many ways that can look. It's not like a prescriptive but it is kind of just about an authenticity.
For these administrators, the racial disproportionality was evident and the focus was more on what they would do to intervene.

This is the reality even for us, like we’re 100% minority, but we still have disproportionality between our Latino and African-American students. That was real. I never got the sense that... There was very few schools where disproportionality was a surprise. People know it exists.

These educators, while tending to question their ability to facilitate productive anti-racist/racial bias conversations are nonetheless owning and thinking about solutions.

Facilitating that kind of dialogue and then really staying present with it to follow through on it, that is like really deep work. It requires a lot of care and attention. I don't know of anyone who feels like they are really able to do it as well as they would like in the context of the resources that we have.... I know that many people there [at another school implementing Restorative Justice] report that they feel like they've had positive experiences kind of on a school-wide level and maybe that is a better lens. Maybe we don't need to make it about culture and bias but maybe we just need to make it about deepening our relationships with each other and building more intentional community and I think that could be the case.

Even as this administrator questions the resources available for and the potential of recognition efforts at the school, he believes in efforts to deepen relationships and strengthen a shared community across race.

Among school site leaders, critiques of the OCR Agreement focused on the implementation process between the school district central office and schools, rather than on the goals of the OCR Agreement itself. Even those school site administrators who expressed critiques of the goals of the OCR Agreement, tended to be concerned about the ways the goals were limiting. One administrator explains:

I can get really specific with people around incremental consequences and around this needs to be fair, like the extent to which it seems like if Susie gets a warning, then so should Johnny, or else it doesn't feel fair. It kind of diminishes the trust that students have in you and they're feeling that this is a safe and fair environment. I can kind of pursue that. Then, that feels like it is a step in the right direction but then it can just mean if the teacher is still not able to communicate that the reason that there are these expectations is because we are trying to do something that is important. It can just feel like, "Okay. Now, you have just gotten more punitive."

This administrator raises the concern that racially proportional punishment is still punishment and that proportional punishment is a step in the right direction but not enough. In essence, this administrator argues that recognition and racial equality is only the first step, and that education for a purpose is the goal.
Across each of the three focal schools, school site administrators also expressed that there was no real resistance from teachers to the OCR Agreement. For example, one administrator shared:

I think the bulk of our teachers took it to heart. Like yes, there is an issue at hand [disproportionality]. I don’t necessarily know how to put a finger on it but there is an issue at hand so how do we improve because… the numbers are so skewed. Obviously there’s an issue and so like having the bulk of our teachers to take it to heart, and like let’s improve things somehow, one way or another…. I think the first conversation we had was during, before school PD. Just having that real conversation like hey, here is the issue at hand. It’s not just a regular mandate coming from the district. It affects us on a daily basis and so like we didn’t get into education to boot kids. Typically folks get into education for the right reasons and so once again, being able to take the situation to heart and being able to like hey, let’s once again, find a way to improve because there has to be a better way.

This sentiment was consistent with perspectives of cabinet-level district central office administrators as well, one who observed that half way into the 5-year agreement, he was surprised to find that there was still no teacher push back.

District and school administrators in my study shared the commitment to non-discrimination invoked by the OCR Agreement and the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, even as they expressed sometimes conflicting demands for recognition and/or redistribution as the means. Educator resistance to the OCR Agreement was not a barrier.

OCR leadership team initially reframed the policy in broad terms. After months of deliberation, the OCR implementation team arrived at an “elevator pitch” that they believed encapsulated their mission and vision for the implementation of the agreement. The elevator pitch put forth a broad and ambitious framing of the problem and appropriate solutions that focused on the goal of making African American students and families feel that they belonged in schools. The elevator pitch read:

The [Agreement to Resolve] is an agreement between the [Green Grove Unified School District] and the Office of Civil Rights to eliminate unequal punishment of our African American students so we can keep them in class and school and make sure they graduate. It is our goal to create a school system that makes our African American students and families feel they belong and matter. By listening to, and partnering with families and organizations, and changing our practices, we are developing the culture, climate, and conditions for success that will transform our discipline practices from punitive to restorative.

In bold at the top of the “elevator pitch,” was a quote, “It’s not just about treating the fish, it’s about fixing the whole ecosystem.” In this way, the initial description of the OCR agreement embodied a reframing of the problem and solution of school discipline in several important ways that differed from the dominant framing of the problem and solutions on the national stage. This early articulation of the problem and solutions challenged the
dominant framing of the problem of school discipline as student misbehavior. Instead, a majority of the team discussed the problem as a systemic problem that needed to be addressed through changes in policies, district structures, and adult perspectives and behaviors. The elevator pitch was decidedly not deficit-based and moved away from therapeutic notions of treating or managing behavioral problems. This early articulation of the OCR Agreement was also focused on a much broader goal of making schools into places where African American student and families felt they belonged. This perspective eschewed the narrow legal framings of the problem as racially disproportionate suspensions and advocated for a collective set of activities involving “listening to, and partnering with families and organizations.”

The OCR Agreement Leadership Team was well aware of the risks of only complying with the letter of the law rather than the intent or purpose. Thus, they attempted to lead with the broad vision rather than the specific mandated activities. A common refrain among team members was that they did not want to comply only for compliance sake.

**Frustration and Overwhelming Constraints**

Two years and hundreds of hours of meetings among district central office administrators later, a general sentiment across the district is that little has changed. While those I interviewed at every level described a pressure to reduce suspensions, and generally felt that it was a “good thing,” there was much less confidence expressed that the OCR Agreement had created any substantive changes. Suspension numbers were down from a one-year spike in 2011-2012, dropping 29 percent and returning to a number consistent with a gradual downward trend in suspensions in the district since 2004-2005.

These declines occurred primarily in middle schools and during the first 10 months of the OCR Agreement with little or no additional involvement of the district central office administrators tasked with implementing the OCR Agreement. In fact, the first meeting of middle and high school principals identified as the OCR cohort occurs in August 2013, during the summer following a year of significant decline in suspensions. A number of district central office administrators and school administrators openly shared that as alternatives to suspensions, school administrators were using work arounds. Students were being held in on campus suspension rooms, being sent home with parent permission, told to take long walks around campus, and put to doing community service. While these practices reduced suspensions and the stigmatization that suspensions could cause for students, they still removed students from the learning environment and often exacted seclusion, exclusion, and manual labor as punishment. For example, one administrator explained:

RJ was picking up trash around [one school]…. There's been a lot of pressure from the old previous regime, I think, to not suspend students, and so they have not suspended students. There have been claims of what's going on at [another school], external systems keeping track of discipline…. There's a drastic reduction, but if there's creative accounting, that happens. We know consistently students are asked to call home if they don't … If you're having a rough day, you're struggling, you don't think you're going to be able to get on track, I'm not going to send you home in the
system, but I'm going to ask you if you want to go home, or call mom, see if mom
will come pick you up or release you for the day.

Some school administrators were just not inputting suspensions into the district database but
tracking suspensions through their own systems.

To the question about what has changed in the district as a result of the OCR Agreement, numerous
interviewees at the district central office and at the school sites responded that much of what is
going on “was going on already.” The only impact consistently referenced was the mandated use of
a district-wide office referral form that requires teachers to fill out student dispositions and
attempted interventions when sending a student out of class for disciplinary reasons and requires
administrators to input responses into the district database. An administrator, who was privy to
cabinet level meetings, as well as both instructional and FSCS divisions of the district, noted the
absence of substantive discussions or actions related to implementing the OCR Agreement in higher
rungs of the district central office or in schools. He noted, “That was the other thing that was weird.
[The OCR Agreement] really has been sitting in the middle for a year and a half. It has been
department heads – it hasn’t been the top and it hasn’t been the schools.” The administrator made
the observation that the Initiative seemed to stall among department heads in the district central
office.

Another district central office administrator described the transition from the hope and
destabilization during the first several months following the signing of the OCR Agreement to the
state of the Initiative after the second year.

They had their little tribe. They were growing some tomatoes, and we were doing
mangos, but it was—they were almost worlds apart. So I think it just—we kind of
went—and what happens? People then retreat back to the silo, and when we
approached it, it was interdepartmental. There were things I think we were
approaching, but anyway, and those transitions, there wasn’t a clean enough passing
of the baton… and it just—I think other things surfaced and then things became
very fragmented.

Similar to the constraints voiced by this administrator, district central office and school
administrators named four major constraints on their ability to implement the OCR
Agreement in a manner that would impact the substantive educational experiences of
students in Green Grove. They named overwhelming number of reform initiatives, incessant
leadership churn, and competition. These constraints arose in almost every interview of
district central office and school administrators, as well as informal conversations with legal
actors involved. These expressed constraints were sometimes discussed on their own but
often were interrelated.

However, while district central office and school leaders openly voiced deep frustration with
these constraints, administrators accepted these conditions as the natural and normal context
for their work. These conditions shaped every minute of their working lives but were
considered something beyond their control. I argue that far from being natural, normal, and
unchangeable, these conditions are products of the larger economic and political context
facing urban education, one characterized by public disinvestment and a growing education reform industry. Public disinvestment coupled with a growing number of competitive public and private grants, created a district central office that was an amalgam of grant-dependent and thus unstable and outwards-facing divisions, departments, and subunits. This context fueled professional insecurity and strategic self-interested behaviors that constrained the kind of collective action required for supporting positive school discipline practices.

**Grant dependency, and reform fatigue.** I found that in Green Grove concurrent trends of public disinvestment in education and private hyper investment education reform (Picciano & Spring, 2013; Saltman, 2009, 2010) created a district central office that was desperate for external sources of funding and was largely grant-dependent. The grant dependency contributed to an overwhelming number of reform priorities placed on schools, and a constant churn of central office positions and programs. This sentiment has been described by Diane Ravitch as a national phenomenon of “reform fatigue” and described in Green Grove as “Initiative overload.”

An administrator who was well respected in the district for his passionate commitment to young people and strong leadership, expressed the resource constraints at his school and the place that soft funding had played in filling these gaps.

> We're hurting here. It's unbelievable. We lost 14 FTEs [full time employees] from last year to this year. One AP [assistant principal]. Two social studies, an English, half a French. Computer technician, lifeguard, 2 clerical people. We lost all that just from last, the 12/13 school year to the 13/14 school year. Classes are full. We've got 37, 39 kids in classes. We're not going to be able to balance. We had to let so many people go, we still got just as many kids, but the other soft funding opportunities left, so we're really in a bad situation.

Yet, when he was asked about what was holding back the work of the OCR Agreement, he draws the connection between the resource needs on his campus and the costs of grant dependency.

> I think there’s a lack of trust of school leaders, for school leaders to make decisions. It’s also because of this need to go after any soft funding opportunity there is, and you need people to run and manage those grants so that you can justify the grant. You need somebody central to run that grant, to manage it, to report on it, to keep it going.

This administrator describes the contradiction that I explore in more detail below.

With the growth of education reform grant making, most of the Green Grove Unified district central office departments, both those involved in implementation of the OCR Agreement as well as ones focused more on teaching, learning, and curriculum, or the “instructional side of the house”, regularly sought and received numerous competitive public and private grants to fund their work. These funding sources, provided by federal initiatives, nationally and globally focused private foundations, state-focused foundations, and even local city-focused foundations, funded a wide range of new programs and activities from implementing literacy measurements district-wide to
piloting new math teaching tools, building medical clinics on school sites, creating bullying reporting systems, and funding mentoring for African American students, just to name a few.

Once grants were obtained, the grant “deliverables”, including numbers of participants, measures of impact, and evaluation methods became the job description of those hired by the grant and those who supervised the grant. District central office administrators that I interviewed, regularly described their roles in relationship to the grants they were hired under, the grants they sought, and the grants they managed. In describing her work, one administrator explains, “There will be work groups aligned to our [district] year 2 plan that is grounded in our four work stream areas that are all informed by the grant that we had… in order to be part of the collaborative district initiative.”

Grants provided funding, networking, and professional prestige for district central office administrators and directed the work they were responsible for in the district.

The number and breadth of grant-driven reform priorities created disjointed and competing priorities in the Green Grove district central office. Just within the departments associated with the OCR Agreement, grants funded district central office activities like creating a “positive discipline handbook,” community meetings about school discipline, or conducting best practice case studies of schools where positive school climates exist. Other grants funded PBIS trainings for school teams, restorative justice coordinators at a handful of schools, creating social emotional learning standards, and program evaluations. This resulted in what one interviewee described as, “For school leaders what it feels to them is that there is a rainstorm of initiatives, none of which are framed, discussed or planned as part of a strategic package for a school.” This sentiment was echoed in principal interviews as well as voiced during principal meetings related to the OCR Agreement where principals asked for fewer mandates and more opportunity to learn from their peers.

Public and private grants that reflected the national policy interest at the moment, also led to a churn of programs. District central office departments grew and shrank depending on the availability and terms of public and private grants. One district central office administrator describes her interaction with competitive federal and philanthropic grants and how she was able to increase the size of her department from 1 to over 50 district central office administrators, interns, and community partners:

[W]e had a small grant to support RJ [restorative justice] that was in place when I came in. Actually we had a large federal grant, but a carve out was to implement RJ in a couple of those schools…. I formed an RJ task force and we began really looking at, with community partners and internal folks, how do we really expand. We started to expand RJ. Then we started talking and thinking more about prevention. I started to present about positive behavioral support, and research about it and presenting about it. Then I was interfacing with Atlantic Philanthropies, they were really looking at what can we do around disproportionality. That became, pretty early on, a big focus of the work…. We went to some conferences and I really got interested in response to intervention as a framework. I think PBIS came with that from the behavioral health side….Then along the way my department started to grow. Now we just have a lot of people.
Even as the attention on PBIS and mental health allowed a exponential growth of the Behavioral Health Department, the lack of public and private grants for other interventions led to the dismantling of conflict resolution and violence prevention programs.

At the time, I was still managing violence prevention and [my colleague] was to take up the work of restorative justice. At the time we had a grant. And then the [other grant] was supporting the conflict mediation program, and [my colleague] was doing restorative justice…. That was when—and plus, funding was sun setting for conflict mediation, and we didn’t want to let go of the consultant. So part of our decision-making behind the scene that some people felt was popular, some didn’t, they didn’t like that, because people were holding true to conflict mediation.

The district administrator explains that in response to a “sun setting” of funding for conflict mediation, her department attempted to bridge conflict mediation with restorative justice interventions as a way to retain people and positions. However, conflict mediation and restorative justice were different models and eventually, conflict mediation staff either needed to adopt the new RJ framework or were let go.

In this way, departments and subunits in FSCS grew and decayed following the boom and bust of particular ways that the education reform industry framed the problem and solution related to school discipline, climate, and culture. For every boom and bust, new leadership came and went, programs came and went, and programs were reframed in new ways to fit new funding streams.

In addition, since grants were short term and ad hoc in nature, the district often used the money to contract out particular tasks to outside consultants. The district hired writers, designers, evaluators, researchers, and trainers to complete their grant deliverables. Thus, schools never saw much of this money. Instead, these grants focused district central office attention on coordinating consultants, grant reporting, and compliance, and placed grant-compliance demands on schools, often without additional resources. Not only were the grants mostly short-term and ad hoc in nature, they tended to fund activities that would increase the demand for their programs rather than the ability for schools to benefit from their programs. For example, a large grant from the Collaborative for Social Emotional Learning (CASEL) funded two years of activities within the district central office that centered around “awareness, learning, and listening,” which effectively mobilized district central office administrators to become “ambassadors” for social and emotional learning in multiple departments but was criticized for not providing any services or learning opportunities for students. This grant was essentially one to build support and demand for SEL programs, curriculum, and coaching. Grants funded pilots of programs and the development of products like the social emotional learning standards. Many of the grants that the departments involved in the OCR Agreement received funded reports, case studies, and evaluations. These grants largely funded efforts to document success. Thus, these grants funded the research and development needs as well as the evaluation needs of the education reform industry. Only a minority of grants funded positions or programs in schools.

Finally, the outwards-facing and grant-dependent reality of the school district central office also made the district particularly susceptible to fluctuations in private wealth, exacerbating the instability
and insecurity of district central office departments. During the Recession, foundation funding dried up with large ramifications for district departments. These cycles fed a great deal of professional insecurity within the district central office. An administrator explains:

In 2009 the office was severely cut, so most of the staff was laid off. After the first round of cuts, I was the only person left, along with our volunteer coordinator and our supervisor. Our supervisor resigned and our volunteer coordinator resigned, so I became the only person in the office. I was holding all of the work… during [the Superintendent’s] strategic planning process. At that point my role shifted from student engagement to—I forgot my title. I think it was family and community engagement specialist. Mainly engaging community in the development of the strategic plan. I was still also in charge of student engagement and all-city council and volunteers. From there, after a couple of years, three years ago, we were able to get funding for the office again…. Our office became the family—I don’t remember the name of the old office, there’s so many names. Anyway… so I was able to hire three people to support the family engagement work and one person to take over the student engagement work.

I found that the grant dependency of the district central office exacerbated the very conditions, such as an overwhelming number of that school leaders expressed as constraints to having substantive impact on positive school discipline. Yet, the outwards facing and grant-dependent district central office did meet the research and development needs of the education reform industry.

**Neoliberal leadership model and leadership churn.** Principal, and superintendent turnover have always been relatively high in urban school districts like Green Grove due to the demands of the job, scarcity of resources and support, and a long list of “better school districts” that structure the upwards career ladder for school administrators (March & March, 1977). I argue that the twin trends of public disinvestment and private sector influence that created the education reform industry has served to heighten the impact of leadership churn by incentivizing and normalizing frequent and drastic organizational changes that led to paralyzing instability within Green Grove.

During the first two and a half years of the OCR Agreement, Green Grove had two superintendents and an interim superintendent. During this same two and a half year period, the principal of every comprehensive high school in the district had turned over at least once. While the middle schools enjoyed more consistent leadership, over the course of the five years of the agreement, less than 35 percent of the middle schools kept the same principal. Five of the principals most well-known for their ability to build positive school climates were removed from their schools and promoted to central district office positions.

However, these conditions are neither natural nor immutable. For the past several decades, venture philanthropies like the Eli Broad Foundation and Gates Foundation have heavily invested in creating and sustaining alternative teaching pathways, superintendent and principal training institutes, and school board academies that train a new group of educators and school leaders committed to bold transformative change in public education modeled after market-based concepts such as competition, efficiency, and innovation (Hess, 2003; Saltman 2009, 2010). For example, one of the goals of the Broad leadership model was to create a more competitive environment,
promising that “A more competitive approach would help force school systems competing for managerial talent to pay competitive rates, boosting the rewards for high performers and augmenting their ranks,” (Hess, 2003). The Broad model advocated for bringing in executive leaders from the military and corporate sector into public education to create change. These alternative pathways for educational leadership supplanted more traditional pathways whereby teachers became principals and principals became superintendents.

Four of the last six superintendent-level positions in Green Grove have been alums of the Eli Broad Foundation leadership academy. Only one of the last six superintendent-level positions was filled by someone who was a teacher and principal in Green Grove for decades. District central office administrators that I spoke to attributed the drastic organizational changes they witnessed under the bold transformative change model of leadership to a number of factors including ego and the transposition of business models into education. A district central office administrator critical of the new administration described the leadership model in this way:

So many people are here trying to make their mark. It’s so sad. And people come in and try something and it crashes and burns and they leave the rubble and go. That happens one after the other with these big egos coming in.

Another administrator, who had otherwise favorable things to say about the new administration described the model of leadership that he associated with the new administration as an industry-model.

I think that’s the well-intentioned space of this leadership group planning on being here for a few years. They’re coming to terraform their area for their arrival so to speak… It’s cyclical. It’s an industry…. When you take it from the stance of let's support kids, like we're fixing kids because every day that a kid loses out on having this instruction or these things has the potential to have a negative life outcome for them. It's very different than setting up a 5-year business model and saying that these are the tenable goals for this year. This year, this is how much we're going to try and cut our operating expenses and we're going to hope to funnel it back into this. That kid is in 10th grade by the time you may have figured it out and their skill set could be anywhere in that space. When I talk about it being an industry, I really talk about it being not necessarily student-centered but really centered on a business model.

Under each new administration, cabinet positions were completely revamped, departments were renamed, re-arranged, and collapsed, and priorities reset. During some transitions, all cabinet-level leaders needed to re-apply for their positions. Over sixty percent of the district central office administrators that I interviewed for this study experienced a significant change in their title or department during the two and a half years of this study, which required adjusting their role, goals, and daily tasks.

In the process relative positions were upended with peers becoming supervisors or supervisors becoming peers, driving a number of district and school leaders to leave the district every year. This exodus was supported by the fact that charter organizations, that had steadily grown in number since the first of the Broad alums took the helm in Green Grove, exerted a constant pull for experienced
and seasoned leadership. A number of district leaders who left, left to take on leadership positions in
the growing number of charter schools and charter organizations in the city of Green Grove.

New superintendents hired on to “transform school districts” also tended to bring in all new cabinet
level leadership from outside the district, and promote principals within the organization who shared
their narrative of successful reform but were fresh to the district central office arena. At least five
Green Grove principals, who had built reputations for successfully building supportive school
cultures and climates in their schools, were promoted to the district central office during the time
period of this study. While these promotions brought important site-level insights and expertise to
the district central office, these promotions also left significant leadership vacuums and instability in
schools. These school leaders moved from neighborhood nested school sites where they interacted
daily with young people and their families to a carpeted downtown office-building supervising
multiple school sites from afar. One interviewee shares in exasperation:

There’s so much transition in the district. They keep blaming other people – the
principals keep changing, whatever. But they have to look at themselves too. What
are you doing? It’s not like those people are leaving the district. They’re just moving
position – moving up. I believe in promotion and all that but… like [the successful
principal at a school serving predominately African American students]. I think they
pulled him out too early. They’re like, you’re doing all this great stuff, okay now
we’re going to move you.

In this particular case, the leadership vacuum left at this school led to the initiation of at least
one other OCR complaint that alleged that students were kicked out of classes and allowed
to roam the halls. There were also allegations that students were being warehoused in
classrooms that were meant to be targeted mentorship and empowerment spaces for African
American children, disrupting those classrooms as well as the normal schedule of those
students kicked out of class.

These district leadership decisions to promote successful principals into district central office
administration disproportionately affected schools serving higher proportions of low-income
students, particularly ones in traditionally African American communities. While principals
from more racially integrated schools serving a larger number of middle-class families often
left the district for other districts, these were not the principals that were promoted into
district central office. Instead, of the five principals that had been promoted internally, two
were leaving schools with over 85 percent students eligible for free or reduced lunch and
over 90 percent African American students. The others were leaving schools with 84 to 91
percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch and over 97 percent students of color,
with a majority of students being Latino. These decisions had alternatives. One administrator
describes the alternative that he would have liked to see.

I would have found a way to keep [the two principals leaving schools serving
traditionally African American communities] there, because I know they were both
interviewing for other things outside, but I’m like, “Look, what do you need?” I
would have found some money and said, “Look, brother, pay you here and let’s find
who’s gonna follow you, your predecessor or whoever it is, and let’s groom them.”
But to just leave, in particular at those two communities where the norm is—I mean, damn… They’ve had some amazing folks, but two or three years and then they’re out, in communities where you’ve got grandparents, people build the people…. When you find those good folk, support them and give them voice, give them power, but I just think it was too soon. And I don’t want to say that they’re not ready for that, I’m just saying in the spirit of—even what was said when they got there to those communities, it wasn’t, “Hey, we’re gonna be here.”

Instead, school leaders who demonstrated some success in building positive school environments in schools serving the lowest-income and most concentrated communities of color were removed from their schools and brought into the folds of the new district central office administration.

Lower rung district central office administrators who support schools in implementing programs, experienced both the constraints that leadership churn at the district central office level put on their work as well as the constraints that leadership churn at school sites created. A department head explained, “with the whole redesign of multiple leadership [changes], at one point [my department] was housed in student services, and then it was moved to leadership, curriculum, and instruction, and then it moved back to the family school department.” A district central office administrator in the same department explained:

One of our biggest challenges is principal turnover. I’ve worked with school for years, and things are going well, and then a new principal comes in. It doesn’t matter how many systems you create for sustainability, if a new principal comes in and says, “Here’s the new systems we’re putting in place,” then your systems that you’ve created are gone. There might be people there who remember it and still use it, but in terms of whole-school culture shift, it’s really, really hard.

The result of constant and drastic leadership changes built up mistrust amongst school site leaders, hardening divides between those professionally benefiting from reform and those responsible for implementing it. A school leader who had been at his school site for over 10 years and who prided himself in his dedication to students shared that his biggest frustration with the OCR Agreement was that:

A different boss comes in with a different agenda and then that boss leaves two, three years, and now it’s a different roll out. Now we have a different roll out. It’s like, when can there be something that’s sustained for quite awhile in which we’re all in? Like all in. And be able to see it through. And not just … I might be jaded when I say this but like you know I don’t want… Now, when a new boss comes in, you know, they want to drop all these new edicts. Well, what’s the point of this, if you’re gone in another two years and we’re rolling something else out? What’s up? Mistrust might be putting it on thick but you know… Okay, where is this leading to eventually?
The leadership turn-over coupled with an ideology of transformation and reform has created cultures and practices that feed instability and insecurity at the district central office and mistrust at the school site.

These leadership changes created a great deal of instability and insecurity within district central office and schools. Administrators at all levels of the school district attributed the lack of more substantive engagement with the OCR Agreement to leadership churn. One administrator describes:

The district restructuring has been planned ... It went into effect July first. In the sense of new departments, new positions, new everything, lay offs for people.... It's like a flood which totally disrupted people and displaced everybody... All of these things and so the [OCR Agreement] is really not in the forefront of anyone's mind.... Once again I have to say that the chronology of what happened now there are a lot of external factors that have detracted from the excitement and the sexiness of the [OCR Agreement] because earth quakes are happening every day. Earth quakes, fires, 911 calls! Oh, it's a thing of the past now.... half the school sites have new principals. A third are new to the district altogether. You have hiring firing of teachers. So people's jobs took precedence.

Observations of meetings and informal conversations with district central office administrators also confirm that these drastic organizational rearrangements were at the top of people’s minds. Interviewees looked haggard during these long periods of uncertainty and transition, and those whose positions improved shared with me renewed hope for the coming year while those whose positions declined shared frustrations, critiques, and plans for leaving the district for other jobs.

**Instability and insecurity led to intense competition and self-interested behavior.** As I described in the previous section, the drastic organizational reconfiguration that occurred with every new “transformational leader” and successive tidal waves of reforms produced by the education reform industry created instability and insecurity for everyone working in the school district. From year to year or even semester to semester, district central office administrators moved offices, moved up or down the district hierarchy, gained or lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding, quadrupled the size of their departments or became one-person remnants of defunded departments, and either kept or lost their jobs. This insecurity led to competing professional interests dominating other personal or political commitments of the district central office administrators. District central office administrators, independent of their expressed political commitments to racial or social justice, engaged with the OCR Agreement in strategic ways to either maintain their influence in the district or to enlarge it.

Initially, the Superintendent and OCR leadership convinced district leaders and school board members that signing the Agreement would bring additional federal and private funding to the district, however little, if any, appeared. A district central office administrator shared:
We all thought it would mean all these new resources. Which I think that was kind of a one two buckle my shoe scenario. It was that a lot of folks thought that once this thing went – oh – we won this position in Oakland – the federal government duh duh duh duh – but it meant absolutely no new resources.

The public and private funds had already come into the district even before the OCR Agreement and were for specific programs such as PBIS, RJ or SEL. No additional external funding came with the OCR Agreement for implementation. The board reluctantly voted to provide $750,000 of the district’s general funds towards the implementation of the OCR Agreement.

Thus, the OCR Leadership Team found themselves fighting for hoped-for foundation grants and for schools to “choose” their program under the OCR Agreement and fund them. One OCR Leadership Team member astutely explains the competitive dynamics created on the OCR Leadership Team:

The folks that have self-selected to be a part of this team have a deep commitment to this work. Because their jobs or their personal commitments align very well with these things. So the priorities are to advance their work and not necessarily to advance students. And I get the sense of saying that students are the center of everything but the reality is that I think the priority is securing resources. And so that just may be my stance for it, take it or leave it, but I think that that is ultimately the priority of a lot of folks. Cause like I need to secure resources for my staff. You know, and this is an opportunity to grow my department. It is an opportunity to grow my body of work to increase my institutional power. I manage three now; I can manage 8. Now I can be a super manager and so I think the priorities are, people are about the kids, I just think that the priorities become increasing their institutional stronghold or their longevity and you do that by having dollars earmarked for your department. You know being bigger and bad-er then the next department.

Here, the OCR Leadership Team member explains that team members are both “about the kids” and about “increasing their institutional stronghold.”

Interests were largely defined within the district central office by the divisions, departments, and subunits that one belonged to. For example, the interests of the non-instructional side of the house, or departments in the Student, Family, and Community Services (SFCS) division were seen as conflicting with the interests of the “instructional side of the house”, or the departments involved with academics. An administrator interviewed during the first year of the OCR Agreement describes this divide and the impact of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in challenging the dominance of academics in Green Grove:

At leadership level the focus has remained primarily on academics and this [“how we’re treating kids"] is just an add on because people that work in education are educators.... So, leaders are evaluated on their graduation rates. They’re not evaluated by their school climate index, but yet I think the national dialog is bringing those together. And thank god but it’s had to come from a civil rights side.
Within the Student, Family, and Community Services (SFCS) division, conflicting interests existed between departments and subunits, funded to implement the competing solutions present in the education reform industry. These conflicts between departments and subunits appeared in cross-departmental OCR Leadership Team meetings where department heads would challenge one another for time on the agenda. Additionally, these conflicts arose in OCR Leadership Team strategic planning processes where department heads advocated for their own programs without being able to synthesize a larger coherent vision or a vision not directly tied to the grants they held.

District central office administrators openly discussed these conflicts and competitive relationships in interviews, providing evidence not only that these competitive self-interested behaviors existed, but created real constraints on more collective possibilities. Cabinet level leaders raised concerns that departments advocated and lobbied for their own work without being able to create a unified plan. “[W]e don’t have enough controls around working against each other. We have people competing for the same resources, people competing for the same time, people competing for the same not just time in front of teachers, but air time, visibility.” Division leaders also described the ways in which the departments they supervised competed with one another in counter-productive ways:

I’ve tried to connect both [departments] to say, “There actually is—” ’Cause all these folks have their own little territory that gets in the way of them seeing that someone else figured out something that would actually benefit you, just ’cause they all have different ideas about who’s doing the most important work still.

Those who engaged in the competition also recognized it as such. These district central office administrators shared:

It’s hard to—it has to do with divide and conquer. It has to do with the systems that prevent [the other department head] and me from—I love [the other department head] personally. I really admire his work. But it’s hard to figure out how to join with it. And somehow we’re pitted against each other…. How can I not reinforce—I don’t want to be party to that. But it happens.

The presence of competition heightened even more self-interested behavior, leading to a feedback loop.

In addition to the overall job insecurity created by public disinvestment in education, and private investment in education reform that I’ve discussed in the previous section, the education reform industry and the public and private grants it made available to Green Grove structured the district departments and subunits to mirror the dominant reform solutions and funding sources in the environment. Thus, departments and subunits within SFCS were funded to implement the dominant education reform solutions being pushed at the national education policy level, including positive behavioral interventions and supports (PBIS) and social emotional learning (SEL), and other federal agency priorities like violence prevention, anti-truancy programs, and bullying prevention.
Because the Behavioral Health Department secured grants for PBIS, Restorative Justice, and trauma-informed mental health services, district central office administrators framed these programs and services as working together to provide tiered interventions for misbehaving and traumatized students. While, other departments funded by other sources advocated for the importance of their solutions for schools. Funded by a large multi-year grant from the Collaborative for Academic Social and Emotional Learning (CASEL), Green Grove created a new department for Social Emotional Learning, focusing on the social and emotional standards that adults and students needed to learn and meet in addition to the academic benchmarks. The Office of African American Student Success (OAASS), created during the Green Grove school district's previous administration, was funded largely by progressive venture philanthropies, local foundations, and corporate donations. OAASS focused on providing targeted mentorship and curriculum to young African American students through elective coursework. In these classes, African American teachers introduced young people to their history, systemic racism, and ways of resisting and coping. The instructional side of the house, funded and focused on academic achievement, engaged in limited fashion with the OCR Agreement and at times advocated for schools to use competing behavioral management programs and services from the education reform industry.

**Impact on District**

Five things resulted from the interaction of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative and the political and economic conditions of Green Grove. First, the OCR Leadership Team narrowly advocated for competing solutions funded by the education reform industry rather than engaging in more collective struggles to actualize broader expressions of the problem and solutions raised by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative and the larger movement against the school-to-prison pipeline. Second, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative fed the growth of the Behavioral Health department and not the Office of African American Student Success, strengthening treatment and therapeutic ideologies in the district. Third, the OCR Leadership Team resisted creating a unified strategic plan that would support substantive change in schools, contributing to the confusion and lack of support experienced by school leaders in the previous chapter. Fourth, the OCR Leadership Team failed to address or reform issues arising from the School Security Officers program, a mandate of the OCR Agreement as well as a concern of school leaders. Finally, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative provided an opportunity for a diverse array of district central office and school administrators - individuals who expressed a broad range of political ideologies but a common shared managerial interest in monitoring others through data - to agree that implementation of a universal disciplinary data system was the one coordinated priority for the district.

**Narrowing the definition of the problem and solutions and creating additional demand for the education reform industry.** The struggle within the district central office became about the growth or decay of competing programs - whether PBIS or SEL or OAASS courses, rather than the broader vision articulated in the OCR Leadership Team’s original elevator pitch - “It is our goal to create a school system that makes our African American students and families feel they belong and matter.” While school and district
leaders expressed broader articulations of solutions than program adoption, program adoption became the focus of the implementation efforts.

There was a [OCR Agreement] meeting earlier in the spring semester before we started talking about, you've gotta either be PBIS or you've gotta be RJ. If you're not you're on your own. That whole meeting, that whole period of time around [the OCR Agreement] seemed really weird and awkward. Things would shift overnight. Leave us Friday, think we're going in one direction, and then somebody would have a conversation with somebody else, and they get super excited about that conversation, and that becomes the new marching orders…. Kidnapped is not the right word, but it got, it continued to shift and didn't stay focused…. PBIS and RJ, is not going to reduce suspensions. I'd rather just have a crooked person in the office that's not inputting the paperwork, because PBIS and RJ alone, I think falls short…. You've gotta name the problem first. You've got to name the problem correctly, ask the right questions in the beginning. I think that would have been more helpful. I think even the [OCR Agreement], even the way it was designed, it could have had curriculum focus. It could have had a culturally relevant focus. It could have had a pedagogy focus. It could have had a focus there. But, instead of that it had a focus on technology and discipline policies, and PBIS and RJ, which was a missed opportunity.

Here, like in many meetings and interviews, district central office administrators and school leaders shared articulations of broader solutions and viewed the mandates of the district central office as limiting.

A number of alternative solutions existed and were discussed in meetings and re-iterated in interviews by more than one interviewee when asked what it would take for the OCR Agreement to be successful. These alternatives included expecting and supporting teachers to build more meaningful relationships with young people and their families, creating conferences where educators could share best practices with one another for how to build positive climates in their classrooms and schools, hosting professional learning opportunities for OAASS classroom teachers to share lessons of how they design curriculum and classroom practices to encourage, engage, and empower African American children, and flipping the hierarchy of power and pay in the district so that great school leaders are paid well to remain in schools, rather than removed to district central offices. However, these alternative solutions never gained traction because they did not meet the requirements of the grants nor the needs of district central office administrators in maintaining or building their influence in the ever shifting district bureaucracy.

The most contentious issues shared during interviews with different district central office administrators revolved around which programs were being pushed into schools by different district central office departments.

She's pushed it [No Nonsense Nurturing] in to a bunch of schools where we already have PBIS, which she hasn't championed, where we already have RJ, which she hasn't championed. $30,000 to 60,000, that's the money that would have gone to the
mental health or RJ services…. Yes and also to notice that when you take $60,000 out of the limited budget, that's money that would have gone to these other things that are school wide. That's what they bought. It's a program that actually undermines the work that we're already doing around PBIS and RJ.

This quote illustrates the contours of the game that district central office administrators were engaged in. Different departments pushed schools to adopt different behavioral management programs. Since the OCR Agreement came with no additional funding, the cost of program adoptions would need to come out of individual school budgets and the board approved budget of $750,000.

The OCR Agreement resulted in creating significant demand for the programs, products, and services of the education reform industry. The district paid for program consultants and trainers to support implementation of school climate and culture programs in every school. A majority of schools adopted PBIS, which according to the creators costs an average of $10,000 per school site over two years. For this medium-sized school district, just implementing PBIS district-wide costs approximately $860,000 over two years. This cost does not include the technology costs for purchasing and maintaining data systems, which are at the core of the PBIS model, or of the on-going training for schools that experience 20-40 percent teacher turnover every year. In addition, PBIS consultants and trainers were flown in to train top district level administrators and to participate in district-wide events. During this time, the district also adopted No Nonsense Nurturing, a coaching-intensive classroom management program, that one administrator described as costing between $30,000 and $60,000 to implement per school site. In addition to the marketed programs and packages, the district entered into contracts with local reform product and service providers, including consultants with expertise in providing training, evaluation, and reporting. Consultant costs included among other things, hiring writing consultants to produce the mandated reports to OCR and to help with publishing a professionally-written and designed discipline handbook, hiring a project manager to convene and manage the implementation process in the second year, and paying a data software company to design a data system that would integrate the data collected through the universal referral form into the district’s existing student data system.

Despite increased adoptions of behavioral management programs and alternatives to suspensions across the district after the OCR Agreement. The three focal middle schools that were a part of my study had already adopted behavioral management programs or alternative suspension programs before the Agreement. However, even in these early adopters, I found that these programs did not challenge the social control and punishment aspects of school discipline in each of the three middle schools. Instead, I found that educative and democratic functions of discipline existed seemingly un-problematically alongside control and punishment functions.

Rock Point Middle School implemented Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), hired a restorative justice coordinator, and opened classes dedicated to teaching and mentoring boys of color, the years prior to the district’s signing of the OCR Agreement. In this school, I found strong evidence of educative practices within classrooms, care and
service to students outside of the classroom, but double-digit suspension rates and racially targeted dress code enforcement. Although this school had engaged fully with the PBIS program even before the OCR agreement, I observed no mention of the PBIS agreements or the use of “bucks” to applaud good behavior in any of the classes I observed. Thus, I found evidence of positive discipline and rigorous pedagogy, but these practices were occurring before the adoption of the programs and school administrators expressed frustration that the newly mandated programs were just more of the “latest and greatest,” administrative idea that would be gone in a year or two. Instead, school administrators asked for more “grunt workers,” those individuals that could spend their days working with children and teachers.

River Glen Middle School had also implemented PBIS and RJ. However, systems and structures for school discipline were not clear. In this school, I found evidence of care, control, and permissiveness regularly interacting with one another. Yet, in the same school, in each of the days that I conducted field work, four to eight African American students spent their morning outside of class in a small hallway space in the main office - doing what looked a lot like on-campus suspension although the on-campus suspension room had officially been discontinued the year before. Students helped fold fliers and stuffed envelopes for office staff and talked amongst themselves. Walkie talkie conversations that I overheard revolved around the control and movement of students mimicking law enforcement communications. For example:

SSO: [Student] wants to act a fool in Mr. [Teacher’s] class.
Administrator: Don't let him out of your sight.
SSO: I got 'em, [Administrator’s name]
Administrator: What's your location?

During passing periods, observed interactions between administrators and students revolved around regulating dress code violations. I observed in more than one occasion, administrators asking African American boys to take off their hats or hoodies, while not seeming to even notice other students breaking the same dress codes. These observations were true of administrators of different races, genders, and expressed commitments to racial equity. In addition, in the three meetings I observed of the PBIS-inspired school climate and culture team focused on how to create an effective detention system run by teachers and not administrators, arguing over who would mete out punishment, not alternatives to punishment. The overall discipline culture of the school was control oriented and there were few if any instances I observed of an educative or democratic function of discipline. While River Glen appeared to be the school most in need of more positive or restorative school discipline, PBIS only seemed to rename systems of control and punishment already in place.

In New Design School, a school that had been described by some district central office administrators as being a “resister” of the OCR Agreement and district mandates, I experienced deeply educative interactions between the administrators and students. Here, school administrators described their attempts to create individualized holistic supports for their students in spite of district policies. In one instance in particular, the administrator received a call on the walkie that several students were caught skateboarding across the yard
by the neighboring school’s security personnel, breaking one of the rules on their shared campus. Several minutes after the call, three boys showed up at the door of the office. The administrator spoke to them in a kind but exasperated tone – maybe like a big sister would use on her younger brothers. She explained, “You know we’re already breaking the district rules about skateboards so that we can have a skateboarding class for the younger grades, right?” The boys nod. “What do you think is going to happen if you skate board over there and they ask you to get off and you don’t? Why didn’t you just pick it up?” One student tries to say something but the administrator interrupts, “Don’t ruin it for the younger kids.” After asking the students to explain what they would do in the future, the administrator dismissed them without any further punitive measures. The administrator drew on the students’ sense of responsibility to their younger peers, their love for skateboarding, as well as a sense of shared rebelliousness against district policy to ask them to change their behaviors.

Existing alongside these interactions outside of classrooms, I found that control-oriented pedagogies dominated the classrooms I observed. In a majority of classrooms I observed students sitting in rows facing forward, not allowed to speak to one another. Teachers’ interactions with students largely focused on providing directions on the individual assignment and regulating the movement and conversation in class. I observed one classroom in which students were required to sit the entire period in the “learning position” with their two feet planted on the ground and facing forward, palms flat on the table, backs straight, eyes on the teacher, and silent. During the period I observed, African American students who raised their hands to participate in class discussions were never called on. The assistant principal explained with some empathy towards the teacher that he had been hit in the back of the head with a battery in a previous school and “treats every kid as if they have a D battery.” She also shared that his class is rigorous and regimented, so socially marginalized children feel safe in his class and students are being prepared for college. In this school, administrators exhibited restorative relationships with students but solidarity with intense forms of social control in the classrooms. Administrators justified these contradictions with a belief that these practices were good for students without questioning whether these same practices would be accepted in schools serving middle class students. However, the OCR Agreement and the programs that schools adopted did not provide any new tools for addressing these deeper contradictions.

In summary, even as educators across the system described other solutions that would build upon the existing capacity of educators, redistribute resources from management to the school sites, and address racial bias amongst staff and teachers, the OCR Leadership Team focused their energies on gaining support for their own funded programs and documenting their own success, leaving schools largely unsupported and unchanged.

**Strengthening the Behavioral Health department and weakening the Office of African American Student Success.** Moreover, the availability of public and private grants to fund PBIS, trauma-informed care, and other school psychology and mental health solutions for school discipline meant that the Behavioral Health department won out in the struggle over how Green Grove would address racially disproportionate punishment. During the implementation years of the OCR Agreement the Behavioral Health department grew exponentially and the Office of African American Student Success (OAASS) declined in
tature and resources. The head of the Behavioral Health department was hired into the district as a one-person department five years prior to the signing of the OCR Agreement, but through connecting her work with the issue of racially disproportionate suspensions after the announcement of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in 2010, she grew her department from 1 to over 50 employees and interns by 2014 not including over 100 mental health providers that work in schools and collaborate with her department. The department head describes in her own words,

[We] were invited to this disproportionality conference… put on by the US Office of Civil Rights and one of the main best practices they talked about was PBIS. So at that point we started to say, let’s actually bring this to Oakland and see if it can work, and then along the way my department started to grow and now I just have a lot of people.

The Behavioral Health department grew through securing philanthropic grants and federal grants connected to the special education intervention, Response to Intervention (RTI) and Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, mental health services in schools, as well as smaller grants for Restorative Justice.

The Behavioral Health department also secured a large proportion of what limited resources the school board allocated to the implementation of the OCR Agreement. While budget proposals from the OCR Leadership Team initially asked for funds primarily to fund district central office positions and activities, after some push back from the school board, district funds went to paying for several restorative justice coordinators for schools, and a scheduled restorative justice, de-escalation, and trauma-informed care training for School Security Officers. Finally, mid-way through the OCR Agreement, the Behavioral Health department secured several multi-million dollar federal grants to provide trauma-informed services and re-entry services for young people returning to school from the juvenile justice system.

In contrast, the Office of African American Student Success struggled to maintain a bare bones budget with only 3-5 staff located centrally at any one time, and part-time teachers funded by school sites to teach courses a dozen or so schools. The director of OAASS was demoted repeatedly during the first half of the OCR Agreement. Initially, the director was appointed to lead the OCR implementation process for the entire district, reporting directly to the superintendent and participating in the district’s executive cabinet. Throughout the study, he was called on to hold community meetings about the OCR Agreement, report back on the progress of the OCR Agreement to the school board and public, advocate on behalf of the OCR Leadership Team for district funds, and meet with OCR attorneys. However, increasingly he described himself, and was described by others, as being more of a figurehead than a leader of the implementation efforts. He shares:

Hey I’m trying. It’s out of my hands. No funding. We’re going to be cut in half. To look at all we’ve done and in the first four years and to actually get to this point… you’re telling me that I have to create a staffing structure with half the money that we had from this year? And so you’re burning inside but on the exterior you still have to advocate, you still got to obviously work as a team.’
By midway through the OCR Agreement, the director of OAASS no longer participated in cabinet or instructional leadership meetings, and was largely relegated to running targeted programs for African American students and families. During this time, OAASS was also moved from the main floor of the Family, Student, and Community Services building to a portable on the far side of the parking lot. The move of OAASS, and the repeated demotion of the director, was considered by a number of district central office administrators as a clear symbol of the declining importance of the OAASS and the OCR Agreement to the district.

The impact of the growth of the Behavioral Health department and the concurrent decline of the Office of African American Student Success, was that the Behavioral Health department, and the ways that their grants identified the problem of school discipline and the appropriate solutions, began to dominate the implementation efforts and will likely significantly shape the remaining years of the Agreement. As one example of this, out of 61 slides in a PowerPoint slide deck used to train all of the district’s School Security Officers (a training only secured after a high-profile incident of SSO brutality), two slides described the work of the Office of African American Student Success. One slide showed a group of African American children with the title - “We are not dangerous. Racism is.” It was the only slide in the deck that moved from an individual to a structural analysis of the problem. Three slides discussed Restorative Justice, but primarily as a way to address “criminal behavior” and misbehavior. One slide read, “Restorative justice is based on the idea that because crime hurts, justice should heal.” Seven slides discussed PBIS, primarily describing the importance of having and teaching clear positive expectations, using common disciplinary procedures, and collecting data to monitor disciplinary progress. The interventions described for PBIS largely framed the problem as student misbehavior, relying heavily on individual interventions.

The largest component of the presentation, taking up twenty-nine slides, focus on trauma-informed practices that described student misbehavior as an outcome of family and community-induced traumas like neglect, emotional abuse, physical abuse, and sexual abuse. A slide explained, “Neglect, physical abuse, and emotional abuse are most often perpetrated by immediate family members. Sexual abuse is largely perpetrated by extra-familial members.” Even as the data on the slides suggested that only a small percentage of students experienced these intense forms of personal trauma, between .2 percent and .9 percent of children with and without disabilities, these became the focus of the training. Compare this to an alternative framing of trauma that could have focused on the prevalence of stress and traumas that arise from hunger, eviction, unemployment, mass incarceration, gun violence, and police violence - all traumatic events that had been on the rise in Green Grove during this time and that many school leaders shared as having direct impact on the kids and communities they served.

I found that in many ways predicted by or mirroring the dominant interests active in the national education policymaking field that created the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the federal enforcement of the civil rights provisions through the OCR Agreement fed the growth of the school psychology profession and the focus on individual psychosocial explanations for over and racially disproportionate use of school punishment, marginalized
and tokenized racial justice advocates and their framing of problems and solutions within the school district, and further shifted resources upwards from schools and into both a local layer of reform managers within the school district central offices and the broader education reform industry of education reform product and service vendors.

**Resisting a unified strategic plan of support for schools.** Since the OCR Agreement created the mandate on schools as well as the external mandate on the district, these departments competed over the framing of the OCR Agreement as a way to mandate their reforms and secure their influence. The interests of students, schools, or even a unitary district mission became secondary priorities.

I mean I just think that once again there are whole departments in [SFCS] that are set up and their job are these things that the [OCR Agreement] is pushing. And because there is enough structural institutional power for those spaces it’s really become a lobbying practice for resources.

An OCR Leadership Team member illustrates how the lobbying practices appear in meetings and trainings:

I think its the amount of face time that you can give your program in the meeting. I want to talk about PBIS. Well, I want to talk about [another program]. I want to talk about RJ, well I want to talk about [another program]. It's not to say that these things don’t do things but it becomes this matter of my program is better than your program. Give me the money because everyone is competing for the same pot.

However, more disruptive than even the competition for “face time” in meetings was the OCR Leadership Team’s inability, and perhaps even resistance, to creating a coherent synthesized implementation plan. At the end of the second year of the OCR Agreement, there was still no written plan. The OCR Leadership Team spent a full day retreat, a three-hour externally facilitated retreat, and several leadership team meetings trying to arrive at an implementation plan for the OCR Agreement. In each meeting, OCR Leadership Team members invariably spoke almost exclusively about what schools would need to do from their own departmental perspective. These discussions thus re-created the same silo-ed and competing work streams represented by formal organizational charts and job descriptions. For example, in the second year of the agreement, during one attempt to synthesize an implementation plan, the family and student engagement member of the leadership team arrived late to a meeting to find that no one had mentioned any broad goals in the ATR related to family and student engagement even though it is mandated in the negotiated agreement and her work was well-known and well-respected in the group. Without her physical presence, no one else voiced the interests of her department. She immediately voiced the importance of engaging families and students to transform school culture and the existing organizational chart was recreated for a second time.

An OCR Leadership Team member who was relatively new to Green Grove made the following observation about the multiple failed attempts at creating a strategic implementation plan for the OCR Agreement:
The other part of the tension was the fact that, I personally thought this was pretty stunning. I was surprised that people didn't want to engage in it more. Every single theory of action was coming directly from where that person sat within the organization…. I've always felt like when you're a school leader like a principal or you are a department in a district, it is your job to see a whole picture. You need to see a big picture, you're part of a big system, that's partly what it means to be a leader there. You're not just advocating for your particular place…. I think that's what we saw in those meetings. I was amazed at how consistently each theory of action matched up with where that person sat in the organization. It essentially meant that they weren't incompatible but it wasn't unified. If you were to write a theory of action statement, it was like dot, dot, dot because this person does this, this person does that, this person does this, right down the line.

Another district central office administrator describes her own experience of attempting to use the destabilization of the OCR Agreement to create a different collective solution:

I was given a list of people that I was supposed to lead for my group. So I got all those people together and they all wanted to argue with each other. [One program] wanted to say no, it's this way, [district instructional leaders] wanted to say no, it's this way and [another program] wants to say it's that way. So it’s like getting everyone on the same page and I finally did have them say what they all believed and we organized it into a framework and yet it was - all they did was organize themselves into the framework that we already had to begin with so, how did it move things forward? It didn’t. But it took so much time to get everyone on the same page.

In each of the three formal attempts to create a strategic plan, the OCR Leadership Team recreated each of their departmental duties - implementation of PBIS, R], and trauma services, implementation of OAASS courses, family and student engagement, new data systems, new policies, etc.

Even as the Team struggled to create a strategic plan, starting and stopping at least four times over the course of two and a half years, each of the individual meetings I observed where individual departments engaged with principals or school sites over programs or data systems began with an invocation of racial disproportionality and the presence of a federal mandate to comply. Thus, the absence of a unified strategic plan existed alongside individual departments framing their work as OCR mandates to school leaders and staff.

I argue that the strategic behaviors that district central office administrators engaged in led to conflict, disagreement, and an ultimate inability to arrive at a collective understanding of the problem and what combination of collective actions would actually support substantive change at the school level. As one example of this, at the half-way point of the agreement, the OCR Leadership Team had still not agreed on nor provided any professional development or training for teachers and school staff on the agreement or ways to address racially disproportionate suspensions. This occurred despite the teachers union repeatedly asking for professional development. At different OCR Agreement meetings and retreats, a wide host of teacher professional development topics were suggested including culturally relevant pedagogy, best practices for engaging African
American students, recognizing and combatting implicit biases, systemic oppression, meaningful parent engagement on issues of school culture, and involving students in transforming school culture. None of these occurred in any formal fashion. A central office administrator explains, “If we don’t do anything to shift [teacher] mindsets, all of this stuff we’re doing, it’s not going to matter.” Thus, the competitive behaviors that the district central office administrators engaged in left schools without any coordinated plan beyond the directive to reduce suspensions, expulsions, and racial disproportionality, leading to practices focused on “gaming the system” rather than substantive change.

**Abdicating responsibility for addressing the School Security Officer's Program.**

I argue that the focus of the OCR Leadership Team on maintaining and increasing their departmental influence in the district also led to an abdication of duty to implement OCR mandated reforms to the School Security Officer Program that involved a social field outside of their field of competition. The OCR Leadership Team, even after being provided the opportunity, left mandated reforms and trainings of the SSOs up to the School Police Chief to design. Thus, the reviewing, monitoring, and training of SSOs was never on the agenda in any of the OCR Leadership Team meetings during the first half of the OCR Agreement. Neither was SSO training or monitoring raised in any strategic planning sessions.

The acting School Police Chief shared that he had designed and vetted a three-day training for SSOs through a smaller OCR working group that he belonged to during the initial months following the signing of the OCR agreement. In the interview, he shared the outline of the proposed training, which included two days of state mandated proper weaponless defense techniques, handcuffing, and laws and liabilities related to student discipline, and only several hours of restorative practices training (Green Grove SSO Training Agenda Proposal, 2013). Thus, the SSO training the Chief proposed requested $60,000 from district funds earmarked for OCR implementation to run a training primarily focused on law enforcement techniques. The Chief explained that the funding would largely go to over-time salaries for SSOs.

The more substantive activities that the School Police Chief described as addressing community concerns over the role of law enforcement in schools were instituted in the year prior to the OCR Agreement. He described sending a number of his staff to trainings on restorative justice and conflict mediation, creating a complaint process for filing complaints against SSOs and school police, participating in a youth summit organized by the Family and Youth Engagement Department to rebuild relationships with students, and starting a summer camp for kids to “see police as normal people.” The Interim Chief explains that these actions were not related to the OCR Agreement. Instead, he describes his work as “really in the rebuilding stage,” after a loss of trust in the police as a result of the Green Grove School Police shooting. As a part of this process, he secured extra funds for training seven or eight leaders of School Security Officer teams to attend training, titled “Dealing with Difficult Customers.”

The OCR Leadership Team’s lack of engagement with the SSO program or school policing occurred despite several concerns raised by principals that law enforcement were overstepping their bounds as well as evidence that both the City Police Department as well
as the School District Police Department engaged in racially disproportionate punishment. During the two years prior to and subsequent to the signing of the OCR agreement, data on the youth arrests rates of the City Police Department showed that the City Police Department arrested African American youth six times more frequently than other ethnic groups in the city for low level offenses such as gambling, driving under the influence, disorderly conduct, suspicion, and loitering (CBO Report, 2013). Over half of the youth arrests that were referred to the County Probation Department were deemed “non-sustained,” and African American young people comprised 78 percent of these non-sustained arrests. Data shows that between 2010 and 2012, the Green Grove School Police responded to approximately 1,200 service calls, 17 percent of which were crimes against a person. The remaining calls were for drugs and alcohol (5 percent), weapons (3 percent), property crimes (5 percent), non-criminal conduct (49%) and “other service calls” (23%). The Green Grove School Police department arrested 85 students during these two years, but similar to the city police department, African American students were disproportionately arrested, comprising 70 percent of those arrested.

In 2012, the budget for these school police and security officers was nearly 5 million dollars, with an average police officer’s salary equaling more than an average elementary and middle school principal’s salary and nearly double the average teachers salary in the district. These funds largely come from unrestricted funds that once funded instruction and intervention programs (CBO Report, 2013). This force had been growing in previous years. For example, during the height of the district suspension spike in 2011-2012, Green Grove approved funding for an additional 9 School Security Officers midway through the year (CBO Report). The number of law enforcement leadership and management positions has also grown in recent years.

Finally, in the second year of the OCR agreement, the School Board passes two resolutions to regulate law enforcement activity in schools. However, the Board did so not in response to the OCR Agreement but to yet another high profile incident of excessive force and violence involving the Green Grove School Police Department. The incident involved an SSO beating a disabled student and the story, including video, appears in a number of major local news outlets. In the following school board meeting, the board passed two resolutions that finally mandated the collection of data on law enforcement referrals, citations, and arrests, the notification to students that they could request that a parent be present before interrogations, and suggested that law enforcement officers conduct arrests in more private locations. The following summer, SSO trainings included a PowerPoint presentation about the OCR agreement, data on the racial disproportionality of school discipline, the programs and best practices implemented in the schools to address these issues, and a description of trauma, de-escalation techniques, and restorative practices.

I raised this notable absence of any expressed interest in this area of work by the OCR Leadership Team during last round of interviews with OCR Leadership Team members. Team members responded that those concerns were not part of their tasks under the OCR Agreement. Since OCR Leadership Meetings in the district central office were largely places for strategic action between competing departments attempting to gain a larger share of schools or larger influence in the district, I argue that the School Security Officer’s program
was neither viewed as a direct competitor or a arena for competition. Their funding was secured as a portion of the general fund and did not compete for the same grants that the other departments relied on. School Security Officers were also supervised within Green Grove's school police department by the Chief of Police, who reported directly to the Superintendent. Thus, neither the department location nor the funding stream crossed paths with the other departments in charge of the OCR Agreement.

The OCR Agreement coordinated and strengthened the managerial interests of the district central office for data auditing systems. Data auditing and accountability arose as the only coordinated solution to the school discipline problem in Green Grove. I found that this occurred because data auditing and accountability was relatively inexpensive and served the interests of district central office administrators, and principals, who expressed a broad range of political demands but a common shared managerial interest in monitoring others through data. Despite some district central office administrators expressing hope for democratic uses of the data, the data system that was created did not meet these democratic ends. Instead it supplanted more robust data systems that schools had adopted or created on their own that permitted teachers, administrators, parents, and students to communicate with one another. The universal data system mandated district-wide was never made accessible to teachers. Ironically, the interface accessible to school administrators did not permit the disaggregation of the data by race to examine the racialized impacts of disciplinary practices.

The Office for Civil Rights, as a legal enforcement agency, was very interested in Green Grove creating a district-wide discipline data system, thus contributing to the data auditing and monitoring demands on the district. For example, four out of the twenty pages of the OCR Agreement articulated precise mandates for the kinds of data Green Grove was responsible for collecting. In addition, OCR monitoring reports regularly requested data to monitor progress from year to year. OCR lawyers asked district administrators in different meetings how they planned to demonstrate that they had made progress in reducing racial disproportionality in school punishment. Moreover, it was well understood by everyone that data would be critical to whether Green Grove would be released at the end of the 5-year agreement. However, this alone, did not explain the focus on data accountability as the one coordinated solution.

I argue that in the context of limited resources and grant-dependency, the OCR Leadership Team agreed on the creation of a universal data system as the one coordinated solution because it served the interests of management. The universal data system required teachers to document every out-of-classroom disciplinary referral and intervention on the district-wide referral form, and mandated school administrators to input the data into AERIES, the district’s student data system that everyone admitted was outdated and “clunky”. The OCR Leadership Team focused a majority of its implementation energy in the second and third years on implementation of this universal data system. By the second academic year of the OCR Agreement, a majority of OCR Leadership Team meetings and meetings between the OCR Leadership Team and school site administrators or staff revolved around implementation of the district-wide referral form. A subgroup of the OCR implementation team, made up of the department head for Behavioral Health, the district’s Disciplinary
Hearing Panel, and the Data Department, created and implemented the plan for training all principals, teachers, and clerical staff in the district to document and upload any out-of-class referral of a student beginning in the 2014-2015 school year.

Meetings to coordinate implementation of the district-wide referral form were logistically oriented and collaborative. Department heads commended each other for great trainings, discussed the data coming from pilot schools who implemented the forms a semester early, and expressed shared concern that teachers were failing to fill out all the data fields, creating “data issues.” In discussing how to respond, a cabinet-level administrator volunteers to get his communication department to “set our universal position on this in a letter, and then hold people accountable to that.” A district central office administrator volunteers to have representatives from her department go to each of over eighty school sites to train the staff on how to use the district-wide referral form - a significant amount of staff time.

The only costs associated with the new discipline data system was the creation of a data entry interface that would provide a user-friendly way of entering data into the district’s existing student data system and the printing of new forms on triPLICATE carbon paper. Thus, the new data system required minimal expenditure of resources. However, more than just a cost effective tool, data auditing received support from administrators sitting in very different locations in the school district and who expressed different ideologies and political demands.

Racial justice oriented district central office administrators expressed hope that data would lead to recognition of racial disparities and drive changes in practice.

If you don’t create systems to provide professional development to have those conversations, or to share the real data, you’re just as much a part of the problem as you accuse the educators that’s in front of our kings and queens. You’re part of the problem if you’re not providing the access and accountability for groups to have honest dialogue about what’s going on and to really share data for what it really, really is and show it and not hide it behind other factors. As a district, as an ecosystem, you’re just as responsible for that not happening, because you’re not giving them the proper training or support or coaching or acknowledgment or awareness that this is an issue around equity and that we need to really address it and be as transparent as we can and say, “I know your data says this, but here’s this data, and these kids, even though they may be a smaller percentage of your school, is just as important as the majority percentage of your kids that you may be able to hide behind some type of data that hides this other data.” So every school needs to have that conversation.

Here, this district central office administrator expressed the importance of data as a demand for recognition - for school staff to examine racial disparities in outcomes produced and reproduced in their school. He also made a demand for redistribution of resources to support schools to look at data in these ways and make changes.
In addition, the data system met the needs of district central office administrators. Many district central office administrators felt that the data accountability system would allow them to monitor what was really happening at the school sites and to illuminate dishonest behaviors of school leaders.

The [district-wide referral form] I think should capture referrals in school and out of school. I think it should be the way that we are able to gather information on the ground about what's happening in those three categories. Two of those are very new so that's also saying that it's going to give us the ability to look deeper than we've ever looked before. I can see that answering a number of questions for us like, are you sending kids home? Are these RJ walks or these taking an hour, 6 hours, 2 hours. It answers a lot of questions and mysteries and other Title XI violations we have going on at the same time about those same issues. I feel like the form itself, if used right can do that.

Other district central office administrators, particularly department heads, prioritized data systems as a way to demonstrate the success of their own programs.

I would say that the big focus now is, for next year anyway and I'll stop talking about this, but my big goal now is, we've got all the people in place. What I really want to have is a really solid data system - a way to demonstrate what we're doing.

Public presentations of these evaluations occurred regularly and was an important part of growing ones influence in the district as well as in the broader education reform field.

Since the press conference an release of the RJ report getting a gazillion request from people around the country to see our school – develop a relationship with a university to disseminate what we are doing. Every week we get multiple requests for press information. It's an exciting time, I'm beginning to think that in the context of how we really begin to develop the evidence base for braiding of the PBIS, RJ, and trauma-informed work. How do we deliver evidence of what is happening with RJ and how these pieces fit together.

This district central office administrator discusses the importance of data for evaluations and other forms of legitimation within the field of education reform. I am not arguing that evaluating and sharing best practices is a bad thing. However, I argue that the grant dependency of the district central office and the outwards-facing perspective of those working in it created incredible incentives for department heads to claim more significant successes publicly than were warranted internally. I knew of at least one unfavorable evaluation of a program that was never discussed or shared.

Finally, the data system met with the applause of principals who wanted the data systems in order to identify and discipline teachers who were sending out students from their classrooms. During a rotating training of school principals in the use of the discipline data system, one of the most frequent requests from principals was that they be able to identify teachers who sent out a large number of students. While district central office administrators
reminded principals that the intent was not to use the data system in punitive ways, during the third year of the Agreement, there were significant efforts to incorporate classroom behavioral management data into teacher evaluation measures.

The Supportive School Discipline Initiative and the OCR Agreement provided the opportunity for these diverse managers to coordinate their common interest in data auditing and accountability. Thus, data auditing and accountability became the common agreed upon solution to the school discipline problem in Green Grove.

At best the disciplinary data system strengthened bureaucratic burdens on schools. A common theme across all three focal middle schools in my study was that the evidence of impact was limited to the adoption of the new mandatory district-wide office referral form. When asked about how the OCR agreement changed his work, one administrator laughs and ruffles through a stack of papers on his desk and says, “these.” When asked to explain, he responds, “Has there been any changes? Not really, can you tell me if you seen any changes anywhere? Just give me an example.” Another administrator at another school shares,

What was the impact of [the OCR Agreement]? We didn’t start anything…. They started talking about the [OCR Agreement] that fall in the context of how it’s going to affect PBIS because it went from … it affected what systems we’re doing. Mainly, the only way it was really implemented with us was with the [district-wide office referral form]. That’s it.

For an administrator in the third school, she was aware of the PBIS work that the district was engaged in, which she described as spending all day in the cafeteria with multiple groups of students making students say please and thank you through the line, a lawsuit with the Office of Civil Rights, and the district-wide office referral form.

The district-wide office referral form required teachers to check off possible motivations for the students behavior and three interventions that the teacher had engaged in before sending the student out. Several lines at the bottom of the form permitted administrators to write down the follow-up disposition on the issue, including suspension, detention, parent conference, and referral to counseling services. Schools were mandated to input this data into the existing district student database AERIES and had paid a software development company a significant amount of money to create an on-line form that mimicked the paper referral form and would properly populate the fields within AERIES. District central office administrators widely touted the implementation of the district-wide office referral form as a significant achievement that would change teacher behavior by drawing attention to the underlying issues behind student misbehavior, educate teachers about the kinds of interventions they should try before punishing a child by removing them from class, and provide useful data to teachers and administrators at the school site for making decisions about school discipline.

Despite these hopes, principals and teachers experienced the district-wide office referral form as ridiculously bureaucratic. For Rock Point Middle School, a school I described as
“earnestly compliant”, the mandated district-wide office referral form was met with some annoyance but was implemented with little difficulty. Administrators simply replaced the office referral form that their staff as a whole had created the year before through their PBIS roll out with the new one. The forms were similar and an office staff was assigned the job of inputting the data. One administrator explains,

I just hand it over so the only thing I have to do is just call a parent or guardian, whoever that might be. Hey, I just want to make sure that you know that Joe got booted from [teacher’s] class and he has detention with me and I just want to make sure you know that he’s coming home a little bit late.

While administrators enjoyed saving the “2-minutes of time” that they no longer had to spend to input the data from each referral, the change to the new form and the reporting requirements of the district central office encouraged the administrative staff to move the responsibility of engaging with the online database to clerical staff and away from those doing the work. The result of this was to increase the bureaucratic burden of the school, yet removing the benefits to the school community of keeping detailed records. After reflecting on his own comment about the impact of the changes, the administrator lamented:

Call me old school, but I like inputting it myself. I like to capture it myself being the fact that I spoke with the kid, I know the situation. It makes my life easier for me to type it in myself. Once again, I think I understand the gist of the situation whereas on paper, it’s just that - “Joe disrupted my class, constant talking” blah blah blah, because she inputs it verbatim…. That doesn’t describe the context… like Joe was disrupting the class because he was hungry. Because he didn’t have breakfast and so he was bugging the teacher because he was hungry and so [it’s different ] than just “got in trouble for talking out loud and disrupting class - Disposition is detention”, right? Whereas like I think for me, to be able to provide him a little bit of the context gives me more of a talking point and not just for the kid but with the teacher as well. Okay so next time that you see this kid fidgeting like that, like give him a pass to me so I can deal with it rather than him disrupting your class like that. I can take two minutes out of my time and deal with it and now he’s out of your hair and you can continue teaching your class and I can deal with him, I can give him a granola bar in my office, two minutes, eat, drink water, go, now, like that just alleviated the situation not just for this time but for the next time as well.

The overall impact of this new system in Rock Point further bureaucratized an otherwise nurturing student-adult relationship. Finally, administrators shared that when the school attempted to use the new data system to track other interventions like parent conferences or students being sent to buddy rooms, they were penalized for having high office referral numbers and have created a new code for those types of disciplinary actions.

The New Design School, a school I described as a “thoughtful noncompliance” school, was described by one district central office administrator as one of the “resisters” and rumors circulated that they refused to input any of their discipline data, raising concerns about their disciplinary practices. In truth, New Design School, had adopted, as a number of other
schools in the district had, a student database and communication software system that allowed any student, parent, teacher, staff, or administrator to log on and view assignments, grades, teacher comments, disciplinary actions, and attendance for themselves or others, depending on their data access status. Once a teacher sent a student out of a class, and logged this into the program, a text would automatically be sent to the administrators responsible for discipline. Special notifications or communications could also be sent via text or email to parents, guardians and students through the program. An administrator describes the central role that the program plays in their disciplinary systems:

Jupiter Grades totally revolutionized what we did, because we went from doing paper referrals that got filed in a binder, but nobody ever saw them, nobody ever looked at, to “this is posted online where you and your parent can see.” What that did is it fixed it on both sides, because when you make information public, teachers are more conscious about what they’re putting out there, and parents and students have no excuse…. That was our tier one thing. Because we have kids who know their parents - good kids, well raised - who know their parents are going to check that, and who know if they get a referral in there their parents are going to freak out. That is an active deterrent for that.

The cluster of schools that used this on-line data system had suggested that the district adopt the more robust system in lieu of the data-base and interface proposed by the district data and technology departments or to find a way for the systems to communicate with one another. These principals were told no and told to use the district-wide office referral forms. Administrators at New Design School decided against requiring their teachers to move to the paper referral forms. Instead, an administrator sat down every Friday afternoon at the end of the long week and re-entered data from one system to the other.

Despite promises of school-based data-engaged decision making and data-inquiry cycles that would be made possible by the implementation of the district-wide office referral system, what ultimately became most frustrating for school administrators was that school sites were never able to disaggregate the data collected by teacher or race of the student. One administrator says:

Our big impetus [for adopting a new referral form], we didn't go into it thinking that it would change teacher behavior but we did it thinking we would get better data to help us target our actions. It was supposed to be reported in SWIS [another student database] at the time that we started. Then, that never happened. I don't know. They kept telling us, telling us. We kept waiting and eventually it just never happened. Then, they updated ARIES.net to be able to do some of what SWIS could do but not a lot of it. We still can't, ourselves, run a report by teacher if we want to use this data to target teachers. Then, they give us these big reports by teacher but that doesn't desegregate the [out of class referrals] from the not [out of class referrals]. We need to desegregate it. We are not able to control that data ourselves. We literally are in our fourth year of waiting to be able to run these data reports that we were told that we would be able to run.
Another explains in exasperation,

If I’m the one telling them that, three months into the school year, that the ARIES dashboard does not desegregate by teacher or race, I’m telling them that, nobody’s looking at this centrally. That says that nobody’s looking at the data. This was a tool for us to look at the data when we already had a tool to look at data.

The resulting data system that was arguably the most significant outcome of the first three years of the OCR Agreement turned out to not be capable of showing schools whether or not their office referrals and other disciplinary actions were racially disproportionate or whether particular teachers were sending out a disproportionate number of students from their classrooms. Even when made aware of these flaws in the data system, district central office administrators responded initially with disbelief and then seemed to forget about it altogether.

River Glen Middle School, a school I described as “haphazardly noncompliant”, struggled with basic implementation. One administrator explained, “[It] takes like 5 minutes to fill out and that's a long time while your class is sitting there. So we say, just text us and then send the referral by the end of the day but then it doesn’t get to us by the end of the day.” During my observations, I did not see the referral form in use although in each of the days that I conducted field work, four to eight African American students spent their morning outside of class in a small hallway space in the main office—doing what looked a lot like on-campus suspension although the on-campus suspension room had officially been discontinued the year before.

Thus, I found that the single most significant impact of the OCR Agreement, the creation and implementation of the district-wide office referral form, had no observable impact on the school struggling most with providing alternatives to punishment (the “haphazardly noncompliant” school), and had a negative impact on the “earnestly compliant” school that successfully implemented the form as well as the “thoughtfully non-compliant” school that had its own data system. An administrator says in disgust,

How has that (the district-wide office referral form) changed anything, honestly? It has not changed one thing. Again, students who need help, most of the time their families need help and education and encouragement. That referral is not educating anyone about what’s going on. We need a resource to help in a positive way. Some people do a good job of filling them out but some people don’t. We had small referrals before and then we had something that looked like this. This is a buddy room slip now. This, if anything, is just for the district to be able to keep track and count of who's being sent out. Why?

The district-wide office referral form furthered the centralized, auditing and accountability needs of the district central office but did not serve the needs of the school or improve the educational experiences of the students.
A district central office administrator who had recently been a principal critiqued the universal disciplinary data system for serving the needs of the district central office and not meeting the needs of school communities.

I think you’ve heard way too much about the universal referral form. But that’s an example of something very well-intentioned, but unfortunately I think it’s been created with a focus on central office need data for OCR. So we need data, so we want to create this form that will serve our need for data at the central office. Versus, if we have disproportionality in schools, what can schools do on a site level, what kind of data do they need to change that.

These forms of data auditing create bureaucratic burdens on the schools without supporting the change in practices that potentially lead to substantive change in outcomes. An interviewee described how data was used in the district.

The reason why a lot of students fail, like on CST, people don't know they fail. Nobody ever tells them. They may send a report home to the parent, they may say to teachers, "This is our data. We've got 20% of our students performing at proficiency," but nobody never sits down with the student. "Let me show you your CST scores and let me explain to you what this means." That never happens. It's like if you have a relationship and you have problems with your husband and you never tell him what the problems are, you expect him to change. No, it's not going to happen.

District central office administrators, often those who had recently been principals, often shared much broader visions of the use of data. They attempted to lobby and advocate for schools who used data in more democratic ways, such as New Design School, but failed in the end to halt or modify these reforms.

**Conclusion**

Policy reforms “failing” during implementation is not a new story. Outside of schools the common sense explanation for these failings are biased, resistant, or incapable educators. These explanations were expressed in interviews with attorneys and district central office administrators as well as reflected in research literature on racial equity reforms in education. Other theories blame the inertial resistance of large institutions. However, I found that educators at every level of the district overwhelmingly supported the Initiative and those leaders most responsible for implementing the Initiative shared the values of the agreement as well as a professional incentive for its success. In addition, the district was in a constant state of change and reform - not one of stasis.

I argue that existing theories take policy implementation to be about educator or institutional resistance at the local level without considering two interrelated phenomena. First, the economic context that shaped the social forces engaged in federal education policymaking has also shaped or is in the process of shaping the distribution of resources and interests at
the local level. Thus, the terrain upon which the policy enters as a disruptive force is not distinct from the social forces and interests that have shaped policies. In fact, the local is a smaller micro social field that nests the larger interests and conflicts into a local institution and organizational context. Second, the policy itself is not a politically neutral instrument, but rather a product of struggles between existing social forces in the education policy landscape. Therefore, the content of policies often contain enable particular outcomes that further the common coordinated interests of the field of power, while constraining challenges to those interests.

In this chapter I examined the political economic context that structures the terrain of contestation that district central office divisions, departments, and subunits engage in to implement the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. I also explored in more limited fashion the economic interests that undergird their ideological struggles. I found that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative provided a tool to the Green Grove Superintendent to placate growing demands for reforms to the school police department. I found that in the aftermath and continued public outcry over the shooting death of an African American student by Green Grove School Police and subsequent allegations of a cover-up involving Green Grove Superintendent and Legal Counsel, the Superintendent signed an OCR Agreement that required no reforms to the district’s School Police Department or the district’s relationship with the city’s police. Rather than addressing Green Grove Unified School District’s persisting issue of harmful, and even deadly, law enforcement activities on school campuses, Green Grove had in fact enlarged the school district police force as well as the city police force assigned to schools.

I found that despite what policy implementation scholars might think of as ideal implementation conditions - personal, professional, and institutional commitment to the civil rights and racial equity ideas invoked by the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the Initiative failed to make substantive changes in school disciplinary practices in schools. I explain this outcome by first looking into the constraints that district central office administrators shared. I argue that their experienced and expressed constraints - resource scarcity, reform fatigue, leadership churn, and competition - were products of decades of political economic restructuring of public education. The resulting instability and insecurity they felt incentivized district central office administrators to engage with the OCR Agreement in self-interested and competitive ways.

Thus, the OCR Leadership Team engaged in self-interested behaviors at the expense of more collective efforts, which resulted in narrowing the problem and solutions of racially disproportionate school discipline, increasing demand for education reform products and services, frustrating efforts to create a unified plan of support for schools, and abandoned efforts to address the punitive practices of the School Security Officers Program. However, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative also provided an opportunity for the OCR Leadership Team and others to coordinate their common managerial interests. Out of the messy struggle within the district central office to define the purpose and mandates of the OCR Agreement, the only coordinated solution that all could agree on was the importance of collecting data and monitoring schools, which was not only tied to compliance under the
OCR agreement but would allow department heads to monitor and evaluate the impact of their programs, and for school principals to monitor and manage their teachers.

In summary, I found that the struggles that district central office administrators engaged in were struggles over the relative influence of divisions, departments, and subunits within a district that was unstable and ever changing. However, these competitive relationships were not just the natural competition between co-workers, but structured by the political economy of education reform. The professional jockeying amongst district central office administrators obscured the deeper sources of instability and competition that structured their work. The self-interested and strategic behaviors between district central office administrators absorbed their efforts and distracted them from engaging in more collective efforts that might have productively bridged divides between district central office administrators and school leaders, between racial justice oriented administrators within the district and school-to-prison pipeline activists, between district central office administrators who made demands for recognition and those who made demands for redistribution, and between OCR Leadership Team members who fought each other for resources but could have collectively demanded for redistribution.

I found that through destabilization, the contemporary education reform industry and the policies they pushed secured the consent and collusion of educators, even those with demonstrated and expressed commitments to communities, children, and social and racial justice. The district central office administrators engaged in what Bourdieu has called “palace struggles” where “there is a proliferation of the agents who contribute, often unwittingly, to the work of legitimation, but only by taking their ‘cut’ of the profits, by seeking to divert to their advantage whatever quantum of power they capture” (Wacquant interviewing Bourdieu, 1993, p. 36).
Chapter 6
Conclusion

In the midst of intensifying income inequality, police violence, and school segregation, Obama’s Administration launched the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in 2010 to reinvigorate civil rights enforcement and eliminate the school-to-prison pipeline. Since then, the Supportive School Discipline Initiative has been touted as a success story of grassroots advocacy, philanthropic involvement in education reform, bi-partisan collaboration, and cross sector coordination between education, school psychology, law enforcement, and criminal justice. Education reformers invoked common narratives of liberal reform in this process, including bottom-up change, collaboration between strange bedfellows, and innovative policymaking through networks. Yet, this study finds that even under ideal implementation conditions, characterized by successful destabilization and educators committed to change – the social control, punishment, and policing practices in the school district didn’t change much. Instead, the district mandated the adoption of more behavioral management programs and the creation of a district-wide discipline data system, both experienced as bureaucratic and insufficient to address the school climate and culture needs in schools.

While, dominant explanations for liberal reform failure place the blame on resistant or incompetent educators, this study asked what larger political and economic interests were at stake in the creation, implementation, and outcomes of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative. Through social network visualization of the “field of power” involved in the creation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, I found that civil rights advocacy and the federal attention on school discipline supported and shaped the national policy network through which education reform non-profits and for-profits co-opted the school-to-prison-pipeline problem. Through the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, the education reform industry invoked racial disproportionality in school discipline to pressure schools to adopt a set of pre-existing solutions that largely blamed students for misbehavior or teachers for lack of classroom management skills. In so doing, the federal initiative absorbed more radical concerns about the growing carceral state and challenges to the social control ideology in schools, and created demand for behavioral management products and services.

Through the in-depth qualitative case study of Green Grove, I found that the OCR mandate, the civil rights ideals it invoked, and the current grant-dependency of urban districts incentivized district central office administrators to act in ways that ultimately served the interests of the education reform industry and not substantive changes in schools. I found that the larger neoliberal economic and political context, characterized by resource scarcity and a growing and active education reform industry, created grant dependency and instability, and constrained collective action. Acting in self-interested and competitive ways the district central office administrators advocated for narrow solutions amounting to program adoptions rather than broader solutions that "treated the water and not the fish.” The implementation of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative in Green Grove resulted in little substantive change for schools but more demand for education reform products and services, increased data accountability, and no reforms to school policing. Thus, the OCR
Agreement served the needs of the education reform industry and not the efforts to make schools more racially just.

**Contributions**

More than providing a more complete understanding of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative itself, the evidence provided in this study contributes to our understanding of how education reform functions in our current domestic context, providing a sobering perspective on the potential of networked federal education policy making to address issues of racial or social justice. Consistent with scholarship on the growing education industrial complex and education reform industry (Ball & Junnemann, 2012; Picciano & Spring, 2013) the evidence in this study supports the notion that an education reform industry, made up of a network of venture philanthropies, think tanks, government agencies, and education products and services vendors, heavily influenced education policy making and implementation regarding school discipline reform. Members of these networks largely identified a problem, and then advocated for and funded policy solutions that furthered their own professional and financial interests.

The findings of this study contribute to the literature in four ways. First, it contributes to our understanding of the array of social forces invested in the domestic education policy field. Not only were there education products and services vendors, think tanks, and civil rights advocacy groups, there were also other domestic professions that demanded an increasing share of public education spending as public dollars declined for social services, exerting unprecedented influence in education policy making. In the arena of school discipline reform, school and clinical psychology, special education, mental health, and law enforcement were prominent and growing professional sectors within the education policy network. The growing influence of these professional sectors in public education likely results from the absence of other domestic industries, but will have important implications for the educational process and the understood purpose of education. Namely, policies that encourage a growing influence of law enforcement technologies and personnel in schools will strengthen the social control and criminalization tendencies, and policies that encourage the growth of clinical school psychology will augment the treatment and behavioral control tendencies. Likewise, increasing influence of the legal sector further bureaucratizes educational processes. As described in Chapter 5, these tendencies exist alongside restorative, student-centered, and empowering tendencies within schools as well. Thus, we should be thoughtful of the kinds of places we want schools to feel like, and support the growth of positions, professions, and solutions in education that share those visions of education.

Second, this study also suggests that the State, acting through government agencies, is not as outmoded and ineffectual as some critiques of neoliberal education policies would assume. As described in Chapter 4, the State played a critical role in structuring the shape of the school discipline reform policy network and the relative power of social forces. The DOE and DOJ created and funded a consensus and capacity building process that simultaneously invited participation by racial justice advocates and structured the process to favor the dominant interests of mental health, law enforcement, and education reform product and service vendors. Yet, the analysis of the network suggests that within the policy network
competing interests struggled for dominance. The demands for more law enforcement were in potential competition with the demands for more behavioral intervention programs or character education curriculum; however, through the state coordinated network, these interests found a workable compromise. This social formation shared a common interest in a narrative of reform that identified a problem with schools and the incapacity for those within schools to solve it. The network shared an interest in the professionalization and commodification of reform. Thus, despite the advocacy and counter advocacy efforts of these different interests participating in the policy network, members of this network shared a common interest in defining an educational problem for which their expertise, products, and services were required. Together they supplied the demand for a growing market of education reform products and services targeted at increasing data accountability and monitoring, program adoption and the associated professional development for teachers and administrators, and the growth of both mental health and law enforcement professions in schools.

I would also argue that there was some evidence that only through the structured social fields of the State (i.e., the existence of a relatively smaller and less funded Office for Civil Rights within the Department of Education and the Department of Justice) could a racial justice issue like the school-to-prison pipeline be championed, absorbed, co-opted, and re-coordinated to further the interests of the education reform industry. While not possible to fully explore these processes within the federal government with my existing data and within the strict policies regulating government employee speech, collecting interview data as individuals leave or retire from these departments can provide a more nuanced narrative of how different departments or subunits engaged with the Initiative.

Third, I argue that the role of civil rights organizations and ideals is not well theorized in education policy research. The findings of this study suggest that the inclusion of civil rights organizations into the national policy network described in Chapter 3 and 4, as well as the invocation of civil rights ideals and OCR enforcement in Chapter 5 was necessary for the Supportive School Discipline Initiative to have the reach into district central offices that it did. Under our federalist system of enumerated powers the federal government cannot mandate local and state government agencies to do things without the provision of funding, with some exceptions. Civil rights enforcement is one of these exceptions. Racial disproportionality became a justification for exercising the coercive enforcement powers of the State to pressure schools and school districts to adopt accepted programs and services. Thus, civil rights involvement in the education reform network provided the legal justification for the Initiatives' reach into school districts. By defining a problem for which the education reform industry was ready and waiting to provide a solution (and at a price to districts and schools), civil rights groups, found themselves contributing, advertently or inadvertently, to the growth of the education reform industry at the expense of schools. Finally, the OCR Agreement, and the anti-discrimination commitments it contained, secured the consent of educators in Green Grove to reforms. Civil rights and racial equity resonated with a majority of the educators in the district and secured the support of racial justice oriented district central office administrators.

Fourth, the findings of this study elaborate on our understanding of the relationship between the economy and education policy. I found that many of the same economic and social
forces that produced the school-to-prison pipeline also constrained efforts to address it. The continued disinvestment in public education, the rise of an education reform industry, and the growing influence of law enforcement, mental health, and clinical school psychology in education, created a divided, grant dependent, and competitive district central office unable and unwilling to participate in collective action. I found that the struggles that district central office administrators engaged in were struggles over their relative professional influence and were structured by the political economy of education reform. The resulting “palace struggles” absorbed the efforts of those most committed to substantive changes in schools.

Finally, I want to note that it is possible that some of the products and services produced and advocated for by the education reform industry may improve the educational experiences of young people at the end of the policy stream. However, these solutions also each create a long trough that feeds a large and growing school reform industry of program designers, professional development consultants, implementation coaches, evaluators, standards and measurement developers, data system creators, data managers, and academics. What should be a concern to the larger public is that the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, and other education policies, are currently created and disseminated through complex networks in which the very same industries that benefit financially and professionally also hold tremendous sway in the creation and implementation of the policy.

**Contribution to Methods**

The study also contributes to network ethnographic methods and the use of social network visualization to understand the relationship between various social forces in education policy making. This study builds upon the network ethnographic methods described by Ball and Junneman (2012). Through network ethnography, scholars have used in-depth web searches to map the personal and professional relationships between elite policy actors and traced relationships of influence by “following the money,” (Ball, 2008, 2009; Debray, 2014; Rechhow & Snyder, 2014). Some of this scholarship has been criticized for finding relationships that may or may not have a direct impact on a policy outcome. In this study, I attempt to more explicitly trace the relationship between ideological interests, network structure, and policy outcomes. I do this in three ways. First, my source of data are policy reports, advocacy briefs, and national convenings that have been either directly cited by official policy texts or cited in one of three rounds of snow ball sampling, using the official policy texts as seeds. Thus, the data sources on which the analysis rests are arguably organizations and ideas that had some influence on the Supportive School Discipline Initiative.

By analyzing the collaborative ties described in policy reports, advocacy briefs, and national convenings over a 15 year span, I was able to visualize the changes in the kinds of organizations active in the policy network over time, as well as the changing strength and structure of the collaborative ties between organizations over time. Analyzing the changes in position of individual organizations or classes of organizations within the network over time also strengthened my ability to describe the roles of these particular organizations. Finally, coupling the social network analysis with the qualitative coding of policy reports for problem and solution frames allowed me to draw connections between the structure of the policy
network and the dominance or marginalization of particular definitions of the problem and solutions.

While some aspects of these methods strengthen the analysis, there are also ways in which the findings of this chapter are limited. Constructing social network diagrams from archival data – particularly cited policy reports and briefs – may result in several biases. Many influential collaborative relationships exist that will never be described in a policy report, meeting agenda, or other publicly accessible document. Thus, creating a social network using publicly available information provides a glimpse of the field and the structure of relationships but not the entire network of relationships. There are also concerns that the further back we go using policy reports the less complete the records may be. In this case, there was only one cited policy report that I was not able to obtain a copy of. The report appears to be an evaluation of a previous federal initiative, the Safe Schools Healthy Students Initiative published in 2009. A 2012 report by the same organization and with a similar title was found, suggesting that at least a portion of the missing data may have been retrieved. Constructing social network maps from cited policy reports and briefs may also overemphasize the influence of larger organizations that can publish policy reports to the detriment of other organizations that may be influential through other means. Including media coverage of school discipline and school discipline reforms might help identify other organizations active on the issue that may not have been mentioned in the sampled policy reports. In addition, interviews with policy actors and reviewing emerging policy histories may provide additional ways of determine the influence of other organizations. Constructing social network diagrams through data obtained through structured surveys or interviews is an alternative method, but one which has its own limitations in terms of self reporting and recall biases.


EdSource. (2013, August). Recovering from the recession: Pressures ease on California's largest school districts, but stresses remain.


Losen, D. J. (2011). *Discipline policies, successful schools, and racial justice.* The Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles at UCLA.
Losen, D. J., & Gillespie, J. (2012). Opportunities suspended: The disparate impact of disciplinary exclusion from school. The Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles at UCLA.

*Educational Policy, 17*(2), 257–279.


APPENDICES

List of Policy Reports Included in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Produced By</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facing the Consequences: An Examination of Racial Discrimination in U.S. Public Schools</td>
<td>Applied Research Center</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School House Hype, Two Years Later</td>
<td>Justice Policy Institute</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment</td>
<td>Education Policy Center, Indiana University</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Tolerance Policies: A Critical Review (Not available on line but found 2002 paper presentation of it by same author - Verdugo)</td>
<td>National Education Association</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every Child Learning: Safe and Supportive Schools</td>
<td>Learning First Alliance</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Social Competence for All Students</td>
<td>Council for Exceptional Children</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derailed: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track</td>
<td>Advancement Project</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion</td>
<td>American Academy of Pediatrics - Committee on School Health</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Interrupted: Do Discipline Policies in Today's Public Schools Foster the Common Good?</td>
<td>Public Agenda</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Tolerance for Zero Tolerance</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author/Institution</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Report to the Nation: Smart &amp; Good High Schools - Integrating Excellence and Ethics for Success in School, Work, and Beyond</td>
<td>Center for the 4th and 5th R's, the Institute for Excellence &amp; Ethics, and the Character Education Partnership</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What works in Character Education: A Report for Policy Makers and Opinion Leaders</td>
<td>Character Education Partnership</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The School Climate Challenge: Narrowing the Gap Between School Climate</td>
<td>National School Climate Council &amp; the Education Commission of the States</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLSEN Research Brief - Gay Straight Alliances: Creating Safer Schools for LGBT Students and Their Allies</td>
<td>Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locating the School to Prison Pipeline</td>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten Years After Columbine</td>
<td>Community Matters</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Climate Guide for District Policymakers and Education Leaders</td>
<td>Center for Social and Emotional Education</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspended Education: Urban Middle Schools in Crisis</td>
<td>Civil Rights Project, UCLA &amp; The Equity Project, Indiana University</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Principles of Effective Character Education</td>
<td>Character Education Partnership, character.org</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test, Punish, and Push Out: How Zero Tolerance and High Stakes Testing Funnel Youth Into the School to Prison Pipeline</td>
<td>Advancement Project</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter: School Climate, School Discipline, and the Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First, Do No Harm: How Educators and Police Can Work Together More Effectively to Preserve School Safety and Protect Vulnerable Students</td>
<td>Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint for School-wide Positive Behavior Support Training and Professional Development</td>
<td>National Technical Assistance Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (pbis.org)</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author/Institution</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Survey from the Field</td>
<td>NAACP, Poverty &amp; Race Research Action Council</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Responses, Promising Results: Evidence-Based Non-Punitive</td>
<td>Child Trends</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives to Zero Tolerance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relates to Students' Success and Juvenile Justice Involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline Policies, Successful Schools, and Racial Justice</td>
<td>National Education Policy Center</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Under Arrest: The Case Against Police in Schools</td>
<td>Justice Policy Institute</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Protect &amp; Educate: The School Resource Officer and the Prevention</td>
<td>National Association of School Resource Officers</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Violence in Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting School Discipline: Snapshots from the Safe Schools/</td>
<td>American Institutes for Research</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Students Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports: A Multi-tiered</td>
<td>National Education Association, Center for Great Public Schools</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework that Works for Every Student” (2012) - revised and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>re-released 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2011 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian,</td>
<td>Gay Lesbian and Straight Education Network</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our Nation's Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Inform the National Leadership Summit on School-Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measuring School Climate for Gauging Principal Performance</td>
<td>American Institute for Research</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: Why Zero Tolerance is Not the</td>
<td>Advancement Project</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution to Bullying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities Suspended: The Disparate Impact of Disciplinary</td>
<td>Civil Rights Project UCLA</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion from School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Climate Research Summary</td>
<td>National School Climate Center</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a Safe and Respectful Environment in our Nation's</td>
<td>Safe and Supportive Schools Technical Assistance Center</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classrooms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Student Achievement through Sound Behavior Management</td>
<td>National Evaluation and Technical Assistance Center for the</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices in Schools and Juvenile Justice Facilities: A Spotlight on</td>
<td>Education of Children and Youth Who Are Neglected, Delinquent, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS)</td>
<td>At-Risk (NDTAC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author/Institution</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework for Safe and Successful Schools</td>
<td>National Association of School Psychologists</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Climate Practices for Implementation and Sustainability</td>
<td>National School Climate Center, Brown University</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Climate for Academic Success</td>
<td>California Comprehensive Center, West Ed</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police in Schools are Not the Answer to the Newtown Shooting</td>
<td>Advancement Project</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundtable: The Perspectives of Youth Affected by Exclusionary School Discipline (Report Released 09/00/13)</td>
<td>Human and Social Development Program, American Institutes for Research (AIR)</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Climate Measurement and Analysis</td>
<td>National School Climate Center</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Role for Officers in Schools (E-newsletter of the COPS Office)</td>
<td>Department of Justice - Community Oriented Policing (COPS)</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Day in the Life of a School Resource Officer</td>
<td>Department of Justice – Community Oriented Policing (COPS)</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASP Briefing on Effective School Discipline Policies</td>
<td>National Association of School Psychologists</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of School &amp; Off Track: The Overuse of Suspensions in American Middle and High Schools</td>
<td>Civil Rights Project, UCLA</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Generation Later: What We've Learned About Zero Tolerance in Schools</td>
<td>Center for Youth Justice, Vera Institute of Justice</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond Bullying: How Hostile School Climate Perpetuates the School-to-Prison Pipeline for LGBT Youth</td>
<td>Center for American Progress</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New and Developing Research on Disparities in Discipline</td>
<td>Discipline Disparities Research to Practice Collaborative</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Discipline Consensus Report</td>
<td>Council of State Governments - Justice Center</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 4 - Organizational Ranking by Betweenness Centrality Scores in Two Time Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 - 2009</th>
<th>2010 - 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Learning First Alliance</td>
<td>American Institute of Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Applied Research Center</td>
<td>New York State Judicial Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nat School Climate Council</td>
<td>Civil Rights Project, UCLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Stanford University, Education</td>
<td>US Department of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Advancement Project</td>
<td>Council State Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>US Department of Education</td>
<td>US Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Character Education Partnership</td>
<td>National Leadership Summit 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Civil Rights Project, UCLA</td>
<td>Discipline Disparities Research to Practice Collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Center for Character &amp; Citizenship, UM-SL</td>
<td>Rutgers University, Psychology (SEL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Education Commission of the States</td>
<td>National Association of School Resource Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>National Educators Association (NEA)</td>
<td>Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Equity Project, Indiana University</td>
<td>National School Climate Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>National School Boards Association</td>
<td>Equity Project, Indiana University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>American Academy of Pediatrics</td>
<td>Justice Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>University of Missouri, St. Louis</td>
<td>Character Ed Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>American Institute of Research</td>
<td>Open Society Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Coalition Community Schools</td>
<td>NAACP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Yale Child Study</td>
<td>Atlantic Philanthropies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Special Education</td>
<td>Center for Great Teachers &amp; Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>University of Illinois, Chicago, Psychology</td>
<td>University of Oregon, Special Education (PBIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>UCLA, Psychology</td>
<td>National Education Policy Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>What Works</td>
<td>Advancement Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>Yale Child Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Justice Matters</td>
<td>Charles Hamilton Houston Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rainbow/PUSH Coalition</td>
<td>Center on Education, Disability, and Juvenile Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CS Mott Foundation</td>
<td>Novo Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>Child Trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>MacArthur Foundation</td>
<td>Stopbullying.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Milwaukee Catalyst</td>
<td>University of Connecticut, Special Education (PBIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>National Center on PBIS</td>
<td>CA Department of Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>