Building a Home-Land: Zionism as a Regime of Housing 1860-2005

By

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ABSTRACT

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The received study of Zionist practices largely disregards a cardinal aspect of Jewish nationalism: the role of housing in producing and inhabiting the home-land. This research identifies housing as the key site for the formation of subjects (Zionists) and place (Zion) and offers a new perspective on the history of Zionism as a massive housing project. It thus offers a complementing historiography to scholarly attempts to understand Israel through the specters of war (Morris, 2008), modernization of the orient (LeVine, 2005), colonization (Gregory, 2005), ethnicity (Yiftachel, 2005), gender (Boyarin, 1996) or the trauma of the holocaust (Wistrich, 1997).

The framework I propose for discussing housing addresses it at the same time as an action (to house), scheme of action (set of policies, funding schemes etc), value system (a basic right, identity marker), architectural form (physical houses), and settlement (location and typology). It is thus deeply involved in attempts to form national identity and citizens-subjects. In addition, two cardinal questions involve the actors at hand: Who performs the act of housing, and who benefits from it?

The modern nation state (Nairn, 2003) marks a shift of governance from kings supported by divine legitimacy, to rule legitimized “in the name of the people” (Bendix, 1978, Foucault, 1971). Housing of the common citizen is thus the key site for any modern nation-state to base and legitimize its rule (Castells et al, 1990, Goh, 2001), more so than the court or the parliament largely studied as the locus of nation building (Vale, 1992, Morton, 1989). Zionism’s unique task to materialize a national home where none existed for millennia involved in addition connecting subjects and homeland in order to form a sovereign political entity legitimated by these people. This unique task was addressed by associating national home and individual housing (Kallus, 2005) and by the state assuming mediating role for the relationship between citizens and homeland (Nitzan-Shiftan, 2006).

This dissertation explores the relationship between nation, citizens and housing by historical examination of Jewish nationalism as a regime of housing. My research unfolds the history of “good housing”, used for producing a legitimate claim for the homeland and for designing good citizens. My archival research of texts and planning
documents indicates that early Zionist leaders understood housing as the answer for both above challenges (Weiss, 1956, Ruppin, 2001, GenGurion, 1969) and defined the materialization of Jewish nationalism as a housing problem. My research process maps the history of housing phenomena based on previous research, locating pivotal cases serving as laboratories for “good housing”: where the ideas and materiality of “good housing” were formed and re-thought. These laboratory case studies, among which are Kibbutz Degania, Ahuzat Bait, the Amidar Shack neighborhood of Ramla and others, are then studied as a housing issue by examining primary sources.

Research methods include primarily archival research of texts and planning documents, as well as of visual documentations and textual descriptions of early dwelling environments. These are complemented with interviews with dwellers, planners and policy makers.
Dedicated

to my family

and to my beloved grandmother and role model

Dr. Lola Lidia Krakauer
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Introduction
Not all that is recounted is important
Much that is important is missing
And the written story, again
Awaits a writer
One ought to probably return
A different man on another evening

- Nathan Alterman

Preface

The received study of Zionist practices largely disregards a central aspect of Jewish nationalism: the role of housing in producing and inhabiting what I will call the “homeland”. The present study identifies housing as the key site for the formation of subjects and of place and thereby offers a new perspective on the history of Zionism, between 1860 and 2005, as a massive housing project. This dissertation, then, is a history of Zionist “good housing”, housing which was used for producing a physical connection between homeland and ‘natives’ in order to form a sovereign polity. The role of housing in rooting the Jews as natives in the homeland, in producing both the citizen and the nation, makes it the cornerstone of the state-citizen contract in Israel.

The architecture of housing has had a central role in shaping Israeli-Palestinian history, beginning with early Zionist settlement in the 1860’s, a role which goes virtually unnoticed by scholarship, which focuses primarily on events of war and the actions of leaders. Architecture and domestic architecture in particular, therefore represents a lacuna in the scholarship of Israeli history. This lacuna is both scholarly and analytical: since housing is not recognized by scholars of nationalism as a significant process and source of data for Israeli history, it is accordingly not analyzed. Housing is therefore a blind spot in the scholarship on nationalism in Israel-Palestine. By turning a scholarly eye to housing, I aim to contribute to the filling of this lacuna. Alongside the creation of a geographical homeland, Zionists experimented with housing typologies that expressed and reinforced the types of citizens they wanted to be, or wanted in their homeland.

The centrality of housing for the state-citizen contract in Israel recently became apparent in the July 2011 Housing Protests, which lead hundreds of thousands of middle class, young, working people to form tent cities as part of a demand for the renewal of Israel’s housing-based social and political contract. After 20 years of neoliberal privatization of the state, the protesters demanded the state renew its commitments to them. “We can disagree, however some things are basic. A roof over one’s head is the basis which everyone ought to have… the roof is the basis, the home is the basis. We are the foundation upon which this state is built and we have to claim what’s ours,” stated Daphne Leef, one of the initiators of the protest movement, at a mass demonstration in Tel Aviv on July 23, 2011. In their conception of the contract between state and citizens as one based on housing, – the protesters effectively declared the government irrelevant unless it cares for the people. Essentially, then, they were calling for a “revolution”.

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“Governments can be replaced – citizens can not” called protesters, adding that “when the government is against the people – the people is against the government”.

It is important to note that this housing protest did not start with proclamations and demonstrations. Rather, it started with a housing act: the laying of dozens of tents along the public space of Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard, and soon after in cities all over the country. The tent towns soon included communal amenities like a shared kitchen, a ‘living room’ for meetings and debates, and ‘urban planning’ in the form of tent layout, ‘addresses’ and designation of ‘plots’ for public services like a clinic and public toilets. The tent boulevard soon extended beyond the street layout to became an ‘urban’ grid of four parallel streets lined with intersecting streets, public spaces and amenities. Housing is at the center of this social struggle for equality, as expressed on an Israeli flag whose Star of David was replaced with a house, seen at the mass demonstration of July 30, 2011 in Tel Aviv (fig. 0.5).

Fig. 0.1, 0.2 The Tent Boulevard on Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv. July 23 2011. Images show the ‘street’ of individual tents, communal tents for congregation and clinic, and tent address ‘25 Tent Boulevard’, which housed the couple Amir and Merav. Source: author.

Fig. 0.3 The tent city, July 31, 2011. Now an ‘urban’ grid of 4 main ‘streets’ of tents. Source: Activestills.

Fig. 0.4 Protesters build a brick and mortar wall in order to block the road leading to Parliament, June 25 2011. Source: Flash 90, Ma’ariv.
Housing’s central role, as well as the lack of scholarly attention to it, is well demonstrated by another dramatic event: the disqualification of a prominent Israeli military commander, General Yoav Galant from becoming the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces in January, 2011 following protests regarding his house. Galant, a decorated soldier, was the leading candidate for the position, supported by Defense Minister Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Yet, in January 2011 images of his house appeared on the front covers of Israeli papers and generated public protest against his appointment. According to the protesters, Galant’s house was proof that he was the wrong man for this sensitive position. As a result of the public uproar, his candidacy for the position was withdrawn and General Benjamin Ganz was appointed instead.

Officially, the reason for Galant’s disqualification was “conduct unbecoming an officer”. In the process of building his house and laying the driveway, Galant had wrongfully encroached on public land. And yet, legal action against him had already been initiated as early as 2006, and information about his misconduct had already appeared in the press as early as 2007 and was familiar to the public as well as to the State Comptroller. Galant’s misconduct had never before threatened his rise in the chain of command. The decisive act which sealed his fate was the publication of an image of his house on the front covers of all Israeli newspapers on January 19, 2011. The picture, which was taken from above, showed the size and typography of the house (fig. 0.6, 0.7) shocked the public.

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1 Ha’aretz editorial, January 11 2010.  
2 Ha’aretz, February 5, 2011.  
3 Kaspit, B. The Galant Affair, Ma’ariv, January 28, 2011.  
4 Ibid.
“The Galant castle” as the headlines read, uses both typology and architectural features identified with Crusader castles and Ottoman caravanserai, a number of them now archaeological sites and national parks dotting the Israeli landscape (such as the popular Antipatris caravanserai in the Afek park (fig. 0.8)). As has been observed by the Israeli architect Arad Sharon, Galant’s house resembles Crusader architecture in both detail and typology:  

“The four towers resemble a Crusader castle...completely foreign to the context of Israeli architecture. The purpose of Crusader architecture was defending the interior with a walled structure...this is not a building for the Chief of Staff. This villa is solid, a castle alienated from its environment...as if it was taken from Spain and parachuted here. You would expect him [to live in] a more modest house in terms of the house itself...it is a huge mistake to project such a message to the army and citizens...This building belongs to nothing, not to its land, not to its period, not to its environment. The house was designed in the spirit of its resident...reflecting alienation from Israeliness and its surroundings.”

Sharon’s reading of Galant’s house is an architectural reading. It stood out as the only architectural analysis of the critical public reaction to the house; most other attempts to understand Galant’s disqualification focused on the legal or media ramifications of his choice to build the house in the way he had. Sharon’s sharp critique of Galant’s house focused on the house as exhibiting the style of foreign colonizers - the very opposite of Israel’s conception of itself as a re-rooted society, native to its homeland. A ‘crusader’

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5 Ga’aton, Y. “Arad Sharon, What Can We Deduce Regarding Galant from His Villa?”, Ha’aretz January 23, 2011.
6 Ibid. Arad Sharon is the grandchild of Arieh Sharon, designer of Israel’s 1952 masterplan, and head of the Sharon architecture firm.
Chief of Staff for the IDF would project an image of the army and of Israeli society, in general, as a foreign, crusader society. The Israeli public, too, was aware of the associations that such a structure might call up, and the an image of themselves as foreign to the land was something they irrevocably rejected. This can be seen in the web comments to news stories on the day house pictures were published and on subsequent days: “This is not the Galant house, this is the Galant castle,” said one commentator.7 “I am not interested in the theft. This is not what a Chief of Staff’s house should look like!” declared a commentator on January 24. For this commentator, then, it was not merely the fact that Galant had designed and built a home in an improper style; it was the fact that the house was not suitable for the leader of the nation’s armed forces, no matter who he might be. Another comment extended the moral critique to the IDF itself: “He can steal and keep lands that are not his own. He fits the position of Chief of Staff perfectly, no?”

Yet the lack of an analytical framework for the study of Israeli architecture made architectural readings like Sharon’s irrelevant to the public discourse. One telling comment which pointed to the blind spot of architecture criticized the public obsessions with Galant’s housing choices: “Everybody’s gone nuts. Pushing their noses into architectural design. Are your own houses pretty??”8 This last comment reflects the surprise that the architecture of one’s house can affect one’s public image and career. Interestingly, this disregard of the effects of architecture was shared by the academic community in Israel, whose scholastic attempts to make sense of the firestorm around the subject of Galant’s house focused primarily on law, media or the power relations between army and civil society. Except for Sharon, no scholar referred to the object at hand, namely the house itself and particularly its architectural form or style.

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7 Comments made to the article: Adyiat, Faed. Galant’s Neighbors: He Thinks He is Above the Law, Ha’aretz, January 20, 2011.

8 Comments made to the article: Idelman, Oded. How Was Public Land Appropriated Into the Galant Estate?, Ha’aretz, January 24, 2011.

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Fig. 0.9 Poster for the symposium “Who Appoints the Chief of Staff in Israel? Between Media and Law”, Bar-Ilan University, February 2, 2011.
Moreover, General Benni Ganz who replaced Yoav Galant and became the IDF Chief of Staff, was also accused of encroaching on public land next to his house in 2010. If the two generals are guilty of the same misconduct, why was one replaced with the other? It seems that focus on legal and media frameworks is not enough to explain away the fact that Ganz was guilty of the same misconduct, or that Galant’s actions were public knowledge years before the affair. The reason for this is that such a focus ignores the fact that the decisive act was the publication of images of the Galant house. This points to the architecture of the house as the crux of his dismissal from office, a fact further evidenced by the glaring difference between the architecture of the Galant and Ganz homes, crusader castle vs. local hut (fig. 0.11).

The analytical lacuna I mentioned above extends well beyond the Galant affair to include the study of the history of Jewish nationalism and the Israeli nation state. The present study thus offers a complementing historiography to scholarly attempts to understand Israel through the lens of war, modernization of the orient, colonization, ethnicity, gender, or the trauma of the Holocaust.

The framework proposed for this discussion understands housing as a complex phenomenon. Housing is at the same time an act (“to house someone or something”), a scheme for action (a set of policies, funding schemes etc), a value system (a basic right, identity marker), an architectural form (the houses themselves), and a settlement (location and typology). It is thus deeply involved in attempts to form national identity and citizen-
subjects. In addition, in attempting to understand the role of housing, two central questions are repeatedly asked regarding the agents involved: Who performs the act of housing, and who benefits from it?

The above framework is extremely important in making the important distinction between ‘house’ and ‘housing’, something which must be kept in mind in this study of Israeli housing history. For example, the temporary housing of immigrants in tents in the 1950s, remembered by many immigrants with horror, was a very different kind of housing than the tent which housed the poetess Rachel, one of the Degania pioneers, even though they were similar dwelling spaces (fig. 0.12, 0.13). What, then, is the Israeli ‘good house’, and how is it related to the formation of good citizens? This question is at the basis of my study.

![Fig. 0.12 A woman in the Pardes Hana Maabara, December 1949. Source: NPC. Fig. 0.13 Poet and pioneer Rachel in front of her tent in Degania, 1913. Source: Degania archive.](image)

The ‘Galant affair’, then, highlights several of the basic issues of this dissertation: A. the association of the ‘good house’ with the ‘good subject’; B. the definition of the ‘good house’ as the native house and of Israeliness as an identity which is rooted in its land.\(^{16}\) C. the presentation of a citizen-state contract which ties housing to subject formation and in which the public is an active participant in setting the terms of citizenship. Housing in Israel, then, is not only the obsession of a society in which 74.4% of the population are homeowners,\(^{17}\) nor is it merely a form of economic investment, it is also what appoints the Chief of Staff, forms unlikely alliances among social factions as seen in the 2011 housing protests, and removes governments from office (as in the case of 1977 electoral earthquake which removed the Labor party after 30 years in power and replaced it with the Likud, largely based on the demand by immigrants for access to “good” housing).\(^{18}\) Furthermore, in the settlements of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, housing, has even been used by the political leadership as a form of aggression in the struggle with the Palestinians for ownership of the homeland (fig. 0.14).\(^{19}\)

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18 See detailed account in chapters 6 and 8 of this dissertation.
19 Unfortunately the planned chapter dealing with housing as violence could not be included in the scope of this dissertation.
This dissertation deals with the relationship between nation, citizens and housing in Israel-Palestine as a historical process. This research proposes a scholarly framework for the study of Israeli-Palestinian history through housing, a historical overview still glaringly missing from the literature. Our historical focus will extend from the first Jewish neighborhood outside Ottoman city walls in 1860 up to the disengagement from Gaza and the removal of Jewish homes and settlements there in 2005. This broad historical scope is addressed by detailed study of pivotal cases as laboratories where the ‘good Zionist house’ was formed and rethought.

In addition to the much-studied national housing project in the period of nation building after 1948, our perspective will extend backwards, much before the establishment of the state of Israel in order to study the role of housing in the very process of formation of the nation state and of its proper subjects.

This dissertation does not propose a new theoretical framework for the study of nationalism and nation building. Rather, it proposes a new historiographic perspective, pointing to housing as a hitherto ignored object of inquiry. This historiographic perspective accepts the theoretical definition of nationalism as popular rule legitimating the nation-state institution, even in non-democratic regimes, and therefore of the nation-state as homestead for nation and national citizens, but identifies housing as its main site of inquiry. The point of departure for this study – as well as its main conceptual contribution - is pointing to housing as the locus for materializing and sustaining the institution of the nation-state and thereby as a central site for the study of the nation, of popular-governance and of the citizen. The focus of this study is therefore detailed examination of the individual-collective object of housing, rather than the objects of superstructures like modernity, globalization or neoliberalism.

**Housing and nation building**

In a key text about the relationship between nation state and citizens, Peter Marcuse discusses what he defined as “The Myth of the Benevolent State.”

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20 See detailed discussion of the nation below.

citizen contract as exploitative rather than benevolent. Marcuse argues that while nation states claim to be benevolent institutions serving their peoples, they in fact use the very basic terms of the social contract – like housing – in order to dominate (rather than care for) their citizens. Marcuse’s paper should be examined in its Cold-War context, in which two dominant political ideologies confronted and tried to outdo one other by showcasing their citizens’ satisfaction with their rights and living standards, i.e. with their side of the state-citizen contract.

While the contract between a state and its citizens includes many attributes, among them education, healthcare, and other provisional goods, Marcuse’s analysis seems to point to housing as the key to the whole contractual structure. Why does he do so? Is this a valid observation? Based on the data presented in this dissertation regarding the case of Israel-Palestine, supported by an examination of theoretical perspectives on nationalism in this introductory chapter, we come to the conclusion that Marcuse’s observation is valid, and indeed should be taken much more seriously than it has to date. Housing indeed emerges as the locus for the simultaneous production of people and nation, in the political framework of the citizen-based nation state.

Why housing? Theories of nation and citizens

The nation, the state and the nation-state are three different analytical categories. Jürgen Habermas carefully distinguishes between them. Modern states, he argues, existed long before “nations” in the modern sense came about. Those states were absolutist in character, ruled by a monarch whose very body symbolized the state, and not by the people themselves. It wasn’t until the late 18th century that the state was conceived of as a political order voluntarily established by the will of the people, who emerge from the status of subjects to self-conscious citizens, i.e. as a nation state. What enabled this transformation is the modern idea of a nation, and awareness of national identity. As a result, both elements, modern state and modern nation, were joined together into the shape of the nation-state. The basic source of legitimation for the nation state is therefore its citizenry.

Our understanding of nationalism has been dramatically influenced by the work of scholars of modernity, who have identified nationalism as a distinctly modern – rather than primordial – phenomenon. Anderson’s seminal definition of the nation as an “imagined community”, a political community imagined as both limited and sovereign, unsettled the accepted scholarly view of nationalism as essential and natural, in face-value acceptance of the nationalist rhetoric. Anderson thereby identifies the shared imagination of the citizens based on horizontal solidarity as central to nationalism. Anderson describes the nation of “imagined community”, a political community

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23 Some scholars mark the first nation-state to be revolutionary France, while others point to England’s conception of sovereignty as vested in the “Crown-in-Parliament”, a result of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, as the first experiment in popular governance.
imagined as both limited and sovereign, as one based on solidarity.\textsuperscript{25} “[the nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”\textsuperscript{26} Hobsbawm’s equally seminal definition of the nation as an “invented tradition” highlighted the invention of a “historical” set of narratives and practices around which modern nations were, and are continuously, formed.\textsuperscript{27}

Another important perspective on the modern nature of the nation state, by Bendix, focuses on governance and on the nation-state as a political association governing “in the name of the people”.\textsuperscript{28} The formation of nationalism in relation to patterns of rule is studied by Bendix through a historical analysis of the revolutionary change from monarchical to popular rule. This change is defined by Bendix as a dramatic change in conceptions of legitimacy from the theory of “divine right”, which granted kings power over their subjects – a legitimacy the subjects could not question – to governance in the name of popular mandate.\textsuperscript{29} It is important to note, as Chatterjee does, that “even the most undemocratic of modern regimes must claim its legitimacy not from divine right or dynastic succession or the right of conquest but from the will of the people, however expressed.”\textsuperscript{30} Foucault discusses the transition from the marking of bodies to the discipline of souls as a change parallel to the change in dominant models of political organization and legitimization of power. Monarchies, whose source of power and legitimacy was the body of the king and who inflicted power violently, were replaced by states based on the idea of a social contract and the principle of universal citizenship and its rights, controlled via the disciplinary society and its judicial system.\textsuperscript{31}

The state institutions, argues Balibar, form the individual into a homo nationalis by means of a network of apparatuses and daily practices. Linking Foucault’s work with Anderson’s, Balibar states that “every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary.”\textsuperscript{32} In the case of the nation this imaginary entity is the “people”, produced as a community and as individuals.\textsuperscript{33} The dramatic change in the nature of authority and its legitimacy became a worldwide movement of nationalism calling for government by popular mandate.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{25} It is interesting to note that solidarity is a Marxist term.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{27} Hobsbawm, E., (1983), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press.
\textsuperscript{28} Richard Bendix, \textit{Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule} (Univ of California Pr, 1980).
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} For the historical development of change see Lea Greenfeld, \textit{Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity} (Harvard Univ Pr, 1993); Bendix, \textit{Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule}.
\textsuperscript{34} Marx’s ideas of the international proletariat, as well as Nietzsche’s “death of God”, Durkheim’s ideas of the social fact and of God as a social construct and Weber’s “city air makes free”, are all related to the modern idea of popular mandate of rule – although not framed through nationalism and (for example in Marx’s case) resisting it as hindering humanity’s evolvement.
The state-citizen contract in modernity, then, is based on mutual commitments between the state and its citizens as regards their rights and their duties to one another (though, of course, the particular set of rights and duties differs from nation to nation).

Accordingly, citizenship, like nationality, can be understood as a form of membership, as do John Rawls and T.H. Marshall who defined citizenship in the modern nation-state rights-conferring membership, with the chief right being that of participation in governance.\(^{35}\) The nation-state, in fact, is the only modern framework which makes this possible, and is thus distinguished from various transnational forms of membership such as the UN, the ‘network society’ and multinational corporations in the global-urban political and economic system, which have been the focus of so much scholarly attention in the past two decades but which in fact, erode the nation-state.\(^{36}\) While the nation state was studied as a bygone social structure by scholars of globalization, neoliberalism and neo-Marxist theory,\(^{37}\) recent events clearly mark it, as opposed to some supra-national institution, as the key framework in which people claim their political and economic rights.

Since modern rule derives its legitimacy “from the people”, the citizen’s place in the nation becomes very significant. While national institutions such as parliament are important as concrete representations of the relationship between state and citizen - the housing of the common citizen is the key site in which each citizen is formed as part of the governing polity. In comparison with institutions representing the nation such as capitol complexes, studied by Vale,\(^{38}\) or exhibition complexes studied by Morton,\(^{39}\) housing is far more than just a representation or symbol of the nation. It is equipment,\(^{40}\) a tool with which subjects are formed, values are inscribed, and class struggle, in the broadest sense,\(^{41}\) is waged. In addition, housing embodies the nation-state’s idea of what it means to “be at home” as a member of the imagined community of the nation.\(^{42}\) More


\(^{41}\) I refer to Ong who discusses class as a marker of status for which capital is but one aspect, as it includes race, gender, citizenship, “taste”, and location in space. Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Duke University Press Books, 1999).

\(^{42}\) Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities.*
than any other built form, then, housing can serve as a tool for questioning the modern nation-state as a cultural-political institution.

In recent years, as peoples all over the world have begun to resist global capitalism, they have demanded that their own national states reassert themselves by reaffirming the state-citizen contracts rooted in popular sovereignty and the popular will. This return of the nation state by means of a bottom-up mass movement has remade housing into a central element of state—citizen contract, suspended for the past three decades and subjected to the market, and thus a central arena for the study of nationalism.

**Why architecture? The social effect of architecture in the service of power**

Before assessing the role of housing for several nation building projects, we should take a step back and examine a preliminary question, namely: What is the nature of the relationship between power and architecture in general? This relationship is often taken for granted and thus under-studied and under-theorized, as scholars of architecture tend to under-theorize power, while scholars of power tend to under-theorize architecture.

Relevant cases in point include architecture historian Lawrence Vale’s “Architecture, Power, National Identity”, and political scientist James Scott’s “Seeing Like a State”. Vale’s architectural analysis addresses, for example, the architecture of capitol buildings as manifestation of state power, representations of a national identity necessary to legitimize state rule vis-à-vis both its populace and the “family of nations.” In other words, Vale does not ask what power is, but simply assumes that nations “have it” and moves on to study architecture as a tool for the implementation of that power. Scott’s research presents the opposite side of the same coin. Dwelling on the workings of state power, Scott defines legibility as a central problem in statecraft. He thereby identifies “high modern” architecture and city planning simply as an apparatus used by the state to render society legible and thus governable. Scott’s work, despite its under-theorization of architecture, is nonetheless noted for ‘seeing’ the effects of architecture and urban planning within the scope of state power, compared with most studies of the nation-state which disregard architecture and its effects completely.

Within the field of architecture, the debate on its effects can be framed by two extreme positions held by two key modern architectural thinkers: Le Corbusier and Manfredo Tafuri. Le Corbusier, in dedicating his 1933 urban planning manifesto Ville Radieuse, “to authority” claimed that architecture had an immense capacity to act on populations in the service of power. In 1923 he defined architecture as an antidote to a possible (socialist) revolution, in his famous promise “architecture or revolution”. Despite Tafuri’s strong Marxist critique of Le Corbusier and of modern architecture, he interestingly accepted the dictum about “architecture or revolution”. Tafuri’s claim was that given that architecture can only serve the powerful (i.e. those with sufficient capital to enable them

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43 For a more concise engagement with this issue see the methods question in this exam.
to actually build\textsuperscript{46} - architecture can never serve ideological revolutions but only those already in power.\textsuperscript{47} Both Tafuri’s and Le Corbusier’s lack of problematization of the nature of power should be qualified in light of Colin Gordon’s statement that “power is only power when addressed to individuals who are free to act in one way or the other”,\textsuperscript{48} which presents the powerless as nonetheless actors who have agency.

**Housing and the state-citizen contract**

Taking Marcuse’s above statement regarding housing as the key for state-citizen contracts seriously, we should examine the role of housing for various national projects across geographical areas, political economies, historical epoch and regimes. To do so, I will briefly examine three examples: the U.S., Singapore and China. In all three cases, housing will be shown to be a multi-faceted phenomenon: it is, at one and the same time, a set of policies, a value system, a building type, a form of dwelling, real estate and an architectural style. In each case it is also necessary to ask our foundational questions: who performs the act of housing and who benefits from it? We must remember, however, that just as there is no single model for the modern nation-state, there is no single model for the housing at play in the state-citizen contract. These contracts are based on different formulations of the duties of the ‘good citizen’ to the state and the state’s obligations or promises to its citizens.

Each of the cases chosen sheds light on my analysis of the role of housing in nation-building and subject formation in Israel, from a different angle. The American case study serves as an example of how the state can use homeownership for defining good subjects and pacifying populations via access to homeownership. The case of Singapore points to public housing as a tool for state survival. And finally, the case of China points to place-based citizenship and to housing as the arena for citizens to partake in negotiating the regime’s most basic principles.

**Owning a share in the American dream**

“A nation of homeowners, of people who own a real share in their own land, is unconquerable”, stated President Franklin D. Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{49} Roosevelt’s statement identifies the American nation as produced by its people - and access to housing as a key element connecting citizens and homeland. This statement marks the basic terms of the American nation building project as strikingly similar to the Zionist one. Access to housing is at the heart of American society’s value system and the individual’s relationship to society.\textsuperscript{50} Membership in the nation and full citizenship in the nation-state have traditionally been associated with access to the proper kind of housing. For centuries, writes Wright, Americans have seen domestic architecture as a way of encouraging certain kinds of family and social life and inculcating the proper citizen. The

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{46} This idea was later framed by Lefebvre as “the production of space”, albeit with a less pessimistic-deterministic approach. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1991).
\bibitem{50} Gwendalyn Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America* (the MIT Press, 1983).
\end{thebibliography}
detached dwelling became the instrument for accomplishing each American’s mission to “make something of himself,”51 a responsibility that was viewed as solely his own, as depending on his capacity for self-rule, in accordance with the right conduct. The American social ideal of the “self-made man” produced a political and economic climate in which the isolated single-family dwelling became a popular ideal that gained an increasing ideological importance, even among blue-collar workers.52 The American dream house - despite being an individual, single-family, dream – was nonetheless thrust directly upon the nation as a goal of federal policy in a series of acts since the 1920’s, the most noted of which is the post-World War II GI bill which introduced great numbers of working class families into the “good citizen” milieu during the early period of the Cold War with its fears of a proletarian revolution.53 Private architecture thus has a distinctly public side, a remarkable fact in a society that prides itself on the supposed non-involvement of government in the private sphere.54 Hayden goes so far as stating “for the first time in history, a civilization has created a utopian ideal based on the house rather than the city or the nation.”55 Hayden’s identification of American nationalism as based on the individual home resonates surprisingly with my findings regarding Zionist and Palestinian nation building in this dissertation, despite the strikingly different contexts, time periods and ideologies involved.

Fig. 0.15. Typical post war tract housing.
Fig. 0.16. “It’s a Promise!”, GE ad, 1943.
(Source: Archer, Architecture and Suburbia).

51 The American was a “he”, of course.
54 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (Oxford University Press, USA, 1985).
55 While my study challenges Hayden’s American-centric view of the ‘dream house’, her observation regarding the centrality of the house is valuable for our comparative discussion Dolores Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life (WW Norton & Company, 2002). Pp. 34.
Homogenized housing and citizens in Singapore

The case of Singapore presents almost the exact contrary of the American relationship between state and citizens, as far as housing and its role in the social contract is concerned. A strategic node for finance, shipping and related services in the framework of the British Empire, Singapore reluctantly became a sovereign nation in 1965 as result of the decline of the Empire. Unlike in Israel, sovereignty was not a goal for the immigrant population of Singapore, yet similar to Israel, it was deeply occupied with issues of survival, as a result of three historical traumas: insecurity over its national identity and ability to protect itself following the Japanese brutal occupation and the break with Malaysia, racial riots that questioned Singapore’s social viability as a multiethnic society, and the political threat of Chinese communism. The invented tradition of a “communal struggle to survive” (which remains a strong theme in its national life, even though it is now the second-richest country in the SEA) supplies Singapore with a collective historical narrative for its imagined community.

The issue of survival lies in the state’s deep dependency on its citizens. Because the citizens of this commercially driven society hold most of the savings and investments in the country, accounting for three-quarters of total investments, the citizens’ loyalty to the state and their sense of national belonging are crucial for the state’s survival and success. The diverse population of twelve ethnic-linguistic-religious groups seems to share very little that could be the basis for the formation of an imagined community. What they do share is the island of Singapore itself and the material environment of public housing, in which a seventy percent of Singaporeans live (Fig. 0.17, 0.18). Singapore’s Housing Development Board (HDB) produced a homogenizing housing environment consisting of uniform apartments, rented to the public at subsidized rates.

The uniform material environment of these housing estates enables the regime to use housing as a means for the implementation of social policies. For example, ethnic tensions in Singapore are controlled by allocating apartments in each housing estate according to the proportions of the various ethnic groups in the society, forming a mini-Singapore of ethnic harmony in each estate. The homogenized architecture and dwelling environment which characterizes these estates is also used to downplay the significant differences between the citizens and consolidate them into a nation.

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Housing and place-based citizenship: China’s ‘floating’ citizenry

The Chinese system of citizenship differentiates categories of citizens based on their territorial identity. While all Chinese are legal citizens, the distribution of provisional and political rights is not based on national citizenship but on local affiliation. Li Zhang talks about the social and cultural roots of this place-based citizenship in Confucianism, which valorizes attachment to one’s native land and unwillingness to leave it, as the normal state of being. For this reason, the ‘floating population’, those who have left their rural villages for the city is defined by the Chinese state as “improper citizenry”. The housing of this floating population is relevant for the study of the Israeli-Palestinian case due to the direct relationship, in China, between citizenship and place of birth, therefore between citizenship and housing. Leaving their rural villages for the city, many Chinese lose their claim to benefits from the state and so lose some of their political rights.

This improper citizenry threatens the regime on multiple levels, including straining urban infrastructure and increasing the possibility of political unrest. It is therefore stripped of any provisional rights and forced to provide for its own subsistence – and primarily house itself according to what is available on the market and outside the framework of the state since, having left their native region, they are denied access to public housing provided by the state. As the economic system in China officially has no market, this floating population in fact produces a market economy in China, i.e. a real estate market. The state therefore uses this population in order to experiment with elements of a capitalist economy.

59 Source: http://www.crookedbrains.net/2008/01/massive-apartments-estates-public.html

60 Li Zhang, Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China’s Floating Population (Stanford Univ Pr, 2001).

61 Ibid.
economy within the overall socialist structure, without such experiments posing a threat to the regime. The terms of Chinese citizenship are nonetheless changed by this process. Rather than mere victims of the state, Zhang views the floating population as active agents in negotiating the terms of Chinese citizenship as a result of its commodification of state supplied public services, such as housing.

Fig. 0.18, 0.19 Urban housing used and produced by the ‘floating population’ in Beijing. Source: Zhang, 2001.

**Historiographies of nationalism**

The relationship between nationalism and history has been central to the literature which tries to make sense of the phenomenon of nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm is noted for showing how nations use invented traditions to give a sense of timeless ritual to their fragile imagined communities. Hobsbawm’s oxymoron of the “invented tradition” highlights the role of history in nation building. Anderson points to new understandings of time as homogenous and empty, experienced by all nationals at the same time as crucial for the formation of imagined communities. In order for the modern imagined community to emerge, states Anderson, ancient cultural conceptions of time, truth and the legitimization of sovereignty had to fall away. Hobsbawm shows that modernization disrupted the meaning of tradition as a practice handed down through transmission and fundamentally altered its role in social life, turning it into a tool for serving contemporary needs and purposes.

While Hobsbawm’s work seems to imply that the role of tradition has ended, AlSayyad states that “it would seem that what has ended, in the end, is not tradition itself, but the idea of tradition as a harbinger of authenticity...tradition as a place-based, temporally situated concept; as a static authoritative legacy; and as a heritage owned by certain groups of people”. History making remains central to nation building, writes AlSayyad, however “tradition is no longer found only in ‘real’ places; it lives on in the most fake of all places, where it is reborn everyday in the social practice of those who inhabit what used to be the space of fakery”, such as the cleansed New York City whose spirit as the

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64 Ibid.
65 Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*. Hobsbawm and Ranger give examples such as the invention-fabrication of Scottish national tradition.
quintessential American city, has re-emerged in the unlikely space of the New York hotel and casino in Las Vegas.\(^{66}\)

Nations are not based on remembering together but rather on collective amnesia, declared Renan, an amnesia that would wipe away memories of origin, racial affiliations and the violence involved in nation formation.\(^{67}\) Hobsbawm clearly states that “nations without a past are a contradiction in terms. What makes a nation is the past, and historians are the people who produce it.”\(^{68}\) Basing himself upon Renan’s statement that historical study is often dangerous to nationality, Hobsbawm claims that a historian dealing with nationalism cannot but make a politically or ideologically explosive intervention in it.\(^{69}\)

### Historiographies of Israel-Palestine: Housing as a lacuna in scholarship

The extensive historical scope of the research involved in this dissertation engages with the work of both ‘old historians’ and ‘new historians’ of Zionism. ‘New historians’ is a term coined by historian Shabtai Tevet, for a group of critical writers of Israeli history who emerged primarily in the mid-1980’s, and challenged the founding myths of the State of Israel.\(^{70}\) ‘Old historians’ were accused by ‘new historians’ of constructing historical myths to serve the regime. The two historiographical approaches are commonly viewed as holding opposed political commitments regarding Zionism: The view of the ‘old historians’ which sees Zionism as a heroic, just project is usually associated with the right-wing of the political spectrum, while the post-colonial tincture of the ‘new historians’, with their focus on the consequences of Zionism for its victims, is deemed left-wing, and often “post-Zionist”.\(^{71}\)

It seems to me, however, that these two approaches are in fact characterized by two different points of departure, characterized by the two different historical ‘objects’ which they study. The ‘New historians’ focus on Jewish nationalism during the period of Israeli sovereignty (starting from 1948, with attention to the last decade of the British Mandate period). They invest scholarly effort in demystifying the ‘miracle’ of the realization of Zionism in a nation state by critiquing and challenging that realization, especially in terms of socio-spatial justice. Leading ‘new historian’ scholars include Oren Yiftachel, Baruch Kimmerling, Benni Morris, Ilan Pappe, Tom Segev, and others.\(^{72}\)

‘Old historian’ research focuses on the pre-state period, especially on the Ottoman Empire, and does not view the Israeli nation state as a direct result of Zionist ideology but rather of a myriad of processes of which ‘proper’ or self-consciously Zionist state-

\(^{67}\) Ernst Renan, “What Is a Nation?,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (Routledge, 1990 [1882]).
\(^{70}\) The term ‘new historians’ was coined as a derogatory term by historian Shabtai Tevet. See Efraim Karsh, *The New Historians: Fabrications of Israeli History* (Tel Aviv HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1999).
ideology was but one element. It thus focuses on the many varied attempts to materialize Jewish independence in Zion by a number of different and contradicting political programs including religious Zionism, capitalist Zionism, and communist non-Zionist communities and of course the leading socialist Zionism. Leading ‘old historian’ scholars include Ruth Kark, Abraham Granot (Granovski) and others.73

The present study, however, aims to cut across these historical periods, and transcend the distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ historians. It devotes considerable space to pre-state housing and the materialization of Zionism in the Yishuv, like the ‘old historians’, but also to the mechanisms of the nation state as the ‘new historians’ do. In addition, much like the ‘new historians’, we will examine the Zionist project of nation building while always keeping in view its relation to the competing Palestinian use of housing for the purpose of reaching similar goals of self-governance in a national framework.

Prior to my field research, I had planned for my dissertation to treat two opposing regimes of “good housing” competing for the same homeland: Zionist national housing, concerned with re-rooting the Jews as a native people in Israel, on the one hand, and Palestinian national housing, which, especially after the 1948 war, represents the determination to never again be uprooted from the land. Therefore, I had planned to compose this dissertation as two parallel historical narratives. This could have been a great story. However, field research transformed my understanding of the relationship between the two housing regimes. To my surprise, the history of Zionist and Palestinian national housing turned out to be inseparably intertwined. If one is going to discuss, for example, the Zionist dwellings in the first Kibbutz, one cannot disregard the fact that this very housing had served dispossessed Palestinian serfs beforehand. Nor can any study of the housing strategies of Palestinian nationalism within the boundaries of post-1948 Israel ignore the state’s attempts to curb and control it. Consequently, the structure of this written manuscript changed dramatically.

The shared homeland discussed in this dissertation is referred to as “Israel-Palestine”. This term is used here for the entire historical period between 1860 and 2005, since despite political changes and governmental frameworks – the homeland never ceased to be shared and contested by the two nations. The meshing of Israel-Palestine, especially uncanny for the post-1948 time period, when ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’ have seemed to be cleanly separated, is used here in order to point to the unsettling effect of housing upon our common understandings of both ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’. It should be emphasized, however, that the use of ‘Israel-Palestine’ is by no means meant to argue for a particular ‘solution to the conflict’. Our concern is exclusively with the shared homeland as the crux of the issues at hand; issues which have not disappeared with the partition of the land in 1947-48, and the establishment of the state of Israel.

**Home-land and native**

The concept of “home-land” is used in this dissertation to point out the meshed nature of collective home and individual home in these two national projects, marking the concrete materiality of land and housing as central to both Zionism and Palestinian nationalism.

The scholarly study of housing in service of nation building in the case of the U.S, Singapore and China, which we reviewed above, focuses almost exclusively on the role of the state, i.e. on the state as a regime of housing. Statehood and the sovereign regime precedes housing in these case studies. However, study of housing in Israel-Palestine extends to the first proto-national housing in the 1860’s, and exposes a reversed dynamic. In both the Israeli and Palestinian case, the creation of homes and of “home-land” predates the establishment of political and governmental institutions. The sovereignty of the national collective arose from the accumulation of individual sovereignty by means of self-built housing; i.e. the individual sovereignty came first. This causal reversal which we will study in the case of Zionism might provide a model for challenging the literature on nation building in other cases.

The native, the individual rooted in the homeland, emerges in this study as a modern rather than aboriginal figure. The common understanding of the native’s ancestral relationship to the homeland is complicated in this study by the findings indicating that the newly formed national projects of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism were ‘born’ in new built environments, and at the same time period. These new built environments therefore produced ‘new-native’ proto-citizens for the two nations, each of which made a coherent claim for the necessity of national territory for the new governmental framework of the nation.

This study identifies a significant distinction between the ‘aboriginal’ native and the ‘national’ native by identifying and analyzing the dramatically different forms of housing characteristic of each population in the wake of the 1858 Ottoman land commodification code. ‘New native’ housing forms developed as a result of the privatization of imperial land for exploitation by landlords as a source of profit. This process resulted in housing arrangements quite distinct from the Ottoman walled city built environment. This land reform, however, undercut peasant relationship to the land by rendering theme mere labor, rather than rights-bearing citizens. ‘New native’ housing environments were subsequently the sites where calls for a land reform for the native people, in the wake of the Empire’s betrayal of its own subjects. Both Zionists and Palestinian nationalists who produced new housing forms outside the Ottoman walled city produced themselves as ‘new-natives’ of the homeland. It is only the non-nationalist populations in Israel-Palestine, the Jewish, Muslim and Christian imperial subjects who lived under imperial rule in the old cities and fortified villages, that can accurately be termed ‘aboriginal natives’ in this context. This is not to say that the ‘new

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75 See chapters 1,2,3 of this dissertation.
native’ of the modern national project, with its invented traditions and imagined communities, is a fabricated identity. It is rather a reformulated, modern, understanding of the relationship between people and place.76

**The ‘good house’: ‘Good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ housing**

This study focuses on the concept of what constitutes ‘good’ national Zionist and Palestinian housing. The struggles, within both nationalist movements, over the meaning of nationalism itself and over the identity of the proper national citizen, were reflected in normative evaluations of housing environments as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘ugly’. ‘Good’ housing was defined as housing enabling the project of nation building and the formation of proper future citizens. ‘Bad’ housing was defined as hindering the nation building project, as undermining the necessary project of accumulating self-governing future citizens in the country, and as therefore detrimental to national collective claims to the homeland. ‘Ugly’ housing was housing which contributed to the nation building project by claiming the homeland and accumulating good citizens, yet was run down or ill serviced and thereby had negative consequences for the invented traditions involved in forming the imagined community of the nation.

The first houses of Ahuzat Bayit, the seed of the city of Tel Aviv, were envisioned by the city’s founders, such as Akiva Arieh Weiss and his friends, in normative architectural terms, as the ‘good’ houses which would serve the accumulation of Zionists in Eretz Israel and hence the creation of self-governing, Jewish-Zionist urban community.77 The pioneer commune members of Kibbutz Beit Alpha in the Jezreel Valley were engaged in discussions over the ‘good’ housing for their children and invested great efforts in constructing a permanent, well serviced, house where their children will develop as ‘good’ future citizens.78 Arab-Palestinian Israelis are constantly engaged in defining the ‘good’ house which will allow them to continue to live in the village of their birth and thereby maintain their national identity and claims to the homeland.79 Jewish immigrants flocking to the country following independence have continuously measured their social status in the country by the quality of their housing, with ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ housing attesting to their economic and ethnic marginalization by the state’s housing regime.80

**Zamud and Summud**

What is the “good” Israeli house? Examination of the home of Chief of Staff Benni Ganz in the town of Rosh Ha’ayin (fig. 0.20) shows a detached one storey building with a tiled roof surrounded by its own yard. This typology, which I will explore extensively in later chapters, was identified by artist Gal Weinstein to be the Israeli “habitus”. Weinstein’s installation (fig. 0.21), presented at the Sao Paulo Biennale of 2006 crystallizes the

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76 Part II, “Nationalism as New-Nativism: new ‘proper’ housing typologies in Palestine”, examines these issues at length.


78 Beit Alpha archive, see chapter 5 of this dissertation.


minimum elements of this ‘good house’: its location upon its own plot of land and under the sky. The various differences in size, volume, architecture, materials and style in which this housing type can manifest itself, as well as the different geographical location, settlement types and populations it houses do not affect these two essential elements: rooting the Israeli native in the homeland and giving him sole relationship to a specific plot of land. I use ‘housing type’ here to refer to the single-standing detached house – rooted in the land and with nothing built on top of it – rather than to architectural style, materiality, size, scale or cultural attributes. In the framework of this study I give this housing a proper name – **Zamud**. Hebrew for ‘attached to the land’, **Zamud** is the term used in Israel to describe single family homes, highlighting the relationship to the homeland as their most important characteristic.

![Image](image-url)

**Fig. 0.20** The ‘proper’ Ganz house, Image extracted Feb. 1 2011 from the street view website Zoomap. Ganz’s address and house picture were removed from the website after his appointment approval. Silhouette in red lines by me.

**Fig. 0.21** ‘Roof’, 2006. Installation by Gal Weinstein at the Sao Paulo Biennale.

Housing of the Arab-Palestinian citizenry in Israel is by definition not ‘good’ housing as far as the housing regime of the Jewish majority in the state is concerned, since it challenges the Zionist claim for sole Jewish possession of the homeland (at least within the territory of the state of Israel). Access of Palestinian-Israeli citizens to ‘good’, **Zamud** housing was therefore actively prevented by the state, in way discussed in detail in Part III. In the face of these restrictions, however, the Arab-Palestinian public has subjected itself to its own unique housing regime, which we will term **Summud**, Arabic for ‘resistance to being swept away’. This housing regime makes its claim to the homeland by insisting on remain in the village of one’s birth at all costs, constructing one’s home in the village, often in violation of state planning and land use legislation. As result of the **Summud** housing regime, the density of village settlement has increased significantly and the typical village home has been transformed. Families now share apartment houses serving parents and married children, in a housing form very different from the detached single family house. No longer ‘attached to the land’, yet still able to claim Arab-Palestinian rights to the homeland, **Summud** unsettles the normative judgments of the Israeli housing regime regarding housing (as ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’).
Israel as a housing project

Jewish nationalism, known as Zionism, arose in the late 19th century in response to the failure of Jewish assimilation in European nations.

Zionism expresses the three processes of nationalism mentioned above in section 2.1: First, the invented tradition of the history of Jewish sovereignty in the homeland in biblical times as the direct ancestor of the modern Israeli nation state (which can be seen in a 1967 victory postcard (fig. 0.23), in which the IDF soldier by the Tower of David in Jerusalem is depicted as the modern resurrection of the Maccabee heroes of antiquity). The re-invented history of biblical times enabled an imagined community for Jews, an alternative to the imagined community of world Jewry based on religion and ethnicity; Second, nationalism as a form of governance – self-governance - legitimated by proper, sovereign, subjects who break the chains of enslavement in the diaspora to carry the banner of a reborn Jewish collective Israel, as can be seen in the image of ‘Jewish Marianne’ (fig. 0.24); And finally, the nationalist understanding that the territory of the
homeland is necessary for the realization of Jewish nationalism (as expressed in a 1936 JNF poster, stating “a nation reborn on its ancestral land”) (fig. 0.25). The Zionist project had to confront two questions: First, how to transform the imagined community of Jews from one based on religion, ethnicity and a common fate, to one based on a shared territory and political sovereignty. Second, how to argue for the creation of such a sovereign nation-state before its land and its citizens were even in existence? Housing served as a key site for addressing these two issues.

The idea of materializing Jewish nationality in concrete spatial form was not trivial, as the Jewish nation state did not replace a different state mechanism (absolutist or colonial) governing pre-national subjects. Instead, it had to produce the physical connection between the homeland and ‘natives’ first, in order for a sovereign political entity legitimated by these people to even be possible. This task was undertaken by meshing national home and individual housing, by regarding individual houses as significant building blocks of the future nation state.

The interrelation of national home and individual house is therefore central to Zionism as ideology and as a regime. Israel’s housing regime was intended to provide housing for each citizen as a fulfillment of the right of each Jew to the ancestral homeland in which he or she was being “re-rooted”. In this view of things, which has been operative since the 1860’s, producing a national home requires the housing of Jewish nationals. This is a condition for their transformation into self-governing members of an independent polity.

Housing was therefore the main tool for designing proper citizens of the future nation-state. The ‘good house’, the cradle of the good citizen, was an indispensable element in state-citizen contract of the new polity-in-the-making. As the chapters to follow will show in greater detail, to this day, ‘good housing’ is understood, in Israeli society, as the introductory step into the ‘good citizen’ milieu. We will examine the history of the ‘good house’, asking what it is and who the ‘good subjects’ are which it is meant to produce.

Fig. 0.26 “After 2000 years, the homeland is ours again.” JNF archive. Note the markings of homeland by houses, fields and road.
Palestine as a housing project

The Palestinian national project, competing with Zionism for the shared homeland, is deeply invested in housing. What little discussion there is of Palestinian housing generally revolves mainly around displacement and the loss of housing during the 1948 Palestinian Nakba (literally “catastrophe”). There has been scant study of the formation of Palestinian national housing, in relation to the development of Palestinian national consciousness. Moreover, Palestinian housing, like the Palestinians themselves, are traditionally studied as aboriginal, as though they have existed in the same form for generations. As a result, there have been few attempts to study the Palestinian claim to the homeland as part of the modern project of nationalism.

This study therefore will also contribute to the scholarship regarding Palestinian housing - its history and transformation in light of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of nationalism. Unlike the case of Zionism, housing was not a conscious act of Palestinian nation building. Rather, it was the loss of housing which ignited a national consciousness among the people.

While not materialized in a formal nation state, Palestinian nationalism has nonetheless produced several distinctive kinds of national housing, which will be examined in Chapters 3 and 7 of this dissertation. These housing forms can be grouped into two categories, corresponding to the two different understandings of the homeland and consequently of nationalism, in the wake of the 1858 Ottoman land privatization code. One housing form was typical of the Ayan, the landowning elite whose perception of the homeland as their territory developed as they become owners of privately held lands. The second was characteristic of the dispossessed peasantry, the fellaheen, whose relationship to their homes, land and village was alienated and who consequently developed Balad (village) based nationalism focused on staying put in their homes and villages.

Analytical frameworks, Methodology and sites of inquiry

Housing – disciplinary and analytical approach

As mentioned earlier, the analytical framework proposed here understands housing as a complex phenomenon composed at the same time of actions (to house), schemes of action (set of policies, funding schemes etc), value systems (a basic right, identity marker), architectural forms (physical houses), and settlements (location and typology). It involves the actors who perform the act of housing and those who benefit from it and raises questions regarding both.

This analytical framework takes its explicit starting point from the architecture of houses, extending its inquiry to social and political issues and processes involved in the production of housing, and comes full circle by returning to architecture as the primary source of data explored for examining our research questions.

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81 See detailed discussion in chapter 3.
The disciplinary focus of this dissertation is part of a broader context, namely the parallel processes of a ‘spatial turn in the social sciences’ and a ‘social turn in the spatial sciences’. As a result of these two processes the study of housing in the past two decades has primarily focused on issues of urbanization and development, gender, class, race, globalization, and architectural discourse. These extremely productive perspectives have changed and deepened our understanding of the house, previously studied mainly as form and as shelter.

My education at the deeply interdisciplinary ‘Berkeley School’ of architecture, where the ‘social turn in the spatial sciences’ first took shape in both research and pedagogy, exposed me to the many methodological lenses for the study of the built environment. As a result I was compelled to reevaluate my primary disciplinary tools, namely, the ‘reading’ of buildings, plans, drawings, facades, construction techniques, proportions, materiality, typology, and the decision making involved in the planning and construction processes. The unique perspective and immense contribution of architecture history lie in its ability to expose and discuss data otherwise missing from our view.

Following the interaction with my professors at the Department of Architecture at Berkeley, this dissertation significantly relies on the primary data of housing architecture, analyzed using the disciplinary tools of architecture history integrated with the methodologies of the social sciences. In this sense, research conducted for this dissertation is ‘traditional’, since it returns to the classical methods of the discipline of architecture history. But since architectural history has itself been deeply transformed by its engagement with social science methods (such as ethnography), a return to the classical core of architectural history is in fact also a contribution to the revival of its disciplinary method.

The architectural building type

Focusing study on a single building type is a long-standing method in architecture history, one that has been used by scholars well beyond the discipline, most notably perhaps by Michael Foucault. The survey of building types, associated with proto-historical architectural style like Greek, Roman or Gothic, was traditionally part of architectural courses in the late 19th and 20th century and was later used by modern scholars like Michael Foucault and others.

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82 See Barney Warf and Santa Arias, *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Taylor & Francis, 2009).
83 See my own paper at the ….. conference
86 Foucault, *Discipline & Punish*. 
architecture to break with 19th century architecture with after the emergence of new, modern building types such as the railway station. 86

The renewed interest in the study of architecture types as a method is undoubtedly influenced by Foucault’s formulation of his seminal theory of the modern institution by means of an analytical study of institution-types: the asylum, the prison, the clinic. 87 Other studies dealing with modern institutions such as the hospital or the summer camp rely on his conception of the institution. 88 It should be noted, however, that Foucault’s interest in the building type was very different than that of architects and architecture historians. In fact, he was not at all interested in the building type per se but rather in the extensive disciplinary measures employed by the modern state. The institution’s building type, as an object, enabled Foucault to zoom in on specific sets of practices applied on certain “parts” of the subject (the body, the mind, one’s sexuality, one’s death) and confront the vast disciplinary-reality of society.

The implications of Foucault’s study of modern institutions stimulated rethinking of what is at stake in their built environment. As modern institutions set out to work on the conduct of subjects – on their hearts and minds – those same subjects also brought their bodies with them, creating new architectural problems. These problems were then addressed with the formation of new building types, such as hospitals and modern schools. 89 Study of these new building types therefore served Foucault and others in their study of new forms of governance.

It should be pointed out, however, that Foucault studied not the primary source – the building itself, ideally when occupied by people – but secondary sources, in the form of writing about architecture. In the case of the Panopticon, Foucault studied Jeremy Bentham’s depictions of the Panopticon, and used the latter’s architecture drawings as illustrations to the text rather than as data. In “History of Madness” Foucault uses only textual descriptions of the asylum, including of its physical environment, opening his account of a Quaker asylum near York with the words “We know the images”. 90 We do not, however, know the images or the spaces unless we study them, using the primary source material of architecture, namely the building themselves and their architectural drawings and images. This dissertation explores issues stemming from Foucault’s examination of the building type, but it operates within the methodological tradition of architecture history by examining housing as a primary source of analysis using the methods of architecture history.

89 Foucault, Discipline & Punish.
Historical scope and the pivotal case study

Because the realization of Zionism as a nation building project began with the housing and settlement of small groups of Jews in Late Ottoman Palestine, it became clear that the historical scope of this research would have to address Zionism’s history as a whole. This is, no doubt, a daunting task and many studies have accordingly narrowed their historical focus, as can be seen in Zvi Efrat’s “The Israeli Project: 1948-1973”, or, more commonly, limited their investigation to a specific location, such as Haim Yacobi’s study of the city of Lod in the years 1948-2002.

My insistence on studying the entire historical scope of Jewish and Palestinian national housing resulted from observing the crucial role of housing for the nation building project. No such full historical account exists in the literature, which constitutes a major lacuna in the scholarship. Undertaking an inquiry of this vast historical period (1860-2005) nonetheless required limiting the scope of investigation by other means.

While Efrat’s project examines Israeli architecture as a whole, but within a limited time period, my research focuses on a single building type, housing - in the scholarly tradition of studying building types - but over a long historical time span. My first act was mapping the housing phenomena and possible ways to analyze them using a table which plots various types of housing beginning in 1860 according to agency which initiated the housing project, the population housed, housing type and location, settlement type and location, and ownership. Mapping also included analytical categories of political ideology, identity categories, political economy and relationship to space (fig. 0.27).

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Following the mapping and categorization process, resulting in very large number of housing phenomena to be studied, my research question was crystallized to focus on the nature of the ‘good national house’. However the mass housing phenomena required me to narrow my inquiry further in order to locate sites for in-depth archival study. I required a strategy for choosing specific, justifiable, sites of inquiry which transcend the ‘case study’ methods whose merit is representative of certain phenomena.

After long deliberations and discussion with my advisors I came to the conclusion that the study of case studies, representative of larger similar phenomena, the primary method in architectural history, seemed inappropriate for a project which wants to track a large and complex process of change. My project was invested in narrating a historical sequence by locating and studying cases of pivotal change, which served as laboratories for ‘good housing’: places or moments in which good housing was articulated and tried, rethought and reframed. Some of these cases, like the ‘first Hebrew city’ of Tel Aviv, are obvious and heavily researched. Others, like the world’s first children’s house in Kibbutz Beit Alpha, 1950’s immigrant housing in and around Ramla, or Palestinian housing following the Ottoman Land Code have never been thoroughly studied. What mattered for me in identifying pivotal cases for study was their role in shaping the ‘good’ national house rather than the availability of previous research. The scope of Zionism’s housing history is therefore addressed here by examination of a series of these pivotal cases. The aforementioned focus on housing eventually lead to the discovery of surprising data.
regarding all the pivotal cases, including the oft-studied modern urban planning of Tel Aviv.

Fig. 0.28 Pivotal cases examined in this research

**Sources**

This research is primarily archival in nature, in search of architectural drawings and planning documents, as well as visual documentation and textual descriptions of early dwelling environments. Study therefore focused on archives of architects and planning agencies. Key archives studied include the technical archives of Tel Aviv, Ramla, Mazra’aa and Beit Alpha; archives of the Jewish National Fund and Jewish Agency settlement operations at the Central Zionist Archive; and archives of the Ministry of Housing (and preceding departments in the ministries of Labor and Prime Minister) in the State Archive. In addition, my study included study of the built environment itself, which many times guided my research in the archives. This was especially true for my study of the Geddes plan housing in Tel Aviv, where houses from that era which were still standing led to my exploration of archival material.

As much of this work examines housing which is no longer standing, unplanned temporary housing and auto-constructed housing, no proper planning documentation was available for much of the earlier period of my investigation. As written documentation and artistic representation of the built environment in Israel-Palestine was many times suspect because of biases and orientalism, I was reluctant to rely upon it. One of my main sources of evidence (especially indispensable for the investigation of early, unplanned national dwellings) was therefore photography. Photographic data revealed the temporary dwelling environments (now long since gone and for which no archival evidence is available) which served newly-formed national housing explored in this study, throughout the historical period investigated, by both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. The mud shacks initially housing the first Kibbutz of Degania (ch. 2), the mud and straw shacks serving the first Arab-Palestinians settlements along the coast (ch. 3), the temporary immigrant housing in the 1950s (ch. 6), temporary housing for internal refugees (ch. 7) – were all documented primarily in photography. The methods of classic
architectural history, study of archival documentation of drawings and planning documents, was obviously not applicable to these dwelling environments, and focus on such sources alone would leave these dwellings outside the scope of inquiry.

While there are a number of artistic drawings available from the Late Ottoman and early Mandate periods, I preferred using photographs, because they include what Barthes defined the *punctum*, elements in the photograph disregarded by the photographer and likely to be missing from a drawing of the same place/time. The housing environment proved to be the true *punctum* of photographs, appearing many times in the back of the picture, behind the people at its front. Photographs were accessed in the Israeli National Photo Collection, the JNF archive, the CZA, the Library of Congress photo archive and secondary sources.

**Dissertation structure**

This dissertation is divided in three parts, each devoted to a different time period and focusing on a key attribute of the nation building project as it was executed via housing. Part I, “Historiographies of land reform and nationalism”, discusses the formation of nationalism in Late Ottoman Imperial Palestine as a direct result of the Ottoman land commodification code of 1858. Disconnecting imperial subjects’ relationship to their land, the land code led to mass peasant dispossession, and thus to the rise of a distinctly national consciousness among Palestinian Arabs, while also making possible, for the first time, Jewish attempts to materialize Zionism by housing and settlement. Part I tries to understand the housing environment that produced nationalism in Ottoman Palestine and why some forms of housing and settlement became ‘good’ while others did not. This part of the dissertation includes two chapters: Chapter 1 examines the conditions leading to the new Ottoman land code, its practical meaning and consequences for sovereignty for both empire and citizens. It seeks to understand the role of the Ottoman Empire in igniting nationalism in Palestine. Chapter 2 identifies housing environments which became dominant for nationalism and asks what made them significant for the nation building project.

Part II, “Nationalism as new-nativism” focuses on housing as means to claim rights over the homeland and define modern proto-citizens as ‘new-natives’. What kind of housing emerged from this “reset” of the political reality in Israel-Palestine? Part II includes three chapters: Chapter 3 discusses the new Palestinian housing formed after the Ottoman 1858 land code and asks how these houses served as the site for the formation of Palestinian nationalism. Chapter 4 uncovers the housing-based urban planning of Tel Aviv and asks “Can there be ‘native’ modern urbanism”? Chapter 5 discusses the Kibbutz children’s house as a site for nursing the ‘future state’ and asks how this housing shaped the built environment of the Kibbutz and the rural landscape in Israel.

Part III, “Housing and nation building in the age of state sovereignty”, examines the project of nation building under the aegis of statehood. It includes three chapters exploring the effects of statehood on national housing across several strata of Israeli society. Chapter 6 explores the consolidation of the *Zamud*, ‘good house’ and Israel’s

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regime of housing in the first five years of independence and asks how national housing helped the young state establish its fragile sovereignty vis-a-vis its Palestinian citizenry, world Jewry and in a situation of constant social unrest. Chapter 7 explores the transformation of Arab-Palestinian housing in Israel from rural ‘native’ housing to Summud, de-facto urban housing and its consequences for citizenship and nationality. It seeks to understand how Palestinian ‘bad’ housing was nevertheless able to make claims for the homeland and challenge Israel’s sole sovereignty over it. Chapter 8 provides a capsule overview history of the ‘good house’ (1948-2005) as a vehicle for producing a differentiated class system based on housing, and asks whether erosions of Zamud “good” housing by the state and its citizens have transformed the logic of housing-based differentiated citizenship.

In light of current social struggles over access to housing and social justice in Israel, the conclusion discusses housing as the quintessential object of agonistic conflict in Israel-Palestine, around which the Israeli polity is formed and reformed. It points toward a new understanding of the ‘good house’ housing typology.
Part I

Historiographies of Land Reform and Nationalism
Introduction:
The Commodification of the Homaland

Part I discusses the formation of nationalism in Late Ottoman Imperial Palestine as a direct result of the Ottoman land commodification code of 1858. Disconnecting imperial subjects from their relationship to their land, the land code led to mass peasant dispossession and to the formation of Palestinian nationalism as an attempt to reconstitute the native Palestinian relationship to the land. At the same time, by enabling monetary access to land for non-Muslims it made possible, for the first time, Jewish attempts to actualize Zionist ideas of a Jewish national home through housing and settlement in Zion.

Chapter 1 examines the conditions leading to the Ottoman new land code, and its practical meaning and consequences for sovereignty for both empire and subject. This chapter identifies the post-1858 built environment as a mass phenomenon of ‘leaving city walls’, encompassing all groups in Palestine, forming a distinct new housing environment – the ‘new native’ housing of nation building.

Chapter 2 examines the multitude of newly formed housing solutions and built environments following 1858 and attempts to ask why some have become sites for the formulation and materialization of nationalism while others have not.
Chapter 1: Housing Outside City Walls: New Forms of Sovereignty in Ottoman Palestine, in relation to the Commodification of Land, Labor and Money, 1858-1917

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1.1 Introduction:

This chapter locates the emergence of nationalism in Palestine as the result of the Ottoman 1858 land reform, leading to the commodification of land, labor and money, and eventually of Imperial sovereignty. The formation of both rural and urban Zionist environments (the Kibbutz and Tel Aviv respectively), as well as the transformation of the native Arab peasant village in Late Ottoman times, indicates that inquiry into nationalism in Palestine should focus on housing and settlement, rather than on the usual objects, such as Imperial political declarations and violent clashes, and on the Late Ottoman period rather than the British Mandate. Focusing historical inquiry on the built environment, this chapter identifies the phenomenon of ‘leaving city walls’ first made possible by the 1858 land code, as the crucial step by which Ottoman Palestine was transformed from a walled-city, imperial environment to a densely populated countryside, the homeland for two competing national projects.

The research for this chapter was carried out with a focus on questions of housing, since housing was the cornerstone of settlement, as evidenced by archival findings and memoirs and manifestations such as the recreation of Kibbutz Degania’s first shack in the Kibbutz centennial celebration of 2010.

Fig. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. Degania’s first shack and commune, recreated in the 2010 centennial celebrations. Source: Lavon Institute, NPC. President Shimeon Peres can be seen in the middle of fig. 1.2.

The emergence of nationalism in Palestine has been traditionally treated in the literature as a case of Western imperialism and colonization of the Orient, undertaken for the purpose of capitalist exploitation and using the technologies of modernization and the techniques of racialization of the Oriental. Study of housing, however, revealed data identifying the Ottoman Empire itself as the active agent in the formation of Zionist and Palestinian nationalism. Nationalism, which, according to Eric Hobsbawm, is meaningless unless materialized in a nation state, was formed in response to the Ottoman land reform which “completely transformed the relationship of people to land in the Ottoman Empire by permitting individuals to possess large areas of land”. The 1858

94 Historiographically ‘leaving city walls’ is associated with Jewish settlement and understood as a Zionist process, however the phenomenon was overarching and included all segments of Palestinian society. Yehoshua Ben Arie, “The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s,” Katedra 1, no. 2 (1977).
95 Nahum Gutman, A Little City and Few Men within It (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1959).
96 See for example LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
97 See Said, Orientalism.
98 Hobsbawm, “The Nation as Invented Tradition.”
land reform was unique in that, for the first time, land, labor and money in Palestine were commodified and sovereignty subjected to the logic of the market. By placing state land on the market, the Ottomans disconnected land from labor, thus placing labor, too, on the market.\textsuperscript{100} Allowing the introduction of commercial banks and a credit system enabled the further alienation of land and labor by for-profit sale of land\textsuperscript{101} leading to the dispossession of peasants, who now became tenants (without rights to land) of landlords, rather than rights bearing tenants of the state.\textsuperscript{102} The Ottomans thus subjected citizenship and sovereignty to market logic, as discussed by Aihwa Ong in the case of China.\textsuperscript{103}

The Ottoman experiment with land privatization via its 1858 land code was a dangerous one, which carried grave consequences for the Empire.\textsuperscript{104} Ottoman commodification of land, labor and money led affected populations to attempt to re-embed the economy in social relations by removing those same elements from the market in the framework of sovereignty, i.e. nationalism. The late Ottoman land reforms of 1858 thus represent a pivotal moment of change, a ‘restart’, for the Palestinian social system. A new ‘native language’ formed in Palestine, involving new patterns of relating to place and to the political system, had to be mastered in order to counter the new imperial logic which was being enforced. This process led to the eruption of nationalism in Palestine based on the logic of land reform for the native population. This study of nationalism as a process of agrarian land reform for the native population (as a people) is located in the context of similar studies in cases as varied as Indonesia\textsuperscript{105} and Bolivia.\textsuperscript{106}

Zionist and Palestinian nationalism will be studied here as concrete attempts to form sovereign entities in the homeland, after limited autonomy under imperial Ottoman rule, for example in the form of the Jewish farm (Moshava) or the Arab peasant village,

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
\textsuperscript{103} Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception (Duke University Press, 2006). Neoliberalism as Exception. University of California Press. Ong analyses China’s suspension of its sovereignty in Special Economic Zones in favor of international corporations and identifies it as experimentation with foreign governmental and economic systems as a “neoliberal regime of rule”. Her analysis offers an intriguing analogy to the situation in Late Ottoman Palestine, where the hinterland was subject to privatization and suspension of Imperial sovereignty as the Empire’s ‘space of exception’.
\textsuperscript{104} Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press, 2001). Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the conditions that gave rise to Fascism in Europe offer an intriguing analogy with the conditions that gave rise to nationalism in Ottoman Palestine. Karl Polanyi identified Fascism as a backlash response by European society to destructive processes commodifying land, labor and money whose placement on the market dis-embeds the economy from society and subjects social relations to market logic. Society is thus destroyed as such.
See Salim Tamai and Miron Benvenisti,’s discussion of Jerusalem ‘from multiculturalism to nationalism’ during Ottoman rule, in Misselwitz Peter and Tim Rieniets, ed. City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism (Basel: Birkhäuser Architecture,2006).
\textsuperscript{106} Nancy Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia (Stanford University Press, 2007).
became impossible following the land reform. Zionist and Palestinian nationalism were therefore attempts to prevent the destruction of society by re-embedding the economy in society through a de-commodifying backlash to the Ottoman 1858 land reform.  

The contribution made by this chapter is threefold. Extending the historical scope of inquiry to the Ottoman period, we will introduce the Ottoman role in the formation of nationalism in Palestine. Political economy, revealed as the native language of Late Ottoman Palestine suggests that the formation of nationalism was the direct consequence of the Ottoman land code. As far as urban issues are concerned, this chapter contributes to historical knowledge of the formation of the Israeli-Palestinian built environment, and especially knowledge of the reasons for the prominence of Tel Aviv and the Kibbutz among Zionist built environments and of the reasons for the vulnerability of the Arab peasant village to Zionist claims over the same homeland. Methodologically, this chapter demonstrates that nationalism cannot possibly be understood historically without careful study of its material realization in the built environment.

1.2 Ottoman Palestine as a Walled City Environment

Upon conquering Palestine from the Mamluke Empire in 1516, the Ottoman Sultan, Suleiman invested great efforts in building and reinforcing the walls around its ancient cities. The Ottomans understood their Imperial territory as composed of walled cities – comprised of private (Mulek) and endowment (Wakf) lands – and the lands outside of them which were state owned (Miri) yet cultivated and populated by tenants. As the Ottomans had no means for controlling all the Empire’s territory, they limited their rule to the cities and left the hinterland barren.  

Fig. 1.4 Jaffa, late 1860s. Source: Khatib, 2003.

Fig. 1.5 Acra, 1870s. Source: Khalidi, 1991.

Zionism understood the Jewish people to be the native inhabitants of Zion, and the national movement of Zionism as one of return to the ancestral land. This native language of Zionism was severely critiqued by some who regarded it as colonial (see Gershon Shafir, “Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach,” Israel in Comparative Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom (1996). for example). Nonetheless, disregarding Zionism’s self proclamation as native to Zion hinders our ability to understand why and how it was able to make claims for Ottoman Palestine as its homeland and gain purchase on it in the Late Ottoman framework.


Many scholars describe the Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe”, an incompetent and deteriorating world power with little control over its vast territory and population. Late Ottoman Palestine (as well as other Ottoman provinces) was indeed acutely ill-served by its government, which provided very little in the way of infrastructure, policing services and a legal framework.\textsuperscript{111} The reality in much of the empire was chaotic, as described by many travelers of the time.\textsuperscript{112} Yet, analyzing the local actors in Ottoman Palestine, Haim Gerber posits that the lack of public security in fact signals that the Ottoman government was strong enough to prevent the consolidation of any local force as a challenger to the central authority within the country, a force which would be able to reduce lawlessness.\textsuperscript{113} The Ottoman means for causing chaos in the countryside of the coastal plain was the nomads, while in the mountainous parts of country the main factor was the incessant violence among the powerful local elite of village sheiks.\textsuperscript{114} It is evident that as long as this state of near-anarchy prevailed, any political or economic development of the countryside — requiring more governing resources - was virtually ruled out.\textsuperscript{115} The Empire thus relied on sovereignty over the cities and left the countryside largely ungoverned, undeveloped and subject to Bedouin attacks and arbitrary rule.\textsuperscript{116}

The walled cities of Ottoman Palestine - Jerusalem, Jaffa, Tiberius and Safed - were small, crowded, badly serviced and disconnected from one another. These cities were the centers of small geographical areas, characterized by Mulek land ownership, where the city’s produce was grown. Very little was produced in the cities, and very little commerce

\textsuperscript{111} Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917. LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
\textsuperscript{112} Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad: (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1959).
\textsuperscript{113} Gerber, ”A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem.”.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
was carried on beyond local consumption.\textsuperscript{117} The justification for the cities’ existence involved specific geographical attributes like Jaffa’s port or religious-historical pilgrimage sites like in Jerusalem. Yet, for the Ottomans, the cities served as portals for laying claim to their vast territory. Municipalities, i.e. administrative bodies independent of the government, did not exist in Palestine before the *tanzimat*, reflecting the fact that Ottoman rule itself was conducted via the cities as instruments of rule rather than as independent local entities. For example, Jerusalem’s municipality was established only in 1863 and Jaffa’s in 1872.\textsuperscript{118} The Ottoman era in Palestine can thus be understood as one of walled cities. Following Gerber, I would like to argue that the era’s scarcity was in fact intended: it represented a policy and strategy of minimal governance.

This reality affected the formation of villages as well, built with defense in mind “like forts and close together.”\textsuperscript{119} Moreover, observers of the time like Elihu Grant likened villages as fragments of a city: “the houses of a small village are oftentimes just as closely packed as the buildings in a city, so that a village will look like a fragment knocked off a city....This compactness of the village became a fashion in times of insecurity, when feuds between villages led to raids and reprisals.”\textsuperscript{120} The pre-*tanzimat* Ottoman era in Palestine can thus be understood as one of walled cities, despite the fact that the majority of the people were peasants living in villages.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figures.png}
\caption{The village of El-Salt and Beit Haneif. Source: Langlois, 1923.\textsuperscript{122}}
\end{figure}

The political instability and lack of rule in Ottoman Palestine made living conditions highly insecure and dependent on protection. This protection was either in the form of walls around settlements (especially cities),\textsuperscript{123} housing in defensive formations serving as walls, or in armed militias defending movement between cities and life outside city


\textsuperscript{118} Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Middle East*.

\textsuperscript{119} George Robinson Lees, *Village Life in Palestine: A Description of the Religion, Home Life, Manners, Customs, Characteristics and Superstitions of the Peasants of the Holy Land, with Reference to the Bible* (Green: Longmans, 1905). p. 75.

\textsuperscript{120} Elihu Grant, *The People of Palestine: An Enlarged Ed. Of the Peasantry of Palestine, Life, Manners, and Customs of the Village* (JB Lippincott Co., 1921 [1907]). pp. 43-44.


\textsuperscript{122} This was supported by the nature of multi-layered law, described by Weber as the Kadi legal system. See Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem."


\textsuperscript{123} The Jerusalem and Jaffa city walls were erected by the Ottomans, reflecting the need for fortifications under their rule. References.
walls. Ottoman rule by scarcity, leading to civil chaos and lack of personal security, made walled cities the only secure habitat prior to and even after the *tanzimat*. Roads were bad and poorly maintained. Gangs and brigandage thrived. Several reports indicate that venturing outside city walls even during the day required armed escort for fear of gangs. The violence inflicted on those attempting to live outside the protection of city walls is manifest for example in the case of the American missionaries of Mount Hope and their farm outside Jaffa, attacked by Bedouins in 1858 and abandoned.

### 1.2.1 The 1858 Tanzimat Land Code: The End to the Walled-City Era.

The walled-city era ended in Ottoman Palestine around the middle of the 19th century. The need to meet technological changes of the battlefield, which became unmistakable following the Crimean war, led to an imperial monetary deficit and the necessity of new sources of revenue for the imperial mechanism. This deficit led the Empire to reconsider its strategy for territorial control and look for ways to generate revenues from the vast imperial hinterland. The Ottoman government decided to open up the countryside for exploitation via taxation of more of its imperial territory. It thus had to find a governing mechanism which enabled ruling over the countryside without increasing expenses on governing power. The 1858 land code was an important vehicle in this new governing mechanism, an extension of the *Tanzimat* reforms to the areas of agricultural property and taxation.

The code reaffirmed prior laws pertaining to land and introduced two major innovations that, by permitting individuals to possess large areas of land, completely transformed the relationship of people to land in the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the nineteenth century.

The *Tanzimat* represented a new system for administering the imperial land by regulation of landed property, meeting two main challenges: First, the governance challenge posed by the tax collecting social strata, the *ayan* local urban elites, which threatened to fragment imperial governance. Second, as mentioned above, the growing need for

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125 See Akiva Arieh Weiss depiction of touring the Kerem Jebali plot, Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv.*

126 The Mount Hope settlers were the grandparents of American author John Steinbeck. Kark, *Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.*


129 The *iltizam*, or tax farming, was ineffective as indicated by data that sometimes no candidate appeared who would farm out the tithes, which is of course an unlikely occurrence where the tax farmer has effective control over the countryside. Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Middle East.*

130 It should be noted that many researches of the Ottoman Empire and its *tanzimat* reforms ignore the 1858 land reform altogether and focus on aspects of governance and military reform. See especially Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora.*

revenue required increasing tax revenues by encouraging transformation of more land into productive and thus taxable land. Guaranteeing property rights, new forms of tenure and taxation, as well as rationalization of governance were the measures taken to enhance cultivation of existing lands and encourage the reclamation of uncultivated or “dead” lands, thus guaranteeing an increase in tax revenues. The 1858 Land Code was a response to these multiple needs. Following the 1858 reforms, land owners who lived in cities all over the Empire regarded land as a means of production, to be traded between them as such. The peasants, previously tenants of the state and now tenant of the landowners, typically remained on the land as part of its production mechanism.132

1.2.1.1 The Ottoman Land System

Classical Ottoman land-tenure legislation made a fundamental distinction between the right to cultivate land (tasarruf) and the absolute ownership of land (raqaba). The two main categories of land were mülk and miri. The owners of mülk land combined the right to cultivate with absolute ownership which comes closest to private property as understood in the West. This land was largely confined to cities and orchards adjacent to them and constituted a small proportion of land in the empire. Miri land, by contrasted, was owned by the empire; the actual cultivators of the land were essentially tenants of the empire, although they were entitled to pass on the right of cultivation to their heirs and thus possessed the right of access to the land as state tenants. Miri land constituted the vast majority of agricultural land in the empire and taxes on it were a primary source of income for the Ottoman imperial state.

Ottoman Palestine was a predominantly agricultural economy, yet less than a third of it was considered arable.133 The topographical features and poor soil meant that the rural population barely subsisted. As one scholar has noted: “Control of this limited amount of fertile land became the essential criterion for prestige and influence. One’s relationship to land reflected one’s political, economic and weaknesses and strengths.”134

1.2.1.1.1 Categories of land use:

Ottoman Imperial land was categorized into six classes of use: mülk, miri, wakf, mawat, mahlul, and matruka. As we have seen, Mülk lands were held in complete freehold and were exempt from tithe. This land could be disposed of through sale, mortgage and bequeathal. Most mülk land in Palestine was confined to urban areas and only a negligible fraction of it was agricultural.135

Miri land was state land, held by usufruct, which gave legal right to the land and to profits from it. Miri land could not be mortgaged or sold without the consent of the Ottoman Land Office. Productive cultivation of miri land was taxed by the state, which thus had an interest in assuring its productive cultivation. Miri land could not be used for

132 Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.
134 Ibid, p.3.
135 In the immediate vicinity of Jaffa a certain number of orange groves were on mülk land. Stein, ibid.
brick making, for building houses and planting vineyards or orchards. When miri land remained uncultivated for three years it reverted back to the state.

Wakf land was land held as part of a religious endowment; profits derived from Wakf lands funded religious institutions. Mawat was ‘dead’ land, uncultivated thus not profitable. Mahlul land was land which had lapsed from productive use. Matruka land was land used for communal purposes such as roads.

1.2.1.1.2 Categories of tenancy:
Miri, Mülk and Wakf lands was held in several tenancy patterns, the most common and significant for our discussion is the musha, or collective land ownership. Accounts of the Musha land system, (also spelled Musha’, Mousha, Moucha) either in the scholarly literature or in accounts by contemporary travelers and settlers are scarce, especially in the English language. Most scholarly study of this land system is very dated (from the 1940s, for the most part) and involving intensive value judgments mixed with data, based in the ideology of political economy and orientalism.

Fig. 1.9 An Arab village near TulKarem, 1931. Source: Miriam Arazi (Family album)

Musha is the Palestinian and Syrian Arabic name of a form of group land ownership, also known in many other countries of the Near East.136 Under this system the “land is held in common by all the inhabitants of a village, and apportioned at stated times to the individual cultivators according to their ability to cultivate.”137 The right of the individual fellah, local peasant farmer, to cultivate part of the musha land was handed down from father to son. The title of the village as a whole to its lands was called haq el-muzdra’a (right of sowing) - right to usufruct. The land itself, however, did not belong to the village, but to the Imperial Ottoman State, in its capacity as the legal heir of the Emirs. The miri character of the land was emphasized by such regulations as that which made it unlawful for villagers to build houses or plant trees on these lands unless granted special permission from the imperial treasury. The lands of the village were distributed annually, or once every two or three years, among the immediate or extended families, according to various principles, among which were the number of oxen available for plowing and the

number of able bodied men. In accord with a traditional sense of justice, no family received its share of land in one single plot, but in numerous widely separated plots, so that not only did each family receive exactly the quantity of land it was entitled to, but its allotments were also equivalent in quality (nature of the terrain, proximity to water).\textsuperscript{138} The redistribution of lands was effected by casting lots.\textsuperscript{139}

Despite the communal essence of the musha system, it included little solidarity in terms of land improvements and careful exploitation.\textsuperscript{140} Yet as musha lands could neither be sold nor mortgaged, villagers were bound to the village as place and community. Until 1863, all the lands in Palestine and the neighboring countries, apart from the towns and their immediate environment, were held in a mash\textsuperscript{a} tenancy. In that year the Ottoman government introduced the "betterment" measure which divided the land among individual owners and provided for registration of the parcels in the names of their owners.\textsuperscript{141} The change from the musha to individual holding system had an immediate and considerable effect. Where this conversion came into effect, fellahen had legal ownership of their land for the first time. At the same time, the distribution of village holdings made it possible to convert land into money and alienate it. Since this was impossible under the musha system, musha must be seen as an important traditional and national institution of the Palestinian Arab population, connecting people to their homeland as individuals as well as a collective. The progress of land distribution was such that in 1917, when four hundred years of Ottoman rule over Palestine came to an end, about 70\% of the village lands were still cultivated under the musha system.\textsuperscript{142} Where village land was not distributed to its peasants, absentee landlords and urban notables (ayan) were often able to gain hold of very large tracts of land as a result of the musha system, usually as result of imperial corruption.\textsuperscript{143}

\textbf{1.2.1.1.3 Categories of tax collection rights:}

In addition to use and tenancy frameworks, land was also allocated by tax collection rights. The timar system, formed in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, was based on tax collection rights over large segments of land given to military officers who collected the land tax and used it to procure and equip military forces to fight the empire's wars. The Ottoman Empire thus made a direct connection between military sustainability of its territorial scope and the land itself, by which land productivity directly financed imperial sovereignty over that land. The empire received military services in exchange for the exploitation of land. By the 1800s, this system was gradually replaced by one called iltizam (tax farming). Wealthy individuals, often government officials, would bid at open auction for the right to collect taxes, transferring an agreed-upon proportion of taxes to the government and keeping the rest. The idea of ‘tax farming’ represented another level of productive use of the land, by which taxes were understood as a form of produce. While initially, tax farms

\textsuperscript{138} Patai, "Musha Land Tenure and Cooperation in Palestine."
\textsuperscript{139} Patai gives a detailed ethnographic account the allotment process. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Edwin Samuel, \textit{Handbook of the Communal Villages in Palestine} (Jerusalem1945).
\textsuperscript{142} Patai, "Musha Land Tenure and Cooperation in Palestine."
\textsuperscript{143} Guzel, "The Implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of in Eastern Anatolia".
were granted for limited periods of time, in a further development, they were granted for life, and even became inheritable. These grants were known as *malikane*, one consequence of which was that, over time, tax farmers augmented their autonomy from the state and often became local rulers, the *ayan*. The *ayan* thus provided the empire with administrative services, which enabled it to control local populations with only a meager investment of resources. The Ottomans thus made a direct connection between governance of territory and the extraction of profit from agricultural land and labor.

The new code, in fact, was specifically meant to address the problem of the *ayan* as a local urban elite, whose governing service to the Empire was repaid by granting them control of political and religious offices in exchange for tax farming rights. By the 1800s the *ayan*’s tax farming power over the peasantry deepened to de-facto governance which threatened the central imperial government in a series of separate conflicts throughout the empire. Sultan Mahmud II's successful campaign to reassert state control over the *ayan* created a need for a new system to administer state lands by regulations of landed property, while simultaneously preventing a reemergence of the *ayan*’s political challenge. The new land code transformed the role of the *ayan* from unaffiliated middlemen to subjects of the empire and, by turning them into tax-payers, it placed them under the direct sovereignty of the empire. At the same time, however, the code disconnected the empire from its other subjects, the peasantry, by subjugating them to the *ayan* landowners, whose interests were profit-based, rather than to the empire.

1.2.1.2  *Innovations of the 1858 Land Code*

The land code altered the nature of land ownership in much of the Empire. It was concerned with determining the legal status of the taxpayer. Its major consequence was the disconnection of taxpayer/owner from the cultivator in many parts of the empire. The fellah now bore the risk of the owner disposing of them, which is exactly what happened. While previously the fellah was a subject of the empire and had a connection to the land, he now became merely a means of production, disposable without compensation, because the *ayan*, whose primary motive was profit, now held the direct right to the land. This caused a de-facto alienation of the land, away from the effective control of the state and towards a regime of private land ownership – for the first time in the Muslim world.

While villagers’ collective right of cultivation was respected by the state as landowner, once landownership reverted to the *ayan*, the right of cultivation lost most of its meaning with landowners’ decisions to change land use or replace the workers. The Empire thus betrayed the majority of its subjects by disconnecting them from land and subjecting them to the *ayan* who placed land on the market. This was made possible as result of two crucial innovations. The first was the obligation of landowners to register their land with the government and receive a formal title deed to the land. Second, the code specifically stated that legal ownership of land took precedence over actual occupation and cultivation, thus defining legal and monetary ownership of land as superior to habitation and cultivation, and enabling absentee ownership. The code transformed the nature of

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legal ownership of land. The nature of Ottoman land laws, which distinguished between ownership of land and rights over that same land, entailed cruel consequences for the peasantry. While prior to 1858, legal ownership of the land was held by the state and the irrevocable right of cultivation was held by the peasantry, after 1858 legal ownership by the время undermined and even annulled the peasants’ right of cultivation. Covenants written into the law in order to protect the peasants’ right of cultivation were many times averted and corruption many times led to the sale of musha collectively held land to single landlords. If land were sold, the new owner was not required to respect the peasants’ right of cultivation. While some landowners kept the peasants as paid labor (rather than taxpaying farmers), in many cases the peasants were dispossessed due to changes in agricultural use or their replacement with ‘better’ workers. Following the promulgation of the new code, legal ownership was the product of formal deeds for land bought on the market. This had direct consequences for citizenship. Whereas previously, those who did not cultivate land (the время nobility) possessed the right to collect taxes as middlemen between the landowner (the Ottoman Empire) and tenants-cultivators, now those who did not cultivate land could possess land and become taxpayers themselves. Therefore, while, prior to 1858, the время were disposable middlemen, as revenue generating landowners they became in fact the Empire’s proper subjects, placed under direct Imperial sovereignty. Tenants, now subject to landowners’ profit-based decisions, lost their right of access to land and became subject to eviction and dispossession.

The cynical dispossession of peasants for the sake of land-based profit is commonly blamed on the landlords. However it should be recognized that it was the Empire-landowner itself which, by means of the 1858 land code, separated land from labor and transformed land into a commodity on the open market. Concerning the code, one writer observes that “long before the Balfour Declaration, which is often seen as the fount of all contention over Palestine, the inarticulate but ancient peasantry had slipped a rung on the ladder which was to lead them down into the refugee camps in 1948.”

1.2.1.3 Misconceptions regarding the Tanzimat and the 1858 Land Code
Martin Bunton, who studied colonial land policies in Palestine during the British mandate, stated that “much of the literature on the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict has focused on the question of transfer of land from Arab owners to Jewish purchasers… [this focus] has narrowed the history of land policies to a narrative of loss, with an emphasis on how [British] colonial policies…and Zionism…developed in Palestine a new land regime, a fundamental disjunction from what was there before”. However,
states Bunton “a substantial proportion of the 10 percent of land transferred from Arabs to Jews by 1948...was purchased prior to the mandate coming into effect”. The bulk of these transactions, Bunton states quoting Rashid Khalidi, were “purely economic”, the result of land sale by absentee landlords. 151 Bunton thus makes a clear and uncompromising statement that the new land regime in Palestine, enabling the commodification of land and its sale to Jews (and thereby the formation of a Jewish homeland and the dispossession of Arab native peasants) was a product of the Ottoman period.

This, states Bunton, is a surprising conclusion as received literature views Western colonialism responsible for policies leading to the commodification of Palestine’s land. The fact that the British kept most of the Ottoman land policies in place, supplementing and supporting them with a modern planning mechanism, too indicates that the British found no need to adjust the land code in Palestine, since the commodification of land was already embedded in it. Furthermore, these changes in policy, which enabled land transfers and generated the two competing national movements, should thus be examined in the Ottoman framework rather than the British Mandatory one.

Another misconception concerns the implementation of the new code. According to Findley, “The hoary truism about Ottoman history of the latter periods includes the propositions that new laws and reforms remained mostly ‘on paper’ and that the examination of how the measures were officially prescribed tells little about how they were actually implemented”. 152 This truism is a problem of analysis.

1.2.1.3.1 Intentions and planning:

Land costs in Jerusalem’s periphery increased from 65 francs per hectare, to 300 francs per hectare between 1870 and the First World War. The cost of land at the periphery of Jaffa increased from 10 to 300 francs per hectare. The cost of agricultural land rose too, from 0.7 francs per hectare to 30. 153 It is frequently asserted that this outcome was precisely the opposite of what the Ottoman government intended, 154 yet a Polanyian reading of this code suggests otherwise. If a primary purpose of the code was to raise revenues for the imperial treasury, it was a success: Between 1887 and 1910, a period when the territory of the empire was shrinking, the revenue collected from the agricultural tax increased from 426 million to 718 million piasters. 155 Even allowing for the fluctuations in the currency rates and inflation, it is evident that both demand and land

152 Carter Findley, Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center, in Kushner, David, Ed., Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Brill Press, 1986).
153 Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.
155 Guzel, "The Implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of in Eastern Anatolia". While before 1858 Itizam tax farming licenses were had to procure. See footnote 31.
cost increased markedly. As result of land commodification, this goal was met without increasing imperial expenditure on governance. Most scholars ascribe the causes of rising land cost to Western intervention rather than to the Ottoman’s own land codes of 1858. Yet, as Gerber states, “most of the changes were in most probability generated by the Tanzimat movement itself”.

1.2.1.3.2 Imperialism and nationalism:

David Kushner writes that, “it happened to be the Ottoman Empire which ruled over Jews and Arabs at just that particular moment in their history when they began aspiring toward national liberation and it was only natural that much of their protest and grievances be directed at their Ottoman masters”. Yet, one should ask whether the eruption of nationalism just happened to occur under the Ottomans or whether the Ottomans somehow contributed to this process. I would like to show that the Ottomans indeed contributed to the emergence of a new alternative to imperial sovereignty in Palestine in the form of the competing nationalist movements of Jews and Arabs.

1.2.1.3.3 Social class:

Scholars discussing the social consequences of the 1858 land code tend to read it as a class phenomenon. “Urban leaders and their families…transformed their traditional type of influence into…power based on landowning and office-holding in…state bureaucracy”, according to Philip Khoury. As we mentioned above, the alignment of the ayan with the Empire rather than with the local population had clear class consequences, by enabling the commodification of land and dispossession of the local population. Yet these are dwarfed by the consequences for nationalism. By aligning with the Empire, and contributing to the dispossession of the fellahen the ayan thereby hindered their own ability to pose as leaders of a Palestinian national movement. As Bunton shows, reverse-historical scholarship tends to organize social groups in Palestine according to their present day allegiances. The historical data, however, challenges the validity of these categories.

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157 Kark, ibid.
158 Gerber’s study is based on a rare Ottoman archive situated at the Israel State Archive, Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem."
159 David Kushner, ed. Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Brill,1986).
160 Reilly states that that word ‘Palestine’ refers to the areas later incorporated into the British mandate over Palestine, since “In Ottoman times, “Palestine” as such did not have a separate administrative existence”. Rather, it was composed of three districts and administered from the regional cities of Damascus, Jerusalem and Gaza. Reilly, “The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine.”
161 Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 1983). P. 3. Khoury’s work deals with the Damascus sanjuk but is largely applicable to Palestine as well.
162 Shafir gives data indicating the ayan of the three sanguks which later formed Palestine were responsible for selling 23% of the land sold to Jews. More specifically, families leading the Palestinian national movement as the Husayni and Nashashibi families too sold land to Jews. Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914.
1.2.2 A New Native Language in Palestine: Political Economy and the backlash of Nationalism

Gershon Shafir, in his groundbreaking study ‘Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882-1914’ stated that when Zionist leaders “had to make choices, adopt or reject models, and change strategies of action, they constructed these not so much from the grand cloth of general ideologies as from the simpler materials of concrete methods of settlement.” The ‘materials of concrete settlement’ in Ottoman Palestine, posits Shafir, were land, labor and national struggle. Shafir begins his historical inquiry in 1882 with the second wave of Jewish immigration, thus locating this particular stream of Zionism as the key to the processes at hand. Still, while positing that land, labor and nationalism were the local logic of Late Ottoman Palestine, he does not precisely locate its origins. Shafir goes so far as to term the Late Ottoman period ‘the pre-Mandate era’.

Karl Polanyi’s groundbreaking study of the great transformation of European civilization is used here to understand the collapse of Imperial sovereignty in Palestine as the result of Ottoman commodification of land, labor and money, leading to the collapse of imperial society and social structure. Disembedding the market and subordinating society to it annihilates the human and the natural substances of society. This destruction, states Polanyi, is met with a backlash which attempts to restore society, a backlash which may generate its own abnormalities such as fascism and other tensions which lead to social unrest. Ottoman society was indeed destroyed, including the society of local tenants and noble elite. The emerging national movements, Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, promoted explicit agendas insisting on self-rule, which would eventually construct new societies by safeguarding land, labor and money from commodification.

My inquiry into the processes of housing and settlement in Late Ottoman Palestine led to the study of Tanzimat reforms (starting 1839) and especially to the 1858 Land Code as the central events which enabled the emergence of nationalism. Study of the 1858 Land Code serves to contextualize nationalism as the native language for Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Moreover, locating the emergence of the language of land and labor in the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms brings the Ottoman governmental framework back into the foreground. The formation of Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms is thus studied not only one against the other but also against the backdrop of imperial sovereignty, as alternatives to it. The Ottoman framework associates the 1858 commodification of land, labor and money with local society’s rejection of this process, a rejection which was expressed by the attempt to form alternative modes of governance. Jewish settlement, states Shafir, became conceivable only through the creation of a land market. It stood on two pillars:

164 Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914.. p. 3.
165 Shafir, ibid. p. 22.
166 Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
167 Pappe, "The Rise and Fall of the Husainis.”.
168 Shafir himself critiques scholars of Israeli-Palestinian history for starting their inquiry with WW1 and the British Mandate and not attempting an understanding of processes preceding it. Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914. p. 4.
the WZO Jewish National Fund purchasing land on the market in order to *take it off the market by designating it as “national land”*, and the workers’ unions actions to *circumvent the land and labor markets*. It was around these that Zionist nationalism evolved as an attempt to form a new sovereign society, in a process directly opposed to that of the commodification of land, labor and money which was eroding late Ottoman society.

### 1.2.3 Leaving City Walls: A Historical Shift

While pre-*Tanzimat* Ottoman Palestine was a geography of walled cities, the *Tanzimat* led to the formation of new un-walled towns like Beer-Sheba, which was intended to facilitate the settlement and taxation of the Bedouins, and de-walled cities like Jaffa whose walls were torn down to enable urban expansion. The *Tanzimat* attempt to enforce Ottoman rule beyond the cities was expressed in a dramatic transformation in urban and rural settlements, essentially in breaking away from the old walled city.

“Leaving City Walls” is a key term in Zionist historiography, which refers to the building of the first Jewish neighborhoods outside Jerusalem’s city walls as the first act of Zionist sovereignty, despite the fact that this process engulfed all publics in Palestine, and not only the Jewish community. That even ‘Old Historians’ of Zionism understood the neighborhoods outside Jerusalem’s walls in Zionist terms despite the fact that these neighborhoods were dependent on philanthropy (and on the city itself) is a significant fact which points to housing and settlement as important units of analysis, predating other expressions of political change. The term “leaving city walls” was usually used to refer only to neighborhoods outside Jerusalem. Very few scholars used it to refer to the new neighborhoods outside Jaffa. Yet it is important to understand all settlements outside Ottoman walled cities as a case of “leaving city walls”. This understanding can serve as an analytical ground upon which to compare them as attempts to step outside the Ottoman framework and establish some form of Jewish (or other) sovereignty; and in this way can we ask why some proved significant while others were not.

#### 1.2.3.1 New Settlement Forms

The 1858 land code led to a slow yet steady process of stepping outside the protection of city walls and of the Ottoman government; it was in essence a civil rebellion which sought alternative forms of protection. The process began with institutions built by Christians, mostly pilgrimage complexes built under the auspices of European powers, which became possible as result of the Capitulation System imposed by world powers on the Ottomans. Following the Christians, individual Muslim effendis, or landowners,
began to build mansions for themselves outside city walls.\textsuperscript{176} Last were the Jews, leaving the city due to the epidemics and overcrowding among the poor.\textsuperscript{177} By 1874 there were six Jewish neighborhoods outside Jerusalem’s city walls,\textsuperscript{178} as well as a number of Christian pilgrimage complexes\textsuperscript{179} and Muslim effendi residences. This was the beginning of a process that shifted the center of Jerusalem outside of the protection of the Ottoman-walled city.\textsuperscript{180} The actors in the search for new forms of sovereignty included world powers, Zionist Jews, and local peasants losing their land-based identity. While scholarship focuses mostly on world powers and their colonialism – it remains a fact that the world powers and the logic of empire ultimately lost control over the territory of Palestine,\textsuperscript{181} leaving the struggle over it to be waged by two popular movements of land reform. Unfortunately, the two peoples staked their claims for land reform on the same land as their homeland.

1.2.3.2 \textit{The Native and Non-native Actors in Late Ottoman Palestine and Their Uses of the 1858 Land Code.}

While current scholarship, influenced by present-day understandings of the actors at hand, categorizes neighborhoods outside the walls by religion and meshes it with nationality (i.e. Jewish vs. Palestinian), this distinction glosses over significant differences within Jewish, Muslims and Christian societies. “Muslims” included three main social groups, very different from each other: fellaheen, landowning \textit{ayan}, and the colonial Ottoman rule itself, as well as that of its Egyptian challenger, Ibrahim Pasha, making ‘Muslim’ a very problematic analytical category. Christian locals were divided in a number of religious sects in constant strife concerning access to the holy sites. In addition, there were European political-religious counselors representing Christianity and Western interests and aiming to gain control over the deteriorating Muslim Empire, making ‘Christian’ too problematic as a category. The Jews in Palestine belonged to two main communities: the Old Yishuv and the New Yishuv, which differed primarily in their understanding of the role of Jewish residency in the Holy Land. ‘Jewish’ is thus also a problematic analytical category. In this section, I aim to review the local actors of post-1858 Palestine in terms of their actual and aspired relationship with the place, via labor and residence. Essentially, I claim, these differences are between ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’, although these are terms which are problematized in this study. This seems to me the most appropriate framework within which to understand the extremely important differences among the communities, as they are manifested in housing and settlement, or in the dispossession from these.

1.2.3.2.1 \textit{The Muslim public}

\textsuperscript{176} Pappe, “The Rise and Fall of the Husainis.”.
\textsuperscript{177} Ben Arie, "The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s." Kark, "The Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa 1840-1917."
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Jerusalem’s old city walls (still standing) were constructed by the Ottomans 1537-1541. ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Morris located the moment of imperial loss for national movements to be WW2, yet it seems to me that looking at the built environment rather than at wars would locate this moment of the loss of empire much earlier, with the Ottoman land reform for Jews and local serfs. Benny Morris, \textit{One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict} (Yale University Press, 2009). p. 37.
The Muslim public was comprised of two main social groups: the fellahin (agricultural workers) and urbanites led by the ayan, the elite of effendis (land owners). The fellahin leased the land from effendis who lived in cities, sometimes as far away as Damascus. This semi-feudal system, in addition to the health and security hazards outside the city, marked life outside the walls as of a lower class than urban life.\footnote{Hillel Cohen, \textit{Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948} (University of California Press, 2008), p. 32}

1.2.3.2.1.1 The fellaheen native population

Fellaheen were made tenants as a result of the new Ottoman land law of 1858. Fearing both Bedouins and tax extortions, the farmers either abandoned their ownership rights to the tax collector or to a city-dwelling strongman, thus becoming tenant farmers. In this way, large amounts of land came into the hands of a few owners, and the socio-economic gap widened.\footnote{Raymond E. Crist, \textit{Land for the Fellahin: Land Tenure and Land Use in the near East} (Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1961).} This also contributed to the strength of urban families – a phenomenon particularly widespread in Jerusalem and Jaffa toward the end of the Ottoman era. In addition, the transformation of large tracts of barren land into farms required their cultivation and the formation of new peasant villages in the flatlands, which were from their inception tenant villages, easily dispossessed.

The case of Metula: Isaac Epstein, a Jewish settler, wrote in 1907 of the Jewish land reform that resulted of the Ottoman land laws of 1858 and 1876, which finally allowed Jews to buy land across the Empire.\footnote{Sandra Marlene Sufian, \textit{Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920-1947} (University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 57} Epstein pointed to the consequences of the Jewish land reform for the native fellaheen, by noting the difference between absentee landowners and fellaheen in terms of relationship to the land, i.e. between Arabs as native and Arabs as for-profit landowners. Agricultural land, previously owned by effendis as a means of production, was now being bought by Jews, as a means for identity formation through reconnecting to their ancestral land. As such they were not interested in profiting from the land by using serfs to cultivate it. Rather, they aimed to leave the city walls, inhabit the land, and cultivate it themselves, something which they had been unable to do prior to 1876. Zionism’s logic of land reform for Jews, claimed Epstein as early as 1907, was blind to the above differences in Arab society, thus to the consequences of dispossession for fellaheen. “While we feel the love of homeland, in all its intensity, toward the land of our fathers, we forget that the people living there now also has a feeling heart and a loving soul,” wrote Epstein. “The Arab, like any person, is strongly attached to his homeland”. Epstein recounts the sale of Metullah and the impact of the sale on its Druze fellahin:

In 1897-1898 the purchase of the Druze village Metullah, in the Iyun valley on our northern border, was completed, and the large, well-known settlement of that name--the crown jewel of the \textit{yishuv}--was founded… in the village of Metullah were more than a hundred Druze families on leased land that had changed ownership several times. The

\footnote{Kark, \textit{Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917}, p. 31.}

\footnote{Epstein, "A Hidden Question."}
last owner was a certain pasha who loathed his tenants because he could neither evict them nor collect payment. Several times the government was forced to lay siege to the village and wage war upon it in order to extract the tithe. The pasha tried to sell the estate, but found no buyer, because no one wanted to take on or to expel by force such tenants who had grown old on the land (they had dwelled there for some ninety years)… And the day came to pass when the settlement official came to Metullah with a bag of gold coins in his carriage, and as though by chance there also appeared an army officer with troops, who came to arrest those evading military service--there are many of these among the Druze and the government does not pursue them diligently--and they were ready to command the hold-outs to sign the bills of sale. All of them of course signed, and within a few days more than six hundred souls left the village of their birth.185

1.2.3.2.1.2 The Ayan native population

The extensive scholarship on pre-Israeli Palestinian society focuses on the ayan elite families, depicting them as leaders of the Palestinian national movement. Very little scholarship exists on the everyday life of the fellaeen and their role in nationalism. Pappe, for example, devoted great scholarly effort to ‘The Rise and Fall of the Husaynis’,186 the leading family of Palestinian Arab ayan, who were given great power by the central authority in Istanbul in the form of political and religious offices, among them the office of the Mufti and of mayor of Jerusalem. As we mentioned earlier, the notables’ peculiar position enabled the central government to administer the provinces from afar. Therefore, the essence of ayan politics was the careful mediation between the society they represented and the authority that appointed them.187

“The ayan became the social leadership in their localities due to the double-edged legitimacy granted to them both by their society, which respected the notables' religious standing, and by the central authority in Istanbul, which vested the notables with important positions within the provinces”.188 The Husaynis’ modus operandi, states Pappe, “enabled adaptation to every new regime…it saw the Husaynis through dramatic upheavals including the two major revolutions in Palestine’s fortune: the end of Ottomanism in 1908 and the termination of Islamic rule altogether in 1918. It was not however sufficient in the face of Zionism.”189

Why was Zionism so powerful, compared to Husayni politics? Pappe ascribes the difference to Zionism’s ethics of dispossession. This seems insufficient, however, since many scholars attest to the dispossession of fellaeen by the Husaynis themselves.190 The Husayni family, which produced leaders such as Haj Amin al-Husayni, the last mufti of Jerusalem and self-proclaimed leader of Palestinian nationalism who objected strongly to the sale of land to Jews and foreigners yet never to the transfer of lands to effendis like themselves, thereby defending their own rights to own land as property rather than the...

185 Ibid.
186 Pappe, "The Rise and Fall of the Husainis."
187 Ibid.. See also Shafir, "Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach.".
188 Pappe, "The Rise and Fall of the Husainis."
189 Ibid., p. 28.
right of local fellahaen. Since the *ayan* no longer viewed agricultural cultivation as the most profitable use for the land, they willingly dispossessed the serfs living on it, in favor of revenue-generating cultivation and summer mansions outside city walls. “The Husaynis had a vested interest in safeguarding their rights as land owners. By the beginning of the 19th century, they had become property owners, among the richest in the city [of Jerusalem], by being deeply involved in the process of the dismemberment of Waqfs...[and] benefited considerably from the transactions in which they were involved”. Moreover, Pappe states that “Husaynis' navigation skills in between the society and the external authorities could be seen at work...even in digesting the newest of all human ideological inventions: nationalism.” This suggests that the Husaynis (and other *ayan* families) used nationalism opportunistically.

One could ask why would a politically committed scholar like Pappe would invest scholarly effort in the rise and fall of the Husaynis – rather than in the rise and fall of the fellahaen they were supposedly representing. While Pappe himself declares nationalism to have been a mere tool by the Husayinis to maintain their privileged status, he nonetheless focuses his study on them rather than on the dispossessed Palestinian fellahaen. The Husaynis lost power, I argue, because, following the 1858 code, they aligned themselves with the Empire rather than with the local population. Ensuring the loyalty of the *ayan* to the Empire and foreclosing any possibility of a challenge to imperial sovereignty based in the *ayan*, was one of the two main purposes of the land code, as mentioned in section 2.1 of this chapter. As seen in the arena of housing, the Husaynis and other *ayan* families no longer served the local public, leaving the ‘nationalism’ of which they spoke a hollow shell, vulnerable to Zionism, which was competing for the same homeland.

The case of the Husayni Neighborhood: In response to Zionist historiography identifying Jewish sovereignty with leaving city walls, Palestinian scholarship addresses non-Jewish residences by Christians and Muslims (which they define as Palestinian) in order to claim that Palestinian nationalism too emerged by stepping outside the walls. Yet, as these scholars themselves show, Muslim residences outside the walls were primarily mansions on enclosed compounds, built by urban Muslim effendis who gained access to lands as result of the 1858 land code. In addition, Davis shows that these houses were only summer homes. They were not disconnected from the city and thus did not constitute attempts at new sovereignty even when located upon Wakf land. The ability to purchase lands outside the city led the *Ayan* to build mansions for themselves outside the walls. The Husayni family led this process in Jerusalem, building mansions north of Jerusalem, in the Wadi-al-Joz area (on the road to Nablus), thereafter called the Husayni

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191 Pappe, “The Rise and Fall of the Husainis.” See chapter 7 of this dissertation for discussion of competing Palestinian national leadership.
194 Salim Tamari, ed. *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighbourhoods and Their Fate in the War* (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002); Rochelle Davis, “Ottoman Jerusalem,” in Jerusalem 1948, the Arab Neighborhoods and Their Fate in the War, ed. Salim Tamari (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002).
neighborhood. Of those mansions, the most famous are the American Colony hotel, the Shepard hotel and Orient House.

A focus on housing requires a change of focus in the study of Palestinian society as well, from the ayan to the fellaeen population and their housing. Palestinian nationalism was indeed formed as result of the Ottoman land laws. However, I would argue that it did not emerge from the summer homes of the effendi. Rather, it emerged due to the dispossession of fellaeen from the lands they cultivated, a dispossession largely carried out by Muslim effendis and to which the building of those same summer-homes contributed in part. Fellahin and effendis, understood today in a unitary fashion as Palestinians, were, in fact, on two opposing sides following the land reform.

Fig. 1.10 The Orient House, built as summer mansion by Ismail Musa Al-Husseini in 1897. Source: Orient House Archive.

1.2.3.2.1.3 Empire: non-native Muslims

The Muslim neighborhood of Manshiyyeh, located north of Jaffa, was one of the significant Muslim neighborhoods outside the walls of Ottoman controlled cities. In the current political-historical perspective, it is remembered by scholars only as a Palestinian neighborhood which was conquered by the Hagana in 1948 and thus serves as an example of Palestinian dispossession in the Tel Aviv area. However, as shown by Kark, LeVine and others, Manshiyyeh was the product of a historical process of challenge to Ottoman imperial sovereignty. Built by Egyptian soldiers who came to Jaffa with Ibrahim Pasha during his 1830s conquest of Palestine, Manshiyyeh represents the struggle between world powers over sovereignty in Palestine as a result of Ottoman degeneration. According to LeVine, “Numerous workers’ neighborhoods sprang up in the wake of the Egyptian invasion outside the walls of the Old City to the north, south and east…among them Manshiyyeh. The development of these neighborhoods, which paralleled the establishment of Muslim neighborhoods outside the Old City of Jerusalem, led to new streets being cut through the existing orange groves, creating new spatial patterns that facilitated the urbanization of the region, including its villages.” Manshiyyeh dwellers were not fellaeen working the land for generations, but rather

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195 Sharon Rotbard, *White City, Black City* (Tel Aviv: Babel 2005).
196 LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*. 

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immigrants “that clearly referred to their hometowns of the Nile Delta”, making Jaffa a center for immigration from neighboring Arab countries and beyond. LeVine describes the Muslim villages outside of Jaffa (Summel, Sheikh Munnes and others) as ones formed as result of the Egyptian conquest by Ibrahim Pasha: “These villages, with their mixed populations of immigrants from Egypt and Jordan and Bedouins from southern Palestine, all grew in the wake of the Egyptian conquest (and more so after the Crimean War) as increased security made settlement in open (rather than walled) areas more tenable”.

1.2.3.2.2 Christians:

We should also keep in mind the distinction between Muslim and Christian Palestinians. While the Muslim elite occupied religious and administrative positions, given to them by Muslim rulers for generations, and became great landowners during the 19th century, the Christian elite was mostly formed during the British Mandate. Christian Palestinians gained access to landownership as result of the 1876 edict allowing non-Muslims to register lands in their names, as well as result of access to Wakf lands controlled by the various churches by virtue of the Capitulation System. This access became more pronounced with the gradual introduction of world powers to Palestine till 1917.

1.2.3.2.2.1 Religious complexes and housing by non-natives.

The first community to leave Jerusalem’s city walls was the Christians, who made use of the Capitulation system, which granted religious minorities a certain degree of autonomy to build religious institutions. Construction of complexes outside city walls by political-religious institutions served as the spearhead for a political presence in Jerusalem, mostly using the logic of aiding local Christians and pilgrims. A distinct example is the Russian Orthodox Church, which constructed the Russian compound in Jerusalem using the political patronage of the Tsar.

Construction by rich Christian notables, too, was part of this process, as these tended to be representatives of Western powers, for example, James Finn the British counsel who

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197 Ibid, p. 38.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid, p. 53. It is thus extremely confusing that LeVine himself refers to these neighborhoods as ‘colonized by Jews’ in later chapters of his book, as part of a ‘modernization of the orient’ colonial project.
built his own mansion outside the walls and Samuel Gobat the Protestant Bishop who
built the Bishop Gobat school on Mt. Zion. “During the 19th century, European-based
religious activity in the Holy Land increased,” writes Davis, “The Ottoman land reforms
of 1839 and 1856, which allowed non-Ottoman citizens to own land, combined with the
political drives of European powers for ‘religious-cultural penetration’ made Jerusalem
and all of the Holy Land an arena of European rivalries”.200 The rising European interest
and economic influence in Jaffa was symbolized by the founding of educational
institutions by various churches (British, French, Scottish, Greek Orthodox and Maronite)
in the last decades of the 19th century. These schools were considered, by both Ottomans
and Europeans, as spearheads of European colonialism and imperial rivalry.201 The
French Saint Joseph’s Catholic school built in 1882, for example, represented a coalition
of interests: the government of the French Republic, the Catholic church and the local
Catholic community in Jaffa.

1.2.3.2.2 Christian missionaries: Mount Hope
A number of Evangelist missionary groups had arrived in Palestine from America and
Germany since the mid 19th century. Their aims were to cultivate the Holy Land in
preparation for the return of the Jews and Christ’s Kingdom. The Mount Hope lands
north of Jaffa were purchased by the Steinbeck family in 1855 and cultivated successfully
for about three years. In 1858, however, the farm was attacked by a gang, leading to
casualties and to its desertion.202

Fig. 1.12: Mount Hope, 1933. Photographer: Yosef Ben-Yosef. Source: TAMA p-960.

1.2.3.2.3 Jews:
Jews in Ottoman Palestine belonged to two main communities: the Old Yishuv and the
New Yishuv. The Old Yishuv was comprised predominantly of ultra-orthodox, pious
Jews in the holy cities of Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias and Hebron who, while born in
Palestine, had no intentions of engaging with the land or establishing self sovereignty.
The New Yishuv, on the other hand, was comprised mostly of Zionists who immigrated
from North Africa and Eastern Europe with the intention of reconstituting Jewish
sovereignty in Eretz-Israel. Yishuv, meaning ‘settlement’, was the term used for the

200 Davis, "Ottoman Jerusalem.". The book focuses on ‘the struggle over land between Arabs and Jews’ yet
the chapter dealing with Ottoman Jerusalem and its expansion beyond its walls narrates the shift from an
imperial to a national logic of land as result of the process of ‘leaving the city walls’.
201 LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
202 Writer John Steinbeck is the grand grandchild of Friedrich Steinbeck, murdered in Mount Hope. Alter
Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Book Committee, 1936).
Jewish community living in the Holy Land by Jews residing both there and abroad. The very use of this specific term indicates the importance of residence in the land as the very purpose of this community. Distinguishing between “native” and “non-native” Jews in Palestine is slightly complicated since, while there were always Jewish natives in the four religious cities, Zionist immigrants who came to Palestine from North Africa and Eastern Europe nevertheless considered themselves natives, who were returning to their ancestral home, and acted accordingly by attempting to gain access to the land via the land reform. This study understands Zionist settlers, using their own rhetoric, that is, it understands them as ‘natives’ and their settlements as an attempt to form a homeland, rather than as attempts at colonization.

1.2.3.2.3.1 The Old Yishuv

Jews of the Old Yishuv were in the position to fulfill the one Jewish religious commandment no other Jew could fulfill: “dwelling in the Holy Land”. As such, the community in the Holy Land served as a representative for the Jewish people in the Diaspora, fulfilling the religious commandment of residency by proxy on their behalf. Until the early days of Zionism, this representative role was understood in religious rather than political terms; the Jews of the Holy Land were “shlichei mitzvah”, or agents, in the performance of a religious commandment for those who could not fulfill it themselves. Jews of the Old Yishuv were supported not by their own labor or property but by Jewish communities overseas, in exchange for fulfilling the religious rites of living in the Holy Land. The financial support system, the Haluka (Hebrew for distribution), was based on donations which were distributed among the members of the Old Yishuv, according to denominational affiliation with the supporting community overseas by its representatives in the Holy Land. The Jewish public was ‘employed’ in prayer around religious centers in Jerusalem and the Galilee, and was therefore urban. This mechanism was institutionalized in the 17th century. In addition, since Ottoman law forbade non-Muslims from buying land and building houses outside existing cities prior to 1876, there was little option of living and subsisting outside the cities. The number of Jews in Palestine in Late Ottoman times is debated by scholars, yet all agree that it was no more than 10% of the total population (i.e., around 80,000 out of 700,000). The Jews owned only 1.5% of the land (400 square km out of 29,000).

Zionists, of all stripes, were opposed to the Haluka; it represented dependence and incompetence, and thus contradicted their stated aim of self-governance. Leaving the city walls, within which Jewish life was arranged geographically by the Haluka system, was therefore understood by ‘old historians’ as a challenge to the Old Yishuv and its

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204 Ibid.


206 Eliav, 1977, p. 128.

207 David Smilanski, *A City Is Born* (Defense Ministry Press, 1981). Later judgments of Jews who suffice in residing upon the land rather than actively cultivating or defending it bear reference to the nature of the Old Yishuv and its understanding of residency as sufficient. Later on, blocking access to military service and land cultivation – limiting access to residency alone – was a vehicle for marginalization of improper communities (Mizrahim, Orthodox Jews, IPs).
logic and the beginning of self-governing Zionism. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the new neighborhoods outside Jerusalem were still supported by Haluka funds or by a new form of fund distribution, namely, philanthropy by rich Zionist Jews (as in the case of Mishkanot Sha’ananim).

1.2.3.2.3.2 New Yishuv
In the context of the Old Yishuv, stepping outside the protection of city walls, cultivation of land by its legal owners (rather than serfs), Jews engaging in activities other than prayer, and, in general, life under one’s own sovereignty – were strange ideas indeed. They were made manifest in the formation of new forms of settlement outside the walled cities.

The 1876 emancipation act gave Jews the right to own land in Palestine in their own name. The change which this law represented, (occurring, as it did, at roughly the same time as the abolition of slavery in the United States and in South America and the emancipation of the serfs in Russia), was a part of a worldwide 19th century movement towards emancipation and civil rights for oppressed minorities. Organizations created to aid Jewish migration to Palestine also bought land from absentee landowners. Jewish immigrants then settled on the land, sometimes replacing peasants already living there.

Mishkenot Sha’ananim [MSH], built in 1860, the first Jewish neighborhood outside the city walls, is said to mark the beginning of the end of Jewish communal dependence on the Haluka in the Holy Land – and thus the beginning of Jewish self-sovereignty, i.e. of Zionism. However, the driving force behind the neighborhood’s formation was an acute housing problem. A series of epidemics among the poor Jews of Jerusalem, the result of severe over-crowding and poor sanitation in the ill-serviced Ottoman city, led English Jewish philanthropist Sir Moses Montefiore to finance the construction of a new Jewish neighborhood outside the walls of the Old City. Montefiore’s concern for urban Jews resembles similar concerns among philanthropists in England and America, regarding housing conditions in the industrial cities of the 19th century, despite the fact that Jerusalem’s harsh conditions were hardly the result of industrialization. The planning for the MSH housing complex attempted to reduce dependence on the city. MSH apartments were constructed as a cluster of apartments attached to each other and overlooking the city in order to ease residents’ fears of leaving. At the same time, however, the MSH complex served as a protective wall in itself, and included a windmill as a source of livelihood for the residents, separate from the city. As Jews were reluctant to leave the protection of the city and live in a dangerous no man’s land, Montefiore paid them to do so, thereby reinstating the Haluka logic in the seemingly independent neighborhood.

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208 Ben Arie, “The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s,”
209 The land for Mishkenot Shaananim was bought by Montefiore in 1855. Ibid.
210 Ben Arie, “The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s.”
211 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow (University of California Press, 1988).
Jewish neighborhoods were the result of philanthropic aid to the city’s poor rather than Zionist zeal for self-sovereignty. Why, then, is this phenomenon understood in Zionist terms? Moreover, none of the neighborhoods and complexes built by Christians, Muslims or Jews outside of Jerusalem formed a new and separate settlement but rather extensions of the city. As can be seen in the case of MSH, there was a great dependence of the neighborhood upon the city, similar to the summer homes of the Muslim effendi whose business remained within the city, or the Christian pilgrimage complexes, which served pilgrims on their way to or from the city. Was this process, then, an actual materialization of new forms of settlement and sovereignty, thus constituting a true challenge to Ottoman urbanism?

1.2.3.2.3.2.1 Farmers: Agricultural Moshava
The first Jewish agricultural settlements outside Ottoman walled-city Palestine were farms founded by members of the Old Yishuv. Petach Tikva, the first settlement, was founded in 1878 by Jews from Jerusalem, based on private Jewish ownership of land. The purpose of Moshava settlements was to enable the fulfillment of biblical commandments such as Shemita (leaving the land fallow in a sabbatical year). A condition for the performance of this commandment according to religious law, was Jewish ownership of the land; shemita did not, however, require actual cultivation of the land by Jews. This understanding of claims to the homeland was in direct conflict with that of the young Zionist workers, and it was the cause of ideological and social strife between them and the Moshavot farmers.\(^{212}\) The ideology which underlay the Moshavot, would later be reincarnated in the Israeli settlement project of the biblical lands of the West Bank.\(^ {213}\) Moshava farmers found it hard to survive economically and soon became dependant on Jewish philanthropy, similar to the Haluka system.\(^ {214}\)

1.2.3.2.3.2.2 Agricultural workers: Kibbutz
Unwilling and unable to own land as landowners, young socialist immigrants to Palestine believed that the land belonged to those who toil upon it. They coalesced into communes and attempted to gain access to the land through what was called the principle of ‘conquest of labor’ (kibush ha-avoda) on the land, especially in Jewish owned Moshava farms. That is, the young socialists vociferously opposed the practice of allowing Jewish

\(^{213}\)See chapter 8 of this dissertation for further discussion of the West Bank settlements.
\(^{214}\)For further discussion of the Moshava see chapter 2.
owned land to be farmed by Palestinian or other laborers. They insisted that only Jewish labor would grant real title to the land, just as only Jewish labor, in all productive sectors, could create and sustain an independent economy. Untrained and poor, however, they were rarely given access to land by Jewish Moshava farmers. Their need of land to cultivate was matched with the need of the WZO to cultivate national lands and keep them from becoming ‘lapsed’. This marriage between national lands bought by Diaspora Zionists and Jewish labor produced the form of housing and settlement known as the “Kibbutz”.

1.2.3.2 Urbanites: Tel Aviv
Unwilling to transform their lifestyles from urban to rural, Zionist merchants and entrepreneurs believed that rural life would never attract enough Jews in order to mature into sustainable Jewish sovereignty. A city, they believed, was the only settlement form able to attract masses of Jews to Palestine, and the means to build a city was housing.

1.2.4 Approaches of all actors to land, labor, money and sovereignty
The commodification of land, labor and money caused by the 1858 land code saw two very different movements of land reform for two different native peoples. One by the local fellaheen who became serfs and no longer had legal claims to their land as a source of identity and livelihood, and the second by the Jews, who though they had been landless for millennia (both as individuals and as a nation), based their claim to Zion as homeland on the ancient ‘divine promise’. These two claims can be understood using Karl Marx’s and Fanon’s concept of “land reform for the people”. The case of the local fellaheen serfs is more similar to the ‘classic’ communist example, while in the case of Jews, Franz Fanon’s discussion of nationalism as the result of the elite’s engagement with the countryside is more relevant. Both sides used nationalism and state sovereignty in order demand access to the homeland for the common citizen. I wish to argue, in other words, that both peoples used the modern ideas of nationalism and government ‘in the name of the people’ in order to make collective claims for the land they were deprived of as individuals. Sovereignty, identity and culture were very important aspects to be sure, but they were ministerial to the ability to claim the physical place, not the other way around.

Claims for the land as a national homeland were made using four means. A. Monetary acquisition of land, which after the 1858 land code was the only way to obtain legal ownership of land. B. Working the land and dwelling upon it as its native people, (which required agrarian reform). C. Divine promise, as expressed in the Scriptures, D. History, as “read” in archeological findings and the Bible as historical source. These four

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215 See chapters 2 and 5 of this dissertation for a detailed discussion of the Kibbutz.
216 For further discussion of Tel Aviv housing see chapters 2 and 4.
217 Prior to 1858 legal ownership of most land was held by the state and leasehold rights were gained by cultivation and residency, as discussed above.
means intersected and complemented one another in service of the agrarian reform for both national movements.\textsuperscript{218}

1.2.4.1 \textit{Jewish Land Reform:}

Zionist claims for the ancestral homeland of Eretz-Israel were made using the four above frameworks: A. Monetary acquisition following the 1858 land code was the primary way for the Zionist movement to obtain legal ownership of land. Until 1876, the year reforms enabled Jews to own land in their names, the purchase of land by Jews was scarce and limited to specific notables like Sir Moses Montefiore.\textsuperscript{219} Following the 1876 amendment Ottoman citizens who were not Muslim could purchase land and have it registered in their names. Most of the land purchases by Jews in Palestine were made by foreign Jews, either by immigrants from Eastern Europe who chose to keep their foreign citizenship and benefit from patronage of foreign consuls in the framework of the Capitulation System or by representatives of Zionist organizations dedicated to “redeeming the land” such as “Geula” (Hebrew for redemption).\textsuperscript{220} Such organizations and individuals tended to purchase the land and register it in the name of an Ottoman Jew they trusted.\textsuperscript{221} Jews who held Ottoman citizenship, for example Aaron Shlush, used the opportunity to purchase large tracts of land in keeping with the Jewish interest in settlement. Ottoman Jews, most of them Sephardim, were thus important participants in practical Zionism.\textsuperscript{222} Land was purchased by Zionist individuals and organizations for three main purposes: taking the ancestral land off the market as national land, a process termed ‘land redemption’, agricultural cultivation, and housing.

B. Agrarian reform: The ideology of the Jewish labor movement was based on the idea that the land belongs to those who work upon it, and hence that working the land – and not legal title nor historical right based in the Bible - provides the moral ground for ownership. Their practical ideology involved the ‘conquest of labor’ throughout the homeland in order to claim it.\textsuperscript{223} This idea meshed with complementary ideas about the necessity of a mass working class for founding the nation and state as well the idea that renewing roots in the ancestral land involved becoming native in body and bodily practices.\textsuperscript{224}

C. The divine promise of the Holy Land as expressed in the Bible, as well as the aspiration to perform religious duties involved in land cultivation which had not been

\textsuperscript{218} Interestingly, political declarations and charters from world powers were not materialized as means for making claims for the contested homeland. This is so for both Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. The extensive study of nationalism in Palestine focuses, however, precisely on such political declarations.\textsuperscript{219} Ben Arie, "The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s."\textsuperscript{220} Yosef Katz, Redeem the Land: The Geula Company for Land Purchase (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1984).\textsuperscript{221} This practice left landowners vulnerable to fraud, as seen in the case of EzratIsrael, the association formed for establishing NeveZedek whose lands were mortgaged by the Ottoman Jew to whom they were registered. See Shlush, ibid.\textsuperscript{222} Yosef Eliahu Shlush, The Story of My Life (Tel Aviv: Babel, 2005 [1931]).\textsuperscript{223} Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914.\textsuperscript{224} Meira Weiss, The Chosen Body (University of California Berkeley, 2002).
performed by Jews for millennia, were the driving forces behind the formation of the first Jewish agricultural settlements in Ottoman Palestine, the Moshavot.225

D. History, or the secular interpretation of ‘divine promise’ in biblical texts, was the rationale behind Zionist claims for Eretz-Israel specifically, as opposed to other sites for materializing Jewish nationalism, most significantly Uganda.226 ‘Sources’ for this project of invented tradition227 included the religious texts themselves, read as mythology, and archeological findings attesting to Jewish ‘ownership’ of the homeland in biblical times.228

Zionism as agrarian land reform for the Jewish poor was the most important of Arthur Ruppin’s ideas. Ruppin served as head of the Eretz-Israel Office of the WZO and in his capacity managed all lands owned by the WZO via the JNF. He proposed an agrarian fund “to buy land and make it possible for Jews without means to acquire it via an amortization of the purchase price over many years”.229 “By these means,” wrote Ruppin, “Jewish agricultural laborers in Palestine, who now have no chance of independence and leave Palestine for that reason, will be tied to the land...first as tenants and then as owners.”230 This idea of land reform for the poor reflected Ruppin’s understanding that Zionism will be realized, practically, by attracting young, poor Eastern European Jews rather than capitalist entrepreneurs, who were preferred by the WZO. Moreover, Ruppin’s idea reflected an understanding of Jewish nationalism’s materialization as land reform for the landless Jewish poor. Moshe Leib Lilienblum, one of the leaders of Zionism in Russia, wrote in 1908 that this idea meant “that the redeemed land will not belong to individuals but rather to the people as a whole. We need nationalization of the people, but not that land will be their nationality”.231 Lilienblum’s opposition reflects the importance of Ruppin’s idea: it was the first appearance of the idea of national ownership of land.232

The opinion that Zionism was not to be materialized by the poor was expressed not only by Zionist politicians and thinkers like Lilienblum but also by those actually engaged in settlement. Moshava farm owners characterized Jewish workers using derogatory terms describing their poverty (like yachfan, barefoot) or lack of planning and support (shmendrik, spineless).233 Ruppin, on the other hand, viewed Moshavot as suffering from weaknesses caused by their economic dependence on the philanthropy of the Baron de Rothschild, which led to an ever-weakening connection between them and the land since

225 Ben Arie, "The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s.".
226 Yeshayahu Friedman, "Herzl and the Uganda Debate," Reviews of Israel’s Rebirth D(1994)..
227 Interestingly, the Uganda Plan was made possible by a British ‘charter’ and rejected by the 6th Zionist congress.
228 Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition.
230 CZA ZZ/639.
233 Bloom, "The German Origins of Hebrew Culture: On Obscuring the Nationalist Role of Arthur Ruppin," the Father of the Jewish Settlement in Erez Israel."
they neither worked it nor owned it. Once again, we can see how, for the Zionists, the connection to the land was tightly associated with independence.

1.2.4.1.1 Palestinian Land Reform

The vulnerability of local peasants to Zionism was the result of their inability to resist Zionism’s claims for the shared homeland, and their inability to resist the processes which lead to their eventual dispossession. The local peasantry’s demands for a land reform to reverse the consequences of the 1858 land code faced four different challenges.

A. The loss of tenancy rights by the local peasantry resulted from the purchase of state land by private individuals as result of the Ottoman 1858 land code, as shown above. While the dispossession of fellaheen was the direct result of this land transfer from the state to individual Muslim owners between 1858 and 1876 (the year that non-Muslims were allowed to purchase land in their names), in fact in the early years after the sale the fellaheen everyday lives changed very little. As effendis and absentee landowners were interested in for-profit cultivation of the land they viewed the peasants as means of production and did not remove them from the land. Furthermore, cultivation of previously arid lands in the coastal plains required new villages and gave the fellaheen population access to more land.

B. The sale of land to Jews whose ideology involved Hebrew labor and working the land was the decisive act in peasant dispossession. Unlike ayان effendis and absentee landlords who wanted to benefit from the land economically, viewed working the land as second class and thus had no interest in removing the fellaheen, the Zionist workers claimed the land as their home, not only as profit base. Jewish workers intent on claiming the land through labor and returning to it as a native population necessitated removal of the fellaheen. As legal claims for land were transformed, by the 1858 land code, into formal deeds obtained by monetary purchase, the tenants had no legal way of objecting to their eviction. The Tanzimat goal of disconnecting the ayان from the populace throughout the Empire via the 1858 land code (as discussed above) was highly successful in Palestine. The ayан’s choice to profit from land sale to Jews, despite their awareness of the consequences for the peasant tenants, had a decisive role in the peasants’ dispossession. The lack of solidarity between proto-Palestinian capital (the ayан) and peasantry, a lack of an ‘imagined community for the nation’ – unlike the case of Zionism described above – stunted the growth and development of Palestinian nationalism and hindered its ability to lay claim to the homeland.

C. The long Muslim dominance of Palestine, by the Mamluks and Ottomans, made the idea of Jewish dominance of the land speculative and marginal, thus not something actively opposed by the Ottoman regime and local Muslim society. Moreover, as Moshavot farms, based on the idea divine promise were keen on employing local peasants as agricultural labor many peasants maintained their access to the land in a new framework. Therefore, while Moshava settlement formation was based on the

236 Epstein, "A Hidden Question."
237 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
commodification of labor (rather than taxation of produce in the tenancy framework), peasant resistance to the Moshavot was quite limited, a fact to which Moshavot farmers themselves pointed at the time as a reason for employing local peasants rather than Jewish workers.\footnote{Arthur Ruppin, \textit{My Life Chapters} (Tel Aviv1968). Baratz, \textit{A Village by the Jordan: The Story of Degania.}}

D. Local \textit{ayan} and peasantry did not engage in producing an ‘invented tradition’ in support of their nationalism. They were no longer parts of the same society as a result of the 1858 code and \textit{ayan} alignment with the Empire as its proper subjects (as described above). Proto-Palestinian nationalism was thus unable to counter Zionism’s ‘invented tradition’ of history. Palestinian nationalism only really came into its own after the loss of the Ottoman Empire and commencement of the British Mandate. The \textit{ayan} who lost their position as the Empire’s proper citizens finally aligned with the dispossessed peasantry to form Palestinian nationalism by means of invented tradition and imagined community, finally producing a competing claim for the contested homeland and demanding a land reform as the native population of Palestine.

1.3 Conclusion:
Chapter 1 examines the conditions leading to the Ottoman new land code, its practical meaning and its consequences for sovereignty for both empire and subject. This chapter identifies the post-1858 built environment as a mass phenomenon of ‘leaving city walls’, which encompassed all communities in Palestine, and lead to the formation of a distinct new housing environment – the ‘new native’ housing of nation building. The Ottoman land code, framed in order to sustain the Empire, is revealed here to be the trigger for a fermenting process of national consciousness which ended with the removal of empire.

The 1858 land reform was an attempt of the Ottoman Empire to hold on to its vast territories by curbing the constant attempts of the local nobility to usurp some of the empire’s authority over its assets. The new land code was meant to transform the nobility from tax collecting intermediaries into direct tax payers by granting them ownership of imperial land. Consequently, however, the masses of imperial subjects had to fight for their relationship to the land. The empire did not view its subjects as citizens and therefore did not see their dispossession as a threat to its rule, yet popular consciousness of self sovereignty had started to disseminate among the people, leading to the overthrow of all imperial rule in Palestine – whether Ottoman or British - 90 years later.

The built environments of nationalism, the housing and settlement types where Zionism and Palestinian nationalism developed, are the subject of Chapter 2.
2.1 Introduction: New native environments

Chapter 2 examines the multitude of newly formed housing solutions and built environments in response to the 1858 land code. It exposes the surprising fact that the housing of both Zionist pioneer settlements and early national Palestinian settlements share the same – new – housing typology. Moreover, findings reveal that the very same houses served both national projects, with the first Kibbutz housing in peasant mud shacks. However the process of nation building was different for each of the two national projects. As the idea of Jewish nationalism developed before the dramatic land reform, housing and settlement were attempts to materialize nationalism by creating the substantive material environment without which nationalism is an empty term. The idea of Palestinian nationalism, on the other hand, developed as a result of the harsh consequences of the 1858 reform for the peasantry and in the housing environments formed as result of it. Nationalism as a new-native built environment is examined here in the case of each of the two nations, in order to understand why certain housing-settlement forms became the cradles of nationalism while others did not: Why, for example, did Ahuzat Bait become the ‘first Hebrew city’ of Tel Aviv rather than other neighborhoods outside city walls? Why did the Kibbutz become the pinnacle of Zionist rural settlement? And why was it the Palestinian village of the coastal plain which gave rise to nationalist ferment rather than the villages of the Judean hill country?

2.1.1 The Kibbutz and Tel Aviv as Zionism’s leading forms of settlement

Arthur Ruppin, head of the WZO Eretz Israel Office, defined the idea of Jewish autonomy in Palestine as the practical meaning of the Basel Program, namely to form a national home for the Jewish people in Zion. This autonomy was possible only under the following conditions: a. the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine; b. the purchase of most of the land; and c. the unwavering ambition to achieve Jewish autonomy. In Ruppin’s vision, then, sovereignty was deeply tied to land, and the domination of land was linked to the ability to populate it. Hence, the materialization of Zionism was understood to be a problem housing and settlement. As stated by Gershon Shafir, when Zionist leaders constructed models and devised strategies for action, they “constructed these not so much from the grand cloth of general ideologies as from the simpler materials of concrete methods of settlement”.

Received scholarship on early Zionism suggests that Tel Aviv and the Kibbutz were the dominant settlement forms in the materialization of Zionist nationalism. This position is agreed upon by both mainstream and ‘new’ historians; with mainstream historians invested in asserting the founding myths of ‘first Hebrew city’ and the reborn Jewish village populated by the ‘new Jew’, while ‘new historians’ are invested in deconstructing

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239 Hobsbawm, “The Nation as Invented Tradition.”
240 See detailed account in chapter 3.
242 Etan Bloom, "Arthur Ruppin and the Production of the Modern Hebrew Culture" (Tel Aviv University, 2008).
243 Ruppin, My Life Chapters.
244 Ibid., Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.
Yet, scholars never questioned why it was that Tel Aviv and the Kibbutz became Zionism’s dominant built environments rather than other rural and urban settlements of their time. Moreover, scholarship continually positions the two settlement forms against one another as rivals. On the contrary, Tel Aviv and the Kibbutz are better understood via their similar ideology: attainment of sovereignty by way of actions of a distinctly political economic nature. The Kibbutz did so by taking national land and labor off the market, and Tel Aviv, by using the commodification of land and money to accumulate territory and population, thus laying claim to being a sovereign urban entity. The Kibbutz and Tel Aviv are thus contrasted with the religiously-based settlement forms of the Holy Cities populated by the Old Yishuv and the new Jewish farming villages outside city walls (the Moshava) who based their claims on God’s promise of the Holy Land to the Jews. The Kibbutz was not the only form of rural-agricultural Zionist settlement of its time, nor was Tel Aviv the only form of urban Zionist settlement. Moreover, neither the Kibbutz nor Tel Aviv was the first attempt at rural or urban Jewish settlement in the country. Why is it, then, that they became so central for Zionist materialization?

In order to ask why the Kibbutz and Tel Aviv become leading forms of settlement and housing we should compare them with other forms of settlement competing for leadership of the project of materializing Zionism. The ‘losing’ settlement forms are quite unknown to the international public, especially as potential alternatives to the existing Israeli built environment, due to the nature of available scholarship in English. Analysis of these settlement forms is crucial for the present inquiry into the formation of iconic forms of dwelling. These settlement forms are also extremely important historically, as they did not disappear but rather were reincarnated later in both ideological and spatial terms, most notably by the West Bank settlement project. Understanding their later formations requires a genealogical understanding of their evolution.

Arthur Ruppin was the central figure in the creation of both forms. In 1909 he encouraged the JNF to grant the founders of ‘the first Hebrew city’ a generous loan which enabled their ambitious land purchase. In 1910 he contributed to the formation of the kibbutz movement by enabling a commune of workers to cultivate national land in what became the first Kibbutz, Degania. According to Bloom, Ruppin’s approach to settlement was revolutionary, differing in essence from the prior settlement plans of “First Aliyah” Moshava settlements and the philanthropic administration of the Baron de Rothschild, in that it proposed the idea of collective national ownership of the homeland. Specifically, Ruppin’s approach was non-philanthropic in character and identified the poor young pioneers as just as crucial to the national project as Jewish capital was always assumed to be.

245 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (Owl Books, 2001).
246 Maoz Azaryahu, Tel Aviv: Mythography of a City (Syracuse University Press, 2007).
247 See detailed discussion of the Moshava typology further in this chapter.
248 See chapter 8 for further discussion of the settlement project.
250 Bloom, "Arthur Ruppin and the Production of the Modern Hebrew Culture".
Ruppin was therefore a pioneer in understanding settlers as partners (rather than employees) of capital in service of the mutual goal of Jewish sovereignty. Rothschild saw himself as a private individual doing good for the Jewish people, not as a capitalist developer. Nor did he consider himself a political figure seeking to create an autonomous, self-sufficient entity that would become a Jewish homeland, which was how Ruppin viewed his own role, from the very beginning.\textsuperscript{252}

Ruppin’s view was by no means the single or even dominant view of Jewish settlement in Palestine and Rothschild, who was the dominant agent of Jewish settlement until 1910 opposed the agenda of practical-Zionism and refused to conceive of Jewish settlement in Palestine as an assertion of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{253}

2.1.2 \textbf{New Rural Arab villages}

Scholars tend to understand the Arab peasant village of Palestine as a stable, even stagnant, entity until it was destroyed as a result of the violent struggles with Zionism, culminating in the Nakba, the 1948 Palestinian exodus during the Arab-Israeli war and the civil war that preceded it.\textsuperscript{254} In addition, scholarship tends to read all Muslim actors in Palestine from a present-day perspective as ‘Palestinian’, thus assuming great solidarity between them, while ignoring distinctions of identity which were manifest, first and foremost, in forms of dwelling and settlement. However, by 1948, the native Palestinian Arab village, as such, had already been destroyed by the Ottoman land reform which severed the direct relationship which peasants once had to their land as tenants of the empire. Following the 1858 reform they became either serfs of urban landlords who viewed them as labor, a means of production - or independent landowners themselves. This distinction had great consequences for their understanding of Palestinian nationalism which pertains till this day.\textsuperscript{255}

The peasant villages in the coastal and inland plains were newly formed as landlord-owned farms and groves, where peasants were serfs with no ability to claim any relationship to the land. These villages became the site of a popular-nationalism, very different from the elite-nationalism which developed in old-city landscapes primarily in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{256}

One misconception which arises out of a certain scholarly agenda, is the assumption of the uniformity of the ‘native’, an assumption which disregards dramatic differences in class, habitat and political views, in addition to – and, in fact, more significant than - the oft-mentioned ethnic and religious differences. A disregard for the richness of the local community, has enabled scholars to study the urban elite, the ayăn, as if it were the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid.]
\item DJ Penslar, \textit{Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective} (Taylor & Francis, 2007).
\item Morris, \textit{The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949}.
\item Segev, \textit{One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate}.
\item Oren Yiftachel, “‘Ethnocracy’: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” \textit{Constellations} 6, no. 3 (1999).
\item Pappe, “The Rise and Fall of the Husainis.”
\item See chapters 3 and 8 ahead.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
representative of the Palestinian people, despite the fact that this people was comprised mostly of the peasantry. Historiographic accounts of local life in Palestine during Ottoman rule are colored by 20th century conceptualizations, primarily of religion, ethnicity, capital and nationality. These readings make it possible to group the ayan nobility together with landless, Muslim peasants as belonging to the same Palestinian polity. However, this ignores the fact that, after 1858, the ayan emerged as proper imperial subjects only at the price of the alienation and dispossession of the peasants from both place and polity. Their nationalism can therefore be read in Fanon’s terms as a ‘white mask’.

Politically correct scholarship tends to read Palestinian nationalism as an immemorial phenomenon, in order to combat the Zionist claim that it never existed as such, thus rejecting all evidence attesting to nationalism as a new phenomenon in Ottoman Palestine, a response to the consequences of Empire.

This study, focusing on the built environment, cannot ignore the extensive and varied data pointing to new forms of housing and their direct contribution to the formation of new, nationalist, polities in the Late Ottoman period. Moreover, data exposed by this research enables us to move beyond the Manichean distinction between Zionist and Palestinian nationalisms and view their mutual formation as land reform movements by and on behalf of the native peoples in the country, fighting first and foremost against the alienation of the native population from the land in the context of privatization of empire.

Some preconceptions arise from the choice of sources. Privileging textual sources like memoirs, for example, which were available only to the ayan, makes the peasantry invisible to scholars. Examination exclusively of textual documents represents an active disregard of the peasant population which was mostly illiterate and thus did not keep written accounts of its lived experience. Textual accounts of the peasantry appear mostly in memoirs and travel accounts of foreign travelers. These sources are thus suspected of orientalism or acute ‘new world’ patriotism and thereby dismissed as evidence, despite the fact that they contain valuable information unavailable elsewhere.

Many accounts of the Late Ottoman period by Christians include a strange mix of documentation and biblical imagination. One such example is George Robinson. Lees’s 1905 account of “Village Life in Palestine”, which includes ethnographic descriptions ‘supported’ by quotes from the Old and New testaments. Even the photographs included in Lees’s book are indexed using references to biblical events (figs. 2.1, 2.2,

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257 Pappe, “The Rise and Fall of the Husainis.”
258 See chapter 1 of this dissertation for a detailed account of this process.
260 Zionism is posited on Zionists’ self-perception as native to the Land of Israel.
261 Elizabeth Anne Finn James Finn, A View from Jerusalem, 1849-1858: The Consular Diary of James and Elizabeth Anne Finn (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980).
262 Twain, The Innocents Abroad: .
263 Lees, Village Life in Palestine: A Description of the Religion, Home Life, Manners, Customs, Characteristics and Superstitions of the Peasants of the Holy Land, with Reference to the Bible.
2.3). While extremely orientalistic, these images include what Barthes defines as ‘the punctum’ – information missed or disregarded by the photographer. Housing environments are many times the punctum of these images, providing us with data about the sparsely documented built environment of Palestine; data which can be analyzed using the methods of architectural history, in order to glean information regarding the size, typology and construction of housing and settlement. Our ability to extract the punctum and examine it, while disregarding the photographer’s agenda in other parts of the image, makes these images important primary sources despite their tainted production.

Fig. 2.1. “Woman carrying child – ISA, XLIX 22”. Fig. 2.2. “A good shepherd”, Source: Lees, 1905. Fig. 2.3 A stone structure serving ‘the watchman’. Source: Lees, 1905.

2.2 New urban environments outside old city walls

2.2.1 The ‘First Hebrew City’

The original germ from which Tel Aviv developed was Ahuzat-Bayit, a Jewish neighborhood formed in 1909 outside Jaffa. It was the eleventh such Jewish neighborhood outside Jaffa and twenty third Jewish neighborhood outside Ottoman walled cities. Yet unlike its peers, Ahuzat-Bayit did not remain a sleepy suburb but attracted similar neighborhoods to form around it. After changing its name to the Zionist ‘Tel-Aviv,’ it absorbed all other Jewish neighborhoods and in 1921 earned the status of a township. Most of the scholarly writing on Tel Aviv’s historical development focuses on deconstructing Ahuzat-Bayit’s founding myth as the seed of the first Hebrew city, a unique urban environment which could give birth to a metropolis. Scholars stress Ahuzat-Bayit’s small scale, bourgeois aspirations, suburban exclusion of commerce, and suburban structure in attempts to challenge its founders’ proclamations of its unique urban vision. This ‘new historian’ tradition, which, as noted by Tom Segev, was

263 Barthes, A Barthes Reader.
264 Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917; Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.
265 Literally "Homestead"
266 Built on land purchased by AhuzatBait’s founders to ensure the right development surrounding their neighborhood. See Shlush, The Story of My Life.
267 Tel Aviv was the title of the first Hebrew translation of Herzl’s novel Almeuland. Literally, it translates to Hill of Spring.
268 See Azaryahu, Tel Aviv: Mythography of a City.
invested in deconstructing Zionist myths, is extremely useful in opening up alternative historical narratives of our reality. Yet, to date, no scholarship has tried to push forward and ask why it was that Ahuzat-Bayit was the seed for Tel Aviv rather than any other urban neighborhood outside Jaffa and Jerusalem?

If Ahuzat-Bayit was indeed just like all other neighborhoods outside Ottoman city walls, was it a mere coincidence that it developed from a sleepy suburb into a metropolis? Deconstructing Tel Aviv’s myth without using the freedom from that myth to address, in a scholarly manner, questions previously answered by the myths, leaves us with little understanding of the formation of our constructed, ideological and built environments.

Lately, Barbara Mann has asserted that Tel Aviv and its founding fathers attempted nothing less than the formation of “a Jewish place in history”. Mann addresses for the first time the reasons for Tel Aviv’s importance and suggests taking its founders’ proclaimed intentions seriously. Moreover, unlike geographers and urban scholars, Mann, a scholar of Jewish literature and theology, studies the built environment in tandem with issues of identity and nationalism. Regrettably, her study of Tel Aviv as a ‘Jewish place in history’ is not historical. In this section, I aim to address the question of Tel Aviv’s urban development as a Jewish urban space in a national framework using historical methods.

2.2.2 Sovereignty as Economic Independence

As discussed in chapter 1, Mishkenot Sha’ananim (MSH), the first Jewish neighborhood outside Ottoman city walls, was not an independent neighborhood but rather dependant on philanthropy for its construction, reliant on the city of Jerusalem socially and economically, and housing its residents in a structure with a distinct fortress architecture. MSH was thus not really sovereign, in its economic, urban or political aspects. The subsequent neighborhoods outside Jerusalem’s walls, too, were courtyard neighborhoods surrounded with walls (Meah Shearim, Mahane Israel, Beit David) or defensive clusters surrounded by barracks resembling walls.

Ruth Kark posits that settlements developed outside Jaffa were significantly different from those outside Jerusalem for economic reasons. She shows that both local and foreign land development surrounding Jaffa, even when framed in idealistic terms, included strong economic motivations. Following the successful cultivation of mülk land orchards outside Jaffa as orange groves during the 1840s, large tracts of miri land were bought by ayan as profitable orange grove estates. Kark shows that the choice by foreigners to settle in and around Jaffa, rather than elsewhere in Palestine was also profit-driven. In addition to factors like the availability of land for sale and the proximity to the Jaffa harbor, she states that,

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269 Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate.
270 Barbara Mann, A Place in History: Modernism, Tel Aviv, and the Creation of Jewish Urban Space (Stanford University Press, 2006).
272 Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.
…another feature of European and American colonization in the Jaffa area conflicts somewhat with the common belief that the settlers’ motives were entirely religious or ideological. From the reasons cited by various colonists it is clear that economic opportunity and the desire for financial success also played a vital role. This is equally true for Jews, Americans, Templar, and other foreigners who did not belong to organized groups.  

Kark’s analysis is well reflected in my archival inquiry into the early formation of Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv was not the product of accident or a random choice. Instead, it was the result of careful thought and planning, based on research into the extant conditions of the time, and on a clearly-framed political and economic ideology. The main protagonist in this story was Akiva Aryeh Weiss, a Zionist merchant from Lodz, Poland, who is remembered for proposing the idea of a Hebrew City on the eve of his first day in Jaffa.  

Weiss did not conceive of this idea upon his arrival in Jaffa, but rather emigrated after framing this idea as the realization of Theodore Herzl’s legacy and careful examination of opportunities to realize it.

Weiss was a clock maker, but his real dream was to be an architect. He studied architecture in a correspondence course with the Technical University of Berlin before immigrating to Palestine.  

The new construction I propose will unite the dispersed into one unit and the Yishuv will develop and blossom to the joy of all those interested in Zion and Jerusalem…The main question…is the money question. I have with me no checkbook signed by the ‘generous benefactor’ and it is very likely such a checkbook will never be in my hands.  

My proposal comes from the clear recognition that money can be obtained in various ways, and especially in commercial terms. We will turn to no one asking for donations. Nor shall we send communication to the ends of the earth with recommendations from noted Rabbis as has been customary till now. Nor shall we write pieces in journals advocating donations for settling the land. Because donations will not establish a people and Tzedaka [charity] funds will not build cities. We should not act except in the ways accepted all over the world, the system of credit. Most of the buildings built in the world were built with credit funds and both sides, the lending and the lender, made good business. The lender pays the loan as he starts earning from the property and the lender’s investment is safe since the building is listed in his name till the loan is removed.

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273 Ibid., p. 94-96.
274 AhuzatBait protocols, MATA, Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
276 Ibid.
277 Referring to the Baron Rothschild who supported the agricultural Moshavot.
278 Referring to the Haluka system supporting the Old Yishuv.
279 AhuzatBait archive, TAMA. Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv. p. 81.
The ‘association for home building’, established that night in 1906, published a prospectus for acquiring members, printed in five copies only. In the prospectus, written by Weiss, the problems of the Yishuv were phrased in terms of housing, and the housing problem – in business terms:

“We shall depict the current state:” declares the prospectus, “98 percent of Jaffa Jews live in Arab homes and the rent cost is no less than 40,000 franks. This money going into their hands builds them and destroys us at the same time. If we manage to transfer these annual payments to our hands we will accumulate great funds. Thus, we should purchase a large piece of land upon which to built houses for us. It should be located close to Jaffa and become the first Hebrew city, where all Jews will reside, Hebrew will be spoken, and cleanliness will be kept. Just as the city of New York marks the entry gate to America, so we should refine our city, to become one day the New York of Eretz Israel”.

While some interpreted Weiss’ aspiration for a “New York of Eretz Israel” as a model pointing to modernity and westernization, it seems to me that the rhetoric used refers to New York as the gateway to America the “land of opportunity” – i.e. economic opportunity. As Weiss himself notes in his diary as early as 1904, the initiators of the city viewed it as a machine for Zionism, a vehicle for independence understood in financial terms. The people required for this enterprise, stated Weiss, would not necessarily come there out of any Zionist ideology but rather, “as usual, due to the competition [for gain]” once such opportunity is afforded to them by the Zionists. Weiss reports that no announcement was made of the association’s founding, whether via proclamation or in a written publication, because the short prospectus hit the right target of need and capabilities, and in two weeks the association already had 50 members. Weiss had managed to identify correctly both the housing problem and the Zionist ideology of sovereignty – and tie them together by means of the capitalist rhetoric of business

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280 AhuzatBait proclamation prospect, TAMA.
281 LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*.
282 Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv*.
opportunity – as an engine for actualizing the plan. The city as a site of business and real estate – rather than the moshava as a site of economic dependence – was for Weiss the true locus of the realization of Zionism as Jewish sovereignty.

Weiss did not believe in pioneer suffering and sacrifice. Many times he expressed his belief that only few can commit to the hardships of village life – and a few were not enough for materializing Herzl’s vision:

“An entire people cannot be expected to act only upon ideals. The change of values required to transform most of the people into farmers will not come easily. Most of the people of Israel is used to urban life and finds its livelihood in commerce, industry, etc. It is hard to make us into village people who toil the land and suffice with little. It is even harder to transform [us] to dependants on constant help and donations of philanthropists In order to develop sources of livelihood it is not enough to preach in favor of spiritual life in our land. We should prepare the conditions for great demand for workers who will be employed for their labor, not donations. This can be achieve by building cities and factories which employ many people and increase commerce. Building and industry will provide outlets for investment and so emigration will increase on its own without propaganda. The adventurers who emigrate…will attract a large crowd because they will prosper. The conclusion is, that at this moment, immediate action is required to serve as a living example.”

2.2.3 Comparing Tel Aviv with Neve Zedek

As stated above, Ahuzat-Bayit was not the first pioneer in stepping outside Jaffa’s city walls; eleven Jewish neighborhoods predated it, starting with Neve Zedek in 1887 and including Mahane-Israel, Mahane-Yosef and Ohel-Moshe which were built between 1903 and 1909. On the eve of the founding of Ahuzat-Bayit, five thousand Jews were already living outside of Jaffa. The Jewish move outside of the city followed a flow of Muslims and Christians which had started in 1880 and could have served as the seed for a metropolis with an ethic, cultural and political identity quite different from Tel Aviv’s. This fact brings up the obvious yet still unanswered question: what was it about Ahuzat-Bayit which made it the seed for a new city rather than its peers? This question is perplexing since the earlier neighborhoods, especially Neve Zedek, were centers for Jewish-Hebrew culture, the home for Hebrew writers like Shmuel Yosef Agnon, religious leaders like Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Cohen Kook, and social institutions like Hebrew schools and the formation of the Hebrew workers’ association. In order to answer this question, I will compare the early formation of the two neighborhoods.

284 Ibid, p. 85, 86.
286 Gideon and Shavit Bigger, Jacob, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 2001).
287 Ibid.
288 Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917., p. 100. For example Manshiya, built by Egyptian soldiers of Ibrahim Pasha, LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
289 S.Y. Agnon was the Nobel Prize laureate in literature in 1966.
290 Rabbi Kook (1865-1935) was one of the leading figures in religious Zionism.
291 Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
Neve Zedek was built by an association titled ‘Ezrat Israel’ (“Support of Israel”), established in Jaffa with the goal of assisting the Jewish community and especially its poor (for example by establishing a hospital). Inspiration for establishing a neighborhood outside the walls of Jaffa came from the new neighborhoods which were erected outside Jerusalem in order to supply good sanitary housing for poor Jews. Elazar Rokah, the leading figure in the organization and the son of a prominent Jerusalem Rabbi, initiated and promoted the new neighborhood.

However, the first person to conceive of the idea of Jewish life outside Jaffa was Aharon Shlush, owner of the lands upon which Neve Zedek and four other Jewish neighborhoods which were later built. Shlush was a Sephardi Jew who came to Palestine from Algeria following the proto-Zionist preaching of Rabbi Yehuda Bibbas, who called upon Jews to settle in the Holy Land. When the Algerian Jews settled in Jaffa there were no longer any Jews living in the city. Jaffa served Jews merely as a way-station along the pilgrimage road to Jerusalem. The Algerians began by residing in Han-al-Yahud, a hostel en route to Jerusalem, which had been built by a Jewish philanthropist. Familiar with Arabic and skilled in business, the Algerian Jews quickly established themselves in Jaffa and established good relations with its Egyptian and Ottoman rulers. Shlush decided to purchase lands following the 1876 edit allowing non-Muslims to register land in their name. As an Ottoman subject he was able to do so, unlike most of the other Zionist protagonists who remained under the protectorate system by which citizens of world powers were served by the consulates of their countries of origin.

Shlush bought non-arable sand dunes north of Jaffa, in the explicit hope of establishing a Jewish neighborhood outside the city. The lands he bought were vast, 80 hectares,

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292 Ezrat Israel protocols, 1885 Central Zionist Archives, file A323\343
293 Ezrat Israel protocols, 1885, Ordinances of Neve Zedek, 1875, found in the Central Zionist Archives, file A323\343.
294 His son, Israel Rokach, was later the third mayor of Tel Aviv.
295 Smilanski, 1942 in CZA/A 232\12.
298 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv. Elkayam, Jaffa, Neve Zedek: The Beginning of Tel Aviv: The History of the Jewish Yishuv in Jaffa since the Early 19th Century.
299 Ibid.
300 Control of the city and province changed as the Pacha of Egypt rebelled against the Ottoman rule and took over Palestine. Pressure by world powers made him return the land to the Ottomans. See Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.
301 Of course, as a Jew Shlush was able to purchase land in his own name only after the 1876 emancipation act.
302 While powers like Russia and Austria viewed their subjects as agents of their interests in the Ottoman Empire, Zionist Jews in turn used the protection of the protectorate system in the increasingly insecure atmosphere in Ottoman Palestine.
upon which four neighborhoods outside Jaffa were eventually built. This fact indicates that Shlush had grand aspirations for Jewish settlement outside Jaffa. In 1883 Shlush built his own house – the first Jewish house outside Jaffa - north of the Muslim Manshia neighborhood, even though no other Jewish family was willing to leave the city at the time.

Although he was himself a Sephardic Jew, it is perhaps not surprising that Shlush did not manage to convince Jaffa’s Sephardi families to join him outside the city walls, since the Sephardi community as a whole accepted Ottoman citizenship and did not see itself as foreign to the empire, whether in grand-political or everyday terms. Much of contemporary scholarship celebrates Sephardi willingness to participate in and assimilate into Ottoman Palestine as Ottoman subjects, and views this as evidence of the tolerance, multicultural pluralism and peaceful character of Ottoman rule.

Taking on Ottoman citizenship was of course open to, and demanded of, Ashkenazi Jews as well. Yet Ashkenazi Zionists rejected it. In the words of Max Nordau, “immigrating to Eretz Israel as Ottomans is not acceptable. If we wish to assimilate we have a shorter, easier route to it [in Europe]”. Zionists, thus, understood Ottoman citizenship as subjugation while they viewed themselves as a nation, within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. It was the Ashkenazi newcomers, most of them foreign subjects, who bought Shlush’s land to erect Neve Zedek and became his neighbors outside city walls. Shlush’s aspirations, which extended far beyond only Neve Zedek, were realized by the Ashkenazi members of Ahuzat Bayit, most of them from areas which at the time were located in the Russian empire, who envisioned a Hebrew city, separate and independent from Jaffa. Independence and subjugation, then – the pressing issue which was later addressed by Zionism as a national movement – was already being faced in the concrete materializations of housing and neighborhood even before the establishment of an organized movement of political Zionism in the 1890’s.

Shlush built his aforementioned home in order to stake his claim to the 80 hectares of sand dunes he had purchased, since the transaction had caused a dispute between him and a Christian Arab. The use of housing as a way to stake claim to disputed land remains a key tactic in the conflict of the land to this day. Aware that, given the poor security conditions, he could not live in the isolated house, he tried his best to convince other Jews to build homes next to his. Shlush was so interested in convincing Jews to live outside Jaffa that he sold the lands owned by Ezrat Israel at a very cheap price, and on enviable

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304 Pomrock, *Shlush: The First Tel Avivian*


306 Elkayam, *Jaffa, Neve Zedek: The Beginning of Tel Aviv: The History of the Jewish Yishuv in Jaffa since the Early 19th Century*..

307 Ibid.

308 Protocols of the IX Zionist Congress.

309 Talmi, 1967. Several oral sources report that land sale was conducted by the buyer casting a stone as far as possible, obtaining all the land covered by the stone (Talmi, 1967, Shva, 1963). This sale process, involving no mapping and precise documentation fostered land disputes.
financing terms;\textsuperscript{310} the only undertaking required was that construction of a home on the purchased property start within one year.\textsuperscript{311}

The initiators of Neve Zedek decided to include Jaffa’s poor in the neighborhood\textsuperscript{312} in order to attract enough Jews to such a no-man’s land outside the city.\textsuperscript{313} They bought a rather small plot of land from Shlush and designated small house plots, of 300 square cubits (or 225 square meters) each.\textsuperscript{314} These plots were sometimes subdivided into two half-plots sized at 150 square cubits each, with very little land allocated for roads and communal institutions (fig. 2.5).\textsuperscript{315} “Who were the tenants? Residents of old Jaffa, with modest means. Craftsmen, shopkeepers, teachers, peddlers, clerks. Compared with Old Jaffa, Neve Zedek was like Paris,” recounted Isaac Rokach.\textsuperscript{316}

In this un-ambitious neighborhood plan, Neve Zedek was viewed as a neighborhood at the outskirts of the city rather than as a seed for a new, separate – Hebrew – city. This modest plan was not the product of necessity but rather of choice, as described by Nahum Talmi: “A large part of Tel Aviv, not yet established then, could have been a suburb of Neve Zedek but the hand of fate intervened at the last moment and prevented this ‘distortion’. It was when Shimeon Rokach bought a vast plot of sand dune north of the neighborhood for 400 ‘Napoleons’, a territory upon which much of Tel Aviv now lies. Yet after the deal, he panicked about its scope, and worried that haste had led him to pay more for the property than its actual worth. He used his contacts and managed to cancel the deal and get back most of the money, to the joy of his family and friends who worried that he was burying money in the sand.\textsuperscript{317} And so, Rokach left the task of buying the land for the first city to the members of Ahuzat-Bayit, who…in 1909 laid the cornerstone of the city which made Neve Zedek into its suburb”.\textsuperscript{318}

\textsuperscript{310} The plot for Neve Zedek, including 20,000 cubit, or 1.8 hectares, was sold for 2500 Franks (Kark, 1990). Shlush agreed for the land to be paid for a year after its sale.


\textsuperscript{312} Kahanov, 1942. Kahanov recounts that the residences were too poor to pay for leveling the plot’s sand hills for construction, and so that each resident was in charge of carrying 100 baskets of sand from the hill to the valley each day to level the ground (Kahanov, 1942, CZA file A323\343).

\textsuperscript{313} The gravest challenge for the neighborhood was the need to use guards day and night against the looting of Bedouins Pomrock, Shlush: The First Tel Avivian

\textsuperscript{314} Neve Zedek Ordinance Book, CZA/A323\396

\textsuperscript{315} From the handwritten memories of Isaac Rokach, written on the occasion of Neve Zedek’s 80th anniversary (1967). CZA/A232\12. CZA/J85\7716. Subdivision plan to divide the plots of Pechter Hofman and Geula, by Irgoon engineering office.

\textsuperscript{316} CZA/A232\12

\textsuperscript{317} Talmi, 1967. As there was no credit bank yet in Palestine, nor any agencies for funding settlement, the loan for building the first 10 houses of Neve Zedek was obtained by Rokach from rich members of the Jewish community in Jerusalem, due to his father’s reputation in the community (Smilanski, 1942, in CZA/A232\12).

\textsuperscript{318} Talmi, 1967, p.4. CZA/A323\396.
2.2.3.1 Housing conditions

Neve Zedek’s “lack of ambition” was apparent also in its non-urban characteristics. Moses Shlush stated that “Neve Zedek was founded in the form of a Russian village, with its baker, butcher and grocer”, giving details of the many flies at the butcher shop and the many drunk Germans at the wine shop.\textsuperscript{319} Aharon Shlush’s own house in the neighborhood – one of its largest and most adorned– is depicted by his granddaughter Margalit Havazelet-Shlush as a rural rather than urban house. “My grandfather’s house was a patriarchal house, surrounded with a wall, where he settled his sons and daughters. He was a real patriarch. He built small houses for his married daughters in and around the yard. The house was full of women and children. In the summer after harvest bags of wheat were brought to the house and the women removed the seeds. After the olive harvest olives were brought in and the women pressed them for oil. Raisins were made into wine for Passover. The yard also contained a vegetable garden and a chicken coop”.\textsuperscript{320} Isaac Rokach depicted the neighborhood as one big family, with the women taking care of each other’s children and families sharing one big Sukkah (a temporary hut constructed for use during the week-long Jewish festival of Sukkot).\textsuperscript{321}

Much like Mishkenot Sha‘ananim in Jerusalem, most of the houses in Neve Zedek were part of a long linear structure of attached dwellings. “Each house included two large rooms with an open porch in the front. The building style was Arab, with plain foundations and 4m tall walls. The houses were built in a row and had shared walls. One street had all the doors, and the other – all the windows. This was done for the purposes of saving money and simultaneously for security reasons. A tight rope was tied between the houses with a bell in its end – a sort of emergency phone.”\textsuperscript{322} Neve Zedek, as we can see, was built not as an urban center independent of the city but as a Jewish neighborhood

\textsuperscript{319} Quoted by Weinstok, 1963, CZA/A323\textbackslash 396.
\textsuperscript{320} Havazelet-Shlush in Shva, 1963. CZA/A323\textbackslash 396
\textsuperscript{321} Isaac Rokach in Shva, 1963. CZA/A323\textbackslash 396
\textsuperscript{322} Weinstock, 1963. CZA/A323\textbackslash 396
of the city. It was too small to ever try and challenge Jaffa, as reflected the intimate scale of its housing and commerce. It had no land reserves for future expansion.

The neighborhood’s true achievement was in forming a center of Jewish culture, which was independent of Jaffa. After a while this independent culture required an independent material environment to house it, and expansion beyond Neve Zedek became a necessity.

The new neighborhoods outside Jaffa are not understood by historians as part of the ‘Leaving City Walls’ phenomenon. Kark is the only scholar who referred to the Jaffa suburbs as such, and even she made do with using the term as a title rather than examining the ideological and practical meanings of this analytical category. It should be noted that the Jaffa walls were torn down by the authorities (Egyptian and later Ottoman) in order to develop the city, while Jerusalem’s walls were further fortified by the Ottoman authorities. Leaving Jaffa’s borders was thus not seen by historians as an act of Zionist independence but as part of Jaffa’s economic development.

![Fig. 2.6 NeveZedek, early 50s, Source: CZA.](image1)

![Fig. 2.7 Old Jaffa after removal of its circumference wall. Circa 1910. Source: TAMA.](image2)

### 2.2.3.2 Plan for Hebrew Independence (economic vs. cultural)

There is much evidence of Ahuzat Bayit’s Zionist purpose of creating an independent Jewish neighborhood. Even the dangerous conditions outside the city, indicate the degree to which the neighborhood was revolutionary for its time. Furthermore, Ahuzat Bayit’s main act of independence – and thus of Zionism – was embodied in its founders’

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323 Unlike Mishkenot Shaananim which never succeeded commercially as it was always supported by philanthropic aid, Neve Zedek can be understood in urban terms as a Faubourg of Jaffa.

324 Unlike Neve Zedek, the neighborhoods outside Jerusalem were never culturally independent of the city and so never required – or aspired to be – an independent entity from Jerusalem. The center of Jewish life in Jerusalem has always been the religious institutions inside city walls, except the brief period of 1948-1967 when it was under Jordanian rule and at the same time the Israeli civil state institutions were formed.

325 Kark, *Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917*.

326 LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*.

insistence on founding it as an entity separate from Jaffa, whether they defined this entity as a “Hebrew city” (Weiss) or “Jewish center” (Moshe Smilansky). Ahuzat Bayit therefore should not only be understood as part of the phenomenon of “leaving the city walls”— but also as its key and only successful urban example. It is clear that the Ottomans took note of the distance of the new neighborhood from the center of town, as well as its separatist character, writes Mark LeVine. While the Shari’a court records described older Jewish neighborhoods located near Manshiyyeh as ‘Manshiyyieh al Yahud’, or simply “Jewish Manshiyyeh”, and therefore a continuation of an existing neighborhood, Tel Aviv was referred to as ‘Mahallah Tel Aviv’ or the Tel Aviv quarter.

This independence from Jaffa was framed by Ahuzat Bayit founders as financial independence. The neighborhood’s very name indicates this. At first it was simply referred to in technical terms as a “Society of home builders”, but was then given a proper name, “Ahuzat Bayit”, namely “Homestead”, reflecting an entrepreneurial and capitalist understanding of Zionism’s realization. Upon laying out the neighborhood’s streets and building its first houses, the name was changed to “Tel Aviv”. This name is the Hebrew-translation title of Herzl’s book Alt-neu-land, depicting what the realization of Zionism would look like. Tel Aviv founders thus made a direct link between their settlement and the grand ideas of Zionism, proclaiming their understanding that Zionism requires material realization and making a direct statement about what should this realization consist of.

Why, then, did Ahuzat-Bayit develop into a city, rather than the considerable number of other suburbs which surrounded Jaffa, built by Muslims, Christians and Jews starting the 1880’s? As stated by Edna Yekutieli the founding fathers of Ahuzat Bayit conceived of it, from the very beginning, as a Hebrew city, not merely an ex-urban neighborhood or a suburb of Jaffa, and not as an agricultural village. Moreover, as mentioned above, Weiss openly proclaimed the necessity of an urban center as a condition for the realization of Zionism in a Jewish homeland. These ideas were proclaimed by him in the public meeting on his very first night in the holy land, at the Yeshurun Club in Jaffa.

Even Ahuzat Bayit’s neighborhood planning distinguished it from other neighborhoods around Jaffa, which were laid out by going to the site with contractors and deciding then and there how to lay out the streets. Moreover, while in most neighborhoods topographic conditions determined the urban layout, the founders of Ahuzat-Bayit first leveled the ground and dug a well and only then set out to plan their neighborhood to best

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328 Moshe Smilansky was a Zionist leader and writer, one of the founding members of Ahuzat Bayit.
329 Mainstream scholarship about AhuzatBait focuses on its meager early realization as an attest to the fact that it was not intended to be a city but rather a suburb. Yet the evidence brought here clearly show the opposite. Yekutieli, 2000, Ahuzat Bayit protocols, Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
330 LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
332 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
333 Yekutieli, "Akiva Arieh Weiss and the First Hebrew City."
334 AhuzatBait protocols, MATA
suit their needs. Several planners were invited to propose plans for Ahuzat Bayit: the engineer Yosef Treidel of Haifa, William Staiassny of Vienna, engineer Yosef Bareski, Professor Borris Shatz of the Bezalel Academy in Jerusalem and engineer Abraham Goldman. The plan was a grid. It included a north-south main road, Herzl road, 12 meters wide and vertical streets 10 meters wide. The grid planning differed from the single-street, linear urban formation of neighborhoods such as Neve-Zedek and Moshavot like Rosh-Pina (see below) and allowed better circulation – and future expansion. Unlike the above mentioned neighborhoods, Ahuzat Bayit was not walled and had no fortified urban structure. The plan allotted 66 individual lots which were allocated by raffle among the 66 founding families. At the end of Herzl street a large plot was designated for the Herzlia Hebrew school.

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**2.2.3.3 The Independent City as a Housing Problem**

“I was surprised that the housing question, which is so important and should have been the first on the agenda, did not occupy the participants [of the Jaffa Jews emergency meeting],” stated Weiss in his memoir. “As 120 people participated in the meeting I used this opportunity to propose a plan for building a Hebrew city which will fill the existing shortage of housing, expected to increase in every respect…Since we all want to better the economic situation of inhabitants and re-settlers…I came to the conclusion that there was a safe and unique opportunity to revive the land, reinstate its ruins and restore its grandeur of two thousand years ago. But what will immigrants to the land do if they don’t find proper housing? Will they stay in the land if they have no place to dwell? Can all urban people suddenly move to the village and manage there? Here I learned that we pay our Arab neighbors in this city 40,000 franks for rent each year. With this money the

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336 Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.*
337 See chapter 5 of this dissertation for a detailed account of Ahuzat Bayit’s planning process. Ahuzat Bayit Protocolos, TAMA, ibid.
339 Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv.* p. 77
Arabs build new houses and get stronger. We empty our pockets and shed gold like water into their pockets without considering the consequences. After all building houses is the essence, and we must grasp this. If we came here to build the land, then everybody knows and understands one cannot build without buildings…I have a plan to build cities 100% Israeli. These cities will have quality of life, the streets will be wide, there will be water in the houses, gardens around the houses, electric light in the streets and the houses and electric power for industry day and night. General sewage will be in order and as well as the amenities fit for a modern city”. 340

As a city could not be built from thin air, housing was the platform upon which Ahuzat-Bayit recruited both its members and the financing necessary for construction. Ruppin, who recommended the granting of a JNF loan to Ahuzat-Bayit, viewed the poor housing conditions as preventing prospective immigrants from settling in the land: “I see great importance in constructing a Jewish neighborhood in Jaffa and Jerusalem…The narrow paths, the filth and the horrid architecture in the existing Jewish quarters are complete disgrace for Jews and discourage many from settling in the land”. 341

In Weiss’s perspective, the housing problem could only be solved in urban terms, an idea he expressed during his first visit to the Holy Land, in 1904. “My conclusion was that a Hebrew city has to be built in the country. A city would be an impetus to construction, commerce and industry. It should be built like the cities envisioned by Dr. Herzl in his Altneuland…Propaganda for this idea is not enough. We need actions. First a small group of people should agree to this plan and start fulfilling it. Then, the usual competition will naturally come”. “As long as we continue sitting in Lodz, Warsaw or even Vilna - the ‘Jerusalem of Lita’, and dream nice dreams about Eretz Israel – the land will remain desolate and diaspora will never end…First we have to start building cities…The idea of establishing a company for urban development is on the table – this idea did not give me rest. I did not wait long till I immigrated…in order to do my part in realizing the plan articulated in Herzl’s book Altneuland – Tel Aviv”. 342

Weiss thus laid the foundations for building the city with a view to a more comprehensive national purpose. He was not interested merely in a neighborhood to satisfy the dwelling needs of a small group, as was the case with other neighborhoods erected outside Jerusalem and Jaffa. 343 In the general meeting of June 3, 1906 Weiss proclaimed that the gathering was “for the purpose of erecting a new Hebrew settlement, not only for our own private benefit but for the benefit of all, public and individual together. Many companies had already been established to build in the land but they are of another sort and their goals differ from ours in every respect”. 344

340 Ibid., p. 77, 78. Weiss’s account in his diaries matches the Ahuzat-Bayit protocols at the TAMA.
341 Ruppin, My Life Chapters. p. 48-49.
342 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv. p. 60. Altneuland was translated to Hebrew by N. Sokolow in 1902, giving it the name Tel Aviv, literally “Hill of Spring”, to reflect the idea of ruined city reborn in spring.
343 Yekutieli, "Akiva Arieh Weiss and the First Hebrew City."
344 Ahuzat Bayit protocols, TAMA.
As Edna Yekutieli shows, while some researchers claim that Ahuzat-Bayit was established for the purpose of erecting a nice quiet suburb of Jaffa and was never intended to be a city, the writings and proclamations of Weiss, who initiated the housing association, clearly envision it as a city from the very start. Moreover, Weiss’s proposal to found the society for home builders as the cornerstone for a Hebrew city was accepted in the first meeting described above. The important actions taken by Ahuzat Bayit, which determined its destiny, included purchase of a tract of land both large and far from the city, careful site planning and building regulations, and acts which betokened self-rule: establishing education and sanitary facilities (a well), obtaining a large loan from the JNF, and a governing system comprised of a general assembly of members making decisions and an executive committee to carry them out. All these actions were proclaimed in the initial brochure of 1906, thus their execution can be seen as a manifestation of original intentions.

The most significant decision which attests to the vision for Ahuzat Bayit’s future was the amount of land purchased. Approached by land dealers proposing to sell Ahuzat Bayit parts of the Jibali vineyard, Weiss insisted on buying the entire plot of 187,000 square cubits, or 10.75 hectares, more than 10 times the size required for a regular neighborhood like Neve Zedek. The plot was considered enormous for the time, as the plot for Neve Zedek was only 17,300 square cubits (0.995 hectares), and for Neve Shalom 20,000 cubits (1.05 hectares). While some of the founding fathers of Ahuzat Bayit supported buying a smaller tract of land befitting their vision of it as a quiet suburb, they later admitted their mistake and supported Weiss’s position. The location of the plot was contested as well. While Weiss insisted on a large plot of land outside Jaffa which would enable self-rule, some members preferred a small plot inside the city for reasons of security, comfort and ease of conducting business.

In order to obtain funds for building Ahuzat Bayit in a commercial way (rather than by donations and philanthropy), its committee had to mortgage the land and houses. Initially, the committee considered taking a loan from one of the foreign institutions in the country; they were concerned, however, about entrusting their city to institutions which did not share their ideology and national goals. Weiss therefore approached Arthur Ruppin and David Wolffsohn, head of the World Zionist Organization. This reflected his view that Ahuzat Bayit, as the seed for the ‘first Hebrew city’, was the realization of a national goal, and for that reason, worthy of the financial support from “national” institutions such as the JNF.

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346 Weiss was a known Zionist activist, familiar to the assembled Zionist of Jaffa. For more information on Weiss see chapter 5 of this dissertation.
347 Yekutieli, "Akiva Arieh Weiss and the First Hebrew City."
348 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv. Ahuzat Bayit protocols, Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.
349 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.
350 Danin, In News of the Municipality of Tel Aviv, 1944 Ibid.
351 Yekutieli, "Akiva Arieh Weiss and the First Hebrew City."
352 Ruppin, My Life Chapters.
members had already deposited substantial funds for its construction with the Anglo-Palestine Bank. Ruppin acknowledged the national contribution of Ahuzat Bayit, and in his letter to the JNF, highlighted especially the fact that the land bought by the association was much greater than needed for the first 60 houses.353 “Jerusalem, Safed and Tiberius are mostly Jewish cities in terms of population and real estate property, and yet Jews are not the decisive and directing element there because they are sunk in lethargy and not interested in autonomy. This interest should be awakened,” wrote Ruppin. The WZO, via the JNF, recognized Ahuzat Bayit’s contribution to the national project and granted it a loan on excellent terms: the funds were loaned out for 13 years at four percent interest.354

Yet the struggle over the ‘proper’ form of Zionist settlement led to critiques of the JNF decision to use its funds to support an urban rather than rural-agricultural settlement, and a population of capitalists and merchants rather than farmers. An assumed connection between the ‘proper Zionist’ and his ‘proper housing’ is manifested here, as it will be throughout the history of Zionist materialization and formation of future citizens.355 Another loan was granted to Ahuzat Bayit in 1908 by Meir Dizengoff, head of “Geula”, a society for land redemption.356 Dizengoff one of Ahuzat Bayit’s founders, who would go on to become the first mayor of Tel Aviv, was thus personally invested in the neighborhood. His decision to grant a loan of 40,000 franks at six percent interest was made without consulting the Geula trustees in Odessa and severely criticized afterwards. Dizengoff nonetheless managed to push the decision through, claiming that the land of the Jibali vineyard had to be redeemed immediately and there was no time to await approval.357

2.2.3.4 Urban Planning

The urban nature of Tel Aviv is understood by most scholars as a mistake rather than the result of planning.358 The main argument, made for example by Yossi Katz, is that no areas for business and shops were allocated in the Ahuzat Bayit plan, thus that it was intended to be a suburban neighborhood, not a city.359 Yet, unlike all preceding neighborhoods outside Jaffa, Ahuzat Bayit was planned by professional planners and architects, the result of the efforts of Weiss who studied architecture. In addition to allocating plots for parks and public buildings, the planners allocated a ‘commercial center’ for the neighborhood, beyond the railroad tracks. As reflected in Ahuzat Bayit’s protocols, the members who objected to commercial establishments in the neighborhood did not object to commerce per se, but only to the phenomenon of residents who ran

353 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv. p. 76-77.
354 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv; Smilanski, A City Is Born.
355 Yekutieli, "Akiva Arieh Weiss and the First Hebrew City."
356 The Geula (redemption) society was founded in Odessa by Dizengoff in 1904 in the intent of buying lands in Palestine for the purpose of Jewish settlement using private capital of middle class Jews. See Yossi Katz, The" Business" of Settlement: Private Entrepreneurship in the Jewish Settlement of Palestine, 1900-1914 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University 1994).
357 Ibid.
359 Katz, Redeem the Land: The Geula Company for Land Purchase.
shops out of their own homes,\textsuperscript{360} as was the case in Neve Zedek.\textsuperscript{361} According to the protocols, the commercial center “means: no permission to open stores in private homes and plots. Stores will only be located in public space, and the committee will rent them according to the interests of the settlement”.\textsuperscript{362}

Throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Jewish society became increasingly urbanized. The growth rate of Jews in urban centers was phenomenal. For example, Odessa housed 25,000 Jews in 1860 and 139,000 in 1900. Emigration from the Pale of Settlement also transformed the Jewish communities which began to form in the New World into distinctly urban ones. Jewish literature of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century was ambivalent about the modern city and the Jewish urbanization processes. On the one hand, the city was perceived as a free space where social and economic opportunities were available to Jews, a place of enlightenment and freedom. On the other hand, it was perceived as an autonomous entity which would give rise to two contradictory processes: either to the fragmentation of Jewish society and greater assimilation and loss of identity or to the creation of new ghettoes.\textsuperscript{363}

This ambivalent perspective toward the city shaped the ambivalent attitudes towards Tel Aviv, long before it became a city. In 1948, the year the State of Israel was proclaimed independent in Tel Aviv, the city housed 58\% of the Yishuv population. 84\% of Yishuv population lived in urban centers while only 10\% resided in Kibbutzim and other agricultural settlements. Moreover, during the political and military campaign for a Jewish state, Tel Aviv played a central role in the life of the Yishuv and served as its de-facto capital. Why is it that the leaders of the Zionist movement – most residing in and operating from Tel Aviv – nevertheless continued to defer to the agricultural settlements and the Kibbutz movement as the pinnacles of Zionism?

2.3 Agricultural Settlements Outside City Walls: New Forms of Land, Labor and Housing

As we saw in Chapter 1, the initial ‘model’ for agricultural settlement in Ottoman Palestine was the Arab peasant village. This ‘model’ was however dramatically altered by the 1858 Land Code and essentially reinvented as a tenant village, in which land cultivators were tenants not of the Empire but of individual landowners holding both land and farmers as means of capitalist production. All agricultural settlements were thus transformed following 1858, a unique moment which “reset” agricultural cultivation in Palestine and in the settlements engaged with it\textsuperscript{364} and required reform of all segments of the agricultural population. The destruction of the Arab peasant village model also enabled the formation of non-Arab agricultural settlements, i.e. land cultivation by groups as different as American and German missionaries, Ottoman orthodox Jews and secular Jewish nationals.

\textsuperscript{360} TAMA, protocol of the 26 of Tishrei
\textsuperscript{361} Shva, 1963, Shluss, The Story of My Life; Shluss, Galabyia and Tembel Hat.
\textsuperscript{362} TAMA, protocol of 26 of Tishrei.
\textsuperscript{363} Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
\textsuperscript{364} For detailed discussion of the Arab Village see chapter 7 of this dissertation.
2.3.1 Arab peasant villages – transformations

The Arab peasant village ranged in population from 30 to 1,000 inhabitants, living in 20 to 100 houses. The village provided the physical, political and economic context for the majority of the population of Ottoman Palestine. Due to the conditions which prevailed in Palestine throughout most of the Ottoman period, the villages had to be self-sufficient.\textsuperscript{365} The transformations which the Arab peasant village underwent following the 1858 land code primarily involved modes of land ownership, and thus had immediate implications for dwelling and settlement forms. As imperial miri and mawat lands changed hands and became privatized, in the process depicted in Chapter 1, a large amount of land required prompt cultivation in order not to be confiscated by the state.\textsuperscript{366} The result of this process was the formation of new peasant villages in previously unpopulated lands, primarily the lowlands separating the Judean Mountains from the Mediterranean coast.\textsuperscript{367} The residents of these newly formed villages were tenants of absentee landlords, having no legal right to the land. Often, these villages were formed as extensions of villages in the mountainous heartland, first as temporary seasonal villages and later as permanent ones. This association with the mother village is reflected in village names, bearing the prefix ‘hirbet’, along with the name of the mother village.\textsuperscript{368} Formation of the tenant villages was the result of connections and allegiances between urban effendi landowners of the newly acquired properties and the village Sheiks of the Judean Mountains.\textsuperscript{369} The commodification of the land, understood by effendi landowners as a means of production, implied that labor which took place upon it, too, was a means of production and based on for-profit logic and motivations.

Scholars are divided as to the actual consequences of the code for the peasantry. Inefficient administration of the law, it is contended, allowed powerful individuals to register in their own names lands previously held by peasants. This occurred because peasants depended on local notables for protection; or because they feared that registration of land would be followed by conscription or increased tax burdens; or because peasant indebtedness to moneylenders led to forfeiture of deeds to land; or because they were too ignorant to comprehend the land registration regulations; or because Bedouin sheiks used their authority within the tribe to usurp all the land of their tribesmen.\textsuperscript{370}

More recent scholarship has contested this view, however, arguing that the consequences of the Land Code differed from region to region in the empire and that peasants were willing to participate in and benefit from the new system. In Palestine, for example, in areas of established peasant settlements such as the hill country surrounding Jerusalem, peasants did register land in their own names and peasant ownership continued to be the predominant form of land tenure. On the coastal plains, however, city notables were able

\textsuperscript{366} Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid. Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914.
\textsuperscript{368} LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
\textsuperscript{370} Kark, Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917, p. 28.
to take advantage of the government's new policy of selling deeds to unclaimed lands. Large-scale landlords took possession of enormous quantities of land still mostly unoccupied or unclaimed and on wasteland, often located in swampy plains. However, the need to cultivate these lands within three years or lose them meant the formation of new agricultural villages which had no rights whatsoever.

Gabriel Baer offers a compelling explanation of peasants’ difficulties in trying to register land in their names, based on the nature of Musha land ownership, which characterized the significant majority of peasant-cultivated land in the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine. According to Baer, it was precisely the collective character of ownership under the musha system, which required that village land be redistributed periodically among the village community which was an important factor in the failure to register individual titles.  

Recent scholarship by Oya Guzel supports Baer’s explanation. “The practice of shifting the agricultural plot in the musha system” writes Guzel “blocked the application of the Land Code, since the villagers could not prove ten years of occupancy on a fixed plot of land. Since they could not prove ten years’ possession, their lands were either granted in exchange for the tabu payment or put on public auction. The sheikhs, notables and aghas benefited from this gap.” Guzel’s investigation of the process in Iraq and Anatolia shows evidence of great corruption, which enabled sheikhs and the ayan to circumvent the auction process altogether and register in their names lands that should have been bought and registered by the peasants. This practice most probably took place in Palestine as well. It was part and parcel of the Empire’s more general betrayal of its subjects.

As Kark shows, the Jaffa area was significantly cultivated as result of the success of orange groves on private mulk land around the city in the 1840s. Following the 1858 reforms, sand dunes north and east of the city were bought by effendi landlords from the area and from as far away as Damascus and planted with orange groves, exported from the Jaffa port with great profit. Yet by the early years of the twentieth century, orange groves and vineyards were less lucrative than sale of the land as real estate for the construction of new neighborhoods outside the city. As we have seen, Ahuzat Bayit, built on land sold by the Jibali family, lead to the evacuation of all tenants from the property. Weiss describes in his diary the trips to survey the Jibali land, addressing the need to keep secret from the Arab workers the fact that the land was on sale by its effendi landlord. When lands held by private landowners as for-profit means of production were sold for the erection of urban neighborhoods as in the case of Ahuzat Bayit, or to owners intent on cultivating it outside of the market as in the case of Missionary or Jewish religious settlements – the Arab tenants were evicted.

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373 A. LeBor, City of Oranges: Arabs and Jews in Jaffa (WW Norton, 2007).
374 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
A more painful consequence of the 1858 reforms for Arab peasants was the loss of ownership rights over villages where they had resided for generations. As described above, there were various reasons for this dispossession. They included exploitation by the village sheiks of their authority to register communal lands in their name, peasant disobedience and refusal to register land for fear of incurring taxes or military obligations, peasant ignorance of the process, and hardships leading peasants to mortgage their ownership rights due to famine or sickness. Peasants living in the villages in the Judean Mountains, on the other hand, used the opportunity of the 1858 land code to register the miri land they had been cultivating in their name, to become individual landowners and direct taxpayers in the empire, not dependant on tax farmers. Much of the miri land around Jerusalem was thus registered as owned by individual peasant families, a fact which has a dramatic impact on debates over the West Bank territories till this day. The difference between these two village environments in Palestine in terms of landownership and housing developed into two very different forms of nationalism in the course of the 20th century: Urban nationalism and rural nationalism which proposed two very different strategies for holding on to the homeland, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 7 ahead.

2.3.2 Jewish agricultural settlements – new forms

Jewish agricultural settlements in the late 19th century, were part of a movement of ‘Returning to Zion’. These agricultural settlements were revolutionary in taking a stand regarding the proper way to materialize Zionism and the proper identity of the Zionist subject - as opposed to the urban environment of Old City of Ottoman Palestine and the new ‘Hebrew city’ of Tel Aviv. Agricultural settlements gained most of the attention of the Jewish nationalist public, despite the fact that only 10% of the Jews of Eretz Israel lived in rural villages. Agriculture became synonymous with settling the homeland and was viewed not only as a livelihood but as an ideal of national revival through return to the homeland.

The ultimate priority given to rural settlements in building the national project was not the result of any study into the best economic structure for a national economy. Rather, the land was understood as the place from which the strength of a nation, its proper human and national culture, could spring. Very few people – Akiva Weiss and Arthur Ruppin were two of the exceptions - challenged the position that the rural settlement was the sole foundation for building the Jewish Yishuv.

Jewish agricultural attempts were troubled and tormented, a fact expressed in numerous accounts of the time, which emphasize the prevalence of diseases, insecurity, scarcity, poor training and inability to subsist economically. These hardships and the attempts to

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376 See the above discussion of the case of Metula Kark, *Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917*, p. 28.
378 See the discussion of nationalism as invented tradition and of the nation as imagined community in the introductory chapter.
379 Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv*.
380 Kark, *Jaffa a City in Evolution: 1799-1917*.
adjust to them led to several forms of housing and settlement which we now, in hindsight, see as paradigmatic for the Zionist movement as a whole. Yet the very first settlements were experimental and were based on very vague planning, evolving, instead, in tandem with changes imposed by late Ottoman reality, and especially those involving land. In fact, the difficulties involved in materializing the aspiration for Jewish agricultural settlement were the main impetus to the galvanization of those successful settlements into models, recipes for successfully coping with agricultural challenges. These models include the Moshava, the Kvutza, the Kibbutz, the Moshav and the agricultural Training Farm, which will all be compared in this section.

Just like Ahuzat Bayit, seed of the ‘first Hebrew city’, Degania, first of the Kibbutzim was not the first agricultural Jewish settlement outside city walls in Ottoman Palestine. The reasons for its eventual importance are the subject of this section.

The Kibbutz became, with time, the pinnacle of Zionist revival in the homeland. As a result, the international public, both scholarly and lay, is aware mostly of the Kibbutz and almost completely unaware of the other forms of Jewish agricultural settlement and housing of the era, which competed vigorously with the Kibbutz for the dominant role in the Zionist revival.\footnote{While extensive scholarship was written in Hebrew of all the above settlement forms, most of what was published in English concerned the Kibbutz. The exception to this rule is Moshav Nahallal, known in the literature of town planning for its distinct round design. See for example Spiro Kostof, \textit{The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Throughout History}, Bulfinch, Boston (1991).}

Scholarship on the Kibbutz is vast, focusing on its ‘new society’ ideology and institutions, its role in producing Israel’s future borders and later on the reasons for its demise.\footnote{Daniel Gevron, "The Most Intriguing Question in Modern Jewish History," \textit{Ha'aretz} 2003. M Chyutin and B Chyutin, \textit{Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment} (Ashgate Pub Co, 2007). Ron and Keinan, 2004, Amir et al, 2005, Lapidot et al, 2006.} Scholarship regarding the Moshava and the Moshav attempts to demonstrate the originality and contribution of these forms of settlement and argues that they are worthy of celebration as the Kibbutz.\footnote{See Ben Arie, "The Jewish Neighborhoods Built Outside Jerusalem City Walls in the 1880s."} While contributing to our historical understanding of these settlements and complicating Zionist mythical narratives, such studies fail to address the question of why the Kibbutz acquired and maintained its iconic status. Additionally, this body of work completely disregards the tremendous influence of the Arab peasant village on the formation of the Kibbutz housing and settlement model.\footnote{384 At the same time, international scholarship on Zionist agricultural settlements focuses on the Kibbutz as a single typology, missing the opportunity to study it in a comparative context. These studies are also hindered by their tendency to posit the Kibbutz and the Arab peasant village as complete negations of one another, locked in a struggle over the land, a picture very far from the actual reality of the times.\footnote{See for example LeVine, \textit{Overthrowing Geography}. Horrox, 2009, Davis, Uri, 1973, Palestine into Israel, journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3. no.1.}
The movement of a return to the land can be categorized by ideology, roughly divided into two distinct understandings of Jewish Revival, secular-nationalistic, and messianic. In addition, they can also be divided by the identity of settlers, namely Jews of the Old Yishuv leaving the walled cities to erect agricultural settlements, or Jews emigrating from Eastern Europe following the violent collapse of any hopes (or illusions) of assimilation in Europe as citizens of their respective nation-states. These two secular and messianic streams of Jewish national revival intersected and created a rich array of identities and sub-ideologies. It should also be noted that the two streams were not nearly as neatly distinct in the early days. Only later did they become distinct ideological interpretations of Zionism, manifest in different settlement forms and struggling with one another over the nature of state and citizen. The two settlement groups differed in several respects: interpretation of Zionist ideology (secular vs. messianic), political economy (private vs. collective understanding of property, economic independence), and settlement/housing form.

2.3.2.1 Moshava settlement

The Moshava was the first model for Jewish agricultural settlement in Ottoman Palestine. Beginning in 1878, by 1910 there were already 26 Moshavot in Palestine, cultivating some 202,000 dunams and housing some 5,000 people. The Moshavot were revolutionary by default, as no previous Jewish agricultural settlements had existed in Palestine for millennia. I’d like to argue that the Moshava was also revolutionary in the sense that it created the locus for a more fully religious way of life involving the land, and thus allowing for a Judaism practiced not only in prayer but also by working the land, as had been the case in biblical times.

While the Moshavot were largely populated by immigrants of the First Aliyah, I find it significant that the first two agricultural settlements erected by Jews in Ottoman Palestine were erected by Jews of the Old Yishuv. Petach Tikva, popularly known as the ‘mother of Moshavot’ (“Em ha-Moshavot”) was founded in 1878 by Jews from Jerusalem, while Rosh Pina was founded a few weeks earlier by Jews from Safed. In both cases, the pioneers were observant Jews who understood settling the Holy Land in religious terms, as the fulfillment of religious commandments. As such they offered an alternative to the Old City model of religious observance, by suggesting that cultivation of the Holy Land and fulfilling the religious commandments associated with it was a form of religious observance. Both settlements were deserted shortly after and their residents returned to Jerusalem and Safed. Upon returning to Safed, the Rosh Pina settlers

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386 To these, of course, we can add the urban-capitalist understanding of Zionism, manifest by Tel Aviv.
encountered hostility, due to the theological position which was implied in the very act of settlement, i.e. that proper religious Jewish life required land cultivation, as in Biblical times, in order to make possible the fulfillment of those Jewish religious commandments which were associated with and depended upon the land, such as jubilee years and tithing.\textsuperscript{389}

No Jewish agricultural settlement existed till 1882, when immigrants from Eastern Europe arrived in Eretz Israel following the pogroms with the intention of forming such settlements. In 1882 immigrants from Romania and Russia, members of the Hibbat Zion movement, established Rishon LeZion and Zichron Yaakov and resettled Rosh Pina.\textsuperscript{390} These settlements and similar ones which followed embodied messianic ideas and religiously inspired views of agriculture as reinstating religious commandments related to the land. They thus saw themselves as a religious revival of Judaism and a theological challenge to established Rabbinic Judaism, although this challenge did not become explicitly stated until the writings of Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Cohen Kook.\textsuperscript{391} The unique nature of Moshavot was their foundations on Jewish religion and messianic hopes. Most of the Moshavot members were observant Jews who rejected the Haskala – the Jewish Enlightenment. The ideas of a Jewish return made concrete by a return to the land as an active means for bringing about the coming of the Messiah were reflected in the Moshavot ordinances. Both immigrants to Zion and Jews from the sacred old cities compared themselves to Ezra and Nehemia who returned from Babylon to the Holy Land and erected the Second Temple, and like those biblical heroes, they viewed their settlement as the seed for the future-state of the Jewish people.\textsuperscript{392}

Yossi Ben-Artzi, in his introduction to a book aiming to correct the historiographic bias against the Moshavot, defined their form of Zionism as the purest and most proper. The renewed interest in the Moshavot, stated Ben-Arzi, was due to their founders’ purist Zionism as “the true, early beginning of rooted innocent actions of farmers whose sole wishes comprised creating a Hebrew village in the land of Israel and the formation of a Jewish farmer who works and subsists on his land. This is the most distilled essence of Zionism”.

This ‘pure’ Zionism, however, was interested in an individual relationship with the homeland, rather than a benchmark for national sovereignty, and was thus limited in scale compared to settlement forms aspiring to serve the nation as a whole. The Moshava settlement form was therefore easily susceptible to losing its economic independence to the philanthropic domain of Baron Rothschild. The foundation of the Moshavot using private capital, and their understanding of their own relationship to the land as based on individual rather than full national access as sufficient as far as religious duties were concerned, contradicted Zionists’ goals.

\textsuperscript{389} Rosh Pina archive.
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid.
While the built environment of the Moshavot was believed to have been the product of chance and ad-hoc planning, Ben-Artzi showed that they were in fact carefully planned to meet the challenges and obstacles they faced or expected to face.\textsuperscript{393} For example Rosh Pina, one of the first two Moshavot\textsuperscript{394}, was built in a tight cluster of houses along one street, thus forming a protective wall. This defensive structure is interestingly similar to that of Mishkenot Sha’ananim outside Jerusalem of 1860 and the neighborhood of Neve Zedek outside Jaffa in 1887.

![Fig. 2.10, 2.11 Rosh Pina prior to 1889. Source: Scheid, Eliahu, 1883-1889\textsuperscript{395}](image)

The Moshava model predated the Kibbutz and, by 1908, was already an established and successful settlement type, including 26 Moshavot economically supported by a philanthropic network. Why has it lost its leadership of Zionist agricultural settlement for the Kibbutz?

Most Moshava settlers defined themselves as ‘farmers’ rather than ‘pioneers’ in the sense of sufficing with their personal access to land and the fulfillment of religious rites as serving as shlichei mitzvah for the masses of the Jewish people, i.e. did not see it necessary for masses of Jews to gain access to the land. They found no reason in employing Jewish workers or in maintaining their sovereignty over the land as long as it was Jewish owned and enabled performing land-based rites. However, most Zionists

\textsuperscript{393} Yossi Ben-Arzi, \textit{Early Jewish Settlement Patterns in Palestine, 1882-1914} (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1997).

\textsuperscript{394} Rosh Pina was first founded as ‘Gey Oni’ by Old Yishuv members from Safed in 1878 but abandoned shortly after. It was resettled in 1882 and renamed Rosh Pina by First Aliyah immigrants from Rumania.

\textsuperscript{395} Eliyahu Scheid, \textit{Memories} (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1983). Scheid was the highest rank representative of the Baron Rothschild in EretzIsrael for the purpose of managing his protégée Moshavot. Scheid was a gifted drafter and his visual documentations are considered reliable and accurate.
viewed the Moshava farmers as landlords employing landless workers on the one hand and as protégées dependent on massive capital on the other. As a result, they were viewed as ideologically spineless. The ideological split was made even more acute by the fact that this “spinelessness” had an impact on the most important arena for Zionism – sovereignty. Zionist ideologists viewed Moshavot farmers as subjugated and enslavers at the same time, unable to understand the true purpose of return to the land and unwilling to support their own people. Hence, the farmers were perceived as bourgeois even though in practice they embodied the goals of Zionist return to the land.

Not one Moshava was established by the settling agencies after the formation of the WZO. Ruppin’s Eretz Israel office, and later the settlement departments of the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Agency, refrained, on ideological grounds from establishing Moshavot. In their view, the Moshava was disqualified as a settlement solution for masses of Jews in Eretz Israel because its foundations on private ownership of the land, private production, marketing and consumption seemed inappropriate for institutional settlement. The religious motivation underlying the Moshava was foreign to secular Haskala Zionist organizations. Moreover, the religious commandments associated with the Holy Land do not require Jewish cultivation of the land. In most cases, Jewish ownership of the land sufficed, and this too conflicted with the secular-Zionist understanding of the proper relationship of people and land as one based on active work and cultivation. Moshavot were therefore left to private initiative, for people of means, outside the framework of national effort.

Despite the views of the Zionist national institutions, the Moshava remained the dominant form of new Jewish settlement for the first 40 years of the process. New forms of settlement, namely the Kibbutz and the workers’ Moshav, were established beginning in 1910, yet at the time they were insignificant in size when compared to the thirty Moshavot which housed 12,000 of the 12,500 Jews living in rural settlements in 1914. Arthur Ruppin issued a report in 1907 in which he reviewed the state of the Moshavot. While he was enthusiastic about their contribution to the agricultural cultivation of the land, he noted that their economic foundations were unstable. According to Ruppin, agriculture on the Moshava was based on monoculture (vines, citrus or cereals), which made them vulnerable to the market forces and dependent on Arab labor. Economic dependency on Rothschild’s support led to a total sense of impotence, which eroded their entrepreneurship and idealism. The model of Moshavot, stated Ruppin, was dangerous both economically and socially.

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396 Ibid.
397 Following the establishment of the state of Israel the Moshava was not recognized as a legitimate form of settlement and all Moshavot were declared towns. This move reflects the Mapai-dominated Yishuv position that private property equaled urbanity. Ben-Arzi, *Jewish ‘Moshava’ Settlements in Eretz-Israel (1882-1914).*
398 The Moshava was declared an improper means for making claims to the land and determining frontiers, even though the Moshavot of Metula and Beer Tuvia (Kasina) marked the future-state’s borders decades before the first Kibbutzim.
399 Ibid.
400 Arthur Ruppin, *Thirty Years of Building Eretz Israel* (Jerusalem1937).
2.3.2.2 Kinneret: Kinneret Moshava, Kinneret Training Farm, Degania

My case study for comparison of the Kibbutz, the Moshava and the agricultural Training Farm is the site of Kinneret-Degania, where the three settlement-housing forms were formed at the same place and time, on the lands of Um Junni and Deleika, lands bought by the JCA and the JNF from a Bahai Persian absentee landlord and previously cultivated by tenants.\(^{401}\) This case study thus represents, in a nutshell, the consequences of the 1858 land code on agricultural settlement forms in Palestine.

The land in question was purchased in 1905 via Haim Margaliot who was able to negotiate the land sale from its absentee landowners. According to Ottoman land laws the land had to be settled and cultivated in three years or become lapsed land (mahlul) confiscated by the state.

2.3.2.2.1 The Kinneret Moshava

The JCA settled its plot of land as a Moshava village, populated by eight families from other, previously established, Moshavot. Founded along the shores of the Sea of Galilee in 1908, the farm included 8 small houses for the farming families and one larger house for the JNC representatives. The entire area was surrounded by a wall. The farm was not self-run, but managed by an agronomist-foreman employed by the JCA to make sure its property was well tended and economically viable. The settlement was unsuccessful, and in the course of its first four years, all the farmers left and were replaced by farm workers of the Second Aliyah, intent on the “conquest of labor”.\(^{402}\)

![Fig.2.14 Kinneret Moshava, 1912. Source: Kinneret archive.](image)

![Fig. 2.15 Kinneret Moshava, 1937. Source: NPC](image)

2.3.2.2.2 The Kinneret Training Farm

In his position as head of the Eretz Israel office of WZO, Ruppin managed the JNF lands. As we have seen, in order to meet the Ottoman requirement for active cultivation of the land, he had to populate and cultivate it one form or another within three years, or lose it. The unavailability of Jewish farmers made settling all the territory as a Moshava unfeasible. Moreover, as JNF land, it was owned by the nation and could never be sold, not even to private Jewish owners, which made settling it a very complicated task.\(^{403}\) The Jewish immigrants interested in agriculture at the time (second aliyah immigrants) were mostly young, poor, single and untrained in agricultural labor. They were neither able

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\(^{401}\) Degania archive, Baratz, A Village by the Jordan: The Story of Degania.

\(^{402}\) Mordechai Naor, Jezreel Valley - Birthbed of Kibbutz Settlements (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1993).

\(^{403}\) The JCA had more lands in the area, which could be sold to individuals, upon which the Moshava of Kinneret was formed by 8 farmers in 1908-9. Margalit Shilo, "The Female Workers’ Farm in Kinneret, 1911-1917, as Solution to the Problem of the Female Worker in the Second Aliyah," Katedra 14(1980).
(nor willing) to be landowners in the Moshava settlement model. Hence, despite their honest desire to toil the land as agricultural workers, they could not serve Ruppin in cultivating the JNF lands. The territory had to be cultivated – fast – by other means. In order to settle the land quickly, Ruppin conceived of the model of educational farms, where land is cultivated by Jewish workers-to-be, led by a foreman. The land was still national land, and the workers-trainees received a monthly salary from the WZO via Ruppin. ‘National training farms’ were to be temporary formations. Ruppin matched the national land not yet settled with the unemployed workers, who were often workers by proclamation only due to their inexperience in agriculture. By forming the national farms, Ruppin aimed to meet three goals: cultivating the land to prevent confiscation, employing the starving young Jewish immigrants and training them for future work in agriculture. Kinneret, the name given to this national farm, was formed on the lands of Deleike, an Arab village in June 1908. It included 8 young men and 1 young woman, led by the agronomist Moses Berman. Initially, they resided in the half ruined caravanserai (or khan) in the area. The workers transformed the khan into a kitchen, dining room and sick room. Sleep was on the khan’s roof, under the sky. After a few months, further sick rooms were added to the khan and it was encircled with a wall.

Ben Arie lists three reasons for choosing the ruined khan for the farm’s residence: First, the fact that the structure existed enabled the settlers to avoid asking for a permit (a rochsia) for construction of a new farmhouse, as required by the Ottoman authorities. Second, the farm’s meager funds were not enough for constructing new structures but sufficed for remodeling the khan for its new purpose. Third, the khan’s location near the Moshava of Kinneret gave the settlers a sense of relative security.

Michael Chyutin’s work suggests another possible reason: the educational farm represented an actualization of the influence, on practical Zionist leaders, of the Prussian

404 Ottoman law required any purchased agricultural land to be cultivated within one year, or be confiscated.
405 Forming Zionist future citizens was an explicit goal for Ruppin. He perceived the primary obstacle for settling Eretz Israel to be “transforming urban Jews to an agricultural class” Ruppin, My Life Chapters..Naor, Jezreel Valley - Birthbed of Kibbutz Settlements..
406 The name was given by writer Shay Agnon. Ibid.
407 The group was named by the site of its formation as a communal workgroup.
408 Ben Arie, "Settlement in the Jordan Valley During the Second Aliya."
agricultural colonial settlement as well as the ideas of the Garden City movement and its implementation by Robert Owen in New Harmony and Letchworth or Charles Fourier in the Phalanstere. The Prussian model was that of a courtyard surrounded by dwellings and farm structures. Many scholars have discussed the resemblance between Ruppin’s plan for the agricultural farm and the Prussian settlements in Poland. The Prussian Colonization Commission, to which the WZO is likened by these scholars, bought estates from Polish and German landowners, parceled them into family farms, and sold them to Germans. Yet as stated by Blum, Shafir and others, the idea of national ownership of land did not appear in Zionist or Prussian settling ideas before Ruppin’s formation of the Eretz Israel Office of the WZO.

The idea of communal ownership of land. I’d like to propose, stemmed from Ruppin’s encounter with the nature of landownership in Palestinian peasant villages, and more specifically with communally-held musha land. Ya’akov Firestone’s study of musha land on Ottoman Palestine, as well as Ruth Kark and David Grossman’s, indicates this.

After fulfilling the first goal of materializing hold of the land, the Kinneret farm and Moshava had to perform as viable and economically productive cultivators, in order to pay taxes to the Ottoman government and to prove to the agencies which owned the land that the investment was worthwhile. Furthermore, he WZO, which owned the land via the JNF, had purchased the land using donations gathered from Jews in Europe and America and had to report to this public. Several important WZO members opposed Ruppin’s initiative of the Kinneret agricultural farm, casting doubts on its value and necessity and lamenting its heavy losses. Khan insisted constantly that an economy that didn’t carry itself was a failing economy.

This was also the Zionist perspective on sovereignty. The WZO posited self-rule as a goal and rejected ‘empty philanthropy’; it thus demanded that the settlements formed on national lands be self-supporting, and furnish a viable example of the possibility of a self-governing national home in Palestine. Success was thus framed in economic terms, which were understood as evidence of political viability as well.

This perspective was shared by the pioneers themselves. For example, the Kinneret workers insisted on self-rule, which they practiced in governing their own commune. As a result, fierce conflict broke out in Kinneret between the workers and the foreman.

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409 Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment. Hall, Cities of Tomorrow. See also Ruth Hanin-Rabinowitz, Garden Colony and a School Farm as Models for the Zionist Cooperative Settlements (Haifa: Pardes, 2006).
410 This first model later served the planners of several Kibbutzim – the first Kibbutzim to be properly designed by skilled architects, planners and agronomists like Kauffman, Baerwald, Vilkonsky and Korenberg. Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment.
413 Bloom, "Arthur Ruppin and the Production of the Modern Hebrew Culture"; Shilo, "The Female Workers’ Farm in Kinneret, 1911-1917, as Solution to the Problem of the Female Worker in the Second Alyia."
Berman which revolved around his disbelief in the viability of Hebrew labor. The conflict culminated in the construction of a grand mansion for the foreman while workers lived in the barn, thereby marking the farm’s success as result of the foreman’s management rather than workers’ labor of the land.

The specifics of the conflict were as follows: the farm was under great pressure to prove that national settlement (rather than private settlement) could be profitable, or at least that it would not operate at a loss. At the end of Kinneret’s first year it was clear that it had incurred losses. Struggles between the workers and the foreman regarding the reasons for failure led to a crisis in October 1909, including workers’ demand for the foreman’s resignation for hiring Arab workers for harvest. The workers went on strike and Ruppin, who was called in to mediate, suggested the farm to be divided in two and that the workers take over its eastern part (Umm-Juni) and manage it for a year while the foreman managed the western half. In December 1909, Ruppin obtained the JNF approval and supplied the group with seeds, tools and monthly pay, while they provided the labor. The experiment of providing workers with responsibility for national property without constant supervision and management was considered a daring one. To the surprise of all, the commune finished the year with profit. News of this success spread widely throughout the country and in the Zionist press. Self-rule had proven to be economically feasible; it was indeed a path which could lead to economic independence.

Moreover, in suggesting this self-rule experiment, Ruppin established a standard by which there would be full equality between settling-financing institutions and the settlers-workers. This standard, by enabling an equal partnership and cooperation between the working class and national capital for the mutually desired purpose of national revival, was critical to the role of the Kibbutz as a model for national settlement (based on shared means and self-rule).

414 The Kinneret farm was geographically divided in two by the Jordan river.
415 While Ruppin made a point of perceiving success “not from the merchant’s standards but from that of national good”, with profit secondary to the goal of designing a Jewish farm worker it should be noted that Umm-Juni’s financial success was nonetheless the aspect recognized and manifest by Zionist leadership and public. Shilo, “The Female Workers’ Farm in Kinneret, 1911-1917, as Solution to the Problem of the Female Worker in the Second Aliya.”
416 Ruppin, *Thirty Years of Building Eretz Israel*. 
Political economy is therefore the Rosetta stone with which to assess Zionism’s primary goal of self-rule. While workers and capitalists differed in class and in their interpretation of the correct means for obtaining independence, both groups understood that independence in essentially economic terms. The commune’s economic success was even greater as it was in stark contrast with the two adjacent agricultural models: the Moshava of Kinneret, settled by eight families and managed by a foreman which failed within four years, and the national farm of Kinneret cultivated by workers managed by a foreman.\(^{417}\)

2.3.2.2.3 Communal settlement: the Kibbutz

The formation of communal groups of workers predated the formation of communal settlements. As mentioned earlier, the workers who formed into communes had no property or land to cultivate – nor did they aspire to ownership of any; they viewed their contribution to the nation as the formation of a Jewish working class, which would enable the construction of a healthy society. As a socialist-Marxist working class they aspired only to cultivate the land rather than own it, because they believed that the land belongs to those who toil upon it. Commune members had only three principles: Hebrew labor, self rule, and communal life. All other principles were formed by way of trial and error – including the modes of settlement and housing.

The Kibbutz model was formed by everyday actions, as shown by Mordechai Naor.\(^{418}\) The beginning of communal settlement was the product of two intersecting process: the failure of Jewish farm workers to ‘conquer’ the labor market i.e. find employment in the Moshavot farms, and the WZO’s decision, following Herzl’s death, to abandon the political Zionist attempt to obtain a charter for Eretz Israel from the world powers, and to act instead according to an ideology of ‘practical Zionism’, i.e. forming a national home from the bottom-up, through housing and settlement.\(^{419}\)

The immigrants who insisted on working in agriculture as means to redeem the land, the nation and themselves, were faced with a harsh reality. As untrained workers they were less attractive to Moshavot farmers than the native fellahin and were consequently not employed. Desperate for work they accepted very low wages which enabled very meager subsistence. Many came down with malarial fever and were thus excluded from active work on the farm. Having no family, they had no one to care for them, and were unable to provide for their own food and medical care. Dwelling in tents and shacks made them vulnerable to health hazards. Many left, some committed suicide. Evidence shows that 90% of the immigrants between 1904 and 1914 left the country shortly after.\(^{420}\) Of the roughly 10,000 immigrants only about 1,200 remained in the land.\(^{421}\) Unlike the Arab fellahin, who supplemented their family income with farm labor, the Jewish workers had no other source of livelihood and had to fight over each day of work. In these conditions, the workers found that they simply could not subsist on their own. Young (18-23 years old) and unattached, they gathered into small groups who lived in some form or another

\(^{417}\) Ben Arie, "Settlement in the Jordan Valley During the Second Alyia."
\(^{418}\) Naor, Jezreel Valley - Birthbed of Kibbutz Settlements..
\(^{419}\) Ibid.
\(^{420}\) See Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
\(^{421}\) Naor, Jezreel Valley - Birthbed of Kibbutz Settlements..
of communal life. Those who managed to get work supported the unemployed, and they were sometimes able to contract jobs.

The many communes differed greatly as there was no existent model for them to employ or adopt. Some communes included full equality while others had only a limited degree of shared life. Yet communal life was a choice made not only due to the harsh living conditions; it also matched the workers’ aspiration for a way of life completely different from that in the capitalist world. It was the unique combination of objective circumstances and a state of mind ripe for a belief in social change which gave birth to the unique phenomenon of workers’ communes in Eretz Israel.

2.3.2.2.3.1 Degania

The formation of the housing and settlement forms unique to the Kibbutz was the result of the social and economic failure of the Kinneret Farm. The workers lived in the village of Umm Juni in mud huts previously populated by the peasants who cultivated it before and in a wooden shack purchased for them by the JNF and assembled on site. At the close of the year it was clear that the self-managed settlement was an economic success. Crops were abundant and income was higher than the expenses. Yet the commune cultivating Umm Juni left it to ‘conquer labor’ elsewhere in the Galilee.

Fig. 2.20, 2.21, 2.22 Umm Juni shack and mud huts, 1910, 1911. Source: Lavon Institute, Degania archive

422 Baratz, A Village by the Jordan: The Story of Degania.
423 Ibid.
Ruppin managed to convince another commune, the ‘Hadera commune’, to come to Umm-Juni and cultivate it. This commune, consisting of ten men and a woman, cultivated the site for a year and was also an economic success. Yet they too planned to leave to work elsewhere. The decisive act in the formation of the Kibbutz as a settlement form was the suggestion of the commune’s leader to stay on the land. Yosef Bossel influenced his friends by arguing that striking roots in one place was as important as conquering labor by moving from place to place, as practiced by all other work communes. This settlement – a direct and lasting tie between place and people – was different from the Kinneret Farm since the very nature of the training farms meant that the people residing upon and cultivating the land were transitory, and would be there only for a short period. In a speech summarizing the activities of the commune for the year 1912, Bossel stressed the settling principle at the bases of Degania’s way of life: “One more thing we should credit old Degania [Umm-Juni] for, which is...our way of work. As we know lately the way of [labor-]conquest communes has developed...I find this way of work worthless for us...People who come settle the land should learn to settle, to toil, to guard...” Avigail Paz-Yeshayahu clearly states that Degania’s decision was a substantial landmark in Zionist settlement: it was the first independent worker settlement which stated that its localized settlement in the homeland was not temporary but a way of life and which marked settlement, not only labor of the land, as a significant Zionist act.

The Arab village and mud hut housing of UmmJuni, the first Kibbutz’s first dwelling of small freestanding shack-structures in organic layout was – albeit unintentionally - the first built environment of a successful Zionist national settlement, that is a settlement erected on national land and cultivated by a collective body of workers. The first Kibbutz , the result of harnessing the communal idea in a specific place, was therefore made in the dwelling environment of the Palestinian flatland peasant. Settlement in the new Kibbutz framework claimed for a Jewish land reform by taking land, labor and money off the market. The land was national land and never owned as such by the Kibbutz members who cultivated it for JNF on behalf of the Jewish people. While paid by the WZO via Ruppin, the communal framework of Degania removed labor and its pay from the Market. Its economic success was understood by both workers and landowning JNF as a marker of sovereignty rather than sheer productivity.

2.3.2.2.3.2 Planning Degania

The Umm Juni site where settlers resided in peasant village mud huts was understood as temporary by the JNF and Ruppin due to the nature of the shacks and mud huts and the location at the edge of the territory, all of which resulted from constraints in the early settlement process. After obtaining building permits from the Ottoman authorities for constructing permanent structures for Degania, proper structures could be built in a better location in the center of the settlement’s territory. The Ottoman permit enabled the construction of new structures at the Jordan River estuary and despite the commune’s attachment to their Umm Juni site, the settling agencies insisted that they move to the

425 Ibid.
427 Abigail Paz-Yeshayahu, "Degania - the Way to Total Communalism," in Zionism ed. Aviva Halamish and Yaakov Shavit (Tel Aviv Tel Aviv University Institute for the Study of Zionism, 1993).
permanent location of the settlement. Planning of Degania’s permanent location was thus made after the social and economic formation of the members into a commune and thus designed to represent its values.

The agronomist Yizhak Vilkonsky was in charge of planning Degania’s permanent village. He was one of the leading figures in agricultural research and a firm believer in the cultivation of national lands rather than private lands, as was the case in the Moshavot model. His plan for Degania was a yard plan, with structures surrounding a central yard and serving it as a protecting wall. The permanent housing of Degania was built on the location designated for housing in the Ottoman permit, a 20 minute walk from Umm Juni, at the Jordan River estuary. Two stone houses were built, one as a dwelling and one as a kitchen, bathrooms and storage. The permanent settlement was designed in advance and formed around a yard in a compound typology, including barns and stables on the ground floor and communal dwelling rooms on the upper floor. The houses enclosed a protected inner courtyard where people and livestock dwelled.

The permanent settlement of Degania, built as a yard compound, was hailed, by members of the commune, as the most suitable built environment for a communal society. Architects Arieh Sharon and Leopold Krakawer described interactions with Kibbutz members. “Asking how would they like their dwelling, he responded…Are we a Kibbutz or not? Do we live and work together or not? Well, we want one big house to live in together. New life in Eretz Israel!” Later Kibbutzim, however, were formed not on the Degania yard model but on Degania’s founding built environment in the village of Umm Juni, with its detached houses in campus layout.

![Fig. 2.23 Kibbutz Tel Yosef houses, designed by Kauffman. 1928. Source: Efrat.](image)

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430 Vilkonsky, later Vulkani, also known by the pen name A. Zioni, was founder of the agricultural research institute ‘Vulkani Institute’ and of the Department of Agriculture of the Hebrew University. Vulkani, Yizhak, 1950, Vlkani’s Writings (A. Zioni), Taverski Publishing.

431 Ben Arie, "Settlement in the Jordan Valley During the Second Alyia."

According to Chyutin, Degania’s permanent Kibbutz courtyard model was abandoned due to its limited expansion ability.\textsuperscript{433} Sharon too states that “when the population increased and the economy burgeoned, the new structures of farmhouses and dwellings extended outwards from yard’s boundaries. A new model for settlement layout was required, to enable future expansion more easily and comfortably”.\textsuperscript{434} However, I propose to take into account the typological similarity between the detached individual shacks of Umm Juni based on the Arab peasant village model, and the later development of the Kibbutz, on a campus model with small detached housing and public facilities scattered in a garden environment.

From a housing history perspective, the source of the Kibbutz’s self-governance and ability to assume a leading role in Zionist society in Palestine seems to be different from the received narrative. Why did the Arab village model ultimately prevail and dominate forms of settlement and housing on the Kibbutz? The findings of this study suggest that the decisive materialization of commune sovereignty on national lands was made possible via the Umm Juni model of housing, thus pointing to this housing type as having a significant role in the formation of the Kibbutz. The fact that the germ of the Kibbutz movement was the autonomous and economically independent Degania rather than the proletarian yet financially unsuccessful Kinneret Farm made Degania’s material environment - the Arab village model - the one to duplicate, even though the courtyard model of Kinneret seemed to embody Kibbutz communal ideology much better.\textsuperscript{435}

The early form of housing used by Degania, mud hut shacks in the existing peasant village until proper housing could be built, was the model for all Kibbutzim, especially till the 1960s. Kibbutz Beit Ha-Shita, for example, included two wooden shacks and a number of tents, which served the first settlers as a dwelling for 8 years.\textsuperscript{436} Tents were replaced with wooden shacks, and shacks gradually with permanent housing.\textsuperscript{437} In order to understand the developmental process of Kibbutz dwelling, one has to grasp the communal nature of its basic social component. The commune denied the status of the family as the basic unit of society and replaced it with the individual as the basic,
essentially equal, atomic unit. The family as an economic (producer and consumer) unit was dismantled by the commune. In addition, the family’s social responsibilities such as cooking, raising children and education were also taken over by the commune. The development of the physical structures for all social activities, including housing, was the direct result of this understanding of society. A great number of activities traditionally associated with the family house became embodied in collectivized spaces: dining room and kitchen, bathrooms, storage of property, spaces for socializing and care for children. Sleep was the only function remaining in dwelling structures. Accordingly, lodging (whether in the communal halls or in tents) was not labeled ‘house’ but ‘tent’ or ‘room’.

2.4 Conclusion: Commodification of Imperial Sovereignty and the Formation of Nationalism

At the twilight of the Ottoman Empire, early Zionist settlers, of all stripes, understood political economy, and specifically the political economic structures governing the ownership and use of land, as a vehicle for sovereignty rather than as a tool for social justice or for financial gain. Indeed, although Kibbutz socialists claimed to be interested in social justice while entrepreneurs in Tel Aviv focused on profitable gain, evidence seems to show that the two distinctly different Zionist solutions – and the harmonious relationship between them during that period – reveal an ideological similarity far deeper than the strife on the surface. This common ground was the ideology of Jewish sovereignty in the national homeland – personal freedom or worker solidarity were means to the end. Evidence shows that both capitalism and socialism were understood by the leadership as tools rather than ideologies – with the true underlying ideology being Zionism. Leaders understood both capitalism and socialism as practices – the right practices for the specific time period – by which to actualize the Zionist idea, a sovereign Jewish community in its national homeland, as envisioned by Herzl.

The financial relationship to the land supported by philanthropic aid of the Haluka system – was replaced, in Zionism, by a financial relationship based on self support and economic independence as vehicles for political independence. Settlement and housing forms that produced a relationship to the ancestral land by means of economic independence proved viable, vanguard forms of residency. Following the 1858 land code, Jews had to relate to the land in economic terms as no other access to it was available to them. That they themselves rejected this relationship to the ancestral homeland is clear from the JNF regulations which, for example, forbid the final and indefinite sale of any national land, thus taking it off the market.

Zionists understood this as a de-commodification of land. By working the land themselves they transformed it from a means of production into a source of livelihood. Moreover, money was used to ‘free’ the ancestral land by the JNF (or “redeem” it, using the term “geula”, which also has resonances of emancipation of slaves and liberation of captives) in order to become free upon it. The Jewish workers were interested in the de-

439 Ibid.
440 Friedman, "Herzl and the Uganda Debate." shows that Herzl described Zionism as an means for diverting Jews from socialism and revolutionary ideologies.
commodification of labor of the land and the unlinking of agricultural production from paid labor. By freeing themselves from the Haluka system they were releasing themselves from the commodification of money. All of these were to produce for early Zionists not only a good society (as described by Karl Polanyi) but a sovereign one.

2.4.1 Why Nationalism?

Late Ottoman reforms, especially the 1858 reform, effectively commodified Ottoman sovereignty over the local population and betrayed the Empire’s own subjects. The destruction of the fabric of Late Ottoman society necessitated the formation of alternative frameworks to protect and restore society, as discussed in Chapter 1. By commodifying land and labor the Ottomans transformed themselves from a sovereign to a colonial power and facilitated the eruption of nationalism throughout the Empire. The alternative societies, understood today in reverse-history as constituted in opposition to one another, in fact formed simultaneously in response to the same privatization of sovereignty by the Ottomans. The conflict between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism arose due to the fact that each was claiming the same land as its homeland.

The 1858 “reset” of the relationship to the land affected all segments of local society and transformed, from the ground up, all settlement forms. The land code thus created a new grounded theory for Palestine and a new native language, the mastering of which was required in order to cope with the post-reform Ottoman socio-economic order. The new built environments and social frameworks of nationalism contributed in turn to the collapse of the Empire itself. This chapter has demonstrated that the prominent position of the Kibbutz and Tel Aviv in the development of the Jewish Yishuv, resulted from their ability to ‘speak’ the new language of late Ottoman life. This allowed both of them to be compelling alternatives to Ottoman rule, while the competing formations, namely Jewish religious-nationality embodied in the Moshavot came up short.

The archival findings revealed in this chapter indicate that the Kibbutz aimed to form a new Jewish, sovereign society in Palestine by taking land and labor off the market and de-commodifying them. Tel Aviv, on the other hand, contributed to the creation of Hebrew sovereignty by agglomerating territory and population using Ottoman commodification of money and land to create a profit-base for attracting population to a ‘land of opportunities’. The Moshavot of the First Aliyah, on the other hand, were economically dependent on philanthropy and reliant on paid labor, understanding sovereignty in religious terms as based on the will of God. This logic, which resurfaced in the West Bank territories after 1967, could not form a new society in Late Ottoman era since it did not speak the relevant native language of the period in terms of labor and money.

Palestinian ayan elite-led nationalism, on the other hand, did not even attempt a land reform for the dispossessed peasants. Instead, it was active participant in the accumulation of land for profit and was accordingly viewed by many peasants as a purely cynical endeavor. The nascent nationalism of the flatland villages formed as result of the 1858 land code, which posed an alternative Palestinian nationalism to Ayan-Jeruselamite nationalism, is the subject of Chapter 3.

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441 See chapter 8 for further discussion.
Part II

Nationalism as New-Nativism: New 'Proper' Housing Typologies in Palestine
Introduction to Part II
‘Restart’: New natives in new housing

Long before the political transformation of rule in Palestine from Empire to nation-state materialized, its housing environment had already been national rather than imperial. Part II discusses the housing materiality of the ‘restart’ in the Palestinian political system through a study of the housing of a new form of nativism in Palestine: national rather than aboriginal. What kind of housing emerged from this ‘restart’? Part II examines the kinds of housing formed as a result of the 1858 land reform as the housing of future nationals. What typology, location, and housing scheme did they feature? Who built them? Whom did they house?

Housing of the common member of the nation was a key site in the formation process of the nation and in defining its proper subject. Whereas the Ottoman built environment was one of walled cities, the built environment of nationalism – both Zionist and Palestinian – was the previously marginal typology of the mud-hut flatland village of the peasantry. My inquiry, undertaken from the perspective of housing and settlement, identifies two starkly different housing typologies, imperial and national. These two typologies, the Ottoman walled city and the national detached housing environment, do not correspond with present day scholarly categories used for this case study, namely those of religion, ethnicity, belonging and political affiliation; nor do they adhere to traditional distinctions between rural and urban. In other words, observation of the built environment of housing transcends our traditional categories of analysis and exposes a dramatic historical narrative which complements as well as unsettles the way we are used to read the history of nationalism in Israel-Palestine.

Part II comprises three chapters. Chapter 3 studies the ‘new native’ Palestinian rural housing as the backdrop for Palestinian nationalism and compares it to urban Palestinian built environments. Chapter 4 studies housing as the building block for Tel Aviv’s ‘indigenous’ modern urban planning by examining the early Ahuzat Bayit plan and the Geddes urban plan for the city. Chapter 5 studies the Kibbutz children’s house as the first ‘good house’ of the Kibbutz, serving as nursery for the ‘good’ Zionist citizens and the future state.
Chapter 3:
‘New Native’ Palestinian Housing: Locating the Backdrop for Palestinian Nationalism, 1858-1948

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3.1 Introduction
This chapter traces the Palestinian built environment of the post-1858 landed reality of dispossessed, landless peasantry as the backdrop for the formation of Palestinian nationalism. The new built environment of flatland farms, owned by the Ayan nobility and cultivated by landless overflow peasantry from the hill villages, led to the formation of two distinct understandings of the Palestinian homeland, and correspondingly of two distinct Palestinian national consciousnesses and national projects. On the one hand, Ayan national consciousness, with its social base in the traditional locus of the local population (namely the Ottoman walled city), developed a conception of a territorial nation-state as a result of its newly gained access to the flatlands. On the other hand, peasant national consciousness was based in the newly-developed flatlands where they were employed as landless workers by the Ayan. Flatland peasants developed a village-based nationalism, or Balad, as a land-reform movement rejecting the alienation of peasants from the land by Ayan and empire alike.443

This short chapter aims to analyze the built environment of Ottoman Palestine following the 1858 land reform in order to locate changes in housing and settlement caused by this paradigm shift. My analysis focuses on settlement and housing typologies rather than on political economy, and exposes surprising findings which unsettle the common historiography of the built environment and of the formation of nationalism in Palestine.

As seen in Part I, the mid-nineteenth century witnessed a ‘restart’ in the political system in Late Ottoman Palestine, from imperial dominance to nationalism geared at the establishment of a nation-state. National consciousness developed as part of a land-reform movement that gave rise to a new understanding of what it means to be native to the land, as well as to a new native housing typology. The formation and dominance of the flatland village typology was the backdrop for the eruption of Palestinian nationalism, and this typology eventually became the typological model for ‘good housing’ for both Zionist and Palestinian national projects.

The 1858 land code is traditionally given scholarly attention mainly for its contribution to the materialization of Jewish nationalism. The land code’s transformation of the terms of legal ownership to monetary ownership, is historiographically focused on as enabling Zionists to gain a foothold in the homeland through monetary purchase of land.444 Data exposed through the lens of housing, however, identifies the 1858 land code as the backdrop for the formation of Palestinian nationalism as well, as a new polity formed parallel to, and in the same dwelling environment, as Zionism’s early iconic settlements of the Kibbutz and the Hebrew city.

3.2 ‘New native’ housing
Little study has been hitherto undertaken of the Palestinian housing environment following 1858. The reason for this lacuna in the scholarship can be traced to two

444 See a detailed account of the 1858 land code in chapter 1 of this dissertation.
different causes: the orientalist nature of the available sources, and scholarly frameworks regarding the native.

3.2.1 Orientalist sources – and their ‘punctum’

Studying the history of dwelling environments in post-1858 Ottoman Palestine, we are fortunate to have available a detailed survey of Ottoman Palestine in the early 1870s, enabling us to understand the conditions of housing and settlement right after the dramatic land reform, which “completely transformed the relationship of people to land in the Ottoman Empire by permitting individuals to possess large areas of land”. This detailed survey, published in 1882 as *The Survey of Western Palestine*, is a three-volume record of the independent surveys of four British expeditions, led by Lieutenant Conder, Earl Kitchener, Palmer, and Sir Besant. The Editors, Besant and Palmer, included in the volume references to supporting and contradicting findings by additional expeditions by Consul Rogers (1859), Guerin (1863) and others. In addition, we have available a relatively rich body of travel literature of the period, written by Westerners who lived in and traveled through Palestine, and who made discursive documentations of the peasants’ built environment otherwise missing from Palestinian accounts of the time due to the illiteracy of the peasantry and gaps in *Ayan* literature.

Scholars of the post-1948 period, however, most notably Edward Said, have explicitly critiqued the survey and travel literatures published by Westerners in the nineteenth century as orientalistic, namely as an intentional fabrication of the orient as ‘other’ in the service of a Western imperialist power/knowledge mechanism. Specifically, criticism concerning the surveys and travel literature of Palestine included critiques of the short time-periods spent in the land versus the vast accounts produced; and of the religious-Christian eye which made notice primarily of ‘biblical’ sites and which identified Palestine of that day with biblical times, often using the Bible itself as a reference. These criticisms have led to a complete avoidance of these sources as unreliable and misleading. As data of the peasantry was produced predominantly by these orientalists, the disqualification of these sources has left us with no sources for the study of this built environment. Consequently, the significance of the peasantry for the development of Palestinian nationalism, not to mention the basic historical account of Palestine at this period, is dramatically lacking.

Despite the obvious orientalistic biases characterizing this literature, I view it as a reliable source regarding the built environment of Palestine at the specific historical moment of

446 Accumulating the works of: Conder, C. R. (Claude Reignier); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Earl; Palmer, Edward Henry; Besant, Walter, Sir. Published in 1882 by The Committee for the Palestine Exploration Fund, London.
447 Said, Orientalism.
448 Most noted is Phillip J. Baldensperger, The Immovable Past (London1913).
post-1858, as it was clearly the ‘punctum’ of these accounts.\textsuperscript{450} The punctum, Roland Barthes’ seminal identification of objects in an image that escape the eye of the photographer producing it, is used here for the geographical, archaeological, and ethnographic accounts of orientalists, for whom peasant housing was merely the backdrop for their discussion of Biblical remains. The punctum, missing from the view of the photographer, nonetheless exists in the produced image and can be potentially read and analyzed by viewers.

The punctum nature of the dwelling environment in Palestine in the 1870s may be seen in the abovementioned survey by Conder \textit{et. al.}, whose focus was the archeological remains of Biblical and Roman sites, rather than the local population and its habitat. Editors included in the survey information regarding the contemporary towns and villages under the section ‘topography,’ as landmarks indicating the whereabouts of archaeological sites, making an underlying statement that the villages are part of the scenery. For example:

\textbf{TOPOGRAPHY –} Only four inhabited villages occur on this sheet [sheet 7]. They belong to the Kadha Haifa. The most important is –

Tanturah (I j) – This is a moderate sized village of cabins, one storey high, built of mud, and lying along the beach. To the east is a square, isolated stone building used as a Medafeh, or ‘guest house’, for passing travelers. There is a well north-east of the village. Tanturah, or more accurately the ruin of Khurbet Tanturah, (see el Burj, section B.), is supposed to mark the site of the ancient Dor. \textsuperscript{451}

The dwelling environment of the village of Tanturah is discussed in the four sentences just cited as the backdrop for a detailed archeological account of ancient Dor. The strikingly different volume of discussion dedicated to the two material findings observed, makes this very clear. Whereas archeological finds are discussed in detail and accompanied with measured drawings, the discussion of peasant villages is located in the general preface to each geographic sheet.\textsuperscript{452} Nonetheless, despite the survey’s tacit view of the villages as merely part of the scenery, the informative and disinterested account of Tanturah provides the present-day scholar with data regarding this little-documented built environment, highly important in light of the scant data available on flatland peasant housing.

\textbf{3.2.2 Scholarly frameworks of the native built environment}

‘The native’ is usually understood in the scholarly literature as the aboriginal population of a certain land or territory, namely as the people who were at the place since the beginning of time, versus the non-native Western colonialists. This perspective, stemming from postcolonial theory, schematically identifies populations as ‘aboriginal’ and ‘colonial.’ It thereby runs the risk of disregarding the rich variations of nativeness to place, including phenomena of urban and rural migrations, changes in landed economy,

\textsuperscript{450} Barthes, \textit{A Barthes Reader}.

\textsuperscript{451} Ibid, Sheet VII, section A. p.3. Section B, discussing archeology, is much more detailed, including drawings and extensive data of the ruins, indicating that the villages are just the backdrop for the survey’s main interest, namely Roman and Biblical remains.

\textsuperscript{452} Conder \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Survey of Western Palestine}.
the scale of the territorial homeland associated with it (namely, village, region or nation), and changes in patterns of ownership and association to place over a vast historical scope of imperial and proto-national history before the coming of Western colonialism. The postcolonial perspective of the native, especially for the Palestinian case, tends to be ahistorical as it privileges but one historical moment – the watershed appearance of the Western colonial. In this sense, however, it is itself faulted with orientalism as it views the native as aboriginal, immemorial and history-less, rather than as a modern subject.

Another body of literature pertaining to the Palestinian case is that of Palestinian nationalist writings which, interestingly, share with orientalism an understanding of the history of the ‘Arab native house’ as immemorial and alien to the project of modernity. Its historical development, examined here, has been elided in the service of the two opposing projects of Western colonialism on the one hand and Ayan Palestinian nationalism on the other. Tawfiq Canaan’s 1930 account of the ‘Palestinian house’ serves a good example for the use of native housing for the ‘invented tradition’ of Palestinian Ayan nationalism:

Those who travelled in the country observe a main characteristic which marks the construction of the majority of the Palestinian houses, namely the preference for straight lines, manifest in the walls, the doors, the windows, and most of the roofs. Owing to this characteristic, as well as to its simple square form and its greyish color, the Palestinian peasant's house harmonizes excellently with the landscape, and is more pleasing than most of the modern, occidental houses found in the modern colonies which have recently sprung up in Palestine. The fellah dwelling is also more suited to the climate of the country.

Orientalist Western scholars of the time like Gustaf Dalman disregarded the history of the Palestinian house and its role in the modern national project by famously stating, “Since the Palestinian house is to be considered here from an archeological point of view … for the village house it is accepted that in its materials and design it stands close to Biblical antiquity.”

These scholarly perspectives, orientalistically presupposing the aboriginal nativeness of the Palestinian environment, saw no reason to inquire into its history. Current attempts, moreover, to study this environment using the orientalistic sources available to us are immediately deemed orientalistic and therefore meaningless.

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453 Studies from a postcolonial theoretical perspective tend to focus on the colonial regime of rule, settler populations, and attempts to exploit, modernize and Europeanize the colonies. See for example Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (University of Chicago press, 1995).

454 See for example Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq*. This problem appears even in the work of Mark LeVine who devoted study to the pre-Mandate era. LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*.

455 Tawfiq Canaan was a Palestinian nationalist from the hill village of Beit Jala outside Jerusalem. Tawfiq Canaan, *The Palestinian Arab House: Its Architecture and Folklore* (Jerusalem1933).

Examination of the ‘punctum’ of Western and nationalist literatures, namely the history of the native built environment, is capable of dismantling this deadlock, thereby enabling a serious study of the native environment of Palestine. Perhaps not surprisingly, it serves to expose significant data challenging our understanding of Palestinian nationalism and the nature of the native for the modern project of the nation, in Palestine and beyond.

3.3 Village punctums

The Conder survey’s observation of the village, clearly the punctum of the picture portrayed for us by the surveyors, includes an unexpected and unintended insight into the nature of peasant villages in the 1870s. The subsumption of village population and housing conditions under the category of ‘topography’ ironically offers an analytical reading of the cardinal role of topography for the nature of village housing. This punctum-type data includes revealing pieces of information unidentified and unaccounted for by the survey as such, emerging from the mapping of the location and size of existing villages in the 1870s, which enable us in turn to trace the consequences of the 1858 land code.

Comparing the coastal area of Tanturah, mapped in sheet 7 (fig. 3.1), with the hilly area of Samaria in sheet 8 (fig. 3.2), we can observe that, at this dramatic historical moment, the hills of Judea and Samaria were vastly populated compared with the plains and the coast. This finding is explained by the fact that the flatland plains had just been opened for purchase and agricultural development. We can therefore clearly identify the villages established in the wake of the 1858 land code as ‘new native’ environments. Moreover, in indicating whether the village is on hilly or flatland terrains and whether its houses are made of stone or mud, the survey provides data that shows a direct correlation between flatland location and mud housing, and between hilly location and stone housing. This relationship is further mentioned by different scholars and observers of the time, among them Lees and Finn.457 Recently, Salim Tamari has examined the strife among the hill and flatland areas in Palestine in his Mountain Against the Sea, albeit focusing on cultural attributes and devoting little attention to housing and settlement forms.458

457 G.R. Lees, Village Life in Palestine (Longmans, Green & Co., 1911 [1905]). Finn James Finn, A View from Jerusalem, 1849-1858: The Consular Diary of James and Elizabeth Anne Finn.
3.3.1 Hill villages vs. Flatland villages

As already noted, the existing scholarship tends to read all villages in Palestine as similar due to their agriculture-based economy, versus the administration- and commerce-based city. The difference between hill and flatland villages is most often discussed in terms of their defensibility: writing in 1905, for example, G.R. Lees observed that villages were built on hilltops or hillsides, giving them a commanding view of the surrounding country and rendering them nearly impregnable in ordinary village-to-village warfare, whereas flatland villages were not fortified. Yet it seems that this data points to a much more intriguing phenomenon, namely that flatland villages constituted a dramatically different dwelling environment from hill villages, with a distinct housing and settlement typology.

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459 Reilly, “The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine.”
460 Lees, Village Life in Palestine. p. 75.
3.3.1.1 Hill village urban housing and layout

Hill villages are identified as constructed of stone and as “seem[ing] at a first glance…to be a part of [the hill’s] rocky side.” They were “built like forts and close together.” This description marks hill villages as similar in conception and built environment to the ‘proper’ environment of Ottoman Palestine: namely, the walled city. Elihu Grant, writing in 1907, went as far as likening hill villages to fragments of a city: “the houses of a small village are oftentimes just as closely packed as the buildings in a city, so that a village will look like a fragment knocked off a city....This compactness of the village became a fashion in times of insecurity, when feuds between villages led to raids and reprisals.”

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Fig. 3.3 The village of Ein Karem, east of Jerusalem, circa 1900. Source: Khalidi, 1991
Fig. 3.4 Unidentified village in Palestine, circa 1900, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-matpc-10543

Fig. 3.5 Arab village in northern Palestine. Source: American Colony, LOC.

Grant goes on to observe that one could trace the physical development of a Palestinian village by finding its highest point, the burj, around which the early village clustered. James Reilly states that Palestinian villages adapted to the conditions which prevailed in Palestine throughout most of the Ottoman period, mainly to the absence of a strong central government which, coupled with the ruggedness of the country, made long-distance communications and trade difficult and required them to be self-sufficient. Villages husbanded their resources, and in so doing often quarreled with each other over

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461 Ibid.
water, land, and grazing rights. Consequently, they had to be built with defense in mind to withstand forays by their enemies. Yehuda Karmon, in his study of the Hebron area in the nineteenth century, notes that the preferred positions for villages on the Hebron plateau have been on the edges of spurs, thereby making access to them impossible from three sides. Villages were rendered defensible not only by their location but also by their construction; mountain village houses were constructed of stone and built adjacent to each other, forming wall-like structures in concentric terraces around the center of the village. Lees extends this observation to indicate that hill villages were built “upon the bedrock” to form solid and non-destructible settlements.

Fig. 3.6 The village of Silwan east of Jerusalem. Source: Khalidi, 1991
Fig. 3.7 The village of Beit Jalla and surrounding orchards from above. Source: Khalidi, 1991
Fig. 3.8 Bethlehem, circa 1905. Source: Lees, 1905.

463 Reilly, "The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine."
465 Reilly, "The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine." Karmon, ibid.
The villages of Silwan and Beit Jalla (figs. 3.6, 3.7) are understood in the existing scholarship as different from cities like Bethlehem (figs. 3.8-3.10) or Jerusalem because of their different economy: whereas the Ottoman city was based on administration and some commerce, the village economy was based on agriculture. Focusing our attention on the built environment, however, we can see a striking resemblance between hill village and city. Examination of photographic documentations of settlements understood as urban at the time, for example the city of Bethlehem, affirm Grant’s observation of ‘the village as a fragment of a city’ – that is to say, that city and village built environments differed primarily in scale, while embodying the same structural conceptions. 467 Both city and village are built on a hillside, their houses forming tight, parallel, wall-like facades along the topographic lines. The continuous and tightly clustered houses form a built environment where no single house is disconnected from the community. While houses in Bethlehem have two to three stories, houses in Silwan have one to two stories. Yet in both settlements, houses are permanent structures built of stone, with shallow vaulted roofs serving as a continuous rooftop streetscape used for defense. 468

3.3.1.1.1 Urban housing in cities and hill villages

Urban housing in cities and hill villages are relatively well documented in the scholarly literature of architecture history, as well as in travel accounts of the time. Mrs. Finn describes the Jerusalemite house of her Westerner host as follows: 469

The small court of entrance had in it a stone staircase, which led up to a set of rooms, among which was the guest-chamber, which I occupied, and also, across a paved terrace, Mr. Andersen’s study. From this terrace there was a magnificent view. […] My room was vaulted, and the roof covered by a small dome, as are almost all the rooms in Jerusalem. It is not, as in Europe, that each house has one roof to itself; and this innumerable collection of domes, of different forms and

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467 Grant, The People of Palestine: An Enlarged Ed. Of the Peasantry of Palestine, Life, Manners, and Customs of the Village.
468 Lees, Village Life in Palestine.
sizes, gives a most picturesque effect to the views of the city. The houses, too, are built of stone. [...] The floor, made of a kind of cement, was covered with matting. Passing again into the air, and down the somewhat precipititous steps to the entrance court, I was led into an inner court, at the farther end of which an open door showed a little flower garden. In the middle of the court was the mouth of the well or cistern.

Finn’s account of the house identifies it as a cluster of rooms, each roofed with its own vaulted ceiling, clustered around a courtyard. The house she describes, owned by a Westerner, was used by its owners as a single spatial unit, whereas according to scholarly accounts of Palestinian urban housing, for example by Fuchs, such houses typically served an extended family or hamoola, with each room serving as a nuclear house-unit within the structure (fig. 3.11). Each such room was a nuclear family home of a single room serving all life functions. It was often separated into two areas by a raised platform serving as sleeping and hosting area, elevated with a few steps (fig. 3.15, 3.16). This housing form of single-room houses clustered into tight, fortified structures and enclosing small courtyards was typical for both cities and hill villages, as can be seen in figs. 3.11, 3.12, and 3.24.

Finn’s observation of the nature of the one-room house unit, based on her identification of the relationship between roofing and house space is impressive and corresponds with scholarly accounts of the Palestinian house as a one-room structure. These houses are characteristic not only of Arab or Muslim communities, but more broadly of the Ottoman walled-city dwelling environment as a whole, serving Jews, Christians, Armenians and other communities in cities throughout Ottoman Palestine. The later introduction of European influence in housing construction produced multi-room houses in urban areas, featuring a single roof and signaling a transformation in the understanding of the house unit.

470 Fuchs, "The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic" Primitive Hut".
471 Hirshfeld, "The Village House in the Hebron Mountain and the Eretz Israeli Construction Traditions.
475 Fuchs, "The Arab House in Eretz Israel Revisited."
Finn’s observation regarding the correlation between roofing and the formation of the house as a spatial unit highlights the great significance of roofs for analyzing the Palestinian house. The roofs of most of the urban and hill-village houses were vaulted roofs, primarily groin vaults, built with local stone by skilled masons.476 This

475 Ibid.
476 Hirshfeld, "The Village House in the Hebron Mountain and the Eretz Israeli Construction Traditions."
construction method was slow and costly compared with flat wooden roofs based on wooden beams, but was widely used due to the limited availability of wood (compared with stone) in the mountain areas, and to the limited durability of wooden roofs, which required constant maintenance and suffered from dampness. Hirshfeld brings detailed accounts of construction methods of the hill villages of the Hebron mountain area, including interviews with several masons, which indicate the central role of these craftsmen in the production of the urban and hill-village house. The masonry craft and skills, handed down from father to son, were necessary for the construction of stone houses and were required primarily for the construction of the vaulted stone roofs. The masons performed all the acts involved with home building, including design in adaptation to family needs, structural engineering, stone cutting and construction. Although family members participated to some extent in the construction process, houses were not self-built but rather based on the skilled expertise of a professional builder. Stone-built urban and hill-village houses were therefore dependent on professional, skilled labor rather than intuitive autoconstruction and were designed and built as permanent structures.

Fig. 3.17. Isometric drawing of a stone house in construction. Drawing: Erez Cohen. Source: Hirshfeld.

3.3.1.2 Flatland-village campus housing and layout

Having established that Late-Ottoman hill villages were urban built environments and part of the Late-Ottoman walled-city environment, I will now show that flatland villages were dramatically different in terms of their houses, construction methods, and village layout. Whereas the location of hill villages was chosen for their defensibility, as Reilly notes, the location of villages built in the plains and valleys was determined by their accessibility to springs, that is, for their productivity. The houses of the plains villagers were built of mud and straw due to the scarcity of stones, Reilly observes, and were spread out on the terrain in a campus layout, detached from each other. Whereas hill

477 Ibid.
478 For detailed discussion of construction methods see ibid.
479 Reilly, "The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine."
480 Ibid.
villages were built on the bedrock, as stated by Lees, flatland villages were built upon the soil from which they were constructed.

Before 1858 the vast majority of villages in Ottoman Palestine were hill villages, and flatland villages were very scarce. The Survey of Western Palestine, as well as scholarly accounts, provide detailed information on the number, location, and population of villages. Of the few flatland villages that existed, most were in fact temporary farm-labor residences, occupied during high agricultural seasons with overspill peasants of hill villages and deserted for the rest of the year. In Yehoshua Ben-Arie’s account, the rural settlements in the Ottoman sanjaks (provinces) of Nablus, Gaza, Jerusalem and Acra (those that would later constitute British-mandate Palestine) were concentrated in the mountain regions. Furthermore, most accounts of the time refer only to hill villages and do not mention the flatland villages at all. The western plains of Ottoman Palestine were scarcely cultivated miri lands. Detached housing in a campus layout was thus a

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482 Lees, Village Life in Palestine. Finn James Finn, A View from Jerusalem, 1849-1858: The Consular Diary of James and Elizabeth Anne Finn.
marginal housing typology, hardly representative of the native peasant housing of pre-1858 Palestine.\footnote{Conder et al., The Survey of Western Palestine. See the plates of the Survey of Western Palestine maps above for an example of the shore area of Tenturah (sheet 7) vs. the hilly area of Samaria (sheet 8) above.}

The 1858 land code opened the way (as discussed in chapter 1) for the exploitation of much more of Imperial (Miri) lands by enabling individuals to purchase land and cultivate it for profit. Since very few villages existed in the western plains at the time, the lands there were the cheapest and most available for purchase, and their acquisition involved neither contestation nor dealing with collective land tenancy (musha).\footnote{Musha was a form of collective right of land cultivation in peasant villages of the Ottoman empire. See chapter 1 for a detailed description.} Cultivation of these plain lands, however, required peasant labor and thus the formation of new rural settlements, populated by peasants from the hill-villages. Although villagers were by and large interested in remaining in their ancestral hill villages, the overflow of population\footnote{Despite some accounts of the drop in hill-village population in Late-Ottoman times (for example by Finn), most scholarly accounts attest to the opposite: an increase in the local population, leading in turn to the allocation of smaller lots to each farmer in the musha system and to more feuds between villages over territory. Ben Arie, "The Population of Eretz Israel on the Eve of the Zionist Settlement Project."} coupled with the opening of new land for cultivation as tenants, led hill peasants to move to the flatlands and form new villages. In addition, several new flatland tenant villages were formed by Bedouins who started toiling the land for part of the year.\footnote{Finn, The Palestine Peasantry. Finn, Home in the Holy Land.}

Whereas prior to 1858 hill villagers could theoretically spill out to the plains and gain legal access to miri land by cultivating it, the dramatic change in the terms of landownership in 1858 no longer enabled ownership by productive use. Legal ownership defined by the new code involved ownership rather than use, and required proper registered deeds, representing the monetary purchase of land from the government. Accordingly, new villages formed after 1858 provided no land ownership to the villagers, as their lands were owned by Ayan landowners. Villages often started, therefore, as temporary settlements formed for the duration of the agricultural season and abandoned when peasants returned to their home villages after the harvest. These villages were termed by the Ottoman authorities ‘sun villages’ (shamsia) to point to their temporary nature. This practice is well manifest in the names of many flatland villages, bearing their link to a certain hill village by having the prefix hirbat- added to the name of the original village. Hirbat, Arabic for ‘the ruin of,’ attests to the nature of the temporary settlement: Peasants of the hill villages cultivating effendi lands returned to their temporary settlement each year to find its mud huts in ruins, and therefore prefixed the village with hirbat-. One example is the village of hirbat-Azzun in the Sharone area, now in Israel, whose population came from the hill village of Azzun near Tul-Karem, now in the West Bank.
3.3.1.2.1 The formation of flatland villages

The village of Mazraa, literally ‘farm’ – a pivotal case studied extensively in chapter 7 ahead – was the product of the process just described. The Ayan Badr family of the village of Sheikh Badr outside Jerusalem purchased miri lands north of Acre and cultivated them as a farm, using overflow peasants from their village as farm labor. The farm therefore included a small village for the workers.

In the process of liquidating Empire lands following the implementation of the 1858 land code, the Ottoman authorities conducted in 1872 an Imperial survey in which Mazraa was also included. The detailed survey of land conditions and existing villages was intended to record the land’s current state and determine its legal status. The survey was conducted by teams of surveyors assigned to each Sanjuk and took 20 years to complete. Surveyors distinguished between populated (Mulk land) villages and depopulated (Miri land) villages, as well as between villages 300 years old and more and villages that were part of new farms and were populated only during the agricultural season, namely sun (Shamsiya) villages. This distinction was significant for determining villagers’ rights for registering the land in their names in the new property registration books. Residents of villages recognized as old villages were given the privilege of registering land in their name for a nominal registration fee (Badl Mythl), whereas villages recognized as sun villages included no registration privileges for the villagers, who had to compete over them in auction with the ayan nobility.

Mazraa was surveyed by the Ottoman authorities in January 1872 and listed as a ‘sun’ village of 12 houses and 262 hectares, partially planted. Even as it lists 12 houses to exist in the village, the report states that its dwellers have been found missing and therefore not eligible for purchase of the land for the nominal fee. The survey’s finding of 12 deserted houses in the village corresponds with early settlement patterns in the plains whereby farmers from mountain villages returned home during winter and summer. This explains why the January survey therefore did not locate the villagers in Mazraa, while it did identify houses (rather than ruins) and planted fields.

The British land survey of 1930-31 and landownership surveys of 1940-41 and 1944 mapped the vast Mazraa lands of 655.7 hectares and identified the main owners of Mazraa lands to be one landowning family (the Badr family), whose lands extended to some 300 hectares; the Wakf whose lands included 24.4 hectares; and the peasant village of 11 families whose plots were partially owned by the villagers with 0.05 hectares of housing plots. In addition, some 300 hectares were owned by the JNF and cultivated by the Moshavim of Shavei Zion and Naharia. The British state owned some 30 hectares in roads, railway and water ways. The villagers cultivating the vast farmlands of Mazraa

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488 Ibid.
489 Schecter, "Land Registration in Eretz Israel in the Second Half of the 19thc." p. 155. The survey is dated to January 10, 1873.
491 In 1940-41 a court trial was held at the British Court in Acre over a landownership dispute between the JNF and 30 villagers from Mazraa. The dispute involved land purchased by the JNF from the Greek
were therefore virtually landless except for small house plots. Initially spending only part of the year in Mazraa as overflow of the crowded village of Sheikh Badr, they eventually settled in Mazraa permanently, where they had no claims for land. This process characterized most flatland village formation after 1858.

Fig. 3.22 Map of ‘sun lands’ surveyed by the Ottomans in the Acre area. Source: Shechter, 1988.
Fig. 3.23 Portion of map produced by the Survey of Western Palestine, first published in 1880 by the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund. This portion is based on a survey of 1878.

Fig. 3.24 The built-up area of Mazraa, 1940, including fellahaen houses at the bottom, the Wakf house and Badr Basha house at the top. Detail of a 1940 British map. Source: State archive.
Fig. 3.25 British Al-Mazraa landownership survey, 1930, with village boundaries amended December 1940. Source: State archive, Mazraa land trial file.
Fig. 3.26 The Ottoman Aqueduct at Mazraa prior to 1946. Source: Haifa University Digital Archive.

Orthodox Patriarchy in the total area of 45 hectares. Detailed records of land ownership were therefore prepared for Mazraa in 1940. State archive, Mazraa lands court file.
Some flatland villagers, however, did manage to register land in their names following the Ottoman land code and to become landowners. The village of Tanturah, covered by the abovementioned Conder survey, was also included by the Ottoman authorities in their 1872 Imperial survey. Schechter discusses Tanturah’s unique process of land registration (compared with other ‘sun’ villages) using copies he has made of the original Ottoman registry books while employed by the JNF in the 1910s. Tanturah villagers were known to have come from the Tantur region in India, and village head was traditionally titled ‘Al Hindi’. Even though the Ottoman registries of the village indicated that it was a depopulated ‘sun’ village known as Darhimya, whose lands were to be sold by auction, Tanturah’s villagers insisted on having it registered as a veteran village, thereby granting them the right to register the land in their name for the nominal fee. Some of the villagers managed to gain land registries (Kushan) for nominal fee based on the claims of Tanturah as a veteran village, yet this right was later revoked by Ottoman authorities, and the remaining village lands were sold by auction, primarily to the villagers themselves, for higher prices. Villagers’ ability to gain legal title of the land was limited as they had to compete over the land in auction with absentee effendis from Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Beirut. Hill villages around the cities of Jerusalem and Ramalla, on the other hand, were largely entitled for land registry for the nominal fee, so in these areas significant numbers of villagers were able to register land in their names.

Kark and Schechter, in their presentation of the 1872 Ottoman mapping of ‘sun’ villages up for sale by auction in the Acre district, indicate that Tanturah’s villagers managed to register some of the land as Tanturah and some as Dahumya (listed as Dahumya, village number 3 on map Fig. 3.22), and were therefore able to purchase most of the land for nominal fee.

3.3.1.2.2 Flatland village housing

As temporary village housing serving farm laborers only part of the year, the flatland village house formed after 1858 was invested with less construction effort and resources than the urban and hill-village permanent house. Houses were built of the materials available in the flatlands, which unlike the hills included little stone. Homes were typically built of mud bricks or mud-covered straw. These construction materials dramatically affected the typology of both houses and settlement, including the formation of the new flatland villages as a cluster of huts in a campus layout rather than in defensive wall-like structures like those characterizing hill villages and cities. The vulnerability of mud structures to erosion by the elements and their need for constant

492 Ibid.
493 Schechter, "Land Registration in Eretz Israel in the Second Half of the 19thc." See also the Palestine Remembered memorial website Tanturah page.
495 Schechter, "Land Registration in Eretz Israel in the Second Half of the 19thc."
496 Kark, "Mamluk and Ottoman Cadastral Surveys and Early Mapping of Landed Properties in Palestine."
497 The report is brought by Isaac Schechter who served in the Palestine Land Colonization Association land department between WW1 and WW2.
498 Schechter, "Land Registration in Eretz Israel in the Second Half of the 19thc."
499 Lees, Village Life in Palestine.
repairs made large wall-like structures like those prevalent in hill villages impractical. Mud structures are extremely vulnerable at their seams, so single-standing structures were more durable than a cluster of houses forming a wall structure, and the campus layout made it easier to construct and maintain single-standing buildings. In a wall-structure, the seams between attached buildings would have to be maintained constantly by members of both houses, and could cause the destruction of both buildings; thus, the deterioration of one hut in a wall-like structure could affect the entire structure. Historical remains indicate that some flatland villages included wall-like structures and that the deterioration and destruction of segments in the structure, as well as the addition of new huts, either by new peasants or by people preferring to construct a new structure rather than mend an old one, changed the layout of the village from compound to campus. As such, this was a ‘new’ housing typology for peasants leaving overpopulated hill villages to cultivate flatland farms owned by absentee landlords.

Mary Rogers describes the village of Tentura and its houses in her ‘Domestic Life in Palestine’ of 1862 so:

"...we approached the little town, which comprises about thirty or forty rudely built houses, made of irregularly-piled blocks of hewn stone, bits of broken columns, and masses of mud or clay. The custom-house officer, Abu Habib, guided us to his house, which consisted of one low large square room, lined with clay, and roofed with tree branches blackened with smoke. One half of the ceiling was concealed by matting, and the other half was picturesque with pendant branches. Small holes served as windows, and the roughly-made door was a portable one. A mattress spread in the floor was used as a divan. Jars of earthenware, and metal saucepans, stood against the wall, a cooking-place was built in one corner, made of large finely-leveled ancient stones and burnt clay;"

Hirshfeld’s detailed account of Palestinian housing in the Ottoman period, although focused mostly on hill villages of the Hebron area, devotes some of his account to describing new villages formed by Bedouins on the southern slopes of the Hebron hilly area, in a campus layout composed of mud and straw houses. Hirshfeld’s account of the Bedouin villages, however marginal in relation to the rest of his paper, nonetheless provides rare information regarding the construction methods, materiality, and skill involved in producing these houses.

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House roofing was based on two compressed stone arches made of uncut stones whose gaps were filled with smaller stones. On top of the arches, wooden beams were laid diagonally covering the gap between the arches, and upon them thick layers of wood branches and bush (fig. 3.30). These are covered with several layers of earth and mud, renewed regularly to keep rain from penetrating the roof structure and rot its wooden elements.\footnote{Ibid.}
Since the land had been privately owned before the formation of villages, peasants could easily be removed off the land according to Ottoman laws if the owner decided to sell the land or employ other workers. Since cultivating the land for three consecutive years made the peasant able to claim rights of cultivation, landowners constantly replaced their tenants and moved them around to prevent them from claiming tenancy rights. This strategy became more widespread when Zionists, regarding Zionism as a land-reform project for the Jewish poor, started buying national land in order to take it off the market and cultivate it as natives. The flatland village was thus the site, both of the new housing form and of dispossession from it, thus forming the backdrop for the formation of a new sense of native relationship to the land and of national consciousness beyond one’s ancestral village.

3.3.1.3 Mixed construction methods

The two typologies of hill and flatland villages, built as agglomerated stone structures and mud-hut campus layouts respectively, were not clear-cut and dichotomous. There are examples of villages using planning and construction methods associated with both of these typologies simultaneously. Poor hill villages were sometimes built of uncut stone or of mud huts. Those villages, however, required defensibility on the one hand and were permanent settlements on the other, and so used defensible wall structures which had to be constantly maintained all year long against the erosion of the elements. As for mixed construction methods in flatland villages, evidence is provided by one of the rare images documenting a street in a flatland village: the image of ‘a village center’ included in Lees’s 1905 account of village life in Palestine. Lees identifies the oven as the center of the village, and the medafa or ‘guest chamber’ (on the left) as its communal house. Lees does not discuss the structure of the houses or their layout. Yet we can analyze the village image in tools of architecture history. From the image we can learn that the village included stand-alone structures. The peasants’ dwellings are single-story, about six feet high, made of uncut stone and plastered with mud. The medafa is made of cut stone, built using skilled masonry and is about 15 feet high. The center of the village, where the oven is located, is unpaved and is the product of the space left in-between the houses.

Fig. 3.34 An Arab hill village near Tul-Karem, 1931. Source: Miriam Arazi (Family album)
Fig. 3.35 ‘The center of a village,’ circa 1905. Source: Lees, 1905.

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504 See detailed account of this process in chapter 1 of this dissertation.
505 TulKarem is currently a city in the Palestinian Territory, in the hilly ridge of the West Bank.
3.4 The relationship between national consciousness and habitat

Finn, Lees and others devote detailed accounts to the commitment of hill peasants to their village habitat. They extend this ethnographic account to an analysis of the nature of patriotic and national sentiments of those peasants. These accounts locate the patriotic sentiments of fellaheen in the limited realm of their native village, rather than in a modern ‘imagined community’ inhabiting a shared homeland territory. The Ottoman Empire, too, was observed not to be the fellaheen’s geopolitical frame of reference, although as a Muslim Empire it was not regarded as a foreign colonial entity either. Elizabeth Ann Finn, the wife of James Finn who served as the British Consul in Jerusalem from 1846 to 1863, wrote:

Though they have with each other no national cohesion, the fellah clans cleave to the land with the tenacity of aboriginal inhabitants. No clan has for a long time overpassed the boundaries of its own district and they show no disposition to do so. The gradual decrease in population, moreover, renders it unnecessary for them to extend the limits of their territory. They cling to the hills and the plains where their fathers lived and died. Nothing but the strong arm of government can ever induce a fellah to quit his native village, and this only for compulsory service in the army. They reverence the Sultan as the Khalif of Mohamed, as their civil and spiritual sovereign, but they care nothing for the empire of Turkey. Many of them do not even so much as know the names of the villages a district or so from their own homes. They are influenced for no patriotism for Turkey.506

… [W]e had abundant opportunities for observing that the fellaheen do not, properly speaking, form a nation. There is among them neither coherency nor spirit of patriotism. Just as the wild bedaween are divided into distinct and generally hostile tribes, so the fellaheen are divided into clans governed by their respective sheiks. They speak a common language, they possess a common religion, their manners and costumes are generally the same all over the country. Yet of national unity there is absolutely none.

Lees, too, writing in 1905, referred to many of the attributes forming an ‘imagined community’ as discussed by Anderson (1989).

Few can conceive the affection the fellah bears for his home and country, the country around his dwelling, for he has no national pride. There is no part of this great love lavished on a Fatherland. He belongs to a clan, governed by a Sheikh, which forms no part of a united nation. The members of these clans have a common language. They possess a common religion, their manners and costumes are all the same, but of national unity there is none. They do not even know what it means, nor can they understand the feeling of patriotism that links people together into a brotherhood that co-operates for the well-being of the mother country. Every district lives in and for itself alone, waging its own petty wars, managing its own affairs, settling its own disputes, with but occasional recourse to the center of government of the power that rules the land as a whole...Seldom do they ever show any desire to extend the limits of their territory. Each village has been in the possession of its land from time immemorial, and no necessity for

506 Finn, The Palestine Peasantry. p. 11-12.
stepping over its boundaries ever seems to arise without the aggression being forcibly resisted at the expense of blood. Every man clings tenaciously to his freehold, and the village to its common land.\(^{507}\)

In 1906, Wilson summarized the centrality of the village in the life of the Palestinian peasant as follows: “The Fellahin have a great love for their native place, and think it is a real hardship to have to settle elsewhere.”\(^{508}\)

These and similar writers are disregarded by serious scholars who consider them suspect of orientalism and misjudgments in the service of colonial interests. Yet it should be noted that their accounts of peasants’ village-patriotism, marked by fellaheen insistence on remaining in one’s ancestral village at all cost, is an early depiction of the Palestinian everyday practice of *Sumuud*, Arabic for “resistance to being swept away,” now an explicit political ideology.\(^{509}\) Moreover, by identifying this ideological practice with Late-Ottoman hill-village society, these accounts help us study the formation of ‘proper,’ fatherland-nationalism as a distinct and modern phenomenon, and enable its localization in the new flatland villages formed on *ayan*-owned lands as a result of the 1858 land code.

The difference between fellaheen housing and landowner housing was striking, as can be seen in fig. 3.36 of the Lajun village. Lajun was founded in the Jezreel Valley by peasants originally from Umm el Fahim cultivating the lands of the Budaye family (fig. 3.36). Peasant mud huts in the foreground of the image are contrasted with the landlord family’s two-story stone house at the top back. Similarly, the village of Mazraa in the Galilee (discussed at length in chapter 7) included meager peasant housing and a single two-story, 10-room house for the landowning Badr family of the Sheikh Badr hill village near Jerusalem (fig. 3.37). Extending the abovementioned discussion of the single-room Palestinian house, distinguished spatially by its individual roofing, we can see that post-1858 peasant houses were indeed single-room spaces (whether grouped into campus or into defensive yard complexes), whereas houses of the emerging landowning elite included a system of rooms all under the same single roofing. Housing of the landowning elite thereby departed from the native housing typology of Palestine. These changes to elite housing have been studied by Fuchs and associated with Mediterranean and European influence.\(^{510}\) This difference in the house typologies of peasant and landowner housing was also a difference in the two social groups’ national consciousness and conception of the homeland.

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\(^{509}\) See for example Sayed Qashua, *Dancing Arabs* (Grove Press, 2004).

\(^{510}\) Fuchs, "The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic "Primitive Hut"."
The accepted historiography, especially that produced by Palestinian and Israeli historians, privileges national institutions and the formal Ayan Husaini leadership of Palestinian nationalism, while completely disregarding the Balad level of national leadership. One of the key such figures is Sheikh Rabbah Awad of the Western Galilee, whose house in Mazraa after the Nakba is studied in detail in chapter 7. Sheikh Rabbah Awad was a local Palestinian national leader from the village of Gabsiya in the Western Galilee, one of the national leaders who opposed the Mufti Husaini and the Ayan Jerusalemite urban leadership. Cohen brings evidence that Palestinian national leaders like Awad proposed a political agenda for Palestinian nationalism based on a violent conflict with Zionist nationals. This agenda diverged sharply from that of the established Palestinian leadership, which was mostly interested in maintaining its hold of the land as a means of production. It was based on a mutual affiliation between Zionists and Balad Palestinians based on the two national movements’ calls for a land reform for the people. Dubbed by Cohen ‘an alternative Palestinian nationalism,’ Balad flatland villages can be seen here in fact as the locus for the formation of Palestinian national consciousness.

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among the peasantry, emerging out of a rejection of Ayan nationalism rather than of Zionism.

In 1939, Sheikh Rabbah published a statement against the Arab Revolt and the Mufti’s Ayan leadership and was subsequently declared wanted by the Mufti Husseini and his supporters. The statement, quoted in Davar, called upon “Our Palestinian brothers in general and especially residents of the Acre district” to “keep their weapons for times of need and enable political solution by negotiation.” Awad stated in the call that he had taken part in the revolt and fought “for religious, political, national and economic rights, but the Arab leadership has betrayed [us] by taking hold of (national) funds and hiring men to commit murder and arson.” Awad positions himself in the call as an alternative Palestinian power, capable of enforcing his agenda with power: if murder and arson in the district did not stop, he declares, people who perform it will be strongly dealt with. The call is signed by four “warriors,” among them Sheikh Rabbah Awad, titled “servant of his brothers and homeland.”

Internal disputes among Palestinians have been characterized since the 1920 using the discourse of treason, with Ayan and Balad mutual accusations of the other as ‘traitors’. Cohen shows that the Husaini family and primarily the Mufti Hajj Amin declared all opposing factors in Palestinian society as traitors. This discourse pertains to this day in popular discourse and in the scholarly study of Palestinian society, for example in Cohen’s own work. Palestinian sympathy with Zionism’s ideas of land reform to the people is presented in those works as ‘collaboration,’ as if the Palestinians involved had no interests of their own. Several recent studies call for a reassessment of Palestinian political activity in Israel within a different interpretive framework, but they do not tend to reassess the history of this particular social group’s political activity.

Franz Fanon’s concept of the ‘white mask’ is very useful for examining Ayan Palestinian nationalism in relation to the peasantry. For this landowning elite, nationalism served as a framework for obtaining control of the territory of Palestine as a means of production and of the peasantry as labor, in a ‘white mask’ of colonial exploitation. Their nationalism was not based on horizontal solidarity forming and legitimizing imagined communities, but rather on what Nigel Gibson has identified as Fanon’s ‘nationalism

514 Sheik Rabbah Awad, "Call against Terror in Acre District," Davar, August 13 1939.
517 I find statements like Cohen’s “some internal refugees were willing to act against the positions advocated by the nationalists and against the interests of the refugees as a whole” to be highly problematic since it expresses the assumption that the people should serve goals set by the leadership rather than the leadership serve the needs of the people. Therefore, defining the people not as self-governing nationals but as subjects to whatever it is that the leadership defined as ‘good for them’, as in Fanon’s nationalism (2). See ibid.p. 107.
519 Fanon, "Black Skin, White Mask."
(1)’; an elite dominating the people in lieu of the colonizer and drawing its legitimacy from the ethnicity it shares with the people. The Ayan were not interested in a polity based on popular sovereignty; hence, if we identify nationalism as a governmental system based on popular sovereignty, they were in fact not interested in nationalism other than as a tool for domination. Ayan Palestinian nationalism was therefore highly vulnerable to the competing claims for the homeland made by Zionists.

3.5 Developments in national housing

The abovementioned surveys as well as photographic documentations indicate that plains villages like Tanturah and Mazraa have undergone little development between the 1858 opening of lands for exploitation and the 1948 Nakba. Mazraa’s built environment remained at 12 houses, and its population did not grow beyond 200 persons between the survey of 1872 and 1948. Tantura’s built environment and village size did not grow significantly, as can be seen from figs 3.38 and 3.39, taken 1918 and 1949 respectively.

Upon their 1948 conquest by the IDF, villages throughout the rural plains were documented to have remained very similar to the mud-hut structures discussed above. Images of the houses in Al-Ghubayya Al Tahta (fig. 3.41) and Umm el Fahim (fig. 3.42) taken by the occupying IDF forces depict mud and earth structures with roofs of wooden poles covered with earth. These documentations signify that the flatland Balad Palestinian national house and village retained its typological and material characteristics discussed in this chapter until 1948. This built environment was to undergo a dramatic process of change following the Nakba, elaborated on in chapter 7 of this dissertation.

Fig. 3.38 Tantura, 1918. Source: Palestine Remembered.
Fig. 3.39 Tantura, 1935. Source: Walid Khalidi.

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521 See the theoretical discussion of nationalism as a form of governance “in the name of the people” in the introduction to this dissertation.
522 Pappe states this clearly in his Pappe, "The Rise and Fall of the Husainis."
523 See chapter 7 below for further discussion of Mazraa.
3.6 Conclusion

By changing the terms of legal ownership of land from cultivation to monetary ownership, the 1858 land code opened *miri* flatlands for exploitation in farms owned by *effendis* and absentee landlords. This phenomenon is traditionally taken into account only in terms of its contribution to the materialization of the Zionist land-reform movement by enabling Zionist organizations and individuals to purchase land and thus gain legal ownership of portions of the homeland. Yet my study shows that this process was decisive for the formation of Palestinian nationalism as well, a fact disregarded in the literature, which tends either to view Palestinian nationalism as an aboriginal and constant fact\(^{524}\) or to associate its formation with the modern *Ayan* nobility.\(^{525}\)

Historical accounts indicate that the number of local peasants and villages in the newly accessed flatlands increased dramatically in the 1870s and 1880s.\(^{526}\) While traditionally unwilling to leave the confines of their village (as indicated above), some hill villagers as well as some Bedouins did leave their traditional habitats to cultivate land in the plains and live in newly formed houses and settlements, thereby changing the frame of reference for their belonging and locale. Flatland mud and stone villages were, therefore, the site

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\(^{524}\) Reilly, "The Peasantry of Late Ottoman Palestine."


\(^{526}\) Ben Arie, "The Population of Eretz Israel on the Eve of the Zionist Settlement Project."
where modern Palestinian nationalism emerged among the peasantry in response to Ayan ‘white mask’ nationalism and to Zionist nationalism and their respective claims for the home-land.

Khalidi identifies 418 Palestinian villages evacuated from their dwellers in the 1948 war, based on the British survey of 1944-45. To these we should add the 137 Arab-Palestinian settlements within Israel, mapped by the Arab Center for Alternative Planning, none of which were formed after 1948. These total to 555 active and populated Palestinian settlements before the 1948 war. Comparing this number with the 1871-77 British Survey of Western Palestine, which had identified 261 Arab-Palestinian villages in the same territory that became Israel in 1948 (i.e. excluding the West Bank and Gaza), we see that 294 new Palestinian villages were formed in these 68 years. These new villages were predominantly the product of the Ottoman land code of 1858 and constituted the fermenting ground for Palestinian nationalism. Once formed, however, the built environment of these villages changed very little prior to 1948, when they were placed under the Israeli regime of housing. Their subsequent transformation will be the subject of chapter 7.

527 Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora.
528 To these we should add the 137 Arab-Palestinian settlements within Israel, mapped by the Arab Center for Alternative Planning, none of which were formed after 1948. These total to 555 active and populated Palestinian settlements before the 1948 war. Comparing this number with the 1871-77 British Survey of Western Palestine, which had identified 261 Arab-Palestinian villages in the same territory that became Israel in 1948 (i.e. excluding the West Bank and Gaza), we see that 294 new Palestinian villages were formed in these 68 years.
529 These new villages were predominantly the product of the Ottoman land code of 1858 and constituted the fermenting ground for Palestinian nationalism. Once formed, however, the built environment of these villages changed very little prior to 1948, when they were placed under the Israeli regime of housing. Their subsequent transformation will be the subject of chapter 7.

528 http://www.ac-ap.org/hebrew/files/municipality2011HE.swf
529 Khamaisi (2004) lists only the 116 Arab-Palestinian settlements recognized by the Israeli government.
530 Conder et al., The Survey of Western Palestine.
530 See chapter 7 ahead for detailed discussion of the transformation of the Palestinian peasant village under Israeli state sovereignty.
Chapter 4:
Housing as the building block for ‘Indigenous’ Modern Urban Planning: Tel Aviv’s Geddes and Ahuzat Bayit Urban Plans

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4.1 Introduction

Celebrated as a quintessential exemplar of modern garden-city planning, Tel Aviv's two stages of urban planning, those of 1909 and 1925, are traditionally examined as urban schemes. Whether framed as Western, colonial or capitalist, Tel Aviv's modernity is usually constructed as characterized by top-down modern urban planning, disconnected from its locale. These studies examine modernism and modernity, which they associate with Tel Aviv and Zionism, in stark opposition with the traditional native built space, which they associate with the local population and Jaffa.

However, as scholars of modernity have shown, modernity and tradition are two sides of the same coin with modernity always-already based on manipulations of tradition. Nationalism, as Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson show, is the direct product of an engagement with tradition, which aims to rearticulate and invent tradition as such. Critiques of Tel Aviv’s urban planning are made within a political context, which focuses on its formation as the ‘first Hebrew city’ in Ottoman Palestine. Defining Tel Aviv’s formation as European, colonial or modern in the sense of breaking with the past, implies strong statements regarding Tel Aviv as non-native and estranged from its locale. These statements are of course made in the context of the historiography of the Zionist-Palestinian struggle over the land which each side claims as its homeland. These arguments, however, are made based upon a study of Tel Aviv’s urban plan alone, completely disregarding its housing environment. This scholarly choice is peculiar as Tel Aviv was founded as a ‘society of homebuilders’. Moreover, as this chapter shows, housing served the city’s planners as a building block for a ‘housing before street’ urban planning scheme.

Recent scholarship has studied Tel Aviv’s built-up environment together with issues of identity and nationalism. These studies have called for taking seriously the founders’ proclaimed intentions realizing Jewish sovereignty via urbanism. The findings discovered and presented in this chapter support this scholarly approach, which, to my mind, has never yet been carried out with the requisite thoroughness. I will present two sets of dramatic discoveries, which point to housing as the bottom-up building block for Tel Aviv's modern urbanism, rather than as the infill of a top-down scheme.

The first set of findings concerns housing as the mechanism for Tel Aviv’s first urban plan of 1909 as ‘housing before street' urbanism, devised by Tel Aviv’s founder Akiva Aryeh Weiss. Data found in Weiss’s bequest reveals that he was a trained and practicing architect who actively led the Tel Aviv ‘association of homebuilders’ in formulating the

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531 In 2003 UNESCO declared Tel Aviv a world heritage site, because of its Geddes urban plan and 'International Style’ architecture.  
532 Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture (Thames and Hudson, 1980).  
533 LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.  
534 Katz, The "Business" of Settlement: Private Entrepreneurship in the Jewish Settlement of Palestine, 1900-1914.  
535 AlSayyad, The End of Tradition?  
537 Mann, A Place in History: Modernism, Tel Aviv, and the Creation of Jewish Urban Space.
town plan. Housing, declared by Weiss as the Achilles heel of Zionist materialization, was the basis for the founding, in 1909, of Tel Aviv as a society of homebuilders aiming for self-government via the accumulation of a critical mass of Zionists in a city.538

The second set of findings concerns Sir Patrick Geddes’ celebrated 1925 master plan for Tel Aviv. Geddes defined the goal of the plan as "continuing the Garden Village Tel Aviv began with, and bettering this as far as may be."539 Accepting Tel Aviv’s urban principles, Geddes’ design involved extending its typology of freestanding single-family houses amidst small green plots throughout the urban area. Scholars claim that Geddes’ ‘home-block’ housing was never realized, that it was rejected by city and citizens alike in favor of three storey apartment houses.540 However, the findings in the present study will show that ‘home-block’ housing was in fact realized en masse throughout the Geddes plan area during the 1930’s.

These two dramatic revelations require a rethinking of Tel Aviv’s urban development, both as a specific city and as a celebrated model of modern urban planning. Specifically, several questions arise: what does it mean for modern urban planning which is in the service of national homebuilding to be based on individual housing? How could Tel Aviv have developed using housing as the building block and yet still manage to create a successful urbanism and a clear urban diagram? How does the relationship between housing and urbanity reflect on the relationship between housing and nationalism? In this chapter, and in light of the new archival discoveries regarding its built environment, I aim to understand Tel Aviv’s home-based, modern urban planning as an attempt on the part of an important part of the Jewish public to become indigenous and self-governing in the homeland.

This study of Tel Aviv is framed within the context of the role of housing in the two best known exemplars of modern cities, Brasilia and Chandigarh (a national capital and a state capital), designed top down by renowned international urban planners. While it shares these attributes, Tel Aviv differs dramatically from these ‘Corbusian radiant cities’541 in its housing. In Tel Aviv, housing was never ‘a machine to live in’, and its urban planning was never “a single example of creation, of the spirit which is able to dominate and control the mob”,542 like Luciano Costa’s “grandiose” schematic plan for Brasilia. Rather, Tel Aviv was formed by its housing. Housing was used explicitly to accumulate a mass of Zionists in order to form a self-governing polity in the framework of the city.

Peter Hall’ states that “Le Corbusier was the last of the City Beautiful planners”. He thus makes a connection between the ‘Corbusian radiant cities’ of Chandigarh and Brasilia.

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538 Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv*.
542 Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*.
and the City Beautiful monumental planning movement in America, in light of which Tel Aviv's rejection of Richard Kauffmann's “City Beautiful” plan in 1921 marks its urban planning as consciously different from these dominant modern urban planning movements.\footnote{Hall, Cities of Tomorrow.} The “planning of display, architecture of theatre” which characterized Richard Kauffmann’s 1921 design for parts of Tel Aviv was rejected and the city eventually hired Geddes to design it as an anarcho-modernist “city of sweat equity” formed from the bottom up by housing.\footnote{ibid.p. 262.}

4.1.1 Methodology and findings

The research for this chapter was primarily archival in nature, yet also included site mapping and identification of still extant housing remnants of the city’s original urban plans. Archival research for this chapter came across two dramatic discoveries. One was papers (not yet archived) from the estate of Akiva Aryeh Weiss,\footnote{See previous discussion of Weiss in chapter 2.} containing documents and architectural drawings proving that he was an active, practicing architect, who trained at the Berlin Technikum via a correspondence course. Weiss’ work, both as an architect and as one of the founders of Tel Aviv is studied here for the first time as urban design and planning and taken into account in the analysis of the city’s urban development. The second discovery reveals that the Geddes master plan for Tel Aviv, believed to have been a top-down street layout, in fact incorporated Weiss’s housing-based urban design principles. Moreover, data reveals that Geddes’s home-block guidelines for Garden Village housing, which most scholarship assumes were never realized,\footnote{Dutta, “Organicism: Inter-Disciplinarity and Para-Architectures.”} in fact materialized on a large scale.

4.2 ‘Housing before street’: Housing as a vehicle for sovereignty

As we have already mentioned, in Chapter 2 above, Ahuzat Bayit, the homebuilders association which founded Tel Aviv, was established 1906. Upon inception, Weiss and other founders proclaimed it to be the seed of the “First Hebrew City” and the site for the formation of Jewish sovereignty.\footnote{Ahuzat Bayit was therefore declared by its founders as a vehicle for the creation of good Zionist housing for good, Zionist, self-governing subjects. The unique position of Ahuzat Bayit-Tel Aviv within the Zionist project can be attributed to its clear vision for the materialization of Jewish sovereignty. The First Hebrew City was not a utopian new society like the Kibbutz, but rather a pragmatic solution to what to problem housing, the weak point in Zionist activity identified by Weiss.} Ahuzat Bayit-Tel Aviv was believed to have been a top-down street layout, in fact incorporated Weiss’s housing-based urban design principles. Moreover, data reveals that Geddes’s home-block guidelines for Garden Village housing, which most scholarship assumes were never realized,\footnote{See previous discussion of Weiss in chapter 2.} in fact materialized on a large scale.

If only they could gain access to good housing, stated Weiss, Jews could accumulate in Zion rather than in America, and thus become sovereign and free. In the first decade of the 20th century, millions of Eastern European Jews fled persecution by emigrating to North and South America and to South Africa. New York, the gateway to America, was for many the symbol of the better life which was available far away from the confines of

\footnote{Dutta, “Organicism: Inter-Disciplinarity and Para-Architectures.”}
the Jewish towns of Eastern Europe. For Weiss, a city which offered a better life in Zion – rather than just the hardships of agricultural pioneer life which could only appeal to a few – would be the decisive factor in directing Jewish immigrants to Eretz Israel and gathering them together into a sovereign polity.⁵⁴⁸

It should be noted that ‘new historian’ scholarship about Tel Aviv disregards the founders’ intentions and studies Ahuzat Bayit as a residential suburb of Jaffa which was transformed into a city by historical accident.⁵⁴⁹ These scholars have labeled as “bourgeois” the central role of housing in the formation of Ahuzat Bayit, and its founders’ fixation on housing form and amenities.⁵⁵⁰ Hence, scholars understand Ahuzat Bayit as being on the opposite pole from a nationalist ideology which privileges the common good.

Homeowners of Ahuzat Bayit indeed invested great efforts in ensuring of good living standards; but what scholars fail to see is that this was part and parcel of their ideology, rather than a contradiction of it. Weiss’s idea of ‘competing’ with New York for Eastern European Jewish immigrants implied that the new city in Eretz-Israel needed to have high living standards, especially housing. Prior to immigrating, Weiss purchased books concerning city planning and visited a city planning exhibition in Belgium.⁵⁵¹ Weiss, as well as Arthur Ruppin, were familiar with Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities, as well as with German urban planning manuals.⁵⁵² Weiss and fellow founders examined the ideas of the European Garden City and American City Beautiful movements not as utopian models for an ideal new society, but rather as concrete attempts to create better urban living conditions.⁵⁵³ The real question is: what was the source of this ambitious vision, and what made Weiss think it was possible to realize it at a time when even founding small agricultural farms in Ottoman Palestine was so difficult that it discouraged many settlers and pushed them into the arms of Jewish philanthropy?

Weiss’s archives reveal data that allows a reconsideration of the scholarship regarding Tel Aviv’s urban development. This data suggests that Tel Aviv is the result of a unique perspective on modern planning. Rather than privileging the plan, for which housing serves as infill, Nahum Gutman, in his illustrated account of the foundation and early years of Ahuzat Bayit defines the motive principle of this urbanism as “Housing before Street”; that is, Ahuzat Bayit’s houses were built before the development of the urban

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⁵⁴⁸ See detailed discussion of Ahuzat Bayit’s founding prospect in chapter 2. Weiss, 1956. This statement by Weiss has been used by scholars to attest to the Western aspirations of Zionism and the estrangement of Tel Aviv founders from its locale, and go as far to serve scholars as attesting to Zionism as a “beachhead of the West for a crusade over Islam”. See LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*.

⁵⁴⁹ Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City*.


⁵⁵¹ Little is known about Weiss’s specific sources of influence and the literature to which he was exposed. The little we know is recounted by the editor of Weiss’s diaries in his introduction to Weiss’s published diaries. Chorgin, "Introduction."

⁵⁵² Katz, *Redeem the Land: The Geula Company for Land Purchase*, List of books of the Weiss bequest donated to the national library, CZA.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.
streetscape. Gutman thus describes the formation of urbanity as a process in which houses were the decisive element in the creation of the urban street and urban life more generally:

Two dozen houses standing on two sides of a white lane are still not a street…the construction worker said: I choose to live in my filthy alley in Jaffa among people and not in the middle of this desert. The buildings became houses… Yet, I tell you, a house is not a home…The movers came, and houses became filled with chairs, beds, dinner tables, and babies. You have a home…The workers erected a brick fence between the houses…the houses became yards…Then the sand was leveled and pavements were laid…One night someone knocked on the door. The construction worker, the one who [preferred life in Jaffa] said...”I wanted to ask you if you are willing to rent out a room in your house. I would like to live in this street.” At that moment, we all agreed: we have a street.\footnote{Gutman, \textit{A Little City and Few Men within It}. pp. 9-13.}

Fig. 4.1 Houses before street, Gutman 1959. Fig. 4.2 Construction of Allenby St, early 1920s. Photography: Abraham Soskin.

However, contrary to the phenomenon by which makeshift housing predates formal settlement and creates the city \textit{de facto}, as in the auto-constructed peripheries of Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Calcutta\footnote{Holston shows that the poor at the urban periphery of Sao Paulo auto construct their own houses in an action, which constructs the city itself and themselves as rights bearing citizens of the city. Holston, \textit{Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil}. Caldeira shows that the very rich construct enclaves of wealth in gated communities at the periphery of Sao Paulo thereby expanding the city and transforming it.Caldeira, "City of Walls."} - the formation of Tel Aviv via housing was the result of a conscious choice given the circumstances.

A number of Zionist leaders had raised the possibility of Jewish neighborhoods outside the accepted urban framework of the Ottoman Empire, neighborhoods initiated by their residents rather than by philanthropists (as was the case in Montefiore’s Mishkenot Sha’ananim outside Jerusalem).\footnote{See chapter 2 for discussion of Mishkenot Shaananim} Zalman Levontin, for example, one of the founders of the Moshava “Rishon Le-Zion”, had raised the idea of such neighborhoods outside the existing cities, though he did not specify Jaffa.\footnote{Zalman. D. Levontin, \textit{To the Land of Our Fathers} (Tel Aviv: Massada, 1924).} In 1904, during his visit to Eretz Israel, Weiss himself broached the possibility after observing the obstacles to Zionist settlement
, but made no move to realize it. In 1905 another Zionist activist, Isaac Chayutman, organized meetings in his house in attempt to organize such a neighborhood outside Jaffa, but was not able to push his initiative through. In addition, the Sephardic Jews of Jaffa, and most notably the Shlush family, started buying lands outside Jaffa in the hope that Jewish neighborhoods would be founded there.

However it was only when Weiss immigrated to Jaffa in 1906 and proclaimed his ‘plan for erecting Hebrew cities’ that the idea materialized in an operative association of homebuilders. Scholars agree that while Weiss’s 1906 initiative found a public among whom this idea had been fermenting for a while, it was his involvement which was crucial for the foundation of Ahuzat Bayit. However, these same scholars downplay Weiss’s contribution by discussing it in discursive terms alone, rather than examining its substance. Because of this lacuna, historical accounts of the formation of Ahuzat Bayit on the very night of Weiss’s arrival in Jaffa in June of 1906 seem peculiar and improbable. Why would Jaffa Jews accept the ideas of an unfamiliar immigrant and instantly trust him to lead them?

4.2.1 Housing as urban planning: Weiss, architect and urban planner

Answering the above questions involves two elements: Weiss’s Zionist activism in Poland on account of which he was already familiar to the Jaffa Zionist public, and the nature of his proposal - namely for a Hebrew city rather than merely a neighborhood. First, some biographical facts about Weiss are in order, which might help to explain his familiarity to the Jews of Jaffa. Weiss was born in 1868 in Grodno Russia and immigrated as a child to the industrialized city of Lodz, where he was acquainted with the writings of Theodore Herzl and joined the Zionist “Chovevei Zion” movement. He was among the founders of the Zionist synagogue in Lodz and participated in the 1902 Zionist Congress in Minsk and in the 7th Zionist Congress in Basel. Moreover, Weiss served as head of a branch of the Geula company in Lodz, which encouraged the Jewish middle class to invest in Eretz Israel. He was therefore not an unknown immigrant but familiar to Zionist activists in Europe and Eretz Israel.  

558 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
560 As Ottoman citizens, the Shlush family was able to purchase lands following the 1876 Ottoman edict enabling non-Muslims to register land in their name. See chapter 2 for discussion of the Shlush contribution to the founding of Jewish neighborhoods outside Jaffa.
562 The reduction of Weiss’s contribution is the result of a fierce conflict between him and Meir Dizengoff, Tel Aviv’s legendary mayor, and dates as early as the first historical account of Ahutaz Bayit’s history, written by Druyanov in 1936 ‘as a present to Dizengoff’. See also Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City. Ruppin named Weiss as the proprietor of the city in several letters and publications. See Shchori, The Dream Turned to a Metropolitan.
563 See for example Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
564 Lodz is currently located in Poland, yet at the turn if the 20th century was part of Russia.
566 Shchori, The Dream Turned to a Metropolitan. Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
Second, Weiss proposed Ahuzat Bayit as the seed of a Hebrew city, a center for Jewish sovereignty and autonomy and a substantial building block for the Zionist project. His idea of a Hebrew city founded on individual housing thus combined the idea of private entrepreneurship with the national enterprise of Zionism, and embedded the idea of proper housing within the Zionist idea which had attracted most Jaffa Jews to Eretz Israel in the first place. While supporting the greater ideology of Zionism, the proposition that a city be based on housing was a plan that could be feasibly materialized.

How did Weiss come to conceive of an urban plan based upon housing? The two great influences on him were the Zionist idea expressed by Herzl: that Jews can control their own destiny via a ‘Jewish State’, and his own experiences living in Lodz, which taught him that a city could be formed ‘from thin air’, as the result of the actions of people who migrated to it.

Weiss was an aspiring architect and city planner influenced by the modern city planning of Lodz. Having come to Lodz as a young child, he had witnessed its transformation into an industrial city in the 1880’s, when it became a textile-production center which rivaled Manchester. Weiss’s perspective on Lodz’s development was that of the small-scale businessmen-craftsmen like his father the goldsmith-clockmaker, rather than capitalists who owned vast means of production.

Thus, the idea of new cities requiring planning both excited him and materialized in front of his eyes since his childhood. Weiss experienced the development of Lodz as the direct result of individual decisions of migrant families, including his own parents, to move from rural villages and towns to the city. While urban migration is largely discussed in scholarship in the framework of ‘push and pull factors’ determined by capital, Weiss viewed such migration as a popular process, a bottom-up accumulation arising from people’s search for a better life. Furthermore, in Lodz, Weiss was exposed to the housing problem which was inherent to newly industrialized cities. As Lodz’s population grew exponentially, doubling every ten years between 1830 and 1905, it required massive housing solutions. Lodz exposed Weiss to the idea of cities as centers of industrial production, rather than of commerce in agricultural products, and to the urban transformations involved in the accumulation of masses of workers and craftsmen, forming a city ‘out of thin air’ due to the new demands for mass housing, commerce and transportation. Migration and urban development were inseparable in Weiss’s mind.

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567 Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv. Shchori, The Dream Turned to a Metropolitan.
568 Chorgin, "Introduction."
569 Chorgin, the editor of Weiss’s diaries, published in 1956, includes in his introduction the information that as a boy Weiss’s interest in architecture caught the eye of a German architect who offered to finance his architecture studies in Germany. Weiss’s father refused. Ibid.
570 S. Liszewski, C. Young, and B. Gontar, A Comparative Study of Lodz and Manchester: Geographies of European Cities in Transition (University of Lódz, 1997).
571 Hall, Cities of Tomorrow.
572 Liszewski, Young, and Gontar, A Comparative Study of Lodz and Manchester: Geographies of European Cities in Transition.
574 Chorgin, "Introduction."
He connected the urban idea of people taking their future into their own hands and forming a city with the Zionist idea of Jews taking control of their destinies to form a sovereign nation.

As we have already seen, Weiss was a devout Zionist and admirer Herzl. In 1904, aged 36, he visited Eretz Israel in preparation for his family’s immigration (At the time, Weiss was already married with six children). While Weiss was in Eretz Israel, Herzl passed away and Weiss concluded that his death marked the end of Political Zionism i.e. the diplomatic attempt to acquire a charter from the Great Powers to settle the country. What was required now was the materialization of Jewish sovereignty in Eretz Israel via practical Zionism. In the land at the time, there were several Jewish Moshavot farms, supported by the Jewish philanthropist Baron de Rothschild. Weiss, however, believed that sovereignty necessitated economic independence and that few Jews would be able to adjust to – and become economically independent from – agricultural labor alone.

Weiss’ survey resulted in several conclusions: (a). Zionism’s main problem is the condition of housing for Jews in Eretz Israel; (b). Pioneer village life cannot generate a mass accumulation of sufficient numbers of Jews in the country; (c). There is a dire need for an economically independent model of settlement; (d). Agglomeration, economic independence and suitable employment are possible only in a city.

Facing the difficulties met by Jewish settlers in Ottoman Palestine and given his analysis of the consequences of these difficulties for settler self-rule, Weiss conceived a plan of action which involved the collective private capital of Jews of moderate means (as opposed to the Moshava model, which required Jewish philanthropic capital and was dependant on Jewish workers). Weiss discussed this idea with a Moshava farmer Aaron Eisenberg, who shared his frustration with this model during his visit. Weiss returned to Lodz and started planning for immigration. The planning process included making connections with Zionist institutions like the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Eretz Israel and sending 500 rubles to the Geula land purchase society headed by Meir Dizengoff for buying a plot of land. In Lodz, Weiss gave lectures promoting the idea of capitalist immigration to Eretz Israel and acquainted himself with contemporary theories of city planning. He sold his business and house and in 1906 immigrated with his wife, six children, and a concrete plan for a Hebrew city based on homebuilding. Or perhaps we should say that Weiss’s proposal was not yet a concrete plan, but rather the idea of planning, an idea which was enthusiastically accepted by the Jaffa Jews who formed The Association for Home Building in Eretz. Execution of the plan began immediately with the issuing of a founding brochure, printed in five copies only. The brochure stressed the profit potential embedded in the idea of homebuilding and soon recruited 50 members for the ‘association of homebuilders’. Housing, rather than

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575 Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv*.
576 Later the first mayor of Tel Aviv and Weiss’s bitter rival. Ibid.
577 Weiss, *The Beginning of Tel Aviv*. A list of Weiss’s books donated to the national library at the CZA includes several city planning and construction manuals in German.
578 Ibid.
579 Ahuzat Bayit protocols, TAMA.
580 Ahuzat Bayit protocols, TAMA.
urbanity, was the platform upon which Ahuzat Bayit recruited both members and financing. Ruppin, who recommended the granting of a JNF loan to Ahuzat Bayit, viewed the lack of decent housing as an obstacle preventing prospective immigrants from settling in the land.\textsuperscript{581}

The first act of planning for the new city was determining the size and location of the land to be purchased for it. While some members proposed purchase of a small parcel within the old city, Weiss managed to push for purchase of a large plot outside the city, where the Jewish autonomy would be sustainable. Lower land prices outside the old city meant that Ahuzat Bayit could purchase a vast parcel of land which would enable it to serve as the seed for the future city.\textsuperscript{582} The Ottoman governor of Jerusalem 1906-1908, Ali Akram Bey, had severely restricted purchase of land by Jews, therefore Ahuzat Bayit founders looked for land which was already Jewish owned. They were offered two parcels of land. One parcel, located by the shore, was owned by the Jewish Anglo Palestine Bank (APB) and the second parcel, the Jibali vineyard near the Jaffa-Jerusalem railroad tracks, was owned by land merchants from Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{583} While the APB land was securely owned, at 11 hectares, Weiss considered it too small for future development into a city and convinced the Ahuzat Bayit Committee to reject it.\textsuperscript{584} He then convinced the Committee to purchase the Jibali land, despite its complicated ownership and untrustworthy sellers, stressing that the decisive act which would enable the development of a city was purchase of a large enough plot of land, serving the city for future expansion and as a profit base.\textsuperscript{585}

After long deliberations with landowners and association members Weiss managed to push for purchase of most the Jibali vineyard from the Jerusalemite middle men who sold the land for descendants of an absentee landlord.\textsuperscript{586} There were two reasons behind Weiss’s initiative to buy 22 hectares of land for Ahuzat Bayit even though its 60 houses required only 3 hectares (calculated per 0.05 hectares per house plot).\textsuperscript{587} First, the society could later sell individual plots from the surplus for housing construction to Jewish families, thus allowing for enlarging the neighborhood towards becoming a city without the need for buyers to form new homebuilders associations. Second, the land bought in bulk could be sold with profit, which would enable Ahuzat Bayit to pay off its debt to the Anglo-Palestine Bank and develop communal amenities like sewage and street paving. Ahuzat Bayit indeed sold 3 hectares of vacant land after one year to individual homebuilders for more than double its purchase price.\textsuperscript{588}

\textsuperscript{581}Ruppin, My Life Chapters. p. 48-49.
\textsuperscript{582} Ahuzat Bayit protocols, TAMA; Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv. Katz, "The Ahuzat Bayit Association 1906-1909 - Foundation for the Formation of Tel Aviv."
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{584} Weiss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv. As the APB was the main lender for Ahuzat Bayit members, this act generated conflict with the bank, which resented Weiss and preferred to communicate with Dizengoff. See Katz, Redeem the Land: The Geula Company for Land Purchase; Katz, "The Ahuzat Bayit Association 1906-1909 - Foundation for the Formation of Tel Aviv." Ahuzat Bait protocols, TAMA.
\textsuperscript{585} Ahuzat Bait protocols, TAMA.Wei.ss, The Beginning of Tel Aviv.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{587} Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
\textsuperscript{588} Ibid.
Purchase of the Jibali land rather than the APB land involved a number of complications concerning land ownership. Prior to its sale to the Jerusalemite land traders, the Jibali land was owned by 9 different heirs, and some doubts arose as to these owners’ rights. As the land was held in *musha* ownership (collective ownership, see chapter 2), the Ottoman authorities refused to register the land in the name of the Ahuzat Bayit representatives. Moreover, while the land was private land (*Mülk*), some of it was mistakenly registered as state land (*Miri*), and some as lapsed land confiscated by the state (*Mahlul*). In addition, Jaffa landlords, who were concerned that the new neighborhood would jeopardize their income, approached the Jaffa municipality, which constructed a police base at the border with the Jibali land; according to Ottoman law then in force this would prevent the construction of private dwellings upon it. The sellers, who had committed to petitioning the authorities to solve all these problems, took their time and therefore stalled construction of the neighborhood.

Planning the neighborhood involved two elements, both of which were guided by the need for housing: association regulations and site plan. While regulations and a plan...
were required by the Anglo-Palestine Bank and the JNF as a condition for the loan,\textsuperscript{591} these were clearly drafted beginning from the primacy of the house and extending from there to the neighborhood as a whole. The first regulations proclaimed by Ahuzat Bayit included the following: (i) “Houses will be detached free standing houses on four sides, surrounded by wide area for planting and garden; (ii) The house parcel will not be smaller than 0.057 hectares;\textsuperscript{592} (iii) Neighborhood streets will be wide and paved, planted with trees and lit by street lighting; (iv) Land will be allocated for public parks; (v) Sewage and water supply will be installed; (vi) Water for the neighborhood will be based on wells rather than rainwater.”\textsuperscript{593} These regulations were re-written by Ruppin as representative of the JNF (though they remained based on the above regulations framed by the Ahuzat Bayit committee), and were approved by the committee in January of 1909.\textsuperscript{594} The approved draft of the regulations included the following:\textsuperscript{595}

a. Prior to construction each member must submit to the neighborhood committee, for its approval, house plans prepared by an architect with a detailed account of construction materials.
b. No member is allowed to construct any structure whatsoever over more than 0.3 of his land area.
c. Each plot must border the street with a fenced garden of three meters wide. The garden and yard must always be properly maintained. Otherwise, the association is allowed to fix the garden and fence itself and charge expenses to the member who owns the plot.
d. Porches are considered part of the structure if roofed over.
e. Each structure has to be at least one meter from border of the neighboring plot. This applies to porches as well. Houses should be at least 2 meters from the street.
f. Stairs leading to the street should not extend to the pavement. If the fence of the property has doors, they should open inwards.
h. Toilets must be hidden with a fence or with greenery and access to them should be from the direction of the house rather than facing either the neighbor’s plot or the street. No toilets can be positioned on a street façade.
i. Septic tanks must be located at least 5 meters from the house and 1 meter from the border of the plot. The tank must have the dimensions of 2x2x2 and be built of stones and covered with a lid.
J. All plots have to be fenced. Fencing expenses shall be shared by neighboring plots.
k. Neighborhood streets, parks and public plots are property of the entire neighborhood and cannot be sold for individual housing.

Owing to Weiss’s insistence, the layout of Ahuzat Bayit involved urban planning, unlike the layout of preceding neighborhoods outside Jaffa, in which streets were laid out in an ad hoc fashion decided on site by the contractors.\textsuperscript{596} The urban plan involved a scheme for allocating the neighborhood area into 66 plots for the construction of members’ houses, and included the layout of neighborhood streets, plots for public services and parks, and instructions regarding infrastructure, primarily digging a well for running water supply.

\textsuperscript{591} Ruppin, \textit{My Life Chapters}.
\textsuperscript{592} Measurements were based on the cubit unit, and plot area was therefore determined for 1000 square cubit, equal to 0.057 hectares.
\textsuperscript{593} A letter from Ahuzat Bayit to the JNF, quoted by Druyanov, \textit{The Book of Tel Aviv}. Weiss, \textit{The Beginning of Tel Aviv}.
\textsuperscript{594} Regulations were written by Ruppin as representative of the JNF but were based on the previous regulations written by the Ahuzat Bait committee.Ruppin, \textit{Thirty Years of Building Eretz Israel}.
\textsuperscript{595} Druyanov, \textit{The Book of Tel Aviv}. Additional regulations concerning noise and cleanliness, as well as regulations concerning payments to the association, were too based on the house.
\textsuperscript{596} Ahuzat Bayit Protocols, TAMA Bigger, \textit{The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City}.
Several planners were invited to propose plans for Ahuzat Bayit: Josef Treidel, a Haifa engineer, Abraham Goldman, William Staiassny, a Viennese architect and Josef Bareski together with Professor Borris Shatz of the Bezalel Academy in Jerusalem. Shatz and Bareski approached the neighborhood committee for the plot data (in order to produce a plan) but did not submit any proposal. The Staiassny proposal arrived late, in April 1909, after the neighborhood layout was already approved and was therefore not considered even though it was appealing to the neighborhood members.

The only plan brought forth at the decisive Ahuzat Bayit general meeting of January 1909 was the Treidel and Goldman plan (fig. 4.4). This plan was framed in a series of letters between Weiss and Treidel, now located at the Tel Aviv Municipal Archive (TAMA). The letters show that the plan was the product of Weiss’ design, while Treidel’s skill and professional authority were relied upon for its detailed actualization. Weiss stated that Treidel worked on the plan for more than a month, followed by additional work done by Goldman. The plan included a circular peripheral road 12 meters wide with four traversing roads parallel to the Jaffa-Jerusalem railroad, each 8-10 meters wide. At the center of the neighborhood there was a large parcel designated for the Herzliya Gymnasium, and at its north-west a sizeable public park. The plan designated the topographically high areas (20 meters above sea level) for construction while low-lying areas (11 meters) were reserved for parks, a principle which prevented expensive leveling of the ground. The area allocated for public services (roads, parks and a water tower) amounted to 41% of the total area. This plan was presented to the General Assembly of Ahuzat Bayit in the form of a rough street layout superimposed upon Treidel’s land measurement map. Immediately upon its presentation, however, the plan was criticized by members as inadequate as far as housing was concerned. Members complained that the plan’s large park and two main roads (i.e. the circular road) meant that too much of the area which should have been assigned for housing construction was used up for public services. Members proposed replacing the two-road grid with one main road at the center of the neighborhood, leading to the Gymnasium. In order to compensate for the lost road space and in order to take into account the future development of the neighborhood, they also proposed widening this main artery to 16 meters instead of 12.

597 Staiassny was a prominent figure among Vienna’s Jewry and nominated for the assembly of the Zionist committee at the Bazel Zionist congress. Ruppin approached Staiassny requesting literature on urban planning towards writing Tel Aviv’s regulations. Katz, "The Ahuzat Bayit Association 1906-1909 - Foundation for the Formation of Tel Aviv."

598 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.

599 Katz does bring a drawing of proposed housing types for the neighborhood signed by Baresky however it seems no neighborhood layout was submitted. Shchori states this proposal was based on ‘inspiration from Baresky’s studies in Paris’. It seems the proposal was not made specifically for Ahuzat Bayit but rather presented as proposal for house design. Katz, "The Ahuzat Bayit Association 1906-1909 - Foundation for the Formation of Tel Aviv.". Shchori, The Dream Turned to a Metropolitan.

600 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv; Shchori, The Dream Turned to a Metropolitan. Harpaz, N. Plastic Arts and Architecture in Tel Aviv in the 1920s. Masters Thesis, Tel Aviv University.

601 Druyanov includes accounts of an interview with Goldman, however does not take into account Ahuzat Bayit protocols’ statement that the Goldman plan was included in the Treidel plan.

602 Treidel-Weiss letters, TAMA.
addition, members proposed leveling the ground at the eastern end of the lot, which had been designated by the plan for a public park, in order to allow for more housing.\textsuperscript{603}

Weiss attempted to object to these changes, citing the cost of leveling the ground, the pressing time for construction due to the Ottoman rent cycle law (\textit{Muhram}), and need for each owner to donate area for a public park. Housing construction set the pace for determining the plan, due to the need to allot plots and complete housing construction by the end of the \textit{Muhram} cycle. Members whose houses could not be completed by

\textsuperscript{603} Protocols of the General Assembly meeting of Ahuzat Bayit, Shvat 26, 1909. TAMA.
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Muhram would have to keep renting, and bear the cost of a full year’s rent. 604 After a debate, members accepted the grid principle of the Treidel-Goldman proposal, but decided to shift the plan’s main street, Herzl Street, to the center of the plan, so that each of the 60 plots, allotted by raffle, would have equal access to it. The members also decided to level the ground allocated for a park and divide it in housing plots. The plan which was finally accepted allotted only 25% of the area for public services, including roads. No park was allocated in it. 605

Weiss and his fellow founders were thus responsible for Ahuzat Bayit’s urban planning, rather than any of the proposal planners. 606 Their two initial acts adapted the land to the needs of neighborhood: digging a well and leveling the ground prior to laying out the neighborhood’s urban plan. 607 In March 1909 Ruppin sent the neighborhood plan and ordinances to the JNF with his recommendation. The JNF approved the plan and granted the neighborhood the necessary loan. 608

![Fig. 4.7 The Staiassny plan for Ahuzat Bayit, perspective drawing, April 1909. Source: TAMA.](image)

While the Staiassny plan was never formally considered, the Committee published a special announcement in the press thanking Staiassny for “generously taking upon himself to develop housing types and general layout for the new settlement “New Jaffa”, founded by the Ahuzat Bayit association.” 609 Members were very impressed with the Staiassny proposal because its focus was housing (fig. 8). 610 Staiassny included house parcels throughout the neighborhood land, with the exception of a central square for

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604 Muhram was an Ottoman ordinance declaring the annulment of nay leasehold over property on the month of Muhram thus requiring renters to change their residence each year. This ordinance was placed to prevent the renter’s ability to claim hold over property if not evicted in Muhram, thus take possession of property. Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.

605 Ahuzat Bait protocols, meeting of 20 Kislev 1909. Ibid.

606 See for example Ahuzat Bait protocol of February 17, 1909, TAMA.

607 Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.

608 Katz, ”The Ahuzat Bayit Association 1906-1909 - Foundation for the Formation of Tel Aviv.”

609 Hazvi, Sivan 25, 1909.

610 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.
public buildings and the Gymnasium (the northern part of the plan was designated for future development, as it had not yet been purchased by Ahuzat Bayit in 1909). Moreover, Staiassny’s plan was distinguished from the four other plans by the level of detail which was invested in planning the houses, and this appealed to Ahuzat Bayit members by emphasizing housing as the main purpose of the plan itself and as the building block of the future city (fig. 4.7). Despite the fact that it was never formally adopted, then, Staiassny’s plan had a great effect on the design and construction of housing in Ahuzat Bayit.

After approving the neighborhood layout, members allotted house plots by raffle and began design and construction of their homes. The new ordinances written for the neighborhood, now named Tel Aviv, were influenced by the Staiassny plan and included limiting construction to 30 percent of plot size, a front setback of at least 5 meters, a side setback of at least 3 meters, and construction height limit of 9 meters.611

4.2.2 The ‘good house’ as an urban house

Housing in Tel Aviv’s seminal neighborhood was defined by Weiss as ‘good housing’ in both ideological and architectural terms. Housing amenities such as running water, sewage, electricity, and greenery were the materialization of a good quality of life in a

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611 Ahuzat Bait protocols, TAMA.
sovereign environment. The urban setting for these “good houses” was to provide the
density and volume required for a self-governing polity.

Many scholars discuss the rejection, by Zionist ideology, of urban housing as
inappropriate to the goals of the movement. As evidence of Zionism’s opposition to
city life, scholars quote proclamations like the one made by Zionist leader Avraham
Harzfeld at the 1935 Zionist Congress, who declared: “there are two Palestines, that of
the cities, such as Tel Aviv, which are in a degenerate state, and that of the agricultural
colonies”.

This reading of Zionism’s approach to urban housing is accepted by both
‘traditional’ and ‘new historian’ research.

However, while mainstream Zionism clearly judged urban life and dwelling as improper
from the mid 1920’s onwards, the statement that urban life was condemned by Zionism
outright is a-historical, and neglects developments in the Zionist attitude towards Tel
Aviv. Changes in the Zionist approach to Tel Aviv are especially evident in relation to
housing. The early housing of Ahuzat Bayit was celebrated as “proper” Zionist housing
in which Jews ‘leave city walls’ in favor of independent, self-governing life. The
change in Zionist attitudes to Tel Aviv housing models began later, in the 1930’s, when
the city was declared degenerate because of its profit-based speculation and detachment
of residents from the land by use of modern apartment houses.

4.2.2.1 The Weiss house

As we have seen, Weiss’s urban planning for Tel Aviv was simultaneously modern and
‘indigenous’, in perceiving the sovereign subject’s ‘proper house’ as the building block
of the modern city and nation. Weiss’s ideas can be examined by study of his own house,
which was self-designed and self-contracted, a laboratory case for defining ‘proper’
Zionist urban housing.

The house was one of the first erected in Ahuzat Bayit in 1909. One of the most dominant
features of Weiss’s own house and of the houses he envisioned for the Hebrew city was
that for him the ‘proper’ house for the good, sovereign Hebrew was also a good house in
normative architectural terms: that is, large enough for a family, well lit and ventilated,
surrounded by its own garden, serviced with running water and a sewage system, and
with electric light. His model for Zionism was far from the model of the suffering
pioneer. Rather, for Weiss, the purpose of the pioneer life’s was to better his living
conditions in political, spiritual and material terms. For Weiss starting anew in the
ancestral homeland was a chance not only for independence and sovereignty but also for
good quality of life. Good housing reflected, for Weiss, the right environment for the
development and flourishing of a Jewish national home. As we have noted, Weiss

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612 See for example LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
614 See for example LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
616 Ruppin, My Life Chapters.
617 LeVine, Overthrowing Geography.
repeatedly expressed his belief that only a few can commit to the hardships of village life – and a few were not enough for materializing Herzl’s vision.

The Weiss House included one storey and an attic, surrounded by a small fenced garden of fruit trees. Its main entrance was from Herzl Street, the main thoroughfare. Houses were built before street pavement was laid and elevated from street level by a few stairs in order to distance them from street dust and mud.

Weiss’ design addressed the different house functions. The plan divides the house into four main and autonomous areas: two living quarters, a service area, and an area for Weiss’ public activity. Upon entering the house, one could access the right wing, which served the Weiss couple and younger children; the left wing was for the older children. From the entrance, one could take the stairway to Weiss’ study in the attic or continue below the staircase to the service area at the back of the house, including washroom, kitchen, dining room and toilet. An additional service entrance lead directly from the main street to the service porch, at the left of the house. This division, as well as the arrangement of each wing, shows consideration for separation of the private and public spheres of life and grants autonomy to each function within a total structure, something characteristic of modern design principles. The right wing included the main living room and two additional rooms serving as master bedroom and baby room. The left wing was comprised of two rooms, a girls’ room and a boys’ room, which open to each other. The service area located at the back of the house could be accessed directly from the back rooms of the two wings. The kitchen is located at the end of the main corridor, with a service porch and informal dining area by the washroom at the back of the house. At the back of the house was a garden with fruit trees, accessed from the back rooms and service area. Each room was lit and ventilated with at least two windows and the study, designed within a mansard roof, included a large window facing Herzl Street. Domestic amenities initially included running water serviced from the neighborhood well (rather than accumulated rain water) and later, sewage and electric lighting.
In Weiss’ conception, the houses themselves had a role to play in the development of the neighborhood layout, since the streets and intersections would be planned around the houses, rather than vice versa. Ahuzat Bayit’s ordinances further specified the houses’ relationship to the street by determining a three meter front setback and requiring a front garden as seen above. The Weiss house, however, was located on a unique parcel of the neighborhood, at the intersection of Herzl street (the main street of the neighborhood) and Ahad Ha’am Street, right across from the main public institution in the neighborhood, the Herzliya Gymnasium. By designing a round façade, which faced both Herzl Street and the Gymnasium, Weiss acknowledged the public nature of the intersection between a residential street and public institution, in attempt to use the house design to form an urban square. Gutman records the story of Weiss’s attempt to convince his neighbor across the street, whose house also faced the Gymnasium, to also design a round façade “in order to respect the corner”. The neighbor was convinced and a fanning intersection was formed.617

As head of the neighborhood committee and construction committee and as architect and contractor for several houses in Ahuzat Bayit, Weiss could affect housing designs, construction materials and construction technique. He insisted on the principle of a Hebrew city built with Hebrew labor as a measure of self reliance and independence from the constraints of the Jaffa housing environment. However, most Jewish construction

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617 Gutman, A Little City and Few Men within It.
workers were not skilled in the local techniques of construction with carved lime stone. Moreover, it was a slow and expensive technique and Weiss was not sure that homebuilders would be able to meet the Ottoman rent cycle deadline.

This situation necessitated developing and adapting building materials and construction methods to fit the unskilled Hebrew construction worker. One solution introduced by Weiss in Ahuzat Bayit was the method of construction using cement bricks, which were being produced by the new “Arber” factory. This construction method did not necessitate skilled stone carving and so was suitable for untrained Hebrew labor, yet it was experimental and homeowners did not trust its durability and perseverance. Moreover, the APB, which was legal owner of the property until full payment of the loan issued a warning to Ahuzat Bayit homebuilders stating the cement block construction method was risky.\(^{618}\) Cement was at the time indeed an experimental material, used primarily for industrial structures.\(^{619}\) For Weiss the new material was important because it provided him with the opportunity to extend the principle self-reliance to which he aspired, into the realm of construction. Prefabricated construction elements were one of the characteristics of Zionist housing, which enabled the production of housing even under conditions of technical incompetence (as will be seen in chapters 5 and 7). In Ahuzat Bayit, only four homeowners took the risk of using cement bricks. Weiss’s professional skills made him confident that he could use bricks for his own home and for other houses on which he worked.\(^{620}\)

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\(^{619}\) See the revolutionary work of August Perret, largely discredited till the early 1940s.

\(^{620}\) Yekutieli, "Akiva Arieh Weiss and the First Hebrew City."
In the face of the challenges and opportunities for housing design and construction, Weiss decided to extend his architectural education via correspondence with the Berlin Technical University. We do not know whether or not Weiss completed his studies at the Technikum and received a diploma, nor what courses he took, yet the large number of architectural drawings he left attests to the fact that he was a professional, practicing architect. However, to date, Weiss’s architectural education and practice have been disregarded by scholars and not taken into account in study of the conceptualization and development of Tel Aviv.621

In 1911 the Ahuzat Bayit association bought another plot of land comprising 7 hectares, and several other associations bought tracts of agricultural land totaling 35 hectares, tripling the area of the new settlement, and taking a giant step towards achieving Weiss’s vision of a large, vibrant city. In 1910, a year after its founding, Ahuzat Bayit housed 300 inhabitants in 60 houses. By 1914, Ahuzat Bayit incorporated the neighborhoods of Nahalat Binyamin and Hevra Hadasha, changed its name to Tel Aviv and housed 1,491 inhabitants in 139 houses.622

4.3 Ugly housing: Deviations from Ahuzat Bayit planning regulations
World War I and the following years posed great challenges for Tel Aviv’s ‘good housing’. The war in fact halted the city’s development altogether. Moreover, in 1917 the Ottoman authorities exiled the Jewish population of Jaffa and Tel Aviv northwards, where they lived in shacks and makeshift housing and many suffered from hunger.623 The Jews were allowed to return in 1918 with the British conquest of the Galilee. Tel Aviv’s population in 1920 numbered 2,084 in 182 houses at high density and overcrowding.624 However a greater challenge to Tel Aviv’s ‘good housing’ was yet to come. Data documenting Tel Aviv’s population and housing growth marks 1921, four years after the war ended and British rule established, as the true pivotal moment in its historical development as a city. On May 11, 1921, the British declared Tel Aviv a township, independent in internal matters yet subject to Jaffa in matters such as urban planning. Almost simultaneous with this important declaration, violent ethnic riots erupted in Jaffa on April 1, 1921, taking the lives of 49 Jews and 48 Arabs, and leading to the flight of 9,000 of Jaffa’s 16,000 Jews to Tel Aviv, quadrupling its population. In the immediate aftermath of the riots in April 1921, the city’s population increased by 50% to number 3,604 residents, and 1922 saw a further 400% increase, to a total of 12,892 inhabitants. Many Jaffa Jews were renters who lived in houses and apartments owned by Jaffa Arabs, in which they could no longer stay following the riots. Many of them also lost their sources of livelihood in the city and were thus very poor as well. 625 In addition, the riots

621 The fact that Weiss designed his own house is indeed recognized by scholars, yet this fact is framed as an act of auto-construction in the city’s early days as a small neighborhood, and disconnected from the fact that Weiss conceived of the city and owned an architecture and construction company. See for example Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
623 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.
624 Ibid.
625 Scholars are debated on the relationship between Tel Aviv’s declaration as a township on April 11 1921 and the eruption of violence on April 1st. See Nati Marom, City of Concept (Tel Aviv: Babel, 2009).
resulted in the British erection of a formal border between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, thus contributing to the de facto materialization of Tel Aviv’s political independence as a township. Due to the border, several working class Jewish neighborhoods were included within Tel Aviv’s municipal domain, such as Neve Zedek, Kerem Ha-Teimanim and Achva. The events of 1921, then, marked a dramatic shift in Tel Aviv’s housing conditions, architecture and planning.

The pretty, ‘good’ houses of early Tel Aviv, inspired by Weiss’s model, were submerged in 1921, by the sudden mass construction of ‘ugly’ housing by Jews fleeing Jaffa and immigrants fleeing Europe. Large numbers of tents, tin and wood shacks and huts filled every undeveloped tract of land to the south, north, east and west of Tel Aviv. These dwellings had no running water or sewage, no streets, electricity or social services. They were constructed by their residents with only grudging cooperation from Tel Aviv’s “good housing” administration and residents, who had themselves been shack-dwelling refugees, scattered across the Galilee merely three years earlier.

The shack neighborhoods changed the nature of housing in Tel Aviv, as well as the nature of its urban planning, its municipal status and its role in the materialization of Zionism into a nation state. The incorporation of a large population of workers in Tel Aviv transformed it from a homeowner community to one comprised predominantly of renters. And, as we have seen, most of the new inhabitants had no choice but to dwell in self-constructed shacks and huts, i.e. in “ugly” housing. “Comparing pictures of Tel Aviv in its first decade with pictures from the 1920s and 1930s, one cannot but notice the houses ‘breaking the ranks’...from a pretty, solid town Tel Aviv grew to an unappealing clutter of houses, primarily due to an extremely rapid population growth,” states Oz Almog.

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626 Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
627 Almog, Oz, “Tel Aviv, Capital of Modernity in Eretz Israel”, www.peopleil.org, visited May 12, 2011. People Israel, The Guide for Israeli Society, is a wiki website for mapping sociological phenomena in Israeli society managed by Professor Almog of the Bar Ilan University. While problematic in many ways, I find it useful in reflecting ‘common knowledge’ facts and normative judgments regarding the built environment as ‘proper’ or ‘ugly’.
The Tel Aviv municipality organized to house the refugees, at first in schools and in homes. Subsequently, the municipality purchased used tents from the British army and housed the refugees in tent camps on the beach. This could only be a temporary solution, since winter winds and sea waves destroyed the tents and made living conditions impossible. Tent dwellers gradually moved to rented apartments in the city, to self-constructed dwellings made of wood and tin, or to towns and settlements outside Tel Aviv.

One of the areas settled by refugees in makeshift housing was the area designated for the Nordia neighborhood at the north of the city center. The land on which Nordia was to be built was previously a large orange grove covering 12.8 hectares. The JNF purchased the land from a Jaffa merchant, Ali Suleiman Zaripa for the purpose of erecting a neighborhood named after Zionist leader Max Nordau, and based on the principles of Garden City planning. However, before the planning for Nordia was completed, the 1921 riots erupted and refugees fleeing Jaffa settled there.

Despite this new complication, the JNF continued to insist that the Nordia neighborhood be built. However, some of the refugees, represented by the headmaster of the new Herzliya Gymnastium, Dr. Hayim Bugrashov, convinced the JNF to allow the refugees to build their houses there and form the nucleus of the new neighborhood. The neighborhood was built by “The Society for Building Houses for the Homeless of Jaffa”, formed with members’ private funds. Architect Yehoshua Zvi Tabechnik, designed the neighborhood scheme so to allocate as many plots as possible, and prepared five house models for dwellers to choose from in order to reduce costs. In two years, all the shacks

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628 Druyanov, *The Book of Tel Aviv*.  
629 Ibid.  
630 Ibid.  
631 Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City*.  
632 As the Nordia, land was not large enough to house all refugee shacks, the owner of the attached vineyard, the Jaffa effendi Adib Hinawy, offered refugees to build shacks on his land in exchange for rent. These shacks were too auto constructed of wood and tin. Hinawy collected rent per shack or half-shack weekly, and was murdered on one of his collecting trips by an unknown killer during the Arab revolt of 1936, allegedly due to renting his land to Jews. See: Berger, Tamar, 1998, Dionysus at Dizengof Center, HaKibutz Hameuchat, Tel Aviv.  
633 Another group of the Nordia refugees formed the neighborhood of Neve Shaanan.
in the neighborhood were had been replaced by small houses built of sand-stone bricks, which were cheaper than concrete bricks and less dependant on expensive cement. The sandstone bricks were produced in a nearby factory, ‘Silicat’, which was opened to meet the growing need for cheap building materials. The prefabricated sand blocks, and the proximity of the Silicat factory to the Nordia neighborhood, meant that it was now possible for many homeless tent and shack dwellers to build their own permanent housing.

Fig. 4.20, 4.21 Nordia neighborhood, late 1920s. Source: NPC.

Fig. 4.22 Building permit for a second structure on the Bar Kochva 22 plot, issued 1926.: TAEA

As permanent housing, these houses were now considered “good” rather than “ugly”, although they were denser and more modest than earlier houses in Tel Aviv. The small plots were soon filled with additional makeshift structures, serving dwellers as workshops, outdoor kitchens and additional dwelling units for extended family.634

An example of one of these plots is located on Bar Kochva St. 22. This plot was assigned to two brothers, Haim and Yosef Olitski, members of the ‘homeless’ community which established the “Society for Building Houses for the Homeless of Jaffa”. In 1922, the brothers built a small house on Bar Kochva Street. The building permit for additional structures on the plot indicates that the area of the initial house totaled 45 square

634 See for example TAEA, Bar Kochva 22 and 24 files.
meters. In 1926, the two brothers decided to build an additional house, at the back of the plot, facing the first one. Although the regulations in force at that time permitted only one structure on each plot, the construction was approved. The building permit was for a brick structure of two rooms, a toilet, a kitchen and a porch in a total area of 44 square meters; however the structure itself was a shack built of wood rather than brick, perhaps for lack of means.

4.3.1 Ugly city – City Beautiful?

As result of the massive construction of ‘ugly housing’, Tel Aviv had by the mid 1930’s become an ‘ugly city’: new neighborhoods were constructed on whatever land became available, and each formed autonomously as separate entities rather than part of a unified city (fig. 4.25). The rising cost of land led to overcrowding and ignoring many of the regulations which had been agreed upon at the time of Ahuzat Bayit, such as limiting construction to 1/3 of the plot – a source of dismay to the city’s authorities, but one to which they could not effectively object, given the dire housing conditions of immigrants and refugees. In 1923, the city prepared a comprehensive map of all 28 different neighborhoods in the city (fig. 4.23). The map constituted an attempt to push forward a planning process that would regulate city development in light of expected future growth. To this end, the municipal authorities approached the architect and planner Richard Kauffman who arrived in Palestine 1921, and asked him to prepare its plan.

![Fig. 4.23 Kauffman plan for Tel Aviv 1921. Source:CZA](image-url)

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635 TAEA. As Nordia was officially annexed to Tel Aviv in 1923, construction documents for these houses do not exist in Tel Aviv’s Engineering Archive.

636 TAEA.


638 As will be seen in Chapter 5, Kauffman was appointed head planner for the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC) and designed many rural and urban settlements for Zionist settlement organizations.
Kauffmann’s design for Tel Aviv, like his designs for other rural and urban settlements (the most well-known of which is Nahalal), embodied ideas of monumentality, reflected in the concentric squares and grand vistas which have often been associated with the City Beautiful movement. As can be seen in Fig. 4.23, Kaufmann’s design followed the logic of Tel Aviv’s development in the 1920’s: that is, a city composed of collection of different neighborhoods, each having a main square at its center, from which a number of main roads radiate outward, connecting it to other parts of the city. The “segmental” design of the city into separate neighborhoods (fig. 4.26, 4.27) was based on the existing patterns of land-ownership, namely the slow process of land purchase vs. the need to quickly develop all available land due to the pressing need of housing we have noted above.

Kauffmann’s massive planning project, undertaken for the PLDC, beginning in 1921, comprised 80 urban neighborhoods and 160 rural settlements. It was conducted piecemeal, settlement by settlement, in accordance with the pace of land purchases on the ground, rather than in the framework of a national or regional master plan. Kaufmann’s design for Tel-Aviv, like his designs for other Zionist settlements, embodies the theatrical sense of monumentality existing in all his designs for Zionist settlements across the

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639 It is not clear if Kauffmann was directly inspired by the American City Beautiful movement for modern urban planning, however he was clearly aware of it, as with its sources of inspiration in the rational beaux-arts planning. Kauffmann, R. 1926. Planning of Jewish Settlements in Palestine: A Brief Survey of Facts and Conditions. The Town Planning Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Nov., 1926), pp. 93-116.

640 The Kauffmann file at the CZA contains land ownership maps prepared for the PLDC, as well as plans for additional neighborhoods in Tel Aviv, each planned separately on its own, including the Sheinkin Neighborhood, the Gabelia neighborhood south of Jaffa, the Tel Nordoi neighborhood, the AlKarkara land, the Alenbi-Sumeil junction.

641 See chapter 5 for further discussion.
country. This monumentality has turned many of his settlements into landmarks of Zionism, many times in stark contrast to their small scale of 20-120 families.

As far as Tel Aviv’s mayor, Meir Dizengoff, was concerned, however, Kauffmann’s plan was limited in scope, area, and vision and did not conceive of Tel Aviv as a city. It did not propose an overall planning structure for future development but rather a cumulative design for lands already purchased or in negotiation for purchase; it lacked, in other words, a unifying vision for them as a whole. We could say that Kauffmann’s design reflect his client to be the developers and homebuilders’ associations interested in the land rather than the city. A conflict with the city (and especially with Dizengoff personally) over Kauffmann’s fees led to the plan being withdrawn in 1923.642

Dizengoff was not a man who shied away from monumentality. Rather, he encouraged commemoration of himself and his city in parks, streets, squares and written accounts.643 However he was not interested in what Hall calls “planning for display, architecture of theatre,”644 but in a plan that would bring Tel Aviv back to its starting point: to the clear urban vision for the first Hebrew city.

Tel Aviv’s rejection of Kaufmann’s monumental City Beautiful neighborhoods should be contrasted with the realization of such plans in Chandigarh and Brasilia, whose monumental “grandeur” is their raison d’etre. “The rest does not work, but in a sense that is beside the point”, as Hall defined Chandigarh. While beauty and grandeur were important for him, Dizengoff was fully aware – given the conditions under which Tel Aviv was founded and developed – of the difficulties to which Hall refers when he remarks that it was “hard to build a City Beautiful amidst the confusion of democracy and the market”.645

James Holston demonstrates that Brasilia was designed with the aim of creating a classless urban reality, which would harness the power of architecture and the egalitarian principle of the nation in order to effect a political transformation of the deeply entrenched stratification of Brazilian society.646 Tel Aviv, however, was a city founded before the nation-state of which it would become a part, and hence, it could not make use of the powerful tools of sovereign power in order to make grand, but unrealized, urban plans and fill them with houses and population, as the state of Israel was later able to do.647 It was a voluntary city, whose residency and development were based on housing, and had to be treated as such. Dizengoff, however, never retreated from his belief in the necessity of a master plan for Tel Aviv’s future development as a city and in 1925 he took the opportunity of Sir Patrick Geddes’ visit to Palestine and invited him to devise Tel Aviv’s master plan.648

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642 Kauffmann file, CZA.Weill-Rochant, L’atlas De Tel Aviv: 1908-2008..
643 Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv.
644 Hall, Cities of Tomorrow.
645 Ibid., p. 234.
647 See chapters 6 and 8 ahead.
648 Marom, City of Concept.
4.4 Geddes’ plan and ‘good housing’ guidelines

Sir Patrick Geddes, designer of Tel Aviv’s first (and to date, its only) master-plan, made a clear statement on the nature of good housing in Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv’s original “detached cottages with small gardens” were seen by Geddes as constituting ‘good housing’ versus “human warehouses” and tenements.649 And indeed, a full chapter in Geddes’s 1925 report, which accompanied the master plan, was dedicated to defining good housing and distinguishing it from undesired slums and tenements, which the plan undertook to prevent.650

The centrality of housing for Geddes’ planning principles is generally disregarded by scholars, who tend to focus on his urban scheme for the city.651 Cathrine Weill-Rochant, who conducted an extensive study of the plan, focused her analysis on Geddes’ ‘biological’ design of the city’s circulation system, namely on its layout, and discusses how housing was meant to fill this layout.652 Rachel Kallus who investigated the Geddes plan writes that, “The plan’s main contribution is in creating a street hierarchy which differentiates between quite residential streets from major throughways. The major streets (‘main ways’) define large urban blocks (‘home blocks’).”653 Both scholars pay little attention to the housing proposed in the Geddes plan since they, like others, claim that it was completely ignored by city officials and by the public, and that it never materialized.654 However, housing is significant for study of the Geddes plan not only because it was realized en masse (as will shown below) – but primarily because it informed the plan’s profound principles.

Geddes was to a great extent marginal to the modern city planning movements, including technocratic-capitalist Haussmanism, the aesthetic City Beautiful, or the utopian Garden City. And yet, despite the fact that, with the exception of Tel Aviv, none of his urban plans were never realized, he was a celebrated theoretician of modern urban planning (celebrated enough, indeed, to be knighted by King George V). By 1925 Geddes’ ideas were widely acclaimed, following publication of his 1915 book ‘Cities in Evolution’655.

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650 Geddes, "Town Planning Report - Jaffa and Tel Aviv."
651 See for example Bigger, The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City.
653 Kallus, "Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel Aviv.,” p. 293.
Catherine Weill-Rochant, Myths and Buildings of Tel Aviv, Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem [En ligne], 12 l 2003, mis en ligne le 22 octobre 2007, Consulté le 20 mai 2011. URL: http://bcrfj.revues.org/index672.html. Weill-Rochant publishes in French and the above is her English paper version available online only.
Geddes distinguished himself from the modernist conceptions of planning by his insistence that schematic, mechanistic and repetitive planning stood in stark contrast to the aims of true urban planning. As he stated in his book,

“Urban Planning cannot be made from above using general principles easily implemented on the ground, studied in one place and imitated elsewhere. This way leads to Haussmanism. City planning is the development of a local way of life, regional character, civic spirit, unique personality, which can of course develop…yet always in its own way and based on its own foundations”.  

This principle of urban growth based on a city’s unique character and foundations, led Geddes to a housing-based approach to Tel Aviv, in explicit continuity with the city’s original urban logic of ‘house before street’. Geddes indeed defined his plan’s primary aim as “continuing the Garden Village Tel Aviv began with, and bettering this as far as may be.”

Geddes’ urban vision was deeply affected by issues of housing in an industrial city, as these were treated in the tradition of modern urban planning. However, his approach to modern urban housing was anarchistic when compared with other top-down attempts to solve the housing problem of the working class. His urban vision was termed by Hall as ‘the city of sweat equity’, namely “contributing to planning theory, the idea that men and women could make their own cities” and the idea of the role of planning in leading a civic reconstitution of society and cities. This perspective on the city was a perfect match with Tel Aviv’s Zionist urbanism, based on individual housing constructed and financed by resident-citizens as a vehicle for self-government.

Geddes’ affinity for the Zionist project was a long-standing one. An old friend, the Zionist leader Israel Zangwill, whom he had met in Edinburgh, recommended Geddes to the head of the WZO (later the first president of the state of Israel), Chaim Weizmann, who was also impressed with Geddes’ ideas. Geddes subsequently visited Palestine in 1919 and 1920 to design a number of projects including a master plan for Jerusalem, the Hebrew university, and a suburb of Haifa. He was also asked to aid the British government in devising the foundations of the Mandatory planning system in Palestine.

In 1925, upon receiving Dizengoff’s invitation to design the plan for Tel Aviv’s un-built areas (in light of the massive growth since 1921 and the expectation of further growth),

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658 The industrial city and its horrible housing conditions triggered many theories and models for better urban housing and formed the discipline of urban planning. See Hall, Cities of Tomorrow. Geddes himself lived in a tenement in Edinburgh upon his marriage in the mid 1880s. Ibid.
659 Ibid. pp. 263.
661 Geddes’ first visit to Palestine was in 1919, immediately after the close of the war. He visited Palestine again in 1925 for the opening of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and was invited by Dizengoff to devise a plan for Tel Aviv. Druyanov, The Book of Tel Aviv. Marom, City of Concept.
Geddes spent two months in Tel Aviv conducting a ‘civic survey’ of the city and region, according to his ideas of regional planning. Afterward, Geddes produced a 64 page written report and a scheme for Tel Aviv as a city for 100,000 inhabitants which he defined as his most ambitious plan. In his report, Geddes analyzed Tel Aviv’s 1925 condition as one of being at a crossroads of two different paths: one, continuing its original principles of garden village - and the other transforming it into a city of tenements. Geddes presented this crossroad in his report by analyzing two types of housing in Tel Aviv: detached cottages with small gardens in Shapira Alley and a nearby “warehousing tenement block”. These two housing types “represent the essential contradiction between the two types of planning, and whoever wishes to understand clearly and assess decently the new city plan should thoroughly examine these two opposing types. He will then better assess (1) how much we can further improve the advantages of the better type, and (2) how can we fully avoid the dangers of presented by the worst type.”

The ‘human warehouse’, “threatening to reject the garden village character of Tel Aviv,” was viewed by Geddes not merely in light of its aesthetic or economic consequences or its effect on local character– but as a matter of life and death, contributing to high mortality rates, especially in children. In his report, Geddes imagines a dialogue about Tel-Aviv’s construction regulations, between himself and a visitor to the city from one of the British colonies. While the visitor considered Tel Aviv’s restriction of construction to 1/3 of each parcel to be a ‘bad regulation’ for the landowner, Geddes defends it, along with the restriction to two storey buildings, as preventing child mortality, which is “first and foremost a matter of housing and urban planning.” Tel Aviv’s small detached houses were therefore a moral issue, “a measure of good citizenship, for our care not only or mostly for our own lives but…for each other and the entire human beehive.”

In this way, Geddes essentially accepted the original building regulations of Ahuzat Bayit, and incorporated them into his new plan. He wrote that Ahuzat Bayit, “the original Tel Aviv at its best…enjoys superior planning to most of later planning…we have a well defined plan with houses, town hall and a boulevard whose main streets nicely converge around its main cultural institution.”

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662 Geddes’s plan for Tel Aviv included a written report, sketches, photographs and a plan. The Tel Aviv Engineering Archive holds the written report alone, Town Planning Report – Jaffa and Tel Aviv 1925, and an illustration of the plan on its cover (see above). The map and drawings, mentioned in the report text, have disappeared, allegedly burned by Arab insurgents in 1936. See Dutta, “Organicism: Inter-Disciplinarity and Para-Architectures.” The available map we have today is a plan was drawn up by the city engineering département circa 1931, according to the report and master plan suggested by Patrick Geddes in 1925. (Tel Aviv Engineering Archives).

663 Constructed by Meir Getzl Shapira, a land merchant from Detroit. Now the Almonit Alley.


666 Ibid.

The housing proposed by Geddes for Tel Aviv was dramatically different from Chandigarh’s and Brasilia’s Corbusian apartments, mass-produced for mass-living, designed with the concept of the “perfect human ‘cell’...the ‘house-machine’.” Moreover, as housing for Zionists who came to Palestine as natives returning to their homeland, the character of Tel Aviv could never accept the Corbusian idea of “the ‘old home’ disappearing and with it local architecture, etc., for labor will shift about as needed, and must be ready to move, bag and baggage.” Operating within a nationalism-before-nation-state framework, Tel Aviv’s housing was produced by its residents rather than for them, a fact which Geddes took into account.

In order to provide good housing along the lines set by Ahuzat Bayit, Geddes proposed to extend the city northwards, which he explained by the geography of the region, as well as the proper positioning of houses in relation to the sun and sea. Extending the city northwards would enable ‘good housing’ beyond the city center and also prevent the overcrowding of the center with dense blocks of apartment houses. It has generally been assumed that the high cost of land in Tel Aviv generated densification of the population into ‘human warehouses’. Geddes, however, insisted on the contrary: “the popular belief is that the cost of land necessitates high rise building, however the fact is that by building high rises we make land expensive.” The Geddes plan, then, can be seen as a return to Ahuzat Bayit’s original framework, from which the city deviated due to WW1 and its consequences.

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670 Ibid., p. 14. While scholars critique the Geddes’ home-block proposal as accessible only to the well off, it should be mentioned that the northern land by the Yarkon river was remarkably cheap at the time compared to the city center, and indeed enabled poor workers to obtain homeownership in homeblocks. See sections 4.1-4.4 ahead. This critique seems to suffer from reverse history, as the city’s advent to the north made this area expansive.
671 Marom, City of Concept. For some reason Marom relegates this important observation to a footnote. Pp. 59. f. 64.
As can be seen in fig. 4.29, 4.30, the Geddes plan offered a structured linear extension of the city north to the Yarkon river, compared with the city’s earlier concentric development, as an collection of neighborhoods around Ahuzat Bayit. Geddes based this northern linear extension not on the orthogonal grid, which he critiqued, but on a street layout distinguishing ‘mainways’ designated for through traffic which define large urban blocks, from narrow ‘homeways’ serving the inner blocks (see fig. 4.31). The plan sets a

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north-south axis for the mainways, with several east-west roads leading to the waterfront park area. Unlike the existing city, which was composed of a collection of neighborhoods of varied size and structural logic (fig. 4.30), Geddes defined home-block units of different size and qualities but embedded them in the systemic plan layout, which composed all the home-blocks into one city. Weill-Rochant defined this as ‘biological’ design. 673

The house plot suggested in Geddes’s report was 560 square meters, just as it had been in Ahuzat Bayit. This lot size was determined not by Geddes but by Tel Aviv’s town planning committee as an average plot size, an enlargement of the 300 square meter average plot in the city center. Tel Aviv’s early building block of the individual house plot was thus embedded within Geddes’s large-scale urban scheme. Geddes retained Ahuzat Bayit’s by-law of limiting construction to one-third of the lot and building height to 9 meters. 674 He also limited the use of the plot, by stipulating that each lot would contain a single, semi-detached house with no more than two residential units. 675 He openly opposed ‘human warehousing’ in apartment houses and recommended detached or semi-detached houses with up to two stories and an open veranda, encircled with a private garden. As we have seen, this definition of the ‘good house’ accepted and explicitly continued the Ahuzat Bayit housing type. Geddes’s scheme for ‘good housing’, along with the inclination for this type of housing already present in Tel-Aviv governed the development of new housing neighborhoods in the areas in the north of the city which were developed in the 1930s. As for the ‘home block’ itself, Geddes’ plan called for this to be structured by small narrow streets (‘home streets’) which, together with pedestrian ways lead to public parks of enclosed avenues at the core of the home blocks, with communal facilities such as playgrounds and tennis courts (fig. 4.32). 676

Geddes’ recommendations were adopted and incorporated into a document prepared by the Technical Department of the Tel-Aviv Municipality, which was approved by the City Council on 6 April, 1926. A legal document, containing a colored map and written by-laws, drafted in accordance with the British Mandatory ‘Town Planning Order’ of 1921, was approved by the planning Board of the Mandatory Authority in 1927. 677 Plan adaptation included detailed street layout and parcel allotment plan, prepared by the engineers of the Tel Aviv technical department. 678

Because the extant housing in Tel Aviv since the 1940’s is mostly three and four storey apartment houses, scholars claim that home-block housing was rejected by city and public and never materialized. 679 According to Weill-Rochant:

“Scientific publications on the history of the city, dealing primarily with the topic of the garden-city, discuss the inadequacy of this type of model, selected by the founders of Tel Aviv at the turn of the century… while in the 1930s the city developed like gangrene [its

673 Weill-Rochant, L’atlas De Tel Aviv: 1908-2008.
674 Geddes, "Town Planning Report - Jaffa and Tel Aviv."
675 Kallus, "Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel-Aviv."
676 Ibid.
677 Kallus, "Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel-Aviv."
678 Weill-Rochant, L’atlas De Tel Aviv: 1908-2008.
679 Kallus, "Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel-Aviv."
mass development made obsolete the development plan drawn up in 1925 by the Scottish city planner Patrick Geddes, which was also inspired by the idea of the garden-city. Following this cataclysm, the earlier phases of city planning were wiped out and with them, the remains of the utopian urban plan devised by the founding fathers.\textsuperscript{680}

Architecture historian Arindam Dutta goes as far as stating that the Geddes plan did not exist.\textsuperscript{681} However, existing evidence of the built environment show that Geddes' plan was in fact implemented en masse, a fact requires a revision of the usual understanding of his work and its influence on the urban fabric of Tel Aviv. Little studied and scarcely written about, the home-block housing type has largely disappeared due to later development, and very few of the original houses still remain in Tel Aviv’s urban fabric to attest to the fact that Geddes’s ‘home block’ scheme was indeed materialized.\textsuperscript{682}

The realization of Geddes’ design – i.e. with Garden Village houses – was the product of a distinct period in the city’s political and class orientation. The dramatic change in Tel Aviv’s housing environment and municipal status in 1921 led to a dramatic change in its social composition and political affiliation. Between 1921 and 1924, the city’s blue collar and socialist population grew dominant thus transforming the political map in Tel Aviv, which was no longer an owners’ town but one housing many blue collar renters, a sizeable proportion of which were immigrants and refugees.

The poor housing and employment condition of blue collar workers led to social unrest and a governmental change. Between December 1925 and 1928, Tel Aviv’s mayor was the socialist leader David Bloch, who had the support of the large blue collar population. The Geddes plan was approved, over the loud objections of landowners, during Bloch’s tenure as mayor\textsuperscript{683} and workers’ neighborhoods transformed Tel Aviv’s built environment.

This domination subsided with the so-called “Fourth Aliyah”, that is, the fourth wave of Jewish immigration, in 1924-5, which brought 20,000 bourgeois urbanites to the city. Consequently, by the early 1930’s, the balance of power had shifted again, as reflected in the prominence of ‘Bauhaus’ apartment houses in the built-up environment of the city. Nonetheless, the brief time span in which political power rested with the socialist element of the city enabled the realization of Geddes’ scheme.

\textbf{4.4.1 Urban Workers’ houses: Houses in the Geddes ‘home block’}

Geddes’ definition of ‘good housing’ proved to be a perfect match for urban workers. The large plot enabled them to maintain a small farm for subsistence as well as for actualizing the ideal of land cultivation. Restrictions on housing size and height made auto-construction [auto-construction is a technical term] a realistic possibility. Danny Rabinowitz discusses cooperative, urban worker housing as ‘the forgotten option’ for

\textsuperscript{680} Weill-Rochant, \textit{L'atlas De Tel Aviv: 1908-2008.}
\textsuperscript{681} Dutta, “Organicism: Inter-Disciplinarity and Para-Architectures.”
\textsuperscript{682} See for example Dutta’s statement that Geddes’s plan disappeared as “its buildings remained unrealized by Zionists and its paper burnt by Arab insurgents”. Ibid pp. 427-430. p. 428.
\textsuperscript{683} Scholars interpret the support of legendary mayor Dizengoff, a capitalist and Bloch’s opponent, and a key supporter of Geddes’s plan to claim that workers opposed the plan. See Marom, \textit{City of Concept}. 
social housing. Yet this housing was not only forgotten as a social solution, even the fact that of its existence as a housing type in Tel Aviv’s fabric seems to have disappeared from view. While many scholars study the cooperative housing complexes of Meonot Ovdim, modernist icons designed by Sharon and others, to date no study has been made of detached-housing worker neighborhoods as social housing. Consequently, no association was made between this type of housing and the Geddes ‘home block’. Scholars and the public alike, then, have forgotten the existence of Geddes’ home-block garden village housing in Tel Aviv.

The Geddes plan was designed and approved in a period of great political conflict between workers and capitalists in Tel Aviv, which reached a climax with Meir Dizengoff’s resignation as Mayor in December 1925 following the demand by workers for free elementary education. As we noted above, the socialist party was in power in Tel-Aviv between 1925 and 1928, when the Geddes plan was approved by the British government. Dizengoff demanded that the workers’ party and its head Mayor David Bloch not interfere in the Geddes plan. Worker leaders, interested in providing workers with access to land, enabled “leapfrog” development, thereby increasing the availability of relatively cheap land at the far end of the Geddes plan area, at a price workers could afford. Public funds were used in order to service these remote neighborhoods with roads and public services. Dizengoff who was interested in continuous land development in the interest of keeping land prices at their maximum profit margin strongly opposed these actions and expressed his frustration that the workers were using city taxpayers’ money for putting up infrastructure for leapfrog development.

Scholars usually focus on the insignificant or harmful role of workers in the actualization of Geddes’ plan, but the reality was, in fact, quite the opposite. It was the workers who were a decisive factor in making Geddes’ plan a reality. Their control of the city at the time of the plan’s approval enabled such things as purchase of cheap land at the far north for small self-built housing in the home-block framework and the realization of the built environment envisioned by Geddes.

Before becoming Tel Aviv’s mayor, David Bloch was a driving force in the building the country’s first neighborhood for urban workers, in his capacity as head of Kapai (the Workers of Eretz Israel Fund). The Borochov neighborhood, founded in 1921, was based on the idea that urban workers needed access to the land. Neighborhood home plots included a small farm for subsistence, cultivated by the women and children while the men worked as paid labor in the city. This kind of built environment was making a

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684 Rabinowitz, “The Forgotten Option: The Urban Cooperative Housing Complex."
686 Kallus, “Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel-Aviv.”
687 Marom, City of Concept.
688 Quoted by Marom, 2009.
689 Hyman, quoted in Marom, 2009.
690 Kapai was absorbed into the Histadrut umbrella worker federation in 1925, thus the Borochov neighborhood for urban workers is often associated with the the Histadrut’s Shikun company.
statement: the urban worker was just as rooted in the homeland and just as engaged in cultivating it as the rural farmer.  

Bloch’s involvement in the foundation of the Borochov neighborhood influenced his proposal to allocate city-owned lands for housing for urban workers, much to the dismay of capitalists like Dizengoff. The allocation of urban funds for the welfare of workers, in light of the soaring property and rent prices in Tel Aviv, became the crux of tensions between workers and capitalists in the 1920s.  

This struggle was also about municipal

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690 Karsel, 1961, memories of Chava Haruvi.
691 Workers demands that their children be educated free of charge in the urban schools led to the resignation of mayor Dizengoff and instating workers leader Bloch. The British preferred Dizzengof upon Bloch due to Tel Aviv’s municipal deficit as result of his social provision for poor workers and affected Dizengoff’s re-election. Druyanov, *The Book of Tel Aviv*. 
power and politics. Tel Aviv’s ordinances defined only homeowners and residents paying high taxes as eligible to vote for municipal government, which left the workers with little representation in city hall. Access to housing was thus important for the workers’ leaders not only as a social issue but also as a political issue; it was the key to the Zionist idea of self-governance. Thus, the direct relationship between housing and self-governance, which had been part of Weiss’s conceptualization of the Hebrew city, once again manifests itself.

Their meager means, coupled with the constantly rising cost of housing, made it very difficult for workers to gain access to housing. In 1928, the Histadrut founded Merkaz Ha-Shikun (Hebrew for “the Housing Center”) which constructed worker neighborhoods and worker residences in urban areas.692 Between 1928 and 1931, the first cooperative neighborhoods for urban workers were formed in Tel Aviv.

In the framework of this chapter, I will briefly present three such neighborhoods, in different areas of the Geddes plan, each with its own political and financial formation, in order to show that materialization of Geddes’ ‘home block’ housing was far from limited. The neighborhoods discussed are ‘Worker Neighborhood A’, the ‘Workers Neighborhood B’ and the ‘Camel Leaders Neighborhood’. The three are ‘typical’ Geddes urban blocks, adhering to his typology of a residential block defined by main ways and cut crosswise by narrow streets and pedestrian lanes, with a block-scale, small urban park.

By 1937, there were sixteen worker neighborhoods and worker residential complexes in Tel-Aviv, mostly located in the ‘old north’ of the city, in the area of the Geddes plan. This concentration of worker neighborhoods made the entire area into a “worker’s quarter” of the city. Some of the original buildings still exist, standing as a testament to the existence of a workers’ neighborhood with subsistence farms in what is now the heart of the city.693

4.4.2 Workers’ neighborhood A

The first urban workers’ neighborhood in the city, “Worker Neighborhood A”, was established east of the poor Mahlul shack neighborhood and tannery on a three hectare plot at the northern tip of the Geddes plan area, far from the developed city center. While Nordia had housed blue collar workers before it, the importance of Worker Neighborhood A was in being the first neighborhood designated and built for workers in the city, granting them access to limited homeownership rather than depending on the limited availability and fluctuating prices of rented housing. Rental costs were a painful issue for workers, ranging from 40 to 50 percent of a worker’s average wage in the early 1930’s.694 The workers response was unionization: The Histadrut (General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel), founded 1920, established Bank Ha-Poalim (“Workers’ Bank”), the Solel Boneh construction company, and the Shikun (housing) company for

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692 In 1935 Merkaz HaShikun was transformed to the Shikun stock based company. Lavon Institute archive.
694 Zelig Lavon, Shelter (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1974).
constructing worker housing. These were collective-self-help institutions, whose goal was workers’ independence from capital through the formation of their own means of production and financial services. While the Borochov worker neighborhood discussed above was the first, the significance of Workers’ Neighborhood A was in creating a political power base for workers in the city, by virtue of its location within the municipal boundaries: since homeownership was one of the conditions of gaining the right to vote for the city’s municipal council only a neighborhood like this one, located inside the city, could transform not only the workers personal condition, but also their political status.

Engineer David Tuvia designed the neighborhood layout as well as its identical houses. The neighborhood included 35 such small houses, each with a small-attached farm, each on a 0.05 hectare plot. The small farms were meant to ensure minimal subsistence in periods of unemployment as well as a sense of self-dependence. The price of the house was 350 lira, paid in monthly installments. The relatively low cost of houses in this neighborhood was the result of two decisions: first, worker unionization to obtain loans for land purchase and construction finance and second, the decision to form the neighborhood at the very north of the city, far from its developed city center where, just as Geddes had predicted, lower land costs would enable the formation of his home-block housing.

The most prominent resident of the neighborhood was David Ben-Gurion, one of the Yishuv’s most important leaders, founder of the Histadrut, and later to be first Israel prime minister. Ben Gurion’s house was built 1930-1931 and included two rooms, a porch, a kitchen and a bathroom on the first floor. Due to Ben Gurion’s public position he was given a permit for an additional room on the roof for library and study.

Fig. 4.36 Air view of north Tel Aviv, 1932, detail. Source: LOC LC-DIG-matpc-15890. Worker neighborhood A can be seen at the bottom right. Dizengoff square, yet to be built in the mid 1930s can be seen on right.

Fig. 4.37 Detail of the Geddes plan. Source: TAEA.

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695 Gur, "Concepts of Public Housing in Israel: The Formative Years 1920-1948".
696 Druyanov, *The Book of Tel Aviv*. Marom, *City of Concept*.
697 TAEA, Ben Gurion house file.
The Ben Gurion house included two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, a toilet, and a dining room with a service porch. One of the rooms served as children’s room and the other doubled as master bedroom and living room. The service porch was later closed off as a bedroom for Ben Gurion’s daughter. Upon entry to the house one could take the stairway to Ben Gurion’s study on the second floor. The house was connected to the water system but not to the sewage system. A septic tank serviced the house till the mid 1960’s. The house plan is divided in three separate areas: the living area at the front of the house, facing the front yard and JNF Boulevard; the service area at the back of the house, facing the yard and subsistence farm; and the second floor study, accessed by stairs from the main entrance, which served Ben Gurion in his public and political activity. Typologically, it bears a striking resemblance to Weiss’ house built 1909. The public area of the house was later extended by architect Aryeh Sharon, who expanded Ben Gurion’s study to cover the entire second floor.

4.4.3 Camel leaders’ neighborhood

Compared with the worker elite of Worker Neighborhood A, some of Tel Aviv’s workers were much poorer and managed to gain access to land primarily due to their unionization in a communal workers organization. The Camel Leader neighborhood in north Tel Aviv resulted from unionization of camel riders in 1925-6. These workers turned to Zelig

698 Ibid.
699 Ibid. Note the relationship between Ben Gurion and architect Sharon, who was appointed head of Israel’s national planning department after independence.
Lavon, head of the Histadrut’s Shikun company, for help in obtaining land for a neighborhood. Lavon was able to obtain a loan for the group based on their future earnings for the purchase of the Levin Grove land at the very north of the Geddes plan, by the Yarkon River. Far from the city center and near the river, the site was considered dangerous during the violent struggles of the 1930s between Jews and Arabs which culminated in the 1936 Arab Revolt. Land was therefore relatively cheap, which made homeownership possible for the camel leaders’ at a time of high rental costs which consumed most of their incomes. After obtaining the land, camel leaders first built wooden shacks for themselves (fig. 4.42) and only in the early 1930’s did they gradually begin issuing building permits for the construction of small permanent houses.

Fig. 4.42 The Camel leaders’ neighborhood, 1936. Photographer: Rudi Weisenstein.
Fig. 4.43 Detail of the Geddes plan.
Fig. 4.44 Map and Aerial photograph. Source: TAEA GIS. Note limited block park compared to the Geddes plan on fig. 4.45. Original houses still remaining in the landscape marked in red by me.

\[700\] TAEA house files, for example Yeshayahu Street no. 36.
Camel leaders were very poor and could not purchase large land parcels. They therefore shared standard plots of 0.056 hectares designated by the Geddes plan for construction of two attached units, each on a parcel of 0.028 hectares. Neighborhood houses were very small and included two rooms, a kitchen and toilet and an open service porch, covering a total area of 32 square meters (fig. 4.46). The back yard served as a subsistence farm, and included an additional structure for a chicken coop, an oven and in some cases a workshop. All structures were built by the residents themselves, as indicated in reports of the municipal technical department which inspected construction in order to ensure that it met minimal standards. Inspectors reported that some of the houses used scrap metal for reinforcement rather than construction-quality materials. As a result, the municipal technical department specifically banned construction of more than one floor in this neighborhood (fig. 4.46).

However, the houses were ‘good houses’ for several reasons: first, by enabling dwellers of the city’s ‘ugly’ shack neighborhoods to gain access to proper permanent housing surrounded by subsistence farms; and second, by transforming workers into homeowners and therefore proper citizens of the city, who could participate in its political community. Third, extending the city to the north and thereby contributing to the process of auto-

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701 The Geddes plan regulations enable this option. Geddes plan file, TAEA.
702 TAEA building files, Yeshayahu Street. Some of the uses of these back structures deviated from approved functions which involved neighbor complaints and municipal ordering actions. See fig. ? for the building permit of a chicken roost at the back of Levin Grove lot 26.
703 TAEA building file, Yeshayahu Street no. 36.
construction of the city, as discussed by Holston and Caldeira for Sao Paulo, but in the Tel Aviv tradition of ‘houses before street’.

Fig. 4.47 The semi-detached houses on 36 and 38 Yeshayahu street. While house number 36 was torn down for construction of a three story apartment house in the 1940s, the house on number 38 still stands. Fig. 4.48 A poster welcoming the neighborhood founders to a gym newly opened at the site of the old cinema. Source: Author.

4.4.4 Neighbors’ neighborhood B

Alongside the Histadrut worker neighborhoods, two of which have been examined above, four neighborhoods were built by middle class neighbors’ associations in 1930-1932. The Histadrut assisted residents in obtaining loans for construction. The residents themselves demonstrated a leftist resistance to landownership by transferring title in the land to the JNF, even though they were not organized in a collective as required by Histadrut regulations. As was the case in the worker neighborhoods, residents preferred small, single story houses with a small farm composed of a chicken coop, vegetable garden and fruit trees. Because of their higher socio-economic status, the middle class members of the Neighbors’ Neighborhood B could afford land closer to the city center, which was safer and in the vicinity of services like schools and sources of employment.

Fig. 4.49, 4.50 One of the Neighbors’ Neighborhood B houses, 1933. Source: Tel Aviv 100

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704 Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. Caldeira, ”City of Walls.”

705 Transferring ownership of one’s land to the JNF was a clear statement that one is not a land speculator and is using one’s house for settling and development of the homeland rather than for profit making. See Gracier, 1989.
The house includes three bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, a washroom and a toilet. Each two rooms share an open porch, one facing the Latrice lane and the home-block inner park, and the other facing the back yard subsistence farm. Upon entry to the immediate left is the living room used for hosting and family gathering with a round façade facing the park. To the right, the corridor leads to the bedrooms and a service area. The design of the house directly revolves around its location in relation to the home-block park, diagonally across Latrice lane (fig. 4.52). Three of the four rooms, including the living room porch, are located so that their windows open to the direction of the park, while the service area is located along the opposite façade of the house. Acknowledging the home-block’s inner park, this house demonstrates his owners’ awareness of the home-block qualities and marks them as active rather than passive dwellers who made conscious statements regarding themselves and their city via their private family home.

Anat Sela, grandchild of the owners of a house in Neighbors B, describes the autarkic economy in her grandfather’s house: “My grandparents lived on Latrice 4, a small ally off Chen Boulevard. There, in Tel Aviv, they ran their own autarkic farm. Grandpa built the house with his own hands, little by little, step by step, till it stood. By the time I was five, goats were held in the washroom and chickens in a corner of the back yard. Grandpa collected rainwater in barrels in the backyard, with which he watered the roses, lemon and guava trees, spinach, parsley, onions, potatoes and kohlrabi, his favorite vegetable.”

The house is located in a ‘classic’ Geddes block on a pedestrian lane and faces the entrance to the home-block inner garden (fig. 4.52). Along with the house at 29 Hashoftim Street, it attests that the Geddes guidelines were indeed realized even in this part of the city, most known for its collective apartment houses.

In the face of the rising land costs and speculation, which lead to the construction of ‘degenerate’ apartment houses that owners could profit from by renting them out, the

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Note that in the plan (fig. 4.53) living room windows were located on the round section of its façade, while the house itself (fig. 4.54) was constructed with living room window facing the street.

choice (and ability) to house oneself in ‘good’ housing was a political statement regarding the nature and values of the proper Zionist urban house.

4.4.5 ‘Bad’ housing: Apartment buildings made for expansion

Much has been written about the Tel Aviv apartment buildings and cooperative housing complexes, therefore this chapter will discuss them only in general terms, while directing the reader to relevant literature.\textsuperscript{708} The purpose of this section is to portray the transformation of the ‘good housing’ of Ahuzat Bayit and the Geddes plan into the ‘bad housing’ or ‘warehousing’ of apartment buildings, which was defined by Zionism as a poor habitat for the proper Zionist.

As mentioned above, 1924 marked the beginning of the fourth immigration wave from Eastern Europe, which followed upon the promulgation of anti-Jewish laws in the new post-Versailles states and the restriction of immigration to America. Jews of the fourth immigration were white-collar, secular urbanites who were able to immigrate with some means. They preferred to settle in urban areas and their arrival in 1924-1925 added 20,000 new residents.\textsuperscript{709} While the 1924-25 boom ‘merely’ doubled the city’s population (compared with the 500\% increase in the city’s population after the Jaffa riots in 1921), it nonetheless raised the problem of housing a large number of people who were not willing to make do with shack or tent housing.

Kallus observes that the Geddes’ scheme was unrealistic in light of the nature and volume of this immigration wave. The need to double the number of available residential units had a dramatic effect on the cost of land and of existing housing as is shown by

\textsuperscript{708} Kallus, "Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel-Aviv."; Nitzan-Shiftan, "White Washed Houses."; Rabinowitz, "The Forgotten Option: The Urban Cooperative Housing Complex."

\textsuperscript{709} Bigger, \textit{The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City}. 

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Granovski’s indication of the sums invested in land development in 1924 and 1925. In 1925, land development was 250% of the land developed in 1924 – however land development expenses in 1925 soared, with almost five times more funds spent on land development as compared with the previous year.\textsuperscript{710} The increase was especially pronounced in the city center, a phenomenon which was severely criticized as cynical speculation in national lands, and therefore non-Zionist.\textsuperscript{711} Real estate prices were decisive in the transformation of the ‘good house’ into what Geddes termed ‘human warehousing’ in three and four storey apartment houses in the city center, which were interpreted by mainstream Zionism as the essence of Tel Aviv’s degeneration and as representations of a cynical approach to the homeland as a profit-base. It was this development which marked the beginning of Zionism’s rejection of Tel Aviv as non-Zionist. The new housing typology of apartment houses was a reflection of the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Zionist subjects.

4.4.6 Weiss house expansion

With 20,000 people to be housed, Weiss’s own actions demonstrated rejection of Geddes’ (and his own) original definition of good housing, in favor of Tel Aviv’s expansion to become the city he envisioned in 1906, housing as many Jews as possible in order to enable the creation of a sovereign polity. As we have already seen from his declarations as early as the Yeshurun Club meeting in 1906, Weiss’ interest in the urban environment was about density and volume of Jewish sovereign life.\textsuperscript{712} Weiss designed and built expansions and alterations to a number of houses, as well as new semi-detached homes and apartment buildings replacing original Ahuzat Bayit and Nahalat Binyamin ‘good houses’. In 1924, for example, Weiss designed the alteration of the Hosdorf house from a modest three-room single storey house to two semi-detached houses of six rooms and two stories each. Expansion came at the expense of the house’s garden, previously a large vegetable garden which now only encircled the house. Another example is Weiss’ expansion of the Greibman-Epstein semi-detached house in 1924 (fig. 4.55). This expansion included extending the house to its front yard, adding two additional rooms to the first floor of each of the units, as well as a second floor, serviced by a new stairway, forming two additional dwelling units. The parcel’s dwelling capacity was thus expanded six fold (4.56, 4.57).

\textsuperscript{710} Granovski, \textit{Land Values Development and Speculation in Eretz Israel, Hebrew Land Policy in Eretz Israel}. Granovski calculated land cost in Israeli Lira.
\textsuperscript{711} See Holzman-Gazit, \textit{Land Expropriation in Israel: Law, Culture and Society}.
\textsuperscript{712} Weiss, \textit{The Beginning of Tel Aviv}. 

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These expansions followed Weiss expansions to his own home, which were made even before the population boom of 1924. The plan (fig. 4.63) represented a change in the Weiss family with most children leaving home and dedication of more area for public activity. In 1923, responding to the growing need for commercial and workshop space in the city center, which resulted from the disconnection from Jaffa in 1921, Weiss added a second floor of six rooms on top of his original structure. The Weiss residence moved upstairs, while six stores and workshops opened on the ground floor which previously served as the family residence. Construction of the additional floor was made by erecting a new brick supporting wall alongside the original cement clock walls, which Weiss suspected could not take the load of an additional floor.\footnote{Weiss house file, Tel Aviv preservation department.} In 1927, Weiss redesigned the
façade of the building and lowered the level of the stores to bring it even with street level for the use of a large bookstore facing the Gymnasium.

In the redesigned structure, the stairway, now located at the back of the house, leads to Weiss’s study via a reception room facing the stairs. The private dwelling section is separated with an additional door. Weiss’s study, accessed both from the reception room and from the bedroom, connects the private and public sections of the plan. The living quarters are served with two porches, one facing the back garden and one facing the Gymnasium.

Fig. 4.59  Facades of the expended Weiss house, 1923. Source: Weiss bequest.
Fig. 4.60 Section of the 1927 expansion. Source: TAEA.

Fig. 4.61, 4.62 Section and elevation of the Weiss house 1927 enlargement. Source: TAEA.

Fig. 4.63 Weiss’s plan for the second floor of his house, 1923. Source: Weiss bequest with Edna Yekutieli-Cohen.
### 4.4.7 Bauhaus apartment buildings

In 1932 a group of young members of the Yishuv who returned to Palestine after acquiring architectural education and apprenticeship in Europe formed “the architects’ circle’, or ‘Chug’, to institutionalize modern architecture in Tel Aviv and beyond. The first modernist apartment house in Tel Aviv was the Engel house of 1933, designed by Ze’ev Rechter on Rothschild Boulevard and placed on stilt columns (piloti). Arguing for a dialogue between modern form and the social, political and ethical convictions of the Zionist project, Alona Nitzan-Shiftan draws attention to the variety of opinions and intense debates in the 1930s about architectural forms vis-à-vis re-valuations of the self (Jewish culture, nation, society and religion) and other (the Orient and the 'Arab'). She points to the friction which developed between the architecture of the Chug, which reflected the ideology of the socialist leadership of labor Zionism, inspired by Herzl's political Zionism, and that of famous architect Erich Mendelssohn which gave form to Martin Buber's interpretation of Ahad Ha'am's cultural Zionism.

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714 Nitzan-Shiftan, "White Washed Houses."
715 While Tel Aviv housing was modern, I use Berman’s distinction between modern, modernized and modernist in order to discuss Chug modernist architectural style. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (Verso, 1983).
717 Erich Mendelson designed such iconic Zionist institutions as first President Hayim Weizman’s house and the Hadassa Mount Scopus hospital in Jerusalem. See ibid.
718 Nitzan-Shiftan explains this distinction as the conceptual difference between Ahad Ha-am's aspiration for the Jews to be a “light unto the nations” and Herzl's desire that they become a nation “like all nations”. Ibid.
Scholars like Weill-Rochant and Marom have argued that labor Zionism rejected Geddes’s housing style, because it did not meet the mass demand for reasonably priced and collectively financed worker dwellings.\textsuperscript{722} His guidelines for housing architecture, although they were manifested in the auto-constructed workers’ neighborhoods discussed above, are not studied as a materialization Zionist ideology even though it housed labor leaders like Ben Gurion. Housing in the Geddes plan area is therefore understood to be Chug apartment housing. This housing typology attracted criticism from Chug members themselves, for being crippled by the Geddes plan, which restricted housing to small parcels (thereby foreclosing on the possibility of Corbusian housing blocks) and ‘generated a suffocating environment’ (fig. 4.66).

\textsuperscript{722} Weill-Rochant, \textit{L'atlas De Tel Aviv: 1908-2008}. Marom, \textit{City of Concept}. Please note that the above statement addresses Geddes’s architectural guidelines for the ‘home block’ and not his urban street layout, extensively studied and recognized.
4.4.8 Cooperative housing complexes

Corbusian housing was realized in Tel Aviv on a plot of 0.3 hectares which was donated to the JNF by an elderly couple for the purpose of constructing worker housing. Because the plot was not large enough for the construction of a neighborhood of detached houses with small farms, it was designed in the mold of European cooperative housing by architects Jonathan Shlain and Dov Kochinsky, and named ‘Workers Residence A’ (Me’onot Ovdim Aleph).\textsuperscript{723} The Histadrut also purchased two adjacent plots, which became Workers’ Residence B and C, in order to form a substantial block of worker housing.

There has been much scholarship regarding the worker residences, which need not be repeated here. For the purpose of this study, however, it is important to quickly review the nature of this housing. This is a communal apartment complex around a communal courtyard. Unlike the Tel Aviv housing typology, in which a single structure is located in

\textsuperscript{723} Bigger, \textit{The History of Tel Aviv Part A: From Neighborhoods to City}. Lea Orgad, \textit{Workers' Residences in Tel Aviv (1931-1939)} (Tel Aviv1985). Nitzan-Shiftan, "White Washed Houses."
the middle of its plot surrounded by greenery, the workers’ residence is a complex upon several such plots forming a monolithic façade and enclosing a communal yard. The ground floor housed some communal amenities such as a kindergarten and a laundry room. It is noteworthy that these residences ended up housing not blue collar workers but leftist politicians and white-collar workers. While many associate this fact with the corruption of the Histadrut mechanism, Lavon associates it with the nature of this housing type. In his 1974 book ‘Shelter’, he states that urban blue collar workers aspired to houses which included a small farm like the Workers Neighborhood A and B built that same year, and also chosen by Ben-Gurion.

4.4.9 Cooperative apartment houses

In addition to the Histadrut labor union and its housing company Shikun, other socialist political parties like the Zionist Workers Left (ZWL) also operated a housing company. This company, Workers’ Residence, did not have the financial means and institutional assets needed for securing large loans, nor the connections required for purchase of large plots of land on which to build detached houses or large housing complexes like those built by Shikun. Workers’ Residence built apartment buildings for its members by operating within the constraints of the Geddes plot system. In its twenty years of operation, Workers Residence built 12 such buildings throughout the city. Building in this style enabled the company to divide the cost of land, half of the cost of construction, among all apartment owners thus reducing costs for its members. The plot was used to the limit of what was allowed by the urban plan in order to reduce cost per apartment: up to three apartments per floor in buildings up to three stories high. As construction was not for profit but to provide party workers with access to housing, the profit margin to the contractors was eliminated - another way to reduce costs.

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724 Kallus, "Patrick Geddes and the Evolution of a Housing Type in Tel-Aviv."
725 Lavon, Shelter.
726 Unlike Ahdut HaAvoda, led by Ben Gurion and Catzenelson, which privileged nationalism and called for the cooperation of all Zionist movements aspiring to form an independent nation state, ZWL viewed the Jewish national home as a stage towards the socialist revolution.
Furthermore, by contracting ZWL workers to construct the house, Workers Residence also provided employment for construction workers.

Workers’ Residence A, which broke ground in 1934, was the company’s first apartment house on Zerubavel Street and the first apartment house in the Geula neighborhood, which, till then, had included only single storey houses. The cost of land in Tel Aviv later required ZWL to construct limited and dispersed residences for their members, leading the movement to look for cheaper land outside of the city in a larger housing complex close to the Borochov worker neighborhood in the Tel Aviv suburb of Givatayim.727

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727 Noam Dvir, "The Lavie Complex in Givataim to Be Redeveloped," Ha'Aretz, 13 October 2010.
East of the Geddes plan area, in the ‘new north’, apartment houses of various sizes were built as the result of the cooperative association of groups of workers, from philharmonic orchestra musicians to port workers. Such associations enabled workers to approach institutions like the JNF and the Histadrut Shikun company and ask for access to housing. These workers were ideologically opposed to Histadrut membership, or affiliated with less mainstream political parties like the Revisionists, or they were ‘the middle class’ which was not serviced by the Histadrut.
Tel Aviv’s ‘good’, home-block housing was replaced by ‘bad’ apartment houses in a long and gradual process. The gradual nature of the transformation can be mapped by paying attention to the architectural style of the buildings, which attests to the period in which they were built, replacing one of the original houses. On Yeshayahu Street, in what was formerly called the Camel Leaders Neighborhood, semi-detached single storey houses were replaced with three and four storey apartment buildings. Architectural style helps us to chronologically track the transformation from single storey, home-block houses to apartment buildings. In addition to style, the apartment buildings reflect the increasing density of the built environment as does the closing off of porches to serve as extra rooms.

While the house at number 36 still remains, the adjacent house at number 38 was torn down in the 1940s to make room for the construction of a three storey apartment house with sun porches (later closed off with plastic shades). The house at number 46 was constructed in the 1950s and includes a smaller open porch, also later closed off with plastic shades. The house at number 40 was built in the late 1960’s, and includes no porches at all but rather large living room windows and smaller windows for bedrooms in the façade facing the street. This house is already four stories high and includes an elevator. The house at number 42 was constructed in the 1980s and is stylistically distinct from the ‘Bauhaus revival’ style in Tel Aviv, using stylistic elements like the Bauhaus-style round porches, which were in fact used as living rooms rather than open spaces. The house at number 44 was recently torn down for to make room for the erection of a six floor apartment house designed in 2009. The house at number 36, then, is now the last house on this block still attesting to its design and long time use as a home-block part of the Geddes scheme.

Fig. 4.74 Peretz-Hayut Street attached plots, one with the original one-storey shack and the other a residential apartment house of eight floors. September 2011. Source: Author.
4.5 Conclusion

Chapter 4 studies housing as the building block for Tel Aviv’s ‘indigenous’ modern urban planning by examining the early Ahuzat Bayit plan and Geddes urban plans for the city. This chapter identifies housing as the building block in the ‘housing before street’ schematic which defined Tel Aviv’s two urban plans – Weiss’s 1909 plan and Geddes’ 1925 plan. Housing served both plans as the building block defining urban block and city form, rather than as mere filler for a scheme based on axes and squares. Housing, identified by city founders as its raison d’etre, and as the condition for realizing national sovereignty, emerges here as the building block of a native-modern urban planning. This chapter exposes dramatic findings regarding the Geddes plan, challenging accepted historiography of his celebrated plan for Tel Aviv, as well as findings regarding the city’s original 1909 plan.

The formation of Tel Aviv as a modern city based on the individual house rather than on a schematic plan like that of Corbusian modern cities such as Brasilia, Chandigarh and Howard’s garden city requires us to ask why Tel Aviv’s modern urbanism developed this way? This paper accepts as a starting point Mann’s call to take seriously the founders’ proclamations of the city as the site for the formation of political sovereignty and the materialization of Jewish nationalism. This approach led to discovery of two exciting archival findings. First, that A. A. Weiss, designer of Tel Aviv’s original urban plan, was a trained and practicing architect, i.e. that Tel Aviv’s ‘housing before street’ modern planning was intentional and self-aware. Second, that house-based urban planning served Tel Aviv not only in its early period, but was accepted and incorporated by planner Sir Patrick Geddes as the grounds for the city’s 1925 master plan, which remains in effect to this day. Unlike the common belief, citizens accepted housing as the source of belonging to the city and the nation as well, and materialized the Geddes ‘home block’ throughout most of the Geddes planned area.

The change in Tel Aviv’s housing typology of Tel-Aviv reflects the shifting status of the city as the ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ dwelling environment for the good Zionist subject, even though the city itself has not changed in terms of its urban layout since the 1930’s. Until then, its urban housing was predominantly ‘proper’ detached housing with subsistence farms providing for a ‘proper’ way of life involving direct engagement with the homeland. After the appearance of apartment houses on stilt columns it was considered a degenerate bourgeois form of living, rejecting proper Zionism. Housing is thus the true denominator of identity and ideology for Tel Aviv, however completely disregarded it has been when compared with the urban form of the city. Tel Aviv’s housing-based urban design enabled the bottom-up formation – and transformation – of the city in a process of continuous ‘sweat equity’ development. While in its early days, detached housing was the dominant form, the later, dense housing enabled the accumulation of population required for forming a sovereign polity, precisely as envisioned by Weiss in 1906.

Tel-Aviv’s urban planning represents the role of housing in forming ‘indigenous’ modern urbanism. Seemingly a contradiction in terms, Tel Aviv’s urban fabric matched the contradictory project of nationalism, itself modern and invested in tradition at one and the
same time. A number of studies have discussed the adaptability and transformations of modern urban schemes in the face of the indigenous aspect of nationalism (for example Holston’s study of Brasilia). However, Tel Aviv’s urbanism attests to a deeper level of engagement between modernity and indigenousness in the city as a national project. Since modern urban planning reached full realization primarily in societies in the process of becoming sovereign in the framework of nationalism, and since Tel Aviv’s urban planning seems to have taken a very different route, it requires us to revisit the way we now understand ‘modern urbanism’ and the ways in which we study its materialization worldwide.

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728 Hobsbawm, "The Nation as Invented Tradition."
Chapter 5:
“Today’s Child is Tomorrow’s State”:
The Kibbutz Children’s House as the Nursery for the Good Zionist Subject 1922-1948

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5.1 Introduction

The Kibbutz, while traditionally discussed as the complete material and ideological opponent of the Hebrew city of Tel Aviv, shares many of its founding principles. The mechanisms forming the built environment of the Kibbutz and especially its housing are surprisingly similar to those discussed with regard to Tel Aviv in Chapter 4. Termed the ‘Romulus and Remus of Zionism’ (as we saw in Chapter 2), the two produced similar and competing variations of Zamud good national housing, re-rooting Zionists in the homeland as ‘good’ future citizens.

“If asked to state the factor which determined the size and typology of the Kibbutz dwelling unit throughout the years, more than any other, the answer would probably be: children housing”, states Kibbutz housing researcher Eyal Amir. According to Amir, the institution of the “children’s house”- an institution for the collective care and education of Kibbutz children - was the most significant factor in the development and design of Kibbutz housing as a whole.

It is a unique institution, in that it serves both as public educational institution and a private dwelling at the same time. As a public institution, it belonged to the commune and served the collective cause of care and education of its future citizens, yet as housing it served the function of dwelling, which even in the commune was identified as an individual space. This duality characterized the children’s house from the very start and influenced its physical formation and foundational ideology. It thus forged a deep relationship between the shaping of proper citizens and housing in Zionist culture, by identifying the home as the site in which one begins one’s acculturation into society. Naturally, the communal children’s house affected the formation of the individual housing of Kibbutz members as well, by causing a transformation in the structure and purpose of the family home. The history of Kibbutz housing is thus the story of the Children’s House.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the housing and planning of Kibbutz settlements were not produced by the direct interaction between architect and client alone, but rather by three parties: the architect, the settling agency which held the land and the funds, and the Kibbutz settlers themselves, who were much more than mere farm workers employed by landowners, but rather, equal partners in the realization of settlement ideology. Having no economic means of their own, and ideologically rejecting possession of private property, Kibbutz settlers could not construct their own housing. In order to achieve the goal of Jewish land cultivation upon “national lands”, they were housed by the settlement agencies, which determined, in most cases, the type of housing they were willing to fund.

730 Joffe, "100 Years of Kibbutzim."
731 Eyal Amir, ”The Kibbutz Dwelling Unit: Ideology and Planning” (Technion, 1997). p. 103. Amir uses the Hebrew term ‘linat hayeladim’, literally ‘children’s sleeping’, as children spent several hours a day in their parents’ rooms however their dwelling was understood to be determined by where they spent their nights.
733 Meishar, ”Leaving the Castle.”
However, Kibbutz members were able to define their terms of ‘good housing’ and thus affect the kinds of homes in which they would live.

Some Kibbutz settlements made use of this ability more than others. Kibbutz Beit Alpha, known to be a highly ideological community, intervened in significant ways in the design of both the settlement as a whole and the private dwelling, as can be seen below. Beit Alpha thus made important contributions to the consolidation of the typology of Kibbutz settlement and dwelling. The main, and closely interrelated contributions, which proved critical to both domestic and urban planning schemes for later Jewish settlement, were the first “Children’s House” (built in 1929) and the first “campus” layout for a Kibbutz (in 1929). Both of these innovations were later adopted by the settlement agencies and Kibbutz settlements across the country.

Just as the discussion of Tel Aviv in Chapter 4, centered on good housing as the site for materializing sovereignty and the creation of a ‘native’ polity, discussion of Kibbutz housing in the present chapter will focus on good housing as the nursery for good national citizens. While, between 1910 and the present, some 270 kibbutzim were founded, including a number founded by some headstrong and deeply ideological factions, this chapter does not aim to recount the whole history of the Kibbutz. Rather, our focus will be limited, by the question of the individual’s role in the national project, to the study of the children’s house as the nursery for citizens fit for Zionist sovereignty.

The children’s house, as a venue for collective child care was indeed a unique Kibbutz creation. And indeed, up to the early 1990s, collective care for the children was one of the principles of Kibbutz collective life. From birth, children were housed in this institution rather than in their parents’ private dwellings (known as ‘rooms’), and care for them was the task of the Kibbutz at large. The Kibbutz ‘children’s society’ and its materialization in the ‘children’s house’ is one of the most well known and notorious institutions of the Zionist project. It was the subject of severe criticism by opponents of the Kibbutz movement and by those who experienced life in it, as a cruel vehicle for shaping proper subjects at the expense of children’s childhood and souls.  

Dozens of critical treatments of the children’s house have appeared in scholarly and artistic venues and contemporary publications about it can be grouped into three categories: First, artistic explorations of Kibbutz life in the form of novels, films, drawings and installations, which explore primarily the relationship between the individual and collectivist society. Second, in the fields of sociology and education, there has been some scholarly writing regarding the children’s house as a unique social experiment that offered a laboratory for studying the effects of variations in child rearing.

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Amir Inbari, Home (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Books, 2009). [Hebrew]
Yael Neeman, We Were the Future (Tel Aviv: Ahuzat Bait Books, 2010).
735 Neeman, We Were the Future.; Inbari, Home.
736 Tal, "Children of the Sun.;
737 Tamir, "Communal Sleeping: Exhibition Catalog."
on personality development. This “experimental society” was also studied anthropologically, as part of an attempt to compare the differences between socialization and family relations in Kibbutz and urban settings. In this field, the Kibbutz is often viewed as a faux-native, isolated society in the anthropological tradition of Bronislaw Malinowski. Third, studies in the field of architectural history which examine the children’s house either as a typology which appears in many Kibbutz settlements (with little attention to its historical development) or as part of the massive bodies of work of renowned architects such as Richard Kauffmann, Leopold Krakower, Arieh Sharon or Shmuel Mastechkin. Amia Lieblich in her review of literature on Kibbutz communal education marks the children’s communal dormitories as its “most notable innovation.” Yet, despite the role of housing structure in the formation of this social institution, surprisingly little has been written about the architecture of children’s houses in Kibbutz settlements. Perhaps this is due to the life experience in the children’s house, described by Yael Ne’eman as isolated from adult society and from time itself, and therefore a-historical as far as his users perceived it. Whatever the reasons, the role of housing conditions in the formation of this model was mentioned only in passing. B. Hirshkowitz, a doctor, briefly mentioned the role of housing conditions in shaping the children’s house institution in relation to Kibbutz pioneer ideology in his 1928 article, titled “to the question of baby houses”:

“The first baby room was formed six years ago in Ein Harod. The baby room was formed as result of social conditions, primarily the wish to free the mother from the burden of caring for her child so she can work, but also health reasons: the bad housing conditions (everybody lived in tents) and the Malaria epidemic which necessitated housing the children in a safer place in Kefar Yehezkel.”

Fig. 5.1 The baby room in the hospital shack, 1925. Fig. 5.2 Babies in cribs by the Gilboa, 1925. Source: Ein Harod archive.

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738 This approach was especially popular in the 1960s and 1970s. See for example:
741 See for example Dr. B. Hirshowitz, "To the Question of Baby Houses," *Davar*, May 17 1928.
742 Ibid.
The children’s room and later children’s house was very different from institutions for the care of orphaned children which have existed since the Renaissance, in that it served children who were not orphans but who were cared for collectively by their community. The idea of care for children in day care centers outside their parents’ home – in order to allow their mothers to work - was popular among labor Zionists in a variety of settlement forms, including both rural Moshav settlements and urban settlements. Beginning in 1925, for example, voices expressed the need for a ‘baby house’ in Tel Aviv to serve working women who must work to support their families. “Today’s child is tomorrow’s state” was chosen by the Association of Hebrew Women in 1928 to be its motto for child care. However, the ‘children’s house’ institution was given its quintessential and concrete manifestation in the Kibbutz as a housing form, with removal of children from their parents’ dwellings to a house designated specifically for them. A building type within a building type, i.e a particular type of housing, the children’s house thus addresses both housing and the shaping of children as proper citizens.

Scholars of the Kibbutz settlement form and of its structures tend to examine it typologically, for a number of good reasons: First, the Kibbutz is a movement which produced 270 settlements. Second, most Kibbutz settlements till the 1940s were designed by a single planner, Richard Kauffmann, who was chief planner for the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC). Third, the deep and self-admitted influence on Zionism, by the Garden City planning movement, itself a utopian movement invested in developing planning models, made typological analysis seem logical. This scholarly approach is appealing but insufficient since it tells us little about the historical, social and political formation of the typology. Moreover, the dominant understanding of Kibbutz society through the lens of collectivist ideology has directed the social and spatial historiography of Kibbutz settlements to the study of communal institutions such as the dining halls. Despite its central role for Kibbutz society and its peculiar architectural features, the children’s house has never been studied as an architectural space, perhaps because it meshed private dwelling with public social functions. Accordingly, study of the children’s house in this chapter departs from the tradition of typological examination of Kibbutz institutions and rather focuses on the laboratory case study of the formation of the first children’s house in Kibbutz Beit Alpha in 1929, upon which all later Kibbutz children’s houses were modeled.

5.1.1 Kibbutz as a permanent settlement form: Achieving Self-Consciousness

The formation of an institution for housing Kibbutz children marks the stage of self-consciousness and consolidation of the Kibbutz, after the first stage of ad-hoc temporary

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743 Ibid. It should be noted that while the idea of the children’s house was conceived as a solution for collective care of commune’s own babies, the first such children and youth in Kibbutz settlements were indeed orphans, the younger siblings of pioneers like in the case of Beit Alpha or WWI Galilee orphans in Degania. Beit Alpha archive.

744 N.L., “To the Question of a Baby House in the City,” Davar, 18 November 1925.


formation by work-communes of young, single pioneers. Planning permanent settlement required thinking about continuity, an issue that threatened to fragment the worker’s communes of the 1910’s like Degania, as soon as the first couples were formed and children began to be born.\textsuperscript{747} Beit Alpha, where the first children’s house was built as an institution, therefore marks a pivotal change in Jewish permanent settlement in the homeland.

Beit Alpha was founded in 1922 as the first Kibbutz of the socialist Zionist youth movement in Eastern Europe, “Ha-shomer Ha-tzair”,\textsuperscript{748} with the proclaimed goal of making settlement – rather than labor - the vehicle for sovereignty.\textsuperscript{749} Consciousness of the cardinal role of settlement marked this second wave of socialist communes, as distinguished from the Kibbutzim of the first stage discussed in Chapter 1, which formed around issues of labor.\textsuperscript{750} The Hashomer Hatzair commune which founded Beit Alpha first settled in Bitaniya in 1920 and was employed on the construction of the Haifa-Jeda road. In Bitaniya they formed the terms and principles of their communal life, which had tremendous influence on the materialization of the Kibbutz communal project as a whole.\textsuperscript{751}

Beit Alpha followed the model set by Degania, of a two-stage settlement process in which a commune first settles at a temporary location and consolidates its social fabric and only later moves to a permanent settlement site.\textsuperscript{752}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig53.png}
\caption{Map of the Jewish settlements in the Nuris land, 1924. Source: Ein Harod archive.\textsuperscript{753}}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{747} The Moshav settlement form was formed by Kibbutz members of Degania who were interested to keep the family unit intact within the communal social framework, and therefore left the Kibbutz in 1921 to form Moshav Nahalal in the Jezreel valley.
\item \textsuperscript{748} Hashomer Hatzair youth movement was formed in Galicia in 1913. Its founders consolidated in Vienna during WW1 and developed communal thought and mode for action.
\item \textsuperscript{749} Bossel, Yosef. 1911. \textit{Letter to Arthur Ruppin}, Lavon Institute Archive.
\item \textsuperscript{750} While Ein Harod was the first Kibbutz in the Jezreel Valley, settling in the Harod Spring in 1921, it relocated to its permanent site of Kumi in 1926, while Beit Alpha’s settlement in the valley by the spring in 1922 was the first permanent Kibbutz in the valley, following temporary settlement in Bitanyia in 1920.
\item \textsuperscript{751} Our Commune, (Jerusalem: Yad Yizhak Ben Zvi, 1988 [1922]).
\item \textsuperscript{752} As discussed in chapter one, Degania’s commune first settled in the site of Umm-Juni, in and among the mud huts of the Arab peasant village.
\end{itemize}
Settlements include the villages of Kefar Yehezkel and Tiveon and Kibbutz settlements of Geva, Ein Harod, Tel Yosef, and Beit Alpha, later to include the adjacent Hefziba as well. In 1926 Ein Harod and Tel Yosef moved to their permanent locations on the Kumi hill.

As mentioned above, Beit Alpha’s ideological framework was consolidated and put down in writing during the initial, temporary settlement at Bitaniya. Many Hashomer Hatzair members immigrated to Palestine in 1919 following the British conquest of Palestine, aspiring for agricultural communal settlement as the materialization of their ideology of communalism and Jewish sovereignty. The group’s ideological debates about communal life were collected and published in 1922 under the title ‘Our Commune’, one of the key texts of socialist nationalism whose influence on the consolidation of the Kibbutz phenomenon was immense. The collection reflects the extremist form of communalism which the members had developed. Commune members were expected to share every detail of their lives with the group, including sexual relationships and intimate feelings. Intense communalism was to bond the members and make them into a tight unbreakable community in the hope of reforming themselves into exemplars of the ‘new man’ and ‘new society’.

The members of the Beit Alpha commune were intellectuals and artists who engaged in a rich intellectual life which included the reading of classical Western and Jewish texts, and the production of the first theatrical performance of ‘The Dybbuk’.

Based on their unique community and ideological contribution to formulating communal life, the Bitaniya Hashomer Hatzair group approached the JNF asking to form a communal settlement. Beit Alpha was given access to newly acquired JNF land in the Jezreel Valley, next to the Harod spring where Kibbutz Ein Harod had settled a year before. Like Ein Harod, Beit Alpha was formed on the principles of permanent settlement. These principles aimed to allow for continuity and the development of the settlement beyond the initial commune.

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753 The Nuris land purchase by the JNF from the Sursok family of Lebanon was completed in 1922. The peasant village of Shuta, after which was named the train station, did not serve settlers for housing like in the case of Umm Juni. Ein Harod archive.
755 Muki Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad,1983).
757 The famous production of the Dibbuk by the Habima Jewish theater in Moscow was opened January 1922. The Bitanyia commune, dissolved by April 1921, was the first to produce the play.
758 Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment; Amir, “The Kibbutz Dwelling Unit: Ideology and Planning”.
Beit Alpha, like all Kibbutz settlements formed before 1948, settled on national land owned by the JNF. In exchange for the land grant, the kibbutz provided important services: agricultural cultivation and maintenance of the Jewish hold on the territory, whose ownership by the JNF would otherwise be annulled. Arthur Ruppin invited German Jewish architect Richard Kauffmann in 1920, to immigrate to Eretz Israel and design master plans for settlements upon JNF lands.\textsuperscript{759} Kauffmann designed most Kibbutz and Moshav settlements, as well as a number of urban settlements. Beit Alpha members, however, were the most active in thinking and rethinking the built environment designed for them by Kauffmann, as can be seen in the unparallel number of design schemes and plans he made for Beit Alpha between 1923 and 1929.\textsuperscript{760} Moreover, Beit Alpha members invited an architect on their behalf to give a second opinion on the plan, their friend architect Leopold Krakauer, who also drafted a Kibbutz master plan and designs for various buildings.\textsuperscript{761} It was from these ideological debates among Beit Alpha’s members that its two spatial contributions to the Kibbutz movement developed, namely: the children’s house and the Kibbutz campus settlement layout.

\section*{5.2 Permanent Settlement: the Challenge of Family and Children}

Children and family posed a serious challenge to communal society on two accounts: a. Care for children is ‘non productive’ labor, thereby challenging the commune’s principle of equality by placing the ‘non productive’ burden of the care for children on women; b. Strong family ties undercut the direct and unmediated relationship of individual members to the commune, thus threatening it with fragmentation.\textsuperscript{762}

\subsection*{5.2.1 Female labor}

Female labor was a problematic issue in Zionist communes even before families formed and children were born. It was the source of many debates and struggles over gender

\textsuperscript{759} Uri Adiv, "Richard Kauffmann – 1887-1985: Retrospective" (Technical University of Berlin, 1985).
\textsuperscript{760} Kauffmann files, CZA.
\textsuperscript{761} Christa Illera, "Der Architekt Leopold Krakauer" (Technischen Universitat Wien, 1992).
\textsuperscript{762} The Moshav settlement form was formed by Kibbutz members of Degania who were interested to keep the family unit intact within the communal social framework, and therefore left the Kibbutz in 1921 to form Moshav Nahalal in the Jezreel valley.
equality in the developing autonomous society. The birth of children only accentuated female labor as one of the ideological weaknesses of the commune. Pioneer society had very limited resources. The resource most sought after, ideologically, economically and as a source of identity, was labor. For young immigrant pioneers, labor meant not only subsistence but also their identity as part of the working class and their ideological basis for making moral claims for a national homeland. Employment was limited, especially the farm labor privileged by pioneers. In order to gain access to the few jobs available, workers grouped into communes where the employed supported the unemployed and the sick and in turn were supported by the others when unemployed.

Men naturally perceived themselves to be most fit and entitled to the subsistence and identity-formation enabled by labor. The communes tended to include 10 men and one woman, who in fact worked for them preparing their food and caring for the sick. While the men were farm workers, the woman worked a service job in household maintenance. In fact, then, she was employed by the men. The women’s claim to be genuine farm workers was perceived as ridiculous, both by Moshavot farmers and by their fellow male workers. As agricultural labor was extremely hard for the formerly urban men suffering from malnutrition and fever, women were ridiculed for expressing the wish to take part in it. In addition, the observant Moshavot farmers resented the idea of men and women working together and did not employ them. Sara Malchin, one of the women, recounted: “We were ridiculous in their eyes. Not only those of us who wanted to destroy the seemingly natural fences and practice hard agricultural labor, but also those of us who wished for jobs in which the woman is compatible with men. These were ridiculous too.”

The workers, proclaiming their belief in values of equality, did not perceive women as equal. Women were partners in the communes, yet their membership was partial and compartmentalized. In Umm-Juni (later Degania, the first Kibbutz) the women did not gain the formal status of members of the collective but were considered to be employed by the collective in service jobs. The Eretz Israeli office of the WZO, which paid workers’ salary, did not pay for the women but expected the workers to allocate funds from their pay to pay for women’s work. Women could not vote in the collective decision-making and thus did not participate in democratic public life. The number of female members of the collective was thus limited to the number of people needed for service jobs.

This situation prevailed in most groups. Service jobs, primarily cooking for the workers using the meager ingredients that they could find, was hard and unappreciated work. Yoseph Hayim Brenner, the writer of the Second Aliya period, depicted this in his iconic Breakdown and Bereavement (1920): “workers acknowledge the woman’s right to

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763 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.
765 Ibid.
only be a cook...feeding 40 people, each complaining and demanding...spilling the food and the cook’s blood with it...wishing the enslavement of the cook!”

Women’s unequal role as ‘help’ is reflected in the words of Josef Baratz, one of the founders of Degania: “We cherished the hours after work...how encouraging was the motherly smile of our female comrade who worked in the house. Ready for us were: a bowl of water, a clean towel, a clean shirt. She is helping us, caring for each one of us.”

Workers perceived their female comrades as supporting sisters, yet did not see them as equal partners, workers striving to fulfill themselves and their goals. “We strive for equality and liberation for women”, declared Yael Gordon in the second female workers’ conference in 1914, “to enable them to fulfill their role as human and productive members of society together...The young Hebrew women who came here, in addition to fulfilling their national role as members of our people would also like to realize themselves...to be realized most properly in our workers’ society.”

5.2.1.1 The female workers’ farm

Female workers attempted to understand their marginalization in the Moshava and the communal Kibbutz and their analysis was framed in economic rather than gender terms. As agricultural production focused entirely on field crops, perceived as ‘proper agriculture’ and as hard labor fit only for men, they stated, there was no place for women in the agricultural economy and they were cornered into service jobs. Female workers’ observation of the nature of farm economy matched those of Ruppin, whose 1907 report lamented the choice of monoculture agriculture rather than a mixed economy, which, he argued, made the farm economy unstable, vulnerable and eventually dependent on philanthropy and devoid of self-rule.

Women thus demanded a structural change in agricultural production of Moshavot and Kibbutz settlements so as to include agricultural fields in which they could be employed. Yet because they did not have the requisite training for work in areas such as vegetable gardening and livestock nor could they obtain such training in their own communal farms, they could not effectively push for such a structural change. Female workers thus looked for agricultural training outside the communes. This training was sometimes initiated individually, as in the case of Miriam Baratz of Degania who learned milking from an Arab villager, purchased two cows and established the Kibbutz dairy economy. Yet the decisive action was the formation of the Female Workers’ Farm in Kinneret, on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, in 1911 by Hana Meizel. Ruppin, who supported the idea of mixed agricultural economy as means for economic dependence, supported the Female Workers’ Farm by leasing the women JNF land. However, Ruppin’s support of the female initiative arose from economic reasons not a commitment to principles of female equality.

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767 Yosef Haim Brenner, *Breakdown and Bereavement* (Cornell University Press, 1971 [1920]).
768 Baratz, in Shor, Shimeon, ed. 1976, Documentary Appendix: Sayings and Decisions Regarding the Problem of Society in the Kibbutz, HaKibbutz, 3-4, p. 129.
770 Female Members’ Discussions, *Davar*, June 3 1928.
772 Bernstein, "Female Workers and Pioneers in the Second Alyia – Hopes and Disappointments."
773 For more information on the Female Workers’ Farm see: Shilo, “The Female Workers’ Farm in Kinneret, 1911-1917, as Solution to the Problem of the Female Worker in the Second Alyia.”
774 Ibid.
WZO’s perception of the role of women can be seen in an open letter to the female workers written by Sara Tahoun, wife of Ruppin’s assistant. In this letter, Tahoun calls upon the workers to stop aspiring to resemble men and “become good housekeepers… and natural people… embroidering here the future of our people… based not only on immigrants but on the generations to be born here,” hence framing women’s role for the future of the nation in terms of birthing and caring for children. In response, a group of female workers from Kinneret published an open letter rejecting Tahoun’s arguments. The workers stressed they had no intention to “resemble men but…aspire, like men, to recover our spirits and bodies via labor and obtain by labor the same freedom, beauty and spiritual integrity Mrs. Tahoun speaks about so enthusiastically.”

The female workers of the Kinneret Farm did not view being wives of farmers as their future. Marriage was not common among female workers of the Second Aliya and was even undesired by most girls. They did not offer any alternative to the institution of marriage but aspired to break the conventions by which the family, and its division of labor, had a central role in society. They thus refused to learn housekeeping on the farm. As stated by Shoshana Blubstein, one of the young pioneers: “Kitchen and children – what else did the woman see in her life? She never left the boundaries of the nursery and the kitchen… the kitchen is a bitter necessity – but to make it a profession?” Self-training proved the best way to promote female equality in the worker society, by acquiring skills to transform the economic structure of the communal farms– and with it the social structure as well. Graduates of the Kinneret Farm joined the existing communes – on the condition that they join in pairs or groups of three. This requirement was meant first, to prevent a situation in which they were marginalized into service jobs as housekeepers and cooks for the commune, and also to assure the formation of new agricultural fields for vegetables and livestock in which the women could participate. As skilled laborers, female workers were now able choose which commune to join and to contribute to agricultural production on their own terms.

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775 Tahoun, Sara, To the Question of the Female Agricultural Workers, *HapoelHAzair*, 1913, 6-23, p.6.
776 A Group of Female Workers, 1915, To Mrs. Tahoun’s Paper, *Chapters of HapoelHazair*, ch. 3, Tel Aviv.
777 Shilo, "The Female Workers’ Farm in Kinneret, 1911-1917, as Solution to the Problem of the Female Worker in the Second Alyia."
778 Blubstein, quoted in ibid.

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Fig. 5.5 The female worker farm, Petach Tiqua 1932. One of the members of Beit Alpha marked with a red dot. Source: Beit Alpha archive.
5.2.2 Fragmentation of the Commune

5.2.2.1 The lesson learned from Merhavia

The Merhavia Cooperative, founded 1911 in the Jezreel Valley, was the materialization of an ideal settlement model conceived by Professor Franz Oppenheimer, a German Jewish sociologist and economist formed with the help of Ruppin, Yehoshua Hankin and the Anglo-Palestine Bank. It was a cooperative farm whose members received differential pay according to their contribution to the farm’s productivity.\textsuperscript{779} It thus differed from the Kibbutz social model which disconnected labor from monetary compensation (as discussed in chapter 2) and which adhered to the Marxist principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”\textsuperscript{780} It is clear that the Merhavia and Degania pioneer groups were aware of each other’s lives and the hardships which attended their respective ideological-social experiments. Nahman Besser described, in his memoirs, the agricultural training in Degania as well as the help given by the Degania commune to the Merhavia settlers in plowing the land in time for the winter season.\textsuperscript{781} Moreover, the settling agencies even urged Degania to embrace Oppenheimer’s Merhavia model, as they did not believe Degania’s communal social structure would last.\textsuperscript{782} Degania refused. Ruppin, who supported Degania, tried to blur the distinctions between the two cooperative models so that agencies like the JNF would not dismiss Degania because of its ‘communist principle’.\textsuperscript{783}

Surprisingly, however, it was the Merhavia model which proved to be short lived. In compensating members only for their productive agricultural labor, the cooperative did not provide for women tending to young children. As a result, the differential economic structure soon created two social classes in the community: ‘rich’ single men and ‘poor’ family men providing for wives and children. Tensions led to the fragmentation and dispersal of the cooperative by 1918. Its physical structures and lands later served several communes of workers as a training farm, much like the Kinneret farm. Merhavia’s social failure is attributed by settlers and scholars alike to its inability to address the challenge of family life, in particular the care for young children, which effectively removed women from the work force.\textsuperscript{784}

\textsuperscript{779} Yehuda Don, ed. Franz Oppenheimer and the Merhavia Cooperative Colony (Bar Ilan University Press, 1974).

\textsuperscript{780} Yehuda Don, “Between Merhavia and Degania,” economics quarterly 33 (132)(1989).

\textsuperscript{781} Nachman Besser, Memoirs of Israel Besser, Merhavia Archive. The Besser family was one of the first families in Merhavia, and Israel Besser was a member in the HaShomer, the first Jewish militia. The ‘first [Jewish] baby of the [Jezreel] valley’, Yardena Besser, was born one month after her parents Shifra and Israel came to Merhavia on January 24, 1911 after a period of agricultural training in Degania-UmmJuni. The ‘first baby of the valley’ is traditionally considered Shlomit Slutski, born one year later. Both girls were born before Degania’s first born, Gideon Baratz.

\textsuperscript{782} Paz-Yeshayahu, “Degania - the Way to Total Communalism.”

\textsuperscript{783} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{784} Rabinowitz, Yosef, Merhavia, The JNF Eretz Israel Library, 58-59, Amanot, Tel Aviv.
Fig. 5.6 Yardena Besser, ‘the first Jewish child in the Jezreel Valley’ with her family in Merhavia, circa 1912. Source: Bitmuna.

Fig. 5.7 Shlomit Slutski with her mother at the family vegetable garden in Merhavia, circa 1912. Source: Merhavia Archive.

Yosef Rabinowitz, Merhavia’s secretary, wrote “we were at a disadvantage with regard to family life. When a baby was born in a young family, the mother stopped working because there was no institution among us for caring for young children. The father was required to carry the burden of providing for the entire family by himself.” Families kept leaving the cooperative because of its failure to address the family issue. One of the solutions attempted to create vegetable gardens and chicken coops along the houses, which women could cultivate while caring for their children (see fig. 5.7), but there were not enough suitable plots of sufficient size for agricultural production.

Degania’s members, and especially their leader and ideologue Yosef Bossel, recognized family life as a potential threat to the commune and devoted much thinking to this challenge, which became concrete with the marriage of Miriam Ostrovski and Yosef Baratz in June 1912, to the great concern of the commune. In May 1914, a year after the birth of Degania’s first child, Bossel organized the 2nd female worker convention in Merhavia. This convention brought together 30 female workers, who served as the elected representatives for 209 female workers throughout the country. This second convention focused its discussion on motherhood and child rearing in the communes, while the first convention two years earlier had focused on agricultural training, reflecting a dramatic change in female workers’ conception of the challenges which they faced en route to equality and fulfillment in their communities.

5.2.3 Property

Property and its abolition was a key aspect of communal life, directly associated with the rejection of bourgeois life and the embrace of an egalitarian class-less society. The discourse revolving around the birth of the first children in the Kibbutz was framed

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785 Ibid.
786 Merhavia book
787 Miriam Baratz, Memoirs.
788 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.
initially in terms of property, in order to address the question of whether the child should be in the domain and responsibility of the parents or of the commune. This reflects the primary stage of the child’s challenge to the commune, when the child was still regarded only as an object requiring care, prior to commune members coming to view the child as the ‘future state’, who needed to be educated and shaped as a future citizen. Bossel described the debate thus:

“The commune idea now meets strong internal resistance. The primary reason is the tendency to make the child into private property, the portrait of their mother and father. We, who resist governance, wish for governance over our own children. Into each aspect of our lives we introduce the commune, but contradict it in education. If we assume the child is private property, and talents are private property – where will we end? Life will win out over us. The commune idea is all innovation. Our lives are one large revolution. We showed that a Jew can saw, reap, and thresh. We embarked on a new communal life in terms of membership and liberation of the woman in society. Children are common property, and should be given communal education. We are climbing a steep mountain and must do this in one stroke or we will fall – and Degania will be like Petach Tikva.”

Gideon Baratz, the first child of Degania born May 1913, is described as “the eldest son of Miriam and Yosef Baratz and of the Kibbutz idea as a whole.” The idea that children are the property of the community as a whole rather than their parents is expressed in a somewhat cynical testimony of a mother from Kibbutz Kfar Giladi: “When it was time for me to give birth to Yael it was clear to me, as to all, that I am not to name her as I wish. The child belonged to the Kibbutz, and the Kibbutz was to name it. At the hospital I was presented with two alternatives by the Kibbutz: Yael or Tamar. I was not forced, God forbid, but rather left to make the decision, hence liberalism pertained. I chose ‘Yael’.”

5.2.4 “Child as Future State”: The child as leader of society

In ‘Our Commune’ and other Hashomer Hatzair writings, the child is the symbol of the hoped-for revolutionary society. Child and childhood are leading symbols in ‘Our Commune’. ‘Child’, one of the texts in this collection, presents the child as the nexus of wonder, goodness and purity which exists as a nucleus in all human souls. Preserving and realizing these aspects of the child’s nature is the last opportunity to mend the world. In each childhood, there resides the ‘childhood of the human race’ as a whole, experienced each time anew. “The youngster in this society carried the hope for cultural and moral rejuvenation, and accordingly had a significant influence on the society’s culture and life style,” writes Aviva Opaz. Care and education of children in the commune was seen as care for the future of the entire community, for its society and ideology, and the children’s house was its materialization.

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790 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land. Bossel refers here to Moshava settlements’ dependency on the patronage of philanthropists.

791 http://www.baratz-fam.022.co.il/BRPortal/br/P102.jsp?arc=87714

792 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.

793 Our Commune, p. 15-23, 195-201.

The Zionist project required the transformation of Jews from a diaspora people into a native people living upon and off its own homeland. This was not a simple challenge, and many doubted its feasibility. Kauffmann expressed this idea in 1926 in describing his plan for Zionist settlements in Palestine:

“To understand the construction of the new Jewish settlements in Palestine, some knowledge is essential of the character and objects of the Zionist movement, which aims at the settlement and revival of the Jewish people...Zionism strives to obtain for the Jewish people the erection of a publicly proclaimed and legitimate Homeland in Palestine. The driving force of the movement is founded in an inward rejuvenation and concentration of the Jewish masses. The only people in the world which for centuries had to live without a country of its own, without a national culture and therefore without freedom, is now striving in its ancient homeland, Palestine, towards the self-realization necessary for the existence of a free and creative body of people. The first essential in this direction is their conscious turning towards the productive spheres of agriculture and industry, i.e., nothing less than their process of domiciling themselves.”

In the same year, Arthur Ruppin wrote:

“1. that for the success of the Zionist colonization, sociological no less than economic factors have to be taken into account. 2. That the peculiar nature of the problem, which is to bring back townsmen, and Jewish townsmen, to agricultural life in Palestine, renders a solution on the lines of any existing model impossible, and necessitates the application of new methods...”

Since forming this new, imaginary geography for the self was quite difficult for Zionist pioneers, they wanted their children to be raised as proper citizens from birth. “The child is the future state”, stated the Association of Hebrew Women 1929, reflecting the Zionist understanding that the ‘duty to the welfare of the child’ consisted in educating the child as a future citizen. “I’m for separating the children entirely from our public, which is ill, which breaks its own will repeatedly. The parents’ house is disqualified as an educating force in my opinion.” stated a member of Ein Harod.

The discussions in Beit Alpha regarding the education and molding of children included heated debates which resulted in statements such as “the Kibbutz = in lieu of parents” and “the political issue: enforcing political views upon the children – allowed.”

5.3 The Children’s House: a Housing Solution

Despite the need to solve a number of issues associated with children (namely, female labor, property, communal fragmentation and education) the decisive impetus which led to the development of the children’s house was the poor condition of Kibbutz housing. This cardinal role of housing in the creation of the children’s house can be examined in Degania. While early housing in Degania was in mud huts and wooden shacks, by the time Degania’s first child was born in May, 1913, permanent, stone houses had already been in use for a year. While the children of Degania were cared for communally, thus

795 See for example: Oz Almog, The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew (Univ of California Pr, 2000).
796 See for example Weiss’ statement that few Jews can become farmers and therefore that a Hebrew city should be founded – chapters 2 and 4 of this dissertation.
799 Said’s “imagined geography” as created for a nation by others. See Said, Orientalism.
800 Our Duty to the Child, Davar, July 7 1929.
801 Quoted by Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.
802 Beit Alpha archive.
803 Degania archive.
addressing issues of subject formation, female labor, property and commune fragmentation, the fact that suitable housing for children now existed, removed the impetus to establish a designated children’s house. Indeed, Degania never had a separate house which served as a full-time dwelling for its children. Instead, it made do with communal care for the children during the day so that mothers could work. Degania’s children always resided with their parents.

According to Eyal Amir, prior to 1925 it is hard to distinguish a housing typology unique to the Kibbutz. Housing was simply shelter from the elements and there were many possible solutions, arising from whatever materiel settlers could get their hands on; the solutions were arbitrary, in other words, they neither arose from nor resulted in any detailed planning.

Due to their profound devotion to the Zionist cause, states Lieblich, the kibbutz pioneers tended to settle in desolate, remote locations. The decision to raise the children communally stemmed predominantly from the founders’ intention to protect the children and provide for their welfare. Dire physical conditions and high infant mortality rates made the process of child rearing enormously challenging, requiring the adoption of stringent regulations and restrictions concerning child and infant care. While Kibbutz settlements endured the hardship of temporary lodging arrangements, the children were accommodated in the only proper buildings erected on the kibbutz grounds, in order to provide them with the best available shelter. While the adult members lived in tents and received limited food rations, the children of the collective were never hungry. Strict sanitary regulations applied to the children’s house, including isolation of children from the sick and of ‘children’s society’ from adult society. And indeed, child caregivers on the kibbutz did succeed in drastically reducing infant deaths.

5.3.1 Beit Alpha: dwelling before planning

Beit Alpha’s early housing was in tents and in one wooden shack supplied by the JNF, kinds of housing which were characteristic of early dwellings in Kibbutz settlements in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s, i.e. in all the phases of pre-state Kibbutz settlements. Yet what distinguished the Kibbutz settlements of the 1920s from their cooperative models of the previous decade was their outspoken intention to become permanent settlements and their consciousness of issues of continuity and their challenges for communal life. Beit Alpha’s permanent settlement was established in November 1922 in the Jezreel Valley at the foot of Mt. Gilboa. There was neither formal nor informal planning for the settlement, composed of tents, aside from a decision to group the tents close by Mt. Gilboa itself, in order not to use up the fertile valley land for non-productive purposes.
The Bitaniya commune, the germ of the later Beit Alpha Kibbutz, discussed in great detail the consequences, for family and sexuality, of longstanding communal life. The basic dwelling structure of Bitaniya, the tent, was significant in forming this intense mixture of private and public. The tent was chosen by the community as the image for the cover of the volume “Our Community” (fig. 5.9), as well as for the Bitaniya monument constructed in the form of a concrete, open tent (fig. 5.10).

Beit Alpha members, like other Kibbutz settlements of the 1920s, did not view family and children as jeopardizing their communal goals but rather as attesting to the

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809 Our Commune.
Yet, as discussed above, and unlike the case of Degania, Beit Alpha’s first children were born long before Kibbutz members resided in permanent housing. Makeshift housing characterized Beit Alpha not only its initial settlement in Bitaniya (seen in representations in figures 5.9-5.11) but also in the permanent settlement location (fig. 5.12). Housing solutions included tents, mud huts, shacks subdivided by fabric partitions, and straw shacks. Each tent housed three to four single Kibbutz members or two couples, separated with a sheet.

Fig. 5.13 Production of mud bricks for construction, Kibbutz Tirat Zvi, 1939. Source: NPC.
Fig. 5.14 Residential tents in Kibbutz Beit Hashita, 1938. Photography: Eleanor Porat. Source: Beit Hashita archive.

Fig. 5.15 Straw huts, Tirat Zvi, 1939. Source: NPC.
Fig. 5.16 Mud hut and tin shack in Kibbutz Tzor’a, 1949. Source: NPC.

Makeshift housing was the result of several processes, both internal and external to the commune. External factors included the role of the settling commune as workers upon the land, owned by the nation via organizations like the JNF. As mentioned earlier, the commune had no property and was very reluctant to own any due to its socialist-Marxist ideology. Settling organizations, on the other hand, were not fully convinced of the communes’ ability to sustain their settlements and therefore did not wish to invest, in the construction of proper housing, funds which were in any case limited and which they had earmarked for land purchase.

810 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.
811 This of course is dramatically different from the case of Degania, whose members dwelled in makeshift housing in Umm Juni and moved to their permanent location at the Jordan River estuary after permanent housing construction was complete Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment.
812 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land., pp. 38, 95, 97, 180.
813 Beit Alpha archive, Ibid.
814 Amir, "The Kibbutz Dwelling Unit: Ideology and Planning".
815 Ruppin, Thirty Years of Building Eretz Israel.
Internal factors included several layers of the ideological commitment of the commune members. Amir, who studied the effects of ideology on the development of Kibbutz housing, identified two such layers, which affected the nature of both Kibbutz housing and the formation of the children’s house institution. One is communalism, which required removing several central life functions from the private into the public realm. This will be discussed in depth below as it had cardinal role in the formation of the children’s house. The second ideological layer concerned minimal consumption and material equality. In the realm of housing, this commitment manifest itself in the sanctification of the minimal living standards and the material hardships involved in pioneer life. Yosef Baratz, one of the founders of Degania, stated ironically in 1924 “now when we sit in our beautiful houses we are overtaken by a strong longing for the mud huts. […] it was a windy stormy night and the wind carried our shacks up to Zemach and we remained naked, frozen. New members heard our stories jealously… overtaken by sadness and desperation: they, the first settlers, they had meaning in their lives…”

Thus, a combination of minimal monetary resources and the communal decision to direct all labor resources to agricultural cultivation (rather than construction) meant that the first dwellings were devoid of basic amenities, such as running waters and toilets. Sanctification of a life of austerity highlighted these conditions and transformed them into an ideological practice. The communal showers were an iconic institution in the Kibbutz mythology and celebrated as the meeting place at the end of the workday in the fields and arena for daily debate and political engagement among the members.

The equality principle, applied in the arena of labor and consumption according to the dictum ‘each according to their ability, each according to their needs’, was realized in housing by quantitative distribution of housing resources, disregarding of members’ social needs. The most notorious example of quantitative distribution of housing resources is the practice of housing a single member, often a man, in a room used by a couple. The additional tenant was nicknamed the ‘primus’ (after the noisy water heaters common in those days) due to the nuisance caused by his presence to the couple’s life.

The Kibbutz member’s dwelling unit was characterized by having only a single space or room. As many life functions were relegated from the private to the public, communal life, one’s private space served primarily for sleep. Privacy was not a value in communal life to begin with, and so the factor which decided the number of people in each residential unit was the size of a bed. Oral histories of the early days of Kibbutz Beit Alph

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817 Amir, “The Kibbutz Dwelling Unit: Ideology and Planning”.
818 Baratz, Yossef, 1924, Old and New [Settlers], in The Commune: Collection on Commune Life and Affairs, Cultural Committee of the Histadrut of Hebrew Workers, Tel Aviv. P. 75.
819 Running water and sewage were first introduced to members’ houses in Beit Alpha, for example, only in 1951. See detailed discussion of these ‘senior housing’ in chapter 8.
820 Shaul Shlomnitzki, Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary (Kibbutz Beit Alpha, 2002).
821 Amir, ibid.
Hashita, collected by Lieblich in the early 1980s, portray the early conditions of housing.

‘Shlomo’: “I have lived here since the first tent and the first tree…just naked tents and sheds, poverty and creative joy. In the conic tent there were two to three iron beds with mattresses made of corn leaves we grew ourselves…all this traveled later to the shed, and from the shed to the room.”

‘Saul’: “First there were only tents and only later they started building the sheds…Dwelling conditions were very hard. Early on there were tents… but when I came here there was nowhere to sleep and I shared a bed with another guy. In summer we lived in huts on the trees. After I married, there were small shacks 4 by 6 meters each, in each of them three tiny rooms with partitions. Three families lived in each shack.”

‘Vered Iceman’: “I remember when we came here, the children’s house was in a shed and the parents’ room, which was a tent. It was all tents around here, with only two structures.”

With the birth of the first children in the Kibbutz, the harshness of living conditions became glaring. Dripping tents with muddy earth floors were recognized by all members as inappropriate dwellings for babies. Allocation of housing resources for children as a special population in the commune – much like the sick – thus became a necessity that could no longer be avoided. The technical solution, chosen ad-hoc for the problem at hand, was to allocate the best housing available in the commune to the children. Children were housed in the first shack, and later in the first concrete or stone structure. The first communal housing solution for children in the Kibbutz was the children’s room in Ein Harod. Sara Itzkar, one of the first settlers of Ein Harod recounted the formation of the first baby room:

“My friend N. who came here with a young child said she will watch over my child [so] I will be able to work, and after a few days we will swap. Soon, we were three mothers debating the future of our children…We found the need to set a place where all our children would be located together. A few members in our camp participated in the debate as well. We cleared a room in a run down stone structure of the remains of the Arab houses. We fixed the room and the ‘institution’ was established as if a hidden hand was involved. One family came from Jerusalem with a young child, and another family came from Kfar Giladi, and in a few days the children numbered 8. The next improvements including purchase of a mat and construction of a small 1x1m structure for a children’s kitchen.”

The mother of the first child in adjacent Kibbutz Tel Yosef recounted her return from the hospital in Haifa back to the Kibbutz with her newborn:

“It was a great event for the entire camp – the first child. We took the form of a settlement – we already have a family with a child. All that time I was troubled by the

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822 Professor Lieblich’s study of Kibbutz Beit Hashita (Hebrew for house of the Ana tree) was published as ‘Kibbutz Place’, yet has since been identified publicly with Beit Hashita. The Kibbutz commune was formed in 1928, settled for agricultural training next to Beit Alpha in the Harod spring in 1931, and moved to its permanent location in 1935.
823 Lieblich, Kibbutz Makom: Report from an Israeli Kibbutz.
825 Ibid, p. 35.
826 Ibid, p. 108.
827 Sara Itzkar, quoted by Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land..
question: where shall we house the baby? In the tent? What about the days’ heat and nights’ winds? But behold! The comrades built us a palace. A square shack made of straw mats with a tin roof, a true palace. This was the first children’s house in Tel Yosef. Back then, Tel Yosef and Ein Harod were one farm in two locations and we were invited to move there and even pressed to do so for the sake of the baby. But moving the baby seemed to us like ‘betraying the homeland’. We remained in our shack.”

The above testimony makes three important points: the need for better housing conditions for babies, the assertion that a settlement is a ‘proper settlement’ only once it includes families with children, and third the sense that removing the child would be betraying the settlement’s integrity. Compared with the puritan, minimal adult housing in the Kibbutz, the children’s house would always constitute an improvement.\(^\text{829}\)

5.3.2 The entanglement of children’s housing and settlement planning

The first child on Kibbutz Beit Alpha was born in August 1923, a year after the commune’s settlement in tents at its permanent location. The baby was born in a tent on site, and was named Reuben by the commune, after the eldest son of the biblical patriarch Jacob. Reuben Sinader and his parents lived in one of the commune’s temporary tent dwellings.\(^\text{830}\) As we saw earlier, the birth of the first child was a landmark in Beit Alpha’s transformation into a permanent settlement. Moreover, as will be discussed in depth below, the Hashomer Hatzair ideology which dominated in Beit Alpha was deeply invested in the idea of childhood as a mindset necessary for the formation of a new pure society, and invested the birth of the first child with great meaning.\(^\text{831}\)

In addition to the birth of its first child, 1923 was also a significant milestone for the permanence of Beit Alpha because of the planning scheme prepared by the Palestine Land Development Company architect Richard Kauffmann. This initial planning scheme, prepared in tandem for Beit Alpha and the nearby Kibbutz Heftziba,\(^\text{832}\) reflected the belief of the WZO and JNF in the sustainability of these settlements as permanent settlements.\(^\text{833}\) However, while Kibbutz settlers and settling agencies agreed about the nature of the Kibbutz as a permanent settlement, they were not in agreement regarding the ‘proper settler’ or the nature of ‘proper settlement’ and ‘proper housing’. The Beit Alpha-Heftziba planning scheme (and its development, as discussed in detail below)

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\(^{828}\) Thirteen Years to the Occupation of the Valley, *Davar*, August 30, 1924.

\(^{829}\) Lieblich, “A Century of Childhood, Parenting, and Family Life in the Kibbutz.”

\(^{830}\) Shlomnitzki, *Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary*.

\(^{831}\) Shaul Slomnitzky, one of the first Kibbutz children, told me that Beit Alpha leaders passed a decision not to have any children due to the harsh living conditions, a decision broken by the Sinaders. This decision was broken by the three leaders themselves a year later, with the birth of Dina Reizner, Rivka Dror and Abraham Hakohen in 1924. Conversation, June 20 2011.

\(^{832}\) Opaz, “The Symbolic World of ‘Our Commune’.” Beit Alpha archive.

\(^{833}\) The plan included the two Kibbutz settlements as required by the PLDC for saving land and planning resources, as well as for safety reasons in a hostile environment. 1921 marked the breakout of violence between Arabs and Jews in British-held Palestine. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of these events.

\(^{834}\) CZA, Tal, *The Architectural Planning of the Kibbutz: 1920-1930*. 180
reflected the negotiations between the settling agencies and the settlers over the nature of Kibbutz society, its proper citizens and therefore proper housing.

Richard Kauffmann, the chief architect of the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC), is responsible for the planning of most settlements of JNF lands between 1920 and 1945. Kauffmann was educated in the new spirit of modernism in Munich under Theodore Fischer and headed an architectural firm in Frankfurt until his recruitment in 1915 to the Prussian army. From 1920 until 1932, Kauffmann was chief architect for the PLDC, and he served until 1938 as its representative in the British High Town Planning Committee. In this capacity, Kauffmann designed plans, programs and buildings for the entire Zionist agricultural settlement project, almost single handedly. His vast body of work includes designs for approximately 160 agricultural settlements and 80 urban settlements and he is considered the single most influential designer of pre-state Zionist landscape in Palestine.

Kauffmann’s planning principles were of course very influential in the settlements which he himself designed, but also for the Kibbutz movement as a whole. His principle for the design of Kibbutz settlements took into account the fact that settlers and landowners were two separate entities. While he was employed by the JNF via the PLDC to design settlements on land to which settlers had no legal rights, Kauffmann invested great efforts in designing both a layout and specific buildings to meet settlers’ particular understandings of their communal lifestyles. His plan for Beit Alpha and Hefziba demonstrates very well the significance he gave to settlers’ definition of their proper housing and settlement.

In the spirit of the Garden City movement which was very influential in the 1920’s, Kauffmann saw no strict division between city and village, and his designs for both embed the same principles. Yet while his planning is associated with the Garden City movement and its concern with utopian and new societies, Kauffmann was also deeply influenced by the City Beautiful movement whose roots spring from European Beaux-Arts urbanism. This latter influence can be seen in the monumentality present in Kauffmann’s urban planning, including careful attention to grand visual axes and monuments, present even in his design for small poor communist settlements like Kibbutz settlements. Kauffmann was fully aware of the revolutionary nature of the Zionist settlement project as the re-establishment of Jewish sovereignty in Zion and therefore included monumental features in his designs, celebrating this fact.

Kauffmann’s initial proposal for Beit Alpha and Hefziba, which dates from July 1923 (fig. 5.17), included two adjacent settlements, each composed of two areas arranged around two yards: the dwelling and communal services area, located at the foot of Mt. Gilboa and the farming area located deeper into the valley. Between the dwelling areas of

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835 Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment.
836 Innes Sonder, Lotte Cohn: Pioneer Female Architect in Eretz Israel (Bauhaus Center, 2009), Adiv, "Richard Kauffmann – 1887-1985: Retrospective". The most influential designer for Zionism’s state period is Arie Sharon who designed its first masterplan in 1952. See chapter 7 of this dissertation.
837 See a more detailed discussion of Kauffmann’s urban planning in chapter 4 of this dissertation.
the two settlements, Kauffmann located two buildings for communal services to be shared by both communes. Each of the yards was encircled by a group of buildings, forming a disjointed khan structure of several buildings each with its own specific function. The division of the yard into several free standing buildings was the result of the WZO and PLDC distrust of the sustainability of communal societies and their demand that permanent structures be able to house families should the communal structure of Kibbutz society break down.\textsuperscript{838}

Kauffmann’s design was accepted by the settling agencies, as well as by the members of Hefziba, who felt that concentrating their housing and communal services in a compact layout would strengthen their commune. The design was rejected by Beit Alpha’s members, however, who had specific problems with the centralized design of the plan and who were, in any case, still undecided regarding their proper built environment. They regarded Kauffmann’s plan as not communal enough and as too monumental for their ideal of communal life.\textsuperscript{839} Monumentality contradicted some of the core principles of socialist nationalism as the Beit Alpha members understood it. Their life principles, carefully thought and clearly proclaimed in their manifesto of ‘our commune’ placed great value on austerity, hard work and simplicity, and were uncomfortable with Kauffmann’s design. The Beit Alpha members, therefore invited a friend from their Vienna days, the architect Leopold Krakauer, (who had since settled in Jerusalem) to advise them and propose his own settlement layout.\textsuperscript{840} As a result of the long and exhausting debates among the members, however the planning process for Beit Alpha had ground to a halt by 1923.

\textsuperscript{839} Kauffmann files, CZA. Illera, "Der Architekt Leopold Krakauer". Beit Alpha archive.
\textsuperscript{840} Ibid., Beit Alpha archive.
The Kibbutz members placed higher priority on the design of communal structures rather than the members’ residences. “In a developing communist settlement, the conditions of poverty serve some of the purpose of its existence and development process, which necessitates beginning with construction of a culture house for all before a solid roof over the head of each individual.”

When approaching the design of structures for Kibbutz collective services, such as the communal dining hall and communal washrooms, their only precedent was Degania’s communal structure built a decade earlier by Isacc Vilkonski. This structure was a small building, which included a communal dining room, a kitchen, showers and a laundry. While serving the family-size Kvutza of Degania well, this structure could not serve the large-Kibbutz community of Beit Alpha. Yet the concentration principle embedded in the Degania communal structure did serve the designers as a model for the design of the larger communes.

Korenber’s design for Degania B of 1922, as well as Kauffmann’s design for Kiryat Anavim in 1923 included the shared facilities of dining hall, kitchen, washrooms and other public amenities in highly concentrated structures. Furthermore, Kauffmann’s design for the communal institutions in Heftziba, and Krakauer’s extremely concentrated design for Beit Alpha, both indicate that settlers and planners preferred to concentrate the communal facilities in a single structure. However, the settling agencies which owned the land and financed planning and construction were deeply suspicious of the ability of

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841 BenAsher, 1933. p. 39.
842 See chapter 2.
843 Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment.
communal life to sustain itself beyond the first generation. They viewed the social collapse of Merhavia as an alarming warning sign about the pitfalls of communal models for settlement. JNF and PLDC thus insisted that Kauffman design structures that could be modified at little cost to serve individual families should the commune dissolve.  

Delaying its own master planning had a direct affect on the housing conditions in Beit Alpha, since it entailed a delay in the construction of permanent, well serviced housing. The Sinader family, having lived with a young baby in a tent for two years, could no longer tolerate the living conditions in Beit Alpha and in 1925, when Reuben was two years old, they left the Kibbutz and the country and returned to Poland. The Kibbutz was shocked and alarmed. The departure of the Sinader family with the Kibbutz’s first born, considered the child of the commune at large, was traumatic. Reuben was no longer considered ‘first child of Beit Alpha’ and the title moved over to the second child, Dina Reizner, born 1924.

Yet, while families and individuals continually left (and joined) all Kibbutz settlements, it was the unique character of Beit Alpha’s commune which made this particular departure into a catalyst for rethinking and reforming the communal structure. Recognizing that the community could not socially sustain itself in dire, temporary housing, the Beit Alpha commune resumed the planning process for a permanent settlement. The Sinaders’ decision to leave the Kibbutz, impressed upon the members that there was a clear correlation between bad housing conditions and ‘bad’ subject formation. The Sinader family leaving, with the Kibbutz’s first child, marked the Kibbutz community as a whole responsible for the bad housing conditions it supplied its children. In fact, the two were seen as inseparably bound up with one another rather than being in a causal relationship. While one aspect of Beit Alpha’s decision to build a concrete and hygienic children’s house can be seen as an attempt to mold better Kibbutz citizens, it was also the result of accepting the Sinader family’s implicit critique of Beit Alpha’s inadequate child care, and the Kibbutz itself as a ‘bad place’ for a child’s education. The first generation of children, that is, the first four babies born 1924-5, were therefore taken out of their parents’ tent dwellings and given the best structure in Beit Alpha – the first wooden shack supplied by the WZO-Eretz-Israel office.

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847 Shlomnitzki, *Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary*.  

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The shack provided the babies with objectively better dwelling conditions: it was better insulated, more durable, and better ventilated. The shack was placed on a concrete platform which elevated it slightly from the ground and prevented flooding at times of rain, and unlike the tents, it ensured a dry floor which could be washed and kept relatively clean. Fixed doors and windows enabled better control of insects and thus helped to prevent children catching fevers. Communal care for the children in the best available structure allowed them to be distanced from adult society, whose members were frequently ill. As in Ein Harod, the children shared a room in the infirmary shack and their health and sanitary environment was one of the main objectives set by the commune.\textsuperscript{848}

The tents first used in Beit Alpha for dwelling were gradually replaced with wooden shacks which had previously served the Ottoman army, and were purchased in the Arab town of Jenin (hence the name ‘Jenin shacks’).\textsuperscript{849} Shacks were sold disassembled and assembled on site by Kibbutz members themselves. Board lengths of three and four meters determined the size of constructed wooden shacks, and later of molds for pouring concrete. A room in one of these shacks measured 3x4 meters (12sqm).\textsuperscript{850} Each such room could fit up to four beds serving single members or one couple.\textsuperscript{851} Unlike the single standing tent, the dwelling unit in the shack was part of a structure of four or six rooms arranged in a row, termed ‘rail’ housing. One window and a door ventilated each room.\textsuperscript{852} Rooms in the ‘rail’ structures included a single unit and provided for sleep alone; they did not include sanitary amenities or cooking facilities. The shacks were not connected to

\textsuperscript{848} Note the wooden cribs (fig. 5.19) used for taking the children out of the shack yet preventing them from touching the dirt and mud. Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land. Beit Alpha archive.
\textsuperscript{849} Shlomnitzki, Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary.
\textsuperscript{850} Meishar, "Leaving the Castle."
\textsuperscript{852} Meishar, "Leaving the Castle.".
any facilities, whether sewage, running water, or paving. Using the toilets, showers or sink required leaving the room for the communal showers.853

Fig. 5.20, 5.21, 5.22. Construction of wooden shacks by the Beit Alpha members from disassembled parts. Source: Bait Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.23. The first ‘rail’ shacks in Beit Alpha did not include porches but a wooden deck to level it with the hilly topography. Each room included a door and two windows on opposite facades for ventilation. In this picture we can see an addition to one of the rooms at the expense of the deck. The original door is leaning against the addition. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.24. Four female Kibbutz members in front of their room on one of the shacks. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.25. ‘Rail’ housing structure with four rooms and an entry porch. Each room houses four persons in a single space. Source: Chyutin, 2010.

Fig. 5.26. One of the remaining shacks in Beit Alpha, 2011. Note location of sink outside the shack.

The traumatic departure of the Sinader family in 1925 was followed by another shock, which proved to be a milestone in Beit Alpha’s decision to mesh housing and children’s education. While Reuben Sinader was the first of Beit Alpha-born children, the Kibbutz had, since 1924, served as home for a number of older children, including the younger brothers of members, known as ‘outsider children’, whose parents could not care for them and the three school-age children of an Austrian-Jewish scholar, Dr. Eliyahu Rapaport of Vienna, who joined Beit Alpha with his family in 1924.854 Rapaport initiated

853 Ibid.
854 Shlomnitzki, *Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary*. Beit Alpha archive.
the formation of a ‘children’s society’, an independent society in the Kibbutz social framework which was supposed to be self-educating, self-managing and self-governing. His purpose was the ‘creation’ of a social man by nurturing the commune and constructing the individual.\textsuperscript{855}

The ‘first children’s society’ in Beit Alpha included 36 children in 1925, when David Idelson became its chief educator. Idelson, a member of adjacent Kibbutz Tel Yosef, added more children since he believed a society requires a minimal number of 50 members. Since most of the children in the Beit Alpha children’s society did not live with their parents, Idelson declared that the family home was not an important factor in the children’s society.\textsuperscript{856} The society was divided according to age groups and allocated an independent farm which served as the site for a revolutionary topic-based educational program.\textsuperscript{857}

In 1927 a non-Zionist communist cell was discovered among the children, shocking the Kibbutz and leading to deep ideological conflicts which later divided Beit Alpha.\textsuperscript{858} The dangerously improper subject formation of children in the children’s society shocked the members of Beit Alpha, Heftziba and Tel Yosef, who were Zionists first and socialists second. Beit Alpha, which had already experienced its first child’s desertion of Zionism and return to the Diaspora, was especially alarmed. Members wondered about the wisdom of maintaining a children’s society whose members were not children of the Kibbutz and who reside in it only temporarily.\textsuperscript{859} The very fact of such a debate reflects the existence of a clear position regarding the role of permanent housing in proper subject formation. Following heated debates the members of Beit Alpha, Hefziba and Tel Yosef decided to disband the children’s society and form a new one which would serve their own children, all still infants at the time.

5.3.3 \textbf{Permanence: tying permanent housing to permanent planning}

The ‘second children’s society’ was formed in 1929, coinciding with the construction of its proper house, the first concrete children’s house, and included Beit Alpha’s and Heftziba’s nine schoolchildren and several ‘outsider children’.\textsuperscript{860} Declaring its intent to allocate its best resources for the children by constructing a special permanent housing structure for babies, the Beit Alpha commune made a bold statement regarding both proper care and proper education of the commune’s new generation. In addition, because its indecision regarding the master plan for the settlement was viewed as being

\textsuperscript{855} M. Shavit, "Education at the Shadow of Conflict: Collective Education in Kibbutz Beit Alpha in Light of Ideological, Personal and Social Conflict 1922-1940" (Tel Aviv University 1990).
\textsuperscript{856} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{857} Shlomnitzki, \textit{Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary}. Shavit, "Education at the Shadow of Conflict: Collective Education in Kibbutz Beit Alpha in Light of Ideological, Personal and Social Conflict 1922-1940". Beit Alpha archive.
\textsuperscript{858} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{859} Beit Alpha archive, Shavit, "Education at the Shadow of Conflict: Collective Education in Kibbutz Beit Alpha in Light of Ideological, Personal and Social Conflict 1922-1940".
\textsuperscript{860} Ibid.
responsible for the housing conditions that lead to the departure of the Sinader family, Beit Alpha resumed its debates regarding settlement layout.\textsuperscript{861}

Kibbutz settlements were too poor to finance construction of members’ housing. However, as they were considered the executors of Zionist sovereignty they were supported by the national institutions which owned the land they settled upon. As owners, however, the settling agencies defined the type and standards for housing and imposed these upon settlers. It is not clear from the primary sources whether Beit Alpha’s request to the PLDC for funding construction of the children’s house re-ignited the Beit Alpha-Heftziba planning process or whether Beit Alpha made its demand for a children’s house as a condition for renewing the planning process itself.\textsuperscript{862} The relationship between the settlement planning and the children’s house nonetheless sheds light on the role of the children’s house in the design process for the entire Kibbutz. It is clear from the sources that the planning process for the settlement master-plan began anew in November 1925 in conjunction with Beit Alpha’s request to the PLDC for design and funding of a children’s house.\textsuperscript{863} With the process back on track, Kauffmann proposed several planning schemes for Beit Alpha-Heftziba in late 1925, including a design for children’s houses, produced in January 1926.\textsuperscript{864}

While Kauffmann did support the communal dwelling structure idea, his plans met his JNF commissioners’ requirements for flexibility by breaking down the structure into several buildings. When planning resumed in 1925, Kauffman prepared sketches for a children’s house building parallel to working on his proposal for the settlement layout. These sketches, submitted in January 1926, served for planning two such buildings, one in Beit Alpha and one in Heftziba. Kauffmann let his colleague and assistant, the architect Lotte Cohn, develop the scheme for a detailed design for Heftziba’s house while he designed the Beit Alpha building.\textsuperscript{865}

Kauffmann’s scheme for the children’s house called for several identical rooms serviced by a corridor, thus adapting a typology which served both in adult ‘rail housing’ and in the children’s shack (fig. 5.27, 5.28). The fact that the PLDC agreed to consider funding the planning and construction of the communal children’s house was extraordinary in the early 1920’s, in light of its doubts about the sustainability of communal societies. However, the dual nature of the children’s house, and the need to provide children with concrete and sanitary housing where limited resources could not provide good housing to all families separately, made the children’s house a reasonable solution.

\textsuperscript{861} Beit Alpha archive.
\textsuperscript{862} Kauffmann files, CZA. Beit Alpha archive.
\textsuperscript{863} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{864} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{865} For more information on Heftziba’s children’s house see Sonder, Lotte Cohn: Pioneer Female Architect in Eretz Israel. The first concrete structure in Beit Alpha was a cowshed designed by built in 1927. The cowshed was a simple structure of three concrete walls and wooden tiled roof. Some writers state that the cowshed construction indicated that livestock were more important in Beit Alpha than people. See Slomnitzki, 2002. Yet the above data indicates that proper planning for memebrs’ dwelling area and children’s house was already underway by 1927.
Fig. 5.27, 5.28 Kauffmann’s schemes for design of the Beit Alpha and Hefziba children’s houses, January 1926. Source: Tal, 1991.

The children’s house’s unique duality as public institution and private dwelling characterized it from the very start and influenced its physical formation and formative ideology. It was presented by Beit Alpha as a dwelling structure when necessary - for example, in the request to the PLDF for construction funding, and as a public institution, for example in convincing Kibbutz parents to educate their children as proper future citizens within it. The formation of the children’s house as the first public institution as well as first proper house has to be read in light of this duality. The only Kibbutz ‘house’ in the sense of serving all of life’s functions in a single structure was the children’s house.

The two architects, Kauffmann and Krakauer, presented their plans to the commune in October and November of 1925 respectively. Both planners attempted to form a solid structure composed of separate buildings, satisfying both the settlers’ demand for a ‘one big house in which to live together’ and the settling agencies’ demand for several flexible buildings. However, while Kauffmann’s was an urban planning scheme, Krakauer’s proposal attempted to solve the design conflict using a detailed architectural design for the central Kibbutz structure. This difference enabled the two plans to coexist alongside one the other.

Fig. 5.29 Beit Alpha-Hefziba planning scheme, November 1925. Kauffmann. Source: Tal, 1991.

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866 Davar, 1926.
867 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.

Fig. 5.30 Beit Alpha-Hefziba plan, December 1925. Kauffmann. Source: Kauffmann, 1926. Hefziba on the plan’s right hand side, Beit Alpha on the left hand side, and the shared communal structures in the middle.

The Krakauer (fig. 5.31) and Kauffmann (fig. 5.31) plans, have very similar designs for the Kibbutz dwelling area. This similarity suggests that both architects developed the same sketch approved by the Kibbutz. However, while both architects proposed similar layouts for the dwelling area as a fragmented courtyard structure, i.e. are very similar typologically, the architecture of these two proposals is very different and expresses two distinct interpretations of Kibbutz communal life. Kauffmann’s proposal presents what he defined as a ‘chaotic’ design, composed of two connected courtyards whose bordering structures are not aligned with each other but fan out slightly. The two courtyards themselves are not clearly defined, instead, their shape is blurred by enclosed structures and landscape. While perhaps less ordered compared with other designs by Kauffmann, the Heftziba-Beit Alpha plan was organized in a symmetric fan plan, organized along fanning axes whose focal point was the Gilboa mountain top. The two dwelling areas and farm areas are well defined around respective yards, and the Beaux-Arts monumentality of the shared public institutions in the middle of the plan is highlighted with landscaping leading towards the valley fields.

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869 Ibid. Kauffmann’s notes found in the CZA are in German with which I am not familiar. I therefore rely on Tal’s quotations from these notes.
The influence of the City Beautiful movement on Kauffmann is clear in his “focal point” scheme from December 1925, which uses the view of Beit Alpha and Heftziba from the Gilboa mountaintop as a key organizing principle in the design. Compared with Kauffmann’s Beaux-Arts or City Beautiful inspired plan, Krakauer’s design (figs 5.31, 5.33, 5.34) attempted to form an organic native village-scape. His design includes several buildings connected by covered passageways. Alignment of the structures with axes from the imaginary focal point of the Gilboa mountain top provided some order to the plan and added a vertical breakdown of the massive courtyard structure. Influenced by Camillo Sitte, Krakauer attempted to form a communal structure which is basically a dense village, including irregularity, narrow paths and the illusion of gradual accumulation. Internal facades included open colonnaded porches leading to the rooms, facing internal courtyards. The external facades include vaulted windows and openings, and flat roofs, all considered local architectural elements. This architectural statement was influenced by the Haifa architect Alexander Berwald, who was invested in developing a local architectural style (as reflected in his design for the Haifa Technion building) and who employed Krakauer upon arrival in Palestine.

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870 Tal, ibid. and Illera, “Der Architekt Leopold Krakauer”. Both discuss Krakauer’s influence by architect Camillo Sitte. 
871 Illera, “Der Architekt Leopold Krakauer”.

Krakauer’s design was made on a scale of 1:50, enabling him to detail elements like openings and level of amenities such as the number and location of toilets in the structure (fig. 5.34, 5.33). The architectural scale of 1:50, requiring a significant design effort on Krakauer’s part, enabled him to outline his proposal for a dwelling complex both unified and fragmented. The unity of the structure, enclosing a large courtyard, can be seen in the arrangement of identical rooms along continuous corridors, forming equal dwelling spaces grouped into one communal structure (as can be seen in the plans, fig. 5.34). The fragmentation of this structure into a ‘native’ village can be seen in Krakauer’s use of the topography to break down the unified structure to seemingly-separate buildings formed independently from one another (as can be seen in the facades, fig. 5.33).

The settling agencies rejected both proposals as insufficiently flexible, i.e. not easily convertible into family dwellings, and refused to fund their construction as communal structures. The construction of the children’s house, it seems, was conditioned by the PLDC upon the completion of a Beit Alpha-Heftziba masterplan, i.e. by Beit Alpha members’ cooperation with the PLDC’s goal. Since the Heftziba members imposed no

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demands or constraints that would have stalled the process, the plans for their homes were already completed by Cohn in March 1926, and awaited PLDC funding. Beit Alpha members, however, rejected the PLDC’s conditioning the funding for their children’s house on their acceptance of Kauffmann’s settlement layout. On December 26, 1926 the workers’ newspaper Davar announced that Beit Alpha intended to construct an “infants’ house” and hoped for a loan from the Zionist leadership, indicating that the settlers wished to separate the issue of settlement planning from the pressing issue of the children’s house by finding funding sources other than the PLDC.873

What happened next requires some detective work, in light of the dramatic changes to Kauffmann’s design for Beit Alpha and the gaps in the original sources. We know that Kauffmann’s plans for Beit Alpha’s children’s house were completed by July 1927 and construction completed by early 1929, suggesting that the conflicts between the PLDC and Beit Alpha were finally settled. In January 1929 Kauffmann presented his final master plan for Beit Alpha, which was dramatically different from the original one and deviated from his prior yard layouts in favor of a campus layout (fig. 5.35).

![Fig. 5.35 Beit Alpha-Hefziba plan, Kauffmann, January 1929. Source: Tal, 1991. Beit Alpha is on the left, Heftziba on the right.](image-url)

While Hefziba’s plan (on the right hand side of the plan, fig. 5.35) retained its structure of two yards, Beit Alpha’s (on the left hand side) was completely fragmented into an egalitarian campus layout. This layout is a schematic representation of the layout of Beit Alpha’s early days, in tent dwellings scattered across the landscape (rather than grouped around yards) since its establishment in 1922. The 1929 campus layout plan thus reflects a choice to maintain Beit Alpha’s urban reality, and a statement regarding the entire Kibbutz as a home, rather than just one part of it (the dwelling yard). This dramatically different planning principle forces the question upon us: how did Kauffmann suddenly change his plan for Beit Alpha after presenting three variations of the “yard layout” scheme, all reflecting the monumental design with which he was identified and in which he was deeply invested?

873 *In the Valley*, Davar, December 27, 1926.
The answer to this question is found in the form of a plan located in Beit Alpha’s archive (fig. 5.36). This plan, re-drawn in 1975 by the Hashomer Hatzair technical department, bears the following caption: “Kibbutz Beit Alpha, 1928 settlement layout plan, composed from two plans from the Beit Alpha archive: Architect Kauffmann’s 1928 proposal for farm buildings and Architect Krakauer’s 1927 proposal for dwelling area with 1930 location of dining room.” This plan therefore identifies a missing plan made by Krakauer for the dwelling area, replacing Kauffman’s yard logic which was never accepted by Beit Alpha members with a “campus” logic. The campus plan, however, also reflects a departure from Krakauer’s own detailed design for the communal dwelling structure (fig. 5.33, 5.34), raising the question of the role of the Beit Alpha community itself in preparing the 1928 proposal.

While prior to Beit Alpha’s layout, Kibbutz settlements were designed by Kauffman and others in yard layouts, afterward all new Kibbutz settlements were designed in campus layouts, which became the dominant, even iconic, Kibbutz landscape, synonymous with its built environment. Most studies of Kibbutz planning, however, focus on the Kibbutz early yard planning model and neglect the historical formation of the campus layout, the model for Israeli “good housing” “bathed in greenery”. The transformation of Kauffmann’s City Beautiful monumental yard settlement layouts of the 1920s to the predominant campus layout has never been posed as a research question by scholars of

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874 None of the three original plans were located at the archive. This is possibly due to their papers’ deterioration, as indicated by Moti Horowitz head of Beit Alpha’s building unit.

875 Chyutin and Chyutin, *Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment*, do attempt to explain the fragmentation of the Kibbutz yard model by discussing Kibbutz expansion.
Kibbutz built environment.\textsuperscript{876} Beit Alpha, however, represents the turning point in this transformation. Unlike all other settlements designed by Kauffmann at the time (Kibbutz, Moshav and urban settlements alike),\textsuperscript{877} Beit Alpha members never accepted and realized his plans. It was therefore the first Kibbutz to retain its campus layout based on detached tent dwelling scattered across the landscape, which characterized early stages of all Zionist settlements of the time. Even Tower and Stockade Kibbutz settlements of the late 1930s, erected in the course of one night in a yard layout to meet the covenants of Mandatory British law restricting erection of new settlements,\textsuperscript{878} for example Kibbutz Negba (fig. 5.39) and Kibbutz Mizra (fig. 5.38) were later enlarged as campus Kibbutz settlements.

The institution of a children’s house played a key role in the consolidation of the campus layout in a formal plan, as well as in its acceptance by the JNF and the PLDC. The planning and construction of the children’s house in 1926, prior to the consolidation of Beit Alpha’s plan and the preparation of final layout by Krakauer in 1927, indicates the central role of the children’s house. Thus, the campus model represents a phenomenon of

\textsuperscript{876} See ibid.; Meishar, "Leaving the Castle."
\textsuperscript{877} Save for Tel Aviv, which too rejected Kauffmann’s design as seen in chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{878} Tower and Stockade Kibbutz settlements were new Jewish settlements founded during the British Mandatory ban on new settlements in Palestine. In order to meet the ordinance stating that existing settlements cannot be removed, these new settlements included an encircling wooden wall defining them as full constructed thus immune to removal. See Rotbard, S. 2003. Tower and Stockade, in Weizman, E., and Segal, R., eds., \textit{A Civilian Occupation. The Politics of Israeli Architecture}, Verso, London.
‘houses before street’, similar to what we saw in Tel Aviv, where dwelling structures preceded settlement planning and defined it *de facto*.\(^\text{880}\)

![Image](image.jpg)

**Fig. 5.40** A view of Beit Alpha and Heftziba from the Gilboa, circa 1929. The two storey children’s house is at the center of the picture. To its right, the two first ‘rail’ houses, and wooden ‘rail’ houses further right. Left of the children’s house is the Heftziba dwelling yard, still in wooden shacks. Heftziba’s first children’s house is at the far left.

Beit Alpha’s campus layout, and its ‘indigenous’ modern planning reflects the contradictory project of nationalism, at the same time modern and invested in tradition.\(^\text{881}\) Of the original Kauffmann yard plan (Fig. ?) the only remaining element is the fanning view axes aligning the buildings. Forced to give up the ordering mechanism of the yards, while still refusing to devise a completely ‘chaotic’ plan, Kauffmann used the radial axes which served him in designing the relationship between yards in his 1925 plan to arrange the individual buildings of the new 1929 plan. While arranged along view axes from the top of Mt. Gilboa, the ordering principle of the new plan for Beit Alpha was reversed: rather than being based on a series of fanning yards along vertical axes from mountain to valley, the plan was now based on a vertebral path leading from the dining room to the children’s house, and further towards Heftziba. The new Beit Alpha layout embedded the idea (seen in Tel Aviv in chapter 4) of houses preceding street layout. Children’s house and adult housing preceded the path linking them.

### 5.3.4 The first children’s house: architecture for good care and subject formation

#### 5.3.4.1 Good living conditions

Beit Alpha’s first children’s house was a two–story, concrete house with running water and toilets on each floor, serviced by plumbing. Each floor included five rooms, with four to six children per room. When the house was built, the population of Beit Alpha included twenty children, and its construction reflected the expectation that this number would double. The cellar included a room for the adult responsible for watching over the children at night. Two floors were separated by age: the ground floor, allocated for young children and the second, accessed by an outside stairway, was for the babies due to its better ventilation. Each room was ventilated by two windows and a door leading to the corridor. The corridor doubled as a porch, glazed with large windows covered with nets. Shades were placed on all room windows to block intense sun radiation in the valley. In

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\(^{880}\) See chapter 4 of this dissertation.

\(^{881}\) Hobsbawm, "The Nation as Invented Tradition."
the middle of each floor, two small rooms served as a bathroom and toilet, serviced with small service porches for hanging laundry and ventilation. The tiled roof was meant to ensure better ventilation of the valley heat by allowing the release of hot air.

In the evenings, the children’s house was a social hub of the Kibbutz, a meeting point for members working all over the farm who came there to put their children to sleep. As there was a night watch-woman in the house it was the only Kibbutz structure lit at night, serving as a gathering place where members could chat and drink coffee while the entire Kibbutz was dark.

Compared with the dark, stifling wooden shacks serving the community, the children’s house was a well-ventilated, well-lit and spacious dwelling environment. Each room of 15 square meters initially served four children or babies, just like the adult rooms, thereby giving children more floor space. Each room included two windows and opened onto a glazed corridor, enabling maximum airflow and ventilation. The glazed corridors, and especially the second floor porch serving the babies, provided a clean outside play area, distancing babies and young children from the muddy unpaved Kibbutz lanes. The corridors were also designed to buffer the dwelling rooms from the outside area, thereby preventing the flow of dust and dirt directly into the rooms. As a paved inside ‘street’ connecting the rooms, the glazed corridors served as a clean, shaded, play area for the children especially in the winter and in the heat of high summer. This protected play area enabled children to interact and form their children’s society in a clean and secure environment, while also allowing parents to interact with their children and among themselves. As a permanent structure, the children’s house did not suffer from rain leakage and unsealed doors and windows.

These porches were later closed off to enlarge the bathroom and toilet. When a sewage system was introduced into the building, sewage pipes were laid in the corridors.
Fig. 5.43 Beit Alpha’s children’s house, main façade, circa 1929. On the left, shacks of Kibbutz Hefziba. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.44 A rare picture of Beit-Alpha’s first children’s house on 1929. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.45 Babies and caregivers at the children’s house, circa 1932. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.46 Six children seated in their room in the children’s house with an adult reading a book. Source: Beit Alpha archive. Note the specially made beds with surrounding rail to prevent children from falling.

Fig. 5.47 The babies and caregivers by the children’s house back façade. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.48 Saul Slomnitsky, first generation in the children’s house and Dolly Goldenberg, last generation to live in the house, by the entry to the second floor, 2011. Source: author.

Fig. 5.49 The entire Beit Alpha community by the children’s house stairs, circa 1929. Note the sandbags at the top of the stairs. Source: Beit Alpha archive.
5.3.4.2 Sanitary Conditions

The children’s house had the only en-suite bathrooms and toilets in Beit Alpha. These toilets required sewage and as there was no sewage system yet, the members dug out a large drainage pit, paved with stones, to serve the house. The first Kibbutz shared facilities were built at the same time for adult members a little uphill from the children’s house, as an upgrade of the un-flushed toilets used before. The adult facilities were nonetheless outside the dwellings and required leaving one’s dwelling hut and traversing the muddy or dusty Kibbutz paths to use. The sanitary conditions of the children’s house were therefore much better than those of the adults. A sewage pump was installed to pump out the pit when it became full.

One of the main reasons for constructing the children’s house was to limit infant and child mortality by providing good sanitary conditions for the children. The sanitary conditions in the remote Kibbutz were initially very low. A South African envoy who visited Beit Alpha in the late 1920s remarked on the harsh conditions: “The colony is filled with flies…some of the rooms are very dirty…pavements are covered with filth…toilets are but uncovered cans, black with flies…complete ignorance of individual and public cleanliness and criminal inattention to the basic demands of public life.”

Supporters of communal care for the children and for housing them in the children’s house claimed that its better sanitary conditions would prevent the spread of diseases and the design of the structure does indeed reflect the centrality of sanitation considerations. First, the washrooms and toilets are located at the center of each floor, easily accessed from all rooms. The washrooms are ventilated with a service porch for easier cleansing and disinfection by running water and sunlight. Second, the separation of the two floors serving children and babies enabled the isolation of age groups to prevent the spread of disease, especially to protect the young babies. Each floor included an

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883 Quoted by Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.. p. 204.
884 Through the 1950’s, the children’s houses in Beit Alpha were the only dwellings serviced with in-house running water and toilets. Adult shared bathrooms were located in a special structure in the middle of the Kibbutz, and an additional toilet facility was built by the dining room upon its construction in 1934. See chapter 8 for detailed discussion.
‘isolation’ room, or infirmary, where sick children were isolated from the rest of the children’s community to prevent infection. Kibbutz children’s houses maintained a high level of sanitation to the point of obsession, a fact noted by the famous educator Janusz Korczak. The result was a drastic drop in child illness and mortality.

Fig. 5.51 Children and caregiver by the Beit Alpha children’s shack. Circa 1928. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.52 Babies on a mat in the second floor porch of the children’s house, circa 1930. Photography: Soskin. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.53 The first public toilet in Beit Alpha, marked in red. Children’s house marked in blue. Source: Plan based on a compilation of the Kauffmann and Krakauer plans from 1928, detail. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

5.3.4.3 Security

In 1929 Beit Alpha was attacked by Arabs from Beit Shean. The members of Beit Alpha and Heftziba barricaded themselves in the new children’s house, using it as a defense post, and managed to drive away the attack. The division of the house into two floors with no internal vertical connection between them (but only an outside stairway) was very useful in defense, as attackers could not access the upper floor from within the house and so there was no need for the few defenders to occupy both floors. Following the attack on Beit Alpha and the proven ability of the Kibbutz to withstand it by barricading in the children’s house, the PLDC transformed its design principles for all new Kibbutz settlements and decided to invest in concrete structures doubling as children’s houses and as a battle posts. The children’s house, and the principle that children should be located in the only permanent and safe structure, was adopted across the board by Kibbutz

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885 Shlomnitzki, Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary.
886 Korchak, 1937, quoted by Shlomnitzki.
887 Unger, 1932.
settlements of the second wave like Tel Yosef and Ein Harod, and later by ‘tower and stockade’ Kibbutz settlements formed in the 1930’s.\textsuperscript{889} The new children’s houses erected following the attack on Beit Alpha, for example in Beit Hashita (fig. 5.57) included flat roofs with tall parapets which served members as observation posts and bases for counter attack, as recommended by Kauffmann.\textsuperscript{890}

Fig. 5.54 The first children’s house, Beit Alpha. Note sandbags at the top of the stairs.
Fig. 5.55 Beit Alpha defenders at the children’s house stairs. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.56. Kibbutz Beit Hashita in its permanent location, 1938. The Children’s house, the only permanent structure, can be seen on the far right. Photography: Eleanor Porat.
Fig. 5.57 The first concrete structure in Beit Hashita, designated for the babies and the guards, already included a flat roof. 1938? Photography: Eleanor Porat.

The children’s house, then, was the focal point of the whole settlement, from which the development of Beit Alpha’s permanent structures radiated. The first permanent housing for adults, designed by Krakauer in accordance with the campus settlement layout, was constructed only after completion of the children’s house, immediately next to it. Constructed between 1929 and 1932 as freestanding structures on the Kibbutz campus, permanent housing gradually replaced the wooden shacks. These houses were built ‘before street’ and did not include in-house shared sanitary facilities. Krakauer’s design for permanent adult housing did not constitute a new housing typology like the children’s

\textsuperscript{889} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{890} Ibid. Amir, "The Kibbutz Dwelling Unit: Ideology and Planning".
house, but rather preserved the room layout, size and level of service that prevailed in wooden shack housing. Permanent rather than makeshift construction was the main achievement of these structures. Room and building size remained the same as well, perhaps due to the dimensions of wooden beams serving as molds for casting the concrete.

Fig. 5.58, 5.59 The first permanent housing structures in Beit Alpha during construction. The two-storey children’s house can be seen in the background. Circa 1930. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

5.3.5 **The second children's house**

With the birth of more babies it became clear that additional children’s houses would have to be built both in Beit Alpha and Heftziba. Krakauer was entrusted with design of the houses, which he completed in 1934. He designed two houses, almost identical to each other. Houses were allocated for schoolchildren and included classrooms. The six year old children were to ‘graduate’ from the first children’s house and move into the new one. Beit Alpha’s house was designed to include two floors while Heftziba’s had only one floor, but initial funding from PLDC enabled construction of Beit Alpha’s first floor alone. Therefore Beit Alpha’s house had a flat roof and Hefziba’s a tiled one. Each floor included four rooms designated for six children each along both sides of a corridor. At the center of each floor there were shared toilets and bathrooms. Until 1942, Beit Alpha and Heftziba shared use of the two houses, with older children housed in Heftziba’s house and younger children in Beit Alpha’s. Krakauer’s design reflects the emphasis he placed on ventilation and shading in the hot climate of the Jezreel Valley. The facades included double windows for better shading and ventilation, based on a concrete frame protruding from the façade.

Fig. 5.60, 5.61. The second children’s house in Beit Alpha, designed by Krakauer, circa 1936. Source: Beit Alpha archive. Note wooden shacks around the house, still serving the adult community in 1936.

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891 Wooden shacks repeatedly caught fire from the oil lamps serving for lighting and burnt to the ground. Shlomnitzki, *Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary.*

892 Ibid.
Fig. 5.62 Plan and section, Krakauer children’s house. Source: Illera, 1992.

Fig. 5.63 Mother and baby in front of the second house, during construction. Source: Beit Alpha.

Fig. 5.64 The second children’s house in Beit Alpha, designed by Krakauer, circa 1936. Source: Beit Alpha archive.

Fig. 5.65 Section of Krakauer’s Beit Alpha children’s house, 1936. Source: Illera, 1992.

Fig. 5.66 Section of Krakauer’s Beit Alpha children’s house, 1934. Source: Beit Alpha technical archive.

893 Illera, "Der Architekt Leopold Krakauer".
5.4 Childhood as everyday life

The everyday lives of children in Beit Alpha revolved around the communal care in the children’s house, which treated the children as non-biological siblings. The first five children, born 1924-1925, shared a room in the first wooden hut and moved to the first children’s house when constructed (fig. 5.67). They all shared the same room, like siblings, with no gender separation between boys and girls. Children were grouped into age-based ‘sibling’ groups named after fruits and flowers, for example the ‘olive group’, and were so known in the Kibbutz. One’s roommates were therefore also one’s classmates and quasi-siblings, with whom one spent most of one’s days.

In the idealized conceptions of childhood among Hashomer Hatzair Beit Alpha members, as reflected in ‘Our Commune’, the expectation was for children to form an ideal, equal and pure ‘children’s society’, removed from the illnesses of adult society, to serve as grounds for the new society of sovereign Jews in the homeland. Children were therefore left to form relationships among themselves as semi-siblings, rather than with their parents, who perceived themselves as ‘degenerate’ (see section 2.4). However, belief in the purity of the child left members and caregivers incapable of dealing with aggression and rivalry among children.

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894 Beit Alpha’s technical archive’s file for the Krakauer children’s house contains only structural drawings, including sections and foundation plan but none of the original architectural plans of the original set. As many changes have been made to the building, they were discarded of as unnecessary.

895 This affiliation was as permanent as a family name. Compare this with the customary designation of children-groups into classes in the school system, changing each year (first grade, second grade) and marking progression.

896 The semi-sibling relationship among children is discussed as the reason for little romantic or sexual relationships among the children. See Lieblich, "A Century of Childhood, Parenting, and Family Life in the Kibbutz.”

897 The consequences of a ‘children’s society’ little managed by adults upon its weaker members are one of the most critiqued aspects of Kibbutz education, compared by some to Lord of the Flies. Ibid.
Children lived and studied in the children’s house, and visited their parents in their rooms in the afternoons. These visits lasted about two hours and included some formality: both children and parents would wash and change clothes after their days’ work before meeting, for example. Children-parent interaction included concentrated attention like reading books and discussion, rather than mundane activities of feeding, washing or clothing. The time spent with parents was the only time of the day which children spent outside their alternative family of sibling-group. Younger children were often escorted by their parents to the children’s house where the parents put them to sleep and met with other parents.
Like every member of Beit Alpha, the children too bathed with their peers in the shared showers. Shared use of the showers was the result of the lack of individual attached facilities on one hand, and the tight communal schedule on the other. Members finished their workday at approximately the same time to host their children in their rooms and take dinner at the dining room, and so washed together in the communal showers. However, while adults shared showers and toilets were gender separated, the children’s facilities were not; boys and girls washed together till the age of 14. \(^{898}\) While the shared facilities in the children’s house were initially quite Spartan (fig. 5.76, 5.77), they were later designed in a more domestic style (fig. 5.78-60). All group children, of both sexes, bathed together (fig. 5.79) and were helped by the caregivers as in a domestic setting (fig. 5.78), however the showers themselves were specially designed to accommodate a number of children at the same time, allowing for communal dressing and undressing, washing, and getting in and out of the shower (fig. 5.60).

Fig. 5.76 Children in their room at the children’s house of Kibbutz Kfar Hanasi, 1949. Source: NPC.
Fig. 5.77 Children getting undressed before washing at Kibbutz Yehiam, 1954. Source: NPC.

Fig. 5.78, 5.79, 5.60 Children washing and dressing up in their children’s house washrooms, aided by their caregivers, Kibbutz Misgav Am. 1970. Source: NPC.

\(^{898}\) Shlomnitzki, *Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary.*
5.4.1 The inclusion of children in parental quarters

The dramatic improvements in Kibbutz living conditions following Israel’s independence in 1948 – including permanent structures, sanitation and the security provided by a national military rather than a local militia – led to the transformation of ‘communal sleeping’ of children from necessity to social practice. As such, the disadvantages inherent in the institution of a children’s house, with respect to both the parent-child relationship and the status of weak children in society became glaring. When parents’ rooms included running water and attached bathrooms, they were no longer less sanitary than the children’s house, removing its primary material justification. The educational-ideological idea of the new and pure ‘children’s society’ as a ‘future state’ was therefore consolidated as the new raison d’etre for the institution. During the 1970s and 1980s, following heated debates about education, ideology, and the relationship between society and individual, most Kibbutz settlements gradually deserted communal care for the children and passed decisions to house the children in their parents’ rooms. Beit Alpha passed the decision to stop communal care for children in 1991. Consequently, the children’s houses stopped serving their initial function and became instead the children’s society community center while parental housing had to be altered to make room for children.

The decision to switch to housing for a nuclear family required dramatic changes to the parental quarters and the abrupt nature of the change meant that new housing solutions would be needed for a large segment of Kibbutz community at the same time. Unlike the repetitive and equal nature of couple housing, as well as of children’s facilities in the children’s houses, the task of accommodating all children into parents’ rooms at once depended on the number and age of each couple’s children, requiring varying spaces. In addition, solutions also depended on the present condition of parents’ housing, set primarily by seniority in the community.

Housing solutions in this initial period were thus ad-hoc solutions, including changes in room function, the closing off of porches to become rooms, and, in some cases, even the addition of rooms to existing structures. Members living in two-unit rooms transformed the bedroom into nursery and reverted back to one-unit use of the second room as both bedroom and living room. Members living in one-unit rooms closed their porch to become a nursery. Following this social change, new houses were gradually built for families with several young children. These were the first Kibbutz houses designed to accommodate the children, and a new typology for the ‘proper house’ in charge of children’s subject formation. In addition, the new nuclear familial structure of Kibbutz housing brought about a change in the Ministry of Housing ‘standard Kibbutz housing

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900 Lieblich, "A Century of Childhood, Parenting, and Family Life in the Kibbutz."
901 Ibid.
902 Shlomnitzki, Omega in Cacao Valley, Memories of Childhood in Beit Alpha Written at the Kibbutz 80th Anniversary.
903 See chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of the seniority system in Kibbutz housing following 1948.
unit’ and its funding for each such unit. As a result, all family quarters in Beit Alpha added an additional room in the early 1990s. Members who needed yet another room closed off their porches as well.

Amir and Chayutin both define the first proper Kibbutz house to be one including both dwelling and additional household functions such as cooking and dining. As seen in this chapter, the first such house in the Kibbutz was in fact the children’s house. The transfer of children into their parents’ ‘rooms’ meant that household functions such as cooking, dining and most importantly child rearing would be transferred as well, thereby transforming adult Kibbutz housing into a new kind of ‘proper housing’.

Fig. 5.61 New semi-detached houses, 1990s. Source: Beit Alpha archive.
Fig. 5.62, Kibbutz family housing designed to accommodate the children. Source: Chyutin, 2010.

5.5 The good habitat for the Zionist ‘new man’

Did the children’s house serve its purpose of proper subject formation, in addition to supplying better quality housing for children? Kibbutz-educated Zionists dominated the Yishuv pre-state society as well as post-independence society until 1977, out of all proportion to their numerical weight in the country (less than 10% of the population in 1948 and less than 13% since). This domination took several forms. Kibbutz members were over represented in the IDF’s prestigious units and officer corps. Ne’eman states that the children’s society was not very different from army service, in social as well as built environment, which made it easy for Kibbutzniks to ‘feel at home’ in the army. She bases her claim on the communal nature of work towards a large goal in Kibbutz and army unit, and on the shared and uniform living space in children’s houses and army barracks. Ne’eman and Lieblich discuss life in the Kibbutz as a political act. Kibbutz members, and Kibbutz children in particular, were expected to serve as a living manifestation of the success in forming a new society whose members effortlessly live a communal life, free from the illnesses of capitalist society.

The essentially political nature of Kibbutz life also manifested itself in over-representation of the Kibbutz settlements in parliament in relation to their share in the

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905 Ministry of Housing. Department of Rural Settlement.
908 Neeman, *We Were the Future*.
909 Ibid. Lieblich, "A Century of Childhood, Parenting, and Family Life in the Kibbutz."
Kibbutz members assumed positions in the government and in the JA and were in charge of immigrant absorption and the formation of new settlements by the sovereign state. Noted among these are the designer of Israel’s first masterplan in 1952 Aryeh Sharone, head of the JA absorption department and future prime minister Levi Eshkol and head of the JA settlement department Giora Yoseftal.

The vanguard social roles played by the Kibbutz in border defense and land cultivation were embedded in housing and assigned to the children’s house as well. Children worked in agriculture in the Kibbutz as part of their education, maintaining vegetable gardens and small livestock farms. In the afternoons, they were employed according to their age in tasks intended to free adult labor (like peeling corn). Moreover, during times of peak agricultural work such as the harvest, children were released from school to work in the fields. Labor, especially labor of the land, became a key element of Kibbutz education.

The Yishuv considered settlement as the main factor in determining sovereignty over the homeland, and this perception indeed proved itself in the U.N General Assembly decision on Partition of Palestine, which set the future border between the Jewish and Arab states according to settlement location. David Cohen, one of the key spokesmen of the United Kibbutz movement, asserted, in 1948, that, “our border is set by settlements…if not for settlements of the Negev [area] we could say that the Egyptians would have conquered the Negev, since their army holds [the area] from shore to mountains. Yet despite the Egyptian [military] occupation they did not achieve the political fact of an occupied Negev. Jews hold the Negev because it still has Jewish

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911 Moshe Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel (Jerusalem Bialik Institute,2009).
913 Lieblich, “A Century of Childhood, Parenting, and Family Life in the Kibbutz.”
settlements not yet conquered [by the Egyptians]. This political fact is decisive during truce negotiations and for setting the borders."\(^915\)

This ideology regarding the role of settlement, rather than military post, in border defense was applied to all aspects of Kibbutz life, including the children’s house. Kibbutz Negba’s defensive battle against the Egyptian army in 1948, which prevented the advance of the Egyptian army to Tel Aviv, was waged in the barricaded children’s houses, just as had been the case in Beit Alpha in 1929. While evacuated from the battlefield, Negba’s children were present in this campaign via the shelled children’s houses (fig. 5.65). The Kibbutz children’s house as the frontline for Jewish sovereignty and control of the homeland marks the supreme subject formation of the Sabra as defender and caregiver of the country.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter studies the Kibbutz children’s house as the first ‘good house’ on the Kibbutz, serving as nursery for the good Zionist citizens and for the future state. The best available resources were directed to housing the community’s children who were cared for collectively outside their parents’ room and, as we have seen, the children’s house was the first Kibbutz house to be capable of including all segments of daily life: sleep, washing, dining, recreation and schooling – while adult housing or ‘rooms’ were still tents and shacks serving sleep alone. The children’s house institution did not only determine the Kibbutz housing form but, more importantly, served as the breeding ground for the ‘Sabra as future state’ – the self-sovereign member of the future sovereign state. We have also revealed the role of the children’s house in the formation of the Kibbutz campus urban layout, which became the dominant rural landscape in Israel, replaced the expert-designed yard-Kibbutz layout, with a self-designed layout of structures embedded in the landscape.

The Kibbutz is traditionally discussed as a built environment formed from above by the PLDC and its planner Richard Kauffmann,\(^916\) yet the study of Beit Alpha points to settlers’ deep engagement in and dramatic influence on Kibbutz planning. The role of housing in forming national identity and political sovereignty demonstrates how Beit Alpha’s settlement planning layout was an example of ‘indigenous’ modern planning. Unlike the yard layout model proposed by Kauffmann, Beit Alpha’s campus fabric suits the contrary goals of the project of nationalism, both modern and engaged with tradition.\(^917\) The Members’ choice of a campus layout is a significant statement regarding the un-hierarchical nature of the Kibbutz home and the rootedness of housing in the landscape of the home-land. Beit Alpha’s children’s house, as the first element of the first campus layout was therefore a cornerstone of Kibbutz national housing.

The children – the proper subjects – are what gave the children’s house institution its meaning and raison d’etre. Once they left to live with their parents, the children’s house

\(^915\) Settlement Department committee, June 16 1948. Labor Movement archive.
\(^916\) Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment; Hanin-Rabinowitz, Garden Colony and a School Farm as Models for the Zionist Cooperative Settlements.
\(^917\) Hobsbawm, “The Nation as Invented Tradition.”
typology was emptied of meaning. Members’ houses were now the site for the formation of the proper subject and thus the proper house. The redesigned members’ houses, as a detached or semi-detached family home within the Kibbutz campus layout, became the new proper Kibbutz house and the new and sought-after model for Israeli good housing, as will be discussed at length in chapters 6 and 8 below.
Part III

Housing and nation building in the age of sovereignty
Introduction: The consolidation of ‘good housing’

Part III of this dissertation discusses Israeli ‘good housing’ in the age of Israeli sovereignty, focusing on the consequences of state sovereignty for the Zionist and Palestinian national housing and nation-building projects. State sovereignty, after some 600 years of imperial rule, marks 1948 as a pivotal moment in Israel-Palestine’s housing history, a housing ‘big bang’ of sorts. 1948 witnessed the beginning of mass Jewish migration and vast housing solutions to accommodate it, and a mass loss of housing for the Palestinian population inside and outside the state.

A pivotal moment in the housing history of Israel-Palestine, 1948 also marks a watershed line in the relationship between housing and sovereignty. The nation-building project and its use of housing were not over with the gain of national statehood. Rather, it was dramatically transformed from a nation-building project based on accumulating self-governing subjects via housing (as discussed in Part II), to a nation-building project based on planning and management of populations.

Part III identifies the significance of state sovereignty for housing and nation-building in its introduction of two novel conceptions: the citizen and national planning. The state ‘housing regime,’ formed to mediate the relationship between citizens and planning via housing, marks the post-1948 housing condition in Israel-Palestine. The Israeli housing regime, Zamud, is a consolidated state policy intended to re-root the Jewish people in their homeland by providing housing to all Jewish citizens as the realization of the right of every Jew to his or her homeland. This housing regime reflects the idea that nation-building must involve housing the members of the nation and transforming them into citizens, while at the same time limiting the access of non-nationals to the homeland. Housing is therefore made into equipment for designing the proper citizen who supports the regime, and for distinguishing the good subject from improper subjects. Over against the state’s housing regime, the Arab-Palestinian Israeli housing regime, Summud, is a self-imposed housing regime intended to hold on to the homeland and to resist the Zamud regime’s attempts eliminate the Palestinian threat to its sovereignty over the homeland.

Although housing in the age of state sovereignty was no longer the direct result of dwellers’ actions, Part III shows that it was nonetheless planned and produced as a direct result of the citizens’ continuous demands for alterations to the state-citizen contract. The consolidation of ‘regime’ and ‘subjects’ as opposing ends of power, as suggested by Foucault for modern governance, is thus deeply contested.

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918 See discussion of my use of the term Israel-Palestine in the introductory chapter.
919 See discussion of this dissertation’s use of sovereignty and self-rule in the introductory chapter.
What is the ‘good house’ and who is the ’good citizen’? The relationship between sovereignty and housing is discussed in Part III in three chapters which map housing in Israel-Palestine following the post-1948 ‘housing boom.’ Chapter 6 investigates the consolidation of Zamud ‘good housing’ during Israel’s first five years of independence, a period curiously little studied in architectural terms, focusing on the post-1948 mass Jewish migration and the vast housing solutions devised to accommodate it. Chapter 7 focuses on the uprooting of Palestinians and investigates the Summud housing strategy employed by Israel’s Arab-Palestinian citizenry since 1948 in response to the state’s Zamud housing regime. Chapter 8 aims to outline a capsule history of ‘good housing’ during state sovereignty, from 1948 to the present, the story of the formation of a differentiated system of citizenship in Israel, based on differentiated access to ‘proper’ housing. This capsule history is written against the backdrop of the absence of any overarching narrative of the Israeli housing regime in the existing literature.
Chapter 6:
The consolidation of the state housing regime and the Zamud housing form during Israel’s first 5 years of independence, 1948-1953

6.1 INTRODUCTION

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6.8 CONCLUSION

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6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the nature of ‘good housing’ in the early stage of Israel’s statehood. State sovereignty marked the consolidation of Zionist housing policies into a state housing regime managing the relationship between nation-state and citizens via housing. While the consequences of sovereignty for the formation of housing in the service of nation-building is the focus of this chapter, it also exposes the fragility of sovereignty and the impact of the governed, namely the masses of post-independence immigrants, on the actions of the sovereign state as they materialized in housing. Much has been written about the mass housing and planning project of the ‘long 1950s’ in Israel, but little attention has been paid to the first five years of primarily temporary and ad-hoc architecture and planning, a fermenting ground for a number of laboratories for the Israeli ‘good house.’

The contribution made by this chapter lies in spreading the fan of this historical period in order to locate the step-by-step consolidation of the state housing regime and the Zamud housing type. The state housing regime itself emerges here as but one actor in the housing game, and often led rather than leading.

During the first five years of independence and nation-building, Israel faced three perceived threats to its sovereignty. The state housing regime addressed these threats with three different housing policies issued in the course of five years. The first perceived threat was posed by Israel’s Arab-Palestinian ‘enemy’ citizenry who had not been ‘swept away’ during the 1948 war, perceived as a ‘fifth column.’ Israel’s first housing policy, geared to curb this threat, included harnessing pioneer immigrants for the settlement of vacated Arab-Palestinian houses and lands in primarily agricultural border settlements. The second perceived threat was posed by the JA and JNF, whose continued involvement in post-independence immigrant absorption and settlement threatened to form a state within a state and subject Israel to the sovereignty of world Jewry. This perceived threat was curbed with the Maabara housing policy, which took immigrants out of JA-controlled immigrant reception camps and settled them upon the land in temporary pioneer housing destined to form their allegiance to state and country. The third perceived threat was posed by the immigrants themselves who refused the state’s definition of proper housing and proper citizen, thereby rejecting the regime and threatening the state’s citizen-based legitimacy. This perceived threat was curbed using a planning policy for fragmenting the masses by dispersing them across the country, and a housing policy which accepted the immigrants’ understanding of proper housing as permanent, well-serviced housing for all. The irony of the process described in this chapter is the eventual success of the state housing regime in inscribing the immigrants with its definition of the ‘good house’ and ‘good citizen’ as Zamud, followed by a new wave of social unrest in the mid 1970s in mass demand for access to Zamud housing.

6.2 Nation building in the age of sovereignty

The Zionist nation-building project changed dramatically as a result of state sovereignty. Restrictions on Jewish immigration and limited access to land, the main obstacles to Zionist nation building, were removed. Masses of Jewish immigrants-citizens and access

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922 See chapter 8.
to nationalized land enabled the consolidation of state sovereignty as a mechanism for re-rooting the Jewish people in its ancestral homeland by providing universal housing as a materialization of the right of each Jew to his or her homeland. One of the most important changes to nation building following independence was the ability to conduct planning on a national scale, using access to nationalized land and the manpower of immigrants.

6.2.1 Access to land

The UN resolution of November 29, 1947 on the partition of Palestine declared the division of the homeland into two nation-states: a Jewish state and an Arab-Palestinian state. Its immediate consequence was Jewish legal right over parts of the ‘ancestral homeland’ by virtue of being a nation. This form of ownership of national lands was dramatically different from pre-statehood landownership by way of monetary legal ownership. The state, legitimated by the nation, therefore formed a landowning mechanism and housing regime dramatically different from pre-statehood Zionist settlement. The attempt by the UN partition plan to settle the two competing claims for the homeland failed, leading to civil war in British-ruled Palestine and eventually to the 1948 war. As result of the war, Israel enlarged its territory at the expense of the area designated to the Arab-Palestinian state and nationalized these parts of the homeland. Furthermore, large numbers of the Arab-Palestinian population were vacated from their lands and homes. Access to land, a paralyzing problem for pre-state Zionism, was thereby removed.

6.2.2 The ability to conduct planning

Pre-state planning focused on the planning of specific settlements and, in the rare case of purchase of a vast area like the Jezreel Valley, on regional planning as well, as seen in chapter 4 of this dissertation. “Though it was highly preoccupied with imagining the nation, Zionism never formed a clear physical image of its territory. While it aspired to produce a new space fit for a new society – a new environment for the ‘new Jew’ – the shape of this environment or the model by which it would be designed were never given any thought.” Planning conducted for the JA and JNF during the British Mandate, primarily by Richard Kauffmann, did not include any national planning or even regional planning. Planning efforts were relegated primarily to the realm of the settlement, whether urban or rural. One of the members of the JA Planning Committee, economist Dr. Alfred Bone of the JA research unit, recommended in January 1948 the formation of a central state institution for planning and development. This recommendation led to formation in March 1949 of the Governmental Planning Administration, which operated under the Ministry of Labor and was put in charge of master planning, general planning,

924 See chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation for further discussion.
and housing. Architect Arieh Sharon, a Kibbutz member, Bauhaus graduate, and decorated architect who worked for David Gen-Gurion, was appointed head of the department. The department was later broken down into three departments: the National Planning Department which operated under the Office of the Prime Minister; the General Planning Department which operated under the Ministry of the Interior; and the Housing Department which operated under the Ministry of Labor.

6.2.3 Free immigration of pioneer citizens

One of the most significant consequences of independence was control over state borders and therefore the ability to take in Jewish immigrants with no restriction as manpower for nation building.

Masses of Jewish immigrants flocked to the country upon independence, doubling Israel’s population in the course of three years (1948-1951). State leaders, especially first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, identified the new immigrants as citizens, the main legitimating factor for Israel’s sovereignty and regime. Prior to independence, and especially in light of resistance to British restriction of Jewish immigration, immigrants were regarded as pioneers. Illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine was hailed as heroic in view of the dangers involved, including travel in rickety boats and incarceration by the British. A case in point is the ship Jewish State, which sailed from Bulgaria in September 1947 carrying 2,664 immigrants, and whose name makes a direct link between Jewish immigration and Jewish sovereignty. The ship was caught by the British after a battle at sea with British ships (fig. 6.2). The pioneer ethos ascribed to immigration can be seen in the ‘immigration stamp’ issued by the JNF in Germany, depicting a small boat at the shores of Eretz Israel, facing a rock representing the British ban on Jewish immigration.

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930 Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/Personal Home: The Role of Public Housing in Shaping Space."
933 Jewish immigration to Mandate Palestine was severely restricted by the British in order to maintain the population status quo between Jews and Arabs. The Jewish Yishuv found this policy unacceptable for hindering its ability to form a Jewish national home, and as WW2 progressed also as a cynical forsaking of Jews escaping the Nazis. D. Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944 (Oxford University Press, 1990).
936 The ship later became part of the IDF navy. Anat Kidron, “The Israeli Navy, Founding Years” (Haifa University 2000).
immigration and blocking the boat’s entry to the Haifa port. The stamp reads: I will return to thee from the sadness of death, crib of bereavement (fig. 6.1).

Fig. 6.1 JNF ‘immigration stamp,’ JNF Germany, 1947.

Fig. 6.2 The Hagana ship ‘Jewish State’ with illegal immigrants at the Haifa port, caught by the British after a long fight with British ships, September 23, 1947. Photographer: Lazer Dinner.
Source: JNF archive.

Unlike the accepted belief, the scope of post-independence immigration did not surprise the independent state. On the contrary, Ben-Gurion’s 1943 plan for absorption of mass immigration expected the arrival of 1 million immigrants upon independence. Ben-Gurion’s plan, initiated during his tenure as JA chair, was prepared in response to the recommendation of the Peel Commission report to restrict Jewish immigration by making it conditional upon a proven ability to take in such a volume of immigration. Facing calls to restrict immigration, leaders Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir insisted that Israel should admit every Jew willing to immigrate and that housing the Jewish people was the state’s raison d’etre. Israel’s Declaration of Independence ties immigration with housing and political independence:

“...Impelled by historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. They made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns … aspiring towards independent nationhood. The massacre of millions of Jews in Europe identified … the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open wide the gates of the homeland to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations … The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles…”

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935 Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/ Personal Home: The Role of Public Housing in Shaping Space."
937 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel.
938 The Right of Return Law was issued in July 1950 and the Land Entry Law in August 1952. Source: Israeli Parliament.
939 Israel’s declaration of Independence
This approach was indeed materialized with a universal intake of Jewish immigrants. Between the May 15, 1948 declaration of independence and July 1951, the Jewish population in Israel doubled from 650,000 to 1,322,000 people, with immigration responsible for 88% of population growth. The universal approach to Jewish immigration was inscribed in a formal law, the Law of Return, signed July 1950, which acknowledges the right of each Jew to immigrate and become an Israeli citizen.

With the outbreak of the immigration wave, immigrants were lodged for several days in one of five ‘immigrant houses’ for the purpose of recording and recuperation before finding permanent housing across the country. These intermediate camps were former British army camps transformed into temporary immigrant reception camps. Following the short intake period of up to two weeks, the immigrants were expected to look for permanent housing throughout the country. These solutions were with relatives already in the country, in existing rural settlements and towns, in vacated Arab housing or in new border agricultural settlements which had formed during and immediately after the war. Temporary lodging for immigrants in barrack housing was not a foreign typology for Zionist immigration. In the 1910s and 1920s immigrants to Eretz Israel stayed for a few days to a week in the Jaffa immigrant house, before moving on to agricultural Moshavot and Kibbutzim (fig. 6.3, 6.4).

6.2.3.1 The Bulgarian ‘pioneer immigrant’ community

The hardship faced by the immigrants, primarily with respect to housing and employment, were accepted by state leaders as part of the pioneer experience and likened to the hardship faced by these leaders themselves when they had been pioneers. One of the most pioneer-minded immigrant communities, therefore marked as ‘good immigrants’ and ‘proper’ citizens, was the Bulgarian community.

Fig. 6.3 The Jaffa Immigrants’ House from 1912, photographed in 1969. Source: Ben-Shachar, 1990.
Fig. 6.4 The Brit Olim immigrant house, Jaffa, 1933. Source: Zur and Rotbard, 2009.

6.2.3.1 The Bulgarian ‘pioneer immigrant’ community

The hardship faced by the immigrants, primarily with respect to housing and employment, were accepted by state leaders as part of the pioneer experience and likened to the hardship faced by these leaders themselves when they had been pioneers. One of the most pioneer-minded immigrant communities, therefore marked as ‘good immigrants’ and ‘proper’ citizens, was the Bulgarian community.

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939 Sikron, 1957.
940 Ibid.
941 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State’s Early Settlement Map."
942 Zur, ed. Here Upon This Land.
943 Pinhas Ben-Shachar, Tel Aviv’s Houses Recount: The History of the First Hebrew City (Tel Aviv Ministry of Defence Press, 1990).
944 Sharon Rotbard and Muki Zur, Neither in Jaffa nor in Tel Aviv: The Shapira Neighborhood (Tel Aviv Babel, 2009).
The Jewish Bulgarian community was quick to immigrate to Israel upon independence, the only European Jewish community to immigrate in its entirety and in a single stroke. Bulgarian Jews, about 40,000 people constituting 11% of Europe’s Jewish population, all immigrated to Israel in a single year between May 1948 and December 1949. This time of arrival made the Bulgarian community dominant in Israel’s early years and a dominant community in the ‘internal borders’ of former-Arab and mixed cities in Israel like Jaffa, Haifa and Ramla, as will be shown below. Many Jewish-Bulgarian youth were members of the HaHalutz (pioneer) Zionist youth movement in Bulgaria, in the framework of which they received agricultural training towards immigrating to Eretz Israel. Like the immigrant-pioneers of the illegal immigrant ship Jewish State, members of the Bulgarian HaHalutz youth movement attempted to immigrate to British-dominated Palestine during the 1940s, and especially after the close of World War II. Many boats were caught by the British, yet some Bulgarian Jews managed to arrive in Eretz Israel and settled primarily in Kibbutzim across the country and in Tel Aviv. Those caught by the British were sent back to Bulgaria or kept in detention camps in Cyprus.

Following their agricultural training, HaHalutz members from Bulgaria saved money for purchase of land in Eretz Israel. They transferred the funds to envoys of the JA in Bulgaria, who established the Palestine Immigration Settlement Company (PISC) in 1937 in Tel Aviv. The objectives of the company included “settling Jewish immigrants from Bulgaria and elsewhere on land in Palestine” and “promoting the cause of the National Home for the Jewish People under the mandate of the League of Nations” (fig. 6.7). PISC was established to manage and execute the settlement of Zionists from Bulgaria upon land purchased in the early 1920s via JA envoys in Bulgaria. ‘The Bulgarian Lands,’ as they are known to this day, are 34 hectares of land located north of Ramla on the Lyda-Jaffa road and designated for the erection of a settlement based on houses with subsistence farms. The plan devised by the PISC in 1945 for developing the land into a settlement divided the land into 162 plots for housing and subsistence farms, 1500 sqm each. The plan was announced in October 1947 (fig. 6.8). Due to the 1948 war, the materialization of the settlement was not possible. After the war, for unclear reasons, landownership transferred to the JNF.

947 For further discussion of vacated Arab housing see chapter 8 of this dissertation.
948 Haskell, *From Sofia to Jaffa: The Jews of Bulgaria and Israel*.
949 Lissak, ed. *Studies in the Social History of Israel*.
951 File of the Palestine Immigration Settlement Company, Register of Companies, Government of Palestine (currently with Israeli Register of Companies archive).
952 The land is currently waiting the regional council of GanRave, next to moshav BeitOved.
953 Court verdict, Tel Aviv court of appeals, February 16, 2011.
954 Ibid.
The Bulgarian Zionist immigrants, partaking in Israeli citizenship and nation building as pioneer individuals and as a community, made this community a significant population in Israel’s formative first decade. As pioneer citizens, the Bulgarian immigrants were ideal participants in the state’s first housing policy for both rural and urban areas, as discussed
The importance of the Bulgarian community lies both in the historical moment of their immigration immediately upon independence, marking them numerically significant in post-independence Israel, and in their distinct character as a ‘buffer community’ positioned at the intersection of many of the watershed social conflicts in Israeli society upon independence and ever since. As sincere pioneer-immigrants they mediated between the pioneer Yishuv society and the immigrant society, which were often explicitly hostile to each other. While ‘good subjects’ by virtue of their willing acceptance of the pioneer tasks entrusted upon them by the state when settled in internal and external borders with the Arab enemy, they nonetheless established very good relationships with the Arab-Palestinian population. This was true especially for internal-urban borders (in Jaffa, Haifa, Ramla) where immigrants were housed in vacated Arab-Palestinian housing yet nonetheless cohabited with the remaining population. Moreover, despite being religious Jews they were comfortable with eating pork and driving on Saturday. The rabbi of the Bulgarian community in Jaffa, Rabbi Abraham Bachar, was known to ride his scooter to Saturday matches of the community-led soccer team, Maccabi Jaffa. Their citizenship, at once comfortable with the state and unwilling to dominate it and become the elite, was noted for being all-Israeli rather than sectarian. This community’s perspective on pioneer citizenship, the senior Yishuv, as well as the ‘enemy citizenry,’ religion and social power relations has greatly affected the society of those times.

6.3 First housing policy: Agricultural-border settlement

The first stage of Israel’s housing policy was directed primarily at the perceived threat of its ‘enemy’ citizenry and at the vacated land gained during the war. The only physical, economic, and cultural planning for the absorption of immigrants, Moshe Lissak notes, was in the rural framework. This housing policy was not new in terms of its conceptual thinking. It identified the threat to Israel’s sovereignty to be the same old threat as in pre-statehood, namely Palestinian claim for the same homeland, and proposed the same tool for containing this threat, namely staking a hold on the homeland by rural settlement and land cultivation. In July 1949, at the agricultural convention in Petach Tikva, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion outlined the government’s course of action towards agricultural settlement in the four upcoming years. These planning guidelines included settling 150,000 immigrants in 500 new settlements, developing versatile, intensive agricultural production for supplying food for the growing population, and forming a ‘belt’ of border settlements having a key role in border defense and in safeguarding the state’s sovereignty over its territory. State leadership, especially prime minister Ben-Gurion and head of the JA Settlement Department Levi Eshkol, regarded the agricultural

955 Haskell, From Sofia to Jaffa: The Jews of Bulgaria and Israel.
957 A popular song by the popular group Gazoz, written in 1979, talks about social conflict in Israel and states ‘there are many people among us/white, brown and black/on the outside they all look different/but on the inside they are all Bulgarians’. Dany Sanderson, An Everyday Song, 1979.
958 Haskell, From Sofia to Jaffa: The Jews of Bulgaria and Israel.
959 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel; ibid.
960 Food shortages due to the mass immigration and need to nourish all immigrants were a severe burden on the population. See Mordechai Naor, “The Maabarot,” in Immigrants and Ma’abarot, 1948-1952, ed. Mordechai Naor (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1988).
961 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel.
community as the strongest sector in Israeli society and in the best position to absorb the immigrants and form them as proper subjects.\textsuperscript{962}

In addition, the Zionist housing regime hoped – and in a sense assumed – that incoming immigrants share the pioneer willingness to sustain the Zionist goal of political independence via land cultivation and border defense. Directing immigrants to villages and rural labor was therefore the ideal strategy for the state housing regime.\textsuperscript{963} Immigrant rural settlement was to continue the Kibbutz pioneer tradition of border defense and land cultivation. The new settlements were designed to increase the overall volume of agricultural production and to provide the immigrants with employment and housing solutions.\textsuperscript{964} The ‘plan for rural settlement’ included in the guidelines of Israel’s first government of March 1949 states that the government would act to direct immigration to villages and rural settlements.\textsuperscript{965} The first round of national planning was thus aimed at settling immigrants in the framework of pioneer Zionist rural settlement, embedded in the pioneer ethos of rooting oneself in the homeland via toil of the land.\textsuperscript{966} Responsibility for housing the masses of immigrants was divided between the JA and the state. While the state was responsible for providing permanent housing solutions based on its ability to conduct planning, the JA was responsible for the intake of immigrants in interim reception camps. This division of labor seemed logical as it utilized the comparative advantage of the two bodies: the state had the capacity of national planning, but it suffered from acute shortage of foreign currency, leading to a severe austerity regime intended to prevent starvation. The JA, on the other hand, did not have the capacity to generate far-reaching solutions for the immigration problem, but since it was funded by world Jewry it had available funds to support the immigrants’ subsistence at the camps. This was intended to be merely short-term support, for the brief period until immigrants were permanently housed in agricultural settlements and were able to provide for themselves.

New agricultural settlements were founded as early as the outbreak of the year-long 1948 war, used by the interim government, the IDF, and the JNF as a means to stake claims to the homeland, in the tradition of the Zionist use of settlements to design political borders.\textsuperscript{967} The first stage included settlement along the 1947 partition line in order to secure the lands allocated by the UN for the Jewish state.\textsuperscript{968} As the war proceeded and lands beyond the UN plan were gained, the IDF added a settlement officer to its General Staff, in charge of conveying to the settling agencies concrete settlement proposals for occupied and partially occupied areas. A memorandum submitted by General Shamir

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item 962 Goldstein, \textit{Eshkol - Biography}.\newline
\item 963 Lissak, ed. \textit{Studies in the Social History of Israel}.\newline
\item 964 Guidelines for Government Policy, March 1949, in Government Yearbook 1950. p. 38.\newline
Levi Eshkol, \textit{The Hardships of Settlement} (Tel Aviv Am Oved, 1959).\newline
\item 965 Ben-Gurion letter to Dr. Grinbaum of the department of economic research in the Ministry of the Interior, August 4 1949. State Archive. Ben-Gurion asks Grinbaum to make sure the plan for agricultural settlement is fulfilled.\newline
\item 967 See chapters 2.4.5 of this dissertation.\newline
\item 968 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State’s Early Settlement Map."; ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
stated that “our hold of significant territory can slip from our hands if we don’t literally occupy them … These lands are seemingly within our territory according to the frontline, but are not ours in practice. If we don’t settle and cultivate them immediately they might not be ours.”\(^969\) During the war, until December 1949, 101 agricultural settlements were founded, of which 66 were Kibbutzim and 35 were Moshavim. Of the Moshav settlements, 22 were immigrant Moshavim composed entirely of pioneer immigrants.\(^970\)

As far as the IDF settlement department was concerned, this number should have been doubled. The main obstacle for settlement was manpower, and immigrants were expected to fulfill this need for pioneer settlement along the borders. As early as November 1948, while the war was still being waged, Eshkol, head of the JA Settlement Department, proposed settling immigrants in vacated Arab villages. “We should make a serious attempt to storm the new immigrants now located in immigrant reception camps and find options for designing and educating them as settlers,” Eshkol stated.\(^971\) His proposal was to settle immigrants as soon as possible in vacated villages: “There are hundreds of deserted villages in the land … we should storm them in preparation for winter, transfer dozens of families there with [agricultural] instructors from the veteran Kibbutzim and Moshavim. We should supply each such group with tools and … start cultivating the fields at once.”\(^972\)

Settlement immediately after the war, too, was directed at the threat posed by Palestinians, now at the Palestinians who had not been ‘swept away’ during the war and had become Israeli citizens yet were suspected as enemy citizens. While most of the Jewish population was located at the center of the country, most of the Arab-Palestinian population was located at its periphery. This postwar reality was maintained by enforcing a military regime upon the Arab-Palestinian population.\(^973\) Settlement in the country’s periphery along the ‘enemy’ Arab-Palestinian population and in vacated Arab-Palestinian housing was therefore defined as pioneer settlement even when not agricultural in nature. Vacated Arab-Palestinian housing in the main cities of Haifa, Jerusalem, and Jaffa and their neighboring villages were also identified as ‘pioneer’ sites for settlement due to their proximity to the Arab-Palestinian ‘enemy citizenry.’\(^974\)

As a result of the war some 400 Arab-Palestinian agricultural villages were vacated of their inhabitants.\(^975\) Yet upon review of the vacated villages, the JA Settling Department soon reached the conclusion that only 36 vacated villages included housing appropriate for immediate settlement.\(^976\) Thus while vacated land was plentiful and available for each of the vacated villages, only 36 such villages were populated in early 1949 due to the


\(^{970}\) Ibid.

\(^{971}\) Eshkol, *The Hardships of Settlement.* p. 204-205.

\(^{972}\) Ibid. p. 270-273.

\(^{973}\) For a detailed discussion of the Arab-Palestinian citizenry of Israel see chapter 7 ahead.

\(^{974}\) Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."

\(^{975}\) The exact number of villages is debated. See chapter 7 of this dissertation for a detailed account of this debate.

\(^{976}\) Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
conditions of the vacated housing. New agricultural settlements and housing therefore had to be formed. Starting in January 1949, 10 to 15 new agricultural settlements were founded monthly, most on them on vacated Palestinian lands. Between May 1948 and May 1952, the JA settlement department founded 270 rural settlements, of which 147, or 54%, were immigrant Moshav settlements, housing 50,000 immigrants. An additional 35,000 immigrants joined existing Kibbutzim and Moshavim. In order to preempt Palestinian return to these lands in the framework of a future settlement, lands nationalized by the state was sold to the JNF, whose founding treaty defines its lands as designated for settlement of the Jewish people.

6.3.1 Self-help housing

Self-help is a core principle of Jewish nationalism. It is posited on the idea of self-governance, understood by Zionists as key for materializing state sovereignty. Self-housing and settlement based on limited, provisional support of the settling agencies was employed by Zionist pioneers since the 1910s. It was therefore the main housing policy following state independence as well, posited on the abovementioned construal of immigrants as pioneer citizens. The self-help housing options available to immigrants after leaving the interim immigrant reception camp included housing vacated by Palestinians and core housing provided by the state, often in the form of building materials (primarily timber and concrete blocks) for autoconstruction and further expansion by the immigrants themselves.

6.3.1.1 Vacated housing

As some 600,000 Palestinians had left their homes and settlements during the war, vacated housing became a significant housing solution for incoming immigrants. “It is better than keeping immigrants in the camps on allowance … and keeping fields desolate,” Eshkol stated. “Until we manage to plan permanent settlements and build new houses, until we can embark on planning settlements, many months will pass.” The state housing regime encouraged immigrants to house themselves in these houses, and some 124,000 immigrants were so housed between May 1948 and December 1949. Use of vacated housing was unplanned, as can be seen by the initial demolition of vacated housing by the authorities for various reasons: unsafe structures damaged in the war, the wish to prevent Arab-Palestinians from returning to their homes, and preventing immigrants from settling in ‘improper’ housing. The initial populating of vacated

977 For a more detailed discussion of vacated Arab-Palestinian villages see chapter 7 of this dissertation.
979 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
980 Ibid.
981 I will be using the term ‘vacated’ for these houses rather than that-day term of ‘deserted’ housing. For a detailed account of the Nakba as a housing issue from the Palestinian perspective see chapter 7.
984 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel. Vacated Arab housing were confiscated by the state and managed by the Amidar government company. Immigrants were required to pay the government via Amidar for renting these housing. See further discussion ahead.
housing was the result of actions taken by the immigrants themselves prior to state direction of immigrants to vacated housing.\textsuperscript{986} Since vacated housing was up for grabs, immigrants arriving in the first few months after independence found quality or at least intact vacated housing, whereas immigrants arriving shortly thereafter found houses of lesser quality or partially destroyed due to the war. Moreover, the pace of immigration and extent of housing needs led to the subdividing of houses to serve several families, each occupying a room.\textsuperscript{987} One of the immigrants from Bulgaria recounts:\textsuperscript{988}

We arrived in the country on May 15, 1949, and stayed for a short time at the immigrant reception camp in Pardes Hana. We then moved to Tel Aviv and stayed at hotel Plagia by the shore till we got word that Arab Jaffa is available for population. We were assigned a room in a house on the central Yefet street. It was a beautiful house with painted ceilings which belonged, we were told, to a rich pharmacist who had fled the country. We were full of admiration for the beauty. Ours was a two-room wooden section outside the main house, with attached bathroom and kitchen. It felt like a palace to us … Each section of the house was housed with a different family … the Hashomer Hazair [youth movement] club was located in the building … We later moved to Bat Yam.\textsuperscript{989}

Another immigrant from Bulgaria recounts:

We arrived in the port of Haifa on October 28, 1949, on the boat \textit{Kefalos} after a long journey via Greece. It was a dream come true. Buses took us to the Immigrant reception camps in Hadera where we received a warm meal, blankets, iron beds and canvas tents. But the pleasant weather became stormy and rainy … All that was on the floor of the tent was washed away with the water, including my shoes … We remained in the camp but a few days. My father started looking for a house in Jaffa and soon found one. It was a house in early stages of construction, with no windows or paving, but it served us as a roof over our heads. A big case served us as a table and small cases as chairs. We received folding metal beds and wool blankets from the JA. We were so happy when father came back from the market with a loaf of bread and a piece of halva … only those who experienced the shortage of a long war can understand that … Jaffa, street number 229, house number 13 – this is where my second life began.\textsuperscript{990}

As the testimonies just cited attest, the mere five months’ difference in arriving in the country generated a dramatic difference in availability of vacated housing. Moshe Lissak gives a demographic account reaching the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{991} By December 1949, vacated Arab housing was no longer available, and the state housing regime had to offer the flocking immigrants other housing solutions. The legal status of vacated property was

\textsuperscript{986} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{987} Naor, ”The Maabarot.” Lissak, ed. \textit{Studies in the Social History of Israel}.
\textsuperscript{988} Oral histories of the Bulgarian community in Israel, at the Association of Bulgarian Immigrants, Tel Aviv.
\textsuperscript{989} Betty Leon, archive of the Association of Bulgarian Immigrants, Jaffa.
\textsuperscript{990} Madi Benado, archive of the Association of Bulgarian Immigrants, Jaffa.
\textsuperscript{991} Lissak, ed. \textit{Studies in the Social History of Israel}.
ordered by the ‘Deserted Areas Order’\textsuperscript{992} issued by the interim government on May 16, 1948.\textsuperscript{993} The order declared all property left by its owners as state property. Vacated housing was managed by the Amidar governmental company, which leased out vacated housing, or more accurately charged rent from immigrants who settled in vacated housing.\textsuperscript{994} Despite the obvious tensions emerging from the situation of immigrants settling in houses vacated by locals turned refugees, scholars acknowledge that the relationship between the immigrants and the remaining population, especially in Jaffa, Ramle and Haifa, were surprisingly good.\textsuperscript{995}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{immigrants.jpg}
\caption{Fig. 6.9 “An immigrant from Bulgaria speaking with an Arab man in a street in Jaffa,” 1949. Photographer: Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC. Fig. 6.10 New immigrants from Bulgaria living in vacated houses in Jaffa. Photographer: Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC. Fig. 6.11 New immigrants from Yemen moving into vacated houses at Aqir, 1949. Photography: Hugo Mendelson. Source: NPC.}
\end{figure}

6.3.1.2 Shack housing

Israel’s pressing need for housing generated many business propositions for the commercial supply of dwelling units. Most of the initial propositions were for simple wood and asbestos shacks, cheap and requiring little construction skills. Most of these propositions, however, were above state budget, including such amenities like in-house kitchen and toilet (fig. 6.12, 6.13). While purchase of such shacks would provide dwellers with long-term housing solutions of relatively good quality, their higher cost meant providing housing for fewer citizens. The cheapest way to import shacks was in the form of raw material, i.e. as bulk cut timber. Nonetheless, the Housing Department’s technical unit, headed by engineer Asher Allweil, examined the technical details of each proposal and produced detailed reports of the minimal needs appropriate for the Israeli climate, the desired level of infrastructure services, and family size. Costs were reduced by specifying roofs that do not need to withstand snow load, or by giving up toilets since the settlements were not connected to a sewage system.\textsuperscript{996} After long deliberations the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{992} See further discussion of absentee Arab-Palestinian land and property in chapter 8.
\item \textsuperscript{993} The temporary government ruled the country till the first elections held on January 25, 1949.
\item \textsuperscript{994} Amidar was later entrusted with construction of new permanent housing for immigrants, a task it did not manage to perform quickly enough to meet demands. Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel. Azulai, Foundational Violence 1947-1950.
\item \textsuperscript{995} Haskell, From Sofia to Jaffa: The Jews of Bulgaria and Israel.
\item \textsuperscript{996} Mrinalini Rajagopalan, “Building the Homeland: Narratives of Violence and Aesthetics in the Construction of Eretz Israel” (University of California, Berkeley, 2003).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Ministry of Labor Housing Department chose to purchase wooden shacks in bulk pre-cut planks, primarily from Sweden and Finland, whose governments offered Israel barter purchase schemes that allowed Israel to sidestep its severe shortage of foreign currency. The Housing Department then commissioned local companies to transport timber to the designated sites, cast concrete foundations for the shacks, and hammer them on site. In many cases, however, the shacks were assembled on site by the dwellers themselves, in the tradition of Kibbutz shacks in the 1920s (figs. 6.14, 6.15). Shacks sized 24, 28 or 32 square meters, allocated to immigrant families by family size. Shacks were leased out to the immigrants by the governmental company Amidar at the cost of 8, 9 or 10 Lira respectively, with a 150 Lira deposit. If immigrants did not have the means to pay the deposit, they were given a loan for this sum by the Absorption Department. Purchase of the dwelling unit was also possible for a payment of 400 or 600 Lira, and the remaining unspecified amount in monthly rent.

Fig. 6.12 ‘The Wentik House,’ Dutch proposal for import of prefabricated shacks, 1952. Source: State archive, prefabricated houses file.

Fig. 6.13 Pilod Company, France, 1958. Source: State archive, prefabricated houses file.

997 State archive, Building methods file part B. See for example letter from David Tene, head of the Department of Housing in the Ministry of Labor to the Ministry of Finance, dated October 26, 1953, concerning the terms of a $400,000 contract for purchase of wooden shacks from Finland.

998 State archive, shack file. One example was the state’s contract with Ha’argaz Company.

999 See for example the contract signed by the Israeli government and the Amishav company, dated July 27, 1952. State archive, building methods file part B.

1000 Letter from David Tene, head of the Housing department in the Ministry of Labor to the Amidar company, dated December 14, 1952. Letter from the Housing Department to the Rasco company, dated November 11, 1952. State archive, building methods file part B.
6.3.1.3 Hollow concrete block housing (‘blockon’)

The ‘blockon,’ named after its construction method of hollow concrete blocks, was the first model for permanent housing proposed by the Planning Department of the Ministry of Labor and Construction. This model was a single-story structure of two dwelling units of 24 square meters each, built of concrete blocks upon a concrete cast floor. The roof was made of asbestos or concrete tiles. The first blockon, ‘an experimental standard house,’ was built on the grounds of the government headquarters in Tel Aviv (Hakirya) in the course of one day in June 1949, in order to be examined and approved by all ministries and relevant professionals. Initially, each dwelling unit included a single room and a water tap. The ‘dry’ toilets (not connected to a sewage system) were located in a small shack outside the house. Later versions included an internal ceiling and a plywood partition separating parents from children. The blockon was to serve a self-help unit for a ‘growing house.’ Its advantages, compared with the immigrant camp, were “the opportunity to enlarge the apartment with family growth; stronger attachment of the dweller to their house; a plot of land for each apartment; the possible transfer of ownership over the house to the dweller,” These actions and statements figure the blockon clearly as an instance of Zamud housing. In May 1949 preparations were already made for constructing 3000 blockon units across the country. 7,800 units of the basic blockon were constructed, some of them by the dwellers themselves (fig. 6.18, 6.19, 6.21). The housing department did not regard the blockon as permanent housing but rather as core self-help housing. Its small size and limited amenities were never

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1001 Tirat Yehuda was founded 1949 on the lands of the village of Al-Tira, conquered by the Israeli army along with the towns of Ramla and Lod. Vilnai, ed. Ariel – Geographic Encyclopedia of Eretz Israel.

1002 The department of public health complained it was not invited to examine the house. See State archive, blockon file.

1003 David Zaslewski, Immigrant Housing in Israel - Construction, Planning and Development (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1954).


1007 See Sharon’s definition of the blockon above. While the state housing regime did not explicitly term the blockon ‘self-help’, this housing logic fits well in the scope of self help housing. See:
identified by state planners and architects as ‘good enough’ for the immigrants but rather as a first step towards self-sufficiency, connection to the land, and better living conditions.\textsuperscript{1008} The blockon was therefore ‘proper’ pioneer housing in the Israeli historical framework, a continuation of the pioneer tradition discussed in chapters 1, 2, 4 which by definition possessed a ‘self-help’ nature and purpose.

Fig. 6.17 The ‘blockon’ house: two family units of 24 square meters each. Source: Zaslowsky, 1954.

Fig. 6.18, immigrants constructing their own permanent houses in Moshav Ein Ayala, October 1950. Photographer: Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC.

Fig. 6.19 Construction of block house in Beit Nekofa, 1950. Source: JNF archive.

Fig. 6.20 Initial housing in Moshav Ein Ayala in tents, 1949. Photographer: Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC.

Fig. 6.21 Immigrants from Sophia, Bulgaria, building an additional structure for their family now living in one room in Azur. June 1949.

\textbf{6.4 The pivotal case of the Ramla district}

Ramla is a pivotal case of the first housing policy, now pretty much forgotten by scholarship.\textsuperscript{1009} A major Arab city with a long and significant history, it is a city where the Israeli nation-state decided to house homeless immigrants it wished to transform into

\textsuperscript{1008} Letter from Arie Sharon, head of the housing department to the technical department of the Jewish Agency, September 29 1949. State archive, Blockon file.

\textsuperscript{1009} Scholarship of the mass immigration absorption process focuses primarily on the third housing policy discussed below in section 7.
‘natives’ in and next to the old Arab city housing the competing nationality, where some if its members remained. What kinds of tension emerge here? What is the meaning of immigrants’ housing in this context? How do questions of belonging and nativity play out here? As seen in the case of Umm Juni in chapter 2, these questions are not unique to Ramla but are foundational to Zionism’s housing policy, appearing in various modalities in all the pivotal cases for the history of housing in Israel-Palestine.

As part of its intention to curb the local Arab-Palestinian population, the state housing regime combined in the Ramla district its two pioneer-settlement strategies to create a single housing form, one that provides both agricultural cultivation and containment of the ‘enemy citizenry.’ Most of the scholarly attention on the mass housing of immigrants is focused on the northern and southern districts of the country. The existing literature overwhelmingly focuses on immigrant towns and villages in the Negev desert and the Galilee as primary sites for immigrant settling efforts by the state’s housing regime. Yet data presented by Haim Darin-Drabkin indicates that the population growth in the Ramla area by 1955 exceeded all other areas in the country and amounted to 2143.5%, significantly surpassing any other part of the country as a site of immigrant settlement. Comparatively, Darin-Drabkin brings data indicating that the Jezreel district grew 181%, the Beer-Sheba district grew 1779%, and the Tel Aviv district grew 87.2%. The Ramla district grew 12 times more than the Jezreel district, 25 times more than the Tel Aviv district, and 1.2 times more than the Beer-Sheba despite being merely 1/10 its size – and can therefore be identified as the most significant district for immigrant settlement. Ramla, moreover, was the most densely populated district, both in terms of population growth and in terms of the number of new settlements formed. And, as indicated by Darin-Drabkin, the majority of the new settlements formed in the Ramla area were agricultural settlements, the proper locus for citizen formation and border protection, as defined by state leaders.

Darin-Drabkin himself ignores these facts, preferring to focus on the Jezreel and Beer Sheba districts, as has all the rest of the literature on this topic. This lacuna in the existing scholarship is to be attributed, as I will show below, to the nature of the architecture involved.


1011 The Jezreel Valley, including Kibbutz Beit Alpha, is the focus of chapter 5 of this dissertation.


1013 Goldstein, Eshkol - Biography.
Ramla was a border district, not only because it bordered on the Jordanian-held West Bank, but primarily because its two main population hubs – the cities of Ramla and Lydda – were important Arab-Palestinian cities until 1948. As mentioned above, the Ramla area was designated by the UN partition plan to be part of the Palestinian state, and its conquest by Israeli forces was a major event of the 1948 war. After the war, the area was still populated with a significant Arab population of remaining residents and internal refugees, and was considered an internal border zone. While located at the geographical center of the country, the Ramla district was a border area and treated as such by allocation of significant ‘pioneer’ settlements and population. Immigrants were settled in the Ramla district in one of two border areas: the internal urban border with Israel’s Arab citizenry, and the external rural border with Jordan. In the first stage, the state housing regime directed immigrants to find housing in vacated houses in the old city of Ramla. Some 6,000 Jewish immigrants found dwelling in rooms in the city, often sharing a house with several other families. Subsequently, the Ramla district was settled with two key dwelling types: subsistence farms right outside the old city and agricultural immigrant Moshav settlements.

The significance of the Ramla district and city, which explicitly contributed to the concentration of settling effort there by the state housing regime, lay in its centrality as an Arab-Palestinian area before the war. Under the British Mandate, the population of

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1015 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
Ramla grew steadily, reaching 12,000 Muslims and 3,300 Christians in 1945. Although Ramla was primarily an Arab city, it had a small Jewish community until the outbreak of the civil war in Palestine in 1936–1939. Ramla was part of the territory allotted to the proposed Arab state under the 1947 UN Partition Plan. However, Ramla's geographical location and its strategic position on the main supply route to Jerusalem made it a point of contention during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Ramla was captured on July 12, 1948, and most of the inhabitants, estimated at 50,000-70,000, were driven out on the orders of David Ben-Gurion. The events in Lydda and Ramla accounted for one-tenth of the overall Arab exodus from Palestine.

6.4.1 Immigrant Moshav settlements

Kibbutzim, the dominant agricultural settlement form, were reluctant to absorb immigrants, and immigrants on their part were no less reluctant to settle in Kibbutzim. A research conducted in 1949-1950 found that 75% of the immigrants declared that they preferred urban life to Kibbutz life. The Kibbutz was a problematic settlement model for immigrant absorption, despite its dominance of the agricultural sector with 145 Kibbutzim to 72 Moshavim in 1948. First, Kibbutzim were concerned that their unique social structure, based on ideology, was in danger of dissolving due to introduction of settlers who did not share their principles. As non-member workers residing in the Kibbutz, immigrants posed the ideological challenge of paid labor, rejected outright by Kibbutz ideology as corrupting their classless society. Furthermore, attempts to absorb immigrant youth into the subject-formation mechanism of the Kibbutz youth society failed due to immigrant families' need of the youth's support in family income, which made many such youth leave the Kibbutz.

Correspondingly, many immigrants considered Kibbutz communalism an undesirable social model. Given the status of the Kibbutz as the dominant agricultural settlement form in the pre-state Yishuv, declaring it unfit for absorbing immigrants threatened to define agricultural settlement as a whole as unfit for immigrants, which leaders Ben-Gurion and Eshkol rejected outright. A different rural settlement model had to be devised for immigrants.

In February 1949 a special meeting of the Moshavim Movement convened in Ramla, proposing the absorption of Immigrants in Moshavim, under the slogan ‘from the camps to the village.' Later known as the Ramla Convention, the meeting included leaders Ben-Gurion and Eshkol who accepted the call of the Moshavim enthusiastically. The Moshavim Movement’s call for the state to direct immigrants to their settlements was based on their dire need of population rejuvenation following the 1948 war. The enlisting

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1016 Morris, _The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949_. See chapter 7 for discussion of the refugee housing of Palestinians from the Ramla area.
1018 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
1019 Lissak, ed. _Studies in the Social History of Israel_.
1020 Ibid.
1021 Lissak, ed. _Studies in the Social History of Israel_.
1022 Goldstein, _Eshkol - Biography_.

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of Moshavim members to the British Army during World War II and to the Jewish militias during the 1948 war had left many lands uncultivated and desolate for extended periods of time. Moshavim had also suffered many casualties during the war.\textsuperscript{1023} State leaders, on their part, accepted the Moshav as an appropriate framework of agricultural settlement by immigrants.\textsuperscript{1024} The Moshav framework was a cooperative model for family-based agricultural farms, as discussed in chapter 6, which seemed more appropriate for the immigrants who were Zionists but not necessarily communists.\textsuperscript{1025}

The abovementioned Ramla convention of February 1949 did not take place in Ramla accidentally, but due to the designation of the Ramla district for development by immigrant Moshav settlements. These settlements were to circle the towns of Ramla and Lydda and to protect the Jordanian border from infiltration. One such Moshav is Tirat Yehuda, founded on the lands of the village of Al-Tira in 1949, following the conquest of Al-Tira along with the cities of Ramla and Lydda. As absentee land, Al-Tira lands were nationalized by the state. In order to ensure that refugees would not be able to return and claim the village, the state sold these lands (along with other lands) to the JNF, whose founding edicts determined its lands for Jewish settlement.\textsuperscript{1026} Tirat Yehuda’s plan, prepared by the Settlement Department of the JA, included 35 agricultural farms and 22 subsistence farms. The plan follows design principles formulated by Kauffman for the JA since its early involvement in the planning of agricultural Kibbutz and Moshav settlements in the 1920s, discussed at length in chapter 4. Tirat Yehuda is organized around a core of public services (school, clinic, meeting hall), surrounded with members’ houses and farms. Behind each family house lie the family agricultural fields. Houses in the inner core, east of the public buildings, were subsistence farms allocated to professionals living in the Moshav, such as the doctor, the teacher, and the agronomist. Tirat Yehuda’s planning is that of the early stage of Moshav planning, characterized by individual, little-mechanized cultivation of agricultural fields. Later Moshav planning models included shared fields in addition to shared services, and correspondingly a more compact residential area.\textsuperscript{1028} The Tirat Yehuda plan was submitted in 1951 and approved in 1954, after all its houses were already standing and fields cultivated.

\textsuperscript{1023} Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
\textsuperscript{1024} It should be noted that directing immigrants to Moshavim rather than Kibbutzim was also a political statement on the part of Ben-Gurion. Kibbutzim were supporters of the Mapam political party rather than Ben-Gurion’s Mapai political party. Allocation of land, resources and population to undergo subject formation in this of the other parties’ stronghold had significant political implications in internal politics.
\textsuperscript{1027} For further discussion on the sale of state lands to the JNF see section 5.2 ahead.
\textsuperscript{1028} Chyutin and Chyutin, \textit{Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment}. 
The immigrants initially settled in the vacated houses of Al-Tira, which were stone and earth houses (fig. 6.29), and were employed by the JA in road construction until houses and fields were laid out. Initial housing in the stone and earth houses of Al-Tira is in the tradition of pioneer Degania-Umm Juni, discussed in chapter 2. The houses were built of local stone with a roof of wooden poles and earth (fig. 6.28, 6.29). In 1950 the JA supplied the settlers with concrete blocks, and construction of their permanent housing was finally accomplished. Blockon houses were standard core 4 by 8 meters with a roof of concrete tiles. Small concrete foundations were used to adjust them to the topography. Soon additions were made to the houses from scrap materials to serve for storage, kitchens, and workshops. The pioneer border location of Tirat Yehuda meant an everyday reality of attacks by infiltrators through the Jordanian border. Attacks generally amounted to harvest theft and sabotage. The most lethal attack on Tirat Yehuda, in June 1953, included shooting and throwing a grenade into one of the houses, resulting in the death of one resident.  

1029 Infiltrators Attacked a Moshav Near Lydda. Davar, June 10, 1953.
6.4.2 Urban subsistence farms

The internal border of the Ramla district, namely the Arab city of Ramla itself, was addressed by planning several new Jewish neighborhoods to surround and contain it in the framework of the Sharon Masterplan for Israel of 1951, as can be seen in fig. 6.34. The first of these neighborhoods, and a laboratory for the Ramla plan, was the Amidar Shacks neighborhood, erected right outside the Arab city in early 1950. The neighborhood combined urban housing and land cultivation in the form of self-help subsistence farms located just outside the boundary of the old city (fig. 6.33, 6.34.). The neighborhood included some 50 wooden shacks, each located upon a plot of land sizing 0.05-0.07 hectares. It provided pioneer-immigrants with a piece of the homeland to own and to cultivate.

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1030 See detailed discussion of the Sharon plan and its housing environment below in section 7.
Bulgarian ‘pioneer immigrants’ who purchased land for agricultural farms for themselves as part of the ‘Bulgarian lands’ (discussed in section 2.3.1 above) remained in the immigrant camps for relatively long periods while waiting for their land to become available for settlement.\textsuperscript{1032} Whereas most Bulgarian immigrants spent no more than three weeks in the camps while looking for housing in vacated towns and villages,\textsuperscript{1033} owners of plots in the Bulgarian lands spent a year in the barracks and tents of immigrant reception camps while waiting to be housed on the land they had purchased while in Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{1034} As far as they were concerned, immigrant reception camp housing was bad housing, not for the mud, the dripping tents, and the crowdedness, but for the lack of access to the land and to the Zionist dream of a small farm in Eretz Israel. After the 1950 winter, which was exceptionally cold and brought rare snow, the Bulgarian immigrants sent a representative to the JA office in Tel Aviv demanding answers and access to their privately owned agricultural land. Families who refused to wait for the development of their settlement were offered alternative plots of land in ‘pioneer’ areas in the country. The options included Kibbutz Dalia on the northern border, Moshav Kfar Hanagid, and a subsistence farm right outside the old Arab city of Ramla.\textsuperscript{1035} These options are all characterized by agricultural cultivation and border locations – either external or internal – thereby embodying the pioneer life of the proper Sabra, as the Zionist Yishuv understood it.

The prospect of becoming pioneers was the hope offered to the new citizens by the Israeli housing regime. The latter promoted this option vigorously by forming immigrant Moshav settlements in border areas like the Jezreel Valley, and extended it to far greater numbers of immigrants than acknowledged by scholarship, as will be discussed in depth below. Of the 36,000 Bulgarian Jews who immigrated after independence, one third settled in Jaffa and Tel Aviv, one third in Arab towns near Tel Aviv, and one third across the country, including in Moshavim.\textsuperscript{1036} Members of the groups each chose one of the

\textsuperscript{1032} Interview with Jacob Ninio, May 2011.
\textsuperscript{1033} Basok, 2008.
\textsuperscript{1034} Bulgarian Lands Court verdict, Tel Aviv court of appeals, February 16, 2011.
\textsuperscript{1035} Jacob Ninio, conversation May 2010.
\textsuperscript{1036} Basok, 2008.
abovementioned options according to considerations such as the whereabouts of other family members.

Fig. 6.36 Kibbutz Dalia, 1947. Photographer: Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC.
Fig. 6.37 Moshav Hosen, 1950. Source: JNF archive.
Fig. 6.38 A rare image of the Ramla shack neighborhood, 1957. Source: Author.

Some Bulgarian families chose the subsistence farm in Ramla, outside the old Arab city where other Bulgarian family members had squatted in rooms in vacated houses. Neighborhood lots included half of a wooden shack, 8 by 4.2 meters (34 square meters), and a plot of land 18 by 40 meters (0.07 hectares). The half-shack allocated was core housing, including two rooms with a water tap. Toilets were located at the far side of the plot in a small shack, since the neighborhood was not connected to the sewage system and every toilet had a septic tank (see fig. 6.43). The shack had already been assembled on site prior to their arrival, from timber purchased in Finland (hence their name, ‘Swedish huts’). The Shacks had ‘double’ walls comprising an inner skin and insulation. Shack roof was made of asbestos tiles and included no inner ceiling. The shack was laid on a floor of concrete tiles used for street pavements.

1037 Most wooden shacks were purchased as pre-cut timber in a barter agreement with the Finish government. State archive, shacks file.
The ratio between the shack area of 24-32 square meters (depending on family size) and the plot area of around 700 square meters (0.07 hectares) indicates that the shack was a self-help core housing within a plot wholly understood as the family home. The plots of land, the long aspired Zionist dream, served immigrant families as subsistence farms and main source of livelihood during the decade-long austerity period of 1949-1959, instituted by the Israeli government. The austerity, enforced by food rations, was declared in order to take consumer goods off the market, thereby bringing under control the soaring prices which resulted from high demand, and which would have left the poor immigrants with no capacity to provide for themselves.\textsuperscript{1038} Unemployment was one of the major problems, and many families relied on rations alone. People who had access to land and to some agricultural skill could support themselves by growing vegetables and livestock. Upon arrival the families found several apricot and almond trees on their plots, part of an orchard which had previously existed along the main road. The plots were used to grow vegetables and fruit trees, and to keep chickens and goats. The food produced helped support not only the nuclear family and the older parents living with them, but also extended family members who came for a visit and a meal and were sent back with rare

\textsuperscript{1038} Giladi, "From Austerity to Economic Growth."
eggs. As shacks included no ovens, people would bring their unbaked pastry to the baker and pay for the baking process, so building an oven in the yard served both the family and neighbors who baked their pastries in this private oven, rather than paying bakers for use of their ovens.

Since the shacks were extremely small, families used it primarily for sleep and considered the entire plot as its home, spending most of their time outside in a vine-covered shack and in the vegetable garden. Interestingly, this approach is very similar to the early Kibbutz, where the member’s room served primarily for sleep and most of the member’s time was spent in communal areas. Soon the families began to expand their living space by means of autoconstruction: porches were autoconstructed using concrete floor and a roof made of scrap wood, in order to serve as a covered outside sitting area facing the plot. After a while, some families autoconstructed an attached shack to serve as kitchen and workshop. Disassembled wooden barrels found in the area, flattened and hammered to a wooden frame, served as building material. These wooden walls were then covered with tar paper to prevent water leakage. Next, stone ovens were built in the yard for baking bread and Bulgarian pastry, and were surrounded by another autoconstructed shack made of scrap wood and disassembled barrels. During the winter the oven-heated shack would serve as workshop and play area.  

Families built additional structures on their plots, as can be seen in the 1964 plan which recorded property ownership. These structures served additional family members, teenage and married children, and small production workshops for extra income.

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1039 Interviews with Jacob Ninio, August 2011 and Rachel Aruetti, September 2011.
6.5 The housing crisis: New challenges to Israeli sovereignty

The preoccupation of the state housing regime with curbing the threat of ‘enemy citizenry’ by initiating ‘pioneer’ housing in border agricultural settlements led to the emergence of a massive housing crisis in the country. The direction of most resources and planning efforts to ‘pioneer settlements’ came at the expense of providing the masses of new citizens with appropriate housing solutions.\textsuperscript{1040} The filling up of vacated Arab housing by May 1949, and the exhaustion of whatever limited housing options were available in existing settlements,\textsuperscript{1041} required that the absorption agencies provide immigrants with some housing solution. This immigrant housing crisis, furthermore, escalated with each new immigration wave. Of the 100,000 immigrants arriving in the first eight months since independence (i.e. by January 1949), about one in four (28,000 immigrants) were housed in immigrant camps, while the three others managed to find permanent housing in existing settlements or in vacated Arab housing. With the rapid influx of immigrants, however, more and more immigrants encountered difficulties in finding permanent housing. By the end of 1949 some 90,000 immigrants lived in 7 camps throughout the country. With all the former British army camps filled, new camps were formed rapidly with no appropriate infrastructure and far away from sources of employment. No employment was available in the immigrant reception camps, and some camps forbade immigrants from leaving the camp to find employment outside it.\textsuperscript{1042} Of the 341,000 immigrants arriving in Israel by December 1949, 105,000 were housed in vacated housing: 53,000 in existing towns, 16,000 in Kibbutzim, and 36,000 at relatives’ housing. The remaining 236,000 immigrants required some form of housing solution,\textsuperscript{1043} and were eventually provided temporary housing in yet more immigrant reception camps.\textsuperscript{1044}

As the influx of immigration continued, an increasing number of immigrants did not manage to find permanent housing solutions and remained in the camps. When the five first camps filled up, additional former army bases throughout the country were turned into immigrant reception camps. At the end of 1948, camp population numbered 28,000 people. January 1949 alone saw the incoming of 27,000 immigrants and the transformation of additional army bases to immigrant reception camps, with 54,000 immigrants living in immigrant reception camps by April 1949.\textsuperscript{1045} As this condition persisted, the Jewish Agency (JA) and state absorption agencies dedicated one camp to the initial intake of immigrants. The St. Lucas British army camp near Haifa, the main immigration port, became the main intake and transit camp for immigrants, where all

\textsuperscript{1040} Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
\textsuperscript{1041} For the housing shortages for workers and low income families in the urban center of Tel Aviv see chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{1042} Partial leaving of the camp for employment only was often restricted. Naor, "The Maabarot."
\textsuperscript{1043} Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel.
\textsuperscript{1044} While dwelling was the thing at stake in both immigrant reception camps and The maabara, scholarship tents to focus its analysis of these housing forms on issues like employment, education, ethnicity and political ideology. See for example ibid.; Kachinsky, 1986; Darin-Drabkin, Housing in Israel: Economic & Sociological Aspects. Lofban, 1967; Shlomo Svirsky, "Not Retrograde but Retrograded - Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in Israel: Sociological Analysis and Conversations with Activists," Books for Research and Criticism (1981).
\textsuperscript{1045} Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
immigrants were classified, recorded, and housed for their first days in the country. The transit camp was to serve immigrants for a stay of three days to one week, before moving on to immigrant reception camps across the country. Renamed Sha’ar Aliya, or immigration gate, the camp took in an average of 1,000 immigrants per day, and at certain peak times housed up to 12,000 immigrants.

The immigrant reception camps, managed by the JA, provided the cheapest form of housing: large barrack shacks previously serving the British army, with 50 immigrants packed into each barrack. An immigrant’s living space was limited to his or her bed, with no division by family units, age or gender, and with poor food and sanitation facilities. Yet hardest of all was the long duration of camp dwelling, lasting several months under conditions of an ‘overnight shelter,’ before moving to permanent urban and rural dwelling in the tradition of the pioneer immigrants’ house discussed above. At the camp, which existed as a territory unto itself, the immigrants were disconnected from the rest of the country and forbidden from taking work outside it. Immigrants staying there were aimless and unemployed, frustrated and depressed. In short, given these miserable living conditions, it is hardly surprising that years later immigrants would still lament their time at the reception camp, recounting the extreme cold, the muddy, unpaved paths, the soup kitchen, the crowdedness, the unemployment. And yet, notwithstanding the poor housing environment it provided, the reception camp was rooted in the Zionist housing tradition as the pioneer’s first stop in the homeland, so state officials regarded it as a legitimate transit station where immigrants recuperated before heading for their permanent housing.

Fig. 6.47, 6.48, 6.49 Immigrants in the Sha’ar Aliya reception camp, 1949. Photography: Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC.

Fig. 6.50 Yemenite immigrant in an immigrant reception camp in Jerusalem, November 1949. Photography: Photo Manara. Source: JNF archive.

1046 Part of the process included questionable actions such as the spraying of immigrants with DDT and giving them new, Hebrew names. These practices were highly critiqued during and after the affect. References.
1047 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel.
Fig. 6.51 Immigrant women cooking a meal inside one of the barracks of the Sha’ar Alyia camp, July 1949. Photography: Zoltan Kluger, Source: NPC.

Fig. 6.52 Immigrant identity card for the Ninio family, stating they arrived on the boat *Bulgaria* on May 15, 1949, and left the immigrant reception camp of Pardes Hana on May 10, 1950. Their card lists the cost of their maintenance in the camp. Source: Jacob Ninio.

6.5.1 Threat of civil rebellion

The state housing regime did not intend to use the camps for long-term housing by any standards, neither technical nor ideological. Yet, as temporary as this arrangement might have been meant to be, immigrants remaining in the reception camps did not accept this protracted temporariness with a pioneer spirit of endurance. Moreover, many of them refused to settle in immigrant Moshav settlements along the borders. Meishar brings the testimony of a family from Cairo which refused the state’s offer to settle in a border Moshav “and be cannon fodder.”\(^{1048}\) Dr. Giora Yoseftal, head of the JA absorption department, described the camp condition as follows:

> When fifty men and women, children and the elderly are located in one barrack, the atmosphere is necessarily impossible. These are humiliating conditions in which we should not hold people. Several social crimes exist in the camps besides murder, theft, violence and prostitution. The good [human] material coming to the camps deteriorated quickly to a state of depression, until people were able to do nothing but weep quietly…The government should know that 47 persons held together [in a single hall] are explosive to the entire state, not only a threat of failure to the agency.\(^{1049}\)

Pinhas Lavon also defined the situation as explosive, putting the young state at the risk of a counter-revolution against the regime.\(^{1050}\) Lavon’s threat to the Mapai ruling party was based on his own judgment that immigrant camp conditions were deeply wrong, robbing immigrants of their ability and right to participate in the process of nation building as proper subjects, and expecting them to revolt in demand of their rights and duties. This improper housing, as both Yoseftal and Lavon note, were actively responsible for turning immigrants from potentially good Zionist subjects participating in the project of nation building into depressed and aimless people dependent on the state, if not into a challenge threatening to undermine the newly gained sovereignty. Expecting the immigrants to

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\(^{1048}\) Meishar, "Leaving the Castle."

\(^{1049}\) Jewish Agency board meeting protocols, March 29, 1949, CZA.

\(^{1050}\) Lavon Institute archive.
perform as self-governing pioneers and house and feed themselves, and letting the JA provide food and lodging to those immigrants who did not care for themselves, the regime had no real solution for this emerging crisis and its potential threat to state sovereignty. The masses of homeless immigrants, the short timespan, and the little monetary means available converged to create a massive housing crisis, both objective (i.e. hundreds of thousands of homeless citizens) and ideological, due to Israel’s self-definition as the ‘home for the Jewish people.’

“The policy of the Government of Israel in this situation was determined by the concept that the government should have to take upon itself the major responsibility for housing the immigrants,” stated Mordechai Bentov, Minister of Housing in Israel’s interim government. “Their urgent needs had to be catered for, since they could not be left to spend their nights on the beaches.” Bentov identified in his statement two components of the threat posed by the housing crisis to Israel’s sovereignty: first, the threat of social unrest among maltreated citizens; and second, as will be discussed below, the threat that institutions competing with the state would cater to the immigrants and thus challenge the state’s sovereignty. The state housing regime insisted to push as many immigrants as possible into pioneer life in immigrant border Moshavim. Since immigrants already in the country refused to ‘be cannon fodder’ in these border settlements, a new policy included settling immigrants in border settlements upon their arrival in the country, against their will, and often in the middle of the night. Adriana Kamp brings a quote attesting to the nation-building goal of ‘pioneering’ the immigrants beyond the need to settle the border: “most important is the feeling engulfing the new immigrants upon their arrival that they were taking part in one of the foundational projects of their nation’s rebirth. There is nothing like the feeling of standing by the state’s crib for the immigrant’s social healing.”

6.5.2 World Jewry: JNF pioneer housing, a state within a state

The two key elements for settlement remained access to land and the manpower of settlers. Control over these two resources made settlement possible. While the JNF did possess lands, purchased monetarily before the formation of the state, most of these lands were agriculturally undesirable, including a significant percentage of mountain terrain. Mass agricultural settlement, preferred by all settling agencies, required fertile land like that vacated by Arab-Palestinians and nationalized by the state. Moreover, the mass immigration of Jews became possible as a result of state sovereignty as discussed above, and was thus at least theoretically in the domain of the state. World Jewry, however, controlled the immigrants in the reception camps as well as most of the monetary means

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1053 Kamp, "The Face of the Border Like the Face of Janus."


1054 Laish, quoted in Kamp, "The Face of the Border Like the Face of Janus."
necessary for the actual construction of houses and for financing the living cost of immigrants.\textsuperscript{1055}

Immigrant reception camps were the responsibility of the immigration absorption department of the Jewish Agency, which provided for the immigrants while staying in the camps at the total cost of 500,000 dollars monthly, a third of its budget. As the immigrant reception camp crisis developed, the Israeli government started to identify world Jewry as a threat to its independence and sovereignty. This identification was shocking as the JA and JNF had until that moment been considered part and parcel of Israeli drive for sovereignty. Eshkol articulated the threat as follows: “Damned is this system of immigrant camps! I want to kill this system of [JA] clerical administration. Today the veteran Yishuv does not absorb immigration. Not Degania, not Ein Harod, not Tel Aviv. An absorption regime means that every citizen feels it. We shall take the Jews and their tents and place them by Degania. We can find them jobs clearing stones, leveling the ground. Nowadays when [immigrants] want to leave the camps they say: give me a house, I have no money for a house. \textit{Someone invented this system to destroy us}.\textsuperscript{1056}

One should remember that Eshkol occupied at the time a high office in the JA as head treasurer. Why did Eshkol respond so severely as to identify JA-controlled immigrant camps as “a system invented to destroy us”? While the state-JA relationship has been one of friendly rivalry over settlement since independence, the decisive act was the JNF’s initiation of a new settlement type upon its own lands, disregarding the state as a sovereign.

6.5.2.1 \textit{The Work Village}

The JA control of JNF lands, as well as its control of the immigrant population in the camps, enabled it to initiate the formation of settlements without the approval or permission of the state. This new settlement type, the Work Village, was initiated by JNF director Josef Weitz in response to the immigrant camp crisis. Work Villages, as the name suggests, were posited on supplying immigrants with work rather than charity and were founded on JNF border land, in Zamud housing, thereby granting immigrants access to the status and ethos of Israeli pioneer. This initiative seems like a response in the nature of Eshkol’s abovementioned call to enable immigrants to become pioneers, yet Eshkol regarded it a blunt violation of Israeli state sovereignty. Why? Because the JNF acted in this case as a self-sovereign state within a state. The JNF’s hold of lands and the availability of JA funds, matched with control of immigrants in the camps, enabled Josef Weitz to bypass the state and render it irrelevant. Moreover, by supplying immigrants ‘a way out’ of the camps, the JNF and indirectly the JA were pointing to the state as responsible for the immigrants’ grim situation. The civil unrest in the camps was capable of taking down the elected government, but of course not the non-elected organizations of world Jewry.

\textsuperscript{1055} Lissak, ed. \textit{Studies in the Social History of Israel}.
\textsuperscript{1056} Eshkol, protocol of the state-JA coordination committee, 1950. Quoted in Sleifer, "Urban Settlement 1948-1963."
Josef Weitz, director of the JNF land department, initiated the formation of Work Camps on JNF hilly terrains in mid-1949. Weitz was concerned about the depopulation of the JNF’s hilly lands in the border areas of the Galilee and Judea Mountains, fearing that Israel would lose hold of them in the event of war or following UN border-correction agreements. Rocky and infertile, these lands were unamenable to agricultural cultivation. Therefore, the JNF’s strategy for claiming them was mass forestation. The JNF calculated that forestation of the 15,000 hectares of rocky terrain would require planting 30 million trees, and 3.5 million workdays. Weitz thus proposed forming immigrant work villages of 120 to 150 families, each responsible for foresting 750 hectares of rocky land. Following forestation and groundwork, the work villages were to be based on mountainous agricultural branches like vineyards and fruit orchards, as well as on crafts, light industry, and tourism. Weitz’s proposal came during the peak of Yemenite Jews’ immigration, following a year of mass migration. Immigrant reception camps were full and could not take more immigrants. The formation of work villages began in the summer of 1949. During late 1949 and the early months of 1950, 37 work villages were established, of which 15 in the frontier area of the Jerusalem corridor, 12 in the Arab-populated Galilee, and the rest on the Gilboa, Carmel and Menashe Mountains.

The work village was not foreign to Zionist settlement. The formation of work villages in the 1950s follows the idea of camps used by work communes in the 1920s, like the Bitanya camp discussed in chapter 5 serving the Hashomer Hatzair pioneers when employed in construction of the Haifa-Geda road. What ignited state alarm and fury was its understanding of the JNF’s actions as undercutting its sovereignty: initially keeping immigrants in unrest-fermenting camps, the JNF then took over the state’s role of permanent settlement by taking them from those camps and settling them in permanent pioneer settlements on its lands. This strategy threatened to undermine the notion that state sovereignty over the land superseded JNF legal ownership of it, and that the immigrants were state-citizens. The state therefore viewed the work village as an undercutting of its sovereignty by the JNF.

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1057 Josef Weitz, *The Struggle for the Land* (Lion ThePrinter, 1950).
1058 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
1059 Weitz, *The Struggle for the Land."
1061 See chapter 5 of this dissertation.
At the same time, an examination of photographic documentations of work villages reveals that the temporary settlements were not invested with settlement planning in the sense of seeds for permanent settlements. Tents, and later wooden or tin shacks, were placed upon the land in dense, crowded rows, in the interests of speed and of leaving as much land as possible for agricultural cultivation. Houses did not include any land for subsistence cultivation as land was to be cultivated collectively in the form of public works. Houses were not fitted to the terrain but rather placed upon it with no consideration given to topography. The generic shacks were fitted onto the sloped terrain by use of stacked foundation bricks, placed under the shack to adjust shack height and level it with the ground. No paths or streets were laid out in the camp structure, other than that formed as the negative of houses, as in the case of the settlement of Agur (figs 6.58, 6.59). Less dense settlements like Mesilat Zion (figs 6.56, 6.57) had no apparent circulation system. Although shacks were laid more or less along the topographical lines, these did not form into street layouts. People therefore moved about the settlement, formed as a campus settlement layout, as seen in Kibbutz settlements in chapter 5. Housing was in shacks assembled on site by the settlers themselves from precut building materials. Housing included one-room tin shacks, two-family wooden shacks with tin roofs, and tents.
6.5.2.2 JA-State relations

The work camp brought the tension between the Israeli state and the JA to overt confrontation; but the issue of Israeli dependency on, or independence from, world Jewry dates back to the pre-Zionist Haifa system, and extends well into the present. The complex relationship between state nationalism and peoplehood became most glaring in the face of the mass immigration crisis of the 1950s. Who is responsible for the immigrants, and when are they transformed from members of the Jewish people to Israeli nationals? This cardinal issue of Israeli sovereignty and independence from that part of the Jewish nation living outside the realm of the state was negotiated via settlement and housing of immigrants.

The relationship between world Jewry and the Zionist Yishuv underwent dramatic changes following the formation of Israel as an independent nation state. World Zionist organizations, primarily the WZO and its Eretz Israeli Office, which had led the settlement mechanisms of nation building prior to national independence, were suddenly asked to move back as the state apparatus assumed its governmental mandate over national territory and citizenry. Faced by the reluctance of Zionist world Jewry to relinquish its power to the state, the Israeli leadership came by 1950 to understand the former as a threat to Israel’s sovereignty and independence. Whereas in 1948, immediately following independence, the policy of Israel’s housing regime had been directed at addressing the Arab-Palestinian threat, by 1950 the threat posed by world Jewry’s involvement in immigrant housing and subject formation was more threatening and consumed more of the state’s attention. Separating the JA from state mechanisms was not a simple, clean-cut task. Key figures in the JA served in the state government and vice versa, often simultaneously, making it hard to distinguish which institutional agendas they served. For example, the most prominent leader of Israel’s state-independence, Ben-Gurion, headed the JA between 1935 and 1948. Distinguishing state from JA policies will be done here by examination of housing and settlement policies for immigrants, as actions marking the immigrants as ‘Israeli citizens’ or as ‘members of the Jewish people,’ respectively.

1062 See chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation.
1063 See chapters 1-4 of this dissertation for detailed account of the WZOs settlement activities since 1908.
1064 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
The WZO assumed the role of the consulting ‘Jewish agency’ to the British Mandate over Palestine, necessitated by the League of Nations’ Mandate for Palestine edict, serving as the de-facto representative for the future state government. It thus rivaled the Jewish National Council, the elected government of the Jewish Yishuv posited on Jewish autonomy in Eretz Israel. While sharing similar goals, the WZO Jewish Agency (JA) and the Yishuv Jewish National Council (JNC) were rivals throughout the Mandate period. This rivalry was operational rather than ideological, based on the JA’s dominance of financial and land resources versus the JNC’s status as representative of the Yishuv’s ‘proper subject’ population which was needed to populate settlements. This balance of power changed upon gaining sovereignty in the framework of a national state. State sovereignty introduced another actor, superior in hierarchy: the Israeli government. Since the formation of the interim government during the 1948 war, the question of the relationship between the JA and the state of Israel became a pressing one. The issues of immigration, absorption, and agricultural settlement – the main areas of JA activity – were key to this question. The Yishuv’s elected body, the JNC, became sovereign over state lands and capable of absorbing mass immigration, and a position that enabled it to assert its state sovereignty. The WZO, however, did not revoke its property and institutions to state sovereignty upon independence, but rather insisted on maintaining control over JNF lands and over settling institutions like the JA. This control, coupled with its financial resources, posed a threat to Israel’s independence from world Jewry and threatened to form a state within a state.

The housing and absorption of immigrants became the site of confrontation between the JA and the Israeli state over the central question of the identity of the supreme sovereign institution in Israel. After being recognized as sovereign by the UN and de-facto (albeit reluctantly) recognized as such by neighboring Arab countries and the Palestinian population, the state faced the challenge of winning the recognition of its sovereignty by the Jewish People. The state’s resources, especially in foreign currency, were very limited. The state mechanism was therefore dependent on the WZO and its settling mechanisms – the JNF, JA, and United Israel Appeal (UIA) – for its immigrant absorption. This was particularly the case in the arena of housing, which required the greatest financial resources. The logistical mechanisms for absorbing the large influx of population were based on the institutional and budgetary infrastructure of the Yishuv, essentially controlled by the JA.

Negotiations between the state and the WZO over authority and sovereignty were a long, protracted process, lasting throughout Israel’s first decade. Following a series of debates, an ad-hoc agreement from 1948 maintained the JA’s traditional roles yet placed them under state sovereignty. The ‘coordination institution,’ formed in mid-1949, was a committee for coordinating state and JA actions involving immigration and settlement. Committee members included five government representatives, five JA representatives, one JNF representative and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. While the Jewish Agency (JA), and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) as its land management authority, were still responsible for settlement planning and immigration absorption, the state was in charge...
of general planning and housing. This rivalry, for all its friendliness, reflected the central issue of sovereignty: Does the Jewish Agency, representing Jews all over the world, have sovereignty over the State of Israel, or does the State of Israel have sovereignty over JA actions in its territory?

6.6 Second housing policy: Maabara temporary housing

The Maabara is largely associated with the post-independence immigrant experience. As we have seen earlier, however, the Maabara was not the first but rather the second housing solution offered by the state. In the wake of public protest, the refusal of immigrants to settle in pioneer settlements, and the JA’s proposal of the work village, the state housing regime’s response was the initiation of a new housing policy intended to replace both immigrant camps and work villages: the Maabara (Hebrew for transitory). The Maabara was based on temporary, single-family Zamud housing, replacing the immigrant barrack halls and based on employment rather than provision by soup kitchens. “We spend money on the camps while [settlements across the country] are crying for workers,” Eshkol argued. “We should reach further: dismantle the immigrant camps throughout the country; wherever there are settlements – we will lean immigrant housing upon them. We will bring them to self-govern. And should there be unemployment we will give them money to buy bread in the local store without administrators.” The Maabara was a revolutionary turning point in immigrant absorption, as all researchers of the field have argued. But scholars tend to highlight employment as the revolutionary aspect of the Maabara, rather than the dramatic change it brought about in the realm of housing, from mass barracks to individual-family pioneer housing upon the homeland. By May 1952 there were already 113 Maabarot all over the country, housing some 250,000 immigrants.

The distinction between work villages and Maabarot derives from the settling agency involved (JNF vs. state, respectively). But the first Maabara, Ksalon (discussed below), was in fact a work village. Why was it given a different name and presented as a new settlement form? The answer lies in the conflict between the JA and the state over the immigrants’ identity and affiliation. Eshkol was a key figure in this conflict. A member of the Yishuv security committee and Ben-Gurion’s right hand man, Eshkol was deeply invested in state sovereignty and in the political and military independence of the State of Israel as an autonomous unit within the Jewish people. Upon independence, Ben-Gurion

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1067 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel.
1068 Eshkol, quoted in Feitelson, 1998.
appointed Eshkol Director-General of the Ministry of Defense. Parallel to this state position, Eshkol was also appointed member of the directorate of the JA and head of the JA Settlement Department (JASD). As a member of the state mechanism, Eshkol’s position in the JA marked the practical takeover of JA settlement activity by the state. Eshkol proposed the ‘new plan’ for immigrant settlement and absorption, based in fact on the settlement-absorption model of the JNF work village and given a different name.

The main difference between Maabarot and work villages was that the Maabarot were located upon state land, whereas work villages were located on JA land managed by the JNF. This difference was cardinal to state leaders since, for them, ‘housing the persecuted Jewish people’ and Zionist subject formation (seen as dependent on access to the homeland) were the raison d’etre of Israeli sovereignty, and the state housing regime was therefore determined to dominate the absorption and settlement mission and assert its sovereignty over its territory and subjects. But this division is superficial, as may be learned from the similarity in housing; and the first Maabara was in fact a work village in terms of immigrant employment and site. Moreover, this superficial division elides the fact that the work village was in fact the preliminary stage of the Maabara. The significance of this finding lies in locating the Maabara in the framework of pioneer settlement forms, springing from the same sources as iconic temporary settlements like Bitaniya, which were basically work camps for pioneer settlers employed in public works. The settling agencies, however, considered the Maabara housing form to be a good one, associating it with their own housing as pioneers in Eretz Israel some 30 years earlier, the housing form that had given them their first access to the homeland.

The first Maabara opened in Ksalon in the Jerusalem Mountains in May 1950. On May 23, 1950, Davar announced the formation of Ksalon and reported that the temporary settlement housed 120 families whose providers are employed in forestry and paid daily wages. As a temporary settlement, the report stated, Ksalon included no subsistence farms. The Maabara was jointly managed by the JA and JNF, which also financed immigrant employment. Ksalon was founded on the lands of the vacated village Kasla, associated with the Biblical town of Ksalon.

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1071 The division between the two forms of temporary immigrant settlements is made evident in the archives. While Work Camps are archived in the JNF archive at the CZA, Maabara settlements are archived in the State Archive.
1072 While housing was the thing at stake in both immigrant reception camps and The maabara, scholarship tent to focus its analysis of these housing forms on issues like employment, education, ethnicity and political ideology. See for example Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel. Kachinsky, 1986 Darin-Drabkin, Housing in Israel: Economic & Sociological Aspects. Lofban, 1967; Svirsky, "Not Retrograde but Retrograded - Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in Israel: Sociological Analysis and Conversations with Activists."
1073 The lack of access to the land for subsistence farms in the Maabara was overlooked by scholars but was a cardinal issue, as will be discussed in depth below.
1074 The First Maabara for Immigrants Employed in Forestry was Established, Davar, May 23, 1950. Ksalon Maabara file, State Archive.
Ksalon was in fact an experiment in temporary dwellings. As can be seen in fig. 6.64 of 1950, Ksalon included a variety of dwelling structures scattered upon the landscape: family-size tents, small tin and asbestos shacks, and several wooden shacks on poles. There was no urban planning. As temporary settlements, the housing regime believed they required none. The hasty formation of Maabarot settlements left little consideration for planning. While space was by no means an issue, tents and shacks were erected close together, generating acute density in addition to the bad housing conditions. As temporary settlements, Maabarot did not include ‘blockon’ housing but only tents and shacks. These dwellings were not allocated land parcels unlike as were their counterparts in the immigrant Moshav framework of the first housing policy; nor were they framed as self-help housing, as can be seen in figs 6.62, 6.64, 6.68. As in argued by Eshkol in his above-cited statement, Maabara temporary dwellings were located next to existing towns, villages, Moshavot, Moshavim and Kibbutzim across the country, with the aim of employing the immigrants in the economies of these settlements and, no less important, acculturating the immigrants to a pioneer life of self-governance and self-subsistence. Maabarot were temporary as a housing form, not as a settlement. Their locations throughout the country were to serve as seeds for new settlements or new neighborhoods in existing settlements, especially Moshavim and Moshavot where agricultural workers were needed. The temporary tents and shacks were to be replaced as soon as possible

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1075 Eshkol, *The Hardships of Settlement.*
1076 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
with permanent concrete housing, as can be seen in fig. 6.66 and 6.67 of Ksalon and the town of Yokne’am.

Fig. 6.65, 6.66 First permanent houses in Ksalon, 1952. Source: CZA. Note the ‘little boxes’ nature of the houses, adapted to the hilly terrain with concrete foundations cast on site. Stairs did not always reach the ground.

Fig. 6.67, 6.68 Yokne’am Maabara in the foreground and the new housing project built for them and by them in the background, 1952. Photographer: Fritz Cohen. Source: NPC

The decision to deal with the housing shortage in stages by forming Maabara temporary settlements, rather than keeping immigrants in the camps until the construction of permanent housing had been completed, was costly, doubling the financial investment in housing. The state decision to invest in Maabarot was intended to give immigrants some form of ‘proper’ shelter in makeshift housing upon the homeland, resembling the housing that had served pioneers of the first waves of immigration. Between the years 1949 and 1951, 44,309 temporary dwelling units were erected, among them wooden shacks, tents, and tin huts, housing 25% of Israel’s population in 1952. Maabarot were built near existing towns or where towns were planned, but they started from individual dwelling units. Their building block and raison d’etre was the individual shack, breaking down the masses of immigrants into family units and providing each family with access to the homeland. The Maabarot supplied poor housing and dwelling conditions, which many immigrants considered degrading. The harsh conditions in the maabara became glaring during the rough winter of 1950, when rain floods and even snowfall, very rare in Israel,

led to a humanitarian crisis. Another aspect of Maabara housing viewed by its dwellers as degrading was their location. Immigrants could not choose the location of their dwelling but were sent wherever housing was available, often in remote areas and in disconnected neighborhoods devoid of transportation and communication.

Fig. 6.69 Children in front of a snow-covered tent, 1950. Source: Kochinsky, 1986.
Fig. 6.70 Helping Hand to the Maabara, 1951. Poster calling the public to donate money to prepare the Maabara for the 1951 winter. Source: Lavon institute.

As discussed earlier, however, the temporary dwelling solution embodied in the tent and shack of the Maabara was not designed by the state housing regime to marginalize and degrade the immigrant population, as the latter believed. Instead, Maabara dwellings were associated by the state housing regime (rather naively, as may be seen in Eshkol’s statement cited above) with early pioneer Kibbutz and Moshav settlements such as Degania, the first Kibbutz, as well as the Kibbutzim of the third and fourth immigration periods discussed in chapters 1 and 4. Temporary housing was part of the pioneer experience, rather than a means to degrade improper subjects. Maabara temporary dwelling expressed the view held by the elite of those days, that a home in the homeland was cardinal but that such a home needed only two basic elements: a roof over one’s head and a floor upon the homeland.

The importance of the Maabara as a dwelling solution in Israel’s housing history is fourfold. First, its formation makes clear that the young state regarded it to be its responsibility to provide dwelling for each citizen as a civil right, underscoring the cardinal role this home-land project assigned to individual homes. Second, the temporary nature and poor dwelling conditions of the Maabara, housing newcomers who were not part of the founders of the state, established housing as a facet of social class. Third, the Maabara made visible the political and ethnic divide in Israel two decades before it took shape in the political arena, thereby pointing to housing as the arena in which social phenomena are manifest and in some cases formed. Fourth, the Maabara temporary housing, placed in the historical context of Zionist housing typologies, demonstrates the bare essentials of this typology, namely location upon the land and a roof over one’s head.
6.6.1 Civil Unrest

The protracted temporariness of the Maabara and the harsh winter of 1950-51 led to a quick deterioration of Maabara housing and built environment. Dwellings leaked, were blown by the winds, flooded and swept with mud. Sanitary facilities were disgraceful and degrading and health services insufficient. Moreover, as day laborers in the veteran settlements, immigrants could not but notice the stark difference between their Maabara housing and Kibbutz or Moshav permanent housing. The immigrants couldn’t care less that as pioneers the veteran citizens had also endured harsh housing conditions, and did not associate their harsh living conditions with the moral sacrifice of pioneer life. As discussed above in section 4.1, most immigrants were not interested in being pioneers. They read the class difference between them and the veterans, made explicit in housing, not as a veteran-newcomer class system that can allow them to climb up its social ladder. Rather, many immigrants viewed their housing conditions as representing a deep racial discrimination, relegating them forever to the status of second-class citizens and leaving them no hope of ever climbing the social ladder and transforming their housing.

Of course, their perception had solid grounds; strong racial sentiments did exist within the veteran public against the predominantly Mizrahi immigrants. The vast body of literature examining Israel’s first decade understands the state’s mass housing project as directed primarily at the immigrants in an attempt to form them as proper subjects or exclude them from loci of hegemonic power, thereby giving rise to the social categories informing Israeli society to this day. Immigrant housing in Israel in the 1950s is universally considered ‘bad housing.’ Both temporary Maabara tent towns and permanent Shikun mass housing blocks are studied as material testimony to the discrimination of mostly Sephardi immigrants of the 1950s. Historiography as well as popular discourse understand immigrant housing as a violent act towards the new citizens, intended to keep them outside of the good subject circles and centers of power. Notable is Ella Shohat’s essay, “Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the standpoint of its Jewish Victims,” which invokes Said’s ‘j’accuse’ of Zionism written a decade earlier in order to frame her analysis of the immigrant absorption process of the 1950’s as colonial. Housing conditions, construed as the epitome of discrimination, were according to this literature the focus of the civil unrest leading to the dramatic

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1078 Lissak, ed. Studies in the Social History of Israel.
1081 Yacobi, "The Mizrahi Dwelling Machine."
regime change of 1977.\textsuperscript{1084} This discourse involves deeply heated feelings, and despite the passage of time, it is still a gaping wound in Israeli society.

The earliest protest against the state housing regime towards the immigrants was the October 1952 \textit{Maabara} protests. The harsh winter of 1951 placed the 65,000 \textit{Maabara} residents in dire conditions (see fig. 6.69, 6.70) and resulted in the evacuation of 10,000 of them to nearby settlements. There, immigrant children first encountered “a shower with warm running water, a white private toilet right next to the housing, and electricity.”\textsuperscript{1085} A year later, despite persistent promises, nothing had been done by the state housing regime to ensure that the 1951 winter crisis would not be repeated, and \textit{Maabarot} across the country fermented with unrest. Moreover, \textit{Maabara} dwellers could not evade the austerity food shortage by producing food like the Ninio subsistence farm or cooperative Kibbutz and Moshav settlements, and consequently experienced constant food shortage. An alleged food theft from Kibbutz fields by a resident of the Emek Hefer \textit{Maabara} led in November 1952 to a civil rebellion against the police, which quickly spread across the country.\textsuperscript{1086} Protesters from dozens of \textit{Maabarot} took the cue to protest their pressing needs, primarily concerning housing and the lack of services.\textsuperscript{1087}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig6.71}
\caption{The deterioration of \textit{Maabara} dwellings over the years. Jelil, 1960, demolition day. Photographer: Moshe Pridan. Source: NPC.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1084} Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/ Personal Home: The Role of Public Housing in Shaping Space."
\textsuperscript{1086} 105 Maabara Dwellers Arrested. 1952. \textit{Maariv}. October 27, 1952.
\textsuperscript{1087} Fogelman, Ibid.
6.7 Third housing policy: population dispersal in permanent housing

The civil unrest that was unleashed in the Maabarot marked the latter as a failure in the attempt to form the immigrants as pioneers. A new housing solution was therefore to be formulated, the third in four years. This time, the state housing regime aimed for a permanent rather than temporary plan which will provide immigrants with the permanent, good-quality housing that they demanded. The attempt to transform immigrants to pioneers, however, was no longer part of the plan. This new, third policy is known primarily for producing a national master plan, known as the Sharon plan after its head planner. The Sharon master plan design was a process and is therefore hard to date. It is clear, however, that the planning process began parallel to – rather than after – the Maabarot. The plan’s main principle of population dispersal was indeed embedded in the Maabarot which were formed adjacent to existing settlements across the country, as noted above. The plan was first presented to the public in February 1950 in the framework of an exhibition at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art, aimed to make the public ‘planning-minded.’\(^{1088}\) The exhibition included a series of posters outlining in a popular way the challenges identified by the planners, and their operational planning principles. The plan was well underway at the time but not yet completed and approved by the government. The plan was published in Hebrew in 1951 under the title *Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953*, and included an enclosed booklet with English translation.\(^{1089}\) Sharon gives the following account of the planning process:

Work began immediately, despite the war. Together with several dozen architects and engineers, we prepared a working program for town and regional planning, and submitted it to the Knesset’s Committee for Internal Affairs. I wanted to get together a staff of one hundred planners, architects, engineers and socio-economists. We thought hard how to make the Committee understand our aim of planning new towns and regions creatively in the entire country. We were determined to

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\(^{1088}\) Source: Sharon archive.

overcome vested interests, local ambitions, and short-range emergency targets. Our spirits soared even higher when, in the spring of 1949, a new Government was formed, and the importance of national planning was acknowledged by attaching our department to the Prime Minister's office. From there we could work with the high authority of David Ben-Gurion behind us. We tried very hard to gain the support of public opinion for our national planning, using various channels, such as press conferences, articles, and lectures. The high point of this information drive was a town-planning exhibition in the Tel Aviv Museum, the first exhibition ever held there which was not devoted to the arts. We presented panels showing the principles of the National Plan, some regional plans – including communication networks, agricultural and industrial areas, distribution of population, National Parks and open spaces – and the general layout of new towns spread all over the country. The Minister of Finance, Eliezer Kaplan, a very able economist, was our most severe critic. He said bluntly, "Even if you were the world's best architects, it is not your job to decide on the location, size, and ultimate goals of the new towns, but the Government's." I replied, "These are only proposals; it is up to you, the Government, to study them, to consider them, and then to make the decisions." He laughed and said, "You know very well that the Government will never have the time and patience, especially with the war going on, to concentrate on these matters. Once the plans are drawn, the development, if any, will follow your suggestions." He was right.

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Fig. 6.74 From Maabara to permanent housing. David Maabara dwellers moving to permanent housing constructed for them, 1960. Photography: Moshe Pridan. Source: NPC.

### 6.7.1 Sharon Master plan: Two distinct scales: national planning and housing

Much has been written about the Sharon master plan for population dispersal and the formation of new ‘development towns’ in Israel’s periphery as a result of it. My discussion of the Sharon plan here focuses on a little-explored dimension of the plan – for which it is nonetheless greatly critiqued – housing. In contrast to the usual association of

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the Sharon plan in Israeli historiography with mass housing blocks, it should be noted that the housing samples presented by the plan to serve the goal of population dispersal were not massive housing blocks, but rather two-story, 4-unit houses, similar to those built at the same time for non-immigrants. The Sharon team defined its challenge as follows: “1000 immigrants arrive each day – one dwelling unit has to be erected every two minutes. Should the new houses be built in the existing, already densely populated cities – or should housing and development be directed into new towns?”\(^{1092}\) This question made no reference to the architecture and nature of the dwelling units themselves and proposed no formation of a new housing type for immigrants. The posters presented in the 1950 exhibition present houses similar to those built for ‘veteran’ immigrants and young couples at the time, as can be seen in figs. 6.76-6.80. Sharon’s statement that his planning team “tried very hard to gain the support of public opinion for our national planning” even as it was “fully backed” by the powerful Prime Minister Ben-Gurion is of great importance. Sharon expresses here a perception that the public is the sovereign and should be convinced to approve of the plan. As the locus of the sovereign public, housing proposed by the plan should therefore be examined carefully.

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\(^{1092}\) Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953*. 

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![Fig. 6.75 Model housing exhibition, 1950s. Source: Zvi Alhayani. Note the expectancy of regular citizens to read and understand architectural plans.](image-url)
The Sharon plan document, *Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953*, presents the first new neighborhood in ‘New Beersheba,’ one of the plan’s new towns (fig. 6.77), a pivotal case for study of the third housing policy due to its ‘new town’ location, planning, housing type and housing construction. The neighborhood was designed, following the Sharon

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1093 The brochure, issued by the Ministry of Labor, specifies eligibility for the ‘popular housing’ enterprise, which included primarily ‘veteran’ immigrants living in insufficient housing conditions. Source: State archive.

1094 New housing in several Kibbutz settlement, among them Beit Alpha, too included this two-storey house with 4 apartments. Yad Yaari archive, Mastechkin file.
plan, by architect Kuhn of the planning department, and was constructed between the years 1951-1953 north of Beersheba’s old town (fig. 6.81). The neighborhood is arranged in a curvilinear layout with the open area in the middle of the neighborhood designated for public buildings and ‘green wedges.’ The typological characteristics of the neighborhood include winding roads, simple small houses on large parcels of land, minimal development, a peripheral road, a few dead-end driveways, and communal services located at the heart of the neighborhood (fig. 6.81). “Curvilinear roads were laid out on the basis of a naïve ‘rural’ approach,” Shadar writes. This rural approach was matched with limited urban development, leaving the houses scattered across the landscape. Moreover, the Sharon plan defines the neighborhood as a “free structure of roads adapted to the topography,” whereas the neighborhood was constructed on a flat terrain, reflecting design principles formed elsewhere. In its illustration in the Sharon plan, neighborhood houses are spread across its campus landscape, bathing in greenery.

Fig. 6.81 Beersheba neighborhood A, illustration from the Sharon plan. Source: Sharon archive.

As Efrat points out, ‘development town’ urban planning as reflected in the Sharon plan was no new urban planning but rather a replication of the Kibbutz campus planning. However, whereas Efrat defines the development town as a paradoxical combination of Kibbutz rural planning with mass housing blocks, the Sharon plan and Beersheba neighborhood A attest that ‘development town’ housing was not a new housing typology either, but rather a replication of the ‘proper’ self-help Zamud housing. Neighborhood A housing are two-story houses of four apartments of 26-32 square meters each (fig. 6.82,

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1096 Laor, 1963.
1097 Sharon, Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953.
1098 Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing on the Urban Development of Beer-Sheva 1948–1999”.
1099 Ibid. p. 135.
1100 Kuhn, 1961.
1101 Sharon, Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953.
1102 Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing on the Urban Development of Beer-Sheva 1948–1999”.
The houses were allocated large parcels of land in anticipation of their future expansion by their residents. Sharon stated that the “architectural uniformity [of the houses] is the result of mass production and the minimal areas allocated for each unit. [In the future,] dwelling units will be expanded in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, and the completion and improvement of the neighborhood by the addition of multi-story dwelling houses, public buildings, public parks and avenues in accordance with the general town-planning scheme that has been prepared” (fig. 6.81).

Fig. 6.82, 6.83 Four-unit apartment house plan and elevation. Source: Zaslewsky, 1954.

Fig. 6.84, 6.85 First houses of the neighborhood unit in process of construction. Source: Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953, Sharon archive.

Fig. 6.86 First neighborhood unit (A) of the new Beersheba. Source: Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953, Sharon archive.

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1104 Zaslewski, Immigrant Housing in Israel - Construction, Planning and Development.
1105 Ibid.
1106 Sharon, Physical Planning in Israel 1948-1953.
We can see that these are the houses cast in the Turnalayer system from the smooth, unplastered wall surface and the distinct seam between the two floors.

One part of the A neighborhood houses were built in the ‘conventional’ construction method of concrete blocks like the blockon, while the other part was constructed by Solel Bone using an innovative, industrialized construction method. Solel Bone imported the Turnalayer system of casting full floors in their entirety in large molds. Large, canon-like cement mixers were imported, producing one two-story, 4-unit house per day. Figs. 6.89-6.91 show the construction process of the Beersheba neighborhood A, involving a floor-size mold for external and internal walls. The mold required lifting with heavy machinery to make it possible to cast the second floor (fig. 6.90). While quick and innovative, removing the need for a large skilled workforce, the Turnalayer construction method was a disappointment because construction quality was poor. The Beersheba A neighborhood is a pivotal case as the first ‘new town’ neighborhood, constructed using a new building construction approach. Although the Turnalayer system itself was a disappointment in terms of production quality, the idea of industrialized housing that it proposed gained purchase among officials throughout the Israeli state housing regime, including architects, engineers, and policy makers. The industrialization of construction was accepted by professional architects and engineers as the means for producing mass permanent housing cheaply, quickly, and in good quality.

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1108 Ibid. Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing on the Urban Development of Beer-Sheva 1948–1999".
1109 See Solel Bone and Allweil, State archive prefabricated housing file.
6.7.2 Shikun mass housing: Housing before planning

Although the Sharon plan was conceived and executed in the first half of the 1950s, the mass housing projects it is associated with, for example the 250-meter-long housing block in Beersheba by architect Yaski, were only constructed in the early 1960s (fig. 6.92). The mass housing block, the Shikun, has developed in the framework of the third housing policy as a specific housing typology: public housing in modernistic mass-housing blocks composed of repeated flats, and themselves repeated throughout the Israeli landscape. The development of this housing type is historiographically associated with the 1952 population dispersal master plan and the formation of the new Development Towns, and is therefore studied primarily as the use of architecture for marginalization of the Mizrahi immigrant population. As seen earlier, however, the Shikun is a later phenomenon, and not an integral part of the population dispersal planning agenda. Moreover, despite the awareness in the scholarly literature that identical buildings in terms of spatiality and materiality were showcased as ‘model housing’ to the world and constructed in well-off neighborhoods as well, the Shikun’s formation and dissemination is rarely studied as an architectural question. Why was the dispersal of

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1110 Accounts of the massive block often associate it with the 1950s while it was completed 1962. See for example ‘Neighborhood H, Be’er Sheva’, Laboratory for Contemporary Urban Design, Tel Aviv University, Israel, May 2011.

population brought about by *Shikun* structures rather than *Zamud* housing as before? What determined the nature and characteristics of the produced dwelling spaces? Who in the state – the direct client for mass housing – made the policy decisions regarding ‘appropriate’ housing in terms of construction methods and residential spaces?

![Image](image_url)

Fig. 6.92 The 250 meter long housing block, Beersheba. Architects Yaski and Alekandroni, 1962. Source: Rotbard, 2007.\textsuperscript{1112}

![Image](image_url)

Fig. 6.93, 6.94 Housing conference delegates visiting the Model housing, Tel Aviv, 1960. Source: NPC.

In her historical survey of the development of Israel’s Ministry of Housing, Shadar demonstrated on several occasions that the house preceded the neighborhood, city or rural settlement in both planning and erection.\textsuperscript{1113} The provision of houses was the reason for forming a settlement, and housing construction was allocated most of the funds spent by settling institutions, at the expense of infrastructure and communal services. The Housing Department, made into the Housing Ministry in 1961, was de-facto in charge of planning. Bennet states that “in practice, the Ministry of Housing and the housing firms which operated back then *built houses rather than neighborhoods* … development was practically null compared to worker housing until World War II … Houses were planned such that they were simply laid on the land. There was no consideration of topography. If the land was leveled, houses stood somehow on small pikes. If the land … was complex, they built ‘legs’ of different lengths and the house stood this way.”\textsuperscript{1114} General neighborhood plans were built directly, with no detailed plans for development. Housing types were developed in the Housing Bureau’s Technical Department, headed by engineer Allweil and ‘planted’ on site with no additional site planning.\textsuperscript{1115}

6.7.2.1 *Ministry of Housing technical department*

The state housing regime faced the challenge to house as many people as possible as soon as possible and in the most cost-effective permanent housing. The technical department at

\textsuperscript{1112} Sharon Rotbard, *Abraham Yaski: Concrete Architecture* (Babel, 2007).

\textsuperscript{1113} Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing on the Urban Development of Beer-Sheva 1948–1999".

\textsuperscript{1114} Brand, quoted in Zippor, 1973, p.4.

\textsuperscript{1115} Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing on the Urban Development of Beer-Sheva 1948–1999".
the Ministry of Housing was therefore extremely significant in determining the type of housing built during the mass housing period. While the Planning Department headed by Sharon determined ‘where,’ the technical department determined ‘what.’ The department, headed by engineer Asher Allweil, gave expert evaluations regarding the quality, the foreseen construction costs, and the appropriateness of the varied commercial and entrepreneurial housing proposals considered in order to satisfy the burning need for housing. Whereas much scholarly attention has been devoted to the planning issues – that is, to the population dispersal logic and the new town solution – little attention has been directed at the technical architectural considerations involved in the formation of the distinct and ultimately prevailing Shikun housing form. Suggestions for housing solutions flowed to the young Israeli government from inside and outside the country throughout its first years of independence. Israeli consuls throughout the world reported with business proposals by companies to sell full houses, construction materials, and construction techniques. Proposals included completed cork houses from Portugal, mobile homes from the US, wooden shacks from Finland and Sweden, and a number of prefabrication construction techniques from France, the Netherlands and other countries (figs 6.97-6.98).\footnote{Prefabricated houses file, State archive.} Israeli contractors and entrepreneurs also sent proposals for construction systems and mechanisms (figs. 6.95-6.96).

Fig. 6.95, 6.96 Levin-Kedar proposal for three-anchor raw housing, 1959. Source: State archive.

Fig. 6.97, 6.98 Proposal for a ‘dry’ building system by Viennese company Fahstein Baugesellschaft, 1957. Source: State archive.
The technical department, later renamed the engineering department, was formed to serve as purchasing consultant, helping the ministry to execute its policy of housing as many people as possible in the shortest time and in the best possible houses, and Allweil’s accounts initially gave limited judgment regarding many of the abovementioned and other business proposals.\textsuperscript{1117} Disappointment with the Turnalayer system indicated that technical expert review of the proposed housing forms was needed. Gradually, however, the technical department started to express an explicit agenda regarding the proper housing policy for fulfilling the housing need. In 1956 Allweil composed a report outlining his stand regarding building construction methods and their adaptability to the challenges faced by the Ministry of Housing’s third mass housing plan since independence.\textsuperscript{1118} Allweil wrote the internal report in response to yet another proposal for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1117} State archive, prepared housing file.
  \item \textsuperscript{1118} Asher Allweil, Head of Engineering Department. Proposal for Importing Prefabricated Houses from Abroad. December 31, 1956.
\end{itemize}
purchase of prefabricated asbestos and wood houses from the US. Allweil stated his objection to the purchase of wooden houses abroad, and his support of concrete construction within Israel. His reasons included the following: (A) Imported housing required spending 75% more foreign currency than did concrete construction. (B) Safety regulations in wooden housing require building detached or semi-detached housing, therefore spending more land and infrastructure per unit, 50-60% more than in concrete housing. (C) The maintenance of wooden structures renders their ‘life span’ shorter than concrete structures. (D) There are technical solutions that make it possible to attain the required construction speed without use of wooden structures, namely construction of prefabricated industrialized elements. Allweil goes on to report that the housing department is already in the process of examining proposals for prefabricated housing of concrete elements and other materials produced in Israel, some of which are ready for production.

Industrialized housing construction based on prefabricated elements was a construction method whose immediate consequence was scale. The production of prefabricated concrete elements is based on two principles distinguishing it from ‘conventional’ construction: careful design of the assembled system, and high cost of the casting molds producing the elements. These two principles dictate a construction system posited on mass production of housing units and on limited variations in them, due to the high cost of changes to the mold and system design. The housing produced is therefore characterized by mass and uniformity. Industrialized housing construction was promoted enthusiastically by Allweil compared to conventional construction in hollow cement bricks for four reasons: first, little dependency on the limited number of skilled construction workers; second, accuracy in construction and the ministry of housing’s ability to supervise the quality of prefabricated products; third, the relative speed of construction; and fourth, the competitive cost of housing units due to the large number of units produced, limiting state expenditure per unit and therefore housing more people. Allweil supported the formation of factories for prefabricated elements by several construction companies, some using knowledge acquired abroad. Prefabricated elements ranged from walls and core elements (stairs, bathroom units) in the Belency system (fig. 6.99) to three-dimensional units in the Diskin system (fig. 6.102-6.105). In order to examine the quality of produced housing, the different companies were asked to produce sample houses for inspection by the engineering department. If Allweil and the department were satisfied with the produced housing, the companies signed contracts with the Ministry of Housing for founding factories and producing certain amounts of residential units per year. Engineer Diskin of Jerusalem, for example, who had proposed a prefabricated system of three-dimensional elements, was asked to construct housing in Jerusalem in order to examine his system (fig. 6.103). The technical department was not

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1120 Allweil, ibid. Allweil also states a social reason to reject wooden houses: the resentment of Eastern European dwellers to these houses as they are lower standard in their countries of origin.
1121 Allweil, "Construction Methods in Israel: Engineering Survey."
very pleased with the Diskin system after examining the constructed housing structure, and no more housing in the Diskin system were produced.  

Fig. 6.102, 6.103. Diskin system construction principle A.  
Fig. 6.104, 6.105 Diskin system construction principle B. Source: State archive prefabricated housing file.

Given that the state housing regime was invested in the Zamud ‘good housing’ typology, the question arises, Why were prefabricated industrialized housing methods not used to produce Zamud housing? The answer to this question lies in technical construction issues – which is the right element for prefabrication – rather than in social environmental-deterministic goals inscribed in the housing. The mass experiments with several housing construction techniques until the mid-1950s were all based on different scales and materials of the assembled element: wooden shacks, ‘conventional’ construction in hollow cement bricks, concrete casting on site, construction in mud bricks, the ‘Knap’ dry construction of wall parts, and the Turnalayer casting of three-dimensional full floors discussed above. Construction in mud bricks (fig. 6.107), with the guidance of a UN expert, was declared by Allweil unfit for Israeli needs since the production of bricks required trained construction workers, took a long time to construct, and consumed large amounts of Portland cement for brick stabilization. Hence it could not compete with hollow cement bricks and was soon out of use. The ‘Knap’ system was the first introduction of a prefabricated element larger than a brick. The Knap wall was composed of two sides, made of 100 by 50 cm concrete panels. The panels were connected to each other with screws in a ‘dry’ system with no use of mortar. The smooth panels required no

\[\text{Fig. 6.102, 6.103. Diskin system construction principle A.} \]
\[\text{Fig. 6.104, 6.105 Diskin system construction principle B. Source: State archive prefabricated housing file.} \]

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\[\text{1122 State archive, prefabricated housing file.} \]
\[\text{1123 Allweil, "Construction Methods in Israel: Engineering Survey."} \]

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plastering but paint. The Turnalayer system discussed above was abandoned despite the means invested in the machinery, due to the low housing quality.

![Fig. 6.106 The ‘Knap’ system. Source: Allweil, 1983.](image1)

![Fig. 6.107 Mud brick housing. Source, Allweil, 1983.](image2)

After examining this experience with housing construction, Allweil reached several conclusions. First, the required construction speed could not be met with the conventional, labor-intensive construction methods, and therefore industrialization of construction methods was necessary. Second, the low quality of construction for state housing required supervision. Third, relying on a single construction method like Turnalayer was a mistake, hence many such methods should be employed by different companies simultaneously. The Ministry of Housing therefore signed contracts with several construction companies for producing pre-fabricated housing, each using its own system and modules. In architectural terms, the most important disadvantage of the chosen prefabricated methods was their rigidity. As ‘closed’ systems based on the measurement of casting forms, repetitivity was embedded in the living spaces produced. Closed systems were posited on repetitivity for both technical and financial reasons. The productivity of the prefabricated construction systems depended on mass. As casts were very expensive, large number of identical elements forming identical living spaces had to be produced in order to cover the costs. Unfortunately, the engineering department did not enforce a standardized module which would require prefabricated elements produced by different factories to correspond with one another, thereby forming an open system of modular architectural design. The engineering department deliberately avoided setting any standard for the industrialized production of housing due to its bad experience with the Turnalayer system, imported to Israel by Solel Bone and the Amidar state housing company.

The technical department did, however, set minimal standards for the housing in terms of residential quality. Housing were required to provide running water and connection to the sewage system, good introduction of sunlight and ventilation, and minimal standards for privacy by separating parents from children. In addition, minimal standards for structural and material quality were set and strictly enforced. Contracts with contractors were

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1124 Allweil does not explain why did the Knap system not gain purchase in the Israeli market.
elaborated documents outlining exactly which paving, doors, plaster and shading would be used by the contractor.\textsuperscript{1125} Setting minimal standards for housing, with the ability to supervise construction quality of the prefabricated elements, produced good quality housing in relation to the means spent and the tight time-frame. This idea of quality, mass-produced minimal housing was explicitly influenced by postwar housing in Europe,\textsuperscript{1126} yet it also served as a successful model for developing countries newly gaining national independence and hence responsible for housing their citizenry.\textsuperscript{1127}

6.7.2.2 Housing before urban planning

Despite the architectural significance of the Sharon master plan, its most recognized importance lies primarily in marking the location for new ‘development towns’ and in defining their economic bases as industrial rather than agricultural.\textsuperscript{1128} As I have shown, however, the Sharon plan expounded no new gospel regarding housing, but rather offered immigrants the same housing as that constructed for veteran Israelis at the time. As the plan is many times faulted for proposing mass immigrant housing blocks, this fact interestingly somewhat rehabilitates the plan.

The industrialized construction method used to produce this typical housing, however, set the course for a dramatic transformation in immigrant housing, based on their ‘internal’ need for industrialized mass production. The formation of differentiated housing for the immigrants was an ongoing process rather than a top-down planning policy. The most significant characteristic of this process can be identified as ‘housing before planning,’ a phenomenon identified by this research as characteristic of a number of pivotal cases serving as laboratories for good Israeli housing.\textsuperscript{1129} ‘Housing before urban planning’ is discernible in the categorical production of generic housing designed first and foremost to meet the internal dwelling needs. Discussions of the mass housing designed and produced since the late 1950s include economic calculations of cost, production time and the feasibility of transporting prefabricated elements, with no discussion of attempts to design place-specific housing.\textsuperscript{1130} Houses were not designed to fit their landscape or urban layout; their design considerations were purely architectural and stopped at the boundaries of the Shikun structure. It should be noted that rural housing, developed as part of the first housing plan for rural-border settlement, was also thrust upon the landscape with no consideration of topography and settlement layout. Consider for example the settlement of Li-On in the Adulam region, regarded by state authorities as a good demonstration of its settlement success and worthy of being showcased to the visiting Congolese president (fig. 6.110)

\textsuperscript{1125} State archive, prefabricated housing file, immigrant housing file.
\textsuperscript{1126} Allweil was sent to Paris in 1955 and visited French mass housing complexes. State archive, prefabricated housing file. Architects like Yaski openly pointed to post-war housing as inspiration.Efrat, \textit{The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture 1948-1973}.
\textsuperscript{1127} The state of Israel organized an international housing conference in 1960, which attracted delegates from across the developing world. See fig. 6.93-6.94.
\textsuperscript{1128} See discussion in chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{1129} See chapters 1-5.
\textsuperscript{1130} State archive, prefabricated housing file.
Despite the fierce critiques of the Shikun as a repetitive, anonymous dwelling environment, and the symbol it became for immigrant marginalization and exclusion from Zamud good housing, it was nonetheless a successful dwelling type in two main aspects. First, as a housing solution it provided good-enough dwellings for masses of Maabara residents within a short period of time. This fact may account for the relatively long, two-decade period of social rest that followed. Second, the Shikun contributed to the consolidation of Zamud as the proper form of Israeli housing by operating as a ‘machine for modernization’ of the immigrants, leading to their acculturation to Israeli conceptions of proper nationalism and proper dwelling environments for the good subject. The result of this process, as seen in chapter 6, was another wave of social struggle for equality in Israel with the mass demand for inclusion into Zamud proper housing.

6.8 Conclusion

Although the establishment of state sovereignty had opened way for Israel to conduct national planning, this chapter shows that it was not planning, but rather the need to find housing solutions for the masses of new citizens, that proved to be the decisive factor in determining the state-citizen contract in Israel. Moreover, citizens’ discontent of the housing solutions they were offered, as well as of the very definition of proper housing for a proper citizen, led to two dramatic changes in housing policy during the decisive early years of the state’s nation-building project. The new citizens’ involvement in this project was therefore far greater than assessed before. Since, as citizens did not self-govern according to the regime’s standards of ‘proper’ ideals and behavior, their ‘deviant’ self-governance repeatedly forced the regime to change the course of its
policies. While the regime and its bureaucrats developed and executed housing policies, there very soon responded to popular demands of housing rather than formed these demands.

The contribution made by this chapter is threefold. First, it offers an interpretation of housing policies as responses to multiple perceived threats to Israel’s sovereignty: not only the Arab-Palestinian threat already identified in the existing scholarly literature, but also the JA and the ‘reluctant pioneer’ citizenry. Second, this chapter maps out three distinct waves of housing policy and points to the cardinal role of housing in the negotiation of power relations and sovereignty in Israel’s nation-building project. Third, this chapter exposes pivotal cases ignored by the existing scholarship, such as the pivotal housing laboratories of Ramla, the Work Village, and the first Maabara of Ksalon; and unsettles accepted truisms regarding housing in the much-studied cases of the Sharon master plan and the Beersheba new town A neighborhood. It therefore contributes both to the study of Israel’s period of nation building and to the study of its architectural history.
Chapter 7:  
‘Resistance to being swept away’: *Summud* Arab-Palestinian housing in Israel, 1948-2004.

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7.1 Introduction: Houses of temporariness and permanence

Whereas inclusion in ‘proper’ Israeliness involved gaining access to Zamud housing (as discussed in chapter 6), this process was very different for the state’s Arab-Palestinian citizens, who were excluded from ‘proper’ citizenry by being labeled as ‘enemy citizenry.’ Unlike the housing strategies used to turn Jewish immigrants into normative citizens, Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel were placed under military rule and faced an entirely different situation. Perceiving them as a threat to Israel’s fragile sovereignty, the Israeli housing regime used housing explicitly to exclude them from the polity. Arab-Palestinian citizens in turn used informal housing strategies as the only form of resistance to the state available to them. Palestinian national housing, whose formation as a result of the alienation of the peasantry by the 1858 Ottoman land code is discussed at length in chapter 3, has undergone significant change in the wake of the events of 1948. For the Palestinian peasantry of the flatlands, 1948 marked two dramatic changes which immediately reflected on the nature of national housing: the loss of sovereignty over the homeland and the mass loss of individual housing.

1948 marked the closing of a window for various possibilities of Palestinian self-governance: local village-based autonomy in the framework of Empire similar to the hill villages in the Ottoman Empire; Ayan-Jerusalemite ‘white mask’ Palestinian nationalism in the framework of a nation-state; and the little-studied attempts at a village-based Balad nationalism in the newly available flatlands. The civil war, which erupted in British Mandate Palestine among Zionists and Palestinian nationalists fighting over the homeland, resulted in bringing the 600-year-long age of Empire to an end with a UN plan to partition the homeland into two sovereign nation-states. The year-long Arab-Israeli war of 1948, however, resulted in only one nation state – Israel – and the subjection of Palestinians to the state-sovereignty of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Syria as well as to the international sovereignty of UNRWA. Although they were granted Israeli citizenship, the Palestinians remaining in Israel was regarded as ‘enemy citizenry’ and treated accordingly by the Israeli regime, which placed them under military rule between 1948 and 1966. The consequences of Israeli sovereignty on housing for the Jewish citizenry of Israel, discussed at length in chapter 6, differs from its consequences on Israel’s ‘enemy citizenry,’ as we shall see in this chapter. The differences lay both in housing actions taken by the regime and in resistant housing actions taken by the Arab-Palestinian citizenry itself, both the focus of this chapter. As for the struggle for Palestinian sovereignty in the homeland, 1948 carved out two main Palestinian communities: the population that remained within the borders of Israel, subsequently becoming Israeli citizens; and the population ‘swept away’ by the war, subsequently becoming a mass of refugees in neighboring countries, devoid of state citizenship. This distinction corresponds – for several reasons that will be discussed here – with the two forms of Palestinian nationalism discussed in chapter 3, namely with Ayan nation-state nationalism and peasantry Balad nationalism. These two nationalisms take concrete housing form in refugee and Summud housing after the Nakba.

1131 Using the term ‘Arab-Palestinian Israelis’ I wish to represent the historical process of identity change, by which pre-1948 ‘Arabs’ were made ‘Arab Israeli’ as they gained Israeli citizenship, and, increasingly after their exposure to the Palestinian national movement in to ‘Arab Palestinians’ holding Israeli citizenship.
In addition to loss of the collective national home, the 1948 war resulted in a mass loss of individual housing for Palestinians living in the land that became Israel. Of the 650,000 Palestinians estimated to have lived in the land, only 134,000 have remained after the war. Some 400 villages and 20 towns were depopulated. The loss of individual housing and the threat of being ‘swept away’ like the majority of the local population in 1948 led to the formation of a distinct housing strategy among the Arab-Palestinian Israeli population. The limited modes of action and resistance available to this ‘enemy citizenry’ made housing the main venue of ‘resistance to being swept away,’ or *Summud*. As a housing strategy, *Summud* means the insistence to hold on to one’s village of birth by erecting one’s house on top of, behind, or as an extension to the family home. Whereas the better-studied Palestinian refugee housing is posited on temporariness in order to claim the right of return, *Summud* housing is posited on permanence in order to ‘resist being swept away.’

This chapter first reviews the housing consequences of the Nakba for Palestinian citizens of Israel and for those ‘swept away.’ Second, it investigates the formation of two ‘new Arab villages’: the village of Mazraa, pivotal for the formation of the *Summud* house and village forms; and the Israel Museum, Israel’s national museum explicitly chosen by state officials for its design in emulation of a traditional Arab-Palestinian village. Third, it investigates transformations to Mazraa’s housing environment in response to the transformation in Arab-Palestinian Israelis’ national consciousness since the violent popular uprising of 2000 (known as the October events), leading to the first liquidation of state lands for the purpose of Arab-Palestinian housing.

The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, it discusses housing strategies employed by the state for its ‘bad’ subjects with the explicit aim of restricting their inclusion in the national polity. Second, it contributes to scholarship on the little-studied Palestinian *Summud* housing form. Third, it makes an argument regarding the relationship between national sovereignty and access to national housing. Extending the study of the formation of Palestinian national consciousness in post-1858 flatland houses presented in chapter 3, and the housing-based challenges of the Israeli housing regime discussed in chapter 6, this chapter points to housing as the key site for citizens’ ability to challenge the terms of the state-citizen contract.

### 7.2 The consequence of the Nakba: four types of Palestinian housing

The Nakba, or catastrophe, generated four kinds of Arab-Palestinian dwelling environments: (1) refugee camps housing those ‘swept away’ in neighboring Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt; (2) housing of Palestinians who managed to hold on to their homes and villages; (3) housing of the ‘internally displaced’ within Israel in houses and lands vacated by Palestinian refugees who were not allowed to return; and (4) housing reused by the few Palestinian returnees who managed to cross the borders and get back to their homes. The Nakba is explored here not as military defeat or loss of sovereignty, though it was both, but rather as the loss of access to national housing. As a result of the loss of homes and the workings of the Israeli housing regime, the Palestinian national housing typology discussed in chapter 3 has ceased to exist in the same way it had since
the 1860s. Palestinian national houses and housing strategies have undergone significant transformations, and with them Palestinian ability to claim the homeland.

Palestinians’ housing conditions at the close of the 1948 war determined citizenry identity, political affiliation, and national ideology more than it affected their much-discussed living conditions. The May 1949 truce agreements between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt consolidated the place-based identities and dwelling environments of Palestinians according to their (often arbitrary) locale at the close of the war. For generations of Palestinians, therefore, housing was decisive in determining their national frame of reference, identity, rights, and call for a solution to the problem of sovereignty. Despite the central role of housing in the study of the Palestinian condition, the scholarly literature on Palestinian history focuses primarily on the role of the war in galvanizing and expanding Israel’s sovereignty or on the catastrophe of Palestinian uprooting and the loss of the promise of national sovereignty. These two historiographical currents focus their study on detailed accounts of the war’s every turn using state and military archives.

While these studies have made significant contributions, they nonetheless disregard the centrality of housing to the matter at hand – namely, the Nakba as the loss of housing. The focus of this chapter is the dwelling environments formed as a result of the Nakba with its destruction of twenty towns and some 400 villages and the uprooting of some 700,000 people. While the term ‘refugee’ of course refers to the uprooting, it refers primarily to political rather than individual homelessness.

Housing conditions distinguished Palestinian state-based nationalism advocated by the pre-1948 Jerusalemite Ayan from Palestinian village-based nationalism, or ‘Balad,’ Arabic for both land and village. This term will be used here to distinguish the

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1134 The exact number of displaced Palestinians and destroyed villages is disputed. The numbers used here follow Khalidi’s accounts. See Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948. Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora.
1136 Balad is also the abbreviated name of a Palestinian nationalist party in Israeli parliament. See http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/heb/FactionPage.asp?PG=103
nationalism of the remaining Palestinians from that of the Palestinian refugees. As discussed in chapter 3, *Balad* is posited on a nationalism of place and derives its claims for the homeland as native population form the intimate connection to home and land, transcending any legal or political institutions undercutting this claim.

Whereas the little scholarship that exists on post-1948 Palestinian housing is concerned primarily with the refugee camps established under UN extra-national sovereignty,1137 this study focuses on Palestinian housing within the state of Israel as a product of the *Summud* self-inflicted housing regime, in response to the state’s exclusionary housing regime. Studying the housing conditions of the various Palestinian communities following the Nakba, I employ the key term *Summud*, used by the Palestinians themselves, in order to define and examine the housing conditions produced as result of actions taken in order to remain in one’s ancestral village-homeland and resist being swept away. My inquiry explores the respective housing practices embraced by the state and by dwellers, which in their mutual interaction brought about the formation and consolidation of what I call here the *Summud housing typology*.

*Summud*, like the Zionist *Zamud*, is the materialization of national ideology via housing practices. As mentioned above, *Summud* is a concrete housing strategy characterized by an insistence on dwelling upon one’s ancestral land by constructing one’s house behind or on top of the family home or on private agricultural land, often without permits and in confrontation with the Israeli housing regime. A threat to Israel’s claim to nativeness in the homeland, *Summud* housing is continually subject to attempts by the Israeli state to curb it by limiting access to land and planning. These restrictions led over time to the densification and urbanization of the villages and their transformation from ‘proper’ national housing as discussed in chapters 1 and 2 to ‘improper’ housing environments. Transformations in *Summud* housing had consequences for the role of Arab-Palestinians in the Israeli polity, albeit different from the consequences intended by the regime.

![Fig. 7.1, 7.2 The village of Kabul in the Western Galilee, circa 1980. Source: Alon archive.](image)

Sayed Kashua, an award winning Arab-Palestinian-Israeli writer, defines this housing strategy using the following story. One of elders of the small village of Kabul in the Upper Galilee traveled to Mecca for Hajj. He got lost and his papers were stolen. Brought to the police station in Mecca, he was asked where he was from. “From Kabul,” he replied – and was therefore sent to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{1138} The old man’s choice to confine the scope of his identity to a small village of 30,000 inhabitants – rather than the national scope of ‘Palestine’ or the citizenship-based scope of ‘Israel’ – is revealing. This story, regardless of whether it is urban legend or real event, serves Kashua for framing the nature of homeland-as-village for Arab-Palestinians in Israel. Homeland-as-village is an everyday living strategy for many Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, politically framed by the notion of Summud – referring to the devastation of the Nakba.

The principle guiding the choice of sites for my inquiry was the attempt to trace housing lineages across space and time, characteristic of the housing processes in the studied population. By housing lineages I attempt to present connections between housing environments which housed the same people on their turbulent movements across space as a result of the Nakba. One lineage connects the ‘internally displaced’ Palestinians of the village of Birem, whose struggle with the Israeli state has been made the symbol of the internally displaced population’s struggle against land confiscations. Birem Palestinians found shelter in vacated housing in the village of Jish, whose residents had fled to Lebanon. When some of them infiltrated back through the border to return to their homes, they faced the Birem refugees in their old homes. Another lineage is the Gibsiyya internally displaced community in the village of Mazra’aa vis-à-vis Mazra’aan villagers who had remained in place. Yet another lineage forms between Ramla, settled with Jewish immigrants (as seen in chapter 6 of this dissertation), and the Palestinian refugee camp of Jilazoun, serving refugees from the Ramla area. Looking for lineages through housing, I seek to represent the Palestinian housing consciousness, extending the home beyond its place and time to include previous homes housed by ancestors as integral parts of the perceived home. These lineages, extending the Palestinian home-based identity across space and time, contributed dramatically to the formation of national consciousness beyond village-patriotism throughout this dispersed society.

7.2.1 The ‘swept away’: The refugee tent

The number of Palestinians ‘swept away’ in the Nakba is debated. While UNRWA reported 267,000 refugees, the British Foreign Ministry estimated the refugees at 711,000 and the Israeli Foreign Ministry assessed the number at 530,000. The number of refugees is currently assessed at 650,000.\textsuperscript{1139} For political reasons, namely the wish to keep the ‘Palestinian refugee problem’ from dissolving by their assimilation and integration into other Arab nation-states, care for the refugees was not managed directly by countries hosting the camps.\textsuperscript{1140} A UN agency was formed to administer care for the refugees, the

\textsuperscript{1138} Kashua told this story in his talk in Berkeley January 15, 2008. He described the story as an urban legend nonetheless useful for understanding the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli’s perspective of homeland. One of the people in the audience, a Palestinian ex-pat, insisted the story was indeed true.

\textsuperscript{1139} Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Appendix A.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), formed November 1949. UNRWA thus provided a non-elected ‘benevolent state’ for the Palestinian refugees, supplying shelter, health, and education services upon land leased from the host countries. Peter Marcuse’s well-known critique of the ‘myth of the benevolent state’ echoed well in the Palestinian refugee public, which directed much of its efforts at resisting UNRWA’s actions – especially housing actions – which were perceived as an attempt to settle them and dissolve their right of return. Moreover, Abreek-Zubeidat shows that refugees in West Bank camps perceived UNRWA’s provision of housing and other basic amenities as their rights rather than charity, i.e. that camp dwellers perceived UN benevolence as care they are entitled to as citizens even though they had no formal citizenship.

Housing in refugee camps was initially purveyed in the form of tents, the basic shelter unit, distributed to each nuclear family individually with no consideration of kinship ties and village of origin. Tent size was determined according to family size, and allotment by the ‘zoamot,’ the tent’s central pole. According to its size, a family received one, two or three zoamot. The tent served all life’s functions for the entire family. Public toilets were built by UNRWA only in 1954. The objectively poor conditions of this dwelling environment were made worse by the dispersal of support networks of village and extended family. UNRWA provided no planning of the camp but simply the tent housing units. As tents are movable, the families themselves moved their tents in order to erect them next to family members of people from their village of origin, forming tent clusters named after original villages. Fatina Abreek-Zubeidat brings testimony that the Maglas district of the Daheisha camp was formed by families from the village of Maglas near Ramla who had accumulated in the camp by 1954, clustered themselves in one area, and encircled it with a low stone fence. This area later became known as the Maglas neighborhood. Refugees from the Ramla area clustered in several refugee camps set up by the Red Cross around Ramallah, including the Amari, Jalazoun, Dyr Amar and Kalandia, formed in 1949.
Refugees continued to live in tents up to seven years. In 1956, UNRWA started gradually to replace all tents with concrete shelters. Tents, as temporary dwellings, did not withstand the harsh weather conditions and wearing and required replacement. The cost of two tents, 90 dollars, matched the cost of a brick structure of 9 square meters, and so tents were gradually replaced with ‘shelters’ in all camps. The insistence on the term ‘shelter’ rather than house was cardinal for the refugees’ willingness to accept the brick or concrete rooms provided by UNRWA, the latter being suspected by refugees of attempting to settle them permanently and deprive them of their right of return. Most shelters were funded by UNRWA and built of hollow concrete bricks and mortar (fig. 7.7). Where land was available, however, UNRWA enabled the private construction of shelters by refugees. The camps were soon filled with identical cubic structures, laid out according to plans made by French and British engineers employed by UNRWA. Construction itself was carried out by local contractors from the camp area, using their

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1150 Jabr, "Housing Conditions in the Refugee Camps of the West Bank."
own workers as well as the refugees themselves, who were employed in construction for larger food rations.\textsuperscript{1151}

\textsuperscript{1151} Abreek-Zubiedat, "The Architecture of the Palestinian "Refugee Camps" in the West Bank, Dheisheh Refugee Camp as a Case Study 1948-1967".

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig77}
\caption{Deheisha camp 1959. Source: Palestine Remembered.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig78}
\caption{Shelter module plans and section. Source: Abreek-Zubeidat, 2010.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig79}
\caption{Jalazoun refugee camp. Source: Palestine remembered.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig710}
\caption{Jalazoon, 1959. Source: Palestine Remembered}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig711}
\caption{Deheisha camp ‘Shelters space’ plan 1956-57. Camp Development Plot Research Project, cooperation between the University of Stuttgart and UNRWA 2006-2008. Source: Abreek-Zubeidat, 2010.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig712}
\caption{From tent to shelter. Aida refugee camp, West Bank, 1956. Note shallow rock bases for tent, intended to keep rainwater from entering and flooding the tent. Source: Abreek-Zubeidat, 2010}
\end{figure}
Shelters sized 8.4, 10.5 or 12.6 square meters, and housed 5, 8, and 8 or more persons respectively. Each shelter included a window, a door, a concrete floor and a sloped roof (fig. 7.13, 7.14, 7.10). Each shelter was allotted a 7 by 14 meter plot (100 square meters) for future expansion. Expansions to the shelters, built of tin and other temporary materials, were to serve the expansion of families while maintaining the makeshift and temporary nature of camp housing.\textsuperscript{1152} Yet even as refugees insisted on maintaining their housing’s temporariness, confinement to the limited area of the camps nonetheless changed their built environment dramatically over the years. By 1990, the Dehaisha camp had become a dense, urban, built environment of several-story houses covering their entire plots. The temporariness of camp housing, one of the main tools for claiming refugee status and maintaining the ability to call for a return to the homeland, is now represented primarily by graffiti drawings of tents upon the houses.

\textsuperscript{1152} Don Perez, \textit{The Refugee Problem}, UNRWA HQ Amman Report 140 (4). (1968)


John Stebbing, “The Creation of a Palestinian Arab State as Part of a Middle East Settlement,” \textit{International Relations} 6, no. 3 (1979).
7.2.2 *Summud and Balad in Israel: Resistance to being swept away*

With the removal of some 650,000 Palestinians from the land that became Israel, the 134,000 Arab-Palestinians who remained within the borders of Israel seemed marginal to the Palestinians’ national and humanitarian problems, rather than being regarded as proffering a distinct agenda for Palestinian nationalism. Moreover, as most of the urban population was vacated, most of the Arab-Palestinian settlements in Israel after the Nakba were small rural settlements not exceeding 3000 inhabitants, clustered in three main geographical locations, all in the periphery of the state (the Galilee, the northeastern part of the Negev desert, and the eastern Wadi Ara). The Nakba is therefore frequently discussed as robbing the Palestinian public in Israel of its leadership and politically conscious populace, leaving only ignorant peasants as subjects under Israeli rule. Indeed, the urban Ayan leadership has by and large left and with it the particular form of nationalism it advocated. However, the Ayan’s bitter opposition – namely, the local-patriotic leaders of Balad nationalism – have done their best to remain on their lands or in their regional district, and have often succeeded in doing so. Therefore, the remaining population was indeed led by a politically conscious national leadership, albeit one largely disregarded by scholarship due to its rivalry with Ayan ‘white mask’ nationalism.

While most of the Jerusalemite national leadership left the country during and following the war, the local leadership and political power base insisted on remaining. They relied on mutual non-violence pacts they had signed with the surrounding Jewish settlements and, by holding on to their land, homes, and villages, risked their lives in their ‘resistance to being swept away’ by the Israeli army. These Palestinians became Israeli citizens following the truce agreements of May 1949. Yet resistance to being swept away did not end with the war but became an everyday practice of resistance to the Military Regime placed on Arab-Palestinian citizens and lasting until 1966. In his novel *Dancing Arabs*, Kashua describes the *Summud* strategy of Arab-Palestinian Israelis as insistence on staying put based on a national consciousness that the place alone can grant them.

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1154 Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
1156 Ibid.
identity. The father in this story keeps warning his sons from leaving their village. “Will none of you remain to protect the land? Refugees, is this what you want to become? Look at what happened to those who ran away. It is better to die and not flee.” Kashua’s speaker states that he hates his father: “because of him I cannot leave the country since he taught us we have no other place. That it is better to die on the land.”

While Palestinian refugees who left their homes fought Israeli sovereignty over the homeland using the terms of nationality and their collective national claim to return to the homeland, Arab-Palestinian Israeli citizens resist the Israeli nation state by individual insistence on staying in place. This challenge is first and foremost based on the ability to dwell upon the ancestral land of one’s village. In practice, keeping one’s sons in the village means the ability to provide them with access to housing within it. Summud strategy is therefore manifest first and foremost in housing.

Studies of this housing strategy, however, are scarce primarily, it seems, due to political issues. Studies of the Palestinian population conducted outside Israel focus their attention on the Palestinian’s dispossession and on the refugee camp. Most studies conducted within Israel before 2000 disregard the refugee altogether and focus on Israel’s Arab-Palestinian society and housing as disconnected from any political process. The traditional approach focused on the ‘Arab village’ and used an anthropological perspective in order to humanize the Arab peasant and present his native life as a source for Sabra emulation. Another approach focused on socioeconomic statistical data and its analysis of the Arab village on the axes of modernity and tradition. The third approach is the planning approach, explaining the evolution of the built environment of the village as an outgrowth of physical planning and lack thereof. All these approaches largely disregard the political elephant in the room, namely the Nakba’s effect on Arab-Palestinian housing.

Starting in the 2000s, more and more research of the Arab-Palestinian built environment in Israel has explicitly addressed issues of national identity, (post)colonialism, and the fact that this population is the losing side of a violent national struggle over the homeland. Correspondingly, more scholarly interest sprang regarding the Palestinian

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1157 Kashua, Dancing Arabs. p. 42.
1158 Ibid. p. 110.
1159 See section 2.1 above. In addition lately scholars have directed their attention at the ‘internally displaced’ Arab-Palestinians within Israel, see section 2.2.2.2 ahead.
1160 See for example Stavski, M. 1946. The Arab Village, Am Oved, Tel Aviv.
1161 See for example Rosenfeld, H. 1964. They Were Fellaheen: The Social Development of the Arab Village in Israel. Hakibbitz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv.
1164 Iris Levin-Azriel, "Identity and Place in Producing Dwelling Environments: Foreidis Hill" (Technion, 2004).
population holding Israeli citizenship.\textsuperscript{1164} No study, however, has attempted to examine the \textit{Summud} political strategy as a housing phenomenon. The \textit{Summud} housing strategy includes new construction on the same plot, home enlargement, addition of stories, addition of outside porches, closing off porches to serve as rooms, closing the gap between pilotis to serve for dwelling, changing the arrangement of functions inside the house, and swapping housing between family members. These strategies are required in order to meet the family’s growing demand for housing with natural population growth and the consequences of the Nakba on mobility and access to land. As a result, the single-story square earth huts, discussed at length in chapter 3, have undergone significant architectural and typological change, resulting in the \textit{Summud} housing form.

7.2.2.1 \textbf{The Military Regime and its consequences for land, housing, and homeland}

The Arab-Palestinians who remained inside the land that became Israel became Israeli citizens. They had voting rights equal to the state’s Jewish community, and according to Israel’s Declaration of Independence were guaranteed social and political equality. After independence, however, the areas in which 90 percent of the Arab-Palestinian population lived were placed under Military Regime, which lasted until 1966. Although Arab-Palestinians in Israel were citizens who exercised their right to vote for parliament, they were governed directly by the Military Regime rather than by state institutions and ministries.\textsuperscript{1165} This system, and the assignment of almost unfettered powers to military governors, were based on the Defense (Emergency) Regulations promulgated by the British Mandate Authority in 1945.\textsuperscript{1166} Using the 1945 regulations as a legal base, the government created three areas or zones to be ruled by the Ministry of Defense. The most important was the Galilee Area, the locale of about two thirds of the Arab population. The second critical area was the Little Triangle, located between the villages of Tira and Taiyiba near the border with Jordan. The third area included much of the Negev Desert, the region where nomadic Bedouins lived. Arabs living in urban and mixed areas were not governed by the military regime and enjoyed relative freedom.\textsuperscript{1167} Under these provisions, 93 out of 104 Arab villages in Israel were constituted as closed areas out of which no one could move without a military permit. In these areas, official acts of military governors were, with rare exceptions, not subject to review by the civil courts. Individuals could be arrested and imprisoned on unspecified charges, and private property was subject to search and seizure without warrant. Furthermore, the physical expulsion of individuals or groups from the state was not subject to review by the civil courts.\textsuperscript{1168} In the first years of Israel’s independence, the Military Regime was repeatedly justified by the threat posed by Arab-Palestinian nationals as a fifth column; yet by the mid-1950s, calls to abolish it had become increasingly frequent. The most interesting ones came from the right-wing opposition leader Menahem Begin. In his speeches in Parliament, Begin publicly declared that “we have all agreed, since taking the banner of Zion into our hands, that we believe the Jewish state should include equal rights to all its

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1164} Susan Slyomovics, \textit{The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village} (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).
\item \textsuperscript{1165} Cohen, \textit{Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967}.
\item \textsuperscript{1166} Pappe, \textit{The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951}.
\item \textsuperscript{1167} Cohen, \textit{Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967}.
\item \textsuperscript{1168} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
citizens regardless of religion, nationality, and origin. By sustaining this administrative institution … we are removing the moral grounds at the foundation of our state.”

About half of the Arab-held lands were nationalized by the state using a number of mechanisms. In the scope of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, embraced in 1949 and renewed annually, land was allowed to lapse. Under this law, the Ministry of Defense could, subject to approval by an appropriate committee of the Knesset, create security zones in all or part of what was designated as the “protected zone,” an area that included lands adjacent to Israel’s borders and other specified areas. The defense minister used this law to categorize “almost half of Galilee, all of the Triangle, an area near the Gaza Strip, and another along the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway line near Batir as security zones.” A clause of the law provided that permanent as well as temporary residents could be required to leave the zone and that the individual expelled had four days within which to appeal the eviction notice to an appeals committee. The decisions of these committees were not subject to review or appeal by a civil court. Yet another measure enacted by the Knesset in 1949 was the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Ordinance. One use of this law was to transfer to Kibbutzim or other Jewish settlements land in the security zones that was lying fallow because the owner of the land or other property was not allowed to enter the zone as a result of national security legislation. The 1949 law provided that such land transfers were valid only for a period of two years and eleven months, but subsequent amending legislation extended the validity of the transfers for the duration of the state of emergency. Another common procedure was for the military government to seize up to 40 percent of the land in a given region—the maximum allowed for national security reasons—and to transfer the land to a new Kibbutz or Moshav. Between 1948 and 1953, about 370 new Jewish settlements were founded, and an estimated 350 of the settlements were established on what was termed abandoned Arab property. The property of the Arabs who were refugees outside the state and the property expropriated from the Arabs who remained in Israel became a major asset to the new state. According to Peretz, by 1954 “more than one-third of Israel’s Jewish population lived on absentee property, and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settled in the urban areas abandoned by Arabs.” The fleeing Arab-Palestinians emptied thriving cities such as Jaffa, Acre, Lydda and Ramla, plus “338 towns and villages and large parts of 94 other cities and towns, containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel.”

At independence, the State of Israel succeeded to the ‘state lands’ of the British Mandate Authority, which had inherited the lands held by the government of the Ottoman Empire.

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Jityis bases his study primarily of Israeli formal sources.
1172 See chapter 6 of this dissertation.
1173 Peretz, Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process. See chapter 6 of this dissertation for further discussion of immigrant settlement in vacated housing.
Development of these state lands by establishing new settlements for accommodating the 
‘returning masses of the Jewish people’\textsuperscript{1175} denied Israel's Arab-Palestinian population 
access to about 95 percent of state lands. A department called the ‘Arab Absentees' 
Properties Department’ was set up, whose task was to control all such Arab properties. In 
July 1948, a Public Custodian of Arab Absentees' Properties was appointed in the power 
of the Absentees' Properties Regulations which the Israeli authorities issued at that time 
to regularize the measures taken to occupy Arab property. Meanwhile a process of de 
facto expropriation was being carried out on the land by Kibbutz and Moshav settlements 
near Arab villages, which were taking over large areas of territory belonging either to 
refugees or, in some cases, to internally displaced Palestinians still remaining in the 
country.\textsuperscript{1176}

The real estate left by the refugees included built-up areas and agricultural land. Whereas 
use of the built-up area was immediate, with the housing of Jewish immigrants as 
discussed in chapter 6, state policy towards agricultural land was less decisive. A land 
survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1950 identified some 420,000 
hectares of vacant lands whose use policy was unclear.\textsuperscript{1177} The appropriation of these 
lands was a creeping process. With the evacuation of Palestinian villages, the surrounding 
Jewish settlements harvested the abandoned fields.\textsuperscript{1178} Subsequently, the state issued a 
temporary lease arrangement for 50,000 hectares to interested Jewish settlements.\textsuperscript{1179}

The formation of the first new Jewish agricultural settlements, discussed in chapter 6, 
was characterized by great sensitivity to the landownership issue. Initially, settlements 
were founded on lands belonging to private Jews, the JNF, and German nationals who 
were deported by the British during World War II.\textsuperscript{1180} In late 1948, the JNF approached 
the Absentee Custodian asking to be given temporary access to absentee lands for the 
purchase of which it had been in the process of negotiating before the war.\textsuperscript{1181} In August 
1948, the JNF brought up the idea of permanent nationalization of Palestinian agricultural 
land for the purpose of Jewish settlement. The rationalization for this process defined 
these lands as ‘excess land’ beyond the subsistence needs of the Palestinian village 
population should it return, based on land requirements for village subsistence calculated 
by the British survey of 1945. The JNF purchased Palestinian ‘excess lands’ from the 
state while the state assumed responsibility for compensating landowners should claims 
be made.\textsuperscript{1182} The government made the decision to sell Palestinian land to the JNF in

\textsuperscript{1175} See chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
\textsuperscript{1176} Ilan Pappé, \textit{The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel} (Yale Univ Pr, 2011). 
\textsuperscript{1177} Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map." As' Ad Ghanem, "The Palestinian 
Minority in Israel: The challenge of the Jewish State and Its Implications," \textit{Third world quarterly} 21, no. 1 
(2000). 
\textsuperscript{1178} Benni Morris, \textit{1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians} (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 
1994). 
\textsuperscript{1179} Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map." 
\textsuperscript{1180} Morris, \textit{1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians}. 
\textsuperscript{1181} Ibid.
order to claim Jewish hold over the lands before a political settlement.  

The state acted to consolidate the Arab-Palestinian population into the fewest possible settlements, consolidating the remaining population of some 418 villages before the war (as recorded by Khalidi) to 153 villages (as recorded by the Arab Center for Alternative Planning). This policy was adopted for two main reasons: first, for making easier the control over the Arab-Palestinian population, which (as already noted) was regarded as hostile and placed under Military Regime. Second, in order to exhaust the state’s ability to claim lands it itself defined as state lands due to the fleeing and dispersal of the Arab-Palestinian population (i.e. the absentee law discussed above).

In addition, ‘absentee land’ was nationalized by the state and managed by the ‘Absentee Property Custodian,’ managed since 1951 by the Development Authority as part of the Israel Land Authority (ILA). ‘Absentee’ is a term used for people belonging to one of three categories: (1) Owner of property within Israel who resided in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq or Saudi Arabia on and after November 29, 1947; (2) a citizen of the British Mandate who left the country by September 1 1948; or (3) a citizen who left for areas held by enemy troops. Access to absentee land and property was made by lease or purchase from the ILA. In addition, large tracts of land were confiscated for the purpose of public works such as roads and the National Water Carrier project. The Military Regime over the Arab-Palestinians had significant consequences for their built environment. Between 1948 and 2004, the Arab-Palestinian population grew sixfold while the land at their disposal shrank by half. Influx of the internally displaced, along with mass confiscation of land, generated severe densification of the villages. Whereas the Arab-Palestinian built environment developed slowly and moderately until the late 1940s (as seen in chapter 3), its housing and settlement were irrevocably changed and made increasingly urban thereafter, as can be seen in the study of Mazraa in section 3 below. The ‘military regime over Israeli Arabs’ was formally removal on November 9, 1966, following continuous public protest against it, growing significantly in the wake of the Kafar Kassem massacre of October 1956.

7.2.2.2 Housing

The transformation of Palestinian housing, leading to the eventual consolidation of Summud as a housing type and housing strategy, was deeply affected by the workings of the Nakba dispossession within Israel. Following the Nakba and the instating of the military regime over the Arab population, Arab-Palestinian Israelis comprised three sub-populations defined here by the nature of their access to housing. These included the villagers who managed to remain in their houses and villages; the internally displaced population, resettled in houses and villages vacated by refugees; and the population of returnees, infiltrating back to return to their homes and fields. While houses’ architecture

1185 As 94% of the land in Israel was nationalized, purchase is in fact long term lease for 99 years. Formal land ownership remains in the hands of the state.
1187 Rosenthal, ed. The Kafar Kassem Massacre: Events and Myth (HaKibbutz HaMeuchad,2000).
1188 Other common distinctions are made primarily among urban and rural residents and between fellaheen and educated populations.
and village layout themselves changed little in the first few years of the Israeli regime, the nature of homeownership and occupancy were fundamentally altered, and consequently too the housing strategy employed by the Arab-Palestinian population.

The housing strategy among the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel is to house married sons and their families next to the parents’ housing. This housing norm and tradition is not disconnected from historical and political circumstances and dovetails with the *Summud* housing ideology and strategy posited on ‘resistance to being swept away’ from one’s village of birth. Yusef Jabarin gives an account of Palestinian housing culture in his study of ‘culturally sustainable’ housing in Gaza. While focusing on Gaza, Jabarin extends his account to Palestinian housing culture at large. The extended patriarchal family of three generations—comprising parents, married sons, and their children—is the basic family unit, several of which form a *hamoola*, or patrilineage, recognized by a number of scholars as dominating the familial landscape of Palestinian society. Moreover, scholars state that the Palestinian struggle for independence, as well as life under the Israeli regime, made the *hamoola* family structure an even stronger and more influential institution in Palestinian society. The *hamoola* is not only a tight social unit but also a spatial unit in the village, a neighborhood, called Hara and named after the family. The Palestinian neighborhood is a socio-spatial unit whose residents are extended families belonging to the same *hamoola*. Spatially, the neighborhood is framed by several housing structures serving extended families. It is composed of households with different socio-economic status, which nonetheless prefer to reside in the same neighborhood space. The village itself is ordered not by streets but by neighborhoods and has no proper addresses. At the center of each there is a main square, formed by the intersection of roads and serving as the neighborhood’s commercial and social center.

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1189 Yusef Jabarin, "Culturally Sustainable Housing: Case Study of the City of Gaza" (Technion, 2002).
1190 Ibid.
1192 Jabarin, "Culturally Sustainable Housing: Case Study of the City of Gaza".
7.2.2.2.1 The villages that remained: Foreidis

Fig. 7.19, 7.20, 7.21 Streets of the Arab village of Foreidis, 1949. Photography: Hugo Mendelson. Source: NPC.

If the Israeli state and army were interested in what Morris called the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, how is it that some villages have remained on their lands? Morris addresses this question in his book *1948 and After*, where he presents four villages that managed to remain on their lands—Abu Gush, Beit Naqubba, Foreidis and Jisr Zarka—and explains how this was possible.\(^{1193}\) Of the four villages examined by Morris, only one, Foreidis, remained intact upon its lands during the war, whereas residents of the other three villages were removed and later either infiltrated back (Abu Gosh) or rebuilt their village on part of their lands (Beit Naqubba, Jisr Zarka).\(^{1194}\) Morris and Pappe more than insinuate that the remaining villages managed to remain in place since they were accomplices with the Yishuv and the army, and therefore traitors. This accusation of treason echoes the Husaini rhetoric of treason, addressed at Palestinian villagers who resisted his leadership prior to the Nakba, namely supporters of *Balad* nationalism. Cohen, who investigated the phenomenon of Arab accomplices with Zionism, describes bitter confrontations within villages between the internally displaced and the remaining villagers over the issue of collaboration with the Israeli authorities.\(^{1195}\)

Foreidis is described in an 1882 Survey of Western Palestine as “a small village of mud and stone at the foot of the [Carmel] hills with a well to the south. It would seem to have decayed as Consul Rogers gives the population (1859) as 200 souls with 18 feddans of

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\(^{1194}\) Morris does not explain why he chose to examine the 4 above villages, nor does he state that these villages are several among some 105 villages which managed to remain on their lands.

In the 1920s, Foreidis’ population grew as a result of the violent hostilities between Jews and Arabs. Arab agricultural workers from the Qualanswa area who stayed at the Jewish Moshava of Zichron Yaakov were asked to leave. As they no longer had connections to their original villages, they moved to nearby Foreidis. Examination of the few available images of Foreidis housing from 1949 reveals a cluster of around a dozen houses of limestone and mud bricks (see especially fig. ?). This built environment supports the historical accounts of a rural settlement whose population shrinks and expands due to external factors. Morris attributes Foreidis’ ‘success’ in holding on to the village to the appeal made to the army by the neighboring Jewish Zichron Yaakov to keep Foreidis intact in order to serve Zichron as cheap labor. Another explanation given by Morris for Foreidis’ perdurance while the nearby village of Tentura was violently and completely vacated is that the villagers chose loyalty for the village over loyalty to the nation by surrendering their weapons and signing a pact of surrender before the decisive battle over the area. Foreidis thereby marked a claim that the homeland is the village and did not take part in the battle over the national homeland. Supporting evidence for this claim is the fact that Foreidis was never placed under the Military Regime otherwise imposed on all Arab-Palestinian villages. The outright accusations of Foreidis villagers as accomplices find resonance in the tense relationships between Foreidis villagers and the Tantura refugees, primarily women and children, who found shelter in Foreidis following the military conquest of Tentura. Although the two villages enjoyed close relations before the war, with Foreidis children attending the Tantura school, Foreidis villagers were not willing to absorb in their village the Tantura refugees who accused them of standing by rather than fighting for the homeland. As a result, both Tantura refugees and Foreidis villagers asked for the Tantura refugees to be transferred to Iraqi troop controlled Tul Karem. This affair tainted village-nationalism in Arab-Palestinian collective consciousness, rather than being hailed as a triumph of resistance in the face of Israeli dispossession.

7.2.2.2.2 The Internally displaced: Manshiyat Akka – Makr, Birem - Jish

The fleeing of the Arab-Palestinian population occurred throughout the country during the outbreaks of violence, and paused with the short periods of remission. Some refugees therefore did not move very far from their home village, but were nonetheless unable to go back and were therefore stuck in their host villages due to the shifting

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1196 Conder et al., The Survey of Western Palestine, p. 42.
1198 Zichron Yaacov is one of the Moshava settlements of the First Alyia, founded in 1882 and supported by Baron Rothschild.
1199 Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians. Levin-Azriel, "Identity and Place in Producing Dwelling Environments: Foreidis Hill".
1201 For detailed discussion of Tantura’s national housing see chapter 3 of this dissertation.
1203 Foreidis official website.
1204 How Were 1000 Arab Women Transformed to Arab-Controlled Territory, Davar June 20 1948.
1205 The 18 months long war was in fact a series of battles over geographic areas with periods of truce among them. See Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.
borders and subsequently the Israeli-enforced Military Regime. The Military Regime explicitly declared its intention to prevent as much as possible the return of the internally displaced to their villages. If the village houses remained, they were purposely populated by Arab-Palestinians displaced out of another village. Little study has been made thus far of the housing of the internally displaced. Although some scholars have examined this population (starting with Slymovics’ pioneer paper of 1993), very little of this literature focuses on the housing itself, stressing instead issues of identity and discourse to be examined primarily by means of oral history and literature. Yet the houses vacated and those used by the internally displaced were active elements of the identities produced, especially since the displaced often refused to revoke their claims to their ancestral village, while living in another village, frequently in houses vacated by other refugees.

This complexity can only be studied by examination of housing lineages that bring together several houses in several locations into a single story by virtue of their having served the same people. For example, a housing lineage may be traced from the houses of Manshiat Akka near Acre, whose villagers fled east, to the village of Makr where they found refuge in makeshift housing built on agricultural land belonging to refugees who had fled to Lebanon. Furthermore, Abreek-Zubeidat gives an account that due to the good prewar relations between the residents of Manshiat Akka and members of Kibbutz Ein Hamifratz, Kibbutz members appealed to the government on behalf of the refugees, asking to provide them with proper housing in Makr. Manshiat Akka refugees were therefore permanently housed by the state on land belonging to Makr refugees. The state housing regime provided them with housing in cubical rooms of 16 square meters, each housing an entire family, as a self-help unit. Soon the space was not enough, and additions serving as kitchens and bathrooms were added to the rooms (fig. 7.22). In 1952, the state officially claimed Manshiat Akka’s lands in order to connect old Acre with new Acra. The state offered the internally displaced a settlement in the framework of which they were given formal ownership of their rooms in Makr and 400 square meters of Makr land in exchange for revoking future claims to return to their village. Abreek-Zubeidat identifies the consequence of permanent housing for refugees as nullifying their ability to make demands to return to their lands. She connects the refugee housing provided by UNRWA in Gaza and the West Bank with the housing solutions provided by the Israeli government for the internally displaced.

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1208 Ibid.
1209 Ibid.
1210 See detailed discussion of the refugee camps in section 3 below.
as far as asking whether the Israeli government supplied UNRWA with the plans for refugee housing, or vice versa.\textsuperscript{1211}

Fig. 7.22 New housing built in the village of Makr, near Acre, March 1950. At the back are the old houses of Makr. Photographer: Fritz Cohen. Source: NPC.
Fig. 7.23 Housing for internally displaced Arab-Palestinians in Isfiya. Late 1950s. Source: Uniform housing samples file, Ministry of Housing. State archive.

The internally displaced formed a quarter of the Arab-Palestinian population in Israel, whose housing conditions were the hardest due to their limited access to land.\textsuperscript{1212} Some Arab-Palestinian villages experienced significant population growth as a result of the war due to the influx of population of the internally displaced. In some cases these refugees moved into housing and lands vacated by people fleeing from these very villages. Others squatted around the host village in makeshift, autoconstructed housing.\textsuperscript{1213} The internally displaced were eligible for compensation for their lands but were not allowed to return and repopulate them. Unwilling to give up their right to return to their villages, many of the internally displaced refused to accept alternative plots belonging to refugees, and were therefore left with little land on which to house themselves.\textsuperscript{1214} Cohen gives an account of the bitter conflicts among internally displaced villagers, revolving around the issue of accepting absentee lands vacated by refugees as compensation for land in their original villages.\textsuperscript{1215} It should be noted, however, that as the vacated houses and lands were declared state property by the Absentee Property Law of 1950, the internally displaced who settled upon them (just like Jewish immigrants) had either to rent or to purchase them from the state’s Land Administration Authority.\textsuperscript{1216}

Another, better-known lineage involves the village of Birem, one of the symbols of the demand of the internally displaced to return to their villages and of their struggle against the state’s confiscation of land and housing. Conquered by the Israeli army without resistance on October 29, 1949, Birem’s villagers were asked to leave it for two weeks.

\textsuperscript{1211} Abreek- Zubiedat, "And Gave Them These Rooms."
\textsuperscript{1212} Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel’s" Internally Displaced" and the" Unrecognized Villages"."
\textsuperscript{1213} Farid Awad, "The Process of Change of the Arab House in the Galilee" (Technion, 2003). Abreek-Zubiedat, "And Gave Them These Rooms." Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel’s" Internally Displaced” and the" Unrecognized Villages"."
\textsuperscript{1214} Farid Awad, Mazraa municipal engineer. Interview held August 2011.
\textsuperscript{1216} Ibid.
until the battle over the area was over. They were never allowed to go back despite a court appeal in their favor. The reason given was the strategic location of the village, four kilometers from the border with Lebanon. As ‘enemy citizens’ the Birem villagers were not trusted to perform the ‘good Israeli’ task of protecting the border. Birem lands were confiscated for the formation of Kibbutz Bar’am whose members were deemed capable of guarding the borders against infiltrators. The struggle of Birem villagers against any form of settlement over their lands and their insistence on going back led to the army’s decision to destroy village houses on October 1953.

The houses of Birem no longer exist, and accounts of them are primarily oral histories collected by the Birem Displaced Committee and by scholars. Hana Farah, a displaced descendent of Birem, is an architect who conducted reconstruction work of the material environment of Birem in an ongoing, ten-year-long project (1998-2008). Farah’s work uses different materials for the bombarded remains of the village and for his reconstruction of village structures (fig. 7.24). Like other internally displaced families from Birem, the Farah family moved to the nearby village of Jish, where they squatted in houses vacated by Jish refugees. The sense of a housing lineage is well expressed in Farah’s account: “They abandoned their home along with their cousins who lived with them around the same well and paved yard. They left to live in a vacated house in the village of Jish. Grandma, grandpa and their cousins ‘selected’ a vacated house, found a room by a room and shared them…What will [they] do? They were living in a vacated house and their own house probably housed people who came by boats.” I would like to suggest that lineages connecting houses in different villages to each other, as well as the Palestinian refugee camps across state borders, were significant for the formation of a national consciousness extending beyond the village to encompass the entire homeland.

Fig. 7.24 Aerial photo of Birem village, 1949. Source: Hana Farah.
Fig. 7.25 Kufer Birem, work in progress (model/actions/photography) 1998-2008. Source: Hana Farah.

1218 Harozen, Y. To the Call Voiced by the Maronites. Davar, February 8, 1950.
Since vacated housing was limited, the state’s housing regime constructed new housing for the internally displaced refugees of Birem at the outskirts of Jish upon absentee land vacated by Jish refugees, similar to Makr housing for Manshiat Akka villagers. These houses were built of concrete blocks with a concrete roof and included a bedroom, a living room, and a small kitchen. Toilets were located in a cabin outside the house, because the houses were not yet connected to the sewage system. House plans show 9 by 5 meter concrete houses divided into two rooms and including a kitchen area. 51 such houses were built in Jish from 1958 onward. Each of the identical houses was located on its own plot of land. Houses included a stairway leading to the roof (7.28), thereby figuring the houses as self-help units intended for expansion by the dwellers over time. Yet a picture of these houses taken in 1959 (fig. 7.26) indicates that the stairways were not built with the houses. Farah gives an account of this housing as “built of concrete block walls, flooring made of square gray tiles of 20 by 20 cm, concrete roof. The house is painted grey, its height a little over the height of a man, sized by the new order of the new regime. The toilet booth at the back yard was a hole in the ground with a concrete cast on top. Its walls made of concrete panels assemble with screws and a door made of wooden boards.” This housing solution, a core of self-help housing, is similar in many respects to immigrant housing supplied in the Ramla shack neighborhood discussed in chapter 6.

Cohen brings evidence that Birem villagers in Jish refused to resettle in the new houses and engaged in fierce conflicts, both with Jish villagers who cultivated absentee land and with displaced Sasa villagers who moved into the new houses. He describes this situation using the terminology of treason and collaboration. Farah, on the other hand, reports of his father Fuad’s wish to live in one of the new houses upon his marriage. As an internally displaced person from Birem, Farah was eligible for the housing, yet since he had been caught bringing food from Lebanon during the war, he was identified as an infiltrator, a status that rendered him ineligible for access to housing.

![Fig. 7.26 Gush Halav (Jish) newly built houses in the Arab Maronite village. 1959. Photography: Moshe Pridan. Source: NPC.](image)

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1221 State archive, Gush Halav (Jish) file.
1225 Farah, “Twenty Years I Have Dreamed to Host My Friends in My House, My Father’s House, My Grandfather’s House.” p. 170.
7.2.2.2.3 The returnees-infiltrators: Jish

The housing lineage connecting Birem and Jish connects the refugee camps across the Lebanese border as well. The village of Jish, where Birem refugees found shelter in vacated housing and land, had been vacated by some of its residents during the war, most of whom fled to Lebanon. A few of those refugees infiltrated back through the borders in order to return to their homes and villages. Farah recounts the return of an old woman to her home in Jish where his family lived:

"One day an older woman came back from Lebanon, sneaked through the border with its round towers which could be seen from the village. She pushed the gate without calling the names of the people living beyond it, a large key in her hand, and unlocked the door to the closed room which hid a secret. The home survived intact, as if untouched by time. All her possessions – pans and pillows, wool blankets and mattresses she received as dowry from her mother – were arranged in niches in the thick wall. Knives and tools still placed on the wooden shelves hooked with wooden pikes into the thick walls, and the glass lantern was still placed on top of the mud shelf forming the corner fireplace. The woman with the ‘alusfa’ on her head, who seemed old to me 40 years ago, her husband and son remained in Lebanon and she alone returned and made do – had to make do – with the single room for which she held the key under her apron. Umm Muhamad’s home had a wooden door and a concrete roof, but its walls were of earth and stone. The woman’s son had cast that roof of concrete. It was one of the first roofs in Jish cast of concrete, supported by iron beams 4 or 5 meters long. Her son must have purchased the beams from the British Army’s warehouses. Iron beams were very rare and expensive then. The flat roof served the neighbors in turn during the summer for drying cooked wheat, sparing the task of sifting the wheat from the tiny stones collected when laying cooked wheat on mud roofs."

Umm Muhamad’s home, described by Farah, has shrunk following the settlement of the Farah family in Jish. Whereas before the Nakba her home had included several rooms encircling a yard, all used by her family, her home now comprised only the room she herself occupied. While the architecture of the house did not change – its earth walls and concrete roof remained intact – it was significantly changed in terms of its relationship to the land, to other houses, and to the village. Umm Muhamad’s house was now a single-standing structure, no longer connected across the yard to similar structures to form single home.

Returnees, if recognized as such by the military regime authorities, were categorized as ‘infiltrators’ and given a green identity card which carried with it limited rights, especially with regard to housing, as seen above with regard to access to state-built housing.\(^\text{1227}\) The number of infiltrators crossing Israel’s borders – in both directions – during its first decade of independence was large. Reasons for border crossing were

\(^{1226}\) Ibid.
\(^{1227}\) Ibid.
numerous: smuggling, visiting relatives across the border, returning to one’s home and village, theft and acts of revenge, and even cropping one’s fields. Israel viewed border infiltration as a challenge to its sovereignty and borders, and demanded its Arab-Palestinian citizens’ cooperation in turning in infiltrators. Infiltrators, however – most of them returnees to their own villages – were largely aided to stay. Some 20,000 infiltrators managed to return during the first five years after the Nakba and were eventually granted Israeli citizenship. The Arab-Palestinian population in Israel thus grew by 15 percent. These citizens nonetheless were largely not entitled to their original homes and fields, especially those already occupied by Jewish immigrants or by the internally displaced population.

7.3 The ‘new Arab village’: Summud Mazraa and The Israel Museum

In addition to enabling Arab-Palestinian Israelis to remain in – and keep their claims for – the village-homeland, the Summud housing strategy nonetheless marked a fundamental transformation in the built environment and in the nature of both house typology and village.

The village of Mazraa in the Western Galilee, the ‘first new Arab village,’ is a pivotal case for examining the transformation of flatland, Balad-nationalism villages to Summud-based villages, a process whose elements are discussed in detail below. Parallel to the formation of Summud as the ‘new Arab village’ typology and housing strategy, another surprising inflection of the idea of a ‘new Arab village’ was designed by the state for one of its key nation-building institutions, the Israel Museum. The Museum, the product of a design competition, was explicitly presented to state officials as a traditional, Arab-Palestinian built environment. The following section will discuss the two forms of the ‘new Arab village’ produced in the service of the two competing national projects, making both concrete and symbolic use of housing.

The two sites of inquiry are – accidentally or not – tightly connected historically to each other. Mazraa was founded as an agricultural farm by a noted Ayan family of the Jerusalem area in the aftermath of the 1858 land code. The Badr family, and probably the 12 tenant peasant families cultivating Mazraa as well, originated from the village of Sheikh Badr outside Jerusalem. The Israel Museum, along with the Israeli Knesset or parliament and other state institutions, were erected upon the lands of Sheikh Badr, conquered during the 1948 war and vacated. The Badr family, and the village of Sheikh Badr at large, are associated with Ayan-Jerusalemite nationalism and took active part in the Arab Revolt, resistance to the British during World War II, and the battles of 1948. Mazraa, however, is a pivotal case illustrating the development of Summud as an ideological continuation of Balad nationalism as a result of a number of processes discussed below, as well as of the post-Nakba leadership of local Balad leader Sheikh Rabbah Awad. The Israel Museum, a ‘new Arab village’ built upon the lands of Sheikh

1228 Infiltrator Prevention Law, 1954.
Badr in the service of Israeli state-nationalism, is compared here with the ‘new Arab village’ of Mazraa, produced by its villagers in the service of Palestinian Balad nationalism in an attempt to resist being swept away.

7.3.1 Mazraa: Traditional national housing prior to 1948

A feudal farm of the Ottoman period, Mazraa was one of the sites for the formation of Palestinian nationalism in flatland housing in the wake of the 1858 Ottoman land code (as discussed in chapter 3). As a vast farm owned by two single landowners (the Wakf and a landowning family) and cultivated by a small number of landless serfs, Mazraa reflects the tension between the two frameworks of Palestinian nationalism discussed above: state-nationalism and Balad-nationalism. The landowning family, the two Badr brothers, was part of the Ayan Sheikh Badr family of the Jerusalem area. The farm of Mazraa was therefore a spillover of the village of Sheikh Badr near Jerusalem, today part of the city,1231 The Badrs were well-known Arab nationalists; they were involved in the nationalist struggle against the British, and allegedly sheltered Germans sent to organize the Arab revolt against the British during World War II.1233 During the 1948 war, the Badr brothers left Mazraa for Acre, while the 12 peasant families cultivating the land remained in the village, reflecting two distinct understandings of the geography of the homeland. Whereas many villages with Mazraa’s pattern of landownership in Palestine’s coastal valleys were ‘swept away,’ some of Mazraa’s population managed to remain in place, reflecting seeds of the Summud practices of Palestinian nationalism, albeit not consciously framed as such.

Following the Badr brothers’ departure, their lands, comprising most of the land in Mazraa, were declared by the Israeli state as ‘absentee’ land and nationalized. Although the serf families were able to purchase some of this land, the vast nationalized lands enabled the state to use Mazraa for resettling internally displaced populations from villages across the Western Galilee. This resettlement marks Mazraa as a pivotal case for the state’s practices towards its ‘enemy citizenry,’ practices which constituted an explicit attempt to consolidate this citizenry, to take hold of the lands of their original villages, and to control them by dint of their dependence on the state due to residency on ‘public’ national land.

Between 1949 and 1955, Mazraa absorbed large numbers of internally displaced Palestinians from a number of villages in the area. Settled on land now owned by the state, Mazraa has since 1948 been suffering from the same severe condition now faced by most Arab-Palestinian communities in Israel, namely an inability either to expand or to densify. Mazraa’s mix of original population and several waves of resettled internally displaced communities affords the opportunity to examine the adoption of Summud by various village publics.1234 Furthermore, the exceptionally limited availability of land in Mazraa required the village to densify sooner and to a greater extent than other (more typical) villages, as well as to negotiate with the regime for land and housing options for

1231 Interview with Mrs. Raqiyah Awad, conducted August 2011.
1233 Kibbutz Evron archive, testimony of Micha Cahani regarding “the ruined house”.
1234 Other villages examined, for example Faradis,
its next generation. The result of this negotiation is the first plan for a new neighborhood designed for an Arab village upon state lands. Mazraa is therefore also a pivotal case in examining state-population negotiations of *Summud* housing.

Whereas in Foreidis the remaining families rejected the integration of the internally displaced into their village, in Mazraa the original families quickly became a minority in their own village. Families from villages across the Galilee, regarded as absentee by the military regime, were forcibly resettled in Mazraa, many of them given Mazraan land as ‘compensation’ for land in their original home villages. Even as some of the resettled elders refused to accept compensation from the state, demanding instead their right of return to their original villages (as in the case of the Birem villagers), an interesting and dramatic counter-culture developed in Mazraa amongst the second generation, seeking to use the compensation lands as bases for a new strategy, *Summud*. Mazraa was a ‘dumping ground’ for villagers throughout the Western Galilee whom the Military Regime managed to define as internally displaced ‘absentees’ whose lands therefore belong to the state. Mazraa was a convenient target for these purposes for two main reasons. First, Mazraa’s small original population of 11 fellaheen families possessed little power or resources. Whereas villages like Foreidis and Jish had large original populations which rejected the displaced population, leading to severe confrontations in the villages, Mazraa’s original population was too small to resist the massive influx of internal refugees and vacated returnees from 7 different villages in the Galilee. Second, and perhaps more important, the fact that most of Mazraa’s lands belonged to the Badr Basha family and to the Wakf, and were therefore nationalized by the state, gave the state full control over village lands. The Israel Land Administration (ILA) subdivided Mazraa’s lands and leased them to the villagers. The heterogeneity of Mazraa’s population resulting from these policies renders this village a pivotal case for examining *Summud* practices taken by all segments of Palestinian society in Israel.

### 7.3.1.1 Mazraa: Traditional national housing prior to 1948

In order to track the transformation process of Mazraa’s houses and village layout, we must look at its built environment prior to 1948. As seen in chapter 3 in detail, the Ottomans and the British mapped Mazraa in the 1870s, pointing to the characteristics which made it a pivotal case for the development and consolidation of *Summud* following the Nakba. Specifically, surveys note the small number of peasants and their limited land rights, and the spatial distinction between peasant houses and landowner houses. Village houses included a cluster of a dozen peasant houses, north of which were the two structures serving the landowners: the Wakf khan house and the Basha house. This relationship characterizes villages formed following the Ottoman 1858 land code based on the privatization of imperial land. Mazraa, literally ‘a farm,’ was purchased by the effendi family who employed the villagers as agricultural workers.

Houses included one storey and were built of limestone, mud bricks, and earth. Roofs were made of wooden beams covered with earth. Awad brings a plan of one of the original houses of Mazraa (fig. 7.30), located on plot 11 of the British plan (fig. 7.29).

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1235 See chapter 3 for detailed discussion of Mazraa in the 19th century.
1236 British maps of 1941. Source: Mazraa engineering department.
1237 Awad, "The Process of Change of the Arab House in the Galilee".
The square house, destroyed in 1978, was built of stone and earth. It sized 8 by 8 meters and included two levels. The lower level (at the bottom of the plan) served for domestic animals and included a manger. It was separated from the Divan where the family conducted most of its living functions. The sleeping area was located in a gallery built on wooden beams, located above the animal area and reached by a wooden ladder. One of the original houses of Mazraa still remains, albeit unpopulated (fig. 7.30). Its roof is based on wooden beams covered with earth, which had to be redone each fall to prevent rain leakage into the house.

Fig. 7.29 Detail of the 1941 British map of Mazraa, including 11 peasant houses of various sizes on plots averaging at 0.05 hectares.

Fig. 7.30 Hayak house, Mazraa. Source: Awad, 2003.

Fig. 7.31 Mazraa houses. Source: Bimuna.

Fig. 7.32 One of the original old houses of Mazraa, 2011. Source: Author.

Fig. 7.33 Basha house in Mazraa. The Baha Ullah, prophet of the Bahai religion, rented a room here when placed under house arrest by the Ottomans in the 1870s. Source: Bahai –guardian.com.

Fig. 7.34 Plan of the Basha house, detail of the 1941 British map. Source: Mazraa engineering department

The Badr house and Wakf Khan were different from village houses in location, size and materiality. Both were located outside the village and by each other (fig. 3.24). Both were built of limestone (and still standing) and were composed of a series of rooms, rather than a single room. The Badr house includes two floors and more than ten rooms, extending the village house typology of two levels to a full separation between private and public functions. Living rooms were located at the top floor and reception, cooking, and dining areas at the bottom floor.\textsuperscript{1238} The two housing forms, namely the peasant village house

\textsuperscript{1238} The Bahá’u’lláh, the founder of the Bahá’í Faith, has lived in a room in this house during his house arrest after released from the Ottoman prison in Acre. The Badr family refused to sell the house to Jews and it was purchased by Bahai believers and is now managed by them.
and the landowner house, were both based on the same principle as located upon the land and under the sky, and placed in the campus layout of the Mazraa fields, with the difference mainly in their size and quality. This housing type was virtually erased following the Nakba and replaced by a completely different housing type defined as Summud.

7.3.1.2 Mazraa: The step-by-step transformation of traditional national housing to Summud

Following the Nakba a large number of families, vacated from their villages in the Galilee, were concentrated in Mazraa as part of the Military Regime’s policy to concentrate internally displaced villagers from throughout the Galilee in Mazraa, whose lands were primarily nationalized by the state. This policy served the military regime’s purpose of depriving Arabs-Palestinians from their national claim to the homeland on the basis of native ancestry, as well as of taking hold of vast tracts of land as discussed above. The internally displaced squatted on agricultural land in makeshift shacks. Accounts from that time discuss some 1000 internally displaced Arab-Palestinians living in Mazraa, originating from the villages of Ghabsiyya, Sheik Danun, Akziv, Kwaikam and Basa, and “living in improper shacks and limestone houses which endanger their health.”

Mazraa was therefore composed of villagers who had remained in the village, internally displaced peasants arriving in several waves, and a few ‘infiltrators’ housed there as well. These different populations had different access to land and housing, and therefore employed Summud differently from each other, each informing the practice of remaining in the village to resist being swept away again. In addition, generational differences in the approach to Mazraa as homeland existed between villagers born in Mazraa and their fathers who were forcibly settled there, affecting the actions of families across time. Sections 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.2 and 3.1.3.3 below examine these sub-strategies through case studies of several houses in Mazraa, serving the remaining population, the internally displaced, and infiltrators. My examination focuses on local Balad national leader Sheikh Rabbah Awad, whose family still dominates the village, as a case indicative of dramatic social transformations occurring in the remaining villages following the Nakba and the resettlement of the internally displaced; transformations that manifested themselves clearly in the realm of housing. The Summud actions of the three sub-populations are examined in section 4.2.1 against the backdrop of the actions taken by the state’s planning authorities in their attempt to regulate, order, limit and contain the ‘enemy citizenry’ by shaping their access to housing.

1239 Darwish, "Arab Refugees Construct a Modern Village."
7.3.1.2.1 Military-regime and regional planning for Mazraa

The terms for the transformation of Mazraa were set in 1958 by a plan made for Mazraa by the regional authority (fig. ?). The plan was laid out in order to subdivide Mazraa’s nationalized lands to plots in order to lease them out to Mazraan families for homebuilding. The plan arranged housing plots along concentric inner roads and allocated the central area to public services, a school and a park, following the template of the Jewish agricultural settlements planned by Kaufmann, such as Nahalal. Plan 331 limits Mazraa’s expansion to a cluster of plots concentrated around the old village center. Its preparation by the regional authority of ‘Gaaton, Naaman, Sulam Tur and Shavei Zion,’ named after the Jewish settlements in the area, indicates the plan’s purpose to curb Mazraa’s expansion by way of a legal planning document. As Mazraa was under Military Regime like all Arab-Palestinian villages in the country, the plan had to be approved by the Military Regime. Correspondence between the regional authority and the military officer in charge points to planning considerations involving the potential ability of Mazraa villagers to attack the nearby Acre-Naharia main road. Yet the plan’s main motivation was housing. The Military Regime district officer termed plan 331 “the legal means necessary to motivate the inhabitants to construct permanent housing.” This statement reflects two facts: first, that most of Mazraa’s population of internally displaced families had by 1958, a decade after the Nakba, not yet settled in permanent housing; second, that the state wanted them to settle in permanent housing. This struggle between permanence and temporariness, very similar to that described by Abreek-Zubeidat and Sanyal with respect to the Palestinians who were swept away, was a struggle over the right to return to the original lands and villages. At this time period, prior to 1958, the housing practice in Mazraa was not yet Summud, but was rather posited on temporariness and the claim for return.

The plan explicitly disregards the dozens of auto-constructed shacks housing the internally displaced upon agricultural lands in the village and defines the plots upon

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1240 See my discussion in chapters 2, 5 and 8.
1241 State archive, plan 331 file.
1242 Housing will be Built for Mazraa Arabs. Davar, February 2 1960. [Hebrew]
which most shacks were built as agricultural land. The Authority for Rehabilitating Refugees and Evacuees, formed in October 1962, identified housing as the main problem facing the rehabilitation of the 3,500 internally displaced families numbering 20,000 people. Rehabilitation meant the resettling of the evacuees by assigning them land previously owned by refugees or internally displaced persons. However, “while many have in fact rehabilitated themselves, one main problem is shared by them – the problem of housing. Survey of housing conditions among refugees and evacuees found that 1100 families live in tents and shacks and 2500 families live in mud shacks and [poor] houses.”

The report identified several obstacles stalling the rehabilitation and settlement of the displaced: First, the latter’s refusal to accept lands owned by refugees in exchange for their own lands. Second, their refusal to settle with the state and thus acknowledge it. Third, the refusal of large landowners who did not subsist off the land to accept monetary compensation for their properties.

Mazraan villagers rejected plan 331 and its proposal of permanent housing. Despite the state’s encouragement of permanent settlement by offering plots of nationalized land in cheap long-term leases, villagers largely preferred their makeshift, temporary dwellings. Although the school allocated by the plan was inaugurated a year later in October 1959, only four houses were built by January 1960. The plan was not executed due to the internally displaced population’s refusal to accept land in Mazraa as compensation for their lands in their original villages. “A proposal to settle the Mazraa refugees in their place of residence and pay them compensation was formally handed to village representatives this week by representatives of the State Holdings office, Acre district officer and Gaaton regional authority” reported Davar. “Long-term loans were offered to all inhabitants wishing to construct permanent housing. Some inhabitants reject this offer and the compensations and ask to return to their ruined villages at all cost.”

What changes has this approach undergone, and how did the Summud approach develop?

Fig. 7.36 Plan 331 for Mazraa, 1958. Source: State Archive, Mazraa file.
Fig. 7.37 Mazraa school. Source: Palestine Remembered.

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1244 State archive, Authority for Rehabilitation of Refugees and Evacuees file, report of March 30, 1963.
1245 Ibid.
1246 A School was Inaugurated at the Arab Village of Mazraa. *Davar*, October 23 1959. [Hebrew]
1247 Arab Refugees in the Western Galilee Have Been Offered Rehabilitation in the Village of Mazraa. *Davar*, January 31, 1960. [Hebrew]
7.3.1.3 *Summud Mazraa: the “first modern Arab village”*

The struggle over housing in Mazraa was described by Yoel Darwish as an inter-generational struggle. “A fierce conflict exists in the village between the fathers who insistently refuse to accept compensation from various government ministries for their deserted lands, and the sons who are willing to accept compensation funds, with which they can form the first modern Arab village in the country.” Reading Darwish’s account it is clear that this struggle is also between the refugee strategy of maintaining temporariness in order to claim the right to return and a newly forming strategy of permanence. This struggle between approaches to the homeland was essentially between one approach viewing land as the source of the Arab-Palestinian claim for the homeland, and the second approach locating Palestinian claim for the homeland in permanent housing. As the Galilee’s dumping ground for the internally displaced, new internally displaced communities were settled in Mazraa as late as the end of the Military Regime in 1966. The more internally displaced and infiltrating Palestinians were herded to Mazraa from across the Galilee, the clearer it became to Mazraans that permanence was cardinal for their ability to remain in the homeland. Darwish’s 1960 characterization of the struggle between the two approaches as generational was insightful, since the greatest challenge to Arab-Palestinian Israelis’ ability to maintain permanent communities was that of keeping the younger generation in the villages. Arguments adduced by the sons in favor of accepting compensation and settling permanently in Mazraa, rather than returning to the original villages, included lack of transportation, distance from sites of employment, their adjustment to Mazraa and the great resources necessary for reinhabiting the old, partly ruined houses of the original villages. Indeed, Darwish opens his account of Mazraa as follows:

A 19-year-old young Arab woman worked all day in the blazing sun, helping her husband build their new home in the outskirts of the refugee village of Mazraa. The young newly wed couple is not the only couple occupied lately with tearing down the run-down shacks where they have lived (along with their families) since the founding of the state. They started erecting modern, spacious houses instead, whose large windows open to the main Acre-Naharia road. … The sons are willing to accept compensation (for the family’s deserted lands) with which they can build the first modern Arab village in the country.

Darwish observed that the new houses built in Mazraa were transforming it into a new form of Arab-Palestinian village. I would like to extend Darwish’s observation to propose that the new houses, and the new housing strategy they represented, figured Mazraa as the ‘first village’ embodying a new understanding of space-based Palestinian nationalism, that of *Summud*. While the use of the word ‘modern’ to describe this new village is problematic, simplistically referring to planning and architecture, it is nonetheless adds an interesting dimension to the assessment of *Summud* as a nationalist strategy. As a housing strategy for

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1249 Darwish, “Arab Refugees Construct a Modern Village.”
1250 Forty families of the Arb el Aramshe Bedouins were displaced from Hirbat Idmit in the northern Galilee were ordered to evict in April 1966 and were resettled in Mazraa. Eviction Orders for 40 Families of Tel Idmit. *Davar*, April 10 1966. [Hebrew]
1251 Darwish, "Arab Refugees Construct a Modern Village."
1252 Ibid.
resisting being swept away again, Summud places the locale of the village at the center of one’s claims for place and is directly connected to the Balad nationalism of the older generation. This ideological affinity is perhaps what convinced the parent generation to accept compensations and make Summud feasible.\textsuperscript{1253}

Another push towards the formation of Summud in Mazraa was plan 1130 of 1971, which acknowledged the volume of makeshift housing in the village and mapped it in detail (fig. 7.38). The plan declared its purpose to be “to regulate construction in the village of Mazraa and limit it so that it does not expand without direction and harm the area’s rural landscape.”\textsuperscript{1254} So, on the one hand, the plan recognizes and maps the density of Mazraa’s shack housing environment, which provided shelter for more than 1700 persons. On the other hand, the plan also limits the expansion of this housing by defining the lands circling the dense village center as agricultural land. Only 64 new housing plots were allocated by the plan, which could hardly satisfy the demand for housing plots in the framework of traditional housing. Moreover, the plan dictates that only one structure can be built on each plot and bans any further construction in the dense shack areas (circled in orange. Fig. 7.38). Protocols of the planning committee include acknowledgement that the plan enables only limited expansion in Mazraa and does not meet housing needs:

Mr. Borman: 80% of the area is already occupied. Where is the area for expansion?
Mr. Swartz (planner): There are 80 vacant plots. We do not believe the place can take in more population since any further construction will indeed be upon agricultural land. It has been agreed with the regional office that those wishing to build will do so in Sheikh Danoun.\textsuperscript{1255}

This statement reflects the planners’ intention to prevent the next generation of Mazraans from remaining in the village, and therefore to bring about the dispersal of the community. This, as we saw, was far from the intention of the Mazraan population, which was willing to accept compensation and revoke its claims for the original villages only in exchange for the ability to form a permanent community in Mazraa.

The result of the constraints of the plan and the Mazraan homebuilders’ Summud strategy, a new Arab-Palestinian building type, urban in nature, formed in Mazraa. This new housing type was based on densification of housing construction upon the plots allocated by the plan, thereby forming three- and four-story houses to serve the extended family of married sons. As will be shown below, Mazraans overwhelmingly chose to keep their sons in the village at the price of deep transformations to their traditional build environment and house form. In this way, Summud actions led to the emergence of the Summud housing type. Developments in Mazraa’s built environment are examined here

\textsuperscript{1253} Scholarly analysis of the Arab-Population in Israel by generations tends to be problematic, for presenting a developmental process of resistance to the Israeli state, by which the Nakba generation was ‘the survivor generation’, the second generation was the ‘crouched generation’ and the present generation is the ‘upright generation’. My own study, as well as Levin-Azriel’s reveal this analysis as simplistic and deterministic. Rabinowitz Danny and Abu-Baker Rabinowitz, Haula, The Upright Generation (Tel Aviv: Keter, 2002).

\textsuperscript{1254} State archive, plan 1130 file.

through the study of 4 plots in the original, pre-Nakba village, marked in red rectangles in fig. 7.35. These include two plots with original stone and mud houses and two vacant plots.

Fig. 7.38 Detail of plan 1130 for Mazraa, 1971. Source: Israel Land Administration. Note the mapping of all shacks housing the internally displaced and infiltrators.

Fig. 7.39 Plan 1130 for Mazraa, 1971. Source: Israel Land Administration.

7.3.1.3.1 Vacated stone housing – the internally displaced

Sheikh Rabbah Awad of Ghabsiyya, whose national leadership was discussed earlier, was internally displaced from his village. Khalidi gives a historical account of Ghabsiyya, surveyed by the British in 1931 to include 470 inhabitants living in 125 houses. In 1944 the village numbered 690 people.\textsuperscript{1256} As such it was 10 times larger than Mazraa’s community. As some of Ghabsiyya’s villagers were accused of attacking the Hagana Yechiam convoy in March 1948, the army considered the village hostile. After its conquest in May 1948 its population was dispersed by the IDF. Many left for Lebanon and many others found shelter in the Druze villages in the area, like Abu Senan, where they were registered and given identity cards.\textsuperscript{1257} “The villagers slowly returned to their village homes. The military regime knew of it, of course, and did not object since everybody knows that dispersing this friendly village was a cruel mistake.”\textsuperscript{1258} In 1950 the army dispersed the village again, and Sheikh Rabbah led the community’s appeal to the Supreme Court asking to return to the village. The case was lost in 1955.\textsuperscript{1259} As Ghabsiyyans nevertheless kept going back to their village, the army eventually destroyed village houses in 1958.\textsuperscript{1260}

\textsuperscript{1257} Interim Order Issued Again in the Case of Ghabsiyya Arabs. \textit{Davar}. December 10, 1951.
\textsuperscript{1259} Cohen, 2010 gives account of the trial.
Mazraa’s fields were east of Ghabsiyya’s (as can be seen in fig. 3.25), and Sheikh Rabbah owned some lands there. Sheikh Rabbah, as well as most Ghabsiyya families who managed to remain in the Galilee, arrived in Mazraa between 1949 and 1955. The Sheikh’s family moved into a vacated stone house at the center of Mazraa. The house of 8 by 8 meters served the family of two wives and 5 children. The house was previously owned by a Mazraan family which had moved to Lebanon during the war. Sheikh Rabbah was privileged to be given access to this absentee property, as many of the internally displaced had to live in autoconstructed shacks for lack of proper housing (as will be seen below). Sheikh Rabbah faced a multifold dilemma in accepting this house. First, accepting ‘alternative land’ in Mazraa meant revoking his right for his land in Ghabsiyya and therefore of his demands to be allowed to return. Second, as the leader of the Ghabsiyya displaced community, his actions had consequences beyond his own family and therefore consequences on his leadership. Third, settling in land owned by refugees who were not allowed to return meant taking part in their dispossession. Since Sheikh Rabbah had vast lands in Ghabsiyya, he settled over one of his Ghabsiyya plots by accepting his Mazraa plot as compensation, but kept much of his lands in Ghabsiyya under his name, refusing to settle and accept land in Mazraa in exchange. Fellahen families who never possessed land were of course less fortunate.

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1261 State archive, Mazraa land ownership file.
1262 Interview with Farid Awad, August 2011.
The stone house was built of limestone and earth like the Mazraan houses described above. Its entrance was from the back of the plot and it had four windows facing east and south, towards the main square of the village. Awad soon extended the stone house with shacks built upon the plot. First a toilet was built behind the house (2). A shack serving as kitchen and shower was built later (3), followed by a shack built by the Sheikh’s son Mohammad to serve as a grocery store. The last addition to the house was an external shed facing the main square and serving the Sheikh as a reception area to the main house.\footnote{Awad, "The Process of Change of the Arab House in the Galilee".} As in the case of the Ramla shack described elsewhere, Mazraa shacks were self-built of materials found in the area, primarily wood and tin barrels. Mohammad Awad dismantled barrels and used their skin to cover a wooden frame. Shack size was the product of barrel width module.\footnote{Ibid.} As the Sheikh’s sons wished to get married, they were unable to construct housing for themselves upon their father’s plot. Not only was the plot very small, it was identified by the 1970 plan for Mazraa as an area with no additional construction due to the dense autoconstruction of shacks in the area (fig. 7.38). No building permit could therefore be issued for the plot. Sheikh Rabbah purchased a plot of land at the outskirts of the village, past the wadi, in order for his sons to marry and dwell inside the village. In order to purchase the plot from the Israel Land Authority (ILA), Awad had to settle for another plot of his lands in Ghabsiyya. The need to keep his sons in the village, rather than have them leave it to live in Acre or elsewhere, dictated Sheikh Rabbah’s decision. The insistence on keeping one’s sons in the village – even though it is not the ancestral village – is an adaptation of ‘resistance to being swept away’ by the internally displaced, who at the same time maintained their claim to return to the ancestral village.

The insistence to keep all sons in the village was achieved at the price of a dramatic change to the nature of Summud housing. Sheikh Rabbah’s original house in Ghabsiyya, as well as his first house in Mazraa, were single-story stone and mud houses placed upon the land and under the sky and in the campus layout of the village, the housing type identified in chapter 3 as the built environment forming Palestinian national
consciousness. His second house in Mazraa, however, was a two-story attached house (called in Israel a two-family house), later extended with the addition of a second floor to become a three-story apartment house of 6 apartments occupying the plot almost entirely. This adaptation of Summud, from single-standing housing built of local material in local and traditional construction techniques to apartment housing of urban nature built of reinforced concrete using modern construction skills, is striking. Moreover, the architectural design of the house and apartments is a typical specimen of modern Israeli apartment-house design. The apartments are identical to each other, divided into public and private areas and including all the conventional in-house amenities in Israeli urban housing at the time: separate toilets and bathroom, separation of kitchen and living room, allocation of separate rooms for parents and children. The Awad family apartment house could fit snugly in any Jewish town at the time.

Fig. 7.44 Sheikh Rabbah Awad’s second house in Mazraa, 2011. Source: Author.
Fig. 7.45 Sheikh Rabbah Awad house plan, 1977. Source: Mate Asher regional engineering archive.

Fig. 7.46 Ground floor, serving Sheikh Rabbah: housing (left) and open reception area (right). 1977.
Fig. 7.47 First and second floors plan, serving the four eldest sons, 1977. Source: Awad, 2003.

Fig. 7.48 Detail of plan 1130, 1970. Area for restricted construction circled in orange. Sheikh Rabbah house marked in red (added). Source: ILA.
7.3.1.3.2 Makeshift shacks – infiltrators

The Al-Hassan family left Ghabsiyya for Lebanon in 1948. After a few months they infiltrated through the border and returned to their home in Ghabsiyya. As the army and Supreme Court struggled over Ghabsiyyans’ right to go back to the village, the family kept going back, only to be driven away again. In 1955, with the Supreme Court settlement, the family moved permanently to Mazraa. In Mazraa they leased an empty plot from the ILA. Hsein Al-Hassan therefore autoco nstructed a shack out of tin upon his plot like many other internally displaced and returnees in Mazraa. The state Authority for Rehabilitation of Refugees and Evacuees identified Mazraa as one of the main clusters of the internally displaced in the Galilee, with 140 families living in makeshift shacks.

Fig. 7.49, 7.50, 7.51 Original tin and wood shacks still standing in Mazraa, 2010. Source: Author.

Al-Hassan’s shack included two rooms and a divan between them, with a front porch. Another small shack was constructed at the back of the plot for toilets, shower, and kitchen (fig. 7.52). The shack was built of a wooden frame upon which tin panels were placed. The roof was made of asbestos panels. The family’s small plot did not enable adding more structures in addition to the original shack, as had been done by other families in the village. In 1967 the family started construction of a permanent house on top of the shack by constructing an open ground floor of pilotis. They kept living in the shack until construction was complete and moved upstairs. The house included three bedrooms, a kitchen, a shower and a porch. The practice of constructing a permanent house on pilotis on top of a temporary shack is described by Farah as well with respect to the internally displaced in the village of Jish. Above the Farah shack a ‘Corbusian-inspired’ three-story house was built, covering the plot in full to serve parents and married sons.

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1265 Ibid.
1266 State archive, Authority for Rehabilitation of Refugees and Evacuees file, report of March 30, 1963.
1267 Awad, “The Process of Change of the Arab House in the Galilee”.
1268 Farah, “Twenty Years I Have Dreamed to Host My Friends in My House, My Father’s House, My Grandfather’s House.”
In 1973, following the marriage of two sons, the house was divided into two apartment units for the sons’ families. The open ground floor was therefore closed off to serve the mother and the younger children (fig. 7.55, 7.56). When the third son married in 1980, the ground floor was subdivided into three dwelling units: One for each of the remaining two sons and one for their widowed mother (fig. 7.57). At the same time, the two apartments on the first floor were expanded as well and divided into three to accommodate another son who was about to get married (fig. 7.58). In 1989 the house was further expanded, with a third floor erected on top of the right wing of the house (fig. 7.59, 7.60) for the first Al-Hassan grandchildren. The right wing was expanded again in 2000 to include open porches on the first and second floors. A similar expansion to the left wing of the house is currently under construction (fig. 7.61). Tracking down the division of each plan into apartments is quite a challenge (see for example fig. 7.57).
These accumulative additions were guided from within the dwelling units, in an attempt to satisfy the need to provide more space for each son forming a new family, and thereby to enable him to remain in the village. This development had a significant effect on the house. The inside-out planning and re-planning of the house generated such bizarre elements as three separate stairways, two of them discontinuous, arbitrary windows and roofing, and very little open space on the plot. Construction has exceeded the permitted limit according to plans and is therefore explicitly ‘illegal.’ Expansions are made without building permits since none can be legally obtained. Yet despite the location of the house across the street from the office of the municipal engineering department, no legal action is taken against the family, for it obviously has no other options for dwelling within the village.\footnote{Conversation with municipal engineer Farid Awad, August 2011.} The Al-Hassan family house is one of the most complex assemblages in Mazraa, but it is not unique. The house shown below (fig. 7.62) is a four-story house built upon and to the sides of a small concrete house, still apparent on the ground floor.
7.3.1.3.3 Remaining houses – original residents

The Hayik family, one of the original families remaining in Mazraa, was a peasant family which held a small plot of land. Plot 11 (fig. 7.63) was owned by the two Hayik sisters, Haniya and Raqiya Muhamad Mustafa El Hayik, who had inherited the small plot of land at the center of the village from their father, in addition to some agricultural land. Arab-Palestinians who remained upon their lands and houses were identified by the Authority for Rehabilitation of Refugees and Evacuees as “generally well-off financially” compared to refugees and evacuees, since they maintained their access to land. As landowners the two sisters’ families were better-off than most Mazraans.

Fig. 7.63 Parcel 11 of block 18138 at the center of Mazraa village.
Fig. 7.64 List of owners for block number 18138 in Mazraa, Acre district court (British). Ownership of Parcel 11 is registered to the Hayik sisters. Source: State archive, Mazraa lands file.

Fausi Mahmood of Ghabsiyya arrived in Mazraa in 1948 and married one of the Hayik sisters. Women traditionally move to their husband’s village, but this was impossible in the case of Fausi. The Fausi half-parcel bordered a large stone house where the Hayik widow lived. On their plot, Fausi has built a concrete block house of 85 square meters including two rooms, a porch, kitchen, toilets and bathroom (fig. 7.65). The Fausi house was one of the first concrete houses in Mazraa and included the modern amenities of in-house kitchen, shower, and toilets. The Fausi family was very large with 12 children, and the one bedroom house soon became insufficient for its needs. In 1973 the family expanded the house to include two more rooms. The former living room was made into the girls’ room and the new bedroom was designated for the boys. The new living room was accessed directly from the courtyard, thereby creating a separation between the reception public area and the private dwelling area of the house (fig. 7.66).

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1270 State archive, Authority for Rehabilitation of Refugees and Evacuees file, report of March 30, 1963.
When the first Fausi sons married in 1978, the family tore down the old stone house on the grandmother’s parcel (fig. 7.68) and constructed a concrete block house with two apartments of three bedrooms each (fig. 7.67, 7.70). The house was constructed on top of an open ground floor which initially served the family as an open outside area, instead of the yard space now covered by the house (7.69). The open ground level served the extended family for gatherings and events, as well as a shaded area for casual stay outside the house. In this sense, the open ground floor on stilt columns (pilotis) served the Fausi family for a different purpose than the Al-Hassan family, for whom the open ground floor enabled dwelling in their shack during the construction of the house. The new Fausi house fits its plot almost entirely, and the shape of its 45 degree contour is given to it by the shape of the plot. In 1984, half of the ground floor was closed off to serve as a grocery store, taking advantage of the parcel’s central location in the village (fig. 7.71). A year later a second floor was added for two more sons who got married. When the last son married, the family constructed a second floor for him on top of the parents’ house (fig. 7.72). As a landowning family, the Fausi family was able to house all its sons in the village and upon the family’s parcel. The family has not yet used up the building potential of their parcel, and is able to construct an additional building upon it in the future.
7.3.1.4  *Summud as urban environment*

Mazraa’s built environment was transformed beyond recognition in the course of sixty years of Israel’s state housing regime. The vast agricultural farm, with small peasant villages of stone and mud houses surrounded by fields, was transformed into a dense urban built environment whose population is employed primarily in services and industry. The little open parcels available in Mazraa have long been developed for apartment houses. The wish to remain in the village has led to its over-densification and to the formation of *Summud* as a new housing type for Arab-Palestinians in Israel – namely, the apartment house. Mazraa is by no means unique. Khamaisi defines this overarching phenomenon of the Arab-Palestinian built environment as ‘urbanization without cities.’ The fact that many have abandoned farming and at present work in construction services and industrial sectors has not changed the rural characteristics and perceptions of these localities. Most residents still identify themselves as villagers and prefer to go on living within traditional, semi-rural social structures, and housing continues to be provided on a self-housing basis.\(^{1271}\) The price paid for remaining in the villages is the densification and typological changes to the Arab-Palestinian housing type.

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The willingness of the Arab-Palestinian population to live in dense apartment housing in order to remain in the village and by their families has been examined by several studies throughout the years, which in turn enable comparative analysis and tracking changes in patterns. In the 1960s, a study examined Arab-Palestinian willingness to live in apartment houses with members of different families in the best location in their village. 73% of the people rejected this possibility, reflecting rejection of urban dwelling outside the familial framework even in their own village. 1272 Reports made for the Housing Ministry in 1978 and 1991 examined willingness to live in apartment housing. In 1978 the report found willingness to live in apartment houses to be between 39% and 19%, depending on lifestyle (‘modern’ vs. ‘traditional’) and varying from one village to another. The 1991 report identified 49% to 67% willingness to live in apartment houses due to the land shortage, depending on the level of nearby services offered. Of those, 87% preferred this housing to be in their village. 1273 Elrich-Hay examined the effect of family ties on willingness to live in apartment houses, and reported that willingness increased when neighbors were parents and brothers; in some cases cousins were considered acceptable as well. 1274 Yet the dense Summud environment, similar in many Arab-Palestinian villages, has consequences for Summud’s sustainability. Writer and political activist Uda Basharat described this urbanity in his novel The Outdoors of Zitunia: 1275

“The spring came but was unnoticeable in Zaitunia, since cultivated lands were already very limited. Housing was built on these lands, designated for vegetable gardens and agriculture, and more housing structures were built next to them and on top of them, more and more floors were added with no order or system. Therefore it is hard to say the spring covered Zitunia with greenery. Zitunia is a village when you discuss the disadvantages of the village, and it is a city when you discuss the disadvantages of the city. It includes all the disadvantages of the village, from lack of services to lack of jobs and leisure. The disadvantages of the city too all exist there, especially high density due to natural population growth and forced migration, i.e. the presence of the internally displaced from other villages. Expanding the boundaries of Zitaunia was out of the question. Indeed, the inhabitants say, we are lucky for just holding the lands upon which we live.” 1276

The dense and chaotic living conditions in the village pose a great challenge for Summud’s main principle of remaining in one’s village at all costs. The ability to house one’s sons in the village has become a marker of status in Palestinian-Israeli society, for it marks both financial ability and authentic identity by resistance to the Israeli state. Mazraa’s mayor, Kasem Awad, defines his vision for the village to be “to keep the young people living in the village and refrain from migration.” 1277 Awad refers to the young generation’s frustration with the living conditions in the village as well as with the

1273 Baruch Kipnis, Willingness to Live in Apartment Housing in Arab Villages (Jerusalem: Ministry of Housing, 1978).
Baruch Kipnis, Willingness to Live in Apartment Housing (Jerusalem: Ministry of Housing, 1991).
1274 Liora Elrich-Hay, "The Effect of Family Ties on Residential Distribution in Arab Settlements in Israel" (Technion, 1995).
1275 Basharat, The Outdoors of Zitunia.
1276 Ibid. pp. 8.
1277 Mazraa official website.
society formed within it. This frustration pushes them to live elsewhere, in mixed cities and Jewish towns.

The problem is crowdedness. We are closed in our houses, in our villages, in our rooms even … Every problem here generates severe consequences. With every car honking, with any yelling in the road, my heart shrinks with fear of a violent fist fight … Living conditions in the village frustrated and disgusted her: no room for the bedroom, the garage is next to the living room, the yard where children play invades the bedroom, the cemetery which was once at the edge of the village is now already surrounded with houses, from the balcony you can read what is written on the tombstones and visitors to the cemetery can look into the houses. No place to dream here, no place for development. As if it were not enough that this government left no inch of vacant land, everybody here wants to build houses as big as a palace and the village is already one big concrete block …Where will we live? The price of land here is high in world standards, as if we live in a posh city and not in a crummy village.1278

A number of Mazraans left the village for lack of housing opportunities to live in nearby mixed Acre and Jewish Nahariya.1279 However, Arab-Palestinians looking for housing outside the village often encounter hostility and refusal to allow them housing.1280 The most famous such case is the Kaadan family lawsuit against the settlement of Katzir for discriminatory covenants.1281

7.3.2 The Israel Museum as a preserved Arab village

Whereas Mazraa, formed as a tenant peasant farm by the Badr Ayan family, was made into a ‘new Arab village’ and transformed without recognition, a completely different ‘new Arab village’ was built upon the lands of the vacated village Shaikh Badr near Jerusalem.

Israel’s national museum, the Israel Museum, was designed in 1959-60 explicitly using the traditional Arab-Palestinian village as inspiration and model for its spatial design. The museum was designed by architect Al Mansfeld, designer Dora Gad and engineer Eliyahu Traum, following a design competition. In the framework of the competition, Mansfeld and Gad explicitly presented the Arab village as illustration for their cumulative-growth museum design scheme. Whether the Arab village was a direct inspiration for the design or mere illustration after the fact is debatable. Mansfeld’s interest was in a theory of cumulative architectural development, and his use of the Arab village as an ‘organic’ cumulative system was formal-illustrative rather than romantic or political.1282 Nonetheless, Mansfeld’s decision to market his proposal to the state in the framework of a design competition using the other’s dwelling environment is outstanding. Examination of the state’s expectations of its national museum cannot avoid the explicit reference to the dwelling space of the competing nation. Mansfeld’s village-

1278 Basharat, The Outdoors of Zituni.. pp. 8, 188, 191.
1279 Conversation with Farid Awad, August 2011.
1282 Conversation with Shuli Mansfeld, Mansfeld’s daughter in law who has worked with him, August 2011. None of Mansfeld’s publications or many other design projects refers to the Arab village or to vernacular architecture. Use of the Arab village in the case of the Israel Museum reflects his understanding of the state, his client.
inspired design proposal was not only presented to the state committee, but also won the competition and materialized into one of Israel’s first national symbols. Mansfeld’s drawings, presenting the silhouettes of the museum as an Arab village (fig. 4.73), were far from hidden, published as they were in popular and professional journals. The Arab village was therefore chosen by the state committee as the model for housing that which is supremely Israeli. Moreover, after completion of the museum in 1965, designers Mansfeld and Gad were awarded the Israel Prize, the highest award granted by the Israeli state. The village environment served the museum designers to illustrate the dense cluster of pavilions they designed on top of the Givat Ram hill, surrounded by the museum’s sculpture garden and olive trees.

The accepted historiography of Israeli architecture tends to place it squarely in the lineage of European modernism, casting it as an attempt to Europeanize and modernize the Orient. It therefore cannot explain the design of this national museum, chosen by state officials to emulate the other. The suggestion that Mansfeld and Gad produced the Arab village illustration (fig. 4.73) as a marketing tool after their design of the museum does not dissolve the question, Why would the Israeli state form its national museum in the image of the housing environment of the competing nation? Far from being a mere peculiarity, this dissertation shows that the Israel Museum institution is by no means unique in using Arab-Palestinian housing as its model and site of national formation. Rather, housing is identified by this study as the site for the formation and materialization of national consciousness for the two nations. Consider, for example, the first housing of the first Kibbutz Degania, 1910, in mud huts previously housing the peasants of Umm Juni, or post-1858 flatland Palestinian housing.

Fig. 4.73 Mansfeld and Gad’s competition proposal for design of the national museum in Jerusalem, 1959, with drawing of the Arab village of Malha. Source: Efrat, 2004.

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1283 See for example Israeli Architecture 1966 (4).
1284 The Hebrew term for ‘museum’ is ‘house of treasures/antiquities’.
1288 See chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation, respectively.
What is truly peculiar about the Israel Museum’s use of the Arab village is the stark discrepancy between the way it was taken as a model for mathematical, repetitive, cumulative development, and the reality of its chaotic transformation process as described earlier in this chapter. Mansfeld’s reading of the Arab village as a model for ordered accumulation stands in sharp contrast with the process of chaotic post-Nakba urbanization in the Israeli Arab-Palestinian built environment since 1948. As discussed above, the Military Regime had significant consequences for the Arab-Palestinian built environment, causing severe densification and urbanization in the villages. The village was therefore used by museum designers as a model right before its dramatic transformation. As the Arab-Palestinian village was transformed from ‘native’ to semi-urban environment, the Israel Museum seems to serve as a site of bizarre preservation of village housing characteristics in pavilions spread upon the hilly landscape.

7.3.2.1 The Israel Museum’s architecture

The Israel Museum is commonly defined, Efrat writes, as the masterpiece of Israeli architecture, a symbol one wished to identify with, a building respected for its dignity. This is why its function as a system of exhibition, observation, circulation and storage are little examined, while it is more commonly discussed for its ‘fit with its surroundings’ or its absorption into the scenery. These are not aesthetic observations pointing to successful assimilation in a natural fabric but wishes, thrust upon the national museum, feeding it with collective values of adaptation, holding, flexibility, tolerance, and growth.1289

The values discussed here by Efrat as associated with the Arab housing environment identify the museum pavilions with the housing of the competing enemy nation. Mansfeld developed an architectural system, later termed theory, for the museum’s design. This system, a ‘theory of growth, change and uncertainty,’ was based on repetitive use of a building-block element in order to form a systemic design. Variation and repetition of the basic element was intended to create a “cumulative, open-ended system” for the museum.1290 What was the building-block unit, and what form of system did it produce?

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The competition proposal presenting the silhouette of the Arab village as design inspiration marks the housing pavilion as the building block for the exhibition spaces of Israel’s national museum. Eliyahu Traum, the museum’s chief engineer, defined the design of the house-like pavilion as his greatest design challenge for the museum’s structure. “The Israel Museum’s unique architectural solution stresses its attachment to the landscape by using pavilions of modular units which form a continuous, organic fabric. We had to develop a structure capable of attaching itself to the various ground elevations, and roof pavilions joined together for great lengths. The pavilions’ character required the development of a uniform constructive form and a repetitive, modular roofing solution.” Traum’s description of the Museum’s design as one based on the clustering of pavilion-home units is well reflected in his structural design for the pavilions. The latter were designed as tent-like, single-standing structures that may be placed where appropriate, based on a single hollow column (where the buildings’ systems are located). Traum’s design of the pavilion roof as a hyperbolic paraboloid shell enabled free assembly of units and complete separation between the roofs at different levels (fig. 4.76). Moreover, Traum’s structural solution for Mansfeld’s architectural scheme of clustered pavilion-homes is typologically an inverted-tent structure (fig. 4.76). Held by a single central pole forming an inverted four-side gable, the museum’s pavilion is structurally disconnected from the walls enclosing the exhibition spaces. The pavilion section (fig. 4.76) and the museum model (fig. 4.75) both identify the pavilion-home module as the museum’s dominant component, organized as a campus of detached pavilions across the landscape at the top of the hill. The museum’s facades were therefore formed as an accumulation of pavilions in campus layout (fig. 4.77, 4.78).

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Fig. 4.75 Construction detail for the museum’s modular pavilions. Source: Eng. Traum, Israeli Architecture, 1966 (4).
Fig. 4.76 Israel Museum model. Source: Efrat, 2004. Red dashed line marks the monumental path towards the main entry, marked with red rectangle.

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1291 The ‘Competition for design of a national museum’ was held April 1959. The committee invited 10 leading Israeli architects to submit proposals, and received in addition 14 more proposals, among them by S. Mastechkin, head architect of the Kibbutz movement. State archive, Israel Museum file. Competition materials have mysteriously disappeared from archives throughout the country.
1292 Traum uses to word ‘hizamdut’ whose noun is Zamud, etymologically parallel to the Arabic Sumuud.
However, an examination of the museum’s plans and sections, which include indications of its functional and circulation systems, reveals the pavilion-home to be highly *marginal* to the design of the exhibition halls. Plans and sections (fig. 4.79, 4.80) indicate that the museum is not arranged as a collection of pavilions upon the campus landscape, but rather as a continuous, linear exhibition space arranged in horizontal levels. As plans and sections indicate, movement through the exhibition complex of the Israel Museum is horizontal rather than vertical, and the pavilion-home space, so dominant to the museum’s silhouette and facades, becomes meaningless as far as circulation and viewing are concerned. Instead, its meaning lies primarily in introducing natural light into the halls. Pictures taken during the museum’s construction (fig. 4.83) expose the museum’s basement floor (later buried) and reveal its slab logic. An aerial image of the museum (fig. 4.82) gives us a rare image of the museum from above and renders its slab logic apparent. This image is rare as the museum’s location at the top of the hill makes it visible primarily from below. So, structurally and visually the Israel Museum is a campus exhibition complex based on pavilions, while functionally it is a horizontal, linear space of three floors stacked upon each other. There is a tension in the museum campus between the horizontal circulation inside the museum’s exhibition spaces and the vertical uphill movement along the monumental path towards the museum’s main entry, along the facades of the museum-qua-village. (fig. 4.84).
The museum is therefore composed of two very different exhibition spaces: an open-air museum, experienced while walking along the monumental entry path and sculpture garden and viewed from across the city; and an indoor museum organized in one main, continuous, horizontal slab. The museum’s internal exhibition and external exhibition are two very distinct environments. What are they showcasing and for whom? Who constitutes the museum audience and what are they to learn of themselves and others? Protocols of the National Museum Committee clearly discuss its educational purpose for the citizens, especially for children.\(^\text{1294}\) Long deliberations were held in an attempt to formulate the exhibit mix to be housed and showcased by the museum. Deliberations were influenced by agendas of ‘invented tradition’ presented by army general and archeology professor Yadin, appointed head of the museum committee. The ‘imagined community’ of modernity was represented by the Bezalel Academy of Art. The archeology wing, the museum’s original purpose, was to contribute to the formation and dissemination of the invented tradition of the Jewish nation in Zion in Biblical times. The archeology wing housed findings collected in archeological digs conducted since independence and managed by Professor Yadin, as well as archeological collections held in universities.\(^\text{1295}\) The museum’s second important wing was the modern art wing, defined by the museum committee to be “not a museum for modern art – but a museum for modern man.”\(^\text{1296}\) The collection relied on the Bezalel Academy of Art collection with additional exhibit donations from Jews all over the world. The most famous such donation was the Billy Rose sculpture collection, for the display of which the Rose Sculpture Garden was designed.

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1294 State Archive, Israel Museum file.
1295 Ibid.
Exhibits were accessible only to those who purchased tickets or who were brought to the museum as part of their schooling. Those citizens included primarily the veteran ‘proper citizen’ milieu, rather than immigrants who had little means and mobility required to access the museum. Citizens invited into the museum were acculturated to the invented tradition of Biblical times\textsuperscript{1297} and their formation as ‘modern men,’ whereas the general public experienced the museum primarily from the outside, as a silhouette representing native Arab-Palestinian housing. This view of the museum’s silhouette was protected from obstruction by including most of the hill slopes in the area of the museum and limiting any construction that might hide it from view.\textsuperscript{1298}

Mansfeld’s illustration of the Arab village for the competition committee was based not on a generic village, but rather on the specific village of Malha, located south-west of Jerusalem. The village was conquered by the Irgun Jewish militia on July 14, 1948 after a fierce battle with Egyptian and Jordanian troops.\textsuperscript{1299} With the massive influx of immigrants it was populated with Jews from North Africa. Its built environment correspondingly went through a slower development process than the villages discussed above. Mansfeld’s drawing of Malha’s built environment in 1959 was made a moment before its own transformation as well. While Mansfeld’s use of Malha’s model was proclaimed to be illustrative of accumulated growth, this growth was to be curbed and contained by limiting development in the surrounding area, as seen above. The image of the village at the top of the hill, viewed from among the trees—one of the iconic images of Malha released by the IDF following Malha’s heroic conquest (fig. 4.85)—was actively reproduced by Mansfeld’s design of the Israel Museum (fig. 4.86). The two images portray a dense, coherent cluster of pavilions, solid and self-standing within its landscape.

The museum itself was built on nationalized land, previously cultivated by the village of Sheikh Badr, from which the landowning family of pre-Nakba Mazraa

\textsuperscript{1297} The Shrine of the Book section of the museum was a separate structure housing the Judea desert scrolls. It as part of the Israel Museum administrively yet since it is a detached structure with different architects I do not include its study here.

\textsuperscript{1298} State archive, Israel Museum file.

originated. The Sheikh Badr lands, now comprising the Givat Ram area, is the site for many state institutions like the Knesset (Israeli parliament), the Supreme Court house, the Hebrew University campus and several government ministry headquarters. Note that the area of the museum, colored in gray (fig. 4.87), includes a vast open area. This area had already been populated by 1959 with temporary immigrant housing as the Neve Shaanan neighborhood, yet those dwellings were removed for the purpose of constructing the museum. The area surrounding the museum was intended in Mansfeld’s plans to remain empty in order to keep the museum silhouette visible in its surroundings. This area also serves the museum-qua-village as its metaphorical fields, an indispensable part of the pre-1948 Arab-Palestinian village which largely disappeared due to the construction of housing on agricultural land.

Fig. 4.87 Site plan: location of the Israel Museum in relation to the Hebrew University, Knesset (parliament), and conference center. Source: Architecture in Israel 1966.

Fig. 4.88 The Israel Museum and Shrine of the Book (right), November 1965. Photography: Sima Zelig. Source: JNF archive. Note the photographer’s decision not to focus on the museum but to show it within its surroundings.

The village of Malha was no ordinary village as far as the Israeli historiography of the 1948 war is concerned. Its conquest by a unit of the Irgun right-wing militia took place one day after the Altalena affair, which formally closed the debate over military power other than the IDF’s. The battle over Malha between the Irgun unit and Jordanian-Egyptian troops was glorified as the Irgun’s last battle as independent from the IDF, thereby turning Malha into an icon of the war. The battle over Malha included three stages. Following the Deir Yassin massacre, Malha’s families left the village. According to the Palestine Remembered website and the Jabotinsky Archive, Malha defenders included members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian soldiers. The village’s built environment, which served the defenders of Malha as battle posts, were historical landmarks in the Jerusalem landscape and collective memory of the war and used as part of the historical narration of the war.

1300 State archive, Israel Museum file.
1301 Malha battle file, Jabotinsky Institute archive.
Yet whereas the Israel Museum was protected from development, as noted above, Jewish-occupied Malha soon underwent a development process similar in nature – albeit not in speed and scope – to that experienced in Summud villages. Khalidi reports of the village’s state in 1986 as follows:

Many houses are still standing and are occupied by Jewish families, although a few houses on the southern side of the village have been demolished. The inhabited houses are generally two-story structures built of limestone, with arched windows and doors. Some houses have balconies with roofs supported by columns and circular arches. Some of the village streets are wide and paved over, while others are narrow alleys interrupted at points by limestone steps. The village mosque, with its tall, round minaret, still stands in the center of the village.\footnote{Khalidi, \textit{All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948}. pp. 23.}

Images of Malha, however, like Fig. 4.92 taken in 1979, indicate that development in Malha did take place by addition of new, modern housing structures on pilotis across parcels previously designated for agriculture. The Israel museum thus became a form of controlled ‘preservation’ of the Arab-Palestinian village prior to its irreversible transformation as a result of the Israeli housing regime. This ordered built environment ‘preserves’ a number of historical landscapes and thereby meshes them together. On the one hand, it preserves the idea of nativity springing up from the homeland and accumulating gradually to form a campus-society. On the other hand, it preserves the relics of Biblical archaeology upon which Zionism bases its invented tradition as native to this homeland. Additionally, it preserves the heroic story of the regaining of the homeland by the potent ‘new Jew’ during the 1948 war. Yet at the same time it also ‘preserves’ the built environment of Palestinian housing, thus making present the competing claims for the same homeland by the other nation.
Fig. 4.92 Malha in 1979. Photography: Dov Dafnai, Source: JNF archive. Note new construction on pilotis.

7.4 Summud, the next generation: containing national consciousness

The two forms of ‘new Arab village’ discussed above reflect two levels of national consciousness, namely Summud Mazraa reflecting nationalism as Balad village patriotism and the Israel Museum reflecting state-nationalism. These two levels of nationalism, each producing its own version of ‘locality,’ were in relatively little conflict throughout the years. The conflict that did form was over the further nationalization of private Arab-Palestinian lands, primarily in the Galilee, for ‘national projects’ of housing for Jews. These conflicts, in the form of annual demonstrations on ‘Land Day,’ reflected the consciousness of Balad nationalism and was relatively easily contained by the state.

In October 2000, with the onset of the Second Palestinian Intifada, Arab-Palestinian Israelis set out on a number of demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. These demonstrations quickly escalated beyond the traditional ‘Land Day’ conflicts, culminating in 14 casualties, 13 of them Arab-Palestinian Israeli citizens. These events mark the consolidation of national consciousness among this public, and the appearance of what Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker term ‘the upright generation.’ State-national consciousness among the Arab-Palestinian citizenry is associated by scholars and public alike with the Second Intifata and the influence of West-Bank Palestinian nationalism. This study, by contrast, points to a gradual formation of state-national consciousness among this public due to the housing lineages described above, connecting several villages and towns into a single historically-cumulative home and expanding the homeland beyond one’s village of birth to include other villages from which ancestors and neighbors originate.

In order to contain this threatening state-national consciousness among its Arab-Palestinian public, the state housing regime tries to resuscitate Balad nationalism by initiating for the first time since 1949 the liquidation of state national land for the housing of Arab-Palestinians. Mazraa is the first village where this policy is implemented. The formation of Mazraa as the ‘new Arab village’ of Summud, a dense urban environment, has reached its densification limit by the early 2000s. Village houses are

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1306 Ibid.
1307 Rabinowitz, The Upright Generation.
1308 Ibid.
apartment houses including three and sometimes four floors and as many as 8 apartments per building. Village members can no longer find housing in the village and are forced to move to Acre and even to the Jewish town of Naharia in order to find housing. This process is nonetheless identified as unwelcome by villagers and state alike. A new planning initiative was thereby advanced by the state housing regime, the local authority, and the Mazraa mayor.

7.4.1 Planning before housing: a new masterplan for Mazraa

Mazraa is a pivotal case for the study of planning in the Arab-Palestinian village in Israel. The unavailability of private land in Mazraa makes development possible only upon state land, thereby rendering planning an absolute necessity for its development. Most Arab-Palestinian villages in Israel include private agricultural lands upon which housing is built outside the framework of planning. While deemed ‘illegal,’ these housing nonetheless have the capacity to evade planning since the private ownership of the land offers landowners some liberty of constructing housing upon these lands without approved urban planning. Entire neighborhoods in Arab-Palestinian villages and towns are built without permits and are unrecognized by the state.

While this form of development was possible in Mazraa before, as seen above, the unavailability of private lands means that further expansion of the village to accommodate its sons can only be made internally, by densifying the village further – or by engaging in planning. Since 1948, Mazraa’s two abovementioned master plans of 1958 and 1971 (as well as several local plans not reviewed here) were regulatory rather than active plans; that is, the planning process followed de-facto development and regulated it after the fact.

The state refrains from involvement in Summud villages: it supplies the village no planning or infrastructure services, and despite constant threats does not act against the mass densification of the villages, despite the illegality of construction upon agricultural land and of additions not permitted by urban plans. It seems that the state deliberately avoids enforcing its own laws regarding construction in the villages in order to enable the formation of Summud as dense urban housing. Summud serves the Israeli state for two reasons: containing the Arab-Palestinian population within the villages, and transforming their native built environment to an urban, ‘non-native’ built environment, since it is no longer ‘good housing’ laying upon the land and under the sky.

At the same time, the disengagement of state governance from the villages enables villages de-facto to self-govern. While limited provision of services is naturally lamented, villagers are traditionally interested in this self-governance and reject state involvement.

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1309 Levin-Azriel shows that private land ownership was a barrier for implementing planning in Foreidis, to the point of risking the village’s new neighborhood built partially on state lands. Levin-Azriel, "Identity and Place in Producing Dwelling Environments: Foreidis Hill".
1310 Architect Adib Daud, Protocols of the Knesset hearing of April 7, 2005. Source: Musawwa: Center for Promoting Equality for Arab Citizens Within the Borders of Israel.
1311 Fard Awad, interview August 2011.
Unfortunately, this self-governance more often than not follows hamoola power-codes which do not match proper governance codes. In Mazraa, for example, the Awad family controls most key positions of power, such as mayor and head of engineering department, and leases one of its private structures to the Mazraa council house. Uda Basharat, in his critical writing on the prototypical village of Zitunya, discusses common practices such as hamoola voting patterns and allocation of local government positions to affiliates with the village mayor. Removal of state authority from the villages includes removal of police supervision and consequently the deepening of corruption to de-facto control of some villages by criminal factors. The corruption, crime, and lack of services due to the state’s withdrawal from the villages have generated a surprising interest in state intervention in the villages, in civil aspects as diverse as policing and urban planning. Architect Adeeb Daoud, Mazraa’s urban planner, expressed this thirst for planning in his 2005 address to the Knesset parliamentary committee for the interior and the environment. As the committee consultant on planning for the Arab sector, Daoud stated:

when I plan Arab settlements I often ask myself whether I am planning or whether I am chasing after on-site construction? Since my planning has to regulate irregular construction and compensate for past gaps, am I planning the past or should I plan the future? I hope we would wish to answer this question and that we would soon reach the state of planning for the future.

However, a new planning process is underway in Mazraa with the signing of a plan for a new neighborhood, which will triple the village area. This plan, titled ‘Mazraa 2020,’ was prepared by Daud and approved in 2004 by the Ministry of the Interior. This plan is pivotal for being entirely on state land, allocating 65 hectares for Mazraa’s future residential development. It marks the direction for future development in Arab-Palestinian settlements, one generation before the exhaustion of private land would require all Arab-Palestinian settlements to develop upon state land. This new plan for Mazraa is therefore pivotal for planning-based state involvement in Summud built environment, an experiment for both the Arab-Palestinian citizenry and the state.

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1312 Recently the large village of Tira has objected the introduction of a police station to deal with the rising crime rates in the village, lamented by most residents. See Kobovitz, Y. 2011. Tira Refuses to Allocate Structure for a Police Station. Haaretz August 24, 2011. For Tira residents’ lament of the rising crime rates see: Sayed Kashua. Look at Kfar Saba. Haaretz January 29, 2011.

1313 Basharat, The Outdoors of Zitunia.


1316 Adeeb Daoud, Mazra’a planner, is a Nazareth based architect and town planner who has won a Aga Khan award for an office building serving the Galilee Society NGO in Shefar’am. For Daoud’s structure at the Aga Khan website see: http://archnet.org/library/images/one-image.jsp?location_id=3215&image_id=25157
Mazraa’s ability to expand is constricted by the location of Kibbutz Evron to its north, Moshav Regba to its south and the main north-south Highway 4 to its west. Mazraa’s expansion is possible only to its east. These lands, agricultural fields cultivated by Moshav Shavei Zion, are JNF lands purchased prior to 1944. As JNF lands they are subject to two restricting covenants: never to be sold to anyone and to serve the Jewish people. In order to make these lands available for Mazraa, a complicated land swap had to be conducted between the state and the JNF, since state lands do not correspond with the JNF pre-statehood bill, and consequently do enable development for non-Jewish citizens. In addition to the landowners, namely the state and the JNF, this land swap had to satisfy the land users, namely Mazraa and Shavei Zion. Mayor Awad, who represented Mazraa’s plea, managed in the negotiations to bring the state to offer waterfront lands to the JNF to serve Shavei Zion’s future residential expansion. In exchange, the JNF transferred ownership of the lands east of Mazraa to the state for the construction of Mazraa’s new neighborhood. Mayor Awad attributes this successful land swap to his “excellent relationships with everybody involved. Everybody in the area and in the

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\[1317\] State archive, Mazraa lands trial file.

\[1318\] Farid Awad, conversation August 2011.
This includes relations with neighboring settlements Evron and Regba with whom the new neighborhood will border. This is by no means trivial, for only recently has a similar land swap for the development of Jisr Az-Zarka been objected to by neighboring Jewish settlements.\(^{1320}\)

Mazraa’s 2020 plan includes a high degree of planning, stating not only the limits on construction, but also restrictions on architectural elements like the pitched roof, and design regulations concerning building materials and colors.\(^{1321}\) The plan regulations state that “building permits are conditional upon submitting architectural and design planning documents for each structure … and a detailed plan where needed.”\(^{1322}\) This degree of regulatory planning is at the highest level of integrationist design in Israel, used primarily for new neighborhoods expecting posh communities, and is generally understood as a form of covenant.\(^{1323}\) In Mazraa, however, this interventionist design is accepted enthusiastically rather than as an act of governmental intervention, oppression or enforcement of ‘foreign’ Jewish standards on its built environment.\(^{1324}\) Mazraa’s mayor Kasem Awad has initiated the plan and has been involved in setting its regulations along with his municipal engineer Farid Awad. Farid Awad stated in an August 2011 interview that planning was much desired by the Mazraa council. “Have you seen what is going on in the village? Here, look out my office window at the Al-Hassan house (see section 3.1.3.2) Look how they expanded to their limit. Look how houses are expanding … there is no street left, forget about pavements. Stores open in residential areas, people park in the middle of the street.”\(^{1325}\) Awad points to living conditions in the village and unavailability of further expansion as the principal reason for leaving the village. He himself left for Acre for a number of years and returned to Mazraa when an apartment was made available for him in the family compound in the village. Awad defines the new neighborhood as extremely important for maintaining the village community by providing its sons a decent dwelling environment.\(^{1326}\) The Ministry of Housing and Construction has already executed all the development for phase 1 of the plan, including paved roads and infrastructure for sewage, electricity, water and telecommunication. Several houses are now in the process of design and submitting documents for approval of building permits. For the first time in Mazraa, planning and infrastructure are laid out before housing construction.

Nonetheless, the lack of housing solutions and proper governance in the village lead more and more young Arab-Palestinian couples to leave the village, looking for housing in the cities outside the Summud framework. The experience of living in dense urban housing in...
the village renders moving to urban dwelling environments easier than expected. This process is viewed by the generations of both parents and sons as unfortunate, as described by Kashua who himself left Tira to live in Jerusalem: “You cannot really disconnect from the village. The perception of homeland relates to the village, to the place of birth. The national affiliation to a certain place, as Israeli or as Palestinian, does not change a thing. Once Tira used to be a haven, but with time, primarily by its own fault, it stopped serving as such. But although you can probably take a person out of Tira, you cannot take Tira out of the person.” Leaving one’s village-homeland is posited by Kashua as a true threat to one’s identity. A threat substantial enough to consider accepting state intervention in the village: “It is sad to see Tira this way. Sad to see people who just want to live their lives quietly live in fear because of the absence of the state. Helpless residents who cannot escape the [crime-ridden] hell imposed by a few dozen criminals.”

The purpose of planning for Arab-Palestinian villages is to regulate and contain the Summud housing actions taken by residents rather than to initiate a framework for housing development. Mazraa is not unique in this respect: Khamaisi, Meir-Brodnitz and Levin-Azriel all show that regulatory rather than initiatory planning characterizes planning for Arab-Palestinian settlements in Israel. Moreover, Meir-Brodnitz points to Arab-Palestinians’ distrust of planning due to its function as a tool at the hands of the state as one of the reasons for lack of initiatory planning in a housing-before-planning modus operandi. Consequently, Summud bottom-up housing construction effectively dictated village planning, with state planning acting after the effect in an attempt to regulate it, always two steps behind the actual ‘planning’ of the village.

Introduction of planning to the villages should not be taken lightly, for it would mean letting the state set the rules for – and interfere with – what Arab-Palestinians in Israel view as their site of identity formation and resistance: Summud housing. Moreover, a number of studies have focused on Arab-Palestinian rejection of planning as a vehicle of state regulatory intervention, accepting this resistance as cardinal for this community’s Summud. Just like accepting land settlement with the state in the early 1960s in order to form the Summud strategy of permanence, planning stands out for Arab-Palestinians as a double-edged sword: accepting planning would enable village sons to remain in the village in good housing conditions, yet would introduce greater state governance of the

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1327 Levin-Azriel, "Identity and Place in Producing Dwelling Environments: Foreidis Hill".
1329 Kashua, 2011.
1331 Meir-Brodnitz, "Physical Planning in Arab Settlements in Israel: Its Sources and Influence."
1332 See further discussion of the urban house, the polity and the Arab-Palestinian community’s role in the social revolution of 2011 in the conclusion for this dissertation.
1333 As Levin-Azriel shows for Foreidis, planning is indeed accepted with mixed feelings but was promoted by Foreidis’ municipal government and technical department. Levin-Azriel, "Identity and Place in Producing Dwelling Environments: Foreidis Hill".
village and erode the village’s self-rule and hamoola social structure. Just like in the early 1960s, Mazraa is a pivotal case for taking an explicit stand and accepting planning.

7.4.2 Urban housing: rural or urban framework?

The reality for Arab-Palestinians in Israel is urban housing in apartment houses, albeit serving multi-generational families. These houses resemble the houses serving most members of Israeli society who do not belong to the Zamud elite. The state housing regime’s policy of transforming this population’s housing from pioneer-like houses identified as native to ‘improper’ urban houses was very successful. The current question on the table, for both Arab-Palestinians and the state housing regime, is in what framework these urban houses would be located.

While calls in the Arab-Palestinian public and political discourse demand that the state housing regime allocate state lands in the Galilee for ‘a new Arab city,’ the new neighborhood in Mazraa marks a different planning process. This process, promoted by village leadership, marks the solution to Arab-Palestinian housing needs on state lands within the villages; but this solution is an urban one. The guidelines of Mazraa’s master plan include urban housing of five floors with a commercial area in the ground floor along the main road, and lower houses of four and three floors to its sides. The layout of the plan is orthogonal rather than curvilinear and rural, acknowledging the urban nature of the settlement. The Mazraa plan has three parallel through ways, one of which runs along a linear park extending to the creek running through the village and to the aqueduct. The main roads open to neighborhood clusters which can potentially be purchased by hamoolas, yet they can also become heterogeneous neighborhood spaces. While part and parcel of the village, and while it is marketed as a Build Your Own House project, new houses in the new neighborhood are designated by the master plan to be three- and five-story apartment houses, urban in nature. These houses are far from the single-family BYOH houses elsewhere in Israel, discussed in chapter 8. Since in some cases the investment in the houses is undertaken by families for their sons’ future dwelling after marriage, and in other cases by two brothers for their married sons, the houses in the new neighborhoods are shared not by parents and married children but by brothers and by cousins. These houses therefore further extend the urban nature of apartment housing, namely of forming small-scale polities of strangers. While not complete strangers of course, the urban house extends the community’s willingness to maintain the idea of ‘resistance to being swept away’ by clinging to the village on the one hand and perceiving themselves as citizen-members of the Israeli polity on the other.

This planning is different from Foreidis’ which is BYOH urban plan with urban housing. Ibid.
7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the Summud housing strategy employed by Israel’s Arab-Palestinian citizenry since 1948 in response to the state’s Zamud housing regime. This strategy enabled Arab-Palestinians to remain in their home villages and resist being ‘swept away’ by the Israeli regime, but transformed the Palestinian national housing typology (examined in chapter 3) beyond recognition, into urban apartment-house dwellings. This chapter has mapped the development of Palestinian housing within Israel and brought data previously unavailable in scholarship regarding its historical spatial development.

Arab-Palestinian Summud housing in Israel has undergone dramatic changes since 1948, as can be seen in the pivotal case of Mazraa. Changes to the houses reflect the changes in the relationship between the Israeli housing regime and its Arab-Palestinian citizenry. On their part, this population presented a systematic insistence on its understanding of nationalism and homeland as their village, or Balad. The attempt by the Israeli housing regime to impede this population’s ability to define itself as native by restricting its housing options and generating its transformation to urban housing gave rise to the self-conscious Summud housing type. While dramatically different from pre-Nakba housing in its architecture and built environment, Summud has nonetheless maintained its principle of place-based nationalism. The new planning process, leading to greater state involvement in the village, is accepted enthusiastically since it enables the village community to remain in its village-homeland (thereby maintaining the principle of Summud) rather than being ‘swept away’ from the village and becoming internally dispersed across the country. Mayor Awad of Mazraa views the possibility of keeping Mazraans in the village as his greatest achievement, despite the fact that it was made possible by way of state planning.1334

At the same time, however, the transformation of the Arab-Palestinian village from scattered stand-alone huts in a campus layout to a dense urban environment of tightly packed apartment houses has gradually generated a dramatic change in Arab-

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1334 Interview with Mayor Awad, August 2011.
Palestinians’ understanding of themselves within the Israeli polity. The state’s goal of divesting Arab-Palestinians of the ability to claim nativity on the basis of rooted housing bore unexpected consequences. Residing in urban apartment housing increasingly similar to that of the mass of Israel’s citizenry has contributed to the Arab-Palestinians’ self-understanding as citizens deserving equality, as concluded by several researches of Arab-Palestinian Israelis residing in various locations, from the village-town of Foreidis to the new neighborhoods of Nazareth. Self consciousness as citizens led to demands to be serviced by the Israeli nation-state as part of its sovereign polity and based on citizenry rights. This is a dramatic change from this population’s prior withdrawal from participation in the polity and self-confinement to the political sphere of the village. Future study is required in order to examine the results of the liquidation of state land for Arab-Palestinian housing, a citizenry service geared at the same time to containing these citizens in the physical and political space of the village.

1335 Levin-Azriel, "Identity and Place in Producing Dwelling Environments: Foreidis Hill". Amin Sahala, "Suburbanization and Sprawl in Arab Settlements in Israel and Its Causes" (Technion, 2010).
Chapter 8:
Housing and nation building in the age of sovereignty: Differentiated citizenship in differentiated housing 1948-2005.

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8.1 Introduction

Israel’s independence was the culmination of a call for equality for Jews among the nations, a call which made demands not only upon the nations but also upon Jewish society in Palestine. As we have seen in chapters 4 and 5, the principle of equality among future citizens was inherent to the Hebrew Worker movement and practiced in housing in the Kibbutz and in the city. However, even as independence finally made the principles of Labor Zionism into state doctrine, it also constituted the benchmark for the formation of a state system of differentiated citizenship, manifest primarily in access to housing.

Independence introduced two novel frameworks to Zionist settlement: the nation-state and the citizen. Housing in the age of sovereignty in Israel is very much the result of the consolidation of a state regime of housing and of the state-citizen contract as one based on housing. Israeli citizenship, as defined in its declaration of independence, promises equality regardless of religion, gender or nationality, based on the principle of jus sanguinis (rather than jus soli). To overcome this proclamation of equality, Israeli society devised a system of differentiated citizenship, similar in its conceptualization to the Brazilian system described by Holston.

As far as social class in Israel is concerned, however, its marker is not primarily ethnicity or wealth, but housing. This chapter provides a capsule history of differentiated housing in Israel, based on differentiated access to ‘proper’ housing. Differentiated housing executed the logic underlying the state mechanism, turning it into a system of differentiated citizenship. The consolidation of Zamud as the ‘good house’ served both elite and state housing regime in distinguishing ‘good’ citizens, entitled to the full provision of citizenry rights, from ‘improper’ citizens worthy of mere shelter. However, Israeli citizens have continuously resisted differentiation, shaping their own access to housing by means of a series of social struggles over housing which repeatedly changed the map of proper housing in Israel. The inclusion of more segments of society into the ‘good housing’ milieu, however, never managed to change the basic principle linking ‘good citizen’ to ‘good housing’ (Zamud), thereby differentiating them from the rest of society. The 2011 housing-based social unrest constituted the first attempt to transform the logic of differentiated housing as a means for differentiated citizenship. This chapter first identifies the consolidation of Israeli society as one characterized by housing-based differentiated citizenship, then identifies changes in social access to ‘good housing’ in the wake of social struggle, and finally, in the conclusion, lays out the context for rethinking the nature of Israeli ‘good housing’ and state-citizen contract.

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1336 Israel Declaration of Independence, Knesset website.
1337 Jus sanguinis, or blood-based rights, is the allocation of citizenry rights based on blood relation to a citizen, while jus soli, or land-based rights, is the allocation of citizenry rights based on place of birth. Israeli citizenship is based on jus sanguinis, yet applies jus soli for its minority populations of Arab-Palestinians, Druze, Bedouins and several other small groups.
1338 Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil.
1339 Chapters 6 and 7 expand on the history of immigrant and Palestinian housing. Chapters 4 and 5 in Part II provide the historical context for some of the discussion in this chapter.
8.1.1 Grounds for differentiation

Israeli differentiated citizenship has been studied extensively by scholars of the ‘new historian’ tradition in Israel, who focus on the Israeli nation state and analyze its consequences with respect to various publics. This critical body of work examines state mechanisms and analyzes social relations in space through the conceptual prism of power. As the excluded social classes included primarily Mizrahi immigrants, the markers identified by scholars as underlying the system of differentiation were those distinguishing the Mizrahim from the predominant Ashkenazi pre-independence public, namely: the markers of ethnicity, modernity (vs. primitivism), and ‘oriental’ culture (vs. European cultural values). Yet beyond general, deterministic statements regarding the racist and orientalist nature of Israeli society, little attempt has been made to explain the appearance of social differentiation following independence, in stark contrast with pre-independence practices. Moreover, attempts to explain the collapse of the egalitarian ideology and society of the Kibbutz in the 1970s provide poor explanations, adducing such factors as the external forces of capitalism and the introduction of kettles into the rooms of Kibbutz members. Hence it seems to me that the accepted frameworks for analyzing Israeli differentiated citizenship in terms of the above mentioned Western ideological frames of modernity, ethnicity, and orientalism, are limited.

In order to understand the productive use of differentiated citizenship by the state, I prefer to utilize theoretical frameworks developed by James Holston, Teresa Caldeira, and Aihwa Ong in their attempts to analyze the state’s use of differentiated citizenship for the purpose of nation-building in non-Western nation-states like Brazil and China. I find Holston’s and Ong’s frameworks productive for my own inquiry by virtue of the centrality they attribute to space, as used by state and citizens, for negotiating the citizen-state contract, an issue little explored in the Western theoretical models discussed above. The central role of the homeland, and especially of housing, in the formation of the Israeli nation-state (as seen in Parts I and II of this dissertation) puts the emphasis on concrete material space, rather than on social and cultural attributes like modernism and ethnicity, as the central state-building mechanism.

This chapter, then, traces the role of housing, as used by the state and social elites, in forming and marking differentiated citizenship in Israel from 1948 to 2011. Rather than a causal agent of social stratification, housing emerges here as the site for materializing the

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1340 See for example: Svirsky, "Not Retrograde but Retrograded - Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in Israel: Sociological Analysis and Conversations with Activists." Ibid.

1341 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine.

1342 Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims."


1345 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception.

1346 Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil.
idea that people who ‘came first’ or had a ‘more significant contribution’ to the state deserved better housing conditions, the latter thereby serving as markers of better citizenship. This chapter does not attempt to identify the socio-cultural origins of the materialization of this idea, but rather to map the workings of this materialization in transforming post-independence Israeli society to one based on differentiated citizenship. The data examined here is therefore differentiated housing itself, rather than proclamations and textual evidence.

Differentiated citizenship is embedded in Israeli society and culture and is based on the merit ascribed to social groups according to their contribution to the nation-state. Social changes in Israel, most notably perhaps the 1977 regime change, have to date been characterized by the replacement of one elite with another, rather than by the inclusion of more social segments into the milieu of ‘proper Israeli’ citizens. Social struggle has thus far always been directed at the state and its leading elite, in the attempt to overturn the elite and take over the state. Using Fanon’s terminology we can say that social struggle in Israel has been engaged in replacing the ‘black skin’ under the ‘white mask’ but maintaining the logic of a postcolonial elite dominating the masses of seemingly sovereign citizens.

As this chapter clearly shows, the arena for social struggle and social change in Israel has always been the arena of housing, a phenomenon stemming from the nature of the state-citizen contract in Israel. While the state-citizen contract in the United states, otherwise known as the American Dream, involves the promise of unlimited opportunity in a classless social structure based on merit and equal opportunity, its Israeli counterpart is based on the promise of a home in the homeland, and of equal access to this home.

Like all other social struggles in Israel’s history, the current struggle which erupted in July 2011 under the banner of public housing for all reveals the Israeli public’s disillusionment with its ability to fulfill the dream of a home in the homeland. At the same time, however, the 2011 social struggle reflects for the first time a broad social awareness of the state’s deployment of housing-based differentiated citizenship in its management of the Israeli populace. Engulfing 80% of the Israeli public, the call for social justice in housing is an inclusionary call for changing the nature of the political-economic system, it marks the possibility of transforming the Israeli social culture of elite and masses into a one of equally-served citizens managing the state, rather than managed by the state as different and segmented publics.

8.2 The consolidation of Zamud as a differentiated typology
Israel’s social fabric changed dramatically following independence. The Yishuv population, credited for bringing about state sovereignty, became the minority in a society of immigrants. On the other hand, the number of Palestinian nationals in the country was significantly reduced due to the mass exodus of Palestinian refugees during and following the 1948 war, known as the Nakba. As a result of these two processes, the state housing regime produced a housing class system distinguishing ‘proper’ from

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1345 Fanon, "Black Skin, White Mask."
‘improper’ citizens. Nationalization of 94% of the land enabled the state housing regime to allocate citizens to specific location and housing types and to distinguish certain groups of citizens as proper by granting them access to proper housing. Simply living in the state entailed citizenship, but the type and location of housing was key to one’s position in the Israeli citizenship-class system. Good citizenship was marked by access to Zamud, detached single-family houses built directly on the ground of the homeland. Struggles over access to proper citizenship and competition among fractions of Israeli society for the status of vanguard elite were waged primarily over access to Zamud housing.

8.2.1 Kibbutz ‘senior housing’

The first indicator of the formation of a housing class system in Israel was its appearance within the heart of the self-proclaimed egalitarian society: the Kibbutz. As shown in chapters 2 and 4, Kibbutz housing was initially of meager amenities, and better resources were allocated first for the weaker segments of the community – the children and the sick. Moreover, shelter was provided as a basic need for newcomers to the Kibbutz at the expense of its founders and seniors, for example with the introduction of single members into rooms shared by couples. Starting in the 1950s, however, a new housing form emerged in the Kibbutz movement: ‘senior housing.’ This housing was allocated to Kibbutz founders, then in their fifties, and included dramatic improvement in housing conditions. For the first time in the Kibbutz, members’ housing included in-house toilets, shower, and sink (fig. ?), which allowed for less engagement with the rest of the community and relative privacy within it. These housing improvements marked the easing of the ideologically driven austerity and extreme communalism which had characterized early Kibbutz society. Better housing conditions for senior members were accepted gladly even in the deeply ideological and austere Kibbutz Beit Alpha.

But the allocation of improved housing on the bases of seniority rather than need constituted a dramatic change to Kibbutz housing, subsequently generating equally dramatic transformations in its society and ideology. The collective showers and toilets, as well as the need to leave one’s room and traverse the muddy or dusty paths of the Kibbutz in order to use them, were now allocated to the Kibbutz’s ‘lower class’ of non-seniors. Privacy and individual amenities, rather than forms of participation in the Kibbutz polity, were made the signifiers of social status. The Kibbutz ideology of equality was replaced with a class system based on access to better housing, thereby eroding the Kibbutz society from within. Moreover, the identification of merit with ‘being first’ lent the new class system a detrimentally fixed character that offered little social mobility for new Kibbutz members, either children or newcomers. Furthermore, whereas Kibbutz children had previously been associated with the vanguard class of the Yishuv by virtue of their better serviced children’s housing, now their

1347 For a detailed discussion, see chapter 4 of this dissertation.
1348 Meishar, "Leaving the Castle."
1349 Beit Alpha archive.
1350 Discussion of the Kibbutz’s loss of its status as vanguard of Israeli society tends to locate the change with the 1977 regime change and the right-wing’s rise to power, subsequently forcing Kibbutzim to operate by market logic. See for example: Daniel Gavron, The Kibbutz: Awakening from Utopia (Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2000).
separation from their parents had no justifiable, practical reason and was therefore read by many Kibbutz children as exclusionary and cruel.\textsuperscript{1351}

Krakauer’s design of Beit Alpha’s first permanent adult housing in 1930 included the option of adding private bathrooms as a second stage when funds would be available, as seen in fig. 8.1. Stage One included open porches which could later be closed off to serve as private washrooms and toilets. However, as more members joined the Kibbutz and required housing, these porches were closed off to serve as single member rooms, thereby making a strong statement by providing shelter for more members rather than improving the housing conditions of members already living in permanent housing (fig. 8.2).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{fig81.png}
\caption{First permanent adult housing in Beit Alpha, 1930. Leopold Krakauer. Source: Illera, 1992. Note the open entry porch serving every two rooms, designated for future inclusion of sanitary facilities.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{fig82.png}
\caption{First amendment to Krakauer’s adult housing structures: conversion of some of the open porches to rooms for single members in 1935. Source: Beit Alpha construction archive.}
\end{figure}

Plans for the second amendment of Beit Alpha’s adult housing were prepared in 1949, immediately after independence. The plans included annulling the single rooms and dividing their area among couple-rooms to provide each room with private attached bathroom and toilet, to form two units of ‘senior housing’ (fig. 8.2).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{fig83.png}
\caption{Second amendment to Krakauer’s adult housing structures: replacement of single member rooms with private attached sanitary facilities for each senior room, 1949. Source: Beit Alpha construction archive.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1351} See chapter 4 of this dissertation for further discussion and a literature review.
New senior housing units were designed throughout the 1950s by the planning department of the Kibbutz movement for Kibbutz settlements across the country (fig. 8.4). The space allocated for washrooms was minimal, 3.5 square meters, barely enough to serve one person at a time, especially when door opening radius is taken into account. Despite the modest size, however, the introduction of privacy for intimate bodily activities was significant. The fact that this privilege was not allocated to all members or to the weak but to the Kibbutz’s elite milieu is of great significance. The next stage was inclusion of an additional room in senior dwellings, enabling leisure time spent privately in the room rather than in the communal members’ club, dining hall or other public spaces. Again this privilege was assigned to the senior members of the Kibbutz, marking a differentiated membership within the Kibbutz polity. In comparison, children still spent their entire days with no privacy under the same conditions designed during the austerity period of the 1920s.\textsuperscript{1352}

The position of Kibbutz-senior was esteemed in post-independence Israeli society for its central role, as the ‘advance vanguard of the camp,’ in bringing about state sovereignty. Fig. 8.6, a poster celebrating Jewish sovereignty as a result of gaining hold of the ancestral homeland, presents the icon of the Kibbutz environment as responsible for statehood. The Kibbutz is not marked here using its proper name, heroic members or social structure, but rather using its built environment: the Kibbutz yard enclosed by dwellings and a communal structure and surrounded by agricultural fields. Addressees of this poster were not the Kibbutz, but members of Israeli society and the Jewish people at large, as can be seen by the religious subtext of its title: “After 2000 Years, the Homeland is Ours Again.” The Kibbutz’s vanguard status and contribution to state sovereignty were

\textsuperscript{1352} See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of children’s houses.
linked to Kibbutz housing. This type of housing bore two key elements: a *Zamud* housing typology, namely being rooted in the agricultural land of the homeland; and its border location, helping in the maintenance of state sovereignty over the land (fig. 8.8).

The *Zamud* housing typology, appearing in graphic representations as small houses upon the land with pitched roofs (fig. 8.6, 8.7, 8.8) gradually consolidated into single-family detached houses, rendered self-sustaining—and detached from the Kibbutz community—by including more functions within the house, including a bedroom, living room, shower and toilets, and a small kitchen (fig. 8.5). The built environment of the Kibbutz was promoted to immigrants as the best environment for their children, as can be seen in a Yiddish poster portraying the Kibbutz environment as the promised land seen from the immigrant ship window (fig. 8.7). The Kibbutz’s border location and agricultural cultivation of the land were self-defined as heroic and vital for maintaining the state (fig. 8.8).

Fig. 8.6 After 2000 Years the Homeland is Ours Again. JNF poster 1948.
Fig. 8.7 The Kibbutz – The best place for children. JA absorption department Yiddish poster 1951. Source: Lavon Institute.
Fig. 8.8 We are the state’s security belt – the 70th Mapam Kibbutz established. 1955. Shraga Weill. Source: Yad Yaari archive.

Fig. 8.9 A two-unit ‘room’, including separation of living room and bedroom, and a porch. 1950s and 1960s. Source: Amir, 2007. Fig. 8.10 Border settlements stamp. Source: Israel Stamp Authority.

Fig. 8.11 Isometric view and sections for Hashomer Hazair Kibbutz family housing. Architect: S. Mastechkin. Source: Yad Yaari archive.
The state perceived its Kibbutz vanguard population as possessing full self governance in the framework of polities characterized by direct democracy. It allowed the Kibbutzim full autonomy from intervention, withdrawing almost completely from managing the network of kibbutz settlements. It thus allowed the existence of a de-facto state within a state enjoying great privileges, which in turn were perceived as rights due to the Kibbutz’s dominant role in forming and sustaining the state. As declared by Minister of Housing Mordechai Bentov (a kibbutz member), the Kibbutz society provided its individuals with relief from direct state intervention and with self-rule through the exercise of direct democracy. “[The Kibbutz member] is spared from dealing with the tax collector, electricity bills, social security… shielded from the whims of modern bureaucracy.”

Bentov states that Kibbutz settlements bypassed the local towns in their areas and were “interested in keeping all their economic, servicing, and social activities within their own cooperative frameworks of marketing and purchasing, which function directly through the big cities.” This analysis is impressive in suggesting the Kibbutz as Israel’s first case of state withdrawal from a space of exception, as suggested in Aihwa Ong’s theoretical framework. Ong’s concept of exception is important here for examining withdrawal of governance, coupled with active support through the allocation of land and water, the subsidizing of education, transportation, and infrastructure, and the granting of priority to Kibbutz enterprises. Those not enjoying the vanguard status of the Kibbutz, i.e. dwellers of cities and immigrant towns, had a dramatic opposite relationship with the state. The state took care to intervene in their government, and, although supplying them with basic amenities, did not support them with an equal support net.

Equality, one of the core ideals of the Kibbutz, was no longer professed in relation to the rest of society, nor inside the Kibbutz communities themselves. Ideals of equality and solidarity were therefore made cynical and the logic of Israeli society as composed of masses and privileged elite became Israel’s dominant social structure, executed and manifested by housing. Given that Kibbutz researchers like Freddi Kahana, architect and planner for the Kibbutz movement since 1955, trace the factor leading to the Kibbutz’s ideological collapse to the kettles introduced to Kibbutz member rooms – rather than to the design of the rooms themselves – it is clear that Kibbutz planners and architects were...

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1353 Bentov, *Public Housing in Israel: Lecture at the University of California, Berkeley.*, p.17.
1354 Ibid., p.16.
1355 Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception.*
unaware of the significant effect ‘senior housing’ would have on the egalitarian nature of Kibbutz society.\textsuperscript{1356}

8.2.2 Social unrest in resistance to differentiated housing

The choice to invest in better, differentiated housing solutions for seniors of the Kibbutz movement (who were also seniors of the practical Zionism movement) affected not only intra-Kibbutz social relations but also the social relations between the Kibbutz movement leading Israeli society and the large population of immigrant-citizens. The introduction of private sanitary amenities in permanent structures for senior members, while immigrant families were housed in dripping tents within malserviced camps, with an average of one toilet for 120 people, did not go unnoticed.\textsuperscript{1357} The fact that Kibbutz pioneers themselves had lived in poor housing conditions for decades (as seen in chapter 4) justified the expectation of the Kibbutz-dominated state that immigrants embrace poor housing conditions as markers of pioneer status – while Kibbutz senior members no longer did. This approach reflects the deep ideological social change in Israeli society: seniority serving as the organizing principle for a hierarchy of citizenship based on differentiated civil and social rights.

As seen in chapter 6, bad housing conditions led to social unrest in the immigrant camps (\textit{Maabara}), temporary makeshift immigrant settlements and deserted Arab-Palestinian neighborhoods populated with immigrants. In a series of public protests in the 1950s and 1960s, the immigrants approached the state housing regime in demand for appropriate housing conditions, rejecting the pioneer framework and demanding in exchange a state-citizen contract posited on the supply of good quality housing.\textsuperscript{1358} Immigrant demands to be serviced by the state were demands to be acknowledged as equal citizens, the nation-state’s power base and source of legitimatization. One of the most significant social uprisings was that which erupted in July 1959 in the Haifa neighborhood of Wadi Saliv, partly destroyed and evacuated from its Arab-Palestinian population during the 1948 war and housed primarily by Mizrahy immigrants. This uprising rejected the differentiated allocation of housing to immigrants in general and to Mizrahy immigrants in particular by the Israeli housing regime. Identifying housing as the marker of Mizrahy discrimination, the riots demanded that the state amend its differentiated logic of citizenship by guaranteeing good housing for all citizens.\textsuperscript{1359}

\textsuperscript{1356} Kahana, \textit{Neither City nor Village - Kibbutz Architecture 1910-1990} See also: Yuval Danielli and Muki Zur, \textit{To Build and Be Built in It: Samuel Mastechkin and Kibbutz Architecture in Israel} (Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2008).
\textsuperscript{1358} Fogelman, S. 2010.
\textsuperscript{1359} Yifat Weiss, \textit{Wadi Saliv: The Present and the Absentee} (Jerusalem: Van Lear Institute, 2007).
Having recognized this demand, the state housing regime embarked on a new housing policy, as seen in chapter 6, which eventually produced mass estates of public housing known as Shiˈkuniˈm, offering immigrants mass permanent housing in the country’s periphery in the framework of the Sharon 1952 master plan. The state’s response to immigrants’ demands, while providing them with non-Zamud differentiated housing, nonetheless reflects the housing-based nature of the state-citizen contract in Israel.

8.2.3 Mass immigrant housing

Starting in the late 1950s, Mass blocks of public housing, or Shiˈkuniˈm, were constructed for immigrants by the state housing regime. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the formation of Israel’s massive immigrant housing blocks, showing that the process leading to the differentiated allocation of immigrant housing and to the environmentally deterministic view of housing as ‘machines for modernization’ of the improper immigrants was far from conscious and directed. By the late 1960s, however, it had already become a truism accepted by state housing regime and public alike. An explicit example for the spread of this narrative can be seen on the cover of a Maˈariv popular science issue dedicated to the development towns, published 1977 (fig. 8.15). The cover portrays the gradual ascent of immigrants from their position as primitive, stagnant people mired in the desolate grounds of Diaspora, lifted and taken by modern planes to Israel, where there are transformed into active, productive citizens and soldiers by way of the modern apartment building.

Housing hundreds of thousands of homeless immigrants in the framework of public housing was one of the nation-state’s key challenges. By providing public housing, the

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1360 See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of immigrant housing.
state fulfilled its part in the state-citizen contract, proving itself to be a sovereign entity responsible for its citizens and capable of caring and providing for them. The massive supply of housing units by a young regime with limited substantial means was an impressive achievement on the part of both the government and the professional community. Yet this public housing project involved the creation of differentiated housing for immigrants, based on of physical and demographic control of the immigrants as subjects rather than as equal citizens. In this framework, immigrant populations were dispersed and settled throughout the country according to the political considerations of the housing regime, primarily in the peripheral hinterland of the country, thereby becoming physically, culturally, and socially isolated from the power centers of Israeli society. Alona Nitzan-Shiftan discussed modernity and modernism as supplying the state with both context and tools for producing a national space based on three negations: negation of Diaspora, negation of the bourgeoisie and negation of the Orient. The power of the new, modern, national space lay in its national planning by the state housing regime, which presented the nation-state as a new society composed of reformed subjects serving national goals. The Sharon master plan of 1952, discussed at length in Chapter 6, reflected first and foremost a political program which posed housing as the foundational mechanism for the design of national space. Moreover, defining housing as its primary challenge, the plan also defined housing as its main instrument for social engineering and control of the threatening political power of the malformed citizen mass. Allocation of free public housing enabled the state housing regime to unitarily design state territory and the identity and social construction of its subjects. The immigrants served as raw material, along with concrete and mortar, for the construction of the new national space. Immigrants, Holocaust survivors, and Jews from the Arab world (Mizrahim) were regarded (as shown above) as victims and Levantines, not yet capable of sustaining the nation-state. Their development towns and massive housing blocks suggested that their main asset from the standpoint of the state was their sheer number, used to populate vacant, desolate state territory.

The immigrants on their part increasingly viewed their desert towns and anonymous housing as degrading, reducing them to a governed mass rather than part of the state’s self-governing polity. State provision of housing free of charge in the towns was soon viewed as non-benevolent, since the poor unemployed immigrants were unable to move elsewhere. Able immigrants did everything in their power to leave the towns, and no

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1361 Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/ Personal Home: The Role of Public Housing in Shaping Space."
1363 Nitzan-Shiftan, "Contested Zionism--Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelsohn and the Tel Aviv Chug in Mandate Palestine." For my critique of the accepted historiography of negation of the orient, see Chapter 2 and chapter 7..
1364 Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/ Personal Home: The Role of Public Housing in Shaping Space."
1365 Ibid.
1366 See Marcuse’s discussion of the myth of the benevolent state. Marcuse, "Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State."
senior member of society was willing to reside in them. Differentiated citizenship stands in stark contrast to the principles of equality, comradeship, and solidarity proclaimed as Israel’s values during its struggle for sovereignty and stated in its Declaration of Independence. By the mid 1960s, however, the housing regime and the general public understood differentiated citizenship as a necessity and even as just, reflecting citizens’ differential role and contribution to the state. Mass anonymous housing marked the masses of improper citizens, whereas Zamud housing served the small elite of ‘proper’ citizens in rural, border-area Moshavim and Kibbutzim. Apartment house dwellings included substantial intervention in the immigrant family’s everyday life, with the proclaimed goal of using the dwelling unit as an educational tool for proper family life and adjustment to “accepted residential standards … as some habits cannot be accepted and the dweller must be educated to give them up.” Apartment houses, which included compact apartments subdivided into rooms of specific function, were to educate immigrants as to the modern way of life, including such attributes as the separation of private and public and of ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ functions. Compared with Zamud self-help immigrant housing like the Ninio family shack discussed in Chapter 6 and ‘patio’ core housing discussed by Shadar, Shikun apartments did not provide any ability of apartment improvement and adaptability by means of sweat equity, i.e. did not enable residents to make decisions regarding their dwelling environment and enact them by way of auto-constructed additions, a fact declared by planners to be one of the advantages of this housing type. As the towns were located in Israel’s desert periphery and included little employment and mobility options, the people living in the towns were subject to great governmental intervention in every aspect of their lives. The towns were quickly left with a desolate and weak populace and a fermenting ground for social unrest.

8.3  **Zamud as a system of differentiated housing**

Settlement of the Israeli hinterland with development towns populated almost entirely by disenfranchised immigrants, and the quick desertion of the towns by able immigrants,

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1367 Shadar, "Cultural Issues in Public Housing."
1369 Ibid.
1370 Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/ Personal Home: The Role of Public Housing in Shaping Space."
1371 Rivka, "Israeli Be'er Sheba: Between Place and Vision."; ibid.
marked the towns as lower-class habitat for lower-class citizens. Despite the social failure of the development town model, the Israeli government decided in 1960 to settle the Arad region of the Judea Desert by way of a new development town: Arad. Following the bad experience with the first development towns in the previous decade, a committee of ministers was formed to develop a new settlement policy. The housing Programs Department conducted planning research towards designing the new town, which included two studies: a geographical study and a social study. The social study included the attempt to design the social composition of the new town in an attempt to make sure that it would sustain itself and prosper socially. As a lesson taken from the social failures of previous towns, whose population included only immigrants and whose stronger population left as soon it could, Arad was planned to attract veteran population which would serve as a social anchor for the town and ease the absorption of new immigrants. Seniors willing to come to Arad, however, were unwilling to live in mass housing blocks. A new housing program, reflecting the principle of differentiated housing, was therefore devised for them, marking the transformation of differentiated housing into a state system.

8.3.1 Arad: Seniors’ Zumud housing in a development town

The first attempt to attract veteran Israelis to Arad included a marketing brochure produced by the ministries of housing and labor titled ‘Arad is calling.’ The brochure presented Arad at the center of a vibrant employment hub near the Dead Sea factories in the beautiful desert landscape, whose residents are families of professionals. The brochure was published in 1962 and included a campaign in the press. It included the schematic plan and isometric drawing of the future city on its cover, depicted as a distinctly industrial town with mass housing blocks (fig. 8.17, 8.18). The brochure included two apartment plans available for the newcomers (fig. 8.19), one of an apartment in an asbestos shack and one of an apartment in public housing. This campaign failed to draw enough veterans. The housing it offered clearly did not meet veteran Israelis’ self-perceived status.

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1372 State archive, Inter-ministerial committee for Arad planning.
1373 State archive, Ministry of Housing program department, Arad file.
1374 Rivka, "Israeli Be’er Sheva: Between Place and Vision."
1375 State archive, State archive, Ministry of Housing program department, Arad file.
1376 Arad is Calling You, Maariv July 18 1961.
Attracting senior Israelis to a development town in the desert required offering them Zamud housing. Arad’s master plan (fig. 8.21) therefore included Hazavim, a villa neighborhood (right, in yellow), completely disconnected from the city center (in orange). This neighborhood was distinguished from Arad’s city center using both geography and housing. A year after the first campaign, another campaign was launched, placing Zamud housing at its center. “Free land for homebuilders in Arad” was the new slogan, and the bright brochure included clear visual and textual indication that seniors moving to Arad will gain access to Zamud housing. The new brochure was produced in April 1963 by a Tel Aviv-based public relations office. The brochure (fig. 8.22) included plans and isometric drawings for two housing options available. Houses were clearly presented as detached and located on private plots handed over for free (fig. 8.23). The plans are detailed rather than schematic and the ad states that housing construction is to begin immediately and to be completed by 1965.

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1377 State archive, Ministry of Housing, Arad master plan file.
The new campaign was not merely cosmetic, but rather included design of a new neighborhood at the town’s prime location and designated for senior Zamud housing. This neighborhood, Hazavim, is missing from Arad’s 1961 draft master plan as it appears on the cover of the first campaign brochure, marked there vaguely by the caption ‘villa area’ located near the city center, whereas the prime location was allocated for a hotel area (fig. 8.25). The second marketing effort was successful and many enrolled for ‘a free plot for homebuilders in Arad’. Allocation of the prime ridge location for Zamud housing was embedded into Arad’s 1964 formal master plan, reflecting the importance attributed to this neighborhood as one designed to attract senior settlers (fig. 8.25). The Hazavim neighborhood plan of 1965 (fig. 8.24) extends along a mountain ridge and affords beautiful views of the Judea desert from all the houses. The neighborhood is serviced with three parks, schools, a clinic and a commercial area. A single road connects it to the city center.

1378 The plan is found at the State Archive, Office of Housing Minister Tene file.
1379 State archive, Arad, file.
This quick adaptation of planning to market response was not accidental. The early settlers of Arad’s ‘front camp’—engineers, architects, and state officials employed in materializing the new city—formed the ‘board of Arad housers’ and demanded to be serviced as Arad’s pioneer dwellers. Among them was Israeli elite member Abraham Shohat, Solel Bone engineer and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s son-in-law, later head of the Arad municipal government.\textsuperscript{1380} Settlers included elite members of Israeli society who were looking for Zamud housing outside the collectivist social framework of the Kibbutz. Many of them were former Kibbutz members looking for Zamud housing in an urban framework. Some were immigrants from Western countries.\textsuperscript{1381} The settlers’ sense of entitlement is well expressed in a letter they addressed at the Minister of Housing July 1964.\textsuperscript{1382} The settlers stated:

\begin{quote}
We would be greatly offended by the government and yourself, should you decide not to grant us the housing parcels in exclusive ownership, and would reconsider whether to invest our efforts in building our houses here. Our demands do not spring from commercial reasons – we deserve that the government donate us a plot of land, less than 0.1 hectares, for building our houses in the desert.\textsuperscript{1383}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1380} Solel Boneh is one of the largest infrastructure and construction companies in Israel, founded by the Histadrut (the Labor movement’s trade union) in 1921 and dominated by the Mapai labor party. See E. Bieltzki, Solel Bone 1921-1974 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1974).

\textsuperscript{1381} Details on Shohat’s employment in Arad’s ‘front camp’ can be found at the Arad front camp file, State Archive.

\textsuperscript{1382} Interview with Naomi Gal, one of Arad’s early settlers, January 2011.

\textsuperscript{1383} Board of Private Homebuilders in Arad, letter to Minister Tene, July 16 1964. State archive, Tene file.
Elite settlers demanded, on grounds of merit, to receive access to *Zamud* housing and to be serviced by the state on better conditions than most of the country’s population, or else they would not settle in Arad. While this demand makes sense in the framework of free-will settlement conditions, it nonetheless reflects the logic of differentiated housing. The seniors’ threat not to settle in Arad, and the subtext that building their homes in the desert is a sacrifice on their part, echoes the fact that most inhabitants of the desert towns had no choice regarding their dwelling options. The power relations between the state and the elite emerging from this letter are strikingly different from the state’s power relationship with most segments of the population, who were not in a position to ‘be offended’ by the state and ‘demand’ privileges of it (other than in the form of social unrest). Minister Tene’s and ILA’s response to the homebuilders’ board was that they would be charged 1 Israeli Lira for rent per year, de-facto free of charge.\(^{1384}\) Moreover, Arad homebuilders benefited from generous state loans. The 40 families of ‘veterans’ living in the front camp received a state loan of 9,000 Lira for 25 years and a bank loan of 5,000 Lira for 10 years. 120 additional families joining Arad received a state loan of 3,000 Lira and a bank loan of 6,000 Lira.\(^{1385}\) This funding scheme financed homebuilding in Hazavim almost entirely, thereby positioning the neighborhood as a public housing program. The Ministry of Housing issued a brochure for families enrolled for homebuilding in Arad with a concrete proposal for an expanding house, including a concrete tariff and a detailed account of the house’s fitting: 20/20cm mosaic floor tiles, two layers of plaster and paint, wooden cupboards in kitchen and bathroom, the type of windows and shades, etc. (fig. 8.26). The houses proposed to Arad homebuilders were all inverted to face a climatic courtyard rather than the street, reflecting the disconnected nature of the entire neighborhood (fig. 8.28, 8.39, 8.30). Desert heat and radiation dictated small openings and an in-house courtyard. Houses are further removed from the street due to the hilly topography, forming a non-urban street. These houses reflect the Ministry of Housing’s perception of Arad homebuilders as an elite not interested in mixing with Arad’s industrial workers and immigrants assigned to mass housing blocks in the city center. Homebuilders, by contrast, were free to choose their own design scheme and construction company, as the brochure states explicitly.\(^{1386}\)

Settlers used the abovementioned funds to build their houses on the open market, in a dramatically different model from public housing funded directly by the state and built by the Ministry of Housing via state and private construction companies. The Hazavim *Zamud* housing was therefore public housing in terms of state support and resource allocation, coupled with a complete withdrawal from governance of the construction itself. In this sense, Arad homebuilders benefited from the privileged status of vanguard *Zamud* dwellers just as Kibbutz dwellers had before them.

\(^{1384}\) State archive, Minister Tene file.
\(^{1385}\) State archive, Program department file.
\(^{1386}\) Ministry of Housing and Shinkun vePitucah brochure for Arad homebuilders, 1964. Source: State archive.
The houses were a source of privilege not only in terms of their built environment, but also as a source of self-governance. As vanguards of the city of Arad, serving the national project of settlement in the hinterland and residing in their self-built Zamud housing, Hazavim dwellers expected to self-govern. The new city, however, did not yet include enough dwellers to be considered an independent municipality and was therefore governed directly by the government via the appointed Arad Administrator. The board of homeowners, embedded as it was in Israeli politics, demanded open elections and self-management. The Arad Administrator objected to self-government merely two years after the city’s founding, yet “people thought they could run things on their own from the first
moment without governmental management” in the tradition of the vanguard, Zamud-dwelling Kibbutz, and were granted self governance while other development towns were not.  

8.4 Replication of the differentiated housing system

Since the early 1950s, demands for access to the ‘good housing’ of Zamud, reflecting upon one’s status as a good citizen and a contributing member of society, spread across the country. Immigrants from Muslim countries, Mizrahim, became increasingly aware that their mass housing was marginalizing them, casting them as improper members of society. The discrimination of Mizrahim in the areas of education, health, and employment was also framed in terms of their access to ‘proper’ housing. Shikun mass housing was perceived by Mizrahim to be demeaning, marking them as an anonymous, faceless mass. As in many social-housing projects around the world, hatred of the Shikun symbolized the marginalized Mizrahim’s animosity towards the Ashkenazi elite and the Kibbutz state. Development-town social housing no longer represented the state’s inclusion of the immigrants into its citizenry via the state-citizen housing contract. Rather, it represented the vehicle for Mizrahi marginalization as a group of faceless people significant only for their numerical volume. Their ‘right’ for housing, as they perceived it, was no longer simply for permanent shelter but for housing that accords dignity. It was the repetitively and marginalization, rather than the concrete poor housing conditions, that were an insult to Mizrahi citizenship as individual members of the polity. While they kept their side of the state-citizen contract in sustaining the state by taking part in the glorious 1967 war and devastating 1973 war, the state did not. The dramatic 1977 regime change, replacing 30 years of Labor dominance in Israeli politics with a right-wing government, was largely based on Mizrahi frustration with their housing conditions. Right-wing leader Menachem Begin condemned the inequality in access between Mizrahim and the Kibbutz elite by comparing their housing. As Mizrahim live in development towns, Kibbutz members had “not only houses, but swimming pools!”

Fig. 8.32 The Black Panthers’ protests of Mizrahi discrimination, 1971. Source: Panthers’ archive.

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1387 Pundak on Arad. Davar, November 9 1965.
1389 Dror Mishani, The Ethnic Unconscious, Emergence of Mizrahy in Hebrew Literature of the Eighties (Tel Aviv Am Oved, 2006).
1390 Begin, quoted in Mishani, ibid.
8.4.1 **Build Your Own House program in response to demands for proper housing**

Based on the experience gained in the pivotal case of Arad Hazavim housing, the state housing regime, via its Ministry of Housing, developed a comprehensive housing policy titled Build Your Own House (BYOH). This housing policy, developed after the Hazavim model, was experimented on in several senior-neighborhoods across the country between 1968 and 1972 and formulated as a model for privileged settlement.\(^{1391}\) The new government, brought to power in 1977 by Mizrahi discontent of its socio-political marginalization, consolidated the BYOH model into a comprehensive state housing policy extending the Zamud house to Mizrahim in order to advance its political agendas. In short, the new regime adapted the BYOH framework in order to grant large numbers of Mizrahi citizens access to Zamud houses. The new right wing regime found the BYOH project a natural means for addressing its electorate’s demands for proper housing, as well as for marking its electoral power base as ‘proper citizens’ by granting them access to Zamud housing. This aim was not only based on narrow political considerations as some have hinted,\(^{1392}\) but was rather a goal of solid national importance: social equality for ‘the second Israel’ by integrating them into the Israeli elite via proper Zamud housing. Authority over BYOH planning and execution was transferred within the Ministry of Housing to the newly formed (1974) Authority of Rural Housing,\(^{1393}\) an act which de-facto bypassed the traditional Labor dominance of the Ministry. Unlike the mass Shikun housing of the 1950s – so foreign to the history of Zionist housing that it required a top-down statutory master plan for its logic to be implemented – BYOH was in perfect line with Zionist housing\(^{1394}\) and required no such master plan.

The BYOH project marks the state housing regime’s rediscovery of Zamud housing as a large-scale tool for executing state policy, after nearly two decades of focusing on mass Shikun housing to meet state and immigrants’ housing needs. Identification of Zamud housing with the realization of state goals – as seen in Arad as well as in Zionist pioneer housing since 1910 – explains the formation of BYOH programs for settlements and areas requiring strengthening.\(^{1395}\) While BYOH was employed as a housing strategy wherever the state wanted to attract “strong” citizens – including the Galilee Judaization project and East Jerusalem\(^{1396}\) – it is mostly associated with Zamud neighborhoods in development towns.\(^{1397}\) The reason for this is precisely the fact that development town dwellers were far from identified as part of Israel’s elite. The Ministry of Housing had already initiated a BYOH program for development towns as early as 1975 based on a strategy similar to Arad’s, i.e. attracting “strong” populations to the development towns.

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\(^{1391}\) Dikla Yizhar, "Build Your Own Home Project: The Built Space as a Social, Cultural and Professional Turning Point" (Technion, 2008).


\(^{1393}\) State archive, Ministry of Housing, Authority of Rural Housing file.


\(^{1395}\) Ibid.

\(^{1396}\) Yizhar, "Build Your Own Home Project: The Built Space as a Social, Cultural and Professional Turning Point".

by offering them Zamud housing, but this strategy failed to attain its goal. By contrast, the BYOH programs following the regime change departed from their predecessors precisely in identifying the elite to be the town members themselves and giving them access to Zamud in order to strengthen the towns.

The plan was executed by liquidating state lands near the towns for the purpose of housing development. The Ministry of Housing devised the urban planning and developed infrastructure for the new neighborhoods, while the residents themselves were responsible for the design and construction of their houses. Like the Arad Hazavim neighborhood, BYOH neighborhoods in development towns enjoyed a generous package of financing and development. The cost of land and neighborhood development were formally assigned to the residents yet de-facto financed by the state, by way of a three-item funding scheme devised individually for each settlement. In Shlomi, for example, the price for a 0.05 hectare plot was 89,000 Lira, yet the state provided each BYOH family with 110,000 Lira as ‘standing loan’ and 60,000 Lira as ‘security grant’. In addition, homebuilders were granted a regular mortgage of 200,000 Lira for 25 years if they owned no other dwelling and 130,000 Lira if they did. Development-town BYOH was therefore a project of public housing, initiated by the state as part of its long term plan that fulfills state policy through the ministry of housing. In this sense, Naomi Karmon and Dan Chemanski claim that there is no change in the state’s housing policy as a political tool for achieving its goals.

Plans for BYOH neighborhoods designed for Shlomi, Kiryat Gat, Nazrat Illit and Beer Sheba between 1979 and 1986 all indicate that the new neighborhoods were designed

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1398 Build Your Own House Plan for Development Towns 1975, Minister Ofer file, State Archive.
1401 Shlomi is a border town situated next to the Lebanese border and located in the ‘security priority area.’
1403 Naomi Karmon and Dan Chemanski, Housing in Israel, from Planned Economy to Semi-Free Market Management, (Haifa: Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Technion, 1990).
right next to Shikun mass housing as part and parcel of the towns. This design is significantly different from the Hazavim neighborhood located far from Arad’s development-town center. The plans themselves were quite straightforward in allocating housing parcels. Between 1980 and 1989, 4,284 housing units were added to development towns in the BYOH framework. A survey conducted for the Ministry of Housing in 9 development towns in 1982 discovered that most of the BYOH dwellers were veterans of the towns. The survey found that 71% of BYOH dwellers were employed in the towns and that 86% of them had lived previously in Shikun apartments. Only 17% of BYOH dwellers moved to the towns from elsewhere in order to gain access to Zamud housing.

It thus appears that the plan was successful in realizing the new regime’s goal of introducing the former masses into the category of “proper” citizens via introduction to Zamud housing. As public housing, this plan was the first to enable mass access to Zamud housing outside the Kibbutz and Moshav settlements, and was therefore understood by all social segments as mass entry into hegemony. While some viewed this mass inclusion of more segments of the Israeli public into ‘proper’ citizenship as a step towards social equality, others critiqued the ‘bad taste’ of dweller-designed houses as a means to disqualify their introduction to the ‘good citizen’ milieu.

The state housing regime withdrew from BYOH housing primarily in terms of their architectural design and construction. Compared with the state’s withdrawal from Arad Hazavim neighborhood, which (as shown earlier) pertained to settlers’ self-governance while attempting to maintain control over architectural design and construction, the BYOH framework for the towns included no architectural regulation. As long as they followed construction regulations, residents were able to design their house as they pleased, not even being required to employ an architect. Resentment of this housing policy therefore focused on the state housing regime’s withdrawal from BYOH architectural design, in two aspects: one is taste, and the other is the mistreatment of the land. While the “taste” argument pointed to Mizrahim as “vulgar” and thereby questioning if they can fit into the sabra image, the “mistreatment of the land” argument referred to the way in which the introduction of Mizrahim into the sabra impacted the land itself. This impact, specifically, would be the corruption of the sacred relationship between the sabra and his land and thus the corruption of Zionism altogether. In order to distinguish between Kibbutz detached houses, deemed heroic, and BYOH detached houses which were regarded as a corruption of the heroic endeavor, the term “suburb” was adopted to portray the seemingly “new typology,” suggesting that it is a foreign housing form. Unlike the Zionist, idealistic Kibbutz house, BYOH houses were cast

1405 Brand, "Examination of the Build Your Own House Project: Final Report."
1406 Shadar, "On the House and the Landlord."
1407 Gilead Ofir, Cyclopean Walls (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Museum of Art, 1992).
1408 Shadar, "On the House and the Landlord."
1409 The sabra was of course male.
1410 Treitel, "Happiness Awaits at the Garden: The Cottage Neighborhood of Neot Hashikma in Rishon Lezion West."
as capitalist, for-profit, American houses alienated from place and from national project. Labeling BYOH neighborhoods in the towns as suburbs associates them with the American suburb phenomenon, hence not with the Israeli detached house they aspired to relate to, but to the American foreign environment. BYOH suburbs were presented as violating the land itself, as well as the traditional Israeli relationship with it, through the deployment of bulldozers, the chopping of trees, and the formation of mountains of construction rubble.

![Image](image.jpg)

**Fig. 8.37 Violation of the relationship to the land. Source: Ofir, 1992.**

Discussion of the architectural features of self-designed BYOH in the architectural arena, including endless debates whether they are ‘modernist’ or not and whether their formal vocabulary is Israeli or not, preoccupied professional architects and scholars alike who ridiculed and lamented BYOH as a distinct typology. Examination of a typical BYOH neighborhood in Yavne reveals a different reality. In general, houses look very similar: most have red tiled roofs and walls of white plaster, with windows of various sizes and concrete shading elements. They have open-floor plans for the first floor and porches on the second floor, and quite a few 45-degree lopping. These elements, however, are in no way anomalous to the Israeli context. A house with white plaster and a red tiled roof is the generic type, the symbol of Israeli rural building from its very beginning in the kibbutz. Certain elements of ornamentation that were added to the type angered Israeli architects: round or trapezoid living rooms sticking out of the façade, covering parts of the façade with natural stone, chimneys, zigzag roof line, and so on. Those elements, hardly excessive or even original (adhering, rather, to European traditions), rarely included oriental elements, as expected by the orientalist architectural profession of Mizrahi homebuilders.

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1411 Identification of the BYOW with American ideals constituted a derogatory questioning of their dwellers’ status as ‘proper citizens,’ based on associating the new Likud right-wing capitalist regime with American capitalism.
1412 Ofir, *Cyclopean Walls*.
While Mizrahi protesters called for equality, and while they managed to gain access to Zamud housing in large numbers, the BYOH project merely replicated the logic of differentiated housing. Its contribution was in the inclusion of marginalized populations into the ‘proper’ citizen milieu, yet it did not question the vanguard-mass dichotomy of Israeli society and housing. “BYOH homebuilders internalized the conceptions of ‘proper’ housing…The ‘good house’ has been embedded so deep in dwellers’ cultural perception that no other dwelling form was proposed,” Shadar writes.\textsuperscript{1416} Moreover, the inclusion of new populations was explicitly made at the expense of the previous elite of agricultural-workers’ settlements, namely Kibbutzim and Moshavim. These settlements were dramatically cut off from state support and have consequently undergone a devastating financial and ideological breakdown.\textsuperscript{1417}

8.5 Differentiated citizenship as pioneer privilege

8.5.1 The West Bank and Gaza settlement project

The West Bank settlement project was embarked upon as a popular demand for access to the Biblical lands of the West Bank following its conquest in 1967. The Settlements’ ideological grounding in religion and political theology cannot be examined in the scope of this chapter.\textsuperscript{1418} I will focus here only on the settlements’ Zamud housing and its development. Immediately after the 1967 war, an influx of enthusiastic Israeli citizens flooded the West Bank in order to tour ‘our not so little land.’\textsuperscript{1419} Sites mentioned as special attractions include Jericho, the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, Nablus, Sebastia and Jenin. The transportation authority opened access roads and parking lots next to key sites

\textsuperscript{1416} Shadar, ”On the House and the Landlord.”. p. 40.
\textsuperscript{1417} Gevron, The Kibbutz: Awakening From Utopia.
\textsuperscript{1418} Due to time limits, this dissertation unfortunately could not include an additional chapter dedicated to Zionism as political theology, focusing on the West Bank settlement project. This chapter will hopefully be published in the future.
The Entire West Bank Will be Opened to Tourists on Tuesday. 	extit{Davar.} July 16, 1967.
toured by the Israeli public, including hiking sites like the Kelt springs and archeological sites of Biblical Judea and Samaria like the ruins of the city of Samaria. Following this tourist access to the Biblical lands, religious Jews were exposed to the materiality of their religious claim on the land, but were satisfied with Israel’s military hold of it. Following the 1973 war trauma of near-defeat and the post-war threat that the Biblical land might be ‘returned’ to Jordan in diplomatic peace negotiations, religious Jews demanded to ‘renew the Jewish settlement in Samaria’. Samaria, accessed via the old Ottoman train station of Sebastia, was the symbol of this demand (fig. 8.43). After the 1973 war, the Gush Emumim movement formed a settlement group, Elon More, to settle there. The settler families, joined by supporters, ‘ascended to Sebastia’ eight times in an attempt to settle it. They marched on foot from Netania and barricaded themselves in the old train station, demanding to be allowed to settle there. The settlers used the old train station as synagogue and Yeshiva (religious school) (fig. 8.45) and attempted to form housing structures (fig. 8.44, 8.46, 8.47). The settlers were repeatedly evacuated by the IDF (fig. 8.48, 8.49).

Fig. 8.40 Architect Dani Karavan’s drawings of sites in the West Bank. Maariv, June 16 1967.
Fig. 8.41 The first ascent to Sebastia. The sign reads ‘Elon More: renewal of Jewish settlement in Samaria’.
Source: Elon More archive. The structure at the back is the Sebastia train station.

Fig. 8.42, 8.43 Ascents to Sebastia. Source: Elon More archive.

In each attempt to found the settlement, the settlers made an effort to form a full pioneer settlement model. The fourth ascent to Sebastia included a nightly convoy to the station, carrying with it food supply, a generator, and two prefabricated shacks. The 150 settlers worked all night and constructed the two shacks, a kitchen, a dining room and a synagogue, and half of a stone structure. The ‘settlement’ thus formed followed the principles of Kibbutz pioneer settlement seeds: one permanent structure serving for barricading, makeshift housing structures, and communal services indicating the settling of a community. The eighth attempt included “a tent town including all public institutions: kindergarten, school, synagogue, clinic, communal kitchen. The main square was named “Zionism square”. Complete prefabricated structures were brought by trucks to serve the girls’ residence, Yeshiva and synagogue. The settlement remained through the weekend and attracted large crowds of supporters”.

The eighth attempt, made in November 1975, was successful: the settlers reached an agreement with the Minister of Defense in charge of the military regime of the West Bank, which allowed the settlers to remain in Samaria in the IDF army camp near Kedum. The ‘ascent to Sebastia’ was a founding event in the history of Jewish settlement in the West Bank.

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Sebastia was a tent-based settlement, repeatedly formed by the settlers and dismantled by the IDF. The tents serving the settlers were basic tents based on three poles and one piece of waterproof fabric, hooked to the ground with six nails, forming triangular-shaped dwelling structures (fig. 8.44, 8.50, 8.51). “We washed the kids with cold water in a manger, adults did not wash much. Our tent had a field toilet and all the tents shared a common kitchen. On Saturdays, hundreds of friends and supporters joined us. We came with many children and formed schools right away. I was the first teacher in Samaria.” recounts Weiss.\textsuperscript{1425} Per the agreement with the IDF, the settlers moved to the Kedum army camp, where they lived in tents and shacks. The settlers, 12 families and dozens of single men, lived in the army base for four months, before the settlement of Kedumin was founded south of the camp in several prefabricated concrete cubical housing called ‘eshkubit’ (8.52).
The West Bank settlement project explicitly used the Kibbutz social framework and the BYOH infrastructure in order to form its 'communal settlement'. The Kibbutz was used by the settlers both as a model for pioneer ‘practical Zionism’ and literally as a settlement model.\textsuperscript{1426} When forming the permanent settlement, however, the settlers found the BYOH framework most appropriate for their purposes. Settlers see themselves as followers of the Kibbutz in leading the ethos of pioneer settlement in Israeli society.\textsuperscript{1427} The settlement of the Biblical lands of the West Bank was framed by settlers as an opportunity to create a model society, superior in ideology and practice to the society in Israel-proper. Naturally, the settlers viewed themselves as superior to the local Palestinians, whose relationship to the land dated back 600 years at best and was not granted by God via the Bible. The settlers defined their settlement type a “communal settlement” pertaining, too, to the original model of the Kibbutz in terms of ideology, layout, and use of attached houses. At the same time, the “communal settlement” is based on the BYOH framework according to which each family builds its own house on its plot of land. The settlement project was supported by the Israeli right wing from the very start, with right-wing leaders (including MP Menachem Begin) figuring as active supporters of the Sebastia settlement. Upon rising to power in 1977, the right wing regime supported the settlers with incentives such as land allocation, loans for housing, and physical and social infrastructure.\textsuperscript{1428} Unlike in the Kibbutz, the “communal” aspect of the West Bank settlement was not centered on economic cultivation of the land but on a religious relation to it, based on performing the divide edict to settle the Biblical lands. West Bank settlements never aspired or assumed to be agricultural. Their hold on the land was framed since the early ascents to Sebastia as one based on residency rather than cultivation. Most settlers are employed in services either within the settlement or in the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas. Houses are privately owned and developed and do not include fields or subsistence farms. Houses are single-families - that is, the community does not interfere in the realm of the family, much like in BYOH neighborhoods across the country.\textsuperscript{1429} At the same time, unlike BYOH, spaces serving social communal practices are developed and owned collectively. Such spaces are community and infant centers, synagogues and the educational facilities surrounding them. In many settlements there is a civilian security association formed by the dwellers, who share responsibility for protecting the settlement in addition to the army.

\textsuperscript{1426} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1427} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1429} State archive, Elon More BYOH file.
The withdrawal of state government from the settlements is primarily in the realm of settlement formation. New neighborhoods in the settlements, as well as new settlement strongholds, are not designed by the state but rather initiated and embarked on by the settlers, followed by formal planning the state to follow and sustain the settlements with infrastructure and military defense. Violence and the resistance of Palestinians to the settlement project are exploited by the settlers as reasons for forming new neighborhoods and settlements. For example, Kedumim’s new neighborhood of Maale Yishai is an extension to the settlement on a nearby hill named after one of its dwellers who was killed on duty (fig. 8.56, 8.57).

The BYOH framework enabled the settlements to demand that the state provide them with infrastructure, site development, roads and substantial financing for homebuilding. While not residing within the territory of the state, the settlers nevertheless demanded, and received, state financing in the BYOH framework. The housing constructed and developed in this framework were generally not much different from Zamud houses in BYOH neighborhoods across the country in terms of size or architecture. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the settlement and the occupation itself were embodied in the Zamud house of the settlement (fig. 8.60). Critique of the settlements focuses on the
tension between their proclaimed ideological rationale and their BYOH privileged housing (fig. 8.58, 8.59). The new discourse on the settlements, largely arising in the wake of the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, defines them as “suburban.” The “suburban” argument is used to reject the settlers’ self-definition as ideological, and consequently to reject the figuration of the settlement project as a direct descendant to the pioneer ethos of the Kibbutz, which all strata in society adhere to. If the settlements are indeed not ideological but about quality of life and self-gain – then there is no hindrance to dismantle them.1430

In “colonization as suburbanization: the politics of the land market at the frontier,”1431 Newman expands on Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal’s discussion of the West Bank settlements as “civilian occupation.”1432 Weizman and Segal discussed the settlement location on hilltops as an “architecture of verticality,” a measure making the civilian into a colonial fort, equating the settlements with military posts. Newman’s critique of settlement architecture, on the other hand, discusses the relation of motherland-colony in the language of city-suburb. Since there is no real distance between Israel as the “motherland” and the settlements as “colonies,” with commuting to Tel Aviv an everyday, common practice, the settlements should be viewed as having the same purpose as suburbanization: “namely, socioeconomic advancement,” rather than the ideological purpose of colonies.1433 Since many development town dwellers, right-wing voters anyway, were offered better conditions (in real-estate market logic) for achieving the “attached home” dream in the settlements compared to BYOH in the towns, Newman claims that the settlements are more about improving quality of life than about ideology. “If suburbanization, i.e. socioeconomic advancement, played a major part in making the

1430 Newman, "Colonization as Suburbanization.”.
1431 Ibid.
1433 Newman, "Colonization as Suburbanization.”, p. 120.
settlement process possible despite its explicit political objectives, perhaps the reverse is possible: changes in patterns of Israeli suburbanization could bring about a decline in settlement, political processes notwithstanding.¹⁴³⁴

Critique of the strongholds, or seeds for future settlements, which include primarily trailers and makeshift housing, focuses on them as violation of the land. The stronghold requires vast infrastructure development to maintain them and additional army units to protect them, thereby involving the state in the act of settlement. The original Sebastia state-settler framework in which the state follows suit and supports settlement after the effect enabled both state and settlers to seemingly disconnect the practice of settlement from political decision-making and thereby make the settlement project possible.¹⁴³⁵ The differentiated housing of the West Bank settlement therefore marks settlers not only as a state within a state, as was the case with privileged segments of Israeli society before, but as extending the territory of the state by demanding that it service them wherever they dwell, while rejecting state sovereignty over them on the grounds that the true sovereign dictating their actions is God.

Fig. 8.61, 8.62 Settlement strongholds. Source: Weizman, 2007

The accession of the national-religious public, traditionally marginal to the Zionist ethos, into the Zamud elite came at the expense of the BYOH neighborhoods in development towns all over the country, including the Hazavim neighborhood of Arad. The development towns, given full governmental support for a decade, were increasingly deserted (again) for allocation of state resources for the settlement project of West Bank and Gaza. The towns experienced a new process of degeneration, hitting hardest the most peripheral towns which lacked employment sources and to which the new immigration waves of Russian and Ethiopian Jews were directed in the 1990s. Arad in particular experienced a dramatic decline in its social status and faces phenomena of poverty and crime.¹⁴³⁶

8.6 **Oppositions to the Zamud differentiated public housing project**

Several (albeit contradictory) attempts have been made to counter the association of Zamud housing with proper citizenship. Some of these attempts were conscious ones, predominantly those made by Arab-Palestinian citizens of the state, while others—even the suburbanization of the Moshav by the affluent classes—have been unconscious of their erosive effect on the Zamud principle and model. Nonetheless, the

¹⁴³⁴ Ibid.
principle of Zamud housing serving the ‘good-citizen’ milieu has been eroded by several processes since the early 1980s, culminating in the explicit rejection of Zamud housing by the mass 2011 public protest movement.

8.6.1 Bauhaus: rehabilitation of the urban apartment house

In response to Tel Aviv’s loss of population and national importance due to the settlement and BYOH projects, the architectural community embarked on a rehabilitation project of the urban apartment house. This professional-led project is of course associated with the exclusion of architects and planners from design of the Israeli landscape, but was enthusiastically embraced by the urban public in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. This process involved purifying the image of the city in Israeli culture and reinventing its historical role in the formation of the nation.

The pivotal event setting this historical process in motion was an exhibition titled “Tel Aviv – White City” at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art in 1984, curated by architecture historian Michael Levin, presenting a historical study and beautiful images of details of modern buildings, until then considered ugly and degenerate. The “White City” exhibition celebrated Tel Aviv’s “international style” architecture of 1920s and 1930s, tied it to the Bauhaus school, and presented it as Tel Aviv’s contribution to the Modern legacy of Zionism. “Bauhaus” was an invented architectural style, made up by identifying certain modernist architectural features in Tel Aviv’s urban fabric of the 1930s and 1940s. These features, including some or all of Le Corbusier’s Five Points of Modern Architecture (piloti columns, flat roofs, ribbon windows, free façade and open floor plans), and design by German architects (especially Bauhaus graduates), were canonized and declared worthy of preservation as a cultural asset, well-translated to real-estate value.

Tel Aviv thus embarked on a long process of preservation and iconization, both of specific buildings and of the urban fabric of its center, through mapping, municipal position papers, conferences, posters and stamps, school curricula, festivals and celebrations. This rehabilitation process included both Tel Aviv’s modern urban planning and its building block, the apartment house. The results of this process include, for example, the transformation of Patrick Geddes, planner of Tel Aviv’s 1923 master plan, from an obscure figure to a household name and a figure in school plays. In 2003, after years of lobbying, UNESCO declared Tel Aviv’s urban fabric and 4000 international-style buildings as a world heritage site. The involvement of citizens in this process can be seen in the activity of a group of dedicated citizens which has taken upon itself to maintain the cleanliness of the “White City” plaques on city sidewalks, periodically cleaning them themselves using home-cleaning products and toothbrushes, signifying that for these city-citizens the city or at least its symbols should be cleaned like their own bathrooms (fig. 8.67, 8.68). This purification process has influenced the scholarly discourse of Tel Aviv which since then has centered on modernism, and even critiques of

1438 Nitzan-Shiftan, "White Washed Houses."
1439 Zandberg, 1990
1440 http://www.flickr.com/photos/yoavlerman/608837166/in/set-72157600460273602/
Tel Aviv focus on it as a “modern” city. Mark LeVine, for example, focuses on the modern identity of Tel Aviv, marking it as a modern-colonial Zionist project as opposed to “authentic” Jaffa.

![Fig. 8.63, 8.64 Dizengoff square, Tel Aviv, 1947. Photography: Molovinski](image1)

![Fig. 8.65, 8.66, Renovated houses in Tel Aviv Fig. 8.67, 8.68 Tel Aviv citizens cleaning UNESCO plaque.](image2)

In 2000, yet another exhibition at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art served the purification of another urban Israeli typology – the development town. “The Israeli Project” exhibition, curated by Zvi Efrat, rediscovered the “architecture of nation-building” of the 1950s and 1960s, the grand project of which were the development towns. The exhibition presented images of the “ugly” mega-block housing and public buildings of the 1950s as heroic. The aesthetics of clean lines, gray concrete made white–and-black under the desert sun, was linked to that of the White City by use of similar iconography of documentation. This perspective on development-town architecture, much condemned since the 1950s for being the regime’s handmaiden in marginalizing Mizrahim, was celebrated as controversial and critical, but in fact proved to be instantly accepted by professionals and the “educated public.” Efrat, for whom this research was a (never finished) dissertation, was embraced by the “fathers of Israeli architecture” whom he praised. Embracing the 1950s architecture of nation-building was explicitly placed in its political context, calling to rehabilitate the citizenry-led nation-building project rather than the elite-led settlement project. “For 40 years the architecture of the ‘Israel project’ was neglected, no doubt due to political and ideological reasons. The race for building new settlements and infrastructure in the West Bank as well as within Israel left it behind, abandoned and rejected.”

Due to the logic of differentiated housing in Israeli society, according to which the public is divided into elite and masses, rehabilitation of the urban apartment

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1442 Zandberg, 2009.
house is made in explicit rejection of Zamud housing in BYOH and the settlements, and in a call to renew the housing-based contract between the state and its mass citizenry, rather than relegate it to the settler elite alone.\footnote{The rehabilitation of the apartment house is further discussed in the conclusion to this dissertation.}

8.6.2 ‘Estate’ and ‘Expansion’ Moshav housing: Disconnecting Zionist ideology from Zamud housing

In addition to the explicit resistance offered by urban apartment houses to the Zamud ‘good housing,’ another substantial erosion of Zamud was its ideological hollowing-out by rich and middle-class suburbanites. While not an explicit opposition to the ethos of Zamud ‘good housing,’ the transformation of pioneer-heroic agricultural settlements to bourgeois, quality-of-life suburbs eroded the close relationship of ‘good citizen’ with ‘good’ Zamud housing.

Following the integration of large segments of Israeli society into Zamud housing, Israel’s rich and upper middle classes started to seek access to Zamud housing as well. These two populations both identified the Moshav rural settlement as the framework which could provide them Zamud access based on the BYOH framework upon agricultural land. The Moshav lent itself to these forms of housing due to two housing categories embedded in its framework: agricultural estates and the historical inclusion of non-farmer professionals like doctors, schoolteachers, and agronomists in the Moshav community. The Moshav thus enables access to Zamud housing for suburbanites through liquidation of agricultural land in the framework of “professionals’ housing” in the agricultural community, as well as through direct access to vast agricultural plots, purchased by Israel’s wealthy for the formation of vast estates serving a landed elite. In both cases, Moshav housing transforms its pioneer egalitarian housing environment to one of the most differentiated housing environments in Israel, comprising minimal immigrant housing on agricultural plots, new villas, and vast estates.\footnote{Social Differences in Israel}

The Moshav settlement model, the ‘younger brother’ of the Kibbutz, was formed as an agricultural settlement form posited on the Zionist idea of gaining hold of the homeland through land cultivation. As a settlement form, the Moshav is a product of two historical periods. The first Moshav settlements were formed in the 1920s as a less-cooperative alternative to the Kibbutz. The first Moshav of Nahalal was founded in 1921 in the Jazreel valley on the basis of Kauffmann’s iconic oval design.\footnote{Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment. For further discussion of Kauffman and the Jazreel Valley settlement, see chapter 4.} The Moshav framework was posited on the family unit (rather than on the individual as in the Kibbutz) and on a strict division between private and cooperative. Moshav members
shared public services located at the center of the settlement, and as a cooperative the Moshav featured collective responsibility for the land assigned to it by the settling agencies (primarily the JNF). Unlike the Kibbutz, however, the Moshav was parcelled out into equal-sized plots assigned to individual families. Each family plot included three components: the house plot, attached fields for orchards and small-scale agriculture, and more distant fields for large-scale cultivation. Kauffmann’s plan for Nahalal arranges these land functions in concentric radial areas (fig. ?). This model of villager plots composed of three units (house, attached agricultural land and fields) characterizes the Moshav to this day.  

The second wave of Moshav formation took place immediately following Israel’s independence. The settling agencies, namely the state and the JA, considered the Moshav settlement form as most appropriate for agricultural settlement of immigrants, and 270 immigrant Moshav settlements were founded across the country.  

Various planning schemes were experimented with over the years to adapt field size to mechanized agricultural production. Moshav settlements enjoyed the prestige and social clout associated with pioneer land cultivation, granting them the status of ‘salt of the earth’ Sabras. On the other hand, however, as most Moshav settlements were peripheral immigrant settlements, Moshav life was also associated with poverty, isolation, and desperation.

Fig. 8.69 Moshav Ram-On in the Taanach, Jazreel Valley, 1965. Source: Ram-On.  
Fig. 8.70 Nahalal, 1930s. Source: Bitmuna.

Moshav Bnei Zion (literally “The Sons of Zion”) was founded by the JA as a village in 1947 in the Sharon plain north of Raanana for the purpose of settling Jews in agricultural settlements. Bnei Zion was founded during the strained period of violent Arab-Jewish conflict in an attempt to influence the boundaries of the future state via settlement. The land, 75 hectares, was purchased by the JNF and settled as a cooperative agricultural society. Its initial housing was in wooden shacks and one concrete ‘security structure’ in

\[ \text{\footnotesize 1446} \] Scholars associate Kauffman’s design of Nahalal with other twentieth-century designs of ideal settlements, primarily in Europe. See ibid.  
\[ \text{\footnotesize 1447} \] See chapter 7 above for further discussion of the immigrant Moshav.  
\[ \text{\footnotesize 1448} \] Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment.  
\[ \text{\footnotesize 1449} \] Almog, The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew.  
the model seen for Kibbutz settlements in the 1920s. Subsequently, permanent concrete-block houses for the first 12 families were constructed by the Rasco construction company.

Each family plot in Bnei Zion is composed of a housing plot (fig. ?, marked in orange) with attached agricultural fields (fig. ?, marked with diagonal green stripes). Following independence, Bnei Zion absorbed new settlers, primarily Holocaust survivors and illegal immigrants released by the British, to include 84 agricultural farms and 24 subsistence farms.

Starting in the mid-1990s, Israel’s wealthy families began to purchase agricultural plots in Bnei Zion for erecting luxurious estates. The nature of the Bnei Zion plot, which includes agricultural land attached to the house plot, has enabled the formation of private estates of one hectare, with ‘agricultural’ land serving as vast gardens. Sheri Arison, the wealthiest individual in Israel, purchased a large plot in the Moshav in 1996, upon which she constructed a vast mansion (fig. 8.74-8.77). The plot, previously housing three small structures and fruit trees, was redesigned to include one estate with a swimming pool.

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1451 See chapter 2 of this dissertation.
1452 Bnei Zion heritage center.
1453 Bnei Zion heritage center. Bnei Zion plan. ILA.
1454 Listed among the world’s 50 wealthiest people by Forbes 2010.
pool, lawns and a horse stable. The vast plot enabled the construction of a vast house, based on the principle of house size determined as percentage of the total land parcel. Architect Amir, who designed the Arison mansion, states that it sizes 1050 square meters, which makes it “the largest private house built according to construction building code in the rural sector in Israel.” Amir defines the design principles for the Arison mansion to be the appearance of modesty, which dictated separation of the house to two wings and leveling the ground so as to make it seem from the street like two separate structures of one storey each. The wings are connected in the lower floor by a communal space with a glass façade overlooking the pool, lawn, and stable. The construction of ‘estate housing,’ rather than expensive urban penthouses or villas, provides their owners with the ability to connect to the romantic ethos of agricultural rootedness in the land and to the status of social vanguard, while distinguishing themselves from ‘regular’ zamud.

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1456 Ibid.
The upper middle class, too, previously residing in urban apartments, found the Moshav to be an apposite framework for gaining access to Zamud housing. Compared to the very rich, the middle and upper middle class were unable to purchase agricultural estates in the center of the country. The options available to them were therefore agricultural estates in Moshav settlements in the country’s periphery or ‘extension’ house plots in Moshav settlements, de-facto suburbs in the center of the country. The bulk of this social segment purchased small residential plots upon which to self-design their Zamud homes in the BYOH tradition. The closer the Moshav to the Tel Aviv metropolitan center, the more expansive the housing plot, and with it the resident’s marker as ‘successful.’ ‘Expansion’ is a planning term used in Israel for non-agricultural extensions to rural settlements, primarily Moshav settlements, for the purpose of Zamud housing construction. Moshav Amikam, for example, has been expanded three times between 1988 and 2005. Expansions include liquidation of agricultural land for homebuilding by subdivision to plots of 0.05 to 0.03 hectares. Houses can size up to 40%
of the plot area, in one or two floors, forming small urban villas with small yards. Amikam (literally ‘my people has arisen’) was founded as an immigrant Moshav in 1950 by the JA on JNF land as part of a cluster of three Moshav settlements in the Carmel area. Part of its members still engage in agriculture and its first (1988) expansion was issued to add more agricultural plots for ‘continuing sons,’ the next generation of Moshav farmers who wished to continue living in Amikam as farmers (fig. 8.79).

The second and third expansions of Amikam (1996, 2005) are additions of non-agricultural plots for construction of housing in the BYOH framework, used in the Moshav context as housing plots for self-design and contracting of the house. These plots are marketed to Moshav ‘continuing sons’ who do not wish to provide as farmers and to families outside the Moshav who wish to build a Zamud house in a Moshav rural environment. ‘Expansion’ Zamud housing transposes the BYOH template onto agricultural land. While not enjoying the financial framework of the public-housing BYOH, a Moshav extension house bestowed upon its dweller the prestige of the old settler elite, for whom Moshav rural settlements in the vicinity of Tel Aviv, like Bnei Zion and Amikam, constituted border pioneer locations in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. While Moshav houses are rarely autoconstructed in the sense of self-building, dwellers are very involved in every decision regarding the design of their house. Choices of architect and design, materials and colors, building elements and details are viewed to reflect on their dwellers’ personality and identity (fig 8.83, 8.84). The architecture of ‘expansion’ Zamud housing is invested in distancing its resident from the plain, economical Moshav house and demonstrating their dwellers’ personalities, identities, and social success. The most notorious such house is the ‘Galant Castle’ in Moshav Amikam, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, condemned by the general public for corrupting the Moshav ethos with its flashy and exaggerated architectural design. It is a pivotal case for discussion of the Moshav as a site of differentiated housing.

Fig. 8.83, 8.84 Moshav Sde Warburg, 2006. Old original house in the front and new house at the back, as seen from its window (old house to be removed). Source: Sharon Gal.

Fig. 8.85 The ‘Galant Castle’ in Amikam, 2010. Source: Ha’aretz.
Fig. 8.86 Amikam plan (detail). Source: ILA.
Note the difference in scale and typology from the neighboring houses.
While not supported by the state housing regime in terms of infrastructure and services, the Moshav expansions are supported by the state housing regime by way of liquidating state-managed national land designated for agriculture for the construction of private housing and private estates. This process of privatizing national land for the upper classes comes at the expense of the rest of the public, which can no longer afford to live in what have became de-facto gated communities. Moshav expansions for the wealthy and upper middle class generated a gentrification process in agricultural settlements in the center of the country, transforming the landscape of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.\footnote{1457} This process came on top of the devastation of agricultural settlements in the 1980s as a result of the state’s cynical withdrawal from them. Furthermore, the formation of urban suburbs in agricultural settlements rather than BYOH neighborhoods in development towns and urban apartment houses in towns and cities has extracted strong urban population from the urban centers rather than rejuvenating them, thereby further intensifying the differentiation marked by Zamud housing between rural suburban from urban citizenry.

### 8.6.3 National opposition to differentiated housing: Summuud Arab-Palestinian housing

As integration into Israeli society involves access to the Zamud house, this process was very different for the state’s Arab-Palestinian citizenry. Palestinian pre-Nakba housing was ‘proper’ in the basic sense of being upon the land and under the sky, thereby suggesting that their residents might qualify as ‘proper’ Israeli citizens. This housing therefore posed a serious challenge to the Israeli state housing regime. Whereas the state assumes the role of mediating the relationship between the Jewish people and the holy land it resists mediating such a relationship for its non-Zionist Arab-Palestinian citizenry.\footnote{1458} The latter thus lived in de-facto ‘proper housing’ unsupported by the state housing regime. In practice, this means no allocation of land for new houses, no support of infrastructure and social services, and tearing down any “illegally constructed” new rooted houses.

The regime governing Arab-Palestinian housing is thus the bottom-up Summuud – Arabic for ‘clinging to the land to resist being swept away’ – which involves practices of constructing one’s house on top of or behind the family home or on family-owned agricultural land. Palestinian housing in the age of Israeli sovereignty is subject to land confiscations and movement limitations which led to dramatic densification and urbanization of Summuud, and consolidation of a new Palestinian housing form. In order to remain in one’s village and resist being swept away, Summuud housing strategy posited constructing one’s house on top of or behind the family home. The pivotal case of the village of Mazraa in the Western Galilee, examined in detail in chapter 7, serves my examination of these three housing forms and their consolidation into one overarching housing strategy enabling Arab-Palestinian Israelis’ ‘resistance to being swept away’. Refugee camp housing is discussed in this chapter as the glaringly opposed alternative to Summuud, whose consequences serve as a warning sign for Arab-Palestinian Israeli

\footnote{1457} Israel 2020 Master Plan. Institute for City and Regional Research, Technion. \footnote{1458} Nitzan-Shiftan, “The Israeli’place’in East Jerusalem: How Israeli Architects Appropriated the Palestinian Aesthetic after The’67 War.”; ibid.
citizens and highly influence Summuud housing practices. Examination of remaining, returnee, and internally displaced housing in Mazraa makes apparent that Summuud housing solutions galvanized into political ideology.

Fig. 8.87, 8.88 The village of Kabul in the Western Galilee. Source: Alon archive.

The formation and consolidation of Summuud as a means to maintaining one’s identity and relationship to the homeland, led to intense housing densification and to dramatic alterations of the Israeli Arab-Palestinian house and settlement forms. As chapter 7 shows, the factor determining housing densification in the villages is acute shortage of lands, the result of mass nationalization of lands by the state. Land nationalization was not a single event of post-1948 state independence. Rather, Arab-Palestinian private agricultural land, especially in the Galilee, has been nationalized for the purpose of Jewish settlement well into the 1980s. The combined processes of loss of land, densification of Arab-Palestinian villages due to the freezing of liquidation of private agricultural land for housing, and the allocation of confiscated land for Jewish housing, ignited a mass protest movement among the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel. In 1976, following the announcement of another expropriation of 2,000 hectares of private Arab land in the Galilee for the enlargement of the development town of Karmiel, mass demonstrations erupted on March 30th under the banner of ‘day of the land.’ Six Arab-Palestinians were killed in confrontations with the police in the first Day of the Land in 1976.

The violent protests took on national proportions in response to the explicit ideological purpose of the expropriation, defined in the 1975 master plan for Galilee Development as ‘Judaization of the Galilee’. The goals of the 1975 master plan were defined as follows: “the special problem of the Galilee is the scant Jewish population in comparison with the non-Jewish population. In 1973, 62,000 Jews lived in the Galilee, compared to 147,000 non-Jews. This present demographic condition should be changed via long-term planning schemes.”

1459 Yiftachel, "Day of the Land."
Social unrest among the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel has been read in national terms as a Palestinian national opposition to Jewish national domination of the shared homeland. This national reading of political demands to be serviced by the state as equal citizens has become inevitable following the violent ‘October 2000 Events,’ protests in support of the second Palestinian Intifada or uprising in the West Bank. Violent clashes with the police culminated in the death of 14 citizens, 13 of them Arab-Palestinians. While the role of land in the formation and fermentation of social unrest among the Arab-

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Palestinian public could not be ignored, the role of housing densification and typological transformation has not been well addressed. Demands for access to housing, to be realized either through the liquidation of agricultural land for dwelling neighborhoods as in the case of Mazraa or through resistance to demolitions of housing and housing additions built without permits, have been conducted since 2000 under the banner of Palestinian nationalism. The January 2007 demonstrations in Jaffa in resistance to such demolition of housing populated by Arab-Palestinian citizens included demonstrations and processions where Palestinian flags were presented in order to oppose the state’s definition of Arab-Palestinian Summud housing as ‘illegal.’ Housing demolitions in Jaffa were indeed postponed following this opposition.\(^{1463}\)

![Demonstration in Jaffa, January 13, 2007. Source: Ha’aretz.](image)

8.6.4 Disengagement from Zamud

The strongest opposition to Zamud as a national housing of pioneer Zionists since the foundation of the State of Israel was made by the state itself. In 2005, the Ariel Sharon government ‘disengaged’ from the Gaza strip by removing all Israeli settlements and tearing down all their structures. The fiercest battles between settlers and state army and police forces involved not the symbolic structures of synagogues and regional government buildings, but the houses of the residents. As seen in fig. 8.60 above, settler houses were understood by both Palestinians and the settlers themselves as the built environment enabling Jewish hold of the Gaza strip. Houses were barricaded in and barb wired to prevent their evacuation and destruction. In order to prevent settlers from attempting to go back to their homes, the Israeli state decided to tear down all houses before handing down the territory to Palestinian hands. The loss of private and home therefore became the settler narrative regarding the disengagement.\(^{1466}\)

\(^{1463}\) Ha’aretz. January 10, 2007.

\(^{1466}\) Survey report conducted for the Knesset parliament by the ‘Maagar Mohot’ survey research company, 2008.
By tearing down Zamud housing of the settler elite, the state made a strong statement regarding it’s ‘disengagement’ from this pioneer national elite. Facing state rejection of the settler ethos and leading role in Israeli society, the dislocated community conditioned their removal from Gaza with access to Zamud houses within Israel. The state-settler settlement agreement included meeting settler demands to be re-housed in Zamud houses rather than in urban apartments. In addition to allocation of funds and of land for erecting proper Zamud houses, removed settlers insisted to be housed in Zamud housing also till their new homes would be completed. They were therefore housed in temporary Zamud mobile homes, termed ‘cara-villa’, are ‘ugly’ housing due to their temporality and basic amenities yet they reflect the settlers’ insistence not to live in Zamud dwellings upon the land and under the sky in order to mark themselves as still part of the elite of Israeli society.\footnote{Ido Efrati, "Housing Evacuees in Cara-Villas - Money Throught Away," \textit{Yedioth Aharonot}, May 27 2005.}

A case in point is the evacuated settlers of the Azmona settlement in the Gaza strip who chose to join, as a community, the degenerate Kibbutz of Shomria in the Negev desert. Shomria, a Kibbutz of the HaShomer HaZair movement, was founded in 1985 to mark 70 years to the movement. In 2005 it numbered 23 people and was virtually dysfunctional, a symbol of Kibbutz social and economic deterioration. The Amona settlers’ decision to re-settle upon the land as pioneers in Shomria, including the requirement to formally join the leftist Kibbutz movement, signifies their insistence to mark themselves as last in a chain of pioneer settlers.\footnote{Uri Heitner, "A Dead Kibbutz or a Live Settlement?," \textit{Shavim}, April 12 2005.} Nonetheless, as many vacated settlers still live in ‘ugly’ cara-villas 6 years after the disengagement, many of them claim that the state has deserted...
them and is not interested in rehabilitating them as elite proper citizens, especially as the state responds to 2011 housing-based social protest.  

8.7 Conclusion

Chapter 8 provides a capsule history of the consolidation of differentiated citizenship in Israeli society by way of differentiated access to housing. It provides a ‘thin’ history of access of various segments of Israeli society to Zamud ‘good housing’ as a means for inclusion in the Israeli elite, while excluding the rest of society from it. It includes a review of the differentiated Kibbutz veteran housing, Maabara immigrant housing, immigrant mass housing blocks, Zamud veteran-citizen housing, the Build Your Own House housing program, the West Bank settlement project, rehabilitation of the Bauhaus apartment house, ‘expansion’ Moshav housing, and Arab-Palestinian Sumud housing.

The Israeli ‘good house,’ used prior to state sovereignty in order to materialize Jewish nationalism and base its future sovereign polity on equality and justice, was transformed by the state housing regime into a system of differentiated allocation of housing, marking a system of differentiated citizenship. Social struggles between segments of Israeli society over hegemonic domination of the state’s ideology and policy have been struggles over access to the ‘good’ Zamud housing. Differentiated citizenship produced by differentiated access to ‘good housing’ has become dangerous for Israeli society. While scholars of the BYOH project identify it as a gradual inclusion of more segments of Israeli society into the ‘good citizen’ milieu, this chapter’s historical review of the phenomenon demonstrates that integration of a new public into Zamud is always at the expense of the previous elite. The pyramidal structure of elite-mass differentiated citizenship is stable and its top is narrow. The elite-mass logic of differentiated citizenship is consolidated and manifested by state control of the resources required for settlement: land and population. None of the publics introduced to Zamud demanded universal inclusion in Zamud, but rather their own inclusion in it as a differentiated elite.

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1470 See for example Shadar, "On the House and the Landlord.".
The result of this process is an erosion of solidarity in Israeli society and its collective polity. This collective polity is replaced by an archipelago of competing polities fighting with each other over the state’s resources and over the position of ‘proper’ regime-supporting elite.

The housing-based social reform movement of 2011, however, proposes a rethinking of the mechanism of differentiated housing and the nature of the ‘good Israeli house’. This housing-based reform, discussed in the epilogue for this dissertation, proposes a dramatic change in the state-citizen contract in Israel as well as in its social fabric and terms of nationalism. Concrete challenges made by the movement on the Zamud housing type, posing it as elite rather than popular national housing, threatens to change the Israeli built environment and proposes surprising alliances between unlikely groups of citizens.
Afterward:
For the Nation Yet to Come

AbdouMaliq Simone’s influential study of African cities, “For the City Yet to Come,” stayed at the back of my head while writing this dissertation. As my research deals with housing and the nation-state, rather than with infrastructure and the city, it seemed that Simone’s work would not significantly contribute to my study. Yet the opening line of his book, “African cities don’t work,” kept resonating in my study of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, continuously studied as dysfunctional, ill-formed, and producing “horrifying” circumstances. Simone’s work identifies forms of social collaboration in four African cities as the infrastructure that continuously remakes them and enables them to ‘work.’ It seems to me that in a broad sense the goals of this research resonate with Simone’s: Like Simone’s, my research points to an object of inquiry missing from the purview of scholarship – namely, to housing as the mechanism by which the Zionist and Palestinian nation-building projects are continuously formed.

How come Israel-Palestine is still puzzling and frustrating for scholars and the public after so much research and debate? Why is Israel-Palestine still the focus of great academic and popular attention after so much has already been written about it? Why is it so interesting, captivating people all over the world and subject to endless frustrating attempts to figure it out? What is it about it that defies ‘proper’ processes: Why does it not die out like all other cases of colonialism? Why does it not end like other racist regimes, for example South-African Apartheid? How does this fragmented and discriminatory social structure maintain itself as a parliamentary democracy, ‘real’ or ‘fake’? And how, despite the permanent violence it is afflicted by, does it remain a desirable place to live, with housing real-estate valued like New York’s?

Scholarship has proposed a number of compelling answers for these and other questions regarding Israeli-Palestinian reality. Yet the answers provided do not seem to satisfy us: we still seem to pose the same questions about it. Zionism and its materialization in the form of a nation-state are still for many an incomprehensible phenomenon, sometimes defined using helpless (i.e. non-analytical) terms like “horrifying” by distinguished scholars like Derek Gregory. The “horrifying” terminology suggests the locus of the flaw to be in the case study itself, yet I posit that the flaw is rather in the tools of inquiry employed to study it: we still seem to address Israel-Palestine with the same analytical frameworks providing answers we are not satisfied with. The fact that we are continuously frustrated with this case study for not fitting into our elsewhere-applicable analytical models indicates not that it is ‘flawed,’ but rather that our scholarly analysis of it is lacking. Israel-Palestine is still a puzzle, I suggest, since the existing answers are partial. They are therefore perhaps compelling - but nevertheless flawed.

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This flaw is methodological rather than theoretical. The crux of the problem lies in the analytical focus on the wrong objects of inquiry. The object of study commonly identified for Israel-Palestine is ‘conflict,’ understood in normative terms as undesirable and in need of ‘solving.’ However, Chantal Mouffe’s seminal work on the political identifies conflict as central to the very formation of a polity. Agonism, ‘a conflict that cannot be resolved,’ suggests the productive role of conflict in assembling a society based on the object upon which the irresolvable conflict is waged. This object thereby forms a polity out of conflicted social actors by “bringing them together because it divides them.” The irresolvability of the conflict is therefore pointed up by Mouffe as essential to political communities. Mouffe's argument regarding agonism is supported by findings in a number of ethnographic researches by Ong, Chatterjee, Simone, and Caldeira, which describe public spheres throughout the world as formed as a result of agonistic conflict rather than consensus. These studies are commonly framed using Lefebvre’s similar ideas regarding the public sphere as collectively produced as a result of social conflict over it.

This methodological flaw produces a cumulative array of wrong analytical decisions: first, identifying the object of study to be violence, scholars confuse the object and its affect. Even as scholars keep devoting much attention to the workings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to venues for ‘solving’ it, little scholarly effort is directed at identifying the object of conflict, namely the object around which this society forms as a political one. Second, by thinking about conflict as a problematic event – rather than as an inherently agonistic condition – scholars continuously work towards a political ‘solution,’ rather than engaging in a deep scholarly analysis of what is at stake in the case they investigate.

An interesting lesson can be learned from the scholarly study of South Africa, which highlights the important and dangerous role of a scholarly fixation on an object of analysis. Up until the 1980s the study of this society (in South African academia and abroad) focused primarily on issues of class from a Marxist perspective. The lens of class produced many compelling studies explaining South Africa’s social unrest through examination of strikes, unions, and industrial and mining cities. This perspective did identify a problem of inequality and of a deterministic social hierarchy that cannot be overcome without social revolution, and it prevailed for so long because it was compelling. The true mechanism for South Africa’s inequality and later for revolution –

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1476 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception.
1478 Simone, For the City yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities.
1479 Caldeira, "City of Walls."
1480 Lefebvre, The Production of Space.
namely, race – was marginal to the scholarly picture for decades. It was only when scholars realized that the story they were telling was partial – both compelling and wrong at the same time – that they began to look for a fuller story, and a more relevant object of study. The problem with reading South Africa as a class problem was not in the Marxist theoretical perspective used, but in class as the object of study.

As discussed at length throughout this dissertation, I suggest that Israel-Palestine’s is a story of the gain and loss of homeland via the gain and loss of individual housing. Housing is thus the object of agonistic struggle for this case study, around which this society is formed as a polity. This study explores the relationship between nation, citizens, and housing through a historical examination of Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms as regimes of housing. Housing architecture plays a central role in shaping Israeli-Palestinian history, starting with housing-based responses to the Ottoman 1858 land code, which led to the formation of the two national projects replacing empire and competing over the same homeland. The dramatic role of architecture is an analytical lacuna which this dissertation aims to contribute to filling. Pointing to the centrality of home and homeland for the formation of this polity, my study rejects attempts to ‘resolve’ this conflict or to regard its insolvability as ‘pathological,’ paths that lead to no scholarly achievement in understanding Israel-Palestine historically, socially or politically.

As stated above, the flaw identified in the scholarly study of Israel-Palestine is methodological rather than theoretical. Looking at the wrong data with the sharpest theoretical eye is like looking at the landscape with one eye covered. Using the single eye of theory, as sharp and far-sighted as it may be, produces a distorted and confusing image, a two-dimensional image mixing shadows with objects. Opening one’s second eye, that of object, without shifting or moving the theoretical perspective, the view suddenly becomes three-dimensional. Far and close become distinguishable from one another, as are big from small, object from shadow. One hopes that others will come to appreciate the view.

Nationalism as a new humanism

In his seminal The Wretched of the Earth, Franz Fanon discusses postcolonial national rule in the name of the people in Africa as a “white mask” reproducing the practices of Western colonialism. Only a rule by the people and not in their name in the framework of nationalism, Fanon states, can lead to the development of a “new humanism” through a reconciliation between the elite and the people that would generate a genuine authentic national consciousness, based on moral systems that can inform the whole of humanity.

Fanon’s insistence on discussing the new humanism in the framework of nationalism seemed for many years inappropriate given the violence and oppression conducted in the

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1483 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Pr, 2004).
name of nationalism, as recognized by Fanon himself. Phenomena of oppression of the nation’s own people, violence towards national minorities, and the numerous wars among nations have led many social theorists to reject the possibility of a ‘new humanism’ in the framework of the nation-state and to conceive of ways to bypass and evade the nation. Fanon, however, is uncompromising in his statement that only the institution of the nation-state, understood as the only socio-political institution based on the people, can serve as the vehicle for freedom and social justice towards the goal of ‘new humanism.’ The essence of nationalism, according to Fanon, is the will to be sovereign and nothing but it. The resilience of the nation-state in the face of supra- and sub-national social frameworks is rooted in its position as the only social institution based on the rights-bearing and indirectly self-governing citizen. The basic principle of the nation-state as legitimated by its people bears hope for just societies. In other words, the nation-state is the only social institution in the framework of which the individual citizen can claim things as rights. As such it is in the citizen’s interest to maintain the state framework in the face of supra- and sub-state institutions attempting to dismantle it. The possibility for a new humanism in the framework of the nation-state is not proposed by Fanon as an idealistic space of consensus. Rather, Fanon is quite blunt in suggesting this transformation to be one based on conflict, pointing to the productivity of violence, thereby resonating with Mouffe’s work. Can the central role of housing and homeland as the object of conflict for Israel-Palestine potentially be the basis for a ‘new humanist’ nationalism?

Rethinking ‘good housing’
This dissertation is written at the exciting time of early days of social uprising, July 2011. This uprising is exciting for producing images and statements which accept as a given the basic premise this study argues for: Housing is the basic object at stake for Israel-Palestine. What the current protests propose is a reassessment of the Israeli state-citizen contract, based on reasserting housing as the key element of this contract and as the basic right of all citizens. The idea of rule for the people by the people, based on a reconciliation of the elite and the masses that would generate a new understanding of the notion of collective home, excites many in Israeli society today. The social revolution of summer 2011 is not accidentally based on housing. One of its symbols, the Israeli flag with a house replacing its Star of David, makes a clear statement (expressed in words as well) that this social uprising changes the conceptual framework of the Israeli nation-state from one centering on nationalism to one centering on citizenship (fig. 8.93). As citizens – rather than as nationals – protesters demand just access to housing, and thereby to their place upon the homeland and in the social polity. The dramatic consequences of this social struggle is a revolution in the terms of nationhood and belonging which offers an alternative to nationality and religion, the two watershed lines in Israeli society, and replaces them with place-based citizenship. It thus breaks down the Manichean binary of Left and Right and of competing Jewish and Palestinian claims for the homeland, forming unlikely alliances and proposing a dramatically new framework for Israeli politics. Alliances connecting Arab-Palestinian Israelis and ‘white’ middle-class

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professionals as equally ‘native’ and entitled to housing in the homeland, that is to say, as part of the same people, are striking and have never before been conceivable.\textsuperscript{1486}

The deep demand for a new, humanistic contract between state and citizens is publicly proclaimed by protesters throughout Israel. Protesters call, "public services are rights, not commodities. We talk about homes, [the government talks] about real estate"; "this protest is for civil [rather than national] Israel”; "we demand our state back, as a welfare state.” In the Arab towns of Nazareth and Baqua AlGarbia there were protests as well, and protesters stated that "this government should be replaced by a government which would take responsibility for all its citizens."\textsuperscript{1487}

These calls identify housing as the site upon which to call for a change in the basic foundations of the Israeli state. Both Jewish and Palestinian nationals calling for a civil state based on the right for the homeland as the simple right for home is a sharpening, and at the same time a significant change, of the terms at the basis of the Israeli nation-state. “The current social struggle breaks the rules of the game … a new politics emerges which refuses to cooperate with old dichotomies and calls for non-trivial alliances,” Golan writes.\textsuperscript{1488}

The true threat of this uprising, which the settlers and their political milieu have understood from its very beginning, is this the call of this new politics for a nation-state for all citizens based on citizenship and on residency in the homeland, rather than one based on Jewish nationalism. The call for Israelis living abroad to return home and partake in the social struggle demonstrates, too, that dwelling is what enables one to engage and make claims for what is at stake. The protest is a strong, uncompromising statement that Israel, and Palestine, are not about nationalism but about the right for place. This transformation is marked initially and primarily in housing. The primary civil right demanded by protesters – so basic a right that it ignited the largest civil protest in Israel since the 1970’s – was housing. Housing as a place to dwell in, which came with the uncompromising statement that housing is far more than shelter, far more than a roof over one’s head. Housing for the 2011 protesters is a good place to live in, extending to the state as a good place to live in: where good health, education, welfare and other services are provided equally to all. The demand for equal service to all segments of society is an undeniable call for a citizen-based polity, the true sovereign of the nation-state.

\textsuperscript{1486} The Abraham Fund Initiative along with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Report on the Arab Public’s Positions Regarding the Social Protest, presented at a conference November 28, 2011.

\textsuperscript{1487} Statements made at the July 30\textsuperscript{th} mass demonstrations.

\textsuperscript{1488} Haaretz, July 31, 2011.
The social struggle in Israel marks a dramatic change in the understanding of the ‘good house.’ Protesters explicitly critique the Zamud-Summud ‘good house,’ as can be seen in fig. 8.96 of an installation of a sinking Zamud house, having no windows and doors, placed among protesters’ tents on Rothschild Boulevard; or in the ‘apartment house’ tent placed on Rothschild Boulevard (fig. 8.95), with a sign declaring the urban apartment house to be the ‘real dream house.’ As this dissertation shows, the apartment house serves most residents of Arab-Palestinian villages and 90% of the Jewish population. The new civil revolution, calling for the state’s recognition that it belongs to ‘the people,’ is represented in the residential apartment house, termed in Israel the ‘collective house,’ forming a small polity in each residential building. Being part of such a polity, connecting oneself to the people above and below you – rather than connecting to land and sky alone – embodies a very different reading of ‘proper’ dwelling in Israel. It represents collectivism and small-scale direct democracy, a shared fate, and the need to take others into account, principles that have guided Zionist ideology since its early materialization by capitalist revisionists in Tel Aviv or socialist workers in the Kibbutz, yet have been long deserted. Unlike the Mizrahi housing protest and the religious right-wing protest (discussed in chapter 8), both asking for integration into Israeliness via inclusion in the ‘proper’ house milieu, the current housing protest changes the rules of the game by defining a completely different housing form as ‘proper.’ It thereby transforms the terms of the Israeli polity and of the good subject as citizen and proposes a dramatic change in the understanding of the ‘good housing’ typology.

Can the social uprising of 2011 lead to a ‘new humanist’ nationalism in Israel? Could place-based citizenship replace nationalism and religion and become recognized as Israel’s agonistic polity-forming mechanism? Is the housing environment in Israel about to undergo a dramatic transformation, from a system of differentiated citizenship to one based on solidarity for each citizen’s right of access to the homeland? Further study of housing developments is required in order to inform us of this ‘nation yet to come.’
Fig. 8.95 A tent duplex on Rothschild Boulevard, July 2011. Source: Author.
Fig. 8.96 An installation of a ‘sinking’ Zamud house, including a door-less door knob and broken door bell. Rothschild Boulevard, July 2011. Source: Author.
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