PART FIVE:
CUL TURE AND BEHA VIOR
DEMOCRACY AT WORK IN THE SWEDISH
BUREAUCRACY
Morris A. Fred
INTRODUCTION
The general concern of this article is the relationship of public bureaucracy to the wider
society it ostensibly serves. In earlier discussions I set forth the argument that for any unit of
organization the level above provides the purpose for its activity while the one below provides
the mechanism (Fred 1978, 1979). Hence the role of any level in an organizational hierarchy is
situational in that it changes in terms of the level to which it is relating. In the case of a
bureaucracy, it is society which provides the purpose for an agency's activities, while it is the
bureaucracy which contributes the mechanism for the society's functioning. Moreover, within
any institution the same relationship between higher and lower levels holds true; thus, in
analyzing bureaucratic organization and its relation to wider society, one is in actuality distin-
guishing between different levels of relationship that-in terms of mechanism/purpose-are
analogous to each other.
This model-albeit a simplified one-does suggest a framework for examining the basis of
one of the main concerns of Western political democracies, reflected in continual complaints
about the increasing incursions of bureaucracy into political and daily life. This is certainly not
a new concern, nor is it confined to Western societies, as witnessed in one relatively recent
example, the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In his discussion of the state administration vis-a-
vis civil society, Marx noted what he perceived as a source of the ambiguity between the two:
"... bureaucracy is a formal system for content lying outside it.... [It] appears to itself as the
ultimate purpose of the state" (1974:106-107). Reformulated in this paper, such ambiguity will
be viewed in terms of a symbolic merging of purpose and mechanism in which bureaucracy,
created as a mechanism for carrying out specific purposes or social goals, comes to be identified
with the purpose itself.
SWEDISH ADMINISTRATION
I shall approach this issue by considering a case related to efforts to democratize decision
making in the Swedish public bureaucracy. To summarize that country's administrative system,
there has been at the national level a traditional division of functions between relatively small
ministries, which formulate policies then acted upon by parliament, and the much larger
boards, which administer those policies within the framework established by the ministry.
Ideally the ministries are expected to refrain from interfering in the daily administrative activi-
ties of the boards under their jurisdiction, while the boards in turn are expected to leave policy
to the ministries.
These formal boundaries have become increasingly blurred by changing nuances in the
role behavior of public administrators. In his study of Swedish political culture, Thomas Anton
summarizes the types of such behavior according to the extent to which public officials "adopt
an active or passive stance toward their responsibilities, and the extent to which officials adopt
KAS Papers
an open or closed posture toward other political institutions" (1980:18). At the one end of the
continuum one finds Weber's classical bureaucrats (passive/closed) whom Anton then contrasts
with what he calls political bureaucrats (active/open). These latter have come to dominate
Sweden and other Western administrative systems as a result of public demands for reform and
social planning. In terms of my earlier comments on the merging of social purpose and
mechanisms, this role alteration implies a simultaneous "politicization of bureaucracy" and
"bureaucratization of politics" in which the effect has been to enhance the Swedish public
administrators' overall power and influence by allowing them "to impose a markedly rationalis-
tic style on policy-making procedures" (Anton 1980:6).
DEMOCRACY AT WORK ACT
On January 1, 1977, a new law came into effect in Sweden, which was intended to enable
employees through their representative organizations to exert some influence over the manage-
ment of- their work. This law, henceforth to be referred to by its initials MBL
(Medbestammandelagen), has been translated as the "Democracy at Work Act" or the
"Codetermination Act" and was meant to serve as an umbrella statute furnishing guidelines for
collective agreements to be concluded between workers and employer representatives. Only as
a last resort was the state to intervene, "providing an efficient conciliation and judicial pro-
cedure enjoying the confidence of both sides" (Bouvin 1977:4).
This general policy regarding democratization of working life was simultaneously extended
in a complementary Public Employment Act (Lagen om Offentlig Anstallning, or LOA) to
include those working in national and local government jobs. At the heart of the act pertaining
to the public sector was the notion that the integrity of the democratic sovereignty of the people
must be maintained. Therefore, it was deemed necessary that the negotiations for public
employees' rights would not undermine the "autonomy of public authorities embodying the
will of the electorate" (Bouvin 1977:13). While public employees were to have a considerable
degree of influence on their working conditions, they were not to usurp policy-making authority
from parliament and the ministries. These limitations were noted in a government publication
of MBL:
All enfranchised persons-public employees included-are able by their votes to influence
decisions concerning the activities to be conducted by national and local authorities, the
Public Employment Act observes. It would be contrary to the established democratic
order in Sweden-as expressed above all in the 1974 Instrument of Government Act-to
allow public employees to obtain through the medium of collective agreements another,
more direct form of influence than is exerted by other citizens on the aims [goals], direc-
tion, scale, and quality of the activities of public authorities.... It should be the task of
political bodies and, in the event of delegation, administrative boards and other authorities
to decide which types of activity an authority is to engage in. . . [Swedish Ministry of the
Budget 1978:24-251.
During the years since its enactment, the various parties in the negotiation process in both
private industries and public agencies have been engaged in attempts to agree upon common
interpretations of the law in order to establish forms under which future decisions can be
made.1 Many of the frustrations expressed by those who have at one time or another been
involved in the MBL may be due to the uncertainty regarding new norms for negotiating
behavior. Particularly within the public sector, where individuals have often been socialized to
respond to bureaucratic hierarchical command, the demands for new patterns of behavior
require them to reevaluate the structural situation in which they are working.
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THE CASE
This case concerns events in a particular section within the National Board of Health and
Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), an administrative arm of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
(Socialdepartementet). To describe its position in the overall organization of the board, this
Refugee Section was a subunit of the Division for Social Welfare, which in turn was one of
three divisions comprising the Department for Long-Term Care (Avdelning LA: Langtidsvard
och Aldringsvard). The purpose of the section had been to see to the psychological and physi-
cal welfare of incoming refugees in order to promote their integration into Swedish society.
The section was composed of about twenty individuals, some of whom were involved with
reimbursing localities for services provided refugees, and others (called konsulents),2 who dealt
with more general problems relating to refugees. Among their duties were providing informa-
tion about and to immigrants and refugees; organizing conferences for the special group of
social workers who worked with refugees and Gypsies (discussed in Fred 1979); gathering
material on the psychological and social problems of various groups of immigrants and
refugees; checking the medical facilities at refugee camps, which were under the rubric of the
Labor Market Board; and participating in various conferences and courses, often as lecturers.3
On August 22, 1978, my first day of fieldwork in the section, the various konsulents were
sitting together critically reviewing for subsequent comment a year's study on refugees which
had been released several months earlier by the Ministry of Labor. Suddenly one of their
number, who had been absent that morning on union affairs, came into the room and
announced that the National Board of Health and Welfare was submitting a proposal to its min-
istry to cut the section's staff by about 80%. Activities that had been carried out by the section
were to be transferred to the board's county representatives as part of a concerted effort at
decentralization and decreased spending at the national level. The shocked silence in the room
was quickly supplanted by comments from everyone. The previous discussion was suspended
so that data could by marshalled for the upcoming battle over the section's existence.
The elimination of the section's personnel was viewed by those making the decision as
being consistent with the board's overall administrative aims of disengaging itself from particu-
lar cases and concerning itself primarily with providing a theoretical and practical framework for
local authorities. The konsulents viewed their candidacy for decentralization as based on a fal-
lacious understanding of their job. They discovered that they had been victims not only of ear-
lier demands for decentralization but also government requests in the spring of 1978 that the
various boards make efforts to cut their budgets. Most serious, however, was the fact that no
one in the section seemed to have been aware that such a decision was pending. It had been
during the summer, when many officials were on vacation, that meetings took place within the
board to discuss those activities that were to be given priority. Thus, at the end of the sum-
mer, when the announcement of the section's demise was presented as a fait accompli, it not
only came as a shock but pointed to a possible breach of the legislation governing the joint
regulation of working life, the MBL.
The Meeting
The next morning a meeting was held. It was attended by the section personnel and
representatives of the two unions to which employees in the section belonged.4 The meeting
was divided into two phases, the first involving the entire section (minus its director, whose
absence will be discussed later), two high union officials, and two other board officials from
organizational levels above the section (i.e., division and department). In the second phase the
board officials left, but the union representatives remained. The meeting from the section's
standpoint could be described as an attempt to reveal details of the past months' activities and
to determine responsibility for the present crisis. Not surprisingly, the process of pinning
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blame became one of "passing the buck" in which all involved denied willful complicity.
The board's position as stated by the two officials was that the decision was essentially one
of policy, based on the notion that the konsulents' activities would be more effective if
transferred to the local level. However, they stated that the report to be submitted to the min-
istry should be viewed only as a recommendation, with the possibility still remaining for altera-
tions. Finally, they stated that during the summer when the economic secretariat had met to
determine future priorities at the board, the division director had been acting department head
and did not have on hand all the materials necessary for an objective decision (because the
head of the refugee section was also on vacation).
The union representatives, for their part, said that they had not been given the expected
five to ten days to consider their recommendations and prepare for the upcoming negotiations
on organizational changes. They were extremely disappointed that information had not been
distributed properly, thus hindering them in making the necessary contacts with their members.
Those working in the section stated that they had received no information regarding the
pending decision. If, as had been claimed, a memorandum had been sent to the division, why
had no copy been forwarded to the Refugee Section? Moreover, they said, the description of
the konsulents' job, on which the decision for their elimination had been based, was incorrect;
the board would be transferring services that did not exist to the extent claimed. Finally, as far
as budget cutting went, the funds for the section came from a special source outside the board's
regular budget, so that the deletion of konsulents would not represent any belt tightening on its
part and in fact might end up costing society much more because social workers in each of
Sweden's county administrations would have to take over the section's responsibilities.
After presentation of these positions, the two board officials left and the section's
members with their union representatives began to plan the presentation of their case before
the board's steering committee as a example of the failure of the board's leadership to follow
the principles set forth in MBL/LOA.
The Aftermath
From the day in August 1978, when the section came to hear of plans for its future,
morale had declined sharply. The konsulents in particular had been forced to work under con-
ditions of uncertainty, a situation that hampered them in their contacts with localities and in
their continued guidance of social workers directly involved with refugees. By the beginning of
1980 it seemed that despite a temporary reprieve to the section given by the government,
decentralization would take place, although the exact date was still uncertain. By the end of
1980 most of the konsulents had left their jobs within the section, and it now appeared that in
the near future, in place of the Refugee Section there would be a special section of four or five
individuals entrusted with activating and overseeing issues of concern to all immigrants for the
entire National Board of Health and Welfare.
A UNION REPRESENTATIVE CONSIDERS MBL
The following segment is based on an interview with the representative for the union to
which the vast majority of those in the Refugee Section belonged. His comments are not only
instructive in clarifying many of the problems that must be dealt with if MBL/LOA is to be
used effectively but are also revealing of the structural and operational realities in the Swedish
public bureaucracy. While the following is a paraphrase of remarks made by one individual
with experience in negotiations, his observations represent many of the attitudes expressed by
those involved in the crisis:
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DEMOCRACY IN SWEDISH BUREA UCRACY
It would perhaps be better to consider MBL/LOA not as providing in its present form the
right to codetermination, as implied in its name, but rather the right to take part in nego-
tiations, to be present when many decisions are being made. In this sense the biggest
change that has occurred in the public arena since MBL's inception has been that union
representatives (the above example excepted) have been receiving better information,
particularly regarding personnel policy, which is the major concern of unions at the insti-
tutional level.5
The problems with MBL should not underestimated. Many of those at the higher levels
are still not aware of how MBL functions. In the case of the Refugee Section, those who
had made the decision claimed that they had spoken to several individuals in the division,
interpreting this as sufficient in following the guideline about keeping employees
informed.
Another difficulty for the union in this case was that other units within the board were
also to be relocated or eliminated; if the union had decided to take a position regarding
each group it would have come close to interfering with the policy-making process. (In
fact, the government has taken the decision regarding the board's actual reorganization
out of reach of MBL by placing it in the hands of a special committee on organization,
which as a government-delegated authority is immune from MBL consideration.) Hence,
the union decided to concentrate on the job security of its members rather than on partic-
ular activities, i.e., that members would be guaranteed other meaningful work. This in
itself requires great effort, for despite a law regarding job security [Swedish Ministry of
Labor 19771, individuals whose work roles are eliminated or in today's parlance "rational-
ized away" may find themselves with salaries but without any meaningful work. The per-
sonal sense of insecurity that ensues leads many of them to feel continuously threatened
and forced to seek jobs outside the board.6 It is thus in the area of personnel policy that
unions at the institutional level come to concentrate their efforts within the framework of
MBL. It is the unions' function to emphasize that the employers' demands for efficiency
and effectiveness cannot be satisfied through the total sacrifice of workers' rights.
One risk with MBL is that in order to function effectively within the bureaucracy, the
union will be forced to create its own bureaucratic hierarchy of decision making, leaving
most individual members still unaware of their rights.7 Since so many within the bureau-
cracy have been socialized into a chain of command where orders are followed from those
above, it is necessary to teach the forms for democratic participation so that, from the
employees' side, decision-making power may be delegated among all the members.
Democracy itself is a difficult process, and it is necessary to develop forms for its realiza-
tion. Otherwise, the chaos or informality ensuing may lead to a situation in which only
those who yell loudest will be heard, disregarding the needs of most workers.
The MBL as such may be viewed as another step in the evolutionary process of democrat-
ization of decision making in private and public employment in Sweden. This particular case
represents a point in time in which individuals, unsure of the correct procedures for securing
their rights within the MBL framework, are involved in a process of learning the means of
negotiation and testing the acceptability of various practices within the confines of the law, a
process often beset with disappointment. In the next section, I shall examine what information
the above case history can provide from the perspective both of public bureaucratic institutions
and of society in general.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL
Because the raison d'etre of MBL/LOA is to provide individual workers with a basis for
determining aspects of their work milieu, we must look at the principles on which patterns of
decision making within the bureaucratic organization are based. The initial stages of an MBL
negotiation may be viewed as entailing both the identification of lines of authority and the del-
ineation of behavioral norms for the roles of employer/employee or superior/subordinate.
In public bureaucracy such delineation is complicated by the fact that MBL is based impli-
citly on the notion of a rather clear dichotomy between employer and employee. In a setting
where all in a sense are employees, this dichotomy must be translated into a series of
superior/subordinate relationships which in turn are defined by the situational contexts of deci-
sion making.8 Even here the role identification of the individual is fraught with ambiguity as
he or she is faced with a certain element of choice. The role expectations of each individual
within a bureaucracy are determined both by his group affiliation and by hierarchical patterns.
Within the National Board of Health and Welfare, for example, an individual is at once a
member of a subsection, section, division, department, and the entire board. The particular
decision-making context thus becomes a general framework in which individuals perceive their
roles and attempt to express them to others as ones in which they are acting as "employer" or
"employee."
A good illustration of this problem is the situation of the head of the Refugee Section. At
one time he himself was a union representative, but with the introduction of MBL he viewed
this position as posing a problem of potential conflict of interest, and gave up his union duties.
Moreover, at the time of the crisis he behaved in such a way as to suggest that he identified
with board leadership or at least with that at the level above the section. He neither attended
the section's meeting with union representatives nor signed the appeal letter the section staff
later presented to the board's steering committee. Several members of the section expressed to
me confusion and suspicion about his part in the whole affair. He himself described his
dilemma as one of conflict between the roles of employer and employee. I would suggest that
it might also be expressed in terms of his choice of identification with those determining the
section's purpose or with the section itself, which provided the mechanism for carrying out par-
ticular goals, and that this confusion at an individual level is analogous with that represented in
the relationship between public bureaucracy and the wider society.
Without drawing absolute conclusions as to the total impact of MBL in the public sector,
it may at least be stated that the process of applying it has had the effect of forcing participants
to differentiate between those rules which are necessary for maintaining efficiency and those
which have developed as a result of an arbitrary use of power through control over the channels
of communication. While in the short run MBL has the positive effect of distributing more
information throughout the hierarchy, the long-term organizational effects may be open to
question. For example, we can theorize that in 1978 the social consensus necessary for working
within the Refugee Section depended to a degree on the ambiguity of its leader's role, provid-
ing him with a flexibility that was lost when he was "forced" to identify openly with those
above the section. On the other hand, identifying with the section would have hindered his
relationship  with the  divisional and  departmental leaders.  Finally, as relations of
superior/subordinate become emphasized within the institution itself as a means of guarantee-
ing greater involvement in decision making, the problem remains as to the repercussions such a
process will have on attitudes and behavior regarding the relation between bureaucratic institu-
tions and the general society.
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FIRED
DEMOCRACY IN SWEDISH BUREA UCRACY
THE LEVEL OF SOCIETY
In preparation for an international conference to be held in Sweden, a Swedish public
agency commissioned an English translation of a description of its organization and activities.
Working directly from the Swedish, the translator began: "The X Agency is organized on the
basis of a decision-making hierarchy, with a Director-General at its apex. ..." Several days
after completion, it came to the translator's attention that the head of the agency had been
displeased with the initial reference to hierarchically organized decision making and that the
entire pamphlet had been withdrawn in order to check its contents and phraseology more care-
fully. This incident, told to me while I was in the midst of my field research in the Swedish
bureaucracy, seemed to encapsulate an ideological difficulty that often faces those who work in
the public sector. As greater demands for economic equality and participation in decision mak-
ing are being made in the wider society, there is a determination within the bureaucracy to
undercommunicate what are perceived as nonegalitarian/hierarchical features which tend to
contrast it with ideals predominant in the wider society. Another attempt to deal with this
discrepancy was partially symbolized in a celebrated case in the 1960s in which the then director
of the National Board of Health and Welfare requested that the formal address form "ni" be
replaced in daily contacts by a general use of the familiar "du."
Beyond the numerical significance of the public sector, in which about 30% of Swedish
employees work (Swedish Ministry of the Budget 1978:11), there is the added significance that
it encompasses within its organizational boundaries the distinct categories by which society is
ordered. While the bureaucracy may first symbolize these categories and their related features,
its instrumental nature requires that it act upon that ordering system, and it does so in such a
way so as to maintain a similarity between itself and society in order to ensure more efficient
administration. This leads to a problem, not unique to Sweden, in which the bureaucracy
ostensibly created as a response to needs in society reverses its relation with its "master" and
takes control.
This reversal has both ideological and structural ramifications. Anton notes the former in
drawing attention to the relevance of Mannheim's comment in Ideology and Utopia that "the
fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into prob-
lems of administration" (Anton 1980:8). With regard to the structural aspect, there is the fact
that to maintain political control over policy formulation there is a need for specialization within
representative bodies similar to the administrative bureaucracy that is to be overseen. It is not
merely the growth of the public sector but rather this bureaucratic organization of the structure
of the political establishment that may lie at the heart of fears regarding the perceived threat of
bureaucracy to democratic institutions.
That bureaucratic control is not always apparent and hence is difficult to correct can be
understood if the relation between bureaucracy and society is seen in terms of a dialectic
between actual power relations and symbolic action. It is the interdependence of these two
variables in the dialectic which can lead to an inversion of the dominance patterns originally
intended. Here MBL/LOA is instructive. In its applicability to the public sector, the law for-
mally recognizes the need to maintain the sovereignty of civil society over the bureaucracy.
Because each institution is to reach agreement between employer and employee, MBL directs
its attention to the level of mechanism (provided by bureaucracy) and not to that of purpose
(provided by society). In fact it explicitly forbids interference in the latter realm. MBL/LOA
in stating society's control over bureaucracy is asserting a separation between bureaucratic
mechanism and purpose. At the same time, by focusing attention on actual power relations
within the bureaucracy so as to lead to greater internal democracy, the MBL/LOA expresses
bureaucracy's resemblance to society. Symbolically, then, in terms of mechanism, bureaucracy
is operationally similar to society (i.e., both are based on democratic principles), while in terms
of purpose it is subordinate to society. The problem is that an emphasis on developing
equivalent democratic processes within the bureaucracy merely reinforces a perception of the
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KAS Pape]
latter's identity with society, in which those within its boundaries see their own desires 4
representing those in the wider society. Seen in terms of a confusion between mechanism an
purpose, it then becomes more clear how the purpose of bureaucracy, which should be dete
mined by factors external to it, in actuality becomes determined within its bounds.
FINAL COMMENTS
Consideration of the MBL process can help elucidate the reasons bureaucratic institutior
develop means for preventing outside influence on their decision-making capabilities. On
explanation is that by forcing bureaucrats to concentrate so much of their time and efforts o
internal personnel relations, they tend to lose sight of their actual functions in terms of tl
wider society. Another, however, is related more directly to the MBL process itself. Her(
again, it is important to distinguish between mechanism and purpose. It is apparent that whil
the purpose of MBL is to permit greater participation in decision making (denial of state
differences), the means for reaching this requires clarification of the realities of hierarchic]
authority (assertion of status differences). Thus, as an elaboration of internal hierarch
becomes necessary in order to reach a degree of equality, the process entails a need for strict(
boundary maintenance in order to control those forces that are to become relevant to tl
decision-making situation. The effect may be to engender further means to exclude outsid
factors from interfering with internal decision-making procedures.
Finally, our analysis of the MBL suggests another function of bureaucracy, tl
significance of which increases as traditional religion declines in force as a means of providin
social order. Often lacking the power of myth to structure a sense of general social orde'
rational society (and here I suggest Sweden merely as a penultimate example) must nonethele4
cope with fundamental contradictions that gnaw at its sense of purpose. Those revealed t
MBL-between demands for democracy and authority, between aims of equality and the nee
for hierarchic order-are perhaps the most basic dilemmas inherent in the Swedish welfax
state. Exemplifying a means for dealing with such dilemmas, the MBL process within th
bureaucracy symbolically combines two elements: an assertion of equality in spite of an existin
hierarchy and an identification (i.e., merging) of bureaucracy with the wider society. Thuw
from a ritual standpoint MBL as a facet of bureaucracy represents the latter's role in copin
with the basic ideational contradictions of modern Sweden, providing a foundation for belief i
the efficacy of a rational ordering system on which the functioning of that society is to be base(
NOTES
Acknowledgments. This article is based on field research conducted during 1978-79 and funded t
the Swedish Ministry of Labor under the rubric of its Commission on Immigration Research (EIFO).
would like to express my deep appreciation to the individuals working in the Refugee Section of th
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare for their continued encouragement and cooperatio
throughout my study.
1 At the time the MBL was introduced, I was working at Stockholm University and recall the va:
numbers of meetings conducted in order to explain its relevance to decision making at the university an
the resulting confusion regarding changes in procedures.
2 The word konsulent is best translated into English as advisor or consultant. As the use of thew
terms may tend to confuse their actual functions, I have decided to refer to these workers by their Swe(
ish title.
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DEMOCRACY IN SWEDISH BUREA UCRACY          1
3 This description is taken from a memorandum written by the board's steering committee to eluci-
date the konsulents' job activities.
4 The two unions were the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) and the
Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO). The vast majority of section employees were
members of the latter.
5 A constant complaint leveled against bureaucracy is that much of its power vis-a-vis the citizenry
rests in its secretiveness. This also holds true within any single agency where power relations are main-
tained through control over allocation of bureaucracy's fundamental internal resource-information. In
attempting to increase access to information, MBL may be seen as fundamentally challenging the base on
which hierarchical power differentiation and bureaucratic decision making rest.
6 There was also a move afoot to require the board to call a temporary halt to hiring externally, as
the number of individuals within the board needing new jobs was rather large; however, there was no
agreement to that effect between the board and the unions.
7 In a discussion of rank-and-file attitudes regarding workers' ability to influence union decisions,
see interviews with Swedish metalworkers in Korpi (1978).
8 To an extent this is also true of private organizations, in which middle-line and personnel
managers may find themselves in very similar ambiguous roles with conflicting claims of loyalty.
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Fred, Morris
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