Framing Bosnia: 
The Politics of Architecture and City Building in the 
Austro-Hungarian Administration of Bosnia, and 
Hercegovina, 1878-1903

By 

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Abstract

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The Berlin Treaty of 1878 granted the Habsburg Monarchy the right to occupy and administer the two provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the ultimate goal of integrating these lands into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By looking at the architectural and urban projects of the occupying power through a critical historical lenses, this dissertation examines the Austro-Hungarian administration’s attempts to frame and re-order these formerly Ottoman lands as a modern Central European space, between 1878 and 1903. I argue that from the very beginning of the occupation, the notion of culture and cultural policies as manifested in the built environment were perceived as the most effective and preferable political tool for
facilitating a fast integration of these territories into the Empire.

Using a wide range of archival documents and other sources in German and Serbo-Croatian, this study delineates the process of the Habsburg Empire’s integration of Bosnia and Hercegovina into their lands through the work of architectural and urban modernization projects. The first part of the dissertation analyses the initial spatial endeavors of the military administration between 1878 and 1882, which ranged from mapping to regulating and ordering these former Ottoman territories, that were deployed in cementing the modern infrastructure of the Austro-Hungarian plan of change. This section of the study explores why the early regulatory phase of the administration was deemed as the prerequisite for a future modernization and subsequent integration of these lands. The second half of the study shifts to considerations of a series of urban and architectural projects of the civil administration, between 1882 and 1903, that were intended to create an imperial bond between these newly acquired lands and the Habsburg monarchy. Throughout this part of the discussion, a special emphasis is given to the questions of how and why certain aesthetic values and architectural styles were generated by the Austro-Hungarian cultural policies in order to foster the process of integration.

The goal of this study is to shed light on the question of how the advance of certain aesthetic programs, architectural languages and spatial transformations were meant to help the occupying power to achieve their greater political goal of ‘civilizing mission’ in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
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Introduction

Politics, Culture and the Built Environment

Whoever speaks of culture speaks about administration as well, whether this is his intention or not. The combination of so many things lacking a common denominator—such as philosophy and religion, science and art, forms of conduct and mores—and finally the inclusion of the objective spirit of an age in the single word “culture” betrays from the outset the administrative view, the task of which, looking down from on high, is to assemble, distribute, evaluate, and organize.

Theodor Adorno, Culture and Administration (1978)
Sometime during the early months of 1879, Anton Schädler, standing on the heights of the furthest eastern end of Sarajevo, looked westward through the wide-angle lens of his camera and took the first panoramic photograph of the city (Figure 1). Schädler was a Viennese soldier-photographer who entered Sarajevo with the Austro-Hungarian occupying army in the late summer of 1878. Following the Treaty of Berlin (13 June – 13 July 1878), the Great Powers of Europe granted Austria-Hungary the right to occupy and administer once Ottoman-ruled Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a military photographer, Schädler’s service in the

![Figure 1](image_url). Anton Schädler, “Sarajevo vom Kastell aus Ostseite, 1879". Source: Nikola Marušić, Fotografija u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. (Foto-savez Bosne i Hercegovine, 2002), 51.
occupying forces was not unlike that of the soldier war-painters who were engaged by the imperial army to record all accounts of the war for information and propaganda purposes. While the Habsburg army’s invasion of Bosnia was followed and recorded by many Western correspondents, the way the events were documented by the army’s personnel bespoke the inauguration of a new era in the occupied territory. From taking portraits of local insurgents and recording their subsequent executions to registering the street battles, along with the urban and topographical settings of the Bosnian towns, the plan was a profound investigation of this newly gained Ottoman province. The unknown space of the “other” had to be framed as precisely as possible if it were to be brought under the control of its new rulers.¹

Looking at Schädler’s panorama in this context, it becomes a significant visual record—a pan (all) + horama (sight)—a comprehensive survey of four centuries of the Ottoman legacy in Sarajevo. The boundaries of the photograph frame the moment of a historical transition: the end of the Ottoman era, heralding the rule of the Habsburgs. Considering Sarajevo’s place as the administrative capital of the Bosnia vilayet, whose border for centuries marched along the Austro-Hungarian Military Frontier (Militärgrenze), there is much more to this transitional moment. This photographic moment visualizes the essence of the long-lasting myth of the Antemurale Christianitatis—a concept that embodies the centuries-old mission of protecting the territories along the borders of Christian Europe from the intruding Muslim Ottoman Empire.

¹. For a rare account of the history of photography during the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina see: Niko Marušić, Fotografija u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. (Foto-savez Bosne i Hercegovine, 2002).
Not surprisingly, most European reports contemporaneous to the announcement of the decision of the Berlin Treaty considered the Austrian mandate to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act of liberation. For instance, Peter von Radics, an Austrian historian and journalist, published *Das Befreite Bosnien* (1879) a few months after the Habsburg invasion of Bosnia.² His narrative looks into the many meanings of the German word *Befreiung*: not only was Bosnia being liberated from the centuries-long yoke of the Turks, but it also was being politically and culturally emancipated and enlightened.

Seen in this historical context, then, Schädler’s photograph traces the very last moments of an Ottoman space whose liberation by the Austro-Hungarian army was to foster its restoration as a former European territory. Though the political and ideological aspects of the event may remain obscure in Schädler’s photograph, they surely find their nuanced expression in other existing and related cultural artifacts of the time. Indeed, it is to that end that an iconological reading of the printed image of Radics’ book cover, for instance, communicates instantly the political motives of the era that had orchestrated Bosnia’s plan of transformation and lays out the fundamental ideals promised by the completion of that task.

The drawing on the book cover (Figure 2) takes the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the arrival of Habsburg rule as its theme. However, the center of attention in the image is the figure of the Roman goddess Libertas, who is the female personification of both liberty and personal freedom. She wears her distinctive laurel wreath and a pileus—a headgear that symbolically was given to freed slaves—as she

approaches a group of Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish Bosnians. Above her head, three military figures of Austrian history are on display, whose names are reminders of the long-lasting conflict at the border between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. The famed bloody Austro-Turkish wars of 1697 and 1788, conducted under the command of Prince Eugene of Savoy (on the left) and Ernst Gideon von Laudon (on the right), were only two of the many attempts by the Habsburg army to

Figure 2. Peter von Radics, *Das befreite Bosnien. Prinz Eugen 1697, Laudon 1788, Philippovic 1878: Mit Abbildungen nach der Natur*, (Wien: Von Carl Prochaska, 1879)
regain control of a frontier zone that included Ottoman-ruled Bosnia. However, it is the pivotal figure of the Austrian army’s general, Joseph Philippovich, that is situated anachronistically in relation to the other two earlier historical personalities, precisely at the center of the image and right above the head of Libertas. After all, it was under Philippovich’s command that the Habsburg troops invaded and occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in summer of 1878, thereby liberating both provinces. And so it was that the goddess Libertas arrived in Bosnia with this very final attempt of Austria-Hungary. What was her plan?

Flanked by two pillars adorned by the Imperial and Royal coat of arms of Austria-Hungary and protected by two soldiers of the Habsburg army, Libertas cuts a good figure as an envoy of the occupying forces. With her arms open to the assembled group of Bosnians in the foreground, she holds in her right hand an olive branch, the well-known sign of peace and victory.

However, as one of the most significant symbols of Western culture, it is the olive branch’s origin in Greek mythology that further sheds light on the ideals of the occupying power’s impending plan of transformation for Bosnia.

When Cecrops, the first king of Attica, aimed to find a patron deity for his city state, he called on the two Olympian gods Athena and Poseidon to compete with each other and to offer the city their best possible gift if they wanted its patronage. He declared that whoever presented the most valuable gift to the city would lay claim to it. To that end and to demonstrate his beneficent capabilities, Poseidon, the god of the seas, thrust his massive trident into the Acropolis, creating a well of streaming water. Yet the water was of little use, as it turned out to be salty. As the goddess of
wisdom and skill, Athena made a choice that contrasted with the violent and unpromising actions of Poseidon. She kneeled down and planted an olive branch into the ground, which over time would grow into an olive tree. Through her peaceful act of cultivation, Athena offered the city and its inhabitants a prosperous future and thus convinced the court of gods to assign her as the patron deity of the city, which subsequently was named after her.\(^3\)

When the Great Powers of Europe granted Austria-Hungary the right “to occupy and administer” the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, their agreement was a direct result of the Eastern Question: the disintegration of the Ottoman territories (the so-called “sick man of Europe”), which had been accompanied by the rise of enduring violent crisis in those regions. Though the origin of the Eastern Question might lie in much earlier centuries and was not a new political concern, nevertheless it was the Herzegovinian Christian peasants rising up against their Muslim landlords in the summer of 1875 that led to the Eastern Crisis (1875-1878). It was following the Russian military intervention and declaration of war on the Ottomans that a European intervention arose, which eventually culminated in two agreements in 1878: The Treaty of San Stefano and The Treaty of Berlin.\(^4\) Subsequently, according to Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty, the

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provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were “to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary”. ⁵

Indeed, the intervention of European powers and the subsequent call upon the Habsburg Monarchy to occupy Bosnia was deemed not just a purely political affair, but also as a moral and religious obligation. Surely, the proximity of these chaos-ridden and troubled lands to Europe was a major source of concern that required an immediate plan of cultivating peace and stability.

there. The task was nothing less than transforming and integrating “savage Europe”⁶ into civilized Europe.

Thus, the general European (and specifically Austrian) reception of the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia was one that deemed it as a “civilization mission”—an outright honorable act of cultivation. For instance, the Austro-Bohemian historian and legal scholar, Joseph Alexander Helfert, noted in his book *Bosnisches* (1879) that the “humanitarian and civilisational” endeavors that Austria had undertaken by occupying “a territory that for too long had submitted to a system of tyrannical despotism” was indeed “a work of humanity, a civilization mission to abolish savagery …, in the name of and on behalf of the enlightened Europe”.⁷

However, the sheer belief of the contemporary European observers in the unquestionable power of Western enlightenment as the most powerful instrument of change for the occupied territory met serious and immediate obstacles. Most notable was the fact that the occupation inevitably was confronted with a space that had been deeply shaped by four centuries of Islamic rule. In other words, the cultural gap between the occupiers and the occupied was immense. This point did not go unnoticed by observers as the obstacle provoked and asked for the articulation of much stronger positions apropos of it. For instance, the notes of the Austrian orientalist and military officer Armand Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, composed during his “ethnographic studies” of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was undertaken concurrently with the occupation of these lands, are a case in point. In his book *Bosnien, Das*

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⁶. Harry De Windt, Through Savage Europe: Being the Narrative of a Journey (Undertaken as Special Correspondent of the “Westminster Gazette”), throughout the Balkan States and European Russia (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907)
⁷. Joseph Alexander von Helfert, *Bosnisches*. 1879 (Wien: Manz, 1879), 157-158. All translations in this study, unless otherwise indicated, are mine.
The question that forces itself upon us as we conclude our ethnographic accounts is as follows: will the Mohammedan element in Bosnia accommodate itself to a Western system of government, and is a modification that could make it more flexible towards general civilizing efforts to be expected in its Bosnian representatives? This question must in principle be answered most unfavorably, since based on experience one would be justified in denying Islam's ability to transform itself, and the same proposition would apply to the Bosnian Mohammedans as well.8

Despite the fact that Schweiger von Lerchenfeld identified Islam as a religion inherently incapable of reform, he continued to emphasize the very unique position of Bosnia as a territory that was geographically part of Europe, but politically had been under the rule of the Muslim Ottoman Empire since the 15th century:

Indeed, one can assert that different domains of the Christian West, such as Russia, England, and France, have more or less numerous Islamic populations under their rule. But it is an entirely different matter as to whether such groups stand merely in an external relation to the center of power or are to be found directly within its circle of authority and influence, as is especially the case with the Bosnians vis-à-vis the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In addition, all the so-called Islamic colonies and realms that lie under Christian rule are to be found in regions outside of Europe, in Asia and Africa... Things are different in Bosnia. Europe is the home of Christianity and its respective nations owe their present high culture to it alone, to its highly internal moral values... The task of European culture as such, however, can only be to get rid of all conditions and institutions that resist it, whether they are of a religious or a social nature, not through violent means but with civilizing efforts.9

9. Ibid., 145.
In fact, at the time of the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and when Schweiger von Lerchenfeld was reflecting on the Bosnian situation, the greatest part of the Islamic world was ruled by the European powers. In these lands, much of the work of the colonial administrators circled around the question of how to accommodate Islam to and bring it under imperial rule. However, as Schweiger von Lerchenfeld emphasizes in his lines, the major difference between these colonial lands and Bosnia-Herzegovina was spatial and geopolitical, as both provinces were located in the European continent and were adjacent to the Habsburg lands. Additionally, the peculiarity of the case had to do with the fact that for the very first time in its history, Austria-Hungary per the Berlin Treaty was to incorporate a great number of Muslims into its empire. However, when Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, evoking Athena’s mode of conduct, insisted upon “the task of European culture” to get rid of all kinds of conditions and institutions that resist it through the civilizing efforts and not violent means, he has not just Islam on his mind but any kind of obstacles to the Habsburg rule in Bosnia, including the nationalist-separatist sentiments of its Christian population.

After all, the arrival of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia occurred in the late 19th century, when the emergence of Central European nationalism was accompanied by a simultaneous diminishing presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. In Bosnia, this historical and political shift led to the formation of different and competing variations of collective

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belonging: while a large part of the Christian Orthodox and Catholic groups of the population tended to imagine their future in the form of joining with other national groups (such as their neighbors, orthodox Serbia and catholic Croatia), the Bosnian Muslims’ aspirations suggested a fundamentally different approach. Since the region was no longer under a Muslim rule and was administered by a Christian foreign power, the need for self-definition in this new political context demanded a religious adherence to the national formation of the Muslim collective identity.\footnote{Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Robert Donia, *Islam Under the Double Eagle: the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Mark Pinson, “The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918,” in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, ed. Mark Pinson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 84-128.}

In fact, the invasion of the Habsburg forces led to the formation of fierce resistance and insurgency groups among both the Muslim and Orthodox populations, and it also caused a mass emigration on part of Muslim dissidents who decided to leave Bosnia for other Ottoman regions.\footnote{Ibid.} Nevertheless, the occupying authorities quickly aimed to establish a network of socioeconomic administrative reforms that would eventually lead to the creation of a stable “model colony”.\footnote{Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815-1986* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ferdinand Hauptmann, *Die österreichisch-ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Herzegovina 1878-1918: Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsentwicklung* (Graz: Institut für Geschichte d. Univ. Graz, Abt. Südosteuropa. Geschichte, 1983); Sugar, *The Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-1918*.} In addition to envisioning a general plan of economic modernization and industrialization for the occupied territory, the new administration imposed well-crafted modern sets of laws and regulations that would introduce fundamentally new types of political and sociocultural practices into these lands. The goal was to break up and to block the formation of any kind of particularism (religious, nationalist, or otherwise)
Figure 4. Prelaz austrougarske vojske u Bosnu is an ideological painting by Ferdo Quiquerez (1845-1893), a war painter who had previously served in the Habsburg army as an artist during the latter’s campaigns against the Ottomans. The painting depicts the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Figure 5. Boj pod Magribija džamijom is a work by Theodor Breitwieser (1847-1930) who was a painter trained in the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts and specialized in the military genre. It narrates the bloody battle which occurred at the Magribija Mosque during the occupation of Sarajevo by the Habsburg army. Other works by this painter include a series of watercolors that document the executions of the leaders of the resistance.

A striking point to note is that Breitwieser seems to have been the very same painter who had illustrated the arrival of the Goddess Libertas (and the cultivation of peace) in Bosnia on the cover of Peter von Radics’ book, Das befreite Bosnien (1879).

Source: Both images adapted from Ljubica Mladenović, Građansko slikarstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX veku (Sarajevo: IRO “Veselin Masleša” OO Izdavačka djelatnost, 1982), 25, 31.
while simultaneously integrating these lands into the monarchy.

So it was precisely in this polarized political setting that the Kulturarbeit (cultural development) of the occupying power was conceived as a pacifying political force whose fundamental principle was based on a unifying rather than dividing approach. This project of unification, whose fulfillment was conceived as the prerequisite of and path to controlling the region, had two significant objectives:

For one, it was an attempt to isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from the neighboring countries and thereby to dissipate the formation of any pan-Slavic transnational aspirations, and equally to disengage Bosnian Muslims from the Sultan and the clergy in Istanbul. Secondly, it was a plan to foster an imperial bond between these newly acquired lands and the rest of the monarchy. And it is precisely this aspect of the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia that clearly underlines how and why the process of “cultivation” might not always be a matter of individual or collective endeavors, but rather a task imposed by a foreign occupying state upon a group of people to sustain that state’s political interests.

Evidently, in this process of cultivation (“cultural mission”) there is a dynamic asymmetrical relationship between those who cultivate and those who become cultivated. This, in fact, is a constellation already marked within the semantic root of the concept of culture itself. As Raymond Williams has argued, the term culture “indicates a complex argument about the relations between general human development and a particular way of life”. This is similar to Terry

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Eagleton’s etymological consideration of the notion of culture, which sheds light on the inherently asymmetrical relationship of the concept of culture. Noting the Latin root of the word as colere, Eagleton explains how the term, which can mean cultivating, inhabiting, or protecting, “has uneasy affinities with occupation and invasion,” hence rendering titles such as “Culture and Colonialism” as mildly tautological. Accordingly, the word culture signifies “momentous historical transitions”, as it brings into focus “questions of freedom and determinism, agency and endurance, change and identity, the given and the created”, thereby turning culture into “the site of a political conflict”.

And, it is exactly its quality as a “site” (in other words, its very spatial aspect) that allows it to serve as a medium for demarcating boundaries and declaring inclusions and exclusions and framing differences, as Wolfgang Müller-Funk has noted in his Hegelian reflection of Herrschaft und Kultur (Domination and Culture). He convincingly points out: “culture is extremely spatial as there is not enough room for two at the same site”. Hence, he goes on to consider culture as a place in which nations, regional and sub-cultural groups are invented, and where each of these entities strives to claim respect and sovereignty.

When Schweiger von Lerchenfeld considers “the task of European culture” as to eliminate anything that resists it, he is insisting on the precise deployment of strategies of exclusion and inclusion that closely correlate with the process of negotiating the boundary

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16. Ibid., 19. 
18. Ibid.
between self and other: Europe, eternally, is Inside, while non-Europe remains Outside. Europe is the center; non-Europe is the periphery.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, following this model of thought, the immediate question that the Habsburg administration faced upon the occupation was: if the two former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “the peripheral other”, were to be integrated into the lands of the monarchy then they had to be reordered and redefined according to procedures (inclusion-exclusion) that would allow for their eventual framing as a European territory.

In the chapters that follow, I intend to examine this very process of framing that commenced immediately upon the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Considering the spatial aspect of the notion of culture as a “site” of negotiation between self and other, I intend to map out the new administration’s spatial endeavors that sought to “cultivate”, reorder, and redefine these former Ottoman spaces as a well-assimilated Central European territory that was subjected to the rule of the Habsburg monarchy. Throughout the discussion, the focus of the analysis remains on Sarajevo, which the new authorities considered the capital city of the occupied lands and planned its development as a showpiece for their socioeconomic and cultural achievements in Bosnia-Herzegovina accordingly.

An investigation of the spatial transformation of Sarajevo will allow me to explain how the carefully planned process of framing manifested new types of urban and architectural spaces, practices, and aesthetic programs that in turn enabled the Austro-Hungarian administration to exercise power throughout the occupied territory, thereby subjecting both the place and its inhabitants to imperial rule. By taking

\textsuperscript{19} James M. Blaut, \textit{The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History} (New York: Guilford Press, 1993)
the metamorphosis of architecture and urban space as my
unit of analysis in this study, I aim to look at the
dynamic and ever-changing process of negotiation
between the occupiers and the occupied (self and other)
that occurred during different stages of Austro-
Hungarian rule and assumed various forms in response to
political exigencies in different eras.

Not unlike other areas of Austro-Hungarian cultural
development, urban and architectural policies grew out
of the greater political agenda of the new state.
However, from the initial stage of military rule in
1878 and well throughout the civil administration that
included the annexation era (1908) and only terminated
at the end of World War I, the political and cultural
agenda of the Habsburg administration remained far from
straightforward, as its “civilization mission” took
many twists and turns along the way. This might
partially be explained if we take into consideration
the general function of the concept of civilization,
and by extension that of a civilization mission which,
following Norbert Elias: “expresses the self-
consciousness of the West”.20

As Elias explains, throughout history Western society
has sought by this term to point to “its special
character and what it is proud of: the level of its
technology, the nature of its manners, the development
of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and
much more.”21 However, evidently, one’s consciousness of
and relationship to self is never static, as the latter
changes over time. And, conversely, the transmutation
of self-consciousness, which follows the significant
shifts that occur in the historical, socio-political,
or economic realms, is mirrored in the relationship of

Translated by Edmund Jephcott (Blackwell Publishers. 2000), 5.
21. Ibid.
self to the other. Hence the process of “othering”, as Johannes Fabian has noted, “expresses the insight that the Other is never simply given, never just found or encountered, but made." And, accordingly, it follows that “our ways of making the Other are ways of making ourselves.” This point, then, explains how and why the boundary between self and other, not unlike other types of conceptual boundaries (physical or metaphysical), is in a perpetual state of vacillation.

The present project is concerned precisely with this very notion of “making the Other” as it occurred within the context of the Habsburg civilizing mission in Bosnia. In fact, this task of “making”, which I have so far explained as a process of framing, was never solely dictated by the political realities that the new administration faced in the occupied territories. Instead, its outline equally mirrored the negotiation of the center (self) with itself as the latter went through different transformative stages of the fin-de-siècle. After all, the occupation of Bosnia occurred during and was sustained well throughout the modern age that witnessed many accelerating and drastic changes across the Habsburg monarchy and the rest of Europe. As the experience of modernity led to continuous change in everyday life patterns, it also altered the self-consciousness of the West.

The concept of a “civilizing mission” in the context of the Habsburg administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a subject that has already been discussed in the work of a series of historians. However, these works deal predominantly with subjects other than urban and architectural development. Most notably, these studies have focused on issues such as economic development,

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23. Ibid., 756.
land and agricultural reform, internal political developments, the rise of the intelligentsia, the establishment of religious and secular associations and societies, the formation of political parties, and many other topics. In contrast to this body of work, discussions of the spatial endeavors of the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been limited to a few descriptive architectural surveys that provide brief information about visible architectural aspects of the built environment, addressing questions such as: what the style of a residential, commercial or governmental building is; or, who the architect of a particular building was? When and for whom this was built? Yet, in these scholarly works, which I regard as valuable in their own right, the questions of how and why certain spatial transformations happened, or why the execution of certain projects were necessary for the establishment of the new modern civilizing state and for the assertion of the latter’s sovereignty over the occupied lands, or how the new administration enforced its ideas of statehood, modernization, and integration in space remain conspicuously absent.

Occasionally, however, in these works, we read some references and allusions to concepts such as Edward Said’s “Orientalism” when these studies seek to underline the domination of local inhabitants through the imposition of particular architectural styles. But

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can the formal appearance of a style be political and dominating without a consideration of its larger matrix of making? Can we claim that an architectural work is hegemonic only by reasoning that its appearance is based on an imported style? While this question might in certain cases be affirmed to some degree, I suggest that no style is political or hegemonic per se, but that any style can become political and hegemonic under the right circumstances. As Terry Eagleton states:

“[Cultural] things are not innately and eternally political; they become so only under specific historical conditions.... They become only when they are caught up in a process of domination and resistance—when these otherwise innocuous matters are turned for one reason or another into terrains of struggle.”

I shall return to Eagleton’s point later, but here I only want to capitalize on his consideration of cultural issues “becoming” political amid the dynamic process of power relations. Based on this assumption, then, it can be argued that the required task when rendering an architectural work or transformation of space as manifestations of unequal power relations is a contextualization of these works within their greater historical and political processes of making. In other words, it is a question of looking underneath the formal appearance of a given space and revealing the hidden forces that led to its rise and cemented its architecture of becoming.

In fact, Said’s notion of “Orientalism” itself is a concept that seeks to decode and to describe the discursive process of constructing the “other” that takes place at the conjunction of power and knowledge. Said, who draws on Foucault’s notion of discourse, conceives of culture as a body of disciplines that link knowledge to power. “Orientalism”, in other words, is the description and hence the construction of “the

Orient” as the incompatible counterpart of “the Occident” from a position of power.\textsuperscript{27} It is, then, the very process of construction and framing, which incorporates strategies of exclusion and inclusion, that allows for power to be exercised and not the mere appearance of a style or a space.\textsuperscript{28} Hence, it can be suggested that it is a discursive consideration of the notion of (Orientalist) style or of a spatial configuration that might enable us to grasp how what is built and constructed—or, alternatively, what is said and assumed—fits into a larger historical and political network of forces.

Using a wide range of documents in German and Serbo-Croatian from various archives in Sarajevo and Vienna, this project aims to identify and analyze the urban and architectural works of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were developed at the nexus of state power and its diverse forms of knowledge production. Throughout the discussion, the focus shall be upon the work of the new modern state and its administrators and officials whose works, ideas, and political stances I trace via close reading, translation and analysis of various sources produced by the state’s policymakers during the 40 years of Habsburg rule. The documents, among others, include military reports and maps, government-issued publications (reports, magazines, and newspapers), legal codes and statute books, urban and architectural ordinances, correspondences between different state officials, manuscripts of official lectures and presentations, exhibition catalogues, photographs, Edward Said, \textit{Orientalism} (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).\textsuperscript{27} In his work \textit{The Archeology of Knowledge}, Foucault, elaborating on the indispensability of the notion of context apropos of the formation of discourse, explains that the question that a given discursive fact always poses is: “According to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?”; he then continues to add that the description of the “events of discourse” poses a quite different question, namely: “How is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?”; see Michel Foucault, \textit{The Archeology of Knowledge}, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 27.

\textsuperscript{28} In his work \textit{The Archeology of Knowledge}, Foucault, elaborating on the indispensability of the notion of context apropos of the formation of discourse, explains that the question that a given discursive fact always poses is: “According to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?”; he then continues to add that the description of the “events of discourse” poses a quite different question, namely: “How is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?”; see Michel Foucault, \textit{The Archeology of Knowledge}, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 27.
illustrations, and urban and architectural plans and competitions.

Before proceeding with a short review of the structure of the present project, one point needs be clarified. Despite the present study’s main concern being the Habsburg administration’s spatial endeavors through which the latter sought to establish its rule and to exercise power in the occupied lands, throughout the discussion the notion of power is not conceived as an exclusive repository reserved for the occupiers only. As we shall see in the following chapters, from the beginning of the occupation and despite the presence of unequal power relations, the task of drawing an unambiguous divisive line between the two clearly identifiable categories of players, namely Austrian oppressors and Bosnian oppressed, while ascribing to the former exclusive monopoly of power, is not feasible. Instead, following Foucault, we will see that power rarely functioned in a hierarchical way, and in fact different agents were involved in facilitating the execution of the new state’s project of the civilizing mission. In short, we shall see that power never flowed from a single source, and the implementation of the state’s modern strategies of spatial framing required an inclusion of diverse local players.

This way of conceptualizing the operation of power allows for the consideration of a more dynamic and complex network of forces in which multiple and diverse players with contrasting and at times competing political and ideological ideals were involved in facilitating the process of Habsburg’s framing of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the latter’s imperial integration.
…Nothing can remain immense if it can be measured. Prior to the shrinkage of space and the abolition of distance through railroads, steamships, and airplanes, there is the infinitely greater and more effective shrinkage which comes about through the surveying capacity of the human mind, whose use of numbers, symbols, and models can condense and scale earthly physical distance down to the size of the human body’s natural sense and understanding. Before we knew how to circumscribe the sphere of human habitation in days and hours, we had brought the globe into our living rooms to be touched by our hands and swirled before our eyes…

Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (1958)
A few months after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was completed and the most imperative administrative steps such as census and house-numbering were carried out, the preparation of a cadastral survey of the territory along with its detailed mapping were seen as prerequisites for establishing a thorough and modern administration. It was the conviction of the occupying power that no proper reformation of the region was possible prior to the formation of a cartographic awareness of it.\(^1\) For this reason, in December 1879, the Common Ministry in Vienna established a special bureaucratic unit—Die Cataster-Commission.

The Commission consisted of both Austrian and Hungarian military and technical state officials.\(^2\) Between December 1879 and January 1880, a series of negotiations took place that led to the formation of a very precise agenda of land surveying. The goal was that through a fast-paced and effective plan, all occupied land down to the smallest detail would be recorded in such a full, clear, and exact manner as to facilitate the political and military authorities’ spatial intervention at any given moment.\(^3\)

After all, the unknown and for centuries long chaos-ridden lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be framed, made known and legible according to Western rational standards if they were to be reintegrated into Europe. It was thus concluded that the process of mapping and hence ordering would be developed in compliance with the already well-established Austrian


\(^2\) For a detailed list of the involved members see the report of Mitteilungen des K.u.K. Militärgeographischen Institutes 1881, 73. Source: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek-Archiv.

\(^3\) Ibid., 79.
monarchy’s system of land surveying.⁴ Seen in this way, mapping Bosnia and Herzegovina not only accentuated the beginning of a territorial recovery (and the end of Oriental despotism), but also signaled the realization of a long-awaited historic move, which was “to master Ottoman Europe and thus to conclude European Geography”.⁵

The immediate attempt to map and frame the occupied territories upon the arrival of the Habsburg army casts light on the unique quality of the map as a discursive site that produces geographic knowledge, hence serving as an instrument of power, and simultaneously itself being the direct result of a particular Weltanschauung and way of truth-claiming. If cartography is the political process of crafting the narrative of a given place according to a certain set of historical truths and ideological beliefs, then the map is a metaphor sculpting that narrative.⁶ Perhaps the best place to exemplify this is to look at the rise of comprehensive measurement and mapping, which took place concurrently with a shift in territorial and spatial perceptions.

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⁴. Ibid., 73.
⁶. For an examination of cartography as a site of knowledge production see David Harvey, “Cartographic Identities: Geographical Knowledges under Globalization” in Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography, ed. by D. Harvey (New York: Routledge, 2001), 208-233; Harvey bases his argument on Foucault’s viewing of map as an instrument of power/Knowledge. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings, 1972-1977 (Vintage: 1980), 63-77; an illuminating discussion of map as a modern tool in the service of state control is James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); see especially the Part I: State Projects of Legibility and Simplification, 9-84; for a critical examination of mapping as a “visual practice” that represents a sovereign power that creates, sustains and justifies itself see the section “Mapping, Claiming, Reclaiming” in Martin Jay and Sumathi Ramaswamy, Empires of Vision: A Reader (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 211-279.
within the Austrian monarchy in the middle of the 1700s.\textsuperscript{7}

Prior to the eighteenth century, the Habsburg Empire did not have a strong administrative and political mapping capacity. If not utilized in the interest of political propaganda, maps were mostly used for humanistic scholarship and travel, or occasionally for defense.\textsuperscript{8} This absence of a cartographic consciousness, which was due to a limited appreciation for a unified state, changed systematically once the Habsburg monarchy became a more clearly defined empire under the reigns of Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and Joseph II (1765-1790). It was only after the centralization of power and when a great transformation in governmental structure occurred that the first comprehensive mapping of the monarchy could be undertaken.

The centralized system created by Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II, was strictly imperial and had no defined national character, as the monarchy was supposed to represent a single political unit.\textsuperscript{9} However, amid this superimposed sense of territorial homogeneity and unity, there existed a clear Austrian hegemony over all other national holdings of the empire. It was argued that Austria was an imperial organization and not a country, and that to be Austrian

\textsuperscript{7} While the evolution of modern administrative cartography among the European states differs nonetheless it can be argued that it was not until the 18.th century that mapping was established as a powerful administrative tool in most regions of the Western Europe. For a comparative discussion on this see: David Buisseret,(ed.), Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early modern Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).


meant to have no national feeling.\textsuperscript{10} It was then that the map became an essential political tool for crafting the imperial character of the Austrian state. However, this homogenization of the imperial territory and its hegemonic cartographical order were consequently challenged by other national groups whose counter-maps deliberately demarcated the boundaries of their political and cultural territories within the empire.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to their symbolic power and practical implementation, maps served the Austrian state and its administrators in carrying out their moral obligation embedded in the 18\textsuperscript{th}-century enlightened government.\textsuperscript{12} Territoriality and defining a clear homogeneous territory, as opposed to indistinct lands of particularities and backwardness, were seen as foundational steps towards modernity and progress.\textsuperscript{13} It was this very vision of the modern civilizing state that would also be extended to the occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the nineteenth century.

Based on the earliest reports of Die Militärgeographische Institut (The Institute for Military Geography) in Vienna that recorded in detail

\textsuperscript{10}. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918, 22.
\textsuperscript{12}. Popova, Representing National Territory, 21.
the process of the mapping in both provinces, two aspects underlined the cadaster surveying:

Firstly, we learn that the uncompromisingly detailed and modern mapping of Bosnia and Herzegovina was taking place in a fashion not even to be found in many other Austrian provinces at that time. The attempt to frame these unknown and insecure lands and break them into manageable units of detailed categories of spatial information was seen as the first required step for bringing them under control. Here, one thinks of Foucault’s approach to the map as a discursive tool in which power is simultaneously integrated and actively created.

Additionally, in its wider context, the map as a cartographic discourse creates and limits the reality of a place: turning into a disciplinary technique, the map converts the illegible and inefficient “human multiplicities” into a “manageable unity”; it creates a world of fixity and hence exercises power. This notion of “fixity” perfectly corresponds with what James C. Scott describes as a “narrowing of vision” that certain forms of knowledge and control such as state mapping require:

The great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise complex and unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of vision more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and calculation.

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14. see footnote 1.
17. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); see especially the third section of the book: 195-228; Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu has shown how power is generated through the very definition of certain categories that are marked by a perception of fixity, which in turn has the power to make and un-make the reality of the world. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Combined with similar observations, an overall, aggregate, synoptic view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree of schematic knowledge, control, and manipulation.\textsuperscript{18}

In regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, establishing this very perception of “fixity” and hence manageability during the initial stage of the occupation was the key to their integration into the monarchy. It was clear that the rapid integration of these countries would lead to their successful modernization and economic growth, and consequently to the greater political stability of the whole region. However, if this represented the more logistical side of the mapping process and surveying then, there was also a moral aspect growing out of a much older historical idea, which was to “rearrange the map of Europe”. Larry Wolff, in his discussion of the cartographical ambitions of the Western Europeans to map the European territories that were under Ottoman Rule, the so-called paradoxical lands of “Turquie d’Europe” (in Europe, yet of the Orient), explains this historical idea(l) as follows:

Cartography was clearly identified with the Enlightenment, the work of “enlightened people” seeking to cast light upon the darkest corner of the continent. Furthermore, the light of cartography was implicitly related to the light of civilization, for Eastern Europe was often described in the eighteenth century as emerging from darkness, ténèbres. Interestingly, the proclaimed determination to map Ottoman Europe in this period coincided with the emergence of [the] “Eastern Question” and its specific political agenda of driving the Turks out of Europe.\textsuperscript{19}

In fact, Wolff’s point on the intimate relationship between the Western European cartographical ambitions and the abiding political agenda of “Eastern Question”—i.e., driving the Turks out of Europe—finds palpable

\textsuperscript{18} Scott, Seeing Like a State, 11.  
\textsuperscript{19} Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 149.
grounds in the Bosnian case. His observation frames the way in which the logistical and ideological aspects of the Bosnian occupation would intertwine.

It is noteworthy that despite the immediate mobilization for completing a surveying map of both provinces upon the occupation, the very idea of studying and recording these regions had a much older origin. However, what was novel in the latter stage's way of discovery was a major transformation in its form of intellectual mastery. In fact, this shift is best captured in the professional career of General Johann Roskiewicz, a key military figure involved in the mapping enterprise of Bosnia, who would become the powerful director of the cadaster survey group shortly after the occupation.

Prior to his engagement in the military mapping of Bosnia, Roskiewicz, then an officer with the General Staff of the Austrian Army, travelled extensively through the whole region during the last decade of Ottoman rule there. His travel notes would become one of the most rare and detailed accounts of late Ottoman Bosnia, covering all possible political, cultural, demographic, and economic aspects of life there. Additionally, it was not a coincidence that Roskiewicz, a connoisseur of the Balkans, would become the head of the cadaster survey group in the occupied lands about a decade later. This illustrates what Larry Wolff sees as the transformative moment when "Philosophic Geography" is put at the service of military mapping. "As in the case of the Orient", Wolff argues, "so also with Eastern Europe, intellectual discovery and mastery

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20. For a selection of historical accounts on Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Western Europeans see the previous chapter.
could not be entirely separated from the possibility of real conquest”.  

So, if philosophic geography sustained the Habsburg army’s mapping endeavors in the occupied territory, then the question is how exactly the production of map led to a subsequent organization of space according to Western rationality. Put differently, if the main goal of mapping was to facilitate the rapid integration of these newly acquired lands and their modernization, then how did the logic of the map shape and condition that procedure? How was the urgent need to create spatial order, control, and security met during the initial phase of the occupation, and what was the role of the map in that regard? Finally, in what way did the civilizing light of Austrian cartography penetrate the darkness of these formerly Ottoman-ruled lands? How did this Oriental space start to transform under the casting light of modern European spatial organization?

Keeping these questions in mind, I intend in the following two chapters to explore the ways in which the map’s quintessential logic—not just as an “organizing” artifact but rather as an archetypal phenomenon—manifested the beginning of a new political order in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is my contention that all future spatial and economic developments, which would grow according to this new political order, depended on the unfolding process of this initial phase of framing and ordering.

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23. Wolff, as an example, describes how France’s 18th Century experts on Eastern Europe ended up in Napoleon’s regime and academy and soon the Enlightenment’s discoveries were pointing towards outright conquest and domination, see Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 8. A classic source on the entanglement between cultural production and the authority that these bestow on the process of imperial domination is Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). See especially p.97-p.110, The Cultural Integrity of Empire, which discusses how cultural experts enabled Napoleon’s Oriental adventures.
In what follows, two subsequent chapters will each be organized around a central question in order to map out the formation of this new political order, along with its spatial manifestations. While the first chapter seeks to highlight the ideological background of the Habsburg army’s early projects in Bosnia, linking it with greater imperial politics, the second chapter investigates the actual methods (norms and forms prevalent throughout the monarchy) that were applied by the occupying administration to shape and transform the space.

The first chapter asks how, in fact, the inherited Ottoman space was perceived by the Austro-Hungarian authorities upon their arrival in Bosnia. A significant part of the analysis draws upon the first official architectural report completed in 1887 by Edmund Stix, the first head of the construction department of the new administration. The discussion seeks to go beyond the logistics and the pragmatic dimension of the project’s descriptions. Instead, it examines the questions of transportation and infrastructure, which figure prominently in the 1887 report, through the lenses of imperial politics and policies. It argues that the narrative of the report and hence of the perceived image of the occupied territories, and the circulation of this constructed image across the Habsburg Empire, reflected a complex political world that extended beyond the purely pragmatic orchestration of the early projects.

Then, in conversation with this chapter, there follows another complementary discussion that addresses the question of how and through what concrete methods the new authorities regulated the former Ottoman space in order to transform and integrate it into the greater Austro-Hungarian Empire. It asks, among other things, how the questions of land, its ownership and
maintenance were responded to upon the occupation. Who, for instance, was permitted to practice architecture in the new city, and how was this regulation justified and overseen? The discussion seeks to demonstrate that the initial years of the occupation were about cementing solid and reliable grounds for future development and building. It was during these early processes of framing and regulation that sets of fundamentally new spatial relationships (ranging from the initiation of urban ordinances and laws in space to new forms of property ownership and urban development), forms of practicing architectural profession, and degrees of spatial control and policing emerged.
Chapter Two

The Method of Seer: Perceiving the Space of the Other
The initial phase of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia was distinguished by its clear attempt to establish a well-organized world whose aim, above all, was to provide for the needs of an efficient army at the local level. So, if the two goals of cartography (and, ultimately, of the Berlin Treaty), were to integrate and civilize Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it was clear that their achievement depended on the presence of a strong army and reliable financial resources to fund the military and later the civil administration in Bosnia.

However, once the occupation took place, there was little consensus between Vienna and Budapest about how these highly important yet contentious issues were to be organized. After all, what was the political structure of the occupying government? How was Bosnia to be governed? Who was its ruler? Austria? Hungary? Or Austria-Hungary? And, most importantly, who was responsible for the occupation's resulting expenses? Reflecting upon these questions, Peter Sugar, in his important work on the economic history of Bosnia under the Habsburg rule, explains that immediately after the invasion, the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian government in the occupied territory faced both economic and constitutional obstacles.¹

Before elaborating on this point further, However, it is important to note that these obstacles were due to the complexity of the political structure of the monarchy itself; although Austria and Hungary each had their own Parliament, political affairs common to both states could not be settled separately in these

¹ Sugar, *The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 25. It is worth mentioning that Sugar highlights the fact that according to the Berlin Treaty, Bosnia-Herzegovina was still officially part of the Ottoman Empire and was only to be administered by the Habsburg Monarchy; however, this legal fact was being completely ignored during the internal debates of Austria-Hungary as the occupied territory was being seen and treated as part of the Habsburg Empire. This is an important point as it signifies the Austrian violations of a series of agreements made with the Ottoman Empire regarding Bosnia.
parliaments and needed to be discussed through the selected members of so-called Delegations from both parts of the monarchy.\(^2\) Given the pronounced domestic opposition to the invasion within both halves of the monarchy, there was doubt that the Delegations would be in favor of funding the Bosnian adventure. Both Austrians and Hungarians feared that marching Austro-Hungarian troops into Bosnia would lead to exhausting expenses and financial burdens. Additionally, from the Hungarian point of view, the occupation would mean adding more Slavs to a part of the monarchy that bordered on the Hungarian Crown—and this, they believed, was a clear step towards the formation of a strong southern Slav state that would come under Russian influence.\(^3\)

Despite all this opposition, the 1878 invasion occurred, and the two questions of finance and administration had to be resolved as efficiently and quickly as possible. Although a detailed discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this project, it is crucial to consider their ramifications for the initial spatial planning of the occupied territory.\(^4\)

As mentioned previously, mapping and framing the unknown territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina were seen as a prerequisite for the transformation of these regions. However, without a clear political administrative structure, an efficient army, or a sustainable financial plan, no step towards modernization and integration could take place. Once the occupation occurred, two parallel yet complementary processes started to take place in Sarajevo and Vienna.

\(^2\). For a comprehensive discussion of the political structure of Austria-Hungary and its impact on the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina see Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 19-39.  
\(^3\). Ibid., 20.  
\(^4\). For more information on the political and economic dilemmas of Austria-Hungary in pre and post invasion periods see the entire second and third chapters of Sugar, 19-67.
In Bosnia, following the conquest of Sarajevo and other major cities, the immediate establishment of military rule was an unavoidable task. The foremost goal of this administration was, in addition to controlling the local population and combating insurgencies, to facilitate a spatial visibility and order that would maximize the mobility of the troops in space. These steps were deemed as the prerequisite of a plan for spatial transformation. However, back in the monarchy’s capital, there existed a fierce opposition to the creation of a military administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was argued that if the occupation was to be seen as a strategic move to incorporate these new provinces into the empire, then it had to be treated like all other provinces of the monarchy, of which none was then ruled by the army. \(^5\)

Additionally, the opposing parties insisted that a military rule would be far more expensive than a civil regime. However, paradoxically enough, any attempt to create a civil administration in Bosnia would be equally problematic, since a civilian government, it was maintained, would raise the constitutional question of which political entity was to rule the occupied lands. Peter Sugar, highlighting these internal controversies within the Habsburg monarchy, emphasizes how a gradual solution to these problems determined the future of economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. \(^6\) In this chapter, however, I am mostly interested in this political and economic nexus

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\(^5\) Ibid., 25; most part of Sugar’s analysis of the Austro-Hungarian administration is based on Ferdinand Schmid’s extensive work *Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns* (Verlag Von Veit & Comp, 1914). Schmid (1862-1925), who was an expert of legal studies and jurisprudence and a professor of statistics and public administration in Innsbruck and later at the University of Leipzig, created the Landesregierung’s first Division of Statistics (Das Statistische Departement) in 1894 and was later asked by Vienna to produce a comprehensive account of the Habsburg administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until today his book remains a major source of reference regarding different segments of the Habsburg military and civil administrations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
inasmuch as it formed and conditioned the spatial transformation of these provinces.

Between September 1878 and February 1880, several imperial orders were issued by Kaiser Francis Joseph regarding the structure of the Bosnian administration. Following myriad difficulties, a final decision was made that led to the establishment of an administration based in two locations and that would operate through two separate yet interconnected political entities: 7

In Vienna, a Bosnian Bureau was created that served as the highest legal and administrative authority responsible for making policies for the occupied territories. Its counterpart in the province was the Landesregierung (the Provincial Government), which was to carry out orders from Vienna. The Landesregierung included several Abteilungen (Divisions) that were subsequently broken into Departments. At the highest position of the administration was the Joint Minister of Finance, appointed to supervise the activities of both the Bosnian Bureau in Vienna and the Landesregierung in Sarajevo. As the head of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian government, he resembled a colonial administrator whose task extended well beyond the financial matters of the monarchy. Subsequently, the general who commanded the XV Army Corps in Bosnia was selected as the head (Landeschef) of the Landesregierung, while his civilian counterpart, Civil-Adlatus, was responsible for all non-military dimensions of the administration. These two administrators were the highest officials of the Provincial Government; however, in reality, the Civil-

Adlatus remained the real administrative head in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the following chapters, we shall see how the political power, play and involvement of these men, especially the Joint Minister of Finance, directly shaped the contours of architecture and urbanism in both occupied provinces.

Not unlike the above mentioned bureaucratic positions that manifested the hierarchy of the political power throughout the administrative sphere a spatial division of the occupied territory followed as well: as depicted in Figure 6, six Kreise (regions) were demarcated based on the inherited Ottoman Empire’s structure. Each Kreis took the name of the most important city of its territory and was further subdivided into Bezirke (districts). As we shall see, the political significance of breaking the occupied territories into smaller spatial units (Kreis and Bezirk) - was wide-ranging. In addition to creating a sense of order and security in space, easing the process of controlling and policing and facilitating the taking of a census, their systematic creation greatly affected the question of transportation in Bosnia. The fact was that the

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8. Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle, 12-13; Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 28-29; Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism.
9. The Six regions (Kreise) were Sarajevo, Travnik, Bihać, Donja Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Mostar.
10. Sugar explains how the new regime modeled its initial administrative system partially based upon the inherited Ottoman Empire’s - for instance, Sandjaks were transformed into Kreise and the Kazas into Bezirke. However, the resulting spatial transformation was due to the infusion of a new political order and logic-such as urban ordinances, architectural guidelines and economic laws-into space.
11. A comprehensive and original study of the development of Bosnia-Herzegovinian railroads under the Austro-Hungarian rule is the work of Bosnian historian Dževad Juzbašić, Izgradnja željeznica u Bosni i Hercegovini u svjetlu austrougarske politike od okupacije do kraja Kállayeve ere (Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 1974); for a wider geo-political and economic consideration of the question of railroad development within the Austrian context see: Richard G. Plaschka, Anna M. Drábek, Brigitta Zaar, Eisenbahnbau und Kapitalinteressen in den Beziehungen der österreichischen mit den südslawischen Ländern (Wien:Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1993); for the internal conflict and rivalry between Austria and Hungary over the Bosnian railroad planning see Dževad Juzbašić Chapter in Richard Plaschka’s edited volume: “Der Eisenbahnbau in Bosnien und der Hercegovina und die wirtschaftlichen Gegensätze zwischen Österreich und Ungarn,” 143-167; for a short discussion in English on the development of railroads see: Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 68-88.
severely underdeveloped and problematic condition of the inherited Ottoman roads and railroads was seen by the Austro-Hungarians as a major impediment to their planned goals in Bosnia. Apart from promoting the Habsburg army’s efficient circulation throughout the region, a reliable transportation system was considered as the most crucial infrastructure element for successful economic development and an imperative step prior to the commencement of building construction.\textsuperscript{12}

Already between 1878 and 1879, even before the establishment of Die Cataster-Commission and the beginning of the mapping process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Habsburg army had completed a series of road-building and repairing projects. Figure 6, an 1887 transportation map taken from Edmund Stix’s extensive and detailed study\textsuperscript{13} of the urban and architectural endeavors of the early years (1878-1887) of the Landesregierung, clearly demarcates the early roads built by the army between 1878-1879.\textsuperscript{14} In addition to the urgent security needs of the military administration, what seemed to have stimulated the immediate accomplishment of these tasks was the imperial law that declared the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to operate in such a manner that their

\textsuperscript{12} Regarding the centrality of infrastructural projects within the imperial agendas see Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); on the issue of Transportation see Headrick’s entire third section “The Communications Revolution,” 129-210.


\textsuperscript{14} Stix, “Karte der im Jahre 1887 bestehenden Communicationen in Bosnien und der Hercegovina. Maassstab 1:500.000.” Stix' map clearly differentiates between Haupstraßen, Bezirkstraßen, and if these were in use for carriages.
expenses would be covered by their own revenues.\textsuperscript{15} This fact and the lack of any financial assistance from the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{15} Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 43-44. The Imperial Edict of 1880, initially published in the Wiener Zeitung, Nr. 48, Feb. 28, 1880, clearly defined the administration of the occupied territories, while its third paragraph payed specific attention to the question of finance. For an English translation of the complete Imperial Edict, see “Appendix I” in Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 223; also Stix, Das Bauwesen, 23.
\end{footnotesize}
empire meant that the construction of roads and railroads was seen as the key to organized exploitation of the natural resources, which would then lead to massive industrialization and subsequently promotion of export and trade possibilities.\(^{16}\)

However, equally important was the fact that these initial transportation endeavors of the army, seen strictly with reference to urban and architectural development, not only paved the way for a systematic mapping of the region but also served as a platform from which the initiation of urban regulations and building ordinances into major cities emerged. These points will be discussed in the following chapter. However, the main objective of this early phase of spatial intervention was less about finding the most appropriate architectural style or form of urbanism, but rather to render the place as a legible and well-ordered spatial entity. And, not surprisingly, the fulfillment of this task was assigned to imperial military engineers and technicians rather than civil architects.\(^{17}\)

Still, these early spatial activities were seen as indispensable foundational roads stretching towards civilization. Not unlike many of the 19\(^{th}\)-century Western travelers to the Balkans, who considered the state of the roads (and thus the degree of comfort) as a yardstick for the assessment of the level of

\(^{16}\) It is important to note that despite the Imperial Edict's emphasis on Bosnia's long term financial self-sufficiency some basic investments were paid by Austria-Hungary without which no initial development could've taken place. In fact, as Peter Sugar has argued most of these initial investments were in transportation-roads and railroads-which were the most crucial needs of the army. See Sugar, *The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 45.

\(^{17}\) For a detailed discussion on the structure of the construction division's personnel see Stix, *Das Bauwesen*, 21-29.
civilization, the Austro-Hungarians believed that the first stage of the “transition from Turkish barbarism to European Civilization” would be a major improvement of the roads in both provinces. This point is captured perfectly throughout the study of Edmund Stix, the director of the building and construction division of the Provincial Government. At the very beginning of his report of 1887, while reviewing the Provincial Government’s initial years of endeavor, Stix observed that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a territory utterly deprived of “Cultur,” the most important task of the new political administration had been the maintenance of an efficient transportation system (Communicationswesen). The reason, he believed, went far beyond military needs and security provision and was rather an imperative for civilizational advancement (Culturelle Entwicklung) in both provinces. Valuing highly the Habsburg administration’s less than a decade of initial achievements in Bosnia, despite the absence of any substantial financial support, Stix went on to insist that any progress in finding the required investment for building construction, railroads, and hydraulic structures ultimately depended on the presence of a successful main road network (Hauptstraßennetz).

According to Stix’s retrospective evaluation, it was the extension of a dependable transportation network across the territory that had sown an emerging civilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And, of course, given the low level of civilizational condition (Culturzustand) of these lands at the time of the invasion, Stix maintained, this task could only have

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18. In his book Wilde Europe the Slovenian anthropologist Božidar Jezernik provides a humorous and interesting account of the correlation between the perceived level of comfort in transportation and the assessment of the state of civilization as documented by the Western European travelers of the Balkans between the 18th and 20th centuries. Božidar Jezernik, Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers (London: Saqi in association with the Bosnian Institute, 2004); see especially p.23-p.46: “The Land where the East Begins.”
been completed by the occupying power and its army while excluding all private builders. This, as we shall see in later chapters, would change soon after the civil administration replaced military rule in Sarajevo and when the era of great architectural and urban works surfaced. But until then, the military administration remained the most significant builder in space.

However, before proceeding to a discussion of the army’s involvement in city building, two preliminary issues need to be touched upon. Both of these points are important inasmuch as they enable us to recognize how the political ideals of the occupation and of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty were being implemented already within the early spatial interventions of the army. And, in the same manner and by extension, they prepare us to grasp and locate the subsequent spatial transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the greater political ideology of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Firstly, some elaboration on the notion of “Cultur,” used multiple times by Stix in his study, is necessary as it pertains to this project’s main assumption (the Habsburg’s civilizing mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and profoundly frames the political mentality of the new administration. Furthermore, closely correlating with the concept of “Cultur” is Stix’s way of documentation, which requires some specific attention. Despite the fact that the Stix survey is mainly concerned with work completed under the Habsburg administration, his synoptic descriptions of the pre-occupation era are equally informative. Most projects mentioned in the report were built between 1882-1887 under the civil administration, and hence will be discussed in later sections of the present work. However, in this chapter I am mostly interested in

briefly examining the survey itself as a cultural artifact along with its organization, teasing out what in fact Stix’s manner of historical documentation tells us about the greater political context of the late 19th-century Habsburg Empire. Additionally, the retrospective nature of the survey’s narrative indicates that from the very beginning of the occupation, the political goals of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty were being executed in the work of the new administration.

As will be discussed, Stix’s conspicuously brief and devalorizing references to more than four centuries of Ottoman heritage demand a contextualization of the survey’s production. After all, Stix was an imperial officer and the head of the Landesregierung’s construction division when he was commissioned to complete a survey based on government sources and records. As a means of forming an official review of the administration’s first nine years of achievements in the field of construction, Stix’s survey, with its near-total omission of the Ottoman era, manifests the political ideology of the Austro-Hungarian regime while simultaneously justifying the occupation.

In order to address these points and to illuminate how the notions of Kultur and civilization were being reified through the agendas of spatial practice, Stix’s recording, along with its location within wider Austrian historical scholarship of the 1870s, needs to be brought into focus and contextualized. Throughout Stix’ 1887 report, not unlike other texts of the time issued by the Landesregierung, one repeatedly encounters the word Cultur. Contrary to its immediate interpretation, the German concept of Kultur, or as recorded in its old-fashioned version in Stix’s 19th-century text, departs in meaning from the English and French notion of culture. As Norbert Elias in his
seminal work The Civilizing Process (1939) explains, the specifically German sense of the concept of Kultur cannot be exactly translated into French and English; the most appropriate and equivalent term that would correspond with the German definition Kultur is the concept of civilization in English and French. Still, subtle differences remain: for instance, while the French notion of “civilization” included political, economic and technical life, the German concept of “Kultur” also included religious, artistic and intellectual attributes. What is illuminating here, however, is that both these concepts ultimately point in the same direction while underlining the self-consciousness of the West along with its achievements. As Elias put it clearly:

[H]owever different the self-image of the Germans, who speak with pride of their Kultur, and that of the French and English, who think with pride of their “civilization”, they all regard it as completely self-evident that theirs is the way in which the world of humans in general wants to be viewed and judged.

While elaborating on a transmutation of the notion of civilization in different stages of Western European history, Elias deems this concept a gradual yet perpetually forward-moving process that at times would serve as a political platform to justify Western national expansion and colonial aspirations. He proceeds to depict how gradually throughout history Western nations came to consider the Process of civilization as completed within their own societies, …[and they] came to see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished civilization to others, as standard-bearers of expanding civilization…[And] the consciousness of their own

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20. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process; for a discussion of the historical development of the concepts of Kultur and Zivilisation and their different meanings in German see Elias' entire first chapter.
21. Ibid., 7.
superiority, the consciousness of this “civilization” [served] at least those nations which have become colonial conquerers, and therefore a kind of upper class to large sections of non-European world.22

Elias illustrates his point by citing Napoleon when he, upon his Egyptian conquest of 1798, reminded his troops that:

“soldiers, you are undertaking a conquest with incalculable consequences for civilization.”23

However, problematizing this view in Discrepant Experiences, a section of his book Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said juxtaposes and contrasts two contemporary descriptions of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt: namely that of the Frenchman Jean-Baptist-Joseph Fourier, who accompanied Napoleon, with the account of the Egyptian scholar and chronicler al-Rahman al-Jabarti, who witnessed the French invasion of his homeland. As Said explains, what Fourier recorded, “a French Imperial Victory that would herald the expansion of Civilization into Egypt”, was perceived by Jabarti as “the destruction of his society”. As Jabarti recorded in his book: “This year is the beginning of a period marked by great battles; [...] miseries multiplied without end, [...] the common meaning of life was corrupted and destruction overtook it and the devastation was general…”.24

Yet, interestingly enough, an important fact distinguishes Napoleon’s euphoric call for the expansion of “civilization” into the non-European land

22. Ibid., 43, emphasis in original.
23. Ibid.
of Egypt from Stix’ glorification of the advent of the Habsburg army in Bosnia, and that is the occupied territories’ proximity to Austro-Hungarian lands. Stix, as clearly noted in his records, perceived Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of the Habsburg invasion as a place that embodied one of the most primitive cultural condition of human history (Primitivste Culturzustände der Menschlichen Geschichte)—a place in which any aspiration toward progress (Aufschwung) had been prevented for centuries. However, what induced him to frame the so-called sorrowful condition of these lands as inconceivable (kaum denkbar) was their proximity to “Civilized Europe.”

Evidently, the fact that these lands were former European territories and shared the same continent with Western Europe perplexed Stix, along with most other Western European visitors to Bosnia. However, this paradoxical notion of “proximity,” as registered in almost all official and non official assessments of the occupied lands, is one of the most fundamental factors that distinguishes the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the Balkans as a whole, from other territories like Egypt, Algeria, or India, which also experienced the European civilization mission at different times in their respective histories. As the Bulgarian historian Maria Todorova in her important book Imagining the Balkans explains, all descriptions of the Balkans underscore the “transitionary status” of these lands: while the West and the Orient have always been presented as incompatible oppositional worlds, the Balkans, on the other hand, have always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroad between the East and the West, Europe and Asia—an ambiguous transitory

25. Stix, Das Bauwesen, 1.
space. And this ambiguity throughout history has contributed to the indefinable character of this territory, which in turn has exasperated Western observers of the Balkans. “The Balkan peninsula is”, as Todorova cites William Miller’s 1898 remark, “...the land of contradictions. Everything the exact opposite of what it might reasonably be expected to be.”

And so it was that an expansion of Habsburgian reason into the unreasonably ambiguous yet inevitably “proximate” lands of Bosnia-Herzegovina was seen as a righteous civilizational act. This is pointedly captured in Edmund Stix’s “corrective” aspirations for Bosnia, as he noted that since the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the desolate condition of both provinces had started to change gradually. He gratifyingly equated the advent of Habsburg rule with the inception of a prosperous time when Bosnia and Herzegovina opened themselves to civilizational achievements (Errungenschaften der Cultur) as their natural wealth (natürlicher Reichtum), along with the local inhabitants’ potential (Begabung), were being systematically utilized.

Furthermore, Stix reiterated his point by contrasting the former “despotic” Ottoman rule of these lands with the new administration. Thus he claimed that it was the authority and the strength of the latter rule that had brought these lands long-awaited peace (Ruhe), justice (Gerechtigkeit) and order (Ordnung) that transformed them in a short period of time, into aspiring provinces. For Stix, this attained state of progress (Fortschritt) not only correlated intimately with the Landesregierung’s achievements in the fields of building and construction but, in fact, was most

28. Ibid., 18, emphasis added; see also William Miller, Travels and Politics in the Near East (London, T.F. Unwin, 1898), xvi.
appropriately manifested through them. The birth of civilization was thus heralded through the language of new roads, buildings, and urbanism.\textsuperscript{29}

What seems especially remarkable in Stix’s narrative is his complete belief in the evolutionary logic of the Bosnian conquest. It vividly captures the essence of the Western imperialist mind and echoes the modern myth of potential, according to which lands, natural resources, and human capacities have to be realized in the most productive way. His rhetoric mirrors the evolutionary frame of thought of an era in which, as Johannes Fabian has elegantly shown, the sacred sense of Judeo-Christian time was secularized, naturalized, and subsequently spatialized.\textsuperscript{30}

“By claiming to make sense of contemporary society in terms of evolutionary stages, the natural histories of evolutionism reintroduced a kind of specificity of time and place... that has its closest counterpart in the Christian-medieval vision contested by the Enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{31} And, this spatialization of time had as one of its consequences a naturalization of subjects and a denial of ascribing historical meaning to them, as it pretended to make its claim based on “strictly scientific hence universally valid principles.” In this way, as Fabian writes, the followers of cultural evolution paved the way for Western imperialism, as concepts such as “Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, modernization (and their cousins,}

\textsuperscript{29} Stix, Das Bauwesen, 1; Stix’s rhetoric perfectly captures the quintessential aspect of the 19th Century Modern project and its fundamental belief in creating societies, in which a reason-based organization of human potential and capacities, along with those of the natural resources, would lead to growth and progress. Accordingly, Stix organizes his book in a chronology, so it moves smoothly towards growth and progress throughout his report. In an almost Darwinian way, he constructs his narrative in a comparative way: pre- and post-Austro-Hungarian occupation, when rationality and reason dictated the new mode of building while replacing the desolate and arbitrary space of Orient.


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 17.
industrialization, urbanization)” found their conceptual content in “evolutionary Time”.

The cultural evolutionists, in fact, found quite firm ground during the 1870s in the Habsburg monarchy as they committed themselves to the honorable task of “cultivating” the “half-barbarians” of the Balkans with the aspiring goal of “die Erhöhung und Erweiterung der Cultur” as a whole.\textsuperscript{32} It was believed that under the so-called despotic rule of the Ottomans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the rest of the Balkans, were wastelands until the arrival of the Habsburg administration.

In fact, many of the earlier travel accounts of the Western Europeans of these lands testify to this point. It was frequently noted, amid a deep fascination with these uncultivated, wild, and inaccessible lands, that much sheer profit could potentially be extracted from them, yet remained undiscovered due to the backward, Oriental mentality of the ruling system. As one French traveller framed it: “for the Turks laziness was even stronger than love for silver”. It was often assumed that Bosnia would in fact have great success in developing its natural resources were it not under the Ottoman yoke: “…since mining was foreign to the nature of the Turks, they were...content to let the rich mineral treasures of Bosnian mountains lie buried for the most part”.\textsuperscript{33}

 Appropriately enough and in a related context, Clemens Ruthner in his post-colonial consideration of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia quotes a text originating from around the same year when Edmund


\textsuperscript{33} quoted in Jezernik, Wild Europe, 36.
Stix's report was published and circulated in Vienna that perfectly illuminates this point.\textsuperscript{34}

Reflecting on the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, the quoted writer noted enthusiastically in 1888 that, for the first time, the world was experiencing how a European power set about reorganizing an Asiatic country. Using the principles and means of the modern state, he maintained, the Habsburg administration has initiated the conversion of a bulk of 1 and 1/3 million of uncultivated human resources into a functioning European body politic in order to form a civilized nation—in short, to transform Asians into Europeans.

Here one is tempted to recall and juxtapose the enthusiastic utterances made by the Western Europeans about Serbian independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1833 with Stix’s narrative. Writing about the favorable receptions of the Western Europeans regarding the liberation of the Serbian people from the Turkish yoke, Edin Hajdarpasic in his fascinating recent book narrates how the formation of the Serbian state was perceived, among others, by Leopold von Ranke.

Writing in the late 1830s, the eminent German historian noted “the new Balkan principality of Serbia embodied "the spirit of modern times" that came about through "the liberation of a people" from the Turks, a struggle that illuminated the inevitable “progress of the West towards the East”.\textsuperscript{35} A few years later, Ranke added to


his observations regarding the declining Ottoman presence in Europe:

The Ottoman Empire is overpowered and penetrated in all directions by the Christian system. We do not mean by that expression the Christian religion; nor would the words 'culture,' 'civilization,' fully convey our idea; it is being enlightened by the genius of the West: by that spirit which transforms nations into disciplined armies, that traces roads, cut canals, covers all the seas with fleets and converts them into its own property, which fills remote continents with colonies, that has taken possession of the domains of knowledge and cultivates them with unflagging industry.\(^{36}\)

In a similar vein to Ranke and in order to underscore the Habsburgian civilizational genesis in the desolate occupied territories, and, by the same token, to emphasize the total lack of “civilization” during four centuries of Ottoman rule, Stix devoted a few pages of his governmental report to brief descriptions of the so-called “bleak condition” of the roads and buildings prior to the occupation. This, in his view, was indicative of a total absence of any kind of construction and building administration during the Ottoman era.\(^{37}\)

Despite the fact that Stix, throughout his survey, dismissed almost everything inherited from the Ottoman era, he nevertheless came to consider two types of historic buildings/monuments worthy of remark: bridge constructions and ruins of medieval castles.\(^ {38}\) However, while praising the achievements of the master builders (Baumeister) and architects of these historic monuments, he immediately attributed these


\(^{37}\) Stix, Das Bauwesen, 12.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 14.
accomplishments to non-Ottoman (Muslim) subjects and eras.  

In regard to the bridges, without drawing upon any historical records, he claimed that although they were built under the Ottoman rulers, they were nevertheless the impressive work of certain builders from the Christian region of Dalmatian Dubrovnik (Ragusanern).  

To be sure, Stix was not alone in his assessment of the historical origin of the inherited Ottoman bridges. During the nineteenth century, most Western European delineations of the Bosnian bridges associated them either with pre-Ottoman eras, in particular the Roman, or with the work of the Greeks of the Eastern Empire. The assumption that these impressive architectural achievements could be the work of the Ottomans was treated with great skepticism, if not categorically rejected. For instance, the famous 16th-century bridge of Mostar, commissioned by the Suleiman the Magnificent and built by a student of the famous Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan in 1566, was repeatedly described as bearing all the characteristics of Roman architecture.  

In addition to these retained old bridges, there were the ruins of the pre-Ottoman medieval castles that, according to Stix, were reminders of a once-existing higher culture and civilization (höhere Cultur) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He regarded these ruins as being almost the only surviving historical buildings that testified to the memory of a formerly prevailing Christian civilization across these lands, which had been eradicated in the 15th-century Ottoman invasion. Furthermore, he argued that following the Turkish conquest, the Muslims became the ruling class and were in charge of construction activities. Accordingly, the spatial engagements of the subordinated Christian

39. Ibid.  
40. Ibid., 14-15.
population were reduced to the production of simple houses and small churches that were built in no architectural style at all (Styllose Kirchen).  

Interestingly enough, what is implied throughout Stix’s narrative is blaming the cultural degeneration of the occupied lands on over four centuries of rule by an “alien power”; this position would continue to figure repeatedly in European historical discourses of the following centuries. In this regard, for instance, Mark Mazower has observed that many European scholars (and perhaps mass popular opinion) would subscribe to and follow the Polish historian Oskar Halecki who, more than half a century after Edmund Stix, insisted that

From the European point of view, it must be observed that the Ottoman empire, completely alien to its European subjects in origin, tradition and religion, far from integrating them in a new type of culture, brought them nothing but a degrading foreign dominance which interrupted for approximately four hundred years their participation in European History.  

So, if Stix perceived declining Christian churches as poor and alienated buildings, lacking any style of their own, then he regarded the numerous existing Muslim religious buildings (mosques and madrasas) as other than noteworthy historic monuments (Keine nennenswerte Baudenkmäler). However, he proceeded with his argument while making a clear exception for Sarajevo’s Gazi-Husrev beg Mosque (Figures 7-9) and explained that this was the only mosque in Sarajevo whose composition perfectly corresponded to the requirements of architectural style.  

41. Ibid., 14.  
in fact, were these requirements that would frame a building as a historic monument (Baudenkmal) and stylistically worthy? What were the criteria that would bestow a building civilizational merit? And why do these questions matter to our discussion?

I have already touched upon how the notions of culture and civilization were tangibly integrated into Stix’s way of documentation, yet what remains to be discussed next is to demonstrate how these notions, along with Stix’s manner of documentation, corresponded to a larger political ideology in the empire. Doing so will enable us to see how both these provinces were being spatially perceived, framed, and evaluated from the very beginning of the occupation. This consequently will illuminate the ideological background of the Habsburg army’s prospective spatial planning in Bosnia, while simultaneously demonstrating how the invasion was being justified from a civilizational point. Once the ideological framework is explained, then we can see more clearly how, a reorganization of space by the army took shape according to that political ideology.

Of course, the prevalent 19th-century European disbelief and disdain for Ottoman achievements correlated clearly with the decaying presence of the Turks on the global map. For during its powerful reign, particularly between the eleventh and the second siege of Vienna in the late seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was respected and feared for its power, influence and efficiency throughout Europe. The Turks were feared as “the present terror of the world”, yet respected in equal measure. Surely in this historical era Europeans had no skepticism whatsoever regarding the architectural capabilities of the Ottomans. However, due to the gradual growth of Christian Europe and the
Figure 7-9. Section, floor plan and view of Sarajevo’s Gazi-Husrev beg Mosque.

waning power of the Ottomans, a shift in sentiment took place.\textsuperscript{45}

Then there appeared to be another aspect of this historical shift that simultaneously shaped the ways the Ottoman world was being re-evaluated: with the rise of science, the Enlightenment, and the resulting secularism, a new way of conceptualizing the future formed in Western Europe. As Reinhart Koselleck has argued, if until then the notion of the future involved an apocalyptic end, an archetypal final struggle between Christ and the Antichrist, with the advance of science, the future became subject to human planning and control. Prophecy was replaced by prognosis, and the future was no longer an unknown divine eschaton, but rather open and undetermined.\textsuperscript{46} That means, for instance, if the fall of Constantinople in the fifteenth century was perceived by Christians “as proof of the degeneracy of Orthodoxy, the ultimate failure of Byzantium as an imperial system, and a divine punishment for men’s sins”\textsuperscript{47}, then, in the nineteenth century, it was not belief in the divine hand that determined the future, but rather human foresight and control.

This very new and modern notion of the future, along with its openness, as Koselleck has shown, had as one of its consequences a revised view of the past.\textsuperscript{48} So it was then that the Europeans came to look upon the prospects of the dying Ottoman Empire, once considered the greatest power in the world, and ask: “Is this the man that made earth tremble, that did shake kingdoms; that made the world as a wilderness, and destroyed the

\textsuperscript{45} For a brief and concise description of the shift in Europeans’ perception of the Ottoman Empire see Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, xxi-xliii.


\textsuperscript{47} Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, xxxii, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{48} Koselleck, Futures Past.
cities thereof?" And as the Turkish presence on the European continent started fading away, there also arose great doubts about their past cultural achievements, including those in architecture.

Broad shifts in values accompanied these political and economic transformations that resulted in the formation of new conceptual polarities such as the civilized West and the barbarous East, or freedom-loving Europe and the despotic Orient, which would then appear in philosophers, historians but also travel writers’ texts. In fact, this point matches perfectly the literary scholar Mary Louise Pratt’s observation that “important historical transitions alter the way people write, because they alter people’s experiences and the way people imagine, feel and think about the world they live in. The shifts in writing, then […] will tell […] something about the nature of the changes.”

Similarly and as a consequence, when sociocultural and political changes in space and time alter the world of meaning and their conceptualization, a shift in representational and architectural forms occurs as well. It was amid such a political and intellectual atmosphere that the Ottoman origin of the Bosnian bridges was vehemently contested.

One of the earliest accounts of the famous Mostar Bridge that associated it with Roman architecture was the work of the famous English Egyptologist Sir John Gardner Wilkinson, composed during his travel through Dalmatia and Montenegro in 1844, and can be taken as a

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revealing case. His observation of the Mostar Bridge is worth quoting at length, as many subsequent European writers and travelers would return to this text as their source of information throughout the century:

The breadth of the arch is only 14.2, the road over it 13.2, and, with the two parapets, 14.10. On its north side is a raised conduit of stone, looking like a footway, which conveys water over the bridge to the eastern part of the city, and is supplied from a source, in the undulating valley to the West. The bridge rises about ten feet in the centre; but this does not appear to have been so originally; and though the lightness of its appearance may have been increased by lowering the two ends, the convenience of the bridge is much diminished, as it abuts on the East against a rising ground. On each bank is a tower, built to command it; and the passage may be closed by the gate of the guard-house at the West end, in case of need. Tradition pretends, that the towers are on Roman substructions, and that the one on the eastern side is the most ancient. The building of the bridge is attributed to Trajan, or, according to some, to Adrian; and report speaks of an inscription, that once existed upon it, with the name of one of those emperors. The Turks attribute its erection to Suleyman, the Magnificent; but the Vizir, in answer to my question respecting its date, said that, 'though they claim it as a work of that Sultan, the truth is, it was there long before his time, and was probably built by the Pagans.' The Turks have entirely concealed the original masonry; not a block is to be seen of Roman time, and the smallness of the stones, the torus under the parapet, and the spandril projecting slightly over the arch, give it all the appearance of Turkish construction. But the grandeur of the work, the form of the arch, and tradition, all favour its Roman origin; and the fact of the town being called Mostar, shows that an ‘old bridge’ already existed there, when it received that name; and Mostar was a city long before the Turkish invasion of the country.53

Despite the ubiquity of the account of the Roman origin of the Bosnian bridges, there nevertheless existed other descriptions whose narratives and arguments framed and underlined the existence of different

political ideologies in 19th-century Europe. That is to say, works produced by Victorian travelers from Britain differed from, say, their German counterparts, as the former texts correlated with a different set of imperial objectives.\textsuperscript{54} For instance, in the context of the aforementioned Mostar Bridge, the English archeologist Sir Arthur John Evans, known for his unearthing of the Cretan palace of Knossos and his conceptualization of the notion of Minoan civilization, drew on Gardner Wilkinson’s work when writing that “anyone who has seen it [the bridge] will agree with Sir Gardner that the grandeur of the work, and the form of the arch, as well as the tradition, attest its Roman origin.”\textsuperscript{55}

Writing during the heyday of British imperialism and being completely immersed in his research into

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Mostar_Bridge.jpg}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{54} For a short discussion on the Mostar bridge and its historical treatment see Jezernik’s chapter “A Bridge Between Barbarity and Civilization” in \\textit{Wild Europe}, 191-205; for an interesting, nuanced and comparative analysis of different European powers’ relationship with the so-called “Orient,” and as part of that the Ottoman Empire, see: Suzanne Marchand, \textit{German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

\textsuperscript{55} Arthur John Evans, \textit{Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot During the Insurrection, August and September 1875; With an Historical Review of Bosnia, and a Glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the Ancient Republic of Ragusa} (London: Longmans, 1876), 345.
Mediterranean civilization as the hub of history, Evans went on to claim that even:

The mosques, of which there are forty, are many of them domed, and the plate tracery of their windows is curiously Roman or Byzantine: the minarets—which, not taking their pinnacles into account, look like unfinished Corinthian columns—struck us as more elegant than those of Sarajevo; and even the Byzantine church was in better taste. The impression which the streets of Mostar are perpetually forcing on us is that we have come once more on the fringe of Roman civilization. These stone houses are no longer the Turkish Chalet but the Casa of Italy or Dalmatia. Some are roofed with a rough slate, others with tiles, Romanesque if not Roman. Every now and then an Italian physiognomy strikes us among the citizens; the auburn locks and blue eyes of the Illyrian interior are giving place to swarthier hues. The name of the mountain under whose barren steeps we passed on our way here—Porim—in the Sclavonic tongue means on, or over against Rome, and seems to indicate that this part of the Narenta Valley remained Roman at a time when the mountain wilderness of the interior had passed into the hands of the Sclavonic barbarians. Mostar indeed owes her name, and perhaps her very existence, to Roman enterprise.56

However, as already mentioned, there remained views that did not agree with those of Wilkinson and regarded the claim of the Roman origin of the Bosnian bridges with skepticism. In his book Reisen in Bosnien und der Hertsegowina: topographische und pflanzengeographische Aufzeichnungen (1877), published less than two years after Arthur Evans’ book, the German Orientalist Dr. Otto Blau recorded no traces whatsoever of Roman art when describing the Mostar Bridge and its surroundings.57 Blau, who had held the post of the General-Consul of Prussia in Bosnia-Herzegovina since

56. Ibid., 342-343.
1864, was well acquainted with the region. In his book, while reviewing contemporary research on Bosnia, he went on to include Arthur Evans’ work and to praise his great and “audacious deed” of traveling through these lands. Interestingly, however, when writing on Mostar and other Bosnian bridges, Blau referred to neither Evans nor Wilkinson:

Pointing to certain characters chiseled on the sidestones of the Mostar Bridge, Blau concluded without the slightest fear of contradicting himself that the Bridge was an achievement (Werk) of Turkish rule. However, he then continued to add that his appraisal regarding the origin of the construction would not preclude the architect’s (Baumeister) being Venetian or Dalmatian. Here Blau was referring to the work of Carl Ritter von Sax, a connoisseur of Ottoman affairs who had been engaged in the Austrian consular service since 1861. As a diplomat, Sax had years of experience in the Balkan region; unsurprisingly, in June 1879, only a few months after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he would join the Landesregierung in Sarajevo as a senior civil servant.

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58. Otto Blau, 1828-1879, was a German Orientalist who started with his studies in Theology and Philosophy before devoting himself to the study of Oriental languages. Later, he became more involved with the practical side of Orientalist studies and served as a diplomat. Prior to his appointment as the Prussian General-Consul in Bosnia, he travelled extensively as the attaché and later the Vice Chancellor of the Prussian Legation to Persia, Asia Minor and the Greek Islands and published numerous researches regarding these regions and the Balkans. For a short biography of Blau and his publications see Numismatische Zeitschrift, numismatischen Gesellschaft in Wien; Band 11, Jahrgang 1879, 443-446.


60. Carl Ritter von Sax, 1837-1918.
Despite the similar background of Otto Blau and Carl von Sax and the fact that they both came from the German-speaking part of central Europe (German/Prussian and Austrian), a comparison between their ways of contemplating the origin of the bridge reveals two different sets of political ideology that simultaneously deviates from the Victorian narratives of Evans and Wilkinson. While Sax, just like his compatriot Edmund Stix, considered the Bosnian bridges the skilled work of Dalmatian and Venetian stonemasters, Blau had no difficulty in considering the possibility of their Turkish origin. As in the case of the “Orient," one is reminded here of the complexity and diversity of 19th-century Europeans’ relationship with the Ottoman Europe and the Balkans.62

Otto Blau composed his book on Bosnia only a few years after the unification of Germany in 1871. He had just returned to Sarajevo after the end of the Franco-Prussian War when he was asked to leave for yet another post at the new German Consulate in Ukraine. Under Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of a united Germany, a new political epoch had begun. When Blau’s Bosnian book came out in 1877, the European powers’ main concern centered around the crisis in the Balkans, which eventually would culminate in the Russo-Turkish war of the same year. Bismarck’s policy regarding the so-called Eastern Question and the Balkans, however, remained one of disinterest and disengagement from Ottoman affairs. Nevertheless, he simultaneously kept a vigilant eye on the Austrian-Russian rivalry in the

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62. In German Orientalism, Suzanne Marchand convincingly problematizes the homogeneous and non-differentiating way of seeing all Europeans as a “united group” over and against “the oriental other”. For more on this issue see Marchand, German Orientalism, xvii-xxxiv; and, the chapter “Orientalism and the Long Durée,” 1-52.
Additionally, when considering Blau’s narrative, it is crucial to note that he was a representative of a political time period well before the rise of imperial Germany’s colonizing aspirations in 1884, when the era of the German colonial empire (Deutsches Kolonialreich) started.

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The situation in the Habsburg lands was slightly different, not least because of the centuries-long proximity of the Habsburg to the Ottoman Empire created after the defeat of Hungary at the Battle of Mohács in 1526. As Leopold Hellmuth has argued, one of the consequences of this geopolitical landscape was an early Austro-Hungarian devotion to the study of the language and culture of the enemy. In other words, investigating, understanding and writing about the Ottoman world contained an “eminently political component”.65 By the 1800s, many decades before texts such as Carl von Sax’s would appear, the relationship between the Austrians and the Ottomans had already undergone a tremendous transformation due to the receding Turkish threat and presence in territories between the two Empires. Under Maria Theresa, an Oriental Academy (Orientalische Akademie) was established in 1754 whose curriculum, with its clear emphasis on advancing the linguistic and cultural training of translators and diplomats, signified the

63. Bismarck’s detachment regarding the crisis of the Balkans is best described through his famous speech in the Reichstag on 7 December 1876: “The policy which we pursue must be dictated solely by our own interests, and we will not permit ourselves to be influenced by any proposal whatsoever to pursue any other policy. I do not therefore advise any active participation on the part of Germany, as I do not see for Germany any interest which would warrant our sacrificing-excuse the harshness of the expression-the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” Quoted in William Kay Wallace, The Trend of History; Origins of Twentieth Century Problems (New York: Macmillan Co., 1922), 289; on different European stances vis-à-vis the Balkan Crisis see Wallace’s V chapter: “The Eastern Question,” 283-294.

64. For an analysis of the German Orientalism during the period between 1884-1914, see the Chapter “German Orientalism in the Age of Empire” in Marchand, German Orientalism, 333-386.

beginning of a new political era that preferred well-informed diplomacy to the battlefield.\textsuperscript{66}

This, of course, did not mean that the centuries-long tradition of fearing the “Other” was replaced by a sudden sense of trust, but rather it was continued through a different set of political tools. In this context, Sax’s career and texts capture perfectly this transformation as he, after decades of being in the service of Austria across the Ottoman regions and writing extensively and critically on the Turkish presence in the Balkans, returned to Vienna in 1884 to teach at the Oriental Academy as a professor in charge of training a new generation of Austro-Hungarian diplomats.\textsuperscript{67} Interestingly enough, three years earlier, he had joined the Bosnian Bureau—the Viennese counterpart of the Landesregierung and based in Sarajevo. Here it becomes evident how and why texts such as Sax’s narratives and way of framing (for instance, insisting on the Venetian origin of the Bosnian bridges) underline the fact that geopolitical and diplomatic affairs directly intersected with and shaped the production of scholarship.

In order to extend this point to the architectural studies of the time and to see how it influenced the question of evaluating the “civilizational” merit of a building or setting, I will now turn to contextualizing Edmund Stix person and work.

\textsuperscript{66} Marchand, German Orientalism, 25; for a detailed discussion of the Oriental Academy in Vienna see Hellmuth, “Traditionen und Schwerpunkte der Österreichischen Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert.”

\textsuperscript{67} The following books by Sax are the most referred to: Carl von Sax, Türkei, Bericht verfasst im Auftrage des Comité für den Orient und Ostasien (Wien: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1873); Vorträge über osmanische Verwaltungskunde; Geschichte des Machtverfalls der Türkei bis Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und die Phasen der “orientalischen Frage” bis auf die Gegenwart (Wien: k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1913).
Edmund Stix was born in 1837 in Vienna and grew up, like Sax who was born in the same year and city, during the years following the revolutionary uprisings of 1848. He completed his formal architectural training at the Polytechnic Institute of Vienna (K.u.K. Polytechnisches Institut) in 1859, and began his career as an engineering draftsman for city’s newly planned hospital, the Rudolfstiftung Krankenhaus. After two years in 1861 he became involved with Vienna’s most notorious 19th-century architectural project, the Ringstrasse, while simultaneously receiving a teaching position at the Polytechnic Institute that he maintained until 1865. Stix’s architectural world in both training and practice was shaped during an era that experienced major sociocultural and political transformations.

During the early decades of the nineteenth century, the emergence of civil society and the rise of Austrian liberalism formed a bourgeois intelligentsia that embraced liberal ideas of progress and science. In 1860, one year before Stix embarked on supervising the construction of the Ringstrasse’s Parliament building, the liberals of Austria had transformed the institutions of the state in accordance with the principles of constitutionalism and the cultural values of the middle class. From the beginning, their rise to power was reflected in and manifested through a reshaping of Vienna that culminated in planning and designing the Ringstrasse project. This sociopolitical process was in turn accompanied by the formation of series of governmental reforms that aimed at

68. Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815-1950, Band 13 (Verlag der ÖAW. Lfg. 61, 2009), 269.
69. For the intersection of the rise of Austrian liberalism and reorganization of space see Matthew Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History: Empire and the Politics of Scholarship, 1847-1918 (Pennsylvania State University, 2013) 8-30; and Carl Schorske, Fin-de-siècle Vienna: politics and culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 24.
70. For an excellent depiction of this process see Schorske’s entire second chapter in Schorske, Fin-de-siècle Vienna, 24-115.
controlling and shaping the mind of the middle class. At the heart of this political constellation were university and educational reforms whose agenda, while quite progressive in promoting liberal and advanced methods of investigation, was the entrenchment of a strong sense of patriotism and loyalty to the Habsburg Empire.

One of the institutions that perfectly exemplified a place in which both agendas of modern scientific inquiry and the formation of loyal imperial subjects intersected was the Vienna’s Institute for Austrian Historical Research. As Matthew Rampley in his recent book explains: “a major motivation for [the] foundation of this institute was to foster “in-depth study of the history of the fatherland, driven by patriotism, loyalty, love, and devotion to the ruling house” and to “prevent younger talents from being diverted from the true goal of historical research due to the influence of national movements”. The new institute was thus organized around the study of history as a patriotic enterprise, involving the construction of narratives that would legitimize Habsburg rule.”

Consequently, the course of art historical study was profoundly influenced by the Institute for Historical Research’s patriotic conception of history and its curriculum’s deep commitment to the ideas of scholarship and science. The situation in the Polytechnic Institute was not much different; in fact, it was only a few years before Stix’s entrance into Vienna’s Polytechnic Institute that Rudolf von Eitelberger, the leading figure of these political and intellectual shifts and the founder of the Vienna School of Art history, was hired to teach there. Eitelberger played an eminent role in shaping the minds of generations of art historians to come, as his

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71. Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History, 17.
endeavors “came to be central to the emerging definitions of ‘scientific’ art history across Europe and, crucially, also served ideological agendas linked to larger state imperatives.”\textsuperscript{72}

One of Eitelberger’s first tasks was to construct a patriotic art historical narrative that required a systematic documentation of artistic monuments across the Habsburg monarchy. It is noteworthy to mention that the idea of the state’s interest in selecting, surveying, and subsequently linking its territory’s most significant monuments to the project of the 19\textsuperscript{th}-century nation building was widespread throughout Europe.\textsuperscript{73} However, what distinguished Eitelberger’s approach was his great attention to detailed topographical studies and his systematic and scholarly documentation of monuments. While the emphasis on precision and authenticity along with privileging primary artistic and textual sources had constituted a significant epistemological break, introducing empirically driven art historical inquiry, Eitelberger’s work additionally was guided by another parameter, namely highlighting state legitimization.\textsuperscript{74}

In other words, the critical selection and description of the buildings of a territory and the estimation of their artistic, archaeological or historical merit were based not only on their date and architectural characteristics, but also on the events they had witnessed, as “such documentation aided the legitimization of the regime by promoting the idea of a continuity with the past.”\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 22.
\item \textsuperscript{73} For an excellent discussion on this issue see Françoise Choay, The Invention of the Historic Monument (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
\item \textsuperscript{74} Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 22, emphasis added.
\end{itemize}
In fact, a study that perfectly illuminates these points is Eitelberger’s architectural survey of the medieval artistic monuments of Dalmatia that he conducted during 1859. The survey concerned a territory that was historically seen as part of the medieval kingdom of Croatia, yet had become separate from the rest of Croatia proper in late medieval times. While Croatia was later absorbed into the Hungarian crown, Dalmatia remained a province of Austria. At the time of Eitelberger’s survey, the case of Dalmatia was complicated due to its history of being dominated by both Venice and the Habsburg Empire; nevertheless, it was this coastal region’s Venetian (as opposed to Hungarian) cultural and social inheritance that mattered most. Of course, Eitelberger’s documentation was intended to be an art historical survey, yet it also remained deeply committed to the Empire’s political expectations, which demanded framing the Dalmatian region within the Italian-Venetian (hence Western European) traditions. In his survey Eitelberger wrote:

As with all lands, so too in Dalmatia the development of art should not be assessed on the basis of petty local points of view, but from the standpoint that views art as part of that great civilization whose laws govern humanity. The directions and impulses of art always proceeded from those sites that were the centers of great civilization.

Of course, what is being alluded to here is the political position of the Habsburg Empire with respect to the much-feared rising Slav nationalism in the Balkans, which was considered to be under possible Russian influence. However, in order to gain a more

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77. Ibid., 22-25; quoted in Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History
78. Ibid., 23-24; quoted in Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History
comprehensive understanding of Eitelberger’s point and subsequently to relate it to Stix’s survey, we need to look a bit further back in the history of Dalmatia—namely, during its 18th-century Venetian rule. This is a time when, as Larry Wolff has shown in *Venice and the Slavs*, the Venetian Enlightenment became preoccupied with the backwardness of Dalmatia and embarked on a civilizing mission toward the Slavs. Often during that century, Dalmatia was reframed and recalled by Western Europeans as a territory once part of the Roman civilization but which, after the fall of the empire and prior to becoming part of the Venetian Republic in the fifteenth century, was “invaded” and “infested” by the “Slavic tribes of barbarians” during the seventh century.

This shows that already a bit less than a century before Eitelberger’s survey, during the final years of the Venetian rule of Dalmatia in the 1770s and 1790s there existed very clear thoughts on what should figure as Dalmatia’s past and upon which civilization the historical claim should be built and against whose barbarism it should be defended.

In the same year, when Eitelberger conducted his survey, Stix completed his architectural training at the Polytechnic Institute and started with his career as an architect and civil servant. Given the aforementioned historical background, it is relevant to consider that Stix’s survey, though conducted years later, followed the same political logic as all other government documents of the time. It is in this light that Stix’s insistence, like Carl von Sax’s, on the Roman and Dalmatian origin of the Bosnian bridges and his praise for the medieval monuments of Bosnia-

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80. Ibid., 1-24.
Herzegovina, which were reminiscent of a once-existing Christian civilization in the region, are to be understood.

On the one hand, the survey’s structure indicates a high level of precision, detail orientation, and objectivity, while simultaneously, from the very first page, its narrative reveals loyalty to the politics of the empire; the readership of the imperial metropoles had to be persuaded by Stix’s narrative that the Habsburg invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the consequent financial burden were an honorable act justified in the name of civilizing mission. Simultaneously, through a rejection of Ottoman heritage and an emphasis on the Dalmatian and Roman historical links in both provinces, the recovery of a former European territory from the Turkish yoke was proclaimed.

In fact, in this context, it is interesting to consider the occurrence of similar political and intellectual tendencies in the new nation-states that were emerging from the Ottoman Empire in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Such were, for instance, the cases of Greece and Serbia after they achieved their independence in the 1820s and 1830, respectively. The designation of both countries’ new and modern capital cities, Athens and Belgrade, was a conscious political step that aimed at reclaiming these territories’ interrupted European historical continuity through a massive elimination of their Ottoman traces and a revitalization of their ancient Greco-Roman and European heritages.81

When Stix in his survey considered the Ottoman heritage of the occupied territories as insignificant, his dismissal was neither due to an ignorance of architectural history nor a matter of negligence, but rather it strictly corresponded with the Habsburg Empire’s greater politics regarding the occupation of Bosnia and Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty, in which Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be integrated within the imperial territory, and consequently their future had to be anchored in European civilization. Doing so required an immediate plan of removing their Oriental past, which was regarded as an obstacle to this goal. Stix’s survey sought to demarcate the time of the birth of civilization and *Kultur* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, asserting that history started with the march of the Habsburg army into these lands. Its narrative manifested how upon the event of the occupation the temporal aspects of past and future were related.

However, it should be mentioned that not unlike other state-controlled reports and writings, another equally important aspect of Stix’s survey was not only to justify the occupation to the Empire’s subjects in the metropole, but also to portray it as meaningful and logical. Considering the state’s interest in shaping the mind of the middle class, as previously discussed, the survey by Stix gains centrality while also raising the question of how an architectural survey of the occupied territory would in fact find its readership amid the metropole’s subjects.\(^{82}\)

In 1888, one year after the publication of Stix’s survey, the journal of The Austrian Society of Engineers and Architects (*Österreichische Ingenieur-und Architekten-Verein*), which was founded alongside other

\(^{82}\) For three excellent recent discussions on the role and the place of the mass-produced printed materials within the politics of global empires see Martin Jay and Sumathi Ramaaswamy, *Empires of Vision*, 141-207.
liberal bourgeois associations following the revolution of 1848, published a special report about a group of imperial architects and engineers travelling through the occupied lands. The report, whose content will be discussed in the following chapters, had a travelogue-style prose and was accompanied by several architectural sketches. A closer examination of this publication, however, clearly demonstrates how the Society's journal, which figured as its official organ, had built its entire narrative upon Stix's study. This certainly was not a coincidence, as Edmund Stix was not only one of the Society's most well established members; he had served for several years as the editor of its journal. Here it becomes evident how the process of knowledge production in the periphery and its circulation across the empire's metropoles created a matrix of power.

In fact, the Austrian Society of Engineers and Architects was a prestigious scientific institution that included all well-known architects and engineers from across the monarchy, with the highest memberships concentrated in Vienna. However, the Society was more than just a purely scientific cause-devoted organization, as it had equally significant impacts on both the execution of the Empire's architectural and engineering practices and the creation of technological policies. On the one hand, the Society was commissioned by the Imperial Royal Ministry for Culture and

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83. Österreichischer Ingenieur und Architekten Verein: Bericht über die Studienreise in Bosnien, Mai 1888, von Paul Kortz. Separat Abdruck aus der „Wochenschrift des Österr. Ingenieur- und Architekten-Vereines” Nr. 35 und 38 ex 1888. (Wien: Verlag des Vereines, 1888). To my knowledge, there have been altogether two architectural travel reports by this association regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. In addition to the issue of 1888, there exists a report from the year 1903. For this see Zeitschrift des Österreichischen Ingenieur- und Architekten-Verseins: Bericht über die Studienreise des Österr. Ingenieur- und Architekten-Vereines nach Dalmatien, Herzegovina und Bosnien. Wien, 4. September 1903. Nr. 36. Jahrgang LV.

84. At the time of its initiation in 1848, the Society had only 14 members, while less than two decades later it had 778 members thereof 526 based in Vienna. See Verhandlungen des Vereins. Wochenversammlung am 21. Oktober 1865. In: Zeitschrift des österreichischen Ingenieur-und Architekten-Vereins. Heft 12/1865 (XVII. Jahrgang), ZDB-ID 2534647-7. Waldheim, Wien 1865, S.264 f.
Education to review the regulations concerning engineering education and the curriculum of the technical universities, while on the other hand, it served as a major intellectual venue where lectures, seminars, and discussions with themes based on concrete projects from all over the world would take place. Pioneering engineering and architectural projects such as the construction of the Suez Canal, which was originally designed by the Austrian Alois Negrelli, or the world’s first mountain railway line, were among the topics debated by the members in the Society’s salon.\textsuperscript{85}

In her book \textit{Imperial Eyes}, Mary Louise Pratt has brilliantly shown how reports such as Stix’s, which were written by Europeans about non-European parts of the world, created the imperial order for Europeans “at home” and gave them their place in it.\textsuperscript{86} According to Pratt these texts “gave European reading publics a sense of ownership, entitlement and familiarity with respect to the distant parts of the world that were being explored, invaded, invested in, and colonized.”\textsuperscript{87} To be sure, this is an important point in the case of Bosnia when considering the previously mentioned political contest that existed in Habsburg’s main metropoles regarding the Bosnian occupation. Stix’s survey elegantly makes its claim and convinces its readers that both provinces had to be occupied, framed, and brought under the control of the Habsburgs’ civilizing rule and reason. How the march of civilization took its initial steps and expanded across Bosnia-Herzegovina is the subject of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{86} Pratt, \textit{Imperial Eyes}, 3.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
Figure 11. Hans Niemeczek architectural drawings that originally were made for Stix’ report were reproduced in the 1888 travel report of the architectural society.


Figure 12. The conference hall of the Architecture society
Source: Der Österreichische Ingenieur- und Architekten-Verein (OIAV), 1873

Figure 13. The 1873 issue of the society’s magazine
Source: Der Österreichische Ingenieur- und Architekten-Verein (OIAV), 1873
Chapter Three

Mapping the Unknown: Ordering the Space of the Other
From the beginning of the occupation until the end of 1878, the Habsburg military administration was entirely in charge of the development of the field of construction and building in the occupied territories. This was due to the fact that the civil administration was still in the process of emerging, and hence had no means or power to take any initiative in matters of architecture and urban development. Consequently, a major part of early building works was done primarily to serve the needs of the military and its spatial operations. This tendency would remain almost unchanged and would stretch well into 1882, when the civil administration started to gain a stronger presence in the occupied territories, slowly replacing military rule. However, both the military budget and the expertise of the army’s technical and engineering officers remained indispensable for the Landesregierung.¹

The dominant presence of the army in space had two logical consequences that would further transform the cities of both provinces. For one, as Edmund Stix argued in his architectural report, the initial building activities primarily focused on providing accommodations for the Austro-Hungarian troops in cities. This goal had to be achieved either through adaptation and renovation of the properties that were inherited from the Turkish government or through the construction of new buildings.² Furthermore, if the major role of the army was to maintain security across the country and to prepare it for massive economic development, then roads and rails had to be built to facilitate the movement of troops.

The underdeveloped state of the inherited Ottoman dirt carriage roads and the absence of any road maintenance

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¹ Stix. Das Bauwesen, 58.
² Ibid., 83.
were seen as serious impediments to Austro-Hungarian development plans. But more importantly, their presence rendered the conquest incomplete, since the territories were not perceived as fully under the control of the army. Movement under these unpropitious circumstances was not only a difficult and at times impossible task, but it also consumed a significant amount of time. For instance, prior to the establishment of the railway company Bosnabahn by the military administration, when the Austrian officer and chief engineer, Philipp Ballif (1847-1905), travelled from Sarajevo to Bosanski Brod in 1879, he had to spend full eight days while changing his horse daily. It was clear to the new administration that traffic conditions had to be reorganized. Consequently, the major task of the soldiers became building and repairing roads in addition to providing security.

There was also an urgent need for the construction of railroads, which was deemed as having the most significant influence on both economic and social transformation of the occupied lands. Among other things, as Dževad Juzbašić writes in his book, were three interconnected issues. Firstly, from the beginning of the occupation, the Austro-Hungarian administration considered Bosnia as a suitable transit area that would connect the occupied territory and the monarchy as whole with the Orient. This had serious geopolitical and economic consequences. Furthermore, the expansion of the railroads towards the north, which would connect Sarajevo via Budapest with Vienna, was regarded as a crucial factor in the growth of Bosnian economy and trade. This indeed was imperative for the

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3. For an extensive discussion of the state of communication and transportation prior to and after the Austro-Hungarian occupation see Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 567-617; also Philipp Ballif, Das Strassenwesen in Bosnien und der Hercegovina, Allgemeine Bauzeitung-Oesterreichische Vierteljahrschrift für den Öffentlichen Baudienst, Vol.72, 1907, 39-58.
5. Juzbašić, Izgradnja željeznica u Bosni i Hercegovini.
new administration’s economic policy as, due to the absence of any imperial financial assistance, Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be self-sufficient. Finally, this latter point was intimately connected to creating a systematic plan for exploitation of natural resources of both the provinces and their prospective exports.\(^6\)

However, as Edmund Stix’s 1887 report reveals, the early years of the occupation were marked by a conspicuous absence of any reliable infrastructure or, for that matter, housing for the arriving military officers and bureaucrats. The immediate needs of the occupying power severely contrasted with the existing circumstances in both provinces. In this context, not unlike earlier observers,\(^7\) the Bosnian architectural historian Ibrahim Krzović notes that during the first years of the Habsburg administration, there was a great discrepancy between the prevailing conditions of the land and the requirements of the new government. This discrepancy, however, would become the dictating logic of the early phase of architectural and urban projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^8\)

The goal of this chapter is to explore the wider experience of this imbalance in space between 1878 and 1882. What forms of policy constituted the new administration’s responses to this imbalance? How and through which concrete methods did the new authority regulate this former Ottoman space? Finally, what were the spatial consequences of those responses?

However, the discussion begins first with looking at the arrival of the Habsburg army in Sarajevo and examining the new authority’s immediate aesthetic and

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\(^6\) Ibid.; Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 567-617; Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 68-149.

\(^7\) Stix, Das Bauwesen; Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns.

\(^8\) Krzović, Arhitektura Bosne i Hercegovine, 1878-1918, 13.
spatial perception of the inherited Ottoman environment. It seeks to demonstrate that the Austro-Hungarians' reflections on the style of the found buildings, which ranged from governmental to residential, mirrored the political and cultural stand of the monarchy, and for that matter all of Western Europe vis-à-vis the Ottomans. In other words, the discourse of the Eastern Question continued to form and condition the newly arrived power's perception of the architectural style of the Turkish buildings. As in the case of the impoverished condition of the Ottoman roads, the observation was that also in terms of architectural style, the desperate imitations of the "sick man of Europe" signified a civilizational absence.

Building on this, the chapter then looks into how these perceived aesthetic and pragmatic deficiencies led to the formation of new policies, norms, and rules that would systematically frame and regulate the space according to the Habsburgs' civilizing principles. Modern regulatory processes and apparatuses ranging from making different kinds of maps and writing laws and ordinances to the establishment of new governing political institutions, manifested new forms of spatial relationships and practices that would transform the Ottoman space.

In the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian administration, most of the found buildings inherited from the Turkish government were in a condition that did not allow for their immediate use. As a result and in order to make some of these properties available to the arriving members of the new authority, a series of extensive and
costly demolitions and adaptations had to be planned. However, in addition to their dilapidated state, the Ottoman facilities faced an additional problem—namely, architecturally speaking, that they did not meet Western European aesthetic requirements.

“The peculiar customary design of the existing buildings,” Edmund Stix’s report records, had such drastic impact on the Austro-Hungarian administration that even their architectural adaptation would not encourage long-term use. At most, from the Austrian point of view, the structures could only be regarded as a temporary solution necessitated by the found circumstances. Following this, the military occupied all buildings that had permanent or temporal military value, while all the other former imperial Ottoman objects were taken by the civil administration. This trend would last until 1881, when the civil administration replaced military rule and when the former Ottoman objects that no longer had military value were passed to the Landesregierung, which consequently was in charge of considering their potential utilization or eventual demolition.

However, in order to accelerate the process of locating accommodations and offices for the military administration, the head (Landeschef) of the Landesregierung, Feldzeugmeister (General) Joseph Philippovich, immediately upon his arrival in August 1878, declared a statute that led to the formation of the Sarajevo city council. Though this statute was

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9. Stix, *Das Bauwesen*, 83; while Stix’s report provides a detailed set of information about the cost of the adaptations and new constructions there is a conspicuous lack of data regarding demolitions that took place in both provinces. In fact, a survey or work that would map out the Austro-Hungarian administrations’ demolitions is not known to me. However, an interesting comparative study of the process of “De-Ottomanisation” in the Balkans is Maximilian Hartmuth’s work “Negotiating Tradition and Ambition: A comparative perspective on the ‘De-Ottomanisation’ of Balkan Cityscapes,” in *Urban Life and Culture in Southeastern Europe: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives.*, ed. Klaus Roth, Ulf Brunnbauer (Münster, London: LIT Verlag, 2007), 15-33.

10. Stix, *Das Bauwesen*, 83.
designed to be provisional, its inauguration would nevertheless serve many current and prospective interests of the occupying power. A few years later in 1884, a permanent city council statute was issued. Although the latter statute’s basic principles did not deviate much from its predecessor, its member composition was differently organized. And, by extension and more importantly in terms of voting rights, the 1884 statute considered all Austro-Hungarian civil servants to be eligible voters while restricting the political rights of the local Sarajevo citizens according to the taxes that they paid.\textsuperscript{11} This point will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, as it pertains to the political and cultural content of the post-1882 regime. But for the current discussion, it is important to understand why the city council was created in the first place and its primary functions in space.

Not unlike other parts of the world that experienced foreign imperial domination, Bosnian elites had to be incorporated into the political structure of the new authority. The Austro-Hungarian administrators depended on the local elites’ assistance in ruling Bosnia. As Robert Donia writes, “prominent Bosnians of all confessions were appointed to local posts if they were politically loyal and enjoyed the confidence of the local population.” He continues quoting Józef Szlávy von Okány, the Joint Minister of Finance in 1880-1882, who stated that he sought “personalities who appear able to influence their coreligionists because of their integrity, education, irreproachable conduct, and social status.”\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 73.
Of course, the question of elite integration was not just a matter prevalent in the Western imperialist administrative world, but rather was a crucial aspect of the Ottoman Empire’s regulatory system across its wide territory as well. Under Topal Şerif Osman Pasha, Bosnia’s governor from 1861-1869, a city council had already existed in Sarajevo. Upon the occupation of Bosnia, the Austro-Hungarians included most of the very same local elites in their matrix of power. Following the confessional model of the Ottoman era, the first Sarajevo city council under the Austro-Hungarians consisted of six Serbian Orthodox Christians, five Muslims, four Jews, and three Catholics. The political expectations of both parties—the involved local elites and the Habsburg government—would not differ from the previous one. In order to gain a more comprehensive and comparative view of this point, it is helpful to look briefly at the case of another territory that was concurrent with the Austrian occupation of Sarajevo under the Ottoman administration.

In his study of the creation of the Beirut city council under the Ottoman rule during the 19th century, Jens Hanssen has argued that “in Beirut as in Damascus, the most attractive channels of urban power and participation were the municipal and the Provincial councils whose members wielded a high degree of decision-making power over the allocation of taxes, public constructions, and planning procedures.”

13. Ibid., 35. Donia explains that following its administrative reforms, in 1865, the Ottoman Empire introduced councils at all levels of government. Seats were allocated based on confession. For Bosnia, each of the districts had two seats for Muslims and two for non-Muslims.
14. Ibid., 74.
goes on to explain that from the perspective of the Ottoman government, the municipality “incorporated a socio-economic elite in the making into the political and cultural orbits of the state”, while from the point of view of the local elite, participation in Ottoman institutions “solidified their informal social ascendancy in a new formalized political realm.”

Both these aspects mentioned by Hanssen can be applied to the case of the Bosnian elite and their relationship to the new Austrian authority. What was at stake was to define the political structure of the new urban power along with ensuring the desirability of this body’s future policies and projects. At the same time, by way of including local agents, the new authorities aimed at legitimizing the whole imperial enterprise for the greater Bosnian citizenry. However, it is important to note that during the nineteenth century, the question of the structure of the municipal government and the organization of its power dynamics were not restricted to colonial domains. According to Carl Schorske, for instance, it was in the same century that the Austrian liberals extracted the right to municipal self-government from the emperor after three centuries of direct imperial rule. And so, as Friedrich Lenger has shown in a comparative context, that throughout most Western European cities the principles of municipality, along with communal autonomy, were a vigorous part of the political discussions surrounding the organization of the modern city. [16]

As in Beirut, most duties of the Sarajevo city council, which ranged from collecting taxes and urban planning to sanitation and public health to facilitating spatial

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[16] Schorske, Fin-de-siècle Vienna, 27; Friedrich Lenger, European Cities in the Modern Era, 1850-1914 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012); for the issue of the urban governance and municipality in a comparative European context see Lenger’s entire fifth chapter 131-187; for an illuminating discussion of this issue in the Habsburg context see Judson, The Habsburg Empire.
security and market control, had serious lasting spatial consequences, as we shall see later. However, in the phases that immediately followed, the council became a major political player that facilitated a reconstruction of the entire city based on European models that included the creation of urban infrastructure and the implementation of urban and architectural regulations and ordinances.\(^{17}\)

Upon its initiation, one of the very first responsibilities of the council was to provide food and accommodations for the imperial troops.\(^{18}\) For instance, Muslim council members were asked to requisition local mosques to store military provisions and to annex private homes for housing imperial army officers.\(^{19}\) Following this, the military administration organized its different segments along the left bank of the Miljacka, moving into inherited Ottoman government buildings. As the head of the Landesregierung, General Philippovic moved into the Konak (residence) of the former Ottoman governor, while his troops occupied the large Medžidije barracks, also known as Kršla.

Despite these inevitable compromises, the Landesregierung’s prospective plan remained a complete reorganization of space. Before proceeding to an exploration of this point, however, it is necessary to include observations from the historical sources of the time, which described the built environment along with the condition and style of the local buildings used during the occupation. As with the architectural report of Edmund Stix, whose analysis and contextualization in the previous chapter shed light on ideological aspects of the early spatial intervention of the occupying power, the textual and visual sources also help us to

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\(^{17}\) Donia. Sarajevo: A Biography, 75
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
\(^{19}\) Ibid.
see the hidden political and ideological dimensions of the impending spatial reconfiguration as well.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, most government narratives of the time were constructed in an almost identical fashion as Stix’s report. However, one of the most comprehensive portrayals of the “found” (Ottoman) and “planned” (Austro-Hungarian) Bosnia-Herzegovina contains diverse sections, ranging from jurisprudence, political and governmental regulations to forestry, public health, and building administration; these are discussed in Ferdinand Schmid’s previously mentioned book.

When writing on local buildings as part of his evaluation of the state of construction administration in Bosnia prior to its occupation, Schmid noted that

Prior to the occupation, the prevalent structural conditions all over the country, even in the capital city of Sarajevo, were quite desolate. The private homes of the population were mostly built in extremely primitive ways and complied very little with the modern hygiene requirements. Under the Ottoman rule, the private constructions in the urban areas were almost exclusively about the production of simple residential and commercial buildings. Yet among them, there were only a few fireproof buildings that did not meet Western European standards and requirements. In the countryside, most houses were usually made with traditional dry stone masonry or on timber-framed walls and were covered with straw, reeds or boards.

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There are, understandably, not too many photographs originating from the year 1878 that would visually complement Schmid’s description. Instead, around that time, illustration magazines circulated widely across the European regions and served, in an equally powerful way, as a popular visual medium that informed Western European readers about the Balkan crisis, along with other global and local affairs.

Among the illustrations that directly depicted the Bosnian occupation scene, the works of J. J. Kirchner, one of the few soldier-painters who served as an officer in the Habsburg army during the Bosnian invasion, count as one of the most informative visual sources.

From the beginning of his stay in the occupied territory and until his departure few years later in the 1880s, Kirchner remained an active observer of his new environment and produced a series of illuminating sketches for the German magazine *Illustrirte Zeitung* under the title of *Die Occupation Bosniens: Architekturbilder aus Sarajevo* (The occupation of Bosnia: Architectural motives from Sarajevo), along with his 1879 illustrations that appeared in a collaborative work with the Austrian Orientalist and military officer Armand Schweiger von Lerchenfeld. These depicted not only the official, commercial, and private buildings of the city, but they also provided valuable information about other sites, including the Austrian and German consulates–edifices that signified the presence of the international political body that

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22. For a rare account of the history of photography in Bosnia during the Austro-Hungarian rule see Nikola Marušić, Fotografija u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918.
Figure 14. J. J. Kirchner's illustrations of Sarajevo

Figure 15. J. J. Kirchner’s illustrations of Sarajevo

watched out for the protections of the rights of the “suffering Christians” of Bosnia under the Turks. The physical outline of these buildings was rarely provided by any other visual sources.

Despite their simplicity, Kirchner’s sketches prove to be invaluable when considering the final phase of architectural practice under Ottoman rule. Equally important, however, is that Kirchner’s illustrations, which were mass-printed and widely disseminated through various illustrated magazines across Europe, created a discourse that sustained and justified the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What Schmid and Stix lamented in their evaluation of the condition of the Bosnian buildings was visually depicted in Kirchner’s sketches. The textual sources recorded the rhetorical commitment of the occupying power to reorganize the space, while the mass-printed sketches denoted the signs of arrival in an Oriental, exotic and uncertain place that was about to become part of a Western European empire. Both mediums (text and image) were regulated and unified by the same ideological regime. In what follows, I shall briefly explain how the complementary visual and textual rhetorics manifested the political discourse of the time.

At first glance, seen in isolation, Kirchner’s Bosnian architectural sketches appear as artistic expressions that were extracted from a typical 19th-century travel sketchbook whose purpose, beyond the personal, was to provide European readers with evocative images from Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, they instantly gain additional layers of meaning when contextualized within their matrix of production. In other words, and building upon Ali Behdad’s recent meditation on

“Orientalist Photography”, the simplicity of Kirchner’s sketches conceals “[t]he network of relations that enabled the production of these images in the first place as well as the politico-cultural context, which made them so rapaciously consumable as visual and exotic objects.”

Looking at Kirchner’s twenty pen drawings, printed in 1879 along with a text by his compatriot Orientalist, Armand Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, shared ideological scaffolding that regulated the work of both men is clear. By extension, the same can be asserted about other works of the time, including Ferdinand Schmid’s and Stix’s; they all were part of the same matrix of power (and hence production) and were unified through the same ideological framework.

Schmid, in line with what his predecessors such as Schweiger von Lerchenfeld had already observed, found nothing beyond a civilizational decline and prevailing poverty when surveying the Bosnian local architecture and assessing the aesthetic value of the inherited Ottoman buildings. However, when reading Schmid’s book, or for that matter all other texts of the time, it is clear that the true target of impeachment was the Ottoman administration of Bosnia and its legacy there. Certainly, what needed to be documented and affirmed, visually and textually vis-à-vis the civilizational encroachment of Austria-Hungary was a depiction of more than four centuries of Ottoman failure in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, while Schmid was perfectly aware of the late Ottoman modernization attempts

26. Ali Behdad, “The Orientalist Photograph,” in Photography’s Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation, ed. Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2013), 14; the essence of Behdad’s argument is built upon Foucault’s notion of “discursive regularities” which he explains by way of “describing the relations between disparate and diverse statements made by practitioners of a particular discourse such as medicine, grammar, and political economy, relations that are marked by particular rules of formation, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies that govern and unite them.” in Behdad, 11-32; see also Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 21-79.
Figure 16-18. Konak, Muslim House, Christian House as depicted by J. J. Kirchner.

(Tanzimat) in Bosnia, he nevertheless rendered them all as ideas whose failure was already preordained at the time of their inception. He wrote that

In fact already in 1863 the Ottoman government had adopted a construction and building law for the cities and larger markets of both provinces. Yet from the beginning this statute was not up to all modern standards and in fact remained, not unlike most other legislative actions of this regime, only a matter on paper.27

Similarly, he maintained, when writing on the condition and style of the Ottoman representative buildings:

The condition of the Ottoman administrative buildings was not much different. From the Governor's Residence (Konak) in Sarajevo to the smaller district office buildings, most of these structures were highly inflammable and the design—made partly of quarried stone, but mostly from timber-framed walls and unbaked mud-bricks—remained primitive, not having the necessary attributes of a representative building.28

Of course, as mentioned previously, part of the reason that all these documents argued for a rapid reorganization of space found their rationales in promoting economic development and modernization throughout the occupied territory. However, at least as important—and, perhaps more relevant to the current discussion—were the critical assessments of these sources regarding the style and design of the local buildings. Here, despite the fact that the aforementioned texts did not figure as the apex of the Austro-Hungarian scholarship on or surveying of the Ottoman architectural legacy in the Balkans, they still had a profound impact on shaping the mind of the people in the metropole regarding the Bosnian occupation. Of course, during the years that followed the invasion of 1878, systematic surveys and studies of both provinces

27. Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 525.
28. Ibid.
were initiated; however, this scholarship, which needs to be scrutinized in its own right, would not classify as mass-printed popular publications that were disseminated across the empire. The two aspects that rendered the governmental and popular printed sources (such as illustration magazines and travel literature) as distinctive were their mass production and their systematic circulation, which generated new ways of seeing and understanding the Balkan crisis.

The collaborative work of Schweiger von Lerchenfeld and J. J. Kirchner, *Bosnien In Bild und Wort* (Bosnia in Images and Words) was published only a few months after the invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, an Orientalist and military officer by training, travelled through Bosnia that same year and completed a book on the state of both provinces that set a precedent for his collaborative work with Kirchner.

Biased or not, he was familiar with the region, as he had been reporting on the Balkan crisis for years as a correspondent for several German papers such as the Augsburg magazine *Allgemeine Zeitung, Fremden-Blatt,* and *Neue Illustrierte Zeitung.* Later, during the 1880s, he became the editorial representative of the prominent German illustrated paper *Über Land und Meer.*

In point of fact, his 1879 Bosnian descriptions, adorned by Kirchner’s illustrations, embody the late 19th-century *Zeitgeist* when the European great powers started to compete in the Balkans in light of the deteriorating state of the Ottoman administration. For instance, when describing the physical and aesthetic conditions of the residence of the former Ottoman governor in Sarajevo, he drew an analogy between the

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condition of the former and the actual ways of the Ottoman governance in Bosnia:

Sarajevo, though regarded by Bosnians as a matter of pride, is a city that lacks substantial and larger buildings. At most, there are only a few dozen of the latter to be found here, which would include the two large barracks, some apartments of the Konsularcorps and the houses of several distinguished Mohammedans, and finally the Konak of the former Bosnian governor. Yet, none of these buildings, in fact, represents an attractive architectural style \((\text{ansprechende Bausthyle})\): the large barrack complex, situated next to the Konak, is a clumsy, bulky building that rises upon a space to which it is suited inadequately. And the former governor’s residence, the Konak, stands out, at most, only because of incorporating oddly an asymmetrically superimposed second floor, as well as through its large whitewashed and uncoordinated wall surfaces. That being the case, nevertheless, one can say that the outer surface of these structures, along with other similar Ottoman official buildings, may less insult the European eyes than the dirt and the truly Asiatic way of negligence regarding the interior space, where there is not a single undamaged wall, no stairs without alarming cracks and fractures, no window without broken panes. All the courtyards are filled with accumulated filth of years and garbage of all kinds. Of course, there are places that house the families of the Governors and are a bit cleaner than the rest, but this should not mislead one to expect even the most modest level of comfort or simple neatness from the local offices.\(^{31}\)

Kirchner’s accompanying illustration of Konak (see page 94), seen alone, would not necessarily reveal its political implications immediately. But when framed along with the above mentioned text, it becomes part and parcel of an ideological discourse whose purpose is to visualize the Ottoman administrative deficiencies in the occupied lands and to proclaim the end of the latter’s presence in Europe. When Schweiger von Lerchenfeld delineates the characteristics of a former Turkish local office, he aims to provide his readers

\(^{31}\). Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, \emph{Bosnien in Bild und Wort}, 51.
with a narrative of the failed and chaotic state of both the Ottoman administration and its architectural (spatial) organization. At the same time, he continues to declare both elements as parts of a past that shall never return:

Such place [local office], wherein everlastingly much is discussed and yet little implemented, has bare, unadorned walls underneath which long, low Divans run all around the room. The purpose of these Divans is to receive the members of the administrative commissions, functionaries, and all kinds of councils from among the pious local people. In fact, these Divans - the so-called "Minder-" are said to be the actual archives of the Turkish authorities, for whatever disappears beneath the seat cushion is deemed as a completed task, or rather is shelved as ad acta. […] Likewise with the Sarajevo local office's Divans, underneath which many of the finest government regulations and decrees have vanished. Yet, today, everybody knows of the fruits of such governmental conducts and hopes for that to remain, ad infinitum, a thing of the past. 32

The political motivations of Schweiger von Lerchenfeld narrative become even more tangible as his observations of the local architecture extends toward the Sarajevo's Serbian Orthodox church, completed a decade before the Austrian arrival and after Sultan Abdul Aziz, as part of the new Tanzimat, had granted a permit for its construction. In a book section called Die Serbische Kirche in Serajewo, he noted:

The beholder can hardly avoid the embarrassing impression that the architectural tastelessness of the Greek Orthodox Church evokes: narrow, high arched windows, inelegant tower roofs and a massive large tower-all fail to enliven this heavy awkward structure. And, one should bear in mind that such is the condition of the largest and most important Christian church to be found throughout Bosnia. 33

32. Ibid. 52.
33. Ibid. 43.
However, as before, he quickly locates the root cause of the malaise not in the capability of the church’s *Baumeister* (architect), but rather as a result of the former government’s rules and regulations:

Indeed, it is not the architect who should be blame for such monstrosity of taste, but rather the former Turkish governors, who maintained major reservation when considering the church towers’ height.\(^{34}\)

The real problem was, he argued, the Ottoman law that prohibited Christians from building towers more than fifteen feet high and consequently corrupting the balance and harmony that an elegant architectural proportion would require.\(^{35}\)

Here, the prominent political component of the Eastern Question, namely, the suggested centuries-long

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\(^{34}\) Ibid. 43.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
suffering of Christians in both provinces under Muslim rule, figures more sharply than in other parts of the text.

However, Sarajevo’s Serbian Orthodox Church was a direct outcome of the later stage of the Ottoman imperial reforms with its great emphasis on the rights of Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Edin Hajdarpasic has argued, in the 1850s-1870s, the most integral question of the Tanzimat that the Ottoman imperial reformers faced was redefining the political standing of Christians in Turkey—a task deemed critical to the future of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. However, while the earlier phase of the reform (the first half of the nineteenth century) still maintained restrictions on non-Muslims, “the new Tanzimat directives from 1853 onward consistently sanctioned and even encouraged the attempts of the Bosnian Catholic and Orthodox clergy to expand their ministerial activities, which were focused especially strongly on the construction of new churches and parish houses during the reform period.”

So, while during the eighteenth century neither the repair of existing monasteries or parishes nor the construction of new churches were permitted, starting in the 1850s, a series of new plots were purchased for prospective structures. In fact, the site of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Sarajevo was purchased in 1859, almost a decade prior to the completion of the church in 1868 and during the final years of the

reformist Ottoman governor of Bosnia, Topal Šerif Osman Pasha. During his administration, he not only acted as one of the protectors of the Ottoman Christians and their new churches, but also donated to Christian seminaries and schools. All of these acts were, as Hajdarpasic explains, to “[reinforce] the perception that [they] were a part of his reform policy.”

However, equally essential as and in fact parallel to the efforts of the reformist Ottoman governors were the rising anxiety of the local Bosnian Muslim notables. They feared a loss of privileges due to the rising presence of the churches and the new inclusionary policies that reinforced the position of the Christians in both provinces.

This point, in fact, has been quite frequently pointed out and explored through the case of the Sarajevo Orthodox Church, whose design and presence (height) instigated an infamous protest of a group of forty Muslims led by a Sarajevo imam named Salih Vilajetović. However, threats and vandalism against the church started well before its completion, when a dispute between the Orthodox community and the Muslim clergy broke out. The latter insisted that the church’s belfry should not exceed the height of the minaret of the Begova mosque. Yet, when the work of the bell tower was completed in the summer of 1872 and the threats and vandalism against the church continued, the reformist Ottoman governor ordered a new military commander with twelve hundred men to provide security for the church dedication.

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41. Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 34.
Despite knowing of the reform efforts of the Ottoman governor and his support of the Serbian church, Schweiger von Lerchenfeld nevertheless maintains his contention that

The scruple that highlights the last decade’s Ottoman Governors’ way of conduct is highly significant of the merit of all those so-called reforms which in vain proclaim to guarantee the equality of rights for all religious communities.\(^{42}\)

His observation did not represent a minority point of view, but rather was most widely circulated across Europe. In fact, concurrently with the establishment of the Great Powers’ consulates\(^{43}\) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in 1850 as part of the reform endeavors that aimed at the supervision of the condition of the Christians in both provinces, a proliferation of Western European journalistic work aimed to provide the European public with direct observations of the place. However, most of the time these observations maintained a consistent perspective and thus political position, and reproduced and confirmed each other in a circular way.

For instance, Schweiger von Lerchenfeld’s observation of the case of the Serbian church was an exact reproduction of what the Berlin journalist and writer, Franz Maurer, had written a few years earlier in 1870.\(^{44}\) Maurer, who was an editor of the well-known Berlin newspaper *Vossische Zeitung*, had travelled to Bosnia in

\(^{42}\) Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Bosnien in Bild und Wort*, 43.

\(^{43}\) The first European consulate to open was the Austrian consulate in 1850, which was followed with the French in 1853, Russian in 1857, Italian in 1862 and Prussian in 1864.

\(^{44}\) Franz Maurer, *Eine Reise durch Bosnien, die Saveländer und Ungarn* (Berlin: Heymann, 1870), 44-345; in addition to his Bosnian travel account, Franz Maurer (1831-1872) wrote another book in which he openly argued for a German colonization program; see *Die Nikobaren. Colonial-Geschichte und Beschreibung nebst motiviertem Vorschlage zur Colonisation dieser Inseln durch Preussen* (Berlin: Carl Heymann's, 1867); for a discussion on Maurer and German Colonialism see Arthur J. Knoll and Hermann J. Hiery, *The German Colonial Experience: Selected Documents on German Rule in Africa, China, and the Pacific 1884-1914* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2010).
1869 and stayed in Sarajevo as the guest of the Prussian consul, Dr. Otto Blau. In his book, in addition to writing about the historical and political issues of the time, he reflected, if not with great enthusiasm, on the condition of Bosnian cities and their layout and architecture. In Sarajevo, with the exception of a few old mosques, he argued that there is not a single building [t]hat, architecturally speaking, would not insult the aesthetic feeling of the delicate mind. And, the most notable case of the city, in this regard, is the Serbian Cathedral whose design manifests the barbaric tastelessness (barbarischer Geschmacklosigkeit) at its highest possible degree.\footnote{Maurer, Eine Reise durch Bosnien, 344.}

But like his successor Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, Maurer also proceeded to exonerate the “Serbian architect” along with the building owners for the “barbarischer Geschmacklosigkeit”, only to blame the “old Mohammedan regulations” that oppressed Christians and which would de facto remain in force until after the “sick man of Europe is once and for all buried.”\footnote{Ibid., 345.}

In the following part of his text, when writing on two other late Ottoman architectural projects, namely the Kršla (Barracks) and the Konak, the architect would no longer remain immune to Maurer’s aesthetic objections, as he addressed them directly:\footnote{Ibid., “Ein anderes architektonisches Ärgernis bildet die kolossale Kaserne, die aussen mit allerlei militärischen Emblemen bemalt oder richtiger angestrichen ist, nämlich mit Kanonen, Gewehren, Säbeln etc., grade so als ob ein Knabe hier seinem Geschmack und seinen Ideen hätte folgen dürfen. Vor der Front steht ein hoher Altan auf viereckigen Pfeilern, denen der einheimische Baukünstler tulpenartig geschweifte Capitäle gegeben und dieselbe Schablone, nur umgekehrt, auch zum Fuss der Pfeiler verwendet hat. In den Seitenflügeln fand ich im dritten Stockwerke Pferdeställe, die aber doch zur ebenen Erde ihren Eingang hatten, indem das Gebäude in einem hufeisenförmigen Thale steht, dessen Wänden man nicht dem Bau, sondern letzteren den Wänden accomodiert hat.”}

As a Western European observer, he regarded the composition of the horseshoe-shaped barracks as the result of the inexperienced and unsuccessful attempts...
of a “little boy” who had the urge to exercise his bad taste and artistic ideas. The exterior of the building was naively “painted” with all kinds of military emblem-guns, rifles, sabers, etc., while the entrance of the building, he chastised, gained its prominence through a large balcony (Altan) that stood over rectangular columns to which the “native architect” had added curly tulip-like capitals. The same template in reverse was applied to the base of the pillars.

Great confusion also surrounded the spatial organization of the barracks after Maurer reported horse-stables on the third floor of the side wing of the building. This perceived sense of disorder finally drove him to conclude that the barracks’ spatial logic was one that absurdly required an accommodation of the entire architecture to the walls and not, as common sense would dictate, the reverse. He then proceeded to sharpen his argument by turning his attention to the Ottoman governor’s residence—the Konak:48

While he promptly dismissed the “outlandish” (fremdartig) and “massive” impression of the earlier architectural works of the Ottomans, such as the Besiztan and the steam baths with their stone-domes (both depicted by J. J. Kirchner) as rather unaesthetic and poor, he condescendingly deemed the Konak, like all other structures of the new reform era, as reduced to a three-story building whose outline suggested an abortive imitation of European architectural styles. Prominently as such, he argued,

was the condition of the windows and their perfunctory arrangement, which revealed a complete lack of design conception. The fact that for the preparation of the windows the carpenter had to comply with the existing panes’ sizes, Maurer argued, resulted in truly poor frames that incorporated multiple panes of different sizes. Additionally, he noted, was a general indiscriminatory sense of space that had designed varying parts of the building, each indeed serving different purposes in the very same way, all perfectly resembling horse stables.

Maurer’s reflections on the aesthetic of the Konak’s façade, its window arrangement, and its spatial disorder, along with its “abortive imitation of European architectural styles”, epitomize the typical rhetoric of travelers to the Balkans during that century. In fact, in his book The Balkans, Mark Mazower has argued that these writers, who imagined themselves standing on a threshold between Europe and Asia, routinely commented on discovering “signs of European life,” such as “houses with glass windows.” “Balkan cities”, he writes, “are usually described as having a European façade behind which hides an oriental-meaning picturesque but dirty, smelly, wooden and unplanned reality.”

In point of fact, the frequent appearance of concepts such as “uncivilized,” “barbaric,” “backward,” “childlike,” “naïve,” “unaesthetic” or “unplanned,” as highlighted in the aforementioned writings of the time, indicates a perpetuation of the hegemonic discourse of culture and civilization, which in turn, as Wolfgang Müller-Funk argues, has always divided humans into two categories: one that is cultivated and civilized, and

the other that has to be civilized and cultivated. After all, if modernity means to be in the civilized state, then whatever remains outside of it is considered to be in a state of “self-inflicted immaturity” that perpetuates an uncivilized condition of backwardness. In accordance with Western modernity, these naïve “outsiders” resemble children whom one must teach the very standards of modern civilization.\footnote{Wolfgang Müller-Funk, “Polyphems Kinder: Kulturelle Irrfahrten zwischen Zentren und Peripherien,” in \textit{Zentren, Peripherien und kollektive Identitäten in Österreich-Ungarn}, ed. Endre Hárs, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Ursula Reber, and Clemens Ruthner (Tübingen und basel: Francke Verlag, 2006), 22.}

The narrative of progress, as propagated in the previously reviewed texts, automatically and inherently stigmatizes all non-Occidental cultures as primitive and backward. However, as Müller-Funk reminds his readers, both accounts of progress and of the conflict between the West and the rest of the world are two inseparable sides of the same modern drama. What seems to stand out here is a historical condition in which two groups or concepts are situated asymmetrically, but this sociopolitical and cultural constellation certainly has had its earlier historical forms, for “the historical world [...] operates for the most part with asymmetrical concepts that are unequally antithetical.”\footnote{Koselleck, \textit{Futures past}, 157.} For instance, the distinction between “civilized” and “primitive” clearly resembles other earlier asymmetrical counterconcepts such as Hellene and barbarian or Christian and heathen. In his essay “The Historical-Political semantics of Asymmetric counterconcepts”, Reinhart Koselleck has shown that the old Hellene and barbarian distinction, in fact, served as a precursor to the distinction between “civilized” and “primitive” people in the modern era. The essence of both conceptual constellations, however, is a manifested asymmetry that is “semantically based on [a]
Accordingly, it can be argued that what is being implied in all mentioned writers’ ‘interpretations’ of the Ottoman edifices is a demarcation of the realm of power and hegemony, as the “other” is being asymmetrically defined and framed. In other words, following the literary critic Terry Eagleton’s meditation on the confluence of art, ethics and ideology, what these “interpretations” signify is an entire apparatus of power that is considered the “aesthetic,” and which in turn determines the field of culture. Here, of course, the notion of “aesthetic” indicates a whole program of social, psychical and political reconstruction on the part of a dominant group. The “aesthetic” discourse that figures as ideology determines the political meaning and function of culture. Culture as such is a medium that consciously produces difference that in turn demarcates the border between self and other.

Following this, one can assume that what frustrated the European observers of Ottoman Bosnia is the absence of the familiar culture—the civilized “self” and facing an outlandish uncivilized “other.” Here it becomes clear that the notion of culture, as Fredric Jameson once infamously put it, stands for nothing but the very “idea of the other”.

In order to explore further the wider meaning of the above argument and to provide an accompanying and related picture, I would like to note an observation made by Sir Arthur Evans during his Bosnian stay, which took place around the final years of Ottoman rule.

52. Ibid., see especially the entire chapter “The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts,” 155-191.
Following his arrival at the English Consulate in Sarajevo, located on the left bank of Miljacka and not far from the Konak, Evans, who had intended to visit the English Consul, Sir William Holmes, recorded with great enthusiasm his immediate impressions upon leaving the “metropolis of fanaticism”\textsuperscript{55} and entering the safe “English home”:

[We] found ourselves, after our long course of roughing, once more among the comforts of an English home, and surrounded by the quiet of an English garden. Here, in this rich soil, under this Eastern sky, we saw for the first time in Bosnia our familiar flowers—roses, verbenas, and petunias, and others equally delicious—scenting the air, and making us realise \textit{what a paradise this land might become in civilized hands}. The Fruit trees—the stock of which Mr. Holmes, who has great horticultural taste, had imported from Malta—were weighed down with an exuberant crop of plums, peaches, greengages, and apples, each of which would have secured a prize at a show. […] Contrast with these the miserable plums, pears, and apples obtainable in the native markets of Sarajevo! The Bosnians show themselves absolutely incapable of pomiculture; they plant their fruit-trees almost as close together as cabbages, and expect them to thrive. Our Consul produced magnificent peaches by simply planting the miserable Bosnian substitute properly.\textsuperscript{56}

Evidently, Evans’ disturbance, which was due to the perceived disorderliness of Bosnian life, is inseparable from his simultaneous delight in finding refuge in a familiar English home. The source of both emotional experiences, however, is an expectation formed and dictated by the logic of a preexisting and recognizable pattern: namely, the familiar European order of things. He is indeed aware of the fact that the territory in which he finds himself is part of the European continent, but this only exacerbates his experience when encountering the ambiguous nature of the place: “in Europe yet of the Orient.” In fact, in

\textsuperscript{55} Evans, \textit{Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina}, 249.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 250-251; emphasis added.
an earlier section of his narrative marked as “Asia in Europe,” Evans describes his entering Bosnia as follows:

We [...] realise in what a new world we were. The Bosnians themselves speak of the other side of the Save [the river] as ‘Europe,’ and they are right; for to all intents and purposes a five minutes’ voyage transports you into Asia. Travelers who have seen the Turkish provinces of Syria, Armenia, or Egypt, when they enter Bosnia, are at once surprised at finding the familiar sights of Asia and Africa reproduced in a Province of European Turkey. 57

“Disorder spoils pattern,” writes Mary Douglas in her influential book Purity and Danger. Order, on the other hand, by way of being strongly linked with the notion of pattern, implies a sense of restriction where a limited selection has been made, and from all possible relations only a limited set has been used. In contrast to this constellation, Douglas points out, is disorder, which by implication is unlimited; no pattern has been realized in it yet, but its potential for patterning is indefinite. However, while disorder is destructive and is considered as a threat to existing patterns, it simultaneously has potential. 58 I will explain and contextualize Douglas’ points within the current discussion.

Implied in all reviewed interpretations, including those of Evans, is an assumption that frames Bosnia along with the rest of the Balkans as a historical and geographical fragment of a territorial order (hence, an established pattern) called Europe, from which it had been dissected unnaturally following the invasion and subsequent rule of the Asiatic Ottoman Turks. Consequently, these former European lands, so the assumption goes, were inflicted with a centuries-long

57. Ibid., 89.
sense of perpetual disorder due to the presence of “an alien substance” that was “embedded in the living flesh of Europe.”

Interestingly enough, however, it was thought that this “alien substance,” the source of disorder that had been perceived as a threat to the existing pattern for centuries, had to be eliminated by utilizing the potentiality embedded in the found disorder itself. As Mary Douglas explains, disorder’s potential for patterning is indefinite: disorder is an open state and hence “symbolizes both danger and power.”

In order to relate Douglas’s point to the present work, what is at stake for Evans is the creation of order out of Bosnian disorder and to hope “What a paradise this land might become in civilized hands”, as framed in his words when he reflects on the English Consul’s “garden of order” amid the threatening Bosnian fanaticism and disorder. Just as the uncivilized Bosnian plums could metamorphose into civilized ones, provided they are cultivated according to a European order, Evans, along with Maurer and all other contemporary observers, believed that the entire territory and its population had the potential to become civilized and once again European.

Indeed, the very same asymmetrically posited and hegemonic point of view (civilized self versus uncivilized other) formed and conditioned the rhetoric of the previously reviewed architectural descriptions as well. As noted before, most of these interpretations did not base their arguments on a close analysis of the Ottoman edifices and what they in their own context

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59. I have extracted this line from a quote by Sir John Marriott that Mark Mazower refers to within his discussion of the Eastern Question; for the original quote see Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, xl.
60. Douglas, Purity and Danger, 41; 95.
were and meant, and yet in all of them the notion of style and style assessment remains central.

Of course, what the architectural attributes and setting meant in their local context were seen as irrelevant, as the descriptions were built upon a comparative logic that propagated the superiority of a known point of view and pattern. This is not an insignificant matter, for style and its surrounding debates figure as important parts of the greater equation of culture. Style is, in fact, a concept whose very historical development within the discipline of art and architectural history perfectly corresponds with Terry Eagleton’s previously mentioned reflection on the “aesthetic” discourse. The concept of style, not unlike the aesthetic discourse, which stands as ideology and determines the political meaning and function of culture, “has always had a radically historical bias,” as Svetlana Alpers has observed.61

Though the discussion of style in the context of the Austro-Hungarian development in Sarajevo is an issue discussed in the following chapters, here I only want to briefly call to mind its key position in 19th-century European architectural history. For one, during the early decades of the century, the question of style had already become a fierce point of dispute amid practicing architects and historians. As regards German speaking Europe, in 1828, Heinrich Hübsch published his infamous fifty-page book, In welchem Style sollen wir bauen? (In which style should we build?), which manifested the crisis of the contemporary architectural style debate. This was the beginning of a generational break in which the young architects, mostly born around the turn of the century, moved away from their

61. For an excellent critical engagement with the concept of Style within the discipline of art history see Alpers, Svetlana, “Style is What You Make It: The Visual Arts Once Again” in The Concept of Style, ed. Berel Lang (Ithaca and London: Cornell University, 1987) 137-162.
teachers’ fundamental belief in the universal validity of the architectural canon of antiquity, searching for a style that would be an outward expression of their own epoch and spirit.\textsuperscript{62}

Additionally, this was a historical era when the question of style was inevitably shaped by rising national movements. As Barry Bergdoll explains, it was amid the historical and political transitions taking place in the 19\textsuperscript{th}-century, as the map of Europe was repeatedly redrawn, that architecture was called upon to serve as an ideological tool for building identity and reinforcing the claims to the naturalness of nation-states. So issues of style became matters of state politics, and architects thus spoke of a “battle of styles” across the continent.\textsuperscript{63}

But next to the entanglement of style with national politics in the 19\textsuperscript{th}-century, and particularly relevant to our discussion here, was the century’s extensive exploration of the relationship between systems of classification and the analysis of the objective world through the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{64} In other words, and not unlike the field of art history where categories were developed that supposedly served the interests of objectivity and freed the observer from any responsibility,\textsuperscript{65} a scientific classification and


\textsuperscript{63} Bergdoll, European architecture 1750-1890, see the entire chapter 5 “Nationalism and Stylistic Debates in Architecture,” 139-170.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{65} Alpers, "Style is What You Make It," 138.
ordering of architectural styles was established. It was hence not surprising that the eclecticism and the diversity of stylistic repertoire that historicism of the second half of the century offered to architects were greatly stimulated by increasing specialization and the scientific treatment of the world and history. As both archaeology and architectural history, which had by now developed into autonomous and rigorous disciplines, along with their scientific publications, started to exercise great influence on architectural style experimentation in Europe.

And so it was that an exploration of the architectural styles of other cultures was instigated. Needless to say, the implementation of the so-called “exotic” and “Oriental styles” in Europe was anything but new, yet what was indeed new was a greater scale of their application: if until then non-European styles appeared only amid the limited areas of, say, parks and green areas, in the nineteenth century they started to “emancipate themselves” and turned into inspirational sources for the creation of new styles.66

Notwithstanding this trend, a few points need to be highlighted here: firstly, as Stefan Koppelkamm has argued, the “exotic style,” despite its creative and inspirational power, remained a “second-class style” in Europe as it was seldom commissioned for any serious architectural tasks.67 The newly achieved creative freedom that enabled and encouraged architects to choose among diverse styles did not consider the equality of those styles’ status, as this was regulated by a convention that attributed to each style a quite

different aesthetic value.\textsuperscript{68} Clearly, the persistent emphasis on the very objective nature of the processes of studying, recording, and depicting unfamiliar cultures and styles impeded the underlying ideological preconceptions that formed those processes, including the designation of each style’s status.\textsuperscript{69}

Despite the so-called scientific treatment of the Oriental styles, their studies remained controversial and far from accurate as names, concepts, and geographies were interchangeably and indiscriminately used in mid-century publications. After the 1870s, however, this tendency decreased due to massive archaeological excavations and expanding trade in Oriental art, both of which had resulted in a series of exhibitions in Europe and hence cultivated a more thorough system of familiarization.\textsuperscript{70} Still, for decades to come a widespread inability to consider non-European cultures in their own rights not only influenced European attitudes towards these cultures but also conditioned assessment of their architectural value.\textsuperscript{71}

With regard to the appropriation of Islamic architectural styles by European architects, Koppelkamm has argued that their classification and valuation were inextricably linked to images and concepts that Europeans associated with the larger cultural context of Islam: the evaluation of Islamic styles was never purely about the style per se, but rather the culture as a whole.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{68} Koppelkamm, Der Imaginäre Orient, 20.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{70} Marchand, German Orientalism, 391.
\textsuperscript{71} Koppelkamm, Der Imaginäre Orient, 22–23; for an interesting and critical discussion of the display of Islamic Cultures at World’s fairs of the 19th century Europe see Zeynep Çelik, Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992).
\textsuperscript{72} Koppelkamm, Der Imaginäre Orient, 24.
Another important aspect that shaped the Europeans’ view was the impossibility of disregarding their own cultural benchmarks while experiencing an unfamiliar style. As a consequence, the observers would repeatedly seek familiar and trusted reference points and categories and then comparing these with the unfamiliar world with which they were confronted.\footnote{Ibid.} In other words, as soon as they failed to decode and to grasp the regularities imbedded in unfamiliar styles, their judgment, based as it was on a comparative logic that drew upon a familiar category or style, would relativize the unknown patterns and render them confused gibberish.\footnote{Ibid., 25.}

Interestingly enough, and as noted by Nasser Rabbat in a related context, the discrepancy that arose between the specific local context of Islamic style/art productions and the cultural context of the Western viewers, which served as a navigating tool while interpreting the unknown world of the “other”, paved the way for the hegemonic structure of Western art history to “discursively” control the intricate network of epistemological structures through which then, over time, the so-called category of “Islamic Art” evolved.\footnote{Nasser Rabbat, “Islamic Art at a Crossroads?” in Islamic Art and the Museum: Approaches to Art and Archeology of the Muslim World in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Junod Benoît, Georges Khalil, Stefan Weber and Gerhard Wolf (London: Saqi, 2012).}

It is important to note here that this prejudicial way of observing and evaluating an unknown style is neither an attitude that only objectifies the Islamic styles and patterns, nor a thing restricted to the West-East relationship; instead it is a psychological and subsequently political stance that figures whenever and wherever an asymmetrical axis of relating self to other emerges. For instance, in this context, Koppelkamm refers to the architectural observations of the French
Jesuit Le Comte, who was sent by Louis XIV to China. While visiting the imperial palaces in Peking, Le Comte noted bewilderedly how “bizarre” and “Gothic” they appeared to be. To emphasize the bizarreness of the palaces’ style, he referred to the familiar European style (category) of “Gothic”, which during that historical era and since the Renaissance had been deemed a “Barbarous style”.

Or, an even more striking case that problematizes the prevalent perceived dichotomy of Western imperialism versus non-Western subordination is, as Ussama Makdisi has shown in his work *Ottoman Orientalism*, “how Ottomans represented their own Arab periphery as an integral part of their engagement with, explicit resistance to, but also implicit acceptance of, Western representations of the indolent Ottoman East.”

Similarly, in an architectural historical reading of the very same issue, Zeynep Çelik challenges “the conventional bilateral axes of east-west and north-south,” as she demonstrates in her book *Empire, architecture, and the city: French-Ottoman encounters, 1830-1914*, describing how the Ottoman and French imperialism and civilizing missions (“race thinking”) coincided in the Arab territories of the empire.

Nor was this an experience that merely took place between Europeans and non-Europeans. Svetlana Alpers, for instance, draws our attention to the attitude of Italian art commentators in the sixteenth century who wrote: “they simply could not deal in their terms with the non-Italian art of northern Europe.” She then asks “how can one conduct study of all art with tools and assumptions developed in the service of one,” as she

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76. Ibid.
problematizes the limited and biased nature of the “terms” of the Italian point of view. To make her case, she then cites one of the best-known Italian accounts of Flemish art—a statement attributed by Francesco de Hollanda, a Portuguese writer, to Michelangelo:

The Flemish pictures please women, especially the old and very young ones, and also monks and nuns, and lastly men of the world who are not capable of understanding true harmony. In Flanders they paint, before all things, to render exactly and deceptively the outward appearance of things...Though the eye is agreeably impressed, these pictures have neither art nor reason; neither symmetry nor proportion... In short, this art is without power and without distinction... 79

This recounted assessment of the Flemish art signifies here, as Alpers reminds us, that the Italians did not realize that the North, too, was involved in the Renaissance and had developed its own artistic styles. Northern art was conceived as “an art for Women” which lacked all reason and proportion, and by implication contrasted the reasonable and well proportioned Italian art that suited Men. 80 And here, though within a strictly European context, we see yet again the crystallization of an asymmetrical framing of self and other.

The purpose of my arguments here has been to frame the observations of the aforementioned European commentators of the Ottoman edifices in Bosnia against the politico-cultural backdrop of their historical era. Stix, von Sax, Maurer, Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, Kirchner, and Schmid, all born during the nineteenth century in German-speaking Europe, were part of a generation that shaped and shared the collective cultural values of an era commensurate with the historical events of the 1860s-1870s. Naturally, these

80. Ibid., 151.
men’s Weltanschauung was inextricably informed by the political forces of the time such as the Eastern Question, along with the impending disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. By the same token and as discussed previously, their aesthetic evaluations of the Ottoman architectural environment never reflected a purely formalistic treatment of the question of style, and instead were an extension of their political and psychological positions vis-à-vis the culture of the Ottoman Empire and its presence in the European lands: civilized self opposing the uncivilized other. It is in this context that the ubiquitous application of evaluative and by implication asymmetrical concepts of “barbaric,” “childlike,” “unaesthetic” or “primitive” as applied by them to the inherited Ottoman traces in Bosnia are to be understood.

For instance, the highly narrow descriptions of the traditional wooden structures of the Bosnian urban and rural houses as reduced to “primitive” and desolate structures would categorically make no reference to their historical development in their Ottoman context. Despite the fact that the Ottoman wood technology was not very complex, its peculiarity was, as Maurice Cerasi has shown in his work The Formation of Ottoman House Types “that it did require skill and organization. Its techniques were not the simple building procedures..., which the house owners themselves could apply. Noteworthy were the use of standard sizes in materials and such refinements as the horizontal transposition of vertical struts to decrease static momentum on beams and to reduce the quantity of wood needed.”

In fact, these structural forms were deemed to be well suited to the Ottoman demands at the time for rapid settlement (urban growth). Interestingly enough, however, this trend would persist for a long period of time, despite frequent disastrous fires and the imperial *fermans* (orders) forbidding timber housings. The reason was, as Cerasi explains: “the Ottoman town form and wood-construction techniques developed together and completed each other. Deep psychological factors of settlement and home and a broad technological and ideological exchange among ethnic groups had rooted the technique in urban culture.”

Similarly, suspension of local historical relevance becomes even more evident when the observations are directed towards the representative buildings of the *Tanzimat* era. When Maurer described the new *Konak* as incorporating “an abortive imitation of European architectural styles,” he meant to underline the failure of and the shallowness of the whole modernization and Westernization attempts of the Ottoman Empire and used the architecture of the new *Konak* to exemplify his point. Yet was this new building, or for that matter all other *Tanzimat* structures in Sarajevo, purely the result of an “imitation” of European styles? Did Westernization, as implied by European observers, mean a complete interruption and abandonment of Ottoman historical references?

Answering these questions would indeed require a rather long discussion, if not a separate project, which goes well beyond the scope and focus of the present work. However, I intend to only briefly comment on few points in regard to the question of style in the late Ottoman era in order to accentuate the shortcomings (deliberate or otherwise) of the previously reviewed European

82. Ibid., 135.
writings of the time, and in turn to contrast these with alternative readings.

Borrowing and incorporating techniques and styles from other cultures (meaning non-Turkish) had a much longer tradition across the Ottoman territories than the Empire’s opening to Western influences in the eighteenth century. In fact, the long-lasting presence of “cultural syncretism”⁸³, that is, as Maurice Cerasi frames it, the capacity and will to exploit and combine the manpower, attitudes, and skills of the various tribes and ethnic groups of all Turkic-ruled states, had led the Ottomans for centuries to subjugate the crafts and techniques of their artisan subjects to a common design, both political and aesthetic. In this design they had learned to incorporate the most heterogeneous ideas and contents that came from all strata of urban society. This explains why most Ottoman art and architectural manifestations would traditionally refer to a striking variety of sources simultaneously.⁸⁴ It is precisely this very point that sheds light on the conflicted interpretations of Europeans of the origin of the Bosnian bridges.

It is noteworthy that although the Ottoman Empire’s urban civilization was not homogeneous, it was in the nature of its culture to melt into homogeneity some aspects of its manifestations, including a unitarian aesthetic and cultural ideology that would in turn accommodate the process of unification across its empire. However, despite the fact that Ottoman syncretism connected quite distant sources (Eastern and Western) that stood in sharp contrast to one another, it would be mistaken to consider this eclecticism;

instead, it is more appropriate, as Cerasi argues, to “interpret it as deliberate appropriation ... of all that might come in handy for the expression of a basically unitarian artistry or ideology.”

And yet the very paradoxical process of incorporating elements of extreme heterogeneity, which contrasted with the uniquely specific character that they expressed simultaneously, manifested the very culture of the empire. In other words, Ottoman syncretism was a widely used architectural procedure that incorporated and juxtaposed, montage-like, different elements from Persian, Central Asian to Greek and Byzantine or Western, and yet in the end, the overall feeling and expression it produced were truly Ottoman.

In order to gain a better understanding of the process of unification and architectural syncretism, however, we must look at the unique role and position of the empire’s master builders who played a great and key part in collecting, circulating, and incorporating different elements while creating new styles and patterns.

It was particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and as a response to urban population growth, that master-builder guilds became increasingly more involved in design and construction works across Ottoman towns. It was during the same centuries when that Balkan mason corporations, mostly originating in the Albanian area, started to establish whole dynasties of master builders who would design

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85. Ibid., 132.
86. Ibid., 133.
87. Maurice Cerasi explains that the design and construction responsibilities of all kinds of buildings in Ottoman urban culture were shared by two distinct category of crafts: one of the architect and the other of the master builder. While the architect was better integrated into and participated in official and well-defined organizations, the master builder belonged to a socially broader sphere and was involved in the corporations; see Cerasi, “Late Ottoman Architects and Master Builders,” 87-102.
public as well as private buildings throughout the empire.\textsuperscript{88} All of these builders “were organized as traveling confraternities of masons and carpenters, often belonging to the same family, town, or village... [who] had a secret language which extended from building nomenclature to everyday terms. The best-known companies worked over a vast territory, even as far as Cairo.”\textsuperscript{89}

Despite the fact that the majority of the master builders were illiterate, two distinct facts cultivated their crucial contributions to the stylistic and linguistic unification of the architectural types of the Ottoman town. Firstly, depending on the region from which they originated, they were influenced by different foreign trends: for instance, Central European if they were in Bulgaria or Macedonia, and Italian if from Epirus. Yet despite their great openness to foreign influence, the master builders remained “instinctively loyal to traditional culture.”\textsuperscript{90}

Another important fact was “the ease with which these builders borrowed techniques and style from other cultures... They were willing to learn from enemy, from the many European craftsmen and engineers employed in the Ottoman army... The multiethnic and multi regional composition of skilled labor recruited for the important building sites also favored the exchanges of styles, techniques, and skill... [which in the long run, too], stimulated the syncretism that characterized Ottoman culture in ... the first half of the nineteenth century.”\textsuperscript{91}

However, it needs to be emphasized once more that despite their openness to and absorption of foreign

\textsuperscript{88}. Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{89}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91}. Ibid., 90.
elements, the builders did not incorporate these indiscriminately in their creative work, and as a result Ottoman architecture, despite many borrowings from other sources, remained original and “part of a great urban civilization that formed a recognizable, long-lived, and meaningful entity from Bosnia to Syria. Regional differences were perceivable, but that part of the way of life that affects environment and architecture was overwhelmingly unitarian.” In the same context, the early assimilation of Western contributions needs be examined: assimilation indeed happened, but that did not lead to “the abdication of internal elements in favor of external ones.” Abdication and “clumsy imitations of European styles,” however, were events that would follow in the later decades of the nineteenth century.

Despite the process of syncretism, the reception of Western influence differed across the Ottoman territory. For instance, in predominantly conservative Bosnia or provincial Macedonia, areas where not only Western European elements but also those of Istanbul were regarded with great skepticism, structural works followed the fundamental concepts of earlier Ottoman town architecture. Nevertheless, at the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, few buildings in Sarajevo were truly representative of the Tanzimat era, whose design clearly incorporated elements of foreign (Western) influence. Naturally, these buildings were also the work of traveling master builders. However, when considering the first and the final three-story buildings of the Ottomans in Sarajevo, namely the Medžidija barracks, also known as Kršla, and the other new Konak built by the Bosnian vizier Topal Šerif Osman

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92. Ibid., 89.
93. For an interesting discussion of major architectural styles of 19th century Istanbul see Zeynep Çelik, The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of An Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993); see especially Çelik’s sixth chapter “Architectural Pluralism and the Search for a Style,” 75-154.
94. Cerasi, “Late Ottoman Architects and Master Builders,” 91.
Pasha, two different stages of application of Western architectural styles become visible.

In his 1956 study of the courts of the Bosnian governors, the eminent Bosnian historian Hamdija Kreševljaković argues that the Medžidija barracks, whose initiation had started almost fourteen years prior to the inception of the new Konak in 1867, was built on a site that originally housed the old Konak of the city.\(^95\) Initially, in 1827, the Bosnian vizier Abdurahim-paša had made a proposal to design a new Konak on the site,\(^96\) yet it took about a quarter of a century before the old and by now ruinous Konak was demolished, and building a military barracks complex on the site was pursued instead. However, the barracks’ design concept or what exactly the interior space or its façade had looked like are largely unclear because of the lack of historical evidence. At this point, texts such as Franz Maurer’s 1869 description of the Turkish barracks’ exterior and interior become invaluable sources. Putting aside Maurer’s degrading aesthetic judgments, such as the façade of the barracks being “painted by a little boy”, there are informative architectural details that can be extracted from his narrative.\(^97\)

In addition to its modern three-story height and volume, we learn about the horseshoe-shaped form of the building and its entrance that was adorned by a centrally posited balcony, which in turn stood over rectangular columns that had curly tulip-like capitals. In fact, all these elements are sufficient to suggest a deviation of the barracks’ design from the established traditional local architectural forms, while also


\(^{96}\) Ibid., 18.

\(^{97}\) Ibid., 20.
bringing to mind the eclectic architectural characteristics of the Empire Period\(^9^8\) that typically intermingled European Baroque and Neoclassical styles with traditional Ottoman architecture.\(^9^9\)

Despite the lack of historical sources regarding the Kršla, a rare and extremely valuable photograph taken by František Topič\(^1^0^0\), one of the Austro-Hungarian administration’s most prolific photographers, perfectly complements the above descriptions visually. The photo, which is part of the Topič collection\(^1^0^1\) at the archive of the Zemaljski muzej (National Museum) in Sarajevo, was published in the December 1902 issue\(^1^0^2\) of the famous Habsburg administration’s monthly illustrated magazine, Nada, juxtaposing the old Turkish barracks with the newly built Franz Josef garrisons that replaced the latter. The photograph of the new military complex depicted the recent collaborative work of the Czech-born and Vienna-trained architect Karel Pařík and Ludwig Huber which itself was an adaptation of the earlier work of another Habsburg architect, František Blažek.\(^1^0^3\) Though Pařík’s work will be discussed in the

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\(^9^8\) The Ottoman architectural style period that extended between 1807-1878.
\(^9^9\) An important Ottoman military barracks of that era is Istanbul’s Selimiye Barracks that was built by Kirkor Balyan. Cerasi writes of him as the first of the Armenian Balyan dynasty of imperial architects whose designs manifested a fine blend of Western and Ottoman elements; for additional discussion of the architecture of Balyan family see in Çelik, Zeynep, *The remaking of Istanbul*, 126-154.
\(^1^0^0\) František Topič (1867-1938) was a Czech photographer who worked for the Viennese print company C. Angerer und Göschl that served the Habsburg Imperial court. In 1885, Topič joined the Provincial Government in Sarajevo as a civil servant, assuming multiple tasks that included working as an archivist and librarian in addition to being the state’s main Photographer. See Marušić, *Fotografija u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918*, 52-56; Olga Lalević and Andrea Dautović, *Istraživački rad o Počecima Djelatnosti Bibliotekе Zemaljskog Muzeja u Sarajevo*, (Informatics Museological: Zagreb, 1988), 65-67; also, in 2007, the archive of the Zemaljski Muzej organized an exhibition about Topič work: Lebiba Đeko, Sarajevo Između Dvije Carevine. Fotografije Františka Topiča iz Perioda 1885-1919. (Sarajevo: Foto arhiv Zemaljski muzej Bosne i Hercegovine, April 2007).
\(^1^0^1\) Topič documented all possible aspects of life (architectural, geological, craft, folklore, sport, etc.) during the Habsburg administration of Bosnia. According to the archive of the Zemaljski Muzej in Sarajevo, there are over 5000 images credited to Topič.
\(^1^0^2\) *Nada*, U Sarajevu, 1. decembra 1902, Broj 23. God VIII, Strana 320-21; Library Archive of Zemaljski Muzej, Sarajevo, BiH.
\(^1^0^3\) Topič’s photograph of the old Turkish barracks is marked as *Stara Filipovićevo Vojarna*, which indicates how the complex was called immediately after the occupation, while the other photo is labelled as: *Nova vojarna Franje Josipa I.* (Sagragjena na mjestu vojarine), denoting the replacement of and the re-naming of the old Filipović building with the new Franz Josef I Barracks.
Figure 20. Old Ottoman barracks, Kršla
Source: Nada, U Sarajevu, 1. decembra 1902, Broj 23. God VIII, Strana 320-21; Library Archive of Zemaljski Muzej, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Figure 21. Franz Josef garrisons
Source: Nada, U Sarajevu, 1. decembra 1902, Broj 23. God VIII, Strana 320-21; Library Archive of Zemaljski Muzej, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
next part of my project, the focus here remains on the final Tanzimat projects in Sarajevo. Given the lack of substantial historical evidence, an exploration of the architect of the barracks himself reveals additional interesting facts.

The construction of the Kršla, according to several historical accounts\(^\text{104}\), has been attributed to the great Veles-born master builder Andrea Damjanov (1813-1878), who was part of an infamous Macedonian family of fresco painters and builders. The Damianovs that originated from the old Renzovski family were builders of churches, mosques, houses, konaks, and clocktowers, not only in the most important Macedonian towns, but also throughout the greater territory of the Balkans.\(^\text{105}\) Andrea, who along with his tajf (team) had built a large number of Orthodox churches in Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the nineteenth century and gained a great reputation for his artistic performances, had been commissioned by the Serbian community of Sarajevo to build the Orthodox church of the city. Sometime during his work on the Serbian church, he also became involved with designing a new


All of the above sources, including the work of the Yugoslav Ethnologist Milenko Filipović, maintain that the Kršla was the work of A. Damjanov. I have found only one account that argues otherwise and attributes the work to a “Vezenković,” whose work and person I have not been able to locate within any other historical sources so far; for this see Krvocić, Arhitektura secesije u Bosni i Hercegovini, 90-91.

\(^{105}\) Filipović, “Andreja Damjanović,” 33; see also Cerasi’s discussion of the Damianov Master-Builder family in Cerasi, “Late Ottoman Architects and Master Builders,” 89.
military barracks for the Bosnian governor, Topal Šerif Osman Pasha.106

Notwithstanding all the European aesthetic objections to the barracks, Milenko Filipović relates how the work in fact received much appreciation from the Turkish Sultan, who even gave Damianov the honorable right of wearing a sword.107 The incident underlines how differently the building was understood and appreciated in its traditional context.

However, when considering the design of the barracks or of the Orthodox church, another important fact is the way in which Andrea Damianov, like other Bulgarian and Macedonian builders of the Ottoman Empire, was influenced by Central European architectural trends. Like many other Vienna-oriented architects of the time, his architectural ideas were specifically shaped by the neoclassical and historicist teachings of the Danish-Austrian architect, Theophil von Hansen (1813-1891), whose many works would appear along Vienna’s infamous Ringstrasse.108 Since the early forties and throughout the mid-century, Hansen, a distinguished professor at the University of Vienna, had been an advocate of the Byzantine-Romanesque and Neo-Byzantine style movements.109

106. Filipović, “Andreja Damjanović.” The exact date of the beginning of the construction of the barracks is not known to me. However, sources inform us that the church was under construction between 1863-1868 and considering the 1861-1869 reign of Topal Šerif Osman Pasha we can assume that the barracks were built sometime during the early phase of the church construction. However, in the 1902 issue of Nada magazine, we learn that the barracks were initiated sometime in early 1850s during the time of Omar-paša Latas. This date also corresponds with Hamdija Kreševljaković suggestion.
108. Mladenović, Građansko slikarstvo, 17.
109. A comprehensive study of Hansen is Renate Wagner-Rieger and Mara Reissberger, Theophil von Hansen (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980); for an interesting and provocative example of Hansen’s Neo-byzantine advocacy and his involvement in the building process of modern Athens, where the politics of the day directly formed, dictated and re-formulated the style of much of the buildings, see Eleni Bastéa, The Creation of Modern Athens: Planning the Myth (Cambridge University Press, 2000), see especially her sixth chapter “Building the Capital,” 146-179.
However, a closer look at the neoclassical design of Damianov’s Serbian Orthodox church, with its three-aisle basilica along with its five Neo-byzantine domes and its large dominant baroque-style belfry, indicates an amalgamated style that includes, along with Central European influences, elements of the Serbian Orthodox urban churches of the Ottoman territory. This highlights Damianov’s massive involvement in constructing churches for the Orthodox communities of the Ottoman Empire, including pre-independent Serbia.

This point, then, from two perspectives, shed light on the great resentment of European commentators as they described the Orthodox church of Sarajevo. For one, throughout their texts the observers referred to the humiliation of the Bosnian Christians at the hands of their Turkish ruler as being manifested in the sorrowful design of the new Serbian Orthodox church. However, this provides only a partial explanation regarding the assessments of the style of the church. Another equally crucial fact, and one not unrelated to the Eastern Question, was the Western Europeans’ problematic relationship with the Eastern Orthodox Church itself and its religious, cultural, and political affiliation with Russia.

With respect to Austria-Hungary, as Matthew Rampley has pointed out, the difference between Catholicism and

110. Mladenović, Gradansko slikarstvo, 17.
111. Aleksandar Kadijević, Jedan vek traženja nacionalnog stila u srpskoj arhitekturi: sredina XIX-sredina XX veka. 2 izd (Beograd: Građevinska knjiga, 2007); see also a recent (published online) work by Kadijević that discusses the diversity of styles that was imbedded in the work of Andreja Damjanov: http://www.academia.edu/21409587/Mixture_of_Styles_and_Civilizations_in_the_Ecclesiastical_Architecture_of_Andreja_Damjanov_in_Balkanic_Regions_under_Turkish_Rule_in_XV_Turk_Tarih_Kongresi_4.Cilt_4.Kisim_Ankara_2010_2125-2135.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. In fact, Arthur Evans’ account of the Serbian Orthodox church in Sarajevo—“built in the usual bastard Byzantine taste”—is an excellent case that illuminates both political aspects mentioned above: Ottoman presence and Russian expansionism, see Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina, 247-248.
Orthodoxy functioned as a cultural and political boundary that demarcated the realm of rivalry with Russia over influence in the Balkans. However, depending on the greater political interest of the time, the conflict was approached differently. For instance, when in the newly independent states of Serbia, Greece, Romania or Bulgaria, “the minaret-dominated skyline of Ottoman cities was replaced with the new contours of bell-towers and Neo-Classical and Neo-Byzantine domes”, then the substitution of the mosques with the new Orthodox churches were interpreted and celebrated as “the reconquest of Christianity over Islam.”

Of course, the same complex ideological and political constellations shaped the way the Byzantine style was perceived in Austria. Important in this regard is that there, Neo-Byzantine architecture was frequently indistinguishable from other eclectic styles of the time such as Moorish and Romanesque. However, accentuating the very differentiation of these styles was a major concern of the state, as Rampley refers to Rudolf von Eitelberger who argued: “Among the confusions that frequently appear in archaeological reports in Austria, none is as important as the confusion of Byzantine with Romanesque.”

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114. Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History, 167; for more on this division see Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 1994.
116. For an interesting discussion of the treatments of the Byzantine style see Rampley’s eighth chapter “Between East and West” in Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History, 166-185.
The reason for his concern, Eitelberger argued, was that while Romanesque architecture constituted the beginning of a new epoch, the Byzantine style represented a “decline in artistic spirit, explicable by the general decline in culture.” In other words, what is implied in Eitelberger’s statement is a contrast between the “cultural decline” of the Mediterranean with the “emergent Germanic people.” Rampley elaborates that Eitelberger considered “the difference emblematic of the axis between East and West, for “Byzantine points toward the Orient, Romanesque toward the West.”

Additionally, another political aspect at that time was “the interplay of politics and confessional affiliation”, which led Eitelberger to maintain that the Orthodox Church was “an instrument of Russian foreign policy” and had therefore to be countered. He argued “the connection between the Greek Church and Russian diplomacy in the Orient is a matter of notoriety, and its centuries-old hostility toward the Catholic Church has only increased in recent times.”

It was against this political backdrop of Ottoman suppression of Christians and the threat of Russian expansionism that the presence of the Sarajevo Serbian Orthodox church was interpreted. From the very beginning, multiple political players left their imprint on the actual construction of this building. After the foundations of the church were laid on June 15, 1863, in order to secure the cost of the construction, 36000 ducats had to be collected. In addition to the major contributions of Sarajevo Serbian merchants, especially that of Manojlo Jeftanović (1781-1878), whose money helped to cover the dome of

118. Rampley, The Vienna School of Art History, 170.
119. Ibid., 170-171.
120. Ibid., 170-171.
the church with lead, both Sultan Abdülaziz and Prince Mihailo Obrenović of Serbia each donated 500 ducats toward the completion of the building. Many Serbs from Belgrade, Vienna, Trieste, and Dubrovnik also provided financial help.\textsuperscript{121}

However, a major part of the cost was funded through Russian donations collected by the Metropolitan Sava Kosanović, who had been traveling from Bosnia to Russia for that very purpose.\textsuperscript{122} In fact, most of the church furnishings and ritual objects were donated by the orthodox Russians, while the icons of the church were given as gifts by the family of the Russian Tsar Alexander II, who further sent Russian craftsmen to Sarajevo to create the iconostasis locally. The icons themselves, however, were painted in the most important religious center of Russian Orthodoxy, the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius—a place where Andrei Rublev, the great and legendary medieval Russian painter of Orthodox icons and frescos, had created his works.\textsuperscript{123}

As discussed so far, multiple political aspects shaped the narrative of both the practice of architecture and its interpretation. European commentaries on Ottoman projects were as much embedded in Realpolitik as the architectural representations of these buildings from the side of the Ottoman administration of Bosnia. Both empires perceived the built environment as a medium that would signify and advance their political ideals and interests. And so it was that during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new set of political agendas and belongings had to be inscribed on space, while slowly eliminating the old Ottoman regimes of representation.

\textsuperscript{121}. Mladenović, Građansko slikarstvo, 17-18.
\textsuperscript{122}. Okey. Taming Balkan nationalism, 12.
\textsuperscript{123}. Mladenović, Građansko slikarstvo, 17.
One striking point about the new Franz Josef garrisons, whose design demonstrated a strong adherence to then-prevalent principles of pure historicism, was the fact that its architect, Karel Pařík, like the old barracks’ Ottoman master builder Andrea Damjanov, was a devoted follower and student of Theophil von Hansen. Both architects shared the aesthetic sensibilities of their epoch, yet simultaneously were in charge of responding to the demands and dictations of the greater political sphere in which they were subsumed. This is an illuminating point that frames well the intimacy of the political and aesthetic interests that existed between the two rival empires.

However, when the Habsburg administration’s magazine Nada juxtaposed František Topič’ photographs of Sarajevo’s old (Damjanov) and new (Pařík) barracks, it went on to announce the completion of the latter as being “the real glory of the capital” (Koja je pravi ures glavnoga) and a major achievement of the Landesregierung’s construction division, which was headed by Edmund Stix. Needless to say, the “glory” of Pařík’s new building transcended the purely formalistic achievement of a successful architectural practice, as it framed and promulgated through architecture Bosnia’s integration into the Habsburg Empire.

A major reorganization of Ottoman space began to unfold according to the political and aesthetic demands of the new occupying power. However, there were also serious and pressing logistic concerns at work, especially the need for housing. In terms of the growing number of the empire’s bureaucrats and military officers, who were rapidly moving from across the monarchy into the

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124 Nada, U Sarajevu, 1. decembra 1902, Broj 23. God VIII, Strana 320-21; Library Archive of Zemaljski Muzej, Sarajevo, BiH.
provinces, there was an urgent need for a fast solution to the problem of housing shortage.

Despite this fact, the early construction process maintained a conspicuously sluggish pace, and the urban transformation was anything but smooth. Indeed, Edmund Stix’s 1887 report testifies that within the first few years of the administration between 1878-1880, there were in fact very few opportunities for private construction activities (private Bautätigkeit) in Sarajevo or the rest of the occupied territory. There were many obstacles and setbacks; in addition to a shortage of qualified native construction workers, Stix argued, the most important complication in regard to growth and building in Sarajevo was a great fire that occurred on August 8, 1879.\textsuperscript{125}

The fire, which happened during the initial stage of the administration, destroyed more than half of the capital city within a few hours and meant that no urban and architectural development could begin prior to the initiation of urban and building regulations.\textsuperscript{126} Preventive measures had to be taken in order to stimulate growth and building, along with finding reliable investors. The process of regulation had to be executed in three ways: firstly, the most principal task was to establish an adequate and appropriate bureaucratic body in accordance with Western European standards that would monitor all spatial projects.\textsuperscript{127} Furthermore, all activities were to be based on a set of legal regulations that concerned all aspects of the building industry and that was developed in compliance with Austrian building legislation.\textsuperscript{128} Finally, there was the crucial question of land regulation, which

\textsuperscript{125} Stix, Das Bauwesen, 103; also see Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 526.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 527.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 530; Stix, Das Bauwesen, 103.
included important interconnected issues such as land ownership, land reform, and taxation, whose ordering could not advance without the prior completion of a precise cadastre.

Although the early phase of the new administration did not promote a building boom in the occupied lands, the initiation of these regulatory steps nevertheless provided a solid foundation for the spatial activities of the following decades. Above all, their implementation facilitated pivotal changes in spatial relationships, as new forms of architectural practices, new types of legal and technical monitoring of those practices, and new forms of property ownership emerged.

Regulation meant securing and promoting the growth of the city and optimizing building practices. But most importantly, these regulations were meant to eliminate the disorderliness of the former Turkish space. As one government report recorded, “the beginning of the Austrian occupation marked the ending of the final epoch of an architectural history of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which creations (Schöpfungen) were described as inferior.”

In order to meet the requirements of this comprehensive task, it was mandatory to first organize a monitoring construction authority (Baubehörde) based on the Western European model. This controlling bureaucratic unit was to be supervised directly by the Joint Ministry of Finance in Vienna, which was also in charge of approving all necessary construction funds, granting permissions (Genehmigung) for building applications (Bauanträge), and setting up each year’s construction program.

130. Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 527.
While the ultimate power of regulation remained in the hands of the Joint Ministry in Vienna, at the local level the Landesregierung, working closely with two lower administrative authorities (Unterbehörden), namely regional authorities (Kreisbehörden) and district authorities (Bezirksamter), was responsible for site supervision and the detailed and precise execution of projects whose approvals had already been granted by Vienna.\textsuperscript{131}

The organization of both of these lower administrative authorities corresponded to the smaller spatial units of Kreis and Bezirk, as discussed in the previous chapter. While the main task of the Kreisbehörden focused predominantly on the executive matters of construction administration and made decisions about the deliveries of the building inspectorate regulations (baupolizeilichen Vorschriften), the Bezirksamter served as the responsible construction supervisor for all prospective projects. One exception was the capital city of Sarajevo, where the management of the building inspectorate regulations fell strictly within the scope of the municipality’s (Magistrat) responsibilities, which worked closely with the aforementioned city council.\textsuperscript{132}

With regard to spatial regulations, a few months after the fire, on May 14, 1880, the first official urban and building ordinance (Bauordnung) was authorized, which was based upon the existing Ottoman Street and Building Regulation of 1863 (Straßen und Bautengesetz von 7. Džemaziul-evel 1280) that had been installed in Sarajevo since the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms. However, more than a decade later in 1893, a new Bauordnung was introduced that retained much of the

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 528.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
initial 1880 ordinance, but incorporated a larger part of the city and had a more extensive agenda.\footnote{Sammlung der für Bosniyen und die Hercegovina erlassenen Gesetze, Verordnungen und Normalweisungen, 1878-1880, I Band, Allgemeiner Teil – Politische Verwaltung (Wein: K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1880); Bau-Ordnung für die Landeshauptstadt Sarajevo, in Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Bosniyen und die Hercegovina, Jahrgang 1893 (Sarajevo: Landesdruckerei), 410-435.}

One point that needs to be mentioned here, however, is that the Ottoman Street and Building Regulation of 1863 itself had its origin in the ideas of the Prussian field marshal and planner Helmuth von Moltke. Already in 1839, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, one of the main advocates of Ottoman government reforms, had hired von Moltke to improve Istanbul’s street-network immediately following the declaration of the Tanzimat Charter and to design a plan of the city.\footnote{Çelik, The Remaking of Istanbul, 49-50.} Despite the fact that von Moltke’s plan was never implemented, his ideas, as Zeynep Çelik has argued, would later become the essence of the following urban and building regulations that would emerge at different stages of the Ottoman administration.\footnote{Ibid., 51.}

This in fact is an interesting point that completes the previous discussion of the treatment of Ottoman styles by European commentators and highlights the politics of the latter regarding the Ottoman Tanzimat urban regulations. Despite the fact that some elements of the modern urban planning and organization had already appeared in Bosnia during the final years of Ottoman rule, in the eyes of Austro-Hungarian officials, Ottoman regulations were signs of pure arbitrariness (reinste Willkür).\footnote{Schmid, Bosniyen und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 530.} However, as already mentioned, the problem did not lie in the logic of regulations per se, as these were of European origin in any case and could be easily adopted; rather it was the “ Asiatic nature”
of the former rulers of Bosnia that had hindered urban modernization.

Given the tremendous importance of monitoring the practice of law as part of “good governance,” on October 1, 1880 the Joint Ministry in Vienna released a decree (Nr. 22099) that commissioned the Landesregierung in Sarajevo to constitute the structure of a responsible building authority (Baubehörde). Following this, the city council (Stadtgemeinde) was to serve as the building authority, while the Municipality (Stadtmagistrat) was entrusted with the task of managing the practice of the building regulations. However, taking into account the provisionally organized state of the current municipality, which conspicuously lacked qualified civil servants, the decree furthermore announced the chief police of Sarajevo, Heinrich Ritter von Alpi, as the ultimate supervisor of all matters related to the Baubehörde.

Of course, this was a temporary solution, since by 1882 the structure of the building authority would slowly start transforming into a rigorous bureaucratic entity that employed many hundreds of civil servants and engineering officers. A few years later, under the leadership of Edmund Stix as its first Sections-Chef (Head), it would act as a sovereign multilayered bureaucratic division called the Bau-Departement (Construction Division) that consisted of two main offices of building construction (Hochbau) and of road construction and hydraulic engineering (Straßen- und Wasserbau).

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138. Ibid., 283.
Regarding the urban and building ordinance (Bauordnung), most of the regulatory norms and guidelines were identical with Austrian building legislation. All building steps, including the mandatory acquisition of a building permit for any prospective project, the strict application of a legally appropriate method of construction and building materials, or the absolute submission to building lines for any new construction, had to follow these rules. In fact, the 1880 Bauordnung consisted of a set of eighty-two legal paragraphs (§§) that partially incorporated and modified the forty-nine Ottoman law sections of 1863 that were initially adopted by the new administration. While a comprehensive discussion of all eighty-two paragraphs is beyond the scope and intention of this work, the point is to highlight their significant impact on space and spatial practices.

Although the main purpose of the Bauordnung’s detailed and precisely defined paragraphs was to reduce the threat of future catastrophes such as fire and flood, and to optimize and promote thriving urban and economic growth based on the latest principles of modern and scientific urban planning, their implementation nevertheless caused immediate great complications for the local residents and the arriving members of the new regime alike.

When the great fire of August 1879 happened in Sarajevo, 304 houses along with 434 shops and 135 other structures across an area of 36 streets burned down, while more than 10000 urban residents became homeless overnight. However, the destruction was much larger than that, as four mosques, one Catholic church, and the city’s synagogue, along with the German consulate

(sketched by J. J. Kirchner), the Tašlihan, and the Đulov han were all destroyed. Following the fire, any form of architectural practice, from demolishing or rebuilding the ruinous structures to constructing new ones, had to follow the principles of the initiated Bauordnung.

The immediate effect of this new modern order on the process of rebuilding, was anything but productive, as in reality its implementation caused a tremendous sense of insecurity and anxiety among the local residents who, for the very first time, were subject to a fundamentally different set of legal rules. Their reaction in turn became a serious impediment to the provision of housing for the army and the arriving members of the new administration, as they showed a clear reluctance to accommodate the building process.

Notwithstanding the peculiarity of the Bosnian case, reminiscent of other colonial cities’ initiation into modern urban life, it is noteworthy to consider its similarity to different European cities in the late nineteenth century, where the implementation of modern European urban regulations and administrative modernization led to great public fear and discontent.

For instance, Elitza Stanoeva has shown that when Sofia became the capital of the Bulgarian nation-state in 1879 after its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the process of its urban development served as a politically loaded project to Europeanize this former Ottoman town. She explains that under the supervision of a Russian Provisional Administration that controlled the newly founded City Council of Sofia, an urban

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140. Hamdija Kreševljaković, Sarajevo za Vrijeme Austrougarske Uprave, 24; Mehmed Bublin, Sarajevo Throughout the History: From the Neolithic Settlement to a Metropolis (Sarajevo: Buybook, 2008), 112.
141. Stix, Das Bauwesen, 103; also see Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, 526.
modernization and redevelopment plan was initiated based on European regulatory models. However, as Stanoeva explains, the plan was not smoothly accomplished, as it encountered serious local resistance. "The foreign architects approach to the arrangement of the built environment in Sofia relied on the direct borrowing of European models that evolved under...different historical conditions and ...traditions of urban life quite alien within the Bulgarian context." However, it is important to keep in mind that the disquieting receptions of modern urban regulations in Sarajevo and Sofia were not unique to these transitory geographies that were in the process of re-Europeanization, but rather at the heart of the common experience of urban modernity that occurred across Europe, their colonies, and beyond.

Walter Benjamin’s reflection on Haussmann’s public works in Paris of the middle of the nineteenth century and on the consequent transformation of the city, both of which he famously framed as “the phantasmagoria of civilization itself,” is a prime example of this modern phenomenon. In his essay “Paris – Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” Benjamin pointedly described the alienating impact of Haussmann’s modern urban projects on the lives of Parisians who were utterly estranged from their city and “no longer [felt] at home there, and [started] to become conscious of the inhuman character of the metropolis.”

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143. Ibid., 94.
146. Ibid., 12.
Of course, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Parisian experience would appear in different forms and intensity across varying regions of the world. Although different in some aspects from Haussmann’s Paris, the transformation of Vienna under Franz Josef in the middle of the nineteenth century was also celebrated as a model of urban modernization.\(^{147}\) Similar to the Parisian experience, its notorious Ringstrasse was not just an urban beautification project that glorified and represented the cultural values of the bourgeoisie, since its modern aesthetic and architectural accomplishments made visible the desperate plight of the same city’s masses and the working class at the same time.\(^{148}\)

Furthermore, with regard to other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, for instance, Nathaniel Wood’s interesting recent work on Cracow’s process of becoming a modern metropolitan and thus entering “European civilization”, is an appropriate case in point of an experience of urban modernity shared equally by European and non-European settings.\(^{149}\)

In regard to Sarajevo, different sources inform us of persistent local reservations and discontent regarding the new building regulations and of how the new administration’s effort to counteract this trend was unsuccessful. For instance, five years after the initiation of the 1880 Bauordnung, an article in the


\(^{148}\) For an excellent discussion on the duality of Vienna’s urban transformation see Wolfgang Maderthanser and Lutz Musner, *Unruly Masses: The Other Side of Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); see also Schorske’s chapter “Ringstrasse, Its Critics, and the Birth of Urban Modernism” in Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna*, 24-115.

Bosnische Post, a paper sponsored and published by the Landesregierung in Sarajevo between 1884-1918, wrote:\textsuperscript{150}

Clearly, even in the eyes of the new government’s functionaries, the enforcement of the Bauordnung was deemed a daring venture, given that this emerged in the immediate aftermath of the great fire when the affected residents, whose possessions were all burned to ashes, had to find ways to build new homes. Because of this conspicuously vulnerable situation, the new administration had to take necessary measures regarding the implementation of the Bauordnung and to exclude, at least at this initial stage, a large area of Sarajevo located on the right bank of the Miljacka that was severely hindered by the stringent provisions of the new urban and building regulations.

The paper went on to argue that the postponement of a comprehensive application of the new regulations to the entire urban area in 1880 was an absolutely crucial step toward accommodating the process of urban redevelopment. It was hoped that this temporary suspension provided a time gap during which the conservative and anxious local population could be convinced that all these modern regulatory measures were in fact created in their own interests. But then again, the paper, writing in 1885, provocatively asked if this very moment of conviction had finally arrived in Sarajevo, identifying the ongoing dilemma even five years after the initiation of the Bauordnung.

In fact, the legal paragraphs whose application to the burnt area was considered difficult and was pointed to in the Bosnische Post article (especially §40, which established that all public, residential and commercial buildings had to be constructed in stone or fire-bricks

\textsuperscript{150} “Bauten und Bauordnung in Sarajevo,” Bosnische Post, Sarajevo II, 1885, 26.VII, Nr. 60. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek – Archiv (ÖNB-Archiv)
while their roofs had to be covered with fireproofed materials, and further required that all buildings had to be separated from each other in a fireproofed manner) were later complemented by a series of exception clauses whose purpose was to ease the process of urban redevelopment.\textsuperscript{151}

During the first decade of the occupation, a wave of building projects convulsed the entire city. If we look at the Sarajevo Appel-quai postcard (Figure 22) from the next page, which originates from the late nineteenth century, we get a strong sense of how the process of rebuilding must have turned the entire city into a vast labor-consuming construction that would last for many years. In fact, the postcard deliberately juxtaposes the inherited Oriental, picturesque, and messy Ottoman town situated on the left bank with the well organized structure of the right bank, vividly framing the fast-moving and dynamic qualities of an emerging modern city. It is this palpable contrast that testifies to the high level of intensity involved in the transformation of this former Ottoman town into a modern European city. But before we move on to a further discussion of this initial spatial re-organization, a few more points need to be raised.

As indicated in the second part of the Bosnische Post article, the part of the city that posed a significant challenge to the process of urban modernization was the flat area along the banks of the Miljacka at the bottom of the valley. This area, adjacent to the heart of the Čaršija (Market) and the historic urban core, was located along an axis stretching from east to west that demarcated the historical urban growth of Sarajevo. Here, for more than four centuries, the former rulers of Bosnia had built their great administrative, religious, and commercial architectural works.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
However, the situation on the slopes, where the Mahalas (the residential neighborhoods) and their houses were located, contrasted with the flat area of the valley in all aspects, including topography, density, and economic power. In fact, this part of the city was where the much poorer local residents had traditionally built their houses and, as the *Bosnische Post* argued, was not a top priority for the new administration when considering a strict implementation of the *Bauordnung*. Given the traditional setting of the slopes’ houses and the lack of high density there, it was recommended to retain the Mahalas’ prevalent traditional way of design.
(bosnische Bauweise) without subjecting this to any substantial changes.\textsuperscript{152}

In sharp contrast, and given the clear determination of the new administration to build its representative center of power as quickly as possible, much effort was invested in finding ways to immediately implement the Bauordnung in redevelopment of the area of the old town and the historic urban core along the east-west axis of the city. However, this vision did not figure as a completely new urban development blueprint, but instead suggested a continuation of this particular urban territory’s tradition which, for the most part, had meant encompassing the former administrative, economic, and religious centers of power, along with housing numerous Bosnian elites. Consequently, upon the Austro-Hungarian occupation, one of the foremost tasks of the new administration was to signal the change of government by demonstrating its sovereign presence through an immediate occupation and replacement of the former Ottoman places of power, including administrative (Konak) and military (Kršla) sites. And, not surprisingly, in the following years the area direct adjacent to these centers of power would develop into a territory where the majority of arriving Austro-Hungarian civil servants and the future foreign and local bourgeoisie would be settled. Although this point shall be covered in the next chapter, suffice it to say here that from the beginning of the occupation, it was clear that the allocation of governmental and private investments would not occur evenly across the city.

This conspicuously differentiated treatment of space is an important element that should be kept in mind when

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\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., “In der eigentlichen Miljacka-Talsohle bis incl. Bahnhof wird die Strenge Handhabung des §40 seiner besonderen Schwierigkeiten bereiten; auf den zumeist von ärmeren Einheimischen bewohnten Hängen der Stadt kann die bisherige bosnische Bauweise ohne Änderung beibehalten werden, um so mehr, als daselbst die Bauobjekte nicht so dicht aneinander gerückt sind wie in der Talsohle.”
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considering the subsequent urban modernization of Sarajevo. At the heart of the redevelopment of the city, there existed from its initial stage a spatial division that perfectly embodied the concept of “the dual-city”, whose raison d’être was, as described by Shirine Hamadeh in her study of the French administration of Tunis and Rabat, to create and maintain a spatial demarcation between the colonizers and the colonized, thereby promoting different standards for two different populations.\textsuperscript{153} By the same token, a close reading of the related legal paragraphs might enable us to comprehend in both sociopolitical and spatial aspects how the new laws actively shaped the relations between the Mahalas and the greater city.\textsuperscript{154}

Acknowledging the centrality of and the consequences of this constructed duality in space is pivotal, as it facilitates the framing of Sarajevo’s impending urban transformation as a “city in a colonized society and territory”. This assumption subsequently generates a historical-spatial analysis that, according to Nezar AlSayyad and Anthony King, enables us to conceive of and scrutinize four interconnected elements of society, territory and location, the process of colonization, and eventually the city that results simultaneously.\textsuperscript{155}

In fact, this constructed “split in urban hierarchy” that embodied the logic of the Austro-Hungarian

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administration’s urban redevelopment in Sarajevo resembles other colonial cases in several aspects. For instance, Janet Abu-Lughod’s observation of a constructed “double standard” in space, as she examines the French spatial planning in colonial Rabat, perfectly illuminates the Bosnian situation. She conceives of the establishment of this “double standard” as an operation that “ensured that the caste differences created by economic and political colonialism would be reflected sharply in a gap between the physical conditions of the two cities—coexisting but not interpenetrating.”

It is important to emphasize, however, that in the Bosnian context, this notion of separation that advocated for urban “coexistence” was justified and framed through a commitment of the new administration to respect and protect local customs. Indeed, the aforementioned duality between the newly developed part of Sarajevo and its Mahalas would last until the end of Austrian rule and well beyond that. However, this initially considerate treatment of space did not preclude realizing the ultimate goal of the new administration, which sought total modernization and hence transformation of the country and society.

The process of the intended change was slow, as its pace was determined by the present circumstances of the country; yet no part of the plan was left to chance. Moreover, to render all aspects of the transformation, including the spatial separation, as something taking place in the interests of the people and the country, all actions were grounded in and reinforced by the logical language of laws and modern regulations. However, notwithstanding this tendency, and as Abu-Lughod similarly has argued in her study of Rabat,

156. Abu-Lughod, Rabat, 151.
these changes did not figure “as the proliferation of a
duplicate or supplementary structure but as the
introduction of a new dominant structure, to which the
preexisting [city] became increasingly subordinate.”¹⁵⁷
In other words, the new Austro-Hungarian system was not
placed on a par with but instead above the inherited
Ottoman system.

During the initial stage of Austrian rule, while the
Ottoman laws were respected, they nevertheless were
slowly but surely modified and replaced by the new
modern regulations. However, when appropriate and
advantageous some laws were kept intact occasionally.
Such, for instance, was the case of the regulation of
the Robot, the unpaid compulsory labor that originated
with the existing Ottoman Street and Building
Regulation. The law considered all male adult
inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina aged between 16 and
60 years, with the exception of the clergy of all
confessions, teachers, military, and the frail, as
eligible for forced unpaid labor. For an average work
performance of five days per annum, using their oxen
and horses, those who were conscripted into the Robot
had to participate in the building of roads and
railways.¹⁵⁸

Though the law of Robot would eventually be abolished
by the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
1908, its enforcement in 1879 by the Austro-Hungarians
seemed to be a major deviation from the contemporary
standing of the monarchy regarding this law. The
Bosnian situation clearly contrasted with the fact that
by the time of the occupation, in most parts of the
Habsburg Empire the Robot had been slowly but surely

¹⁵⁷. Ibid.
¹⁵⁸. Ballif, Philipp, “Das Strassenwesen in Bosnien und der Hercegovina,” Allgemeine
Bauzeitung-Österreichische Viertel Jahrschrift für den Öffentlichen Baudienst, Vol.72,
(1907): 44; also see Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-
Ungarns; and Stix, Das Bauwesen.
terminated. After all, and as Pieter Judson argues in his recent book, *The Habsburg Empire*, elimination of this law had already started to figure as an important part of Maria Theresa’s and Joseph II’s reform endeavors starting in the late eighteenth century, which specifically sought to improve the situation of the peasantry.¹⁵⁹

Of course, the main purpose of the adaptation of this law in the occupied provinces was to reduce expenditures of the new administration and to increase the revenue of the territory.¹⁶⁰ However, in addition to monetary gain and as the Austrian chief engineer Philipp Ballif explained in his report, *Das Strassenwesen in Bosnien und der Herzegovina*, the enforcement of the law of *Robot* provided an “educational” platform upon which the Austro-Hungarian civilizing mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was further exercised.

After writing in favor of the adaptation of the Turkish law by the new administration, Baliff went on to emphasize why the very same law had not been efficient during the Ottoman rule of Bosnia. He argued that both the inadequate nature of the former administrative system, whose failures were documented through the miserable condition of the existing infrastructure, and the inexperienced state of the conscripted laborers, along with their defective and outdated equipment, prevented the fulfillment of the promising potential of the *Robot*. In contrast to this, he argued, was the enforcement of the very same law under the new administration that provided the local population with the productive opportunity of learning how to operate modern Austrian equipment, thereby serving as a school

¹⁶⁰ Ballif, “Das Strassenwesen,” 44.
where the most elementary concepts of ordinary work performance were taught.\textsuperscript{161}

Ballif reiterated his position by asserting that since the notion of Time was of little value among the oriental local population (im Orient hat die Zeit wenig Wert), the promulgation of the Robot law was a highly appropriate method to foster a vigorous work ethic (ein regerer Arbeitssinn). As a result, he concluded, the local population was expected to become aware of their new modern needs, to learn to work, and eventually to appreciate the value of time (dadurch arbeiten und den Wert der Zeit schätzen gelernt).\textsuperscript{162}

However, in sharp contrast to the adopted Turkish law of Robot that aimed at promoting a new “work ethic” among the Bosnian laborers, there was a newly crafted law that directly regulated the practice of architecture and further targeted local builders’ building activities. Paragraph §19, which was part of the 1880 Bauordnung,\textsuperscript{163} required the planning and the design of all future structures to be conducted exclusively by “skilled craftsmen”. In other words, a professional category was defined according to new regulations whose intricate and precise guidelines would outlaw the inclusion of local bricklayers, carpenters, and roofers who, as the new administration believed, had been performing all sorts of architectural tasks prior to the Habsburg occupation in an “interchangeable erratic manner.”\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} “Bauten und Bauordnung in Sarajevo,” Bosnische Post, Sarajevo II, 1885, 26.VII, Nr. 60. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek - Archiv (ÖNB-Archiv)
Indeed, the regulation of the building industry and spatial practices was regarded as one of the most important steps of the new administration. The presence and the growth of uncontrolled building activities, the so-called "Bauwucher," were deemed serious threats whose prevention, similar to that of natural disasters such as fire and flood, required strict application of modern regulatory norms and codes.\textsuperscript{165}

However, not unlike the discriminated application of the \textit{Bauordnung}, as discussed previously, §19 allowed for the continuation of traditional design practice as executed by local builders throughout all \textit{Mahalas} (traditional neighborhoods). Simultaneously, however, the law terminated the participation of those very same builders in the construction of the modern city, where all projects and resources were concentrated at the time. Furthermore, §19 outlawed the application of traditional local construction methods to any newly planned modern structure, as these were to be designed exclusively by skilled and licensed builders (\textit{conzessioniert}).\textsuperscript{166}

While the law clearly aimed at optimizing the future growth of a well planned and strictly controlled modern built environment, its inauguration, nevertheless, like other paragraphs of the \textit{Bauordnung}, encountered further complications and slowed down the actual building process. This was so because the existing local construction industry from which the new administrators had to recruit skilled builders, as the \textit{Bosnische Post} maintained, had never historically granted professional licenses before and, given its ungovernable constellation, anyone involved in it could claim to be a professional mason or carpenter. And, in order to put

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
an efficient end to this problem and to prevent any further complications, the new administration went on to establish regulatory norms according to which professional status (architect, master mason, mason, carpenter, roofer, etc.) of any potential worker was to be examined and determined. In this way, it was argued, each category of worker was responsible for that very particular stage of building activity to which he was assigned according to his proven qualifications and which he was not to exceed.\textsuperscript{167}

However, as explained before and like all other regulatory paragraphs, the law did not explicitly propose outright exclusion of local builders and craftsmen. Instead, it aimed at imposing a new system upon the existing one while simultaneously suggesting the possibility of local participation. In fact, this very point was further underscored as the law maintained that it did not seek to rule out possible

\textsuperscript{167}. Ibid.
inclusion of the local people in any branch of the building industry if they were able to prove they had the necessary qualifications—which, however, had to be in line with the professional norms defined in and prevalent throughout the Habsburg lands.\textsuperscript{168} The law’s carefully crafted rhetoric, indeed, maintained an inclusionary appearance, but given the participation’s prerequisites, it remained a powerful exclusionary tool in practice.

The new administration clearly intended to monitor and bring under its control all aspects of spatial practices. However, as with the introduction of new urban laws and building norms and codes, and in order to compensate for imposing prohibitions on the building activities of the local craftsmen and make provisions for a sustainable future building industry, it decided to establish a modern construction training system for local youth (für einen geschulten Nachwuchs von Einheimischen bei den Baugewerben zu sorgen). Following this, the administration aimed at establishing an appropriately regulated apprenticeship system (geregeltes Lehrlingswesen) that would admit and train young local construction students free of charge and, in return, put them to work unpaid at the new administration’s modern construction sites.\textsuperscript{169}

The very idea of the formation of a new generation of local builders who were to be educated strictly according to modern European standards was seen as a crucial part of the greater modernization plan for

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.; in fact, the regulation of the building industry and granting designated licenses to its different branches was not a unique process that started in the occupied lands. Rather, it was in line with a similar law that originated from Vienna’s Bauordnung of 1859, see “Zum Gesetzentwürfe, betreffend die Regelung der concessionirten Baugewerbe,” in Der Bautechniker. Centralorgan für das Österreichische Bauwesen, Nr. 18, III. Jg, Wien 4 Mai 1883. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek – ANNO Archiv (ÖNB-ANNO); And, “Zur Regelung des Baugewerbes” in Der Bautechniker. Centralorgan für das Österreichische Bauwesen, Nr. 39, III. Jg, Wien 28 September 1883. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek – ANNO Archiv (ÖNB-ANNO).
\textsuperscript{169} “Bauten und Bauordnung in Sarajevo,” Bosnische Post, Sarajevo II, 1885, 26.VII, Nr. 60. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek – Archiv (ÖNB-Archiv).
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, the lack of required qualified professional architects and builders at the initial stage of the building process was a pressing issue that would consequently lead to a great importation of Austro-Hungarian civil architects and engineers recruited across the Empire. While this will be addressed in the following chapters, the current discussion intends to elaborate on how, immediately upon occupation, Austro-Hungarian regulations assigned different roles to two different categories of people in the process of making the modern city of Sarajevo. Indeed, as we shall see later, it was this clear division of labor accompanied by spatial differentiations that would lay the foundation of the impending modern city.

Of course, the general outline of Sarajevo’s urban redevelopment was not much different from many other Habsburg cities in the nineteenth century. What distinguished its case, however, was its status as a “city in a colonized territory”. In the urban and architectural context and following King and AlSayyad’s analytical model, we can claim that certain characteristics here framed Sarajevo, or for that matter both provinces, as a colonial city (territory) in contrast to other parts of the empire. As we have seen so far, immediately after the occupation of Bosnia, political, economic, and social power was clearly in the hands of non-indigenous Austro-Hungarian officials. Though a minority, due to their military, technological, and economic resources, they were in a superior position that assured them unlimited power in making decisions, including spatial ones.¹⁷⁰

Of course, by emphasizing the specificity of the Bosnian constellation, I am not suggesting that an otherwise conflict-free urban and architectural

¹⁷⁰. See footnote 155.
transformation took place across the monarchy. As previously mentioned, in the nineteenth century, architecture and urban projects served as ideological tools for building identity and reinforcing nation-state claims. But the difference between these “architectural battles” and the Bosnian scenario is the absence of any local agency involved in the latter.

If, for instance, in Lemberg, the ethnically mixed populated capital of Austrian Galicia, it was the Polish and Ruthenian nationalist movements that competed with the Habsburg state to shape urban space, then in Bosnia the only valid decision regarding the production of space was that of the occupying administration, which did not include local positions.\textsuperscript{171} It is equally important to note in the same context how in the case of Lemberg, as Markian Prokopovych has shown in his interesting study, ethnically diverse local architects with Polish, Ruthenian and German backgrounds actively competed for and participated in diverse projects. This situation clearly contrasted with the total and immediate shutdown of the building activities of the Bosnian craftsmen and master builders following the initiation of the new regulations, specifically due to §19 of the 1880 Bauordnung.

In addition to the regulation of labor and spatial practices, the creation of the new modern city required a negotiation of the crucial question of land and how it was to be obtained. After all, without precisely knowing what land was owned by whom and what type of tenure status it maintained, no move towards spatial redevelopment could occur. However, due to the complexity of the inherited system of land ownership in

\textsuperscript{171} For an excellent discussion of Lemberg transformation see Markian Prokopovych, \textit{Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-1914} (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009).
the occupied territory, determination of land tenure status was a difficult task that first required the establishment of systematic recording method and the introduction of a comprehensive land registry system. This very point explains the centrality of the aforementioned remarks of the 1880 report of Die Militärgeographische Institut in Vienna, which considered an immediate preparation of a cadastral survey of the territory and its detailed mapping as the foremost prerequisite for establishing a modern administration.\textsuperscript{172}

Of course, the system of land tenure in Ottoman ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina had been based on principles that differed from those of the Central European models. As Robert Donia summarizes in his study of Bosnian Muslims, under the Ottomans, both agrarian and urban landholding were based on the precepts of Islamic law and centuries-old traditions of land usage that resembled the feudal system of medieval Europe. He explains that according to Ottoman laws, there were two types of property that the Austro-Hungarians encountered in the occupied territories: mulk, or private property which was owned outright, and miri, state property over which a landlord exercised certain sovereign rights on behalf of the state.\textsuperscript{173} However, the Ottomans deemed most lands as being under the ownership of the Sultan and registered them as state property (miri), while restricting mulk mainly to most buildings and fruit trees that were on miri land.\textsuperscript{174}

Despite the fact that Ottoman laws had arranged a land registry system, a major problem was, as Donia points out, the “incomplete and unreliable” nature of the land register in which, contrary to the provisions of law,

\textsuperscript{172} See footnote 1 in chapter One.
\textsuperscript{173} Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle, 25.
\textsuperscript{174} Okey, Taming Balkan nationalism, 94.
most miri lands had become permanent hereditary holdings of their Muslim landlords. In order to bring the complicated yet crucial question of land tenure under its authority, the new government inevitably had to establish a comprehensive land registry system. However, during the process of registration, the state’s surveyors acknowledged the distinction between the miri and mulk as defined according to Ottoman law, yet they “insisted on some written proof for landlord claims to outright private ownership.”\textsuperscript{175} Donia explains

Since many landlords had assumed ownership rights over property without troubling about legal formalities, the net effect was to reduce many landlord claims to mulk lands. Similarly many landlords had come to regard woods and forests as their personal hunting property, despite Ottoman laws that made forests into state property… In the Austrian land register, the state’s control over woodlands was re-asserted to the detriment of landlord claims. These problems were to create serious disagreements between the government and the Muslim landowners in later years of the occupation.\textsuperscript{176}

However, in addition to being part of the greater regulatory endeavors of the regime, there were two major reasons for rapid initiation of the land registry. The first reason was a fiscal one, as clarifying the status of privately owned properties meant an increase in the amount of taxation that the state could expect. Simultaneously, failing to provide legal evidence and title for claiming outright ownership rights to a private property would facilitate its expropriation and subsequent absorption into state property. This, then, could be utilized in the process of housing the arriving military and other members of

\textsuperscript{175} Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle, 27.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
the new administration, since the property could be transferred to them.

Furthermore, reclaiming of the state lands that had turned into permanent hereditary holdings under Ottoman rule, would facilitate faster redevelopment. This was so because outright state ownership of land would more readily attract foreign investments and would further accelerate the planning process, whose unfolding then would no longer demand the prior formation of a collective consensus.

However, as Peter Sugar has argued, without a cadaster a change in landholding was not possible and, consequently, no further steps towards modernization could take place.\textsuperscript{177} Similarly, other related and necessary elements for the making of city, its social organization and its political governance, such as a census, Robot (labor), taxation, or numbering houses and naming streets could not be addressed at all. So once again, it becomes clear why the initial mapping process and surveying was the most elementary step towards administrative modernization of the occupied lands and the accompanying initiation of industrial capitalism there.

In fact, it is precisely in this context that David Harvey, in his book \textit{Consciousness and the urban experience}, considers the introduction of cadastral surveys and the making of accurate maps as the major developments that led to a precise definition of “property rights”. He explains how, with the arrival of industrial capitalism, cadastral surveying along with modern regulations created sets of precise and marketable parcels of land, which in turn would facilitate urban growth. It was the accuracy of maps, combined with the precision of regulations that

\textsuperscript{177}. Sugar, \textit{The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 32.
generated legally defined parcels, that in turn then actively promoted great investments in urban areas. Potential investors aimed to maximize their profits from rising land values, often in the form of rent, which would correlate with the immediate vicinity of their parcels vis-a-vis the location of major sociopolitical and economic centers of power. Additionally, it is with these points in mind that the aforementioned differentiated developments of Sarajevo’s slopes (Mahalas) and its flat area along the riverbanks have to be framed.

Another interesting point to consider, however, is that the complicated situation of private ownership of land that the Austro-Hungarian planning faced in Bosnia-Herzegovina somewhat resembled the condition of the very same issue in the Habsburg monarchy after the bourgeois revolution of 1848. In fact, the struggle that sought to address this very point would consequently lead to the formation of two distinct concepts of urban planning that would reappear in all cities of the occupied lands, just like the rest of the monarchy.

As Renate Banik-Schweitzer explains, while prior to the revolution the development of an entire city district in Habsburg lands could have been the idea of a single feudal lord, after the 1848 revolution, due to the abolition of the feudal system and the introduction of private property in Central Europe, city planners faced a new kind of challenge as they had to negotiate with numerous small landowners whose diverse interests were not always mutually compatible. Banik-Schweitzer points out that as a response to this dilemma, two

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conceptions of urban planning emerged between 1850 and 1870: either the persons and institutions involved in planning tried to buy up large areas, in order to proceed along feudal lines... or—as was especially the case in the German-speaking countries—the state or one of its organs issued general guidelines (building code, regulation, and construction plan) within the framework of which various, mostly private property owners could reach individual decisions.\textsuperscript{180}

In fact, it is noteworthy that it was in this very context that one of the pioneering urban planning texts of the time, namely Reinhard Baumeister’s infamous 1876 book, \textit{Stadterweiterungen in Technischer, Baupolizeilicher und Wirtschaftlicher Beziehung}, deemed the regulation of the use of private property to be one of the most essential parts of modern scientific planning. Several chapters in his book, which are concerned with different aspects of urban regulations ranging from building codes and norms to public health and traffic to square and park design, underline the conviction of Baumeister and others of his era that no proper planning was possible without urban and building regulations.\textsuperscript{181} For all this to unfold, the completion of a cadastral map was the most necessary task.

Following the general outline of the Austrian monarchy’s system of land surveying, as the 1880 military report informs us, the mapping of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be drawn according to the Austrian measurement tables on a scale of 1:12,500. However, the procedure was supposed to entail more than a merely precise geometrical determination of size and circumference of each municipality. Instead, it was to entail other informational clues that were present at

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Reinhard Baumeister, \textit{Stadterweiterungen in Technischer, Baupolizeilicher und Wirtschaftlicher Beziehung} (Berlin: Ernest & Korn, 1876).
the site, including the existence of forest complexes, reeds, or other natural resources. ¹⁸²

An important emphasis, in fact, was placed on a separate depiction of the forests owned by the state that were to be treated as independent municipalities during the mapping process. Their clear-cut defined boundaries were intended to demarcate their detachment from the surrounding lands and thereby place them under the guardianship of state power. ¹⁸³ Forest complexes were mostly viewed as important sources of state revenue that had to be reclaimed and secured by way of eliminating the local people’s former unlawful yet commonly practiced use. By the same token, the cadastral map had to make legible and recognizable the very separation of all the parcels representing the state forests (Staatswaldparcellen) from the privately owned lands, so that future intervention apropos of the state property would be reported to the authorities and considered a punishable act. ¹⁸⁴

Furthermore, for each municipality, a protocol map (Parcellen-Protokoll) was to be prepared that would include the informational recordings of all present property parcels and housing lots (Grund- und Hausparcellen) in their smallest details. In addition to listing the surface area, the size of each given house, and the type of land use, the protocol would indicate the name of the property owner, his affiliation in the community and, in relevant cases, his interdependent relationship with the existing tenant farmers (Die Pächter). ¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Mitteilungen des K.u.K. Militärgeographischen Institutes 1881, 73.
¹⁸³ Ibid.; for an illuminating discussion of the modern state and the invention of the notion of scientific forestry see the chapter “Nature and Space” in Scott, Seeing Like a State, 11-52.
¹⁸⁴ Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen für Bosnien und die Hercegovina, Jahrgang 1885. Zbornik zakona i naredaba za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Godina 1885 (Sarajevo:Landesdruckerei), 490.
¹⁸⁵ Mitteilungen des K.u.K. Militärgeographischen Institutes 1881, 74-75.
In conjunction with the land surveying process, an assessment and classification of plots followed which, together with other types of information, determined the amount of taxable surface area and properties in each municipality. All houses and plots on the municipality’s map were numbered and color-coded in such a way that information about the types of building construction (stone or wooden) or uses (public or private) could instantly be gained through the indicative colors and symbols.\textsuperscript{186}

After all, the new administration had to create these basic regulatory steps of legibility and control that were embedded in the mapping process if it wanted to pursue its plan of redevelopment and modernization of the occupied lands. In fact, as James C. Scott has shown, the process of cadastral surveying mostly conveyed how thoroughly society and space were refashioned by “state maps of legibility,” since:

They were … not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade. Thus a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-holders does not merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its ability to give its categories the force of law.\textsuperscript{187}

The essence of this very point, namely the Austro-Hungarian regime’s ability to create a regulatory system that would allow them to make legible and to control their subjects and space down to their smallest details, becomes perfectly understandable if we consider the transformation of the “urban unit” as being reflected in practices of naming streets and

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 73-82.
\textsuperscript{187} Scott, Seeing Like a State, 3, emphasis added.
numbering buildings that grew out of the cadastral mapping.

As Alija Bejtić has shown in his study, *Ulice i trgovi Sarajeva* (*Streets and Squares of Sarajevo*), while the practice of naming streets in Sarajevo was as old as the city itself, under Turkish rule the naming of a given street was a purely personal affair for the inhabitants of that very street. This was so because the basic urban element used by the Ottoman administration was the *mahala*, or a cluster of many streets. This tradition would remain intact until the Austro-Hungarian administration took over in 1878 and when a transformation in the urban unit from the Ottoman *mahala* to the Austrian *Straße* (street) followed.  

Similarly, the numeration of buildings was initiated during the *Tanzimat* reforms in 1853 for the purpose of identifying movables and taxpayers. However, like other Ottoman regulatory steps introduced during this era, in practice, its execution differed fundamentally from the modern systematic organization of space initiated by the Austrian administration, which drew its logic from the precise organizational unit of street (consequently block) and the grid system.

In fact, it is precisely this replacement of the “urban unit” that perfectly depicts two different administrative mentalities (or rather epochs), along with their approaches to the notions of power and control. It was due to this new scale of legibility that the modern state was able to not only embark on spatial and economic redevelopment of the occupied lands, but also to govern its subjects in all related aspects, including taxation, security and prevention of

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insurgencies, public health, or later military conscription. Similarly, it was the cadastral mapping that enabled the state to gather information about its subjects’ ethnic identities, religious affiliations, and status of landholding and wealth.

As we have seen so far in the first section of this project, the initial stage of the spatial transformation of Sarajevo under Austro-Hungarian rule can be deemed a preparatory phase in which the infrastructure for a comprehensive sociopolitical, economic, and cultural as well as spatial change was constructed. This infrastructure consisted of laws and modern regulatory measures that facilitated a greater sense of legibility and hence control, both of space and people. Here it becomes tempting to consider the space that began to grow according to the regulatory principles of this “infrastructural phase” as the embodiment of the kind of space to which Henri Lefebvre in his classic book, Production of Space, refers to as “conceptualized space”—a space claimed, constructed and administered strictly by technocratic and professional agents. In fact, it was in the representational sphere of this “administered space” that power and ideology would find ways of expressions during Austro-Hungarian rule. How this was the case in an architectural and urban development context is the subject of the following section of the present work.

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Chapter Four

Forging the Imperial Space
Between 1881 and 1882, an uprising sprang up in eastern Herzegovina that seriously challenged the Austro-Hungarian administration, which had started its rule in the occupied territories only a few years earlier. The cause for the revolt was the introduction of compulsory military service in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was announced following a November 1881-decree that required all able-bodied men in both provinces to serve three years in active service to the Austro-Hungarian army and nine years in the reserve. Although this highly unpopular conscription law seemed to be the major instigator of the Herzegovinian uprising, there were indeed several other issues that had contributed to this event.\(^1\) Chief among them was the fact that the Austrian rule, right from the very early stage of the occupation, was regarded with suspicion and hostility among the diverse groups of the local population.\(^2\) The Muslims, specifically the ruling elites and wealthy landowners, fiercely opposed their transference from Turkish to Habsburg authority, an event they interpreted as a direct threat to the long-standing and privileged position they had held in both provinces during the Ottoman administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Equally problematic for them was submission to the rule of an infidel Christian

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\(^2\) Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Jelavich, "The Revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina;" Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism.
occupying power whose law now forced them to serve in the army of the Habsburg Emperor.\(^3\)

After all, as defenders of the Ottoman territories that were situated along the Austro-Hungarian Military Frontier (Militärgrenze), historically and until very recently, they had been the ones fighting the very power to which they now had to submit. The Orthodox Serbs, on the other hand, did not conceive of exchanging Turkish for Austro-Hungarian rule as a development that would advance their case for they were as wary of the Muslim Ottomans as they were of the Catholic Habsburg Monarchy; their desired objective was to join either Serbia or Montenegro.\(^4\)

Sharing the Catholic faith with the new authority, the Croats, in contrast to both other major groups, regarded the Austro-Hungarian occupation and rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina as promising and potentially fruitful events that would, with time, facilitate their desired goal of unification with Croatia proper. However, the differing opinions of the local inhabitants regarding the Habsburg administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina would become more understandable if we consider the inherited Ottoman social structure of the occupied territories as well.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) This issue has been pointedly depicted in Meša Selimović’s novel Derviš i smart (Death and the Dervish) when Hasan, the protagonist of the novel, laments: "...We belong to no one, we’re always on some frontier, always someone’s dowry. Is it then surprising that we’re poor? For centuries we’ve been trying to find, trying to recognize ourselves. Soon we won’t even know who we are, we’re already forgetting that we’ve been striving for anything. Others do us the honor of letting us march under their banners, since we have none of our own. They entice us when they need us, and reject us when we’re no longer any use to them. The saddest land in the world, the most unhappy people in the world. We’re losing our identity, but we cannot assume another, foreign one. We’ve been severed from our roots, but haven’t become part of anything else; foreign to everyone, both to those who are our kin and those who won’t take us in and adopt us as their own. We live at a crossroads of worlds, at a border between peoples, in everyone’s way. And someone always thinks we’re to blame for something. The waves of history crash against us, as against a reef. We’re fed up with those in power and we’ve made a virtue out of distress: we’ve become noble-minded out of spite. You’re ruthless on a whim. So who’s backward?" in Meša Selimović, Death and the Dervish, trans. Bogdan Rakić and Stephen M. Dickey (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 329-331.

\(^4\) Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

\(^5\) Ibid.
Following the first census conducted by the Austro-Hungarian administration, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1879 was about 1,158,164, of which 42.88% were Orthodox Christian, 38.73% Muslim, 18.08% Catholic, and about 0.3% Sephardic Jewish. During the Ottoman period the real power and status in both provinces was in the hands of the native Muslim (converted Slavs) landowners, who were the most important and powerful segment of the population. At the time of the Austrian arrival, this group amounted to slightly over 1.5% of the Muslim and a little over 0.5% of the total population. The main reason for the prestigious status of this small group of people was that in Ottoman-ruled Bosnia, capital could only be accumulated via landowning, and, according to the Ottoman regulations, only Muslims were eligible to own land. Additionally, the same census indicates that 75% of the Muslims were free peasants, a status that, again following the Ottoman laws, only Muslims could enjoy. The remaining part of this confessional group were servants and wage laborers. Hence, as Peter Sugar has argued, about 80% of the Muslims were considered free men.

In contrast, the Orthodox population, which was the largest of all communities, was mostly consisted of kmets (serfs), although a small portion of them were merchants, urban real estate owners, shopkeepers, teachers, or priests as well. The Catholics, however, with the exception of some who were priests, were almost exclusively kmets. And, the only non-Slav segment of the population was the small Sephardic Jewish community. Expelled from Spain by the Spanish Inquisition in 1492, they had found refuge in different

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6. For census see in Schmid, Bosnien und die Hercegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns; Kreševljaković, Sarajevo za Vrijeme Austrougarske Uprave; Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Đaja, Bosnien-Herzegowina in der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Epoche.

urban parts of the Ottoman Empire, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they worked mostly as merchants, tax farmers or shopkeepers.\textsuperscript{8}

Naturally, given the varying socio-economic standings of these groups following their confessional affiliations under the Ottoman rule, the arrival of the Catholic Habsburg administration was perceived differently. By the same token, in the context of the 1882 Herzegovinian revolt, a major source of frustration on part of the Orthodox population was due to their long-held hope of a change in the inherited land-tenure system, which did not take place as they had hoped. As Charles Jelavich elaborates on their situation, with the advent of the new rule, the Orthodox Serbs, who during the entire Ottoman era had served as kmets to the Muslim begs (landowners), had hoped that under the new administration the beg-kmet relationship would end and the kmets would become the exclusive owners of the houses in which they lived and of the land they cultivated.\textsuperscript{9}

Indeed, the Bosnian Christian kmets’ demands and expectations found much of its inspiration in the fact that one of the first consequences of Serbian and Bulgarian independence from the Ottomans had been a radical change in land tenure system that included massive expropriation and redistribution.\textsuperscript{10} Yet a similar outcome would not occur in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finding a solution for the question of land reform would remain in a continuous state of postponement for various political and financial reasons.

After all, when the question of agrarian reform was being raised in the occupied territories, the principle

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{9} Jelavich, “The Revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina.”  
\textsuperscript{10} Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 32.
industry in the Habsburg Empire itself was agriculture. In other words, in both parts of the monarchy, more than half of the population was involved in agricultural production. Another issue that figured more specifically in the case of the Hungarian half of the monarchy was that both government and parliament there were dominated by the element of landowning, hence it was expected that a possible forcible land expropriation in Bosnia would not receive the blessing of the Hungarian government.

In fact, the peculiarity of the question of land reform and the crucial position of landowning class in shaping the economic and political spheres of this Central European territory would lead to the formation of socio-cultural and spatial organizations that would be distinguishable from the Western European model. In this regard, the architectural historian Ákos Moravánszky, drawing upon the work of another Hungarian historian, Péter Hanák, explains "whereas the West resolved its economic crisis by colonial expansion and the consequent development of its cities as focal points of economic activity, Central Europe did not have this option. Instead, the landowning class sought... to shift the burden to the peasantry." Consequently, the dominant position of the landowning gentry along with the absence of a strong Western-style entrepreneurial class and bourgeoisie would lead to the formation of a different path to industrial modernity. This is an important fact to bear in mind when we think about the pace and the process of industrialization and urban modernization taking place in Austria-Hungary and by extension later in the occupied lands.

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12. Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 33; see also Judson, The Habsburg Empire.
13. Moravánszky, Competing visions, 3.
Needless to say, all these parameters had direct impacts on the course of the Habsburg lands’ economic modernization, which consequently would begin much later when compared with Germany or France. Yet the issue of land reform was not only an economic one, as it had both confessional and political implications. Particularly noteworthy in this regard was that apart from the above-mentioned facts, one of the most important criteria that would explain the new administration’s restrained handling of land reform in both provinces—indeed a fact closely linked with the 1882 Revolution—was the assumption that Austria-Hungary, under all circumstances, could rely on the Catholic population’s support, but never on the Orthodox element of the region. Hence, from their point of view, no effort on the part of the new government was necessary to win the Catholics and no effort was possible to win the backing of the Orthodox population whose religion and culture made them opponents of the occupying Catholic power and sympathizers of either Serbia or Montenegro. Following this, in order to form a majority that would support the new authority in the occupied lands, the Austro-Hungarian administrators had to invest in acquiring the allegiance of the landowning Muslims who traditionally had held the local power. Thus it was concluded that a forcible land reform would only alienate this crucial group of the population and jeopardize their potential backing for the new government.

In fact, the centrality of the Muslim element apropos of the Habsburg rule in Bosnia was a matter already noted prior to the occupation as General Joseph Philippovich was specifically instructed by Vienna that “besides the Catholic population, attention needs to be directed also to the Muslim population and to give it special protection all the more since the Muslims not

only have the largest land ownership, but represent the relatively most progressive and most enlightened part of the population.”

Following this logic and in order to maintain the economic and political status quo, a perpetual postponement of a genuine reform of land-tenure system formed and conditioned the new administration’s policies for many years to come. Yet despite the new regime’s immediate acknowledgment of the indispensability of the powerful local Muslims in sustaining the Habsburg state’s interests, there simultaneously remained a strong sense of skepticism in regards with the question of how to absorb a large group of Muslims into the monarchy, and, by extension, how to accommodate Islam—a politico-cultural sphere which for too long had been deemed as a threat to European civilization and an obstacle to progress—to the imperial rule.

After all, for centuries, following emblematic events that included the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (1453) and the sieges of Vienna (1529, 1683), Islam and the Muslim world had manifested themselves in European collective consciousness and across the latter’s territory as the unassimilable and incompatible ‘other’ of European ideals and values. According to both Christian theological position and European geopolitical exigencies, Islam and its followers constituted an ever-growing threat to the very existence of Europe.

In the context of the Habsburg Empire, given their long-standing conflict with the neighboring Ottomans, the way in which Islam, and more specifically the Ottomans, were understood and framed was embedded in the shifting diplomatic, political, and economic contexts that defined the amorphous relationship between the two rival powers. In her book *Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire confronts Islam, 1526-1850*, Paula Sutter Fichtner has depicted the Habsburg’s vacillating attitude in constructing Islam along with the figure of “the Turk” over three centuries that closely correlated with the shifting political rivalry between the two Empires.¹⁷

In the early modern era, due to military clashes between the Habsburg and the Ottomans, “the Turk” came to embody the “tyrannical despot,” and the “terror of the world.” In the eighteenth century, following the 1683 Ottoman defeat, a transition occurred that would lead to a re-invention of “the Turk” (and Muslims) as a “hapless fool” and “ridiculous impotence.” However, with the declining Ottoman power and presence in European territories there began an improved diplomatic relationship, which would then substitute the “Turkish terror” for the notion of the “sick man of Europe.” Though a fundamental shift in perception occurred that would consider the Ottomans and Muslims as ‘fellow humans,’ nevertheless the prevalent sentiments remained predominantly negative as the benign yet still deprecating stereotypical images and the skepticism regarding Islam were to last throughout the following centuries.¹⁸

¹⁸. Ibid.; for this issue see also the recent publication of Larry Wolff, *The Singing Turk: Ottoman Power and Operatic Emotions on the European Stage from the Siege of Vienna to the Age of Napoleon* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017).
In order to return to the case of the Bosnian occupation and to trace the Habsburg’s psychological standing with respect to Islam and Muslims in its context, it is helpful to draw upon a contemporary observation. In a section of his 1878 ethnographic studies, called *Der Islam als Hinderniss der Cultur* (Islam as Obstacle to Civilization), Schweiger von Lerchenfeld perfectly captures the essence of the Austro-Hungarian concerns and wariness in regard with the inherited Muslim Ottoman system and the challenges that this would pose to the impending planning of a modern Central European administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{19}\)

At the end of his concluding observations that took place well before the Habsburg army had fully assumed control and overview over the occupied lands, he foresaw what great hindrance the existing Islamic tradition of the place would be to the Austro-Hungarian rule. He elaborated the found dilemma as follows:

> ...Islam does not permit reform, a transformation from within, at all... [due to] its entire organization, its strict discipline, undiminished for twelve centuries; its inner emptiness, a consequence of the absolute lack of dynamism and generative power; its quite intimate blending of the religious with the worldly, as it achieved expression in the Koran and was probably necessary during the lifetimes of the prophets, but over the course of centuries had to lose all of its logical justification; in addition, the Muslim moral law that recognizes external religious, but not civil, morality, and thus grants no validity to the ethical values of the individual; and, finally, the fact that the "holy book, the revelations of the 'one God'," which is at the same time the civil code for Mohammedans - all of this renders a fruitful reform of Islam unthinkable, so long as the inviolability of precisely this Koran as most holy command fulfills the soul of each and every member of the faithful. Since everything we have mentioned is incompatible with the goals and aims of a modern culture, there are only two possibilities:

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\(^{19}\) Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Bosnien, Das Land und seine Bewohner.*
either Muslims recognize the untenability of their Koranic precepts, and then are no longer Muslims, or they don’t change their traditions and then forever remain mere subjects of the 'Caliph' and bad subjects of the Christian realm to which they now belong, whose civilizing efforts will not be conducive to them.\textsuperscript{20}

However, given the inevitability of the existing circumstances, he then went on to reflect how this “obstacle” could possibly be eliminated in order to pave the way for the establishment of a modern rule:

It is precisely Islam which forms an insurmountable obstacle, and since it no longer really has a home in Europe, its harmful rigidity must be disrupted or else it will disappear from the scene altogether. Here there are only two ways forward: either Islam will allow itself to be modified in the spirit of Western cultural activities or, with all of its dogmatic arrogance, it must cease to exist as a public factor.\textsuperscript{21}

Yet, evidently, seeking out ways that would allow a reformation of and a subsequent accommodation of Islam into the Habsburg monarchy was not deemed the sole prerequisite for establishing the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia as equally important and pressing issue was the nationalist-separatist tendencies in both provinces that posed as a challenge for the new authority. In fact, from the outset, a major undertaking of the new government was to neutralize and remove any destabilizing element (religious, nationalist, or otherwise) that would potentially target the authority of the new rulers. In this context, the main goal was to break up and to block the formation of any kind of particularism while simultaneously fostering the process of integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the broadest sense, the formation of an imperial bond between these lands and the rest of the monarchy.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 147-148.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
Thus the new administration’s major preoccupation in Bosnia was how to create a world of policy that would maintain a balance between the different and competing objectives and claims of all groups of the local population and thereby, in fact, to reproduce and to promote the monarchy’s modern unifying principles of plurality, tolerance and multi-ethnicities. In fact, already at the beginning of the occupation, and as the Habsburg soldiers marched through Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kaiser Francis Joseph unveiled a proclamation that would underline the new administrators’ commitment to policies that would sustain equality of treatment between all segments of the population:

The Emperor-King orders that all sons of the land will enjoy equal rights according to the laws, that you will all be protected in life, faith and property… Under his mighty sceptre many peoples live together… he rules over the followers of many religions… and all freely profess their faith.22

After all, at the time of the Bosnian occupation, the Habsburg territory was constituted of a multitude of different regions which, according to the Compromise Agreement (Ausgleich) of 1867, were spread across the two associated states of the Austrian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary. The inhabitants of the empire, representing several different linguistically defined nationalities, spoke several languages including Croatian, Czech, Flemish, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Ladin, Polish, Romanian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovene, Ukrainian, and Yiddish. Similar was the diversity of the practiced religions in Austria-Hungary. Despite the traditionally privileged position of the Catholic Church in the empire, the Habsburg territories’ subjects included Orthodox Christians,

22. Quoted in Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 27.
Greek Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, Jews, Armenians, and Unitarians.\textsuperscript{23}

Consequently, in view of this prevalent sense of cultural (i.e., linguistic and religious) diversity, forging a sense of imperial unity among varying groups of people and regions had been an essential task of the Habsburg state since the eighteenth century. As Pieter Judson has shown in his recent study, “shared imperial institutions, administrative practices, and cultural programs helped to shape local society in every region of the empire…. [These] collective elements gave imperial citizens in every corner of the empire experiences that crossed linguistic, confessional, and regional divides, as well as chronological boundaries.”\textsuperscript{24}

In fact, by praising the benefits that imperial unity provided to all interest groups, both state and dynasty legitimized Austria-Hungary’s very existence.\textsuperscript{25} However, with the rise of nationalism during the nineteenth century, which was accompanied by increasing public discussions of cultural diversity and its nationalist implications, the virtue of the dynasty’s proclamation of “Unity in Diversity” had to be touted more effectively among the peoples of the monarchy. Thus, building upon the work of regime’s ideologists—which included ethnographers, cartographers, scientists, artists, engineers, explorers, etc.—the state sought to frame and present the diversity of its peoples as a strength that benefited all the various inhabitants of the Habsburg lands.\textsuperscript{26} As Judson elaborates on this point: “in popular geographies and scientific


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 270.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 274.
publications, in anthropological exhibitions, in folk art, and in public architecture, the imperial regime articulated a vision of empire meant to reinforce a popular sentiment for unity among its culturally diverse peoples."27

Yet, ironically enough, it was precisely the state’s much-celebrated notion of imperial unity that would serve as an ideological tool to justify and sustain the Habsburg civilizing mission to eastern and southeastern Europe that included places such as Bukovina and Galicia, and by 1878, the Balkans.28 This apparent paradox was due to the fact that parallel with the state’s effort to emphasize the strength that its diversity offered ran a conviction that regarded different groups in a strictly hierarchic manner and consequently evaluated them according to their perceived level of “culture and civilization”. And, it was in this very context that the empire’s different elites would consider “their mission to bring “advancement” and “civilization” to other--usually linguistically different--groups within the Monarchy.”29

In fact, these “rankings” of the designated ‘others’ (e.g., Slavs, Jews and Roma) would subsequently provide the basis for the formation of more divisive ethnic characterizations that would eventually culminate into the disastrous construction of racial superiority during the interwar period.30

Notwithstanding the existing cultural hierarchy, however, growth and advancement were still regarded as feasible assimilating endeavors. For instance, in the eyes of liberal Germans and Hungarians, the most dominant and hence ‘civilized’ groups: “anyone could

27. Ibid., 317.  
28. Ibid.  
30. Ibid.
become German and Hungarian—that is, civilized—by learning their language and partaking of German or Hungarian high culture.” And, indeed, it was precisely this conviction that formed the ideal of imperial unity and was both appreciated and resented among different segments of the Monarchy’s population. In this light, for instance, Judson brings into attention the case of a liberal Jewish writer, Karl Emil Franzos (1848-1904) who had been fully educated in German-language institutions. Franzos, whose renowned short stories mostly covered Jewish life in Eastern Europe, was convinced “Germanness” did not “oppress the other nationalities, but instead offered them a reconciling point of unity.”

 Appropriately enough, when Franzos completed his first collection of short stories, which were set in the peripheral eastern part of the empire, he named it Aus Halbasien (From Semi-Asia). He depicted these “Semi-Asian” landscapes as liminal spaces where “European education met Asiatic barbarism, European striving toward progress met Asian indolence, and European humanity met cruel Asiatic conflict among nationalities and confessions.” In one of his essays, for instance, while arriving in one of Austria’s furthest eastern cities, he detected signs that testified to the civilizing encroachment of the West. He then went on to claim enthusiastically that whoever wanted to know “who created this miracle” should take note of the spoken language there—in other words, he perceived of the arriving German culture as a civilizing and unifying force.

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32. Ibid. 322.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 324.
Indeed, this notion of overcoming “Asiatic barbarism,” or getting away from cultural and economic backwardness, was an explicit imperial agenda that was propagated across all lesser ‘European’ parts of the Monarchy. Consequently, it was the diminishing presence of the so-called “Asiatic” characteristics in different locations of the empire that signified, like a yardstick, the pace and the process of modernization and hence Europeanization in them.

It was precisely in this imperial context that the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the goals of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty, namely, modernization and integration of both provinces into the Monarchy, were carried out. It was believed that an Austro-Hungarian civilization mission in these lands, whose goals would include, among others, the executions of economic modernization, education and legal equality of all inhabitants, would eventually replicate the promises of imperial unity and thereby reaffirm the political position of both state and dynasty. Put differently, if the Austro-Hungarian administration was able to implement the transmission of imperial ideals in its occupied lands, demonstrating their ability to treat all different segments of the population equally, then they could successfully “demonstrate the superiority of the liberal Habsburg multinational ideal over ethnic nationalism as the best vehicle for progress.”

However, this was not an easy undertaking given the aforementioned existing local power dynamics and the so-called ‘obstacles’ in the occupied lands. Nevertheless, the new administration maintained its ambitious colonial objectives and hoped that its endeavors would slowly yet ultimately bring about a

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36. Ibid., 330.
major transformation, in both Bosnian society and territory, and furthermore, facilitate a slow absorption of these lands into the Austro-Hungarian empire.

Reflecting on this very issue, Schweiger von Lerchenfeld, who represented the political standings of the occupying power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, went on to conclude his hitherto caustically critical chapter Der Islam als Hinderniss der Cultur on a more promising note as he predicted the following scenario:

One should not underestimate the fact that... the political task of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is confronted with very difficult, even apparently irresolvable problems. However, they are not irresolvable, nor will they be, if Time, with its wonderful influence on customs and traditions, is allowed to operate as the most effective means towards a gradual transformation, subversion, and enlightenment, scarcely recognizable from outside, and under the radiant warmth of a constant progress at work can indiscernibly break the chains of an old dogmatic rigidity and cultural intractability. A new generation, raised under different conditions of existence and constructively influenced in how they express their lives by a Western ethos and culture, will surely only require the thinnest layer of an ice crust around them to be thawed. But, in the end, a longer process is always better and more rational than some kind of compulsory action, which would remain ineffective and would, moreover, contradict the main thesis of modern culture and civilization—that of religious tolerance.37

Indeed, it would take less than six years from the time of Schweiger von Lerchenfeld’s prophecy until an 1885 article in the Bosnische Post, a paper sponsored and published by the Landesregierung in Sarajevo, would proudly report of great achievements of the new administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it uttered how both space and people were undergoing a discernible transformation:

Sarajevo has more or less lost its Oriental character... So much has happened, wherever we look there are new bridges, new roads and streets, new churches and schools, new sophisticated routes... but, above all, if we have the younger generation in mind: new people.  

In point of fact, a lot of writings of the time made frequent references to the city’s fast transformation once the military administration completed its tasks of preliminary spatial organization and security provision. With the initiation of the civil administration in Bosnia in 1882, much attention was paid to how the occupied territories, but more specifically Sarajevo as the administrative center of the new regime, were moving away from their “Asiatic” and “Oriental” past and thereby transforming into a typical imperial city.

In January 1884, two years after the civil administration had taken over the power from the military, a feuilleton entry of the Bosnische Post juxtaposed Sarajevo’s cityscapes of 1879 and 1884, while enthusiastically describing how drastically the city had changed since the Austro-Hungarian occupation.

What fascinated most the writer-observer of this piece, however, was not the fact that a city’s physical elements and appearance could potentially enormously change within a given period of four to five years. After all, as the writer himself confessed, at the time of his observation of Sarajevo, many of European cities were experiencing major urban transformations—a fact that testified that urban change in itself was not a phenomenon of novelty at all. Then again, as he proceeded to add, in all of these places the “overall picture of the city” (das Gesamtbild), or more
accurately the “habitus,” had remained unchanged. And surely, he continued, the same kind of urban morphology could not be ascribed to places, such as Sarajevo, where the “traditional” path of urban progress and the “habitus” had been interrupted through the initiation of powerful new influences, which, by way of not acknowledging any aspect of the existing system, had been able to effectively impose an entirely new direction of transformation onto the existing patterns.  

Furthermore, he acknowledged, time had not just changed the “urban Physiognomy” (“...der Stadt eine veränderte Physiognomie aufzuprägen”) but it equally had transformed the Community (Gemeinwesen) profoundly. Not unlike all the new buildings that had emerged since the disastrous fire of 1879 and which deviated, at least externally, from the inherited ones, so also had changed life in the city (Das Leben in der Stadt) as the local inhabitants embarked on adopting into new imported lifestyles that included new types of dwelling (Wohnen), foods, and consumption. After five years of the Habsburg administration, the writer reported, one could observe how “many of the locals now put on European costumes (Tracht), and their women choose to appear in Parisian style, no matter how insecurely they might feel in it, however.”

“Up to its seizure by the Habsburg army,” he proceeded, “Sarajevo was an outright Oriental city. Now, shortly after, distinct traces of transformation processes demonstrate that the city, culturally speaking, can already be conceived of as a half-European city; whereby, if we regard it mathematically, one-eighth of this notion of “half” would point towards

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40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
transformation of the visual impressions (spatial changes) while three-eighths would point towards the alteration of city’s life and community.”

What seems most striking in this observation and is, in fact, closely in line with Schweiger von Lerchenfeld’s prediction on the transformative power of time, is the writer’s reference to and emphasis on the notion of “habitus,” as he initially drew a comparison between the two opposing modes of urban transformations that had taken place in Europe and the occupied territories: an unchanged “habitus” versus a transmuted one. Apart from the questionability of this assumption—as in reality the sense of “habitus” was equally interrupted.

42. Ibid.
in European cities during their modernization—the recurring reference to “habitus” throughout this article reveals much about the nature of the transformation that was expected upon the occupation.

Change, in this context, was not just directed at the inherited Ottoman physical environment but rather it aimed at something much more complex, multilayered and inclusive: the “habitus”—a space in which interrelated relationships between individuals had been historically formed and contained. This, after all, and following Norbert Elias, was a social space in which, under the influence of time, both dynamic and ever-changing

Figure 25. A postcard from the turn of the century that frames the newly developed Franz Josef Park and the modernized embankment promenade along which a series of new modern apartment blocks were built according to the regulations of the new Bau-Ordnung. Most interesting is that the western part of the postcard is marked by the newly built Catholic Church (see the two towers) at the city center, while its eastern borderline is accentuated by one of the minarets of the Begova Mosque. Source: Author’s collection
concepts of individual and society would unfold.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, it was a transformation of “habitus,” which simultaneously compressed and bonded together concepts of time, space, people, and their relationships, that would precisely capture the essence of what Schweiger von Lerchenfeld had predicted and hoped for in his 1878 concluding reflections.

After all, it was only three years after the completion of the cadaster survey and the mapping of the occupied lands that rows of new buildings that were executed in the prevalent and recognizable styles of the empire “would lean against the slowly vanishing Oriental type of local architecture,” as the 1884 paper reported.\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, within a short period of time, many grand public buildings were built whose architecture was less about the aesthetic or engineering accomplishments of their architects as it was about orchestrating a powerful visual sense of imperial uniformity and commonality. The familiar appearance of the yellow-painted Neo-Baroque architecture, which was frequently applied to the state’s buildings across the empire, formed and framed the shared imperial identity of all different regions of the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{45}

In Austria-Hungary through much of the nineteenth century, most large-scale modernization and urban architectural projects were conducted on the order of the crown, and, consequently, all official buildings required the approval of the imperial government.\textsuperscript{46} In many cases, these buildings were built by “official” architects of the building departments of the empire whose task was to create a visual uniformity. In fact, the visual similarity that these projects shared with each other attested “to the imperial effort to meld the

\textsuperscript{44} “Feuilleton: Sarajevo 1879 und 1884,” \textit{Bosnische Post}, Sarajevo I, 1884, Nr. 6, Archive of Bosnia-Hercegovine, Sarajevo. (Arhiv BiH).
\textsuperscript{45} Judson, \textit{The Habsburg Empire}, 346.
\textsuperscript{46} Blau, “The City as Protagonist,” 12.
peripheral urban centers of the ethnically diverse state into a homogeneous civilization." As Ákos Moravánszky has explained, these architectural works did not figure as singular outstanding achievements but they were "the typical everyday architecture." The familiar designs of railway stations, saving banks, theaters, the post office, the plane tree-lined main street to the market square, all demarcated the kaiserlich und königlich (imperial and royal) status of any given provincial town of the empire. "The place of these buildings in the hierarchy of the city—the familiarity of their inner disposition, the stucco ornaments on the façade, and even the colors—contributed more to the identity of the region than the masterworks of the famous architects. This was the architectural production that physically created and expressed the unified infrastructure of the Habsburg Empire." 

By 1900 Sarajevo’s urban and architectural transformation clearly resembled many other cities of the Empire whose architectural repertoire replicated the prevalent styles of the center and frequently modeled themselves on the neoclassical trends of the Vienna’s Ringstrasse. However, much like other parts of the occupied lands, Sarajevo’s spatial reorganization was not simply an architectural reiteration of the imperial trends, but rather it framed the city’s, and by extension Bosnia-Herzegovina’s, initiation into the Austro-Hungarian territory.

In fact, in Sarajevo, a major emphasis was placed on the transformation of the city center and the market area (Čaršija)—a place that had been shaped under the dominating Islamic influence and power for centuries. Logically enough, a rearrangement of this part of the

47. Ibid.
48. Moravánszky, Competing Vision, x.
49. Ibid., xi.
city was deemed as one of the most crucial and yet delicate initial acts of the new administration. Despite the fact that the new administration did not set its goal to destroy or jeopardize major Muslim structures, the new direction of the urban transformation, which was an extension of the previous organizational endeavors of the military rule, introduced major shifts into how Sarajevo for centuries had been conceived: an Ottoman administrative center of power.

By challenging the inherited Muslim monopoly on having major structures in the city center and by adding other monumental religious (Christian and Jewish) and public buildings into this landscape, the new authority sought to challenge the inherited Ottoman “habitus” and thereby to visualize its own sovereignty over the occupied lands, and simultaneously to pave the way for the latter’s integration into the Monarchy.

As an 1884-observer noted in an entry of the Bosnische Post, the transformation of the city made itself most visible and tangible at its center. There, as the old conservative element of the place retreated more and more (das conservative Element zieht sich immer mehr zurück), the new development grew out slowly, yet continuously and unstoppably. Yet, perhaps, one of the most remarkable aspects of the spatial transformation of Sarajevo at that time, in fact the one that clearly signified the establishment of the new regime in the occupied lands, was, as the writer pointed out, how the new large structures, executed in new architectural styles, unsettled the existing urban skyline of the place as their height surpassed the peaks of the Minarets of the city.50

50. “Feuilleton: Sarajevo 1879 und 1884,” Bosnische Post, Sarajevo I, 1884, Nr. 6, Archive of Bosnia-Hercegovine, Sarajevo. (Arhiv BiH).
Although the new modern city’s formation was indeed established, numerous contradictions (Gegensätze) remained visible. Most notably, reported the Bosnische Post, was that while certain districts of the city made a fully European impression already, other parts still retained their “unchanged Oriental imprint” (unveränderten orientalischen Eindruck). But this was just the beginning of the unfolding process of change. Soon, the Post predicted, one would have to search in the farthest corners of “Neu-Sarajevo” to detect any remaining traces of the former Oriental life and dynamic.\footnote{Ibid.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure26.jpg}
\caption{A Panoramic photograph of Sarajevo taken around the turn of the century from the Southern part of the city. \textbf{Source:} Author’s collection}
\end{figure}
Epilogue
Sometime during the year 1900, nearly two decades after Anton Schädler had taken Sarajevo’s first panoramic photograph, František Topič, a Czech photographer who had joined the Landesregierung in 1885, was asked by the new administration to provide a series of photographic panoramas of the new modern city.

Standing at the very same height, located at the easternmost end of Sarajevo, and the same point from which Schädler had recorded the inherited Ottoman city in 1879, Topič would create a photographic panorama that would be a testimony to how drastically this former Ottoman space had transformed itself into a modern Central European one. His recording was no less

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**Figure 27.** A Panorama of Sarajevo taken from the Eastern part of the city by František Topič in 1901. **Source:** Lebiba Džeko, Sarajevo između Dvije Carevine. Fotografije Františeka Topiča iz Perioda 1885-1919. Foto arhiv Zemaljski muzej Bosne i Hercegovine. (Sarajevo: Zemaljski muzej BiH, 2007), 39.
than a detailed inventory of the new city along with its many newly added structures that allowed Sarajevo to be framed and celebrated as an imperial Habsburg city.

By the late 1890s, the new administration had already accomplished a significant part of its plan of urban modernization for Sarajevo. As recorded in the Topić photograph, in addition to large, modern buildings that were mostly built on the right bank of the Miljacka and around the city center, shaky old wooden structures and bridges were removed and replaced. In fact, it was only few years before Topić would take his photographic panorama that the river had been developed, along which a fully modern embankment promenade that was illuminated by electricity, and along which Europe’s first electric tram line would be planned.

However, an equally significant aspect of the urban transformation of Sarajevo, which was recorded prominently in the Topić image, was the fact that the new urban development along the historic east-west axis of the city was defined by the dominant presence of two important secular buildings of the new administration that represented its authority: the City Hall, which was located at the easternmost end of Sarajevo, and the Regional Government Building, situated in the western part of the city. Equally noteworthy in this new constellation, however, was the rise of structures related to religions other than Islam (churches, synagogues, and religious seminaries) that were built in close proximity to each other in the city center and not far from the Muslim religious institutions. But the increased religious diversity was meant to serve as a tool to fight and block the formation of any kind of national particularism. In other words, the photographic panorama memorialized an imperial city in which the notion of multi-religiosity was propagated.
and protected along the imperial ideal of "Unity in Diversity."

And it was the juxtaposition of this two aspects of Sarajevo’s urban transformation, namely, the sovereign presence of a modern secular state and the simultaneous advancement of religious tolerance that, along with the spatial and economic modernization of both provinces, would imply that the ideals of the imperial unity and the goals of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty had been attained. It was thought that through spatial, infrastructural, economic and educational modernization, Bosnia-Herzegovina could fully be integrated into the Empire.

Figure 28. A 1905 plan of downtown Sarajevo. Source: Author’s collection
Already in the year when the occupation occurred, Schweiger von Lerchenfeld had hoped for the rise of “a new modern generation,” that would rise under different conditions of existence and would learn to express their lives in a “Western ethos and culture.” Yet paradoxically, what the Austro-Hungarian administrators had not expected was the fact that it was precisely the modern city and urban life, along with modern education, that would eventually lead to the formation of an increased sense of cultural and national particularism. And, indeed, two decades after Schweiger von Lerchenfeld’s statement, by 1900, it was in the modern industrialized city that different social movements would be born—from the growth of a working class to the formation of different youth and students activism—whose modern political agenda, often based in nationalist arguments and formed by modern Western intellectual ideas, challenged the Habsburg presence in and administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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