

ECONOMIC ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF FAMILY TYPES IN A BOSNIAN TOWN¹

Leon M. Bresloff
Brandeis University, Massachusetts

I. Historical Introduction--The Turkish Past

Due to the complex historical occupation of Bosnia and other Balkan territories by Ottoman Turks spanning a period of four centuries and not coming to an end until the latter years of the nineteenth century, "town" life arose early in a previously rural agrarian structure organized around feudal kingdoms. The "town" in Balkan history was a political creation of the Turkish occupiers and overlords. It developed as part of a policy of "urbanization" in order to regulate trade in the Ottoman Balkan provinces and to maintain peace along the vital trade routes. These trade routes were an important adjunct of the Empire for two reasons: 1. they were the link between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe; and 2. they were the routes along which were carried a major portion of the food resources supporting the expanding city of Istanbul.

These factors play a crucial role in the development of the Ottoman Empire only in light of the fact that "urbanization" for the Ottomans did not mean "industrialization." The association of urbanization and industrialization is a western phenomenon which, in fact, caused the decline of Turkish rule in the Balkans. Urban conglomerations for the Ottomans were mainly an alliance between the military-religious elite and merchant-carriers. The only other important segment of these populations was the artisan-craftsmen who supplied luxury items to their retainers and smiths who manufactured agricultural and household implements for trade to the underlying rural peasant population.

The character of the provincial Balkan towns which developed as a result of the Ottoman urbanization policy resembled, then, the largest of all centers of the Empire, Istanbul. The functions of these towns were to see that the Empire was properly fed and that the flow of trade goods from the Orient to the newly developing centers of Western Europe was maintained and well protected. The mechanisms of these functions were based on the presence of the Ottoman political-religious elite and armed garrisons in the numerous towns along the trade routes and the tax-farming of urban merchants creating peasant indebtedness to them and huge profits from the sale of food products to the Empire (Stoianovich 1960:238).

This is the base line for the early development of the town, Novi Šeher, Central Bosnia, Yugoslavia.² The only other important consideration to be discussed is the nature of the merchant population in the towns of the Turkish Empire. The Turks themselves rarely became tradesmen. Even in Istanbul, the Turks relied on Greeks, Vlachs, Jews, and other minority groups to carry on trade and transport goods. This was always a heavy burden to bear for an Empire built on trade and commerce (Stoianovich 1960:291-292). In the provinces, and in Bosnia in particular, a similar pattern arose. The few Turks who actually settled in these towns comprised a small part of the

actual population and were mainly a handful of political-administrative officials, religious leaders and soldiers. Because the Turks never mastered the art of trade but only that of conquering an area to provide the necessary conditions for the trade upon which they relied for their very existence, they utilized the talents of the local indigenous population for the provision of this necessary service (Stoianovich 1960:241). Enlisting in the trade of the Ottomans, however, meant enlisting in their cause. The development of an indigenous merchant class in Bosnia by the Ottoman Turks went hand in hand with the development of towns and the introduction of Islam as a way of life. For attachment to the Empire in the form of attraction to its towns and the opportunities they offered in the performance of services in trade and craftsmanship for the local representatives of the Empire entailed the obligation of conversion to Islam. At the conclusion of the Turkish reign in Bosnia when the Austro-Hungarian Empire entered in 1878 to administer this territory as its newly acquired province, over forty percent of the population had converted to Islam (Sugar 1963:14-15).

Novi Seher developed in the manner described above. It has been, and still is, a Moslem community. The people recognize themselves, however, not as Turks, but as converted Slavs. And they realize that four centuries of Turkish occupation have made a significant impression on their way of life and their present identification. The Turks, nevertheless, disappeared with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. And the present population has altered significantly since the entrance of the Austro-Hungarians and the beginning of industrialization and proletarianization of the area.

The social structure of this and other old Turkish provincial towns was then fairly clear-cut. We can reconstruct a politico-religious alliance of Turkish origin on the top layer. Its components were administrators, Moslem priests, and military officers with a garrison of soldiers (Stoianovich 1963:297). Next were the merchants who were of local origin but, at the same time, aligned with the Turkish politico-religious elite. They operated under the grace of this elite and in its service. Third in rank were the artisans and craftsmen. These people lived mainly off the income of the above two groups producing luxury items and services for them. It was probably true also that the artisan or craftsman was a poor member of the merchant's family.

Craftsmanship, learned in the nearly self-sufficient peasant household, may have been a key factor in the peasant's capability to move to the early Turkish towns and take advantage of the opportunities offered there. This would be especially the case if a near relative was already there to introduce the peasant-craftsman to the ways of the town, to provide him a place to live, and a place to ply his trade. The arts and services practiced in these towns doubtless ranged over a great variety of skills from hair-cutting to weaving to smithing.

These three types made up the Turkish provincial town population. This is all that was needed to siphon produce off the land to supply the Empire and carry on its trade functions. The other important segments of the population were rural and non-Moslem. These were the rural peasantry and the pastoral carriers, mainly Vlachs from Northern Greece (Stoianovich 1960:253). The former harvested the crops which the merchant literally controlled

through tax-farming methods supported by the Turkish elite, and the latter transported the produce to the Empire as it also carried highly valued trade goods to the West from the Orient.

II. Austro-Hungarian Entrance into Bosnia

The rise of the industrial urban West brought this pyramidal structure to its destruction piece by piece beginning from the top. This de-structuring and subsequent re-structuring of the population of Novi Seher and its concomitant results in family organization and livelihood are what will concern us from this point.

The early part of the last century preceding the actual occupation of Bosnia by the Austro-Hungarian Empire saw a loosening of Turkish controls in the Balkan provinces and the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was reflected in the village by the growing power of the indigenous but Islamized merchant class through concentration upon ownership and control of huge parcels of land which lowered the status of the peasant from indebtedness to serfdom; the formation of strong alliances and protective arrangements with pastoral carrier groups; and the assumption of the formerly indispensable functions of the Turkish elite. Communications between the province and the Turkish Empire became continually interrupted by the rise of outlaw bands looting the caravan routes in the West. The pastoral carriers themselves were often involved in this looting of supplies. But the growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire as its supply lines were cut off functioned also to weaken the administrative-military controls of the provincial Turks. This finally led to their alliance with the merchants and carriers and to the growth of exploitation of the countryside by the local town dwellers. This vacuum left by the loss of Turkish armed power in Bosnia and the coinciding rise of Austro-Hungarian power in the adjacent territories to the north brought a new type of foreign occupation to Bosnia with the further consolidation of the Islamized merchants' control. For the legal props of Turkish control which favored the Moslem population over the Serbian and Catholic, especially in relation to land ownership and control and an inequitable tax system based on ethnic affiliation, was left intact and enforced by Austrian officials. This, along with the expulsion of the Turkish elites carried all the important means of power and wealth into the hands of the local merchants with the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878 (Sugar 1963:31; Tomasevich 1955:108-109). Although the new industrial urbanized powers of the north brought with them the seeds of the merchants' undoing in the forms of nationalism, foreign capital investment in industry and proletarianization of the countryside, most of the forty years of Austro-Hungarian occupation (which lasted to World War I) saw town life maintained and controlled by Moslem merchants, now the major suppliers of Austrian-controlled industry in nearby centers and collaborators with western investors who now entered the provinces with little knowledge of its marketing or industrial possibilities (Stoianovich 1960:297-299).

Collaboration with the administrators of the western imperial powers of Austria-Hungary had a quite different meaning from collaboration with the former Turkish overlords. For the Moslem merchants now had to cope with a new kind of occupation. Not content with passive acceptance of their regime

through payment of taxes and levies on food production, the Austro-Hungarians demanded active participation both from the towns and the countryside in their armies and industries. And it was during this period that portions of the population began to be siphoned off, in the winter slack season, into the nearby forest industries and the developing mining and steel production centers of Zenica.

It was during this period also that large Roman Catholic populations (Croats) were attracted to the area by the Austro-Hungarian occupation (also Catholic). In fact the present population distribution of the environs of Novi Šeher was formed during this period. Out of fourteen villages which surround Novi Šeher and utilize it as a service center and former political center, seven of the largest ones are Catholic (Croat), two are mixed but mainly Catholic, one is Orthodox (Serb), one is mixed but mainly Orthodox, and three of the smallest settlements are Moslem. The settlement of this large Croat population undoubtedly brought great pressures on the land and the cutting down of much of the forest in the surrounding hillsides of Novi Šeher and the complete deforestation of the valley in which the settlement is located. (In talking of times past, the elders frequently remembered that the forest used to extend right up to the village, c. 1910. Today the valley floor, about fifty square kilometers, is heavily cultivated. The remaining trees are used as property demarcations. Only the hills surrounding this valley retain their forest cover.) Many of the tensions that have existed for centuries between national groups in Yugoslavia were exaggerated during this period. Even though the Austro-Hungarian representatives in Bosnia had more to gain by upholding the former Turkish legal system which favored the Moslem population, they also had great sympathies with their Catholic brethren, the Croats who settled in the countryside. Nevertheless, it was the Moslem population which controlled the towns and political structures of the larger communities and their immediate countrysides. And it was the Moslem population, with experience in trade and marketing, that was advantageous for the Austro-Hungarians to utilize rather than the experience of the basically peasant stock of the recently arrived Croats.

III. Experiences in Industrial and State Organization

The introduction of wage labor, the entrance of a significant and alien population into the countryside of Novi Šeher, pressure on the land, the loss of trade goods from the Orient, the beginning of land reforms after World War I with the formation of the first Yugoslav state or Federation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which included Bosnia as a part of Croatia, all tended to squeeze the merchant out of his lofty position. The pre-industrial town and the people who controlled it were rapidly becoming appendages of industrial-urban centers to be exploited by them for labor and food supplies. Although the land still offered an opportunity for some, the Moslem merchants' control over it was being shaken from above and below. As the heavily indebted peasant demanded his plot of land free from the constraints placed on him by Moslem merchant-landholders, the state was attempting to take control of the land away from the large landholders in order to feed its own pockets (Tomasevich 1955:352-356).

The exigencies of this new condition led to many changes in the local economic scene. As Novi Šeher, a pre-industrial town, was suited neither

geographically nor structurally to the introduction of industry,⁴ it changed mainly in relation to the external forces of the modern state and its policy of urbanization tied to industrialization. This is even more true today with a modern communist regime in power. And it is carried through on the local level by the fact that Novi Šeher has been reorganized within a system of communes. It now exists as an outlying community in the Commune of Maglaj whose head town (also called Maglaj) is the industrial center of the Commune with a large paper factory. It is as well the politico-administrative locus of the Commune. As a matter of fact, this new reorganization of the politico-administrative system which occurred at the time that the factory of Maglaj began its operations, has relegated Novi Šeher to the status of a village.

We shall now examine the population structure of Novi Šeher in light of this new status. In effect, we have seen that Novi Šeher grew up as a town. Its population handled those kinds of activities which made it so. And not until the end of the nineteenth century did any significant changes in these activities occur. This is the case even though certain structural changes in relation to colonial occupiers did take place and produced or, at least, created the conditions for future change.

The merchants began to be squeezed out of their power position from the beginning of the century. Finally they were snuffed out completely by the establishment of a communist regime after World War II which was intolerant of their capitalist, entrepreneurial activities. At this time, they began to diversify their methods of gaining a livelihood.

As lucrative trade was no longer possible, two basic divisions occurred. There were those who reverted to subsistence type activities and those who took advantage of the opportunities offered by the larger society. The former either continued to ply their trades as craftsmen or took up small-scale agriculture, and the latter availed themselves of the opportunities of education and wage labor. The nature of the conditions which led to one path or the other is not entirely clear. Undoubtedly part of the story rests in the limited opportunities to gain an education or a job in a factory for a community not in easy walking distance from the centers which housed these modern institutions. And, on the other hand, the explanation lies in the cohesiveness of the extended family as a corporate group resisting the attraction of the school or the factory.

IV. Family Units which have Evolved in the Present Period in Novi Šeher (see Table 1)

Four types of socio-economic family units have evolved, each with its historical antecedents and all representing a basic adaptation to the new socio-political forces acting upon the community. These four types can more profitably be looked upon as alternatives which arose when the traditional modes of gaining a livelihood, e.g. commerce, tax-farming, crafts, collapsed or, in other words, were no longer viable alternatives for the historical reasons discussed above. Each in its turn has its manifestations in family organization and its view of the future. All have basically a similar past and look upon it as something of a golden age of "agas" and "begs."⁵ Even though most of the elders and middle-aged people do not hesitate to admit that conditions are generally better today than they were in their youth and

their fathers' and grandfathers' days, they yet speak of their Turkish heritage with a glimmer in their eyes. That, "My father was a wealthy beg who owned much land and many cows, who had three wives and as many houses; and I am only a poor man with little to boast of," was recognized as a step downward in status for the man that admitted such a difference between himself and his father or even in himself in the present and "before the revolution." But, of course, it was never a total loss of status. For recognizing the glorious past in many ways brought its status to the person relating stories about it.

The four types of family units which have evolved are basically socio-economic units molded in the particular adaptation which individuals of larger family units chose from among the alternatives available. Even though certain choices tended to disband the previous extended family form, the Zadruga (Halpern 1958:135)⁶ and others tended to strengthen it, we can assume that all choices met the conditions of maintaining the community, Novi Šeher, as a viable unit. This means that the range of economic alternatives were limited by the decision not to abandon the community and move elsewhere. For permanent migration is minimal in Novi Šeher, its major form being a small number of cases of exogamous marriages of females (see Table 2). The four types then are: 1. agriculturalist, 2. small businessman, 3. wage laborer, 4. quasi-professional. The first two types are directed inward in the sense that the individual works in the community and, therefore, his work becomes a "family affair." Types three and four, on the other hand, are directed outward. This means that the individual working or preparing for work must reside elsewhere at specified intervals for his study or job and return to the community only for short spans of time at school or work breaks. For the distances between the community and the job or the classroom are too great to return home in the evening, especially with the poor transportation facilities which presently exist. None of these types are clear-cut. Often a man will attempt to maintain himself in two or three categories in order to maximize his income. He will seldom do this at the same time, but at different intervals in the yearly cycle. The categories are not clear-cut in another, more interesting way. That is, by taking the household unit as our analytic framework, we find a generational difference in operation or in preparation. Where father is generally in category one or two, son is or prepares to enter category three or four. In this sense our arrangement of categories from one to four represents a progression in time, a series of stages on a ladder of increasing status, financial benefit, and social mobility, a generational progression toward taking advantage of the increasing opportunities offered by the larger society, the nation-state. But we must now examine what the units within this framework characterize; how they came to be and how they presently function, as well as their future possibilities.

V. The Agriculturalist and His Offspring, the Worker

The first category, the agriculturalist or farmer, is, according to official policy of the Yugoslav government, looked upon as a relic of the past. We are speaking here of the private farmer who, today, can legally own no more than ten hectares of arable land (c. twenty-five acres), as opposed to the agricultural laborer on a collective farm or state co-operative enterprise. This official stance concerning peasant agriculture is taken in spite

Table 1

POPULATION OF NOVI ŠEHER BY AGE AND SEX 1961

Sex	AGE							Total
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +	
Male	201	109	65	73	36	30	29	543
Female	185	113	86	87	39	40	32	583
Total	386	222	151	160	75	70	61	1126

Source: Federal Institute of Statistics. Belgrade 1961.⁸

Table 2

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF PEOPLE FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER
WHO WERE BORN IN NOVI ŠEHER BUT NOW RESIDE ELSEWHERE

NOVI ŠEHER 1964

(N=41)

Sex	AGE											Total
	15- 19	20- 24	25- 29	30- 34	35- 39	40- 44	45- 49	50- 54	55- 59	60- 64	65 +	
Male	-	3	7	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	15
Female	1	4	5	7	2	2	2	-	1	2	-	26
Total	1	7	12	9	4	3	2	-	1	2	-	41

Source: Bresloff 1964.⁹

of the fact that almost half of the population of Yugoslavia is today classified as rural and of that most would be involved in small-scale agriculture as a way of life.

The case of Novi Šeher, however, shows that peasant small-scale agriculture was never a way of life in the community and that only the exigencies of the changing times led to a reversion to these activities on the part of some of its people (see Table 3). One significant reflection of the difference between these small-scale agriculturalists of Novi Šeher and others of the surrounding villages is that the former distinguish themselves from the latter terminologically by regarding the population of the countryside as seljaci (peasants) and themselves as zemljoradnici (literally land-workers). It seems that the attitudes of superiority which we can expect to have developed under town life have carried through to this day. The zemljoradnik of Novi Šeher considers the seljak of the countryside a "primitive," "poor," "dirty," "peasant." He is distinct from the town-dweller who with pride often refers to his history of "culture," "character," and "good breeding." As we have described earlier, because of the tax-farming methods of the merchants and the armed might of the local Turks, town-rural relations have in the past usually been expressed in the roles of oppressor and oppressed. This undoubtedly would account for attitudes of superiority on the part of the townspeople.

Farming, in any case, was never adopted by the majority of the population. And it is more than likely that the percentage of the population involved in farming will in the future continually decrease (see Table 4). This will be the case as long as present political policies are directed toward cooperative measures in food production, with state aid and other opportunities especially in labor and professional training being increasingly accessible. Farming has seldom, in the modern period, been a way of life. That is, it is rarely the total occupation of the economic unit, the household. In those cases where it has become a total occupation, it is usually the result of lack of personnel (family members tied into the household as contributing members) to direct the household along other lines. Ordinarily this means the lack of young males in the household who are able to work and a subsequent alliance among brothers or near male relatives of the same generation to continue their reliance upon the land.

If we can stop to reconstruct the situation which gave rise to these conditions we will understand the present condition of the agriculturalist and his future much better. A generation and two ago it was still quite respectable for individuals, or more probably, extended families, to have control over large expanses of land and its produce through, at the very least, rent. This was, moreover, a molding influence in two ways. It served to keep brothers and their sons under one economically unified household in order to maximize their gains by keeping their collectively owned land intact. With the increasing loss of interest in agriculture and the attraction of wage labor, growing land reforms and the abolishment of peasant indebtedness, a war and revolution, and the establishment of a communist state, the brothers, instead of abandoning the land, took to working it themselves keeping their holdings, although now diminished in size, intact and operating as an economic unit as it had been previously. The younger generation, however, with their modern experience and with the realization that although the family land may

Table 3

SAMPLED MALE POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER
BY OCCUPATION AND LAND OWNED.

NOVI ŠEHER 1964

(N=118)

Land (in dunum, 1 dunum = 1/10 hec- tare)	OCCUPATION						Total
	Private Farmer	State Worker	State Clerical Semi-prof.	Private Craftsmen Businessmen	State Student Soldier	Unclass. Unknown	
0-9	-	31	7	13	18	3	72
10-19	3	6	1	6	-	-	16
20-29	5	1	-	2	1	-	9
30-39	4	-	-	1	-	-	5
40-49	5	-	-	-	-	-	5
50-59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
60-69	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
70-79	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
80-89	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
90-99	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
100 (legal limit)	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
Unknown	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
Total	24	41	9	22	19	3	118
Percentage	20	34.5	8	18	17	2.5	100

Source: Bresloff 1964.

Table 4

SAMPLED MALE POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER
BY AGE AND OCCUPATION.

NOVI ŠEHER 1964

(N=118)

Age	OCCUPATION						Total
	Private Farmer	State Worker	State Clerical Semi-prof.	Private Craftsmen Businessmen	State Student Soldier	Unclass. Unknown	
15-19	-	2	-	-	9	1	12
20-24	-	3	-	2	7	-	12
25-29	1	14	1	3	3	-	22
30-34	2	8	2	5	-	1	18
35-39	1	6	2	5	-	-	14
40-44	3	1	3	3	-	-	10
45-49	2	1	-	1	-	-	4
50-54	3	3	-	2	-	1	9
55-59	6	2	-	1	-	-	9
60-64	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
65 +	6	1	-	-	-	-	7
Total	24	41	9	22	19	3	118
Percent- age	20	34.5	8	18	17	2.5	100
Mean Age	51.8	33.2	39.2	36.5	20.4		

Source: Bresloff 1964.

support the elder generation it could not support them, took to other forms of livelihood. They turned, in fact, to wage labor. The consequences of this move was a split in generations. The elders retained the traditional extended family as an economically viable unit with no successors, and the new generation set up its own households with no more than a garden for the wife and young children of the now nuclear family household to work in order to supplement the family larder.¹⁰

For the most part we have explained and analyzed categories one and three. Part of the laborers are the sons of agriculturalists. As the latter decline in numbers the former grow. It is perhaps only a matter of time before the agricultural population is stabilized at a very low point. The developing industries of the Bosnian and Yugoslavian economies are increasingly in need of labor. Even though partial automation has begun to be introduced in some areas of industry there, labor is still a cheaper source of energy. A major problem is to develop enough skilled labor to operate, maintain and develop recent industrial growth. And the people of Novi Šeher as elsewhere in Yugoslavia are participating in this trend and are eager to grab the new opportunities which it offers.

Among the laborers, family life is "nucleated." This is to say that the economic unit is the nuclear family. And there are very good reasons for this development out of the extended family situation.

As we have noted above, opportunities for wage labor did not develop suddenly for the population of Novi Šeher. Wage labor began as a temporary venture on a seasonal or part time basis with the introduction of industry into the area beginning over eighty years ago. At that time wage labor never formed the basis of household economies but provided a supplement to the dwindling incomes and positions of the population. In a sense individuals dropped in and out of the labor market as the need arose.¹¹

As industry continues to develop in even greater proportion and opportunities for labor increase, the attraction or "pull" of wage labor also increases. Gradually, wages begin to form the basis of household incomes. As agriculture (as a family livelihood) fails to prop up the household budget as it had in former days, more and more of the income from wages (gained by the younger generation as noted above) is invested in agricultural pursuits. This was undoubtedly the case as budgets were controlled by the elder generation which yet had both feet on the soil. As wage incomes fail to raise the standard of living of the household, and the wage earner, subsequently, sees no results from this added income, the seeds of dissatisfaction and nucleation of the extended family household are sown. Sooner or later a split along generational lines including those between younger and older brothers takes place dividing households. Today this split is virtually complete among the households under discussion. The major remnants of the extended family household exist only in the presence of a widowed mother or father of the husband and wife of the nuclear family.

VI. Position of Women

An interesting by-product of this division between generations is that between the sexes. Traditional Slavic culture reinforced by Islam

granted no equality to females. Modernization, today carried on strongly in both schools and factories, has virtually no effect on the women of Novi Šeher. In fact, this modernization trend which is a dominant theme of the Yugoslav nation, has operated only to isolate and further segregate the females from the mainstream of contemporary events. Whereas family nucleation has operated to integrate the male population into the developments of the nation, it has destroyed the major mechanism of female association and status, the extended family household.

Few women have left the town for work elsewhere. And, as males must migrate to their jobs, returning home ordinarily on Saturday afternoons only to leave again on Sunday night, females do not even enjoy the companionship of their husbands not to speak of that of other women in the household. And the absence of the help she once received from the females of the extended family household has multiplied the woman's household duties as well as further confining her to persistent household chores. Even attempts to organize women into social groups and the Communist Party have been miserable failures. Most have not the time and, as a result of their condition, fail to support any organization with political (socialist) overtones. Having been by-passed and burdened under the new scheme of things, she has clung most faithfully of all, along with the older men of the community, to Islam and its associated beliefs. In an important sense the female population of Novi Šeher is a residue of conservatism which, perhaps, has yet to express itself.

VII. The Craftsman and the Quasi-Professional and Their Families

In effect, the last two types of families represent a parallel development with the former. Category two, small businessmen, is dying out as category four, quasi-professional, is growing. Both today are minor portions of the population, but, nevertheless, are of significant importance to consider.

Briefly, the craftsman and artisan provided for the well being of the merchant and Turkish elite in the traditional setting. They manufactured jewelry, weaved carpets, cut hair, tailored clothes, among innumerable other tasks. The final blow to them came with the entrance of the manufactured, finished product. But, preceding this, they were slowly eliminated as town life subsided and the need for their many services became sharply reduced.

Today only a handful of such people maintain themselves. Some make a handsome living relative to present low standards. These are mainly the innkeepers (who sell liquor and beer) and coffeehouse proprietors. For large amounts of liquor and coffee are consumed daily and these establishments are traditional meeting places for men of Novi Šeher and surrounding villages who come to town to avail themselves of the services there (including the Catholic Church and the Mosque). The others, namely blacksmiths, bakers, barbers, shoemakers, millers, and butchers, must rely on other sources to supplement the family larder. This normally means maintaining and working a plot of land or periodic wage labor when business is bad or a crisis occurs. More often, however, the land is abandoned and sold. For land taxes become a liability in a financially marginal situation. Wage labor, on the other hand, offers the possibility of meeting and pulling through the temporary crises and eventually returning to the business.¹²

The craftsmen, who were said to have numbered into the hundreds two generations ago, were bound to the same process which affected the merchant. They too underwent similar processes of change. Perhaps the only major differences were that their skills and, for a certain segment, manual dexterity, were now functional in the new industries. More often than not they took on skilled factory jobs with greater remuneration. The effect, moreover, on the household, was the same nucleating process that occurred among the former merchants turned agriculturalists. In fact, the tendency here was even greater. For skilled work holds high priority with the present industrial system. This means greater integration into the main stream of the new national culture along with membership in the Communist Party. This last move is the ultimate alienating force from the older generation and not entirely popular in the community.¹³

Finally, no craftsman has an assistant or apprentice. No craftsman expects or desires his child to continue in his footsteps. The case is the same among the former merchants, now farmers. Furthermore, no child is eager to enter into these "traditional" livelihoods. If anything, the generation growing up today has a distinct aversion toward these traditional occupations. Only a crisis in the household or personal disability¹⁴ could lead him into these avowedly low status positions in the new Yugoslavia. The ideal jobs today fall among the professional and skilled labor classifications and are based on technical and academic education. Even the lowest form of physical labor is the better alternative to subsistence farming.

This brings us to our last category, quasi-professional. All factory labor, quasi-professional and professional positions are controlled and financed by the state. And the unions to which these people belong are centrally controlled under government auspices. The very nature of the controlling agency has, in the past generation, been the basis of antagonism and lack of desire for involvement in its organization in the form of work. The fact of growing participation in the ranks of labor has been, in recent years, the mechanism for the dissipation of this antagonism of the people of Novi Šeher toward the communist state. It is interesting to note that for some years after the revolution up to the early and mid-1950's, Novi Šeher remained a pocket of resistance toward the state and communism. This was a result, in part, of the processes described above which led to the sharp decline of the traditional Turkish town which culminated in participation of the people of Novi Šeher with the axis powers during World War II against Tito's partisans and continued resistance after the war. No less than forty members of the community were jailed for political reasons of "resistance" and "subversion." And many were not freed to return to Novi Šeher and their families until the middle and late 1950's.

Education has been another mainspring of integration into the national economy. For it has been the basis of the leap into the professional classes of the society. But education has not equally provided the necessary skills for professional work. Although in the larger society party membership has undoubtedly made this path easier to climb, it is only beginning to do so in Novi Šeher. For the most part, the attainment of such positions has its foundation in the individual's family background.

Education has always played a significant role in the rearing of children in a Moslem household. Even outside of the household the religious school, *mehteb*, was crucial in the child's upbringing before the coming of the public school in the 1930's, and to some extent to this day.¹⁵ Although both household and religious school education have always been mainly for teaching Islam, it also included literacy in Serbo-Croatian and Arabic. Undoubtedly, much more was learned in the process and the tradition is today held in esteem. Although not all families took equal advantage of this tradition, or had the leisure to continue it in recent years, especially with the prominence of public-school education and its time-consuming role in the activities of children, a particular type of family appears to have exploited this tradition to the benefit of the new generation. This has provided the basis of high achievement in the public school and high aspirations in work and way of life. Paradoxically, however, it has also produced a highly "religious" person in a state which does little if anything to encourage religion. (Membership in the Communist Party precludes all participation in religious activities.) What has happened in Novi Šeher is that the most religious (and the most conservative in terms of values) have had the best preparation to participate in the higher occupational brackets of great prestige in the larger society as well as in Novi Šeher. And although they are only a handful of people, they have succeeded in climbing into these positions.

One of the conditions of this is academic ability to succeed in the high school and university and financial ability to pay for one's education.¹⁶ This has reinforced, then, not the nucleating trend in family organization in contemporary Novi Šeher, but the cohesion of the traditional extended family spanning three generations. It has, in effect, maintained the former dependence of offspring on their parents in a new fashion. No longer does a son want to inherit land, business or house, but he has become reliant upon the larger family's resources for his education, "professionalization," and greater integration into the larger society. In return, the family household reaps the rewards of this process in its receipt of moral and economic support from its product, the new professional.

Although a small and new trend, this is yet a significant division in Novi Šeher both in the historical and contemporary settings. For this type of family structurally typical in stemming from the extended family occupied, in former days, the apex of the town's social structure. And as leaders they no doubt strongly carried on the traditions of their culture in its religious, political, economic and educational aspects. In doing so they embraced some of the important attributes necessary for a successful adaptation to the new society and modern national culture of Yugoslavia. Consequently, they have and continue to maintain this position in the local social structure of Novi Šeher and play an active role in sustaining it as a viable community. For, although training and job often take them outside the community, they nonetheless have no thoughts of leaving their homes behind them. Traditionally and now strongly tied into their extended family units which made possible their training and profession,¹⁷ they continue to live at the homes of their fathers, with their wives and children, brothers and unmarried sisters. Tied into the community, they take active roles in its development and political representation in the larger society, i.e. commune.¹⁸ Furthermore, they attempt not only to get jobs in nearby communities but in Novi Šeher itself. That is, they seek to be even nearer to their families and more highly

integrated in the community life by establishing their services and skills in the community and for the community. As this sector of the local economy (professional services) must be financed by the state and commune, it grows slowly and openings appear only after the need is well established--e.g. more teachers, doctors. But the trend appears to be established awaiting only the opportunity for its fulfillment. Apparently only time is needed to decide the fate of this trend.

Conclusion

In conclusion it must be admitted that the full establishment of this trend (returning the most skilled to the community) is crucial to the viability of village life. These are the leaders of the community, recognized for their achievements and solid "character." Along with the larger growing population of migrant workers they will ultimately decide the lot of the community. Although it is not under threat of being abandoned due to the development of nearby industrial centers, there has not been much potential for urban industrial development itself. It (Novi Šeher) will, nevertheless, continue to change in one direction or the other; and these changes, critically dependent upon events external to the community itself, will ultimately also depend on the forces and skills of the community itself.

Finally, Novi Šeher has never had to face the problem of the peasant-worker. He simply does not exist in the community for the reason that the conditions of his existence are absent because Novi Šeher is located far from the two major industrial centers on which it depends. Zenica, by far the most important, is about fifty kilometers to the south of Novi Šeher and Maglaj, the commune center, is about eighteen kilometers northwest. Due to inadequate transportation to these centers, it is impossible to return home each evening after work.¹⁹ Most workers in Zenica live in barracks near the factory grounds during the workweek. The few workers from Novi Šeher in Maglaj ordinarily find quarters with relatives or close friends. They can return home more frequently than their colleagues in Zenica but it is difficult and time consuming, especially during the winter months when the roads are muddy.

All this adds up to the unlikelihood of a worker from Novi Šeher maintaining a farm of any greater significance than a household garden worked by his wife and children. This worker who does not rely on the land to supplement his income will often utilize his spare time participating in various factory sponsored "cultural" activities, e.g. academic and technical classes, trade union functions, dramatic groups, thereby adding to his prestige on the job.

The peasant-worker, on the other hand, lives near the factory and because of this, is able to farm his land for profit in after work hours. A major consequence of this is, of course, his peripheral status in the labor force and lack of integration into the new economic system. Furthermore, the factory officials and the organized groups under them play a large role in the administration and affairs of the community. The peasant-worker being only marginal to factory activities and having little leisure time is rather estranged from the mainstream of community life.

Social scientists in Yugoslavia are busy studying the peasant-worker. Industrial problems in production and management are highly conditioned by the existence of this anomaly. Having one foot on his land and the other in the factory he neither fully participates in factory affairs nor devotes his full energy and concentration to his job. He is the root of production losses due to being tired on the job (for he in fact works two jobs, at the factory and on his land) and causing accidents; and managerial problems due to his lack of training in using machinery and following instructions, and his inability to operate under rigid factory routine. In brief, he is ordinarily inefficient as a worker and as a participant in this critically important sector of the nation's economy.

Novi Šeher has not produced such anomalies. It is tied only indirectly to the factories in neighboring centers and relies upon its own resources and not those of the factory for running the community. Although migrant labor has not been a completely satisfactory adaptation to an industrialized society it has, nevertheless, allowed greater and more efficient participation and integration into the economy of the nation along with at least gradual development in the community itself. It has also, we would suggest, left the community with a better outlook for the future. Having given up its traditional forms of livelihood in the control of land and trade it has, perforce, developed a greater stake in the progress and development of the nation and, in time, its own community than many of the small settlements clustered around factories and other industrial centers. At these places the farmer still clings to his land and former way of life gaining no interest in the developing nation. Novi Šeher, because of historical and geographical reasons, has had no opportunity to develop along the lines of the peasant-worker. It is apparently to his advantage that these conditions do not prevail.

The particular adaptation made by the community Novi Šeher to the new industrial setting is more successful and productive to all concerned than that made by the peasant-worker. The accusation that conservative elements predominate in contemporary Moslem communities in Bosnia and in contemporary Yugoslavia as a whole is not entirely well founded. On the contrary, some elements of the Turkish past which continue to operate to this day seem not to have hindered but to have provided significant assets to the nation and to the community.

Although there are undoubtedly many more so-called "dysfunctional" aspects related to the changing situation, e.g. the position of women, than have been noted here, some of the major aspects of family and community adaptation to modern conditions appear reasonably successful and well on their way toward producing fruitful developments through greater integration into the nation.

ENDNOTES

¹The data were collected in the summer of 1964 in Yugoslavia on a field trip sponsored by the Department of Anthropology, Brandeis University. Graduate seminars preceding and following the field work program also contributed to the writing of this paper. The program was directed by Dr. Joel M. Halpern.

²My stay in Yugoslavia (three and one-half months) included ten weeks in Novi Šeher, located approximately one hundred miles north and west of the provincial capital of Bosnia, Sarajevo. This is fairly rugged country, hilly and in many parts still heavily forested.

³All of the Moslem villages have under eighty houses whereas most of the others claimed to have more, some reaching to four hundred.

⁴It is not located by a river or a railroad and its population was controlled by merchants often resisting the introduction of western "liberal" ideology and the appurtenances of western culture.

⁵Moslem religio-political officials installed by the Turks.

⁶"Two or more nuclear families sharing a common household and economy."

⁷This is by no means rare today. An agriculturalist will often take on wage labor in the forest as a lumberjack in the wintertime when there is little work to be done on the land. A wage laborer will often spend time studying on his own or going to school in order to eventually rise to a foreman or managerial position, or into skilled labor. A small businessman often relies on a small plot of land which he works at slow periods for a proportion of his household food supply. The examples become more complex when the division of labor within the household unit is dealt with and not simply individuals.

⁸During my field work in 1964, it appeared to me that the population of Novi Šeher was about fifteen hundred. This was based on the number of households (approximately 250) in the community and the average number of people per household (approximately six). Many households consisted of more than a nuclear family. The differences between my figure and the 1961 census figure are only partially explained by population increase. The variations may also be a result of the fact that census takers counted only those people present on the days the census was taken. Some people undoubtedly were away, especially migrant laborers.

⁹Data received for this and all the following tables were obtained through interviews with residents of Novi Šeher.

¹⁰If a working man owns more than 1,000 square meters of arable land he must forfeit the monthly subsidies the state offers for children living in the household--in 1964 this was 3,000 dinars per child (a little more than \$4 at the official exchange rate).

¹¹There are still a handful of cases today of people practicing this kind of unstable relation to the expanding labor market. For the most part they fall into the small businessman category and will be discussed later.

¹²The miller, for example, who has a history of brief periods of wage labor--from three months to two years at a stretch--went through such a crisis during my stay. The dam for his mill was destroyed by heavy rains at the time he was preparing to send his eldest child to high school in Maglaj. This meant a large expense for him in terms of room and board for the child

away from home. His immediate thought was to return to factory work in a nearby town, and put his child to work for the present time until enough cash could be gathered to meet expenses of a new dam. As it happened the situation turned out quite differently than expected, but the reaction was a typical one.

¹³Membership in the Communist Party for most members of the community is usually rationalized on the basis of its being a practical move for greater job preference and "political" favors for the children in reference to future school and job opportunities.

¹⁴This would usually mean abnormally low intelligence or physical inability to carry on factory labor tasks. Another circumstance would be coercion of an extremely patriarchal father upon his son to continue working for the household and on its land, especially in cases of extreme need of help and inability to change or to rely upon other sources of livelihood.

¹⁵Although there are no more than one hundred students in mehteb today compared with seven hundred in the public school. The mehteb only meets three days a week for two hours after public school classes and includes only students from Novi Šeher. The public school meets six days weekly and each child has four to five hours of instruction daily. However, it is an eight year school and the only one of its kind for Novi Šeher and its fourteen satellite villages. It is unknown, but assuredly there are more than one hundred students from Novi Šeher enrolled in the public school.

¹⁶Although education is free (paid for by the state) there are often exorbitant expenses for the generally poor household in books, room and board. For example, an unskilled worker who may earn only about \$35 monthly (take home pay) would find it a burden to relinquish \$10 monthly to support a son in high school in a nearby town for four years in order that he receive his "diploma." Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to think that \$10 would be sufficient with the present high cost of food. More than likely the boy would live with a relative or some fictive kin, e.g. godfather, and the father would pay in kind, e.g. produce from the village, more often than cash.

¹⁷Their professions are mostly veterinarian, teacher, businessman, manager, doctor or nurse, and agronomist.

¹⁸For example, they were instrumental in the building of the new school (1956) and its addition (1964), the health clinic (1945), obtaining electricity (1956), and getting bus service for the community (1965) as well as building and financing a grand-sized minaret (1958) attached to the mosque in the center of the settlement which can be seen for miles around.

¹⁹Public transportation in the summer of 1964 was as follows:

Friday--a weekly bus to and from the market in Žepče, an adjacent commune center to the southwest about 14 kilometers.

Saturday--weekly busses (sometimes up to five or six) arrived from the work centers of Zenica, Žepče and Zavidovići in the late afternoon bringing workers home for the evening and the next day. The hours in Yugoslavia

for most workers are seven in the morning to two in the afternoon six days a week.

Sunday--these very same busses return late Sunday night to bring the workers back to their factories.

Through correspondence in early 1965, I was told that the commune financed a twice-daily bus between Novi Šeher and Maglaj. This may have the potential to change work and living patterns in Novi Šeher. For example, expansion of the factory in Maglaj may mean greater job opportunities for the young men of Novi Šeher along with their ability to reside permanently (nightly) at home with their families.

REFERENCES

- Halpern, Joel Martin
1958 Serbian village. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Stoianovich, Traian
1960 The conquering Balkan orthodox merchant. *Journal of Economic History* XX, No. 2, June, pp. 234-313.
1963 The social foundations of Balkan politics, 1750-1941. *In Balkans in Transition*, Charles and Barbara Jelavich, eds., pp. 297-345. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Sugar, Peter F.
1963 *Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-1918*. Seattle, University of Washington Press.
- Tomasevich, Jozo
1955 *Peasants, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.