Figures of Speech: Texts, Bodies, and Performance in Lucian

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines four texts of Lucian of Samosata (Fisherman, Apology, On Dancing, and Herakles), with a focus on the representation of bodies and embodiment and their relation to speech, writing and performance. I argue that the representation of bodies is an important metaphor for how Lucian’s texts imagine their own reception, and for how they imagine the possibilities and limitations of reading, writing, performing, and spectating.

The first two chapters each discuss a text in which the author uses the control and punishment of bodies as a framework for engaging with the reception and criticism of his own texts. Chapter One shows how the comic dialogue Fisherman imagines the interpretation of texts as a contentious process of securing control in which authors, readers, and texts seem to be able to influence one another in an almost physical or material way. Chapter Two examines how the Apology confronts a lack of alignment between the author and views expressed in an earlier text. I argue that this misalignment is characterized as a disruption to the connection between the author and his text that has caused him to lose control over its interpretation. Like Fisherman, the Apology imagines a kind of material connection among texts, authors, and readers, but suggests that securing physical and interpretive control over them is not always possible.

Chapter Three discusses the dialogue On Dancing, demonstrating how it depicts pantomime as a space in which bodies transform and where the fluidity of a body is one of its more significant attributes. I argue that a central concern of this text is how dancer and audience interact and the influence that one can have upon the other. This emphasis on fluidity and transformation complicates the standard model of interpretation as the province of an individual interpreter who asserts control over a performer or particular text, and problematizes the concept of a body as an object or agent that can be interpreted in isolation from other bodies to which it is connected.
Chapter Four explores the intersection of language, bodies, interpretation, and control through the figure of Herakles in Lucian. I argue that this image of Herakles is used to represent both the possibility of multiple interpretative viewpoints, and also the power of language to constrain and control bodies, up to and including the speaker himself. These paradoxical threads are never fully resolved, but remain in unsettling tension, even in later reception and re-imaginings of this text.
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Introduction

In the opening of his 1990 article on sculpture and literary artifice in Lucian, James Romm observes offhandedly that “Lucian of Samosata … seldom abandons a rich metaphor before exploring every facet of its meaning.”¹ Romm later adds that this process of turning a metaphor over and over to pick out new strands of meaning is often diffused across Lucian’s corpus, with variants on the same metaphor or image surfacing in multiple texts. Only by drawing together these diffuse pieces can one begin to identify all the facets of that metaphor and the strands of meaning it creates.² This observation seems to me to articulate a particular challenge that Lucian’s texts present, one that extends beyond the specific kinds of reoccurring metaphors to which Romm refers. Unifying patterns in Lucian can often be elusive and difficult to grasp, whether because they only emerge from related references that are scattered across widely varying texts, or are simply difficult to follow within the twists and turns of a single text. But by framing Lucian’s literary strategy in this way, Romm also points to a possible interpretive strategy. That is, if the elusive author of these texts is returning again and again to the same rich metaphors, unraveling new strands of meaning, then perhaps it is the work of a reader and interpreter to do similarly: find the loose end of a thread and follow where it goes. This is how I would characterize the approach to reading Lucian that orients this dissertation.

The thread that I follow across four different texts (*Fisherman, Apology, On Dancing, Herakles*) to explore different facets of meaning is the representation of bodies and their relation to speech, writing and performance. My attention to bodies concerns both how they are presented as meaningful objects that can be read and interpreted like texts, and the ways in which bodies are subject to material influence and change, particularly corporal punishment and physical harm. I argue that the representation of bodies serves as a metaphor for how Lucian’s texts imagine their own reception, and for how they imagine the possibilities and limitations of reading, writing, performing, and spectating.

This reading of Lucian responds, albeit indirectly, to several themes in recent scholarship on Lucian.³ I characterize these themes as, first, the reading of Lucian as a multi-masked performer, and, second, the reading of Lucian as a creator and theorizer of fiction. I will discuss each briefly before giving an overview of the chapters in this dissertation.

The many-masked Lucian emerges in part, I think, from the tantalizingly elusive presence of the author within the corpus that comes down to us under his name.⁴ Outside

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¹ Romm 1990: 74.
² Romm 1990: 90 and n.44.
³ Here I focus primarily on scholarship from the past twenty years. For an overview of themes and concerns in earlier scholarship, as well as additional bibliography, see Macleod 1994.
⁴ Eighty-six individual texts or groups of texts under the name of Lucian have come down to us in the manuscript tradition, although authorship for a few of these is still
of these texts, there is little information about who the historical Lucian of Samosata might have been. Lucian’s texts offer glimpses of the author and his literary career, but there is never a straightforward relationship between narrator and author. Even the historical context that we can plausibly reconstruct for Lucian seems to lend itself to characterization of multiplicity and performativity. Simon Swain (2007) speaks of the “three faces of Lucian” – Syrian, Greek, and Roman – to describe the different facets of his cultural position. Lucian was born around 120 CE in the city of Samosata on the upper Euphrates River in what was then the Roman province of Syria, but which had only a few generations earlier been the kingdom of Commagene, a remnant of the Seleucid Empire. This elusive author thus emerges from a cultural context with multiple layers: the Aramaic-speaking Semitic population of the region, the influence of Greek culture and language from centuries of Seleucid rule, and the more recent presence of the Roman Empire. An additional layer of complexity comes from the prevailing trend in Greek literature and other aspects of elite culture in this period to look backwards towards an idealized Classical past. Lucian’s texts engage self-consciously with these different layers of identity, both personal and literary, commenting upon the identity of their

5 There is only one contemporary reference to an author named Lucian, in Galen, *de epidem.* 2.6.29 (this text survives only in the 9th century Arabic translation of Hunain ibn Ishaq). Galen identifies Lucian as a writer famous for forging some works of Heraclitus. The reference is discussed by Strohmaier 1976: 118-122; Baumbach and v. Möllendorff 2017: 15 quote Strohmaier’s German translation of the Arabic. Lucian has an in two later sources, Eunapius *VS* 2.1.9 (fourth century CE) and in the *Suda* 1.683 (tenth century CE), both of which make reference to titles of his surviving texts.
7 The following summary draws from Swain 2007 and 1996. For another influential reading of Lucian within his historical context, see Jones 1986.
8 The classicism in Greek language and literature in the first through third centuries CE, often described as the “Second Sophistic,” is discussed in Bowie 1970, Anderson 1993, Swain 1996, and Whitmarsh 2001 and 2005; these works offer a good overview of thinking on this term and period has developed. Greek identity and culture under the Roman Empire has been explored from a variety of angles in a number of collected volumes on the topic: Goldhill 2001, Borg 2004, Konstan and Said 2006, Whitmarsh 2010, van Nijf and Alston 2011. Discussions of the relationship between identity and public presentation during this period have been significantly influenced by Gleason 1995. Lucian’s use of Attic has been catalogued exhaustively by Schmid 1887: 216-432; Householder 1941 compiles all the direct quotations or allusions to classical authors found in Lucian.
author as a Hellenized Syrian whose “Greekness” has been achieved through paideia (education), and on their own status as mimetic or secondary in relation to an older literary tradition.

Approaches to this author have often been shaped by an interest in the performance of identity even when the aim is not necessarily to securely identify a historical Lucian, per se. In fact, the interest in performance as a unifying theme seems to pick up at the point of moving away from a search for the “real” Lucian underneath the variation in his narrative personae. A good example of this is Tim Whitmarsh’s chapter on Lucian in Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation (2001).  

Whitmarsh is primarily interested in how Lucian, like other Greek authors of his time, negotiated his relationship to the Roman Empire as well as to the imagined Greek past. Both this chapter and the overall project are oriented towards attempting to describe how identities like “Greek” and “Roman” are produced through literature, rather than transparently reflected in it. For Whitmarsh, the main strategy of Lucian’s satire lies in exposing the “theatricalization” or “spectacularization” of Greek paideia in a second-century Roman context. In texts such as Nigrinus, Fisherman, and Salaried Posts, Lucian demonstrates how paideia has become a performance or spectacle in which external appearances and public display substitute for authenticity or “true” knowledge. Lucian’s satire thus serves as an acerbic commentary on the anxieties in second-century Greek literary culture about the gap between past (assumed to be original and authoritative) and present (always necessarily secondary and imitative), and the attempt to surmount this gap through mimesis of classical models. This exposure and mockery of theatricality, moreover, does not point to any secure position of authenticity outside of these performances and spectacles, but rather ironizes any claim to hold such a position, even for the author himself, who constantly subverts the authority of his own narrative voice. The elusive presence of the author is part of a satirical strategy of self-ironization and disavowal of any claims to authoritative truth. For Whitmarsh, Lucian is characterized by “the proliferation and infinite regress of personae,” which ultimately makes his satire “a comedy of nihilism.”

In Whitmarsh’s reading, the metaphor of the mask, and the endless multiplicity of identities it affords, offers an alternative to the inevitably frustrated search for a single, unified authorial identity.

Performance and theatricality are also central to the portrait of Lucian that emerges from Nathaniel Andrade’s Syrian Identity in the Greco-Roman World (2013), as well as the introduction to the 2016 Illinois Classical Studies issue on Lucian, co-authored with Emily Rush. The key term for their analysis is doxa, which they use to describe a zone of indistinguishability between appearance and reality that is applicable both to mimesis in relation to acting and performance, and to the verisimilitude of fiction. Like Whitmarsh’s characterization of Lucian as an infinite regress of personae, the concept of doxa takes its cue from Lucian’s use of metaphors of theatrical spectacle to describe the performance of identity and social roles; it likewise assumes that

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11 This term is discussed in Andrade 2013: 262-4, 281-4 and Andrade and Rush 2016: 152-3, 165-6. The description of doxa as a “zone of indistinguishability” is my own interpretation of Andrade’s use of the term. I take the phrase from Deleuze 2003.
“performance” and “theater” in these contexts primarily connote deception or dissimulation. Its application extends beyond representations of performance, however. Andrade and Rush argue that the defining preoccupation of Lucian’s texts is the instability of “imitative representation and real original”: copies or imitations replace or substitute for their imagined originals, even as these likenesses are made to verify the existence of the original; “seeming” thus becomes conflated with “being” or “becoming.” Lucian points to this instability as a problem of Greek classicism, but also as a problem that seems to be inherent in any form of mimetic representation. His satire thus comments on the fallibility of human perception and knowledge in general.

Andrade and Rush observe, as Whitmarsh does, that the author himself is implicated in this instability or indistinguishability, even when his purported motive is the unmasking of fraudulent claims to truth and reality. In this reading, too, Lucian is defined by virtue of this continual shifting and multiplicity, rather than in spite of it; hence his characterization, in the 2016 introduction, as a “Protean pepaideumenos.” For Andrade, this polyphonic or Protean quality of Lucian is indicative of the complex and multi-layered cultural position he negotiates as a Hellenized Syrian, and reading him as such offers an alternative to reductive or essentialist conceptions about how those identities are expressed in his texts.

Lucian’s interest in the confusion of reality and appearances is framed differently in Karen Ni Mheallaigh’s 2014 book Reading Fiction with Lucian: Fakes, Freaks, and Hyperreality. Rather than doxa, the focus of this approach to Lucian might be better termed paradoxa: weird and strange marvels, hybrids, monsters, and everything that is fictive or fantastical about Lucian’s texts. Ni Mheallaigh views Lucian’s self-conscious post-classicism as a literary aesthetic akin to postmodernism, concerned not only with its own secondariness, but also with the possibilities of innovation and hybridity involved in

13 Lucian’s interest in the fallibility of perception is also central to the analysis of Camerotto 2014.
14 Andrade and Rush 2016: 172-8 discuss Alexander and The Death of Peregrinus as two examples of this. Both of these texts involve the satirical takedown of a fraudulent figure whose deception involves the theatrical/performance-like appearance of being what they are not; in each instance, the narrator positions himself as a clear-sighted observer whose wit cuts through the fraudulent performance. Upon closer examination, however, the narrator proves to be part of the performance in his own way too. This discussion draws on the analysis of these texts in Branham 1989 and Fields 2013.
15 The identification of Lucian with Proteus is informed by the use of this mythic figure in Peregrinus and in On Dancing. On the latter see Schlapbach 2008: 322 and further discussion of that text in Chapter Three. Whitmarsh has also noted that Proteus is a figure for the slipperiness of the sophist (Whitmarsh 2001: 228n.184, 2005: 19n.60).
16 Andrade 2013: 288-313. I think the interest in the performance of identity may be seen in part as a response to nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarly evaluations that dismiss Lucian as unoriginally imitative, a “second-rate hack,” and insufficiently “Greek” in the purity of both his literary artistry and his ethnic background. Goldhill 2002: 93-99 discusses this trend in Lucianic scholarship and its troubling ties to German and English fascism. See also Baumbach 2002: 217 ff.
mixing together pieces of the old to form new creations, in what she terms “Promethean poetics.”" The analysis in this book moves away from questions of truth and perception to consider other possibilities for approaching fiction qua fiction. Ni Mheallaigh argues that Lucian defines the value of fiction in terms of the reader’s experience of it, rather than its truth, moral or didactic value (as the discussion of fiction tends to be framed by earlier Greek authors). Instead, Lucian insists “on fiction as an embodied, sensory and psychological experience” associated with disorientation, dislocation, or an altered mental state like madness or drunkenness. This experience, moreover, is not “a crude, uni-directional phenomenon like deception, but as an experience that is shared contractually between author and reader” and in which even “the physical text itself colludes.” Read in this way, Lucian offers a framework for reading not only his own fantastical texts, but also other fiction; the main project of Ni Mheallaigh’s book is using what Lucian has to say about fiction as a theoretical guide to other fiction texts, both ancient (Greek novels) and modern (Umberto Eco’s *The Name of the Rose*).

This dissertation is informed by these approaches to Lucian, but seeks to chart its own approach that runs both between and beyond them. I agree that performance constitutes a significant organizing theme across Lucian’s corpus. Textual representations of various types of performance (acting, dancing, declamation) are one of the threads that connect the texts I have chosen to explore. However, I contend that by reading performance in terms of the mask, as a site of potential deception or illusion, the analyses of Whitmarsh, Andrade, and Rush miss some of the ways in which the body of the actor, dancer, orator, and even the spectator, is important for understanding how these representations of performance function in Lucian. In directing attention to the bodies behind masks, I do not mean to uncover a singular, consistent “Lucian” that is somehow more “real” than what anyone has described before, and certainly not an identity that could be mapped onto a historical Lucian. What I do want to propose is that a many-masked Lucian, defined primarily in terms of proliferating personas, is not the only framework that accounts for the elusiveness or slipperiness of these texts. The alternative approach that this dissertation proposes is more in accord with Ni Mheallaigh’s suggestion that Lucian is interested in the experience and processes of reading, in what texts do when they circulate in the world. I aim to show how concerns with interpretation and reception are often embedded in the texts themselves, and how they contain suggestions for how to read them, and re-read them, and read one text against another. By following these patterns with attention to the points at which “body” and “text” overlap, I want to suggest further that the concept of interpretation within these texts is inseparable from power, control, and the ways in which these are bound up with language itself. The “Lucian” that emerges from my readings is no less versatile, but perhaps less nihilistic,

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17 Ni Mheallaigh 2014: 23-27. The concept of “Promethean poetics” follows in part the Romm 1990 article mentioned in the beginning of this introduction. Romm observes that Lucian compares his innovative literary craft to sculpting with malleable materials like clay and wax, as opposed to stone; this signifies a plasticity that is opposed to the rigidity of classical models, which is both more creative and yet potentially less durable.

18 Ni Mheallaigh 2014: 30-31. She points in particular to how enjoyment of stories (even when we know they are not true) is foregrounded *True Histories* and *Lover of Lies*. 
engaging comically, but nonetheless in earnest with the performative power of language to make and unmake the world.

I begin in the middle, as it were, with two texts that are each framed as a response to another text in Lucian’s corpus. The first two chapters each discuss a text in which the author uses the control and punishment of bodies as a framework for engaging with the reception and criticism of his own texts. In the first chapter, I examine The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman, a comic dialogue in which a free-speaking orator is put on trial by a mob of angry classical and Hellenistic philosophers for his insulting depiction of them. This insulting depiction is a clear reference to Lucian’s own Sale of Lives, a dialogue that mocks various philosophical schools by imagining them as slaves up for auction. I observe that the trial in Fisherman is effectively a dispute over the interpretation of a text, yet also a contention between and over bodies, such that “body” and “text” seem at times to overlap: threatened by the angry philosophers with torture and execution, the orator is liable to answer in his body for writing he has distributed, which itself seems to have posed a threat of bodily degradation towards its targets. The defense that he contrives rests on establishing his authority to control the bodies of others, culminating in the (literal) fishing out of those philosophers judged to be frauds and their commensurate corporal punishment. Fisherman thus imagines interpretation as a contentious process of securing control, in which authors, readers, and texts seem to be able to influence one another in an almost physical or material way.

This framework of interpretation and control continues to be central in the second chapter, which focuses on a text whose main concern is the author’s loss of control over the meaning of his writing. Lucian’s Apology is a direct response to On Salaried Posts in Great Houses, in which the author criticizes educated Greeks who take hired positions in elite Roman households. In the Apology, the author defends himself against charges of hypocrisy, which have emerged now that he has taken a position in the Roman imperial administration. This text thus confronts a lack of alignment between the author and his earlier text, yet one that seems concerned as much with risks of physical repercussions against the author’s own body, as it does with the accurate meaning of the text in question. In this chapter, I draw attention to how this misalignment is characterized as a disruption to the connection between author and text that has caused him to lose control over its interpretation. The Apology responds to this disrupted connection by attempting to revise both the meaning of the earlier text and the author’s position relative to it. Like Fisherman, the Apology imagines a kind of material connection among texts, authors, and readers, but suggests that securing physical and interpretive control over them is not always possible.

From there I move to exploring other ways in which the representation of bodies relates to conceptions of interpretation. The third chapter examines On Dancing, a dialogue on the dangers and merits of pantomime dance. This text, too, is concerned with interpretation and control, portraying the body of a pantomime dancer as a meaningful object that can be “read” and interpreted almost like a text. Yet On Dancing also depicts pantomime as a space in which bodies transform, to varying degrees of literalness and ensuing material consequences, and where the fluidity of a body is one of its more significant attributes. Moreover, this text is concerned not only with what the dancer represents or imitates (performance in terms of mimesis), but also how dancer and audience interact, and the influence that one can have upon the other (performance in
terms of embodied response or affect), with the implication that a pantomime spectator, as well as a performer, may be subject to transformation. The emphasis on fluidity and transformation complicates the standard model of interpretation as the province of an individual interpreter who asserts control over a performer or particular text, and problematizes the concept of a body as an object or agent that can be interpreted in isolation from other bodies to which it is connected.

The fourth chapter explores the intersection of language, bodies, interpretation, and control through the figure of Herakles in Lucian. This analysis centers upon the *prolalia Herakles*, in which the author describes a painting of a (supposedly) Celtic version of the god (Herakles-Ogmios), as part of an attempt to preemptively manage audience expectations and reactions to his own oratorical performances and self-presentation. I argue that this image of Herakles is used to represent both the possibility of multiple interpretative viewpoints, and also the power of language to constrain and control bodies, up to and including the speaker himself. These paradoxical threads are never fully resolved, but remain in unsettling tension, even in later reception and re-imaginings of this text. The “Heraklean” Lucian that I propose in the concluding chapter thus offers a framework through which to explore this paradoxical and dynamic author without reducing his complexity, even if it never exhaustively encompasses him.
Chapter 1

Lucian’s comic dialogue, *The Dead Come to Life, or the Fisherman*, begins with a chase scene. The first speaker, Socrates, shouts for his fellow philosophers to pursue a particular scoundrel while wielding stones, clods of earth, bits of broken pottery, and even clubs:

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ: Βάλλε βάλλε τὸν κατάρατον ἀφθόνοις τοῖς λίθοις· ἐπίβαλλε τὸν βόλων· προσεπίβαλλε καὶ τῶν ὀστράκων· παίε τοῖς ξύλοις τὸν ἀλιτήριον· ὃρα μὴ διαφύγῃ.

Socrates: Pelt, pelt that accursed man with plenty of stones! Pile him with clods! Pile him up with broken dishes, too! Beat the guilty scoundrel with your clubs! Don’t let him get away! (1)\

In the back-and-forth that follows, details about the chase begin to emerge. The target of the stones is one Parrhesiades (“son of Free Speech”); his pursuers are a group of famous classical and Hellenistic Greek philosophers who have temporarily returned from Hades to avenge the insults committed against them by Parrhesiades in his satirical writings, where they were all auctioned off as slaves. Unable to escape his pursuers and their increasingly gruesome threats of punishment, Parrhesiades eventually convinces them to at least hold a formal criminal trial. This clever scoundrel then not only secures his acquittal, but also successfully turns the tables on the prosecution. By the final sections of the dialogue, he becomes a pursuer himself, literally fishing for and unmasking imposter philosophers.

It is fairly easy to read this contest as a meta-literary commentary on Lucian’s own writing, with Parrhesiades being a transparent persona for “Lucian;” he is even explicitly identified as a “Syrian” in chapter 19. The insulting words that have provoked the philosophers have a ready analogue in the dialogue *Sale of Lives*, in which the author pokes fun at different schools of philosophy by representing them as slaves being put up for sale, precisely what Parrhesiades is accused of having done. It follows then that we can read *Fisherman* in terms of Lucian’s own literary self-definition. What Parrhesiades claims to be doing with his scathing satire is a window onto what the author Lucian claims to be doing in this and other similar texts.

This kind of preoccupation with self-definition and textual reflexivity is a prominent feature of Lucian’s texts. Indeed, he seems almost obsessively concerned with how his literary innovation fits into the classical tradition and how it may be received. Since *Fisherman* is among the texts that address these concerns explicitly, parts of it have often been referenced in attempts to define Lucian’s literary practice as a whole. Branham (1989) notes how the structure and themes of the dialogue link Lucian to Old Comedy and its tradition of lampooning philosophy, suggesting that it is an attempt to

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19 All Greek text is from Macleod’s *OCT* (1972-87). Translations in Chapter One are adapted from Harmon 1913. Translations in all other chapters are my own unless otherwise indicated.
establish himself as a rightful heir to the invective comic tradition. Both Whitmarsh (2001) and Ní Mheallaigh (2014) point to images in Parrhesiades’ defense speeches as indicative of Lucian’s literary practice and its place within the “Second Sophistic” period of Greek literature. These readings emphasize, respectively, anxieties around mimesis of classical models, interest in spectacle and display, and the eclectic innovation of a post-classical literary framework. I would not dispute that all of these are important components of the text, or that they contribute significantly to a comprehensive picture of Lucian and his work. There is, however, an additional, potentially fruitful approach to *Fisherman* that seems to have gone largely unnoticed, despite its centrality to the text.

To explain what I mean, I start with a point that is already implicit when we draw a connection between the internal drama of the dialogue and the external literary framework in which it resides, but that bears stating explicitly. That is, the conflict in *Fisherman* is over a text and its interpretation. Socrates and the other philosophers are angry because they have taken Parrhesiades’ writing as a personal insult that degrades them as philosophers and demeans the practice of philosophy generally. In his defense, Parrhesiades argues that his satire is not aimed at either of those things, but rather serves to expose the many philosophical frauds of his own day. In other words, his defense hinges upon convincing the jury to accept one textual interpretation over another. Whether or not we accept his interpretation as a convincing reading of *Sale of Lives* (most commentators are skeptical), what he claims to be doing with his writing has bearing upon how we might interpret this and others of Lucian’s texts. If we consider how this conflict over interpretation plays out over the course of *Fisherman*, a second observation becomes evident: the stakes are physical. We need look no further than the violence of the chase scene that opens the dialogue, summarized briefly above, to get a glimpse of this. Parrhesiades’ words may be the source of his offense, but it is his physical body, first and foremost, that stands to reap the consequences.

Here I come to my central claim. The root of the conflict in *Fisherman* may be a dispute over texts, but it plays out here as an altercation between, and over, bodies: the body of the author who has written the insulting words, to begin with, but also the bodies of the philosophers he has outraged, and, later, the bodies of fake philosophers Parrhesiades pursues. This interest in the bodily dimension of the conflict is, I contend, not just an excuse for comic slapstick. Rather, we should see it as lending a concrete and serious weight to the dynamics involved in textual interpretation. Effectively, bodies stand alongside, and even stand in for, words and texts. The production of a text (*Sale of Lives*, or whatever we imagine Parrhesiades’ incriminating words to be) has precipitated threats of violent punishment against the body of its author. Moreover, that content of that earlier text seems itself to have involved physical harm or degradation to the bodies it made fun of. In the course of defending himself from these threats, Parrhesiades not only secures a self-serving interpretation of his own text, he also gains the power to control the bodies of the fake philosophers he claims to be criticizing. Again and again throughout the dialogue, the focus turns to bodies, what they mean, how they can be controlled or punished. To fully understand how textual reflexivity and authorial self-

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20 Branham 1989: 30-33, 52-54.
presentation function in *Fisherman*, we need to look at what is happening to bodies over the course of the text.

My argument runs thus: Lucian’s *Fisherman* is concerned with interpretation of texts and control of interpretation, but this is figured throughout the dialogue in terms of the interpretation and control of bodies. The potential effects and consequences of producing, and perhaps even reading, a work of literature are imagined as physical and concrete, and are thereby lent an undercurrent of seriousness despite their humorous content or intent. In this high-stakes game of literary interpretation, the power dynamics involved in attempting to control interpretive boundaries come to the foreground. Parrhesiades’ self-defense is primarily a claim to the role of interpreter, that is, someone with the authority to control bodies (and thus, texts), their meanings, and the ways in which audiences respond to and interpret them.

The terms of authorial self-definitional and textual reflexivity that emerge from this reading are, I would argue, essentially in accord with those described by Branham, Ní Mheallaigh, and Whitmarsh, but it prompts us to consider them from a different angle. Most obviously, it suggests an author who is concerned not only with how his innovation fits within the classical tradition, but also with the inherent complexities of control over the texts he produces. I should be clear that I am not necessarily making an argument here about what might have happened to the historical Lucian regarding his writing and its reception. It may well be that *Fisherman* was written as a response to real criticism of *Sale of Lives*, but the efficacy of the text does not depend on those conditions. I hope to show that the framework I am attempting to describe works on literary grounds irrespective of actual historical circumstances. Moreover, as a feature of the text, it extends beyond any single moment to which the author might have responded, continually implicating each reader and re-reader in the power dynamics it explores.

In what follows, I will trace the representation of bodies over the course of the text, beginning with the opening chase scene and the stakes it sets up, and moving from there to how Parrhesiades constructs his defense and establishes his role as interpreter, and the resulting implications.

I. Punishment of Bodies and Texts

The opening scene, as I have noted, foregrounds the physical, violent element of the dispute between Parrhesiades and the old philosophers. In addition to the colorful details of all the objects they are hurling at him, the philosophers provide gruesome suggestions for methods of capital punishment: impaling (ἀνασκολοπισθήναι), whipping (μαστυγωθέντα), gouging out his eyes (τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκεκολάφθω) or cutting off his tongue (τὴν γλῶτταν … ἀποτετμήσθω), and tearing him to pieces (2). Although they claim to take issue with his insulting words, they don't seem especially bothered to refute these words with their own persuasive arguments, as much as they are intent on exacting revenge upon the body of the one who produced them. Indeed, the force of some of these specific dismemberment threats seems to be aimed directly at capacity to produce any future speech or texts: without a tongue, Parrhesiades will not be able to speak; without eyes, his ability to write would be impaired. Punishment of his body is not just about retribution, but also pointedly about silencing of language. It threatens to reduce Parrhesiades to a body devoid of voice or agency, leaving him unable to use language to defend himself, before annihilating him completely. By attacking with physical violence, the old philosophers are attempting to overwhelm any power or meaning the offending
words might have had by cutting them off at the source. They see controlling the author’s body as the most effective way of controlling a text.

What happens in this initial exchange between pursuers and pursued is not, however, quite as simple as the erasure of language by physical means. Even the physical violence in this scene is at times "literary" itself. For example, the suggestion that Parrhesiades be dismembered is phrased as a recommendation that he meet a fate like a Pentheus or Orpheus, elaborated in a quote from tragedy, λακιστὸν ἐν πέτραισιν εὑρέσθαι μόρον (found torn to pieces on the rocks) (2). In order to describe a physical punishment, the text reaches for a literary precedent; if Parrhesiades were to undergo such punishment, he would become, as it were, a literary character like Pentheus. Is this a literary reference with physical implications, or a physical threat with literary implications – or both?

We might ask a similar question just a few lines later when, as Parrhesiades begs for mercy, he and the philosophers trade quotations, first from Homer, and then Euripides, Parrhesiades with the hope defending himself, the philosophers to justify their attack. A problem that is, in the world of the text, practical and physical, is met with a solution that is literary, or rather meta-literary, requiring a reader to view the scene on multiple levels. On the one hand, the relevance of these particular quotes to the present situation rests upon their literal meaning in the original context. From the most literal perspective, if circumstances put you in the position of a warrior or suppliant, it makes sense to use the words appropriate to each sort of character. On the other hand, the effectiveness of such "weapons" only actually makes sense in an imagined literary world, where epic and tragedy exist as material for the author, and thus the characters, to draw upon. The result effect is both over-literalizing and meta-literary at the same time. The meta-literary dimension is all the more obvious because Parrhesiades and the other characters are doing precisely what Lucian himself does in all his writing, that is, reworking earlier literary material for their own purposes. We are never allowed to forget that Fisherman is, itself, a text. Yet the over-literalizing dimension of the scene, while certainly drawing on comic convention, also does not allow readers to forget that this is about bodies and the predicaments in which they can find themselves. “Body” and “text” are impossible to separate cleanly; one always bleeds into the other.

If, in the world of Fisherman, bodies and texts are continually implicated in one another, what does this imply about the nature of the philosopher's grievance in the first place? The way that they seem to perceive the insults against them also suggests a substitution of body for text, on the one hand, and a blurring of the boundary between body and text, on the other. When Parrhesiades, hemmed in by his pursuers, asks to at least know what he is about to be executed so cruelly for, Plato responds:

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22 Trag. Adesp. 291.
23 Il. 22.262, 6.46, 6.48, 20.65, 10.447-8.
24 Eur. fr. 937, Or. 413, fr. 938.
25 Not unlike the strategy employed by Euripides in Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusiae, for example, when he uses scenes and language from his own plays in an attempt to rescue his kinsman. See Zeitlin 1996.
What terrible wrongs you have done to us? Ask yourself, you scumbag, and those precious dialogues of yours, in which you not only spoke abusively of Philosophy herself, but insulted us by advertising for sale, as if in a slave-market, men who are learned, and worst of all, free-born (4)

The explanation makes it clear that the offense is about offending words (logoi), but the force of those words is closely related to the action of selling free men as slaves, and this seem to be, in large part, where the source of their humiliation lies. Parrhesiades’ offending speech is repeatedly characterized as hubrizein or hubris (1, 4, 5, 23, 25, 27): action that, in legal terms, justifies an extreme reaction and retribution, even if it is difficult to define precisely what kind of legal context there is in this imaginary world.26 What does seem significant is that this humiliation centers on their bodies. Turning these philosophers into slaves carries an implied threat of both violence and dehumanization; it renders them as mere bodies, which are at the mercy of those who control them, lacking an authoritative voice or agency of their own.27 In this abject position, the old philosopher’s teachings and writings have no authority, but could easily be silenced by physical punishment. In other words, the effective threat of Parrhesiades’ satire is not so different from the threats of retribution he receives. This suggests that attempts to control language via bodies did not start with the opening chase scene, but was already set in motion at the origin of the conflict.

Here again, the dynamics of how this process is imagined as occurring makes it difficult to delineate between bodies, on the one hand, and language on the other. The old philosophers seem to be confused whether what Parrhesiades has done is speech that threatens humiliating actions, or in fact the real actions themselves, as if they both do and do not understand how metaphors work. When Diogenes gives the formal prosecution speech (25-27), he accuses Parrhesiades of causing people to despise philosophy by making fun of it in public speech (25) and circulating his words in a “thick book” (πάχυ βιβλίον) (26); the charge is one of insulting language, not actual bodily harm. But when, at the very end of his speech, he again brings up the humiliating detail of the slave auction, he seems to be less sure about the metaphorical nature of it: he is particularly angry at the fact that he was sold for a paltry two obols (27). If this was meant as a metaphor, it seems to have slipped into concrete fact.

26 Under Athenian law, the charge of kidnapping and unlawfully enslaving a freeborn Athenian citizen was among those covered under the form of arrest called apagōgē – in which someone caught red-handed could be seized and brought before a magistrate, subject to immediate execution if admitting guilt, and to a trial only if claiming innocence (Todd 1993: 187).
27 As Todd 1993: 189, notes (quoting Demosthenes) a slave was, in (Athenian) legal terms, “liable to answer in his body for his misdeeds.” On the significance of slavery, torture, and the body, see also DuBois 1991.
In a discussion of Lucian’s relationship to Attic Comedy, Ralph Rosen reads the reaction of Diogenes and the other philosophers as representing a misreading of satire as a generic form. Effectively, they have mistaken satire for personal insult: they can only imagine invective in the context of real-world, non-literary exchange, when such behavior would merit legal consequences. Their response is an over-reaction to a text, displaying a lack of awareness of how the conventions of satire or invective comedy are supposed to work.  

If we think of the philosophers’ reaction as misreading, then their inability to distinguish between hypothetical and real harm is essentially misrecognition of metaphor (mistaking words for bodies, as it were). Maybe the real problem is that everyone fails to understand that Parrhesiades is only joking, and so they react as if his words had greater power than they do. What complicates this interpretation in my view, however, is the degree to which this “misreading” seems central to the text. Most intriguingly, if we look back at Sale of Lives, at the place where Diogenes (or a Cynic representing him) is brought up for auction, we see a curious prediction. The Cynic is advertised as andrikon (“manly”), ariston kai gennikon (“noble and genteel”), and eleutheron (“free-born”) (Sale of Lives 7). At the mention of “free-born,” the buyer becomes nervous; aren’t you worried, he asks Hermes, the auctioneer, about being charged for unlawful enslavement (andrapodismos)? In Sale of Lives, these concerns are quickly dismissed, but this is exactly what does happen in Fisherman. This suggests that confusion over whether Parrhesiades’ words threaten hypothetical action or perform that action is not a matter of missing the point. Rather, the text itself is predicated upon that very confusion; misrecognition of metaphor is the point. The punishment to which Parrhesiades’ body is exposed is thus, from this perspective, not an anomaly triggered by misguided over-reaction, but part of the risk one takes when stepping into the game of satire in the first place.

Thus far, we can see in Fisherman a tendency for bodies to replace texts, but always with a blurring of categorical differences between body and text that make it difficult to decide where one ends and the other begins. The effect is such that we can conceptualize the potential effects of texts in terms of physical actions without ceasing to think of them as texts. Words, the dialogue seems to suggest, can give you power over other people, a process made visible and concrete by comparison with the ways power acts on bodies – yet the metaphor itself never fully detaches from the process it describes. To control bodies is to control language, and to control language is to control bodies. It seems to suggest a dynamic in which different texts, and even their authors and readers, can have a material influence on each other irrespective of chronology or any other practical consideration. Parrhesiades is somehow a direct threat to philosophers long dead, while they are, by revivification and literary slight of hand, made to be a threat to him. Putting out words into the world is a risky game to play.

These are the stakes that Parrhesiades is up against when we first encounter him. How then does he manage to come out on the winning side?

29 It is interesting that the Diogenes of Sale of Lives seems entirely different from the one in Fisherman, and in fact more closely resembles Parrhesiades with his claims of speaking truth to power. Branham 1989: 52-54 notes this, suggesting that Lucian is situating himself in a Cynic tradition of parrhesia.
II. The Interpreter

On the surface, Fisherman seems to encourage us to view the trial of Parrhesiades in direct contrast to the extrajudicial violence he faced initially, and thus to see a progression away from crude violence, and implicitly, attention to bodies, and towards the power of language and reasoned argument, as the events of the dialogue proceed. Parrhesiades is presented as a rhetor (orator), who presumably will talk his way out of the situation (something that itself arouses some suspicion for these philosophers, especially Plato), and his argument for a trial is framed in terms of a need for law-court justice as opposed to brute force (8). But precisely how and why his defense is successful does not, I think, map onto a clean separation between body and language any more than the parts of Fisherman examined thus far have managed to maintain such distinct categories. To begin with, Parrhesiades' first attempt to talk his way out of the situation, as it were, does not seem to work. While he is still being chased, he offers a short speech in which he tries to frame his approach to philosophy as a kind of “curating”: his aim is to show the old philosophers in their best light, like a bee plucking and arranging the best flowers from a garden (6). By itself, this is potentially fruitful as a programmatic statement of Lucian's eclectic literary approach. But precisely how and why his defense is successful does not, I think, map onto a clean separation between body and language any more than the parts of Fisherman examined thus far have managed to maintain such distinct categories. To begin with, Parrhesiades' first attempt to talk his way out of the situation, as it were, does not seem to work. While he is still being chased, he offers a short speech in which he tries to frame his approach to philosophy as a kind of “curating”: his aim is to show the old philosophers in their best light, like a bee plucking and arranging the best flowers from a garden (6). By itself, this is potentially fruitful as a programmatic statement of Lucian's eclectic literary approach. 30 In the moment, however, the old philosophers seem utterly unconvinced by his assertion. Their immediate response is that it is only a rhetorician’s excuse (κατὰ τοὺς ρήτορες εἵρηται) (7). If a clever argument by itself isn’t enough, then perhaps something else is going on here. The ultimate success of Parrhesiades' defense does not depend on leaving bodies behind, but on harnessing them for his own purposes. This happens in several stages, starting even before his official defense speech.

A. The “Reading” of False Philosophy

The first step comes in the preparations for the trial. Parrhesiades suggests that to keep matters entirely fair, "Philosophy" herself can be the judge for the trial. And so Philosophy, personified as a female figure, enters the dialogue, along with a host of other abstract ideas (Aletheia, Parrhesia, Elenchos) made flesh, all of which ultimately end up being supportive of the defendant. As a particular kind of body, personifications occupy a space in the overlap of language and physicality that is congruent with how the dialogue has dealt with these categories thus far. What emerges for the first time in the entrance of these figures is an interest in what it might mean not just to beat up or otherwise violently control bodies, but specifically to read or interpret them; that is, to think of a body critically as a site of meaning equivalent to a text.

This is particularly notable in a section of the dialogue (11-12), spoken by Parrhesiades, which occurs right after the decision to hold a trial. It starts as a kind of tangent to the matter at hand, namely, where they should be looking for Philosophy if she is to be a judge at the trial. Parrhesiades tells the story of his initial search for Philosophy, presumably at an earlier point in his career. His quest primarily involves looking at bodies, guided by visible signs that he assumes will indicate something about the bodies that exhibit them. He explains that he first approached men with short cloaks and long beards, believing them to be philosophers because of these external markers (11); philosophy here has been “reduced to the level of instantly recognizable external...

30 Ni Mheallaigh 2014: 11-13 discusses Lucian’s use of the bee as a meta-literary metaphor in relation to Callimachus, Hymn to Apollo 110-112.
But this initial attempt at “reading” these bodies does not work out as hoped, for he quickly learns that these bearded men do not know any more than he did where Philosophy lives. Next, he locates doors that many men are going in and out of, with appropriately serious and scholarly bearings and expressions (σκυθρωπῶν καὶ τὰ σχήματα εὐσταλῶν καὶ φροντιστικῶν τὴν πρόσωπον) (12). This moves the terms of legibility a little, suggesting that the relationship between body and visible marker may be more complicated than Parrhesiades assumed. Perhaps it is not enough to notice whether someone has a cloak or beard; maybe you have to look at the expressions of their face and body, elements that are less precisely defined but perhaps a more accurate representation of their inner character and habits. As an observer of bodies, Parrhesiades’ reading skills seem to gradually become sharper.

Inside the frequented door, Parrhesiades sees a female figure that might be the Philosophy he is looking for. However, it appears that this is not the real Philosophy, but some kind of imitator or pretender, who has fooled many others into following her – but not Parrhesiades. According to his account, this “false” Philosophy appeared to be trying to look simple, unadorned, and unconcerned with her appearance, but clearly this was a pretense. Upon closer inspection, she was seen to be wearing make-up and gold jewelry, and acting like a courtesan, fawning on her wealthy lovers (that is, the men who wish to become philosophers) while ignoring the poor ones. Expressing contemptuous pity for those fools who have been ensnared by this seductive figure, Parrhesiades claims to have left in disgust.32

Parrhesiades’ ability to detect and avoid this Philosophy’s fraud rests upon a penetrating, suspicious reading of her body. However obvious his reaction may seem, what happens in his account is not at all straightforward. Here is the beginning of the description of False Philosophy:

εἶτα ἑώρων γυναῖκαν τι οὐχ ἀπλοῖκον, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα εἰς τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ ἀκόσμιον ἑαυτὴν ἐπερρύθμιζεν, ἀλλὰ κατεφάνεσθε τὸν ἀφετον ὅτι κόμψαν ἀκαλλώπιστον ἐώσα οὐδὲ τὸ ἀφετον ὅτι κατεφάνεσθε τῷ ἀφετον ἑαυτὴν ἐπερρύθμιζεν, ἀλλὰ κατεφάνεσθε τῷ ἀφετον ἑαυτὴν ἐπερρύθμιζεν. ἐὕτε δὲ ἦν ἐκεῖνη καὶ πρὸς εὐτρέπειαν τῷ ἀθεραπεύτῳ δοκοῦντι προσχρωμένη.

Then I saw a lady who was far from simple, however much she strove to bring herself into harmony with simplicity and plainness. On the contrary, I perceived at once that she did not leave the apparent disorder of her hair

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32 This contrast between a degenerate “false” Philosophy and the “true” Philosophy who appears later in the dialogue resembles that between the “ancient,” Rhetoric and the “new” Rhetoric made in the Preface of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ Lives of the Ancient Orators, where the “new” Rhetoric characterized as a kind of hetaaira, in contrast to the legitimate wife represented by the old Rhetoric. The “new” Rhetoric is similarly disparaged for valuing showiness over substance and wealth over morality. Lucian plays with the idea of a new and old Rhetoric in very similar terms in The Double Accusation (31), where the Syrian claims to have left his wife Rhetoric after her behavior became too promiscuous.
unenhanced by art, nor carelessly drape the folds of her clothes. It was clear that she was using those things as dress-up, and employed her seeming negligence to heighten her attractiveness. (12)

Parrhesiades continues his description by pointing out glimpses of face paint and “courtesan-like” (hetairika) chatter, noting the women’s fawning behavior towards the men around her. Looking even more suspiciously at this figure, he observes that her clothing often slips aside as if by accident (γυμνοθείσης αυτῆς κατά τό ἀκούσιον) to reveal golden necklaces thicker than dog collars (περιδέραια χρύσεα τῶν κλοιῶν παχύτερα) (12). Overall, this description moves from surface to inside, as his gaze penetrates from the most outward level of appearance to a deeper level beneath it. This fits with the motion of the quest that has taken Parrhesiades closer and closer to a coveted inner location and the insights it promises, his gaze increasingly attuned to finer details.

The implication is that what is on the inside is more true than what is on the surface. In terms of bodies, a deeper level of appearance reveals more clearly who or what that body really is.

However, Parrhesiades’ characterization of this supposedly fake figure is not just a matter of separating appearance from true identity or inner character, as his initial, failed attempts at “reading” the bearded men might suggest. Rather, to see the fakeness of this body accurately requires a kind of double seeing, an awareness that one thing is evident on the surface while simultaneously seeing through it to something deeper. This double-ness is evident in the way that Parrhesiades presents his initial impressions as a series of negations and opposites. The “not simple” (οὐχ ἄπλοικόν) lady is trying to arrange her body and appearance in order to seem plain and unadorned (ἀφελὲς καὶ ἀκόσμητον), but in fact the apparent artlessness of her appearance is not artless (οὐδὲ … ἀνεπιθέτως) in its procurement or intent. The veneer of carelessness is carefully contrived: she is trying to appear attractive by making it seem like she is not trying to appear attractive. This paradox is only visible by observing multiple levels of appearance at the same time and discerning the disjunction between them.

It is true that once Parrhesiades looks closely enough, concrete visible markers (such as the gold necklace) corroborate the suspicions developed from the initial reading of surface and depth. But by beginning with his suspicious, double-sighted reading, he creates a different impression of this figure than if he had simply noted these signs immediately as evidence for this Philosophy’s degeneration. It is also different than a description structured around a sequential observation of deceptive appearance (she appeared simply adorned at first glance) versus true substance (until I noticed her make-up and jewelry). Instead, the description follows Parrhesiades’ doubled gaze, holding both surface and depth even as it looks further inside. It encourages us as readers of the text, I would argue, to “read” this body in the way that he does, while allowing us to see that this reading is an interpretive choice, made by putting certain elements together and evaluating them in a particular way. Parrhesiades may have entered (false) Philosophy’s house as a potential follower, but he leaves it as an interpreter of bodies, starting with hers.

33 And of course the inner level with make-up and jewelry is itself another surface.
There are two main elements to how this plays out. First, control of bodies is still at the root of what is at stake. In this case, the control is asserted less through violence than by something more like seduction. False Philosophy seems to be using her physical appearance to deceive potential followers but also, and perhaps primarily, to attract them; her apparent simplicity may draw would-be philosophers into the room, but it is the fawning courtesan-like getup that ultimately wins them over. That attraction is even described in physical (and somewhat violent) terms: unfortunate followers are “dragged towards her not by the nose but by the beard” (ἐκείνους ἐλκομένους πρός αὐτῆς οὐ τῆς ρινός ἀλλὰ τοῦ πόγωνος) (12). The combination of deception and attraction adds yet another layer to the concept of physical control: false Philosophy is attempting to control her own body and its appearance in order to control the bodies of would-be philosophers.

The use of the term ἐπερρυθμίζεων, in particular, suggests not just an arranging of the body but a re-arranging, the imposition of one kind of order over another.34 Moreover, the root ῥυθμίζεων suggests an arrangement or order that combines form and movement, a measured but still dynamic and changing process rather than a static, fixed appearance.35 When in turn Parrhesiades’ response is to scrutinize and expose the “real” meaning of her body, he is attempting to exert his control over her body in a way that counters the pull of her seduction. Interpretation is another form of control.

Second, reading a body is not just a matter of matching a particular visible marker with its associated meaning. In fact, the various kinds of reading that Parrhesiades performs in his account make it difficult to determine with certainty that the visible marks on bodies can be easily attached to a stable meaning. Rather, the process we see is dynamic and contestable, something that both the reader and the body being read are trying to manipulate to their own advantage. In the back and forth pull of meanings, the emphasis falls on the process of interpretation and the ability of a given interpreter to gain persuasive or coercive power over the bodies involved.

This role of interpreter is ultimately what becomes key to Parrhesiades’ successful acquittal, and he develops it further in his defense speech (Fisherman 29-37).

B. Masks, Bodies, and Stage Managers

The explicit argument that Parrhesiades makes in his defense is that his satirical writing is aimed not at the original teachings of the old philosophers he offended, but at modern-day fakes. His purpose, as he sees it, is to expose those who claim to be practicing philosophy but actually care only about money and fame, and by exposing them, restore proper honor to philosophy in its true and original form.

As with false Philosophy, he characterizes the deception of modern philosophical imposters in terms of their bodies, their fakeness being an identifiable disjunction between visible markers on their bodies and their true inner nature. These philosophers, Parrhesiades alleges, want the doxa (“fame, reputation”) of a philosopher but not the

34 This seems to be one of the few places in extant Greek literature where this word appears. Another is Plato, Laws 802b, where it is used to describe the revising or remodeling of music to make it appropriate.

35 I take this connotation of ῥυθμός from Benveniste 1971. The connection between ῥυθμός and the control of bodies is further explored in Chapter Three.
actual fact of it, so they adopt certain external trappings, the beard (*geneion*) and gait (*badisma*) and style of cloak (*anabolē*), that are easy to imitate and signal their profession to the world (31). The way they act and live, however, contradicts their appearance, largely due to habits of greed and hypocrisy (32). To help illustrate his point, Parrhesiades makes a comparison that is the first of several theatrically themed analogies in his speech:

καὶ τὸ πράγμα δομιον ἐδόκει μοι καθάπερ ἂν εἰ τις ὑποκριτής τραγῳδίας μαλλιακὸς αὐτὸς ὄν καὶ γυναικεῖος Ἀχιλλέα ἢ Θηρεά ἢ καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα ὑποκρίνοιτο αὐτὸν μήτε βαδίζων μήτε βοῶν ἡρωίκον, ἀλλὰ θρυπτόμενος ὑπὸ τηλικοῦτῳ προσωπεῖῳ, ὃν οὐδὲ ἢ Ἐλένη ποτὲ ἢ Πολυζένη ἀνάσχοιτο πέρα τοῦ μετρίου αὐταῖς προσωπεικότα, οὐχ ὅπως ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Καλλινίκος, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ τάχιστα ἢν ἐπιτρύψαι τὸ ῥοπάλῳ παῖον τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸ προσωπεῖον, οὔτως ἄτιμως κατατεθηλυμένος πρὸς αὐτοῦ.

The matter seemed to me to be rather like if some actor of tragedy who was soft and womanish should act the part of Achilles or Theseus, or even Herakles himself, without either walking or speaking as a hero should, but traipsing about coyly in so great a mask. Even Helen or Polyxena would never permit such a man to resemble them within reason, let alone Herakles, the conquering hero; in my opinion, he would very soon smash both man and mask with a few strokes of his club, for having been so disgracefully feminized by him (31).

He claims that these philosophers are like actors who are poorly suited to playing heroes like Theseus or Herakles because of their weak and effeminate bodies and mannerisms. Even female mythic figures in tragedy would be ashamed to be portrayed by such an effete actor; a manly hero like Herakles would be provoked to outraged violence, smashing the man with his club.

The usefulness of this analogy is that it allows Parrhesiades to emphasize the contrast of "inner" and "outer" appearances, easily signified by mask versus body. But if we use this particular body and mask as the basis for such a dichotomy, it starts to shift the terms of inner and outer in a different direction than we might have expected. According to Parrhesiades' initial criticism of the fake philosophers, outer markers used to project an appearance of being a philosopher are implicitly less authentic or true than the inner qualities these signs may mask. Anyone can grow a long beard; it does not make him a philosopher. In the analogy, however, the mask, as a symbol of the role it represents, is the thing invested with authenticity. It is not so much that the mask inaccurately represents the body behind it, as it is that the body fails to live up to the standards of the mask it wears. Even though the mask is the outer layer, a means by which an actor takes on a pretended identity, in this equation it instead becomes the stable

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36 It is likely significant that *doxa* itself has the connotation of external appearance; see the introduction to this dissertation.

referent against the potential instability of the bodies underneath it. The mask always represents the same role, and a body that wears it can align with that role or not, and it is this – not just the fact of wearing the mask – that creates a successful or unsuccessful performance.

As with Parrhesiades' reading of false Philosophy, the judgment that these actors' performances are unsuccessful requires an audience to see both levels of appearance (body and mask) and evaluate the performance based on their alignment, or lack thereof. Although he assumes that the misalignment will be obvious, and therefore ridiculous, it is nonetheless an interpretive judgment that requires at least some assumption about what the performance should look like, what the mask should represent. We can glimpse something of the interpretive process in the descriptive choices Parrhesiades makes. He twice mentions the trait of "gait" or manner of walking (badisma, badizein), first as one of the external markers of philosophy that anyone could imitate, then as a heroic characteristic that the bad actor fails to perform, thus giving himself away. In the first instance, this characteristic is read as something that obscures a body's true identity, but in the second, it is one of the main ways that we can read a body for what it "really" is. The shift in the importance placed on this particular symbol gives us a momentary glimpse behind the interpretive process. Parrhesiades is choosing to describe and evaluate bodies in ways that grant meaning to different symbols at different times; he is trying to direct what his audience sees.

Interestingly, however, any hypothetical audience of these bad performances is elided in Parrhesiades' analogy. Instead, it is Herakles, the very character being represented onstage, who is imagined as the judge of the quality of the performance, striking the effeminate actor with his club as if avenging a personal insult. This collapsing of representation and audience seals the authority of the interpretation, forestalling the possibility that the effeminate actor's portrayal might be an acceptable variation. This wretched fellow doesn't even need an audience to boo him offstage: his very role rejects him. At the moment of condemning this misalignment between body and mask, however, we get a glimpse of what is at stake, namely, of course, control. If the bad actors need to be beaten and physically separated from their mask, and by the role itself no less, there seems to be something problematic about a failure of imitation beyond just a performance flop. It is as though their inadequate performance might somehow contaminate the original figure they claim to be imitating; the effeminate acting seems to "feminize" Herakles himself. This fear implies that the mask/role is in fact only stable insofar as it forcibly excludes transgressive uses of itself.38 There may be one

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38 This point is underscored by the fact that Herakles is by nature an ambivalent figure, and at least partly so in terms of gender (e.g., Sophocles' Trachiniae 1046-75). On the feminization of Herakles, see especially Loraux 1995 (but also Llewellyn-Jones 2005). This is not to say, necessarily, that a soft, effeminate body is equally "correct" for this hero as a hyper-masculine one; rather, that the full spectrum of his representations undermine a strict dichotomy between masculine and feminine bodies. The forceful exclusion of one type of body here seems like protesting too much, a denial of any possibility of ambivalence. I discuss Lucian's representation of Herakles more extensively in Chapter Four.
overwhelming way that Parrhesiades wants his audience to evaluate this performance, but he seems to have inadvertently let us see how that interpretation was secured.

This violent control of bodies also suggests that Parrhesiades is starting to turn the tables of his predicament. Rather than facing violence in retribution for his acts of misrepresentation, he is beginning to direct that violence towards other bodies; in other words, to gain control of interpretation. In the following sections of Parrhesiades’ defense speech, a figure of the interpreter apart from actor or audience emerges explicitly. The role of the interpreter seems primarily to be enforcing the acceptance of one interpretation or reading over all others, played out, again and again, through violence directed at bodies. Following the analogy of the effeminate actors, Parrhesiades adds a few related comparisons, as if to bolster his claim: the fake philosophers are like monkeys wearing the masks of heroes, or like the ass that donned a lion's skin and frightened the people of Cumae with its braying. In the latter story, the deception is revealed by the arrival of a xenos who having seen both asses and lions before, exposes (ēleŋxe) the fake lion and runs him out of town at the end of a club (32). The xenos, with his more astute ability to discern bodies and costumes, acts as the interpreter both by exposing the fraudulent lion, and by assuming responsibility for the enforcement of an "acceptable" performance through physical force. Parrhesiades claims to be engaged in a similar exposing of deception on the behalf of the old philosophers, using the same word (elengxein) to describe his actions (33). His satirical attacks distinguish the older, "true," philosophers and the values they represent from new, "fake," philosophers who don't practice those values, lest uniformed viewers (like the ignorant people of Cumae), mistake one for the other.

Parrhesiades’ outrage over being unfairly censured for this exposure of frauds leads to another theatrical analogy with echoes of the one in chapter 31. He compares his situation to the case of contest-judges (ἀγωνοθέται) who might flog actors portraying gods when they perform in a manner inconsistent with the role (μὴ καλῶς ὑποκρίνεται μηδὲ κατ᾽ ἄξιαν τῶν θεῶν) (33). The gods aren't angered, even those whose masks and costumes the actors are wearing, but rather they are pleased by the punishment. Like Herakles, the gods in this imagined scenario are intimately concerned with the correct alignment of actor and role, but this alignment is not policed by them or by a hypothetical audience, but by the mediating figure of the agōnothētēs. This figure is the interpreter of the performance, who decides whether it is good or bad and deals punishment accordingly. He is like the audience in the sense that he views the performance and reacts to it, but out of all potential viewers he has particular power to control both performer (in that he has the authority to flog an actor) and audience (in that his judgment enforces an assumption of how a potential audience should react). Indeed, both actor and audience in this scenario seem like rather impotent players in comparison, at the mercy of their potential failure to act or interpret correctly, and the risk of violence this contains.

The agency of the performer and audience does not, however, drop out entirely, as we can see in Parrhesiades’ final performance-related analogy, the story of the dancing monkeys (36). An Egyptian king taught once a group of monkeys to dance in a particular style, wearing costumes and masks. Everything went well until someone in the audience tossed some nuts in front of the monkeys, at which point they abandoned their dance, tore off their costumes, and fought one another over the food. In keeping with the earlier analogies, we see here masks and costumes covering bodies that are not ultimately
commensurate to them, and the failure of the performance accompanied by destruction of those masks. But instead of the judgment being made by the absent "original," in the case of Herakles, or by an intermediary judge like the agōnothêtēs, it is the performers themselves who sabotage their act when they prove unable to control the "natural" urges of their animal bodies. The monkeys are such bad actors that they do not even keep up the pretense of the performance itself, something that even the bad actors in earlier examples presumably managed to do. The misalignment between mask and body is grotesquely obvious – an ideal insult to throw at Parrhesiades' fake philosophers. The catch here, however, is the fact that it is the audience that breaks up the illusion by tempting the monkeys with nuts. They are effectively refusing to see these performers as dancers and insisting on seeing them as monkeys, which precipitates the separation of body and mask. However obvious the meaning of a given body may seem, it is still ultimately shaped by whoever has the power to interpret it.\textsuperscript{39}

Together, these series of analogies helps to construct the claim that Parrhesiades is making for the purpose of his satirical writing. His work as an un-masker of frauds is about delineating and protecting a certain, “correct” interpretation; it is a service for the old philosophers (and presumably other Classical models) because it protects them from misrepresentation, and a service to latter-day readers in that it protects them from incorrect reading. Note that his analogies focus on disparate physical categories: animals as opposed to humans, gods or heroes versus mortals, or effeminate bodies in contrast to masculine ones. That these bodies are marked as inherently different from one another serves to bolster his claim that the imitation of the fake philosophers is so different from the real thing that there can be no comparison between them. By mapping differences onto physical bodies, he naturalizes the gap between copy and original and the failure of imitation to bridge that gap.\textsuperscript{40} As a rhetorical strategy, at least, this seems to be quite effective, for all charges against Parrhesiades are immediately dropped once his defense speech is concluded, and there is no more mention of pelting him with stones.

However, the claim of inherent and obvious difference seems to exist alongside the problem that, for uninformed viewers, it is actually difficult to distinguish between real

\textsuperscript{39} It is worth noting, too, that in this story the breaking up of the dance becomes its own performance, causing the onlookers to laugh. The interpretation, in a sense, has caused the performance to change qualitatively from one form to another.

\textsuperscript{40} Whitmarsh 2001 takes this as one of the central points of Fisherman: “Manliness and humanity are implicitly linked with undeceptive simplicity: a real, male human would not need to play a role. The philosophy of the age is symptomatic of a general decline; lesser (effeminate, bestial) being attempt to pass themselves off as the objects of their ineffectual imitation” (263). My concern with this conclusion is that it misses the mediating role of the interpreter in securing the falseness of these imitations. To me, Parrhesiades’ choice of analogies implies not that a “real” human would not need to play a role, but that he would do so successfully, without a gap between body and mask for a keen-eyed viewer to spot and punish him for. The specter of failed performance exists to reassure the “real,” legitimate performance that it will be taken seriously. And if a failed performance must be met with violence, how secure can the successful one truly be? Gunderson 2000: 126-145 engages with a similar point in his discussion of actors and orators in Roman discourse on oratory.
and fake. We may recall that this was part of the older philosopher’s original concern, as expressed in Diogenes’ speech: because Parrhesiades portrays philosophers as charlatans and fools, he makes ordinary people laugh at the notion of philosophy in general (25). Parrhesiades never quite escapes this charge, despite his efforts to contrast monkeys and humans. Even after his acquittal, he admits as much: there is no token (gnōrisma) or sign (semeion) to distinguish false philosophers, and often the charlatans (goētes) are more persuasive than the real philosophers (42). The final chapters of Fisherman are therefore concerned with how to effectively deal with this problem. The solution that finally proves successful involves the marking of bodies:

ΑΛΗΘΙΑ: εῖθ᾽ ὧν μὲν ἄν εὐρή γνήσιον ὡς ἀληθὸς φιλοσοφίας, στεφανωσάτω θαλλὸν στεφάνῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ Πρυτανεῖον καλεσάτω, ἣν δὲ τινὶ—οίοι πολλοὶ εἰσὶ—καταράτω ἄνδρι ὑποκριτῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἐντύχῃ, τὸ τριβώνιον περισπάσας ἀποκειράτω τὸν πόγωνα ἐν χρῷ πάνω τραγοκουρικῇ μαχαίρᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου στίγματα ἐπιβαλέτω ἢ ἐγκαυσάτω κατὰ τὸ μεσόφρυον· ὁ δὲ τύπος τοῦ καυτῆρος ἐστῶ ἀλώπηξ ἢ πίθηκος.

Truth: Whenever he finds a truly legitimate son of philosophy, let him crown the man with a wreath of green olive and invite him to the Prytaneum; but if he meets a scoundrel who is only a stage-actor of philosophy (there are many of that sort) let him tear his cloak, cut off his beard close to the skin with goat-shears, and stamp or brand a mark (stigmata) on his forehead, between the eyebrows; let the pattern of the brand be a fox or a monkey (46).

Those found to be true philosophers will be given crowns, but pretenders will lose their cloaks and beards and be marked with stigmata on their foreheads, like runaway slaves.41 It seems particularly suggestive that one of the recommended brands is a monkey (pithēkos), which is also one of the body types that are paradigmatic of the difference between authentic original and shoddily deceptive fake. The text here is trying to have it both ways: the fakes are supposed to be transparently different from and inferior to the original, yet they still require an interpreter’s chastising mark to make this evident. The “correct” interpretation can only be secured through violence enacted on bodies.

41 Jones 1987 argues that stigma in a classical Greek context usually refers to a tattoo, not a brand, and that this would have been a more common way of marking a disobedient or runaway slave (branding being reserved for animals). Jones does note, however, that in Roman sources this distinction is harder to identify, since the Latin terms to describe such marks are more ambiguous: slaves and convicts in Plautus, Juvenal, and Apuleius are described as litterati or inscripti without reference to how those letters were inscribed; Cicero and later authors use inurere (“burn on,” “brand,” or “imprint”) to describe both actual and metaphorical marks. See Jones 1987: 153-4. The stigmata in this text do seem to clearly be made by branding (ἐγκαυσάτω, ὁ τύπος τοῦ καυτῆρος) rather than tattooing, although I think the association with runaway slaves is still operative (erstwhile philosophers as runaway slaves is central to the plot of Lucian’s Fugitivi). The distinction may also not really matter here, since the humor of the “fishing” also relies on the image of the fraudulent philosophers as animals.
The task of catching these fake philosophers is assigned to Parrhesiades, who will lure them on a fishing line baited with gold and figs. Each “fish” that he reels in receives a mocking appraisal in language that puns on stereotypical features of its philosophical school, before being rejected as false imitation by the original philosopher of that school. The Cynic, for example, is a dog-fish (kuōn) with huge teeth, a play on association of Cynics as dogs, while the description of the Platonist “rather flat” (hupoplatus) puns on the philosopher’s name (“rather platonic”). In this role of fisherman, Parrhesiades secures a position as an interpreter, like the agōnothetēs of his earlier analogies, with the power to both assess bodies and to physically control them. The process of fishing and marking each philosopher according to authenticity combines several of the ways of controlling bodies that have been effective throughout the text: the lure of the baited fishhook recalls the seductive False Philosophy dragging men around by their beards, while the branding of the frauds with an imprint of a monkey or fox underlines the association between “unworthy” or “inauthentic” bodies and animals that was central to Parrhesiades’ analogies. It also reads like a reversal of the philosophers’ initial, enraged pursuit of Parrhesiades, with the participants similarly debating how to dispose of these “fish” according to the fate they deserve. At one point, Plato proposes throwing the “Platonist” fish on the rocks, as he had suggested doing with Parrhesiades (50). In the midst of one mocking interrogation, Parrhesiades remarks cheerfully that fish are, of course, voiceless (aphōnoi), and therefore unable to respond to his questions (51). Rendering these fake philosophers as “fish” (as well as fugitive slaves and monkeys) makes them voiceless bodies, subject to violence without recourse – the very fate with which Parrhesiades was threatened earlier. Now, in his newly secured role as interpreter, he has managed not only to avoid the harm directed against his own body that would have rendered him unable to speak, but also succeeded in turning that violence against other bodies.

By the end of *Fisherman*, then, the stakes are still physical, and only the body being targeted has changed. This is potentially troubling, for it implies that while Parrhesiades has temporarily won the game of interpretation between him and the old philosophers, he has not eliminated the risk it poses. Successful interpretive control of bodies (and texts) is never entirely secure, but seems to require constant, preemptive attack as a means of fending off competing possibilities. Even Herakles can only preserve the integrity of his heroic role with the force of his club. What is to prevent another audience’s laughter from reducing Parrhesiades – or Lucian – to dancing monkeys? *Fisherman* does not have an answer for this. The story must be continued elsewhere.
Chapter 2

At the end of my discussion of Lucian’s *Fisherman*, I posed a question that the text seemed to leave open: what is there to prevent an audience’s laughter from turning Lucian himself, rather than those he lampoons, into a dancing monkey? To state the point more plainly, *Fisherman* seemed to suggest that the very act of writing or speaking left the author and his text vulnerable to the interpretations of others, despite his attempts to secure full control over the interpretive process. It was, of course, somewhat disingenuous for me to ask this question rhetorically, because Lucian actually has an answer for it, in a manner of speaking. In chapter 5 of the *Apology for Salaried Posts in Great Houses*, the author imagines how a charge of hypocrisy might be raised against him. He might be compared to the monkey that Cleopatra taught to dance, who put on a good show until it saw a dried fig lying around and promptly abandoned the dance to eat it: “bidding a great farewell to the *auloi*, the rhythms and the dance-steps, it snatched and gobbled up [the fig], having thrown away, no, shattered its mask” (µακρά χαίρεν φράσαντα τοῖς αὐλοῖς καὶ ρυθμοῖς καὶ ὀρχήμασι συναρπάσαντα κατατρώγειν, ἀπορρίσαντα, µᾶλλον δὲ συντρίσαντα τὸ πρόσωπον) (5). Here is another version of the story told at *Fisherman* 36, in which monkeys who have been trained to dance abandon their performance, tearing off their costumes and masks, after someone in the audience offers them some nuts. 42 In *Fisherman*, Parrhesiades uses this analogy to describe fraudulent philosophers who are unable to keep up their shoddy pretense of actually practicing philosophy when tempted in the slightest by material gain. In the *Apology*, the author himself43 faces accusations of an equivalent hypocrisy; caught out as monkey, as it were (ἡλέγχθης πίθηκος ὄν) (6).

Like *Fisherman*, the *Apology* is framed as the response to an earlier text of Lucian’s. The text in this case is *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses*, in which Lucian criticizes Greek pepaideumenoi who pursue paid positions in elite Roman households and warns others against this path. Now, however, it appears that the author himself has taken a paying position in the Roman imperial administration in Egypt, thus undermining the stance he took toward Roman power in his earlier text. This precipitates the need for a new text that plays out both an imagined critique and defense of the author’s decision relative to the views previously expressed in his writing. The *Apology* is thus a response to *Salaried Posts* in a manner parallel to the relationship between *Sale of Lives* and *Fisherman*. Both pairs of text imagine scenarios in which the author receives criticism based on something he has written, and must defend himself by attempting to salvage the interpretation of his earlier text. As the monkey story suggests, however, *Apology* is also a kind of response to *Fisherman*, and in fact, this shared story is only one focal point of a

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42 This story is included in Perry’s *Aesopica* (463), but Lucian is the only extant source for this version. Anderson 2009: 8 suggests a parallel in Quintilian 6.1.47, in which young boys are similarly distracted from declamation by nuts, and an anecdote in Claudian *In Eutrop.* (1.300ff.), which pokes fun at the incongruity of a monkey wearing a fancy costume.

43 I will refer to the author occasionally as Lucian, as convenient shorthand, not to imply any straightforward connection between the first-person narrator and the historical Lucian.
larger, complex interweaving between the two texts. It is from the point of this intertextual connection, rather than the relationship to *Salaried Posts*, that this chapter orients its claims about the *Apology*.

I start with the observation that in the *Apology*, as in *Fisherman*, the main problem is how a text will be interpreted, and that once again the stakes for this interpretative dispute are repeatedly imagined in physical terms. Bodies and texts are related, and we must understand the workings of one to understand the other. The main body at stake is again the body of the author of a text, and the status of that body is intimately linked to control over the interpretation of his text. However, if in *Fisherman* the primary aim was always to secure control over bodies, and thereby texts, things play out differently in the *Apology*. What is central here is the author’s *loss* of control over his body and his text. Now it is as if his efforts to secure the position of interpreter (who was uniquely positioned to police the bodies and/or texts around him) have failed, and both *Salaried Posts* and the author who produced it have come to mean something different from what he intended them to mean. Rather than attempting to wrest back control and secure a dominant interpretation, as *Fisherman* does through the defense and acquittal of Parrhesiades, the work that Lucian’s *Apology* does is to revisit and reconsider the implications of this loss of control, and through this, to reconsider the possibilities and limitations of interpretative control. To phrase it in terms of the anecdote with which I began, I read this text as unfolding from the moment when the mask comes off the monkey and the audience laughs; it ultimately neither restores the mask nor drives the monkey offstage, but instead offers ways for its readers to reconsider what both the losing of the mask and the monkey behind it might mean.

It is in its emphasis on this re-visiting and re-consideration that I believe my analysis breaks new ground. I have already departed from a historicizing position that seeks to account for the *Apology* in terms of the author’s personal expediency, instead treating the text’s posture of defense as a deliberate rhetorical strategy that can be analyzed as such. ⁴⁴ But I would argue further that although this text presents itself as a “defense” against an accusation, it might be most productively understood not as a justification of its author’s position, but in terms of an ongoing and incomplete revision of its own claims. ⁴⁵ The text continually invites its readers to revisit the same set of

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⁴⁴ To the extent that scholarship on Lucian references the *Apology*, it is often with the aim of piecing together Lucian’s biography and cultural context. For examples of this see Jones 1986, Swain 1996 and 2007. Others (notably Branham 1989, Whitmarsh 2001) have demonstrated how this and similar works (e.g., *Defense of Portraits* as a response to *Portraits*) use a posture of self-defense as a deliberate literary strategy, one that is not limited to specific historical circumstances. For these approaches to the text, which I follow in general principle, the fact that such texts represent themselves as necessitated by the urgency of defense is more important than whether or not a historical Lucian really needed to defend himself.

⁴⁵ My approach to this topic draws inspiration from recent studies on revision in Roman literature that have highlighted how revision, or the advertisement of it, can be part of an author’s rhetorical self-positioning within and across texts (Gurd 2012 looks in particular at Cicero, Horace, and Pliny the Younger; Martelli 2013 focuses on Ovid). For the Roman authors examined in these studies, revision is not necessarily a progressive
concerns and consider them again from a different perspective. These response processes are not linear, nor do they aim towards a unified and totalizing conclusion, but interweave and intermingle throughout the text. Much has been written on Lucian’s creative reworking of literary tradition, but less attention has been paid to how he approaches the reworking and revision of his own texts, and what insights this might have to offer. The Apology presents itself as a response to an experience of disruption and change that have befallen the author and his earlier text. It responds to this disruption and change through a kind of revision that does not aim for restoration to a previous state or the secure establishment of a new one; this revision works instead like a continual doubling back, in which the text calls into questions its own assumptions without necessarily overruling them. These processes of revision and re-reading will in turn invite us to reconsider how the embodiment of texts might serve as a model for authorial self-presentation and textual reflexivity.

It will help at this point to give an overview of the structure of the text. Although not a dialogue like Fisherman, the Apology is structured in such a way as to include both the accusation against the author and his defense, and we can roughly divide the work into two parts based on which of these functions it serves. Within each part, however, there are many smaller twists and turns. To outline briefly, the Apology is a second-person address to a friend of the author’s named Sabinus. In this format, we might position the author/Lucian as “I” and Sabinus as “you,” except that those positions (who is the “I” and who is the “you”) switch at several points in the narrative. Chapters 1-7 lay forth the criticisms that the author imagines to be directed against him, all phrased as things that Sabinus might say, at first phrased indirectly (in a section introduced by the phrase δοκῶ μοι ἀκούειν σου λέγοντος, “I think I hear you saying”) (1), then directly (παραλαβὼν τὴν ῥήτραν σοὶ ταῦτα πρὸς με ὁ Σαβίνος ἢδη λέγεις, “taking up the speech you, now, as Sabinus, say these things to me”) from chapters 3 through 7. This fluctuating narrative perspective allows the author of Apology to effectively talk both for and against himself. “Sabinus” functions as both internal audience and prosecutor, process aimed towards a perfected piece of writing, but may instead be an end in itself, serving other purposes besides improvement of a text. Understanding revision in this way allows us to then to interrogate evidence or advertisement of it not in terms of recovery of a lost or absent original, but for how it contributes to construction of both text and authorial persona.

Lucian’s Apology is not precisely parallel to any of the Roman examples discussed by Gurd or Martelli, largely because it advertises its author’s position in terms of quasi-litigious defense, and thus both the need for and methods of revision are imagined as extra-literary concerns. In this it resembles another Roman text that stages not its revision, but certainly its own re-production: the double prologues to Terence’s Hecyra, in which earlier disruptions of the play, while presented as historical fact, more likely serve to further the author’s self-presentation. On the Hecyra prologues see for example Lada-Richards 2004, Goldberg 2013.

46 This figure is otherwise unknown, but it is perhaps significant that the name is Roman rather than Greek, for it orients the Apology towards a potential combined Roman and Greek audience, as opposed to the Greeks who were explicitly the addressees of Salaried Posts. See Swain 1996 and 2007, Andrade 2013.
standing in for all those who have read Lucian’s earlier text, and anyone who might read this one. In the remaining text (8-15), the author returns to speaking in his own persona as he attempts a defense. He proposes and discards several possible excuses (8-10) before offering a few to which he seems more committed (11-15). By the end, however, he adopts a posture of nonchalant indifference to the accusation, almost flippancy. Even at the level of narrative structure, the text seems to prioritize continued response over consistency.

At the risk of replicating the text’s complications rather than elucidating them, I have found it productive to proceed with my argument as if gradually untangling threads and then weaving them back together. In the first half of my analysis, I identify several threads that all relate to what the author imagines to be the accusation against which he must defend himself; the second half will explore ways the text revisits and reconsiders these threads as it constructs a defense. My analysis in both parts does not always follow the text diachronically, instead sliding back and forth among related elements. It will, moreover, sometimes require a gradual unfolding, in which the full significance of individual ideas may only become apparent after they have been first separated out and then recombined. My hope is that this unraveling structure will serve my argument by capturing those internal processes of re-reading, re-visiting, and responding, as much as condensing them into a conclusion. That is, my analysis is structured this way in large part because I am trying to reflect how I feel we can most effectively read and re-read the text, tracing the contours of its contradictions rather than smoothing them out.

I. Dissonance

Let us begin with the central problem at stake, namely, the interpretation of bodies and texts. I have noted already that the Apology, like Fisherman, presents a literary space where “body” and “text” are overlapping concepts. By this I mean that a body can seemingly be “read” or interpreted in a manner analogous to a text, and the production and reception of a text (whether through speaking or reading) are not separate from the bodies involved and implicated in these processes. However, if in Fisherman the prevailing tendency was elision of body and text, such that to control bodies was to control texts and vice versa, the Apology is primarily concerned with text and body as distinct yet never fully separable entities. We see this first in the way that the author’s problem is framed as a contradiction between the earlier text (variously τὸ βιβλίον, τὸ σύγγραµµα, οἱ λόγοι) and the author’s current life (ὁ νῦν βίος, τὸν παρόντα σου βίον). The text says one thing, but the author’s actions say another, and so he is in trouble if anyone encounters both and makes an association between them. Implicit here is the idea that the author’s “biological” body is, like his text, an object that can be read for meaning in some sense. The way he presents himself communicates values or beliefs to those who are watching him, just as his writing tried to communicate those things. Implicit, also, is

47 This final turn of indifference is not discussed in this chapter, but I do address it (in connection to a similar rhetorical gesture in Herakles) in Chapter Four, section II C.
48 The assumption that the body can be “read” clearly draws on the conventions of rhetoric, in which the orator’s deportment and body language were as important as his words. We might compare the language used here to the Preface to Dionysus of Halicarnassus’ Lives of Ancient Orators, which assumes that the bios and the logoi of an orator are parallel indicators of their style and character. In Roman Antiquities 1.1.3,
the assumption that body and lifestyle should align to some degree with the text, and the fact that they do not is notable; moreover, the fact that they might be widely seen or heard to not align is particularly problematic. “Sabinus” warns the author to take care that no one hears him reading the text, and not to let anyone who can see his current lifestyle encounter his earlier writings. For those who have already heard or see it, he should pray that they forget (3).\footnote{The combination of seeing and hearing is also operative in the description of the dissemination of Salaried Posts, which is described in chapter 3 prior to those warnings: it was read aloud or performed in a public setting (ἐν πολλῷ πλῆθει δειχθέν) and later circulated privately (ιδίᾳ), presumably as a written text, among other pepaideumenoi who might stand to benefit from it.}

Body, text, and the relation between them – all are subject to scrutiny for meaning by observers and potential critics.

The concern over the misalignment of body and text further engages with both visual and aural appearances. The term used to describe the contradiction between the author and his text is διαφωνία (“discrepancy,” “dissonance”) (1). The dancing monkey, from the story I summarized earlier, is an embodiment of this discord in both aural and visual terms. The monkey is initially “in step” (ἐν τῷ σχήματι) with both the form of the dance and the accompanying music (τοῖς ἁδοὺσι καὶ αὐλοῦσι συγκινούμενον), but breaks that alignment once it sees the fig, “bidding farewell” to the auloi and the rhthmoi along with the dance (5). This choice of language and analogy suggest a connection between the order imposed by conventions of dance and music, and the expected relationship between author and text. Alignment is, metaphorically, a matter of the proper harmony, the proper rhythm, the proper physical posture; failure to align is noticeable for the way it jars the ears or the eyes. The whole affair, in fact, starts to resemble a performance, with the critics – including the addressee Sabinus – positioned as an audience, ready to judge author and text at any moment.

The metaphor of performance is another link between Apology and Fisherman, and one that also proves more complicated than it might appear on the surface. Let us break down this metaphor, as it appears in Apology, in more detail. If, as the interest in “dissonance” suggests, the expected alignment of body and text is equivalent to a successful, orderly performance, than the failure of alignment can be construed in terms of theatrical performance gone wrong, and indeed this is explicit at several points. The wayward monkey is actually the second analogy that uses imagery of failed or inadequate performance as a criticism potentially made against the author. The first, which immediately precedes it, picks up imagery from Fisherman 31 and 33:

οἱ μὲν τοῖς τραγικοῖς ὑποκριταῖς <σ’> εἰκάσουσιν, οἱ ἔπι μὲν τῆς σκηνῆς Ἀγαμέμνων ἔκαστος αὐτὸν ἢ Κρέον ἢ αὐτός Ἄρακλῆς εἰσίν, ἔξω δὲ Πῶλος ἢ Ἀριστόδημος ἀποθέμενοι τὰ πρόσωπα γίγνονται ὑπόμυσθοι τραγῳδούντες, ἐκπίπτοντες καὶ συριτόμενοι, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ μαστιγούμενοι τινες αὐτῶν, ὡς ἀν τῷ θεάτρῳ δοκῇ.

logoi (or graphai, “writings”) are described as the “mirror-image” of a man’s life: ὁτι τοιούτοις ἔχθισαν αὐτοὶ βίους, οίας ἐξέδωκαν τὰς γραφὰς: ἐπιεικῶς γὰρ ἅπαντες νομίζουσι εἰκόνας εἶναι τῆς ἐκάστου ψυχῆς τοῦς λόγους. On oratory and body language see also Gleason 1995, Gunderson 2000.\footnote{The combination of seeing and hearing is also operative in the description of the dissemination of Salaried Posts, which is described in chapter 3 prior to those warnings: it was read aloud or performed in a public setting (ἐν πολλῷ πλῆθει δειχθέν) and later circulated privately (ιδίᾳ), presumably as a written text, among other pepaideumenoi who might stand to benefit from it.}
Some will liken [you] to tragic actors who on stage are variously Agamemnon or Kreon, or Herakles himself, but offstage, when they take off their masks, are just your ordinary “Polus” or “Aristodemos” acting for money, being thrown or hissed offstage, sometimes even whipped, at the whim of the audience (5).

Here, the alignment between body and text is compared to alignment between the body and mask of an actor. Successful alignment is like playing a role correctly: if the body measures up to the mask, the performance will succeed; otherwise, the body must be physically and even violently separated from the performance context (ekpiptontes, “thrown off stage”), or somehow marked as faulty and criminal (mastigoumenoi, “whipped”). According to this analogy, Lucian has fallen into the place of the fake philosophers of Fisherman, unable to live up to his role and finding himself a weak and incapable (and in the case of the monkey, bestial) body against a strong, heroic mask – and like those philosophers, as well as the foolish Greeks of Salaried Posts, tempted by money when he throws away the mask. This failure is observed and subsequently policed by the discerning eyes of the audience, who here seems to hold an interpreting/judging position like the agōnothētēs of Fisherman 33. The author’s only hope for escaping a beating is a forgetful audience who might not spot the inconsistency.50

If we press a little on the analogy of mask and body to text and body, however, we find that it starts to bend in new and unsettling directions. In Fisherman 31 and 33, the analogy set up the mask as a stable referent against a fallible body, the latter attempting and failing to live up to the former. This is also what the story of the vulgar actors and that of the dancing monkey seem to presume, and if we take them as analogies of the author’s current situation, the equivalency is clear enough at first glance. The earlier text (Salaried Posts) is like the mask, a stable site of meaning in contrast to the author’s fallible body. In his “un-masking,” author is exposed as a hypocrite, unworthy of his own words. However, the relation between body and text in the Apology is not quite so simple as this analogy would have us believe.

To being with, the author’s alignment issues are not exactly the same as those of the failed actors to whom he is compared, for the body of the author is not just one thing. There is not only a difference between author and text, but a difference between who the author was (or seemed to be) when he wrote Salaried Posts, and who he seems to be now. Mentions of his current occupation and status frequently include a temporal qualifier (nun, paronta) specifying that it is present life that is being referred to.51

50 Whitmarsh 2001: 291-3 has similar observations about the Apology and Fisherman. 51 Martelli 2013 observes that revision for Ovid is a means of temporal self-extension, and that this in itself reveals the extent to which extension over time is necessarily “both a symptom of and condition for the written word, alienating the author irrevocably from herself and multiplying her identities accordingly” (4). In other words, revision allows us to glimpse the author in a different relationship to his or her text at different points in time, and thus allows us to see the author changing over time. The change described at this point in the Apology seems almost to work in reverse: the change to the author allows us to notice the temporal extension of a text.
Moreover, the text is clear about why the past author and the present author are different, for the language used to describe Lucian’s decision, and its consequences, characterizes them explicitly as a change to his lifestyle, status, and body. Although only once directly termed a “change” (metabolē) (6), words with met- prefixes cluster around descriptions of the decision and its aftermath: metapesontos, metepeisan (1), metedoxe (3), periodically reminding us that something has shifted from one state to another. The text further characterizes this change with a negative slant, a “recanting for the worse” (παλινῳδεῖν πρὸς τὸ χείρον) (1), or reversal of fortune, emphasized by a quote from the chorus of Euripides’ Medea. That is, it is a change that results in the author’s abjection or degradation relative to his previous state. In particular, it is imagined as a change from freedom to slavery that has physical consequences for the author’s body. He has let himself be dragged and shackled as if by a gold collar (1), or has willingly placed his neck under a yoke (3), in this new life of bondage.

There is a lot to unpack in the imagery of slavery and physical abjection, but for now I want stress the degree of change to which it points. The author’s body stands in contrast to his earlier text because it has undergone change and become different as a result, and this process of change is significant enough to be imagined in material terms. This is a fine-grained distinction to make, but it is important, I think, because it reveals a limitation in the analogue of mask and body that I have presented up to this point. That is, the implications of a body and mask as two separate entities with their own distinct, and potentially contradictory, meanings, seem to bump awkwardly against the implications of a body undergoing change. Both get their insulting force from the assumption that certain kinds of bodies are necessarily unworthy or unfit relative to others – particularly animal bodies, slave bodies, or bodies otherwise liable to torture or physical humiliation. But in its attempt to emphasize contrast, the metaphor of body and mask relies on the assumption that these classifications are consistent and constitutive, that certain bodies reliably mean certain things. To talk of changing bodies, however, even in terms of degradation, seems to undermine that assumption, because it implies that one kind of body can, in fact, become like another, and so the meaning of any given body is not necessarily stable. If we consider these two different elements of the accusation next to each other, there seems to be tension between the assumptions of contrast, on the one hand, and change, on the other.

I argue that this tension, far from undermining one or the other aspect of the accusation, allows us to begin to reconsider the implications of performance and dissonance as a structuring metaphor in the text. To start this process, let us return to the dancing monkey. This is ostensibly an example of contrasting differences, which highlights the incongruity of the author’s current position through the comic difference between monkey and (normally human) dancer. The monkey’s impulsive grabbing at

52 τὸ ἄνω τοῦς ποταμοὺς χωρεῖν καὶ ἀνεστράφθαι τὰ πάντα (Eur. Med. 410-11).
53 Beard 2014: 164 notes that the Romans seem to have found monkeys particularly funny, and the humor seems to lie in their imitative nature relative to human beings. There is a persistent ambivalence to this imitation, however, because it points to both similarity and difference. Monkeys are enough like humans to be recognizably mimetic of them, yet different enough for that imitation to be comically “bad.” A similar ambivalence seems to underlie the analogy here; the dancing monkey is at once
the fig mimics the author’s impulsive reach toward material wealth, which is the presumed motive of his employment. Both creatures seek gratification of pleasure but end up with a debased status in the eyes of others, and both are even described as having “waved goodbye” (rather ostentatiously it would seem: μακρὰ χαίρειν) to their previous, acceptable state (3, 5). Viewed in this way, to say of the author “you have been exposed as a monkey by the appearance of this fig” (upy' ischadou tauthsei parafaneisheis pal'egrotheis pithekois on) (6), is to say that he is no better than either the fake philosophers of Fisherman or the hapless intellectuals of Salaried Posts: simply put, a fraud, now exposed. But to read the monkey as the author in this way implies that he was the monkey all along, so to speak, with his true nature covered by the mask. This leaves us without a way to account for the change the body has undergone. I would like to propose a slightly different approach to this analogy that attempts to account for this tension between inherent differences (and their exposure) and difference that emerges through change.

What if, rather than an unmasking of an inner identity that was always incongruous anyway, we think about the monkey’s abandonment of the dance in terms of a change in the performance? To be sure, it is clear that the monkey was always a monkey underneath the mask; no material change occurs to that particular body. But does this necessarily matter for the conditions of the performance as such? As noted above, it does seem like before it saw the fig, the monkey was a perfectly good dancer, adhering to external conventions of the performance. Not only did it follow the rhythm and music, while dancing it was orderly (kosmioi), harmonious (emmeloi), and maintaining proper form (to prepon phulattontai). Even if this was a monkey pretending to be a human, the contrast was not necessarily problematic so long as certain external conditions of order were met. The extent of the incongruity between human and monkey only becomes visible when the performance itself changes, when the monkey acts differently than it did before. We can see the shift to monkey antics as undermining the initial success of the dance; a monkey can never really become human, even if it is good at pretending. This is likely the primary way we are meant to read this analogy. However, it is also possible, I think, to draw a different conclusion: given the right conditions, a monkey could be just as good as a human dancer, and but for the intervention of the fig, perhaps no one would have noticed. The failure of the performance marks a decisive break from its initial success.

From this perspective, what is significant about the dancing monkey is less the laughable contrast between human and monkey in general, and more about the implications of the moment when the monkey reaches for the fig. In that moment, the body of the monkey may not actually change, but the conditions of the performance do, and that shift in the performance changes how an audience will evaluate the monkey in relation to the role he is playing (or failing to). The “failure” of the performance reveals comically un-human and, so long as it dances well, a bit too close to human. On monkeys, imitation, and comedy, see also Connors 2004. Although the audience is not mentioned in this story, the version told in Fisherman 36 includes the detail that a member of the audience was the source of the distracting treat. So the breaking up of the performance is not just a failure of the performer to adhere to its role, but in a sense, also the audience’s refusal to see the performer as anything other
the monkey behind the mask, but it also shows us the extent to which the conditions of
the performance as a whole affect whether a hypothetical audience notices the monkey to
begin with, and how they interpret that body if they do.

Thinking of the dancing monkey in terms of a moment of disruption and change,
as much or more so than the revealing of hypocrisy, offers additional resonance for the
situation it purports to describe. If the author of Apology is the monkey, then what is his
fig? For there must be one, given that it is so emphatically pointed out in the text – he is
exposed as a monkey ἔφη ἰσχυόδος ταυτησι, as if to reference something we can see before
us. The obvious answer is that this fig is the paying position that tempted him and the
material gain that it represents. Except that this, as we have seen, is not what exposes
him, but what changes him from free man to slave, well-respected pepaideumenos to
groveling disgrace. We might even say that it makes him a kind of monkey, with his body
subject to degradation, but that need not imply that he was one already. So, then, what is
the "fig" that makes his hypocrisy visible, that exposes him as a monkey? Perhaps that
would instead need to be his text (Salaried Posts), in the sense that the juxtaposition of
author and text is what makes the misalignment between them visible. The visibility of
the text disrupts the orderly “performance” of the author in his new job; or perhaps the
other way around, since visibility of the author in this state disrupts the “performance” of
the text for its audiences. Neither way of reading the analogy exactly fits
the situation, but perhaps that is the point. Read back against its referent situation, the dancing monkey
analogy seems to be trying to have it both ways, employing difference for insulting
effect, while inadvertently revealing that change might, in fact, be a part of how that
difference comes about in the first place.

The unresolved tensions of the monkey story suggest that we might need to
rethink the initial framing of the function of performance in Apology. “Failed”
performance as misalignment is a useful metaphor for a charge of hypocrisy, but it seems
to be only part of how this metaphor functions in context. It also matters how we
conceptualize the “failure” itself. The text shows us not only the dissonance of difference
or contrast, but also the disruption; the moment when the song goes out of tune, as it
were. At least in this example, the relationship between the body and the mask it wears,
or the role it plays, is not just a matter of reading one against the other to notice where
they fail to match, with the assumption that one is a stable site of meaning. Rather, the
moment of failure prompts us to think more critically about what it is that creates
alignment in the first place. Perhaps the conditions of the performance itself affect what
the body means in a particular context. Perhaps performance is an inherently dynamic
situation, where meaning is created and sometimes shifted depending on the relation
between different elements. If this is so, perhaps we should not think of performance as
only and necessarily figuring deception or hypocrisy, even if it can represent those things.

than a monkey. It is their interpretation, as much as the monkeys’ actions, that disrupts
the original terms of the performance – specifically, that changes the performance from
one form (a dance) to another (monkey antics). In that version, then, the audience
emerges as a significant force that can shape the meaning of a performance.

A fig is also one of the items used by Parrhesiades as “bait” to lure in false
philosophers in Fisherman (40).
It may also be a place where we can think about how different circumstances might shape bodies and the ways in which it is possible to view and interpret them.

To conceptualize performance as a site of change, we need first to return to the changing bodies and texts that are discussed in the first few chapters of *Apology* and consider their significance more carefully. It was noted above that the author’s career change is compared to enslavement, with frequent mention of the physical constraints this status has placed upon the author’s body. He has let himself be dragged and shackled as if by a gold collar (παρέχει ἑαυτὸν Ἐλκέσθαι καὶ σύρεσθαι καθάπερ ὑπὸ κλοιῷ τιν χρυσῷ τὸν αὐχένα δεθέντα) (1), or willingly placed his neck under a yoke (ἐκόντα ὑποτιθέντα τὸν αὐχένα τῷ ζυγῷ) (3). This imagery parallels the virtual enslavement of the hapless Greeks in *Salaried Posts*, as well as the fake philosophers in *Fisherman*, who end up physically dragged on the end of Parrhesiades’ fishing line. Clearly, this shared imagery is meant to put the author in the place of those he himself has previously criticized. But it is interesting that the language used here also echoes the description of the personified False Philosophy in *Fisherman* 12, who wears gold necklaces as thick as a collar (κλοιῷ) and has her disciples dragged around (ἐλκέσθαι) by their beards. In that context, this imagery links physical control of bodies to control of meaning via interpretative reading. Seduction through adornment and the promise of wealth, with some rougher physical force if necessary, is part of False Philosophy’s attempt to control the interpretation of her body and the (false) philosophical profession it represented. In *Fisherman*, the Lucianic mouthpiece Parrhesiades resists the pull of that seduction, and his critical, resistant reading of False Philosophy is the first of several authoritative uses of bodies that eventually establish him in the role of interpreter. If the author is now subject to physical constraints that are similar to the ones he once claimed to have resisted and overcome, it suggests that he is no longer in that role. Instead, he is the one subject to interpretation alongside his text, and to all the ensuing consequences.

The change the author has undergone, therefore, is not only a matter of becoming an abject body unworthy of his text, but also, crucially, about losing control over the interpretation of his own text. There is further evidence to characterize the change in this way. In chapter 3, the author is compared to Bellerophon: εὔχου δὲ Ἐρμῆ τῷ χθόνιῳ καὶ τῶν ἀκμίστων πρότερον πολλὴν λήθην κατασκεύασαι, ἢ δόξεις τὸν τοῦ Κορινθίου μιθῶν τι πεπονθέναι, κατὰ σαυτὸῦ ὁ Βελλεροφόντης γεγραφὼς τὸ βιβλίον (pray to chthonian Hermes that those who did hear it will be struck by forgetfulness, or you will seem to have suffered something like the story of the Corinthian, a Bellerophon who has written a text *[biblion]* against yourself) (3). This is a curious analogy. The comparison fits to the extent that Bellerophon, as his story is told in the *Iliad*, is also endangered by the existence of a text, that is, the tablet that contains the orders to have him killed, written in mysterious symbols. But Bellerophon is not (as Lucian seems to imply) the author of this text, nor is he even a reader of it; the very premise of the story is that he does not know what the tablet contains and thus has no control over the impact of the words. So how does this comparison make any sense? Perhaps we need to look at it in terms of a different kind of relationship between text and body. Bellerophon does not write a *biblion*

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56 See Whitmarsh 2001: 291-3 for more examples of specific echoes between *Apology* and *Salaried Posts*.
57 *Il.* 6.152-211.
against himself, but he does carry it with him, unwittingly fulfilling its purpose; his body is physically proximate to the tablet, and it is by virtue of this proximity that he is endangered. Bellerophon thus appears as a figure who is, paradoxically, physically close to a text but impossibly distant from control over its meaning or interpretation. If the author is Bellerophon in this analogy, this suggests a situation in which he has lost control over the meaning of his own text, yet is still closely associated enough with it that someone else's reading of it can have harmful consequences for him. The text becomes a strange appendage to the body, something that can affect or influence the author, while the author seems unable to influence his own text, or even to intervene between the text and any possible readings of it.

The implications of Bellerophon and his tablet suggest that the relationship among author, text, and audience is not a straight line that runs from one to the other in a defined order, but a dynamic and shifting interaction among the many parts involved. Not only has the author's body changed relative to his text, and changed relative to what it might have been at some other time, but that very text, or some interpretation of it, might have contributed to this change. The text can turn against the author even though he is the one who produced it; once his written words circulate in the world, he may not have control over how they are read and interpreted, yet he cannot (or will not?) successfully distance himself from them. The process of writing and circulating a text becomes a kind of persistently embodied, yet simultaneously alienating, experience; words that have ostensibly been given a separate and detachable existence from their source through writing (as opposed to the immediacy of speaking) still remained linked as if by an invisible thread.\(^{58}\) The comparison with Bellerophon thus makes ambiguous the author’s agency in the change to his status and body, although elsewhere described as “willing” (and all the more despicable for that). If the text itself is somehow responsible for turning against the author, is this process really as voluntary as the accusation portrays it? Or is it perhaps an inevitable risk of producing a text that an audience will interpret it in a different way than the author intends? The ambiguities this comparison raises suggest that the image of the abject body, like that of the body in performance, might serve multiple and not necessarily cohesive purposes in the text.

To take a step back and untangle the threads I have been following through the text thus far: the accusation against Lucian in the first seven chapters of his Apology is essentially that he is a hypocrite and a fraud because he fails to align with a text he has produced. The metaphors used to characterize this mismatch and hypocrisy, however, seems to bend and waver when careful scrutiny is applied. One strand I have identified is the figuring of the public presentation and/or circulation of a text in terms of other kinds

\(^{58}\) This formation of author and text is an interesting complication of the performance metaphor, which makes no distinction between speaking and written text; or more precisely, it effectively re-imagines both writing and speaking as visual and oral display. It also seems to invoke Derrida’s conception of language, both written and spoken, in terms of alienation from its source and the alterity of each successive utterance (Derrida 1988). What complicates fitting this imagined scenario into a Derridean framework is, first, the insistence upon loss of control, which seems to presume a prior control over the utterance; and, second, the effect that the text continues to have back upon its author. See also n.68.
of performance (drama, dance, music); this emphasizes that the author’s body and his words are both on display, open to interpretation by audiences. In order to describe the mismatch of author and text, the accusation employs moments of failed or disrupted performance, where bodies do not properly fit with the masks they wear. Alongside this, the situation is also framed in terms of change that the author’s body (or other bodies) undergoes, particularly change in the form of abjection and exposure to physical harm. Both metaphorical threads intersect around the meanings assigned to bodies: to pretend to have a different body than one does, to try to hide behind a mask, is an indication of hypocrisy; so too, to be rendered a certain kind of body undermines one’s authenticity and authority. Yet when I have tried to think through the full implications of these metaphors, especially to the degree that they do or do not work together, the insults sometimes seem to falter. Body and mask are not always stable points to be read against one another, but instead dynamic parts that can shift in meaning when a performance is disrupted and changed. Change to the body can be a form of degradation, but also a loss of control that complicates assumptions about where authority lies in the relation between author and text. The threads, as such, seem to be left dangling. In the second part of this chapter, I will explore how the text takes these same threads and finds ways of responding to, if not necessarily defending or resolving, the questions that they raise. This too will require a gradual unpacking of the text in an effort to see beyond its surface.

II. Disruption

Having extensively imagined what accusations might be levied against him, the author of the Apology finally offers this justification for his employment: essentially, that it has nothing to do with the type of exploitation he discussed in Salaried Posts, because his current situation is completely different (τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα παμπόλλην ἔχει τὴν διαφωνίαν) (11). He may be working for hire, he concedes, but in an administrative position that affords him considerable authority and respect (12); moreover, getting paid to do a job is not in itself disreputable, but fully in line with how both politics (13) and even sophistic rhetoric (14) properly work. Aside from whether or not we find this explanation entirely convincing, it seems logically out of step with much of what is raised in the accusation. To put it bluntly, if the problem really is “completely different,” why not just say so in the first place?

In answer to this question, I would like to suggest that perhaps “completely different” (παμπόλλην ... τὴν διαφωνίαν) is not all that it appears to be on the surface. I began with the premise that the positioning of the Apology as a response had more to do with ongoing revision than with justification. Rather than approaching the author’s defense with the aim of identifying a logically cohesive answer to the accusation, let us take it as a moment to pause, double back, and reconsider. The word that I translated as “different” in the phrase above is one we have seen before: diaphōnia (which most literally has the sense of “dissonance”), the same word that was used in the accusation to describe the misalignment of author and text and the “falling out of tune” involved in his change and exposure. Backing up a little, the context of the re-appearance of this word may also seem familiar:

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You will find that, as they say in music, the matter is an octave apart \([\text{dis dia pasōn}]\), and the lifestyles as are similar to each other as lead is to silver, bronze to gold, a poppy to a rose, and a monkey to a human. There is pay, both in that case and in this one, and being under another orders, but the situation is entirely different (11).

Curiously, comparisons that were central to the accusation seem to resurface here as ready examples of defense. Not only does the narrator use \textit{diaphonia} to indicate contrast, he underlies his point with examples of the contrasting difference in bodies and other material forms, notably human and monkey (\(\text{ἀνθρώπος πίθηκος}\)), and difference in musical pitch (\(\text{δίς διά πασῶν}\)). I want to take this re-use of metaphors as an opportunity to re-read and reconsider a part of the text, a movement that will in turn complicate our assumptions about what these metaphors signify.

The music reference, in particular, bears closely scrutiny. The phrase \textit{dis dia pasōn} seems like it should be connected to \textit{diaphonia}, since both are examples of auditory phenomena, and clearly it is meant here to denote a difference between the two modes of employment. As a technical musical term, however, \textit{dis dia pasōn} usually refers to the interval of an octave, like strings at opposite ends of a lyre.\(^{60}\) In both ancient and modern musical discourse, an octave is a \textit{consonant} interval, not a dissonant one (an example of \textit{sumphonia} not \textit{diaphonia}) because it consists of the same musical notes in different registers.\(^{61}\) If he means \textit{dis dia pasōn} to describe difference in the same way as \textit{diaphonia}, Lucian seems to be using to the term incorrectly – or else he is playing a little with words.\(^{62}\) Perhaps we should follow his lead. My initial suggestion, prompted both by the placement of \textit{dis dia pasōn} at the beginning of a list of contrasting items, and by its phonetic similarity to \textit{diaphonia}, was to collapse the former term into the latter. But what kind of difference is an octave, actually? The phrase suggests both doubling (\textit{dis}) and separation (\textit{dia} = through). The pitches on either end of the octave are only different insofar as they are at a distance from one another, and though separate, still exist in measurable relationship – a doubling, in this case. Thus, this phrase could be used to

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\(^{60}\) For ancient definition of \textit{dis dia pasōn} as the octave, see Arist. \textit{Prob.} 19.32.

\(^{61}\) See Arist. \textit{Prob.} 19.34-35a and 41: the doubled octave (\textit{dis dia pasōn}) is consonant (\textit{sumphōnei}), and is in fact the most beautiful concord (\textit{kallistē sumphōnia}).

\(^{62}\) My suggestion that Lucian is playing with words is admittedly speculative. I would note, however, that while Lucian uses this same phrase several times in to describe difference (\textit{Ignorant Book Collector 21, How to Write History 7, You Are a Prometheus in Words 6}), as though it were an easily recognizable convention, it otherwise seems to be uncommon outside of technical usages in musical or philosophical treatises. So Lucian might well have been at liberty to bend its meaning when writing in a satirical context.
denote difference, but a particular kind of difference: a measurable separation as opposed to a random, jarring contrast.

Instead of reading *dis dia pasōn* in terms of *diaphōnia*, perhaps we can instead use it to rethink *diaphōnia*, and specifically the *diaphōnia* in performance that was a key metaphorical image for the accusations against the author. Its derivation also implies a motion of separation (*dia*), perhaps even a kind of cleaving into parts, as opposed to the drawing together or unity of *sumphōnia*. Might we thus not also think of it as potentially describing a kind of difference based on separation and the relation between two parts, as well as contrast more generally? For this word, even more so than *dia pasōn*, there is a sense of the separation between two formerly (or potentially) unified parts. *Diaphōnia* thus might also signify a kind of breaking apart, a disruption, as a point at which that separation occurs. All of this might, admittedly, be pushing the limits of semantics. But I would point out that a dual connotation of *diaphōnia/dissonance* as contrast, on the one hand, and disruption, on the other, already surfaced in my reading of the dancing monkey analogy. There I argued that the “failure” of the dance performance marked both a moment of exposure of contrasting differences, and also, from another angle, the creation of incongruity among elements of the performance that were previously in orderly alignment: a moment of disruption as well as the exposure of contrast. And given that the dancing monkey and the fig are an analogy for the author and his predicament, this concept of *diaphōnia* as contrast, on the one hand, and disruption, on the other, is thus central to the problem that the *Apology* presents itself as having to confront and defend.

I argue that we can extend this dual connotation of dissonance/difference to conceptualize how the *Apology* responds to the accusations it has raised against its author. The text represents itself as having been necessitated by an experience of disruption and change, specifically, the change of the author relative to his earlier text and concurrent loss of control over the interpretation of that text. To the extent that it responds to this predicament, it can only do so from the other side of that disruption, from a changed position. When it raises claims that seem contradictory to those made elsewhere either in the same text or another one, we can think about this contradiction as a deliberate attempt to reconsider or reframe something from the different perspective of a changed position.⁶³ The text enacts both the need for and the process of its own

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⁶³ The basic idea of a text responding with alternative possibilities is already suggested, to some extent, by the premise of the *Apology* as a response piece to *Salaried Posts*. As Whitmarsh 2001 has observed of this and other defensively positioned texts in Lucian’s corpus, “by evoking the agonistic, antiphonal structure of the law courts, Lucian introduces a contrapuntal, dissonant voice that challenges the narratorial persona of the initial piece; and, at the same time, he encourages his audience to take a more active role in judging the case, in assessing the validity of his position” (292). What seems “dissonant,” that is, contradictory, in the relations among Lucian’s texts might be reframed as a deliberate “contrapuntal” response, a chance for Lucian to talk back to his earlier text and prompt his audiences to do so as well. Whitmarsh’s brief discussion of the *Apology* makes no reference to *diaphōnia* or similar terms, so his choice of the words “antiphonal,” “contrapuntal,” and “dissonant” may be a coincidence, but my use of them is not, for this language seems to get at something fundamental to the structure of the text. Where I differ from the premise laid out in his observation is, first, in viewing this
revision, and each part of this can only be fully understood in reference to the other. We might go so far as to say that in the act of separation, of breaking apart, there is room for a new perspective to emerge; a perspective that, far from being in contrast to existing assumptions, does not even properly make sense under them, but require a break of existing “sense” to become intelligible in the first place.

III. Change

There are two ways that I see the Apology use this strategy of internal response to reframe (or continue to reframe) its own assumptions and claims. Both pick up the threads that I identified in the first half of this chapter: the use of bodies in performance as a metaphor for author and text, and subsequently, and the implications of bodies that have undergone change.

I begin with the first of these. In my discussion of the dancing monkey and its performance failure, I raised the possibility that we might think of performance as a place where the meaning of bodies is generated, not just hidden or revealed. There is stronger evidence for seeing performance in this way, which emerges not in the later, “defense” sections of the Apology, but hidden in the twists and turns of the narrative voice that structure the first few chapters that are still part of the accusation. I noted briefly the conceit by which Lucian “speaks” as and through his addressee Sabinus, both directly and indirectly at different points in the text. This shifting is also aptly framed in terms of performance: Lucian describes “speaking” in Sabinus’ voice as “wearing his mask” (ὑποδός τό σόν πρόσωπον) (2). We might even be tempted to identify this narrator shifting as one of the ways in which the Apology employs an internal “dissonant” response to itself, by allowing divergent voices to “speak” in a manner transparently set up as literary device.

However, what happens at this moment in the text is not quite as simple as an exchange of masks and personas, and to take them as such is to miss the full implications of the metaphor. Looking at the context of the “mask” remark, we notice the following:

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64 In this possibility, diaphonia resembles Rancière’s conception of “dissensus.” For Rancière, aesthetics is concerned with what can and cannot be represented, what is intelligible or even visible and what is not – what he terms the “distribution of the sensible.” Dissensus involves the breaking apart of established distributions of the sensible, allowing for the emergence of representations that were un-representable within the previous order. See Rancière 2006.

65 My reading here departs from the analysis of performance and theatrical metaphors in Lucian discussed by Whitmarsh 2001, Andrade 2013 and Andrade and Rush 2016 (see the Introduction to this dissertation), which view performance primarily as a problem of mimesis and the conflation of imitation and “original.” This approach to performance seems to me to fuse mask and body, so that everything becomes a performance, and there is no getting to the “reality” behind it. But the breaking apart of mask and body is central to the metaphor here, and it seems to me that its implications must follow from that point.

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If, putting on your mask, I answer worthily, then it will be well for me and we will sacrifice to Logios. But if not, then you will add what is lacking. It is time now that we change the scene, with me remaining silent and submitting to being cut for my well-being, while you sprinkle the drugs and at the same time hold ready the knife and the red-hot cauterizing iron. And taking up the speech you, now, as Sabinus, say these things to me (2).

What at first seems to be a playful exchange of one mask for another turns out to entail something more drastic. In the moment of “changing the scene” (μετασκευάσαντας ἡμᾶς τὴν σκηνὴν), in which we might expect a change of external trappings like masks and costumes, the text turns our attention towards the author’s body and what will be inflicted on it. He must silently submit to being cut (τεμνόμενον), medicated (ἐπιπάττειν τῶν φαρμάκων), and cauterized (τὸ καυτήριον διάπυρον) at the hands of his addressee as the latter takes up the narrative “mask.” These are no surface-level changes, but ones intended to leave permanent alterations on the body.66 The shift from one speaker to another thus seems to involve not a mere playful switching of masks, but a radical and perhaps irreversible change to the body underneath.

This change of theatrical scene is thus revealed to be a moment of disruption and change even more forceful than the monkey tearing off its mask and running for the fig. Neither visible surface nor hidden interior seem to be stable in this context, for it is not that the mask changes and the body stays the same, or that the body changes while the mask is stable; rather, it seems like both body and mask can change, and that each has the potential to change the other. The disruption in this moment is marked not, as with the dancing monkey, by the tearing of the mask from the body (which changes the way that the body is perceived, but sidesteps whether or not it has actually undergone change), but by the literal cutting (τεμνόμενον) of the body itself. The act of cutting seems in particular to underscore a kind of separation; it is almost as if the body itself is being split from its former state, and becoming a different, separate body through this transformative process. The physicality of this gesture seems to forestall any possibility of reversal or reunification through the mere taking up of another mask. Once cut, the body will never be quite the same as it was before. In the turn from mask to mutilated body, change and theatricality literally converge: a change in performance becomes not only a change in the alignment of the body with other elements of the performance, but a transformation of the body itself.

66 The fake philosophers in Fisherman are also threatened with branding, but with the aim of leaving a physical mark (the brand of a fox or monkey) that will distinguish them from genuine philosophers.
It is this convergence of exchanged masks and irreversibly altered body, I think, that makes this scene significant, because it opens up a space to reconsider the metaphorical implications of performance. It suggests that we might think of performance not only as a game of imitation at which an individual performer can succeed or fail at living up to his mask, because it is the active interaction of body and mask, performer and audience, that generates possible meanings for the performance. It seem interesting that the text here never fully lets go of the image of the mask, but instead slides from it into an additional image that allows the change being described to take on an additional resonance. On the one hand, by directly implicating the body, the text prompts us to view performance as more consequential, insofar as it is capable of representing a physical, decisive change, as opposed to a situation where any mask is as good as the next one. On the other hand, it still retains something of the versatile potential of performance, its capacity to expand the possibilities of an individual body. When we try to hold these perspectives together, a new possibility seems to emerge: what if we thought of shifting from one mask to another not as a sign of deceptive, superficial slipperiness, but as a necessary adaptive strategy? What if the capacity to speak from a different perspective is a reasonable response to the reality that, sometimes, circumstances change? The Apology does not, I think, necessarily define here what that kind of adaptation might look like from a productive, rather than a reactionary, standpoint; it simply prompts us to consider the possibility.

This reconsideration of the possible implications of the mask is complemented, in the same scene, by a reconsideration of the body in its exposed and mutilated state. The change to the author’s body imagined in this changing of scenes is like the other images of physical change we have examined thus far, in that it also involves a loss of control over the body in question, and its exposure to physical influences upon from outside forces. However, there is something slightly different about the imagery here, for the treatments applied to the body here seem to promise to absolve the author of his failure rather than further degrading him: he is to be cut ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, for his well-being, and both the application of drugs and the cauterizing iron seem to connotation healing measure rather than punishment. Paradoxically, the same fate that elsewhere in the accusation has a negative connotation – the loss of control and subjection of the body to the intervention of others – here surfaces tentatively as a way out of the predicament. The author may be in trouble because of the change to his body, yet it seems here that only by ceding control and silently submitting to further change does he have any hope of defense.

The paradox deepens when we observe that images of abjection and vulnerability also feature in several potential excuses that the author proposes and discards at the beginning of the defense half of the text (8-10). None are examples of actual shackling and servitude, as appeared in the accusation, but they are not far off: the author could claim, he concedes, that his choice was due to fortune, fate, and happenstance, forces from which no one escapes (8). Or he could point to the grievousness of old age, illness, and above all, poverty (ὀδύρεσθαι τὸ γῆρας καὶ τὴν νόσον καὶ μετά τούτων τὴν πενίαν) (10) as legitimate reasons for seeking employment, no matter how questionable. Although these images of bodily vulnerability and fallibility are ultimately dismissed as unsuitable excuses for this particular defense, their plausibility is never denied outright. Risk of harm to the body, it seems, is at once a (metaphorical) consequence of the
author’s career change, and a possible reason that he would willingly embark on the path to that change, and somehow also a possible method of coping with this predicament (if we view the medical treatments in chapter 2 to that effect).

This persistent return to the author’s vulnerable body seems to raise the possibility that vulnerability and loss of control might be inherent risks of embodiment, rather than incidental weaknesses. Even if only momentarily, we are allowed here to glimpse the author’s body as an entity that, far from being self-contained and fully in control of his circumstances, is embedded within a larger framework of sustaining relations. Should he lose access to money, or good health, or some other temporary support, he might be left vulnerable and exposed, in need of the help of others. This perspective on the inherent risk of vulnerability does not necessarily lead to the reevaluation of bodily abjection, slavery, and physical harm as such, but it does reframe them as potentially universal risks, rather than conditions that can be securely fended off. Indeed, it seems as if it is only by acknowledging these as potentially universal risks, as opposed to particular, individual failings, that the author has any hope of defense.

What matters most for the author, however, as we have clearly seen, is not so much defense as reconsideration and response. I would like to take the suggestion that vulnerability is an inherent feature of bodies and bring it back to the Apology’s construction of the relation between bodies and text, where it will offer one final piece of how the text reconsiders and reframes the possibilities and limitations of interpretive control. Let us recall that the vulnerability of the author’s body is construed through the vulnerability of his texts to interpretation and changes in meaning. We saw this played out in the parts of the accusation that dealt with the change in the author’s body relative to his text and the accompanying loss of control over that text, exemplified by the comparison with Bellerophon and his tablet. The implication that the author might be a Bellerophon suggested that the relation of author and text was that of an appendage or prosthesis to the body, physically proximate but not fully within the body’s control. This lack of control left the body vulnerable to harm through the (mis)interpretation of his text by others, since it was unable to either fully separate from the text or prevent another’s access to it. In this peculiar nexus of body and text, it is not quite accurate to say that a body is a text and vice versa; rather, the production of a text is a persistently embodied process, insofar as it continues to implicate the body that has produced it, while the text itself is like a part of the body but never fully coextensive or integrated with it.

This interrelatedness of text and body seems to pick up on a model of embodiment centered on the embedded and interconnected nature of bodies, and the inherent vulnerability that it describes. That is, just as a body in that framework is never

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67 My conception of vulnerability and embedded-ness is influenced by writings of Judith Butler that emphasize vulnerability as an inherent and constitutive condition of embodiment itself; it is something we need to understand in order to understand what we mean when talk about a “body.” In Butler’s framework, bodies are vulnerable because they are not separable from the conditions that sustain them; they require external support in order to live, to exist as subjects in the world. A body is therefore never just a body in isolation, but always in reference to the conditions in which it is embedded. It is often only at moments of loss that the full extent of one’s embedded-ness and vulnerability may be perceived. See especially Butler 2003 and 2015.
completely on its own, but connected to the other bodies and material conditions by which it is supported and sustained, so too a text is not just a self-contained entity, but connected to it author, its readers, and to other texts. In the world that the Apology imagines, each one of those interconnected parts seems to have the capacity to influence the others, not just the author who originated the words. This suggests that complete and secure control of the interpretation of a text is inherently impossible, which makes the production and dissemination of a text an inevitably risky endeavor. Or to put it another way, it suggests that Bellerophon, far from being an anomaly, may in fact represent a logical extension of how texts work.

These re-evaluations of mask and body, separately and together, resist any final attempts to tie them up neatly and satisfactorily. The suggestion that vulnerability is an inherent risk of textual production (or simply of language utterance in the first place) is answered imperfectly by the suggestion that the change involved in performance might offer the author a new place from which to speak. What both do seem to offer, if also incompletely and provisionally, is space to re-evaluate and expand upon Lucian’s strategies of literary self-presentation.

I have argued that Lucian’s Fisherman presents a picture of textual production and reception where authors and readers were in constant struggle for control over interpretation. It uses bodies as a metaphor for and alongside texts, moving the processes of reading and writing into a fantasy world where the author, what he writes about, and who he writes for, all seem to exist on the same embodied level. The author’s goal within such a playing field seem first and foremost to be establishing control over the meaning of his text, and the other texts or “bodies” to which that text might related. Interpretive control is thus concretized through comparison with the physical control of bodies. The Apology is playing a similar game, but takes it in a different direction. It starts from a point where control of interpretation has been upended, and author and text have become alienated from one another. According to the parameters of textual interpretation that Fisherman leaves us, this sort of situation is problematic; it threatens the security of the author’s body as well as the secure interpretation of his words. The Apology does not deny that these are problems, and indeed spends much of the text exploring in some detail what these problems entail, finding numerous ways to imagine what it looks like to charge the author with hypocrisy and fraud.

In its descriptions of shackled bodies and dancing monkeys, however, the text also begins to reconsider and revise these assumptions about the meaning of that loss of interpretive control. It seems to take seriously the implication that what transpired between the author and his earlier text represents an irrevocable change in their relation to one another and their meanings. From the other side of this disruption, it appears that

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68 This again suggests a Derridean alterity and alienation. Martelli 2013: 6-7 observes that the act of revision itself alienates writers/speakers from their (earlier) selves and distances them from their “original” intentions regarding a give utterance or piece of writing, even before that utterance is subject to another’s interpretation. Revision thus reveals the impossibility of locating an author’s “original,” singular intention as expressed in a given piece of writing. We can similarly see the reevaluation of the author’s loss of control over his text as the subsuming of authorial intentions within the interconnectedness of author, text, and readers.
no author may ever be fully in control of their own words, and that many different forces, including potential readers, can shape the meaning of a text at any given point in time. We return again to the peculiarly leveled, embodied playing field imagined in *Fisherman*, where texts “literally” interact with and affect their authors, readers, and other texts. This time, however, there is no authoritative interpreter to police the more unruly bodies involved. Yet in this same space there is the suggestion, however tentative, that this lack of control might itself be productive. Without the limitations of interpretive control, the possibilities for meaning may be continually expanded, as assumptions are reconsidered, and earlier claims revised.
Chapter 3

Near the end of Lucian’s On Dancing, there is an anecdote of a performance gone horribly wrong. There was once, the story goes, a pantomime dancer who seemed to go mad himself while performing the madness of Ajax: he tore the clothes from the musician beating out the time, and snatching an aulos from another musician, struck the dancer playing Odysseus on the head, nearly killing him. A portion of the audience reacted to this breach of etiquette by going crazy along with the dancer, jumping up, shouting, and tearing off their clothes (On Dancing 83-85).

This peculiar incident is made more puzzling by where it falls in Lucian’s dialogue. The premise of On Dancing is a debate between two speakers, Kraton and Lycinus, over whether or not pantomime dance is an acceptable form of entertainment for elite, educated Greek men. At the beginning of the dialogue, Kraton is aghast when he hears that his friend is a regular attendee at pantomime shows and reproaches him for engaging in such a degrading form of entertainment. In response, Lycinus spends most of the remaining dialogue extolling the virtues of pantomime, in an ultimately successful attempt to change his interlocutor’s opinion. Lucian’s text is notable in this regard as one of the few positive literary sources on pantomime dance. Nonetheless, his speech (and the dialogue) concludes with the anecdote of the dance disaster just described. I propose that we can parse the significance of this story without necessarily having to assign a singular attitude toward pantomime to the text or its author. Instead, I argue that this episode is significant for what it suggests about bodies in performance, and that we can better understand how it fits into the text by examining how On Dancing represents bodies in its depiction of pantomime.

My choice to approach the text in this way is grounded in part by current assessment of the ambivalent cultural and social position of pantomime in the second century. Widely popular in many parts of the Roman Empire from the Augustan period onward, pantomime featured a solo, masked dancer, or occasionally several dancers, whose performance enacted a story or scene. The dancer was accompanied by music and some kind of recitation narrating the story, although none of these libretti survive and they seem to have been auxiliary to the action of the dance. References to pantomimus appear in the Latin epigraphic record by the 80s BCE; most Greek literary and epigraphy sources that reference pantomime speak simply of orchēsis (dance) and the orchētēs muthōn (dancer of stories), a pattern that On Dancing follows. According to some traditions, pantomime was introduced to Rome by two famous eastern dancers, Bathyllus

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69 One traditional explanation for this pro-pantomime position is flattery of the emperor Lucius Verus. Jones 1989 and Swain 1996 suggest that On Dancing could have been composed in Antioch, at or in some association with the court of Lucius Verus, when the co-emperor took up residence there during the Parthian Wars.

70 On pantomime libretti, see Jory 2008. On Dancing mentions narration briefly in chapter 29 but otherwise focuses primarily on the dancer’s body.

71 See Jory 1981 and Hall 2008: 11. There is one reference to pantomimos in On Dancing (67), as “what the Italians call orchēsis.”
of Alexandria and Pylades of Cilicia.\textsuperscript{72} As a genre, it shares affiliation both with representational dances described in the Greek tradition (the “Theseus and Ariadne” dance at the end Xenophon’s \textit{Symposium} in particular)\textsuperscript{73} and with Roman mime and farce.\textsuperscript{74} It borrowed subject matter from Greek tragedy yet seem to have reached wider audiences, including those in lower classes, while still enjoying popularity among the elite. Pantomime was thus a form of performance that straddled the categories of Greek and Roman, popular and elite, blending elements from performance forms that preceded or coexisted with it. It was therefore perhaps already “good to think with,” as Ismene Lada-Richards puts it, by the time Lucian turned his attention to the topic.\textsuperscript{75}

My aim in this chapter, however, is not to reconstruct some piece of the historical reality of ancient pantomime, nor even necessarily to identify ancient attitudes surrounding it, as Lada-Richards and others have done. Instead, I want to take seriously the suggestion that pantomime is “good to think with” in terms of the text itself. I propose that the ways \textit{On Dancing} represents pantomime in all of its complexities are also ways of thinking about bodies, and what bodies can mean and do in situations of performance. This emerges in the text through the following inter-connected themes: the interpretation of performing bodies, control of bodies in performance, and performance as a site of bodily transformation.

If the events of \textit{On Dancing} 83-5 illustrate an example of pantomime gone wrong, then it makes sense to first establish how the text characterizes pantomime in its usual or correct form. In this regard, as I have noted, the text is divided between the anti- and pro-pantomime positions of its two speakers, who offer two very different visions of what the ideal form of pantomime looked like, and in particular, two very different opinions on its appropriateness as a form of elite entertainment. Both positions nonetheless base their evaluations of pantomime largely upon two inter-related elements: the evaluation of the pantomime dancer’s body, and the effect of pantomime viewing upon the body of the spectator. On one side, Kraton depicts pantomime as a performance space full of unruly and improperly controlled bodies, which simultaneously has the power to ensnare and control its spectators, making it not only inappropriate but also potentially dangerous. Lycinus, in contrast, paints the dancer as a paradigm of order and virtue, whose rhythmic control over his own body allows him to embody all the knowledge of Greek \textit{paideia} and communicate it to audiences, thereby allowing them to absorb the same virtue and knowledge. Both positions thus approach the dancer’s body as a meaningful object that can be “read” and interpreted in some way, both in the sense that the dancer’s gestures and movements communicate stories and ideas, and because certain moral valences and cultural positions are attached to the dancer’s body by virtue of how it moves and comports itself. Moreover, the claim that each side makes is centrally concerned with the

\textsuperscript{72} Athenaeus, \textit{Deipn.} 1.20d-e (see Hall 2008). These details do not appear in \textit{On Dancing}, which offers its own putative genealogy of pantomime as a descendent of \textit{orchēsis} and \textit{mousikē} more universally construed.

\textsuperscript{73} The Theseus and Ariadne dance mentioned in Xen. \textit{Symp.} 9.3-7 is frequently cited as a precedent in the Greek tradition. See Wohl 2004 for a discussion of this text.

\textsuperscript{74} In many later sources it is often difficult to delineate between “mime” and “pantomime.” See Wiseman in Hall and Wyles 2008.

\textsuperscript{75} Lada-Richards 2008: 285 and ff.
control of the bodies involved in pantomime: how they fit, or fail to fit, within a system of structuring order, and whether pantomime inherently facilitates such regulation or upends it. Control of bodies in performance is thus intertwined with their interpretation.

Both positive and negative characterizations of pantomime On Dancing are likewise concerned with transformation. In different ways, they each imagine pantomime as a space in which bodies can transform with varying degrees of literalness and ensuing material consequences. Kraton’s dangerously seductive, ensnaring pantomime seems to pose a risk of degrading transformation for any spectator foolish enough to be ensnared – so much so, as to suggest that pantomime poses a threat to the very notion of a body as stable and securely bounded object. For Lycinus, transformation emerges primarily as a virtue of mimetic representation: the key to the pantomime dancer’s virtuoso performance is his or her ability to “transform” into representations of many other bodies. Even so, this potential for transformation exists in tension with, and ultimately disrupts, many of the text’s claims about interpretation and control.

In the first section of this chapter, I examine the two opposing characterizations of the bodies involved in pantomime in terms of control, interpretation, and transformation. I show how the fear of pantomime as a kind of bodily disintegration is countered by competing claims of pantomime as the embodiment of order and an ideal vehicle of mimesis. The second section focuses on this second, positive characterization of pantomime, and considers more carefully how Lycinus invites readers of the text to interpret the dancer’s body. I suggest here that some of his claims about interpretation and control are complicated by the role that an audience can potentially play in a performance. Fluidity of the body, and even the porousness of boundaries between bodies, remains as underlying tension with claims about control. In the third section, I return to the story of the mad Ajax dancer, and examine how aspects of this episode speak to both opposing characterizations of pantomime, as well as to the limits of interpretation and control as both speakers have invoked them. I argue that the representation of bodies, control and transformation in On Dancing suggests a model of performance that centers the inter-relation of performer and spectator, in which the interpretation or evaluation of a performance cannot be separated from an embodied response to the viewing of it.

I. Transformation of Bodies
A. Pantomime as Bodily Disintegration

Kraton’s opposition to pantomime rests largely on a judgment of the bodies involved. He objects to pantomime because of the kinds of bodies its performers display, namely, bodies that are inappropriately effeminate, lustful, and generally inimical to freeborn, elite, educated men, like Lycinus and himself. In related terms, he objects to the intense corporeal pleasure that dance provides its audiences, as opposed to the intellectually and morally improving effects of “respectable” entertainments such as tragedy and comedy. Threaded through these objections is an anxiety not only about the

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76 Kraton’s concern about the wanton effeminacy of pantomime and its inappropriateness as elite pastime places him firmly in an ancient tradition of anti-pantomime discourse, as Lada-Richards has shown (2007: 68-74). Christian writers such Novation, Tertullian, Cyprian, and John Chrysostom, connect pantomime to licentiousness, decline of morals and the emasculation and/or enslavement of viewers. A lost speech by Lucian’s
propriety of particular bodies, but about what happens to bodies within a pantomime performance itself. The danger of pantomime, according to Kraton, is that it has the power to captivate and even transform the bodies of those who view pantomime performances, leading them into its path of degeneracy. When he characterizes pantomime as effeminate, Kraton first presents a judgment of the body of the performer and suitable audience: the pantomime dancer is an “effeminate man” (θηλυδρίαν ἄνθρωπον), who imitates “lustful women” in his dances (2); in contrast, he makes repeated reference to the hyper-masculine characteristics – long beard, hairy legs – possessed by him and Lycinus, in emphasizing how inappropriate a pastime pantomime is for them (5). But the problem is not simply the incongruity of audience and performance; there seems also to be an anxiety that an effeminate dancer poses a risk of emasculation to the body of the masculine spectator. Kraton goes on to warn Lycinus that if he spends too much time at pantomime shows, he might unwittingly turn from a man into one of the courtesans being depicted onstage (λάθης ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ πάλαι Λυδῆ τῆς Ἡ βάκχης γενόμενος) (3). A little later, he expresses the fervent hope that he himself never gives in to the allure of pantomime as long as his beard remains un-plucked (τὸ γένειον ἀπαράτιλτος) – a more literal instance of gender “transformation” (5). It is as if the gender transgression of the effeminate male dancer was somehow contagious, and could cause a masculine spectator to involuntarily begin to embody the same transgression. In blurring boundaries of gender in the bodies it displays, pantomime seems to create a space in which all bodies that enter may be subject to a similar dissolution of status.

Kraton’s other objections about the effect of pantomime viewing on a spectator also characterize pantomime as a performance experience that can overpower and transform, with a particular focus on the body. When he asserts that pantomime provides only physical pleasure, rather than intellectual or moral improvement, he describes it as akin to having one’s ear’s tickled by a feather (τὸ ὀμοιον πεπονθὼς τοῖς τὰ ὑπα πτερῷ κνωμένος) (2). This phrase suggests a collapse of hearing into touch, perhaps carrying the implication that touch is a sense of purely physical gratification, and that hearing has...
been reduced to that level as well.\textsuperscript{81} The focus on bodily stimulation is bolstered by references to the overwhelming sensory experience of pantomime performances, which include not only the sight of dancer’s body but also loud, percussive instrumental music: the dancing is accompanied by “pluckings and twangings and the beating of feet” (ὑπὸ κρούμασεν καὶ τερετίσμασι καὶ ποδὸν κτύπῳ) (2).\textsuperscript{82} The clapping (κροτοῦντα) and shouting (ἐπιβοῦντα) of the audience (5) also add to the cacophony. Pantomime seems to draw attention to the ways that sensory categories are composite and overlapping, with an emphasis on the confusing or overwhelming aspects of this. Moreover, it is implied that the blurred or composite sensory experience of dance works together with its blurring of gender categories in terms of effect on the (elite, educated, male) body. Succumbing to the purely bodily pleasure of pantomime is part of the spectator’s feminization and/or degradation, since it causes him to forget all the learning and traditions that define him (2).\textsuperscript{83} Dance communicates nothing in the way of knowledge, but only makes a body feel and react in a base physical sense. The effect is like the power of the Sirens, Kraton asserts, but worse, for it enslaves not only through the ears but also the eyes (3), again implying confusion or collapsing together of sensory experiences.\textsuperscript{84} The effect of pantomime is thus at once alluring and arousing, debasing and enslaving, and this process is imagined as one of disintegration or collapse of categories and distinctions.

\textsuperscript{81} This is not to imply that hearing and touch were normally separate or antithetical sensory experiences in ancient thought. We might note, for example, that Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima} 2.8 explains the physical phenomenon of sound as the striking (πλέγε) of one object against another (\textit{to tupton} and \textit{to tuptomenon}) (419b10-11), which generates movement (κίνεσις) of the air, movement that eventually affects the air inside a listener’s ear (420a4-5). In \textit{On Dancing}, the sensory overlap seems to point toward a sense of overwhelming confusion, more than simply correspondence. The word used here to indicate tickling (κνάω) (which also means scratching an itch) recalls Plato \textit{Philebus} 46d, in which γαργαλίζω (tickle) and κνήσις (scratching) are given as examples of a mixed sensory experience that involves both pleasure and pain simultaneously. Peponi 2012 discusses this “mixed” sensation as a comparable aesthetic experience to the combined sadness and pleasure that spectators of tragedy feel (cf. \textit{Republic} 10 605c-d).

\textsuperscript{82} The last sound is likely a reference to the \textit{scabellum}, an iron clapper often attached to a shoe, which was used to mark time in pantomime performances.

\textsuperscript{83} Schlapbach 2008: 317-18 notes that forms of \textit{lanthanein} and related words are important for how both Kraton and Lycinus describe the effect of pantomime; it is something that catches one “unawares,” or that distract one from the ultimate path to perception and truth (\textit{alētheia}).

\textsuperscript{84} The emphasis on the vulnerability of the eyes, in particular, is likely related to ancient ideas about vision and the power of the gaze. See Bartsch 2006: 152-160, who observes that Roman-era sources, in particular, describe the gaze as potentially wounding and/or effeminizing, in its power to offer pleasure to others and to “penetrate” the one looked at. This is a danger elite Roman men are supposed to avoid by being the spectator rather than the object, but it is still possible for a \textit{spectator} to be degraded or effeminized by “weakness of his own visual hunger for inexemplary sights and corrupting pleasures” (160).
Kraton’s concerns about allure and enslavement are familiar from ancient discourse on the effects of poetry, music, and rhetoric, but there is something interesting about the way the body is implicated in the effects he imagines. He traces the line of transformation directly from the body of the pantomime dancer to the body of the pantomime viewer, such that the effeminacy of one inevitably leads to the feminization of the other. There seems to be no viable possibility of an educated man viewing pantomime from a critical distance, without being affected by its power and allure. Instead, the performance experience necessarily draws the audience in, remaking them in its own image, perhaps even on a bodily level. The audience in this situation appears to have no control over what happens to their own bodies, except insofar as they can refuse to engage with the performance at all and thereby escape its effects (which seems to be the proper approach for someone like Lycinus or Kraton). It is as if pantomime itself exerts a controlling force upon the bodies it encompasses. At the same time, however, this controlling force is characterized by its own lack of control, in a certain sense. That is, the performance experience that overwhelms and transforms the viewer gains its force from a failure to maintain “proper” boundaries; it allows the gender classifications of bodies to blur together, and different senses – hearing, touch, sight – to collapse into one another. The transformative effect upon the spectator is in turn a blurred boundary between performer and audience, and thus between one body and another. It seems therefore that pantomime is especially dangerous because it threatens the notion of a body as a securely bounded and stable entity.

B. Pantomime as Rhythm and Embodied Knowledge

Lycinus’ defense of pantomime counters Kraton’s fears of blurred boundaries and disintegrating bodies by insisting upon a different interpretation of the bodies of pantomime. The strategies he uses to build his case and how these fit into broader discourses around pantomime have already been described well by Lada-Richards and others, but I want to draw attention to two claims that have particular relevance for a characterization of the dancer’s body. First, a large part of Lycinus’ argument rests on the association of pantomime with eurhuthmia (rhythmic order or movement). He claims that dance is by its nature a regulatory, ordering force, and thus requires its practitioners to discipline their bodies in a manner that is consonant with, rather than in contrast to, the standards of elite paideia; and this ordering force can, in turn, be transferred beneficially to a spectator. A second, closely related element of the argument is that dance produces legible bodies, that is, bodies that can communicate through movement as if it were speech. This, too, allows pantomime to participate in paideia, because it is able to contain and transmit the same body of knowledge as oratory and tragedy, for example. In this way, he offers an indirect answer to Kraton’s claims that pantomime’ embodied nature

85 As Schlapbach 2008: 319 points out, both slavery and enchantment are part of ancient discourse on rhetoric and poetry, going back to Gorgias, and found also in Plato (Rep. 401b8-c3, Symp. 215e). On Plato’s concerns with the effect of performance on audiences, see for example Halliwell 2002, Peponi 2012.

86 It is interesting that Kraton’s own name (“one who has control,” from κρατεῖν) seems to underscore the concern with control. Perhaps he is so called because of his attempt to control both the discourse around pantomime and the unruly bodies that pantomime encompasses.
makes it inimical to the proper pepaideumenos. Within these claims of order and meaning, however, transformations of the body remain a central tension of the text, whose unsettling implications even Lycinus seems unable to avoid.

If Kraton’s image of pantomime is all about the blurring of boundaries and categories, Lycinus’ characterization returns repeatedly to a vocabulary of good order and propriety. He positions dance (orchēsis) as a practice that is inherently about the control and self-control of bodies both individually and in concert, drawing on favorable references in Homer, Hesiod, and Plato. According to this line of reasoning, the capacity of dance to control bodies works to make warriors strong and armies disciplined; one might say that it reflects the “natural” order of things rather than blurring or upending established categories. For example, Lycinus explains that the Lacedaemonians govern their affairs by mousikē and eurhuthmia, which ensures that not only their festive dances but also even their marching in battle maintains “rhythmic and well-ordered step” (καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ εὐσταχίου ἔμβασιν) (10). Lycinus later makes similar claims about the good order and self-regulation inherent in the body of the individual pantomime dancer, who must not only be eurhythmos but also eumorphos and summetros (81). To dance well requires complete control of one’s movements and postures, and thus produces well-disciplined bodies, in a manner congruent with training in oratory or athletics. Implicit in these connections is the link between the state of having rhuthmos and eurhuthmia and the maintenance of all forms of bodily and social order, regulation, and moderation. To be eurhythmos is to necessarily be eutaktos, summetros, and otherwise above reproach.

The regulating force of pantomime on the body of the performer seems in turn to offer an alternative path of influence between the dancer’s body and the spectator’s eyes, one in which the transformed result is not emasculation or debasement. Just as pantomime keeps the bodies of dancers in rhythm, Lycinus claims, it also “brings into rhythm” (rhythmizein) the souls of those watching it (ῥυθμίζει τῶν ὀρθῶν τὰς ψυχὰς) (6). Here again, the assumption seems to be that “rhythm” constitutes a regulating force that upholds certain boundaries and relations that are appropriate for certain kinds of bodies. Lycinus later expands his claim about the power of dance with a suggestion that the order inherent in pantomime is transferable to the spectator through a kind of gaze that generates self-improvement. In its most praiseworthy incarnations, pantomime allows the spectator to see himself in the contemplation of it as though in a mirror (ὅπερ ἐν κατόπτῳ τῷ ὀρθοστῇ ἑαυτόν βλέπῃ), which then allows him to see what he ought to emulate or to avoid (81). Where for Kraton the spectator’s gaze upon the pantomime dancer leads to his enslavement to pleasure and even the transformation of his body for the worse, Lycinus makes this same visual process the equal of philosophical contemplation. This analogy relies on a paradigm of the “self-improving” mirror and associated forms of spectating, in which the opportunity to see oneself as others do

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87 Lycinus explicitly compares dance to gymnastic training in On Dancing 71. Lada-Richards 2007: 82-87 and 90-93 discusses the implications of the connections to rhetoric and athletics in more detail.

88 See Lada-Richards 2005 on the significance of the mirror analogy.
enables the subject to accurately “know himself,” his limitations and strengths. Instead of being transformed into something else, the ideal pantomime spectator becomes more fully himself; rather than falling under outside control, he gains greater capacity to control himself.

Lycinus’ characterization of pantomime thus seems to allow that pantomime has a powerful effect upon both performer and spectator, but by framing that effect as one of rhythm that leads to order, he seems to assuage Kraton’s concerns about blurred boundaries and unruly bodies. Yet even this version of pantomime involves the transformation of bodies from one form to another, in a manner of speaking. The ideal dancer’s body, Lycinus asserts, must be not only *eurhythmos* but also *eukinetos*, able to twist, bend, and flow into the postures and stances that best serve his performance in any given moment (77). This wide-ranging flexibility is a function of pantomime’s mimetic and communicative nature. Because the dancer must represent the stories and characters he or she enacts through gestures and movements, rather than words, the body itself must be capable of changing and adjusting its shape and postures accordingly. The pantomime performer is thus the consummate shape-shifter, able to imitate even the “wetness of water” and the “rapidity of flame.”

Lycinus even goes so far as to claim that a dancer must have been the inspiration for the myth of the Egyptian shape-shifter Proteus (19).

This insistence upon the dancer’s capacity to transform his or her body as a central virtue of pantomime has some interesting implications for Lycinus’ argument. On

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89 The famous Delphic “know thyself” (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) is in fact invoked in the same passage. See Bartsch 2006: 21-25 on its significance for self-knowledge and the symbolism of the mirror.

90 Although this process may not necessarily be less mesmerizing or overwhelming than in Kraton’s model. He also describes pantomime as a *pharmakon* (79), a nod to discourse on rhetoric and poetry that also has ambiguous connotations, as Lada-Richards 2007: 95 notes.

91 Lada-Richards 2007: 53 notes that the fluidity and flexibility of the pantomime dancer’s body is prominent in other sources as well, and suggests that the novelty of this was central to pantomime’s appeal.

92 Exactly what these physical transformations would have involved in practice remains tantalizingly unavailable from Lucian’s treatise, although comparative evidence has allowed for some fruitful speculation. See Webb 2008: 54-56, who draws on a study of the training techniques of South Indian Kathakali dancers.

93 *On Dancing* 19: ὄδατος ὑγρότητα, πυρὸς ὀξύτητα. It seems particularly significant that these images evoke fluid motion.

94 The way that this claim about Proteus is presented in 19 seems to have implications for how the text frames *mimesis* and pantomime. Schlapbach 2008: 322 notes that while Proteus is commonly used as a mythic model for performance (e.g., Plato *Ion* 541e and *Euth.* 288b, Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Dem.* 8), by suggesting that Proteus was a pantomime dancer, rather than simply a model for latter-day dancers, Lucian effectively dissolves the myth itself, and “original” and “imitation” become conflated. On Proteus in Lucian and the related conflation of original and imitation, see also Andrade and Rush 2016 and the Introduction to this dissertation.
the one hand, this capacity allows pantomime to be a site of knowledge and a vehicle of communication, which are additional points in favor of its respectability. Whereas for Kraton, dance is deficient because of its failure to contain and transmit knowledge or moral improvement, Lycinus boldly asserts that pantomime embodies that very knowledge and morality. He invests in the body of the dancer the power equivalent to that of a poet or orator, a vessel of memory for the full tradition of Greek paideia, presenting a long list of mythical and historical episodes with which the pantomime must be familiar (36-62). If dance is equivalent to poetry or rhetoric, then physical transformation is simply the method through which this performer communicates his knowledge, and may be subject to judgment on its own merits. Nonetheless, the flexibility of the pantomime dancer’s body, and its related mimetic power, coexists uneasily with its orderly control. On the surface, at least, Lycinus seems careful to link these two qualities. A good dancer must have complete control of his body in order to correctly represent whatever he intends to represent; failure to control the body means failure to correctly tell the story and fulfill the purpose of the performance. When he offers examples of insufficiently skilled dancers, their failings are a combination of confused rhythm and confused storylines. Some dancers move inexpertly such that their foot, as it were, says one thing, and the rhythm another (ἐτέρα μὲν γὰρ ὁ πούς, ἐτέρα δὲ ὁ ρυθμὸς λέγει), and they commit a “solecism” in the dance out of ignorance (80). Others dance in rhythm, but outside of the proper order of the plot (τὰ πράγματα δὲ μετάχρονα ἢ πρόχρονα) (80). Clarity of representation is framed as concurrent to, and perhaps even the natural outcome, of the ability to regulate the body within certain lines of order and meaning.

Nevertheless, this elevation of change alongside order does seem to evade part of the concern that was put forth in Kraton’s initial critique. After all, doesn’t the ability to change infinitely, to take on any possible shape and form, suggest a potential for the dangerous blurring of boundaries, rather than the regulatory upholding of them? For much of his speech, Lycinus seems unaware of this potential contradiction, choosing instead to foreground the advantages of the vast representational capacity that the pantomime’s flexible body affords. I have observed that Lycinus elevates pantomime to the level of more respectable, elite performance arts, such as oratory, through its embodiment of paideia.95 The concept I want to draw attention to here is “embodiment”: what makes pantomime different from orator is that the knowledge that a dancer possesses must be clearly interpretable for an audience through its physical body, not just through auxiliary words. While Lycinus acknowledges briefly that some narration is involved in pantomime, this is treated as a superfluous addition, while he depicts the gestures of the dancer as equivalent to, or even surpassing, spoken words.96 That is, a viewer of pantomime should be able to clearly interpret what the dancer is representing simply by looking at changes in the dancer’s body. Clarity (saphaneia) emerges as yet another virtue of the ideal dancer, intertwined with flexibility, transformation, and self-control (36, 62; in 62, the dancer is even attributed oracular powers). In this performance situation, a body can be “read” not simply by virtue of its analogy with (or replacement

95 See Lada-Richards 2007, especially 82-95.
96 Lada-Richards 2007: 44 cites several other ancient descriptions of pantomime that make similar claims about the capacity of the dancer’s body to “speak.”
Lycinus illustrates this ultimate clarity of pantomime with, among other anecdotes, the story of a converted pantomime skeptic, Demetrius the Cynic (63). This philosopher, he explains, used to object to pantomime for reasons very much like Kraton’s: that is was alogos movement, without speech and so without meaning; anyone who enjoyed it was simply bewitched (γοητεύµενος) by its various accouterments, the costume and mask and the musical instruments. Then a famous dancer offered to perform for him, alone, without any musical accompaniment, and the dancer danced the story of Aphrodite and Ares so perfectly that all elements of it were interpretable. Demetrius responds to the performance by shouting, “ἀκούω, ἄνθρωπε, ἃ ποιεῖς· οὐχ ὅρῳ μόνον, ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖς ταῖς χερσίν αὐταῖς λαλεῖν” (I hear what you are doing, good man; not only do I see you, but you seem to me to be talking with your very hands!) (63). In this story, we start with a negative image of pantomime as overwhelming sensory, sensual, and enslaving. But those negative implications are stripped away along with the dancer’s accompaniment, leaving behind only the pure, unadorned body of the dancer himself. In the performance that follows, there is still a composite sensory experience, as sight collapses into hearing (Demetrius hears by virtue of seeing), and gestures become assimilated into oral speech (the dancer’s hands seem to speak like a voice). Yet unlike the collapse of touch and hearing or seeing and hearing that Kraton imagined in his references to tickling feathers and Sirens, which lead to a more complete and debasing enslavement, this merger seems to refine and sharpen the level of communication. Instead of becoming muddied or diluted, the merger of sight and sound expands each beyond its individual capacity. The dancer’s gestures are equivalent to words yet somehow even more immediate than speech, since they seem to almost transcend the confines of spoken language. The suggestion of transcending language is further supported by the additional example that Lycinus offers in chapter 64, the story of how even a semi-Hellenized barbarian was able to comprehend the “speaking” of a dancer at Nero’s court. In these stories, it seems as if meaning can adhere directly to the dancer’s body, achieving a kind of immanent communication that eliminates need for additional interpretation.

The communicative potential that Lycinus invests in the dancer through these examples seem to disrupt the dichotomy that was implied in Kraton’s earlier critique of pantomime between the (logo-centric) communication of knowledge, on the one hand, and (nonlinguistic) bodily sensation, on the other. He insists that the embodied character of pantomime’s representation does not necessarily make it separate from or inferior to that which is represented in language. In fact, Lycinus implies this form of communication might even be superior to spoken language, because it is universally interpretable, and perhaps even immediately and immanently transferred from the body of the dancer to the eyes of the spectator. Such claims about the power of dance and embodied communication have an interesting parallel in a concept that arises in early twentieth century dance theory: “kinesthetic empathy,” or the embodied response of a...

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97 It is interesting that this story, performed by the bard Demodocus in Odyssey 8, is itself preceded by a virtuosic dance performance by the Phaeacians. In its context, the dancing seems to have no connection to the later story, but does Lucian perhaps intend to imply one here? On the representation of dance in Odyssey 8, see Olsen 2017.
viewer to a dancer’s movements and positions, activated on the level of the viewer’s inner awareness of their own body (kinesthesia). One of the earliest theorists of (what came to be referred to as) kinesthetic empathy, John Martin, suggested that the sight of a dancer’s movements provoked even in a stationary spectator a kind of “inner mimicry” of these movements, that in turn allowed for direct transfer of the dancer’s inner emotions to the spectator, without any intermediary narration or representational aids. While scholars since Martin have been more cautious about the level of direct access to the inner life of the dancer, they still draw on evidence for some degree of neurological “mirroring” on the part of the spectator of the bodily movements they observe in the performer, and thus some kind of immediate and extra-linguistic communication, that does not necessarily require additional interpretation.

For modern dance scholars, the conceptual usefulness of kinesthetic empathy is that it attempts to describe what dance does on its own terms, rather than in reference to another art form. The anecdotes Lycinus provides in On Dancing 63 and 64 seem to have a similar aim, focusing on what the dancer’s body by itself can represent and communicate. It is further tempting to describe the communicative power that Lycinus attributes to pantomime as an example of kinesthetic empathy in performance, because it would offer a potential positive reframing of the inter-relation between performer and spectator that was so problematic in Kraton’s objection. The relation between spectator and performance that kinesthetic empathy describes may elide distinctions of subject and object, or the viewing body as distinct from the performing body. In modern theoretical work on this topic, dance becomes a privileged point of entry for understanding human experience and identity at the level of the body, often calling into question the artificial divides that exist between bodies or subjects in other forms of performance or communication.

It seems that even though Lycinus is eager to contest Kraton’s assertion that the body could not possibly be a vehicle for the communication of knowledge, he is ultimately still cautious about assigning the body too much power, particularly when it comes to the potential effect upon a spectator. In the Demetrius story, he identifies the pure, unaccompanied body as pantomime’s ideal form, and the best representative of its effect upon a discerning viewer. This ideal, however, is not consistently at the center of Lycinus’ praise throughout his speech. Elsewhere he still tries to maintain costumes and music as part of pantomime’s appeal, by claiming that they allow pantomime to be a kind

99 For an overview of Martin’s influence and the limitations of its universalizing claims, see Foster 2008, 2012: 156-162.
100 Foster 2012: 122-3.
101 See Reynolds 2011 and Rabinowitch et al. 2011 for this aspect of kinesthetic empathy and its applicability to dance and other performance studies.
102 For possibilities of this term beyond performance studies, see Foster 1995, for example.
of universal repository of arts and entertainments. The choice to bracket these as mere distractions in the Demetrius story narrows the focus to the dancer’s body, on the one hand, but also, on the other hand, sidesteps questions of what might happen to the spectator’s body via the overwhelming allure of percussive music or attractive costumes. We might therefore read it less as a centering of the body, per se, than as an attempt to keep the focus entirely on the “words” that dance communicates, rather than any other forms of pleasure or captivation it might offer. This seems in a different way to elide the corporeality of pantomime, by privileging language over any kind of nonlinguistic bodily response. Lycinus never directly refutes Demetrius’ (and Kraton’s) concern that the overwhelming sensory experience of the performance might bewitch or ensnare the spectator, instead appealing to a way of engaging with the performance where such possibilities are not imminent. In this acceptable form of pantomime, the body can be central only insofar as it has been transformed into words. The embodied communication of pantomime, however universally “readable,” seems to be fundamentally semiotic in nature, rather than existing beyond language, as sensation that could only be experienced in the body. Pantomime comes close to transcending language, yet also seems reluctant to entirely leave it behind; Lycinus, like Kraton, seems to be wary of what dangerous possibilities might lie behind a purely embodied response to dance performance.

Lycinus’ grand claims about the near-universal legibility and representational clarity of pantomime also become more complicated when we consider how his speech frames the process of interpretation relative to the dancer’s body. How does the text invite us to “read” bodies, and what does this imply about how interpretation works? It is to these considerations that I now turn in the next section of the paper.

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103 On Dancing 68: other forms of entertainment (aulos or kithara playing, tragedy and comedy, etc.) are singular in what they display (ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ἔργου τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἔχει), while dance incorporates all possible forms of display (τὰ πάντα ἔχει συλλαβών). This is notably counter to the way that Aristotle categorizes artistic genres in Poetics 1. There, tragedy, comedy, and dithyramb are the most composite entertainment forms, employing rhuthmos, melos (melody), and metron (meter) to effect mimesis (1447b25), while for Aristotle orcheσis does so only in rhuthmoi (1447a25). Perhaps pantomime, in Lycinus’ characterization, supersedes tragedy in its capacity to encompass other genres; this would dovetail with the contrast of pantomime and tragedy discussed in section II. Aristotle’s Poetics aside, however, other evidence clearly suggests that Greek music and dance were often conceived as a multi-sensory or even synesthetic experience – e.g. Homeric Hymn to Apollo 179-206 (see Griffith forthcoming). The apparently unaccompanied dance in the Demetrius story would be the unusual experience.

104 Although it is directed towards painting rather than dance, there is an interesting parallel here to one important element of Deleuze’s analysis of Francis Bacon’s art. Deleuze makes a distinction between painting that is “figurative” and that which is “figural;” the first attempts to communicate sensation via the illustration of something that causes that sensation, while the second aims to communicate that sensation directly, via precise depiction of particular forces in the style and technique of the painting itself (as Deleuze argues that Bacon’s paintings do). This story seems to gesture at the possibility of dance as a figural medium, but waver and retreat to the figurative. See Deleuze 2003.
II. Interpretation of Bodies

In this section, I consider more carefully how Lycinus invites the readers of On Dancing to interpret the body of the dancer. I argue from this that despite his insistence upon the ultimate clarity of pantomime’s representation, he also inadvertently seems to imply that the framework of the interpreter (and not merely the intentions of the performer) can shape the process of interpretation. In turn, this attention to the role of the interpreter invites us to consider more carefully the role that spectators and audiences play in Lycinus’ characterization of pantomime. This ultimately shows the ways in which a spectator can have a transformative effect on a pantomime performance, and not just the other way around.

Lycinus’ characterization of the dancer as a communicator of knowledge offers an obvious comparison with another, contemporary kind of entertainer, whose body might be scrutinized for meaning – namely, the orator. Most discussions of On Dancing have focused on how we might think about the dancer’s body in relation to ancient conceptions of the orator’s body, which has also been the frequent subject of study. But while the parallel with oratory is implicitly obvious from Lycinus’ speech, the one explicit evaluation of the body of another performer that appears in the text is not the orator, but the tragic actor (On Dancing 27-30). It is this comparison that I argue is most instructive for thinking through how Lycinus invites us to “read” the dancer’s body.

It makes some sense to connect tragedy to pantomime historically in terms of a kind of genealogy, if not contemporary popularity. But in On Dancing, the main issue of comparison (or rather, contrast) is instead the performer’s body and how it communicates meaning. Lycinus brings up tragedy in response to Kraton’s inclusion of it as one of the more respectable forms of entertainment in which an educated man might indulge. Immediately, he turns to a description of the tragic actor’s body and appearance:

ὁς εἴδεχθες ἀμα καὶ φοβηρὸν θέαμα εἰς μῆκος ἀφρυθμὸν ἕσκημένος ἄνθρωπος, ἐμβάταις ψηλοῖς ἑποχόμενος, πρόσωπον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀνατεινόμενον ἐπικείμενος καὶ στόμα κεχηνὸς πάμμεγα ὡς καταπιόμενος

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105 See especially Lada-Richards 2007: 106-125. She argues that pantomime serves as a conceptual and ideological boundary for oratory, both standing in opposition to it and defining what constitutes the space of “legitimate” oratory (11-120). Gunderson 2000: 126-145 articulates a similar relationship for acting and oratory in the Roman world, on which Lada-Richards draws. (But see also Connolly 2001 on the complexities of this framework when looking at Greek sophists within the Roman empire). For Lada-Richards, the pure physicality of dance is what pushes it beyond the pale of oratory, despite many formal similarities; the dancer’s embodied knowledge is too accessible and not quite securely elite, Greek or masculine (109). Schlapbach 2008 takes a different view, suggesting that we might instead think of pantomime and rhetoric more as intertwined parts of the same cultural discourse, rather than necessarily as opposites.

106 It has been suggested that we might think of pantomime as a continuation of the tradition of classical Attic drama, no longer performed in Lucian’s time. See Jory 2004, Hall 2008: 8. Lada-Richards 2008: 292 observes that pantomime often appears in epigraphic records as ἄφρυθμος τραγῳδία and similar variants. See Schmitz 2010 on Attic tragedy in Lucian.
τοὺς θεατῶς, ἔδω λέγειν προστερνίδια καὶ προγαστρίδια, προσβατίνας καὶ ἐπιτεχνητὴν παχύτητα προσποιούμενος, ὡς μὴ τοῦ μήκους ἢ ἀρρυθμία ἐν λεπτῷ μᾶλλον ἐλέγχοιτο.

How ugly and also frightful a sight is a person decked out to an unproportional [arrhythron] height, mounted on high boots, laying over his head a mask, stretched out and with a great gaping mouth, as if about to gulp up the spectators. Not to mention the chest padding and the stomach padding, attached for extra and artificial bulk, lest in his thinness he be accused of arrhythmia of size (27).

The body of the actor is, in fact, barely visible here. Instead, we see the distracting elements that surround the body: the high shoes, the oversized, gaping mask, the padding and props to make the actor seem bigger than he really is. These elements are not presented as a seamless extension of the actor and his performance; rather, he seems to be encased in a costume like some kind of “outer shell.” The repetition of the pro- and pros- prefixes (two of each) reinforces the sense of the costume as a superfluous addition to the actor’s body. It is something that stands out in front of it or in excess, disproportionally so, obscuring the body’s actual form and movement, and exaggerating the artifice of the performance. Moreover, all of this artificiality is an attempt to compensate for the natural arrhythmia of the actor’s thin, weak body, a sharp contrast with the eurhythmia and orderly proportions of the pantomime dancer’s body, whose beauty (Lycinus asserts) is clear to “anyone who is not blind” (29). The tragic actor is thus marked as the physical opposite of the ideal dancer.

107 As Wyles 2008: 80 phrases it.
108 The dismissal of the actor’s mask here as a cumbersome and unconvincing prosthetic attachment is markedly different from how Lucian approaches the mask in the Apology, as I discuss in Chapter Two. We might contrast it also with the other significant “prosthetic” in that text, Bellerophon’s tablet, which is offered as an analogy for the author’s relationship to his text. The prosthetic nature of the actor’s mask and costume disconnect it from the body, while the prosthetic quality of Bellerophon’s tablet connect closely to a body an object that would otherwise be distinct, such that one can have an effect on the other; lack of agency over the prosthetic attachment is the same in both examples, however.
109 Wyles 2008: 69-70 and 77-8 observes that the mask and costume in pantomime function differently than they do in tragedy at the level of stagecraft. While a single actor in a drama might play more than one character, he signals change in character by going offstage and reappearing with a different mask, and perhaps a different costume or additional props. The pantomime dancer, on the other hand, plays multiple roles without ever leaving the stage, altering his posture and movements to signal these changes to his audience. Even if the change in roles did sometimes involve a change in masks (as suggested by On Dancing 66, where a dancer has five masks laid out in preparation of performance), unlike tragedy, pantomime makes no effort to conceal the fact that it is the same performer appearing under different masks. Likewise, it seems likely that a dancer would have used props both in iconic and symbolic representations: e.g., a prop scarf.
If the tragic actor, in this account, lacks the proportionality and rhythm of the dancer, it follows that he also lacks the capacity to control and manipulate his body. The only element of the performance that he can properly regulate is his voice (μόνης τίς φωνῆς ὑπεύθυνον) (27), as he speaks his lines. And it is only through these spoken words that tragedy can communicate stories and generate emotions; words that, Lycinus contends, are more to the credit of the poet than the actor. The “gaping mouth” of the mask seems to underscore this point as well, especially since it is noted that the mask of the dancer is closed-mouthed in contrast (29). Thus, for Lycinus, tragedy is the opposite of pantomime not simply because it makes for an awkward, ill-proportioned visual spectacle, but because this very lack of proportion and control leads to a limited mimetic capacity relative to pantomime. Just as the mask and costume are artificial padding that does not meld seamlessly with the actor’s body, so too the role he is representing is distant from the body, and therefore imperfectly and artificially rendered. The tragic actor does not embody his role the way a dancer does; he does not have the ability to “speak” with his hands in a manner that is perfectly clear and representationally accurate, as the dancer in the Demetrius story was supposed to have had. Tragedy, in this reading, fails to meet the standards of bodily control and representational clarity that Lycinus has held up as the primary virtues of pantomime, and therefore makes for an ideal unfavorable comparison.

Implicit in this comparison, however, is a particular approach to looking at the actor’s body, an insistence on seeing it from one perspective rather than another. Lycinus seems to look at the actor as if through the eyes of someone who did not know the conventions of tragedy, or not very well, which shapes his gaze and evaluation. He prefaces his description by stating that he will look at tragedy ἀπὸ τοῦ σχημάτος πρῶτου, from the physical form that it presents “first,” that is, its outward physical appearance. By starting here, however, he never moves past the surface level, insisting upon only describing what the actor’s body looks like and not attempting to understand what it might mean on its own terms. To someone with a different perspective, this surface-level description might seem like a deliberate misreading. Lycinus refuses a point of view that would accept that tragic actors wear high boots as a matter of convention and move to considering the merits of the performance in its own context; likewise, he does not allow us to see the mask as representing a particular character or character type through some conventional visual symbol, insisting instead on noticing only its large, gaping-mouthed appearance, apart from any representational meaning. It may be true that the actor and his costume are less seamlessly aligned than the dancer’s are, but Lycinus’ description seems bent on prying the two apart. Additionally, the use of schēma seems to contain a pun,

might represent a real scarf, but it might also be used to represent something else (a swan’s tail, a whip) by resembling it in form or appearance. The audience sees both the continuity of the same dancer onstage and his changes in character over the course of the performance through his manipulation of masks, props, and his own body. In pantomime, it is not the mask that defines the body, but the body that shapes the mask.

110 See Griffith 2019 on music and dance in post-fifth century performance of tragedy.

111 Lucian seems to often use the tragic actor as a comparison when discussing those who fail to live up to their roles or otherwise demonstrate hypocritical appearances. See especially Fisherman 31, 33, Apology 5, Menippus 16, Icaromenippus 29, Nigrinus 8-11.
since schēmata can be used to refer to the gestures or figures of dance, specifically.\textsuperscript{112} By approaching it \textit{apo tou schēmatos prōtou}, Lycinus seems to be insisting upon reading the actor’s body as if it were a dancer’s, rather than on its own terms and within its own conventions, thus guaranteeing that it will be found lacking in comparison. What the text presents as a descriptive reading is, in fact, profoundly shaped by the voice presenting the reading and his rhetorical aims. If we continue with this more suspicious lens, it raises some uncomfortable questions. Does not pantomime, as a type of performance with its own conventions and expectations, also require an audience that can correctly approach it?\textsuperscript{113} How can the meaning of any body be universally interpretable if interpretation relies on the preconceived framework of the interpreter?

The way that Lycinus seems to compensate for this potential problem is by positing an ideal audience as well as an ideal performer. In chapter 76, he points to the people of Antioch as an example of an ideal pantomime audience, because they know that good dancing should be like and help to reinforce it with their reactions during a performance. Careful observers, they miss nothing of what happens in performance (μηδένα μηδὲν αὐτῶν διαλανθάνειν) and do not hesitate to voice their disapproval.\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{quote}
μικροῦ μὲν γὰρ ὅρχηστῳ εἰσέλθοντος καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορὰ ὀρχισμένου μιὰ
φωνῆς πάντες ἀνεβόσαν, ὡς Ἀστυάναξ, “Ἑκτὸρ δὲ ποῦ; ἄλλοτε δὲ ποτε
μηκίστου τινὸς ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτριον ὀρχεῖσθαι τὸν Καπανέα ἐπιχειροῦντος καὶ
προσβάλλειν τοὺς Θηβαίων τείχεσιν, Ὑπερβηθή, ἔφησαν, τὸ τείχος, οὐδὲν σοι
dei κλιμάκος.

When a small dancer was portraying Hector, they shouted in one voice, “Hey Astyanax, where is Hector?” And another time, when some disproportionally tall man was dancing the attack on Kapanes and storming the walls of Thebes, they said, “Climb over the wall, you have no need for a ladder!” (76)
\end{quote}

Especially fat or thin dancers are likewise criticized for failing to maintain the physical standards that the Antioch audience expects. In all of these examples, the dancers’ bodies fail to adequately match to the roles they are purporting to portray, much like the hapless tragic actor from the earlier example. The nature of their “failures” accords with the link that Lycinus has made between the structuring order of the body and its capacity for representation; bodies that are \textit{huper to metrion} in size and shape are unfit for their intended \textit{mimesis}, as opposed to the \textit{emmetros} body of the ideal pantomime dancer. But in these anecdotes, the emphasis falls not on the performer’s ability to embody these ideals so much as on the spectator’s ability to detect and enforce them. Here it is the audience who assumes responsibility for making the dance “rhythmic” (\textit{rhuthmizein}), if the dancer fails to do so, as Lycinus asserts at the conclusion of his story. They thus exert

\textsuperscript{112} cf. Xen. \textit{Symp.} 7.5, Pl. \textit{Lg.} 655a, Luc. \textit{Apol.} 5.

\textsuperscript{113} By this, I do not mean to imply that pantomime necessarily requires an educated or elite audience (although it is true that Lycinus’ portrait of pantomime seems to expect one, as Lada-Richards 2007: 87 observes).

\textsuperscript{114} Note that this ideal audience, who misses nothing, is the opposite of Kraton’s projected audience, who forgets everything. See n.83.
the same controlling, ordering rhythm over the dancer’s body that the ideal pantomime performer is expected to maintain over his or her own body. This order is, in turn, bound up with the representational meaning of the performance in question, over which the audience also attempts to exert control – refusing, for example, to see a small dancer as a Hector, or accept that a too tall man is the appropriate size next to imaginary city walls. Thus the audience not only polices the rhythm or order of the pantomime dancer’s body, but also, by extension, what it is permitted to imitate and represent.

The commentary of the Antioch spectators thus serves as its own claim to authoritative interpretation of a performance. Like Lycinus’ unfavorable reading of the tragic actor’s body, their intervention is an insistence on seeing the dancer’s bodies according to one particular standard that the body either successfully fulfills or does not. I would argue, however, that something slightly different also happens in this situation. The act of interpretation here does something besides asserting one possible reading to the exclusion of others. It also seems to reorient the process of mimesis that that is taking place in the performance, shifting the focus from meaning that adheres to the dancer’s body to meaning that is created in the exchange between spectator and performer.

Hitherto we have discussed the dancer’s body rather as if it were a fully formed text that the audience reads; the path of communication runs from the body of the performer to the eyes of the spectator, who is able to partake of the knowledge that the performer has already acquired. Here, however, the audience seems instead to bring their own knowledge against which to read the pantomime’s body. When they judge it lacking, they disrupt the performance, but not (exactly) by shutting it down. Instead, they turn the path of communication around and talk back to the story that the dancer is attempting to communicate, actively inserting themselves into the performance. This disrupts the performance in the sense that it subverts the performer’s presumed intention, but it is also possible to understand it as changing the meaning of the story. That is, the audience’s rejection of the dancer’s attempt at mimesis is also, in a way, the construction of a new mimetic representation, if one that is not fully realized (e.g., the refusal to see Hector is also the inadvertent debut of Astyanax, even if, presumably, the pantomime does not continue in that direction).

The possibility that the audience, and not just the performer, might be able to control the course of the performance, effectively flips the line of transformation that Kraton’s negative view of pantomime implied, in which the alluring body of the dancer both captivated and emasculated the body of the male spectator. In these examples, the influence runs in the opposite direction, from the spectator to the dancer; the performer’s body exerts no captivating or controlling force on the audience, but instead is itself vulnerable to their interference. Rather than allowing the spectacle to transform them, the spectators attempt to transform the spectacle into the form they think it should take. Moreover, they are able to do this while still invested in the viewing of the pantomime, in fact as active participants in it. Being absorbed into the experience of performance does not necessarily imply a loss of self-control for the spectators, and it seems rather to be an integral part of the control they exert upon the performer.

Looking back at the two competing claims in the text about the appropriateness of pantomime, we can see two distinct views on what happens to bodies within it. For Kraton, the embodied nature of dance makes it inimical to language, a kind of raw sensation; while for Lycinus, pantomime allows the body itself to be an ideal vehicle for
knowledge communication, even if he seems to betray some unease about whether this should be rightly imagined as language or as sensation. From the negative standpoint, the inherent fluidity of the body in pantomime makes it uncontrollable and therefore dangerous, but Lycinus tries to make the dancer’s expansive flexibility exist in tandem with bodily self-regulation and clarity of representation. Likewise, the absorption of the spectator into the performance, and the risk of transformation therein, were central to Kraton’s alarm, whereas Lycinus seems to suggest that audience participation, if done correctly, effectively empowers the spectators rather than enslaving them. Despite their opposition, both claims seem nonetheless to ascribe to pantomime a potentially disruptive power of transformation; both speakers seem anxious to control the bodies of pantomime, which are always threatening to slip out of their grasp. Lycinus never really confronts the contradiction between dance as rhythmic control of the body and the power that the dancer apparently has to transform into any other possible body. He stops short of the possibility that the embodied communication of dance might affect the spectator in a bodily way that is not easily reducible or confined to language. And while it seems clear that the Antioch audience’s interference is meant to accord with the ideal of pantomime as an embodiment of both euruthmia and mimetic clarity, the implication of it in terms of transformation is no less troubling for Lycinus’ position than the dancer’s own transformative-representational power. That is, if an audience potentially has the power to disrupt a performer’s intentions and reshape the performance into something new, who is to say that what standards they will uphold? This latent potential for disruption seems finally to come a head in the story of the mad Ajax dancer, to which I now return.

III. Performance Disrupted

As I noted at the beginning of the paper, this story appears at the very end of Lycinus’ portion of the dialogue (83-84), introduced as an additional example of how pantomime might be practiced badly. And in some respects, the sequence of events does seem to offer a convenient example to reinforce the ideal standard of pantomime that Lycinus has hitherto constructed. The dancer in question, according to Lycinus, was previously a perfectly good dancer (ὀρχηστὴν εὐδοκίμονα πρότερον), but by some chance (οὐκ οἶδα δὲ τινι τῷ ἐξοκείλαντα) drifted waywardly (ἐξοκείλαντα) into an unseemly performance. While performing the madness of Ajax, this dancer went beyond (ὑπερεξέπεσεν) the proper bounds of performance to such an extent that “he would likely seem to someone not to act out insanity but to actually be mad” (οὐκ ὑποκρίνασθαι ἀλλὰ μαίνεσθαι αὐτὸς εἰκότῳ ἄν τινί ἔδοξεν) (83). This madness takes the form of attacking the other performers: tearing clothes from a musician and striking another dancer with an aulos. The dancer’s “failure” is thus, mostly obviously, a matter of

115 It seems just as likely that a pantomime-mad crowd would demand something more sensual and less intellectual than the ideal Lycinus presents. And indeed, that such an audience demand might exist in practice is suggested by how strenuously he tries to construct an alternative. Lada-Richards 2007: 132 suggests that in its effort to construct an intellectually acceptable version of pantomime, as Lycinus’ speech does, does a disservice to pantomime on its own terms. In other words, the popular appeal of pantomime may in fact have been the alluring, seductive qualities that On Dancing tries to downplay.

116 Like a ship running aground?
boundaries and transgression; he disrupts the performance when he goes off script and out of line, as it were. We can connect this disruption of boundaries back to Lycinus’ insistence upon rhythm as a regulating force over the body. It is surely significant that the dancer interferes with the musician who is beating time with an iron shoe, literally disrupting the metrical order of the performance.\footnote{As Webb 2008: 59 observes.} He both fails to maintain orderly control over his own body, and also interferes with the rhythmic regulation maintained by the bodies of the other performers. He also disrupts any link between representational meaning and order, because the more realistic the imitation of madness, the more unconstrained the performance becomes. Rather than control of one’s body working to facilitate mimetic accuracy, this accuracy undermines bodily control.

Unlike the other examples of failure or disruption that we have seen, however, this incident is not defined by a performer’s failure to live up to a particular standard, not exactly. It is not that the dancer tries to imitate madness and is unsuccessful, like the small dancer in Antioch trying unsuccessfully for a convincing representation of Hector. He seems rather to succeed all too well, except that this, in itself, constitutes the problem. Just as the dancer’s madness brings him outside the boundaries of rhythm, so too his failure of \textit{mimesis} is the excess or overstepping of it: acting that is δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν μιμησιούμενος, as Lycinus describes it (83). Rather than the "under-mimesis" that beset the failed Antioch dancers, we have here a kind of “over-mimesis,” resulting in the performer spilling over into the audience, rather than necessitating the audience reaching into the performance. The resulting representation is deemed problematic because it collapses the distinction between imitation and reality. Even the precise line between what is “real,” and what is merely “represented,” is ambiguous in the way the action plays out. Looking again at Lycinus’ description of the dancer’s madness, we see that while he distinguishes between “acting madness” and “being mad,” he introduces both with the phrase εἰκότος ἄν τινι ἐδοξείν ("he would likely seem to someone"), thus framing the situation in terms of appearances, rather than a claim about what “really” happened. The verisimilitude of this insanity, therefore, might imply its reality, or merely its persuasiveness, and the text seems to allow for both possibilities. For that matter, such confusion may be precisely the point. To borrow a concept from Deleuze and Guattari, we might think of the Ajax dancer’s madness as a “becoming,” which marks not a change between “imitating” and “being,” but a kind of proximity between fiction and reality that makes the boundary between them difficult to distinguish.\footnote{See Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 235-239; 272-3. They discuss “becoming” (or “becoming-animal,” “becoming-Other”) as a way of thinking about the capacity of bodies to affect one another laterally and across boundaries, rather than by evolutionary lines of descent and filiation.} In this moment of “becoming,” it seems to matter less whether or not what the dancer becomes is “real,” and more how this blurring of boundaries affects the other bodies around him.\footnote{In this suggestion and the following discussion, I depart slightly from the way that this passage is often invoked as a key example of Lucian’s interest in the difficulty of distinguishing fiction from reality, e.g., Andrade and Rush 2016: 158-160 (see the Introduction to this dissertation). Lada-Richards 2006: 154 similarly remarks that this episode demonstrates “the precariousness of the dividing line between likeness as... bounty... and... fiction...”} That is, whether or not the dancer’s...
madness is real or over-realistically pretended, the dangers of it seem to be real enough: if the other dancer who was struck hadn’t been wearing a cap, Lycinus remarks, the blow would have killed him (83). Confusing imitation and reality, it seems, can have deadly consequences.\footnote{Invoking the “fatal charades” of Roman public execution, as Lada-Richards 2006 notes.}

The affective consequences of blurring the boundary between imitation and reality are also significant when we consider what happens to the spectators in this unfortunate situation. Unlike the clear-sighted Antioch audience, who judges and intervenes in one voice, the interpretation of this audience is divided, Lycinus tells us. The “common” element (οἱ συγγετώδεις καὶ ιδιώται), unable to distinguish good dancing from bad, assumes that this is accurate imitation (ἀκραν μίμησιν) of the condition. The more educated audience members (οἱ ἀστειότεροι), on the other hand, are able to recognize this erratic behavior as the madness of the dancer, rather than Ajax (ἀκριβῶς ὁ ρῶντες ὅτι οὐκ Ἀιάντος ἀλλὰ ὀρχηστοῦ μανίας τὰ γιγνόμενα ἤν) (83), and are embarrassed by it. The audience reaction in the moment also appears to differ along these lines, but the division in Lycinus’ account is less clear. He first tells us that the whole theater (θέατρον ἅπαν) went crazy along with Ajax, leaping and shouting and tearing off their clothes, before clarifying the distinction in levels of recognition just described. From this we can assume that it is the “common” part of the audience that participates in the madness, as an extension of being convinced by and approving of the excessive performance, while the “sophisticated” presumably hold themselves aloof from what they perceived to be a ridiculous display. But despite their claims to accurately perceive and interpret what is happening, this latter segment of the audience fails to correctively intervene as the Antioch audience did. In fact, Lycinus is explicit that their reaction is the opposite of intervention and correction: they cover up the foolishness of the dance with their applause (τοῖς δὲ ἐπάινοις καὶ αὐτοί τὴν ἄνοιαν τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἐπικαλύπτοντες) (83), as if trying to spare the dancer the embarrassment that they themselves are experiencing on his behalf. Both reactions thus go against the ideal that Lycinus has posited for pantomime: either the spectators are absorbed into the performance and lose control of themselves (rather than gaining greater self-knowledge and control, as asserted in 81), or they fail to assert their role as enforcers of the regulating eurhuthmia that the performer has failed to embody.

If we look at this split audience only in terms of interpretation, as Lycinus presents it, we could see the problem of audience reaction primarily as one of discernment. Either the spectators recognize what is an appropriate performance, or they do not, and this is what distinguishes them as belonging to a particular category of spectator. But if we take into account their reactions in the moment, there seems to be a problem not so much of recognition as of embodied response, which in both reactions take precedence over evaluation. Those who go mad along with the dancer seem to undergo the kind of boundary-blurring transformation about which Kraton warned...
Lycinus at the beginning of the dialogue, unwittingly becoming an extension of the performance itself. Nor is such a fate limited to those with insufficient perception: when he discusses the reaction of the ἀστειότεροι, Lycinus adds, almost as an afterthought, that the dancer went into the audience and, pausing among some high-ranking officials, acted as if he were going to whip one of them like a ram (ἀυτῶν τινα ὄσπερ κρών μαστιγώσῃ λαβών). That is to say, perhaps the reason why the more discerning spectators did not react appropriately was because they, too, were unwittingly drawn into the performance, and feared bodily harm as a result. At least in the moment when this performance is taking place, it does not seem to matter that much whether or not you can distinguish representation from reality, because the blurring between them implicates everyone, whether they like it or not. This potential for the harmful effects of over-mimesis to encompass the entire audience, regardless of perceptual acuity, seems to bookend the way that the dancer’s error was introduced as having happened “by chance” to a previously capable performer. The madness that occurs during the performance is like a kind of contagion that infects both performer and spectator, and against which both may be helpless. Bodies in this space seem to be susceptible to transformation in a way that exceeds the possibility of control.

IV. Towards a Reconsideration of the Transforming Body

Ostensibly, it is the pro-pantomime position that prevails in On Dancing. Kraton admits to being wholly swayed by Lycinus’ speech, and becomes a convert to the pastime he disparaged not so long before. Yet the story with which the text concludes seems instead to circle back to Kraton’s original warning that pantomime is a threat to orderly boundaries and bodily integrity. We have seen that Lycinus does, in some ways, successfully counter Kraton’s objections, and convincingly proves dance to be more than meaningless hand-waving and loud noise. But he seems unable, in the end, to successfully insist that pantomime is fully controllable, to guarantee that it will never blur the boundaries it purports to uphold. It seems rather that the most powerful and unique feature of pantomime, namely, the fact that it is a performance medium in which bodies necessarily transform, is inherently inimical to the maintaining of boundaries. Perhaps most troublingly, the story of the mad Ajax dancer suggests that this risk lies not in a dancer’s failure to represent clearly through his body, but in the potential success of this embodied representation; to truly embody transformations would mean to effectively collapse the distinction between fiction and reality. The unlimited metamorphosis of the dancer’s body is unproblematic for Lycinus’ argument so long as it remains a metaphor. Once a body is revealed to have really (?) undergone change, the situation becomes more challenging to parse. Even if this disintegration is framed as an aberration, it still seems like a risk that is always hiding within a pantomime performance, needing only one mistake to slip loose. It is almost as if On Dancing stumbles, too late, upon the realization

121 And, ironically, with a form of harm (whipping) elsewhere directed mostly at performers. The risk of audiences members being forcibly drawn into a performance resembles the dynamics of life under Nero described in Bartsch 1994.

122 The idea of performance as “contagious” also appears in a story Lucian tells in How to Write History 1, where spectators develop a kind of “tragic” or tragedy-obsessed fever after watching a production of Euripides’ Andromeda.

123 As Lada-Richards 2006: 159-162 observes.
that the pantomime dancer’s transformations might be able to exceed the boundaries of performance and spill out into spaces beyond it.

Yet the Ajax dancer’s madness and its consequences also suggest that there may be different ways of looking at this problem. If we were to attempt to understand dance in terms of the embodied response it provokes, rather than in spite of it, this suggests that how an audience reacts to a performance cannot be meaningfully separated from how they interpret it. Conversely, the meaning of a given body becomes inseparable from how it affects other bodies to which it relates in some way. To the extent that there is a possibility of interpretive control, it requires becoming a part of the performance or inserting oneself into it (as the Antioch spectators do). From this perspective, it also becomes more difficult to maintain a strict opposition between “rhythmic” control of bodies, on the one hand, and a transformative, boundary-blurring lack of control, on the other. Whatever quality of rhuthmos pantomime contains, it seems to have the potential both to regulate bodies and to cross boundaries, passing from one body to another, and thus contains within itself the possibility of change as well as continuity.124 If in this framework meaning becomes less stable, its possibilities are, at the same time, open to expansion beyond the individual intentions of either performer or spectator.

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124 See Benveniste 1971 for the etymological derivation of rhuthmos as “flow.” See also Deleuze 2003: 55-61, which explores rhythm as articulating relations between figures in painting (and thus an inter-relating, rather than boundary-defining, force), and Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300-315, on the musical “refrain” as boundary-crossing. Levine 2015: 49-81 articulates a similar complexity around rhythm and control when she argues that rhythm (defined as a temporal pattern) can both uphold institutional structures across time (regulation of bodies) and cut across and through other organizing or regulation forms and structures (disrupting the notion of clearly bounded temporal periods or social institutions, for example).
Chapter 4

A quick glance through the scholarship on Lucian shows a tendency to characterize the author through association with one of the mythological figures that feature prominently in his work. Lucian has been variously labeled a “Protean pepaideumenos” and “a literary Prometheus,” in analyses that emphasize the versatility of his authorial personas, or the tension between tradition and innovation that marks his literary style, respectively.\(^{125}\) Such approaches are useful for attempting to capture an author who is, on the one hand, very present in his writing, constantly commenting on his own literary strategies and the reception of his texts, yet always elusive, seeming to hide behind a multitude of masks. In this chapter, I would like to introduce a new, possibly unexpected figure to the list: Herakles. It is not quite accurate to say that Herakles is one of Lucian’s “masks,” although some of Lucian’s engagement with this character does include the author’s identification with him. Rather, the figure of Herakles proves to be a site upon which several themes that run through Lucian’s corpus converge. These converging threads are often tangled, and frequently paradoxical, with strands relating to the uses of language, the possibilities of interpretation, and the control of bodies. Herakles surfaces throughout Lucian’s corpus as a figure who himself wears multiple “masks” and is played by multiple actors, sometimes quite literally. Across these various roles, this character is invoked to define the parameters of “correct” and “incorrect” interpretation, while in other places he serves to open up the possibility that different interpretations of the same object might be valid. Yet even as Lucian’s Herakles points toward the possibility of multiplicity, he is also used to represent the power of language as confining and rigid, able to ensnare, control, and otherwise exert force over bodies. When we push a bit deeper, we find that even this controlling power is complicated by tension between the power that a speaker exerts and the vulnerability he risks by speaking. The paradoxes continue in Lucian’s reception during the European Renaissance, when a strange version of Herakles that Lucian invented takes on a life of its own in service of claims about the possibilities of interpretation and the power of language.

The threads of this chapter also converge upon a single object of the same name: Herakles, one of Lucian’s prolaritai or “introductions.” This short text serves as a focal point for my discussion because the peculiar version of Herakles it describes most clearly embodies the convergence of themes that I posit for this figure. In order to demonstrate the particular significance of this text, I begin with a brief overview of the appearances of Herakles across Lucian, which clarifies why I have chosen to characterize many of these appearances in a framework of masks, bodies, and the acting of roles. I move from there to the text of Herakles, considering how it engages with multiple frames of interpretation,

\(^{125}\) Here I refer to Andrade and Rush 2016 and Baumbach and von Möllendorff 2017, respectively, although these are not the only instances of such associations (see for example Ní Mheallaigh 2014, who discusses the significance of Prometheus for Lucian). In this tendency to think about Lucian in terms of other figures, one might also include Menippus, whose literary relationship to Lucian has been of interest since Helm’s *Lukian und Menipp*. For an overview of the different narrative personas that appear across Lucian’s texts, see Baumbach and von Möllendorff 2017: 26-57.
on the one hand, and the controlling power of language, on the other, as well as how these elements factor into the author’s self-presentation. In the final section of the chapter, I explore briefly some aspects of the reception of Herakles in Renaissance-era France, with a view towards how these have bearing upon my earlier discussion of interpretation and language.

I. The Mask and Body of Herakles

Herakles has a subtle but persistent thematic presence across Lucian’s corpus. He is not featured as a prominent speaking character in the manner of Menippus, and even when he does appear as a character (Tragic Zeus, Runaways, Dialogues of the Dead 11, Dialogues of the Gods 15), he generally spends less time at the center of the action than other mythological figures like Zeus, Hermes, or even a personified Philosophy. This lack of stage time is perhaps why Herakles is not as easily identified as an emblematic figure for Lucian. Yet Lucian returns repeatedly to a range of the stories and images that are connected to this hero. As Deborah Gera has discussed, the choice of Herakles at the crossroads lies behind the encounter in Lucian’s Dream between Techne and Paideia.126 The same story is likewise one of the references that Lucian builds upon (and subverts) in the Professor of Public Speaking, when he contrasts the images of easy and difficult roads leading to a personified Rhetoric.127 Other traces of Herakles are evident elsewhere. In True History, the author encounters a monument left behind by Herakles and Dionysus. When Menippus descends to the Underworld in the Necymanteia, he dons a lion-skin and club as part of his disguise, in a joking allusion to Dionysus’ “Herakles” disguise in Aristophanes’ Frogs. The image of Herakles on his funeral pyre, accompanied by Philoctetes, is invoked in the Death of Peregrinus, a nod to Cynic reverence for Herakles, which is also referenced in Demonax and Sale of Lives.128 Philosopher, explorer, comic buffoon: Lucian’s Herakles may not usually take center stage, but he does wear many different masks.

At the points in Lucian where more literal masks of Herakles turn up, however, the interest falls instead on the hero’s body, which is used to comment on the bodies and bodily deportment of tragic actors. In Fisherman, when Parrhesiades describes fake philosophers as incompetent actors, one of the more evocative examples he can think of is an actor who is “soft” or weak (µαλθακός), effeminate (γυναικεῖος) and dissolute (θρυπτόµενος) attempting to play Herakles. Such inadequacy would be so offensive that Herakles would bash this actor with his club rather than allow for such a portrayal of himself (Fisherman 31). Variations on this image, with Herakles as one of the key roles that a feeble and effeminate actor might fail to live up to, appear also in Nigrinus 11,

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126 Gera 1995: 239-245; the reference is to Prodicus’ story in Xen. Mem. 2.1.22, in which a young Herakles must chose between a personified Arete and Kakia (“Virtue” and “Vice”).
128 For the Cynic reverence for Herakles see Diog. Laet. 6.71 (Life of Diogenes) and Prince 2015 on Antisthenes. Herakles/Hercules was also a significant figure for the Stoics: i.e., Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus, Hercules Furens, De Const.Sap. 2.1-2; Cic., Off. 3.5.25. For Lucian’s engagement with the Cynic tradition, see Branham 1989 and Relihan 1993.
Apology 5, and On Dancing 27. Although the specific uses of this image vary among the different texts, they seem to share the same basic implication that Herakles, at least as he appears in tragedy, must be a kind of man’s man, a hero’s hero, and therefore a body that is coded as effeminate and weak could never live up to this role. Any discrepancy, therefore, will surely be visible from the moment such an actor puts on this character’s mask.

This use of Herakles as paradigmatic example of gendered contrast is a bit more ambiguous than it first appears. The hero himself also has a “feminine” side, most notably in the accounts of Herakles donning female clothing during his enslavement to the Lydian queen Omphale. Lucian himself makes reference to this story in How to Write History 10: he compares unnecessarily embellished historical writing to a famous painting of Herakles and Omphale, in which she is wearing his lion skin and club, and he is wearing a woman's dress and working wool, while Omphale hits him with her sandal. This comparison is effectively the opposite of the failed portrayal of Herakles in Fisherman 31 and elsewhere. Rather than an effeminate man botching the role of a masculine hero, Herakles himself seems to be failing at the portrayal of a woman, which is marked by the contrast between body and costume. The feminine clothing he wears is said to be “falling off” (ἀφεστώς) and “not adhering” (μὴ προσίζάνουσα) to the hero’s body, and his masculinity is “unseemly feminized” (ἀσχημόνως καταπαγμένος) by the incongruous adornment. It is almost as if the feminine adornment fails to meet the standard of the masculine body, rather than the other way around. This failed performance nonetheless makes the same point as the other examples, marking inadequate performance by the presumably obvious discrepancy between body and costume. Likewise, it still reinforces the assumption that Herakles represents a particular kind of masculinity, which is necessarily opposite to any kind of femininity (and indeed ought to be forcibly excluded from it), perhaps all the more so by attaching the masculine standard to a body, rather than to a mask.

All of these examples assume a certain consistency to the representation of Herakles. Yet to interpret any of these images requires different levels of attention to both body and costume or mask and the relation between them, as well as the complex chain of references that both may invoke. “Herakles” is recognizable by a lion-skin, club, and bow, but not if the body wearing these is not strong enough to wield them; or perhaps he is recognizable without these, in the wrong kind of clothing, simply for the strength of his.

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129 We might also see in these attempted performances a further engagement with Arist. Frogs, in which the incongruity of the effeminate Dionysus’ “Herakles” disguise is a point of humor (cf. Frogs 42-48), as is the switching of the role between Dionysus and his slave Xanthias (cf. 494-673).

130 This story appears in Diodorus 4.31.5-8, Apollodorus 2.6.2-3, Propertius 3.11.17-20, Ovid Heroides 9.73-118 and Fasti 2.303-358. See Stafford 2012: 132-4. On the feminization of Herakles, see especially Loraux 1995. For alternate views see for example Llewellyn-Jones 2005.

131 This instance of a garment “feminizing” a body also recalls Sophocles Trach. 1046-1075, when Herakles, who is being consumed alive by Deianira’s poisoned tunic, laments that the destructive garment and the suffering it causes is turning him into a woman.
body. And what does it really mean to wear the costume of Herakles? Is he the tragic hero, venting his violent rage and madness? The comic buffoon? The Cynic proto-philosopher? The more we press the question, the less simple it seems.

II. Greek Herakles and Celtic Herakles

The one text in which the author explicitly aligns himself with Herakles contains the most peculiar variation on the hero out of all his appearances in Lucian. *Herakles: a Prolalia* describes a Celtic painting of Herakles, whom (the author explains) the Celts call Ogmios. This Herakles-Ogmios is depicted as a man of advanced age, grey-haired and bald, with a wrinkled and sun-darkened body, although still with the usual equipment of lion skin, club, and bow. He looks, the author remarks, rather more like a Charon or Iapetus than a Herakles. Even more strangely, the god is joined by a large group of men who are linked to him by fine gold and amber chains running from their ears to his tongue. The chained followers show no distress at their captivity, appearing instead to exult in it. As the author stands perplexed and dumbfounded in front of this strange painting, an unnamed Celtic man unravels the riddle of the painting (τῆς γραφῆς τὸ αἵνημα) for him thus: the Celts represent Herakles as an old man because they associated him with logos, which they believe more suited to old age. Thus the chains that link the god to his followers are a visual representation of the power of logos to influence its listeners. Likewise, the Celts view the physical strength and martial prowess typically associated with Herakles as a metaphor for rhetorical persuasion, which is the true power behind his heroic exploits. The meaning of the image thus explained, Lucian then pivots to himself, explaining that the Celtic representation of Herakles is a source of encouragement to him as he returns to performing as a sophist in his old age. The painting serves both as justification for the author’s appearance, preempting any critiques from his audience about the inappropriateness of his age, and as implicit assertion of his own rhetorical skill.

This combination of peculiar anecdote and justification of authorial self-presentation are common elements of all the six texts in Lucian’s corpus generally labeled *prolaliai*, or “introductions,” short set-pieces that may have introduced longer pieces in performance.\(^\text{132}\) The *prolaliai* are concerned with anticipating how the author will appear to his audiences and how they will respond to aspects of his sophistic performance and rhetorical style, especially those that might seem unusual or unexpected. Each serves to preempt these reactions by confronting, and in various ways subverting, expectations and assumptions, often through comparisons with strange or exotic images or phenomena that themselves involve the subversion of expectations and assumptions.\(^\text{133}\)

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\(^{132}\) See Nesselrath 1990: 111-114 for discussion of the label *prolalia* and the characteristics of the texts thus categorized, which typically includes *Herakles, Dionysus, Amber or the Swans, Zeuxis or Antioch, Herodotus or Aetion*, and *Dipsades*. “Prolalia” does not seem to have been the ancient term; it appears as only an alternate title for Lucian’s *Herakles* and *Dionysus* in manuscripts of the tenth century and later. Nesselrath notes parallels for a similar kind of introductory set-piece (perhaps called a *dialexis*) in post-classical epideictic oratory in some works of Dio of Prusa and Apuleius’ *Florida*, as well as in the description of introductory pieces labeled *lalia* in Menander Rhetor.

\(^{133}\) Nesselrath 1990: 116 observes that many of the stories told in the *prolaliai* appear in no other sources.
In this way, these pieces are a kind of converse to texts like *Fisherman* or the *Apology*, in which the author reacts to the interpretation and reception of his words after the fact. The *prolalai* instead operate from the front end of this process, attempting to control criticism before it even has a chance to start.

In *Herakles*, the criticism that is at stake, at least ostensibly, is the author’s old age and whether it is suited to rhetorical performance. Yet to reach this point, we must first confront the oddity of the example proffered in anticipation of this criticism. The sheer strangeness of the painting Lucian describes in *Herakles* has prompted much speculation about its inspiration. Especially in the early twentieth century scholarship on the text, there is extensive debate over the extent to which Lucian might have been inspired by a real image, or at the very least, whether or not the image he describes bears any resemblance to Celtic mythological traditions.\footnote{This debate is summarized in Spickermann 2008: 57-59 and Nesselrath 1990: 133n.34-35, 134n.36-38.} The existence of a Celtic god Ogmios is confirmed by the appearance of the name on two *defixiones* from early second century CE,\footnote{Found near Bregenz in western Austrian, region near Lake Constance. See Spickermann 2008: 57 for discussion and additional bibliography.} but no other literary or archaeological sources link this god to the Greek Herakles, nor has any Gallic depiction of Herakles that resembles Lucian’s description ever been found.\footnote{See Moitrieux 2002 for overview of cults of Herakles in Gaul.} Attempts to uncover the historical basis for this representation, or the symbolic associations it contains, therefore risk falling into circular arguments, in which the text itself constitutes the only solid evidence for its own subject. Other commentators, rejecting the existence of a specific painting or direct Celtic influence, propose reading this text as a vivid, but likely fictional, display of *ekphrasis*, in which the effect of the description matters more than the reality behind it.\footnote{Spikermann 2008, Favreau-Linder 2009, and Dubel 2014 take more or less this view towards the text.} This is the place from which I begin my investigation of the text. Rather than attempt to pinpoint external sources that will in some way elucidate the strangeness of *Herakles*, I seek to understand what the text achieves by introducing that strangeness in the first place.

The two features of the Herakles-Ogmios portrayal that combine to signify rhetorical prowess – the unexpectedly advanced age of the god’s body and the inclusion of the chained followers – are the same features that make this depiction so peculiar, and indeed are explicitly highlighted as such in the author’s description. Precisely what makes each of these features strange, however, differs slightly, in a way that seems to me to be indicative of their significance in the text. The god’s old age is marked as strange because it is unexpected for the context in which it appears. The body of Herakles-Ogmios runs counter to Greek expectations for what this particular divine body will look like, as well as assumptions about what that body, given its appearance, will signify. Only through an explanation from a non-Greek perspective (whether real or imagined) do we come to understand what this body means. The gold and amber chains linking tongue and ears are also unexpected, presumably, and have a similar shock value for this reason, but their strangeness seems to have as much to do with what they symbolize in their own right. The inclusion of this element in the painting provides a concrete allegory for the
power of *logos* that seem to align rhetorical persuasion with forceful, constraining and even violent physical power. The description and explanation of the Herakles-Ogmios painting thus engages with issues of language, rhetoric, and interpretation in two slightly different ways. The subverting of expectations around the body of Herakles-Ogmios, and the subsequent explanation of its apparent deviation, suggest a process of interpretation that requires multiple, overlapping frameworks in order to fully make sense. We are invited to read the body of Herakles, and then to read it again, and only in this double reading does it become comprehensible. If other representations of Herakles in Lucian capitalize on the mythical and moral ambiguities of this god, his manifestation in this text seems to go a step further, offering a glimpse of a body as an inherently polyvalent object. The depiction of the power of *logos*, on the other hand, suggests a latent violence within rhetorical persuasion that seems to implicate both listener and speaker alike. In contrast to the flexible quality of interpretation implied by the polyvalent body of Herakles, the power of rhetoric/language is imagined as immobilizing and coercive, capable of controlling and even harming bodies in physical terms.

In the following sections of this chapter, I examine these two facets of the *proslalia*: first, the double reading of Herakles’ body and its implications for interpretation, then, the chains and their implications for the power and violence of language. Each of these aspects of Herakles contributes to the author’s self-presentation and reflection on his own position as an orator, and so I conclude this portion of the chapter by discussing this dimension of the text.

### A. The Double Reading of the Body

The interpretation of the Celtic painting of Herakles is a carefully staged process in the narrative structure of the text, gradually revealing additional layers of meaning to the reader. This unfolding process of interpretation relies on the assumption of two interpretive perspectives: “Greek,” in the narrative voice of the author who provides the description of the image, and “Celtic,” in the voice of the Celtic interpreter who explains it. The god in the painting is both the Greek Herakles and the Celtic Ogmios, and understanding him as such necessitates two overlapping frameworks of symbolic meaning. We can examine the implications of this doubled perspective, I think, without necessarily assuming access to a genuinely “Celtic” worldview. Rather, the inherent double-ness of the representation, its simultaneous familiarity and unfamiliarity, is precisely what defines it. The double perspective maps not only onto the two narrative voices that describe and interpret the image, but also onto the two parts of the god’s appearance, his body and his adornment, and the way these combine to form the full significance of his representation. The aged and sunburnt body marks the figure as the Celtic Herakles-Ogmios, rather than one of the more typical Greek manifestations of the hero, while his “costume” (*skeuē*) of lion skin, club, and bow nonetheless marks him definitively as Herakles and not a Charon or Iapetus. More precisely, these characteristic items are what make the god recognizable as Herakles for a Greek viewer, while the body is, from this perspective, an unexpected and unfamiliar addition that requires the explanation of a Celtic interpretive framework. From a hypothetical Celtic perspective, in contrast, the appearance of the body is the important element of the image, because it is central to their association of the god with *logos*. If the god is not recognizable to a Greek as Herakles without his costume, he is likewise presumably unrecognizable as Ogmios, to a Celt, without his aged body. Yet neither the body and costume nor the contrasting ways
of viewing and interpreting them can be fully separated from one another. The combination of body and costume makes this figure simultaneously Herakles and not-Herakles, Ogmios while still being Herakles; the combination of “Greek” description and “Celtic” explanation likewise enables this representation of the god to be interpreted as such.

The internal interpreter of the painting himself occupies a comparable space of overlap. The unnamed Celtic man who speaks to the author is described as both an expert in local customs (φιλόσοφος ... τὰ ἐπίμορια) and “not uneducated” in “our” customs (οὐκ ἀπαίδευτος τὰ ἡμέτερα), as demonstrated by his precise (ἀκριβῶς) ability to speak Greek. He is thus uniquely positioned to see the painting from both perspectives and to bridge the gap between the two through his explanation. The nature of his in-between position, as well as the manner in which he interprets the painting, nonetheless make clear that the overall frame of the text is Greek, and even the supposedly “Celtic” can only be articulated through Greek terms. Although the Celt’s ability to interpret Herakles-Ogmios is based on his expertise in local customs, this expertise needs to be verified by the additional capacity to communicate clearly in Greek, for a Greek audience. This is further emphasized in his interpretation, which, although purportedly an explanation of Celtic beliefs, consists entirely of Greek literary references. To support the Celtic claim that rhetoric is more suitably represented by an elderly figure, he weaves together several references from the Iliad that make a similar connection between old age and skill in speaking. Even the chain piercing the tongue of Herakles-Ogmios is justified by an otherwise unknown comic fragment. The strangeness of the “Celtic” imagination becomes legible through the most familiar of Greek images and symbols.

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138 As with possible historical inspirations for the painting, the identity of this anonymous Celtic philosophe has been a subject of speculation. Dubel 2014: 96n14 identifies this figure as a Druid. Amato 2004 argues for identifying him instead with the famous sophist Favorinus, native of Gaul, to whom Lucian refers indirectly and by name in several other texts (Eumuch 7, Demonax 12). Whether or not this particular interaction between Lucian and Favorinus ever took place (Amato argues that it is at least plausible), we could see this anecdote as an inter-textual engagement between the two authors, both similarly positioned as Hellenized non-Greeks (Amato 2004: 139-143). This level of identification seems somewhat unnecessary; the similarity between the Celt and the author as Hellenized “barbarians” is evident whether or not there is a specific individual behind this character.

139 Nestor’s honey tongue (τοῦ Νέστορος ἀπορρεῖ ἐκ τῆς γλώττης τὸ μέλι), Il. 1.249; and the “flowery” speech of the elderly Trojan agorētai (οἱ ἄγορηται τῶν Τρώων τὴν ὀπα τήν [λειριόεσσαν] ἀφιάσαι εὐανθῆ τινα), Il. 3.150-2. The Homeric λειριόεσσαν is bracketed by Macleod (and omitted in Harmon’s 1913 Loeb edition) as a gloss, although the word does appear in the Il. 3.152. Perhaps relevant to this uncertainty is the fact that Lucian’s text contains its own gloss, as it were: immediately after these references, the Celt adds the explanatory aside: λείρια γὰρ καλεῖτα, εἰ γε μέμνημαι, τὰ ἄνθη. In an interesting reversal of roles, the Celt appears to be explaining Homeric Greek to a Greek audience.

140 τοῖς λάλοις ἐὰν ἄκρον ἢ γλῶττα πασίν ἔστι τετρυπημένη: “the tongue of every chatterer is pierced at the tip” (Com. Adesp. 398).
The interpretation of Celtic imagery through a Greek framework further suggests that *Herakles* is less concerned with actual Celtic mythology than it is with the possibilities of an outsider’s perspective. A point of comparison may be found in another text that directs its gaze onto the non-Greek world: Lucian’s *On the Syrian Goddess.*[^141] As Jas Elsner has shown, this text employs a complex cultural positioning towards its subject, the temple of the Syrian goddess Atargis at Hierapolis. Its first-person narrator, who identifies himself as an Assyrian, describes the iconography, rituals, and stories associated with the temple, in an account that is clearly framed for a Greek audience, but which relies on the authority of autopsy and the author’s position as an insider to the culture he describes.[^142] He thus occupies a similar position, and performs a similar interpretive function, to the anonymous Celt in *Herakles*, one that is articulated by multiple, overlapping frames of reference. These many layers are particularly noticeable in the discussion of several statues of gods in and around the temple complex, one of which, an image (*xoanon*) of Apollo (*Syrian Goddess* 35), contains an interesting parallel to Herakles-Ogmios. In his discussion of the image, the narrator presents this Apollo as the Greek Apollo without qualification, unlike some of the other gods we encounter in this section, who have both Greek and Syrian names, or are assigned multiple identities on account of the difference between their Greek and Syrian associations.[^143] Except that this Apollo, like the Celtic Herakles, differs from typical Greek depictions in the age of his body, which is mature and bearded rather than beardless and youthful. And just as the Celt justifies that representation by reasoning that old age is a better symbol of rhetorical skill, the Syrians believe that their choice of representation is more accurate on the basis of what youth and old age represent. To the Syrians, the narrator explains, that it would be incorrect to make an image of a god *atelēs*, and they consider youth to be *atelēs.*[^144] This assertion, as Elsner notes, momentarily flips the dominant perspective of the text; rather than viewing Syrian customs through a Greek lens, we get a glimpse of how the Syrians view Greek customs, and even their claim to be more correct in their choice of representation.[^145]

Just as the aged body of Herakles-Ogmios distinguishes him as the Celtic *interpretatio* of an otherwise familiar figure, so too the bearded face of the Syrian Apollo

[^141]: Andrade 2013: 303-4 also notes the parallel between *Herakles* and *On the Syrian Goddess.*

[^142]: Elsner 2001: 126-128. Elsner reads the text as an act of cultural translation that combines elements of Herodotean autopsy and religious pilgrimage. Andrade 2013 expands Elsner’s approach into a larger argument about Lucian’s presentation of his complex cultural position (Hellenized Syrian living under Rome); the polyvalence of the religious iconography in *On the Syrian Goddess* is an important image for this argument.

[^143]: *On the Syrian Goddess* 31-32, on statues of Zeus and Hera in the *aduton* of the temple: “Zeus” is unmistakably Zeus, according to the author, but the Syrians call him by another name (which is not provided); “Hera” is described as both Hera and a multitude of other (Greek) goddesses, and is surrounded by adornments and offerings that mark her as both Pan-hellenic and pan-barbarian. See Elsner 2001:137-8 for additional discussion.

[^144]: Elsner 2001: 139 notes that the choice of *atelēs* here is significant, since this word also denotes the incompleteness of ritual actions.

[^145]: Elsner 2001: 139-140.
differentiates him from all other representations of the god, while not making him something other than a (presumably) recognizable Apollo. Explicit in this text, however, is the possibility that this alternative representation contains its own claim to truth, one that is even critical of the dominant frame from which it deviates. The narrator is clear that not only do the Syrians believe their image of the god to be more correct, but they also reproach (κατέγορεος) the Greeks for representing Apollo and other gods as youthful, incorrectly. To be sure, this claim is not without its own degree of ambiguity; it is also possible, Elsner observes, to read the Syrian critique of Greek representation as subtle mockery of the Syrians themselves, indicative of their misunderstanding of Greek representation. Even so, this moment in the text seems to allow for some possibility of imagining what the Greeks and Greek gods might look like to a Syrian, and suggesting that they might be just as strange and incomprehensible from the outside as Syrian customs appear to Greeks. If the dominant mode of this text is the work of translating the foreign and unknown into familiar terms, it seems also to acknowledge, if only briefly, that the “familiar” can seem strange to others.

The interplay of perspectives in Herakles is not precisely the same as in On the Syrian Goddess, because the first-person narrator is not the one responsible for interpreting/translated the painting into Greek terms, and thus the Celtic representation is more explicitly marked as strange and unfamiliar before we are offered a frame in which to understand it. This text does nevertheless contain its own brief moment of acknowledging a Celtic perspective towards the Greeks: in chapter 2, the author supposes that the Celts have chosen to represent Herakles as an old man as a kind of retaliation for the actions that the hero himself took against them in his travels:

ὅμην οὖν ἐφ᾽ ὑβρεῖ τὸν Ἑλληνίων θεὸν τοιαῦτα παρανομεῖν τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐς τὴν μορφὴν τὴν Ἡρακλέους ἀμυνομένους αὐτόν τῇ γραφῇ, ὅτι τὴν χώραν ποτὲ αὐτῶν ἐπήλθην λείαν ἐλαύνων, ὁπότε τὰς Γηρυόνου ἀγέλας ζητῶν κατέδραμε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐσπερίων γενόν.

I supposed therefore that the Celts committed such an offense towards the appearance of Herakles in insolence of the Greek gods, and that they were punishing him by means of the painting because he once came through their land with stolen cattle, at the time when he raided most of the western peoples while seeking the herds of Geryon (2).

On the one hand, this speculation still keeps the Greek frame in place, assuming that Greek legends about Herakles are a universal given, and marking the deviation from typical Greek depiction as an act of insolence (hubris). Yet the author’s comment also

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146 Curiously, the narrator provides a second strange feature for the Syrian representation of Apollo: μούνοι Απόλλωνι εἴμαι κοσμέουσιν (“they alone adorn Apollo with clothes”) (On the Syrian Goddess 35). No further details about this clothing are provided.

147 Elsner 2001: 141. Elsner observes that a similar ambiguity arises when we try to parse many of the unusual Syrian rituals that the narrator goes on to describe in the sections of text that follow: are we meant to marvel at foreign strangeness, or solemnly appreciate a religious experience that the author himself claims to have undergone?
seems momentarily sympathetic to the perspective of a foreign people, acknowledging that they might be motivated by wrongs previously done to them. The language of cattle raiding (λείαν ἑλαύνων) in particular invokes war and conquest, with Herakles as the aggressive invader and the Celts as a subjugated people.\textsuperscript{148} This moment of sympathy for the position of a foreign (and even conquered) nation acknowledges that by virtue of their different position in the story, as it were, the Celts might view Herakles differently than the Greeks do. Imagining through their eyes, a Greek viewer is then prompted to see familiar things as strange and unfamiliar.\textsuperscript{149}

With its doubled, overlapping frameworks of interpretation, and the interplay of familiar and unfamiliar perspectives, the body of Herakles-Ogmios thus seems to offer a different way of thinking about bodies and identities than the attempted performances of Herakles elsewhere in Lucian. Rather than insisting that only one kind of body is appropriate for the god, and that any other kind would necessarily result in an unconvincing or unsuccessful representation, this text imagines a situation in which a different kind of body might be meaningful in its own right. It arrives at this possibility by allowing for different interpretive perspectives – different eyes that may see the same object, but that understand or construct meaning out of it in different ways. It is important to note that this possibility of polyvalence does not precisely map onto either a costume change (in which a single, stable body can take on multiple identities via change of masks), or a progression of actors bringing their varying bodies to a fixed costume/character role. Full understanding of the representation still relies on the interpretation of both body and costume and the relationship between the two; both are potentially changeable, separately or in concert, and both are potentially stable, depending on the reference point of the viewer.

B. Golden chains and the power of speech

Any interpretation of the body of Herakles-Ogmios is incomplete, however, without consideration of its other strange feature: the chains that bind the ears of the other men in the painting to the mouth of Herakles (3). The author devotes a full half of his description to this aspect of the painting, emphasizing its especially unusual and odd (παραδοξότατον, ἀτοπώτατον) quality, even as he seems also to revel in the fine details. The linking chains are described as σειραὶ λεπταί (delicate ropes)\textsuperscript{150} of gold and amber, resembling the most beautiful necklaces (ὅρυς καλλίστοις). They are so delicate, the narrator observes, that the men being dragged along could easily break free. Yet they do not even strain at their captivity, but seem to rejoice in it, even slackening the bonds.

\textsuperscript{148} As Favreau-Linder 2009: 161-2 observes. Favreau-Linder notes also the similarity between the language of this passage and the ways that Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus both recount Herakles’ “civilizing” of the Celts. See n.154.

\textsuperscript{149} Another comparison here might be the encounter between the Indians and the invading forces of Dionysus in Lucian’s prolalia of the same name, in which the familiar Greek symbols of a Bacchic revelry become strange and incomprehensible through the imagined eyes of the Indians. See Branham 1989 on this text.

\textsuperscript{150} The word σειραί appears several times elsewhere in Lucian (Tragic Zeus 14, Zeus Accused 4, Hermotimus 3, How to Write History 8), always specifically in reference to the “golden chain” (σαρή χρυσεῖν) with which Zeus threatens to bind the other gods (II. 8.17-27). This suggests that its use here may imply a similar divine binding power.
(ἐπιχαλῶντες) and overtaking their captor in their eagerness to be led. Even more surprising is that the end of this leash is not in Herakles’ hand, as one might expect; the artist (the author explains) had already filled both hand with the club and bow, respectively. Instead, the other end of the chain pierces (τρυπήσας) the tip of the god’s tongue, which is visible in the open and smiling (μειδιῶν) mouth he turns toward his captives.

What makes this arrangement particularly strange is that it juxtaposes an undercurrent of violence with the appearance of pleasure.\(^{151}\) On the one hand, the binding and dragging of the men leads us to expect a scene of forcible submission and physical humiliation, evoking slavery and perhaps even war and conquest.\(^{152}\) Yet these captive men are visibly happy and willingly submissive, their captor grinning. Even the chains themselves resemble jewelry rather than ropes or fetters, the gold and amber material suggesting opulent adornment that has been strangely repurposed, and should not even be physically capable of securing captives in the first place.\(^{153}\) The overall effect is paradoxical: bonds that bind without actually binding, captives that follow without needing to be led, and violence resulting in pleasure rather than suffering. We might account for this paradox of violence and pleasure in terms of what the image is intended to symbolize, that is, the replacement of physical force with rhetorical persuasion, which can achieve the control over others through pleasure rather than suffering. Yet even if the aim is to elevate speech over force, the effect of the juxtaposition seems rather to be an entanglement of physical violence with speech, such that one cannot be cleanly separated

\(^{151}\) There are a variety of parallels for the metaphorical or literal binding of tongue and/or ears and the binding power of language in general. These include the phenomena of “binding” spells (katadesmoi), as well as numerous associations between magic and the power of rhetoric, poetry, and music. On magic and binding spells see for example Faraone 2001, Collins 2008; for magic and rhetoric, de Romilly 1975. For this particular scene, we can see resonance for example in Plat. Protag. 315a-b, in which the sophist Protagoras is compared to Orpheus, surrounded like a chorus by a crowd of followers who have been enchanted by his voice. The chains in this image also recall Plat. Ion 533d-e, in which Socrates uses the metaphor of a magnetically linked chain of rings to describe poetic inspiration. Binding or ensnaring of the ears as a metaphor for being pleasantly (and metaphorically) captivated by speech appears elsewhere in Lucian: ἀναδήσαμενος τῶν ὄτων (Tragic Zeus 45), and “hanging by the ears,” ἐκ τῶν ὄτων ἀπηρτημένον (Icaromenippus 3).

\(^{152}\) Favreau-Linder 2009: 163 observes that this arrangement resembles a procession of war captives in the Roman triumph.

\(^{153}\) It may only be a coincidence, but the combination of gold and amber (χρυσοῦ καὶ ἡλέκτρου) perhaps also recall the opulent hormoi of gold with amber beads that are exchanged on a few occasions in the Odyssey (15.460, 18.295-6). This speculation gains some ground from the fact that Lucian does quote directly from Odyssey 18 at the end of the text: οὖν ἐκ ῥακέων ὁ γέρων ἐπιγονίδα φαίνει (Od. 18.74). If we posit some kind of allusion, both appearances of this necklace are (rather ill-fated) instances of persuasion involving deceitful speech (the Phoenician pirates bribing Eumaeus’ nurse in Book 15, and the suitors’ gifts to Penelope in Book 18).
from the other. The golden chains might result in cheerful, willing captives, but they still suggest that the power embedded in speech is the power to direct, coerce, and control bodies, just as literal chains do. And even if Herakles’ arrows are really just symbols for well-aimed *logoi*, and the hero’s conquering strength lies in his speech rather than his body, the allegory only works if we have a parallel image of Herakles as a physically strong figure who is capable of violence with the weapons he still carries, even in this supposedly weakened manifestation. Speech might replace physical violence, but the implication still seems to be that language itself contains the equivalent power to control bodies, and thus the potential for the violence.

This implication is central to the reading of *Herakles* proposed by Anne-Marie Favreau-Linder, who interprets the overlap of violence and speech as a metaphor for the “civilizing” force of language in an imperial context. She argues that this representation of Herakles invokes his association with exploration and the conquest of barbarians, both through the direct reference to myths of his western travels, and in the stark visual symbolism of his chained followers, reminiscent of the prisoners of war displayed in a Roman triumph. This Herakles, however, fights and conquers by the power of *logos*, which Favreau-Linder interprets in this context as representative of Greek *paideia*, rooted in the mastery of Greek language. Thus, in this imagining of conquests, the civilizing force of Greek *paideia* replaces the civilizing force of Roman military conquest, and is even marked as superior to Roman might, insofar as it seems to imagine the conquered as willing and happy. This “civilizing” process is itself enacted in the text through the translation of Celtic iconography into a Greek framework, by an interpreter who is positioned, like Lucian, as a barbarian successfully Hellenized through master of *paideia*. Read from this angle, the dominant narrative of the text is less about imagining a different perspective, than it is about glorifying the success of one particular perspective in dominating via language, even if it briefly acknowledges and sympathizes with other possible viewpoints.

In trying to account for the violence done through language, this reading misses one crucial detail of the chained followers of Herakles-Ogmios; namely, the fact that the end of the chain is pierced through the tip of the god’s tongue. The text frames this part of the painting as strange and unusual, assumed to provoke surprise and shock. This detail is revealed only at the end of the description, deliberately delaying access to what might, in actual viewing, be the most striking part of the image. The author makes a show of disavowing hesitation before the reveal, as if anticipating disbelief or outrage: ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον εἶναι μοι ἔδοξεν, οὐκ ἴκνήσω καὶ τοῦτο εἰπὲν (the thing that I thought strangest of all, I will not hesitate to speak of) (3). Even the Celtic *philosophos* is

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154 Favreau-Linder 2009: 159-163. For Herakles as conqueror, see for example Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Rom. Ant.* 1.41.1-3, Strabo 4.1.7, both of which present Herakles as a kind of prototype of Roman conquest. The association of Herakles and exploration of “undiscovered” lands is also referenced in Lucian’s *True Histories*. See Georgiadou and Larmour 1995 for the suggestion that *Herakles* could have been the *prolalia* to *True Histories*.

155 And even if Roman imperial expansion nonetheless underlies the whole encounter in practical terms. Favreau-Linder 2009: 163.

156 Favreau-Linder 2009: 164-5.
quick to assure his Greek audience that the pierced tongue is not meant as *hubris* against Herakles (5),\(^{157}\) which seems only to highlight the possibility that someone might interpret it as such. Like the other paradoxical features of the binding arrangement, the piercing makes a kind of sense as a metaphor: the tongue, the instrument of speech, holding a chain that symbolizes speech or song. Yet it is difficult to get away from the physicality of this detail. The description prompts us to imagine the physical limitations of the painting and the body within it: the god’s hands are full and there is nowhere else to put the end of the chains, so the painter opted to (or had no option but to?) pierce the tongue to attach them. Moreover, the concrete implications of this choice seem to disrupt the mapping of metaphor onto the image, since presumably a chain stuck through the god’s tongue would actually make it more difficult for him to speak. Even the Greek parallel that the Celt offers by way of reassurance, from an otherwise unknown comic fragment, seems to re-inscribe this physicality without fully explaining its metaphorical significance: τὸ ἵς λάλοις ἐξ ἄκρου ἡ γλῶττα πᾶσιν ἐστὶ τετρυπημένη: “the tongue of every chatterer is pierced at the tip” (5). We are left without a straightforward explanation for this markedly strange detail. Why should the captor, rather than his captives, be pierced by his own chain?\(^ {158}\) Is the speaker somehow wounded by his own speech?

I draw attention to Herakles’ pierced tongue not because it necessarily invalidates Favreau-Linder’s reading, but because I think it should prompt us to unpack a bit more carefully what we mean by the violence embedded in language. It is certainly true that a weapon- and chain-bearing Herakles as a symbol of *logos* asks us to imagine the power of speech as a weapon wielded by a speaker, which he uses to persuade and control his listeners, even to conquer and subdue them, and as a chain he drags to solidify control over those he has successfully conquered. The potential violence and/or controlling power of language, therefore, can be understood to lie in its capacity to be used by an authoritative speaker to enact violence or exert control. Yet the piercing of the god’s tongue suggests that the speaker is also somehow affected materially by the power that he wields. The captor, too, is physically bound to the chains of *logos*, even, in a strange way, wounded by them. The power of language, then, seems to lie as much in the chains themselves as it does in the one who handles them, since even he cannot escape their effects. We might note here the similarity between these delicate *seirai* and Lacan’s description of the signifying chain as “links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of another necklace made of links.”\(^ {159}\) Which is to say, it is possible to think about the power of language not only in instrumental terms, but also in terms of how it structures the world, how it creates and orients particular patterns of meaning. In such terms, the

\(^{157}\) As if he has heard the narrator’s speculation in chapter 2 about the Celts’ insolent retaliation for Herakles’ cattle thieving.

\(^{158}\) Of course, the captives’ ears are also attached to the chain, but it is not specified that they are pierced in the same way (the captives are simply described as “bound from their ears,” ἐκ τῶν ὀτίων ἀπαντάς δεδεμένως). It is possible that this part is implied, given that pierced ears would be a less strange and unexpected concept (the verb *truphein* is used for pierced ears and the wearing of earrings in Xen. *Ana.* 3.1.31). Nonetheless, the description seems constructed to highlight the violence inflicted on the tongue, more than the ears.

question of where that power originates or who ultimately wields it is more ambiguous, if it is even possible to delineate at all; persuader and persuaded alike only emerge as subjects within the chain that binds them. It is true that unlike Lacan’s signifying chain, the chains of Herakles-Ogmios have a defined beginning and end, and we can distinguish between a victor at one end and captives at the other. It does seem nonetheless that the power they represent is also embedded in the linking together of both speaker and listeners; and as such, that the power of language to control or enact violence upon bodies is not only a matter of who wields what end of it, but perhaps something latent in language itself, to which all bodies are potentially vulnerable.

The piercing of the tongue, in particular, seems to highlight this vulnerability; it is not merely that the god is bound up in the chains that he leads, but also that he is physically impacted by this attachment, and in a form that invokes some level of physical harm, even if the grinning Herakles does not seem precisely to be suffering from it. I have noted how the literal implications of the tongue piercing cut across the metaphor: the source of speech, the tongue, mutilated (as it were) by the act of speaking. As a metaphor, it suggests not only that the speaker is vulnerable to the violence that is latent in language, but also that he is vulnerable precisely at the point when he himself seeks to enact that violence against others. In this way, the tongue here seems to encapsulate a paradox similar to that which Derrida identifies for the mouth in *la bête et le soverain* (*The Beast and the Sovereign*). Derrida observes that the mouth is site of both orality and language (associated with sovereign power, the enforcer of the law), and eating or devouring, particularly in the sense of voracious, destructive consuming (associated with the figure of the beast, or the outlaw). The mouth is thus the place at which the difference between the beast and the sovereign “both expresses itself and collapses;” that is, the point where the two figures seem most different, yet also where that difference becomes indistinguishable. For Lucian’s Herakles-Ogmios, the piercing creates a similar kind of collapse of difference. On the one hand, the attachment of the chain to the tongue versus the ears is what differentiates the speaker and the listeners, the persuasive *rhetor* and the captive audience he has ensnared, the chains themselves representing the path that speech follows. Yet by virtue of the tongue being attached via piercing to those chains, that path of speech also physically impacts or wounds the speaker, making him subject to the power of *logos* in a way that he does not fully control. The god’s pierced tongue is therefore the locus both for the power that he exerts upon others and his own potential vulnerability to that same power.

C. Vulnerability as Defense?

The explanation that is offered in the text for the pierced tongue avoids addressing what that vulnerability might look like outside of the image itself. Perhaps the full implication of this *pantōn atopōtaton* risk undermining the claim to the superior power of *logos* that Herakles-Ogmios represent. But *Herakles* does engage further with the

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160 See Derrida 2009: 46, 100; quote is from Danta 2014: 37.
161 In Derrida’s discussion, the paradox of the mouth and the potential for collapse it contains contribute to the conclusion that sovereignty is itself “devouring,” in the sense that it contains its own destruction embedded within it. The possibility of self-*destruction* might be extreme for the case of Herakles-Ogmios, given that the effect of the tongue piercing is at most one of binding and wounding, rather than devouring entirely.
possibility of vulnerability in the final sections of the text (7-8), when the author turns to talking about himself. At this point, the text circles back to the first part of the description of the Celtic Herakles and its focus on the god’s unexpected old age, which becomes the point of comparison between the painting and the author’s own situation. Here, at last, we are offered the reason why this peculiar image is relevant for this *prolalia*: because both Lucian and Herakles-Ogmios are old men, indeed the same age (ἡλικιώτης). This similarity allows the Celtic painting to be an encouraging reminder to the author as he contemplates returning to sophistic performances in his old age. He admits to initial trepidation about how he might appear to audiences, wondering whether he would face criticism or mockery for behaving in a manner more appropriate to a young man. Recalling the elderly Herakles, however, he feels emboldened to stay on this course. Even if he now must relinquish physical attributes like strength, beauty, and dexterity, he still has access to the power of speech, and so will be able to drag crowds by the ears, as it were, and hit his targets with his arrows every time.

This comparison seems to elide some of earlier sense of cultural and interpretive distance that the author expressed in his initial viewing of the Celtic image, in favor of the one salient similarity that both author and painting possess. Now it seems as though sufficient explanation has been given for Herakles-Ogmios, and the only strangeness that continues to be a concern is the possible incongruity of an old man performing epideictic speeches. While the Celt’s speech drew a favorable contrast between old age and youth in terms of wisdom and experience, here the author focuses on the possible negative connotations of such a contrast. When he imagines potential critiques of his position, he seems to imagine that his audiences will associate oratory with youth, rather than old age, referring to it as a pursuit more typically appropriate for a young man using almost redundant phrases (μειρακιώδη ταύτα ποιεῖν, νεανιεύσεθαι) (7). He then imagines some youth “Homerically” reproaching him with quotes from the *Iliad* on the grievous effects of age upon the body and physical strength: “σὴ δὲ βίη λέλυται, “ἡπεδανὸς δὲ νῦ τοι θεράπων, βραδές δέ τοι ἤπει” (8). Given that these quotes are addressed to Nestor, this is an interesting inverse to the Celt’s reference to τοῦ Νέστωρος ἄπορρει ἐκ τῆς γλώττης τὸ μέλη, honey dripping from Nestor’s tongue). Even in the act of presenting an elderly Herakles as a positive counterpoint, the text lingers on the physical vulnerability of old age—the dissolving of bodily strength, the creeping in of weakness and slowness. We might be reminded by this that an old Herakles is not merely strange because unexpected as a way of representing the hero, but also because of the way such a figure juxtaposes associations of strength with the realities of physical weakness and vulnerability. Just as he is, paradoxically, both chainer and chained, Herakles-Ogmios is also at once weak and strong, vulnerable and powerful. If the author shares an age with this god, then presumably he is also vulnerable, yet powerful, in the same way.

The paradoxical admission of vulnerability as part of authorial self-defense recalls Lucian’s *Apology*, another text in which the author’s age is central to the premise of the text. It is also as a self-described old man that the author of the *Apology* grapples with the loss of control over the interpretation of a previously disseminated text and the

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162 More precisely, the one reproaching is τίς Ὁµηρικὸς νεανίσκος, which Harmon 1913 translates delightfully as “some young fellow full of Homer.”
resulting consequences for his self-representation. Throughout the text, the association of old age with bodily weakness and suffering contributes to the representation of the author’s vulnerability and abjection. The Apology is also interested in old age as evocative of the passing of time, since it is the contrast between (past) text and (present) body that both precipitates the need for a defense and also offers opportunity for revision. The fact that the author in Herakles talks about a return to sophistic performance after a long hiatus hints at a similar concern with the consequences of time on potential audience response. In accordance with this text’s function as a prolalia, rather than an apologia, this concern is proactive, rather than reactive; rather than wait to be caught off guard by a change in audience interpretation, Herakles preemptively acknowledges the vulnerability of its author, while providing his audiences with an alternate framework for understanding that vulnerability.

The author of Herakles lingers only briefly in self-pity about his own bodily condition. No sooner has he imagined the possible jibes of some youth against him, than he recalls his similarity to the Celtic Herakles and feels emboldened to bid farewell (χαρέτω) to all bodily strength and beauty, in favor of the metaphorical strength that rhetoric still affords him, symbolized by Herakles’ chains and arrows. He signs this grand gesture of farewell with an aphorism of indifference: ὁ Ἱπποκλείδης οὐ φροντὶ (Hippocleides doesn’t care) (Herakles 8). This (adapted) quote, and the turn from anxiety about vulnerability to the declaration of indifference that it implies, are another link between this text and the Apology. In the very final chapter (15) of the latter text, the author suddenly becomes dismissive of the whole affair he is discussing, remarking to his addressee that he composed this defense “although in the midst of countless other matters of business” (καίτοι ἐν μυρίαις ταῖς ἀσχολίαις, Apol. 15). If there are any further accusations, all he has to say towards them is οὐ φροντὶς Ἱπποκλείδης, “It is not a concern to Hippocleides.” This saying, here a direct quote from Herodotus (6.129), is left as the final word of his self-defense. In both texts, this gesture and quote seem to cast doubt on what has been said previously, leaving the text with a deliberate lack of resolution. If Lucian really didn’t care what his audiences thought, surely there would be no need for a defense, whether reactive or preemptive?

One possible explanation lies in a reading of the quote, οὐ φροντὶς Ἱπποκλείδης. While clearly meant both in its original and quoted contexts to be an assertion of indifference, the story in Herodotus that it references is also concerned with performance, bodily display, and audience reaction. The Hippocleides of Herodotus 6.129 is almost engaged to the daughter of Kleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, but loses his chance at the marriage after some outlandish dancing at a feast. Herodotus describes a progression of behavior that progressively increases the prospective father-in-law’s disapproval: Hippocleides first dances by himself, apart from the others suitors, then on top of a table, and finally engages in a dance of his own invention, in which he puts his head on the table and waves his legs in the air (τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔρεισας ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν τοῦτο σκέλεσι ἔχωρονομησε) (Hdt. 6.129). This final antic proves too much for Kleisthenes, and he tells Hippocleides that his has “danced away” (ἀπορχήσαο) his marriage, to which the young man responds with the phrase that later becomes a saying for expressions of indifference.

Whatever Hippokleides’ motivations may have been, one way of looking at this story is as a failed performance, in which the performer (the youthful Hippokleides) and the audience (the elderly Kleisthenes) lack a mutual understanding of what a “correct” or
“successful” ought to look like. When Hippokleides first starts to dance, the text notes that his dancing was pleasing to himself (ἑωτο ἀρεστος), but that Kleisthenes viewed with suspicion (ὑπωτευε). Therein seems to be the mistake; the young man has no thought of how someone else might see his dancing, but is only concerned with how he, himself, experiences and understands it. This gap is progressively widened with each new dancing style, culminating in a form that is so unconventional and inverted that a word must be re-purposed in order to describe it: χειρονομεω normally means to gesticulate with the hands; if he is τοισι σκέλεσι ἐχειρονόμησε, then he is in effect, using his legs like arms. To its audience, this sensational but baffling dance is comprehensible only as disrespectful behavior, and the performer does nothing to defend against this judgment. Yet by speaking in Hippohleides’ voice at the end of Herakles and Apology, Lucian seems to take the position of the misunderstood dancer, rather than the disapproving viewer. In this way, he implies what has already been suggested by the interpretation of Herakles-Ogmios; namely, that a performance, or a painting, may simply seem strange and even disrespectful, only because a viewer does not yet have the correct interpretive framework through which to understand it. This conclusion allows the author to acknowledge the possibility of vulnerability while deflecting it away from himself.

III. From Herakles Ogmios to Hercules Gallicus

To borrow a phrase from Lucian, I have not yet mentioned the most paradoxical aspects of the image of Herakles, which arise in its curious afterlife as both a text and an image. The first part of this trail of paradoxes lies in the inverse relationship of text and image, description and object. Herakles is a text based upon the description of a painting that itself likely has no prior or independent existence; the text precedes the image, conjuring up the presence of the absent painting. But when we take into consideration the reception of this text, this creation of presence is more than rhetorical, for Lucian’s vivid ekphrasis has the unintended consequence of giving the image it describes a real existence, if more than a thousand years after the composition of the text. During the 1500s in Western and Southern Europe, shortly after the first translations of Lucian’s texts into Latin and vernacular European languages become available, there appear also a multitude of visual representations of Herakles with chained followers, most of them prints of woodblock engravings, presented as an allegory for the power of rhetoric and persuasion, and even the power of language itself. In the final section of this chapter, I will explore some selected portions of these afterlives of Herakles-Ogmios, with a view towards how they might have bearing upon my own interpretation of the text.

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164 Perhaps rather like a monkey? This would be interesting in the context of the Apology, where the example of “failed” performance is a dancing monkey.
165 A complete Greek edition of Lucian appears in print in Florence in 1496; a second print edition, from the Aldine press in Venice, was available by 1503. Erasmus and More began publishing Latin translations in 1506, which had a significant impact on interest in Lucian in northern Europe. For more on the availability of Lucian as a text for the study of Greek, see Botley 2010: 85-88.
166 Perhaps the most famous example of an artistic representation of Lucian’s text is a watercolor drawing by Albrecht Dürer, titled “Allegory of Eloquence,” dating from the early 1500s, which substitutes Hermes for Hercules.
The images connected to *Herakles* are only one small piece of Lucian’s reception in the Renaissance and his extensive influence on humanist scholars. It is not even the only allegorical *ekphrasis* from Lucian to achieve a visual reception. The description of a painting by the famous artist Apelles in *On Slander*, which also has no independent ancient existence as a painting, provided inspiration for works by Botticelli, Mantegna, Raphael, and Dürer, among others. In the reception of *Herakles*, however, the paradox of image and description is only the beginning of a complex entanglement of past and present that converges upon the body of Herakles. For humanists in sixteenth and seventeenth century France, Lucian’s Herakles-Ogmios seems to offer access to an ancient Gallic perspective, and thus serves as evidence of an ancient lineage for “Gallic,” that is, *French*, rhetorical and literary excellence. If, in Lucian’s text, a “Celtic” representation is made legible through a Greek frame, these later iterations make legible a contemporary “Gallic” or French identity through an ancient Greek text, effectively replicating or extending the interpretive work of the text. The object that the painting is supposed to represent gains a kind of retroactive existence in service of contemporary claims about literature, national identity, and sovereign power. Furthermore, as a symbol the meshes together language and power, this reimagined Herakles also replicates and extends the implication of the Lucian’s text that violence and control are embedded within speech.

These later visual representations and interpretations of Herakles-Ogmios embody a multiplicity that the original text likely could not have anticipated. For there is not one image depicted by a painter’s hand, as Lucian’s text imagines, but many iterations of images, printed and re-printed, transferred from one context to another, or appearing with variations under the same title. We can get a sense of this multiplicity from even a brief overview of some of these iterations. An image of Herakles bearing a bow, club, and lion skin, connected with a crowd of eager followers by chains drawn mouth to ear, appeared on the frontispiece of a Greek-Latin dictionary published in 1519 by the Swiss printer Andreas Cratander, accompanied by the inscriptions *Hercules Gallicus* and *Typus Eloquentiae*. The same print also appears in an edition of Pomponius Mela, also published by Cratander. The same title of “Hercules Gallicus” is given to a different print of the same scene in the first book of Geoffroy Tory’s *Champfluery*, an influential treatise on printing and the French language (1529) (Fig. 1). The label of *Eloquentiae* follows the scene in a popular “emblem book,” or collection of allegorical illustrations with

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168 For the influence of the Calumny of Apelles on Renaissance art, see Cast 1981, Massing 2007.

169 I do not mean to imply that the idea of the ancient Gauls or Celts as ancestors of the modern French was universally accepted during this period, only that this does seem to be the assumption for the examples I discuss.

170 In the following selection, I draw on the examples recorded by Jung 1966 and Bowen 1979.
accompanying explanatory text, by Italian legal scholar and humanist Andrea Alciato, the first edition of which was published in 1531.\textsuperscript{171} Here yet a different image of Hercules and his chained followers appears under the title *Eloquentia fortitudine praestantior*, along with a short poem explaining the allegorical significance. Alciato’s emblems (usually referred to as the *Emblemata* or *Emblematum Liber*) were widely reprinted and translated throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and many editions include commentaries that quote Lucian as the source of the allegory. The image itself, however, varies widely across different printings, often without regard for illustrative accuracy: in the 1531 edition, the crowd is chained to the god from their waists instead of their ears (Fig. 2); in a version from 1661, the print shows the chain running from Hercules’ ear to the mouths of his followers (*a turpissimum ὅτερον πρώτον*, the commentator remarks) (Fig. 4).\textsuperscript{172} Proximity to Lucian’s text is also apparently not quite enough to influence the illustration that appears in the first complete French edition of Lucian by Philibert Bretin (1582), in which the engraver has entirely omitted any kind of chains between Hercules and the crowd beside him (Fig. 6).\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{171} This is generally considered to be the earliest example of an emblem book, a genre that flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It follows a pattern that became commonly associated with the emblem, consisting of a motto (*inscriptio*), picture (*pictura*), and a verse text or epigram (*subscriptio*). The *subscriptio* for *Eloquentia fortitudine praestantior* can be found in Fig. 3. It is also important to note that while I have described the *Emblemata* as being “by Alciato” (whose name sometimes also appears in modern scholarship as Alciati), and his name is indeed associated with the emblems in this way, the details of authorship and publication are a bit more complicated. Alciato himself was the author of the *inscriptio* and *subscriptio* portions of the emblems; his friend Conrad Peutinger (1465-1547) commissioned the woodcuts and collected the emblems into the first edition of the book, which was printed in Augsburg by Heinrich Steyner. In addition to variation in the woodcuts themselves, subsequent editions were produced by different publishers and presses throughout Europe, and contained a variety of additional commentary by other authors, both in Latin and in French, German, Italian, and English (Claude Mignault’s commentary being particularly influential, see below). A detailed online archive of the various editions of Alciato can be found at https://www.emblems.arts.gla.ac.uk/alciato/.

\textsuperscript{172} There are similar creative variations in other emblem books of this period, such as Achilles Bocchius’ *Symbolicarum Quaestionum*, 1574, and Laurentius Haechtanus, *Microcosmos/Parvus Mundus*, 1579. In Bocchius, Hercules is mounted on a chariot pulled by a team of oxen, and chains link him both to a crowd of men following alongside the chariot and to a group of children urging on the oxen. In Haechtanus, two ribbons link the god and six followers. Interestingly, most illustrations do not clearly depict the body of Hercules as old and wizened to the degree described in the text (although he sometimes seems to be bald, or leans upon his club like a walking stick). One exception is an illustration in Vincenzo Cartari, *le imagini de i dei de gli antichi*, 1571, which shows a thin and wizened Hercules with a few strands of scraggly grey hair.

\textsuperscript{173} According to Jung 1966, an illustration in Budé’s earlier French translation has Mercury in place of Hercules, like Dürer’s painting.
Amid this proliferation of representations, the poly-semantic Herakles-Ogmios takes up yet another identity, involving not quite a change of costumes as much as a shift of nationality. As the above examples suggest, the label “Hercules Gallicus,” in place of or in addition to “Hercules Ogmios,” seems to be fairly standard for most appearances of this figure; this is likely because Erasmus’ Latin translation of Lucian’s text, which would have been the earliest available, renders the Greek Keltoi as Latin Galli. While the Greek and Latin terms are not in themselves precise, it seems clear that most sixteenth-century readers took this Galli and Gallicus to refer specifically to the Gauls as the ancestors of the modern French. This is nowhere more evident than in Geoffroy Tory’s *Champ Fleury*, a treatise on the correct formation of Roman capital letters, which draws from the genres of medieval allegorical commentary and humanist essay, advocating for the improvement of the French language, both written and spoken.  

At the beginning of the first book of *Champ Fleury*, in a series of ancient testimonies for the inherent eloquence and beauty of French, Tory introduces an excerpt of Erasmus’ translation (Lucian’s chapters 1-6), followed by his own French translation and a print of the image; the French translation renders Galli and Gallicus as François. He presents this story as clear proof that when spoken eloquently French is even more persuasive than Latin or Greek, remarking that the Greek text admits as much when it calls this Hercules not Latinus or Graecus, but Hercules Gallicus. The figure of Hercules surfaces several more times in the rest of his treatise, invoked as a figure with specific importance to the ancient Gauls, and thus to the modern French (e.g., claiming Hercules as the founder of Paris), and in connection with other Greek mythological figures with similar associations to rhetoric, writing, and related spheres, such as Mercury, Apollo, and Orpheus.

In this dual insistence upon the French identity of Hercules Gallicus and upon the authority of Greek sources, the *Champ Fleury* seems to acknowledge something like the doubled, overlapping frameworks of “Greek” and “Celtic” that I have discussed for Lucian’s text, but to approach them with a rather different purpose. This way of reading Herakles-Ogmios recognizes it as a Gallic image described through Greek eyes and in Greek terms, but nevertheless attempts to interpret it through what it imagines to be Gallic eyes and a Gallic-centered perspective. This desire to see through “Gallic” eyes insists upon “Gallic” and all that it represents within the Greek text not so much as an enigmatic Other that requires deciphering, as a kind of lost Self, waiting to be rediscovered and re-invigorated. The Greek framework, in turn, lends a kind of retroactive authority to the imagined Gallic perspective. For Tory, the fact that Lucian, a “Greek philosopher and orator” (fol. 2r), records the existence of a Gallic Hercules-Ogmios is surely proof that such a figure existed. Additional Greek and Roman myths

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174 Bowen 1979: 15.

175 ❌ Nous voyons donc que par les mots de Lucian sous les corce de ceste fiction, que nostre langage est si graciex, que sil est pronunce d’un homme discret, sage, et age, il a si grande efficace, qu’il persuade plustost et mieux que le latin, ne que le grec. Les latins et les grecs le confessent quand ils disent que cestui Hercules, estoit, Gallicus, non pas Hercules Latinus, ne Hercule Graecus (fol. 3r).

176 Bowen 1979: 15.

177 At times possibly conflating all of these figures, see Bowen 1979: 25.
and symbolism related to Hercules, far from creating confusion over which “Hercules” one might be invoking, seem to be equally available as thematically resonant source material. The irony of this anachronistic elision of identities is that it is also a kind of continuation or re-invigoration of the interpretive process that happens in Lucian’s text. Like the Celtic philosophos of Herakles, Tory in the Champ Fleury explains “Gallic” images and symbolism by way of Greek ones, verifying their existence and significance by the authority of another language and tradition. The existence of these “Gallic” symbols then becomes something that their presumed descendants can use to bolster their own confidence about the worth of their language and its rhetorical power.

Another influential example of retroactively breathing life into a Gallic Hercules can be found in Claude Mignault’s commentary to the image in Alciato’s Emblemata. The commentary identifies Lucian as the source of the description, and includes an excerpt of the Greek text with a Latin translation. As in Champ Fleury, the text is treated as authoritative proof of a distinctive “Gallic Hercules” who symbolizes the importance of rhetoric among the ancient Gauls. In fact, Mignault seems to view this figure not so much as a Gallic adaptation of a Greek Hercules, as something rather more like a Greek adaptation of a Gallic Hercules. He declares that the story “proves nothing other” (id nihil aliud indicabat) than the fact that Hercules subdued the formerly uncivilized Gauls by force of eloquence (viribus eloquentiae), but that deceitful Greece (mendax Graecia) later changed the account of these exploits to be feats of arms (ad armorum stupenda facinora postea convertit), rather than words, and attributed them to their “own” Hercules (suum Herculem), the son of Jupiter and Alcmene. Apparently, the Gallic version of Hercules is not merely a more accurate way of representing the power of logos/eloquentia, but a more accurate way of representing Hercules, himself. Like

178 Mignault’s commentary (first published in 1571) had significance influence on the popularity and reception of this emblem book. See Russell 2003.
179 A reference to Juvenal 10.174?
180 Alciato and Mignault 1589: 618.
181 Ideas of an alternate, pre-Greek Hercules were already in circulation in Europe during this time. In his study of representations of Hercules in sixteenth-century France, M.-R. Jung attributes the popularity of this idea to the antiquarian Annius of Viterbe (Giovanni Nanni de Viterbe), and his commentary on Berossus of Chaldea, published in Rome in 1498 as part of a collection called the Antiquitatum variarum, or Antiquities. The Babylonian author Berossus was known from antiquity but his work had been largely lost; unfortunately, this supposed rediscovery was itself a contemporary forgery, possibly by Annius himself. Although the question of the texts’ authenticity sparked controversy even around the time the Antiquities were published, they still proved influential. The work of Berossus in the Antiquities contained a history and genealogy of an Egyptian/African Hercules, son of Osiris, whose travels from Egypt throughout the Mediterranean bring him to Celtiberia and Italy, where he drove out the Lestrigonians and founded many towns, among other “civilizing” exploits. Drawing Berossus’ (alleged) account together with other references to Hercules’ travels in various Greek and Roman sources, particular Diodorus Siculus (see above), Annius distinguishes between an “Egyptian Hercules” and a “Greek Hercules,” the former being older and venerated longer than the latter. He further makes this Egyptian Hercules the mythic ancestor of the
Tory, Mignault uses the authority of Lucian’s text to verify ancient symbols while simultaneously attempting to reach through the Greek account to a Gallic original that is assumed to lie behind it. The Gallic Hercules that emerges from the Emblemata and the Champ Fleury is thus paradoxically both old and new, modern by virtue of being ancient. His existence is mapped out by both an appeal to an authoritative Greco-Roman tradition and also an attempt to circumvent that tradition; the latter gesture reaches even farther back into the past to claim a pre-Greek Hercules and a pre-Greek Gallic tradition of rhetoric, even as it extends its claim into the present in order to advance the emerging authority of a modern language.

Such a claim about the authority of a language speaks to more than the identity of this Hercules Gallicus or his supposed descendants; it is also clearly invested in the power of logos/eloquentia that the image symbolizes. Tory’s assertion in Champ Fleury that the French language possesses inherent eloquence, and in particular, persuasion, suggests a conceptualization of language in terms of its power to influence and even control, first and foremost. Figuring this power through the image of chains wielded by a conquering hero capitalizes on the overlap between the persuasive force of rhetoric and the “persuasion” of physical coercion or violence, even if Champ Fleury does not necessarily emphasize this implication of the image. However, we need not look very far for examples in which the overlap between language and physical force is not merely implicit, nor even especially metaphorical. Made popular by publications like the

Gallic/French, Spanish and Italian royal families. The “Greek” Hercules is identified as a later figure to which the Greeks ascribed many of the same exploits. Annius also identifies a third Hercules, descended from Noah, who is the mythic ancestor of the Germans. See Jung 1966: 42-51. The notion of an ancestral Hercules was very appealing to French nationalists during this period. At a certain point, Annius/pseudo-Berossus’ ancestral Egyptian Hercules seems to have merged with the Gallic Hercules-Ogmios from Lucian. In fact, Mignault’s commentary seems to be contributing to this merging, since he cites Annius on Berosus as additional evidence for his claim about the antiquity of Gallic eloquentia. For the (non-forged) ancient testimony on Berossus and his influence, see Dillory 2014.

182 Raisch 2017 identifies a similar paradox of new oldness and old newness in discussion of Lucian’s influence on Thomas More. Although that has more to do with the revival of ancient Greek and its place in humanist-scholastic polemics, it still speaks to how humanist scholars might use an ancient text like Lucian to point in two directions at once. More recent scholarship on Lucian’s Herakles and the identification of Herakles-Ogmios is also tangled up with modern attempts to reconstruct ancient identities. For example, Nesselrath 1990 and his sources include among the possible evidence for a Celtic Ogmios an etymological connection between the god’s name and the ancient Irish alphabet Ogam and god Ogma (a link that Spickerman 2008 rejects). Even aside from the specific accuracy of this etymology, the assumption that it is possible to connect the Celts of ancient France with the ancient Irish in such a straightforward way is based on modern reconstructions of “Celtic” identity that have come under scrutiny since the late twentieth century. See for example Collis 2003.

183 See also the 1549 treatise in defense of French poetry by Joaquim Du Bellay (La deffence, et illustration de la langue Françoyse), which invokes Lucian’s Gallic Hercules
Emblemata, Hercules Gallicus proved a potent political symbol for sixteenth century French monarchs anxious to define and assert their authority as rulers amid numerous political and religious conflicts. Both King Henry II and Henry IV of France drew on the image of this Hercules for triumphal visual displays that were orchestrated to promote their royal power. In 1549, the entry of Henry II into Paris opened with an arch displaying an image of Hercules with four golden chains extending from his mouth, attached to figures personifying the different divisions of French society (clergy, nobility, commoners). For Henry IV, Alciato’s original emblem was featured among the decorations in his 1595 entry into Lyons, on an obelisk erected in 1596 at Rouen, and in a program of decorative arches developed to celebrate the entry of his bride, Maria de Medici, upon her procession into Avignon in November 1600.\textsuperscript{185} These representations portrayed the monarch as the unifier of warring religious and political factions and a bringer of peace and prosperity, while drawing on associations of the humanist prince whose claim to power came from his wisdom and persuasive skill as well as force of arms, and who promoted scholarship and literature for the advancement of national interest. As a dual embodiment of military and intellectual power, this figure draws from the advantages of both ways of acquiring and maintaining sovereign power. In his guise as a Gallic Hercules, the king gains the willing submission of his subjects by force of persuasion, but without fully letting go of the threat of physical dominance.\textsuperscript{186}

There is much more that one might say about this complex overlap of language and power, but it lies outside the scope of this chapter. Rather than continue any further along this track, I would like to conclude by glancing back briefly at the tangled trail of paradoxes that we have encountered. I have observed that the creation of this Hercules Gallicus might be seen as an extension of the multiplicity I identified within the body of Lucian’s Herakles-Ogmios. That is, these sixteenth-century French interpretations are possible because the text leaves open the possibility that there are multiple valid ways of interpreting this figure. Yet once brought into being, this Hercules is easily taken up by those who would wield language as a weapon and as a chain, to quite literally exert control over the ears, minds, and bodies of others, extending the work of the original text in a rather different direction. What seems to be missing in these interpretations, however, is the possibility of vulnerability, the wounding of Hercules by his own self-inflicted chains. This omission is evident when we consider the images themselves and in its conclusion amid a piling up of military metaphors: “Vous souvienne de votre ancienne Marseilles, seconds Athenes: et de votre Hercule Gallique, tirant les Peuples après luy par leurs Oreilles avecques une Chesene attachée à sa Langue”. Such language is indicative of the one of the main strategies of the treatise, which is to advocate for literature as a means of working out national rivalries, aligning poetry with military and imperial power. See Melehy 2017 for an overview of Du Bellay’s context and influence.\textsuperscript{185} Strong 1984: 24-5 and 70-71.

\textsuperscript{185} For more on Henry II and IV as the Gallic Hercules, see Vivanti 1967 and Wintroub 1998. Wintroub also notes that this use of Hercules is also situated in a dualism of “savage” (or “barbarian”) and “civilization.” These categories were of interest to humanists in debates over the place of vernacular and classical languages in scholarship, but perhaps more significantly, increasingly central to the discourse of European exploration and colonialism of the Americas and Africa.
how they engage with the precise part of the image that suggests the interlocking of power and vulnerability. As I noted briefly in the overview above, the manner of depicting the chains varies considerably across different versions of the images, and is also one significant way that the representations sometimes deviate from the description in Lucian’s text: for example, the 1531 Emblemata, which shows the chains around the waists of a group of men, and the 1661 edition, in which chains run from the ear of Hercules to the mouths of his followers. Even when the chains clearly extend from the mouth, no print goes quite so far as to show the tongue sticking out of the smiling mouth, pierced by the tip of chain, as the text so vividly describes.\textsuperscript{187} This omission allows these representations to elide the troubling and ambiguous threat of the pierced tongue – namely, that the violence of speech might rebound upon the speaker even as it exerts control upon the listener. It is as if this possibility proves too dangerous to show directly, and so it becomes subsumed under new versions of Herakles, even if, like the Celt in Lucian’s text, they never quite manage to explain it away. These new iterations attempt to re-inscribe the power that the god wields with his golden chains of speech, yet remained haunted by the possibility of vulnerability still embedded within them.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{187} The omission of the tongue piercing could be due in part to the constraints of medium and scale of representation. But note a possible parallel in a 1547 print with an allegorical representation of slander, noted in Cast 1981: 102 and fig. 24. This print, entitled Der falsche Klaffer (the False Detractor), depicts a man whose extended tongue is pierced by a large lock as a snake whispers in his ear.

\textsuperscript{188} Just as Derrida’s bête “haunts” the sovereign, and vice versa. See Derrida 2009: 38-9.
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Appendix: Figures for Chapter 4

Fig. 1
Geofroy Tory, *Champ Fleury* (1529) Source: The Getty Research Institute

Fig. 2
Andrea Alciato, *Emblematum Liber* (1531) Source: Glasgow University Library
Arcum leva tenet, rigidam fert dextera clavam,
Contegit & Nemees corpora nuda leo.
Herculis haec igitur facies? non convenit illud,
Quòd vetus & senio tempora cana gerit.
Quid quod lingua illi levibus traiecta cathenis,
Quīs fissa facili allicit aure viros.
An ne quod Alcyden lingua non robore Galli,
Praestantem populis iura dedisse ferunt.
Cedunt arma togae, & quamvis durissima corda,
Eloquio pollens ad sua vota trahit.

Fig. 3
The subscriptio (accompanying verse text) found in most editions of Alciato’s Emblemata.
Source: Glasgow University Library
Fig. 4 Andrea Alciato, *Emblemata* (1661) Source: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library
Fig. 5
Andrea Alciato, *Emblemata* (1589) Source: Duke University Library
Fig. 6  
*Les œuvres de Lucian de Samosate*, Filibert Breton (1583)  
Source: Bibliothèque nationale de France