At the Crossroads of Empire:
The United States, the Middle East, and the Politics of Knowledge, 1902-2002

By
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Abstract
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This dissertation examines how U.S. foreign policy shaped the origins and expansion of Middle East studies and expertise. For over sixty years the United States has considered the area called the “Middle East” to be vital to its national security interests, and governmental and academic institutions have been essential pillars in support of this policy. America’s involvement in the Middle East has matched its rise as a global superpower and I argue that U.S. foreign policy significantly influenced the production and professionalization of knowledge about the region. I demonstrate that passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 ultimately led to the growth and diversification of the field. Moreover, my dissertation contends that an unintended consequence of this expansion was strained relations between academia and the government, which contributed to and was compounded by decreased federal funding for area studies. By the late and post-Cold War periods, I assert that these factors led to a perceived decline in the field while private think tanks garnered increased attention and influence.

Drawing on research completed at national, university, and foundation archives, I explain how key governmental and non-governmental institutions collaborated to promote Middle East studies and expertise. I examine early American attempts to produce contemporary regional expertise through different wartime agencies and programs during the First and Second World Wars. In particular, I focus on the Inquiry, a group of scholars created to help President Woodrow Wilson prepare for the Versailles Peace Conference, as well as the Office of Strategic Services and the Army Specialized Training Program. I assert that the example of these initial efforts and their alumni helped establish the institutional precursors for the development of area studies. During and after the Cold War, I analyze how the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency coordinated with the Middle East studies programs at Princeton and Harvard and supported the American Universities of Beirut and Cairo. I also discuss the coordination of private foundations and academic societies with governmental agencies as well as their funding and support of area studies programs before and after the NDEA. This includes the activities of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies.

I conclude that different regimes of knowledge production and cultures of expertise related to the Middle East have emerged over the past century. While these regimes have often intersected and competed for supremacy, I contend that U.S. foreign policy interests and goals have had a
predominant influence on the contested ways knowledge is produced, communicated, and consumed. I demonstrate that the terminology and associated geographical representations inherent in U.S. foreign policy discourse has been adopted and promulgated by academic scholarship on the Middle East. Thus, revealing that even when Washington’s policies are contested by area experts its interests have already been subsumed into existing discourse on the region. While university-based Middle East studies were successful in expanding and enhancing the U.S.’s knowledge about the region and producing potential candidates for government service, I assert that the foreign policy and intelligence establishments developed their own processes for collecting and analyzing information and trends which benefited from but were independent of academic scholarship on the Middle East. Furthermore, I argue that think tanks emerged at the expense of university-based Middle East studies programs by actively pursuing research agendas in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
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There will assuredly come a day, when this country will have some weight in the scale of Empires.

- George Washington, August 15, 1786

What are the limits of United States foreign policy? The answer is that the limits of our foreign policy are on a distant and receding horizon; for many practical purposes they are what we think we can accomplish and what we think are necessary to accomplish at any given time.

- Joseph M. Jones, U.S. Department of State, 1955

Imperialism’s culture was not invisible, nor did it conceal its worldly affiliations and interests.

- Edward Said

Introduction

For over sixty years the United States has considered the area called the “Middle East” to be vital to its national security interests, and governmental and academic institutions have been essential pillars in support of this policy. This dissertation, At the Crossroads of Empire: The United States, the Middle East, and the Politics of Knowledge, 1902-2002, examines the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and the origins and expansion of Middle East studies and expertise over the past century. America’s involvement in the Middle East has matched its rise as a global superpower and I argue that U.S. foreign policy shaped the production and professionalization of knowledge about the region.

Several questions frame this study. How did the U.S. government develop expertise on the Middle East, an area it had limited interests in at the turn of the last century to this century where it is deeply enmeshed in the region? Were national security interests the sole driver? If so, how was this manifested in the relationship between the national security establishment and academic institutions?

Using Middle East studies as a case study, I answer these questions by examining the relationship between American power and the production of knowledge along two intersecting strands. First, I trace the evolution of the United States as a global hegemon with increasing interests and commitments in the Middle East over the past century. Second, I detail the emergence of area studies as part of the postwar expansion of American universities and as an extension of the national security bureaucracy. Combining these narratives, I reveal the close

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cooperation and mutually beneficial relationship between the foreign policy and intelligence establishments and academia and their influence on the creation of Middle East studies and expertise.

Drawing on research completed at national, university, and foundation archives in the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Lebanon, I explain how key governmental and non-governmental institutions collaborated to promote Middle East studies and expertise. I analyze the transition from the private knowledge of American missionaries and Orientalist scholars adapted for government use in the First and Second World Wars to privatized knowledge of think tanks with close ties to the U.S. foreign policy establishment in the late and post-Cold War periods. The core of this study focuses on the Cold War period, with the emergence, expansion, and then perceived decline of Middle East studies. I demonstrate that passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 ultimately led to the growth and diversification of the field. Moreover, my dissertation contends that an unintended consequence of this expansion was strained relations between academia and the government, which contributed to and was compounded by decreased federal funding for area studies. By the 1980s, I assert that these factors led to a perceived decline in the field while policy-related think tanks garnered increased attention and influence.

I discuss early American attempts to produce contemporary regional expertise through different wartime agencies and programs during the First and Second World Wars. In particular, I focus on the Inquiry, a group of scholars created to help President Woodrow Wilson prepare for the Versailles Peace Conference, as well as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). I assert that the example of these initial efforts and their alumni helped establish the institutional precursors for the development of area studies. During and after the Cold War, I analyze how the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coordinated with the Middle East studies programs at Princeton and Harvard and supported the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the American University in Cairo (AUC). I also detail the coordination of private foundations and academic societies with governmental agencies as well as their funding and support of area studies programs before and after the NDEA, demonstrating their close identification with and support of U.S. foreign policy goals and policies. This includes the activities of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS).

I conclude that different regimes of knowledge production and cultures of expertise related to the Middle East have emerged over the past century. While these regimes have often intersected and competed for supremacy, I contend that U.S. foreign policy interests and goals have had a predominant influence on how knowledge is produced and consumed and expertise is created and cultivated. While university-based Middle East studies were successful in expanding and enhancing the U.S.’s knowledge about the region and producing potential candidates for government service, I assert that the foreign policy and intelligence establishments developed their own processes for collecting and analyzing information and trends which benefited from but were independent of academic scholarship on the Middle East. Furthermore, I argue that think tanks emerged at the expense of university-based Middle East studies programs by actively pursuing research agendas in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
Analytical Frameworks

In order to provide insight into the intersection of and tension between national security interests and higher education, this dissertation relies on two frameworks of analysis. First, I draw on the works of Edward Said to examine the influence of Orientalism as a discipline, discourse, and ideology on U.S. foreign policy and the production of knowledge about the Middle East. Where possible, I utilize Arabic language sources to provide a post-Orientalism analysis, demonstrating that those in the region had agency, choosing to either accept or contest American policies and associated definitions. Second, I consider the implications of the notions of American exceptionalism and empire on area studies in general and Middle East studies in particular.

Orientalism and U.S. Foreign Policy

Orientalism emerged as a scholarly field in Europe during the nineteenth century. The main centers for Orientalist scholarship were in Britain, France, and Germany. It was (and to an extent remains) largely based on the practice of philology and driven by the belief that language and the analysis of historical texts provide insights into the history and culture of different societies. These societies were often described as static and unchanging since antiquity, and the analysis tended to contrast the perceived differences and inherent deficiencies of the “Orient” with the West, which was depicted as modern, progressive, and rational.

As a scholarly discipline, Orientalism in America lagged behind that of Europe. However, the American Oriental Society was founded in 1842 and is the oldest learned society in the United States. Unlike Europe, American perceptions and representations of the “Orient” during this period were generally of East Asia, not the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Edward Said’s seminal work Orientalism critiqued the discipline as well as the ideology it represented. Said argued that the notion of “the Orient” was an invention of the “Occident,” Europe and later, the United States. He claimed that the Orient served as an “idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.” Said asserted that “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.” He added that the interaction between the two was, and remains, “a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony.”

Said asserted that Orientalism served to justify the imperial policies of Britain and France. Its relationship to imperialism, he argued, gave Orientalist discourse its power and ensured its durability. According to Said, the production of knowledge about the Orient classified and represented who and what were (and were not) Orientals. These definitions were intimately tied to the prevailing political order. Thus, the characterizations of the Orient’s inferiority reaffirmed the superiority of the Occident and perpetuated its hegemony.

The United States, Said argued, not only inherited the imperial mantle from Britain and France, but adopted these representations as well. European characterizations and study of the Orient were incorporated into and reproduced by American Orientalist scholarship and later area

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studies. As in Europe, it was also reflected in American popular culture. In addition, the emphasis placed on the threat posed to Western civilization by the “other,” was readily adopted by the United States.

Said maintained that Orientalism’s four dogmas were adopted by American scholars and government officials studying the contemporary region. First, was the inherent superiority of the West, now represented by the United States. Second, that the Orient could be understood through abstract textual analysis, rather than interaction with the contemporary region or its inhabitants. Third, the belief that the Orient is static, homogenous, and unable to represent itself, while the Occident has the capabilities to objectively define and categorize the region and its inhabitants. Finally, that the Orient was something either to be feared or controlled.5

Scholars have attempted to determine what influence, if any, Orientalism has had on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Douglas Little contends that popular culture products reinforced a negative view of the region and its inhabitants in the minds of Americans, including policymakers, serving to justify U.S. foreign policy.6 However, historian Salim Yaqub, argues that while the archival record is littered with disparaging and racist remarks, the links to policy formation and implementation are tenuous. Indeed, there were instances, as in the Eisenhower administration, when the United States attempted to mollify the Arab states because of its Orientalist perceptions.7 Through an intellectual and institutional history of Middle East studies and expertise, this dissertation demonstrates the relationship between and influence of Orientalism on U.S. foreign policy.

American Exceptionalism and the Primacy of American Power

The belief that the United States is a unique nation with a divine mission to spread liberty dates to the founding of the republic. Indeed, the linkage between exceptionalism and empire were prevalent in the ideological origins of the American revolution. Based on the belief that civilization and empire moved westward, proponents of this ideology among American colonists claimed that Britain was the inheritor to the civilizations which began in Asia Minor and over the previous two millennia migrated west to Greece and the Rome. America, they argued, represented the ultimate and final destination of empire, but unlike Britain, it would be one of liberty and freedom.8

The power and persistence of exceptionalism and by extension empire, was found not only in political writings and rhetoric or justifications for territorial expansion, but were incorporated into the American social sciences. While the disciplinary traditions were borrowed

5 Ibid., 300-301.
from Europe, Dorothy Ross argues that they were shaped to fit the logic of American exceptionalism, which she calls a “national ideology.”

America’s emergence after the Second World War as a global superpower offered another opportunity to demonstrate its exceptionalism. The U.S.’s industrial production eclipsed that of a devastated Europe as well as the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the U.S.’s atomic monopoly affirmed its technological prowess. Melvyn Leffler argues that international institutions created during the early postwar period were designed not only to reshape the world in America’s image but to ensure the preponderance of its power. The perceived threat of the Soviet Union, real or imagined, to American power was at the core of the policies adopted during the early Cold War period. However, the United States did not want to confront the Soviet Union directly in a conflict. Instead, Leffler argues that containment of Soviet expansion would “perpetuate American preponderance.” While “preponderance did not mean domination,” it did mean “creating a world environment hospitable to American interests and values” and a “configuration of power” so that adversaries would “defer to American wishes.” In short, preponderance meant hegemony.

Area studies were an articulation of American preponderance and exceptionalism. They were a product of the competition between Washington and Moscow, more specifically the intersection of the Cold War university and the American national security state. As this dissertation will demonstrate, in creating and funding Middle East studies the different governmental and non-governmental institutions involved each pursued a particular set of interests, all ostensibly for the greater good of defending and protecting the United States and to a lesser extent the region they believed was subject to Soviet influence and domination.

**Historiography**

Area studies in general, and Middle East studies in particular, are relevant to several broad historiographical categories: U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the history of American higher education, and the postwar expansion of the U.S. foreign policy and national security establishments. The professionalization of knowledge and expertise about the Middle East over the past century intersects with these three categories.

The history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has tended to focus on high-level decision-making involving the White House and the State Department. However, some scholars have sought to identify and explain the different influences on policy formation and development. As previously mentioned, Douglas Little examines the influence of American Orientalism on U.S. policy, focusing on the influence of popular culture in shaping perceptions of the Middle East and its inhabitants. Although he does not draw on Said’s work, Michael

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11 Little, *American Orientalism*. 
Hunt argues that notions of racial and religious superiority significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, Peter Hahn emphasizes strategic interests over ideology and culture. Salim Yaqub incorporates the influence of Orientalism and American perceptions of the region in discussing key foreign policy doctrines. In his analysis of the American role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, William Quandt emphasizes domestic political considerations and the bureaucratic politics model to explain decision-making by successive presidential administrations. Michael Oren combines these different approaches with an emphasis on religion as well as the importance of the Zionist movement and the state of Israel to explain the history of the U.S.’s relationship with the region from the American revolution to the second Gulf War. Conversely, Ussama Makdisi contends that American support for the creation of the state of Israel was a rupture point in U.S.-Arab relations, which were previously defined by and benefitted from the role of American educational institutions in the region. However, these works have generally ignored the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and the development of expertise on the region.

Indeed, the history of the origins and expansion of Middle East studies in the United States remains relatively unexplored in the scholarly literature. Scholars have typically emphasized the NDEA as the beginning of government funded, university-based area studies programs. In doing so, they overlook the existing inter-disciplinary programs already established at major universities as well as the burgeoning relationship between the U.S. government, private foundations, and academic institutions beginning with the Second World War that formed the basis for area studies.

Scholarship on Middle East studies in the United States has largely focused on its intellectual roots. Timothy Mitchell and Zachary Lockman discuss the influence of wartime programs on Middle East studies, however, they only provide a cursory overview of the role government agencies played in promoting the field in American universities. Beshara Doumani’s edited volume focuses on controversies in the field after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and

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threats to government funding of Middle East studies. However, an intellectual and institutional history of Middle East studies has not been written.

Area studies were part of the growth and evolution of the social sciences in the twentieth century and scholars have examined the implications of government support on their different disciplines. Mary Furner, Thomas Haskell, and Dorothy Ross discuss the intellectual and institutional origins of the social sciences in the United States prior to the Second World War. Ido Oren argues that political science was shaped more by the wars with Imperial and Nazi Germany and the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union than by advancements in theory. David Price details the U.S. government’s use of anthropologists during the Second World War in the OSS and Ethnogeographic Board and the targeting of those with real or imagined ties to the American Communist Party during the Cold War. Similarly, Laura Nader asserts that government-funding shaped the research agendas of anthropologists during the Cold War. Robert McCaughey provides an intellectual history of international studies in the United States, discussing efforts before the NDEA was passed through the early 1980s. However, he argues that the pre-NDEA era was a “golden age” of scholarship on foreign areas conducted by “gentlemen-scholars,” especially missionaries.

Scholars have also discussed the relationship between area studies and the national security establishment. Bruce Cumings and Richard Engerman examined the origins of area studies, in particular Soviet and Asian studies and expertise. Vincente Rafael discusses Southeast Asian studies within the cultural context of the Cold War. Although the National Security Act has received significant attention in Cold War historiography, scholars have not discussed the role of

21 Peter Johnson and Judith Tucker, “Middle East Studies Network,” *Middle East Research and Information Project* June 1975: 3-20, 26; is an excellent but dated introduction to the institutional origins of Middle East studies in the United States.
26 Robert McCaughey, *International Studies and Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the Enclosure of American Learning* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). In addition, McCaughey focuses on and is critical of the Ford Foundation’s role in funding international studies before and after the NDEA, viewing it as far more instrumental than the U.S. government in the “enclosure” of area studies.
academic institutions and scholars in helping government agencies build the capacity to collect and analyze foreign area intelligence.  

Several works have analyzed the coordination between American scholars and wartime intelligence agencies, but they neglected to discuss how this relationship evolved in the postwar periods. Although Lawrence Gelfand published an exhaustive study on the Inquiry, the Western Asia division was not a major area of focus and he does not analyze the intellectual or ideological origins of the reports on the territories of the Ottoman Empire or the soundness of their claims. Other scholars have examined the Inquiry as part of broader discussions of the Wilson presidency, the relationship between the President and Colonel House, and the negotiations in Paris. The Inquiry is also discussed in the biographies of its members, notably Walter Lippmann and Isaiah Bowman. Key members of the Inquiry offered their own assessments of the Paris Peace Conference and the promise or shortcomings of the Versailles Treaty in What Really Happened at Paris.  

In contrast to the Inquiry, government programs created during the Second World War have received significant attention in the literature. In particular, the OSS has been the subject of numerous accounts by former members and journalists. However, discussions of the OSS have typically focused on the Strategic Intelligence division (SI) rather than the Research and

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31 Gelfand; Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher Learning in America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975). While Gelfand focused on the Inquiry, Carol Gruber details the support of American academics not involved in the group for the war effort. However, she does not address the Western Asia division or American interests in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire.


Analysis Branch (R&A). In addition, scholarship has generally focused on OSS operations in London and overlooked activities in the Middle East and North African Theaters of Operations or was limited to discussions of the invasion of North Africa. Moreover, the shift in OSS activities after the invasion of North Africa, particularly the operations of the Cairo office, has not been discussed by scholars. Other wartime programs have also been analyzed in the literature, including the Ethnogeographic Board, the Council on Foreign Relations’ War and Peace Studies Program, and the Army Specialized Training Program. The conventional wisdom is that area studies emerged out of the wartime agencies, in particular, the OSS. As this dissertation will demonstrate, although they were influenced by wartime agencies, area studies were not simply a continuation of those programs.

Like the OSS, histories of the CIA are predominantly written by journalists relying on interviews and published sources and tend to be highly critical accounts. The agency also


37 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in War-time London (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003); Price’s Anthropological Intelligence also examines the activities of the Smithsonian Institution’s Ethnogeographic Board. Neil Smith’s American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) discusses the State Department’s “M Project” led by geographer Isaiah Bowman, a three year effort to examine the issue of postwar refugee resettlement. Smith also briefly discusses the War and Peace Studies project funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and also led by Bowman. Scholars attached to the War and Peace Studies project were organized along thematic lines (e.g., political, security and armaments, economic and financial, and territorial) and produced confidential reports for the State Department and President Roosevelt. Louis Keefer, Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1988) examines the Army Specialized Training Program but only briefly mentions Princeton’s Near East program.

38 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 309-310; Szanton; Wallerstein. To date, the notion that the OSS was the forerunner of area studies has largely been based on anecdotal rather than archival evidence. This includes an oft-cited statement by McGeorge Bundy, then National Security Adviser to President Johnson and future President of the Ford Foundation. Bundy claimed that “the first great center of area studies in the United States was not located in any university but in Washington…in the [OSS].” In quoting Bundy, Wallerstein adds that a study is needed to determine the influence of the OSS veterans on area studies. See McGeorge Bundy, “The Battlegrounds of Power and the Searchlights of the Academy,” in The Dimensions of Diplomacy, ed. E.A.J. Johnson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964): 2-3. In his overview of the origins of area studies in the U.S., Szanton briefly discusses the dearth of foreign area expertise in the U.S. prior to World War II and the collection of key scholars in the OSS. He notes that some stayed in government service and others returned to academia, but does not discuss the continuing influence of government agencies or the OSS veterans on area studies. Similarly, Novick’s brief discussion of area studies focuses on the role of historians who served in the OSS and helped establish Harvard’s Russian Research Center and the Russian Institute at Columbia.

sanctioned official histories that drew upon declassified materials.\textsuperscript{41} Scholars have examined the CIA but these works generally provide overviews of its creation. They also tend to overlook the Middle East or it is only discussed within the context of the Cold War competition between Moscow and Washington. \textsuperscript{42} In addition, the interactions between the agency and academia to develop expertise on the region is absent from these works.

It should be noted that the relationship between academia and U.S. national security interests has been and remains controversial. While it is important not to exaggerate the influence of the foreign policy and intelligence establishments on the production of knowledge, it is similarly unhelpful to understate or dismiss the coordination as mere conspiracy theory.\textsuperscript{43} The official histories of academic societies, universities, and private foundations have conceded Cold War ties with the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{44} However, as this dissertation will demonstrate, the relations were far deeper and more involved than previously conceded by the participants.

Different aspects of the influence of the Cold War and the national security establishment on American universities have been explored by scholars. Sigmund Diamond and David Engerman focus on Soviet Studies and expertise.\textsuperscript{45} Irene Gendzier, Nils Gilman, and Michael Latham examine the influence of modernization theorists on the foreign policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.\textsuperscript{46} Frances Stoner Saunders details the CIA’s funding and promotion of the arts, including the Congress for Cultural Freedom, magazines, and international conferences.\textsuperscript{47} Stuart Leslie and Rebecca Lowen discuss the role of the American research university in the “military-industrial-academic complex,” focusing on the dramatic growth and


\textsuperscript{42} Athan Theoharis and Richard Immerman, eds., \textit{The Central Intelligence Agency: Security under Scrutiny} (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 2006) offers an annotated bibliography of various works on or related to the CIA; Scott D. Breckenridge, \textit{The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence Systems} (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1986); Zegart.

\textsuperscript{43} For example, critics of both Cumings and Winks claimed that the historians were engaging in conspiracy theory and attacking the reputation of dead scholars no longer able to defend themselves.


\textsuperscript{45} Sigmund Diamond, \textit{Compromised Campus: The Collaboration of Universities with the Intelligence Community} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Engerman.


change in research and funding of the sciences at MIT and Stanford during the Cold War. However, the Middle East is not the focus of these works, and is either discussed in passing or not at all. Moreover, this dissertation argues that the relationship between academia and the national security establishment was far more complex and dynamic than has been portrayed in the literature on the Cold War university to date.

Scholars have analyzed the emergence of a professional foreign service in the United States, focusing on the intellectual influences and organizational structure. Robert D. Schulzinger examines the professionalization of the State Department prior to the Second World War. The actions and activities of the State Department in the Near and Middle East prior to the Cold War and American hegemony is detailed in classic studies by Phillip Baram and John DeNovo. Robert Kaplan argues that the missionary roots of the State Department’s Near East hands, as well as a latent anti-Semitism, was responsible for an emotional connection and bias toward the Arab states and opposition to the creation of Israel which persisted until the 1960s. In contrast, the scholar as policymaker has received less attention in the literature. Bruce Kuklick’s critical account of leading scholars serving in government during the Cold War contends that the “defense intellectuals” who left the ivory tower for Washington reshaped their academic theories in order to accommodate policymakers. However, the influence of the foreign policy establishment on the production of knowledge about the Middle East is not the focus of these works.

The role and influence of think tanks on the policy making process has received substantial, if uneven, attention by scholars. James Allen Smith places the emergence of think tanks within the context of the professionalization of the social sciences and policy expertise dating to the late nineteenth century. Andrew Rich’s monograph offers a similar, if narrower, analysis of the evolution of think tanks, with an emphasis on their political ideologies and role in partisan debates over policy. However, these and other works are almost exclusively focused on the impact of think tanks on domestic policies and politics.

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Of Silences, Gaps, and Omissions

This is an incomplete study. Although it benefits from extensive archival research, significant gaps in the historical record remain. More than three years after I completed research at the U.S. National Archives a large number of Freedom of Information Act requests remain unresolved. In addition, the records of key agencies are either partially declassified or remain closed to researchers. This includes the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Even when an archive is open and accessible to researchers, the question of what is and what is not in the historical record remains. Diplomatic historians have emphasized, if not fetishized, archival documents not just for their authenticity but presumably because they offer an unbiased perspective into a particular historical events. While archival records do provide an insight into a particular period by an individual, agency, or institution, it is a view not the view. In other words, archival documents are constructed. They can provide insight into an event or issue and they can also provide the perspective the original writer or individuals sought to present at the time and perhaps with an eye toward history. When dealing with sensitive issues within government or academia – or the intersection of the two – the possibilities for gaps and silences in the archival record are even greater. Indeed, while I uncovered interactions between academia and the national security establishment that were heretofore unknown by scholars (or only hinted at), a number of troubling gaps in the national and university archives remained. It is unclear what if anything to make of these omissions and it is unlikely that they will be resolved fully or partially when this dissertation is eventually revised into a manuscript. This is not to suggest that it is impossible to truly know “what happened.” Rather, that historians and readers should not assume that archives present an unbiased and unfiltered record of the past – they do not.

In the following pages, I have attempted to approach the archival documents with humility and healthy skepticism. I am aware that a number of scholars, many who are no longer alive, are discussed in this dissertation as are major American institutions. My intention is not to impugn their reputations or engage in character assassination. Where possible, I have tried to let the documents speak for themselves and allow the reader to make their own judgments. I also leave it to the reader to determine if my attempts at scholarly impartiality were successful.

Chapter Overviews

The remainder of this dissertation details the emergence of Middle East studies and expertise and its relationship to U.S. foreign policy from 1902 to 2002. Chapter One, The Crossroads of the World, argues that the “Middle East” is an ideational construct whose varied representations reflected the strategic interests of Britain and the United States. It analyzes the etymology of the term the “Middle East,” its different geographic representations and their correlation to British and American foreign policy doctrines and policies over the past century. I also examine how the Arabic translation of the “Middle East,” or al-Sharq al-Awsat, has been adopted and contested by Arab journalists and scholars in the region.
In Chapter Two, Wilson’s Experts, I contend that the creation of the Inquiry in preparation for the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference was a significant but flawed precursor to the development of area expertise for government service. This chapter asserts that American Orientalism significantly influenced the Inquiry’s policy recommendations and shaped U.S. foreign policy decisions on the disposition of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Chapter Three, Building Expertise, asserts that the OSS and the ASTP helped establish important institutional frameworks for area studies. Although their structure and emphasis would later be deemed incompatible with university-based area studies, this chapter argues that the example of these wartime programs and more importantly their alumni influenced the postwar development of area studies. I contend that the personal and institutional linkages established during the war would later serve as a reference point for scholars, universities, and the U.S. government for the development of area studies and language training as well as conducting and analyzing foreign area research. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates that the close collaboration between the U.S. government and academia deemed essential during the war transitioned seamlessly to postwar planning before hostilities ended.

Chapter Four, A Time of National Emergency, argues that area studies in general, and Middle East studies in particular, were the product of Cold War containment policy and the expansion of the national security bureaucracy. I examine the relationship and interactions between U.S. government agencies, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the ACLS, and the SSRC to demonstrate that the earliest Middle East studies programs at Princeton and Harvard were created in order to provide expertise for government service and employment in the business sector. This chapter also demonstrates how the U.S. foreign policy establishment promoted AUB and AUC in order to contain Soviet influence in the region. Moreover, I argue that these and other academic institutions and scholars embraced their relationship with Washington and saw their educational missions as helping to further U.S. foreign policy goals.

Chapter Five, In Sputnik’s Wake, contends that the NDEA was responsible for the expansion and diversification of university-based Middle East studies in the United States. This chapter examines the passage and implications of the NDEA and argues that it was the culmination of earlier efforts to produce area expertise for government service and the business sector. I assert that a decade after the NDEA was passed, the influence of the U.S. foreign policy establishment on university-based area studies programs began to be challenged by academic institutions and scholars leading to an eventual rift in the post-Vietnam period.

Chapter Six, The New World Order, examines the perceived decline of area studies in the late and post-Cold War periods and contends that it was a consequence of the emergence of policy related think tanks with strong ties to the U.S. government. This chapter challenges the claim that area studies “failed” and argues instead that Middle East studies diversified and enhanced the U.S.’s understanding of the region while struggling with decreased funding and an uncertain mission. I also profiles two major think tanks related to the Middle East, the Brookings Institution and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and asserts that their prominence was due to their support of U.S. policies in the region and strong financial backing. Finally, this chapter argues that Washington’s relations with both AUB and AUC were reflections of U.S. policies toward their host countries and changes in regional and international conditions.
The Epilogue offers a brief discussion of the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Bush Doctrine on Middle East studies. It argues that the doctrine was a culmination of the last century of American involvement in and hegemony over the Middle East. I also discuss the emergence and influence of neoconservatism, including its ties to think tanks and criticism of university-based Middle East studies programs. Finally, I examine the post-September 11 expansion of the national security establishment and its implications for future research related to the Middle East.

*The East was named from the West, never having enjoyed the advantage of a name that sprang from the region itself.*
- G. Etzel Pearcy, Geographer, U.S. State Department, 1959

*To define, as to name, is to conquer.*
- Arif Dirlik

**Introduction**

While en route to Hong Kong in 1867, Alfred Thayer Mahan visited the port of Aden on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Serving as the Executive Officer of the *U.S.S. Iroquois*, Mahan later described the visit in his memoir, *From Sail to Steam*. Aden, he wrote, had a “long and checkered history,” and its position at an “important center on a commercial route, tends to the gathering of incongruous elements. English, Arabs, Parsees from India, Somalëse from Africa-across the gulf-sepoy soldiers, and Jews, all were to be met.”3 Mahan’s biographer would later explain that although he “winced at the squalor and filth of the backward people” he encountered in Aden, Mahan believed that British rule had provided them with a “benevolent influence.”4

However, Mahan did not initially favor such a role for the United States. He confided in an 1884 letter to a friend that “to me the very suspicion of an imperial policy is hateful.” Yet within a decade Mahan would emerge as “the foremost American imperialist” and a leading proponent for developing American naval power. Advocating national self-interest fused with a moral mission to save civilization, he believed sea power was the medium through which the United States could accept Rudyard Kipling’s call to adopt the “white man’s burden.”5

Mahan returned to the region in 1902 not by sea, but in an article for the London-based *National Review* entitled “The Persian Gulf and International Relations.” He asserted that the “guiding principle” in relation to “the question of the Persian Gulf” was “its relation to India and the Farther East.” Mahan claimed that commercial and political influence over the land and sea routes “from Europe to India and to the East beyond” was concentrated at the Persian Gulf. He called the area the “Middle East,” and while he did not provide concrete geographical boundaries for the region, the term would be adopted and continues to endure.6

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5 Ibid., 92, 160-161. Letter quoted in West. Mahan explained in the letter that even though he was “identified, unluckily, with a military profession I dread outlying colonies, or interests, to maintain which large military establishments are necessary.”
Four decades after Mahan’s article was published, the region known as the “Middle East” shifted westward from his original designation of India and its neighbors. It would eventually encompass a broad swath of territory ranging from Morocco to Afghanistan. Even after the United States determined that “the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East” were vital to its national security interests in 1947, the region’s boundaries continued to expand and contract during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.\(^7\) I contend that these boundaries shifted based on the interests of the major hegemonic power in the region, initially Britain and then the United States.

Indeed, the Middle East is arguably the last remaining geographically indeterminate region, a status that inspires the questions by specialists and students alike: “middle of what?” and “east of where?”\(^8\) Nor does the term explain how Morocco can belong to a region called the “Middle East” when its latitude and longitude places it west of London, or account for the more recent “stanization” of the region with the additions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the former Soviet Central Asian republics.\(^9\) Perhaps most telling is that the term historian Roderic Davison described as “a strategic concept imposed from without by British interests” has not only persisted in the post-World War II era of American hegemony but has also become synonymous with chronic instability, conflict, radicalism, and terrorism.\(^10\) In addition, its usage has persisted even though other geographical regions have shed their colonial- and Cold War-era appellations (e.g., Indochina, Pacific Rim, etc.) and international organizations including the United Nations tend to favor geographic designations that are more specific (e.g., Southwest Asia, Western Asia).\(^11\) Moreover, the “Middle East” has also eclipsed other existing terms for all or part of the


\(^9\) One example of this expansion is a comparison of the Middle East Institute’s (MEI) area of coverage in 1947 and 2009. When the MEI launched the *Middle East Journal* in January 1947, it stated that the publication would focus on “the heart” of the Middle East from Egypt to Iran, as well as cover “closely related peripheral areas” that stretched from Morocco to Turkestan” (see Map 4). Harvey P. Hall, ed., “Editorial Forward.” *Middle East Journal* 1 (1947): 3. According to the MEI’s website, it currently defines the region as stretching from Morocco to Pakistan and including Central Asia.” http://www.mei.edu/Home/MissionandHistory.aspx (last accessed on June 27, 2011).

\(^10\) Roderic Davison, “Where is the Middle East?” *Foreign Affairs* 38, 4 (July 1960): 669.

\(^11\) For example, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) is comprised of fourteen nations ranging from Egypt and the Sudan to Iraq, including the Arabian Peninsula. However, it is worth noting that the UN is also inconsistent in applying these designations, as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) uses the terms “Middle East and North Africa” for the territory from Morocco to Iraq and “Southwest Asia” for Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
region, including the “Levant” and the “Near East.”12 Nor have scholars assisted in clarifying this issue, as their definitions of the Middle East have often been as varied and subjective as that of American policymakers. Which raises the question: why has a region which has been considered vital and strategic to American interests remained vague and inconsistently defined?

In this chapter, I argue that the Middle East is an ideational construct produced and maintained by geographical, ideological, and intellectual representations. In other words, the “Middle East” is not just an invented geographical area as scholars agree, but a notion that is infused with and reified by intellectual justifications and ideologically driven assertions.13 Building upon Edward Said’s claim that “The Orient was almost a European invention,” I contend that the “Middle East” was a British-American creation based on shared interests and ideologies.14 Its invention and adoption across the twentieth century and into the twenty-first reflected not only the imperial attitudes and interests of the United Kingdom and the United States, but the movement of hegemony and empire from London to Washington.15 Using a combination of published and archival sources, this chapter traces the etymology of the term “Middle East” and its correlation with British and American foreign policy doctrines and policies over the past century. It will demonstrate the relationship between the region’s varying geographical boundaries and the associated justifications made by scholars, journalists, and policymakers. I assert that these representations were ideologically driven and reflected British and American imperial attitudes as expressed in their respective foreign policy doctrines and national security policies. Moreover, I argue that the military, political, and economic interests

12 Davison, 666-667. Although the “Levant” and “Near East” covered similar territories, the boundaries of the latter expanded and contracted based on the strategic interests of major hegemonic powers in the region, in particular Britain. The Levant, French for “East” or “Orient,” is generally used in reference to the territories of the Eastern Mediterranean from Egypt to Turkey and did not include the Arabian Peninsula. In contrast, the Near East generally referred to the territories of the Ottoman Empire. While some definitions of the Near East ranged from present-day Serbia and Bulgaria to Iran and included the territories of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula, others were more limited and only encompassed the area from present day Israel-Palestine to Turkey.


14 Said, Orientalism, 1-7. Indeed, the creation of the Middle East is part of the larger construct of “the Orient.” Said argued that the notion of “the Orient” was an invention of the “Occident,” Europe and later, the United States. He claimed that for the Occident, the Orient served as an “idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.” Said added that the interaction between the two was, and remains, “a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony.”

15 Charles Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7, 62-63; Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 4-7. Although not synonymous, definitions of “empire” and “hegemony” share a number of similarities. Maier defines empire as “a form of political organization in which the social elements that rule in the dominant state -- the ‘mother country’ or the ‘metropole’ -- create a network of allied elites in regions abroad who accept subordination in international affairs in return for the security of their position in their own administrative unit (the ‘colony’ or, in spatial terms, the periphery’).” Citing historian Paul Schroeder, he states that “a hegemon exerts a predominant voice over collective policies, but does not possess, or chooses not to exploit, the raw power to compel obedience.” However, McCormick offers a more robust definition of hegemony. Stating that in the context of world-systems theory, “hegemony means that one nation possesses such unrivaled supremacy, such predominant influence in economic power, military might, and political-ideological leadership, that no other power, or combination of powers, can prevail against it.” He adds, “By fear or respect, it must be able to exert its political will over the rest of the system and command deference to its principals and policies.” As this chapter will demonstrate, over the course of the twentieth century the policies pursued by the U.K. and the U.S. in the “Middle East” resembled the actions of an “empire” and a “hegemon” as described above.
of London and Washington were reflected in the different geographic boundaries of the area called the “Middle East.” Finally, this chapter also examines how the Arabic translation of the “Middle East,” or al-Sharq al– Awsat, has been adopted and contested by Arab scholars, journalists, and diplomats in the region.

**Constructing the Middle East**

As an ideational construct, the “Middle East” has a perceived strategic, symbolic, and rhetorical importance. The various definitions and associated depictions of the region over the past century were not representations of a geographic reality. Rather, they were inspired by and rooted in discourses of power and hegemony that reflected the interests of Britain and the United States. For London and Washington, the “Middle East” was an arena of competition for the control of vital resources, transit ways, and territory. Therefore, the boundaries of this area fluctuated according to their perceived security needs and not due to fixed geographical features or even the preexisting terminology and preferences of the region’s inhabitants. Moreover, the region’s declared borders were invariably rationalized by scholars, journalists, and government officials. As will be demonstrated, these justifications were often reflections of British and American policies in the region. Thus, the criteria for inclusion in the “Middle East” were as subjective and arbitrary as those for exclusion.

The construct of the Middle East has been informed by material interests and ideology. As will be demonstrated, the various definitions of the region were influenced by four key factors: power politics, oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and religion. At times, these factors competed for primacy, but they also coexisted and often reinforced each other. Historians Bernard Lewis and P.M. Holt assert that while the Near East was “the product of nineteenth century diplomacy,” the Middle East was the product of “twentieth century strategy.” While geo-political competition for supremacy of and within the region would appear to be at the heart of military and political

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16 Lewis and Wigen, 47-48. Lewis and Wigen explain that “from a planetary perspective all East-West distinctions are clearly arbitrary. On a rotating sphere, east and west are directional indicators only and can be used to divide the entire planetary surface into distinct regions only if there is an agreed-upon point of reference.” They note that in early Japanese maps “the Americas” were considered the “Eastern Hemisphere.” Nor do Lewis and Wigen find the claim, “East and West were never meant to be precisely mappable categories” and that “they are both simply convenient rhetorical labels without any rigorous geographical underpinnings” to be a compelling argument. Instead, they counter that “like the myth of continents, the East-West myth suggests that the globe is divided into fundamental and ultimately comparable groupings of humanity. And as with the Asia-Europe divide on which it is ultimately based, this false binarism plays to a sense of European exceptionality, reinforcing the untenable distinction between Europe and Asia while doing nothing to solve the imbalance between the two.” Moreover, the arbitrariness of the “East-West divide” is further compounded in the “Middle East” due to the imposed borders of the nation-states in the region, whose boundaries were initially determined by Britain and France at the end of World War I.

17 Bernard Lewis and P.M. Holt, eds., *Historians of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 1-2. Lewis and Holt note that both the Near East and the Middle East “obviously derive from a world of which Western Europe was the centre and in which other regions had significance only as Western Europe saw them.” They added that both terms persisted because “for so very long a time, the East-the ancient, classical, and archetypical Orient which has become the neighbor and often the rival of Europe and the West from the days when the invading armies of the Persian Great King first crossed to Greece until the last rearguard action of the Ottoman Empire. As late as the nineteenth century the countries of south-west Asia and north-east Africa were still simply the East, without the need for further definition, and the problem of their disposal was the ‘Eastern Question’.” (emphasis in original).
strategic planning, these rivalries were driven by contrasting ideologies as well as a contest for territory and resources.

Although the Cold War was instrumental in the reification of the Middle East, it was not the sole cause. With the emergence of oil as the essential commodity of the global economy and the role of the Persian Gulf countries as its major exporter after World War II, the competition for control of oil resources also served to define the Middle East. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its ripple effects throughout the region and internationally were instrumental in delineating the Middle East’s boundaries. Like oil, the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict were influenced by but not dependent upon global power politics.

Religion has also influenced definitions and characterizations of the region. Palestine’s role as the “Holy Land” in the theological traditions and imaginations of the major monotheistic religions assured its symbolic importance within the “Middle East.” The presence of Islam’s holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the region has also created a flawed but persistent association between the Muslim faith and the Middle East. This linkage has endured even though Islam is a global religion with more adherents living outside even the most expansive boundaries of the “Middle East” than within them. Yet because of its vague and generic nature, the “Middle East” also has a bureaucratic utility which allows it to be applied to countries in the region that are predominantly non-Muslim, non-Arab, or both.

An indeterminate geographic area almost requires that its population be equally inchoate. Indeed, subsumed within the various definitions of the region were the associated characterizations of its inhabitants. As the Middle East has been described as a perpetual source of tension and turmoil, its inhabitants were also depicted as either the irrational embodiment of the region’s troubles or an unfathomable enigma. British and American policies in the region were informed by and further propagated these characterizations. Both powers believed “modernization” and “reform” were essential if the “hearts and minds” of those in the Middle East were to be won or at the very least mollified. Should their policies be opposed or rejected, the use of force was seen as an unsavory but necessary course of action in order to “maintain stability” in the region and avert catastrophe. As will be demonstrated, the persistence of these characterizations of both the region and its inhabitants correlated to and were a reflection of U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East.

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19 Hunt, 159-160. Hunt asserts that the theories of development and modernization adopted by Washington and applied to the “Third World” were rooted in American beliefs of religious and racial supremacy. As will be demonstrated, conceptions of the “Middle East” and its inhabitants were integral to the development and propagation of modernization theory.
Britain’s Middle East

The Middle East emerged as a term and a region in the early twentieth century reflecting British strategic interests. London’s primary concern was maintaining colonial rule over India, the “crown jewel” of its empire, and preventing Russian encroachment into bordering territories, particularly Persia and Afghanistan. India was a key factor in Britain’s involvement in the “Eastern Question” with France, Russia, and Germany, in which the European powers coordinated and competed over the disposition of the Ottoman Empire’s territories. In these negotiations, Britain’s goal was to ensure its hegemony over the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf’s ports and sea routes. Indeed, Suez’s strategic importance influenced Britain’s invasion and occupation of Egypt in 1882, then a semi-autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire.20

Lord Curzon, viceroy of India, discussed the connection between India and the Eastern Question in a 1909 address entitled “The Place of India in the Empire.” He asserted that India played a central role in Britain’s expansion, stating that:

But for India, Lord Beaconsfield would not have bought the shares in the Suez Canal; and but for the Suez Canal, we should not now be in Egypt. The historic rivalry and struggles with Russia for nearly a century sprang from the supposed necessity of keeping her far away from the frontiers of India. Had it not been for India…Mauritius would not now be ours; nor should we have acquired a predominant position in Mesopotamia, or have controlled the Persian Gulf. India compelled us to lay hold of Aden, a position of incomparable importance, and to establish a protectorate over the neighboring parts of Arabia.21

Lord Curzon’s penchant for hyperbole aside, British officials clearly believed that protecting India’s immediate land and sea borders was vital to their empire’s security.

How to protect the sea approaches to India was the purpose of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s article, “The Persian Gulf and International Relations.” Mahan focused on how Britain could maintain its primacy against Germany and Russia in the Persian Gulf, and argued that London did not need to share control of the area with its European competitors. Instead, he asserted that Britain could retain its position through a network of established relations with “minor local rulers” and by further enhancing and solidifying trade and diplomatic relations in Persia and Mesopotamia.22 To protect its presence in the region, Mahan advocated that Britain establish naval bases similar to Malta and Gibraltar to support operations around India, Aden, and the Persian Gulf. He stated that because London had demonstrated “a long prescription of useful action, of predominant influence, and of political primacy locally recognized in important quarters…there is no reason why she should be expected to abandon these advantages, except as the result of war, if a rival think that result will repay the cost.”23

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22 According to Briton Cooper Busch there was extensive debate within the British press over the question of allowing a Russian presence into the Persian Gulf at this time. He confirms that Mahan’s article was the most influential of the nearly two dozen articles published in less than a twelve month period in various newspapers and magazines. See Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1896-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967): 246n-247n.
While Mahan is credited with coining the term “Middle East,” it is unlikely that it would have been popularized without adoption by the press. The Times of London reprinted portions of Mahan’s article and the head of its foreign department, Valentine Chirol, adopted the term. Based in Tehran, Chirol offered an expanded version of the Middle East, incorporating the western and northern land and sea approaches to India. Chirol’s reporting from the region was revised and compiled into a book in 1903 entitled The Middle Eastern Question, or Some Political Problems of Indian Defense.24

Chirol claimed that India’s geographical position would serve to put it at the “forefront of international politics” and increasingly develop into the “strategical frontier of the British Empire.” As the “masters of India,” Chirol asserted that Britain had achieved “a position of unparalleled ascendancy in the Asiatic continent.” He defined the “Middle East” as “those regions of Asia which extend to the borders of India or command the approaches to India, and which are consequently bound up with the problems of Indian political as well as military defense.” Chirol asserted that the “Middle Eastern Question” was “the outcome of that constant projection of European forces -- moral, commercial, and military -- into Asia” and was “only a part of a much larger question upon which the future of Asia depends.” He added that it was not a new issue but one that “occupied the minds of far-sighted statesman for generations past.” Chirol claimed that “it is a continuation of the same question with which we have long been familiar in the Near East. It is closely connected with the more novel development of international rivalry in the Far East.”25 Thus for Chirol, controlling the “Middle East” was part of the larger contest for hegemony over the “Near East” and the “Far East.”

Chirol also extolled the benefits of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf. Citing Mahan’s article, Chirol assailed English critics who claimed Britain had no territorial claim to the Gulf. He promoted Mahan’s celebrity, expertise, and impartiality as an American to argue that Britain’s presence in the Gulf would protect its imperial territories elsewhere and facilitate trade in the region. But for the “vigilance of the ubiquitous British gunboat,” Chirol claimed that the Gulf would be subject to the indigenous Arab tribes who had settled on the coasts and “imported to its waters the predatory habits of the desert.” While hegemony had come at an unknown cost in British treasure and lives, he asserted that the empire had “derived no material advantages for ourselves beyond those which British trade and British shipping can reap from the freedom and security of commerce and navigation in open competition with the rest of the world; we have claimed no direct compensation, no exclusive privileges.”26 Chirol’s view of British altruistic imperialism would later be adopted by the United States as it established hegemony over the region.

God & Oil

The “rediscovery” of Palestine and the development of the oil industry in Persia were instrumental in shaping the contours of the Middle East. Several factors contributed to the

26 Ibid., 241-245.
growing importance of Palestine in Europe and America by the nineteenth century. As evidenced by the “Eastern Question” and the British occupation of Egypt, there was increased European cultural, political, and economic influence and dominance over the Ottoman Empire. This was accompanied by a religious revival in Europe and the United States, which led to a greater interest in and travel to the biblical lands of Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. According to historian Ussama Makdisi, the initial wave of American Protestant missionaries embarked for the “Holy Land” in the early nineteenth century intent on redeeming it from the “profusion of impure religions and nations” that had corrupted its “pure Christianity.” This included the presence of other Christian denominations, Jews, and Muslims. Makdisi asserts, “The Bible lands were a proving ground for American redemption, ostensibly free of the entanglements and corruptions of American colonialism and Western empire.” While the early attempts at conversion were unsuccessful, a second generation of American missionaries returned to the area and established some of the most prestigious educational institutions in the region.

Similarly, the establishment of Britain’s Palestine Exploratory Fund found a welcome audience in America. Supported by the British Consul in Jerusalem, the Palestine Exploratory Fund promoted early excavations of the city and its activities were covered in American newspapers. Historian Lester Vogel states that the Palestine Exploratory Fund awakened “American interest in Palestinian antiquity” in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. He adds that it offered Americans a “shared sense of commonality with the British” based on a mutual heritage of Anglo-Saxon Protestant “Holy Land lore.” Vogel asserts that the shared Anglo-American Protestant traditions influenced the “public’s receptivity to missionary efforts, the guardianship of holy sites, and even the historical viewpoint on biblical events and figures. Perhaps with no other European people did Americans share so much in common when it came to the Holy Land.”

The numerous pilgrimages and expeditions by European and American missionaries, scholars, and travelers also produced a variety of travelogues published during the nineteenth century. These travelogues were best-sellers in the United States, including Mark Twain’s The Innocents Abroad, which sold over 65,000 copies in its first year of publication. Kathleen Christison contends that the travelogues shared several features. Like Twain’s account, they offered derogatory portrayals of the Arab and Muslim inhabitants, as well as the territories they visited. When the indigenous population was not demeaned it was ignored, as the missionaries

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28 Ibid., 11. Makdisi places the first wave of American missionary work in the Middle East within the context of previous initiatives among Native Americans. However, he states that from the beginning they were “implicated in settler colonialism, which both made possible and consistently upset the most benevolent mission among Indians.” Makdisi adds that “the methodologies and ideals of early American evangelism to the Islamic world were inevitably refracted through the experience of archetypal mission work to the Indian heathen.”
29 Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven, 209-214; David Finnie, Pioneers East: the Early American Experience in the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 137-241; Kaplan, 31-44. The Syrian Protestant College was founded in Beirut in 1866 and renamed the American University of Beirut in 1920. Other colleges were established in the region, including in Aleppo and Istanbul. However, they were later nationalized by the host country or ceased operations.
and travelers attempted to find the “real Palestine,” which they equated with the “biblical Palestine.”

Oil’s emergence as a vital commodity to industrialized Europe and America served to enhance Persia’s status from just a strategic approach to India to a strategic interest and prize in its own right. In 1901, a sixty year concession was signed between the ruling Qajar shah and William Knox D’Arcy, a wealthy British-born speculator and investor. Coupled with the decision by the British navy to move from coal to oil, the D’Arcy concession marked the beginning of the oil era in the Persian Gulf. On May 5, 1903, British Foreign Secretary Lord Landsdowne declared in the House of Lords that Britain “should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to Britain’s interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal.” Lord Curzon would later declare that it was Britain’s “Monroe Doctrine in the Middle East.”

World War I and the Middle East Department

In spite of the efforts by Chirol and Mahan, the term “Middle East” was inconsistently applied prior to World War I. Nor did this trend go without comment. Writing in The American Journal of International Law in 1918, historian Norman Dwight Harris noted how recently published works related to the “Near East” were characterized by a “looseness of terms” due partially to the preference of earlier European writers to refer to “Asia minor and adjacent countries as the ‘Orient’ or ‘East’.” He stated that “writers and students of Asiatic affairs, as well as European statesmen now recognize three chief regions on the great Eastern continent: the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East. And it is imperative that those who wish to speak intelligently on questions relating to this part of the world should observe carefully this distinction.”

31 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 16-21; Lawrence Davidson, America’s Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 4-5; Fuad Sha‘ban, Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: Roots of Orientalism in Early America (Durham, N.C.: Acorn Press, 1991). All three authors discuss the role of popular American perceptions of Palestine which were based on a combination of religious teachings and writings and travelogues. Davidson states that while the vast majority of Americans were unaware of the reality of contemporary Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “they knew a great deal about a romanticized and theocratized version of that land.”


34 Dwight Norman Harris, “The War and the Baghdad Railway: The Story of Asia Minor and its Relation to the Present Conflict,” The American Journal of International Law 12 (1918): 905. For example, Milivoy Stanoyevich’s Russian Foreign Policy in the East (San Francisco: Liberty Publishing Company, 1916), 1-16, segmented the eastern territories into the Near, Middle, and Far East. Stanoyevich, then a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, defined the different regions around major bodies of water strategic to Russian interests. For the Near East this was the Aegean Sea, while the Middle East was centered around the Arabian Sea, and the Yellow Sea for...
As European hegemony was further entrenched in the region after the war, it was accompanied by subsequent attempts to redefine the “Middle East.” In 1920, Britain’s Royal Geographic Society announced that the Near East would apply only to the Balkans, while the Middle East would denote the territories from Turkey to eastern India. Meanwhile, the creation of League of Nation mandates over the newly created states of Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan helped shape the map of a new, modern Middle East. In London, it led to the establishment of the Middle East Department within the Colonial Office to administer the new additions to the empire.

Prior to the creation of the Middle East Department, the port of Aden and the Persian Gulf territories were ruled by the Government of India. This included extensive and lucrative trading ties throughout the Persian Gulf region. Even though these territories were not administered by League of Nations mandates, it was decided that they would be overseen by the Colonial Office’s new department. Prime Minister David Lloyd George assigned an interdepartmental committee to examine how the mandated territories and Aden would be administered. In response, the committee report noted that the initial problem in creating a new department to cover these territories was that they were “not conterminous.” It added that the Cabinet intended that “the Middle Eastern, or rather the Arab, problem should be treated as one organic whole” and that the new Department would “be responsible for directing policy” for the entire Arabian Peninsula. The committee recommended that the Middle East Department govern the territories “bounded by the Mediterranean, the frontier of Egypt and the Red Sea on the south-west, on the south and south-east by the Indian Ocean, on the northeast by the north eastern boundary of Mesopotamia and by the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf.”

Planning for the Middle East Department was a source of tension between Lord Curzon and the new Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill. Churchill’s plans were threatened by the concerns of the public and other government officials that Britain was overextending its commitments and responsibilities in the region. Meanwhile, Curzon was adamant that the

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35 Davison, 668.
36 Adelson, 187. During the war, Lord Curzon chaired the War Cabinet’s Middle East Committee which was responsible for region between Persia and India. By 1918, this committee was incorporated into the Eastern Committee, also chaired by Curzon. According to Adelson “the committee had little effect on military matters, which were determined by the War Cabinet and the general staff. Nor did Curzon have much influence over Palestine, Mesopotamia, Syria, or the western part of the Arabian Peninsula, all of which were still administered predominantly from the Arab Bureau in Cairo.”
37 Report on Middle East Conference, Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12-30, 1921, CO 935/1, United Kingdom’s Public Records Office (hereafter PRO). The report’s Appendix, entitled “Section 1-Events Leading up to the Conference and Procedure Adopted,” stated that the Persian Gulf littoral have “for the last hundred years or more been under the political control of Government of India, exercised for the past fifty years through an officer of the Government of India with headquarters at Bushire – with the title of Political Resident in the Persian Gulf -- who also controls the Northern (Persian) littoral as well as certain inland Consulates in South Persia.” That control included heavy reliance on Indian currency and trade as well as military, social and political services and personnel. The report noted, “The transfer to the new Department of the Arabian littoral would entail an additional burden on His Majesty’s Treasury and could scarcely be accomplished without much confusion and possible friction.”
38 Ibid., 18.
Government of India maintain responsibility for the Arabian Peninsula.\(^{39}\) However, Churchill was able to overcome Curzon’s resistance and the Middle East Department was formally established in the spring of 1921.\(^{40}\) With the creation of the new department, the term “Middle East” was finally affixed to a governmental organization and bureaucracy. Thus, it was no longer an abstract and generic term but was representative of specific countries in a particular geographic location. However, this did not end its arbitrary application, even within the same government.

World War II

As Europe lurched toward another continental war in the late 1930s, the British military offered a number of different definitions for the “Middle East.” The Middle East Air Command (MEAC) initially covered Egypt, Sudan, and Kenya, but was expanded to include Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Aden, and Malta in 1938. At MEAC’s height during the war, it also included Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Libya, Greece, Crete, and Iran.\(^{41}\)

Britain’s creation of the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) in 1941 offered another definition of the area. Established to provide supplies to territories in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, it initially comprised only six countries. The MESC became a joint Anglo-American operation the following year. By May 1944, it was responsible for supplying 17 countries and territories. A report produced by the U.S.’s Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) during the war stated that due to the combination of attacks by German aircraft on Allied supply lines and the infiltration of Nazi agents into the region “signs of unrest developed which endangered the operations of the British and Allied forces assigned to hold this strategic area. It was vital to the anti-Axis nations that means be established for insuring at least a minimum supply of civilian materials to the peoples of the Middle East.”\(^{42}\)

\(^{39}\) Adelson, 197-201.
\(^{40}\) Report on Middle East Conference, Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, CO 935/1, PRO; Adelson, 200. Churchill arranged a conference to determine how rule and expenditures would be transferred from the Government of India to the Middle East Department. He was also concerned with reducing the cost of administering the territories. Held in Cairo, the attendees included the High Commissioners for Palestine and Mesopotamia, the Residents of Aden and the Persian Gulf posts, the Governor of Somaliland, and the General Officer commanding in Persia with discussions held over two weeks. According to Adelson, Churchill was only able to receive approval from the Prime Minister after estimating that the cost of Iraq and Palestine to the treasury would fall from £30 million to £8 million within two years.

\(^{41}\) Davison, 668-669.

\(^{42}\) The Middle East Supply Center, May 1944, RG 226, Entry 16, Document 76932, Foreign Economic Administration, Special Branch, Middle East Division, Records of the Office of Strategic Services National Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter NARACP). At different times the MESC serviced territory ranging from Malta to Iran, and briefly supplied Greece and Yugoslavia as well. The FEA report noted that the MESC area was “considerably larger than the United States or Europe. Outside of the Soviet Union, it is the largest, though not the most populous, area in the world under a single economic administration.” It stated that some countries, like Turkey and the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, were only included in the MESC because they received certain commodities like sugar and cereal. Similarly, a number of East African countries, including Kenya and Uganda, were included as “supply areas” only.
As the war drew to a close, James Landis, the dean of the Harvard University Law School and director of the U.S.’s Economic Operations in the Middle East, explained the importance of the MESC. Landis claimed that because of the loss of Greece during the war and the resulting shipping difficulties in the Mediterranean that “the supply of those countries representing the Middle East became of overwhelming importance. They represented Islam, and a peaceful Islam was essential to the defense of Suez. A peaceful Islam could not be assured if it were permitted to starve.” Yet ranging at times from Kenya to Iran the area covered by the MESC also had a large non-Muslim population who likely would not have starved “peacefully” either. More telling is Landis’s admission of the key role of Suez within the MESC’s coverage area and the perceived need to placate the indigenous populations of the countries in its vicinity in order to maintain control over the strategic waterway.  

Further complicating usage of the term by the British Government, the newly created position of Minister of State in the Middle East was also based in Cairo. Yet it covered a different area from the other military and political offices for the “Middle East,” serving the territories from Syria to Ethiopia.

The U.S.’s wartime definition of the “Middle East” was based on that of its British allies. This included the coverage area of the Middle East by both the armed services and the OSS, America’s wartime intelligence service. For example, the Middle East operations of the OSS’s Secret Intelligence branch (SI) ranged from Egypt to Afghanistan. However, after the Allied

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44 The Middle East Supply Center, May 1944, RG 226, Entry 16, Document 76932, Foreign Economic Administration, Special Branch, Middle East Division, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, NARACP.
45 Davison, 668-669.
46 U.S. Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Collection Agencies, 1943-1945, RG 226, M1642, Roll 6, OSS, NARACP. In contrast, the “Near East section” of the OSS’s Research and Analysis Branch initially had a different coverage area.
invasion of North Africa was successfully completed, the OSS’s operations in the region were geared toward the invasion of Europe and preparation for the postwar period.47

Shared Interests

The end of the Second World War witnessed the emergence of the United States as a global superpower and the waning of Britain’s empire. This transition was marked in a series of meetings between the Anglo-American allies known as the Pentagon Talks. Held in Washington in the fall of 1947, these discussions developed out of the Allies joint determination that the Middle East was “vital” to their security. Condensed into a memorandum entitled “The American Paper,” which was eventually renamed National Security Council (NSC) Action Number 13, the talks established the foundations of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.48

NSC Action Number 13 (NSC AN13) declared that Washington’s main goal was “the maintenance of world peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations” and that it “must be concerned with any situations which might develop into an international armed conflict.” NSC AN13 claimed that such a situation existed in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and that the security of the region was “vital to the security of the U.S.” It asserted that the region’s security would be jeopardized if Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran came under Soviet Union control and that America should use “political, economic, and if necessary, military power” to maintain the “territorial integrity and political independence” of these states.49 NSC AN13 established the basis for the development of policies for specific countries within the region, including NSC 5 and 42, which were formulated for Greece and Turkey, and served to form the core of the Truman Doctrine.50

These national security policies also led the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to differentiate between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which they considered two separate areas. According to the JCS, the Eastern Mediterranean included Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, (and regional designation) from that of the SI branch. Its analysis covered the territories from Palestine to Afghanistan, including Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula, while Egypt was initially classified under the British Empire section.

47 For example, by 1944 Istanbul became SI’s headquarters for the Mediterranean theater and gathered intelligence on Greece and southeastern Europe ostensibly for the Allied invasion of Germany, but it also monitored Soviet and perceived Soviet-inspired activities in the area. Similarly, the OSS’s North Africa operations were geared toward the invasion of Sicily and eventually the Italian mainland. Both the Mediterranean and North African branch operations reported to the OSS’s Cairo office as well as to OSS headquarters in Washington.


49 Ibid., 575. NSC 13 stated that to prevent Soviet misunderstanding of U.S. interests in the region, Washington should make Moscow aware in “a firm but non-provocative manner” the extent of its determination. However, it cautioned that the success of this policy relied on the Allies maintaining “parallel policies” in the area.

50 NSC 5 warned of the dire implications for the region if U.S. assistance were withdrawn from Greece, and provides an insight into American policy maker’s Cold War perspective based on George Keenan’s “bandwagon” theory, later rebranded the “domino theory” in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. This included “Soviet control of Greece,” followed by the “collapse of resistance in Iran,” the “encouragement in Italy and France to internal Communist movements,” and a weakening of Turkey. There would also be implications for the Anglo-American alliance, and the position of the United States “on the Eurasian land mass.” FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1948, Vol. IV, 4.
Palestine, and Egypt; while the Middle East contained Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula. Yet in spite of the efforts to differentiate between the two areas, the terms would become interchangeable and within a decade usage of the term “Middle East” would prevail over the Eastern Mediterranean and eventually the Near East as well. Indeed, while the Middle East was considered a separate area, the JCS and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal viewed maintaining a base in the area of Cairo-Suez-Khartoum as essential in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. These bases would initially be used for offensive air operations and then as a staging ground to retain “as much of the Middle East oil resources as allied capability will permit.”

Announced by President Harry Truman before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was publicly targeted at supporting Greece and Turkey against internal Communist subversion and external pressure from the Soviet Union. While Greece was viewed as vital to protecting southern Europe, Washington believed that Turkey held a “key position” to protecting “the Middle East and the Arab world generally.” A day after the President’s address the JCS informed Secretary of Defense Forrestal that Turkey’s resistance to Soviet pressure would provide “a test case to all Middle East countries.” The memo added that:

Should Russia dominate Turkey in peace time we consider it highly probable that all the Middle East countries would then come rapidly under similar Soviet domination. If Russia can absorb Turkey in peace our ability to defend the Middle East in war will be virtually destroyed. In war Turkey presents a natural barrier to an advance by Russia to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East countries, Palestine in particular.

In conjunction with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan was designed to contain Communism in Western Europe and Japan through economic reconstruction. Under the Marshall Plan, the first five years of aid were aimed at rebuilding the war-torn countries, while the following five-to ten-year period focused on ensuring that their economies did not stagnate. This was to be accomplished with cheap oil from the Middle East sent to Europe via the Suez Canal. Particularly important to this effort was the British-owned refinery in Abadan, Iran, then the world’s largest. Thus, the secure and reliable production, refinement, and distribution of oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and Japan became an integral component of Washington’s containment policy.

This period also offered the State Department an opportunity to redefine geographic areas and terminology from an American perspective. However, as observed in Britain during World War II, existing labels were preserved, but the territories they covered were changed. The Near Eastern Department was created in 1909 covering a vast expanse that included the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. Renamed the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)

51 FRUS, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1948, Vol. V, Part 1, 2-3. NSC AN13 also supplied the foundation for NSC 19/3, which formalized U.S. policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and later, NSC 47/2 for Israel and the Arab states, which specifically applied to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
53 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 77.
in 1939, it was still responsible for a large area encompassing most of Africa and southwest Asia to Burma. Restructured again in 1944, the new NEA was responsible for the territories from Egypt to Iraq, while a newly established Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (MEA) covered Iran to present-day Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). 54 By the 1950s, the MEA would be dissolved, and a restructured NEA would again be responsible for the territories from Sudan to Iran and the eastern Mediterranean, including Greece, Crete, and Cyprus. 55 It is uncertain why the Middle East failed to persist as a departmental designation, although it is likely that as observed in Britain during World War II, bureaucratic precedent was the key factor. 56 Yet in retaining Britain’s designation for the region, the State Department symbolically demonstrated the shared interests and legacy of the Anglo-American allies in the Middle East.

The “Middle” of the World

Although the State Department’s did not adopt the Middle East as an official designation, it fully emerged as a term and a region in the postwar era, albeit with definitions that continued to vary. For example, two separate articles written by State Department officials after the Truman Doctrine was announced defined the region differently. Loy Henderson, the State Department’s Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs, claimed the Middle East was comprised of countries from Afghanistan to Sudan. Yet Harry Howard, chief of the Research Branch Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, excluded the Sudan in his discussion. Both men stated that the region was a “highway” between East and West and emphasized the wealth of its mineral and oil resources. Howard added that the Middle East “is the gateway to the three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa.” 57

Indeed, it was the identification of the region as a strategic link to other areas that inspired various attempts to justify and reify the “Middle East” during this period. Geographer W.B. Fisher’s influential The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography argued that the region could be studied as a single unit based on similar geographic, social, and cultural factors. He claimed that “on geographic grounds” the area from eastern Libya (then Cyrenaica) to Iran (including Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula, Crete, and Cyprus), formed a “natural region to which the name Middle East can be applied.” However, Fisher conceded that including the eastern Mediterranean region within the Middle East did not appear logical and was open to criticism. Yet he maintained that as a term, the Middle East denoted “a single geographical region with certain elements of marked social and physical unity.”

Fisher also offered other unifying factors for the region. He claimed that advancements in air transport increased the area’s importance, in particular Egypt which emerged as a major node in air routes during and after World War II. Coupled with the Suez Canal, which he described as

54 Baram, 67.
55 Pearcy, 411.
56 Davison, 670. According to Davison, during the war then Prime Minister Winston Churchill attempted to clarify the use of terminology. Churchill believed that the Near East was comprised of Egypt, the Levant, Syria, and Turkey, while Iraq and Persia constituted the Middle East. He attempted to reorganize the MEAC in the region along these lines, but the War Cabinet would only agree to the division of Command but not renaming it “to avoid confusion.”
the “principal artery of communication between Europe and Asia,” these factors made the Middle East “a crossroads -- the point of junction between an awakening Asia, a still influential Europe, and a triumphant America.”

Another prominent work during this period was George Kirk’s *A Short History of the Middle East*. A classical scholar and archaeologist, Kirk’s definition of the Middle East differed slightly from that of Fisher. Arguing that Arabic was the major unifying factor for the region, Kirk claimed that the Middle East stretched from western Libya (then Tripolitania) to Iraq. He added, however, that Turkey and Iran were historically integrated with these areas and could not be studied separately. Moreover, Kirk asserted that the Arabic-speaking countries formed “geographically and historically the central core” of the Middle East.

These definitions were reinforced by the establishment of the first American-based scholarly institution focusing exclusively on the contemporary “Middle East.” Founded in May 1946, the Middle East Institute’s (MEI) declared goal was to support a “deepening American interest in the Middle East, and broadening understanding between the United States and Middle Eastern countries.” Initially led by Congressman, former Governor of Massachusetts, and later Secretary of State, Christian Herter, and George C. Keiser, a scholar who became Chairman of the Board of Governors, the MEI maintained extensive linkages to U.S. government agencies, major oil companies, and academic institutions and scholars. It established a library in Washington, D.C. which collected works from and about the region and sponsored annual conferences and public lectures. By January 1947, the institute launched the *Middle East Journal*, a quarterly publication which stated that it would focus on “the heart” of the Middle East from Egypt to Iran, as well as cover “closely related peripheral areas” that stretched from Morocco to Turkestan.

Three years later, Keiser reaffirmed the MEI’s purpose at a conference hosted by Harvard University. He claimed that the combination of America’s lack of knowledge about the region and the Middle East’s increasing importance made the MEI necessary. He added that “the Middle East is our concern. We must find ways to become more familiar with it.”

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58 W.B. Fisher, *The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1950), 1-8. Fisher’s *The Middle East* was based on an article published three years earlier entitled “Unity and Diversity in the Middle East,” *Geographical Review* 37 (July 1947): 414-435. In his 1947 article, Fisher claimed that the term “Near East” was no longer significant with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and with the emergence of the “Middle East” as competing geographical construct there was too much confusion for the Near East to be “readopted.”


60 Harvey P. Hall, ed., “Note on the Middle East Institute,” *Middle East Journal* 1 (1947): 123. Financial support for the MEI initially came from the Charter of Diplomatic Affairs Foundation of New York. In addition, the institute’s Board of Governors initially included the President of the Diplomatic Affairs Foundation and the Director of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

61 Ibid.; Lockman, 127.


In spite of these efforts, the “middle” of the “Middle East” was still a point of contention. Harvey Hall, the editor of the Middle East Journal and a former OSS and State Department official, discussed this problem at a 1949 conference. Hall explained that while archaeologists and historians referred to the Middle East as the region between the Near and Far East, for the “modern, militarist, economist and student of international affairs” it was “a strategic area centered at the juncture of the three continents of the Old World.” Although he asserted that there was “no particular logic in designating the area ‘Middle’” either geographically or strategically, Hall conceded that “its usage has become fixed in the popular mind.” He added that “it is unfortunate that a fresh phrase was not conceived when the need first arose, but even if one now came to mind, it is not within our power to reverse the popular trend. The best we can do is to attempt to clarify it.”

Attempts to clarify the term would continue for the next six decades. Anthropologist and OSS veteran Carleton S. Coon offered one explanation in Caravan: The Story of the Middle East. Although he admitted that part of the region was “west of Greenwich and closer to America than continental Europe,” Coon asserted that it was middle in “latitude, and it is ‘Middle’ also in a more important sense. It lies strategically between the richer and more populous subcontinents of the Eurasianic land mass, China, India, and Europe, and is in contact by ship and caravan with Africa south of the Sahara.” He added that “the Middle Easterners have long served as Middle Men for goods and ideas of these mutually distant regions.” Ranging from Afghanistan to Morocco, Coon stated that the “Middle East” was a “cultural area

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64 Middle East Journal, 1 (1947).
65 “What is the ‘Middle East’?,” Harvey P. Hall, Paper prepared for the Modern Middle East Studies Conference, Dropsie College, 11-12 April, 1949, Box E 22, American Council of Learned Societies Archives, the Library of Congress.
66 There were also various attempts to replace the term during this period, none of which were successful. One example was offered by George McGhee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Kennedy Administration and former Ambassador to Turkey and West Germany. In his memoirs, McGhee proposed the term the “Middle World” as a replacement for the Middle East. Although he admitted it was not “in general usage,” he stated that he hoped to make it so. Encompassing an enormous stretch of territory from Morocco to Bangladesh as well as half of the African continent, McGhee’s “Middle World” was a more problematic term than the one it sought to replace. In addition, in spite of their historical and geographical connections to the rest of the proposed region McGhee deliberately excluded Greece, Israel, and Turkey from the “Middle World.” He stated that “Greece is an integral part of the West,” and that Turkey has “over several centuries developed strong ties with Europe and the United States.” In addition, he claimed that Israel “lives in but is not really a part of the Middle World.” Envoy to the Middle World (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), xix-xx, 1-2.
of its own with a center and peripheries.” Those peripheries included Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey, which he stated were “transitional to another cultural area,” but he conceded that the countries could also belong in the Middle East.  

Princeton scholar Manfred Halpern, an OSS and State Department alumnus, adopted a different approach from other scholars. Halpern conceded frankly that “there is no way to define the Middle East simply, permanently, and with precision.” However, he added, “The very fact that it spills over and also interlocks with other regions is an essential part of its true definition and of its significance.” Indeed, the malleability of the term and the region it represented would be an asset to U.S. strategic planners during the Cold War.

**The Cold War and the Middle East**

By 1950, Washington began reassessing its containment policy toward the Soviet Union. As advocated by George Kennan, a former diplomat with the U.S. embassy in Moscow and later the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS), containment was to be achieved through the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan. In addition, the military would serve largely as a deterrent force, with the U.S. identifying and defending certain areas vital to its security. However, Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons and the potential threat that Moscow would develop thermonuclear weapons drove the creation of a more robust strategy.

NSC 68 reshaped Washington’s Cold War strategy toward the Soviet Union with implications globally and at home. It advocated a dramatic increase in U.S. military spending and military assistance to other countries as well as a global containment effort, including in the Third World. The document portrayed the Soviet Union as an aggressive force intent on world domination and fundamentally opposed to American values and institutions. It asserted that the Soviet Union was inherently militant because it was “possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement,” had inherited the mantle of Russian imperialism, and was a totalitarian dictatorship. NSC 68 claimed that Western Europe, the oil fields of the Middle East, and Japan were particularly vulnerable in the short-term.

Building on the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) two years earlier, Washington and London actively sought the development of a similar regional security organization for the Middle East. Indeed, attempts to create a regional defense organization would serve as a new defining factor for the region during the 1950s. However, these efforts

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67 Carleton Coon, *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East* rev ed. (Malabar, Fla: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976), 1-2. Coon claimed that “the civilization which characterizes [the Middle East], in various regional forms, is not only a unit, and not only intermediate between those of East and West, but in many essentials ancestral to both. It has served not only as a vehicle of transmission but also as a creator.”

68 Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), xv-xvi, 366. Halpern defined the area from Morocco to Pakistan, including Afghanistan and Sudan, as the “Middle East and North Africa.” However, throughout the text he consciously referred to the region as the “Middle East” for “present convenience.”

69 See *FRUS, General; United Nations, 1948, Vol. I, part 2*, 662-669. Formalized as NSC 20/4, the policy was approved by President Truman on November 24, 1948.

were consistently hampered by the repercussions from the creation of Israel in May 1948. In addition, the legacy of British colonialism in the region made many of the newly and barely independent Arab states wary of joining a defense pact with the U.K. On May 25, 1950, the U.S., Britain, and France announced the Tripartite Declaration. The intent of the declaration was to assist the British in developing an Anglo-Egyptian military alliance, later known as the Middle East Command (MEC). Washington, London, and Paris believed that the region’s defenses could be strengthened against a potential Soviet attack by providing defensive weaponry to the countries in the area without setting off a local arms race.71

North Korea’s invasion of South Korea a month later created a significant shift in U.S. policy in the Middle East and the MEC became a top priority. American diplomatic and military officials stressed to Israel and the Arab states the importance of resolving their differences in order to combat the greater Soviet threat. China’s entry into the Korean conflict five months later convinced American policy makers that NSC 68’s description of the Soviet Union was accurate. They began to prepare for Soviet attacks and intrigues globally, particularly in the Middle East where the Suez Canal and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf region were considered vulnerable. This led to increased pressure on the states in the region to enlist in the MEC.

Anglo-American attempts to create the MEC faltered initially due to the Arab-Israeli conflict and then the overthrow of Egypt’s King Farouk in July 1952. Although the new Egyptian government composed of the Free Officers Movement and led by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) initially appeared receptive to joining the defense pact, Cairo eventually informed Washington that it believed Britain and Israel were a greater threat than the Soviets. The inability to secure Egypt within the MEC or its still-born successor the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) led the Eisenhower administration to pursue an alliance of countries in the Middle East’s “Northern Tier.” Pursued largely by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Northern Tier was initially comprised of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and would serve to redefine the borders of the “Middle East” yet again.72

72 “Daspit to Dixon,” 25 November, 1952, RG59, Entry 1436, Box 12, Records of the State Department Office of Near Eastern Affairs (hereafter NEA), 1941-1954, NARACP. The Eisenhower administration inherited the MEDO proposal from the Truman administration and it met the same fate as the MEC. MEDO also served as an intermediary step to the creation of the Northern Tier. A briefing paper prepared for Dulles stated that if created, the MEDO would be “atypical among international organizations.” This was due to the “milieu in which the Organization is designed to function and to the objective it is intended to serve.” The paper stated that “as to the milieu, the most significant factors are: the great strategic and economic value of the Middle East area; its exposed and presently defenseless position except for Turkish strength on the Northwest; the internal weakness and instability of the regimes in most of the states of the area; the extreme nationalism and distrust of the West which is common throughout the area. The MEDO thus is designed to operate in an area of great value to the West, which there is serious danger of losing either by internal subversion or by Communist conquest, and where the tools for exercising constructive Western influence are presently lacking.” It added that MEDO’s objectives were initially to “strengthen the ability of Middle East States to resist subversion and to provide a framework for Middle East-Western cooperation, at first limited to military planning. Thus, the proposed military organization is intended at least initially to serve political or cold war objectives. Only after progress has been made on this front, will it be possible to take effective measures for the creation of area defense.” Among the positive factors that were to be considered in the creation of MEDO was, “The existing military strength of Turkey and the considerable potential of Pakistan.” Another key factor that was recognized was the “willingness of certain of these regimes (notably Syria
In the same year as the Free Officer’s revolt, the National Geographic Society offered its own definitions of the Near, Middle, and Far East. Relying on the State Department’s definition as a baseline, the Society reported that the Near East comprised the areas from Egypt to Iran including Turkey, Cyprus, and the Arabian Peninsula. It considered the territories from Afghanistan to present-day Sri Lanka to be in the Middle East, stating erroneously that it was adopting Washington’s pre-World War II definition of the region. While the Society followed the State Department’s recent designation of placing Burma in the Far East, in the Near East it did not and omitted Greece and the Sudan. The Society explained that “the Balkan states of southeastern Europe often have been tabbed as part of the Near East, but American practice is to align them geographically with the West.”

Two years later, a leading Middle East expert offered a geo-strategic definition of the region. Halford Hoskins, a former director of SAIS and consultant to the State Department for the Middle East during World War II, claimed that the Middle East included “Turkey, Iran, and Egypt (plus the Sudan) and the other countries included within these peripheral limits.” Hoskins asserted that the region “we have chosen to call the Middle East occupies the position of a partial barrier...in both geographical and cultural terms, between the West and Farther East.” He added that “it is obvious that the political orientation of the peoples of the Middle East is a matter of consequence of the first order to any group of contestants for world hegemony.”


The Eisenhower Doctrine

In response to a perceived threat to U.S. interests from within the region, a new definition of the Middle East emerged by 1957. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s emergence as the president of Egypt was a watershed moment for the region. Nasser’s anti-colonial stance coupled with his call for Pan-Arabism was a rhetorical force that inspired regional political movements and contrasted

and Egypt) to cooperate with the West providing sufficient inducements are offered and a face-saving formula can be found.”

73 “Geographers Map 3 Disputed Easts,” *New York Times* 27 April 1952. It should be noted that usage and implications of the term “Balkans” has been critiqued by scholars over the past decade. See Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).


75 Ibid., 257-259, 266-267. As depicted in Map 3, Hoskins’s “Middle East Defense Area” encompassed the entire Mediterranean region. It included air bases in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco, and detailed the importance of British bases at Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus to the defense of the Middle East.
sharply with the generally ineffectual leadership of the more conservative Arab regimes. In contrast, Egypt’s unwillingness to allow Britain to maintain military forces in the Suez Canal zone and refusal to join the Baghdad Pact ensured the West’s antagonism toward Nasser’s regime.

That antagonism climaxed with the 1956 Suez War. Tensions between Cairo and Washington increased after Egypt concluded a deal for Soviet military aid in September 1955. Relations worsened over the next year, resulting in London and Washington withdrawing their promised economic support for the expansion of Egypt’s Aswan Dam in July. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, instigating an Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in late October 1956. While their reasons for wanting Nasser removed from power differed, the military victory of the tripartite forces proved to be a disastrous political defeat after they were compelled to withdraw under U.S.-Soviet pressure. Moreover, while the White House and Whitehall shared the same policy goals toward Egypt before the canal was nationalized, the tripartite invasion and Washington’s response proved to be one of the rare public moments of discord between the allies.

The 1956 Suez War served to dramatically increase Nasser’s popularity in Arab countries as well as in other former European colonies in Africa and Asia. However, his growing relationship with Moscow and calls for Arab nationalism and unity were unwelcome in Washington. Historian Salim Yaqub demonstrates how the Eisenhower administration attempted to engage Nasser publicly, while it covertly worked to undermine his regime. The Eisenhower administration was influenced by several factors. While Nasser believed the Aswan Dam project was essential to Egypt’s plans for industrialization and economic independence, Secretary of State Dulles began to view it as too expensive for Egypt to sustain. Washington was further angered by Cairo’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China and Nasser’s threats to seek economic support from the Soviet Union as an alternative. In addition, the administration faced increasing resistance in the U.S. Congress. Meanwhile, Nasser believed Washington and London were attempting to force Egyptian compliance with their policies toward the Soviet bloc. Moreover, he was offended by Dulles’s suggestion that Egypt’s economy was too weak to support the project, viewing it not just as a thinly veiled insult but a threat to his regime.

The 1956 Suez War, and in particular the conflict between Washington and London, have received extensive, if not disproportionate coverage, in the historiography. Several historians have offered key insights into the build-up and implications of the conflict. Hahn’s *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt*, Rashid Khalidi, “Consequences of the Suez Crisis for Egypt,” Diane B. Kunz, “The Importance of Having Money: The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis,” and Keith Kyle, “Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956,” all in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences*, eds. William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). The break, albeit temporary, between the U.S. and U.K. was rooted in the Eisenhower administration’s consistent warnings to London against the use of military force. This was compounded by President Eisenhower’s belief that he was deliberately misled by Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Hahn details Anglo-American coordination in Egypt during the early Cold War period and shared belief that the country was essential for their regional security planning. In addition, Kyle confirms that the allies had common policy goals toward Nasser’s regime which diverged only after the canal was nationalized. Kunz details the economic and political pressure brought to bear by Washington on London, and the failure of Eden’s government to adequately prepare for the Eisenhower administration’s reaction. Khalidi and Shlaim discuss the motivations and responses of Egypt and Israel, including Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s planning and discussions with Britain and France for the Suez invasion.

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Doctrine developed out of these efforts, and was the first U.S. foreign policy doctrine specifically targeted at the “Middle East.”

Finalized after the crisis, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a combination of military and economic assistance designed to thwart the influence of the Soviet Union and Nasser in the region. Echoing the claims of NSC 68 in his speech to Congress on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower claimed that the region had “always been coveted by Russia” and was “prized more than ever by International Communism.” He asked for Congressional authorization to assist “any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of the economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.” Eisenhower also requested support for the deployment of U.S. military forces to “secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.”

Attempts to define the doctrine’s area of coverage occurred publicly and privately. While testifying before Congress, Secretary of State Dulles was pressed to list the countries where the doctrine would be applied. He stated that it ranged from Libya to Pakistan and included the Sudan, Ethiopia, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula. However, the State Department produced position papers for countries beyond Dulles’s definition in preparation for the diplomatic mission of the president’s special envoy to the region, Ambassador James Richards. This included Afghanistan, Morocco, Greece, and Tunisia.

Indeed, these four countries were added to Ambassador Richards’s itinerary because of their perceived connection to and influence with the countries Washington determined to be in the Middle East. In a May 6, 1957, memorandum to Richards, Cavendish D. Cannon, the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, promoted the country’s strategic importance as the Western entry to the Mediterranean Sea. It also hosted four American air bases and a Naval air station, which were “deemed essential to our national security at present.” In a meeting that afternoon with Moroccan Foreign Minister Ahmed Balafrej, Richards explained that “although Morocco was not in the Middle East, we attach great importance to our friendship.”

Prior to his Rabat trip, Richards held meetings in Washington with Greek officials, the Deputy Prime Minister of Greece, Pavlos Apostolides, pointed to a map in a recent newspaper in order to demonstrate that his country stood “at the crossroads of the M[jiddle] E[ast].” He also stated that Greece “could appreciate the U.S. strategic interests in trying to build a bridge between NATO and [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] SEATO” through the Eisenhower Doctrine.

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78 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 30-58.
80 Davison, 665, 675.
82 “United States Assistance to Morocco,” Cavendish D. Cannon to James Richards, May 6, 1957, Box 13, Morocco Folder, NEA, Lot File 57 D 616, NARACP.
83 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Rabat, May 6, 1957, Box 13, Morocco Folder, NEA records, Lot File 57 D 616, NARACP.
84 “Memorandum of Conversation,” April 30, 1957, Box 13, Greece Folder, NEA, Lot File 57 D 616, NARACP.
The public but vague declaration that the United States would defend the Middle East from Communist subversion or invasion renewed interest in defining the parameters of the region. In the *State Department Bulletin*, G. Etzel Pearcy, the State Department Geographer, conceded that “no standard delimitation exists by which a Middle East region can be precisely located geographically.” He added that “its position is not only shadowy around the edges but entire countries or groups of countries are included or excluded with surprising facility.” Yet Pearcy cautioned that this “indefinable” but “critical” region “looms on the horizon as a crash zone between conflicting ideologies of the free and Communist worlds.” As seen in the map below, Pearcy detailed the countries that were “generally considered” to be in the Middle East, and those who had limited acceptance” of belonging to the region. He asserted that the term the “Middle East” evolved from the more general designation of the “East.” Pearcy added, “The East was named from the West, never having enjoyed the advantage of a name that sprang from the region itself.”

By the end of the decade, one scholar claimed that these discussions were mere semantics. In *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy*, which was originally published in 1958 for the Council on Foreign Relations, John Campbell focused on the territories ranging from Egypt to Iran, including Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. He acknowledged that like the “Near East,” the “Middle East” was “an elastic definition of an undetermined area.” But Campbell claimed that it was irrelevant whether the correct term for the region was Near East or Middle East, stating that “the important thing is what we do about the Middle East, not how we define it.”

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85 Pearcy, 407-409; “Pearcy to Buford,” April 8, 1959, Box 2, State Department, Office of Intelligence and Research records (hereafter OIR), Entry 1595, NARACP. In an April 1959 memorandum, Pearcy noted that his office had “recently received requests pertaining to the identification of certain geographic regions. Unlike nomenclature of specific places such as cities, states, provinces, mountain ranges, and other physical and cultural features of the landscape, it is not usually possible to make official a general regional term as denoting a specific area. All that can be done is to recommend certain regional concepts in the hopes that some consistency will [be] obtain[ed] from one agency to another. Accordingly the [Geographer’s] Office has issued suggested procedures to be considered in the defining of regions causing the most trouble: Middle East, Near East, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, South America, Middle America, Central America, Caribbean America, etc.”

86 Ibid., 408-409.

However, Campbell’s prescription for “what to do” in the region was bound purely by American national security concerns. He asserted that “we need assume no inconsistency between what serves our own national interests, broadly conceived, and what serves those of other nations.” Campbell added, “The overriding national interest is the security of the United States -- put more starkly, its survival.” He warned that Soviet control of the region would have dire consequences for America’s position in the world adding that “the triumph of communism in the heart of the Islamic world could be the prelude to its triumph throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe.” Campbell stated that “it is fundamental to the United States, then, that the Middle East remain part of the free world.”

Campbell’s assertions are revealing not just for their hubris, but the acknowledgment that what was truly important was the projection of power into and control over the region regardless of its name or associated boundaries. Yet the question remains: how can policymakers or their expert advisers make decisions with any certainty or insight for an area as broadly and inconsistently defined as the “Middle East”?

Modernization Theory and the Middle East

For modernization theorists, the answer to the above question was simple: one size fits all. Indeed, geographic certainty was irrelevant as modernization theorists believed they had the answer to the “problems” of the Middle East and the broader post-colonial world. Intellectually influenced by the work of Walt Whitman Rostow, an economic historian at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), modernization theorists viewed his “six stages of growth” as a historical and ideological model for human evolution. Modernization theory was also the basis for the most influential book published in this period, Daniel Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. Ostensibly a discussion of the influence and impact of the media in the Middle East, *The Passing of Traditional Society* was actually a template for future works on modernization theory. Although the Middle East was never defined, Lerner claimed that the factor unifying “Third World” countries was “their common problems: how to modernize traditional lifeways that no longer ‘work’ to their own satisfaction.” He added that “modernization, then, is the unifying principle in this study of the modern Middle East.”
The Passing of Traditional Society offers an insight into how the new “Third World” was viewed by a select group of American scholars and policymakers in the early Cold War years. Historian Nils Gilman asserts that modernization theory offered a “theoretical articulation of how the containment doctrine applied to the underdeveloped areas.” Attempting to undercut the global influence of the Soviet Union, modernization theorists believed that the Western economies as exemplified by 1950s America could offer a superior model for the industrial development of post-colonial societies. Lerner asserted that “from the West came the stimuli which undermined traditional society in the Middle East; for reconstruction of a modern society that will operate efficiently in the world today, the West is still a useful model. What the West is, in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become.” In spite of Lerner’s dubious claims, that the template for modernization theory was based on the “Middle East” is indicative of the symbolic role the region played for America and its plans for reshaping the world in its image during the Cold War.

Modernization theory was arguably at its zenith during the 1960s, finding ardent support from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Like The Passing of Traditional Society, Manfred Halpern’s The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa used the region as a template to examine the “political modernization” of a “traditional society.” Halpern, like Lerner, was not an area specialist. He later explained that he was “a political scientist interested in the Near East as a laboratory in which to study the problems and processes of modernization.” Perhaps it was this lack of area expertise and focus on modernization theory that contributed to Halpern’s essentializing the region and its inhabitants.

Halpern declared that “the area from Morocco to Pakistan is in the midst of a profound revolution,” which was not just limited to the “nationalist revolution” or the “revolution of rising expectations.” He stated that his goal was to “define the scope of the Middle Eastern and North African transformation,” which he argued was “broad and runs deeper than nationalism and its discontents.” Halpern asserted that he was offering a “comparative analysis of changing internal politics” in the region, but would not examine each country separately. Moreover, he stated that the “cultural diversities” within the region were outside the scope of his study, but were factored into his analysis. However, the brief discussion of cultural differences contained in The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa reflected little more than basic Orientalist stereotypes. Halpern stated that “the Saudi Arabian, whose heritage is the proud, parochial freedom of the desert, obviously has a different cast of mind from the Egyptian, who for so long

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90 Lerner, 9, 47; Lockman, 133-139; Said, 288-296. Edward Said and historian Zachary Lockman each detail the influence of Orientalist scholarship on modernization theory. They contend that works by scholars, in particular Hamilton Gibb and Bernard Lewis, reinforced the beliefs of modernization theorists that the areas they studied were mired in the past, unchanging since antiquity. Said and Lockman both note that Gibb’s later work broke with his earlier descriptions of Islam as unchanging, uniform entity. However, modernization theorists continued to use his earlier works to frame their research and analysis. Fitting into the paradigms of modernization theory and Orientalism, The Passing of Traditional Society emphasized the irrationality and fanaticism that supposedly characterized “traditional” societies. For example, David Riesman explains in the book’s introduction that Egypt under Nasser’s spell had witnessed the “surrender of sensible socioeconomic goals for strenuous symbolic ones.”

91 Undated memorandum by Professor Harry Eckstein, Manfred Halpern Faculty Files, Princeton University Archives, Seeley G. Mudd Library, (hereafter PUA).
has been dependent on the tyrannical corrupt rulers of a generous Nile; the trading Lebanese have different values from the mountaineers of land-locked Afghanistan.” He added that a future study should examine how these differences “affect style and preferences of action.” In addition, Israel was deliberately left out of Halpern’s study, because he initially believed it was an outlier in an overwhelmingly Muslim region. Yet as the study progressed he realized that “Islam shared many problems with Israel,” in particular how the “orientalized majority” would be integrated into society by the “modern, Westernized elite.”

Rather than invalidating the work of modernization theorists, these broad and questionable characterizations of the region and its inhabitants reaffirmed the beliefs of policymakers in Washington. As historian Michael Hunt explains, development theory inherited and incorporated American views on race and the pseudo-scientific belief in racial hierarchy. However, by the early 1960s these views were no longer politically or scientifically acceptable and development theorists assisted policymakers by “recasting the old racial hierarchy into cultural terms.” Instead of race, Hunt states that it was the “attributes of modernity and tradition that fixed a people’s or nation’s place on the hierarchy.” Yet these perceptions and characterizations would persist even after modernization theory was abandoned by Washington and were inextricably linked to definitions of the Middle East.

The Middle East According to its Strategic Resources

Like Islam, oil was a key factor that helped define the Middle East. Indeed, the presence of vast oil reserves served to justify broader and narrower geographic definitions of the region. A 1942 State Department memo on foreign oil reserves stated that the Middle East was the most important of the three areas outside of the U.S. that produced the majority of the world’s oil and it included “the great fields of Iran, Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.” The memo noted that because Russian oil was controlled by the Soviet government it would have to be considered separately. It added that two-thirds of the remaining oil in the region was controlled either exclusively by the British, the U.S., or joint British-Dutch control.

Five years later, a presentation produced by the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) noted the “strategic position of the Middle East.” It contained a large fold-out map of the region from the perspective of Europe. The Middle East ranged from Greece to Afghanistan and the Indian border and the accompanying caption noted that “since the dawn of history these rugged mountains, wide sand masses and narrow sea lanes have proved inhospitable to the ambitions of conquerors.” It added that “centered around the Persian Gulf” were the world’s greatest oil reserves, and stated that through these supplies “this underdeveloped crossroads of the world” was making a “major contribution to the European economic renaissance being achieved under the Marshall Plan.” As seen below, the caption accompanying a second fold out map entitled “Middle East Crossroads of World Traffic: Hub of

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92 Halpern, vii-xiv.
93 Ibid., xiv-xv.
94 Hunt, 161-162.
95 “The Importance to the United States of Foreign Oil Reserves in General and of Saudi Arabian Reserves in Particular,” December 29, 1942, RG 59, Entry 1436, NEA, Box 9, NARACP.
Sea Routes and Air lanes” noted that as the “hub of Europe, Asia and Africa” the region “assures its continued importance.”

The discovery of large oil reserves in Libya and Algeria coupled with the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) offered new parameters for the Middle East. Established in 1960, OPEC contained Arab and non-Arab member states, including large oil producers in southern Africa and South America. By the early 1970s, the organization included Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Yet following the six month oil embargo initiated by key Arab oil-producing states during the October 1973 War, it was the image of the wealthy Arab oil sheikh that became synonymous with OPEC and the “Middle East” in the United States. This combination of events and their implications served to illustrate the most prominent intersection between oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict as defining factors of the region. Indeed, they would predominate and reinforce each other until the end of the Cold War.

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96 “Maps & Facts Concerning the Middle East,” (undated) RG 59, Entry 1436, NEA, Box 9, NARACP.
97 Ibid.
98 Yergin, 602-634. Angered by Washington’s overt support for Israel during the conflict, the oil embargo was imposed initially against the United States and the Netherlands on October 22 by several Arab states but not OPEC itself. Lasting until mid-May 1974, oil prices quadrupled in only a few months, increasing from $2.90 per barrel before the war to $11.65 by December 1973.
99 McAlister, 133-138. McAlister describes the outrage in mainstream media over the oil embargo stating, “This was the beginning of what would soon become a staple of American popular cultural images: the greedy oil sheikhs, with their hands on America’s collective throat.”
The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War served to reshape and redefine the boundaries of the Middle East yet again. Israel’s swift victory over the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula dramatically altered the political and geographic landscape of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the armistice borders established at the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In routing Egypt, Israel dealt a severe blow to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regional prestige and his ideology of Pan-Arabism. The conflict also led to a strengthening of ties between Israel and the United States and a burgeoning “special relationship.” In the aftermath of the war, the Middle East came to be defined by two criteria: Israel and its belligerent Arab neighbors and the conservative regimes of the key U.S. oil producing allies, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s victory contrasted sharply with the U.S.’s difficulties in Vietnam. As part of Washington’s effort to reduce its overseas commitments, beginning with Southeast Asia, the Nixon Administration looked to regional proxies to shore up American interests. In addition to Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia became known as the pillars of American policy in the Middle East. The “Twin Pillars” strategy, and in particular Iran’s emergence as a regional power, followed Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Announced in 1968, the decision marked the end of an imperial presence dating back over a century. With tacit, if not overt, encouragement from Washington, Tehran began exerting its influence in the Gulf. James Bill contends that by stabilizing the region while “promoting the mutual interests of itself and the

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100 J.E. Peterson, ed., The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1983), 528. Note this map was adapted by Peterson from the Exxon Corporation’s Public Affairs Department.
102 Douglas Little, “Gideon’s Band: America and the Middle East since 1945,” in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1945, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 496-497. Little asserts that by 1969, President Lyndon B. Johnson had “laid the groundwork for a ‘three pillars’ approach that would govern American policy toward the Middle East for nearly twenty years.” He adds that Johnson “bequeathed Nixon a set of informal partnerships with Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia designed to cope with growing U.S. dependence on oil imported from the Persian Gulf and to combat growing Soviet influence in the Arab world.”
At the Crossroads of Empire

Chapter 1

Osamah Khalil

United States,” Iran under Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi became “the prime example of the Nixon Doctrine in action.”\(^{103}\) Flush with cash from skyrocketing oil prices following the OPEC oil embargo, the Shah began purchasing massive quantities of American hardware.\(^{104}\)

Although not a military power, Saudi Arabia’s role as a “pillar” of American policy was to use its wealth and influence to balance against the radical Arab regimes and political movements in the region. Perhaps Riyadh’s greatest accomplishment in this area was in helping to underwrite Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s break with the Soviet Union.\(^{105}\) In addition, Saudi Arabia played a vital role for Washington as a “pivot” producer of oil, ensuring its stable and steady supply to global markets. Like Tehran, Riyadh funneled vast sums of newly acquired wealth back to the United States for the purchase of weapons, which exceeded any domestic demand or capabilities for use.

By the end of the decade, Nixon’s “Twin Pillars” strategy collapsed when the Shah was overthrown and eventually replaced by an Islamic Republic led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The impact of the fallen Iranian pillar was compounded by the end of détente with the Soviet Union. On Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet airborne troops parachuted onto Kabul airport, the vanguard of a massive force intended to put down a coup against the Moscow-allied government.\(^{106}\)

These events inspired another policy declaration from the White House that further refined America’s interests in the region. Early in his term, President Jimmy Carter emphasized the importance of human rights as a guiding principle of American foreign policy, leading some observers to argue it represented the administration’s informal “doctrine.” However, the Soviet invasion led Carter to announce an unequivocal warning to Moscow that “any attempt to control the Persian Gulf region” would be “regarded as an assault on the vital interest” of the United States.\(^{107}\) While the Soviet threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf never materialized, the Carter and Nixon Doctrines were challenged and thwarted by actors from inside the region. Rather than continuing to rely exclusively on local powers to “police” the Gulf, Washington established the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) following the failed attempt to rescue American hostages held in Tehran. Originally based in Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM was responsible for monitoring the area from Kenya to Pakistan and not only represented a more robust American presence in the region, but a new criterion for defining the “Middle East.”\(^{108}\)


\(^{104}\) Ibid., 202. Bill reports that between 1972 and 1977 the value of sales to Iran amounted to $16.2 billion, during this period the Iranian defense budget increased from $1.4 billion to $9.4 billion. By 1977, the Iranian military and security establishment accounted for 40 percent of the budget. Bill adds that in 1973 alone the price of oil quadrupled and revenues increased from $4 billion to $20 billion annually.


\(^{106}\) Coll, 50.


The Greater Middle East and the New World Order

The dramatic end of the Cold War witnessed various attempts by scholars to explain the unexpected events and offer a paradigm for what President George H.W. Bush called “the new world order.” Political scientist Francis Fukuyama saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof of the inevitable ascendance of democracy and free market capitalism, or the “end of history.” In contrast, another political scientist, Samuel Huntington, predicted that international relations and politics would be defined by conflicts between different “civilizations.” Prominent journalists also attempted to frame the changed landscape, including a guide to “understanding globalization” during this period. Yet wrapped in the spirit of triumphalism after the U.S.’s “victory” in the Cold War, these works represented an ideological continuation of the past rather than an informed insight into the present or future.

Moreover, with the U.S.’s emergence as the sole global superpower and its decisive victory in the 1991 Gulf War, there were new attempts to reframe the definitions and boundaries of the Middle East. Following the independence of the former-Soviet Central Asian republics, oil reemerged as the key defining factor in the new “Greater Middle East.” This was exemplified by Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East by political scientists Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy. Kemp and Harkavy noted that the region had once “been a crossroad linking empires, dynasties, cultures, and armies in both peace and war, and those who controlled access to its vital land and water trade routes wielded great power and frequently amassed huge fortunes.” While these factors lessened due to geopolitical and technological factors, Kemp and

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110 Arguably the most influential and controversial article released in the early post-Cold War period was Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993). Huntington stated that civilizations were “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity.” He named eight major civilizations (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African), and claimed that future conflicts could occur along the “cultural fault lines” that separated them. Huntington considered and discussed the “Middle East” as part of the broader Islamic civilization, although no definite borders of the region were provided. The article was later expanded into a book and a ninth “Sinic” culture was added. A map labeled “The World of Civilizations post-1900,” depicted “Islamic” civilization as stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, but interrupted by the “Hindu” and “Sinic” civilizations. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Map 1.3.
111 Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999). A columnist for the *New York Times*, Friedman has been a vocal advocate of the benefits of globalization. Melding Fukuyama and Huntington, he offered a simplified and decontextualized take on the split between what he viewed as the largely secular, post-modern, post-industrial, Internet-based world (“the Lexus”) and the traditional, religious, territorially-based, conflict-ridden world (“the Olive Tree”). The Middle East, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was seen as clinging to “the Olive Tree,” but through several anecdotes Friedman hinted that future generations might be able to move beyond the conflicts of the past.
112 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 123-125. Former National Security Adviser to President Carter, Zbignew Brzezinski offered a competing but less adopted phrase to the “Greater Middle East.” He asserted that the region from Egypt to Kazakhstan, including Turkey and Pakistan could be described as the “zone of instability.” Within this zone was a smaller region he deemed the “Eurasian Balkans.” Like the “more familiar Balkans” of southeastern Europe, he claimed the Eurasian Balkans were an “ethnic cauldron.” However, the major difference between the two was that the latter was “infinitely more important as an economic prize.” While American hegemony in the Middle East was “the ultimate arbiter,” Brzezinski claimed that the political instability of the states in the “Eurasian Balkans” not only confirmed his appellation, but served to “tempt and invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbors, each of whom is determined to oppose the region’s domination by the other.” As previously noted, usage of the term Balkans has been unpacked by scholars over the past decade.
Harkavy cautioned that they could change again because of instability in post-Soviet Russia or due to economic and infrastructure development further linking Europe with Southeast and Central Asia. They asserted that the region of the “greater Middle East and its energy resources may now be the strategic fulcrum and prize in the emerging arena or world politics.” However, Kemp and Harkavy cautioned that it would also “continue to be a source of anxiety” due to concerns about energy supplies and the propagation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across the region “where rivalries are intense, distances short, and enemies contiguous.”

Kemp and Harkavy initially combined the State Department’s coverage of the Near East with the Department of Defense’s parameters for CENTCOM. The result was a “Greater Middle East,” that ranged from Morocco to India and included countries in central East Africa and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. They asserted that because of the strategic focus and implications of their book, the “definition of the region must include those countries involved in four main conflicts in the area-Arab-Israeli, Persian Gulf, Caspian Basin, and South Asia.” Yet they conceded that this approach was problematic, particularly in South Asia where a number of countries were not included. Moreover, Kemp and Harkavy admitted that they included countries from the Caucuses and Central Asia which were not discussed in detail. This was also true of their treatment of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. These admissions not only served to undermine the utility of Kemp and Harkavy’s strategic study from the outset, but offer yet another example of the relationship between the construction of strategic interests and their geographical representations.

**September 11th & The New Middle East**

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and in preparation for the invasion of Iraq, the United States declared a new foreign policy doctrine aimed primarily at the Middle East. Building on President George W. Bush’s call for a “War on Terror” and bearing his name, the Bush Doctrine enunciated four core principles: defeating global terrorist networks, preemptive unilateral action to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, spreading democracy, and promoting free markets and free trade. Accompanying this hyper-aggressive foreign policy approach, scholars understandably rushed to place the events and the origins of America’s relationship with and foreign policy in the region into a broader historical context. Yet the increased attention tended to focus on Islam, in particular radical political Islam as the major factor that defined the “Middle East.” Thus, a number of these works echoed the approach of scholars discussed earlier who contrived or overstated geographic, historical, and social ties to validate their theories.

One example of this trend is *American Orientalism* by historian Douglas Little. Drawing on a variety of sources, Little attempts to identify the influence of Orientalism on U.S. foreign

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113 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), xi-xiii, 15. The “strategic geography” of the book’s title is defined as the “control of, access to, spatial areas (land, water, and air, including outer space) that has an impact -- either positive or negative -- on the security and economic prosperity of nations.”

114 Ibid., 14-15.

policy from the American Revolution to the present. While *American Orientalism* provides a richly detailed and needed insight into the influence and expressions of Orientalism in U.S. foreign policy, it is also unable to resist propagating Orientalist stereotypes, further demonstrating the power and persistence of these notions. Little contends that “few parts of the world have become as deeply embedded in the U.S. popular imagination as the Middle East.” Although he examines the origins of America’s interactions and fascination with the region, Little states that September 11, 2001 “brought the Middle East to America” and that the attacks were a “brutal reminder of how very different the Middle East is from the Middle West.” These assertions are not only contradicted by his analysis, but serve to essentialize an entire region and conflate it with horrific violence. They also ignore over a century of immigration to the United States of Christians, Muslims, and Jews from the “Middle East,” as well as the presence of large, diverse Arab-American communities in major urban centers of the American “Middle West.”

Moreover, the key factor for Little’s definition of the “Middle East” is radical political Islam. Little concedes that his definition of the “Middle East” is “expansive and encompasses not merely Israel, the Arab states, and Iran but also the Muslim lands stretching from the Sahara Desert to the Khyber Pass and from Algeria to Afghanistan.” However, he does not explain why Afghanistan was included in this expanded definition of the Middle East, and the equally Muslim and non-Arab, non-Persian Turkey, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan were not. More telling is that Little’s historiographical essay examining the history of U.S. foreign relations with the Middle East failed to discuss the role of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, or North Africa. Published in 1995, it instead focused on the following themes as they relate to the U.S.: the politics of oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations, and Iran.

*Power, Faith, and Fantasy* by Michael Oren is another recent offering intended for a general readership. Oren, a historian and current Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., examines the relationship between America and the “Middle East” from the founding of the republic and the challenge posed by the Barbary pirates to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As illustrated below, his geographical template is as broad as his narrative with a Middle East stretching from Morocco to Iran. While Oren acknowledges the ever shifting borders of the region, he inexplicably claims that he chose a definition of the Middle East that matched America’s historical definition of the “Orient.” However, America’s “Orient” was situated around East Asia, in particular Japan and China, rather than Southwest Asia and North Africa. Indeed, Oren’s expansive definition of the “Middle East” accompanied by an inaccurate historical justification, is reminiscent of previous works discussed from the mid-twentieth century, in which the region served as a template for a scholar’s ideological predispositions. In addition, as demonstrated by a similar map of the

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116 Little, *American Orientalism*, 1-3, 9-24. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the area around lower Manhattan that later became the sites of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and the World Trade Center was largely populated by Arab immigrants from present-day Syria, Lebanon, and Israel-Palestine and was known as “Little Syria.” See Philip K. Hitti, *The Syrians in America*, (New York, G. H. Doran Co., 1924).

117 Ibid., 3. It should be noted that while usage of the term “Arab states” is common parlance for the different nations in the Arab League, it does overlook that a number of the countries have sizable non-Arab minorities. Similarly, a number of the countries considered to be in the “Muslim world” have sizable and influential non-Muslim minorities.


119 Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 11-12. Two key themes are present in *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*. First, that the U.S. has had benevolent but often misunderstood intentions in an expansive region called the “Middle
region in Oren’s *Six Days of War* published five years earlier, a different geographical definition of the region is offered. Thus demonstrating that over a century after the term “Middle East” was first coined and the importance of the region to the United States has grown dramatically, its boundaries remain inconsistently applied even by the same author.


*Al-Sharq al-Awsat*

In spite of Pearcy’s claim that a name for the region never emerged from its inhabitants, there were in fact multiple designations for the area now known as the Middle East. Indeed, they also indicate a perspective of power and hegemony -- but from within the region rather than Europe or America. These included designations by Arab Muslim geographers for *al-*mashriq, the east, and *al-maghrib*, the west, with Jerusalem initially at the center and eventually replaced by Mecca.  

Other more general designations include *Dār al-Islām* (the abode of Islam), *al-ʿālam al-ʿArabī*, and *al-ʿālam al-Islāmī* (the Arab world and the Islamic world respectively).

East.” Second, that America’s most substantial gift to the “Middle East,” itself, and the world, is its historic and continuing support for the Zionist movement and the creation of the State of Israel.  


There were also regional designations. For example, Bilād al-Shām, or lands of the north (for the territories north of Egypt), which included present-day Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Today, al-Shām is typically used in reference to the city of Damascus and occasionally to Syria. Similarly, Morocco is referred to as al-magrib in Arabic, but the term is also synonymous with the other territories comprising North Africa except for Egypt and Libya. Meanwhile, mīṣr, or settlement and civilization, initially applied to Cairo but expanded over time to include present-day Egypt and Sudan, and today only Egypt. In addition, al-jazīra, or the island, was the name for the Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, al-Khalīj al-‘Arabī, or the Arabian Gulf, is the Arabic designation for the area called the “Persian Gulf.” Although these geographic designations still exist today and are frequently used by the press and in general conversation, over the past half-century the Arabic translation of the Middle East, al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, has also been widely adopted. This includes an Arabic-language newspaper named al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ that is published in London and provides coverage from across the Arab world.122

As the “Middle East” slowly gained widespread acceptance in the U.S. in the 1950s, it had yet to be adopted in the region. One example of this dichotomy was an article in the January 1956 edition of the Egyptian magazine al-Hilāl. The magazine requested an article from then President of the American University in Cairo Raymond McLain on the subject of “Why I Like the East?” In response, McLain’s submitted an essay entitled “Why We Like the Middle East,” in which he noted, “Most of the things that please everybody about the Middle East please us too.” He added that “we Westerners thought that the East, including the Middle East, was leisurely if not idyll [sic] but we were mistaken.” Although the published article maintained the original title of “Why I like the East,” it translated the rest of McLain’s letter directly, including the references to the “Middle East.”123

However, as usage of the “Middle East” became ubiquitous in international political and diplomatic discourse, commentators in the region began to take notice. Indeed, the term and its associated importance to the U.S. and globally became internalized within the region. Mohamad Riad, a Professor of Geography at Egypt’s Ain Shams University, observed that the term “Middle East” was adopted in the region even though its borders were neither clear (wādiha) nor fixed (qāṭi’a). Riad argued that the Middle East was inherently “gelatinous” (hulāmī) and therefore could not be consistently and definitely classified on world maps because its boundaries fluctuated based on the different perspectives and needs of researchers, politicians, and diplomats.124 He claimed that in the past, the region was characterized by its central position, historically and geographically, between East and West. In the present, he stated, that the al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ was an “alternative” (badīl) to historical terms like Near East and Levant.125

Riad argued that the “Greater” Middle East was comprised of the area from Libya to Kashmir and included Greece, Turkey, Somalia, and the Arabian Peninsula. He stated that the countries in this “Greater” Middle East had common characteristics including climate,
architectural style, the influence of Muslim culture (including social and religious norms, and Arabic language), and the relations derived from their geographic position in the “middle” (waṣṭ) between different continents and worlds. However, Riad conceded that his Middle East was too large and that based on these criteria many countries could belong to the Middle East. He added that due to other factors, the countries designated as part of the region could also be considered part of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Riad claimed that the “heart” (qalb) of the Middle East was comprised of the area from Turkey’s Dardanelles Straits to the Iran-Iraq border to Yemen’s Suqutra Island to the Egyptian Nile delta. He asserted that the key criteria for the “heart” of the Middle East were: Arabic language, oil reserves, and access to or control of major waterways. Riad added that there was a tendency to conflate the Middle East with the Arab World and the Islamic World. However, he cautioned that these regions and associated terms were not synonymous as the Arab World was limited to the western part of the Middle East and the Islamic World included but stretched well beyond the region.126

In Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ wa al-Sirā‘ al-Duwalī (The Middle East and International Conflict), Lebanese journalist Yahya Ahmad al-Ka‘kī’s borrowed from Riad’s discussion of the Middle East. Al-Ka‘kī discussed the “concept” (maḥfūm) of the term. Explaining its Eurocentric geographical and political origins, he added that the “middle” signified the region’s place on current world maps as well as those of the “Old World” (al-‘Alam al-Qadīm).127

Al-Ka‘kī’s definition of the region and criteria were similar to those of Riad. He claimed that Middle Eastern countries shared several characteristics, including language, shared Arab and Muslim history and culture, access and control of key water transit ways, oil reserves, weather and climate, and historical settlement patterns. He asserted that these factors also “intertwined” (yatadākhal) the Middle East with the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. In addition, Al-Ka‘kī noted that due to the “variables” (al-muṭaghayyirāt) of the Cold War, the countries of North Africa could be included in the region as well. Yet ranging from Somalia to Kashmir and possibly including the North African states, the countries included in the Middle East of Riad and al-Ka‘kī’s had as many shared characteristics as differences.128

Map 9. Al-Ka‘kī, Duwal al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ (Countries of the Middle East). Reprinted with the permission of Dār al-Nahḍa al-‘Arabiyya 129

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126 Ibid., 298-309.
128 Ibid., 141-150.
129 Ibid., 195.
In contrast, Mohammad Dia’ al-Din al-Rayyis, a historian at Cairo University, asserted that the Middle East is the “heart of the world” (qalb al-‘ālam). Although he acknowledged that the term was of recent European origin, al-Rayyis stated that it became “acceptable” (maqbūl) and “widespread” (mutadāwūl). Like al-Ka’kī, he claimed the region was in the “middle of the world” (wasat al-‘ālam), but that the term itself was not specifically defined. According to al-Rayyis, the “center” (markaz) of the Middle East was comprised of the Arab countries but also included Turkey and Iran and could be expanded to include Afghanistan and Pakistan. He asserted that the “soul of Middle Eastern life” (rūh hayyāt al-sharq al-awsat) is Islam.\(^{130}\)

Although Egyptian writer Yehia Ghanim’s Māfawāḍat al-Siyāda ‘ala al-Sharq al-Awsat (Sovereignty Negotiations in the Middle East) is devoted to the negotiations around the Arab-Israeli “peace process,” he detailed the varying definitions of the Middle East by the different Western powers. Ghanim noted that one Russian definition of the “Middle East” ranged from east Asia to north east Africa, while in the modern Russian language the region included Iran and Afghanistan. Ghanim also explained that British definitions of the region often intertwined the Middle East with the Near East (al-Sharq al-Adna). Although he did not offer a competing definition from the Arab perspective of the region, Ghanim asserted that the Middle East’s borders are dependent upon and vary according to the particular topic under discussion, ranging from diplomatic negotiations to regional security.\(^{131}\)

**America’s Middle East**

As a region and a term, the “Middle East” is an articulation of American strategic interests. Over the past sixty years it has been a reflection of and subsumed within the broader construction of Washington’s national security policies.\(^{132}\) The most public pronouncements of these interests were the different presidential doctrines announced during this period, and the Middle East played a vital role in each. Indeed, the varying manifestations of the “Middle East” reveal how the United States views the region and itself.

In its role as a strategic construct, America’s “Middle East” was a barrier to Soviet expansion. Unlike Britain, it was not guarding a valued colony. Rather, its role was to strengthen the United States. From the perspective of American military strategists, the geographical boundaries of the region were defined by key land and sea points. As Britain had earlier sought to limit Imperial Russia’s access to warm water ports, the Anglo-American allies deemed a similar approach toward the Soviet Union was essential. Thus, the Dardanelle Straits and Turkey served as the northernmost boundary of the region during the Cold War. Similarly, by the end of the 1950s, the straits of Gibraltar was the western border of the Middle East, where the combination of a British base at Gibraltar located across from American air bases in Morocco.

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\(^{132}\) For discussions of U.S. national security interests as social constructions, see Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Robert Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy*. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001).
guarded entry and exit into the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez Canal was the strategic heart of the region, due to its essential role for global commerce, especially the flow of oil to Europe. Britain’s naval base at Aden served as the southernmost point of the Middle East, guarding access to the Red and Arabian Seas.

This buffer zone could, and did, expand or contract based on strategic needs and ideology. Pakistan’s entry into the Middle East in the 1950s coupled with Afghanistan’s absence illustrated that the term defined areas based on their strategic role: as Pakistan had far more in common historically and socially with Afghanistan and India, than it did with Iraq, Iran, or Syria. The key criteria for Pakistan’s incorporation into America’s “Middle East” were membership in the Baghdad Pact and friendly relations with Washington. Like Palestine, Algeria was portrayed as empty before French colonization. As a colony, it was considered distinct from the rest of the region; indeed, Algeria was France. Yet with the French departure and the discovery of oil, Algeria would become part of the Middle East by the 1960s. However, the presence of non-Arab and non-Muslim countries in the “Middle East” also served to justify and reify the term, especially when those countries were allied with Washington, and made it more than a bureaucratic euphemism for the Arab or Muslim World.133

Moreover, the indeterminate boundaries of the “Middle East” were integral to the construction of American national security interests. In detailing these interests to Moscow, Washington could be as specific or as vague as the situation required. In 1947, the Soviets’ numerical superiority of conventional forces in Europe coupled with America’s slim atomic monopoly required the Truman Doctrine to be publicly specific.134 As historian John Lewis Gaddis explains, the Truman administration’s emphasis on symmetrical deterrence was designed to create “certainty in the mind of the adversary both as to the inevitability and the limits of an American response -- the United States would counter, but not exceed, the initial provocation.”135

By the Eisenhower administration, the combination of a change in military strategy emphasizing nuclear weapons, America’s advantage in the number of strategic bombers, and NSC 68’s call for combating Communism globally allowed for a more generally worded

133 Nor were the attempts to redefine the Middle East limited to Europeans and Americans. As Israeli historian Michael Bar-Zohar explains, following the 1956 Suez War Israel sought to expand the definition of the Middle East through the creation of a defense pact with non-Arab countries “situated on the periphery of the Middle East.” The “Peripheral Pact” was to include Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia, with hopes of expanding further into Africa and South Asia by establishing relations with Burma, Nigeria, Liberia, and Ghana. Ben-Zohar, a one-time spokesman for the Israeli Ministry of Defense, states that with the pact, “Israel for the first time felt it had something to offer the Americans.” This was because it included a member of NATO as well as two members of the Baghdad Pact. Moreover, with the inclusion of a major African state like Ethiopia, it was “a bloc whose population exceeded the number of Arabs in the Middle East, and which was prepared for far-reaching cooperation with the Americans in opposing Soviet ambitions in the area.” He notes that Israel recognized the importance of American financial and political support if the pact was to succeed. Michael Bar-Zohar, “David Ben-Gurion and the Policy of the Periphery,” in Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign relations, pre-1948 to the present, 2nd ed., eds. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2008), 193-195.

134 David Holloway, “Stalin and the Bomb,” in Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 2nd ed., eds. Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (New York, London: Routledge, 2005), 86. Holloway states that the U.S. “did not have enough atomic bombs in the early postwar years to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and the Soviet leaders were aware of this.”

Thus, the deliberately vague “general area of the Middle East” was an advantage that allowed the Eisenhower administration to determine where and when it would intervene. Therefore, the warning to the Soviets’ was intentionally ambiguous but clear: the U.S. could intervene anywhere in the region or nowhere, depending on the perceived threat and possibility for success. Indeed, this approach was integral to the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” nuclear strategy. According to Gaddis, by adopting a strategy of asymmetrical deterrence Washington “sought to combine the certainty of a response with uncertainty as to its nature.” Gaddis asserts that the benefit of this approach was that it would keep Moscow guessing as to American intentions. At a strategic disadvantage, the Soviet Union “would come to see the risks of aggression as outweighing the benefits.”

Nor was the strategy based on empty threats. Political scientist Marc Trachtenberg asserts that America’s nuclear superiority allowed it to “undertake more limited forms of military action, regardless of what the balance of forces was, because they were in a position to escalate the conflict. America, in the final analysis, had the ability to launch a full-scale nuclear attack; the [Soviet Union] had nothing comparable.” Therefore, if pressed Moscow would be forced to yield. Secretary of State Dulles likened it to a game of chess, but rather than taking your opponent’s king, the strategy was to “checkmate the king, and don’t play out the rest.” Dulles added that America’s military establishment was “superior to Russia’s and the Russians knew it was superior. Thus if necessary, we could call checkmate on the Soviet Union.”

Although the U.S. could choose where it wanted to apply its foreign policy doctrines, this did not guarantee success. For example, Yaqub demonstrates that Washington was able to maintain the regimes in Lebanon and Jordan, but the failure to establish a friendly government in Syria “was the beginning of the end” for the Eisenhower Doctrine. Moreover, the window for vague warnings was a short one. Nuclear parity and the doctrine of mutual assured doctrine required not just specific statements of American interests to the Soviets, as evidenced by the Carter Doctrine’s application only to the Persian Gulf, but a demonstration of the determination to defend them.

However, a strategic perspective is not the sole factor in defining America’s “Middle East.” With its entry into the region, the U.S. was symbolically at the crossroads of the world. While the repeated references to the region as the intersection of trade, religion, culture, and continents were intended to warn of German, Russian, and Soviet ambitions; they also served to identify American interests and confirm its status as a hegemonic power to the rest of the world and itself. Hegemony over the region meant controlling Suez, the major artery of trade between

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136 Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans: 1943-1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Marc Trachtenberg *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Peace Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 151-153. Cohen details the shift in Allied war planning from the Truman to Eisenhower administrations and the increased reliance on strategic bombers armed with nuclear weapons to deter or respond to a Soviet invasion of the Middle East. Trachtenberg cites Eisenhower discussing the strategy at a JCS meeting that the U.S. capability had to emphasize the ability to deliver “swift and powerful retaliatory blows” at the Soviet Union, while protecting the continental U.S. through a robust air defense system.
137 Gaddis, 145-151.
138 Trachtenberg, 181.
139 Yaqub, 147-148.
Europe and Asia. It also signified dominance over oil supplies, which Halford Hoskins declared “in the contemporary world is power.” Indeed, the Middle East’s oil resources were considered America’s “reserves” and guaranteed its continued prosperity.

As the Holy Land, Palestine was the symbolic heart of the Middle East. Control of Palestine confirmed the religious, even messianic, component underlying imperial expansion. Historian Arif Dirlik contends that the Pacific Rim represented a newfound “paradise” to the Euro-American conquerors. In contrast, Palestine was their paradise lost, the land of the Bible that could only be redeemed by a return to its original biblical state. With America’s military superiority, control of the Middle East denoted not just power but empire.

Rhetorically, the victory of the “Middle East” over the “Near East” reflected the shift in power from London to Washington by the end of World War II. What appeared to be the “Near East” from a European perspective was the “Middle East” from that of the Americans. Moreover, scholars increasingly identified the “Near East” with the “ancient” world, while the “Middle East” was associated with “modern” history and “contemporary” events.

Indeed, the construct of the Middle East corresponds well with the invention of the “Third World.” Historian Carl Pletsch contends that during the Cold War, the “Third World” was viewed as “the world of tradition, culture, religion, irrationality, underdevelopment, overpopulation, political chaos.” Thus, the “Middle East” and its corresponding characterizations fit comfortably within the notion of a “Third World.” With the “modern” world divided between the Cold War camps of Communist or Free, the “traditional” societies of the “Third World” became an ideological and military battleground. Thus, a “vital” and “strategic” region like the “Middle East” was guaranteed Washington’s attention and

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141 Dirlik, 6; Davidson, 5. Building on the work of Fuad Sha’aban, Davidson asserts that the construction of a “mythical Palestine” was based on Judeo-Christian theology in which it was “the land of the Bible, the birthplace of Jesus and the ancient homeland of the Jews.” These characteristics made it “an important extension of the West.” He adds that as it was “geographically located beyond the borders of Western civilization lent it an exotic air, but was ultimately secondary to the fact that, religiously, it was as important to the West as Rome, Canterbury, or the Puritan meeting hall. Unfortunately, in the dim past this sacred place had been captured by infidel hordes and ruled ever since by despoothing ‘Mohammedans’. Thus the ‘land of milk and honey’ had been turned into a ‘land of dust’.”
142 Lewis and Wigen, 66-67. Lewis and Wigen note that the “Near East” is still widely used in philology, ancient history, and antiquarianism. They add that “the farther back in time the period under consideration (and the more recondite the study), the more likely the geographical frame will be labeled the Near rather than the Middle East.” Lewis and Wigen claim that the decline in usage of the “Near East” began with the end of the Ottoman Empire. However, a literature review relying on ProQuest, JSTOR.org, and the *Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature Volume* (Minneapolis, New York: H.W. Wilson Co.) from 1905 to 1959 reveals a different trend. Usage of the term “Near East” predominated in American periodicals and journals until World War II. During the war it was used interchangeably with the “Middle East,” and applied to a region with expansive and inconsistent boundaries. However, by the 1950s the “Middle East” became the dominant term for the region in the mainstream press and scholarly journals, and the “Near East” was consistently used by scholars when discussing the ancient and pre-modern periods.
involvement. In keeping with Britain’s tradition of a “benevolent influence” in the region: only with American help could the Middle East be saved from itself, and only American action could save the world and keep the homeland secure.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated how the “Middle East” emerged as an ideational construct over the past century. It has detailed the relationship between the region’s varying geographical boundaries and the associated justifications made by scholars, journalists, and policymakers. It has also examined how these representations were ideologically driven and reflected British and American imperial attitudes as expressed in their respective foreign policy doctrines and national security policies. This was evidenced in the shifting geographic boundaries of the area, which reflected the military, political, and economic interests of London and Washington. Indeed, this was best observed in the geographic extremes of the “Middle East,” including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Greece, and Libya. Where the Middle East ended and Central Asia, North Africa, and Southern Europe began reflected intellectual, political, and ideological interests, not geography. Yet this chapter also discussed how the “Middle East” has been adopted and contested within the lexicon of those in the region, particularly journalists, and scholars. Further demonstrating the influence of hegemonic power over discourse and how constructed notions are promulgated and perpetuated.

The Middle East’s replacement of the Near East as a geographic and political term symbolized the transfer of hegemony from London to Washington after World War II. It was also emblematic of Anglo-American coordination in the region in the postwar period, where America adopted Britain’s terminology and its commitments in the region, but modified them to serve its own interests. Control of the Middle East had great symbolism for both powers and was accentuated by their rivalries with Russia, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Hegemony over the Middle East as defined by the U.S. and U.K., meant dominance over the historical crossroads of commerce, culture, continents, and religion. It also ensured dominance, directly or indirectly, over the population of the region, which was reflected in part in representations of the Middle East and its inhabitants in British and American print and media culture. The presence of vast oil resources, the Suez Canal, and the Holy Land in the same region ensured that its importance was simultaneously genuine and symbolic: the country that controlled the Middle East, in effect controlled the crossroads of the world.

The remaining chapters will demonstrate how U.S. foreign policy shaped the production of knowledge related to the “Middle East.” Chapter 2 examines the influence of missionaries and university-based Orientalist scholars on policy formation for the Paris Peace Conference. It discusses the creation and operation of the Inquiry, a group of classical and Orientalist scholars and professionals tasked with preparing reports to assist President Woodrow Wilson in the negotiations. In the chapter, I contend that the Inquiry was an important but flawed early effort by the U.S. government to draw upon academic knowledge and expertise for foreign area intelligence.
Chapter II. Wilson’s Experts: Missionaries, Orientalists and the Inquiry in Western Asia, 1917-1922.

You are, in truth, my advisers, for when I ask [for] information, I will have no way of checking it, and must act on it unquestionably. We shall be deluged with claims plausibly presented, and it will be your job to establish the justice or injustice of these claims, so that my position may be taken intelligently...Tell me what’s right and I’ll fight for it, give me a guaranteed position.

- President Woodrow Wilson to members of the Inquiry

The isolation of the United States and its lack of intimate interest in and touch with other countries, especially in the eastern hemisphere, left our government without any accumulation of information and with too small and scattered a trained personnel to deal with such information as might be gathered.

- Stanley Mezes, Director of the Inquiry

Introduction

Docked at Pier 4 in Hoboken, New Jersey, the U.S.S. George Washington was the center of attention on December 4, 1918. The George Washington was originally a German ocean liner seized by the United States and converted into a troop transport. It was refitted with the tapestries, curtains, and rugs of other seized German vessels and restored to its former glory in order to carry President Woodrow Wilson to France, the first sitting American president to make a trip to Europe. The George Washington had a crew of a thousand officers and men, a naval brass band and string orchestra, and a Marine company designated to serve as an honor guard for President Wilson. In addition to the President and First Lady Edith Wilson, the ship was crowded with ambassadors and cabinet members, including Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and other advisors and distinguished guests. At 10:15 a.m. the George Washington slowly left the government dock and made its way into New York Harbor, where onlookers on the Manhattan and Staten Island waterfronts cheered and waved. As the George Washington passed the Statue of Liberty it encountered the troop transport Minnehaha on its way from London. The deck of the Minnehaha was crowded with uniformed soldiers who shared greetings and cheers with the President. After Liberty Island, the George Washington was met by the battleship U.S.S. Pennsylvania and four destroyers, who served as the escort accompanying the President and crew to Brest, France.

While the majority of media attention was focused on the President, the First Lady, and other dignitaries above deck and the celebration ashore, preparations were underway below for the Paris Peace Conference. Over the previous two years, a large group of American scholars were organized to develop contemporary knowledge and expertise that would assist Wilson.

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However, in the United States little was known about the countries and territories outside of the Western Hemisphere or parts of Western Europe. This dearth of expertise was particularly pronounced for the territories of the Ottoman Empire, then referred to as the “Near East.” Colonel Edward M. House, a friend and advisor to Wilson, convinced the President of the need and benefit of assembling a group of experts to assist with preparations for the peace conference. The group became known as the Inquiry, and at its height it included over 150 scholars, of whom only 23 made the voyage to France. Although its role during the Paris Peace Conference has been largely forgotten, the Inquiry represented a significant early attempt by the U.S. government to develop foreign area expertise. It also revealed the intersection of sources of knowledge that were privately held either by American missionaries abroad or university-based Orientalist scholars with government agencies.

In this chapter, I examine the activities and proposals of the Inquiry’s Western Asia division. I argue that Orientalist perceptions shaped U.S. foreign policy decisions on the disposition of the territories of the Ottoman Empire at Versailles. In particular, I analyze the claims by members of the Inquiry that Muslims and Arabs were unprepared for independence and incapable of self-rule. These arguments were incorporated into the recommendations made to President Wilson and were used to advocate for the establishment of European-ruled protectorates over the former Ottoman territories. Finally, this chapter discusses the emergence of AUB and AUC before and after the First World War and their relationship with Washington as well as their host governments.

Missionaries in the East

At the outbreak of the First World War, the U.S.’s main interests in the Near East were commercial and religious. The major commercial interest was the acquisition of oil reserves by American companies. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, American missionaries began traveling to the region, eventually establishing colleges and universities. The experience of missionaries in the Near East was one of the few sources of information for American officials about the region, and this private knowledge created a base of expertise about the native population. Missionaries and their children have been described as more sympathetic toward the native populations where they resided and served than other Americans. However, such analysis ignores their paternalistic attitude, which was often mixed with notions of racial and religious superiority.

Founded in 1810, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) eventually became the largest missionary organization in the United States. The ABCFM emerged out of the New England Congregationalists, and historian Ussama Makdisi argues that its members viewed themselves as the “inheritors of Puritanism.” Spurred on by the Second Great Awakening, the ABCFM were firm believers in the notions of American exceptionalism and divine providence, of which they were to be the vanguard. Makdisi states that the ABCFM “sent forth its missionaries to seek out, to confront, and to overturn ignorance and error across

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4 See Kaplan, *The Arabists*.
the world and replace it with what it considered to be the singular truth of evangelical Christianity.”

In 1870, the ABCFM and the newly established Presbyterian Board of Foreign Mission (PBFM) split the region. The PBFM was responsible for Syria and Persia, while the ABCFM was limited to the Anatolian Peninsula and Southeastern Europe. By 1914, the ABCFM’s largest operations were in present-day Turkey and Greece. According to historian Joseph Grabill, it included twenty missionary stations with roughly 15 personnel who were augmented by a thousand local workers and served 15,000 members in over 130 evangelical Armenian churches. The ABCFM also operated schools, hospitals, and dispensaries in these areas. Meanwhile, the PBFM had four missionary stations with roughly 50 staffers and employed 200 local workers and had about 3,000 church members.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the initial wave of missionaries to the Near and Middle East were intent on the conversion of Muslims. However, these early attempts at conversion failed and in order not to anger the Ottoman Sultan, the American missionaries focused largely on other Christian denominations. The second wave of missionaries had a more lasting impact on the region, not by focusing on conversion but with the establishment of educational institutions.

In May 1864, the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut and Robert College in Istanbul were incorporated in the state of New York. Over two years later, the Syrian Protestant College opened to 16 students, although its course offerings and instructors were limited. By the turn of the century, the College boasted a student body from across the Ottoman Empire. Instruction was initially in Arabic but switched to English by 1873. The university claimed that the diverse student body and lack of qualified instructors able to teach courses in Arabic was the reason for the change. However, Makdisi argues that this shift was indicative of a broader institutional philosophy that “privileged white Anglo-Saxon professors over the very people whom they had come to serve.” Indeed, the Syrian Protestant College maintained a discriminatory policy toward the hiring and reimbursement of native-born instructors until after World War I.

The relationship with the ABCFM ensured that the Syrian Protestant College had influential donors. Among the prominent early backers was the Dodge family who were owners of the Phelps Dodge Corporation, a mining company. David Stuart Dodge was not only one of the College’s founding donors, but also served as an English instructor, and eventually became the chairman of the Board of Trustees. His grandson, Cleveland, would emerge as one of the major financial backers of fellow Princeton alum Woodrow Wilson. Cleveland Dodge would also become the head of the Board of Trustees of Robert College. In addition, Cleveland’s son Bayard married Mary Bliss, the daughter of Howard Bliss, the second president of the Syrian Protestant College and son of its first president, Daniel.

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8 Makdisi, 211-212.
9 Grabill, 81-89; Makdisi, 211.
The Reformer and the War

The connections between the missionaries in the Near East and Woodrow Wilson were one aspect of the new President’s constituency and represented part of the broader reformist trend sweeping the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. Emerging out of the post-Civil War Gilded Age, the Progressive movement benefited from and built upon the abolitionist movement. Progressivism embodied a broad range of social issues from organized labor and women’s suffrage to prohibition and anti-trust. Woodrow Wilson’s reputation as a Progressive reformer was initially earned at Princeton and then reaffirmed when he challenged New Jersey’s Democratic Party bosses in his bid to become Governor of the state. As Governor, he won major victories in the New Jersey legislature, pushing through a series of progressive laws, including electoral and education reform.\textsuperscript{10}

Wilson’s high profile battles and victories attracted national attention and he became a natural front runner for the Democratic Party nomination in 1912. Although he was a formidable candidate, Wilson’s ascendancy to the White House benefited from internal strife within the Republican Party. Much of the campaign focused on domestic issues, particularly anti-trust reform with Wilson and former President Theodore Roosevelt offering contrasting policies. Foreign policy was largely absent from the discussion and after Wilson’s victory he confided to a Princeton faculty member, “It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign problems, for all my preparation has been in domestic matters.”\textsuperscript{11}

Wilson’s hopes and plans for his first term were interrupted by the outbreak of war in Europe during the summer of 1914. For foreign policy expertise he increasingly began to rely on Edward M. “Colonel” House, who had become a close confidant during and after the campaign. House helped identify cabinet members for Wilson during the transition period and refused a cabinet post, preferring to serve as an unofficial advisor. Indeed, in January 1915, Wilson dispatched House to Europe as a personal representative with an offer for the United States to serve as a mediator between the belligerents.\textsuperscript{12}

While House was in Europe, relations between Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan deteriorated. In May 1915, a German submarine sank the British cruise liner \textit{Lusitania}, killing nearly 1,200 passengers, including over 120 Americans. The President, backed by a strong telegram from House, wanted to adopt a tough line with Germany, a stance that Bryan feared would lead to war. Bryan eventually resigned, hoping to lead a campaign against the war. Even though he did not replace Bryan as Secretary of State, House’s influence would grow within the White House.\textsuperscript{13}

In spite of the continuing German submarine attacks and American civilian casualties, America’s entry into the war did not occur until after Wilson was elected to a second term. In his April 2 speech to a joint session of Congress declaring war against Germany, the President stated that the U.S.’s goal was to “vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power.” He argued that “a steadfast concert of peace can

\begin{footnotes}
\item[10] Cooper, 420-421.
\item[11] Ibid., 174-182.
\item[12] Ibid., 180-276.
\item[13] Ibid., 285-295.
\end{footnotes}
never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.” In perhaps the speech’s most memorable line, Wilson declared, “The world must be made safe for democracy.”

However, the President still sought a wartime policy of “peace without victory.” In spite of the speech’s rhetoric about Germany, Wilson had few illusions about his British, French, and Italian allies. During the summer of 1917, he confided to House that common ground on a peaceful settlement could be found with “liberals in Germany.” By the fall, Wilson asked House to assemble a group of experts that would help with preparations for the eventual negotiated settlement.

**The Inquiry**

During the 1912 campaign, Wilson derided Roosevelt’s policy proposals and claimed that he feared a “government of experts.” Yet to help prepare America’s negotiating positions for a postwar settlement, he asked Colonel House to assemble such a group from across American academia. House’s initial outreach was to Harvard President Lawrence Lowell and Herbert Croly, the progressive writer and co-founder of *The New Republic*. He also selected Sidney E. Mezes, then President of the City College of New York and his brother-in-law, to serve as director and manage the organization’s daily activities. Based on Wilson’s recommendation, House also recruited Walter Lippmann to the group. Lippman co-founded *The New Republic* with Croly and during the war served as an assistant to Secretary of War Baker. He would eventually become one of the most influential newspaper columnists of the twentieth century.

House’s new organization was to operate independently of the State Department, thereby creating the potential for bureaucratic infighting and competition. In order to prevent any false optimism on the part of the public, Wilson wanted the body to operate in secrecy. However, rumors of the new organization hit the press soon after it was initially formed, which the White House worked to squelch. The press frenzy subsided by the fall and the new group settled into its initial headquarters at the New York Public Library. Initially dubbed the “War Data Investigations Bureau,” the name was replaced by a more non-descript moniker offered by Columbia professor and historian James T. Shotwell. The group was called “The Inquiry,” and Shotwell later explained that the amorphous name was deliberately and appropriately chosen because it was “blind to the general public, but would serve to identify it among the initiated.” A month later, the Inquiry relocated to the offices of the American Geographical Society (AGS), where they occupied the third floor. Isaiah Bowman, director of the AGS, initially served as secretary for the Inquiry and eventually replaced Mezes as head of the group in Paris.

September’s revelations in the press about the formation of the Inquiry were overshadowed by events in Russia. The reverberations from the Bolshevik Revolution were felt around the globe and were compounded by Russia’s withdrawal from the war and the publication of secret agreements for the postwar disposition of the territories of the Ottoman Empire negotiated with

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14 Albert Shaw, ed., *President Wilson’s State Addresses and Papers* (New York: George H. Doran Company, the Review of reviews company, 1918): 378-381, Cooper, 385-386.  
15 Cooper, 417-420. Wilson quoted in Cooper.  
16 Cooper, 163.  
17 Gelfand, 37-39.  
18 Ibid., 40-44; Steel, 128-129. Shotwell’s quote originally cited in Gelfand.
Britain and France. However, Wilson learned about the secret agreements from Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, and he vowed to Colonel House that he would use financial pressure to change Allied attitudes after the war. The President requested that the Inquiry prepare a memorandum which would examine the key questions to be resolved at a peace conference. Lippmann worked with other members of the Inquiry’s Directorate to draft a memorandum entitled “The War Aims and Peace it Suggests,” that was delivered to Wilson by Christmas. The memorandum outlined the possible areas for post-war settlement and borders in Europe and became the foundation for Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech.19

Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress on January 8. Four days earlier he spent the day with House adapting the Lippmann memo into fourteen statements that addressed the terms for achieving peace.20 Wilson explained that the United States entered the war “because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence.” He declared, “What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves,” adding, “It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.” After reading the fourteen points in succession, Wilson stated, “In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right,” the Americans were “intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists.” He added that Americans “cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.” Wilson concluded with a powerful call summarizing his speech and the position of his administration, stating that:

An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.21

While the final point calling for the creation of a “general association of nations,” was arguably the most groundbreaking part of Wilson’s address to Congress, it was the phrase he did not utter -- self-determination -- that became associated with the speech. Although implied in the President’s “Point V,” the term “self-determination” was coined by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who used it in a speech in London while Wilson was finalizing his own address. According to historian and Wilson biographer John Milton Cooper, the President was concerned

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19 Steel, 133-134; Cooper, 420-421. Cooper notes that due to the holidays Wilson did not review the initial memorandum. A revised version was delivered after the New Year which became the basis for the Fourteen Points speech.
20 Cooper, 421-424.
21 Shaw, President Wilson’s State Addresses and Papers, 464-472.
that he had been upstaged by Lloyd George. However, House reassured Wilson that his speech would “smother” that of the British Prime Minister and that he “would once more become the spokesman for the Entente, and indeed, for the liberals of the world.” House’s assessment proved correct, and while Wilson eventually coopted the term “self-determination” as his own, he was never entirely comfortable with its implications, particularly for the people outside of Europe.  

Wilson’s speech captured the imagination of a war-weary globe. It also created an additional burden for the Inquiry, which was compounded by the Bolshevik Revolution and the weakening Austro-Hungarian Empire. A March 20, 1918, Inquiry memorandum noted, “Since the peace conference is to be conducted by open discussion, a command of fact totally unnecessary in secret negotiations is required.” It explained that at the conference, “The whole world is to be the critic of the debates, the American influence will be in proportion to the depth and incisiveness with which just principles are applied to particular cases.”

The Inquiry viewed itself as an impartial referee and fact checker of the different and competing claims that would be made at the conference. The “Scope and Methods” memorandum explained that “American negotiators must be in a position to judge whether a claim put forth by a power is supported by the democracy at home, or whether it is merely a traditional diplomatic objective or the design of an imperialistic group.” It added that in the “fiercely disputed areas,” American negotiators “must be prepared freely to offer friendly suggestions either of compromise or of constructive experiment” that were backed by “a body of reliable fact” that “must be presented tersely and graphically so as to carry conviction.”

American negotiators were expected to be well-versed in a variety of topics ranging from trade to minority rights. The memorandum explained that they should also “command various well-tested programs of reform and reconstruction for the historically embittered areas.” This included the “torn peoples of the Balkans and Turkey” as well as “the natives of Africa” and would involve the “expedients of education, sanitation, financial reform, adequate police, and simply administered justice.” The memorandum noted that “with this end in view, comparative studies are being made of the different types of government applied to dependent and backward peoples,” and that “a careful examination is planned of the various attempts in the past to secure

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22 Cooper, 421-423, 428-429. Point V stated that “a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in demonstrating all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” In his “Four Points” address to Congress on February 11, Wilson again implied but still did not use the term “self-determination.” In the first point, Wilson explained that “each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case.” The second point stated that “peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.” Third, any territorial settlements were to be made in the “interest and for the benefit of the population concerned.” Wilson’s final point stated that “all well defined national aspirations” were to be considered and fulfilled “without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism.”


24 Ibid., The memorandum explained that the members of the Inquiry were to collect the following data for each disputed area, “what resources human and material it contains, what is the concrete interest of each power in the area, what political group or groups within each power are concerned in that interest.” It added that it would be “necessary also to know the place of that area in the general plan of each power’s foreign policy.”
Recruiting the required expertise, however, proved to be more difficult than House or his aides imagined. Writing to Secretary of War Baker, Lippmann confided, “On many of the problems we face of first-rate importance there is a real famine in men and we have been compelled practically to train and create our own experts.” He added that this was particularly true of Russia, Southeastern Europe, Turkey, and Africa, which he declared were “intellectually practically unexplored.” Lippmann explained, “What we are on the lookout for is genius-sheer, startling genius and nothing else will do because the real application of the President’s idea to those countries requires inventiveness and resourcefulness which is scarcer than anything.”

Yet in his detailed study of the Inquiry, Gelfand observed that intellectual prowess was less important than political connections. Gelfand stated that “men were sought whose experience in research could be described as generally successful even though it had not focused squarely on the specific problem to be treated by the Inquiry.” He added, “The Inquiry’s correspondence is replete with instances of members who brought in colleagues and friends rather than attempt seriously to comb American academic institutions in search of the best qualified talent.” As would be expected of such an effort during this era, much of the expertise was drawn from elite eastern universities, in particular Harvard and Yale.

However, American expertise, even from elite universities, was limited. Gelfand states that for the Asia, Africa, and Pacific divisions, “With almost no exception, no writer whose services were mobilized by these divisions of the Inquiry could have been described as of ‘expert’ caliber in terms of his assigned subject at the time he started his work.” For the “Western Asia” division, which comprised the Ottoman Empire and the disposition of its Arab-majority provinces, a particular form of expertise was sought and reinforced. Led by Princeton’s Dana C. Munro, the division was populated with experts in ancient history and literature who had little or no knowledge of the contemporary issues of the region. Indeed, when Arthur Andrews, a professor of history at Tufts and a Harvard alum, was introduced into the Inquiry, he was told by Harvard professor Archibald Cary Coolidge, “You know one Mohammedan from another’ i.e., from others.” Munro, a medieval specialist with knowledge of the Crusades, was joined in the division by his son, Dana G., a Latin American specialist, William Westermann, a classics professor at the University of Wisconsin, and Princeton’s L.H. Gray, a scholar of Persian linguistics.

Orientalism as Policy

Although he was assigned to the Balkans group, Leon Dominian’s authored reports related to the Ottoman Empire and Islam. A recent émigré from Turkey of Armenian descent, Dominian

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25 Ibid.
27 Gelfand, 48-51.
28 Gelfand, 227.
29 Ibid., 60-63. Gelfand states that “perhaps more than any other branch of the Inquiry, this division illustrated how the Inquiry’s directorate selected men having special knowledge of ancient, classical civilizations and placed on them full responsibility for studies involving contemporary history.”
was a staffer at the AGS before joining the Inquiry. According to Gelfand, his work on the southeastern Europe was not without controversy. His analysis was dismissed by other members of the Inquiry due to its “Greek bias,” which they argued prevented him “from any attempt to achieve scientific objectivity in his reports.” Indeed, his analysis outside of the Balkans was not impartial either.  

In a May 1918 report, Dominian offered a scathing assessment of the “Mohammedan World.” He asserted that for the population of the areas stretching from northwest Africa to the Dutch Indies a “restlessness and a chafing of the Mohammedan spirit under non-Mohammedan rule or influence is observable everywhere.” Dominian claimed, “As a rule the Mohammedan has shown a total want of compatibility with the spirit of modern progress. He is generally bigoted and inclined to be violent in word and deed against non-Mohammedans.” Dominian asserted that it was general and inherent Muslim deficiencies, psychological and moral, which “compelled European powers to control and police Mohammedan lands.” However, Dominian cautioned that there was a difference in the rule of the European powers. He stated that unlike the areas under German rule, “economic exploitation” by Britain and France was “accompanied by a cultural development of the native.”

Dominian’s analysis offered few specific policy recommendations other than maintaining the status quo. He acknowledged that the U.S. could have a greater role in affairs within the Muslim world, particularly through greater influence with its allies, and that the area was particularly important especially in preventing future conflicts. However, Dominian warned that that “the low stage of economic and cultural development of Mohammedan countries preclude placing too great resilience on Mohammedan sympathy for foreigners.” He asserted that Muslim countries abandoned to self rule quickly fell into anarchy, as was witnessed in Persia. Dominian stated that Egypt and Morocco would also descend into chaos if their protectorates ended.

In a separate report, Dominion argued that the same inherent deficiencies limited the prospects for self-rule in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Dominion argued that “the exercise of a protectorate by one of the great powers is a requisite because in each region the majority of the population consists of Mohammedans who have proven themselves culturally inferior to either Jew or Christian and whose sympathy to the ideas of civilization upheld in Western lands is doubtful.” He explained that Islam was a “bar to cultural contact with the occident, whereas intimate ties of material and moral interests bind the Jews and Christians to the west.” Dominian added that independence for the majority Arab Muslim areas would be a “menace to unhampered intercourse between Europe and the regions of Southern Asia and the Far East.”

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30 Ibid., 60. Gelfand notes that the scholars in the Balkans group fell into two categories. The first he describes as Americans from different specialties that traveled in the region at one time. The second were immigrants from southeastern Europe living in the United States, which included Dominian. However, he states that one characteristic of the latter group was that their “training and experience had not provided any professional competency for handling or criticizing the source materials.”


32 Ibid.

33 “The Arab Problem in Relation to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia,” Leo Dominian, 15 April 1918, Document 1016, Inquiry Records, M1107, Roll 47, NARACP.
The report advocated the establishment of British and French protectorates over Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, in addition to those in Egypt and Morocco. In Palestine, Dominian argued that the presence of a large Jewish population would “contribute an important shore in the development of Palestine” resulting in closer relations with the west than any of the other formerly Ottoman-ruled areas. He added that “the necessity of preventing Mohammedan control of the internal or external affairs of the contemplated Zionist state is hence obvious.” Dominian claimed that Christian as well as Jewish leaders in Palestine “stood in great fear” that the Muslim majority would influence British and French policies in the territories they ruled. He asserted that British and French control over the three territories would serve as an “Entente ring” around the Arabian Peninsula helping to contain any emerging Pan-Arab movement. Although he acknowledged that a Pan-Arab union was unlikely, Dominian argued that “already at this early stage of emancipation from Turkish rule, the signs are not wanting to indicate that the possibility of an all-Arab union from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf and southward to the Indian Ocean is not foreign to the thought of some ambitious Arab.” He cautioned, “The Arabs will undoubtedly resort to Islam in the propagation of their natural aims,” adding that the religion was a “latent force with a dynamic reserve which will be felt as soon as the Arabs progress in education.”

Dominian reiterated this line of argument in a separate report on Arabia. He asserted that “the Arabs are a primitive people with uncritical minds and hence are easily swayed by religious feeling.” He added, “The appearance of a strong man or a Mahdi in their midst is an ever present possibility.” Dominian explained, “The entire population of Arabia may be classed into either a desert or a sedentary group. Both are made up of very primitive types. Fanaticism, superstition and ignorance are common traits.” Although he deemed Bedouins to be “better individuals” because of their “higher idea of honesty,” than peasants, Dominian warned that “both classes are uneducated.” Indeed, even when educated, as seen with “leaders and priests,” they were “generally men of crass ignorance.” However, this did create the opportunity for educational work in Arabia.

Dominian again extolled the benefits of European intervention in the region. He claimed that Britain was responsible “for the few and elementary ideas of Western civilization which have penetrated Arabia.” This included establishing “law and order” in areas where they had a predominant influence as well as the reduction of piracy “due to the watchful eye of British gunboats.” Dominian advocated the restoration of “ancient caravan and trade routes,” arguing that there were “no better means of impressing the Arab or of acquiring his sympathy.”

Dominian’s discussion of the central role of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina are similarly revealing. He argued that with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, “a transfer of the Caliphate from Constantinople to Mecca has thereby been occasioned.” He added, “the Mohammadean world may be expected to turn hereafter to Arabia rather than to Turkey for religious leadership.” This shift was “significant to powers whose colonial domain comprises Mohammadean areas.” Dominian asserted that the annual pilgrimage to Mecca “had

34 Ibid.
35 “Arabia,” 31 March 1918, Leo Dominian, Document 1018, Inquiry Records, M1107, Roll 47, NARACP.
36 It should be noted that Dominian’s claim of the benefits of British imperialism appears to echo Mahan’s influential 1902 article “The Persian Gulf and International Relations” discussed in Chapter 1.
37 Ibid.
considerable bearing on the foreign relations of Mohammadean countries since the religious trip provides the opportunity for the discussion of common aims and policies in widely separated regions.” He claimed, incorrectly, that like Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina “contain representative communities of the various Mohammadean sects,” thereby ensuring that “intercourse between Mecca and the region inhabited by each community is constant.” With the fall of Turkish rule, Dominian claimed that “the hold of Mecca over Mohammadean areas will tend to increase.”

Other scholars in the Western Asia section attempted to offer more nuanced portraits of the region and its inhabitants, but they were still marred by inaccuracies, contradictions, and mischaracterizations. Writing in October 1919, E.H. Byrne claimed that Syria’s population was composed of Arabs, Christians, and Jews. While he conflated “Arabs” with Muslims, Byrne explained that except for the Armenian population, Christian Syrians were Semitic, spoke Arabic, and had “to a degree Arab manners and mode of thought.” Yet he argued there was diversity in racial origins of Syria’s Christian community. While Christians in the villages and cities of the interior were clearly Arabs, those along the coast were “a bastard race, the result of crossings of conquerors, crusaders and traders through thousands of years; they are not Arab, but fundamentally Semitic.” He added that Jews in Palestine were “another racial element of disunion.”

Byrne advocated creating a sense of national unity within Syria. Pointing to the influence of the Syrian Protestant College among regional elites, he argued that education could help form a national ethos. However, Byrne cautioned that the emphasis should be on “national unity” rather than a particular nation-state. He noted that a national consciousness had developed in spite of active Turkish and European efforts to hinder such a development.

A separate report authored by Howard Crosby Butler examined the possible options for the creation of an independent Arab state or states. In evaluating the different proposals, Butler argued that it was “impossible” to apply the principle of self-determination to the majority Arab territories. He added that “it would be impossible to discover what any of these large number of people desire.” Butler explained that “even if this were possible, it might easily turn out that they desired something which would soon be found to be disastrous to their well-being.”

Butler’s report offered two perspectives on how to approach the issue of self-determination in Arabia. One possibility was a government that would not disrupt their social customs and allow for gradual improvements in living conditions and governance. The second option was the type of government based on what “more highly experienced experts in political institutions and social economics believe to be best for them in the long run, regardless of native customs and prejudices.” Although Butler conceded that native inhabitants would not welcome a foreign

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
At the Crossroads of Empire
Chapter 2
Osamah Khalil

protectorate, he stated that without such “foreign guidance and protection, the Arabs can not be
guaranteed good government of any sort at the present time.”

William Westermann, head of the Western Asia division, concurred with the determination
that the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire were not prepared for self-rule. Westermann, a
classics professor from the University of Wisconsin, focused on religious differences within the
empire to justify establishing protectorates. He explained that the population of Syria, divided
by religion, needed a greater sense of “national unity” than a government could provide. A
protectorate, Westermann argued, could provide such a national ethos. However, he argued that
Arabia should be granted independence, and the different tribes which populated the peninsula
would decide on their own traditional form of government. Like Syria, Westermann also
envisioned different forms of international protection over other areas of the empire, including
Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Palestine. In the case of Palestine,
Westermann acknowledged that the proposed boundaries were in accordance with the aspirations
of the Zionist movement for a separate state.

Britain, America, Palestine and Zionism

As discussed in Chapter 1, Western interest in Palestine was renewed in the late nineteenth
century, as part of the debate between Britain, France, Russia, and Germany over the “Eastern
Question.” The Eastern Question revolved around the disposition of the various territories of the
Ottoman Empire, how much of it should be retained and how to prevent war between the
European Powers over its holdings. This period also witnessed increasing European and
American interest in, and travels to, the lands of the Bible, especially the “Holy Land” of
Palestine and “Holy City” of Jerusalem.

The Zionist movement emerged in Europe in parallel to the competition over the Ottoman
Empire’s territories. Largely based among Russian Jews, who suffered from a series of legal
restrictions and pogroms under the Tsar, Zionism called for the emigration to Palestine, the
“ancient home of the Jews.” The Zionists advocated the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine,
“founded on the principles of Jewish agriculture and Jewish labor.” Yet the movement had
limited appeal among European Jews. Most European Jews, particularly those in Western
Europe, preferred assimilation within the countries where they lived to emigration to Palestine.
However, the Zionist movement did find prominent supporters among wealthy and influential
Jews in Western Europe.

The Ottoman Empire’s wartime alliance with Germany provided the opportunity for Britain
and France to expand and formalize their presence in the Middle East. Over the next three years,
London engaged in separate and contradictory negotiations and agreements that eventually

42 Ibid.
43 Gelfand, 248-250.
44 Alexander Scölch, Palestine in Transformation, 1856-1882 (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies,
1993), 47-50. The European powers focused on the protection of religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire as a
way to increase their influence in the region, in particular Palestine. Scölch states that “for those seeking to acquire
influence through religious-cultural penetration and by means of a ‘religious protectorate’, what country other than
the ‘Holy Land’ could have held out a greater promise of success?”
created the modern map of the region. Hoping to create dissension within the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire, Britain engaged in a series of conversations with Sharif Husayn of Mecca. Husayn was the patriarch of the Hashemite family, direct descendants of the prophet Mohammed and guardians of Islam’s holiest shrines in the cities of Mecca and Medina. The exchanges between Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Cairo, and Sharif Husayn occurred over the course of six months beginning in July 1915. The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence prompted the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, led by Husayn’s sons Feisal and Abdullah and backed by the British. In return for initiating the revolt, Husayn was promised support for Arab independence in areas of the Middle East. The boundaries of the independent Arab state to be led by Sharif Husayn were vague, particularly regarding the region of Palestine, then part of the Greater Syria province of the Ottoman Empire. This created one source of Arab anger after the war and their claims of betrayal by the British.46

In fact, Arab claims of British duplicity were not unfounded. During the period of the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, the British also began negotiations with France over the division of Ottoman territories. The key negotiators were Sir Mark Sykes, a member of Parliament, and Georges Picot, a veteran French diplomat. Ratified in May 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the Arab regions of the Middle East into areas of “direct rule” and “spheres of influence.” The agreement stipulated that British direct rule was to be established over Egypt and the region of Mesopotamia in present-day Iraq. Britain’s sphere of influence encompassed lower Palestine, the cities of Haifa and Acre, present-day Jordan, and eastern Iraq. French direct rule was to be established over present-day Lebanon and eastern Anatolia, and its sphere of influence encompassed present-day Syria. The region of northern Palestine, including Jerusalem, was to become an international protectorate. While neither power was satisfied with the agreement it served as the foundation for later arrangements.47

The Sykes-Picot Agreement helped to pave the way for Britain’s third set of secret negotiations, this time with representatives of the Zionist movement. The outcome was the Balfour Declaration, announced in November 1917. Largely negotiated between Chaim Weizmann, at the time an activist in the World Zionist Organization, and Lord Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, the Declaration promised support for a Jewish national home in Palestine.48 It also guaranteed the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” in other words the Palestinian Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, who accounted for over 90 percent of the population. More telling is that the declaration did not explicitly guarantee political rights for the Palestinian Arabs.49

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and President Wilson had similar backgrounds and reactions to the Balfour Declaration. Lloyd George would later explain his support for the Zionist movement by recalling, “I was taught in school far more about the history of the Jews than about the history of my own land. I could tell you all the Kings of Israel. But I doubt

46 Ibid., 62-67.
47 Ibid., 67-70. Russia was initially involved in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Bolshevik’s revealed the agreement after the Revolution. The exposure of the agreement further angered the Arabs.
48 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete (New York: Henry Holt, 1999): 39-46. Segev reports that although an activist, Weizmann “held no office in the Zionist movement.” He adds that at the time of the Balfour Declaration “most Jews did not support Zionism; the movement was highly fragmented, with activists working independently in different capitals.”
49 Ibid., 70-76.
whether I could have named half a dozen of the Kings of England and no more of the Kings of Wales.” Wilson expressed similar support for the Zionist movement based on his own Presbyterian background. In 1916, Wilson confided to Rabbi Stephen Wise, a leading American Zionist leader, “To think that I, a son of the manse, should be able to help restore the Holy Land to its people.” Unlike Lloyd George, Wilson’s support for the Balfour Declaration was discreet and relayed to the British through Colonel House.

Following the announcement of the Balfour Declaration, Lloyd George ordered Jerusalem to be captured by Christmas. General Sir Edmund Allenby captured the city well before the holiday, with British troops entering Jerusalem on December 9, 1917. In response, Lloyd George remarked that Allenby had achieved “something which generations of the chivalry of Europe failed to attain.” Accompanied by French, Italian, and American representatives, Allenby formally accepted the city’s surrender from Mayor Hussein Salim al-Husseini. The British Parliament was informed of Jerusalem’s capture and the bells of Westminster Cathedral rang for the first time in three years. In addition, King George V dispatched a personal note of congratulations to Allenby.

The influence of the Zionist movement, latent and overt, was also observed in the research of the Inquiry. In his report on Palestine, David Magie, a classics professor from Princeton, echoed Byrne’s report on Syria. Indeed, Magie’s description of Palestinian society was more revealing about American perceptions than a particular reality. Like Byrne, Magie considered “Muslims” synonymous with “Arabs” and “Christians” were classified as “Syrians.” He argued that the Jewish population was represented by the “immigrant Zionist,” who comprised a small minority, and ignored the presence of the larger non-Zionist Jewish population comprised of urban-based religious communities. Magie explained that neither Christians nor Muslims “would accommodate themselves readily to a Zionist State at present.” However, he argued that the native Palestinians “lack any sufficient experience in self-government to offer a nucleus for autonomous control,” again ignoring participation of leading Arab families from Jerusalem and other major cities in the Ottoman parliament. Although he argued that either a British or American protectorate over Palestine would be “welcome by all classes,” Magie stated that Britain should be granted the protectorate. He added that until self-government was achieved in Palestine, a “Jewish chartered company” should be established that would assist with the country’s development and “the settlement therein of the Jewish people.”

A report on Zionism produced by O.J. Campbell of the University of Wisconsin offered a favorable analysis of the movement. Relying on articles published in academic journals by scholars associated with the Zionist movement, Campbell stated that the Zionist settlers were

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50 Lloyd George quoted in Segev, 36.
51 Wilson quoted in Lawrence Davidson, America’s Palestine, 15-17.
52 Segev, 13, 50-54.
53 Lloyd George quoted in MacMillan, 415.
54 Segev, 37-39, 50-55. Segev notes that while Lloyd George appeared to profess an admiration for Jewish history and tradition, it was based on a deeply seated anti-Semitic fear of perceived “Jewish power” that was also prevalent among British officials in the Foreign Office and diplomatic corps. He adds that Chaim Weizmann actively encouraged the impression that the Zionist movement was well connected internationally, and particularly in the United States, where Lloyd George believed they had influence in the White House.
quickly improving agricultural and economic production in Palestine. Campbell reported these advances, while also detailing the heavy subsidies underwriting the Zionist colonies as well as their prior economic and agricultural failures, and chose to emphasize their positive potential over the negative experience to date. In the case of agriculture, these improvements were in sharp contrast to the Palestinian farmers, whose methods he claimed had “seriously impoverished the soil.” Although Campbell stopped short of openly endorsing the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, his analysis emphasized the advances achieved by the movement’s colonies and their affinity with European methods. He also emphasized the statements of Zionist supporters who suggested that the existing Palestinian population could live with, and benefit from, the Zionist movement, rather than Zionist leaders who advocated for the expulsion of non-Jews.56

At least one Inquiry report critical of the Zionist movement was revised. Westermann authored a February 1919 report which endorsed an independent Palestine but did not advocate for the creation of a Jewish state. Inquiry Director Mezes altered the report’s recommendations to favor the establishment of a Jewish state, which was provided to the British delegation for the creation of a joint report. Westermann’s objections were apparently limited to a private conversation with Mezes and an angry entry in his diary.57

Paris

During the voyage to France, members of the Inquiry had only one formal meeting with the President. Aboard the George Washington, the Washington bureaucracy, in particular the State Department and the military, were intent on reasserting their advisory role to the Presidency and reining in, if not undermining, the Inquiry. The American delegation numbered over 1,200 and was headed by five commissioners, including Wilson, House, Secretary of State Lansing, General Tasker Bliss, and Henry White, a retired Republican diplomat. With only a small number of participants, it appeared that the Inquiry would be eclipsed by the State Department and military.

However, upon arriving in Paris, Isaiah Bowman and Colonel House appealed to the President to intervene. Wilson placed the Inquiry, and in particular Bowman, over the State Department and Military personnel. Renamed the “Division of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence,” Bowman’s staff swelled to over 100 personnel across eighteen divisions. In his biography of Bowman, Neil Smith states that “he saw his job in Paris as not simply supplying advice to Wilson but also corralling the factual and graphic support for Wilson’s positions.”58

56 “Zionism,” O.J. Campbell, undated, Document 88, Inquiry Records, M1107, Roll 1, NARACP; Gelfand, 246. Gelfand notes that the Palestine reports “were of definite substandard quality.” He adds that the Campbell report in particular was criticized by other scholars in the group, who claimed that it was “absolutely inadequate from any standpoint and must be regarded as nothing more than material for a future report.” For an examination of the prevalence of the philosophy of transfer within the Zionist movement see Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).
57 Gelfand, 327.
58 Neil Smith, American Empire, 143-147.
Wilson’s belief that European indebtedness to the United States would translate into concessions at Paris proved to be overly optimistic, if not misguided. Neither Lloyd George nor French Premier Georges Clemenceau succumbed to American pressure. Indeed, they recognized that Wilson’s overriding desire to establish a League of Nations provided them with negotiating leverage to achieve their goals, including German reparations and maintaining their colonies in Africa and Asia. Moreover, hanging over the proceedings was the specter of the Bolshevik Revolution and the realities of unemployed men and starving families in postwar Europe created ripe conditions for further unrest. At the conference, numerous dignitaries from around the world came to Paris to press their claims for independence, however, their entreaties fell on the uninterested ears of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, who were intent on expanding their imperial holdings. Meanwhile, Wilson, already uncomfortable with the implications of self-determination for the population of what Colonel House called “the waste places of the earth,” believed that the League of Nations would mitigate future conflicts while providing an incubator for the fledgling states.\(^{59}\)

The League of Nations provided a legalistic mechanism that allowed Britain and France to retain their colonies and recently conquered territories. Through the creation of “mandates,” Britain and France were to temporarily assist the territories under their control to form the necessary political, economic, and social structures and institutions for democratic self-governance. In reality, the mandates legitimized the imperial interests of Britain and France. The majority Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire were divided into new-nation states that were designated class “A” mandates, signifying that their provisional independence could be recognized and that their respective populations were to have input into the selection of a mandatory power.

At the San Remo Conference, held in Italy in April 1920, Britain and France finalized their plans for the region, regardless of the wishes of the inhabitants. Britain imposed mandates on the new states of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. Meanwhile, France established mandates over Lebanon and Syria. In the case of Palestine, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the mandate’s preamble, firmly establishing the creation of a Jewish national home as British policy.\(^{60}\)

The decisions at the San Remo Conference also ignored an American effort to determine the wishes of the non-Turkish inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. Led by Charles Crane, a wealthy confidant of President Wilson, and Henry King, the president of Oberlin College, the King-Crane commission was dispatched to the region in the summer of 1919. After conducting interviews in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, the Commission had a far different understanding of the region, its inhabitants, and their wishes from those in Paris. Although the Commission determined that the areas were not ready for self-rule, they found strong resistance to British or French rule and

\(^{59}\) House quoted in Gelfand, 229; Macmillan, 53-60. Joining the three men in what became known as the “Council of Four,” was Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Like his British and French counterparts, Orlando had hopes for expanded possessions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. However, Orlando’s domestic position was the weakest politically of the four and he was hampered in Paris by an active, and apparently belligerent, foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino. The Italian delegation left the conference in April 1919, angered by what they perceived as British and French duplicity and American hypocrisy on the issue of territorial expansion and self-determination of the native populations. Although Orlando returned, he was out of power before he was able to sign the Versailles Treaty.

\(^{60}\) Neil Smith, 81-88, 106-108.
the Zionist movement. Indeed, the interviews revealed a desire for an independent and united Syria, including the areas designated for Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Moreover, if a mandate was to be established, the inhabitants wanted it to be administered by the United States. In their initial report, the King-Crane Commission warned that the Palestinian Arabs were resistant to the program and aims of the Zionist movement and recommended limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine. However, the Commission’s initial recommendations and the final report, not completed until 1922, were both dead letters.\textsuperscript{61}

The Syrian mandate also flew in the face of British promises to Sharif Husayn of Mecca and was a betrayal of the Arab Revolt led by his sons. Although the revolt led to the founding of the Arab Kingdom in Damascus, it lasted less than a year. Husayn’s son Faysal attended the Paris conference accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, the British Army liaison officer serving with the revolt. Faysal advocated that the Arab Kingdom comprising the areas promised by the British in the correspondence with his father be considered an independent nation. However, an agreement between Lloyd George and Clemenceau was achieved even before he arrived in France. At the Paris conference, Arab hopes for independence were further undermined by a seemingly unlikely source. Howard Bliss, then president of the Syrian Protestant College, testified that Arabs lacked “balance” and “political fairness” and would need guidance toward self-determination.\textsuperscript{62}

In July 1920, French forces overthrew the Arab Kingdom, sending Faysal into exile and imposing mandates over the new states of Lebanon and Syria.\textsuperscript{63} Although Faysal would eventually be rescued by his British patrons and installed as the monarch over the newly established mandate territory of Iraq, his demands for independence drew the ire of French and American representatives. Describing Faysal’s appearance before the Conference two years later, Colonel House was both complimentary and dismissive, stating that:

> Of the visiting chiefs and potentates from far-off lands, none made a more profound impression than the Emir Feisal, son of the king of the Hedjaz. He spoke Arabic only, but he had an able friend and interpreter in Colonel Lawrence, who himself was one of the unique characters of the war. The Arabian prince, in his native dress, was a striking figure. He looked not unlike the accepted pictures of the Christ, but there the resemblance ended, for Feisal had proved himself a dangerous foe on many fields of battle, and at Paris asserted himself in a way in which no signs of humility were apparent. He came less like a suppliant than any of the others, for he bore himself with a kingly air and was imperious in his demands. This attitude finally brought about his undoing and landed him in exile.\textsuperscript{[sic]}\textsuperscript{64}

Although the remainder of the Ottoman Empire was to be partitioned as well, the plans of the Entente powers were disrupted by a war hero and former diplomat named Mustafa Kemal. Leading a nationalist insurgency, Kemal, later known as Atatürk, not only thwarted British, French, Italian, and Greek plans to carve up the Anatolian peninsula but also succeeded in

\textsuperscript{61} Neil Smith, 84; MacMillan, 406, 423.
\textsuperscript{62} Cooper, 473-474.
\textsuperscript{63} MacMillan, 406.
preventing the establishment of Armenian and Kurdish states. The hyperactivity surrounding the Kemal-led resistance to the plans and forces of the European forces contrasted sharply with the defeatism and impotence of the Ottoman Sultan, and the establishment of the Turkish republic marked the end of the Ottoman Empire after nearly six centuries.

Unlike the Anatolian Peninsula, Britain was successful in guarding its influence in Persia. As discussed in Chapter 1, London deemed protecting the land and sea approaches to India as vital. With the discovery of large quantities of oil reserves and the transition of the British naval fleet from coal to oil, Persia became a valuable prize. Although a delegation from Persia was present at the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George ignored its requests and prevented any in-depth discussions of the disposition of the territory from arising. In the aftermath of the Paris Conference, the British Foreign Office sought a long-term agreement whereby London would lend Tehran £2 million and in return have control over Persian military and financial affairs. Although Persia would be considered “independent” under the terms of the agreement, in reality there was little to differentiate it from the mandate territories under British rule or the protectorate over Egypt. The Anglo-Persian Agreement was short-lived and set the stage for the emergence of Reza Khan, a Cossack officer, who sought to establish a modern Iran using Atatürk and Turkey as his example. Reza Khan, later Reza Shah, became the founder of Iran’s Pahlavi dynasty. ⁶⁵

Wilson returned to Washington exhausted but triumphant. Although he was treated to a hero’s welcome, the President soon found that the negotiations in Paris were only the beginning of his problems. Wilson’s health deteriorated after his return from Paris, providing Republican opponents of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations with the opportunity to block ratification. Yet the Treaty and Wilson’s actions at the Conference were also criticized by his supporters. Writing two years later, William Westermann assailed the abandonment of American principles and responsibilities, particularly toward the Armenians. Westermann argued that the few gains achieved in the treaty were meager in comparison with “the hopes that men set their hearts upon at Paris.” ⁶⁶

**The Legacy of the Inquiry**

The Inquiry had a mixed impact at the Paris Peace Conference. Prior to the Paris Conference, the Inquiry was the focus of media attention, had access to the President, and was instrumental in the drafting of Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech. At the conference, Bowman was elevated to a position of authority above the State Department and Military. Although the final decisions rested with Wilson, he consulted the collected team of experts, especially Bowman, on a range of territorial issues. While the Fourteen Points speech served as the basis for the American position at Paris, other policy recommendations advanced by the Inquiry were also adopted. In the case of Western Asia, their advocacy for protectorates was modified and adopted as the mandate system. Indeed, but for the intervention of Mustafa Kemal, the remainder of the Ottoman Empire would have been further segmented into small states defined by ethnicity.

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In the aftermath of the conference some key participants, including Secretary of State Lansing attempted to downplay the Inquiry’s influence on the final decisions. Gelfand, however, disputes this claim and states that a “draft program” was developed which offered recommendations on the different territorial questions to be discussed. While the program was not officially endorsed by the American delegation “and therefore never constituted an American program in any official sense,” Gelfand adds that the recommendations were a baseline for the negotiations which key figures like Wilson adapted in order to find agreement. He reports that the recommendations were completed “during the first month of the conference. They were in no sense random proposals culled from numerous reports.”

However, in other respects their expertise was underutilized. One of the Inquiry’s most ambitious undertakings was the development of maps for the different regions under consideration. Considering the influence of the AGS, in particular Bowman, on the group this was hardly surprising. Yet Inquiry Director Stanley Mezes observed afterward that the maps were “hardly used at all” and that “some of the cases containing them were not opened.”

In the edited volume What Really Happened at Paris published in 1921, key members of the Inquiry examined different aspects of the conference. Although not all of the chapters offered positive reflections on the experience, the volume was clearly a defense of the proceedings and the resulting Treaty of Versailles. Mezes explained that unlike the European powers, the United States had no permanent consular services in many of the areas that were discussed at the conference. He added, “It was only recently that our diplomatic and consular services had been organized on a permanent basis with secure tenure, and the incumbents in these services had dealt chiefly with governments and with business agencies, and had little training or interest in questions of geography, history, ethnology, economics, strategy, etc., that would be the chief considerations at the Peace Conference.” While Europeans often traveled to these different areas, Mezes noted that “few of these regions had been visited more than casually, or studied with any thoroughness by American travelers, traders, or scientists.” He concluded that the armistice agreement “constituted a substantial basis for a peace of justice and of healing.”

Isaiah Bowman was similarly optimistic about the outcome of the conference. He was cautiously optimistic about the mandates, stating that if successfully implemented they could be “one of the most powerful elements of international justice.” In later years, Bowman defended the Inquiry and its role at the conference. According to his biographer, he was “proud and possessive” of the group’s activities, “ever vigilant in correcting others about the true history.”

One of the men responsible for the creation of the Inquiry offered the most strident defense of the conference’s outcome. Before Paris, Colonel House and President Wilson had a strong relationship, evidenced in the President’s request that House assemble the group of experts. However, the friendship grew strained in Paris, where Wilson discovered House conducting side negotiations and agreements. After returning from France, the two men never saw each other again. Two years later, House argued that despite public expectations, which he and Wilson

67 Gelfand, 321-323.
68 Mezes, 5.
69 Mezes, 3, 14.
71 Neil Smith, 172.
72 Ibid., 156-162.
had helped set, “it is doubtful whether more could have been done, considering the conditions after the armistice was signed.” House, like Wilson, saw the creation of the League of Nations as the major outcome of the conference. He also extolled the “sincere effort to give racial entities self-determination,” and the creation of the mandate system. House argued that “these parts of the treaty mark a distinct advance in international morals, and if they fail of their purpose it will be because of the refusal of the United States to accept the treaty in good faith and to give it her powerful support -- a support which is essential to success.” He added that the League of Nations was “the only instrument which has been devised to save us from the destruction another world war would bring. It is a melancholy reflection upon our right to exist.”

In January 1919, the Inquiry ceased operations as an independent functional body. The small group that went to Paris and eventually became the Division of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence returned to the United States. While most members returned to their positions in academia, others joined the State Department. William Westermann, whose connections to the missionary community helped secure a position on the Inquiry, was able to draw upon his new political connections and experience to leave Wisconsin for Cornell and eventually Columbia. Dana G. Munro joined the State Department, where he served for 12 years, including as head of the Latin America division, before returning to Princeton and eventually became head of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. When the Second World War broke out, both Westermann and Munro were called upon to provide expertise to the State Department.

Meanwhile, Isaiah Bowman helped establish a new organization that was designed to address the failings of the Paris Conference, both personal and structural. Smith explains that in Paris, although Division members were influential on some issues they “were often frustrated by what they saw as Wilson’s periodic vigilante decision making.” Before returning to New York, a series of meetings were held between disgruntled American and British advisers, who decided to establish an Anglo-American organization that would address important issues of world affairs. Although he missed the meetings in Paris, Bowman joined a group comprised of former diplomats, lawyers, and bankers to establish the Council on Foreign Relations. While the initial vision of an Anglo-American organization did not materialize, the Council maintained close relations with its British counterpart the Royal Institute for International Affairs. By its first year, the Council had nearly 300 members, and as Bowman described its mission, the Council’s main goal was to “change the opinion of our government.”

Twenty years later as another conflict was sweeping Europe, Walter Lippmann met with Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan in Washington. Donovan had recently been selected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to lead the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), which like the Inquiry was a vague title that offered little insight into its true purpose. The COI and its successor the OSS was America’s first civilian intelligence agency. Lippmann discussed his experience with the Inquiry and provided Donovan with the names of several scholars who could assist with gathering information on foreign areas, including Isaiah Bowman.

75 “Lippmann to Donovan,” 31 July 1941, OSS Director’s Office Files, M1642, Roll 66, NARACP.
American Universities in the Near East

While the peace conference was underway in Paris, a new educational institution was being founded in Cairo by American missionaries. Led by Charles Watson, then the corresponding secretary of the PBFM, the missionaries conducted negotiations with British officials for several years. Initially unsupportive of the effort, the British finally relented in 1917. It took an additional two years to raise the funds, and after several failed attempts to identify a location for the university, downtown Cairo was finally chosen. In July 1919, the American University in Cairo (AUC) was incorporated in Washington, D.C., and its doors opened to students a year later. The initial class numbered 142 and over the next several years the university expanded the number of entering students, classes offered, and degrees conferred. However, the university struggled with attracting permanent faculty members from the United States and experienced the typical growing pains of enrolling qualified students.76

Watson was an ideal founder for such an effort. The son of missionaries, he was born in Cairo and later educated at Ohio State University and Princeton. Watson was joined by fellow Princeton alum Wendell Cleland and Carl McQuinston also a graduate of Ohio State. While Watson attempted to convince British officials to allow an American university to open, he and his colleagues spent World War I working with the Red Cross in Palestine. Watson also traveled to the Paris Peace Conference where he represented the interests of German missionaries in the region.77

Like other American education institutions in the region, AUC struggled to find the balance between its missionary heritage and an interdenominational student population. The university was originally envisioned as a training ground for new missionaries to Egypt and neighboring countries. This included the establishment of its School of Oriental Studies, which was intended for instruction in Arabic and Islamic history and theology. Indeed, AUC’s promotional materials produced in the early years after it was founded revealed how it viewed its mission in Egypt and the status of the native inhabitants.78 As Image 1 below demonstrates, AUC was portrayed as the “fulcrum” on which the “lever” of “Christianity” would overturn the “rock” of “Mohammedanism.” Further evidencing the university’s early aims and political views, a February 1919 advertisement in The Christian Intelligencer promoting the establishment of AUC hailed the “retreat of the Turk.” As illustrated below in Image 2, the advertisement noted Britain’s predominant influence in Egypt and Persia and stated that “Jerusalem is in Christian Hands -- GOD DID IT.” It reinforced this statement with the claim that the Near East was the area where “God is working most actively,” and that donations “invested at the highest rate of interest” to AUC would further God’s work.

Yet by 1923 a rift developed between the university and American missionary organizations. The missionary groups argued that AUC’s interdenominational approach was contrary to the original goals of the university, which many of them supported with the understanding that AUC would assist missionary efforts in the region. Historian Lawrence Murphy explains that while Watson and other staff members claimed the university was interdenominational, in reality it had quickly evolved into an independent, nondenominational institution. Over time, fewer faculty

77 Ibid., 2-3, 20-22.
78 Ibid., 34.
members would come from the ranks of the United Presbyterian Church and a greater number of Muslim and Jewish students enrolled in the university.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image1.png}
\caption{Image 1. AUC Promotional Pamphlet, (undated, circa 1921-1922). Courtesy of the American University in Cairo Archives.\textsuperscript{80}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image2.png}
\caption{Image 2. AUC Advertisement, \textit{The Christian Intelligencer}, February 19, 1919. Courtesy of the American University in Cairo Archives.\textsuperscript{81}}
\end{figure}

Meanwhile in Beirut, the Syrian Protestant College was about to embark on a period of growth and heightened influence. Renamed the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1920, the institution was evolving from its missionary origins. As Makdisi explains, the new name signified a change in AUB’s mission and goals toward an ecumenical approach to education. Indeed, in a May 1920 article published by \textit{The Atlantic Monthly}, Howard Bliss, AUB’s new

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 32-35.
\textsuperscript{80} American University in Cairo Promotional Materials, Box 1, AUCA.
\textsuperscript{81} “Study the Map” advertisement, \textit{The Christian Intelligencer}, 19 February 1919, American University in Cairo Promotional Materials, Box 1, AUCA.
president, argued that the “modern” missionaries must not only retain their Christian convictions, but tolerance toward other faiths as well.82

Although the university was concerned that the French mandate authorities would interfere with the AUB’s operations, these fears proved unfounded. The university was able to attract European, American, and Arab faculty members and its student body grew and was religiously and geographically diverse. AUB’s alumni would soon be found in the government ministries and parliaments of the fledgling states under British and French rule. The university’s expansion was aided by donations from the Rockefeller Foundation, which were geared toward the basic and medical sciences. By the end of the decade, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded the university with grants to establish a medical school and hospital, as well as funds to support hiring faculty in Anatomy, Histology, and Pharmacology.83

Surprisingly the American educational institutions did not play a significant role in assisting with the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference. However, over the next two decades their influence and activity would increase dramatically. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, as the United States entered the Second World War and prepared for combat in North Africa and the Near and Middle East, the faculty, staff, and alumni of AUB and AUC would be seen as natural allies.

Conclusion

Wilson’s presidency was marked by a series of ironies and contradictions. Although he was elected with a mandate for domestic reform and generally unfamiliar with foreign affairs, foreign policy dominated Wilson’s presidency. The specter of the war in Europe overshadowed Wilson’s first term and when the U.S. entered the conflict in his second term, he was preoccupied with achieving a lasting postwar settlement. Wilson became identified with the phrase he did not coin – self-determination – and was never entirely comfortable with its implications. Although Wilson was instrumental in crafting the Versailles Treaty, incapacitated by stroke upon returning from Paris, he was unable to secure its passage in the U.S. Senate. Moreover, the League of Nations he envisioned and hoped would secure the postwar peace, was established without American participation.

The creation and operation of the Inquiry mirrored the hopes, frustrations, and disappointments of the Wilson presidency. To help determine the best course of action at the peace conference, Wilson sought out expertise from outside the U.S. government. In spite of their intelligence, individual and collective, Wilson’s experts had little if any first-hand knowledge about the areas they were researching. Moreover, their research and policy proposals were marked by racial and religious prejudice. Although such sentiments were not uncommon for the period or even later, the characterizations of Muslims and Arabs as well as the

82 Makdisi, 214. Bliss’s May 1920 article cited in Makdisi.
83 AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book III, 1908-1929, AUBA. Funding from the Rockefeller Foundation began with a modest donation of $5,000 annual gift in 1917. In 1923, the foundation provided $22,000-$25,000 to underwrite salaries of adjunct professors of anatomy, histology, and pharmacology. Four years later, the foundation made a five-year donation of $1 million for AUB’s medical school, including $250,000 for building and equipment and $750,000 as an endowment for teaching medical sciences. Support continued into the 1930s, including funds for construction of AUB’s hospital.
misrepresentations of the different societies contributed to the justification for British and French rule in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. While it is questionable whether the United States could have imposed its will on Britain and France, as Wilson learned to his frustration, the Inquiry’s claims that establishing protectorates in order to assist the native populations with self-governance were dubious at best.

Nor does the U.S.’s lack of expertise in foreign areas excuse the shortcomings of the Inquiry’s reports. The establishment of the Inquiry was a political decision and its composition and assignments were similarly based on political and ideological connections and some nepotism. In addition, those experts outside of the Inquiry who provided information to the group often reinforced their own ideological predispositions and prejudices. This was also true of the American missionaries whose expertise was sought after and respected because of their experience in foreign countries. Indeed, the missionaries’ paternalistic attitudes toward the natives of the countries where they served were evident in the Inquiry’s final reports and recommendations. This was also evidenced in the American educational institutions established in Egypt and Lebanon. Both AUB and AUC were able to expand in size and influence after adopting a more ecumenical and less paternalistic approach to the populations they served.

The Inquiry marked one of the earliest attempts by the federal government to develop contemporary expertise on foreign areas. It was also a reflection of the reformist trend sweeping American society, including in the social sciences. Based on the principles declared by Wilson in his Fourteen Points address and subsequent speeches, the members of the Inquiry believed they were utilizing their knowledge to help create a better world. Indeed, some of those who traveled to Paris were dismayed by the negotiations and subsequent treaty, which they viewed as an abandonment of the principles and cause they served. Moreover, it was the perceived failure to achieve their goals that led Inquiry members to establish the Council on Foreign Relations upon returning from France.

Yet the Inquiry left an uncertain legacy. In some respects, it is little more than a historical footnote. While it successfully produced voluminous reports on different geographic areas and key issues to help Wilson prepare for the Paris conference, few scholars have revisited the group’s actions and activities or their policy recommendations. With the outbreak of World War I the United States had few experts within academia on different foreign areas. Over the next two decades foreign area expertise within academia would remain limited largely to Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the limited number of scholars with knowledge and experience in Asia and Africa were predominantly Orientalists who could offer little insight into the contemporary affairs of the areas they studied. When the Second World War began, the United States sought to create a new organization to provide research and intelligence on foreign areas. Although the founders of the OSS were aware of the Inquiry, they chose not to adopt it as a model.

Chapter 3, Building Expertise, examines the U.S. government’s next attempt to develop foreign area expertise during wartime. Like the Inquiry, the OSS drew upon elite academic expertise for its Research and Analysis Branch. However, unlike the Inquiry, actual knowledge of, and experience in, the area under study were preferred. In addition, the OSS was a government entity, officially empowered by President Roosevelt to gather foreign area intelligence as well as to conduct covert operations overseas. As will be demonstrated, the OSS
helped establish the institutional foundations not just for university-based area studies but the creation of a civilian intelligence service.
Chapter III. Building Expertise: Wartime Agencies, Scholars as Spies, and Soldiers as Scholars in the Middle East, 1938-1948

I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger, unable to think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England in her war. If I could not assume their character, I could at least conceal my own, and pass among them without evident friction, neither a discord nor a critic but an unnoticed influence....Pray God that men reading this story will not, for love of the glamour of strangeness, go out to prostitute themselves and their talents in serving another race.

- T.E. Lawrence

Since childhood I have wanted to do the kind of work I have been doing for the past year. There should be nothing unusual in this; it is probably the secret ambition of every boy to travel in strange mountains, stir up tribes, and destroy the enemy by secret and unorthodox means. Most boys, however, grow up and as they adjust themselves to civilized living this ambition usually dies. In my particular case, as I think my family and friends will be all too quick to agree, I have never in this sense completely grown up and I have been able to fill in the period between boyhood and warfare by alternative tasks which permitted this ambition to survive.

- Carleton Coon

It is permitted to walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge. The OSS was in a death struggle with the Gestapo and, like Churchill, allied itself with devils to survive. We deserve to go to hell when we die...The OSS had no conscience...It is still an open question whether an operator in OSS or in CIA can ever again become a wholly honorable man.

- William T. Eddy

Introduction

The weekend of November 22, 1941 found the Harvard campus abuzz with events and visitors who were in town for the sixtieth playing of “The Game.” Leading up to the contest students, faculty, and alumni attended a variety of formal and informal functions from the Yale-Harvard Ball to joint performances by the Red and Blue Glee Clubs and matches between other Yale and Harvard teams. Next to stories about the weekend festivities, The Harvard Crimson published ominous signs of the conflict abroad and sentiments at home. Under the headline “Yale ‘News’ Poll Reveals Bulldogs Swing Toward War,” the paper reported that 67 percent of Yale students favored increased aid to opponents of Nazi Germany and 21 percent advocated full participation, a dramatic increase from just 6 percent in February. Another article warned that

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3 “Adventures in the Arab World, 1896-1961,” unpublished autobiography manuscript, William T. Eddy Personal Papers, Box 1, PUA.
the Axis powers were advancing against Soviet forces and in North Africa were countering a British offensive in Libya. Indeed, it was the situation on the North African front that led one visitor to the Harvard campus that weekend.

Dressed in a blue serge suit and walking amongst the large crowds in Cambridge and Boston that weekend, Wallace Phillips had a different purpose from the other visitors. Phillips, a naval officer, had recently accepted a post with the newly created COI in Washington and was the Director of its Special Information Service. In spite of its generic title, the COI was the U.S.’s first attempt to create a civilian intelligence agency and Phillips was in town to recruit a spy. Appearing at the office of Professor Carleton Coon without an appointment, Phillips quickly got to the business at hand. A respected professor of anthropology, Coon had previously conducted research in North Africa, spoke local Arabic dialects, and was familiar with the regional tribes. Coon later described the visit in two autobiographies.5

After swearing Coon to secrecy, Phillips then “told me more about myself than I had dreamed anyone else could know. He asked me if I wanted to serve my country.” Coon explained that he was already in the Massachusetts State Guard. However, Phillips replied that “was not enough.” Phillips detailed projected Nazi plans for conquering Spain and Morocco from Vichy France, thus strengthening existing Axis forces in North Africa and threatening the entire Middle East. Coon, he explained, had “been chosen to be the Lawrence of Morocco.”6 Indeed, the legacy of T.E. Lawrence hung over the scholar-spies assigned to the North African, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern theaters of operations. Some, like Coon, were approached with the promise of becoming the Lawrence of their generation, while other scholars privately hoped that would be the case.

Like other scholars recruited for the COI and its successor agency the OSS, Coon was approached with great secrecy. However, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor less than three weeks later, scholars would be volunteering to assist the American war effort. The United States entered the war as an industrial power with limited political influence on the world stage and negligible military forces but would emerge as a global superpower. During the war, key agencies were established to provide the U.S. government and military with area expertise and intelligence as well as language training.

In this chapter, I examine two major wartime programs that served as precursors of university-based area studies: the OSS and the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). While their structure and emphasis would later be deemed incompatible with university-based area studies, I argue that the example of these programs and more importantly their alumni

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5 Carleton Coon, Adventures and Discoveries: The Autobiography of Carleton Coon (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1981) 162; idem., A North Africa Story, 5-6; “Torch Anthology,” RG 99, Box 49, NARACP. There is a discrepancy in Coon’s different accounts of the meeting with Phillips. In Adventures and Discoveries, he states that the meeting occurred the day before the game in his office. However, in the Torch Anthology and A North Africa Story, Coon reports that the meeting occurred the day of the game also in his office.
6 Coon, Adventures and Discoveries, 162; A North Africa Story, 6. Phillips wanted Coon to obtain a Naval commission and travel under Navy cover. However, Coon failed the physical because of “obesity and gross overweight, and hypertension.” In the Torch Anthology and A North Africa Story, Coon was quick to point out that “None of these conditions exists today.”
influenced the development of area studies in the postwar era. I detail the wartime activities of several key scholars, some who served in the field as spies and others who remained at home to assist the OSS with research and analysis or language training for the U.S. military. I contend that the personal and institutional linkages established during the war would later serve as reference points for scholars, universities, and the U.S. government for the development of area studies and language training as well as conducting and analyzing foreign area research. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates that the close collaboration between the U.S. government and academia deemed essential during the war transitioned seamlessly to postwar planning before hostilities ended. Indeed, this shift to postwar planning for collecting intelligence occurred in the North African, Mediterranean, and Middle East theatres almost two years before the end of the war. Finally, I discuss the implications of the Second World War and the Palestine conflict on the transnational identities of AUB and AUC and their relationships with the U.S. government.

**The Coordinator of Information**

The COI was established almost five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Led by Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan, it was Washington’s first attempt at creating a centralized intelligence agency. A corporate attorney with a private practice on Wall Street, Donovan was a one-time Republican Party nominee for Governor of New York and a confidant of Roosevelt. On previous trips abroad, he gathered foreign intelligence and reported it back to the President. This included a 1935 trip to Italy and Ethiopia where he was able to assess the capabilities and effectiveness of Italian forces fighting in Africa. According to journalist Burton Hersh, Donovan’s report was also shared with the British Foreign Office. A year before the COI was established, Roosevelt dispatched Donovan to England to evaluate British capabilities to defend against a German invasion as well as sabotage by German agents. This was followed by a tour of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East from December 1940 to March 1941. After his trip, Donovan was convinced that the Middle East and Southeastern Europe “should be utilized to the utmost in British military strategy and in American political strategy.” Historian Barry Katz adds that these trips abroad also convinced him of the important role that strategic intelligence would play in modern conflicts.

In June 1941, Donovan submitted his proposal for creating a “service of strategic information.” He stated that its basic purpose would be to provide the President, the military, and the political advisers of his “Strategic Board” with “available and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions could be based.” Donovan argued that existing military intelligence efforts were inadequate for the strategic planning and assessment during wartime. Meanwhile, he believed that valuable intelligence regarding the capabilities and potential of the Axis powers could be found in documents located in different government departments. However, specialized personnel with background and training in research techniques and languages were needed for the appropriate analysis. Although he did

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7 Burton Hersh, *The Old Boys*, 1-35, 54-55.
8 “History of OSS-Cairo,” (undated), RG 226, Entry 99, Box 54, OSS, NARACP.
9 Barry Katz, *Foreign Intelligence*, 1-3.
not advocate for their recruitment, Donovan was essentially describing scholars trained in the social sciences and other disciplines as his ideal analysts.  

After Roosevelt created the COI, Archibald MacLeish, the Librarian of Congress, organized a meeting to identify individuals for the new organization. Held at Boston’s Tavern Club at the end of July 1941, the meeting was attended by representatives of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the National Archives, and scholars from major universities. The goal was to identify a “board of analysts” that would oversee experts on different foreign areas. This group became the governing board of COI’s Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). R&A was originally led by James Phinney Baxter III, the President of Williams College, who recruited Harvard’s William Langer to serve as chairman of the board of analysts and director of research. However, Baxter stepped down in September 1942 because of an illness and Langer served as Chief of R&A until it was absorbed into the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR) in 1946.  

Originally based in the Library of Congress, R&A’s scholars were initially tasked with examining the Library’s published works for potential intelligence. Langer later explained that this approach was based on Donovan’s “hunch” that valuable intelligence could be gleaned from published works, including older books. While the “cloak and dagger” of the OSS’s Secret Intelligence (SI) branch was later glorified in the press and films, Langer asserted that it “never became a major source of intelligence for [R&A] studies.” However, SI did procure a variety of published material in German and Russian that proved to be useful. Although not as exciting as SI, R&A’s strength “lay in the research training and experience of its personnel.” Langer added that Donovan’s instinct was “proved altogether correct,” as the analysis of disparate published materials and diplomatic cables demonstrated the branch’s effectiveness to the military services.  

Yet R&A’s impact on wartime planning had less of an impact than Langer suggests. In his history of the R&A, Katz explains that the branch collected a vast quantity of documents and maps which were used to create country handbooks and regional surveys that military planners valued. However, R&A’s final intelligence summaries and reports, “cooked intelligence,” were either disregarded by military and political leaders or were simply irrelevant.  

A State Department memorandum written by Near East Chief Gordon Merriam after the war discussed the benefits and limitations of R&A’s analysis. Merriam stated, “While a great deal of winnowing of wheat from chaff was necessary with regard to OSS reports, it must be said that on the whole they were of great value to us during these past two years.” In particular he cited reports from Greece as well as those on minority groups in the Near East. Merriam noted, “For the first year, reports from the field were practically worthless because sources were hidden and evaluation was impossible.” However, after the State Department complained to the OSS’s leadership “a considerable improvement resulted.”  

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10 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA, 419-420. Troy republishes key documents in the appendices, including Donovan’s June 10, 1941 “Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information,” which was reprinted as Appendix B.  
11 Katz, 5.  
14 “Merriam to Henderson,” 2 November 1945, RG59, Entry 1434, Box 1, NARACP.
example and its alumni would have a far greater impact on academia and the U.S. government in the postwar era than their activities during the conflict.

While Donovan’s office was based in New York, R&A was located in Washington. In spite of the Presidential authorization, the COI immediately encountered bureaucratic hostility from other governmental agencies. This was compounded by the COI’s vague charter of operations. Langer later admitted that “we were badly hampered by our own ignorance about the details of our mission. No one would or could enlighten us as to what we should do and how to go about it.”15 As they attempted to overcome Washington’s entrenched interests and resentments, Langer recruited an elite group of scholars for R&A, including a number of his Harvard colleagues. Like Langer, a number of these scholars would alternate between government service and academia in the post-war era. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, a number of OSS alumni would serve as the core group of scholars around which area studies centers would be established in the 1950s and 1960s. This included Langer, who would serve as the driving force behind the creation of Harvard’s Center for Middle East Studies.

Following America’s entry into World War II, Roosevelt authorized the COI’s transformation into the OSS by June 1942. Donovan was given the new title of Director of OSS, and the organization was enhanced and expanded to gather and analyze information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In addition, it was to organize and implement “special services,” i.e., covert operations, directed by the JCS.16

In Washington, R&A’s Near East section was part of the broader Europe-Africa division led by Sherman Kent.17 Like fellow historian Langer, Kent would serve as one of the key individuals in the post-war development of the intelligence establishment. While Kent led the division throughout the war, the Near East section had several different heads over time.18 It was initially led by Walter E. Wright, Jr., former President of Istanbul’s Robert College. After Wright was dispatched to Turkey, John Wilson of the University of Chicago was his initial replacement. Wright’s deputy, Ephraim Avigdor Spieser, an expert in Semitic languages at the University of Pennsylvania, was the third head of the Near East desk and remained in the position for most of the war.19 In addition to Wilson and Speiser, the Near East desk had a mixture of elder Orientalists and younger scholars including, historians Edwin Wright and Lewis Thomas, political scientists J.C. Hurewitz and Harvey Hall, archaeologist William F. Albright,

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15 Langer, 182.
17 “Wright to Langer,” 14 December 1942, RG 226, Entry 146, Box 135, OSS, NARACP. R&A’s Near East section initially covered territory ranging from Palestine to Afghanistan, including Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. In describing the section’s geographic coverage, Wright erroneously stated that “Although this area includes the heart of the Islamic world, it does not include by any means all of the countries in which society and government are organized on the basis of Moslem law and religion, where the typical Moslem languages (Arabic, Persian, and Turkish) are in common and official use.” The remaining areas were identified as: Egypt, Italian North and East Africa, French North and East Africa, Sudan, Southern Caucus, Azerbaijan, Moslem Central Asia, Baluchistan, and Moslem India. Wright explained that there was significant overlap of the remaining areas with different R&A sections, but that their concerns were generally not focused on the issues affecting the Moslem world. To avoid duplication of effort, Wright requested that the Near East section be consulted before the other sections began work related to problems affecting the Moslem world.
18 Robin Winks, Cloak & Gown, 84-85.
and linguists Harold Glidden and T. Cuyler Young. Indeed, Hurewitz would later write, “It did not take long to appreciate that I had been invited to join a unique and uninterrupted scholarly seminar on the Near East at war, for which at government expense I was ordered to update my familiarity with the contemporary history of Palestine and keep abreast of unfolding developments with the support of the best evidence available to Washington.” While most of the scholars remained in Washington as analysts, Glidden was assigned to the OSS’s Cairo office. Other scholars were dispatched to the region, where they used their academic credentials and contacts as cover for their espionage activities. This included archaeologist Nelson Glueck, anthropologist Carleton Coon, and historian Richard Frye.

**Orientalism as Area Intelligence**

Among the earliest items produced by the R&A’s Near East section were country guides for military personnel dispatched to the region. By early 1942, three guides were developed and distributed detailing life in the Persian Gulf, Egypt, and Eritrea. Offering a mixture of practical travel advice and information with stereotypical and contradictory observations about the different areas, the guides provide a revealing insight into the influence of Orientalism on the production of intelligence.

For example, the “Life in Egypt” guide cautioned that it was “a more or less medieval country” until the end of the nineteenth century. Presumably since the British occupation in 1882, the guide added that “now it is being modernized fairly rapidly.” As the U.S. military remained segregated and servicemen were dispatched from across the United States, including the Jim Crow South, the guide informed its readers that “many Egyptians are very dark, but this does not necessarily mean that they are Negroes, any more than Hindus or Hawaiians are.” It added that Egyptians “don’t like to be called ‘natives’, because this word makes them think you are comparing them with inhabitants of uncivilized or backward countries.” Moreover, as Americans would encounter troops from across the British Commonwealth, including South Africa, the guide stated, “Don’t forget that the South Africans have Negroes in their country too, and feel about the same toward them as we do in the South.” In describing Egyptian society, the guide explained that members of the upper and middle class “are more less westernized in dress

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20 J.C. Hurewitz, “The Education of J.C. Hurewitz,” in *Paths to the Middle East: Ten Scholars Look Back*, ed. Thomas Naff (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993): 69-73. Hurewitz was a doctoral student at Columbia with what he described as a “disguised major” in U.S. history, and he later developed a specialization in international law and relations. He completed his oral qualifying exam in the spring of 1942 and after completing a training class in Egyptian colloquial Arabic was drafted into the Army Signal Corps. However, after publishing an article entitled “Arab Politics in Palestine” in the *Contemporary Jewish Record* he was recruited by Speiser into the OSS. He was assigned to cover the Palestine Mandate, which also included Transjordan, for R&A. Hurewitz found that R&A’s contemporary information on Palestine was limited to two published articles on Arab nationalism and Zionism. Before being dispatched to the Cairo office, Glidden was responsible for Egypt, Sudan, and the Arabian Peninsula. He was replaced by Franz Rosenthal, who later became a scholar of Islamic history at Yale. T. Cuyler Young, later of Princeton, was responsible for Iran and Hall covered Turkey. Hurewitz remarked that Speiser “infused in our work a 5,000-year perspective on the overall region.” He added that the Near East chief combined his training in biblical Mesopotamia with contemporary knowledge of Iraq’s political leaders based on his trips to the country to conduct archeological digs.

21 “Donovan to Roosevelt,” 10 February 1942, RG 226, Entry M1642, Roll 22, OSS, NARACP. Donovan informed the President that 250 copies of each guide were produced and provided to the War Department to be distributed to servicemen. He also provided the President with copies for his own records.
and home life and speak English and French.” However, it also warned, “If you have to deal with upper-class Egyptians; you should dress carefully; nowhere is a man more judged by his clothes than the East.”

A similar booklet for Syria was developed by the Near East section for the War Department. Adorned with a number of illustrations and quotations, the guide was designed to help American servicemen with their mission by giving them “a quick picture of Syria.” Although the guide discussed the cosmopolitan nature of cities like Beirut and Damascus, the illustrations offered a different image of the area and its people. This included men dressed in traditional garb and herding sheep, a bazaar, and a Bedouin. Under a drawing of a camel caravan, it explained the apparent historic importance of the U.S. mission:

Your unit has been ordered to Syria. Soon you will be standing on the shores of the sea or on a desert which has played a great part in world history. You, an American soldier, are now one of the countless fighting men, over the past two thousand years, who have tramped across this neck of land connecting Europe and Asia. Alexander the Great, Cesar, Napoleon -- all have struggled on this land for world domination.

You are in Syria to fight for -- and to win -- against Hitler, who seeks world domination. And a big part of your job is to make friends for your cause -- because this is a war of ideas, just as much of tanks, planes and guns.

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22 “Life in Egypt,” “Life in the Persian Gulf;” “Life in Eritrea;” (all undated), RG 226, Entry 146, Box 135, OSS, NARACP. Although no author is listed, based on his responsibilities at the time Harold Glidden was likely responsible for producing the Egypt travel guide.
23 Ibid.
24 “Short Guide to Syria,” 22 April 1942, R&A 624, RG 226, Entry M1221, OSS, NARACP. “Syria” encompassed Syria and Lebanon, both under French mandate and governed by Free French forces.
The guide stated that Syria was a “friendly country” which would welcome American troops. It noted that Syria once sought an American mandate from the League of Nations at the end of World War I and that many Syrians were educated at AUB. Although it was not hostile territory, the guide cautioned the servicemen that they needed to use “ordinary horse sense” in their “dealings with the people of this land.” While it offered some practical advice, including navigating local customs and understanding religious practices, it also contained several curious warnings:

Shake hands with Syrians; otherwise don’t touch them or slap them on the back.

Remember Syrians are very modest people and avoid any exposure of the body in their presence.

When you see grown men walking hand in hand, ignore it. They are not “queer.”

Be kind and considerate to servants. The Syrians are a very democratic people.

Avoid any expressions of race prejudice.

Shake hands on meeting and leaving.

On meeting a Syrian, be sure to inquire after his health.

Be polite. Good manners are essential among the Syrians. Be hospitable to Syrians whenever possible.

Above all, use common sense on all occasions. And remember that every American soldier is an unofficial ambassador of good will.25

Image 4. Image from a Short Guide to Syria, 1942. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD (RG 226, Entry M1221) and Southern Methodist University, Central University Libraries.26

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25 Ibid. The original draft offered even more explicit (and questionable) advice considering that “common sense” was to be used at all times, including “Shake hands with Arabs; otherwise, don’t touch them. Don’t strike Arabs. Urinate and defecate in private. Don’t expose your genitals in the presence of Arabs. Don’t break wind noticeably in their presence.”
While the guides demonstrated the benefit of regional expertise with contemporary knowledge of conditions and customs, they also demonstrated the patronizing and paternalistic nature of American and European scholarship of the Middle East at the time. The booklets were produced in the COI’s early months of operation when the U.S. was almost completely reliant on its British allies for intelligence from the Middle East. By the time the guides were distributed to the War Department, the COI dispatched its first secret mission to the region.

**The OSS in Cairo**

Building on Donovan’s trip to the region the previous year, the Cairo office was established in the spring of 1942. The mission was created as Germany’s *Panzerarmee Afrika*, led by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, launched a major offensive that threatened to oust Britain from Egypt. However, Donovan did not inform the JCS about the mission until July, when the fate of British forces appeared uncertain. He stated bluntly, “The importance of holding the Near East area is increasingly obvious.” Donovan asserted that that this was due to three factors: preventing the linkage and unification of Axis offensives in North Africa and the Caucuses, ensuring Allied control of the region’s oil resources, and preventing German and Japanese forces from joining in Central Asia. He explained that although the region was under British hegemony, the U.S. could assist because “American prestige and influence in the Near East is still probably as high as ever.” Donovan stated that this was due to “the deep seated conviction of the peoples in this area, due mainly to a century of American missionary, educational, and philanthropic efforts that have never been tarnished by any material motives or interests.”

The Cairo mission had three objectives. First, was to establish a base for the OSS’s SI branch which would coordinate with existing British intelligence organizations. Second, was to counter German espionage and sabotage activities. Finally, in the event British forces were defeated, to organize resistance activities. To prevent competition or redundancy with exiting British efforts, Donovan claimed that the OSS mission would focus its activities on the students and alumni of the American educational institutions in the region. He noted that the students were the “mental and physical elite of these countries,” while the alumni were “naturally the business and political leaders.” Thus, they would serve as “the backbone for sabotage and guerilla work” if necessary or simply support Allied wartime activities.

Donovan discussed his plans at a July 29, 1942, subcommittee meeting of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee. Lt. Colonel Harold Hoskins attended the meeting, and his family background in the region and association with AUB were presented by Donovan as an assurance of his expertise. The plans for developing a subversive unit were discussed and

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27 “Donovan to JCS,” 27 July 1942, RG 226, Entry 1642, Roll 18; “History of OSS-Cairo” (undated), RG 226, Entry 99, Box 54, OSS, NARACP. According to the History of OSS-Cairo, Donovan did not receive JCS approval until December 16, 1942, and the mission was to be consultative not operational.

28 Ibid. In his July memo to the JCS, Donovan originally designated Lt. Col. Harold Hoskins, a son of missionary parents born in Beirut and Vice President of AUB’s Board of Trustees. However, Hoskins was not assigned to Cairo. Instead, the initial officers assigned to Cairo were Lt. Turner McBaine and Lieutenant Commander Joseph Leete, a former instructor at AUC who was fluent in Arabic.
representatives from the JCS argued that the head should be a uniformed military officer. The reasoning was that, “The only thing that reaches the Arab mind is power. The only other thing that reaches them is money.” Hoskins confirmed these points and added that “power, money, and independence” were the keys to influencing Arab leaders.29

Benefiting from Donovan’s relations with the British political and military leadership, the OSS’s Cairo office quickly developed a rapport with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and other Allied intelligence agencies. Among the first actions taken was to establish a radio station to counter Nazi propaganda in the region. More importantly, the SIS began sharing intelligence from the Middle East and Southeastern Europe regions with their OSS liaison officer, and in an unprecedented manner also allowed the information to be distributed to Washington without restrictions.30 As the U.S. lacked sources of intelligence in the region, the SIS reports were welcome. In addition, there were already several agents operating in the region that were dispatched by the Near East desk in Washington. However, due to security concerns they did not have contact with the Cairo office and some of the agents did not have the appropriate clearance for their activities with the British authorities.31 One of the first agents in the field was archaeologist Nelson Glueck.

The New Lawrence?

On December 2, 1941, Nelson Glueck was interviewed by COI representatives in Washington. Glueck was an ideal candidate for the COI. An archaeologist fluent in German and Hebrew, he also had a good command of colloquial Arabic. He had completed his term as Director of the American School of Oriental Research (ASOR) in Jerusalem the previous summer. A professor of biblical archaeology at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, over the previous decade he had conducted several expeditions in Transjordan and led ASOR for five years. However, after meeting with then NEA head Walter Wright, Jr. and Wallace Phillips, then Director of COI’s Special Information Service, he demurred.32 Five days later the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Writing separately to both Phillips and Wright on December 12, Glueck restated his credentials and his new willingness “to offer my services to the government, under any conditions, anywhere.”33

29 “Subcommittee of Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, Verbatim Report, 29 July 1942,” RG 226, M1642, Roll 8, OSS, NARACP.
30 “History of OSS-Cairo.” (undated), RG 226, Entry 99, Box 54, OSS, NARACP. The History of OSS-Cairo notes that “So far as is known this was the first the United States was given British SIS reports directly and with no restrictions on their official use in the United States. It had been the invariable insistence of the British that our agencies, such as State, War, and Navy, obtain British SIS reports only after they had passed through British Foreign Office, War Office and Admiralty, thus subjecting them to possible British policy control. Even reports obtained from the London headquarters of British SIS were marked ‘For the attention of Colonel Donovan and one other high ranking officer,’ and it was forbidden for COI to disseminate them to other United States officials.”
31 Ibid., According to the official history, the Near East section “did not at the time realize the advantages to be gained by having a field coordinator in close contact with its agents, and in many cases it did not even notify Lieutenant McBaine when a representative was sent to his post.” It adds that in some cases the inability to obtain clearance “proved to be a source of embarrassment” for McBaine and the Near East section.
32 Troy, 106-107. Troy explains that Special Information Services was a forerunner of the OSS’s SI branch and Phillips was tasked with recruiting agents for overseas assignments.
33 “Glueck to Wright,” “Glueck to Phillips,” 12 December 1941, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
In a subsequent correspondence, Glueck offered further evidence of his suitability for covert activities. He wrote, “Transjordan is a vital pathway between the Red Sea and Syria, between Palestine and Iraq. I believe that an American with my knowledge of the Near East in general, and particularly of Transjordan could be of use to my government.” He explained that over the previous five years he had surveyed two-thirds of the country, stating, “I do not believe that there are five men in the world, European or Arab, who know the country as well as I do.” Glueck asserted that he was “the only non-Governmental official who was allowed to enter Transjordan at will.” He added, “For years, I have wandered far and wide in the Transjordan desert, unarmed, and accompanied by only one Arab companion, and never suffered any harm, where others were not allowed or did not dare to go, or were killed when they went.” Glueck wrote that he “learned how to get along with Arabs. All of my contacts in Transjordan were with Arabs only.”34

However, he mitigated the latter claim by revealing that he had close relations with British Mandate officials in the country. He noted, “There was never a reasonable request which I addressed to them, with which they did not immediately comply.” Glueck explained, “They provided me with everything from armored cars, when once I went into the Arabian desert, to cavalry horses, to airplanes put at my disposal. The work I was doing was work they wanted done.” He stated bluntly, “The Transjordanian Government is controlled by the British resident” Alec Kirkbride, who was “known as Kirk to his friends.” Glueck explained that “Emir Abdullah is the titular head of Transjordan, is advised by Mr. Kirkbride, and has thus far acted in accordance with that advice.” He added that he was also well acquainted with Major John Bagot Glubb, the British officer in charge of Jordan’s Arab Legion.35

His knowledge and contacts were not limited to sparsely populated Transjordan. Glueck’s time in the region coincided with the “Great Arab Revolt” in Palestine, a three-year period of unrest by Palestinian Arabs against the British Mandate authorities. Glueck explained that he was able to travel extensively and conduct his work during this period without incident, “when the road was usually only traveled by heavily armed convoys, which were frequently attacked.” He stated that even though ASOR was located in Jerusalem’s Arab quarter, “no harm ever came to any of us at the School because of the personal relationships I had with the Arabs of the area.” Moreover, under his tenure as Director, ASOR was “about the only place where Arabs and Jews and others could or would come together for meetings.” Glueck offered to be affiliated with ASOR as a cover, “at no expense to the Government.”36

However, he did not believe that his proposal was unethical or improper. He explained that during an expedition seven years earlier he encountered Franz Fritz, “the notorious German spy” who was based in Palestine during World War I. Glueck wrote, “I am certain that he was working then on behalf of the German government.” He added, “The day before the present war was declared, he disappeared. I have a suspicion where he may be found although I could not guarantee finding him.” Glueck stated, “At least I could do, on behalf of my government, or on behalf of the British government, what he has been doing. And I should be glad to do it.” He

34 “Glueck to Compton, Curriculum Vitae of Nelson Glueck,” 24 December 1941, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP. Glueck followed up with a detailed memorandum on the “Strategic Importance of Palestine,” dated February 3, 1942, which repeated a number of these claims.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
claimed, “If I were sent back to Transjordan, I believe I am one of the few capable of knowing what is really going on among the Arabs of the country.” To demonstrate his point, Glueck explained that during the Arab Revolt, he was aware through his contacts about rebel movements to and from Palestine but that he never divulged the information to the British authorities. Moreover, his Arab contacts and language skills assisted him when, “In several tight situations, I have been able to talk myself out of difficulty in Arabic.”37 By the end of February, Glueck was dispatched to Palestine where his mission was actively supported by Britain’s SIS. He arranged to be reappointed Director of ASOR and obtained funding to conduct an expedition as his cover.38

Glueck’s orders were detailed in a February 10, 1942, memorandum to David Bruce, then the head of SI. Written by David Williamson, the COI’s Liaison Officer with the State Department, the memorandum stated that Glueck was to be informed “that it is out of the question to make him a Colonel in the Army.” Williamson added that the mission’s three requirements should be explained to the archaeologist “in firm but polite language.” First, Glueck was being dispatched on “purely an SIS mission” to Palestine and Transjordan. Second, he was to “carry out his archaeological plans and, through his contact with the tribes, establish insofar as is possible, a network of informants who will report to him or his deputy.” Finally, he stated that:

[Glueck’s] usefulness will largely depend upon his discretion and in the avoidance of any semblance of [Secret Operations (SO)] operations. If the time should come when the British authorities wish to use him in a role parallel to that played by Colonel Lawrence in the last war, vastly different arrangements will have to be made and Dr. Glueck should keep in mind that a very long and arduous preparation for such operations would have to be made in Washington, London, Cairo, Palestine and other central points.39

Codenamed “Puma,” Glueck arrived in Jerusalem at the end of April and would spend most of the war in Palestine and Transjordan. His dispatches to Washington were signed “William Hicks.” The information relayed ranged from the state of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, to the level of Soviet activity, and suggestions for reshaping the region after the war. He also repeatedly warned Washington of the dangers of the “Palestine problem” in fostering conflict and instability across the region. Glueck also argued that the region should remain under direct rule from Britain, asserting that the Arab world “does not understand this business of running a country by committee.”40

By May 1943, Glueck reported on British attempts to establish a training program in Jerusalem in conjunction with the intelligence services and the Colonial Office. The goal was to “train advanced students in the affairs of the Middle East, languages, politics, literature, etc., who will be able to function in this part of the world no matter what changes in boundaries and governments may take place after the war, and who will form a permanent source for recruits for particular kinds of services in case of need.” He advocated that the OSS pursue a similar training program, but qualified the suggestion by stating, “I need not assure you that I have no personal

37 Ibid.
38 “Glueck to Field,” 10 February 1942, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
39 “Williamson to Bruce, Rehm, Hutchison,” 28 February 1942, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
40 “William Hicks to Caleb,” 24 May 1943 and 20 August 1943, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
interest in any of these things other than assisting our cause to the best of my abilities. As soon as is possible in consonance with my duty to my country I want to return completely to my academic life, and pursuits.”

Planning & Implementing Operation Torch

Dubbed “Operation Torch,” the Allied invasion of North Africa offered the R&A Branch an opportunity to demonstrate its value. Scheduled for November 1942, R&A scholars spent much of August and September rapidly producing detailed reports on Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The initial Morocco report was finished in 50 hours and within the next month similar reports were produced for Algeria and Tunisia. Based on published information, the reports detailed the key demographic, historical, socio-political information for each North African country. According to historian Robin Winks, Donovan informed the branch that the military was surprised and impressed by the level of detail and the speed at which the information was produced. He informed the scholars that was “the first victory” for the R&A concept.

In preparing for Torch, the Near East section also developed psychological warfare plans. One of the key concerns was the impact of the North African invasion on the rest of the region and the “Muslim world.” In detailing the potential effectiveness of propaganda, the report stated, “Most loyalties in the Moslem world are based on direct personal relationships, not on abstract ideas or distant propaganda.” It added that “in general Moslems are impressed by force only. This also has come to be true of Frenchman.” Among the complicating factors for the Allied mission, was the “Jewish problem.” It asserted, “Moslems are Anti-Semitic” and that “the support of 400,000 Jews is not worth the antagonism of 15,000,000 Muslims.” In addition, the report claimed, “Ideological terms: Democracy and freedom in the American and British sense of the word are not understood.” This was because, “There is no Arab word for democracy. Natives follow the leaders they respect for their force and their wealth.” Meanwhile, the French only believed in democracy “for themselves, not for the population as a whole.” Moreover, it stated, “Freedom is interpreted as freedom to do what you please. Freedom to the natives is freedom to loot and persecute enemies. Freedom to Frenchmen is freedom to exploit North Africa economically for their own and not the natives’ benefit.”

The report asserted that for propaganda to be effective, the Allies must defeat the Axis powers and demonstrate that they had no interest in the acquisition of territory. Moreover, the Allies could ensure the friendliness of the local population through the prior deployment of agents. These agents “should have absolute control and directive power over propaganda. Agents abroad should always be men intimately familiar with North African conditions.” Among their activities was maintaining relationships with local leaders and producing materials

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41 “William Hicks to Caleb,” 24 May 1943, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
42 Winks, 84-85.
44 Winks, 85. Donovan originally quoted in Winks.
45 “Psychological Warfare in North Africa,” 20 July, 1942, RG 226, M1642, Roll 34, OSS, NARACP.
for dissemination to the population.\textsuperscript{46} One of the key men sent to North Africa in preparation for Torch was Harvard anthropologist Carleton Coon.

\textit{Lawrence of Morocco}

Nearly seven months after he was visited on the Harvard campus, Carleton Coon was dispatched to Tangier in May 1942. Coon was to operate out of the American Legation where he was to serve as Special Assistant. However, the position came with no associated responsibilities and Coon quickly clashed with the Chargé D’Affairs, J. Rives Childs.\textsuperscript{47} His duties included coordinating agents in the area and conducting sabotage raids against Axis targets. In addition, Coon was to assist with the production and dissemination of propaganda throughout the theater of operations.\textsuperscript{48}

Although he was ordered to North Africa, Coon was unaware that the Allied invasion had been set for November. He would not learn of the invasion until two weeks before the landing. Coon later explained, “I did know that I was there to prepare for military eventualities and that my probable job was to make things hot for the Germans if and when they should move westward from Egypt and Tripoli.”\textsuperscript{49}

In Tangier, Coon joined Colonel William A. Eddy. The son of American missionaries, Eddy was born in present-day Lebanon and spoke fluent Arabic. Serving in the Marine Corps, he was a highly decorated veteran of the First World War. Afterward he received his doctorate from

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47} “Torch Anthology,” RG 99, Box 49, OSS, NARACP. Apparently this was not Coon’s first issue with the State Department. In the Torch Anthology, Coon reported that because of a 1933 incident in Ethiopia (which he did not describe further), he was on the State Department’s blacklist and the OSS had difficulty obtaining a diplomatic cover for him. Among the issues between the two men was Coon’s lack of fluency in written and spoken Arabic. They also quarreled over a large report on “Propaganda in Morocco” produced by Coon and based on his book, \textit{Principles of Anthropology}. Coon explained that the report incorporated “enough technical words to make it ponderous and mysterious, since I had found out in the academic world that people will express much more awe and admiration for something complicated which they do not quite understand than for something simple and clear.” Although Childs was impressed by the report he refused to allow Coon to send it to Washington, which he proceeded to do secretly anyway. After asking for revisions to the original report, Childs dispatched it to the State Department with his own introduction. Upon leaving North Africa, Coon was under the mistaken impression that he and Childs had developed a mutually amicable and beneficial relationship and were friends. After the war, Coon sought and was denied approval by the U.S. Embassy to Saudi Arabia to conduct research in the country, where Childs was now Ambassador.

\textsuperscript{48} Carleton Coon Personnel File, “Job Description in the Case of Carleton Steven Coon,” 10 July 1943, “Halliwell to Guenther,” 4 August 1943, RG 226, Entry 1568, OSS, NARACP; Price, 248. Based on his work in North Africa, Coon was recruited for deployment in the Near East Theater in 1943, specifically the Balkans. The OSS’s 1943 job description noted his experience conducting “special operational work in the North African Theater for one year” for the organization. It added that Coon was a “noted anthropologist” who had traveled widely, spoke six languages, and was an expert on the different tribes and tribal leaders in the theater of operations. The job description stated that upon arriving in the area, Coon was to conduct “special subversive and demolition work.” His responsibilities included “physical subversion in enemy or enemy occupied or controlled territory.” In addition, Coon was to “promote, organize, and equip partisan groups and operational nuclei for guerilla warfare, will instruct and use allied agents in modern methods of sabotage and will furnish the necessary implements and weapons of resistance.” Although clearly similar to Coon’s mission orders for North Africa this document and its description are misidentified in Price, as they were for the Near East.

\textsuperscript{49} “Torch Anthology,” RG 226, Entry 99, Box 49, OSS, NARACP.
Princeton, and was briefly the head of AUC’s English department. Prior to America’s entry into the Second World War, Eddy was President of Hobart College in Geneva, New York. Coon had previously met Eddy in Washington, and later wrote that he was “one of the greatest men I have ever met, one of the happiest associations of my life.”50 Later he would write that Eddy not only spoke perfect Arabic but could also “think like an Arab.”51

As part of Coon’s propaganda efforts, he helped to translate President Roosevelt’s Flag Day speech into Arabic. However, he did not believe a literal translation would be suitable and with the assistance of two other OSS agents revised the speech. Coon stated that “every time Mr. Roosevelt mentioned God once, we named Him six times; and the result was a piece of poetry which might have come out of the Koran.” The statement was produced as a leaflet that was dropped into the Spanish North African zone, and accidentally into the French zone as well. It was also read over Rabat radio several times after the Allied invasion. Coon asserted that:

More than anything else it gave the natives the idea that we had come across the sea to set them free; this influenced many of them in our favor, particularly those who had been wavering in an Axis direction, and it was very hard to explain to these natives, after the landing, why their condition had not immediately changed for the better.52

After the success of Operation Torch and the Soviet Union’s devastating defeat of German forces at Stalingrad, Britain’s position in the Near East was no longer under threat and the region was no longer a priority for military planners. Indeed, as preparation began for the invasion of Europe, R&A’s Near East section was no longer the center of attention. However, using the Washington and Cairo staff, R&A would begin preparing for postwar intelligence gathering and planning before the war was won.

Preparing for the Future

With the end of the German threat to North Africa and the Middle East, Glueck began questioning the anti-British sentiment prevalent throughout the region. In August 1943, he reported on an initiative by the British Council, the Foreign Office’s cultural and educational outreach division, to enhance and expand cultural activities across the region. Glueck stated, “The real purpose it seems to me, is more than to spread just a knowledge of British culture among the Arabs in the Near East. It is rather to strengthen the entire British position as such.”53 However, he argued that the United States should not follow suit and that the work and reputation of American educational institutions in the region surpassed any superficial and belated British attempts at cultural outreach.

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50 Ibid., 7.
51 Coon, 164.
52 Ibid. Coon noted that this was the OSS’s sole print propaganda success. He explained that the British had been similar frustrated in their efforts, “They had bales of funny books and cartoons which the Arabs could not understand or did not consider funny.” Britain had apparent success with an ornately decorated card for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which they provided to the OSS agents to distribute and were in turn given copies of the modified Roosevelt speech.
53 “William Hicks to Caleb,” 20 August 1943, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
Yet by the spring of 1944 Glueck would argue for an even more robust American presence in the Middle East. In a dispatch detailing Britain’s plans for its Jerusalem-based training center, he stated, “The purpose, I take it, is to strengthen the British hold on the Middle East. Ought we Americans not methodically plan to do something of the sort.” Yet as the threat to the region faded but American intelligence activity increased, Glueck became increasingly uncomfortable with his role. He would soon raise objections to new orders and the changing mission parameters, biding his time before ultimately returning to Ohio and academia.

Meanwhile in Washington, policymakers had come to a similar conclusion. In March, President Roosevelt informed James Landis, the American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, that “it was an area in which the United States has a vital interest.” Roosevelt’s declaration built on a similar determination the previous February that Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves were vital to U.S. interests. Although the determination was ostensibly for providing Saudi Arabia with Lend-Lease aid from Washington, by the summer the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Roosevelt of the need to identify and secure crude oil reserves for the war effort.

In April, R&A’s Near East section chief argued that the United States needed to begin planning for the post-war era in the Middle East. In a memorandum to Langer, Speiser asserted that since the military threat to the region had largely passed, it was time to assess its “broader strategic and economic importance.” He noted the interest of the Soviet Union and Britain in the region as demonstrated by the increasing number of Soviet legations recently established. Speiser made particular note of the U.K.’s new training center established in Jerusalem, which was to “add to the already formidable British representation throughout the region.” He referenced the mission of then Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius to London, stating that it confirmed the area’s importance and that there was “no doubt as to the potential scope and magnitude of the stakes involved. The political implications are without precedent in U.S. foreign policy.”

As a result, Speiser argued that intelligence independent of America’s British allies would need to be gathered. He explained that “we need research and analysis material of our own not rationed or predigested by our allies, who in this area may be, and in some respects actually have proved to be, our determined rivals.” Moreover, the intelligence would need to be gathered

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54 “William Hicks to Caleb,” 7 March 1944, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 383, OSS, NARACP.
56 FRUS, The Near East and Africa, 1943, Vol. IV, 859-860, 921. At the end of 1944, then Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal detailed the U.S.’s strategic interest in developing and protecting Persian Gulf oil in a memo to then Secretary of State Stettinius. Forrestal stated that “it is patently in the Navy’s interest that no part of the national wealth, as represented by the present holdings of foreign oil reserves by American nationals, be lost at this time. Indeed, the active expansion of such holdings is very much to be desired.” FRUS, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, 1944, Vol. V, 755-756.
57 The Stettinius mission and discussions with the U.K. political leadership dealt largely with planning for the postwar. A major topic of conversation was the creation of an international organization that would eventually become the United Nations. In addition, the disposition of the former European mandated territories in the Middle East was also discussed. In their memorandum of conversation, the State Department representatives stated that the legal questions regarding the disposition of the different territories were “complicated and novel.” While Iraq was already independent and Syria and Lebanon were to become independent after the war, the British political leadership asserted that “Palestine must under any circumstance have special treatment.” FRUS, The British Commonwealth and Europe, 1944, Vol. III, 15-18.
across the whole area, due to what Speiser claimed were “the peculiar interplay of local interests, especially in the Arab World, whereby a matter affecting Saudi Arabia or Palestine will have immediate reactions on Iraq, the Levant States or Egypt.” He added that “with the existing close interconnection of the local economic, cultural, and political factors, an accurate appraisal of Turkish or Iranian sentiment is apt to be a prerequisite to the success of a given enterprise in any one Arab state.”

Speiser asserted that the OSS’s Cairo office needed to be enhanced and formalized. Considering the growing demand for intelligence from the area, he explained that from the “standpoint of the national needs” it was irrelevant which agency was responsible for collection and analyzing the information. However, Speiser asserted that “R&A alone has the nucleus for doing this work adequately.” In addition, the State Department’s Near East personnel were not up to the task, especially when compared to their British counterparts. Therefore, for R&A to truly be successful in this endeavor, what was required was the “intensification in the direction of up-to-date direct contacts with the area” in Washington. While in Cairo, a “proper Near East outpost” needed to be established. Speiser stated that “what is wanted there is a small but hand-picked group of experts capable of commanding the respect of the British officials and native leaders while fully alive at the same time to our quickening requirements. In selecting such men we cannot aim our sights too high.”

By September, Speiser was calling for an overhaul of SI efforts in Cairo. He explained to Sherman Kent, the Europe-Africa Division Chief, that the Near East section had four main sources of intelligence: British, U.S. military, the U.S. State Department, and OSS agents. However, the majority of reports produced by the OSS were duplicative of the other three sources. He stated bluntly that “what independent residue there is, generally fails to meet our present needs. The exceptions serve by their very excellence to bring out the insignificance of the rest.” Speiser asserted that continued OSS effort in the region was “essential” as “indications are multiplying that the Near East is destined to supplant and outdo the Balkans as a center of political gravity.” Based on its geographic location and oil wealth, the area was “certain to command increasing attention on the part of the world powers,” including the U.S. which had already demonstrated its interest. Reiterating his previous argument, Speiser stated that “the task before us is to concentrate more and more on independent, rather than pooled intelligence, since in the Near East our Allies of yesterday are at best the fence-sitters of today and will be our rivals of tomorrow.”

Moreover, Speiser maintained that the Near East section should pursue the “sort of intelligence that is calculated to meet our prospective future needs in the area.” This would require a shift from gathering intelligence for immediate military needs, “which is scarcely suitable for coping with the sub-surface developments in so complex a region as the Near East.” Speiser asserted that the “tid-bits and handouts for which we might have been grateful for in 1942 will not satisfy our requirements in 1945.” He explained that “the kind of information that we shall need is not likely to be on tap to secret operatives, who of necessity are restricted in their contacts.” Instead, he claimed that “the required background intelligence be accessible to those who combine an intimate knowledge of the local scene -- social, political, historical, and

58 “Speiser to Langer,” 19 April 1944, RG 226, Entry 1, Box 6, OSS, NARACP.
59 Ibid.
60 “Speiser to Kent,” 20 October 1944, RG 226, Entry 1, Box 6, OSS, NARACP.
linguistic -- with a keen analytical sense, in other words experts who can hold their own with the native foreign and political leaders while keeping their own council and forming their own conclusions.”

Speiser stated that the best reports from the region were prepared by recently dispatched R&A staffers. In contrast, since Operation Torch was completed the SI personnel had not displayed an adequate understanding or knowledge of R&A’s needs or the situation on the ground. He added that “they have not shown, and could not be expected to show, the foresight and initiative needed to foreshadow trends and sift out possibilities.” Speiser concluded by calling for an integration of the objectives and resources of SI and R&A. He stated that “our future needs are certain to be greater and far more complex than they have been so far” and would “lean heavily in the direction of expert research and analysis.”

While Speiser was arguing for what would eventually become the template of future area studies training, one of the leading figures in the creation of Middle East studies was putting theory into practice. In the fall of 1941, Richard Frye was completing his dissertation at Harvard when he was contacted by his former Turkish instructor, Walter Wright. Then head of R&A’s Near East section, Wright asked Frye to serve as an analyst for Afghanistan. Fluent in multiple languages, including Arabic, Turkish, Persian, German, and Russian, he was also trained in Chinese and Japanese. Upon arriving in Washington, Frye’s initial task was to compile a bibliography on Afghanistan. However, after the attack on Pearl Harbor he was ordered to Kabul where the OSS believed the Japanese and German embassies had relay stations for Nazi radio broadcasts. Under cover as a teacher, Frye made the long trek to Kabul in August 1942 by boat and then overland by train, plane, and bus.

During his tenure in Kabul, Frye traveled throughout Afghanistan and India, including present day Pakistan, and sent his observations to the Cairo office. When he wasn’t attempting to gather information on German and Japanese activities in the region, Frye’s days were occupied by his teaching duties. By December 1943, Frye was preparing to leave Kabul – he thought for good. Shortly after arriving in Cairo he was sick with dysentery and spent most of the winter convalescing. Although he was reluctant to return to Afghanistan, Frye was back in Kabul by the spring.

OSS Cairo asked the American Legation in Kabul to support Frye’s activities. Still operating under cover as a teacher, the Cairo office explained, “We want him to send us reports from time to time on the state of mind existing in the country, any occurrences of strategic, economic and other importance.” Frye’s reports were to be dispatched to Cairo by the Legation’s diplomatic pouch. The letter added that Cornelius Van H. Engert, the American Minister in Kabul, was free to correct the reports for accuracy and to avail himself of Frye’s services if needed. It concluded by stating, “Naturally we are anxious to conceal his relationship with our organization, so we

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61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 47-56.
hope his communications to us and ours to him and any remittance of funds to him may be handled as discreetly as possible.”

Engert, however, was not as cooperative as the OSS Cairo office had hoped or its operatives in Kabul would have liked. Mirroring the bureaucratic infighting in Washington, the American Legation in Kabul served to limit OSS operations as much as possible. As he prepared to depart Kabul for the second and last time, Frye detailed the problems of serving as a teacher for undercover operations. He explained that American teachers paid by the Afghan government were not entitled to any of the privileges afforded to the American Legation staff or Military Attaches. This impacted everything from travel to obtaining basic supplies, which were rare and expensive. In addition, there were prohibitions on foreigners traveling within Afghanistan without special permits which were difficult to obtain without diplomatic intervention. Frye added that teachers were forbidden to discuss internal politics and there were no libraries in Kabul, except for a small collection at the British Legation.

After Kabul, Frye spent the rest of the war in Iran and Istanbul. His reports often mixed the political with the mundane. While in Iran, Frye reported on internal tensions between the Provisional Government and British advisers. However, in Istanbul, Frye’s Russian language skills were essential and he was to help the OSS prepare for the postwar.

_Eddy in Arabia_

Following Operation Torch, Eddy was dispatched to Saudi Arabia, after Washington declared that the country’s massive petroleum reserves were a vital and strategic interest. Serving initially as the Special Assistant to James Moose, the American minister resident, Eddy arrived at the American Legation in Jidda in February 1944. His first assignment was to travel throughout the region making contacts with local leaders and gathering intelligence. By August, Eddy replaced Moose and became the U.S.’s main diplomat in Saudi Arabia.

Prior to Eddy’s arrival, Saudi Arabia’s importance to the U.S. war effort was discussed at the highest levels in Washington. In June 1943, the JCS informed President Roosevelt that because domestic supplies of oil were insufficient to meet the needs of civilians and the armed services, the U.S. needed to secure adequate foreign reserves. In particular, the JCS recommended that Washington acquire a “controlling interest” in Saudi Arabia’s oil concession. By April 1944, the State Department recommended economic assistance to the kingdom through lend-lease funds.

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65 “OSS Cairo to American Legation, Kabul,” 18 March 1944, RG 226, Entry 215, Box 1, OSS, NARACP. The letter noted that in the past Afghanistan had been the responsibility of the OSS’s India Office but “for some reason” was now included in the Near East and under the purview of OSS Cairo.
66 “Position of American Teachers in Afghanistan,” 19 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 215, Box 1, OSS, NARACP.
67 “Richard to Caleb,” 28 June, 1944, “Richard to Caleb,” 29 January 1945, RG 226, Entry 215, Box 1, OSS, NARACP.
68 Frye, 66-81.
In a memorandum to Roosevelt eight months later, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. argued that “An American national interest, basically strategic in character exists in Saudi Arabia.” As a result of this determination, Stettinius proposed extending long term financial aid to the kingdom. He asserted that the assistance would help strengthen the government against possible aggression as well as protect and develop the oil concession. In addition, U.S. military advisers in the country were requesting the establishment of airbases and flight privileges to assist with the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. Moreover, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud “indicated that he prefers to rely upon the United States for the assistance his country needs and that he would adopt a much more independent attitude toward third countries if he were assured that this Government will extend adequate aid on a long-range basis.” Stettinius’s proposal, which was also backed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, requested roughly $43 million over five-years until the kingdom’s budgetary deficit was resolved. 

As the U.S.-Saudi relationship developed, Eddy’s relationship with Abd al-Aziz also blossomed. The King was impressed that the Colonel spoke Arabic and was concerned with conditions inside the country, which was suffering from a severe drought at the time. Eddy also accompanied Abd al-Aziz on frequent excursions to visit different tribes. As Stettinius’s memo was reaching Roosevelt, Abd al-Aziz was making his annual trip to Mecca in a massive caravan of American-made cars. While Washington was discussing how to resolve the problem of the kingdom’s deficits, the royal family, and in particular the king, did little to contain their profligate spending.

Saudi Arabia’s key role in the postwar political and economic order would be on display in a February 1945 meeting between Abd al-Aziz and Roosevelt in the Suez Canal’s Great Bitter Lake. Eddy accompanied the King on a voyage up the Red Sea on an American warship, the U.S.S. Murphy, to meet the President. Roosevelt was en route to Washington from the Yalta conference and the meeting was to take place aboard the U.S.S. Quincy, anchored near the Egyptian city of Ismailia. In addition to meeting Abd al-Aziz, the President was also scheduled to meet Egypt’s King Farouk and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassi.

The trip up the Red Sea took a day and a half. Eddy later wrote about the interactions between the American sailors and their Saudi guests. He stated that “the sailors were much more impressed and astonished by the Arabs and their ways than the Arabs were by life on the U.S. destroyer.” Eddy explained that:

Neither group has seen anything like their opposites before, but the difference is that any such violent break with tradition is news on board a U.S. destroyer; whereas, wonders and improbable events are easily accepted by the Arab whether they occur in the Arabian Nights or in real life. The Arab is by nature a fatalist and accepts what comes as a matter of course and as a gift from Allah, all of whose gifts are equally wondrous, undeserved and unexplained. The Arab gets off a camel and climbs into an airplane without any special excitement even though he has skipped all intervening stages of the horse and the buggy and the automobile. Allah gave the camel the proper equipment to walk on the sand and he gave the airplane wings with which to fly like a bird. There is, therefore, no

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72 Lippmann, 112-125.
reason to be astonished at the airplane any more than to be astonished that camels can walk or birds fly.\textsuperscript{73}

Demonstrating the burgeoning relationship between the countries and between the American diplomat and the Saudi King, Eddy served as a translator for both Roosevelt and Abd al-Aziz. The meeting on the \textit{Quincy} lasted nearly five hours, during which the discussions ranged from the issue of Palestine and Zionist immigration, the development of Saudi Arabia and the postwar status of Arab countries under British and French rule. According to Eddy, Abd al-Aziz asked for and received Roosevelt’s “friendship and support.”\textsuperscript{74}

The President dispatched a letter to Abd al-Aziz a week before he died. Dated April 5, 1945, Roosevelt stated that he would “never do anything which might prove hostile to the Arabs” and that the U.S. Government would not change its policy toward Palestine “without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs.” While the friendship with Saudi Arabia remained after Roosevelt’s death, Eddy later noted that the assurances on Palestine would be ignored by President Truman.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Creating Near East Studies}

Prior to the Second World War, the modern history of the region called the “Near East” was not an area of focus for either the U.S. government or American academia. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the outbreak of the First World War and the creation of the Inquiry in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference revealed the lack of knowledge and expertise among American scholars on the contemporary issues of the region. This situation did not improve during the inter-war period, as the vast majority of academic specialists in the U.S. were European-trained Orientalists whose training and research was not on the modern era. However, by the mid-1930s, the ACLS began planning for studies of the contemporary Near East.

Led by Mortimer Graves, then Secretary of the ACLS’s Committee on Mediterranean and Near Eastern Studies, the society started to identify and contact key scholars in 1936. However, the committee did not have an auspicious beginning. It took roughly a year for members to be identified and agree to participate and the actual mission of the new committee was uncertain and undefined. The major lacuna in American scholarship identified by the committee was a lack of coverage in the contemporary affairs of the region, in particular of the Arab world. Reluctantly chaired by Yale’s E.H. Sturtevant, a Greek and Latin linguist, among the initial members of the ACLS’s new committee were John Wilson of the University of Chicago and Philip K. Hitti of Princeton. The committee’s initial meeting was held at New York City’s Harvard Club on October 30, 1937. Among the items on the agenda was identifying the actual area of coverage, present resources, and needed resources.\textsuperscript{76} While the ACLS’s committee was not successful in achieving these goals, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, its ambitious

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 33-37.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 35-37.
\textsuperscript{76} Library of Congress, ACLSA, Box 83, Committee on Mediterranean and Near Eastern Studies, 1936.
agenda would be repeated in the postwar period as the U.S. government and academic institutions and societies struggled with how best to build expertise on the Near and Middle East.

Princeton at War

Following America’s entry into the war, universities across the country were enlisted to support the war effort. While the OSS gathered scholars for intelligence purposes, campuses were converted to provide area and language training to military personnel. In New Jersey, Princeton was the leading university providing Arabic language instruction for the ASTP. Led by arguably the leading scholar of the Near East in the United States, Philip K. Hitti, the Princeton ASTP program provided a template for area training programs that would be adopted in the postwar.

Hitti was born in the tiny mountain village of Shimlan located south of Beirut on June 24, 1886. Drawn to books because of frequent illnesses as a child, Hitti eventually graduated from the Syrian Protestant College in 1908. He taught at the College for five years before leaving for New York and completing his doctorate at Columbia in 1916. After a four-year stint serving as a lecturer of Oriental studies at Columbia, he returned to Beirut where he became professor of History at his alma mater, renamed the American University of Beirut. During this period, Hitti published *The Syrians in America* in 1924, which profiled the immigrant communities in the United States from the Greater Syria province of the Ottoman Empire. He was eventually recruited by Princeton in 1926 and served as the Chairman of Oriental Languages and Literatures until 1954. Hitti remained an active board member at AUB throughout his time at Princeton and until his death in 1978.

Writing in May 1942, Princeton President Harold W. Dodds informed Professor Dana Munro, a former member of the Inquiry and then Director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, about Washington’s urgent requests. Dodds explained that “The need in the war emergency and for the reconstruction to follow of men with knowledge of the languages and culture of the Near East is being brought to our attention constantly by various agencies of the Government.” He noted that while the university was offering an “emergency course” in colloquial Arabic, it did not have similar offerings in Turkish or Persian. Dodds recommended a proposal by Hitti for course work to combine language training in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish with studies in the social sciences. He added that “we should consider our responsibilities and opportunities as a University in this area” and noted that Hitti’s proposal could be implemented with “minimum of cost to the University and no interference with your departmental program.”

Hitti’s proposal was implemented at the School of Public and International Affairs for the Fall 1942 semester. Munro notified students that the program was “planned with the idea that men with a knowledge of the language and civilizations of specific regions in which military operations are being carried out will be particularly useful in the Army or Navy and may have opportunities for interesting and important specialized services during the war or in the period of

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77 Philip K. Hitti Personal Papers, Box 1, AUBA.
78 “Dodds to Munro,” 26 May 1942, AC 129, Box 13, PUA.
reconstruction afterward.” In addition to the language courses, Hitti offered a class entitled “The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Rise of the Modern Arab States.”

Princeton’s ASTP program in Arabic and Turkish consisted of several components. Area study focused on the history and culture of the region, as well as geography, economics, and current problems. Language classes consisted of 6 hours of class work and 10 hours of conversation per week. In addition, the trainees participated in preceptorials, a Princeton tradition where topics from the readings and lectures were discussed in small groups of 8 to 10 trainees with a moderator.

The university identified a need to train military personnel for combat and post-combat operations. A 1942 memorandum produced by the School of Public and International Affairs noted that advanced training would be important for the Near and Far East, “where social conditions and points of view are so different from our own.” Indeed, in listing the different Princeton Departments which could be drawn upon to help train Army and Navy personnel, the university was offering a model for postwar area studies programs. This included combining area and language training with the resources and expertise of the State and Local Government, Office of Public Opinion Research, and Office of Population Research.

However, a concern developed within the administration of the ASTP program for the Near East about the religious persuasion of a majority of the trainees. An undated internal memorandum stated that roughly 40 to 50 of the 75 men assigned to Princeton for Near East training were Jews. It cautioned that those returning from official missions to the region reported that “the rising tensions between Jews and Arabs is a serious problem in the whole area from Morocco to India” and of the threat of violence breaking out in Syria and Palestine. In addition, because Axis propaganda in Arab countries warned that an Allied victory would strengthen the position of the Zionist movement in Palestine, it was believed that “this propaganda could obviously become more effective if most of the men showing up in the Near East for military government or liaison work turned out to be Jews, or even if reports that we were training Jews for this work were disseminated by Axis propaganda.” The memorandum noted that a number of the trainees “were beginning to understand the seriousness of this problem” and were concerned that they would not be useful in the region. As a solution, the university proposed assigning some of the Jewish trainees to the Far East and others to be trained in Greek or Italian or possibly Turkish or Persian. It specifically stated that not all of the Jewish trainees should be transferred and added that “a reasonable proportion of Jewish officers in military government in the Near East might do no harm. What must be avoided is the impression that most of the men being trained for this work are Jews.”

In addition to the ASTP, Hitti also assisted the COI and later the OSS with intelligence and translation. In November 1941, Hitti provided the COI with detailed information about Arabic-

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79 Dana G. Munro, “School of Public and International Affairs Memorandum,” 30 June 1942, PUA. Prior to the creation of the Near East program, Princeton had previously developed a Latin American program under Munro. A Far Eastern Program was also added in the Fall of 1942.

80 “Princeton University Army Specialized Training Program, Area and Language, Arabic and Turkish,” undated. AC 129, Box 13, PUA.

81 “Plan for Training Program for Military Government Work in Near Eastern Area.” (undated), AC 129, Box 13, PUA.

82 “Strictly Confidential,” (undated), AC 129, Box 13, PUA.
language publications in the U.S., South America, and the Middle East. He also identified and offered brief biographies on Arab literary and political figures. In addition, Hitti arranged for the translation of Nazi radio addresses in Arabic.\(^83\)

Hitti’s relationship with U.S. government agencies continued after the war. In July 1946, Hitti participated in a meeting at the American Legation in Damascus with several key ministers of the newly independent Syrian government. He explained that “his mission” was to “strengthen friendly relations between the American people and the Arabic-speaking peoples through educational and cultural means.” This would be achieved through an exchange of educators and students, the acquisition of books, and archeological collaboration. However, the ministers were unwilling to commit to allowing American educational institutions in Syria to continue operating. Hitti reported back to Washington that he found two disturbing trends in Damascus. First, the Syrian government was not going to permit Christian schools to educate non-Christian children. Second, that it proposed to “use education as a means for strengthening the national spirit, rather than a means for developing the wider human and democratic ideas.” It was the latter point which led a State Department official to remark that Syria was adopting a “dangerously ultra-nationalistic approach to education.”\(^84\)

*Preparing for Postwar Area Studies*

While the R&A division began looking toward postwar intelligence collection and analysis, one major foundation began to examine the division as a template for postwar academia. During the war, representatives from the Carnegie Foundation visited William Langer in Washington. In coordination with the SSRC and the ACLS, the Carnegie Foundation funded early university-based area studies programs and believed that R&A could offer an example for future programs. Describing the meeting in his autobiography, Langer stated that “my visitors were impressed by the R and A approach to the analysis of complicated situations” and were curious if it could be applied to a university setting. He added that “I gave them what encouragement I could,” and noted that Carnegie funded the establishment of Columbia’s Russian Institute and Harvard’s Russian Research Center by the end of the war.\(^85\)

The SSRC also recognized the increasing importance of planning for the postwar period. In a June 2, 1943, letter the SSRC informed Langer that it was establishing a committee on world regions. Chaired by Guy Stanton Ford, former president of the University of Minnesota and then president of the American Historical Association, the committee report stated that “the present war has focused attention as never before upon the entire world.” It added, “The immediate need for social scientists who know the different regions of the world stands second only to the demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential combat zones.” The SSRC stated that “our need for comprehensive knowledge of other lands will not end with the armistice or reconstruction.” Moreover, it asserted that for the United States to fulfill its postwar

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83 “Wright to Langer: Conversations with Professor Philip K. Hitti,” 11 November 1941, RG 226, Entry 146, Box 135, OSS, NARACP.

84 “Letter from Dr. Hitti,” “Confidential: Informal Talk, Damascus Syria” 11 July 1946, RG 59, Entry 1434, Box 2, OSS, NARACP.

85 Langer, 230-231. Langer’s description of the meeting is vague and was uncertain if it occurred in either 1943 or 1944.
role as a member of the United Nations, “our citizens must know other lands and appreciate their people, cultures, and institutions.”

The Committee discussed the examples of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany and how their experience could benefit the U.S. government, academia, and business. It noted that because of its “world-wide interests and age-old political wisdom,” the British example was “particularly important.” This included funding by the British government for the School of Oriental Studies at the University of London. To address the dearth in American expertise, the SSRC report called for the establishment of university-based area studies centers focused on research and graduate training as an initial step. It asserted that the primary goal should be to supply experts for government service and employment in the business sector and secondarily to train instructors and develop teaching materials. The SSRC stated that the initial centers should only be established for “broad areas of great economic, political, or cultural importance” to the United States.

Less than a year later, the Rockefeller Foundation in conjunction with the SSRC and the ACLS organized a two-day area and language program conference in Philadelphia. Led by the ACLS’s Mortimer Graves, the conference gathered some of the leading American scholars, including Princeton’s Philip K. Hitti. Hastily planned, the conference attendees sought to build on the SSRC Committee report in preparation for the end of the ASTP on April 1, 1944. The attendees were generally supportive of the area studies approach and their main concern was how it could be sustained by universities after the war. Graves asserted during the opening session that there was “no necessary connection” between selecting the areas for study and those that were developed during the war. He added that “there is no particular reason why the training technique should carry over in place of an educational technique.”

Princeton’s Hitti supported Graves’s statement and argued that the ASTP would not be an appropriate model for university areas studies, especially for Arabic speaking countries. He argued that because the ASTP focused on colloquial Arabic, which had different variations, such an approach would not be feasible for university programs. In addition, because of the difference between colloquial and literary (or modern standard) Arabic it would be like teaching two languages and argued that the literary form should serve as the core of the area program’s content. Hitti argued further that the key characteristic for each area should be linguistic rather than geographic or political units. He added that area programs should be prioritized based on the lack of existing resources and knowledge as well as perceived importance (e.g., Russia, China, “Arabic World”) rather than reinforcing existing strengths (e.g., Western Europe, Britain). Although not all attendees agreed with Hitti’s approach, they did find consensus by

86 “Crane to Langer, World Regions in the Social Sciences: Report of a Committee of the Social Science Research Council,” 2 June 1943, RG 226, Entry 146, Box 121, OSS, NARACP. In addition to Graves and Hitti other attendees included Elizabeth Bacon and W. Duncan Strong (Ethnogeographic Board), J.M. Cowan (ACLS), Donald Young (SSRC), Marvin Niehuss (University of Michigan), Miller D. Steever (Lafayette), William C. De Vane (Yale), John Dodds (Stanford), Cornelius W. deKiewiet (Cornell), W. Freeman Twaddell (University of Wisconsin), John Fogg, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania), William N. Fenton (Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institute), Charles Hyneman (U.S. Army Training Branch), David Stevens, Joseph Willits, John Marshall, and Roger Evans (Rockefeller Foundation).
87 Ibid.
88 “The Conference on Area and Language Programs in American Universities,” 15-16 March 1944, RG 1.1, Series 1.1, Sub-Series Area and Language Studies, Box 210, Rockefeller Foundation Archives (hereafter RFA).
attempting to prioritize the need for study of particular areas due to their relative importance to the United States.  

The attendees agreed that area programs would require cooperation across disciplines and university departments. However, they believed that this would be difficult to sustain due to bureaucratic constraints within universities as well as the need for a different approach that corresponded with the new discipline. In describing the ideal individual to teach an Arabic area program, Hitti stated that “new type of professor” would be one who was a “cross between a political scientist and a social scientist and an anthropologist.” He added that “if we can find such a creature and train him. We may have to find a new designation for him.” Moreover, since area programs were different from existing practices, Hitti saw it as a “golden opportunity” for experimentation. He stated that “A new discipline is being introduced into our curriculum. Let’s develop new personnel if we can.”

In order to meet the new challenge of establishing area programs and developing new personnel, some attendees believed that “native informants” would fill a short-term need for expertise. Native informants could either be living in the U.S. or individuals recruited from abroad for a short period of time to assist with training. The ACLS’s Milton Cowan, who was also a member of the OSS, argued that these individuals could serve “as a storehouse of information that could be imparted to trainees or students” and did not necessarily have to be trained for such a purpose. He added that “it is going to be necessary for us to develop ways and means of getting that information out of these people in the presence of the students by means of some sort of interrogation technique.” Cowan likened it to the process by which linguists become familiar with a non-literate language or one with few available instructional materials.

However, other attendees believed that native informants were of limited value. William Fenton representing the Bureau of American Ethnology argued that unlike trained scholars, the native informant was “a little naïve about his culture, as all good informants are.” He added that “the native of the culture, even though he may be trained, has an inevitable bias in terms of one pressure group, one class group or another, and needs the unbiased perspective of the student of society,” to assist with identifying the relevant information to be imparted.

The attendees did agree that the native informants could be particularly useful in language training. Hitti noted that at Princeton native Arabic speakers were recruited to teach classes in colloquial Arabic. Hitti offered a second option, which was to recruit Americans living abroad who were educated in the U.S. but fluent in the language and culture of the region and therefore knew “the East and the West.” He stated that some of these individuals could be found in the Near and Far East and would be ideal for the area programs. A number of these Americans

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89 Ibid., In drawing distinctions between language and religion, Hitti was careful to point out that defining an area by language would exclude countries with religious, historical, and cultural ties. For example, defining a region by the Arabic language would exclude Turkey, Iran, and parts of East Africa. In addition, during the conference the term “Middle East,” was used to refer to India and its neighboring territories.

90 Ibid., In response to Hitti’s call for new type of scholar, Michigan’s Niehuss remarked that “I can think of a name for that professor. It would be Superman.” To which the ACLS’s Graves replied, “I have a great fear that he might be Superficialman.”

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.
were children of missionaries or were missionaries themselves, and some were involved in American educational institutions overseas.

*America’s Sheet Anchors*

As Vichy governments were established in Syria and Lebanon and Axis forces threatened Egypt, the United States had few key interests in these countries or the broader region to protect. Arguably the most prominent interests were educational institutions founded by American missionaries in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including AUB and AUC. Both universities emphasized their American character and emphasis on liberal education, while attempting to make accommodations to local social and cultural norms. AUB was the older and more prestigious of the two universities. In addition to the liberal arts, AUB had a respected medical school and hospital.94

With the outbreak of the war, faculty and administrators from both AUB and AUC joined the American war effort. Stephen Penrose, a member of AUB’s Board of Trustees, became the Chief of the OSS’s SI Branch in Cairo.95 Similarly, Wendell Cleland, an AUC founder and faculty member, worked for the Office of War Information (OWI).96 However, John Badeau, Cleland’s colleague at AUC, declined an invitation by the OSS to join the organization. Then the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Badeau would become AUC’s president after the war and would later serve as U.S. Ambassador to Egypt during the Kennedy Administration. Writing in September 1942, Badeau stated that while he understood the need for the clandestine services and was “entirely in sympathy with its objectives, I also believe that the work we are doing at the University is making a unique contribution toward winning the loyalty and cooperation of the Arab world for the United Nations.” He added that the “contribution rests in part upon the fact that we are accepted in Egypt as a non-official American agency.” Badeau explained that “What I fear, both for the present and the future, is that to engage in the activity you suggest in the Near East (i.e. where one is known) would be to rob the University of this influence. Even the State Department has said to us that we were doing [the] work that they, because of their official status, could not do. I do not want to imperil that kind of work nor the influence for American sympathy that it brings.”97

Badeau was not alone in his assessment of the role of American educational institutions in the region. In a letter to the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Division, Bayard Dodge, the President of AUB, explained the importance of American universities and colleges in the region. Dodge asserted that “what the Arab lands need, if they are to become stable, progressive and contented enough to withstand Communism and other dangerous influence, is a greater enlightenment of the whole.” He argued that this could be achieved through improvements in education, agriculture, science, medicine, public health, and social service. Dodge recommended that a fellowship program should be established which would fund promising Arab students to

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94 AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book III, 1908-1929, AUBA.
95 “History of OSS Cairo,” (undated), RG 226, Entry 99, Box 54, OSS, NARACP.
96 Wendell Cleland Papers, AUCA. After the war, Cleland shifted to the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR).
97 “Badeau to Halsey,” 22 September 1942, RG 226, Entry M1642, Roll 73, OSS, NARACP. Emphasis in original.
study in the United States and train future leaders. He advocated that before students were issued a student visa they needed to finish as much preliminary work as possible at one of the American educational institutions in the Near East. This would allow the students to learn English, demonstrate their aptitude, complete required coursework, and gain “an understanding of western ways of doing things.”

Dodge claimed that American educational institutions were essential to U.S. goals in the region, identifying in particular AUB and AUC. He stated that “in order to make the Arab respect American culture, it is very important that such American institutions as exist, should maintain high standards and be worthy in every way of the names which they bear and of the announcements, which they publish.” Of the existing institutions, Dodge identified AUB as the only one able to meet the preliminary requirements for training students. As the principal training site for key professions for Arabs from the Persian Gulf to Egypt, Dodge believed that “the future of these Arab states depends to a great extent upon the efficiency of” AUB. However, he cautioned that additional funding was needed to improve and expand the university’s facilities. Dodge concluded with the warning that “the Arab World is at a crossroads. Whether it becomes sympathetic with our democratic Anglo-Saxon civilization, or is dominated by some other culture, like Pan-Islamism or Communism, will depend largely upon the coming generation.” He added that “unless America does her part at this time, the Arab World cannot hope to have commercial stability or political peace.”

Dodge’s letter was written at the request of Harold Hoskins, an AUB Board member who was dispatched to the region by Colonel Donovan at the beginning of the war. In his own March 1943 memorandum, Hoskins argued that recent immigration from the Near East to the United States combined with the Palestine question made the region more important. Hoskins argued that American missionary and educational activities were more important and beneficial to the United States than its limited commercial interests. He stated that because the institutions were backed by missionary and philanthropic institutions and not the U.S. government it “added to the prestige that America gained from these efforts. As a result, American standing and influence have for many years been extremely high throughout the whole Near East.”

However, Hoskins warned that American prestige had declined over the previous two decades in the region, in a similar but less precipitous drop than that of Britain and France. He stated that this was due to American isolationism after World War I, U.S. support for the Zionist movement, and its association with British and French colonialism in the region. Hoskins added that Nazi propaganda had successfully emphasized these issues while at the same time promising “complete independence.”

Hoskins asserted that American educational institutions should serve as the backbone of Washington’s efforts to restore the U.S.’s position in the region. He argued that “higher education along American lines is the soundest form of cultural contribution to this area.” Hoskins stated that this approach benefited from the presence of existing American institutions in the region that were already performing this task as well as the Near East College Association

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98 “American Cultural Activities in Arab Lands,” (undated), RG 59, Entry 1434, Box 2, NARACP.
99 Ibid.
100 “Cultural Relations Policy for the Near East,” 9 March 1943, RG 226, Entry 146, Box 256, OSS, NARACP.
101 Ibid.
(NECA) which could serve as a funding channel. However, the universities and colleges needed additional funds but feared that direct government subsidies would affect how they were perceived by the host countries. Hoskins proposed that this risk could be mitigated if the amount provided was less than or equal to one-third of their operating budget and was provided through the NECA rather than directly. He recommended a combination of short and long-term projects, including an emphasis on agricultural programs and economic research. For the long-term, Hoskins advocated the creation of an agency for international educational exchange. He warned, however, that the “most effective work in this field will be accomplished if the efforts of such an organization are not directly aimed at short-range political or propaganda efforts, but rather at helping to raise the human standards of life, both physical and spiritual, in various parts of the world, which in turn will prove to be the soundest form of propaganda and political policy for the United States.”

As the war neared its end, Bayard Dodge reiterated the importance of the universities in the region. He asserted that American education could play a vital role in training future leaders of the newly independent states. Dodge argued that “the task of providing cultural leadership for the states of the Near East will not end but will really begin in earnest, when the war terminates.” He added, “Subversive influences cannot be guarded against by neglect, but rather by the consistent and positive pressure of intellectual and cultural guidance.” After the war, Dodge believed that educational institutions would need to be expanded and modernized to meet the needs of a growing student body. Although the universities did not receive assistance from the U.S. government before the war, Dodge argued that such support would benefit the people of the region and the United States. He stated that the benefits of support included “gaining good will” and the “increase of wealth abroad” which would help with trade. Dodge claimed that it would also assist with “the establishing of stability and order, so as to add to the security and wealth of the world as a whole, America included” and “the assuring of loyalty to the United States, in case there should be conflicts in the future.”

However, Dodge cautioned that if the U.S. government were to support the educational institutions any propaganda benefits should be indirect. Moreover, any assistance should be free of political pressure. He argued that rather than building new institutions, existing universities should be expanded and enhanced. In addition, Dodge advocated for an emphasis on trade work and agriculture, reporting that there was a dearth of such programs in local and European schools in the region. He noted that “from the point of view of propaganda, work of this sort is especially valuable.”

The American educational institutions in the Near East had supporters within the State Department, particularly among former instructors and children of missionary parents. This sentiment was best expressed by Gordon Merriam, then Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, in a May 8, 1946, memorandum to then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

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102 Ibid.
103 “Post-War Cultural Development in the Near East,” 17 February 1945, Document 114661, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 1299, OSS, NARACP.
104 Ibid. Dodge argued that any government support should not go to education institutions which were evangelically based, stating that “non-Christians might resent having the American government introduce evangelistic propaganda into their communities and it might ‘cheapen American [sic] in the eyes of the natives, if the United States government should subsidize foreign schools for propaganda reasons.’"
Merriam, a former instructor at Robert College in Turkey, wrote, “Our policy toward, interests in, and relations with the various Arab countries in the Near East, chiefly Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, are of an importance which is certainly commensurate with our interest in the future of the occupied zones of Europe.” He explained, “We have many political, economic and educational interests in these countries.” Merriam noted that the educational institutions had “taken more than a century to build up, and they constituted a sheet anchor in the Middle East when we were militarily weak.” He added, “These American schools and colleges require Arab good will for their continuance and effectiveness.”

Merriam’s comments were part of a broader discussion and complaint about the U.S. government’s emerging policy on the Palestine question. His memorandum to Acheson was in response to the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which called for the immigration of 100,000 European Jewish refugees to Palestine, then under British mandate. Even though London rejected the recommendations, President Truman favored their implementation. In his memorandum, Merriam warned Acheson of the implications, stating, “The Arab reaction to the Committee’s recommendations has been swift and alarming” and that “they give every indication of the intention to resist.” Indeed, Truman’s announcement in October 1946 calling for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine infuriated America’s British and Arab allies. British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin resented Truman’s statement, which was delivered over their objections. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud viewed it as not only a break with promises of the late President Roosevelt but a betrayal.

Palestine and American Universities in the Middle East

Although AUB and AUC developed strong relations with Washington during and after the Second World War, tensions between academia and the U.S. government were present on regional political issues, in particular Palestine. Indeed, AUB and AUC felt the direct repercussions of U.S. policy toward Palestine and the Zionist movement but they approached the issue differently. In response to the Truman statement, John Badeau, then President of AUC, attempted to gather support for an open letter of protest signed by the presidents of other American educational institutions in the region. Badeau explained that the university had a

105 “Memorandum by Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson),” 8 May 1946, FRUS, The Near East and Africa, 1946, Vol. VII, 597-598. Merriam’s use of the term “sheet anchor” likely has a dual meaning. In nautical terms, the sheet anchor is the largest of a ship’s anchors and typically only used during emergencies. However, it also has a religious connotation and symbolism. As David Hackett Fisher’s explains, the sheet anchor became a religious symbol during the English Reformation, “the sheet anchor of salvation,” and was adopted by Oliver Crowell’s New Model Army during the English Civil War. Fisher states that these Puritan symbols “became part of New England’s complex imagery of liberty and freedom.” Thus, when Rhode Island was initially formed, the sheet anchor became its emblem and was eventually adopted by Rhode Island regiments during the American Revolution. It still graces the Rhode Island state flag today. As a native of New England and former Robert College instructor, Merriam would have been familiar with both usages of the term. David Hackett Fisher, Liberty and Freedom: A Visual History of America’s Founding Ideas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 35.


policy “to refrain from taking any official stand on political issues -- either Egyptian or American.” However, because “the present situation causes such grave concern,” the University Council believed that “some step ought to be taken which would on one hand call the attention of American authorities to our position and interest here, and on the other hand give evidence to our constituency in the Middle East that we are not merely acquiescent in the face of a questionable American policy.” Badeau stated that “such a letter would still maintain our official neutrality so far as the actual policy towards Palestine is concerned, and yet its implications would be clear to our constituency here.”

In his reply to Badeau, Dodge explained that it was a “fixed policy” at AUB to “keep out of political matters.” He added that “if members of the faculty mix into politics, it makes it impossible to keep students from doing the same.” Dodge wrote, “It is also true that we have a good many Jews on our staff and in our student body, so that it is very delicate for us to enter into the Zionist question.” He also cautioned Badeau that “anything which is done through the State Department will have little effect, as I am sure that the State Department is doing all that it can to keep the White House from being unreasonable.” Yet Dodge was hopeful that “after election day the politicians will leave foreign affairs to the Department of State.”

Badeau replied to Dodge eight days later. He explained that “such a statement will probably receive little attention at home, but my hope was that it might be useful here.” Badeau conceded that the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt was opposed to such a move and that it would likely lack the support of the University Council. However, he reported that the president of Aleppo College was in favor of releasing a statement.

Although Badeau was unable to convince the other universities to join him in protesting the Truman administration’s policies on Palestine, he reached out personally to regional leaders to distance AUC from Washington. Writing to Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, Badeau enclosed a recent lecture given by his predecessor Charles Watson at Princeton. Watson’s lecture, he explained, “was prepared for Americans and seeks primarily to correct the misinformation they have received through Zionist propaganda.” Badeau added that while AUC was an educational institution that was apolitical and non-partisan, there were “opportunities for individual members of the staff while in the United States to correct some of the misunderstandings regarding the situation in the Middle East.” He noted that as a recently retired member of the AUC administration, Dr. Watson felt that “he could speak on the topic of Palestine without prejudicing the non-political character” of the university. Badeau wrote, “We are glad that he delivered this lecture for as individual American citizens living in the Middle East, we are all gravely concerned for Arab-American relationships.”

In February 1947, Britain announced it was terminating its mandate over Palestine and referring the Palestine Question to the recently established United Nations (UN). At the end of November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two states: one majority Jewish and one largely Arab. The result was civil war with regional and international

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108 “Badeau to Dodge,” 15 October 1946, Badeau Presidential Papers, AUCA. Badeau explained that the letter would be delivered to the American Ambassador to Egypt and published in the Middle Eastern press, likely through the United States Information Service. (emphasis in original)
109 “Dodge to Badeau,” 21 October 1946, Badeau Presidential Papers, AUCA.
110 “Badeau to Dodge,” 29 October 1946, Badeau Presidential Papers, AUCA.
111 “Badeau to Azzam Pasha,” 29 October 1946, Badeau Presidential Papers, AUCA.
implications. By the April 1948, the militias of the Zionist movement had largely defeated the rival Palestinian Arab forces. The capture of major urban areas in Palestine was accompanied by the expulsions and flight of the civilian population. Seeking refuge in other towns and villages within Palestine as well as the neighboring states, the refugee crisis heightened the pressure on the Syrian, Egyptian, Transjordanian, and Lebanese governments to intervene. On May 14 the British Mandate of Palestine ended, and the state of Israel was declared and quickly recognized by Washington. Although the Arab League authorized an invasion of Palestine, the member states had their own agendas. Divided by competition, undermined by secret agreements, and outnumbered and outgunned by the better equipped and trained Zionist militias, the 1948 Palestine War resulted in a resounding defeat for the invading Arab armies. By the end of 1948, the state of Israel had expanded its borders beyond those called for in UN General Assembly Resolution 181, the remaining territories were controlled by Egypt and Transjordan, over 750,000 Palestinians had become refugees, and Palestine ceased to exist.\(^{112}\)

While the leadership of AUB and AUC appeared to disagree with the Truman administration’s overt support of the Zionist movement in Palestine, they continued to adopt different approaches to express their dissonance. AUC continued to take an open political stance, in contrast to AUB’s silence. Following the U.S.’s recognition of Israel, AUC’s Badeau authored a scathing letter to President Truman criticizing his decision to recognize Israel. Dispatched by telegram to Washington on May 17, 1948, Badeau’s letter protested the decision “on behalf of my colleagues and myself.” He explained that it would hurt American interests in the region, cause the deaths of innocent Palestinians and non-Zionist Jews, and undermine the U.S.’s “long record of interest in freedom and justice.” Badeau’s telegram concluded by stating that “as American citizens long resident in the Middle East and devoted to the best interests both of Middle Eastern peoples and the United States we are humiliated by the action of our government and strictly repudiate it. We urge that this action be immediately reviewed and altered by our government.”\(^{113}\)

A week later, Badeau dispatched a letter to Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, reiterating his opposition to American policies regarding Palestine and explained that “this decision of Mr. Truman made it impossible for us longer to keep still.” Badeau added, “I only hope that such protests will help in changing our present policy.” He concluded the letter by stating, “We are looking forward eagerly to the success of the Arab armies in finally liberating Palestine from political Zionism. Only then can a new era of peace begin.”\(^{114}\)

Washington’s support for the partition of Palestine and the recognition of Israel affected AUB’s ability to recruit a new university president. In the wake of the UN’s partition resolution the AUB Board found that the situation in the region had made it difficult to attract candidates for the position. For example, the AUB Board approached John Wilson, a noted Orientalist at the University of Chicago and OSS veteran, multiple times but he repeatedly declined the offer.

\(^{112}\) Of the different works by the Israel “new historians,” Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) offers the most detailed examination of inter-Arab rivalries and secret agreements and understanding between Transjordan’s King Abdullah and the British government as well as the Zionist leadership.

\(^{113}\) “Badeau to Truman,” 17 May 1948, John Badeau Presidential Papers, AUCA.

\(^{114}\) “Badeau to Azzam Pasha,” 21 May 1948, Badeau Presidential Papers, AUCA. Badeau’s May 21, 1948, letter was in response to a letter from Azzam Pasha thanking him for his statement of protest to President Truman.
The Board eventually settled on Stephen Penrose, one time head of OSS-SI Cairo, whose family had close ties to the university. Commenting on behalf of the Board’s Executive Committee, Harold Hoskins noted that Penrose was selected in part to demonstrate to “the Arabic speaking population the unselfish purpose of [AUB] and the perpetuation of its instructive tradition.”

Evaluating Wartime Programs

In the initial postwar period, the American Council on Education (ACE) sponsored studies which evaluated the wartime training programs for the armed services. In 1947, ACE published a report by Ethnologist William Nelson Fenton of the Smithsonian Institution which examined the ASTP. Fenton discussed Princeton’s Near East program, which he believed was a model for future area studies. This was due largely to the composition of its staff and the interdisciplinary courses. Fenton stated that the Princeton program managed to avoid the difficulties present in the European area programs, which were undermined by inter-disciplinary squabbles and competition.

Fenton cited a statement by Princeton’s Hitti on the overall benefits of utilizing native area teachers, or “native informants,” for language study. In contrast to his statements at the 1944 Philadelphia conference, Hitti offered a more critical appraisal of both native informants and Westerners with experience in the region. Although Hitti found that native teachers were beneficial for language training and had knowledge of the particular area, he asserted that they tended to underestimate the difficulty American students had in learning Arabic. He added that because of “national pride,” native teachers tend to “cover up defects in a culture, and this pride gives rise to jingoism.” At the same time, Hitti claimed that “the American teacher of area [studies] who has been a missionary in the area exhibits a tendency to belittle a foreign culture.”

The ACE study offered several conclusions based on the ASTP experience. While Fenton cautioned that integrated area study was a “challenge” to existing university departmental structures and that resistance would be encountered, he favored the establishment of area programs. He asserted that “areas for study may be ranked on a scale of priorities deriving from their importance to education and in international relations at the time.” In terms of priorities, Fenton ranked “the Arabic World” and “the Indic World” fourth. He argued that “the Near East is a center of culture crisis and India has reached a climax in her long history,” adding that, “Americans cannot afford to be ignorant of the potentiality for future history in the Moslem and Hindu worlds.” Fenton believed that Near East studies could be expanded “through

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115 AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book V, 1947-1952, 6 January 1948, AUBA.
117 Ibid., 48.
118 Ibid., 80-82. Fenton defined integrated area study as “the focusing of all the disciplinary competences (geography, history, economics, language, and literature, philosophy, political science, and the like) upon a cultural area for the purpose of obtaining a total picture of that culture. He explained that “Culture is the central concept of anthropology, the study of man, as region is the central concept of geography. These combine in area study.”
119 Ibid., 83. Fenton’s top three priorities in order were: “The Americas,” “Western Europe and its margins,” and “The Slavonic World, the Far East.” It should be noted that he never defined the geographic area for the Near East or the Arabic World but used the terms synonymously.
the agencies of American relief and educational institutions that have operated in the area for a generation.” He added that “the Near East needs American experts, teachers, and educated commercial men. Arab students would come here for agriculture, medicine, history, rural sociology, and animal husbandry.”

The Future National Good

Two months after the surrender of Imperial Japan ended the Second World War, the Senate’s Committee on Military Affairs began holding sub-committee hearings to authorize a “study of the possibilities of mobilizing the national resources of the United States.” Among those giving testimony during the four days were representatives from academic associations and universities, professional organizations, major corporations, and government agencies. On October 31, 1945, Brigadier General John Magruder appeared before the sub-committee. Magruder was Donovan’s Deputy Director for Intelligence and was now the director of the Strategic Services Unit, the initial successor agency for the OSS’s SI activities. Magruder cautioned the sub-committee members that national strength was not merely a function of military might, stating that “this war has demonstrated that the role in wartime of the nonmilitary instrumentalities of strategy is only slightly less important than in peace.” He cited the war-time efforts of the Allied and Axis powers to utilize the “forces of political, economic, and psychological warfare and the large strategic advantages which came to those who used them with skill and with a knowledge of their power.” Citing Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz’s maxim that “war is politics,” Magruder noted that based on the experience of the recent conflict, if the Prussian historian and military theorist was writing in 1945 he would have added “war is also economics and psychology.” The general explained that during World War II, political, economic, geographic and psychological factors were “extraordinarily important” in the development of military strategy and that “estimates of enemy capabilities -- a prime determinant in strategic planning -- must be based on something more profound than front line strength.”

Magruder stated that “with the return of peace comes the strategy of peace.” He asserted that any strategy must be based on the “knowledge of the geography and history of other countries, their political, social, and economic structures, their national psychology without which no analysis of their capabilities, aspirations and probable intentions can be made.” The General cautioned that the lack of this knowledge would have dire implications for the nation and its strategy of peace, and he called on the U.S. Government to “do all in its power to promote the development of knowledge in the social sciences.” Magruder feared that without government support the “best minds” would be diverted into “fields of less value to the future national good” and that American intelligence agencies would be “handicapped” if there was a dearth of social

120 Ibid., 84-85.
121 Bradley Smith, The Shadow Warriors (New York: Basic Books, 1983): 206-207. Smith states that “OSS-SI was charged with running agents and collecting secret intelligence, that had to cope with the task of sorting the true from the false, artifice from actuality. Probably the most significant achievement of OSS Washington in 1943 and 1944 was that its intelligence estimates were reasonably close to reality, thereby convincing the JCS that the various branches of General Magruder’s Intelligence Services Division were actually doing their job.” After the war, the SSU was transferred to the War Department and a year later was transferred again to the Central Intelligence Group's Office of Special Operation.
122 S1297, 31 October 1945, Record Group 286, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. (hereafter NARADC).
scientists. He concluded by stating that “the research of physical scientists is essential to the Nation’s industrial strength, so is research of social scientists indispensable to the sound development of national intelligence in peace and war.” Senator Harley Kilgore, the chairman of the sub-committee, noted that Magruder’s statement was particularly important because of the “sad lack of public understanding of the social sciences and what they do.”

Magruder’s emphasis on the need for social scientists was echoed by earlier witnesses. Appearing on the first day of testimony, Wesley Clark Mitchell the president of the SSRC, read from a prepared memorandum that his organization believed the U.S. government should “for purposes of the national interest” support research in the natural and social sciences. Mitchell added that “every problem of national concern has its human as well as material aspects,” and noted that the military services recognized the benefits social scientists could provide during the war. He stated that “the need for the best research obtainable on the human aspects of innumerable matters of national interest and welfare is no less in times of peace.”

The SSRC called for both direct and indirect federal funding of research. Mitchell explained that in addition to the research conducted under government oversight by the proposed “National Research Foundation,” funds should also be made available to non-governmental and academic institutions to conduct research that would “advance mutually advantageous objectives.” However, he cautioned that the SSRC was concerned that participation of social scientists within a government-run agency would make them subject to government control or bias the outcomes of their research. He argued that this problem could be overcome through contract work between government and non-governmental agencies whereby the “definition of suitable areas of work

123 Ibid.
124 Testimony of Wesley C. Mitchell, 29 October 1945, S1297, Record Group 286, NARADC.
involving matters of national interest, and the specification of proper and effective terms governing the conduct of the work to be done.” A more problematic issue for Mitchell was ensuring that a sufficient quantity of students trained in the social sciences, which he maintained was not possible due to the prohibitive cost of undergraduate education. This concern was echoed by Mitchell’s colleague and fellow witness, John M. Gauss, president of the American Political Science Association (APSA).

While the proposed National Research Foundation never materialized, the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (the G.I. Bill) helped to transform American higher education. Dramatically increased enrollment in colleges and universities after the war helped to address the calls of the SSRC and the intelligence community for a greater number of individuals trained in the social sciences. However, the surge in student enrollment only addressed part of America’s need for social science knowledge to match its increased global commitments in the post-War era. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, in the early Cold War period the State Department and nascent intelligence establishment actively sought partnerships with American universities to produce and analyze foreign area research.

Conclusion

The end of the Second World War found some scholars returning to their universities while others chose to stay within government service. Although he volunteered for clandestine work at the beginning of the war, by 1944 Nelson Glueck had become increasingly uncomfortable with requests from Washington for continued spying inside Palestine and Transjordan and eventually resigned. After the war, William Langer, Carleton Coon, and Richard Frye returned to Harvard, but over the next decade they would maintain their contacts with the U.S. national security establishment. After briefly returning to Yale, Sherman Kent went back to Washington and became one of the key figures in defining the role of the U.S.’s postwar intelligence service. William Eddy remained in Saudi Arabia after the war eventually working for ARAMCO while also spying for the U.S.’s newly established Central Intelligence Agency. Although he did not achieve Lawrence’s notoriety, Eddy was perhaps the only scholar-spy of the war to replicate the British Colonel’s access and trust among regional leaders during and after the conflict. However, Eddy died before his memoirs were published and in spite of Coon’s best efforts, the World War II generation would have no literary equivalent to Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom.

Like the Inquiry, the OSS and other wartime agencies relied on American academia for research and analysis about different foreign areas. Although there were major differences in the sources and quantity of intelligence produced during the two wars, the analysis was still marred

125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 42. Mettler reports that by 1947 over 1 million veterans enrolled in college, a five-fold increase from the previous year. By 1949 the number of veterans in college had doubled. She notes that when eligibility ended for World War II veterans to use the G.I. Bill, 7.8 million veterans, 51 percent of all who severed in the military, had attended school or training. Of which, 2.2 million attended college or university.
by racial and religious prejudice, essentialist characterizations, and a paternalistic attitude toward the inhabitants of the areas the United States sought to liberate or keep free. Most, if not all, of the scholars were trained in or influenced by the Orientalist tradition, and this was reflected in the country guides that were produced for American soldiers or the analysis to assist Allied policy makers and military strategists. While the influence and biases of the British Foreign Office and intelligence services was clearly present and transferred to the U.S.’s agencies, as was some of their research, American scholars brought and applied their own preconceived notions and biases to the Near and Middle East and North Africa. The Americans may have been liberators but they were hardly innocents.

While the Second World War again demonstrated America’s lack of contemporary knowledge about the rest of the world, the wartime programs offered initial if unsuitable models for area studies. Efforts during the inter-war period to improve Oriental studies in the U.S. never advanced beyond preliminary discussions. Although wartime programs, particularly the OSS and ASTP, demonstrated some of the benefits of area studies and language training there were limitations. Indeed, those scholars involved with different wartime programs from the OSS and ASTP to the Ethnogeographic Board acknowledged their inadequacy for university settings. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the wartime experience became the reference point for many scholars as they attempted to establish area studies in American universities.

The war offered an extensive demonstration of the intersection of scholars and intelligence services. After the war, scholars defended their decision to serve in the OSS and other government and military agencies because of the fundamental threat of Fascism to the American way of life and the justness of the cause. Yet for the Near, Middle East, and North African theatres of operations, once the threat to the areas was over scholars began planning for intelligence operations in the postwar. While not all scholars agreed with this approach, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, a significant number of influential scholars from major programs operated in both the world of academia and government intelligence, raising the question of where the line was drawn between the two.

Yet another line between academia and government service was observed in the American universities located in the region. Both AUB and AUC were supportive of the American war effort but sought to maintain their appearance of independence and freedom of action during and after the conflict. However, government officials saw the universities as key outposts not just representing American ideas but potential sources of recruitment for anti-Axis sabotage activities during the war and supporters of the United States after the conflict. As demonstrated by the Palestine conflict, AUB and AUC sought to maintain their transnational identities at least publicly. Privately, the university officials conceded that much of their public protestation to Washington’s policies were for local consumption.

As tensions heightened between Washington and Moscow and developed into the Cold War, the government sought to replicate the wartime collaboration with academia. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, during the initial Cold War period the emerging national intelligence establishment sought out partnerships with universities to conduct foreign area research. The Korean War heightened these discussions and planning for the establishment of language and area studies programs in order to meet the anticipated need for regional expertise during a time of national emergency.

Our democracy stands under arms. Military problems have become the focal point of American politics. The task before us is the defense of democratic values against totalitarianism. The problem is how to preserve free institutions while meeting the threat of regimented societies.

- E. Pendleton Herring

If [educational leaders] recognize the many ways in which the resources of their institutions can help to save the nation by building programs in the humanities and sciences which serve national security as well as military defense, the nation will be safer – and so will our educational institutions.

- Charles E. Odegaard, Executive Director, American Council of Learned Societies, March 29, 1951.

Introduction

Standing before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman called for the United States to support the governments of Greece and Turkey. Reading from an open notebook, Truman declared “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” He added, “I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.” This was to be accomplished mainly through economic and financial aid, which would assist with “economic stability and orderly political processes.” Truman asserted that the implications of the situation were stark, “Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.”

Although tensions between Washington and Moscow increased in the postwar era, the Truman Doctrine marked a definite break with the past. The speech publicly enunciated Washington’s strategy of containment toward the Soviet Union adopted the previous year. Coupled with the announcement of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe in May, the Truman administration appeared to be drawing a firm line with the Kremlin. Relations with Moscow would deteriorate significantly over the next year and a direct conflict between the former allies over Berlin was narrowly avoided. While the Truman Doctrine was an open declaration of support for the regimes in Greece and Turkey, it was also intended to covertly bolster the governments of Iran and Italy against Communist-inspired subversion. Washington believed its support would help establish a barrier to Soviet influence in Western Europe and the Middle East.

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2 “Address before the Commission on Colleges and Universities, North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Chicago, Illinois,” 29 March 1951, Record Group 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
4 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 141-148.
If the United States was to truly contain the Soviet Union and promote economic development and effective government in Europe and the Middle East, it would need trained specialists. However, by 1947 the wartime efforts to establish foreign area expertise were either orphaned or absorbed into existing bureaucracies. Yet their example, and more importantly their alumni, would serve as the core group around which Middle East studies in the U.S. would be created. In the initial postwar period, the federal bureaucracy, in particular the foreign policy establishment, was transformed in an attempt to match America’s new status as a global superpower. Similarly, academic societies, universities, foundations, and the U.S. government struggled to create Middle East expertise to match America’s growing interests and commitments in the region. In this chapter, I argue that these interests coupled with rising tensions with Moscow drove Washington’s need to formalize area and language training. It contends that the overriding goal of these efforts was to create a sustainable supply of candidates for the State Department and the intelligence agencies, not to promote academic research. Based on the archival record, I demonstrate that the interactions between the U.S. government and academic societies, universities, private foundations, and corporations were far deeper and more involved than previously conceded by the participants. Although they were influenced by wartime agencies, they were not simply a continuation of those programs.

This chapter reveals that during the early Cold War period, government agencies actively sought to collaborate on foreign area research and to recruit personnel from major universities and academic societies. Far from rejecting these overtures, academic institutions and scholars embraced and encouraged collaboration with the U.S. government to help guide and shape their research agendas and programs. In addition, government agencies and personnel played key roles in the production of influential reports on area studies by the leading academic councils. Yet the relationship between academia and the national security establishment was far more complex and dynamic than has been portrayed in the literature to date. As the United States settled into its role as a global superpower, the federal government and academia were bound in a mutually beneficial relationship based on shared interests and ideas. At the center of these discussions were key “academic power brokers,” scholars who alternated between government service and academia, in particular, Harvard’s E. Pendleton Herring and William Langer.

Establishing the National Security Bureaucracy

As discussed in Chapter 3, the dissolution of the OSS at the end of the Second World War and the transfer of the R&A Branch to the State Department was part of a larger transition toward the creation of a centralized intelligence entity. President Truman proposed the unification of the armed services in a message to Congress on December 19, 1945. Truman’s proposal led to the development and eventual passage of the National Security Act in July 1947. With the creation of the new position of Secretary of Defense, the Act placed the different military branches under civilian control. It also established the National Security Council (NSC), a coordination council that was to advise the President on all “domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.” The Act also authorized the creation of the CIA.

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Creation of the postwar national security establishment was a key component of Washington’s broader effort to reorganize the U.S. government in order to meet its new global commitments. The adoption of containment policy toward the Soviet Union required a robust intelligence service and policy analysis agency to assist the President with decision making. The framework for America’s postwar intelligence collection and analysis was embodied in the initial series of NSC directives authorized by early 1948. NSC Intelligence Directive Number 2 (NSC ID 2) identified the key governmental agencies responsible for collecting and distributing foreign area intelligence by topic. A separate directive, NSC ID4, was developed to support the data collection authorized in NSC ID2. It called for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to “prepare a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objectives applicable to foreign countries and areas,” which was to “serve as a guide for the collection and production” of intelligence. This was followed by NSC ID 7, which authorized the “domestic exploitation” of foreign intelligence resources.

As will be demonstrated, these directives set in motion an unprecedented level of discussions and agreements between the U.S. foreign policy and intelligence establishments and universities, academic councils, and private foundations. To date, these interactions have not been discussed by scholars. In addition, they reveal the importance of a governmental department, the External

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University Press, 1978): 10-11; Anna Kasten Nelson, “President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” *Journal of American History* 72 (1985): 369-374; Zegart, *Flawed by Design*. The role of the NSC in policy formation and analysis was far more ambiguous. It was created in order to obtain the military’s support for the unification of the armed services and was to serve only as an advisory body. In addition, it was intended to provide the armed service secretaries with the opportunity to express their opinions directly to the President rather than include them within the Presidential Cabinet. The NSC’s original members included the secretaries of the different armed services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of State, and the new positions of Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA. In addition, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was a statutory member of the council. However, it became a redundant organization after the Department of Defense was created and most of its activities were subsumed within the new department in 1953.

Arthur Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, 183-4. The position of DCI emerged with the dissolution of the OSS and the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). According to historian Arthur Darling, the CIA emerged out of attempts to strengthen the authority and status of both the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIG. Created by a presidential directive, the CIG essentially served as a coordination agency between the various intelligence services operated by the State Department and the military services prior to the formal creation of the NSC and the CIA a year later. Under the National Security Act, the newly created CIA was given greater intelligence collection and recommendation authority than the CIG. It also enhanced the Director’s authority and responsibility for recommending “intelligence activities” to different governmental departments.

“National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2,” 13 January 1948, *FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950*, available online, [http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/422_435.html](http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/422_435.html) (last accessed June 19, 2011). The State Department was authorized to collect political, cultural, and sociological information, while the different branches of the military were to gather information related to their specific branches. In addition, all of the agencies were to gather and share any economic, scientific, and technological information. Overseas posts were the main sites of information collection, and the senior representative was responsible for the task.


Ibid., Document 427, 12 February 1948. NSC ID 7 called for the CIA to establish field offices around the country for “direct contact” between the agency and nongovernmental sources in the U.S. to enable the collection of technical and foreign intelligence information. NSC ID7 also called for the intelligence agencies to identify and contact U.S. citizens with “high foreign intelligence potential” that were leaving or returning the country in order for “briefing or interrogation.” Any information obtained by the CIA through this process was to be distributed to the appropriate agencies.
Research Staff, whose activities have heretofore been rarely discussed or understood in the scholarship on the national security bureaucracy. While Washington was implementing these policies, one of America’s most prestigious universities was establishing a program to assist government agencies in developing expertise for a region considered vital and strategic.

Princeton in the Nation’s Service

Although the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East were considered vital to American national security in 1947, only one formal multi-disciplinary area studies program was developed for the region. Located at Princeton under the supervision of Phillip Hitti, then chairmen of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, the Near Eastern Studies program attempted to build on the university’s wartime activities. As discussed in Chapter 3, under Hitti’s direction Princeton was the center for training of Arabic, Turkish, and Persian for the U.S. military’s ASTP. Hitti and other professors also assisted with translation and analysis for the OSS. The combination of these services and relationships with the foreign policy establishment made Princeton the ideal university for Near East training in the postwar era.

Citing the “rapid emergence of the Near East as an area of vital interest to the United States,” Princeton announced the creation of an areas studies program for the region in April 1947. Starting in the fall 1947 semester, the program would train “men for eventual service in the government, business, and teaching posts.” Citing its history of Arabic and Islamic scholarship and service as an ASTP center for Arabic and Turkish, Princeton boasted that this program was the first “in the history of higher education” in the United States. Organized through the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, the program was geared toward undergraduate education and offered interdepartmental course work on the “culture, religion, history and institutions of the Near East area” combined with language training in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. In addition, the program offered a two-year Master of Arts degree and a Ph.D. concentration similar to that of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literature.

While the press release reiterated that “one of the objectives of the program was training men for government service or business positions in the region” and for “teaching and missionary work,” it noted that the students would receive the benefits of a “liberal education...irrespective of whether or not they pursue a career in the Near East.”

Responding to Princeton’s announcement, Harry Lee Smith, Jr., then Assistant Director of the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), informed Professor Hitti that it was “enthusiastically received” and that a formal letter would be forthcoming that would “express officially the interest of the Foreign Service and the Department in your program.” On May 26, 1947, Christian Ravandal, Director General of the Foreign Service, dispatched a formal

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10 “Princeton University Press Release,” 21 April 1947, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP.
11 “Smith to Hitti,” 14 April 1947 and 12 May 1947; “Smith to Maddox,” May 1, 1947, NARACP, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555; “Merriam to NEA,” 28 March 1947, RG59, Entry 1434, Box 1, NARACP. On an earlier visit to the Princeton campus, Smith was briefed on the program by Hitti and William Wright, former President of Robert College in Istanbul and an OSS veteran. However, in spite of the State Department’s enthusiastic response, Smith recognized that Princeton’s program would not fully address their needs for language training. The FSI determined that the only language courses offered by Princeton suitable for FSOs would be for writing not speaking. Those FSOs who did not have a background in Arabic or Turkish would participate in an initial nine month intensive training class at the institute before advancing to Princeton for an additional nine months.
acknowledgement of the announcement to Princeton President Harold Dodds. Ravandal stated that the State Department noted the “development of the Near East program since so few universities have taken an adequate interest in this important area.” He added that the university had “for many years been the source of rich talent for the Foreign Service and the Department of State. We shall follow with interest the development of your Near East studies and trust that you will have many able students preparing for the public service who will take advantage of them.”

However, Princeton was unwilling to wait for the State Department’s developing interest. In July, Gordon Merriam, then Chief of Near Eastern Affairs, informed Loy Henderson, then Director of Near East and African Affairs, that “Princeton let us know in strong terms that they have gone to great trouble and expense in creating facilities for advanced study in languages, history, and institutions of the Near East and that we ought to support them by utilizing these facilities more than we have.”

Establishing a pattern for future Middle East studies centers, Princeton’s program was supported by philanthropic foundations and major oil companies. Initial funding was provided by both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. Three years later, this was augmented with support from the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), the Gulf Oil Company, and California-Texas Oil Company (Cal-Tex).

Demonstrating the university’s commitment to the new program, Princeton hosted a three-day conference on “Near Eastern Culture and Politics” as part of its bicentennial conferences in April 1947. Under the broad title of “The Arab and Moslem World: Studies and Problems,” the conference brought together leading scholars in the field with different benefactors and supporters of Middle East studies in the United States. The conference’s general theme was “new approaches in research” for topics ranging from Islamic art and architecture to international relations. In addition to Hitti and Wright, presenters and commentators included Oxford’s Sir Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb, Gustave von Grunebaum and John Wilson of the University of Chicago, and Charles Malik and Constantine Zurayk of AUB. Attendees included representatives from ARAMCO, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the ACLS, the Middle East Institute, and the State Department.

Within four years, Princeton was training government and military personnel. Reporting to the Rockefeller Foundation in 1951, the university noted that it was “meeting a national need” based on “the continuing and increasing demand on it by the Armed Forces, the Department of State, the educational institutes operating in the Near East -- both American and native -- industries and the general public.” Indeed, by the program’s fourth anniversary Hitti declared

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12 “Ravandal to Dodds,” 26 May 1947, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP.
13 “Merriam to Henderson,” 1 July 1947, RG59, Entry 1434, Box 1, NARACP.
14 Dept. of Oriental Studies, 1933-1966, Box 9, 29 January 1951, AC 164, PUA. Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation provided five-year grants of $42,500 and $61,000 respectively. ARAMCO and Cal-Tex provided $11,500 and $10,000 per year for five years respectively, while Gulf Oil made a $10,000 contribution over two years. Other initial contributors included the Grant and Dodge Foundations, $8,000 per year and $5,000 per year, respectively.
16 Ibid; “Report to the Carnegie Corporation, 1948-1949,” AC 164, Dept. of Oriental Studies, 1933-1966, Box 9, PUA. In a 1948-1949 annual report to the Carnegie Corporation, Princeton reported that in its first term, 51 students enrolled in area and language study and 69 students were enrolled in the second term. The following year, the
that its emphasis on preparing graduate students for careers in government or business in the region was “further testimony to the continuing vigor of Woodrow Wilson’s ideal of ‘Princeton in the nation’s service’.” He claimed that with international students joining the program and American alumni going abroad, the university’s purpose was broadened to “Princeton in the world’s service.”


Evaluating Wartime Area Programs

A month after Princeton’s announcement, the SSRC published an evaluation of existing area studies programs. Authored by Robert Hall, a political scientist from the University of Michigan and Chairman of the SSRC’s Committee on World Area Research, it was the first of two landmark reports on area studies produced by the SSRC in the early post-war period. A specialist on modern Japan, Hall served on the Ethnogeographic Board during the war. Created by the SSRC, the Smithsonian Institute, the ACLS, and the National Research Council (NRC), the Board collected information needed by the military services and intelligence agencies for overseas operations.

The report detailed the positive and mostly negative influence of the wartime experience in area studies. Hall asserted that “World War II was not the mother of area studies. In fact, a strong case can be made that a healthy prewar development was not only retarded but, at least

program boasted a dramatic increase of 172 students enrolled in the first term and 129 in the second. In addition, the program had ten full-time graduate students, including two from the Department of State in the 1948/1949 academic year, and added another ten graduate students the following year. Princeton also created a special, and informal, program to meet the needs of the armed services, the foreign service, and the intelligence agencies for language training. Twenty army and air force officers attended courses in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Greece. By 1950, this number dropped to three Army officers and a Foreign Service Officer (FSO).

17 “Program in Near Eastern Studies: A Descriptive Statement, Princeton University Department of Oriental Languages and Literature, 1951,” RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP.
temporarily, warped in direction by wartime developments.”

However, thanks to wartime programs like the ASTP and the Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), Hall noted that there had been an “acceleration in and enthusiasm for area studies.” Because research by government agencies was organized by regions during the war, it served to introduce some scholars to the area approach. Although it served to inspire a number of scholars, Hall argued that the “makeshift” approach to instruction in area studies and languages by the wartime programs was actually detrimental to the field’s development. While languages were generally well taught, Hall stated bluntly that “the wartime program is certainly not to be taken as the model for a liberal education or for training or for research.” He added, “No campus was found in the course of this survey where any important residue of personnel or materials remains from the war programs relating to special areas.”

Rather, Hall observed that the wartime programs had left a legacy of bitterness and opposition on some campuses. This was particularly true of those universities with existing area programs, as they lost a significant number of faculty members to government agencies and the military. These losses were compounded by government awards to the same institutions to administer ASTP and CATS programs. The dearth of instructors meant that many wartime programs were taught by instructors without the appropriate qualifications. In addition, a large number of faculty members were either killed during the war or decided to continue working for the government, leaving a significant gap in skilled professors who could establish and direct area programs. As a result, Hall argued that “some of the opposition to postwar area programs was traceable” to the wartime experience.

The loss of personnel was exacerbated by the lack of institutional support within the universities for area studies. Hall stated that many of the pre-war area programs were operated as a “labor of love,” where faculty members were “convinced of the inherent value of the area approach” and “had learned to work together and to benefit from each other’s experience.” However, in these programs, “no one person had the responsibility or authority to make good the losses as they occurred, or to plan and provide for the future.” In order for area programs to be successfully instituted, Hall asserted that enhanced legislative and budgetary support would be required.

Hall called for a national area studies program that would incrementally achieve global coverage. This approach was necessary because “in terms of the national good, we must not gamble.” Not only was it uncertain where America would face the “next great crisis,” but world coverage would also benefit academia. However, since consistent quality across all regions could not be developed, Hall argued that the “critical” areas should be targeted first based on several considerations like their “relative power” and “level of culture existing in an area.” He noted that once coverage of “important areas” was achieved the U.S. should “move rapidly

20 Robert Hall, *Area Studies: With Special Reference to their Implications for Research in the Social Sciences* (New York: Social Science Research Council, May 1947): 12. Hall claimed that the origins of area studies could be found in the classics, where the combination of studying languages with literature, history, and geography offered students as comprehensive a view of the ancient world as possible. While he conceded that modern area studies were different, Hall stated that “the way of life in most parts of the modern world is as similar to our own as was that of the ancient Mediterranean lands, if not actually more similar.”

21 Ibid., 17-18.
22 Ibid., 18-19.
23 Ibid., 45.
toward filling out the map.” Hall offered a quick overview of existing area programs by region. He stated that that the Near East was “completely neglected” with a small number of scholars who had relevant language skills but were not knowledgeable about the region.

To help coordinate area research nationally, Hall called for the creation of a national organization affiliated with a quasi-governmental organization, similar to the relationship between the Smithsonian Institution and the Ethnogeographic Board during the war. He argued that it could serve as a “recording center” that would maintain a list of area research being conducted in the U.S. and a current list of experts as well as existing centers for area studies. Hall also wanted the center to distribute “certain limited types of area information,” similar to what was easily available in Washington. However, instead of a quasi-governmental organization as advocated by Hall, the national security establishment was already in the process of developing an agency to serve as a coordinating body for research on foreign areas.

Foreign Area Intelligence & Academia

The External Research Staff (ERS) was created in late 1947 ostensibly to coordinate between the State Department and universities, foundations, and research organizations. Considered a division within the State Department, the ERS was actually a joint effort with the CIA. Although it remained part of the State Department, by 1953 its costs were assumed by the Agency and the Department of Defense (DOD). ERS had three key responsibilities. First, in keeping with NSC ID4, ERS monitored and collected foreign area research from different scholars, organizations, and research institutions. Second, it communicated the “research and policy interests and requirements of the U.S. government” to research institutions and scholars. Finally, ERS monitored government-funded research by external organizations for all government agencies.

In spite of minimal staffing, Evron Kirkpatrick, the first head of ERS, quickly established contacts with other relevant government agencies and departments. He also met with the leading foundations, academic societies, and professional organizations within weeks of ERS’s creation. For the latter group this included the Rockefeller and Mellon Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation, as well as the SSRC, the ACLS, the American Political Science Association, and the NRC.

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24 Ibid., 82-83.
25 Ibid., 50-68, 81-84. Hall noted that Princeton had “both plans and some resources” for the Near East.
26 Ibid., 85.
27 “Armstrong to Smith,” 1 April 1953, RG 59, Entry 1439, Box 68, NARACP.
28 “Bureau of Intelligence and Research Semi-Annual Report to the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, Final Draft,” 23 April 1959, RG59, Entry 1595, Box 1, NARACP.
29 E.M. Kirkpatrick, “Report of the Joint State-CIA External Research Staff for the period August 1-November 30, 1948,” 4 January 1949, RG 59, Entry 1434, Box 2, NARACP. In his first six weeks as chief of ERS, Kirkpatrick contacted departments within State Department Intelligence and the CIA, Social Science Division of the Office of Education, Army and Air Force intelligence, the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the National Security Resources Board, and the Research and Development Board of the National Military Establishment (later Department of Defense), and the Library of Congress’ Foreign Area Committee and the Legislative Reference Service.
30 Ibid. ERS also made contact with a number of individuals connected with the wartime intelligence agencies including Allen Dulles, future Director of the CIA, and A.W. Schmidt and Allen Scaife, both former OSS members and part of the extended Mellon family.
In the fall of 1948, Kirkpatrick and his colleague Harold Penniman visited almost a dozen universities, including Yale, Harvard, Georgetown, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins. While the conversations with university faculty and administrators focused initially on obtaining research related to Europe and the Soviet Union, ERS was also interested in other foreign areas. In addition to providing the State Department and associated intelligence agencies with the requested research, the universities asked for help in identifying topics and areas for future research programs and projects.

At Yale, Pennimen met with key faculty members. This included Frederick Dunn, director of the Institute of International Studies, Percy Corbett, head of the Political Science Department, S.B. Jones, director of Graduate Studies in Foreign Areas, and William T.E. Fox, then editor of *World Politics*. Yale’s Institute of International Studies had preexisting ties to the American foreign policy establishment. In his examination of the integral role played by Yale scholars and alumni in the OSS and the CIA, historian Robin Winks asserted that the Institute for International Studies was “one of the two best sources for intelligence information on Yale’s campus” during the war. Professors Dunn and Corbett were members of a luncheon group, organized by political science professor Arnold Wolfers, that included other prominent Yale scholars and visiting fellows. According to Winks, Wolfers was Yale’s main conduit to the State Department. He visited Washington every two weeks and communicated regularly with Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State. The luncheons eventually expanded into a faculty seminar entitled “Where is the World Going?” that discussed issues important to the State Department. From this seminar, Wolfers created study groups that specifically addressed problems the State Department was attempting to resolve. In addition, Dunn would frequently travel abroad on behalf of the State Department.

During the September and October 1948 meetings, Pennimen reported that “all who attended the meeting supported the [ERS] program.” In a memorandum sent after the meeting, Professor Jones offered to “do research of value to the intelligence offices if the Branch and Division chiefs” would provide “a list of topics to the agencies” through the ERS. Like Jones, other attendees dispatched copies of their manuscripts and graduate student papers, while Professor

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31 Ibid. Pennimen also met with professors Gabriel Almond, Bernard Brodie, Cecil Driver, Andrew Gyorgy, and Klaus Knorr.
32 Winks, 40-41. It should be noted that Yale’s William Fox and Gabriel Almond, a former political science professor at Yale and Stanford, objected to Winks’s characterization of Yale’s Institute of International Studies. Responding to a review of *Cloak & Gown* in the *New York Times*, Almond and Fox stated in their letter to the editor that during World War II the Institute was “a tiny group of international relations scholars engaged in unclassified research on questions they believed would lead to better American foreign policy in the postwar world” and that the Institute’s members were “independent scholars each working on a project of his or her choosing. No institute project dealt with anything that by the remotest stretch of the imagination could be described as ‘wartime intelligence’. No project was financed by the government and none was based on classified sources.” They added that the Institute “was not a group of scholars in Mr. Winks’s secret war. The most that can be said is that, like many other Yale professors, those in the institute who could did help some graduating Yale seniors make their brains as well as their bodies available for the war effort. They could hardly have done less.” Almond and Fox chastised Winks for not attempting to interview former members who were still alive asserting that “gossip that tarnishes the reputation of distinguished deceased Yale professors is no substitute for accurate information readily available from key participants.” Winks replied that he did not state that the Institute was “converted to the purposes of intelligence” and that his discussion of its wartime activities was limited to “the context of policy studies that were of value to the State Department.” Gabriel Almond and William T.R. Fox, “Yale at War,” *New York Times* 20 September 1987.
Fox offered to send the ERS manuscripts submitted to *World Politics* or other journals for publication.33

Like Yale, the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced and International Studies (SAIS) had a preexisting relationship with the State Department. After meeting with the ERS, SAIS agreed to expand these contacts, including providing the group with a biographical statement of each student, a list of a current research underway at the school, and copies of completed research papers. In return, SAIS “expressed a strong desire to have lists of basic research desired on various foreign areas to serve as a guide in the direction of their program.”34

Georgetown and Harvard’s Russian Research Center were also eager to cooperate. In a meeting with Father Yates, then Chairman of Georgetown’s Political Science Department and Acting Dean of the Graduate School, he agreed to aid the ERS “in any way he could.” This included making all Ph.D. and M.A. theses available to “the intelligence agencies” through the ERS. Father Yates also requested that research topics be provided when not prohibited by “security needs.” Georgetown also provided a report on research on foreign areas conducted at the school in 1948.

Similarly at Harvard, Clyde Kluckhohn, then Director of the Russian Research Center, agreed to cooperate on “basic research” and requested a list of topics from the ERS. Professor Kluckhohn also agreed to provide any completed research to the ERS.35

Kirkpatrick also detailed the reports that were produced and collected by ERS on area programs and distributed to the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) and the Office of Research Evaluation (ORE). This included area programs at universities and research institutes in the U.S., and a report focusing on programs and research specifically related to the Near East. In addition, as part of its coordination with universities and private foundations, the ERS arranged for the OIR and the ORE, to interview scholars returning from travels abroad from research or study trips. These interviews were based, in part, on a list of scholars with research projects funded by the SSRC.36

However, the information gathering was not one-way. The ERS also supplied declassified reports to universities, research libraries and scholars, including reports from the field and a bibliography service “on special subjects for research workers engaged in projects of interest to

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34 Ibid. The report stated that “continuing contact has been maintained with SAIS under the agreement negotiated some time ago.” Although it notes that the agreement is attached, it was apparently not declassified by the State Department, and I was unable to find a copy at the U.S. archives or those of SAIS. It also recorded receipt of five papers from SAIS, ranging in topics from “Wool as a World Problem” to “Trans-Jordan from ‘mandate’ to ‘independence’ 1918 to 1947.”
35 Ibid., Kirkpatrick cited six reports collected from the Russian Research Center on topics related to the Soviet Union, including economic and resource issues. It should be noted that Kluckhohn apparently had a change of heart about collaborating with governmental agencies and resigned from Harvard’s Russian Research Center in 1954. Laura Nader writes that “I never heard why he resigned and he never spoke of his resignation. No other anthropologist subsequently joined the center.” See Laura Nader, “The Phantom Factor: Impact of the Cold War on Anthropology,” 112-113.
36 Kirkpatrick noted how Yale Professor Henry Wells was debriefed by the ORE and OIR after returning from an SSRC funded research project in the Philippines. Wells “loaned extensive notes” to the ERS and agreed to provide the group with a draft of the study before it was published.
the intelligence agencies.” Kirkpatrick noted that “these services, as well as other aid and assistance given to scholars, not only creates good will but serves to improve the character of research done and to make the product more useful.”

Planning for the Cold War in the Middle East

Writing from Beirut on a cold April morning in 1949, Mortimer Graves was struggling with how best to create a program in Near East language training and area studies in the United States. Graves, then Administrative Secretary of the ACLS, explained to John Marshall of the Rockefeller Foundation that “every suggestion for the stimulation of Near Eastern studies begins with the demand for more and better language teaching, and we simply do not have the materials for such teaching.” He noted that because of the ACLS’s “war experience” it was better suited to administer the proposed language programs in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.

Graves’s interest and involvement with Near Eastern studies predated the war and he was a key figure at the ACLS in attempting to reform and revise Oriental studies in America. As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1944 Graves began coordinating with key scholars in order to plan for postwar area studies programs. By 1948, Graves and the ACLS were coordinating with the SSRC to develop a multi-disciplinary, long-range program focused on the modern Near East. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, Graves’s trip was to examine the existing educational institutions in the region and the possibility of their collaboration with their American counterparts.

The ACLS’s newly formed Committee on Near Eastern Studies was comprised of the leading American figures in the field, a number of whom served with the OSS in the region during the war. This included Harvard’s Richard Frye, Nelson Glueck of the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR) and Hebrew Union College, University of Pennsylvania’s E.A. Speiser, and Princeton’s Walter Livingston Wright. The Committee also had several representatives from the State Department including, Harold Glidden, Sidney Glazer, Edwin Wright, and Halford

37 Ibid; “Publications of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,” 9 April 1959, RG59, Entry 1595, Box 3; “Bureau of Intelligence and Research Semi-Annual Report to the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, Final Draft,” 23 April 1959, RG59, Entry 1595, Box 1, NARACP. By 1952, ERS was responsible for producing several reports distributed to policymakers. This included “External Research,” an unclassified compilation of social science research on foreign areas that “serve as a quid pro quo for scholars who provide the Department with considerable intelligence information through the External Research program.” The collected information was shared within the government as well as with individual scholars, university libraries, and faculty members. A second report entitled “External Research Papers,” were reproductions of scholarly research made available to State Department officials. Depending on the information, these reports were either classified as “Official Use Only” or unclassified. The ERS also produced and distributed a third report named “External Research Papers and Memorandum,” that were generally unclassified summaries of academic conferences and other relevant events in the social sciences distributed to policymakers and government officials. Finally, ERS developed a report entitled “Government-Sponsored Research on Foreign Areas.” Classified as “Secret” and distributed within the intelligence establishment, these reports detailed government funded research “on foreign areas and with psychological and unconventional warfare.” The reports were designed to “facilitate the planning and utilization” of the research.

38 “Graves to Marshall,” 15 April 1949, Record Group 1.2, Series 200 R, Box 263, RFA.
39 “Committee on Problems and Policy Agenda and Minutes,” 13-14 September 1948, SSRC, Accession 2, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA.
Other prominent members included Princeton’s Hitti, Chicago’s John Wilson, and William F. Albright of Johns Hopkins and ASOR. Tasked with surveying and evaluating existing facilities in the U.S. and recommending improvements, the Committee’s final report was published in 1949. Curiously, although the committee boasted an illustrious panel of scholars, the report was drafted by Glazer and Hopkins of the State Department and Myron Bement Smith, Acting Secretary of the ACLS and Fellow of the Library of Congress in Islamic Archeology and Near Eastern History.

The ACLS report stated that the Near East was important not only for its rich historical past which linked it to the achievements of the Western world, but the modern geo-political realities of the Cold War. Located adjacent to the Soviet Union, which the report noted was “a civilization competing with our own for world leadership,” the region is situated along “the world’s most important transportation routes in peace and war.” In addition, the Near East’s “possession of fabulous wealth in oil ensure that Americans will have to make many decisions affecting the peoples of that area.” It asserted, “Without widely diffused knowledge of the Near East, public understanding of the issues involved is impossible. Without competent experts in universities, in the professions, and in government, there will be no way to enlighten the public.”

Acknowledging that European dominance in the field could not be surpassed overnight, the ACLS offered short- and long-term programs that would set the stage for more expansive growth in the future. At the core of the ACLS’s plan was the creation of language and field training programs and associated fellowships. Unlike the existing programs and associated funding, the Council argued that new fellowships were needed for an “understanding of the problems of the modern Near East, their historical developments, and -- most important of all -- what the best Near Eastern minds are thinking about their problems and the world’s.” The ACLS also advocated the creation of a translation program focused on major texts from the region and

Sidney Glazer served as Acting Chief of the State Departments International Broadcasting Division-Near East Section, Harold Glidden was a researcher for the Near East and Africa Division of the State Department’s OIR, Halford Hoskins was a former consultant to the State Department for the Middle East during World War II and future director of SAIS. He also served on the Editorial Board of the Middle East Journal. Edwin Wright was Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Acting Director of the Middle East Institute.


Ibid., 6-10. Although no precise definition of the “Near East” was given, the report noted a lack of expertise based on geography and language. Geographically it stated that the U.S. needed scholars for “the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, North Africa (exclusive of Egypt), and Ethiopia. The shortage of language specialists was even more pronounced with a need for “Berber, Kurdish, Persian dialects, Pashto, Urdu, Turkish dialects, Caucasian languages, Ethiopic, and Arabic dialects.” (10)

Ibid., 6-7.

Ibid., 17, 32. The Council suggested a three-year, seven-step program that would cost $500,000. However, the ACLS cautioned that the suggested interim program would not promote research directly. Instead, it would help establish the foundations for future research. Stating that “only when we have more in trained personnel and more of the adequate implements can we begin to put research on the modern Near East in its proper place in higher education.”

Ibid., 18-20. Building on Graves’s suggestions to the Rockefeller Foundation, the ACLS proposed that it should have a central role in the language program, including the preparation of the training materials, for Arabic, Persian and Turkish.

establishing an administrative center to coordinate between the humanities and social science related to the Near East. While the Council believed that creating separate university-based Near East Departments was preferable, it argued that it would be undesirable in the short-term.47

The ACLS’s long-term goal was for the U.S. to become the world leader in Near Eastern scholarship. This was to be achieved through Near East representation in relevant university departments, the creation of university centers for area training and research, establishing American research centers in the region, and education outside of the university setting. Establishing university-based centers was considered vital to advancing American scholarship on the region. Similarly, overseas research centers were seen as benefiting the United States as well as the host countries, where they might one day be absorbed into the national universities. Should this occur, the report boasted it would be “another and crowning contribution of American education to these countries.”48 In spite of the ambitious goals, the ACLS program was quite modest, particularly in comparison with the European efforts it profiled. Although the program discussed direct government funding for Near East studies in the U.K., the Council did not explicitly advocate such a program. Indeed, in listing how the U.S. could benefit from studying European programs direct government funding was not mentioned.49

A year later, Mortimer Graves addressed a Harvard conference on “The Near East and the Great Powers.” His talk, “A Cultural Relations Policy in the Near East,” argued that government intervention was required if American universities were to reorient from a Western European perspective to one focused on the entire world. Graves asserted that such a shift could only occur with the “expenditure of large social capital,” which was only possible through the support and use of government funds. While he acknowledged the contribution of private foundations, Graves likened it to venture capital which served to indicate the best approach “when the real money is available.” As a result, the foundations could not achieve the task alone.50

In developing a cultural relations policy for the Near East, Graves called for a program that would replicate the relationship between Europe and America. He suggested that a successful program would have three components. First, an increase in the number of Americans with “fundamental knowledge” of the region, in particular “Near Eastern thought and aspirations.” Second, the adoption of a global world view in academia. Finally, it would provide for an enhanced appreciation of the “American picture itself.” For this to be achieved and for Americans to have a better comprehension of the region, he argued that there must be an understanding of the two major competing forces for “the American idea” in the Near East:

47 Ibid., 20-23, 27-31. The ACLS argued that a separate Near East department might become “something abnormal, remote, esoteric, even slightly unwholesome in the minds of the rest of the university and thus ineffective in the general academic ensemble.” Second, the ACLS believed it would take ten years to achieve such an outcome due to the required preparation and training. Thus, the ACLS argued incorporating Near East specialization into existing university departments would be quick and cost-effective.
48 Ibid., 33-38.
49 Ibid., 1-4. In the report’s forward, Charles Odegaard, Executive Director of the ACLS, stated that the proposed program was possible to achieve and that the necessary resources were available domestically. He called for a “central plan” that drew upon the U.S.’s academic and educational resources in conjunction with the government, private foundations and business interests that would form the “basis for coordinated effort in understanding the Near East peoples.”
Islam and Communism. Graves stated that “Americans that understand neither are at a terrible handicap when they try to explain what the American way has to offer in competition.” Graves concluded with the warning that without these components American attempts to develop the region without understanding its myriad of problems would “do more harm than good.”

Although the United States considered the Middle East vital and strategic to its national interests, that determination had yet to be challenged by the Soviet Union. Thus, the need for Middle East expertise remained a secondary priority in the early post-Cold War period as Washington’s attention was focused initially on thwarting Soviet influence in Western Europe and then East Asia. However, the Korean conflict served to stimulate interest in the U.S. government and academia in developing expertise across all regions of the globe.

Korea and the National Emergency

Early Sunday morning on June 25, 1950, an artillery barrage across the 38th parallel initiated the Korean War. Within days the United Nations (UN) would authorize creation of a force to repel the invading North Korean army. By late October, UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel and captured Pyongyang. After repeated warnings over the previous months that they would intervene, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River on November 2. Earlier in the year, President Truman approved NSC 68, which advocated for a more aggressive containment policy of Communism. China’s entry into the Korean conflict convinced the American policy makers behind NSC 68 that their description of the Soviet Union as an expansionist power with designs for world domination was accurate. In order to thwart Soviet designs, NSC 68 called for a dramatic increase in military spending.

As UN forces were advancing up the Korean peninsula in September, the State Department began addressing its lack of area experts. Led by the FSI, the key concern was to maintain the small number of language and area specialists in the event of “full mobilization.” The FSI organized meetings with representatives of the NSRB, the armed services, and colleges and universities, in order to “discuss the unanimous concern over the critical shortage of qualified specialists who would be needed to conduct cross cultural (language and area) training, especially for Asia and Eastern Europe, in the event of a national emergency.” Because language and area specialists had yet to be classified by the NSRB on the list of “Critical Occupations,” the State Department feared that they could potentially be assigned to “unrelated or less crucial work.” Should a national emergency emerge, the State Department argued that a unified language training program, likely under the auspices of DOD, would be needed. In the interim, the training programs should remain intact. This included the FSI’s courses as well as those by university language-and-area programs for foreign service and intelligence officers.

51 Ibid., 78-79. In response to Graves’s talk, Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussed the competing priorities for the attention of Congress and the broader American public. After listing the numerous issues that Congress addressed since the end of World War II, Wilcox noted that Congress typically only responds to issues when there is a crisis, as in Palestine, or when presented with a matter by the Executive branch. He stated that “the Near East is one of the important areas of the world which has been neglected in congressional thinking, and how to stimulate interest in the Congress with respect to this area is a difficult problem.”


The State Department asserted that it was “important that all of these groups be left intact because they are already serving the national defense and because they should be available as functioning units to be taken over by the military” during a national emergency.\(^{54}\)

In the wake of the Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict, UN coalition forces retreated back across the 38\(^{\text{th}}\) parallel. Meanwhile, the State Department attempted to address an anticipated need for area experts once the Cold War turned hot across multiple fronts. By the end of the year, Foggy Bottom proposed a language and area training conference designed to achieve several key objectives. The first was to assist government planning and coordination for its “direct interest in the language-area field,” in particular determining the gap between anticipated needs and available training resources. The second objective was to evaluate available university-based training and determine if and how they should be expanded for programs that combined language, geography, economics, and psychology for “government administrators, operators and observers in foreign areas.” The third was to plan for a central agency that would coordinate with the universities for the expansion of area programs. The fourth objective was to gather and benefit from the experiences of organizations and institutions involved with language and area training, including universities, research councils, and foundations. Finally, the conference was to determine the feasibility of registering and classifying language experts, collect and develop teaching materials, and promoting research in foreign areas.\(^{55}\)

While the federal government attempted to determine how it would promote and sustain language and area training, American universities used the opportunity to remind Washington of their value. Writing from Princeton, Hitti informed the State Department, “Our department stands ready in this national emergency to cooperate to the utmost limits of its resources with any agencies in Washington, civilian and military, in providing basic training in the languages and areas of the Arab Moslem world.”\(^{56}\) Two months later the University of Michigan dispatched a similar letter to the State Department. University Provost James Adams called attention to “the contribution the University could make in the present emergency.” Accompanying the letter was a report entitled, “The University of Michigan is Ready to Serve in the National Emergency,” which detailed the different ways the university could assist the U.S. government with a specific emphasis on its “Area Training Programs.”\(^{57}\) Indeed, the initial outreach by these universities was just the beginning of extensive contacts between academia and the foreign and intelligence establishments which would continue and expand during the early Cold War period.

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\(^{54}\) “Hawkins to Martin,” 27 September 1950, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. Emphasis added.

\(^{55}\) “Language and Area Training Conference,” 27 December 1950, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. A number of government departments were to attend including, the State Department, DOD, CIA, NSRB, Labor, Commerce, and the Office of Education. Other proposed attendees included the ACLS, the Ford Foundation, the Library of Congress, and the American Council on Education.

\(^{56}\) “Hitti to McGhee,” 19 December 1950, RG59, Central Decimal File, 880.412/12-1950, NARACP.

\(^{57}\) “Adams to Smith,” 5 February 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP. Adams letter was a follow-up to an earlier meeting between university representatives and Colonel R.J. Will, Chief, Individual Training Division, Professional Education Branch, U.S. Air Force. Will informed the university representatives that “in the future” the State Department would be looking for “training facilities” in some of the languages taught at Michigan. At the time, Michigan offered area studies programs for Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Persia as well as for Central Europe and countries in East Asia.
The National Need

By February 1951, the State Department was considering an informal SSRC proposal for expanding university-based area studies programs. Under a heading proclaiming, “THE NATIONAL NEED,” the proposal stated that “in the present crisis” the U.S. was “faced with the urgent need of specialists with knowledge of the languages and peoples of major world areas and competent to work on economic, political or social problems of these regions.” It noted that key government departments required these trained personnel in particular, the State Department, the DOD, and the CIA. The SSRC asserted that existing university-based programs could be utilized to meet this need, stating that the facilities could be doubled in size and “put to more intensive use.” Because of the likelihood that existing area specialists would quickly be recruited by government agencies they would be unavailable to train a larger and younger cohort.58

The SSRC proposed that the Federal government fund the training of 1,000 area specialists over three years. Using the Council as the coordinating body, an eight-man board of leading specialists from participating universities would be established that would set standards and coordinate activities. The board would assign the number of seats per training class at each participating university and would also select the trainees. Training was to be modeled on doctoral programs with two years of university-based course work and a third year in the field. Course work would range from language training and general area background to specialized coursework and research. Depending on their status, students would require a deferment from Selective Service or from DOD during the training period. The cost of the three year program was estimated to be $15.5 million, including instruction costs, living stipends, and travel.59

Although the State Department considered the SSRC proposal to be “highly desirable and in the national interest,” it required improvements. Foggy Bottom shared the SSRC’s fears that the existing cohort of college and university language and area training staffs would be “dissipated” by the national emergency unless existing centers received a “reasonable flow of students or trainees.” However, the proposed military deferments for graduate study were deemed unlikely and the State Department believed the proposal would require the support of DOD and the Selective Service. Moreover, in the absence of a national policy on deferments, the State Department staff asserted that language and area studies would be competing with the physical sciences, which were perceived to have stronger support in the military and Congress.60 In order to bypass the deferment issue, the State Department proposed expanding language and area training for existing government employees rather than adopting the SSRC’s focus on university students. While it acknowledged that this would not totally resolve the deferment issue, it

58 “Staats to Smith,” “Informal meeting to discuss program training of area specialists,” March 1951; “SSRC Proposal: A Project for Training Area Specialists,” 19 January 1951, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
59 Ibid., Coverage was to be provided for all world areas with the majority of positions assigned to “critical regions.” Of the 1,000 trainees, 250 would be for the Soviet Union, 200 for the “Far East,” and 150 for Central and Western Europe.” A hundred trainees each were designated for “South Asia,” “Southeast Asia,” and the “Middle East,” 60 for “Latin America” and 40 for “Africa.” Each region would have a national or other type of sub-division where some students would be assigned based on academic discipline, which included sociology, political science, economics, anthropology, psychology, history, and linguistics. The SSRC’s board would determine the actual number of trainees per discipline based on “the national need.” For training for the Middle East region, the SSRC identified the centers at Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, Michigan, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins.
60 “Staats to Smith: Informal meeting to discuss program training of area specialists,” March 1951; “Webb to Staats, 6 March 1951, “Department of State Staff Study,” (undated), RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
believed that this could be performed based on occupation rather than a blanket post-graduate education deferment.

The second obstacle, and a key requirement to meet the required number of area specialists, was the provision for Congressional funding. In discussing the SSRC proposal, State Department personnel acknowledged that Congress had “traditionally been conservative with respect to Federal grants for education.” Moreover, the State Department’s staff study of the SSRC proposal noted that those representing the program before Congress “must be able to refute successfully the charge that the program is designed to foster an ‘aristocracy of brains’ at the taxpayer’s expense while the average young American is required to don a uniform.” Regardless of Federal funding, the Department emphasized that “full use should be made of funds supplied by foundations,” in particular the Ford Foundation. 61

In notifying the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), the State Department specifically referenced the SSRC proposal. It stated that the training program was “designed to meet the urgent need for specialists” by key national security agencies “for work essential to the national interest.” The letter asserted that:

With its responsibility for effective diplomacy in the present “cold war,” the Department feels that it must have in the universities educational programs which will produce the kind of trained specialists needed for work in critical areas of the world. Such specialists are no less vital to the national interest than highly trained physical scientists. Consequently, we believe existing facilities for language and area instruction should be both maintained and if possible strengthened to meet this national need. 62

This statement was reinforced by the accompanying State Department staff study. The study stated that the U.S.’s leadership in the Cold War and its increased global commitments had “placed a high premium on persons who can speak and read the difficult languages involved, who possess expert knowledge about the critical areas of the world, and who can interpret the interrelated facts of economics, politics, culture, and geography.” It added that “it must be assumed that the Soviet Union has placed as much importance on this vital cog in its foreign affairs machine as it has on machinery for disseminating propaganda.” 63

Once the program was instituted, the State Department wanted “adequate provisions” to ensure the “security and loyalty fitness” of those students receiving government funds. It also wanted more departmental input into the students selected for training to ensure that they would meet the different employment requirements of the various agencies invested in the program. In particular, for employment with the State Department “a premium would be placed on securing well-rounded individuals willing to serve abroad and able to represent the United States in its foreign relations.” Moreover, the staff study asserted that training should be “more closely related to the specific needs of the end user.” 64

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. The letter specifically noted the agencies in need of specialists were the DOD, CIA, and State Department.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
In detailing the acute shortage of area specialists facing the federal government and the foreign policy establishment in particular, Robert Clark, the Director of the NSRB’s Manpower Office explained that the dearth of expertise was most pronounced in the “Asiatic areas.” After detailing specific shortages in knowledge of Asian languages, Clark stated that “our manpower resources in understanding and dealing effectively with Middle Eastern countries are inadequate in the extreme.” He noted that there were only eight to ten universities in the U.S. that offered area and language training and these were “staffed with a bare minimum of competent specialists.” This was compounded by the fact that many of the specialists were foreign born and could not qualify for the appropriate security clearances.65

The lack of expertise was further exacerbated by the even greater dearth of knowledge about the actual requirements of the government agencies and what resources were available nationwide. Clark stated that the “only comprehensive requirements estimates” were those of the ACLS’s Graves, who conceded they were “to a very considerable degree arbitrary.” In spite of this limitation, Clark explained that Graves’s projections were based on “his own knowledge and extensive contact with the departments of government using such personnel.”66 Clark issued a stark warning, asserting that “in contrast with the bleak resource outlook in this highly important field, our requirements are already pressing and growing rapidly.” He added, “As our broad security programs develop, [the] need for specialists in foreign languages and cultures will be more urgently needed as advisors in policy formulation and execution, as administrators, as technicians in special problems, and as observers.”67

While the State Department was considering expanding language and area training, its own center was underutilized. By 1951, there were 30 FSOs enrolled in the FSI’s year-long language and area training program. According to the State Department staff study the actual number should have been 200 FSOs enrolled each year for the next four to five years. However, the staff study warned that this number could be achieved only “at the expense of crippling essential operations.” Moreover, FSI staff acknowledged that the institute could not meet the expected demand for specialists without an infusion of funding, additional support, and expansion of existing university-based centers.68

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65 “Clark to Flemming: Shortage of Language and Area Specialists,” 12 March 1951, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
66 Ibid., To provide coverage for all countries and regions, Graves’s estimated that a minimum of 1,200 language and area specialists would be needed. However, his figures ranged from country-specific estimates to those for broader and vaguely defined areas. For example, Graves stated that Iran and Turkey required 10 and 15 specialists respectively. Meanwhile, the “Western Mediterranean” and “Eastern Mediterranean” regions required 20 and 30 specialists respectively. Moreover, for the even vaguer, “Moslem World,” 30 specialists were needed. Clark quoted Graves stating that “after all the forced draft of a total global war and a decade of worldwide activity, we are not equipped with even an approximation of this minimum.”
67 Ibid., Clark noted that there were a number of other organizations in need of area specialists. This included the various missions and bodies of the UN. The creation of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and economic planning for Europe related to the Marshall Plan would also require language and area expertise, as would recently announced initiatives in East and Southeast Asia. Moreover, Clark stated that private agencies and companies had similar needs, although he conceded that not even a rough estimate of their requirements was available. In addition, Clark asserted that any action taken on the issue “requires close coordination of a number of federal agencies and several private groups.” This included the ACLS, SSRC, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the Carnegie Corporation.
68 Ibid.
Indeed, in a separate memorandum the FSI’s Acting Director Frank Hopkins reported that the institute’s training program was actually deteriorating rather than expanding. This was even more pronounced for Asia, where he observed that it was “difficult to get sufficient officers to express an interest in Asian specialization, and it is very difficult to make them available for training even when they display interest.” Hopkins believed that one benefit of an expanded government training program would be to reassure the universities, which were considering abandoning their Asian area studies programs due to a dearth of students.69

In offering his own training proposal, Hopkins claimed that it would “give the universities assurance that they could stay in the area training business.” He stated that the CIA, ECA, and DOD were also interested in maintaining the universities as “training centers as well as research centers to handle large volumes of important area research which have to be farmed out to the universities because of the lack of adequate government personnel.” Hopkins added that a Presidential letter was being prepared which authorized the State Department to “organize an inter-departmental committee to mobilize the various agencies for immediate joint action to utilize the university centers while they are still in existence, and thereby to preserve and maintain them in operation throughout the entire emergency period.”70

**Negotiating a Gentleman’s Agreement**

An “informal meeting” was held between key government and academic representatives on March 20, 1951.71 In general, the attendees were enthusiastic about the SSRC proposal. However, the major points of disagreement largely centered on the issues of who should be trained, where the personnel would be assigned, and how the program would be coordinated.72

Arguably the most influential figure attending the meeting was E. Pendelton Herring, then President of the SSRC and the first dean of Harvard’s School of Public Administration. Although there were vastly more powerful agencies in the room than the SSRC, many of the

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69 “Hopkins to Martin, Rowe, Jean, Dubrow, ‘Employ Young College Graduates and Enroll them in University-Language-and-Area Programs’,” 23 March 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.

70Ibid., In his proposal, Hopkins stated that over the next five years 280 FSOs “with varying degrees of expertise” would be needed in Asia and Eastern Europe. In addition, 100 to 200 area specialists per year for the research and geographic bureaus were required. Hopkins proposed recruiting 200 college graduates per year and then offering financial support for two years of university-based area training followed by work in the Foreign Service in their particular area. He added that the CIA and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) were considering a similar proposal because “there seems to be no way of getting language-and-area specialists except to hire promising people and train them.”

71 “Wood to Members of the World Area Research Committee, Second Progress Report on Project for Training Area Specialists,” 20 March 1951, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. Attendees included: Frank S. Hopkins (Chairman, Department of State), Henry Lee Smith, JR. (FSI. Department of State), Captain J.J. O’Donnell (U.S. Navy), Major Gordon D. Buckley (U.S. Army), Luther Evans (Library of Congress), Donald Stone (ECA), Robert Clark (NSRB), Col. Matthew Baird (Director of Training, CIA), Dr. James C. O’Brien (Assistant Commissioner, Office of Education, FSA), Elmer Staats (BOB), Charles Odegaard (Director, ACLS), and E. Pendleton Herring, Wendell Bennett, Bryce Wood (SSRC).

72 “Wood to Members of the World Area Research Committee, Second Progress Report on A Project for Training Area Specialists,” 20 March 1951, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. The meeting was chaired by Elmer Staats, Assistant Director of BOB, the meeting’s agenda was based on four documents: the SSRC proposal, the State Department staff study, the March 6, 1951 letter from Acting Secretary of State James Webb to Staats, and the March 12, 1951 memorandum from NSRB’s Clark to Dr. Flemming of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
government representatives were mid-level officials. In contrast, Herring was a major “academic power broker” who had helped to shape the postwar national security bureaucracy. His book, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms*, was published several months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and examined the tenuous balance between democratic governance and national security during wartime. Herring was given the opportunity to adapt his theory into policy while serving on a government committee that developed a plan for unifying the armed services. Under the leadership of Ferdinand Eberhardt, the former Vice–chairman of the War Productions Board, the committee’s plan eventually became the National Security Act of 1947.

The SSRC proposal bore all of the hallmarks of Herring’s corporatist philosophy, specifically that in a time of total war the national security institutions should be operated by “an administrative elite in government and by patriotic experts from the private sector through quasi-official advisory councils, commissions, and associations.” Herring argued that during wartime these groups would act as “national symphony,” balancing out their different and at times competing interests to achieve victory.73

Herring was joined by his colleague Yale Professor Wendell C. Bennett, an anthropologist who served on the Ethnogeographic Board during the war.74 Over the previous two years, Bennett conducted a follow-up to the 1947 Hall report on the status of area studies in the U.S. as part of the SSRC’s Committee on World Areas Research. The Council’s proposal was based on the findings of the new study.75

During the meeting, FSI’s Frank Hopkins reaffirmed the State Department’s belief that it was “essential” that existing university programs and personnel be maintained so that government personnel could be trained. He also acknowledged the different training needs between graduate students and government employees. Hopkins stated that the State Department supported the SSRC proposal for training graduate students and believed that the government agencies could coordinate their needs. Moreover, he advocated the creation of a small representative group to find solutions for the “difficult problems of finance and deferment.”76

In addition to Hopkins, the most enthusiastic government representative was Colonel Matthew Baird, the CIA’s Director of Training. Baird stated that he had a “tremendous demand for the type of ‘end product’ envisaged in the SSRC proposal.” He added that while the Agency was “generally favorable” to the Council’s proposal, there were some reservations on the details. Still, it was “willing and ready to enter discussions for implementing the project.”77

74 Price, 98-99.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. Unlike the State Department and CIA, representatives from the armed services were mixed in their response to the SSRC proposal. Captain J.J. O’Donnell, then Chairman of DOD’s Committee on Educational Liaison, reported that the DOD Committee wanted to utilize area specialists but did not want to be actively involved in developing the program. While the Army believed the proposal was promising, it was already training 80 officers per year through its own specialized area and language program. In addition, as the SSRC proposal focused on civilians, the Army was more concerned with the personnel produced rather than the training process itself.
During the meeting, Herring emphasized the need to maintain some “seed corn” in the existing university-based area centers in order to train an even greater number of specialists in the future. He added that governmental action was needed by the spring if the area centers were to be maintained and strengthened. Herring’s assertions were supported by the ACLS’s Odegaaard, who stated that government coordination was “essential.” According to Odegaaard, the foundations which provided the initial funding for area centers were unable to finance their expansion. He stated that “the point had been reached where private foundations might turn away from this field.” In order to “retain interest on the part of the foundations, some indication of government interest must be shown.” Odegaaard added that there was a need not just for government officials but people “outside the government to direct the training” and “to engage in educational activities related to informing the general public.”

Responding to the concerns of Odegaaard and Herring, the CIA’s Colonel Baird suggested that since the participants were in agreement on the need for a training program, the conversation should shift towards determining if it was “practicable.” He added that the agency wanted a long-range plan and not a “one-shot” arrangement. Moreover, Baird stated that the CIA did not want to continue competing with other government agencies for training facilities.

Baird’s comments drew support from the SSRC’s Bennett and the BOB’s Staats. Bennett explained that the universities also wanted continuing programs. Staats concurred with the need for a long-term plan and suggested that the next step was to obtain a Presidential letter authorizing the State Department to lead the initiative and coordinate with the other agencies present at the meeting. The goal would be to draft legislation for the existing Congressional session in order to create a fellowship program for graduate students and government personnel. He noted that Congressional approval would be needed for the training of graduate students but not for government officials, and the interagency group would need to determine how much training could be completed under existing authorizations. Staats asserted that “the whole program should be looked at in terms of a long-range plan of research in the interests of our national security.” He added that a process needed to be developed “for utilizing most efficiently the best available talents both inside and outside the government” and suggested developing a roster of area specialists.

Representing the State Department’s ERS, Howard Pennimen urged the group to reach a “rapid decision.” He informed the participants that reserve officers from the staffs of area centers were being called up and that other teachers, particularly linguists, were being dismissed because of the expected drop in enrollments. Pennimen’s statements were reinforced by Herring who stated that “if there was not too much delay on the governmental side, the universities could start work immediately.” He added that “the next two months were critical both for making arrangements for faculty and materials, and for recruiting students.”

Colonel Baird of the CIA attempted to assuage Pennimen and Herring. He stated that if there was “a good possibility” of a program being created, he preferred “a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ by the representative agencies that they would refrain from recruiting members of the faculties of area centers.” Baird was supported by Staats, who stated that this would be incorporated into the

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
Presidential letter, which he believed would be signed by the end of the month. In the interim, he suggested that the Department of State convene informal meetings to explore “practical steps.”

The first informal inter-agency meeting was hosted by the FSI two days later. Although the government agencies believed the SSRC proposal was insufficient, the “national emergency” provided an exceptional opportunity to resolve the related problems of an insufficient number of specialists and training facilities with a single program. However, implementing the program would not be a trivial task. In spite of Colonel Baird’s hopes of a “gentleman’s agreement” in the previous meeting, the attendees agreed it would be difficult to prevent government agencies from raiding existing faculty at university area centers. FSI’s Frank Hopkins noted on his copy of the meeting agenda that “[the] State [Department] won’t raid but can’t be sure.” The attendees also believed it would be difficult to prevent reserve officers or area center faculty from being activated for military service. This latter issue was further complicated by a number of different groups attempting to make special arrangements to retain their staff.

To resolve these and other related issues, the attendees advocated creating an inter-agency committee that would serve as a “clearing house” for area training and research by government agencies. In addition, coordination through the committee could potentially minimize the raiding of university staff. However, the committee would not have authority over manpower-related issues, including student deferments, which remained the “main obstacle to the SSRC project.” Moreover, the attendees did not believe that the committee would be able to prevent government agencies from recruiting students already enrolled in area studies programs. The students might be employed and paid by a particular agency and then receive any additional training as identified by their employer. In addition, if a fellowship program was established through future legislation, working in government service for a certain period could be required for those awarded funding. It was estimated that in addition to current government employees being trained, if the university area centers produced 400-500 graduates per year they could be employed by various government agencies.

With the expectation that the necessary legislation would be delayed, the attendees suggested that the academic councils approach the Ford Foundation and other private foundations for interim funding. This would allow universities to begin planning for expanded enrollment. In particular, the FSI’s Hopkins viewed Ford funding as necessary for both the interim and a “nationwide buildup,” with “some subsidies from Congress or FSI and other agencies.”

Of particular importance to moving the program forward was the Presidential letter authorizing the State Department to establish an inter-agency committee. Other members of the committee would be the CIA, the armed services, the Office of Education, and the ECA. Although the manpower authorities had previously resisted the creation of similar committees,

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81 Ibid.
82 “Ad Hoc Committee on University Language-and-Area Training, Meeting Minutes, 22 March 1951,” RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
the attendees believed that it would “be of great value as a central point for the exchange of information within the government and between the government and the universities.”

A follow-up meeting was hosted by the SSRC a week later. Although the letter from President Truman was still pending, based on a circulated draft the attendees were aware that it would likely empower the State Department to lead the government’s effort in defining its area expertise requirements and training needs. However, Foggy Bottom was reluctant to take the lead in “a manpower program,” and wanted the interdepartmental agency to be chaired by another department, preferably the NSRB. FSI Director Hopkins informed the committee that the State Department was interested in the SSRC’s proposed program as well as area training for it own employees. He added that area training was “the sole interest” of the CIA and ECA. Combined with the State Department, these organizations would require 500 specialists per year for the next several years with the interdepartmental committee determining the need by area and specialty. He noted that the government agencies would provide grants-in-aid to universities to support the expansion of area studies facilities but that they could not underwrite student scholarships because they “could not be certain of securing the services of the students at the end of the training period.”

The inability to secure funding for graduate students made the SSRC proposal unfeasible. Representing the SSRC, Wendell Bennett stated that there was still a need for highly trained area specialists “both for the advancement of knowledge and the training of additional government personnel.” Bennett offered two possible alternatives. First, to train recent Ph.D.’s in the social sciences with the government agencies. After serving with a government agency they could then staff a university area center. The second proposal would “permit the employment of graduate students on research projects financed by contracts between government agencies and area centers.” Hopkins thought that the proposals “might be feasible” and suggested that Evron Kirkpatrick of the ERS serve as liaison for research contracts with the Department.

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85 Ibid.
86 “World Area Research Committee Meeting Minutes, 30 March 1951,” RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. Present at the meeting were members of the SSRC’s Committee on World Area Research: Robert B. Hall (Chairman, University of Michigan), Ralph L. Beals (University of California, Los Angeles), Wendell Bennett (Yale), W. Norman Brown (University of Pennsylvania), Donald C. McKay (Harvard), George Taylor (University of Washington), and Bryce Wood (SSRC). Also present were: Harold Deutsch (University of Minnesota), Philip Mosely (Columbia), David Mandelbaum (University of California, Berkeley), Lauriston Sharp, J. Milton Cowan, and L. Gray Cowan (Cornell University), Frank Hopkins and Harry Smith (FSI).
87 Ibid., In a March 29, 1951 memorandum to Elmer Staats, Assistant Director of BOB, Hopkins explained that safeguarding university-based area programs and producing area specialists fell under the NSRB’s purview of “conserving and building up precious manpower skills.” He added that the NSRB had “an official responsibility to look out for the whole national interest,” rather than just narrow interests of end-users like the State Department. Hopkins stated that the “vital and most difficult aspect of the whole problem is that of securing a reasonable degree of protection for language-and-area teachers and students from being called to military service during the critical and early period of scarcity of trained personnel.” Thus, the NSRB would serve as an impartial broker with the Selective Service and different military branches on behalf of the different agencies requiring agency specialists. “Hopkins to Staats,” 29 March 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., In a separate memorandum, Kirkpatrick noted that the different proposals for area training, including the research contracts were “right in line with our needs and with conversations that I have been having with the SSRC and university people.” “Kirkpatrick to Meloy,” 11 June 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
Yet representatives from the universities warned their government colleagues of the risk of relying on recent college graduates. Philip Mosely, an OSS veteran and professor of International Relations at Columbia University, was skeptical about the plans for training government employees. He stated that “there would be many misfits” if the agencies hired college seniors and that the program would be more expensive, as the government would be paying full salaries rather than fellowship stipends. Mosely also believed a fellowship program could be implemented faster than a program for training government employees, and urged the attendees not to abandon the SSRC proposal. Another “academic power-broker,” Mosely’s influence extended beyond Columbia, where he was also head of the Russian Institute. According to historian Bruce Cumings, Mosely was “one of the most important figures in Russian studies and U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s.” While the other university representatives concurred with Mosely’s assessment, they argued that research contracts could serve a similar purpose as fellowships. In addition, the representatives from the government agencies believed that if selection for the training program was similar to the process for entering the Foreign Service it would mitigate the risk of recruiting poor candidates directly from college.

The Bennett Survey of Area Studies in America

As previously noted, when discussions between the SSRC and the State Department, began the Council was conducting a follow-up study on the state of area studies in the United States. Led by Yale’s Wendell Bennett, the SSRC initiated the study in 1949 after a meeting of university presidents sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. The study was near completion by the spring of 1951, however, the government’s ad hoc committee meetings led to additional data collection. Authored by Bennett and published in June, Area Studies in American Universities, contained revised versions of the information presented to the ad hoc committee. However, the Bennett report generalized the collected data

90 Ibid.
91 Cumings, “Boundary Displacement,” 271-275. Mosely was Director of Studies for the Council on Foreign Relations (1955-1963), and was an active member of the American Political Science Association and served on several of the Ford Foundation’s boards and committees.
92 “World Area Research Committee Meeting Minutes,” 30 March 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
93 Wendell C. Bennett, Area Studies in American Universities (New York: SSRC, June 1951 ): v. The universities represented at the meeting were: Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, University of North Carolina, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Stanford, Tulane, Vanderbilt, University of Washington (Seattle), University of Wisconsin, and Yale.
94 “World Area Research Committee Meeting Minutes,” 30 March 1951; “Social Science Research Council Survey of Area Centers,” 15 May 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. To assist with initial planning for the training program, representatives of the different universities were asked to provide information on the current and recent graduate students at their respective area centers. After determining that the initial data collected by the university representatives was insufficient, the ad hoc committee requested the SSRC complete a more in-depth survey. Census data from 40 area centers in 24 universities was compiled and distributed to members of the government’s ad hoc committee in May 1951.
95 Bennett, vi. Bennett noted in the report’s preface that “detailed results of the census are on file” in the SSRC’s Washington office. He added that “six tabular summaries of the information have been prepared, which with slight modifications served as the basis for the tables in this report.” Two of the tables, “Table V” and “Table VI,” containing the detailed information on graduate students were partially summarized on page 15.
and did not publish the university-specific information shared with the ad hoc committee.\textsuperscript{96} Widely considered a landmark report on area studies in the United States prior to the passage of the NDEA, the influence of government agencies on the Bennett study has never been discussed.\textsuperscript{97}

Government influence should come as no surprise, however, as the dual purpose of the SSRC’s data collection and reporting was an inherent characteristic of its involvement in area studies dating to the Second World War. In the report’s preface, Bennett stated that the SSRC’s Committee on World Area Research “has given continuing consideration to the government’s interests in area-trained personnel for the execution of its numerous, large scale international programs.” He added, “The principal problem which faces the universities is how they can serve the government’s expanding need for personnel and the requirements for specialized area training programs without disrupting the highly important function of training research scholars.” Bennett claimed that a new study was required “as a basis for a sound national policy” and that “universities may be called upon to meet the increasing government needs” for area specialists.\textsuperscript{98}

In evaluating university programs, the SSRC placed an emphasis on what it defined as “integrated area programs.” These programs trained personnel and performed research on specific geographic areas by “integrating the specialized knowledge from many fields,” in order to focus “it on the problems of understanding the culture of the people of an area, and of estimating the capabilities and intentions of the nations involved.” The report identified key features of an integrated area program, including intensive language instruction, joint seminars, group research, compiling and use of specialized research materials, and drawing upon foreign instructors and students for language training and cultural insights. In addition, the programs

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., vi, 15, 20; “Social Science Research Council Survey of Area Centers,” 15 May 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. The data that was not published included detailed information collected on the citizenship status, gender, and military service status of graduate students by area of study. Similarly absent was an addendum listing the universities that reported their ability and capacity to expand their existing programs. Instead, Bennett’s report discussed figures submitted by the universities prior to the spring 1951 census. But this data was also sanitized, and only listed the total potential for additional graduate students by area and not by university. The universities reported the additional slots available with “existing staff or a slight increase.” For the “Near East,” Columbia and Michigan stated that they were able to expand by 48 and 20 to 30 students respectively. Columbia’s 48 new seats were divided equally between Israel, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The earlier report, which was also available to the Committee for review, stated that Princeton and Michigan could expand by nine slots each for a total of 45 seats. This figure was reproduced on Bennett’s page 20.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., vi. Further demonstrating the influence of the ad hoc committee on the final report, Bennett makes a special note of thanks to those “who participated actively in the survey,” and listed: Harold Deutsch (University of Minnesota), Philip Mosely (Columbia), David Mandelbaum (University of California, Berkeley), Lauriston Sharp and J. Milton Cowan (Cornell), Frank Hopkins and Harry Smith (FSI), all of whom were present at the March 30 meeting.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., v-3. Although the Bennett report did not specifically define the criteria for area specialists, the SSRC provided a detailed description to the ad hoc committee. It defined an area specialist as a “person possessing competence in any one of a large number of professional fields, such as agronomy, economics, or engineering, and who in addition has a special knowledge of the social, physical and linguistic features of a foreign country or region.” The SSRC differentiated specializations into two general categories. First were scholars with a professional doctoral degree in a discipline with a specialization on a particular region, the ability to read and speak in local languages and having conducted field research in the area. The second category was comprised of individuals with two years or less of graduate training and the ability to read the local language and add spoken language competence. In addition, the SSRC noted a third category of individuals who had some level of area training including military program or prior language instruction. RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, “Area Specialists,” undated.
combined elements of the humanities and social sciences for the “full comprehension of the life of peoples of another culture.”  

By June 1951, Princeton and Michigan had the only integrated area programs dedicated to the Near East. In addition, the SSRC identified five “potential area programs” at the University of Chicago, Columbia, Dropsie College, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Pennsylvania. However, the SSRC determined that none of these programs were “adequate to meet the anticipated demand for specialists in the area.” Particularly glaring was the continued emphasis on ancient rather than modern history. Bennett noted that Princeton and Michigan were attempting to improve their programs. He added that a combination of improved language facilities, field work, and greater number of specialists for the region were essential. Of particular importance was expanding the expertise in the social sciences and economics. In addition, he noted that inadequate language instruction was particularly acute for the Near East.

Bennett’s report acknowledged the tension between national security interests and academic inquiry. He acknowledged that “universities have the responsibility of increasing scientific knowledge regarding every part of the world” and that eventually research facilities should be developed for all areas. However, Bennett asserted that “ultimately the federal government must furnish financial support for the type of training that its activities demand.” He added, “Government interests are immediate and focused on certain critical areas of the globe. These shift with rapidity. Furthermore, government grants are seldom free of restrictions.” In contrast, he claimed academic inquiry was “universal and presumably constant.”

Preparing for the Future

Established by an Executive Order from President Truman, the inter-agency committee was tasked with identifying short and long-term needs among the key departments and developing a plan that would not affect existing university centers and faculty. In addition, the committee was to determine if expansion of existing area centers was needed and what governmental support was required. Led by former Congressman Robert Ramspeck, then chairman of the United

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99 Ibid., 7-9.
100 Ibid., 10-15, 24, 46, 68-69. The Near East was defined as North Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. At the 28 universities with area programs, there were 375 area specialists, of which 25 faculty members were Near East specialists. The largest concentrations for the region were in history and literature, each with ten scholars. This distribution was even more striking among graduate students. The report found that of the 669 registered graduate students in integrated area programs, only 27 focused on the Near East. Moreover, the SSRC identified 588 doctoral students, of which it determined that 153 were nearing completion and only three were specializing in the Near East.
101 Ibid., 24-25, 33-37. Bennett reported that only two universities offered Advanced Arabic and Turkish. Although Persian was offered at five universities, it was not taught at the advanced level. As a result, of the 55 students enrolled in language classes, 24 were studying Arabic and 17 Turkish.
102 Ibid., 33.
103 Ibid., 41.
104 “Truman to Acheson,” March 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.

142
States Civil Service Commission, the inter-agency committee was convened in April 1951 and delivered its final report four months later.\textsuperscript{105}

The committee’s report concentrated on the government’s long-term needs. Adopting the SSRC’s definition for area specialists, the report identified a need for 1,500 specialists over the next five years. Referencing the findings of the Bennett study, the report noted that certain areas were expected to have a “critical shortage,” particularly for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Near East, and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{106} Although the majority report acknowledged the “urgent need” for area specialists to “serve the interest of the United States in its international relations,” it deferred making recommendations for the best course of action.\textsuperscript{107}

Instead, it asserted that a permanent inter-agency committee should be created to address the issue and implement a solution. The report claimed that a permanent committee would improve upon and substitute for existing bilateral arrangements between different agencies and universities. By serving as the main interface between the government, the universities and private bodies like the SSRC and the ACLS, the permanent committee would benefit all parties. This included ensuring the quality of instruction, identifying institutions for the training network, provide for expansion of existing facilities, prioritize training among the different agencies, and reducing administrative duplication.\textsuperscript{108}

In spite of the apparent urgent need for specialists, the permanent committee was not established until April 1952. Meanwhile, a second survey committee was created to determine the needs of American businesses and higher education in relation to those of the government. Chaired by Lawrence Carmichael, then President of Tufts University, the second survey committee did not hold its first meeting until February 1952. Although given different charters, both committees were to assist in finalizing the requirements for area training. Once completed, an evaluation of different training facilities and institutions could be conducted and an attempt made to reduce the bilateral agreements between governmental agencies and universities that proved inefficient and problematic during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{109}

The most notable difference between the inter-agency and special survey committees was the presence of and discussion about the needs of American businesses interests in the latter. Represented initially by Standard Oil, the special survey committee determined that there was a sharp difference between industry’s “on-the-job-training” approach generally for recent college graduates and that of the State Department and other governmental agencies. However, the committee members agreed that Standard Oil and other companies would benefit from graduates

\textsuperscript{105} Report of the (Ad Hoc) Committee on Area and Language Specialists on ‘The Shortage of Area and Language Specialists’,” 20 August 1951, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP. Including Ramspeck, the committee was comprised of representatives from the State Department, CIA, DOD, the NSRB, the ECA, the Office of Education, and the Library of Congress.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., Of the 1,500, it was estimated that DOD would require fewer than 200 specialists, particularly those with language proficiency. The projected number of specialists needed for these areas was 215 (Western Europe), 182 (Eastern Europe), 139 (Near East), and 131 (Southeast Asia).
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., A minority report was submitted by Captain J.J. O’Donnell, representing the Navy, who disagreed that the U.S. was facing a shortage of language and area specialists. O’Donnell claimed that based on an analysis of the SSRC’s Bennett report a sufficient quantity of specialists would be ready within three years.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} “Smith to Sohn, Establishment of a Departmental Committee on Language and Area Specialists,” 29 April 1952, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.
of area training programs. Building on the discussion with Standard Oil, the Carmichael committee authorized the creation of a survey to determine industry needs. In addition, it invited the SSRC, ACLS, Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations to appoint representatives for future meetings and share insights from their experience to date.  

The SSRC & Near Eastern Studies

While the federal government considered the broader issue of area studies training during early 1951, the SSRC and the ACLS formed committees devoted to Near Eastern Studies. At a January 1951 conference sponsored by the SSRC, the gathered attendees composed of leading academics and government officials unanimously supported the establishment of a committee devoted to Near Eastern studies. The attendees agreed that the conference was convened at an opportune time and confirmed the government’s need for Near East specialists. They also developed an initial program for the committee to pursue.

A few weeks later the inaugural meeting of the SSRC’s Committee on the Near and Middle East was held in New York. Its goal was to “contribute to a more complete understanding by the Government, people and scholarship of the United States about the area or the Near East.” Illustrating the influence of the wartime experience on the committee members, they asserted that an “over-all area program” should be developed similar to “that attained by the OSS during World War II.” Describing the OSS as a “group of able and informed people” from various fields “who were possessed of expert knowledge about individual countries of the Near East, could pool their judgments in such a way as to represent and reflect the region as a whole.” Thus, through sharing resources national standards could be developed for an area studies program.

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110 “Departmental Committee on Language and Area Specialists, Minutes of February 19, 1952 Meeting of the Special Survey Committee,” RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 556, NARACP.

111 “Summary Minutes of Conference on Near Eastern Studies, 11 January 1951,” SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA. Although the conference was chaired by Michigan’s Robert Hall, the Near Eastern Studies committee was to be considered separate from the Council’s World Area Research Committee, which he also led and served as the main interface with government agencies on area studies. The conference attendees included several OSS veterans, Carleton Coon from the University of Pennsylvania, J.C. Hurewitz, then of Dropsie College, and W. Wendell Cleland of the State Department’s OIR division and a trustee of the American University in Cairo. Invited but unable to attend was another OSS veteran, Harvard Professor Richard Frye. It should be noted that it was not until the following year that the Committee defined the Near East as Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the “Arab World” including North Africa. “The Social Sciences and the Near East: Proposals for Research and Development,” 28 February 1952, SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA.

112 Ibid., Among the committee’s initial actions was a survey of existing facilities to determine the types of courses, research materials, and funding available for students. In addition, the committee was to examine how to organize and fund field work and developing curriculum standards. Finally, the attendees identified a number of areas where scholarship and information were lacking. This included statistical data for the entire region; shortage of studies on most countries in the area except for Palestine, and insufficient coverage of the Caucasus, Russian Turkestan, and Afghanistan.

113 “Minutes Committee on the Near and Middle East,” 7 February 1951, SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA. Like the ACLS committee, a significant number of the SSRC’s committee members were OSS veterans, including Hurewitz, Frye, as well as the University of Pennsylvania’s E.A. Speiser, who sat in for Carleton Coon. Robert Hall served as Acting Chair of the meeting, as his Michigan colleague George Cameron was on a research trip abroad. SSRC President Pendelton Herring and Afif Tannous of the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations also attended the meeting. Although Princeton’s C.C. Pratt attended the January conference, neither he nor his colleagues joined the SSRC committee.
program. A brief review of the programs represented at the meeting confirmed that none of the universities had developed the ideal Near East program.\footnote{114}{Ibid., This included discussions of American, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).}

For its main area of research, the committee selected “forces and factors of tension in the Near East.” The topic was selected because it was “related to [the] policy concerns of the United States Government.” Committee members also believed that it would enable broad participation among scholars interested in the region and maximize existing university resources, including those who were already engaged in related research.\footnote{115}{Ibid; “Minutes Committee on the Near and Middle East,” 28 April 1951, SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA. Although U.S. foreign policy interests influenced the committee’s research program, it was not always a decisive factor. In a subsequent meeting, the committee debated the merits of establishing a national institute for Oriental studies in Washington, D.C. The members decided against the idea for several reasons, including that it “might be overly influenced by governmental interests.”}

By the summer, as the government’s inter agency committee report was finalized, the SSRC’s Near and Middle East Committee prepared a draft of its own research program. Renamed “Dynamic Forces in the Near East,” the program proposed a broad-based examination of the social, political, and cultural forces in the region. It tentatively approved ten projects to be conducted by committee members and non-members. To fund the research program, the committee approached the Ford Foundation.\footnote{116}{“Minutes Committee on the Near and Middle East,” 7 June 1951, SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA. The topics ranged from “Opposition to Westernization in the Near East” by Rafael Patai of Dropsie College to SAIS’s Majid Khadduri’s “Political Forces Operating in the Arab League,” and Columbia’s J.C. Hurewitz’s “Anglo-American Relations in the Near East in the Past Decade.”}

\textit{The Foundations}

Prior to the NDEA, university-based area studies in the United States were largely underwritten by private foundations. Initially, the most prominent organizations were the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. However, their involvement in higher education would be eclipsed with the emergence of the Ford Foundation.\footnote{117}{“Area Studies a Reexamination,” 22 September 1948, Rockefeller Foundation, RG 3.2, Series 900, Area Studies, RFA. Rockefeller and Carnegie jointly funded Princeton’s Near East program as well as the University of Pennsylvania’s South Asia program. Carnegie provided support to Yale for Southeast Asia, the University of Minnesota for Scandinavia, and Johns Hopkins for Central Asia.}

Established in 1913 and 1936 respectively, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations followed different paths to funding education. Almost from its inception, one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s main goals was to support medical education and public health, including AUB’s medical school and hospital.\footnote{118}{Waldemar A. Nielsen, \textit{The Big Foundations} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972): 50-56.} As discussed in Chapter 3 and above, the Rockefeller Foundation was actively involved in promoting area studies with the ACLS during the 1940s.\footnote{119}{“The Rockefeller Foundation Over-All Support for Area Studies,” 20 January 1955, Rockefeller Foundation, RG 3.2, Series 900, Area Studies, RFA. Indeed, from 1946 to 1949, the foundation provided over $3.2 million in funding for area studies, $2.4 million of which was for the humanities and $830,000 for the social sciences. However, funding decreased from 1950 to 1953, averaging $624,000 per year. Although 1954 witnessed a dramatic
In contrast, the Ford Foundation’s support for education did not materialize until after 1949, when it expanded its mission toward the “advancement of human welfare.” Acknowledging the threat posed by Communism, the Foundation saw an opportunity to influence national and international policy. This would be achieved by directly engaging with policy makers as well as influencing broader public discourse. With its reorganization and new purpose, the Ford Foundation was poised to be the leading private funder of educational initiatives.\(^{120}\)

As agreed during the March 1951 meetings of the government’s ad hoc committee on university language and area training, the SSRC dispatched a draft proposal to the Ford Foundation for funding. In the accompanying letter, SSRC President Herring informed Bernard Gladieux, assistant to the President of the Ford Foundation, that it was not a formal submission, but rather “the basis for further discussions.”\(^{121}\) Divided into two phases, the proposal mirrored the discussions of the ad hoc committee.\(^{122}\) It called for area centers to be expanded and a greater number of students recruited in the first stage, stating that “this move is of the utmost immediate importance if a beginning is to be made in meeting governmental needs and if the faculties of the existing training centers are not to be dispersed.” The second phase would be initiated with the introduction of government funding for the training of “substantial numbers of men from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.” It notified the Ford Foundation that negotiations were underway, adding that “it seems not unlikely that within six to eight months Federal funds may be available to pay for the training of officials and prospective Federal employees who are to be sent to foreign areas.” The proposal asserted that “existing area centers must be greatly strengthened if they are to be able to bear the increased load.” It added, “Once the present crisis is met by holding the area centers together and getting a good flow of trainees started, the second phase of the program becomes of major importance.”\(^{123}\)

Although the Ford Foundation did not support the SSRC’s initiatives directly, in 1952 it announced another mechanism to fund research in the region.\(^{124}\) The Foreign Study and

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\(^{121}\) “Herring to Gladieux,” 5 March 1951, SSRC, Accession 2, Series 1, Sub-Series 39, RFA.

\(^{122}\) “Area Training Program of the Social Science Research Council-Preliminary Draft,” 5 March 1951, SSRC, Accession 2, Series 1, Sub-Series 39, RFA. The draft proposal requested $4 million over three years to support existing centers at 15 universities and underwrite fellowships to train 400 specialists with a particular focus on neglected areas including Africa, the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., Echoing its original proposal, the SSRC was to administer the program. The Council reiterated its qualifications, including the work of Wendell Bennett, as well as the establishment of the Committee on the Near and Middle East and its joint committees with the ACLS on Slavic and South Asian studies. While an advisory committee of leading specialists would be created for planning and coordination with the participating universities, “final authority on major policy and fiscal questions would be vested in the [SSRC].”

\(^{124}\) “Minutes Committee on the Near and Middle East,” 26 January 1952, SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1, Sub-Series 20, RFA. Neither the SSRC’s proposal for expanding area studies nor the research program of the Committee on Near and Middle East Studies was funded. However, the meeting minutes note that the Foundation did express an
Research Fellowship Program supported research in Asia and the Middle East, funding 83 fellowships in its first year. While there were other research fellowships available, including those sponsored by the SSRC and ACLS, they were not exclusive to the Middle East or Asia. The Ford Fellowship would become integral to scholarly research overseas, however, it also provided U.S. intelligence agencies with sources for information on other countries. Within five years, the State Department’s OIR was providing some Ford Fellows with orientation before their departure, and ERS and the CIA were debriefing them upon their return.

While the Ford Foundation dramatically increased its presence and influence in area studies, by 1954 the Rockefeller Foundation was questioning its involvement. In a report to the Foundation’s Board of Trustees, Director of Humanities Charles B. Fahs argued for a reassessment of how the organization funded area studies. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Fahs’s recommendations would be implemented by the end of the decade. Fahs also offered the Board conflicting data on the state of area studies and the national need. He reported that there was an overproduction of doctorates for some areas and some Ph.D.’s with area specialization were unemployed. Moreover, the U.S. government had dramatically reduced its employment of area-trained graduates. Indeed, by 1954, the national emergency appeared to have passed.

**Drowning in Oil**

General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election in November 1952 appeared to portend an escalation in the Korean conflict. Instead, the death of Soviet premier Josef Stalin less than two months after Eisenhower’s inauguration instigated movement by China and North Korea at the negotiating table. Signed on July 27, 1953, the Korean armistice marked the end of crisis planning for area studies. Yet as Cold War tensions appeared to ease in East Asia with the end of the Korean Conflict, the Middle East became a new arena for a potential superpower confrontation either directly or by proxy. The previous July witnessed a nationalist coup in Egypt that overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk, potentially threatening Anglo-American interest in the “general subject of Near Eastern studies.” The committee resubmitted its research program the following year. Although not all projects were funded two committee members, J.C. Hurewitz and Majid Khadduri, were awarded Ford fellowships in 1953 and 1954 respectively. Moreover, the Columbia Near East program was awarded a three year grant in 1953 for $150,000. The Ford Foundation, *The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1953, The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1954*, *The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1952*. Of the initial fellows, 47 were to conduct research in 16 countries in 1952 and 18 were to conduct research in the second year. Funding for Academic Year (AY) 1952-1953 was $480,000 and $500,000 for AY 1953-1954. The Foundation also provided a $100,000 grant to the University of Michigan’s Near East program.

125 *The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1952*. 126 “Pelcovits and Fina to Evans, Weekly Roundup,” 23 September 1957, RG59, Entry 1498, Box 7, NARACP. The report notes the orientation and subsequent debriefing of William Klausner, a Ford Fellow returning from Thailand after two years where he conducted research on village culture. It adds that ERS was “arranging a number of interviews for Ford Fellows who are departing for their areas of study.”

127 “Fahs to Rusk, Long-Range Policy with Regard to Area Studies,” 5 April 1954; Rockefeller Foundation, “A Reexamination of Rockefeller Foundation Program in Area Studies,” 24 October 1954, RG 3.2, Series 900, Sub-Series Area Studies, RFA. Although Fahs reaffirmed that America would have a long term need for area studies, he argued that the Rockefeller Foundation could not “continue indefinitely as a nursemaid in these fields.” He argued that an alternative would be a limited number of large capital grants to provide long-term support and stability to a few institutions where the Foundation had previously provided funding, including Princeton and Columbia.

128 Stueck, 173-179.
access to airbases in the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal waterway. Meanwhile in Iran, the Eisenhower administration increasingly viewed the nationalist government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq as an unwitting stalking horse for a Communist takeover. Mosadeq’s removal in an Anglo-American backed coup in August 1953 and the reinstatement of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi appeared to reaffirm America’s willingness to defend its perceived interests in the region. Indeed, from Washington’s perspective the two coups demonstrated the power and potential threat of nationalism in the region.

Two months after Stalin’s death a collection of scholars, businessmen, diplomats, and intelligence officers gathered on the Harvard University campus to discuss the creation of a Middle East studies program. The attendees included representatives from Standard Oil New Jersey (later Exxon) and New York (Socony, later Mobil), ARAMCO, U.S. Army Intelligence, and the State Department. Originally developed by Harvard’s Committee on International and Regional Studies, the program proposal stated that America’s “international commitment to counter the Soviet threat in the Middle East, the fundamental importance of Middle-eastern oil to our economy, and the continuing crisis in the area make it imperative that American universities turn their attention to this vitally important but hitherto relatively neglected region.” It asserted that “what is needed is a graduate program designed both to train selected men for service in private industry and in government, and at the same time to encourage scholarly basic research on the modern Middle East,” in fields ranging from economics to social psychology.129

Chaired by Dean Edward Mason of the School of Public Administration, an OSS veteran and former economic adviser to Secretary of State George Marshall, the meeting’s morning session evaluated the prospects of establishing a Middle East studies program. The discussion was framed by several questions, including the need for such a program, Harvard’s suitability as a parent institution, the curriculum, and the students’ job prospects upon graduation. Mason asserted that it was the latter question which was the key to the discussion, and that the “market” for graduates should determine the “whole curriculum, the whole training program.” He argued that the market was “the principal American companies operating in the Near East, plus the State Department, the CIA, and other government agencies.”130

Mason’s approach found support among the different attendees.131 While the participants agreed that the region was neglected, there was some disagreement on determining the need for the program. Although there were several programs focused on the Middle East, the general consensus was that none covered the modern era well or at all. Comparing the U.S. to the U.K., Harvard’s Richard Frye asserted that “we are tremendously behind the times and we are not really training people.”132

129 “Proposal for a Program in Middle Eastern Studies,” 26 March 1953, HUFP 19.9, Box 12, HUA. At the time, Harvard’s Committee on International and Regional Studies was led by Soviet specialist Robert Wolff.
130 “Middle Eastern Studies Conference Minutes,” 11 May 1953, HUFP 19.9, Box 12, HUA.
131 Ibid., Representatives of Standard Oil of New Jersey, American Export Lines, and the Export-Import Bank explained that based on their experience language training and an understanding of the region’s culture and history were vital. Harry Smith, then Director of the FSI’s School of Languages and Linguistics, cautioned that to date the attempts to integrate language and area training at the different institutions had not successfully achieved their goals. Smith’s observations were confirmed by Col. Thomas Marston of Army Intelligence, who added that integration was the key issue even after students had a year of language training at the military’s Monterey school.
132 Ibid.
In terms of the government’s interest in hiring graduates, the FSI’s Smith asserted that there was the potential for increasing personnel in the region by “at least 100%.” Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, Jr., the architect of the coup that would overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mosadeq only a few months later, echoed Smith’s claim. Representing the Harvard Foundation, Roosevelt explained that based on his experience serving as a consultant for several government agencies, if Harvard was “satisfied with a pure government market, the government could take care of all the products for the next ten years; and from the point of view of the research that would be done, the government would regard that as of tremendous value.”\footnote{133}

At least one participant was skeptical of Harvard’s intent, or at least the pretense of a discussion of the merits of creating a program. Writing afterward to Princeton’s Hitti, FSI’s Harry Smith explained, “Many of us had the impression that Harvard was inviting us and entertaining us in order to get our stamp of approval on a fait accompli.”\footnote{134} He added that while Harvard had an advantage due to the number of foreign nationals that attend its professional schools, “I still think they are trying to get on a gravy train and are definitely after oil money.”\footnote{135}

However, Smith’s skepticism was not unfounded. Later that summer, Frye sent a copy of the Center for Middle East Studies’ (CMES) preliminary announcement to British scholar Bernard Lewis, then at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. In the accompanying letter Frye admitted, “As you will see the great emphasis is upon oil, and I, frankly, am beginning to drown in oil.”\footnote{136} What Frye disclosed privately, William Langer admitted publicly in his autobiography. As the CMES’s first director and former head of the OSS’s R&A Division, Langer stated that he was asked by Harvard’s administration to examine the possibility of creating a center for studying the Middle East similar to the university’s Russian Research Center. He claimed the impetus behind the request was “several American oil companies, in need of trained personnel,” who were “prepared to supply financial support.”\footnote{137}

Formally established in the spring, CMES offered a two-year masters degree in Regional Studies and a joint Ph.D. program with other departments. In addition to Langer, fellow historian and OSS alumnus, Richard Frye served as the associate director. Frye was also a member of both the SSRC’s Committee on Near and Middle Eastern Studies and the ACLS’s Committee on Near Eastern Studies. Echoing the March program proposal, the Center’s program announcement declared that its purpose was “to train specialists for academic and non-academic work in an area which has become increasingly important in world affairs and in which the interests and responsibilities of the United States have grown steadily since the Second World War.”\footnote{138}

\footnote{133}{Ibid.}
\footnote{134}{“Smith to Hitti,” 12 May 1953, RG59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP.}
\footnote{135}{Ibid. In spite of his criticisms, Smith conceded to Hitti that it was a “very good conference,” and that “most of the points you would have liked to hear stressed were mentioned.” He added that “at least they show themselves ‘against sin’ in many respects, and, I suppose in the long run the thing will work out as contributing to our relations with the area rather than the other way around.”}
\footnote{136}{“Frye to Lewis,” 2 July 1954, HUF 569.5, Box 1, HUA.}
\footnote{138}{“Harvard University, Center for Middle East Studies, 1954-1955,” RG59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP.}
Like his former Harvard colleague Herring, Langer was one of several “academic power brokers” to emerge during this period. Comfortable in the halls of government as well as the ivory tower, Langer would have significant influence on both over the next decade. A diplomatic historian by training, Langer was not a Middle East scholar. Instead, his goal was to establish the program and recruit top faculty. In December, Harvard announced the appointment of the preeminent scholar in the field, Oxford’s Hamilton Gibb, after a contentious competition for his services with rival Princeton. Gibb would succeed Langer as Director of the Center. CMES also recruited the FSI’s Charles Ferguson, who was considered the leading American linguist for the region. Prior to Harvard, Ferguson led the FSI’s Arabic Language training school based in Beirut. Derwood “Ted” W. Lockard, an anthropologist and former Chief of the CIA’s Middle East Division, joined the Center in the fall and served as the associate director until 1972.

In spite of its reputation and respected faculty, CMES experienced the usual growing pains of any new academic program, including internal disputes over curriculum and problematic students.

Arguably the leading Orientalist at the time, Gibb’s transition from Oxford to Harvard was emblematic of the broader postwar shift in hegemony from Britain to America. Not only did it indicate, as historian Zachary Lockman asserts, that American universities had surpassed their European equivalents in their study of the region, but also served to validate the emerging field of Middle East studies. Moreover, as Lockman demonstrates, it represented the continuity between Orientalist thought and writings and the production of knowledge in American Middle East studies.

**Strengthening America’s Sheet Anchors**

While American universities and academic councils were coordinating and planning for the creation of area studies, AUB and AUC were each hoping to expand and enhance their institutions. As discussed in the previous Chapter, the faculty from AUB and AUC assisted the Anglo-American war effort and were described by the State Department as the U.S.’s “sheet anchor” in the region when it was militarily weak. However, by the early 1950s, AUB and AUC were in an uncertain position. Although both universities were “American,” they could not rely on state or federal funding. As private foreign institutions that valued and guarded their independence, they were similarly unable to rely on the Governments of Lebanon or Egypt for

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139 Langer, 106-144, 162-168.
140 “Lockard to Freund,” 9 August 1963, HUF 569.5, Box 5, HUA; Babai, 9; Price, 221-222. According to Price, Lockard worked with the OSS during World War II while serving as a U.S. Navy liaison officer, initially in Kenya and then Beirut. After the war, Lockard apparently returned to Washington and continued working for the OSS and its successor agencies for the next decade. Although Lockard began working at CMES in the fall, in a recommendation letter on behalf of former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, James Sayle Moose, Jr., to the Rockefeller Foundation, Lockard noted his experience with Moose while serving as Director of the CIA’s Middle East Division from 1945-1955.
141 “Lockard to Langer,” 5 October 1955; “Langer to Lockard,” 7 October 1955, HUF 569.5, Box 1, HUA; Babai, 6. CMES shared space with its predecessor the Russian Research Center, and six students enrolled in the program’s first year.
142 Lockman, 110.
143 “Merriam to Acheson,” *FRUS, The Near East and Africa, 1946, Vol. VII,* 598-599. As discussed in Chapter 3, Gordon Merriam’s use of the term “sheet anchor” likely has a dual meaning, one nautical and the other religious.
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funding. Indeed, both schools were fearful they would be nationalized after their respective host countries achieved independence from colonial rule. Thus, their capacity to fund growth and ability to recruit talented faculty from the United States was limited. Instead, American foundations and private donors were the main source of funds for both universities. As discussed in Chapter 3, both institutions felt the local political and economic fallout from Israel’s creation in 1948, and the U.S.’s swift recognition of the state.

Although both universities were founded by American missionaries, there was a distinct difference in their reputation and financial standing. By the 1950s, AUB’s graduates could be found as the government ministers and officials throughout the region. It was also the largest and most respected institution in the Near East College Association (NECA), an organization that excluded AUC until the 1960s. Lacking a consistent benefactor and drawing on a smaller donor base, AUC was the smaller and poorer institution. AUB also had supporters within the U.S. government, particularly among the State Department’s Near East hands. As Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee informed then AUB President Steven Penrose in 1949, the university “has many ‘partisans’ who would like to see it maintain its high standards and expand its services.”

The partisans were vocal advocates within the State Department, arguing that these educational institutions played a vital role in the region as a vanguard of American ideas and policies in the Cold War. In February 1949, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, then Director of the Division of Research for the Near East and Africa, stated that “it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the American philanthropic educational institutions to our relations with countries of the Near East.” He claimed that “these colleges, and related organizations like the Near East Foundation, are far and away the most effective representatives of America and the most effective demonstration of what America is and stands for.” Satterthwaite asserted that the institutions had played a vital role in educating the leaders of the region and were the source of the remaining good will toward the U.S. even after the “Palestine controversy.” He added bluntly that “any impairment” to their status “would be an absolute disaster from the point of view of American foreign policy in the Near East.”

However, other partisans warned against overt financial support for the American universities. After a discussion of the issue in a NEA staff meeting, W. Wendell Cleland, an AUC trustee and OIR official, argued that assistance must be indirect in order to maintain the

144 “McGhee to Penrose,” 6 October 1949, RG59, Entry 1422, Box 4, NARACP. McGhee was responding to two letters from Penrose. The first dated September 8, 1949 discussed AUB’s ability to support the U.S.’s Point IV program. McGhee noted that the AUB “partisans,” were connected to Point IV’s Near East division. This included Wendell Cleland, Harold Glidden, Edwin Wright, and Huntington Demon. McGhee added, “All these and others who know of the work that Beirut has done, will give warm support to make full use of the facilities of the American University of Beirut when the Point IV plans are formulated.”

145 “Satterthwaite to Allen,” 4 February 1949; “Satterthwaite to Allen,” 4 February 1949; “Satterthwaite to Thorp,” 4 February 1949, RG 59, Entry 1434, Box 2, NARACP. To support the universities, Satterthwaite called for immediate and long-term action, including federal aid for the institutions. He argued in a separate letter to Willard Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, that the American colleges could assist with the Point IV program in the region. Using Point IV funds to pay the salaries of the instructors involved in technical assistance and providing the colleges with new equipment would help alleviate their financial stress. It would also ensure that the Point IV program benefited from their “prestige and facilities,” which would “get the program off to a flying start.” As noted above, Stephen Penrose, AUB’s President and an OSS veteran, approached the State Department in September about the university’s ability to assist in the Point IV program.
institutions’ influence in the region. Cleland stated that “if their high standing is to be preserved, this fact of dissociation from national political policy must be maintained, even to the extent of exercising the liberty to criticize their own government’s policies.” He added, “This liberty in fact gives them a great deal more influence than if they appeared to be subservient to government policy.” Cleland asserted that if other members of the State Department agreed with this opinion, “Then it is essential that whatever assistance of any kind is given to American institutions abroad, it must allow them to maintain their liberty of policy and action.” Therefore, instead of direct government assistance, he argued for a combination of scholarships, donations of books, loaning personnel and materials, from American universities and government agencies. To maintain the appearance of independence, Cleland suggested that the activities be coordinated through local boards and foundations.146

In spite of his suggestions for maintaining the appearance of independence, Cleland also sought ways for the universities to assist Washington’s policy goals in the region. In a letter to Professor John Provinse, Director of AUC’s new Social Research Center (SRC), Cleland stated that he soon hoped to dispatch basic research topics that “will represent the interests of the State Department.”147 Indeed, early drafts of the SRC proposal identified OIR, the State Department’s Intelligence Division, as a liaison agency along with different American universities and Egyptian governmental bodies.

Discussions of the beneficial role the institutions played were not limited to conference rooms in Foggy Bottom. Harold Hoskins, a consultant to the State Department and envoy to the region during the Second World War, served as Vice President of AUB’s Board of Trustees and President of the NECA. He would eventually become Director of the State Department’s FSI. Hoskins traveled to the region in 1953 on behalf of the NECA, where he visited all of the member institutions. Afterward, Hoskins discussed his trip with AUB’s Board. Although each institution had its problems, mainly involving personnel and funds, he stated that he returned with a “deeper feeling of the soundness and importance of our educational work as one of the most consistent factors of U.S. Foreign Policy, often more effective than what is contributed by many of our diplomats.” In particular, Hoskins referenced the rapidly increasing number of AUB graduates who were prominent in government and business and referred specifically to the new prime ministers in Lebanon and Jordan.148

The Ford Foundation’s new emphasis on overseas philanthropy proved to be fortuitous for AUB and AUC as well as their supporters in the U.S. government. Like their counterparts in the continental U.S., the foundation would serve as a major new source of funding for both institutions.149 Indeed, in 1953 AUC’s Executive Director Ward Madison informed Cleland, then serving as the university’s acting President, that the Ford Foundation identified AUC as one of five institutions in the region “to be strengthened.”150 That same year, Ford awarded AUB a

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146 “Cleland to Chartrand,” 21 February 1949, RG59, Entry 1434, Box 2, NARACP.
147 “Cleland to Provinse,” 24 January 1955, Raymond McLain Personal Papers, AUCA.
148 AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book VI January 1952-June 2 1955, 25 May 1953, AUBA.
149 Ford Foundation Annual Report 1952, 57. In 1952, the Ford Foundation provided AUB with $550,000 in grants, this included $300,000 to “strengthen its liberal arts college” and $200,000 for the creation of a Research Institute for Economic Development. Ford also awarded AUC a $200,000 grant to establish the SRC in 1952.
150 “Madison to Cleland,” 19 October 1953, W. Wendell Cleland Personal Papers, AUCA.
$500,000 grant to fund the creation of an agricultural school.\footnote{Ford Foundation Annual Report 1953, 79.} AUB had lobbied for the agricultural school for several years, including directly to the State Department.\footnote{“Memorandum of Conversation by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs,” FRUS, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V, 1950, 852-855. Visiting Washington in April 1950, Penrose met with McGhee to discuss some of his suggestions on how the U.S. could improve relations with the Arab World following the creation of Israel. During the meeting Penrose asked for assistance from the U.S. government in establishing an agricultural department at AUB, stating that it was “a project he considered one of the most worthwhile in the area.” By October 1951, Penrose received oral approval from the Ford Foundation for a $500,000 grant for the agricultural department. In addition, the Foundation expressed interest in a proposal submitted by AUB for strengthening arts and sciences. AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book V 1947-1952, “October 17, 1951 Meeting Minutes,” AUBA.}

**Collaboration and its Challenges**

Although Princeton’s Near East program had established relations with the State Department and other agencies for training, there were growing pains. In particular, the State Department encountered issues around language instruction and the training of female employees. While the Department was satisfied with the area coursework, language instruction at Princeton was designed for doctoral dissertation research. As a result, the course materials ranged from translations of Islamic legal essays to classic Persian poetry and were not satisfactory for the needs of government employees. Led by the FSI, discussions between Foggy Bottom and Princeton sought to find an adequate accommodation to meet the needs of the university and the foreign policy establishment. Where the FSI wanted a separate course created for government employees, Princeton sought to assuage their concerns by hiring an additional instructor and modifying the existing language course.\footnote{“Smith to Burns,” 1 July 1953; “Burns to Smith,” 3 July 1953, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP.}

Similarly, the State Department required a special accommodation for female employees. Prior to 1961, Princeton did not accept female students for either graduate or undergraduate degrees. As it did during the Second World War, the university offered government agencies an informal arrangement, whereby women would attend area and language courses but would not be formally admitted or enrolled as students. Interestingly, when Princeton made its proposal to the FSI, the university did not believe the State Department would be interested in an informal arrangement. Perhaps revealing the institute’s desperation for appropriate language training for FSOs in the Near East, Harry Smith accepted.\footnote{“Smith to Hitti,” 28 May 1953; “Young to Smith,” 1 June 1953; “Smith to Young,” 8 June 1953, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 555, NARACP. In this instance, the FSO required Turkish language training.}

In spite of these challenges, the State Department continued exploring possibilities for collaboration with the universities. The development of National Intelligence Summaries (NIS), the forerunner to the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), was intended to provide policymakers with an assessment of key political, military, and economic trends and indicators by country. Tasked to the Director of the CIA in 1947, the NIS was developed in collaboration with other government agencies, in particular the State Department’s OIR.\footnote{“National Intelligence Survey Program,” 9 September 1948, RG 59, Entry 1595, Box 9, NARACP. The report notes that because of the administrative burden on OIR, the CIA agreed to provide funds to the State Department to employ six NIS analysts by fiscal year 1949.} By May 1954, the OIR division initiated contacts with major universities for assistance with developing the NIS.
After visiting Yale, Harvard, Princeton and MIT, OIR’s Cyrus Peake determined that research conducted at the universities was of “direct interest and value to the NIS program.” Peake recommended that OIR adopt an experimental program in the fall, in which personnel would be retrained in research techniques used by political scientists and sociologists at the different universities. He added that the personnel would also “reap the benefits of research underway for strengthening the basic NIS research program.” Peake reported that he “received a hearty response” from Harvard and Princeton to his request for office space and permission for OIR staff to attend and participate in classes. He added that “our people would be welcome and [the universities] would do everything they could to make the stay of OIR personnel profitable.”

Peake singled out Princeton as definite site for training and collaboration. He stated that the research conducted at the university was “most interesting and suggestive in so far as future needs of NIS are concerned.” He specifically noted the work conducted by Professor Dana Munro, Director of the Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, and Professor Fredrick Dunn of the Center for International Studies. Peake reported that the research approach and interests of Princeton’s centers were similar to the sections of the NIS related to the foreign and domestic policies of different countries. He added that NIS staff could benefit from their association with different research projects conducted by the Centers as well as contribute to the development of future analytical tools and methods. Peake noted that Princeton had research programs focused on the Near East and Latin America, and added that Professor Munro’s background as a former State Department officer for Latin America “enables him to appreciate readily the research needs of the Department.”

Middle East Oil & Middle Eastern Studies

While the State Department attempted to enhance its research gathering and analytical tools on foreign areas, American oil companies had already achieved success in this regard. Indeed, a 1950 internal assessment by the State Department on Middle East oil found that “oil operations of U.S. companies in the area familiarizes large numbers of U.S. technicians with strategic materials in a strategic area; area intelligence is consequently excellent.” It added, “Oil company activities provide the West’s broadest contact with the lower levels of Middle East peoples.” As a result of these interactions, the assessment claimed that “oil companies are instrumental and can be more instrumental in contributing to the attainment of overall U.S. policy objectives for the area.”

As observed with Harvard, the inability to produce a government-funded program for area studies led the universities to other sources for support. The combination of oil wealth, experience in the region, affinity with the goals of the U.S. government, and the need for trained American personnel made oil companies a natural sponsor for university-based Middle East studies. As noted previously, by 1951 several oil companies were contributing to Princeton’s Near East program and influenced the creation of Harvard’s CMES.

156 “Peake to Evans,” 16 June 1954, RG59, Entry 1498, Box 4, NARACP.
157 Ibid., Munro was a member of the Inquiry and served in the State Department after World War I.
158 FRUS, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V. 1950, 80. The assessment listed those policy goals as “economic and political stability, increased standard of living, Western orientation, development of democratic processes, expansion of international trade, etc.”
Indeed, the burgeoning influence of the oil companies on the nascent field was evident at two separate events held in 1956. In May, Princeton hosted its Eighth Annual Near East Conference. A two-day affair, the topic was “Economic Development of the Near East.” In addition to the executives from ARAMCO, Gulf Oil, Socony, Continental Oil, Cal-Tex, Atlantic Refining, and Standard Oil of New Jersey, the other attendees included representatives of the State Department, the UN, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the Carnegie Corporation. Of the oil companies attending the conference, only ARAMCO’s representatives made a presentation.159

Six months later, during the 1956 Suez War, a meeting of the “Visiting Committee” for Harvard’s CMES was held. Unlike the Princeton conference, the committee was comprised overwhelmingly of oil company executives and there were no attendees from government agencies, embassies, or the UN. Hosting the same oil companies that attended Princeton’s conference, Harvard’s faculty was joined by representatives of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The meeting was chaired by Howard Page of Standard Oil of New Jersey and co-chaired by William Langer, the Center’s former director.160

Similar to the May 1953 conference which preceded the founding of CMES, initial discussion focused on the job market for Harvard graduates. Although he was no longer the CMES’s director and Gibb attended the meeting, Langer dominated the discussion. He noted that while there was an excess of foreign applicants, there was a “dearth of top-notch Americans applying to the program.” The reason was there were other job opportunities available which did not require the extensive time commitment for a degree. Except for ARAMCO, the other companies reported that they filled their positions either with individuals trained in British schools or by the State Department’s FSI. However, ARAMCO’s Terry Duce stated that the company would require employees for the next ten to fifteen years until “a sufficient number of Arabs could be trained.” The attendees agreed that government service offered the best market for Harvard’s graduates, but over time with increasing commercial development in the region non-oil companies would require trained personnel.161

Langer restated the Center’s purpose, emphasizing that it was not “to develop Arab philosophers.” He added that it was important to encourage “able, young American students into the program.” Moreover, Langer requested assistance from the attendees to determine if “the program was adequate and useful.” If not, he was “prepared to shift it to meet [their] requirements.” In the discussions, Langer stressed the need for financial support for American students as an incentive. He responded positively to a suggestion by Page of Standard Oil New Jersey that oil companies recruit and provide scholarships for personnel to be trained at Harvard. In addition, Langer reassured the oil company representatives that ad hoc programs could be developed in conjunction with other departments and programs to meet their training needs and interests. He concluded the meeting with a plea for cooperation between the Center and the

159 “Princeton University, Eighth Annual Near East Conference, May 18 and 19, 1956,” HUF 569.5, Box 1, HUA. J. Terry Duce, Vice President of ARAMCO and a member of the Near East program’s Advisory Council, and his colleague Joseph Ellender, ARAMCO’s Chief Economist, discussed “The Economic Resources of the Near East: Present and Future.”
160 “Harvard Foundation, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Pre-Dinner Meeting,” 11 November 1956, HUF 569, Box 1, HUA.
161 Ibid.
companies, stating that Harvard did not want to “find students, support them, and then find that the companies did not want them.”¹⁶²

Although the Suez War was not discussed at Harvard’s meeting, it would have direct implications on U.S. foreign policy in the region. As will be discussed in the next chapter, within a year, the Eisenhower administration would develop and implement a doctrine designed to contain Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and the perceived threat of Arab nationalism. As the Eisenhower Doctrine was being tested in the region, the broader Cold War competition between Washington and Moscow would instigate a new crisis, the response to which would serve to enshrine and ultimately transform university-based Middle East studies.

Conclusion

On the eve of the Sputnik launch, university-based area studies in the U.S. remained in their infancy. Contrary to the general perception of the origins of area studies, as this chapter demonstrated, while the wartime intelligence and training programs provided an example, they were not a template adopted wholesale by American universities. Instead, they served as a reference point for scholars, most who served in or assisted with the different government agencies and military services during World War II. Indeed, how scholars perceived the effectiveness of the wartime programs was largely dependent on which wartime agency they were affiliated with, as they ranged from the military to the OSS to the Ethnogeographic Board. Moreover, even when universities had wartime relationships and training programs with government agencies like Princeton, their new area programs still encountered problems in the content and focus of their curriculum. In fact, more than five years after it was founded Princeton’s Near East program had yet to change its focus to the modern history of the region.

As this chapter demonstrated, while there were significant discussions and planning for federal funding for area studies driven by the Korean War, the crisis planning ended when the threat of a broader conflict with the Soviet Union passed. Yet these discussions served to institutionalize the nexus around which university-area studies would be built: government agencies, academic councils, universities, private foundations, and major corporations. They also demonstrated the central role occupied by the two major academic councils, the SSRC and ACLS. While the SSRC and ACLS collaborated on developing Middle East studies, they both sought a central role in the administration of a future government-backed area studies program. Although there was clearly an ideological component to the SSRC’s initial proposal that was based on E. Pendleton Herring’s writings and public policy experience, its motives were not purely altruistic or patriotic. Similarly, even though the U.S. foreign policy establishment, especially the State Department, was sympathetic toward the goals of the academic councils and universities to expand area studies, its primary mission was to effectively train its employees. All other considerations were secondary. Nor was this attitude limited to the federal government. As witnessed at Harvard, the goal was not to create future scholars but to recruit and train individuals for more lucrative professions in the business world.

Without federal funding the potential growth of area studies was severely restricted. Although philanthropic foundations could provide the seed funding to begin programs, without ¹⁶² Ibid.
governmental support the institutions were unlikely to expand their course offerings, faculty, or even the development of new teaching materials. In addition, the bilateral arrangements between various government agencies and different universities in the U.S. and the Middle East served to restrict rather than promote Middle East studies. Indeed, one implication of universities tailoring their research programs to the needs and interests of the U.S. government was that it ensured there was little diversity in the approach or analysis of the region. Moreover, as observed at Princeton, government agencies gravitated toward the university centers where the research, analysis, and experience were parallel to and synergistic with the intelligence and foreign policy establishment. Similarly, at Harvard, the university actively sought the opinion and advice of major oil corporations and offered to tailor the Middle East program to meet their needs. As demonstrated by AUB and AUC, this was not limited to universities in the continental United States. While the State Department touted the benefits of the universities’ prestige within the region, they also sought ways to benefit from their influence and activities to further U.S. foreign policy goals.

What stands out about the pre-National Defense Education Act period is the enthusiasm in which universities, academic councils, and individual scholars pursued interactions with U.S. intelligence agencies and major corporations. Rarely was there a concern about compromising academic inquiry due to these relationships or their potential for influencing scholarly analysis. Instead, the various components of the area studies nexus appeared to reaffirm Herring’s belief that in a time of national emergency, “a national symphony” of disparate organizations with differing interests was required to work in harmony to achieve victory. However, upon closer inspection, as these relationships were largely initiated before and continued after the Korean War, how the “national need” was defined by different groups appeared to be influenced as much by opportunity as they were by necessity. Moreover, the planning discussions revealed that the scholars and institutions involved shared an affinity with the stated interests of the U.S. government and the belief that their activities would assist in achieving those goals. Yet as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, an unintended consequence of federal funding for area studies is that within a decade these relationships would be called into question and ultimately frowned upon within academia.

The basic motive in the development of area studies in the United States has been political.

- Leonard Binder¹

Area studies have a special meaning for the new diplomacy, going well beyond their practical importance for men who make decisions for little-known parts of the world. Area studies constitute the first explicit recognition, in the main-stream of American intellectual history, of the simple proposition that people are different.

- McGeorge Bundy²

I invented that god awful title: The National Defense Education Act. If there are any words less compatible really, intellectually, with the purposes of education – it’s not to defend the country; it’s to defend the mind and develop the human spirit, not to develop cannons and battleships. It was a horrible title, but it worked. It worked. How could you attack it?

- Stewart McClure, clerk of the Senate Committee on Labor, Education and Public Welfare, January 28, 1983³

BEEP—BEEP—BEEP-- BEEP—BEEP—BEEP--BEEP—BEEP—BEEP—BEEP

Hurtling through space at 15,000 miles per hour, a small silver orb emitted a simple pulsating signal from its twin radio transmitters to the planetary body some 560 miles below. Composed of an aluminum shell and weighing less than 200 pounds, the sphere raced across the October evening sky oblivious to its historic mission or the commotion that would ensue as listening stations began to hear its unique “voice.” Its transmissions continued for three weeks, and were heard by scientists, intelligence analysts, and ham radio operators around the globe, until the chemical batteries finally expired. Although silent and an unobservable without special equipment, the tiny satellite continued circling the planet for ninety-two days before losing orbit and descending back to earth. Its official name was Iskustvenniy Sputnik Zemli, or artificial satellite of the earth, but it would become known to the world as Sputnik.⁴

American officials and lawmakers initially discounted Sputnik as a “propaganda stunt” and a “silly little bauble.” However, within a month, the Soviet Union launched a second, larger satellite into an even higher orbit. As a further demonstration of Soviet technological capabilities, Sputnik II carried a passenger: a small dog named Laika. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who initially failed to comprehend the importance of the initial launch, hailed Sputnik II as evidence that the Soviet Union had “outstripped” the United States in “the field of scientific and technological progress.”5 Within a year, Congress would pass the NDEA which authorized a dramatic increase in federal funding for science and math, as well as the study of languages needed for “strategic areas” and the creation of university-based, multi-disciplinary centers.6

The impact of Sputnik I and II on the American psyche and their implications for the Cold War far outweighed their meager size and generally unsophisticated technology. The NDEA was the culmination of efforts dating back to the pre-World War II era and the Sputnik crisis succeeded in securing federal funding for area studies where previous efforts failed. In this chapter, I argue that in authorizing federal support for university-based area studies and foreign language training, the NDEA served to formally establish and expand Middle East and other area studies in the United States. Originally intended as a temporary measure, once passed the NDEA became integral if not essential to the study of foreign areas in American higher education. Over the next two decades, the legislation would have the unintended consequence of diversifying area studies as well. The post-NDEA period also witnessed a similar expansion of the national security establishment and a more overt relationship between academia and the U.S. government in the form of modernization theory. However, this chapter will demonstrate that by the mid-1960s the cozy and mutually beneficial relationship that existed between the national security establishment and academia would become strained. These changes occurred against the backdrop of increased American engagement in the Middle East, but the region occupied less of Washington’s attention as the Vietnam War intensified.

**Eisenhower and the Middle East**

The Sputnik launch came nearly a year after tensions between Egypt, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States erupted into a conflict and invasion of the Suez Canal. As discussed in Chapter 1, the end of the 1956 Suez War found a triumphant Nasser emerging on the world stage as a hero to the “Third World.” After his regime survived the tripartite invasion, Nasser would eventually emerge as one of the leaders of the “non-aligned movement,” with Indian Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru, Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito, and Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, and Indonesian President Sukarno. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower

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5 Brzezinski, 171, 213-216.
administration struggled with how best to contain Nasser’s influence throughout the region, viewing him either as an active Soviet client state or an unwitting supporter of Soviet goals in the region and the broader Third World.

Through a combination of military and economic aid, the Eisenhower Doctrine sought to buttress conservative Arab regimes aligned with the United States in the region. Over the next decade this split between the “conservative” and “radical” Arab regimes would in part reflect the broader Cold War competition between Washington and Moscow. During the early phase of the Arab Cold War, Washington’s allies included the monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq as well as the sectarian government in Lebanon. Perhaps the most vulnerable of which was Jordan, led by a young King Hussein.

Hussein bin Talal was coronated three years before the Suez War at the age of 18. The vast majority of Jordan’s citizens were Palestinians, including refugees from the 1948 Palestine War and native Palestinians in the West Bank territory annexed in 1950. Politically active, educated, and generally hostile to the Hashemite monarchy due to its collusion with Britain and the Zionist movement during the 1948 Palestine War, Palestinians in Jordan formed the core of the country’s political and intellectual class but not its military. Like his grandfather King Abdullah, who was assassinated in 1951, Hussein attempted to co-opt the wealthy and educated Palestinian elite and relied on a combination of political patronage and repression to control the rest. Coupled with the prevalence of pro-Nasserist officers within the Jordanian Arab Legion and heavily reliant on British aid, the Eisenhower administration believed that Hussein’s reign was unlikely to survive. The Eisenhower Doctrine served to instigate a confrontation within Jordan and would prove to be an unexpected savior for Hussein’s reign. It also marked the shift in support for the Hashemite monarchy from British subsidies to American aid.⁷

Unlike Jordan, Saudi Arabia was already considered a vital and strategic interest by Washington. As discussed in Chapter 3, the U.S.-Saudi alliance developed during the Second World War due to the Kingdom’s vast oil reserves. By the mid-1950s, Saudi Arabia was struggling with its new found oil wealth. In its efforts to combat Nasser’s growing prestige, the Eisenhower administration attempted to promote Saudi Arabia’s King Saud as a leader of the Arab and Muslim worlds. As the Kingdom was the site of Islam’s holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina, Eisenhower believed -- incorrectly -- that Fahd could become a Muslim pope. As Nasser’s popularity eclipsed that of the royal family, Saud was unwilling to openly confront him or to fully endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine. Instead, in what would set the trend for the next half century in dealing with radical political leaders in the region, Riyadh would embrace Nasser publicly while working covertly with Washington and other Arab leaders to undermine him. The split between Riyadh and Cairo would become more pronounced in the early 1960s and the second phase of the Arab Cold War.⁸

The Eisenhower Doctrine was intended to protect the nations in the region from the aggressive threats of “international communism.” Washington’s willingness to intervene militarily within the region was tested in Lebanon. Although Lebanon’s political strife was due

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⁷ Yaqub, 119-145.
⁸ Vitalis, 184-193; Yaqub, 44-49, 102-106.
largely to internal factors rather than Soviet or Nasserist intrigues, the United States dispatched forces in July 1958 to prop up the regime of President Camille Chamoun.\footnote{Yaqub, 205-236.}

American troops landed in Lebanon even though the Eisenhower administration was already reevaluating its Middle East policy and attempting to come to terms with Nasser. While the political crisis in Lebanon appeared to be close to resolution, a bloody coup in Iraq overthrowing the Hashemite monarchy helped to trigger Eisenhower’s decision to dispatch troops to Lebanon. Although the Iraqi Free Officers Coup was inspired by Nasser’s example, the plot to topple King Faysal II was homegrown. Indeed, the new Iraqi revolutionary government led by General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim continued to be independent of Cairo. Qasim backed out of joining the United Arab Republic with Egypt and Syria and purged Nasserites from his cabinet and arrested others. A distinct chill in relations between Baghdad and Cairo followed and in determining relations with the new “radical” government in Iraq, Nasser sided with the conservative Arab regimes. By the end of 1959, the Eisenhower Doctrine was shelved and Washington and Cairo began a brief rapprochement that would continue into the Kennedy administration.\footnote{Ibid., 237-267.}

\textit{Tensions in the Middle East}

As the Eisenhower administration developed its containment policy toward Nasser, a conference was held at Johns Hopkins University to discuss the Suez crisis and “Tensions in the Middle East.” The participants included OSS veterans J.C. Hurewitz, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Robert Sethian, as well as scholar and former British intelligence official Bernard Lewis and former State Department official and author of NSC 68, Paul Nitze. Of the conference participants, Lewis would have the most lasting impact on Middle East studies. Indeed, the themes of his presentation would be repeated in his work over the next half century and would eventually be adopted by other scholars in the post-Cold War era.

In “The Middle East in World Affairs,” Lewis examined the region after the Suez crisis and as a Cold War battleground. He argued that “to achieve some understanding of Middle Eastern attitudes in world affairs at the present time, we must view the Middle East not as countries, not even as nations, but as a civilization.” In spite of the protestations from those in the region, Lewis claimed that “no Middle Eastern state, nor any conceivable combination of Middle Eastern states, could in present circumstances play an active and wholly independent role in Middle East affairs -- as can easily be seen in the maneuvers in the last few years, of pro-Westerners, anti-Westerners (a more accurate description than pro-Communists) and adherents of the a-plague-on-both-your-houses school.” Of these different political stances, Lewis stated that it was the anti-Westerners which “commanded the widest, readiest, and strongest support in most of the countries of the Middle East.”\footnote{Bernard Lewis, “The Middle East in World Affairs,” in \textit{Tensions in the Middle East}, ed. Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958): 51, 54-55.}

According to Lewis, the widespread support for Nasser across the region after the Suez War was not the result of any legitimate grievances or identification, rather it was due to an inherent anti-Westernism, more specifically “the mood of revulsion from the West and the wish to spite
and humiliate it.” While there were politicians in the region that wanted to pursue relations with
the West, they were restrained by the sentiments of their respective populations who preferred a
“policy of rejection and insult.” The root cause of the “present discontents,” Lewis asserted, was
not due to conflict between nations but a “clash between civilizations.” He stated that this
conflict began with emergence of Islam and its eventual expansion into North Africa and Spain
and continued with the failed “Christian counteroffensive” of the Crusades. After the lengthy
rule of the Ottoman Turks, the century and a half of Western domination “shattered traditional
patterns of thought and behavior, of political and social loyalty and organization, beyond repair,
and has posed to the peoples of the Middle East an immense problem of readjustment, both in
their dealings with the outside world and in their own internal affairs.”

Lewis claimed that the people of the region were experiencing a “crisis of transition” that
was initiated by the West but which they must resolve alone. Although this phrase would be
adopted by modernization theorists, Lewis suggested a policy that they would not approve of,
asserting that “masterly inactivity” was needed in which neither the West nor the Soviet Bloc
would interfere in the region.

Commenting on Lewis’s paper, Johns Hopkins University’s C. Grove Haines stated that “the
role of the Middle East is disproportionate to its inherent strength.” He asserted that that in the
Cold War contest between Moscow and Washington, the region’s importance was in its
“usefulness as an instrument to withhold from or insure to western Europe the oil resources upon
which Europe so largely depends, in the political impact of its nationalistic strivings upon the
ancient great powers of Europe as well as upon the uncommitted areas of the world, and in its
strategic significance relative to Western global defense.” Haines supported the major assertion
of Lewis’s argument and claimed that the Middle East was “not very consequential as an active,
independent element in international politics.” He claimed that it was “dependant” and
“malleable” and “exposed to and responding to the competing influences of the great powers on
the outside.” Haines stated that the combination of political weakness, strategic resources and
location, “invites the exertion of influence and makes it inescapably an area of major
contention.” Therefore, the United States could not adopt a policy of “masterly inactivity,”
which would expose the region to Soviet “penetration and dominance.” Haines argued that the
U.S. must “shoulder the greatest part of the burden, for alone among the Western powers it
enjoys at least a measure of respect in the area and the power and prestige that are essential to the
exertion of influence.”

The National Defense Education Act

Like his predecessors, Eisenhower’s presidency was characterized by several ironies. The
most well known of which was the former general’s warning at the end of his presidency on the
dangers to American democracy from the growing military-industrial complex. Passage of the
NDEA during his second term was another irony. Although he was the President of Columbia
University before becoming the thirty-fourth President of the United States, Eisenhower did not

12 Ibid., 55-57.
13 Ibid., 59.
14 C. Grove Haines, “Commentary,” in Tensions in the Middle East, ed. Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
favor federal funding for education. Yet like school desegregation, which Eisenhower opposed but begrudgingly enforced, the NDEA authorized the federal funding of education in spite of the White House’s lukewarm support. As discussed in the previous chapter, early efforts to establish university-based area studies and language training programs were hindered by Congressional resistance to government funding.

The Sputnik launch coincided with a crisis in American public education. According to Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose, the 1956-1957 school year was the largest in American history, resulting in a shortage of classrooms and instructors from elementary schools to colleges. Because of the postwar “baby boom,” increases in school enrollment were projected for the next decade. However, the Eisenhower administration did not have a comprehensive plan to address the problems in public education, preferring the situation be resolved locally with a combination of government grants and loans for poorer states.15

The Sputnik crisis provided a rare political opportunity to bridge the ideological gridlock on federal aid for education. While Congressional Democrats pushed for generous long-term funding for school construction and instruction, the Eisenhower administration and its Republican allies favored temporary loans to the states. Only three months before the Sputnik launch, H.R. 1, a compromise bill for school construction in the House was narrowly defeated. Historian Barbara Barksdale Clowse asserts that the Sputnik crisis “disarmed opposition to federal aid” and to the existing bills. She explains that supporters were able to push legislation forward by creating a composite bill that was not exclusively focused on federal aid for education while also tying the funding for education to defense. Clowse adds, “Proponents never forgot either idea.”16

While Eisenhower offered lukewarm support for the previous legislation, education became the center of the administration’s domestic agenda after Sputnik. The President scheduled four “science and security” speeches, with the emphasis on the latter. Yet he was initially unwilling to pursue more than temporary funding. Meanwhile, Democrats led by Alabama Senator Lister Hill and Representative Carl Elliot sought more sweeping support from the elementary school level to colleges and universities. However, they also wanted control to remain at the state and local levels.17

The legislative process carried throughout the spring and into the summer of 1958. While the Senate focused on the benefits of education funding for national security, the House debated the implications of federal support for education. By the spring, negotiations occurred behind closed-doors, away from the committee hearings. Although President Eisenhower was not directly engaged in the discussions, Secretary of State Dulles did advocate for area and language training as well support for the sciences. However, one threat to finalizing negotiations for the education bill was that by the late spring and summer the panic over Sputnik was abating.18

As discussion of the education bill stretched into the summer, allies in the press attempted to sway public opinion. Writing in the Washington Post, Malvina Lindsay argued that the lack of Arabic knowledge among American diplomats in Baghdad was partially to blame for the lack of

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16 Clowse, 40-49.
17 Ibid., 66-67.
18 Ibid., 88-104.
intelligence on the Free Officers’ Coup in Iraq. Lindsay referenced a recent survey conducted by the University of Wisconsin which she claimed demonstrated, “The frightening unpreparedness of this country in linguistics for the Middle East cold war.” In spite of warnings a decade earlier by the ACLS’s Mortimer Graves, Lindsey reported that the Wisconsin survey found that only 23 out of roughly 1,800 higher education institutions offered one or more Arabic courses and 12 offered area studies classes on the region. More importantly, she claimed that in spite of recent language training efforts by the State and Defense Departments, “a small proportion of diplomats and officials sent overseas” had the necessary language proficiency. This contrasted with the Soviet Union, where “Russian technicians are trained in the languages and cultures of areas to which they are sent.” Lindsay concluded by stating that if Congress passed the educational legislation under debate it could improve the U.S.’s ability to train more language specialists.19

H.R. 13247 was finally brought to the House floor in late July. Carl Elliott, the Alabama Democrat who co-authored the bill and pushed it through the Education and Labor committee declared that it was “America’s answer to the Soviet challenge.” In spite of Elliott’s substantial efforts over the previous six months, it required an unlikely alliance of a Republican administration and organized labor to secure passage in the House and Senate.20 After nearly a month of negotiations and attempts to scuttle the legislation, it was passed on August 24 and was signed by Eisenhower on September 2. Clowse notes that Eisenhower claimed upon signing the bill that it was “an emergency undertaking to be terminated after four years.”21

**Implementing the NDEA**

In the first four years, $61 million was allocated for NDEA’s Title VI programs. Of which, $8 million per year was designated for language development (or Part A of Title VI), including centers, stipends and research. An additional $7.25 million per year was for language institutes and stipends (designated Part B of Title VI). In fiscal year 1959, $400,000 was allocated for Part A from the original appropriation to initiate the program and establish language centers, including $25,000 for research.22

The research funding was for a three-month study conducted by the ACLS on behalf of the Office of Education to determine which languages and areas should be prioritized. In a memorandum to Homer Babbidge, Jr., then the United States Office of Education’s (USOE) assistant commissioner for higher education, Kenneth Mildenberger, USOE’s chief of the language development section, asserted that the ACLS was the “logical non-governmental agency” to oversee a survey of which language centers should be established. Mildenberger explained, “For many years, almost alone in the American educational world, the ACLS has maintained an active interest in the problems associated with languages rarely, or never, taught in

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20 Newhall, 210. Newhall states that specific language was added to the bill to mollify the criticism of those who opposed federal funding for education because it intruded on states’ rights. The bill stated, “Nothing in the Act shall be construed to authorize any agency or employees of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any institution or school system.”
22 “Defense Educational Activities, Office of Education: Advanced Training in Foreign Languages and Areas, Fiscal Year 1959,” 5 January 1959, RG 12, Entry 17, Box 73, NDEA Files, NARACP.
U.S. educational institutions.” He recommended the creation of a steering panel mostly drawn from current and former ACLS officials to oversee the survey. Harold B. Hoskins, the Director of the State Department’s FSI and ACLS Treasurer, and Mortimer Graves, the former Executive Secretary of the ACLS, were among those recommended for the steering panel.

As discussed in the previous chapters, Mortimer Graves, Executive Secretary of the ACLS, played a leading role in the creation of Middle East studies. Although Graves retired from the ACLS before the Sputnik launch, he was called upon after the NDEA became law. Similarly, Hoskins played a role during and after World War II due to his family connections with AUB and members of the Roosevelt administration.

By March, the Office of Education released the findings of the ACLS study. The ACLS identified six “critically needed foreign languages” that it recommended be studied in centers established with Title VI funds: Arabic, Chinese, Hindustani, Japanese, Portuguese, and Russian. It noted that “these six languages are spoken by more than 1 billion people, or about 35 percent of the world’s population yet very few people in the United States have studied any of them.” In a released statement announcing the ACLS’s findings, Arthur Fleming, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, added, “It is clearly imperative that this huge impediment to easy communication with the peoples of other vast areas of the world be removed as rapidly as possible.” Fleming noted that the initial six languages were a “major step toward this objective” and were just the beginning. He stated that “this nation, however, cannot in the long run meet its already gigantic commercial and diplomatic commitments around the globe without adequate instruction for its citizens in more than 50 other official and unofficial modern foreign languages.” Fleming added, “Many of these languages are not taught at all in any American university or college, and priorities will need to be established in this area.”

The Impact of the NDEA

The NDEA’s impact was demonstrable in its first five years. By 1965, 15 Title VI centers were established for Arabic language instruction. In addition, Turkish was taught at 9 centers, Hebrew at 7, and Persian at 6 university-based centers. By 1964, a total of 1,084 students were studying Middle Eastern languages, a dramatic increase from the 286 students in 1958.

Perhaps the longest lasting impact of the legislation was an increase in the number of doctoral students trained in the different areas. By 1960, 241 doctorates were awarded in international studies, 28 of which were related to the Middle East. In comparison, there were a total of 181 international studies PhDs in 1951, of which 24 were related to the Middle East.

23 “Mildenberger to Babbidge,” 17 September 1958, RG 12, Entry 17, Box 75, NDEA Files, NARACP. In a subsequent memorandum to Lawrence Dertich, Commissioner of Education, Babbidge requested that $25,000 of the initial $400,000 allocated for the establishment of the centers be made available for the ACLS study. The request was approved on September 24, 1958.
24 “Statement by Arthur S. Fleming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,” 23 March 1959, RG 12, Entry 17, Box 74, Budget Justification Files, NARACP.
total of 379 international studies PhDs were awarded in 1966, of which 40 were in Middle East studies.26

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Ford Foundation established the Foreign Area Training Fellowship Program (FATFP) in 1952 for Asia and the Near East. Two years later the fellowship was expanded to include Africa, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By May 1962, the FATFP was transferred to the SSRC-ACLS Joint Committee. Of the 2,001 FATFP applicants in the program’s first three years (1952-1954), 798 (40%) were for the Near East, of which 85 (10%) received awards. In contrast, 18 percent of applicants for Asia during this period received grants.27

The number of fellowships awarded for the study of the Near East decreased after the NDEA was passed. From 1958 to 1961 an average of 22 fellowships were awarded per year. However, the numbers of fellowships were cut in half from 1962 to 1965, with a low of only 8 fellowships awarded in the 1963-1964 academic year. While the percentage of grants awarded during the post-NDEA period improved, especially by 1966, the Middle East still lagged behind the rest of Asia. During this period, the number of fellowships awarded for research in South, Southeast, and the Far East increased. Moreover, the number of applicants per year from 1958 to 1966 remained relatively consistent, averaging roughly 340 per academic year.28

In 1962, the first professional organization for Middle East studies, the American Association for Middle East Studies (AAMES), organized a study of the field. Led by Columbia’s J.C. Hurewitz, the study focused on undergraduate instruction. Hurewitz explained in the report’s preface that the emergence of Middle East studies were part of a larger postwar trend of “broadening the liberal arts education” in American universities and colleges. He noted that the traditional curriculum focused heavily on Western civilization, and the increase in non-Western studies was “intended to redress the balance.” However, Hurewitz asserted that “the intimate connection between such area studies and politics could not be denied.” He added, “Although the present survey did not set out to answer the question, it has indirectly helped illuminate the relationship between the unprecedented problems of American security and the growth of undergraduate instruction on one foreign area.” However, he argued that “to admit the original political stimulus is not to denigrate the value of such studies. It is merely to put them in the proper perspective.”29

AAMES was established in 1959 and commissioned the study in order to determine the “overall problems to which the rapid spread of Middle East studies has given rise” as well as to determine measures for improvement. According to AAMES, by 1961 there were 330 faculty

26 McCaughey, 200. The most dramatic increase observed during this period was for South Asian studies, which accounted for 16 PhDs in 1951 and 49 in 1960.
29 J.C. Hurewitz, Undergraduate Instruction on the Middle East in American Colleges and Universities Provisional Draft (New York: American Association for Middle East Studies, 1 May, 1962): iii-iv. Hurewitz explained that unlike graduate education which was for professional training, undergraduate instruction on non-Western areas “is normally designed to impart to the student a comprehensive understanding of his own civilization in global perspective and thus hopefully convey to him a sense of responsibility as a citizen in a land that has suddenly and not too happily taken over duties of world leadership.”
members and 180 colleges and universities in the U.S. offering Middle East-related courses.\textsuperscript{30} The survey focused on social sciences courses as well as those in languages and the humanities. It excluded courses focused on ancient history of the region as well as language classes without a social science component as it deemed those to be part of Oriental studies. Administrators were asked to select four reasons for adding Middle East courses to the curriculum. Hurewitz reported that the largest number, 78 percent, identified “American security” as the main rationale. This was even more pronounced among universities at the “Top” schools, where 91 percent of administrators selected “American security.” In addition, 53 percent of all administrators and 68 percent at the “Top” programs also identified “cultural enrichment,” as a major reason for adding Middle East courses.\textsuperscript{31}

Although there was an increase in the number of graduate students interested in Middle East studies after the NDEA, there remained a considerable dearth of trained scholars with contemporary knowledge of the region. Writing in February 1961, Harvard’s Hamilton Gibb informed a colleague at the University of Michigan that “the area of selection in the Modern Near East is very limited indeed.” He added, “I must confess that I am not impressed by most of the publications in this field.” Gibb stated that the problem was because, “The younger men in particular seem to be narrowly specialized on contemporary Turkey or Egypt or one of the Arab countries, and nearly always display an extremely superficial and inaccurate knowledge of the nineteenth century.” He remarked that he found political science scholars better prepared and knowledgeable than those who studied history.\textsuperscript{32}

While there was an increase in the number of area centers related to the Middle East after the NDEA was passed, the region clearly lagged behind other areas in terms of priority for study and funding. In a 1967 assessment of the field conducted for the SSRC, Princeton sociologist Monroe Berger, who also chaired the Joint SSRC-ACLS Committee on the Near and Middle East, offered four explanations for this trend. First, the difficulty in language acquisition, particularly as the study of regional languages did not begin until undergraduate or graduate studies. Second, he asserted, “The modern Middle East and North Africa is not a center of great cultural achievement, nor is it likely to become one in the near future. The study of the region or its languages, therefore, does not constitute its own reward so far as modern culture is concerned.” Third, the Middle East and North Africa was, “not a center of great political power nor does it have the potential to become one.” Finally, he explained that “the Middle East, (less so North Africa) has been receding in immediate political importance to the U.S. (even in “headline” or “nuisance” value) relative to Africa, Latin America, and the Far East.” Because of these factors, Berger concluded that the contemporary Middle East “has only in small degree the kinds of traits that seem to be important in attracting scholarly attention.” He added that while this did not “diminish the validity and intellectual value” of scholarship and study of the region, it did limit the “field’s capacity for growth in the numbers who study and teach.”\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 12. The survey was initially sent to the faculty and administrators on the AAMES list. It was then expanded to other faculty and administrators who were identified through the survey. In total, 201 institutions and 393 faculty members completed the questionnaire.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 36-37.

\textsuperscript{32} “Gibb to Bowditch,” 21 February 1961, UAV 569.10, General File, Box 1, B Folder, HUA. Gibb identified several scholars in the letter that he thought Michigan should approach, including Majid Khadduri, Roderic Davison, Sidney Fisher, Hisham Shirabi, George E. Kirk, Malcolm Kerr, William F. Polk, and Nicola Ziadeh.

The Princeton Consultants

If area studies were a public manifestation of American national security interests, other programs were developed covertly to draw upon and utilize the knowledge and foreign area expertise of leading academics. Chapter 4 detailed attempts by the State Department and CIA to identify sources within key universities for foreign area intelligence and training in analytical methods. This was especially pronounced with the development of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The Office of National Estimates (ONE) was created within the CIA in October 1950. According to then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) General Walter Bedell Smith, ONE would become the “heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery.” Smith proposed that ONE include a panel of outside experts comprised of “five or six outstanding men.” This panel would develop into the Board of National Estimates (BNE).  

According to William Harding Jackson, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Smith, the goal for BNE was to obtain “independent judgment, free of department bias” in evaluating the NIEs. Smith and Jackson believed this could not be achieved from a joint intelligence committee. Jackson also felt that the process would produce a “more authoritative judgment” than would be available from the ONE staff. He believed that “all intelligence personnel, departmental as well as central, were bureaucrats isolated from reality.” The BNE, Jackson argued, “would be composed of men of great prestige with practical experience in the conduct of affairs” and “would subject the findings of intelligence bureaucrats to the test of practical realism.”

Harvard’s William Langer served as the BNE’s first chairman. As discussed Chapter 3, Langer led the OSS’s R&A division during World War II. Apparently attempting to recreate R&A, Langer recruited academics to the BNE. Jackson later recalled that “these professors were as uncomprehending of practical considerations as were the intelligence bureaucrats.” As a result, he moved to establish an external panel of consultants, dubbed the “Princeton Consultants.” The Princeton Consultants were originally intended to provide the “practical realism” in evaluating the NIE, versus the “ivory tower” expertise of the BNE and the myopia of the ONE. However, roles would soon be reversed after Allen Dulles became head of the CIA.

The consultants met at the Princeton Inn, located near the university campus. Former ONE staff member Ludwell Lee Montague later explained that “the basic idea was to get away from the bureaucratic atmosphere of Washington.” Since the majority of consultants were to come from the northeastern United States and Deputy DCI Jackson had a home in Princeton, it was a “convenient midpoint” and a “pleasant place” to meet. The initial consultants included former head of the State Department’s Public Policy Staff (PPS) George Kennan, Vannevar Bush, the President of the Carnegie Institution, Hamilton Fish Armstrong of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Charles B. Fahs, director of humanities for the Rockefeller Foundation.

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34 Montague, 129-130.
35 “Interview with William Harding Jackson,” 8-9 December 1969, RG 263, Entry NN3-263-91-004, Box 2, NARACP.
36 Montague, 135-136.
After stepping down as Assistant Deputy for National Estimates, Langer served as the chief of the Princeton Consultants for the rest of the Eisenhower administration. His replacement as head of ONE was OSS R&A alum and former Yale professor Sherman Kent. After the war, Kent returned to Yale where he published *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, one of the earliest and most influential works on the subject. Although Jackson was skeptical of academics, especially OSS veterans, he was impressed by Kent’s book and recruited him to replace Langer at ONE.

Although Jackson viewed Langer’s tenure unfavorably, CIA Director Allen Dulles was more complementary. In a July 1956 letter to Langer persuading him to continue serving as a consultant, Dulles explained that the “Princeton consultants group is a part of our organization on which I rely highly for all sorts of purposes.” Dulles explained that the NIE’s “profit enormously from the opportunity that [Sherman Kent’s] people have to sit down several times a year and review our current estimative problems with a wise and experienced group like yours.” He added that it the consultative process gave him “great comfort and confidence.” Dulles stated, “I also value this opportunity of keeping leaders in the academic world aware of our estimative work. You continuously suggest new and rewarding lines of inquiry, you have sent us (and I hope will continue to do so) valuable recruits from among your students, and the consultants panel itself has proved a most useful proving ground for prospective members of the Board of National Estimates.”

As head of ONE, Kent served as the main interface for the consultants and with Langer, his former boss at R&A. From academia, Langer was joined by Columbia’s Philp Mosely and Princeton’s Joseph Sayer. The predominant influence of professors from the Ivy Leagues on the consultants’ board was evident by the spring of 1962 when the large number of consultants from the Cambridge, Massachusetts area created an issue for the agency’s couriers. As there were more consultants from Harvard than MIT, the CIA requested that Langer reserve a room on campus where the consultants could review the materials. In response, Langer was able to secure a room at the top floor of the Widener Library. By early 1963, Langer resigned from the consultants’ board after accepting a position with President Kennedy’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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37 “Dulles to Langer,” 2 July 1956, William Langer Personal Papers, Box 1, HUA.
38 “Interview with William Harding Jackson,” 8-9 December 1969, RG 263, Entry NN3-263-91-004, Box 2, NARACP.
39 Ibid.
40 According to medieval historian Norman F. Cantor (and Sayer’s former graduate student), Sayer’s involvement with the CIA went beyond the Consultant’s board. Cantor explained that Sayer was recruited by Allen Dulles and “for at least five summers Strayer spent five days a week at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and during the year he would go down whenever there was a crisis somewhere in the world.” Cantor recounts that on these occasions he was asked to fill in for Strayer’s lectures. He added that “I once had the temerity to ask him what he was doing for the CIA and why it found the services of a medievalist so important. The response was that Allen Dulles knew medievalists were used to drawing conclusions from fragmentary evidence, and that is just what the CIA did.” Norman F. Cantor, *Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works, and Ideas of the Great Medievalists of the Twentieth Century* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991): 261-262.
41 “Smith to Langer,” 28 February 1961; “Smith to Langer,” 10 April 1962; “Langer to Smith,” 18 April 1962, Langer Personal Papers (HUFP 19.46), Box 1, HUA.
42 “McCone to Langer,” 24 January 1963, Langer Personal Papers (HUFP 19.46), Box 1, HUA.
Although much of the work is still shrouded in secrecy, the Princeton Consultants continued offering opinions on NIEs into the 1970s. According to Montague, by 1971 the BNE was comprised overwhelmingly of professional intelligence officers, while the consultants were generally academics. He is careful to note that by that time “the intelligence professionalism of the CIA” was “far superior to anything known in 1950.”

Academia and “The Invisible Government”

While the CIA’s professionalism developed over time, a rift began to emerge between the agency and academia only a few years after Langer departed the Consultant’s Board. A November 1965 memo by Deputy Director Ray Cline to CIA Director William Raborn revealed that scholars in the social sciences were reluctant to engage openly with government agencies in particular the CIA. Cline’s memo detailed the reactions of the Consultant’s Board to a proposal for the establishment of area and functional panels. The Consultant’s Board warned that the proposal would be “coldly received and “arouse suspicion and antagonism.” It explained that scholars in the social sciences “have come increasingly to fear that association with the U.S. military and intelligence agencies -- above all with the CIA -- will jeopardize their opportunities for investigations and research abroad.” The memo added, “In short we are in a period of poor relations between the Government (CIA) and the scholars as far as social science is concerned. It may last for some time. This does not apply to the natural and physical sciences.” It noted that “the issue dividing the social sciences is a moral one” and that “counterinsurgency has brought the issue to a head viz. do we put down the good insurgents with the bad?” It added, “Social science is not a science and mountains of research do not yield political wisdom, though they provide platforms for debate over foreign policy.”

Instead of creating formal panels in conjunction with the SSRC, the decision was made to continue informal relations with individual scholars who had received security clearance. Deputy Director Cline explained that “we are increasing our list of cleared consultants, with due care, concentrating on our substantive task -- and not on the ‘CIA image’.” He added that the Consultant’s Board would continue operating for input on national estimates, and that “for military and economic research we will draw from an increased list of specialists according to

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43 It should be noted that minimal information is available on the “Princeton Consultants,” and I have requested additional records from the CIA on the group’s activities and membership under the Freedom of Information Act.
44 Montague, 136.
45 “Cline to Raborn: Organization of Panels of Social Scientists,” 18 November 1965, RG 263, Entry History Source Collection (NN3-263-94-010), Box 9, Folder 21, NARACP. Although source text is deleted in the declassified document available in the U.S. National Archives, there is little doubt from the description of the consultants that the recommendations presented to DCI Raborn were from the Consultant’s Board (“The Princeton Consultants”). Cline’s memorandum explains, “They are a group of distinguished scholars and social scientists in both regional and functional fields who have met with us periodically as friends since December 1950. We owe much to them. In early days they helped us define the form and content appropriate to a national estimate. (The meeting of 28 October was their fifty-second.) The membership has changed with the years, but the group has maintained continuity of service and devotion to national intelligence and CIA. Although referred to as [source text deleted] as you know, the members of the group come from all over the country.” The memorandum named the Professors and their universities, however, the source text was deleted in the declassified copy. One name which was not deleted was that of former CIA chief Allen Dulles. Cline explained that Dulles was a “member” of the board and had participated in the discussion of outreach to social scientists.
the problem.” However, Cline asserted, “We have a more difficult problem in political matters where the emphasis is on current intelligence and not on research.”

The memo argued that the recent publication and success of *The Invisible Government* by journalists David Wise and Thomas Ross served to undermine relations between the CIA and academia. In their discussion of the postwar U.S. government and the expansion of the national security bureaucracy, Wise and Ross asserted, “There are two governments in the United States today. One is visible. The other is invisible.” They explained that “the first is the government that citizens read about,” while the second was “the interlocking, hidden machinery that carries out the policies of the United States in the Cold War.” Wise and Ross stated that “this second, invisible government gathers intelligence, coordinates espionage, and plans and executes secret operations all over the world.”

Published in 1964, the *Invisible Government* found a welcome audience in an America still struggling to understand the assassination of President Kennedy. It offered readers insights into the activities and excesses of the myriad government and military agencies, in particular the CIA, from the Bay of Pigs to the “secret war” in Vietnam.

*The Invisible Government* also revealed the “two-way” relationship between academic institutions and the CIA. Wise and Ross explained that the Agency covertly funds research programs at some institutions while the universities assisted with recruiting personnel and provided “a pool of expert knowledge about foreign countries upon which the intelligence agency can, and does, draw.” They added, “Despite the possible loss of academic freedom, most universities and professors have shown little reluctance to work for the CIA. The agency has been able to obtain the services of almost all of the academic institutions and individuals it has approached.” Wise and Ross briefly discussed the connections between the Agency and Harvard and MIT. They asserted that Harvard “refused to accept money for classified projects, but some of its faculty members have done research by the simple expedient of funneling their work through the Center of International Studies” at MIT.

Wise and Ross concluded with a warning to American academia, writing, “There is a real danger that the academic community may find itself so closely aligned with the Invisible Government that it will have lost its ability to function

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46 Ibid. Cline noted that the CIA was “encouraging analysts to attend meetings of scholarly and professional associations. (During FY 1965 our records show that more than 300 DDI employees attended meetings of this kind.) We are requiring written reports of any matters which were helpful to them or of potential use to others in the Agency, which we will send to all interested divisions in the Agency.”


48 Ibid., 242-243, Gilman, 158, 298. Led by economist Walt Whitman Rostow, Wise and Ross stated that MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS) was “set up with CIA money in 1950.” For their evidence, Wise and Ross rely on the June 12, 1962 testimony of Rostow associate Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, where he acknowledged the connection between CIS and the CIA. Based on a 1999 interview with Rostow, Gilman explains that “initial seed funding” for CIS came from the CIA and that the Ford Foundation provided $875,000 of initial funding that was supplemented by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. Wise and Ross also reported that Rostow’s *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, which was produced by CIS, was “published in two versions, one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the other ‘sanitized’ for public consumption.”
as an independent critic of our government and society.” They also called for academics to “reexamine” their “acceptance of hidden money from the CIA.”

Indeed, within a year the seemingly cozy relationship described by Wise and Ross would become strained. Cline’s August 1965 memorandum noted that “there is a growing tendency in certain quarters to look for CIA behind the Government front in foreign affairs and in the foundations and universities.” Cline reported that “our academic community is in a period of soul searching and debate.” He added that “some of our consultants at [source text deleted] expressed alarm at the way in which their colleagues have accepted ‘The Invisible Government’ as a factual description of the CIA’s role and serious concern over the lack of understanding their colleagues show for the problems of our Government.” While “in the past,” Cline stated, “a relation with the CIA may have enhanced a professor’s prestige. There is an insinuation that he is being used.” He added, “Our [source text deleted] consultants reminded us in no uncertain terms of the current strain in Government-academic relations.”

In April 1966, the magazine Ramparts exposed further evidence of the relationship between academia and the CIA. The article, “The University on the Make,” was ostensibly an exposé of a mid-1950s training program in South Vietnam overseen by Michigan State University. However, the article’s introduction by Stanley K. Sheinbaum, a former Michigan State economics professor and member of the South Vietnam project, revealed that the real target were the “automatic cold warriors” which could be found on “every university campus,” particularly in the social sciences. Hyperbole aside, the article raised questions about the extent of cooperation between university departments and the intelligence community. Ramparts argued that the Michigan State project, which was to train the civil service and police, provided CIA agents with a cover. The article claimed that the agents “were all listed as members of the MSU Project staff and were formally appointed by the University Board of Trustees. Several of the CIA men were given academic rank and were paid by the University Project.”

Nor was criticism directed solely at faculty, as Ramparts also condemned the actions and policies of Michigan State administration, in particular then university President John A. Hannah. It asserted that under Hannah’s administration, Michigan State was “more service oriented than the average Standard Oil retail outlet.” In particular, through its international programs, Michigan State was providing assistance to 13 countries, the majority of which were “military dictatorships.” Ramparts argued that Hannah’s “view of the modern university is tied to the liberal concept of America as the defender of the free world.” It added, “That the university must prepare young citizens to assume this proud task, and to be a leader abroad in areas chosen for it by the government, is Hannah's educational credo.”

The Ramparts article had an impact beyond the critics of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Indeed, coupled with the publication of The Invisible Government and five-part series in the New York Times in April 1966 on the Michigan State controversy, the U.S. intelligence community was interested and concerned about the coverage. At a meeting of the President’s Foreign

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49 Ibid., 355.
50 “Cline to Raborn: Organization of Panels of Social Scientists,” 18 November 1965, RG 263, Entry History Source Collection (NN3-263-94-010), Box 9, Folder 21, NARACP.
52 Ibid.
Intelligence Advisory Board held at the end of May 1966, recent media coverage of the intelligence community, in particular the articles published by *Ramparts* and the *New York Times*, were distributed to Board members and placed on the agenda for discussion.53

*The Foreign Service Institute*

University-based area studies programs were viewed by the national security establishment as the initial stage of training for scholars as well as future government officials. Those graduates who were hired by the State Department or CIA were eventually trained at the State Department’s FSI. As discussed in Chapter 4, the FSI was first established in 1946 and the outbreak of the Korean War found the institute with excess classroom capacity but an insufficient number of instructors. Moreover, language and area instruction for certain geographic areas, including the Near and Middle East, was not viewed by many FSOs as beneficial to their careers. By 1952, the FSI was also beginning to evaluate how to improve its training programs for the Near and Middle East, conducted in conjunction with Princeton University. It determined that the university programs “though quite adequate for the instruction not given up to now at the Institute, are by and large not satisfactory for the special needs and requirements of Government language-and-area specialists.” To address the gap, the FSI proposed a pilot program that would be based in the Near East. The region was chosen because the FSI’s staff had more “academic and Field experience in the Near East than in any other area.”54

The FSI’s Language-and-Area School, Near East was launched in March 1953 and based in the U.S Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Led by Charles Ferguson, who would leave a year later for Harvard’s fledgling Middle East program, the school was established to provide intermediate and advanced training in Arabic. Initial language and area training was conducted in Washington at the FSI and included a focus on U.S. policy in the region. Area studies in Beirut provided the trainees with the geographic, historical, economic, and social background of the Near East. Meanwhile, intermediate and advanced training in Persian and Turkish was conducted at Princeton.55

Harold Hoskins became the director of the FSI in 1955. Hoskins inherited an FSI that was underutilized and understaffed, but during his tenure the institute expanded and improved its services. It would become known during his tenure as “Hoskins University.” Hoskins was charged with implementing a training program for State Department personnel. The FSI’s shortcomings were compounded by the Sputnik launch and criticisms in the press of America’s deficiencies in science and languages. In response to press reports in March 1958 that roughly 50 percent of FSOs did not possess any foreign language skills, the FSI instituted mandatory training and testing program. The goal of the program was that all FSOs would be proficient in a “world language” (French, German, and Spanish) and have “useful” knowledge of the principal languages.

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53 “Memorandum for the Members of the Board,” 19 May 1966, William Langer Personal Papers, HUGFP 19.46, Box 1, Folder CIA 1960-1971, HUA.
55 “Sollenberger to Oechsner: Language-and-area specialization programs conducted by the Foreign Service Institute,” 12 November 1953, RG 59, Entry 5091, Box 557, Language and Area Specialists Folder, NARACP.
language of the country where they were assigned. By the end of 1959, it reported that the number of FSOs without any foreign language skills had been reduced to 16.5 percent. In addition, the FSI benefitted from a dramatic increase in its training budget. Indeed, the budget for foreign language training alone in 1960 exceeded the entire training budget for the 1955 fiscal year.56

After Sputnik, the FSI set ambitious targets for its language training program. Based on an evaluation of 1,490 FSOs in 26 languages, the Institute determined that 24.7 percent had attained specialist or bi-lingual status and 35.4 percent were proficient at the professional use level. By 1963, the FSI set a goal for 85-90 percent of FSOs to have the “professional use” level of proficiency in at least one foreign language.57

Prior to Hoskins’ tenure the FSI had conducted limited language training. From 1946-1954, 20 FSOs completed the Institute’s intensive Arabic training program and two FSOs finished training in Persian. In comparison, 34 FSOs received Russian language training and 16 completed instruction in Chinese. From 1955-1959, 25 FSOs were trained in Arabic, 3 in Hebrew, 6 in Persian, and 9 in Turkish. In contrast, 385 were trained in French, 145 in German, 35 in Russian, and 17 in Chinese during this period.58

In September 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was considering legislation that would authorize the creation of a Foreign Service Academy. However, an internal State Department assessment ruled out this possibility. In a letter to Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, Loy Henderson, then Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration, explained that the review “strengthened the Department’s confidence in the current practice of drawing FSOs directly from the universities, public and private, of this country as the best means of obtaining qualified people with a wide range of geographic and educational backgrounds.” Henderson added that the State Department determined that the creation of an academy “would not improve the caliber of the young people now becoming available to the [Foreign] Service.”59

The internal assessment confirmed previous reluctance within the State Department to establish an academy for either undergraduate or graduate training. Instead, the State Department argued that government-financed loans to support the studies of students wishing to join the Foreign Service as well as the continued recruitment of university graduates would be superior to establishing a stand-alone institution. It argued that an academy could not compete with the faculty and resources of a major university, the graduates of which were already serving in the State Department. Rather, it asserted that FSOs would derive greater benefit from additional training during their careers. In addition, the Department stated that the key skill needed by FSOs was language training, which was available through the FSI. Moreover, as

56 “Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Language Training and Skills,” 15 November 1959, Hoskins Papers, Box 4, Folder 2, PUA; “Principal Witness Statement,” 17 January 1961, Hoskins Papers, Box 4, Folder 5, PUA.
57 Ibid.
58 “FSI Intensive Language Training Programs,” 8 January 1959, Hoskins Papers, Box 4, Folder 2, PUA.
59 “Henderson to Mansfield,” 3 March 1960, Harold Hoskins Personal Papers, Box 4, Folder 3, PUA.
FSOs were now drawn from across the country and from different socio-economic backgrounds, the State Department argued that establishing an academy would reverse this trend.\footnote{Recruitment and Training in the Foreign Service: Position of the Department of State on a Foreign Service Academy and Related Questions, (undated), Hoskins Papers, Box 4, Folder 3, PUA.}

The State Department reported that FSOs were graduates of over 200 different American universities and colleges and roughly 60 percent had graduate degrees. It noted that a recent survey of lower level FSOs revealed that 5 percent were from high income families. In contrast, middle income and lower income families accounted for 79 percent and 16 percent respectively.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, the State Department conceded that the FSI’s training program should be expanded to meet existing needs. It maintained that Institute would continue to provide language training as well as career development courses for FSOs. Specialized coursework and training would be completed at universities or through arrangements with non-governmental institutions.\footnote{Ibid.}

In spite of the State Department’s reliance on the FSI, a separate internal review from the same time period led by Cornell’s J. Milton Cowen identified problems with the language training program. The most prominent issue was retaining staff, as they were often recruited by major universities. This was compounded by the lack of materials for instruction as well as inconsistent and unpredictable class sizes. However, the Cowen report acknowledged that because of the specialized nature of the language training at FSI, the review committee could not identify a more economical or effective alternative.\footnote{“A Report on Language Training in the Foreign Service Institute,” February 1960, Hoskins Papers, Box 4, Folder 3, PUA.}

Harvard, Princeton and the Foundations

As discussed in Chapter 4, by 1954 the Rockefeller Foundation began discussing how best to fund area studies over the long term. Led by Charles H. Fahs, then Director, of Humanities, the Foundation considered offering sizable grants to a few institutions after which it would no longer fund area studies on a regular basis. With the passage of the NDEA, this proposal was revisited at the end of the decade and coincided with a massive fundraising campaign by Harvard for CMES. Harvard approached the Rockefeller Foundation for a $500,000 grant that would help it meet its $2 million fundraising goal. As part of the negotiations for the grant, the Rockefeller Foundation also encouraged the Ford Foundation to provide Harvard with a similar institution-building grant. CMES eventually received a $500,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and $950,000 from the Ford Foundation.\footnote{Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1961; Ford Foundation Annual Report 1962; Babai, 9.}

In the discussion between Harvard and the Rockefeller Foundation, future Secretary of State and Foundation President Dean Rusk informed Harvard’s President Nathan Pusey that the university had made “remarkable progress over the past few years” in its Middle East studies program. He noted that the Foundation was encouraged by the fundraising campaign and its potential to solidify CMES. Rusk also offered “personal and private” advice, regarding a trend
that he claimed the Foundation had observed at different universities, including Harvard, in making appointments related to area studies. He explained that this was related to different standards for area studies than for traditional departments. Rusk wrote that “there have been instances where appointments were tolerated, rather than made with enthusiasm, possibly on the assumption that one cannot expect too much from men in area studies.” Considering this situation, Harvard’s fundraising effort was designed to secure and tenure the best area studies scholars. Rusk suggested that this could be achieved by identifying scholars who were highly qualified in a particular discipline and who also had competence in their particular area. He cited Harvard’s successful recruitment of Hamilton Gibb, who exemplified these characteristics. Rusk added, “I realize that it is a bit rough to suggest a unique man as a standard.”

Under Gibb’s leadership Harvard celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Middle East Center and program. As discussed in Chapter 4, the program was originally intended to produce candidates for the oil industry and government service. However, by the mid-1960s Harvard declared that its focus had shifted to providing graduate training and promoting research into the “less explored areas” of the history and culture of the region. In addition, the university asserted that the program was “impartial” toward the “contending factions” in the region “torn by bitter disputes and infested by angry unscrupulous propaganda.” It explained that these factions were “sharply sensitive to their image as presented in America, both in content and in tone.” CMES acknowledged that the majority of students in the Master of Arts (A.M.) program were still geared toward the government and business sectors, but that a significant number continued on to obtain doctoral degrees.

The Harvard program experienced dramatic growth in its first decade. From 1954 to 1958, CMES Center had a total of 55 students, of which 40 were in the Master’s program. During this period, 11 A.M. and 2 Ph.D. degrees were awarded. In 1959, the program increased the number of Master’s and doctoral students admitted to the programs. From 1959 to 1964, 245 students were admitted, of which 156 were Master’s students. The rise in admissions was matched by an increased number of degrees conferred, with 63 A.M. degrees awarded during the later period. Of the 74 total A.M. degrees awarded in the program’s first decade, 14 (19%) of the graduates worked for the government and 5 (7%) in the business sector, while 28 (38%) continued their graduate studies, including Fulbright scholars. While the program’s growth would continue, it suffered a major setback when Hamilton Gibb had a stroke in 1963 and was unable to resume his duties after an extended recuperation. Gibb died in 1971 and CMES struggled to find an academic leader who could replace him.

Princeton’s program also expanded since it was established in 1947. After the retirement of Philip Hitti, the program was led by OSS veteran T. Cuyler Young. By 1959, it produced 26

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65 “Rusk to Pusey,” 15 April 1959, Box 3, RFA; CMES Director and Assistant Director’s Files (UAV 569.12), HUA.
66 “Harvard University, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The First Ten Years, 1954-1964,” December 1964, HUF 571, HUA.
67 Ibid. It should be noted that 10 (13.5%) of the graduates were “unaccounted for” by the time the report was published.
Ph.D.’s and awarded 43 Master’s and 27 B.A. degrees. During this period, it also trained 18 FSOs and 54 officers from the Department of Defense.  

Like Harvard, Princeton was also looking for additional funding to support the Near East program at the end of the 1950s. Although the Rockefeller Foundation considered providing a large grant to support Princeton’s program, it was never awarded. In addition, the Ford Foundation did not identify Princeton for a ten-year institution building grant. In spite of Harvard’s massive funding drive, Princeton maintained a more prestigious faculty, especially after Hamilton Gibb’s illness. In addition to Young and Monroe Berger, their faculty included Manfred Halpern, one of the leading modernization theorists.

Modernizing the Middle East

The Kennedy presidency had a far greater impact on the perceptions of Americans than its brief thousand days in office would suggest. While Kennedy’s policies toward Cuba and Vietnam often receive the majority of attention, the administration’s embrace of modernization theory was arguably as important. As discussed in Chapter 1, MIT’s Walt Whitman Rostow was a leading figure in -- if not the architect of -- modernization theory. Rostow viewed it as an alternative model for Third World development. Historian Michael Latham argues that in the context of Cold War tensions, Kennedy believed that the developing countries were vulnerable to Soviet influence and eventual domination. He states that “theories of ‘modernization’ proved particularly appealing to policymakers hoping to contain revolutionary expansion.”

Modernization theory dominated the social sciences during the 1960s. Latham explains that at its core, modernization theory was defined by four characteristics. First, the belief that societies were either “traditional” or “modern” with distinct and opposing differences between the two. Second, that “economic, political, and social changes are integrated and interdependent.” Third, that development is a common, linear process culminating in the modern state. Finally, developing nations can modernize at a quicker rate through interactions with developed countries, in particular the United States, which modernization theorists considered the prime model for comparison.

As discussed in Chapter 1, two major works produced by modernization theorists were related to the Middle East. Both Daniel Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society and Manfred Halpern’s The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa used the region as a template for modernization theory. Indeed, Washington’s support for modernization theory helped ensure its acceptance and promotion within academia. Meanwhile, during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations modernization theory was Washington’s preferred tool for countering Moscow’s influence and Soviet style development in the Third World. Nils Gilman asserts that “in the context of an American cold war mentality that considered ‘developmental dictatorships’ preferable to ‘vulnerable’ democracies, the utopian impulses of American liberals all too easily degenerated into endorsing the wholesale destruction of communities and social

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68 “Report to the President, for the year 1 July 1958 – 30 June 1959, Department of Oriental Studies and Program in Near Eastern Studies,” Department of Oriental Studies, AC 164, Box 12, Presidential Reports Folder, PUA.
69 Latham, 3.
70 Ibid., 4.
and political groups as the necessary by-product of ‘forcing men to be free’ in a non-Communist fashion.”

In practice, American support for “developmental democracies” meant the promotion of authoritarian regimes, particularly those led by the military. The Orientalist roots of modernization theory were at the heart of these policies. Gilman explains that while modernization theorists held the United States as the model for comparison for the Third World, they did not believe that even “nominal democracy” as present in the West was appropriate for the post-colonial countries, whose citizens were deemed less “sophisticated” and “rational.”

In the Middle East, the preference for authoritarian regimes was evidenced in Washington’s support for Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. The Kennedy administration pressured the Shah to reform, leading to tensions between Tehran and Washington. In response to these calls, the Shah launched the “White Revolution,” a half-hearted and unsuccessful attempt at social and economic reform. The most notable aspects of the White Revolution were policies for land reform and women’s right to vote. Calls for land reform in Iran dated to the Mossadeq era, but in the hands of the Shah the policy was used to reward political allies and reduce the wealth and holdings of potential competitors. Meanwhile from the perspectives of Washington and London, historian Ali Ansari asserts that “the image of a reforming monarch leading the revolution from above was exactly what the academic doctor had ordered.” Ansari adds, “The Shah was a strong man required to dictate the transformation from the forces of tradition, who left to their own devices, would hand Iran to the communists.”

Pressure on Tehran to reform subsided during the Johnson administration. Unlike his predecessor, President Johnson was determined to reward the Shah’s loyalty in the fight against anti-Communism, particularly the American war in Vietnam, as well as broader support for Washington’s policies in the Middle East. Among the Shah’s major proponents within the administration was Rostow, who left MIT to serve as Johnson’s National Security Adviser. In 1966, Johnson’s Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments determined that Iran was a developed country. A year later, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shuttered its Tehran offices. USAID was replaced by American companies and weapons manufacturers drawn to Iran’s oil wealth and the profligate Shah’s open checkbook.

While modernization theory was an attempt to counter and contain the Soviet Union ideologically, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations also relied on more traditional means. The Arab Cold War which simmered during the late 1950s erupted into open hostilities with the civil war in Yemen. Backed by Nasser, elements of the Yemeni military overthrew the monarchy of Imam Muhammad al-Badr in September 1962. However, al-Badr survived the coup d’état and reemerged in northern Yemen. The ensuing civil war quickly became a regional conflict.

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71 Gilman, 11.
72 Ibid., 50-51.
73 Ansari, 147-165. A more favorable, and deeply flawed, analysis of the White Revolution can be found in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
74 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 169-180.
conflict with the conservative Arab monarchies allied with Washington, in particular Saudi Arabia, supporting al-Badr against Egypt and the republican forces.\footnote{William L. Cleveland, \textit{A History of the Modern Middle East} (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000): 438-441.}

As the civil war in Yemen bogged down, the Arab-Israeli conflict began to heat up. Tensions were heightened after Israel’s unilateral decision to divert water resources from the Jordan River in August 1963. A series of cross-border raids by Palestinian guerilla fighters, or \textit{fedayeen}, based in Syria in late 1966 and early 1967 led to punishing reprisals by Israel that escalated into an international crisis. Israel’s swift and stunning victory in the June 1967 War was also a crushing defeat for Nasser and Pan-Arabism. In the aftermath, Israel captured and occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, Syria’s Golan Heights, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.\footnote{For a discussion of the errors and miscalculations that led to the June 1967 War see William Quandt, \textit{Peace Process}; Avi Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}; Tom Segev, \textit{1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East} (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007).}

\textit{The American Universities in the Middle East}

By the late 1950s, both AUB and AUC were experiencing budgetary difficulties. The universities were eligible for funds from Washington through the Mutual Security Act, which was delivered by the International Cooperation Agency (ICA). As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, both institutions were reluctant to accept direct funding from the U.S. government. However, the two universities arrived at the same decision differently and independently.\footnote{The Mutual Security Act of 1951 authorized foreign and military aid to American allies. It was renewed annually until 1961 when it was replaced by the Foreign Assistance Act signed by President Kennedy.}

By the late 1950s, AUB began reexamining its educational mission regionally and internationally. An internal study on education in the Arab world conducted by Constantine Zurayk, a professor of history and vice president of the university, asserted that the different Arab states were at different stages of development. Among the trends Zurayk observed was the broad-based expansion of education by the newly independent states, with all of the countries spending greater amounts on education and witnessing a steady increase in the number of students, schools, and teachers. He also found a greater centralization with the fledgling governments establishing schools and educational programs. Zurayk asserted that this was due to the desire of the new states to achieve rapid results as well as their recognition that education was a means for unification and strength. He also observed improvements in technical education across the region, including trade schools and teacher training programs. Zurayk claimed that there was a greater infusion of politics into education and the manipulation by political leaders.\footnote{AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book VIII, October 1958-December 1960, Box 5, Sec. AA2, 29-30 April 1959, AUBA.}

Zurayk explained to the AUB Board of Trustees that Egypt had the greatest influence on education in the region. This was driven in part because it had the largest and most developed system as well as the least expensive. He asserted that Egypt was also making a “determined
effort to influence the educational processes of other countries.” He added that Cairo’s success would be “greatly dependent on the political relationships between Egypt and other countries.”

Zurayk argued that AUB had certain advantages over other universities in the region. This included freedom from government control and the ability to establish its own standards and encourage freedom of thought. He cautioned, however, that these freedoms were not absolute as the Lebanese government and others exercised a certain amount of indirect control by deciding whether or not to recognize AUB’s degrees. Zurayk added that AUB also enjoyed the advantage of having stronger cultural ties and contacts with Western countries as well as its tradition and former graduates.

The university’s position also had disadvantages. According to Zurayk this included being a foreign institute in a “nationalization-conscious” society. In addition, it bore the name “American” university. Moreover, AUB did not enjoy government support which limited its ability to grow and was also expensive for students. Zurayk noted that AUB’s future was governed by factors, some of which could not be controlled, including the impact of nationalism in the region and the future of America’s relationship with the Arab world. However, he argued that the university could control its performance and that it needed to become “stronger and broader” by emphasizing “intellectual pioneering, moral and spiritual values, and quality of achievement.”

In response to the presentation, John Case, Chairman of Board of Trustees, asserted that “some machinery should be established to carefully study the question of AUB’s future role” in the region. He added that the university should “be sympathetic to the problems of Lebanon, and be prepared to offer all possible assistance to the Lebanese Universities.” Case noted that in a meeting with Robert McClintock, the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, that the ambassador observed that the Middle East was undergoing what other former colonial areas had experienced, namely that civilian leadership necessary for an independent country had not been developed under foreign rule. As a result, individuals who held minor administrative posts during the colonial period were now heads of ministries. Case stated that “the need for trained leaders is keenly felt and this has been one of the forces behind the drive for education particularly for national universities.”

In the spring of 1960, a commission was established by the ICA to evaluate American universities in the Middle East. The commission was initially led by William Stevenson, the former President of Oberlin College, and included former AUC President John Badeau, who became Ambassador to Egypt while the report was being finalized. Produced in April 1961, the report explained that in the initial postwar period the universities served as “training centers for nationals under United States government programs and members of their faculty have been called upon to participate in the foreign aid programs.” It added that the universities were “in operational and financial relations with the United States -- a position entirely new to them.” The report noted that during this period higher education within the region also expanded dramatically as the governments of the newly independent states focused on the creation and

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
growth of national educational systems. It noted that while foreign educational institutions were welcome in the region before the Second World War, they were now coming under the authority of new ministries of education. In addition, while the American universities were the leading institutions prior to the war, they were “only a few of the growing number of educational influences serving the area.”

In evaluating AUC, the report stated that of the three universities under review, it was the “least ‘American’.” It added that it was “just this fact that makes it an effective American influence and should enable it to continue serving within a strongly nationalistic cultural situation.” Moreover, it found that AUC’s “particular significance” was its position “at the center of the United Arab Republic, from which presently emanates many of the strongest forces of the Arab world.” The report asserted that AUC’s reputation and “the contacts it establishes with significant Egyptian groups is a major source of American influence in the [United Arab Republic].” Without the university, “The foreign cultural field in Egypt would be left largely to neutralists and Soviet bloc influences, which would be both a loss to the Egyptian community and to the Western world.” The report stated that “it is precisely because conditions are changing rapidly in Cairo and traditional bonds of friendship with the West are weakened that the American University faces a new, more significant and exacting role.”

Although the Stevenson committee also evaluated AUB, the university was less welcoming of its findings. This was due largely to Zurayk’s internal assessment, which was warmly received by the Board of Trustees. Indeed, Case remarked that that he believed the Stevenson committee “was thinking about the type of university program which would appeal to the U.S. government.” In particular, this was evident in the report’s emphasis on technical education. Instead, Case asserted that Zurayk’s program, which recommended that AUB remain a private university and strengthen its relationships in the region, was “far more apt to gain real support.”

The passage of the Foreign Assistance Act and the creation of USAID were initially greeted with relief in Beirut and Cairo. However, at AUB it sparked an internal debate about accepting governmental support and the degree of coordination that was required between the university and the State Department. By 1963, the university was facing a large deficit and the continuing support by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations was uncertain. Indeed, the Ford Foundation was reluctant to provide AUB with long term support unless it received similar funding from Washington. In addition, attempts to raise money from Arab countries had limited success. After internal deliberations and discussions with State Department representatives and assurance that the universities independence would be respected, the Board of Trustees agreed to accept government funding.

83 Report of the Middle East Survey Commission, 1961, AUCA.
84 Ibid., 3-4.
85 AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book IX February 1961 – December 1963, Box 5, Sec. AA2, 14-15 November 1961, AUBA. It should be noted that while other trustees supported reaching out to AUB alum for donations, they did not believe it would be adequate to meet the universities future financial needs. Instead, they argued that “every effort should be made” to acquaint Washington with AUB’s value and for the U.S. government to “recognize its responsibility toward such a university.”
86 Ibid., 12 September 1962; 28 November 1962; 19 December 1962; 2 January 1963; 22 May 1963. In a trip to Saudi Arabia, Case had a meeting with Crown Prince Feisal and requested financial support for a new AUB Medical Center. Feisal requested a written response from the AUB Board to two questions. First, detail the advantages and
Formalizing Middle East Studies

By the late 1960s, the impact of the NDEA on Middle East studies was evident in the expansion of the number of university centers and programs and degrees conferred. With funding from the Ford Foundation, the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) was formed in 1966 with several hundred members. Previous attempts, including the creation of AAMES were unsuccessful. Similarly, the American Oriental Society, although the oldest scholarly society in the United States and still extant, remained narrowly focused. Like the Middle East Institute, MESA’s definition of the region stretched from North Africa to parts of Central Asia. While the organization, as envisioned by Berger, was to initially focus on the contemporary history and politics of the region, its breadth and scope has expanded over the past four decades. Indeed, it promotes scholarship from antiquity to the contemporary era, including a broad range of topics and diverse fields.

MESA grew out of the SSRC-ACLS Joint Committee, headed at the time by Princeton’s Monroe Berger. Held in December 1967, MESA’s first annual conference had only modest attendance. In addition, the association also founded and continues to publish the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Over the next two decades MESA would experience internal controversies and growing pains. This included questions of effectiveness and internal rifts exacerbated by conflicts in the region and internationally. In spite of these issues, MESA remains the leading academic association for the study of the region with over 3,000 members from the United States and internationally. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the organization and the field would be faced with questions of relevance after the Cold War was over.  

Conclusion

In his 1967 assessment of the field, Princeton’s Monroe Berger asserted that “in the past, it was doubted that this nation would support the scholarly study of other nations except as part of a program of national security.” He cautioned, “In the future it may be difficult to study other nations under an educational program that has to be called the National Defense Education Act.” Although President Eisenhower declared that the NDEA was a temporary four-year measure, more than five decades after it was passed it remains the foundation for the study of foreign areas in American universities and colleges.

Building on prior efforts, the NDEA served to firmly establish area studies in the United States. The initial allocation of $15 million over four years demonstrated the federal government’s ability to immediately impact higher education. Critics of the NDEA, particularly those at universities like Princeton with existing area studies programs, argued that it was a “shotgun” approach to deal with an issue that required a more surgical response. Yet within a decade after passage, the impact of the legislation was quantifiable, from the growth in the number of centers, to the number of students educated, as well as the development of textbooks and related course materials. Moreover, federal funding benefited new as well as existing

benefits to Saudi Arabia from the existence of the new medical center. Second, why the U.S. Government, which was “going to spend a great deal of money in Israel, could not provide the small sum required for the operation of the medical center.”

87 Lockman, 127.
programs. However, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, by the second decade, the NDEA would be attacked from inside and outside academia.

Mirroring the growth spurred by the NDEA, the national security establishment experienced a similar expansion during this period. This included the further development of its internal training facilities, like the FSI, as well as collaboration with academia. The development and adoption of modernization theory by the Kennedy and Johnson administration offered a public demonstration of the close relationship between academic theory and practice. Meanwhile, the Princeton Consultants were another example of the growing and powerful “invisible government” and the permeable line between academia and the national security state. While relations between academia and government agencies became strained by the mid-to late-1960s making overt contacts difficult to sustain, Chapter 6 will demonstrate that the covert relationships continued.

The NDEA provided a fresh infusion of funding for fellowships and course development for Middle East studies. However, support for Middle East studies consistently lagged behind the rest of Asia, a condition which persisted even after the NDEA was passed. Chapter 6 will examine how the U.S.’s increased interests in the Middle East after the June 1967 War combined with the decreased funding for area studies post-Vietnam impacted Middle East studies.

We simply cannot monitor an outside world of growing complexity, of shifting economic and political and political issues, with a fixed handful of people. Furthermore, we cannot run the risk of leaving ourselves uninformed about the world in which we live. We have paid tragically high costs in the past and must avoid any unacceptable surprises which could mock our security and undermine our economy.

- Rose Hayden, American Council on Education, Testimony before Congress, March 1975

If you did not exist, we would have to ask someone to create you.

- President Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech to the Brookings Institution, September 29, 1966

Introduction

It was a bright, cold morning in late March 1979 on the White House’s north lawn. The three leaders sat at a long nineteenth century walnut table and read from prepared texts as the flags of their respective nations flapped behind them in the brisk wind. Compared to the sixteen-months of intense and at times acrimonious negotiations, the signing ceremony was brief and lacked the suspense of the announcement six months earlier that a framework agreement had been reached. The Camp David Accords not only marked the end of the conflict between Egypt and Israel, but ostensibly ended the Cold War in the Middle East. Egypt was the Soviet Union’s largest client in the region at the beginning of the decade. After Nasser’s death in 1970, relations between Moscow and Cairo soured, including the expulsion of Soviet advisors in July 1972. By the end of the decade, Egypt was an ally of the United States and in the coming years would assist Washington’s covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The end of the Cold War in the Middle East presaged its end globally by a decade. It was also indicative of Washington’s greater involvement in and hegemony over the region. Ironically, heightened American interests and involvement in the region exacerbated a growing rift with academia. Indeed, a little over a decade after the NDEA was passed, Washington already considered area studies a failure. In this chapter, I argue that this determination was the result of the growing split between academia and the U.S. government with relations reaching their nadir as campus protests erupted over the Vietnam War. By the early 1970s, the Nixon administration proposed funding cuts to area studies, a threat that would persist for the next two

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decades. Meanwhile, a new generation of scholars emerged more skeptical of America’s role in the world and academia’s history of supporting U.S. national security interests. I also contend that private think tanks with close ties to the American foreign policy and national security establishments emerged at the expense of the academia and benefitted from its strained relationship with Washington, particularly in Middle East studies.

The Nixon Doctrine

Richard Nixon’s election in 1968 marked a conservative turn in American politics that would continue into the post-Cold War period. Nixon’s anti-Communist credentials and reputation as a hard line cold warrior added credence to his claim during that campaign that he would end the war in Vietnam. The Vietnam War drove his predecessor from office and would soon dominate Nixon’s presidency as well. Nixon unveiled his new policy of “Vietnamization” shortly after taking office. The policy called for South Vietnamese forces to assume greater responsibility for the fighting. Vietnamization would serve as the template for the Nixon Doctrine, in which local allies would be used to secure and ensure American interests around the globe.\(^3\)

Nixon’s National Security Advisor, and later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger explained that the doctrine emerged out of necessity. Kissinger stated that when the administration came into office “the intellectual capital of U.S. postwar policy had been used up and when the conditions of determining postwar U.S. policy had been altered, we had to adjust our foreign policy to the new facts of life.” He added, “It is beyond the physical and psychological capacity of the U.S. to make itself responsible for every part of the world.”\(^4\)

In the Middle East, the Nixon Doctrine relied on three countries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. As discussed in Chapter 1, although Washington’s alliance with Tehran and Riyadh was known as the “Twin Pillars” policy, the “special relationship” with Israel, which expanded after the June 1967 War, ostensibly served as a third pillar. Iran’s military was to serve as the new guarantor of security of in the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia relied on its oil wealth to co-opt or counter radical movements in the region. Israel’s military essentially served to contain and counter radical states and political movements, especially Egypt, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

There were other benefits to Washington’s reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia. The increase in oil prices after the June 1967 War was part of a broader shift in the postwar global economy. Oil producing countries across the region witnessed an increase in their coffers from the dramatic spike in oil prices. In Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahalavi used the newfound wealth to embark on a military spending spree. According to James Bill, Nixon and Kissinger assured the Shah in 1972 that he could purchase any conventional weapons system he desired, including


advanced F-14 and F-15 fighter jets. These assurances were made over the reservations of the Pentagon and State Department.\footnote{Bill, 200-202. As noted in Chapter 1, Bill reports that between 1972 and 1977 the value of sales to Iran amounted to $16.2 billion. The Iranian defense budget increased from $1.4 billion to $9.4 billion during this period. By 1977, the Iranian military and security establishment accounted for 40 percent of the budget. Bill adds that in 1973 alone revenues increased from $4 billion to $20 billion annually due to the quadrupling of oil prices.}

A year later, the October 1973 War and subsequent embargo by major Arab oil exporting states would lead to a quadrupling of oil prices. Although it did not participate in the embargo, and actively subverted it, Iran benefited from the price increase. The windfall would lead to greater arms purchases by Tehran over the next several years. By 1977, Iran’s defense budget was $9.4 billion, an astonishing 880 percent increase in only five years.\footnote{Ibid., 202.}

With the largest proven oil reserves, Saudi Arabia was the key state behind OPEC. However, Riyadh was a reluctant participant in the oil embargo and was driven to support the action due to inter-Arab rivalries and Washington’s overt support for Israel during the conflict. In 1972, Saudi Arabia earned $6.4 billion from oil revenues, within three years it would increase to $27.7 billion.\footnote{Cleveland, 443.} The increase in revenues was even more pronounced across all exporters during this period, increasing from $23 billion in 1972 to $140 billion by 1977.\footnote{Yergin, 634.} Although relations between Riyadh and Washington were strained during the embargo, Saudi Arabia would once again demonstrate its usefulness to the United States by helping to underwrite Egypt’s split from the Soviet Union. It also returned to its prewar role as ensuring a stable flow of oil to Western markets and preventing the more “radical” states within the organization from renewing the boycott or continuing to inflate oil prices.\footnote{Ibid., 592-632.}

While the June 1967 War helped establish the parameters of the Arab-Israeli peace process, in particular the “land for peace” formula, it was the 1973 War and the threat of a superpower confrontation that served as the catalyst for negotiations to begin in earnest. This was due largely to Kissinger’s actions after the announcement of the Rogers Peace Plan in the wake of the June 1967 War. Named after then Secretary of State William Rogers, the plan sought to build on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and initiate negotiations between Israel and the neighboring Arab states mediated by the superpowers. As National Security Adviser during Nixon’s first term, Kissinger tended to avoid the Middle East, and in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it was one of the few regions where Rogers had some autonomy of action. However, Nixon and Kissinger feared that the Rogers plan would reward the Arab states, weakened and smarting from the war, and allow Moscow to maintain its influence in the region.
Instead, they advocated continued support for Israel and the belief that only when the Arab states were weak would they be willing to negotiate, and more importantly abandon Moscow.\(^\text{10}\)

Rogers and his plan were replaced by Kissinger’s ascendancy in Nixon’s second term to Secretary of State, a post he held in addition to that of National Security Advisor. Kissinger also began to actively manage the Arab-Israeli peace process. However, the negotiations to end the Vietnam War took priority and Kissinger deferred to the Israeli position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and more importantly on Israel’s military dominance to ensure stability. As a result, he missed or ignored different overtures by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Meanwhile, the Watergate scandal, which was reaching a climax in October 1973, served to distract Nixon. The near superpower confrontation during the October War served to impress on Kissinger the Arab-Israeli conflict’s potential to ignite a broader conflagration. Once a cease-fire was achieved, Kissinger explained in a State Department press conference that “the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in the process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions.”\(^\text{11}\)

However, the ensuing negotiations mediated by Kissinger demonstrated a different dynamic. In negotiating the disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel over the next two years, Kissinger’s emphasis was on piecemeal, short-term arrangements accompanied by high-profile “shuttle diplomacy.” In addition, he did not engage with either Syria or the PLO in order to obtain a more comprehensive agreement, while actively limiting Moscow’s role in the negotiations. The Sinai I and II agreements were successful in achieving limited redeployments of Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. More importantly, from the perspectives of the United States and Israel, they set the stage for Egypt’s split not only with the Soviet Union but the Arab League’s stance of a unified negotiating position. Indeed, the Sinai agreements helped set the stage for the Camp David Accords finalized three years later between Presidents Carter and Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.\(^\text{12}\)

The Nixon Doctrine and Area Studies

The anti-war protests which engulfed university campuses in the late 1960s had implications for area studies. Student protests reached their apogee with Nixon’s decision to expand the Vietnam War by invading Cambodia in April 1970 and a month later were marked by the shooting deaths of four students by Ohio national guardsmen at Kent State University. As discussed in Chapter 5, funding for the NDEA was to expire after four years. By 1969, the Nixon administration was threatening to end Title VI funding the following fiscal year. Five days after the deaths at Kent State, the Washington Post reported that an omnibus bill to fund higher education was unlikely to pass due to the ongoing protests. Conservative members of Congress were also threatening to add anti-protest measures to any legislation over the objections of the Nixon administration.\(^\text{13}\)


\(^{11}\) Ibid., 98-124. Kissinger quoted in Quandt.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 172-173.

A centerpiece of the Nixon administration’s approach to funding education was the creation of the National Foundation for Higher Education. Originally proposed by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in December 1968, the proposed organization was to be a vehicle for reform and institutional development within American higher education. The Carnegie Commission’s recommendation was adopted by President Nixon in his 1970 higher education message. However, Congress altered the Foundation’s mandate to include the operation of existing programs, including Title VI. 14

Meanwhile, the Nixon administration advocated for reductions in area studies funding. The budget for the 1971 fiscal year reduced funding for area studies from $18 million to $15.3 million and $6 million the following year. In response, the universities argued that government funding was essential for Asian and Middle Eastern languages because they were “unproductive” for academic institutions to support due to the extra costs for faculty and equipment compared to other disciplines. The New York Times reported that in addition to the economic argument, the universities argued that “it is in the national interest that there be a trained corps of scholars in the languages, the politics and the economics of areas of the world central to United States foreign policy.” As a result, government funding was essential to continuing the programs because the universities were unable to support them independently. The Times quoted anonymous administration officials stating that area studies were “outmoded” and “unproductive,” and that the government should not be supporting “elitist programs.” However, the administration sought to mollify universities by claiming that the National Foundation for Higher Education would be able to support the area studies programs once it was established with an initial funding of $200 million in the 1972 fiscal year. 15

In response to pressure from the universities, in particular Harvard’s Nathan Pusey, the Nixon administration restored area studies funding. Support was to remain at $15.3 million for the 1971 and 1972 fiscal years. Although the Nixon administration still hoped that the National Foundation for Higher Education would assume responsibility for area studies, the universities were successful in securing funding until the foundation was established. 16

However, the threat to area studies funding would return three years later. Support for area studies was eliminated from the proposed 1973 fiscal year budget, which the President deemed his “peacetime” budget after the peace treaty with North Vietnam was signed in January 1973. Citing the expansions of area studies over the previous fifteen years, then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Casper Weinberger argued in his testimony before Congress that “significant capacity for teaching non-Western languages and cultures has been established in the nation’s colleges and universities.” This determination was based on the 100 area centers created and 5,000 specialists produced during this period. Weinberger added that the programs had developed to a degree that federal funding only accounted for less than 10 percent of their annual budgets. He stated that it was the administration’s belief that “these efforts are now strong enough to make it on their own.” Weinberger’s claims were not supported by the

16 Semple, “Nixon asks more for College Fund.”
universities, or even a recent survey of area studies sponsored by the SSRC led by the University of Pennsylvania’s Richard Lambert.\(^\text{17}\)

**The Lambert Report**

A decade after the NDEA was passed, the Office of Education and the SSRC initiated an evaluation of area studies. Led by sociologist Richard Lambert and published in 1973, the review was the first major evaluation of area studies since the legislation was signed and the most comprehensive since the series of reports produced in the early Cold War period discussed in Chapter 4. In the report’s preface, SSRC President Pendleton Herring hailed the progress to date stating that “despite uncertainties of support and in the face of considerable indifference and resistance, dedicated scholars and determined administrators brought into being area programs diverse in quality, but many highly distinguished.” He added, “Area studies have been innovative, experimental, and resilient. They have met a challenge, and they fulfill a need.”\(^\text{18}\)

Hanging over the report was the Nixon administration’s threat to funding area studies. In spite of the progress made because of Title VI, Herring explained that “financial support is uncertain, and the nature of and status of area competence is a matter for some academic debate.” He added that “public policy with respect to area studies is not strongly supportive. Employment and research opportunities are not as favorable as they have been. The period immediately ahead does not seem propitious.” However, Herring argued that the “necessities of the age” made area specialists essential and that “there can be no surplus, no over-supply of persons” with the requisite skills and competence.\(^\text{19}\)

Lambert’s review found that significant shortcomings still existed in American higher education after fifteen years of federal support. He argued that there were not a sufficient number of Americans trained in the areas outside the U.S. and Western Europe. This was compounded by the Eurocentric focus of American education, which he claimed was “stunting the growth of a more cosmopolitan world view among students, and more broadly, among the public at large.” Like Herring, Lambert cautioned that there was no way to determine if a sufficient number of specialists had been achieved or if it was possible to determine the appropriate number. He explained that job prospects for area specialists outside of academia were uncertain. Although businesses supported the creation of different regional programs, including the Middle East, they had not hired a large number of the graduates. Similarly, while the State Department had dispatched personnel for training at the different area centers, Lambert reported that it was not a major employer.\(^\text{20}\)

Lambert warned that foreign policy interests should not be the key factor in determining the appropriate priority for training specialists. He argued that because interests can shift rapidly and quickly, resulting in shortages of specialists for particular areas. Lambert stated that “by the time machinery is cranked up to remedy this shortage, public attention is diverted elsewhere.”

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 366-367.
He cautioned that an approach which placed a priority on areas where the U.S. had longer-term interests could lead to a repeat of the experience in Vietnam, where America had little experience and even fewer trained specialists, an issue which persisted even after the war was over.\footnote{Ibid., 367-373.}

\textit{Unearthing the Family Skeletons}

The revelations about U.S. decision-making during the Vietnam War contained in the “Pentagon Papers” combined with the Watergate scandal served to undermine the faith of Americans in the political establishment. A new series of revelations about the actions of the CIA published by the \textit{New York Times} in late December 1974 appeared to affirm the worst suspicions about the national security establishment. The front page story researched and written by Seymour Hersh described the illegal surveillance of 10,000 American anti-war protesters as well as members of Congress by the CIA at the behest of the Nixon administration. It added that the CIA had performed a number of actions dating to the Eisenhower administration that were prohibited by U.S. law. Upon learning of the \textit{Times}’ investigation, CIA Director William Colby explained to the Council on Foreign Relations -- in a talk that was intended to be off the record -- that he had already ordered an internal review which identified some improprieties. However, he added, “I think family skeletons are best left where they are -- in the closet.”\footnote{Seymour Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” \textit{New York Times} 22 December 1974. Hersh’s revelations about the CIA emerged after a separate investigation and report by the Senate Armed Services Committee into spying by the Pentagon on Nixon’s National Security Council. Anonymous CIA sources quoted by Hersh suggested that operation was led by the Agency’s Counterintelligence division led by James Angelton, a veteran official whose work in the clandestine services dated to the OSS. The sources believed that the domestic spying effort grew out of efforts to identify the foreign sources for the antiwar movement.}

Following the \textit{Times} report, Colby drafted a memorandum for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger detailing the agency’s actions, which included wiretapping reporters, opening mail, illegal searches, medical and psychological experiments, and assassination of foreign leaders. In his memorandum to President Gerald Ford summarizing the information, Kissinger referred to the CIA file as “the horrors book.”\footnote{Weiner, \textit{Legacy of Ashes}, 336-337. Prior to his appointment as Vice-President and then succeeding Nixon, Ford served for a decade on the House’s CIA subcommittee. According to Weiner, Ford claimed he had never heard about the CIA operations.}

One consequence of the Watergate scandal was the sweeping Democratic Party victory in the 1974 elections and a new Congress determined to contain Executive power. The revelations about CIA activities in the \textit{New York Times} led to the formation of a Senate investigative committee led by Idaho Democrat Frank Church in January 1975. Over the next year, the Church Committee held an unprecedented series of hearings into the CIA’s activities culminating in a scathing report.

Among the Church Committee’s findings were the interactions between the CIA and academia. The report stated bluntly that the agency has “long-developed clandestine relationships with the American academic community, which range from academics making introductions for intelligence purposes to intelligence collection while abroad, to academic
research and writing where CIA sponsorship is hidden.” It added that the agency provided funds to private American organizations operating overseas whose activities were in support of “or could be conceived to support” U.S. foreign policy goals. The report also confirmed that the CIA had a covert relationship with American philanthropic foundations until 1967 in order to funnel funds to private organizations whose work the agency supported.24

The Church Committee differentiated between “witting” and unwitting organizations and individuals. It found that the agency was involved in different types of relationships with individuals and organizations, some were paid while others were not. In addition, some were aware of the CIA’s involvement. It also found that in some cases funding did not provide the CIA with operational control, instead it was “primarily a way to enable people to do things they wanted to do.” However, there were instances when the agency’s “influence was exerted.” The report noted that the relationships were dynamic and that in some instances CIA support “turned into influence, and finally even to operational use.”25

Arguably the largest covert relationship was the CIA’s funding of private foundations. The report stated that the CIA’s “intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only be described as massive.” In particular, the agency relied on legitimate foundations rather than front operations for distributing its funds. The committee found that 108 of 700 grants over $10,000 awarded by 164 foundations -- excluding the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation -- from 1963 to 1966 involved partial or full CIA funding. This was even more pronounced for grants involving international activities where almost half used agency funds. In addition, over a third of the grants in the physical, life, and social sciences involved CIA finding. Funded activities included the creation of a research institute at a major research university in 1951 (presumably MIT) and its continued financial support for over a decade as well as an international education exchange program operated by American universities.26

The CIA’s covert relationship with individual academics was also addressed by the Church Committee. It stated that the CIA was using several hundred scholars, including administrators, faculty, and graduate students, to make “introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad.” The report added that these academics were located in over 100 American colleges, universities, and institutes. It noted that in some cases only the individual involved knew of the relationship to the CIA, while at other institutions a university official was also aware of the “operational use made of academics on his campus.” In addition, the committee found that American academics overseas collected intelligence for the agency.27

The Church Committee’s report stated that the CIA viewed its operational relationships with the American academic community as “perhaps its most sensitive domestic area.” As such, it had “strict controls governing these operations.” In particular the agency could not recruit

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 182-183.
27 Ibid., 189-190. The committee defined “operational use” as “individuals as used in this report means recruitment, use, or training, on either a witting or unwitting basis, for intelligence purposes. That is, the individual is directed or ‘tasked’ to do something for the CIA -- as opposed to volunteering information. Such purposes include covert action, clandestine intelligence collection (espionage) and various kinds of support functions (fn 184).
academics who were receiving Fulbright-Hays fellowships. In addition, the CIA did not recruit individuals receiving funds from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations or the Carnegie Corporation or their employees.\textsuperscript{28}

The report chastised the CIA for its recruitment policy of American academics. In particular it objected to the agency’s hesitation in expanding the program was due to the “risks of exposure,” rather than “an appreciation of dangers to the integrity of individuals and institutions.” However, it stopped short of recommending legislation prohibiting the practice. Instead, it called on the academic community to police itself and set the appropriate standards. The committee explicitly stated that the agency should not recruit academics who receive funding through government-sponsored programs. It stated, “It is unacceptable that Americans would go overseas under a cultural or academic exchange program funded openly by the United States Congress and at the same time serve an operational purpose directed by” the CIA.\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{The CIA at Harvard}

The Church Committee’s call for academia to police itself and restraint by the CIA was apparently ignored at Harvard. As discussed in Chapter 5, after Hamilton Gibb’s illness and untimely death, CMES experienced an extended period of stagnation. It suffered from a lack of leadership and the university’s inability to hire Gibb’s replacement. This was not for a lack of effort as Harvard’s History Department unsuccessfully pursued several leading scholars who could also lead CMES, including Gustave von Grunebaum, Albert Hourani, and Bernard Lewis.\textsuperscript{30}

However, by the early 1980s it appeared that the university found a scholar who could return CMES to prominence. Nadav Safran, a Harvard trained political scientist and professor of Government, became director of CMES in 1983. Safran advocated the need for CMES to be relevant in policy circles as well as in academia. He sought an expansion of course offerings, with a particular focus on the modern era and contemporary issues.\textsuperscript{31}

Two years later CMES was mired in scandal. The \textit{Harvard Crimson} reported in October 1985 that a planned conference on “Islam and Politics in the Contemporary Muslim World” received $45,700 in funding from the CIA. Conference participants were unaware of the agency’s support and more than half withdrew in protest when it was exposed. The \textit{Harvard Crimson} later reported that Safran received a $107,430 grant from the CIA to support research for his book on Saudi Arabia. As part of the grant contract, the CIA required final approval of the manuscript and non-disclosure of its funding. While the preface to Safran’s \textit{Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Request for Security} acknowledged the support of the Rand Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, the CIA was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{32}

As the university launched an investigation into the matter, there was considerable uproar over the revelations within CMES. Three members of the Executive Committee, including

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{28} Ibid., 190.
\bibitem{29} Ibid., 191.
\bibitem{30} Babai, 11-12.
\bibitem{31} Ibid., 16-17.
\bibitem{32} Kristin A. Goss, “Safran to Leave Top Post After Inquiry into CIA Funding,” \textit{The Harvard Crimson} 6 January 1986; Lockman, 244-245.
\end{thebibliography}
Richard Frye, whose connections to the intelligence services were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, called for Safran’s resignation. The university review found Safran at fault for accepting funding from the CIA for the conference and not disclosing the source. In the case of the grant for the book, however, the review faulted the university, in particular Dean of Faculty Henry Rosovsky. The review found that Safran had followed Harvard’s procedures by notifying Rosovsky of the grant and its unusual terms but that the Dean had not conducted the appropriate review. Safran resigned his position as director in January 1986 but the damage to CMES’s reputation lingered.33

From Carter to Reagan

The 1978 Camp David Accords was the zenith of the Carter presidency, however, he would not oversee its implementation. Within a year, events elsewhere in the region would undermine his presidency. The 1979 Iranian Revolution not only saw the collapse of a key American ally in the Middle East but set in motion a series of events that would draw the United States more deeply into the region. As discussed in Chapter 1, the seizure of American hostages and the failed rescue attempt led to the establishment of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which signaled a more robust American military presence in the region. Over the next two decades it would become even more pronounced.

The Camp David Accords were only partially implemented. While the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula was completed -- and not without complications -- the autonomy provisions for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were never implemented. Nor did the new Reagan administration push for Israel to do so. Instead, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon sought a way to consolidate their hold on the remainder of the territories occupied in 1967. In 1981, Israel annexed the Syrian Golan Heights. With a year, a tense but stable cease fire with the PLO along the border between Israel and southern Lebanon would collapse. Begin and Sharon used the attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom by a breakaway Palestinian faction as the pretext to invade Lebanon. Sharon briefed Secretary of State Alexander Haig about the planned invasion, offering two possibilities. Haig would later claim that he urged Israel to exercise restraint and proportionality in any military action. Sharon, however, was unmoved and had far more ambitious plans for the region than his presentation implied.34

It is uncertain how much of Sharon’s plan Begin was privy to and understood. Both men agreed that the priority was to wipe out the PLO, thereby crushing Palestinian nationalism and in the process facilitate the annexation of the West Bank. Sharon, however, also sought the creation of a rump Lebanese state led by Israel’s Maronite Christians allies and free from Syria’s influence and military presence. Sharon’s plan envisaged the new Lebanon signing a peace treaty with Israel and the expulsion of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon into Jordan. He anticipated that the Hashemite monarchy would eventually be overthrown and a Palestinian state created in Jordan, thereby removing international pressure on Israel to negotiate with the PLO or grant autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza. Sharon’s vision of a new Middle East would have

33 Babai, 16-17; Kristin A. Goss, “Safran to Leave Top Post After Inquiry into CIA Funding.”
34 Quandt, 248-252; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 384-402.
been unthinkable only a few before, but by removing the Egyptian threat from Israel’s southern border, the Camp David Accords helped set the stage for the invasion of Lebanon.35

At the time of the Israeli invasion, Lebanon was in the midst of a civil war. Although the religious aspect of the conflict has often been emphasized, the roots of the civil war were political. As discussed in Chapter 5, Lebanon’s sectarian political order withstood a challenge in 1958 with American support. However, the underlying issues remained unresolved and became more pronounced by the early 1970s. Added to Lebanon’s already volatile mix was the PLO, which created a para-state in the country after it was expelled from Jordan in September 1970. The outbreak of violence in 1975 found the leftist Lebanese National Movement (LNM) allied with the PLO against the Maronite Phalange, whose militia joined with other Christian paramilitary organizations to form the Lebanese Front (LF). In May 1976, the LNM-PLO appeared on the verge of victory, when the Arab League at the behest of Saudi Arabia authorized Syrian forces to intervene. The Syrian military ensured that neither the LNM nor the LF would win the civil war and that it would be the main political and military force in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the PLO retained autonomy within Lebanon and it served as the organization’s main base of operations until the 1982 Israeli invasion.36

AUB struggled to maintain its mission and independence against this backdrop of civil strife and eventually civil war. As discussed in Chapter 5, AUB was struggling financially by the mid-1960s and accepted funds from the U.S. government after considerable internal debate and dissension on the subject. By the early 1970s, the university embarked on an ambitious effort to raise funds among its extensive alumni base in the region. Like universities in the United States, AUB suffered from declining grants from the major foundations and decreased donations from individuals. This was compounded by a weakening dollar which served to increase the university’s operating deficit.

Like its counterparts in the United States, AUB also struggled with the increased politicization of its student body. This included large scale student protests and strikes. A large portion of AUB’s student body identified with the LNM and the PLO.37 Indeed, the support for the Palestinian national movement on campus led to critical coverage of AUB within the American media. An October 1970 Newsweek magazine branded the university “Guerilla U.,” and depicted the students as benefitting from an American style-education while condemning Washington’s policies. Similar negative coverage in other media outlets, including an NBC News program, forced AUB’s Board to embark on a spirited defense. However, university officials were privately assured by contacts in the State Department that the negative media coverage was not as serious as they feared.38

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38 AUB Board of Trustees Reports, Book XIII – Book XIX (Jan. 1969-November 1981); President’s Annual Report to the Board of Trustees, 1970-1991, AUBA.
Adding to the financial woes, which persisted and were exacerbated by the civil war, was the impact of the conflict on the campus. This was compounded by the Israeli invasion and siege of Beirut and the deepening of the civil war in its aftermath. Like the rest of Lebanon, AUB became a site for international intrigues, real or perceived.\textsuperscript{39} Faculty and administration were also targeted for kidnapping and assassination. Acting president David Dodge was held hostage for a year, and his successor, Malcolm Kerr, was assassinated in 1984. The university reduced its operations during the civil war, especially after 1982, and lost faculty and staff due to the chronic instability. Indeed, AUB would not reemerge from this period of forced stagnation until the signing of the 1989 Taif Accord ended the civil war and a new administrative leadership and faculty was recruited.\textsuperscript{40}

AUC had a different experience during this period and benefitted from Egypt’s improved relations with the United States. Following the June 1967 War, the AUC campus was sequestered. Six years later, the October 1973 War forced the university’s closure, severely impacting its operations and finances. The death of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat’s assumption of the presidency was the beginning of a broader shift in Egyptian and regional politics. Among the most important changes at AUC were the end of the university’s sequestration and the Egyptian government’s recognition of its bachelor’s degrees. With official recognition, AUC’s graduates were available to work in Egyptian universities as well as the foreign and civil service.\textsuperscript{41}

While AUB struggled financially during this period, AUC benefitted from legislation which filled its coffers. For nearly two decades the university sought funds paid by Egypt to the United States for excess wheat. Known as the Food for Peace Act or Public Law 480, surplus American wheat was sold to Egypt. AUC requested that it receive some of the funds that Cairo was to pay Washington as part of the program. Congress authorized that the university receive $45 million in 1969, which would serve as a local endowment. The cash infusion, which was delayed until 1974, built on support the university received through USAID’s American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program.\textsuperscript{42}

Egypt’s split with the Soviet Union was confirmed by Sadat’s new economic policy. Known as \textit{al-infitah}, or the opening, the policy was designed to encourage foreign investment in Egypt. Coupled with the Sinai disengagement agreements, the economic policies signaled Cairo’s new relationship with Washington. AUC’s graduates appeared to be some of the initial beneficiaries of Sadat’s policies, as they found positions with new companies. Meanwhile, the need for English speaking employees led companies to raid AUC staff. In a demonstration of the improved relations with the Egyptian government, AUC established an intensive English and two-year MA program for recent graduates of Egyptian universities. Upon completion of the

\textsuperscript{39} In the course of my research on this project I met a number of AUB alumni from this period, all of whom insisted that several members of the AUB faculty were known (or at the very least suspected) to be CIA agents. The claim is impossible to verify, as neither AUB’s nor the U.S. archives offer evidence of such a relationship between the university and the CIA.

\textsuperscript{40} AUB President’s Annual Report to the Board of Trustees, 1970-1991, AUBA.

\textsuperscript{41} AUC President’s Annual Reports 1973-1974, Byrd Presidential Papers, Box 2, AUCA.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
masters program, AUC was to assist the students with placement in doctoral programs in the U.S. and Europe. Costs of the program were funded in part by the Ford Foundation.\textsuperscript{43} 

After the Camp David Accords were signed, Egypt and Sadat were embraced internationally but isolated within the Arab world. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Washington’s covert support of the resistance provided Cairo with another opportunity to embarrass Moscow. Egypt became a key supplier of Soviet weapons funneled to the Afghan rebels, with the intent of obscuring Washington’s role in supporting the insurgency. Sadat, however, would be assassinated before Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai was completed or the Soviets defeated in Afghanistan. However, his successor Hosni Mubarak would continue his policies drawing Cairo closer to Washington and he remained committed to the peace process with Israel. In addition, AUC would benefit from closer relations with the Mubarak regime. In particular, first lady and AUC alum, Suzanne Mubarak, would be a major sponsor of the university.\textsuperscript{44}

\textit{Think Tanks and the Middle East}

The term “think tank” was used by the military during the Second World War to refer to a secure room or location where strategy and plans could be discussed. It was first applied to the RAND Corporation in the 1950s. Originally a subsidiary of Douglas Aircraft, RAND was spun-off into an autonomous unit after the war. However, it was still reliant on the U.S. government for its funding and its research was largely related to the military. Over time, RAND’s sources of funding and its research would diversify and expand. RAND would become the template for future think-tanks, whose number would expand in the late Cold War period as would their influence on policy.\textsuperscript{45} In relation to the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy in the region, two think tanks intersected in terms of their coverage, staff, and eventually the knowledge they produced.

The Brookings Institution is perhaps the oldest think tank in Washington. Founded in 1916 as the Institute for Government Research (IGR), initial funding was provided by several wealthy individuals, including John D. Rockefeller, Cleveland Dodge, banker J.P. Morgan, and businessman Robert S. Brookings. IGR’s founding mission was to provide non-partisan analysis of the government with a particular focus on administrative efficiency. Robert Brookings served as the IGR’s major fundraiser, eventually securing a major grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The IGR merged with two other institutions (one focused on economic research and

\textsuperscript{43} AUC, President’s Annual Reports 1974-1975, Byrd Presidential Papers, Box 2, AUCA. 
\textsuperscript{44} Coll, 58, 66; Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 390-391. It should be noted that AUC named a major hall on campus after Suzanne Mubarak. However, her name was removed after her husband’s regime was overthrown in February 2011 due to protests by students on campus. 
\textsuperscript{45} James Allen Smith, \textit{The Idea Brokers}, 115-116; Rich, \textit{Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise}, 42. Smith states that “RAND became the prototype for a method of organizing and financing research, development, and technical evaluation that would be done at the behest of governmental agencies, but carried out by privately-run research centers.” He adds, “The contractual arrangement placed the expert in a relationship to the government that was neither fully dependent nor completely free. Loosed from the constraints and procedures of a governmental bureaucracy, the researcher now had to take account of the client’s needs and preferences. Therefore, Smith explains, “It required considerable boldness to issue a bad report. Though operating outside the government, the contract researcher was, in many respects, more dependent on the client in the short-term, since contracts were perpetually being sought or coming up for renewal.”
the other a graduate school in public policy) in 1927 and was renamed the Brookings Institution. In his speech marking the institution’s fiftieth anniversary, President Lyndon Johnson stated that it had become a “national institution,” whose work was important to the White House, the Congress, and the country.

Although Brookings has generally been regarded in the press as a liberal think tank, it has historically offered more nuanced positions on issues of policy. For example, it initially supported and then opposed the New Deal. Yet it also assisted with the formation of the United Nations and the development of the Marshall Plan. Brookings has three major research interests: governance, economic issues, and foreign policy. During the Cold War its foreign policy focus was on the Soviet Union as well as the Middle East and Asia. It has since expanded its coverage to include Latin America and Africa. Its research on economic issues has similarly expanded to include analysis on the global economy and development.

Brookings longevity was also due to its generous funding. In 1991, the institution’s endowment was over $100 million and it had an annual budget of $16 to $17 million. Moreover, it benefited from large annual grants from the Ford Foundation. However, unlike RAND, Brookings did not conduct contract research and its revenues were limited to individual contributions. In addition, government related research does not account for a large percentage of its budget.

In 1975, Brookings published a report on the prospects for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict that would have a direct impact on U.S. policy. The institute organized a study group comprised of leading scholars, including Columbia’s Zbigniew Brzezinski, Malcolm Kerr and Stephen Spiegel of UCLA, Harvard’s Nadav Safran, Princeton’s Monroe Berger and Charles Yost of Brookings served as co-directors of the group. William Quandt, a former NSC official with the

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47 Johnson, “Government and the Critical Intelligence.”
48 Alice M. Rivlin, “Policy Analysis at the Brookings Institution,” in *Organizations for Policy Analysis: Helping Government Think*, ed. Carol H. Weiss (London: Sage Publications, 1991): 25-26. In her brief insider account of the Brookings Institution, Rivlin argues that it is not a liberal think tank as the press suggests. Rather, that the researchers tend to be “middle-of-the-road pragmatists, technocrats rather than ideologues, and debunkers of the zealots who offer simplistic solutions. Indeed, if a recurrent theme exists in Brookings policy analysis, it is that public choices are really hard, that there are no easy answers, only difficult trade-offs.” The Brookings Institution website offers additional information on their current areas of focus: [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu).
49 Smith, 78-79.
50 Ibid., 271-273.
51 Smith, 271-272; Rich, 65; Saunders, 106-107. According to Rich, Brookings’ budget increased from $5.7 million in 1971 to $21.7 million in 1996. He states that almost all of the growth was due to inflation. In 1977, only 0.5 percent of Brookings’ support was from individual contributions. Yet within a decade it increased to 2.7 percent. During the 1990s, individual contributions accounted for 12 to 16 percent of Brookings’ budget. A similar trend was observed with corporate contributions, which increased from 1.1 percent in 1977 to 16 percent after 1986. According to Saunders, much as it had done with Harvard’s CMES, the Ford Foundation provided a large capital grant to the Brookings Institution. In 1965, Brookings received a $14 million grant from Ford. It also received an $8 million grant that year from the widow of Robert Brookings before her death.
Nixon administration and a faculty member at the University of Pennsylvania, played a key role in the group.\footnote{The Brookings Institution, Toward Peace in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975).}

The final report, Toward Peace in the Middle East, sought to build on the Sinai disengagement agreements. It argued that because the United States had political, economic, and moral interests in maintaining peace in the region it should pursue a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The report cautioned that the Sinai agreements did not address the underlying causes of the conflict. It advocated that any agreement address and integrate several key elements, including security for all of the parties, Israel’s staged withdrawal to the June 1967 borders, and Palestinian self-determination in the form of an independent state or confederacy with Jordan. Although the group did not offer a recommendation on Jerusalem, it called for open access to the holy sites in the Old City. The report called for the U.S. not only to broker the talks but to offer a negotiating framework and substantive proposals as well as any economic and military assistance needed to conclude a settlement. It also recommended that Washington involve Moscow in the talks, if the Soviet Union could provide constructive support.\footnote{Ibid., 1-3.}

The report found support in the Carter campaign. Brzezinski was selected to serve as Carter’s national security adviser and Quandt returned to the NSC. Toward Peace in the Middle East eventually set the parameters for the Carter administration’s attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, including its outreach to the PLO. Although the Camp David Accords fell short of the comprehensive settlement advocated in the report, Carter adopted its recommendation for an aggressive American effort to resolve the conflict.\footnote{Quandt, 178, 436 fn1. Quandt notes that the report was considered “controversial” at the time. He states that while both Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance read the report, “it would be an exaggeration to say that the report served as a blueprint for the policies of the first year.”} Subsequent administrations would not follow Carter’s example. Indeed, key members of his foreign policy and national security staff would remain outside of government for the next twenty years, including Brzezinski and Quandt.\footnote{Quandt returned to Brookings during the Reagan and Bush administrations and took a faculty position at the University of Virginia. Although he would later publish several well-regarded books on the Arab-Israeli peace process and was frequently quoted in the press, he was not selected to serve in the Clinton administration. See his Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986); Decade of Decision: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Peace Process.}

During the Reagan administration’s second term, a new think tank was established which would have a significant influence on U.S. policy toward the Middle East over the next two decades. Funded by the influential pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was established in February 1985. The overlap between the two organizations was not superficial. Martyn Indyk, a former deputy director for research at AIPAC, served as WINEP’s first Executive Director, and other AIPAC officials were among the organization’s founders. While WINEP alternately billed itself as an organization focused on “public policy” and “research and education,” it did little to
mask its pro-Israel orientation.\textsuperscript{57} In contrast to its limited public profile, the organization developed strong links within Washington policy circles.\textsuperscript{58}

This was demonstrated in September 1988, when Secretary of State George Shultz appeared at a conference sponsored by WINEP. The first Palestinian intifada, or uprising, erupted ten months earlier in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As pictures of Israeli soldiers shooting at or beating unarmed Palestinian youths were broadcast around the world, the PLO leadership attempted to benefit from international sympathy toward the Palestinians and unprecedented criticism of Israel. The PLO’s renewed push for recognition by Washington and the creation of a Palestinian state obtained support internationally, however, it was rebuffed by the Reagan administration. In his speech to the WINEP conference, Shultz asserted that peace could not be achieved through the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. He added that calls for Palestinian self-determination were code words for an independent Palestinian state, which the United States could not accept. Shultz stated that if the PLO renounced terrorism, recognized Israel, and accepted UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, Washington would consider it for participation in the peace process. The PLO met Washington’s conditions two months later, and Reagan announced that the United States would begin discussions with the organization.\textsuperscript{59}

Although AIPAC and WINEP opposed Washington’s discussions with the PLO, they were unable to scuttle the talks. However, the talks proceeded at a much lower diplomatic level than the PLO had hoped. Meanwhile, WINEP’s influence continued to grow. In October 1989, the Washington Post declared that WINEP “appears to have placed its experts and ideas on Mideast matters at the top of the Bush administration.”\textsuperscript{60} The ideas were embodied in a September 1988 report published by WINEP entitled \textit{Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{57} WINEP’s website asserts that it was established in order to “advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in the Middle East.” Its mission was to “inject the power of ideas and the discipline of scholarship into the making of U.S. Middle East policy.” This was extended to the deliberate choice of “Near East,” rather than “Middle East.” WINEP explains that the organization’s founders “wanted the Institute's name to reflect the U.S. State Department's own geographic designation.” In addition, they “understood that American interests in the region emanate from a handful of core ideas: security, peace, prosperity, democracy, and stability.” Moreover, the founders recognized that “these interests can be best advanced through policies rooted in inquiry, debate, and research” and that WINEP would “reject romantic notions of what outside observers want the Middle East to be, and instead embrace disinterested assessments of what the region actually is.” See www.washingtoninstitute.org. (Last accessed April 30, 2011).


\textsuperscript{60} David B. Ottoway, “Mideast Institute’s Experts and Ideas Ascendant,” \textit{Washington Post} 24 March 1989. Ottoway reported that in four years WINEP had a permanent staff of 10, including five Israeli and American fellows, with an annual operating budget of $750,000. Funding was largely from contributions from the Jewish community.
East. Some of the key individuals involved in developing the report had become leading members of the Bush foreign policy and national security team. This included deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger; Richard Haas, Senior Director of the NSC for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Dennis Ross, director of the State Department’s PPS. Other members included Francis Fukuyama, Haas’s aide on the NSC, Ross’s aide Aaron David Miller, and Secretary of State James Baker’s speechwriter, Harvey Sicherman.61

The involvement of key Bush administration officials was not a coincidence. Indyk explained to the Washington Post that WINEP invited the Middle East policy advisers from the campaigns of both Vice President George H.W. Bush and Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis.62 In developing the report and selecting the participants, WINEP was also attempting to copy the perceived success of the Brookings Institution’s 1975 study group and final report. Indyk stated that “the Brookings plan was precisely what we were trying to replicate. The key was that the people engaged in the report went into the administration and had a common idea of what they wanted to do.”63 WINEP would succeed not only in copying the Brookings Institution, but over time the two organizations would be virtually identical in terms of leadership and policy recommendations.

Building for Peace offered recommendations on U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf. It argued that the Middle East was a “dangerous place” for the United States and the next administration faced a region in transition. This was due to the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the reversion of the Arab-Israeli conflict to its “inter-communal roots,” and an escalating superpower arms race. The report advocated that the United States “reshape the political environment” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In what would become a common refrain over the next two decades, the report argued that “the U.S. cannot make peace for these parties; it can only assist them once they are willing to do so.” It argued that rather than pursuing “traditional American diplomacy which seeks to produce a breakthrough to negotiations,” the next administration should attempt to cultivate a new Palestinian leadership drawn from the occupied Palestinian territories “willing to coexist with Israel” while also supporting an Israeli leadership that would assist with the effort. The report also advocated that “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians should be secured through direct negotiations.” Negotiations would be held between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians and any agreement would require a “prolonged transitional period,” in which “the intentions of the Palestinians to live in peace with Israel and Jordan could be tested.” Prior to either negotiations or the transition period, the study group advocated “confidence-building measures” between Israeli and Palestinians.64 These recommendations would be accepted in part by the Bush and Clinton administrations.

62 The study group was initiated in October 1987 and Eagleburger and former Vice President Walter Mondale served as the co-chairs. Unlike the Brookings Institution study group it was much larger and predominated by former policy makers rather than scholars. UCLA’s Stephen Spiegel was the only individual to serve on both study groups. Other notable members of the WINEP study group included former (and future) Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Harvard professor Joseph Nye, Jr., conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer, and Daniel Pipes, director of the conservative Foreign Policy Institute.
63 Ottoway. Indyk also sought to downplay WINEP’s pro-Israel orientation, asserting that “the image that I would like to convey is that we are friendly to Israel but doing credible research on the Middle East in a realistic and balanced way.”
64 Ottoway; Building for Peace, vii-xviii.
particular, the emphasis on confidence-building measures would become a hallmark of the Oslo Accords. However, the recommendations would be modified to account for changes regionally and internationally.

Dennis Ross is perhaps the best demonstration of WINEP’s ability to quickly integrate into and influence America’s Middle East policy. One of the key figures at WINEP, Ross began working for the Pentagon during the Carter administration, initially serving under Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs Paul Wolfowitz. Ross also served in the Department of Defense during the Reagan administration. In February 1985, he authored WINEP’s first policy paper, “Acting with Caution: Middle East Policy Planning for the Second Reagan Administration.” In the paper, Ross advocated that the Reagan administration revive Kissinger’s approach before the October 1973 War of “patiently awaiting real movement from the local parties.” During Reagan’s second term, Ross served as the director of the NSC’s Near East Affairs. He left his post on the NSC to join the Bush campaign in 1988 as a foreign policy adviser. However, he accepted a temporary affiliation with WINEP before joining the campaign. After the election, he became the head of the State Department’s PPS.

The end of the Cold War and the swift victory of the U.S.-led coalition in the first Gulf War appeared to offer an opportunity to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, the convening of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the ensuing direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians inspired optimism in some quarters that a peace treaty was achievable. When George Bush lost the 1992 presidential election, it appeared that a new foreign policy team would be in place. However, President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher surprisingly tapped Ross to serve as Special Middle East Coordinator with responsibility for the peace process. Before the post was announced, Ross was due to return to WINEP and replace Indyk as Executive Director. Indyk was selected by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to serve as head of the NSC’s Middle East section, the post Ross held during the Reagan administration. As in the 1988 election, WINEP assembled a bi-partisan study group composed of the Middle East experts from the Bush and Clinton campaigns and released a new report. Thus, WINEP maintained its influence on U.S. policy in the region with another administration.

WINEP’s influence during the Clinton presidency was also demonstrated in policy formation and implementation for the broader region. Most prominently, the Clinton administration’s

65 Ottoway.
66 Clyde Farnsworth, Charlotte Evans “Briefing: A Useful Affiliation” New York Times 12 July 1988; Quandt, 293. It should be noted that neither WINEP, nor his role in the organization, are discussed in Dennis Ross’s The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
67 Joel Beinin, “Money, Media, and Policy Consensus: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” Middle East Report January-February 1993. Beinin reports that during the first Gulf War commentators affiliated with WINEP “were frequent sources of the sound bites, op-eds, and canned quotes featured by the mass media. They reinforced the Bush administration’s framing of the issues, legitimized the war, affirmed the authority of the media, and provided color commentary once the shooting began.” He adds that at the Madrid conference, Indyk was an expert commentator for CNN.
68 Indyk, 23-24; Quandt, Peace Process, 321-323. Indyk calls the appointment a “quiet coup,” that was due to Ross’s “political skills and the wisdom of Clinton and Christopher in understanding the important of continuity.” It should be noted that the Middle East peace process Ross was to oversee had stalled following some initial hope with the convening of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.
policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran was detailed in a speech by Indyk to WINEP.\textsuperscript{70} The organization continued to expand its presence in the media and policy circles in the late 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century.

The Brookings Institution was not immune from WINEP’s influence. After serving as U.S. Ambassador to Israel twice during the Clinton administration as well as the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Indyk joined the Brookings Institution. In 2001, as the peace process lay in tatters and the second Palestinian intifada raged across the occupied Palestinian territories, Indyk fielded a call from a wealthy donor to the Democratic Party. Media mogul Haim Saban wanted to establish a think tank specifically focused on the Middle East and securing Israel’s future. Saban rejected Indyk’s suggestion that he donate to WINEP, preferring to establish his own think tank. Eventually, Saban would make a $13 million donation to the Brookings Institution, and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy was born.\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Middle East Studies in Transition}

As funding for area studies was under pressure throughout the 1970s, Middle East studies were experiencing a transformation. The threat of reduced federal funding combined with decreased support from the foundations placed severe constraints on the growth of area studies. Yet the field of Middle East studies was beginning to diversify intellectually during this period. Although NDEA funding was targeted at strategic areas, there was no mechanism to ensure that the types of research conducted by graduate students would further U.S. national security interests other than obtaining competence in a particular foreign language. Indeed, for many scholars who completed their doctoral degrees during and after the Vietnam War engaging in such research was anathema. The new generation of scholars also sought to distance themselves from, if not challenge outright, the prevailing orthodoxy within the field as represented by Orientalist scholars.

Historian Zachary Lockman argues that this shift in Middle East studies grew out of the “New Left” movement in academia. Building on the critique of America’s role in the world embodied in the scholarship of the New Left, and emboldened by the civil rights movement in the U.S. as well as opposition to the Vietnam War, the new generation of Middle East scholars were interested in investigating structural factors to explain developments in the region. This contrasted sharply with the prevailing view of Orientalist scholars and modernization theorists that the region was unchanging since antiquity and that any issues could be explained by focusing on the inherent character flaws of the population. Over the course of a decade,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[70] Indyk, 41–43. Indyk explains that the duty of delivering the address fell to him because neither Lake nor deputy national security adviser Sandy Berger were available. He claimed that the term “dual containment” was developed following a conversation with a \textit{New York Times} reporter in which he was explaining the U.S.’s policy of “aggressive containment” of Iraq and “active containment” of Iran.
\item[71] Indyk; Connie Bruck, “The Influencer,” \textit{New Yorker} 10 May 2010; Aaron Ross Sorkin, “Schlepping to Moguldom,” \textit{New York Times}, 5 September 2004. In the \textit{New Yorker} profile, Bruck quotes Saban as stating that there are “three ways to be influential in American politics.” He explained that it was donations to political parties, establishing think tanks, and controlling media outlets. Six years earlier in the \textit{New York Times}, Saban explained “I am a one-issue guy and my issue is Israel.” He repeated this sentiment to the \textit{New Yorker}.
\end{footnotes}
scholarship in general, not only related to the Middle East, shifted from focusing on elites to examining the influence of race, class, and gender across different disciplines.\footnote{Lockman, 151-153.}

The challenge to Orientalist scholars and scholarship was aided by the publication of Edward Said’s \textit{Orientalism} in 1978. \textit{Orientalism} was a scathing critique of Orientalism as a profession, a discourse, and an ideology that had an impact beyond Middle East studies. Indeed, Middle East studies was arguably (and ironically) one of the last fields to be influenced by Said. As discussed in the Introduction, Said argued that Orientalism was not just a profession or scholarly pursuit, but an expression of European material culture. In particular, he focused on British and French scholars and the production of knowledge about the “Orient,” which he called an invention of the “Occident” -- initially Europe and later the United States. Said narrowed the borders of the Orient to Europe’s “East,” or what would eventually be referred to as the Near and Middle East.\footnote{Ibid., 2-3.} He asserted that the research and writing of British and French Orientalists was used to justify and reinforce the actions of the European colonial powers in these areas. Invariably, Said claimed, theses representations portrayed the Orient as different and inferior to Europe. Although the United States did not share the long history of interaction with Arabs or Muslim (as America’s “Orient” was generally considered to be Japan and East Asia), Said argued that it adopted European definitions and representations which were manifested in popular culture as well as the development of area studies.\footnote{Lockman, 193-200. Lockman offers an extensive discussion of different reviews of \textit{Orientalism} by influential scholars after it was published.}

While intellectual challenges to Orientalism were growing over the previous decade, none had the immediate or long-term impact of Said. However, \textit{Orientalism}, was not without its flaws or its detractors. As Zachary Lockman demonstrates, the book received mixed reviews initially. While some scholars welcomed it, others objected to Said’s dense writing style as well as to his monolithic treatment of the Occident. The sharpest criticisms accused Said of ignoring Orientalist scholarship from before the British and French imperial periods or the extensive works of German Orientalist scholars who did not have colonial holdings in the Near and Middle East.\footnote{Ibid., 151-153.}

In critiquing the profession of Orientalism, Said challenged the notion that the Orient was timeless and unchanging and could be understood through philology and the analysis of authoritative texts. The response to his argument was led by arguably the leading Orientalist scholar in the U.S., Princeton’s Bernard Lewis. Lewis responded to \textit{Orientalism} nearly four years after it was published, in a 1982 article in the \textit{New York Review of Books}. The debate between the two scholars was contentious and heated, and underlying it was the Arab-Israeli conflict. Said was an outspoken advocate for the Palestinian cause and in 1979 published \textit{The Question of Palestine}, he also had a seat on the Palestine National Council, the PLO’s “parliament-in-exile.” Lewis, however, was an advocate for a robust American Cold War policy and a supporter of Israel. Although Said arguably won the contest of ideas within academia, Lewis’s influence would become far more pronounced within policy circles. His notion of a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Muslim world discussed in Chapter 5 would
find influential adherents as a framework for understanding the post-Cold War international landscape. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks it would be deemed prophetic.\textsuperscript{76}

As the field of Middle East studies was transforming, area studies were undergoing a retrenchment. In 1984, the Association of American Universities published a new report on area studies by Richard Lambert. In the new report, Lambert confirmed that the era of rapid growth in area studies was over. He found that reduced federal funding in the 1970s led to a decline in the number of Title VI programs from 107 to 46. Following the restoration of support in the early 1980s the number of centers increased to 76. However, federal funding alone was insufficient. Indeed, a survey by the Rockefeller Foundation warned that area studies centers anticipated a “disaster” due to cuts in the types of funding available to the universities. In addition, Lambert reported that there was a decline in the number of foreign area experts in the United States.\textsuperscript{77}

The impetus for the 1984 Lambert report was the Pentagon’s renewed interest in language training. Like the State Department, the DOD had its own training programs but also utilized university-based centers. With the end of détente and the renewed Cold War, the DOD believed foreign language and area training, particularly for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, was a priority. Indeed, less than decade after he declared that university-centers were ready to stand on their own, Casper Weinberger (now Reagan’s Secretary of Defense) stated that language and area studies as well as mathematics and science were the subjects most important to the DOD and the most at risk. The concerns expressed by Weinberger were echoed by other government agencies, Congress, and academic institutions and societies.\textsuperscript{78}

While the DOD was interested in improving its language training, academic research for particular areas was considered less important. A DOD representative explained in the 1984 Lambert report that academic research was “out of sync” with the needs of the intelligence community, which tended to focus on “immediate policy questions.” Lambert explained that this was due to the types of knowledge produced within academia, which were based on the scholarly training, research, and teaching of the different disciplines in a university setting. The intelligence community often required specific information to assist with the completion of certain tasks, however, academic research offered contextual knowledge about countries and societies that were either not directly related to policy questions and issues or were of limited value. In spite of this gap, intelligence analysts valued and benefitted from academic scholarship, which the report stated provided “the broad basis and background for analysts preparing for more specific, classified studies.” The report found that analysts tended toward periodicals that covered contemporary issues, in particular \textit{Foreign Affairs}, as well as technical publications. Scholarly journals, monographs, and other academic publications were typically

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 190-192. Lockman offers a discussion of the Said-Lewis feud, which continued for the next two decades until Said’s death in 2003.
\textsuperscript{77} Richard Lambert, \textit{Beyond Growth: The Next Stage in Language and Area Studies} (Washington, DC: Association of American Universities, 1984): 10-13. Although they received Title VI funds, Lambert did not include centers for international studies (12), Canadian studies (2), and Pacific Islands (1) in his review.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 22-23.
drawn upon for “deeper research where time and analytical requirements permit or demand them.”

In its assessment of Middle East studies, the 1984 Lambert report found that the field had several issues hindering research. First, there was limited access to a number of countries, including Iran and Yemen. Second, the difficulty in language acquisition for the major regional languages remained a barrier. In the case of Arabic, this was compounded by the different colloquial dialects and differences between written and spoken Arabic. This raised the need for additional training centers in the region, especially for training in local dialects. Third, a number of Middle East centers benefited from the spike in oil prices after the October 1973 War due to donations from major corporations and oil-producing countries. However, it was anticipated that a drop in oil prices would lead to a reduction in these types of donations making federal support even more essential.

The 1984 Lambert report recommended a number of modifications to area studies funding and programs. It advocated that DOD provide supplemental funding for language instruction, particularly for areas where it had identified a critical need. The report also called for long term strategy and plan for language and area studies. However, the Cold War would end before the recommendations could be implemented. Indeed, with the superpower competition over, the national security rationale for area studies was also increasingly difficult to justify. Yet American hegemony did not produce the peace dividend that many hoped it would. Instead, university-based centers and area scholars were faced with a new paradigm: decreased funding, a changing mandate, and an uncertain future.

America Triumphant?

The end of the Cold War coupled with the triumph of the U.S.-led coalition in the first Gulf War confirmed American hegemony in the Middle East. A process which began in the early post-war period, was tested during the competition with Moscow and concluded with the Camp David Accords was
reaffirmed not only by American military power but the political and economic pressure Washington brought to bear on Iraq as well as any opponents to military intervention. It also provided scholars of the region an opportunity to reexamine and reimagine the possibilities for the future of Middle East studies in the United States. As discussed in Chapter 1, this period witnessed yet another expansion in the boundaries of the area called the Middle East, not a contraction.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to renewed interest in the newly independent Central Asian republics. From the perspective of Washington policymakers and former Soviet specialists, the republics had a potent combination of majority Muslim populations, either large oil reserves or few natural resources, and the potential for unrest. However, the differences in language, history and scholarship made it more difficult to incorporate the studies into existing Middle East studies departments, centers, and courses.

Meanwhile, there were discussions within Middle East studies over its future direction. In 1994, then president of MESA, historian Rashid Khalidi argued in his speech to the association that the future of the field was in the disciplines not as stand-alone area studies. The disciplines, he asserted, had greater institutional support and were more universal compared to the “Middle Eastern ghetto.” In a later article, Khalidi also asserted that the end of the Cold War offered an opportunity to abandon the term “Middle East” as an appellation for the region. However, the decade and the century would end with discussions of the future in terms of Middle East studies and a more appropriate term for the region still unresolved.

Conclusion

By 1998, the fortieth anniversary of the NDEA’s passage, area studies in general and Middle East studies in particular were at a crossroads. The Cold War conflict which instigated the NDEA’s passage was over and American hegemony in the Middle East was unquestioned and essentially unchallenged. While the field of Middle East studies expanded and diversified in the 1970s and 1980s, it occurred during a period of funding reductions and constraints. Moreover, as a new generation of scholars emerged less inclined to produce knowledge deemed useful by the foreign policy and national security establishments, the rift between academia and the U.S. government deepened. As demonstrated by the Safran scandal at Harvard, a majority of scholars believed that covert CIA funding for academic conferences and studies were to be shunned not embraced. Yet independent studies conducted at the same time as the Safran scandal stated that area studies scholarship needed to be more useful to government agencies.

The implications of American policy in the region were also demonstrated in the changing relationships with universities in the region. AUC was the primary beneficiary of improved relations between Cairo and Washington. Indeed, the university’s status within Egypt and with the government was dramatically different by the 1980s than at any time in its history. Meanwhile, AUB suffered from Lebanon’s fifteen-year civil war, which was so violent that the university was not only forced to close for a period but made it an untenable environment for faculty, staff, and students. In the aftermath of the conflict, AUB worked quickly to restore the university’s standing regionally and in the United States.

Israel’s swift victory in the June 1967 War, resulted in a public strengthening of the “special relationship” between Tel Aviv and Washington. The relationship was enhanced further following the Camp David Accords and the end of the Cold War in the Middle East. This was best demonstrated by the emergence of WINEP and its close ties to the foreign policy establishment. WINEP’s core policy belief that Israel and America’s interests in the region were intertwined was adopted by successive

82 Hajjar and Niva; Khalidi, “The ‘Middle East’ as a Framework of Analysis: Remapping a Region in the Era of Globalization.”
administrations, Republicans and Democrats. The key positions within the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations occupied by WINEP founders and alum ensured significant agreement on policy issues related to the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. During the Clinton administration the alliance between the U.S. and Israel would be upgraded to a “strategic relationship,” and within a decade it would be enhanced further, becoming a “strategic alliance.”

Private policy-related think tanks emerged in the late and post-Cold War periods at the expense of university-based area centers. Well-funded and actively embracing the foreign policy and intelligence establishments, think tanks like WINEP and the Brookings Institution as well as the plethora of conservative and right-wing institutions that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s, offered U.S. government agencies the seemingly impartial external expertise it desired. The privatized knowledge produced by the think tanks at the end of the twentieth century for use by the U.S. government were a corollary to the private knowledge of missionaries and Orientalist scholars utilized by the Wilson administration during the First World War. Drawn from a small, select group where political connections and ideology were considered more important than contemporary knowledge about the region, the think tanks produced knowledge about the Middle East that reinforced Washington’s predisposed notions about the region and its inhabitants as well as its own policies. In the wake of another national emergency at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Washington’s politically expedient relationship with and reliance upon the think tanks would become even greater.
Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of the Empire: how not to die, how to prolong its era. By day it pursues its enemies. It is cunning and ruthless, it sends its bloodhounds everywhere. By night it feeds on images of disaster: the sack of cities, the rape of populations, pyramids of bones, acres of desolation. A mad vision yet a virulent one.

- J.M. Coetzee

History. We don’t know. We’ll all be dead.

- George W. Bush

What we are seeing here, in a sense, is the birth pangs of a new Middle East.

- Condoleezza Rice, July 21, 2006

Epilogue: The Bush Doctrine and the New Middle East

It was a warm June morning on the West Point campus. President George W. Bush stood at the podium in Michie Stadium to address the graduating cadets, their families, and friends. Nine months had passed since the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington stunned the nation and the world. In the intervening period, the United States declared a “War on Terror” and invaded and occupied Afghanistan. Bush’s graduation speech would not only signal a new phase in the war, but an apparent shift in American postwar foreign policy.

The West Point speech built upon Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. In his speech to Congress, Bush declared that “every nation in every region” must decide “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” The enemy, he explained, was “a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.” Bush added, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” Within three weeks, the United States and its NATO allies would attack Afghanistan where the leadership of al-Qaida was believed to be based. However, the swift victory in Afghanistan was overshadowed by the failure to capture or kill the main figures in al-Qaida’s leadership, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

At West Point, Bush explained that new strategies were needed to counter “new threats.” Unlike the Cold War, he stated that deterrence and containment were “not possible when

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unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.” The audience applauded when Bush claimed, “If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long.” There was also applause when he declared that “the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.” The West Point speech outlined a new strategy of “preemptive action” and ensuring unrivaled American military supremacy. Although Bush stated that the United States could not impose democracy on other countries, it would soon become a key pillar of the Bush Doctrine. Iraq was to be the test case for the doctrine, and over the next nine months the Bush administration would present its case to the American public and the international community while steadily building up military forces in the Persian Gulf.

The Bush Doctrine, and the invasion and occupation of Iraq that it justified, were a culmination of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East over the previous century. While it appeared to be a break from the policies of previous administrations, the doctrine was a culmination of American involvement in and hegemony over the Middle East. Indeed, the key tenets of the doctrine were based on the policies, actions, and rhetoric of previous administrations. The difference was a changed international system and the absence of a significant counterweight to American hyperpower which enabled if not validated the doctrine’s militarism. Moreover, the fusion of democracy promotion and military intervention were informed by and reproduced an image of the region and its inhabitants that were justified in terms of vengeance and the need for security.

**Middle East Studies under Attack**

Shortly after the September 11 attacks a report was published by the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), a conservative organization founded by Lynn Cheney, wife of Vice President Dick Cheney. Entitled “Defending Civilization,” the report’s introduction claimed that academia was the only part of American society that did not respond in a patriotic manner to the attacks. Instead, it stated that “professors from across the country sponsored teach-ins that typically ranged from moral equivocation to explicit condemnation of America.” While American politicians and media figures stood with the President in “calling evil by its rightful name,” professors “demurred” and “refused to make judgments.” Some members of the academy “invoked tolerance and diversity as antidotes to evil,” while others “pointed accusatory fingers, not at the terrorists, but at America itself.”

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6 American Council of Trustees and Alumni, *Defending Civilization: How Our Universities are Failing America and What Can be Done about It* (Washington, DC: American Council of Trustees and Alumni, 2001). Although Cheney was ACTA’s founding chairman, she was no longer serving in that capacity when the report was published. However, the report included a number of quotes by Cheney that reinforced its claims. This included an October 5, 2001 speech in which she stated, “To say that it is more important now [to study Islam] implies that the events of
ACTA declared that the insufficient expressions of patriotism and criticism of U.S. foreign policy by professors were part of a larger problem at American universities. Indeed, the report’s subtitle claimed that academia was “failing America.” The ACTA report criticized universities for adding courses on Islamic and Asian civilizations. It asserted that instead the universities needed to ensure that students understood the “unique contributions of American and Western civilizations.” Although it was important that students learn about other cultures and societies, the urgency with which courses were added immediately after the attacks “reinforced the mindset that it was America -- and America’s failure to understand Islam -- that were to blame.” The report claimed that “America’s first line of defense is a confident understanding of how and why this nation was founded, and of the continuing relevance and urgency of its first principles.”

Arguably the most controversial aspect of the ACTA report was the selective quoting of over 100 faculty, staff, and students in the appendix. However, the attempt to blacklist the professors led to an outcry and ACTA reissued the report in February 2002. Although the names of the individuals accompanying the quotes were removed, their title and institutional affiliations remained, thereby implicating the entire university department or student body in the remarks that ACTA deemed objectionable.8

Within the year, the ACTA report was followed by an on-line monitoring effort that specifically targeted Middle East studies scholars. Established by Daniel Pipes and linked to his Middle East Forum think tank, the “Campus Watch” website monitored statements by faculty members and students deemed anti-Israel or anti-American. Like the ACTA report, the attempted blacklisting led to a backlash. A number of Middle East scholars who were not initially named by Pipes emailed the site requesting that they be added to the list. Campus Watch eventually adopted ACTA’s approach and began providing a “survey of institutions” rather than listing the names of individuals.9

More sophisticated efforts to target Middle East studies emerged in the wake of the attacks. WINEP published a book critical of Middle East studies in the United States by Martin Kramer, a former research fellow. Entitled *Ivory Towers on Sand*, the book laid the blame for the September 11 attacks on the failure of Middle East scholars to adequately predict the rise of fundamentalist Islam. Kramer argued that this failure was due to the wholesale adoption and intellectual hegemony of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* in Middle East studies. He asserted that the field was predominated by anti-Israeli and anti-American scholars who emulated Said’s

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8 Ibid.; Joel Beinin, “The New McCarthyism: Policing Thought about the Middle East,” in *Academic Freedom after September 11*, 244-245.
9 Beinin, “The New McCarthyism: Policing Thought about the Middle East,” 252. Beinin reports that Campus Watch initially claimed that it would “monitor and gather information on professors who fan the flames of disinformation, incitement, and ignorance.” The language has since been removed from the site after the backlash and the attempted blacklist. Beinin also discusses efforts by pro-Israel organizations to monitor faculty, staff, and students on university campuses during the 1980s and early 1990s.
intellectual and political perspectives. Kramer implied that the implications of this shift and the “blind spot” on a resurgent and militant Islam were the September 11 attacks.

Kramer’s real goal was to target funding for Middle East studies centers under Title VI. He laid out a series of “modest reforms” that would modify Title VI to ensure that it “would contribute to meeting the ‘national need’ of reconnecting the field to its constituencies.” This included revising how Middle East centers were evaluated to enhance the weight given to outreach and including non-academics in the Title VI review process. Kramer also suggested that congressional hearings should be held to determine the “contribution of Middle Eastern studies to American public policy,” in which academics and non-academics could present testimony. He stated that the hearings “could sensitize the academic recipients of taxpayer dollars to the concerns of the American people, expressed through their elected representatives.” The goal of these reforms, Kramer claimed, was to remove the “culture of irrelevance” which had pervaded the field.

The changes advocated in *Ivory Towers of Sand* served as a virtual template for a concerted effort by conservative commentators, academics, and think tanks to target Title VI funding over the next three years. Efforts began in earnest after the invasion of Iraq and the overwhelming outcry by Middle East scholars against the war and occupation. Following a Congressional subcommittee hearing in June 2003, in which Kramer’s allies testified, a bill was attached to the reauthorization of Title VI funding. Essentially mirroring Kramer’s recommendation, House Resolution (H.R. 3077) called for the creation of an advisory board to ensure that government-funded academic programs related to international affairs reflected “diverse perspectives and represent the full range of views.” The Secretary of Education was to appoint three board members, two of which would be representatives of a national security agency of the U.S. government. Two additional board members were to be appointed by the majority leaders of the House and Senate. Although the House passed the bill, it did not make it out of committee in the Senate. A similar attempt the following year was also unsuccessful. While the attempts to impose a politicized oversight board failed, the combined impact of high profile efforts to police and intimidate Middle East scholars had a chilling effect on the field.

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10 Lockman offers a thorough refutation of Kramer’s claims in *Contending Visions*, 195-200, 257-265.
11 Kramer, 44-60. Kramer was serving as the editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*, a journal published by Pipes’ Middle East Forum, when the book was published. It should be noted that Kramer’s accusations and leaps in logic were not limited to September 11. For example, he suggested that an article published by the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) in the mid-1970s, which discussed the connections between the U.S. government and AUB may have inspired the 1984 assassination of Malcolm Kerr, the university’s president in Beirut.
12 Ibid., 124-127. Kramer noted that a subcommittee hearing would also provide the representatives from academia with the opportunity to address their concerns to members of Congress, ignoring the obvious imbalance in power between the Congressmen holding the hearings and witnesses.
13 Beinin, “The New McCarthyism: Policing Thought about the Middle East,” 253-254; Newhall, “The Unraveling of the Devil’s Bargain: The History and Politics of Language Acquisition,” 219-221. The intent of H.R. 3077 was in sharp contrast to the original language in the NDEA. As discussed in Chapter 5, NDEA restricted the intervention of government agencies on issues of curriculum, instruction, administration, or personnel of the institutions receiving funds. Ironically, the language was added to the bill to mollify the criticism of states’ rights advocates, many of whom were supporters of H.R. 3077.
14 Beinin and Newhall describe some of the high profile attacks on faculty in the U.S. during this period, including at Columbia University.
Middle East studies scholars and centers came under increasing scrutiny while experiencing a dramatic increase in the enrollment for Arabic classes as well as courses on the history and politics of the region. A 2002 survey by the Modern Language Association reported that 10,596 university and college students were enrolled in Arabic courses that year, almost double the number in 1998. Although the number of Title VI National Resource Centers (NRC) increased from 14 to 17 after the September 11 attacks, the increase in federal funding hoped for after the attacks were either never delivered or were insufficient to address years of underfunding. In addition, the dramatic spike in student enrollment was exacerbated by a distinct shortage in Arabic instructors.\(^\text{15}\)

Meanwhile, a controversial program established after the Cold War found new support inside and outside Washington. In 1991, Senator David Boren of Oklahoma sponsored the creation of The National Security Education Program (NSEP). The NSEP provides funding for language study to institutions and individuals. Recipients of the fellowships agree to work in a national security agency of the U.S. government for at least one year. Administered by DOD, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Education Board oversee the NSEP’s programs and policies. Although the program was greeted with hostility by major academic associations, a significant number of Boren fellows receive language training through Title VI NRCs. In contrast to Title VI, the NSEP has benefited from funding increases since September 11.\(^\text{16}\)

\textit{The Neoconservative Moment}

Although it was not immediately apparent at the time he was sworn into office, George W. Bush would preside over the most conservative administration in the postwar era. Already emboldened by American military and economic dominance after the Cold War, the September 11 attacks would provide the neoconservatives in the Bush administration with the opportunity and the pretext to implement their vision of American foreign and domestic policies. Once considered on the fringe of the Democratic and Republican parties, the presence of neoconservatives in key national security and advisory positions ensured their influence on policy-making decisions.

Neoconservatism emerged out of disaffection with the Democratic Party during the Vietnam War and Johnson’s Great Society programs.\(^\text{17}\) Among the key aspects of neoconservative


\(^\text{16}\) Newhall, 213-219. According to Newhall, the oversight Board is comprised of thirteen members and is chaired by the president of the National Defense University. The Board members include the CIA director and five other government officials, and six officials outside of government. Newhall reports that several other programs have been established similar to the NSEP, including the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholarship Program and the Intelligence Community Scholarship Program. She notes that as of 2003, 30 percent of NSEP graduate fellowships were given to students at universities with Title VI NRCs.

\(^\text{17}\) Nathan Vai\'sse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010): 6-13. Vai\’sse separates the movement’s history into “three ages.” During the first age, which lasted until the 1972 Presidential election, neoconservatives were members of the Democratic Party,
ideology are staunch anti-communism, a strong U.S. military, advocacy for human rights, neoliberal economic agenda, and support for the state of Israel. Two of the leading intellectual figures behind the movement were Irving Kristol, editor of Commentary magazine and co-founder of The Public Interest journal, and Arnold Wohlstetter, a professor at the University of Chicago and UCLA. Within policy circles, neoconservatives found a sponsor in Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington. Some of the leading figures in the movement would eventually take positions in the Reagan and Bush administrations, including Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle.

The origins of the Bush Doctrine can be traced to the end of the Cold War and the formation of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. Produced by the office of then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, the initial draft laid out a vision of American military supremacy and preventing the emergence of a new superpower rival. Although the language was modified after the document was leaked to the New York Times, the strategy of ensuring American dominance, particularly over strategic areas like the Middle East, from potential rivals remained.

During the Clinton presidency, Wolfowitz and former members of the Bush and Ford administrations advocated for a tougher American policy toward Iraq. Embraced and emboldened by well-funded think tanks, including AEI and WINEP, neoconservatives launched two organizations whose positions would have a long-lasting impact on U.S. policy in the Middle East: the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and the Jewish Institute for

including some whose political beliefs were on the far left. In the second age, after advocating for a change in the Democratic Party through the organization the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), many neoconservatives joined the Republican Party and served in the Reagan and Bush administrations. However, some neoconservatives remained within the Democratic Party, like Senators Daniel P. Moynihan and Henry Jackson. The last age was the perceived decline of the movement during the 1990s and its reemergence with the George W. Bush presidency. It should be noted that advocacy for human rights by neoconservatives was genuine, but selective. It was typically geared toward dissidents in the Soviet bloc as a way of embarrassing and weakening Moscow internationally. However, after the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions, some neoconservatives, including Irving Kristol questioned the movement’s emphasis on human rights. According to Vaïsse, Wolfowitz remained committed to human rights, including pressuring non-Communist regimes friendly to the United States like that of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. (138).

Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 157, 170, 419; Vaïsse, 119, 159. During the 1950s, Kristol served as the Executive Director of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom and co-editor of Encounter, a CIA funded magazine. Kristol would later become affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think tank, and found the journal, The National Interest. Vaïsse states that Wohlstetter never embraced the neoconservative label although he embodied many of its principles.

Vaïsse, 119-121. As discussed in Chapter 6, Wolfowitz served in Carter’s Pentagon as Deputy Undersecretary for Regional Programs. He was head of the State Department’s PPS in the Reagan administration where he recruited a number of neoconservatives, including Francis Fukuyama, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Alan Keyes, and Zalmay Khalilzad. Although not necessarily a neoconservative, Dennis Ross was also recruited by Wolfowitz and served on the PPS after working for him in the Pentagon during the Carter administration.

James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004): 209-210. Although the Defense Planning Guidance has often been attributed to Wolfowitz, Mann states that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had and took ultimate responsibility for the document and its contents. While Wolfowitz contributed ideas to the document, Mann notes that he did not review it before it was leaked. Drafting the document fell to his aides, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and Zalmay Khalilzad. After the document was leaked, Mann reports that Wolfowitz attempted to distance himself from the contents. According to Mann, Wolfowitz and Libby also thought that the strategy proposed was not aggressive enough.
At the Crossroads of Empire

Epilogue

Osamah Khalil

National Security Affairs (JINSA). PNAC was co-founded in 1997 by Irving Kristol’s son William, who had also launched the Weekly Standard two years earlier. Within a year, PNAC published an open letter calling on the Clinton administration to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The letter was signed by leading neoconservative figures from the Reagan and Bush administrations, as well as the Clinton’s former CIA director, James Woolsey, and former (and future) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

Many of the prominent individuals and policy makers that were affiliated with the AEI, WINEP, and PNAC were also active with JINSA. Founded in 1976, the organization’s main purpose is strengthening military ties between the United States and Israel. Like PNAC, JINSA also viewed Iraq as a strategic threat to Israel and advocated for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Its board members during the 1990s consisted of several figures that would reemerge in prominent positions in the Bush administration, including Perle, former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, John Bolton, and Douglas Feith.

Three months after Bush’s speech at West Point, the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) was published by the White House. While the NSS expanded on the major points of the West Point address, the major change was a new emphasis on promoting democracy. The core of the strategy remained the shift from a policy of deterrence and containment to preemption against terrorist organizations and their state sponsors, in particular those who sought or planned to use WMD. While Bush had spoken of an “axis of evil” in his first State of the Union address, comprised of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, the NSS was aimed primarily at Iraq. It stated that in the previous decade a number of “rogue states” emerged with shared attributes, including internal repression, corruption, disregard for international law and treaties, a determination to acquire and use WMD, sponsor terrorism, and “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” Establishing the rationale for the invasion of Iraq, the NSS stated that the United States “must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients

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22 Vaïsse, 226-227. Both PNAC and JINSA adopted approaches and policy positions that were similar to Cold War-era neoconservative organizations, the CDM and the Committee on the Present Danger.
23 For a full list of signatories see http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm (last accessed May 20, 2011). The PNAC letter was similar to a 1996 policy document produced by Perle for the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, a think tank with offices in the U.S. and Israel. Entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” the document advocated that newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adopt a different approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process. This included abandoning the “land for peace” formula embodied in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and reaffirmed by the Camp David Accords. Instead, Israel should pursue a policy of “peace for peace,” toward Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. Moreover, it called for a regional realignment, in particular overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime and bolstering the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan to increase its influence regionally, as well as a change in Israel’s domestic economic policies. The text of the document can be found at http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm (last accessed May 20, 2011). See also Joel Beinin, “The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse,” Social Text Volume 21 (No. 2) Summer 2003: 125-139.
24 Beinin, “The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse,” 132; Jason Vest, “The Men from JINSA and CSP,” The Nation 15 August 2002. Woolsey also served on JINSA’s board and with Perle was a vocal advocate for attacking Iraq. In addition, Feith was involved with Perle in developing the 1996 “A Clean Break” document. In his profile of JINSA, Vest reports that it has developed strong ties to military contractors, including some who serve on its board, as well as retired and active senior American military officers.
before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our allies and friends.”

Implicit in the doctrine was the notion of America as a benevolent empire. Unlike previous empires, the United States sought no territory to conquer or even resources, but to make the world safe for and promote democracy. Neoconservatives promoting military action in Iraq and across the region touted not only its benefits but the altruism of American empire. Indeed, leading neoconservatives inside and outside the Bush administration offered assurances that empire would be inexpensive in terms of lives lost and cost to the U.S. treasury. Compared to the despotism of the “axis of evil,” this was to be a humanitarian intervention that would safeguard the United States and its allies as well as Iraqi lives. It would also send a very clear message to other rogue states: you are next. Moreover, the invasion would remake the Middle East in America’s image and Iraq would become the catalyst for change across the region.

The intellectual justification for the policies initially advocated by the neoconservatives and enacted by the Bush administration was provided by a small but influential group of like-minded Middle East scholars led by Princeton’s Bernard Lewis. As discussed in Chapter 5, Lewis claimed that a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Muslim world explained Nasser’s popularity after the 1956 Suez War. Over the next six decades he would repeat this argument with little change in the analysis or evidence. It reappeared in a September 1990 article in The Atlantic following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The phrase would be adopted and popularized by Samuel Huntington three years later, perhaps explaining why it was absent from Lewis’ November 2001 New Yorker article, “The Revolt of Islam,” although the argument remained the same. As the Bush administration began making the case in earnest for the invasion of Iraq in September 2002, Lewis penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Time for Toppling,” in which he affirmed the President’s “axis of evil” claim and argued that regime change in Iraq would assist efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq appeared to be the fulfillment of neoconservative ideology. However, the failure to find WMD and the emergence of a stubborn insurgency that metastasized into a civil war exposed the Bush administration’s arguments for invasion. Moreover, the lack of post-war planning as well as the endemic corruption, incompetence, and brutality of the U.S. occupation further undermined the argument of neoconservatives that the

25 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The NSS also devoted considerable attention to the expansion of free markets and free trade as key part of the U.S.’s new strategy.
26 Vaïsse, 234-235. Among the most prominent neoconservatives Vaïsse identifies as advocates of empire and this line of argument were Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol, and Max Boot.
27 Ian Buruma, “Lost in Translation,” New Yorker 14 June 2004. Buruma writes that Lewis was “a mentor to [Senator] Henry (Scoop) Jackson in the early nineteen-seventies, and a friend to several Israeli Prime Ministers, Lewis has been especially sought after in Washington since September 11th. Karl Rove invited him to speak at the White House. Richard Perle and Dick Cheney are among his admirers.”
29 Bernard Lewis, “Time for Toppling,” Wall Street Journal 23 September 2002. Although he did not use the phrase in his op-ed, Lewis’ argument was echoed by other neocronervative supporters of invading Iraq inside and outside of government, who claimed that the “road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad.”
war was necessary for American security and benefited the Iraqi people.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, rather than weakening the other “rogue states” in the region, by the 2005 the United States faced an emboldened Iran and Syria, and a Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Some neoconservatives, like Francis Fukuyama, renounced their support for the war and the movement. Others, like Fouad Ajami, placed the blame on Iraqis for failing to embrace the “American gift” of liberty.\textsuperscript{31} Lewis, however, was unrepentant. As neoconservatives attempted to shift attention from Iraq to Iran and advocate for an American attack on the Iranian nuclear program, Lewis joined the fray. He argued in a \textit{Wall Street Journal} op-ed that deterrence and mutual assured destruction could not work against an enemy gripped by a messianic and suicidal leadership.\textsuperscript{32}

Although their access to policy circles eclipses that of other Middle East scholars, the neoconservatives are not in the mainstream of Middle East studies. In addition to targeting funding for Middle East studies, they have sought to challenge the predominance of the major scholarly association, MESA. In 2007, Lewis and Ajami announced the formation of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA). According to \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education}, Lewis and Ajami founded ASMEA because they believed MESA had become “too overtly politicized.” ASMEA also launched a scholarly journal, \textit{The Journal of the Middle East and Africa}, and hosts an annual conference. At its first annual conference, the association claimed it had 500 members from 40 countries.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{The National Security State 2.0}

The end of the Cold War witnessed a readjustment of priorities within Washington. Funding for the national security agencies, in particular the CIA, was no longer a priority. Instead, the agency would be forced to live within a reduced budget, especially the Directorate of Operations


\textsuperscript{32} Bernard Lewis, “August 22,” \textit{Wall Street Journal} 8 August 2006. Ever eager to display his knowledge of Islamic history regardless of the relevance, the title of the op-ed was a reference to a statement by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which he promised a response to U.S. questions about Iran’s nuclear program “by the end of August” 2006. Lewis explained that August 22, 2006 “corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to ‘the farthest mosque’, usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (c.f., Koran XVII.1). This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” It is worth noting that the date passed without incident.

and counterterrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{34} Even after the agency ranked Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaida at the highest threat level following the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it was still forced to fight for resources. Although CIA Director George Tenet “declared war” on bin-Laden in December 1998, he was not willing to redirect personnel or funding from the other parts of the agency in order to confront al-Qaida as there were too many competing priorities for the limited resources available. Moreover, other agencies within the “intelligence community” were unaware of Tenet’s decision. Neither the Clinton White House nor the Republican-controlled Congress, both locked in a bitter impeachment effort, responded to Tenet’s request for additional funding. That would change after September 11.\textsuperscript{35}

Prior to September 11, the U.S. intelligence establishment was comprised of 14 agencies with tens of thousands of employees.\textsuperscript{36} The size of the community has expanded dramatically in the nine years since the attacks.\textsuperscript{37} A special report by the Washington Post estimated that roughly 1,270 government organizations and 1,930 private companies work on programs related to terrorism, homeland security, and intelligence across the country. Meanwhile, during this period the U.S. intelligence budget has more than doubled to a public amount of $75 billion, with the figure for military and counterterrorism activities much higher.\textsuperscript{38} The unrestrained growth has resulted in redundancies, lack of coordination, and information overload, with the different agencies competing for attention for their voluminous reports and analysis.\textsuperscript{39}

Unlike the initial growth of the national security establishment in the early postwar period, which emphasized the recruitment and training of civil servants, this growth has relied heavily on the private sector. Existing corporations have expanded operations and a plethora of new firms were established. Of the estimated 854,000 individuals that hold top-secret security clearances, roughly 265,000 are contractors. The emphasis on contractors is most pronounced at the CIA, where they comprise nearly thirty percent of the employees and are involved in

\textsuperscript{34} See Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, eds. \textit{U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform} (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995) for an insight into the different priorities and challenges faced by the intelligence community after the Cold War, during a time of budget restrictions and spy scandals.

\textsuperscript{35} Coll, 436-437; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” August 2003, 39-46. In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, Tenet expressed his regret that he did not redirect a large number or CIA personnel to deal with the al-Qaida threat. He testified that attempts to obtain additional funding from the Executive Branch, especially the Office of Management and Budget, were consistently rebuffed and that he had informed members of Congress that the CIA needed roughly $1 billion per year for five years to address all the priorities it was given.

\textsuperscript{36} “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.”


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., For example, in 2001 Congress committed an additional $40 billion for the effort against al-Qaida. In 2001, it provided an additional $36.5 billion and authorized a further increase of $44 billion in 2003.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.,
activities ranging from training personnel and analyzing data to conducting rendition operations and interrogations at secret prisons outside the United States.\textsuperscript{40} Privatization was not limited to the intelligence establishment. Indeed, one feature of the Global War on Terror has been the reliance on private military contractors, whose responsibilities ranged from providing laundry and food services to the U.S. military to serving as guards for elected leaders and dignitaries, including Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai. While funding has flooded into the national security sector over the past decade, as previously mentioned funding for university-based Arabic language training has not increased in spite of the overwhelming demand and increased enrollment. In addition, during this period the U.S. armed forces continued to purge gay and lesbian Arabic translators despite the obvious need for their skills.\textsuperscript{41} Meanwhile, the sustained insurgency in Iraq forced the U.S. to outsource Arabic translation and gathering intelligence to allies in the region, in particular Jordan.\textsuperscript{42}

The need for local knowledge in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in another controversial program that involved military contractors and American social scientists. Initiated in 2006, the Human Terrain Systems (HTS) is designed to embed social scientists with combat units.\textsuperscript{43} HTS’s initial budget was $40 million and six Human Terrain Teams comprised of nine individuals were deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq by October 2007.\textsuperscript{44} Originally run by the military contractor, BAE systems, due to issues with oversight and management the Pentagon shifted the program to a different company. The Pentagon asserts that HTS’s goal is to assist the American military with obtaining a better understanding of the social and cultural issues of the different combat areas and will ultimately save lives. Team members have described themselves as “cultural advisers” to the U.S. military and “cultural brokers” with Iraqis and Afghans.\textsuperscript{45} However, the link between the HTS and American counterinsurgency efforts and combat

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “National Security, Inc.,” \textit{Washington Post} 20 July 2011. Priest and Arkin state that the rationale for hiring contractors was to limit the number of permanent workers, streamline the hiring process, and save money. They note that cost savings have never been achieved and that the Obama administration has attempted to reduce the number of contractors.
\textsuperscript{41} Sara Hebel, “National-Security Concerns Spur Congressional Interest in Language Programs,” \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education} 15 March 2002. Hebel cites the results of General Accounting Office report which found that the Army did not fill 44 percent of authorized positions for translators and interpreters for critical languages, including Arabic. The same study found 6 percent of positions with the needed language skills went unfilled.
\textsuperscript{42} George Packer, “Betrayed,” \textit{New Yorker} 26 March 2007. Jordan’s assistance to American efforts in Iraq is separate from, but related to, the intelligence coordination with Washington after September 11. This includes the interrogation, imprisonment, and torture of individuals brought to Jordan (and other countries in the region) as part of the U.S.’s program of extraordinary rendition.
\textsuperscript{43} David Glenn, “Program to Embed Anthropologists With Military Lacks Ethical Standards, Report Says,” \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education} 3 December 2009. Glenn reports that the majority of team members have degrees in political science and international relations, but news reports have emphasized the role of anthropologists. He notes that this has been compounded by the military leadership which refers to all of the social scientists as “anthropologists.”
\textsuperscript{44} David Glenn, “Anthropologists in a War Zone: Scholars Debate Their Role,” \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education} 30 November 2007. According to Glenn, the Human Terrain Team is comprised of “a team leader with extensive military experience, 2 social scientists (1 anthropologist and 1 regional specialist), and 6 research analysts.”
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the arming of some of the social scientists, and similarity to notorious Cold War programs has led to criticism of the program within academia.46

In October 2007, shortly after high-profile articles about the HTS appeared in the press, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) issued a formal statement declaring that the program violated the organization’s code of ethics. The AAA asserted that anthropologists in the HTS were placed in situations where they were indistinguishable from military personnel and restricted the individuals from adhering to their ethical obligation to reveal their identity and role as well as to obtain voluntary informed consent from subjects in war zones.47 While advocates of the HTS argued that it was intended to improve relations between the military and civilian populations, testimony of individuals involved with the program acknowledged that information gathered by the anthropologists assisted with combat operations (or “kinetic engagements”).48

Criticism of the HTS has been reinforced by insider accounts of the program. Former trainees and team members have recounted in the press the lack of substantive training, lowered standards for recruitment due to the dearth of qualified social scientists willing to join the program, and pseudo-scientific research methods. The insider accounts also reveal the increasingly blurred line between the HTS’s scholars and soldiers, and the pressure on team members to conform to the military’s definition and expectations of the program.49 Indeed, the U.S. Army acknowledged in its 2010 fiscal year budget request that the HTS provided “intelligence support” for its operations.50

These problems with HTS have been compounded by the deaths of team members. By 2009, three HTS members were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq. A fourth was indicted on murder charges after he killed a handcuffed Afghani prisoner who attacked and severely burned a female

47 The AAA’s statement on the HTS can be found at [http://www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/Human-Terrain-System-Statement.cfm](http://www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/Human-Terrain-System-Statement.cfm) (last accessed May 22, 2011).
48 David Price, “‘Counterinsurgency’s Free Ride’”; David Vine, “Enabling the Kill Chain,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 30 November 2007. Price quotes a March 8, 2009 article in the *Dallas Morning News* profiling HTS anthropologist Audrey Roberts who expressed little concern on how the information she gathered was used by the military. “If it's going to inform how targeting is done -- whether that targeting is bad guys, development or governance -- how our information is used is how it's going to be used,” she said. “All I'm concerned about is pushing our information to as many soldiers as possible. The reality is there are people out there who are looking for bad guys to kill,” Roberts said. “I'd rather they did not operate in a vacuum.” Price also quotes U.S. Army Lt. Colonel Gian Gentile, a historian at West Point and critic of the military’s counterinsurgency program, stating “Don’t fool yourself. These Human Terrain Teams whether they want to acknowledge it or not, in a generalized and subtle way, do at some point contribute to the collective knowledge of a commander which allows him to target and kill the enemy in the Civil War in Iraq.”
team member. The team member later died of her injuries.51 While few in number, the deaths reveal that insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq do not distinguish HTS members from military personnel or they are unable to do so, especially when the scholars carry weapons and seek information for use in military operations.

Although the HTS has garnered wide-spread criticism within academia, another emerging trend has not received similar attention by scholars. Prior to September 11, terror studies was a minor field that tended to attract former defense officials and retired military and intelligence officers. However, in the wake of the attacks, colleges and universities rushed to provide course offerings as well as to establish formal programs. By 2004, 100 private and state universities and colleges launched programs in terrorism and emergency management. These programs tended to expand upon existing criminal justice and emergency management programs at these institutions. Indeed, the New York Times reported that terrorism was regarded as “the flashy side of disaster studies.”52 Like the expansion of the national security establishment itself, a large number of for-profit colleges, including those offering on-line degrees, rushed in to provide courses on and degrees in terror studies and homeland security.53

As part of the expanding national security budget, the federal government also began funding the development of terrorism-related research centers. In 2003, the government also awarded the University of Southern California $15.3 million to establish the first interdisciplinary homeland security center.54 A year later, two additional centers focused on agricultural security were established at the University of Minnesota and Texas A&M.55 The University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) also received federal funding to establish a counterterrorism center in 2003. However, three years later members of UNLV’s Board of Regents were calling for an internal investigation to determine why the center had not achieved its original goals after spending $9 million.56

Nearly a decade after the September 11 attacks, the initial enthusiasm for terror studies appears to have waned. Washington, however, is still pursuing and funding research in the social sciences. This includes Project Minerva, a program announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2008 to establish a consortium of university-based, open source, social science research. In announcing the new project, named after the Roman goddess of war and wisdom, Gates noted that it was the fiftieth anniversary of the NDEA. He explained that as in the aftermath of Sputnik, the United States was “again trying to come to terms with new threats to national

52 Claire Hoffman, “As Anxiety Grows, So Does Field of Terror Study,” New York Times 1 September 2004. The New York Times noted that George Washington University and North Dakota State University were both planning to offer doctoral programs in terrorism studies. To date neither institution has such a program.
56 “UNLV Institute on Counterterrorism Spends a Lot, Achieves a Little,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 20 June 2006. Among the issues identified by the Board of Regents, was the lack of implementation of a promised master’s degree program and the center’s abandonment of three of its seven areas of focus, including studying the social and psychological impact of terrorism and the relationship between terrorism and the Internet.
security.” Although still in the conceptual phase, the Pentagon would fund studies in several declared areas: Chinese Military and Technology Studies, Iraqi and Terrorist Perspectives Project, Religious and Ideological Studies, and the New Disciplines Project. These projects ranged from open access archives to improving analytical tools.57 A year later, the Pentagon announced 17 grants administered through the National Science Foundation totaling $7.6 million for a range of topics from advanced game theory to social-network analysis.58

In his 2008 speech, Gates acknowledged that the relationship between academia and the U.S. government had changed from the time of the NDEA and ranged from friendly to antagonistic. He stated that the consortia would be based on “openness” and “rigid adherence to academic freedom and integrity,” adding, “we are interested in furthering our knowledge of these issues and in soliciting diverse points of view -- regardless of whether those views are critical of the Department’s efforts.” Gates conceded, “Too many mistakes have been made over the years because our government and military did not understand -- or even seek to understand -- the countries or cultures we were dealing with.” He concluded with a call for finding “new ways” for academia, “this pillar of American society to serve our citizens, our nation, and the world.”59 Indeed, what those “new ways” of service are and if American scholars and universities can retain their independence while also meeting the needs of the state remains as vital and uncertain a question in this new century as it was in the last.

58 David Glenn, “New Pentagon-NSF Grants Draw Criticism From Social Scientists,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 12 October 2009. Glenn reports that an additional 7 grants not administered by the National Science Foundation were to be announced in December 2009.
Conclusion

America’s engagement with Middle East has matched its own evolution as a superpower. Over the past century it has been transformed from a regional power with limited interests in the area called the Middle East to a hyperpower with hegemony over the region. U.S. foreign policy has shaped the different regimes of knowledge production and cultures of expertise related to the Middle East during this period. While these regimes have often intersected and competed for supremacy, U.S. foreign policy interests have had a predominant influence on the contested ways knowledge is produced, communicated, and consumed. Moreover, this dissertation has demonstrated that academic scholarship on the Middle East has adopted and promulgated the terminology and associated geographical representations inherent in U.S. foreign policy discourse. Thus, revealing that even when Washington’s policies are contested by area experts, its interests have already been subsumed into existing discourse on the region.

However, this was not simply a one-way relationship between center and periphery. Rather, the interaction between the United States and the Middle East influenced the production of knowledge about the region. It also shaped the relationships between governmental and non-governmental institutions operating in the Middle East.

In order to support and maintain its supremacy in the region the United States sought and cultivated area knowledge and expertise. Washington initially relied on the privately-held knowledge of missionaries and Orientalist scholars. As American interests in the region expanded during the Second World War, the U.S. sought knowledge from a variety of sources, including missionaries, contemporary and Orientalist scholars, spies, diplomats, soldiers, allies, and foes. Although Cold War policies drove the establishment of area studies, federal funding had both predictable results and unintended consequences. While area studies initially appeared to provide the expertise needed by the national security state, less than a decade after the NDEA was passed scholars were no longer willing to openly collaborate with the government. In addition, the expansion of area studies and federal support for language study combined with the social movements of the 1960s led to a diversification of Middle East studies. Meanwhile, U.S. government agencies developed, expanded, and enhanced their own research, analysis, and training capabilities that benefited from but were independent of university-based scholarship. In the wake of campus protests and a losing war, the Nixon administration was ready to abandon area studies. Paradoxically, as U.S. interests and involvement in the Middle East increased over the next two decades, federal funding of area studies plateaued or decreased. The end of the Cold War in the region coupled with the emergence of well-funded private think tanks contributed to the reduced influence of university-based Middle East studies programs. After the Cold War, the field struggled with reduced funding, an uncertain mission, and attacks from inside and outside academia. These challenges would increase after the September 11 attacks and sharpen the divide between the policies pursued by the U.S. in the region and those advocated by the majority of Middle East scholars.

The NDEA was the culmination of earlier efforts to establish area studies in the United States. While the law did not create area studies in the United States, it is uncertain that without intervention and funding by the federal government that area studies programs would have survived. At the very least, they likely would have remained starved for resources and isolated to a few elite institutions. The NDEA was successful in achieving part of its original mandate:
the number of Americans trained in foreign languages for strategic areas increased dramatically. However, the expansion of area studies also meant a greater number of Americans would be trained in foreign languages and without a requirement for government service. Thus, there was never a guarantee that the individuals receiving fellowships would pursue the type of research or careers in government service intended by the NDEA. In the post-Cold War period, the national security establishment added the service requirement to ensure a return on the government’s investment.

Orientalist perceptions of the Middle East and related scholarship have influenced aspects of U.S. foreign policy since the First World War. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Inquiry’s recommendations for the postwar disposition of the territories of the Ottoman Empire relied on analysis of the region and its inhabitants that were steeped in racial and religious prejudice. Chapter 3 detailed how Orientalist representations were incorporated into the intelligence produced by the OSS and how these perceptions influenced the actions of the allies during and after the war. Chapters 1 and 5 demonstrated that these perceptions were incorporated into Cold War modernization theory and in the construction of the region itself. Orientalist representations persisted after the Cold War and were apparent in the justifications for American policies over the past decade.

The Middle East was an early theater in the Cold War and was arguably the first region where it ended. As discussed in Chapter 3, the United States began planning for the postwar period two years before the end of the Second World War. This included shifting the focus of existing offices and operatives and expanding the number and duties of personnel in the region. The signing of the Camp David Accords marked the end of the Cold War in the region. Over the next three decades, American power in and hegemony over the Middle East would be affirmed and contested by the region’s inhabitants.

Area studies were tied to the expansion of the national security establishment during the early postwar period. As discussed in Chapter 4, America’s growing interests around the globe during the early Cold War drove the development of expertise and research and analysis capabilities of the U.S. government on foreign areas. Yet as the establishment evolved and grew during the course of the Cold War, greatly enhancing its ability to collect and assess information and intelligence as well as improving its training programs, the government’s reliance on university-based area studies centers decreased. By the late 1970s, the rift between academia and government agencies was exacerbated as scholarly research and publications were deemed less relevant to government officials. In the post-Cold War period, Washington actively sought and cultivated scholarship that conformed to and validated its policies, particularly in the Middle East.

This dissertation has also demonstrated that the relationship between academic institutions and the federal government during the Cold War was dynamic and fluid. Although universities and scholars welcomed relations with the foreign policy and intelligence establishments during the early Cold War period, over time and in response to changing national and international conditions the interactions became more difficult to maintain. The Middle East studies programs at Harvard and Princeton were launched before the NDEA was passed in order to produce graduates for government service and employment in the business sector. However, both institutions had difficulty meeting their original mandates. Harvard benefitted from a strong funding base, but the program suffered from inconsistent leadership. In contrast, Princeton
benefited from consistent leadership, but struggled with gearing its program to meet the needs of the government programs for contemporary knowledge of the Middle East.

Meanwhile, AUB and AUC maintained transnational identities which reinforced and competed with their educational missions. Although Washington viewed both institutions as vanguards of American ideas and policies in the Middle East, they were highly regarded within the region and maintained extensive ties to governmental and business elites. While U.S. government support for AUB and AUC reflected and was at times hindered by American policies in the Middle East, both universities had agency which was evidenced in their active development of local bases of support and their attempts to affect and occasionally oppose Washington’s goals.

As of this writing, popular revolutions have swept across the region threatening the decades old status-quo. The rulers of Tunisia and Egypt have been overthrown, and those in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen are either clinging to power or actively backing counterrevolutions. Meanwhile, Washington has been caught seemingly unaware as many of the regimes it has supported and relied upon to maintain its hegemonic position collapsed or are under duress. Although President Barack Obama has claimed that the U.S. favors these democratic movements and has intervened militarily in Libya, Washington’s belated and lackluster support for some (as in Egypt and Tunisia) and the open hostility toward others (Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain) suggest a different policy is favored. Even more troubling is the discourse about the popular revolutions in the American media and official policy circles, which have emphasized the need for stability and security over freedom and justice. Once again a sharp divide exists between experts with close ties to the U.S. foreign policy and national security establishments and those in academia. How the United States accommodates these popular movements and ends its occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly after the death of Osama bin Laden has further reduced the threat and appeal of an already weakened and politically irrelevant al-Qaida, will determine the U.S.’s relations with the area called the Middle East for the short and long-term. What is certain is that more than a century after Mahan coined a term for the region, the United States remains at the crossroads of empire with an ever widening gap between how it perceives itself and its policies and how it is viewed in the area called the “Middle East.”
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