Danger and Data Collection in American Policing

By

Brittany Bilderback Arsiniega

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Jurisprudence and Social Policy

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Calvin Morrill, Chair
Professor Jonathan Simon
Professor Bryan Wagner

Summer 2019
Abstract

Danger and Data Collection in American Policing

by

Brittany Bilderback Arsiniega

Doctor of Philosophy in Jurisprudence and Social Policy

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Calvin Morrill, Chair

Empirical evidence is critical for democratic policing. Data are paramount for the effective governance of the police. This has become especially clear as police officer-involved homicides have gained national attention in the last half-decade. In the wake of the killing of Michael Brown in 2014, scholars and activists quickly identified and decried the lack of reliable national data on police use of force. Media outlets like The Washington Post intervened, establishing a dataset on all civilians shot and killed by police that has created, for the first time ever, close-to-accurate data on the lethal dangers to civilians from encounters with the police.

Yet danger in policing is not just present for civilians that the police encounter. Officers themselves are in danger while carrying out their duties. While many other jobs are statistically more dangerous than policing, including commercial fishing, logging, and roofing, policing is unique in the potential for intentional assault by civilians that officers sometimes face while performing their jobs. Because of this, in the public imagination and in the views of officers themselves, being a police officer is one of the most dangerous jobs in the United States. Many researchers have shown that a preoccupation with danger is a central – if not the central – element of police occupational culture.

As officers carry out their various duties as law enforcers, maintainers of order, and social service providers, however, they experience critical incidents from a much wider variety of sources than just intentional violence from civilians. Officers respond to gruesome traffic accidents and crime scenes; they investigate child abuse; they encounter individuals in the worst moments of their lives or who are suffering from severe mental illnesses. All of these encounters create stress that, accumulated over time, can and does place officers at an elevated risk of mental illness (such as PTSD and depression) and can lead to maladaptive behaviors including substance abuse and even suicide.

This project interrogates what is known empirically about the dangers of being an American law enforcement officer and what is knowable, given extant data collection. I explore the ways in which data collection about the dangers of policing is co-constitutive with police culture itself. I explore the questions: What do we know about the dangers of policing, what do we not know, and why?
I use a variety of sources in this project to demonstrate the ways in which the data that are available on policing are themselves a cultural product, the result of a social process in which police themselves historically played, and continue to play, a critical role.

I explore the history of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) using archival records of that organization’s meetings between 1893 and 1905. I demonstrate the presence, even in the IACP’s earliest days, of certain dominant normative orders of policing, including danger and white male hegemony. I explore the IACP’s cooperation with and encouragement of the FBI, which started the nation’s first data collection on police officer fatalities in 1937. I draw a through line between the IACP, the FBI, and modern data collection which focuses disproportionately on civilian assault to the exclusion of other (and statistically more likely) harms to officers, including mental illness and suicide. I present the databases that track dangers to officers and discuss who runs these datasets, what information they collect, and what knowledge is thus created about the hazards of policing. I suggest, in the spirit of critical data studies, that we cannot take data at face value. Instead, we must continue to understand the ways in which policing data and police culture are co-constitutive.

I then present data on police officer injuries from two urban police departments in majority-Black cities in the United States as case studies in what data are available on the dangers of policing. For one department, which I call CPD, I present officer injury data from all causes between 2010 and 2018. In line with earlier research, I show that civilian assaults account for only 11% of all officer injuries. For another department, which I call MPD, I present data from 2015 to 2018 on assaults on officers. I show that, even in a dataset already constrained to civilian assaults, injuries to officers are generally minor; not a single officer from MPD was shot or stabbed during my four-year sample. I use MPD and CPD data to reinforce the understanding that police data are designed to create knowledge about the physical dangers of policing, especially from civilian assault, but are currently incapable of creating reliable knowledge about suicide and mental illness. Data collection practices help to perpetuate the myth that the most dangerous part of policing is the civilians that officers encounter.
For the boy I met at Machu Picchu.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. vi
Common abbreviations ........................................................................................................ viii
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Theoretical orientation ....................................................................................... 4
  Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4
  Critical data studies: an overview .................................................................................... 4
  The work that data do ......................................................................................................... 6
  Critical data studies in criminal justice and policing ....................................................... 8
  The role of culture in data collection ............................................................................... 9
  A critical approach to policing data ............................................................................... 9
  Normative orders in policing .......................................................................................... 11
    Normative order #1: Law ............................................................................................... 12
    Normative order #2: Bureaucratic control ................................................................. 12
    Normative order #3: Adventure/machismo ............................................................... 13
    Normative order #4: Safety ......................................................................................... 14
    Normative order #5: Competence ............................................................................. 15
    Normative order #6: Morality .................................................................................... 16
  The danger imperative ....................................................................................................... 17
  Data activism .................................................................................................................... 17
  Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 18

Chapter 3: Methods .............................................................................................................. 19
  Sources of empirical data ............................................................................................... 19
  Site Description ............................................................................................................... 20
  Data collection strategies .............................................................................................. 20
  Challenges encountered; reflexive issues ................................................................. 21

Chapter 4: Police culture and the history of the IACP ........................................................ 24
  Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 24
  The genealogy of national data collection on the dangers of policing ...................... 25
  National Police Convention of 1871 ........................................................................... 26
  The creation of the National Chiefs of Police Union .................................................. 27
  Normative orders of policing in the IACP’s early years ........................................... 28
    Normative order of machismo/adventure ................................................................ 29
      Women in the IACP’s early years ......................................................................... 30
      Race in the IACP’s early years ............................................................................. 31
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Police Department (CPD)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding in CPD data</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What injures CPD officers?</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries caused in the presence of a suspect</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries from civilian assault</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious injury and death in CPD</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes from MPD assaults on police officers</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commensuration in police assault data</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion: what MPD narratives tell us about police culture</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The paradox of the danger imperative</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who harms cops?</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and MPD officer assaults</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and police use of lethal force</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion: data collection as path dependency</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: The uncounted: police officer suicide and mental health</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police cultural aversion to the non-physical hazards of policing</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative order of competence</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic ignorance and homegrown stereotypes</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative order of adventure/machismo</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social attenuation of risk</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National governmental data collection efforts</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit data collection</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badge of Life</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue H.E.L.P.</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on police suicide</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police suicide reform and awareness efforts</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges facing researchers studying police suicide</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sunshine law conundrum</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Institutional Review Board (IRB) hurdle</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death benefits for families of LEOs killed in the line of duty</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal resources</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit resources</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State-level resources .......................................................................................................................................... 132
Summarizing ........................................................................................................................................................... 134
Mental health ............................................................................................................................................................... 135
Normative order of law ........................................................................................................................................ 135
Recent legislation ................................................................................................................................................... 137
H.R. 2228: Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act of 2017 ................................................ 137
S. 998: Supporting and Treating Officers in Crisis (STOIC) Act of 2019 ............................................... 138
H.R. 3735: Law Enforcement Suicide Data Collection Act ....................................................................... 139
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................. 139
Chapter 8: Theoretical implications and conclusion ................................................................................................. 140
A new normative order in policing: officer as victim ........................................................................................... 140
Risk, culture, and polarization between police and civilians ............................................................................ 141
A gap between police culture and behavioral realities of police culture ............................................................ 141
Historical data collection practices and the danger imperative ........................................................................... 142
Suicide and mental illness: the unquantified dangers of policing ....................................................................... 143
Unifying the problematic public-private divide in the lives of officers ............................................................. 143
Guardian policing mindset may not be the solution ............................................................................................ 144
Progress and reform ................................................................................................................................................... 145
References ........................................................................................................................................................................ 147
Appendices ....................................................................................................................................................................... 171
Acknowledgements

It takes a village to raise children. It also takes a village to write a dissertation. Trying to raise children and write a dissertation simultaneously takes a metropolis. I am grateful for the many who have nurtured both me and my family, including but of course not limited to:

The Berkeley people: My committee – Cal, Jonathan, and Bryan. For giving advice. For letting me steer my own ship. For supporting my decision to move south. Cal: “out of sight, out of mind” never applied to your style of mentorship. I am grateful for your ability to point me in precisely the most useful direction when it comes to lit reviews, and for the many long phone calls. Toni, who always had chocolate and let me cry or just hide out, and who will always be aunt to Gabe and Lucas. KT, who swooped in when I really needed it, and whose advice -- that it takes three adults to manage a household when you have working parents and small kids -- sticks with me always. Frank and Harley, who put food on my table.

The research help: Steve from ODMP, who always picked up the phone despite having a ‘real’ job. The folks at NLEOMF. The many from CPD and MPD who answered my harried emails and phone calls. Cameron Kovach. Kerry Karaffa, for sharing data. Sally Merry Engle, for reminding me that individuals’ lived experiences are never ‘anecdotes.’ Blake, for speaking quant to me. Spencer and Pops, for the research assistance. Sam Martin, for the extra set of eyes. To all the folks across the country who took the time to answer my questions. Especially Otto. Dr. Douglas, too. Jenny: If I had a penny for every Jenny, I’d have a penny.

The Greenville folks: My committee away from home. Teresa, for believing and empowering. You’re the reason I first came to Furman. The politics and international affairs department at Furman, who provided support in my last two years of graduate school. Tricia Ravenhorst, whose kindness knows no bounds, and to whom I attribute much of my success here. The Wyche folks, who nurture my crazy dreams to be both lawyer and researcher. The Hispanic Alliance – all of them, but especially the legal team. Everyone who texted, called, and emailed to check in and send good vibes.

My lawyer role-models: Charlotte, Nathalie, Meliah, Eric G., Cary, Marshall, Poss, Jessica. And, of course, my law-school classmates who continue to inspire me with their client advocacy around the world.

My academic role models: Susan Hallstead, Anita Halvorsen.

My folks: Mama and Pops. You taught me to read, which started it all. You shower me my kids with love. I have the comfort of picking up the phone when Lucas yells, “go see gramma’s house!” and knowing you’ll say yes.

Tiffany: I’ve spent most of my life annoying you, but you always loved me anyways. I love you!

The therapists: Between Colorado, California, and South Carolina, you literally kept me sane.

The animals: Mr. Gus, my original companion. Cloudy. And the chickens.

The gals who kept me accountable: Mary, who got me through the finish line. Alayna, who showed me that long-distance accountability can work, and be fun.
Amigas: The girls from the neighborhood. The Birches. Who always checked in, and always shared their beer. Jenny, whose visit during crunch time was a dream of vegan cooking and delegated bedtimes.

Gabe and Lucas: for keeping things funny. I’ll never forget our failed attempts at potty training while dissertating. For forgetting and forgiving the many nights when hummus sandwiches were dinner.

Mike: For asking questions. For facilitating the late nights. For keeping your sense of humor despite the seemingly unending string of tests and deadlines. For bathing the dogs. For building me a chicken coop when I didn’t plan ahead, and repainting it when I hated the color. ¡Te volcán!
### Common abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Critical data studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Community Police Department, pseudonym for a city I study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACP</td>
<td>International Association of Chiefs of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEO</td>
<td>Law enforcement officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEOKA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted Program, part of the UCR Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Department, pseudonym for a city I study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLEOMF</td>
<td>National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODMP</td>
<td>Officer Down Memorial Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-traumatic stress disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR</td>
<td>Supplementary Homicide Reports, part of the UCR Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

Policing is a dangerous occupation from the vantage point of police officers and in the public imagination. Early ethnographers of American police identified both danger (Skolnick, 2011; Van Maanen, 1975) and the authority to use state-sanctioned force on civilians as defining features of police work (Bittner, 1970).

In the wake of nationally publicized killings of civilians by police starting in 2014, improved public record-keeping has made available more accurate data on the volume and character of killings by police each year (Zimring, 2017). Starting in 2015, The Guardian and The Washington Post newspapers began compiling online news reports of police killings in the United States. These reports suggest that approximately 1,000 civilians are killed by police each year (Sherman, 2018). Zimring (2017) studied a subset of these reports and found that in more than 95% of all circumstances resulting in the use of lethal force by the police, it is the officers themselves who believed they were at risk (as opposed to killing to protect a third party) (p. 63). Danger as an element of police culture, and the implications of this danger, are not merely abstract: hundreds of civilians die each year in circumstances in which officers felt endangered.

But, the risk of being assaulted by civilians while carrying out law enforcement duties is only one of the potential hazards of policing. Officers also carry out at least two other functions: order maintenance and service (Brown, 1981; Rumbaut & Bittner, 1979; Wilson, 1978). These functions also pose dangers to officers, including exposure to a myriad of traumatic incidents that extend far beyond assault from civilians. Officers must respond to gruesome crime scenes and automobile accidents; they encounter child abuse and severe mental illness. All of these are ‘critical incidents’ that can trigger stress responses. The nation’s leading researcher on police stress, John Violanti, and colleagues explain that “exposure to traumatic events (e.g. violence, seeing dead bodies, abused children, etc.) may produce some of the highest stress levels” for American police, which in turn can cause PTSD (2017, p. 3). Stress in police work can also lead to maladaptive behaviors, including depression (Hartley, Violanti, Fekedulegn, & Andrew, 2007) and suicide (Violanti, 2007). Civilian assault is far from the only danger of police work.

Police culture provides a potential analytic leverage point for systematically understanding the dangers that police officers are attuned to and those they collect data about. By culture, I mean the “habits, skills, and styles” out of which people construct “strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). For police, such strategies of action are “grounded in common-sense reactions to real events” including “real threats to police officer safety” (Crank, 2014, p. 160).

Information is crucial to good policing. As Harmon (2013) points out, information about the police is crucial for many segments of society: voters, police chiefs, those in charge of city budgets, regulators, and government agencies. Recently, the call for improved data collection practices has focused on the lack of use-of-force data, especially for officer-involved homicides (Currie, Paris, Pasquetto, & Pierre, 2016). The Washington Post has started to fill these gaps by compiling a database of civilians shot and killed by police; this database shows double the official government estimates reported by the FBI in its Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR).

The incentives for reporting civilians killed in the line of duty do not, at first blush, align with the incentives to fully report the harms that come to police officers as a result of, or related to, their work. It is not in the best interest of the police for the public to know the full scope of their killing of civilians (Zimring, 2017). But, we can easily conceive that law enforcement officers would
Scholars have invested considerable effort studying police culture. This research repeatedly shows that the physical dangers that law enforcement officers face in the line of duty form an essential component of police culture (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016). Increasingly, those concerned about civilians killed by police look to data regarding officers’ line-of-duty injuries and fatalities to understand why officers shoot and kill civilians (and whether such killings are, indeed, legally justified) (Zimring, 2017).

There is considerable data collection nationally on officers killed in the line of duty; there is also a national dataset on assaults to officers, both those that cause injury and those that do not. However, despite abundant evidence indicating that suicide kills more officers nationally than do civilian assaults and line-of-duty accidents combined, no reliable national dataset exists to document or produce knowledge about these suicides.

This dissertation offers insight into the data that law enforcement officers collect about the dangers of their jobs. I seek to answer the questions: How does data collection about the dangers of policing reflect and reinforce police culture? What do we know about the dangers of policing, what do we not know, and why?

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on critical data studies and police culture that informs this project. Critical data studies see data as a form of power. Data, which are produced by data assemblages consisting of both human and non-human actors, shape knowledge production and, by extension, our knowledge of the world in which we live. This is no less true for policing than any other kind of data. In Chapter 2 I also introduce the research on police culture that orients my project, including Sierra-Arévalo’s (2016) concept of the “danger imperative” and Herbert’s (1998) normative orders of policing.

Chapter 3 provides a methodological accounting, detailing the ways in which I went about gathering data from two urban departments and how I accessed the databases that I use in this project. I also highlight the challenges and limitations of this study.

Chapter 4 explores the history of the preeminent policing organization, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). I examine the ways in which Herbert’s normative orders of policing are present from the earliest days of the organization, dating back to 1893. I then explore the evolution of the IACP and its role in the creation first of the FBI and then of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, under which umbrella national police fatality data was first created.

Chapter 5 discusses the physical hazards of policing, both fatal and nonfatal. I discuss the three major national databases that collect and disseminate information on law enforcement fatalities: the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) dataset, the Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP), and the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF). I explore which deaths are included in these databases, and which are not, and why, connecting these databases to the police culture that created them.

Chapter 6 presents police officer injury and assault data from two urban departments I call Community Police Department (CPD) and Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). I use these data to explore the causes and severity of officer injuries and connect my findings to earlier research showing that roughly 10% of all police officer injuries are caused by civilian assault; the rest are...
caused by various workplace accidents and mishaps (Brandl & Stroshine, 2012). I use detailed descriptive fields provided to me regarding assaults on MPD officers to highlight various recurring themes, including a tendency for officers to reference size and strength discrepancies between themselves and the individuals they arrest for assaulting them. I use both CPD and MPD data to reiterate other scholars’ findings about the rarity with which officers are assaulted with any weapons beyond a suspect’s hands and feet and the extremely low level of serious injury to officers from civilian assault. In fact, over the years 2015 through 2018, MPD and CPD together employed a total of roughly 2,600 police officers each year, but between the two departments experienced only three serious injuries caused by suspects.

Chapter 7 explores what is not included in national datasets about the dangers of policing, namely, suicide and mental illness. I discuss what is known about these dangers and the ways in which police culture attenuates such risks. I examine the disparities between the way that line-of-duty deaths are treated compared to off-duty deaths, including by suicide. These disparities include benefits paid to the families of deceased officers. I also present workers’ compensation data to highlight the way that workers’ compensation statutes can drive data collection and therefore knowledge production on the hazards of policing.

Chapter 8 offers theoretical implications of this project, suggestions for policy reform, and my conclusions.
Chapter 2: Theoretical orientation

Introduction

What are the occupational hazards of police work? Policing is a dangerous occupation from the vantage point of officers and in the public imagination. But just how dangerous is policing, and what (or whom) is most dangerous to the police?1 Answering these questions requires knowledge about policing in the United States. This project is about examining what we think we know about the dangers of policing, where this knowledge comes from, and the ways in which the data we have are expressions of normative, political, and ethical processes (Currie et al., 2016).

Instead of taking public indicators -- like the FBI’s annual publication on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) -- as evidence of the dangers of policing, this project inverts the analysis, looking instead to what public indicators like LEOKA tell us about the culture that produced them. In this chapter I offer a theoretical approach to understanding how knowledge about the hazards of policing is produced, and to what ends. My approach seeks to combine the relatively nascent field of critical data studies, the more well-trodden theory of normative orders in police culture, and the way that a cultural preoccupation with violence -- the “danger imperative” -- underlies and unifies these normative orders and is co-constitutive with data collection in policing (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 13).

Critical data studies: an overview

Critical data studies (CDS) is premised on the notion that “[d]ata are a form of power” (Iliadis & Russo, 2016, p. 1). Dalton and Thatcher first coined the term “critical data studies” in 2014 in an effort to create coherence for disorganized and piecemeal critiques of ‘Big Data’ (Dalton & Thatcher, 2014). Kitchin and Lauriault (2014) explain that societies have collected data for at least two millennia (the Egyptians, they note, collected and maintained data on the sizes of fields, land deeds, and livestock) (p. 3). But it is only within the past 50 years that we have entered an “era of big data,” which they note is “huge in volume...high in velocity...diverse in variety [and] exhaustive in scope” (p. 4, italics in original). Rieder and Simon (2016) expand upon traditional definitions of Big Data -- which include a technological dimension (hardware, software, and infrastructure) and scientific dimension (analytical skills and mining techniques) -- and add a “cultural dimension” (p. 2, italics in original). This cultural dimension refers to “the pervasive use of [information and communications technologies] in contemporary society and...the growing significance and authority of quantified information in many areas of everyday life” (Rieder & Simon, 2016, p. 2). Data production is now ubiquitous across sectors and industries: data are now produced not only by government agencies but by private sector entities such as financial institutions, social media websites, retailers, surveillance agencies, and mobile phone providers.

---

1 For the duration of this dissertation, I use ‘police officer’ and occasionally ‘law enforcement officer.’ I mean these terms to include all law enforcement officers, such as municipal and state police and county sheriffs. My usage of these terms does not include correctional or parole officers.
CDS brings a sociological and anthropological sensibility to the increasing dominance of Big Data in the social sciences. Currie et al. (2016) explain that CDS:

seeks to explore data as situated in complex assemblages of action, from data collection and categorization to its subsequent cleaning, storing, and dissemination. This framework also considers how this data is then granted meaning and value as it becomes operable in different situations (p. 2).

The concept of “data assemblages” comes from Kitchin (2014). Data assemblages are the “complex socio-technical system[s]” that are structured to produce certain data (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 8). Assemblages include “all of the technological, political, social, and economic apparatuses that frame [the data’s] nature, operation, and work” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 8). A data assemblage and the data it creates are “mutually constituted, bound together in a set of contingent, relational, and contextual discursive and material practices and relations” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 8).

Aragona, Felaco, and Marina (2018) explain that data assemblages consist of both human and non-human actors. Human actors can be ‘internal’ to the database (professionals, computer scientists, data scientists, or domain experts) or ‘external’ to it (journalists, ordinary citizens, policy makers, politicians, or researchers) (Aragona, Felaco, & Marino, 2018). Likewise, nonhuman actors can be ‘internal’ (platforms, dashboards, software, hardware, or algorithms) or ‘external’ (administrations, platforms, data formats, metadata, and data regulations) (Aragona et al., 2018, p. 458). Kitchin and Lauriault (2014) note that these “apparatuses and elements” are “thoroughly entwined” in the “production, management, analysis, and translation of data” (p. 8).

By determining what data are collected, data assemblages shape knowledge creation and, by extension, our understanding of the world in which we live. This power means that the production of data assemblages “is not a neutral, technical process, but a normative, political, and ethical one that is contingent and often contested, with consequences for subsequent analysis, interpretation, and action” (Currie et al., 2016, p. 3). The goal of CDS is to examine critically this knowledge production, accepting that “data are never raw but always ‘cooked’” (Iliadis & Russo, 2016, p. 1, quoting Gitelman, 2013). CDS thus seeks to “question how decisions made in the design and use of these tools shape our understanding of the world in which we live” (Currie et al., 2016, p. 3).

Data do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they are tied to (and mutually constitutive with) the assemblage that produces them and the “technological, political, social, and economic infrastructures that sustain [them]” (Currie et al., 2016, p. 3; see also Rosenberg, 2013). Because of the human actors involved in data assemblages, cultural and political values may dictate what information these assemblages do (and, notably, do not) present. CDS scholars understand that information is a constitutive force in society that both reflects and shapes social reality (Milan et al., 2018, para. 1). A popular quote from sociologist William Bruce Cameron (often mis-attributed to Albert Einstein) asserts that “not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts” (Cullis, 2017, p. 505). A CDS orientation would suggest the following edit to that classic phrase: not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted should be trusted at face value.

---

2 Researchers increasingly treat ‘data’ as a singular noun, including Currie et al. (2016), Dourish and Gómez Cruz (2018), and Iliadis and Russo (2016). This is likely the way of the future, but in this present dissertation, except for when I am directly quoting others, I treat ‘data’ as a plural noun. My choice aligns with a 2012 APA Style Blog post (Krupa, 2012).
Other social scientists write in the spirit of CDS, even if they are not in direct communication with that field. Sally Engle Merry’s 2016 book, *The Seduction of Quantification*, is one such example. Merry writes about the increasing use of global indicators on human rights, gender violence, and sex trafficking. She notes that “[b]eneath the ‘truth’ of quantified knowledge, indicators are part of a regime of power based on the collection and analysis of data and their representation. It is important to see who is creating the indicators, where these people come from, and what forms of expertise they have” (p. 5). Merry -- an anthropologist -- thus brings to her research on global human rights indicators a similar sensibility of those writing explicitly under the CDS banner.

Bowker and Star use an approach now familiar within CDS, using case studies to explore the fraught nature of classification systems in their 1999 book, *Sorting Things Out*. The authors noted that “[s]eemingly purely technical issues like how to name things and how to store data in fact constitute much of human interaction and much of what we come to know as natural” (p. 326). One of their case studies explored the classification of tuberculosis patients attempting to navigate bureaucratic infrastructure in order to prove they were sufficiently cured to be released from confinement in sanatoriums; another case study explored the racial classification of individuals in Apartheid South Africa. Much like contemporary CDS scholars, the authors “seek to understand the role of invisibility in the work that classification does in ordering human interaction...to understand how these categories are made and kept visible, and in some cases we want to challenge the silences surrounding them” (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 5). They introduced the term “infrastructural inversion,” which “seeks to uncover those infrastructures -- technical, social, political, and economic systems that facilitate certain types of knowledge -- that have become invisible as a result of their efficiency or ubiquity” (Currie et al., 2016, pp. 4-5). Other researchers call this method of infrastructural inversion the act of “exposing the inner workings of knowledge production” (Kaltenbrunner, 2015, p. 1).

Interest in CDS has expanded beyond just Big Data. Dourish and Gómez Cruz (2018) write about the relationship between data and ethnographic methods, writing: “We understand ‘data’ broadly here. As ethnographic researchers, our own data is of disparate types; not just notes, transcripts, and observations, but jottings, artifacts, feelings, and experiences” (p. 2). I use the CDS field here as an anchor or shorthand to describe research that critiques and interrogates data creation and the knowledge it produces. But, what is most important is not the field’s formal name, but its researchers’ sensibility to “interrogate all forms of potentially depoliticized data science and to track the ways in which data are generated, curated, and how they permeate and exert power on all manner of forms of life” (Iliadis & Russo, 2016, p. 2).

The work that data do

Data assemblages not only create knowledge; they “do work in the world.” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 13). This work includes “governing people and territories, managing organizations, producing capital, creating better places, improving health care, advancing science and so on” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 13). Merry (2016) calls this work that data assemblages do (though she does not use that term) their “governance effects” (p. 4). She notes that quantification is core to the enterprise of modern government, or what researchers call “evidence-based governance” or “new governance” (Merry, 2016, p. 10). New governance, according to Merry, involves “a broad range of regulatory strategies that rely on empiricism, quantitative knowledge as the basis for
Governments increasingly use data to understand and control their populations. Indeed, Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ encompasses modern states’ efforts to govern by producing knowledge about their population in order to control it (Foucault, 1991; see also Foucault, 2002 & 2012). Rieder and Simon (2016), in discussing the growth in data-driven forms of government, note the “close relationship between statistics and state-making” (p. 3). The creation of Big Data tools such as the census permit the government to produce knowledge about the individuals that comprise the country and thereby devise strategies of controlling them. Merry (2016) notes that “indicators and other forms of statistical knowledge have long been central to the exercise of state power” (p. 43).

But numbers -- like a state’s population, or a city’s median income, or the rate of violent crime in a particular census tract -- can be deceptive. Numbers “convey an aura of objective truth and scientific authority despite the extensive interpretive work that goes into their construction” (Merry, 2016, p. 1). With the ubiquity of data, “people take the data as fact and no longer bother to look deeper into how and why the data exists in the first place” (Currie et al., 2016, p. 12; see also Floridi, 2010). In other words, data are perceived as “the stuff of truth itself” (Gitelman & Jackson, 2013, pp. 2-3). Numbers often hide the politics and power behind them. Researchers in the CDS tradition seek to expose those power dynamics.

Kranzburg famously noted in his ‘First Law of Technology’ that “[t]echnology is neither good nor bad, nor is it neutral” (1986, p. 545). CDS demonstrates that the same can be said for data assemblages and the data they produce. In terms of governance, data can be a force of good --- they can be used to tackle poverty and homelessness, create jobs where they are most needed, or develop policies to mitigate environmental damage. But there is also a “darker side” to some data work such as “dataveillance and the erosion of privacy, profiling and social sorting, and anticipatory governance” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 14).

Critically examining the way that data assemblages are designed allows for a renewed focus on the human role in data creation. With the human comes politics. Politics are visible in “the way categories are constructed; decisions are made about what to count, and concepts are defined as measurable” (Merry, 2016, p. 208). In her study of international human rights indicators, Merry (2016) noted that “those who create indicators aspire to measure the world but, in practice, create the world they are measuring. In other words, indicators do not stand outside regimes of power and governance but exist within them, both in their creation and in their ongoing functioning” (p. 21).

CDS is a ‘big tent’ field. Iliadis and Russo (2016) note that “[i]n every way that data are organized in a communicative context, CDS – as a clear call for the critical investigation of Big Data science – has coalesced around researchers ready to deploy critical frameworks in order to foreground data’s power structures” (p. 2). CDS has tackled issues and themes “ranging from food and health to policing and the environment” (Iliadis & Russo, 2016, p. 3). Thus, CDS is a sensibility that can be applied in any discipline. The field follows three basic principles inspired by Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and its call for “education for the common good” (Aristotle, 2012): “the identification of social data problems, the design of critical frameworks for addressing social data problems, and the application of social solutions to increase data literacy” (Iliadis & Russo, 2016, p. 5). Thus, CDS is more concerned with providing guiding principles to inform the study of data in any discipline than dictating specific objects of study. In the next section, I explore the ways in which the principles of CDS apply in the fields of criminal justice and policing.
Critical data studies in criminal justice and policing

Long before the formal creation of the field of CDS, researchers were already seeking to lift the hood on public indicators such as crime statistics in order to expose the social processes behind them. Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) were among the first to assert that the rates of deviant behavior we learn from crime statistics should not be taken at face value, but instead are “produced by the actions taken by persons in the social system which define, classify, and record certain behaviors as deviant” (p. 135). Instead of focusing on the end-product of data collection, Kitsuse and Cicourel argue for a closer examination of the processes that led certain behaviors as being defined as deviant in the first place. They ask “what forms of behavior are organizationally defined as deviant, and how are they classified, recorded and treated by persons in the society?” (Kitsuse & Cicourel, 1963, p. 139). Similarly, Savitz and Johnston (1965) called attention to the dangers of rhetoric promoting an “aura of infallibility” that often surrounds crime statistics (p. 1049).

If data do work in the world, what work are data doing for American police? Harmon (2013) wrote a law review article titled Why do we (still) lack data on policing? In it, she recognizes the critical importance of data to policing: “information is crucial both to governing the police effectively through local politics and to the project of regulating them through state and federal law” (Harmon, 2013, p. 1123). She sees data as a source of public benefit for voters, police chiefs, city administrators, regulators, and government agencies:

[S]everal kinds of political and legal actors benefit from data about policing. Local voters, police chiefs, and other officials who make policy use empirical judgments to form views about what that policy should be and whether it is being effectively implemented. State and federal legislatures and administrative agencies use data to regulate the police further and also to pursue other legal goals that can affect law enforcement. In their sundry tasks, actors in these institutions make judgments about the social and financial costs of particular policing strategies and about the effectiveness and efficiency of those strategies in reducing fear, crime, and public disorder… [P]ublic policy and legal decisions about policing depend heavily on empirical judgments. The availability of data and research will determine how well-founded those assessments are (Harmon, 2013, p. 1128).

In this dissertation, I accept all of Harmon’s stated uses for data on policing, but suggest that our view of the work that policing data do should be much broader. Instead of focusing on what policing data can tell us about the relationships between officers and the communities in which they work, I suggest that policing data can also reveal a great deal about police culture itself. I focus not on data about police actions, as did Currie et al. (2016) (who examined the available data on the killing of civilians by police), but on data about the dangers of policing and the various harms that police officers experience related to their occupations.

One area that is ripe for investigation using the sensibilities from critical data studies is identifying what information is not collected within our criminal justice system, and why. Iliadis and Russo (2016) explain that data are “conspicuous in their absence -- a lack of data is another identification of power, the power not to look or to remain hidden” (p. 1).

Harmon (2013) notes that, despite the potential benefits of data collection in policing, getting data is hard due to recalcitrance within the policing community. She notes that “[t]hough officers will collect information when police chiefs and local governments require them to do so, they will collect only that information and only in the form mandated ...In practice, police chiefs and
other local government actors often limit rather than promote information availability” (p. 1129). Here, Harmon is implicitly embracing the logic of CDS -- examining the power and politics undergirding data collection.

Currie et al. (2016) used data on police officer-involved homicides (POIH) in Los Angeles County collected by both law enforcement and civic groups “to examine the cultural and political dimensions of such statistics and to position this data within power struggles to own, manage, and share it among different groups” (p. 2). The authors compared four classification systems, including the Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR), the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS), the Los Angeles Times’ Homicide Report, and report created by a community group called the Youth Justice Coalition. They compared what they call the “socio-technical dimensions of the data” in each database, including how each database defined POIH and the granularity of data included about each death (Currie et al., 2016, p. 9).

The role of culture in data collection

Borrowing concepts from cultural psychology is helpful in understanding how datasets and databases might be conceived as “cultural products” -- that is, the products of the particular cultures that create them. By cultures, I generally mean the “habits, skills, and styles” out of which people construct “strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). Cultural psychology “was founded on the premise that people are shaped by participating in the meanings, opportunities, and norms of specific cultural contexts, and in turn, these culturally shaped people reinforce, recreate, and maintain those cultural contexts” (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012, p. 299). Lamoreaux and Morling (2012) define cultural products as the “tangible, shared representations of culture, including advertising, television, texts, laws, public behavior norms, internet content, and language” which constitute “one manifestation of the person-shaped culture” (p. 300). Social psychologists approach cultural products much in the way that CDS scholars approach data, by understanding that these products are co-constitutive with the humans that create them. Just as data produce knowledge, so too do cultural products: “Where do people develop their conceptions of cultural consensus -- of ‘common sense’? It seems likely that one option is to consult public, tangible cultural products as a source of information” (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012, p. 300).

A critical approach to policing data

My goal in this dissertation is to use a critical approach to the data collected about the hazards that police face in the line of duty. I consider data produced by and about American police as cultural products, and seek to “apply critical social theory to [this] data to explore the ways in which they are never simply neutral, objective, independent, raw representations of the world but are situated, contingent, relational, contextual, and do active work in the world” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2018, p. 7). I rely on Manning’s (1995) definition of occupational culture: “accepted practices, rules, and principles of conduct that are situationally applied, and generalized rationales and beliefs” (p. 472).

The identification of danger as an important element of police culture dates back to the now iconic policing studies of the 1960s and 1970s. Some scholars focused on the danger that officers posed to civilians vis-à-vis their possession of the authority to use state-sanctioned force (Bittner, 1970; Herbert, 1996). Others, like Muir (2012) and Skolnick (2011), also emphasized the danger that
civilians pose to officers in their police work. Muir (2012) notes that, “the reality, and the subtle irony, of being a policeman is that, while he may appear to be the supreme practitioner of coercion, in fact he is first and foremost its frequent victim” (pp. 44-45). Westley (1970) argued that reciprocal violence between the police and the public contributes to officers’ bonds of loyalty to each other and social isolation. Skolnick (2011) described “authority and danger” as an essential couplet of the police officer’s role (p. 49). Danger “has a unifying effect on officers” (Paoline, 2003, p. 201; see also Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998). Both formal (i.e. training academies) and informal (i.e. peer socialization) pressures reinforce the need to be constantly vigilant of potentially dangerous or violent situations (Van Maanen, 1974).

There are many harms associated with being a police officer. Research demonstrates that the “[c]ritical incidents experienced by law enforcement officers are broad and far-ranging” (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25). Violanti (2014) notes that:

[w]hen one thinks of police work, the immediate danger of this occupation comes to mind. Certainly, law enforcement personnel are subject to the everyday threat of violence, death, and witnessing traumatic events in their work. Less noted, however, is the physical and psychological danger associated with police work, including harmful environmental exposure, stress, and trauma (p. xiii).

Stress responses, and the symptoms resulting from critical incidents3, can be cognitive, physical, behavioral, or emotional (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25). In police culture, however, the overwhelming emphasis is on the risk of the physical dangers of policing (i.e. civilian assault), rather than the mental or emotional hazards of the work (Cullen, Link, Travis, & Lemming, 1983). The perceived risk among officers is disproportionate to the actual risk of physical danger (Paoline, 2003, p. 211, n. 2; see also Slovic, 1987 & 2010). In the remainder of this dissertation, I use “dangers” and “hazards” interchangeably to refer to the wide variety of circumstances and individuals that may cause cognitive, physical, behavioral, or emotional harm to police officers.

What we know about the hazards of police work depends on the data we collect. The availability of rich data on certain hazards (i.e. physical injury) and a paucity of data on other hazards (i.e. stress and mental illness) might reflect the relative frequency and severity of such hazards in policing. But CDS cautions against accepting these available data at face value. Instead, the relative abundance and richness of data on police dangers reveal what we as a society care about. Data on the dangers of policing are products of the culture that generates them and are co-constitutive with that culture. We count what we care about, while “things that have not been counted or are hard to quantify tend to be neglected and thus disappear from view” (Merry, 2016, p. 219). Decisions about what data to collect were not and are not made externally to policing; police officers have played an integral role historically in determining what gets counted and therefore, what is ‘known’ about the hazards of police work.

3 Cross and Ashley (2004) define ‘critical incidents’ as “any situation in which an officer’s expectations of personal infallibility suddenly become tempered by imperfection and crude reality can be a critical incident. Examples could include an officer-involved shooting, the death of a coworker, serious injury while on duty, life-threatening incidents, hostage situations or negotiations, exposure to intense crime scenes, a police suicide, or any situation that falls outside the realm of normal experience.” (p. 25; internal quotations omitted).
Normative orders in policing

How might police culture reflect and reinforce data about the dangers of policing? To answer this question I turn to Steve Herbert’s (1998) theory of the role of normative orders in police subculture. Throughout this dissertation, I will apply these normative orders to explore knowledge production and data collection about the hazards of policing, in order to understand how data about the dangers of policing “reflect the social and cultural worlds of the actors and organizations that create them and the regimes of power within which they are formed” (Merry, 2016, pp. 4-5).

Herbert (1998) sought to intervene in what he identified as shortcomings in popular accounts of police culture. These shortcomings, he claimed, were twofold: 1) inappropriately distinguishing between the formal rules and informal ethos of the subculture, and 2) treating police culture as a “more-or-less cohesive whole” (Herbert, 1998, p. 344). Instead of accepting the cultural homogeneity present in much of the early police culture literature (with notable exceptions including Brown, 1981; Muir, 2012; Reiner, 1978; Reuss-Ianni, 1983), Herbert seeks to capture “the formal and informal groupwide [sic] dynamics that constitute police as a distinct group while also providing a means to capture internal variations” (1998, p. 345). These internal variations, sometimes called ‘police subcultures,’ take the form of “particular styles that members may develop when processing work related information” (Paoline, 2003, p. 207; see also Swidler, 1986). Van Maanen and Barley (1985) call this internal variation “ideological differentiation” towards issues such as “the nature of the work, the choice of appropriate techniques, the correct stance toward outsiders, or the best way to treat particular clients” (p. 44).

Herbert (1998) conducted ethnographic fieldwork with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in 1993-1994. This fieldwork led him to identify six normative orders that shape police officers’ social worlds (Herbert, 1998, p. 351). A normative order is “a set of rules and practices oriented around a central value” (Herbert, 1998, p. 343). Social worlds, including those of American police, do not consist of a single normative order. Instead, they “consist of varied collections of such orders, which together provide guidelines and justifications for actions of members of the group” (Herbert, 1998, p. 347). Different combinations of these normative orders may be present to varying degrees in different departments, which aligns with more recent scholarship asserting that police culture is not monolithic (see, e.g., Paoline, 2003). Stoughton (2016) offers a contemporary interpretation of normative orders, noting that “an officer’s underlying value system, learned from and reinforced by peers and agency culture...will inform the officer’s decisions and actions” (p. 675).

The six prominent normative orders Herbert finds present in police subculture are: law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo, safety, competence, and morality. These six normative orders sometimes cohere, and sometimes conflict, but in all instances provide officers means of understanding, enacting, and valuing situations (Herbert, 1998). One contemporary example of conflicting normative orders comes from a 2017 Pew Research survey of nearly 8,000 police officers across the United States: “Sometimes police are faced with situations where doing what is morally the right thing would require breaking a department rule. By a ratio of 57% to 40%, officers say they would advise a fellow officer in this type of situation to do the right thing rather than follow the rule” (Morin, Parker, Stepler, & Mercer, 2017, p. 32). Here, the normative order of bureaucratic control is conflicting with other normative orders, depending on how each officer interprets the meaning of “the right thing” from the survey question.

Herbert’s study focused on the role of these normative orders in the social worlds of the police. His observations were limited to ride-alongs with officers in patrol units and the observation
of specialized units (units focused on vice, narcotics, gangs, and helicopter surveillance) and radio
dispatchers. I argue that his theory of normative orders can be extended to the production of
knowledge related to policing. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the ways in which these six
normative orders can be applied, in the spirit of CDS, to understand data assemblages related to the
hazards of policing.

Normative order #1: Law

Law “fundamentally informs police practice, both by defining officers’ powers and
responsibilities and by shaping how they interpret and react to events” (Herbert, 1998, p. 353). This
does not mean that officers have no discretion to “ignore, stretch, or only provisionally apply the
law,” but rather that officers “use the law...to decide whether and how to respond” to various
situations” (Herbert, 1998, p. 352).

As applied to data collection, this normative order points to identifying the laws that define
law enforcement agencies’ data collection and dissemination responsibilities. Harmon (2013) notes
that “officers will collect information when police chiefs and local governments require them to do
so, [but] they will collect only that information and only in the form mandated” (p. 1129). The
examination of the relationship between the normative order of law and data collection on the
dangers of policing does not end, however, with merely identifying the laws that define the data
collection and dissemination responsibilities of law enforcement agencies. Laws themselves are
cultural products (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012), so understanding why certain data are collected --
and others not -- requires examining the social processes that produced these laws. Especially
important is seeing who is creating these laws, where they come from, and what forms of expertise
they have (Merry, 2016, p. 5).

Normative order #2: Bureaucratic control

The normative order of bureaucratic control refers to the “[b]ureaucratic regulations” that
“constitute another more formalized set of guidelines for public behavior” (Herbert, 1998, p. 354). These
bureaucratic stipulations “determine the type and location of incidents for which officers will
assume responsibility. They further determine the range of tactics the officers are likely to employ.
Situations and responses are significantly defined based upon an officer’s position on the
bureaucratic flowchart” (Herbert, 1998, p. 354).

Even if federal, state, or local laws do not mandate the collection or dissemination of certain
data by police departments, departmental bureaucracy, by means of internal policy, plays an
important role in determining what information is collected, how it is stored, and to whom it is
released (Harmon, 2013, p. 1129). Harmon notes that “[d]epartments often, for example, keep only
paper files and use anomalous report forms and categories, and they are much more receptive to
video cameras in police cars than to collecting traffic stop data” (Harmon, 2013, p. 1129). Thus,
examining the stance that police bureaucracies take towards data on policing hazards is an important
component of a CDS-based study.
Normative order #3: Adventure/machismo

This normative order is one that values the “aggressive officer willing to rush into dangerous situations” and who “demonstrate their courage and bravery by willingly placing themselves in potentially dangerous or otherwise uncomfortable situations” (Herbert, 1998, p. 356). This masculine culture has extensive support in the literature as a core characteristic of police culture (Heidensohn, 1992; Fielding 1994; Loftus 2008; Manning, 1978; Reiner, 2010; Silvestri, 2017). In fact, the ‘cult of masculinity’ has been regarded as “one of the defining characteristics, or indeed the defining characteristic, of the police occupational culture” (Brown, 2007, p. 190). Fielding (1994) calls this the “cop canteen culture” and elaborated that it is composed of:

(i) aggressive, physical action; (ii) a strong sense of competitiveness and preoccupation with the imagery of conflict; (iii) an exaggerated heterosexual orientation, often articulated in terms of misogynistic and patriarchal attitudes to women; and (iv) the operation of rigid in-group/out-group distinctions whose consequences are strongly exclusionary in the case of out-groups and strongly assertive of loyalty and affinity in the case of in-groups (p. 47).

More recently, policing scholars describe this normative order as the “warrior mentality” (Balko, 2013; Rahr & Rice, 2015; Stoughton, 2015 & 2016). Stoughton (2016) explains that “the Warrior appeals to officers’ self-image because it is a heroic and noble figure, imbued with the qualities that officers most respect and admire... those qualities...can be fairly condensed into four attributes: honor, duty, resolve, and the willingness to engage in righteous violence” (p. 632).

Police reformers call for a shift from a warrior to a guardian mindset (Rahr & Rice, 2015; Stoughton, 2015 & 2016). The guardian mindset, an alternative normative order to that of machismo, “prioritizes service over crimefighting... [and] long-term relationships” with the community; it “emphasizes communication over commands, cooperation over compliance, and legitimacy over authority” (Stoughton, 2015, p. 231). But both the warrior and guardian normative orders still share a paternalistic value of keeping people safe, even at the expense of one’s own health and wellbeing.

The normative order of adventure/machismo likely influences the data that policing insiders choose to collect. In chapter 4, I explore the creation of the first national database on police officer fatalities (the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted dataset) and the role that policing insiders played in this process. Researchers have not yet studied the relationship between the dominant normative orders of policing, like machismo, and the nature of the data that is collected about the dangers of policing. A CDS-based approach to this issue recognizes the role that police culture plays in determining what knowledge is created about police culture. This co-constitutive process might actually reinforce such normative orders by highlighting certain dangers (those physical injuries that would most exemplify the warrior) and minimize others (those related to mental health). Officers who conceive of their appropriate role as that of a warrior will be more likely to care about collecting the type of information that is reflective of and reinforces that warrior image, such as evidence of ‘combat’ with civilians resulting in officer injury or death. This same normative order would likewise lead to the occultation of cognitive, behavioral, or emotional harms in data collection on the dangers of policing. Human actors involved in data assemblages count what they care about. If it turns out that the police themselves are internal actors in data assemblages that produce knowledge about the harms of policing, we can infer that the order of machismo would result in an overemphasis in data production related to physical harms.
Normative order #4: Safety

Whereas the normative order of adventure/machismo encourages officers to “summon the necessary bravery to handle potentially perilous calls,” the normative order of safety is premised on “the preservation of their own life and the lives of others” (Herbert, 1998, p. 357). This calls to mind what Stoughton (2015) calls the “first rule of law enforcement...go home at the end of every shift” (pp. 226-27; see also Stoughton, 2014, para. 3). The concern with safety -- especially their own -- is ubiquitous. Officers are:

constantly barraged with the message that they should be afraid, that their survival depends on it. Not only do officers hear it in formal training, they also hear it informally from supervisors and older officers. They talk about it with their peers. They see it on police forums and law enforcement publications (Stoughton, 2015, p. 227).

What do officers fear? Social science has established that perceptions of risk are socially constructed, not naturally occurring (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). Of the many catastrophic risks that humans might pay attention to, those risks that individuals choose to emphasize are determined by their membership in various social groups (Douglas, 2013; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). Individuals do not identify and prioritize risks alone. Instead, judgments about danger depend on social context (Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999).

Cultural risk theorists focus on the processes through which “risks are defined, perceived, and managed according to principles that inhere in particular forms of social organization” (Rayner, 1992, p. 84). At the same time, this formulation does not mean that because risks are socially constructed, that they do not have real consequences (Berger and Luckmann, 2011; Douglas, 1997). Early cultural risk theorists, for example, focused on environmental dangers, such as nuclear power, asbestos, or radiation. The public nor policy-makers recognized these phenomena as inherently dangerous, but through cultural and political processes they came to be identified as dangerous (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). A second wave of cultural risk theory, more influential in criminology, focused on threatening behavior by human beings and governmental attempts to control crime (O’Malley, 1998; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Whitmire and McCall (1994) specifically applied cultural risk theory to policing, exploring the ways in which social structure determines law enforcement officers’ perceived risk of contracting HIV while on duty.

A key finding of cultural risk theorists is that risks are amplified within social organizations as the result of “direct personal experience” with situations and/or people deemed “risky” and “indirect, or secondary, experience, through information received about the risk” (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 184). In the context of policing, risks are understood and socially amplified through both individual officers’ violent encounters with civilians and through the stories that officers tell one another about such encounters (Crank, 2014; Marenin, 2016).

The normative order of safety, and the risk and culture literature that it calls forth, have important implications for a critical study of the available data on the dangers to police officers. Rather than “revealing truth” about the dangers that police face, data may in some ways “create it” (Merry, 2016, p. 5). The CDS approach I take in this dissertation focuses on the way that the normative order of safety may influence the production of data that police organizations then, in a circular manner, use to create knowledge about the risks their officers face. Currie et al. (2016) note that “[t]he production of data is not inevitable; protocols, organizational processes, measurement scales, categories, and standards are designed, negotiated, and debated in the process of data generation” (p. 3). Later chapters explore the ways in which police culture emphasizes the risks from
civilian assault and, to a lesser degree, accidents. Police culture does not emphasize the risk of mental health problems generally or suicide specifically; this respective emphasis is reflected in data production about the dangers that police face in the line of duty.

Normative order #5: Competence

The normative order of competence works “to provide officers with a sense of what constitutes doing a good job, [sic] what outcomes will provide them with approbation from their peers” (Herbert, 1998, p. 358). This normative order “also consists of ensuring that officers pull their own weight, that they do not need unnecessary assistance from others in managing their basic workload” (Id.). As Herbert noted, normative orders in policing often cohere with one another. Thus, the emphasis on self-sufficiency could reflect both the normative order of competence, but could also be tied to that of machismo in the sense that ‘real men’ do not do need help (see, e.g., Möller-Leimkühler, 2002; Wright, 2014).

Police seek to avoid being stigmatized with a label that is negative (e.g. wimp or "can't cut it") in order to project an “image[] of what a good person or good group member is supposed to look like” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 357). Social psychologists note that such conditions can give rise to “homegrown stereotypes (Prentice & Miller, 2002). The origins of homegrown stereotypes “lie in self-presentation[s] that are enacted by a sizable proportion of a group’s members. These presentations may be motivated by a desire to present oneself as a good person according to the values of the broader society or as a good group member according to the values of a particular social group” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 352).

Another phenomenon closely related to homegrown stereotypes -- and also relevant to the normative order of competence in policing -- is pluralistic ignorance. Prentice and Miller (2002) define pluralistic ignorance as “a phenomenon characterized by the belief that one’s private attitudes and judgments are different from those of others, even though one’s public behavior is identical” (p. 354; see also Miller & McFarland, 1991; Prentice & Miller, 1996). They further explain that pluralistic ignorance:

originates in the same self-presentation processes that give rise to homegrown stereotypes. When people try to present themselves as good people or good group members in front of their peers, they often act in ways that belie their private sentiments. A self–other discrepancy emerges because people take their peers’ similar behavior at face value—that is, they assume that it provides an accurate reflection of their peers’ private sentiments and therefore that those sentiments must differ from their own. A homegrown stereotype also emerges because the uniform behavior of group members prompts an inference about the characteristics of the group (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 354).

There are significant consequences of homegrown stereotypes and pluralistic ignorance in policing. Even though “[o]fficers may agree that there is a legitimate need for psychological services...they are also cognizant of stigma and the potential professional implications of seeking treatment. Officers may also underestimate their colleagues’ personal willingness to seek mental health services, thus demonstrating pluralistic ignorance” (Karaffa & Koch, 2016, p. 761; see also Toch, 2002).

Police are not alone in suffering from pluralistic ignorance. Maslach’s (1982) study of nurses is illustrative here. She found that while nurses present a public facade of professionalism, they
privately expressed feelings of anxiety and stress. Their public presentations, then, were not only driven by a desire to appear professional but to avoid being stigmatized as “sore thumbs” or “weak links” (Maslach, 1982, p. 11; see also Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 356). In any group context, “people seek to avoid being stigmatized with a label that is negative” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 356).

The normative order of competence carries serious implications for the study of data in policing. Harmon (2013) notes that the “actors who shape policing -- from the officers themselves to local politicians -- often face incentives that undermine data collection and research on policing as well as distribution of information about policing to the public (p. 1130). The social psychological phenomena of homegrown stereotypes and pluralistic ignorance help illustrate the “counter-incentives that can lead [public agents] to underinvest in research” (Harmon, 2013, p. 1131). Even if officers are privately suffering, especially from mental illness, the normative order of competence predicts that they will present a facade belies their struggles (Karaffa & Koch, 2016; Karaffa & Tochkov, 2013). Karaffa and Koch (2016) note that:

> [s]tigma may keep police officers from discussing things that are distressing to them, because officers do not want to seem as if they cannot handle their jobs or be relied upon for backup...losing control of their emotions could jeopardize their career. (p. 761, internal citations omitted; see also Blum, 2000; Fair, 2009; Kirschman, 2018; Kureczka, 1996; Miller, 1995).

If officers refrain from seeking help for certain injuries or illnesses that result from or are exacerbated by their work, such injuries or illnesses will not be present in formal presentations of data on the dangers of policing. This, the normative order of competence and the phenomena discussed here help understand why official data may significantly under-count certain illnesses and injuries.

Normative order #6: Morality

Police work is “part of a wider struggle between good and evil,” with police as “valiant defenders of the good” who must keep society safe from *bad guys* but also *idiots, terrorists, and assholes* (Herbert, 1998, p. 360; Van Maanen, 1978). This normative order is closely linked to that of machismo, because officers see themselves “as more than mere enforcers of the law; they are warriors in the age-old battle between right and wrong” (Herbert, 1998, p. 360).

Just as this normative order encompasses sharp boundaries between good guys and bad guys, in the context of the dangers of policing, certain injuries are seen as “good” and “pure” (physical injuries resulting from violent encounters with civilians) while other injuries are considered “bad” and “impure” (mental illness and suicide). Not only does this normative order strip police work of “the unavoidable ambiguities that invariably inhere in the various situations officers handle,” but it works inward on the officers themselves, who may be unable to confront the ambiguities within their lives and their experiences with their occupations.

This normative order carries similar consequences as the normative order of competence when it comes to the data on danger in policing: the underreporting of injuries or illnesses considered “impure” or “bad” and the voluntary reporting of injuries or illnesses considered “good” or “pure.”
The danger imperative

Sierra-Arévalo spent nearly 1,000 hours between 2014 and 2016 observing police officers across three large urban departments: one on the East coast, one in the southwest, and one on the West coast. He also interviewed just shy of 100 officers from these same departments. He does not directly engage with Herbert’s normative orders, but argues that policing is defined by what he calls the “danger imperative,” which is a “preoccupation with violence and demand for officer safety…a cultural frame that orients police officers’ perception and behavior” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, pp. 3-4). This frame --- rather than providing alternate normative orders to those proposed by Herbert (1998) and discussed above --- “underlies and unifies” those orders (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 13).

Research demonstrates that physical injuries are only one of the dangers of policing (Brandl & Stroshine, 2012). Other dangers include the possibility of cognitive, behavioral, and/or emotional harm (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25). Yet police culture overwhelmingly focuses on and revolves around the “potential for physical injury and death,” which is believed to “require[] immediate and unquestioned action from [officers] and their comrades on patrol” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 14; emphasis added).

Sierra-Arévalo explains that the danger imperative is created and perpetuated in police organizations by means of “information that comes to police from within and outside the police department” (2016, p. 14). This information includes news and social media, academy instructors, other officers, superiors, and officers’ own experience. These various sources of information “are all interpreted through the frame of the danger imperative, emphasis placed on person-to-person violence in the line of duty” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 14; emphasis added). Kasprow et al. (1988) call this “social amplification,” a process by which the perceived risk of statistically rare events is heightened. One important way that such risks are made more memorable and imaginable is through the re-telling of departmental ‘war stories’ (Van Maanen, 1978a, pp. 297–98) that “provide officers with vivid evidence of just how dangerous their work is” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 16).

Sierra-Arévalo argues that the danger imperative and the “safety-enhancing behaviors” it engenders reify that same danger imperative and the “underlying assumption of police work as dangerous” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 15). Such ‘safety-enhancing behaviors’ may include the preemptive use of force (Zimring, 2017) or the failure to wear a seatbelt to ensure quicker access to one’s service weapon or ability to jump out of the car at a moment’s notice to chase (or defend oneself from) a suspect. I argue that the “behaviors” of police should be extended to include the data that they collect about the dangers of their occupation, especially because such data collection is voluntary (Zimring, 2017). The danger imperative creates incentives for reporting and amplifying certain experiences and dangers in data collection. The knowledge produced by such data will then reify the danger imperative as well as the normative orders “and patterns of action that make up the broader organizational culture of the department” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 15; see also Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Van Maanen & Schien, 1979). Thus, the danger imperative is the dominant cultural frame through which the normative orders of policing are experienced and the way that police work -- including the work of collecting and reporting data -- is performed.

Data activism

CDS offers a normative prescription to counteract the power relationships inherent in and often made invisible by hegemonic data collection practices. This comes in the form of “data
activism” (Milan & van der Velden, 2016), which is also known as “counter-data activism” (Currie et al., 2016). Data activism occurs when “individuals actively interrogate data and their relation to it” (Currie et al., 2016, p. 3). Data activism involves empowering those whom existing data assemblages may disempower, and/or devising new metrics to supplement or supplant existing authoritative ones (Currie et al., 2016, p. 4). Currie et al., for example, held a “hackathon” for community members in Los Angeles to explore policing data:

[W]e worked side-by-side with the participants with the goal of understanding the ways different actors collect and organize POIH [police officer-involved homicide] data -- in tabular and visual formats, in coding practices and on social media -- in order to imagine how these processes might proceed otherwise (2016, p. 7).

In the coming chapters, where relevant, I will highlight what such community data activism efforts exist related to the dangers of policing. Even though efforts to interrogate the prominent FBI data on police injuries and fatalities do exist, I will demonstrate how these same efforts reflect the normative orders of those involved. This is especially prevalent in existing efforts to collect data in police officer suicide.

Conclusion

In this chapter I introduced the theoretical approach that I take in this dissertation to study data collection on the dangers of policing. I employ the nascent but rapidly-growing field of critical data studies and explore its call to dig beneath the surface of data to uncover the data assemblages that constitute them. I argue that databases on the dangers of policing “are not simply a neutral, technical means of assembling and sharing data but are bundles of contingent and relational processes that do work in the world” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2018, p. 6).

I employ Herbert’s (1998) six normative orders of policing, undergirded and unified by the danger imperative (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016), as a means of understanding how the subculture of policing and the data this subculture produces may be mutually constitutive. Put differently, I introduce normative orders to provide a framework to understand how police culture might both reflect and reinforce the knowledge produced by data that same culture collects. In the following chapters, I seek to answer the following questions (based on Currie et al., 2016, p. 3) in my CDS-inspired study of policing data:

1. How does the data currently available about the dangers of policing reify certain assumptions about the world of police officers, as well as involve and extend regimes of power?
2. How were the choices made about definitions of various dangers, granularity, and scope of the dataset, and different datasets’ positions within wider assemblages of support?
3. How, if at all, are actors engaging in data activism by actively interrogating data on the dangers of policing and their relation to them?
Chapter 3: Methods

Sources of empirical data

I use a variety of data sources in this dissertation. Chapter 4’s exploration of the history of the IACP relies primarily on that organization’s own annual convention minutes, primarily from the years 1893-1905. I am grateful for the extensive collection available in Hathitrust which allowed me to access these records. I also rely throughout this dissertation on government documents, including records of congressional hearings and committee reports on various bills related to law enforcement. I accessed these using the US Congressional Serial Set Digital Collection. I also use media coverage. I accessed historical newspapers (coverage from the late 19th and 20th centuries) through ProQuest’s historical newspapers database. I accessed more recent media coverage, especially from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, through my subscriptions to those news sites.

I use publicly-available police officer injury and fatality data from LEOKA, as well as line-of-duty death data from ODMP and NLEOMF. I also mined each of these database’s websites extensively for information on their histories, founders, and current leadership. I contacted the Research Manager from NLEOMF and the Director of Research from ODMP both by email and telephone. They provided me with the raw data that is published on each organization’s website and assisted me in understanding their criteria for inclusion and exclusion. I also communicated with LEOKA staff by email numerous times over the years; they helped clarify the history of their data collection and point me to the sources of LEOKA’s data collection authority.

I submitted electronic open records requests to MPD and CPD (described in greater detail in the following section on site description). I requested the same data from each department: non-identifiable officer injury data for 2015-2018 and, for the subset of those injuries caused by civilian assault, information on individuals arrested for assaulting a peace officer. I also requested this data from two other major metropolitan police departments. One, on the west coast, responded that they had no data responsive to my request. The other, in the Midwest, initially sent a letter indicating they needed another week to work on my request, but I have not heard anything since.

MPD provided me a dataset in Excel format that included all assaults on MPD officers between the years 2015 and 2018. Over the course of six months, I repeatedly attempted to obtain from MPD the full scope of what I requested, that is, all injuries to sworn officers, not just assaults on police. I spoke with multiple members of the open records division who indicated that the data was coming, but I never received it. My efforts in this dissertation were accordingly limited by my inability to speak to any injury-causing incidents in MPD beyond civilian assault.

CPD provided me a dataset in Excel format documenting all injuries to police department employees for which a workers’ compensation claim was filed. This spreadsheet was created and is maintained by the third-party administrator (TPA) of their workers’ compensation insurance. As indicated above, I initially requested only the years 2015-2018. However, during a phone call with CPD’s open records supervisor, he indicated that his office could easily provide me injury data as far back as 2010. I enthusiastically accepted this more longitudinal dataset. I sorted the dataset to
remove injuries sustained by civilians working for the police department (i.e. secretaries and administrative assistants).

I also reviewed the police academy training manual for the state in which MPD and CPD are located.

I used various sources to study police officer suicide: media reports, the website of Blue H.E.L.P., and the PowerPoint presentation used at the 2019 Law Enforcement Suicide Prevention Symposium in New York City. For background information on police officer suicide I spoke to Dr. Robert E. Douglas, Jr., who runs the National Police Suicide Foundation. I also spoke to Timothy Wiles, owner of Renovo Advantage (a company that provides critical incident stress recovery). Steve Weiss of ODMP also provided helpful background on police officer suicide in NYPD.

Site Description

I collected injury and assault data from two urban police departments located in the same eastern state and selected to represent a significant comparative divide in the rate of assaults causing injury to police officers in the line of duty. Departments in cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000 inhabitants experience approximately double the rate of assaults causing injury to officers compared to cities with populations of greater than 250,000 (FBI LEOKA, 2017). Law enforcement officers in medium-sized cities are also feloniously killed in the line of duty at a rate 30% higher than those in the largest cities (FBI LEOKA, 2017). There are a number of potential reasons for these differences across population groups: different bureaucratic pressures, differential access to advanced training and weaponry, and increased use of one-person patrols in smaller cities (Zimring 2017). This site selection thus focuses on a region of the U.S. less studied in the policing research and controls for state and region while enabling the exploration of variations in danger across size of population patrolled. The first data collection site is “Metro Police Department” (MPD; a pseudonym), which is located in a densely-populated urban city of about one-half million residents located in a larger metropolitan area. The second site is “Community Police Department” (CPD; a pseudonym), which is located in a city of approximately 150,000 people, also surrounded by a metropolitan area. MPD and CPD employ approximately 2,000 and 600 sworn officers, respectively. Each has standard departmental administrative hierarchies overseeing regional precincts/zones and a variety of specialized units, including SWAT and gang units.

Data collection strategies

As outlined above, I submitted open records requests to both MPD and CPD. I asked each department for non-identifiable information on all injuries to sworn police officers, from all causes, for the years 2015 through 2018. I also asked that, for the subset of those injuries caused by civilian assault, they provide me with offender information when someone had been arrested and charged with assaulting a peace officer.
Both departments have specialized divisions to respond to open records requests and both operate under the same state law regarding what must be disclosed, what may be disclosed, and what cannot (or should not) be disclosed.

I received very different responses to my request. CPD provided me injury data from all causes for the years 2010 through 2018, giving me five years in addition than what I initially requested. These injuries were compiled by CPD’s workers’ compensation TPA. CPD was not able to provide me a full dataset of offender information for those arrested and charged with assaulting a peace officer due to the department’s hierarchy rule in counting and recording offenses. This rule stipulates that only the highest offense is recorded. Assault on a peace officer was the highest charge for only 12 suspects from CPD during the years 2015-2018, so I decided not to use that offender data here.

MPD provided me a dataset that contained only assaults on officers, not injuries. I read the extensive descriptive field for each assault to decipher whether and to what extent the officer was injured. I repeatedly requested that the open records office supplement their initial disclosure with injury data from all causes, rather than just from civilian assault, but I was unsuccessful in this attempt. MPD did link officer assaults with offender data, though, which allowed me to engage in a much more detailed exploration of who assaults MPD officers. I was not able to engage in a similar query for CPD.

Challenges encountered; reflexive issues

This dissertation was initially conceived as a project that would involve data collection both through open records requests to MPD and CPD as well as interviews with officers in both departments. I spent nearly a year attempting to gain access to CPD and MPD officers for the purposes of interviewing them. MPD did not deny my requests; they ignored them – phone calls and emails went unanswered, month after month. I attempted to contact both police leadership as well as the public affairs office, with the same result.

I was more successful in initial conversations with CPD and got as far as their public affairs office reviewing my interview schedule in preparation for sending my invitation to participate to officers. However, as my request was pending, an officer was killed in the line of duty, shot dead while investigating a robbery. This was the first shooting death of an officer (apart from suicide) in thirty years, and the department was understandably shaken. I cannot say with certainty that the officer’s death was dispositive for the department’s decision to ultimately deny my request to interview officers, but I believe it was the driving factor. The department was not enthusiastic about an outside researcher asking officers questions about the dangers of their occupation in the immediate aftermath of the shooting death of an officer.

The lack of interview data limits my ability to speak to these officers’ perceptions of the dangers of their occupation as well as how they make sense of those dangers through storytelling. I therefore rely more extensively on the work of others, especially Sierra-Arévalo, whose nearly 1,000 hours of observation and roughly 100 interviews with officers in three urban departments provide important insight into what officers believe poses the greatest risk to them. Multiple informal
conversations with CPD and MPD officers confirm Sierra-Arévalo’s account, but I am unable to use those conversations because they were not conducted within the purview of my IRB approval.

My difficulties gaining entrée are not entirely surprising given the insularity and social isolation between police and “nonpolice” like me (Paoline, 2003, p. 203). Also, I attempted to study two departments that do not have a history of working with outside researchers.

Another challenge lay in the starkly different datasets provided to me by MPD and CPD. I had hoped to receive injury data that I could easily compare. This was not the case. The datasets contained fundamentally different information collected for different purposes: CPD’s dataset of officer injuries is one assembled and maintained by its workers’ compensation third-party administrator, whereas MPD’s dataset contained only assaults on officers collected presumably for submission to the FBI’s LEOKA program. MPD provided me offender data for those arrested and charged with assaulting a peace officer; CPD did not. It was therefore very challenging to directly compare the two departments’ data.

As with many projects, I encountered interpersonal challenges. I had to speak extensively to personnel in open records offices at CPD and MPD, often multiple times a week over the course of nearly a year. One relationship proved to be especially interesting. The officer from MPD who was in charge of fulfilling my open records request began emailing me religious messages when I checked in about the status of my request. It started with “GOD BLESS…” and progressed to, “THIS IS THE DAY THAT THE LORD HAS MADE AND WE SHALL ALL REJOICE AND BE GLAD IN IT!” Finally, he wrote, “Ahhhhbla….aahhhblabla….aahhhblabla….aaahhhblabla….that means I’m getting the holy ghost!” I was never sure how to respond to these messages. I did not want to alienate him, given the power he had over fulfilling my request. I finally wrote, “Amen!”

I never received the full scope of my open records request (all injuries to sworn officers, from all causes) despite my repeated phone calls and emails with that officer and his supervisor.

My gender may have played a role in my fieldwork: “the dynamics between researcher and researched when a woman researchers a male dominated environment are bound up with power and status, and these issues may interact with the subject of study” (Horn, 1997, p. 305). Nearly everyone with whom I interacted over the course of my fieldwork was male: those working in both CPD and MPD’s open records offices; those officers and experts with whom I conducted preliminary and background interviews; the director of research for ODMP. The rare exceptions were the open records supervisor from MPD (with whom I was finally put in contact after months of working with the individual described above), and the director of research from NLEOMF.

Hunt (1984) identified that police tend to associate women with the ‘clean’ world of police management rather than the ‘dirty’ world of patrol officers; this makes it more likely that officers may see women researchers as ‘spies’ (Horn, 1997). If I was perceived as a spy, this might have impeded my access to MPD and CPD, especially given that neither department approved my request to interview their officers. Perhaps I would have received such permission if I was a male and therefore “one of the boys” (Horn, 1997).
But, my gender may also have helped me. Though I did not receive permission to interview officers, I was provided extensive injury and assault data by MPD and CPD. The departments could have denied my open records requests under the justification that what I was requesting would constitute medical records or identifiable government employee data. Had the departments done this, I would have been left to challenge their decision with a lengthy appeals process. Perhaps, as a woman, the departments saw me as “harmless and unthreatening,” and were therefore willing to release information to me (Horn, 1997, p. 299).

A final obvious limitation is my own lack of experience as a law enforcement officer. My perceptions of police work are grounded in my admittedly privileged experience as a graduate student studying the police. Karaffa (2012) and Kirschman, Kamena, and Fay (2015) write about the frequency with which police officers are mistrustful of mental health professionals who have no law enforcement experience. Many researchers note the mistrust that police have for all outsiders (Skolnick, 2008). Similarly, I am an outsider looking in to the world of policing.
Chapter 4: Police culture and the history of
the IACP

Introduction

Today, the International Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP) claims to be “the
world’s largest and most influential professional association for police leaders” with more than
30,000 members throughout 150 countries (IACP, Membership). The IACP dates back to the late
1800s, when a group of police chiefs met in Chicago during the World’s Fair. It was an exciting time
for these chiefs (all men). Rail travel allowed them to come together from distant cities to share
stories and enjoy the fair’s attractions. They were eager to cooperate with one another in the
apprehension and detention of criminals who – along with the rest of the country – were becoming
increasingly mobile, moving between jurisdictions. The men unanimously adopted the Bertillon
system of criminal identification, which was cutting edge at the time. Whereas criminals were
previously identified by description alone (McCorn, 1986), Alphonse Bertillon’s system combined
photographs with detailed measurements and the classification of unique features, which were
recorded on standardized cards in orderly files (“Visible Proofs,” n.d.). The chiefs vowed not only to
help one another arrest and detain criminals, but to go home and advocate to their home legislatures
for the adoption of the Bertillon system.

The IACP is a key player in a critical-data study of danger in policing. The support of its
members was crucial in overcoming opposition to the formation of the FBI, which the IACP saw as
necessary “to provide a platform to facilitate information exchange” (Richman & Seo, 2019a, p. 4).
The IACP transferred its own internal criminal records to the FBI, and rallied for the creation of the
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program that would expand the IACP’s early efforts on a national
scale and with the budgetary resources of the federal government. Within a decade after the creation
of the UCR program, it was collecting not only general crime data but also statistics on police
officers killed in the line of duty. Ultimately, the UCR program would alert the public to the crime
that necessitated police presence as well as the dangers that officers faced in the line of duty.

In this chapter, I employ the genealogical method to explore the earliest years of the IACP,
highlighting the presence of Herbert’s normative orders – and tensions between these orders -- in
the meeting minutes from the organization’s first dozen years of existence (1893-1905). According
to Merry (2016), the genealogical method:

asks how an indicator develops, which actors and institutions promote and finance it, and
how and when its features become settled. It considers how the creators grapple with
converting the broad terms of a standard into a series of measurable and named phenomena
(p. 6).

Although Merry uses the genealogical method to study global indicators related to human
rights, I adopt her approach here -- in the spirit of CDS -- to dig into the rarely told (and if told, only
superficially) creation story for national data collection on the dangers of policing. In this chapter, I
identify the actors and institutions that have participated in and shaped this process. I further assert
that both “data inertia” and “expertise inertia” are present in national data collection on the dangers
of policing, especially when taking into consideration the relationship between LEOKA and subsequent databases which use LEOKA as a model.

Merry (2016) explains that expertise inertia occurs when “insiders with skills and experience have a greater say in developing measurement systems than those without -- a pattern that excludes the inexperienced and powerless” (p. 6). Data inertia, on the other hand, “occurs because reliance on existing data constrains what can be measured, and new issues require either the use of existing data as proxies or the expensive collection of new data” (Merry, 2016, p. 209).

I demonstrate here that decisions about what data to collect regarding the dangers of policing have been made primarily (although not surprisingly) by members of the law enforcement community. From what I can decipher from the written record, these decision-makers were exclusively men. The dominance of male law enforcement officials in the creation and expansion of data collection on the dangers of policing point to the relevance of Herbert’s (1998) theory of the normative orders of police subculture. These normative orders help make sense of why certain data on the dangers of policing are collected and amplified, while others are omitted from the national storyline of danger in policing.

The genealogy of national data collection on the dangers of policing

The history of data collection on the dangers of policing is deeply and inextricably tied to data collection on crime and efforts to standardize data collection about crime across jurisdictions. The FBI’s UCR program was the first national effort to collect information on police killed in the line of duty.

Before the early 20th century, crime was a “more or less local issue” (Richman & Seo, 2019a, p. 4, quoting J. Edgar Hoover, 1925). Perpetrators tended to stay close to the areas where they committed their crimes, and policing was a local affair. With the advent of mass-produced automobiles and railroad travel, however, criminals became more mobile, and police officials began to work together to track perpetrators across jurisdictional lines (Richman & Seo, 2019). Early efforts at understanding crime nationally focused on inmates by including questions targeted at them starting in the 1850 U.S. census. Criminal statistician Leonard Robinson called this census data “worthless” (Robinson, 1911). Prison census data allowed for an insight into offenders, but not total incidents of crime (Rosen, 1995).

The late 19th century saw the first efforts at organizing police professionals across multiple jurisdictions throughout the United States. A National Police Convention was held in St. Louis in 1871, and the National Chiefs of Police Union (now the IACP) was created in 1893 in Chicago. In the following sections, I draw on media accounts and archival evidence to explore the players involved in order to shed light on the “social and cultural worlds of the actors and organizations” that participated in the creation of data on the dangers of policing, as well as “the regimes of power within which [these data] are formed” (Merry, 2016, pp. 4-5).
National Police Convention of 1871

An early effort to organize police chiefs occurred in 1871 when then Chief of Police of St. Louis, Captain James McDonough, organized a National Police Convention (“A National Police Convention in St. Louis,” 1871). The goals of this convention were lofty: it aimed to include “Chiefs of every city in the Union” with the purpose of “taking council together to inaugurate and adopt a code of rules and regulations, whereby the whole detective force of the country can act in union for the prevention and detection of crime” (Tenth Annual Report of the Board of Police Commissioners of St. Louis, 1871, p. 296). Chief McDonough traveled in the summer of 1871 from St. Louis to Washington, D.C. to meet with Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and “through [Secretary Fish], to open up a communication with foreign countries in regard to their police, detective, and reformatory systems” (“A National Police Convention in St. Louis,” 1871). McDonough then reportedly planned to travel through more than a dozen large cities on his way back to St. Louis, “to confer with the heads of the Police Department, and prepare the way for a successful conference of the Captains of the Police and Mayors of the principal cities on the continent” (“A National Police Convention in St. Louis,” 1871). The convention was held in St. Louis on October 22, 1871, at which the attendees discussed “improving the conditions of the abandoned youth of both sexes...a systematic plan for transmitting detective information throughout the country...consideration of the question of social evil...a perfect system of Police telegraphing throughout the several states...photographs, and a regular system for exchange of the same... [and] [t]he subject of reward for extraordinary service” (“Meeting of the National Police Convention,” 1871).

Despite the hoopla leading up to this convention, its legacy was “short lived” (Upson, 1929, p. 122). One possible reason for this is that the Convention’s organizer, Chief McDonough, came under investigation in 1873 for dozens of charges including “drunkenness”, cock-fighting, and many specifications that came under the general head of abuse of official authority” (“Investigation of the Charges Against Chief of Police McDonough,” 1873). McDonough eventually stood trial for false imprisonment after arresting and imprisoning a female neighbor with whom his wife had exchanged “impolite words,” (“The Chief of Police Being Investigated—His Dismissal Probable,” 1873). He was acquitted at trial (“Verdict of ‘Not Guilty’ in the Case of Chief of Police McDonough,” 1873). McDonough remained in office for another decade, but his efforts at standardizing a national detective force never came to fruition.

Although McDonough’s efforts to organize police leadership in the 1871 convention might be considered admirable, it appears from the written record that McDonough embodied the “aggressive, physical action” and “strong sense of competitiveness and preoccupation with the imagery of conflict” associated with the normative order of machismo in police culture (Fielding, 1994, p. 47). Ten years after the investigations described above, he again made local headlines:

Two reporters happened to be in [Chief McDonough’s] office [after a contentious meeting of police commissioners]...He ordered the journalists out of the house, but [one of them], considering the Chief’s office a public resort, failed to obey the order. The Chief, who is as broad and fat -- although not quite so tall -- as Falstaff is represented to have been, grew red in the face with anger. He struck at the newspaper-man, hit him two buttons above the belt, and was about to follow up this blow with another when police officers stepped in and acted

4 Another article noted that “there will be little difficulty in proving that the Chief was seriously under the influence of liquor for days and even weeks in succession” (“The Chief of Police Being Investigated—His Dismissal Probable,” 1873).
Even the highest-ranking police officer in St. Louis was not above displays of hyper-masculinity that characterized police culture. McDonough was replaced as Chief of Police of St. Louis soon after this incident (“The St. Louis Chief of Police,” 1884). It would be another two decades until the next effort by police officials to organize nationally.

The creation of the National Chiefs of Police Union

On May 18, 1893, a group of about four dozen police chiefs met in Chicago during the World’s Fair (Upson, 1929, p. 122). Chief Webber Seavey, the first police chief of Omaha, Nebraska, led the effort to organize the meeting and presided over it (“Law and Order. Many Chiefs of Police in Consultation at Chicago,” 1893; “OPD History,” n.d.). Chief Seavey was joined in his organizing efforts by Philip Deitsch, superintendent of Cincinnati’s police force (“Chiefs of Police Coming,” 1895).

Reports vary as to the total number of police chiefs in attendance at the Chicago meeting. Some media accounts note that there were 48 (“Chiefs of Police Coming,” 1895), while others note the presence of 51 (Upson, 1929, p. 122) or even 75 (“They Adopt the Bertillion System,” 1893), but the report of the Secretary from that meeting lists 51 (including Chief Seavey). Those attending were “gentlemen, each the head of the police department in as many different cities of the United States” (“Chiefs of Police Coming,” 1895). They met with the goal -- not dissimilar from that of Chief McDonough two decades earlier -- “to consult as to police administration and improved methods of detection and prevention of crime” (“Law and Order. Many Chiefs of Police in Consultation at Chicago,” 1893). These men formed the National Chiefs of Police Union (“the Union”) and elected Chief Seavey as President. They also elected various vice-presidents to represent some of the larger cities in attendance: Benjamin P. Eldridge (of Boston); Roger O’Mara (of Pittsburgh); W.C. Davis (of Memphis); Thomas M. Speers (of Kansas City); L. Harrigan (of St. Louis); P. Crowley (of San Francisco); and A.B. Connolly (of Atlanta). Henry O. Carr of Grand Rapids was elected secretary and treasurer (“Police Chiefs Convention,” 1893; Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 10). Membership would be open to “any Chief of Police or Superintendent in any city or town in the United States and Canada” (Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 18). The newly-elected President Seavey created a three-man executive committee (Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 12) and the men assembled themselves into various other committees, such as one “to consider the questions of making arrests by telegraph and for vagrancy” (“They Adopt the Bertillion System,” 1893) and another to “draw up and recommend civil service rules whereby all police officers shall be selected according to a uniform standard as to mental and physical qualifications” (Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 12).

The assembled men made various promises and adopted resolutions with the intent of increasing uniformity and cooperation across their jurisdictions. The Union unanimously adopted the Bertillon system of identification of criminals and resolved to “do everyone in our power to hold in custody such persons until the arrival of the proper officers with requisition papers” (Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 12).

---

5 His last name is alternatively spelled Seavy in some publications.
Committee on Organization, 1893, pp. 15-16). They made time for fun, too, accepting an invitation from the manager of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show to attend a performance on May 19 (Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 17).

Unlike McDonough’s earlier effort, this Union had sufficient momentum and enthusiasm from its inaugural members to plan a second annual meeting the following May 1894 in St. Louis (“A Council of Chiefs,” 1895). “[N]early a hundred” (“Chiefs of Police in Convention,” 1895) officials attended the St. Louis meeting where the same executive officials were reelected (“A Council of Chiefs,” 1895), though there is no formal record of that meeting.⁶

The Union continued to grow, holding annual meetings to pursue its agenda -- “the establishment of a certain central bureau” and the achievement of “closer bonds of affiliation” in order to “reduce[ ] their work to more systematic lines...to promote efficiency in the detection and prevention of criminal offenses” (“Chiefs of Police in Convention,” 1895).

At the Union’s second meeting (also called the first annual meeting) in St. Louis in 1894, the men “sent a memorial to Congress requesting that our Government establish in connection with the Department of Justice, a bureau for the identification of criminals and for the recollection and dissemination of information concerning criminals and the criminal classes” (“Second Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 11). This highlights just how early in its existence the Union was advocating for the national collection of crime information -- advocacy that would eventually contribute to the creation of the FBI (Richman & Seo, 2019a, p. 28).

The organization’s name changed a number of times before settling on the name by which it is known today. The Union’s name was changed at the second annual meeting in Washington, D.C. to “The National Association of Chiefs of Police of the United States and Canada” (“Second Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 11). At the sixth annual convention in Chattanooga, Tennessee, it was again changed to “The International Association of Police Officials” (“Sixth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 31). Finally, at the ninth annual convention in Louisville, KY, in 1902, the name was changed to the “International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) by which it is still known today (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 77). Hereafter, I will refer to the organization as IACP, even when referring to its first ten years of existence.

Normative orders of policing in the IACP’s early years

Herbert wrote about the normative orders of policing in 1998. By this time, the IACP had already celebrated its centennial and was a powerful organization with thousands of members worldwide. My archival exploration reveals that Herbert’s (1998) normative orders were evident in the IACP from its earliest days, as was Sierra-Arévalo’s danger imperative, which serves as a unifying force for those normative orders. These aspects of police culture were present regardless of the fact that scholars were not yet studying them. The IACP pre-dated the existence of data collection on American policing and, importantly, helped determine what data would be collected about the police. As I will show in the coming chapters, the data that is still and has historically been collected both

---

⁶ The Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the IACP from 1893-1905 skip from 1893 (in Chicago) to 1895 (in Washington, D.C.). There is no written record of the 1984 meeting included in the compiled annual conventions’ minutes.
reflects and reinforces the normative orders of policing that have been visible since the earliest days of nationally-organized police.

**Normative order of machismo/adventure**

Chief Deitsch of Cincinnati – credited with co-organizing the first IACP meeting in Chicago – embodied the normative order of adventure/machismo. Deitsch was praised in the news while serving as chief of police for his “adventures with the redskins” in the 1850s (“The Chief Tells Indian Tales,” 1895). An 1895 article retells these adventures in what reads like a Wild West novel. Deitsch, at 17, joined the U.S. Army and was sent with a company of 35 soldiers on a surveying expedition along the Pacific coast in Oregon. His party survived an attack from a “tribe of hostile Indians.” Later, Deitsch was separated from his group and encountered “four powerful Indians, naked as they were born,” who led him back to safety. At one point in the journey, “four nights and four days they spent without sleep” while being pursued by a band of Indians; at some point Deitsch was wounded in the wrist by an arrow. A doctor wanted to amputate Deitsch’s arm, but “a squaw cured him.” The article concludes that Deitch’s “life in the West was full of danger and excitement, and he could talk for a week and not exhaust the story of his adventures” (“The Chief Tells Indian Tales,” 1895). Such was the quality of the men leading the May 1893 meeting in Chicago.

As conceived by Herbert, this normative order is about a willingness to rush into dangerous situations and demonstrate bravery. This is evident from the 1904 convention when Chief Bennett of Braddock, Pennsylvania noted:

> The soldier upon the field of battle surrounded by his companions is in danger for a time, but with the patrolman, single and alone it is an ever-recurring, daily condition. He must be brave, physically strong, cool in action and careful of judgment (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 89).

Braddock’s explanation of the “ideal officer” almost perfectly resembles the normative order of machismo/adventure about which Herbert wrote nearly 100 years later.

Other scholars emphasize the more exclusionary aspects of machismo. Fielding (1994) argues that police culture is actually a “pure form of ‘hegemonic masculinity’” (p. 47, emphasis added). While Fielding would agree with Herbert that police cultural values highlight “aggressive, physical action;” he adds that the following are also present:

> a strong sense of competitiveness and preoccupation with the imagery of conflict… an exaggerated heterosexual orientation, often articulated in terms of misogynistic and patriarchal attitudes to women; and… the operation of rigid in-group/out-group distinctions whose consequences are strongly exclusionary in the case of out-groups and strongly assertive of loyalty and affinity in the case of in-groups (p. 47).

Adventure and machismo, for Herbert, are about “courage and bravery,” “the thrill of the hunt,” and “regaling listeners with story after story of various precarious situations” (1998, p. 356). But, reading through the IACP’s early records reveals that Herbert’s conception of adventure/machismo does not go far enough. Masculinity in early IACP records is much more reflective of Fielding’s
conception of hegemonic masculinity, especially in regards to patriarchal attitudes towards women and the exclusionary, out-group treatment of Blacks.

Women in the IACP’s early years

That the IACP was an all-boys’ club is clear from the organization’s earliest records, where speeches begin with “Gentlemen of the Convention...” or “Brothers.” Speakers regularly refer to those they are addressing as “brother Chiefs” and refer to their relationship with one another as a “brotherhood of men” (“Twelfth Annual Session...”, 1971, p. 49).7

Women are sometimes discussed, but apparently never included in the early proceedings. The IACP’s early constitution uses exclusively male pronouns (“Every person...desirous of becoming a member of this Association, shall file his application with the Secretary...”) (“Sixth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 33). Women are sometimes objectified. For example, at the 1902 convention held in Louisville, Kentucky, R. Lee Suter of Louisville’s Board of Public Safety welcomed the group by saying, “our women are the fairest, our horses the fastest and our whisky -- well, you will have an opportunity to judge of that as you round into condition for the transaction of business before you” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 8). That same year, the IACP’s President (then Richard Sylvester), addressed the association as “Brother Members of the National Association of Chiefs of Police” and, echoing Suter’s earlier pronouncement on the aesthetic qualities of local women, praised host state Kentucky as “renowned for the production of distinguished men, beautiful women, fine horses...” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 12). The men even formally passed a resolution in the minutes from that convention that “our eyes have feasted on the pretty women and fast horses for which Kentucky is proverbial, and... the whiskey is as good as expected” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 85). Fielding’s (1994) understanding of the exaggerated heterosexual orientation that is normative in police culture is visible in the way those present at the 1902 convention -- all men -- repeatedly describe the women of Kentucky.

Other references to women in the IACP’s proceedings between 1893 and 1905 are still paternalistic, even if less overtly heterosexual in nature than the comments from Kentucky. At the 1903 convention in New Orleans, Chief J. W. Ball of Atlanta, GA announced in a speech that “[t]he noblest work, in my opinion, which can be accomplished by any police department, barring the suppression of crime and preservation of peace, is that of seeking to help and uplift the poor, unfortunate characters who daily come within the scope of our observation. In all our principal cities there are more of less unfortunate women and children...” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 55). This phrasing is common throughout speeches made at that and other conventions.9

---

7 Throughout this dissertation I capitalize Black and White (as well as other racial and ethnic group designations) in accordance with the APA Style Guide (“APA Style Blog: Spelling Success in APA Style,” 2013). I am conscious, however, that this may be inconsistent with other writers, and that the capitalization of Black and White might perpetuate a monolithic view of race (Burnett, 2016). Others see capitalizing White as problematic, given the association with White supremacists (Perlman, 2015). Style guides vary: while the Associated Press and the New York Times call for writing back “black” and “white” with lowercase letters, The Chicago Manual of Style allows capitalization at the author’s discretion, and the APA calls for capitalization. When I cite other writers, I retain the case usage of the original source.

8 See also the second Annual Convention (1979, p. 19): “[W]e ought to recognize our Union as one common brotherhood...”

9 For example, at the 1904 convention in St. Louis, Chief Rea of Fort Worth, Texas admonished, in a speech about crime, petty thieves who “plunder[] women, children, and babies” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 68).
Women are alternately discussed as sexual objects, helpless, motherly, and sympathetic in the IACP’s records of its first twelve conventions. At the 1895 convention in Washington, D.C., the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia welcomed the visiting chiefs, in part, by saying that “the efficient policeman is apt to have friends. The business man upon his beat, the private citizens, the women and children come to know the man who is faithful to his trust...How often has a man on the police force saved some wayward girl from a fate which is far worse than death?” (“Second Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 6). At the eighth annual convention in New York City in 1901, Chief B.F. Howard of Richmond, Virginia blamed women for failing in their motherly duties, arguing that this caused criminality in their children:

I think mothers owe it to themselves and their children to look after their boys and keep track of their movements and whereabouts...They ought to know their children better and keep them from roaming with evil companions. They should not say to their little son, as a great many do, ‘oh, go way and do not bother me, I have no time to trouble with you now.’ The mother who has no time to have a pleasant work for her children, and talks in such a way, will in five or six years have a heavy penalty to pay for her folly. Her baby will get into mischief, then into more serious trouble, and then it dawns upon her mind the stinging thought of her neglect of duty to her son by allowing him in his younger days to run in the streets. She will see her mistake, but ah, more than likely too late, too late (“Eighth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 26).

At the 1903 convention, John Foster, the Chief of Police of Camden, New Jersey, called for the “appointment of police matrons everywhere” to deal with female offenders. He noted that “[o]nly a police matron, with a motherly and sympathetic nature, can learn all the facts in cases of this sort” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 99). At the 12th annual session held in 1905 in Washington, D.C., Chief Corey from Brookline, MA spoke to the convention about legal loopholes allowing perpetrators to escape justice which he claimed fostered mob rule: “the most revolting crime against the honor and chastity of women may, through legal sharp practice, appeal from one court to another, with the hope that they will wholly escape the penalties imposed by the laws of the land” (“Twelfth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 53).

Race in the IACP’s early years

The racially exclusionary nature of the IACP is clear from the organization’s early records. One of the earliest and more disturbing race-related entries in this early history comes from the 1899 convention in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The minutes note that after the Tuesday morning session of May 9, 1899:

Chief Hill of Chattanooga then invited the chiefs to witness the blood hound chase after a negro. The chase to take place on the bank of the Tennessee River, and the delegates to see the exhibition from the decks of a steamboat during the afternoon, and to attend the cake walk at the Auditorium at night. Both invitations were accepted (“Sixth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 7).

This casual entry revealed that dozens of White men would watch from a boat while a dog chased (and possibly mauled) a Black man along the banks of a river, and then go eat cake. This entry speaks volumes about the racial views of those in attendance, and those responsible for note-taking. At that same 1899 convention, the Louisville, KY police chief presented a paper “giving comparative figures of different police departments of the country” (“Sixth Annual Convention,”
In his presentation, he noted that “Louisville police have a great deal of trouble with negroes, having a negro population of over 50,000, and where you find a dozen law abiding negroes, there are a hundred as vicious rascals as police ever had to contend with” (“Sixth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 16). The implication is that “negroes” are more inclined to criminality than Whites and therefore pose more problems to the police executives present at the convention.

At the tenth annual convention in 1903 there was an entire paper, prepared by Chief W. D. Vinzant of Jacksonville, Florida and read by President Sylvester, on “The Negro in Crime” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 58). The speech alleges that “the negro forms at least ninety-five per cent of the crime-committing classes” in Jacksonville, and the chief makes broad generalizations about “negro criminals” as a class: “the negro is most generally the most willing and anxious to squeal...the negro, while he is very wily, keen and dexterous in the commission of his offense, yet when he succeeds and completes his offense, and is apprehended, gets beyond his sphere and into deep water, and most always is the direct cause of his own conviction” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 59). Chief Vinzant’s speech goes on to categorize Blacks as ‘chicken thieves,’ ‘store thieves,’ ‘railroad thieves,’ ‘educated negro criminals,’ ‘turpentine negroes’ and ‘spotters’ (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, pp. 60-61). The chief makes clear that he does not believe Blacks can be ‘real’ police officers when describing the role of ‘spotters,’ which were Blacks who were paid to help catch other Blacks (because, as Vinzant notes, “it takes a nigger to catch a nigger”) (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 60): “The spotter...has never been known to hold his job for more than six months, for at the end of that time he generally thinks himself an officer or patrolman, and most generally winds up his career in impersonating an officer and extorting money by means of blackmail” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 60). This juxtaposes his view of White and Black communities:

In almost every locality in the south, just as the big white society folks have their Cotillion Clubs and German Clubs, and other dancing places, so do the crime-committing classes among the negroes have their dives and dancing halls, and it is these places of assembly that act as a magnet and chief attraction for the negro criminals in the city (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 61).

Chief Vinzent further postulates about the causes of criminality among Blacks, and in doing so, reiterates his view that Blacks are inferior to Whites: he hypothesizes that “[n]ecessity, as a rule, among negro thieves and burglars, is the foundation of their crime...and the negro does not differ from his higher brother in this respect” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 62; emphasis added).

This sentiment of racial superiority was echoed again two years later at the 1905 convention. Brookline, Massachusetts’s chief of police - in the same speech quoted above in which he espoused on the chastity of women - praised the “machinery of law” in Cuba in response to “one of the most revolting murder ever recorded, that of a white female infant of a year and a half, committed by a set of the most ignorant and fanatical [sic] negroes” (“Twelfth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 53).

There is also some evidence that the Bertillon System of criminal classification was used to support White supremacy. The Bertillon system was so lauded by the early members of the IACP that adopting the system was one of the organization’s first resolutions; members also resolved to lobby their home legislatures to also adopt the system. The Bertillon System involved taking precise measurements of various parts of offenders’ bodies. One presentation at the 1902 convention makes clear how Bertillon and other measurements could and were used to justify viewing Blacks as inferior. F.H. DePue of the San Francisco Police Department submitted a paper at the convention, proposing a “more subtle and covert application of Bertillonage” which involved projecting images of suspects, dissecting the images into a grid, and taking anthropometric measurements (Finn, 2009,
DePue described various “facial angle” measurements in descending order, noting the angle was:

In Europeans, from 7 to 85. In Indians, 73. In Africans, 70. In orang outangs, 55. In monkeys, 57. In dogs, 40. In sheep, 30. In horses, 23. Here you have a range of difference, through the facial angle alone, of mental character from the Caucasian scholar down to dogs and the horse with his single idea. Horses, you know, can have but one idea at a time… (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 100).

Some argue that Bertillon’s system “laid the groundwork for problematic profiling in the 20th century” and reflected “racist applications of eugenics and phrenology” (Meier, 2016). The method was extrapolated for use in the eugenics movement by Sir Francis Galton, who famously asked, "Could not the undesirables be got rid of and the desirables multiplied?" (Brauer, 2015, p. 145). The IACP’s early culture embraced an exclusionary stance towards Blacks, which was evident even in the earliest crime data collection efforts.

In his 1996 book *Black Police in America*, W. Marvin Delaney calls the IACP “the embodiment of professionalism among white police executives” (p. 110). It wasn’t until 1976 that “black police administrators formed their own organization, the National Order of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE)” (Delaney, 1996, p. 110). I could not identify definitively when IACP accepted its first Black member, but it may not have been until the late 1980s (“A History of African Americans in Law Enforcement,” 2017); the organization did not have a Black president until Lee Brown in 1990 (Dulaney, 1996, p. 157, note 13).

The way that early IACP members talk about women and Blacks during the earliest years of that organization’s history reveal that Herbert’s conception of the normative order of machismo/adventure is missing the element of White male hegemony that Fielding (1994) asserts is an important aspect of police culture (see also, Connell, 2005; Messerschmidt, 2017; Prokos & Padavic, 2002). Power is clearly operating as external discipline and control with regard to groups or categories of people that are being policed, such as Blacks. However, as I will discuss in coming chapters, this hegemonic exclusionary culture also exerts power inward on officers themselves, in the form of internal occupational discipline and control. As I discuss in Chapter 7, this internal discipline is especially prevalent in the case of suicide and mental health as well as data collection about those issues. Officers suffering from these issues (and their survivors, in the case of suicide), despite being ‘internal’ to policing, are treated as external and are excluded from normative police culture.

Machismo/adventure, exclusionary White male hegemony, and othering

Herbert’s normative order of machismo/adventure does cannot account for the exclusionary stance taken towards women and Blacks in the early IACP records. This exclusionary positioning is not just evident in the way the early IACP records regarding race and gender, however. Police executives repeatedly decry other members of the criminal justice system, including lawyers, judges, and lawmakers. These ‘others’ allow criminals to “escape justice” due to “innumerable loopholes afforded by badly drawn statutes...cumbersome jurisprudence...legal sharp practice” or “numerous continuances, for the sole purpose of tiring out the officer” made by attorneys who “know the ins

---

10 DePue’s proposed method was never adopted (Finn, 2009, p. 42).
11 The facial angle was “the horizontal angle formed by a line parallel to the bottom of the nose, with another line from the level of the upper jaw to the ridge of the frontal bone” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 100).
and outs of police court practice” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 35). Chiefs complain about “smart, ambitious lawyers” who do nothing but “bickering and fighting and trying to beat the policeman” (“Twelfth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 89). One chief goes as far as saying that “[i]t is largely the obstructive machinery of the laws that is responsible for the most virulent and disgraceful form of mob violence known as lynching” (“Twelfth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 52). Given that nearly three-quarters of all lynching victims were Black (“Lynchings: By State and Race, 1882-1968,” n.d.), this chief takes an exclusionary stance towards both Blacks and other criminal justice actors in a single statement.

The previous sections have highlighted how otherness and the process of othering are relevant to early police culture. Dervin (2015) explains that othering generally means:

- turning the other into an other, thus creating a boundary between different and similar, insiders and outsiders… Othering refers to differentiating discourses that lead to moral and political judgments of superiority and inferiority between ‘us’ and them.’ In this understanding of othering power is always employed in representing other and self. The other is also often described through a deficit framework, that is, s/he is not as good or capable as ‘we’ are, which leads to stereotypes and other forms of representation (p. 2).

Race and gender are well-documented instances of othering in police culture (for race, see Kochel, Wilson, & Mastrofski, 2011; Mastrofski, 2012; for gender, see Brown, 2007; Silvestri, 2017). I would argue that othering goes beyond just race and gender, however, as demonstrated by the examples shown above demonstrating police officers’ adversarial position to others in the criminal justice system. As I discuss below in the section proposing a new normative order of officer as victim, othering also happens between officers and ‘nonpolice’ at large and is manifested as a persistent belief among officers that they are undervalued.

The IACP’s Membership Committee may have functioned as another means of exclusionary gate-keeping. Whereas the earliest meeting stipulated that membership would be open to “any Chief of Police or Superintendent in any city or town in the United States and Canada” (Report of the Committee on Organization, 1893, p. 18) by 1899 there was an article inserted into the IACP’s constitution describing the process for “Applications for Membership,” which consisted of an applicant submitting an application containing “his name, position, and place of residence,” after which the Membership Committee would “make the necessary inquiry as to his qualifications and personal fitness for membership, and report to the Association” for the man’s admittance to be determined by a majority vote (“Sixth Annual Convention,” p. 33).

Normative order of safety

Early IACP records contain evidence of the dangers that the members viewed as being present in their occupation -- the danger by which they were “constantly surrounded” (“Eighth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 16). Although there are very few direct mentions or examples of specific dangers to officers within the IACP’s early records, the word “dangerous” is used to refer to the potential for physical violence, rather than mental trauma, mental illness, or suicide. One exception is when President Sylvester, in his annual address at the beginning of the 11th annual convention in St. Louis in 1904, noted the dangers of shift work: “[i]rregular hours for sleep and meals, when prolonged, conduce to physical disabilities and mental distress follows” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 24; emphasis added). This demonstrates an early understanding of what has since
been proven: the increased health risks that police face from working in shifts (Mikkelsen, 2006; Violanti et al., 2008).

A concern for the danger of physical assault from civilians is present throughout these records. Chief John J. Downey of Detroit noted in 1903 that “[b]rave police officers have fallen to a carpet of their life’s blood, pierced by a bullet or slashed by a razor or other dangerous weapon in the hands of [sic] desperate and despondent gambler, always a thief” (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 56). In an early iteration of what Stoughton (2015) calls the “first rule of law enforcement” (to go home at the end of every shift), Chief Bennett of Braddock, Pennsylvania noted in his 1904 speech that “as [the police officer] leaves home and family to enter upon his lonely vigil, he knows not but what the bullet or knife of the law-breaker may lay him low ere he can again look into the eyes of his loved ones” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 89).

At various places in the records of the IACP’s first twelve years, different speakers discuss the importance of being “mentally and physically” fit, although nowhere is there an elaboration of what “mental” fitness means, or how to evaluate it. There is, however, repeated discussion of the need for physical fitness. At the 1904 convention, a speaker emphasized the importance of physical strength in the police force:

Health is a pre-requisite to a wise selection. Ill health leads to irritability, and that leads to indiscretion...Physical qualification is another important feature...A man physically well proportioned presents an appearance that more quickly inspire [sic] confidence and respect from those viciously inclined. The officer of strength is better prepared in cases of emergency which frequently arise in cases of great calamity; they can assist and do not need it from others. It is the strong arm to lean upon, and not the weak one to hold up. The old and the decrepit should no longer be called upon to guard, but the young, the active, and the strong should bear the bear and burden of the day (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 67).

These views of the ideal officer reflect the danger imperative in policing as well as the exclusionary nature of the normative order of machismo. The ideal officer is a man, who must be physically fit to prepare for “the greatest battle…the battle against crime” (“Twelfth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 12).

Proposing a new normative order: Officer as victim

Whereas Herbert’s (1998) normative orders recognize the importance of both adventure (danger and thrill-seeking) and safety in the police subculture, my reading of the IACP’s first dozen years of meeting minutes reveals a broad normative order of officer as victim. This order is the product of other normative orders colliding and conflicting. The conflict and tension between normative orders of safety, danger, and machismo creates the officer as victim. Officers feel called to serve in their occupations, and there is certainly an element of excitement in this service. Yet while simultaneously feeling excited, they feel endangered, and feel that the public does not appreciate their service. The normative order of officer as victim is centered on the premise that nonpolice fail to recognize and appreciate the important job that officers are playing.

Herbert believes that police culture values voluntary exposure to danger, and his normative order of adventure/machismo is embodied by officers who “hunt aggressively for threatening suspects and actively seek out possible stolen cars in hopes that a vehicle pursuit might result” (1998, p. 356). But Herbert’s fails to recognize that officers engage in their work with an expectation
of how this work should be valued by others in society. When they do not receive the appreciation they expect, officers feel victimized. I take a broad conception of victimization here: officers can be victims not only from experiencing critical incidents while working, but also when they feel oppressed or subjected to hardship or mistreatment. This view of victimization is even broader than Sierra-Arévalo’s (2016) danger imperative, which posits that officers are fearful of victimization mostly from physical assault. The normative order of officer as victim sees officers as attuned not only to the potential for physical victimization, but also to *symbolic* victimization, through slights to their pride. This creates, ultimately, a very interesting juxtaposition of ‘officer as victim’ and White male hegemony – the hegemonic White male is the victim.

That this is a modern, and not merely antiquated, sentiment is supported by 2018 Fraternal Order of Police survey showing that “[n]early all respondents (96%) feel that the public is unaware of the effect that critical stress has on police officers” (Fraternal Order of Police, 2019, p. 6). But plenty of historical examples are present in the IACP’s early records. Chief Shields of Morristown, Tennessee submitted a paper titled “The Police Undervalued” at the 1902 convention (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 64). In it, he lauds the police, saying that “[w]ithout the police force the courts would be a farce and the laws a dead letter” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 64). But, he claims, the public does not value the policeman’s sacrifice:

> But how little is this arm of the civil service appreciated? How little do the bulk of the people realize that they owe their peace, security, and prosperity to the many of the billy? Like the pestilence, he ‘walketh in darkness,’ but unlike the pestilence, he brings quiet and safety to the homes of the people. The average family of the city lies down and sleeps in security, fearless of the burglar, the robber, the incendiary, the murderer, because the policeman is on his ceaseless rounds. The policeman in the various wards of the sleeping city are the eyes that never sleep, that glare into every alley and into every nook and corner, where vice may be doing its dirty work (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 65).

Chief Shields went on to explain how police should ideally be treated, if they were indeed adequately valued:

> If men properly appreciated the debt they owe to policemen, they would have free passes on the railroads, whose property they guard; every city would furnish them with a free library; no college would accept tuition fees from their children; every town would furnish them a free banquet once or twice a year; and happy homes would be provided for those worn out in the service and for their families, where necessary...they would be handsomely interred at the public expense, grateful citizens would strew their graves with flowers, and monuments... (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 66).

That an officer is still willing to sacrifice himself for the greater good “regardless of his individual welfare” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 89) and despite being underappreciated and undervalued, is reminiscent of the Guardian mentality advocated by modern police reformers (Stoughton, 2015 & 2016; Rahr & Rice, 2015).

This vision of police as otherworldly, idealized guardians appears frequently in the way chiefs presenting at early IACP conventions speak about their profession and those within it. Cincinnati’s Superintendent of Police, Phil Deitsch (who was discussed above for his adventures as a young man fighting Indians), read the following at the eighth annual convention in 1901 about the qualifications for being an officer:
Constantly surrounded by danger, risking at a moment’s notice his own life to save that of others, kind and gentle as a woman, as courageous as a Coeur de Lion, possessing the strength and agility of an athlete, with ears wide open and lips closed, talking while on duty only when necessary, patrolling his post of duty, rain or shine, facing the cold winter’s blast, or the blazing sun of a hot summer’s day, never losing his temper and level-headed to the last, are some of the qualifications necessary for the make-up of an ideal American police officer (“Eighth Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 16).

The ideal officer painted here is one that values physical strength, decries weakness, and acts selflessly. These characteristics are reminiscent of the now-familiar understanding of machismo in police culture. Police do not ask for help; they help others. But, police officers – especially the early members of the IACP – are consistently preoccupied with feeling undervalued and constantly judged by “the eyes of a scrutinizing public” (“Third Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 12). In fact, part of the whole mission of the IACP was “to awaken interest with the general public and to give the policeman a higher standing in the eyes of the public” (“Twelfth Annual Session, 1971, p. 12). Understanding police culture from these early IACP records is important to understand the culture that pre-existed national data collection on the dangers of policing, and shaped that data collection. Even in the late 1800s and early 1900s, officers were already preoccupied with the physical requirements and dangers of their jobs as well as the pervasive feeling that they were undervalued. They feel that criminals are out to get them, and that the public neither understands nor appreciates the sacrifice made by these “men who do their duty during the summer’s heat and the winter’s snow” (“Second Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 7). Knowing this, we should not be surprised that the data collected about policing tends to reflect and reinforce these normative orders. Police, including the IACP, advocated for robust data collection on crime – data which ended up confirming and perpetuating myths of Black criminality (Muhammad, 2010). This data collection includes data about the officers themselves and the dangers of their occupation.

In the next section, I describe the IACP’s successful efforts to create a national data collection system on crime, which also led to the collection of data on the dangers of policing. I argue that the culture of the IACP -- evident clearly from the earliest days of that organization’s existence -- influenced choices about what data would be collected about the hazards of police work.

IACP efforts to create a uniform crime report

As early as 1894, members of the IACP advocated for more participation by the federal government in the collection of national crime data. As discussed above, at the Union’s second meeting the men “sent a memorial to Congress requesting that our Government establish in connection with the Department of Justice, a bureau for the identification of criminals and for the recollection and dissemination of information concerning criminals and the criminal classes” (“Second Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 11). Congress took no action in response to this request, and the IACP created its own internal Bureau of Criminal Identification (“BCI”) that was “placed in operation” sometime between the 1897 and 1989 conventions (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 21). The BCI was “maintained under an annual private subscription amounting to about $3,000” from “about fifty” municipalities leading to the collection of “a lot of fingerprints” (Jenkins, 1902). As a project internal to the IACP, it was overseen by a Board of Governors, all members of the IACP (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 21). This Bureau’s work consisted of collecting Bertillon cards (“several thousand” per year) from participating agencies, and using these cards to help
identify criminal suspects or provide information to other member agencies (resulting in “two hundred and forty or fifty identifications made” in 1903, for example) (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 82).

The IACP appears from its early records to be fixated on this BCI. In one debate in 1903 about how to raise funds from smaller agencies to keep the program running, one Chief noted:

If there is any reason why this Association should exist, outside of the social features connected with it and the entertainments participated in by us, furnished by the departments of the various cities in which our Conventions are held, it is to be found in the Bureau of Criminal Identification. That department is the soul of this organization… (“Tenth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 88).

The IACP seemed to foretell that it would not be able to financially sustain the BCI internally or reach the level of participation its leadership desired (To Create a National Police Bureau; To Create a Bureau of Criminal Investigation, 1924, p. 7). So, even while praising the BCI’s accomplishments at yearly conventions, the IACP was simultaneously pressuring Congress to adopt a bill that would create a National Criminal Identification Bureau. At the 1900 convention in Cincinnati, Chief Haager of Louisville introduced the “Sylvester bill” which proposed to create a National Bureau of Criminal Identification located within the Department of Justice; the members present adopted the bill and agreed to present it to the Attorney General of the United States as “the sense of the convention” (“Seventh Annual Convention,” 1971, pp. 46-47).

The IACP drafted and introduced to Congress a similar bill in 1901 whose goal was the creation of a National Bureau of Criminal Identification. This bill -- H. R. 10068 -- would create a new division within the Department of Justice “where shall be collected and filed, so far as may be practicable for record and report, plated, photographs, outline pictures, descriptions, information, and measurements of all persons who have been or may be convicted and imprisoned for violating any of the...laws of the United States” as well as the laws of “any State or Territory...or the municipalities thereof” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 15). This bill also contemplated the participation of the IACP in the selection of the director of that bureau: the director “shall be appointed by the Attorney General of the United States, who shall first confer with the chiefs of police composing the board of governors, as appointed by the National Association of Chiefs of Police of the United States” (“Ninth Annual Session,” 1971, p. 16). The House Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably on the bill (Jenkins, 1902), but the Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary (S. 448) did not, and the bill was “postponed indefinitely” (U.S. Senate, 1902, p. 1226).

Despite this setback, the IACP continued to push for the federal government to adopt the program that would:

provide for the concentration of photographs, measurements, descriptions and information to be received from police authorities generally and which any police official possessing credentials may in turn consult for the advantage of his particular jurisdiction (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 19).

In his 1904 address at the opening of the convention, President Sylvester noted with confidence that “such a bureau or division will ultimately be maintained by the Government, I have no doubt” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 20). The IACP even moved the BCI’s headquarters to Washington, D.C. “largely for the reason that there is affords to the National lawmakers an object
lesson of its value...It is our aim to have the government give it a general endorsement” (“Eleventh Annual Session,” 1971, p. 40).

For another two decades, the IACP did not convince Congress to adopt its proposal and instead continued to maintain its own voluntary BCI (Richman & Seo, 2019, p. 6).

### Early cooperation between the IACP and the FBI

Richman and Seo (2019) tell the origin story of the Bureau of Investigation (the predecessor to the FBI), which was created in 1909 after Attorney General Charles Bonaparte “called on Congress” to establish a “permanent detective force” under Department of Justice’s control (U.S. Department of Justice, 1907). Richman and Seo (2019) explain that the FBI’s creation:

is a tale of two informational stories coming together... one involving raw information sharing across jurisdictions and one involving a new demand for prosecutions that embodied information gathered across jurisdictional boundaries...The first ...had the bureau emerging as the winning candidate to realize the IACP’s vision for a centralized clearinghouse for crime-related information (pp. 7-8).

The IACP continued, at annual conventions throughout the 1910s and 20s, to advocate for the creation of a national bureau of criminal identification “maintained under the auspices of the U.S. DOJ” (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924, pp. 26-27). The organization went as far as, on September 21, 1923, drawing up a bill of sale and turning over its internal Bureau of Criminal Identification housed in Washington, D.C., including all “office equipment, and records, to the extent of 138,000, to the Department of Justice” (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924, p. 35). The IACP did so despite “a great deal of discussion as to whether [the IACP’s national identification bureau] could be lawfully accepted by the Department of Justice” and with the hopes that “the proper legislation would be enacted later authorizing that transfer” (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924, p. 35).

That authorizing legislation did come. In 1924 Congress again held hearings to consider the IACP’s proposal to create a Bureau of Criminal Identification. Both W. P. Rutledge and Richard Sylvester (who had served as president from 1901-1915) testified before the House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary, and letters from dozens of IACP members were read into the record in support of the legislation (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924). The Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, William J. Burns, also testified, praising the IACP for its willingness to “turn over their bureaus of criminal identification, which contained about six or seven hundred thousand descriptions and finger prints” (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924, p. 75). Burns noted that the bureau had “already demonstrated that it does prevent crime, reduce it to the minimum, and makes it far more difficult for the criminal to get away” (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924, p. 77) and that the Bureau of Investigation was working closely with the IACP: “We are already functioning now with the police departments throughout the country. We have been getting lots of information from them. We have been giving them a lot of information” (To Create a National Police Bureau..., 1924, p. 76).

In the end, the fierce support of both the IACP and Burns were sufficient to convince Congress to authorize the Identification Division on July 1, 1924, housed within the Bureau of
Investigation (Richman & Seo, 2019, p. 28). With this authorization, “all criminal identification data and records of the former Bureau of Identification of the Department of Justice, together with the records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, were consolidated into the Division of Identification under the jurisdiction of the [FBI]” (Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor Appropriation Bill, 1937, p. 193).

J. Edgar Hoover (who succeeded Burns as Director of the Bureau of Investigation) told IACP members at its 1925 convention that the “Division of Identification is your child” (Richman & Seo, 2019, p. 28). Hoover further told the gathered chiefs the following year that the Division was “Of you, by you and for you” (Richman & Seo, 2019, p. 28). The Division of Identification offered benefits to both the IACP -- who finally had the national clearinghouse they had advocated for over two decades -- and the FBI, whose power grew concurrent with “scope, influence, and value of the National Division of Identification” (“Thirty-Third Annual Convention,” 1971, p. 111). Upson (1929) calls the creation of the Division “[t]he most outstanding example of accomplishment by the [IACP]” (p. 123).

This would be the start of a long relationship between Hoover and the IACP. In fact, Hoover partially owed his tenure as Director of the FBI to the continued support from the IACP, who wrote letters to the Attorney General and President of the United States endorsing and encouraging them to retain Hoover as director of the FBI (Alfred Seymour Collection, n.d.). Alfred Seymour (president of the IACP from 1932-1933) was especially close with Hoover during the early days of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, with the men regularly corresponding by letter (Alfred Seymour Collection, n.d.).

A full examination of the ways in which Hoover exemplified the normative orders of policing is beyond the scope of this chapter, but ample evidence exists to suggest that hegemonic masculinity and competence were especially central in his nearly 50-year career as director of the FBI (See Gentry, 2001; Summers, 2012; Theoharis & Cox, 1998). Hoover reportedly fired all female agents and banned the hiring of women into these roles when he was first named director (Poster, 2018), collected pornography from investigations for his own files, and weaponized sexuality by using “sexual innuendo and evidence to attack political rivals” (Wills, 2018).

Opposition to federal law enforcement and nationalized criminal data collection

While the IACP supported both the creation of the FBI as well as the empowerment of the FBI’s Division of Identification to collect national crime data, other individuals and organizations opposed both. For most of U.S. history, politicians believed crime was most appropriately addressed at the level of the states (Stolberg, 1995, p. 393). When Attorney General Bonaparte (grand-nephew of the emperor Napoleon) first called on Congress to establish a “permanent

---

12 Richman and Seo cite the 1926 convention of the IACP and note that the division was created “under the provisions of an Appropriation Act which had been passed by the Congress of the United States covering the general expenses of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice” (p. 28).
detective force” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1907, p. 10), many members of Congress balked – presumably because several of them:

were implicated in corrupt schemes that DOJ was investigating…not only did Congress reject Bonaparte’s proposal, but so strong was its fear of a political police force that it also moved to preclude the department’s use of Secret Service agents (Richman & Seo, 2019b, p. 11).

Bonaparte quietly cooperated with President Theodore Roosevelt to create an investigative unit (Richman & Seo, 2019b, pp. 11-12), and Congress authorized the creation of the Bureau of Investigation in 1909. This action met criticism from advocates for states’ rights, who were concerned about federal overreaching (Stolberg, 1995, p. 396).

There was also opposition to the creation of a national crime statistics and criminal identification database. The IACP was enthusiastic about transferring this responsibility to the Department of Justice. As described above, the IACP sent its own criminal identification records to the DOJ before the DOJ had even received Congressional approval to collect such records (To Create a National Police Bureau; To Create a Bureau of Criminal Investigation, 1924, pp. 27; 35). Others did not share the IACP’s enthusiasm. During the 1924 hearings, some expressed concern that national criminal identification was un-American or would be too expensive (Richman & Seo, 2019b, p. 43). New York City Police Commissioner Enright objected to the Department of Justice taking control of criminal information, due to that department’s own ambitions to “win control of the country’s criminal information infrastructure” and because of the city’s “opposition to the federal Prohibition mission” (Richman & Seo, 2019b, p. 44).

Ultimately, however, the IACP’s vision won out, and Congress established the National Identification Division within the Bureau of Investigation in 1924 (Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the IACP, 1926, p. 50). The IACP continued to lobby even after this victory. At the 1926 convention, members were urged to “enlighten Senators and Representatives in Congress from their respective districts regarding the success and value of the Division of Information and Identification, that they may readily comprehend its worth and assist in its upbuilding” (Proceedings of the Annual Convention, 1926, p. 65).

The IACP’s role in the creation of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program

The normative orders of policing, evidence from the very beginning of the IACP, shaped the organization and the data it sought to collect itself and have collected. The close cooperation and “mutuality of benefits” between the IACP and the FBI continued after the creation of the Identification Division, as did plans to expand the scope of the Division’s involvement in national crime statistics collection (Richman & Seo, 2019, p. 30). This continued cooperation soon contributed to the creation of the UCR program, “one of the most important events in the history of criminal statistics in the United States” (Rosen, 1995, p. 215).

At a 1927 meeting of the IACP, police reformer August Vollmer argued that, “before energy is expended to improve police procedure, it will first be necessary to collect reliable statistical data”
Vollmer saw large-scale data collection as a means to combat disinformation, explaining:

We hear on all sides that crime of one type or another has increased; that cities are overrun with gunmen; that juvenile delinquency has reached such enormous proportions that national safety is endangered. These statements have been repeated so often that even conservative police officials now believe it to be true, although they are the sole possessors of such facts as are available concerning crime conditions in this country, and these facts have never been compiled, evaluated, or interpreted .... I conclude that statistics furnish a powerful means of discovering the causes of crime, provided they are used critically and carefully (Proceedings of the Annual Convention, 1927, p. 71).

The police were not alone in desiring improved crime data (Rosen, 1995). They were joined by criminal statisticians, sociologists, and criminologists, all of whom agreed in the 1920s that “the major problem was the lack of uniformity in defining crime” (Rosen, 1995, p. 221). The social sciences, Rosen reveals, “were actively in pursuit of their own goal of developing a national crime data system that could contribute to a scientific understanding of crime” (Rosen, 1995, p. 227).

But once again the IACP “took the lead, as it had in many police reforms in the early 20th century” (“A Byte Out of History…,” 2006). At the same 1927 convention at which Vollmer spoke of the need for more crime statistics, the assembled chiefs created a Committee on Uniform Crime Records. This committee was divided into a 12-man ‘Police Committee” chaired by Chief William P. Rutledge (who had testified before Congress as discussed above), an 11-man “Advisory Committee” chaired by Lent D. Upson, of the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, and a 4-person “Technical Staff” led by Bruce Smith, a prominent police consultant and staff member of the Institute of Public Administration in New York City (A Guide for preparing annual police reports, 1929). J. Edgar Hoover also served on the advisory committee (A Guide for preparing annual police reports, 1929). The committee received $50,000 in funding from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) (Rosen, 1995, p. 217). There is evidence that the SSRC, which had been deliberating on its own about a uniform police data system, intentionally involved the IACP “as a way of gaining acceptance by local police departments” (Rosen, 1995, p. 227).

The committee published Uniform Crime Reporting: A Complete Manual for Practice in 1929, “after extensive study of crime reporting, statutory designations, and police recording of various offenses throughout the country” (Wolfgang, 1963, p. 708). This manual attempted to establish standard categories of offenses for reporting purposes. In that same year, the Committee instituted a system of uniform crime reporting on an experimental basis. Though the IACP had administrative responsibility for the project, Rosen (1995) notes that the Bureau of Social Hygiene (BSH) actually conducted the “fieldwork, analysis, and completion of the final report” (p. 217). The SSRC funding allowed the IACP to publish its first exploratory Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) report in early 1930, covering just January of that year (Rosen, 1995, p. 217). That first report contained crime data from 400 cities in 43 states (“About the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program,” 2010).

But just as it had done with its earlier Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the IACP quickly moved to have the FBI take over the UCR program, at least in part because of limited budget and staff (“History of Uniform Crime Reporting,” n.d.). In 1928, J. Edgar Hoover reported to Congress that the IACP had suggested “the Identification Division of the Department of Justice might be a very logical place in which to assemble statistics on crime, because all fingerprints taken in connection with felonies in the United States are sent to us” (Appropriations Bill, 1928, p. 58).
On June 11, 1930, Congress authorized the Bureau to collect, compile, and distribute crime records with Public Law 337, Title 28, Section 554. While the Division of Identification had been receiving appropriations from Congress since 1924, the June 1930 Act formally created the Division of Identification and Information and vested it with:

the duty of acquiring, collecting, classifying, and preserving criminal identification and other crime records and the exchanging of said criminal identification records with the duly authorized officials of governmental agencies, of States, cities, and penal institutions.

The FBI incorporated the IACP’s categories in its first bulletin of Uniform Crime Reports (Wolfgang, 1963, p. 708). Richman and Seo (2019) explain that:

Path dependency and short political attention spans, in addition to the longer-lasting interests of IACP leaders and the relationship they had already forged with Hoover’s Bureau, all explain why, since 1930, the Bureau of Investigation, now FBI, has been in charge of the Uniform Crime Reporting system. Significantly, what had begun as the compilation of fingerprints served a much larger goal of understanding the nature of crime, its environment, and the character of individuals mired in the justice system (p. 35).

The IACP was integral in the creation of a national crime statistics clearinghouse. While Rosen admonishes that “[t]o suggest that the police were the only major player for the creation of the UCR would be naïve,” even he agrees that “in subsequent years the police exercised considerable influence and control,” and since 1930 the UCR has been “almost exclusively a police program” (Rosen, 1995, p. 228). The cooperation between Hoover at the FBI and the leadership of the IACP was long and fruitful, with the Association helping Hoover maintain his position as FBI director and he, in turn, helping the agency achieve its desire for a national crime reporting program.

The goal of the preceding sections was to underscore the IACP’s role in the creation of the UCR and provide a genealogy of the IACP’s creation, including an examination of the actors that featured prominently in its establishment. As might be expected at this point in the narrative, the IACP and FBI did not part ways after the FBI took over the UCR program in 1930. Instead, the IACP continued (and continues) to work closely with that federal agency. The IACP continued to maintain a Committee on Uniform Crime Reporting into the 1950s, and the FBI would call on this committee to evaluate the UCR program in 1957 (Wolfgang, 1963, p. 712).

Important moments in the history of data collection on policing dangers

Understanding the history of data collection on the dangers of policing requires examining, as I have, the creation of the UCR program and the players involved. The reason for this is that the UCR was the first source of data collection nationally regarding officer injuries and fatalities in the line of duty, and for nearly fifty years the only such data source. The UCR continues to be significant for the study of police officer death and injury, because many departments align their internal data collection with UCR categories. While attempting to gather officer suicide information from CPD, an employee told me, “We don’t collect information on suicide because the UCR doesn’t have a code for suicide” (CPD open records division, personal communication, June 6, 2019). In this section I highlight the evolution of UCR data collection on employee injury.
In 1936, FBI director Hoover spoke to the IACP at their convention in Kansas City, Missouri. Hoover professed that “[o]n average of once a week, somewhere in the United States, a law enforcement officer is killed at the hands of the underworld. It is unfortunate that we do not possess accurate statistics upon this subject…” (IACP Yearbook, 1936, p. 15). The following year, the FBI first started collecting data on law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty and publishing it alongside other crime data in printed tables reported in each year’s crime report (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 14).

Initially, this data was limited to the total number of officers killed (both from accident and from assault) across the entire United States, without differentiation by agency. In the first UCR report to contain officer fatality information, “389 cities disclosed that 40 police officers were killed by criminals during the calendar year 1937” (Uniform Crime Reports, 1936-1939). The FBI, relying on the voluntary reporting of agencies, does not appear to have investigated these reports, and the fatalities from 1937-1959 were only collected from “selected agencies” (LEOKA, personal communication, July 9, 2019).

In 1960, still under the leadership of Hoover, the FBI started publishing national statistics on officers killed and also added assaults on officers. The 1960 Uniform Crime Reports note that:

There is also being presented for the first time an analysis, by geographic division and by population group, of police officers assaulted in line of duty. These figures, presented in table 33, emphasize the potential dangers confronting the police officer each time he responds to a call, whether it be a domestic quarrel or a barricaded murderer. The analysis discloses that 6 of every 100 city police officers were assaulted, many seriously, during 1960, with the highest number of assaults occurring in the South Atlantic States and in cities with populations under 10,000. Fewest assaults were reported by the East North Central States and by cities containing 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants” (pp. 19-20).

Separate categories of felonious killings and accidental deaths were created in 1963, and assaults on police officers causing injury were first reported in 1965 (LEOKA, personal communication, July 9, 2019).

The most significant change to the FBI’s officer fatality data collection came in 1972, in response to pressure from law enforcement for increased FBI involvement in preventing and investigating officers’ deaths (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017; Rabe-Hemp, 2017, p. 61). On June 3, 1971, President Nixon, Attorney General Mitchell, and FBI Director Hoover met with 20 law enforcement officials to discuss measures to “prevent police slayings” (“LEAA Newsletter,” 1970). Hoover reportedly put together the list of invitees at Nixon’s request (Detroit Free Press, 1971). The President of the IACP was, of course, present (“LEAA Newsletter,” 1970). Nixon “began the conference by renewing his pledge of federal support for local police and sheriffs’ departments which experience attacks on their officers” (“LEAA Newsletter,” 1970). Then, on June 8, 100 police chiefs met at the DOJ to discuss “ways to prevent and reduce attacks on policemen” (“LEAA Newsletter,” 1970). Following these meetings, the executives present wrote a Memorandum to Hoover in which they recommended that the UCR program was capable of collecting detailed data on law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty, and

---

13 Hoover was lambasted in certain media outlets for failing to invite the police chiefs of New York or Detroit and for politicizing the issue of police safety.
disseminate that information immediately over the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Network (“UCR Program—Summary of Authorities,” n.d.).

The danger imperative is apparent from the June 15, 1971 congressional record. Congressman Mario Biaggi -- a 23-year veteran of the NYPD who is known for sponsoring the “Police Officers’ Bill of Rights” (Schmidt, 2005) -- addressed the House to support Nixon’s proposal to provide $50,000 to the families of policemen killed in action. Biaggi emphasizes the physical dangers of policing:

These men are on the front lines of our domestic war -- a war whose casualty rate has increased astronomically during the last few years. Without a doubt, the criminal element has declared an open season on policemen...As a former 23-year veteran of the New York Police Force who has been wounded 11 times in the line of duty, I kow [sic] what it is to live in constant fear of being killed. The fear is not so much for yourself, but of what will happen to your wife and children after you are gone. We have long provided benefits for the widows of veterans who have fought wars on foreign soil. We can do no less for the families of men who have laid down their lives protecting the institutions of freedom and liberty here at home (U.S. Senate, 1971, p. 19966).

Two others also spoke in favor of Nixon’s proposed benefits for survivors of police killed in the line of duty. Lawrence Hogan noted that “policemen must not only cope with an alarming and increasing crime problem, they are also forced to defend their very lives. The slayings of police officers in New York City and in Washington, D.C., in recent weeks show the degree of violent danger faced daily by our police” (U.S. Senate, 1971, p. 19969).

To address these law enforcement concerns, the UCR program expanded the number of details it collected about incidents in which police were assaulted or killed starting with its 1972 publications. This expansion included collection of data to differentiate accidental from felonious deaths, the type of assignment the officer was on when injured or killed, the type of call the officer was responding to, the time of day, and the number of assaults cleared (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 14).

Also in 1972, the FBI separated out police assault and injury data from other crime reporting and started to produce two new annual reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed Summary documenting officer deaths, and Analysis of Assaults on Federal Officers. These two reports were merged in 1982 into a single Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) annual report (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017).

LEOKA today

Since 1972, the FBI has collected this injury and assault data monthly, but regular collection does not necessarily translate into reliability. Indeed, “few agencies consistently provide monthly assault data. For example, in 1998 only 1,559 agencies (8.4%) provided monthly assault data for all 12 months” (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 14).

LEOKA reports were published in hard copy until 2005, when the FBI began reproducing LEOKA exclusively as a web publication. Now, LEOKA data for each year is generally made available online between summer and fall of the following year. The FBI occasionally releases parts of the report early by, for example, releasing police fatality data on its website months earlier than assault data (e.g. the FBI announced the early release of three sections of the 2017 LEOKA dataset
in a May 9, 2018 press release). In addition to the comprehensive annual report, the FBI maintains a ‘running tab’ of officers feloniously and accidentally killed.

LEOKA data are now available online in access tables that sort police officer deaths according to victim profile, circumstance, type of assignment, weapon used, month, day and year of incident, and profile of assailant. The full dataset (e.g., the dataset containing all data categories not already pre-sorted into one of the aforementioned access tables) is available by request or available for download via the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Uniform Crime Reporting Data Series.

The UCR Program reportedly uses three types of reporting procedures to learn of an officer’s death for inclusion in LEOKA. The first (and overwhelmingly most common) is direct, voluntary monthly reporting to the FBI by the agency in which the officer worked. The second procedure involves the reporting by FBI field divisions when an officer death occurs in their area. The third involves reports made by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) through its Administrator of Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program (PSOB) and other nonprofit organizations dedicated to supporting families of fallen officers, who sometimes report to the UCR when they become aware of a line-of-duty death (Fisher & Lab, eds., 2010, p. 650). At the local level, when police officers are injured or assaulted in the line of duty, the officer’s agency generally investigates the circumstances surrounding the incident. One purpose is to pursue criminal charges against the suspect, if the suspect is known and was not killed in the encounter. The other purpose is to gather information to submit a report, if the agency chooses, to the UCR program. Upon receipt of preliminary data from the local agency, LEOKA staff then work with FBI field offices to contact the agency involved “to ensure that for each case all the data gathered is pertinent to the LEOKA and consistent for each case, allowing for continuity across cases” (Fisher & Lab, eds., 2010, p. 650).

The LEOKA publication is limited in scope both in the types of deaths it reports and the types of agencies it covers. LEOKA contains only information on “felonious deaths, accidental deaths, and assaults,” not deaths resulting from natural causes, suicide, or on-duty deaths attributed to the officer’s own personal situation (e.g. domestic violence) (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017). Additionally, LEOKA does not report information for deaths of correctional officers, bailiffs, parole officers, private security officers, or others who do not carry a badge, have full arrest powers, or carry a firearm ordinarily (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017).

Overall, the FBI’s LEOKA dataset continues to be the most widely utilized source of information on law enforcement officer injuries and deaths in the United States: “While the FBI itself does not claim that the data it publishes are a thorough representation of crime, policymakers, the media, researchers, and law enforcement rely on these statistics continually, as they are one of only two crime figure sources at the national level (the National Crime Victimization Survey is the other)” (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 12).

Discussion and conclusion

Data inertia is the phenomenon explaining why, once we started collecting certain data and not others, it is less likely that we will collect more or other data (Merry, 2016). LEOKA is the United States’ oldest data collection system on the dangers of policing, but that dataset is limited. It reflects the normative orders of the police officers who helped created it -- officers who belonged to
a culture that was defined by its hegemonic masculinity, especially when decisions were made about what data was important enough to be collected. As Merry (2016) noted, “measurement makes things visible, while the unmeasured disappear” (p. 219). The UCR has been measuring police officer fatalities since 1937 and police officer assaults since 1960. Thus, fatalities and assaults of police officers are very visible. There is, however, no national data collection on police suicides, which is the topic of Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

As demonstrated from my genealogical exploration above, the IACP subculture during the late 19th and early 20th century was one that was concerned with elevating the professional status of police, garnering the respect of the public, and was exclusionary towards women and Blacks. This organization, combined with the notorious personality J. Edgar Hoover, significantly shaped the data that is collected about police officer injuries and the focus on physical dangers in the LEOKA dataset.

Conley (2011) wrote that, “To name a category, to define it, to decide the criteria for inclusion and exclusion, to lay down the rules for its measurement, is simultaneously to produce knowledge and power. That power tends to reproduce itself, because the same knowledge elite that designed and promulgated the indicator will likely retain the role of policing it” (p. 93, commenting on Merry & Conley, 2011). Thus, the IACP and the FBI produced knowledge and produced power by deciding what data would be collected and disseminated in the UCR. Of course, they were not alone in this endeavor, but they were hugely influential. The greatest increase in data collection about the hazards of policing took place the year after Nixon and J. Edgar Hoover met with police chiefs and made the chiefs’ agenda -- to reduce “police slayings” -- their own.

Conley’s insight into this power “reproducing itself” is also important here. Those that assisted in the creation and implementation of the UCR, and that portion of the UCR related to the dangers of policing, have controlled what knowledge is produced about those dangers. By focusing on certain dangers (physical assaults) to the exclusion of others (mental wellness and suicide), LEOKA contributes to the reification of the notion of policing as a physically dangerous occupation inhabited by warriors on the domestic front-lines.

The written record of the IACP and the congressional records that give insight into the creation of the FBI and the UCR reveal the obsession with physical safety of officers that was prevalent from the earliest days of the UCR. There is plenty of research that demonstrates the influence of police subculture on the occupational lives of the police (Bittner, 1970; Herbert, 1998; Muir, 2012; Skolnick, 2011; Van Maanen, 1974; Westley 1970) and those they encounter (Brown, 1981; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 2010). But, there is very little research that examines the way that police culture might relate to the data that is collected and available about the police themselves (for an exception, see Currie et al., 2016, who write about data collection on police officer-involved homicides). My goal with this chapter was to provide insight into the culture of the organization that played such an important role in the creation of national data collection on the dangers of policing, and to suggest that this culture shaped -- and continues to shape -- what knowledge is produced about the dangers of policing.
Chapter 5: National fatalities databases and the physical hazards of policing

Introduction

What do we know about the physical hazards of policing? In police culture, the overwhelming emphasis is on the risk of physical, rather than mental or emotional, hazards of the occupation (Cullen et al., 1983). This emphasis on physical dangers is entwined with the normative order of machismo, which values bravery in the face of violence and a voluntary willingness to place oneself in dangerous situations (Herbert, 1998).

Those wishing to study fatalities to police officers in the line of duty have access to a wealth of data ranging from an official governmental dataset maintained by the FBI to databases compiled by nonprofit organizations founded to honor and memorialize fallen officers. Between them, these surveillance systems make available to the public an abundance of information about deceased officers and the circumstances surrounding their death: not only their name, rank, and department, but also photographs, a narrative explaining the situation surrounding their death, various situational information about the circumstances leading up to the homicide (including the time of day, weather conditions, whether the officer was wearing body armor, etc.) and even information on the suspect responsible and the disposition of that suspect’s criminal case.

In this chapter I summarize the research on police culture which reveals that police officers emphasize the physical risks of their occupation over other risks, such as mental illness or legal trouble. I further show that among the physical risks of policing, those posed by civilians are disproportionately amplified in comparison to risks from accidents. I then introduce the national databases available to study both the fatal and non-fatal physical hazards of policing and discuss what information about physical harm-causing incidents is available in each. These databases include the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) program, which collects and reports on both line-of-duty fatalities as well as assaults on officers, as well as the Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP) and the National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund (NLEOMF). The latter two databases only collect and report information on line-of-duty deaths. Finally, I introduce injury data I collected from CPD and MPD to further highlight the information that departments keep internally about police officer injuries and those who cause them.

These data help reveal what is known and knowable about the dangers to police from civilian assault and accidents. The ready availability of such data is both reflective and reinforcing of the normative orders of policing that emphasize physical threats over other kinds of danger in policing.

Police culture emphasizes physical dangers

Police culture provides a potential analytic leverage point for understanding the prioritization of physical dangers over other potential hazards of the occupation. By culture, I mean the “habits, skills, and styles” out of which people construct “strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). Such
habits, skills, and styles are “taken for granted assumptions that work to define, guide, and constrain what is seen as appropriate behavior” (Brown, 2007, p. 194). For police, such strategies of action are “grounded in common-sense reactions to real events” (Crank, 2014, p. 160). Physical danger in policing is a “ubiquitous cultural theme” and potential danger fundamentally “shapes police work, converting daily activity into a craft of identifying threats to public and officer safety” (Crank, 2014, p. 160). In fact, danger is “synonymous with what it means to ‘do’ police work or ‘be’ a police officer” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 14).

The fact that danger is seen as a core aspect of policing and is integral to police officers’ experience of their work finds wide support in the policing literature (Barker, 1998; Brown, 1981; Cullen et al., 1983; Kappeler et al., 1998; Paoline, 2003, Reiner, 2010; Skolnick, 2011; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990; Toch, 1973; Van Maanen, 1974; Westley, 1970). The perceived risk among officers is disproportionate to the actual risk of physical danger (Paoline, 2003, p. 211, n. 2; Slovic, 1987 & 2010). This does not mean, however, that policing is not a dangerous occupation, and cultural preoccupation with danger does stem from real threats to police officer safety (Crank, 2014, p. 160). Marenin (2016) notes that:

If the police fail to recognize and react quickly to a dangerous situation and person, they may get killed or injured (a false negative). On the other hand, if they perceive a danger which it turns out later was not there (a false positive), the victim gets hurt and not the police. In practice, this means that the police have a strong tendency to over-predict danger as a form of self-preservation (p. 472).

While police officers rank well below other professions in rates of worker death (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2018), policing is distinct from other occupations because “injury and death come not just from accidents, but from job performance” (Moskos, 2008, p. 1). In other words, police, unlike other workers, face the “extraordinary threat of violence at the hands of criminals” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 5; Tiesman, Gwilliam, Konda, Rojek, & Marsh, 2018).

In Herbert’s (1998) typology of the normative orders that shape police work, the normative orders of safety and machismo are most implicated in the cultural preoccupation with danger. The normative order of machismo prioritizes physicality -- both the physical prowess of the officers themselves and the physical nature of their occupation (Westmarland, 2001). The normative order of safety, on the other hand, is premised on officers’ preservation of their own lives (Herbert, 1998, p. 357).

Sierra-Arévalo (2016) does not directly engage with Herbert’s normative orders, but argues that policing is defined by what he calls the “danger imperative,” which is a “preoccupation with violence and demand for officer safety...a cultural frame that orients police officers’ perception and behavior” (pp. 3-4). Physical injuries are only one of the dangers of policing; other dangers create cognitive, behavioral, or emotional harm (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25). Barker (1998) extends danger even farther, arguing that legal dangers (lawsuits, divorce) and economic dangers (overspending to ‘keep up with the boys’) (p. 112). Yet police culture overwhelmingly revolves around “potential for physical injury and death,” which “requires immediate and unquestioned action from [officers] and their comrades on patrol” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 14; emphasis added).

---

14 Policing does not crack the top-ten list, which includes occupations like roofers, loggers, fishers, and pilots.
Sierra-Arévalo (2016) explains how the danger imperative is created and perpetuated in police organizations:

The central preoccupation with violence in police work is built and maintained by information that comes to police from within and outside the police department, be it through the news and social media, or academy instructors, fellow officers, superiors, and officers’ own experience. These various information sources are all interpreted through the frame of the danger imperative, emphasis placed on person-to-person violence in the line of duty. This ‘social amplification’ dramatically highlights statistically rare events, such as in the re-telling of departmental ‘war stories’ that provide officers with vivid evidence of just how dangerous their work is (p. 14; internal citations omitted).

Police officers are socialized into the danger imperative through both formal and informal processes (Paoline, 2003). Formal processes include training by instructors during the police academy as well as certain aspects of formal police training conducted by field training officers (FTOs) (Van Maanen, 1974). Informal training is sometimes called the “hidden curriculum” of police socialization (Jackson, 1990). Informal training includes things like storytelling about the kinds of dangers police officers will face (Harris, 1973; Van Maanen, 1974; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979) as well as socialization by peers and superiors in the field (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 7).

Among physical dangers, some are more emphasized than others

The dangers posed by civilian assault are disproportionally emphasized in police culture as compared to dangers from physical injury caused by accident, regardless of the fact that most fatalities and injuries are not caused by civilians (Brandl & Stroshine, 2012; “Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2018). Violanti and Aron (1994) found that police officers ranked being physically attacked as the third most significant stressor in police work (just behind killing someone in the line of duty and having a fellow law enforcement officer killed). Similarly, Spielberger, Westberry, Grier, and Greenfield (1981) found that two of the three most stressful situations for law enforcement officers were related to civilian assault: having a fellow officer killed, or being personally assaulted (the third was exposure to a dead or battered child). The amplification of the risk of civilian assault occurs through a social process known as “amplification” caused by the danger imperative (Kasperson et al., 1988; Sierra-Arévalo, 2016). This amplification takes place through both formal and informal processes, during the police academy and in the day-to-day work of officers. Physical dangers are socially amplified as a result of officers’ personal experiences as well as information officers receive about certain risks from others, including “war stories” re-told by training officers, peers, and the media (Van Maanen, 1978, pp. 297–298). This direct and indirect exposure to dramatic incidents increases the imaginability of the hazard and heightens the perception of the risk (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 184).

Risks are distinct from dangers. While dangers include everything that might cause harm to officers (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 10; Chad & Ashley, 2004), risk “boils down to a balancing act of probability and potential harm” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016. p. 10). Risks are socially constructed, not naturally occurring (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). Of the many catastrophic risks that humans might pay attention to, those risks that individuals choose to emphasize are determined by their membership in various social groups (Douglas 1978 & 2013; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). Individuals do not
identify and prioritize risks alone. Instead, judgments about danger depend on social context (Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999). Risks are amplified within social organizations as the result of “direct personal experience” with situations and/or people deemed “risky” and “indirect, or secondary, experience, through information received about the risk” (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 184). Sierra-Arévalo explains that:

The tools and techniques for mitigating context-specific dangers are learned within the group, as are the dangers that members of a given group are bound to protect themselves from. In other words, danger is constructed through collective action; which dangers are to be confronted, ignored, or avoided is not implicit, but instead decided upon through group processes geared towards preservation and protection of the group and its members (p. 11).

In the context of policing, risks are understood and socially amplified through both individual officers’ experiences and through the formal and informal socialization processes, often by means of the stories that officers tell one another about such experiences (Crank, 2004; Marenin, 2016; Van Maanen, 1974).

Storytelling is a commonly-used method for senior officers to teach recruits about the dangers they will face on the job (Harris, 1973; Van Maanen 1974; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). These stories are sometimes supplemented with video or audio recordings of police officers suffering serious or fatal injuries at the hands of civilians (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, pp. 6-7). These videos are “intentionally graphic, painting a grim picture for recruits” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 25). Sierra-Arévalo, who spent 1,000 hours observing officers in three urban departments and interviewed nearly 100 officers, found that officers on both coasts are shown -- and vividly remember -- the same videos. One video in particular depicts the murder of a 22-year-old sheriff’s deputy by a Vietnam veteran during a traffic stop; the veteran executes the young officer at point-blank range and the officer can be heard screaming and begging for his life.15 Videos are not only shown during the training academy, but also during daily briefings where officers receive their assignments (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 26). Such videos are “held up as vivid proof of just how dire the consequences are for officers that do not protect themselves against the violence emphasized by the danger imperative” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 30).

In police culture, not all physical dangers are created equally. The risk of physical injury or death caused by accident is disregarded or underemphasized, even though police injury and fatality statistics show that roughly the same number of police are killed each year in accidents as by civilian assaults (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017 & 2018). This is because officers “filter their understanding of their work through the danger imperative,” and the police socialization process:

Amplifies the particular danger of armed suspects, and minimizes the danger posed by car accidents. Because police filter their understanding of their work through the danger imperative, they weigh the likelihood of a high-speed crash as less important than maintaining the capacity to quickly engage in a foot chase or respond effectively to violent threats (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, pp. 35-36).

15 The young deputy killed was Kyle Dinkheller, and the civilian, a Vietnam War veteran suffering from PTSD - was named Andrew Brannan. The video is available for viewing on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsrC5QV_Yrc.
Sierra-Arévalo found that the danger imperative was so powerful that police officers frequently defy department policy requiring them to use their seatbelts, even engaging in high-speed chases while unbuckled, because they feel that their seatbelts “hinder[] their ability to protect against violence” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 16). Officers recognize that driving without a seatbelt is dangerous, but choose (and are unofficially socialized) to drive unbuckled in order to have quicker access to their firearms or to be able to jump out of their car more quickly to engage in a foot chase or firefight (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 36).

To summarize, police culture is defined by a preoccupation with physical violence. Police culture amplifies physical violence rather than other forms of harm, including cognitive, emotional, or behavioral harm. Even within the universe of physical harm, the risk of injury or death caused by civilians is amplified, whereas the risk of injury or death caused by accidents - such as car crashes - is not. In the remainder of this chapter, I present the data that is produced nationally regarding police officer injuries and fatalities and present the data I collected from MPD and CPD. These datasets cumulatively demonstrate that current data collection mirrors the danger imperative of police culture, and I argue that it also helps reinforce that imperative.

What data are available on the physical dangers of policing?

The availability of data on the physical dangers of policing and the knowledge such data create have serious implications for the study of policing. Researchers look at fatality statistics and claim that “police are safer now than at any point in nearly 50 years: compared to an annual average of 114 felonious police deaths in the 1970s, fewer than half that number are killed each year since the start of the 21st century” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 1). Sierra-Arévalo uses such statistics as evidence of the overwhelming power of the danger imperative: police officers and the culture in which they are embedded disproportionately focus on felonious killings of police, while “[u]nemphasized in police and political rhetoric are the motor vehicle accidents” that also kill dozens of officers each year (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 37). But he says nothing about the other types of dangers that are also de-emphasized by the police culture that obsesses over physical violence from civilians, such as the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral harms that may be caused in full or in part by police work. Chapter 7 takes up that question by examining mental health harms and suicide.

Police officer fatalities

There are three national databases dedicated to publishing information about police officer fatalities. One of these is sponsored by the federal government: the FBI’s annual LEOKA dataset. The other two databases are maintained by non-profits who share the mission of memorializing fallen officers: the Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP) and the National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund (NLEOMF). There is another national data collection effort -- the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), but I do not discuss that database here because it is not tailored to law enforcement, instead purporting to cover all occupational deaths in the United States. For an excellent review of the CFOI which includes a comparison to LEOKA and the NLEOMF, see Tiesman, Swedler, Konda, and Pollack (2013).

As I demonstrate below, the available databases reflect the danger imperative and its associated preoccupation with physical dangers of policing, especially those caused by violent assaults from civilians. Rich data are available that allow the forensic re-creation of each incident,
and the personal details of officers made public in these databases help ensure the perpetuation of
the warrior mentality in policing. The data that are not made available in these databases -- deaths
occurring off duty, especially those by suicide -- similarly reflect and reinforce the danger imperative
of police culture and the hegemonic masculinity that undergirds it.

Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA)

Of the three national databases dedicated to publishing information on law enforcement
officers killed in the line of duty, LEOKA has the longest history. What is now LEOKA dates back
more than 80 years. Police fatality data from select departments was first published alongside other
crime data in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program’s annual Crime in the United States report
in 1937 (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 14). Initially, this data was merely presented as a total of officers
killed (from both on-duty accidents and assault). National statistics on officer fatalities (as opposed
to just select departments) were first available in 1960, the same year that the FBI added assaults on
police to its annual publication. Starting in 1963, the FBI began separating police fatalities into
‘accidental’ and ‘felonious’ line of duty deaths. Police officer assaults with injury were added in 1965.

The FBI significantly expanded the details it collected about incidents in which police were
assaulted or killed in 1972, in response to pressure from law enforcement (Rabe-Hemp, 2017, p. 61).
This expansion included the type of assignment the officer was on when injured or killed, the type
of call the officer was responding to, the time of day, and the number of assaults cleared (Uchida &
King, 2002, p. 14). Also in 1972, the FBI separated out police assault and injury data from other
crime reporting and started to produce two new annual reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed
Summary documented officer deaths, and Analysis of Assaults on Federal Officers. These two
reports were merged in 1982 into a single Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted
(LEOKA) annual report (“About LEOKA,” n.d.). LEOKA is now one of four data collections that
comprise the UCR Program. The other three are the National Incident-Based Reporting System
(NIBRS), the Summary Reporting System (SRS), and the Hate Crime Statistics Program.

LEOKA data are published annually and are generally made available online between
summer and fall following each calendar year, though the FBI occasionally releases fatality data
earlier in the year (and waits until summer or fall to release assault data). For example, the FBI
announced the early release of three sections of the 2017 LEOKA dataset related to fatalities in a
May 9, 2018 press release. In addition to the comprehensive annual report, the FBI maintains a
‘running tab’ of officers feloniously and accidentally killed. On July 12, 2019, for example, the FBI
website was updated with preliminary officer death statistics as of February 8, 2019.

LEOKA reports were published in hard copy until 2005, when the FBI began reproducing
LEOKA exclusively as a web publication (LEOKA). The variables collected both by the umbrella
UCR and by its subsidiary LEOKA program vary from year to year. As discussed above, a major
expansion of variables collected related to officer assaults and deaths occurred in 1972. The UCR
program then underwent a total redesign again throughout the 1980s based on a 1985 report titled
Blueprint for the Future of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. In one year alone (2016-2017),
the changes made to LEOKA in the form of database updates and variable category changes
covered 12 pages. The FBI notes that “because the information in the tables of this [LEOKA]
publication is updated each year, FBI cautions readers against making comparisons between the data
in this publication and those in prior editions.”
LEOKA data are now available online in access tables that sort police officer deaths according to victim profile, circumstance, type of assignment, weapon used, month, day and year of incident, and profile of assailant. The full datasets (i.e., the datasets containing all data categories not already pre-sorted into access tables) are available for download via the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Uniform Crime Reporting Data Series.

The FBI reportedly uses three types of reporting procedures to learn of an officer’s death for inclusion in LEOKA. The first (and overwhelmingly most common) is direct, voluntary monthly reporting to the FBI by the agency in which the officer worked. The second procedure involves the reporting by FBI field divisions when an officer death occurs in their area. The third involves reports made by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) through its Administrator of Public Safety Officer’s Benefits Program (PSOB) and other nonprofit organizations dedicated to supporting families of fallen officers, who sometimes report to the UCR when they become aware of a line-of-duty death (Fisher & Lab, eds., 2010, p. 650).

Criteria for inclusion in LEOKA

The LEOKA publication is limited in scope both in the types of deaths it reports and the types of agencies it covers. LEOKA contains only information on “felonious deaths, accidental deaths, and assaults,” not deaths resulting from natural causes, suicide, or on-duty deaths attributed to the officer’s own personal situation (e.g. domestic violence) (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017). In addition, the database only covers deaths that occur while the officer was “acting in an official capacity, whether on or off duty, at the time of the incident” (“Officer Criteria,” 2017). Therefore, the majority of the deaths contained in LEOKA are on-duty deaths. The minute percentage of deaths that occur off-duty but that would still qualify for inclusion would be if an officer took police action while off-duty (i.e. intervening in a robbery in a neighbor’s apartment).

Additionally, LEOKA does not report information for deaths of correctional officers, bailiffs, parole officers, private security officers, or others who do not carry a badge, have full arrest powers, or carry a firearm ordinarily (“Officer Criteria,” 2017). These restrictions make LEOKA publications much more limited in scope than ODMP and NLEOMF, which report on deaths from a wider variety of causes (including accidents and natural causes, like heart attacks, but also excluding suicides) and from a broader array of agencies (including correctional officers). These differences between LEOKA and the two nonprofit organizations’ databases will be further explored in the following sub-section.

At the local level, when police officers are injured or assaulted in the line of duty, the officer’s agency generally investigates the circumstances surrounding the incident. One purpose is to pursue criminal charges against the suspect, if the suspect is known and was not killed in the encounter. The other purpose is to gather information to submit a report, if the agency chooses, to the UCR program. Upon receipt of preliminary data from the local agency, LEOKA staff then work with FBI field offices to contact the agency involved “to ensure that for each case all the data gathered is pertinent to the LEOKA and consistent for each case, allowing for continuity across cases” (Fisher & Lab, eds., 2010, p. 650). Overall, the FBI’s LEOKA dataset continues to be the most widely utilized source of information on law enforcement officer injuries and deaths in the United States: “While the FBI itself does not claim that the data it publishes are a thorough representation of crime, policymakers, the media, researchers, and law enforcement rely on these statistics continually, as they are one of only two crime figure sources at the national level (the National Crime Victimization Survey is the other)” (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 12).
National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS): The Future of LEOKA Reporting

A 1985 report titled *The Blueprint for the Future of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program* called for both the expansion of UCR data collection and the creation of a new data collection mode called the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Traditionally, agencies report to the UCR using a Summary Reporting System (SRS), which provides an aggregate monthly tally of crimes. NIBRS significantly expands the amount of data available regarding each incident, including information about the victims, offenders, and situations within those incidents. Bierie (2017: 903) asserts that NIBRS is “the largest and most comprehensive police data system in the United States.”

In 2017, however, only 43% of U.S. law enforcement agencies that participated in the UCR Program submitted data via NIBRS. The FBI aims to sunset SRS and replace it nationally with NIBRS by January 1, 2021, but at the time I am writing this, NIBRS does not enjoy sufficient participation to offer national police officer assault, injury, or death coverage. NIBRS should not be confused as a distinct surveillance system from LEOKA; instead, NIBRS represents a different data reporting method for agencies to submit to the FBI information about officers assaulted, injured, or killed in the line of duty. LEOKA, alone among the other national officer fatality surveillance systems, also collects and publishes information on assaults and non-fatal injuries to officers. I will discuss that assault and injury data in a later section, following my coverage of the other national officer fatality surveillance systems. Before then, though, I turn to the other two national surveillance systems for officer fatalities.

National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund (NLEOMF)

The NLEOMF is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization founded in 1984 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. The organization’s vision is “[t]o inspire all citizens to value law enforcement” and its mission is “telling the story of American Law Enforcement and making it safer for those who serve” (“Vision | Mission Statements,” n.d.). It seeks to accomplish this mission and achieve this vision primarily through the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial in Washington, D.C., which sits on three acres of federal park land in the Judiciary Square area of the capitol. The organization also built the National Law Enforcement Museum, which sits adjacent to that Memorial. In addition to its physical presence, the NLEOMF claims to “maintain the largest, most comprehensive database of line-of-duty officer deaths” (“About,” n.d.). NLEOMF funds its operations through ticket sales and venue rental at its museum, the sale of memberships and memorabilia, and donations.

NLEOMF founder and leadership

The NLEOMF was founded by Mario Biaggi, a cop turned lawyer turned politician turned convicted felon. Biaggi was a “New York City police legend” from 1942-1965 who, at the time of his retirement and “for many years later...was the most decorated police officer in New York City history” (“Founder,” n.d.). After retiring from the police force, Biaggi served 10 terms as a Democratic congressman for the Bronx (McFadden, 2015). Biaggi’s experiences and the publicity that these experiences received throughout his life are exemplary of the sort of “direct personal experience” that amplifies the risk of physical violence and helps reify the danger imperative in policing (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 179):
In 23 years on the force, he was wounded 11 times, killed two suspects in self-defense and became a law-enforcement legend, winning dozens of citations for valor and national recognition...Mr. Biaggi joined the police force in 1942. Saving a woman on a runaway horse, he suffered a leg injury that left him with a rolling limp. He had many violent encounters with suspects. In 1944, he shot and killed a man who had tried to stab him with an ice pick. In 1959, he shot and killed a man who had tried to rob him at gunpoint. He was wounded in the shootout but won the Medal of Honor, the Police Department’s highest award (McFadden, 2015, paras. 4 and 19).

Biaggi, who had left law enforcement to attend law school before running for office, served in Congress until 1988 when he was convicted of 15 felonies. But before that, he was instrumental in creating NLEOMF. He created the organization as a non-profit on June 29, 1984 (Washington, D.C. Dep’t of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs). He then proposed legislation to authorize the construction of a National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial on federal land. House Joint Resolution 482 became Public Law 98-534 on October 19, 1984 (Congress.gov, H.J.Res.482). The Committee on House Administration’s report accompanying H.J. Res. 482 reveals the ways in which this memorial would be reflective of -- and would ultimately reify -- the danger imperative. The report is titled “National Law Enforcement Heroes Memorial” and described the purpose of the memorial: “to honor and recognize law enforcement officers who died in the line of duty” (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, 1984).

The discussion in the House focused on the physical dangers of the law enforcement occupation and elevated the normative order of machismo, which values the police as warriors. Frank Annunzio, a Congressman from Chicago, spoke in favor of the resolution, noting it would “pay a long overdue tribute” to those officers “killed in the act of protecting American citizens” (U.S. Senate, 1984, p. 28058). Biaggi also lauded his resolution for its promise to “honor our Nation’s forgotten patriots,” those “who have sacrificed their lives for the good of their fellow man” (U.S. Senate, 1984, p. 28058). He went on in support of the resolution, focusing intensely on the physical hazards of policing, especially those caused by civilian violence:

Even though I was wounded 10 times during my service with the New York City Police Department, I was one of the lucky ones—I survived. Over the last 10 years alone, some 1,600 other police men and women were not so fortunate. During just the last 2 years 309 law enforcement officers… died while performing their official duties—nearly one police death every 2 days. That is a national tragedy that cannot and must not be ignored. Consider, for example, that just 10 days ago New York City Transit police officer Irma Lozada was shot and killed while in pursuit of a chain snatcher. Imagine that, a woman in the prime of her life killed by a two bit thug over a gold chain. Actually, Irma Lozada was the first woman police officer killed in the line of duty in New York City history. Officer Lozada was a courageous and revered policewoman, who exemplified her proud Hispanic Heritage. Yet, the fact that Irma Lozada was a woman, that she was Hispanic, that she was highly respected among her peers, that she was gunned down over a gold chain, soon becomes forgotten and after some kind words and a few tears, all but a few lives are left unchanged by such a tragedy. Simply put, Irma Lozada, like so many of her comrades before her and the many

---

16 Biaggi and five others were charged with turning a company from the South Bronx into a criminal enterprise that paid bribes for no-bid military contracts. Biaggi was fined $242,000 and served 26 months in prison before being released in 1991 because of health concerns. He attempted a political comeback in 1992 but was defeated by Eliot Engel, who had succeeded him in his Congressional seat in 1992. McFadden, 2015.
who will follow, made the supreme sacrifice for the good of her fellow man, and that sacrifice is worth remembering (U.S. Senate, 1984, p. 28058).

Biaggi used his public platform to reinforce the danger imperative, telling a story that would increase the memorability and perceived possibility of the hazard posed by civilian violence, thereby heightening the perception of the risk (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 184). LEOKA data helped him do this by providing the statistics on the number of officers killed in the line of duty. Such stories are easily remembered, and help constitute social reality (Morrill & Musheno, 2018, p. 64). Among police (if not all persons), stories also include moral elements that link the storyteller’s social identity with the moral basis of decision-making (Oberweis & Musheno, 1999). Thus, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) found that when police officers told stories about dangerous encounters with civilians, the officers included thumbnail depictions of individuals they encountered (person-based heuristics they used to help guide their decision-making), and the moral bases of their responses (p. 84). Officers tended to dehumanize those who they deemed dangerous or threatening, flattening them into one-dimensional, stigmatized racial and gender categories (especially represented by African American and Hispanic males). Biaggi does exactly this here, elevating the risk of physical violence while flattening the suspect who killed Ms. Lozada as a “two bit thug” who “gunned her down” over a “gold chain,” language which blows a racial dog whistle (Haney López, 2014; Smiley & Fakunle, 2016).

Now, NLEOMF is governed by a board of five officers and 19 directors, most of whom have direct or indirect ties to law enforcement. Their names, positions, and relation to law enforcement are summarized below.

Table 5.1. NLEOMF leadership positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NLEOMF Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>LEO experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>Mario Biaggi</td>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>23 years in NYPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Karen P. Tandy</td>
<td>Senior VP of Public Affairs and Communications, Motorola</td>
<td>Former head of DEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chairman and Treasurer, Board Member</td>
<td>Jonathan F. Thompson</td>
<td>Executive Director, National Sheriff’s Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim CEO</td>
<td>Lori Sharpe Day</td>
<td>Managing Partner, Ashcroft Law Firm</td>
<td>Former Advisor Attorney at DOJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Suzie Sawyer</td>
<td>Retired director and founder of Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.)</td>
<td>Police spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Cheryl Schultz</td>
<td>National President, Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.)</td>
<td>Police spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Todd E. Barnes</td>
<td>Program Director of Hard Armor Solutions, DuPont</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Michael Dillinger</td>
<td>Vice President, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association</td>
<td>Has served as DOJ LEO since 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Chuck Canterbury</td>
<td>National President, Fraternal Order of Police</td>
<td>Served 26 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Linda Hennie</td>
<td>National President, Fraternal Order of Police Auxiliary</td>
<td>Police spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Vincent Talucci</td>
<td>Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)</td>
<td>Former DOJ employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Robert Santagata</td>
<td>Executive Board Member, International Brotherhood of Police Officers</td>
<td>Served 16 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Sam A. Cabral</td>
<td>President, International Union of Police Associations</td>
<td>Served 26 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Catherine Seidel</td>
<td>Vice President of Government Affairs, Motorola Solutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>James Palmer</td>
<td>National Association of Police Organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Sonia W.Y. Pruitt</td>
<td>Chairperson, National Black Police Association</td>
<td>Served 27 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Dwayne A. Crawford</td>
<td>Executive Director, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Mike Muth</td>
<td>Director of Communications, National Troopers Coalition</td>
<td>Served 29 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Chuck Wexler</td>
<td>Executive Director, Police</td>
<td>Former assistant to Boston</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 19 board members, 16 are appointed because of their position at a law enforcement organization. Nine board members are active or former law enforcement officers themselves; another two are the spouses of law enforcement officers; another three have worked for law enforcement agencies (like the DOJ). Thus, both in origin and in current governance, the NLEOMF was created by policing insiders, who are members of the subculture dominated by the danger imperative and its preoccupation with physical violence caused by civilians. The following sections highlight the data that the NLEOMF collects and the ways in which such data reflect and reinforce police officers’ emphasis on physical violence while concealing over forms of harm that officers suffer as a result of their work.

NLEOMF data collection

NLEOMF data collection begins at the initiative of the organization’s Research Manager, who looks for news of officer fatalities through Google alerts and social media sites like Facebook and Twitter. In addition, individuals from policing organizations such as Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS) frequently contact the Research Manager directly when they learn of a line-of-duty death. Once the Research Manager is alerted to an officer death through her own media searches or from other agency contacts, she sends an Officer Data Form to the deceased officer’s agency. A blank sample of this Officer Data Form is in Appendix 1. The NLEOMF requests that the agency return this form no later than December 31 of the year in which the death occurred. Once the NLEOMF receives the Officer Data Form back from the agency, a Names Committee (a standing committee comprised of members of the Board of Directors) meets to vote on whether the fatality meets the organization’s criteria for inclusion in its physical memorial in Washington, D.C. (and, by extension, its electronic database). These criteria for inclusion are included in Appendix 2 and are discussed further below. The name is then published in a “Roll Call of Heroes” released on the agency’s website, which lists the officer’s name, their department, and the day they died.

NLEOMF’s data collection and publication on its website (and engraving on its memorial wall) is an ongoing process. Data on the organization’s website are updated as deaths occur and are reported. As of July 13, 2019, for example, the website contained preliminary 2019 fallen officer
fatalities from January 1, 2019 through July 13, 2019. The organization also publishes end-of-year officer fatalities reports in which it compiles information from the previous calendar year and provides information about officer fatalities in graphics, text, and photographs. New names of fallen officers are carved into the monument once each spring during National Police Week (NLEOMF Memorial).

The physical National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial

The National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial, located on three acres of federal park land in the Judiciary Square area of Washington, D.C., is centered around two curved blue-gray marble walls, each 304 feet in length and situated on two tree-lined “pathways of remembrance.” These walls contain the names of over 21,000 officers killed in the line of duty since 1791. At the entrance to each pathway are bronze statues of an adult lion protecting two cubs; one pathway’s adult lion is male, the other is female. The photo below depicts the entrance to one of the pathways.

Caption: Bronze statues of adult lion protecting its cubs at the entrance to one of the memorial wall pathways. The names of fallen officers are engraved on the curved walls beyond the statues. Source: Wikimedia Commons photo by Million Moments.

Below the male lion depicted above is an engraved quote by Vivian Eney Cross, the widow of police officer Christopher Eney who was killed during a training incident when another officer’s gun discharged and struck Mr. Eney in the back. The quote reads, “It is not how these officers died that made them heroes, it is how they lived” (“Memorial | Fallen Officer Search,” n.d.). Yet, as I will discuss in the following section, it is how these officers die that makes them heroes, at least according to the NLEOMF’s own criteria for inclusion.

NLEOMF criteria for inclusion

The NLEOMF includes a broader array of police deaths in its database than does LEOKA but still draws significant lines that exclude most deaths that occur off-duty. In addition to full-time law enforcement officers “directly employed...by a local, county, state or federal law enforcement agency,” the memorial also includes certain part-time employees on a case-by-case basis (Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial, n.d.). Officers must die “in the line of duty”
which means that the officer “died as a direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty” (*Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial*, n.d.). This includes off-duty deaths only if the officer was “en route to or from a specific emergency or responding to a particular request for assistance” or driving (either a personal or departmental) vehicle to or from work (*Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial*, n.d.). The NLEOMF also includes certain deaths attributed to natural causes (i.e. heart attacks), if those deaths were caused by physical exertion while on duty (including training, fitness tests, lifting heavy objects, or responding to a “violation of law or an emergency situation”) (*Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial*, n.d.). The memorial excludes any death attributed to the voluntary actions of the officer, including alcohol or substance abuse, intentional misconduct, or suicide. (*Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial*, n.d.). Unlike LEOKA, which excludes correctional officers, jailers, and prison officials, NLEOMF includes correctional officers who have law enforcement status under their employing jurisdiction (*Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial*, n.d.).

**Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP)**

The third major national surveillance system for officer fatalities is administered by a non-profit corporation and is called the Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP). ODMP was created in 1996 by then-college-student Chris Cosgriff. The organization’s website explains that Mr. Cosgriff:

> read a Washington Post article about the release of a murderer convicted of slaying two Prince George's County, Maryland police officers. Upon learning that this violent criminal had served only 16 years for his heinous act, Chris was compelled to find a way to honor these and other fallen officers. Thus, the Officer Down Memorial Page was created (“About ODMP,” n.d.).

The NLEOMF initially helped the nascent ODMP by providing access to the NLEOMF’s own database of fallen officers dating back to the 1790s. ODMP then applied for and received its own nonprofit status in 2000. Since then, ODMP raises money for its efforts through various events (e.g. motorcycle rides and fun runs), private donations, and the sale of memorabilia like t-shirts and memorial bracelets on its website.

**ODMP founder and leadership**

The ODMP’s leadership board is significantly smaller than NLEOMF’s, consisting of only four people: Founder, Chairman and Executive Director Chris Cosgriff, and three volunteer board members (one of whom is also the Director of Research). Their names, positions, and relation to law enforcement are summarized below.

**Table 5.2. ODMP leadership positions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODMP Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>LEO experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founder, Chairman, &amp; Executive Director</td>
<td>Chris Cosgriff</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>Current LEO since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer &amp; Board</td>
<td>Mike Schutz</td>
<td>Account Manager, Hitachi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three of the four members of the ODMP leadership team are law enforcement officers. Cosgriff founded the site nearly 20 years before he became an officer, when he was still an “18-year-old kid who dreamed of becoming a police officer” (Stockwell, 2005). Cosgriff spent years working on the website “30 hours a week” from a “computer in the basement” while he worked full-time as a systems engineer; he then became a police officer with the Fairfax County Police Department in 2013 (Stockwell, 2005). Like the NLEOMF, his goal in data collection both reflects and reinforces the danger imperative in policing: memorialize officers “slain in the line of duty” so that their “sacrifice...will not be forgotten” (Stockwell, 2005).

ODMP data collection

ODMP differs from the other surveillance systems described herein because the police officer fatality data it collects is not published in aggregated tables, but instead on individual officer “memorial pages” containing a brief narrative of the officer's death and usually also at least one photo of the fallen officer. The site also offers functions to search by date, name, state, agency, or cause. The website now features memorial pages for officers killed as far back as 1791: Sheriff Cornelius Hogeboom, a veteran of the American Revolutionary War, was “ambushed and shot by a group of men who were disguised as Indians.” The site also collects and publishes limited (and non-comprehensive) information on K9 dogs that die in the line of duty, many of whom are killed by heat exhaustion when the air conditioning in patrol cars malfunctions (“ODMP K9,” n.d.).

ODMP identifies fallen officers in a variety of ways. The organization’s website contains a submission page where members of the public can report a fallen officer. The Director of Research reviews the submission and the board votes on whether the death meets the organization’s criteria, discussed in more detail below. In addition to the website submission form, the Director of Research uses data mining, including internet keyword searches and Twitter, to identify officers who die in the line of duty. Some agencies also notify ODMP directly when an officer dies within that agency. Finally, ODMP counts on the assistance of volunteer researchers around the country who forward news of a fallen officer in their area to the Director of Research (ODMP, Private Communication, January 2019).

When news first breaks of an officer death in the line of duty, ODMP will often post a preliminary memorial page without the name of the officer. The organization waits until the name is officially released by the agency (usually via a formal press release) before adding the officer’s name to the online memorial page (ODMP, Private Communication, January 2019). Unlike the NLEOMF, ODMP does not send a standard form to agencies to gather additional information. Instead, it relies on the expertise of its Board members and informal communications with agencies to gather the information that is then published on the website.
ODMP criteria for inclusion

ODMP’s criteria for inclusion are essentially identical to that of the NLEOMF (ODMP, Private Communication, July 12, 2019). Officers must be killed either on duty or, if off-duty, “while acting in an official capacity to prevent loss of property, injury, or death, or is targeted because of his/her duties as a law enforcement officer (“Criteria for Inclusion,” n.d.-a). ODMP includes deaths from both felonious causes and accidental causes. Like NLEOMF, it also includes officers who die on duty from natural causes (i.e. heart attack, brain aneurysm, etc.) “due to physical exertion during a stressful event while on duty” (“Criteria for Inclusion,” n.d.-a). ODMP includes correctional and detention officers who had “primary or limited responsibility for the custody and security of suspected or convicted criminal offenders” (“Criteria for Inclusion,” n.d.-a). Like NLEOMF, ODMP considers the officer’s culpability in her death. “Disqualifying circumstances” include suicides, deaths caused by alcohol or drug use and deaths caused by intentional misconduct or gross negligence of the officer (“Criteria for Inclusion,” n.d.-a).

Table 5.3 below compares various aspects of each of the three national surveillance systems. The table elements are derived from Tiesman et al. (2013), who presented similar categories of comparison but did not include ODMP (p. 696).

Table 5.3. Comparison of three national surveillance systems on law enforcement officer fatalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LEOKA</th>
<th>NLEOMF</th>
<th>ODMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency or org. responsible</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)</td>
<td>National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), non-profit</td>
<td>Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP), non-profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overarching purpose</td>
<td>Provide data and training to help keep law enforcement officers safe, focused on why (rather than what) happened, with a goal of prevention</td>
<td>Memorize officers on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Wall (Washington, D.C.) and associated website.</td>
<td>Memorialize fallen officers through website memorial pages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for inclusion</td>
<td>Duly sworn city, university and college, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement officers who, at the time of the incident, wore/carry a badge (ordinarily), carried a firearm (ordinarily), were duly sworn and had full arrest powers, were members of a law enforcement agency, were acting in an official capacity, whether on or off duty</td>
<td>Individuals involved in crime control or reduction who were directly employed on a full-time basis by a local, county, state or federal law enforcement agency of the United States or its territories, with or without compensation, who were duly sworn and had full arrest powers.</td>
<td>Any marshal, police officer, deputy sheriff, agent, or employee of any other title employed by a municipal, city, county, state, or federal agency and who had arrest powers; any employee of a public authority, railroad, private institution of higher education, or who otherwise held a police commission from a state; volunteer/auxiliary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Overlap and gaps in the three databases

There is significant overlap in coverage within the three databases. All three report all on-duty felonious killings of police and all on-duty deaths caused by accidents, as well as off-duty deaths if the officer was acting in an official capacity (such as taking police action or targeted for being an officer). Though LEOKA does not include on-duty deaths from natural causes, NLEOMF and ODMP both do, as long as the death was the result of physical exertion related to the officer’s job. All three databases exclude off-duty deaths from accidents and natural causes and any deaths for which the officer himself is found to be culpable. Suicides, deaths from alcohol or drug abuse, or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty at the time of the incident, and, if killed, the death was directly related to the injuries received during the incident.</th>
<th>Officers/deputies who were granted powers of arrest while on duty.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excluded from dataset</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel; suicides; natural deaths; officers acting in military capacity</td>
<td>Military personnel; suicides; deaths attributed to voluntary alcohol or controlled substance suicide; intentional misconduct deaths; gross negligence; deaths from natural causes not induced by job-related physical exertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of info</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agencies submit monthly UCR reports to FBI; assembled into annual report published following calendar year.</td>
<td>NLEOMF Research Manager learns of death through search alerts and social media, then sends data form to agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, sex, race, years of experience, month, time of day, state, circumstances of fatality, weapon used, armor use, fatal wound location, narrative for homicides, offender data</td>
<td>Name, age, sex, race, date of death, time of death, marital status, race, rank/title, circumstances of fatality, weapon details, seat-belt use, armor use, narrative field, perpetrator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
deaths resulting from gross misconduct or negligence of the officer do not appear in any of the three databases.

Inclusion in these databases ensures that a complete forensic re-creation of the incident is available to any wishing to study an officer fatality individually or the databases’ fatalities in aggregate. Between them, the three databases collect incredibly detailed information about the deaths that they choose to include. This information includes variables ranging from the characteristics of the officer and the location of the death, to the environment and circumstances surrounding the death and the suspect (if any) responsible. Importantly, the publication of the officers’ names means that one can access even more information about the death from the numerous (sometimes dozens, in the case of felonious killings) media accounts of the officer’s death.

Data availability on police officer deaths is reflective of the danger imperative discussed in the opening section of this chapter. The richest data are available for those officers whose deaths are caused by human violence. Less (but still ample) data are available for officers who die from physical injuries sustained during on-duty accidents or who die from natural causes after on-duty physical exertion. No data are available in these databases for officers who die by suicide, or who are off duty and killed in an accident or die from natural causes. As I discussed above, police culture is preoccupied with physical danger. Herbert (1998) wrote that safety is one of the six normative orders that provide guidelines and justifications for the actions of police officers. Of these, the normative order of safety is the most relevant to the data collected by the three databases described above. This normative order encourages police to be constantly vigilant so that they can go home at the end of their shift. Sierra-Arévalo argues that danger is the defining aspect of police work that “underlies and unifies the concepts and behaviors” of police officers described by other policing scholars (2016, p. 13). But research on risk and culture (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1963) and on police culture specifically (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016) reveals that not all dangers are equally feared by police officers. The risk of physical violence from civilians is amplified in police culture (see Kaspersion et al. 1988). This amplification takes place through both formal and informal processes, during the police academy and in the day-to-day work of officers. Kaspersion et al. (1988) explain that:

The roots of social amplification lie in the social experience of risk, both in direct personal experience and in indirect, or secondary, experience, through information received about the risk, risk events, and risk management systems ...experience with dramatic accidents or risk events increased the memorability and imaginability of the hazard, thereby heightening the perception of the risk (p. 184).

The social amplification of the risk of physical injury or death, especially that caused by civilians, thus is caused by both the individual officer’s experience with such injuries and violence and the information she receives about ‘dramatic accidents’ or ‘risk events.’ LEOKA, NLEOMF, and ODMP contribute to the information that is available, and the knowledge that is created, about the dangers of policing. These databases serve as part of a larger informational network (which consists of media accounts and storytelling) that amplifies the risk that officers perceive of being killed or seriously injured by civilians in the line of duty, even though such events are relatively rare (Zimring, 2017).

The similarities between the three databases are not entirely surprising, given what researchers have identified as “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell explain, is “a con-straining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (1983, p. 149).They further note that isomorphism occurs when, “organizational actors making rational
decisions construct around themselves an environment that constrains their ability to change further in later years” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). The authors posit that there are three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs:

1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy;
2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150).

Normative isomorphism is likely present in data collection about the dangers of policing. After all, LEOKA data collection on officer fatalities first occurred during the period during which police officers were professionalized (White, 1972), and this dissertation has demonstrated the power of normative orders in policing. There is also ample evidence of communication between the databases, especially the ODMP and the NLEOMF. After all, when ODMP first launched, it received officer fatality data from the NLEOMF to help build its online memorial pages. The OMPD’s director of research noted that their database is essentially identical to that of the NLEOMF (OMP, Personal communication, 2019). Another term for institutional isomorphism — in the language of anthropologist Sally Engle Merry (2016) — is “expertise inertia,” which occurs when “insiders with skills and experience have a greater say in developing measurement systems than those without -- a pattern that excludes the inexperienced and powerless” (p. 6). Institutional isomorphism and expertise inertia are concepts that help explain the similarities in police danger databases over time.

Gatekeeping police heroism

The mission of ODMP is “dedicated to honoring America's fallen law enforcement heroes” (“About ODMP,” n.d.), while the NLEOMF’s mission is “to tell the story of American law enforcement, honor the fallen and make it safer for those who serve” (“Vision | Mission Statements,” n.d.). In memorializing fallen officers, the databases simultaneously reflect the police cultural orientation towards danger and, I argue, help perpetuate it. Sierra-Arévalo (2016) notes that the common cultural frame that binds officers together “engenders behavior that reifies the danger imperative [and] filters stimuli in such a way that makes certain behaviors more or less likely given a set of social facts” (p. 15). This behavior can include things like the use of force (Legewie, 2016; Skolnick & Fyfe, 2010) or the failure to use seatbelts while driving to ensure quick access to their service weapons. It could also, I propose, include the data that police officers collect about themselves and the dangers of their occupation. Because the danger imperative orients officers and fundamentally shapes their experience of their work and the way they respond to stimuli, it likely also influences the information they collect about themselves.

The social amplification of the risk of physical violence from civilians occurs both when officers suffer from violent attacks themselves and when they receive information about such violent attacks. The three databases here serve as one such source of information -- they offer a “research tool for academics and a teaching and training resource for hundreds of police departments across the country” (Stockwell, 2005). The information assembled by, and the knowledge created from, these databases joins the ‘war stories’ that officers retell (Van Maanen, 1978, pp. 297-298) and the academy training and pre-shift briefings where officers are shown videos of violent attacks from across the country (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 26) as both evidence of, and reinforcement for, the danger imperative in police culture.
Indeed, most of what is known about the dangers of policing comes from these three databases. Even White, Dario, and Shjarback (2019), who argue for a “broad definition of dangerousness,” still focus on the physical hazards of policing:

[A] full understanding of the hazards of the police profession requires a comprehensive examination of all officer line-of-duty deaths that are caused by felonious attacks, accidents, and other nonfelonious circumstances resulting from the nature of the job (e.g., heart attack and duty-related illness) (p. 13).

White and his colleagues use a 47-year sample of police deaths from ODMP to study dangerousness in policing. Gibbs, Lee, Maloney, and Olson (2018), Kasper (2012), and Maguire, Nix, and Campbell (2017) also use ODMP. Kaminski and Marvell (2002) and Mustard (2001) use NLEOMF. Bailey and Peterson (1994), Cardarelli (1968), Hipple, Gruenewald, Gonsler, and Sargent (2019), Kent (2010), Kobler (1975), Lester (1978), Masera (2019), Mencken, Nolan, and Berhanu (2004), Zimring (2017 & 2019), and Zimring and Arsiniega (2015) all use LEOKA. The availability of data on policing drives public policy decisions (Harmon, 2013). These databases serve as gatekeepers for what information is publicly known and what research is conducted about the dangers of police. I do not venture to argue that policing is not a dangerous profession; it is. Policing is one of the few occupations in which the danger of being killed by another human ranks high when an officer is engaged in the occupation’s routine responsibilities (Gibbs, Ruiz, & Klapper-Lehman, 2014, p. 278). But the general perception that policing is “one of the most, if not the most, dangerous profession,” held by the public and police officers alike, is the result of the social amplification of certain risks over others (Gibbs et al., 2014, p. 286; see also Ehrenfreund, 2015; Kaspersion et al., 1988; Smith, 2013). I do not argue that the danger of being killed by civilians is not real, only that the three national databases discussed here play a role in that amplification.

The three databases discussed in this chapter were all started by policing insiders and designed for policing insiders. J. Edgar Hoover told the police chiefs gathered at the IACP’s 1925 convention that the Division of Identification (which had taken over the IACP’s collection of criminal identification cards) was “Of you, by you and for you” (Richman & Seo, 2019a, p. 28). Similarly, these three databases were all started largely because of the efforts of policing insiders (by you). The databases depend on information that law enforcement agencies share voluntarily with them (of you). Finally, they serve not just their stated purpose of honoring and memorializing fallen officers, but also help perpetuate the danger imperative by creating knowledge about deaths caused by the physical dangers of policing (for you) (Richman & Seo, 2019a, p. 28). The criteria for inclusion in these various databases are essentially gatekeeping heroism: those who meet the criteria have extensive information about their death collected and recorded, leading to knowledge production. Those whose deaths do not meet the criteria for inclusion remain anonymous, hidden from both the public’s and researchers’ views. The danger imperative results in certain deaths ‘mattering less’ because the risk of their occurrence has been socially attenuated. Thus, these databases are co-constitutive with police culture. These databases help build and maintain the central preoccupation with violence in police work, but they also reflect that same preoccupation.

Police officer injuries

National data on less-than-lethal police officer injuries is much harder to come by than line of duty death data, despite the significantly higher prevalence of injury as opposed to death in the line of duty. Neither of the non-profits discussed in the previous section (ODMP or NLEOMF)
collect data on police officer injuries; they memorialize only officers who die as a result of their injuries. In this section, I first discuss the non-fatal officer injury data available nationally from the FBI, then highlight academic research on police officer injuries that attempts to fill in the gaps left by those national databases. The BLS also conducts an annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) which purports to publish national data on workplace injuries in all occupations, but participation in the survey by state and local government employers is not mandatory. So, while the FBI’s dataset reported 17,476 assaults with injury for cops in 2017, the BLS’s SOII only reported 700. Therefore, I will not cover the SOII in this chapter (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2017; “Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) Respondents Home Page,” n.d.).

Less-than-lethal injuries in LEOKA

The FBI collects monthly data on nonfatal assaults against law enforcement officers who were performing law-enforcement functions at the time of the assault and publishes this data sometime between spring and fall for each preceding calendar year. The FBI started reporting on officers assaulted in the line of duty in 1960, initially publishing separate reports on assaults and fatalities (Uchida & King, 2002, p. 14). Officer fatality and assault data were then merged in 1982 into the single annual LEOKA report, though the FBI sometimes makes fatality data available on its website months earlier than assault data. The data elements available for officers assaulted include the total numbers of officers assaulted, and breakdowns by geographic region, whether or not the officer was injured, the weapon used to assault the officer, the time of and circumstances surrounding the incident, information about the suspect(s) involved, and information regarding what kind of assignment the officer was on when she was assaulted.

Just as reporting officer fatalities to the FBI is voluntary, so too is the reporting of officer assaults. The FBI notes that, “for assault data to be included in this publication, law enforcement agencies must have submitted information for all 12 months of 2017 regarding their sworn officers who were assaulted as well as the number of officers and civilians in their agencies employed full time for the reporting year” (“Methodology,” n.d.).

Unlike fatalities, though, the FBI makes no claim that its LEOKA data account for all assaults on law enforcement nationally. Because agencies’ assault data are only published in LEOKA if the agency reported to the FBI all 12 months of the calendar year, agencies who report only certain months (or not at all) are excluded from LEOKA publications. As a result, LEOKA assault data present an under-count of assaults and injuries to American police. In 2017, for example, the FBI collected data from 12,198 law enforcement agencies out of a total of approximately 18,000 agencies. Reporting agencies covered 82.8% of the U.S. population in 2017. So, law enforcement officers serving nearly 20% of the U.S. population were not included or reflected in the FBI’s 2017 assault data. And that 2017 reporting rate – agencies covering roughly 83% of the nation’s population – is a high water mark for reporting in the last decade ("2017 Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted").

The FBI employs the term assault as it is understood in the criminal law: an action by a suspect that carries the potential to cause injury to an officer. The FBI notes that assaults are “instances in which an offender used a weapon that could have caused injury or death,” and notes that assaults that do not cause injury are included “if they involved more than verbal abuse or minor resistance to an arrest” (“Methodology,” n.d.' emphasis added). Injuries, then, represent just a subset of those assaults.
There is no gradation in the dataset for the severity of the injuries sustained. Instead, the FBI’s data are bi-modal: the officer is either reported as injured or not injured by the assault. Of course, one might argue that the fact that LEOKA classifies injuries by weapon used could give insight into the severity of the injury, but classification by weapon uses actually “deepens the mystery” of police officer injury, instead of solving it (Zimring, 2017, p. 93). Zimring’s 2017 book *When Police Kill* explores this mystery in great detail, focusing on the fact that the vast majority (roughly 80%) of all assaults reported by LEOKA are ones in which the suspect used “personal force,” meaning their hands and feet (or perhaps other parts of their body, like their teeth). Yet these types of assaults almost never result in officer fatalities. Inversely, assaults with firearms make up only 4.3% of all assaults on officers reported by LEOKA in 2016 and 2017 but constitute the overwhelming majority for weapons used when officers are killed. Between 2009 and 2018, for example, the FBI reports that 510 police officers were feloniously killed; of those, 471 (over 92%) were killed with firearms. The weapon with the next highest rate of lethality to police officers after guns is vehicles, which caused the death of 31 (6%) of the FBI’s reported 510 officers killed feloniously between 2009 and 2018. Suspects who used personal force to attack cops account for less than 1% of all officer fatalities between 2009 and 2018 (“Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted,” 2018).

I update Zimring’s (2017) table 5.2 below. Zimring used 2012 and 2013 LEOKA data to demonstrate the total number of assaults and the injury rate to officers from four types of weapons and to high proportion of injuries caused by those weapons that nearly never kill officers. I use more recently data from 2016 and 2017 for similar purposes.

**Table 5.4.** Weapon used to assault police officers and rate of injury from 2016-2017 LEOKA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon used to assault officer</th>
<th>Number of assaults</th>
<th>% of all assaults</th>
<th>Number of injuries</th>
<th>Rate of injury to officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal force</td>
<td>91,557</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>26,480</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other dangerous weapon</td>
<td>19,410</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>4,047</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>5,065</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knives and cutting instruments</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>118,222</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>31,212</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted, 2016-2017

---

17 This category presumably includes vehicles, which are sometimes used in assaults on officers (i.e., when suspects intentionally aim their car at an officer while driving).
Zimring’s findings using LEOKA data from 2012-2013 hold true with updated data from 2016 and 2017. Indeed, the greatest concentration of injuries to cops are caused by personal force – hands, feet, fists, teeth – even though the risk that officers face of being killed by such weapons is nearly zero.

The FBI’s data collection on police officer injuries is the only significant national effort to report on officers injured by civilian assault in the line of duty. Yet this distinction carries significant caveats. Reporting assaults and injuries to LEOKA is voluntary, and so 20% of the country lives in areas where their law enforcement agency does not report. Additionally, the LEOKA categorizes assaults only as causing injury or not causing injury, which creates significant limitations in the ability to decipher which injuries might be the most life-threatening.

The LEOKA data are also significant for what they do not cover: any injury to law enforcement officers that is not caused by assault. Importantly for broader considerations of police safety generally, LEOKA does not contain information on officer injuries not caused by assault, such as those injuries caused by exertion or accident. Brandl and Stroshine (2012) demonstrate – and the data from MPD and CPD introduced later in this chapter support – that only approximately 10% of all police officer injuries are caused by civilian assault. Therefore, LEOKA injury data provides only a very narrow window into the empirical realities of police officer injury.

Many researchers have asserted that police preoccupation with the risk of physical violence from civilians is disproportionate to what is known empirically about such risks (Paoline, 2003, p. 211, n. 2; Slovic 1987 & 2010). The assault and injury data published in the LEOKA dataset contribute to the “mismatch between perceived and objective risk” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 2). One of the principal tenets of critical data studies (CDS) is that data and the assemblages that produce them both create knowledge and “do work in the world” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014, p. 13). In policing, LEOKA assault and injury data create knowledge about the dangers of policing that helps amplify the risk of civilian assault, thereby reinforcing the danger imperative in police culture.

Academic gap-filling: scholarly work on officer injuries

For those wishing to study police officer injuries nationally, there are no comprehensive and reliable options. This translates into a relative paucity of knowledge-production related to the non-fatal injuries in policing evidenced by a gap in the literature on non-fatal law enforcement officer injuries (Ross, 2019). The FBI’s LEOKA program only reports injuries inflicted by civilian assault. Even then, agencies are under no legal obligation to report their assaults and injuries to the FBI, and reporting rates hover between 75-80% of the U.S. population whose local agency reports officer assaults and injuries to the program.

Tiesman et al. (2018) note that while national surveillance systems “provide a national picture of officer fatalities, much less is known about nonfatal injuries among officers and how these injuries impact officers and agencies” (pp. 503-504). In this section I will introduce some of the efforts of those same authors, along with others, who attempt to fill in the gaps in national reporting on law enforcement officer injuries. This section is not intended to provide a comprehensive literature review of all studies of police officer injuries, but merely to provide a survey of the types of studies that scholars conduct regarding police officer injuries.

The limitations in FBI’s LEOKA dataset are well established in the policing literature. Zimring (2017) calls LEOKA data “dreadful measures of danger to police” (p. 94). Tiesman et al. (2018) explain that “[u]sing data systems that rely on voluntary reporting could provide misleading
results compromising the interpretations concerning police and civilian interactions” (p. 507). Yet the LEOKA data continue to be used frequently in order to study violent attacks against the police (Bierie, 2017). The resulting knowledge production further contributes to the amplification of perceived risk of violent assault by civilians. These violent assaults, however, are far from representative of all police injuries.

Some researchers attempt to formulate their own national estimates of police injuries in the absence of nationally reliable surveillance systems. Hope M. Tiesman of the Division of Safety Research at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is one such researcher. Tiesman et al. (2018) used the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System Occupational Injury Supplement (NEISS-Work) to study police officers’ nonfatal on-duty injuries between 2003 and 2014. NEISS-Work, a collaboration between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, is based on a stratified probability sample of 67 U.S. hospitals.

Other scholars study law enforcement officer injuries using data from individual states or cities. Their findings overwhelmingly demonstrate that assaults are the cause of only a small fraction of all police officer injuries. Holloway-Beth et al. (2016) examined the cost of police officer injuries in Illinois using workers’ compensation data from 1980 to 2008 and found that assaults accounted for 15% of all injuries (p. 108). Brandl (1996) gathered over 2,000 injury reports from a Midwestern police department and found that 10% of the injuries were caused by assault. Brandl and Stroshine (2012) analyzed a single year of injury incident data voluntarily provided to them by the Milwaukee Police Department and found that 10% were caused by assault (p. 180).

Still others publish detailed literature reviews, like Lyons, Radburn, Orr, and Pope (2017) who conducted a systematic review of seven studies on law enforcement injuries. They found wide variance in injury rates reported in the studies they considered, from 240 to 2500 injuries per 1000 police personnel per year; the most common site of injury was the ‘upper extremity’ (arms/hands), with the most common causes of injury being sprains or strains. They found that “[t]he most common mechanism of injury reported by four of the seven studies...was non-compliant offenders/assault, with percentages of injuries reported to arise from this mechanism varying from 31.5% to 61.67%” (p. 2017). The reason these numbers are so much higher than the assault numbers cited above is the lumping together by Lyons et al. of injuries caused by “non-compliant offenders” and those caused by assault. The former are injuries that occur during arrest but not from the intentional action of the suspect (i.e. officer pulls a shoulder putting suspect in handcuffs).

The IACP sometimes conducts its own studies of officer injuries. In 2012 it published a “Reducing Officer Injuries Final Report” based on a year-long study of 18 difference agencies who reported a total of 1,295 injuries; 1,188 injuries were included in the final report. Of these, a suspect was present when only 453 (38%) of the injuries occurred. A suspect with a weapon was present in only 41 (less than 4%) of the injuries. The most common injuries were sprains, strains, and soft tissue tears (n=610), accounting for over triple the number of the next most frequent injuries, contusion (n=189) and laceration (n=179). Notably, only 1 injury out of the 1,295 was a gunshot wound (The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2012).

The IACP acknowledges in its 2012 report that “little is known about the national scope of police officer injuries outside of line-of-duty deaths and assaults; as a result, relatively little is known about the impact of injuries on law enforcement agencies” (p. 15). But, the IACP does not acknowledge (or perhaps even comprehend) its own role in creating the current status quo, where very much is known about injuries and deaths caused by civilian violence and very little is known
about all other injuries, despite their overwhelming prevalence. The danger imperative helps illuminate how, and why, we arrived at this juncture. Police culture, historically preoccupied since the inception of the IACP with the risk of civilian assault, decided what data it would collect about itself. Data collection practices mirrored the culture of those that created them: a culture focused on certain injuries and largely ignorant (or perhaps merely disinterested) in others. Even the normative order of safety -- which Herbert (1998) argues conditions how officers define and approach situations in order to preserve their own lives (p. 357) -- is fundamentally informed and transformed by the danger imperative. Otherwise, officers, in the name of safety, would buckle their seatbelts, especially when driving at high speeds. But they do not (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016). Instead, the danger imperative continues to define police officers’ experience of their work and their expectations about what risks each shift holds. The fact that the only national database on police officer injuries exclusively covers injuries from assault both reflects and reifies this.

In the following chapter, I present and discuss the injury data -- or assault data from which I could derive injury data -- provided to me by two urban departments in the southern United States.
Chapter 6: Officer injury and assault in CPD and MPD

City and department characteristics

Community Police Department (CPD) is located in a city of approximately 150,000 people and has approximately 600 sworn officers. MPD is located in a densely-populated urban city of nearly 500,000 residents located in a larger metropolitan area and has about 2,000 sworn officers. Both departments have standard departmental administrative hierarchies overseeing geographic patrol zones and a variety of specialized units, including SWAT and gang units. In both cities, Blacks constitute a majority of the population. CPD’s violent crime rate is 1.2 times that of the national average, whereas MPD’s violent crime rate is 2.4 times the rate of the nation generally.18

Both departments are among the top 1 percent in the country in terms of department size. Though both do deal with violent crime (which the FBI defines to include homicide/non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, rape, and aggravated assault), CPD’s violent crime rate is about on part with the national average, while MPD’s violent crime rate is double -- nearly two-and-a-half times the national crime rate. The cities have roughly equal racial demographics. Both cities’ proportion of Black residents is more than four times the proportion of Blacks in America as a whole, which is only 12%.

Community Police Department (CPD)

CPD released injury data to me maintained by its workers’ compensation third-party administration in an Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet contained injuries from 2010-2018, from all causes, that resulted in a workers’ compensation claim.19 Each data element represented a single injury-causing incident for a single officer. If an officer was injured in multiple body parts during a single incident, the ‘part of body injured’ column read ‘multiple’. The spreadsheet contained the following variables: accident date, year, occupation of injured officer, coverage code (all were coded as “WC”), WC claim type,20 status code21, accident type code description, claim description, part of body injured, total cost incurred, and total cost paid.

---

18 I derived the violent crime rate ratios from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for 2017, which reports the number of violent crimes nationally and broken down by metropolitan statistical area. “Violent crime,” according to the FBI, consists of those offenses that involve force or threat of force, including murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

19 As discussed in the methods chapter, I initially requested only 2015-2018 but was informed that it would be ‘just as easy’ to give me injuries dating back to 2010, so I agreed to accept a larger dataset.

20 This column was coded as either “M” or “I”. No codebook was provided, but these likely mean that the workers’ compensation coverage was either medical care or income.

21 These were coded as either “CL” or “OP” for “closed” or “open” claims.
Over this 9-year period, CPD had 1,118 workers’ compensation claims. Despite my request for only injuries sustained by sworn officers, the dataset I received contained injuries for all department employees. I removed from this dataset injuries from civilian employees whose occupation was clearly not sworn police officer. This left 934 injuries during my nine-year sample, or just over 100 injuries per year. Given that CPD had, on average, 599 sworn officers during each of the years in this sample, this translates to 0.17 injuries per officer, per year. In other words, roughly one out of six officers submitted a workers’ compensation claim each year. Apart from the unit name and occupation, I was not provided identifying information about the officers involved (i.e. race, gender, and age). Some claim descriptions included gendered pronouns (e.g., “Employee was responding to a call on a female high on cocaine and she kicked him in the groin”), but many did not.

Coding in CPD data

How useful are the data categories contained within the CPD injury dataset maintained by the workers’ compensation administrator? Not very, due to both the over-specificity and the lack of standardization in the data categories that severely limit the ability to perform aggregate analyses on the injuries detailed within the database. For example, for the 102 injuries that I determined were caused by the volitional act of the suspect (discussed in greater detail below), the following accident type code descriptions were used:

- Struck by Employee/fellow worker/patientBI [sic]
- Vehicle Accident
- Absorption of Substance
- Struck by Member, customer (BI)
- Human violence
- Exertion - reaching
- Alleged personal injury
- Contact with/by Bodily Fluids
- Alleged assault
- Struck by flying object
- Other - Gunshot/Muzzle burn/deafened
- Struck by firearm discharge
- Absorption of Substance
- Struck by moving object (vehicle)

Thus, there were 14 different codes used to describe the ‘accident type’ for the injuries whose descriptions involved the intentional injurious act of a suspect. The categorization by employee’s occupation provides another striking example of the lack of standardization in the dataset. Officers whose occupation is some variation of “Sergeant” are alternatively listed as:

- Patrol Sgt.

22 These included occupations coded as “admin clerk,” “animal control,” “building services,” “communications,” “records tech,” and “secretary,” among others.
23 If it was unclear from the occupation code whether the individual was a sworn officer, I left it in the dataset. These include positions like “trainer” and “trainee” (as opposed to the code “police recruit”). See Chapter 2 on methods for additional information.
- Police Sgt
- Police Sgt.
- Sargeant
- Sargeant Polic
- Seargeant
- Seargent
- Sergeant

Similarly, patrol officers’ occupation is alternatively listed as:

- Patrol
- Patrol corporal
- Patrol Man
- Patrol Officer
- Patrolman
- Patrol Sgt.

Throughout the dataset, but especially in the fields detailing the officers’ occupation and the accident type, the lack of standardization reveals that this is not likely a dataset that the department is using internally to aggregate and study the injuries to its officers. For example, if the department wanted to understand the injuries its officers were suffering during foot chases of suspects, it would have to manually read through and re-code the entire dataset (as I did). The 131 injuries that I determined (from claim descriptions) to be chase-related injuries are coded as 27 distinct ‘accident types’:

- Absorption of Substance
- Caught between moving objects
- Contact with sharp objects
- Contact with temperature extremes
- Contact with/by Bodily Fluids
- Contamination/Pollution
- Cut by object being lifted or handled
- Environmental
- Exertion - jumping
- Exertion - lifting
- Exertion - repetitive motion
- Exertion - twisting, turning, bending
- Human violence
- No specific accident or injury
- Not Otherwise Classified
- Slip or fall - liquid or grease spills/oil
- Slip,trip or fall-elevated surfaces
- Slip, trip, fall - on stairs
- Slip,trip or fall-same level
- Slip,trip,fall-pits,shafts,holes
- Slipped, did not fall
- Stepped on object
- Strike against, stationary or moving object
- Struck by Employee/fellow worker/patient (BI)
- Struck by Member, customer (BI)
- Struck by Object Handled by Others
- Vehicle Accident

Thus, the database is set up and populated by data in such a way that makes it unlikely that the department uses this data to understand injuries caused by specific policing activities (such as engaging in foot pursuits and vehicle chases or subduing and arresting suspects).

What injures CPD officers?

Of particular interest in this project are the causes of CPD officers’ injuries, to allow for an examination of whether the behavioral reality of police injuries conforms to the cultural preoccupation with violence from civilians. CPD’s injury dataset contains the following “accident type code descriptions”:

Table 6.1. Injuries to CPD officers, 2010-2018, by workers’ compensation accident type code description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident type - code description</th>
<th>Number of claims, 2010-2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absorption of substance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged assault</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged personal injury</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal bite, scratch, kick</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caught between moving objects</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken glass</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals, caustics, acids, oils</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold substances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poisonous vegetation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp objects</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperate extremes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily fluids</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needle</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total contact by</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contamination/pollution</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut by object being lifted or handled</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exertion by…</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding or carrying</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumping</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifting</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading/unloading</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulling or pushing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetitive motion</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twisting, turning, bending</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using tool or machine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wielding or throwing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total exertion</strong></td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign body in eye</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human violence</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial vehicle accident</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingestion of Substance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhalation of substance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhalation or ingestion - mold</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect bite, sting</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing auto/Alleged theft</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No specific accident or injury</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise exposure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Otherwise Classified</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other - Gunshot/Muzzle burn/deafened</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slip, trip, or fall on…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liquid or grease spills/oil</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inside floor mat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sidewalk</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hallway or common area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stairs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Speedbump</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Entering or exiting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elevated surfaces</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Entering/leaving vehicle</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parking lot</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recreational area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Same level</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pits, shafts, holes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total slip, trip, or fall</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slipped, did not fall</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stepped on object</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strain, cause unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike against…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fixed product display</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stationary or moving object</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strike against</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struck by…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Employee, fellow worker, patient</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Falling object</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Firearm discharge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flying object</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Member, customer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Moving object (vehicle)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Object being lifted or handled</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Object being handled by others</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As demonstrated above, there are 67 discrete codes for accident type. I examined all 934 injuries and coded for whether a suspect was present when the injury occurred (regardless of whether or not the suspect’s presence caused the injury). This resulted in a subset of 361 injuries where a suspect was present, according to the open-ended “claim description” field.\footnote{The claim description field was cut off for many of the injuries. For example, one claim description read: “EE STATES SHE WAS PERFORMING A PRACTICAL TRAINING EXERCISE H ER [sic] WEIGHT WAS SHIFTED STEPPING ON UNDERBRUSH AND TWIGS TWIST ING HER LE [sic].” It was clear from the great majority of these descriptions whether the injury occurred in the presence of a suspect, but I acknowledge that there may be additional details omitted from some claim descriptions that would reveal the presence of a suspect I had otherwise not noted.}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Total struck by} & 95 \\
\hline
\textbf{Vehicle accident} & 129 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total, all injuries} & 934 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 6.2. Breakdown of all injuries by whether suspect was present when the injury occurred.}
\end{table}

The table below summarizes the number of injuries ‘accident type’ for those injuries that occurred outside the presence of a suspect.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Accident type} & \textbf{Number of injuries (percentage of all injuries 2010-2018, n=934 / percentage of non-suspect-involved injuries, n=573)} \\
\hline
Absorption, ingestion, inhalation of substance\footnote{This includes inhalation or ingestion of mold.} & 34 (3.6% / 5.9%) \\
Animal bite or sting & 41 (4.4% / 7.2%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 6.3. Accident type for injuries sustained outside presence of suspect.}
\end{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Overall Rate / Rate in 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caught between moving objects</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.3% / 0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with harmful object^26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(4.1% / 6.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contamination/pollution/environmental</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(0.9% / 1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut by object being lifted/handled</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(1.2% / 1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exertion^27</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>(12.3% / 20.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign body in eye</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.3% / 0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial vehicle accident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.1% / 0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise exposure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.1% / 0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other - Gunshot/muzzle burn/deafened</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.1% / 0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.1% / 0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slip, trip or fall^28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>(6% / 9.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slipped, no fall</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(0.7% / 1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stepped on object</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(0.6% / 1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike against object^29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(4.1% / 6.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^26 This includes contact with broken glass, chemicals/caustics/acids/oils, cold substances, electricity, poisonous vegetation, sharp objects, bodily fluids, and needles.

^27 This includes exertion from holding, carrying, jumping, lifting, loading/unloading, pulling, pushing, reaching, repetitive motion, twisting, turning, bending, using tool or machine, and wielding or throwing; this also includes strain from unknown cause.

^28 This includes slip, trip, or falls on liquid, oil, grease spills, inside floor mats, sidewalks; in hallways and common areas; on stairs and speedbumps; while entering or exiting vehicles or buildings; on elevated surfaces, flat surfaces, pits, shafts, holes, in parking lots, and in recreational areas.

^29 This includes striking against fixed product displays and stationary or moving objects.
Struck by object/individual^30  34 (3.6% / 5.9%)

Vehicle accident  123 (13.2% / 21.5%)

Not otherwise classified or no specific accident or injury  52 (5.6% / 9.1%)

Total injuries sustained outside the presence of a suspect  573 (61.3%)

The largest injury subcategories, for those injuries that occur outside the presence of a suspect, include injuries from exertion, slip, trip, and fall, and vehicle accidents. These together account for 294, or 51.3%, of the 573 non-suspect-related injuries.^31

Injuries caused in the presence of a suspect

How many of the injuries occurring in the presence of a suspect were caused by assault? The risk of violent attack is the central preoccupation of police culture and its danger imperative. Some injuries were clearly caused by civilian violence: those where an officer was shot, or where the claim description notes the affirmative action of a suspect (i.e. a suspect bit, kicked, or punched the officer). Other injuries occurred when an officer was chasing a suspect or attempting to arrest a suspect. It was not always clear whether this would constitute an assault on the officer. I coded those injuries as “chase” and “arrest” injuries, discuss them in more detail below. A third subset of injuries were clearly not caused by the volitional act of the suspect, even though a suspect was present when the officer was injured (i.e. the officer cut himself on a crack pipe while searching a suspect). The table below shows the totals for each.

Table 6.4. Injury count by suspect’s role in injuries where a suspect was present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total n (% of all injuries, n=934)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect’s volitional act caused injury</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^30 This includes injuries from being struck by an employee or fellow worker (i.e. in combat training), a falling object, a flying object, a customer, a moving object or vehicle, an object being lifted or handled, or an object being handled by others.

^31 I cannot tell from the dataset how many of the vehicle accidents -- some of which were single-vehicle, but many of which involved collisions with other cars -- may have resulted in the ticketing or arrest of the other driver. Unless it was clear from the claim description that the individual(s) in the other vehicle were suspects before the accident occurred, however, I did not code them as being “suspect-present” injuries. Therefore, in my coding scheme, an accident between an officer and a suspect’s vehicle during a chase would be a “suspect-involved” accident, whereas an officer rear-ended at a stoplight would not.
Injury occurred while chasing suspect 131 (14%)  
Injury occurred while subduing or arresting suspect 88 (9.4%)  
Other injuries in presence of suspect 8 (0.9%)  
Suspect was present but did not cause injury 32 (3.4%)  
**Total injuries with suspect present** 361 (39%)  

My findings here are in line with earlier researchers who found that about 10% of all injuries to police officers were caused by civilian assault (Brandl, 1996; Brandl & Stroshine, 2012).

**Injuries from civilian assault**

The danger imperative in police culture amplifies the risk that officers perceive from civilian violence. How does this perceived risk translate into departmental data collection on the injuries sustained by the volitional attacks of suspects? The following table breaks down the injuries sustained by the intentional acts of suspects according to the weapon used by the suspect and the average of the total paid for each of those injuries in workers’ compensation. I use the cost of each injury as a proxy for seriousness (McCollister, French, & Fang, 2010).

**Table 6.5. Injuries from intentional suspect action, by weapon used.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon used</th>
<th>Number of injuries (% of total intentionally-caused injuries)</th>
<th>Average cost of each injury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bodily weapons (hands, feet, head, or general altercation)</td>
<td>50 (49%)</td>
<td>$6,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper spray</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>$769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teeth (officer was bitten)</td>
<td>28 (27%)</td>
<td>$821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cane</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>$835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other injuries include one injury sustained from a flying object during a crowd control operation (the officer was not targeted); four injuries from attempting to lift a suspect or mental patient; and three injuries while transporting someone who was already under arrest.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count (%)</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>$14,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urine</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>$384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saliva (officer was spit upon)</td>
<td>14 (14%)</td>
<td>$1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>$42,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,512</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above demonstrates the rarity of attacks on police involving weapons other than the suspect’s body. Only four officers in this nine-year sample were struck by gunfire; all survived. Two of the four firearm injuries were caused by the same suspect in a single incident. Another firearm injury was actually caused by the bullet from another officer. This leaves a total of two incidents in which a suspect used a firearm to injure a police officer between 2010 and 2018. There were no stabbing wounds to CPD officers during this nine-year sample. This reinforces what Zimring (2017) found about the extremely low death rate that knives pose to police (p. 96; two officers were killed nationally with knives between 2008-2013).

If you add together the injuries caused by the suspect’s body -- arm and hands; legs and feet; teeth, urine, and saliva -- these account for 93 of the 102 injuries (91%) caused by suspects in CPD from 2010-2018. Nine injuries -- or one injury per year across the entire department, on average, -- were caused by weapons other than the suspect’s body.

As I mentioned above, many of the injuries from CPD involved chases or arrest scenarios when the suspect’s culpability in the officer’s injury (beyond engaging in whatever behavior may have prompted the chase or arrest) was not clear from the claim description. Between 2010 and 2018, 88 officers were injured in the process of arresting, subduing, or apprehending suspects. Below are typical examples of claim descriptions from such injuries (EE stands for employee):

- EE was arresting a suspect and as he was lifting the suspect he injured the right side of his groin causing pain to right t [sic] side of ...
- EE was trying to hand cuff [sic] a subject on the ground. This resulted in a [sic] abrasions to right hand fingers and a tear to the nail on ri...
- EE was arresting a suspect and tweaked his back. Resulting i n [sic] pain to back. RTW: Unknown

---

33 Officers opened fire on a suspect while serving a warrant at the suspect’s home. An officer was wounded by bullets from other officers ricocheting off the suspect’s house. The suspect – a 20-year old Black male –had a BB gun, but did not fire it at the officers as initially reported both in the media and in the injury database I was given.

34 The incident involving two officers was a traffic stop with four officers present. The driver opened fire, striking two officers. The officers were treated for non-life-threatening injuries and released. The officers returned fire during the incident and killed the suspect. For the purpose of anonymity, I will not include the source of the news story providing these additional details.
The EE struck his right hand on the back of an offenders [sic] while trying to arrest him; sustaining in [sic] inflammation to the top...

Chasing suspects is another frequent cause of injury, resulting in 131 injuries in the nine-year sample. Of these, 38 are injuries caused by jumping over fences. Below are typical claim descriptions from such injuries:

- The EE was pursuing a fleeing suspect when he began to climb over a 7 ½ foot chain link fence, cut both his hands on the jagged top edge of the fence causing lacerations, lost his balance and fell to the ground causing a contusion to his Lt. lower leg.
- The EE was chasing a guy with a gun. The guy jumped a fence, and as the EE grabbed the guy, he scraped his left forearm on the barbed wire and sustained a laceration.
- While on Church St. chasing a suspect the fence EE was climbing broke and he fell on his LT knee. EE dislocated his knee.

Most chasing injuries, however, appear to occur when the officer trips, falls, and/or generally over-exerts herself while chasing a suspect. Typical examples from the dataset include the following:

- While EE was chasing a suspect, he sustained a rupture to his right calf muscle.
- EE was in the process of chasing a subject on foot, when he tripped and fell. He sustained a sprain on his LT wrist, and he cut both of his hands on concrete.
- EE was checking a subject and lost his footing near the river bank and fell. EE sustained an injury to the right knee.

Finally, 32 injuries occurred when the suspect was present but did not intentionally cause the injury. These included injuries such as the following:

- EE came into contact with an individual who had scabies during the course of duty. The EE hands came into contact with the suspect.
- While the EE was trying to control a subject who was trying to hurt himself, the EE was exposed to subject’s blood on his right rear bicep and elbow. The subject is Hepatitis C positive and might have been HIV positive.
- EE was reaching inside of a subject’s pocket when his finger was pricked by an uncapped syringe.

Serious injury and death in CPD

Of the injuries sustained in the presence of a suspect, the most expensive, and by my proxy, the most serious, was that of an officer who sustained a heart attack while chasing suspects. $434,350 in workers’ compensation was paid for this injury. In comparison, the gunshot wounds sustained by the officers in this dataset -- four of them over nine years -- cost $5,011, $31,195, $12,521, and $8,392. Of course, the dataset cannot account for “close calls” and “near misses” -- encounters with suspects that could have resulted in the serious injury or death of the officer, but-for some intervening cause (such as the officer’s own use of force against the suspect). And surely the gunshot wounds sustained by the officers could easily have proven fatal if the suspects’ gun was pointed even inches in one direction or the other.
But additional research on those shootings reveals that the injury data cannot always be accepted at face value. These four shootings occurred across three incidents; one incident involved a suspect firing at two officers during a traffic stop (the officers returned fire and killed the suspect). Another of the incidents involved a 20-year-old suspect who was killed when CPD officers and US Marshals came to serve a warrant on him at the home where the suspect lived with his grandmother. Media accounts initially reported that an officer was shot by the suspect’s BB gun during the encounter. An investigation later revealed that the officer’s wounds were actually caused by bullets from other officers ricocheting off the house; the suspect had not fired the BB gun at all. Yet CPD’s workers’ compensation database still reads, “The employee was serving a warrant to a suspect at his home. This resulted in the suspect opening fire at the employee. The employee got shot. The employee was injured on the left foot, right calf, and grazed on the buttocks.”

The dataset that CPD provided me contains only one fatality: an officer who was struck by a semi-truck while diverting traffic on the highway. I did not code this as a “suspect-present” injury due to the circumstances surrounding the accident. Thus, in a nine-year sample, the death rate in CPD was approximately 0.02% - stated differently, the risk of dying for a CPD officer was approximately 1 in 5,400 during this nine-year sample.

This appears to confirm what many other scholars have established: the behavioral risk to police officers, especially from civilian assault (i.e., objective risk), is much lower than perceived risk, which is informed by the danger imperative (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016; Slovic, 1987 & 2010). So, if departments like CPD appear to have very low rates of actual injury and death, how does the danger imperative retain its strength as an organizing cultural frame for police?

The answer to this question comes in the form of a tragedy that occurred while I was writing this chapter. An officer was shot and killed feloniously in the spring of 2019 while responding to a robbery. This was the first officer killed by gunfire in CPD since 1989 and the first officer killed feloniously since 1994 (when an officer was struck and killed by a suspect’s vehicle during a chase). A key finding of cultural risk theorists is that risks are amplified within social organizations as the result of “direct personal experience” with violent civilians and “indirect, or secondary, experience, through information received about” such encounters (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 184). The 2019 killing of a CPD officer -- despite being the first shooting death of a CPD officer in 30 years -- provides the nucleus of danger that has already been, and will continue to be, amplified within the department and in other departments. The databases in this chapter play a role in amplifying the danger of person-to-person violence; so too do the news and social media, both of which covered this death heavily, as well as the ways in which the story of this death will be told and retold in both formal and informal training scenarios for years to come (see, e.g., Crank, 2004; Marenin, 2016; Sierra-Arévalo, 2016; Van Maanen 1978).

CPD’s injury data reinforce what earlier researchers, especially Brandl (1996) and Brandl and Stroshine (2012) have shown about the injuries associated with policing. The vast majority -- 90%, on average -- are not the result of assaults by suspects. In line with Zimring’s (2017) analysis of LEOKA assaults, in CPD the greatest concentration of assault-related to cops are caused by personal force – hands, feet, fists, teeth – even though the empirical risk that officers face of being killed by such weapons is nearly zero (and in the case of CPD, actually zero).
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

MPD has similar racial demographics as CPD but is located in a significantly larger city, with double the rate of violent crime, and approximately 2,000 sworn officers (as opposed to CPD’s 600). Despite submitting the same data request to MPD (injuries to sworn officers from all causes), and despite the fact that MPD and CPD operate under the same records-release law, MPD provided me a significantly different dataset in response to my request. The Excel spreadsheet they provided me contained only assaults on police officers (regardless of whether those assaults resulted in injury).

MPD’s database contained the following variables: offense ID\(^{35}\), address of location, report date, beat, command area, reporting officer’s ID, UCR code, IBR code, UCR weapon type, officer’s name, an open-ended ‘remarks’ column detailing the injury. In addition, the database contained various columns related to the officers’ demographics (sex, race, occupation) and the type of injury (i.e. laceration, abrasion, etc.) that were mostly empty. There were additional variables whose purpose I could not decipher, including “suffix,” “record type,” and “name type.” Each data element represented a single officer’s involvement in a single incident. Therefore, some incidents during which multiple officers were assaulted were included as multiple data elements, one for each officer. As with CPD, I was not provided a codebook along with the dataset.

The table below summarizes the differences between the datasets provided to me by CPD and MPD. I asked both cities for de-identified police officer injury data from 2015-2018.\(^{36}\)

**Table 6.6.** Comparison of MPD and CPD datasets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPD</th>
<th>MPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of dataset</strong></td>
<td>Workers’ compensation claims</td>
<td>Assaults on MPD officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contents of dataset</strong></td>
<td>All workers’ compensation claims filed by CPD officers from all injuries</td>
<td>All incidents coded as assaults on officers (regardless of whether injury occurred)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average word count per incident description</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who narrated incident description field</strong></td>
<td>Workers’ compensation third-party administrator employee</td>
<td>Police officer involved in assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variables include</strong></td>
<td>Circumstances surrounding injury, position, description of incident, cost of injury</td>
<td>UCR code of incident, detailed description of assault, limited officer occupation data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{35}\) Each incident has a unique ID. Incidents during which two or more officers are injured share the same offense ID.

\(^{36}\) As discussed above, CPD provided me additional years (2010-2018) because they indicated it was as easy for them to do this as it was to provide me only 2015-2018.
As demonstrated in the table above, the datasets provided to me by the two departments differ significantly, despite the fact that I asked both departments for the same information. CPD’s dataset is created and maintained by its workers’ compensation third-party administrator and contained all workers’ compensation claims for injuries from all causes. I then had to sort through these and manually identify which injuries were caused by civilian assault. CPD’s dataset did not allow me to infer anything about assaults on CPD officers that did not result in injury. MPD’s dataset included all incidents that the department coded as assaults on officers, regardless of whether the assault resulted in an injury. I had to sort through MPD’s data to understand the severity of the injury caused (if any).

Perhaps the most striking difference between the datasets is the amount of detail about each incident included in the open-ended descriptive field. CPD’s workers’ compensation dataset contained, on average, 28 words describing each injury-causing incident. MPD’s dataset contained more than twenty times that, averaging nearly 600 words per assault description. At first blush, this disparity in detail seems to resonate with the danger imperative: scenarios involving violence or potential violence from civilians are amplified in MPD data through the provision of extensive details about each incident. CPD’s descriptive field was a third-hand account written (presumably) by a data-entry employee of the third-party administrator who was summarizing an injury report received over the phone. MPD’s narrative fields included the first-hand report of the officer involved in the incident. Thus, there may be significantly different motivations and incentives for the actors responsible for writing the descriptive fields contained within the CPD and MPD datasets.

MPD’s dataset initially contained 428 assaults on officers between 2015 and 2018. I removed assaults on correctional officers, which left 416 assaults. There was a data element in the dataset I was provided titled “injured killed” which revealed the type of injury, but not the severity of the injury. This field was only filled in for 305 of the 416 assaults. The following table breaks down the type and frequency of injury, as reported by MPD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Injury</th>
<th>Number of assaults on MPD officers resulting in such injury, 2015-2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not injured</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun shot</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stab wound</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laceration</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken bone(s)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Teeth</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burns</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrasions/bruises</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangled</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other trauma</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>305 (111 assaults were not coded)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 Multiple descriptive fields in the CPD dataset note that “caller states that …”
By the MPD’s own coding scheme, 195 out of 416 (46.9%) of assaults on MPD officers between the years 2015 and 2018 did not result in an injury to the officer. 111 assaults were not coded for type of injury, and none of the assaults were coded for injury severity. I read through each incident description myself and coded for both type and severity of injury. For type of injury, I used the same variables included in the table above, but added a code for “spit” given the frequency with which officers reported being spit upon as their only physical injury. For severity of injury, I used a scale of 0-4. This scale is based in part on the medical Injury Severity Score (ISS) system (ACI - Agency for Clinical Innovation, n.d.; Cheatham, 2001; Palmer, 2007).38

Below is an explanation of this injury coding scheme and a breakdown of assaults on MPD officers from 2015-2018 according to the severity of the injury that the officer sustained. Examples of incidents for each injury code are attached in Appendix 3.

**Table 6.8.** Injury severity coding scheme for MPD assaults on officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of assaults on MPD officers resulting in such injury code, 2015-2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No visible or apparent injury</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor injury to the officer (bruise, minor contusion, sore muscles, minor laceration) that may have received medical attention</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moderate, non-incapacitating injury to officer that required some non-emergency medical attention (e.g. laceration with significant bleeding, broken bone, bite that pierced skin).</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Serious incapacitating injury to officer which required immediate medical attention (e.g. gunshot or stab wound); the officer had to be carried or otherwise helped from the scene.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fatal injury</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>416</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 The ISS system scale is from 0 to 6: 0 is no visible or apparent injury; 1 is minor injury; 2 is moderate injury; 3 is serious injury; 4 is severe injury; 5 is critical injury; and 6 is an unsurvivable injury. Using this 0-6 scale would not have changed my findings, given the lack of serious injuries in the dataset.
When in doubt, I coded for a more severe injury. Some of the injuries that had been coded as “not injured” by MPD itself (which would translate to a zero on my severity scale), I actually coded as “1” (minor) or “2” (moderate) injuries. For example, one assault description notes that a suspect “proceeded to strike Ofc [T] in the chest displacing his radio.” I coded this as a 1, because such a strike to the chest could have caused bruising, but MPD itself coded this incident as an assault during which the officer was “not injured.” The MPD coded a total of 195 assaults as resulting in no injury, but by my own coding scheme I identified 77 out of these 195 as 1s (minor injuries) and two of these as 2s (moderate injuries).

Notably, there were no serious or fatal injuries to MPD officers resulting from civilian assault during 2015-2018. I verified with ODMP that no MPD officers were killed by assault during my sample. Indeed, no MPD officers died in the line of duty from any cause during my sample. The most recent line-of-duty felonious death was in 2012 (when an officer was struck and killed by a drunk driver), and the last accidental on-duty death among MPD officers also occurred in 2012.

Between 2015 and 2018, there were 200 assaults on MPD officers that resulted in no injury to the officer. There were 185 assaults on officers that resulted in a minor injury, and there were 31 assaults on officers that resulted in moderate injury to officers. The average injury level across all assaults on MPD officers was 0.59. The average injury level across only those assaults resulting in injury was 1.14.

I then created a new dataset containing only those assaults that resulted in injury to the officer (n= 216), to allow for comparison in injury rates from assault between MPD and CPD. The table below compares the injury rates from civilian assault in CPD and MPD during 2015-2018. Because the incident description in the CPD dataset was very limited, I include in the table below one column which includes all of those injuries that may have resulted from an assault, even if it was not clear from the dataset (i.e. “The employee injured his right shoulder and hand, while apprehending a suspect”), and one column that only includes injuries that clearly occurred as a result of civilian assault.

Table 6.9. Injury rates from civilian assault, MPD and CPD, 2015-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MPD</th>
<th>CPD (including ‘maybe’ assaults)</th>
<th>CPD (clear assaults only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total assaults with injury, 2015-2018</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of sworn officers (average over 2015-2018)</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of injury from assault (injuries per officer per year)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MPD officers sustain an injury as the result of civilian assault at the rate of .03 injuries per officer per year, while the rate of injury from assault at CPD may range from .02 to .06 injuries from assault per officer per year, but I was not able to decipher precise assault numbers from the dataset I was given. Stated differently, roughly one out of every 31 MPD officers suffers an injury by civilian assault each year, whereas anywhere from one out of every 17 to one out of every 43 officers at CPD suffers an injury each year that is the result of civilian assault.

I coded MPD data for the weapon used by the suspect. The table below summarizes the weapons used both in assaults that did not cause injury (injury code = 0) and assaults that caused some injury (injury code 1 or 2). Typical examples of the use of each weapon are included in Appendix 4.

**Table 6.10. Assaults and injuries to MPD officers, 2015-2018, by weapon used.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>All assaults (n=416)</th>
<th>Assaults causing injury (n=216)</th>
<th>Average injury severity (0-4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bodily weapon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Hands/feet</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Teeth</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Saliva</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 297 (71%)</td>
<td>Total: 199 (92%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blunt object</td>
<td>12 (3%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting instrument</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>28 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>27 (6%)</td>
<td>10 (5%)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal threat</td>
<td>37 (9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (dog, Taser)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This weapon data supports what Zimring (2017) identified from LEOKA data: bodily weapons are by far the most frequently used weapon in civilian assaults on police, but rarely result in serious injury or death. Though armed civilians figure prominently in the cultural fixation on danger within policing organizations, armed civilians do not figure prominently in the empirical evidence of assaults on police (even when the officers themselves have provided the accounts on which my inquiry is based). In fact, numerous assaults described in the MPD dataset involved instances in which suspects attempted to rid themselves of their firearms before encountering police by throwing...
it or hiding it.\textsuperscript{39} The single injury from a suspect with a firearm noted in the table above involved an officer who, in the course of retreating from a suspect who had fired at officers, fell and hurt his head, elbow, and knee. Thus, no MPD officer was shot by a suspect during this four-year sample.

I coded for the type of call or scenario that precipitated the assault, using the same variables that the FBI uses in its LEOKA dataset.

\textbf{Table 6.11.} Type of call or scenario leading up to the assault.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Call or Scenario</th>
<th>Number of injury-causing assaults (n=216) (percentage of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambush situation / unprovoked</td>
<td>4 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary in process / pursuing burglary suspect</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery or grand theft auto in process/</td>
<td>9 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pursuing robbery or grand theft auto suspect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempting other arrest</td>
<td>27 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigating suspicious person / circumstance</td>
<td>15 (6.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil disorder (mass disobedience, riot, etc.)</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance call</td>
<td>60 (27.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling person with mental illness</td>
<td>9 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling, transporting, custody of detainee/prisoner</td>
<td>30 (13.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic pursuit / stop</td>
<td>11 (5.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>47 (21.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Total}</td>
<td>\textbf{216}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see from the table above, the most common situations leading to the assault of an officer were disturbance calls (i.e. domestic dispute incidents or bar fights) which resulted in 60 officer assaults. This was followed by ‘all other’ (i.e. removing drunk patrons from bars), which resulted in 47 assaults. Then came handling or transporting someone who was already under arrest, which accounted for 30 assaults, followed by attempting other arrests (i.e. criminal trespass calls; urinating or drinking in public), which resulted 27 assaults.

I also coded MPD data for the circumstances surrounding the assault. The following table summarizes those circumstances.

\textbf{Table 6.12.} Circumstances surrounding assaults causing injury to MPD officers, 2015-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circumstance of assault</th>
<th>Number of injury-causing assaults (n=216) (percentage of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer arresting or subduing suspect</td>
<td>165 (76%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{39} “I...was dispatched...regarding a male armed with a pistol in his waistband. The Black male was reported to be wearing a maroon sweater with a plaid shirt tied around his waist... [A suspect matching that description] came down the alley from the tree line. The male saw me and started to walk at a faster pace toward some parked cars while on the phone...The male ducked in-between cars and lifted a piece of plywood, tossing an object underneath it ... After finally detaining [suspect] I went and looked under the plywood...and found a silver [pistol].”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Count (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer chasing suspect</td>
<td>7 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer investigating suspicious person</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer transporting or accompanying suspect who is already under arrest</td>
<td>29 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unprovoked assault on officer</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle stop</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vast majority of injuries that officers sustain from civilian assault occur while the officer is actively engaged with the suspect and trying to subdue or arrest him or her; these injuries generally occur when the suspect resists arrest using his hands and feet to push, kick, slap, scratch, bite, headbutt, or pinch the officers. The injuries that officers receive during these encounters are generally minor and not incapacitating, ranging from no visible injury at all to scratch marks, sore limbs, lacerations on knees and hands from wrestling the subject to the ground, and occasional sprained or broken fingers. The following is a typical example of the most common type of officer injury: that resulting from suspect’s use of bodily weapons during an arrest or subdue scenario:

I...responded to a domestic dispute… [caller’s] boyfriend and arrestee...was in the process of taking his belongings from their residence and vacating the location...After I had spoken to both [females who called 911], I then proceeded to attempt to communicate with [suspect]...Upon approaching [him] I could smell a profound odor of alcohol emitting from both his breath and from his clothing. I then asked [him] if he had been drinking, to which he responded that he had had a few beers. I then informed [him] that due to his actions that I had enough probable cause to place him under arrest. I further asked if he could...vacate the location temporarily and to sober up and avoid any possible altercation. [He] initially agreed, however, he proceeded to leave the location and sit on the stair in front of the door. Upon observing [his] actions and noting that he was beginning to act in tumultuous manner by refusing to listen to any requests, raising his voice, and advocating in a strong loud irrational utterances that this was his residence and he was not leaving. Upon witnessing said actions I then proceeded to attempt to place a handcuff onto [his] left wrist. [He] at that point began to physically obstruct me, by refusing to provide me with his right arm, repeatedly asking why he was going to jail. In the midst of attempting to secure [his] second wrist [suspect], who is 235 pounds and 6’1” demonstrating a substantial physical discrepancy between [himself] and myself, struck by right arm whilst I was behind him and then proceeded to strike [another officer] in the chest displacing his radio. Such action, based on the physical displacement and later comments made by the accused later on, was intended to cause harm to our person. Furthermore [suspect’s] physical size and height gave him an advantage in terms of strength and power over [the other officer] and me. The two of us [officers] combined, were then without incident to [suspect] able to secure both hands in handcuffs. Whilst further attempting to secure [suspect] into the rear of my patrol car [he] continued to hinder our ability to operate by attempting to kick us, with the intent to cause harm to our personal body, whilst still attempting to escape the grasp of [the other officer] and myself. In the midst of said action I proceeded to strike [suspect] two to three times in the side of his stomach. [The other officer] further proceeded to deliver a “dry stun” with his city issued Taser to [suspect’s] side. Upon such action suspect complied and entered into the rear of the vehicle. Whilst in the rear of the
vehicle [suspect] then continued to bang his head against the glass of the window in attempts to possibly cause damage to the window. In the midst of said action other units were able to arrive ... and with their assistance we were able to remove [suspect] and place him on the grass whilst he calmed down... [Suspect] was then transported to the ... Precinct whilst I completed his arrest paperwork. Whilst in custody at the ...precinct [suspect] continued to make comments to other prisoners such as, "I'm in here cus I knocked one of them pussy niggas in the mouth." [Suspect] also stated that, "the next time you see me I aint finna go down so easy y'all gonna have to do more.... Next time ya'll see me ima be holding.

In addition to documenting the most frequent source and severity of assault-related injury sustained by MPD officers during the years in my sample, this narrative provides insight into a theme that is common throughout the narrative descriptions of assaults on MPD officers between 2015 and 2018: an emphasis on size discrepancies between officers and suspects. In the following section, I explore that theme, along with others that emerged as salient.

Themes from MPD assaults on police officers

After reading the detailed incident reports from all 416 assaults on MPD officers during 2015-2018 and the subset of those 216 assaults that resulted in injuries to the officer, certain themes emerged. Below, I identify the themes and quantify their presence in MPD assault incident narratives. In some incidents, the same suspect(s) was accused of assaulting multiple officers, leading to multiple data entries for the same incident. For the purposes of quantifying the themes below (and in order to study offenders later in the chapter), I created a new dataset condensing multiple-officer assault incidents into single incidents. This left a total of 353 unique incidents.

1. Suspects frequently end up worse-off than police in terms of injuries sustained. Incident reports detailed specific injuries to suspects in 117 of the incidents; this does not include the many situations in which officers noted they punched, used an “academy-taught take-down,” or otherwise physically coerced the suspect into compliance. Police used Tasers on suspects in 43 incidents and pepper spray in another 15 incidents. Suspects received lacerations in 33 incidents, abrasions or bruising in 16 incidents, and 10 suspects were shot with the officers’ service weapons. In 82 incidents, suspects were transported to a hospital after the incident.

2. Threatening the police verbally or symbolically can quickly escalate a situation and result in civilian arrest. 142 incidents involved a verbal or symbolic threat, such as yelling “fuck you!” at the officer or flipping the officer off.

3. Officers sometimes refer to size discrepancies between themselves and the suspect when describing an incident. In nine incidents, officers reported size disparities between themselves and the suspect as justification for their actions and feelings of fear.

4. Police frequently report that it took multiple officers to subdue a single suspect, even when the suspect was unarmed. 51 incidents noted that multiple officers were needed to subdue a suspect.

5. High-school, middle-school, and even elementary-school students are among those detailed as the assailant in assault reports. 28 incidents involved officers working as resource officers at schools; minor suspects are transported to juvenile detention after the incident or released to their guardians.

6. Spitting on officers is perceived by those writing reports as an injurious incident and is recorded as an assault in 33 different incidents.
7. Assaulted officers frequently include details about racial slurs directed at them by civilians in their reports. 35 incidents contain references to racial slurs used by the suspect against the officer(s).

8. Alcohol is frequently involved. In 83 incidents, the suspect is noted to be under the influence of alcohol. This does not include the many incidents that occur at bars or night clubs but where an officer did not explicitly note the suspect’s intoxication.

The following scenario is evidence of themes 1 and 4. Officers responding to a call involving shots fired encountered a man who was bleeding and did not have a weapon. It took multiple officers to subdue the man, who was tased multiple times during the incident:

I… responded to a help call…involving shots fired. Upon arrival, I observed Ofc [B] with his service weapon pointed at the suspect – later identified as [T.F.]. Ofc [B] was backing away from the suspect, who appeared incredibly agitated. [T.F.] was yelling and throwing his hands up, while walking aggressively towards Ofc [B]. [T.F.] appeared to have blood on him, but it was not apparent at the time where the blood had came from. I arrived on scene at the same time as two other officers, Ofc [S] Ofc [M]. The three of us approached [T.F.] with our weapons drawn, issuing loud verbal commands to lay on the ground. [T.F.] ignored the commands as we approached and moved slightly away from us as we continued to issue repeated commands for him to lay on the ground. Ofc [S] indicated that he was going to attempt to use his Taser on [T.F.], and moved into a position to do so, while both I and Ofc [M] kept our weapons aimed at [T.F.]. As Ofc [S] approached, [T.F.] appeared as if he was going to comply with commands, and dropped to his knees, and then to the ground. Ofc [S] stated he was going to "contact" [T.F.], indicating he was going to handcuff him, while I kept cover. As Ofc [S] approached, [T.F.] jumped back to his feet and continued moving away from us as we once again told him to lay on the ground. At this time, having seen no weapon in [T.F.]’s hands, I holstered my weapon and drew my Taser as well. Ofc [S] moved to the side of [T.F.] and deployed his Taser. [T.F.] stopped briefly, but then appeared to keep moving, so I deployed my Taser onto [T.F.]. [T.F.] dropped to the ground immediately after, and Ofc [M] and [S] went to restrain him. Other officers arrived on scene at this time, and also attempted to restrain [T.F.]. Despite multiple officers on top of him, [T.F.] continued to fight and struggle, and refused to give us his hands. He was told multiple times to give up his hands, but continued to pull away, yell, spit, and swing at officers when the opportunity presented itself. I arced my Taser during this ensuing struggle, in an attempt to force [T.F.] to comply and give up his hands; [T.F.], however, continued to struggle and actively resist officers. Seeing this, I dropped to the ground and issued a drive stun to [T.F. ’s] lower left back, while telling him to give us his hands. At this point officers were able to grab [T.F. ‘s] wrists and place him into handcuffs. After being detained, [T.F.] continued to struggle against officers, and required at least two officers to hold him down, as he continued to struggle, pull and push against officers, and spit at them...EMS arrived on scene to render aid to both Ofc [B] and [T.F.].

After being physically restrained by multiple officers, [T.F.] was able to be turned over to inspect his wounds. He suffered a single gunshot wound to his abdomen, had multiple sets of connected Taser prongs, and had multiple abrasions. [T.F.] was restrained on a stretcher and transported to [the] Hospital. Ofc [B] suffered abrasions and lacerations about his face and hands, and blood was observed on his face and arm. Ofc [M] suffered minor lacerations to the palms of his hands.

The following scenario provides evidence of themes 1, 3, and 4. A man acting erratically at a bus station approached an officer and threw a plate of food at her. The incident report (written by a different officer who responded to the scene) notes the size discrepancy and athleticism of the suspect when describing the female officer’s decision to shoot the suspect (who was unarmed). Even after the suspect was shot and pepper sprayed, the report notes that it took “10 to 12” first responders to restrain the suspect:
A call was broadcasted...advising a person had been shot by police at the [bus station]. Upon arrival I spoke to [Officer D.] who was the first officer on scene. [Officer D.] was rendering aid to the suspect who suffered a gunshot wound to the arm and collar bone area. Further investigation revealed, the suspect [W.D.] entered the [bus station] removed his shirt, and started approaching random people aggressively, actions that nearly started several altercations. The suspect became increasingly violent and is seen on surveillance footage portraying an erratic and violent behavior. The suspect is seen in the surveillance video waving his hands aggressively at bystanders. According to witnesses, the suspect then approached [a man named S.C.] and started yelling at his 2 year old son. [S.C.] explained the suspect had been yelling at several kids as well and other customers were in fear for their safety due to the suspect's violent behavior. A verbal confrontation between [S.C.] and [W.D.] ensued and before the confrontation became physical [Officer J.], who was working an extra job at the location, intervened to defuse the situation. The suspect then shifted his aggression towards [Officer J.] who was trying to get the suspect to leave the premises. The suspect is seen on surveillance footage making threatening motions towards the officer by raising his hands and bucking towards her. The video showed a noticeable physical advantage which favored the suspect against [Officer J.]. The suspect seemed to be well conditioned physically and his body movements were aggressive, swift and agile. While [Officer J.] continued attempting to defuse the situation, the suspect is seen turning towards the Officer and throwing what seemed to be a plate of food at her. [Officer J.] sprays the suspect with her OC Spray to avoid another attack; however, the suspect was not affected by the spray and continued to launch towards the Officer. [Officer J.], realizing she would not be able to overpower the suspect physically and understanding the immediate threat of physical harm, quickly unholstered her duty weapon and fired one round towards the suspect in self-defense. Suspect was struck in the arm, the round went through and lodged in his collar bone. Once he felt the muzzle blast, the suspect is seen twisting and turning on the ground briefly and [Officer J.], thinking the threat was over, re-holstered her weapon; however, the suspect returns to his feet and attempted one more time to continue his attack. The Officer then was able to apply a stream of OC spray into the suspect's eyes which caused the suspect to run towards the rear door. Once the suspect exited the Bus Station he laid on the ground in front of the entrance. It was at that point that [Officer D.] arrived on scene and applied pressure to the suspect's wound until...EMS arrived. Once the ambulance arrived and paramedics attempted to transport the suspect, he sprung up, fought the medics and held on to the front fence of the station. It took approximately 10 to 12 first responders to restrain the suspect and place him on the gurney...The suspect...was charged with felony willful obstruction of officers by threats and violence.

The following is an example of themes 1 and 3. An officer working at a jewelry store encountered a customer who punched a display case and pushed the officer. The officer responded by tasering the man and noted that he did so based on the man’s size, stating that the man was a “former NFL football player”:

I...while working an approved extra job...was involved in a physical altercation with a Mr. [A.B.]. This incident began when [A.B.] and two of his male friends enter the stated location to conduct business. While the three gentlemen were inside the store, [A.B.] proceeded to go to the back of the store where customers are not allowed. [A.B.], was asked several times by [owner] to leave the back of the store, but instead he punched a jewelry cabinet which left a very large hole. After [A.B.], damaged the cabinet he attempted to leave the stated location, that's when he was confronted by law-enforcement. During this incident [A.B.] two friends agreed to pay for the damages, but Mr. [A.B.] kept on insisting that he leaves the store. Furthermore, [A.B.] became loud, boisterous, used lots of profanity and stated that he would kill [owner]. [A.B.], also stated that he did not steal anything. I...gave [A.B.] several commands that he cannot leave the store until this matter is resolve [sic], then without being provoke [sic] [A.B.] dashed between his two friends and pushed me very hard, then made his way towards the exit. I...deployed my [MPD] Taser due to the fact that [A.B.] is approximately 315lbs (solid built) 6’04 in height and a former NFL football player. Also, upon
deploying my taser only one of the prong(s) made contact, and [A.B.] fell to the ground, but immediately got back up, pull out the prong(s) and began to give flight again. I...gave chase again, but [A.B.] stopped, turned around and tackled me to the ground, then attempted to leave the stated location, but was confronted by [other] units and gave up. While at [the] precinct [A.B.], stated that we bad a good tussle and he apologize [sic] for his behavior, but then his attitude changed again. [A.B.] would once again used profanity words, he was boisterous and would constantly asked to be release [sic], stating that he did nothing wrong. Moreover, after this physical altercation with [A.B.], my left shoulder and left leg were sore and [EMS] provided medical attention... [A.B.] was transported to [another] precinct where [EMS] provided medical attention.

The following is an example of theme 2. The officer involved is working at the airport when a man picking up a passenger refuses the officer’s commands to circle back around instead of waiting for his passenger. The situation quickly escalates when the man does not comply with the officer’s command:

While assisting the movement of traffic along the curbside of [the airport], I observed a vehicle stopped, not moving, neither loading or unloading...In full police uniform, wearing the reversible high visibility traffic jacket with... markings, reflective gloves and [MPD] baseball cap, I walked up to the parked vehicle and spoke into the vehicle (driver’s window was partially down) to the only occupant of the vehicle and its driver, a subject later identified as [C.J.]. I advised [C.J.] be needed to move his vehicle and circle back around for his party. He advised he was waiting for a passenger. I then advised he could not sit and wait. He stated "she" was coming out now. I asked him to point her out, to give him an opportunity to verify he was about to load a passenger in the immediate area and could thus load. He then stated she's not out on the curb yet. I then advised him a second time he could not sit and wait for his passenger. He became argumentive [sic], insisting on trying to wait. I then told him more affirmatively (a third time) he would have to move and circle back around for his passenger, and stopped traffic in the next lane over so he could move his vehicle. He eventually complied, exiting the curb lane, going around me, but then immediately returning to the curb lane, slowly driving down the lane but moving. I watched as he then proceeded to slowly move down to [another door], where he again stopped and parked. No one was approaching the vehicle at this time either. I then walked down, this time to issue him a citation. I approached the vehicle (again, in full uniform) and immediately asked him for his driver’s license. He was on his cell phone at the time, looked at me and stated dismissively "Man, go on." Failing to comply with my lawful request for his license, I then was going to make an arrest on the subject. I asked him to step from the vehicle, which he ignored and continued with his phone conversation. I went to open the car door from the outside, and it was locked. As the window was down and the subject continued to ignore me and not comply while on his phone, I reached in through the open window with my left hand and attempted to unlock the door. He then grabbed my hand and pulled it from the door, and in a very animated manner, quickly removed his seat belt, angrily stating "You better get the fuck up off me bruh!!" He then quickly exited the vehicle, opening the driver’s door while I was standing immediately next to it, intentionally striking me with the car door and knocking me back towards traffic. I then attempted to gain control of him to effect the arrest, and the subject then swung and struck me in the left jaw area with a closed fist. I managed to wrestle the subject to the ground, where we briefly tussled in the crosswalk and lanes of moving traffic before we were both able to get to our feet. At this time, a male ran up to him and yelled "What are you doing?!? You can't fight the police!"...I removed my City issued taser and ordered him to the ground, where he complied without further incident. He was taken into custody... and his vehicle...was impounded... [C.J.] was then charged and transported to [county jail].
The following scenario provides another example of escalation when a civilian symbolically threatens the officer’s authority by ‘flipping him off’ while the officer is in his patrol car. The officer gets out of his car, engages with the civilian, and ends up arresting him:

_Around midnight, I was...driving a marked [MPD] wagon. I was patrolling down that street because it was a Friday night and this is the [area of the city with dance clubs]. There are fights and disturbances reported every Friday and Saturday night. There were extra job units working and I passed by 3 in uniform. There was a line of people outside of [a club]. There were a few people away from the line to get in. I was driving by when a male quickly turned towards the police vehicle and stepped to the street. He had an angry look on his face and used both hands to flip me off. There was no fight going on and I did not have anyone in custody. I stopped and walked up to the suspect, later identified as [A.H.] I asked him if he was alright, or if there was anything wrong. He was very animated swinging his arms and hands. I was attempting to determine if he was intoxicated. He was yelling and using profanity. He was yelling that he is exercising his Constitutional Rights and I can not do a Mother Fucking thing about it. But at that time, he approached me in a confrontational manner, into my personal safety zone and intentionally made physical contact with me, with his right hand around my left arm then chest. I asked for his identification and told him he was being detained. There were 3 other people that appeared to be with him. One male was telling him to calm down. He got into the other males face, within [sic] inches of his face while yelling and tensing his arms up, like he was going to fight. I placed [A.H.] into handcuffs at this time. He was placed in the back of the wagon. He would not calm down. I asked his friends if he was on narcotics or has a history of mental illness. They told me that they did not [sic] know. None of the friends were related to [A.H.]. I did smell an odor of alcohol on [A.H.] but he was not intoxicated. Mr. Henderson was acting violent towards his own friends. I chose to arrest Mr. Henderson and transport him to Pretrial Detention because his actions were already violent and confrontational [sic], even with friends. He acted up at the jail... He was making threats towards law enforcement, stating that he is a convicted felon and that he would cause harm to police in the future but not specific. He then said that he was taking pills. He was not specific. He did not want to go to [the hospital] and got more violent when I suggested that I take him to [the hospital]. He talked to the nurse at Pretrial and remained in custody at Pretrial Detention Center._

Another example of a theme 2 – a symbolic threat that quickly escalated – occurred when an officer responded to a call for an “unruly and disorderly juvenile”:

_The juvenile advised me to "Shut the fuck up, or she’s going to spit in my face!" I advised I’ll like to see her do that, and without a pause from the juvenile spat a large wad of saliva in my face to the eyes and mouth. In defense and reaction to the assault I returned a straight right hand strike to her face. With the juvenile stunned she was placed against the wall, and the second (right arm restraint) was secured._

The following scenario provides an additional example of themes 2 and 5. The officer had an encounter with a student while on duty at a high school. Though the student was unarmed at the time of the incident, the officer took the student’s threats to kill him more seriously due to the student’s gang affiliation.

_I… was on duty at [a high school] when I encountered the arrestee [D.L.] and his cousin skipping in stairwell c at the ground level as they do daily because the cameras don’t work there. I asked why the two were not in class and [D.L.]s cousin advised me that the substitute would not let them in class I told them I would get them in class no problem. [D.L.]’s cousin said thank you but [D.L.] turned to me and said fuck you I’m going to kill you soon. I told [D.L.] he could not threaten my life and he again said I’m going to kill you that’s not a threat it’s a promise. I advised [D.L.] that he was going to be charged and be ran. I_
advised His cousin to meet me by his class and then I gave chase I was initially unable to locate [D.L.] so I ended my pursuit so that I would not disrupt any classes. As I was walked [sic] down the hall of the 3rd floor where my pursuit ended to get [D.L.]
's cousin in class I observed [D.L.] trying to go back into the stairwell where he was initially hiding. I grabbed him to place him in cuffs but he tried to run again and with our combined momentum he hit his head on the door. Once we entered the stairwell [D.L.] tensed up his body and tried to push off me as a result I had to shift my body weight to take [D.L.] to the ground to gain control. I then escorted [D.L.] to the Principals [sic] office to get his demographics While enroot [sic] [D.L.] was cursing and yelling and causing a scene in the hall disrupting classes, once in front of the Principal...again be stated he was going to kill me. After contacting [D.L.]
's mother... [D.L.] stated that he did not have enough points to be held so he did not care what I was going to charge him with. [D.L.] went on to say "I'll be back after school and I'm going to kill you with my brother's gun. [D.L.]
's brother is currently being investigated for a recent shooting in the area, and is currently on an ankle monitor after fighting with a Police Officer. Both [D.L. and his brother] are known Blood Gang members Identified by red bandanas as well as other members and [D.L.] stated it himself. [D.L.] continued to threaten me for the entire time he was in my presence. Stating he did not care if he could not go home he would be out tomorrow and he was going to get me when he did. I asked [D.L.] if he needed any medical attention he stated no but he was fine that he was not a pussy ass nigga. I asked him again when he seemed to be calm and he became angry again and said again "I'm going to kill you bitch you bitch ass nigga you dead". Finally [D.L.] began to slam his head, feet, and shoulders into the door and walls of my office. Supervisor was advised of this incident Mr. Lowe was transported to [a local youth detention center]. At the time of this report there was no additional information available.

33 different incidents (and 41 total assault narratives) describe the suspect spitting on or at the officers. Of course, there may be (and likely are) many more spitting incidents than are contained in the dataset; I was only able to study those incidents that generated an assault report. Many more officers are likely spit on than are reflected in this dataset. But, these data reveal that for some officers, the experience of being spit upon is a very injurious one, leading to fears of contagion that are not always scientifically sound. The following scenario provides one such example. What starts as an arrest for drinking alcohol outside a gas station turns into a long saga involving lots of spitting and physical altercation.

I...was patrolling...The Texaco gas station sells liquor and alcoholic beverages. While driving by the location I noticed a black male drinking what appeared to be an alcoholic beverage. I turned into the parking lot and saw the male had an open can of Schlitz High Gravity Malt liquor in his hand. As I approached the male he turned and attempted to hide the beverage under his shirt. I detained the male and let him know that he was being arrested for consuming alcohol near a package store. The male was identified as [M.W.] [M.W.] had slurred speech and had the smell of alcohol on his breath as well as coming from his pores. [M.W.] was put into cuffs and placed into the back of my patrol car. While in the patrol I car I attempted to fill out [M.W.]
's arrest ticket. [M.W.] became angry and began to yell and curse at me. [M.W.] then spit through the open partition, spitting on my arm. I attempted to close the Partition, but unbeknownst to me the sliding screen to the partition was broken and would not close. [M.W.] continued to spit at while I attempted to close the partition. Because of fear of being contaminated with any infectious diseases of biological agents I got out of the car and requested for a back up unit to respond to my location. My intention was to switch cars with the responding unit and transport [M.W.] to jail. I had the back windows to the vehicle open because it was a hot day. Mr. Wilcox threatened me several times and told me he would kill me. He also was still spitting at me through the Window. I took Mr. Wilcox out of the car and put him on the ground in preparation [sic] for the back up units [sic] arrival. [M.W.] still continued to spit on me. [M.W.] also kept trying to get up. [M.W.] fell as he attempted to get up. I lightly placed my right foot on the side of [M.W.]
's torso in order to...
control him. [M.W.] grabbed my leg and attempted to scratch and pinch my leg while he was on the ground. [The officer I called for backup] stated he would be responding to my location, but had to handle another call for service before doing so. I put [M.W.] back into my car, and continued filling out his ticket on the outside of my vehicle. [M.W.] was still yelling and spitting through the window. [The other officer] finally arrived on scene and I began to brief him on the situation. [M.W.] spit at [the other officer] several times and also told [the other officer] that he would kill him. Myself and [the other officer] switched vehicles. While taking [M.W.] out of my patrol car he was spitting and yelling at me...While transporting [M.W.] to the jail he continued to Curse and spit out of the open windows. Upon arriving to the Jail I parked and secured my service weapon. I then began taking [M.W.] out of the car. Anticipating that [M.W.] would be spitting at me I secured him in a way that placed his face away from me. I waited at the sally port door, but realized there would be a considerable wait before I was allowed in, as Jail staff was busy. I placed [M.W.] on the ground in front of the sally port door. When I was finally allowed to enter the sally port I dragged [M.W.] into the sally port because he would not get up. When in the sally port I placed [M.W.] on the ground and handed [M.W.]'s ticket to Jail staff. After Jail staff received the ticket they told me to stand [M.W.] up and un cuff him. I did so without incident. I then took my cuffs and stood on the other side of the sally port. [M.W.] was allowed to stand in the sally port uncuffed almost 30 seconds [M.W.] then became combative. He charged at me and the [sic] pushed me with two hands in my chest. [M.W.] then backed up. I anticipated that Jail staff would intervene at this point, however they did not. [M.W.] put his hand up in a fighting stance. [M.W.] then charged me again. He pushed me again with two hands and also swung his hand at me. Jail staff did not intervene, and in attempt to control [M.W.] I approached him and bit him with an open hand strike to the face with my right hand. I then told him to enter the jail. While [M.W.] was entering the Jail I followed behind him to ensure his compliance. [M.W.] then turned around and faced me. [M.W.] then lunged at me. While lunging he spit in my face getting saliva in my eyes, nose and mouth; and exposing me to any potential dangerous diseases and biological agents. In order to subdue [M.W.] I punched him in his face with a closed fist. The first and only punch I can accurately recall was a right hand punch that landed on [M.W.]'s chin. I know that I always throw my punches in combinations, but I can't accurately confirm how many punches I threw and landed on [M.W.] after the initial punch. [M.W.] landed on the floor on his back. I got on top of [M.W.] to control him. I can't recall if I bit [M.W.] while I was on top of him, but I'm fairly certain I did not. I did grab his face and neck to try and turn his face so that he didn't spit on me again. Jail staff finally intervened and I was able to get off of [M.W.]. While I was getting up it appeared to me like [M.W.] was trying to get up and attack me. My boot had fell off of my right foot during the struggle. I used my right foot and kicked [M.W.] in his chest in order to get him back on the ground. Jail Staff finally was able to get the situation under control and detain [M.W.]. [My supervisor was notified immediately] [sic]. [M.W.] was transported to [the hospital]. Also let it be known I work in City with one of the highest rates of HIV in the country. I take being spat on as a serious threat to my health and well being. In addition to HIV many of the Citizens in my zone do carry many other various dangerous illnesses that are a danger to me and my family. Following the incident I found out [M.W.] is HIV positive.

Officers frequently include racial slurs directed at them by individuals involved in the assault the officer is documenting. These slurs included “nigga,” “nigger,” “white nigger,” “spic,” “wetback,” “stupid nigger,” “black piece of shit,” “pussy ass white boy,” “cracker mother fucker,” “kracker,” “fucking chink motherfucker,” “honkey,” “white devil,” “nothing but a nigger,” “suck ass nigga,” “opcy,” and an officer who confronted a suspect that “questioned my legal status referring to me being hispanic [sic].” The frequency with which such slurs are included in officers’ reports reveals the importance that officers place on them. Of course, the officers’ subjective feelings about these slurs cannot be inferred from what they write in the report, but their inclusion reveals that racial slurs play an important role in how officers frame and re-tell, at least formally in their incident reports, these interactions with civilians.
Finally, alcohol plays an important role in many of the incident narratives. Officers note they “could smell the odor of alcohol emitting off” the suspect’s breath; they note that the suspect had “slurred speech and had the smell of alcohol on his breath as well as coming from his pores”; they report that a suspect was “clearly intoxicated, as I could smell the alcohol off her breath feet away.” While 83 incidents involved such descriptions of the suspect, many more likely involved suspects who were under the influence of alcohol, given the frequency with which officers respond to bar fights or patrons refusing to leave premise.

Commensuration in police assault data

National assault and injury reporting occur through a process of commensuration which starts at the level of each of the thousands of agencies that reports to the FBI and the officers who work in them who must decide what behaviors and encounters constitute assaults on police. Merry (2016) explains that “[m]aking things commensurable depends on identifying a core principle that they all share and that renders them various instances of the same thing...Sometimes this means defining an act in a way that diverges radically from the way it was experienced” (p. 27). In her study of international human rights indicators, Merry gave an example of the way that commensuration works:

It is necessary to create equivalence across individual differences. This requires finding a commonality or some shared trait among individuals and ignoring differences. To compare the frequency of violence against women in different societies, for example, it was necessary to establish equivalence across a wide range of forms of conflict involving women, which could include insults, sexual assault, rape, humiliation, slicing car tires, attacking pets and children, intimidation, blows, threats, harassment, injuries, and withholding financial support. These are very different actions with different meaning within a relationship, and they produce quite different experiences. But it is necessary to see them all as manifestations of the same thing in order to count them. It is essential to construct a way to make distinct, individual acts equivalent as instances of a single concept of violence against women” (2016, p. 212).

In policing, officers have wide discretion to decide what constitutes an assault on the officers themselves, what constitutes battery, and what constitutes obstruction. Take, for example, the vague definition of obstruction, a common charge for individuals arrested in MPD after police-civilian encounters:

a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer ... in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor...Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer...in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person shall be guilty of a felony.41

The ambiguity of terms such as “obstructs” or “hinders” or “doing violence” in the statute excerpted above means that a wide variety of behaviors can be construed as criminal acts against police which are then recorded as assaults and reported nationally. Counting ‘assaults on police’ requires commensurating different behaviors ranging from spitting, biting, pinching, urinating, and refusing to move all the way up to stabbing and shooting. These behaviors have vastly different

41 Statutory citation omitted to maintain anonymity.
meanings and reveal fundamentally different intended outcomes. The suspect who spits on officers to show anger or rejection of authority while being arrested is a far cry from the individual who shoots officers during a traffic stop. While both at a certain level are rejecting the officers’ authority, the actions of the former will never kill the officer (and are exponentially more common). Yet these two actions are commensurated in police assault data; each is one assault on cops. The frequency of being spat upon is conflated with that of violent attack in police culture. A wide variety of mostly non-lethal behaviors are commensurated in national assault data. This process of commensuration produces datasets, as demonstrated above, containing high assault numbers that reinforce the danger imperative in policing. But my in-depth examination of the circumstances surrounding the assaults demonstrates the extremely low frequency with which the violent attacks with which police culture is preoccupied actually occur.

Discussion: what MPD narratives tell us about police culture

The previous section helped highlight the rich detail available within MPD’s dataset on assaults to police officers during 2015-2018. The narratives do not necessarily reflect some underlying behavioral or objective reality, but rather help constitute the officers’ realities (Morrill & Musheno, 2018, p. 64). Among these officers, the narratives about being assaulted by civilians also include moral elements that link the narrator’s social identity as a police officer with the moral basis of decision-making (Oberweis & Musheno, 1999). This resembles what Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) found in their study of front-line workers, including police officers: when police officers told stories about dangerous encounters with civilians, the officers included thumbnail depictions of individuals they encountered (person-based heuristics they used to help guide their decision-making), and the moral bases of their responses to such individuals (p. 84). Maynard-Moody and Musheno also found that officers supplied ready justifications for the use of force by officers. Similarly here, officers writing narratives about experiences that they perceive to be assaults on themselves and their colleagues provide frequent justification for their use of force even when the suspect is unarmed. They do so by appealing to the disparate strength and size between the police and the civilian involved, by explaining why verbal threats made by the suspect are credible due to gang involvement, or by appealing to the possibility that suspects have “dangerous diseases.”

The richness of the incident narratives in the MPD data also provide an analytic entryway to think about how the normative orders of police culture, positioned within the danger imperative, manifest in the way that officers talk about these events. The danger imperative - a cultural preoccupation with physical violence - is evident in many of the incidents contained in the dataset and excerpted above. For example, the danger imperative can help explain why the officer at the bus station fired her service weapon, striking an unarmed man who had thrown a plate of food at her, despite the fact that no police officers in MPD have been seriously harmed by unarmed suspects during my sample (2015-2018). Here, the risk posed by such a suspect is greatly amplified through the police officers’ cultural frame. Both the officer involved in the shooting, and the officer who wrote the incident report that was included in the dataset, viewed the man as posing an existential threat to responding officers: the officer writing the report describes the man as “well conditioned physically and his body movements were aggressive, swift and agile” -- and the man was so strong that it took “10 to 12” first responders to subdue him even after he was shot and pepper sprayed. Another officer describes his interaction with a drunk bar patron as follows: “I was able to pull him
to the ground where he positioned himself on his hands and knees (a Graeco-Roman wrestlers [sic]
position when a round for a match progresses).” Still another officer describes a suspect’s positions
as “an offensive fighting stance similar to boxing.” Officers, at least in their written narratives, give
great credence to the strength and fighting abilities of their opponents and describe encounters as battles with well-trained opponents.

The frequency with which suspects are more severely injured than the police they are
arrested for assaulting, and the frequency with which assault incidents result in no injury to the
officer, suggest that assault charges may be levied punitively against suspects for resisting arrest,
which in MPD’s state legal code is called “obstructing an officer.” Marenin (2018) notes that officers
may sometimes use “resisting arrest as a ‘cover charge’ to protect one’s butt” in use-of-force
scenarios (p. 9)

Marenin further notes that in police culture:

A person challenging the control of the officer by words or actions, by verbal or physical
non-compliance with the commands, or physical challenges to the control by officers, can be
and often will be considered resisting arrest, and the challenge thereby turned into a crime
(p. 13).

One of the themes I identified above was the prevalence of such verbal and physical challenges to
police, which frequently escalated into officers’ use of Tasers (even when suspects were unarmed) or
pepper spray.

The consequences of such charges can be severe and extend beyond any physical injuries
sustained during the encounter: “If the offenders are convicted they have a criminal record which
will follow them for the rest of their lives” (Marenin, 2018, p. 4). In a 2015 testimony before the
New York State Senate, the “best-known police chief in the USA” (Marenin, 2018, p. 3), Bill
Bratton, argued for making resisting arrest a felony (instead of a misdemeanor), in order to prevent
“potential injuries to the officer, to the suspect” (Thomsen, 2015). Yet my analysis here shows that
Bratton’s concern may be overstated, given the rarity of officer injuries from such encounters.
Instead, it appears that “resisting arrest charges can elevate routine interactions from the mundane
to the criminal. Suspects can be convicted of resisting arrest…even when the underlying offense is
minor or nonexistent” (Green, 2015).

The paradox of the danger imperative

The danger imperative framework can help explain why the risks from offenders are
amplified, but still leaves certain questions unanswered. Why, if officers are preoccupied with the
threat of violence from civilians, do they engage with suspects and escalate situations seemingly
unnecessarily? The example above where a police officer arrested a man for drinking a can of malt
liquor outside a gas station is one useful example. The officer had a number of options here when he
first witnessed the man drinking outside the gas station: he could have looked the other way; he
could have thrown away the man’s liquor; he could have ticketed the man but not arrested him; he
could have arrested him, but once he started spitting, the officer could have called for backup and
had another officer transport him (instead of just waiting to switch cars). Why did the officer
continue to engage? Herbert’s normative orders are helpful here. Perhaps the officer was prioritizing
the normative order of law: drinking in public is a violation of the law, and the officer did not feel
that he had the discretion to choose not to intervene. Or perhaps morality is at play here: the officer
believes the man is lazy, and wants to prove a point. Or perhaps bureaucratic control might be in the background of the officer's decision-making: the officer's supervisor could have told him to crack down on public drinking in his patrol zone.

What is clear from the narrative is that once the decision to engage occurs, the officer seems repeatedly flummoxed by his wily opponent. He puts the man into his patrol car; the man spits through the grate, so he takes the man out of his car and places him on the ground, where the man scratches and pinches him; the officer then puts the man into his car again, then takes him out of his car to move him to another vehicle for transport. Once they arrive at the precinct, he struggles to control the man in the sally port and engages in a physical altercation, losing a boot and punching and kicking the man before finally getting him under control (but not without the help of jail staff who, the officer admits, were the ones to finally get the situation under control).

The paradox of the danger imperative as revealed in these narratives is that, by amplifying the strength, agility, and cunningness of the civilians whose actions they describe, the narratives actually work to undermine the perceived competence of the police, another important normative order in policing (Herbert, 1998).

Who harms cops?

I requested information from both CPD and MPD regarding the suspects arrested and charged with assaulting an officer during the years of my sample. As with my attempt to gather injury data, I receive substantially different responses from each department. CPD stated that, for the most part, they could not track that due to the hierarchy rule: only the highest offense is recorded for each offender. Unless assault on a police officer was an arrestee’s highest charge, CPD was unable to pull offender information. They were only able to provide me a total of 12 arrest reports for suspects from 2015-2018 whose highest charge was assaulting a peace officer. I will not discuss those 12 here given their inability to speak to the larger body of suspects who were arrested and charged with assaulting officers in CPD.

As opposed to CPD, MPD sent me a spreadsheet in which each data element was a single charge for a single individual. These charges contained an incident identification number that linked the offender to the assault dataset. The offender data contained the suspect’s first and last name, their gender, their race, and the code sections they were charged with violating. There were 437 total charges related to assaulting an officer brought against individuals for the 416 assaults in my dataset, across 271 arrests. 129 individuals were arrested and charged with a single crime; 119 individuals were charged with two crimes; 22 individuals were charged with three crimes; and one individual was charged with four crimes.42

Of the 416 assaults contained in the 2015-2018 dataset, 248 of these had associated offender arrest data. Of these, 232 assaults involved the arrest of a single offender; 11 involved the arrest of two offenders; three involved the arrest of three offenders; and two involved the arrest of four offenders. In total, 271 persons were arrested for these assaults.43

42 These numbers only refer to the numbers of crimes committed that are reported as assaults on police officers. Individuals were also frequently charged with the underlying crime for which the officer initially engaged them.
43 It appears from the dataset that six individuals were arrested twice (which would result in 265 unique individuals arrested) based on the first and last names of the suspects, but I did not have sufficient identifying information to confirm whether it was indeed the same individuals or merely different suspects with the same first and last names.
Of the 216 assaults causing injury to officers, 159 were linked to an arrest. In total, 171 people were arrested for assaults causing injury to at least one officer.

The charges brought against arrestees included simple battery, simple assault, aggravated assault, and obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers. Of the total 271 arrests, 142 individuals were charged with two or more of those crimes. The suspect charging information MPD provided to me did not contain charges for “terroristic threats,” although many incident narratives noted that making terroristic threats (against the officer, usually, but sometimes against a third party) was among the individuals’ charges. The following table shows the statutory definition of each crime as well as the number of individuals charged with each.

**Table 6.13.** Assault-related charges levied against MPD suspects in officer-assault scenarios, 2015-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Statutory Definition</th>
<th>Severity of Crime/Sentence</th>
<th>Number of individuals Charged (out of total n= 271 arrests, 437 charges)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obstruction of officers</td>
<td>When a person “knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer…in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor”</td>
<td>Misdemeanor; punishable by fine of up to $1,000 or up to 12 months in county jail</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstruction of officers with violence</td>
<td>When a person “knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer…by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer.”</td>
<td>Felony; sentence ranges from 1-5 years (first conviction) to 3-15 years (three or subsequent convictions)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstruction of officers with bodily fluids [added to state code in 2017]</td>
<td>When a person “knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer…in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by knowingly and willfully throwing, projecting, or expelling human or animal blood, urine, feces, vomitus, or seminal fluid on or at such individual.”</td>
<td>Felony; sentence is 1-5 years</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple battery</td>
<td>When a person “either (1) intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another; or (2)</td>
<td>Misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature; punishable by fine up to $5,000</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
intentionally causes physical harm to another,” and/or up to one year in county jail

| Simple assault | When a person “either: (1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” | Misdemeanor; punishable by fine of up to $1,000 or up to 12 months in county jail | 40 |

| Aggravated assault | When a person “assaults: (1) With the intent to murder, rape, or to rob; (2) With a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury; (3) With any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in strangulation; or (4) A person or persons without legal justification by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person or persons. | Felony; sentence for discharging firearm at police is 10-20 years; using other weapon, including body, is 5-20 years | 50 |

Table 6.14 below shows the sex of the suspects arrested for assaulting officers, as well as that subset of assaults resulting in officer injury.

**Table 6.14.** Sex of suspects arrested for assault of MPD officer, 2015-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>All assaults (n=271 arrests) (% of all arrests)</th>
<th>Only injury-causing assaults (n=171 arrests) (% of injury-causing arrests)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>201 (74%)</td>
<td>125 (73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Female | 70 (26%) | 46 (27%) 
---|---|---
**TOTAL** | 271 | 171

Male suspects comprise nearly three-quarters of all those arrested for assaulting officers as well as those arrested for assaults causing injury.

The following table breaks down suspects by race for all assaults, as well as those assaults causing injury.

**Table 6.15. Race of suspects arrested for assault of MPD officer, 2015-2018.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>All assaults (n=271 arrests) (% of all arrests)</th>
<th>Only injury-causing assaults (n= 171 arrests) (% of injury-causing arrests)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2 (0.7%)</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>223 (82%)</td>
<td>135 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2 (0.7%)</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“N”</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>42 (15%)</td>
<td>33 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>271</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As demonstrated above, the great majority (82%) of all suspects arrested for assaulting officers are Black; slightly less than this percentage (79%) of suspects arrested for assaults in which the officer is injured are Black. White suspects make up only 15% of all assault-on-officer arrests and 19% of all suspects arrested for assaults causing injury to an officer.
Table 6.16. Assaults by race (Black/White only) and gender for all arrests, non-injury assaults, and injury-causing assaults.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All assaults (n= 271 arrests) (% of all arrests)</th>
<th>Assaults not resulting in injury (n=100 arrests) (% of non-injury arrests)</th>
<th>Only injury-causing assaults (n=171 arrests) (% of injury-causing arrests)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>54 (20%)</td>
<td>20 (20%)</td>
<td>34 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>169 (62%)</td>
<td>68 (68%)</td>
<td>101 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Black</strong></td>
<td><strong>223 (82%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>88 (88%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>135 (79%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>14 (5%)</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>11 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>28 (10%)</td>
<td>6 (6%)</td>
<td>22 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total White</strong></td>
<td><strong>42 (15%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 (9%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>33 (19%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though African Americans make up only 55% of the city’s population, they account for 82% of arrests for assaults on police officers. When the assaults are divided into those that do and do not injure officers, the overrepresentation of Blacks is even more marked: 88% of those arrested and charged with assaulting officers after incidents during which the officer was uninjured are Black. While six times as many Black men were charged with assaulting officers as white men, when all assaults are taken into consideration, that proportion jumps significantly when the comparison is limited to only those arrests for incidents in which an officer is not injured. Nearly 15 times as many Black men were charged with assaulting officers in non-injury producing incidents than White men. Some, like MacDonald (2016), may argue that these numbers reflects higher rates of criminality among Black communities, which helps explain why such communities are overrepresented in police killings of civilians. But others, like Kitsuse and Cicourel, recognize that criminal offense statistics like those above do not necessarily reflect some underlying behavioral reality, but instead are the result of decisions to identify, classify, and record certain behavior as deviant (1963, p. 136). In the following section I explore the relationship between MPD’s officer assault data and race.
Race and MPD officer assaults

Until this point of the dissertation I have not engaged with the vast -- and ever-growing -- body of evidence showing the racially disproportionate impact on minority communities of various police actions (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016). Researchers have identified this impact in police traffic stops (Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014), pedestrian stops (Fagan & Davies, 2000; Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007), searches (Carroll & Gonzalez, 2014; Engel & Johnson, 2006; Ridgeway, 2006; Rojek, Rosenfeld, & Decker, 2012), arrests (Brame, Bushway, Paternoster, & Turner, 2014; Smith & Vischer, 1981; Smith, Vischer, & Davidson 1984), and uses of force (Dunham & Peterson, 2017; Fryer, Jr., 2019; Legewie, 2016; Miller et al., 2016; Nix, Campbell, Byers, & Alpert (2017); Skolnick & Fyfe, 1994; Smith & Holmes, 2014; Terrill & Reisig, 2003)44. If the disproportionate impact of police activity on minority communities is so well-established, how does race matter when studying data on assaults and injuries of MPD officers? Sierra-Arévalo (2016) explains that:

The danger imperative...provides an organizationally-rooted mechanism through which racial bias operates, and helps explain how perception oriented by the preoccupation with violence turns a reach for a wallet turns into a furtive movement, why Cleveland officers believed 12-year old Tamir Rice to be 18, and why Officer Darren Wilson described Michael Brown as a “demon” (p. 39; internal citations omitted).

This does not mean that the socialization of police officers is entirely to blame for implicit or explicit racial bias in policing. Sierra-Arévalo goes on to note that police recruits arrive at the training academy:

with preconceived notions about race, place, and violence, these biases influenced by experience as well as political and media narratives...these biases exist long before individuals become recruits, and can be reinforced by socialization processes that need not explicitly link violence to poor, minority communities. Both outside and within the police department, talk of ‘suspects,’ ‘criminals,’ and violent, high-crime neighborhoods are inextricable from the black, immoral, and violent ‘iconic ghetto’ that sustains public understandings of who commits crime, where, and for what reasons (pp. 5-6).

The close social ties between officers facilitate “an in-group/out-group mentality, with officers viewing themselves as the good guys and the people they are policing as the bad guys” (Richardson, 2012, p. 271). Those “bad guys,” moreover, are disproportionately defined by police and policing politics as inhabiting what Soss and Weaver (2017) call, “Race-Class Subjugated Communities” – communities from which urban poor people of color are both deemed more dangerous and subjected to greater coercion and violence by police than other communities (p. 567).

An enduring feature of policing, both in contemporary and historical contexts, is the use of race and gender (especially for civilians identified as Black males) as a perceptual indicator of the likelihood of crime and danger (Epp et al., 2014, p. 45). Such biases in police work can operate through informal and formal policing practices (Epp et al., 2014) and through “implicit biases that operate outside of conscious awareness and control but nevertheless influence [police] behaviors” (Spencer, Charbonneau, & Glaser 2016, p. 50; see also Mears, Craig, Stewart, & Warren, 2017). Danger and uncertainty in police culture (Crank, 2014) are linked with race and gender. Officers constantly walk the “edge” – not knowing when they might be caught physically unprepared in a life-threatening confrontation with an armed civilian (Van Maanen, 1978a, p. 312). Though officers

---

44 Sierra-Arévalo (2016) is responsible for this helpful organization of race-related police scholarship.
recognize that civilians seriously injure and kill them only occasionally, the enduring potential for risk makes officers constantly vigilant (Cullen et al., 1983), especially when encountering African American male civilians (Epp et al., 2014).

Data collection on the dangers of policing may provide another means for the perpetuation of racial bias, as the actions of the civilians that police encounter are interpreted through the danger imperative. The stereotype of the violent “criminalblackman” likely causes officers to perceive the actions of Black civilians as more dangerous and to record such actions as assaults, regardless of whether an officer is injured (Russell-Brown, 1998). Meta-analyses have demonstrated that minority suspect are more likely to be arrested (for the same behavior) as White suspects (Kochel et al., 2011).

The MPD assault data, on its surface, could be interpreted to signify higher rates of Black criminality (see, e.g., McDonald, 2017: “It is black crime...that drives police presence and activity in black neighborhoods.”). Or, understanding what is known about the operation of racial bias on other areas of policing, we could hypothesize that racial bias -- implicit or explicit -- also operates in who is arrested and charged with assaulting police officers. This could be especially true for interactions with civilians that do not result in a visible injury to the officer. We do not know how many of these incidents -- where officers physically engage with a civilian but are not injured -- occur but are not reported as assaults. We do not know how frequently officers are spit on during the course of their work and do not report the event as an assault; we do not know how frequently officers are threatened by civilians verbally or symbolically (i.e. yelling “fuck you!” at an officer or giving an officer the middle finger) and ignore the incident, thereby avoiding a confrontation that may lead to a reported assault.

Wilson, Rule, and Hugenberg (2017) conducted seven studies during which they asked subjects to make judgments of Black and White male targets from photos. They found that their subjects “showed a consistent and strong bias to perceive young Black men as larger and as more capable of harm than young White men” (p. 77). They state that these perceptions “may have disturbing consequences for how both civilians and law enforcement personnel perceive and behave toward Black individuals” (Wilson et al., 2017, p. 77). Once such consequence of this bias may be that Black men are arrested and charged with assaulting police, even when their actions have not physically injured police officers, for engaging in the same or similar behaviors for which White men and women are not arrested. Just as racial bias operates through other policing actions such as traffic stops (Epp et al., 2014) or stop-and-frisk (Goel, Rao, & Shroff, 2016), it operates through encounters with civilians that are reported as assaults on officers, even though the officer has suffered no overt injury. The corollary to Wilson et al.’s (2017) study finding -- that subjects consistently perceive young Black men as taller, heavier, more muscular, stronger, and more capable of harm than young White men -- is that there is likely a lower threshold for what type of behavior or contact constitutes, in the officer’s view, an assault.

Race and police use of lethal force

Neither CPD nor MPD had an officer killed on duty during the years of my sample. CPD had two officers who were non-fatally shot in a single incident, while MPD did not have a single police officer shot or otherwise seriously injured between 2015 and 2018. As I discussed above, the absence of serious police injuries or fatalities does not foreclose the possibility that officers inflict serious or fatal injury before they are wounded, which would constitute a “near-miss,” and preventing a lethal attack on themselves or a third party is what provides legal justification for the
use of fatal force under *Tennessee v. Garner* (471 U.S. 1, 1985). The tables below summarize the civilians killed by MPD and CPD officers as well as the CPD officers shot by civilians.

**Table 6.17.** Killings of and by police and shooting of police, MPD and CPD, 2015-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MPD</th>
<th>CPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers killed by civilians, 2015-2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers shot by civilians, 2015-2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed by police, 2015-2018</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.18.** Race and gender of civilians killed by police, MPD (n=7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Men</th>
<th>Black Women</th>
<th>White Men</th>
<th>White Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of civilians killed, 2015-2018</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No White civilians were killed by police in MPD during 2015-2018. Six Black men were killed. One was unarmed; four had firearms in their possession; one had a toy weapon. One Black woman armed with a firearm was also killed by police.

**Table 6.19.** Race and gender of civilians killed by police in CPD, (n=4), and involved in shootings of police (n=2), 2015-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Men</th>
<th>Black Women</th>
<th>White Men</th>
<th>White Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of civilians killed, 2015-2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers shot by civilians, 2015-2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No White civilians were killed by CPD police in 2015-2018. Three Black men were killed; two had firearms and had a BB gun. One Black woman was killed; she was unarmed. Two CPD officers were shot during these years by the same Black suspect who was killed during the encounter. Another officer was allegedly shot by a young Black man on whom officers were attempting to serve an arrest warrant (and who was killed by CPD police in the encounter), but it was later discovered that the officer was struck by other officers’ ricocheting bullets.

Marenin (2016) writes about the exaggeration of danger in police culture. He notes that:

If the police fail to recognize and react quickly to a dangerous situation and person, they may get killed or injured (a false negative). On the other hand, if they perceive a danger which it turns out later was not there (a false positive), the victim gets hurt and not the police. In practice, this means that the police have a strong tendency to over-predict danger as a form of self-preservation (p. 472).

Marenin suggests that police exaggerate the dangers they face because “the police need and search for legitimacy. The exaggeration of danger symbolically affirms their own use of force and its value to society” (Marenin, 2016, p. 469). But, research on risk and culture, as applied to race in policing, supports the notion that police do not “over-exaggerate” the dangers they face from all suspects equally. Instead, implicit racial bias is filtered through the danger imperative to amplify the perceived risks from certain civilians -- especially young Black men -- and attenuate the risks from others. The data that I have provided in this chapter on the demographics of those arrested for assaulting officers, even when such assaults do not result in an injury to the officer, provide support for this notion.

Data collection creates knowledge: when MPD submits its assault data to the FBI, the FBI packages that data (without auditing it) and publishes it alongside the data submitted by thousands of other departments from across the country. In aggregate, what we know about assaults on police is based on what encounters officers choose to report as assaults. Sierra-Arévalo (2016) suggested that “[h]ow the preoccupation with danger and the demand for officer safety influence interpretations of race, gender, and neighborhoods that affect police-citizen interactions presents a promising array of places for this current research to be extended to” (p. 39). Here, I have attempted to consider how police-civilian interactions, mediated through the danger imperative, may result in the over-representation of Black men in police assault statistics; the publication of such statistics then reify pre-existing stereotypes about Black criminality (Welch, 2007).

Discussion: data collection as path dependency

Kitsuse and Cicourel, writing nearly 60 years ago, noted that “the rates of deviant behavior are produced by the actions taken by persons in the social system which define, classify and record certain behaviors as deviant” (1963, p. 135). Rather than accepting crime statistics at face value, they asked, “what forms of behavior are organizationally defined as deviant, and how are they classified, recorded and treated by persons in the society?” (Kitsuse & Cicourel, 1963, p. 139). Here, I attempted to look beneath the hood of police officer injury and assault data to consider the ways that police culture may influence data collection and contribute to the symbolic amplification of the risk of violent assault from civilians.

I do not intend to minimize the pain and suffering of those officers who were assaulted in MPD or CPD during the years in my sample. The shooting death of a CPD officer during this
chapter’s writing highlights the fact that, as rare as they may be, officers are in danger of extreme violence from civilians while performing their work. This chapter intends to show that, as tragic as this extreme violence is, it is also extremely rare. The vast majority of police officer injuries are not caused by civilian assault; even those that are, are generally caused by the suspect’s body, and no additional weapon. These injuries tend to be minor ones that can be treated on-scene.

The ‘danger imperative’ both informs and is informed by national data collection on police officers killed in the line of duty. The injury and assault data presented in this chapter are a small part of this informational ecosystem, but they provide insights into the dangers of taking national assault and injury statistics at face value. In her 1998 book, *A History of the Modern Fact*, Poovey explains how, in modernity, numbers have come to be accepted as truth. She writes:

Numbers are the epitome of the modern fact because they seem to be simple descriptors of phenomena and to resist the biases of conjecture and theory because they are subject to the invariable rules of mathematics. Numbers have become the bedrock of systematic knowledge because they seem to be free of interpretation and to be neutral and descriptive. They are presented as objective, with an interpretive narrative attached to them by which they are given meaning (p. 4).

Merry (2011) argues that numbers actually hide within themselves interpretive histories and theoretical assumptions about what matters, what should be counted, how to understand reality, and knowledge about the world is created through quantification. In policing, the numbers collected about the dangers of policing conceal the underlying danger imperative and the various normative orders that organize police officers’ social lives. The warrior mentality in policing is reflected in the glorification vis-a-vis data collection of the wounds sustained by civilian assault; we need look no further than the 600-word incident descriptions provided to me by MPD for civilian assaults, meanwhile they could not provide any information on injuries not caused by assault. The preoccupation with civilian violence that is the centerpiece of the danger imperative means that injuries caused by assault -- ‘battle wounds,’ so to speak -- are those considered worthy of tracking.
Chapter 7: The uncounted: police officer suicide and mental health

Introduction

First responders are warned from day one our jobs will not be easy and we’ll have to see things no person should ever have to see. But our training focuses on physical safety. One of the first things we’re taught is “scene safe, BSI,” which stands for body substance isolation, meaning that first responders need to be wearing protective gear at all times. It is drilled into us that scene safety is dynamic and we have to be prepared for danger at any moment should anyone become violent or have a weapon. What we aren’t told is that we need to protect our mental health, too.

-Ann Marie Farina, former first responder (Farina, 2019)

The previous chapters have focused on the physical hazards of policing. The preoccupation with civilian assault that is central to the danger imperative is reflected in data collection practices: extensive information is available about line-of-duty deaths and assaults. This translates into a wealth of knowledge about fatalities in law enforcement, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, assaults on law enforcement officers. But, researchers and news outlets increasingly recognize the problematic lack of data collection around the non-physical hazards of policing, including mental illness and suicide.45

Physical, rather than psychological, dangers orient the training and daily work experience of officers. The risks of physical dangers is amplified through formal and informal socialization processes within law enforcement organizations. To a certain degree, researchers also reify physical dangers when they define danger, as Sierra-Arévalo does, “in reference to an external source, something outside the individual that stands to do physical harm to them and, by extension, the group” (2016, p. 11).

Others take a wider view of danger. Barker (1999) sees danger facing police to include legal consequences, bureaucratic paperwork, and emotional trauma:

Any serious resistance on the part of a citizen signals to the police officer that potential problems could arise on several levels: physically, there is more likely to be an altercation; legally, there is a great chance of complaints or even lawsuits; logistically, more paperwork will be required; emotionally; an arrest that involves use of force is unsettling, even for police, who deal with arrests on a regular basis” (p. 46).

But it is not just arrest scenarios that can cause both physical and emotional (and potentially bureaucratic and legal) consequences for officers: it is the wide variety of potentially traumatic encounters in their work that can have deleterious impacts on law enforcement officers.

The term “trauma” is derived from the Greek work for ‘wound,’ and originally was used to refer to physical injuries caused by suddenly-occurring outside forces (Atmaier, 2019, p. 1). Now, however, the understanding of trauma has evolved to include “psychological damage from external events that do not necessarily involve physical harm” (Atmaier, 2019, p. 2). The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) Published by the American Psychiatric Association notes that trauma includes:

Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as it occurred to others; learning that the traumatic event(s) occurred to a close family member or close friend; experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s) (e.g., first responders collecting human remains; police officers repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse) (“Exhibit 1.3-4, DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD,” 2014).

Thus, even in the DSM-5 itself, the experiences of police officers are noted to be traumatic in ways that extend far beyond the dangers they face from civilian assault. Critical incidents that police experience are “broad and far-ranging” and include:

any situation in which an officer’s expectations of personal infallibility suddenly become tempered by imperfection and crude reality. Examples could include an officer-involved shooting, the death of a coworker, serious injury while on duty, life-threatening incidents, hostage situations or negotiations, exposure to intense crime scenes, a police suicide, or any situation that falls outside the realm of normal experience. (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25).

Officers reportedly experience 188 such critical incidents over the course of their careers (Heyman, Dill, & Douglas, 2018) and research has shown a correlation between the number of critical incidents an officer has experienced and the likelihood that the officer will suffer from PTSD or alcohol abuse (Chopko, Palmieri, & Facemire, 2014; Komarovskaya et al., 2011; Ménard & Arter, 2013).

What is known about these ‘broad and far-ranging’ traumas in police work, and how is what we know influenced by police culture itself? I explore this question throughout the remainder of this chapter. In this chapter I present the literature on the cultural aversion in policing to non-physical injuries. I discuss police officer suicide and mental illness, including an examination of what is known about these problems, what is not known, and why. By including both suicide and mental illness together in this chapter, I do not mean to conflate the two. Not all mental illness leads to suicide, and not all suicide is precipitated by mental illness. But, they share the important feature of being omitted from major data collection efforts around the dangers of policing. Iliadis and Russo (2016) noted that “[d]ata are a form of power…they are also conspicuous in their absence -- a lack of data is another indication of power, the power not to look or to remain hidden” (p. 1). This chapter attempts to shine a light on the absence of data on certain dangers of police work and to explore how this lack of data is both informed by -- and reaffirming of -- the danger imperative in policing.

46 Of course, I recognize that suicide is a physical injury, but it is not caused by the felonious actions of a civilian, which makes suicide significantly different from the cultural fixation on the harms posed by armed assailants.
Police cultural aversion to the non-physical hazards of policing

Chapter 5 presented evidence that police officers emphasize the physical risks of their occupation, especially the risk of civilian assault. Sierra-Arévalo (2016) calls this cultural frame the danger imperative, and explains that it orients both officers’ perceptions and their behavior (p. 4). There is a flipside to that coin: at the same time that certain risks are amplified in police culture, others are attenuated (Kasperson et al., 1988). In this section, I explore the social attenuation of certain risks using various sociological and psychological concepts, including Herbert’s (1998) normative orders of police subculture and the social-psychological frames of pluralistic ignorance and homegrown stereotypes (Prentice & Miller, 2002).

Normative order of competence

Competence is one of the primary normative orders of the police subculture. Herbert (1998) explains that:

considerations of competence work to provide officers with a sense of what constitutes doing a good job, what outcomes will provide them with approbation from their peers. Competence also consists of ensuring that officers pull their own weight, that they do not need unnecessary assistance in managing their basic workload (p. 358).

What constitutes doing a good job may differ from department to department (i.e. some departments may have certain initiatives and standards by which their officers are judged, such as reduction in gang activity or getting firearms off the streets). Still, police officers across diverse departments share a desire to do their job well (Herbert, 1998, p. 359).

The normative order of competence dissuades the acknowledgement of and data collection regarding non-physical injuries. Suffering a civilian assault reaffirms the danger imperative and the victim officer is hailed by her peers as heroic; such injuries resonate with the normative orders of adventure and machismo and the related view of officers as warriors. But suffering from other harms -- mental illness and/or suicide -- is perceived as a sign of incompetence, even if workplace stressors are the primary or a contributing factor. So, officers generally refrain from asking for help (Violanti, 1994) or pursuing professional mental health treatment (Blau, 1994; Kirschman et al., 2015), even when such services are available (Greenstone, 2000).

This is not to say that stigma -- both public and personal -- is unique to the police profession. Instead, stigmas about mental illness are “widely endorsed by the general public in the Western world” (Corrigan & Watson, 2002, para. 5). Public stigma “refers to awareness of how the general public reacts to individuals with mental health concerns” whereas self-stigma “refers to an individual’s perception that his or her own behaviors or attitudes are not socially acceptable” (Karaffa & Koch, 2016, pp. 760-761). Police officers may be negatively impacted both by self-stigma and by public stigma, especially given that, as “members of the criminal justice system,” they are embedded within one of the “key power groups” seen to “negatively impact the lives of people affected by mental illness” (Corrigan & Kleinlein, 2005, p. 11). And, studies have shown that “police officers [hold] a more negative attitude toward seeking professional psychological help than the general population” (Karaffa, 2012, p. iii).
A 2018 survey of roughly 8,000 law enforcement officers across 49 states conducted by the Fraternal Order of Police found that “90% of respondents believe that there is a stigma in law enforcement that creates a barrier to seeking help for emotional or behavioral health issues” (Fraternal Order of Police, 2019, p. 3).

The consequences of mental health stigma are acute in a profession repeatedly exposed to the types of traumatic and critical incidents described above, incidents that occur with much more frequency than civilian assaults on officers. Stigma keeps officers from discussing things that are distressing to them, because they do not want to be perceived as incompetent, not able to handle their jobs, and not able to be relied upon to provide backup (Blum, 2000; Fair, 2009; Kureczka, 1996; Miller, 1995). NPR’s Scott Simon interviewed four widows of police suicide in May, 2019. One of them, Melissa Swailes, explained her late husband’s experience, saying that he “would go from one call to the next, one crime or trauma to another, then watch video from his body cam at night” (Simon, 2019). When she suggested he talk to a therapist or counselor, Swailes notes:

I remember he looked at me and said, are you crazy? If I go to them, not only could I lose my job, I'm going to never promote. They're going to bench me. Not to mention my colleagues, my brothers - they're going to look at me as a liability. Nobody's going to want to work with me (Simon, 2019).

Even if an officer recognizes the legitimate need for psychological services, they are cognizant of the potential implications of seeking treatment (Toch, 2002), and have been warned throughout their training that losing control of their emotions could jeopardize their careers (Kirschman, 2018; Karaffa & Koch, 2016, p. 761). Karaffa and Tochkov (2013) administered a survey to 158 sworn officers in Texas including questions about accessing mental health treatment. One officer noted that the:

fear of being labeled “unstable” is scary for an officer. If we think we could lose our badge and gun because of a personal problem, anti-depression medication, or unstableness [sic] in our life, then we will build up walls to everyone involved in our life and learn how to cope with the struggle (p. 85).

Competence in policing is associated with the officer’s service weapon; losing the service weapon (and therefore being limited to ‘desk duty’), is a central preoccupation that can prevent officers from seeking mental health treatment. William P. Ryan, a retired detective interviewed for a June 2019 New York Times article on police suicide, noted that acknowledging mental illness can quickly lead to a change in one’s position within the force:

You go in there and say you’re depressed or whatever, they modify you. They take your guns (Southall, 2019).

The cultural fixation on guns as an important aspect of competence is reflected by a wider cultural fixation on firearms as an important element of modern masculinity. Carlson (2015) interviewed and conducted participant observation of gun carriers in Michigan (both police and civilians) and found that “men use guns not simply to instrumentally address the threat of crime but also to negotiate their own position within a context of socioeconomic decline by emphasizing their role as protector” (p. 386). This role as protector is present even among civilian men, but especially so among police officers given the normative order of machismo (Herbert, 1998).

Police officers are not only concerned about being perceived as competent themselves; they also are also hesitant to seek mental health treatment due to presumed incompetence of mental
health professionals, especially those without any law enforcement experience. In the same survey given to Texas officers mentioned above, Karaffa and Tochkov found that officers:

focused on provider competence: How am I supposed to talk to someone about what I have seen, done, felt, and smelled when that person has no real-world experience with such things or has never even been exposed to it? For them, everything we talk about is purely academic and second-hand knowledge. They have likely never had someone else's blood on their uniform or served in an unsafe and hostile environment. They have probably never been punched in the face, watched a child die, or responded to a suicide scene and talked to an eight-year old who is asking you if his Daddy is going to be OK while his father’s blood and brains are still dropping off the ceiling. (2013, p. 82)

Kirschman, Kamena, and Fay wrote a book called *Counseling Cops: What Clinicians Need to Know* that acknowledged the need for a distinct kind of competence among those mental health professionals treating law enforcement officers. They reiterate that “[c]ops see a lot of gory things, including unimaginable cruelty and tragedy. They need to talk about what they see with someone who can ‘hold’ the emotions and contain their own reactions” (2015, p. 9). The authors gave an example from their own files of a police officer’s search for ‘competent’ help:

Tracy was looking for a therapist. The first therapist he consulted teared up and didn’t think she could bear listening to the kinds of challenges he encountered at work. The second therapist reassured Tracy that he understood the impact of carrying great responsibility because many of his clients were CEOs of large organizations. Tracy responded in anger. ‘When a CEO makes a mistake, the company loses money. When I make a mistake, someone dies.’ The therapist Tracy finally chose was a combat veteran who knew firsthand what it meant to put your life on the line and knew the costs of doing it year after year. (Kirschman et al., 2015, p. 6).

The normative order of competence deters police officers from seeking help for non-physical injuries, due to the stigma that exists both within policing organizations and society at large. Officers’ concerns with their perceived competence and the risk of having their gun taken away deter officers from seeking mental health treatment, as does the perceived incompetence of mental health professionals with no law enforcement or combat experience.

### Pluralistic ignorance and homegrown stereotypes

Related to the normative order of competence, pluralistic ignorance also helps explain why officers do not seek mental health treatment, even if they may privately admit that it would be valuable. Pluralistic ignorance is defined as “a phenomenon characterized by the belief that one’s private attitudes and judgments are different from those of others, even though one’s public behavior is identical” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 354). In policing, this manifests as a common fear among police officers that they are the “only ones experiencing unfavorable internal reactions to stress” (Karaffa & Koch, 2016, pp. 761-762; Kirschman et al., 2013). Karaffa and Koch, who administered a survey to 248 police officers in Texas and Oklahoma regarding attitudes towards seeking mental health services, found that “[o]fficers perceived themselves as more willing than their colleagues to seek mental health services for family issues, depression, PTSD, substance abuse, and physiological complaints” (Karaffa & Koch, 2016, p. 769), thereby demonstrating a pluralistic ignorance effect regarding help-seeking for mental health issues. This research finds additional support from the 2018 Fraternal Order of Police survey of nearly 8,000 police officers, which found
that while 35% of respondents had privately sought professional counseling, 90% believed that there is a stigma in law enforcement that creates a barrier to seeking help for emotional or behavioral health issues (Fraternal Order of Police, 2019, pp. 3–4).

Police seek to avoid being stigmatized with a negative label in order to project the image of a good member of the group (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 357). Social psychologists note that such conditions can give rise to “homegrown stereotypes” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 357). The origins of homegrown stereotypes “lie in self-presentations that are enacted by a sizable proportion of a group’s members. These presentations may be motivated by a desire to present oneself as a good person according to the values of the broader society or as a good group member according to the values of a particular social group” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 352). In-group stereotypes are more likely to develop under conditions that heighten the salience of a particular group identity. We know that police officers have an exceptionally strong in-group identity (Cain, 2015) and social insularity (Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1999; Young, 1991). Thus, policing organizations create conditions that are especially ripe for the development of in-group or homegrown stereotypes.

Stereotypes against mental health treatment reflect officers’ desired self-images, though not necessarily their genuine feelings about mental health treatment (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 353). Such stereotypes serve as “important sources of comfort or alienation for individual group members, depending on how the individuals see themselves in relation to the stereotypes” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 353). Homegrown stereotypes about mental health treatment in policing can be important sources for comfort or alienation for individual police officers. If they start to experience mental health crises, they will increasingly feel alienated from the group.

Pluralistic ignorance and homegrown stereotypes are closely related. Both originate in the process of self-presentation. Police officers, in an attempt to present themselves as good people or good cops in the eyes of their peers, act in ways that are at odds with their private sentiments (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 354). This creates a discrepancy between self and other, because the officers take their peers’ behavior (outward presentations that devalue and delegitimize mental health illness and treatment) as “an accurate reflection of their peers’ private sentiments” and therefore believe (incorrectly) “that those sentiments must differ from their own” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 354). Homegrown stereotypes emerge because “the uniform behavior of group members prompts an inference about the characteristics of the group” (Prentice & Miller, 2002, p. 354).

NPR’s May 2019 interviews with police widows is illustrative here, demonstrating the public-private divide in the lives of the women’s late husbands. All, privately, showed signs of stress and trauma, and such trauma which was understood to be universal among their husbands’ colleagues. One widow noted her husband’s private stress from “[t]hat day-to-day interaction of people yelling at him and calling him names and throwing things at him.” (Simon, 2019). She went on:

You’re showing up to people’s worst days of their lives...Call after call after call. And you have to go from one call to the next, pretending like you weren’t affected that you just saw a child murdered or a homicide or you were just in a high-speed pursuit, or a shooting. And then go to the next call as if it didn’t affect you… (Simon, 2019).

Another widow notes the stress of legal trouble: her husband had been named in a federal lawsuit against the city where he worked. All of these stressors -- verbal insults from citizens, high-speed chases, responding to violent and gory scenes -- involve traumas that fall outside policing’s cultural preoccupation with violence from civilians. The widows profiled by NPR recognize the impact these stressors had on their husbands: “whenever he was home he was drinking and he
drank, and he drank, and he drank, until he passed out. And I have memories of him pacing the floors just pacing, pacing, pacing, back and forth. And it was frightening” (Simon, 2019).

Kerry Karaffa (2012) administered an online survey to 158 sworn officers in Texas regarding attitudes towards seeking mental health treatment. He asked officers, “In your opinion, what conditions might improve mental health service utilization within your department?” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 116). Pluralistic ignorance was visible in the way that officers demonstrated a desire to access services, but a fear that others would judge them harshly for doing so. Officers repeatedly reported a fear that seeking help would result in being demoted or stigmatized. One officer wrote:

We do need an OUTSIDE agency/person to talk to when needed. The biggest problem with interdepartmental assistance is that you can not [sic] trust anyone. No one feels comfortable about speaking with ANYONE from the department for fear of it affecting his/her job (Karaffa, 2012, p. 116).

Another reiterated the importance of the “ability to seek care while not exposing ‘treatment’ to other co-workers” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 116). Still another wrote:

I feel that seeking help from the department just sends up a red flag that you are not mentally strong enough to handle the pressures of the job. There was one individual that sough [sic] help from our department and was terminated for not being fit for duty. I feel like his mental issues were not resolved and we failed him as an organization (Karaffa, 2012, p. 118).

Other officers wrote about concerns for “negative consequences on the job, such as not being selected for special assignments or positions” or that, “seeking such service would negatively affect performance ratings, administration opinions and advancement potential. The MOST SIGNIFICANT obstacle to seeking professional service assistance is the fear of being judged by administration” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 118). Still another noted that “[a]n officer in Texas can permanently lose their Peace Office license for psychological reasons. Fear of this is an obvious deterrent to seeking professional psychological help” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 118). Over and over again, officers noted a fear that seeking mental health treatment would mean that “the likelihood of him losing his job is much greater. No one wants people with mental health problems to be armed” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 118). Again, we see the fear of being stripped of one’s service weapon: “in police work, if you admit to any mental issues, they take your gun and put you on light duty” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 118).

Officers also reiterated concerns not only about their own perceived competence within their departments, but also the competence of the mental health professionals that would provide them care. One officer wrote, “The professionals usually don't have a clue about what it is that we go through” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 120). Another wrote, “Police don't talk to civilians. They have no idea what the job is like even if they have a Dr. degree. It should be someone with law enforcement experience” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 120). Others wrote that they would be more likely to seek help from, “a mental health professional with a background or experience in law enforcement,” “a mental health professional who was currently or had been previously employed by or in law enforcement,” or “a mental health professional that can relate to officers” (Karaffa, 2012, p. 120).

Police officers are not, of course, the only members of society who experience pluralistic ignorance. This is a phenomenon that has been studied in prison guards (Akers, Hayner, & Gruninger, 1977; Toch & Klofas, 1984; Wheeler, 1961), fraternity brothers (Katz, Allport, &
Babcock, 1928); college students generally (Lambert, Kahn, & Apple, 2003; Prentice & Miller, 1993); White homemakers (Fields & Schuman, 1976) and nurses (Maslach, 1982). But, the normative order of competence exerts an especially strong influence on police officers who avoid seeking mental health treatment due to the perceived potential for adverse professional consequences, especially losing their guns. I use the term ‘perceived potential for adverse consequences’ because Miller (2002) found that the majority of officers who participated in a police counseling program and shared this with colleagues received support for their decisions.

**Normative order of adventure/machismo**

The normative order of adventure / machismo is associated with the warrior mentality in policing, and encourages officers to see themselves as “heroic and noble figure[s], imbued with the qualities that officers most respect and admire... those qualities...can be fairly condensed into four attributes: honor, duty, resolve, and the willingness to engage in righteous violence” (Stoughton, 2016, p. 632). In this normative order, injuries sustained during violent encounters with civilians are legitimate and the result of ‘real’ police work and help to perpetuate the “myth of policing, as action-filled, exciting, adventurous, and dangerous” (Prokos & Padavic, 2002, p. 442). Other injuries -- especially mental trauma -- are signs of weakness and femininity (Wong et al. 2017; Addis & Mahalik, 2003). Prokos and Padavic (2002) explain the normative and hegemonic power of masculinity in their study based on observations of police academy training:

> Male police officers have drawn on images of a 'masculine cop' to enhance their sense of masculinity and to resist women's growing presence...Male officers equate women with feminine moral virtue, the domestic realm, social service, formal rules, administration, cleanliness, and emotions. In contrast, they equate men and masculinity with guns, crimefighting, a combative personality, resistance to management, fights, weapons, and a desire to work in high crime areas (p. 442; see also Hunt, 1990).

Police reformers, including Seth Stoughton (2015 & 2016) and Rahr and Rice (2015) call for a shift from a warrior to a guardian mindset in policing, based on human connections and community engagement (Rahr & Rice, 2015, p. 2). At its core, this mindset is about “protecting civilians from unnecessary indignity and harm” (Stoughton, 2016, p. 614). But, it appears that the reasons for advocating for such a shift are based on potential gains to police-community relationships and improvement in civilians’ experiences with police, rather than an improvement in the mental health of officers themselves. Both warrior and guardian mindsets see the role of the officer as sacrificing him or herself, to varying degrees, for the benefit of the public. This is evident in the words of Dave Korus, a retired police commander who was interviewed by *The Washington Post* for a 2018 piece on officer suicide. Korus said:

> The problem with us as first responders...is that we don’t take care of ourselves very well. We take care of others, but we don’t want to be other people’s problem. We want to be that brave person. We want to be the one that is standing tall (Miller, 2018).

Korus highlights how even the guardian mentality that seeks to care for civilians rather than coerce them still suffers from the normative orders of competence and machismo.
Social attenuation of risk

Just as risks can be socially amplified, they can also be socially attenuated. Risk is socially attenuated when the public has relatively low levels of interest in well-documented and significant hazards (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 179). Kasperson and Kasperson (1996) note that “each society selects its worry beads, the particular risks that we choose to rub and polish assiduously while we relegate others to inattention” (p. 102). In policing, the “worry beads” involve potential violence from civilians that informs the danger imperative, and, to a lesser degree, the risk of physical injury from accidents, such as automobile crashes. But the risks of other harms, especially mental illness, are relegated to inattention. This inattention manifests at the individual and interactional level, where officers hesitate to discuss things that are distressing to them and resist seeking mental health treatment based on fears of being stigmatized (Karaffa & Koch, 2016). It also manifests at the departmental level, where departments may have policies that strip officers of their gun, badge, or peace officer certification for psychological reasons (Karaffa, 2012). Finally, the inattention to injuries not caused by civilian assault or accident also manifests at the structural and societal level, where very limited data are collected about harms from mental illness and suicide. Of course, the individual, interactional, departmental, and societal/structural levels are in constant interplay and inform one another. Officers who spent their careers embedded within police culture become police leaders who determine departmental policy and inform data collection practices nationally; the unavailability of data on mental illness and suicide further perpetuates the lack of knowledge production around these issues.

I now turn to examining what is known nationally about police suicide, and how – and through what institutions – this knowledge is created. There is no single governmental database such as LEOKA for officer suicides, so knowledge about police suicide is created mostly from information collected by nonprofit organizations and researchers.

Suicide

What is known and knowable about police officer suicide? Media outlets increasingly report that around three times as many officers die by suicide as by civilian assault (Crosbie, 2018) and report that “[m]ore officers die of suicide than die of shootings and traffic accidents combined” (O’Hara, 2017). In this section, I review data collection efforts on law enforcement suicide both by the government and by non-profits. I will also briefly present what is known about police officer suicides thanks to the significant efforts of researchers, who work to overcome the lack of national data collection.

National governmental data collection efforts

Chapter 5 presented the three major national efforts at data collection regarding the dangers of policing: LEOKA, ODMP, and NLEOMF. None of these three collects data on police suicide, regardless of whether the suicide occurred on-duty or off-duty. These databases only include line-of-duty deaths, which can help explain why suicides are not counted; roughly 90% of police suicides occur off-duty (Violanti, Mnatsakanova, Hartley, Andrew, & Burchfiel, 2012). But, the failure to count suicides also reflects a cultural opposition to suicide as sign of weakness; suicide is perceived as an inability to cope that means the officer just “couldn’t cut it” in the policing world. This attitude is evident in a 2019 New York Times article on suicide within the NYPD. Police
commissioner James P. O’Neill declared a mental health crisis after four NYPD officers killed themselves in a 3-week period in June 2019. An NYPD officer called the founder of Blue H.E.L.P. (a nonprofit that collects data on police suicides and will be discussed below) to report how officers were taking O’Neill’s initiative. The officer reportedly said: “I was talking to a bunch of guys about this, and they were making fun of the officers and calling them weak and saying that we’re better off without them” (Southall, 2019).

The Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does collect some information on police officer suicides as part of its effort to collect national data on all workplace deaths across all occupations. The CFOI purportedly includes data for all fatal work injuries as long as the decedents were engaged in an activity related to work (“Scope of the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI),” n.d.). The BLS compiles fatality data for the CFOI from a variety of sources, including “death certificates, workers’ compensation reports, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigation reports, medical examiner reports, police reports, news media, and federal, state, and local agency administrative reports” (Tiesman, Swedler, Konda, & Pollack, 2013, p. 694). At least two of these source documents or one source document plus a follow-up questionnaire are required to confirm that the fatality was work-related. In a December 2018 news release, the BLS notes that “[f]or the 2017 data, over 23,400 unique source documents were reviewed as part of the data collection process” (“Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries News Release,” 2018). This averages out to about four source documents per fatal injury.

The CFOI does include suicides, but only if the suicide occurred “on the work premises” or “can be definitively linked to work,” i.e. through a suicide note that mentioned work as a factor in the suicide (“Scope of the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI),” 2016). Given the fact that so few police suicides occur at work (Violanti, 2012), this means that the CFOI seriously undercounts police suicide. For example, in a 2009 bulletin the BLS reports that 25 employees in protective service occupations committed suicide in 2008 and 14 committed suicide in 2007 (“Increase in Occupational Fatalities due to Suicide,” 2009); this compares to an average of 130 reported by Badge of Life each year (O’Hara, 2017).

Non-profit data collection

The International Association of Chiefs of Police estimated in a 2017 report titled “Officer Safety and Wellness” that suicide “kills twice as many officers as traffic accidents and felonious assaults.” Despite this sobering statistic – and the fact that a 2014 report from a National Symposium on Law Enforcement Officer Suicide and Mental Health reported that “mental health and well-being is integral to the continuum of officer safety and wellness,” there is no governmental data collection on police officer suicide. Those interested in keeping police safe and well should pay close attention to suicide, which poses a higher fatal risk to cops than civilian assault or accidents. But instead, data collection practices reflect and reiterate the stigma among police officers associated with suicide in particular, and mental health in general.

Badge of Life

Badge of Life is a non-profit organization whose mission is educating law enforcement about health, wellness, and suicide prevention. Until recently, they published estimates on their
website for the number of police officers killed by suicide. Now, however, their website notes the following:

For the last six years we have been the only organization who has collected, empirically analyzed and reported on officer suicide. Commencing 2018, Badge of Life will no longer be collecting this data. We have found that regardless of the amount of statistical predictions about unreported suicides we utilized. [sic] Ultimately these numbers were not accurate even with the best statistical projections. Accordingly, Badge of Life is promoting the mandatory reporting of all suicides by chief law enforcement executives into a national repository, possibly the Center for Disease Control (CDC), National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) or other another body with the capabilities to manage this important data (“Suicide Statistics,” 2018).

Blue H.E.L.P.

Blue H.E.L.P. is another nonprofit organization, founded in 2015, that claims to be “the only organization in the country that collects law enforcement suicide data and regularly supports families in the aftermath.” It collects information from “internet searches, friends, family members, departments, other organizations and through [its] online submission form” (“Frequently Asked Questions,” n.d.).

Blue H.E.L.P. collects suicide data on both law enforcement officers and correctional officers, and has the following criteria for inclusion: “An officer shall be included if a department or family states that the officer died as a result of a suicide and there is no information to believe otherwise. An officer must have at least one year of post-academy service, or a significant job-related event, to quality [sic]. Retired and terminated officers are also eligible for inclusion” (“Criteria for Inclusion,” n.d.-b). The website does not elaborate as to what constitutes a “job-related event.”

The organization counts a suicide after it has verified it, and publishes annual numbers of officer suicides on its website. These numbers are the best available national estimate of police officer suicide, and are regularly cited by news media47 and even by Congress.48 However, Blue H.E.L.P. only counts suicides that are reported to it or are publicized in internet searches. Due to the stigma associated with suicide, there is a near certainty that some officer suicides are never publicly reported as such, there therefore the organization notes “there are more suicides that have not been reported” (“Frequently Asked Questions,” n.d.).

Like ODMP and NLEOMF, Blue H.E.L.P. collects extensive information in its online submission form including basic demographics about the officer (gender, race, age, marital status, children), details about the officer’s job (rank, department, veteran status), and details about the officer’s mental health history (whether the officer had sought help; whether there was history of PTSD; whether there were previous suicide attempts; whether officer was under investigation at time of death). Unlike OMPD and NLEOMF, however, Blue H.E.L.P. but does not publish any information about the officers in its database (name, age, gender, etc.) unless the family of the deceased officer gives permission. On the organization’s website, suicides that the organization has verified appear as follows, unless the family has affirmatively consented to the publication of personal details:

As depicted above, most officers included on Blue H.E.L.P.’s website appear anonymously, with only their date of death listed. The icon is identical for each officer, meaning that distinguishing on the basis of characteristics such as race, gender, or age is impossible.

As of July 26, 2019, the organization’s homepage notes that 106 suicides have been verified thus far in 2019. On another page, the organization lists profiles of deceased officers, like the one depicted above, in reverse chronological order. Only three profiles from 2019 contain personal information about the officers, including their name, photo, and a brief eulogy. The organization’s homepage notes, somewhat ironically, that “it’s time to put names and faces to the men and women who have died because their emotional injuries became too much to bear” (“Home,” n.d.). Yet so few officers’ profiles contain identifiable information about the officer that the majority of the database looks like this:
Though the organization’s stated mission is to “acknowledge the service and sacrifice of law enforce officers we lost to suicide,” the forced anonymity of those officers whose suicides the organization verifies makes it difficult to examine the deaths for potential patterns (i.e. across department size or geography) or to identify potential points of intervention for other officers who may be struggling with mental health issues. Such anonymity also de-personalizes the life behind each death, assembling officers who have died by suicide into (literally) a faceless, nameless, and indistinguishable mass. In addition, the use of male-gendered icons perpetuates the centrality of hegemonic masculinity in police work (Prokos & Padavic, 2002).

I do not doubt the sincerity of Blue H.E.L.P.’s desire to support the families of officers killed by suicide and honor those officers’ service. However, the organization was founded and is run by policing insiders who are thus members of the same subculture and susceptible to the same cultural forces discussed throughout this dissertation. The names, positions, and relation to law enforcement for those who run the organization are summarized below.
Table 7.1. Blue H.E.L.P. leadership positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blue H.E.L.P. Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>LEO experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President and co-founder</td>
<td>Karen Solomon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Married to LEO since 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President and co-founder</td>
<td>Jeffrey McGill</td>
<td>Police Academy Director, Northwest FL State College</td>
<td>Served 15 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Melissa Swailes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Widow of LEO killed by suicide in 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Dough Wyllie</td>
<td>Web Editor for POLICE magazine</td>
<td>Member of International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association (ILEETA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
<td>Mark DiBona</td>
<td>Patrol Sergeant</td>
<td>LEO since 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Coordinator</td>
<td>Nick Greco</td>
<td>President and founder of C3 Education and Research, training and consulting firm</td>
<td>Crisis intervention trainer (CIT) in Illinois; Certified Pistol and Rifle Instructor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based liaison</td>
<td>Michael McSellers</td>
<td>Virginia State trooper</td>
<td>LEO since 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive outreach</td>
<td>Steve Casstevens</td>
<td>Chief of Police, Buffalo Grove, IL; First vice president, IACP</td>
<td>LEO since 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-founder and advisor</td>
<td>Steve Hough</td>
<td>retired</td>
<td>Served 20 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training coordinator</td>
<td>Brian Hill</td>
<td>Staff sergeant in Denver metro, CO</td>
<td>LEO since ~2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Joe Willis</td>
<td>Director of Business Development, Team One Network, training company</td>
<td>Served 20+ years as military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Ron Clark</td>
<td>retired</td>
<td>Served 23 years as LEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Rich Levenson</td>
<td>Psychologist in private clinical practice</td>
<td>Department Police Surgeon since 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table above demonstrates, Blue H.E.L.P. -- like the fatality databases discussed in Chapter 5 -- is run by policing insiders. The organization aims to “bring awareness to suicide and mental health issues” (“About Us,” n.d.), and the suicide numbers it publishes are the best and only national estimate available. But, the organization may in fact help perpetuate the stigma around suicide. By anonymizing the officers in its database, the organization implicitly accepts that there is sufficient shame in suicide that families -- and the legacies of the officers -- must be protected and all data must be kept confidential.

There are other indicators from Blue H.E.L.P.’s website that the organization shares cultural similarities with ODMP and NLEOMF. One example is the organization’s logo: a male lion with a wild mane. This is reminiscent of the lion statue guarding the entrance to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial discussed in Chapter 5.

Another similarity can be found on Blue H.E.L.P’s homepage: “It is not how they died that mattered, it is how they lived” (“Home,” n.d.). This is nearly identical to the quotation carved beneath the lion statue at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial: “It is not how these officers died that made them heroes, it is how they lived” (“Memorial | Fallen Officer Search,” n.d.). Blue H.E.L.P. certainly goes farther than NLEOMF in removing the stigma around suicide by publicizing suicide numbers; it could go farther by giving the officers in its database equal memorialization as those on ODMP and NLEOMF including the release of data that would permit more in-depth study of the deaths. I understand, however, that a single organization cannot be expected to change the entire culture of policing. Given the stigma that does exist around suicide in policing organizations, there could be real and serious social consequences for the families of officers who submit the suicide confidentially to Blue H.E.L.P. if the information were released.

Research on police suicide


This evidence dates back more than fifty years. Guralnick (1963) studied death certificates and estimated the suicide rate among police 20 to 64 years of age to be 1.8 times higher than that of the general Caucasian male population. Nelson and Smith (1971) reported a very high suicide rate
among police officers according to analysis of death certificates from Wyoming. Labovitz and Hagedorn (1971) found that police ranked second highest in suicide rate among 36 occupations. Richard and Fell (1975) ranked police officers third highest in suicide among 130 occupations. Milham (1979) studied male officers in Washington State and found that their suicide rate between 1950 and 1971 was higher than the general male population. Vena et al. (1986) and Violanti et al. (1998) found that police officers had a three-fold increase in the risk of suicide over that of other municipal workers. Elevated suicide rates for police officers have not only been identified in the United States, but also in Rome, Italy (Forastiere et al., 1994), the UK (Darragh, 1991); Westphalia, Germany (Hartwig & Violanti, 1999); Australia (Cantor, Tyman, & Slater, 1995); and Quebec, Canada (Charbonneau, 2000), among others.

In the absence of a national police suicide database, researchers use creative means to study the problem. This includes collecting death certificates (Nelson & Smith, 1971) and studying epidemiological mortality databases (Violanti, 1995). Researchers have also used the National Occupational Mortality Surveillance (NOMS) data published by the CDC for the years 1985-1998, 1999, 2003-2004, and 2007-2013 (Violanti, Robinson, and Shen, 2013). Another approach is to develop relationships with police departments that facilitate the release of death-related information for study (e.g. Ivanoff’s 1994 study of New York police). John Violanti’s decades-long relationship with the Buffalo, NY police department nearby the University at Buffalo (where he is a professor), has facilitated much of his research (Violanti, 1995; Violanti et al., 1998; Violanti et al., 2008).

Some scholars have pointed out that while police officer suicide rate is higher than the general population, it is actually lower than that of the appropriate comparison group (e.g. White males between ages 25 and 55) (Aamodt & Stalnaker, 2001). To address this criticism, Violanti et al. (2010) examined police suicide rates and compared them to two other occupations similar in exposure (firefighters and military personnel) using NOMS data (as described above). They used proportionate mortality ratios (PMR), which indicate “whether the age-standardized proportion of deaths from a specific cause of death for a particular occupation appears to be higher or lower than the expected proportion for that particular occupation” (Violanti et al., 2010, p. 274). Police had the highest PMRs for suicide out of the three occupations as well as the highest PMRs for “undetermined deaths” which numbered almost as highly (n=1,036) as suicides (n=1,148) in their study. The authors suggested that some of those ‘undetermined’ cases may actually be suicides, given that police investigators at the scene of a death “can readily control information to protect the victim officer and family from the stigma of suicide” which is seen as “disgraceful to the victim officer and profession” (Violanti et al., 2010, p. 282).

The most up-to-date estimate is that “[o]fficers have as much as a 54 percent higher risk of suicide than other workers”; this is the figure cited by the country’s leading police suicide expert, John Violanti, in 2019 interviews with news media (Barr, 2019; Southall, 2019). This figure is based on Centers for Disease Control (CDC) data from 2013 (Violanti, personal communication, June 26, 2019). The Centers for Disease Control collects suicide data through its National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) which relies on “death certificates, coroner/medical examiner reports, law enforcement reports, and toxicology reports” to create “one anonymous database” consisting of “more than 600 unique data elements” (CDC, NVDRS). But, NVDRS data are currently only provided for 32 states, and “are not nationally representative” (“National Violent Death Reporting System,” 2019).
Regardless of how police suicide rates compare to different benchmarks -- the general population, Caucasian males ages 25-55, or those in similar occupations\textsuperscript{49} -- the truth remains that suicide kills more cops than accidents and felonious homicides combined. The police subculture continues to emphasize and amplify the risks of death at the hands of armed assailants, despite the fact that death by suicide is statistically more likely.

**Police suicide reform and awareness efforts**

Despite a persistent cultural focus on dangerous civilians, law enforcement leaders have begun to recognize the problem of police suicide. The IACP held a symposium on police officer suicide in 2013 and published a report based on that symposium in 2014. The report acknowledges the differential treatment in law enforcement culture between physical and mental wellness:

To effectively address mental wellness and suicide prevention, all levels of leadership must recognize the parity of mental and physical safety and wellness. Law enforcement agencies are committed to officers' physical safety and wellness. Numerous measures— including body armor, firearms training, on-site gyms, and fitness programs—are in place to ensure an officer’s physical safety. But what is the profession doing to protect and support the mental health of officers? Tragically, many agencies lack the resources and the critical guidance to improve and protect their officers’ mental health and wellness (IACP National Symposium on Law Enforcement Officer Suicide and Mental Health, 2014, p. 5).

Over 300 law enforcement officials came together in April 2019 for a Law Enforcement Suicide Prevention Symposium in New York City hosted by The New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). Over 300 “researchers, subject matter experts, and law enforcement personnel from across the world” were in attendance (“Law Enforcement Suicide Prevention Symposium,” 2019). The symposium featured presentations by prominent suicidologists including John Violanti and Miriam Heyman, whose work is cited above, as well as Karen Solomon of Blue H.E.L.P., also discussed above. The symposium closed with 10 suggestions for moving forward on police suicide prevention. The first two both involved data collection:

1. Obtaining more complete information about the extent and nature of police suicides needs to be a national priority. There must be a central repository for capturing and analyzing this data.
2. Agencies should conduct psychological autopsies on police suicides, and they should use that data to inform their policies, practices and programs (Symposium on Suicide by Members of Law Enforcement, 2019, p. 42).

At the symposium, NYPD touted its efforts, including its Employee Assistance Unit, in a section of the presentation titled “What’s Working: Promising Practices from the Field on Law Enforcement Suicide Prevention.” The symposium PowerPoint features a photograph of the NYPD’s employee assistance resource center, wall-mounted sign with various help-line phone

\textsuperscript{49} Violanti et al. (2010) found that the police suicide rate was four times higher than that of military personnel, but lower than that of military personnel.
numbers and brochures. Yet already in 2019, seven NYPD officers have died by suicide -- an increase from the average of 4-5 suicides per year over the past five years (Morales & Almasy, 2019).

Another current initiative is the National Consortium on Preventing Law Enforcement Suicide, which was convened on April 30, 2019 by the IACP in partnership with the National Action Alliance for Suicide Prevention and the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The consortium will convene for 18 months and publish “a comprehensive report on Consortium findings identifying recommendations, policy updates, messaging strategies, and more” (“National Officer Safety Initiatives (NOSI) Program | BJA,” n.d.).

Given the level of attention that police suicide is now receiving by leadership organizations including the IACP and PERF, there is an increasing likelihood of a national data collection on police suicides.

Challenges facing researchers studying police suicide

Those interested in studying police officer suicides face challenges given the lack of standardized national data collection. Two prominent challenges include sunshine laws, which mandate release of information only if departments already collect such information, and the ethical and practical challenges of obtaining Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for suicide-related research. I will briefly discuss each.

The sunshine law conundrum

Open records laws, sometimes called freedom of information laws or sunshine laws, allow members of the public the right to access public documents, which generally means anything in possession of a public agency. All states have passed such laws, although they vary slightly from state to state (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press). These open records laws are what permitted me to access the injury and assault records discussed in Chapter 6. Many police departments -- especially larger, urban departments such as CPD and MPD -- have special divisions to respond to citizen requests for data. The open record law that applies to CPD states that “all records prepared and maintained or received in the course of the operation of the agency are presumed to be open for public inspection and copying” and applies to “all records compiled for law enforcement or prosecution purposes” (MPD and CPD state open records law). There are narrow exceptions, including information related to ongoing investigations, certain personally identifying information (e.g. social security numbers and birth dates), and medical records (MPD and CPD state open records law). But, importantly, an agency is only required to disclose data that it already keeps: “If a report, summary, or compilation is not in existence at the time of the request, the records custodian is not required to prepare one in order to respond to the request” (MPD and CPD state open records law).

Thus, if a police department does not track certain information, open records laws are toothless. When I asked CPD and MPD for police officer injury data, they provided me with the data that their department already maintained, as was required by their states’ open records laws. But when I asked about data on suicides, I was informed by CPD that they do not track such information, and therefore they had no responsive documents. The open records supervisor suggested that the department chaplain might have a sense of how many suicides have occurred in the department, but the chaplain never responded to me. Increasing departmental data collection on
suicide would facilitate the release of such information via open records laws. While this would prove useful for researchers, it could also potentially open departments to criticism if it is discovered that their agency has an elevated suicide rate. Knowing that any data collected by the department can be accessed by the public creates an incentive for departments to not track certain aspects of police work (i.e. suicides or police use of lethal force) (see, e.g., Zimring, 2017). Legally-mandated data collection may be required to overcome such an obstacle (see, e.g., Harmon, 2013).

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) hurdle

Another hurdle to studying suicide, beyond the lack of national reporting, is the ethical and practical challenges that make it difficult for researchers to receive approval for their projects from institutional review boards (IRBs). IRBs are required for any institutions that either directly or indirectly receive funding from the U.S. federal government (“Office for Human Research Protections,” n.d.). Suicidologists Hom, Podlogar, Stanley, and Joiner, Jr. wrote in 2016 that “we have been struck by the challenges that often arise in working with IRBs” (p. 107). They note that suicide research “often necessitates increased IRB scrutiny due to legal concerns...greater potential for adverse events...concerns about high suicide risk participants constituting a vulnerable group and general stigma and lack of understanding about suicide and suicide prevention” (Hom et al., 2016, pp. 107-108). Research shows that “asking questions about suicide is not iatrogenic” and large-n studies of youth and adults (including those at elevated risk for suicide) found that participants “reported no appreciable increase – and in some cases, a decrease – in distress and suicidality after being asked questions about suicide” (Hom et al., 2016, p. 109). Yet “tensions often arise between researchers and IRBs” including “disagreements over whether suicide research can be carried out safely at all” (Hom et al., 2016, p. 109). These tensions, combined with the fact that individual IRBs operate differently and independently from one another, creates “confusion for researchers and [IRB] panel members” (Hom et al., 2016, p. 112). A single institution’s IRB may decide differently on two different suicide projects. For multisite studies, IRBs at different institutions may give conflicting feedback and recommendations, making project approval difficult (Hom et al., 2016, p. 112). These challenges, combined with the insularity of police culture, may deter researchers from studying police suicide in an academic setting. It is much easier to receive approval to ask officers about the external /physical dangers of policing than it is to ask officers about mental health and suicide.

Death benefits for families of LEOs killed in the line of duty

Nowhere is the manifestation of the cultural prioritization of line-of-duty deaths over deaths that occur off-duty (including by suicide) more evident than in the resources available to the families of deceased officers. ODMP publishes guides to assist families of officers employed at both the federal and state levels to understand what assistance is available to them after an officer’s death.

Federal resources

The Public Safety Officers Benefits Act (PSOB) provides a one-time death benefit of around $360,000 to the survivors of federal, state, or local public safety officers whose death was:

- the direct and proximate result of a personal (traumatic) injury sustained in the line of duty (certain fatal, line of duty heart attacks and strokes are also covered). The act also provides a disability benefit to eligible public safety officers who have been permanently and totally
disabled as the direct result of a catastrophic personal injury sustained in the line of duty (“Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program | Benefits.gov,” n.d.).

Officers’ survivors are not eligible if their death was caused by their own misconduct or by suicide (Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc. and the Officer Down Memorial Page, 2010, p. 8). The PSOB also specifically excludes “occupational disease or a condition of the body caused by stress of strain, including psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder” (Szymendera, 2019, pp. 3–4).

If survivors receive PSOB benefits, they also become available for federal funds for educational assistance through the Public Safety Officers Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program. PSOEA support is provided in the form of monthly assistance during full-time higher-education attendance; the monthly payment is currently $1,224 (Szymendera, 2019, p. 1).

Social security benefits are also available to the survivors of officers killed in the line of duty. But, “[a]n intentional and voluntary suicide will not be considered an accidental death,” thereby precluding the families of officers who commit suicide from receiving survivors’ benefits (“C.F.R. §404.335,” n.d.).

Non-profit resources

Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.) is a non-profit that offers programs for survivors of officers killed in the line of duty. These programs include:

- the National Police Survivors’ Conference held each May during National Police Week, scholarships, peer-support at the national, state, and local levels, "C.O.P.S. Kids" counseling reimbursement program, the "C.O.P.S. Kids" Summer Camp, "C.O.P.S. Teens" Outward Bound Adventure for young adults, special retreats for spouses, parents, siblings, adult children, extended family, and co-workers, trial and parole support, and other assistance programs (“Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.),” n.d.).

But, these programs are only available to survivors (including spouses, children, parents, siblings, significant others, and co-workers) who have died “in the line of duty according to Federal government criteria” (“Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.),” n.d.), thereby excluding the families of officers killed off-duty or by suicide.

The National Rifle Association (NRA) offers “$35,000.00 insurance benefit to the widow or survivors of any NRA-member law enforcement officer who is killed in the line of duty. Coverage is automatic for all law enforcement officers who are NRA members” (“Benefits of NRA Club Affiliation,” n.d.). This benefit, too, would be unavailable to the families of officers who die off-duty or by suicide.

State-level resources

C.O.P.S. publishes state-by-state guides for survivors' benefits (“Survivor Benefits,” n.d.). These vary, but the most common benefits are a one-time cash payment (beyond what is available through the federal PSOB program), workers’ compensation, free in-state tuition educational

50Workers’ compensation statutes vary by state, but may sometimes, cover suicide if there is a direct and causal connection between an on-the-job injury and the suicide. See, e.g., https://www.damfirm.com/suicide-covered-workers-compensation/.
benefits (and sometimes scholarships to meet non-tuition costs of attending college), and free funeral and cremation services. Other less common benefits for survivors include property tax credits and exemptions (South Carolina and Georgia) and equine therapy for the children of officers disabled or killed in the line of duty (California). This does not include informal local fundraising efforts after an officer is killed. For example, Adam Jobbers-Millers, was shot and killed in 2018. His community in Fort Myers, Florida:

has continued to rally behind his death in the form of monetary donations, fundraisers, events and mementos for his family or fellow officers so that he will never be forgotten. The community raised more than $175,000, a survey of the events shows (Patel, 2019).

But, again, these benefits are unavailable to the survivors of non-line-of-duty deaths, including suicides.

The story of Sergeant Thomas Connelly is illustrative. Connelly took his own life in October 2017. But before that, he was involved in a number of critical incidents. Connelly was the first on-scene at a traffic accident where a local teacher was struck by a truck while cycling to work. He tried -- and failed -- to resuscitate her. After that were “other bodies, mostly car crashes and overdoses” (Miller, 2018). Then, he was the second officer to arrive to a local high school after a suspect opened fire during prom. The first responding officer had already killed the suspect, but Connelly “raced around the school to see if there was a second shooter” (Miller, 2018). Three months later, he fired his weapon (once) during a standoff with a suspect. He didn’t strike the suspect, but other officers’ shots did, killing the suspect who had pointed a rifle at the officers. It was “the first time in more than a decade that an officer from Connelly’s department had fired their weapon at a suspect” (Miller, 2018). During his tenure with the Langlade County Sheriff’s Department (with 18 sworn officers), Connelly seemed to embrace and embody the normative orders of machismo and adventure. His experiences with armed suspects fit squarely within policing’s danger imperative. But when he killed himself, all of those experiences and that service disappeared, foreclosed in a single gunshot. Connelly’s survivors are ineligible to receive death benefits; his name will not appear on any memorial walls or websites.

Surely, there is a strong and legitimate public policy interest in not incentivizing suicide. But, the stark contrast between the benefits available to the families of officers who die in the line of duty versus those that commit suicide further perpetuates the divide and stigma around suicide; those who suffer are arguably faultless. The family of the officer who served two decades and witnessed numerous traumas before committing suicide receives nothing; the family of the officer who served for two months and was killed in a traffic accident receives hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of monetary benefits, plus the social approbation that comes with C.O.P.S. programs and national memorials. This social approbation includes all of the symbolic ways in which officers killed in the line of duty are honored, including through ritualistic funerals, inscription on state and national memorials, media coverage (Matkin, 2019; Patel, 2019; Shapiro, 2019), and inclusion in survivors’ events (see, e.g., Perkins, 2018).

A January 2016 news story profiled Heidi Rogers, the widow of a Toronto, Canada police officer who killed himself in 2014. Like the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial in Washington, D.C., Toronto officers who die by suicide are not named on the Toronto Police College Memorial Wall. Rogers worked with the Ontario Human Rights Commission to file a claim to the province's Human Rights Tribunal, arguing that “excluding those who died by suicide is discriminatory and stigmatizes officers who suffered from mental illness” (“Widow of cop who died by suicide fights to get his name on memorial wall | CBC News,” 2016). In response, “widows of
some police officers have said they will demand the names of their husbands be removed from the
wall if Sgt. Rogers name is added to it” (“Widow of cop who died by suicide fights to get his name
on memorial wall | CBC News,” 2016). Though from Canada, this highlights the boundary-drawing
that occurs even within the families of fallen officers. Seeking treatment for mental health may
subject the officer himself to social stigma. But if he kills himself, he is not around to suffer from
stigma; instead, his family bears that burden.

The average age of police officer suicide victims in 2017 was reportedly 42 years, with an
average of 16 years on the job (O’Hara, 2018). In 2018, the average age was 41 years, with an
average of 15 years on the job (Lohr, 2019). These suicides are not always caused by work, but
neither are they unrelated to the officers’ work. Suicidal crises:

are most commonly seen in officers with prior histories of depression, or in those who have
recently faced a combination of debilitating stressors, leading to feelings of hopelessness and
helplessness...Like most people, officers commit suicide as a maladaptive response to
intolerable personal, family, and/or work situations they feel they cannot resolve. Unlike
many people, however, cops tend to be very personally invested in their professional role as
law enforcement officers, and therefore react strongly when this image is threatened. In
many cases of suicide, there has been a cumulative effect of several stressors, often involving
a combination of relationship and work problems – the two pillars of self-esteem that most
officers rely on (Miller, 2005, p. 102).

The stigma associated with suicide is nowhere more apparent than in the differential
resources available to the surviving families. Regardless of the role that work stressors may have
played in the officer’s death, suicide is the scarlet letter than forever marks the fallen officer’s family,
precluding them from receiving the material and symbolic resources available to the families of
officers killed in the line of duty.51

Summarizing

In 2018, 106 officers’ lives were cut short by the felonious actions of civilians or accidents
that occurred while they were on duty (such as motor vehicle accidents). Sierra-Arévalo (2016) notes
that, “[d]ichotomizing the deaths of police officers into ‘felonious’ and ‘accidental’ obscures the fact
that these deaths are inexorably linked in ways that cut across time and place” (p. 37); here, he is
focused on the way that the danger imperative in policing amplifies the risk of felonious deaths and
attenuates deaths from accidents. But, missing from the danger imperative are not only risks from
accident, but the risk of suicide, which for officers is statistically more likely than being killed by
either a civilian or in an accident. Dichotomizing dangers into physical dangers from external
sources (of which there is ample data collection) and self-inflicted (of which there is no national data
collection) also obscures the fact that on-duty deaths and suicides are also inexorably linked in ways
that cut across time and place.

---

51 Some officers who kill themselves are memorialized in ways reminiscent of those killed in the line of duty, but this
appears to be the exception, rather than the rule. On such example is Deputy Chief Steven Silks of the NYPD, who took
his life in June 2019, just days before he faced mandatory retirement upon turning 63. Media accounts note that “[h]is
fellow officers gave him a sprawling, honor-guard funeral...Lines of white-gloved officers in dress uniform saluted his
coffin in the street. Bagpipes played ‘Amazing Grace.’ A single police helicopter flew over” (Wilson, 2019).
In the next section, I discuss national data collection efforts -- and impediments to such efforts -- regarding police officer mental health.

Mental health

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, police are said to experience, on average, 188 critical incidents over the course of their careers (Heyman et al., 2018). These critical incidents include officer-involved shootings, the death of a coworker, serious injury while on duty, life-threatening incidents, hostage situations or negotiations, exposure to intense crime scenes, a police suicide, or any situation that falls outside the realm of normal experience (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25). These incidents are associated with a higher likelihood of suffering from PTSD and alcohol abuse (Chopko et al., 2015; Komarovskaya et al., 2011; Ménard & Arter, 2013). Approximately 35% of police officers suffer from PTSD, as opposed to 6.8% of the general population (Austin-Ketch et al., 2012). Between 9 and 31% of police suffer from depression (Heyman, 2019; see also Wang et al. 2010; Darenburg et al., 2006).

What is known about officer mental health, including the studies cited above, is the result of research involving various samples of officers ranging from single departments (Darenburg et al., 2010, who studied Buffalo, NY officers) to national surveys of thousands of officers (Fraternal Order of Police, 2019). As with suicide, there is no national data collection of police officer mental health.

Normative order of law

The normative order of law is relevant for data collection practices on police mental health. Herbert (1998) explains that “the law fundamentally structures police action. After all, basic police responsibilities and powers are defined by the law” (p. 352). Harmon (2013) explains how the law is relevant for data collection in policing:

Though officers will collect information when police chiefs and local governments require them to do so, they will collect only that information and only in the form mandated. Moreover, that information will only become public when chiefs or local governments make it so (in the absence of state or federal law) (p. 1129).

As I discovered in my study of CPD, workers’ compensation laws influence what data are collected about the hazards of policing. These laws dictate what injuries are considered “compensable.” There are roughly 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country. It is unlikely that CPD is the only one that relies on its workers’ compensation administrator to track departmental injuries. When I submitted an open records request to CPD for officer injuries, they provided me a spreadsheet created and maintained by their third-party administrator of workers’ compensation insurance. Thus, the only injuries made visible to me -- and included in this study -- were those deemed compensable under the state laws governing CPD. Any injury not deemed compensable under the workers’ compensation statute remained invisible to me.

This raises the question: what injuries are compensable? States generally distinguish between “physical” injuries, “physical/mental” injuries, and “mental/mental” injuries. Physical injuries are self-explanatory; these are injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment including cumulative trauma disorders (such as carpal tunnel). Physical/mental injuries are mental
injuries linked to and caused by physical injury. Mental-mental injuries are those mental disorders, illnesses, or injuries that are not proximately caused by a physical injury to the body. Some states (e.g., Colorado) also consider “mental/physical” injuries, which is when a “psychological stimulus [causes] physical injury” (“Colorado Workers’ Compensation Claim Handling Guidelines,” 2018).

While physical injuries suffered in the line of duty are compensable in all states, other coverage varies. The following table summarizes coverage across states:

Table 7.2: Number of states (plus Washington, D.C.), by workers’ compensation coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covered?</th>
<th>Mental/Mental Injuries</th>
<th>Physical/Mental Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As presented in the table above, 14 states do not consider compensable “mental/mental” injuries, which are those mental illnesses or injuries not caused by a physical injury (i.e., PTSD caused by killing a civilian or witnessing a gruesome murder scene). In contrast, 20 states do consider “mental/mental” injuries to be compensable. For example, the California statute says that “[a] psychiatric injury may be compensable if it is a mental disorder arising out of the actual events of the employment which causes disability or need for medical treatment” (Cal. Lab. Code §3208.3). A specific example of such coverage comes out of Indiana. In Indiana State Police v. Wiessing (2005), the Indiana Court of Appeals found that an officer’s suicide was compensable because it was the result of PTSD the officer suffered after shooting and killing a motorist who tried to take his gun. The court reasoned that:

[D]ecedent, Indiana State Police Trooper James A. Wiessing, sustained personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with [the Indiana State Police], the injury so sustained was that of post-traumatic stress disorder...Because Trooper Wiessing’s suicide resulted from this condition, it is not considered to be a self-inflicted injury (Indiana State Police v. James Wiessing, 2005).

Another 17 states only allow mental/mental injuries to be covered in certain circumstances, such as when the injury arose out of an “unusual or extraordinary condition” of employment. The South Carolina Supreme Court case of Bentley v. Spartanburg County (2012) is illustrative here. Brandon Bentley was a deputy sheriff with the Spartanburg County, SC Sheriff’s Department. He developed PTSD after he shot and killed a suspect who attempted to assault him. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that his PTSD was not a compensable injury, because using lethal force was not an “unusual or extraordinary condition” of being a law enforcement officer:

The use of deadly force is within the normal scope and duties of a Spartanburg County deputy sheriff. Claimant himself, upon direct questioning, confirmed that he knew that he would sometimes be required to use deadly force in his job (Brandon Bentley v. Spartanburg County, and S.C. Association of Counties SIF, 2012).
This variation in state workers’ compensation laws has significant implications. First, of course, is the fact that officers living in the 14 states that do not cover “mental/mental” illness or injury are generally unable to seek reimbursement for treatment for mental health treatment. Other researchers have demonstrated, and my data from CPD and MPD supports the finding, that line-of-duty injuries are exceptionally rare, especially those caused by civilian violence. Yet these injuries are far from the only stressors of police work. Critical incidents include many situations in which an officer is not herself injured but still can be traumatized, such as responding to a child abuse or suicide call. State laws that only cover “mental/mental” injuries if the injury arose out of an “unusual or extraordinary condition” of employment likewise preclude many officers from being reimbursed for mental health treatment, given the high bar that states like South Carolina have established for what constitutes “unusual” or “extraordinary” police work. Failure to cover treatment for mental illness, including PTSD and suicide caused by mental illness, means that fewer officers will seek treatment (see, e.g., Karaffa, 2012). The lack of affordable mental health treatment was cited by the Texas officers that Karaffa (2012) surveyed as one of the factors that would improve mental health service utilization.

Another implication of state-level variance in workers’ compensation is the difficulty in researching mental illness and the associated invisibility of mental illnesses not covered by workers’ compensation. As I discussed above, open records laws only require disclosure of information that is already maintained by government agencies. If state workers’ compensation laws do not consider mental illness to be compensable, then such injuries will remain invisible in workers’ compensation datasets. This helps explain why, in the nine-year sample of CPD injuries I was provided, there was not a single mental illness or injury for a police officer. This absence does not mean that CPD officers enjoy superhuman mental fortitude or that they do not face the same critical incidents as officers elsewhere; instead, it means that any struggles with mental illness were made invisible to me. Studies like mine, and others that rely on injury data provided to researchers from police departments (Brandl & Stroshine, 2012), may actually perpetuate stigma around mental health by insinuating that the officers in the departments under study do not experience mental injuries.

Recent legislation

Along with the increasing attention from police leadership nationally on the problem of police officer suicide, there has also been recent national legislation aimed at law enforcement mental health.

H.R. 2228: Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act of 2017

This bipartisan bill was signed into law on January 10, 2018. It directs the Department of Justice (DOJ) to report on Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) mental health services and practices that could be adopted by state and local agencies. It amends the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to expand the permissible use of grant funds under the Community Oriented Policing Services program to include the establishment of peer mentoring pilot programs at the state and local level. It also directs the Attorney General to develop resources to educate mental health providers about police culture and the evidence-based therapies to treat officers. It also directs the Director of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to prepare a report containing case studies of different agencies’ psychological health programming. This report, titled Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Programs: Eleven Studies, was published in the spring of 2019; the case study sites were selected based on nominations the
authors requested for best practices in law enforcement mental health and wellness programs. The report notes that:

All of the case study sites take a holistic approach to officer, staff, and family mental health and wellness. They do not separate mental health from a broader continuum of care and services that are closely tied to and impacted by the following: fitness, nutrition, medical care, sleep, healthy relationships, financial stability, substance abuse, self-care, peer support, early warning systems, how disciplinary procedures are handled, and character and moral development.

Even among these 11 “best practices” departments, however, only five -- less than half -- have recurring mental health checks (Copple et al., 2019, p. 5).

S. 998: Supporting and Treating Officers in Crisis (STOIC) Act of 2019

In line with growing attention from policing organizations to issues of mental health and suicide, President Donald Trump signed S. 998 into law on Thursday, July 25, 2019. The Act, called “Supporting and Treating Officers in Crisis Act of 2019,” amends the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 “to expand support for police officer family services, stress reduction, and suicide prevention, and for other purposes” (S.998 - 116th Congress (2019-2020), 2019). The Act reauthorizes $7,500,000 in grant funding each fiscal year through 2024, and will allow recipient agencies to use their grants for suicide prevention in addition to family support services.

There is increasing top-down support for suicide and mental health training and intervention, coming from both the federal government, state governments52, and national police organizations like PERF and IACP (whose suicide symposia and consortia were discussed above). The apparent goal from these efforts is that both funding and de-stigmatization will trickle-down to the departmental level and change the culture and lived experience of police officers across America. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent such efforts will be effective, especially in smaller departments. Though 49% of police departments in the United States employ fewer than 10 full-time officers (Violanti et al., 2012, p. 2), very little police suicide or mental health research focuses on these departments (Violanti et al., 2012, p. 2). There is evidence that small departments face unique challenges. Small-town officers may be the only officer on duty during a given shift, meaning they face danger without the possibility of backup (Lindsey & Kelley, 2004). Further, their families come under scrutiny because the majority of citizens in their jurisdiction know them (Lindsey & Kelly, 2004), which also means that officers are more likely to personally identify with those involved in traumatic incidents or serious crimes, thereby intensifying the officers’ psychological damage (Violanti et al., 2012, p. 2). There is also evidence that attrition is higher at smaller as opposed to larger departments (Yearwood & Freeman, 2004). The same interventions that work in larger jurisdictions, such as those profiled in the 2019 COPS report case studies, may not work, or may not work as well, in smaller departments.

H.R. 3735: Law Enforcement Suicide Data Collection Act

This proposed bill, which (as of August 16, 2019) is in the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security) would create a Law Enforcement Officers Suicide Data Collection Program, “under which law enforcement agencies may submit to the Director [of the FBI] information on suicides and attempted suicides within such law enforcement agencies, including information on— (1) the circumstances and events that occurred before each suicide or attempted suicide; (2) the location of each suicide or attempted suicide; (3) the demographic information of each law enforcement officer who commits or attempts suicide; and (4) the method used in each suicide or attempted suicide.” This data would then be published annually on the FBI’s website. Even if this bill becomes law, however, the voluntary nature of reporting (“agencies may submit to the Director information on suicides and attempted suicides…”) will likely result in low levels of participation, unless and until certain normative orders (i.e. bureaucratic control or safety) can overcome the overwhelming power of the culture of machismo that still dominates law enforcement.

Conclusion

The risks of mental illness and injury and suicide are socially attenuated in police culture. This is reflected in data collection practices: there are no good national databases on these dangers of policing, despite considerable evidence that they pose a graver threat to officers than civilian assault.

Critical data studies offers a normative prescription to counteract the power relationships inherent in and often made invisible by hegemonic data collection practices. This comes in the form of “data activism” (Milan & van der Velden, 2016) and occurs when “individuals actively interrogate data and their relation to it” (Milan & van der Velden, 2016, p. 3). Data activism involves empowering those whom existing data assemblages may disempower (Milan & van der Velden, 2016, p. 4).

This chapter showed the efforts by the nonprofit Blue H.E.L.P. to engage in a form of data activism by collecting information on police suicides, which are currently omitted from the major national databases of police officer fatalities. Yet these efforts to interrogate the prominent FBI data on police injuries and fatalities still reflect the normative orders of those involved, who are overwhelmingly policing insiders. I demonstrated that while Blue H.E.L.P. attempts to bring attention to the problem of police suicide, they may actually help perpetuate the stigma around suicide by continuing to anonymize those whose suicides they document.
Chapter 8: Theoretical implications and conclusion

Policing is a dangerous occupation, but the sources of this danger are much broader than police culture – especially police culture throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries – would have one think.

Dave Korus, a retired police commander from St. Paul, Minnesota, gave the eulogy at the funeral of Tom Connelly. Connelly is the officer from a small Wisconsin department who committed suicide in 2017. Korus, in an interview after the funeral, explained:

The gift that Tom gave us is to understand that these things are secondary damage to the events that he was involved in. So it's not like it's an in-the-line-of-duty death where he was shot by a bank robber. It was more like he carries this weight around, and finally, it came to a point where he couldn't handle it anymore, so he took his own life. So you have to look at that as that is the level of public service, that he was willing to give his heart that deeply to a community, that it was so brutal for him that he took his own life. And what it gives us, and it gave that police department, is to say the word out loud — say the word 'suicide' (Young & Raphelson, 2019).

The literal and symbolic difficulty that departments have with saying “suicide” out loud is reflected in historical data collection practices on the dangers of policing, which focus disproportionately on civilian assault. This dissertation has attempted to unpack policing data by understanding them as reflective and constitutive of a police culture defined by the “danger imperative.” The danger imperative is a “preoccupation with violence and demand for officer safety...a cultural frame that orients police officers’ perception and behavior” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, pp. 3-4). This imperative “underlies and unifies” the various normative orders of policing proposed by Herbert (1998). Herbert’s orders -- law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo, safety, competence, and morality -- are present in the way that officers engage in their day to day work. Different combinations of these orders are present to varying degrees in different departments, but in all cases, these orders are filtered through a cultural preoccupation with violence from civilians.

A new normative order in policing: officer as victim

I embrace Sierra-Arévalo’s danger imperative but propose that Herbert may have missed one important normative order that also influences police work and, by extension, data collection in by and about law enforcement. The additional order I propose is that of “officer as victim.” The normative order of adventure/machismo encourages officers to “rush into dangerous situations” and “demonstrate their courage and bravery” (Herbert, 1998, p. 356). The normative order of officer as victim as the corollary to that of adventure/machismo: officers do put themselves into danger and are sometimes the victims of physical, cognitive, behavioral and emotional harms from their work. The danger imperative magnifies the physical harms, especially those caused by civilians, and attenuates other harms.

In chapter 4, I explored the early history of the IACP, now the preeminent professional association for police leaders. I demonstrated how from its earliest days of existence, annual meeting
notes reflected the officers’ perceived and proclaimed victimhood. Officers reveal an expectation that civilians recognize and appreciate their sacrifices. When they do not receive such recognition, they feel undervalued and unappreciated. The physical dangers of police work are amplified within the police subculture, and the normative order of officer as victim relates to the frustration that occurs when officers learn that this amplification of physical danger is not shared by those outside the law enforcement community.

Risk, culture, and polarization between police and civilians

This disparity presents a new direction for research in risk and culture. There is rich scholarship demonstrating the social construction of risk, dating back to Douglas (1966 & 1978) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1983). This dissertation has shown that there may be another understudied phenomenon that occurs in conjunction with the social amplification of certain risks: the exacerbation of insider/outsider tensions when ‘outsiders’ fail to give the same level of appreciation to certain risks as ‘insiders.’ The amplification of risks (Kasperson et al., 1988) not only dramatically highlights certain events (such as civilian assault in policing), but it also can reinforce boundaries surrounding those within the culture responsible for the amplification. Those who do not amplify the same risks are normatively-denigrated ‘others.’ This is visible in the way that officers consistently report, even from the earliest days of the IACP, that the public does not sufficiently appreciate their efforts or sacrifices. The social polarization that can occur when an in-group amplifies certain risks more than an out-group is widely visible in modern American society, not just in policing. For example, liberals decry the risks from human-caused climate change (McCright, 2010) while some conservatives actively engage in a “denial countermovement,” and global warming views are an important driver of political partisan polarization (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016).

A gap between police culture and behavioral realities of police culture

One of the most fundamental themes in law and society literature is the gap between the “law on the books” and the “law in action” (see, e.g., Abel, 2010; Levi & Valverde, 2008). These ‘gap studies’ explore how “legal doctrine (over which lawyers claimed exclusive mastery) could not adequately explain the behavior of either legal institutions or those the law purported to regulate” (Abel, 2010, p. 5). A similar gap appears in policing, but this is a gap between the dangers of policing as dictated by police culture, versus the dangers of policing reflected empirically in studies of what actually injures police.

I presented injury data from Community Police Department (CPD) for the years 2010 through 2018. My findings aligned closely with those of Brandl and Stroshine (2012) who found that in a sample of Milwaukee Police Department injuries, only 10% were caused by civilian assault. Similarly, I found that 10.9% of all CPD injuries were caused by the volitional acts of suspects.

I also presented data on assaults of police during the years 2015-2018 for Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), and demonstrated that although there were 416 assaults on officers during my four-year sample, not a single one resulted in the serious injury of an MPD officer. Three officers were shot by civilians in CPD during the years 2010-2018; two officers were shot in a single incident; a third was shot in a second incident. There were no officers killed by suspects in CPD or
MPD in the years in my sample. While I was writing this dissertation, however, a CPD officer was shot and killed for the first time in 30 years. Serious injuries and killings of officers caused by civilians do happen, but they are extraordinarily rare.

Despite the rarity of serious injuries and fatalities to officers, the potential for violence for civilians continues to orient officers’ perceptions and behavior. Sierra-Arévalo (2016) coined the term “danger imperative” to describe this cultural frame. This frame “is built and maintained by information that comes to police from within and outside the police department, be it through the news and social media, or academy instructors, fellow officers, superiors, and officers’ own experience” (Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, p. 14). The killing or serious wounding of an officer by a civilian causes ripple effects which amplify the risks that officers face from civilian violence (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). Kasperson and Kasperson (1996) note that:

The consequences of risk and risk events, then, often go well beyond the direct physical harm to human beings … to include more indirect effects on the economy, social institutions, and well-being associated with amplification-driven impact (p. 99).

So it is in police culture. Statistically rare instances of severe violence from civilians are socially amplified and result in a reification of the danger imperative, which already predisposes officers to be more fearful of certain dangers than others. This culture then shapes the data that is collected about those in that culture, creating knowledge that then reinforces and perpetuates the danger imperative.

Historical data collection practices and the danger imperative

I showed that the history of data collection on the dangers of policing confirms Sierra-Arévalo’s proposition of the powerful and driving force that is the danger imperative in policing. Police interest groups such as the IACP advocated strongly for the collection of national data on officer killings, arguing that the public did not appreciate the danger of their jobs. Policing insiders cooperated with and encouraged the FBI to collect the data that would become the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) dataset.

Other data collection on the dangers of policing, including the Officer Down Memorial Page (OMPD) and the National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund (NLEOMF) also focus on the physical hazards of police work, memorializing only those officers who are killed in the line of duty. Mario Biaggi – a NYPD officer turned Congressman who founded NLEOMF – once testified before Congress to encourage the passage of a law that would provide financial support for the families of officers killed in the line of duty. Biaggi claimed:

These men are on the front lines of our domestic war – a war whose casualty rate has increased astronomically during the last few years. Without a doubt, the criminal element has declared an open season on policemen. We have long provided benefits for the widows of veterans who have fought wars on foreign soil. We can do no less for the families of men who have laid down their lives protecting the institutions of freedom and liberty here at home. The peril on the domestic front is far greater today than ever before. Let us give courage to the men and families that are one the front lines of that war (U.S. Senate, 1971, p. 19966).
Biaggi’s equation of American policing with war-fighting and police officers with soldiers is an enduring feature of the danger imperative, and data collection reflects this. Rich data are available on every officer who dies by civilian assault as well as officers who die in the line of duty by accident (i.e. traffic accidents, drowning, falling, or suffering a heart attack from job-related exertion).

Suicide and mental illness: the unquantified dangers of policing

Many of the dangers of policing are invisible – untracked and uncounted within the national databases. More officers die each year by suicide than by accident or assault combined, yet there is no mandatory reporting and no national data collection of officer suicides. Similarly, while LEOKA reports on officers injured as a result of civilian assault, there is no national data collection on mental health injuries or illnesses. My study of CPD and MPD confirms this. I asked both departments to provide me injury data for injuries from all causes. CPD provided me a workers’ compensation dataset that did not contain a single mental-health illness or injury for sworn officers in the years 2010-2018. MPD only provided me data on assaults on officers, despite the fact that this is not what I requested.

Line-of-duty fatalities and injuries from assault are quantified; mental illness and suicide are not. Data collection is co-constitutive with police culture; data collection practices are informed by the danger imperative, but in turn create knowledge that reinforces the danger imperative.

Unifying the problematic public-private divide in the lives of officers

There is a stark public-private divide in the data that is collected on the dangers of policing. The “public” life of the officer, including the physical hazards she faces in that public life, are well-documented and well-studied. For those concerned with police as agents of the state, there is an important distinction between officers on the clock, in uniform, and armed with the state’s coercive authority in the form of her service weapon(s), versus the off-duty officer. On duty, the officer is an embodiment of the coercive power of the state. Off-duty, she becomes just another civilian. Physical injuries and fatalities that occur in the line of duty, when the officer is publicly acting in her capacity as an agent of the government, are well tracked. Injuries that occur off-duty are left invisible in the national databases. Of course, this makes sense for injuries sustained off-duty that have nothing to do with the officer’s job: a car accident during a weekend trip, a laceration while prepping dinner, a pulled hamstring from a rec soccer game, etc. But in other instances, this public-private divide in data collection is more problematic.

53 As I discussed in Chapter 7, the non-profit Blue H.E.L.P. does attempt to publish suicide numbers based on web scraping and voluntary reports, but their numbers are only a low estimate. Many deaths are not reported in the media or by the officers’ families, given the stigma associated with suicide. Plus, some officers’ suicides are not officially listed as such on the death certificate, instead noting that the cause of death was ‘undetermined.’ Officers responding to the scene of a fellow officers’ suicide can easily control information to protect the family from the stigma associated with suicide (Violanti et al., 2010).
However, this project points to a need to recognize the intertwining of officers’ time spent on and off duty. While we can theoretically bifurcate their lives into “on the clock” and therefore ‘state agents,’ on the one hand, and “off the clock” on the other, it is unlikely that the officers experience their own lives in quite this way. Mental health and suicide are “off the clock” hazards: 90% of suicides occur off-duty (Violanti, 2012), and the harms of mental illness do not just manifest while the officer is working. In fact, social-psychological research on homegrown stereotypes and pluralistic ignorance shows that officers either intentionally or subconsciously mask the symptoms of struggles they may be having while at work, in order to continue to present a calm and put-together face to their peers (Prentice & Miller, 2002; Halbesleben, Wheeler, & Buckley, 2006).

Suicide and mental illness may be harms that manifest off-duty, but that does not mean they are unrelated to police work and undeserving of inclusion in data-collection efforts. After all, those suffering from mental illness – even if they are able to mask their symptoms in certain situations – are the same individuals who, while on duty, police our citizens, and in whom we continue to invest the monopoly of the state’s coercive force. This means we should care more. One way we can show we care is to put more effort into counting even those harms that happen to off-duty officers. We cannot expect the public lives of police to be reformed if we continue to divide their lives into public and private spheres and continue to omit from study those hazards of policing that are most prevalent in the “private sphere” but still intimately related to how officers understand their jobs, experience their lives, and respond to civilians.

Guardian policing mindset may not be the solution

Some police reformers are advocating for a movement away from a warrior mindset toward a guardian policing mentality (Rahr & Rice, 2015; Stoughton, 2016). But, this may not solve policing’s problems. The guardian’s focus on keeping civilians safe from harm still denies the self of the officer. Can we really expect officers to subject themselves to repeated trauma (physical, cognitive, or emotional) as guardians of the public, without suffering deleterious mental consequences? The selflessness in service of the public is ideal in theory, but fails to address the consequences to officers who are repeatedly exposed to critical incidents – on average, 188 over their careers (Heyman et al., 2018). Police reformers must take into account the broad harms of policing. These include not only physical injury, but also “stress responses and the symptoms resulting from such incidents,” which can be:

Cognitive (confusion, difficult concentrating, or intrusive thoughts), physical (fatigue, headaches, or changes in appetite or sleep patterns), behavioral (withdrawal, acting out, or substance use), or emotional (anxiety or fear, depression, anger or guilt, or feelings of helplessness) (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25).

Harmon (2013) advocates for “harm-efficient” policing which she explains is “policing that imposes harms only when, all things considered, the benefits for law, order, fear reduction, and officer safety outweigh the costs of those harms” (p. 792). This view seeks to minimize harms to civilians and takes into account physical safety of officers, without fully acknowledging the non-physical harms imposed on officers by their jobs.
Progress and reform

There is momentum within the law enforcement community to recognize and intervene to reduce police officer suicide. This momentum is evident in a 2017 IACP report and a 2019 symposium dedicated to the topic. Hopefully, data collection practices will soon reflect this increased recognition of the problem of police suicide and the wider problem of mental health. Department policies and police culture discourage reporting and seeking help for mental health treatment. I introduced survey responses and media accounts in Chapter 7 showing that officers fear being demoted, losing promotions, or being stripped of their guns if they seek mental health treatment. They also worry about the competence of mental health professionals who have never been cops and the cost of treatment that is not covered by their departments.

True reform will take acknowledgement from all levels of police organizations that failure to acknowledge mental health issues does not mean they do not exist, and does not make law enforcement personnel or the civilians they encounter any safer. Until officers can seek help without fearing they will be stripped of their authority, considerable underreporting and under-treatment will continue to exist.

Herbert's (1998) normative orders of policing can help explain why the ‘trickle-down’ effect of police leadership paying more attention to suicides may not work to change police culture. Recent efforts to shed light on the problem of police suicide, in the form of conferences well-attended by police leaders and experts, reflect only one normative order – that of bureaucratic control. Suggested policy changes that come out of such gatherings will be top-down. Given the well-documented antagonism between “management cops” and “street cops” (Reuss-Ianni, 1983), policies directed at mental health treatment and suicide intervention may be perceived by patrol-level officers as just another instance of “excessive scrutiny” by “watchful administrators” (Paoline, 2003, p. 201). Those interested in changing police culture should keep in mind the other normative orders that organize the lives of law enforcement, especially that of machismo/adventure. This normative order cannot be changed by top-down directives alone, as demonstrated by social-psychological research on homegrown stereotypes and pluralistic ignorance. These phenomena happen at the level of the individual officer and during interactions between officers and their peers. Interventions and culture change must occur at multiple levels -- individual officers, the departments in which they work, and national systems of data collection.

The normative order of law is also important here. As Harmon (2013) noted, police officers will collect data when – and only when – they are required to do so (p. 1129). This is especially true for data that may be critical of police (i.e. use of force) rather than exculpatory of police (assaults on cops) (Zimring, 2017). Laws mandating reporting when sworn law enforcement officers commit suicide, even if that suicide occurs off-duty, are an important step forward. Personally identifying information could be removed from such a database, but having reliable national numbers would provide an important starting place for the improved study of police officer suicide.

Training academies should spend more time teaching officers about the various stressors of their jobs and the statistical likelihood of various potential harms and injuries, including mental illness and suicide. For example, the state in which MPD is located includes only three instructional hours in its training academies on the potential stressors of police work and effective mechanisms for dealing with stress. Officers in MPD receive eight times as much instruction on the physical
dangers of policing: 24 hours of training are dedicated to “officer survival” to “lessen the likelihood of serious injury or death to a peace officer.”

Officers should have access to free and confidential hotline that connects them with therapists who are familiar with the law enforcement profession. The therapists working this hotline should preferably have law enforcement experience and must be prepared with referrals to local therapists who are also familiar with law enforcement culture. Currently, many departments (including CPD and MPD) only provide their officers with the same employee assistance program (EAP) helpline as other city employees. Karaffa’s (2012) research on attitudes toward seeking mental health treatment provides rich insight into the changes that departments can make to incentivize the utilization of mental health resources.

Ideally, we should try to align incentives for data collection so that “the public, municipal policy makers, state police standards and training boards, state legislatures, the federal judiciary, and Congress” as well as police departments have an interest in collecting the same data (Harmon, 2013, p. 1145).

Policing is simultaneously less and more dangerous than police culture would have us believe. Officers are well-trained to avoid physical dangers from civilians. The danger imperative orients police officers’ professional lives before, during, and after the training academy. But empirical studies, including mine, show that most line of duty injuries are not caused by civilian assault. The vast majority of injuries that are caused by civilians are minor, caused by “bodily weapons” (i.e. hand and feet), not deadly weapons like guns and knives. Whereas police culture amplifies the risk posed by armed civilians, it also attenuates the risks from other critical incidents that have nothing to do with dangerous civilians, such as responding to gruesome car accidents or documenting repeated child abuse. Police culture focuses disproportionately on dangers associated with the law enforcement function. Yet there are two other major functions that officers are expected to perform in society: order maintenance and service (Brown, 1988; Rumbaut & Bittner, 1979; Wilson, 1978). These other functions carry less of a risk of civilian assault than the law enforcement role, but can still expose officers to critical incidents that cause traumas that compound over time (Cross & Ashley, 2004, p. 25).

Data collection in policing mirrors a police culture preoccupied with the danger of civilian assault and helps to reinforce that preoccupation. Interrupting the powerful danger imperative in policing so that police culture more accurately reflects the empirical dangers that officers face will require change at all levels – individual officers, interactions between officers and their superiors, and structural and systemic change. Data collection on the dangers of police culture does not exist outside of that culture; it is constitutive with it. Understanding this is a necessary first step before academics, policing professionals, and rank-and-file officers can work together to change the data assemblages that produce knowledge about policing.

---

54 Citations omitted to preserve anonymity.
References


About ODMP. (n.d.). Retrieved August 8, 2019, from The Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP) website: https://www.odmp.org/info/about-odmp


Appropriations Bill. (1928).


*Brandon Bentley v. Spartanburg County, and S.C. Association of Counties SIF,* No. 27140 (Supreme Court of South Carolina July 11, 2012).


California Labor Code, §§ 3208.3 §.


Criteria for Inclusion. (n.d.-a). Retrieved August 8, 2019, from The Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP) website: https://www.odmp.org/info/criteria-for-inclusion


Indiana State Police v. James Wiessing. , 836 N.E.2d 1038 (Court of Appeals of Indiana 2005).


Investigation of the Charges Against Chief of Police McDonough. (1873, September 1). Chicago Daily Tribune.


Report of the Committee on Organization. (n.d.).


Richman, D. C., & Seo, S. (2019b). Mobility, Criminal Information, and the FBI - 1908 to 1941 and Beyond.


St. Louis’ Police. (1881, March 7). *Chicago Daily Tribune.*


*Symposium on Suicide by Members of Law Enforcement.* (2019, April). Presented at the NYPD Headquarters. NYPD Headquarters.


The Chief of Police Being Investigated—His Dismissal Probable. (1873, August 30). Chicago Daily Tribune.


To Create a National Police Bureau; To Create a Bureau of Criminal Investigation, § Committee on the Judiciary (1924).


U.S. Senate. (1902). *Congressional Record*.

U.S. Senate. (1971). *Congressional Record*.


Verdict of “Not Guilty” in the Case of Chief of Police McDonough. (1873, November 13). *Chicago Daily Tribune*.


Appendices
Appendix 1: NLEOMF Officer Data Form

AGENCY INFORMATION

NAME of AGENCY HEAD: ____________________________________________

SUBMITTING AGENCY: ____________________________________________

OFFICER AGENCY: ________________________________________________

MAILING ADDRESS: _____________________________________________
City: __________________ State ______ Zip ______

PHONE _______________ FAX _______________ CONTACT PERSON ______

CONTACT PERSON PHONE & E-MAIL ADDRESS ____________________________

PERSONAL DATA ON DECEDED OFFICER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST NAME:</th>
<th>MIDDLE NAME:</th>
<th>SURNAME (INCLUDING SUFFIX, IF APPLICABLE):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

RANK
WAS DECEDED A DUTY SWORN OFFICER OR WITH FULL ARREST POWERS?
TITLE: _______________ □ YES □ NO □ OTHER EXPLAIN: _____________________


WAS OFFICER CERTIFIED/LICENSED BY STATE, BY P.O.S.T. (Police Officer Standards Training), OR BY A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMY? □ YES □ NO

LENGTH OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICE: _____________________________

MARITAL STATUS: □ SINGLE □ MARRIED □ DIVORCED □ WIDOWED □ UNKNOWN □ OF CHILDREN: ______

RACE: □ ASIAN □ AFRICAN-AMERICAN □ CAUCASIAN □ HISPANIC □ NATIVE AMERICAN □ OTHER □ UNKNOWN

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFICER’S DEATH

WAS OFFICER ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT? □ YES □ NO □ UNKNOWN

THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS: □ FELONIOUS ASSAULT □ ACCIDENTAL SITUATION

WAS OFFENDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF: □ ALCOHOL □ NARCOTICS □ BOTH □ UNKNOWN □ NOT APPLICABLE

WAS THIS A TASK FORCE OPERATION? □ YES □ NO □ UNKNOWN □ NOT APPLICABLE

NLEOMF MEMORIAL RESEARCH

901 E Street, NW | Suite 100 | Washington, DC 20004-2025 | (202) 737-3400 phone (202) 737-3405 fax
www.nleomf.org website | research@nleomf.org email

PAGE 1
Appendix 1: NLEOMF Officer Data Form

Please check the scenario that best describes the action that initiated the fatal incident:

- Officer was dispatched following a call to 911, an emergency communications call center or police station. If so, include a complete copy of the CAD sheet, Call Sheet, or Dispatch Data Sheet showing all the call information.
- Officer was responding to a call for assistance from another officer.
- Officer was on a self-initiated activity, such as a vehicle stop or pedestrian stop.
- Officer was responding to a call for assistance from another officer.
- Officer was engaged in a tactical operation (search warrant, buy/bust, barricade).
- Officer was flagged down or otherwise spontaneously contacted by a citizen.
- Officer was on an administrative assignment (in transit to event or training).
- Other, please describe ____________________________

(A) Check the type of call or activity that the officer was responding to:

- Assault call (fights, threats, or assaults with weapons)
- Burglary in progress call or pursuing burglary suspect
- Disturbance calls (disorderly persons, loud noise, traffic complaint, etc.)
- Domestic disturbance/violence calls (family fights, custody dispute, stalking, etc.)
- Drug related (possession, transporting, distribution, production)
- Emergency call/Search and rescue
- Investigate the trouble or suspicious person call
- Mentally ill or emotionally disturbed person call
- Officer in trouble call
- Robbery in progress call or pursuing robbery suspect
- Shots fired call
- Theft or fraud call (Shoplifting, theft of property, credit card fraud)
- Traffic enforcement (Stop, Check Point, running radar)
- Traffic crash (vehicle crash or pedestrian struck)

(B) Check the box that best describes the circumstances involved in the death:

- Ambush (premeditated, unexpected assault while concealed or by calculated advantage)
- Attempting to place under arrest (foot chase or searching for suspect)
- Civil disorder (mass demonstration or riot, etc.)
- Handling, transporting, custody of prisoners.
- Investigative activity (questioning suspects, taking report, interviewing witnesses)
- Tactical situation (felony stop, barricade, executing search warrant, hostage)
- Vehicular pursuit (collision, intentionally struck, placing stop sticks)
- Inadvertent shooting (crossfire, mistaken for offender, training mishap, etc.)
- Automobile crash (collision with another motor vehicle)
- Single automobile crash (vehicle left roadway or struck fixed object)
- Motorcycle crash (collision with another motor vehicle)
- Single motorcycle crash (motorcycle left roadway, skidded or struck fixed object)
- Struck by vehicle
- Aircraft accident
- Training
- Other cause (Fall, drowning, fire, etc. (specify) ____________________________
- 9-11 related illness
- Job related illness, (e.g. stress induced heart attack) ____________________________

What was the approximate distance between the decedent officer and the offender(s)?

- 0-5 feet
- 6-10 feet
- 11-20 feet
- 21-50 feet
- Greater than 50 feet
- N/A

If this case involved a traffic collision, was it a violation of the “Move Over” law?

- Yes
- No
Appendix 1: NLEOMF Officer Data Form

Weapon used against the Officer:

☐ Firearm (check one):  ☐ Handgun  ☐ Rifle  ☐ Shotgun  ☐ Officer’s own weapon
☐ Armor-piercing ammunition
☐ Bomb
☐ Vehicle
☐ Personal weapons (hands, fists, feet, etc.)  ☐ Other
(specify): ____________________________  (specify): ____________________________

Involvement of other Officers:

☐ DECEASED (officer(s) killed in same incident)  ☐ WOUNDED (officer(s) wounded in same incident)

________________________________________________ [identify officer(s)]

SPECIAL SQUAD

1. Drug: Drug Team Member ___  4. K-9: K-9 Officer ___
2. ERT: Emergency Response Team ___  5. SWAT: SWAT Team Member ___
3. GTF: Gang Task Force ___

Was Decedent wearing body armor?  ☐ No  ☐ Yes: hard body armor soft body armor
Was body armor penetrated?  ☐ No  ☐ Yes
Was Decedent wearing a seatbelt?  ☐ No  ☐ Yes
Was Decedent in uniform?  ☐ No  ☐ Yes  ☐ Plainclothes
Was Decedent driving/riding in a department vehicle?  ☐ No  ☐ Yes  ☐ N/A

PROVIDE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES:

This information is critical and must be completed. A note of “See Attached Document” is not acceptable.

________________________________________________

INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTATION:

1. Incident report (with narrative)  5. News articles regarding incident/death
2. CAD sheet/Dispatch data  6. Copy of officer’s sworn certificate
3. Death certificate  7. High quality Officer photograph (pg. 4)
4. Autopsy Report (if available)

☐ OUR AGENCY HAS CONDUCTED A DILIGENT SEARCH AND EXERCISED A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO VERIFY THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED AND ATTACHED HERETO IS TRUE AND CORRECT, AND THAT THIS OFFICER HAS DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY.

☐ OUR AGENCY HAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS OFFICER’S DEATH IS NOT CONSIDERED LINE OF DUTY.

(Signature of Agency Head)  (Date)

The criteria for including an officer’s name on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial are separate and distinct from the line-of-duty-death criteria used by other entities or programs, including state and local law enforcement memorials and the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits (PSOB) Program, U.S. Department of Justice. Acceptance for inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial in no way impacts decisions made by the federal government regarding the awarding of PSOB benefits. For more
Appendix 1: NLEOMF Officer Data Form

PLEASE PROVIDE US WITH A LIST OF SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBERS.

*We require the name and address of at least one surviving family member for verification of information provided by the department, particularly, the spelling of the officer’s name, as it will appear on the Memorial wall. Survivor information is for internal use only and will not be released to the media or others without the expressed consent of the individual. Survivors will receive invitations to Memorial sponsored events, newsletters and other Memorial-related mailings.

Name: ___________________________  Name: ___________________________
Address: _________________________  Address: _________________________
City, State, Zip: ___________________  City, State, Zip: ___________________
Telephone: ________________________  Telephone: ______________________
Relationship to officer: _______________  Relationship to officer: ___________
Email: _____________________________  Email: __________________________

Name: ___________________________
Address: _________________________
City, State, Zip: ___________________
Telephone: ________________________
Relationship to officer: _______________
Email: _____________________________

Name: ___________________________
Address: _________________________
City, State, Zip: ___________________
Telephone: ________________________
Relationship to officer: _______________
Email: _____________________________

PHOTOGRAPH REQUIREMENTS

The Memorial Fund requires a high quality photograph of the victim officer. Do not send a photocopy. Send a high resolution image no smaller than 4” x 6” and no larger than 8” x 11”.

If you are sending a digital photo electronically, use an original photo that is at least 4” x 6” and scan the photo at a resolution of 600 ppi (pixels per inch). Save the digital photo on a formatted CD or USB flash drive. NLEOMF will not be able to return the CD or the flash drive.
You may email the photo to research@nleomf.org
Appendix 2: NLEOMF Criteria for Inclusion

Criteria for Inclusion on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial

For the purpose of the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial, "law enforcement officer" means an individual involved in crime control or reduction and who is directly employed on a full-time basis by a local, county, state or federal law enforcement agency of the United States or its territories, with or without compensation, who is duly sworn and has full arrest powers.

A law enforcement agency is a governmental agency or subunit thereof having statutory powers of arrest and involved in crime control or reduction. The agency must employ at least one full-time, duly sworn, trained and certified officer with full arrest powers, or the equivalent in part-time officers.

Officers serving with private or state colleges and universities, and railroads will also be included, provided they are recognized as having law enforcement status by state, U.S. or District of Columbia Code, are duly sworn, trained and certified, with full arrest powers.

In addition, military police officers will be included but only if, at the time of their death, they were experiencing similar hazards and performing similar duties as those normally experienced and performed by non-military law enforcement personnel. In such cases, eligibility will be determined after a review of several issues, including but not limited to, whether the officer was receiving combat, imminent danger or hazardous pay; job description; whether the officer was responding to a law enforcement violation in their area of jurisdiction, and circumstances of death. Military police officers serving in a combat situation will not be included.

Less than full-time law enforcement officers will also be considered. In such cases, eligibility will be determined after a review of several issues, including but not limited to, job description, training and circumstances of death.

Correctional employees shall be included if they are recognized as having law enforcement status by their employing jurisdiction. Other correctional employees who do not have formal law enforcement status but who do have a primary or limited responsibility for the custody and security of suspected or convicted criminal offenders, and are employed by a local, county, state or federal correctional agency, will also be considered. If law enforcement is not a person's primary function (for example, correctional employees such as Maintenance Supervisor, Farm Manager, Food Service Instructor and the like), then that person must be engaged in their law enforcement duties when their fatal injury is sustained. In such cases, eligibility will be determined after a review of several issues, including but not limited to, job description; federal, state or local statutes; training, and circumstances of death.

"Line of duty" means any action which an officer is obligated or authorized by law, rule, regulation or written condition of employment service to perform, or for which the officer is compensated by the public agency he or she serves.
Appendix 2: NLEOMF Criteria for Inclusion

The term "killed in the line of duty" means a law enforcement officer has died as a direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty. This includes victim law enforcement officers who, while in an off-duty capacity, act in response to a law violation. It also includes victim law enforcement officers who, while in an off-duty capacity, are en route to or from a specific emergency or responding to a particular request for assistance; or the officer is, as required or authorized by law or condition of employment, driving his or her employer's vehicle to or from work; or when the officer is, as required by law or condition of employment, driving his or her own personal vehicle at work and is killed while en route to or from work.

Not included under this definition are deaths attributed to natural causes, except when the medical condition arises out of physical exertion, while on duty, that is required by law or condition of employment including, but not limited to, the following:

1. running or other types of exercise being performed as part of training programs administered by the employing agency;
2. fitness tests administered by the employing agency;
3. lifting of heavy objects; or
4. a specific stressful response to a violation of law or an emergency situation causing an officer's death immediately or within 24 hours of violation or emergency situation, or causing his or her death during a continuous period of hospitalization immediately following the specific response to the specific stressful response to the violation of law or emergency situation.

Stressful responses include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. a physical struggle with a suspected or convicted criminal;
2. performing a search and rescue mission that requires rigorous physical activity;
3. performing or assisting with emergency medical treatment;
4. responding to a violation of the law or emergency situation that involves a serious injury or death; or
5. a situation that requires either a high speed response or pursuit on foot or in a vehicle.

Also not included under this definition are deaths attributed to voluntary alcohol or controlled substance abuse, deaths caused by the intentional misconduct of the officer, deaths caused by the officer's intention to bring about his or her own death and deaths attributed to an officer performing his or her duty in a grossly negligent manner at time of death.

Each death caused by disease shall be reviewed by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology or other medical personnel with similar skill and expertise. If it is determined that the officer died as a result of infectious disease contracted while performing official duties, or by exposure to hazardous materials or conditions while performing official duties, that officer is eligible for inclusion on the Memorial.

An officer shall be included if a department states that the officer died in the line of duty and there is no information to believe otherwise. NLEOMF Research staff shall exhaust all possible means available to verify an officer's eligibility status, and the correct spelling of the name. Efforts will include having the name verified by the law enforcement agency of record and a surviving family member.
### Appendix 3: Examples of Injury Codes for Assaults on MPD Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury Code</th>
<th>Example of Injury to Officers from MPD, 2015-2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td>On April 9, 2015 at approximately 5:53 p.m. I, Officer [T], was dispatched to [a substance abuse and treatment facility] to a dispute between a resident at the location and the facility management. Upon arrival I met with Mr. [S.B.] and Mr. [K.H.] Mr. [S.B.] advised that the resident, later identified as Mr. [E.J.], had not been following the rules and regulations of the program and when advised to begin following the rules and regulations Mr. [E.J.] had become angry and cursed at the staff and walked away. Mr. [E.J.] later went to his case manager, Mr. [K.H.], and balled his fists exclaiming &quot;You fucked up my recovery!&quot; Mr. [E.J.] then pushed on Mr. [K.H.'s] forehead several times, leaving red marks on his forehead. I was asked to go upstairs to Mr. [E.J.'s] room to help escort him off the property. Upon coming into contact with Mr. [E.J.] he became violent, motioning to me that he was going to shoot me and telling me several times &quot;fuck you!&quot; I then told Mr. [E.J.] directly to grab his bag and walk out with me immediately. Mr. [E.J.] then threw a pile of clothes at me, at which point I proceeded to place him in handcuffs. Mr. [E.J.] resisted, trying to push me away and keep his hands out of my grasp. I wrestled with Mr. [E.J.] briefly to place the handcuffs on him and then proceeded to place him in my patrol vehicle. Witness statements were collected …and later submitted to the city… as evidence. Mr. [E.J.] was charged …and later transported to the…County jail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td>I Officer [J.J.] was dispatched to …a Criminal Trespass call (illegal drugs). The remarks stated there were several males outside of the location selling drugs. As I arrived to the above location, blue lights were activated an unidentified male walked out of the store as I was pulling up. There was no one else at the location. The unknown male walked across the street from the location. I Officer [J.J.] attempted to have a citizen and Officer Encounter. The male stopped at first but as I was talking to the male, the male became very loud and advised &quot;I was just in the store buying chicken, let go ask them&quot; The unidentified male proceeded to walk away from me heading in the direction of the store. The unidentified male began the walk in a faster pace as if he was trying to run. Officer [G] was about six steps behind the male. As the male made his way into the store officer [G] observed the male reaching in his waist area. As Officer [G] rounded the corner next to counter he observed the male drop an unknown item behind the counter and attempt to walk back out of the store. Officer [G] then gave the male a loud verbal command to turn around and place his hands behind his back. The unknown male refused and attempted to walk past us. I Officer [J.J.] attempted to detain the male, the male resisted; the suspect stated I had no charges on him. At that point I attempted to grab the suspect and the male fought by moving his arms and dropping his body weight making him stiff and very hard to move. The suspect weighed over 240 pounds while trying to place the suspect under arrest the male used his shoulder to push officers off him and attempted to run. The male knocked down several self's inside the store pushing myself and officer [G] into the...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Examples of Injury Codes for Assaults on MPD Officers

self's [sic] and counter top. At that point I Officer [J.J.] gave the male three closed fist punches to the face. While Officer [R] gave the call for help signal over the… radio dispatch. Officer [G] and I continued to struggle with the male finally getting him detained. Once the struggle was over Officer [G] was able to locate the item the suspect throw over the counter. The store clerk confirmed what Ofc. [G] saw. The male throw a Cellucor HD weight loss bottle with 31 pink and blue baggies of Marijuana individually package and ready for sale. While several officer attempted to place the male in back of my…patrol vehicle the male once again drop his body weight, making it hard to place the male in the vehicle. The Suspect flop [sic] down in the middle of [the street] refusing to get up, as a safety precaution myself and several units moved the male out from the middle of the street and placed him in a grass area. Dispatch was advised to dispatch…EMS, due to the small cut of the suspect bottom lip. The male stated "I took that", "You punch like a bitch, No power". [A] Fire Engine…arrived on scene and check out the suspect injuries, after several failed attempts from…EMS to arrive; [another] EMS arrived on scene, but ultimately he was checked out by [a] Fire Engine…The male suspect advised he had a medal plate in his leg… The identification unit] arrived on scene to take photos of the males small cut and as well as the damaged done inside the store. The suspect was finger Printed on scene, after refusing to tell myself and other officers his name. The male, was identified as [T.H.]…While, fighting with the male I Officer, [J.J.] suffered an injury to my right wrist…[EMS] advised my right wrist might be sprained…the incident was capture on the surveillance camera inside the location, when i ask the store clerk to fill out a witness form he advised "I'm not trying to get killed". The Clerk advised he observed the suspect [T.H.] throw the bottle behind the counter. Total weight of Marijuana 21.2 Grams.

On June 16th 2015 I Officer [G] conducted a Field Investigation Interview on a suspicious black male at the [mall]. The male, named [A.M.], was cited a criminal trespass from Mall Security...He is known as a "lookout" for a group of males who are known to occupy [the mall] with heavy drug activity. I was trying to identify Mr. [A.M.] so I could officially register his name with [the mall] security as a Trespasser. The male, whom is known to portray the fact that he is crazy, kept giving me false names and told me his name was "Jesus the Mesiah [sic]") and he runs with "The Jihad" an Arabic [sic] terrorist group. I asked the male for a 3rd time to identify his full name in which he refused so I detained him and placed him in hand cuffs and double locked them for safety. While in route to Precinct, I heard movement from behind my patrol vehicle. I looked back and Mr. [A.M.] was attempting to slip one hand out of his handcuffs. I immediately pulled over to and warned Mr. [A.M.] not to try anything foolish while I re-adjust them. I also told him trying to get out of handcuffs alone is obstruction. I stopped at the bottom of the hill near the precinct. As I opened the door, Mr. [A.M.] had both hands free and attempted to run, I grabbed his left wrist to stop him and that is when Mr. [A.M.] went into a rage and attacked me. My radio was the first thing to fall out of my belt, as we were both
fighting and wrestling on the ground, I could not get to my Taser, OC spray and I was blocking his strikes with my right arm and securing my gun with my left. After several more minutes, I flipped Mr. [A.M.] over and was able to gain control. Mr. [A.M.] was still wrestling, kicking and pulling me to the ground. My right knee suffered a severe laceration and was my shirt was ripped. Both of my hands had Mr. [A.M.] subdued as I kept trying to restrain him. He continued to fight and I began to fear for my safety. I pushed him off of me, grabbed him and slammed his backside against my patrol car. After several minutes, an unknown civilian jumped out of his car and helped me place Mr. [A.M.] back in handcuffs. No deadly force was used. Officer [T] stopped and also assisted as he was on his way home from work. Also, I had Mr. [A.M.] in a physical restrain and he was out of breath. I asked him to please stand down. I finally placed the cuffs with the help of two street civilians [sic]. [EMS] came on the scene and rendered aid to Mr. [A.M.’s] injuries. He had a laceration to his face, left arm, and minor scratches on his elbows. Mr. [A.M.] was transported to [hospital detention] and processed with three criminal warrants.
Appendix 4: Examples of Weapons Used in Assaults on MPD Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Example of Use Against Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Hands / feet | On April 2, 2016, I, Officer [C], was working an approved extra job...While working there I was walking with security when another security officer flagged me down about people refusing to leave the flag pole area. When I arrived everyone had left, however one male came back and security told him he had to leave again. The male...did not at first leave, and when I told him he needed to leave and if he was waiting on the bus he needed to stand on the sidewalk. [Suspect] walked over to the sidewalk and was making statements to security that were unintelligible as [suspect] appeared to be intoxicated. [Suspect] was holding what a fast food restaurant cup and security advised that he believed beer was in the cup. I witnessed [suspect] take a long drink from the cup and I approached [suspect] and asked him what was in the cup. [Suspect] mumbled something and walked away from me. [Suspect] then placed the cup in one of the planter boxes on the sidewalk and turned around and walked away from it. I picked up the cup and inside was a brown liquid that smelled like beer. I approached [suspect] and told him that it was illegal to drink in public and told him to give me his ID card. [Suspect] refused and tried to walk away. I told [suspect] that he was not free to go and to give me his ID card. [Suspect] continued to ignore me and at this point I told him to put his hands behind his back because he was under arrest. [Suspect] tried to walk away from me again so I grabbed his arm and told him to put his arms behind his back because he was under arrest. [Suspect] resisted and tried to twist out of my grasp. I told [suspect] to stop resisting or I would put him on the ground. [Suspect] continued to resist so I grabbed [suspect] and took his legs out from under him and he went to the ground [Suspect] immediately got his knees under him and tried to get up. I still had a hold on [suspect’s] arms and was trying to get him to get on the ground so that I could cuff him. [Suspect] was able to start to rise up off the ground and got his left hand free and swung and struck me in the left side of my face with a closed fist. This stunned me and I backed off a little which allowed [suspect] to almost get into a standing position, which he tried to accomplish by grabbing the front of my uniform and ripping a button off. I still had a hold on [suspect] and I struck him three times in the side of the head to get him to go to the ground and I was able to get him on the ground and onto his belly. I put my knee in his back to pin him to the ground and tried to grab his arms so that I could get them behind his back. [Suspect] continued to resist me and I was unable to get his hands behind his back. I attempted to get on radio to request back up however I was unable to come over the air. I then pulled my taser and put it against [suspect’s] back and instructed him that if he did not put his hands behind his back he would be tased. [Suspect] still continued to resist and I advised him that this was his last warning and that he had three seconds to put his hands behind his back or he would be tased. I counted down from three and when I stated two [suspect] put his arms behind his back and allowed me to handcuff him. I then stood [suspect] up and was able to come over radio and advise what I
### Appendix 3: Examples of Injury Codes for Assaults on MPD Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teeth</strong></td>
<td>On December 21, 2018 I responded to a local homeless outreach. At that time I met with Mr. [R.L.] (victim), [homeless outreach] personnel who stated that while engaging a black male inside the [airport] he was assaulted. At that time Mr. [R.L.] stated that this male has continue [sic] to use to the airport as a lodging place after being told on several occasion that he couldn't. Mr. [R.L.] advised me that this was the same individual who I spoke with about a [sic] hour earlier in reference to sleeping. Mr. [R.L.] stated that he re-engage that male inside the…corridor at which time he swung him. Mr. [R.L.] advise that he wanted to seek criminal charges against this male. I proceeded to canvass the area for this male, at which time I located him re-entering the airport… As I approach the male and ask him to exit the airport he visibly begin to get agitated. He continued to make verbal statements towards me calling me a &quot;suck ass nigga&quot;. As the male exited towards outside at that time I proceeded to detain the subject. He was placed into custody at that time. As I attempted to escort the male inside to the police precinct…the male actively attempted to jerk away after being ask to calm down. As the male continued to jerk away at that time I lost my balance and slipped on the wet pavement that was previously sprayed down by airport employee. The male and myself fell to the ground, as I attempted to regain control of this male as he begin to actively resist I fell on top on the male. The male proceeded to bite my right index finger as I attempted to turn the subject onto his chest. My right index finger started to bleed from the skin being broken from the bite. The male was identified as Mr. [S.P.] (arrestee) who also had an active Criminal Trespass…Mr. [S.P.] was charged [and] transported to [jail].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saliva</strong></td>
<td>On 10/25/2016 I, Ofc. [P] was dispatched to a fight in progress at…a gas station. When I arrived on scene myself and Ofc. [B] was [sic] met by victims, Mr. [R.P.]…and Ms. [C.M.] who stated that inside the gas station the store clerk locked the doors because the suspect stole items. [R.P.], who was a customer at the time, stated that he attempted to help stop the male when he started to yell and scream in his face then hit him in his mouth. The store clerk then unlocked the doors in which the customers came out. [C.M.] stated that her fiance, [R.P.] went back inside to finish purchasing items, when the male pounded on the hood of her vehicle…resulting in a visible dent. [R.P.] sustained visible swelling to his mouth area. [R.P.] and [C.M.] left from the scene but was [sic] able to give a written victim statement. [R.P.] refused EMS…The male suspect later identified as [K.B.] was still on scene. I, Officer [P] and Officer [B] seen [sic] that the male was walking away. I, Ofc. [P] then grabbed him by his arm in which he attempted to hit me. Ofc. [B] then grabbed his other hand. I was able handcuff his left wrist while he resisted and did not comply when I told him to give us his other wrist. Ofc. [B] was able to put</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3: Examples of Injury Codes for Assaults on MPD Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blunt object</strong></td>
<td>On 08-19-2016 at approximately 0800 hrs. While on patrol...I observed a black male stand up from behind the bushes. I immediately recognized him as the same subject that was warned several times to leave the area on 08-17-16 and on 08-18-16. He said give him a minute and he will leave, I agreed. Upon return at 0957 hrs. the above listed black male identified as [J.D.], was still at the location. I then gave him several instructions to leave and he refused, cursing at me stating &quot;I ain't leaving you dumb DIKE BITCH&quot;, then he laid back down. I then continued to give more instructions of which he ignored and kept on fussing and cursing at me and Officer. [M.J.]. I then walked over to him (noticing the odor and presence of feces and urine saved in containers) and attempted to get his name and information from him and that is when he picked up the metal plated leg cast and begin to swing it at me. I gave [J.D.] several commands to drop the cast and he refused. He continued to lunge at me in a threatening manner with the cast in his hand, swing it at me. I gave SEVERAL commands to drop the cast and advised him that I was going to taze him. After the first deployment, I observed [J.D.] remove the prongs from his person and that is when I advised [J.D.] to drop the cast of which he still had in his hand refusing my commands, I gave yet another warning of getting tazed again and he still did not drop the cast. Upon the second deployment, [J.D.] dropped the cast and placed his hands up and asked &quot;what do you want me to do&quot;? We then instructed him to get on the ground and he complied. While attempting to get him into custody he pulled away from me twice and then he complied. I then advised radio to start a Supervisor to my location for a tazed subject. [EMT] request was also made. After a while [EMTs] arrived to the scene and was able to remove the single remaining prong from [J.D.’s] clothing. [J.D.] was deemed unscathed and not injured by...medical techs. [J.D.] was charged with 3 counts of Disorderly conduct ... and later transported to the City Jail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cutting instrument</strong></td>
<td>On 09/04/2016 I did respond to ... a dispute with a bottle. The victims [T.G.] and [K.B.] stated they meet [sic] the arrestee [R.E.] at [a club] last night. Both victims stated they meet the arrestee with his girlfriend, and they went back to there [sic] apartment. During that night the arrestee...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Examples of Injury Codes for Assaults on MPD Officers

[R.E.] admitted they consumed large amounts of drugs, and alcohol. Both victims stated the arrestee, and his girlfriend spent the night at there [sic] apartment. The victims then stated the arrestee started acting funny when they was [sic] getting ready to give them a ride home. Both victims stated the arrestee then grabbed a wine bottle from the kitchen, and broke it over the kitchen island. Both victims then stated the arrestee chased them out the apartment with the broken bottle in hand. While [T.G.] was running from the arrestee, the arrestee threw the bottle at the victim hitting him in the back. After he was hit with the bottle, [T.G.] and [K.B.] ran down the stairs to the front desk of the building. While still upstairs the arrestee went inside the other victims [sic] apartment. Mr. [S.C.] stated the arrestee poured alcoholic beverage over his rug, and broke a mens [sic] watch, sunglasses, and a large kitchen knife. [S.C.] stated nothing was missing from the apartment just the damage to his property. When I arrived on scene the front employee of the building escorted me to the 11th floor where the suspect was still on the property. We then came to [the] apartment … and the door was half way open. The arrestee was standing in the doorway with a knife in his left hand. The arrestee was ordered to put the knife down as I had my service weapon at low ready. The arrestee put the knife down after several commands, and then he came open the apartment with his girlfriend. At that time I attempted to place handcuffs on the arrestee, but he refused by trying to grab my left hand. At that time I took out my taser to make the arrestee comply. The arrestee then did get flat on ground, but then he attempted to get up with me on his back. After several minutes of trying to get the arrestee hands I was able to handcuff the arrestee. The arrestee was taken to my patrol vehicle to be secure, and charged with Aggravated Assault times two, Criminal trespass, and Obstruction of Officers. [EMTs] arrived on scene to get medical treatment to the arrestee's girlfriend who was complaining of not feeling well. Arrestee's girlfriend was then transported to [the] hospital, and the arrestee was then transported to [the zone precinct]. After the warrants for arrest, and citations were done the arrestee was transported by Morning Watch transport wagon. Before the arrestee was placed in the wagon the arrestee tried to escape custody by running from the transporting officers…After several minutes the arrestee was captured again. I was able to get the warrant sign for the extra charge of escape. Arrestee was transported without further incident.

Firearm

On 7/12/2016 at approximately 2056 I Ofc. [R.F.] and Ofc. [D.T.] were in the same patrol vehicle and responded to a dispute with a weapon call…The remarks stated that there was a black male with a black shirt and black shorts waving a gun around…As we were arriving at the intersection the natural light conditions were dim at this time of the evening…I noticed a subject that matched the description…crossing the street. The individual was traveling…with his back towards me and Ofc. [D.T.]. I immediately noticed that the individual …had an all-black pistol in his right hand and tucked it behind his right leg. I advised Ofc. [D.T.] that the subject had a gun. Ofc. [D.T.] exited the vehicle and told the subject to drop the
Appendix 3: Examples of Injury Codes for Assaults on MPD Officers

**weapon.** [Suspect] did not comply at this time but instead turned his body towards us in order to face us. [Suspect] was still brandishing the pistol in his right hand and was extended [sic] his arm. In fear that [suspect] was attempting to shoot at either Ofc. [D.T.] or myself. I quickly put the vehicle in park, exited the vehicle and discharged my department issued Glock Model 22 .40 caliber pistol approximately 3 times in the direction of [suspect] from approximately 30 feet away. [Suspect] then dropped the weapon and was taken down to the ground and placed into custody. The subject had not suffered injuries at this time...Upon further inspection of the weapon it was determined that the weapon was infact [sic] an all-black replica bb caliber Phantom air pistol. A canvass of the area did not show any damage to property or injury to bystanders. There were no other individuals in the immediate area at this time.

**Vehicle**

On 04/10/17 at approximately 3:55 PM, I, Ofc. [F.B.], conducted a business park and walk at...a known hub for drug sales...After exiting the store, I observed an unidentified male (approximately early to mid 20s) in a vehicle (a gray 2003 Ford Taurus)...that I did not recognize from the area. Looking into the vehicle, I noticed that the male was excessively sweating and that his eyes were constricted. He was slow to respond to my question concerning whether he was diabetic. As I made my way around the back of the vehicle I called out the tag over the [zone] radio frequency. Approaching the driver's side, I observed a small empty bag on the gentleman's lap that, due to my knowledge, training, and experience, I know to commonly be used for containing drugs. I ordered the male to step out of his vehicle, and he agreed. I took hold of his left arm, but before I could unseat him, he turned the car on and then threw it into reverse with the right. As his vehicle door was open, I was caught in the door jam [sic] (where the driver's door connects with the body of the vehicle). This door then struck me on the side of my body where I was pulled along with the vehicle as it reversed. In fear for my life, I issued several loud verbal commands for the subject to exit the vehicle and attempted to unseat him. After being struck by the door and pulled with the vehicle for a short distance, the subject placed the gear in drive and fled Westbound...I was able to advise the incident over the [zone] Frequency. The vehicle was followed for a brief time...The command to cancel the chase was issued over the [zone] Frequency, and I stopped my vehicle...As of the moment there are no further leads on the identity of the driver, however the body camera did capture a clear visual of his face.

**Verbal threat**

On 02/26/2018 I, Ofc. [T-J], made a warrant and terroristic threat arrest while conducting a suspicious person stop...I observed a male inside of [a plaza] light an object in his hand and raise the object to his mouth. I then observed a cloud of smoke rise from the male. I determined the male violating city ordinance ...which prohibits smoking inside of [city parks]. I knew from previous experience that [the plaza] contained a plainly visible sign that displayed the non-smoking rule. I approached the male, informed the male the reason for the stop, and requested identification. The male stated he had no ID, and instead self-identified as Mr. [A.M.]...
checked Mr. [A.M.’s] information on NCIC, and the inquiry showed Mr. [A.M.] had a possible warrant. I detained Mr. [A.M.] using my city-issued handcuffs, making sure to double-lock and check for tightness. Mr. [A.M.] became irate and began threatening me. While in the rear of my patrol vehicle, Mr. [A.M.] stated the following towards me: "I'll Fuckin kill you man, Im serious man", "I'll get your Mother Fuckin head blown off", "When I get out.....", "It won't take a lot to blow your fuckin brains out", "I got your number nigga, I ain't no fuckin joke", and "I'll kill a cop". After the multiple threats I placed Mr. [A.M.] in custody. A search incident to arrest yielded no contraband...I transported Mr. [A.M.] to [jail] for Terroristic Threats...While in the sally port of [the jail], Mr. [A.M.] stated "Im gone kill you nigga". All of Mr. [A.M.’s] threats were recorded by my Axon-2 body-worn-camera. Since I did not activate the lights in my patrol vehicle, the watchguard to my patrol vehicle did not capture audio for the incident. I submitted Mr. [A.M.’s] bicycle and two bags into property.