The Immigration of Caribbean People to the United States: Some Comments

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Introduction

To begin, I will volunteer to you that immigration is a very personal aspect of my life, in addition to its being the subject of scholarly dedication with which I am identified in these circles. I was born in Panama of a varied West Indian ancestry, and I immigrated to this country when I was already an adult with a family in order to study immigration and immigrants. Whenever I am invited to speak on the subject before a learned audience such as this, I am always prompted to share not only my insights but my inner feelings. Although, for purposes of this program, I will try to concentrate on the former, I cannot avoid urging you to attend to both phenomena—the process and the people—because one without the other is impossible and incomplete even for purposes of academic discussion.

Reference to the personal should not be unusual or irritating in this setting, since most of us are considered "soft" scientists and are expected to demonstrate special expertise and sensitivity to the qualitative, or the superstructural and subjective—all microsociological levels of behavior and organization. It has been my fear ever since a student that, increasingly, social and cultural anthropologists have been abdicating this domain and expertise, or misusing it, to study and generalize about "macro" entities beyond the unique methodological strength and crucial level of explanatory power of their discipline. As a result, they do worse what others do better and leave less done what others do least. I hope in the final analysis I am able not only to inform you about what in my mind are interesting aspects of the history and sociology of the immigration process, but also to inspire you to proceed from these to develop professional interests in immigrants themselves—whether legal or illegal, whether from the Caribbean or other parts of the world—as persons, people, and human groups who have entered and settled in this country and have begun to function in sociologically recognizable and socially consequential ways. Now, however, I must return to the professional chore before me today: to share with you, as a sociologist, some general comments on Caribbean immigration to the United States in a rather restricted amount of time.

Immigration in the United States: A General History

Immigration is the history of the American hemisphere—of all the countries and people who comprise it. But it is the United States that most vociferously articulates and romantically identifies its history as immigration. Even its original inhabitants are viewed technically as immigrants. It is speculated that the first human inhabitants arrived from the Asian mainland to what is today the United States some 12,000 years ago and to the Pacific extensions at least 30,000 years ago. Hence, the United States was founded by aliens, immigrants—peoples of foreign birth or origin.

These early settlers were followed by Europeans and Africans, who came along after the Amerindian population had settled on this land and cultivated and claimed it. From the first days of contact until today, the latter have been called and considered the "first natives" by all others who have followed. It is, therefore, ironic—perhaps instructive—to see today's descendants of all of America's early uninvited and therefore "illegal" immigrants in their self-righteous condemnation of current immigrants, refugees, and "illegals," without their having given a second thought to their own questionable beginnings or to the particular responsibilities of this country for the continued coming of new immigrants to its shores.

Throughout colonial times, people were referred to not as "immigrants," but as "strangers"; others were called "servants," "slaves," "savages," and "settlers." At first, settlement laws were prevalent; preoccupation with strangers was pervasive, at least for a time, until labor needs emerged. Urban growth, constant migration, and other changing circumstances made scrutiny and banishment of such strangers more difficult to practice in any widespread manner. It took more than 100 years after independence for the first federal laws on immigration to be passed—namely, the Act of 1875. And, prior to that, individual communities and colonies, and later individual states or territories, governed the entry, treatment, and settlement of foreigners or strangers in their respective jurisdictions. In fact, until the post-Civil War period, free black sailors or strangers from other countries or states stood a good chance of being arrested, quarantined, and sold into slavery when they came ashore from ships docked in certain southern ports, and there were violent incidents resulting from their mistaken treatment in northern cities as well.

Notwithstanding the existence of much more comprehensive laws and broad stipulative federal responsibilities for immigration today, this country absorbs a large volume and a great variety of immigrants of differing origins and categories, including illegals, into its population. In this respect, it exceeds other nations of similar size and status even at a time when immigration has become a worldwide phenomenon and also a highly politicized national issue in the United States. This situation brings to the fore the seemingly ill-fitting conjuncture between laws and policies on the one hand and social reality and human behavior on the other. This is an area of intimate and legitimate concern to modern political anthropologists and other social scientists, a point upon which I will touch later.

Existing records show a cumulative registration of about 50 million alien persons who had either entered the United States as legal immigrants or had their status changed accordingly from 1920 through 1980. During these 60 years, there has been no year recorded in which immigration has not taken place, even though there were some years when departures exceeded admissions. To date, the lowest annual immigration into the country recorded is 6,354 persons in 1923, the highest being 1,285,309 in 1907. Of course, we know that immigration fluctuates from year to year and from time to time. However, over the last five decades, legal immigration to the United States has been increasing steadily: from about 500,000 in the decade of 1931 to 1940 to almost 5 million in 1971 to 1980.

The "New" Immigration

From all appearances, then, this country is experiencing its latest wave of new immigrants—a wave we have chosen to call "The New Immigration." As with any previous wave, today's new movement of immigrants has certain distinctive features, which characterize it more than others and which distinguish it, then, from those others. And, in addition, these immigrants are also distinguished because of a difference in attitude toward them, as compared to those arriving in preceding years and periods of time and, I suppose,

those who may follow.

This new wave of immigration really started to emerge as a part of the post-World War II changes in the international economic order and also in the gain in power and the assumption of leadership by the United States within that order. Ever since, there have been quite noticeable and sustained immigrations and transplanted ethnic communities from several parts of the world. But it really started to take its more specific shape in the 1960s, in anticipation of and response to the Celler-Hart Bill, otherwise known as the "Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965." The Act itself is new in terms of the shift in its intent and provisions relative to its predecessors—that is, in emphasizing hemispheric ceilings rather than national (racially implicit) quotas, family reunification rather than separation, and the like. And, the immigration itself is new, not simply in terms of increases in rate of volume, but also in the composition and characteristics of its leading source countries, the new immigrants comprising it, the immigrants' target societies and the relations between them, and the consequences of the immigrants' presence. Finally, the American public has been drawn into a new series of annual debates on the future of immigration and the impact of foreigners on the cultural and economic characteristics of this country.

Today, 20 years after the enactment of the incumbent law, we are faced with the greatest and most desperate effort of all times for a new comprehensive immigration bill to be passed. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983, as the bill under consideration is known, has been rejected three times previously by Congress. But, under the stewardship of Senator Simpson, its legendary spokesperson and now majority leader of the Upper House, a version of the bill quite similar to that of the House of last year was passed in the Senate; it will be considered by the House later in this legislative year.

Media and social science paraphernalia are being used with extreme intensity not only to support the bill but to impress the larger public of the need—felt and real—for a new comprehensive legislation. At times, controversy has been featured; in other cases, selective situations are propagated about groups of aliens whose actions or attitudes threaten the sense of public and personal economic security and other sacredly held aspects of American life, as they are known or believed to be today. But more impressive than the seemingly stacked activities of the press are the local governments' establishment of lobbying groups. These include: 1) the new involvement (although not always in a single voice) in immigration affairs of American minorities, whose pressures were critical in defeating last year's Congressional efforts to pass the bill; and 2) the emergence of new voices and leaders among de facto refugees—illegal immigrants themselves who are advocating on their own behalf in light of the bill.

It may well be, whether or not the proposed Act of 1983 passes (and it is not certain that it will pass as is or pass at all), that the four or so years of struggle around its passing have created, as byproducts, evidence of: 1) the vitality of the American tradition of popular democratic participation by the governed in the determination of laws and policies intended to govern them; and 2) the economic and political "Americanization" of alien sub-populations, whose fate, legality, and contributions are being contested in a more open debate, peaceful atmosphere, and better socioeconomic setting than likely would be available to them in their lands of origin.

It should not be necessary to remind this audience—made up of so many people with anthropological orientation and overseas experiences—that immigration is not a simple phenomenon. Nor is it simply a domestic phenomenon; it has a significant international dimension, with implications both diplomatic and domestic for the countries involved. But we tend to forget these truths in the heat of domestically oriented debate and in the name of national interests. Contrary to the myopic perceptions projected by too

many short-sighted politicians and a generally unsophisticated public, international dimensions are and must be seen as a part of the national (and the local) interests of the United States as well.

To date, most of the sensitive attention to international dimensions in the ongoing deliberation over future immigration policies and legislations has been confined to such issues as provision of sanctuaries for Central Americans, recognition of Haitian political refugees, repatriation or release of incarcerated Mariel Cubans, reorganization of bilingual programs, and the like. The least represented element in the debate over this year's bill seemingly has been the foreign source countries, their governments, and the segments within their populations that are most attracted and affected by U.S. immigration policies and laws. Yet the overarching human structures being formed and the transnational identities and subcultures emerging from the presence of their overseas communities in this and other target societies—like the pre-conditions, policies, projections, and general attitudes of their source countries toward expatriates and emigration—are more than academic in their importance to the United States. The presence of new foreigners is having an already quite serious impact on the ethnic, cultural, economic, and linguistic character, as well as the diplomatic behavior, of this country. It can be expected that the new ethnic communities emerging here will gain similar advantages to those already enjoyed by certain older ethnic or interest groups in the country today. Indeed, in their own innocence, the new settlers show greater conviction and blinder commitment to the promises of the "American Dream" than do the more sophisticated and perhaps cynical natives who have tested its myths and tasted its realities.

The Distinctive Nature of Caribbean Immigration

Having spoken about the more general subject of "new" immigration to the United States, I would like to try to elaborate a bit more about the matter of Caribbean immigration to the U.S. and the immigrants in particular. In so doing, I would like to speak first about the process of immigration in macro-sociological terms; then I would like to speak about the people and their experiences, culture, and adjustments as micro-sociological concerns.

To begin, Caribbean immigrants to the U.S. have been both free persons and slaves. People from the Caribbean region have been coming to the United States from the early periods of its political colonization and economic development. Some came with the conquistadors and others as members of the various colonial groups. Some of them were white, while many others were black, and others were neither black nor white. There were among them some who became important figures in the development of the country: Du Salle, a Haitian, founded the city of Chicago; Alexander Hamilton became the first Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; and William Thornton was the first Federal Architect of Washington, D.C. and Georgetown. Prince Hall founded the first black Freemason lodge, and Denmark Vessey gained fame (or infamy, depending upon one's perspective) as the leader of one of the few major slave revolts in the U.S. A man named Johnson, an ex-slave from Jamaica, would come via England in one of the early landings to Plymouth, Massachusetts. And so, too, there were mutinous slaves who prevented the establishment of the first Spanish colony in the Carolinas before the founding of St. Augustine.

In addition to these individuals, who are known for what today seem historical feats, were the large number of slaves (and masters) who came from the Caribbean to do productive work in the fields. In fact, a substantial proportion of the slave population of the northern U.S. (and presumably Canada, too) were sold and shipped from the West Indies; a significant part of the early population of the southern states of Georgia, the Carolinas, and

Florida came from Barbados, Bermuda, and the Bahamas; and much of the black and colored population of New Orleans and the large Louisiana territory came from or through St. Dominique (Haiti) and the French Antilles. Of these latter two movements, at least part was related to efforts by masters to escape with their movable and human holdings from insurrections and independence movements sweeping through the region.

A second major point to be made about Caribbean immigration to the U.S. is that it has been that both direct and indirect. In the latter case, West Indian immigrants to other places in the hemisphere dominated by U.S. businesses or government eventually ended up here, via secondary migration to the U.S. proper. In fact, the earliest major movement of significant free/freed black labor out of the Caribbean dates back to the middle of the 19th century; although not targeted for the United States proper, it was recruited by Americans for a project intended to meet America's needs, involving a company managed and owned by Americans. This was none other than the Panama Railroad, the first man-made, terrestrial, transcontinental route linking the Atlantic (Caribbean) to the Pacific Coast. Failing with both Chinese and European labor and unable or unwilling to attract local Panamanian workers, the railroad company recruited and contracted Jamaicans, who completed the task. The completion of the Panama Railroad provided American speculators from the East Coast with a safer way to reach California during the Gold Rush and the opening of the western frontier. Thus, like their slave predecessors, free Caribbean immigrant laborers were involved in the early economic development of the American frontier. In this case, such development transcended the country proper, having its impact in another area of the world, in this case Panama.

Being Panamanian by birth, of one-fourth Jamaican (or three-fourths West Indian) ancestry, I feel an affinity with California (and U.S.) history. Likewise, I would hope that the North Americans among you feel some affinity with my region of ancestry, my country of birth, and the contributions of my region's immigrant laborers to the development of your great state and country. Interestingly, there are several outstanding persons of Panamanian-West Indian origin who have settled in California, including Jephet Kotto, the actor, Road Carew, the baseball player, Billy Cobham, the percussionist, and Guy Abrahams, the Olympic sprinter—earning their living in, making their mark in, and, by so doing, enhancing the glory of this new state and society.

Indeed, the combination of U.S. money, technology, and sometimes mighty presence—matched by free, dependable, but cheap Caribbean labor and the sweeping concessions of rights and land by the local aristocratic, commercial, and political leaders—again and again succeeded in penetrating the jungles and swamps of Latin America to build railroads, canals, wharves, and other infrastructural projects; to develop and run primary industries, such as plantations, lumber camps, mines, and oil fields; and to erect and maintain American military installations and civilian company towns (called "zones") in the area. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, there were still Central American workers, many of West Indian ancestry, who were migrating into Panama and the Canal Zone to work on the canal, military installations, fruit plantations, and American townships as the U.S. geared up for the Korean conflict and also new political and economic thrusts in world affairs. It would not be surprising to find offspring of these early Caribbean immigrants involved in all sides of the political and military struggle now taking place along and offshore of the Atlantic coast of Central America, even as American-born or naturalized members of U.S. contingents maneuver or are stationed on the greater isthmus.

By the turn of the 20th century, direct migration of Caribbean peoples into the United States had begun to take place as well, involving Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and U.S. Virgin Islanders, all of whose countries had (or were to) become new U.S. overseas jurisdictions. Direct migration also originated from those islands, Hispanic and non-Hispanic,

independent and colonial, with which the U.S. had 1) special trade or protectorate treaties; 2) investment arrangements or interventions similar to those of many Middle American mainland countries; and 3) regular routes, field offices, and deep-sea communication lines, established by U.S. shipping companies to connect their home posts or headquarters to their Caribbean subsidiaries.

From these countries came thousands of West Indians—men, women, and children—to the southern farms of the U.S. and the factories of its industrial cities. Some of these were those workers who, having been discharged or displaced from the U.S. overseas projects in Central and South America, chose to immigrate to the new metropolis rather than to remain in foreign lands or return to the West Indies. Others were immigrants who came directly from the Caribbean. Both groups of West Indian immigrants tended to follow the same route as North American Blacks in their trek from the South to the major industrial cities of the North—e.g., New York City, Boston, and Detroit. Although Harlem became the mecca of these foreign-born black immigrants, Brooklyn and the Bronx attracted larger populations of West Indian immigrants than any other city.

From this wave of West Indian immigration emerged Marcus Garvey, Arturo Schomburg, John Russworm, Hugh Hulzac, Panama Al Brown, Kid Chocolate, Bert Williams, and among the younger generation, Kenneth B. Clark and Hazel Scott. From among this wave came also the parents of such celebrated first-generation Americans as flutist Eric Dolphy, saxophonist Sonny Stinit, actress Cicely Tyson and actor Sammy Davis, Jr., anthropologist St. Clair Drake, black nationalist Malcolm X, operatic singer Martina Arroyo, poet June Jordan, and writers Piri Thomas and Paule Marshall. The last of these, Prof. Marshall, wrote the fictionalized autobiography of a young woman of West Indian ancestry living in Brooklyn during World War II; the book is called *Browngirl, Brownstone*. Professor Marshall not only once worked with me in the Afro-American Studies Program at Yale University, but she has also been a Chancellor's Fellow here at Berkeley. Among the present group of the elected minority of national stature who are distinguished by their Caribbean birth is the Honorable Mervyn Dymally, congressman and former Lieutenant Governor of California, and, on the municipal level, the present mayor of Miami, who is of Puerto Rican birth. Although unsuccessful in their respective primaries, key candidates in the mayoral races of Washington, D.C., Boston, and New York City have been of Caribbean origin, although Americans by birth.

The "New" Wave of Caribbean Immigration

A final observation to be made about Caribbean immigration to the United States is that a "new" wave of Caribbean immigration to this country is taking place. As I have explained, there actually have been many waves of immigrants from this region—more specifically, from certain countries within it—to the U.S. I have identified in broad strokes three general waves: 1) the antebellum movement, 2) the movement of the mid-19th through mid-20th century, and 3) the movement of the 1960s, which is still ongoing. This current movement is interesting for a number of reasons, some of which will be discussed here.

Indeed, it is truly impressive that the Caribbean region, with an estimated population of only 32 million people, would be so consistently prominent among the leading source countries and nationalities represented in the various categories and subcategories of new immigrants to the United States. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, and Puerto Rico consistently qualify in the highest tier of such countries and clearly constitute the leading Caribbean sources and nationalities engaged in the process of peopling the United States. That is to say, they are not only leading among the Caribbean countries,

but they hold their own among the leading non-Caribbean countries contributing immigrants to the American population. Comprising a second tier are Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, Guyana, Barbados, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, some of which are late starters, but may well enter the top ranks if their patterns are maintained or heightened over the coming years.

Countries of both tiers are currently targets of both legal and illegal immigration from other countries within the Caribbean and Latin America. A characteristic of the new Caribbean immigration, therefore, is not only that, relative to its size, it seems to be large and visible in the U.S., but that many of the leading source countries are also the leading recipient countries of immigration from within the Caribbean itself. In some cases, they become final targets, but in many cases, they seem to be stepping stones for immigrants to the United States. Some of the target countries serve as temporary stopovers in the eventual transit to the U.S. Others may be used as substitutes or second choices in view of the difficulties of obtaining a visa for entry into the U.S. The overall performance of the region suggests that it is engaged in a still active, generalized, shared, but multifaceted movement, which has been increasing in complexity, breadth, perception, and policy.

With respect to these current immigrants, we are told of various "types" among them, most of which are legal artifacts rather than distinctive sociological facts. Using the terms broadly, these include "excludibles," "entrants," "refugees," "illegal immigrants," "undocumented laborers," "legal non-immigrants," "legal immigrants," "prospective immigrants," "residents," "citizens," "deportees," and "deportables," among others. The Caribbean population in the United States is represented in most of these categories, and some Caribbean countries are consistently among the leading sources in these categories. On one level, these categories represent streams of people whose attributes correspond to the requirements and restrictions of the U.S. government. On another level, they also represent alternative strategies or sequences chosen by people of generally similar economic or political backgrounds, who have similar desires and hopes of improving their life chances in America and who respond to similar U.S. stimulations and inducements, but do not qualify for one, single category of privileged entry according to U.S. immigration law. These categories, therefore, do not necessarily represent distinct streams of emigration, but rather interrelated variations of the same process, the same movement, and the same region.

These remarks are not intended to assess the law or criticize efforts to control and categorize aliens; yet, they do not deny that such controls and categories eventually have a serious influence on the behavior, life chances, and life-styles of their bearers, collectively or individually. For instance, Puerto Rico, it may be said, represents a different model of immigration from the rest of the Caribbean. In addition to the aliens who use it as a temporary stopover on their way to mainland America, the native population of Puerto Rico comes and goes from the United States with the ambivalent distinction of being U.S. citizens—hence, having the automatic right to immigrate and claim residence on the mainland. Once here, however, Puerto Ricans are treated "sociologically" as other Caribbean or Latin American immigrants, with their culture and language being seen as alien. Had it been a full-fledged American state, Puerto Rico's profile would be more extreme than that of the least developed of the continental states (i.e., Mississippi), but marked by a high intake of legal and illegal immigrants. Had it been an independent, Communist country, its profile would be similar to that of Cuba. Had it been an independent country with a "friendly" regime, it would have been similar to Haiti. And had it been independent, friendly, and characterized by an acceptably democratic regime, it would be similar in profile to both Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. In other words, what I am trying to suggest is that Caribbean immigration is more complex than is revealed by these

generalizations and laws, which categorize people and obscure the common reality and history that they share as elements of one stream responding in different ways to certain common circumstances.

Additionally, when one looks very carefully at the leading source countries in the Caribbean—aside from their being part of the so-called "Great Antilles," close in distance to the United States, and among the largest countries in the region—these leading source countries are relatively developed (compared to the rest of the Caribbean region) and have had relatively long, close, and special types of dependency relationships with the United States. This suggests that immigration, in part, is a response to international inequality. It also indicates that, in the case of the Caribbean as distinct from Europe (or, in the case of the new sending sources of immigration as compared to old ones), these countries, their populations, and their people's felt need to migrate to America are, in part, responses to and responsibilities of the United States. The fact that these nations are now sending large numbers of people to the United States necessarily means that one has to question the nature and history of the U.S. presence—whether populational, military, or economic—in their lands. This presence may be in the form of economic assistance, or it may be primarily intellectual and ideological, but, in all cases, we are dealing with a special assymetrical influence from U.S. commerce and culture on these nations and their seemingly inextricable dependency upon U.S. capital and technology.

Characteristics of the Caribbean Immigrant Population

Moving from the countries themselves to the immigrants, there are some intersting points to consider. In the time left, I would like to speak about two or three points in particular. First, there is the controversy over the degree to which Afro-Caribbean immigrants are confronting and competing with native-born black Americans (and, in the case of Hispanic Caribbean immigrants, with the Chicanos and Puerto Ricans) over work. I would suggest that, on the one hand, it is important to appreciate differences between these immigrants and their native-born ethnic peers. It is also important to recognize internal differences among Caribbean immigrants themselves, rather than make global statements about Caribbean immigrants, as if they were monolithic. Therefore, we must start to look comparatively in terms of sub-ethnicity, sub-nationality, and even certain sex, age, generation, and class differences, both among minorities and between them and immigrants. At the same time, we must be careful not to belabor and exaggerate points of difference (thus adding to the penalization and subdivisions of already beleaguered racial or economic groups) without trying to resolve their common, salient, and persistent problems.

For instance, it may be true statistically, as some scholars indicate, that the U.S.-born offspring of black Caribbean immigrants earn more than their peers of native-born black parents. It is important to keep in mind, here, however, that their numbers are small and their aggregated income insignificant in the larger picture. And today, they have no special hold over, or holdings in, the larger economic picture and are not recognized or treated differently because of ancestry or identification.

However, there are good reasons why the presence of immigrants may be viewed competitively by native-born minorities today. Both groups are concentrated in the central cities. Like the Jews, Italians, Polish, and Irish immigrants of earlier waves of immigration, Caribbean immigrants tend to settle in the central cities. And these cities, during the period of the most recent wave of immigration, have been undergoing very important changes: e.g., shifts in power and tax bases, flights of industry and middle classes, and thus the conversion of the cities into urban arenas of competition between native underclasses and immigrant workers. Also, many of these cities have evolved from being crucial points

of transit in the domestic political-economic systems to crucial points in the transfer of ideas, technology of goods, services, personnel, and populations in the increasingly internationalizing political-economic system of which this country and the Caribbean countries are parts—supposedly as partners, albeit unequal ones.

Thus, such U.S. cities are confronted by people and problems that originated not only from within this country, but from Caribbean and Latin American countries as well. Like money, material, and other pertinent matters of the kind, labor, culture, ethnicity, and identity have become transferable entities in the internationalization process and their attendant problems have taken on a transnational character. It is perhaps the consciousness of kind, commonness of experiences, and similarity of situation within certain ethnic or economic groups which have mitigated against the kind of old-new struggle, which characterized native versus immigrant minorities in earlier periods. Today, that kind of conflict is apparent when classes or ethnicity are mixed—as in cases of black working- and lower-class neighborhoods, where Asian immigrant corner-store owners are often treated with suspicion and resentment.

A second point to be made about Caribbean immigrants is the reduction in their "invisibility." When I wrote my first seminal article on the subject a decade or so ago, I referred to the prevalent character of Caribbean immigrants as one of "double" or really "multiple" invisibility—a characterization that distinguished them and other non-white immigrants from their European predecessors and peers. That is to say, they were almost never distinguished in the eyes of the white majority from their respective counterparts among the traditional American, native-born, non-white minorities—i.e., Afro-American, Puerto Rican, Asian-American, Chicano, etc. And their problems and purposes were disregarded because they were both a non-white minority and a foreign minority. Even as this becomes less true today, when compared to their European counterparts, acculturated, non-white Caribbean immigrants or their children are still not considered "Americans," pure and simple, but rather "Afro-Americans," "Hispanic-Americans," or some other hyphenate of lower status and number than the white majority. As a consequence, their still distinct and sliding visibility raises important strategic questions for them and for their native-born counterparts: On one hand, are the new immigrants more likely to compete or coalesce in domestic politics with other non-white American minorities or working-class groups? On the other hand, are the native workers and minorities prepared to include the problems and aspirations of their immigrant peers in their platforms and politics? Are they prepared to consider the needs of the source countries of such immigrants in their program, thus arranging for some balancing and integration of foreign and overseas development/investment policies and domestic economic and employment programs?

Finally, part of the invisibility of Caribbean immigrants in the past was a function of their limited numbers and participation. With the recent dramatic increase in their numbers, their concentration and activities in the urban centers, and the increased preoccupation of the United States and its media with the international and ideological politics of their source countries and regions, these immigrants have gained new visibility in this country. In addition, the invisibility of Caribbean immigrant groups was produced in the past by the media, the government, the establishment, and the general public—as well as academia—all of whom ignored them. In social science, there was a clear abdication of interest in immigration and in immigrant adoptions, which were once major concerns during the early development of this body of professional scholarship. Today, we are witnessing resurgent interests in immigration, immigrant presence, immigrant problems, and the problems immigrants present to American society.

Yet, we need to consider, too, their participation in and potential for American society. That we haven't been doing so perhaps tells us more about the American culture and its social scientists than about immigrants and their cultures. Nevertheless, there is today an expanding network of scholars, training programs, research, and study centers in the country devoted to Caribbean immigration and immigrants. And, I am quite proud to know—and happy to be recognized as one of—the foremost pioneers in the rekindling and redirecting of social scientific attention to the study of "new" immigration/immigrants in general and Caribbean immigration/immigrants to the United States in particular. This was the purpose of our founding and directing the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies at the Smithsonian Institution from 1972 to 1982. And, this program and your participation here today are evidence of its success. So, too, are the citations and continuing requests for its publications, despite its organizational demise.

Conclusion

Today, given the limited time, perhaps I have directed too much of my presentation to Caribbean immigration and too little to the immigrants themselves. As a sociologist by training, however, I think this may have been appropriate, considering the division and scheduling of labor between our fields. Having, as a sociologist, left you with a contractual statement on the subject, I anticipate from you a more intimate and detailed kind of observation of these immigrants themselves, which anthropologists do much better. I think it equally proper to emphasize that immigration—whether old or new, en masse or alone, direct or indirect, Caribbean or other—is a very complex phenomenon. I would urge you to appreciate its problems, politics, and policies; to not confuse the phenomenon itself with the people comprising it; and to try to contribute to the formulation of sound, just, and humane policy.

Finally, I believe that there are essential roles not only for fair-minded, forward-thinking, broad-minded policy makers, but also for informed and independent-minded scholars in the treatment of immigration and immigrants. I invite each of you younger scholars, particularly the social, cultural and psychological anthropologists among you, to find and shape your professional roles and to use them not only well but wisely, justly, and humanely for the benefit of the immigrants and those other persons or human groups that are most intimately affected by the New Immigration and, of course, for the benefit and broader interests of all the countries involved.