PART FOUR:
PROBLEMS OF MODERNIZATION

ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE: VARIATION IN NORTH AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Anthropologists have a healthy respect for the malleability of tradition. Many scholars use the term "traditional" to connote stasis, rigidity, and continuity with the past, but anthropological experience leads one to question that definition. Anthropologists are familiar with tradition that is invented on the spot—invented to legitimate very pragmatic courses of current action. Hence, the use of the past in the present is a phenomenon that needs explanation, in terms of present realities. It is not a simple translation of what was into what is. Any people's past is diverse. It consists of varying behavioral practices, organizational principles, cultural perspectives, and symbolic focal points of meaning, any one of which may be emphasized and called traditional. In the analysis of tradition, the critical question often becomes, Why is tradition as it currently is, phrased in terms of what was in the past, and what are the consequences of such phrasing?

Elizabeth Colson has been one of the foremost anthropologists to stretch our understanding of the variable role of the past in the present. In *Tradition and Contract* (1974), Colson examines the past from the perspective of the contract. Refusing to see the past as chiseled in stone, Colson asks, What from the past is used and why? In a productive examination of the current role of clanship in Africa, Colson views clanship not as "an entity in itself but as a principle of organization which is utilized in a different fashion according to the nature of other institutions existing within a social field" (1974:30).

Colson's social-contract approach proves useful to a reanalysis of the role of "tradition" in independence movements in North Africa. Morocco's independence movement has been labeled "traditional" because it centers on the centuries-old position of the sultanate and upon the wide-spreading voice of Islam. Tunisia's independence movement has been seen as markedly different, its leaders a newly emergent political elite fired by secular nationalist ideology, and its population mobilized through the political structure of the Neo-Destour party.

In the typical interpretation, precolonial Morocco is portrayed as static and rigid, in the grip of the past. Its independence is depicted as a reversion to bygone days, a misbegotten attempt to use the seventh century to address the twentieth. Tunisia's independence movement, by contrast, is seen as modern and progressive, reflecting the relative openness of the society and the popular receptivity to the ideals of the enlightenment.

In reexamining these movements from the perspective of tradition as sociocultural dynamic, it is possible to reverse the typical scholarly interpretation. If, for the moment, in evaluating the nature of precolonial societies, one drops a political evolutionary perspective, it appears that, in fact, precolonial Tunisia was the more rigid, the more highly structured society. Its beylik and its ulama were systematically institutionalized, pragmatically based, and not geared to change. In building an anticolonial movement, Tunisia's structured past was not directly amenable to changing times. Its independence movement arose outside precolonial structures. Precolonial Morocco, on the other hand, was organizationally and ideationally more

fluid. Its diverse and flexible past proved effective in mobilizing a powerful resistance to colonialism. If Moroccos's independence movement must be called traditional, it is because Morocco's tradition was fluid. Whatever the consequences of anticolonial movements on postcolonial realities, both movements were dynamic adaptations to the complexities of the present. If, from the long-term perspective, one wants to argue that Tunisia's anticolonial movement led to a more progressive society, then progression, at least in part, resulted from structure, not flexibility. However, one must be wary of such qualitative evaluations. In the current world, it is difficult to define in the abstract what clearly will lead to long-term economic, social, and political progress. Situationally constructed, post-facto evaluations appear to be the only ones consistently on target. Given global uncertainties, one can only wish these two North African countries, with their great pasts, their complex presents, and their promising futures, the best along the rocky way.

This paper owes a substantial debt to Elbaki Hermassi's impressive work *Leadership and National Development in North Africa* (1972). Hermassi's examination of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial North Africa remains by far the best in the field. Among numerous questions, Hermassi asks, Why did not Morocco develop a nationalist elite of Tunisia's type? Here I ask the complementary question, Why were not Tunisia's precolonial institutions, its beylik and its ulama, capable of carrying the voice of anticolonial dissent? Mine is yet another vantage point from which to approach very complex realities.

MOROCCO AND TUNISIA COMPARED

Morocco and Tunisia make for informative comparison. They share much in common. Both lie on the southern Mediterranean, Morocco to the west, a stone's throw from Spain, separated from the rest of North Africa by the Atlas Mountains. Tunisia lies in the central Mediterranean, not far from Sicily. Historically, both North African countries have served as key points of contact between south and north. Knowledge of ancient Greece entered Europe through Moroccan and Tunisian routes. The two countries share similar environments. In the northern regions, a Mediterranean climate allows the practice of grain and mixed-fruit agriculture. The south is dominated by the Sahara. Both Morocco and Tunisia were brought into the House of Islam by conquests of the 600s and 700s. Their populations are almost totally Islamic. People in both countries ascribe to the Malakite school of law. In the past, the two countries were politically intertwined. The great Moroccan dynasty of the Almohades extended its control to Tunis itself.

In the immediate precolonial era, both countries had hereditary monarchies. A bey presided over Tunisia, a sultan over Morocco. Both countries participated in long-distance commerce, and began the 1800s with favorable balances of trade. However, the increasing penetration of European goods disrupted that balance. Soon the two countries were deeply indebted to Europe. Indebtedness served as the pathway for colonial takeover (Lejri 1974:I:38). Domination began with the French seizure of customs receipts; Tunisia became a French colony in 1881, Morocco in 1912. The respective colonial eras show some similarities. Both countries were protectorates, subject to indirect rather than direct rule. France claimed that its presence was intended to bolster traditional institutions. In administering the countries, France worked through the hereditary dynasties, the beylik in Tunisia, the sultanate in Morocco. In 1954-55, European settlers comprised 3.5% of the Moroccan population and 7.5% of Tunisia's, and controlled 12% of the cultivable land in Morocco and 18% in Tunisia (Hermassi 1972:76, 82). These characteristics radically distinguished Tunisia and Morocco from Algeria. In Algeria, the European settler colony was large (over 10% of the total population) and powerful. Europeans controlled 40% of Algeria's cultivable land (ibid.:76, 82). Direct rule was practiced. The precolonial monarch was deposed within two weeks of the French arrival in 1830.

Despite certain similarities in their colonial eras, Tunisia's and Morocco's independence movements were polar opposites. Tunisia's independence centered on the new—a new elite, a new ideology, and a new organization. The elite were young professionals, members of provincial families of modest means. Their ideology was that of secular nationalism, their organization that of a political party, the Neo-Destour. Islam was noticeable for its absence as the voice of political dissent. Morocco's independence is remarkable in contrast. Its independence centered on the sultanate, a centuries-old politico-religious institution which can be seen as having a millennium of continuity. Islam served as popular mobilizer and voice of political opposition.

Three interrelated interpretations generally are offered to account for these differences. The first centers on the nature of precolonial society. Morocco is depicted as static, as experiencing four centuries of stalemate (e.g., Abun-Nasr 1971a:286; Geertz 1968:48, 54; Gellner 1969:3; Waterbury 1969:16), while Tunisia is seen as changing, especially in the 1800s (L.C. Brown 1974; Hermassi 1972). From very different perspectives Seddon (1977) and Cigar (1981) have tried to reverse the notion of a static precolonial Moroccan society, but the notion dies hard. Scholars of the second perspective view the independence movements as reflecting the differing repercussions of the colonial eras. Tunisia's colonial era was longer, more intense than Morocco's (Abun-Nasr 1971b; Berque 1967; and Moore 1970:38). The third interpretation centers the nature of nationalist movements in the ideological orientation of the political elites. Tunisia's elite is depicted as more progressive, Morocco's as more tied to the past (Halstead 1964 and 1967; Basu 1978).

Whichever standpoint one adopts, Morocco is consistently characterized as a rather fiercely rigid and traditional society which entered the twentieth century in the grip of the past. Morocco's colonial era is judged to have been brief and is not perceived to have struck at the heart of the country's sociopolitical order. The religious orientation of its political elites is thought to reflect the country's traditionalism. Tunisia, on the other hand, is portrayed as the more open society, open before the coming of the French, open after their departure. The short-lived attempt at Constitution (1861-66) and Khayr al-Din's reforms of the 1870s are cited as cases in point. The greater length of the colonial era is thought to have kept Tunisia on its progressive pathway. The secularism of its nationalist elite is seen to reflect Tunisia's modernity.

While not denying the import of structural changes induced by colonialism nor the import of political elite orientation, I would argue that it is informative to reevaluate the independence movements in the context of their reexamined precolonial pasts.

PRECOLONIAL TUNISIA

It is ironic that precolonial Tunisia is so often interpreted as the more flexible society. If one examines specific domains of existence, Tunisia consistently emerges as more rigid. Power was institutionalized. A clear-cut elite existed. Overarching organizational structures dominated the country as a whole.

The Social Order

In terms of social groupings, Tunisia was more stable. Its population was largely sedentary, and consisted of a circumscribed power elite and a subjugated peasantry. The population could be characterized in terms of clearly ranked social groupings. An institutionalized social hierarchy existed, and lines of economic, political, and religious power converged in it (Bill 1972; L.C. Brown 1974; Green 1978). At the top stood the ruling class of the Husainid dynasty, from which the bey emerged. Next came a well-circumscribed high ulama. Next came the middle-rung administrators of mixed Turkish and Arabic descent, and so forth. In

Tunisia, ascribed social status significantly channeled the positions to which one could aspire. Compared to Morocco, social mobility was limited.

The Economic Order

Tunisia's economic order also was systematized. Wealth centered in land. Land was the dynasty's patrimony; members of the dynasty were important landowners in the countryside. The bey could dispose of large stretches of land as he saw fit. The bey granted 100,000 hectares of fertile land, the Enfinda, to his reformist prime minister, Khayr al-Din Pasha (1873-77). In 1877-78 al-Din fell from power. In 1878 he sold the land to a Marseilles company in the scandalous Enfinda affair, and left for Constantinople, where he served briefly as grand vizier (Ziadeh 1969:19).

Religious leaders also were important landowners. Thanks to the institution of *waqf, habous* land, they controlled 25-30% of Tunisia's arable land (Davies 1978). In the nineteenth century the polity as a whole came to depend upon taxes from land and agriculture for its existence while urban areas and commerce were left largely untaxed (Davies 1978).

Religious Organization

Religious organization also was highly institutionalized in precolonial Tunisia. (See Green 1978 for an impressive book-length study of the Tunisian ulama; L.C. Brown 1972 and 1974 are also important.) An "amazingly cohesive and uniform" religious hierarchy encompassed the country as a whole (Brown 1972:54). At the top stood the Hanafi Shaikh al Islam followed by the Maliki mufti. Thereafter came ramified hierarchies of administrative, judicial, and scholarly personnel. Religious personnel can be divided into two tiers, the high- and low-level ulama. High ulama, centered in Tunis, distinguished themselves by position and religious learning as well as by speech and dress. They spoke a formalized version of Arabic. They wore special robes and headgear, a red chechia and a white turban, which signaled their status as religious elite (Green 1978:50).

Entry into the high ulama was restricted, not as restricted as in the Ottoman center but more than in the Moroccan one. While purportedly there existed a systematic bureaucratic route to administrative position, in fact high-level positions were dominated by key families. One of the most striking cases was the al-Bakri family, who had provided the principal imam of Zitouna mosque in unbroken succession for 190 years (Abdullah al-Hidda quoted in L.C. Brown 1972:64). The dominance of key families increased during the 1800s. Five families who occupied 40% of all offices in 1873 controlled 50% of all ulama positions by 1915 (Green 1978:95). The trend was thus toward denying important religious positions to men of humble and provincial birth "while reserving them more and more for scions of Tunisi ulama dynasties and for representatives of the capital's economic and bureaucratic elites" (ibid.).

There was some mobility into the top ulama, but without high-level connections, advancement was slow. One bright scholar, Uthman Ibn al-Makki, had spent ten years as a teaching assistant, and then sixteen years as a second-class professor. When asked when he was likely to be promoted to the first class, al-Makki replied, "After the last cat from the Nayfur household" (ibid.: 91).

An important aspect of Tunisia's religious hierarchy, one which distinguished it from many other Muslim countries, was that the formal leaders incorporated local-level religious manifestations, saints and brotherhoods, into their domain. Courses in mysticism were a regular part of the curriculum of Zitouna mosque/university. Leaders of brotherhoods and heads of saintly lineages attempted to institutionalize their power by sending their sons to Tunis and Zitouna to become members of the learned elite (L.C. Brown 1972). Hence, Tunisia's high

ulama stood at the top of a ramified organizational network which included scholars and administrators as well as saints and sufis.

Religious income, position, and legitimacy were dependent upon pragmatic political power. The bey made religious appointments, dispensed religious incomes, and dismissed religious personnel at will. Although at times the ulama voiced dissent from the bey on minor points, their structural position left them upholding his legitimacy. In Tunisia, one finds none of the forceful opposition of nineteenth-century Iranian ulama. The Iranian religious leadership was also highly institutionalized, but importantly, it was economically independent of political power.

Political Organization

The relative clarity of Tunisia's precolonial economic, social, and religious orders was reflected in as well as dependent upon the political domain. Comparatively speaking, the country was highly centralized and bureaucratized. Tunisia was divided into forty rural and twenty urban administrative units, governed by sixty qaids appointed by the bey (Hermassi 1972:8-55).

Tunisia's centralization occurred during Ottoman times. In the 1500s, thanks to their skill with firepower and their legitimacy as protectors of Muslims against the infidels, the Ottomans established central political orders in many Middle Eastern countries. Tunisia's Husainid dynasty inherited the Ottoman position and remained in the Ottoman camp. During the late 1700s and throughout the 1800s centralization and bureaucratization efforts greatly increased.

Political power emanated from the center, from the bey himself. He monopolized the means of physical coercion, the means of production, the forms of political administration. He controlled the military, made political and religious appointments. Ultimate legislative and judicial authority was his. The degree of control the bey exerted over the peripheries varied in time and place; nonetheless, political power was firmly in his hands.

Although religious and political leadership were intertwined, the bey was not fundamentally a sacred figure. The bey's Islamic legitimacy rested on a single base, on his role as temporal ruler of a state in which Islam could flourish. The position lacked the diverse undergirding that was a part of the Moroccan sultanate. The bey was not the country's spiritual leader. He was not the mediator of God's grace to humanity. He was not *sherif*, lineal descendant of the Prophet. He was not even Arab, for that matter (the Husainids were Turkicized Greeks). The bey was not holy warrior, not caliph. Friday prayers were not said in his name (a gesture reserved for the Ottoman sultan). The bey's legitimacy lay in the realm of pragmatic power, undergirded by ulama association. As long as the bey was leader of a state in which Islam flourished, he was legitimate. When he failed in that task, his legitimacy was lost.

PRECOLONIAL MOROCCO

The Social Order

Precolonial Tunisia was characterized by a sedentary population linked systematically, if sometimes sketchily, by means of overarching political, economic, and religious institutions. Morocco's population lacked such locational as well as organizational stability. Nomadism continued well into the twentieth century. Migrations, individual and collective, characterized the country from the time of its Muslim inception and were particularly marked in the 1800s. With the decline in overland trade, nomads of Morocco's peripheries descended upon the more settled areas. The great Ait Atta conquests in southern Morocco are a particularly striking example of population shifts (Dunn 1973). Famines, political unrest, and outbreaks of plague, typhoid, and typhus were also reasons for population shifts, as was the common familial

strategy of trying to place family members in as many different economic niches as possible.

Individuals moved between social groups. Social groups themselves moved, and the lines of social group formation were fluid. Kinship, territory, and religious affiliation were alternative idioms in which local-level organization was phrased. Their use varied in time and place. In the area in which I lived, there was in the precolonial era a periodic alternation between patrilineal tribal organization, saints, and strong-arm men. Local organization was diverse and flexible, and local-level groupings had a large degree of political autonomy. Overarching integrative structures were largely absent. This is one reason Morocco is frequently labeled a tribal society.

Just as rigid lines of social groupings are not easily drawn in Morocco, neither are clear-cut lines of social hierarchy. Hierarchy existed; that is, at any given point some people had more status than others, but that status was hard to maintain through time. Institutionalized mechanisms for the transmission of social ascendancy were largely lacking. Burke (1976) claims that in rural areas (most of Morocco in the 1700s and 1800s) social dominance was difficult to maintain for more than three generations. Jamous (1981) claims that for the north, a single generation was more typical. With the death of a status-holder came the collapse of his personal constellation of power and the demise of his family's social standing.

Fes, Morocco's most important precolonial city, was no exception to this pattern. As Cigar notes, key political, social, and economic issues and loyalties were expressed in terms of vertically organized groups, such as Andalusian and Bildiyyin, rather than in terms of horizontal socioeconomic levels (1981:56). People were first and foremost members of their local groupings. Their interests and loyalties for the most part lay within those groups.

Further complicating social ranking in Morocco was the lack of congruency between economic, social, and political power. Wealth could confer social standing, but it was not the only resource that could do so. Sherifian and Andalusian descent, piety, or learning often were more important in this respect (Cigar 1981:57). Likewise, political power was not necessarily based on wealth. It could come from political appointment. In Morocco, social ascendancy was achieved rather than ascribed. Social mobility was marked.

Some have argued that sherifian descent (descent from the Prophet Mohammed through his daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali) was the basis of a social class, but this simply was not the case. There was no clear-cut category from whom the socially high and mighty consistently came. At any given moment, sherifs existed at the top of power constellations as well as at the bottom. Sherifian descent was neither necessary nor sufficient for the conferral of social status. It was not comparable to Husainid descent in Tunis.

The Economic Order

Morocco's precolonial economic order also lacked a stable elite and overarching integrative institutions. At least until the late 1800s, Morocco did not constitute a class society (Burke 1976; Cigar 1981; see Seddon 1977 for an opposing view). Morocco did not consist of an institutionalized landed elite which dominated a subjugated peasantry. Land itself was a questionable basis of wealth and power, partly because of political unrest, partly because of the nature of the land itself (Von Sivers 1981). During the 1700s and 1800s, land prices were low, indicating weak demand. Morocco's fertile plains were actually underpopulated during this period (Burke 1976). The population was concentrated in the peripheries, in mountains and desert.

Dynastic power and wealth did not lie in land. By the mid-1600s collective royal lands in northern Morocco apparently had been divided into private holdings and sold (Cigar 1981:65). Dynastic taxes concentrated on commerce. Wealth was based in commerce, but commerce was not a stable source of economic might. It was subject to enormous vagaries as trade routes shifted, the value of goods changed, and European products increasingly began to dominate the market. It was not until the late 1800s that the commercial elite of Fes began to solidify its economic power and translate it into other domains (Cigar 1981). For the most part, this

change resulted from commercial and governmental reactions to increasing European economic penetration, not from the transference of centuries-old dominance into new domains.

Religious Organization

The same themes of lack of an institutionalized elite and lack of overarching integrative organizations characterize Morocco's religious sphere (Burke 1972; K. Brown 1972). Strictly speaking, Morocco did not have a formal ulama, a clearly designated religious leadership. Local areas, including the great cities of Fes, Marrakesh, and Salé, had their own religious elite, but they were largely autonomous of each other. Furthermore, the composition was not stable through time, nor was the route to religiosity clearly paved, as illustrated in the composition of the religious leadership which signed the *bay'a*, the oath of allegiance to a new sultan. Scholarship, sherifian descent, mystical knowledge, piety, brotherhood affiliation, notable deeds, and family descent, all could be bases of religious renown. Like political, economic, and social dominance, religious position had to be earned (see Gellner 1969 for a fine description of that earning). While the sultan might confirm religious authority in local areas and thereby add to its import, he did not create it. Until 1906, the power of religious appointment did not even nominally lie in the sultan's hands (Burke 1972:107).

In some areas, particular families managed to institutionalize their positions through time, such as the saintly lineages of the Ahansal (Gellner 1969), the Sherqawa (Eickelman 1976), and the sherifs of Wazzan (Michaux-Bellaire 1909 and 1911). However, these institutions were local, not national, and were subject to change. Furthermore, by no means was all of the Moroccan countryside organized along saintly lines (Cornell 1983).

Certain religious brotherhoods also were socially and politically important during Morocco's history, such as the Dila, the Derqawa, and the Nasiriyya (Drague 1951; Hammoudi 1980). They formed ramified networks of local authority in the country, but their membership was circumscribed. They could not be mistaken for a hierarchical religious organization of the country as a whole. They too were subject to enormous changes through time.

While sharing structural characteristics with Morocco's economic and social domains, religious affiliation exhibited an important difference. Diverse and changing religious manifestations linked Moroccans to a universal faith, which received orienting focus in the politico-religious position of the sultanate. In the religious sphere, lack of organizational unity was not echoed by lack of symbolic unity. Organizational disunity was complemented by confessional focus. To some degree, the Islamic focus compensated for the lack of institutional integration in the society.

Political Organization

In organizational terms, precolonial Morocco was neither centralized nor bureaucratized (see Hermassi 1972:8-55). No overarching administrative structure encompassed the country as a whole. Even after the bureaucratization efforts of the last century, Morocco's central administration consisted of only five viziers and sixty secretaries in 1900 (Burke 1969:88). Pragmatic political power was not the prerogative of the center. The sultan did not monopolize the means of production, exchange, nor physical coercion. The sultan's military consisted of tribal forces, forces not different in kind from those available to local leaders. Power was negotiated, not meted out. Center and peripheries were contenders in a complex political game.

Briefly stated, at any given moment, the Moroccan sultan held only part of the country in his administrative control. Moulay Ismail (1672-1722) was the only Alawite sultan who extended control to most of the countryside. In the administratively incorporated regions, he collected taxes, made appointments, and obtained obedience through direct military means.

However, while at any given time only part of the country was under the sultan's direct administrative control, his political authority was far reaching. Areas might lie outside the administrative formation yet within the polity. Beyond the pale is the wrong image. As Dunn (1977) has shown expertly for southeastern Morocco, the sultan, by means of letters of investiture, the appointment of arbitrators, and personal connections to local powerholders, directly influenced the pragmatic political game in local areas. Precolonial Morocco was a polity, but one that falls outside typical Western paradigms of organizationally centralized and bureaucratized states. There was political continuity and unity to the country as a whole. The continuity and unity lay in the politico-religious position of the sultanate.

While the political authority of Tunisia's beylik clearly rested in the pragmatic sphere, much of the Moroccan sultan's power and authority lay elsewhere. It rested on a diverse and potent base of Islamic legitimacy (Laroui 1977 finely deciphers these multiple bases). The sultan was *wali* and *imam*, friend of God, spiritual intermediary, dispenser of God's grace to the nation. The sultan also was sherif, physical intermediary between the populace and the Prophet. He was caliph, the rightly elected ruler of a state in which Islam could flourish. He also was *mujahid*, holy warrior and upholder of the Qur'an. Communal prayers in the Friday mosque were said in his name. The sultan was spiritual center of the country as a whole. As spiritual center he claimed political authority, and as political center he claimed religious power. The two were intimately intertwined.

The base of the sultanate's power and authority gave the position a certain distance from quid pro quo evaluations. In Easton's terms, the sultanate rested on "diffuse" rather than "specific" support (1965:273-274). Diffuse support centers in a "relatively stable set of predispositions that are manifested in the form of emotive attachments and sentimental identifications with the symbols of the political system" (Elder and Cobb 1983:15). Continual failure of the system can lead to an erosion of support, but momentary fluctuations do not have much effect on the system's overall legitimacy. As Siegel and Hoskin (1977) have shown, the reservoir of supportive sentiment distances evaluations of the government from current performance. In the Moroccan case, the diffuse bases of support for the sultanate should not be taken to mean that the sultan actually embodied these characteristics. Rather, firm belief in the characteristics themselves gave the sultans a certain license to transgress them while still retaining popular support. The combined bases of support provided a staunch political foundation.

Colonial power-holders and historians recognized that the sultan had legitimacy in areas outside his direct administrative control. Indicative were incidents in which the sultan's army was defeated and his advisors were killed, while the sultan himself was escorted safely back to his capital. Something was at base here besides unqualified dissent. However, French colonialists, and scholars who have followed their lead, interpreted this legitimacy as existing solely in the religious sphere. They assumed that the population accepted the religious arm of the sultan but not his political authority.

There is something fundamentally amiss in this kind of interpretation. It reflects a separation of political and religious authority which existed in French minds, but not in Moroccan. It appears more accurate to say that what those Moroccans were rejecting was a political form, not the sultan's political authority. After all, what distinguished the sultan from any other religious leader was that he stood at the head of a large-scale political entity. The political basis of his legitimacy was not to be undermined.

The French consistently mistook the sultan's lack of direct administrative control for lack of political allegiance by the Moroccan populace. Throughout the 1800s European observers

own dead weight. Yet the sultanate persisted. Morocco was the last of the Maghrebi countries

[redacted]

time the independence movement was already underway. Resistance to the colonial takeover

Although in unhealthy alliance with the French, the Tunisian ulama were the legitimate

Islam remained important. The voice of dissent as well as the leadership had to come from

bol of the present, tie to the past, and link to the divine. An attack on the sultanate was reason

points of independence, in Morocco they played important but secondary roles. Concentrating

Burke, Edmund, III [redacted]