“The Skeleton of the State:” The Fiscal Politics of Pergamon, 188-133 B.C.E.

By

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Abstract

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In 188 B.C.E., a Roman commission awarded most of Anatolia (Asia Minor) to the Attalid dynasty, a modest fiefdom based in the city of Pergamon. Immediately, the Roman commissioners evacuated along with their force of arms. Enforcement of the settlement, known as the Treaty of Apameia, was left to local beneficiaries, chiefly the Attalids, but also the island republic of Rhodes. The extraction of revenues and the judicious redistribution of resources were both key to the extension of Attalid control over the new territory and the maintenance of the empire. This dissertation is a study of the forms of taxation and public benefaction that characterized the late Attalid kingdom, a multiscalar state comprised of many small communities, most prominent among them, ancient cities on the Greek model of the polis. It argues that the dynasty’s idiosyncratic choices about taxation and euergetism help explain the success of the Attalid imperial project. They aligned interests and created new collectivities. Civic values as much as royal interests determined the cultural categories within which taxation and redistribution took place. To a greater extent than Rhodes, the Attalids integrated and taxed their new
subjects, no easy task in a world of flimsy bureaucracy and taxpayers who spoke of the taxman and the pirate in the same breath.

Previous research has explained the Attalid success in two divergent ways. Either the Attalids were fiscally predatory and manipulated civic institutions, or they were laissez-faire “constitutional monarchs.” Neither picture accords well with the evidence, primarily inscriptions and coins. These documents reflect a social process of mutual implication in fiscal structures. This dissertation builds on models of the Hellenistic king as interactive with his subjects, and of the Greek city as capable of imposing ideological constraints on monarchs, but it advocates a new model for the Hellenistic kingdom that assigns a permanent, predictable, and rational role to the king in the economy of the city.

Part I explores royal acts of giving. Ch. 1 treats the Attalid habit of applying certain royal revenues for the provision of specific public goods in the cities where they were collected, the practice of “earmarking.” I argue that earmarking arrangements were neither a form of sugarcoating the bitter pill of imperialism, nor simply the city’s re-appropriation of what were in origin civic resources, but the end product of a social bargaining process. Negotiations over earmarking provided the Attalid king with an arena for the display of the virtue of providence (pronoia). They also necessitated frequent forays into the domain of private property. Ch. 2 examines Attalid patronage of civic gymnasia, which in its intensity distinguished the dynasty from its rivals in this period. I explain the Attalid preference for giving to the gymnasium by re-conceptualizing that institution in the political landscape of the city. While the Hellenistic gymnasium is often seen as a miniature version of the civic community, I draw attention to its autonomy, both institutional and ideological. This autonomy invited royal participation in the finances of the gymnasium. It also rendered the gymnasium a privileged site of negotiation between city and crown where kings, princes, and courtiers interacted with civic elites.

Part II presents the other, less generous side of Attalid political economy after Apameia: the extraction of revenues. Chapter 3 tells a story of wide-scale monetary change, since we now agree that the Attalids instituted their new coinage, the cistophori, after 188. Light weight and strangely decorated, the cistophori are one of the greatest puzzles of Greek numismatics. Against the common view that the production of these coins was highly centralized, I argue that a series of negotiations stands behind the successful imposition of the new monetary regime and that its responsibilities – and profits – were shared. Further, the cistophoric monetary system was not a closed currency zone. The Attalid kingdom operated on a ramified system, in which different currencies were required for different payments. Coinage helped to integrate economic microregions oriented in very different directions, and thus should be seen as integral to a process of
state formation. Chapter 4 analyzes the fiscal system of the Attalids. It systematically reviews the evidence for the types of taxes, the personnel of tax collection, and tax rates. For direct taxation of agriculture, assessment by community was the norm, and negotiation over the annual rate seems to have been routine. Military settlers (cleruchs), on the other hand, paid individually on allotments granted by royal authority. Their taxes were a mixed liability of cash and kind, the mixed-\textit{phoros} regime known in Anatolia since the Achaemenids. Direct taxation of persons, typically those living in non-polis communities, was irregular. The bulk of our evidence for indirect taxation points to a focus on customs dues and usage taxes levied on different parts of the royal patrimony, such as coastal lagoons, salt pans, mines, and royal forests. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Attalids did not employ tax farmers directly, but relied on the subject communities to collect royal taxes as they wished. In this, as in many other respects, continuity with the earlier Seleukid kingdom is evident. Under the pressure of a highly competitive interstate political system, the Attalids pursued greater revenues. Yet royal fiscality always remained a calque on civic: it did not create new categories of taxation, and civic fiscality survived the encounter intact. Generally, fiscal intensification was pursued through indirect taxation. The Attalids aimed to capture revenue on goods moving between the different fiscal zones of Anatolia. To this end, they built up what is described as an infrastructure of surveillance.
For Mario Segre (1904-1944).
# Table of Contents

List of Illustrations  i  
Acknowledgments  iii  
Introduction  l  

## Part I

1 Following the Money: Earmarking and the Creation of Consensus  12  
2 Before the “Second Agora:” Interaction and the Gymnasium  40  

## Part II

3 Room for Change: Coinage and State Formation after Apameia  75  
4 An Analysis of the Fiscal System of the Attalid Kingdom  122  
Conclusion  167  

Epigraphical Appendix  170  
Bibliography  174
List of Illustrations


**IMAGE 9**: Silver tetradrachm of the Koinon of the Technitai of Dionysos of Ionia and the Hellespont. Photo: Psoma 2009.

**IMAGE 10**: Silver tetradrachm in name of ΘΕΩΝ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΩΝ ΣΥΡΙΩΝ. Mint of Pergamon? Photo: the American Numismatic Society.

**IMAGE 11**: Gold stater of Tralles. Photo: Jenkins 1978.


**IMAGE 16**: Table 1 from Kleiner and Noe, 1977.


IMAGE 23: Late cistophoric drachm of Tralles Photo: Head 1901.


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Introduction

It is Goldscheid’s enduring merit to have been the first to have laid proper stress on this way of looking at fiscal history: to have broadcast the truth that “the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies” – a collection of hard, naked facts which yet remain to be drawn into the realm of sociology.

-- Joseph Schumpeter

Every historian asserts the importance of his or her subject and bemoans its prior neglect. In his famous quotation, indeed a riff on R. Goldscheid’s turn of phrase, J. Schumpeter, the economic theorist who advocated a radically broad economic theory informed by the particulars of history as much as by the abstractions of sociology and mathematics, nevertheless gives fiscal history an anatomical primacy. It exposes the “skeleton of the state.” Yet its facts, Schumpeter argues in his wider meditation, are meaningless stripped bare of the rest of History. We never actually want just the skeleton exposed. What would we do with that? Rather, Schumpeter conceives of the ultimate goal of fiscal history as the exposure of the symptoms of change in history writ large. “He who knows how to listen to its message here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.” This is a dissertation on Pergamon that makes no mention of the Great Altar. This is not because the ideology of the Altar is less important than the facts of taxation to a history of the Attalid state, cultural politics less cold and hard than fiscal ones. It is because the facts of taxation, contrary to the boast of Goldscheid and Schumpeter, also represent an ideology, and in the case of Pergamon, one that has yet to receive its due. The ancients could also conceive of the state as a body with a skeleton. A Ptolemaic court jester could accuse the tax-farming Tobiad clan of stripping bare the bones of Syria the way its scion Hyrkanos devoured meat at a banquet. To never fall victim to such jokes was the imperative of the fiscal politics of Pergamon.

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1 Schumpeter 1991 [1918], 100.
2 Schumpeter 1991 [1918], 101.
3 On the Altar, see for an introduction Stewart 2000; for recent interpretations, see, e.g., Junker 2003; Michels 2003; Queyrel 2005.
4 Jos. AJ 12.212.
THE PROBLEM

In 1755, the Attalids intervened in the Seleukid succession struggle, escorting with martial pomp the future Antiochos IV from Pergamon where he had been crowned “up to the boundaries of his own kingdom (μέχρι τῶν ὀρίων τῆς ἅδεως βασιλείας)” (OGIS 248 = I.Pergamon 160 lines 15-16). The march was, so far as we know, the first time since 188 that the Attalid army had advanced east as far as the Taurus Mountains. This range, which divides Anatolia from the Levant, and much of the ancients’ Asia (Minor) from the hinterland of their Syria, had since 188 demarcated the western limit of the shrunken Seleukid kingdom. In 190, the Romans and their allies, chief among them Pergamon and Rhodes, had defeated Antiochos III at Magnesia, initiating a flurry of negotiations, first at Rome, and later, at Apameia (Kelainai) in 188, before 10 Roman commissioners sent to reconfigure the political geography of Asia Minor. During their short stay, the Roman legates had not issued final decisions on every issue put before them. How could they have? According to Polybius (21.18.2), nearly every community in Asia Minor had sent embassies to Rome, surely an exaggeration, but how many more would have flocked to Apameia in order to press their local claims to territory, resources, or debts, to a particular fiscal status under the new regime, or to the ineluctable “autonomy (autonomia) and freedom (eleutheria)?”

In 188, much had been assigned to agreed-upon, third-party arbiters, while other disputes were no doubt simply left open, subject to the authority of the new hegemons, Rhodes and Pergamon, who had each received at Apameia large swathes of cis-Tauric Asia Minor. Having been assigned Lycia and Caria south of the Maeander, Rhodes had expanded and consolidated its mainland possessions, its peraia. Outside of the modestly sized kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, everything else, including the Lycian enclave of Telmessos, it seems, had been left to the Attalids. Although we find in Polybius the designation of certain cities as “autonomous” alongside others termed “gifts,” the precise “juridical” status of the communities was never fixed, and thus is not

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5 All dates in the dissertation are B.C.E.
6 The inscription is an Athenian honorific decree for Eumenes II and his family. On its interpretation, see Habicht 2006, 191, n. 56.
7 Plb. 21.45.1: περὶ χώρας ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τινος ἔτερου διαφερομένως.
8 For the sources for the Treaty/Settlement of Apameia, which are muddled on the list of specific territories enumerated and assigned to the Attalids, the lost “territorial clause” of Polybius, see Magie 1950, v. 2, 757-64; on the text of the territorial clause and the ambiguity that surrounded its enforcement, see McDonald 1967; I of course recognize that the Roman decision also left various Galatian statelets on the steppe, and following Gruen 1990, 16-19, I admit that the Attalid hold on central Anatolia was always precarious. The point is that the conference at Apameia produced not so much a “document” open to interpretation as the basis for legitimate conquest and subsequent negotiation.
determinable. As is often stressed in studies of early Roman activity in the Greek East, the Romans completely evacuated Asia Minor in 188. Eumenes II had invited them to retain certain positions (topoi) and become his “neighbors (geitniones),” but they had demurred (Plb. 21.21.8). In the final analysis, even if for the sake of sovereignty the name of Rome could be invoked, the enforcement of the Settlement of Apameia, which in reality was not so much the “Treaty” one often references as it was a framework in which the various players were to pursue their ambitions, fell to the actors on the ground. Yet enforcement of the Settlement, this vast and contingent project of state formation, the task of integrating so much territory and so many peoples into a cohesive whole, could never be accomplished through strictly military means. Note how Arkesilaos had begun his epigram: “Pergamos, not famous in arms alone (Πέργαμος οὐχ ὄπλοις κλεῖνη μόνον)” (Diog. Laert. Arcesilaus 4.30). Thus the march of 175, on which the Attalids escorted Antiochos IV to the frontier of the Taurus Mountains, all seemingly armed to the teeth, was not a re-conquest of territory allotted at Apameia. Again, how could it have been? It was a symbolic expression of the Attalid state’s precocious aspirations to sovereignty.

That Pergamon’s sovereignty claims were capacious is evident from the ease with which official rhetoric, as adumbrated in documents of various authorship, moved from describing the Attalid constituency as “Greek cities” (Plb. 32.8.5), to “all those inhabiting Greek cities” (RC 52 lines 8-12), to “all those inhabiting Asia” (Segre 1932 line 9). Of course claims are something different from actual control, a presumption of sovereignty from the form of sovereignty that we have come to recognize within the borders of a modern nation-state. Yet Pergamon managed to expand its influence far beyond the “Aeolian core” of nearby poleis over which Strabo tells us the city had always “held a certain hēgemonia (ἐξεῖ δὲ τινα ἡγεμονίαν)” (13.4.1). This dissertation explores the nature of this influence, of a distinctively Pergamene brand of imperialism. The goal is also to explain the successful enforcement of the Settlement of Apameia. As an historical outcome, it should not be taken for granted, as if the shell of the future Roman province of Asia simply appeared ex nihilo. The problem of the Attalids’ success comes into greater focus when we consider not only the ambivalence of the Romans, but also the pressures of a fiercely competitive, anarchic political system in the Mediterranean, as

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9 This was once a major preoccupation of the scholarship. See Bikerman 1937. This dissertation touches upon the issue passim.
10 Most recently, by Eckstein 2008, 376-81, describing a situation of “unipolarity” in the eastern Mediterranean, 188-170, and a Roman “sphere of influence,” but not an empire.
11 TEXT 8 lines 20-3.
12 On the presumptive aspirations to sovereignty of the ancient state, see the important reassessment of Richardson 2012.
well as the centrifugal forces of civic identity in both polis and non-polis communities.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, the example of Rhodes, which ultimately failed to enforce its share of the Settlement, should help conjure up the counter-factual.\textsuperscript{14} Success was not guaranteed in 188.

Key to the acquisition and maintenance of empire were the related activities of revenue extraction and the provision of public goods. For the Attalids, these were live questions: How to raise revenue? Which public goods to provide? In some cases they held to precedent but in others they clearly innovated. Because the Attalids possessed neither the army nor the garrisons of the Seleukids, nor a heavy, Ptolemaic-style bureaucracy, they were forced to select solutions to the problems of governance that not only respected, but in fact relied upon the institutions of the polis and of its cognate in this period, the \textit{katoikia}.\textsuperscript{15} These solutions also responded to cultural imperatives and must be studied as cultural artifacts in their own right, not simply as techniques of domination. Yet despite the traditional scholarly emphasis on the relationship of king and city (“\textit{Stadt und Herrscher}”), this aspect of the “machinery of government” is entirely left out of, for example, F. Walbank’s account of Hellenistic monarchy in the \textit{Cambridge Ancient History}.\textsuperscript{16} However it is crucial to understanding the Attalids’ success after Apameia and the unique version of Hellenistic monarchy that developed in Asia Minor over the course of the next half century. These methods of raising taxes and of engendering loyalty through euergetism were effective in binding royal subjects ideologically to the new Attalid state and in integrating economically the greater part of Anatolia. The way in which the Attalids taxed and redistributed, in short, their fiscality, encouraged what the sociologist M. Levi has called in \textit{Of Rule and Revenue} “quasi-voluntary compliance.”\textsuperscript{17} In other words, if the Attalids were effective at taxing, this was due in large part to their effectiveness in convincing people to cooperate in their own taxation.

Fiscality is an argument. With choices about taxation and redistribution, the ruler makes his case to the ruled. In the late Attalid kingdom, the argument was not just about the virtues of the king, as in the synchronic model of Hellenistic “personal” monarchy.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{13} On anarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, see Eckstein 2006; cf. Eckstein 2008, for the transition from “anarchy to hierarchy” in the period under review in this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{14} In 167, the Roman Senate, acceding to the demands of local emissaries, formally declared Caria and Lycia free. On Rhodes in this period, see conveniently Habicht 2006, 184-87.
\textsuperscript{15} The \textit{katoikia} is usually referred to as a military settlement, and indeed many of these communities were founded with soldiers. Yet in their political behavior, settlement structure, and institutions, they come increasingly to resemble poleis in this period. The \textit{katoikia} will be treated \textit{passim}, esp. in Chs. 1 and 4.
\textsuperscript{16} Walbank 1984, 68-74, on “The Machinery of Monarchical Government.”
\textsuperscript{17} Levi 1988.
\textsuperscript{18} Walbank 1984; Austin 1986; Eckstein 2009.
It was also about the virtues of belonging to a new collectivity, either within the cadre of the polis, or beyond its parochialism. This kingdom (*basileia*) was an empire (*archê*) in which one could have a share (*meris*); one might even pray for the realm’s expansion (*syn-auxêsis*); and all this, without forsaking a local identity. In fact, the fiscal practices and structures of the kingdom strengthened local identities. To come to terms with the paradox, we have to stop conceiving of *basileia* as the overlay of a reified polis. In his *ad hominem* argument against Eumenes II, the Achaean politician Apollonidas of Sikyon asserted that kings and democracies possess warring natures (*enantiai physeis*) (Plb. 22.8.6). Yet the kingdom, at least, could be conceived of differently. It contained *ta koina*, some sense of “the commons,” if not common funds (*koina chrêmata*). Thus, when the city of Pergamon praises Attalos III for his concern for τὰ κοινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, the king should be understood as a member of the body politic (*OGIS* 332 line 56). That inscription repeatedly praises Attalos for his *megalomereia*, a kind of generosity that presupposes commensurability (lines 26, 46, and 58). The king’s share, whether to consume or to dole out, is enormous – but it is a share nevertheless. This is why the city can invite the king to the common hearth of the prytaneion to take his share (*meris*) of the thank-offering made on his behalf among a college of priests (lines 50-1).

Seen in this light, the late Attalid peculiarity in matters of public finance and euergetism takes on greater significance. It has long been noticed that the dynasty, which was founded by Lysimachos’ treasurer Philetairos, exhibits in the period after Apameia a distinctive approach to taxation and benefaction. First, when it comes to the impact of the Attalids on the finances of subject communities, we are in the unusual position of being able to track the money moving around the system. The Attalids were in the habit of earmarking specific royal revenues for particular public goods, or assigning them to a fund for “the administration of the city (*dioikêsis tês poleôs*).” Second, to a greater extent than any of their peers, the Attalids patronized the gymnasium, at first glance a curious choice for a monarchy, as the gymnasium is often considered one of the central institutions of the polis. Third, the entire Attalid fiscal system in this period was run with coins, the cistophoroi, which have been characterized alternately since the Renaissance as

19 Cf. a provocative conception of Thonemann (forthcoming), with which I am generally in sympathy. Drawing upon a study of European colonialism in Africa, he writes, “While the Seleukid state had remained, as it were, suspended balloon-like in mid-air, the Attalid state consciously and deliberately attempted to rewire the circuits of local authority.”
20 For the status of the question on Hellenistic democracy, see esp. Hamon 2010, but also Mann and Scholz 2012; for the same for Hellenistic kingship theory, see Murray 2007, esp. 22-3, presenting a different view than that of Apollonidas of Sikyon: “[M]onarchy was judged in relation to the other constitutions of the city-state, rather than as a form of government suitable to the control of large empires; the Hellenistic monarchies were reduced to the theoretical status of cities and treated as if their political structure offered the same problems as those of a city-state.”
21 *Suda* s.v. “basileia” no. 148.
both civic and royal. This dissertation argues that the peculiarity of the Attalid approach to fiscality helps explain Pergamon’s successful enforcement of the Settlement of Apameia.

THE SCHOLARSHIP

In the past, to observe this Attalid peculiarity has also often been to pass judgment on a particular king or on the dynasty as a whole. This evaluative trope may go back to Polybius’ glowing eulogy for Attalos I: πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπεβάλετο χρήσασθαι τοῖς χρησίμοις ἄλλα πρὸς βασιλείας κατάκτησιν “He did not attempt to use his resources for anything other than the acquisition of basileia” (18.41.5); or to a caustic remark of Livy: Eumenis beneficiis muneriibusque omnes Graeciae civitates et plerique principum obligati essent “(Though) Eumenes with his gifts and liberality had made all the cities of Greece and most of their leaders beholden to him” (42.5.2). Therefore in scholarship, the question has often been: “If the Attalids were both extraordinarily generous and anxious about the financial health of Greek cities, was it only to dominate them all the more?”

Many moderns have seen despotism behind a veneer of liberality and economic liberalism. A line of thought that had begun with T. Mommsen, by the 1920s, culminated in P. Ure’s figure of the “commercial tyrant” and the notion of the “money power of Pergamon.” Ure’s judgment is crude, but telling: “Much of Pergamene art is exaggerated and ugly, but that does not diminish its economic significance, and Mommsen is justified in describing Attalus I as the Lorenzo de' Medici of antiquity.”

This was the tenor of Anglophone scholarship throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Even if E. Hansen, whose synthetic The Attalids of Pergamon is admittedly light on social and economic analysis, could find an inclusive, generous Attalid style of governance in the first inscription treated in this dissertation (TEXT 1), for the towering M. Rostovtzeff the same text was evidence of a sinister “fiscal policy.”

For Rostovtzeff, royal anxiety for civic finance and royal donations were not incompatible in the least with the model of an oppressive state: “Thus the kings satisfied their desire to control the finances of cities and to appear as benefactors of the community, which, heavily taxed by the kings as it was, was not able to increase

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22 See, e.g., the archetypal suspicion of Rostovtzeff 1930, 605: “It is however, curious, that while taxing heavily the population of the subject cities with one hand, the kings paid with the other hand both to the cities and to the temples, and to the associations of the young men (probably to the Gymnasia) certain subsides in specie and kind.”
23 Ure 1922, 285.
municipal taxation and thus to cover the expense of civic administration and the maintenance of temples and gymnasia.”

Later monographs on Attalid history bear witness to the endurance of these themes, although the emphasis shifts from Pergamene concern for fiscal institutions toward the dynasty’s concern for religious and political institutions. A central argument of R. Allen’s *The Attalid Kingdom: a Constitutional History* is that, as administrators, the Pergamene kings worked within the framework of local institutions. Close links existed, for example, between ruler cult and local religious institutions, whether the cult of Aiakos on Aegina, Apollo in Sikyon, or Dionysos Kathēgemôn in Pergamon itself. Because the world that Allen envisions is populated with states more or less sovereign, but fixed “constitutionally” in that sovereignty status, where he sees royal involvement in civic institutions, like the *stratēgeia*, he suspects the Attalids of breach of sovereignty, which is to say, of Rostovtzeff’s “manipulation.” R. McShane puts a much more positive spin on Attalid relations with Greek cities, which he too terms close, but the happy outcome of the birth of a symmachic alliance under Attalos I, into which the cities entered of their own free will and remained after 188. His Attalids are as conciliatory of their subjects as those of more recent treatments by I. Kertész and C. Carsana.

At present, these institutions, which are in essence sites of complex interaction between king and city, are too poorly understood to be admissible as evidence in a kind of trial of the Attalids on the charge of suppressing “Greek freedom,” political or economic. I. Savalli-Lestrade has rightly urged us in the direction of the hard work of explicating new texts alongside old ones in order to first describe more of the Attalid administrative system. Indeed, one contribution of this dissertation is a *bilan* of what we know. Yet the evidence can be put to a more productive use. We can use it to investigate what J. Ma calls the “workings of empire, practical and, especially, ideological.” This dissertation hews close to the approach of Ma’s book *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*. Ma changed the way we look at a Hellenistic kingdom by giving subject communities, poleis in particular, agency in their encounters with royal power. He drew our attention to this relationship’s formulation in the discourse of royal letters and civic petitions and decrees. That discourse imposes restraints on the

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25 Rostovtzeff 1930, 606.  
26 Allen 1983.  
28 This theory has been roundly criticized. See Gauthier 2006, 502.  
29 McShane 1964.  
30 Kertész 1992; Carsana 1996.  
31 Savalli-Lestrade 2001, esp. 91.  
32 Ma 2000, 24.  
33 Ma 2000.
king’s power, but it also provides the city with room for negotiation. In Ma’s account, the dynamics of empire and the experience of empire are produced and exist in language. Much about this approach is compelling, but for Ma, taxation, and the economic sphere more generally, remained part of the “practical” reality of empire against which he hoped to assert the importance of the ideological. However, in the texts treated in this dissertation, we will observe just how negotiable and subject to ideological modulation in language the fiscal aspects of the relationship were. So much of the interaction between kings and subject communities concerned fiscality. By making it the focus, this dissertation is also a contribution toward a fuller account of Hellenistic monarchy.

This dissertation is an historiographical experiment. Following the Prussian monarchist J. Droysen, who in fact celebrated the “twilight of the polis,” historians of the Hellenistic period traditionally trained their eyes on the kings. Yet from a very early stage, the French epigrapher L. Robert was illuminating and cataloguing the institutions of the post-classical polis. The mantra of the tradition of Robert has always been: the polis did not die in 338. That mantra has at times made it difficult for historians to explain how the polis changed with the arrival of the kings. Thus while this dissertation draws heavily on the tradition of Robert, it is also an attempt to write the king back into the picture. Of course this is easier said than done. Much recent work on civic finance underscores the survival of the polis, though thankfully the debate has moved on to the question of how civic institutions developed. Still, this is largely a question of evolution or deterioration. Thus both the empirical studies, best represented by scholarly work in German, as well as the programmatic essays of L. Migeotte, squarely in the tradition of Robert, seem trapped in a conversation about the relative “strength” or

34 This will be no surprise to anyone living in the contemporary United States in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the so-called individual mandate health insurance penalty and the upcoming presidential election. What constitutes a “tax” or even “economic activity” in this country is a topic of fierce debate and the positions of some politicians seem to change daily.
35 Taxes, for example, are not mentioned in Austin 1986, which is an influential essay on “Kings, War, and the Economy.”
36 On Droysen’s views on Prussia, Hellenismus, and the inherent connection between them, see Gossman 2006, 568-73; the phrase “twilight of the polis,” I take from a lecture by Donald Kagan on late fourth-century Greece.
37 Chaironeia was the site of the battle between Philip II of Macedon and a coalition of Greek city-states led by Athens and Thebes. Philip’s decisive victory has been seen as the end of any hope of a united front against Macedonian monarchy; consider also the difference between the relevant volumes of the first edition of the Cambridge Ancient History (1930) and the second (1984). The first lacks a chapter devoted to cities. In the second, J. Davies devotes subsections to “the polis transformed and revitalized” and the “limits of the polis.” The publication dates mark essentially the beginning and end of Robert’s long career. In a more recent reference work on the period, Erskine 2003, an entire chapter is devoted to cities.
38 The most notable exception is Gauthier 1985; cf. now Mann and Scholz 2012, as well as other forthcoming publications of the German research project entitled, “Die hellenistische polis als Lebensform.”
39 For a summary, see SEG LV 1989.
“weakness” of the finances of the Hellenistic polis. This is a conversation that began with H. Francotte, who argued the weak case in Les Finances des cités grecques. The attempts of recent studies to measure the degree of centralization, risk management, and planning are all responses to Francotte. We could leave this polemic to exhaust itself, dismissing Francotte’s arguments out of hand as those of a straw-man, if much more were not at stake. For all these scholars, insofar as the finances of the Hellenistic city are weak, they invite the intervention of the Hellenistic king. Where they are strong, the polis checks the encroachment of the monarch. Both camps share the ill-considered presupposition of the theoretical autonomy of civic finance in this period. In this they too readily take over pseudo-Aristotle’s division of oikonomia into four neat parts: royal (βασιλική), satrapal (σατραπική), civic (πολιτική), and private (ιδιοτική) (Oec. 2.1.1).

This tendency to view the appearance of the royal authority in the drama of the city’s political economy as an exogenous shock to the system is most pronounced in Francophone scholarship. Migeotte in particular has saved this facet of ancient life from much obscurity, but in defending its dignity so fiercely he has dislodged it from its context, which entails regrettable analytical consequences. The object of study itself is misconceived: “Concrètement, l’étude des finances publiques revient à explorer trois domaines intimement liés entre eux: les dépenses des cités, leurs ressources, et la gestion des unes et des autres.” More recently, he has described the normative sub-structure of civic finance as four mental categories: cult, war and defense, urbanism, and politics. He leaves two other domaines for special treatment, marking them off as extraneous. These are, first, the irregular public purchases of grain, oil, and wood, and second, the payment of tax and tribute to foreign powers, which, in his estimation, “malgré leur longue durée dans plusieurs cas, on ne peut véritablement ranger ces contributions parmi les responsabilités librement et constamment reconnues par les cités comme allant de soi” (emphasis mine). In Migeotte’s terms, the city’s institutions of public finance peek out at us from behind an overlay of royal ones. This dissertation will argue that the evidence from Attalid Asia Minor is entirely inconsistent with such a static conception of Hellenistic political economy. The institutions of civic finance developed with royal participation and were inscribed with royal concerns in a regular and systematic fashion. We can see this already in 203, in Teos, where a fund exists for the anticipated, recurring

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40 E.g., Müller 2005; Schuler 2005.  
41 Francotte 1909.  
42 This conception of monarchy is fundamentally shaped by the medieval and early modern European experience. It is much more appropriate for history of those periods. See, e.g., North and Weingast 1989.  
43 Pace Capdetrey 2004, 126.  
44 Migeotte 1995, 11; note also Migeotte 2009, a textbook overview of the economy of the Greek city. Its index does not include terms such as king, vel sim.  
45 Migeotte 2007, 442.
expenses of τῶν τιμῶν τῶν βασιλέων (SEG XLI 1003 line 63).46 We can see the fiscal lives of the Attalid cities as fundamentally Mediterranean, following N. Purcell: “Local fiscal self-determination in the ancient world was always in tension with the demands, more or less urgent, more or less imperative, of a wider frame.”47

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first half examines two distinctively late Attalid forms of giving, the practice of earmarking and royal patronage of the civic gymnasium. The second half is a comprehensive analysis of the process of revenue extraction, from the nature of the monetary system to the specific taxes levied and the fiscal modalities employed. Part I is aimed at explaining the efflorescence in our sources of these two forms of giving in a particular time and place: Asia Minor of the expanded Attalid kingdom. In each case, the explanation replaces essentializing conceptions of the Attalids or the polis with the story of an historical conjuncture. Ch. 1 is a study of earmarking as a social process and as a cultural practice. It provides the dynamic background to the static earmarking arrangements that we find in inscriptions. Far more often than has been supposed, these arrangements were the outcome of negotiations between the Attalids and subject communities, over the course of which, the two parties became intimately familiar with each other’s institutions. The earmarking process was a gambit of ideological risks and rewards that frequently required the king to venture into the domain of private property. The meaning of earmarking is also broached. Ch. 2 poses, for the first time, the question of why the Attalids patronized the gymnasia of cities so heavily after Apameia. Answering this question requires a fresh look at the gymnasium as a civic institution in this period. Against the orthodox view that as a corporate association the gymnasium was simply the polis writ small, a vision of this institution is advanced that emphasizes its independence, elitism, and adversarial position vis-à-vis the polis – its status apart. Its distinctive culture of euergetism and financial shortcomings are also investigated. The goal is to understand the dynamic that made this a privileged site of interaction between the Attalids and one of the most important of the new collectivities that surfaced in the kingdom.

Part II identifies and explains what is truly novel about Pergamene rule after Apameia precisely on those fronts where innovation was most treacherous: coinage and taxes. No one minted in a vacuum, and the decision to change coin design, let alone weight standard, must have been a solemn affair since this was a famously conservative medium. Rulers also trod carefully when it came to raising conventional tax rates, inventing new taxes, new fiscal categories, or altering the social bond between taxman

47 Purcell 2005, 227.
and taxpayer. Ch. 3, on the monetary system of the kingdom, proposes a new understanding of that most radical of Attalid innovations, the cistophori. By taking these strange coins, as it were, at face value, we are able to cut the numismatic Gordian knot with the notion of “coordinated coinage.” The cistophori were neither purely royal nor civic in nature, but the outcome of a fiscal bargain struck between the cities and the king, according to which, it is argued, the profits of epichoric coinage would have been shared. The cities carved their ethnics and icons on the dies, and the king, providing the indispensable service of coordination, agreed to leave his face off the coin. Following the example of many much smaller Hellenistic states, the Attalids instituted a ramified monetary system, in which only certain transactions required epichoric coinage. Thus the standard description of the cistophoric zone as hermetically sealed is significantly revised. The cistophori and the so-called cistophoric countermarks are presented as attempts to integrate the Attalid imperial space promised at Apameia. In Ch. 4, the central elements of the fiscal system are analyzed: the types of taxes collected, the tax rates, and the personnel of tax collection. Taking account of the paucity of our evidence, a provisional sketch of the entire system is offered. The major features of the Seleukid system are found preserved in at least palimpsestic form. In fact, the Attalids appear less innovative than has been recently suggested, for instance, in the case of personnel. They did not introduce royal tax farmers but relied upon civic officials. Fiscality is again considered as an arena for negotiation, but the rules of the game prohibited the creation of new fiscal categories. Royal fiscality remained a calque on civic. Fiscal intensification was pursued through indirect taxation on mobility and exchange, as evidenced in the build-up of an infrastructure of surveillance.
INTRODUCTION

The devastation visited upon the anonymous city in Hellespontine Phrygia in the war with Antiokhos III had been total. Some years after Apameia, the city voted to honor Korragos, a proud Makedon who was the regional governor (stratēgos) and thus the man who had held the city’s fate in his hands at the time of its absorption into the Attalid kingdom.¹ In the decree in honor of Korragos (I.Prusa 1001; TEXT 1), we are shown what much of Pergamon’s new territory would have looked like in its pristine post-war state. The city could not so much as feed itself, let alone plant crops for the future. The institutions that had preserved its collective identity over generations, public sacrifices, rituals and politics, had all gone into abeyance. The distribution of landed wealth, the basis of social stability, was in jeopardy. It was as if everything had broken down at once. In this environment of catastrophe, the first task of governance was simply to reconstitute the community. Thus Korragos himself provided the animals for the initial public sacrifices and feasting. He was also the catalyst of royal benefactions, prevailing upon Eumenes II to distribute seed, and in the meanwhile, sustenance. Ultimately, the Attalids even paid to preserve the city’s social order, as the propertied were assured of their rights and the un-propertied granted land with royal funds.

It may have been humbled by war, but this unnamed city still managed to strike a bargain with the crown over the impact of royal power on its public finances. In the near term, what had been envisioned as a three-year period was extended for two more years, during which the Attalids agreed to leave untouched all of the city’s sources of revenue (prosodoi). In the long term, Eumenes acceded to the city’s request for a return to certain privileged conditions of the past, in the city’s felicitous shorthand, “things such as they were for us from the beginning (ἂπερ ἡς ἄρχης ὑπῆρ[df] | χεν τῶι δήμῳ)” (ll.12-13). We cannot apply an historical date to this “beginning,” since the phrase is just as vague and malleable as “ancestral constitution (patrios politeia),” which, as the decree tells us, Eumenes also gave back.² In fact, one would be hard pressed to find from the third-century a comparandum for

¹ The unnamed city is often thought to be Apollonia-on-the-Rhyndakos. For the identification of Korragos with Livy’s Corragus Macedo (38.13.3, cf. 42.67.4), see I.Prusa 1001, ad loc.
² Holleaux 1924 and indeed already Homolle 1921 (ad loc.) recognized the rhetoric. Cf. the fiscal claim of Delphi and the Amphictiony before Rome reproduced in the letter of S. Postumius of 189: καθὼς πάτριον συντοίξ ἡς ἄρχης | ἧν (CID 4 104, line 7), with commentary of F. Lefèvre 2002, 248 on the tendentious nature
one notable privilege trumpeted in this inscription: “money for sacrifices and for the administration of the city” (τὸ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ πόλεως διοίκησιν ἀργύριον) (1.11). Since the study of M. Holleaux, the practice of injecting royal money directly into the organs of civic finance has been considered if not an exclusively Pergamene habit, distinctive of Asia Minor in the Attalid century. As Holleaux noted, this was not a one-time gift, but like the “the oil for the neoi” mentioned in the same breath, a routine, regularized, perhaps annual disbursement of money.

A number of recently discovered inscriptions have confirmed the hunch of Holleaux and his generation that the Attalids were prolific issuers of what we may usefully term “earmarks.” Alongside new texts from Phrygian Toriaion, Ionian Metropolis, and the modern village of Taşkuyucak near Sardis (Apollonioucharax?), the Korragos decree appears to belong to a corpus of inscriptions that illuminate the interaction of the structures of royal and civic public finance after Apameia. “Earmarking” is a useful way to describe this phenomenon because a term such as “subvention” neglects the question of the money’s source. Admittedly, plenty of texts are silent on this point – the Korragos decree is a fine example. However, those texts which do speak to the issue invariably specify a local source of revenue. The money is not assumed to issue forth from a distant, centralized treasury. Either some portion of those royal taxes collected locally are re-routed into the city’s coffers, or another source of revenue is provided. This could be a piece of property or an entire village. According to Greek fiscal categories, it did not make much difference. Rather, these were all prosodoi of one kind or another, which is why we will have occasion here to discuss both the “taxes” and occasionally the “foundations” of the modern fiscal lexicon. Earmarking then is the administrative practice of designating specific future revenues for specific public goods. We may not always hear about the source of the earmark, or one text may refer to the public good while another designates the revenue source, but we can be sure that the parties affected, the relevant royal administrators and the subject communities, both knew the details well. This is because they were the ones who had hammered them out.

of the claim; for the language of ex archês, see further the documents collected by Chaniotis 2004, 192-3, esp. n.35; see also Phillip II’s claim of Amphipolis (Dem., 12.21); such language was common in interstate arbitrations. See Ager Arbitrations 37, 74, 126, and 129A.

1 Holleaux 1924; Holleaux’s axiomatic conclusion (25) that the practice signifies an Attalid presence wherever we find it is no longer valid. It is twice attested under Antiochos III: SEG XXXIX 1285, from Sardis (213), and SEG XXXVII 849, from Herakleia-under-Latmos (196-193), which is a case of earmarking for dioikêsis tês polês. Cf. also in this regard a case from Ptolemaic Halikarnassos, P.Cair.Zen. 1.59036. 3,000 drachmas in the royal bank of Sôpolis owed to Alexandria for the tax of the stephanos are applied provisionally to the city’s trierarchy; the “Attalid century” is a paraphrase of A. Bresson’s “Le siècle d’or, 188-133,” (Bresson 2001, 13).

4 Holleaux, 25: “subvention régulière.”

5 On prosodoi, see Gauthier 1976, 7-19.
In this chapter, I explore the dynamics of earmarking as a social process. By 188, the Greeks had been earmarking money for a long time. This was not an invention of the Attalids, nor even of such a towering figure in the history of Greek public finance as Lykourgos of late classical Athens. What is new and specific about Attalid administration and euergetism in the period 188-133 seems to be the extent to which earmarking is employed in a context of empire. How to explain this? A review of the evidence will not support an explanation that relies exclusively on either royal or civic initiative. Both parties clearly reaped benefits from these arrangements. So were the Attalids simply sweetening the bitter pill of imperialism, as some have thought? While earmarking contributed to the ideological accommodation of Attalid subjects, it also circumscribed the king’s freedom of action and exposed the limits of his power. After a theoretical excursus, I lay out the evidence for Attalid earmarking in its various manifestations, arguing that the static earmarking arrangements of our sources were negotiated into existence. The dynamics of earmarking will be seen to include frequent royal forays into the sphere of private property, the devolution of agency, and a reliance on civic institutions, presupposed by an increasing familiarity on the part of royal and civic actors with each other’s institutions. Finally, I explore a set of culturally specific meanings that I argue earmarking invokes. That set of meanings rendered earmarking a privileged solution to the problems of risk and governance in the expanded Attalid kingdom.

EARMARKING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

The Differentiation of Money

We often think of money as homogeneous, undifferentiated, and perfectly fungible. In other words, within a given monetary regime, a dollar is a dollar – one dollar works just like any other; and in social life, one dollar means the same as another. According to a functionalist view of money common in economics textbooks, money functions as a means of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. The homogeneity of money thus lowers transaction costs because different goods and services are priced according to a standard unit, which means less work and more incentives for market participants who want to make an exchange. Because in such a world money is perfectly fungible, the existence of money by

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6 E.g., the Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374/3, which earmarks revenue for the stratiotika (Stroud 1998, lines 53-55). Stroud 1998, 78: “Thus the 8 1/3% tax on the grain from the islands and the pentekoste eventually produced in Athens revenue that was earmarked in advance for this specific purpose;” on Lykourgos, see Humphreys 2004.

7 E.g., Rostovtzeff 1930, 605-6; Jones 1971, 55.

itself promotes an increase in the volume of exchanges, as all money finds acceptance in all transactions. Such a world, however, does not exist; not today, nor in antiquity.  

To be sure, money is an economic instrument of enormous significance. Exchange looks very different without money. Yet, as anthropologists and sociologists have demonstrated with an enormous amount of empirical evidence, human beings steadfastly refuse to treat all money as equal. In a monetary regime that contains multiple forms of money, different monies may be appropriate for different transactions, sometimes exclusively so. One only pays a dowry in, say, bronze ingots, but the services of a seer can only be had for token money, for example, sea shells, even if these must be bought with bronze. These are the “special-purpose monies” of the work of K. Polanyi. Moreover, money is still differentiated and restricted in its fungibility in a monetary regime in which a single form of money predominates or even achieves monopoly status. Users of money will differentiate money in a great number of ways. To take just two examples, we find distinctions made between “clean” and “dirty” money, or between “windfall” money and regular income. The crucial factor here that dictates the ways in which the money can be employed is the source of the money. A purely utilitarian or functionalist account of money misses the link between the variable meaning of money and its uses. Money is both an economic and a semiotic instrument. When the two modalities collide with each other, a friction is produced that we can observe.

Research in the social sciences has heightened our awareness of the diverse properties and possibilities of money. Among economic sociologists, V. Zelizer has led the charge in exposing the limits of money’s fungibility and highlighting the socially and culturally constructed nature of its meaning. She places special emphasis on the practice of earmarking money, both according to its source and according to its use. Earmarking is a prime example of the way in which otherwise homogeneous money becomes differentiated. To define earmarking in the most basic terms, it is the differentiation of money, whether by source, by use, or as in the Attalid practice, by both: money from a particular source is

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9 Earlier scholarship focused on the ways in which pre-modern, “primitive” societies mark money, supposedly in contradistinction to modern societies. For the modern world, see Zelizer 1997.
10 Polanyi 1957, 246-66.
11 Monopoly status was rare if not inconceivable in ancient monetary systems. Indeed, contrary to what is often claimed, the Attalids did not achieve it with the introduction of the cistophoric system – see Ch. 3. Even in the United States, it did not obtain for much of the 19th century.
12 Carruthers 2005, 358.
13 Zelizer 1989 and 1997. She writes of Philadelphia gangster in the 1950s who opts to donate a cash gift from his mother to his local church, rather than make a donation from the proceeds of robbery, and of states that seem to “launder” cigarette tax revenue by applying it to public health expenditures; for a review of scholarship on the social meaning of money and its relevance for ancient economic history, see Boldizzoni 2011, 160-61.
designated for a particular use. Anthropologist M. Douglas has studied the way so-called primitive societies mark off monies into separate spheres of sacred and profane, fungible and non-fungible, as well as the way money moves in and out of those categories.\textsuperscript{15} Of course, students of ancient Greek cultic finance are very well attuned to the different economic behaviors associated with \textit{hiera chrémata}, as opposed to \textit{demosia} or \textit{hosia chrémata}.\textsuperscript{16} But Zelizer’s contribution was to show that modern economic life is also full of earmarking, and not as the result of the survival of a primitive, pre-capitalist practice. In fact, she argues that in American history we see a proliferation of earmarking and more broadly of the social differentiation of money, precisely when the federal government imposes with its full weight a single, uniform, and generalized form of money, a process that began with the National Banking Act of 1863. In Zelizer’s late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century households, the money is not kept under the mattress in one lump sum. It is divided between a set of tin cans: one for mortgage payments, another for the children’s education, another for emergencies. “Pin money” is set aside for the wife’s consumption. Earmarking, however, is by no means exclusively a strategy of non-state actors. The modern state itself engages in earmarking, most obviously when it sets a budget. The state might even encourage households to adopt the practice of budgetary earmarking in an ideological struggle over the shape of home economics.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Earmarking and Greek Epigraphy}

In many cases, earmarking arrangements are the end result of a process of negotiation that pits two or more interested parties against each other. Even then, the process can continue as earmarks are met with counter-earmarks. Relations of domination and subordination are articulated and re-articulated. “The earmarking of money is thus a social process: money is attached to a variety of social relations rather than to individuals.”\textsuperscript{18} Greek epigraphy, while at times occluding certain stages of that process, bears its traces nonetheless. An episode from the cultic life of an Athenian association of \textit{orgeones} of the third century provides a neat illustration of the spotty epigraphical record. \textit{IG 2}\textsuperscript{2} 1289 announces the resolution of a dispute and new rules for the proper use of the revenues (\textit{prosodoi}) of the goddess (line 6).\textsuperscript{19} We are not told the nature of the dispute, but the inscription publicizes an earmarking arrangement: rents from sacred land or the proceeds of

\textsuperscript{15} Douglas 1967; indeed, tracking the movement of funds was a particular preoccupation of polis finance. See Fröhlich 2004, 439.
\textsuperscript{16} E.g., Papazarkadas 2011.
\textsuperscript{17} Walker and Carnegie 2007 (on Australia of 1850-1920).
\textsuperscript{18} Zelizer 1997, 25.
\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{SEG} LII 132 (resuming Sosin 2002) for the conclusion that the \textit{orgeones} did not prohibit the renting of the land as such, but only a certain kind of leasehold. For a new edition of the complete text and similar conclusions, see Papazarkadas 2004-2009, 91-95.
its sale shall only benefit the cult. We can infer that the backstory here is an internal dispute about the proper use of sacred wealth. The orgeones met on relatively egalitarian terms. Was earmarking any less of a process when a vast disparity of power distinguished the parties involved? The case of Antigonos Monophthalmos and the cities of Teos and Lebedos, c.303, suggests that it was not (RC 3, lines 72-94). The ill-fated attempt of Antigonos to synoikize Teos and Lebedos involved a negotiation over the constitution of a grain fund. The Lebedoi had earlier requested of Antigonos that 1,400 gold staters “be set aside from the revenues (ἐξαιρεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν προοδέων)” for a complicated grain scheme (line 73). Antigonos did not act on the initial request of the Lebedoi, but when the Teoi later petitioned for an even larger earmark to cover what they argued was appropriate for the now synoikized population, they were rebuffed. If there were a need for grain, Antigonos reflected, it ought to come from nearby “tribute-bearing (phorologoumenê)” land. Yet in the end, the king agreed to earmark the 1,400 gold staters per the original request of Lebedos.

THE DYNAMICS OF EARMARKING

Our sources are fragmentary, but in the composite, they capture many different stages of the earmarking process. We began with the Korrágos decree both because of the salience of its historical context, the great uncertainty that surrounded the transfer of power, and because of its role in the history of scholarship. This was the document that confirmed scholars’ prejudice and intuition that the Attalid state was peculiarly embedded in the institutions of civic finance. However, as we have noted, even if it alludes to a process of negotiation, the text is laconic about the actual institutional arrangements put in place. We can only state with any confidence that royal funds are earmarked for the religious life of the city and for its administration, disbursed it would seem in a regularized manner, we may presume, at least annually. Provision of oil for the neoi is also promised, to be disbursed in like manner one supposes, but the language of the inscription is even vaguer on this point. So much is left out or left ambiguous. From the perspective of civic finance, should we imagine two separate funds, one for hiera and another for dioikêsis, or instead a joint fund?22

20 For interpretation, see most recently the innovative conclusions of Gabrielsen 2011, 238-45. For Gabrielsen, the 1,400 gold staters were “excluded from the total revenue of the city,” as a liability owed to creditors (241).
21 τὸ τοῖς νεώις ἔλαιον (line 12). Oil distributions in the context of the gymnasium are a common feature of Hellenistic euergetism. Yet it is rare that we can see the details of the disbursement schedule or the underlying financial structures. The finance of the civic gymnasium is discussed fully in Ch. 2.
22 Corsten 1993, 90: a single fund (“Kasse”) linked to two different public goods, sacred and profane. Cf. the decree of Colophon for Polemaios, SEG XXXIX 1243 Column V lines 51-53, in which it is equally difficult to distinguish grammatically a joint fund from a single-purpose one: ἀπὸ τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τῆς διοικήσεως. For Rhodes 2007, 356 the term dioikêsis does not refer to a “fund” at all, if by fund we mean treasury (contra Schuler 2005). It is the remainder of a subvention after earmarked funds have been taken out.
How much money will the royal authorities earmark for each purpose? And, finally, where exactly will the money come from?

_Private Property and Sale_

For the mechanics of arranging a source for a royal earmark, we now possess a rich source in the opisthographic inscription discovered in the village of Taşkuyucak, which overlooks a strategic pass that leads from Sardis north toward the upper Kaikos Valley (TEXT 2). The inscription’s two documents recount in great detail relations between Eumenes II and several communities of Mysians, an indigenous population and mercenaries par excellence of the Hellenistic world. These particular Mysians were settled in several katoikiai in the hinterland of Sardis, one of which was certainly called Apollonioucharax, as P. Thonemann has pointed out in a new edition and commentary of the text. Thonemann plausibly makes Apollonioucharax the interlocutor of Eumenes II, but open questions remain about the precise character of each document on the stone. The working assumption now is that Face A records the king’s directive to a subordinate official, while Face B reproduces an earlier petition of the katoikountes of Apollonioucharax. Face A is then, as it were, a positive response to the request of Face B; Face A is Eumenes II communicating to his bureaucracy, Face B the settlement addressing royalty.

In the ed. pr., P. Herrmann and H. Malay noted the similarity of the script to that in evidence in the Korragos decree. The historical setting is also proximate, as Eumenes II aims to ameliorate the devastation of war with a variety of fiscal privileges and outright gifts. Yet the date of this text is somewhat later, c.165/4, and the war referred to must be the so-called Great Revolt of 168-165. This was a major war fought between the Galatian Celts of the Anatolian steppe and Greeks and others living in the coastal lowlands of the Attalid kingdom. It is important to remember that for all the Attalids’ tendentious representations of Celts, for all their panhellenic posturing, this war was extremely destructive. The threat was not barbarism, but the threat was real. This was a decisive moment for the dynasty, and so much devastation merited a large and complex royal effort after the war. In the inscription, we can see the breakdown of order, as certain soldiers are said to have deserted in the final

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23 Thonemann 2011a. The ed. pr. is Herrmann and Malay 2007, no. 32.
24 As first suggested by Wörrle 2009, 427, n.76 and developed in Thonemann 2011a. This solves certain major problems of interpretation, but it opens others up. In general, the corporate identity of Apollonioucharax is curiously absent from the entire text. One place to look for it might be in the expression ἔτει δημόται ἐσμὲν, which Thonemann translates unsatisfactorily, “because we are poor” (Face B lines 10-11). Also, left somewhat incomplete is his interpretation of the final lines of Face B, which clearly do not represent the voice of Apollonioucharax. He makes no mention of the stray letters below the text on Face B, engraved and then deleted, which Herrmann and Malay read tentatively as |α|υτος ξομα ιρων. Finally, on this interpretation Apollonioucharax seems to reprimand Eumenes for failing to return certain dependant villages to the katoikia. The tone of the reproach is striking and deserves further consideration.
year of the war (Face B line 3). The concern is clearly that they may never return to Attalid settlements, or if they do, they will lack enthusiasm for the future conscriptions that the text anticipates (Face A lines 19-21).26 Again, the goal is to reconstitute the community. Eumenes provides the Mysians with land allotments, as well as with the equipment and infrastructure necessary for durable habitation. He instructs his officials to reclassify populations, divide land allotments, distribute construction materials, and bring know-how. He also provides for the martial cult of Zeus Stratios, both with an expansion of its territorial immunity (asylia) and by earmarking revenues to pay for its sacrifices. Those revenues are to come from the village of Sibloê. The key passage (Face B lines 11-19) reads:

Σιβλοην κωμην την προτερου οδουν ημιτεραν, περι ης γερα | πται, ίνα διορθωσιμενων ημων την τιμην Μελεάγρωι τωι | ήγορακοτι αυτην δραχμων ναει ΥΜΗ | C. ἀποδοθη, κομι | σαβαι νυν άνευ τιμης, ὅπως υπάρχωσιν αι | εξ αυτης | πρόσοδοι εις της του Διος του Στρατιου και τας | υπερ υμων συντελουμενας θυσιας και διαμενη ημων ιερα και άτελης | το δε αργυριον δοθηναι υπερ αυτης έκ του βασιλικου τωι Μελεα | γραι:

(We request that) the village of Sibloê, which was earlier ours – about which it is written that “it will be restored to us when we have settled up a price with Meleager, who bought the village, (vacat), 448 drachmas and 1.5 obols” – that it should now be conveyed to us without a price, so that the revenues of the village shall provide for the sacrifices for Zeus Stratios and for those on your behalf. (We also request that) the village should remain for us sacred and tax-free, and that the money for it should be given to Meleager from the royal treasury.

It seems that Apollonioucharax had mortgaged the revenues of a dependent village to a local big man named Meleager and ultimately defaulted on its debt.27 “Ownership” of the village, or rather the right to collect its taxes, had then passed to Meleager. Now, seizing the moment, Apollonioucharax asks the king to unwind the old transaction in the process of earmarking. If we think of the new transaction of Eumenes with Meleager as the unwinding of the old one, the number on the stone, 448 drachmas and 1.5 obols, will appear less curious. Thonemann finds it too low for the price of an entire village’s revenues and so postulates a missing numeral in the vacat.28 Yet this is because he assumes that the price recorded in the inscription was the original price paid by Meleager, which is to say, the principal of the loan he extended to Apollonioucharax. Herrmann and Malay, who examined the stone, note, “It looks as if the amount had been added later in a space left blank.”29 This does not fit well with the model of interpretation put forward by Thonemann, which sees here a contract

26 This inscription also fits into a series of Attalid documents that present what are clearly the end-products of the crown’s negotiations with groups of mercenaries. The most well known is the agreement of Eumenes I with the rebellious mercenaries of Philetareia and Attaleia (OGIS 266). For Attalid relations with so-called military settlements after 188, see Virgilio 2008, though he does not treat the inscription from Taşkuyucak.
27 Thonemann 2011a, 8-9.
28 Thonemann 2011a, 8.
29 Herrmann and Malay 2007, 51.
quoted verbatim (περὶ ἦς γέγρα|πται). Rather, the final price for Sibloē represents Eumenes’ “settling up” with Meleager. This is the act of diorthōsis: setting to right, but not necessarily paying the “sticker price” that was due. 

Quoted in the moral register of diorthōsis, the 448 drachmas and 1.5 obols becomes a just price. An explicit contrast is drawn, then, with the conveyance of Sibloē to Apollonioucharax and Zeus Stratios, a transaction which is described as “without price (ἀνευ τιμῆς).” The process of producing a revenue source for a royal earmark is thus an opportunity for the display of a particularly economic royal virtue. That we are told that the final transfer of the village to the cult was a specifically priceless conveyance is an indication of what is at stake when it comes to earmarking. One must describe these transactions, and in description lies a gambit of ideological risks and rewards. Without a price, Eumenes and Apollonioucharax meet at a point, as it were, above and beyond the market. In the end, neither party assumes the dreaded role of buyer. Yet what of Meleager, the original buyer? We can only guess at how he really fared in all this. If he had not as yet collected tax in the village, and marketed it for cash in the event that it was collected in kind, the whole business would have approximated an interest-free loan to Apollonioucharax for whatever period of time had elapsed since the original sale. If he had already collected, collected anything at all, this was profit, maybe even a windfall if on account of the tumult of war the revenues of Sibloē were unlikely to equal 448 drachmas and 1.5 obols any time soon. We should note that the inscription makes clear that some partial collection of taxes has already taken place: the remission of arrears explicitly excludes those taxes that are already in the hands of tax farmers (Face B Lines 7-9).

We need to ask what happened to Meleager, even if we cannot answer the question. The same is true of one of the Lycian dynasts named Ptolemaios, who transferred land to another katoikia, this one called the Kardakôn Kôme, but did not receive money promised from the community in return. In a letter of 181, Eumenes II ordered that the katoikountes, the Kardakoi, not pay their debt, even if they happened to have the money (Maier, Mauerbauinschriften 76; TEXT 3, lines 7-10). Just as in the case of Meleager and Apollonioucharax, the fate of creditor Ptolemaios is effaced. Presumably, Eumenes also settled up with him. In both cases, we can infer that private individuals transacted with the

30 Thonemann 2011a, 8.  
31 For διορθοθασθαι, see discussion of Gauthier 1989, 20, who translates, “payer ou régler une somme due.” In this case, I would put the emphasis on the latter. Cf. Thonemann’s translation of Face B lines 13-14: “it will be restored (ἀποδοθῇ) when we repay (διορθωσαµένων) to Meleagros the price (τὴν τιμὴν) at which he bought it (ἠγορακότα).”  
32 Chaniotis 2004, 203-4 discusses the legitimacy of interstate sales of territory with regard to transactions between different kings, between kings and cities or koina (e.g., Attalos I and the Aetolians over Aegina in 210), but he does not discuss any between private individuals and kings.
king over the fate of subject communities. Thus much of the significance of the inscription from Taşkuyucak is that it shows an Attalid king purchasing private property in order to provide the revenue source for an earmark. Indeed, it is one more piece of evidence to belie the notion that only two forms of land tenure existed in Hellenistic Asia Minor, royal land and polis chôra.³³ Private property, in fact, has a distinctly high profile in earmarking.³⁴

Of course as long as Meleager goes unpaid, the reciprocal exchange between king and subject is caught in the balance. With the diorthôsis, royal authority brings to a conclusion in an ethical fashion a transaction that did not go according to plan. Yet the crown does nothing to perpetuate the relationship with Meleager. It does not ask the land-distributor Lykinos to find a different village for Meleager, as this geodotês is to do for the inhabitants of Thileudos and Plazeira, re-designated now as villages of “huntsmen” (Face B lines 22-24). It seems that Meleager just walks away with the money that he receives from the royal treasury. By contrast, the earmarking arrangement construes the relationship between king and community as fixed and everlasting. As often in the finance of cult, the earmarking of prosodotê for the maintenance of sacrifice takes the form of a purpose clause that contains the almost atemporal verb ὑπάρχειν in the subjunctive.³⁵ One does not dare envision the time when the revenue stream will not provide for sacrifices. Here, the royal authority also promises that the village of Sibloê will remain in its new status. And while Apollonioucharax and its priest may not have had to compete anymore with Meleager and his ilk for Sibloê, they are involved in an exchange. They are now responsible for the cost of revenue collection in the village. In turn, their cult will perform sacrifices to Zeus Stratios, the obvious patron deity of a military community on-the-ready, and on behalf of the king.

The inscription from Taşkuyucak may also illuminate the transactions echoed in a very fragmentary text from Pergamon itself, long known but poorly understood (RC 48; TEXT 4). This was once a very large inscription, but a lamentable four discrete fragments of it survive. It is a letter of Eumenes II to the polis of Temnos, a city in the Aeolian core of the kingdom. Thus the Attalids likely had an especially good knowledge of local institutions in Temnos. The city had even been on terms of isopoliteia with Pergamon in pre-dynastic days, which makes it all the more intriguing if we find at play in Temnos those same dynamics of

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³³ Discussed infra and passim in Ch. 4.
³⁴ For an earlier hint of an Attalid purchase from private property owners in the context of earmarking, see Plb. 18.16.1-2. In 198/7, while wintering in Aegina, the island that he had purchased from the Aetolians in 210, Attalos I visited Sikyon. Polybius reports in narrating the episode that the city had earlier erected a colossal portrait statue of the king in the agora, near the temple of Apollo, because Attalos had redeemed Apollo’s sacred land at no small expense (τὴν ἱερὰν χώραν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐλυτρώσατο ἀυτοῖς οὐκ ἄλλης) (18.16.1-2). The revenues of this sacred land would have been earmarked for Apollo. It had clearly fallen into private not public hands, as it was the polis that was celebrating Attalos’ gift to Apollo.
³⁵ See Hedrick 1999, 421.
earmarking that we have recognized in the new territories. C. Welles could not make much sense of what he termed the “certain subsidies” that Eumenes II grants Temnos, but he thought that the inscription reflected the same “financial policy” as the Korrágos inscription. In other words, this inscription was another important building block in the early twentieth-century theory of Attalid penetration into civic finance.

The crucial passages are in Fragment D, and the first few lines in particular. Welles’s text here, however, must be used with caution, as he himself admits that though the script is “fine and even,” the right margin of Fragment D, the measure by which he determines line length elsewhere, is irregular. F. Piejko, who has published several major restorations of Fragment D, provides slightly different line numbers. According to the text of Welles, the opening lines of Fragment D tell us: a) land has been purchased (περαιμένης χωρας); b) a 1/10 tax on agricultural produce is at issue (μερης δεκες); and c) funds are being earmarked for the city’s administration (εις την διοικησιν της πολεος και [...). Welles asks, “Does this mean that crown land had been sold to the city, from which a part of the revenue would be available for the city’s running expenses?”

The model of Apollonioucharax and Sibloë, Eumenes II and Meleager, suggests a different interpretation. In the case of Temnos too, a third party – a private property owner – is likely lurking. Again, earmarking entails recourse to the purchase of private property. The reasoning behind this supposition is both methodological and philological. First, Welles takes as his starting point the old conception of land tenure in Hellenistic Asia Minor as a two-tiered system consisting of royal land and polis territory, with no place for private property of any form beyond the χώρα of the poleis. This view is becoming increasingly less tenable. As for the text, if we examine Piejko’s bold restorations, we see that they cannot stand, but a general framework for interpretation must be proposed in their place. He has restored, on what basis is not clear, first, the remission of two parts of the dekatè, and, second, an earmark for the purpose of hiera and diokësis τες poleòs of revenues from (the future rents from) a stoa that the crown undertakes to build. This restoration does not solve the problem posed by Welles of the purchased land. In the remainder of Fragment D, nothing is said of a stoa, but in fact everything concerns the fiscal status of land. Mention of a place called the Bômitis, of an official land survey (katametrësis), and of the notification of someone called

36 OGIS 265. For the designation of Temnos as “tributary” in this period, see Allen 1983, 111; Allen’s sovereignty rubric, however, is based solely on the dubious criterion of “independent coinage.”
37 Welles 1934, 195-96, invoking Holleaux, Robert, and Rostovtzeff for the “financial policy.”
38 Piejko 1987, 724; Piejko 1989, 401.
39 Welles 1934, 197.
41 For a harsh critique of Piejko’s method, see Gauthier 1989, 171-78.
42 In an unpublished paper, I explore the relationship of stoa rents to public finance.
Pyrrhos regarding an act of “taking over (paralépsis)” follows a series of illegible fiscal prescriptions. The land at issue may have once been part of a gift estate granted in early Hellenistic times, or it may have fallen more recently into private hands through public borrowing and default. The point is that Eumenes must purchase this land in the process of constructing an earmark for Temnos. Once set in motion, the mechanics of earmarking trigger a sale.

**Brokering the Earmark**

Yet there is an earlier stage in the earmarking process that is missing from the rich text from Taşkuyucak. An earmarking arrangement was often the final result of earlier deliberations, of back-and-forth negotiations. This is a dynamic that is not always noticed, despite much discussion in the scholarship of the “interactive” character of Hellenistic kingship. It is no accident that the civic elites who went on frequent embassies to the Attalid court and its regional representatives were the same individuals who brokered earmarks. This connection is apparent in a new inscription from Ionian Metropolis (I. Metropolis 1; TEXT 5). The inscription is two-sided, both of its documents honoring a local dignitary named Apollonios son of Attalos. The longer text casts light on the Revolt of Aristonikos and describes posthumous honors for Apollonios. What concerns us is the other document, which is an honorary decree for Apollonios originally passed either in 145/44 or 144/43 – the regnal year of Attalos II (15) is given. It moves from generalities about Apollonios’ life of paradigmatic civic virtue to a list of specific good deeds, all along emphasizing that Apollonios’ stature outstripped that of humble Metropolis. Insofar as he spent time in other cities, the fair reputation he earned abroad redounded upon that city. Back home, the Metropolitans could count on him in a pinch to travel away again on embassies “to kings and others” (Face B lines 12-13). Owing to his characteristic perseverance and sacrifice of private advantage to public, Apollonios’ embassies accomplished the city’s aims.

What follows then are three positive outcomes of embassies. These are presented in a narrative passage that is closed by one final sentence before the Hortativformel: “(and) in all other respects he consistently engages in politics (πολιτευοµένος διατελεῖ) incorruptibly and eagerly…” (Face B line 27). The three positive outcomes are as follows. First, in land disputes with neighbors, likely with either Colophon, Smyrna, or Ephesos, or with some combination of those three, Apollonios saw to it that the city suffered no loss. Here, the editors of the ed. pr., B. Dreyer and H. Engelmann, as well as C. Jones, who has challenged many of their interpretations, all think of an embassy not to the king, but to his stratégos in

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43 For the debated meaning of paralépsis, see the remarks of Corsten 1993, 89.
44 On this region’s fierce inter-polis competition for territory, see Robert 1976.
Ephesos. We know that this official was responsible for the Kaystrian plain. Next, a dispute with a mysterious group of tax farmers drew Apollonios into a formal arbitration (diakrisis) (Face B line 23). But who presided? We are not told, though we know that the Attalids settled a fiscal dispute between Parion and Priapos. The tax farmers had in some way altered the fiscal status of Metropolis with respect to the “Kaystrian harbor (limén Kaïstrianos)” (Face B line 20).

The result of the embassy was a return to the status quo ante. The Metropolitans received their tax privilege back. But did they get more than just that? It is curious that the third and final benefaction secured for Metropolis by Apollonios from higher authority – in this case, the highest, the king himself – is not set off like the other two with an introductory clause. For the story about the land dispute: κατά τε τὰς γινομένας πρὸς τοὺς παρακειμένους ὑπὲρ χώρας ἀμφιβητήσεις (Face B line 14). For the story about the harbor taxes: ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐφευρισκομένων ἰμέιν τελῶν (Face B line 19). For the third case, we have only a pair of conjunctive particles: δὲ καὶ (Face B line 24). Apollonios also obtained from the king 500 drachmas for oil for the neoi and 500 drachmas for lessons for freeborn youth each year (καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ ἐνιαυτὸν) (Face B line 25). In other words, Apollonios facilitated royal participation in the year-by-year financial planning of the citizens of Metropolis. The question is, “When did he secure the earmark?” Jones does not treat the issue directly, but he counts at least two embassies. “Since the text praises Apollonios just above for his embassies to ‘the kings and to the others’ (12), both issues, that of the land and that of the tax-farmers, must have required recourse either to one of the kings or to an official.” But what of that other issue, who will pay for oil for the gymnasium and for the education of the freeborn youth? The text suggests that in fact there were only two embassies, but on one of them, Apollonios managed to obtain both the old fiscal regime for the Kaystrian harbor and the two pledges of 500 drachmas per annum. This is why we lack a new introductory clause after the story of the tax farming dispute concludes. We might trace these benefactions to the same historical episode. In other words, the process of repealing the new harbor taxes may very well have resulted in the earmarking of royal funds for civic institutions.

There is reason to believe that people like Apollonios of Metropolis participated with royal authorities in the process of cobbling together earmarks. It is important to keep in mind

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45 Dreyer and Engelmann 2003, 50-7; Jones 2004, 476.
46 See SEG XXVI 1238.
47 Str. 13.1.14. It is difficult to discern from Strabo’s report of Parion’s sycophancy (therapeia) whether the Attalid arbitration might have been in any sense formal. As Ager 2007 notes, kings seem to have played a very minor role in interstate arbitration. On the other hand, for Dreyer and Engelmann, as well as Jones, the tax farmers are royal, which necessarily implies an Attalid role in the dispute’s resolution. The identity of the tax farmers is discussed at length in Ch. 4.
48 Jones 2004, 476.
the alternative, which many historians seem to prefer. In that scenario, the interaction is kept to a minimum. Cities simply petition for benefactions, and kings reply. Or, kings swoop into local contexts, rearrange fiscal regimes – to speak euphemistically – and leave. Yet we have other documents that also evince a kind of fiscal intermediation in the earmarking process. Chief among them is the honorary decree of Apameia for Kephisodoros son of Ariston (TEXT 6). We are again in the reign of Eumenes II, perhaps again in the aftermath of the Great Revolt. Robert explicated the fundamental problem with W. Buckler’s original text. Kephisodoros was in Robert’s judgment at once a generous citizen of Apameia, performing the office of gymnasiarch at private expense, and a zealous courtier, dedicating statues of Eumenes II and his brother Attalos in the gymnasium. In this decree, he both receives honors and himself promises a benefaction. The nature of that benefaction was obscured so long as the beginning of line 12 was read: \[καὶ τοῦ δήμου, ἀργὺρίου, \] and so on; and line 13 was read: \[τῷ ταμίαι (?) τῷ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, \] and so on. Robert’s reconstruction put the king in line 12 and the \[δῆμος \] in line 13. This meant that what was announced was a modification to a royal gift first conceived of as 3,000 drachmas for a city that “in time of war demonstrated its goodwill toward the crown by providing grain and other necessities at public expense for soldiers stationed nearby…” (lines 13-14).

The modification consists of Kephisodoros’ personal gift of however many drachmas were listed at the beginning of line 15, that is to say, a “top-up” of the king’s original gift of 3,000 drachmas. Kephisodoros vows this additional money as a dedication in the king’s name (\[ἐνάτιθησιν ὑπερ αὐτοῦ\]), but he also attaches a string to the gift: Apameia will receive the money provided that a gathering (\[synodos\]) of ephebes and \[paides\] takes place each year at the festivals of the Hermaia and the Herakleia, calendar events closely associated with the life of the gymnasium. We can safely assume that some of the promised money – or the revenues it would one day produce – were earmarked to pay for these festivals, perhaps a fairly significant amount in that they involved two age-classes and both the Hermaia and Herakleia. The grammar of a provisory clause is unusual for an earmarking arrangement. The typical construction is: \[apo + genitive (source); then eis + accusative (purpose). \]\[έφ’ ἐσταὶ \] may be proper to the language of dedications. We can compare here a late second-century Delphic manumission that vows the slave to Apollo “on condition that the slave be free (\[έφ’

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49 Scholarship has advanced two different versions of this model of royal-civic relations that posits minimal interaction. The earlier model presented strong kings, unconcerned with the local affairs of cities. See, e.g., Rostovtzeff 1941. More recently, scholars have tended to see a vibrant Hellenistic city, which can act unilaterally or in concert with other cities, setting its own priorities without royal approval or participation. Here see, e.g., A. Chankowski 2009.

50 Robert 1960, 124 gives a date of 168-166, which rests on the identification of the war mentioned in one of the crucial lines as the Great Revolt. See also Thonemann 2003, 104-5 for confirmation of the date on the basis of royal titulature.

51 J. and L. Robert BE (1939) no. 400.
Yet if the grammar of the Kephisodoros decree is unusual, what it exposes about the mechanics of earmarking is commonplace: the actual implementation of these arrangements was often contingent.

The most pressing question in this case is also unanswerable. It is nevertheless worth posing. Do the Apameians receive the king’s 3,000 drachmas whether or not they agree to earmark the money or future revenues for the festivals? In other words, does Kephisodoros, in tacking on his contribution to the sum provided by the king, also tack on this earmarking arrangement? In short, who is the author of the earmark? As gymnasiarch, the euergetist had converted honors granted to him by the *neoi* into honors for the crown, i.e., the portrait statue group (lines 10-11). So it is plain to see how he conducts his local affairs against the backdrop of the kingdom at large. And any promotion of gymnastic life then necessarily in some sense functions as an endorsement of royal power – or better yet, of those polis actors that control the institution of the gymnasium, at least in part because they are the conduit of royal patronage. It is unlikely that the royal authority is solely responsible for the Apameia earmark, inserting Kephisodoros between the king and the city, instrumentalizing him, using his stature in his community to legitimate a symbolically violent intervention in civic finance. Rather, Kephisodoros’s piggy-backing of his contribution on top of the king’s gift speaks to the frequent division of agency in earmarking.

The rider of Kephisodoros to royal writ reminds us how much local agency is unleashed in the earmarking process. On the one hand, the implementation is left to those on the ground, which entails tasks of coercion and the monitoring of the arrangement. As we have noted, Apollonioucharax and the priesthood of Zeus Stratios received from the Attalids not just the right, but the responsibility to collect revenue from Sibloê. In their complaint that certain other dependent villages have not been returned to them in the manner that Eumenes II had authorized we have their admission of failure in the implementation of an earlier earmarking arrangement (TEXT 2, Face B lines 20-21). On the other hand, the creation of earmarking arrangements implicates multiple agencies precisely because earmarking arrangements are tailored to highly local circumstances. There is no one-size-fits all earmark. Thus it does not make sense to speak of an Attalid “financial policy,” as if a bureaucratic blueprint had been available. Kephisodoros occupied a privileged niche in the social hierarchy of Attalid Asia Minor. He was thus in a position to frame the needs of the city of Apameia before the king, to be part of the conversation with royal authority that ends with an earmark.

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52 See Ch. 2.
Foundations are a unique form of earmarking, and they deserve special treatment. In fact, some might argue that certain so-called royal foundations do not actually meet our definition of earmarking. In other words, the king’s role is only to provide money. The precise source of the money is unexpressed because it is inconsequential. How the money is invested and differentiated between the various organs of civic finance and their attendant ideological categories, even the particular type of money, which currency, is on this account the city’s prerogative alone. Indeed, in isolation from each other, certain documents do provide this picture. A notable example is a decree of Teos that describes the setting up of a foundation for the support of the koinon of Dionysian technitai, the association of actors that would eventually challenge Teos for festival revenues, prompting an Attalid mediation (SEG II 580; TEXT 7). Its date is a matter of dispute, with some placing it after 188, others at the end of the third century, late in the reign of Attalos I. This text is most often cited as surefire evidence for Attalid intervention in city finance in the form of a fund, εἰς τὴν τῆς διοίκησιν (lines 17-18). Interestingly, in the Tean arrangement, the foundation is created from the combination of 3,000 drachmas of royal dioikêsis funds and 3,000 drachmas of city money that come from a fund that the Teans have re-earmarked, the grain fund once known as the fund for fortification. This combination is facilitated by the coincidence of civic and royal financial structures: when the city’s treasurers take up their office, the first installment of the year’s dioikêsis funds is disbursed. Yet disbursement appears to be about all the royal authority does. The process by which the city arranges to provide for purchase of property to support the technitai is complex, laid out in detail, and, as far as we can see, free of royal participation. The king, it seems, grants a certain number of subventions per year, and the citizens of Teos do with the money what they will. In this case, they decide to apply it toward a foundation for the technitai.

In an otherwise insightful study, J. Sosin argues that the Attalid kings played a similarly passive role in the establishment of four foundations at Delphi in 159/8. Here, we are of course outside the Attalid kingdom, but the Delphic documents are a precious source for royal economic behavior in the period. They are also relevant because they depict the Attalids interacting with the city of Delphi, not with the Amphictiony or priests. To

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53 See (still) Laum 1914, but also Migeotte 1984 and 1992, for updated texts of many of those collected by Laum.
54 For the Attalid mediation, see RC 53.
56 See esp. Rhodes 2007, 360-61: “Sometimes states in financial difficulties relied on subventions from a king in addition to their ordinary revenues...[T]he remaining 3,000 drachae were to be paid by the tamiai of the following year from the first installment of the king’s grant εἰς τὴν τῆς πολείς dioikêsin.” But why characterize the phenomenon as an extraordinary subvention? It seems to me to be envisaged by Teos as part and parcel of each fiscal cycle.
57 Sosin 2004.
summarize, the city sent four embassies to Pergamon, which resulted in the establishment of four foundations in a period of months, through two separate diplomatic acts. First, the coregent Attalos II, gave 21,000 attic-weight drachmas, called “Alexanders” in the two inscriptions that record the arrangement, three talents of which were earmarked for teachers’ salaries, the remaining half talent for the celebration of a new festival called the Attaleia (Syll. 3 672). A first inscription describes the stringent terms on which this money would be lent out. A few months later, the dying Eumenes II endowed a grain fund (three and a half talents) and another new festival, the Eumeneia (one talent). A second inscription records that Eumenes II also paid in those “Alexander” drachmas (Syll. 3 671). Thus the two gifts amounted to an injection of eight talents of “Alexanders” into a monetary system dominated by other currencies. These coins, surely tetradrachms, whether or not they bore the face of the Macedonian conqueror, had been minted on the (old) Attic standard, which meant that they commanded a premium in international transactions. For Sosin, this fact unlocks the dynamic that produced these earmarking arrangements. Because the Delphic elite were borrowing the Alexanders at a cost less than that which they would have had to pay to buy them on the open market, they stood to gain the most from the arrangement, and on his account, would have ploughed the coins back into international transactions. Sosin astutely demonstrates what certain Delphic citizens stood to gain. However, while this dogged pursuit of cui bono demystifies the claims of the ὅπως clause of the decree for Attalos II, which construes the whole affair as a royal plot to earmark interest “for all time” for the maintenance of sacrifices, the king’s own honors, and the teachers’ salaries, it papers over much of the complexity of the transaction.

Sosin describes the Delphic elite as “crony capitalists,” and for him, the Attalids were engaging in a simple “gift exchange,” cash for honors. He writes, “Though these texts are inevitably studied as specimens of royal gifts, there is no reason to think that the idea to establish the endowments or the restrictions under which they were to operate came from Attalos or Eumenes. Both pairs of endowments were established only after Delphi sent embassies to the kings in support of the idea. Kings provided money. Rich Delphians provided initiative and ingenuity.” The question of origin and invention here seems misplaced. There is no reason to trouble ourselves over whether the idea came from Delphi or Pergamon. What matters is that it took four embassies to produce the four earmarks.

58 See also Gygax 2009, 176 who agrees with Sosin that the initiative comes from Delphi. His purpose, however, is to show that Delphi successfully obtained benefactions from the king by offering, proleptically, “excessive” honors. For dates of co-regency, see Hansen 1971, 127. In fact, these two documents, Syll. 3 671 and 672, are key evidence for the dates of co-regency at the very end of Eumenes’ life. 59 For “Alexanders,” see Knoepfler 1997. For the reduction of the Attic standard and the monetary situation in the Aegean in this period, see Ch. 3. 60 Sosin 2004, 195-96. 61 Sosin 2004, 195.
contained within these two diplomatic acts. To say the kings only provided money is to leave those embassies in an analytical black box. Again, we can at least ask, “What would the ambassadors have discussed with the king and his courtiers?” If not those details of the final arrangement subject to strictly local politics, then the basic shape of the earmark: cash or kind, if cash, which currency, quantity, time of delivery; for royal honors, if a statue, its location, if a festival, at which point in the religious calendar – all this could have been up for negotiation.

Institutions and Earmarking

Such negotiation implies mutual knowledge of institutions. Put differently, if this dynamic obtained in Attalid Asia Minor, it means that the earmarking process familiarized the two parties with each other’s finances. With power so unevenly distributed between king and subject community, it must be demonstrated, not assumed, that subject communities might offer kings a candid look at their finances, and conversely, that kings might take an interest in the form of local institutions of public finance. Inscriptions brought to light in recent years provide two key pieces of evidence in this regard. The first is a decree of Kyme in Aeolis, like Temnos, a city long in the Pergamene orbit (SEG L 1195). 62 The decree dates to the reign of Philetairos, but it gives us a striking impression of an aspect of Attalid political culture that endured into the second century. Kyme had sent an embassy to Philetairos to negotiate the provision of a large number of shields for the city’s protection (phylakê) and security (asphaleia). In a short letter reproduced in the decree, Philetairos obliged, confessing that while the competent royal workshops were defunct, he happened to have the shields on hand and would provide them as a gift. 63 The second half of the text contains a fascinating description of the literal “inscription (epigraphô)” of Philetairos into civic life, as the magistrates who are to distribute the shields according to tribe, are required to carve both the name of the tribe and the name of Philetairos into each shield. Yet what concerns us are the first 13 lines of the text, in which the Kymeans describe their initial offer to Philetairos:


(We ask that) Philetairos allow that the bronze shields come from him, having arranged that for a certain price he give 600 shields; that he give these shields so that 50 should be distributed to each tribe; and as for the future expenditure on shields, (we ask that) the means come in the form of the

62 Ed. pr.: Manganaro 2004; See also Fröhlich 2004b.
63 For the classic exegesis of basilika ergastêria, see Robert 1984, 496-99.
revenue that is to come from the tax on grain in transit; but this revenue will only be available after the monies earmarked in the decree of the prytany of Lysanias have been apportioned between the priests, the archons, and the others; and the archons are to give to the ambassadors a written account of all this (lines 7-11).  

In his commentary on the ed.pr., G. Manganaro treats only the phraseology of the tax on grain in transit, which appears to be unique. Of the passage quoted, C. Brixhe writes dryly in BE, “cette clause serait à commenter.” We can propose the following understanding of what is taking place. Kyme presents Philetairos with an earmarking arrangement that is to provide 600 shields immediately and an indefinite number in the future. The first 600 are to be had at a price that is in some sense fixed by Philetairos (παρ’ ἑαυτῷ κατιστα | μένω ἀναλωματός δόμεναι), and here we would need to know much more about the dynast’s relationship with the workshops in Pergamon than we do in order to understand how the price is arrived at. Perhaps Kyme actually anticipates a gift. In any case, for future purchases, Kyme proposes that the tax on grain in transit – newly instituted? – be earmarked for this purpose, but earmarked within the framework of a master document for civic finance laid out in “the decree passed in the prytany of Lysanias.” In line 11, τούτων could refer to everything that the damos of Kyme has instructed its ambassadors to communicate to Philetairos, beginning in line 4 with παρακαλέωσι. Or it could refer to τὰ προεψαθεμένα ἐπὶ πρυτάνιος Λυσανία in lines 10-11, as if the authors of our text were prompted to command the archons to provide the ambassadors with a copy of that singularly important decree by discussion of it and of the archons. Either way, the ambassadors will present Philetairos with a grapha that contains a map of Kyme’s finances. They are not so much asking for permission to exact the transit tax on grain as proposing an earmarking arrangement that the dynast is free to take or leave. From the looks of his terse letter, it appears he chose the latter, even though Kyme receives 600 free shields. However, in the process, Kyme had laid bare not only the present state of its finances, but its projected revenues.

The new text from Toriaion in eastern Phrygia documents a keen interest on the part of the Attalids in the particular form civic institutions took after 188 (SEG XLVII 1745;

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64 The Italian translation of Manganaro 2004, 406 seems to elide some of the complexity of this key passage. However, I can find nothing in his translation that is inconsistent with mine.
66 I do not believe that Kyme is asking Philetairos for permission to raise their own taxes on grain in transit. As will be argued in Ch. 4, the cities of the Attalid kingdom retained their own fiscality. What happens here amounts to the city earmarking future revenues for future purchases, in terms of Greek public finance, hypothekê. In Kyme of the early second century, a somewhat comparable situation occurred, when the Kymeans hypothecated future revenues as security for a loan (I.Kyme 12). All this from a city Strabo mocked for its naïveté in matters of public finance (13.3.6).
TEXT 8). Toriaion had been a katoikia under Seleukid control. After Apameia, it came into the possession of Eumenes II, who granted it polis status and institutions in a process that we can follow in this dossier of three royal letters, two of which are complete, with only the heading of the third surviving. The letters are thought to date from the first few years after the change of sovereign. In the first, the king addresses himself to Τοριαιτῶν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν, while in the second and third, he speaks to the Boulê kai Dêmos Toriaitôn. Scholarship has tended to focus on the issue of the integration of non-Hellenes into the community. At issue is whether we now have a paradigm for the assimilation of non-Hellenes into Hellenistic urban foundations or re-foundations on the polis model. The import of the text for administrative history deserves more treatment. If Thonemann is correct in assigning a so-called cistophoric countermarking authority to Toriaion, this site was the focus of significant royal attention in the 180s. In the inscription, Eumenes gives the Toriaitaii permission to organize themselves along with τοῖς μεθ’ ὑμῶν συνοικοῦσιν ἐγχωρίοις – whoever they are – into a single politeuma, and to use their own laws (idioi nomoi) (line 28). Those laws, however, are to be submitted to the king for review, lest any of them prove contrary to “their” or “his” interests, depending on whether one accepts Gauthier’s restoration of ἑθύμιν for ύμιν (line 30). The coordination between king and budding polis might go even further. The choice belongs to Toriaion. It appears that Eumenes offers the Toriaitaii either the services of a commission of outsiders that can devise their polis institutions for them, or a ready-made law code, and in that case, the king takes responsibility for creating a council, devising magistracies, dividing the citizenry into tribes, and organizing an oil fund for the neoi. Here, one has to decide whether ἐπιτηδείους is a substantive, or rather an adjective referring to the nomoi (line 31). More than sovereignty is at stake here. Royal concern is expressed for the compatibility if not uniformity of institutions.

We know that the non-polis subject communities of Anatolia in this period sought the status of polis in order to gain economic advantages. We know, in turn, that Hellenistic kings regularly encouraged the transformation of subject communities into poleis and planted

67 Toriaion in Phrygia Paroreios should be distinguished from Tyriaion in Lycia. See SEG XXX 1532.
68 See esp. Schuler 1999, but also Virgilio 2008. For Virgilio, the population at Toriaion is mostly indigenous; Schuler is more circumspect. Jonnes and Riel 1997 see an indigenous population living in forts, which is in the process of hellenizing.
69 For Kennell 2005, it is the paradigm.
70 Thonemann 2008. On the so-called cistophoric countermarks, see Ch. 3.
71 The grant of idioi nomoi has, rightly or wrongly, prompted many commentators to compare the situation of the population of Toriaion to that of the Jewish settlers moved to Phrygia and Lydia by Antiochos III (Joseph. AJ 12.151; Gruen 2002, 17 takes the grant of Antiochos III to be authentic).
72 P. Gauthier BE (1999) no. 509. Gauthier points out that the photo of the ed.pr. is illegible. According to Herrmann and Malay 2007, 58 n.76 the inscription from Taşkuyucak (TEXT 2) exhibits the same mistake (or ambiguity?) on Face B lines 16-17.
73 Archibald 2001 points to Sardis, though the emergence of the polis of the Sardis in the third century is shrouded in mystery. See Gauthier 1989, 151-70.
poleis in strategic locations. What we see in Toriaion is something different, namely the royal and local authorities bargaining out the shape of local institutions. In the second letter, the gymnasium of what is now the polis of Toriaion gains royal support for its provision of oil. This is accomplished by earmarking certain revenues raised in Toriaion. For the time being — and here the political horizon is hazy — revenue from the agoranomia, market revenue of some sort, will pay for the oil. Eventually, a financial official called the hemiölos is to substitute at his discretion a different set of revenues. The nature of these revenues is imperfectly understood, but the future earmarking arrangement will have something to do with taxing certain lands with the dekatê (lines 41-7). Of the third and final letter we have only the first few lines, but they mention another embassy. It would seem that the contingent and provisional terms of the earmarking arrangement laid out in the second letter had generated this second embassy and a third royal letter. We cannot speak here of royal intervention because the royal authority is from their very inception continually implicated in the local institutions.

Thus we can detect a recursive relationship between the process of arranging an earmark and the process of crafting institutions for the polis or even katoikia. The same men who met with the king to negotiate fiscal privileges in another arena were shaping the local institutions of public finance. We can see this best in Carian Apollonia Salbakê, which falls just outside the Attalid area of influence, but faced challenges similar to those of Attalid subject communities in this period. In the decree for Pamphilos, Apollonia praises its benefactor for his demonstrated competence as a financial administrator. He had been on embassies to Manlius Vulso and the ten senatorial legates at Apameia in the summer of 188. Soon thereafter he appeared before Rhodian authorities, on one of the many other embassies that he undertook in his career. Robert dated the decree to soon after the embassy to the Rhodians. What was at issue in appearing before the Romans is clear not only from this text’s report that Pamphilos διώικησεν in Apameia (line 9), but from the narrative of Polybius. For Manlius Vulso and the ten legates, the task was much greater than simply dividing Seleukid Asia Minor between Rhodes and Pergamon. The various communities of Asia Minor confronted them with every sort of fiscal quarrel and territorial dispute. In response, Polybius writes:

"Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Ἀπάμειαν οἱ τῇ δέκα καὶ Γνάιος ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ρωμαίων, διακούσαντες πάντων τῶν ἀπηνησκότων, τοὺς μὲν περὶ χώρας ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τινος ἐτέρου διαφερομένοις"

74 A debate exists as to whether the gymnasium predates the foundation of the polis of Toriaion. See P. Gauthier BE (1999) no. 509; Kennell 2005; Savalli-Lestrade 2005.
75 The nature of this revenue and the interpretive problem here are discussed in Ch. 4.
76 This is an important issue, to which we will return in Ch. 4.
77 L. and J. Robert 1954, 303-12 no. 167.
πόλεις ἀπέδωκαν ὀμολογουμένας ἀμφοτέροις, ἐν αἷς διακρίθησονται περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων.

After listening to the claimants, Manlius Vulso and the ten legates assigned to those cities that were disputing land, money, or something else, different cities that had been agreed upon to act as arbitrators (21.45.1).

Indeed, the Romans ruled directly on issues of fiscal territoriality in only a limited number of cases. For example, the cities of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrai were all successful in petitions for pieces of chôra (21.45.6). In the case of Apollonia and Pamphilos, the settlement of Apameia was not final, and the danger of the crisis was unabated. Pamphilos was then called upon to appear before the Rhodians to contest the claims of nearby non-polis communities. The fiscal landscape of Anatolia seems to have remained unstable in the years after Apameia. Once we are told in the decree that Pamphilos secured an agreement with the Rhodians, the scene shifts to Apollonia itself, and though we lack any temporal marker, what follows seems to be a report of activities that took place after the embassies. Finding the city’s revenues (dêmosiai prosodoi) in disarray, some of them even having gone missing, Pamphilos wrote a psephisma for the city which completely reoriented public finance. The language is highly unusual, technical, administrative-speak, according to Robert rather papyrological. The psephisma looks like another master document for administration, not unlike the graphe of Kyme. In another likely innovation, two chief financial administrators are to be elected annually, and to manage the city’s finances according to this psephisma lest there be another diaptôma, a failure to render account, or perhaps, to meet fiscal obligations to Rhodes.

Institutions arrived in Hellenistic cities through different means. In this world, cities constantly looked around at each other, which meant institutional change could occur through outright imitation. When Teos and Lebedos needed a new set of laws for their synoikism, they agreed to take over the law code of Kos (RC 3). Sometimes, the fear of non-conformity may have sparked change. When the citizens of second-century Beroia noticed that “in the cities that have gymnasia and have established an oil fund,” there were also gymnasiarchal laws on the books, they considered it only fitting (καλῶς ἔχει) that they pass

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78 L. and J. Robert 1954, 310.
80 Cf. the argument of the citizens of Sardis before Antiochos III (SEG XXXIX 1285 lines 8-10). The Sardians seem to know what taxes the “other cities (allai poleis)” pay for the use of ergastēria. Cf. also the speculation of Schuler 2007, 185-87 on civic elites modeling gymnasia at home on what they observed abroad.
those laws too (SEG XLIII 381 lines 6-8). Of course when people moved about, they might take institutions with them. Whatever innate genius Pamphilos possessed, whatever know-how he acquired performing liturgies and magistracies in Apollonia, taking tips from elder kinsmen who had discharged those same responsibilities in their day, we can imagine quite plausibly that his many embassies shaped his master psephisma. We can even go one step further and at least ask whether his negotiating fiscal arrangements abroad in any sense conditioned what he considered administered “messily (μὴ ὀρθῶς)” at home (line 19)? If we accept that these sorts of interactions could affect a city’s choice of fiscal institutions, it is not difficult to conceptualize earmarking as an arrangement between ruler and subject that is the outcome of a social bargain struck in the name of a subject community by men such as Apollonios of Metropolis, Kephisodoros of Apameia, Brennos of Toriaion, and Pamphilos of Apollonia Salbakê. In other words, part of brokering the arrangements was matching royal resources, not only cash, but the means of coercion, with civic resources, not only manpower, but public banks and the sacred repositories of temples.

If this all sounds just too harmonious, too functional, take the case of Eumenes II, Miletos, and the koinon of the Ionians. In the winter of 167/6, the koinon passed a decree that conferred a series of honors on Eumenes, famously proclaiming him the common benefactor of the Greeks (euergetês tôn hellenôn). Two leading Milesians named Eirenias and Archelaos managed to intercept the king in Delos and present him with the decree. While that decree does not survive, two other documents may contain portions of its content. One is the king’s letter of reply to the Ionians (RC 52), the other is a fragmentary decree of Miletos found at Didyma (I.Didyma 488). In his letter, Eumenes writes:


In order that in the future, celebrating a day in our name during the Panionia, you should make the whole festival more illustrious, I shall dedicate for you sufficient revenues, from which you shall be able to make an appropriate dedication to our memory. I shall make the gold statue myself, preferring that this be a cost-free gift for the koinon (RC 52 lines 51-8).

On the face of things, the Ionians are to have nothing to do with the earmarking of certain revenues for the festival. This is vulgar paternalism. The king magnanimously assumes the cost of one day’s festivities during the Panionia, and his subjects agree to use the day to render him cult. They propose a gift of a gilded statue, but he commutes their gold into charis (and then orders them to set the statue up in the sacred precinct voted for him by the

81 This text and the impetus for the law are discussed at greater length in Ch. 2.
82 The career of Eirenias and his social position in Miletos are discussed Ch. 2.
Milesians). It would appear that the king alone decides the source of this earmark, and moreover, that he determines without input from the Ionians just how much revenue will be sufficient to make the mnêmê appropriate. Yet this is all the pretense of royal ideology. “This project,” writes Welles, “as far as the evidence of the letter goes, originated with Eumenes. It was not proposed in the [original] decree.”83 Yet again, our question is not one of impetus. Who knows who started this? Rather, we want to know what dynamic produces the earmarking arrangement in its final and static form.

Welles points us in the right direction by suggesting that the earmarking arrangement referred to proleptically in lines 51-6 of RC 52 could very well have resembled that which we know from a fragmentary Milesian decree from Didyma (I.Didyma 488).84 The first editor of both documents, T. Wiegand, believed that the two inscriptions reflect the same portfolio of honors.85 What remains of the fragmentary decree from Didyma is concerned with the financing of activities associated with the celebration of Eumenes’ birthday. Two foundations are mentioned, one at the beginning of the fragment, the ἀπὸ τῶν προσδόκων χρημάτων (lines 2-3), and later, the ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφειλομένων εἰμπορικῶν (lines 24-5). The revenues of the first are earmarked for the festivities of the king’s birthday: sacrifices and feasting, a parade of the ephebes in full armor...“and everything else according to the stephanêphorikos nomos and the diagraphê of the priesthood” (lines 13-5). The revenues of the second fund, which are thirty talents of retiring maritime loans, are linked to a grain fund. That fund is to provide for a public grain distribution on Eumenes’ birthday. For Welles and Wiegand, the first foundation is quite clearly royal, while the second is also likely to be so, as it is under the control of two officials epi tēs katasseis tou gymnasiou, one of whom is Eirenias of RC 52. I.Didyma 488 may not be conclusive evidence for Attalid involvement with the Milesian grain fund, but it illuminates precisely what the statement of Eumenes in RC 52 occludes. An earmarking arrangement of enormous ideological import for the crown, aiming as it does to guard forever in civic life the memory of the king, his brothers Attalos and Athenaios, and his son Attalos, rests squarely upon Milesian institutions. Putting aside for the moment the question of the role of Eirenias in bringing this all about, we can see in I.Didyma 488 that in order to work, this earmarking arrangement needs: the public bank of Miletos and its personnel (lines 26, 31), local grain commissioners competent enough to manage the fund in such a way that sufficient grain is produced (lines 17-8), and the organizational knowledge contained within the stephanêphorikos nomos and the diagraphê of the priesthood. Also aiding its chances of success are: the procedural sanctions that Miletos institutes to protect against its dissolution,

83 Welles 1934, 217
84 For proleptic honors, see Gygax 2009.
85 Wiegand 1911, 27.
against future counter-earmarking (lines 46-9), and even the facility of the Didymaion, which as the repository of the decree, lends it an aura of the permanent and sacred.

THE MEANINGS OF EARMARKING

If earmarking is a social process that produces meaning by differentiating money, what set of meanings did the encounter of the communities of Asia Minor with Attalid power produce? And what made earmarking such an attractive solution to the problems of risk, governance, and ideological accommodation after 188? Another way of approaching these questions is to ask, “What gave earmarking its legitimacy?” We might call it a time-honored practice, but from where did that honor derive? Likely, it was from the sphere of religion. At the most basic level, the practice of earmarking, perhaps quite literally, portions of a sacrificial victim for the consumption of certain priests or particular members of the cultic community, must go back far beyond our records in the Greek world. In the Hellenistic period, we know that priests divided up their revenues according to source and slated expenditure. The phenomenon is especially visible in inscriptions from Delos. When the Delian priests took up management of the treasury of the city of Delos for the first time in 192, they divided into separate jars funds earmarked by civic decrees for specific public goods, their own working capital, and a reserve (I.Délos 399).86

Moreover, earmarking specific revenues for cultic activity had long been a way of protecting those revenues from others who might lay claim to them: the body politic, its future magistrates, or members of the cultic community with their own ideas about the proper employment of sacred wealth. For example, when the Athenians in the time of Lykourgos came into a new and potentially controversial source of revenue in the form of the Nea, they earmarked it for the cost of the Little Panathenaia (RO 81). For Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, B. Dignas has argued for the independence of cultic authorities, their sense of corporate identity, and the autonomy of the sphere of sacred finance in a study of temple administration.87 Unsurprisingly, earmarking is at issue in her paradigmatic standoff between the priests of Zeus at Labraunda and the Carian city of Mylasa. That earmarking does not seem to have prevented Mylasa from claiming for itself revenues that once belonged to Zeus Labraundeus is telling. Earmarking is one of the means by which Dignas’ priests and city magistrates articulate their different, but only sometimes oppositional, corporate identities. An earmarking arrangement may for a time place restrictions on public money, or create obstacles to its free employment, but these arrangements can almost always be dissolved.

86 For discussion of this text, see V. Chankowski 2008; for earmarking and sanctuaries, see V. Chankowski 2011, 144-59.
87 Dignas 2002.
Even in sacred finance, counter-earmarking is always a possibility. Thus it seems other procedures were developed for safeguarding earmarking arrangements that directed revenues into sacred coffers. The danger was ever present: we can see cities re-earmarking funds time and again through procedures like *metaphora*. The citizens of Delphi may have designated the cash gift of Attalos II *hiera chrêmata* to ensure that a charge of *hierosylia* would stick against anyone who diverted them from their original purpose, but the Delphians also took the extra step of decreeing fines for anyone who would so much as attempt *metaphora*, “by a vote or otherwise” (*Syll.* 3 672 lines 15-8). An even wider repertoire of procedural safeguards is on full display in the charter of the foundation of Eudemos of Miletos (*Syll.* 3 577 lines 64-6). Finally, in Pergamon itself, aspects of ruler cult in the reign of Attalos III depended upon funds of Asklepios designated with the peculiar technical term ἀμέτοιοστοι πρόσοδοι – non-transferable revenues (*I. Pergamon* 246 line 19). The Attalids could rely on the sanction of religion and polis procedure to enforce their earmarks.

Earmarking is not just an administrative practice, but also a distinctive form of euergetism. Part of what is distinctive about this way of gifting is the emphasis on the long term. In earmarking, the relationship of the donor to the recipient is conceptualized as everlasting and is continually re-performed. It is perhaps then not coincidental that this efflorescence of earmarking occurred precisely as a discourse on the virtue of providence (*pronoia*) seems to have entered the epigraphic record. There existed a model for the second-century euergetist, royal or civic, which instructed him to πρόνοιαν ποιεῖθαι. For example, Polythros of Teos took forethought for his city (προνοήσας) when he established a fund for the education of the free-born youth (*Syll.* 3 57 line 3). Cities honored these benefactors for their providence; not for anticipating a rainy day so much as for troubling themselves with accomplishing the long-term goals of the community, in particular, the creation of continuity by means of regularizing revenue streams. A few fixed points in the city’s fiscal landscape could go a long way in reducing anxiety about risk. The acceptance of Attalid earmarks was predicated upon this culturally specific approach to risk. Yet the kings still needed to make their case, which is why the language of *pronoia* is so common in Attalid documents. In an exhaustive lexical study of πρόνοιαν ποιεῖθαι, J. Mourges even suggests that the formula was in origin a creation of the Attalid chancery, a diplomatic convention transmitted to the Greek-speaking administrators of the Roman province of Asia.

Yet *pronoia* was by no means the preserve of the Attalids in this period. We also find it in the civic epigraphy of Asia Minor: in the 180s, in the Maeander Valley (*Milet I 3* 88 δίδοσθαι δὲ ἔς τιν τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὴν σύνοδον αὐτῶν υπὸ τοῦ ταμίου τῶν ἁμετοίοστων προσόδων ἀπὸ τοῦ πόρου τοῦ Ἀσκληπείου ἄργυριον δραχμάς πεντῆκοντα (*I. Pergamon* 246 lines 18-20). 89 E.g., *RC* 53 Fragment II A line 2; *SEG IV* 632 line 4.

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90 Mourges 1995, 432.
Delphinion 149 line 16), c.140 in Cilicia Pedias (SEG XII 511 line 5). One could see here the outsized civic benefactors of the basse époque hellénistique imitating Attalid behavior. Or when the katoikountes of Apollonioucharax ask that “thought be taken for their needs (προνοηθήναι),” we could see the Attalids being caught in the web of their own ideology (TEXT 2 Face B line 10). However, we now have an example of a different royal chancery speaking of πλείστην πρόνοιαν ποιούμενοι in the letter of Seleukos IV to Heliodoros, the so-called Heliodoros stele of the year 178, which was discovered after the study of Mourges (SEG LVII 1838 line 14). The pronoia language of the Heliodoros stele is in fact echoed in several inscriptions from the city of Pergamon. Clearly, the Attalids did not invent the language of pronoia. They embraced it, and they chose to emphasize earmarking because the practice instantiated this political ideal of capacious significance. Pronoia not only points to the future, it also projects an inclusive vision of the past. When a benefactor boasts of having taken forethought for his beneficiaries, he shares with them the deliberative process behind the gift. By the same token, part of the meaning of earmarking was conveyed through a startlingly transparent vision of the kingdom’s fiscal structure: suddenly the subject caught sight of the logic behind royal patrimony. In the end, earmarking arrangements bore the traces of social process.

CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this chapter has been to reveal the dynamics of earmarking in Attalid Asia Minor. For Pergamon, the choice of earmarking presupposed knowledge of civic institutions, or at least a willingness to get to know them. It also opened up a range of transactions with private individuals, all of which were conducted in the public eye. This encounter with private property, as much as the traditional confrontation of Stadt und Herrscher pored over in the scholarship, presented its own ideological risks and rewards. Throughout this chapter, the process, negotiation, and contingency behind the earmark have been emphasized, not in order to portray the Attalids as weak, but to highlight the agency and the participation of the subject communities in their own governance. Earmarking in this

91 On SEG XII 511, see also SEG LIV 1473. Many other examples could be adduced.
92 On the emergence of these big men in the latter half of the Hellenistic period, a defining feature of the period often termed basse époque hellénistique, see Gauthier 1985.
93 As Ma 1999 often describes Antiochos III.
94 Cotton and Wörrle 2005 do not comment on the appearance of pronoia in the Heliodoros stele. The language of pronoia may not be a telltale sign of the Attalids, but I do think it can be used to date documents to the second century. To give an Attalid example, SIG² 270 is a letter of a certain King Attalos to the Cretan city of Aptera. The phrase πρόνοιαν ποιήσαι (line 3) suggests Attalos II or III. Inscriptions from the city of Pergamon: I.Pergamon 167 line 9; MDAI(A) 35 (1908) 375,1 lines 13-14.
95 Cf. Savalli-Lestrade 2003 on the elaboration of royal decisions.
context was neither simple apportionment nor the confiscation of revenues. Nor was it a matter of two states, one of which was hegemonic, dividing up a single revenue base. We can contrast a case from Hellenistic Crete, where the polis of Praisos, having vanquished neighboring Stalai, took for itself half of Stalai’s customs dues, but left them the rest, as well as “(the revenues of) the land, the city, and the islands that the citizens of Stalai now hold” (SIG³ 524 lines 3-8). In Attalid Asia Minor, earmarking at times created new sources of revenue. At other times it was certainly parasitic, but it never involved the complete destruction of civic fiscality or any of its traditional elements. On the contrary, as in the Korragos decree, the Attalids preferred to employ earmarking in the reconstitution of a subject community, or as in Toriaion, in its re-foundation. By rationalizing the inevitable impact of royal power on civic finance, this administrative practice contributed to the success of the Attalid imperial project.
INTRODUCTION

The Roman C. Sulpicius, Polybius tells us, was a man consumed, given over to madness, reveling in his quarrel with Eumenes II of Pergamon (31.6.5). In 164, a perplexed Senate, facing a realignment of power in Asia Minor, dispatched Sulpicius to the region on a fact-finding mission. Upon arrival, he solicited allegations against the king by posting notices in the most important cities. Anyone who wished could come to Sardis at an appointed time and be heard. Sulpicius then retreated to the gymnasium of Sardis where he sat for ten days, holding court and taking complaints. The legate appears to have been energetic, systematic in his investigation, even spoiling for a fight, but mad? What to make of the characterization of Polybius? It no doubt reflects the depth of the Roman assault on the ideological underpinnings of Attalid power, but wherein lies that depth? It has long been noted that Sulpicius was appealing directly to Attalid subjects in Attalid territory. The choice of Sardis must also have stung. The former satrapal capital had grown in significance under the Seleukids, and had acquired under the Attalids the distinction of a cistophoric mint, if not a royal residence. However, to appreciate the full impact of Sulpicius’s visit to Asia Minor, we must consider more carefully his choice of venue.

Sulpicius was not the first hostile leader to occupy the gymnasium of Sardis. Antiochos III had even brought an army into its confines during the siege of 215/14. Seleukid forces remained quartered in it when Sardis fell, one new imposition among many that would have served to chasten the Sardeians for their disloyalty. The next year, however, Antiochos eased the city’s punitive fiscal burden, and simultaneously lightened the occupation. In both cases, the city’s gymnasium was a focus of his beneficence. He restored the gymnasium to the Sardeians in its “former condition” – no mean feat – and

1 ἀνθρώπος τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ φιλοδοξῶν ἐν τῇ πρὸς Εὐμένην διαφορᾷ.
2 For the wider historical context, see Hansen 1971, 125.
3 See, e.g., Walbank 1957-79, 3:471.
4 Tralles contained a secondary Attalid palace. See infra, n. 26. As for Sardis, the theater is the only Hellenistic building securely identified in the center of the city. See Ratté 2009; further on Seleukid Sardis, see Capdetrey 2007, 369-71.
he set gymnasial life on firm ground for the future. Much as he later did for Herakleia-under-Latmos, the king earmarked royal revenues for an oil fund (elaiochristion), one which would provide 200 metrētai of oil to the neoi each year (SEG XXXVII 859; SEG XXXIX 1283 and 1285). Scholarship has always recognized the affections of Hellenistic kings for the gymnasium and “those who frequent it.” One of Hellenistic history’s most famous (and puzzling) episodes of royal involvement with gymnasium society, the attempt of a group of young priests in Jerusalem to have themselves enrolled as “Antiochenes,” is roughly contemporaneous with the visit of Sulpicius to Sardis. Yet with the relatively recent publication of the earmarking documents from Sardis and Herakleia, and with the subsequent discovery of several other inscriptions relating to Attalid involvement with gymnasia, it has become ever more clear that the institution of the gymnasium started to take on new significance c.200 and, by mid-century, constituted a primary site of interaction between city and king. Though the evidence is sparse, this is very likely to have been the case in Sardis in 164. In the late 160s, the Attalids were making gifts in support of gymnasial life in places as distant and different as Rhodes, once an enemy and always a rival, and the city of Delphi; not to mention, in “free” Miletos and Kos, or in Andros, a garrisoned possession. Indeed, not more than a few years before his arrival, the gymnasium where Sulpicius set up shop would have likely been the site of the gymnic competitions of the inaugural celebration of the pentateric Panathenaia kai Eumeneia. Sulpicius’ presence in the gymnasium of Sardis was understood by all as an affront – as it was meant to be; so much so, in fact, says Polybius, that the Greeks, as if for pity, rallied to the king (31.6.6).

THE PROBLEM OF THE ATTALIDS AND THE GYMNASIUM

If royal involvement with gymnasial life, with the ephebate of the Greek city, and with the other institutions and groups that “had a share in the oil” is a pattern of behavior that extends across time and space in the Hellenistic world, it is one which is particularly pronounced among the Attalids, and more intensively so after 188 than ever before. When the Seleukids came into control of Miletos, they set about rebuilding the sanctuary

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6 For a digest of earlier scholarship, see Schmidt-Dounas 2000, 52-61; for “those who frequent the gymnasium” and the various locations of gymnasial corporate identity, see Gauthier 2006, 481.
7 For the ephebes of Jerusalem and their petition for enrollment as “Antiochenes,” an event which preceded the outbreak of the Maccabean Revolt in 168/7: 2 Maccabees 4.
8 Panathenaia kai Eumeneia: OGIS 305; for recent comment on this festival, see Jones 2000, 5.
10 See already Robert 1937, 84-5 for a list of Attalid gifts with special attention paid to the gymnasial ones.
of Didyma. The Attalids, by contrast, paid for a gymnasium in the *astu*.\(^{11}\) K. Bringmann et al. count 27 gymnasial foundations in their corpus of royal gifts.\(^{12}\) Of these, 13 are Attalid. And we can add considerably to that count. The practice certainly goes back to the dynasty’s origins: Philetairos consecrated land in Thespiae to Hermes, gymnasial god *par excellence*, and earmarked its revenues for an oil fund.\(^{13}\) Yet it intensifies after Apameia: eight of the thirteen gymnasial foundations are securely dated post-188. In addition, the much improved edition of the decree of Colophon for Athenaios now allows us to identify the prince’s gift of a *paidikê* (youth) palaistra in the background.\(^{14}\) The decree for Korragos and the new documents from Metropolis and Toriaion show the integration of the polis gymnasium into the fiscal structures of the enlarged Attalid kingdom (TEXTS 1, 5, and 8).\(^{15}\) The Toriaion dossier may even illuminate *RC* 51, which Welles called a “letter of an Attalid king to military cleruchs, conferring various grants,” and which he dated “second century B.C.” Its fragmentary line 24 reads, ὧν ἐδωκα τοῖς νέοις εἰς τὸ ἐλαίον.\(^{16}\)

Yet to gauge the full extent of Attalid involvement with the gymnasium in this period we must consider several other categories of evidence. First, there is a growing body of material that points to the gymnasium as an interface between court and polis. For example, if we can learn anything from the lamentably fragmentary honorific decree

\(^{11}\) Cf. Marcellesi 2004, 173 on royal benefaction at Miletos: “Il n’y a guère de différence entre l’évergétisme séleucide et l’évergétisme lagide ou attalide dans la nature de dons.” Of course the political imperatives had changed, but the focus of benefaction did too.

\(^{12}\) The omission of Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 88 [E] from the list of gymnasial foundations in Schmidt-Doumas 2000, 55 seems to be a mistake, as does the omission of Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 83 [E], Demetrios Poliorcetes’ dedication of “Rhodian spoils” as an oil fund in Thebes.

\(^{13}\) Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 88 [E] for which a date of c.270-263 is given. Cf. Philetairos’ oil fund in Kyzikos (Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 241 [E]).

\(^{14}\) Gauthier 2006 = TEXT 10.

\(^{15}\) The Toriaion dossier was published after Bringmann et al. 1995, but it is discussed in a companion volume. See Bringmann 2000, 142.

\(^{16}\) The partitive genitive must refer back to a revenue source, from the context, likely land, which is again earmarked for an oil fund. Potentially, *RC* 51 may support or vitiate the arguments laid out in what follows. The problem is that the community addressed is not identified in the surviving text. Thus we cannot determine where it falls on the path from *katoikia* to polis. A polis is mentioned in line 14, but Welles takes it to be Pergamon itself, where some of the cleruchs will be quartered. In the case of Toriaon, we can observe the transformation of the *katoikia* into a polis, though indeed the word “polis” is not mentioned in the dossier. There, it is a matter of debate whether the earlier *katoikia* possessed a gymnasium, which is then officially recognized, or whether the creation of the gymnasium signals the creation of the polis. For the debate, see Ch. 1, n. 74. My view, argued infra, is that the gymnasium is a feature of the Hellenistic polis, but not a *sine qua non*. Moreover, evidence from Ptolemaic Thera shows that a garrison community might attract royal patronage for its gymnasium and interact with royal power on this score just as any polis would (*IG* 12 327 + p. 283). Fröhlich 2009, 62 n. 26 analyzes the Theran document alongside the corpus of Bringmann et al. 1995.
recently discovered in Lydia, it is that the courtier Asklepes, Pergaméno and syntethrammenos of Attalos II, will be commemorated with elaborate pomp in a provincial “gymnasium of the neoi.”\textsuperscript{17} Next, Pergamon itself has produced an enormous amount of evidence relating to gymnasiaal institutions.\textsuperscript{18} After all, it contains the largest gymnasium on record in the Hellenistic world, the so-called “grosse Gymnasion,” with its three terraces and two temples. While M. Wörrle has recently argued that one of the principal functions of the Pergamene gymnasium was to produce citizens for the polis of Pergamon, insofar as a polis identity existed in the royal capital at all, it was the result of negotiation with the king, and may very well have been, in this case, at the instigation of the king.\textsuperscript{19} The grosse Gymnasion dates to the period of urban expansion in the lower city under Eumenes II.\textsuperscript{20} Evidence for a third-century gymnasium at Pergamon is surprisingly thin, limited to a single inscription, dated byon the notoriously unreliable criterion of letter forms (I.Pergamon 9).\textsuperscript{21} On any reckoning, Eumenes II would have given the gymnasiaal life of the polis of Pergamon a complete overhaul. Only when the dynasty fell did responsibility for the oil fund pass from the royal treasury to the gymnasiarch.\textsuperscript{22} The institution remained to the end “eine Art joint venture von König und Demos.”\textsuperscript{23}

Finally, indirect and circumstantial evidence of Attalid involvement with the gymnasium abounds. Take Tralles, for example. We have a Hellenistic victor list, mentioning neoi, which W. Dittenberger dated to the second century.\textsuperscript{24} While the proximity of ancient Tralles to a modern Turkish military installation puts 65% of the site off-limits to archaeology, an impressive Roman bath-gymnasium complex has been identified. Throughout Asia Minor, complexes of this sort stand over the remains of Hellenistic gymasia, in many cases, over a gymnasium that the Attalids are known to

\textsuperscript{17} Ed pr. of the text: Malay 1999, no. 182; cf. text and commentary of SEG XLIX 1540, esp. for question of authorship; for the identity of Asklepides and further speculation on authorship, see SEG LIII 1342 and Thonemann 2008, 50; Aneziri and Damaskos 2004, 259 n. 89 consider the text briefly.
\textsuperscript{18} For an introduction, see Radt 1999, 113-34.
\textsuperscript{19} Wörrle 2007.
\textsuperscript{20} Radt 1999, 115.
\textsuperscript{21} Also of relevance here is the problem of the date of the main temple in the gymnasium of Pergamon, likely that of Asklepios. The orientation of the Ionic temple fits with the rest of the complex. However, the building contains pieces of an older Doric building. These are tentatively attributed to the extra-mural Nikephorion, which was destroyed by Philip V in 201. See Radt 1999, 131.
\textsuperscript{22} P. Jacobstahl, MDAI(A) 33 (1908), 381-83, 3, with corrections of H. Hepding MDAI(A) 35 (1910) 419.
\textsuperscript{23} Wörrle 2007, 215; the new urban plan of the city of Pergamon, which is currently under research and as yet unpublished, demonstrates well the centrality of the gymnasium to the city of Eumenes II. Contrary to received opinion, the insulae are not oriented along axes to gates and towers, but to the massive gymnasium complex, its entrance, and the angles created by that structure.
\textsuperscript{24} Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 671 = I.Tralleis (and Nysa) I 107.
have patronized. At Apameia, the Attalids received Tralles as a “gift,” stripping it of its Seleukid dynastic title, but adorning it with a cistophoric mint and a palace. An ostotheke that was found 7km east of Aydin/Tralles bears the names of several Attalid officials and their wives, attesting to the city’s importance as an administrative center. In many ways, Tralles resembles Ephesos, where a gymnasia foundation is known only by indirect means, namely, through an ephetic dedication to [Hermes], Herakles, and King Eumenes. Ephesos too was a gift city, and has produced epigraphic evidence for the local presence of crown officials, the hégémones and stratégoi who dedicate to Eumenes II and Queen Stratonike (SEG XXXIII 942). It was an Ephesian neos that Attalos II considered the right kind of young man to be educated alongside the future Attalos III. One can easily imagine that the king was just as familiar with the neoi of Tralles as he was with their coevals in Ephesos.

In this chapter, I propose an explanatory framework for the dominance of the Attalids in our sources for royal involvement with the gymnasium. As with earmarking, this is a mode of interaction between king and city that predates Apameia, and, again, it is not exclusively but rather characteristically Attalid. What must be explained is its efflorescence in that dynasty, in the period 188–133. To date, scholarship has not considered this a serious problem. One has long struggled with divining the motivations behind individual royal gifts. But the Attalid affinity for the gymnasium is usually understood, first, as a straightforward expression of Pergamene Panhellenism, and, second, as part of a general tendency among Hellenistic kings to use the gymnasium to manufacture loyal, worshiping subjects. To take but two examples, Robert calls the gymnasium “cet édifice caractéristique de la culture grecque” and “le lieu par élection où se manifestait le culte royal avec le loyalisme envers les souverains hellénistiques.”

Much more recently, Dreyer’s kings “wollten durch den frühen Einfluß auf Kinder und

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25 For the Roman bath-gymnasium phenomenon in Asia Minor and its physical relationship to the Hellenistic gymnasium, see Yegül 2010, 154-80, esp. 155-57. For the modern obstacles to excavation at Tralles, see Dinç, 2003, 4. Dinç notes a first-century B.C.E. predecessor to the bath-gymnasium complex, destroyed in the earthquake of 26 (p. 33). However, the claim is also made that Apatourios of Alabanda built a gymnasium in Tralles (p. 4) This figure, known only from Vitr. De arch. 7.5.5 is in fact believed to have been active in the second century B.C.E. – see Howe et al. 1999, 268. But Vitruvius mentions only Apatourios’ ekklesiastérion at Tralles, not, as Dinç writes, a theater and a gymnasi

26 Plb. 21.46.10; Plin. HN 35.72; Vitr. De arch. 2.8.9.

27 SEG XLI 1434.

28 Bringmann et al. 1995, no. 266 [E].

29 Knibbe 1964-1965, 1-6; for important emendations of this text, see also J. and L. Robert BE (1968) no. 464; see also Engelmann 1975; Herrmann 1976, 233-34.

30 See Veyne 1976, 228-30.

31 Robert 1960, 124-25; for the manufacture of loyal subjects, see also Gauthier 1989, 93.
Jugendliche neue Loyalitätsbindungen schaffen und sich den erwachsenen Bürgern als Wohltäter und Förderer hellenischer Kultur empfehlen."

Both statements are far too synchronic, lacking also any recognition of the distinctive autonomy of the gymnasium as a civic institution.

There is no denying that the Attalids represented themselves as the avatars of the Greeks, not only in Athens, and not only in this period. The goal of their Kulturpolitik seems to have been to establish themselves in centers of international significance to Hellenes, such as Delphi, Delos, and later Athens, and to pose as the champions of the Hellene in the never-ending war against the Barbarian – in their day, the Galatian. In these respects, their politics were Panhellenic, as L. Mitchell understands the term. In her study of the origin and development of concepts of Panhellenism in archaic and classical Greece, Mitchell stresses “the very complexity and flexibility of Panhellenism that makes it so difficult, on the one hand, to define, and, on the other, to control.” Key elements of an earlier Panhellenic ideology remained vital in the Hellenistic period, chief among them, the related themes of supra-poliad unity (koinê homonoia) and commitment to the war of liberation against the Barbarian, both spelled out in Chremonides’ decree of 269/8 (IG 2 686 + 687). These may be the well-springs of the visual rhetoric of Attalid art, but they will not help explain Attalid involvement with the gymnasium. Some might imagine a cultural Panhellenism behind this behavior, a concern to unify Hellenes around a shared paideia in the Library of the capital as much as in the gymnasia of the cities. We should not confuse motivation with effect. In the most general terms, the gymnasium created and sustained a Panhellenic community of shared cultural practice. But by patronizing the gymnasia, the Attalids were sustaining polis identities, not suppressing them. Pergamene ideology was by no means supra-poliad. Polybius eulogizes Eumenes II for being his generation’s greatest royal benefactor of Greek cities (poleis Hellénidas) (32.8.5).

32 Dreyer 2004, 218. See also Schmidt-Doumas 2000, 60 for whom the gymnasium guarantees the continuity of Greek culture, and the Attalids, as the supreme patrons of Greek culture, are the natural benefactors of the gymnasium.
34 Mitchell 2007, xviii.
35 Mitchell 2007, 208; for complicated question of the date of Chremonides’ decree, see SEG LVI 190.
36 For Attalid visual rhetoric, see Stewart 2004, 228-32.
37 Cf. Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 313 [E], an honorific decree of Delphi for Eumenes II, which mentions both his tireless effort on behalf of “Hellenes” and his many gifts to “Greek cities;” cf. also RC 52 where Eumenes represents himself, in accordance it seems with the Ionians own claim, as a) euergete of “all Hellenes,” b) defender of these Hellenes against barbarians, and c) benefactor for the welfare of “those inhabiting Greek cities” (lines 8-12); finally, cf. Bringman et al. 1995 no. 49 [E] from Kalauria
There is also no denying that the gymnasium helped produce loyal Attalid subjects. Where impressionable young men were invited to pass the time in a palaistra equipped at royal expense – on the condition that they parade and sacrifice to the king on his birthday – they were bound to be well disposed toward the monarch as adults. Yet this was never the whole story. The young men may have been wrestling beneath portrait statues of the royal family, but they were also preparing for close combat under teachers appointed by the city and declaring their fealty to their patria. By patronizing the gymnasium, the Attalids produced more than just loyal subjects, they produced bands of neaniskoi, the fighting force of the gymnasial society. These neaniskoi might defend royal pragmata, as they did in Metropolis during the War of Aristonikos, or alternatively, they might pursue the particular military objectives of their poleis. Sometimes, we cannot tell which it is; or whether it might be both. For example, in the letter of Eumenes II to the polis of the Tabênoi, a mysteriously named group, the neaniskoi tôn oikeiôn, which F. Guizzi renders, “giovani dei ‘familiari,’” fought under a royal philos against Galatians. P. Hamon, however, has provided a new reading of the text, which also sees the group “going out against Apameia (προσελήλυθ’ Ἐπαμεινον).” At any rate, gymnasium society, while influential, was quite a small part of the overall subject population. If loyalty alone were at stake, the Attalids would have been better off endowing more grain funds, or building bouleuteria.

Recent scholarship on the Hellenistic polis, which aims so often to demonstrate the survival and vitality of its institutions after Chaironeia, proposes an altogether different explanation, one that emphasizes civic agency. For A. Chankowski, the cities of Asia Minor, whatever their particular relation of dependence on the crown, stood to gain the most from the interaction. In his model, unlike the gymnasia of the cities of Antigonid Macedonia or of the Syracusan epikrateia, the gymnasia of these cities

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38 For neaniskos as essentially a technical term, referring to the “neos at arms,” see Van Bremen (forthcoming, 28).; on the ephebate and the defense of the city in Asia Minor of this period, see d’Amore 2007.

39 I.Metropolis 1 = TEXT 5; Ionia in the 180s witnessed widespread inter-polis warfare, without royal interference. See Ager 2007; Ma 2000, 350-51.; note however, A. Chankowski 2010, 369-71 argues that the neaniskoi of the Metropolis inscription were not ephebic.

40 The polis of the Tabênoi, addressed in this new royal letter, has not been identified. The stone was found in the vicinity of Phrygian Hierapolis, which fits with the mention of Apameia. Yet if the addressee were Carian Tabai, the stone would need to be considered a pierre errante. See P. Hamon BE (2009) no. 440. The ed pr. is Guizzi 2006. See also Guizzi et al. 2008 no. 3.

41 P. Hamon BE (2009) no. 440.

42 A. Chankowski 2009, 98-103.
produced citizen soldiers; the civic institution lay largely outside the recruitment structure of the royal army. And because the cities profited most, so the argument goes, civic initiative must lie behind this pattern of royal behavior. Yet the case of Toriaion (TEXT 8), which Chankowski takes as paradigmatic, in fact illustrates the weakness of any explanation founded on an assumption about *cui bono*. Eumenes II, we recall, offered to provide the Toriaitoi with a number of ready-made institutions, among them an oil fund. In the following letter, the king laid out an earmarking arrangement for the fund. While Chankowski recognizes the act as royal promotion of the gymnasium, he reduces Eumenes to an automaton: “Il s’agit donc d’une pratique administrative récurrente.”

The king may have had a model in mind, but we must not imagine one “invented” in his chancery. Rather, we must imagine, Eumenes has adopted a model cooked up in a place such as Herakleia-under-Latmos in the third century – either way, too much imagining. Yet for Chankowski, Toriaion demonstrates once again “l’incapacité des souverains à s’appuyer sur une autre modèle que celui de la cité, et la vitalité des institutions de la cité qui diffusent dans différentes régions du monde grec les mêmes modèles socio-culturels: en l’occurrence, le modèle selon lequel la cité se préoccupe de la préparation de ses ‘jeunes’ à la vie de citoyens-soldats…la popularité du modèle civique du gymnase justifie à elle seule son instauration” (emphasis mine).

What the case of Toriaion actually proves is the futility of searching for a prime mover for this interaction with royal power. Did the Toriaitoi even have a “gymnasium” before 188? We simply cannot say.

Instead, we ought to seek models for the Hellenistic polis that reflect more faithfully the staggered vision of polis actors: local concerns in the foreground, but the king, ever present, on the horizon. There are no easy answers to Ma’s question, “How to talk about the Hellenistic world?” Yet our challenge is to make plain the links between local and high politics that were so obvious to king and polis alike. Our difficulty in so doing is acute when it comes to relations between kings and gymnasia. For example, scholarship has struggled to understand why third-century Halikarnassos asked “King Ptolemy” for “permission (*synchôrein*)” to renovate its gymnasium, “so that the *neoi* should have a gymnasium and the *paides* should reclaim the *paidikê palaistra*.

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44 *SEG* XXXIX 1283 and 1285. On the antiquity of the arrangement in Herakleia, I am agnostic. Unlike A. Chankowski and many other scholars, I am unwilling to take these cities at their word when they claim to have held a privilege “*ex archês*.” See Ch. 1, n. 2.
45 A. Chankowski 2009, 114.
46 Again, for the debate, see Ch. 1, n. 74.
47 Ma 1999, 1.
that the *neoī* are currently using.” The city had sent an embassy to the king before it announced a public subscription (Migeotte, *Emprunt* 102). Scholarship has always found this detail curious. In what sense did Halikarnassos need royal permission to renovate its gymnasium? Migeotte, plausibly, suspects that the Halikarnassians were fishing for a contribution from the king, which they may very well have obtained. What we know for certain is that the king figured from the beginning in the city’s planning; while by what means they were bound, if any, to contact Alexandria before undertaking a public works project that would marshal the city’s resources and loyalties, is unclear. The course of action, it seems, simply implied royal participation. In the panorama of their city that Halikarnassos presented to Ptolemy, the king could find himself.

The case of Toriaion also illustrates the danger of assuming that the popularity of the gymnasium justified its establishment with royal involvement. Indeed, the institution reached the peak of its popularity in the second century, with an ephebate attested in 65 cities. Yet surely royal – and especially Attalid – patronage and promotion helped swell the ranks. And consequently, did the gymnasium not then bear the marks of the encounter with royal power? An institution that we usually think of as quintessentially civic was transformed by the kings it eventually outlived. The Attalids after 188 encountered this institution at a particular point in its development. This was not the *ephebeia* of late classical Athens or Eretria, which molded large age-classes into the core of the citizen-army, some 500-600 young men at a time in Lykourgan Athens, as the gymnasium found architectural expression in city centers for the first time. For that institution, N. Kennell’s formulation “citizen training system” is more apt. Nor was this the gymnasium of the *basse époque hellénistique*, where cities buried their greatest benefactors and rendered them the cult of a *ktistês*, a space that Robert famously labeled the “second agora.” To understand the efflorescence of Attalid involvement with the gymnasium in the period 188-133, we need a deeper understanding of that institution, in that period. Perhaps an Attalid political culture that fostered ties with civic elites is part of...
the story. But the other dynasties needed their civic elites too, and they too could strike a civic pose in a local gymnasium. Philip V and Perseus had their names inscribed on a donor list in the gymnasium of Larisa, without epigraphical distinction, just like ordinary Lariseans. In what follows, I analyze the role and functioning of the gymnasium in cities both inside and out of the territory allotted to the Attalids at Apameia. Sulpicius came to meet Attalid subjects where they were accustomed to meeting their king. How that came to be the normal state of affairs has not been adequately explained.

THE GYMNASIUM AS A CIVIC INSTITUTION

When the ambassadors of Eumenes II approached the assembly (plêthos) of the Achaians in 185 offering a foundation that would thenceforth pay the wages of the league’s boule, they were shouted down (Plb. 22.7-8; Diod. Sic. 29.17). The arguments of Apollonidas of Sikyon had won the day. Apollonidas had cast the gift as in principle worthy of the Achaians, but in practice, in light of the intentions (proairesis) of the donor and the purpose (chreia) for which it was given, both utterly shameful (aischistê) and totally illegal (paranomôtate) (Plb. 22.8.1-2). The Achaians, he pointed out, had laws (nomoi) on the books that prohibited archons or private individuals from accepting a king’s gift (dôra). The boule, then, as a collection of private individuals acting in their capacity as archons, had no business accepting one. We know of course that the Achaians were far from allergic to royal beneficence – they had been accepting Ptolemaic gold for years. For Apollonidas and his camp, however, the gift of Eumenes was a poisoned chalice. It threatened to undermine the autonomy of the boule, and to invite more unwanted royal advances: this time it was Eumenes II, but another year, warned Apollonidas, it would be Prousias and then Seleukos (Plb. 22.8.6).

Consider, in contrast, that the Rhodians accepted in 161/60 a gift of grain from this same Eumenes destined to provide for the instruction of their sons, no doubt at least in part in the cadre of the gymnasium (Plb. 31.31). The critic of this gift is no Rhodian but Polybius himself, who takes the Rhodians to task for abandoning their usual sense of

54 For a distinctive Attalid relationship to civic elites, see Kertész 1992; Dreyer 2009; but also Plb. 32.8.5.
55 Bringmann et al. 1994 no. 106 [E]; see Habicht 1983 for the identification of the other donors as “true” Lariseans, and not Philip’s Macedonian settlers. This text tells against A. Chankowski’s admittedly vague Macedonian exceptionalism.
57 For discussion, see Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 68 [L]; note that for Diodoros, the ambassadors approach the synodos.
58 For discussion, see Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 212 [L].
decency (to prepon). In his view, they had acted indecently in soliciting money (eranizesthai) for the education of their sons when none was lacking.\(^5^9\) Were the arguments of Apollonidas of Sikyon on the mind of the Achaian historian, as F. Walbank suggests?\(^6^0\) Probably not. Polybius finds fault with the recipient, not the donor. Moreover, as Bringmann et al. remark, Polybius makes his critique from the standpoint of private morality.\(^6^1\) It is a critique, however, that he applies to the body politic (politeia) – and not without reason. The Rhodians who secured the gift from Eumenes were acting more like private individuals than representatives of the state, hence the metaphor of Polybius: the philos who inappropriately seeks an eranos-loan from his fellow eranistai.\(^6^2\) Where Apollonidas had nomos as law to buttress his claim, Polybius had merely nomos as custom, the inarticulate rules of philia. Apollonidas speaks only of pragmata, invoking the warring natures (enantia physis) of king and democracy (22.8.6). Polybius speaks of the conduct of fathers on behalf of their sons (31.31.1). They were arguing about two entirely different kinds of civic institutions.\(^6^3\)

The moralizing of Polybius on the Rhodians and Eumenes II throws into high relief the distinctiveness of the gymnasium as a civic institution in the decades after Apamea. Neither its membership nor its interests were identical with the body politic. It had its own law; when subjected to the law of boulê kai dēmos, it retained its own norms; and its ideology, in a world where the vast majority of cities and koina called themselves democracies, was unapologetically elitist.\(^6^4\) It might close its doors to certain citizens, but unlike the Achaian boulê, never to kings. If it was for Pausanias in the second century C.E. the sine qua non of the polis, it had not been for Aristotle, c.335-330 B.C.E.\(^6^5\) We cannot say for sure, it turns out, whether or not the Hellenistic polis could do without one.\(^6^6\) Gauthier, more than any other scholar, has recognized the peculiar status of the gymnasium as a civic institution. In fact, he writes of gymnasia that function “en dehors du cadre de la polis,” the activities of which are but partially or even “nullement civique.”\(^6^7\) His insight comes across in editions of various texts – honorific decrees of

\(^5^9\) Ascertaining the economic condition of Rhodes after Pydna and the Roman punitive action regarding Delos is an historical problem, as this passage from Polybius suggests.
\(^6^0\) Walbank 1957-79, 515.
\(^6^1\) Bringmann et al. 1995, 243.
\(^6^2\) For the eranos-loan, see Millett 1991.
\(^6^3\) Cf. Eckstein 2009, 259.
\(^6^4\) For the problem of defining démokratia in the epigraphy of the Hellenistic city and in royal chancellery language, see Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 528-64, esp. 533-34; for aristocratic kalokagathia and the Hellenistic gymnasium, see Gehrke 2004, 415 and infra.
\(^6^5\) Paus. 10.4.1, on Panopeos in Phocis; Arist. Pol. 6.5.13, discussed by Gauthier 1995, 7.
\(^6^6\) On the question of whether every polis had a gymnasium, Gehrke 2004, 414 is agnostic.
\(^6^7\) Gauthier 1995, 8; Gauthier 1980, 212.
Xanthos for Lyson and of Colophon for Athenaios, for example – and in his prolegomenon to the study of this institution. Yet much recent scholarship emphasizes the civic character of the gymnasion without qualification. Regarding the neoi, Dreyer writes, “Der Verbindung zwischen den Neoi und den Demos war demnach unaufloslich; die Neoi waren in ihren verschiedensten, hier umrissenen Aggregatzuständen ein Abbild der gesamten Bürgerschaft.” For H. Gehrke, the gymnasion is not quite the city in miniature, but close: “In der körperlich-geistigen Formierung sowie in Ritual und Ausstattung wurde mithin fassbar und sichtbar, wie eng das Gymnasium mit der Identität der Polis verbunden war.” Kennell catalogs “state-run systems of citizen training.”

Only if we recognize the distinctive status of the gymnasion as a civic institution can we understand why it became a privileged site of interaction between city and king in the period after Apameia. This is precisely why the only systematic attempt to analyze gymnasion society in its ambiguous and even oppositional relationship to civic society at large, R. van Bremen’s forthcoming essay on the neoi, is also the only treatment to give court and king their due. While we often count the gymnasion as one of the central institutions of the Hellenistic polis, we seldom define “central.” The Korrhagos decree (TEXT 1) shows that a city could plausibly argue to have had a gymnasion “from the beginning.” We in fact know that Toriaion did have one from the beginning (TEXT 8). It may not have been a sine qua non, but it was also not superfluous. Because in hard times too it was important to have one, Philetairos gave the Cyzicenes 20 talents for oil and synagôgê during the Galatian crisis of the 270s. And in calmer times, the resumption of gymnasion life was a sign that things were back to normal. So we saw that the restoration of the gymnasion took priority after the siege of Sardis. Yet the institution was also central because interactions with royal power were central to the political economy of the Hellenistic polis. Paradoxically, these interactions tended to take place in the gymnasion because of its peripheral status.

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69 Dreyer 2004, 234.
70 Gehrke 2004, 416.
71 Kennell 2006, vii; “ephebeia” in his corpus seems to mean the totality of the gymnasiaal society, not just ephebes; see also Habicht 1983, 31-32 (on Larisa): “Bau und Unterhaltung einer solchen, der Erziehung der Jugend gewidmeten Anlage war natürlichereweise eine Sache der Bürgerschaft und wurde in Larisa, wie dies auch für viele andere Städte bezeugt ist, selbstverständlich so angesehen” (emphasis mine).
73 Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 241 [E].
Financing the Gymnasium

However difficult, it is still possible to generalize about the Hellenistic gymnasium, as Gauthier acknowledges in a prolegomenon to its study.\(^{74}\) We can in fact identify regional and historical trends, and one such trend is the elaboration of the institution, throughout the Hellenistic world, and broadly speaking, from the third to the second century. We can observe an increasing complexity in administrative practice and an increase in scale: more instruction, more festivals – more activity. All of this would seem to imply a commensurate increase in financing, if not financial sophistication. Yet the reality was always messier. For gymnasiarchs, there were new responsibilities mandated both by the terms of private foundations, which added events to the calendar, and by law, not just the law of the gymnasium as an association, but also the law of the polis. For instance, each year, the gymnasium of Tauromenion recorded on stone the number of its agônes and their impact on its budget, all in compliance with a “*dogma neaniskôn.*”\(^{75}\) In Athenian Delos, admittedly a special case, the gymnasiarch was both the primary agonothete of the island and chief administrator of gymnasium life.\(^{76}\) An honorary decree for the gymnasiarch of 157/6 praises him for having accomplished all of the sacrifices, “which the laws and decrees of the dêmos had prescribed for him (ὡς τοις προσέτατον αὐτῷ οἱ τι νόμοι καὶ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου) (*SEG* XLVII 1218 lines 16-17).”\(^{77}\) Similarly, the gymnasiarch of Attalid Andros, performed his sacrifices to the royal family “according to the laws ([ἐ][κ] τῶν νόμων)” (*TEXT* 9 line 10).

As the responsibilities grew, so did the prospects for failure. In his learned study of gymnasium finances, C. Schuler notes the appearance of new controls and greater centralization in the second century, a response to a demonstrable weakness (*Schwäche*) in the institution’s ability to sustain itself.\(^{78}\) In particular, he adduces the cases of Beroia and Iasos, where a polis takes tighter control of a gymnasium that has either lost or mismanaged funds.\(^{79}\) Here, arguments about the strength and vitality of the institution fall flat. The *neoi* and *presbyteroi* of Iasos were quite explicit in their statement to their city’s *boulê* and *dêmos*: they could not do it on their own; their best attempt at accounting for the money, a process of review called *διόρθωμα*, had been unsuccessful.\(^{80}\) Neither

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\(^{74}\) Gauthier 1995, 9; cf. the reflections of Gehrke 2004, 414 for whom the task is also to identify trends.

\(^{75}\) *IG* 14 422; see Schuler 2004a, 180-81 for problem of date (second or first century B.C.E.) and discussion.

\(^{76}\) Roussel 1916, 189.

\(^{77}\) For discussion, see Migeotte 2009.

\(^{78}\) Schuler 2004, 180.

\(^{79}\) *SEG* XLIII 381 (esp. Face A lines 13-16); *I.iasos* 23.

\(^{80}\) *I.iasos* 23 lines 15-17.
association had been able to recover the public money (koina chrēmata) that it had lent out. Generally, new regulations were a response to the problem, as the administrative techniques and habits of accountability were transferred from the polis to the gymnasium. But we might also see new regulations as one of the causes of financial meltdown in the first place. In this new era, the gymnasiarch who administered public funds would be held to the standards of the polis.\textsuperscript{81} Meanwhile, he oversaw a patrimony that was a patchwork of foundations, dues, and ad hoc gifts. For those who had to manage the money, the \textit{Mischfinanzierung} of the Hellenistic gymnasium was sometimes more of a liability than an asset.\textsuperscript{82}

The financial shortcomings of the Hellenistic gymnasium are no secret. We have several examples of building projects interrupted, if finally completed. No doubt there were many that were abandoned, and so we lack an honorific decree or a donor’s dedication. In the aforementioned case of Halikarnassos, a local benefactor provided stopgap funding when the public subscription, and perhaps also the appeal to Ptolemy, both failed. Indeed, royal benefactors were not entirely reliable, as Priene learned when a number of second-century monarchs reneged on promises.\textsuperscript{83} Yet the problem was not confined to large projects, to “people getting in over their heads.” The month-to-month and year-to-year operation of the gymnasium was always a fiscal challenge. The ideal presentation of the phenomenon is a long list of gymnasiarchs from Pherai, which dates to the early second century, but which records the names of officials from 334/3.\textsuperscript{84} In several years the list reads “μετέλιπε,” a hapax, but one easy to interpret: in those years, there was no gymnasiarch, perhaps no gymnasium life at all.\textsuperscript{85} Another year, it reads, ἀ πόλις. In this year, the city played an unusually large role.\textsuperscript{86}

Thus, when it faced a shortfall, gymnasium society had several options. It could appeal to the city for help, which was the solution in Pherai, but also in Beroia and

\textsuperscript{81} For these standards, see Fröhlich 2004.
\textsuperscript{82} For “Mischfinanzierung,” see Schuler 2004, 179, and also 185, where Schuler makes the point that complexity could lead to “Unregelmässigkeit;” Similarly, Moretti 1982, 56: “Ma in età ellenistica il carattere aleatorio, eventuale, del contributo pubblico impone il ricorso ad alter forme di finanziamento;” cf. Migeotte 1995.
\textsuperscript{83} Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 270 [E].
\textsuperscript{84} Habicht 1976.
\textsuperscript{85} Habicht 1976, 191 conjectures that the funding gap came in some phase of the First Macedonian War, in other words, the late third century.
\textsuperscript{86} Column B line 7. Cf. case of Priene in the early first century B.C.E. The euergetist Zosimos reestablished the association of the \textit{neoi} after a hiatus (\textit{I.Priene} 114 lines 17-19).
Iasos.\textsuperscript{87} Or it could retreat into autarky, with participants paying more or all of the costs.\textsuperscript{88} Or, finally, it could turn to benefactors, either local or royal, who of course tended to set up foundations. If managed well, these foundations ensured smooth functioning. Yet, as Schuler rightly points out, benefactors with broader horizons might have their own ideas about the management of the money.\textsuperscript{89} He cites the case of third-century Pharsalos, where Leonidas of Halikarnassos, a man scholarship has suspected of mercantile connections, insisted that the tagoi and the tamiai of the city be the ones to manage his gymnasium foundation.\textsuperscript{90} In this way, the gymnasium could lean on the fiscal structures and competence of the city to solve its problems. We should not underestimate, however, the advantages accruing to the gymnasium from its incorporation into a system of royal finance. In fact, royal benefaction could qualitatively change the institution, rather than simply grow it. Under the royal umbrella, some of the typical precariousness of gymnasium finances in this period will have been removed. This is the lesson of the earmarking of Eumenes II in Toriaion (TEXT 8). When the king takes charge of organizing an oil fund, he has at his disposal not just resources, the revenue of the agoranomia or various tracts of chôra basilikê, but the financial know-how of his officials (the hêmiolios), and a flexibility that no city or individual could ever match.\textsuperscript{91}

Yet the royal as much as the civic form of dependence should be seen as a departure from a notional state of independence. Indeed, we can even define the independence of the gymnasium in the city’s own financial terms. If the patrimony of the mid-Hellenistic gymnasium consisted of a mixed bag of foundations and subsidies from various quarters, the financing which the city might provide, termed gymnasiarchikon, vel sim., was always supplemented from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{92} Kings, local benefactors, or the membership itself invariably picked up the rest of the cost. It is futile to evaluate the independence of a given gymnasium according to the origin of components of its patrimony, for we lack even a single complete inventory. Instead, we can ask, “Who in practice controlled the patrimony of the gymnasium?” To begin to answer that question,

\textsuperscript{87} See Schuler 2004, 187, n. 147. It is possible that the gymnasium received an annual subvention from the polis, which in normal times made up only part of the operating budget, the gymnasiarch adding his own wealth. In this year, then, the budget would have been reduced to this subvention.
\textsuperscript{88} Generally considered a late Hellenistic phenomenon, but see Schuler 2004, 183 for cases from earlier in the second century, what he terms, the “Spartan reality” behind the luxury of the honorific decrees.
\textsuperscript{89} Schuler 2004, 185-86.
\textsuperscript{90} For the family of Leonidas, see Miller 1974.
\textsuperscript{91} For the hêmiolios, see Müller 2005.
\textsuperscript{92} For the gymnasiarchikon, see Migeotte 2000, 153 admitting that despite many attestations of the term we know little of the institution, precisely because so often we hear of gymnasiarchs who substituted their own money in its place and were duly honored.
we must consider the case of Beroia in the decades before 167. The Macedonian city has produced some of the very richest documentation, showing that the gymnasium society – rather than the polis, or the king in Pella – controlled and effectively owned this wealth.

The famous gymnasiarchal law makes the gymnasiarch a civic magistrate and thus subject to civic controls on his administration of patrimony. Of the old regime, we are not informed, but one assumes that the gymnasiarch’s election had taken place “dans le cadre du gymnase.” The first words of the nomos proper change all that: Ἡ πόλις σάρκισθω γυμνασίαρχον (Face A lines 22-23). From now on, the gymnasiarch will submit accounts three times per year to a board of exetastai, the kind we know from many other cities (Face B lines 91-97). In the event that he must pay a fine for maladministration, a city official, the politikos praktôr, will exact it (Face B lines 96-103). Yet this seems to be the extent of the city’s new involvement. One of the law’s stated aims is to prevent wasteful use of the “revenues (prosodoi) of the neoi” (Face A lines 13-14). Some of the means of regulating these prosodoi may now be civic, but the patrimony itself is never conceptualized as such. It remains, throughout the text, the possession of the neoi (Face A lines 13-14; 30-31; Face B lines 60; 86-97). The key passage is Face B lines 86-97, which sets out guidelines for the administration of the prosodoi of the neoi. It begins, Κυριευέτω δὲ ὁ γυμνασίαρχος τῶν προσόδων ἕπαρχοσ τῶν νέων καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἀναλισκέτω; for the duration of his term, the gymnasiarch shall be kyrios of the revenues, and he shall spend from them. What is left of it at the end of the year is combined with fines, and the next gymnasiarch becomes kyrios of the total (plêthos). In other words, the money never passes through city coffers. Control of the patrimony of the gymnasium passes directly from one gymnasiarch to the next, even under this new regime. Moreover, if the gymnasiarch himself pays a fine, he pays it to the neoi (“ἀποτινέτω τοῖς νέοις” (Face B line 95)).

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93 Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993 = SEG XLIII 381.
94 Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 51.
95 Frölich 2004, 117-68.
96 This is demonstrated grammatically either by use of a genitive of possession, or by a participle of the verb ὑπάρχειν with a dative of possession.
97 For kurieia as possession, see Chaniotis 2004.
98 Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 127-28: “En ce sens, ‘les neoi,’ groupe par définition mouvant et hétérogène (citoyens et étrangers), continuent à former, après l’adoption de la loi, une entité, que tout à la fois reconnaît et contrôle.”
The text’s major commentators have all noticed that the “revenues of the neoi” are distinct from the “revenues of the city.” 99 Gauthier goes so far as to argue that the burden of financial surveillance remains with les habitués du gymnase. He points to the three men, elected in an ekklēsia en tōi gymnasiōi, and, presumably, taking their oaths of office before that same body. These men are charged with the expressly quotidian tasks of helping the gymnasiarch keep watch over the neoi and over their prosodoi (Face A lines 35-62). Yet unlike the gymnasiarch, these are not civic magistrates. 100 Furthermore, neoi or anciens élèves would seem to play an important role in the process of exetasis, since the law permits “whoever wishes to do so to inspect the accounts of the gymnasiarch along with the exetastai (“ἐάν τινες βούλωνται, μετά τούτων συνεγλογιζοῦσαι αὐτῶν (Face B lines 92-93).” The record of the final rendering of accounts is displayed on a notice board (sanida) in the gymnasium – not in the city archive. Over the course of the next 24 months, anyone may contest in court (euthunein) the accuracy of these accounts (Face B lines 107-9). Consequently, whoever brings such a claim will have spent time in the gymnasium, if only to inspect the board. Finally, Gauthier ascribes to the ὁ βουλόμενος of Face B line 92 sole responsibility for reporting to the civic praktōr malfeasance discovered during the quadrimestral audits. 101 This greatly limits the role of the exetastai, which is why P. Frölich believes that the responsibilities of the civic officials are simply implied. 102 Either way, the law preserves and enshrines many self-regulating aspects of the institution.

If Beroia is unique in terms of its documentation, it still sheds light on the situation elsewhere. In fact, the law’s motivation clause is explicit on this point: ἐν αἷς πόλεισιν γυμνασία ἔστιν καὶ ἀλειμμα συνετήθηκεν οἱ γυμνασιαρχοὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι κεῖται ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις, καλῶς ἔχει καὶ πάντα ἕμιν τὸ αὐτὸ συντελεσθῆναι “(Since)…in those cities in which there are gymnasia and an oil fund established, there are gymnasiarchal laws in the public archives, so it is fitting that for us too it should be accomplished” (Face A lines 6-9). The goal is to bring the institutions of Beroia into alignment with those of other poleis. We have no reason to believe that those other poleis were exclusively Macedonian or Antigonid. On the contrary, because its teachers were itinerant and its benefactors cosmopolitan, the gymnasium developed in a very broad

99 Moretti 1982 56-7, underlining that the expression koinai prosodoi elsewhere refers to gymnasial patrimony; Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 124-28, 140 (insisting on the point); Frölich 2004, 380.
100 Similarly, the aphégoumenos of Face B lines 2-5 is an appointee of the gymnasiarch, a kind of hypogymnasiarchos and not a civic magistrate. See Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 65.
101 Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 140.
102 Frölich 2004, 266.
It is true that Philip V (and Perseus?) took an unusually heavy-handed approach to the gymnasium, laboring to standardize certain aspects of ephebic and gymnasium life in the cities of the realm. For this reason, A. Chankowski argues that models elaborated on the basis of the Beroia law have limited applicability. Yet the law itself never mentions the king. And while we should not rule out royal support for the Beroia gymnasium, the text is silent on this score. It depicts a city in the process of assuming a certain measure of control over a gymnasium in its midst. Thus, the law is both a testament to the strength of polis identity under monarchic rule and a demonstration of how jealously the gymnasium guarded its financial independence.

Adorning the Gymnasium

When a second-century gymnasiarch on Attalid Andros received honors, it was, as is so often the case in these texts, because he had exceeded his duties. He had, as the decree puts it in the shorthand of the gymnasium, “embellished the gymnasium (τὸ γυμνάσιον κεκόσικεν)”; he had added to it (TEXT 9 line 6). In this particular case, that meant building an entryway of some sort (pylōn), and dedicating an exedra and a statue of the king in a luminous variety of marble. The language of κοσμέω, of adornment and elaboration, is familiar to the epigraphy of the gymnasium, where one, it seems, can always add something. The material basis of the gymnasium was of course oil; without

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104 For the “règlementation minutieuse” of Philip V, see Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 145-46.; the crucial text for Philip’s supposed program of standardization is a letter from Amphipolis incompletely published as Hatzopoulos 1996, no. 16; for the late Antigonid reform of ephebic life see also Intesiloglu 2006.

105 A. Chankowski 2009.

106 Indeed, this is a major reason why early commentators dated it after the fall of the dynasty.


108 Dreyer 2004, 234 adduces it as an example of a city asserting control over a gymnasium by one of several means at its disposal; Moretti 1982, 59.

109 For the meaning of pylōn, see Delorme 1960, 358; for the luminous royal portrait statue, see Robert 1960, 117-18; for the ancient meaning of exedra, as opposed to what epigraphers typically mean by it, see Hellmann 1992, 126-30. The exedra is a full room or hall, at times with a porch attached, in other words, a much more substantial gift than a semi-circular statue base at the edge of the palaistra; cf. the exedra of SEG XXVI 139 line 45, which Ma 2008 places in a shrine of the Nymphs, not in an Athenian gymnasium as previously conjectured.

110 For kosmēsis, see first Robert 1937, 349, n. 1. However, that note belongs to the publication of an honorific decree for a gymnasiarch of Sebastopolis in Caria, from the second century C.E. Only a portion of Robert’s parallels are to do with the gymnasium, and many of them are from Roman times. Yet these later benefactors have clearly inherited a Hellenistic model, one which may have been forged in the context of the gymnasium. See, for example, the 196 decree of the Xanthian neoi for Lyson, SEG XLVI 1721 lines
oil, the life of the gymnasium ceased. Thus, a great variety of arrangements grew up to ensure a consistent supply, many of them involving kings.\textsuperscript{111} It has even become a matter of dispute whether one can assume that any other royal gift to a gymnasium was necessarily secondary to a gift of oil. For example, the famous honorific decree of Colophon for Menippos mentions “royal banquets (basilika deipna)” in the gymnasium, evidence of a late Attalid endowment.\textsuperscript{112} While Bringmann et al. see a gift of oil accompanying the banquet endowment, F. de Rossi has criticized their interpretation.\textsuperscript{113} In any case, a king who had already seen to the provision of oil – or found a gymnasium well-stocked – could just choose another form of embellishment. That he had so many options at his disposal speaks to the distinctiveness of the gymnasium as an institution.

Scholarship on the Hellenistic gymnasium has accounted for the many costs associated with the gymnasium, those which were fixed, such as oil, wood for heating the space, and water, and those that were a boon: renovations, distributions of food and drink, etc.\textsuperscript{114} Scholarship on royal euergetism, however, has not appreciated the size of the institution’s appetite for benefaction. We know, for example, that the gymnasium could scarcely function without pay for teachers. So cities very often took charge of this particular aspect of gymnasium finance.\textsuperscript{115} In Delphi, the foundation of Attalos II provided wages for teachers (\textit{Syll.}^{3} 233). But one could always hire more specialized teachers, from farther afield, who commanded higher salaries. The Boeotian koinon even mandated, it seems, that its member cities do so, which implies that local, cheaper teachers sufficed in the absence of intervention from the outside.\textsuperscript{116} Thus, even that which was necessary could always be improved upon. The provision of water is another case in point. The necessity of water in the gymnasium is taken for granted.\textsuperscript{117} So it is no surprise that royal benefactors took pains to keep the water flowing, as Philip III seems to have done in Mylasa. In a land grant of 318/17, the king stipulated that the grant-holder

\textsuperscript{111} Frölich 2009.
\textsuperscript{112} Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 262a [E] line 47.
\textsuperscript{113} Bringmann et al. 1995, 304; De Rossi 2006, 149; for a related problem, note Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 215 [L], the gift of 75 talents for oil that Hieron II gave Rhodes. To many, this has seemed like too much money for oil alone, so in fact the text of Plb. 5.88-5-8 has been amended with Diod. Sic. 26.8.1.
\textsuperscript{114} Gauthier 1995; Dreyer 2004, 227.
\textsuperscript{115} For the public appointment of specialist instructors as a defining feature of the Hellenistic gymnasium, see Kah 2004, 63; for sources, see Roesch 1982, 307-54.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{SEG} XXXII 496 (from Thespiai).
\textsuperscript{117} Delorme 1960, 304: “Point n’est besoin de montrer la nécessité de l’eau dans les gymnases.”
provide water from a fountain on his land to a gymnasium and palaistra down the line.\textsuperscript{118} Yet where the prestige of the dynasty was at stake, as in Pergamon or in the seaborne gymnasium of Hieron II, a king could always add more lavish means of water conveyance.\textsuperscript{119} One could fill up the ritual calendar of the gymnasium. Various kings, Attalids among them, seem to have succeeded in doing just that in Kos.\textsuperscript{120} Space, by contrast, was always available. Perhaps, the peristyle around a palaistra could only accommodate so many exedrae. But one could always build new rooms, like the akroaterion (audience room) that Robert believed one of the Attalids financed at Aigai.\textsuperscript{121} Or instead of rooms, the benefactor could provide entire buildings: a gymnasium for the presbyteroi to match that for the neoi, or a paidikê palaistra where one was lacking, as in Attalid Colophon, where the Homereion had to suffice until Athenaios’ purpose-built structure was finished.\textsuperscript{122} The gymnasium offered seemingly endless opportunities for kosmêsis (adornment), and thus for the display of royal virtue.

\textit{Social Status and the Gymnasium}

When the dynasty fell, the gymnasium of Pergamon became a meeting place for self-styled \textit{aristoi andres}.\textsuperscript{123} Yet if the membership had changed, it had only become more demotic.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, we can see all the more clearly what had not changed: the current of aristocratic agonism that had long animated the civic gymnasium.\textsuperscript{125} This was not so much the “citizen training system” as the nursery of the \textit{kalokagathikos neos}. The case of Menippos of Colophon, who as a neos served on embassies to the Attalid capital, illustrates nicely how a youth’s aristocratic virtue might redound to his city’s credit.\textsuperscript{126} Nevertheless, if for lack of status or simply money, a young citizen could not participate in its aristocratic culture, the gymnasium was happy to leave him untrained. In Beroia, the gymnasium excluded broad categories of people, some of which must have included

\begin{itemize}
  \item Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 298 [E]. However, an alternative interpretation exists: the benefactor might be the original grant-holder, not Philip III. See Bringmann et al. 1995, 372.
  \item Pergamon: Radt 1999, 121; Hieron II: Ath. 5.207d.
  \item Bringmann et al. 1995 nos. 225-229 [E]; see also Savalli-Lestrade 2010, esp. 83. In her model, Hellenistic royalty came to monopolize the festival or sacred time of the cities. I am reluctant to go so far, but the royal dominance of the civic festival calendar certainly came at the expense of local observance. Moreover, as she demonstrates, once on the sacred books, it was actually very difficult to remove rites associated with even defunct dynasties.
  \item Bringmann et al. 1995 no. *357 [E].
  \item Radt 1999, 113-34 considers the many gymnasia of Pergamon; Athenaios and Colophon: Gauthier 2006 = TEXT 10.
  \item SEG L 1211 line 12.
  \item See Wörrle 2007, 513.
  \item Gehlke 2004, 414-15.
  \item SEG XXXIX 1244 = \textit{Claros I. Décrets Hellénistiques} (Paris 1989) 63-104 Column I lines 11-12.
\end{itemize}
citizens: the freedman, the freedman’s son, the physically unfit (apalaistos\textsuperscript{127}), the drunkard, the madman, anyone who had prostituted themselves, and interestingly, anyone who plied a banausic trade (agoraia technē) (Face B lines 27-29). In other words, citizenship did not guarantee admission – not even de jure.\textsuperscript{128} On the other hand, one could grow up to be a citizen without passing through the gymnasium. Mid-third century Athens minted a mere two dozen ephebes per year.\textsuperscript{129} Surely, the body politic was replenished from elsewhere. Here, we can in fact generalize about the Hellenistic polis. As Gauthier concludes, “Le passage par le gymnase ou par l’éphèbie n’y constituait pas ou n’y constituait plus, pour autant que nous le sachions, l’étape obligée vers la citoyenneté ou vers quelque statut juridique privilégié.”\textsuperscript{130}

Scholarship has underplayed the starkly aristocratic character of the membership and ideology of the Hellenistic gymnasium. One tends to recognize aristocratic origins, or emphasize a late turn toward elitism and exclusivity, while the sources themselves tell the story of an institution dominated in most periods and places by the few.\textsuperscript{131} Already, this was true in Argos of the 420s, where a select group of youths (logades) trained at public expense launched an oligarchic coup.\textsuperscript{132} The Argos incident highlights the ever-present potential for conflict. These “disruptive neoi,” in Van Bremen’s apt formulation, stood in a different relationship to power from the rest of their community.\textsuperscript{133} They looked to the aristocrat, the prince, and the king for support, even when it discomfited or perhaps enraged polis society. They were thus at once a threat to the city and a vital connection to royal and later Roman authority. For the cities, the task was to constrain the elites of the gymnasium and still profit from their special relationship.

\textsuperscript{127} The term is puzzling, because we find apalaistoi making a dedication to a gymnasarch in Demetrias, along with paides and oi ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου: A. Arvanitopoulos, Polemon 1 (1929) 126-28. It seems that a group of physically unfit youths might be eligible for distributions of oil that took place at the gymnasium, even if they found themselves excluded from the palaistra itself. See Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 81-4.

\textsuperscript{128} Contra Gehrke 2007, 418 who contends that all citizens had a de jure right to participate.

\textsuperscript{129} Kennell 2006, x, citing Pélékides 1962, 164-65.

\textsuperscript{130} Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 83; cf. the conclusions of Perrin-Saminadayar 2007, 470-72: in late Hellenistic Athens, ephebic status in no way granted foreigners the right to naturalization.

\textsuperscript{131} Lykourgan Athens in this respect represents a notable exception. Lykourgan Athens in this respect represents an aberration, even if it produced the model for the rest of the Greek world in following centuries, as many hold (e.g., A. Chankowski 2010, 143-233). This conclusion accords with one of the major theses of the monumental study on educational and cultural life in Hellenistic Athens (and Delos) of Perrin-Saminadayar 2007: from the third century to the first, the Athenian ephebe became increasingly aristocratic. Perrin-Saminadayar documents his case with an exhaustive prosopographical study.

\textsuperscript{132} Thuc. 5.67.2; Diod. Sic. 12.75.7; Plut. Alc. 15.3.

\textsuperscript{133} Van Bremen (forthcoming, 30-4).
Metropolis, for example, honored Apollonios for his successful negotiation of fiscal and territorial disputes, but also for securing an oil fund from Attalos II “through his own persistence (διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῆς ἐκτένειας)” (TEXT 5, Face B line 24). The effort is private, but the good, we are assured, is public. In the civic discourse of the decree, Apollonios wins high repute in other cities and obviously the affection of Attalos, but never presses his own advantage at the expense of Metropolis and τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα (Face B lines 16-17). Each of his actions manifests civic virtue, and none more so than his death, which a second decree relates came leading the neaniskoi against Aristonikos, “for the sake of his own arête and that of his patris” (Face A line 37). This is the official image of Apollonios that the dēmos of Metropolis has left us: a man of the court and of the gymnasium, yet firmly embedded in civic society. It is an image, however, that we cannot take at face value. The city granted the sons of Apollonios the right (exousia) to build a hērôion for his bones “before the gate on their own property (πρὸ τῆς πύλης ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν)” (Face A line 42). Jones sees Apollonios “as receiving true heroic honors from his city, even if the tomb is on private property.” That the tomb is on private property does not make the honors any less heroic, only less civic. The city’s grant of approval is one last attempt to fix a larger-than-life benefactor in civic discourse.

If we accept the rhetoric of these cities wholesale, the disjuncture between the elites of the gymnasium and civic society at large disappears. Yet that rift is an important part of the context for Attalid patronage of the gymnasium after Apameia. In the paradigmatic case of Eirenias and Miletos, it deserves more attention. Eirenias, we recall, was one of the ambassadors of the Ionian koinon to Eumenes II in 167/6. They met on Delos, and Eumenes followed up with a letter to the Ionians the same year (RC 52). Sometime later, but before 164, the Milesians honored Eirenias with a gilded statue on a very large, round base, which bears a decree (SEG XXXVI 1046). The decree informs us of the massive foundation of Eumenes II for the construction of a gymnasium: 160,000 medimnoi of wheat and sufficient wood. While Miletos had possessed at least two

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134 Translation here and below of Face B line 42 those of Jones 2004.
136 Jones 2004, 483.
137 The rhetoric of the Metropolis decrees is in some ways rather banal. As a form, the Hellenistic honorific decree tends to reduce each individual biography to what Ma 2007, 218 calls a “cipher of civic virtue.” Ma’s essay, which characterizes the honorific decree as social constraint rather than sycophancy, has shaped my analysis here and in the treatment of Eirenias and Miletos infra. The distinctiveness of the Metropolis case consists of repeated assimilation of to idion to to koinon, particularly with regard to heroic cult.
138 = Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 283[E 1]; now also I.Milet 1039.
gymnasia since 206/5, it was able to build yet another with the revenues. Consensus places the so-called gymnasium of Eumenes II under a Roman bath in the city’s southern sector, where a propylon seems to have connected the structure to a stadium along an axial orientation. A Milesian decree for Eumenes II is thought to have been inscribed on an anta block from that propylon (I. Milet 307). However, until the complex is excavated, archaeology has little to contribute to the historical and epigraphical debate.

Eirenias’ involvement in the building project over the course of a decade produced a dossier of inscriptions, which Herrmann was able to place into relative sequence around fixed points like the letter of Eumenes II to the Ionians (RC 52). Most of these documents illuminate the afterlife of the royal gift: a ruler cult that seems to have sprung up in response, then promises of further benefactions, then further embassies of Eirenias as representative of the Milesians. What interests us most here is the prehistory of the gymnasium’s foundation. While the honorific decree of the Milesians for Eirenias postdates the letter of Eumenes to the Ionians, the foundation mentioned in the decree for Eirenias predates the audience on Delos. In other words, before he met Eumenes as an ambassador of the Ionians to deliver a koinon decree, or as a representative of Miletos bearing a civic decree, Eirenias approached the king in a private capacity, as an advocate of the gymnasium. According to Herrmann, this would represent the beginning of warm relations between Miletos and Pergamon. The text reads: ἐντυχὼν δὲ καὶ βασιλεῖ Ἐυμένει κατὰ τὴν δο|θεῖσαν υπὸ τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶι συνχώρησιν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας συστάσεως προτερψάμενος αὐτῶν δοῦναι τῇ πόλει δώρεαν “He met with King Eumenes, according to the permission granted to him by the People, and, by means of his own good relations with the king, prevailed upon him to give the city the gift…” (SEG XXXVI 1046 Block I lines 4-6).

Thus, the gift of the gymnasium of Eumenes II to Miletos came about at the initiative of one man, acting alone but with the permission of the Milesian plêthos. In

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139 The foundation of Eudemos provides the terminus ante quem for the other gymnasia (Milet I 3, 145).
140 = Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 284[E 2].
141 Schaaf 1992, 62 concludes, however, that the propylon undoubtedly belongs to the gymnasium complex.
142 The Milesians voted cultic honors for Eumenes in recompense for the gymnasial foundation. These were announced to the king in a decree that Eirenias delivered. It is very likely that one of these honors was a temenos, the very precinct mentioned in RC 52 (line 60 of Welles’ text). For the chronology, see the useful albeit complex table of Herrmann 1965, 113-14.
143 Herrmann 1965, 111.
144 This is the unambiguous interpretation of Herrmann 1965, 78, 111, who translates “synchôrêsis” as “Erlaubnis” and “Zustimmung;” Cf. Milet VI 3, 1040 which translates “Einverständnis;” Pace, Kleine 1986, 131; for synchôrêsis, granted by the city to the gymnasion, cf. I.Pergamon 252; for further evidence of the informal character of the first meeting of Eirenias and Eumenes, see the Milesian decree for
what sense did Eirenias need “permission?” For Herrmann, Eirenias sought a safeguard from the city *(sich sichern)*. Might the city not have wanted a safeguard from Eirenias? The city, after all, later enshrined that detail of procedure in the decree, defining the gift in no uncertain terms as *dôrea têi polei*. A great deal of money was at stake, and Eirenias would prove to have a hand in its administration until the end.

As witnessed above in the case of one Ptolemy and the gymnasium of Halikarnassos, *synchôrêsi* is a way of aligning interests. Yet scholarship has occasionally seen the interests of Miletos and Eirenias aligned from the very beginning, the initial approach, and therefore, explained the episode as simply the intervention of a leading citizen on behalf of his city.

There is no textual support for that reconstruction, only the familiar and banal statement that Eirenias always acted to the advantage of his polis and for the fame of his *patris* (Block I lines 2-4).

By the same token, one has wavered over the nature of another mission reported in the decree, which Eirenias made to the court of Antiochos IV. Again, Eirenias trades on his rapport with a royal interlocutor, in this instance, the king’s “sister.” The result is a grant of tax immunity to the *dêmos* for certain goods (*genê mata*) exported from the *Milêsia* into the Seleukid kingdom. In the view of H. Pleket, Eirenias acted on behalf of Miletos, “or at least not without its consent,” though we are given no indication either way. Herrmann writes of diplomacy at Antioch, though Eirenias is not designated as *presbeutês*, as he is elsewhere in the decree. All we really know is that in retrospect,

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Eumenes, thought to come from an antis block of the stadium propylon (*I.Milet 307* = Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 284[E 2]). The verbal presentation of Eirenias to the king regarding the gymnasium is described as τὰ τε ὑπὸ Εἰρήνης | ναοῦ ἐμφανισθέντα αὐτῷ ἐχθέμενος, rather than as a decree of the Milesians (lines 17-18).

145 Herrmann 1965, 111.
146 It is worth pointing out that the recipient of royal patronage of the gymnasium is often expressed as the *neoi* or some such group in the dative plural. An interesting case is that of Rhodes and Heron II and Gelon II after the earthquake of 227/6 (Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 215 [L]; Plb. 5.88.5-8; Diod. Sic. 26.8.1). Polybius records among other gifts, 10 talents ἀπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, a phrase commonly rendered simply as, “for the welfare of the citizenry,” whereas the oil is provided τοῖς ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ, “for those in the gymnasium.”
147 See Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 286[E?]. After the death of Eumenes II, the Milesians transferred some of the revenues of the gymnasium foundation to a different (new?) foundation for ruler cult, which included a grain distribution to Milesian citizens. In his capacity as supervisor of the building of the gymnasium, curiously, Eirenias was responsible for the transfer of the money at the public bank.
148 E.g., Dreyer 2004, 234; Gauthier 1985, 67, n. 220.
149 Pleket 1973, 256.
150 Herrmann 1987, 175; Herrmann et al. 2006, 23: “ein weiteres Mal in diplomatischer Mission am pergamenischen Hof;” Eirenias is designated a *presbeutês* on (*SEG* XXXVI 1046) Block I line 9. The embassy in question delivered an honorific decree to Eumenes II voted in response to the gift of the gymnasium.
the city could make the gift out to be perfectly ecumenical: πρὸς ἑπαύξησιν δὲ ἀνήκουσαν τῶν τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἐκάστου τῶν ἰδιωτῶν προσόδων “for the increase of the respective incomes of the city and of each individual” (Block II lines 5-6). 151 It was just one more demonstration that Eirenias was the model citizen (agathos politês) (Block II line 7). 

In reality, Eirenias was not the model citizen. He was an extraordinary citizen, and thus worthy of extraordinary honors. Note that the round monument on which his decree was inscribed is suspiciously similar in form to the Ionian monument for Eumenes II – only bigger. 153 Yet the city’s treatment of Eirenias was not quite “royal.” Eumenes had been able to choose the site of his monument: the temenos that Miletos had voted in his honor (RC 52 line 60). 154 By contrast, the siting of the monument for Eirenias was subject to a further decision (or vote?) of the dêmos, not left up to a board of magistrates, or simply, as so often, designated loosely in the decree as “the most conspicuous spot” in the agora or gymnasium (SEG XXXVI I 1046 Block II line 13). Unfortunately, we do not know where the monument stood, as its fragments were not found in situ. 155 But it is at least interesting to note that there was no role for the gymnasium in the siting of the monument, while there had been one in the earlier case of Eudemos. 156

Again, for Miletos, Eirenias was a different kind of benefactor, which meant that he received unusual honors, but also unusual scrutiny. This is how we should understand the phrase: “provided that the honor is confirmed in court (τῆς δὲ τιμῆς ἐπικυρωθεσις ἐν τῷ δικαστρίῳ)” (Block II line 14). While Herrmann points out that such provisory ratification clauses, usually in a genitive absolute, are a common feature of Greek decrees, those that refer specifically to the confirmation of honors by a process of judicial

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151 Cf. Bresson 2000, 259, for whom prosodoi is the decisive category in the economy of the polis, with the qualifications public and private of secondary importance.
152 Marcellesi 2004, 181, n. 93 best captures the subtext of the situation beneath the rhetoric of the decree. Discarding an old idea about a thaw in Seleukid-Attalid relations as evidenced by this text, she envisions a skillful courtier playing the two dynasties against each other.
153 Herrmann et al. 2006, 22: “ein wahrhaft ‘königliches’ Denkmal;” larger than the monument of Eumenes II: Kleine 1986, 130. Note also that both Eirenias and Eumenes received gilded statues. What had been a royal honor is transferred to the domain of civic benefactors. See Gauthier 1985, 46, n. 116. At Miletos, no one seems to have received such a statue until early Imperial times. See Herrmann 1965, 87, n. 49a.
154 The location of the temenos is controversial. One has suspected that it was near the future site of the gymnasium of Eumenes II, but the findspot of the remains of the king’s round monument was the so-called “hellenistisches Hofhaus,” west of the Temple of Athens. See Kleine 1986, 139.
155 For the findspot, see Kleine 1986, 130. The blocks were discovered in a fountain house in a village SE of the site.
156 Milet I 3, 145 = Syll. 3 577. The decision of the city is contained therein: to erect two stelai, one in the Delphinion, in an exedra dedicated by Eudemos himself, the other in the paidikê palaistra, in “which place seems appropriate (epitêdeion)” (lines 84-87).
review are many fewer.\textsuperscript{157} We hear nowhere else of this Milesian \textit{dikastērion}, but parallels illuminate the spirit of the institutional arrangement. If assemblies tended to vote up-or-down on honorific decrees, the precise nature or size of the honor (\textit{timē}) or “gift (\textit{dôrea})” of recompense might fall to others to decide.\textsuperscript{158} This was a means of checking corruption, of legitimating each honor individually. As third-century Achaian Dyme insisted, the polis itself had judged each and every metic before awarding citizenship (\textit{κρίνασα καθ ἑνα ἐκαστόν}) (\textit{Syll}.\textsuperscript{3} 529 lines 9-10). Herrmann also adduces as parallels grants of naturalization, which, along with the honor of \textit{isoteleia}, fourth-century Athens submitted to a process called \textit{dokimasia}.\textsuperscript{159} However, a more proximate phenomenon occurred in Athens of the third century, which Gauthier has termed “\textit{dokimasia de la récompense}.”\textsuperscript{160} Athens awarded outsized honors (\textit{megistai timai}) to men who had played a decisive role in the city’s affairs on an international stage. One such man was Phaidros of Sphettos, a figure of influence in Ptolemaic Alexandria, who received a portfolio of honors just before 250 (\textit{IG} 2\textsuperscript{2} 682).\textsuperscript{161} A rider to the decree informs us that Phaidros had proposed his own honors in decree form, but that the gift (\textit{dôrea}) was subject to the review (\textit{dokimasia}) of a court (\textit{dikastērion}) (lines 92-101). Eirenias may too have had his own ideas about which honors he merited, but civic institutions would have checked him. This was the dynamic that structured relations between the gymnasion elite, their cities, and their Attalid patrons after 188. The gift itself was the end result of a negotiation on two levels: the city came to terms with the king, but also with its leading citizens.

GYMNASIAL ASSOCIATION

If this scenario seems too adversarial, consider the institutional identity and functions of “gymnasium society,” which we have yet to define precisely. Gymnasion society was made up of a number of groups, \textit{paides}\textsuperscript{162}, \textit{epheboi}, \textit{neoi}\textsuperscript{163}, \textit{presbyteroi}\textsuperscript{164}, even \textit{apalaistroi}\textsuperscript{165}, each with its own rules and habits. Each group also possessed its own sense of corporate identity, but as institutions their functions varied. More often than not,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Herrmann 1965, 88 where parallels are adduced.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 514-15 with Hellenistic parallels.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Herrmann 1965, 88-9; Osborne 1981-1983, on naturalization in Athens, does not seem to comment on \textit{dokimasia}.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} Gauthier 1985, 78.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} For the latest discussions of this inscription, see \textit{SEG} LVI 193.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} See Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 65-9.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} See Dreyer 2004 and Van Bremen (forthcoming) for earlier bibliography.
  \item \textsuperscript{164} See Frölich (forthcoming).
  \item \textsuperscript{165} See supra n. 127.
\end{itemize}
they all acted together, either passing a decree, or partaking of the perquisites of the gymnasium. They were then known variously as “those who belong to the gymnasium (οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γυμνασίου),” or “those who have use of the oil (οἱ ἀλειψάμενοι),” κτλ. 166 Moderns have struggled to define the group. 167 The German tradition in particular has taken up the problem, and the German language is perhaps better suited to the task, as it contains words like Vereinswesen and Verein that lack precise linguistic and cultural equivalents in American English. 168 It will have to suffice to think of gymnasium society as a kind of collective, but not one loosely organized by “weak ties.” 169 In fact, it must have been the strength of the collective as an institution that led to the imposition of the civic gymnasiarch, paidonomos, and grammateus. An institution this strong was liable to run its own line out to royal power, which is what happened in 319 in Termessos during the Wars of the Diadochoi, when the neoi picked a different dynast from their older peers. 170

The boldest and indeed most common expressions of the institutional identity of the gymnasium are its decrees. Scores of inscriptions emanate from a decision of the collective to honor its patron. It is easy enough to characterize these as harmless exercises in citizenship. What gives pause are those gymnasium decrees that are later incorporated into decrees of the polis, since we have reason to believe that the process was at times more adversarial than at first meets the eye. 171 A case in point is Attalid Colophon. Prince Athenaios, the youngest son of Attalos I, seems to have endowed that city with a paidikê palaistra, perhaps already in the 180s when he was still a neos himself. 172 An inscription records honors for Athenaios (TEXT 10). The first editor of the text, T. Macridy, described it as an honorary decree for Athenaios, but as Gauthier points out, the stone actually bears two decrees, the first providing for a statue of the prince in the sanctuary of

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166 See, e.g., Kennell 2006, s.v., gymnasiou; Gauthier 2006, 485, n. 5.
167 See van Bremen (forthcoming, 27), who considers the problem anew.
168 E.g., Ziebarth 1896 and Poland 1909.
169 Of course “weak ties” in sociology are now understood to be strong in certain cases. The classic article is Granovetter 1973.
170 Diod. Sic. 18.46-47; for van Bremen (forthcoming), this episode is paradigmatic of her “disruptive neoi;” cf. Jerusalem and the “Antiochenes” of Antiochos IV, infra n. 7; consider also the technitai of Dionysos, as an important example of an association that operates locally but eludes civic control by appealing directly to Pergamon. The Ionian and Hellespontine guild famously appealed to Eumenes II in a dispute over prosodoi with Teos (RC 53). The resulting arbitration may have been applied beyond Teos. See Le Guen 2001, no. 47.
171 For this genre of decrees, see Robert 1926, 507-9; Robert 1937, 149-52; Robert 1967; Robert 1966, 30; for neoi decrees as such, see Gauthier 1996, 1-34, esp. 9-11; an honorific decree from Roman Smyrna refers to a vote by three bodies: the gerousia, the neoi of the Mimnermeion, and the synodos of the paideutai (I.Smyrna 1 215).
172 Gauthier 2006, 488.
Klaros, the second for a public sacrifice and games on his birthday.\textsuperscript{173} The motivation clause for the second decree indicates that a certain collective of the gymnasium, perhaps οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ τόπου, had already passed its own decree to honor Athenaios as a euergetēs: ψήφισ[μα προεγράψαντο περὶ τοῦ] τιμῆσαι Ἀθηναίον ὄντα | [ἐυεργέτην] (lines 6-8). And the honors ratified in the second decree, the athletic events, are distinctly gymnasium-oriented, as is their administration, and even participation in the feast to follow – the gymnasiarch distributes the leftover meat to hoι aλειπσαμενοι, victors of past stephanophoric games, and various archons (lines 21-6). We catch a glimpse of the manner in which the neoi may have presented the text of their prographê to the Council in an earlier Colophonian decree, which depicts a full 153 of them making one such submission.\textsuperscript{174} Van Bremen also adduces alongside these texts the vivid scene of the Pergamene neoi descending upon the boulê kai dêmos of the capital city en masse (κατὰ πλῆθος).\textsuperscript{175} As she rightly argues, these are all cases of neoi demanding that honors performed in the context of the gymnasium be elevated to the level of the city. In other words, they are not asking for permission to perform honors themselves.\textsuperscript{176}

There exists slim but intriguing evidence that the city did not dictate the circumstances under which the gymnasium passed decrees. For example, the surviving fragment of the mid-second century calendar of the gymnasium of Kos, attesting Ptolemaic, Cappadocian, but especially Attalid euergetism, speaks of a boulê, perhaps in the month of Kyparissos (TEXT 11, line 22). Unfortunately, whatever qualifier preceded the word “boulê” is gone.\textsuperscript{177} Bringmann et al. hypothesize a meeting of instructors (Konferenz der Lehrer).\textsuperscript{178} E. Hicks had proposed a regular meeting of the boulê of Kos, which representatives of the gymnasium were required to attend.\textsuperscript{179} Yet much more likely is an occasion like the annual synodos en tōi gymnasiōi that the Apameian benefactor and Attalid courtier Kephisodoros required of the ephebes and paides of his city (TEXT 6 lines 15-16). The Apameian civic calendar does not seem to have had any bearing on the date of that meeting. Why should it have been different at Kos? In fact our sources for the

\textsuperscript{173} Gauthier 2006, 465, where the honors of the second decree are also qualified as “gymnasiaux;” I am not certain why van Bremen, (forthcoming, 38) considers the award of the statue (eikôn) at Klaros an award of a “cult statue and (thus a cult)."
\textsuperscript{174} See the new edition of Gauthier 2005, 101-2.
\textsuperscript{175} I.Pergamon 252; Van Bremen (forthcoming, 37).
\textsuperscript{176} Van Bremen (forthcoming, 36-8); the classic case, which she also invokes, is that of the neoi of Xanthos (SEG XLVI 1721), who seek their city’s permission to have the gymnasiarch Lyson honored in the city’s main sanctuary, the Letōon. See the text and analysis of Gauthier 1996.
\textsuperscript{177} And the term does not appear in the index of Kennell 2006. He has indicated to me that he knows of no comparanda.
\textsuperscript{178} Bringmann et al. 1995, 252.
\textsuperscript{179} Paton-Hicks, Inscriptions of Cos no. 43.
impact of Attalid benefaction on the institutions of the island, while admittedly very fragmentary, contain a suggestive reference to a distinct sub-polity – a politeuma – in connection with a royal foundation and annual activities. As for whether gymnasium and civic calendars ever fell out of touch, Herrmann has shown that the gymnasium of Iasos, at least in late Hellenistic or early Imperial times, was using a different era than the city proper.

The organizational homologies between the gymnasium and polis institutions are undeniable. The question is whether the gymnasium was a rival institution, or just the city writ small, as it is usually understood. Indeed, already for Aristotle, the non-political association (chrematistikê koinônia) had looked to the polis as its model. For the philosopher, both groups aimed at the advantage (to sympheron) of their constituents. Yet surely, their interests could always diverge. The association of seaborne merchants in Aristotle’s treatment, one imagines, might think of prosodoi differently than the agoranomoi of their city. With regard to the gymnasium and the city, these rival tendencies were as strong as they ever would be in the period 188-133. Witness what happened on Athenian Delos in 141/0. Up until then, the Athenian practice had been to elect the island’s gymnasiarch in the assembly in Athens. However, in that year, the electing body consisted of the Athenian epimelêtês and “those who frequent the gymnasium (οἱ ἁλειφόμενοι)” (I.Delos 2580 lines 31-2). In the following year, the old practice was reinstituted for good – and spelled out (ἐξι[ροτονη]θὲε ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου) (line 34). According to C. Habicht, the reasons for this messiness (Unregelmäßigkeit) are as yet unclear. Perhaps we will never know precisely which events led to the change, but as a lapse in a city’s control over a gymnasium, albeit one separated by a stretch of sea, it can be regarded as paradigmatic, rather than anomalous. In the absence of vigilance and pressure from the city, those who controlled the gymnasium were the elite,

180 Maiuri 1925 no. 434; I am at a loss over this text. I cannot say at present whether it relates to the gymnasium per se.
182 Eth. Nic. 8.9.4-6; cf. Eth. Eud. 7.9.3. The fourth century saw an explosion in the number of these associations. For Arnaoutoglou 1998, they contributed to the ideological coherence of the polis. Gabrielsen 2009, expresses a less sanguine view, but urges more research.
183 Was the power of gymasia, broadly speaking, also as great as it would ever be? Consider the interesting case of Ptolemaic Egypt c.130. Ptolemy Euergetes II issued a prostagma liquidating the assets of all sorts of associations, certainly including gymasia (Lenger 1980 no.50).
184 Habicht 1995, 262.
even the non-citizen population – which is to say, those who were present – and those who, like the king and his courtier, could with money make themselves present. 185

NEW COLLECTIVITIES

Among those who frequented the Delian gymnasium in the 140s, we know there to have been a sizable number of were many non-citizens. 186 Delos was very cosmopolitan, but in this respect, it fits a broader pattern. As the Beroia law and countless ephobic lists show, the Hellenistic gymnasium did not in principle exclude non-citizens. 187 On the other hand, in a post-Apamea but still pre-Aristonikos world, it was not yet the gymnasium’s role to integrate outsiders into the civic corps. In this world, the gymnasium did not produce new citizens, but new collectivities. And these new collectivities were what the Attalids were after. The creation and indeed the performance of the new collectivity owed much to royal sponsorship. So we can neither celebrate the victory of the polis model of social organization over the Attalids, nor credit the Attalids with an agreeably laissez-faire approach to the governance of these cities. The encounter with the Attalids changed the model of the polis. The emergence of these new collectivities, precisely in the context of the gymnasium, should be understood as the backstory to the emergence of a new kind of polis in very late, i.e., post-133 Hellenistic times.

We hear echoes of this historical process in documents that refer to limited distributions of consumable goods to the typically broad-based gymnasium society: certainly oil, but also food, and perhaps sweet wine too. These were events like the banquets known as βασιλικὰ δείπνα mentioned in the decree of Colophon for Menippos

185 The gymnasium of Delos received a great deal of royal patronage in the second century, but none of it Attalid. See Bringmann et al. nos. 153, 189-91. As for the presence of royal figures in the gymnasium, while Roman emperors do appear in epigraphy as gymnasiarchs, Hellenistic kings do not – unless one follows Robert in taking one of the Attalids as the gymnasiarch of Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 357 [E] from Aigai. The requirements of the job were usually just too strict, though in late Hellenistic cities endowments produced “posthumous gymnasiarchs.” Generally, one thinks of the situation in Beroia here, where the gymnasiarch was expected to be present on a daily basis. Similarly, I know of no certain cases of princes enrolled as ephbes before the two Cappadocians in Athens in 79/8 (IG 2² 1039 b' + c' + p). Thus, I am skeptical of the claim that a Nikomedes (the future III or IV, Bringmann et al. do not treat the issue), was an ephbe on Delos (Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 189 [E] = I.Delos 1580); further on the ephebate of Athenian Delos after 167, see Perrin-Saminadayar 2007, 479-521. 186 Habicht, 1995, 262; the prosopography for Delos is much more incomplete than for contemporary Athens. See Perrin-Saminadayar 2007, 489-506. 187 In fact, in certain circumstances, it welcomed them. See Bringmann 2004; one thinks here too of Pergamon, post-133.
(SEG XXXIX 1244 Column II line 47). We will return to that document in a moment, but it is enough to point out here that the Colophonians had hoped to reconstitute with civic monies a royal foundation for (annual?) banquets for neoi and presbyteroi. The Roberts saw a comparable institution in the endowment of Philetairos for the synagôgê of the neoi in Kyzikos. At such banquets, a group would have gathered together in the context of the gymnasium that almost certainly included non-citizens.

While the gymnasium banquet recognized the status distinctions of the polis, it reorganized them according to its own logic. The charters for the feasts of Critilaos from Aigiale (Amorgos) and of Elpinikos from Eretria may mandate different eating arrangements for citizens, metics, Romans, and temporary residents (parepidêmountes), or a larger piece of meat for the table of the ephebes. They do not, however, bar one from eating for lack of citizenship. These two texts date to c.100, but already in the gymnasium honors that a certain Lydian city accorded Asklepides, a courtier and contemporary of Attalos II, a group of participants larger than the politai alone is envisioned. To have a share in the distribution that was the gymnasium banquet it was more important to be present than to be a citizen. Thus, in the case of Critilaos, a share in the banquet goes to “those citizens who are present (τοῖς τε πολίταις τοῖς ἐπιδημοῦσιν),” just as it does to “those foreigners who are temporarily resident (ξένοις τοῖς παρεπιδημοῦσιν)” (lines 72-3). Gauthier underlines the point: “Le caractère religieux (exigent la participation physique) et nullement civique de la fête est ainsi fortement marqué.” The basilika deipna of Attalid Colophon would have been no different. For nowhere in the entire corpus of royal gifts to gymnasia is there a single instance of a distribution made exclusively to citizens, in the manner of the grain fund of a Hellenistic polis. Habicht has restored one for the so-called “Gymnasium of Ptolemy” in Athens, which should perhaps be revisited (IG 22 836).

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189 Critilaos: IG 12 7 515. It should be noted, at Critilaos’ banquet, the youth of the city are required to be present; Elpinikos: IG 12 9 324 = Syll. 3 714.
190 See SEG XLIX 1540 line 22 (and supra n. 17).
191 Gauthier 1980, 212.
192 Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 17 [E]; Habicht 1982, 115-17 restores: [. . . οῖτοι] τοῦ διαμετρουμένου τοῖς πολίταις εἰς τὴν οἰς | τοσον τὴν ἐν τεί παλαιστρα τοῦ γυμνασίου τοῦ | βασιλεώς Πολεμαίου κτλ.] (lines 1-4). I have received a permit to examine the stone (EM 7473), but have not yet examined it. Another possible exception is the distribution of grain made at Miletos in the context of a festival and posthumous ruler cult for Eumenes II (Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 286 [E]). However, it is important to note that in that case the Milesians have modified the earlier gymnasial foundation of Eumenes II. One has at times simply assumed that gymnasial distributions were for citizens only. Roussel 1916, 188 refers to one.
On the contrary, the terms of at least one Attalid foundation, that of either Eumenes II or Attalos III for the gymnasium of Andros, imply a distribution in the manner of Critilaos and Aigiale (TEXT 9). The honorific decree praises the Andrian gymnasiarch for having discharged his duties generously and lawfully, which in part meant organizing a procession and a feast on the king’s birthday. The gymnasiarch seems to have been generous in leading his own cow in procession, but lawful in then sacrificing the animal immediately (παραχρῆμα) (line 8). As Robert explains, the injunction to sacrifice immediately prevented the gymnasiarch from slaughtering the animal at a later date, among different company. It ensured that those who ate the meat were those who were present on the king’s birthday, that the context for the feast was the gymnasium. Critilaos showed the very same concerns for his feast: ἡ δὲ δημοδοιγία γένεσθω ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ ἐπάναγκες “the banquet absolutely must take place in the gymnasium” (lines 59-60). And the flowers, the sacrificial victims, along with their skins – they were all to be consumed “immediately,” again, παραχρῆμα (line 62). Both rituals incorporate elements of civic ideology. For example, at Aigiale, the procession begins at the city’s prytaneion, while on Andros, a sacrifice is made on behalf of the δήμος. Yet in each case, the focus of the ritual is squarely on the patron of the gymnasium and his family: Critilaos and his prematurely deceased and now heroized son Aleximachos, or the king, his father, and their queens.

We may return now to the historical context in which Menippos of Colophon rescued his city from a financial pitfall of its own design. At some point not long after the War of Aristonikos, the δήμος of Colophon had voted to fund these “royal banquets.” The goal was to now make properly civic what was clearly a vestigial institution of the gymnasium, one which had relied on the Attalids for its financial support. However, sufficient public money did not materialize, and the Colophonians resorted to the appointment of magistrate-liturgists called epimēnioi to make up the difference. Menippos then intervened to release his city and his fellow citizens of the entire financial burden. The communities of Asia Minor that had known several generations of Attalid rule suffered greatly during the War of Aristonikos, and the conflict provoked massive social upheaval. The war was so disruptive that it changed the social fabric of the polis in that region permanently. In the following years, inscriptions relate, leading citizens like Menippos, but also Polemaios of Colophon, and Moschion of Priene, instituted public

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feasts that created the new collectivities that the crisis seemed to demand.\textsuperscript{194} As Frölich observes, these feasts were at once a gathering of the entire population and also a means of distinguishing elite groups, which is to say, of maintaining – if reorganizing – the status distinctions of the polis.\textsuperscript{195} The towering benefactors of the \textit{basse époque hellénistique} thus took the royal banquets of the gymnasium as their model for the “inclusive” public feasts that are so distinctive of that period. Menippos, who as a \textit{neos} had proved his worth to Colophon on so many embassies to the \textit{attalikê basileia}, was responsible for reconstituting the royal banquets. Yet he was also credited with sponsoring a lavish public feast (\textit{dêmothoina}) during the Epiphany of Dionysos that fed citizens on the first day, metics and holders of \textit{isoteleia} on the second.\textsuperscript{196}

As we read in the roughly contemporary Colophonian decree for Polemaios, the War of Aristonikos had sent refugees pouring into the city.\textsuperscript{197} Polemaios helped provide for the outsiders, and seems to have promoted the idea of a public subscription (\textit{epidosis}) for their welfare. At his wedding, he treated citizens to a sweet wine distribution called \textit{glykismos}, while to non-citizens he gave a portion of meat. The wedding of Polemaios, just like the public feast of Menippos, was an occasion for the ritual performance of a new collectivity in Colophon. In this respect, these rituals mimicked long-standing practice in the gymnasium, an institution with which both men were intimately familiar.\textsuperscript{198} Indeed, in Pergamon itself and elsewhere in the region, civic elites were using the rituals of the gymnasium to integrate outsiders. The long decree of Sestos in honor of Menas, former Attalid \textit{stratêgos} of the Chersonnese and the Thracian \textit{topoi}, priest of King Attalos in his city, and twice gymnasiarch, provides a wealth of detail (\textit{I.Sestos 1}).\textsuperscript{199} During Menas’ second stint as gymnasiarch, post-Attalid Sestos was in dire circumstances, with the raids of nearby Thracians preventing the cultivation of its territory. In this case, the integration of outsiders was vital for the survival of the city. Menas consecrated his inaugural \textit{Hermaia kai Herakleia} “for the salvation of the \textit{dêmos} and the \textit{neoi},” and “he invited to the sacrifice not only those who have a share of the oil, but everyone else as well, even giving a share to foreigners (\textit{ekålèsev}} \textit{èπi τα ἰερα οὐ}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{194} Archippe of Kyme is on the traditional chronology also thought to have held sway in this period. For the low chronology, see Hamon 2005; for the high, see van Bremen 2008.  
\textsuperscript{195} Frölich 2005, 245.  
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{SEG} XXXIX 1244 Block II lines 36-41.  
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{SEG} XXXIX 1243 = \textit{Claros I. Décretshellénistiques} (Paris 1989) 11-62.  
\textsuperscript{198} The \textit{glykismos} in particular, which Robert and Robert 1989, 50 sees as invariably including non-citizens, I consider to have originated in the gymnasium. See, e.g., \textit{I.Histriae} 59 line 14.  
\textsuperscript{199} = \textit{OGIS} 339}
μόνον τοὺς μετέχοντας τοῦ ἀλείμματος ἕλληκα καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας ποιούμενος τὴν μετάδοσιν τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τοῖς ἔξοι (lines 60-67).

We have lingered over the historical context of the decree of Colophon for Menippos because developments in civic euergetism at the end of the second century in an indirect way shed light on the character of earlier royal euergetism. This is not a novel claim. It has long been recognized that the cult of civic benefactors has a genetic relation to Hellenistic ruler cult.200 What has perhaps escaped notice is that the logic of the “inclusive” public feasts of late Hellenistic times and the earlier basilika deipna of the gymnasium was the same, namely, the creation of a new collectivity that transformed the status distinctions of the polis without breaking them. Of earlier documents, the text from Andros provides the most detail about such feasts (TEXT 9). But for the processions that preceded them, two texts suggest that the mode of interaction with the city was the same.201 In Kos, c.180, Ariarathes IV celebrated military success with a procession that entailed the participation of the gymnasiarch, the neoi, and the ephebes, and he promised to crown three groups: citizens, paroikoi, and temporary residents of Kos (SEG XXXIII 675, lines 6-7). The Attalids were very active patrons of the gymnasium of Kos in this period, and very close allies of Ariarathes IV.202 We have no reason to believe that their festivals on Kos were organized differently. Moreover, we know much of the procession that welcomed the victorious Attalos III home to Pergamon (OGIS 332 lines 33-8). It included the priesthood and the magistrates of the city of Pergamon, but also its ephebes and neoi, gymnasiarch, paides and paidonomos, and finally the citizens, their wives and daughters, as well as the other inhabitants (enoikountes).

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the aim of this chapter was to provide an explanatory framework for Attalid patronage of the civic gymnasium, which, according to our sources, far exceeded that of other dynasties. Of course, it began from the premise that the phenomenon requires explanation. Scholarship has taken for self-evident that for both parties the benefits of the arrangement are patent. On this reckoning, the Attalids gave to the gymnasium in order to produce loyal subjects; or in slightly less Machiavellian terms, out of Panhellenism.203 As for the cities, new work on the Hellenistic polis argues that the

201 On late Hellenistic civic processions, see A. Chankowski 2005.
203 These explanations stem ultimately from Robert; the more Machiavellian ones go back to Rostovtzeff.
vitality of civic institutions after Chaironeia was such that the Attalids had little choice; the cities imposed this model of euergetism on the kings, further strengthening polis identity in the face of royal power.²⁰⁴ Behind these explanations are a pair of related assumptions about who the true beneficiary of the arrangement was, and thus about who had initiated it. Yet just as it was for earmarking, this line of inquiry is ultimately sterile. Both sides had something to gain, and so often we can never know who pushed first. We can, however, state with confidence that the gymnasium was a preferred site of interaction between the Attalids and the cities under their influence in the period 188-133. What made it so, it has been argued, were the dynamics of the gymnasium as an institution at this juncture in its historical development, such as its peculiar system of finance, or the seemingly endless opportunities for embellishment it offered its patrons.

This chapter was also an essay on the distinctive nature of the gymnasium as a civic institution. If this was a preferred site of interaction with royal power, what might that say about its relation to other civic institutions? The gymnasium enjoyed a measure of autonomy from those other civic institutions, it was argued, and occupied a unique position vis-à-vis king and court. This fact has become obscure to us precisely because both royal and civic interests wanted it to be so. At every turn, cities sought to constrain the elites of their gymnasia and bind them ideologically to the polis. As for the Attalids, they certainly intended their patronage of the gymnasium to be perceived as gifts to “Greek cities (poleis Hellênidas)” in the terms of Polybius (32.8.5). A final example comes from Chios, where an inscription records two gifts of “Attalos,” one for the renovation of the city’s walls, and a second for the heating of the gymnasium (Maier, Mauerbautinschriften 51).²⁰⁵ One struggles to relate these gifts chronologically to the epidosis of Chios for wall construction, particularly because the Attalid text also lists the names and properties of locals (Migeotte, Souscriptions 60).²⁰⁶ Yet in epigraphic terms, the association of the two public goods, sturdy walls and a gymnasium that stayed open in cold weather, could not have been any tighter. We lack an explicit statement of the Chians on what the gymnasium meant to them, but the epidosis document provides stark testimony for walls: the freedom (eleutheria) and autonomy (autonomia) of the homeland (patris) (lines 1-2). If the Attalids had convinced at least some of the Chians to think similarly of the gymnasium, they had achieved success.

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²⁰⁴ A. Chankowski 2009.
²⁰⁵ = Bringmann et al. 1995 no. 231 [E]. For Migeotte 1992, 180 Attalos II is certainly possible; for Schalles 1985, 105, n. 634, it must be Attalos II. While Bringmann et al. list Attalos I as the donor, neither historical nor epigraphical arguments favor either candidate decisively.
²⁰⁶ See Migeotte 1992, 179-81; Maier 1959-1961, 194-95 places the Attalid gift close in time to the Chian public subscription.
INTRODUCTION

Thus far, I have argued that the distinctive character of interaction between city and king helps explain the success of Attalid imperialism in the period after Apameia. Taxing or gifting, the Attalids displayed a remarkable appetite for negotiation with their subjects. Genuine negotiation produced the proliferation of earmarking arrangements and the heavy patronage of civic gymnasia that we find in our sources. These practices of empire were not new to the Hellenistic world. On the contrary, they were time-honored, culturally privileged solutions to the problems of governance. What were new were the intensity with which the Attalids applied them and the collectivities that emerged as fiscal structures aligned interests. However, we have yet to consider what is usually regarded as the most strikingly new, distinctive, and in fact mysterious feature of second-century Attalid political economy, namely, the coinage, and in particular, the cistophori.

These odd-looking coins, minted on their peculiar weight standard, have provoked radically divergent interpretations. For F. Kleiner, author of *Early Cistophoric Coinage*, the standard reference work on the subject, the cistophori were “the king’s money,” a straightforwardly royal coinage.¹ That position, it must be understood, is polemical. There is a long tradition, stretching back to Panel and Eckhel in the eighteenth century, with H. Seyrig and W. Szaivert as its most recent exponents, which regards the cistophori as a federative coinage of cities.² In an authoritative study, G. Le Rider writes of “le monnayage cistophorique des Attalides,” but tentatively puts forward a more nuanced vision, suggesting that the Attalids negotiated the cistophori into existence, then shared with the cities of Asia Minor the attendant responsibilities and rewards.³ I will argue that the cities’ cooperation was key not only to the birth of the cistophori, but to the maintenance of the entire Attalid monetary system. Thus, as an arena of negotiation between city and king, coinage merits further consideration.

Neither purely royal nor civic, the cistophori defy simple characterization. Yet much the same can be said of the so-called Wreathed Coinages, or of the so-called “cistophoric” countermarks, no less enigmatic forms of money in the Attalid kingdom.

¹ Kleiner and Noe 1977, 120-25.
² Kleiner and Noe 1977, 10; Szaivert 1983; Seyrig 1963.
³ Le Rider 1989, 189.
after 188. This is a period of massive change in the history of Greek coinage, and, as O. Picard has pointed out, we need different schemata to make sense of it all – at least from the late 170s. Indeed, this chapter will propose one such schema: coordinated coinage. The monetary system of the Attalid kingdom at its acme involved civic institutions and promoted civic identities to an unprecedented and ultimately unmatched degree. In a paradox of sorts, this had the effect of strengthening royal control over the new territory. In other words, coinage had a role to play in fostering the integration of the various micro-regions of the kingdom into a single state. It is interesting to contrast the testimony of Polybius, for whom coinage was merely an index of state formation and integration (*symphronēsis*) (2.37.8-11). For the Megalopolitan, the federal coinage of the Achaean koinon is just one measure of the remarkable transformation of the Peloponnese into, in his formulation, a single polis but for the walls. We can go further, attributing to a Hellenistic coinage the power to bind the smaller polities of a royal state to each other and to the crown.

The question of what to call the cistophori, royal or civic coinage, is really yet another fruitless question of *cui bono*. The cistophoric system generated profits, through the procurement and transfer of bullion, and through the exchange and reminting of old coin. Yet given the present state of our evidence, we cannot so much as guess at the size of these profits and the extent to which the Attalids shared them with the cities. We can, however, observe in the cistophoric system features of both centralized and decentralized control, which permits us to state with more confidence than is typical that the profits would indeed have been shared. Decentralization is emphasized in the explanation of the cistophori set out in what follows mainly because in my view centralization has been overstated. To emphasize cooperation is not to lose sight of the Attalids as the prime movers behind this coinage, nor to discount their role as the indispensable coordinating force behind the system – to ignore the obvious asymmetries of power. It is instead a means of, first, situating the cistophori in the broader context of Attalid money, and second, of highlighting the distinctiveness of Attalid monetary practice. Thus, the chapter first lays out a new understanding of the cistophori: neither royal nor civic, but what I call a coordinated coinage. Second, it proposes an explanation of the various changes in the coinage of the Attalid kingdom, 188-133, set against the wider backdrop of the eastern Mediterranean. But before we can explain them, we need to introduce the coins.

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4 Picard 2010, 189-90.
Numismatic research on the Pergamene mint has not to date observed a decisive change in 188. The Attalids had always minted an Attic-weight, which is to say, international silver coinage bearing the face and usually the name of the founder of the dynasty, the tetradrachms known as the Philetairoi, and they continued to do so after Apameia (IMAGE 1). The Philetairoi have been divided into seven groups by U. Westermark. With minor modifications, Westermark’s groups have been retained, but their absolute dates are not fixed. A. Meadows has recently posited a gap in the production of Philetairoi from c.190 to c.180-175, from when Westermark Group VI B2 seems to end, to when Group VII, on his new chronology, begins. In any case, the Attalids were minting some form of Attic-weight silver coinage in the 180s, since their posthumous Alexanders continue from the late third-century into this period (IMAGE 2). Meadows has placed these posthumous Alexanders (Price nos. 1491-1495) in the 180s, arguing for overlap with the Philetairoi, but also that, “Alexander coinage is likely to have been the principal coinage produced by the Pergamene kings during the period of their conflict with Antiochus III, and in the subsequent decade of reorganization of the Pergamene kingdom.”

At some point in the 180s, a new wave of Attic-weight silver entered the enlarged Attalid kingdom in the form of countermarked tetradrachms of four Pamphylian cities: Phaselis, Perge, Aspendos, and Side. The Sidetan issues, which predominate, bore that city’s own types; the rest, like so many civic coinages in this period, were Alexanders. A

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6 Westermark 1961.
7 Meadows (forthcoming, 14).
8 Meadows (forthcoming, 10).
9 For the hoard evidence that points to 188-183, see Bauslaugh 1990, 53-5; new evidence, same conclusion: Meadows (forthcoming, 20), and in greater detail, Meadows 2008 [unpublished dissertation], on the coinage of Alabanda; de Callataÿ (forthcoming, 13) is more cautious about Bauslaugh’s dates; for the Pamphylian coinage, see Meadows 2009; for the Pamphylian Alexanders in particular, see Mørkholm 1978.
second minting authority placed a countermark on the obverse of these coins, consisting of a bow-in-case alongside an abbreviated city name or ethnic (IMAGE 3). These cities were all in post-Apameian Pergamene territory: Ephesos, Tralles, Sardis, Synnada, Apameia, Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos, Stratonikeia-on-the-Kaikos, Adramyttium, Sala in Lydia, Toriaion, the unidentified ΕΛΗΣ, and Pergamon itself. The bow-in-case icon has given the phenomenon the unfortunate name “cistophoric countermark,” which implies that the two developments, these countermarks and the cistophoric coinage, were contemporaneous. They were not. The so-called cistophoric countermarking seems to end in the early 170s. However, 7 of the 12 known cities referred to by the countermarks correspond to cistophoric cities. While Sardis appears on the countermarks the most, Ephesos barely registers. This is curious because Sardis plays a minor role and Ephesos a major one in the cistophoric system proper.

The cistophori are one of the great numismatic puzzles of classical antiquity. The term cistophoros is an ancient one, usually used by Moderns to refer to the tetradrachms of a system that included didrachms and drachms. It is the tetradrachm alone, however, which bears on its obverse the so-called *cista mystica*, with its lid ajar, and a serpent emerging (IMAGE 4). An ivy wreath wraps around the field. On the reverse, the tetradrachm displays two snakes on either side of a bow in its case, as well as various symbols and the name of a city – or an ethnic – usually in abbreviated form, e.g., ΕΦΕ, less often, as a monogram. The didrachms (IMAGE 5) and drachms (IMAGE 6) share types: on the obverse, a club draped with lion-skin, wrapped in a wreath; on the reverse, a bunch of grapes on a vine leaf, and again, various marks and the shortened version of a city’s name/ethnic. This mythological repertoire, which combines Dionysiac and

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10 For Toriaion and Sala, see Thonemann 2008.
11 Meadows (forthcoming, 17).
12 Bauslaugh 1990, 50.
13 The ancients were more precise. Thus, a Delian account refers to κιστοφόρον τετράχον (*I. Delos* 1443 A1 line 149); for the Delos account, see Robert 1951, 105-35; for a review of literary references to cistophori, see Szaivert 2005.
14 I will discuss below the important question of whether we treat these legends as an abbreviation of a city’s name or as a proper ethnic; Le Rider 1990, esp. 685, and Le Rider and Drew-Bear 1991, e.g., treat them as an ethnic.
Heraklean elements, is seen to be typically Attalid.\textsuperscript{15} The tetradrachm, which I will refer to as the cistophoros per the convention, is the dominant denomination; the didrachms and drachms, which I will refer to as the fractions, are rare by comparison. (By “cistophori,” I mean all three denominations). The cistophoric tetradrachm was minted at a theoretical weight of c. 12.6g, the didrachm at 6.15g, and the drachm at 3.05g.\textsuperscript{16} This weight standard is singular, if also relatable to its contemporaries, with a cistophoros weighing roughly the same as three Attic-weight drachms, and the drachm just .05g heavier than the Rhodian plinthophoros.

We can be reasonably certain of the identity of most of the pre-133 cistophoric mints – at least the major ones. There are two tiers in terms of volume of production: the large, regular mints, which are Pergamon, Ephesos, Tralles, Apameia, and to a lesser extent, Sardis; (Synnada in Phrygia was once thought to be Sardis-Synnada)\textsuperscript{17}; and the small, irregular ones: Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos; Adramyttion, which is attested by a single pre-133 coin, though it became a major mint post-133, probably in the context of the war against Aristonikos\textsuperscript{18}; and, finally, a smattering of small mints whose identity is contested, but at least four seem to be south Phrygian: Blaundos, Lysias, Dionysoupolis, Dioskome, and Lysias (or Synnada?). The mystery mint KOP may be Kormasa in the

\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., Szaivert 2008, but also Kosmetatou 1998, who fits Erechtheus and Athena (Nikephoros) into the picture, insists on Dionysos Kathegemon, and rules out Dionysos or Zeus Sabazios; for the old idea that Asklepios is present in cistophoric imagery, see Wroth 1882. No one, to my knowledge, has suggested mythological allusions to the saga of Telephos and Auge.

\textsuperscript{16} Kleiner and Noe 1977, 15.

\textsuperscript{17} Kleiner and Noe 1977, 78-85.

\textsuperscript{18} Bauslaugh 1990, 48 announces discovery of a pre-133 cistophoros of Adramyttion and planned publication; the coin, however, which is Paris 2600 ex Slg. Garriri, Smyrna, 1853, was only published as Stauber 1996, v. 2, no. 94; for a catalogue of cistophoric countermarks of Adramytteion and the city’s large production of late cistophori, see Stauber 1996, v. 2, 206-11.
Historically, at least by Attalid standards, this is a very large coinage, as measured by the roughly 50 obverse die equivalents used per annum. By comparison, F. de Callataÿ has estimated the average annual production of all regal Attalid (Attic-weight) tetradrachms, from the suzerainty of Lysimachus to the reign of Eumenes II, as 8.3 obverse die equivalents per annum.

**Dating the Cistophori**

The terms of the debate on the vexed question of the date of the introduction of the cistophoric system have narrowed in recent years. Only K. Harl still accepts the testimony of Livy that between 190 and 187 four Roman triumphatores displayed cistophori (37.46.3–4; 37.58.3–5; 37.59.3–6; 39.7.1–2, 5). Others dismiss Livy’s word as anachronism, and have concentrated on the period between 188, when the political geography of Asia Minor was redrawn, and 150, when the Delian accounts first speak of our coins. The debate turns on the dating of a portion of Westermark Group VII Philetairoi re-classified as Nicolet-Pierre issues 19-25. These Philetairoi share control marks with what are understood to be early cistophori. Leaving aside for a moment the important point that the Attalids struck the cistophori and this Attic-weight regal coinage simultaneously, one needs to decide when to date this group of the latest Philetairoi. Their presence in the Ma’Aret En Nu’man hoard provides a terminus ante quem of 162. But it is difficult to determine how much earlier they began, and how long they took to travel from Pergamon to Syria and into the ground. Meadows argues for the lowest chronology yet for the overlap of Philetairoi and cistophori, c.165-160, and points to a coin of Alabanda minted on the cistophoric standard as a supplementary terminus ante quem; he dates the Alabandan coin to 167/6, and places the beginning of the cistophori in

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20 For the methodology, for calculating the original number of dies, see Carter; for the much more controversial move of calculating the original size of the coinage from that number, see de Callataÿ 2011; by a number of “obverse die equivalents,” I mean, according to the widely accepted method of Carter, how many obverse dies were used to strike the coinage, converted into a standard unit of an Attic drachm obverse die. So, the numbers presented in this chapter make no assumption about average die productivity, other than that it was roughly constant.
21 De Callataÿ (forthcoming, Tables 8 and 12).
22 See Kleiner-Noe 1977, 10-16, with Meadows (forthcoming) and de Callataÿ (forthcoming) for a review of the debate; Meadows 2002, 99 could say that the debate was hardening around 190.
23 For discussion, see Harl 1991; for further advocates of the high chronology, see Sosin 2004, 199, n. 44; cf. Szaivert 2005.
24 See supra n. 13.
26 Mattingly 1993.
precisely that year. De Callataÿ treats the evidence of Ma’Aret more cautiously, preferring a start date some time in the 170s.

We can narrow the terms of the debate even further. A certain number of scholars still consider 181 to be a terminus ante quem for the cistophori on the basis of R. Ashton’s interpretation of a letter of Eumenes II to Artemidoros, the Attalid governor of the dynasty’s Lycian outpost Telmessos (TEXT 3). The letter concerns benefactions for the katoikountes known as the Kardakoi, military settlers who had fallen on hard times. The key text (lines 10-14) reads:

καὶ ἐπεὶ τῆς συντάξεως δεῖ διορθοῦσθαι αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ἕνηλίκου Ῥωδίας δραχμὰς τέσσαρας ὀβολῶν, ἀσὶ δὲνεύντες δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις βαρύνονται, τὰ τε παραγραφόμενα αὐτὸ τοῖς ἐκ εἰκακεδακτοῦ ἔτους ἐκ τούτων ἀφεῖναι, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπτακακεδακτοῦ ἔτους Ῥωδίαν δραχμὴν καὶ ὀβολὸν.

Since it is necessary for them to pay arrears on the poll-tax, each of them four Rhodian drachmas and an obol, but since, in light of their suffering, this is not within their means, let this amount be remitted this year, and from next year, let them pay one Rhodian drachma and one obol.

Ashton’s claim is that the poll-tax is normally paid at a rate of four “Rhodian” drachms and one obol, which, if the Rhodian coins are indeed Rhodian plinthophori, is equivalent to a total of c.12.6g of silver, the weight of the cistophoros. This would mean that in Telmessos, in the vicinity of the Rhodian peraia, the Attalids have decided to collect a tax collected elsewhere in the kingdom as a cistophoros in an equivalent amount of Rhodian silver. Unfortunately, all the text tells us for certain is that the Attalids have been unable to collect the 12.6g of Rhodian silver coins from the Kardakoi. Perhaps, they were only unable to collect it recently – or never at all? In any case, the tax rate is lowered to one Rhodian drachm and one obol, or 3.5-6g of silver, significantly more than a cistophoric drachm of 3.05g. What the Telmessos text demonstrates is that, c.181, the Attalids were employing a unit of account that would eventually be expressed in the cistophoros.

27 Meadows (forthcoming, 17).
28 The 1968 Larissa (Sitochoro) hoard (IGCH 237) has always been a problem for advocates of a late date for the cistophoric reform. For the hoard’s publication see Price 1989, who adjusts the IGCH listing date of 168/7 to c.165. It contained a single cistophoros of Apameia (Price 1989, no. 241). The existence of the coin had been reported in the Greek newspaper Estia in 1968, but the coin itself only appeared in the British Museum in 1979, with the accompanying story that it came from the hoard of 1968. According to Price 1989, 240 it has the same “patchy black patina” as the hoard’s Perseus tetradrachms; but Meadows (forthcoming, 18, p. 25), et al., consider it intrusive.
29 Ashton 1994; adopted by, e.g., Thonemann 2011b, 170; Kosmetatou 1998, 15; Kosmetatou 2003, 164; also Bresson 1996, 71 – though he no longer accepts Ashton’s arguments; in an important forthcoming publication, Marcellesi will restate the case for introduction c.190.
30 Part of the context for those hard times might have been the war with Prousias I and the Galatians referred to in the decree of Telmessos of 184/3, Segre 1932 = Allen 1983 no. 7.
Therefore, the origin of the unit of 12.6g may lie in fiscal experimentation, but 181 cannot be posited as a terminus ante quem for the cistophoric system.\footnote{Both Meadows and Bresson have communicated to me that they too hold this position. Meadows (forthcoming) may put it in print; Tietz 2003, 312-13 recognizes the problem, but does not challenge Ashton’s theory. He sees in the letter of Eumenes III to Artemidoros a failed attempt to integrate Telmessos into the Pergamene monetary orbit. His conclusion is that Telmessos fell squarely in the Rhodian zone, as the contents of the coin collection of the museum in Fethiye illustrate: c.600 Rhodian out of c.2500 Hellenistic coins.}

\textit{Attic-weight Coinage}

Whether we date the cistophoric reform to the 170s or 160s, it is becoming increasingly clear that the introduction of the cistophoros did not spell the end of production of Attic-weight coinage in the kingdom. On the contrary, we are only just coming to recognize the impressive scale of the “international” coinages minted in the final decades of Attalid rule. Of those that are patently regal, to the aforementioned Group VII Philetairoi we must add an extremely rare issue of tetradrachms that bears the portrait of Eumenes II, dated by H. Nicolet-Pierre to 166-159 (IMAGE 7). Two other silver coinages known from an exiguous number of specimens seem to be related to officially sanctioned cultic activity: the Athena Nikephoros tetradrachms, usually placed in the mid-160s (IMAGE 8) and a tetradrachm from Teos, but issued in the name of a group with deep ties to the Attalid court, the Association of the Artists of Dionysus, dated by C. Lorber and O. Hoover to the 150s (IMAGE 9). Meadows has added a further coinage to the mix from the mid- to late-140s. These are tetradrachms that show Demeter on the obverse and the Kabeiroi encircled by a wreath on the reverse, in much the same fashion as the reverse of the Eumenes II portrait coins (IMAGE 10). Their legend, however, reads not \textit{ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΕΥΜΕΝΟΥ}, but \textit{ΘΕΩΝ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΩΝ ΣΥΡΙΩΝ}. If Meadows is correct in attributing this coinage to the Attalids, it would be of more than antiquarian interest. By the looks of the die counts, this was a very large coinage, on the same scale as the cistophori in the same period of production.\footnote{Meadows (forthcoming, 25-7).}
A number of cities within the Attalid kingdom also minted Attic-weight coinage after the introduction of the cistophoros. The gold drachms of Tralles share control marks with the cistophori Kleiner-Noe series 9 and 41 (IMAGE 11). Thus, it seems, Tralles minted two gold issues at two chronologically distinct periods of its history. Of much greater importance to the regional money supply were the many Ephesian silver drachms with bee on obverse, stag on reverse (IMAGE 12). P. Kinns has established an early phase for this coinage that ends c.170, as well as a later phase for which he gives only the terminus ante quem of c.150. It is indeed likely that Ephesos was producing Attic drachms and cistophori in parallel. The cases of Ephesos and Tralles, cities awarded to the Attalids at Apameia as gifts (dôreai; Plb. 21.46.10), point up the difficulty of using

34 Kinns 1999.
coinage to determine the political or fiscal status of a community after 188.\textsuperscript{35} The same can be said of Temnos, which, while tightly under Attalid control, continued to mint its Alexanders in the 150s and 140s.\textsuperscript{36}

Finally, the most significant Attic-weight coinages produced in the Attalid kingdom in these years are the so-called Wreathed Coinages.\textsuperscript{37} These are silver tetradrachms bearing the civic types and ethnics of coastal cities, the obverse framed by the wreath that gives them their name (IMAGES 13, 14, and 15). The cities in question are: Aegae, Kyme, and Myrina in the Aeolian core, and Smyrna, Lebedos, Magnesia, and Herakleia-under-Latmos. With good hoard evidence and die studies available, de Callataÿ has been able to date the Wreathed Coinages c.154-135, although it is clear that the mints operated on different schedules.\textsuperscript{38} Still, even on the lowest chronology, the cistophori and the Wreathed Coinages are contemporary developments. It should be noted that several other coinages of the second two quarters of the second century share the wreath design, for example, coins of Macedonia under Philip V, of Eretria and Cyzicus, and of course the Athenian New Style tetradrachms or Stephanephori. This is not evidence of a monetary union, as some have hypothesized, but of a popular fashion in coin design.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. Allen 1983, 110-11, who in what is a standard synthesis of Attalid history, uses coinage to determine the “tributary” status of each city that minted 188-133; Jenkins 1978 suggests that gold staters of both Ephesos and Tralles date to the Attalid period. Both series spell out the civic ethnic in full. In the case of Tralles, he points to control marks shared by early early cistophori of that city, but for Ephesos, no such correspondence of control marks has been found.

\textsuperscript{36} Meadows (forthcoming, 28); Temnos is an interesting case. RC 48 (TEXT 4) is the evidence for its subjection to the Attalids. (Temnos may also have been the recipient of I.Sardis 2 discussed in Ch. 4). In addition to these Alexanders of the 150s or 140s, Temnos, according to Seyrig 1973, 70 countermarked Alabandan Alexanders of the mid-second century. The attribution of these grapes countermarks, however, has been questioned: for the coins and comment, see Meadows (unpublished dissertation, 73).

\textsuperscript{37} For bibliography, see de Callataÿ (forthcoming, Table 10).

\textsuperscript{38} De Callataÿ (forthcoming); for the schedules, see Meadows (forthcoming, 33) = Meadows and Houghton 2010, 185.

\textsuperscript{39} For the debate on the meaning of the wreath, see Picard 2010, 175, n. 48, with earlier bibliography.
The Wreathed Coinages circulated similarly to other Attic-weight coinages of Asia Minor.⁴⁰ They do not appear in mid-second-century hoards from Asia Minor, but they do turn up in Levantine hoards of the 150s and 140s.⁴¹ Thus, they participated in the general flow of Attic-weight silver in this period, moving rapidly from northwestern Asia Minor to northern Syria. All this prompts the question then, “Why study them as a group? To begin with, they do share a common design. They also all originate in cities firmly under Attalid control. Yet most importantly, the enormous size of these coinages cries out for explanation. De Callataÿ estimates a total of 76.8 Attic-drachm equivalent obverses per annum for the Wreathed Coinages – compared to just 51.9 for the pre-133 cistophori!⁴² Thus, since Rostovtzeff, scholarship has suspected Attalid involvement.⁴³ The notion of a “proxy coinage” may seem less conspiratorial after the discussion below. Leaving open for now the question of the precise nature of Attalid involvement with the Wreathed Coinages, it is difficult to understand how these cities minted in such quantities without royal aid.

EXPLAINING THE CISTOPHORI

Scholarship has struggled to define the character of the cistophoric coinage, vacillating between civic, royal, and federal models of minting, largely because the coins just look strange to us. However, their visual strangeness need not be explained away in

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⁴⁰ Meadows (forthcoming, 31-2); pace Marcellesi 2010, 200.
⁴¹ E.g., Kirikhan (CH 1.87; 2.90), Aleppo (IGCH 1562) and Akkar (IGCH 1559).
⁴² De Callataÿ (forthcoming, Tables 9 and 10).
⁴³ Rostovtzeff 1939, 658: “We can hardly suppose that the minting cities – important or unimportant – owned silver mines. It is more than likely that the metal was supplied to them by the kings, who, in all probability were the owners of the mines;” see also Kinns 1987, 107.
our analysis. Attalid silver and indeed bronze had always borne the portrait of Philetairos, and nearly always the legend ΦΙΛΕΤΑΙΡΟΥ. That combination of image and text was standard practice, not only in the Attalid kingdom but across the Hellenistic world. Thus in their design, the cistophori mark a radical break with the past – and with convention, in a medium that is famously conservative. Not only do these coins renounce the claims of typical Hellenistic legends, they also replace the dynastic portrait with cultic imagery sufficiently generic, it seems, to evoke a wide range of associations. On the other hand, the coins bear symbols, control marks of some kind, which without question derive from the iconographic repertoire of the various cities involved. This is best observed in Ephesos, where the bee and stag (along with the quiver of Artemis) appear on the cistophori. Ephesos had for centuries placed this imagery on its coinage, and in fact continued to do so after the introduction of the cistophori on those copious Attic-weight drachms. Around the new harbor of Ephesos at mid-century, one would have handled both coinages together. Or consider the case of Tralles. It provides another clear instance of identifiably civic badges on the cistophori: the humped bull, the maeander pattern, and perhaps, Zeus Larasius. The bull we find on the aforementioned contemporary gold coinage of Tralles, and the maeander pattern, so important to the civic and regional identity of the city, goes back to pre-Apameian bronze. Kleiner sought to limit the phenomenon to Tralles and Ephesos, but his own catalogue shows its breadth. Some Apameian cistophori bear flutes (of Marsyas), and Laodikean ones have wolves for the Lykos. To match image with text, then, we are justified in following Le Rider, who restores cistophoric legends as ethnics, not mintmarks, e.g., ΕΦΕΣΙΩΝ. In other words, the citizens of these poleis were just as likely to have seen themselves on the cistophori as they were to picture an Attalid king.

To cast the cistophori as either strictly royal or civic in nature is to explain away their visual strangeness. Either one argues that the combination of civic iconography and muted reference to the crown signals the withdrawal of the Attalids from the domain of coinage, a restatement of the laissez-faire, constitutional vision of Attalid imperialism; or, the coins must lie, and we actually have interventionist, duplicitous monarchs on our

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44 See Szaivert 2008, which analyzes cistophoric imagery in context of all Pergamene coin iconography.
45 See, e.g., Kraay 1976, 356-57, nos. 600 and 601.
46 For the coin, see SNG München (Lydien) 695; for discussion, see Thonemann 2011b, 40-1, with n. 100 for bronze minted in name of Zeus Larasius (e.g., SNG München (Lydien) 702-6), likely from the period 188-133.
47 Mørkholm 1979 challenges the identification of Apameia as an early cistophoric mint. His view has not carried the day, but it is worth noting that he observes changes in the icon of the flute and argues that it does not belong to Marsyas.
48 Le Rider 1990, 685.
hands. Whence the bald statement of Kleiner: “The cistophoric coinage is not what it appears to be.”

Yet a coin in this world was always in some sense what it appeared to be. According to the classic formulation of the inscription from Sestos honoring the late Attalid courtier Menas, the benefits of introducing any new epichoric coinage were of two kinds (I.Sestos 1, lines 44-6). First, the community was able to place its own charaktër on its coins. Second, the coinage would become a source of revenue (prosodos) for the community, through mandatory exchange, reminting fees, etc. Unfortunately, on the present state of the evidence, we cannot say anything about who laid claim to the surely considerable profits of the cistophoric system, or in what proportions. Tellingly, Kleiner relates the fiscal structure of the cistophoric system to the practice of earmarking. In his view, they were both forms of bait-and-switch fiscality. On the other hand, we can say that the Attalids ceded away a certain part of the charaktër of this coinage, and the text from Sestos provides explicit confirmation of the significance of that aspect of coinage for late Hellenistic cities. Meadows has gone so far as to suggest that the political significance of minting with epichoric types was changing and in fact intensifying in precisely this period.

Thus it seems prudent to take the cistophori at “face value,” even if this means ruling out conventional models of royal or civic coinage. The strange appearance of the coins hints at the same Attalid sensitivity to civic identity and the same reliance on civic institutions that we found operative with regard to the practice of earmarking and royal patronage of the gymnasium. Yet any new characterization of the cistophori must rest on the evidence of the coins themselves for the administration of the system.

The Devil in the Administrative Details: the evidence for centralization

To underline the point yet again, we cannot read from the coins a balance of accounts, how much city and king – or indeed third parties, like traders – each invested in the system, and how much they took out. And this problem is not unique to Attalid Asia Minor. In a recent programmatic essay on late Hellenistic coinage, Picard has sized up our aporia with the question, “D’où vient donc le métal?” Instead, let us focus on what the coins can tell us, namely, where the minting took place, and how the shape of the

49 Kleiner and Noe 1977, 125.
50 Of course in the case of Menas and Sestos, the new epichoric coinage was bronze.
51 Kleiner and Noe 1977, 125, with n. 19; of course, Ch. 1 conceptualizes earmarking very differently.
52 Meadows 2001, esp. 61-2; cf. Burnett et al. 1992 (RPC I 1), 1: coinage is a royal prerogative until the breakdown of kingdoms.
money supply and the rhythm of monetary production were managed. To begin with the
organization of the cistophoric mints, Kleiner’s ECC dramatically overstates the case for
centralized production. Le Rider and O. Mørkholm have offered criticisms of ECC on
this score, but given the status of Kleiner’s book as the standard of reference for the
coinage, its arguments deserve further scrutiny, since for Kleiner, what he calls “inter-
city linkage” would “necessitate a complete reconsideration of the nature of the
cistophoric coinage.”

ECC does not postulate two tiers of mints, large and small, as we have above. The
system of ECC contains just three central mints that produce all the coins, whatever their
charaktēr: Ephesos, Tralles, but most importantly, Pergamon itself, from which all
administrative direction emanates. Central to Kleiner’s argument is this notion of “inter-
city linkage.” The sprawling lines of his Table 1 (IMAGE 16) capture the catchall quality
of the term. These are not just die links, but also shared symbols, monograms, and
crucially, the stylistic links that Kleiner observes throughout the coinage. Numismatic
method privileges the evidence of die links over stylistic links, which are made on the
basis of connoisseurship, but the number of die links in the ECC corpus is surprisingly
low. In fact, there are only two instances of verifiable die-sharing between mints, both
involving Pergamon. The first is the link between Kleiner’s P24 of Pergamon and S10
(series 6) from “Sardes-Synnada” (IMAGES 17 and 18). Noting that “Sardes-Synnada”
series 6 is itself die-linked to the then as yet un-deciphered ΒΑ ΣΥ ΑΡ cistophori, Kleiner
argued for the unlikelihood of a single die traveling between the royal capital, Lydia, and
Phrygia. Since then, Le Rider has suggested that “Sardes-Synnada” is actually two mints,
Sardis and Lysias in south Phrygia; that the monogram on the reverse of the obverse die-
linked coin at issue should be read “Dionysopolis”; and that the ΒΑ ΣΥ ΑΡ coins come
from Blaundos, both Dionysopolis and Blaundos themselves also lying in south
Phrygia. All this still leaves us with the circulation of at least one die between two or
perhaps three regions. We cannot rule out a traveling mint that accompanied the retinue
of Eumenes II, who might have faced the Galatians at both Sardis and Synnada during the
Great Revolt. E. Robinson demonstrated a roving mint for Arstonikos. Whatever the

54 Kleiner and Noe 1977, 120; for criticism, see Le Rider 1990 and Mørkholm 1978.
55 Cf. de Callataý forthcoming, 16, “The amount of die sharing between mints strongly points to a single
minting place for issues allegedly coming from different mints;” cf. Kinns 1986, 164 (non vidi).
56 Kleiner and Noe 1977, 80-81.
57 Le Rider 1990, 697-99; cf. Mitchell 1999b, 25, n. 30, which places the south Phrygian cistophori in the
wake of Sulla.
58 For sources for Galatians at Sardis and Synnada, see Thonemann 2011b, 170-77; on the Galatian War,
more supra.
59 Robinson 1954.
arrangement here, it was short-lived, irregular, and confined to the beginning of the cistophoric system, under the peculiar conditions of the Galatian War.

**IMAGE 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Pergamon</th>
<th>Apameia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>190 B.C.</td>
<td>Sapphire</td>
<td>Lion head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 B.C.</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 B.C.</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 B.C.</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Pergamon</th>
<th>Apameia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>350 B.C.</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>340 B.C.</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330 B.C.</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320 B.C.</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310 B.C.</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Lion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMAGES 17 and 18**

Much more intriguing is the second case of die sharing across mints, known from an impressive five links between Pergamon and Apameia: Kleiner’s A17/P38, A24/P46, A28/P54, A38/P75, and A40/P79. Moreover, Kleiner’s observation that the pace of production at both mints was increasing simultaneously is suggestive. It at least implies that both mints faced a sharp increase in demand for coinage at the same time; and that a response was then coordinated. However, this is a weak foundation for the theory that Apameia did not actually possess a mint, but that the large production of cistophori
minted in the name of Apameia, estimated at 8.3 Attic-drachm obverse die equivalents per annum, in fact belongs to Pergamon – not least because the attribution of some of those obverse die-linked reverses to Pergamon has been challenged. A wealth of comparative evidence from classical and Hellenistic contexts shows that dies and die-cutters passed between mints. Indeed, the detailed study of C. Flament on the mechanics of minting in classical Greece highlights the pitfalls of using hand studies to demonstrate centralized production. Yet Kleiner’s observation of hands is what sustains much of his model of centralization, from Apameia, to the mystery mint KOP, to his tendentious claim that Tralles struck for Laodikeia.

It must be admitted that the cistophori display remarkable uniformity of type. The imagery is consistent, as is the placement of the ethnic and the symbols (IMAGES 19, 20, and 21). The weight of the coin and the size of the flan do not change much either. Most importantly, the repetition of symbols on the coins of different mints implies a coherent administrative system, albeit one that communicates in a secret language in which we are not versed. On the other hand, we find striking administrative anomalies, such as, for example, the letters on a limited number of series from Ephesos (33-35) and Apameia (27-28), sometimes taken as regnal years. Whether or not the letters on either of these coinages actually represent regnal dates, or why these cities alone and not Pergamon itself would have marked time in this way are both open questions. The salient point is that different administrative systems were at work in different places. This implies that local actors and institutions influenced the production of the cistophori. We get a sense of just how integral the locals might have been to the productive process under the Attalids from the behavior of their mints immediately after 133. While the Ephesians were quick to place their city’s civic era on cistophori, the citizens of Pergamon minted cistophori bearing the names of their Prytaneis. Had those magistrates shared responsibility for minting with royal officials all along?

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60 The pi-alpha monogram was once read as Parion (Mørkholm 1979), or as Apollonia Rhyndakos (Kleiner 1980). But the communis opinio now reads it as Apameia – see here Le Rider 1990, 687-89, and also Le Rider and Drew Bear 1991, 366-69 for challenges to some of Kleiner’s attributions of certain obverses in the above sequence to Pergamon.
61 See, e.g., Robert 1967, 87-105; Mackil (forthcoming); and Mackil and Van Alfen, 227, n. 78: die sharing implies centralization but no single state form.
62 Flament 2010.
63 Kleiner and Noe 1973, 88-9, 101, and 98 for the prediction that one day die links may substantiate the claim about Tralles and Laodikeia. In the meantime, we have to work with the evidence we have.
64 See the weight tables of Kleiner and Noe 1973, 128-29; for flans, 121.
...neve interesse quidquam putent, utrum Tralles an Formias venerint.

…that they think it just the same, whether they have arrived in Tralles or in Formia.

-- Cicero (Q fr. 1.1.17)

Die sharing is just one of the twin pillars of the case for centralization. The other is the specialization of the mint of Tralles in the production of small denominations, which is to say fractions, the didrachms and drachms that survive in much smaller numbers than the “cistophoros,” the cistophoric tetradrachm (IMAGES 5 and 6). The peculiarity of Tralles in this respect is patent.\textsuperscript{67} ECC lists 16 obverse drachm dies and 18 obverse didrachm dies for Tralles. No other mint comes close. For Kleiner – and no one has challenged his view – the choice of Tralles was arbitrary. “It is unlikely that the silver currency needs of Tralles differed substantially from those of the other large Attalid cities,” he writes.\textsuperscript{68} On this interpretation, royal needs motivated Tralles’ designation, which represents the ultimate instantiation of the “royal design” behind the cistophoric system.\textsuperscript{69} Even those who model decentralized production assume centralized control of the shape of the supply of coin. Thus writes de Callataÿ, “The fact that the mint of Tralles was in charge of nearly all the fractions points too in the direction of a general policy established at a higher level.”\textsuperscript{70} The Attalids, we are to understand, decided unilaterally to focus the production of fractional coinage in Tralles. As Thonemann writes, “The

\textsuperscript{67} De Callataÿ (forthcoming, Table 8) lists under “Tralles Half-Cistophori” 20 obverses and 30 coins; ECC lists 20 didrachm obverses and 25 coins. He has added to the total coins of ECC, but it is unclear to me that he has checked for new obverses; for the “problem of small change,” cf. Sargent and Velde 2002.

\textsuperscript{68} Kleiner and Noe 1973, 122.

\textsuperscript{69} Kleiner and Noe 1973, 122.

\textsuperscript{70} De Callataÿ (forthcoming, 16).
cistophori were produced at a number of decentralized mints. Their production, however, was closely directed from the centre...[Tralles’ specialization] strongly suggests that the distribution and scale of the mints did not necessarily reflect the coinage’s circulation.”

The special role of Tralles was likely neither arbitrary nor the outcome of a unilateral royal decision. Indeed, the peculiar coinage of Tralles may even shed light on circulation patterns. Consider first that Tralles continued to specialize in small denominations after the fall of the Attalid dynasty. In his study of the very large coinage known as the “late cistophori,” minted from c.133 to c.67, Kleiner found that Tralles retained its traditional role.72 The only hoard of late cistophori that contains fractions is IGCH 1460, of unknown provenance in Asia Minor. It contains two drachms and seven didrachms, all of them, except for one drachm of Ephesos, from Tralles. Kleiner did not make a companion die study of the late cistophori, but he does note that the late fractions of Tralles are overwhelmingly dominant in both public and private collections.73 In trying to understand the persistence of the pattern, we ought to remember that Roman provincial administrators were famously cautious.74 We could see here simply the rote reproduction of an administrative procedure and the inertia of bureaucracy.

However, those explanations make less sense when we consider a yet later stage in the long history of the cistophori. When production of the late cistophori ended c.68/7 in the context of Pompey’s operations in the East, a ten-year hiatus ensued.75 Around 58, cistophori appeared again, this time bearing the names of cities, but also two personal names, one Greek and one Latin (IMAGE 22). These are the so-called “proconsular cistophori,” which in addition to what seem to be the names of local Greek magistrates carry the names of Roman proconsuls. The coinage ends c.42 with the issue of the propraetor L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus. G. Stumpf’s corpus of proconsular cistophori does not record any fractions.76 Yet this is because the one fraction that can be associated with the proconsular cistophori, an almost unique exemplar, does not bear the typical two names, but just the Greek one. The coin is a didrachm minted by a certain ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΗΣ (BMC Lydia 335, no.55; IMAGE 23).77 The same Aristokles of Tralles, we presume, is known to have minted proconsular cistophori (tetradrachms) for both C. Claudius Pulcher (55-53) and C. Fannius (49-48) (Stumpf’s no. 55 (IMAGE 24 =

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71 Thonemann 2011b, 170-71; cf. CH IX 535 (Ahmetbeyli), from the territory of ancient Colophon, buried c.120. Of its 25 cistophoric tetradrachms, 15 come from nearby Ephesos. See Travaglini 1997, 137-42.
72 Kleiner 1978.
73 Kleiner 1978, 90.
76 Stumpf 1991.
77 Another example has turned up recently in commerce, reported in Valverde 2007, 34, n. 68.
It is unclear whether Aristokles’ name appears alone on the drachm due to considerations of space in the visual field, or whether this is an expression of a different institutional arrangement. Either way, it appears that Tralles – and perhaps only Tralles – was minting fractions after a decade-long hiatus.

After all the intervening disruption, why was it yet again “remembered” that Tralles specialized in fractions? We need not imagine that the Tralleians held a monopoly on some form of metallurgical know-how. Rather, we need to take seriously the possibility that the monetary needs of Tralles had been distinctive all along. In other words, we need to look at the economic and historical geography of the Maeander Valley. Thonemann’s study of the long-term history of the Maeander region illustrates beautifully how it can either connect or separate different stretches of Anatolia. Thus, for example, Thonemann views Apameia as both a limit point for the Attalid imperial space, and also as an interchange between the steppe of inner Anatolia and the coastal lowlands. Of course, the Maeander after 188 was very much a political frontier, chosen

78 These coins bear the ethnic of Tralles.
79 Thonemann 2011b, 99-129.
to mark the boundary between Rhodes’ domain on the mainland (peraia) and the expanded Attalid kingdom. In economic terms, this frontier was less formidable. Thonemann’s study does not offer us any idea of what an interchange would look like that connected the Rhodian zone of southwestern Asia Minor to the Attalid Maeander and beyond. Tralles fits the bill perfectly. From Ephesos on the coast, gateway to the Attalid kingdom in this period, all the way to the upper Maeander, the only major road leading out of the Valley heads south from Tralles into Caria. It runs from Alabanda, through Lagina and Strattonikeia, past the Ceramic Gulf, and terminates in Physkos, on the modern Gulf of Marmaris, on the mainland opposite Rhodes. Branching off the so-called Southern Highway, this would have been a major road under the Attalids, the kind of road that M. Aquilius took pains to improve in the early years of the Roman province of Asia. Indeed, Strabo’s source Artemidoros of Ephesos (fl. 104-101 B.C.E.) travelled it. In his testimony, Artemidoros is explicit about how he conceptualizes the road. For him, the road was part of a route from Physkos in the Rhodian peraia to Ephesos:

Φησι δὲ Ἀρτεμίδωρος ἀπὸ Φύσκου τῆς Ῥοδίων περαίας ἱδούσιν εἰς Ἐφεσον μέχρι μὲν Λαγίνων ὀκτακοσίους εἶναι καὶ πεντήκοντα στάδιους, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ εἰς Ἀλάβανδα πεντήκοντα ἄλλους καὶ διακοσίους, εἰς δὲ Τράλλεις ἐκατόν ἕξικοντα ἄλλʼ ἢ εἰς Τράλλεις ἐστὶ διαβάντι τὸν Μαίανδρον κατὰ μέσαν ποὺ τὴν ὀδὸν ὅπου τῆς Καρίας οἱ ὄροι γίνονται δʼ οἱ πάντες ἀπὸ Φύσκου ἐπὶ τὸν Μαίανδρον κατὰ τὴν εἰς Ἐφεσον ὀδὸν χίλιοι ἐκατόν ὑγδούκοντα (apud Strabonem 14.2.29).

For Artemidoros, Tralles was precisely the middle point on this route, both in terms of distance and conceptual geography. Tralles was the end of Caria and the beginning of something else.

In monetary terms, Tralles was an interchange between, on the one hand, the Rhodian zone to the south, where Rhodian and pseudo-Rhodian coinages on epichoric standards dominated for five centuries, and, on the other, the young cistophoric zone. After 188, but before the advent of the cistophoros, the Rhodians reformed their coinage, minting the plinthophoros. The Rhodians may have designed the plinthophoros to be

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80 For the route and the evidence of Roman milestones, see Magie 1950, 41, 797, noting that this road is not in Peutinger. We do not have a milestone of Aquilius for this road. See French 1988, with Map 6; see also the forthcoming Ausonius volume on the historical geography of Caria.

81 See Radt et al. 2002-2011, v. 8, 99 for the problem of whether to attribute to Artemidoros or Strabo these measurements, which have seemed to Moderns wrong; an interesting prosopographical link suggests itself in the figure of Apatourios of Alabanda, who Vitruvius (De arch. 7.5.5.) tells us built the ekklēsiasterion at Tralles; according to MacDonald 1992, 15, the circulation pattern of coins of Aphrodisias in the longue durée follows this route, from Caria to Lydia and Ionia along the roads of Maeander Valley. Only in late Roman times does Aphrodisian coinage flow east.

82 For date of introduction of the plinthophoros, see Ashton 2005 with references to earlier debate.
even more epichoric than other Rhodian and pseudo-Rhodian coinages in circulation. In any case, the plinthophori, like other coinages on the various “Rhodian” standards, circulated throughout the Rhodian peraia and rarely left the zone. For their part, the cistophori almost never left the Attalid kingdom. Thus the Maeander Valley formed the border between two large, relatively impermeable regional monetary systems. Passage between the two would have necessitated currency exchange. And if the volume of those exchanges were higher than elsewhere, the demand for small denominations would have been particularly pressing. Indeed, if we accept that Tralles linked the Rhodian zone to the cistophoric zone, then as an interchange between two major epichoric systems, Tralles was *sui generis* as an Attalid mint.

The only way to estimate the volume of currency exchange in and around Tralles is to examine the numismatic evidence. The record of hoards is thin, as usual, but still suggestive. As noted, fractions of Tralles dominate the only known hoard of late cistophoric fractions, which is the un-provenanced *IGCH* 1460. For early, pre-133 cistophori we are luckier. We still have just one hoard containing fractions, but at least it has provenance. *IGCH* 1328 from Sahnali contains 18 pieces of cistophoric silver, 10 of them fractions. Again, amongst the fractional mints, Tralles predominates, with four didrachms. But the other mints are represented too: one didrachm apiece from Pergamon, Ephesos, Apameia, and “Synnada.” While *IGCH* 1328 provides further confirmation of Tralles’ special role, it also sheds light on circulation patterns in the system. In other words, it is important to notice that the hoard contains coins from all the major mints, both cistophoric tetradrachms and fractions. It could be what numismatists call, with all due caution, a “circulation hoard,” the proverbial snapshot of what was in circulation at a given place and point in time. The hoard was found near the site of ancient Euhippe, which lies just opposite Tralles, south across the Maeander plain, not far to the east from where the route of Artemidoros entered and exited the Valley, on the way from Tralles to Alabanda in Caria. We simply do not have the hoard evidence to test the

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83 Bresson 1993; Bresson 1996.
84 See discussion of hoard evidence infra.
85 For Bresson 1993, the Rhodian zone is closed; *pace*, Ashton 2001, 95-6, with personal observation from storerooms in Rhodes; for regional pattern, cf. also *IGCH* 1330; on the nature of Mediterranean frontiers, see Horden and Purcell 2000, 24: “There may be cultural, ethnic or linguistic frontiers; but there are no natural ones. There are only frontiers that have arisen out of the interaction between political centres and their peripheries. Frontiers are created slowly, not given; they are very often better conceived as fluid zones of transition between jurisdictions than as clear-cut lines on landscape or map.”
“Supplementary information from Saadet Taner. To be published by F. Kleiner;” Meadows communicates to me his suspicion that this hoard is related to fighting in Caria during the war of Aristonikos.
87 For hoard methodology and circulation, see, Howgego 1995, 88-94.
representativeness of the Sahnali hoard in terms of circulation, though it is unquestionably representative in terms of content, i.e., the fractions of Tralles predominate. This is an isolated piece of evidence, but it suggests a pattern of circulation that concentrates fractions from all over the Attalid kingdom in the vicinity of Tralles, on the very edge of the cistophoric zone.

The hypothesis of heavy traffic between the Rhodian and cistophoric zones, channeled through Tralles, which produced a high volume of currency exchange, motivating the special role of Tralles in the cistophoric system, finds support in the behavior of mints south of the Maeander after the introduction of the cistophoros. In reaction to the creation of the cistophoric zone, these cities minted a portfolio of coinages on different standards, which allowed them to maintain their economic ties to the Maeander and profit from their own position of connectivity. After 167, the Rhodian political hegemony in Caria and Lycia began to collapse, but SW Asia Minor was still very much part of the Rhodian monetary koinê. In Caria, Alabanda in the 160s minted not only Attic-weight Alexanders, but also a coinage on the cistophoric standard. With this coinage, Alabanda was not pledging fealty to Pergamon. It remained outside the Attalid kingdom, even if Eumenes II was inching into the power vacuum. The Alabandan “cistophori” imply significant traffic back and forth along the first stretch of the Tralles-Physkos corridor, and represent one state’s attempt to integrate the two regional systems to its advantage. Similarly, Carian Stratonikeia, which lay further south along the same route, minted a curious denomination in this period, an Attic tridrachm alongside an Attic drachm in a system otherwise dominated by plinthophoric drachms and hemidrachms. Meadows has pointed out that the weight standard of Stratonikeia’s tridrachm, c.12-12.5g, made it interchangeable with a cistophoros. In Lycia, Oinoanda

88 For Carian and Lycian revolts of 168, see Plb. 30.3.11-16. In 167, the Senate ordered to Rhodes to remove garrisons from Caunos and Stratonikeia, and then formally ruled Caria and Lycia free (Plb. 30.21, 24). However, Rhodian influence on the mainland was not extinguished (see, e.g., Strabo 14.2.3; Cicero Q Fr. 1.1.33; for Caunos restored to Rhodes by Sulla, or the Rhodian capture of Calynda in 163 with Roman confirmation (Plb. 31.5.5); see generally, Habicht 2006, 174-242; for the coins of independent Lycia before the First Mithridatic War, which remained on the Rhodian standard, see Troxell 1982 with Ashton and Meadows 2008.
89 See Meadows (unpublished dissertation); also, CH X 302, a hoard of 7+ Alabandan cistophori buried 150 (from W Asia Minor?).
90 Errington 2010; cf. the letter of Eumenes II to the Tabēnoi (Guizzi 2006). If the city is in fact Carian Tabai, the document is evidence of Attalid influence in the former Rhodian domain c.165. See P. Hamon BE (2009) no. 440.
may have pursued a similar strategy, minting silver didrachms that equated nicely with the cistophoros at the ratio 3:2.\footnote{Ashton 2005; cf. de Callataÿ 2007, for whom this is a Roman proxy coinage from the First Mithridatic War.}

Another Lycian city, late Hellenistic Kibyra followed Alabanda and minted its own cistophoric tetradrachms and drachms (BMC Phrygia, pp. 131-32, nos. 1-5). The Lycian cases are without firm dates, floating between the mid-second and early first centuries B.C.E. For our purposes, it need not matter. Clearly, the spread of the cistophoros into SW Asia Minor was a slow, intermittent, century-long process, still being completed in the early first century B.C.E.\footnote{The evidence of Aphrodisias is key here. Unfortunately, the weight standard of much of its first-century B.C.E. silver (c. 3.5g = drachm) is unclear, but see MacDonald 1992, 17; also, Crawford 1985, 160 mentions a small late-Hellenistic hoard of Aphrodisias. It contained coins of Tralles. Crawford also provides the following information: SNG von Aulock 7463, Pergamon, from before 134/3, worn; SNG Copenhagen 657, Tralles, c. 100, fresh, 2 specimens; Meadows has no further information, but has contacted Crawford, who may be able to provide more.} Along the way, it was useful for those cities situated on major routes in and out of the Maeander Valley to mint an appropriately flexible coinage.

The survival rates of the small denominations of Tralles may provide indirect evidence that cistophoric fractions were leaking out of the cistophoric zone faster than the cistophori themselves. Its drachms are known from 18 specimens (n) and 16 dies (D), a ratio of nearly 1:1; the didrachms are 30 (n) and 20 (D), exactly 3:2.\footnote{Kleiner’s numbers in ECC are actually 25 (n) and 20 (D), whereas the above numbers (30 (n) and 20 (D)) are taken from de Callataÿ (forthcoming, Table 8). I see two important questions here. First, has anyone checked to see that no new obverses are represented in the 5 new specimens added to the count by De Callataÿ? Second, have more specimens appeared on the market in the last three decades, perhaps even evidence of new hoards? I know of no new hoards, but a survey of auction catalogues is a desideratum.} Numismatists, with theoretical backing from statisticians, typically seek a sample of n/D = 3:1 before undertaking a die study.\footnote{For methodology, see Carter 1983.} Using a lower ratio is dangerous because it is not possible to estimate the original number of dies with any degree of certainty. In other words, we must admit that we do not have any idea of the scale of Tralles’ production of cistophoric fractions. However, we do know that Tralleian fractions survive very poorly. The average n/D for the entire cistophoric coinage (166-123) is 2.75 (1142/416).\footnote{Except for the figure for drachms, all figures from De Callataÿ (forthcoming, Table 8).} So, while the sample size is small, the fractions of Tralles are significantly below the average at 1.5 for the didrachms and 1.125 for the drachms. Yet we must also consider how these fractions compare to other small silver of second-century Asia Minor. Kinns’ study of the copious silver drachms of Ephesos, c.202-150, produced an n/D of 8.43 (590/7).\footnote{Kosmetatou’s unpublished study of the same coinage produced 4/47 (456/102) (De Callataÿ (forthcoming, 22, n. 66)).}
hand, the Rhodian plinthophori (185-84) survive at a much more comparable rate of 1.91 (1583/829), as do the Stratonikeian hemidrachms (130-90) (4.92 = 305/62) and the pseudo-Rhodian drachms of Mylasa (165-30) (5.79 = 619/107). Hoarding practice may account for the problem. It could be that small silver in a multi-denominational system was hoarded differently, i.e., less, and so survives less often. An apposite comparison is available from Bithynia of the reign of Prousias II (189-149). His silver drachms are extremely rare by comparison with his tetradrachms.98 We may also consider the possibility that the high volume of currency exchange on either side of the “cistophoric frontier” just south of Tralles contributed to a distinctive circulation pattern for the fractions, and thus a lower rate of survival.99 The plinthophoric drachm weighed about as much as the cistophoric drachm (3.05g), but we can hardly suppose that money-changers were willing to make the exchange for free.100 Did those who went south take the fractions of Tralles with them, exchanging these coins inside the plinthophoric zone, whence they went to the melting pot?

The weight of the evidence shows that local needs and preferences determined the choice of Tralles as the chief fractional mint in the cistophoric system. Or to put it another way, regionalism inflected the shape of the money supply in the Attalid kingdom. Consider again the regional situation along the Maeander, but now against the backdrop of the wider Hellenistic world. As Picard has illustrated, the typical late Hellenistic monetary system was built around large silver and fiduciary bronze, with little coinage at the intermediary values.101 Few regional systems reserved an important role for small silver. The exceptions to this rule were two: the symmachic Peloponnese and the Rhodian zone that intersected with the cistophoric zone at Tralles. In the late third or early second century, Rhodes even raised a tax (or a public subscription?) called the didrachmia (SEG XLI 649).102 Moreover, the imitative cistophoric production of Kibyra in Lycia seems also markedly biased toward the fraction. No comprehensive study exists, but a survey of major collections reveals a nearly 3:1 advantage for Kibyra’s cistophoric drachms over its

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98 In an unpublished study, I have collected c.154 silver tetradrachms of Prousias II from an extensive survey of auction catalogues and museum holdings. The survey turned up just a handful of silver drachms.
99 For weights, see Ashton 1994; Bresson is the chief advocate of the view that the “interoperability” of some of these denominational systems does not imply that the ancients waved the agio. Rather, he adduces cases like that of Timon of Syracuse in the Cyclades to show that one might, perhaps in a euergetic context, wave it. See Bresson 1996 and 2001; contra, see the carefully argued article on mid-second-century Rhodian coinage of Apostolou 1995.
100 Ashton 1994 on weights; Bresson is the chief advocate, against the views of some others, that the “interoperability” of some of these denominational systems does not mean that the ancients waved the agio; rather, he adduces cases like that of Timon of Syracuse in the Cyclades to show that one might wave it.
101 Picard 2006, where he shows how much bronze is changing hands in Archippe’s Kyme.; Picard 2009 on exchange rates in Delphi is also relevant.
The Tralleian cistophoric fractions are representative of the affinity of SW Asia Minor for small silver. In the end, there were good reasons for Tralles to specialize; the choice was not arbitrary.

The case of Tralles is a far cry from proof that the crown held fiat power when it came to the shape of the money supply. Naturally, the Tralleians possessed some notion of how to shape it themselves. Recall that they minted Attic-weight gold staters in two issues c.167-133. They may very well have minted civic bronzes in this period too. The city also applied its countermark of bull protome and ethnic ῬΩΑΛΛ[ΕΩΝ] to an Athenian New Style tetradrachm, dated on the high chronology to the 170s and on the (radical) low chronology to the 140s (Thompson no. 184b; IMAGE 25). One can conceivably find local inflection up and down the complete range of value. Yet for poleis, just as important as the shape of the money supply was the rhythm of monetary production. As noted, the cistophoric system displays a number of administrative anomalies. From Tralles, we have intriguing signs that the rhythm of minting was not set on high. These are the unusual combinations of letters and monograms on Kleiner-Noe series 33-35, tetradrachms, didrachms, and drachms, which Ashton has read as Macedonian months. Again, the sample size is small, and the die links imply a perhaps short-lived experiment. None of this disproves the existence of a central authority in the cistophoric system. It merely alerts us to the existence of countervailing forces of decentralization. When it came to money, Tralles wanted what every Greek state wanted under the stress of the “anarchy” of their monetary world: some measure of control over the rhythm of the production of coinage – and with it, the shape of the money supply; some room for supple reactions to changing conditions.

103 Collections surveyed: SNG Copenhagen, ANS, BMC, Arthur S. Dewing, SNG Deutschland (U Leipzig), Jameson, Hunterian, Babelon.

104 Discussion in Thonemann 2011b, 40, n. 100; see also Robert, OMS III, 290-91 for the possibility that bronze coins from Tralles minted in the name of Διὸς Εὐμενοῦ date from post-Apameian Attalid times; for Robert, a full study of Tralles’ coinage was still a desideratum; see also Marcellesi 2010, 199, who does not discuss this case in particular but argues for the appearance of numerous civic bronzes in the expanded Attalid kingdom after the cistophoric reform, even in places which had not coined before, e.g. Apameia, for which now note Arslan and Devecioğlu 2011.

105 For discussion of this countermark, see infra; for its publication, see Bellinger 1949, no. 5 (pl. 3, no. 5) and Noe 1954, 85, both of which make no comment.

106 Bresson 2005.

107 Ashton and Kinns 2003. It is interesting to note here that the city of Pergamon under the Attalids employed a modified Aeolian calendar, while the royal chancery used the Macedonian calendar. See I.Pergamon 247 line 14 and 251 line 1, with Daubner 2008. For a discussion of calendrical diversity in Hellenistic federalism, see Graninger 2011, 87-114; cf. Savalli-Lestrade 2010.

108 The notion of an ancient Greek monetary anarchy dates to the nineteenth century. But see too Rostovtzeff 1941, 655; for a classic example; regarding monetary supplicité, the vision here owes much to Francophone scholarship. See, e.g., Bresson 2005, and Delrieux; for the disjunctures of a closed monetary
Closure and Closed Currency Systems

Much about Tralles was royal. It had fallen to the Attalids as a “gift” city at Apameia, and they built it up at the expense of Sardis, traditionally the administrative center of the region. In Tralles, the Attalids constructed a palace and may have received extraordinary cultic honors. Granted, the relationship between sovereignty and coinage in ancient Greece was, to the say the least, fraught; and, as noted, it may have been in flux at this very moment. Still, on first glance, Tralles seems unlikely to have exercised influence over the design of the scaffolding of the cistophoric system. There seems to have been an open-air royal military encampment just beyond the city gates. If the introduction of the cistophoros necessitated negotiation, Tralles was not likely to have been in a position of strength. So the character of the cistophoric coinage was not “royal,” if by royal we mean that we can read the coinage as an expression of system that lacks supplicité at the level of local mint administration, see the case of Zenon, discussed by Bresson (forthcoming). It is becoming increasingly clear that many cities of the Attalid kingdom as a matter of course minted bronze and silver coins. Marcellesi 2010 provides a wealth of evidence of local minting at the lower range of value. Of particular interest here is the small silver (c.3g) of Adramyttion and in the name of Athena Nikephoros (c.1.5g).

See discussion of Tralles in Ch. 2., n. 25 and n. 26.

For the worship of Zeus Eumenes at Tralles as possible form of ruler cult, see Robert, OMS II, 287-91; however, for the suggestion that the cult, at least as it relates to the month Eumenaios in the Pergamene calendar, has nothing to do with the Attalids, see Daubner 2008.

Martin 1985 provides a classic account of the relationship between sovereignty and coinage in ancient Greece, but his focus is narrow, Thessaly under Philip II. The more recent study of Ziesmann 2005, largely confirming Martin’s conclusions, is also focused on the fourth century. Numismatists have begun to suggest that the second century B.C.E. witnessed a transformation of the traditional, looser relationship between sovereignty and coinage, as outlined by Martin and Ziesmann. See Meadows 2001, 61-2, and the prolegomenon to Roman Provincial Coinage (Burnett et al. 1992, 1). One key source is 1 Maccabees 15:6.

SEG XLVI 1434.
raw domination. Again, we can be struck by the un-royal appearance of the coins, but the role of royal authority in the system cannot be denied.\textsuperscript{113} This is because the cistophoric zone was a closed monetary system. The only state around capable of launching and maintaining an epichoric coinage on this scale and on this particular bloc of territory was Pergamon, even if nothing was possible without the cooperation of the cities.

THE SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRIA?

\textit{The Ptolemaic Model}

Confronted with a closed system within a monarchic state, scholarship has always turned to Ptolemaic Egypt, so much better documented, as both the historical and interpretive model for the cistophori. From Mørkholm to M. Marcellesi, the Attalids are seen to have taken direct inspiration from the Ptolemies.\textsuperscript{114} For Le Rider and De Callataÿ, the Attalids imitated the Ptolemies, but the model belonged to no one; closed currency systems were the norm in both classical and Hellenistic Greece.\textsuperscript{115} Lost in all this, is the distinctiveness of the Attalid case. In other words, even more than the term “royal,” the notion of \textit{closure} lacks nuance in accounts of the cistophori. While it has gone unchallenged, the inapt Ptolemaic comparison has led us off track.\textsuperscript{116}

Leaving aside the question of its origins and motivations, how did the Ptolemaic system work in practice?\textsuperscript{117} We know surprisingly little, but it is clear from the hoards that foreign coinage, both Attic-weight and foreign epichoric, ceased to circulate in Egypt

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Contra Szaivert 1983.
  \item Mørkholm 1982, 301: “There can hardly be any doubt that the inspiration came from Egypt...”; Marcellesi 2000, 330-31; cf. Rostovtzeff 1941, 1’293-94: “The monetary policy of the Attalids was in many respects similar [to the Seleukids’]. Their own coinage was sound and abundant. Like the Seleucids they insisted on their monetary prerogative. But Eumenes II, in order to increase the issue of coined silver and thus to promote commerce, did not hesitate to grant several cities of his kingdom the right of minting under his control special uniform coins, the so-called \textit{cistophori}, which soon became a Pan-Anatolian currency and circulated in large quantities both in Asia Minor and abroad. Nor did the Attalids differ from the Seleucids in their policy of allowing the local minting of small change.”
  \item Le Rider and De Callataÿ 2006, 113.
  \item It must be noted, Marcellesi 2010 has now changed the contours of the debate, and my argument is largely in sympathy with hers. She describes the Attalid system as only partially closed, and thus very different from the Ptolemaic. Still, she argues for a “harder” version of closure than that presented in this chapter; cf. Marcellesi 2008, 250: “…un système monétaire fermé. Les monnaies d’argent cistophorique sont désormais les seules qui aient cours à l’intérieur de l’État attalide...mais celui-ci n’atteint pas la rigidité du système lagide.”
  \item Von Reden 2007, 43-5 has provocatively questioned the assumption of a deliberate design behind the Ptolemaic system. For her, the Ptolemies arrived almost haphazardly at their solution, which was a solution to the problem of monetizing rapidly huge volumes of metal. She characterizes the Ptolemaic system as a classic demonstration of the validity of Gresham’s Law.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Over this period, the weight of the Ptolemaic silver coinage descended progressively from the Attic standard of c.17.25g to its own epichoric standard of c.14.25. Around the same time, Ptolemy I also introduced reduced-weight gold and bronze coinages. According to Gresham’s law, the reduced-weight coinages in precious metals would have driven the full-weight (i.e., Attic-weight) coinage, much of it foreign, out of circulation; and market forces alone would have kept Ptolemaic gold and silver coins from leaving Egypt, since their local value so exceeded their international. Yet we believe the Ptolemaic state had a more active role to play in creating the homogeneity of the hoards. Relying upon the indirect evidence of P.Cair.Zen. 1.59021 of 258, one generally sees an official prohibition on the use of foreign coinage in the form of a prostagma issued c.300. Note that we do not possess the text of a law, just the famous letter of the mint official Demetrios to the royal dioiketês Apollonios. It depicts a frustrated foreign merchant class waiting to change foreign (epichorion) gold coins and old Ptolemaic trichrysa into new Ptolemaic mnaieia after the reform of Ptolemy II. Their money is lying idle. The point is that in Egypt there were no options. The Ptolemaic state created a system in which the exclusive legal tender was whatever local coinage royal authority ruled dokimon (legal tender). Buying and selling, all payments public and private, were to be conducted in the local coinage sanctioned by the Ptolemaic state.

Part of the standard reconstruction of economic life in Ptolemaic Egypt, therefore, is the following scenario. A foreign trader arrives at port. To buy an export cargo, he will have to obtain Ptolemaic coinage. To buy Ptolemaic coinage, he has to bring his foreign coinage into the country. It is the opinion of A. Bresson that the import and export of foreign coinage in classical and Hellenistic Greece was taxed. According to Bresson, the Olbia decree of c.370 (Syll.3 218) shows that this was the norm. Having paid customs,

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118 The exceptions are gathered in Cadell and Le Rider 1997, 10, n. 11. Only three out of 35 hoards from Ptolemaic Egypt deposited after c.300 contain foreign coins.
119 For an account of Ptolemy I’s minting, see Cadell and Le Rider 1997, 9-11.
120 For precious metal Ptolemaic coinage from hoards outside Egypt, see the table (of Meadows) in Appendix 1 of Von Reden 2007.
121 For the genre of royal order envisioned here, to prostagma, see P.Cair.Zen. 1.59021 line 14; for Ptolemy I’s general prohibition of the use of foreign coinage c.300, see Cadell and Le Rider 1997, 10; for the comprehensiveness of the ban, see the Olbia Coinage Decree (Syll.3 218), lines 13-16: πωλεῖν δὲ καὶ ὑψώσας, πρὸς τὸν χάλκον καὶ τὸ ἀργυρίον τὸ ὀλβιοπολιτικόν.
122 Bresson (forthcoming, 18); see also CLA line 61, which explicitly prohibits taxation on import and export of coinage, implying that it might occur; just how strictly monetary flow was controlled is difficult to gauge. Were people searched? Again, Bresson has voiced a view of stringent control and announced a future study that will examine the practicalities of customs collection (Bresson 2007, 38). In general, he likens the intensity of surveillance in ancient Mediterranean customs regimes to medieval European standards of enforcement. It may be helpful to note a striking example from the Cairo Genizah. Between Old Cairo and the port of Alexandria, a trader was forced to stop and make 45 different payments (Goitein
the trader goes to a bank, where he changes foreign coinage into Ptolemaic coinage at officially prescribed rates of exchange – taking a 17% (?) loss on silver, perhaps even more on gold, over and above the exchange fee (allagê) of about 10%. Of course he keeps some amount of foreign coinage on hand in anticipation of his final departure from Egypt. He wants to avoid repurchasing foreign coinage from the bank, coinage that he will need when he arrives at his next port of call. Thus foreign coinage was not contraband in Ptolemaic Egypt, but simply useless. This is why it is so rarely found in hoards post-c.300, but occasionally does turn up.124

To compare the situation in second-century Asia Minor, when the Attalids introduced the cistophoros at a weight 25% below the Attic standard, they ensured that the coins would not travel far. Royal authority clearly granted them a premium above their international value as silver bullion. This explains why we essentially never find a cistophoric coin in a hoard outside the Attalid kingdom, the single cistophoros of the Larissa hoard being considered an intrusion (IGCH 237; buried c.165). So the cistophoric zone was closed in the sense that the cistophori did not leave. As Meadows points out, these silver coins behave just like any epichoric bronze: with all their fiduciary value, they are meant to stay put. Yet the Ptolemaic – or Olbian – notion of closure was something else. There, exchange as such was closed to foreign coinage, whether gold, silver, or bronze. In other words, whatever its real value in Egypt as precious metal, or its fiduciary value elsewhere as coin, non-Ptolemaic coinage could not serve as a means of payment in the Ptolemaic state. We have no reason to believe that the Attalids similarly banned the use of non-cistophoric coinage within the territory of their kingdom or even within some “cistophoric core,” the existence of which is scarcely visible in the hoard record. Ultimately, the cistophoric system outlived the Attalids and all their prostagmata. Yet to argue for a “hard” notion of closure, one often points to the

1967-1993, v. 1, 342). If we make this our model for Antiquity, it is not implausible to imagine customs agents of the second century B.C.E. going so far as to “search pockets” for stray coins. I recognize that the banking system changed over the course of the third century. By the end of the century, currency exchange was no longer the preserve of state-farmed monopoly banks, but for the earlier period, see the evidence of P.Rev. lines 73-8: only royal banks and state-farmed monopoly banks collected agio (allagê) on currency exchange. See Bogaert 1998, 169; for an officially prescribed exchange fee, which varies in the papyri, hence my “about 10%,” see Bogaert 1984, 181-82. However, for the exchange rate (kollybos, at least in the papyri), we do not know if it was set officially, particularly since parts of diagramma trapezôn of the P.Rev. are so fragmentary. See Bogaert 1984, 184; for the vocabulary of exchange fees as opposed to exchange rates in ancient Greek banking, see Bogaert 1968, 48-50.

124 See supra n. 118.
125 See supra n. 28.
126 Meadows (forthcoming).
127 See also the decree of Gortyn on bronze coinage, c.250-200 (SIG³ 525). Gortyn voted to demonetize its silver obols and mandate the use of its bronze coinage. Again, this is a different, much stronger form of closure than the one we find in the Attalid kingdom.
hoard record for pre-133 cistophori, which, again, is poor in the extreme. Almost all of the hoards contain only cistophori. However, the earliest hoard to include cistophori is in fact mixed, the 1962 “Asia Minor” hoard IGCH 1453, containing 71+ silver coins, 42 of them cistophori, the rest various Attic-weight coins, including 5 Pergamene. Meadows dates the deposit of this hoard to c.150, but is agnostic about its provenance. To preserve the picture of a Ptolemaic-style closed system, C. Boehringer in publishing the hoard placed it on the frontier between the cistophoric zone and the neighboring Attic-weight zone of Bithynia. We can only guess. In the end, what the evidence of hoards tells us more generally is that, usually, the ancient user kept cistophoric and non-cistophoric coinages separate; not that the Attalids proscribed the use of foreign coin.

The logic of such a hoarding practice is that the monetary system is ramified. Different payments require different currencies. For the Attalid kingdom, then, we can reconstruct the following scenario. A foreign trader arrives at an Attalid port or at an interchange like Tralles, and he first pays customs, we shall grant, on all the coinage he imports. To what extent does he then change his foreign coinage, Attic-weight or epichoric, into cistophori? The answer is that it depends on what kinds of payments he will make – and this is the crucial difference between the Ptolemaic and Attalid situations. For in the Attalid system, cistophoric coinage must have been required for only a certain set of payments. Chief among these payments would have been official payments: taxes, fees, rents, etc., and so our hypothetical foreign trader could certainly not have avoided purchasing some cistophori. Of the official status of the money-changer that he went to, we can say nothing. Yet in light of the comparative evidence, we can be fairly certain that the Attalid state fixed either the exchange rate or the exchange fee (agio), or perhaps both. In the fifth-century, the Athenians set an official agio for the

128 Collected in De Callataý (forthcoming).
130 Boehringer 1972, 183: “Sollte die Vermutung der Herkunft des Hortes aus dem pergamenischen Grenzgebiet zutreffen, so ist man versucht, ihn mit den kriegerischen Ereignissen von 150-149 zu verbinden, in denen Attalos II. Kräftig mitmischte;” cf. Kleiner and Noe 1973, 110: “As a rule, the cistophori did not leave Attalid territory, and it is almost certain that this hoard was buried in an area under Pergamene control.”
131 The hoard record for Asia Minor of the mid- to late second century B.C.E. is rather poor, which makes it difficult to generalize about hoarding practice. On the other hand, mixed hoards of any kind are very uncommon in IGCH for Asia Minor of the second century. A hoarding practice that separates epichoric from international coinages may be in evidence in, e.g., a hoard of 25 cistophori from territory of Colophon, buried ca.120 (CH IX 535, Ahmetbeyli = Travaglini 1997, 137-42). Colophon was of course participating in a wider zone of circulation in this period, even if this hoard does not reflect it; or cf. the Mugla hoard (IGCH 1357), republished in Meadows 2002. Of all its 350+ AR of Rhodes and Stratonikeia in the Rhodian peraia, none belong to Meadows’ “Group 1” of Stratonikeian coins, the subset of the city’s coinage that was minted on a standard that was compatible with both the Attic and cistophoric standards.
132 See supra, n. 122.
exchange of foreign coinage into owls in the so-called Coinage Decree (ML 45 line 5). The Olbiopolitans, in the aforementioned decree, set an official rate of exchange for their coinage against Cyzicene electrum staters (Syll. 218 lines 24-6). In the end, this is part of the logic of any epichoric coinage: the state, whether it be a polis like Sestos or the Ptolemaic kingdom, gained revenue by forcing people into currency exchanges, and then profiting from its position of monopoly power over some aspect of those exchanges.

For a host of other payments inside the Attalid kingdom, one might have preferred or been compelled to make payments in Attic-weight silver or gold; or in a different epichoric coinage such as the Rhodian, perhaps, in places with strong economic ties to Rhodes, its peraia, and the Cyclades; or for small transactions, in the local epichoric bronze that cities minted without Attalid participation and without reference to the cistophoric standard. It may have been that the deeper one went inland, the more payments required cistophori. But it need not have been so. Wherever you went, people were making payments in cistophoric and non-cistophoric coinage.

The Attalid Model

If we adopt a ramified vision of coinage in the Attalid kingdom, we can resolve a number of outstanding problems. The first is the troublesome matter of the extraordinarily high cost of exchanging non-cistophoric coinage for cistophoric. Assuming one exchanged an Attic-weight silver tetradrachm for a cistophoros, the commission was 25%, plus whatever agio was charged. The conventional agio in ancient Greece seems to have been c.5-7%, so the total premium of the cistophoros would have been near 30%. Again, the Ptolemies are seen to have set a precedent with the high rate of exchange of 17%, their agio being around 10%, for a similarly high total premium of

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133 κατ’ αλλάτειν
134 For Sestos: I.Sestos 1 lines 44-6; for exchange rates and fees in Ptolemaic Egypt, see n. 123; should we be imagining an official exchange rate for cistophori against Attic-weight coinage alone? Bogaert 1984, 184 adds the paradigm of the Olbia decree in discussing the possibilities for Ptolemaic Egypt. Olbia mandates an official exchange rate of one Olbian hemistater to one Cyzicene stater, making all other exchanges a matter of “persuasion.”
135 Marcellesi 2010, 198-200 raises the issue of the large number of civic bronze coinages from within the post-Apameian Attalid kingdom, though as she admits, it is not always possible for numismatists to agree on dates for all of these coins. The case of Apamea itself is particularly interesting, since it seems to begin minting bronze for the first time after its inclusion in the Attalid kingdom. On these civic bronzes, see infra.
136 The total premium postulated could be even higher if customs dues on imported coinage are added; for the conventional agio in ancient Greece, see Bogaert 1968, 115 for a norm of around 5%, slightly higher in the Delphic evidence (7-9.5%), on which, see Bogaert 1968, 109; see the discussion of all three cases treated here in Le Rider and De Callatay 2006, 112-14. Their view of the cistophoric system is the traditional one, which likens it to the Ptolemaic system and the experiment of Byzantion and Chalcedon, c.235-220. The Attalids are said to take a “tax au change” of 25%; see also Mørkholm 1982, 296 for conventional rates of agio, and 301 for the standard assumption of a 25% premium for the cistophori.
around 30%. Yet how can we compare the resources and ecology of Ptolemaic Egypt to Attalid Asia Minor? To buy Egyptian grain, the premium was evidently palatable, and the Ptolemies enjoyed the perfect ecological conditions for enforcing monopoly. In an analogous fashion, the cities of Byzantion and Chalcedon profited from their peculiar ecology, but overreached c.235-220 when they tried to force an exchange rate of c.19% on users. This is a limiting case: it seems that Rhodes went to war over the issue, and the closed currency system failed. Byzantion and Chalcedon lacked the resources to sustain the enterprise. For their part, the Attalids enjoyed neither a preciously unique ecological niche, nor a productive base that could have justified a demanded premium of 25+. Thus scholarship has struggled to explain how they managed to impose and maintain the kind of closed system that succeeded in Egypt but ultimately failed in the Propontis. This is a question mal posée. Those are inappropriate comparanda.

We can now also make sense of the large amount of Attic-weight silver minted in Attalid Asia Minor after the cistophoric reform, with both royal and civic types. First, we can dispense with the idea that these were “export coinages.” Notice the scale: this was an important part of the money supply in Asia Minor. Of course as international coinage, these coins were particularly useful for exchange with outsiders. Yet we need not doubt that they passed between insiders too, if we can accept that there existed a series of non-official payments for which these coins were legal tender. S. Psoma restricts these transactions to the fairs of religious festivals, where in her view, locals were required to use Attic-weight coinage to make purchases. These were largely big-ticket items like slaves and livestock, and the vendors were outsiders. She adduces the tetradrachm of the technitai of Dionysus (of Ionia and the Hellespont), and the Attic silver called for in the Archippe dossier from Kyme, prescribed for the purchase of a victim. Indeed, one could explain the rare gold staters of Tralles similarly. Like Kyme, the city needed to buy a bull for a festival sacrifice. Yet why should the city be required to purchase the bull a) from an outsider, and b) under the special conditions of festival commerce? The associations of technitai, after all, were regional; in Asia Minor, they were intimates of the Attalid court – in other words, these were not the consummate outsiders. Psoma’s point is salutary, but she has isolated only one of the contexts for which Attic-weight coinage would have been usable and useful.

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137 This is the interpretation of Seyrig 1968 of the episode recorded in Plb. 4.46-52.
138 Most recently, Meadows (forthcoming); I will make no attempt here to compare systematically the agricultural wealth of Ptolemaic Egypt to Attalid Asia Minor, though the superiority of the former is self-evident. This is why we should be cautious about equating the two states “internal resources,” as Marcellesi 2000, 337 does implicitly.
139 See most recently, Psoma (forthcoming).
140 Psoma (forthcoming, 5-7).
141 The Archippe dossier dates to Attalid times on van Bremen’s high chronology. See van Bremen 2008.
It is difficult to shine a light directly on those other contexts for Attic-weight coinage in the Attalid kingdom, but we possess an important clue in the form of the aforementioned Athenian New Style tetradrachm, which bears the countermark of bull protome and the ethnic ΤΡΑΛΛΙ[ΕΩΝ] (Thompson no. 184b; IMAGE 25). M. Thompson dated the issue of the coin in Athens to 175/4, but the whole series has long been downdated. On D. Lewis’ influential chronology, the Athenians issued the coin some thirty-three years later. Picard’s downward shift is only twenty years, but he also questions the assumption of uninterrupted minting. On any of these chronologies, a coin minted, at least, one or two decades before 133 can plausibly be imagined to have entered circulation in the Attalid kingdom. Later, the coin was countermarked by the Tralleians. A priori, there is no reason for this to have been after 133. Attalid Tralles certainly minted gold on the Attic standard, and probably issued its own epichoric bronze. Why should the city not also have countermarked this piece of Attic-weight silver? It would be circular reasoning to suppose that its weight alone proves that the countermark was applied after a putative ban on foreign coinage disappeared with Attalos III. Again, the cistophoric system survived 133 intact. The problem is how to interpret the countermark. Rather than see it as re-monetizing a coin that is no longer money once it travels inside the cistophoric zone, we can see it as expanding the range of transactions for which the coin is acceptable. Whoever conveyed the New Style tetradrachm to Tralles considered it money. The countermark only extended its acceptability, and perhaps cleared up some ambiguity about its value. The coin became legal tender for some new context, likely for the payment of civic taxes, a stark reminder that civic fiscality had its own relationship with coinage to maintain.

Dispensing with the Ptolemaic model also allows us to clarify the role of bronze coinage in the Attalid monetary system after the cistophoric reform. In Egypt, closure meant the application of standard ratios of value between Ptolemaic gold, silver, and bronze. Thus when the Ptolemies altered the weights and denominational structure of their bronze, the papyri reflect the consistent application of the new ratio. Around 260, Philadelphos was even able to impose a heavy bronze coin at value equal to his silver drachma. Granted, the Attalid state will have had a hand in fixing the rates at which moneychangers in the kingdom sold their cistophori, rates that were reckoned in gold, bronze, or other silver. The state had to safeguard its profit – precisely what the Athenians do in the Coinage Decree, or what we see the Roman emperor Hadrian

\[^{142}\text{See Lewis 1962, but also Mattingly 1971, 34-46, largely endorsing the low chronology of Lewis.}\]
\[^{143}\text{Picard 2010, 173 and 167-75 for references to earlier bibliography.}\]
\[^{144}\text{Pace, Marcellesi 2010, 198-200.}\]
\[^{145}\text{Cadell and Le Rider 1997, 18-19.}\]
attending to in the famous decree of Pergamon (OGIS 484). Yet the Attalids minted no gold and minimal if any bronze in this period.146 No bronze has been shown to be related to the cistophori, unlike, for example, the Rhodian plinthophori. In other words, the Attalids had at most an indirect influence over the value of those coins used in an entire sea of transactions. The value of these bronze coins was not determined solely by the asking price for cistophori, but far more directly by the authorities that issued them. And those authorities were the cities of the Attalid kingdom – and probably also the polis of Pergamon itself – whence came their fiduciary value.147 This coinage has often escaped notice because it has long been conventional to use 133 as a terminus post quem for many of the copious late Hellenistic bronzes of Asia Minor; to assume, unjustifiably, an Attalid prohibition of civic bronze.148 In a recent study of the bronze recovered in the excavations of Pergamon, J. Chameroy shows that the introduction of the cistophoros had no effect on the production of bronzes minted in the mint of Pergamon in the name of Philetairos.149 Furthermore, the bronzes of other cities have not surfaced in Pergamon. The picture that emerges is of each city attending to its own needs for bronze, choosing the value and acceptability of coin for this tier of the monetary system. We are very far indeed from Ptolemaic Egypt.

THE CISTOPHORI: A COORDINATED COINAGE

Part of the justification for examining in detail the incongruence of the Ptolemaic and Attalid systems is that it now allows us to distinguish the banal from the exceptional. That the Attalids should have instituted a ramified monetary system, which coupled closure, in the form of a silver coinage decoupled from the international standard of its day, with an openness absent from Egypt (and Rhodes?) was in fact commonplace. Marcellesi has argued lucidly that the impermeable Ptolemaic system and the famously

146 J. Chameroy’s forthcoming article in Chiron will be a major contribution to the debate.
147 On bronze coins issued in Pergamon, either by the city or by the kings, in lieu of Chameroy’s revisionist study, see Marcellesi 2008, 249-50. Building on Westermark 1991 and 1995, she dates certain series of bronze minted in the name of the city to the post-Apameian period, along with bronze in the name of Athena Nikephoros and other divinities. The bronze Philetarioi, which for her are also minted by the city, stop after 188.
148 See, e.g., the conclusion of J. Krauss in his edition of I.Sestos 1. He dates the civic minting episode of lines 44-46 to some time after 133, applying this rule of thumb; the same rule is applied throughout corpora such as BMC. See, e.g., BMC Phrygia, sv., Apameia, where all of the city’s bronze save one exceptional coin are dated post-133; cf. MacDonald 1992, 1 on certain bronzes, referred to as “pseudo-royal petty coinages.”
149 Forthcoming in Chiron. The article will challenge several received ideas including the contention of Westermark 1991 that bronze issues in the name of Philetairos ceased when the cistophori began; Meadows, in a personal communication, has expressed suspicion of Chameroy’s announced conclusions, which do not fit well with, e.g., the evidence of the ANS collection.
liberal Seleukid one were the outliers of the Hellenistic world. The norm for most Greek states was a mixed regime: epichoric coinage was required for one set of transactions, while for the rest, to paraphrase the Olbian decree on coinage, it was a matter of persuasion. This is just what we have envisioned for the Attalid kingdom. It is instructive here to recall that in the late 180s, the Attalids had twice asked the Kardakoi for a certain tax to be paid in Rhodian coin. It should then be no stretch of the imagination to propose that after 167 Pergamon was prescribing a particular coinage – their own cistophori – for a certain set of official payments. Yet in Marcellesi’s schema, the Attalids belong with the Ptolemies and Rhodes, as opposed to her typical Hellenistic state, which is a smaller state, i.e., the polis. This exposes what is truly strange about the cistophoric system: its size. Instead of imitating the Ptolemies, the Attalids acted rather like a polis with an exceptionally large chôra.

However, as we have shown, the Attalids did not act alone. They decentralized minting, and they seemed to have ceded to local actors some measure of control over the shape of the money supply and the rhythm of its production. Indeed, the cistophoric experiment only succeeded with the help of the cities. Just consider once more how currency exchange for cistophori would have actually taken place, our lack of epigraphical or literary sources notwithstanding. Either the exchange rate or the agio (or both) would have been fixed and standard across the kingdom. This is what all our comparative evidence tells us – again, this is the logic of an epichoric coinage. We have no way of knowing which kinds of banks performed the exchange, but we can be sure that many of them were located in the agoras of poleis, not confined to royal customs stations on a kind of cistophoric frontier encircling the kingdom. We know from the subscription of Colophon in 310 and the audit of Teos in the third century that in western Asia Minor one often held a portfolio of currencies. By the mid-second century, could things have changed so much? In these conditions, it was difficult to prevent people from making private deals that allowed them to avoid paying the state its due premium. The challenge had motivated earlier Greek cities to appoint official enforcers and impose

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150 Marcellesi 2000, 356. Of course in Olbia, exchange rates were a matter of persuasion, and all buying and selling was done with Olbiopolitan coins; regarding the role of persuasion in currency exchange, see the case of the League of Islanders and the banker Timon of Syracuse, IG 12 5 817, reinterpreted by Bresson 2001. Bresson sees a standing arrangement between Timon, the Islanders, Tenos, et al., to waive the agio for changing Rhodian and pseudo-Rhodian into attic-weight coinage. Euergetism seems to buttress the arrangement.

151 Marcellesi does not seem to be significantly modifying this view in her forthcoming habilitation. See Marcellesi 2010, 199.

152 For the “cistophoric frontier,” see Psoma (forthcoming, 5-6).

heavy penalties for non-compliance.\textsuperscript{154} And the problem never went away, as the case of Hadrianc Pergamon makes plain. There, the agoranomoi seem to have been derelict.\textsuperscript{155} The problem of compliance was formidable enough when the terrain was a single city’s \textit{chôra}, but the Attalids needed surveillance, policing, and communication across the wide expanse of their newly expanded kingdom. They needed, in a word, cooperation.

In their prolegomenon to the study of what they call “cooperative coinages,” E. Mackil and P. van Alfen have drawn attention to a broad category of inter- and intra-state minting arrangements that remain poorly understood. Emphasizing the costs and complexities of the enterprise, Mackil and van Alfen seek explanations for why polities submitted to work together. Reacting against a tradition that read these coins as a straightforward expression of political union or domination, they propose a variety of economic explanations: “If, however, in each case it is possible to provide an economic explanation for the (functional) cooperation of multiple cities in minting coinage, then we need to ask whether any hegemonic factor is really significant.”\textsuperscript{156} The point is particularly trenchant for our understanding of a “multiscalar polity” like the koinon. In the case of the koinon, we are not always able to determine which came first, the political union and its attendant regional hegemony, or the joint minting arrangement; one can end, while the other persists. For Mackil, these are simply two different, if complementary ways of institutionalizing, in an effort to maintain and protect, a regional interdependence that already exists.\textsuperscript{157} Instead of a hegemon, an ecological imperative can compel cities to cooperate.

The cistophoric coinage was cooperative, but not quite in the same manner. Mackil and van Alfen seem to cast the monarchy (\textit{basileia}) as another multiscalar polity, but it is left out of their discussion.\textsuperscript{158} Yet here, there can be no doubt: political hegemony precedes the cooperative arrangement of minting and using these coins. Here, the significance of the hegemonic factor can be explained. It was the singular role of the Attalid state to coordinate between the different polities. Revenues may very well have been shared, but the fiscal benefits of the system were still distinctly advantageous for Pergamon. Across the kingdom, it became cheaper for the king to collect taxes and make gifts. Also, beneath the surface of Attalid hegemony, Asia Minor would have appeared

\textsuperscript{154} Thus in Olbia the penalty for non-compliance was the confiscation of all anything bought or sold; in Gortyn, young men at arms called \textit{neotai} enforced a coinage reform.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{OGIS} 484; cf. the incident of clandestine currency exchange in Mylasa, 209/10 C.E. (\textit{OGIS} 515). Mylasa gained important revenues from its monopoly on exchange. Private, illegal exchange threatened the city’s fiscal health. See the discussion of Bogaert 1968, 266-68.

\textsuperscript{156} Mackil and van Alfen 2006, 204.

\textsuperscript{157} Mackil and van Alfen 2006, 220; Mackil (forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{158} Mackil and van Alfen 2006, 204.
very different from Achaia or Boiotia, with their fragile but coherent regional economies. The Attalids, with Roman support, imposed a political hegemony on a group of regional economies oriented variously and only loosely interconnected. On Pamphylia, the Propontis, the Troad, the Maeander Valley, etc., one had to impose economic as well as political integration. The cistophori differ from many other cooperative coinages in that the accent is on the production of new economic behaviors, patterns, and links, rather than on the regularization and maintenance of old ones.

The cistophori, then, represent a special class of cooperative coinage, which is usefully termed “coordinated coinage.” We retain the economic raison d’être of Mackil and van Alfen, but we also take account of the role of the political hegemon, the coordinator. Because a coordinated coinage presupposes the cooperation of civic institutions, as with regard to the practice of earmarking and royal patronage of the gymnasium, it is important to keep in mind here the developmental trajectory of those institutions in the second century. In creating the cistophoric system, the Attalids drew from a reservoir of civic institutional know-how long in the making. They were also able to rely on a network of civic elites, perhaps newly enriched. These were men like Menas of Sestos, who was a trusty Attalid official and the kind of man his polis trusted when it decided to mint, someone who cared for the pragmata of the king but also for the pride of his city (I.Sestos 1, lines 12, 46). As we have seen, the system rewarded cooperation. Cooperation, however, is not the same as coordination. This is one of the conclusions of Levi in her fiscal sociology of revenue collection in a series of historical societies. She argues that successful fiscal regimes promote “quasi-voluntary compliance,” either through institutional or ideological means. Compliance is higher where fiscal institutions are more cooperative, and the Attalid kingdom can serve as a case in point. Yet people also cooperate with the tax-collecting state because they believe it is in their interest. The state gives them something in return. Ultimately, the cistophoric system engendered a level of economic integration in Asia Minor that buffered risk for all, and the revenues, along with the responsibilities, were likely shared. Yet we should

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159 One can see the different economic orientations of these regions in the history of their coinages. Pamphylia, oriented toward the Levant, is obviously an outlier in the Attalid kingdom. The Propontis displays distinctive features, such as the typically Pontic use of electrum and frequent use of countermarking. The economic patterns of the Maeander Valley are discussed at several points in this chapter, but see also IGCH 1330, c.125, from a house in Priene: 329 bronze coins of Priene, one AR of Rhodes, one “cistophoros” of Tralles. Again, we can see the coherence of the region, vaunted in Thonemann 2011b, as well as its contiguity to the Rhodian zone.

160 On the possibly recent enrichment of the great civic benefactors of second-century Asia Minor, see Thonemann 2011b, 249-51; also on these elites, see Grandinetti 2010 for the leading families of Priene, Kyme, and Miletos, and note the forthcoming publications of a German research project (2009-2011) directed by B. Dreyer and P. Mittag, “Lokale Eliten in antiken Großreichen.”

161 Levi 1988, esp. 48-70.
not lose sight of the fact that, fundamentally, the Attalids offered their subjects the service of coordination, itself a public good and a reward worthy of their cooperation.

MONETARY CHANGE AFTER APAMEIA

Explaining the Countermarks

In the cistophori, we have explained just one aspect of the monetary change ushered in at Apameia. Yet we have also developed a framework for analyzing two other numismatic puzzles of this period, the so-called cistophoric countermarking system, which preceded the cistophori, and the Wreathed Coinages, which were an integral part of the money supply after the cistophoric reform. Again, we need to consider the broader context of Hellenistic coinage, since no one minted in, or into, a void. In Asia Minor of the 180s and 170s, the silver coinage of one state countermarked by another would not have been an uncommon sight. While the Seleukid anchor and Helios countermarks seem to begin slightly later than the cistophoric ones, nearby in the Propontis, the practice was time-honored.\footnote{162} From precisely this period, the Propontis Hoard (\textit{IGCH} 888) contains a tetradrachm of Phaselis bearing a cistophoric countermark of Pergamon.\footnote{163} Earlier, Byzantion and Chalcedon had countermarked large quantities of Attic-weight coinage, not only during the “Phoenician episode” of c.235-220, but throughout the first half of the third century.\footnote{164} Moreover, the Propontis Hoard shows that contemporaneous with the cistophoric countermarks were the civic countermarks of Cyzicus, the letters KY ZI within a wreath, stamped on the very same Attic-weight silver tetradrachms from Pamphylia. For Thonemann, the KY ZI countermarks are numismatic evidence that

\footnote{162} For the rather aporetic problem of dating these two Seleucid countermarks of the second or third quarter of the second century, see Le Rider 1999, 229-33, with all earlier bibliography. Le Rider cautiously dates them to the years following 175, while for Bauslaugh 1990, 55-6, the hoard evidence points to c.170; see Bauslaugh 1990, 56 for the evidence of overstrikes (anchor countermarks struck over cistophoric countermarks), our only evidence for a slightly later date for the Seleucid countermarks; for the two countermarking systems in relation to each other, see also the recently published hoard of silver tetradrachms from Uşak (\textit{CH} X 293), which contained c.19 coins with cistophoric countermarks, but just one bearing the anchor.

\footnote{163} Waggoner 1979, no. 79 = Bauslaugh 1990, 41, pl. 4, no. 1; for discussion of date of Propontis Hoard, which has floated between c.180 and c.160, see Harl 1991, 277-78.

\footnote{164} Marinescu 2000, 334-35: “The countermarking of Attic coins which Seyrig placed at ca. 235 BC can now be shown to be part of a long standing tradition at Byzantium, which began by countermarking Ptolemaic tetradrachms...Therefore the countermarking of Attic weight coins must have commenced around 235 BC and seems to be a direct continuation of the same policy which first used Ptolemaic coinage;” note also a different set of countermarks from Byzantion and Chalcedon that seems to be later than Seyrig’s “Phoenician episode.” Marinescu 2000, 335 places one countermark from Byzantium in the last decade of the third century. Moreover the Propontis Hoard (\textit{IGCH} 888) contained two countermarks of Byzantion and one of Chalcedon. Seyrig himself dated the Byzantine ones 220-190. See discussion of Waggoner 1979, 23-4.
Cyzicus was not part of the Attalid kingdom, 188-133. We should be more cautious. Like the countermark of Tralles, or the Tyche countermarks of Smyrna (?) and the grape cluster of Temnos (?), the Cyzicene one is only proof that the city took action to control its local money supply. The cistophori and the Wreathed Coinages both imply that the Attalids regularly afforded cities that latitude.

Therefore, the Attalids adopted a practice in countermarking that may have had roots in the Propontis, and that a number of other states took up at roughly the same time. What motivated all these countermarking authorities to act? What problem(s) were they addressing? The opinio communis on the function of the countermark, as embodied by Seyrig’s explication of the “Phoenician episode” on the Bosporus and an influential essay of Le Rider, has clouded the discussion. To review, for a period of about 15 years, Byzantion and Chalcedon jointly minted silver on a reduced, so-called Phoenician standard. Simultaneously, the two cities seem to have countermarked all Attic-weight silver, mostly foreign, but also their own Lysimachi. For Seyrig, this was evidence of a closed currency system, instituted to raise revenue during a crisis reported by Polybius (4.37.8-10; 4.45.1-53.1). Fair enough, but this case has been used both as a general template for understanding countermarking, and specifically, to explain the cistophoric countermarks. The idea is that it only makes sense to countermark a (foreign) silver coin in order to either a) re-monetize it, or b) re-tariff it. The theory of re-monetization has nothing to commend it. It was plausible when the cistophoric countermarks were seen to accompany the cistophori themselves, or if the cistophoric zone is seen to be hermetically sealed. Yet it is doubtful whether any ancient Greek state, other than Ptolemaic Egypt, could in fact demonetize good silver coinage, especially nomisma hellenikon, which is something quite different from excluding it from certain transactions. The theory of re-tariffing is more suggestive, if by re-tariffing a coin, we mean increasing its local value relative to its value elsewhere. With the countermark, the state told the user that the coin was now acceptable for certain local payments. Was its new value reckoned in epichoric coinage, or was it assimilated to an epichoric coin? It is impossible to know, and the situation would have varied. If we want an axiom, it is that countermarking a precious metal coin increased its likelihood of remaining in the local money supply.

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166 This entire phenomenon of civic countermarks on Attic-weight coinage, (of Kyme and Alabanda, e.g.), is poorly understood, though obviously crucial for any understanding of the monetary system of the Attalid kingdom. Noe 1954 was the first to flag the issue. See also Seyrig 1973, 70, on the Tyche and grape cluster countermarks of the Tell Kotchek Hoard (IGCH 1773). In his unpublished dissertation on the coinage of Alabanda, Meadows dates these countermarks to the 140s.
The usefulness of this axiom is that it divorces our discussion of the cistophoric countermarks from speculation about the exact source of these Pamphylian Alexanders and autonomous issues of Side and the precise means by which they entered circulation. One tends not to challenge Bauslaugh’s suggestion that the coins represent a part of the Seleukid indemnity paid to the Attalids after Apameia. With most having given up on the idea of using the indemnity to interpret the monetary behavior of the Seleukids themselves in this period, it makes little sense to place so much weight on it in the Attalid context. Even more problematic is Bauslaugh’s reconstruction of the administrative procedure behind the countermarks, for it is based upon an untenable notion of “earmarking.” In his view, the cities of the Attalid kingdom had no revenues of their own, but only received “earmarked” revenues from the royal fisc. In similar fashion, Eumenes II would have received the indemnity directly from Antioch, and then disbursed various portions to twelve cities. Those cities would then have countermarked the coins with the common symbol of the bow in case and their individual ethnics, releasing the coins into circulation. Lost in all this is what motivated the administrative procedure. These coins are good Attic-weight silver – if traceable to the indemnity, the “best” (to argyron attikon ariston) (Plb. 21.43.19). Why go to the trouble? The imperative is to keep the silver from leaking out of the local money supply, which the metal was wont to do in a world where its global price was steadily increasing, attracting silver coin to where its buying power was greatest. In the cistophoric countermarks, we see twelve cities, many of them newly Attalid, previously belonging to diverse monetary systems, suddenly cooperating to meet this challenge on an impressive scale. For presumably, the cistophoric countermark of one city was an expression of the acceptability of the coin in any of the other countermarking cities. The mental map of those who used these coins started to look ever more like the one drawn up at Apameia. Functionally, the countermarking system was an initial step in the process of political and economic

\[\text{169}\] The sources for the indemnity are Plb. 21.43.20-21 and Livy 38.38.14; Bauslaugh 1990, 63, and in substantial agreement, Meadows (forthcoming, 21); also tempted to make the connection is de Callataį (forthcoming, 13-14), recalling the suggestion of Meadows 2009 that these attic-weight Pamphylia coins were in the first place a Seleukid “proxy coinage.” See discussion infra.

\[\text{170}\] No one doubts that the indemnity was burdensome, which is the thrust of the literary sources, but see the caution of Le Rider 1993; further on indemnities, see von Ungern-Sternberg 2009, and also Meissner 2008.

\[\text{171}\] Bauslaugh 1990, 64.

\[\text{172}\] I.e., North Syria. The flow of Attic-weight silver from western Asia Minor to northern Syria is well documented in the hoards. This is a problem that many are currently grappling with. For its relation to the long-term, incremental increase in the price of silver, see Bresson 2005; The notion of countermarking as way to economize silver, to stretch less silver into more money, can indeed be found in Le Rider’s classic essay, Le Rider 1975, esp. 44. This is picked up on by Szaivert 1983, 37, “Es kann diese Aktion nur, wie schon Le Rider gesagt hat, die Absicht gehabt haben, eine gewisse Metallmenge für die Eigenprägung bereitzustellen.” However, neither gives the coordinating role of the Attalids its due.
integration that only came to fruition after 167 in the form of the cistophori and Wreathed Coinages.

*The Mineralogical Background*

Before we turn to that changed landscape of the Greek East after Pydna, we must pause to consider the question of silver scarcity in late Hellenistic Greece. Bresson has helpfully urged us to distinguish between a general dearth of silver and local irregularities in its availability. The distinction is crucial for interpreting any monetary behavior that economizes on silver – either the countermarking, as we have conceived of it, or minting on a reduced standard. Granted, Rome withdrew large amounts of precious metal from the money supply of the eastern Mediterranean in the form of spoils and indemnities, and as Pliny noticed, the Romans preferred to be paid in silver (*HN* 33.15.51). Roman exaction was a major factor, but just one among several behind the gradually increasing scarcity of silver in this period. The consequences of this slow, steady drain of silver were twofold. First, because the demand for silver coinage was basically constant, a silver coin was now worth more relative to its weight in bullion. In other words, the buying power of silver coin was on the rise. Thus the value any state added to silver bullion by measuring and minting it, by stamping it with imprimatur, was also greater than before. There was plenty of silver bullion around; states just had a greater incentive to monetize it, to mint it on a reduced standard, and to add more fiduciary value. This is most evident in the silver coinage of Antiochus IV, which descended toward a standard 2% below the true Attic. The second, related consequence was that epichoric standards began to proliferate. Just like the countermarks, epichoric weight ensured that the coin remained nearby, and was thus protection against local irregularities in the supply of silver. But these standards also capitalized on the general uptick in the value of silver. It had become easier for states to add fiduciary value to the coins’ real value as a piece of bullion. Thus the cistophori belong to a group of large *monnaies locales*, including

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174 De Callata 2006, 39; De Callata et al. 1993, 92 estimates that 1/3 of the volume of silver coinage in circulation in the Hellenistic world at the beginning of the third century was in Rome by the end of the second century. To judge the effect of this withdrawal on the supply of silver, coin or bullion, it is necessary to have an idea of the amount of bullion in the system. De Callata 2006 is a systematic attempt to quantify gold and silver bullion in the Hellenistic world, at least in relation to the quantity of coined metal in the system. His conclusion is that only a paltry amount of bullion was coined. A typical Hellenistic king would have had an estimated 70% of his store of precious metal in bullion, 55% in silver bullion. Cf. Panagopoulou 2007, 335 on the “proliferation of silver during the Hellenistic period.”
175 Le Rider 1999, 225-26. This 2% descent had already happened in many other places when Antiochos IV began to reduce. Before the end of his reign, it is only observed at the mint of Antioch; cf. the full 10% descent for the silver coinage of Perseus, noted by Dahmen 2010, 54.
symmachic (reduced Aiginetan) and Rhodian coinages on various standards, which came to dominate particular regions in this period.\(^{176}\)

Rather than an acute lack of silver, the cistophori attest considerable Attalid reserves. The introduction of a new epichoric coinage presupposes a vast accumulation of metal, for it is not designed to appear in fits and starts, but as a deluge. We are dealing with a radical transformation of the monetary system. Indeed, the die counts tell us that the cistophori were minted in much greater number in the initial two decades than after c.150.\(^{177}\) While the tax receipts of the years 188-c.167 may have contained much of the needed silver, it is likely that local sources of silver were also available to the Attalids in their very hinterland. Anatolia on the whole was metal rich, and the northwest does not seem to have been an exception.\(^{178}\) Strabo tells us of a settlement between Atarneus and Pergamon, which by his time had been worked to exhaustion: πολλοίς ἔχουσα τὰ χωρία (14.5.28); and of Argyria on the Aesepos, ὅθεν ἀργύρου ἐστὶ γενέθλη (13.1.45). While the Troad was famed for its metals in Antiquity, it is difficult to match archaeological remains to the reports of Homer or Strabo, or to the testimony of early travellers and modern ethnographers about lead and silver mining in the vicinity of classical Neandria.\(^{179}\) On the other hand, a German archaeometallurgical survey of the region seems to have confirmed the testimony of Galen and lent credence to a theory of Wiegand.\(^{180}\) The site of Balya Maaden, in modern Balikesir province, near the

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176 For symmachic coinage in the Peloponnese of this period, the spectacular size of these issues, and thus their relation to the question of silver scarcity, see Grandjean 2007, esp. 21.

177 For the pace of cistophoric production, the evidence is based around IGCH 1453. See Meadows (forthcoming, 23-4, with table); Bresson 2005, 60 points out that the cistophori have no bearing on whether the Attalids lacked silver; note also that the Rhodian plinthophoros was heavier than earlier Rhodian and pseudo-Rhodian coins, hence the expression argyron rhodion lepton in the Mylasa leases, for which see Descat and Pernin 2008.

178 The site of Balya Maaden, in modern Balikesir province, near the
village of Balya, was recently one of the largest silver mines in the Near East. Between 1880 and 1935, it produced 1000 tons of silver.\textsuperscript{181} The ancient road from Pergamon to Cyzicus passes right through Balya, and it was on this road that Galen tells us a silver-mining settlement called Ergastèria was located (\textit{De Simp. Med.} XII 229 line 16 - 230 line 5). On the site of Balya, the survey catalogued a tremendous number of ancient cuttings, but also clear evidence of Hellenistic occupation.\textsuperscript{182} If in Rostovtzeff’s time it was simply assumed that the Attalids exploited Balya Maaden, the archaeological case today is much stronger.\textsuperscript{183}

\textit{Explaining the Wreathed Coinages}

The Antigonid collapse in the Third Macedonian War permanently altered the political complexion of the Mediterranean. For contemporaries, Polybius tells us, the conflict was a final and decisive battle for absolute hegemony: ὁ ῥώντων κρινόμενα τὰ ὅλα καὶ τὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἑξουσίαν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν πίπτουσαν (30.6.6). Cato the Elder shows us Greek onlookers reluctant to support Rome for fear of the monopoly on power that victory would bring: \textit{ne sub solo imperio nostro in servitute nostra essent, libertatis suae causa in ea sententia fuisse arbitror} (fr. 95 b). Macedonia had not yet been “provincialized,” nor Corinth yet destroyed, but as was clear to both of the chief beneficiaries of 188, the rules of the game had changed.\textsuperscript{184} This was the new environment in which the cistophori as well as the Wreathed Coinages appeared. The production of both coinages entailed the cooperation of royal and civic institutions. Yet Attalid involvement with the Wreathed Coinages is not self-evident. No less an authority than Le Rider has seen them as purely civic in nature.\textsuperscript{185} Taking the Attalid role seriously requires us to briefly consider the phenomenon of proxy coinage in the Hellenistic world. A proxy coinage is a coinage minted in the name of one polity at least in part out of bullion and institutional resources provided by another, larger polity – a cooperative, if not always coordinated minting arrangement.

\textsuperscript{181} Pernicka et al. 1984, 540.
\textsuperscript{182} For Wiegand 1904, the remains at Balya represent the site of Pericharaxis. He noticed that the villagers were offering mostly Roman coins for sale and concluded that the mining activity would have reached its peak in imperial times. The identification of Balya as Pericharaxis is often repeated in the literature, e.g., Gentner et al. 1980, 180 and Panagopoulou 2007, 318. However, see \textit{RE}, sv., Pericharaxis. See also Pernicka et al. 1984, 548, for Kastell Kadikalessi, 5km north of Balya, a site Wiegand himself explored, as Pericharaxis. What is interesting to notice is the extent of settlement along the Pergamon-Cyzicus road in this period, regardless of their toponyms.
\textsuperscript{183} Rostovtzeff 1923, 367, following Wiegand 1904; cf. Cary 1932, 141, n. 4, who presumes that “Bulgar-Maden” was active c.246 B.C.E.
\textsuperscript{185} Le Rider, 2001.
The practice of coining by proxy is not a scholarly invention, but a banal fact of Hellenistic monetary history. Particular cases may be open to question, but the phenomenon is well documented. Some of these coinages declare royal involvement openly, usually through iconography. Thus Erythrai c.306-304 minted bronze coins bearing the portrait of Demetrios Poliorcetes on the obverse, and the mark ΕΡΥ along with the name of a magistrate on the reverse. The citizens of Smyrna under Lysimachus minted bronzes that seem to depict the king’s daughter Eurydike accompanied by their new ethnic EΥΡΥΔΙΚΕΙΩΝ. Similarly, the Ephesians, as the Arsinoeis, put the face of Arsinoe II on their bronze, accompanied by distinctly civic control marks.186 Such marks allow us to understand some drachms of Corinth under Ptolemaic rule as a proxy coinage.187 Certain proxy coinages are easy to spot, such as the silver didrachms minted in Corcyra, bearing the face of Antiochos III on the obverse and the legend ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ on the reverse.188 For others, as H. Noeske has shown in attempting to track Ptolemaic gifts in the numismatic record, we have to look beneath the surface.189 This is usually a matter of evaluating the appropriate scale of a coinage, using the synthetic scale established for Hellenistic coinages by de Callataÿ to measure appropriateness.190 Interestingly, from c.170, suspiciously large coinages in the names of small or medium-sized polities proliferate: the tetrobols of Histiaeia, pseudo-Rhodian drachms from central and northern Greece, the Macedonian Meris coinage – even the Athenian New Style have come in for interrogation. For the Histiaeans and pseudo-Rhodian issues, some postulate Perseus as the source, but in most cases, Rome is the prime candidate, for the triumph of the denarius was yet a long way off in the second century.191 Meadows has provided the most apposite comparandum for the Wreathed Coinages in the large silver issues of

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186 On all these examples from Asia Minor, see Delrieux 2007, who makes the phenomenon seem rather ordinary; see esp. the interesting case of Kyme, with pls. in Delrieux 2007 and BMC Troas 105, no. 58. Under Antiochos I or II, Kyme minted tetradrachms with royal portrait/Herakles that share control marks with a more straightforwardly civic series, one which seems to bear the face of the Amazon of Kyme and certainly the identifying mint mark ΚΥ. We even possess a story of royal proxy minting in the lore of Kyme recorded in the excerpta politiarum of Heraclides Lembus (37): Ἐρμοδίκην δὲ γυναῖκα τοῦ Φρυγῶν βασιλέως Μίδα φασὶ κάλλει διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὴν εἶναι καὶ τεχνικὴν καὶ πρώτην νόμισμα κόψαι Κυμαῖοι.

187 The Chilomodi hoard (IGCH 85) included 14 drachms of Corinth and 12 of Ptolemy I, all with mark ΔΟ in mint condition. See Martin 1985, 179-84; cf. possible civic origin of so-called Peloponnesian Alexanders, discussed by Troxell 1971.

188 SNG Copenhagen 4; BMC Thessaly to Aetolia 195, nos. 9-11; Noeske 2000, pl. 30, 6.

189 Noeske 2000. He makes a laudable attempt to use metallurgical analysis to source the silver in particularly suspicious coinages.

190 De Callataÿ 2011. Whatever reservations we may have about the absolute figures that De Callataÿ has produced, his scale is a major contribution to scholarship and a powerful tool of analysis.

191 For the denarius, which did not achieve dominance until after the death of Caesar, see Crawford 1985, 252, and 345, for speculation on the tetrobols of Histiaeia; the notion of Roman initiative behind the Athenian New Style goes back to Giovannini 1978, 75-102, but most recently contra, Picard 2010, 167.
Pamphylian cities associated with Seleucid campaigns of the late third and early second century.  

The size of the Wreathed Coinages, in total roughly equal to that of contemporary cistophori, has long seemed suspicious, but our analysis of the monetary habits of the Attalids now allows us to make sense of it. It is important to remember that each city minted on a different schedule, over the course of a generation and beyond. The rhythm of production could reflect an Attalid payment schedule or a local need for coin, but it was most likely some combination of the two. We know that the Attalids ceded more than bullion here, as the iconography of the coins is often expressly civic, lacking the visual nod to the higher order polity common to many cooperative coinages of multiscalar states. If this minting arrangement relied on civic institutions and afforded civic actors some measure of control over the shape of their local money supply, it was not unlike the cistophoric system. In fact, these were two complementary and thus coordinated parts of the money supply of the Attalid kingdom. Yet the full scope of that complementarity is only apparent when we see that Attic-weight coinage was produced in the kingdom not just for exchange with the outside, but with locals too. At root, neither the practice of minting a proxy coinage nor even a coordinated coinage sets the Attalids apart. In precisely this period, we see a number of minting experiments that meet our definition of coordinated coinage. One example is the so-called municipal bronzes of Levantine and Cilician cities under Antiochos IV, featuring royal portraits, civic ethnics, and an array of weight standards.

A much greater and growing challenge to the case for Attalid distinctiveness consists of very late Antigonid coinages, minted in bronze and silver, both in the name of the Makedones and in the name of at least one, perhaps more, of the administrative regions (merides) that used to be understood as Roman

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192 Meadows 2009.
193 See supra n. 42.
194 See Meadows and Houghton 2010, esp. 185 (chart).
195 As suggested more or less tentatively by Meadows (forthcoming) and de Callataÿ (forthcoming). See here de Callataÿ (forthcoming, Map 2). This is his visual illustration of the coordination between separate spheres, coast and inland; contra, Marcellesi 2010, 200: “Quoi qu’il en soit, les tétradrachmes à la couronne ne font pas véritablement partie de la histoire monétaire du royaume attalide;” see also Jones 1979, for whom the Wreathed Coinages are a response to the cistophoric; cf. CH IX 535, the hoard from Ahmetbeyli in the territory of Colophon (Travaglini 1997, 137-42), because it shows that at least in c.120 the coastal “fringe” was using cistophori.
196 I of course recognize that large amounts of attic-weight coin produced in NW Asia Minor in this period left the system and entered north Syrian hoards. In light of the lamentably meager hoard record for NW Asia Minor itself in the same period, I cannot accept a priori the idea that all attic-weight coins minted in the Attalid kingdom were for “export.”
inventions. All of the late Hellenistic monarchies faced an upsurge in civic and regional identity, which properly harnessed, was a form of resistance to Rome. The coinage, then, from the countermarks to the Wreathed Coinages and cistophori, is simply a measure of how much farther the Attalids were willing to go to make use of these forces.

CONCLUSION

Our interpretations of each of these monetary practices of the Attalids, including our new understanding of the cistophori, do not rely for their validity on the firm dates that numismatics can so seldomly provide. Rather, they draw on a wide body of comparative material in order to explain the nature of Attalid imperialism, which in this domain, no less than public finance or euergetism, promoted civic identities and instrumentalized civic institutions. Still, if we place the start of the cistophori in c.167, with the Wreathed Coinages taking off over the following decade, the historical implications are significant. In terms of the political dynamics of the Mediterranean, we have emphasized the transformative impact of the Antigonid defeat in the Third Macedonian War. For the Attalids, the crisis did not end at Pydna, since the great Gallic Revolt had broken out in 168 and would continue until 165. The notorious Attalid penchant for bolstering their power with the threat, real or perceived, of the Galatian menace, best known from officially commissioned works of art, should not obscure the gravity of this particular situation. As S. Mitchell has taught us, the enemy was not the inchoate horde of Attalid propaganda, but by this point in the history of Celtic settlement in Asia Minor, a formidable, truly rival state next door. The anecdote of Polyaenus, which relates how a weakened Eumenes II sat in an open-air throne above a pass in order to deceive his Galatian pursuers, reminds us of the seriousness of the conflict from the

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198 For the Roman invention of the four merides, see Livy 45.18: “in quattuor regiones discribi Macedoniam;” yet “scribere” should mean “distribute/divide into parts,” and need not imply create the parts, e.g., Livy 31.14.2: “militibus voluntariss in legions discriptis;” suspicion of Livy’s testimony began with the study of the Larissa Hoard (IGCH 237). For its date of deposition, either 168/7 or perhaps closer to 165, see n. 28. The problem is that it contained six tetradrachms of the First Meris, while the Romans are thought to have closed the gold and silver mines of Macedonia until 158. Ultimately, we have been forced to recognize that the Roman merides were based on much older administrative divisions. (Corroborative epigraphic evidence in Hatzopoulos 1996, v. 1, 231-60). Recently, ever more Meris coinage has been updated to the late Antigonid period. See esp. Kremydi-Sicilianou 2007; Prokopov 2012; summary of recent scholarship (still in flux) by Dahmen 2010, 55; the other very important comparandum for the phenomenon of coordinated coinage is the Mithridatic bronze coinage minted in large quantities in the name of Pontic cities. See De Callataý 2011.

199 For the sources for this war, see Mitchell 1993, 26, and the epigraphical appendix of Ma (forthcoming).

Attalid perspective: this war required the personal attention of the king, who stationed himself on the front lines at Apameia. In this context, the short-lived cistophoric production of south Phrygia becomes much more comprehensible, as does the urbanization of that region, and indeed the settlement of Mysian soldiers all along the eastern approaches to the Anatolian steppe. With the post-Apameian kingdom coming apart at the seams, the Attalids looked for a way to reconstitute and reinforce an imperial space. Their solution was this puzzling new monetary system.

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201 Polyaeus 4.8.1; but no real proof, it seems, that this episode is from the Great Revolt; for Apameia, see inscription announced by Drew-Bear 1975, 357.

202 The evidence for this is an increasingly large body of inscriptions. See both Ma (forthcoming) and Thonemann (forthcoming), as well as Daubner 2011; for c.167 as a kind of caesura in late Attalid history, and not always appreciated as such, see Virgilio 2004.
An Analysis of the Fiscal System of the Attalid Kingdom

INTRODUCTION

to us, *Ελλήνας καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα ἐθνὶ τὴν ἁμφὶ τὸ Πέργαμον Ασιὰν νέμονται, κατὰ τε προσβείας παρόντας ἐπὶ συνθέσει καὶ μετακεκλημένους συναγαγὼν ἐλέαζον ὥδε: ἴμας ἡμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἔλληνες, Ἀττάλος ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν ἐν διαθήκαις ἀπέλειπε, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀμείνονες ὑμῖν ἤμεν Ἀττάλῳ· οὗτος γὰρ ἐτελείτε φόρους Ἀττάλῳ, μεθήκαμεν ὑμῖν, μέχρι δημοκράτων ἀνδρῶν καὶ παρ᾿ ἡμῖν γεωμετρῶν ἐδέφησα φόρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδέσθην, οὐ πρὸς τὰ τιμήματα ὑμῖν ἐπεθήκαμεν, ὧς ἐν ἡμεῖς ἀκίνδυνον φόρον ἐκλέγομεν, ἀλλὰ μέρη φέρειν τῶν ἐκάστοτε καρπῶν ἐπετάξαμεν, ἵνα καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων κοινωνῶμεν ὑμῖν. τῶν δὲ ταῦτα παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς μισθομενῶν ἐνβρειζοῦντων ὑμῖν καὶ πολὺ πλείονα αἰτοῦντων, Γαῖος Καίσαρ τῶν μὲν χρημάτων τὰ τρίτα ὑμῖν ἀνήκεν ᾧν ἐκεῖνος ἐφέρετε, τὰς δὲ ὑβρίδες ἔστησεν· ὑμῖν γάρ τοὺς φόρους ἐπέτρεψεν ἁγείρει παρὰ τῶν γεωργοῦντων.

And when he had gathered the Greeks and all the other peoples who inhabited that part of Asia around Pergamon, as well as those who were present on embassies seeking a treaty, and still others who had been summoned, Antony addressed them as follows: 'Your King Attalos, o Greeks, left you to us in his will, and straightaway we proved better to you than Attalos had been, since we released you from those taxes which you had paid to Attalos, until popular agitators also among us made these taxes necessary. But when they became necessary, we did not impose them upon you according to a fixed valuation so that we could collect revenue without risk, but we required a portion of your yearly harvest, in order that we should share with you the vicissitudes of the seasons. When wronging you the publicans asked for much more, Julius Caesar remitted to you one-third of what you had paid to them and put an end to their outrages: for he turned over to you the collection of the taxes from the cultivators of the soil (Appian, *B. Civ.* 5.1.4) (trans. after White 1972).

This speech delivered by Antony in 42 B.C.E. in Ephesos and reported by Appian is prime evidence for the fiscal history of the Attalid kingdom, 188-133. If it can be relied upon, Antony’s speech transmits important information about the Attalid fiscal system. It tells us the basics: that the direct taxation of the land and its produce was central; that each community was taxed according to a fixed assessment, meaning that the annual rate of taxation will have varied, according to the quality of the harvest; and it seems to imply that the Attalids did not employ royal tax farmers. Yet of course Antony’s rhetorical aim was not to transmit these administrative details to us, but to persuade his audience of the superiority of Roman as opposed to Attalid imperialism on this score. He outlines two different “tax morphologies” for two different states, although because the Attalids function as a foil, we must treat his report with skepticism. Nevertheless, the statement of Antony is at least a reminder that fiscal regimes could change suddenly even in the
conservative climate of antiquity. More importantly, it is clear evidence of the contention that surrounded public choices about taxation, in short, of a public discourse on taxation. The triumvir had stepped into the late-Attalid world. Here, apparently, the ruler justified taxation to the ruled, the subjects whom he flattered from the start, addressing them all as *Hellènes*. Here, he would need to assert the justness of the particular forms of taxation he selected.

We can safely assume that whatever morsels of veracity are contained within Antony’s description of Attalid taxation, the Attalids themselves would have represented their fiscal practices very differently. Antony characterizes the Attalid fiscal assessment (*timêma*) as arbitrary and rigid, the Roman state as responsive. He casts the Attalids as after “revenue without risk (*akindunos phoros*),” shifting risk, in other words, on to the taxpayers, whereas, the Romans, he claims, share the risk. With this rhetorical maneuver, Antony focalizes for us what was at stake in the public discourse on taxation: the perception of the distribution of risk between ruler and ruled in a world of endemic shortage. The success of the Attalid imperial project in Asia Minor hinged upon this perception. Two elements of the Attalid fiscal system examined thus far, the practice of earmarking and the cistophoric monetary reform, contributed to that success in part by giving taxpayers a vested interest in the collection of taxes and the enforcement of new regulations on coinage. Thus about their earmarks and their money, the Attalids might have argued precisely as Antony did about his flat-tax: they spread risk.

Yet beyond earmarking lay a range of fiscal practices unmoored from specific public goods and the rest of the fiscal apparatus on which so much depended – the maintenance of king and court, military pay, Pergamon’s ability to have a seat at the table of high politics. This chapter examines that broader Attalid fiscal system. I argue that what slight evidence we have for its design and for how it worked in practice suggests that Antony’s picture is a distortion. Like the process of cobbling together an earmark, the process of assessment was a social one. War, famine, bad harvests – what Antony calls *ta enantia* – these were cause for a renegotiation of levels of taxation. In general, royal fiscal modalities were pre-determined by civic fiscal institutions, and a patrimonial logic militated against the destruction of the traditional revenue base of the polis. Unsurprisingly, the incidence of taxation broadened after 188, but it also deepened. And where they pursued fiscal intensification, the Attalids seem to have proceeded with characteristic caution, focusing on indirect taxes and the exploitation of extra-urban domains long claimed by kings.
FRAMING THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION OF THE ATTALIDS

Pre-modern fiscal systems as a rule lack the internal consistency of their modern successors.¹ Yet practitioners of the “New Fiscal History” have been able to delineate in broad outline the so-called fiscal constitutions of a wide range of medieval and early modern European states by aiming for “the particular form that a prevailing type of fiscal system takes in a specific country at a given moment in its history.”² Our evidence simply does not permit such precision for the Attalid kingdom in the period under review. We can only guess at the relative importance of different forms of revenue to the system as a whole, and the identification of the modes of exaction remains provisory. Granted, in a period of fifty-five years, “fiscal revolution” was possible, as the first century of Roman rule in Asia Minor would show all too clearly. Yet ever more, one tends to see the Attalids adopting the Seleukid system almost wholesale, which means that the study of late-Attalid taxation is properly subsumed under the study of fiscality in Hellenistic Asia Minor.³ Within the parameters of this dissertation, we can take a first approach at the fiscal constitution of the Attalid kingdom by posing three questions: “Which taxes were collected? Who collected them? How much was collected?”

To organize our presentation of the taxes levied by the Attalids, it will be helpful to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes, a distinction to which we will return in discussing strategies of fiscal intensification. V. Chankowski has argued persuasively that these were not the foundational categories for the ancient Greeks themselves.⁴ However, they do allow us to identify patterns, and ultimately, to place the Attalids in a comparative historical perspective. By direct taxes, we mean taxes on income, property, and persons, which are generally tailored to the taxpayer. By indirect taxes, we mean taxes on consumption, exchange, and mobility, which often allow “shifting,” whereby one taxpayer can shift the tax burden on to another by raising prices, or shift away altogether by avoiding certain economic activities.⁵ The use of the term tax to the exclusion of tribute also requires a word of explanation. To over-simplify, a tax implies

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¹ Well illustrated by the Ottoman attempt in the nineteenth century to impose consistency on its fiscal system, as analyzed by Islamoglu 2004.
² Bonney 1999, 5; see also Bonney 1995; Ormrod et al. 1999; Monson and Scheidel (forthcoming).
³ E.g., Schuler 2004.
⁴ V. Chankowski 2007, 305. Her article both assails the anachronism of the terms direct and indirect taxation and seems to admit their utility by confirming the widely held view that Greeks preferred what we call indirect taxation.
⁵ For “shifting,” see Einhorn 2006. Einhorn also underscores how fraught the debate on what constitutes direct taxation has been in U.S. history, a constitutional inheritance from the thought of early modern Europe; for a discussion of the history of the direct-indirect problem in which the individual characteristics of the taxpayer makes the difference, see Atkinson 1977.
some form of redistribution, to which the epigraphy and architecture of Attalid Asia Minor, as well as the infrastructural basis of the later Roman province, can all attest.  

DIRECT TAXATION

Of direct taxes, the two most important will have been those that struck at the productive capacity of the land. These were of two kinds: taxes levied on whole communities, reckoned in silver money, and taxes on certain categories of land, reckoned as a percentage of output or property value. For the first, we have only a single notice from this period, the letter of the future Attalos II to the Pisidian city of Amlada, c. 160 (RC 54; TEXT 12). There, Attalos first speaks of an annual tax payment of two talents, (τῶν δύο ταλάντων ἄ τελείτε κατ’ ἐνιαυτόν) (line 7). He later seems to characterize the same payment as φόρος καὶ τέλεσμα (lines 13-14). The collocation phoros kai telesma calls to mind the similarly enigmatic phrasing of the first Teian decree for Antiochos III and Laodike III, likely of 203, which praises the king for designating the city as aphorologos and releasing the Teians from the syntaxeis of Attalos I (SEG XLI 1003). While the Teians speak of ἧν ἐφέρεν συντάξεων (line 19), Antiochos speaks of ἧν συνεταξιαμεν φόρων (lines 33-4). The task of distinguishing phoros from other levies called syntaxis, telos, telesma, etc., has proven exceedingly difficult, especially in light of a comment of Polybius on the Settlement of 188:

δοσὶ μὲν τῶν αὐτονόμων πόλεων πρότερον ὑπετέλουν Ἀντιόχῳ φόρον, τότε δὲ διεφύλαξαν τὴν πρὸς Ρωμαίους πίστιν, ταῦτα μὲν ἀπέλυσαν τῶν φόρων· δοσὶ δ’ Ἀττάλῳ σύνταξιν ἐτέλουν, ταῦτας ἐπέταξαν τὸν αὐτὸν Ἐὐμένει διδόναι φόρου.

Whichever of the autonomous cities had earlier paid phoros to Antiochos, and had then kept faith with the Romans, the Romans released them from phoroi. Those cities which had paid syntaxis to Attalos I, the Romans ordered them to give the same phoros to Eumenes II (21.46.2-3).

For the ancients, we know, each term carried different connotations. The scholarly debate is over just how fungible we should understand the lexicon to be. Most

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6 For tax, tribute, and redistribution, see Briant 1989; for V. Chankowski 2007, certain “prélèvements” are more “tributaires” than others, which seems to mean for her, a greater mark of subjection. She points in particular to the ubiquitous phoros. The phoros, however, was certainly at times redistributed. See, e.g., the classic statement of Antigonus Monophthalmos, who promises Teos and Lebedos grain from phorologoumenê chôra (RC 3 line 83).

7 As Ps.-Aristotle writes of the six species of (satrapal) revenue, αὐτῶν δὲ τοῦτων πρώτη μὲν καὶ κρατίστη ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (Oec. 2.4).

8 I am referring to the well-known preference of the Second Athenian League for the term syntaxis in contradistinction to the Delian League’s phoros. See RO 22 and 72, as well as Plut. Sol. 15.2.; Theopompus FHG 115 F 98, and the discussion of V. Chankowski 2007, 324-25.
scholars have given up on trying to recover a distinctive institutional reality behind each term. Rather, the connotations are elusive too. Phoros was clearly a mark of subjection, but as Polybius suggests, political autonomia was not incompatible with this way of taxing – or talking about taxation. Still, it may be possible to draw a few concrete conclusions about the nature of the phoros in the Amladeis letter. First, in terms of incidence, this tax falls on the community as a whole. Ultimate responsibility for payment may fall on elites like Opraates, an ambassador of the Amladeis who happened to enjoy the Attalids’ favor (line 12). However, the phoros of the Amladeis letter is exacted from the community, and it also seems to have been assessed on that basis. The polis as collective forms the basic taxable unit. Second, in terms of punctuality, far more than any of these other terms, phoros implies regularity and indeed perpetuity, hence τελετέ κατ’ ευαιστόν. Thus the annual payment of two talents, while not explicitly named phoros in Attalos’ paraphrase of the Amladeis’ request, is likely just that. What is less clear is whether the remission of a half talent ἀπὸ τοῦ φόρου κα[ι] τε[λε]σι[ματ]ος will be subtracted in its entirety from the phoros sum. Unless phoros kai telesma is simply hendiadys, the introduction of the term telesma raises the specter of a broad range of indirect taxes and irregular contributions. Attalos may have had something very specific in mind by telesma: corvée labor, quartering, or grain. Yet the promise to subtract the two talents ἀπὸ τοῦ φόρου κα[ι] τε[λε]σι[ματ]ος introduces an element of ambiguity. It will have allowed the Amladeis room to maneuver. They may even have been able to choose the point of fiscal impact, or at least spread the benefit of the half-talent remission around their local economy.

9 E.g., on the problem of defining eisphora, Gauthier writes, “La plupart du temps…les modalités d’assiette de ces contributions nous restent inconnues” (Gauthier 1991, 67, with n. 93); Capdetrov 2004, 107-11 represents the view that phoros, syntaxis, and telē can refer to the same institutional reality, while V. Chankowski 2007, 324-28 argues for a differentiated institutional reality and semantic limits; see also Schuler 2007.

10 In the case of the Tobians of the tale told by Flavius Josephus, Joseph the Tobiad put to death the dynatoi of Ascalon in order to force the community to pay the Ptolemies arrears (AJ 12.181).

11 Yet we can also observe some slippage between phoros levied on a community and phoros levied on land that belongs to individuals who themselves belong to a community. We can see that the citizens of Arsinoe in Cilicia sought to eliminate such ambiguity when with Ptolemaic instigation they alienated certain public lands (δέμοια χώρα) (SEG XLIX 1426). The new owners of the land were to be those currently on the land (κατοικούντες), reorganized as the autonomous apoikoi of the nearby city of Nagidos. In transferring property rights to members of this newly constituted political community, the Arsinoeis also transferred to the other community a phoros obligation attached to the land: πειπτέωσαν δὲ καὶ φόρον ἐκ τῶν ἱδιῶν ἀνηλικότων (line 33).

12 Typically, scholars juxtapose the irregularity of the syntaxis to the regularity of the phoros, but the ambiguity of SEG XLI 1003 in this regard is cause for caution; for κατ’ ευαιστόν, cf. SEG XXIX 1516; on the other hand, the syntaxis of TEXT 3, line 10, the so-called “Attalid poll-tax,” is clearly annual.

13 As is generally assumed…See, e.g., Virgilio 2008, 217.
That direct taxation of the polis invariably took the form of a collective obligation in cash, on the model of Amlada, has in fact come in for debate in light of the puzzling final lines of the second letter of Eumenes II to Toriaion (TEXT 8, lines 43-7). Eumenes, we recall, has set in place an earmarking arrangement, which “for the present” routes revenue from the agoranomia into an oil fund for the gymnasium. The arrangement will persist only ἕως ἄν ἐπισκεψάμενος Ἡρώδης ὁ ἕμιολιος ἀποτάξῃ ἐτέραν, ἐάν τε ἀπὸ τινός κτήματος ἢ χώρας, ἐάν τ’ ἀφ’ ἐτέρου εἴ[ν] | δοκιμάζῃ, καὶ τῶν πάντων γενημάτων φέρειν [τὴν] | δεκάτην.14 The central problem is the relationship of the last clause to what precedes, and as of yet, no one has clarified the grammar.15 φέρειν is clearly an imperatival infinitive, but καὶ seems redundant. Only Schuler has argued for breaking the connection with the instructions for an official, the ἕμιολιος Herodes. Provocatively, he proposes that the land in question, subject to a tax of 1/10 on all of its produce, has nothing to do with the land (chôra or ktêma) designated by Herodes to replace with its revenues the agoranomia as the source of the royal earmark.

On this interpretation, the 1/10 “of all agricultural products” is the general tax rate on all land in the new polis of Toriaion and its territory. Were Schuler right, this would imply that the individual landholders of Toriaion all paid a dekatê directly to the royal fisc, though perhaps payments were pooled into a single sum of phoros. However, as H. Müller points out, the conjunction ἐάν ensures a relationship between the two clauses: whether Herodes chooses this ktêma or that chôra – whichever piece of property he ultimately chooses – it will pay the 1/10 on all of its produce. As we shall soon see, the convention of royal administration was rather to tax the different products of the land at different rates. Thus the mention of the dekatê is a further articulation of the revenue demanded of the land that one day will be set aside for the oil fund. Eumenes was either prescribing an unusual tax rate for that land, or he was emphasizing that it remained subject to the dekatê over and above its contribution to the gymnasium. Either way, this text does not prove the existence of an alternative to the method of direct taxation of the polis known from Amlada. The Toriaion letter does not support the claim that the Attalids took 10% of all agricultural production in a polis, even a nascent “subject” polis, since the land in question will have been royal property or a royal dependency – the

14 See Epigraphical Appendix. In particular, I have adopted Müller’s substantive ἔτεραν (scil. πρόσοδον).
15 For interpretations, see SEG XLVII 1745; P. Gauthier BE (1999) no. 509; Jones and Ricl 1997 (ed. pr.), 26-27; Schuler 2004, 535, n. 194; Müller 2005, 356-58 who declares the problem an aporia; in Austin 2006 no. 238 the passage is translated, taking no account of the καὶ, “until such time as Herodes ‘one and a half’ investigates the matter and determines sources of income, / whether from some property of piece of land or any other he might choose, on which a tenth of all the produce would be levied;” Reger 2007, 464, n. 16 seems to take this tenth as a civic tax.
details are left up to Herodes to decide – which lay outside, but necessarily in the vicinity of, Toriaion. \(^{16}\) Exactly as Appian’s Antony boasted of the Romans, the Attalids left to the communities themselves the right of taxing agriculture on their territories.

Direct taxes were also levied on plots of land (\textit{klēroi}) assigned to military settlers (cleruchs). We have already had occasion to discuss their settlements (\textit{katoikiai}), which in this period came increasingly to resemble poleis, both with respect to settlement structure and institutions. From the case of the \textit{katoikia} of Apollonioucharax and its various dependent villages (TEXT 2), we can see that these communities raised revenues of their own. To the crown, the individual cleruchs paid tax on their allotments. The key text here is \textit{RC} 51, a letter to cleruchs holding plots in the hinterland of Pergamon, dated by Welles to the second century (TEXT 13). Each \textit{klēros} included arable and vine-land. The produce of that land was taxed variously: a proportion of the harvest was demanded, a twentieth from the vines (\textit{eikostē}), and a tenth (\textit{dekatē}) of the grain and “the other fruits” (\textit{τούτων ε[κοστήν, ἐκ δὲ το] ὁ τε σίτου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν καρπῶν δεκά | τὴν} (lines 16-17)). We also know that the settlers at Apollonioucharax paid an annual tithe of 10\%, the \textit{dekateia}, from which they were all released (for one year?) by Attalos II (καὶ τῆς ἐφ᾽ ἔτους δεκ[α] | τείας παρεθήκωσαμ πάντεσ) (TEXT 2 Face A lines 22-3). \(^{17}\)

There is reason to suspect that the tax liability of a \textit{klēros} was in fact greater than the annual tithes of 5, 10, or 12\% reported in the sources, if we can extrapolate from the details of the valuation of the estate of Mnesimachos, from third-century Seleukid Sardis (\textit{I.Sardis} 1). In an influential treatment of that text, R. Descat has argued that the gift-estate (\textit{dôrea}) allotted to Mnesimachos was subject to both an annual tithe of a notional 10\% and a \textit{phoros} reckoned as 1/12 of the cash value of the estate. \(^{18}\) Thonemann has modified Descat’s conclusions slightly, casting the \textit{phoros} as 1/12 of the cash value of

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\(^{16}\) Jonnes and Ricl 1997, 27: “In Tyriaion [sic], even after its promotion to the status of a Greek city, the tax of ten per cent of the harvest seems to have remained in force, and this can be interpreted as another favour from the king eager to increase the prosperity of the new city by prescribing a more equitable taxation of its soil.” I can see no reason why this \textit{chôra or ktêma} should be in polis territory, which is the basis for using the text to generalize about how the Attalids taxed poleis. Yet why should Toriaion then be privy to the information in lines 43-7? On the one hand, this is a side effect of an epistolary habit: a kind of internal memorandum is embedded within the royal letter. On the other hand, the information may have been publicized because Herodes’ ultimate decision will have affected local claims on royal land. One thinks here of the distinct possibility of re-appropriation of a gift-estate envisioned in the case of Mnesimachos (\textit{I.Sardis} 1). The power brokers of Toriaion, perhaps even the ambassadors of the dossier, were being given notice.

\(^{17}\) ἐφ’ ἔτους is translated “this year” in Thonemann’s text (Thonemann 2011a), but cf. the ed. pr. of Herrmann and Malay 2007, 52 for the alternative translation “annual,” as in the “annual 1/10 tithe.”

\(^{18}\) Descat 1985.
the produce of the non-arable part of Mnesimachos’ estate.\(^\text{19}\) It is of course conjectural whether the system of “mixed phoroi,” an Achaemenid inheritance, which Thonemann sees as standard for early Hellenistic gift-estates, can simply be assumed for late-Attalid cleruchic land.\(^\text{20}\) Yet the language of lines 16-17 of TEXT 13 suggests that the mixed-phoros regime was retained under the Attalids.

On the one hand, we have tax rates for two specific crops, the produce of vines and grain, corresponding to the two forms of land granted, gê psilê and gê ampelôn. On the other hand, we have one tax rate for “the other crops (τῶν λοιπῶν καρπῶν δέκα| ην).” This “tenth” on the non-vine and non-arable parts of the allotments may not be a tithe at all, but a fixed sum of cash, the argyrikos phoros, paid annually in addition to 1/10 of the land’s grain and 1/20 of the produce of its vines. On this account, each year, instead of delivering to the royal fisc 1/10 of his figs, fruits, and nuts, all the sundry perishables of his allotment, the cleruch makes a single cash payment. This is in essence an arbitrary figure, but it is understood as 1/10 of the cash value of those “other crops.” To carry one step further the analogy with Mnesimachos and with Krateuas from Gambreion, if the cleruch alienates the land, a possibility that our text envisions (lines 25-7), he transfers this set of fiscal liabilities too.\(^\text{21}\) Thus in doling out plots to cleruchs, the Attalids chose a traditional, administratively efficient land tenure regime, not dissimilar to the one employed by their predecessors for their gift-estates. And like the owners of those earlier gift-estates, the cleruchs were tethered to the monetary system of their kingdom via the mixed-phoros regime. If, as we have argued in Ch. 3, the cistophori appeared simultaneously with the build-up of a belt of katoikiai in the 160s, then these new communities, sited remotely at the heads of the river valleys and the edge of the Anatolian steppe, were from the beginning linked to the kingdom’s great cities, whence came the coinage in which they were compelled to pay an important part of their taxes.

Beyond its poleis and katoikiai, Anatolia contained vast stretches of territory worked by populations bound by different relationships to the Attalid state. Some of these were organized as dêmoi and ethnê, (as in the ἔθνη ὑπὸ βασιλεῖ Ἀττάλ[ων] of CLA line 69), others as villages either attached to gift-estates and sanctuaries, or even, one now admits, independent of any larger, more powerful community.\(^\text{22}\) Presumably, all of this

\(^{19}\) Thonemann 2009, 385-89.

\(^{20}\) Although it should be noted, Mnesimachos’ estate, notoriously, included two klêroi.

\(^{21}\) Krateuas’ estate is the subject of Thonemann 2009, which he argues explicates Mnesimachos; we also possess a lamentably fragmentary land conveyance document from Pergamon, which speaks of gê psilê, I.Pergamon 230. It may also have spelled out fiscal liabilities.

\(^{22}\) In an important contribution, Schuler 1998, 160-80 contests the century-old dogma that these communities were all subject either to a polis or directly to the king. That dogma is a correlate of the view
land would have been taxed, although we have next to no evidence from the period of Attalid control. It may have been that the different populations related to royal fiscal authority through different channels, depending on the status of the land they farmed. For example, in a dossier of the future Attalos II from 185 concerning the katoikoi of Apollo Tarsēnos in the upper Kaikos valley, the cult’s archiereus (high-priest) seems to play a significant role in securing a grant of tax privileges (RC 47; TEXT 14). Were such priests also collecting tax on sacred land and transmitting a portion to the crown?

This would make sense, given the implied dependence of the katoikoi of Apollo Tarsēnos on the sanctuary and a phenomenon that we can observe elsewhere: the close connection of local priests to Attalid officials tasked with sacred affairs. The fiscal system of the Attalids certainly preserved the power of the old priesthoods, but it may also have monitored priestly activity with new acumen. This is best observed in Sardis, where two inscriptions reflect the interactions of priests of Apollo Pleurenos and initiates (mystai) with the administrative hierarchy of the Attalids. One priest obtains permission for the erection of a stele from the royal archiereus, a post taken over from the Seleukids (SEG XLVI 1519). Another honors a local man, ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ἵερων προσόδων, which may suggest that the Attalids refined the Seleukid system, adding a layer to the hierarchy and intensifying control over sacred wealth (SEG XXXII 1237). Yet as Robert suggested, the source of that wealth is likely to have been the nearby Gygean Lake, not land. In sum, direct evidence for the taxation of the majority of cultivable land in the enlarged Attalid kingdom is unavailable.
We know that the Attalids levied a tax on persons, what scholarship commonly terms a poll-tax or a head tax. This is what Ps.-Aristotle calls the *epikephaleion* or *cheironaxion*, while the epigraphy of Greek cities generally speaks of taxes on the body or person (*sôma*), as in ἀτέλεια τοῦ σώματος.²⁸ Our only direct indication of an Attalid poll-tax will be familiar from our reconstruction of the Attalid monetary system, namely the letter of Eumenes II of 181 concerning the fiscal status of the *katoikountes* of a village called the kômê Kardakôn, in western Lycia, adjacent to the polis of Telmessos (TEXT 3).²⁹ The Kardakoi were required to pay an annual cash tax, perhaps euphemistically referred to as a *syntaxis*, on “each adult person (ἐκάστῳ τοῦ σώματος ἐνηλίκου)” (lines 10-11).

Two other inscriptions suggest the practice was not out of the ordinary. In Apollonioucharax, the Attalids raised an annual (?) *eisphora* (TEXT 2 Face A line 24). That this *eisphora* was not a collective obligation but a poll tax is implied by the fact that it did not fall on the entire adult population, but on certain registered *katoikountes*.³⁰ The other comparandum also comes from western Lycia, but its author and addressee are both a matter of dispute. This is the royal document first published by Wörrle as a fragment of a letter of Eumenes II or Antiochos III to the city of Telmessos (*SEG* XXIX 1516).³¹ Certain members of an unnamed community, artisans who seem to be described as

²⁷ An important piece of the puzzle awaits publication. This is a letter of Attalos II from the modern village of Ballihisar, in the vicinity of ancient Pessinous. It was first announced in *Kazi Sonuçlari Toplantısı* 26 (2004) 1, 89. J. Strubbe provides further information in *IPessinous*, p. 1, n. 1. At present, T. Drew-Bear is responsible for its publication. In a letter that Strubbe dates to 159, Attalos addresses two functionaries, Sosthenes and Heroïdes, about the request of man named Aribazos, titled *hegemon* of the Galatians at Kleionnaeion and of the *katoikoi* of Amorion. What is fascinating is the request: Ariabazos wants to collect wages (*misthos*). Presumably, this will be collected from the produce of the land, but we will be very interested to know which land. This would have been land that was not normally taxed, but came in for taxation in what may be the extraordinary circumstances of the Great Revolt. Yet the term *misthos* is still striking. It does not appear anywhere in *RC*. Ma (forthcoming, 19) conjectures that Aribazos wants to raise mercenary pay from the agricultural surplus of a *katoikia*.

²⁸ Ps.-Aristotle, *Oec.* 2.4: these are revenue “from the people (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων),” the sixth form of revenue in the satrapal *oikonomia*; for the 10 cases of civic taxes *τοῦ σώματος*, see Gauthier 1991.

²⁹ For Maier 1959-1961, v. 1, 258 the kômê of the Kardakoi is in the territory of Telmessos, and this is repeated or left vague. As Schuler 1998, 192 points out, the village was nearby Telmessos, but in *chôra basilikê*.

³⁰ For *eisphora* as poll tax, see Gauthier 1991, 67, n. 93; Thonemann 2011a, 6 conjectures that, as on the Athenian model, these may have been the wealthier inhabitants of Apollonioucharax. Is the *eisphora* annual or is the remission “for this year?” The question turns on the interpretation of TEXT 2 Face A line 22: ἐφ’ ἔτους.

³¹ Wörrle 1979.
“recently arrived,” are to be released from the *cheironaxion* on condition that they take up a public service called *(h)orophylakia* (τοὰ τεχνιτῶν χειρωναξίου παρεθήσονται οἱ μετατομοί [ὁμίοι] την αἱρόμενον τήν οροφυλάκιαν αἰρόμενον[ν], lines 7-8). Again, we know from Ps.-Aristotle that the *cheironaxion* was a tax on persons, applied discriminatorily, as we can see from this document, on certain craftspersons. The question here is the status of the taxpayers and the tax authority. Wörrle hypothesized that the artisans in question were metics, which would make the *cheironaxion* a civic tax of Telmessos, albeit one that the king summarily abolishes. The Roberts countered that the text is rather an analog to that very letter of Eumenes II concerning the Kardakoi and their poll-tax (TEXT 3), which makes the addressee a royal official and the community at issue a *katoikia* or *kômê*, but certainly not a polis.

In sum, the evidence permits us to posit an Attalid poll tax for certain non-polis communities. It is hazardous in the extreme to assume direct taxation of persons was universal, or even consistently applied outside the polis. As Gauthier writes of one of the scarcely attested civic poll taxes, “Bien que les Grecques ne fussent guère formalistes, on serait tenté de croire qu’ici l’ *épiképhalion* était, lui aussi, lié au temps de guerre, ou du moins qu’il était épisodique…” The royal poll tax may not have been any more regular, and one can supply a multi-year crisis of war, well known Galatian troubles, as the historical context for each of the confirmed Attalid cases. Yet in quest of quantitative models of royal economy in Asia Minor, one has been tempted to make the leap, even though we know how variegated the political landscape of inner Anatolia must have been. It is preferable to understand these direct taxes on persons as part of a greater fiscal burden that included inheritance taxes on klêroi and various corvée labor obligations, from which only the name and ideology of the polis provided the ultimate

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32 In other words, it is not a tax on practicing a craft as such, or on craft output, as the name might suggest. Thus for V. Chankowski 2007, 308 it is a form of “capitation.”
33 Wörrle 1979, 94.
34 J. and L. Robert *BE* (1980) no. 484; They translate μετατομοι [ὅμιοι] as “recently arrived.”
36 If we may suggest a parallel from the civic context, it would be the “Gallic fund,” τὰ Γαλατικά. It was regular enough, at least in the case of Antiochos II and Erythrae, to have been accounted for in a portfolio of fiscal exemptions, but it is juxtaposed with all the ordinary royal taxes collected in the polis, pace Welles 1934, 83 (*RC* 15, line 28). For this tax, see also SEG XXXVII 923 line 41.
37 For example, see Aperghis, 164-66 on Seleukid head-taxes. He assimilates to a head-tax the crowns offered up by poleis to kings. He then notes our sole evidence from the Seleukid kingdom for tax “on the kepâlê,” the not unproblematic testimony of Josephus *AJ* 13.49, asserting finally, “Therefore a royal head tax (ἐπικέφαλον) on a city’s citizens and slaves is quite possible, although not attested;” for the Attalids, Mileta 2008, 208-18 models in the assumption that the entire population outside the cities was taxed in the same manner as the Kardakoi.
defense. Meanwhile, even for non-polis communities, the typically ad hoc character of these exactions made the poll-tax a subject of negotiation with the king, as the case of Apollonioucharax demonstrates.

INDIRECT TAXATION

For the taxation of the exchange and movement of goods we are somewhat better informed. Yet both our key texts from the context of sale require commentary. In the case of Toriaion, the revenue (prosodos) earmarked for the oil fund is of course “from the agoranomia” (TEXT 13, line 43). That institution, however, is usually translated “the office of agoranomos.” Thus the SEG translation of line 43 is “the revenue accruing from the office of agoranomos.” Naturally, the office contained within its purview exchange that took place in the market, but did the agoranomos raise a tax on sale? Does the Toriaion dossier in fact demonstrate that the Attalids taxed sale? Much of the evidence for the function of magistrates called agoranomoi relates not to sale, but instead to the maintenance of social order in the market, price regulation, the enforcement of standards of quality and measurement, and the adjudication of disputes. Thus an agoranomos from Hellenistic Tralles is honored exclusively for his judicial virtue (I. Tralleis (und Nysa) I 32). It is then likely that a portion of the agoranomia revenue of Toriaion came from fines.

Unfortunately, it is neither explicit in the text nor in any of the comparanda adduced in the ed. pr. that the rest of the revenue came from sales taxes, from the farming out of those taxes, or from what are commonly called “market-

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38 For inheritance taxes levied on cleruchs, see TEXT 13, lines 25-6; for corvée labor, note that the Kardakoi are themselves responsible for the repair of fortifications, specifically a pyrgion, and Eumenes II only promises to send a technités (TEXT 3, lines 17-20); clearer indications of corvée obligations come from Seleukid documents, e.g., the phoros létourgikos of the Mnesimachos inscription (I.Sardis 1 Column I line 12); see also the ergazomenoi of the Aigai royal document, Malay 1983 (Chandezon 2003, no. 52. = SEG XXXIII 1034, Face B lines 2-3).
39 As well it should be. Consider the appearance of the word agoranomia in, e.g., I.Magnesia 269, I.Iznik 1260, or perhaps most germane, I.Pergamon 183; Jonnes and Ricl 1997, 5; Dmitrieiv 2005, 24.
40 Citing Ath. Pol. 51.3-4, but also a wider body of evidence, Bresson 2008, 22 summarizes the duties of the agoranomoi in the following way: “de veiller à la régularité des transactions effectuées sur le marché;” indeed, from the classical Athenian context, there seems to be no clear testimony that agoranomoi collected sales taxes. Generally, they police and monitor prices and sale. See Rhodes 1993, 575-76; however, P. Stanley, in his unpublished Berkeley dissertation Ancient Greek Market Regulations and Controls, p. 205 suggests that agoranomoi collected a sales tax in classical Athens. This is an unsettled debate with roots in the nineteenth century; Migeotte 2005 nowhere lists tax collection as a duty performed by agoranomoi. As he notes, in the Delian law on charcoal and wood (I.Delos 509), the agoranomoi monitor and discipline the ateileis, but we must note, they do not dispense tax privileges; cf. Aperghis 2004, 285, who suggests that agoranomoi collected sales tax in discussing the case of Toriaion.
41 As emphasized by Dmitrieiv 2005, 34.
dues.”42 Sales taxes are well known from Greek public finance.43 Yet to associate them with the office of agoranomos is to ignore a large body of evidence, particularly rich from Hellenistic Delos, that points to the enforcement of market rules, some of which were no doubt fiscal, as the primary duty of the magistrate.44

Our best evidence for an Attalid tax on sale is the aforementioned dossier concerning the high priest and katoikoi of Apollo Tarsênos (TEXT 14). It is important to note both the nature of the community, cult dependents, seemingly without a polis as overlord, as well as the context of taxation. This has been shown by A. Wilhelm and Piejko (against Welles) to be a festival, the panegyris restored in line 4 and line 12 of Text A.45 The inscription merely records that Attalos awards the cult community ateleia probatón, a tax remission on livestock (Text A lines 5-6 and Text B line 4). The natural reading of the text is that the festival explains this vague expression, which on its own could mean freedom from a head tax on livestock or their progeny, from customs levied on the movement of livestock across political boundaries, or simply from sales tax. Rostovtzeff read here a head tax, and indeed C. Chandezon’s review of the evidence for the taxation of pastoralism shows that Greek civic fiscality, for its part, may have tended to tax directly in this domain, either on pasture land or on the animals themselves.46 On the other hand, Chandezon’s evidence for royal fiscality in this respect points toward indirect taxation as the norm, and the festival surely provoked the movement of large numbers of animals toward the shrine of Apollo and precipitated their sale.

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42 Jonnes and Ricl 1997, 24: “…the revenues collected through the office of agoranomoi, the bulk of which came from taxes on sales (τὰ ἀγορασία τέλη, ἐπώνυμου, ἄνθρακας), taxes on the registration of documents, as well as revenues produced by tax farming and fines.” However, they do not provide the evidence to support this conclusion. For τὰ ἀγορασία τέλη, they cite a proxeny decree from Zeleia that provides immunity from these market taxes. The phrase has been restored by M. Barth and J. Stauber in I.Mysia (und Troas) 1137 and 1138, in place of H. Lolling’s ἔγγαμα τέλη (AM 9 (1884) 59-60). Nowhere does that text speak of agoranomia or an agoranomos. More to the point, they cite I.Erythrai 503, a third-century decree that sets out rules for the maintenance of the statue of the tyrant-slayer Philitos, which is to be set up in the agora. There, the charge of the agoranomos is to keep the statue clean and to attend to the production of honorific crowns. As for sales tax, it seems that Jonnes and Ricl have mis-read lines 27-9. The (restored) agoranomoi of lines 27-8 are to sell the contract (όνε) for the production of the crowns in the course of the year.

43 Andreades 1933, 144-46.

44 For Delos, see in the first instance, Vial 1984, 232-35; see also Bresson 2006; from late Hellenistic Athens, the agoranomic inscription from the Piraeus illustrates nicely the twin concerns of price regulation and measurement. See Bresson 2000, 151-82, and cf. the measuring table dated with an inscription by two agoranomoi to 143/42 from Marisa (Idumaea), Finkielstzejn 1999.


46 Chandezon 2003, 309-30; Rostovtzeff 1941, 1440.

134
*panégyris* more firmly established in the restoration of the text, the *communis opinio* has settled on an interpretation of sales tax.\(^{47}\)

As for customs duties, we can surmise that the Attalids like other pre-modern Mediterranean states relied heavily on what amounted to taxes on mobility and interdependence.\(^{48}\) Earlier in Attalid history, we catch sight of the customs regime when Cyzicus, c.280-275, honors Philetairos for a grant of tax immunity on the movement of livestock and other movable wealth into his territory, as well as on the export of purchased animals (*OGIS* 748 = Chandezon no. 47 lines 8-12). In order to make sense of the fact that Seleukid territory lay between the territories of Cyzicus and Philetairos, Chandezon suggests transport by sea, making the tax an *ellimenion* of some kind collected in the Pergamene port and satellite city Elaia.\(^ {49}\) Yet the fief of Philetairos need not have shared a border with Cyzicus for the dynast to have claimed customs on the flocks that the Cyzicenes shepherded into his territory in time of war. We know well from contemporary interstate agreements from Crete that pastoralists en route from one polis territory to another routinely crossed the territory of a third city.\(^{50}\) Moreover, as we will have further occasion to discuss, Hellenistic Asia Minor was a patchwork of different fiscal authorities, the kind of place that is not easily represented on a textbook map. In the end, it matters little whether we place the customs house of Philetairos in Elaia or on his northern frontier. The point is that the fiscal territoriality of the Attalid state had already taken shape at this early stage in the political history of the kingdom.

After 188, the Attalids extended their customs regime over much of the territory allotted to them at Apameia. This is evident in the so-called *Monumentum Ephesenum* or Customs Law of Asia (*CLA*), a Neronian compilation of regulations on the collection of customs in the Roman province of Asia.\(^{51}\) The first version of this accretive document may very well date to the origins of the province itself in the years 129-126. If so, it captures an image of the bequest of Attalos III as it was being taken over by M. Aquilius and organized into a province. That the *CLA* transmits information about the late Attalid kingdom is not in doubt. However, even M. Crawford has not completely disentangled

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\(^{47}\) Chandezon 2003, 196, though cf. 315, allowing for the possibility that it is a head tax; Piejko 1989, 400; Schuler 1998, 193: “Verkaufsteuer auf Schafe, von der der Festmarkt befreit werden sollte.”

\(^{48}\) Purcell 2005.

\(^{49}\) Chandezon 2003, 186; see V. Chankowski 2007, 313-19, for the vocabulary of the *ellimenion* harbor tax.

\(^{50}\) Making it of course desirable to obtain fiscal privileges from the third city as well. See Chaniotis 1999, 196-204.

\(^{51}\) Ed. pr.: Engelmann and Knibbe 1989; for authoritative edition and commentary, see Cottier et al. 2008.
the Attalid bits from the rest. Mitchell has shown that the scope of the first version of the law, which includes the Bosporus and Pamphylia, both regions that were not assigned to Provincia Asia in Nero’s time, gives away an Attalid template. After all, long before Pompey organized the province of Pontus and Bithynia, much of the Bosporan territory covered in the lex had belonged to Pergamon. As for Pamphylia, the Attalid hold on this region has been questioned, but not their claim. Nevertheless, the Attalid template has its unresolved problems. For example, in a section on import and export by sea, the CLA lists coastal cities with customs stations, moving in geographical order south and southeast from the Bosporus to Pamphylia, but passing through Caria along the way (lines 23-6). It seems unthinkable that these coastal Carian cities in the heart of the Rhodian peraia ever belonged to the Attalid kingdom. In other words, regrettably, there is no Attalid core to the CLA.

That disclaimer notwithstanding, the CLA is crucial for our reconstruction of the Attalid customs regime. The first of two key passages, lines 26-7, follows immediately after the list of maritime customs stations:

 vụν εἰσάγων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις προσφώ [νείτω καὶ ἀπογραφέσθω ἐν οἷς ἂν τελώνιον τοῖς ὀροὶς τῆς χώρας πρὸ τῶν βασιλείας ἢ ἐλευθερῶν πόλεων ἢ οἰκίων ἢ δήμων ὑπάρχῃ, ἐπὶ τοῦ τελώνου ἢ ἐπί- vacat

The person importing by land [is to] declare [and register], in those places [in which] there is [a customs station on the boundaries of the land] formerly of <the> monarchy or of free cities or of peoples or of communities… (Trans. Crawford in Corbier et al. 2008).

The extent to which Hellenistic customs regimes targeted the transport and smuggling of goods by land has been underappreciated. This passage depicts the interior of Asia Minor, again, as a patchwork of fiscal zones, each of which contained an exaction point.

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52 Cottier et al. 2008, 4, n. 4: “M.H. Crawford notes that the order of the clauses in ll.9-69 excludes the possibility that we have to do simply with an Attalid nucleus and a Republican supplement.”
54 It is common to adduce Livy 44.14.3-4 as proof that Pamphylia was free of Pergamene control by or at least after 169 when certain “legati Pamphylii” approached the Roman Senate “amicitiam renovare” – e.g., Meadows (forthcoming), who argues that Attalos II conquered Pamphylia in the 150s; Gruen 1984, 90, also takes these for the Pamphylians of SW Asia Minor. It is my own opinion that Livy’s “Pamphylii,” who follow a delegation of Gauls, and whose ethnic is reported variously in the manuscript tradition as Pampyli and Pamphyli (see Briscoe’s Teubner), are not tribesmen of Asia Minor but of transalpine Europe. There may be a numismatic clue to their identity in Livy’s description of their gift: a crown of philippi.
55 Cf. Mitchell 2008, 192 who dates the list of harbors in lines 23-6 to the 120s, given the inclusion of Pamphylian cities. He does not explain the inclusion of the Carian ones, which seems problematic. However, he cites (187, n. 82) Marek 1988 for the suggestion that the Carian cities were attached to the province of Asia only after the First Mithridatic War, i.e., some 50 years later.
Navigating them all may have cost traders more than a simple import and export through coastal harbors. There is no consensus on how to understand these four categories of land, introduced from the end of the lacuna. It is especially difficult to see what makes these cities “free,” but they are obviously not free of a customs regime imposed from above.\(^{57}\) The origin of all four, however, seems to lie in the Attalid kingdom, which treated separately with *poleis*, *ethné*, and *dēmoi* in the interior, all the while governing directly its *chôra*, termed here, as restored, *chôra basileias*. In fact, the tripartite collocation of *poleis*, *ethné*, and *dēmoi*, to which the Romans here add former royal land, seems to anticipate the membership of the Koinon of Asia. It suggested to the document’s first editors that an inheritance from the Attalids lay behind the Koinon.\(^{58}\)

Thus we should not imagine the Attalid kingdom encircled by a single customs barrier, with fiscally homogeneous territory inside. On their political frontiers, not only in the busy Aegean harbors, but also in the mountainous Mysian borderlands opposite Bithynia, or in the Maeander corridor running through Tralles, the Attalids surely exacted customs. The *CLA* pulls the curtain back on the interior, which proves to be riven with enclaves of royal fiscal authority, royal land as well as different polities that stood in various relationships of dependence to the crown. In fact, the Attalid state had no interest in rendering all of this territory fiscally homogeneous. The taxation of goods moving between the many different zones of the interior was sufficiently profitable to justify investment in infrastructure. As a matter of shared sovereignty, the best comparandum is the Lycian koinon, as observed in another customs law emanating from Nero’s reform, this one still unpublished. The Lycian law from Andriake shows unequivocally that while the *koinon* collected one set of customs that were then transmitted in part to Rome, the constituent *poleis* also raised their own dues.\(^{59}\)

A second passage from the *CLA*, lines 67-70, mentions Attalos III by name:

\[\text{ἐποίκια} \mid \text{καὶ σταθμοὺς βασιλείας ὑπὸ βασιλεὺς Ἀτταλὸς Ἐυμένους ὑπὸ τελωνίας χάριν ἔσχατον} \mid \text{οὐ [τωσ] καρπεύεσθω. ταύτα τε ὅποια ἂν παραλάβῃ} \mid \text{τῶν ἐσομένων δημοσιών ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐπικρίσει παραδιδότω [i]. vacat αἴτιες πόλεις ἔθνη ὑπὸ βασιλεῖ Ἀττάλ[ω] Ἐυμένους ὑπὸ ὅ γέγονοτο, ἐν οἷς τόποις ἄ[μερες (?) τῆς Ασίας τελῶνι} \mid \text{κατά τὸν τῆς μισθώσεως νόμον ἀπογράφασαι προσφωνῆσαι δεῖσθε, τούτων ἐν ἕκαστη πόλει πρὸς θαλάσση, εἰς τὸ προσ- vacat}\]

\(^{57}\) See the discussion of Mitchell 2008, 184-87.

\(^{58}\) Engelmann and Knibbe 1989, 73-4.

\(^{59}\) Takmer 2007, which is a detailed summary of the text, reproducing certain portions. For the customs barriers within the Lycian koinon, see lines 41-5, concerning customs on saffron, where Takmer also makes clear (p. 176) that he understands Rome to be preserving the fiscal conditions of the Hellenistic period; for the Seleukid kingdom, since at least Bickermann, it has been recognized that multiple customs regimes were operative within the political boundaries of the *basileia*. See Dreyer and Engelmann 2003, 51-2.
With respect to the buildings and royal [staging posts] which king Attalus the son of Eumenes had for the purpose of exaction of telos, [the publicanus] is to use (them) [as he (the king) did]; and he is to hand over *viri boni arbitratu* to [the incoming] publicanus whatever of these he may take over. Whatever cities and peoples were not under King Attalus the son of Eumenes, in whatever places or [regions (?) of Asia] it is necessary to register with or declare to a collector according to the lex of the *locatio*, in each city by the sea there (Trans. Crawford in Corbier et al. 2008).

Even here, we may not have unadulterated evidence for the Attalid system. Mitchell is prepared to take the passage as the very end of the first version of the lex, drafted perhaps between 129 and 126, while H. Engelmann and D. Knibbe give a terminus ante quem of 75. Crawford holds out the possibility that these lines are a post-Sullan supplement to the original document. The lacuna at the beginning of line 70 makes it particularly difficult to generalize about the Attalid kingdom, since we may have lost a reference to parts of the province of Asia that had not belonged to Pergamon. Still, we receive precious information about the physical infrastructure of royal customs collection. The Attalid infrastructure appears substantial: two different sets of structures, the “*epoikia*” and a plural masculine supplement for βασιλικός, for now, the vague *stathmoi* (barracks, stables, or the like). From the instructions to register and declare in each city by the sea in their absence, these customs houses seem to be maritime, either in poleis or in the coastal territory of *ethnê*. From the perspective of the CLA, (and no doubt for the inhabitants of Attalid Asia Minor, too), the presence of these structures was a mark of subjection. Yet the text does not permit us to place those poleis and *ethnê* without royal customs infrastructure outside the kingdom – or even beyond the reach of its fiscal authority. As these very lines from the CLA reminds us, the same state can collect the same tax with or without its own infrastructure; the publicans were required to make use of old Attalid customs stations *if available*. The Attalids, by contrast, seem to have created new infrastructure after 188, which would have facilitated surveillance and thereby increased revenues. Perhaps transparency was also gained, an encouragement to the very quasi-voluntary compliance that Nero was after. Yet to be clear, the Attalid customs houses did not delineate the political or economic boundaries of the Attalid state.

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61 As suggested by Crawford in Corbier et al. 2008, 126.
62 Ed pr.: δούλους, as preferred restoration, meaning that Rome also took over slaves who served as royal customs agents. Subsequent commentators have rejected the suggestion; the replacement of ed. pr.’s εσ[τήσατο] with ἔσχ[εν] precludes certainty that the Attalids built this infrastructure, though it seems likely.
Our evidence for Attalid taxation includes two references to coastal lagoons and lakes containing saltpans and, presumably, much else of value besides. This is a special case both because indirect and direct taxation were employed in the exploitation of this domain, and because it represents one of our best opportunities to register fiscal intensification, as well as outright confiscation, topics to which we will return. The first case is Priene, which at the beginning of the first century B.C.E. disputed with certain publicans called *halônai* over revenues from saltpans (*haleai*) in a coastal lagoon in the Maeander delta called the Gaisonis. For our purposes, this is the significant passage of the honorific decree for Krates (*ISE* 182 = *I.Priene* 111 Column XVI lines 112-17), following *ISE*:

.....c.16...... ἀ πρότερον ἐφημέρες Βασιλεὺς Ἄτταλος, οὕτε διακατέχει ὁ δήμος ἡμῶν οὔτε ἤκουσεν οὔτε ἧ ὑγιής ἐξουσίαν οὐδεμίαν ἕνεκεν τοὺς δημοσίων πεποίηται τάς δὲ κατασκευασθέντας ὑπ’ ἐαυτ’ τοῦ ἄλας τὰς ἀνακειμένας ἑκ πλέονος χρόνου τῆι Ἀθηναί τῇ Πολιάδι, ὧς κατέχει καὶ κατασκευάζει | ὁ δήμος, ἀνέσωσεν, πιαρακαλῶν τὸν ἀνθύπατον τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλόκοντων λειτουργίας μὴ προσ | ἐχεῖν, ἀκέραια δὲ ἐσορίω τοῦ δήμοι τὰ πράγματα, μέχρι ἅν ἠπιγνώμεν τὸ κριθησόμενον ὑπὲρ | [αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς συγκλήτου]

.....which earlier King Attalus worked, and which neither our *demos* possesses nor has the Senate granted the publicani any concession for. About the saltpans that he [Krates] had fitted out himself, which had long ago been reserved for Athena Polias, which the *demos* currently possesses and exploits, he asked the proconsul not to listen to the things said by the *halônai*, but to preserve untaxed (*ἀκέραια*) (the saltpans) for the *demos* until we know the Senate’s decision on the matter…

To divine the Attalid role here we are required to imagine what it was King Attalos (II or III) had exploited earlier, since the object of *ἐφημέρειο* is lost in the opening lacuna. In her study of salt in the Greek world, C. Carusi lends little credence to a restoration of saltpans. She notes the text’s juxtaposition between, on the one hand, the saltpans that Priene claims it possesses and exploits, and on the other, whatever King

Beginn an behielt Rom den geschlossenen Binnenmarkt der Attaliden in seiner neuen Provinz Asia bei.” This is more than an unjustified extrapolation from this particular text. As Ch. 3 has shown, there was no closed currency zone in Attalid Asia Minor. This broader concept of closed “national” markets in ancient Greece, here protected by a customs barrier, has played a long and even insidious role in the scholarship. See Laum 1933, which percepts the ancient Greeks to demonstrate not just the virture of autarky but of closed markets.

On the “underestimation of Mediterranean wetlands,” see Horden and Purcell 2000, 186-90.

Von Gärtringen’s text was significantly amended by M. Holleaux *Études* I 309-11. De Rossi’s *ISE* text is the most recent; there is some dispute over the identification of the contested saltpans as the Gaionis. See Carusi 2008, 83, who urges great caution.
Attalos was working. Yet as Thonemann argues, what is set in contradistinction here is rather the different historical property claims on two different salt pans. In one case, the Attalids staked a claim, perhaps rooted in a confiscation of Alexander, rather than in a confiscation of their own. The Attalid claim gave the publicans, the executors of the Will of Attalos, legal ground to stand on. In the case of the Gaisoneis, so the argument goes, it had always belonged to Priene, always been exploited by its citizens, and always been reserved for Athena Polias. Thus Thonemann, invoking lines 67-8 of the CLA (supra), restores the lacuna: [τὰς μὲν ἀλέας τὰς βασιλικὰς, ἃς πρότερον εἱργάζετο βασιλεὺς Ἀτταλός.

The second case is Ephesos, which, Strabo tells us, won its own dispute with publicans over the “great revenues (megalai prosodoi)” of a seaside lake called Selinousia, as well as another body of water contiguous to it:

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐξομήνυσιν τοῦ Καύστρου λήμνη ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ἀναχωμένη (καλεῖται δὲ Σελινουσία) καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἄλλη σύρροις αὐτῇ μεγάλας ἐξουσίας προσόδους, ἃς οἱ βασιλεῖς μὲν ἱερὰς οὔσας ἀρείλοντο τὴν θεόν, Ρωμαίοι δὲ ἀπέδωσαν πάλιν δὲ οἱ δημοσίων ἔμενεν περιείστησαν εἰς ἑαυτοῦ τὰ τέλη, πρεσβεύσας δὲ ὁ Ἀρτεμίδωρος, ὡς φησι, τὰς τε λίμνας ἀπέλαβε τῇ θεῷ

After the outlet of the Kayster there is a lake next to the sea. It is called Selinousia, and just after, confluent with it, is another lake. They provide great revenues, which though they were sacred, the kings confiscated from the goddess. But the Romans gave them back. And then the publicani by force took the taxes for themselves. Artemidoros went on an embassy, so he says, and got the lakes back for the goddess (14.1.26).

Consensus holds that the kings in question are the Attalids. We know that the temple of Artemis Ephesia raised revenues on salt already in the archaic period (I.Ephesos 1). If those same revenues belonged to Pergamon after 188, this would represent a major reconfiguration of power in the Kayster delta. The particular products that provided these revenues have been the subject of debate. Yet it is more than unuseful to quibble over whether the revenues came from salt, fish, or other sources.

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66 Carusi 2008, 237.
67 Thonemann 2011b, 329, with n. 85 for restoration; 327-32 for the historical context, as well as observations on the intensive exploitation of the rich salt pans in the Maeander delta in Ottoman times.
68 See Radt 2002-2011, v. 8, 36.; moreover, Strabo has just referred to Attalos II at 14.1.24. Proof that Strabo could refer to the Attalids as “the kings” comes in 14.1.39, the distich of Daphitas the grammarian. He was crucified for poking fun at “the kings” for being mere treasurers of Lysimachus, an insult that only makes sense if directed at the Attalids; Debord 1982, 148: “the kings” are the Attalids.
69 Thonemann 2011b, 331 tentatively suggests fish rather than salt here, though he, as is the norm, pairs this text with the aforementioned I.Priene 111 in his interpretation; Caruso 2008, 85 cautiously reads salt among the revenues of the lakes described by Strabo, but rightly, as one part of a portfolio of resources; Debord 1982, 148: fisheries.
obscures the multifaceted character of the ecological niche exploited by the Attalids in the hinterland of both Priene and Ephesos. S. Vacante has recently reinterpreted the Little Sea (*mikrê thalassa*) near Iasos as not just a large fishing ground, but a source of salt and seasonal pastureage on a regional scale.\(^{70}\) Moreover, passage in and out of these coastal lagoons produced revenues, as we see in the case of the *Iônopolitikos kolpos*, today the inland Lake Bafa, between Miletos and Herakleia-under-Latmos. In the late 180s, those two cities were farming a τέλος τῆς πορθµίδος on the marshy gulf (\(\text{SIG}^3\) 633 lines 100-4).\(^{71}\) One understands why the Roman tax farmers needed to employ violence to wrest these places away from Athena Polias and Artemis Ephesia. These were lucrative monopolies, though we should not extrapolate from the evidence of Priene and Ephesos a universal Attalid monopoly on salt, compulsory purchase of salt, or a salt tax as head tax.\(^{72}\) These were taxes on usage (*enkylia telê*). The coastal lagoons were simply part of the royal patrimony, while in a very complicated fashion, they were also part of distinctive regional economies.\(^{73}\)

THE PERSONNEL OF TAX COLLECTION

One of the lessons of Antony’s gloss on the tax history of Asia Minor is the significance of the state’s choice of collection agents for outcomes. This was not simply a matter of choosing the most efficient agents, but of engineering compliance. As the Hellenistic Greeks knew incredibly well, tax farming had its advantages, chiefly, the off-loading of risk, but also the out-sourcing of fiscal assessment and surveillance.\(^{74}\) Tax farming was ubiquitous in the public finance of the cities and non-polis communities of Hellenistic Asia Minor, so much so that it would be otiose to enumerate examples. As is

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\(^{71}\) It is tempting to interpret similarly the dispute mentioned in *I.Priene* 111 line 129, τὸ κατὰ τῶν εἰσπλανοῦν, and traditionally this has been understand as maritime passage into the Gaisonis past the Mykale peninsula. Carusi 2008, 82-3, however, disassociates this dispute from the dispute over the salt pans in lines 112-17.


\(^{73}\) We might also consider the taxation of these coastal lagoons in terms of what V. Chankowski 2007, 310-13 calls “taxes d’usage,” in her view often described in the sources as *enkylia telê*; for other taxes attributed to the Attalids, but not discussed in this Ch., see Crawford 1985, 160, who has suggested without any argumentation that two taxes known from Roman sources may have been Attalid in origin. Having examined both the “door tax” of Caesar *BC* 2.32.2, and the “nail tax” from Aphrodisias (see Reynolds 1982, no. 15), I cannot determine what makes them Attalid.

\(^{74}\) “Incredibly well,” because we see in Ptolemaic Egypt the sophisticated innovation of using tax farmers to guarantee returns and supervise the system, without actually using tax farmers to collect the taxes themselves. This system may have also existed in Ptolemaic Cyprus, Cyrenaica, and the Levant. See Bagnall 1976, 6, 240.
well known, the problem with tax farmers is that they are hard to control; their abuses can lead to diminishing returns, as taxpayers lose their appetite for compliance. This is of course precisely what happened in Asia Minor of the Late Republic. Indeed, Antony admits that the publicani acted outrageously. Yet had the Romans acted outrageously in the first place with their choice of personnel, by farming out agricultural taxes to outsiders? Perhaps, and hence the corrective: Julius Caesar turned over to the communities of Asia Minor the responsibility for the collection of those taxes. This prompts the question of whether these communities had known an imperial power to tax them through its own tax farmers, rather than demand lump sums and fixed percentages of revenues, which the communities themselves collected through tax farming and other means; that is to say, whether the institution of royal tax farming ever existed on any significant scale in Hellenistic Asia Minor.75

Since the Attalids took over so many Seleukid administrative practices after 188, it makes sense to ask the question first of the earlier period. Little has changed since Ma admitted, “It is still not clear whether Seleukid indirect taxation was farmed out.”76 Yet M. Aperghis can write, “There is no specific mention in the sources of the use of Seleukid tax-contractors, other than the high priests of Judaea, but one cannot discount the possibility, certainly for the revenue of cities.”77 In the case of the Attalids, the evidentiary basis has in fact changed of late, as the honorary decree for Apollonios from Metropolis (c.144) has been published and pored over (I.Metropolis 1 Face B; TEXT 5). One of Apollonios’ services to the community concerns a tax dispute (Face B lines 18-23):

υ perd toon efeurismomenon hemen telon upo toon wnnismenon ta diaxwgi a tou
Kaisistranou limenos, eis agonian kai taraikh paraxenomewn hemen tene megisthen,

75 “On any significant scale,” because we know of tax farming in Ptolemaic enclaves such as Lycia. According to Bagnall 1976, 227, it was the norm there. For the specific taxes and documentation, see Gygax 2001, 174, on OGIS 55 = TAM II 1; his discussion of the process at work in third-century Telmessos, which was a Ptolemaic dokeia ruled by semi-autonomous dynasts, provides several useful points of comparison (pp. 167-82). There, we know of tax farmers called dekatônai, who presumably collect a dekatê (OGIS 55 line 19). And we know that the Ptolemies farmed out in Alexandria the tax collection for their possessions in Lycia (P.Tebt. 8). Yet we have reason to believe that many of the tax farmers were Lycians. In the case of one tax, the πορφυρική, the Ptolemies specify in P. Tebt. 8 that the tax farmer is a Lycian. Gygax also suggests that the dekatônai of OGIS 55 may be local sub-contractors; or that the tax was sold locally in the first place (p. 175). In other words, as Rostovtzeff 1941, 338, argued, the model put forth in the “Tale of the Tobiads,” (Jos. AJ 12.4.1–11), of royal tax farming administered through local elites, may actually also fit Ptolemaic Asia Minor.

76 Ma 1999, 139, n. 120; we should note that he leaves open the possibility that tax farmers made use of the infrastructure described in the CLA.

77 Aperghis 2004, 283; needless to say, this characterization of the priests of Judaea as tax farmers is debatable.
υπολαβών ίδιον εἶναι τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐλάσσωμα τῆς πόλεις, πάντα παριθων τὰ καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὑπέστη παρακληθείς καὶ τὴν πρὸς τούτους διάκρισιν, δι' ἣς ἐτήρησεν τὴν ύποκείμενην ἐν τοῖς τέλεσι φιλανθρωπίαν.

(And) with reference to the taxes devised for us by those who had bought (the right to levy) the tolls of the Caystrian harbor, when we had fallen into the greatest anxiety and perturbation, (Apollonios), considering the loss that had befallen the city to be his own, neglecting all his own concerns, when called upon underwent judgment against these too, through which he preserved the established concession in the matter of the taxes (trans. Jones 2004).

Here we have a dispute between tax farmers and the polis of Metropolis, which royal authority adjudicates through a process called diakrisis. Its not out of the question that a representative of the king heard the case, perhaps the stratēgos in Ephesos, referred to in a dedication from Ephesos as ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τη Ἑφέσου καὶ τῶν κατ᾽ Ἑφέσου τόπων καὶ Καύστρου πεδίου, the titulature being relevant to an interpretation of the text at hand (SEG XXVI 1238 = I.Ephesos 201). The nature of these taxes and the fiscal privileges of Metropolis underlying the conflict are a matter of debate. Everyone agrees that τῶν ἐφευρισκομένων ἡμείν τελῶν in line 18 means that at some point new taxes had been contrived for the Metropolitans. Dreyer and Engelmann argue in the ed.pr. that these taxes were produced for the benefit of the Metropolitans; and thus the tax farmers violated the right of the polis to the new revenue by not transmitting it to them. Jones, who marshals all the evidence for grants of portfolio of tax immunities (ἀτέλεια τῶν παροῦν προσόδων, κτλ.), often tailored to specific local economic conditions, then sensibly re-interprets the “invented taxes” as a violation of a particular fiscal immunity.

To a certain extent, this helps us to make sense of the tax, τὰ διαγώγια τοῦ Καύστριανοῦ λιμένος, remission from which was so absolutely vital for the Metropolitans. They are not supposed to have to pay the diagôgia, whatever it is.79 As the name implies, this is a tax on passage, a tax on mobility of some kind. Is it a tax akin to that on diagôgimos sitos in Kyme, the taxable grain in-transit (SEG L 1195 line 9)? It is difficult to be more precise, as the term is an epigraphical hapax.80 Yet the confidence of

78 That this official may have heard the case is suggested in both the ed. pr. and Jones 2004, 476.
79 Contra Dreyer and Engelmann 2003, 54, who see in this diagôgia a toll (“Maut”), which Metropolis has the privilege of charging. On their very complicated interpretation, as a “subject city,” Metropolis does not raise its own customs dues (“Gebühren”), a point to which we shall have occasion to return. Instead, it has the privilege of exacting this toll on passage through its harbor, on river traffic and land traffic – since they make much of the fact that the Kayster is not perennially navigable.
80 “Hapax,” because restoration διαγώγια of I.Milet 54 line 15 is tentative; for diagôgé, we have, e.g., of people: τῶν ἀνδρῶν διαγώγια (BCH 13 (1889) 334,4 line 36); and diagôgé of goods, as is fairly well attested in proxeny decrees, e.g., I.Magnesia 91 line 19. Neither the English word “toll” nor “customs” captures the standard interpretation of Ps.-Aristotle’s (ἡ πρόσοδος) ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων καὶ διαγωγῶν (Oec. 2.1.5). This can be found in Velissaropoulos 1980, 214-15, under “péages.” Velissaropoulos sees in
Jones that this is “a toll on goods conveyed through the ‘Caystrian harbor’” is perhaps not unwarranted. Jones places that harbor in the territory of Ephesos, which is to say, at the mouth of the Kayster. Since it was upstream, Metropolis relied on this coastal limen for its needs. Indeed, the limen Kaïstrianos must be in the Kayster delta. To the Metropolitans, their local harbor would have been simply ὁ λιμήν.

However, the extra designation, Καϊστριανοῦ, may help us better identity the tax farmers themselves. For both Jones and the text’s first editors suggest that the tax farmers of this decree are royal tax farmers. To be clear, by “royal tax farmers” we mean tax collectors who do not necessarily come from the communities that they tax, and who answer directly to royal authority. In this case, they would have been stationed in the Kayster delta, having bought the diagógima directly from the Attalids. The decree for Apollonios would then be the first, unique positive indication that the Attalids employed royal tax farmers. Yet it is unlikely to be so. It is much more probable that these are the tax farmers of the polis of Ephesos, who likely collected both civic and royal taxes, even if we are not in a position to determine which kind of tax the diagógima was. The same civic personnel routinely collected royal and civic taxes.

Furthermore, Metropolis’ choice to leave Ephesos and its territory out of its description of the tax is telling. Their language, τὰ διαγώγια τοῦ Καϊστριανοῦ λιμένος, recalls the titulature of the Attalid diagógai, “droits de passage levés sure les marchandises en transit.” This tax is supplementary to the usual customs dues, pentakostê, etc. As for diagógion, it does occur in Polybius in the context of the Byzantine episode c.220 (4.52.5). Polybius first describes the Byzantines as paragógizein (4.47.1), but later describes their extraordinary tax as a diagógion on those sailing to the Pontus (4.52.5). Strabo (4.3.2) writes of quarrels between communities in Gaul over τὰ διαγωγικὰ τέλη, which Velissaropoulos is agnostic about.

The gloss of Jones 2004, 477, “tolls on goods conveyed through the ‘Caystrian harbor,’” captures well the philological difficulty.

The epigraphical evidence is overwhelming: poleis rarely qualify their harbors with toponyms. Athens is one obvious exception, which speaks of λιμένος τοῦ ἐν Ζεια (e.g., IG 2 ² 835 and 1035); or we have a named harbor precisely in the context of a dispute, as in the Megarid, where Aigosthenai and Pagai both claimed Panormos (λιμένος τοῦ Πανόρμου) (SEG XIII 327 = Ager no. 85).

Dreyer and Engelmann 2003, 55: “Die Erhebung der Maut war augenscheinlich (vom König oder in dessen Auftrag) verpachtet an Unternehmer, die jenseits der festen Pachtsumme, die an den König oder abzuführen war, mit der Zielsetzung einer möglichst hohen eigenen Gewinnspanne arbeiteten;” for Jones 2004, 477, the tax collectors are “probably royal;” cf. Chandezon 2004, 141-42, which does not treat the place.

It may be objected that tax farmers come into view on Face B of the text from Apollonioucharax (TEXT 2, Face B lines 8-9): τινες πράξαντές τινα αὐτοί κατεισχήκασι. Those who may have already “sequestered” funds from Apollonioucharax would seem to be local tax farmers; as the conditional clause here implies, the Attalid state does not have full knowledge of their operations or perhaps not even full control over them.

For royal and civic taxes collected together, the locus classicus is Herakleia under Latmos (SEG XXXVII 859 Column III lines 2-4, the earmark of oil for the gymnasium, which comes from the farmed-out harbor tax. See discussion of Wörrle 1988, 460-63.
The official who may have judged the case: ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆ Ἐφεσοῦ καὶ τῶν κατ᾽ Ἐφεσον τόπων καὶ Καύστρου πεδίου. In the titulature, the Kaystrian plain is conceptually distinct from the city of Ephesos and its environs. The so-called Kaystrian harbor as much as the Kaystrian plain represents the supra-poliad perspective that was proper to Attalid power. For the Ephesians, this may have been just another limen. Thus the Metropolitans assumed the royal perspective as a way of enlisting Attalid power on their side, especially as embodied by the strategos. Part of this man’s brief was keeping the peace in an ecology on which several communities had claims, namely, what the Attalids called the Kaystrian plain. In an analogous fashion, citizens of the poleis of Metropolis, Colophon, and Ephesos, among others, would have all sought passage through the Kayster delta. The task of the strategos of the Attalid state, in the final analysis, was to minimize the resultant strife – especially since royal revenues were at stake.

The king himself did not dispatch tax farmers to collect these revenues from communities, but he did employ royal officials in a fiscal apparatus. Hovering above, and seemingly apart from this fiscal apparatus, were the strategoi. We have noted the possibility that a strategos judged the dispute between Metropolis and the unnamed tax farmers. We are on firmer ground in two other cases. It was Korragos, στρατηγὸς τῶν καθ᾽ Ἑλλήσποντον τόπων, who requested fiscal privileges of Eumenes II for the unnamed community of TEXT 1. Moreover, while it has long escaped notice, another clue as to the role of the stratêgos in fiscal politics may be found in the very fragmentary dedicatory inscription from the epistyle of a so-called market stoa on the theater terrace at Pergamon (I.Pergamon 152-155). The fragments of I.Pergamon 152 clearly read προσόδων. For 154, M. Fränkel suggested [στρατηγ]ὸς τῆς κ[ατά], on the model known to him of στρατηγὸς τῆς Χερσονήσου καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τόπων.

Note that while Strabo (13.3.2) conceives of the Kaystrian plain as part of the Ephesia, the Attalid imperial geography of SEG XXVI 1238 distinguishes it from the topoi kat’ Epheson. The plain has an interesting role to play in Attalid imperial geography. Note that in the upper Kaikos valley, it may even have been possible to form an ethnic from a plain, the Apias Pedion, part of the modern Balikesir plain. See the ephebic list form Pergamon, H. Hepding MDAI(A) 35 (1910) 425,12 Column II line 5: Ἀνδρικὸς Ἀσκληπιδοῦ τῶν ἐξ Ἀπασίωνος ἀγροῦ.

On the fierce inter-polis competition over the ecology in this part of Asia Minor, see Robert 1976; the most apposite compardandum for the situation in I.Metropolis 1 is the famous early Hellenistic decree of Colophon on the abuses of tax farmers (SEG XLVIII 1404 = Étienne and Migeotte 1998). What motivates the decree in the first place is the purchase of tax contracts “from elsewhere,” likely nearby poleis, by citizens of Colophon. This leads somehow to abuse. As for the royal (Ptolemaic or Seleukid?) role, it exists, but is not fully understood: the dikai telônai referred to in lines 22-24 are conducted according to a royal protocol (το διάγραμμα τοῦ βασιλέως). Yet the institutions of tax farming at work in the episode, Étienne and Migeotte emphasize, are steadfastly civic, even if some of the taxes so farmed are royal (p. 155).
(I.Sestos 1; paralleled in OGIS 330). Since Fränkel’s time, new comparanda for this titulature have come to light, the aforementioned dedication from Ephesos (SEG XXVI 1238) and the ostotheke from Tralles (SEG XLVI 1434). Aperghis has argued that the Seleukids deprived the stratêgos/satrap of a direct role in financial administration. This may have been the case for the Attalids as well, but these two texts suggest that the stratêgos could in certain circumstances bring his weight to bear on fiscal matters.

Tellingly, the stratêgos is absent from a list of Attalid administrative titles ritually invoked by a cultic association in the hinterland of Pergamon, near Apollonia in the Kaikos Valley (SEG LII 1197 Face A lines 9-12; dated c.168-164). Many of these officials would appear to be part of the fiscal apparatus of the Attalid state: archiereus, hêmiolios, ho epi tês poleôs, dioikêtês, archeklogistês, oikonomos, eklogistês – in roughly descending order of seniority, according to Müller and Wörrle, though the different officials would have held different mandates. Thus the hêmiolios, familiar from the figure of Herodes in the Toriaion dossier, will have been responsible for revenues from royal patrimony. In other cases, it is more difficult to determine which part of an official’s brief might have been fiscal, as in the case of ho epi tês poleôs, a strictly civil official at any rate. Overall, this document adds validity to the axiom that the Attalids took over much of the Seleukid system, especially since it excludes the stratêgos from the fiscal apparatus. As positive evidence, it gives us a confirmed Attalid tax collector in the eklogistês, the one who “collects (ἐκλέγειν),” but once again, no indication whatsoever that Pergamon auctioned off its taxes to the highest bidder. As a working hypothesis, we can propose that those collecting taxes in the kingdom were primarily local tax farmers, operating within civic institutions, and socially embedded in their communities. For their part, the royal officials of the fiscal apparatus represented in the inscription from Apollonia provided another service of coordination, here between communities, cultic associations, tax farmers, and the central administration in Pergamon and in the other royal centers. Finally, the stratêgoi will have interfered only in extraordinary circumstances.

87 Aperghis 2004, 295; endorsed by Ma in his review, Ma 2007.
88 Müller and Wörrle 2002, 194.
90 See Müller 2005, a full study of this official; we should perhaps think of two different fiscal apparatuses: one connecting the court and the royal patrimony, to which the hêmiolios would belong, but also the riskophylax we know from Sardis (SEG IV 632); and a second, which raises revenues from the kingdom at large.
91 Müller and Wörrle 2002, 228; for the Seleukid system, see Aperghis 2004, 263-96. It should be noted, many of the presumed antecedents also stand in need of clarification.
It must be admitted that we have no evidence for how the Attalids conducted tax assessment. For the Seleukids, at least, we have slim evidence for a common language of cadastration, which king and polis both spoke.\(^{93}\) We have scattered evidence for Attalid land survey and surveyors: καταμετρησις [δε της] χωρας in Temnos (TEXT 4, Fragment D line 18); Lykinos, the γεοδωτης, active in the vicinity of Apollonioucharax (TEXT 2 Face B lines 23-4) and possibly also among the Mysians of Emodi (SEG XL 1062). Perhaps the techniques employed in land distribution facilitated certain forms of tax assessment as well. Finally, for the levels of taxation, our source record is simply inadequate. In the section on direct taxation, we discussed attempts to quantify revenues on the basis of the few numbers that have survived. These are principally, the head tax of the Kardakoi, “one Rhodian drachma and an obol,” and the phoros kai telesma of Amlada of 1.5 talents (TEXTS 3 and 12). Each case has its idiosyncracies, which again makes generalization hazardous. In each case, negotiation has reduced an original level of taxation to our final number.

To summarize the conclusions of this survey of the evidence: Pergamon’s direct taxes fell on communities, not landholders – unless those landholders were cleruchs, in which case they paid the traditional mixed-phasis: a tithe on grain and often vines, a cash sum for “the other fruits.” Villagers who were dependents of temples and sacred estates might also pay taxes on the land that they farmed, but they paid those taxes to their local priest, who was now more closely integrated into the royal fiscal apparatus. For indirect taxes, cautious interpretation of key documents was urged. Poll taxes, which fell on non-polis communities as a rule, were however irregular and ad hoc. The Attalids collected sales tax, but not in the form of Toriaion’s agoranomia, albeit the source of one of their earmarks. Customs dues were likely the most important form of indirect taxation, as evidenced by the CLA. The Attalids built up an infrastructure of surveillance in order to capture revenue from the flow of goods between the different fiscal zones of inner

\(^{93}\) For the Seleukids, the key evidence is again from Heraklea-under-Latmos (SEG XXXVII 859 Column III line 6). The cadastral unit there seems to be the zeugos. See discussion of Wörle 1988, 464-65; see also Chandezon 2004, 142-44, which also treats the question of whether cadastration in Asia Minor goes back to Achaemenid times, on the evidence of Hdt. 6.42, (Artaphemnes’ activities in 493/2); Thonemann 2009, 381-84 makes a strong case that land was assessed according to its productive potential both in Achaemenid and Hellenistic Asia Minor. There, in early Hellenistic Gambreion, the issue is evaluation of land in terms of kypri, a unit of measurement of seed; but he also adduces Magnesia (I.Magnesia 8). In that case, allotments of land of equal surface area are sold for a range of prices, implying both quadrature and a system of valuation according to productivity; finally, cf. the case of early imperial Messene and the oktobolos eiphora (IG 5 1 1432 and 1433). Rome imposed this tax on Messene. The Romans ask for a lump sum, which the Messenians raise through their own civic institutions. According to Migeotte 2008, the “tribes” in Messene are territorial divisions into which the polis grouped non-citizens and Romans for the purposes of this tax assessment.
Anatolia. Taxes on the usage of parts of the royal patrimony such as salt pans and lagoons will also have been significant. These resources may long have been claimed by outside powers, but the local ecology also put at stake the interests of the surrounding poleis and priesthoods. Finally, the personnel of tax collection did not include royal tax farmers. This was the most significant of the many respects in which the Attalid system of personnel mirrored the Seleukid.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

1. Negotiation is routine.

Certain generalizations, however, do present themselves. In accusing the Attalids of raising a “riskless revenue (akindunos phoros),” Antony aimed his criticism at their system of assessments (timêmata), implying that a community’s timêma was fixed, arbitrary, and immutable. Yet the cases of Amlada and the Kardakôn komê belie this characterization. The Kardakoi achieved a 72% reduction of their head tax, while the Amladeis knocked 25% off their annual collective payment. There is no way to determine the representativeness of these figures. By contrast, can we assume that the level of negotiation that went into each assessment was typical? Just how appropriate was this kind of bargaining in the fiscal arena? On the one hand, we have already tried to demystify the practice of earmarking and the peculiar Attalid monetary system by bringing the attendant negotiations out into the light. It makes sense to check for negotiation elsewhere in the fiscal system. On the other hand, we have to contend with both the admittedly tendentious evidence of Antony’s speech that makes of the timêma a fixed sum, as well as the idiosyncrasies of Pisidia c.160 and western Lycia in 181.

With their origins still in dispute, we cannot describe the katoikountes of the Kardakôn kôme simply as military settlers, although the Attalids clearly had a strategic interest in reconstituting the community in 181. In 184, Eumenes II had repulsed what was according to Attalid propaganda a major incursion into the region by Prusias I and the Galatians under Ortiagon. This war may be behind the failure of the Kardakoi to pay their taxes. Yet this is not explicit in the letter of Eumenes II to the official Artemidoros, which resumes the community’s request for a lightening of their tax burden (TEXT 3). Artemidoros had transmitted the request to Eumenes and checked into (ἐξετάζων) the

\[94 \text{SEG LIII 1706 resumes the controversy.}\]
\[95 \text{We know of the war from a single inscription, Segre 1932; for interpretation, see Thonemann (forthcoming, 27-8).}\]
claims of poverty. Not only had bad harvests struck the kôme, the katoikountes had actually started to flee the land. Artemidoros’ investigation implies that claims of poverty may have been commonplace, a hint that negotiation was widespread. The position of Eumenes was in its own way rather weak, as the king needed to incentivize the Kardakoi with tax privileges and the aid of a skilled mason in order to repopulate and refortify the village.

Unlike the Kardakoi, the Amladeis could communicate directly with the king, even if he could only answer them as “polis and gerousia” and not the canonical “polis kai boulê kai dêmos” (TEXT 12). In this case, a large embassy delivered the community’s request to Attalos II. Again, the conditions seem catastrophic. Pisidian Amlada had proven disloyal in the recent Galatikos polemos, so much so that they had been compelled to surrender hostages and now owed the Attalids reparations for “repairs (ἐπισκευ[ης ἐν] | κ[ε] (ʔ)” (lines 6-7). The war referred to may be precisely that named differently in an inscription of 159 from Olbasa in the Milyas, just to the west of Pisidia, as the Pisisdikos polemos (SEG XLIV 1108 lines 6-7). It is difficult to know whether these hostilities were a continuation of the Great Revolt of the Galatians, or a separate series of local wars that eventually involved Prousias II in the revolt of Selge in 156. Like the Kardakoi, the Amladeis represent themselves as impoverished: ἐπεὶ θλιβέντες ἐμπλησότας ἀσθενῶς [νῦν ἔ] | χέτε (lines 8-9). We would not expect self-abasement from Attalos, but was his negotiating position so much more secure? The sources provide a mixed picture of the Attalid hold on this part of SW Asia Minor. Olbasa evidently felt the need to send its honorific decree for two Attalid officials to the king for confirmation. However, we know the region to have been restive. For example, Selge’s battle with kings for parts of the plain of Pamphylia was worthy of Strabo’s retelling (12.7.3).

The historical contexts for the negotiations between the Attalids and the Kardakôn kômê and Amlada may have been extraordinary, but not the tenor of those negotiations, nor the rules of the game. If these two small, semi-Hellenized communities on the periphery of the kingdom could engage the Attalids over their tax assessments, it is likely that a polis of the core could too. Amlada’s Oprasates enjoyed royal favor, but other

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96 Welles 1934, 239 sees this as evidence that Amlada had only recently become a Greek-style polis and was as yet partially Hellenized. Was it actually the case that in communicating with the king through the gerousia Amlada was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other, more “advanced” poleis?
97 See Kearsley 1994, 52-3; for Attalid “local wars,” see Ma (forthcoming, 9-10).
98 Thonemann 2011a, 7 interprets similarly the claim of the katoikountes of Apollonioucharax to be dêmotai (TEXT 2, Face B line 11). Giovanni Marginesu has made the interesting suggestion to me that dêmotês there is rather a term of political status imbued with local meaning.
99 See Kosmetatou 1997.
cities launched their native sons into senior positions at court and in the administrative hierarchy. We can consider Adramyttion as the model. In the 160s, it issued a decree honoring its citizen Pamphilos. He was no ordinary citizen, but in his trustworthiness and moderation had been deemed worthy of appointment to a position in the Attalid court (συσταθείς τῷ βασιλεί ἑυμένει) and taken into the confidence of Queen Stratonike (lines 3, 9). The decree records in typically vague and heavy-handed language that Pamphilos continued to serve his polis and its citizens with honor (lines 13-18). Unfortunately, we are not given a narrative in the motivation clause to describe what is likely taken for granted, namely that many of these services of representation before the crown were fiscal in nature.

Rather more is spelled out in a long honorary decree of the city of Pergamon for a royal courtier (I.Pergamon 224 + I.Pergamon II p. 509; OGIS 323). Most discussion of the text concerns the identity of the syntrophos, usually identified as the powerful Andronikos, representative of the Attalids at Rome in their quarrels with the Bithynians and ultimately a key figure in the coup of Nikomedes II against his father Prousias II. By contrast, recent treatments of the Stadt und Herrscher relationship have not made much use of this important statement, perhaps because Pergamon was no ordinary polis under the Attalids. In honoring a courtier for his administrative virtue, the Pergamene dêmos provides an ideal framework for negotiation between kings and cities:

τὴν τε πατρίδα σπε[ύ]δων, ὅσον ἐφ' ἐυτῶ, διαφέρειν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τῇ πολιτείᾳ οἶκονομίαις, τὰ μὲν παραλειμμένα ἑισηγησάμενος ἐπὶ τῷ[ι] συνφέροντι διώρθωσεν, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἀκολούθως τοῖς νόμοις συνεπείας ξεσεν

…aiming as much as he could to distinguish his fatherland [Pergamon] among other cities in matters of administration according to politeia, [meaning that] on matters neglected, having

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100 Şahin 1987.
101 For Pamphilos, see Savalli-Lestrade 1996, 168-71, esp. 170: the lasting bond with city of origin is common.
102 Date: Fränkel in I.Pergamon proposed the Bithynian war of succession 149/8, perhaps signified in line 21, as a terminus post quem, while Dittenberger in OGIS proposed 156/5 or shortly thereafter, on the basis of the embassy. It dates to the reign of Attalos II, in any case; Allen 1983, 132, n. 203, reports the phi of σύντροφος is visible on a squeeze.
103 For the sources for Andronikos, see the entry in Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 143-44, as well as her discussion in Savalli-Lestrade 1996, 158-68; it may have been the brother (or son?) of Andronikos, Philopoimen, who was the Attalid commander under Mummius in the Achaean War in 146. See also Hopp 1977, 98.
104 For the citizens of the polis of Pergamon under the Attalids, see Bielfeldt 2010, with excellent photo of this text on p. 143.
proposed something useful, he straightened them out; as for the rest, he saw to it that the laws were closely followed (lines 11-14).  

Admittedly, the oikonomiai here may have been a broad range of administrative acts, not all of which touched fiscality, but the language of diōrthis is redolent of public finance. This is a representation of ideal behavior, but it betrays a line of argumentation that those “other cities” surely trotted out in negotiations with the crown over fiscality: we have a distinctive politeia and certain nomoi that preclude some forms of taxation and guard us from arbitrarily high rates. If this argument carried weight in Pergamon, which is always understood to have been under tight royal control, it is likely to have resonated farther afield. Interestingly, this is a tactic known from inter-polis negotiations. In 205, for instance, the Xanthians replied to the request of Kytenion for financial aid, pleading that ἐπιβαλεῖν τε τοῖς πολίτασι | οὕδειμαν ἐξεστὶν ἐπιβολήν διὰ τὴν γεγενημένην οἰκονομίαν μετὰ ψηφίσματος εἰς ἐτη ἐννέα “no extraordinary levy on (our) citizens is possible because we have decreed a nine-year oikonomia” (SEG XXXVIII 1476 lines 53-55).  

In the end, Xanthos gave Kytenion 500 drachmas, but the institution of the nine-year oikonomia, ratified unilaterally, had set limits on the negotiation. I.Pergamon 224 shows that the city of Pergamon, in its agon with other poleis, strove to place an analogous set of limits on royal power.

2. Royal fiscality is a calque.

We have been using Antony’s polemic as a guide through the tax morphology of the Attalid state, but it is not primary evidence for the indignation of the taxpayer. For this, we have to pay attention to the outrage of Metropolis, for whom taxes had been “invented (ἐφευρισκόμενων)” (TEXT 5, line 19).” As we have argued, the Attalids had not invented these taxes for the Metropolitans, though in the end, they succeeded in

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105 On έπισημοῦμαι and συνεπισχύω, see Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 164-65. She and many others have been interested in the text for what it might tell us about the strategeia of the polis of Pergamon, since the introduction of legislation alluded to here would make of Andronikos a stratēgos.


107 Obviously, the city of Pergamon is a special case. However, scholarship is still working out the nature of its distinctiveness. Most glaringly, the kings are often thought to have had a hand in the appointment of the civic stratēgoi, whom we know to have had powerful pro-bouleutic powers. The key text is OGIS 267, in which Eumenes I honors an outgoing board of stratēgoi for their competence. Indeed, as noted above, Andronikos, (or whoever the honoree of I.Pergamon 224 is), has been suspected of taking the actions described in lines 11-14 in his capacity as civic stratēgos. Yet clearly, the horizons of this text are wider than the cadre of the polis of Pergamon (παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις).
cancelling them. Yet the episode could have been a cautionary tale for royal power: the creation of new domains of fiscality remained taboo. The best way to encourage non-compliance was to invent new taxes – or to be perceived as doing so. As for inventions, nothing had changed with the advent of the Attalids. It was an old imperial habit in Asia Minor to retain and not alter the categories of fiscality born of the civic context. Conceptually, if not always economically, royal fiscality was epiphenomenal.

Our best example of this effect comes from Toriaion, where Eumenes II earmarked for the oil fund κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορανομίας πρόσοδον “for the present, the revenue from the agoranomia” (line 43). We can argue endlessly about which institutions the Toraitai possessed before the Attalids conferred a new status on the community through this series of letters. And as we have explained above, the nature of the revenue from the office of agoranomos is not perfectly understood. Yet the implication of the directive for the present is that the revenue stream for the oil fund already exists. It at least takes logical precedence over the procedure of earmarking. In other words, Eumenes did not carve out a new domain of fiscality here in order to pay for monarchy’s new expenditure. In the history of Asia Minor, the observation may appear banal, but not in the history of monarchy. Exempli gratia, France of the ancien régime, at least in its last hundred years, worked very differently. The principal direct tax in France since the fifteenth century had been the taille, but from 1695 to 1789 the monarchy introduced a series of new direct taxes, the capitation and the dixième, later renamed the vingtième, in order to fund increasing expenditures. These new taxes have been termed “universal” in that they were designed to penetrate the barriers of status and privilege that had previously shielded many French royal subjects from taxation. In search of revenues, the French monarchy created new fiscal categories, a radical innovation on the road to the Revolution.

That Attalid royal fiscality was less creative does not mean it was more benign. In fact, if we can rely on earlier evidence from Asia Minor, the calque of royal fiscality could just as easily be used to wound the polis. The classic case comes from Sardis under Antiochus III. In order to punish the city for siding with Achaios, the king added a royal

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109 Contra Rostovtzeff 1930, 605: “The difference was that the kings introduced some new taxes…” There is no evidence to support this claim, and Rostovtzeff did not attempt to provide any.
110 See Ch. 2, n. 16.
111 See Bresson 2000, 297-304 for the comparison of ancient Greece and ancien régime France on a different score, as well as Ober 1993.
112 Kwass 1999.
eikostê tax to a pre-existing politikê one. To what extent this form of “double taxation” was practiced is a matter of debate, but the calque need not have always been a perfect copy: the royal share of a given revenue source may have been less than half. It is clear from the letter of Zeuxis to Herakleia-under-Latmos that the same local tax farmer was collecting royal taxes and civic taxes in the harbor, even if a fixed amount of the royal receipts remained in Herakleia, earmarked for the oil fund. Thus cooperation was possible, or at least coexistence, which is why recent scholarship has highlighted not only the competition between the two fiscalities, but to borrow the French, “connivance” and “cohabitation.” If the latter were a matter of dividing up a single revenue stream, the former was a fight over which of the revenue streams in a relatively stable fiscal portfolio each side would claim. So what was up for negotiation was sovereignty (kyrieia) over the different revenue streams (prosodoi), not their number and location in the civic economy. This is why ateleia inscriptions so often speak of “the taxes over which the city is sovereign (ὡν ἡ πόλις κυρία ἐστίν).”

Just which taxes those might be was subject to change, a possibility that Iasos tried to foreclose by binding an official of Ptolemy I with this oath:

\[\text{τὰς δὲ προσόδους ἐάσω Ιασείς[τ]ις| λαμβάνειν τὰς τῆς πόλεως πάσας καὶ τοὺς λιμένας, σύνταξεν δὲ φέρειν αὐτούς | ἵν αὐν ὁ βασιλεὺς συντάξει.}\]

...that I [Aristoboulos] should allow the Iaseians to collect all civic revenues and (taxes from) harbors, and to raise themselves whatever extraordinary contribution the king might call for (I. Iasos 3, lines 13-15).

For Iasos, the threat is the loss of sovereignty over one or another of its prosodoi. Hence the gist of the oath is: let them all be politikai. In Iasos, the atmosphere was of course competitive, but again, the two fiscalities could just as easily cooperate. The point is that the city defined the categories of fiscality to which both parties wholeheartedly subscribed.

We have a beautiful illustration of this dynamic in a text that may very well be Attalid and post-Apameian. It is a royal rescript (?) discovered in Sardis, but addressed to another polis, which W. Buckler and D. Robinson suggested may have been Temnos, on

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113 SEG XXXIX 1283 lines 5-6; see explanation of Gauthier 1989, 33-6.
114 For Herakleia, see supra, n. 84; for debate on “double taxation,” see Martinez-Sève 2004, 95, on Sardis, and also V. Chankowski 2007, 323-28 who argues for “double taxation” in several domains in the case of Herakleia (p. 326).
115 Connivance: Capdetrey 2004; Cohabitation: Chandezon 2004; more generally, for theoretical discussions of royal and civic fiscality that resume these debates, see Chankowski 2004 and 2007.
116 Discussed by Chandezon 2004, 133.
account of the Τ in line 7 (I.Sardis 2). Judging from the script, they dated the inscription to 225-175. The historical context is the familiar and generic one of post-war devastation and royal euergetism, so it is very difficult to choose between a Seleukid author like Antiochos III and Eumenes II, acting on the model found in the decree for Korragos (TEXT 1). In response to a petition, a royal official grants the unnamed city of I.Sardis 2 a seven-year tax holiday, and the following permanent arrangement starting in the eighth year: διδόναι τρε[ις ἀναφοράς] | [ἐκ] πασῶν τῶν γινομένων προσόδων πα[ρ’ ἑκαστὸν] | ἕνιαυτὸν ἄργα[πί]|ιού μνᾶς ἔικοσι καὶ ἀλλ[ως μή ἐν]οὐχλειοθαὶ “they should pay in three installments out of all the revenues produced, twenty minae in total per year, and should be taxed in no other way” (lines 16-19). In other words, royal fiscality has a role in designing the punctuality of taxation (three installments); and in calculating the tax burden (20 minae); but it does not take part in defining any of the revenue sources (πασῶν τῶν γινομένων προσόδων). Those were left to the city’s discretion. The calque of royal fiscality meant that the battle for sovereignty was effectively circumscribed. The result was that the much larger sovereignty claims of the Attalids, the absolute claims of the Settlement of Apameia, were camouflaged.

3. The survival of civic fiscality is guaranteed.

While it goes without saying, the historical problem of the relationship of royal fiscality to civic fiscality that we have been discussing presupposes the survival of a civic fiscal apparatus and the preservation of much of the traditional tax base of the polis into the enlarged Attalid kingdom. This is of course recognized in Francophone scholarship on civic institutions in the tradition of Louis Robert and in the formulation of the problem by F. Duyrat and V. Chankowski in their 2004 volume Le Roi et l’économie. Moreover, recent German scholarship on the identity and institutions of the city of Pergamon under the kings makes the point expressly. However, in the technical literature on certain key sources for this dissertation, we read that the Attalids, in the first instance, claimed all revenues, giving back to the cities whatever portions suited them. If propagated, this notion may continue to warp interpretations, which justifies a short excursus. The idea goes back to the grand syntheses of Rostovtzeff and later A.H.M. Jones, but has leaked

117 Unfortunately, the stone seems to have perished in the Smyrna/Izmir fire of 1922; if the letter were addressed to Temnos, part of the Aeolian core of the Attalid kingdom, this would make it very likely that the author is an Attalid.
118 Most recently, see Bielfeldt 2010; for the politikai prosodoi of Pergamon, see e.g., I.Pergamon 246 lines 40-1.
into numismatic and epigraphical studies.\textsuperscript{119} Kleiner’s standard treatment of the cistophori and Bauslaugh’s of the so-called cistophoric countermarks both quote the judgment of Jones in summing up their views on the historical import of the coins: “The policy of the kings seems to have been to appropriate nearly all the taxes, and then to make grants from the royal treasury to the cities ‘for the administration of the city.’”\textsuperscript{120} Another version of this argument transposes the ideal type of the “subject city,” which is a convention of modern historiography, on to the ancient reality. Subject cities, then, were a class of poleis, which by virtue of that status designation surrendered not just some vague sense of \textit{autonomia} and freedom of action, but specific domains of fiscality. Thus L. Jonnes and M. Ricl write, “In the case of Tyriaion \textit{sic}, the king presently relinquishes revenues collected by \textit{agoranomoi}, which in case of a subject city went \textit{εἰς τὸ βασιλικόν},” citing the Korragos decree (TEXT 1), which demonstrates no such pattern.\textsuperscript{121} The interpretation of Dreyer and Engelmann of the \textit{diagógion} of \textit{I. Metropolis} 1 (TEXT 5) is based on an analogous and equally unjustified assumption. Since they take Metropolis to be a “sujette ville,” the city was, as it were, “constitutionally” barred from raising its own customs dues. The \textit{diagógion} must then be a toll (\textit{Maut}) and not customs dues (\textit{Gebühren}).\textsuperscript{122} The rule of thumb should be: each domain of fiscality was potentially an arena for negotiation, the domains themselves remaining fixed. So if we were to learn that Metropolis raised its own customs dues, it would not be any more surprising than the recent discovery that the member poleis of the Lycian koinon did too.\textsuperscript{123} For the Attalids, there were also administrative advantages to leaving the civic fiscal apparatus in place.

Finally, from this perspective, the sundry evidence for civic fiscality requires cautious interpretation. To give two concrete examples, in the mountain country northwest of Manisa, two boundary stones were found reading: \textit{ὅροι Αἰγαέων}.\textsuperscript{124} The conclusions that we can draw from this evidence are rather modest. Aigai claimed this rocky terrain as part of its fiscal base, and perhaps the productive ecological niche in

\textsuperscript{119} Rostovtzeff 1930 (CAH\textsuperscript{1}), 605-6 postulates civic taxes alongside royal taxes, but his view was that the royal tax burden was so heavy as to destroy the city’s ability to pay for its own needs of expenditure, thus explaining the practice of earmarking and royal patronage of the gymnasium!

\textsuperscript{120} Jones 1971, 55, \textit{apud} Bauslaugh 1990, 59, n. 54 and Kleiner and Noe 1973, 125, n. 19.

\textsuperscript{121} Jonnes and Ricl 1997, 26.

\textsuperscript{122} Dreyer and Engelmann 2003, 51-4.

\textsuperscript{123} See supra, n. 59.

\textsuperscript{124} J. Keil and A. Premerstein, \textit{Bericht über eine Reise in Lydien und der südlichen Aiolis} (Vienna 1909-1909), nos. 204 and 2055; the stones also bear dates, \textit{8} and \textit{π}, respectively, which may hold the key to their eventual interpretation. Admittedly, I have no reason to believe that these were inscribed under the Attalids rather than the Seleukids. The methodological lesson remains the same.
which the stones were erected was a matter of dispute between Aigai and another polis. Yet we simply cannot use this evidence to assign Aigai a political status (“autonomous” or “subject” city) in the late Attalid kingdom; or by circular reasoning, to date these texts according to a status that we presume Aigai received at Apameia. In the same vein, we should not exclude the Pisidian poleis of Adada and Termessos from the Attalid kingdom because they swore an oath to guard against the dissolution (kataluein) of each other’s laws and revenues (prosodoi). 125 This oath is not an index of Attalid control in Pisidia, but rather of the lengths to which the cities of the realm might go to protect their revenues. 126

DIGGING AROUND FOR REVENUES

Theophrastos bequeathed (his library) to Neleos, who having taken it to Skepsis, bequeathed it to his relations, lay people, who kept it locked up and in disarray. But when they learned of the zeal of the Attalid kings for pursuing books for the foundation of a library in Pergamon, Skepsis being subject to the Attalids, they dug a kind of pit in the ground and hid it there (Strabo 13.1.54).

Surveillance

A nightmarish anxiety about the reach of the Attalid state pervades Strabo’s story. The descendants of Neleos may not have been scholars, but they knew how to hide their wealth from the king’s men. As we have already had multiple occasions to note, the expenditure needs of the Attalids must have been considerable, despite their relatively small standing army and conspicuous lack of royal garrisons. Yet in their pursuit of revenue, the Attalids adhered to certain rules, outlined in the preceding section, which limited their powers of revenue collection. As the story from Strabo suggests, they must also have faced resistance from the taxpayers. Thus to meet their needs, it may not have been sufficient merely to integrate the new territories into their fiscal system, especially if in the surrounding negotiations they faced off against opponents who, like Adada and Termessos, were oath-bound to armed conflict over revenues. We have tried to

125 TAM III 2 lines 13-15; R. Heberdey’s date for this text was 200-102. We know that the Attalids were active in Termessos. See TAM III 9. While there is no way to securely date the treaty, the fact that the two cities possess their own revenues is of course no criterion for making 133 the terminus post quem.

126 Cf. SIG 633 lines 40-1, for an almost identical clause from the isopoliteia agreement of Miletos and Herakleia-under-Latmos, c.180; V. Chankowski 2007, 301 comments on these clauses.
demonstrate that part of the solution was the implementation of fiscal arrangements that encouraged quasi-voluntary compliance, in Levi’s terms.\textsuperscript{127} In the section on salt pans and coastal lagoons, we discussed one form of confiscation. There may have been more.\textsuperscript{128} A different approach may have been to increase the penetration of the fiscal apparatus, to go, as it were, beneath the ground in Skepsis. We do not hear of a major reassessment of fiscal liabilities, such as, for example, the Athenians implemented in 425/4 (ML 69). Instead, just as the Athenians did in eventually focusing their energies on collection of an empire-wide harbor tax (the \textit{eikostē}), the Attalids catered to the cultural preference of their subjects for indirect taxation.\textsuperscript{129}

The richly documented history of imperial Venice reminds us that this preference for indirect taxation is a consistent feature across Mediterranean empires.\textsuperscript{130} What remains to be investigated is whether the Attalids structured their fiscal system in such a way as to progressively deepen the incidence of indirect taxation in an effort to touch groups of royal subjects and types of transactions that had hitherto escaped detection. The most promising hints of evidence point to a focus on capturing revenues from movement and exchange. In the \textit{CLA}, Anatolia appears as a patchwork of fiscal regimes. This patchwork effect will have represented an impediment to trans-Anatolian movement of goods and people, which is why Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos and Stratonikeia in Caria may have granted each other tax immunities late in the second century – to reduce by at least one the number of fiscal boundaries their traders would cross in participating in a regional economy around the Maeander Valley.\textsuperscript{131} On the other hand, from the perspective of royal fiscality, the patchwork effect will have been a boon. The more traders passed in and out of enclaves of Attalid control, the more taxes on mobility accrued to the crown. Yet the king could only profit from as much of this mobility as he could observe. While Purcell has emphasized the model of a “Mediterranean of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Levi 1988.
\item \textsuperscript{128} The most telling indication is the property mentioned in \textit{I.Pergamon} 249 line 25, as “having become royal (\textit{τῶν ὑσιῶν τῶν γεγενηµένων βασιλικῶν}).” The issue of confiscation needs further exploration. The evidence seems to point to a focus on the kind of extra-urban resources that Alexander and his immediate successors claimed as an inheritance from the Achaemenids: forests, salt pans, lakes, mines, quarries, perhaps beehives and brick works. Mileta’s notion of a “Königliches Gebiet” beyond royal land is helpful here (Mileta 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{For eikostē}: Thuc. 7.28.4; Migeotte 2003 collects all the neglected evidence for direct taxation in ancient Greece, but still concludes that indirect taxation was predominate and universal, and in the cadre of the polis, the preferred form of taxation (p. 313).
\item \textsuperscript{130} See Hocquet 1999, 387 for Venetian resistance to direct taxation on income, movable and immovable assets, and property.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Guizzi et al. 2008, no. 3; the restoration in lines 24-5 of the \textit{Stratonikeis} as the counter-party to the agreement is not absolutely secure, but Ch. 3 has also argued for the coherence of a regional economy across the political boundary of the Maeander that lends support to the reading.
\end{itemize}
ellimenia,” there also existed in classical antiquity a fiscal universe of the interior. In other words, beyond the harbor lay a range of checkpoints and surveillance mechanisms, revenue officers checking bags at gates and fortified customs houses set in narrow passes. So it is no surprise that the CLA is concerned with preventing smuggling by land (lines 26-8). In addition to customs houses (telôneia), the law refers to other guard posts called paraphylakai (e.g., lines 31-3, 37-9). The Romans and the Attalids were both after what Ps.Aristotle calls the revenue of telê kata gên, taxes levied along land routes (Oikonomika 2.4).

The Attalid investment in surveillance created both the physical infrastructure of the CLA and units of armed men called (h)orophylakes and paraphylakitai, which likely aided in the interception of smugglers and guarded the nodes of communication. We know the institution of (h)orophylak(e)ia from strictly civic documents of the Hellenistic period, and (h)orophylakes, paraphylakitai, et al., can all be observed in the employ of Greek cities under Rome. Several royal documents that by many appearances belong to the late Attalid kingdom also make mention of these terms. The first is a fragmentary royal document found in Telmessos, introduced above in the section on direct taxation. To recapitulate, thought by the Roberts to have originated in the chancery of Eumenes II, the document records the king’s offer of a tax privilege to craftsmen in exchange for the service of (h)orophylakia (SEG XXIX 1516). C. Brélaz has produced the spelling (h)orophylakeia, which reflects our inability to decide in any particular case whether a mountain or a border is under surveillance. Often in Asia Minor, and certainly in the case of Telmessos or the Kardakôn kômê, the mountain is a border. Thus the (h)orophylakes of Miletos and Herakleia-under-Latmos are responsible for capturing and ransoming the slaves that escape from one city’s territory into the other via the mountainous divide (SIG3 633, lines 88-99).

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132 Purcell 2005, 204.
133 For revenue officers checking bags, see Aen. Tact. 29.5, where the context is arms smuggling. Interestingly, although the officers are posted at the city gates, they are called ellimenistai. Cf. the taxes taken at the city gates of Jerusalem (Jos. AJ 12.138-44); for a fortified customs house in a narrow pass, see the very one flagged by Purcell in Purcell 2005, 218, n. 51: see Mitchell 1999a, 173 for the site of Doseme Bogazi in western Pisidia, on the later Via Sebaste. The fortified customs house is from the early Imperial period, but the same pass held crucial strategic value for the Attalids.
134 For the debate on the precise meaning of paraphylakê, see Brélaz 2005, 123, who concludes, “le substantif η ταραφυλακία désigne la garde, la garnison et, dan un sens figuré, la protection, la surveillance, la circonspection.”
As the Roberts argued, the *(h)orophylakes* of *SEG* XXIX 1516 would have actually patrolled these mountains, high above the coastal plain of western Lycia.  

Yet where the commentary of the Roberts is slightly misleading is in its description of their duties as simply policing the “*eschatiai*.” Indeed for Brélaz too, the service of *(h)orophylakeia* is one of “*securité publique sur ces terres*,” and he carefully notes the lack of direct evidence for the involvement of *(h)orophylakes* in tax collection in Hellenistic or Roman Asia Minor.  

Working from a wider body of evidence, Chaniotis describes such groups “not simply policing the countryside but primarily safeguarding the revenues expected from the countryside.” The crucial question is, “What were these revenues?” Chaniotis’ examples tend to show cities taxing land in liminal and vulnerable locations. Therefore they send armed men out for surveillance, to protect the crops and guard those bringing it in. The mountainous terrain of Asia Minor bore a different kind of fruit, which is probably why the *oreinê chôra* is disputed in the aforementioned *SIG*³ 633 (line 78). In certain seasons, this terrain surely bloomed, but the harvest that the *(h)orophylakes* were responsible for was perennial. Since people and goods were always moving across the fiscal patchwork of Asia Minor, manning the interstices was always profitable. At least some of the revenue collection ensured by the *(h)orophylakes* was customs. Yet in the case of *SEG* XXIX 1516, the concern of Eumenes II (?) for the “public security” of the mountains of western Lycia is left curiously unmotivated.

The royal interest in funding these patrols will have coincided with the motivation behind the placement of groups of *paraphylakitai* in permanent, fortified installations, often outside urban centers. In each case, the goal will have been to capture revenues through territorial surveillance. Our evidence from the civic context is slightly more verbose on the subject. In late Hellenistic Pisidian Antioch, a *paraphylax* was attached to a plain called the Killanion Pedion (*SEG* XXXI 1201). Around 165 C.E., nearby Termessos built a *paraphylakeion* on their new (?) “royal road (*basilikê hodos*)” (*TAM* III 14 = Migeotte, *Souscriptions* 84 line 14). The point was always to observe activity in these places because they brought in revenues for the city. It seems reasonable to infer that royal *paraphylakitai* were also guarding revenues linked to the topography of the kingdom. As in the case of the *(h)orophylakes*, we should try to pin down which revenues they were guarding. The suspected Attalid *paraphylakitai* can be found in two places: the hinterland of Pergamon, and the Milyas. We have discussed the letter of Attalos II to

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139 Chaniotis 2008, 141.
Olbasa (SEG XLIV 1108). A second letter to an unnamed community was found in the vicinity of Olbasa (SEG XLVIII 1532). It mentions basilikoi topoi and paraphylakitai (lines 5, 16). In part on grounds of epistolary style, N. Milner suggests an Attalid author and thus a date after Apameia, yet there is also a danger here of circular reasoning in that the paraphylakitai are thought to point to an Attalid context. Not far away, from Alassos, (again, western Pisidia), comes a dedication of paraphylakitai, whom not everyone takes as Attalid (SEG XLVII 1601). The locus classicus is I.Pergamon 249, in which the city of Pergamon includes paraphylakitai among those granted citizenship after 133 (lines 17-18).

Unless a new source comes to light that describes the territorial charge of a group of Attalid paraphylakitai in the genitive, à la the officer of Pisidian Antioch Κιλλανίου Πεδίου, we just cannot determine which territories these units were guarding. However, even if we knew in every case the name of the territory to which they were assigned, we would still need to explain the nature of the revenues that territorial control was meant to guarantee. Again, the current scholarly bias leans toward landed wealth. Thus, Brélaz suggests that the paraphylakitai of SEG XLVIII 1532 guarded royal estates, namely the basilikoi topoi. Yet in that inscription it is not possible to make out what if any relation these topoi have to the guards in question.

The way forward is to consider the economic geography of the regions where we find these inscriptions. To start with the hinterland of Pergamon, which produced I.Pergamon 249: it was certainly linked in this period to a form of specialized pastoralism that fed the fabled textile production of the city. In fact, this is a pattern that we can also trace in the other large urban centers of western Asia Minor like Ephesos, Miletos, Teos, etc. Specialized pastoralism implies distinctive fiscal modalities, which is to say, it requires a great deal of moving first flocks and then semi-processed and finished textiles. This is why in a fourth-century synoikism document of Teos, a fiscal distinction is made between cloaks of Milesian wool that are imported to be sold and those that are brought into the city to be worked. The density of connections formed by specialized pastoralism in western Asia Minor made surveillance of the pathways

140 Milner 1998, 65-6, no. 145.
141 Schuler 1999, 124, n. 2 suggests a date in the third century and a Seleukid context.
142 For discussion of this famous inscription, see Brélaz 2005, 125-26, with bibliography.
143 Brélaz 2005, 127.
144 Rostovtzeff 1923, 379-82, esp. 380-81, for treatment of the treaty between Aigai and the Olympenoi (Chandezon 2003, no. 51).
145 Chaniotis 1999.
146 W. Judeich, MDAI(A) 16 (1891), 292-93,17 lines 13-16.
between cities, countryside, and markets a constant preoccupation. There was a palpable desire to be able to move animals and products, but also to observe others doing so – and to charge them for it. Thus it was useful for the Colophonian garrison commander who guarded the contested pass between Colophon and Lebedos (“Ta Stena”) to keep a pack of dogs.\textsuperscript{147} The worry was not a surprise frontal assault. It was undetected movement through the pass. The \textit{paraphylakitai} of \textit{I.Pergamon} 249 are more likely to have monitored movement related to specialized pastoralism than agriculture on royal estates in the Kaikos Valley.

The other testimonia come from the Milyas, specifically from around Olbasa, in the Lysis Valley. The mountainous Milyas region, in its geography and history very similar to Pisidia (to its east), separates the upper Meander, i.e., Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos and Apameia, from the coastal plain of Pamphylia (MAP 6). The Attalids were neither the first nor the last imperial power to sink resources into the region. Alexander had fought the Pisidians of Termessos for the narrows (\textit{stena}) connecting the Milyas to Pamphylia.\textsuperscript{149} Augustus would later found a colony on the site of Olbasa.\textsuperscript{150} The two regions that the Milyas could tie together, if so compelled by outside imperial powers, were in fact oriented in opposite directions: the Maeander Valley toward the Aegean and Pamphylia toward the Levant. In terms of the “natural” economic geography of Anatolia, the Milyas is not a vital link. The Attalids had an interest in configuring it into one. The resources of the fertile Lysis Valley notwithstanding, the strategic value of the region was enormous. Yet this was not simply a matter of being able to move armies through. The Milyas lies between two major Attalid emporia, Apameia and the coastal foundation of Attaleia. The \textit{paraphylakitai} of this region were not watching over out-of-the-way royal estates – the place was no longer out of the way. They were actually tasked with monitoring an increasing volume of movement between these two great centers of exchange.

\textit{Centralizing Exchange}

A number of such centers emerged in the late Attalid kingdom. Inland, we find two major periodic markets. Apameia/Kelainai had been a satrapal capital, but under the

\textsuperscript{147} Robert and Robert 1976; cf. \textit{SEG} XXIV 154 + XL 135, the famous Athenian decree of Epichares for the defense of Rhamnous. Epichares employed both dogs and lookouts (the mysterious \textit{kryptoi}) to defend isolated crops around the time of the Chremonidean War.

\textsuperscript{149} Strabo 14.3.9.

\textsuperscript{150} See Kearsley 1994; Mitchell 1994, 132, 136 for the significance of the Hellenistic road from Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos to Pamphylia, as well as Mitchell 1999a, 17–21. This road was the first to receive the attention of M. Aquilius, 129-126. Parts of this road were included in the Via Sebaste, constructed in 6 B.C.E. in order to link Pamphylia to central Anatolia.
Attalids it grew into what Strabo would call the greatest *emporion* of Asia after Ephesos (12.8.15).\(^{151}\) Around the pre-Hellenistic and in fact pre-Galatian sanctuary of Pessinuous materialized what would be for the geographer the greatest *emporion* of those parts, heavily patronized by the Attalids if never politically integrated into the kingdom (12.5.3).\(^{152}\) While in each case an increasing centralization of exchange is contemporaneous with the appearance of the Attalids, the causal connection between the two is uncertain. By contrast, there should be no doubt that the emergence of new coastal entrepôts in this period was the direct result of an Attalid fiscal strategy of centralizing exchange. The sources are not copious, but they do show that the Attalids founded and built up harbor cities after 188. Strabo tells us that Attalos II founded Attaleia in Pamphylia (14.4.1). We have no archaeological record for the Hellenistic settlement, but the site became the principal port of the southern coast of Anatolia for two thousand years, the modern Antalya.\(^{153}\) A longstanding topographical problem relates to Strabo’s following comment that nearby Attalos also settled Korkyros, “another *katoikia*, a fortress that shared its borders, and he cast a greater wall around (them both?)” (πολίχνιον ὁμορον, ἄλλην κατοικίαν καὶ μείζω περίβολον περιθέντος). One solution is to posit another Attalid foundation, but in Lycia, chalking it up to Strabo’s confusion. A second solution is to think of Korkyros as a satellite military settlement of the entrêpot of Attaleia, perhaps on the model of Telmessos and the Kardakôn komê.\(^{154}\)

Not much actually turns on solving this intractable problem because both of those solutions fit with behavior patterned elsewhere. On the one hand, the Attalid building activity in harbors had both a “military” and a “civilian,” i.e., commercial aspect, though in practice they must have been closely intertwined. Aeolian Elaia was a pre-dynastic maritime polis that under royal rule gave Pergamon access to the sea. Strabo’s description of the city as both a naval station (*naustathmon*) and a harbor (*limen*) is reflected in recent archaeological investigations (13.3.5).\(^{155}\) On a much larger scale, Attalid Ephesos was redesigned to serve the Pergamene navy. Yet its harbor was dredged by royal engineers, Strabo tells us, so that large merchant vessels (*megalai holkades*) could sail in

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\(^{151}\) The long-term history and archaeology of the city and its hinterland are now the focus of a major research project. See Summerer et al. 2011.


\(^{153}\) Bean 1968, 41.


\(^{155}\) See Pirson 2004 for analysis of commercial and military infrastructure of Elaia. The closed harbor is actually quite small compared to, say, Zea. No ships sheds have been found, though we know the Attalid fleet wintered there. Pirson dates the fortifications at Elaia to the late third century.
The Attalids wanted to increase the volume of exchange focused in Ephesos. On the other hand, there were likely more coastal foundations than we have yet accounted for. This seems to be particularly true of the north of Propontic Thrace, along the route of the future Via Egnatia, in particular along its last legs west of Byzantion (MAP 7).

The Attalids hoped to capture revenue along this heavily trafficked route, which led traders in and out of the bustling Propontis, in part by founding one or more cities, and in part by controlling a network of settlements. The existence of cities not only drew exchange to a central place, if properly nourished by royal power, civic institutions could shoulder much of the burden of tax collection. Scholars have long argued over whether the poleis of Bisanthe, known from the ATL, and the polis of Panion, not known from any contemporary documents, but thought to be a late Attalid foundation, were one and the same. The crux of the problem is that on the presumed site of Bisanthe (modern Barbaros), an inscription was found that records a dedication made on behalf of Eumenes II, ktistēs (ὑπὲρ βασιλέως Ἐὐμένου σωτήρος καὶ ἐυργέτου καὶ κτίστου τῆς πόλεως) (OGIS 301). The text does not record the name of the polis in question. So those who contend that Barbaros is an ancient city called Panion use this inscription to make the case that it was an Attalid foundation. Alternatively, if Barbaros is indeed Bisanthe, then perhaps the polis was re-founded. Yet there is one other candidate for a foundation or re-foundation in the vicinity of Barbaros that has not been proposed. This is the polis of Hellenopolis, which we propose for the first time should be in Propontic Thrace, not in Bithynia, as previously conjectured. Its name, at least, rings of an ambitious effort at urbanization. Histories of the Attalids typically make mention of the

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156 On Ephesos, see Davies 2011; the archaeological sequencing of the harbor of Ephesos is still a matter of fierce debate. Against the Austrian consensus (Kraft et al. 2007), there are those like E. Lytle (forthcoming) who think the huge Roman harbor visible today (silted up) is precisely that which the Attalid architektones put in place. It was not by chance that the stele of the CLA was set up at Ephesos.

157 See Walbank 1983 for discussion of early Via Egnatia, which in his view dated in its final form to 101 B.C.E.; cf. the view of Loukopoulou 1997, who essentially sees a royal road of Philip V underneath the Via Egnatia; thus, the Via Egnatia was not created ex nihilo: Lolos 2007, 258, n. 10. The parts of the Via Egnatia that went through Bisanthe, Perinthos, and then into Byzantion, however, traversed territory that had never been part of the Antigonid kingdom, (which is why it was not part of Macedonia Prima). By contrast, this region had been part of the enlarged Attalid kingdom. In effect then, the Romans would have succeeded in building a road that connected Philip’s road with the Attalid one, successfully traversing the hostile territory of the Thracian Caeni. The king of the Caeni, Diegylis, makes an appearance in Attalid history as an opponent of Attalos II (Appian Mithr. 6; Diod. Sic. 33. 4-15; Strabo 13.4.2; OGIS 330, 339). The territory of the Caeni, for Walbank 1983, the spine of the Thracian Chersonese, would have cut off the Attalid zone of influence around Bisanthe from Attalid possessions in the Chersonese like Lysmacheia and Sestos, as well as points farther west along the Aegean coast like Ainos and Maroneia.


159 See SEG XLIX 875; Sayar 1999, no. 1.
foundation of Hellenopolis, an old topographical problem arising out of an apparent confusion in the testimonia.\textsuperscript{160} We learn from the second century B.C.E. writer Apollodoros of Athens, active in the library of Pergamon:

\begin{quote}
Ἑλληνόπολις. Ἀπολλόδωρος Ἀτταλὸς έκ τῶν Ἑλληνιδῶν πόλεων οἰκήτωρας συναγαγὼν, ἐκτεινόν πόλιν, καὶ ὅνομαεσσε αὐτήν Ἑλληνόπολιν. (Apollodorus Gramm., \textit{Fragmenta} (Mueller), Fragment 150 line 1.)
\end{quote}

Topographers have looked for Hellenopolis in Asia Minor, specifically Bithynia \textit{in Hellenistic terms}, because of this gloss of Stephanos of Byzantion:

\begin{quote}
Ἑλληνόπολις, πόλις Βιθυνίας. μετὰ τὸν ἀνοικισμὸν Βισάλθης τὸ ἐθνικὸν Ἑλληνοπολίτης. (Steph. Byz., \textit{Etymologicum Magnum} Page 331 line 40)
\end{quote}

Yet no one has questioned the meaning of “Bithynia” here, nor explained Hellenopolis as an \textit{anoikismos} of “Bisalthe.” The linguistic phenomenon observed in the change from Bisanthe to Bisalthe is well documented.\textsuperscript{161} What we need is an historical context for the description of Hellenopolis as πόλις Βιθυνίας. This comes from tracing Stephanos’ sources. Of course Apollodoros did not describe the city in these terms, but Aelius Herodianus, an Antonine grammarian did. Parts of Propontic Thrace were part of the Roman province of \textit{Pontus et Bithynia} from 74 B.C.E. until the reign of Septimius Severus. Thus, in Roman imperial terms, the description of Hellenopolis as Bithynian makes perfect sense.\textsuperscript{162}

It is difficult to know exactly how many foundations or re-foundations we have here, or whether we have in fact one large project of synoikism that may have been interrupted by the fall of the dynasty and the expansion of Thracian power we witness in \textit{I.Sestos} 1 (\textit{OGIS} 339; the Menas decree). The point is that the poorly documented Attalid activity in Thrace was about more than burnishing their credentials as warrior kings in a fight with Prousias II and his Thracian allies for a notorious piece of spear-won land, or protecting what one usually presumes are royal estates in the Chersonnese.\textsuperscript{163} Just as in the Milyas, the estates are a red herring. There is an effort to urbanize this region, and

\textsuperscript{160} See Hopp 1977, 102, n. 236, rightly criticzing Hansen 1971, 178 for locating the city in Hellenistic Bithynia, but making the mistake of seeing in these two testimonia for two different cities.
\textsuperscript{161} Buck 1955, 64.
\textsuperscript{162} In 46 C.E., Perinthos became the capital of the province of Thrace. Thus, Hellenopolis is likely to have been east of Perinthos, just west of Byzantion. For the boundaries of Roman Thrace, see Gerov 1979.
\textsuperscript{163} Cicero writes of \textit{agri Attalici in Chersoneso} (\textit{Leg. Agr.} 2.50). The nature of these \textit{agri} has long been disputed. See Magie 1950, 1044, 1047.
perhaps from the perspective of some privileged subjects, to increase the archê.\textsuperscript{164} Centralizing exchange also took the form of incorporating existing poleis into the royal fiscal system. Thus, though they were ultimately unsuccessful, in 167 the Attalids pursued from Rome the revenues, (not political control), of the port cities of Ainos and Maroneia in Aegean Thrace.\textsuperscript{165} The fiscal exploitation of the Propontis was always contingent upon the maintenance of a network of customs stations, which is evinced in the \textit{CLA}'s special treatment of the region.\textsuperscript{166} All of the major poleis of the region possessed these outposts and indeed fought over them. Since Hellenopolis may have been located overlooking the future Via Egnatia – as Barbaros/Bisathe/Panion certainly was – we ought to consider the possibility that the Attalids sought their own network of positions in the region. This will have been an experiment in fiscal intensification that never quite got off the ground, leaving an incoherent mark on the historical record.

CONCLUSION

In the first half of this chapter, a partial reconstruction of the Attalid fiscal system was offered. On the present state of the evidence, we cannot hope to provide the kind of snapshot of the forms, personnel, and levels of taxation for the Attalid kingdom that practitioners of the New Fiscal History have provided for many other pre-modern states. Nevertheless, we explored three fundamental questions: “Which taxes were collected? Who collected them? How much was collected?” Direct taxes on the land, paid as the collective obligations of cities, \textit{katoikiai}, and smaller, dependent villages were seen to be core to the fiscal system. It is instructive that these are in fact the only taxes mentioned in Antony’s caricature of the Attalid system. Yet we have presented testimonia for a variety of other levies. Direct taxes also fell on persons, though we cautioned against assuming, for the sake of a quantitative model, that the poll tax was universal beyond the polis. As for indirect taxes, their collection was crucial to the success of the Attalid imperial project, though the evidence requires nuanced interpretation. Sales tax certainly existed, but it is not attested in the Toriaion earmark. Our most vivid testimonia are for taxes on usage, in the salt pans and coastal lagoons of Priene and Ephesos, and for taxes on mobility, collected all across the fiscal patchwork of Anatolia, which is writ large in the \textit{CLA}. We also tried to demonstrate the speciousness of Antony’s claim of innocence in

\textsuperscript{164} This is a suggested restoration of Robert for the dedication of courtiers (?) from Thracian Bizye, 145 B.C.E. See Robert \textit{OMS} I, 120-23. Stone reads in line 3: [α]ὐξουσιν τῇ[ν -- -- ].

\textsuperscript{165} Plb. 30.1-3; cf. Dmitriev 2010.

\textsuperscript{166} See Mitchell 2008, 178-83.
the offense of the publicani. For a region that had not known royal tax farmers under the Attalids, the very insertion of an outsider into the traditional, socially embedded role of telônês was already an offense.

The second half of this chapter laid out in a more comprehensive fashion the rules of the game for interaction between the royal fiscal authority and its subjects. Negotiation seems to have been appropriate, indeed routine, around the collective tax assessment (timêma), precisely the place in the system where Antony argued the Attalids were unilaterally shifting all of the risk on to the taxpayer. Just as in our examinations of earmarking arrangements and the cistophoric coinage, there was in fact more negotiation here than at first might have met the eye. In stark contrast, negotiation was out of the question when it came to delineating the categories of fiscality. These came from below, from the cadre of the polis, and here, as in many other aspects of the fiscal system, the Attalids hewed close to Seleukid precedent. The proposition may seem somewhat counterintuitive, as fiscality appears in the sources as a primary arena for the negotiation of sovereignty. Yet as Apollonios and Metropolis remind us with their complaint about the tax farmers, a ruler in this world was loath to be accused of inventing new taxes. However oppressive, royal fiscality remained a calque on civic, which ensured the survival of the latter. Thus, pressed for revenues, the Attalids did not invent new fiscal categories to broaden the scope of taxation. They focused their energies instead on capturing more of those taxes that everyone already seemed to agree were legitimate. As historically in the pre-modern Mediterranean they always were, these were chiefly indirect taxes on mobility and exchange. So the Attalids mustered the bodies and facilities necessary for surveillance, and they founded, re-founded, and refurbished coastal entrepôts to centralize exchange. The experimental aspects of the Attalid fiscal system may lie outside of our range of vision, in the peripheral overseas possessions of which we know little, or in inner Anatolia, in places like Pessinous, whose history under the Attalids is only just beginning to be written.
Conclusion

These matters may be studied from an administrative, institutional, fiscal perspective, or from the social and economic angle. Some scholars have chosen one route, usually the former. There is much to be gained from attempting to combine the two, difficult though the exercise may be.

-- Nicholas Purcell

In the administrative and institutional details offered in this dissertation, the description of the facts of taxation, a certain measure of the skeleton of an ancient state has been exposed. However, the skeleton, we recall, is simply a guide to the living organism, a skeleton key that unlocks the state’s interior and allows us to see an ancient imperialism from the inside. The goal of the presentation was to provide a dynamic account of the Attalid state’s functioning, of the “workings of empire, practical and, especially, ideological.” What was once called the “machinery of monarchical government” was put back in motion; the Attalids were seen staking their claim to rule. Insofar as the distinctiveness of Attalid imperialism was emphasized, the specter of comparison with historically and geographically proximate empires was raised. Yet the results will not fit neatly into the typologies of historical sociology. For the claim of distinctiveness was also advanced for this historical moment, for the scramble for power set off by the event of Apameia, for the conjuncture of monarchy (basileia) and other forms of sociopolitical organization in the second century’s basse époque hellénistique.

As ancient historians, we have struggled mightily to disabuse ourselves of the notion that Rome’s extension of power in the eastern Mediterranean was inevitable at least as early as 188. We must be willing to do the same for the Attalids and Asia Minor. This involves resisting the entire design of the dynasty’s self-representation, from its Great Altar to its posturing as savior of “all who inhabit Asia,” all of which is an attempt to render inevitable what was in fact a highly contingent outcome. The old question of whether the Attalids were “constitutional monarchs” or “financier tyrants” is really a question of whether we approve of their success. Shall we cry when we turn the page at Chaironeia in 338 or in 133 at the Bequest of Attalos III? The interesting question to ask is, “How was success achieved?” For over a century, at least since G. Cardinali’s essay,

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1 Purcell 2006, 205.
2 Ma 2000, 24.
“L’amministrazione finanziaria del comune di Pergamo,” 4th scholarship has recognized the peculiarity of the Attalid approach to public finance. With the more recent turn toward the study of euergetism, the dynasty’s unusual pattern of giving has been noted. Yet perhaps because no study has taken the logic of Attalid fiscality as its singular focus, the crucial role played by this aspect of governance in the successful enforcement of the Settlement has escaped notice.

The earmarking arrangements, a monetary system dominated by the cistophori, and much of the fiscal apparatus of the Attalid state relied upon civic institutions and promoted civic identities, preserving and elaborating the collective of polis or katoikia. The acme of the Attalids coincides with what coins and inscriptions show to have been a time of peak complexity in the social organization of these communities, a period in which civic bonds were renewed after the dislocation and even cosmopolitanism of the early Hellenistic period. Yet as we saw in the case of the gymnasium, as Attalid power spread across Asia Minor new collectivities were also produced. Indeed a number of other important collectivities, such as the koina of technitai of Dionysus and the associations of Attalistai, fell outside the scope of this dissertation. What distinguishes Attalid monarchy after Apameia – perhaps even simply late Hellenistic monarchy, taking Macedonia under Philip V and Perseus into account – from the earlier model of basileia is its capacity to both create and successfully incorporate these collectivities into a multiscalar state. One may protest that the presence of Rome on the horizon aided the process along, but we have reason to believe that the kings actively subscribed to a model of basileia different from the one our textbooks so often reproduce.

An entry from the Suda is often adduced in those textbooks. The foundation of basileia, we are told, rests upon the king’s virtue in war and administrative competence. Thus in favor of the so-called personal monarchy founded on “spear-won land (doryktētos chôra), one quotes Suda s.v. “basileia” no. 147: Βασιλεία. οὔτε φύσις οὔτε το δίκαιον ἀποδιδούσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρίζειν πράγματα νοουέχως. In A. Eckstein’s translation, “Kingship does not derive either from royal descent or from formal legitimacy, but rather from the ability to command armies and to govern effectively. (We see this with the Successors of Alexander).” 5 Thus in fact the connection to early Hellenistic monarchy is explicit. In stark contrast, the legitimacy of monarchy in Attalid Asia Minor, 188-133, depended upon the king living up to the ideal of the lexicon’s next lemma, Suda s.v. “basileia” no. 148:

4 Cardinali 1915-1916.
5 Eckstein 2009, 249.
ὁτι ἡ βασιλεία κτήμα τῶν κοινῶν, ἀλλ’ οὖ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτήματα. διὸ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ μεθ’ ὑβριδος εἰσπράξεις ὡσπερ τυραννίας ἀκολούθας μισεῖν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τῶν εἰσφορῶν ἀπαιτήσεις ὡσπερ κηδεμονίαν τιμᾶν.

Since kingship entails the possession of ta koina [“the commons” or common funds], but the public’s property does not belong to the monarchy, it follows that one must detest as the excesses of a tyrant royal interventions made with force and arrogance, but one must honor like a solemn duty requests for contributions made persuasively and humanely.

The first and classic definition of basileia is indeed appropriate to the Age of the Successors, for it explains the acquisition of monarchy. The second more fully defines its essence in the late Attalid context: as a specific set of possessions (ktêmata), rights, and obligations; as a relationship with rules, negotiable though they are. Common and public property coexist, and they appear distinct, if still contiguous. Resolving this paradox, or rather, understanding how the ancients themselves dealt with it, must be the goal of future research. Only in this way can we make sense of the distinction between early and late Hellenistic monarchy brought out by the contrasting definitions in the Suda. This will also involve a form of seeing double, as we have argued was the ancient way, and thus abandoning the traditional twin foci of Hellenistic history, city and king, for the unified vision advocated for in this dissertation.
Epigraphical Appendix

The following inscriptions have been discussed in detail in the main body of the dissertation and are referred to throughout by these numbers. Each lemma has two parts: a genetic summary of editions, with key restorations described in brackets; and a date, with discussion where controversy exists. Abbreviations are from SEG. All other publications are included in Bibliography.

TEXT 1: Honorific Decree of an Anonymous City for Korragos


Date: 188-171 (Corsten)? If Korragos is identical to Corragus Macedo (Livy 38.13.3; 42.67.4), this text likely dates to just after 188. In any case, the context is “postwar,” so 186-183, 168-166, as well as 156-154 (A. Chankowski 2010, no. 406) have been proposed. Much turns on what event is meant by παράληψιν in line 8.

TEXT 2: Royal Documents of Eumenes II from Taşkuyucak

Herrmann and Malay 2007, no. 32, ed. pr. = SEG LVII 1150. Thonemann 2011a, (a very different text, most importantly with respect to the addressee: a new transliteration is provided in lines 5-6, the toponym Απολυνιουχάρακος for the name and patronymic of the ed. pr.: Απολυνίου Χάρακος. Face B is now understood as the petition of Apollonioucharax, and thus in Face B lines 16-17 υ-|μῶν is restored for ed. pr.’s <ἡ>-|μῶν. Also significant is the restoration of και|νη γῆ (?) in the lacuna of Face A line 4. Face B line 24 contains unjustified punctuation before συντετάχαμεν).

Date: 165/4.
TEXT 3: Letter of Eumenes II to Artemidoros concerning the Kardakôn Kômê

Segre 1938, ed. pr., with photo missing the left part of the inscription (Maier, Mauerbauinschriften 76; Virgilio 2003, no. 28; Tietz 2003, 346-52).

Date: 181.

TEXT 4: Letter of Eumenes II to Temnos

I.Pergamon 157. RC 48, (with two major changes: Welles eliminated much of the publication clause as restored by Fränkel in Fragment D lines 25-7, and Welles excluded Fränkel’s Fragment E, arguing that it belongs to an honorific decree. Cf. the PHI database). (Bold restorations are offered by Piejko 1987, 724 for Fragment D line 3: καὶ δύο (?) μιέρη τῆς δεκάτης ἀφήμης ύμεν; and for Fragment D passim Piejko 1989 restores ἵμα δὲ καὶ ικανῶς ἐχίπτε τήν διοίκησιν τῆς πόλεως καὶ [εἰς τὰ] ἱερὰ καλῶς ἐχὼν εἶναι ἐδόκει μοι ὑπολογήσασθαι κατὰ πόλιν τούς ἐπτάν, ἀφ’ ἡς ἴ ἀεὶ γεννησομένη πρόσοδος προστιθεῖτο τοῖς ἀλλαῖσ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως υπαρχόοσαι καὶ τελὲς ἑσματαὶ[α — —]; cf. Herrmann in SEG XXXIX 1332).

Date: Reign of Eumenes II (197-159).

TEXT 5: Honorific Decree of Metropolis for Apollonios


Date: 145/4 or 144/3. This is the date of Face B/Decree B. Face A/Decree A is a posthumous decree for Apollonios of 130, and thus Face B/Decree B seems to have been republished after Apollonios’ death in the Revolt of Aristonikos.
TEXT 6: Honorific Decree of Apameia for Kephisodoros


Date: 188-159, or perhaps more precisely 168-166 (Robert).

TEXT 7: Decree of Teos Awarding Land to the Technitai of Dionysus


Date: 229-223, 218-206, or the decades following 188. Most discussion of the text concerns the date. While the most recent treatments of Le Guen and Aneziri opt for pre-188 dates, criteria such as the “friendliness” of relations between the Technitai and Teos measurable in the decree are not to be relied upon. Things did turn sour, but many commentators have suggested a post-188 date, and Bringmann et al., e.g., leave the question open.

TEXT 8: Letters of Eumenes II to Toriaion

Jonnes and Ricl 1997, ed. pr., with rather poor photo = SEG XLVII 1745. (P. Gauthier BE (1999) no. 509 raises several textual issues that are dealt with variously in the following editions, which otherwise reproduce the ed. pr.: the transliteration and meaning of ed. pr.’s ἐν χωρίοις in line 27 – see here also Schuler 1999 – and a possible restoration of ἰμαῦν for ed. pr.’s ὑμῖν in line 30; Virgilio 2003, no. 30, which prints εύ[?] ἀνδριάζει in lines 45-6, following Gauthier; de Rossi 2002, no. 196). I. Sultan Daği 393, after autopsy prints ἰμαῦν in line 30. (For an important further restoration, see Müller 2005, 357 with n. 8, ἐτέρων (scil., πρόσωδου) for ed. pr.’s ἐτέρων in line 44).
Date: Shortly after 188.

**TEXT 9: Honorific Decree of Andros for an Anonymous Gymnasiarch**


Date: Middle of the second century. Petrocheilos argues for 175-159 in order to take account of the two royals in line 10: ταῖς βασιλίσσαίς.

**TEXT 10: Honorific Decree(s) of Notion/Colophon-on-the-Sea for (Prince) Philetairos**


**TEXT 11: Festival Calendar of Gymnasium of Kos**


Date: 159-146.
TEXT 12: Letter of the Future Attalos II to Amlada


Date: Late 160s, if the Great Revolt is the war referred to in line 5 (ἐν τῷ Γαλατικῷ πολέμω), but no later.

TEXT 13: Letter of an Attalid King to Cleruchs


Date: Reign of Eumenes II (197-158)?

TEXT 14: Letter of the Future Attalos II Concerning the Katoikoi of Apollo Tarsēnos

Conze and Schuchhardt 1899, 212-14, ed. pr. (Schroeter 1932, fragment 17). RC 47. (Piejko 1989, 395-409 proposes lengthy new restorations, though the stone is lost and neither a photo nor a squeeze exists. Of particular interest are two restorations contra Welles, but following Wilhelm 1943, 35-40 and 61, as well as Feyel 1940, 137-41: πανηγυρεως in line 4 and πανήγυριν in line 12; cf. criticism of Piejko’s text in SEG XXXIX 1337). Chandezon 2003, no. 50, which calls itself a conservative retreat while including the aforementioned restorations in lines 4 and 12.

Date: 185.
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194


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