

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

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Phenomenology and some of the basic ideas associated with it have become predominant in European philosophy, but they have been relatively neglected in the United States. Some early work was done, primarily by Marvin Farber, Maurice Natanson, Alfred Schutz, and Herbert Spiegelberg. More recently, however, a number of scholars have been concerned with introducing phenomenology on a wider scale into current trends of thought in the United States. Quentin Lauer's The Triumph of Subjectivity (1958) is an example of such a concern. Herbert Spiegelberg's monumental two-volume The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (1961) is also an effort to alleviate the anonymity of phenomenology for scholars in the Anglo-American tradition. To quote from his Preface:

My immediate assignment, as I conceived of it, was to prepare an introduction primarily for the benefit of American readers. It should help them gain at least a sympathetic understanding of a philosophical movement which, for better or worse, has become one of the most influential currents of thought in the world outside the Anglo-American and this side of the Soviet orbit (1961:xxiv).

Responses to these pleas are by no means simple. Gaining an understanding of phenomenology and integrating it into American philosophic thought requires essentially an integration of two historic paradigms of thought, Anglo-American empiricism and Continental idealism. This in itself is a problem of tremendous complexity. An immediate manifestation of the general problem is presented whenever anyone not familiar with the "language" of phenomenology attempts to read phenomenological accounts. Concepts such as "essence," "eidetic truths," "transcendental ego," and even "intuition" are at best difficult to translate, and at worst, serve as red flags to thorough-going positivists.

As I will discuss later, there is no good reason for rejecting these concepts without first examining their credentials. For the moment, a quote from Herbert W. Schneider illustrates the general points above:

The influence of Husserl (the founder of phenomenology) has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar...No doubt, American education will gradually take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature (1951:380).

From the above account, it is obvious that phenomenology is first and foremost a philosophy. As such, the question arises, as to what, precisely, phenomenology has to do with social science. Before we can even attempt to deal with this question, however, we have to attempt to specify what phenomenology is. So far I have spoken of phenomenology as if it were some "unity" or doctrine to which the term could be applied. This is far from being the case. In actuality, the term has been applied to wide and diverse types of investigations, ranging from transcendental philosophy to classical sociology. The specification of "what phenomenology is" is thus resolved into a complex historical and analytical problem. Spiegelberg's work (1961) deals with this problem with respect to phenomenology as philosophy, and his work will be relied upon heavily in the present discussion. We may use his work as a springboard by which we can get to the basic question, the possible contributions of phenomenology to social science.

In his Preface, Spiegelberg states that it is a misconception to think that there is such a thing as a system or school called "phenomenology" with a solid body of teachings. The question of "what

is phenomenology" cannot be answered as stated, since the underlying assumption of a unified philosophy subscribed to by all so-called phenomenologists is an illusion. However, it would be going too far, according to Spiegelberg, to say that there are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists, but he holds that the variations exceed the common features. To further complicate the matter, the thought of Edmund Husserl, the founder of the Phenomenological Movement, changed so much, and to the very end, that it cannot be presented adequately except by showing how it developed, which is a rather formidable undertaking. Nevertheless, something of a core of phenomenology may be presented, although Spiegelberg warns that it is no substitute for the examination of the empirical expressions of writers on phenomenology (1961:xxvii).

The most obvious way of discovering a core would seem to consist in searching for the invariants of the different versions of phenomenology, ignoring the variables. Such a procedure has a disadvantage in that what could be distilled would be rather thin and trivial. Spiegelberg argues, therefore, that at the present stage its most characteristic core is its method (1961:653-655). He lists seven steps of the positive phenomenological method, the first three of which have been accepted, at least implicitly, and practiced by all those who have aligned themselves with the Phenomenological Movement. The remainder have been practiced by a smaller group, although they are important to phenomenology (1961:659).

The first step, "investigating particular phenomena," consists of three related operations: the intuitive grasp of the phenomena; their analytic distinction; and their description. These are usually referred to as "phenomenological description," but for the purpose of analysis, they should be discussed separately. Phenomenological intuiting, in practice, "is one of the most demanding operations, which requires utter concentration on the object intuited without becoming absorbed in it to the point of no longer looking critically" (Spiegelberg 1961:659). Precise instructions cannot be given as to how this is done, but the crux of

the matter seems to be that particular attention is focused on the uniqueness of specific phenomena, that is, "on the things themselves." Further, this is accomplished by intuiting the phenomena. What is meant by this is what we might more clumsily call "thinking of," which could mean that we are directing our attention to some phenomena, or that we are reminiscing about something, or even that we are day-dreaming of something. "Intuiting" refers to that aspect of "thinking of" which is a direct and intentional focussing of consciousness on the phenomena in question in order to better understand "the thing itself." This is what Spiegelberg means, I think, when he argues that there is no reason for insisting that there is something mystical about intuition. It has been applied to a variety of procedures, including a highly rational mathematical intuition, and no good grounds exist for treating it as either mystical or irrational (1961:660).

The charge that an intuitive approach is entirely subjective is also misplaced. Without going into the details of Spiegelberg's refutation of this charge, the essentials of his argument may be summarized as follows. The "subjectivity" of the phenomena of phenomenology may be understood in the sense of their essential privacy. Now, it should be realized that originally all phenomena are essentially "private." All experience is basically "subjective" in the sense that it is our own experience. No empirical knowledge, however purged and objectified, can get away from the subjective matrix of all experience. Whether or not the "privateness" of phenomena is "public" is a matter of verification, but it would be preposterous and self-defeating not to admit any phenomenon before it has proved to be public. A science which refuses to take account of private phenomena as such is guilty of suppressing evidence, and will end with a truncated universe (1961:667-668).

The second operation consists of phenomenological analysis. In contrast with logical or philosophical analysis, phenomenological analysis is not primarily concerned with linguistic expressions that refer to the phenomena, but rather with an analysis of the phenomena

themselves. In this case, analysis seeks to trace the elements and the structure of phenomena obtained by intuiting. It comprises the distinguishing of the constituents of the phenomena as well as the exploration of their relations to and connections with adjacent phenomena. Stated more simply, phenomenological analysis stands for the general examination of the structure of the phenomena according to their ingredients and their configuration (1961:669-671).

Phenomenological description comprises the third operation of the first step, and it refers to the description of the phenomenon that has been intuited and analyzed. To give an adequate account of phenomenological description would require a general theory of description, of which there are promising but as yet inadequate beginnings. Nevertheless some points may be made. Describing is based on a classification of phenomena, and therefore presupposes a framework of class names. If we want to describe new phenomena or new aspects of old phenomena, we either refine the coordinates of the system so as to allow for inclusion of the phenomena, or else we determine the location of the phenomena with regard to an already developed system of classes. Regardless of which choice is made, the main function of a phenomenological description is to serve as a reliable guide to the listener's or reader's own actual experience of the phenomena. Its essential function is to provide unmistakable guideposts to the phenomena themselves (Spiegelberg 1961:672-673).

The second step in the phenomenological method is that of "investigating general essences" (eidetic intuiting). While no general formula can be given for this feature, the following may be considered as implied in the eidetic method.

There is no adequate intuiting of essences without the antecedent or simultaneous intuiting of exemplifying particulars. Such particulars may be given either in perception or in imagination or in a combination of both. But while this is the necessary condition of genuine intuiting, it is certainly not its entire content. In order to apprehend the general essence we have to look at the particulars as examples, i.e., as instances which stand for the general essence (Spiegelberg 1961:677).

For example, if we look at any object and consider it to be red, even though it might be any of a number of shades of red, we may take that particular shade as an example of the essence of red or "redness."

"Apprehending essential relationships" constitutes the third step of the method. Essential relationships are of two types: relationships within a single essence, or relationships between several essences. In the former, the basic question is whether the components of an essence are essential to it. For example, in the case of a triangle, one may ask if three sides, three angles, and certain shapes and sizes of these sides and angles are required for the essence "triangle." The way to settle such questions is to use what Husserl called "free imaginative variation," which involves the attempt either to leave off certain components completely or to replace them by others. This allows one to verify, modify, or reject the essence in question. The procedure of imaginative variation is also used to investigate the essential relations between several essences. Keeping one essence constant, we try to combine it with various other essences, leaving off some of its associates, substituting others for them, and so forth. The stock example of a relationship of essences is that between the essences of color and extension. Color in this case proves to be inseparable from extension, which goes to show that color is essentially linked up with extension (Spiegelberg 1961:681-682).

The remaining four steps of the phenomenological method will be merely outlined below. Number four, "watching modes of appearing," refers to the fact that phenomenology is an exploration of the way in which things appear as well as what appears. One way in which objects may appear, for example, is through the side or aspect from which we know the object as a whole, as in the way in which we perceive a solid opaque cube even though we actually only see one or two sides of it (Spiegelberg 1961:685). Step number five is "exploring the constitution of phenomena in consciousness," which consists of determining the way in which a phenomenon establishes itself and takes shape in our consciousness. The purpose of such a study is the determination of the

typical structure of a constitution in consciousness by means of an analysis of the essential sequence of its steps (Spiegelberg 1961:688). The sixth step consists of "suspending belief in existence," which constituted the core of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. What Husserl means by this is simply that when we focus our attention on any object, we may "bracket off" the object, i.e., suspend belief in it, in order to examine the consciousness we have of the object. He also used the idea to justify philosophically his notion of the transcendental ego (cf. Cairns 1961:353-364). Step seven is "interpreting concealed meanings," and it is sometimes called hermeneutic philosophy. It is the least practiced aspect of the phenomenological method, being represented primarily in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927). Hermeneutics may be viewed as an attempt to interpret the "sense" of certain phenomena, using "sense" to refer to meanings which are not immediately manifest to our intuiting, analyzing, and describing. Thus the investigator must go beyond what is directly given and use the given as a clue for meanings which are not given, or at least not explicitly given (Spiegelberg 1961:695).

As given here, the phenomenological method undoubtedly appears vague and general, both because of the terminology and because the account is a summary of Spiegelberg's summary of the core of phenomenology. To clarify matters somewhat, we may, following Spiegelberg, now ask the questions "What, if anything, is original about the phenomenological method?", and "What contributions, if any, can it make that are not equally well or better made by other methods?" In reply to the first question, we may say that phenomenology, not unlike other philosophical movements such as pragmatism, has been a "new name for old ways of thought" (William James). But also like other philosophical movements, it has reorganized and focussed this thought in such a way that a new form of philosophy with a gestalt of its own has emerged (Spiegelberg 1961:19). More specifically,

investigating particular phenomena by intuitive, analytic, and descriptive means is something which has been undertaken with considerable success by other approaches, philosophical, scientific, and even artistic. If there is anything distinctive about the phenomenological approach, it has to be found in its deliberateness and in its conscious challenge to the reductionism of Occam's razor (Spiegelberg 1961:699).

In response to the second question and to see what is meant by the challenge to Occam's razor, we may place the development of phenomenology in historical perspective. By doing so, we may note, as the complement to the positive steps presented above, the equally important negative aspect, the protest against reductionism.

In the nineteenth century, philosophy and science began to become divorced from each other. This was a consequence of two factors. First, the startling practical results of the natural sciences led to the acceptance of their method as the only suitable standard for scientific investigation. Second, a strong reductionist attitude stemming from scientific principles gradually infiltrated all fields of intellectual activity. Phenomenology may be looked upon as a development in opposition to the hegemony of these factors (Tymieniecka 1962:xviii-xx). In this respect, phenomenology was part of a much wider movement protesting reductionism and positivism (cf. H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, 1958, for an analysis of this general movement). Focussing on phenomenology, however, we note that its chief thrust is against the preconception of the principle of simplicity or economy of thought, which has been espoused particularly by the positivists. This principle is usually referred to as Occam's razor, i.e., the idea that entities ought not to be multiplied beyond necessity. As stated, this principle seems reasonable enough, but in practice, it serves to blunt instruments for investigation. There is no good reason to restrict data to sense data, thus refusing access to any other possible data without even looking at their credentials (Spiegelberg 1961:658).

As a summary to the two questions above, then, we may quote Spiegelberg as follows:

The phenomenological protest against this narrowing down of experience in the name of Occam's razor is not a mere difference in emphasis. In this respect phenomenology stands for a kind of rebellion against the trend in modern science which begins with simplifying abstractions and ends with a minimum vocabulary of scientific concepts. Since the advent of Whitehead and other critics of that trend of science, phenomenology no longer stands alone in its battle against uncritical simplification. But it might well be claimed that it constitutes the most concerted and most concrete manifestation of this counter-movement. As such it need not deny the right and usefulness of simplification for limited objectives. But it has the right and the duty to protest against a simplification which claims to supply the only legitimate and the full picture of reality (1961:658).

In addition to being the most representative aspect of phenomenology, the phenomenological method is also considered by some writers to be the most important contribution to other areas of study. Tymieniecka, for example, in Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Thought (1962), espouses this view and discusses the application of the techniques of phenomenology to the study of art, literature, history of ideas, psychology, anthropology, and psychiatry. However, if one takes Spiegelberg's account of the phenomenological method as a model, Tymieniecka's accounts are quite divergent. Even her general account of the phenomenological technique differs, in that she places stress on the establishment of models of enquiry, which consist of multilayered structures and each of which, in turn, contain irreducible features established through contrast. I point this out not as criticism, nor for acceptance of Spiegelberg's model as the correct one, but rather to illustrate the difficulties in labeling work as "phenomenological" even if the method is taken as the most representative aspect of the philosophy. When we leave the realm of philosophy, the problem intensifies. What has sometimes occurred, as for example in sociology, is that one aspect of the phenomenological method is applied to the investigation at hand, and by virtue of this, the study is labelled "phenomenological." E. A. Tiryakian, for

example, has recently undertaken to trace the phenomenological pedigree of sociologists by showing that aspects of the works of Durkheim, Weber, Mannheim, Scheler, and Talcott Parsons may be viewed as phenomenological in character. While such an approach is of historical interest and is to be welcomed as an attempt to integrate phenomenology and sociology, it seems perhaps more important for social scientists, as social scientists, to concentrate on utilizing whatever concepts or techniques that phenomenology has to offer them in their work. Correspondingly, we may now turn to the second of our major questions and see how phenomenology may aid and contribute to social science.

The most comprehensive work on the relationships between phenomenology and social science has been done by Alfred Schutz, who was concerned primarily with developing a social philosophy designed to show how Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is important for the methodology of the social sciences. The key feature of Schutz' philosophy is his discovery of the presuppositions, structure, and signification of the common-sense world. The common-sense world is an expression for the intersubjective world experienced by man within what Husserl termed the "natural attitude." It is the arena of social action both within which men live out their lives and which they take for granted (Natanson 1962: xxvii). Schutz concentrates on Husserl's idea of the natural attitude, which involves the typifications, or constructs, erected by "the common man" in the everyday world. One of Schutz' major ideas with respect to this is that all forms of social relationships involve typifications. By this he means that in any social relationship, we have to typify the personality of our partners, his motives, his attitudes, and so forth, but that in typifying our partners, we have to typify ourselves. We have to assume typical roles, see ourselves in them, and perform in them in the way we assume our typified partners expect us to act. Such typifications permit us to tune in and interlock our typical behavior with what we may reasonably expect to be the behavior of our typified partners. According to Aron Gurwitsch, this approach leads us to the phenomenon of "understanding,"

which Schutz uses to mean the anticipation of one's partner's likely actions and reactions. Anticipation, which is based on typifications, means that I have to impute to my partner some knowledge of the meaning the project has for me, a knowledge that I suppose him to attain in substantially the same way I form my knowledge of my project's meaning to him. This sort of reciprocity (Weber's subjective interpretation) prevails in all social interactions (1962:72).

In order to focus specifically on Schutz' major contribution, we look to the implications of the development of the concept "common-sense world" for the methodology of social science. Using this concept and the idea of shared typifications, which are rooted in the common-sense world, Schutz was able to show that fundamental differences exist between the natural scientific and social scientific interpretations of human action. The basic difference may be formulated as follows. Natural scientists determine which sector of the universe is relevant to their specific purposes, i.e., they select the data, facts, and events, whereas in the common-sense world, these items are preselected and pre-interpreted by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life. These constructs are those which the social scientist has to investigate, and therefore, his constructs are of the second degree, i.e., constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science (Schutz 1962:5-6).

Given the investigation of the constructs of actors in the common-sense world as the goal of social science, we now ask how Schutz thought such an investigation might be conducted. To answer this, we turn to his article "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1962). His method of investigation may be summarized in the following manner: Schutz takes his point of origin from Whitehead, holding that all sciences have to construct thought objects of their own which supersede the thought objects of common-sense thinking relating to unique events and occurrences by constructing a model of a sector of the social world within which merely those typified events occur that are

relevant to the scientist's particular problem under scrutiny. This is done in the following way. The social scientist begins to construct typical course-of-action patterns corresponding to the observed events. Thereupon, he coordinates to these patterns a model of an actor whom he imagines as being gifted with consciousness, and he ascribes to this fictitious consciousness a set of typical in-order-to (i.e., goal oriented) motives corresponding to the goals of the observed course-of-action patterns and typical because-motives upon which the in-order-to motives are founded. In such a simplified model of the social world, pure rational acts are possible, because all the difficulties encumbering the real actor in the everyday life-world have been eliminated. It is thus a model of rational behavior, the use of which gives several advantages for social science. The first is the possibility of constructing patterns of social interaction under the assumption that all participants in such interaction act rationally within a set of conditions, means, ends, motives, defined by the social scientist and supposed to be either common to all participants or distributed among them in a specific manner. By this arrangement, standardized behavior such as social roles, institutional behavior, and so forth, can be studied in isolation. The second is that the rational behavior of a constructed personal type is by definition supposed to be predictable, within the limits of the elements typified in the construct. The model of a rational action can, therefore, be used as a device for ascertaining deviating behavior in the real social world. Third, by appropriate variations of some of the elements, several models or sets of models of rational actions can be constructed for solving the same scientific problem and compared with one another (Schutz 1962:36-45).

The advantages of such may be debatable. I offered the lengthy summary not to give a point for point analysis of its merits or demerits, but rather I intended it to serve as an example of how an investigator may try to get at the typical behavior of actors in social events. Perhaps more importantly, however, the summary underscores the point that the consciousness which is attributed to the actor is attributed, namely

by the social scientist, and therefore, at least theoretically, the attributed consciousness may be limited to those theoretical features which are important for empirical verification or confirmation. To consider this point in more detail, we now turn to the work of two sociologists, Harold Garfinkel and Aaron Cicourel.

Garfinkel, taking his cue from Schutz, considers the sociologist's first and most important problem to be the specification and depiction of the "common-sense knowledge of social structure." Common-sense knowledge involves what Garfinkel calls "background expectancies," the taken-for-granted assumptions upon which people base their everyday lives (1964:225). To investigate the nature of these background expectancies, he uses two methods. The first is "making trouble" in selected commonplace scenes in an attempt to make the background expectancies of these scenes visible. That is, by upsetting the routine grounds of activities, he forces the people involved to highlight the background expectancies that usually accompany the activities (1964:226). The second technique used by Garfinkel is borrowed from Karl Mannheim and is usually referred to as the documentary method. This method involves searching for an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different realizations of meaning. More specifically,

the method consists of treating an actual appearance as "the document of" a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of "what is known" about the underlying pattern (1962:691-692).

With respect to sociological investigations, Garfinkel's basic question is "What is the work whereby a sociological investigator sets an observed occurrence and the intended occurrence into a correspondence of meaning such that the investigator finds it reasonable to treat witnessed actual appearances as evidences of the event he means to be studying?" (1962:692). His point is that sociologists use a framework for the correspondence of meaning, but they either fail to recognize its use or neglect to specify what the framework actually is. In order to

see what the consequences of such a failure or neglect is, we quote Garfinkel again.

There is usually a definite gap in the correspondence between what was actually observed and the intended event for which the actual observation is treated as its evidence, i.e., the gap is in the way in which the investigator decided what the correspondence was to be. In such an account, the reader is faced with the problem of having to decide that the reported observation is a literal instance of the intended occurrence. If the decision is positive, then the reader must furnish the account an investment of interpretative work and an assumption of "underlying" matters, "just known in common" about the society in terms of which, what the respondent said, is treated as synonymous with what the observer meant. Thus correct correspondence is the product of the work of investigator and reader as members of a community of cobelievers (1962:706).

In summary, then, Garfinkel views the documentary method as providing a way in which the gap discussed above may be bridged, and at the same time, it allows for a more systematic and scientific account of behavior. Stated otherwise, Garfinkel advocates that sociologists should examine not only the common-sense world of the "man in the street," but they must also make explicit what their own background expectancies are as they carry out their sociological analyses.

Aaron Cicourel's work in sociology is similar to Garfinkel's. The general thrust of his work may be described as a critical examination of the foundations of method and measurement in sociology, particularly as they relate to social action as described by Max Weber. In his Method and Measurement in Sociology, Cicourel presents the basic argument "that present measurement devices in sociology are not valid because they represent the imposition of numerical procedures that are external both to the social world empirically described by sociologists and to the conceptualizations based upon these descriptions" (1964:2). Of course, he does not argue that concepts used in sociology are not in any fashion amenable to mathematical treatment. He is not concerned, however, with "better" measurement systems as such, but, rather, with strengthening the methodological foundations of sociological research (1964:3).

Most of his book is designed to show "what has been wrong" with sociological methods such as participant observation, interviewing, fixed-choice questionnaires, and so forth. Rather than go into detail about each of these, I will give an extensive quote from the Conclusion to illustrate his basic argument. The affinities with Schutz' model of rational behavior and Garfinkel's documentary method should be obvious.

The sociological observer...who fails to conceptualize the elements of common-sense acts in everyday life, is using an implicit model of the actor which is confounded by the fact that his observations and inferences interact, in unknown ways, with his own biographical situation within the social world. The very conditions of obtaining data require that he make use of typical motives, cues, roles, etc., and the typical meanings he imputes to them, yet the structures of these common-sense courses of action are notions which the sociological observer takes for granted, treats as self-evident. But they are just the notions which the sociologist must analyze and study empirically if he desires rigorous measurement. The distributions he now constructs relegate such notions to a taken-for-granted status or to some latent continuum. Therefore, the observations which go to make up a distribution of, say, types of cities, responses to questionnaire items, or occupational prestige categories are only half of the picture. The distribution merely represents the "outer" horizon for which operational procedures have been devised. Yet the "meaning" of the distribution relies upon common-sense knowledge which includes the observer's typification of the world as it is founded in his own biographical situation, and his formulation of the actor's typification which is inextricably woven into his response. Both sets of typifications must be objects of sociological inquiry (1964:223).

If we return to our original consideration of the relevance of phenomenology for social science, we may retrace for the sake of summary the radial of thought under consideration. It originated in Husserl's concept of the "natural attitude;" Schutz elaborated the idea and described its importance for the methodology of social science; and Garfinkel and Cicourel utilized Schutz' work to strengthen the methodological foundations of sociology by pointing out the weakness of sociological research which fails to take the background expentancies of the common-sense world into account, both for the observed and the observer.

We may now consider a second way in which phenomenology is relevant for the purposes of social science. For this, we turn to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Schutz' evaluation of its importance for social science. Schutz maintains that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology cannot be applied directly to the concrete problems of the social sciences, and the first group of Husserl's students who attempted to do so brought disrepute to the phenomenological movement (1962:140). He holds, rather, that the empirical sciences will find their foundation in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. The central feature of this notion was covered in the preceding discussion, but there is still another way in which the idea is important. This is found in Husserl's attempt to establish a purely descriptive psychology. Schutz summarizes this attempt in the following way:

A psychology from which a solution of the problems of the social sciences might be expected must become aware of the fact that it is not a science which deals with empirical facts. It has to be a science of essences, investigating the correlates of those transcendental constitutional phenomena which are related to the natural attitude. Consequently, it has to examine the invariant, peculiar, and essential structures of the mind; but that is to say it examines their a priori structure. The concrete description of the spheres of consciousness as it has to be undertaken by a true descriptive psychology within the natural attitude remains, however, the description of a closed sphere of the intentionalities. That is to say, it requires not only a concrete description of the experiences of consciousness, but also necessarily the description of the experiences of (intentional) objects in their objective sense found in active inner experience. But such a true psychology of intentionality is, according to Husserl, nothing other than a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude (1962: 132).

Unless one has considerable familiarity with Husserl's phenomenology, this passage is undoubtedly obscure in its meaning, but what Schutz is saying essentially is that Husserl wants to establish a science of consciousness (i.e., meaning) which will give a firm foundation for relating the natural attitude to the Lebenswelt (life-world). In this sense, Husserl's work is similar to and may be taken as providing a philosophical

background for the work in linguistic analysis and ordinary language philosophy. His work, for example, complements Ward Goodenough's interests in developing an empirical science of meaning. Goodenough's definition of the significatum of a linguistic form as "those abstracted contextual elements with which it is in perfect association, without which it cannot properly occur" (1956:195) is very similar to Husserl's definition of an essence "as that which remains constant in all possible variations of that which is being investigated" (Lauer 1958:59).

When we try to assess the contributions of Husserl's descriptive psychology to social science, we are on more tenuous ground than in the case of his Lebenswelt and natural attitude. Perhaps at the moment, the most that can be stated for this aspect of his work is that it provides an epistemological framework and background for the development of a science of meaning. A synthesis of the work of modern linguists, anthropological linguists, psycholinguists, and sociolinguists, in light of Husserl's epistemology would, I think, go far in establishing such a science. All I can do at the present is to indicate the direction such a theory of meaning might take. First, a theory of both language and culture is required for the problem of meaning. Dell Hymes' concept of "ethnography of communication" supports this assertion. I quote:

In short, "ethnography of communication" implies two characteristics that an adequate approach to the problems of language which engage anthropologists must have. Firstly, such an approach cannot simply take separate results from linguistics, psychology, sociology, ethnology, as given, and seek to correlate them, however partially useful such work is. It must call attention to the need for fresh kinds of data, to the need to investigate directly the use of language in contexts of situation so as to discern patterns proper to speech activity, patterns which escape separate studies of grammar, of personality, of religion, of kinship, and the like, each abstracting from the patterning of speech activity as such into some other frame of reference. Secondly, such an approach cannot take linguistic form, a given code, or speech itself, as frame of reference. It must take as context a community, investigating its communicative habits as a whole, so that any given use of channel and code takes its place as but part of the resources upon which the

members of the community draw. It is not that linguistics does not have a vital role. Well-analyzed linguistic materials are indispensable, and the logic of linguistic methodology is a principal influence in the ethnographic perspective of the approach. It is rather that it is not linguistics, but ethnography--not language, but communication--which must provide the frame of reference within which the place of language in culture and society is to be described...To project the ethnography of communication in such a way is tantamount to the belief that there awaits constitution a second descriptive science comprising language, beside that of present linguistics proper (1964:2-3).

In order to tie Hymes' "ethnography of communication" into Husserl's descriptive psychology, we focus on "the use of language in contexts of situation" and "taking as context a community." The former is essentially Wittgenstein's dictum "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use." The significance is that it directs our attention to contexts of actual use for an understanding of our words and expressions (TeHennepe 1965:140). John Austin's remarks are also pertinent here:

When we examine what we should say when (at any given time), what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or "meanings," whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about; we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. For this reason, I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less misleading name than those given above [linguistic philosophy, ordinary language philosophy, analytic philosophy]--for instance, "linguistic phenomenology," only that is rather a mouthful (1961:130).

If we relate this back to Husserl, we note that his descriptive psychology is directed at the problem of how we get from the context to the meaning-in-use, or to use his terminology, the problem of the structure of intentional consciousness.

The phrase "take as context a community" is essentially another way of stating the idea expressed by Husserl as *Lebenswelt* and by Schutz as common-sense world, if we focus on the shared typifications of the actors in these "worlds." The discussion of the work of Schutz, Garfinkel, and Cicourel covered the essentials of this idea.

A third way in which phenomenology may contribute to social science is through the works of the existential phenomenologists. To my knowledge, very little work has been done in this area. Therefore, I will restrict myself to some general comments. Existential phenomenology may be said to have begun with the publication of Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit in 1927. According to Cairns, existential phenomenology complements rather than opposes Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (1961: 353-354). Cairns' argument, in essence, is that existential phenomenology is concerned primarily with an analysis of the concepts "being" and "existence," which Husserl more or less bracketed (suspended belief in) for the purposes of analysis. Concern with "being," "existence," and "ego," led the existential phenomenologists to develop ideas on the essences of ego, alter ego, self, structure of becoming, and so forth. Most of this work was done in France, where existentialism and phenomenology have largely coincided, in contrast to in Germany where they have separated, and the principal writers were Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean Paul Sartre. At the moment, all that will be said about their possible contributions to social science is that the development of the ideas stated above (ego, etc.) lend philosophic support to empirical investigations, especially those centered around the concept of role. An investigation of the ideas of the existential phenomenologists would, however, probably lead to considerable revision and thus a strengthening of the foundations of role theory.

There are two intellectual traditions in the United States that are sometimes referred to as phenomenological in nature, even though they have no direct connection with either of the phenomenological movements discussed above. The first of these, pragmatism, as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey, has been referred to as phenomenological because of the striking similarities between it and the philosophy of the phenomenologists. Both arose as protests against deterministic, reductionist science, which took the form of positivism in Europe and evolutionism in America. The content and concepts of the two philosophies are also very

similar. We have already seen how Husserl was concerned with a science of essences. Peirce's pragmatism had a similar goal, the main purpose of it being to help us explain the meanings of general terms, i.e., common nouns or adjectives as they are used by scientists, with the implication that if we cannot assign a meaning by this method, the term is meaningless from a scientific point of view (White 1955:141). Spiegelberg also points to remarkable parallels between Peirce's pragmatism and the phenomenological movement, such as Peirce's plea for unprejudiced direct inspection free from theorizing interpretations and his stress on the fact that phenomena are not restricted to mere empirical facts, but that they include everything that can be conceivably experienced (1960:18). Further, James Edie has recently compared William James' and Husserl's work, showing how their ideas converge on such points as experience, reality, reason and belief, and action (1965:110-132). Many more parallels could be mentioned, such as the affinities between Schutz' work and James' and Dewey's, but to do so would belabor the point. If we wish to consider the contributions of pragmatism as phenomenology, we have to deal with the parallels mentioned above, which to a large extent would amount to a federalized restatement of what has already been discussed. For that reason, we may now turn our attention to the second tradition in the United States, which is usually called the social psychological school.

The term phenomenological is sometimes used to designate a general style of social science which takes the intended meanings of human consciousness as the proper locus for the understanding of social action. Viewed in this manner, the social psychological school, comprised of such scientists as C. H. Cooley, G. H. Mead, W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, and Thomas Baldwin, may be said to represent the phenomenological standpoint, but only if phenomenology is taken in a very loose sense (Natanson 1963:283). Whether their work is essentially "phenomenological" is, I think, largely a moot point. What is more important is that they were concerned with analyzing social action with

respect to meaning and consciousness. Cooley's "looking-glass self," and Mead's distinctions of "I," "me," and of "mind," "self," and "society" are all attempts to specify that the concept of "ego" or "self" can only be defined with respect to society, and therefore, if we wish to develop a science of social action, we have to focus on a social context and on symbolic interaction (social meaning). For reasons of space and time, I will not give an analysis or summary of the work of this school here, although it would form an ideal complement to what has already been discussed. The work of the school provides the social counterpart to Husserl's epistemology, Schutz' social philosophy, Garfinkel's and Cicourel's methodology, and Hymes' ethnography of communication. As such, it furnishes at least a tentative framework for the synthesis of the ideas presented here.

We turn now to the summary of the ideas of the paper. As indicated at the beginning of the paper, several scholars have urged for more attempts by Americans to incorporate phenomenology into their modes of thinking. The present paper represents, at least superficially, an attempt to accomplish such an incorporation from the point of view of the social sciences. To accomplish such a goal, I first posed the questions "What is phenomenology?" and "What does it have to offer to the social sciences?" In response to the first question, I first gave a summary of Herbert Spiegelberg's conception of the fundamentals of the phenomenological method. In response to the second question, I examined four aspects of phenomenology, using the term in a loose sense, which I consider to be important for social science. The first and most important was Husserl's notions of the Lebenswelt and the natural attitude, which were taken over and developed by Schutz, Garfinkel, and Cicourel, with important consequences for social science. A second feature of Husserl's work was touched upon, considering the importance of his descriptive psychology for a theory of meaning. The other three aspects were discussed only in general terms and represent more of an outline for further research. These were, in order: the relevance of existential phenomenology for a

theory of action and for role theory; the importance of pragmatism for its appeal for catholicity in acceptance of sources of data and a corresponding deemphasis on the reductionist attitude; and the importance of the social psychological school for a science of social action and a theory of meaning.

If we attempt to characterize the general thrust of the ideas presented here, two major trends emerge. The first is that a study of social action must focus on the framework of meaning in any social situation, which consists of the typifications of the actions in the common-sense world plus the background expectancies in the situation in question. Stated otherwise, there must be an investigation of the structure of the process by which we move from immediate experience, whether this be sense-organ perception or intuition, to our classification of such experience as meaningful. The second trend is that the standpoint of the scientific observer himself must be characterized in the fashion as stated above. His background expectancies and typifications must also be specified. This is what Spiegelberg means when he says that there is room for a phenomenology of phenomenology (1961:xxvii), what Gerald Berreman means when he says that we need an ethnography of ethnography (forthcoming, American Anthropologist), and what Cicourel means by saying that we need a theory of instrumentation and a theory of data so that we can disentangle the observer's presence and procedures from the material he labels "data" (1964:2). Phenomenology provides the starting point for such work.

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