Pre-Modern Iberian Fragments in the Present: Studies in Philology, Time, Representation and Value

By

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines the uses of medieval and early-modern Iberian cultural objects in the present. It draws on the notion of fragment and actual fragmentary testimonies to study how pre-modern Iberian things and texts are reconstituted and used for various projects of personal, institutional, national and transnational reconstitution in the present. The corpus objects are necessarily diverse in chronological scope, with examples from the medieval, early-modern and modern periods, and touch upon works of many genres: chivalric romance, royal and personal correspondence, early-modern and modern historiography, Hispano-Arabic and Hispano-Hebrew lyric, inscriptions, pre-modern and modern biographies and 21st century book exhibitions.

The dissertation proposes that Iberian fragments are engaged in various forms of reconstitution or production in the present and, at the same time, are held as timeless, unchanging entities that have the capability to allow users to connect with something genuinely old, truly Spanish and, indeed, eternal. These methods of reconstitution include philology; the writing of history and attempts to understand the meaning of past time; the employment of fragments in debates about the origins of literature in Spain or, alternatively, pluralism and cultural sensitivity; and the collection of old books and the rare book market. To investigate the thesis regarding the existence of fragments between production and belief, I build on work on “presence” by Jean Luc Nancy, H. U. Gumbrecht, Eelco Runia, F. R. Ankersmit and others. Presence refers to the way in which the past is recalled or imagined in the present, or to the effects of present objects on observers and users. I compare the situation of the fragment with the status of the concept of presence. Specifically, the dissertation advances that the notions of presence as developed by the above authors reside between the pulls of production and metaphysics, as do fragments.

The project presents four case studies, each studying one of the modes of reconstitution outlined above, a different motif of fragmentation and an element of the above tension in presence, which I call the “presence dialectic.” The first chapter posits philology as a means of reconstitution in working with highly fragmentary chivalric manuscripts to examine the impact of the fragments’ physical presence on philological practice. The second chapter moves to two 16th and 17th
century codices comprised of different “fragments” compiled by well-known bibliographers. It analyzes how early-modern scholars conceived of and brought together past times through the collection of documents, building a framework for characterizing the time of an old, physically present book. Chapters three and four shift away from fragmentary manuscripts or codices comprised of “fragments” to two very different forms of completion. The third chapter studies the “romance kharjas”, two complete muwaššahāt and concepts of representation to examine the fragmentation of poetry by critics as a form of filling in the gaps of Iberian literary history. In analyzing the muwaššahāt as literature, the chapter investigates the opposition of representation to a less-situational, freer presence. The fourth chapter evinces the thesis of the presence dialectic by querying the meaning of the word “value” in the collection and sale of pre-modern Iberian material in the modern age. It draws on the rise of Hispanism in the United States through an analysis of the formation of the Boston Public Library and The Hispanic Society of America.

The project works across medieval and early modern studies, philosophy of history and cultural studies to assess the reconstitution of pre-modern Iberian cultural objects in the present and their use for present-day projects of reconstitution. The dissertation looks both forwards and backwards, locating the activity of the modern medievalist as one that both historicizes and negotiates a use of the old material in the present. In doing so, the project intends to contribute usable philological studies on specific manuscripts, to further work on presence and to explore critically the meaning of the term “material culture.”
For my parents, Beck, and Sam, for 30 years back, and hopefully two thirties forward
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Introduction

One of the most provocative reasons I have heard for why one should pursue medieval studies as opposed to a modern national literature is that “nobody is medieval.” The logic behind this statement is that American students in Hispanic or other national literature departments are less likely to feel as though they are treading on another nation’s territory if they study its old literature. Such a recommendation to study the literature and things from a period with no survivors recalls all of the pre-modern things and ideas no longer present that the medievalist must ignore or attempt to supply. The Ibero-medievalist thus requires a protean creativity, the ability to work across some five centuries and perhaps that many languages, a facility with both handwritten and early printed books, and the capability to historicize medieval cultural objects while also locating their relevance in the present. At times, medieval studies calls for an indulgence in the thoroughly misguided belief in the possibility of knowing what it was “really like” to have lived back then, or to feel at least moderately comfortable with systems of law, religion, and leisure that no one alive has ever experienced firsthand.

About two years ago, I became interested in fragmentary pre-modern manuscripts of the most damaged sort. Scarcely able to read them, and judging by their tattered appearance, I considered the pieces a physical manifestation of the above notion that “nobody” has a full claim on Iberia’s middle ages. I began by examining the sole extant manuscript of the Amadís de Gaula, consisting of four small pieces (ca. 1425) held at the University of California, Berkeley’s Bancroft Library. I especially wondered how pieces so highly prized and economically valuable, but not able to contribute significantly to the establishment of a more primitive version of the Amadís than Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo’s, had appeared in so few philological studies. My interest in the fragments was not driven by a wish to recapture lost content or a more amorphous missing past. Rather, my aim was to examine the functions the pieces were enlisted to perform in the present and what they “were” to present users. In this vein, I not only sought to investigate the fragments’ historical context or to situate them within the tradition of the Amadís de Gaula, but also to identify the means by which modern-day academic and general public users of various stripes fill in the fragments’ gaps. Likewise, I queried the personal, institutional, and national present-day “gaps” that the fragments fill. These latter gaps include the obligation of a nation to establish a sense of knowing its roots and to create a continuous record from a point of origin to the present. They also consist of the compulsions of an individual to want to complete his or her personal projects of reconstitution. These personal projects include a longing for the prestige associated with owning medieval relics and the desire to feel connected to a distant past by way of working with or collecting medieval relics.

This business of “filling in the gaps” of both the pre-modern material and of the very users who seek to gain something from it is the subject of the present project. The premise of the dissertation is that the notion of fragment and actual physical manuscript fragments are a rich case study for understanding how medieval and early modern Iberian texts and objects are reconstituted and used for reconstitution in the present. The dissertation is thus not a systematic lament about how pre-modern Iberia is gradually slipping through scholars’ and the general
public’s fingers and how they attempt to recapture its “lost memory.” Neither is it a call to “material culture” or a more materialist philology as a physical means to contravene the disappearance of the past. Rather, the project advances that Iberian manuscript and other fragments must be understood in terms of what they “fill in” in the present, and the ways in which users go about filling them in.

Accordingly, while primarily pre-modern in corpus, the dissertation has a definitively present-day orientation and approaches the problem that “nobody” is medieval primarily as a present-day problem. The reason for this “present” orientation rests on two observations about time in the present, as conceived as past, present, and future. The first observation is that the future no longer necessarily represents a wide field of possibilities and infinite opportunities, including those of which we cannot even pretend. This is in part a result of the state of things, as measured by such indicators as a news media fueled on the production of fear, actual terrorist threats and attacks, lack of adequate care for the elderly and the mentally ill, a prison system that does nothing to reform, global warming, lack of clean water, dependence on oil, nuclear warfare, and a weakened global economy. On the other hand, the recent past is forever upon us, including parts that one would definitely like to forget, captured in blog entries, Twitter, Buzz, and Facebook posts, reviews, photographs, videos, and defunct directories. The two areas of time that remain relatively undefined and relatively ripe for the picking are the present and the distant past, in this case, pre-modern Iberia.

The Fragment

A fragment is a piece of material or content separated from its whole whose whole is typically no longer present with the piece or pieces. This separated piece is categorically different from the whole. As Gumbrecht has suggested, most often the piece was not originally created to serve as a metonymy or substitute for the whole (“Eat Your Fragment!” 319; Powers of Philology). Except for fragments of the romantic sort, fake fragments and ruins designed to look old, fragments are thus generally “made and not born” and are only identified as fragments because it is clear for esthetic reasons as well as for those of common sense that they came from something greater (Dionisotti 1). Fragments are created as a result of some accidental or intentional destruction of material or content, or by an extraction of material, which may or may not be destructive.

Fragments make ideal subjects for investigating the piecing together of pre-modern texts, objects, and their present users for three main reasons. The first is that fragments initiate an identification of something lost that a user cannot quite resist remedying. This missing piece might be content, either text or image, a certain historical period or non-specific “past-time,” a

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1 For an example of this perspective in a very beautiful and recent book, see Dodds, Menocal, and Balbale’s The Arts of Intimacy: Christians, Jews and Muslims in the Making of Castilian Culture, particularly the introduction and postscript.

2 In defining future, I am primarily thinking of Husserl’s notion of “protention” that he contrasts with “expectation,” particularly in speaking of memory in On the Phenomenality of the Consciousness of Eternal Time. The difference between the two that interests me here is that the former is completely open, whereas the second implies specific objectives that await fulfillment.

3 I thank Sepp Gumbrecht for his explanation of his idea that we are in a “new chronotope” and for making available several writings treating the topic in advance of their publication.
taste or style, or more generally, the suggestion that one might never arrive at a satisfactory understanding of anything centuries old. This process of reconstituting fragments is thus a version in miniature of the way in which the medievalist copes with the fact that nobody is medieval in the present.

The second reason is that even the most canonical works of Iberian literature have problematical or irresolvable lacunae, are aceanpalalas, or are in some way incomplete. The so-called “romance kharjas”, the Poema de Mio Cid, the Auto de los Reyes Magos, and the Mocedades de Rodrigo represent several prominent examples of works that present significant reading difficulties, are incomplete at either the end or the beginning, and have strange holes throughout, even if the manuscript appears complete.

The third link between fragments and the meaning of Medieval Iberia today is that all fragments have arrived to the present in a less-than-perfect state either by natural disaster or as a result of a determined person’s use or “approach” to the material. Apart from offering a partial explanation for the way these manuscripts look now, examining these accidental or intentional processes of fragmentation facilitates the creation of typologies regarding past uses of fragments. An investigation of these processes of fragmentation also serves as a means to become more aware of the varied uses of pre-modern material in the present day.

The majority of pre-modern Iberian manuscripts show signs of accidental or intentional fragmentation, ranging from the loss of content due to a scribe’s copying of an incomplete model to purposeful tearing and cutting. Physical degradation of manuscript parchment and paper results from natural disasters, the activity of pests, wear and tear, including the tug and wear of fingers, and physical breakage from the use of manuscript material for purposes other than reading. One method of reuse and disregard for one content in order to display another includes the creation of palimpsests, a practice that occurred in Europe for more than a thousand years, even prior to the use of vellum.4 A famous example within the epic tradition is the Latin panegyric to the Cid the Carmen CampidCTORISR. Old or poor copies of manuscripts lying about monastic binderies were commonly employed to stiffen the bindings of newly copied or printed folios at the end of the 15th century (de Hamel 5). From the Late Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution, the printing press and increased book production lead to an institutionalization of the practice of utilizing cut-out leaves as pastedowns, reinforcing strips, pasteboard pads, flyleaves, and as the wrappers of book-bindings.5 Pieces of the Bible, glossed versions of the Bible, the texts of Aristotle, and the Summa theologiae of Aquinas—the greatest hits of the Middle Ages—came to this fate (Ker xvi). It is for this reason that the Spanish chivalric romances pulled from bindings in the 20th and 21st centuries, including the Amadís fragments and some 60 of the

4 Two Iberian manuscripts containing palimpsests include manuscripts 11556 and 10001 held at the Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, the first a collection of texts containing the Epístola del Libro de las reglas, of Bishop San Liciiano, Visigothic fragments, and others, and the second an illuminated aljamiado breviary. Both contain incidences of palimpsest in which the superior text was copied within two centuries of the inferior. In his “Hacia un repertorio de palimpsestos...,” Escobar begins a list of the Greek and Latin palimpsests conserved in Spanish libraries.

5 For general bibliography on the reuse of manuscripts and the fragments it produced, Ker’s classic study of Oxford bindings remains a very useful resource. See also the supplement to Ker’s study in Oxford Bindings 1500-1640. Nicholas Pickwoad is an expert on European bindings from the late medieval period to 1900. For a concise summary of manuscript reuse for enjoyment and for economic gain with examples from both the early-modern period and the late 20th century, see de Hamel’s lecture “Cutting up Manuscripts.” Lucía Megías speaks about the use of Spanish and Catalan chivalric material in bindings in “Literatura caballeresca catalana” and “El Tristán de Leonís castellano.”
*Tristán de León* cannot be said to have arrived there necessarily by censorship. Evidence for systematic destruction can be derived from the case of the thousands of Hebrew fragments stuffed as filler in bindings, such as the hundreds of 14th and 15th century pieces of the Torah and daily life documents (marriage records, sales contracts, and other civic registries) found in the Archivo Histórico in Gerona, Spain. The Geronese fragments are by no means an isolated case within the field of Hebrew manuscripts, as evidenced by research projects focused solely on the search and analysis of Hebrew and Aramaic binding fragments in Europe and Israel, such as the Genizat Germania (Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz). Despite having damaged much of the content, the use of the Hebrew fragments in bindings paradoxically accounts for their presence today, as the practice saved them from even worse fates, such as burning.

Also less damaging than burning, but nevertheless destructive, were uses of manuscript leaves for various quotidian tasks. Folios gave stiffness to items of apparel, including hats. They served as material for personal accessories like shoe linings and bags or folders, as in the case of the folios of the *Roncesvalles* sewn together to form a carrying apparatus, complete with a handle. Fragments of manuscripts functioned as gun wadding, jam covers, and rags to clean shoes and candlesticks. These practices seemed to have been more common than exceptional. The English poet and antiquary John Leland noted to his patron Thomas Cromwell (First Earl of Essex) in 1536 that boatloads of leaves were used in all sorts of everyday cases: “to the grossers and sope sellers, and some they sent ouer see to ye bokebynders…at tymes whole shyppes full” (de Hamel 6). In other cases, extant damage was indeed the work of early modern admirers, rather than iconoclasts, who literally loved books to death, used determined images as wall paper, wall decorations, traveling case adornments, and lampshades, or simply separated and hid particularly beloved pages for safekeeping, not to be unearthed until centuries later.

Fragmentation of a different, non-destructive sort consists of pieces of a variety of genres placed in codices with other works or simply notes or homework practice, such as the transcription of the Arabic or Spanish alphabets. Poetic, literary, philosophical, medical, geographical, legal, historiographical, hagiographical, epistolary, grammatical, Christian, Jewish, and Qur’anic fragments comprise the extant factitious codices. Such codices include the personal notebooks and document collections of a known bibliographer, scholar, community leader, priest, notary, *faqith* or expert in Islamic law, and many others whose owners were unknown. These codices that account for a good part of pre-modern manuscripts are very rarely wholly “miscellaneous” in which no vestige whatsoever of an initial structure, be it chronological or thematic, can be detected, even under years of additions and harried provenance. Indeed, the collections can contain whole texts, especially brief ones such as personal or notarial correspondence that can only be called fragments in a more metaphorical sense in that they have

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6 For more on this project, see the volume of the same name recently published by Brill, as well as the umbrella organization of several Hebrew fragment restitution projects in the US, Europe, and Israel, Books Within Books. http://www.hebrewmanuscript.com/. The word *Geniza*, from Hebrew, refers to a storeroom in old synagogues where discarded religious texts were hidden away in order to protect them from destruction.

7 Menéndez Pidal gives a detailed account of this use of the *Roncesvalles* in the study that preceded his edition, see “*Roncesvalles*, un cantar de gesta español del siglo XIII.”

8 It would be impossible here to produce a bibliography of the myriad document collections and notebooks extant in Spanish libraries, including those studied and the many that remain to be studied. I name a few resources that have been helpful throughout the present project. Apart from Petrucci’s “Del libro unitario al libro miscellaneo,” for the “miscellany” in the context of other modes of transmission of medieval literature, see Rico and Chartier, as well as the volume *The Whole Book*. For multi-work Qur’anic, Arabic, and *aljamiado* manuscripts, including some of those discovered in the 21st century, see *Los manuscritos árabes*. 
been placed in a new context—among potentially quite diverse documents—and separated in cases from the letters or actions that prompted them. Factitious codices also contain works yet to be identified or hybrids of two or even multiple works. In this vein, Francisco Rico and Roger Chartier have called factitious books of this type absent of any “author function”; the compiler, scribe, or owner has complete control of the book, which essentially amounts to a “polytextual” work that sometimes juxtaposes fragments of unrelated genres (Chartier 198).

The modern age contributed and continues to contribute its own mark on medieval manuscripts, with much marginal material eliminated in the rebinding of books and with the practice, which reached its height in the 19th century, of cleaning the margins of annotations so that the manuscript pages appear more attractive to wealthy collectors (Hulvey 161). Scholarly ambition itself has resulted in the marring of certain leaves, primarily through the use of chemical reagents to decipher text. Such is the case with the Poema de Mío Cid and the Roncesvalles. Some partially complete Bibles, Psalters, and Qur’ans sold at Christie’s and Sotheby’s were subsequently separated and sold as individual leaves. Pairs of leaves and non-consecutive lots of leaves from religious books turn relatively high profits on the auction block. In the last three years, the Hispanic Society of America has broken apart and sold key pieces of the collection of Arabic manuscripts and research books assembled by its founder, Archer Huntington, justifying the sale by suggesting that the material resides outside the fundamental mission of the Society. The Qur’ans alone fetched over $4 million. The most valuable one, advertized as the oldest known complete and signed Qur’an (13th century), went for $2.3 million over the other Huntington Qur’an, an “almost complete” 10th century tome. Huntington had purchased this older Huntington Qur’an from his Arabic tutor on the condition that he would never sell it. Manuscript material and the collections of which it forms a part are thus far from the stable and seemingly so solid entity that a glass display case or an extensively detailed entry in a catalog might imply.

The early modern and modern uses of manuscript material outlined above and the incongruity of the flux of the supposedly tangible thing mark two different epistemologies of fragments. On the one hand, fragments are produced. This production consists of the forces that created them as fragments. Fragments are also produced, however, in the sense that their content, use value, cultural meaning, economic value, and even the time they communicate or represent are constantly being reinterpreted, and, in effect, “filled in” via the demands of the book market, philology, and attempts to write national history, or, alternatively, demonstrate sensitivity to the cultures of others. At the same time, however, pre-modern fragments as they exist today are also ascribed an eternal, unquantifiable, impenetrable, and, most importantly, unchangeable spirit that cannot be produced or made up. In this way, while many binding fragments can make but slight philological contributions, few would dispute that they are worthy of careful preservation and

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9 This seems to be particularly common in wisdom literature. An interesting codex that poses problems of identifying works and those that could be combinations of two or more Aristotelian inspired advice texts is BNM Mss/9428.

10 De Hamel mentions a particularly provocative case in which an illuminated Psalter sold at Christie’s some 10 years back was separated and each of its leaves sold for a 500% profit (20).

11 As I explore in chapter four, Qur’ans are hot items at the auctions especially since 9-11, but even before. For a case of inconsecutive Iberian/North African Qur’anic leaves, see for example Lot 20 / Sale 5946, 1998, $9,970. http://www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot_details.aspx?from=searchresults&pos=7&intObjectID=879951&sid=db01b06f-eccf-41ec-9634-fb3ba6f12d36

12 The Qur’an is signed by a person by the name of Yahya bin Muhammad ibn ‘Umar.
even display. Similarly, the book market, while appearing to cheapen a book’s abstract value, can generate interest in the medieval period and initiate questioning as to why one would pay hundreds of thousands for pre-modern material today, as in the case of the sale of the Huntington volumes. Manuscript fragments are clearly pre-modern relics that can sometimes be assigned a specific date of composition or compilation, yet the time in which a modern user experiences them is a strange present in which the user attempts to historicize, i.e., to place it in its historical context, and at the same time, make it usable for a modern one. It is this wavering balance between a mode of intervention or production and a belief that manuscripts can provide access to something genuinely old, truly Spanish, and “culturally important” where fragments reside today.

Presence: Belief and Production

In accordance with its present-day orientation, the dissertation draws on work on a variously defined phenomenon called “presence” as a means by which to find a vocabulary to speak about reconstitution and the above tension between production and belief. This notion most recently unfolded in the pages of History and Theory in 2006 with contributions by Eelco Runia, Frank Ankersmit, Berbger Bevennage, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, and Ewa Domanska, preceded by the work of Jean Luc Nancy and Gumbrecht. Based on the History and Theory discussions, presence refers to the impact or moment of impact of a phenomenon or phenomena on bodies and consciousness. These writings treat the phenomena of the manifestation or presence of the past in the present and in Gumbrecht’s case, more explicitly the impact on us of the physical “presence” of the objects and texts of the world. Gumbrecht’s exploration of presence can be read as a means to explain something he sees as missing for humans in an increasingly virtual world: our desire for “presence,” a “physical and space-mediated relationship to the things of the world” (Powers of Philology 6). This sort of presence communicates something that meaning cannot, yet never occurs in the absence of “meaning effects.” This relationship between meaning and presence could be interpreted as the inability to write about presence outside the meaning-driven epistemology of the humanities.

Gumbrecht’s “production of presence” is not an ontology of things, but rather a characterization of the way in which humans interact with the things around them. The role of presence in the human-object relation comes through in several enigmatic essays by Jean Luc Nancy collected and translated into English as A Birth to Presence in 1993. Perhaps the most salient thread of the essays and usually the only one cited is the notion captured in the title and explained briefly in the introduction, “birth to presence,” referring to the existence of things as a constant state of birth, becoming, or production. This dissertation considers the question of the ontology of things only from the vantage point of the modes of “production” and belief, or the

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13 See Powers of Philology and Production of Presence, as well as his essay “Eat your Fragments!” in the volume Collecting Fragments/Fragmente sammeln.
14 This is more of an interpretation rather than a summary of Gumbrecht’s thought as written in Powers of Philology, Production of Presence, “Presence Achieved in Language,” and “Infinite Availability.”
15 As Jesús Rodríguez Velasco has suggested, this becoming conception of ontology bears relation with Badiou and Deleuze’s concepts of “event.” Although logically one-sided, Badiou’s “The Event in Deleuze” provides a comparison of the two notions of event. I would like to explore the ontology of the “event” in relation to Nancy’s “presence” in future writings on medieval manuscripts.
notion that the use value, cultural meaning, economic value, etcetera is constantly being created, while at the same time, the objects are considered conduits to something genuinely old, truly Spanish, and “culturally important.” I examine the impact of these two modes on the res, or thingness, of the fragments.16

The dissertation also engages elements of Eelco Runia and Frank Ankersmit’s formulations of presence. These conceptions of presence focus mainly on how an ephemeral episode of the past can make an appearance in the present. Presence refers to the manifestation or appearance of the past or a particular past memory in the present or in historical representation. Presence in this sense is thus a name for how the past can uncannily show up, like a “stowaway”, in our daily lives and also in the process of reading written history (Runia “Presence” 27). Similarly, in Ankersmit’s formulation, the past, via “presence”, can actually “appear twice” (331). Informed by both cognitive psychology and philosophy of history, Runia’s presence centers on the way in which the “welling up” of past memories in the present affects self-perception and frameworks for thinking and speaking about ourselves (“Spots of Time” 311). Runia suggests that memories or manifestations of the past are triggered metonymically, not metaphorically. Like Proust’s episode with the madeleine cake in Du côté de chez Swann, a determined person, object, place, piece of music, smell, or taste initiates a memory and produces a sensation that the memory, or time in the past is actually present right now. Such an instance of the presence of the past could happen, for instance, in finding an old notebook and subsequently remembering an occasion in which it was used in an important lecture to draft a risky contribution to the Q&A. A single piece, the notebook, thus recalls for the person who remembers it several times at once. The time of the memory is comprised of the historical time of the lecture in which it was used, the time in the near present in which the memory happened to come again, and the time in which the presence moment occurs, which indeed is out of time.

Contrary to Ankersmit’s view that presence has remained intentionally undefined throughout the debates of the last decade, this project advances that the above notions of presence all move between two somewhat contradictory theses, thereby comprising a dialectic (“Presence and Myth”). These theses are directly in line with the conclusions reached above on fragments’ dual status as something spiritually powerful, yet only very difficultly interrogated, as well as something constantly produced and in the making. On the one hand, presence can be considered something outside of representation and any “meanings” reached through hermeneutics. In this conception, presence is somehow more in line with our primal desires; it appears unexpectedly and is only unintentionally found. On the other hand, presence can be considered entirely “produced,” a variant of “historical representation,” yet a sort of representation that paradoxically allows the past to “come again” in the present.

The Present Fragment: Four Cases

Fragments reside within this tension between metaphysics and production. In this vein, fragments are often engaged to represent ambiguous, but nevertheless emotionally powerful national and transnational projects to perpetuate beliefs of cultural heritage and pride, or, alternatively, global awareness. At the same time, however, the content of the fragment

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16 A particularly helpful Nancy piece for investigating this is his “The Technique of the Present.”
possesses its own systems of representation and signification that a philologist might hope to access and assess quite exactly.

Old books of all sorts are sold at Christie’s, including sacred ones, such as Haggadot, Qur’ans, Bibles and other Jewish, Christian, and Islamic books. These volumes that are indeed priceless for many believers can go for enormously high prices at auction. Some are even dismembered after a sale so that individual leaves might be resold for an even greater profit. While the economic value of these sacred books depends on market conditions and demand, their spiritual value might remain unwavering. War, terrorist attacks and their aftermath, even something relatively small and not explicitly related to economic concerns such as the proposed building of the Islamic Center near Ground Zero in New York and the Florida pastor’s threat to burn a Qur’an, generate greater interest in, and by extension, an increased market for, the old religious tomes.

With regards to time, fragments are similarly caught between what a user believes them to be, namely medieval relics, and the multiple times that they communicate in the present. Fragments point toward a time of their creation as fragments, a time of composition of the content of the whole of which they once formed a part, and to a beginning even prior to that, some moment or moments in which the text or images of the whole were just ideas. Fragments are more generally engaged in the retrojection, or throwing back into the past, of the historicizing user, as well as her or his attempt to make them serve a present-day purpose. In presence research, as well as for fragments, there is thus a play between what old things, or pasts “should be” and what either one appears to be as it unfolds in present-day academic and non-academic uses.

The dissertation organizes its analysis of this play in four case studies of fragments, each study meeting three criteria. All four cases study a mode of reconstitution and use of pre-modern Iberian material, consider a different motif of fragmentation, and examine a different element of the presence dialectic outlined above. The objects of study are diverse in chronological scope, with examples from the medieval, early modern, and modern periods, and touch upon works of many genres: chivalric romance, royal and personal correspondence, early modern and modern historiography, Andalusian lyric, inscriptions, pre-modern and modern biographies, and 21st century book exhibitions. The objects of study are not all properly physical manuscript fragments. Accordingly, the dissertation can be divided into two parts. The first explores reconstitution and presence via analysis of specific fragmentary pre-modern manuscript material. The second examines these questions via printed poems and other texts, as well as two specific Iberian manuscript and relic collections of the modern age.

The definition of fragment used throughout is similarly wide-reaching and connotes both actual fragmentary manuscripts, including binding fragments and individual documents collected in a codex, as well as “fragments” of a more metaphorical sort, including those created by critics and “pieces” of Iberian material, both fragmentary and not, collected by collectors. Presence as it appears in the chapters likewise morphs, indicating physical presence, the manifestation of the past, and a more general impression of proximity or “closeness” with a thing, person, or time. The points of the presence debate treated in the chapters include the effect of a thing’s physical

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17 “Retrojection” is inspired by Meillassoux’s critique in After Finitude of the correlationist in outlining the necessity only of contingency in conceptualizing being. In future redactions of this project, I would like to explore Meillassoux’s critique of the correlation, namely the primacy of the thinking subject (Kant) and the metaphysician (Descartes) as it relates to the “presence dialectic.”
presence on philological practice, the character of the time (with regards to past, present, and future) in which a user experiences an extant pre-modern relic, the relationship between presence and representation, and the role of metaphysics in present day uses and perception of fragments, as explored through the concept of value.

Chapter one posits philology as a means of reconstitution and an attempt at making highly fragmentary manuscripts usable. It draws on a corpus of 15th century chivalric binding fragments including the four dismembered pieces of book three of the manuscript Amadís de Gaula that initiated the project. The other fragments considered are a selection of the 27 image fragments of a manuscript of Tristán de Leonís that were discovered only a decade ago. The chapter focuses on a continuous series of the Tristán images, as identified by Lucía Megías and Carlos Alvar (“Nuevos fragmentos,” “El Tristán de Leonís”). Some of the miniatures depict partial knights, others now portray a barely perceptible body of a character, but others yet still represent central characters in the story, in some cases labeled ones, as well as scenes.

The chapter begins with the definition of fragment outlined above, a piece not intended to be a metonymy of its whole, in order to invert it. Informed by Runia’s conception of the metonymic appearance of the past, the analysis proceeds to overturn the initial definition of fragment by developing a philology for fragments that aims to locate completeness in the extant pieces. In the Amadís fragments, the chapter provides a case of non-contiguous text and in the Tristán pieces, one of contiguous images. Using imagination and philology, the analysis allows the fragments to become unfragmentary—literally metonymies of their absent wholes—and to serve as substitutes for their wholes, despite their destroyed appearance. This re-perception of the manuscript fragments is further implemented by interpreting their current shabby state as the result of one of many uses over time of the whole to which they once belonged. In historicizing the uses of the fragments and by taking note of the engagement of the manuscripts in non-academic arguments in the present, the analysis permits the fragments to become more workable and convincing philological subjects. The final part of the chapter considers a recent exhibit of chivalric manuscripts that included both the Amadís and Tristán fragments.

Chapter two moves to two 16th and 17th century codices comprised of different “fragments.” The word fragment refers, in this case, to documents placed in a new context, whether within a selection of a historical exchange, or within a section marked by a determined year, or merely inserted among documents to which it only tangentially has a relation. The means of reconstitution studied is the ordering and portrayal of past time. The chapter analyzes three factitious codices organized or amended by bibliographers and historians writing and collecting during the period spanning the reigns of Philip II to Philip V. Works or happenings from the late middle ages and the beginning of the early modern period provided good material for clerics and courtiers eager to contribute to historiography while pleasing their patrons. In this context, the three scholars examined in the chapter, Luis Tribaldos de Toledo (1558–1634), Nicolás Antonio (1617–1684), and Juan Francisco Andrés de Uztároz (1606–1653), compiled and redirected diverse pieces lifted from obscure chronicles, colonial political treatises, architectural inscriptions, well-known literary works, letters, and autograph pieces.

In the first codex, Tribaldos gives his censure to an abbreviated version of Gonzalo de Arredondo y Alvarado’s (1450–1518) late medieval Crónica de Fernán González. He writes a lengthy prologue in order to justify the relevance and timely nature of Arredondo’s uncritical and partly fantastical work. He paradoxically establishes the aim and intent of Arredondo’s suspect chronicle as a pursuit of truth. He maintains truth as the highest goal of historical writing, yet also normalizes anachronism by giving examples of mistakes, mishaps, and outright lies in the
writing of history since Antiquity. In this way, Triblados provides Arredondo with a virtuous intention and objective, yet also establishes these aims and goals as impossible. Using Tribaldos’ appeal to truth as a base, the chapter examines Antonio’s and Uztárroz’s methods of marking time in one document collection each. The first comprises a collection of documents originally compiled by Nicolás Antonio. Antonio presents his version of truth via a series of autograph documents and architectural inscriptions to convey a “first-hand” knowledge of the events portrayed. Uztárroz takes Antonio’s affinity for first order testimony to an extreme by filling some 800 folios spread over two codices with original letters and those he copied relating to the reign of Philip II. In the collection studied in the chapter, his focus is the so-called “Altercations” of Aragon involving much political and social unrest, the banditry of the Latrás brothers, and the rebellion of Antonio Pérez (1539–1611), former secretary to Philip II.

In studying the compilers’ approaches to time, the chapter builds a framework for a discussion of the time of a physically present early modern book and the time that codices such as these might communicate for a present user. The practices of the early modern collectors and bibliographers that are relevant for studying the time of the physically present, old book include a positive perception of anachronism, or the acceptance of the “layered”18 multiple temporality of an old document; an acknowledgement that the meaning of a past object depends on what users do with it in the present; and that the writing hands on individual letters and autograph pieces, rather than representing a past moment of a person’s existence, enable the user to achieve a sense of connection with the context of a given historical figure. Like the first chapter, the second advances the thesis that the physically present, old thing requires of the observer the processing of possibilities at odds with those that the physical support might convey. My examination of the codices aims to build on and critique Berber Bevernage’s remarks regarding the “presentists” failure to define presence and absence, as well as time (“Time, Presence, and Historical Injustice”).

Chapters three and four shift away from fragmentary manuscripts or manuscripts comprised of “fragments” to two very different measures of completion. The third chapter turns to the “romance kharjas” and concepts of representation to examine fragmentation of texts by critics as a form of filling in the gaps of Iberian literary history. A muwaššaha is an Andalusian strophic poem written in classical Arabic or Hebrew, except for two verses of its final stanza called a kharja, standard Arabic for exit, departure, something extended or extracted, or a salient piece. The kharjas are generally extant in dialectal Arabic, romance, or a mixture of Arabic vernacular and romance. The fragmentation studied in the chapter consists of an extraction of the kharja from its muwaššaha with the effect of presenting it as prior to the muwaššaha of which it actually forms a part, constituting effectively an ur of “Spanish” literature. Defining representation primarily via Bruno Latour and Louis Marin, the analysis frames two 10th and 11th century muwaššahāt and their kharjas as groups of representations, or the primitive meaning of the word Ding (Thing). This notion of thing directly contrasts the conception that appears in later Heidegger of the thing as an entity with a life of its own that exists prior to and in spite of representation. I align presence with Heidegger’s “Thing” and oppose it to representation in an effort to investigate the above dialectic of presence.

18 I borrow “layered” from Nagel and Woods’ recent book Anachronic Renaissance on the instability and multiplicity of time in the renaissance object. In the present case, however, I aim to show how a “layered effect” is a characteristic both of the pre-modern collector’s perception of time and a modern user’s perception of the old book’s time.
The third chapter works with two contemporary *muwaṣṣāḥāt*, one in Arabic by Abū Bakr al-Jazzār (ca. 1060–1120) and one in Hebrew by Moshe Ibn Ezra (1055–after 1138) that share roughly the same *kharja*. I first study the *muwaṣṣāḥāt* in their entirety, engaging in a comparison of the effect and function of the *kharja* in each of the compositions, and then briefly comment the *kharja* in isolation as a fragment. I organize the analyses of the *muwaṣṣāḥāt* and the *kharja* around two questions. The first examines what these compositions and their *kharjas* have been called upon to represent in the 20th and 21st centuries. The second moves to the level of the poem itself by querying how the compositions and their *kharjas* play with ideas of representation and permit a less situational “presence.” In the conclusions of the chapter, I complicate the use of this notion of less situational presence in the realm of manuscript culture by means of Ankersmit and Gumbrecht.

The final chapter draws on the conclusions of the first three chapters to evince the thesis of the dialectic of presence by querying the word “value” in the collection and sale of pre-modern Iberian material in the modern age. The corpus consists of two cases of the collecting of Hispanic relics in the 19th the 20th centuries and the implications of their projects for the 21st. The first is George Ticknor (1791–1871), the 19th century Hispanist, collector of Iberian manuscripts and books, and author of the *History of Spanish Literature*. Upon his death, Ticknor donated his collection to the Boston Public Library, which he had helped to found. The second is Archer Huntington’s (1870–1955) “Spanish Museum” and project of the Hispanic Society of America (HSA). In this final chapter, the theme of reconstitution that runs through the dissertation takes on its most explicit form in a study of the compulsion to collect medieval and other Iberian manuscripts, reference books, and works of art.

My interest in value comes from an observation that the word appears frequently, yet usually obliquely, in academic, book market, and more general media discussions of material culture. Value might indicate monetary worth, sentimental significance, perceived utility, or prestige, or all of these things. Similarly, the term “material culture” as evoked in graduate seminars, academic articles, even entire books with the word in the title oftentimes escapes definition. The problem is not simply that this term might connote things as diverse as manuscripts, antique jewelry, pottery, carpets, or amulets. Rather, and as in the case of value, it permits an avoidance of looking closely at what these things actually do in the present.

In order to elucidate value with regards to “material culture” and to draw conclusions on the roles of metaphysics and production in the realm of Iberian manuscripts today, I begin by investigating the conceptions of wholeness and fragmentation of the collectors. Furthermore, I establish the characteristics, namely age, content, and monetary and spiritual worth, collectors use to define the value of Hispanic manuscripts, texts, and other cultural objects, especially medieval Iberian ones. Then, drawing on theorists of the commodity and the exchange of cultural objects, as well as the museum, including Marx, Quatremère de Quincy, Benjamin, Bourdieu, and Baudrillard, I briefly study several manuscripts and other relics related to the Boston Public Library and the HSA as they appear on today’s global book market and in conjunction with several 21st century museum exhibits and other events. These include two Qur’ans (one 10th century, the other 13th), Huntington’s collection of Arabic reference books, an Iberian coin collection, a new wing at the Louvre, and recent discoveries and the exhibition of Morisco

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19 The *kharja* also appears in a third composition by Abū Bakr Yahyā ibn Baqī (d. 1145) that is probably slightly later than the compositions studied in chapter three. The three *muwaṣṣāḥāt* are briefly compared and also translated into English in Valencia and Boyarin, “Three *muwaṣṣāḥāt* That Share the Same *Kharja*.”
manuscripts in Spain.

Following chapter 4, I offer a brief essay on a current exhibit at the Biblioteca Nacional de España in Madrid on *aljamiado* manuscripts. The purpose of that essay is to sketch questions for the next version of the present project, with specific attention to how a drawing of similarities between the perception of the distant past and the “present” might illuminate the role of Iberian manuscript and other relics in the present.

The four chapters and conclusion outlined here do not capture a project that systematically traces different moments in pre-modern Spain. Its logic is a progression of ideas, rather than following a chronological plan and likewise acknowledges openly and practices the notion that the modern-day medievalist is always looking both backwards and forwards at the same time. The dissertation takes as its point of reference the “nobody” seated with an extant medieval object that he or she must try to locate in a past, or use to make sense of the present. The dissertation moves from philology, to the marking of time, to conceptions and means of representation, to a notion called “value.” In doing so, the project intends to contribute usable philological studies on specific manuscripts, compositions, and collections of medieval and early modern literature. The dissertation works through its thesis regarding the “presence paradigm.” Finally, it aims to show how Iberian material does not need to be artificially inserted in current debates about the impact of old material things today and their wide variety of uses, but rather easily constitutes a rich platform from which to explore these questions.
Chapter 1

Fragment as Phenomenon and Philological Subject:
Two Cases of Chivalric Binding Fragments

Pre-modern Iberian fragments bear scars from centuries of wear and tear, the marks of natural disasters and pests, and breakage resulting from the use of the material for purposes other than reading.\(^1\) These scars, whether in the form of jagged edges, worm holes, or stains, mark the sites at which breakage occurred and also indicate all sorts of absences, such as missing words and elements of images, including body parts, scenery, and titles. These lacks convey that the preserved fragments are but pieces of what they once were. They also communicate certain practices, ranging from the repeated handling of determined pages, 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) century use of chemical reagents to decipher illegible text, the trimming of margins in rebinding, and the consideration of the folios as simply raw material.\(^2\) A fragment’s destroyed exterior, particularly when it can be inferred that its destruction occurred intentionally, produces a series of puzzling and potentially irritating challenges to their study that elicit resolution, and for some, deserve indemnification.

The present chapter posits philology as a means of remedying the absences of manuscript fragments. It queries the link between scars and philology with specific attention to the way in which the destroyed aspect of certain testimonies, their physical appearance, either in concrete form, or as shown in high quality digital facsimiles, impacts philological practice. As its corpus the chapter studies some of the fragments that lack the most, those mechanically destroyed for use in bindings and pulled from such bindings in the 20\(^{th}\) century. I draw on definitions and discussions of philology, as well as Eelco Runia’s conception of presence, specifically his use of the trope of metonymy, to examine fragments as philological subjects and more broadly as present-day cultural phenomena. With “cultural phenomena”, I refer to the use of medieval manuscripts today for purposes in which their perceived importance, be it historical, cultural, economic, or a combination of these, appears to be derived from elements other than the content they possess and the philological insights that they can impart. The chapter argues how a contextualization of the creation of the fragments’ lacks and the lacks themselves as part of the changes in the use of these manuscripts over time, including their employment in arguments not necessarily academic in the present, allows the fragments to participate more easily as legitimate philological subjects today. Locating completeness in the pieces that remain, the philology engaged in here effectively aims to overcome the initial definition of fragment posited in the introduction, in which fragments are pieces *not intended* to be metonymies of their absent wholes.

The first set of fragments considered is a group of fifty-nine pieces consisting of both text and images of a 15\(^{th}\) century manuscript of the *Tristán de Leonís*, one of two extant medieval

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\(^1\) I borrow “scars” primarily from the writings of H.U. Gumbrecht. See *Powers of Philology* (especially page 15, the comments about the scar as margin). I consider also the use of “scar” to denote the genre of Chinese literature “scar literature” that emerged in the 1970s, which although diverse, commonly has the theme of coping with trauma.

\(^2\) For bibliography on book production, binding, and uses of books, see note 5 of the introduction.
Castilian versions of the *Tristan en proce*. The testimonies of the *Tristán* in prose reflect two lines of transmission. The first is represented by two 14th century folios in Galician Portuguese. The second is comprised of an incomplete manuscript of 131 folios held at the Vatican Library, whose text is known as the *Cuento de Tristán de Leonís*; two different 14th century fragmentary testimonies in Catalan, which combined yield eight folios in all; the fifty-nine fragments of interest to us here, Biblioteca Nacional Madrid (BNM) Mss./20262.19 (1 folio) and Mss./22644, the first found in 1902, the others in 1998; and the 16th century print editions. It is likely that a manuscript similar to the one of which the BNM fragments once formed a part was the source for the printed editions, including Valladolid (1501), printed by Juan de Burgos; Seville (1511), Jacobo Cromberger; Seville (1520), Juan Varela de Salamanca; Seville (1525), Juan Varela de Salamanca; and Seville (1528), Juan Cromberger. The *Carta de Iseo y Respuesta de Tristán* (BNM Mss./22021) discovered in 1976 in a private collection, is an independent text inspired by the *Tristán* story. This *Carta* also derived from the printed editions, along with the only continuation of the *Tristán* preserved, the *Tristán de Leónís el Joven*, printed in Seville in 1534.

Of the fifty-nine BNM fragments, this chapter focuses on a selection of the twenty-seven extant image fragments, specifically the contiguous ones.

The second group of fragments is the four pieces of the sole extant manuscript testimony of the *Amadís de Gaula* (ca. 1420) held at the Bancroft Library in Berkeley, California. The fragments were found by Antonio Moreno Martín in old bindings and first published by Antonio Rodríguez Moñino in 1957. Rodríguez Moñino has identified the pieces as corresponding roughly to book three of Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo’s *Amadís de Gaula* (1508), yet they contain a significantly different text from that of Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo’s version. In addition to lacking the fourth book that Montalvo identifies as one of his contributions to the romance, and apart from differences in the way in which the work was broken into chapters, it is possible to gather that the manuscript possesses its own style and a unique way of communicating events to readers. At the request of Antonio Rodríguez Moñino, these fragments were bound in leather in the 1960s by Emili Brugalla, one of the most famous binders in the Iberian Peninsula in the 20th century. The fragments thus form their own small book.

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3 As proposed in the cited works by María Luzdivina Cuesta Torre, and also in Lucía Megías (“Análisis de las miniaturas”), although Cuesta Torre makes a point of calling BNM manuscripts 20262.19 and 22644.1-51 the “source” of the 16th-century printed editions. She notes as well that some of the chapters in the manuscript are titled exactly as they appear in the printed edition, but that the manuscript likely has almost double the number of chapters as the printed book. In summary: “El modelo de las ediciones impresas del XVI debió ser el Códice conservado fragmentariamente en la Biblioteca Nacional u otro muy semejante, sobre el que se realizaron algunas modificaciones menores de vocabulario y sintaxis, se corrigieron algunos rasgos de estilo, se abreviaron algunos pasajes y se amplificaron muchos otros con el tono retórico característico de la novela sentimental, que triunfaba entonces” (*Tristán de Leónís*, XIX).

4 The text of the *Amadís* manuscript is available in Rodríguez Moñino, Lucía Megías (“Antología”) and, partially, the two larger fragments, in Menéndez Pidal (*Crestomatía* v. II, 457-59). A digital facsimile of the *Amadís* manuscript is available at the Digital Scriptorium: [http://www.scriptorium.columbia.edu/](http://www.scriptorium.columbia.edu/). For the *Tristán de Leónís*, apart from Bonilla’s transcriptions and studies on the first fragment found (BNM Mss./20626), number 19 according to the numeration used by Alvar and Lucía Megías, see *Crestomatía* v. 1, 352. See Alvar and Lucía Megías (“Hacía el códice”) and Lucía Megías “Antología” for a complete transcription and a “critical” presentation of most of the text, save two very brief fragments, as well as descriptions of the miniatures. See Lucía Megías “Análisis de las miniaturas” for a more developed description of the miniatures. A study of the narrative units of the *Tristán*, as well as some analysis of the unique qualities of the manuscripts appear in Gómez Redondo, v. II, 1527-40.
Philology

The decision to extract the *Tristán* fragments from the codex of canon law documents in which they were found, as well as the move to bind those of the *Amadís* are outcomes of a trait that Erich Auerbach, Nietzsche, and more than a century earlier, Giambattista Vico, ascribed to philology. In the words of Auerbach, philology, like philosophy, “investigates what various people regarded as true at each cultural stage and what accordingly formed the basis of their actions and institutions” (16). While not under the guise of philology for its apparent disregard for content, the same could be said of the processes of purposeful physical destruction described above and in the introduction. At some point, it indeed appeared true, or consistent with one’s vision of reality, to value the chivalric manuscripts of which these fragments once formed a part simply for their raw material. This broad notion of philology and my comparison of destructive processes with those aimed at reconstituting a work serves as the basis for the way in which I will use the word philology, specifically, that philology has long been considered not only an interpretation of determined texts and their traditions, but also the reactions, beliefs, and practices that made sense, and indeed appeared correct and true, to a user at a given time.

This notion of “appearing true” also applies to the present time and to the activities and ownership that scholars, students, and admirers today deem appropriate for this material. These activities and uses give rise to debates that go beyond textual and other content analysis. They include methods of collection, conservation and display of material, intellectual property, and cultural heritage. The uses and significance today of things from the past and scholars’ relationships to these things are part of several larger movements, such as cultural post-humanism, to achieve a more direct and meaningful contact with the texts and things around us. This impetus to gain proximity with old things spans fields ranging from the history of science, psychology, and anthropology, to the philosophy of history, among others. The historian and psychologist Eelco Runia, in the context of his conception of “presence”, has employed the trope of metonymy to explain human interaction with the events and cultural production of the past, including popular culture and art. Runia suggests that a sense of proximity with a moment or experience in the past is triggered by a person, object, place, sound, smell, or taste in the present. The single person, object, or sensation that initiates the sensation of closeness, whether a

5 Perhaps one of the most famous examples of a medieval book with a global impact in the 20th and 21st centuries, told in fictional form by Geraldine Brooks in her novel *People of the Book* and in a piece a year earlier in *The New Yorker* is the Sarajevo Haggadah (ca. 1350, Spain). The Haggadah was taken from the National Museum in Sarajevo and hidden from the Nazis in World World II in a Muslim home or mosque, to be later nearly stolen in a robbery of the museum, hidden again during a period of intense feuding with Bosnian Serb forces, rumored at one time to have been sold for weapons, and finally restored through a project funded by the United Nations. For more uses of old sacred books, see chapter 4 of the dissertation.

6 Posthumanism spans a wide range of disciplines and interests, such as science, medicine, technology, lifestyle choices, cultural and political theory, technology, medicine, and popular culture. Posthumanism has many different manifestations, some focused on human enhancement, but others, which are most relevant here, the finding of new understandings of the self, other human beings, things, and animals through a rethinking of consciousness, intelligence, reason, agency, intimacy, and identity. For such a perspective in relationship to things, specifically the agency and politics of things and the way things attract humans, see work by the French anthropologist of science Bruno Latour cited in the bibliography and discussed briefly in chapter 3.

7 For a concise summary of the “return to things” tendency in the humanities with specific attention to the importance of the presence of the past, see Domanska’s “The Material Presence of the Past” and “Let the Dead.”
scarf, a notebook, or the scent of cut grass, is a piece of this past moment recalled. The piece in the present, which again, is somehow part of the whole of the past experience, acts as a direct conduit to that past experience and produces a sensation that the memory, or time in the past is actually present and able to be experienced right now. As I begin to explore in this chapter and in greater profundity throughout the dissertation, in Runia’s work this call to metonymy serves to give voice to a hope that approximates a metaphysical one, namely that one might be able to reach a more fulfilling, but not necessarily at all historical or cognitive, past. He suggests that things existing in the present have a direct relationship with the past and can produce a real and active past with which we can actually engage, rather than representing something like a past, or constituting symbols whose referents can only very partially be recovered.

This yearning and willing about a continuity with the past, despite appearing a far cry from anything scientific, has a clear presence in Western European philology. Among the many re-articulations of philology over the past twenty-some years, much discussion has centered on the way in which philology, rather than being an objective discipline, has long been used at the service of determined political goals. Karla Mallette attributes the recent interest in defining philology to an attempt on the part of medievalists to understand their identity. This effort of medievalists to understand what they are doing has provoked an ongoing interrogation of the philologist, marked by periodic assertions that philology has never been an innocent science, but has always (implicitly or explicitly) connoted a canny deployment of the past to serve a political end in the present. The formation of the modern science of philology shared a historical moment with the emergence of the modern Romantic nationalisms. The nineteenth-century philologists created maps of national difference, organizing a distant and difficult terrain along lines that echoed the political boundaries of the contemporary world. They posited the origins of a set of national identities: their grammars, their reconstituted epics served as retrospective national anthems, monuments to an originary moment of cultural and linguistic identity. When we study the "origins" of English, French, Spanish, or Italian literature, for instance, we are studying works that were discovered or radically rehabilitated during the nineteenth century—Beowulf, the songs of the troubadours, the Chanson de Roland, El Cid, the lyrics of the scuola siciliana (677).8

The formation of national origins in the 19th century, particularly on the shoulders of the epic, ballads, and lyric, and in the 20th and 21st centuries, with the so-called romance kharjas, has been a fundamental task of philology. The use of philology for political gain, which in itself could serve to invite philology and its medievalists into a more global discussion, could be countered with an accusation that philology also sins in its deeply personal drives. Such personal interest and romantic zeal comes through in Menéndez Pidal’s incorporation of living voices, including those feminine Asturian ones “contagiadas de la aflicción” that he mentions at the start of his Flor nueva de romances viejos as evidence to support his theory of the popular and authentic origin of the epic, as well as its long and continuous transmission. Something similar could also be said of

8 Sarah Kay’s article “Analytical Survey 3” provides a panorama of some of these reconsiderations of philology. See Powers of Philology, Paden’s The Future of the Middle Ages: Medieval Literature in the 1990s, and Medievalism and the Modernist Temper.
Paul Zumthor’s performance of the philologist Gustave Cohen’s “chose médiévale” in his microphoneless lecture classes, classes for which years later, he proudly reported having received rave reviews and even standing ovations from students. For a more contemporary example, one could cite the passion with which Samuel Armistead took up Menéndez Pidal’s enthusiasm for work on Sephardic ballads. A confluence of magic, patient interpretation, and delight come through in his description of the songs and in remembering don Ramón’s work:

This splendid, medieval connection with the modern tradition is undoubtedly the most dramatic, the most thrilling feature of the Judeo-Spanish ballad repertoire. To hear, as I have on so many memorable occasions, to hear a song that has been sung in uninterrupted, direct, continuous tradition since medieval times—medieval voices that reach us today, echoing across seven centuries of uninterrupted oral tradition. This was what first attracted Spanish scholars to study the Sephardic ballads. It was, as the great Spanish critic, Ramón Menéndez Pidal wrote in 1922, as if the Jewish towns in North Africa were ancient Castilian cities enchanted centuries ago and plunged into the depths of the sea, and that now allowed us, by some magical means, to hear the voices of their medieval inhabitants, surviving today in the modern world (6).

The identification of some tenuous, but surely present spirit of the Middle Ages that is only able to come through without a microphone, or which Menéndez Pidal sought in one of his “cazas de romances”, rarely appears in absence of affirmations of the rigor of the work of the philologist in question, or stipulations that the purpose of any play is to further already established philological principles. The North African Jewish towns might be sunken treasure that now enables a sense of contact with the Middle Ages, but the town’s role as sites of living songs is not solely spiritual or cute; rather, the songs sung in the present, and even the mystical experience itself of meeting some medieval by way of them, are things to be employed directly in the service of creating a relatively ordered genealogy of medieval literary production as an extension of Tradicionalismo. In the context of chivalric literature, Lucía Megías’ lamentations cited above are similarly accompanied by many studies on the very fragments he has called but “reflejos y sombreros” of a lost tradition, or in the case of the Tristán fragments, those to which he has assigned his own name. There is thus something about past and present philologies that participates in nationalistic projects, but also those of individuals, which may or may not be connected to a larger thesis regarding the origins or genealogy of the literature in question.

I thus begin by defining philology for the present fragments in terms of the practices it involves. The first consists of allowing the pieces to overcome their status as fragments by understanding their damaged physical appearance as a result of another’s approach to the material at hand, with “material” referring to the physical support or the content. This move to contextualize fragments’ physical aspect is followed by an attempt to identify the completeness in the fragment as it is extant in the present, in essence, permitting the fragment to exceed its status as fragment, fragment as defined as a piece not originally conceived as a metonymy of its whole. Adapting Runia’s notion of the possibility that things in the present can connect users

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9 As reported in an interview between Helen Solterer and Paul Zumthor. See “Perform le passé” p. 138 and the conclusions of this chapter.
directly with the past, I propose that this process of defragmentation of works by contiguity in both the case of the selection of *Tristán* fragments, which are actually continuous, and for the *Amadís* pieces, which are not. There is no single way of unfragmenting the fragment, and for this reason, I am not referring to methodology. Rather, I name a will to locate the possibility of completeness for the fragments in the pieces themselves. For the present cases, this will involves the positing of a function of the miniatures in the once extant codex of the *Tristán* and the elaboration of observations about the discourse of the text of the *Amadís* manuscript.

The philology engaged here makes no claim to being new in any way. Under the designation “philology”, I opt in favor of outlining very general skills or practices in textual criticism, aided by a theoretical framework, in this case the notion of fragments, actual manuscript fragments, and presence. Such is the description that Alberto Montaner, in a recent study on philology in Spain, applies to Gumbrecht’s philology as expressed in *Powers of Philology: The Dynamics of Textual Scholarship* (“Filología: España siglo XXI” 24-5). The same definition of philology also aptly describes the philologies employed in other recent books, such of Thomas Burman’s *Reading the Qur’an in Latin Christiandom*, in the context of commentaries on the Qur’an, whose philology challenges the assumption that the study of language and literature necessarily participates in a well-ordered ideological project, and Lawrence De Looze’s study on the manuscripts of the *Conde Lucanor, Manuscript Diversity*, with a new interpretation of the *variance* method.

The present philology also follows trends in philologies that avoid the proposal of a specific outcome for philological activity. Such “outcome” philologies include the interpretation of a text closest to the original after having “reconstructed” this original, Lachmann’s “constituto textus,” and Paul Zumthor, Bernard Cerquiglini, and Dagenais’ *mouvance/variance* approach. In both cases, principles of “non-intervention” in editing are coupled with a belief that the philologist might be able to reconstruct medieval readings via lenses of ethics or technology. Here I give meaning to the term “original” only in the context of the objective to infer by the available pieces what general characteristics of their whole might have been, rather than its particular readings. I adopt the dedication to studying the medieval manuscript as a historical artifact of the “new” “materialist” philologies as presented in *The Whole Book*, a late 90’s effort edited by the editor of the 1990 *Speculum* Forum on “New Philology”, Stephen Nicholas, and one of its participants, Siegfried Wenzel. Such a conviction to study the material book is even more provocative explored from a sociological perspective, as it appeared defined in McKenzie’s redefinition of bibliography in *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* as “the discipline that studies texts as recorded forms and the processes of their transmission, including their production

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10 For a rigorous explanation of the Lachmannian method in the context of the edition of medieval Spanish literature, Alberto Blecua’s *Manual de crítica textual* remains an unparalleled resource. See also “Los textos medievales castellanos” and Orduna’s *Ecdótica*. In the last decade, the *mouvance/variance* approach has become, according to Stephen Partridge, Echard and others, an “enabling assumption”, rather than a methodology. For an explanation of such a change, see Echard and Partridge (eds.) *The Book Unbound*. See De Looze *Manuscript Diversity* for a summary of the application of *mouvance/variance* to Medieval Spanish Literature (pp. 6-7 and notes) and the rest of the book for an updated and a very provocative version of these ideas. For background, see Cerquiglini and Dagenais’ books and the 1990 issue of *Speculum* “The New Philology”, edited by Stephen Nichols. The “Critical Cluster” on “Manuscript Culture in Spain” in *La Corónica*, as well as the letters in the Forum section are of course especially valuable for Hispanomediavists interested in the approach. See in particular Montaner’s contribution, highlighted by De Looze, n. 10., in the introduction of *Manuscript Diversity*. 
and reception” (12). Beyond historical relics, the present fragments are more broadly considered as cultural phenomena used for various purposes in the present. While historicizing the fragments, I also identify a utility or use of the fragments in the present. In locating this use, the philology outlined here parts from a recognition that the main objects of study are the extant pieces, those that the philologist actually has before him or her.

The Fragments

This approach to fragments, intended to counter the philologically destructive effects of another—that is, the approach that turned the manuscript to pieces—requires a vivid imagination whose first task might be to invent a scheme to view the fragments in person. To see the fragments first-hand is a nearly impossible challenge in the case of the unbound Tristán fragments, making procuring a facsimile or drawing on the images included in Lucía Megías’ study of the miniatures the only viable options for consultation. As in the case of the fragments of the Amadís, the appearance of the Tristán fragments is undeniably tattered. The twenty-seven Tristán miniatures present varying degrees of fragmentation, some never completed, others with text transfer from other pieces of manuscripts that stuck to the miniatures’ surfaces, some depicting knights without heads, and others portraying no more than the barely perceptible body of a character who now more appropriately would be called a stain.

It is evident, nevertheless, that the images were once very large in scale and not particularly detailed. Many of the people, animals, and structures they portrayed more fully in the past can still be identified, including characters of the story, such as Palomades, Tristán, Galeote, Iseo, Brangel, el rey Arturo, Lanzarote, el rey Marco, and Saigremor, some identified with a label in the miniature, as well as scenes. It is also possible to classify the miniatures by type. One miniature, 20a, b, and c, according to Alvar and Megías’s numbering, which has attracted more attention than some of the other fragments, as evidenced by its appearance in facsimile form in Lucía Megías and Alvar’s initial edition and again in an exhibition considered at the end of the paper, arrived in three strips that have been literally put back together; others have been separated from existing folios of the manuscript from which the fragments were pulled (BNM Mss./12915), as in the case of 25r.11 Others yet are consecutive (fols. 6ar and 6br, fols. 9a and 9bv) or in close proximity (35a, 35b), providing an opportunity to gage, as Alvar and Lucía Megías have noted, the frequency of miniatures in the codex as well as the relationship between them, including examining them as a series, as I will do here. Others still preserve text that describes the content of the miniature or the names of the characters featured (1r, 6b, 9a-br, 14r, 18r, 20abc, 25r, 30r, 33r, and Mss./20262/19) and others present particularly large figures or showcase determined characters, acting in part as portraits (Iseo, 4r, Brangel, 5r, Tristán and Galeote, 2r). Some fragments have miniatures on both faces, but other pieces provide only a very slight indication of what they once represented (17v, 23r, 30r).

The miniatures appeared frequently in the whole manuscript, with sometimes two illuminations for one chapter of the sixteenth-century printed book, as in the case of the scene depicting the defeat of Palomades’s brother, both Palomades and his brother being foes to

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11 I refer to the Tristán fragments according to the numeration used by the BNM and in scholarship by Carlos Alvar and Lucía Megías.
Tristán, and the subsequent liberation of the temporarily captive King Arthur, King of Britain (Figure 1). About half of the images include titles in red. These titles, instead of offering the observer a single, concrete, preterit, and pre-interpreted event, often evoke processes, enabling the observer to witness the gradual realization of an action: Palomades (adorer of Iseo and enemy of Tristán) searching for some squires and finding Iseo’s damsel Brangel in the forest after she had been ordered to die by Iseo out of jealousy of the familiarity between the maid and the King (6b); Tristán’s rescuing of King Arthur in the Gasta Floresta after the King had been captured and threatened by the Doncella del Arte with death, if he would not agree to marry her (9b); King Arturo and his knights’ journey to a monastery where Tristán and his friend Lanzarote were staying (25) etcetera. Considering these titles, the scale, lack of intricate details, and frequency of the miniatures, which can also be inferred from other consecutive series of folios preserved, as Lucía Megías has suggested (“Análisis de las miniaturas” 8), it is unlikely that each was a puzzle to be consciously and scrupulously deciphered, but rather means by which to make the characters present to those present with the book such that they could more easily imagine the story.

The current state and physical appearance of the miniatures, however, appears to be at odds with this proposed function. It is for this reason that scholarship has reacted by attempting to fix the fragments by indeed tried-and-true methods for whole texts, such as François Garnier’s criteria for studying medieval iconography, based on the premise that a medieval image, rather than simply depicting people, places, and things, represents them using a codified language (“Análisis de las miniaturas” 3). The problem, however, is that this sort of philology, while excellent for whole pictures, does not lend itself to an imagination of the fragments as something more than mere isolated pieces that can only be appreciated singly, or for isolated details. The following examination of one of the three extant series of consecutive miniatures of the Tristán manuscript illustrates this point.

The series reflects part of the Tristán story in which King Mares of Cornwall and Tristán are fighting over Mares’s wife Iseo. This section includes a scene in which King Mares goes to Arturo’s court to seek vengeance on Tristán for the shame Tristán’s affair with the king’s wife has brought upon Mares as well as a scene of feigned reconciliation between Mares and Tristán. The first image depicts King Arturo and Lanzarote speaking with Brangel outside her tent right before Tristán and Iseo emerge from it (Figure 2). The second miniature, essentially a stain and nearly illegible apart from the arms and legs of a standing knight, might depict Tristán, or possibly Tristán and Lanzarote; Tristán and Lanzarote have just recognized each other after having fought one another in a tournament, unbeknownst to them, something that occurs several times throughout the romance, have just recognized each other (Figure 3). The next fragment, number 18, presents text on its verso that is contiguous with the text on folios 17 and 19, but an image on the recto that corresponds with a scene not described in the text on any of these folios that logically could only have occurred after Arturo arranges the reconciliation of Mares and Tristán (Figure 4). The reconciliation, which again is only feigned, includes several iconic scenes of the Tristan tradition that would make appealing subjects for a miniature, namely the series of tricks undertaken to reduce Mares’s suspicion of the two lovers, including the famous placement of the sword between the sleeping Tristán and Iseo to illustrate the couple’s supposed fidelity. Miniature 18 would thus logically come after the one shown on folio 20, extant in three strips, which depicts Mares going to Arturo’s court with twenty knights to seek vengeance on Tristán (Figure 5). At this juncture, it would be plausible as well to expect a depiction of Tristán’s and
Lanzarotes’s entry into Camelot after having been invited by Arturo, accompanied by Iseo and Ginebra, before Mares’s arrival.

The title of miniature 18, the seemingly misplaced miniature, but perfectly contiguous text, identifies the characters depicted and indicates that Arturo, Mares, Tristán, and Iseo go to Camelot where the temporary reconciliation eventually takes place, before Tristán is forced to return with Mares to Cornwall to provide the people with a reason for his association with Iseo. While Lucía Megías has tried to decode the individual elements in an attempt to make sense of the miniature’s placement, a study of the gestures, height, and location of the horses does not offer an answer to one of the most provocative questions of all: why the miniature exists in this location in the manuscript in the first place. Suggesting that the misplaced image constitutes a symbol of the disingenuous truce to come between Mares and Tristán, while a provocative interpretation, ignores all of the evidence that the other extant pieces provide. In effect, there is no indication that such a visual premonitory gesture might occur in the manuscript, as in every other case of the extant miniatures, the images are consistent with material included in the chapter that precedes them. Such is the case, for example, in the two miniatures that follow which are without any sort of hidden message, communicating, respectively, Mares’s arrival at King Arturo’s court with twenty knights to seek vengeance on Tristán and Arturo’s travel to the monastery where Lanzarote and Tristán were resting after having fought in a series of challenges with the fairy Morgaina.

Further, in the two other extant series of miniatures, there is similarly nothing to suggest any symbolic meaning in the pictures, apart from the network of gestures and use of space in medieval iconography as studied by Garnier. The series consisting of miniatures 6a, 6b, and 8v focuses on a single character’s (Palomades) involvement in a series of episodes that begin with Iseo’s ordering of the death of her damsel Brangel, after having perceived an excessive familiarity between her husband and her lady. The extant miniature prior to 6a depicts Brangel crying, tied to a fruit tree and awaiting death, but soon to be pardoned, or in the process of asking for pardon of the squires (not extant) whom Iseo orders to kill her. The next extant miniature 6a (figure 6), which corresponds to the same printed chapter to which the image depicting Brangel corresponds, shows Palomades conducting the maid to the monastery of nuns. 6b (figure 7), as the miniature title seems to indicate, depicts a search on the part of Palomades for the squires who had left Brangel in the forest, after deciding not to kill her. The following miniature, 8v (figure 8) again depicts Palomades with his hand at his sword, in conversation and demanding Iseo of Mares. This series is thus consistent almost to a fault, having chosen to perpetuate the focus on Palomades when it might have been much more provocative, and appropriate considering the main events of the text, to picture in 6b something else, since the text prior to 6b includes such important events as the Queen’s lament for not having seen Brangel for some time (despite having ordered her death) and her order for Brangel to be brought to her, either dead or alive. Viewing the images consecutively as they appeared in the once whole manuscript effectively sets Palomades in motion, which in this case takes the form of his moving gradually to the outer edge of the manuscript page, as though having started by finding Brangel in the forest, and working onward, in this case to the right, until he ends up in Camelot and takes Iseo. A similar appearance of motion and montage is found in the second extant group of contiguous miniatures, miniatures 9a, 9b, and 11. In this series, which also centers on the exploits of one character (Tristán’s successive defeat of Palomades’s brother, his saving King Arthur from
death, and his riding away with the recently saved king) the last two images, 9a and 9b (figure 1), can be viewed concurrently.

Thus with regards to the placement of the seemingly misplaced miniature (no. 18–figure 4) in the series which treats the feud, vengeance sought, and feigned reconciliation surrounding Iseo, based on all the pieces preserved and the aspect and frequency of the miniatures, it is most probable that the picture appears at this juncture by mistake. Specifically, it is likely that the person responsible for indicating that the miniature be elaborated in this folio noticed, but without a careful reading, that the end of the chapter that ends on its recto conveys that Tristán, Iseo, and Brangel go to Camelot on Arthur’s invitation. The miniaturist or person who planned the miniatures thus spotted the word Camelot and the idea of journey, and anticipating the resolution that came after, as well as Tristán’s subsequent forced journey to Cornwall, depicted this journey by mistake. Rather than guess at some lost intention on the part of the miniaturist, or rather, the person instructing the miniaturist, the idea is to begin with a consideration not only that each piece is a viable commentary subject, but rather that the group of extant pieces, while not the whole that it once was, together, and allowed to overcome their status of fragments, yield a new whole, albeit a highly fragmentary one. In this case, location of completeness in the fragmentary pieces resides in imagining the way in which they might have functioned in a pre-modern state based on how a selection can still function in the present.

This wholeness, in the case of the Amadís manuscript, is admittedly more difficult to perceive with so few pieces preserved and because the fragments contain no images, which at least, depict shapes that can be reasonably identified as humans, animals, things, and architecture. The Amadís thus poses complex interpretive challenges. Nearly all of the very limited studies on the fragments conclude that these pieces cannot tell us much of anything—we count with just one article dedicated to the fragments in nearly fifty years. The fragments correspond roughly with four noncontiguous chapters of book three of Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo’s version of the Amadís, chapters 65, 68, 70, and 72, and are now bound in a book in an order different from the order in which they were discovered and in a chronology different from Montalvo’s version, with Montalvo’s chapters 65 and 68 reversed. As Rodríguez Moñino advanced in his initial study, these fragments do provide concrete evidence of a manuscript tradition of the Amadís, as well as indication that Montalvo was indeed not the creator of Esplandián, Amadís’s son, or the epithet Caballero de la Verde Espada, one of Amadís’s identities. It is because of this information that one of the smallest of the four fragments, the one containing the name Esplandián, has been considered the most valuable of all. In the way in which the Tristán pictures do not lend themselves to piecemeal deciphering, the little extant text of the Amadís appears all the smaller when mined for words that might reveal more clearly the relationship between these fragments and the printed editions.

It is yet all the more challenging to do any philology with the Amadís manuscript, as opposed to the Tristán images, because the Tristán images, while incomplete, depict scenes that can for the most part be read on the reverse or in a similar form in sixteenth-century printed editions. Imagining a whole manuscript, or simply the text that would complete the missing lines in the passages conserved in the fragments, seems an entirely more risky venture than guessing.

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12 Apart from Rodríguez Moñino’s transcription and study, and those of Agustín Millares Carlo, and Rafael Lapesa, the most comprehensive study is Montaner’s, proposing the lesser reliance on emblematic elements in the manuscript as opposed to the printed editions.
missing parts of a picture with the aid of a description. This “envisioning” the pieces whole, however, is one of the most viable philological options for the *Amadís* fragments.

Turning to the fragments, it is not entirely clear in the manuscript how Amadís, don Bruneo de Bonamar and Gandalín arrive at the Ínsola Triste and learn about the cruelties of Madarque. In fact, from simply reading the fragment itself, the reader would not even know that Amadís and his friends had arrived at the *Ínsola Triste*, or be aware of the presence of the giant, both clearly articulated, from the beginnings of their arrival at the island in Montalvo’s chapter 65. Borrowing these details from Montalvo’s version, while a move away from the fragment itself, provides an entry point for signaling out the handwritten version’s unique qualities.

Don Bruneo dixo:
—¿Vedes, señor, qué hermosa tierra?
—Tal me paresce—dixo Amadís.
—Pues paremos aquí, señor, dixo don Bruneo—unos dos días, y podrá ser que en ella fallemos algunas extrañas aventuras.
—Aquí se haga—dixo Amadís.

Entonces mandaron al patrón que acostasse la galea a la tierra, que querían salir a ver aquella ínsola, que muy hermosa les parescía, y también para si algunas aventuras hallassen.
—Dios vos guarde della—dixo el maestro de la nao.
—¿Por qué?—dixo Amadís.
—Por vos guardar de la muerte—dixo él—, o de muy cruel prisión; que sabed que ésta es la Ínsola Triste, donde es señor aquel muy bravo gigante Madarque, más cruel y esquivo que en el mundo ay. Y dígovos que passa de quinze años que no entró en ella cavallero, ni dueña, ni donzella, que no fuessen muertos o presos.

(III, LXV, 974).

The recto of this first fragment conveys a similar sense to the passage quoted above, describing Amadís and his companions’ arrival and a perception of the battle on shore. The mention of the positioning of the ship, of shields, coupled with the pronouncement of “¡Dios confunda!,” by Don Marinero, Amadís, or the group of companions in response to the sight of the shields and the ongoing battle all appear in column A, and set the stage for Amadís’ battle with Madarque captured on the inverse of the fragment (figure 9).

![Text](image-url)
[...] por unas alturas [...]
[...] en ya quanto por la tierra
[...] las aguas que descenden
[...] montaña [...]
[...] dio no en marinar ved
[...] so en aquella mova entre
[...] resplandecen escudos
[...] no[n] los[v] di[es]
[...] Díos confunda
[...] t ante los
[...] omes t
[...] se bollir
[...] dezir nin
[...] ad que viera
[...] o[t]ros que pa
[...] vanan t me
[...] paresc
King Cildadán is by chance (also partly the case in Montalvo, as the analysis of the verso will show) and the arrival to the island without knowledge of the island’s history, and thus any creation of suspense about what could occur once they land. In any case, in the manuscript, whether Bruneo, one of the squires, or Amadís notes the presence of shields, the shields, as Montaner has noted, do not appear to have an emblematic function, but rather function primarily to signal the presence of a combat (542). The subsequent mention of “bollir” in the manuscript version is reminiscent not so much of the last part of the passage from Montalvo’s edition describing the brave and skillful defense of Galaor and King Cildadán, but rather of the impact of Madarque’s chaotic and sometimes indiscriminate wrath. It is possible that column B, which contains some fourteen incontiguous complete words, but with inclusion of the words aquella, catar (catas), cavallero, peligro(?), vieron, Dios, escudero (?), mejor, and falles, suggests a further description of the battle and possibly of the efforts of the Irish King and Galaor.

If the chain of communication for deciding to approach the island is not altogether clear in the manuscript, it is certain that the manuscript presents specific divergences from Montalvo’s edition with regards to the particulars of Amadís’ entry into combat with the giant. With no extant mention of the giant in the manuscript, only what is likely a reference to his men’s assault on Cildadán and Galaor, what remains, as Montaner notes in his cited study, is that it is Amadís himself who takes the initiative to enter the combat, having himself recognized and identified both Ardián and Galaor by their appearance or the quality or manner of their fighting (Figure 10):

[... mas
[... su
[... mas
[... tan rre
[...jan roto
[... andauan
[...][A]madis
[...][ntado
[...][nque
[...][rir o ma
[...][a los ca
[...][se pue
[...][a ynso[la]
[...][i tan
[...][o el quiere
[...][a alla tan
[...][de los
[...][os suyos
[...][ τ ama
[...][que ma
[...][tovieze
[...][un po
[...][des boces
Creating context for the fragment using Montalvo’s version, it is possible, despite the piece containing less than one-hundred words, that it be used to hypothesize conclusions about the discursive qualities of the pieces as a group and the once whole manuscript, allowing, in essence, the fragment to overcome its status as fragment. Here it is evident that in the manuscript, as opposed to the printed book, Amadís recognizes Ordián (Montalvo’s Ardián) and then continues as the subject of the first part of the fragment, subsequently, as in the printed edition, recognizing the men fighting to be highly skilled, and next, and unique to the manuscript, identifying Galaor as one of the combatants. There is also a second assertion of Amadís’s identification of Galaor in the narrator’s indication that he relays this information to Don Bruneo and instructs that he take up arms to defend Galaor. It is only then that Ardián notices Amadís’s arms and repeats to Amadís information not only that he already knows, but rather also upon which he has already resolved to take action. It is not clear if Ardián’s comment in the manuscript initiates Amadís’s actual defense, as it does in Montalvo’s edition:

Y Amadís vio venir descontra ellos a Ardián, el su enano; y como vio el escudo de Amadís, conociólo luego, y dixo a grandes bozes:
–¡O señor Amadís, socorred a vuestro hermano don Galaor, que lo matan, y a su amigo, el rey Cildadán!

Cuando esto oyeron, moviéronse al más correr de sus cavallos, juntos uno con otro, que don Bruneo a su poder a él ni a otro en tal menester no daría la aventaja. Y yendo así, vieron venir a Madarque, el bravo gigante que era señor de la ínsola, y venía en un gran cavallo y armado de hojas de muy fuerte azero y loriga de muy gruesa malla, y en lugar de yelmo una capellina gruesa y limpia y reluziente como espejo, y en su mano un muy fuerte venablo tan pesado, que otro cualquier cavallero o persona que sea apenas y con gran trabajo lo podría levantar, y un escudo muy grande y pesado. (III, LXV, 976).

As a result of the seemingly unnecessary series of identifications (Amadís–Ardián; Amadís–combatants) and the reporting of the identification of the combatants by the narrator (“e dixo a don Bruneo que tomase las s[sus armas que cu]jidaba que era don Galaor”), the fortuitous nature of Amadís’s encounter of his brother on the Ínsola Triste in the manuscript appears to have less force than in the corresponding scene in Montalvo’s edition. In the printed chapter, chance is thematized throughout, and the unexpected, but lucky encounter fuels several subsequent affirmations of Amadís and Galaor’s pleasure at seeing one another (“Y desque fueron desarmados, abraçaronse muchas vezes Amadís y don Galaor, llorando del plazer que en se ver avían”), the reporting of this chance encounter to Queen Brisena (“–Amigos, lo que a mí me plazería es que os vais a la reina Brisena y le digáis cómo os embía el su cavallero de la
Ínsola Firme, y que fallé a don Galaor mi hermano, y besadle las manos por mí”), and later in Queen Brisena’s meeting of her two sons, not seen together since their very early encounter with another giant (“—¡Ay, Virgen María Señora!, ¿y qué es esto, que mis hijos veo ante mí?”).

In the scene in the manuscript, and indeed paradoxically, considering its highly fragmentary state, there are no gaps for the reader to ponder but rather a contiguous block of identifications. The effect of this repetition, however, is actually more confusing, even annoying, rather than clarifying, and likely, part of the style that Montalvo claims in his prologue to have corrected, recalling his critique of the “antiguos originales que estavan corruptos y mal compuestos en antiguo estilo, por falta de los diferentes y malos escriptores, quitando muchas palabras superflúas y poniendo otras de más polido y elegante estilo tocantes a la cavallería y actos della” (225). The result is a discourse that emphasizes identification by processes of contiguity such as the use of direct discourse by distinct characters, even at the cost of needless and cumbersome repetition, or succinct processes of representation such as emblems, as Montaner has observed previously, or other strategies of abstraction, which would allow for the shortening of discourse, such as inference, the use of subordination to combine several short phrases joined by copulative conjunctions, and the use of collective nouns.

Parting from the reconsideration of the pieces as legitimate substitutes for the once whole manuscript, the conclusions of the previous analysis of the Amadís suggest that a metonymic-based philology is consistent with its very content. Yet, more than this, and despite the importance of the concrete practices associated with philology in the humanities (the creation of editions and interpretation), much of the meaning of the fragments in the present is derived from impulses in philology—philology defined broadly as the study of the basis of meaning and truth for a given culture—which are much more basic or, prior to these practices. These more basic drives and practices include the need to put the past back together and to reach an acceptable contact or understanding with a convincing past. A brief exploration of uses of the fragments in the present not directly focused on the analysis of text or iconography is informative in this regard.

Fragments as phenomena in the present: an exhibit

People beyond philologists have used these fragments in the present for purposes not explicitly academic; each of these uses is in some way “true,” to return to my interpretation of Auerbach’s and his predecessors’ assessment of philology, and many indicating reactions and sentiments to the objects that could scarcely be perceived as the means to a scholarly goal. Selections from both sets of fragments were featured at a large-scale exhibition commemorating the quincentennial of the Amadís de Gaula (1508). The exhibit, with Lucía Megías as commissioner, was held at the BNM from October 9, 2008, to January 18, 2009: “Amadís de Gaula 1508: quinientos años de caballerías.” Its focus was the origins, content, and diffusion of books of chivalry and included the display of 135 medieval and Early Modern manuscripts, incunabula, and other printed books in glass cases. The Tristán was the first subject of all,

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14 A catalog of the exhibit was published by the Biblioteca Nacional de España, Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2008, edited by Lucía Megías, Martí de Riquer, Carlos Alvar, Fernando Gómez Redondo, and others.
featuring a display of several of the most colorful and complete miniatures against a backdrop of facsimiles of other image fragments in an artful, eye-catching display in which it would be possible, and even highly likely, to ignore that the images ever formed part of a book at all. The Amadís, on the other hand, sat open to folios 1v and 2r on a bookstand, accompanied outside the case by several support materials, including a pamphlet with small-scale color facsimiles of folios 1r and 1v, a map of the diffusion of Arthurian literature, and on the back, an edition, by Lucía Megías, of columns A and B of folio 1v. Most notable, however, was the touch screen fixed to the wall on the left of the case holding the manuscript. With a swipe of a finger, participants could turn a folio of a facsimile of the manuscript, activate a magnifying glass to zoom in on the text, and try their hand at reading it, prompted by the message: “¿Sabrías leer un fragmento del Amadís de Gaula medieval?” The page included a key on the right side of the screen with letters and abbreviations as they appear in the manuscript and their modern equivalents. If participants failed at reading, they could roll a finger over the manuscript text and a transcription would appear in white over the handwriting.

Apart from the pre-modern specialists there to read a bit of the “real thing,” reading, in this case, for most of the audience, which included not only pre-modernists and their students, but rather visitors to the library from many fields and professions, is not reading for research, an objective to reveal something about the work’s tradition or the thing’s provenance and other history, or even for content. Rather, much like the situation of a student who knows the letters and sounds of a language, but whose vocabulary and word recognition are but slight, this reading is a game that creates the sensation of meaningful interaction with a cultural object, but without much actual acquisition of content. Flashy technology unites with what a philologist might consider the primary purpose of the fragments, deciphering, to produce a sort of philology for the general public. This essentially trivial reading exercise opens the possibility of at least the guise of a productive use of the Amadís fragments in the present.

The specialists’ move to read a bit of the “real thing,” as well as providing the opportunity for users of all stripes to seek guided “apparently meaningful” experiences with the fragments, which do not, in turn, involve the understanding of the manuscript’s content, point toward one of the reasons why expensive exhibitions such as this one, as well as much philological activity, might take place at all. A move to establish the sense of a direct contact with a convincing past and to put a more definitive one book together is the intense urge that Runia has characterized as Sehnsucht, a concept aligned with Ankersmit’s “sublime historical experience” andohan Huizinga’s “historical sensation” (“Presence” 7). In the context of philology, it is arguably what Gustave Cohen, by way of his theater group the Théophiliens, called the performance of a version of the medieval, or a “chose médiévale” for a present-day public, and also what Ramón Menéndez Pidal, in the introduction of his Flor nueva, communicated when he spoke of the old romances reanimated in the crisp voices of Asturian women, affirming, indeed, that they were old, but not tired, “viejos son, pero no cansan” (Menéndez Pidal 41). At its foundation, this yearning and the “medieval thing” consist of an attempt to make the medieval meaningful in the present, which as in the example above, does not

15 See the introduction for information on the presence paradigm and a summary of its major currents.
16 For this reference to Gustave Cohen, see Paul Zumthor, ou l’invention permanente: critique, histoire, poésie (Jacqueline Cerquiglini-Toulet and Christopher Lucken eds.) particularly Paul Zumthor’s interview with Helen Solterer.
always involve a full or even partial understanding of the text on the fragment itself or the exterior texts to which the piece or pieces might be correlated and effectively filled-in. This is the common thread of the uses of the reading game, an observer’s reception of the Tristán miniatures as though paintings in a museum, and the two great philologists just mentioned. At its most basic, the yearning is about putting the past to work in different moments, which, and herein lies the rub, can also explain the very destruction that created the fragments.

Although perhaps it is somewhat shameful to compare destructive uses of the material and those not particularly academic to uses that aim to contribute to research, each is a way of making sense of and completing old material, whether it be text, images, or simply paper. All of these modes of completion could be called a compulsion to complete. As I will explore in the subsequent chapters, this compulsion to complete, or will to reconstitution, might become a search for a specific meaning, even an objective, the minute the question of in what time, for what purpose, or any interrogation of a fragment’s medieval, early modern or modern contexts is posited.

The primary problem investigated here for two cases of binding fragments is that although a researcher might have the objects present—in the event that he or she is lucky enough to see the things themselves or at least high quality digital facsimiles—and is able to see, touch, and smell them, it is difficult, due to their fragmentary physical appearance, to put hands to studying the objects as viable commentary subjects. It is undeniable that the physical presence of these binding fragments can have positive, even mystical, erotic, and gastronomic effects on both academics and the general public, in that it is alluring and power-instilling to have an old more or less closely guarded thing within reach. On the other hand, the damaged appearance can also elicit a frenzied effort to put the pieces back together, which, as I have tried to show in this chapter, can involve a neglect of the few that actually remain.

Following the work done in the field of philosophy of history, the present analysis has aimed to engage in a philology consistent with the objects’ very content that allows them to become unfragmentary and to become objects that can serve for their once whole. The chapter also conveys that the fragments’ current state, although apparently lamentable from a philological standpoint, was once a logical response to the material and one that can be better understood by examining, briefly, some of their unphilological uses in the present. At the end of his recent book on the marking, reading, and other uses of books in Renaissance England, William Sherman writes that he hopes that he has shown his readers that used books “when handled sensitively and observed closely have the power to remind us of their social lives” (178). Beyond their social lives, fragments such as these, both as philological subjects and larger cultural phenomena, can bring about a change in our own social relationships.

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17 For a serious, but humorous discussion of this impulse see Gumbrecht, “Eat your fragments!”.
Figure 1. BNM Mss./22.644.9ab
Figure 2. BNM Mss./22.644.14
Figure 3. BNM Mss./22.644.17
Figure 4. BNM Mss./22.644.18
Figure 6. BNM Mss./22.644.6a
Figure 7. BNM Mss./22.644.6b
Figure 8. BNM Mss./22.644.8
Figure 9. UCB Ms. 115.2r
Figure 10. UCB Ms. 115.2v
Chapter 2

The Time of Three Early Modern Codices in the Present

This present chapter moves from discussions of modern philology and highly fragmentary manuscripts to two 16th and 17th century document collections comprised of diverse “fragments.” Rather than the destroyed remains of manuscripts employed in binding, here “fragment” will refer here to a document placed in a new context, whether within a brief selection of a historical exchange, within a section marked by a determined year, or merely inserted among documents to which it only tangentially has relation. The means of reconstitution studied is the ordering and portrayal of past time in both the pre-modern and modern period. The chapter studies pre-modern and modern organization and conceptions of past time with a view to understanding the time, with regards to past, present, and future, that old books communicate as they manifest in the present. In other words, the end objective is to assess the time of old, physically present books containing documents of diverse temporalities.

The corpus consists of three factitious codices organized or amended by bibliographers and historians writing and collecting within the period spanning from the reigns of Philip II to Philip V. In this period, writings on history and histories themselves infused the notion of “truth” with new force. Works or happenings from the late medieval and beginnings of the early modern period received a re-orientation and primary sources that came into fashion in the renaissance made their way into document collections.¹ Such sources included public documents, letters, decrees, charters, codicils, and inscriptions. Two of the codices studied are document collections of well-known bibliographers and the third a book containing an outdated 16th century chronicle contextualized by Luis Tribaldos de Toledo (1558–1634). The codices contain documents that range in content from colonial political treatises, architectural inscriptions, well-known literary works, chronicles of little acclaim, and of particular interest to the present analysis, letters and autograph pieces. En route to investigating the time of the physically present, but old book, the chapter examines the ways in which the initial compilers of the codices talked about time, marked it, tried to control it, or, rather, ignored it, through the use of autograph documents, the creation of divisions within the codex, and by appealing to metaphysics—specifically, to the concept of truth.

In studying the compilers’ approaches to time, I form theses about time for each of the three codices to build a framework for a discussion of the time of a physically present early modern book. These theses include a positive perception of anachronism, or the acceptance of the “layered”² multiple temporality of an old document among other old documents; an acknowledgement that the meaning of a past object is dependent on what users do with it in the present; and that the writing hands on individual letters and autograph documents, rather than representing a past moment of a person’s existence, enable the present user to achieve a sense of

¹ Particularly helpful for examining changes from the medieval to early–modern period in the perception of the past as well as history are Burke’s Renaissance Sense of the Past and Grafton’s What Was History?.
² I borrow “layered” from Nagel and Woods’ recent book Anachronic Renaissance treating the multiplicity of times in the renaissance object. I aim to show how this “layered effect” is a characteristic both of the pre-modern collector’s perception of time and a modern user’s perception of the book’s time.
connection with the context of a given historical figure. In reflecting on the compilers’ relationships to time and this larger problem of the time that a user might experience in interacting with old books, the chapter aims to contribute a study of these specific codices and also to work on presence, specifically to the time or times of the presence of the past and of physically present old objects.

The codices to be studied in this chapter include Biblioteca Nacional Madrid (BNM) Ms./894, a codex once in the library of Phillip V containing the censure and lengthy prologue of Luis Tribaldos de Toledo. The prologue, which serves as a preface to an abbreviated version of Gonzalo de Arredondo y Alvarado’s (1450–1518) Crónica de Fernán González, copied some 70 years earlier, consists of a rumination on the meaning of history that appeals to metaphysics in its argumentation; and two document collections of famed bibliographers, historians, and scholars. The first is BNM Ms./6043, originally a collection of Nicolás Antonio (1617-1684), containing several autograph documents, as well as two texts on architectural inscriptions, one with marginal commentary of a personal nature. The second is BNM Ms./1762, a continuation of a collection relating to the reign of Philip II, compiled, and with many autograph copies, by Juan Francisco Andrés de Uztároz (1606-1653) in the mid 17th century, with texts in the hand of each the Argensola brothers (Lupercio and Leonardo), extensive documentation of the so-called “Altercations” of Aragon involving much political and social unrest, the banditry of the Latrás brothers, and the rebellion of Antonio Pérez (1539-1611), former secretary to Philip II.

Luis Tribaldos de Toledo and the convenience of truth

Sometime in the early 1620s Luis Tribaldos de Toledo gave his censure, context, and a guise of relevance to Arredondo’s questionable late-medieval chronicle, the Crónica de Fernán González, as extant in BNM Ms./894. Tribaldos de Toledo is perhaps most well-known for his publication and edition of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza’s Guerra de Granada (Lisbon 1627), as well as for his efforts to save and publish the work of Francisco de Figueroa (Lisbon 1625). He was first a professor of rhetoric at Alcalá (1591) and eventually the Cronista Mayor de las Indias in 1625, in addition to an important figure in the debates surrounding the authenticity of the Plomos de Sacramonte, or the lead books of Sacramonte, discovered in caves outside Granada at the beginning of the 17th century.

Informed by his involvement in all of these capacities, Arredondo redacted a lengthy proem that effectively attempts to frame Arredondo’s chronicle as a worthy work of historiography. Yet instead of a series of justifications consisting of praises of Arrendondo’s choice of content and style, Tribaldos takes advantage of the pages as an opportunity to discuss the difficulties of writing what he considers a true history. A true and real history for Tribaldos is one that tells the truth about past events, truth being most like akin to what Aristotle, and similarly Plato, put forward in his well known definition of false and true: “To say of what is not, or of what is not, that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Metaphysics 1011b25). Tribaldos writes in part what Collingwood called a “Scissors and Paste” history on the meaning of history, citing and combining a series of theories by authorities on the difficulty of finding truth, beginning with Democritus, while also showing the limitations of this approach and critiquing what become less than authoritarian sources. He draws on examples as temporally diverse as the taking of Carthage, the Conquest of
Peru, and Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s (1553-1617) failure to mention the imprisonment of Francis I in his portrayal of the Battle of Pavia (1525).

In the first section of the chapter, I investigate the conception of history and fluid sense of time that Tribaldos de Toledo creates in his prologue to what is a significantly abbreviated version of Arredondo y Alvarado’s work, in comparison with the earlier version extant in BNM Mss./2788. Tribaldos establishes truth and other metaphysical principles as the essence of history such as to preface and embrace, albeit weakly, Arredondo’s flawed history. The front part of the codex as extant today consists of a group of thirteen folios added some seventy years after the chronicle itself was copied. The first original extant folio is now folio 14, showing also what appears to be the original foliation, 4. The thirteen folios are comprised of two guard sheets, as well as Tribaldos’ prologue (2-11r), followed by Arredondo y Alvarado’s prologue, beginning “A loor y alabança de aquel summo bien” (12-13v). The two guard sheets bear signatures of a notary, Juan Perogila, the censure of Tribaldos, dated the 29th of August, 1622 in Madrid, a sloppily done title page that affirms that the version of the Chronicle that follows was edited, and the approval of the Gil Gonzalez Dávila, Chronicler of the reigns of Philip the III and IV and named Cronista de Indies under this last Philip, that it be printed.

As Arredondo writes in chapter XXI of Book 1 in the longer redaction of his chronicle extant in BNM Mss./2788, he began his chronicle in 1513 (fol. 68v), finishing it in 1514 (fol. 746v). He wrote this and other works on behalf of Charles the V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, Naples and Sicily, whose confidence he had won, having also earned the favor of the Catholic Kings and a significant influence on the court with title of Official Chronicler. Despite the support of Charles the V, to whom Arredondo explicitly dedicates the chronicle in Ms. 2788, the Crónica de Fernán González was shortened by at least half a century later, abbreviating the four rambling books extant in BNM Mss./2788: Book 1: Fernán González’s ancestors, 43 chapters; Book 2: the Count Fernán González, 147 chapters; Book 3: the Castilian Counts that came after Fernán González, 26 chapters; and Book 4: the Castilian kings from Ferdinand I to the Catholic Kings. In Mss./894, in addition to a decrease of about half of the material contained in the longer version, the dedicatory and the preamble of the author’s prologue, as well as the preambles to the four books, are eliminated; many changes have been made to the “author’s prologue,” also in Tribaldos’ hand. On the reverse of Tribaldos’ censure in Mss./894, there is a message that the work had indeed been edited (“quitadas algunas cosas superfluos tomado solamente lo necesarios”). This suggestion that the initial version of the Chronicle presented extraneous information has been crossed out not, I would gather, because a reader found the message offensive, but rather because the abbreviated version had come to be regarded as the definitive and only one worthy of circulation, come 1622.

It is no surprise, then, that neither the lengthy first version nor the abbreviated one ever came to be printed, in 1622, or in at least one other time after, in 1656-1666, as indicated by the

3 While there are no editions of Arredondo’s Crónica de Fernán González, likely due to the contemporary and also the 19th and 20th century reception of the work, it is extant in many manuscripts of varying quality in Spain. There is also a 16th century copy at the Bancroft Library, UC Berkeley (BANC MS UCB 143 v. 25). Amador de los Ríos published a poem written in honor of Fernán González that forms part of the prologue in BNM Mss./2788, which C. Carroll Marden attributes to Arredondo, but judges absolutely horrid in terms of style and content. For an account of the history of Arredondo’s chronicle, see José Gómez Pérez’s “Una Crónica de Fernán González escrita por orden del emperador Carlos V.”
folios added to Ms. 2788 in the 17th century. The folios consist of a favorable review of the work signed by Antonio Zapata y Aragón dated February 15, 1656, as well as the censure and reference to printing by Brother Bartolomé de San Pelayo, dated January 20, 1667. There is evidence that by the middle of the 18th century some of the arguments in the 16th and 17th century regarding Arredondo’s ability as a historiographer and whether or not the Chronicle was “pure history,” as Diego Martínez Cisneros had argued in its favor, had been reduced to an acceptance of his strange style and a use of the Chronicle to ruminate on the nature of history. A member of the Real Academia de la Historia Luis de Herrera, elected 1754, made the following appraisal on the page immediately prior to a fragment of the Crónica in manuscript 26-2-D-42 of the same Academia:

Copiarla toda sería obra de muchos días y la utilidad poco correspondiente, por hallarse toda en autores impresos de que se sacó y no tener en éste fechas, ni más crítica y comprobación que aquellos autores, pues el intento del autor más fue escribir la moral que la historia, y persuadir a seguir las virtudes y huir los vicios con ejemplos y autoridades de los antiguos escritores, tanto sagrados como profanos, en que fue muy versado.⁴

A defective member of the genre of historiography, and not worth the trouble of copying in its entirety, the Chronicle’s place became primarily to mark what constitutes good historiography and what does not, with Arredondo’s history ending up on the negative end. At the same time, the Chronicle was a necessary evil of sorts; it had to be recognized, although not necessarily appreciated, and inserted into literary history, if only for Arredondo’s popularity with Charles V, but had neither the literary value nor factual data to be copied again in either of its more complete forms. What is more, Herrera makes the case for a differentiation between writing a moral guide grounded in examples and the word of classical authorities and writing a history that can stand the test of critical analysis. It is precisely this denomination of Arredondo’s work as something not necessarily historical that might have opened the possibility that it be seen and celebrated in its unique aspects; the designation instead assured that the Chronicle was simply considered second rate, a manuscript written in the age of print that was unworthy of the press.

The strange organization and rambling effect of Tribaldos’ prologue could be explained by a sophisticated attempt to avoid these possibilities, either that of having to approve a second-rate history, or by having to admit that it was something else entirely. In the first folio, Tribaldos establishes truth, by way of Democritus, as the essence of history, despite affirming the difficulty of finding it, and that history should be a mirror of things. Instead of continuing to piece together statements from authorities who speak the truth about history, he begins a lengthy discourse that amounts to an affirmation of the extraordinary difficulty of locating the truth. Tribaldos sets the stage for an affirmation of the fickleness of man and the ease with which he is blinded by his passions. Tribaldos draws on what he sees as a vice in Greek historiography through examples from Herodotus and Theopompus. History is not something arguable, the product of the talents of a savvy lawyer, but rather should be self-evident:

La verdadera diferencia entre la historia y la poesia es que en la historia todo se ha de

⁴ In all cases I copy directly from the manuscripts modernizing punctuation. Parts that I was unable to read appear in square brackets with question marks.
conformar y encaminar a la verdad, mas en la poesía lo más va enderezado a contemporizar con el entendimiento y gusto particular del lector. De aquí es que no solamente se ha de huir de escribir cosa fingida, pero tampoco se ha de callar por miedo ni pasión cosa que en efecto haya sucedido. Porque se ha de tener más consideración con la verdad pura y sencilla que con la gracia ni el respecto humano, contando puntualmente al suceso, sin añadir de suyo ni encubrir de injusticia lo que el amigo o enemigo bien o mal ouieron obra, y encarecer sus proezas con lores, y al contrario vituperar los yerros del enemigo de proposito, callando la grandeza de sus hechos ilustres. Porque esto más sería oficio de abogado, que defendiese su causa contra los adversarios que de legítimo historiador....Mas este fue un vicio propio y particular de la nación griega, que por hauer ostentacion de su ingenio y eloquencia, o por ilustrar los hechos de sus naturales mas de lo deuian, mintieron en la historia con tanta voluntad y libertad como en Herodoto y Theopompo se puede ver, y desto son causa los encomios donde por la mayor parte muchas cosas falsas se encarecen [?] por verdaderas...Se echa de ver la dificultad que tiene el escriuir la historia siendo tan casi imposible acertar con la verdad y poderla descubrir. Esto mismo se aumenta cuando escriúimos cosas antiguas, cuya memoria depende y se ha de sacar delas historias por otros escritores, o [cuando] celebramos sucesos de nuestros tiempos, y entonces corremos peligro: porque primeramente no puede faltar pasiones que nos perturben y destruyan el entendimiento, llevándole por fuerza estropellando de una parte a otra (2r-v).

Tribalos works himself through an argument whose logical conclusion, which he does not state, since failing to voice it allows him eventually to defend Arredondo’s history, is not particularly impressive today: having truth be the essential characteristic of history is problematic because proper history, “contando puntualmente al suceso, sin añadir de suyo,” a story stripped of all subjectivity and most importantly, vice, becomes impossible to find. At issue is not that for Tribalos, there is no normative definition of history, since he posits both a meaning of history and a method for locating its center, truth: “podría dar con ella [la verdad] bien que fuiese diligent en procurarla investiga[...].” (2r) From this perspective, while historical writing is a representation of events, ideally it should be a substitution that would allow full and “true” understanding of events no longer present. The most interesting problem with Tribalos’ definition, a problem, which again, is a logical conclusion of his own analysis, is that while the definition might solicit a hermeneutic method of inquiry, of working from the outside in, the center itself is non-interpretable and without content. Truth thus must be accepted, believed, since as an absolute, it cannot be proven, argued, or modified to support a particular case, to borrow Tribalos legal metaphor. Further, from the way in which Tribalos frames his definition and subsequent complaint about the difficulty of locating the truth he believes to be there, it is evident that any re-description of the center and the substitution of truth for “fact” or “real” would yield the same circular sort of definition: history is truth (fact, real); facts are what really or truly happened in the past. Pascal Engel addresses precisely this point in a statement of what he imagines Richard Rorty’s point of view to be in their debate on truth held at the Sorbonne in November 2002. Speaking of Rorty, Engel proposes:

Thus—for him—we ought to stop speaking of truth as the representation of the real as an ultimate goal, and so on, and try to redescribe what we usually describe using this
vocabulary by means of a different one stripped clean of these mythologies. My principal question is this: can we actually accomplish this when it comes to truth? In other words, can our ordinary way of employing the vocabulary of truth really be redescribed in such a way as to rid this notion of its “objectivist” implications? (Rorty and Engel 13)

Part of the question that Engel presents here and that Rorty addresses later in the debate is that there is a common understanding of the word truth (i.e. everyone knows what true or truth means when they say it) that functions quite well until one tries to define it. The trouble is not only with “truth,” however, but also rather also with the sort of metaphysical language that might be used to re-describe this term. As Rorty explains elsewhere in an analysis of the sayings “in accordance with scientific method” or “correspondence with reality,” when truth is actually taken seriously, submitted to critique and “clarified philosophically” it becomes “empty metaphysical compliments—harmless as rhetorical pats on the back to the successful inquirer or agent” (Rorty xvii). One could take issue with what Rorty means by “clarifying philosophically” and suggest that if one was to clarify philosophically all everyday notions that are vague, but nevertheless understood and meaningful—beyond such things as good, bad, or honest which bear more obvious similarities to truth—words such as woman, man, or ideas such as “formal dress”, “moderately-priced”, or “professional behavior” we would have nothing left to say. The point, however, is that the preservation of truth as something meaningful, for Tribaldos, and also today, is dependent on the user’s holding it at arms-length, believing not only that it exists, but that we know what it means, without saying it.

This ability to understand truth without analyzing and actually articulating the specifics of this understanding, the emptiness that an analysis might yield, and in addition, an investigation of the meaning of history without engaging or exploring the implications of the analysis is what permits Tribaldos to defend a dateless, partly undocumented history. Was it simply that Tribaldos was beginning the change that Collingwood describes as characteristic of the 17th century, the systematic examination of authorities, establishing their relative credibility, or does he go farther, exhibiting barely detectable, scarcely realized hints of Vico’s critique of Descartes, suggesting that certain truths, such as those of mathematics and morality, should not be given a metaphysical justification, but rather understood in terms of how and why they are made?

Unlike Aristotle, Tribaldos uses truth as a genuine property. Aristotle’s position on truth, as read by Paolo Cavielli, approximates a modern minimalist one in which truth cannot be an essential characteristic of a person or thing; the important difference between a modern perspective and Aristotle’s is that Aristotle’s conception of the contingency of truth draws from his belief that truth is volatile because it does, in fact, correspond with the world (31). Aristotle’s “contingency” is thus not properly a contingency.

Tribaldos demonstrates, without querying, the contingency of truth with his examples from history, but never admits that it is problematic to hold “truth” as an absolute. By embracing the medieval conception of history as a compendium of past things generally agreed to have occurred, he thereby is able to back, albeit in the end, only limply, Arredondo’s work. First by disparaging the passions and prejudices of man, and then by noting the differences in proper names, dates, and epochs across histories, Tribaldos begins to unravel, without arriving to analyze, the problem of defining history by a measure that escapes all objectivity and that when submitted to inquiry, lacks any content. With truth as his center, or the problem of truth as the center of his argument, and by refusing to explore the implications of any relativizing of truth
that his examples show, Tribaldos is able to side-step the question of time entirely. This, in turn, permits that Arredondo’s history, even with its archaic aspect, including a lack of dates and uncritical handling of sources, has a place.

Tribaldos’ concern with time, in the form, for instance, of complaining about the variation of dates across histories is primarily ornamental and functions to make a generalizing statement about a certain sort of narrative, specifically, that all long narrations are imperfect. He writes that the variety of dating systems is unavoidable, and what is more, natural:

\[\text{Lo que ultimamente tiene incomprendible certidumbre es el computo ajustado de los días delos años en los annales, chronicas o historias de cualquier nacion que sean. Porque no solo una respecto de otra tienen variedad por ser de diferentes epocas o principios y lleuar otro estilo en esta computacion siguiendo unas la higera, otras la era, otras la ocasion del mundo, y otras el nacimiento del Señor, sino que en una misma gente y en una misma ley doctrina ay tan ordinaria diferencia que causa notable confusión [...]}\]

As in assigning truth as the center of history, here Tribaldos’ creates an irremediable, universal problem—such that he can avoid creating the situation that would require a remedying the specific errors that Arredondo commits. Tribaldos establishes a continuity of errors throughout time: although the epochs may be distinct, and though the system of times within the histories may be of different measure, they should all have as their goal the telling of the truth. His examples at the beginning of his proem showing disagreement among the Auctores and errors present in testimonies from antiquity to histories written in the 17th century are strung together without transitions and regard for time, connected only by their common failure to tell the truth and some of its repercussions:

Don Rodrigo dizque el rey don Fernando el Magno murio en Leon, y Cartagena que en Cabeçon, junto a Valladolid, en la conquista de Mallorca por el rey don Jayme de Aragon. [...] Que escriuen [??] las facciones tan diferentes de como las escrivue Miedes, siguiendo los comentarios del mismo conquistador, que es notable la diuersidad que en muchas cosas se lee de un autor al otro. De donde se concluye que no es falso que tales personajes ayan vivido en el mundo, mas no consta de mas [??] manera la operacion que acaba uno se ha de dar por andar los autores vacilando en su relacion. Algunos dexan de contar en una misma historia lo que otros refieren con fidelidad, no por ignorancia, sino de industria y con malicia, como Liuio, que auiendo sido tan publico que Viriato entre otros consules y caudillos romanos vencio a Claudio Unimano, y que Plinio, Florio. Eutropios ni Paulo Orosio lo pudieron dissimular y lo passo en silencio en cubriendo esta victoria tan celeste con particular passion por honrrar al vencido y no al victorioso. Otros tuercen la verdad y la truecan por enuidia como succedio en las conquistas de Peru que auiendo Rodrigo
Orgoñez sido desafiado de Hernando Piçarro por ciertas quejas que del tenia, admitiendole que le conoceria en una batalla a el y aun compañero por una ropilla acuchillada de tercio pelo naranajdo que llevarian sobre las otras y otras armas, como a su tiempo lo hizo. Succedio que Orgoñez peleando y viendo el disfraz mato al compañero de Piçarro, creyendo que era su enemigo declarado. Dio relacion desto despues en España uno del vando contrario diziendo que Piçarro vistio un criado suyo con las diuisas con que auia dicho saldria el dia dela jornada para que los que le jusgasen se descuidasen del [??] el atavio del criado, motejandose con esto de couarde, y assi se diuulgo por toda España, y llego al Peru hasta que el consejo real de indias se informo de la verdad de Siluestre Gonçalez, hombre aunque de contrario, ando honrrado y fidedigno que le [??] de lo que falsamente a que el mal intencionado le auia impuesto (3r-v).

Pointing out human failings and their causes in the Greek histories that have even come to cross the Atlantic, some of these causes of lesser weight than others, ignorance better than industrious malice, envy, and intentional spread of misinformation, Tribaldos creates a continuity of the flaws in accounts from antiquity to present day. It is not a linear evolution of errors, but rather a repetition with difference, from misattributions (Pliny and Virgil), to confusion over place of death (Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada), an omission traced from Livy to Orosius, to false accusations (over the death of Pizarro’s man, Fuentes). In answer, then, to the question of whether Tribaldos, writing in 1622, was moving toward an understanding of how truths, like the truth of history, were made, it is safe to say that he at least had the evidence at hand. He perhaps also knew that in cultivating in his prologue the belief that histories, no matter from what time, are flawed and by making their failure inevitable (since they aspired to the improvable and impossible truth) then Arredondo’s history at least deserved a reading, since even the Masters were imperfect. In this sense, Tribaldos does push beyond a tentative critical handling of the relative credibility of histories, in that he takes advantage of the benefits that imposing a metaphysical center affords: to ignore time, to reject any thesis that there has been a chronological evolution of the quality of histories, and to ignore the singular errors of Arredondo. In his movement from his signature and comment as notary, to his repetitive, needlessly long, and as though pronounced defense of a flawed history, Tribaldos asks his readers to believe him and his assessment of the state of historiography.

Tribaldos thus promoted anachronism as a basic characteristic of both humans and the things written by them. In the way in which Ernst Bloch wrote of non-contemporaneity, or the appearance of outdated modes and values in the present, and the coexistence of different historical times in what he calledJetzt, or the “Now”, Tribaldos also engaged in a critique of progress, albeit with the specific goal of presenting something perceived by many as disharmonious with the present. In order to create relevance for a cultural object of little relevance, he recurred to a strategy that would ensure total control of the fragment that he had before him: he subverted the typical frame or epistemology of time, replacing adherence to chronological time and progress for an invisible, but still very powerful measure of truth. If progress is never complete and there are always elements of the old and the not quite yet to

5 Bloch developed this concept in Heritage of Our Times in his explanation of the rise of German fascism in terms of primitive and archaic survivals in modern society, including racism, as well as phenomena unique to a mass capitalistic society, such as dance marathons and obsessions with movie stars.
become in a given object, then mediocre, which Arredondo did quite well, is simply the natural state of things.

In this way, Tribaldos took advantage of the opportunity that directing and giving context to a fragment offered him that would have been more challenging had the full version of Arredondo’s chronicle been extant, since, after all, everybody expects a fragment to lack something. This observation points out an important element of the temporality of fragments that I will describe in the next section, that old fragments require more of the present than other objects. Because fragments are necessarily more lacking in context and content than whole works, in the process of simply manifesting or appearing in the present, they incite efforts to put them back together. These reconstructions consist of an approach that first, before moving to any mode of commentary, must create and conceive of the fragment as a viable subject, since in physical appearance, it is defective. This next section will examine the ways in which the fragments of various temporalities, authors, and content in codices 6043 and 1762 of the Biblioteca Nacional, collections of Nicolás Antonio and Juan Francisco Andrés de Uztárroz, respectively, were created as relevant commentary subjects in the respective presents of their creators. The section places particular attention on letters, inscriptions, and autograph pieces.

Locating truth in first-order testimonies

The index of codex 6043, written in the hand of Juan Antonio Fajardo, whose signature it bears, opens a number of possibilities for investigating the above questions. Fajardo, member of the Real Academia Española, academic, and scholar, took care to identify all of the works he considered copies by Nicolás Antonio. The first of these works is Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s De bello Africano seu fragmentum historiae Caroli (ff. 69-95), once thought to be a fragment of Sepúlveda’s chronicle on Charles the 5th, De rebus gestis Caroli V (1556), but now known to be an independent work on the war of Tunis (a war carried out by Charles the 5th in 1535 against Hayreddin Barbarossa) and a source for the De rebus gestis Caroli V, which Antonio copied directly from Sepúlveda’s autograph held at the Jesuit college in Granada. Fajardo’s interest in autograph texts was thus one very likely shared with the organizer of the collection himself, who throughout, and thoroughly in line with his distrust of uncritical histories, copied works which directly presented his method of historiography or relationship, contentious or amicable, with determined literary, political, or historical figures. This attitude is exemplified by his posthumous Censura de historias fabulosas.

In the Censura de historias fabulosas, Nicolás Antonio not only leaves no doubt about his view of Jerónimo Román de la Higuera’s infamous Chronicones (1564), but also about the ease with which new manuscripts, in accordance with the desired ends of the finder and publisher, manipulate the public and pervert their view of both the past and the present. Antonio writes of the multiple consequences of the presence of these infirm books, their birth being just the beginning of the political and cultural damage they can cause:

6 The only edition of De bello africano is difficult to find, that of Mercedes Trascasas Casares, Io. Genesii Sepulvedae De bello Africo (Guerra de Túnez): edición crítica, traducción e introducción, Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2005. For prior studies on De bello africano, see those of Jenaro Costas and Leticia Carrasco, particularly “El manuscrito garnatensis del ‘‘De bello africo’’ de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda”, Epos: revista de filología 8 (1992): 77-12.
La Buena Fortuna con que corrieron las primeras pruebas que hizo, le puso aliento para arrojarse a las segundas. Este es el daño de la dissimulación, dar fuerzas i caudal a la malicia para que haga de si los empleos que fuera facil, i provechoso desbaratar en sus principios. Recibiose con aplauso la novedad de los primeros, i mas antiguos Autores: concibio los segundos de tiempo inferior: i otras fabulas que saco a la plaza del mundo. Todas ellas corrieron con aprobación de los mas. y aun no se ha cocido aquel mal humor, que se gastava en ellas invenciones: antes parece que le han heredado otros, bien que muriess el que le padecio primero. Para esforzar aquellas falsedades, que escandalizan tanto a los hombres advertidos i doctos, se nombran i producen hoy manuscritos antiguos, i se sacan a la luz, como de Archivos, i Librerias, en que dicen se guardan: siendo estos testimonios de tan flaca fe, como los que dellos se valen, Autores indigos del nombre Español, i del lugar que ocupan entre los que por su integridad merecen la fama.

El ver como este cancer politico, i religioso, cunde sin resistencia alguna, es la segunda razon que me hace tomar la pluma. Ya el numero de los contrarios, que han salido al campo, al que no supiere que son uno mismo en diferentes formas, i cuerpos, puede poner horror. I si cada dia nacen destos Gigantes hijos de la Tierra, a hacer la Guerra al cielo de la verdad, cada dia tambien se hace mas dificultoso el oprimirlos con fuerzas comunes (5).

El Doctor Benito Arias Montano, varon de los mas esclarecidos que ha tenido España en ingenio, doctrina, i amor a la verdad, no alcanzò a ver impressos los Chronicones, porque muriò año mil quinientos noventa i ocho, i ellos se publicaron en Zaragoza año mil seiscientos i diez i nueve. Pedro de Valencia su discípulo, varon desconocido, como sus insignes Obras manuscritas, muriò año mil seiscientos i veinte, uno despues de la publicacion de los falsos Chronicones: i el suceso de no aver sido atendidos Benito Arias, i Pedro de Valencia, quando fueron consultados sobre las Laminas, i Libros de Plomo de Granada (manantiales de mentiras execrables, de donde se sacaron muchas para autorizarlas en los Chronicones supuestos) pudo darles ocasión, para su silencio, i desprecio; pensando quizá tan veraces, como grandes hombres, que aquella mala semilla de poquísimos, i mentirossísimos Fragmentos, no creceria tanto, que llegasse a ocupar i embarazar el dilatado campo de la Historia Eclesiastica (7, Dedicatoria).
Try as one might to repress the errant texts, apart from not having the ideal critics at hand or failing to listen to the ones available, the presence of false fragments only ensures that more will arise. Further, their presence and impact suggest that some superhuman force will be required to contain them (cada día también se hace mas dificultoso el oprimirlos con fuerzas communes). Worse yet, however, is that one might discover, going back to Tribaldos’ ruminations on truth, not so much that truth is meaningless, meaningless in the Rortian sense, since, at least in its common application, truth has meaning, but rather that there is a sort of truth even in lies, or at least, a truth in the steadfastness of the erroneous belief of the deluded in the sense that they “truly” believe in the validity of fabricated texts and objects. Drawing more explicitly on psychoanalysis, this case of believing truly in false material is reminiscent of Freud’s admittance of phenomena such as haunting and delusions in his exploration of the “truth of delusion” in relation to Jensen’s Gradiva and his protagonist Norbert Hanold. Freud assesses the attraction of the young archeologist in Gradiva to his objects of study and their ghosts:

If a patient believes in his delusion so firmly, this is not because his faculty of judgment has been overturned and does not arise from what is false in the delusion. On the contrary, there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion, there is something in it that really deserves belief, and this is the source of the patient’s conviction, which is therefore to that extent justified. This true element, however, has long been repressed. If eventually it is able to penetrate into consciousness, this time in a distorted form, the sense of conviction attaching to it is over-intensified as though by way of compensation and is now attached to the distorted substitute of the repressed truth (10, 80 cited in Derrida).

Even the deluded, then, can be after something true–albeit a distorted truth–in their invention. Nicolás Antonio’s attempts to go to the source, the copy written in the hand of the author, suggests that additional measures should be taken, beyond simply reading a copy of a text generally accepted to be legitimate. The problem is not simply that the text of the fragments contains lying content that a reader might assimilate in a given moment, but rather that the presence of the lying books tells us that we are sure to be deluded again and that we might be deluded about others whose content we assume to be true. Questions are raised, thus, and these will be addressed in the conclusions, about how much present is in the objects that are generally considered to be past.

It is perhaps for questions like these that Nicolás Antonio, and the scribes and compilers of the codex that came after him, sought to verify texts, as well as other forms of material objects, including architecture and inscriptions. Soon after copying Gabriel de Santans’ “Noticias de algunos lugares de Andalucía,” commissioned by the King for a general description of Spain, Antonio copied a letter containing a third century Roman inscription on a rock found in the town of Ronda (Arunda), Spain. The inscription is of interest primarily due to its reference to the obligation to obey the ordo of Arunda, the practice of euergetism, and the duties and burdens to the heir:

L Iunio L f Qur / Iuniano II. vr. II / qui testamento suo caverat sepulchrum sibi / fieret
et voluntate patroni cum ob/temperaturus esset. L Iunius Auciprius / et heres eius
penius ab ordine Arundae / ut potius statua iam lab /// aav quam / eius Galli in foro
Although incomplete, the transcription communicates the conundrum of a son, who due to his higher station, must undergo financial hardship; a situation of euergetism in which the heir, simply to be able to exist in the community, must allow the state to profit on the death of his father. The transcription in itself was no doubt of interest for the personal case of a general practice it depicts, as other documents, such as marriage contracts and testaments might do. Communicating the idea of euergetism more vividly than a general definition might, the inscription provides an account of a personal characterization of the practice of giving to the state, one particular case speaking for a complex socio-political system. Nicolás Antonio, while likely appreciative of this last point, based on his approach to the false books and the preoccupation that even a few, or simply one bad book can undermine the whole of writing history, does not question whether or not we should believe the inscription.

Unlike Tribaldos, Antonio is primarily concerned, as were the 19th century bibliographers that followed him, with communicating the transmission as clearly as possible, how it came to be known and through whose hands it passed, rather than with the most provocative details of the content. Although Antonio is sure to indicate that he copied the inscription faithfully, it was essential for him to place his communication of the inscription in its critical context, specifically with interest in noting the accuracy of others, namely friends of Fariñas who had also worked on inscriptions. Referring to the letter, Nicolás Antonio weighs in on the mistakes of other historians, while showing exactly the place in which he has inserted himself into the debate: “Dice que ai otra piedra con otras en Ronda la Vieja de donde como que fue Acinipo en que anduvo muy acertado Rodrigo Caro: aunque no en la moneda…” (154r) In the 19th century, a later letter written by Fariñas to this same Rodrigo Caro and Félix Laso de la Vega was used by José and Manuel Oliver Hurtado to demonstrate that Marcario de Fariñas was indeed the author of a book entitled Antigüedades de Ronda, which Tomás Muños y Rivero (Diccionario bibliográfico-histórico de los antiguos reinos), who later corrects himself, had attributed to Fernando Reinoso y Malo. In reporting the relationships between Fariñas, Caro, Martin de Roa, Félix Laso de la Vega and others cited by the Oliver Hurtado brothers, Muños y Rivero maintains that Fariñas, according to Caro, was the author of the discovery of the inscriptions of Arunda and Acinipo (327).

Antonio, in thinking back to Tribaldos, has his own sort of unchronological conception of time. This consideration of Fariñas as the “author of discovery” by both 19th and 17th century critics, as well as Nicolás Antonio’s careful documentation of the critical milieu of the inscription might appear wholly different from Tribaldos’ approach to generating the relevance of Arredondo’s history. Instead of relying on truth and creating a fluid time that minimizes the errors that a chronological conception of time might emphasize, Nicolás Antonio presents first-hand documents, those that could enable the collector and bibliographer to imagine more easily

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7 I copy from the manuscript. The complete transcription can be found online in the Hispania Epigraphica database, http://www.eda-bea.es/, record 1329: L(ucio) Iunio L(uci) f(ilio) Qir(ina) / Iuniano IIvir(o) II / qui testamento suo caverat sepulcrum sibi / fieri ad l(denarios) CC(milia) et voluntati patroni cum op/temperatu / rus esset L(ucius) Iunius Auctinus lib(ertus) / et heres eius petitus ab ordine Arund(ae) / ut potius statuas tam Iuniani quam / [filii] eius Galli / in foro poneret quam /[qua]m sumptu maiore adgravari / [se sensit h]onestum et necessarium / [duxit vo]luntati ordinis obsecun/[dando pare]re.
the situation of writing or creation of the document. More than this, however, and in addition to
compiling these autograph pieces, letters, as well as other seeable and touchable relics that exist
in public spaces, such as the inscriptions of Arunda, Nicolás Antonio, here in this codex, and in
his *Biblioteca hispana nueva*, recognizes that the meaning of past objects is created in his
present. The meaning of these things is formed literally in the moment in which he has access to
them and can set himself to inserting them, by copy or by taking hold of an autograph document,
in a place in which their relevance can be established through commentary. He painstakingly
notes the people and places that a work or a determined testimony has circulated. In this way,
Antonio creates a situation in which the old object is also connected with a discovery and an
“author of discovery” in a more recent past. Thus like Tribaldos, but for very different reasons,
Antonio promotes an understanding of the past object as also a present one, an understanding
that must be sought not in a chronological order, but rather in a logical one. In speaking of
Gonzalo de Arredondo in his *Biblioteca hispana nueva*, and surely a statement he might have
wanted to retract had he been able to revise his bibliography published posthumously, he thus
starts at Arredondo’s life and then turns to more contemporary texts to give him a place and to
establish him as a relevant figure.

The creation of the meaning of the cultural object in the past and present and a direct
presentation of this practice in the codex does not entail, however, a ceding of control of the
thing itself and a neglect of its history. Although not identified by Fajardo as having been written
in the hand of Nicolás Antonio, there is another inscription copied in the codex, a selection of the
work of Marco Antonio Palau (1543-1645), *Antiguas memorias de los más notables sucesos de
la ciudad de Diana y de su famoso templo*, that appears to be written in his hand.7 As with the
Fariñas letter, here Antonio is concerned not only with summarizing the contents of the text
accurately and faithfully copying the inscription, but also with giving evidence, in writing, of his
own interaction with the testimony. In this case, Antonio does so by intervening in the
transcription that Palau includes in his work. In speaking of one of the Temple of Diana’s
inscriptions, Antonio places his own interpretations of the epigraphs in the margins. In an
inscription of his rendition of chapter six of Palau’s text, Antonio merely corrects the inscription
with what he considers the correct interpretation, noting that the other has erred in his
transcription of two proper names Galieno (Gallienus) and Dianensi (“el autor interpreta galieno
mal, leindo galenia, nombre de la tribu. / el autor copia Dianiensi, no esta sino como io lo
pongo). In the ninth chapter, however, as in other places, he goes further in his intervention,
noting explicitly that this time his correction of a particular inscription is a function of his having
seen the rock directly:

Subi a este sitio y vi esta piedra que es un pedernal [?] de este monte, el mas liso que
pudo hallarse alli. Lei assi:

8 An 18th century copy of this work can be found at the Biblioteca Valenciana Digital: Diana desenterrada: antiguas
memorias y breve recopilacion de los mas notables sucesos de la ciudad de Denia, y su famoso templo de Diana:
desde su antiguisima fundacion hasta el estado presente. Control Number: BVDB20090001602.
http://bv2.gva.es/estaticos/contenido.cmd?pagina=estaticos/inicio
9 I compared the Antonio autograph documents in Mss./6043 with those of different BNM manuscripts. A
particularly interesting example of Antonio’s hand, including his signature, can be found in BNM Mss./6275, fol.
60.
LVL. URBANUS
PRINC · UEXIL LEG VII:
GEM. P.F.H : : : :
CUM SUIS : : CIS
NO : OS L · ATUSRO

El penúltimo renglón
no afirmo que no
puedan ser obra al-
gunas letras del
por lo gastado de la
piedra (21r).

Antonio thus presents the original inscription faithfully and introduces the time of his own encounter with the inscription. In this brief comment, he establishes the inscription as part of an object from antiquity, built in 2 AD, which in the time of Antonio and Palau, had already been used to build the palace of the Count of Corbos. With Antonio’s copying of Palau’s text, the epigraph also exists as a contemporary commentary subject, a thing of debate, a piece of interpretable cultural production. Only in Antonio’s interaction and first-hand encounter with the actual object, however, is he able to gain both an increased authority regarding its content and also an affirmation, which he in turn communicates to readers of the anthology, that it has relevance in his time. The old rock is touchable, able to be smelled, open to all senses and available for an observer to establish a personal relationship with it. In this way, Antonio’s account of the rock combines the idea of the time of creation of the object, a recent past of the rock as a transcribable text and commentary subject, and an assertion that the epigraph is something part his.

When Tribaldos asks his readers to believe that Arredondo’s history is worth a read, insisting that everything has its oddities and uncertainties (“pequeña mezcla de aprocripho… alguna poca apariencia de lo incierto”), he substitutes chronological time, or the ordering of events according to the order in which they supposedly occurred, and critical treatment of sources with an non-interpretable measure of quality: adherence to truth. Relying on metaphysics, and in his discussion of untrue histories, Tribaldos creates an argument for the relevance of the Chronicle that his readers can surmise through inference: the Chronicle’s true intent. He avoids the recent past and contemporary reception of the Chronicle that might make it pale in comparison to more successful ones, recurring to the established, even if also in part mythical greatness of Fernán González himself. In this way, anachronism and some counterfactual information is the norm, and, in effect, is the only means by which one might know what it is that needs to be fixed in order to write a true history.

Nicolás Antonio, on the other hand, adopts more material means in his attempt to establish the relevance in his time of old cultural production. Avoiding appealing to a higher order belief as Tribaldos does, or reconstructing the story of a particular text or object by going in chronological order from the origin forward, Antonio works in the way that is also at odds, for example, to the method that Quentin Meillassoux assigns to the “correlationist”—correlationism
referring to the inseparability between the act of thinking and its content—who tries to understand the old, but physically present thing by throwing it back into the past from the present. Instead, Antonio’s initial collection communicates an awareness of the importance of connecting with the past. He conveys that the importance and very meaning of the thing occurs in the present, primarily through collection and commentary. In the selection of Antonio’s codex studied here, the codex includes texts in which he was able to access an autograph copy, such as Sepúlveda’s *De bello Africano seu fragmentum historiae Caroli*, others that included documentation of past transmission and that he himself could access (Fariñas’ work on the Arunda transcriptions), and rocks that any able reader could ascend and read, as he did. In these cases, Antonio sought control over the past and indeed meaning in the past by creating the object in the present. As in his critique of spurious books and other objects, the central problem is not the existence of the apocryphal books—since interpreted correctly as false, they might serve as negative examples, much like Tribaldos wrote of the stories in his prologue—but rather that their reception and presence were not negotiated correctly. The appropriate scholars (Benito Arias Montano and his disciple Pedro de Valencia, for instance) were missing when the time came to interpret them.

What a year makes: dates, divisions and selection

If Antonio sought to control the potential damage of lying fragments through a first-hand approach and a focus on creating the meaning of the fragments in the present, the poet, historian, and chronicler of Philip IV, D. Juan Francisco Andrés de Uztároz, in addition to using some of these same strategies, appears to have tried to organize his compilation on the reign on Philip the II of Spain with folios bearing dates, thereby creating divisions within the codex. The codex is a continuation of a compilation of original letters and documents, as well as copies treating determined events and people associated with the King. The first volume, BNM Mss./1761 covers the period from 1580 to 1589. The volume of interest here, Mss./1762, spans roughly from 1591 to 1596. The section breaks, some of which were added after Uztároz’s initial process of compilation, function as dividers indicating sections of years throughout the now four hundred some folios. What occurs within these dividers, however, strays from any kind of absolute chronology, yielding to the interests of Uztároz or particularly notorious events of Philip’s reign, specifically, two important mars on the history of government of Aragon: chaos in Ribagorza, including a civil war over the power of the Duke of Villahermosa, one of Aragon’s principle families, the murder of an entire Morisco community by Lupercio Latrás, the Duke of Villahermosa’s mercenary captain; the betrayal of Philip by Antonio Pérez, his longtime advisor and secretary, as well as Pérez’s arrival in Aragon as a fugitive, his trial being the most infamous in the history of the region. In looking at the first one-hundred folios of the codex, it is evident that Uztároz made a significant effort to connect with particular individuals involved in these events, copying documents and collecting original letters that permitted, in the way in which Antonio’s autograph documents did, a sort of history by presentation of individuals and via the words of the king himself. The last section of this chapter will examine the way in which the original collection of Mss./1762 appears to have presented figures, rather than describing them, as a means of commemorating a period of time.

The time between the divisions of Uztároz’s codex is a time defined by individuals and whenever possible, their own words. Nearly all of the documents contained in the codex are
letters, both originals and copies, and while almost all focus on the above events relating to Aragon, they are not bound to a determined form of discourse or to a depersonalized one. Interspersed with political exchanges are personal notices of death and property, papal news, and what might be an autograph copy of one of Lupercio’s sonnets. The first twelve letters of the codex, which Uztárroz indicates he copied in September of 1652, open the discussion and can serve as introduction to nearly all of the content and characters that follow, save the added documents, one appearing at the front of the codex, extracts of letters of the Jesuit martyr Saint Sir Robert Southwell (1561–1595) (fol. 8) and those inserted at the end of the codex, such as the fragment, in Italian, of Hardouin de Pérefixe de Beaumont’s Histoire du roy Henry le Grand (fol. 402), and a document immediately following on the Duke of Orange. The first letters, from 1590 and each from Philip, are addressed to Juan de Gurrea, governor of Aragon. They appear without his replies and treat governance of the region, including a junta in Aragon to discuss the Privilege of Twenty, proceedings to look for Martín de Lanza (harborer of Antonio Pérez), a letter regarding an inquiry of the Marqués de Almenara about Antonio Pérez, and conflicts transpiring with the officials of Jaca from February to July of 1590. Uztárroz, in a move consistent with Nicolás Antonio, ends the series of letters with an indication of the time and place of copying of the letters and a note that he had copied from originals (“copio el don Juan Francisco Andres estas cartas de las originales en Huesca el 24 de septiembre de 1652”–fol. 5).

The meaning of the year 1590, as it appears in Uztárroz’s compilation, is multi-variant and created by way of the presentation of letters, which in turn, allow the senders and recipients to literally have a place and means of existence in the codex. Instead of establishing a pattern of chronology for the book by amassing letters to occupy discrete points on a timeline, the first group of letters establishes a historical, political, and social context for the book. It also shows just one side of 1590, which in the following sections, also comes to mean the individuals and events treated in the documents that follow: the death of Pope Urban VII, who died at the end of September of that year (folis. 6 and 7); the suffering of Saint Sir Robert Southwell (fol. 8, this was a posterior addition); correspondence from the Count of Chinchón to Pedro Latrás about his brother Lupercio’s trip to England and the answer of Lupercio’s servants to the Count; Antonio Pérez’s letter from the “Manifestación” jail to Martín Abarca de Bolea y Castro and the former’s answer; and an unaddressed letter from Pedro Jayme, bishop of Vich. In a collection on the reign of Felipe II, even those of dubious loyalty to the King and indeed, his declared enemies had voice, including Antonio Pérez and his supporters, and subsequently the problematic, although occasionally useful as spy and in other clandestine capacities, Lupercio Latrá and his brother Pedro. Although Uztárroz complained in 1652, the year he copied the initial letters and others, that it was due time to write of the so-called “Altercations” of Aragon, (“sesenta años ha que pasaron los sucesos de 1591, y parece que se puede escribir dellos, pues ya pasó el enoxo que los osasionó”) he actually succeeds right then in not only creating a version of these events, but rather something that can be even more informative for the modern reader, provided that he or she go to the trouble to read the codex (786-7).

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10 José Manuel Blecua has collated and identified Lupercio’s autograph sonnets, citing those that appear in BNM Mss./4141 and 4104 as autographs. The copyist of the sonnet in the manuscript analyzed here is uncertain. Lupercio wanted all of his poetry burned upon his death. In 1634, his son Gabriel published ninety-four of his poems, along with those of Bartolomé.
This more informative vision and the presentation of people as time takes shape, for example, in a section in which Pedro Latrás, whose infamous brother was already dead by the writing of the first letter to which I will refer, is described variously as a valuable helper in the cause of Philip; a potential detriment; and also as one to whom Antonio Pérez appealed for help from jail. Wanting his support and seeing him as a viable help in the capture of Antonio Pérez, the Bishop of Teruel implores Pedro Latrás’ help in the matter:

Estando conformes todos los consistorios que conuenia que el santo oficio pidiesse las personas de Antonio Perez y Maiorin su criado, y auiendo hecho para esto las precauciones necesarias para impedir cualquier escandalos aspirando todos los Titulados y caualleros y los demas consistorios instalados y adquieridos por los lugares ternientes. Y llegados todos juntos al Mercado, pudieron tanto los factores de Antonio Perez, y se uiuieron señores del mercado y han muerto muchos de la parte del rei y an sacado de la carcel a Antonio Perez […] un caso el mas triste que podia acaecio a este Reino…Suplico a Vuestra Merced haga las diligencias possibles para que sean [??] detenidos […] Zaragoça a 24 de setiembre 1591 (fol. 40).

Some five months before the composition of the above letter, in February of the same year (but appearing after in the codex) the same bishop had written to Pedro Latrás to request his help in making peace in Atarés, Jaca. The tone is similar to the September message, but in this second one, it is even clearer that Pedro’s favor was waning, despite any positive efforts on his part to curb the theiving and cruelties of Lupercio and his confederates some ten years earlier in the mountains of the same region:

Amado de su Magestad conuiene tanto a su Real servicio y beneficio destas Montañas procurar la paz y quietud dellas, y acudir al remedio de lo que podria [??], que con esta ocasion entiendo lo que passa en el lugar de Atares y de lo que de semejantes ayuntamientos de gentes, y manera de proceder se puede seguir. Me ha parecido advertiros dello, y que por otro termino mas quieto, y de menor escandalos [??] que pretendeis con los vecinos de dicho lugar, dexando las cosas de hecho de las quales pueden suceder grandes inconvenientes […] Datado en Zaragoça a 25 de febrero 1591 (fol 41).

Yet some two folios after this letter demanding Pedro’s assistance with Pérez, Pedro appears in a letter from Antonio Pérez himself, who having been accused again of crimes against the king, wrote Pedro Latrás requesting his support. The similarities between the fate of Lupercio Latrás and Antonio Pérez make the Pérez letter particularly noteworthy. As Gustav Ungerer and others have noted regarding said similarities, in a sense, Lupercio’s resistance against Castile laid the groundwork for Pérez’s success in gaining loyalty in Zaragoza (17 n. 4). Both were prosecuted for rebellion and treason and went abroad to England, among other places, arguing that they had fought for the law and liberty of Aragon. Unlike Pérez, who stakes some of his complaints in the letter to Pedro Latrás, Lupercio eventually earned back some of Philip’s favor by agreeing to collect secrets on English affairs. Based on Pérez’s language, here it seems that Pedro did not necessarily intend to extend his assistance of rebels to Pérez, as he had in trying to help in the case of his brother:
Yo ando en lucha con mis agravios, y me resolvi a denunciar a Tornalica [?] para remediar dellos. Han salido ya los XVII judicantes, entre ellos el Abad de S. Juan de la Peña, dicenme que es todo de vuestra merced. Yo le suplico que le disponga con todas veras a favor de mi justicia y que assi por cualquier otro vuestra merced obre en esto con el amor que siempre me ha mostrado y con el celo del bien de Todos que en mi y en tales consecuencias se treta. Y que [?] vuestra merced no tiene particular amistad con algun otro haga lo mismo. Mire vuestra merced que haga de cargar de mandes. Assi se ha de hacer con quien de su natural gusta de haçer merced. Dios con todos a 22 de mayo de 1591 (fol. 44).

Pérez, appealing to Latrás’ sentiments and past showings of kindness, requested that Latrás reiterate his benevolences. The version of history of the events in Aragon that emerges from this section is not one in which the period is in any way a pre-interpreted object, or as Jesús Gascón Pérez has said of some versions of these events, including the Marquis de Pidal’s classic study, a univocal vision. On the contrary, while brief in extension, the letters that Uztárroz collected show a groups of individuals in the process of making decisions, of debating and reconfiguring their loyalties, whether those loyalties, in the case of the Latrás brothers and Antonio Pérez, be to family, the King, a geographical area, or a particular cause that is reminiscent in its organization, or alternatively, chaos, to one of the past. The fact that this particular letter of Pérez was written a week after he was moved to a prison in the Aljafería Palace—a move that caused rioting by the people of Aragon who considered it a violence to their rights, and also the death of the marquis of Almenara, representative of the king and Chief Justice—demonstrates that the preoccupations of even the most central figures in the events never ceased to be deeply personal ones that operated at the level of personal relationships and plays on sentiment.

The sense of time communicated in Uztárroz’s codex is thus that people themselves are time. They are their own movement from past, present and future that ends eventually in death; time consists of their attempts to negotiate the situations before them, whether they have been instrumental in creating those situations or not. Uztárroz’s collection posits not so much the idea of non-contemporaneity and the coexistence of outdated modes in the present that were so clear in Tribaldos’ treatment of Arredondo’s history, but rather that a given year is a collection of bodies that suffer, have success, lie, and change their minds.

Further, and most importantly, the documents from Uztárroz’s codex studied here signal the difference between the effect of autograph and other sorts of first-hand pieces such as letters as opposed to third-person accounts—one of these last accounts was added at the end of the codex and appropriately titled “Historia escondida en el ultimo pliego de las más secretas acciones de la vida del Rey Felipe II.” In the way in which Antonio’s autograph documents and inscriptions facilitated a making of sense of old things for his present, in Uztárroz’s codex each document, due to its uniqueness, even if a copy, is a direct voice. Each piece, indeed because it might contradict the next, voices an opinion, position, or claim of the people involved in its content, thereby giving the people themselves presence.

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11 See, for example, Gascón Pérez’s study “Cuatro siglos de historiografía sobre las ‘alteraciones’ de Aragón.”
The time of the physically present, old book

If each document in Antonio’s and Uztárroz’s anthologies gives voice and presence to the bodies involved in its content, of what time or times is this presence, as experienced today? In order to begin to answer this question, I have recurred to the material evidence of the organizers’ strategies to mark and control time. For Tribaldos, these strategies include promoting anachronism as an essential characteristic of people and things, as well as the notion that historical writing, as Bloch said of progress, is not a continuous line of improvements. Antonio and Uztárroz drew on letters, autograph documents, and inscriptions that enabled them to make the person or thing present in the content of the document a meaningful subject in their presents, while allowing that a given year or determined historical event, such as the Altercations of Aragon, be referenced by way of the personal writing of determined people, their requests, complaints, and decisions.

In critiquing the ambiguity of concepts of presence with regard to time and the relationship between presence and absence (“presence” as it unfolded variously in the pages of History and Theory in 2006), Berber Bevernage posits that the presence of the past is ontologically similar to Derrida’s notion of spectrality. The non-contemporaneity and “certain sense of anachronism” that Bevernage interprets as a key characteristic of spectrality actually appears in some form in Husserl’s formulation of time consciousness, in the sense that what is called “present” in the everyday sense has a temporal spread in which the “now” and the “present” can be distinguished. Husserl accounts for our ability to differentiate between remembering an experience as a time-consuming event in the past and the sort of “feed-forward” from the recent past that takes part in creating the impression of continuity in the present. Any affinity here with spectrality, specifically Husserl’s later interpretation of primary memory, or retention, as a sense of the past that never was present and was not derived from the present, is obscured in Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s notion of the living present. Husserl’s living present is at once “thick” in that it includes phases other than the now, in particular, what Husserl calls “protention,” the anticipation of the approaching future, and “retention,” the memory of the recent past, but it is also the present that one is experiencing right now. Derrida, as part of a larger critique of the focus on the present in western philosophy, found it unsatisfactory that for Husserl, the memory of the recent past or retention is a sort of perception in the present, but also appears as “non-perception” and as something apart from the present. He argued that due to inconsistencies in Husserl like these, particularly with regards to the status of the original impression of a phenomenon, it is impossible to know where phenomenological time begins and not to surmise a privileging of the present. In a similar vein to the Derridean critique just cited, and as Deleuze remarked on behalf of Bergson’s critique of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness, traditional accounts of time, such as Augustine’s notion that all experience of time derives from present experience, have lead people to believe on the one hand, that “the past as such is only constituted after having been present; and on the other, that it is in some way reconstituted by the new present whose past it now is” (58).

In substituting spectrality for presence in hopes of avoiding a privileging of the present and establishing the past as ontologically inferior, Bevernage does not accomplish a workaround

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12 I borrow this term from Alfred Gell, who in turn borrows it from the vocabulary of cybernetics, the study of communication and control processes in machines and living organisms and the comparison between the two.
to metaphysics: the ghost, even in more diffuse, less concrete forms than Derrida studies in relation to Jensen’s *Gradiva*, is just another thing we must believe in, or claim to sense or want, since one must recur to a metaphorical formulation to describe it. A critique of this assessment of Derrida’s ghost would likely be that the point is to produce a being that we can sense is there without its ever having been actually fully present to us, but the ghost, in order to make itself known, has to appear as something, or at least a partial something. I do not mean to begin to dismantle Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s model of internal time consciousness, but rather to critique Bevernage’s appealing to deconstruction, and particularly, to Derrida’s spectrality, which he quotes Jameson as being “like the vibrations of a heat wave through which the massiveness of the object world—indeed of matter itself—now shimmers like a mirage”, to counter Runia, mostly for being unclear about the ontological status of presence with regards to the present and past, and other vagaries.13

The fragmentation that occurs in studying these codices in a piecemeal fashion parallels an important element of the time of their presence that I wish to point out, specifically, the way in which it is necessary or perhaps simply unavoidable that the user, using the object as a touchstone, throws herself or himself back into the past, stopping when he or she reaches a past that is convincing as an early modern one. Turning now to one of Husserl’s critics, in *Matter and Memory*, Bergson, speaking of the way in which one recovers a recollection, writes:

> Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment, something like focusing a camera (133-134).

In the sense that both speak of a singular act that may evade complete understanding, Bergson’s account of the recollection has points of contact with Runia’s formulation of the way in which the presence from one’s past, a personal presence of the past, wells up, sometimes like an albatross, and forces us to rewrite our personal stories:

> So like a scattering of flying Dutchmen, presence floats through the here and now, manifesting itself—at convenient and not so convenient moments—in the form of *Sehnsucht*, in the form of Srebrenica historians reproducing their object, and in countless other forms. Floating through the here and now, this presence of the past also makes me *feel* things, *think* things, and *do* things that are at odds with who I think I am—and so forces me to rewrite my story about myself (316).

In the process of trying to connect with the historical moment of the letters in Uztárroz’s codex about and by the Latrás brothers and Antonio Pérez, one can create context by comparing the codex letters with others of the same period, as well as 19th and 20th century accounts of the “Altercations” of Aragón. In doing so, the letters or at least pieces of them are transcribed by the

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13 For a counter-reading of Derrida’s approach to Husserl’s time consciousness, see Martin Schwab’s “The Fate of Phenomenology in Deconstruction: Derrida and Husserl”, in which he raises the important point, in relationship to Derrida’s claim that Husserl posits a simple and pure “now”, that deconstruction, in the notions of “différence,” contamination, and the essential inconsistency of concepts, lays claim to its own universalities (375).
user such that they can more easily be commented. This process creates fragments, as I have already commented, and also moves the observer or user of the codex away from the codex. There is, however, a prior step and moment in which the person moves away from the present, whole codex, in attempting to connect with, or “recover”, to borrow Bergson’s terminology, one of the pasts it contains. In order to do so, the person in the presence of the codex must “detach [herself] from the present” (Bergson) while at the same time, quite possibly feeling, thinking, and doing things that are “at odds with” —and reading Ruya’s ideas from a personal past to a more general past—what she suspected she would encounter as “the past” or the ways in which she might come to understand something about it.

In the way in which the codex becomes smaller in order to be more easily studied, in order for the observer to go to a past, there is a point at which the letter or literary fragment ceases to be the only object of attention for the observer as she focuses some of her attention on imagining first a “past in general” and then a more specific “region” that would tell her something more specific about the fragment. This refocusing of attention, which actually constitutes a turning away from the present thing, occurs because the pasts sought are derived from a combination of educational and other cultural preparation (other books, classes, and experiences with like codices), the physical appearance, including characteristics of the hands, paper, binding, and content of the object, and something “made up” by the user. Like a past arriving that produces a change in who one “thinks [she] is”, the time of the present piece of an old book is a product of parts of the history of the observer, his or her habitus, inspiration from the present object, and remembering Tribaldos, part belief, belief being necessary to cope with any sense of anachronism or the missing parts that must be filled in or ignored those that do not technically “make sense.” In this sense, in order to form a past, the observer can only partly pay attention to the present book, since the time in which it manifests in the present is not simply old, but rather a “presently old.” This is further complicated by the fact that the practices to “make sense” of the codex, namely, philological ones, such as commentary, as Antonio and Uztárroz did, constantly underline the status of the book as “presently old”: an old thing that signals its own temporal strangeness to be negotiated and controlled, as well as fragmented, by philology. It is thus very difficult in the presence of the object to stay with it. This is something that Jean Luc Nancy, not speaking of old objects in particular, says is a strange characteristic of presence in general—that while for him, a thing is its “birth to presence,” this very birth literally withdraws the reality of the res from the thing. In sum, and in line with what I have said here about literally “getting a grip” on old books in the present, presence paradoxically “withdraws the thingness from the thing” and physically present does not necessarily correspond to unmediated tangibility (52).

The time of the present fragment of the codex like Uztárroz’s or Antonio’s, whether separated from the book or simply studied as though it were, depends not on the observer’s ability to resist throwing it back into the past (retroject, as Meillassoux says of the correlationist)—since that past, formed on the basis of the present object, is in the making—but rather on his or her ability to perceive it as a thing that at one time, had a self-evident quality about it, a “ready to hand” object that somebody wrote, exchanged, and filed in that codex. Talking about the time of the entire codex, instead of just a fragment of it, as it manifests in the present would appear to be an even more difficult job, due to the multiple temporalities, genres, and writing hands that it contains. At the same time, this did not appear to have been a problem for Uztárroz or Antonio, and was even advantageous for Tribaldos in his framing of anachronism.
as a universal imperfection. In the presence of the whole codex, it is in some way easier to locate the “self-evidentness” of the book. Sitting among its many past times, it is clear that chronology or origin was never the only system of order, even in the codex’s initial assembly. The confluence of different temporalities in the codex mimics the process of negotiating the time of the present, but old book. The Sehnsucht in this case is none other than a yearning to find connection with the time in which the codex was not a fragment, an albatross, or a rather ugly museum piece, but simply somebody’s book.
Chapter 3

Locating the Romance Kharjas in Representation and Presence

The first two chapters of the dissertation have investigated philology and the ordering of time as two uses and means to reconstitution of pre-modern Iberian fragments. This chapter studies another motif of fragmentation and reconstitution, the fragmentation of text via selection, as well as a broad conceptual issue pertinent to the presence paradigm, representation. Specifically, I examine how scholars in the 20th and 21st centuries have engaged in reconstructive or deconstructive activity in working with the 11th and 12th century Andalusian strophic poems called muwaššahāt (sing. muwaššahāh) and their final refrains, kharjas.¹ In order to consider the relationship between the notion of an unmarked, unmediated “presence” and representation, the chapter analyzes what two of these poems and the so-called “romance kharja” that they share have been called upon to represent in the modern age. It also studies an avoidance of replaying and repetition within the compositions themselves. In doing so, the chapter begins to characterize some of the ways in which physically present objects, as opposed to literary objects of study such as those of the present chapter, communicate intangibility and incompleteness.

The some six-hundred existing muwaššahāt have lines broken into short sections linked by internal rhyme and are written in classical Arabic or Hebrew, apart from their kharjas, standard Arabic for exit, departure, something extended or extracted, or a salient piece. The kharjas are generally extant in dialectal Arabic, romance, or a mixture of Arabic vernacular and romance. In the realm of the muwaššahāt, the compulsion to put back together or put to use has manifested in what could appear to be contradictory ways. One of the main polemics in studies of the muwaššahāt and their kharjas is whether the muwaššahā contrast with, but also has some connection with the classical Arabic quantitative prosodic system, or, rather, that the muwaššahāt are examples of Ibero-Romance stress syllabic poetry, and in essence, primitive “Spanish” lyric.² As a result of this and other related debates, the romance kharjas have achieved canonicity and representation in many anthologies and syllabi of classes on medieval Iberian literature as a sort of miniature authorless genre cast largely as independent of the other stanzas of their muwaššahāt.³ Some of the muwaššahāt, including parts of their kharjas, are indeed fragmentary in the way that some of the corpus for the first and second chapters of this project is, in that they lack parts of what can be inferred to have been their original content. The romance kharjas in particular offer many difficulties of interpretation, primarily due to the fact that the consonantal Arabic alphabet makes the representation of romance words quite difficult. Further, and as Jones has studied in detail for the Arabic corpus, the testimonies of the kharjas in

¹ I have transliterated all Arabic words according to the standard norms for representing the Arabic alphabet in English, following most specifically the UN standards, using diacriticals under and over certain consonants to convey those without similar sounds in English, such as š for the letter “shīn”, ṣ for the letter “ṣād”, and simple s for “ṣīn.”
² This latter view might be traced back to circa 1943 and Dámaso Alonso’s Cancioncillas de ‘amigo’ mozárabes.
³ Michelle Hamilton discusses the place of kharjas in anthologies in her recent article “Hispanism and Sephardic Studies”, 184. See also Karla Mallett, “Misunderstood.” This point is discussed further in the first and final sections of the chapter.
romance are less than ideal, as a result of wear and tear on the manuscripts and scribal confusion in transcribing vernacular material (Romance kharjas 13-16). In addition, at times the kharjas have only a tenuous attachment to their muwaššahāt and are generally quotational in nature, with cases of two or more different muwaššahāt sharing the same or similar kharja, as in the compositions to be studied here. Yet the romance kharjas are by no means fragments in the sense that their presentation in isolation might convey, but rather a genre fragmented by some scholars in critical studies and pedagogical materials, illustrating indeed the power of philology to constitute, or in this case, to break apart its very object.

At the same time, however, critics since the initial studies by Stern in the mid 1940s in the no longer published Spanish journal al-Andalus and subsequent work by García Gómez and a pseudonym he used, as well as Richard Hitchcock, Klaus Heger, James Monroe, J.M. Solà-Solé, Samuel Armistead, Federico Corriente, and Alan Jones, and others have given voice to the importance, or rather, the too often exaggerated concern as to whether the kharjas should be studied in the context of their muwaššahāt or written into the history of Arabic or Spanish poetry.5 Within these concerns about context, debates have also arisen around whether due consideration has been given to the Hebrew muwaššahāt since Stern’s foundational work. Despite these concerns, some scholars have nevertheless felt a need to confess that studying the romance kharjas more or less independently of their muwaššahāt happens more often than it should and indeed must happen to address interest in the romance kharjas. It is in this vein that Alan Jones, long a critic of those scholars who in his view, lacked sufficient knowledge of Arabic to study this material, but nevertheless presented their interpretations as definitive, writes in his paleographic and facsimile edition of the romance kharjas that he is hesitant to publish a work devoted solely to the romance kharjas, which he considers should be principally understood as Arabic compositions of which the romance kharjas formed only a part:

Since I first began to point out how unreliable the printed texts [editions] of the Romance kharjas were, I have been pressed by Romance scholars to re-edit them in as accurate a form as possible. The present work is my response. I confess that I have been reluctant to publish a work that concentrates so narrowly on the Romance kharjas...The point is that phrases and allusions from the main part of the muwaššahāt may well be picked up in the kharja. Secondly, the study of only a small fraction of a scribe’s handwriting is insufficient even for the most skilled paleographer to establish the characteristics and problems of that hand. However, interest in, and writing on, the Romance kharjas

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4 For the Hebrew series of muwaššahāt, the definitive edition is still Brody’s published in 1934-5, reprinted in 1977, apart from those by Egers, Yellin, Stern, and others (Corriente summarizes the primary sources at the start of his bibliography Poesía Dialectal pg. 374). On the difficulties of interpreting the kharjas, see Monroe and Swiatlo, “Ninety-Three Arabic Haṛğās in Hebrew Muwaššāhā” and cited studies by Benabú, “Rivers of Oil” and “Orthography”, as well as Benabú and Yahalom, “The Importance of the Geniza Manuscripts.”

5 Armistead’s “Brief History”, Corriente’s “By No Means” and Hitchcock summarize debates still relevant in kharja studies, but mostly those that occurred in the pages of La corónica in the 1980s. For more recent perspectives, see Armistead “El problema” and studies by Galmés de Fuentes, Zwartjes, and Mallette. Armistead specifically calls the issue of whether the kharjas can be studied independently a “non-problem” among other “pseudo-problems” in “Brief History” (11). Raymond Scheindlin, Rosen, and Brann argue that the Hebrew muwaššahāt demonstrate intense engagement and understanding of aspects of Arabic and centuries of Arabic poetry.
continues unabated, and it would be wrong of me not to respond to the requests of colleagues (7).

Jones’s implication here of a disconnect between what is desired in the field as opposed to what it actually needs is expressed elsewhere in a call for facsimiles and paleographic editions. In the late 1990s he remedied this need for the corpus of Arabic muwaṣṣaḥāt, with editions of the two most important anthologies for Arabic muwaṣṣaḥāt. The first and most crucial is Alī ibn Bishr’s Uddat al-jalīts, extant in a single codex known as the Colin Manuscript after the French philologist Georges Colin in whose possession it had been. The collection was found in 1948 and contains 354 muwaṣṣaḥāt, of which twenty-nine are romance. The second consists of Lišān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb’s Jayš al-tawṣīh, with some 182 of these same compositions, sixteen with romance kharjas.6

The nature, ownership, and origin of the muwaṣṣaḥāt and their kharjas have thus been sites of major contention and acrimonious debate. These quarrels have similarities to disagreements surrounding the origins of the epic and the ways in which medievalists should practice philology, but those on the kharjas have generally involved significantly more personal attacks. With battle-lines drawn and answered, among other ways, with calls for interdisciplinary and fraternity between Romanists, Arabists, and Hebräists, or in the words of James Monroe, after a heated debate in the pages of La Corónica regarding the qualifications required to properly study the Andalusian muwaṣṣaḥāt, “modesty” (“Pedir peras al olmo” 133), the kharjas continue to serve as an object by which to assess the state of the field, as exemplified in their evocation in recent statements by Michelle Hamilton, Nadia Altschul, and David Wacks on the dual marginalization of Iberian Hebrew literature by both Hebraists and Hispanists (“Hispanism and Sephardic studies”, “Toward a History”).7

This chapter will examine both of the above strategies of coming to terms and engaging the romance kharjas as cultural phenomena and study subjects, analyzing the kharjas as independent entities and also in the context of their muwaṣṣaḥāt. Not unlike the cases of physical fragmentation considered in chapters 1 and 2, the romance kharjas raise questions as to how hispano-medievalists are actively engaged in creating—even if the creating involves a taking apart—their very object and representing it to themselves and others. Such a creative process can be seen in the collecting instincts exhibited by both Tribaldos and Uztárroz, in which the creation of a new cultural object results from an intentional extraction from a whole document or contexts of documents. The study of the kharjas also necessitates a consideration of how scholars gather whom they deem the “appropriate” audience around the verses and their greater compositions. By extension, the kharjas entail a determination and representation of the places in which they should be studied.8 By places I refer to academic departments, the pages of modern anthologies of Medieval Iberian literature, academic journals and other scholarly publications, as well as more mainstream means of communication such as performance of Andalusian songs, including muwaṣṣaḥāt, by singers with and without knowledge of Arabic.

6 For easily accessible codicological descriptions of these anthologies in English, see Jones’ paleographic editions.
7 Many of the debates did not reach resolve and continued into the mid nineties, such as Corriente’s severe critique of Zwartjes’ Love Songs from al-Andalus published in Romance Philology (1996).
8 This tripartite notion of representation as well as the evocation of Ding is inspired by Latour’s initial piece in Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, an anthology that commemorates an exhibit held at the ZKM, Center for Art and Media Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany.
In this vein, the Andalusian muwaššahāt and their kharjas could be considered a group of representations, or to draw on the archaic meaning of the word Thing or Ding as an assemblage, and more specifically, an assemblage of representations. As opposed to what Heidegger came to call “Things” in his later writings, those entities, in contrast with represented objects, that have lives of their own, hide their innermost qualities from humans, and that exist prior to and in spite of representation—Heidegger’s jug is a jug whether or not one represents it—an assemblage is an entity that is constantly “put upon”, caught up in debates to designate their appropriate audience, their presentation in anthologies, the places and institutions in which they should be studied, and also their very being (159). This distinction between things and represented objects has come under fire from speculative realists, such as Graham Harman, and pragmatists like Richard Rorty, as a call to metaphysics by a philosopher who had no interest in democracy or any supposed human good. It will nevertheless be particularly useful for speaking of presence with regards to both fragmentary texts or as in the case here, text fragmented by critics, as well as physically present, material fragments (“Heidegger On Objects” 270; “Atomic Bomb” 274).

The ontological status of these verses and what they could be called upon to represent has long been under fire, perhaps even before García Gómez attributed Stern’s rediscovery of the kharjas with romance elements to “Providence” (“Veinticuatro jarýas romances” 60). Those kharjas containing romance words, whether presented in the context with their muwaššahāt or not, were cast into debates regarding the difficulty of accessing and coming to understand medieval Iberia and also to whose past they belonged in the first place and in whose literary history they might form a part in the modern age. To apply the name “romance kharjas” to the kharjas containing romance words is thus itself a thesis, and one that I accept here following many critics from Stern forward, specifically, that while the romance kharjas consist partly of Arabic words and those not identifiable as romance, the predominance of words able to be interpreted as romance is reason enough to classify the verses as romance kharjas.

The muwaššahāt and their kharjas thus raise questions as to the ways in which they have been employed to represent in the 20th and 21st centuries by critics and what, exactly, they are, and how representation and subjectivity appears to function within the compositions themselves. The chapter examines two roughly contemporary muwaššahāt, one in Arabic by Abū Bakr Yahyá al-Ǧazzār (ca. 1060-1120) and one in Hebrew by Moshe Ibn Ezra (1055-after 1138), that share roughly the same kharja. I first study the muwaššahāt in their entirety, engaging in a comparison of the effect and function of the kharja in each of the poems, and then briefly comment the kharja in isolation, as a fragment. I organize the analyses of the muwaššahāt and the kharja around two questions, not intending in any way to produce new interpretations of the romance kharjas: what and who have these compositions, in the first case, the complete muwaššahāt, in the second, their shared, although slightly different kharja, represented in the 20th and 21st centuries? Secondly, how do these compositions and their kharjas play with ideas of

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9 Heidegger changed his attitude toward things throughout his life, but the summary of the above perspective comes from What is a Thing?, in which objects are redeemed, regaining their sense of thingness, so to speak. That being said, I take only part of Heidegger’s conception of thing in this chapter, which is altogether cryptic. For an interesting reading of Heidegger’s notion of the thing as a “dance or mirror-play” of four structural elements “the fourfold” of Earth, sky, gods and mortals, see Graham Harman, Tool-Being.

10 The kharja also appears in a third composition by Abū Bakr Yahyá ibn Baqí (d. 1145), which is probably slightly later than the compositions studied here. The three muwaššahāt are briefly compared and also translated into English in Valencia and Boyarin, “Thee muwaššahāt That Share the Same Kharja.”
representation and enable less situational presence (and does such a thing exist)? Throughout the chapter I recall Samuel Armistead’s call some twenty years back and also more recently in 2005 to read the kharjas out of the polemics and as literature (“A Brief History” 11; “El problema”).\textsuperscript{11} The chapter also investigates what this call to read the kharjas as literature might actually entail by way of presence and representation.

As a corollary to the analysis of the complete muwaššahāt and its kharja as both assemblages of representations and also poetry, I ask whether or not a poetry so “put upon” and indeed literally taken apart in the modern age has the potential to appear complete. Further, can it provide readers with a sense of complete satisfaction, or reading Gumbrecht creatively, fulfill one’s desire of accessing an object of study’s “full presence”, which might also be called its “reality.”\textsuperscript{12} Taking the word representation literally to mean to make present something that is absent, to “present again” something, the chapter will have to find a way to speak about the character of this “again”, as Ankersmit has done in proposing that presence might be a possibility that the past come again in the present, with two doses of the “real thing” twice (331). In contrast to Ankersmit, however, in these last two chapters, and based on the previous two, I interrogate the possibility that writing of the presence of a particular thing or piece of literature, and maintaining its status as something that is opposed to replication, and rather, aligned with real, might be a myth of its own. I begin with a brief look at the representation of muwaššahāt in pre-modern and 20\textsuperscript{th} century anthologies.

The representation of the muwaššaha and kharja in medieval and modern anthologies

The discussion about where and how the muwaššaha should be included within the domain of romance or Arabic literature began in the Middle Ages. In this vein, the frequently cited passage that appears at the start of the chronicler Ibn Bassām’s (d. 1147) compilation of classical Arabic poetry indicates that even in the early twelfth-century and possibly before, there was disagreement about the way in which the Arabic muwaššahāt should be represented in anthologies\textsuperscript{13} (Corriente 88). Ibn Bassām’s collection illustrates that Iberian poets writing in Arabic can compete with Eastern ones writing in the classical Arabic forms. These forms generally use monorhymed lines, with the exception of the urjuza and muzdawija compositions, which often feature paired rhyme. As is in the case in other key anthologies of Andalusian poets, such as Sa‘īd’s Rayāt al-mubarrizīn (Banner of the Champions, completed in 1243, an extract of the fifteen volume al-Mughrīb fiṭḥulā l-Maghrīb) Ibn Bassām includes no strophic poetry in his Kitāb al-Daxīra ft mahāsīn ahl al-jazīra [Treasury of the Virtues of the People of the Peninsula] henceforth known as Daxīra. Such an inclusion of exotic verse would have been unproductive to his argument for the poetic talents of Iberian poets writing in Arabic. Bassām nevertheless demonstrates interest in explaining the basic characteristics of the muwaššaha form, with his description being the earliest extant information on the compositions. Without including

\textsuperscript{11} The complete citation reads: “It is time once again to address the very real problem of editing and interpreting and kharjas and indeed, hopefully, also of reading them now as literature…These are our tasks” (14), cited in “El problema”, 61.

\textsuperscript{12} “Full presence” appears in “Presence Achieved in Language” (320), Powers of Philology (12, n. 9), among other places in Gumbrecht’s work.

\textsuperscript{13} See Corriente’s *Poesía dialectal* for a commentary on the use of the passage, especially page 88.
examples of actual poems, Bassām writes that a blind poet named Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Qābī al-Darīr or another Andalusian poet, ʿAbd Rabbīhi, invented the muwaṣṣaḥaḥa before the end of the 9th century. This invention consisted in the construction of a muwaṣṣaḥaḥa around a base (markaz) of non-Arabic phrases (‘ajami) followed by a development of increasingly elaborate rhyme schemes and the use of internal rhyme. Quoting Monroe’s translation of Bassām’s contested passage, the inventor of the muwaṣṣaḥaḥa

used to compose them after the manner of the hemistichs of classical Arabic poetry (except that most of them were composed after the manner of the non-existent, hypothetical meters) [that are not used in classical Arabic poetry], quoting colloquial Arabic and Romance diction, which he called the markaz, and basing the muwaṣṣaḥaḥa upon it, without any internal rhyming in the markazes or in the ġuṣns (Bassām I, 469 in “On Re-reading Ibn Bassām”).

The earliest muwaṣṣaḥaḥāt were thus strophic, containing both ġuṣns (one of the lines of a stanza linked by the stanza’s rhyme or rhymes–Jones, pl. āqṣān) (not monorhymed) and kharjas (markazes) comprised of quotations of the vernacular, at least in part. As Monroe reads, the passage further communicates that as a consequence of this vernacular diction, the meters were different from those in classical Arabic compositions (“Oral Origins” 60). Such a practice of vernacular borrowing has served as justification for several theses regarding the kharjas. The most prevalent thesis is that of the autochthonous origin of strophic Andalusian poetry in the Iberian Peninsula, which posits the translation of Spanish poetry by Arabic-speaking poets, including Spanish poetry’s meter and strophic character. A version of this thesis, in turn, manifests in modern schoolbooks or student anthologies in the presentation of the romance kharjas as autonomous odd entities cast largely as women’s songs. As Michelle Hamilton has noted, such a presentation, while accompanied in some cases by relatively detailed accounts of the difficulties of reading and interpreting the kharjas, is generally introduced by “a domesticating narrative to explain the inclusion of these seemingly foreign poems in the textbook” (“Hispanism” 184). The effect of the domesticating narrative, even more than in the anthologies that Hamilton cites, comes through in Margit Frenk Alatorre’s anthology of Spanish Popular Lyric. The numbered and unattributed khajas include transliterated Arabic or partially Arabic words, the words of the kharja previously interpreted by García Gómez as Spanish in Spanish, and then a complete translation in a footnote, as though the presence of any non-Romance element at all, even something as known to Western Europe and Americans through music and popular culture as habibi, renders the entire composition incomprehensible. The context lacking in the pages in which the kharjas are found comes in the first paragraph of the anthology:

De los sos ojos tan fuertemientre llorando,
tornava la cabeza i estávalos catando…

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14 Today Ajam typically means non-Arabs in modern standard Arabic, but can also refer specifically to Persians, to Romans or to Christians, or to the languages of these peoples, depending on the Arabic speaking country in which it is used. See Lewicki and also Monroe, “Maimonides”.

15 The counter argument being that Arabic strophic poetry preceded Romance strophic poetry.
¡Cuántas generaciones de lectores se han emocionado con estos versos, que marcaban el nacimiento de la literatura en España! El admirable Poema del Cid estaba ahí, impotente, en el principio de todo. Imposible parecía que algo pudiera llegar a arrebatarle esa gloria. Y sin embargo, hace veintinueve años, a nosotros mismos nos ha tocado presenciar el milagroso descubrimiento que hizo cambiar de golpe nuestra perspectiva. La literatura española comenzaba un siglo antes, y de qué distinta manera: no con el grandioso poema épico, sino con un pequeño corpus de minúsculas estrofitas líricas; no con el solemne paso de las huestes del Cid, sino con la modesta voz de una muchacha enamorada; no en Castilla, sino en tierra de moros (11).

The references to the birth of literature in Spain, the reduction of Spain to Castile, and the denomination of Emilio García Gómez as the father of the “corpus”, make the passage particularly charged. The kharjas themselves are at least four levels removed from the context in which they are extant in manuscripts today—separated from the their muwaššahāt, from any reference to authorship, translated twice, and cast as an independent genre of Spanish “popular poetry.” Yet such a casting is nevertheless illustrative, and even highly effective at representing the kharjas as though their muwaššahāt never existed at all (or did not make it to the present), as the first vestige of Spanish literature which in part due to its underwhelming presence (diminutive in corpus, extension, and voice) or more exactly, the trivial way in which the kharjas are represented, is able to upset past hypotheses regarding the beginning of literature in the Iberian peninsula. The curious dynamic of this passage is that in order to fulfill the tall order of “el principio de todo”, and so as to create a stark contrast with previous hypotheses in which the beginning began with a genre as attested as the epic, it is advantageous, and in a sense, much more manageable, and obviously more Spanish, in the language sense, that they appear as short stand-alone pieces. Such an exclusivity and fragmentation of the kharjas is conveniently supported by their very name, which can translate as “salient parts”, as well as by Bassām’s reference to them as markazes, or bases. In this perplexing format, framed by the above thesis, and without saying much of anything at all, the kharja enjoys a strange notoriety. This notoriety depends little on the text of the kharjas, but rather on their representation as a concrete manifestation of the thesis explained in the introduction that precedes them.

For what they lack in content, fragments do possess a certain manageability and transportability. In the case of Ibn Bassām, the muwaššahāt are not fit to be included as poetry in his anthology namely because their metrics are strange to classical, Khalilian ones (“The measures of these muwaššahāt lie beyond the scope of this anthology, since the majority of them are not [composed] after the manner of the meters [found] in the classical poems of the Arabs”) and also perhaps because their physical presence would threaten too much the thesis that Andalusian poets are as capable poets as classical Arabic ones. These compositions are nevertheless relatively innocuous when presented as fragments present only by citation, or more precisely in description, and included by one of these indirect means in the spirit of providing complete information (Bassām I, 469 in “On Re-reading Ibn Bassām”).16 There is thus something

16 A similar philosophy of providing selections, but not whole or lengthy pieces as a strategy of completion by way of abbreviation can be found in the collections of William of Malmesbury (1095-1143). For instance, speaking of his treatment of Augustine’s City of God: “From Augustine’s City of God I decided to excerpt those items in particular
about the physical presence of actual muwaššahāt and their vernacular, both Arabic and romance, that would indicate too much interest, such as an esthetic appreciation or positive reception of the form. What, then, is this “more” of the muwaššaha and its dialectal kharja, and how does the composition realize its own play on representation?

Abū Bakr Yahyā al-Ǧazzār

The oldest muwaššahah containing a version of the kharja of interest here is one of the 11th century poet Abū Bakr Yahyā al-Ǧazzār, called by his contemporaries as well as scholars simply al-Ǧazzār, the “butcher.” He was active in Zaragoza at the end of the 11th and perhaps at the beginning of the 12th century before he died in approximately 1120. Throughout his life he practiced various professions, working in different moments as a butcher, poet, and a secretary of the chancery for the Banū Ḥūd, rulers of the taifa of Zaragoza from 1039-1110, for whom he composed panegyrics, of which only five are extant, and other compositions. Ibn Bassām gives him less attention than others in his Daxira and al-Ǧazzār’s presence in Saʿīd’s Rayāt al-mubarrizīn (Banners of the Champions) is limited to one citation. Barberá’s work on al-Ǧazzār’s Diwān (ms. 2679 Kāf, Gerenal Library of Rabat, Morocco) or book of his works, published posthumously in 2005 has nevertheless helped to raise the poet’s reputation from “iliterato” (García Gómez) and “unlettered town-dweller” (Alan Jones) to one of the key poets of the taifa of Zaragoza (Barberá; “El esplendor” 212-16). Barberá’s translation of the Diwān has effectively yielded new possibilities of representation for this poet. Rather than the simple town poet born of butchers who managed to gain the affections of the Banū Ḥūd, his name is now attached to one of the largest corpuses of muwaššahāt conserved by a single author.

The single al-Ǧazzār fragment in Saʿīd’s compilation referenced above could be seen to lend authority to the 20th century representation of the so-called butcher as a relatively unknown and inconsequential poet. As Fernando Andú Resano suggests, but without explaining why, the fragment might reference al-Ǧazzār’s talent as both a poet and secretary, as well as his more visceral pursuits, while constituting as well, a request not to allow his butchering to overshadow his way with words:

Beneath the cape a moon was shining and its enchantments were saying to him who had recovered from love, “Love me again.”
What matter if his robe is coarse? The rose has thorns on its calyx.
The wine is covered in pitch and musk is carried in crude vessels (Andú Resano 213; Banners 198).17

Yet al-Ǧazzār could hardly be said not to have recognized his own talents, and nor was he the only butcher-poet, as a century later the compositions of another al-Ǧazzār rose to great

17 For more on al-Ǧazzār’s movement in and out of his butcher shop, see Barberá “Remarks On Their Metrics” 23-24.
popularity, the Egyptian Abū l-Husayn Yahyā al-Jazzār (b. 1204). Unlikely would it have been
that the al-Jazzār of interest here actually thought his robe was coarse, or any of his vessels
crude, or that he had managed to rise somehow above his initial station. Included in Barberá’s
catalog of the appearances of the word ṣab’, natural talent, in our poet’s Diwān, the following
passage would indicate that al-Jazzār never considered at least in public writings, as the Egyptian
butcher does, that his more explicitly physical, but still fairly well regarded profession was a
blemish to his poetic persona (Barberá ccvi-ccxlii). The following affirmation of the importance
of God given talent as opposed to the learning acquired through study provides an interesting
lens through which the present poem might be studied:

Todo ello es simulado y afectación
que ha asumido sin que corresponda a su carácter
A veces el que simula se adorna con la costumbre
y lo que juzgas natural, pero la naturaleza vence.
Toda falsificación es imposible y pasajera,
se aparta de lo propio, pero la naturaleza no pasa (Barberá ¶15, 1, 4-6).

Framing himself as a natural, with his talents, in spite of his butcher heritage, being God given
and without affectation, al-Jazzār distains any transitory appearance of greatness, which by
nature constitutes fakery, and distrusts learning that has been acquired primarily by diligent
study, as opposed to being a natural gift. In this regard, natural talent and acquisition are marked
as two antithetical spheres, thereby limiting the authentic writing of good poetry to those who
would have been able to do it no matter what their training. Consistent with the style of the
Diwāns of his contemporaries, al-Jazzār engages in frequent citation and paraphrasing, with his
book being exceptional in this regard primarily in that it shows him engaging in an even more
transparent borrowing than others.

Bracketing for a moment al-Jazzār’s citation practices and the way in which he has been
depicted in the modern era, I turn to his muwaššaha in full. Al-Jazzār’s poem is comprised of
five stanzas whose lines are divided into three short sections and a prelude, or maṭla’ (opening
line). Each stanza has asmāt (lines or pair of lines at the end of the stanza with rhymes common
to all stanzas) and agsān (one of the lines in a stanza linked by the stanza’s rhyme). This poem,
like al-Jazzār’s nine other muwaššahlāt, is uniquely extant in the three manuscripts of the Jayš al
tawṣīḥ and is actually fragmentary, missing two lines from the third stanza. Apart from Alan
Jones’s general comments in his edition of the Jayš al tawṣīḥ, as well as a note on the part of
García Gómez regarding the corrupt nature of the text of the poem, not much has been made of
its literal fragmentation, with the most recent edition of the piece not bothering to note or discuss
any peculiarity, apart from the use of blank lines to indicate absences of text (Jarchas romances
307). The composition has attracted much attention for what has been interpreted as its almost
wholly romance kharja. A general disregard for the missing verses is likely exacerbated by the
fact that the fragmentary lines belong to the third stanza, which not being the one that
immediately precedes the kharja, functions less critically in the latter’s deciphering. Further,
from what is still extant, this third stanza also appears to be a sort of continuation of the second.
The lesser attention to the fragmentary for interest in the kharja can also be seen as an extension
of the way in which the five and a half stanzas of Arabic of the muwaššaha, even in the presence
of very different and in cases, antithetical translations into Spanish and English, have yet to be comprehensively annotated.

The muwaṣṣaḥa begins by referring to the beloved metonymically as eyes—literally pupils—a reference that doubles as one to the lover’s own eyes which are a site of activity throughout the poem. The poetic voice proceeds to investigate whether his passionate thirst for his beloved results from the beat of his heart, or, rather, if the beat of his heart causes his passions. The subsequent stanzas query the censor/killer/lover about resistance, lamenting the sickness of love; invoke explicitly the theme of concealment of feelings and also the revelation of sentiments and their physical presence; underline the strange violence of love, the power of the gaze of the lover, as well as the gaze of the beloved; and consider the connection between censor, beloved, and lover, as well as the difficulty of realizing proximity with the beloved.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{verbatim}
0
Mis dos pupilas. ¿Son los lagrimales [los que] encienden o bien mi ardor impulsa el llanto?

1
Mi censurador, ¡cuánto reprocharás al que muestra su [debilidad]
Mi matador, a él amo, aunque extenuado.
No tengo de lo que deseo más que la fatiga.
¡Qué cosa sea como yo nuevo pálpito
que llega? Mi marca solo es la palidez.

2
Tengo una cría de [gacela] nada más ¡qué perfumada!
Las entrañas escondieron la pasión [por él pero la mostraron.]
Aunque se descubrió ¿cuánto la ocultó para no difundirla
y de qué forma! ¡Sin otra ayuda que las lágrimas
desbordadas, ni apoyo, más que del sollozo!
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{18} I copy Barberá’s translation and follow with a literal English translation based on Jones’s edition of the Jayš al tawṣīth, as well as Barberá’s transcription of the Arabic, drawing on Jones and Corriente for the kharja. Maher Sabry of Pacific Arabic worked with me on each part of the poem and patiently listened to all my implausible theories about the syntax.
3
Los anhelos son medicina del que procura [cuidado]
[...] [...]
[...] [...]
Qué pasa con estas tristezas tú que predicas, Que se pegan como la túnica de al golpeado.
[debajo]

4
La deseada de mis ojos pasa desde el arrabal. Puede que un día obtengan o duerman:
Dales un momento de gozo o si no, no mires.
Pequeña cría de esos párpados con estos corazones actúan como los filos [de las armas]
[gacela]

5
Mal haya el deseo del vigilante y su afán Siempre que el amado aparece está junto a él
Qué a menudo canté y ella replicó al que [la] llamaba “Pues amé a mozo forastero y él a mí, quiérelo de mí vedar su vigilante.”

[0) Pupils (my love), Do the affairs ignite the fire of the heart, or does the pouring of my heart urge my thirst? 1) My preventer, how much you blame the one who shows grief. My killer, I am smitten with him, even if I gain nothing of what I desire, only fatigue. Anything like me that arrives is without a beat. My only emblem is paleness. 2) I have with me a baby gazelle, I have nothing but him, how perfumed! My chest hides my passion for him, but shows it. If it reveals itself [the passion], how much it hid it, such as not to release it, and in what way. Without any help except overflowing tears, or any support other than sobbing. 3) To the person experienced in the trials of love, the objects of love are medicine. [...] What about these pains of love, you who want me to quit love, they stick like the tightness of a bandage to a wound. 4) The desired of my eyes passes from the outskirts. It could be that one day they obtain consolation, or sleep; give them a moment of pleasure, or if not, don’t look. Little baby gazelle, those eyes, with these hearts, act like war weapons. 5) Wretched what the censor intends and desires. Whenever the beloved appears, they appear together. As long as I sing romantic poetry, she answers to who called her. I loved a foreign little boy, and he me, the evil of the guard wants to keep him from me.]

Like much of the rest of al-Jazzār’s work, the poem takes up themes present in similar compositions and other forms of Arabic poetry, including the physical signs of love, a fiery heart
and teary eyes, and the role of these in love, the use of both genders (i.e. “I am smitten with him”/the beloved (masculine)/she answers) to refer to the beloved, and the reference to the beloved as a young and seductive gazelle. Most importantly, the poem engages in an exploration of the effects of the \textit{raqīb}, or guardian, preventer, censor, or spy, likened in scholarship, but not convincingly derived from the \textit{gardador} of provençal troubador lyric and the \textit{custos} of Latin poetry.\textsuperscript{19} The poem’s employment of common tropes, the borrowing of either thematic material or style, or as the case of al-Jazzār’s own \textit{Dīwan}, direct citations from other authors, gives it at first glance a self-evident quality, as yet another example of the citation culture of Arabic poetry or much more generally, the repetition of love poetry. At the same time, however, this initial perception of repetition, or commonalities with other compositions, can lead in two different directions, namely an examination of the situation of the topos or citation within the composition, or, rather, a location of the citation or topos among similar cases in the \textit{muwaššaḥa} tradition. In both of these possibilities, there is a “re” and an “again” happening, the difference between them being context - either the poem, or some part or parts of the traditions from which it forms a part. A study of the way in which subjects and objects are created in the poem, beginning with an examination of the censor, reveals that the \textit{muwaššaḥa} itself engages in its own experiments in representation and presence. This experiment consists primarily of affording the censor different means to speak and to repress the voices of the poet and the beloved. In the prelude, the poetic voice introduces the possibility of fault by querying whether his tearful eyes enflame his heart or whether his burning desire inspires the tears. This paraphrase nevertheless misses much of the complexity of the stanza, which is ambiguous with regards to the blame and the object of the blame. It is difficult to determine whether an explicit contrast exists between two ways in which the lover’s predicament is stated, as García Gómez reads, among other inventive things, or rather whether the stanza is more generally presenting options for identifying the place from where the trouble starts, as well as the way in which the impact of the dilemma manifests. In Barberá’s translation of the Arabic, in addition to proposing a choice between tearful eyes and ardor as the instigator of the poetic voice’s plight, the plight itself is up for debate:\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
Culprit: lagrimales /ardor \\
affairs / pouring of my heart \\
Problem: el fuego del latido / llanto \\
Fire of my heart / thirst \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

There is another complication regarding the culprit of the lover’s state present in the Arabic, but missing from the Barberá’s translation, yet acknowledged in Solà-Solé’s. The second section of the first line actually reads \textit{šwaɪn}, affairs, or as Solà-Solé translates, “asuntos.” The initial subject is thus only implied and constituted primarily by its object or the second subject mentioned in the stanza, with the two subjects conveniently aligned (pouring of my heart-fire of my heart). Drawing on the reference to the eyes, Barberá uses an image of tears to give the vague

\textsuperscript{19} Hilty has noted that the \textit{raqīb} appears with greater frequency in the \textit{muwaššaḥāt} with romance \textit{kharjas}. See “La figura del raqīb.”

\textsuperscript{20} I include my English translation of the Arabic below Barberá’s translation.
and seemingly repetitive culprits/problems form and difference, thereby actualizing the subtle contrast present in the Arabic, which I have only very poorly been able to render into English.

This sort of delayed or never quite realized subjectivity continues into the first stanza, which also begins with a possessive pronoun attached to a noun (‘ḍīlī), my censor, followed by a question. By the second section of the first line, the censor mentioned in the first section is addressed as “you.” This censor could even be an external person frustrating the “affairs” of the lovers. Similarly, the subject that begins the second line, “my killer” (qātilī), instead of clarifying that the initial subject (‘ḍīlī, my censor) refers to the beloved, is followed by a declaration of love to the killer in the third person and with use of the male pronoun.

The following two stanzas offer a similar uneasiness with regards to the agency given to different subjects and exactly who or what is the object of the sentence, particularly with the object having played such a fundamental role in the definition of the subject in the prelude and in the first verse. In the second stanza, the censor becomes part of the poetic voice himself, namely his entrails that attempt to hide his passion but cannot quite do it, a thought reiterated in the third line (“Although it reveals itself, how much it hid it, such as not to release it, and in what way”). This second time, however, the action is out of the control of any human subject (“even though it reveals itself”). The poetic voice takes form only as a reference to his tears, in a similar way to what occurs in the first stanza with his pale complexion, and in the fourth stanza, with his eyes.

Drawing on the extant material in stanza three, both stanzas three and four treat the topic of the means by which lovesickness might be healed, either by what seems most literally to be the object of desire, i.e. the beloved, which Barberá translates more poetically as “anhelos” in stanza three, or by consolation in stanza four. The second half of stanza three, instead of creating a clear parallel with the previous stanza by referring to a manifestation of his plight (sadness in stanza three), the poem returns to the topic of eyes. The eyes here, however, refer to those of the beloved or to his own eyes, flanked on either side by a reference to the beloved (baby gazelle), and a simile that testifies to the violence of the eyes. This shifting of fault and its multiple instigators and manifestations reaches its height in the final stanza in which the raqīb appears as the subject of the first line, as though he/she was a physical person. Yet by the second line, it is apparent that the raqīb’s ability to have any negative effect is tied to the very presence of the beloved, not only in the sense that a censor is a logical corollary of a frustrated love relationship in the muwaṣṣāha form, but rather also because the censor resides inside the beloved.

It is for this reason that the kharja that ends this last stanza references not simply a situation of a love frustrated by an annoying guardian; the censor is effectively constantly in the making, its subjectivity changing depending on who or what it impacts. The physical signs of the lover’s sentiment, which pass from entrails, to sadness, and to eyes, as well as the beloved herself are all manifestations of the censor. The kharja, interpreted similarly by Corriente, García Gómez and Solà-Solé, but following Jones’s interpretation of the final section as entirely Arabic

21 could read in English:

Because I loved a foreign little boy, and he, me, the evil of the censor keeps him from me (Poesía dialectal 296).
In the context of the stanzas that precede it, the kharja reiterates all of the motifs and locations of fault explored throughout the poem. It is because of the poetic voice’s love, both his affection and the woman herself, that the censor forbids, the censorship and the fault thus actually lies with him. It is a connection demonstrated explicitly in the fifth stanza in which the censor literally steals what I read as the beloved’s potential reply to the poet, the censor realizing a final and the most imposing assertion of its censorship (As long as I sing romantic poetry, she/you (fem.) answers to who called her). The subjects of the line are indeed ambiguous, permitting a translation of either “she answers” or “you answer”, but the second option follows more consistently with the third person employed in the previous line, “Whenever the beloved appears, they appear together.” With shifting subjects, or subjects eventually defined by their objects, albeit but temporarily, the poem has the potential to create these connections. It is thus not particularly easy to define how the censor, or even the beloved or the poetic voice, is “represented” in al-Jazzār’s poem. The kharja does not actually “represent” the motifs played out in the poem as much as possess the sort of ambiguity and space, as in the case of the “affairs” in the prelude, that enables the making of such connections.

Moshe Ibn Ezra

The case is rather distinct, however, in Moshe Ibn Ezra’s poem. While his composition takes up similar topoi to al-Jazzār’s, including the connection between heart, eyes, and tears, as well as the beloved as gazelle/deer, Ibn Ezra gives the poetic voice and the beloved physical form via a use of prolonged metaphors. These metaphors do not allow the listener, or the poetic voice, for that matter, to dwell in a space of “unrepresented” free space. The kharja, instead of a place to collect pieces of the censor engaged in the preceding stanzas, really appears as an outsider whose presence is much less explicitly constructed as a variation of the concealment and revelation that takes place within the lovers themselves. I suspect that this disconnect between the kharja and body of the poem is a function of the presentation of both the beloved and the lover as though they lack self.

The abrupt transition between the kharja and the rest of the muwāṣṣahā is typical of Ibn Ezra’s three extant muwāṣṣahāt with romance kharjas, but unusual in terms of his muwāṣṣahāt with kharjas in Arabic (Sáenz-Badillos 309). This marked change—change both in terms of the person who voices the kharja and the themes that it presents—appears to occur such as to accommodate the female voice that speaks the refrain. As L.F. Compton and others have studied in the work of poet Ibn Sanā’ al-Mulk, for some Andalusian poets of this period, women were the sole speakers of the romance kharjas (84s). In the present poem, the kharja is spoken by a gazelle who could be the beloved herself or an external person. Here the sudden movement to the kharja appears to bring about the personification, literally throw into existence, the very tenuous hints of the presence of the censor expressed in the previous four stanzas. The poem begins with 22 Valencia and Boyarin read the verb as a first person singular past form, translating it thusly “And when I sing, I answer to whomever calls [to him]”, which destroys the contrast of subjects set up by the preceding line. Here the subject of the verb for “answer” in Arabic (written tujību) preceded by another present tense verb (asḥāṭ—I sing) is logically she or you (feminine). Barberá translates the line as past, but with the subjects indicated by the present tense of the two verbs.
a prelude that references the lover’s impossibility of hiding his love from his cruel beloved, with
the beloved metaphorically described throughout as lion, violent aggressor, lion (and lover)
eater, and taxer. In the first stanza, the poetic voice blames the revelation of his love on his eyes
and tears and also on the anger of his beloved. The poem moves to comment on the link between
the beloved’s beauty, especially her face and eyes, the lover’s eyes, the beloved’s resistance, and
his possible cure. In the final stanza, the subject becomes a gazelle who remembers the censor
and then speaks the kharja. This gazelle may or may not be the beloved.23

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Los que me preguntan,
cómo no han sido escondidas
las penas de mi corazón
que preguntan
a un cervatillo cruel,
que devora como un león.

1
El tumulto
de mi deseo escondí
entre mis costillas
porque la magnitud
de su ira me atemorizó,
si no fuera por mis lágrimas.
Un día, el estrépito
de mi pena dejé correr,
revelando mi aflicción.
La perturbación
de mis ojos ciertamente mostró
el secreto de mi pensamiento.
Habían espiaado
secretamente a mi cervatillo
y él se enfadó conmigo.

2
Tras
las delicias de su hermosura
puso el corazón su fuerza
cogiendo
del jardín de sus mejillas
mis ojos su rosa;

23 I offer Solà-Solé’s translation followed by an English version that draws on Valencia and Boyarin, following
Garbell, however, for the last stanza. I will procure a careful English translation of Brody’s edition for future
redactions of this chapter.
y ahora se lamenta
porque puso a su cervatillo
armas en sus manos.
Mis enemigos
conmigo son misericordiosos
al ver mi lucha.
Alegarán
su rostro y mi consanguíneo
apagará mi llama.

3
Escondió
su luz la Osa Mayor
ante su luz.
Devoró
la pupila de sus ojos
a un león
Poderoso en su hostilidad.
Se enfadó
y puso el destrozar
a mi corazón como su designio.
¡Mis amigos,
no os lamentéis, pues,
a causa de mi pena.
que han provocado
sus ojos, ya que mi curación
está en ellos y mi bien!

4
Los aladares
de su cabeza como mi corazón
son negros, y sus ojos
desenvainan
espadas sobre mis espaldas
hasta convertirlas en sus tributarias.
Vierten
lágrimas por mi pena
mis ojos como sus dientes.
¡Quiera
mi Dios que sean buenos
los procederes de mi amado
y que sean compasivos
sus ojos para mi herida
y para el rigor de mi pena!
Rompió
mi corazón la gacela
que embelleció las palabras.
Recordó
que uno con traición
divide a los que están unidos.
Cantó delante de mí, llorando,
una canción de las gacelas.
Pues amé a mozo forastero
y él a mí,
quiere lo de mí vedar
su vigilante.

(0) Those who ask me how it is that the pains of my heart have not been hidden, well, a cruel fawn devours like a lion. 1) I hid the uproar of my desire in my ribs, because the size of his wrath terrified me, but not for my crying. One day the extent of my pain I allowed to run forth, revealing my affliction. The disturbance of my eyes most certainly showed the secret of my thoughts and they had spied secretly on my little gazelle, making him angry at me. 2) The enjoyment of his beauty sets my heart in motion. My eye picks the roses from the gardens of his cheeks, and now it is regretted because weapons have been put in the gazelle’s hands. My enemies pity me, upon seeing my fight. His face will be gladdened as my body is consumed by my spark. 3) Ursa Major hides her light before his. The pupil of his eyes devours like a lion, powerful in hostility. He became angry and began his plan of destruction of my heart. My friends! Don’t despair, since his eyes have caused my pain and my cure and well-being are in them. 4) The locks of his hair, like my heart, are black, and his eyes draw a sword at my back, until they become his tributaries. Because of my pain, my eyes pour tears like his teeth. God willing that the conduct of my beloved be good and his eyes compassionate for my wound and for the severity of my pain! 5) The eloquent gazelle broke my heart. She remembered that by deceit, one can separate those entwined. She sang before me, crying, a song of the gazelles. For I did love a foreign little boy, and he me, his guardian wants to keep him from me.)

As in the Arabic poem, the question of blame appears in the first line of the prelude. In Ibn Ezra’s poem, however, one immediately learns that apart from the lover’s own inability to contain his suffering, neither can the beloved contain her anger, which in itself constitutes a certain revealing of the presence of the advances of her lover (whom she “devours”). The blame for failing to conceal the affair becomes more properly his in the second stanza, and the objects of his wayward heart parts of the beloved (jardín de sus mejillas / ojos su rosa). By the third stanza, a simple allegorical plane gives way to the sort of shifting of subjectivity seen in al-Jazzār’s muwaššaha. The beloved is spliced as four acts of violence towards astrological, natural and human victims, with the fourth substituting the eyes of the beloved for his own eyes that had caused the revelation of his perturbation in the first stanza. This change of focus to the beloved’s eyes is only temporary, however, as the fourth stanza presents a comparison between the
afflicted parts of the poetic voice and the inflicting pieces of the beloved. The afflicted and the inflicting are thus intertwined as with the censor, lover, and beloved in the last stanza of al-Jazzār’s poem. Through an alternating use of possessive adjectives and different nouns (his eyes—my back—his tributaries; my pain, my eyes, his teeth; my beloved—his eyes—my wound—my pain), the beloved and lover gain proximity, but only an uneasy and combative one between their body parts.

Even more so than in al-Jazzār’s composition, in which the censor is explicitly one of the main problematics throughout, here the poet cannot stand alone as a self. Al-Jazzār’s lover is trapped by a tripartite censorship, as victim of his own attempt to love, as sufferer of the restriction of an external censor, and also victim of the beloved’s rejection. Ibn Ezra’s lover, however, is literally consumed by his beloved. To know himself is to feel the impact of his beloved’s “procederes,” but not to be able to bring about what would be his cure (the beloved’s eyes, which have also, consequently, caused his affliction, in stanza 3). Marcel Proust, as read by Leo Bersani and later Sartre, communicates a very similar sense of self:

Now, since the self is constantly thinking numerous things, since it is nothing more than the thoughts of these things, when by chance, instead of having them as the objects of its attention, it suddenly turns its thoughts upon itself, it finds only an empty apparatus, something unfamiliar, to which, in order to give it some reality—it adds the memory of a face seen in the mirror (In Bersani 106-7; also in Pippen 315).

Ibn Ezra’s lover is even less hopeful than what Proust describes in that he does not even own the objects of his thoughts, namely his allegorical interpretation of his beloved’s rejection. It is for this reason that the kharja itself, despite its mention of a specific subject (the gazelle) as opposed to the mere reference of the beloved via the evocation of the lover’s pain, reads strangely disembodied. If this gazelle is indeed a figure for the beloved who has somehow had a change of heart, as Valencia and Boyarin read, her attitude proves to be unusually sympathetic to the beloved’s plight in that although signing of the impossibility of their love, she at least proffers an explanation that lays principal blame on their inability to be together on a force outside the lovers, rather than on the lover himself (82). The two other muwaššahāt by Ibn Ezra with romance kharjas offer hasty transitions to the kharja and both appear to reference the beloved of the speaker. These other muwaššahāt, however, are both panegyrics, one more appropriately a love poem to Ibn Ezra’s absent, but intimate, poet, philosopher and physician friend Yehūda Halevi, in which the lady could be said to speak up as a direct result of her jealousy. Even if it is the beloved who speaks in the poem studied here and not just any lady in love, the poem as is provides no neat resolve or redemption for the lover who suffered throughout all of the anterior stanzas. The doe who has “broken his heart” in recalling the censorship of the guardian only provides another reason for the impossibility of their affair, leaving no way out. Recurring to

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24 See pgs. 151 (the kharja said to be spoken by the “hija de Granda”) and 155 of Solà-Solé for Spanish prose translation of these poems, and pages 278-91 of Brody vol. I for the Hebrew.

25 Valencia and Boyarin read the last half of the first line as “redeem the matter,” the subject being the specific doe who has broken the speaker’s heart, as opposed to Garbell and Solà-Solé, who opt for an adjective. The former translation is literally more accurate, as the first word in the last section is indeed a future verb that translates as “better” or “improve.”
Proust’s “empty apparatus”, or the self that self-reflects and finds a shell, the lover cannot even resort to the paradigms of self-victimization by his own eyes, or aggressive “beloved/lover as victim” that he creates in stanzas one through four. He is instead awoken by something he himself posed in the prelude, but appears to have forgotten about, his self-portrayal as victim of his lady. The singing doe of the last stanza does not improve or re-do anything, but rather leaves the poetic voice as a man who falls prey to observing himself in Proust’s mirror.

In effect, in neither al-Jazzār’s nor Ibn Ezra’s muwaṣšaḥa is the kharja a space for replaying themes explored throughout the compositions. In the first case, the kharja actualizes the possibilities planted in the early stanzas and developed in subsequent ones, and in Ibn Ezra’s it serves primarily to call attention to the inability of the lover to resolve his plight within the system of logic that he creates in the poem. In processing these modes of representation, subjectivity, spaces of possibility, and lack thereof in al-Jazzār and Ibn Ezra’s muwaṣšaḥāt, it is useful to return to the question of the nature of the work of the poet and poetic creation, as well as the qualities of the successful poet. Recalling al-Jazzār’s insistence in his Diwān on the importance of natural, as opposed to acquired, talent in writing poetry, Ibn Ezra’s Kitāb Muhardara wa al-Mudhaakara (Kitāb) proposes this same message. Ibn Ezra’s Kitāb is a literary, biographical and technical book that constitutes the one contemporary work that examines Andalusian Hebrew poetry as a literary art form. For Ibn Ezra, poetry is not really poetry unless it comes from a real poet, one born and not made. He describes the effects of the art that only naturals can produce:

Igualmente se ha de saber que la poesía no llena los ojos y los oídos, ni alivia los corazones y los caracteres, excepto cuando forma parte de la naturaleza del que la dice y de la condición de su artífice, pues no es lo mismo lo que se aprende que lo que se posee de modo natural, como no es lo mismo alcoholarse los ojos que tenerlos negros (73v).

It is not simply that there is bad, good and superlative poetry, but rather, and something that he clarifies with both intellectual and corporeal similes, that poetry can only have a physiological and emotional impact on an audience when the poet himself is a feeler. The poet’s unique intellectual energy and imagination are what enable him to produce the sort of images required to produce lyric. To conjure these images requires a sophisticated sensibility that permits an engagement on at least three bands at the same time, ranging from the repellent to the lovely, in which the poet invokes a scene that is at once very admirable and also unable to be wholly confronted. Quoting the 10th century philosopher and scientist Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (Alpharabius), Ibn Ezra writes:

Los dichos poéticos son los que componen cosas cuya sustancia es la representación imaginativa del asunto del que se habla, sea esta realidad excelente o vil, bella o fea, noble o abyecta. Al decirlas, se les ocurren [a los poetas] imaginaciones por éstas producidas, al igual que nos ocurre cuando miramos algo similar a lo que nos produce repugnancia y disgusta a nuestras almas y nos apartamos de ello, aunque no sea idéntico; lo mismo ocurre con los dichos poéticos, aunque no sea del todo igual (63r-64v).

According to al-Fārābī and by extension, Ibn Ezra, the poet can produce things that are beautiful on paper that in his mind may only appear to him as partially attractive, or that are somehow too
powerful, sun-like, to be contemplated in an unmediated fashion. The poet thus has more possibilities for seeing than the non-poet, even though he cannot see some of the imaginations that might occur to him in full. Poetry itself is thus defined as the possibility for imagining extraordinary phenomena that appear in no books and also for molding said phenomena into lines that produce genuine emotions in the listener. The realm of the genuine for the listener, on the other hand, resides in the emotion that a real poet’s composition should produce.

The combination of indescribable possibility that characterizes the creative genius of the poet coupled with the impossibility of instilling this possibility in someone not naturally gifted illuminates the relationship between the kharja and the rest of the muwaṣṣaḥāt. From the above statements and al-Jazzār’s disdain for anything feigned, real poetry contains no fakery of any kind (“Todo ello es simulado y afectación que ha asumido sin que corresponda a su carácter…toda falsificación es imposible y pasajera”). Yet borrowing and repetition from other poets, as in the case of taking up part or all of an existing kharja, would seem to be acceptable, as long as the kharja came from a genuine poet and then subsequently became truly part of the new composition and rendered the poem in no way unnatural. What seems to give a borrowed verse or piece of prose meaning is the way in which its content is able to manifest in the reading of the poem and in the context of other verses, and how, in fact, the poet actualizes the potential of the vernacular verses.

It is useful to contemplate the link or apparent discord between the kharja and the muwaṣṣaḥa as natural or unnatural, as integrated or seemingly foreign, according to the wisdom and citation practice that Ibn Ezra engages in his Kitāb and al-Jazzār in his Diwān. Alan Jones has expressed doubt as to whether the kharja of interest here, appearing also in the muwaṣṣaḥa by Ibn Baqī, is actually the same in al-Jazzār and Ibn Ezra’s poems. This is a difficult problem to resolve because critics typically substitute readings from the Hebrew manuscripts in places where the Arabic appears corrupt or illegible, as in the third and fourth sections of the kharja, for example. In the extant copies of Ibn Ezra’s composition, with Oxford manuscript 1972.II considered the most legible, the way in which the kharja is divided indicates that the copyists considered it written in Arabic and had trouble understanding it, a problem that could account for its absence in the Schocken Library (Jerusalem) manuscript (Garbell 358-9). Garbell, whom Jones suggests has the most detailed reading of the kharja in Ibn Ezra’s muwaṣṣaḥa, notes that the first word or words of Ibn Ezra’s kharja are basically unreadable. Her reading suggests that the kharja might begin with another exclamation and reference to the duration of the suffering of the girl missing her lover, instead of beginning with an exclamatory que (written as pues in Barberá, porque in Llorach and Corriente, and disputed and omitted by Solà-Solé). Jones also suggests that the final section of the kharja in Ibn Ezra’s version could reference the “evil of the guard” as opposed to the “secret of the guard” as I literally translated the Arabic of the al-Jazzār version. I copy Garbell’s version of Ibn Ezra’s last stanza and kharja:

My heart was broken by an eloquent doe, who, recalling to mind that someone treacherously divides those who are bound together, sang before me, weeping, a song of the gazelles:

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26 Solà-Solé summarizes these arguments regarding the first section on pages 133-4. Regarding the first letters of the first section, he writes: “El texto de Ibn Ezra aboga por un alef inicial, siendo algo discutible la lectura del segundo signo que Garbell leería como un dalet y no como un kaf como quisiera Stern” (134).
Ah! For a long time [?] has he been to me as a foster child; his guard wants to forbid him from me.

Recalling al-Jazzār’s kharja, a confluence of the translations by Corriente, García Gómez and Solà-Solé, with Jones’s interpretation of the final section:

Because I loved a foreign little boy, and he, me, the evil of the guard wants to keep him from me.

In this brief snapshot of the last stanzas, it is clear that despite some differences, which are likely exaggerated by the relative ease of interpretation of the Arabic, the content of the kharja is overwhelmingly similar. In both cases, there is a causal relationship between the existence of a love affair and the interference of the censor, with the duration of the censorship in Ibn Ezra’s version possibly longer, according to Garbell’s reading. The difference, then, comes in the four-and-a-half stanzas that precede the kharja and the way in which the kharja, which in all cases is likely at least partially quotational, is actualized by the muwaššaha as a whole.

To pluck out the kharja as a stand-alone piece is to create by critical fragmentation an entirely distinct and even unnatural entity according to the prose treatises of the poets. Something conceived by acquired talent can never be real poetry or exceed the status of supplement. According to the logic of Ibn Ezra and al-Jazzār’s prose cited earlier and the flow of logic present in their muwaššahāt, if genius, a solution, or the problem itself is not present naturally, it can never be created or truly present. In al-Jazzār’s composition, this principle manifests in the location of the blame in many interconnected pieces with different names (eyes, affairs, fire, the beloved, entrails) that all metonymically refer to the censor who assumes most tangible shape in the kharja. It follows that the kharja, which in itself, apart from problems of decipherment of its letters and words, does not express a particularly difficult idea, can only acquire a more ample interpretation and meaning if it is able to dialog with the material planted in the stanzas that come before it. The kharja does not re-present this anterior material, but rather allows the pieces built in the preceding stanzas to have a place of expression. To further develop the previous discussion of the advantages that an ambiguous subject such as “affairs” affords al-Jazzār’s composition, it is useful to draw on Louis Marin’s conceptualization of “it.” Marin writes of the way in which the third person of the verb ‘to be’ designates someone absent or, in the case of “it”, a “nonperson”:

It is no doubt true that “it” posits a grammatical subject. Yet this pronoun does not introduce a philosophical subject, nor does it situate the act of enunciation in relation to a speaking subject. As a result, linguistics is able to analyze the grammatical subject as providing a genuine contrast to a kind of neuter or absence that is the real subject of the verb...For the act of reducing the verb to the third person, by effacing all personal subjects of enunciation, effectively authorizes the ontological emergence of representation from the realm of things. Judgments such as “the sky is blue” or “the earth is round” can be rewritten as follows: “it is, blue the sky” or “it is, round the earth.” In such utterances, “it”, the subject of the verb ‘to be’, functions as a purely neutral marker
of the indescribable emergence of a thing’s being. As a result, “it” excludes all reference to a subject of representation and discourse (22). 27

In allowing the speaking subject to build and indeed change throughout and reach a non-repetitive fruition in the kharja, it could be said that the muwaṣṣāha operates in the space of the “it” in the above statements (it is, blue the sky, etc.). That is to say, even though the theme of censorship has been expressed throughout, there is never any actual “representation” or redoing of something absent that regains its presence in the kharja. In Ibn Ezra’s piece the final speaker, the gazelle, although a specific subject—more or less, since she could be the actual beloved or another lamenting woman—emerges from this place of the “it.” She is able to appear, speaking in this sympathetic way, as though for the first time. Her voice effectively brings about a feminine being, but also manifests a new being of the poet, one who is recognizable for his melancholy, but nevertheless fresh in that he is redefined by the concrete object of his sadness, the censor.

This discussion of the emergence of subjects in the muwaṣṣāḥāt and the kharja, as well as the literary theory of the poets themselves, raise the question of what, exactly, the kharja is within and without its muwaṣṣāha. Just as the Andalusian poets were able to write a similar refrain into their own compositions, the kharjas containing romance words have been a portable means to argue determined parts of Iberian literary history, namely that these lines comprise the last remaining traces of a primitive Romance lyric of the Iberian peninsula and more generally, that the origin of Spanish literature resides in lyric as opposed to epic. 28 Bracketing the actual fragmentation in the romance kharjas, particularly in 'Līsān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb’s Jayš al-tawṣīh, and their problems of decipherment, there is indeed something manageable about reading the romance kharjas independently. As pieces they can easily be taken up into anthologies, read quickly when put into a modern Spanish translation, and deployed in various arguments since their amorous content can easily apply to anybody, but, at the same time, identify powerfully with individuals. Fragments, meaning in this case, material intentionally selected whose content is not expected to contribute much of anything in literary terms, are ripe for representing determined theses. Apart from the events in literary history already mentioned, these representations include a definitively Spanish claim on al-Andalus; the difference between critics of Iberian literature and students of Spanish literature; and the supremacy of fixing and producing new versions of texts in philology, as opposed to literary analysis, recalling Armistead’s insistence on the need to study the muwaṣṣāḥāt as literature.

Reading these muwaṣṣāḥāt, there is support for the thesis that the most provocative system of representation and possibility occurs within the compositions themselves. The sort of possibility, or as I have called it here in reference to Marin, the space of the “it”, cannot be mechanically constructed or artificially willed into existence - since then it would be the same as representation in the “put-upon” sense discussed in the introduction of the chapter - but rather comes about by space having been left open for it to appear. This idea of pureness that arises from an unrepresented space as though out of nowhere, but at the same time, appearing as something really present, even painfully so, recalls Ankersmit’s interpretation of Runia’s example of parallel processing with the Dutch NIOD Report on Srebrenica. In that example,

27 José Rabasa quotes parts of this passage in contrasting depiction and representation in “Depicting Perspective”, which has some parallels to the discussion of representation and presence here. For more, see the conclusions.

28 This last thesis can be traced most specifically to García Gómez “Veinticuatro jarŷas”, 59.
parallel processing entailed the Dutch writers’ subconscious re-enactments of the failed policies that led to the tragedy on which they were reporting, the death of 8000 Bosnian Muslims in 1995. Ankersmit’s presence, based primarily on Runia’s, but conceived as a type of representation, is not the manifestation of a bad copy of a past event, but rather the occurrence of the past event two times:

For if representation is always a “making present again,” then the copying of past occurrences involved in parallel processing seems to provide all that representation might ever hope for! “Normally,” in the case of painting or of historical representation, a representation and the “real thing” represented by it are by no means identical. But here we really get “the real thing” twice: the NIOD researchers’ behavior really was the same as that of their principals. Is that not the best that representation could ever give us? (331-2)

Ankersmit goes on to suggest that one differentiate between two conceptions of representation, Aristotle’s mimesis in which, thinking in terms of painting and sculpture, but also historical representation, a representation and the thing it represents are “categorically different” and his reading of Runia’s variety, in which the “past is presented again, literally being carried into the present” (332). In a move to further complicate his distinction between these sorts of representation, he draws on Meyer Schapiro’s picture frame as a negative example and writes that the first sort of representation associated with “human artifacts” (painting, etc.) might be opposed with Runia’s. This opposition is possible because unlike Schapiro’s picture frame, Runia’s representation allows for an explanation of how the realms of representation and represented flow into each other like “two lakes after a natural disaster” (Ankersmit 323). The sublime metaphor of two lakes leads Ankersmit to identify points of contact between presence and myth, ending with an observation on the difficulty of locating, as well as the irresistible urge to locate, the meaning of presence:

Note that when speaking about the meaning of “presence,” I have in mind the meaning of the notion; I do not wish to imply by this that presence itself—as a concrete historical or cultural phenomenon—can have a meaning itself. For getting hold of this meaning is just as impossible as jumping over one’s own shadow; its meaning always successfully evades our grasp. That is its sublimity. So I wholly agree with H. U. Gumbrecht who says that “presence” may give us “what meaning cannot convey.” Nevertheless, the urge to get hold of this meaning is irresistible—and this is why we can easily get caught by this loop of presence, so that it may remain with us indefinitely. Indeed, this is, again, another meaning we may give to “presence” (336).

Ankersmit collapses the distinction between the “meaning” that one might ascribe to the presence of the past and, on the other hand, Gumbrecht’s thesis, also the subtitle of his book most specifically dedicated to this subject, that presence conveys what meaning cannot. In

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29 See Runia “Forget About It” for a detailed description of the phenomenon of parallel processing and its place in this event.
30 The picture frame concept appears in On Some Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art.
Ankersmit’s case, the “meaning” that one might ascribe to the presence of the past would be something assigned after the events, (as in Runia’s parallel processing example) or a more general moment in which a presence was felt intensely. In the Gumbrecht case, meaning is opposed to what presence actually is, that presence makes something happen besides meaning which people would not correlate with a specific sense. An extension of this second case is the existence of what Gumbrecht calls “presence effects”, as opposed to, but not occurring in absence of, “meaning effects.” It is precisely this distinction, and the vagueness of this last piece, that would illuminate any difference between the place of “it” and representation, or within Ankersmit’s article, between the two main types of representation.

It is useful to return to Ankersmit’s mention of human artifacts in his definition of the first variety of representation. The problem with physical artifacts, as I have aimed to show in the previous chapters, is that the moment in which one moves to do philology or write critically about the time of a pre-modern manuscript fragment, to literally put hands to describing or even just musing about the presence of objects, the pure sublimity of their presence which seems so intensely clear and indeed intense in thought or in a “presence moment” slips away. It is perhaps what would happen after the passing of what Stephen Greenblatt refers to in the context of the elevation of the Seder as a moment “intensely present” - when the distant past “lays claim to the here and now” and effectively “becomes miracle” (139). I think that Gumbrecht alludes to a struggle to locate the vocabulary for precisely this passing of the miracle in 2003 in *Powers of Philology* while provisionally defining full presence:

The relationship between wholeness/completeness and presence requires some further systematic thought. For the time being, I associate full presence with completeness/wholeness, whereas I suppose that temporal objects properly speaking (clouds, for example…), despite their presence, will always leave the feeling of lack. What needs to be elaborated is a distinction between different types of presence (12 n. 9).

Indeed, one of the most provocative questions that this footnote raises, which itself could serve as the subject of a book, is the elusive name of “temporal objects.” Is a temporal object one whose current state, say the current state of the *Amadís* manuscript, may change, or become somehow invalid or not able to be remembered within a certain time? Are not all objects cloud-like in their own way, but just on a slower moving scale?

As seen in the present chapter in the way in which poetic genius and the possibility within the *nuwaššahāt* cannot be literally “made” to happen, the second chapter argues that one cannot take hold of single pure “pre-modern” in assessing the time of the present, but old and multi-temporal, document collection. Once engaged in the critical thinking and meaning-making involved in writing about objects, as opposed to thinking theoretically about objects, it is impossible to arrive to anything close to a pure past or a “repetition” of the past event. Similarly, a written report about the manifestation of a medieval or early modern manuscript fragment will constitute a representation and interpretation, no matter how unclear and vague, of aspects of this presence. As examined here, the difference resides, when a situation or context is introduced, when one is actually speaking of a definite object, as opposed to a philosophical indefinite, like Heidegger’s jug.

It is for this reason that a return to the so-called “things themselves” or placing increased energy into studies of material culture as a means to invigorate Medieval Studies might not be a
move closer to anything that would facilitate a close contact with a convincing medieval. Full presence, the appearance of the past twice, and the unrepresented place of possibility in the realm of the it, as I have tried to conceive it here, unfortunately for the present project might more easily come from reading the literary works, as opposed to attempting to make the material somehow say more and appear to us more fully. As I intend to show here, there is that thing-like possibility, that is actually so difficult to capture in writing about actual physical things, in the literature itself.

It is thus not only some subset of cloud-like objects that alerts us to the intangibility of supposedly tangible objects, but rather, and perhaps most specifically, touchable historical objects. This intangibility, which fragmentary relics underline in their physical appearance, results not because, as Heidegger’s later writing on things might communicate, they have essences hiding from the gaze of the human observer, or, rather, that we must locate a certain non-hermeneutic mode by which we might approach them. There is no non-hermeneutic in academic writing as it exists today, or in any future that I might predict. It is rather, and something to which Plato referred, because the presence of old things in the now is entirely in the making, a premise that Heidegger became eager to critique: “Plato thought the essence of the thing as little as did Aristotle and all later thinkers. Rather, in a way that was decisive for all that came afterward, Plato experienced all that was present as an object of production” (“The Thing” cited in Rorty 275, my emphasis). To investigate the presence of historical relics then, while aiming to know them in a more technical way according to facts and typologies and traditions, might be to push them further away from communicating the affective completeness to which Gumbrecht seems to refer in the note above. The problem stems, I suspect, from a belief that a present, but old object is plainly present—an assumption that is paradoxically, but very strongly, residing in the heart of Gumbrecht’s “production of presence.” The current context of manuscript fragments to which I have referred above as the contrary notion to the philosophical object is a complex one that requires systematic reflection. This is the very subject of the next and last chapter, with special attention to how the personal and wider national meaning, which I investigate as value, of pre-modern Iberian literature, its manuscripts, and other objects has been produced and is produced in the modern age.

31 For a definition of “production of presence” that in my view, references this problem as a process of dysfunction of the relationship between signifier and signified, see J.R. Velasco, Order and Chivalry, especially pg. 11 of the introduction and chapter 3.
Chapter 4

The Fragment Market:
The Value of Pre-Modern Iberian Things In The Modern Age

The words materiality and material culture have become mainstays in many divisions of the human sciences in which things had previously appeared to have taken a backseat to texts and theory. This interest among students of literature and cultural studies in material culture has produced a flurry of research on relics and the institutions that house them. Such investigations include theoretical queries of the archive, some making use of the late nineties translation of Derrida’s *Mal d’archive*, examinations of the cultural meaning and global impact of museums, particularly post 9-11, post-humanist reflections on the relationship of humans to animals and things, redefinitions of philology, and guidebooks for students undertaking research with physical objects.\(^1\) Within research on presence, Domanska and Gumbrecht write of the ways in which physical proximity with colleagues, friends, and loved ones and even the creative design of buildings might help us to overcome the empty feeling resulting from loss of face-to-face interaction and the difficulty of making the past meaningful and realistic in the present (“Hyper-Comm”, “The Material Presence of the Past”, “Let the Dead”). At the same time, some scholars lament that literary studies lags behind anthropology and philosophies of science when it comes to thinking about human-thing and human-animal boundaries.\(^2\) In discussions in graduate seminars, academic writing, and even in conferences with a definitively object-oriented or iconoclastic anti-representation platform, it is often difficult to identify what material, materiality, and material culture actually mean, or to what things, whether jewelry, pottery, carpets, amulets, or manuscripts this terminology might refer.

Responding to these concerns, and most specifically, to the question as to what material culture actually means in the present, this chapter interrogates the word *value*. Value is evoked frequently, but only rarely defined in academic as well as more mainstream accounts of cultural objects in the present day in the United States and Spain. Value appears in texts relaying information regarding governmental or other institutional projects of digitalization of medieval material, discoveries of manuscript fragments, academic publications, and Wikipedia articles. Even Google Books includes a message with public domain works about what it perceives as the importance of old books to users today when they are downloaded in PDF format. The message reads: “This book has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the

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\(^1\) With the bibliography of these subjects so numerous, I mention a few titles considered here and in other places of the dissertation. For the archive, David Greetham’s “Who’s In, Who’s Out: The Cultural Politics of Archival Exclusion” in the series of articles on this topic published in *Studies in the Literary Imagination; The Archive* and Spieker’s companion book, *The Big Archive*, as well as Manoff. For a concise, but comprehensive bibliography on the archive in cultural studies see n. 12 in Manoff. In museum studies, see work and volumes edited by Karp, Kratz, Szwaja and Ybarra-Frausto as well as Daniel Sherman, among others. In philology, I am thinking of the debates in the 1990s in *Speculum* and *La Corónica* prompted by Dagenais and Cerquiglini, see also Funes, Fleischman and the volume edited by Busby. The student help book to which I refer is a project of Karen Harvey and others published by Routledge in 2009.

\(^2\) See Domanska, Latour (*We have Never Been Modern; Iconoclash; Making Things Public*) and others working in philosophy of science, posthumanism, and the effects of modern science and technology, such as Richard Powers, Richard Rorty, and Lorraine Daston.
public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to discover. Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file—a reminder of this book’s long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.”

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Value, even in its undefined and quotidian sense as I have just used it here, might refer to monetary worth, sentimental significance, perceived utility, or prestige, or to all of these things. In the way in which I have investigated presence throughout the dissertation, value can be defined according to two different epistemological frames. On the one hand, value can be considered a self-evident and metaphysical measure that cannot be taken apart or interrogated, such as Gumbrecht’s “full presence”, the way in which Rorty speaks of truth and other concepts whose contingency is typically ignored, or Ankersmit’s discussion of presence as the possibility that one might experience the “real thing twice” in history (“Presence Achieved in Language” 320; Powers of Philology 12 n.9; Ankersmit 331). On the other hand, however, value might be construed as something that is constantly in the making or becoming, conceived of as “birth”, as being “produced”, or as involving a disjunction between signifier and signified (Birth to Presence; Production of Presence; Order and Chivalry).

To investigate the meaning of value in the realm of the Hispanic pre-modern artifact, I explore the rise of Hispanicism in the United States through an examination of the social programs and personal projects of collection of two 19th and 20th century intellectuals. The first is George Ticknor (1791–1871), the 19th century hispanist, collector, and author of the History of Spanish Literature. Upon his death, Ticknor donated his collection to the library that he helped establish, the Boston Public Library. The second is Archer Huntington (1870–1955) and his “Spanish Museum”, the Hispanic Society of America (HSA). I explore the Society’s connection with the Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, started at Madison in the 1930’s, and their subsequent program of creating computerized editions of medieval works in the 20th century.

The present chapter examines on what characteristics, such as age, content, perceived global relevance, monetary, or spiritual worth do these collectors define the value of Hispanic manuscripts, texts, and other cultural objects, especially medieval Iberian ones. I investigate the conceptions of wholeness and fragmentation of the collectors. Then, drawing on theorists of the commodity, the exchange of cultural objects, and the museum, including Marx, Quatremère de Quincy, Benjamin, Bourdieu, and Baudrillard, I briefly study several manuscripts and other relics related to the Boston Public Library and the HSA as they appear on today’s global book market and in conjunction with several 21st century museum exhibits and other happenings. These books and other phenomena include two Qur’ans, one 10th century, the other 13th century, Huntington’s collection of Arabic reference books, an Iberian coin collection, a new wing at the Louvre, and recent discoveries and the display of morisco manuscripts in Spain.

3 See, for example, the volumes of Ticknor’s History of Spanish Literature.
George Ticknor and his collection of books

The first figure considered is one who continues to live on in the media of the university where he taught as the quintessential teacher and successful communicator of culture. The emeritus Harvard professor Warner Berthoff redacted a warm tribute to George Ticknor in *Harvard Magazine* in 2005 that linked the 19th century intellectual to the present day. Berthoff writes that while before the American Civil War Harvard was just a provincial college focused steadily on the production of respectable citizens, there was one early professor who had a different mindset with regards to the intellectual impact that Harvard might have on its students. Ticknor was indeed so ahead of his time that even today, in the 21st century, he would be welcomed as a member of the faculty (48). Before coming to Harvard to teach French and Spanish literatures, as well as courses in Latin, Portuguese, Provençal and in great authors of other languages, such as Dante and Shakespeare, he studied languages, European history, science, and esthetics in Germany at Göttingen under a schema that he later sought to implement at Harvard. He traveled extensively in France and Spain, as well as Italy, Britain and Portugal, spending some four months in Madrid. As Berthoff notes in his homage, Ticknor used his European travels not only to perfect his language skills and to form certain theses about Spanish and French cultures, but rather also to buy books, for himself, for Harvard, for Thomas Jefferson, and later for the Boston Public Library.

Ticknor was also Boston high society, a veritable social cynosure married to the daughter of an enormously wealthy merchant, Samuel Eliot. Born a Calvinist, Ticknor became the sort of Harvard Unitarian that unlike some of the antislavery graduates of the Unitarian Harvard Divinity School, was a social conservative with beliefs that many of his day thought anachronistic.4 He remained a Federalist throughout his life and while he thought that slavery was an awful institution for his country, it was nevertheless an institution that Southerners had the right to defend with constitutional authority. Following his nephew George Ticknor Curtis who was appointed to oversee the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law (1850), Ticknor considered with Daniel Webster that there was no law above the Constitution. In an effort to defend Webester, Ticknor wrote in the press that one should only “follow his own interpretation of the law of God against a provision of the supreme law of the land” if he thought it “his duty to begin a revolution” (text from the Boston Transcript, 1850, Dartmouth College Library, in Tyack 227). In this regard, he advocated for the educational improvement of society such as to thwart its degeneration, a belief and set of decisions and practices which affirmed and upheld the superiority of whites, biological imagery (a lament that American youth might be “fruit perfectly formed and nourished, which rots without ripening”) as well as a complete disgust that the United States might take Mexico, as he had respect for neither its people nor culture (*Life* II 404). The strand of Unitarianism which appears to have guided much of his academic work as well as his writing for a wider readership emphasizes the innate goodness of the human like other Unitarianisms, but was also keenly guided by a belief in the sanctity of property and more generally, law and order (Menand 12).

Good books and their availability were the keystones to Ticknor’s move to renovate an uneducated American populus, as well as American scholars, who in his regard, often paled in

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4 For Ticknor’s Boston context, see Menand’s book, even though Ticknor does not figure there explicitly, as well as Adam’s recent book and Tyack.
learning in comparison with their European counterparts. In his words, he sought to locate the “peculiar character” of his country, a phrase he often applied also to Spain. After Ticknor resigned his chair at Harvard in 1835 and following the publication of the first edition of his History of Spanish Literature (New York and London, 3 volumes, 1849), he dedicated himself to the foundation of the Boston Public Library. Ticknor envisioned a two-part public library, including a general reading room and a separate study for scholars. Part of his plan for the general section included the purchase of multiple copies of “popular books” with the aim of cultivating a community reading project and most importantly, a collective “appetite” for books.

In a letter to Edward Everett, Harvard professor, Unitarian minister, congressman, president of Harvard, and also chairman of the board of Trustees for the Library, Ticknor wrote of his revolutionary plan to which he anticipated and eventually received some resistance:

One difficulty is to furnish means specifically fitted to encourage a love for reading, to create an appetite for it, which the schools often fail to do, and then to adapt these means to its gratification. That an appetite for reading can be very widely excited is plain, from what the cheap publications of the last twenty years have accomplished, gradually raising the taste from such poor trash as the novels with which they began, up to the excellent and valuable works of all sorts which now flood the country…To do this I would establish a library which, in its main department and purpose, should differ from all free libraries yet attempted; I mean one in which any popular books, tending to moral and intellectual improvement, should be furnished in such numbers of copies that many persons, if they desired it, could be reading the same work at the same time; in short, that not only the best books of all sorts, but the pleasant literature of the day, should be made accessible to the whole population at the only time when they care for it, i.e. when it is fresh and new…This appetite, once formed, will take care of itself. It will, in the great majority of cases, demand better and better books; and can, I believe, by a little judicious help, rather than by any direct control or restraint, be carried much higher, than is generally thought possible (Life II 302).

In a note, Ticknor’s wife Anna, editor of his journals, writes that he was impressed upon seeing Johns’ translation of Froissart’s Chronicles of England in a cheap edition by Harpers at a small inn in southern New York State in 1814 (301). While neither the books Ticknor had in his private library, nor those in languages other than English whose inclusion in the library he staunchly advocated, cheap editions served an important social purpose, namely the elevation of the moral character and cultural capital of the average or below average reader.

More than possessing the possibility of effecting social change or being a means to whet the literary appetite of the common person, popular books in economy editions lead Ticknor to metaphysical predictions about human improvement. In the last sentence of the passage just cited, Ticknor underlines the importance that a “readerly hunger” be discovered by the reader himself or herself, and not artificially created. The civilizing force that the library aims to perform for the general public is thus coupled with hope to make change at the level of the individual, and at a deeply personal one at that. It is in this dual, but not wholly compatible manner that Ticknor speaks of his own private and much beloved collection of Spanish literature. As Anna Ticknor notes, the dialectic between her husband’s personal interests and the public good were sometimes confusing for some. In letter to Everett sent from Rome in the midst of one
of his book buying expeditions, Ticknor frames his want for poor men to have access to foreign language books in terms of the way in which he has shared his own library:

I do not, indeed, want for my personal convenience any library at all, except my own, but I should be ashamed of myself, if in working for such an institution as our Public Library, I could overlook the claims of the poor young men, and others who are not able to buy valuable, costly, and even rare books in foreign languages, which they need in studies important to them and to the public. I never did neglect their claims in relations to my own inconsiderable library, and why should I do it in relation to a large public library? … but I see from your letter that there are persons who would prefer it,—I mean persons who prefer to keep our Public Library almost wholly an English one (Life II 316).

Ticknor had a decided interest in intellectualizing the poor via books that had fed his own appetite for literature. Yet his passion for purchasing books and his plan to place a selection of the ones he most loved in this public collection stuck some as a conflict of interest. Anna writes that while his love of collecting European and especially, Spanish literature, was never simply a “bibliomaniac’s passion”, and was always guided by the literary element from which it sprung, it was nevertheless a “fervent enthusiasm.” In Berlin, Ticknor stayed so late in bookshops that he had to obtain permission from the police such that he could remain in the shops and return to his hotel without being stopped (314). In a similar, relentless manner, he wrote other collectors asking them to sell parts of their collections and to request of their friends the sale of other collections still (251). The Spanish books which Gayangos helped him to procure, and which were said to literally “take him out of the world around him” were of course his greatest prize. Ticknor ends a feverish letter to Nicholas Heinrich Julius (1783–1862), scholar and philanthropist of Hamburg, Germany by imploring his advice in finding yet more Spanish books: “Do you know of old Spanish books anywhere to be obtained in Germany or elsewhere?” (251). Of Gayangos he requested that the volumes that the Spanish scholar had lent him in writing the History might become his, an offer that Gayangos declined in certain cases.

In effect, in the realm of Spanish books, money was of little or even no object, something surely facilitated by his having quite a lot of it. In corresponding with Hamburg sellers Perthes, Besser, and Mauke, and after marking their catalogue, Ticknor indicates in February of 1846: “I am willing to pay high prices for them—not des prix fous, as the French say—but I am willing to pay high prices decidedly, rather than lose them” (249). In June of the same year, he wrote to O. Rich granting him a blank check, as well as significant trust in his bibliographic taste, as he had previously done for Gayangos, to buy whatever he considered worthy of purchase: “I wish to give you carte blanche, and feel sure that with my letter of January 27, and this list of my books, you cannot mistake my wants; which, you know, have always been confined to Spanish belles-lettres, and whatever is necessary to understand the history of Spanish elegant literature. From time to time I pray you to send Mr. Gayangos a note of your purchases, as he has a similar carte blanche from me, and I will desire him to do the same with you” (249). Similarly, he complains lightly to Gayangos in 1844 that Rich had spent only half the sum that Ticknor had given him at the Southey’s sale, to which Ticknor replied that the only thing he wanted returned to him was more Southey’s books (248). Ticknor’s collecting of books, especially Spanish ones, was thus both a collective enterprise, in that it involved many other collectors and impacted his designs for the public library, and also a deeply personal one. In exploring this enterprise in greater detail, specifically, who or what, exactly, were its objects, and what was their value, it is useful to draw
on two thinkers on art in the modern era that flank Ticknor in chronology, namely the very early critic of art museums and historian Quatremère de Quincy, (1755 – 1849) and Walter Benjamin (1892 –1940), as well as Karl Marx (1818-1883).  

Functional art, *prix, valeur*

Iterations of Quatremère de Quincy’s critique of the museum can be found in his *Lettres à Miranda sur le déplacement des monuments d'Art de l'Italie* (1796) and *Considérations morales sur la destination des ouvrages de l'Art, ou de l'influence de leur emploi sur le génie et le gout* (1815), as well as in his earlier *Considérations sur les arts de dessin en France* (1791), a program of art education for France. A fierce critic of the Republican left and of the foreign policy of the republic, Quatremère drew his observations from Napoleon’s removal of thousands of works of art and other artifacts from Europe’s finest palaces and churches, amassing and relocating them in the recently vacated Palais du Louvre (Adams).  

He writes that each work of art has a particular function that carries with it moral education. An art piece’s value (*valeur*) resides in its “rapport utiles” and the way in which it is able to carry out the instruction that its creator intended. Museums like the Louvre not only remove pieces of art from their natural contexts, but also render them entirely useless by divorcing them from any of their local, moral and accessory capabilities and obligations (*Lettres* 102-3; Sherman 12-13). The pieces thus become worthless fragments from which no real utility can be derived.

At the same time, however, Quatremère recognized that pieces have a market value that is purely accidental to the object, in contrast to an object’s more general value, or ability to make a spiritual and pedagogical impact (*Destination* 15-16). Quatremère’s notion of *objets de prix* when used in discussions of commerce, as Sherman cogently recognizes, anticipates quite exactly Marx’s notion of exchange value, as outlined in chapter 1, section 1 of *Capital*: “We have seen that when commodities are in the relation of exchange, their exchange-value manifests itself as something totally independent of their use-value. But if we abstract from their use-value, there remains their value, as has just been defined. The common factor in the exchange relation, or in the exchange-value of the commodity, is therefore its value.” For Quatremère, the commodification of art robbed it of its *valeur* and reduced it to having only an exchange value.

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5 For a comprehensive study on Quatremère, Benjamin and Marx, see Sherman’s study of this name, especially his readings of Quatremère. See also Schneider’s classic work on Quatremère and the volume edited by Bordes and Régis Michel, *Aux armes et aux arts*. For Quatremère’s anticipation of Adorno’s assessment of museums, apart from Adorno “Valéry Proust Museum”, see Rovee, “Trashing Keets” and Adams “Instrumentality.”

6 For the creation of the Louve see McLellan.

7 While Quatremère uses both *prix* and *valeur* to refer to this non-economic, higher order value or utility of a thing (Sherman 129), logically, *valeur* appears to be his preferred term for it. For example, speaking of Raphael in the 6th letter of *Lettres*, “Mais ce Raphael, dont on convoie les tableaux, plus par superstition et par vanité que par goût et par amour de beau, combien peu connaissent et la valeur de ses ouvrages, et la valeur de son génie. Toutes les collections veulent avoir de lui un morceau vrai ou faux, à peu près comme jadis toutes les églises voulaient avoir un morceau de la vraie croix. Le malheur, c'est que la vertu attachée à l'ensemble d'une école ne se communique pas, comme dans une relique, à chaque partie détachée de cette école” (124). *Prix* seems most often to translate as “price”, e.g. in *Destination* “Au premier rang de ces opinions destructives, il faut placer celle qui tend à ne faire considérer les ouvrages d'Art comme des choses utiles, qu’autant qu’ils peuvent être des objets de *prix*. De ce que certains morceaux, par la réputation et le rare talent de leurs auteurs, sont aussi devenus des objets rares, et par conséquent d’un grand *prix…” (15).
Marx, on the other hand, at least considered that a thing could not be a commodity without humans having use for it, and that each commodity has a use-value and/or more generalized “utility” to its buyer. Marx wrote:

To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use value, by means of an exchange. Lastly nothing can have value without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value” (1.1.48)

It follows that in contrast to Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism (Capital 1.1.iv) in which things are imputed a life of their own and an inherent value as a result of their commodification, Quatremère’s notion of valeur refers to a conception of value that resides both outside of and prior to the market. Writing after Marx, Walter Benjamin similarly appears to have construed his notion of “aura”, or the most essential parts of art’s natural impression, as something indeed threatened by the workings of modern life, but that came before and not as a result of modern life. This similarity between Marx and Benjamin is apparent in the latter’s explanation of the dialectical relationship between the decline of aura and modern man’s desire to bring objects closer by way of reproduction:

The contemporary decay of the aura...rests on two circumstances, both of which are related to the increasing significance of the masses in contemporary life. Namely, the desire of contemporary masses to bring things “closer” spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction. Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction (23).

Aura and Quatremère’s valeur, valeur referring to the metaphysical conception of value, cannot be created or artificially kindled, hence the futility of the museum for Quatremère. In this logic, art is not genuinely a commodity, or supposed to be “an object outside of us”, as Marx says of the commodity (1.1). 8

Any attempt on the part of the reproduction-age human to establish proximity with the things around them via images will thus ultimately fail and yield yet more distance and fragmentation of the thing in question. Quatremère draws on precisely the metaphor of the fragment and ruins, as well as the frame of a morbid initiative of renovation, to describe the museum in his Destination des ouvrages de l’art:

Déplacer tous les monuments, en recueillir ainsi les fragments décomposés, en classer méthodiquement les débris, et faire d’une telle réunion un cours pratique de chronologie moderne; c’est pour une raison existante, se constituer en état de nation morte; c’est de son vivant assister à ses funérailles; c’est tuer l’Art pour en faire l’histoire; ce n’est point en faire l’histoire, mais l’épitaphe (48 translated in Sherman 134).

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8 The passage reads: “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside of us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference. Neither are we here concerned to know how the object satisfies these wants, whether directly as means of subsistence, or indirectly as means of production.”
For Quatremère, unlike Benjamin, who had a more compassionate view of the collector,9 the private collector of art and other cultural relics performs a public disservice and indeed renders things useless by precluding the performance of their “rapport utiles.” Ticknor’s model of public service that multiplies cultural objects, as seen in his call for multiple copies of the same book in the Boston Public Library, thus might appear antithetical to Quatremère’s model. Similarly, Ticknor’s removal of as many “Spanish books” as possible from every part of Europe might seem at first glance a variation of Napoleon’s gathering of the best of Europe for the Louvre. At the same time, however, at the center of Ticknor’s impetus to collect his books is a push to recover “the spirit” of a people or thing, a notion similar in its essentialist quality to Quatremère’s notion of valeur, as well as an example of the sort of romantic vocabulary that permeates Ticknor’s writings and others of the period, such as those of his close friend and fellow Hispanist William H. Prescott (1796-1859). Ticknor’s History, journals, and letters reveal a confidence in the activity of collection’s ability to indeed recover Spain’s spirit, rather than to pervert or destroy it. This spirit, spirit in the sense of pre-Marxist Quatemérian valeur, appears in Ticknor’s diaries as something he indeed maintained separate or pretended to maintain as separate, from the demands of the book market.

Ticknor was consequently quick to identify what he saw as the dominant traits of Spanish culture, namely intolerance motored by the Inquisition, an extreme ecclesiastical despotism, and an extravagant and uneducated upper class (Hart 80-1). While having allowed for the flourishing of some arts and letters (Life I 496), including the theatre and lyric poetry, this intolerance leads Ticknor to cast Spain as a research object that attracts him precisely because it also annoys him. Writing from London recalling his then recent travels throughout Spain, he characterizes Spain as a broken study topic with which he cannot quite come to terms, but cannot resist trying:

But I had just come from Spain and Portugal, where all is so dead, so wretched, so abject, at least in whatever is most obvious and external, that the great characteristicks of English power and manners struck me with peculiar force and vivacity. When I recollected the inefficiency of the human character in Spain and Portugal, when I recollected that the inactivity of the people themselves is so great that neighbouring villages are often strangers to each other, and the weakness of the government so alarming that in a considerable proportion of these countries it is unsafe to go fifty miles but with an armed caravan, I could hardly feel, though I knew it, that they belonged to the same species with the people I was now among, where every village and every peasant seems an emblem of activity and power, and where the human anatomy with arteries and veins, and the circulation so safe and so easy that every individual in the whole island may in some sort consider himself a neighbour to every other. I was never so confounded with my own thoughts as in attempting to reconcile to myself such different, opposite, and inconsistent principles and characteristicks in the same nature; for my senses were every moment denying the relationship with my reason, and I grew giddy as I laboured to satisfy both (Travels 52).

As in the case of his own country, Ticknor recurs to biological terminology to explain what in his view ails Spain. Like a sick body, the country’s circulation is off, causing inefficiencies and

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9 See Benjamin “Unpacking My Library.”
inadequacies in its government and education, the social relationships among its inhabitants, and a general depression of spirit that represents an “unnatural state” (History, preface first edition v). Similar to the general patrons of the Library in whom he hopes to inspire a reader’s spirit, Spain’s renovation must start from the identification and location of their peculiar spirit and move outward. For Ticknor, a direct link to a man’s or to a country’s spirit is literature and the physical book, a sentiment that his much admired Goethe, in a passage from his Autobiography, said also of his own body of work:

And thus began that tendency from which I could not deviate my whole life through; namely, to turn into an image, into a poem, everything that delighted or troubled me, or otherwise occupied me, and to come to some certain understanding with myself upon it, that I might both rectify my conceptions of external things, and set myself inwardly at rest about them. The faculty of doing this was necessary to no one more than to me, for my natural disposition whirled me constantly from one extreme to the other. All, therefore, that has been confessed by me, consists of fragments of a great confession, and this little book is an attempt which I have ventured on to render it complete (vol. 1, 240).

Goethe, whom Ticknor met and translated, shared Ticknor’s conviction that the book had the capability to “render complete” a personal story built of the disparate images and poems made of things experienced in life. Ticknor thus logically calls his entire pursuit of Spanish letters, from book collecting, his conversations and study with José Antonio Conde and Gayangos, his lectures on similar topics at Harvard, and writing his History a book. Having rendered homage to Conde, he speaks of Gayangos and the History:

With [Gayangos], to whom I am not less largely indebted, I first became personally acquainted when I passed in Europe the period between 1835 and 1838, seeking to know scholars such as he is, and consulting, not only the principal public libraries of the Continent, but such rich private collections as those of Lord Holland in England, of M. Ternaux-Compans in France, and of the venerated and much-loved Tieck in Germany; all of which were made accessible to me by the frank kindness of their owners. The natural result of such a long-continued interest in Spanish literature, and of so many pleasant inducements to study it, has been—I speak in a spirit of extenuation and self-defence—a book (ix).

Ticknor justifies his interest in Spanish literature by signaling that such a dedication and even obsession produced a book from which the public might benefit. At the same time, Ticknor’s “self-defense” reads as entirely sincere. His History and production of a physical book are not simply ambivalent figureheads for his multi-faceted project of personal fulfillment in acquiring Spanish books, social service in helping to establish the Boston Public Library, and attempt to locate the “peculiar character” of Spain. Rather, the History unites all of these ventures under the name of collecting and recovery. The book is nothing short of a concrete manifestation of his metaphysical project not only to write what he considered a proper literary history of Spain—of which Quatremère would have undoubtedly disapproved—but rather also to find and disseminate the “true value” and spirit of Spain.

Value thus logically appears in Ticknor’s History as a quantity or quality that like truth, requires a good deal of belief and a lack of interrogation to sustain its strength. Value occurs
frequently and casually in the *History* modified by adjectives of degree (more, little, none). Its metaphysical connotation takes shape, however, in instances of literature and literary figures of particular importance to Ticknor. Elements of his treatment in the *History of the Poema de Mio Cid* and the *Poema de Yuçuf* illustrate this point.

In speaking, for example, of the debate as to whether the *Poema de Mio Cid* is historical, and in referring specifically to the historian John von Müller’s opinion that the poem is wholly or nearly wholly historical, Ticknor defends the *Poem* by suggesting that such an argument misses the point of the work and its “proper value”:

> It has sometimes been regarded as wholly, or almost wholly, historical. But there is too free and romantic a spirit in it for history...it is essentially a poem; and in the spirited scenes at the siege of Alcocer and at the Cortes, as well as in those relating to the Counts of Carrion, it is plain that the author felt his license as a poet. In fact, the very marriage of the daughters of the Cid has been shown to be all but impossible; and thus any real historical foundation seems to be taken away from the chief event which the poem records. This, however, does not at all touch the proper value of the work, which is simple, heroic, and national (*History* I 16)

Spending energy to correlate history with all of the events depicted in the *PMC* is antithetical to its value because its value is not up for debate, or variable, but rather one unlike any other, the true Spanish spirit, the spirit unique to Spain. Continuing with this line of thought, Ticknor finds validity in the remark of poet and historian Robert Southey (1774-1843) regarding the Spaniard’s need to appreciate the poetics of the *PMC* before being able to produce any more quality poetry: “The Spaniards have not yet discovered the high value of their metrical history of the Cid as a poem. They will never produce anything great in the high branches of art till they have cast off the false taste which prevents them from perceiving it” (*History* I 25). Ticknor’s citation and moderate approval of Southey’s statement does not appear to function primarily as a means underscore that the *PMC* is great because it is the original Spanish poem, or foundationally “first” in some way. Rather, like the hunger he hoped that the Boston Public Library patrons would develop, and like his own need for books, the valuable part of a book resides in its ability to help its reader, borrower, or owner to establish closeness, in Benjamin’s terms, with the “peculiar spirit” of the culture to which it belongs. Ticknor’s meter for recognizing this spirit was altogether essentialist and totalizing, not linear.

Accordingly, the reproduction of passages of Spanish literature and the removal of Spanish books from Europe was not at all a process of fragmentation for Ticknor, as Quatremère might have spoken of it. Even if the individual pieces collected were actually fragmentary, they were never really portrayed in any of Ticknor’s published writings as such. Each poem or selection, literary work or book that Ticknor signaled out as key was “valuable” in the way just defined. It is perhaps for this reason that Ticknor, for lack of space, contents himself with printing just a selection of the 14th century *Poema de Yuçuf* in his first edition of the *History*, and even less of it in subsequent reprints. Having acquired the poem from Gayangos, and filling

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10 By the third edition, after the poem had been reprinted in English once, printed in the Spanish and German translations of the *History*, and in effect, “saved from the chance of loss”, Ticknor relies on just stanzas to make his point (*History* III, 3rd ed. 451).
some twenty-three pages with its stanzas, he speaks of its parts as coherent, whole things that connect the listener directly with medieval Iberia:

There is little, as it seems to me, in the early narrative poetry of any modern nation better worth reading, than this old Morisco version of the story of Joseph. Parts of it overflow with the tenderest natural affection; other parts are deeply pathetic; and everywhere it bears the impress of the extraordinary state of manners and society that gave it birth. From several passages, it may be inferred that it was publically recited; and even now, as we read it, we fall unconsciously into a long-drawn chant, and seem to hear the voices of Arabian camel-drivers, or of Spanish muleteers, as the Oriental or the romantic tone happens to prevail. I am acquainted with nothing in the form of the old metrical romance that is more attractive—nothing that is so peculiar, original, and separate from every thing else of the same class (History III 458).

This account of the presence of the Andalusian people, voices, and animals that is produced as a result of the listener’s falling “unconsciously” into these images speaks to Ticknor’s conviction that Spanish books and poems, which Quatremère would call mere fragments, could indeed remain valuable and as though not reproduced, even as appendices or in his private library. As I turn to the next collector, Archer Huntington, the notion of the belief in the powers of objects and their “whole impact”, as well as the need to hide or temporarily suspend this belief, come to the forefront. The reason for this is Huntington’s intense life-long involvement in the institution that he founded, the Hispanic Society of America, a sort of involvement that Ticknor’s book buying and writing of his History in part precluded.

Archer Huntington and his “Spanish Museum”

Huntington was some twenty years too young to have known Ticknor. Like Ticknor, however, the act of collecting southern European objects, as well as those of Latin and Central America and North Africa, and bringing them overseas to the American people was not an act of displacement that removed their potential for moral and esthetic impact. Huntington’s public collection aimed to be a place of genuine reunion. Huntington called the HSA his Spanish Museum in the sense of a place in which students and scholars of literature, as well as the general public, could come together not only to see the “best of” the Hispanic world, but rather also to reach proximity with the most essential values, in Ticknor’s sense of value, of these places through their relics. In the words of the Cuban professor and intellectual José Arrom, writing in 1957 after Huntington’s death, South America and Spain were for Huntington “un solo orbe cultural, entrañablemente unido por los lazos del mismo idioma, las mismas costumbres, los mismos sentimientos. Así en su obra generosa no levantó fronteras; al contrario, por caminos unitarios buscó, halló, y dio a conocer algunos de los valores más altos y significativos del mundo hispánico” (11). Huntington refused to buy any of his Spanish books in Spain, as he considered such a practice tantamount to plundering another’s cultural heritage. In this vein, his project sought to reunite Spanish books that had been dispersed to other European countries under one New York roof (Beardsley 7).

Huntington was another believer in the power of individual things to make a thoroughly whole impact, even those that were technically fragments. In the 1953 volume containing the
collected works of his own poetry, much of it with Spanish themes, he includes lines of Spanish verse as epigraphs. Arrom cites an example in which Huntington misquotes slightly from José María Heredia’s “Oda al Niágara” as evidence that the Spanish verses were so significant and present to Huntington that he produced them from memory:

Al hojear los poemas que reunió en el libro *Collected Verse* (New York, 1953), se nota que suele citar, a manera de epígrafe, pequeños trozos de poesía en lengua española…Ahora bien, como los versos del autor de la Oda al Niágara no comienzan así “Dadme mi lira” sino “Templad mi lira”, es prueba de que los citó de memoria, y los sentía tan suyos que no creyó necesario hacer la comprobación de la cita. Hasta ese punto nuestros bardos habían penetrado en la conciencia poética de Huntington… Con la voz del corazón, que es la voz del poeta, Huntington nos ha revelado su visión profunda de nuestros pueblos: estos pueblos hermanos, gestados por la mágica vara de un común idioma, son obra de amor, tierra de maravilla, continente de la esperanza. ¡Ciertamente nos honra expresar la admiración que sentimos por el poeta que así ha cantado a nuestra patria común: Hispanoamérica (14-15).

The affectionately imperfect poetic fragments act thus not only as talismans within Huntington’s collection of poetry, but rather come to refer by metonymy to the enormously ambitious project of the unification of Latin American and Spanish cultures. The key here is that the individual pieces of the museum as well as the poetic fragments, rather than signaling all that one does not have before him or her, namely all the other pieces of Hispanic culture of which one might be able to conceive, and perhaps especially those that one cannot, instead facilitate a direct link with that which is most essential and whole.

By the time Huntington was twenty-two, he had traveled to London, France, Mexico, Cuba, and Spain and had a personal library of Spanish books of two thousand volumes. Huntington had literally been fashioning his Museum since boyhood. The Museum was to include rare Hispanic books, paintings, tapestries, and other relics such as coins. He collected these items aggressively, describing his book quests as hunts, fishing expeditions and battles, and also as poetry. Writing in 1889, ten years before the HSA opened its doors to the public, Huntington reflects on the pieces that he aimed to put in his museum and frames the purpose of his greater project in poetic terms. It is worth quoting him at length.

My collecting has always had for it a background—you know—a museum. The museum which must touch widely on arts, crafts, letters. It must condense the soul of Spain into meanings, through works of the hand and spirit. It must not be a heaping of objects from here or there or anywhere until the whole looks like an art congress—half dead remnants of nations of an orgy. One outline of a race. And one gathering of faithful expositions and kindly, educated Trustees. And true research.

I am collecting with a purpose and you know that purpose quite well. That small compact Museum of Spanish culture will take all the time left me in this world. Others can then come and write beautiful books hot of the shelves—and still others may write books hot off these. I wish to know Spain as Spain and so express her—in a museum. It is about all I can do. If I can make a poem of a museum it will be easy to read.
As I have often said I venture to flatter myself that I am not a “collector,” rather an assembler of a given expression. To be sure this is not altogether unlike the book-maker, but I find these good scholars wonderfully equipped with spongy facts, but insight and discrimination that can be found first hand. One must almost be a Spaniard to understand him—almost! And if you do not understand him how can you feel the story of his culture, how know what to use and what to discard. You see my job is marked out and I have no choice but to continue.

There is one thing of which I am certain, that the study of the book—Spain or any book-country—is too often saving fat and letting the meat go. If I ever have a museum, the staff shall know works and refranes and shall have met native creatures near to men—from mule to bed-bug. They shall pursue a word and its feathery meanings as an Englishman seeks the brush of a fox; they must block the burrows of escape and ride off with the trophy. Then they may write about their Spain. I think women should do it (1898, cited in Codding).¹¹

Recalling Quatremère’s characterization of the museum as a soulless timeline that instead of enlivening the culture in question, admits that it is, in fact, totally dead, Huntington sought to assemble a living, unified, and perfectly working organism from which “true” research could develop. As Ticknor wrote of the identification and presentation to the library patrons of the “peculiar spirit” of Spain, Huntington thought that a Museum could do just this. It is not so much that the Museum is “like a poem” made of fragments that he collects abroad, but rather a center filled with things that express directly what he “feels” is most genuine about the country, nothing short of its soul. Perhaps this is why he says that the stereotypically more sensitive sex should work in his museum and write about Spain only after having met even the country’s most significant insects. Women presumably would understand how to find the trophies in its relics, the essential and indeed eternal parts of Spain, and could write about them and display them to the public as though they were not parts at all. An object’s original context was something that never left the objects that he selected and that could be felt in the modern-age, provided that the relic sat among other relics that communicated the “soul” of the culture. Huntington’s sense of value in the metaphysical sense, as a means to speak of the success with which a Hispanic object underlined his greater project, seems in these writings wholly consistent with Ticknor’s.

Not all museums were capable of such magic, however, and it is possible that even “The Museum” lost some of its shine in Huntington’s eyes as he aged and the place passed from being a youthful dream into an institution. There is a telling passage in Huntington’s diaries in which he contrasts at 19 the richness of practical archaeology—actual excavations—with looking at Spanish coins in a museum. He laments that the latter “aided me but little, because the past is not rightly rebuilt around a fragment in a glass case. There must be more: the hills, the river, the ocean, if they are part of the picture, and best of all the people who are descended from those of the lost years” (cited in Gilman Proske 7). By the 1920s, Huntington appears to have approached his administrative duties at the Society with less energy, longing for this type of hands-on archaeology and creative work. Most specifically, he expresses nostalgia for the days in which he

¹¹Huntington’s diaries held at the Huntington Archives at the Hispanic Society are not published, so I cite from Codding’s (executive director of the HSA) essay that features lengthy passages of Huntington’s letters. For future redactions of this paper, a visit to the archive will be essential. See also Codding’s contribution in the Hispanic Society Tesoros volume, a beautiful book to be sure.
worked on the *Poema de Mio Cid*, the production of a facsimile of the *PMC* and of some thirty-nine other great books in the heyday of the assembly of the Museum. In a letter to his mother he writes:

When I first made the collections, you will remember that the whole field of Hispanics lay before me, and my dream was its classification and presentation by myself, but dreams are dreams, and the administration has taken its toll of my time...In the days when I worked on *The Cid*, I was free, and comparatively poor, and the ten years I spent on that laborious job, with Arabic and other languages as a side issue, were filled with a glorious sense of accomplishment. The building of museums, with all their infinite detail, does not stir the same emotion...However, I do not think you will be ashamed of your infant’s ventures into museum building, for, after all, creative work is a gamble, and I may have set my value of my ability on a pedestal (1920, cited in Coddington 166).

Since there is no putting the river, the ocean, and live people in a museum, even the most amazing un-Museum (“museum” in the negative Quatremèrond sense) ever conceived has the potential to become primarily a project of administration. Recalling Huntington’s citation of poetic fragments and the certainty that kept him from bothering to look them up, Huntington admits to his mother that there is something unspiritual and overly conscious about running a museum. His observations invoke a conception of value that is not nearly as simple and indeed “free” as the remarks of his youth seemed to imply. Even some fifteen years before this letter to his mother and in the height of his excited book quarrying, Huntington wrote of money as an absolutely necessary, even if distasteful thing: “As to money, it is the fashion to treat it with a certain contempt by those whose existence often depends on it. Money has given us chiefly our colleges, museums, and hospitals” (1894, cited in Coddington 194).

Huntington thus assesses the interaction between public obligations and private collecting that was also an issue for Ticknor in defending his plan for the design and content of the Boston Public Library. For Huntington, however, who worked for many years in the institution that he had envisioned, rather than primarily acting as a buying agent and Board of Trustee as Ticknor had for the Library, the contrast between these public and private spheres was likely even more apparent. For Huntington, the exchange value of the objects he collected, from coins to manuscripts to paintings, some of them hugely expensive, seems to have re-emerged as he began to shift roles from assembler of what he had called “a given expression” to an administrator of an institution and its collection. Alternatively, while Ticknor must have thought of his books as commodities when he or his *carte blanche* friends purchased them, the books’ exchange values fade into the background in his writings in favor of valuing the books for what they could tell him and others about the peculiar character of Spain.

This complex of sentiments, costs, and personal and public responsibility, which ultimately involves a sort of self delusion, is elucidated by Bourdieu’s writing on the dynamics of the market of “symbolic goods,” goods whose primary economic value is derived from their cultural value. In speaking of the freedom of expression of modern writers and plastic artists, Bourdieu begins by suggesting that the absence of pre-modern regulating bodies, such as patrons and the Church, logically has lead to an increase of artists’ abilities to create whatever they please (4). The artists nevertheless know that this freedom is only formal, in the sense that it “constitutes no more than the condition of their submission to the laws of the market of symbolic
goods, that is, to a form of demand which necessarily lags behind the supply of the commodity (i.e. the work of art). They are reminded of this demand through sales figures and other forms of pressure, explicit or diffuse, exercised by publishers, theatre managers, art dealers” (4). Bourdieu establishes that the exclusivity of art does not reside in the fact that it is actually an autonomous product unrestrained by the demands of consumers, but rather that it is constrained both from within and without, with the latter being the outcome of the way in which the image of the artist and his very art is sustained by other artists:

It follows that those ‘inventions’ of Romanticism—the representation of culture as a kind of superior reality, irreducible to the vulgar demands of economics, and the ideology of free, disinterested ‘creation’ founded on the spontaneity of innate inspiration—appear to be just so many reactions to the pressures of an anonymous market. […]

Few people depend as much as artists and intellectuals do for their self-image upon the image others, and particularly other writers and artists, have of them. “There are”, writes Jean-Paul Sartre, “qualities that we acquire only through the judgments of others.” This is especially so for the quality of a writer, artist or scientist, which is so difficult to define because it exists only in, and through, co-optative reciprocal recognition among peers (4, 6).

On the market, even one that moves more slowly like the art market, no commodity is actually naturally set apart. Art loses doubly in the sense that not only does it not succeed in escaping commodification, but rather also has its “superior reality” deemed a consequence of the very process (commodification) to which the artist had presupposed it exempt. At the same time, however, the reputation of the artist or intellectual has its own private and oddly provincial economy that sustains itself, as a firestorm does. In this regard, artists create their own “exceptionality”, but are not actually exceptional, in the sense that they are not entirely exempt from the demands of consumers.

A sort of pretending or suspension of belief thus must occur in order for the artist to sustain a version of the Romantic belief that his art is something that does not participate in the market as common things do. The artist or intellectual must distance himself from the selling part of things.

Such a sort of necessary partial detachment appears elsewhere in Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic exchange, namely in his theory of gift-giving. For Bourdieu, gift-giving entails a bipartite movement. When a person gives a gift, she initiates a relationship of symbolic exchange. She also, however, asks the other person to deny that the gift was initially given out of self-interest, since the element of self-interest is something that clearly belongs to the domain of economic exchange. Like art objects in the Romantic sense, a “gift” given in reciprocation of someone else’s gift should be unique and its exchange value should not be able to be detected. In order for the system of gift giving to work and to constitute actual gift-giving, there must be “collective expectations” and trust, or the denial of competition and self-interest between the two parties (192). Like the giver or the recipient of the gift, the collector who wishes to maintain the vision of his collecting habit as one with metaphysical, rather than practical goals, or even the museum builder who wishes to preserve his dream such as to orchestrate an “expression”, rather than to operate an institution, must hold the technical spheres at arm’s length.

This quandary of the need to devote attention to institutional detail while affirming the spiritual impact of the art held within speaks to just how much has been asked of Huntington’s
Museum by both its administrators and patrons, in Huntington’s day and in the 21st century. The production of the facsimile editions of which Huntington spoke so fondly as his creative work continued in the 20th century in the form of the Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies (HSMS) editions. The HSMS began at Madison and came to have its home at the HSA when one of its founders, Lloyd Kasten, retired. Students of Antonio García Solalinde, Kasten and John Nitti, and with the help of many of their graduate students who came to be front runners in their own right in the use of computer technology to facilitate work in the humanities, sought to provide access “to the masses of transcriptions and data that were being produced as a result of their ongoing Dictionary of the Old Spanish Language (DOSL) project.”12 Among both paper and/or electronic editions of the Celestina, the Libro de buen amor, texts by Maimonides and Yehuda Halevi, and 16th century medical treatises, the Society published two enormously useful CD-ROMS of electronic texts and correspondences in 1997 and 1999, the first being transcriptions of Alfonso X’s prose, the second some 200 other fundamental works of medieval Iberian prose. These CDs, which Jerry Craddock believes to represent all or nearly all of the transcriptions that were once published as microfiches by the HSMS at Madison, Wisconsin, would perhaps be yet more useful if scholars could submit corrections and make notes to the transcriptions online, and better yet, if the documents themselves were made available on the Web for a small fee (Craddock 3).13

Huntington spoke of this philological activity in the same terms as his beloved collecting. It is nevertheless difficult to gage if Huntington would have thought his collection of Spanish things, those actually in his Museum, sufficiently utilized by the public in his day and in the present. In 1904, the Society described its objectives in a pamphlet in a way entirely consistent with Huntington’s dream for the Museum: “A free public library, museum, and educational institution” such as to “advance the study of the Spanish and Portuguese languages, literature, and history, and advancement of the study of the countries wherein Spanish and Portuguese languages are spoken or have been spoken”, and “to promote the public welfare by actively advancing learning, and providing means for encouraging and carrying on the before-mentioned work within the State of New York.” With regards to the Research Library, the stated aim was “to extend to students and others the advantages furnished by original documents and examples of Hispanic arts and crafts; and further, to create a center for the dissemination of information regarding Spain, Portugal, and Latin America. The field of the Society is therefore quite unlike that of general museums or libraries, and is of a very special nature” (Hispanic Society 4-5). According to the constitution, then, each of the objects in the Hispanic Society is a Museum piece that is to participate in the collective project of illuminating the Hispanic world through study of its indigenous objects. Each object is thus decidedly educational and perhaps even useful in the Quatamérian sense provided that the items are sufficiently used and that their cultural and affective impact reaches the public. Such a proposal bears close similarity with the

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13 Admyte is available online, but only for a substantial fee. http://www.admyte.com/intro.htm. None of the libraries at UC Berkeley, Columbia, or Harvard has a subscription.
way in which Charles Faulhaber recalls his days as a graduate student working at the HSMS when it was still at Madison. In an homage volume for Kasten, Faulhaber writes of an arduous paleography assignment involving the production of a semi-paleographic text and apparatus, stemmatic analysis, and full introduction:

No one ever got the paper in by the due date, despite the fact that we spent a lot of time in the storefront on West Johnson Street. And the wonderful thing was that that storefront, the Seminary, had all of the tools one needed to do one’s work, the combined libraries of Mr. Kasten and J. Homer Herriott…all of the basic dictionaries, and, of course, the Alfonsoine word list in the card files.

What Mr. Kasten provided to his students, in addition to a congenial home, was a blueprint for a scholarly edition and a set of tools and methodologies for putting it together. Once one finished that course, one was qualified, in theory and practice, to prepare a scholarly text (101).

As Huntington had recognized and echoed in Faulhaber’s words, there is no parallel for work done in the community of scholars with common interests, or in Ticknor’s framework, with the appropriate “appetite” for the material, all working with the same tools in a common space to produce high quality research. Recalling Bourdieu’s assessment of the internal dynamic of a community of artists, the active use of the materials is dependent on the internal dynamic of the users and what they deem interesting research subjects, as well as a mutual assessment of the institution as a place in which good research is produced. Catering to the demands of a more general public, or more accurately, inciting a demand for the material in a wider public was also, however, a fundamental goal for both Ticknor and Huntington.

This interest of scholars and others and the activity of that interest, i.e. people visiting and being in the presence of the collections, are nothing short of the production of the use value of the things contained therein. Today with so many other ways to engage with medieval cultural objects, including paper and digital facsimiles and digital galleries, some of which Madison was successfully doing in the 1970s, the use value of the actual objects is threatened. If scholars can successfully use some of things contained in the Museum by way of reproduction, as Benjamin lamented in the 1930s, why visit the Institution itself? Further, if the general public can go to a more “general museum”, to quote the HSA’s own constitution, in which they could see some Spanish and Latin American art, but also other art at the same time, why go to the Hispanic Society? Part of this why, in the case that it exists for more than a few dedicated hispanobibliophiles, consists of the parts of Ticknor’s and Huntington’s conceptions of value that are metaphysical, the unquantifiable aura of the things that contains the most essential values of the places in which the pieces originated. A good part of the rest, however, depends on the symbolic value attributed to the holding institution, including to its founder.

Today the Boston Public Library is struggling like any other arts institution, from museums to the metropolitan ballet, opera, and symphony, with library worker jobs lost, the recent closure of four branches, and the addition of members to the Board of Trustees and giving the Board for the first time the power to fundraise (July 2010). In 2009, the Boston Globe wrote of the Library’s plan to sell or give away several items of their private collection that required expensive restoration, including a rare 19th century piano, a series of large-scale Audubon prints, and a collection of glass printing plates that were once used to make postcards. The Library
defended these decisions as a normal process for any collection in ridding items that do not properly fit with others, yet raised eye-brows with liquidations in nearby institutions, including Brandeis University’s closure of its Rose Art Museum and decision to sell the collection as a result of a much depleted University endowment, as well sales of expensive items at the National Academy Museum in New York and the Carnegie Museum to cover operating costs. The Boston Public Library is nevertheless still one of the largest public libraries in the United States with some 900,000 patrons and the Ticknor collection, which has doubled in size to 9000 volumes since his initial bequest in 1871, is still recognized as a fundamental, though underused, part of Library’s rare collections, and indeed still the most voluminous one. Ticknor paraphernalia, including first editions of his *Life of Daniel Webster*, *Life of William Hickling Prescott*, his *Life and Letters*, and the *History* sell for several hundred dollars to a couple thousand in book markets. Ticknor’s signature and letters can be purchased on eBay among other Americana, introduced by brief biographies outlining Ticknor’s trajectory from Harvard professor, book collector, library founder, to writer of the *History*. While the central Library might receive less money today than in the past decades, no one would doubt its absolute need to exist, not only, however, to meet Ticknor’s goal of inspiring readerly hunger in its patrons, but rather to provide free Internet access and DVD rentals to its patrons and an air-conditioned space in which to keep cool in the summer.

The Hispanic Society has fared less well in local press and was recently written up in the *New York Times* as a sort of lovely mausoleum and in less prominent media as having been turned into a social club for a few rich gentleman. Author of the Streetscapes column in the *Times* Christopher Gray is clearly in awe of the esthetic as well as the larger idea of the Museum, most exactly with the way in which Huntington foresaw Audubon Terrace as a veritable campus of great cultural institutions. Elements of Quatremère’s concerns of the museum as a chronological tomb set on a piece of prime real estate are nevertheless communicated in Gray’s consciously witty metaphors:

Today the great central courtyard is barren and empty, but peaceful, like a country town that just rolled up the rug. The Hispanic Society of America still crowns one side, and in May reinstalled a spectacular series of murals that should draw quite a few visitors; or, more likely, wonderfully few…The murals are remarkable and amusing: luminous dancers, market sellers, paraders, penitents, cowboys, shepherders, all with the barest of accompanying text — this is naked, unmediated art. Startlingly, at least one person in each panel stares from the painting into your eyes — the dancer in Aragon or the woman carrying bread at the festival might answer a cellphone call in the next second…Indeed, the Hispanic Society is far out of step. Neither its Web site nor its telephone menu has options in Spanish. The society is oriented to connoisseurship, not attendance; during my hourlong visit last week, six employees were on duty, talkative and knowledgeable, but I was the only visitor. In the hall of the Sorollas there is not even a bench, and the air-conditioning is outmatched by a New York summer. This place is not going to be mounting exhibitions of motorcycles or fashion designers anytime soon (“Uptown Outpost”).

The relatively un-staged appearance of the art in the HSA, the art left for its expert visitors to give it context, as well as the dark, earthy colors of the walls and floor make the experience
“unmuseumlike.” The murals are strangely able to have a current impact, despite the discord between what the Museum houses and actual New York Hispanic cultures. In all, he describes the place as real wonder, for its amazingly low attendance and for its survival in the present day on that piece of land, hence the story’s appearance in the Real Estate section of the paper.

With only five trustees, the HSA nevertheless has no debt, something that Huntington himself stipulated in the Constitution. In the present day, however, a series of significant deaccessions of Arabic material has undoubtedly eased any struggle to maintain a balanced budget. In October of 2007, the Society sold two Qur’ans at Christie’s totaling more than $4 million, the first acquired by Huntington in 1897 from his Arabic tutor Albert J. León (Suleyman) of Beirut and held in his private library and bequeathed to his Society in his will. Huntington purchased the second himself in Cairo in 1904, the Qur’an dated and signed by Yahya bin Muhammad ibn ‘Umar. Both of these sales were bound by rules of the American Association of Museums, an organization that represents 3,000 institutions and stipulates that proceeds from sales uniquely be used for “acquisition or direct care” of collections, not for operating expenses. As with the Boston deaccessions, the Qur’ans were justified by suggesting that the books did not fit explicitly within the Society’s overall commitment to Hispanic letters. The second Qur’an mentioned here was sold for the highest priced ever recorded for any Qur’an.

Approximately a year after the sale of the Qur’ans, the HSA sold a lot of 420 of Huntington’s Islamic and Arabic books for $47,500. In the record of the sale, Christie’s quotes a passage of Huntington’s diaries that mentions his tutor and ends with words that express the role of Arabic in Huntington’s vision of Hispanic Studies. The citation functions presumably to document Huntington’s interest in Arabic and to give the items up for sale a compelling context:

Arabic came to be the chief interest and the long hours I spent upon it well repaid me later. From Professor Haupt of Baltimore I got the assistance of Albert J. Leon (Suleyman) and day and night, early and late, we worked. I was driven by the approach of the hour when I would get to Spain and must have every edge ground as fine as possible. It was a feverish year, and later when I continued work on Arabic alone and went to Egypt it was all to the good. I did not study Arabic with any desire to use it as a major help in the future but for a better understanding of Spanish and the Spaniard one has to have it. And many doors it opened and how much time it saved me (1891; partially cited in Coddin 150).

Even if “not a major help in the future” Arabic was a key scholarly tool for Huntington, useful in his book collecting, scholarship, and general goal to get as close to the Spanish as humanly and also spiritually possible. Further, these books, and many others sold, were Huntington’s “finds” and purchased or sold with a purpose in mind. In this vein, in a note in his diaries from Albert Leon regarding the lesser-priced Qur’an mentioned above, Leon notes that he wanted the Qur’an returned to him rather than sold if Huntington was unhappy with it, or decided he no longer wanted it.14

At present, there is a controversy over the sale of some 38,000 rare coins minted in Spain, some of Roman, Visigoth, and Arab heritage worth approximately $35 million that Huntington had leant to the American Numismatic Society on a permanent loan. All of these recent sales

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14 The note reads: “In case you do not care much for the Kôran I sold you I shall be very glad to buy it back from you. I would never have parted with it were it not for the purpose I explained to you” (1897).
have been decried in several coin and other art publications as a violation of Huntington’s mission for the HSA have blamed in part on the controversial airline and “vulture” investor Frank Lorenzo’s involvement in the HSA board of trustees. Lorenzo was a player in the HSA lawsuit to regain control of the coins in order to put them on the market.

Even without Lorenzo’s impact on the HSA, described as universally negative in collector media, the sale of Huntington’s Arabic material and especially the Qur’ans makes perfect sense in economic terms. Like the some forty-eight extant Guttenberg Bibles, as well as illuminated medieval manuscript Bibles and Haggadah, old religious books, especially those with signatures, dates, illuminations, and gold like the present cases, are guaranteed money-makers. Reproductions of leaves from religious books are sold and some of these volumes have become the subjects of hugely popular traveling exhibitions, as well as written into popular fiction and mainstream media. Apart from obvious significance to believers, as well as critics of the religions with which they are affiliated, the books carry a powerful symbolic meaning in the realm of international relations, especially since 9-11.

Even in Huntington’s day, however, the Museum and its books were perceived as potential unifiers of cultures. In Huntington’s homage volume, José A. Mora depicts him as a transcendental force with the power to mend international discord through the discovery of the metaphysical driving forces of other places:

Vivimos hoy en un mundo materialista en el que voces siniestras predicen el odio y la oposición entre los pueblos. Se intenta implantar, como estilo natural de vida, la rivalidad entre las culturas, estableciendo barreras y cortinas de hierro, para evitar justamente que se conozcan los bienes morales que poseen otras naciones, como si se temiese que la pura belleza de las creaciones ajenas pudiera surgir una corriente de buena voluntad. Frente a las fuerzas de la discordia y de la disolución necesitamos, por eso, hombres que como Huntington, contribuyen al acercamiento y a la comprensión internacionales por la vía de amor y de la inteligencia; hombres universales que sientan no sólo admiración, sino también respeto por todas las creaciones del espíritu humano cualquiera que sea la época, el país o la sociedad que las hubiere producido (8).

This same belief, and it is indeed belief, in the power of “pura belleza” as a means to initiate cultural understanding and possibly even secure it has fueled exhibits aimed at cultural sensitivity in the US since the 1960s. The late J. Carter Brown’s two famous exhibitions in the 1990s, “Circa 1492” and “Rings, Five Passions in World Art”– both which elicited critique from Hommi Bhabha that echoes some points of Quatremère’s museum critique–aimed to establish proximity between cultures by way of “affective transmissions from across great gulfs of space and time” (Brown 19 cited in McCellan 48). A year after 9-11, the Met showcased a selection of works of what it called “every culture in every time in history” such as to convey “humankind’s indomitable spirit” and the “universal emotions of despair and hope, mourning and recovery, loss and renewal” (see McCellan 49). The same museum today seems more passive in their approach to create global awareness, as the New York Post reported in January that the Met pulled images of the Prophet Muhammad from its Islamic collection for fear of offending Muslims (“‘Jihad’ Jitters”).

15 The selection of examples in this paragraph owes much to McCellan’s study “Art Museums and Commonality: A History of High Ideals”, 48-50.
Abroad, at the very museum that solicited Quatremère’s critique, the Saudi Prince Walid bin Talal donated $20 million for the construction of a wing for its collection of Islamic Art in 2005, the museum’s largest single gift to date. Prince Walid said that the wing would “assist in the understanding of the true meaning of Islam, a religion of humanity, forgiveness and acceptance of other cultures” (“Louvre Gets $20 million” also in McCellan 49). In response to the gift, Donnedieu de Vabres, the French Culture Minister said that the Louvre was an intentional “instrument for the dialogue of cultures and the preservation of their diversities.” The same claims of both national pride and universal benefit of cultural artifacts can be found in 21st century discoveries of Morisco manuscripts in Spain, namely those found in Hornachos, Extremadura in 2003 and nine volumes of an alfaqūī found in a home in Cútar in Málaga. In both cases, information regarding projects of restoration and transcription of the material was bookended with claims of the positive impact of the discoveries on both Spaniards and “toda la humanidad” and one Qur’an in particular, the “Corán de Cútar”, a book of “incalculable valor histórico y patrimonial” was notably given to the Library of Morocco as a symbol of the “pertenencia mutua” and “compromiso común” between Andalucía and Morocco (“Presentando Hornachos”; “La Biblioteca de Marruecos”). In mid-June, 2010, the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid launched a three-month exhibit commemorating the fourth centennial of Philip IV’s expulsion of the Moriscos, exhibiting for the first time a group of more than a hundred Morisco manuscripts. In the words of Juan Carlos Villaverde, professor of Arabic at the University of Oviedo and one of the organizers of the exhibit, the exhibit illustrates, via books, the way in which the Islamic past forms part of Spanish identity: “El pasado islámico forma parte también de nuestra identidad. Lo más importante es que, en la exposición, podremos ver lo islámico y lo español entremezclados.” (“La literatura escondida en el adobe”).

These words of a Saudi Prince, the French culture minister, and Spanish journalists and scholars echo Mora’s conception of the power of relics and their advocates to produce nothing short of a unification of the present-day people of one place with the beliefs of those of another time or another time and place. “Belief” here is not at all casual, but rather characterizes quite literally the stated goal of the aforementioned projects to locate the “pure beauty”, “true meaning of Islam”, the “universal emotions”, and “mutual belonging” of a culture or thing in question. In the cases of Ticknor and Huntington the meaning of “value” with regards to cultural relics is analogous to the modern examples mentioned here. Value refers to both the exchange value of the thing in question and no less importantly to its ability to fulfill some metaphysical need to restore for the modern man the most genuine manifestation of Spain or another country possible, or, rather, a sense of commonality among humanity. The balance between these two conceptions of value is maintained in a relationship similar to the way in which Bourdieu describes the exchange of gifts and the practice of maintaining money at arms length such that the object can serve as a link to a metaphysical principle, like trust, hope, or cultural understanding. The reputations of the Library and HSA similarly lag behind any current mismanagement by a vulture investor, with their founders invoked at every newsworthy event in the present. Although on different scales, the Louvre and the Qur’an of Cútar are believed and even willed to do things that they could never actually do.

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16 This exhibit is the subject of the concluding essay of the dissertation.
Conclusions

Ticknor and Huntington’s efforts to collect Hispanic relics were at their most basic projects of recovery of spirit or beliefs. The subsequent display of objects, in turn, is an effort to constantly produce the closeness to which Benjamin refers in speaking of reproduction, reproduction being paradoxically motivated by the spiritual need to get “closer” to stuff, both spatially and hermeneutically. With regards to this want for closeness and in making conclusions about “value”, it is useful to recall Bevernage’s critique of presence in which he paradoxically recurs to Derridean spectrality to critique what he considers one of the possible downfalls of the presence paradigm, mysticism. Throughout this project, I have explored presence primarily in reference to the actual physical presence of real things, manuscript and other fragments, as Gumbrecht outlines at the start of Production of Presence (“User’s manual”). The presence explored here necessarily relied in its analysis of time and representation and in dealing with historical objects on Ankersmit and Runia’s conceptions. Bevernage’s critique refers most specifically to Runia’s conception of the “presence of the past”, but also references Domanska’s and somewhat Gumbrecht’s contributions to the debate on presence in the 2006 volume of History and Theory.

Drawing on Ed Jonker’s17 critique of presence, and speaking of the presence of the past Bevernage writes:

While I am very enthusiastic about the recent “presence”–debate as far as it opens a new way of thinking about history, I fear that “presence” could turn into an obscure metaphysical or even “mystical” category if it is not firmly embedded in a criticism of the notions of historical time and the “historical present” (151)

[…]

Sometimes the “presence” of the past is treated as the full presence that is the antonym of absence, thereby risking regression to the mythical reversibility of the time of jurisdiction. This can only lead to an obscure metaphysical or even mystical discourse, because a past that is fully “present in the present” can hardly be considered a past at all. This mysticism of the “presentists” has already been addressed in a (partly unfair, but still worrisome) criticism by the Dutch historian Ed Jonker, who complains about its antirational and antiscientific tendencies and about its “Hegel-feeling” (Hegel-gevoel) that makes him feel dizzy (165).

Bevernage’s insistence on the need to articulate with more specificity the way in which the presence of the past relates to full presence or absolute absence is a central question explored throughout this dissertation. Likewise, the present project sympathizes with Bevernage’s impetus to push presentists to define the role of metaphysics in their concept. Working with an old fragment or codex in the present involves in each case an attempt first to capture or “grab hold” of it. Here I have explored this “capturing” in terms of seeking to determine how fragments

17 This article is written in Dutch and I have thus not been able to consult it directly.
function as philological subjects (chapter 1), what time they communicate (2), what their content has been called upon to represent (3), and what their worth is in the present day (4).

The two pronged approach to value developed in this chapter consists of a Marxist-Quatremèrian notion of objets de prix or exchange value existing in a dialectical relationship with belief, “peculiar spirit”, truth, and “pura belleza”, something that indeed goes beyond a more conceivable and definable “use value” in the Marxist sense. The contrast between objets de prix and the definition of value as spirit is seen in both Ticknor and Huntington’s move to fulfill obligations to the public in the form of running their respective institutions, while at the same time, surrounding themselves with books and other relics and to engage in “creative work.” A more modern conception of this a priori spirit sort of “value” is Baudrillard’s notion, taken at its most general level, of the “ideological genesis of needs” that always precedes the products of labor that meet those needs. The key difference, however, is that in Baudrillard’s schema, as opposed to the way in which I have read Ticknor and Huntington, “needs” only exist because they are productive for the social and economic system, and are thus not really conceived as being separate from this system (82). It follows that for Baudrillard, if there is fetishism in the realm of commodities, it is a fetishism to perpetuate the economic system, and not fetishism for actual things (92). Further, in the complex socio-economic space of the art auction, for example, what looks like the fetish of the participant prior to the purchase is not even needs, but rather the spirit of competition, a wager, or another sort of value altogether, the aristocratic measure of value:

Behind the purchase (or individual reappropriation of use value) there always remains the moment of expenditure, which even in its banality presupposes something of a competition, a wager, a challenge, a sacrifice and thus a potential community of peers and an aristocratic measure of value. Let us not be mistaken: it is this, and not the satisfaction of needs, that occasionally turns consumption into a passion, a fascinating game, something other than functional economic behavior: it becomes the competitive field of the destruction of economic value for the sake of another type of value (113).

The wager in the art auction that disrupts “functional economic behavior” and value’s dialectic, as defined per Ticknor and Huntington’s diaries, collections, and institutions, underline a key point of Bevernage’s critique of presence, namely that presence risks descent into an unsystematic, metaphysical, and even mystical quagmire. In the realm of things, it turns out that Bevernage’s fear that presence turn out to be rather fuzzy and metaphysical are indeed founded. The reason for this, however, is not because presence is some mystical invention on the part of a group of woefully sentimental academics looking for Benjamin’s closeness or another way to refer to the real or hyper real, or, rather because presence is a discourse at all. The reason is because the presence of these objects, meaning the physical, psychological, and larger cultural impact of the physical objects in the present, is a compound product. These things have an economic value, as well as some sort of specific utility, in the Quatremèrian sense, and at the same time, are believed to posses some truth or spirit and the power to make complete a person, place, or time. This negotiation between raw economic reality and the supposed possession of numinous qualities literally causes the res to fall straight from the thing. In the art auction, the art object goes through a series of transmutations from economic exchange value or price, to symbolic value (the painting as a oeuvre), to arrive to be simply a sign of prestige.
As commodities or touchstones to a sweeping project of restitution, or even simply one of an individual, these things have long ceased simply being things of use, such as reference material, doorstops, and talismans. If personal and public restitution from things is to be sought under the guise of a “return to things”, it must be preceded by a discussion of what material culture actually is in the present. And this, indeed, is to make a wager, or to hedge some serious bets. The biggest wager is to risk realizing that material culture is not nearly as material, or, rather, as spiritual, as we thought it was.
Conclusion

Throughout this dissertation, I have referred to the notion of “fragments,” as well as physical manuscript fragments, as a means to conceptualize the ways in which pre-modern Iberia is reconstituted and used in the present day. The means of reconstitution studied ranged from philology to an examination of the word value in the context of collecting and displaying manuscripts, artworks, and artifacts. The primary conclusion of this dissertation is that pre-modern “fragments” are constantly being produced and reconstituted, while at the same time, are perceived as timeless, spiritual entities. I examined highly fragmentary manuscripts and brief poems that initiate national and even global debates, as these cultural objects are fundamental pieces of personal and social reconstitution.

This brief final essay will explore the implications of these conclusions in the context of an exhibit at the Biblioteca Nacional de España featuring aljamiado manuscripts—written in Spanish using Arabic script. I query the assumptions about the perceptions of time that inspired this project, namely the assimilation of the distant, medieval and early-modern past and the present. I also insert the findings of the dissertation within the ongoing work on contingency and time as a means to explore future possibilities for the dissertation.

In mid-June 2010, the Biblioteca Nacional launched a three-month-long exhibit—“Memoria de los Moriscos”—prompted by the passing of some four centuries since the 1609 decree by Philip III and the Duke of Lerma ordering the expulsion from Spain of any remaining people of Muslim heritage. The exhibit displayed some 100 aljamiado manuscripts in glass cases or as digital images. The majority of these manuscripts were found in the walls of the homes of fleeing Moriscos, people of Muslim heritage who were baptized and remained in Spain after the Reconquest. Some of the manuscripts were preserved from mold and decay with paper, parchment, cloth amulets, pelage, or salt.

The exhibit organizers describe the exhibit as a series of “firsts”—the largest showing ever of Morisco manuscripts (about half of those known to be extant) and the first time that the general public has seen so many, or perhaps any. The elaborate exhibit catalog involved the international collaboration of some 40 scholars who contributed brief commentaries or longer studies on these manuscripts and relevant issues in the field of aljamiado studies. The 300-page catalog includes a bibliography of the exhibited manuscripts, an anthology of some of exhibited books, and a glossary. The catalog is complete with letters of introduction from key cultural institutions and their officials, including the minister of culture, the president of the Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, the directors of Biblioteca Nacional de Spain, and the curator of the exhibition. It includes a detailed table of the names of contributors and their official contributions, studies and comments by experts, and high-quality digital images of the artifacts. The catalog is thus a beautiful work of art and a fantastic research tool, portraying each of the major pieces of this dissertation; philology; and the creation of personal, national, and global presences by means of pre-modern materials and their peculiar relation between the past and present, and, indeed, the affinity between the two.

The exhibit and catalog promise to recover many things. The exhibit portrays Morisco literature and other writings, as well as their physical books as means to illuminate and “recuperate” Spain’s Islamic past just as effectively as medieval Andalusian material has (9). Like Ticknor and Huntington’s social service projects at the Boston Public Library and the Hispanic Society to create interest in Hispanic culture and reading in general, the “Memoria de
los Moriscos” exhibit purports to provide a unique service to the general public by bringing what is usually uniquely “scholarly material” to the public. Reminiscent of the French culture minister’s confidence in the ability of the Islamic Wing at the Louvre to do great things for both France and the international community, the Morisco exhibit in Madrid establishes the Moriscos as people with whom we can initiate transnational communication. The Moriscos are also enlisted to promote what the exhibit organizers consider an essential element of Spain’s cultural heritage:

Para el Ministerio de Cultura es una gran satisfacción mostrar el resultado de un proyecto como éste, que ha contado en su desarrollo con la participación de decenas de investigadores internacionales, y que se enmarca en nuestro propósito sostenido de poner a disposición de todos los ciudadanos las riquezas bibliográficas de la Biblioteca Nacional y las corrientes sumergidas de nuestro pasado común. (9).

Furthermore, the exhibit attempts to access the Moriscos themselves in what Soledad López, president of the Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, calls their first-person accounts:

Hasta ahora, el público general no había podido acercarse a la literatura aljamiada, que narra en primera persona la cultura islámica de sus autores y cómo la creciente hostilidad hacia lo morisco y la expulsión final afectaron a sus vidas… Esos documentos, verdaderos tesoros, han ido aflorando con el paso del tiempo, pero la dificultad de su lectura ha propiciado hasta ahora su desconocimiento entre un público no especializado (11).

The notion of first-hand accounts also has relevance in the context of present-day users of the Morisco books. As a Preface to the notes on the transcription into the anthology included in the exhibit catalog, José Jiménez Lozano suggests that aljamiado can be contextualized by the language he has heard in his own lifetime, but which gradually has been eroded by changes:

La lectura de estos textos aljamiados, dejando de lado las soberanas o delicadas imágenes poéticas que se dan en muchos de ellos, ha levantado en mis adentros, una vez más, un habla que yo he oído en mi infancia y adolescencia, y que ha venido desapareciendo, porque ha sido desplazada tanto por la formalización de la lengua que necesariamente llevan consigo tanto el estudio y su construcción conforme a reglas por lo menos desde finales del siglo XV, como por los imperios y desteñimientos que sobre el castellano se han privilegiado a sí mismos como lenguajes aceptables: desde la latinización del español que da lugar a los culturalismos desde el siglo XVI, al francés en el XVIII o al inglés de los Estados Unidos de hoy y sus fonéticas mostrencas entre nosotros, e incluso el triste lenguaje ideologizador que se llama “políticamente correcto” está igualmente tratando ese habla (249).

The language of aljamiado and the exhibit’s objects are key players in an effort to recover an Islamic past and to affirm that it, indeed, had a vigorous existence. This phenomenon of the disappearance of the past generates an urgency to study aljamiado manuscripts and suggests several culprits, or reasons, why the past slipped away. In Lozano’s words, to blame are foreign
influences, grotesque phonologies, and “politically correct” language created to avoid words that are generally considered offensive. The passage of time is also to blame and is cast as a foreigner. The distant past, however, the historical time of the Moriscos, is posited as a sort of last and golden frontier of opportunity and, most importantly, as a new origin by which to create narratives about pre-modern and modern Spaniards.

Aljamiado works are thus “genuinely” Spanish, but apparently are not, a condition that makes them an ideal research subject. They are more easily seen as more urgent material than other early-modern texts because their decipherment began in the 19th century with Gayangos and his contemporaries and it continues to unfold as new testimonies are discovered in the 21st century. The proposed public benefit of the exhibit makes good sense because Morisco materials had previously been neglected by the Spanish media that is accessible to general readers. The Moriscos are an appropriate subject precisely because al-Andalus had previously received most of the credit for having contributed to the Islamic elements in Spain’s medieval and early-modern persona. The contents of aljamiado literature pose challenging transcription and interpretation problems even for specialists. The name “aljamiado literature” is in itself problematic, as many of the extant aljamiado texts are not properly literary (“Literatura aljamiada,” 48-50). For philologists and readers familiar with the early-modern period, the exhibit and catalog create a story of intrigue and a problem to be resolved.

This cycle puts the distant past and the present on the same plane by locating a hope for the present, particularly a “Global Spanishness,” in a past that that could only be understood in the present day due to material and hermeneutic constraints. In the descriptions that accompany the facsimiles in the catalog, the philological and contextual obstacles are clearly identified. Instead of stumbling blocks to research, an identification of concrete problems suggests that the aljamiado manuscript problem is one capable of being understood according to existing categories and tools.

In this vein, an entry in a glossed copy of the Minhaj al-‘Abidin (Methodology for the Worshippers), a work of the mystic of Sunni Islam, philosopher and jurist Al-Gazālī (1055–1111), describes this manuscript as having much to offer. While brief and hardly studied, this Biblioteca Nacional manuscript (BNM Mss./5131) is presented as serving a variety of functions for present-day researchers. The glosses provide evidence of Mudéjar (Muslims remaining in Christian territory after the Reconquest) and Morisco interest in Sufi notions, asceticism, and Al-Gazālī himself. These short explanatory glosses also offer the capability of better understanding Al-Gazālī’s works that exist in partially completed or highly fragmentary manuscripts, or that have not been translated. Juan Carlos Villaverde considers the glosses brief texts from which to build definitions of technical and dogmatic Sunni mystical vocabulary. (142) Similarly, but speaking of a more complete book, the sole extant complete Qur’an translated into Spanish from the Mudéjar and Morisco periods gives credence and literally “faith,” as López-Morillas describes it, to the continued devotion of Qur’anic translators in the face of the persecution inflicted by the Inquisition and lack of facility with the Arabic language. (142)

Contingency

This use of past materials to argue for present-day purposes, both general and specific, could be explained as a correlation of the distant past and present. If it is indeed the case that the future has begun to look rather bleak, in terms of possibilities for employment, the opportunity to
enjoy a restful retirement, better or even low-cost health care, and broader access to the arts, then hope must be located in a place other than the future. If the boot-strap mentality only looks true in looking backwards to times past, then those pasts, namely the distant past, is one place to name as an effective “new future.” The distant past thus enters into a correlation with the present by way of its taking on the guise of the future that one used to be able to imagine in the present.

Quentin Meillassoux explores ontology via a critique of both Cartesian metaphysics and the correlate that “being” must be thought before it can be.\(^1\) He concludes that the only fundamental truth that one actually needs is “absolute” contingency. He identifies the respective assumptions of the metaphysician and the “correlationist” through an analysis of how each conceives, explicitly or implicitly, of ancestral phenomena, or those things or events dated to have preceded the emergence of thought. While the correlationist, most specifically Kant, sins by mediating all knowledge of the world through a thinking subject, Descartes relies on his faith in God as evidence enough that there are places and entities other than those that we can observe. Meillassoux shows how the correlationist, for all his dependence on empirical evidence and insistence on the primacy of man, will always clandestinely presuppose a time and apply some characteristics to a time in which there was nobody alive to report anything at all.

Meillassoux’s resolution to the correlation and metaphysics is to absolutize only the contingency of things. He postulates a contingency of things by which both things we cannot possibly know about directly, like ancestral phenomena, and things we have observed directly exist all at once. This absolutizing of contingency, which he calls “facticity,” is the only absolute we need.

It is by examining what, exactly, is needed within the realm of medieval manuscripts that I would like to conclude. The term “material culture” entails an implicit opposition of material culture to non-material culture. The preceding case studies demonstrate that pre-modern fragments in the modern day are employed in various projects of reconstitution, from philology to collecting, and reside between belief, or metaphysics, and a sort of manufacturing that results from an attempt both to historicize them and to locate their current-day relevance. A higher order issue not explicitly explored in the preceding pages is that this dialectic is a product of a willful, covert, or perhaps even a genuine unawareness of ignorance of the contingency of so-called “material” things. Not knowing necessarily about where medieval things came from, who produced them, what their circulation was like, and how they compared with other testimonies are in part what drives a looking back. One can sense their incompleteness, whether or not they are actually fragmentary. In order to solve these lacks, at some point, both the philologist and the most metaphysically driven user must bracket, as in any scholarly exercise, all the wholes that he or she will not be able to convincingly resolve for himself, herself, or others.

In future redactions of this project, I will write what I have called the “presence dialectic” and the opposition of material, as opposed to immaterial culture into the debate in continental philosophy regarding empiricism and, alternatively, transcendence. Is it possible to be more precise about how pre-modern objects, even those not fragmentary, are contingent? At what point or points do different users of pre-modern objects discover the objects’ contingency? Who, specifically, tries to ignore this contingency and how? Who would ultimately insist upon it? Finally, how does the pre-modern object take the possibility that was once part of our modern conception of future and locate it in the past? These are just some of the questions I hope to examine in a book that does not rely simply on the metaphor of fragment sand reconstitution to

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\(^1\) After Finitude, the English translation of Après la finitude (2006).
depict the intangibility of the medieval and early modern object in the present, whether that intangibility results from either belief or production. Rather, I hope to examine its insecurity in function with the movements of users making their way today with a pre-modern map.
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