PART FOUR: PR OBLEMS OF MODERNIZA TION ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE: VARIATION IN NORTH AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS M. Elaine Combs-Schilling INTRODUCTION Anthropologists have a healthy respect for the malleability of tradition. Many scholars use the term "traditional" to connote stasis, rigidity, and continuity with the past, but anthro- pological experience leads one to question that definition. Anthropologists are familiar with tradition that is invented on the spot-invented to legitimate very pragmatic courses of current action. Hence, the use of the past in the present is a phenomenon that needs explanation, in terms of present realities. It is not a simple translation of what was into what is. Any people's past is diverse. It consists of varying behavioral practices, organizational principles, cultural perspectives, and symbolic focal points of meaning, any one of which may be emphasized and called traditional. In the analysis of tradition, the critical question often becomes, Why is tradi- tion as it currently is, phrased in terms of what was in the past, and what are the consequences of such phrasing? Elizabeth Colson has been one of the foremost anthropologists to stretch our understand- ing of the variable role of the past in the present. In Tradition and Contract (1974), Colson examines the past from the perspective of the contract. Refusing to see the past as chiseled in stone, Colson asks, What from the past is used and why? In a productive examination of the current role of clanship in Africa, Colson views clanship not as "an entity in itself but as a prin- ciple of organization which is utilized in a different fashion according to the nature of other institutions existing within a social field" (1974:30). Colson's social-contract approach proves useful to a reanalysis of the role of "tradition" in independence movements in North Africa. Morocco's independence movement has been labeled "traditional" because it centers on the centuries-old position of the sultanate and upon the wide-spreading voice of Islam. Tunisia's independence movement has been seen as markedly different, its leaders a newly emergent political elite fired by secular nationalist ideol- ogy, and its population mobilized through the political structure of the Neo-Destour party. In the typical interpretation, precolonial Morocco is portrayed as static and rigid, in the grip of the past. Its independence is depicted as a reversion to bygone days, a misbegotten attempt to use the seventh century to address the twentieth. Tunisia's independence move- ment, by contrast, is seen as modern and progressive, reflecting the relative openness of the society and the popular receptivity to the ideals of the enlightenment. In reexamining these movements from the perspective of tradition as sociocultural dynamic, it is possible to reverse the typical scholarly interpretation. If, for the moment, in evaluating the nature of precolonial societies, one drops a political evolutionary perspective, it appears that, in fact, precolonial Tunisia was the more rigid, the more highly structured society. Its beylik and its ulama were systematically institutionalized, pragmatically based, and not geared to change. In building an anticolonial movement, Tunisia's structured past was not directly amenable to changing times. Its independence movement arose outside precolonial structures. Precolonial Morocco, on the other hand, was organizationally and ideationally more COMBS-SCHILLING fluid. Its diverse and flexible past proved effective in mobilizing a powerful resistance to coloni- alism. If Moroccos's independence movement must be called traditional, it is because Morocco's tradition was fluid. Whatever the consequences of anticolonial movements on postcolonial realities, both movements were dynamic adaptations to the complexities of the present. If, from the long-term perspective, one wants to argue that Tunisia's anticolonial movement led to a more progressive society, then progression, at least in part, resulted from structure, not flexibility. However, one must be wary of such qualitative evaluations. In the current world, it is difficult to define in the abstract what clearly will lead to long-term economic, social, and political progress. Situationally constructed, post-facto evaluations appear to be the only ones consistently on target. Given global uncertainties, one can only wish these two North African countries, with their great pasts, their complex presents, and their promising futures, the best along the rocky way. This paper owes a substantial debt to Elbaki Hermassi's impressive work Leadership and National Development in North Africa (1972). Hermassi's examination of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial North Africa remains by far the best in the field. Among numerous questions, Hermassi asks, Why did not Morocco develop a nationalist elite of Tunisia's type? Here I ask the complementary question, Why were not Tunisia's precolonial institutions, its beylik and its ulama, capable of carrying the voice of anticolonial dissent? Mine is yet another vantage point from which to approach very complex realities. MOROCCO AND TUNISIA COMPARED Morocco and Tunisia make for informative comparison. They share much in common. Both lie on the southern Mediterranean, Morocco to the west, a stone's throw from Spain, separated from the rest of North Africa by the Atlas Mountains. Tunisia lies in the central Mediterranean, not far from Sicily. Historically, both North African countries have served as key points of contact between south and north. Knowledge of ancient Greece entered Europe through Moroccan and Tunisian routes. The two countries share similar environments. In the northern regions, a Mediterranean climate allows the practice of grain and mixed-fruit agricul- ture. The south is dominated by the Sahara. Both Morocco and Tunisia were brought into the House of Islam by conquests of the 600s and 700s. Their populations are almost totally Islamic. People in both countries ascribe to the Malakite school of law. In the past, the two countries were politically intertwined. The great Moroccan dynasty of the Almohades extended its con- trol to Tunis itself. In the immediate precolonial era, both countries had hereditary monarchies. A bey presided over Tunisia, a sultan over Morocco. Both countries participated in long-distance com- merce, and began the 1800s with favorable balances of trade. However, the increasing penetra- tion of European goods disrupted that balance. Soon the two countries were deeply indebted to Europe. Indebtedness served as the pathway for colonial takeover (Lejri 1974:1:38). Domina- tion began with the French seizure of customs receipts; Tunisia became a French colony in 1881, Morocco in 1912. The respective colonial eras show some similarities. Both countries were protectorates, subject to indirect rather than direct rule. France claimed that its presence was intended to bolster traditional institutions. In administering the countries, France worked through the hereditary dynasties, the beylik in Tunisia, the sultanate in Morocco. In 1954-55, European settlers comprised 3.5% of the Moroccan population and 7.5% of Tunisia's, and con- trolled 12% of the cultivable land in Morocco and 18% in Tunisia (Hermassi 1972:76, 82). These characteristics radically distinguished Tunisia and Morocco from Algeria. In Algeria, the European settler colony was large (over 10% of the total population) and powerful. Europeans controlled 40% of Algeria's cultivable land (ibid.:76, 82). Direct rule was practiced. The precolonial monarch was deposed within two weeks of the French arrival in 1830. 60 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE Despite certain similarities in their colonial eras, Tunisia's and Morocco's independence movements were polar opposites. Tunisia's independence centered on the new-a new elite, a new ideology, and a new organization. The elite were young professionals, members of provin- cial families of modest means. Their ideology was that of secular nationalism, their organiza- tion that of a political party, the Neo-Destour. Islam was noticeable for its absence as the voice of political dissent. Morocco's independence is remarkable in contrast. Its independence cen- tered on the sultanate, a centuries-old politico-religious institution which can be seen as having a millennium of continuity. Islam served as popular mobilizer and voice of political opposition. Three interrelated interpretations generally are offered to account for these differences. The first centers on the nature of precolonial society. Morocco is depicted as static, as experiencing four centuries of stalemate (e.g., Abun-Nasr 1971a:286; Geertz 1968:48, 54; Gellner 1969:3; Waterbury 1969:16), while Tunisia is seen as changing, especially in the 1800s (L.C. Brown 1974; Hermassi 1972). From very different perspectives Seddon (1977) and Cigar (1981) have tried to reverse the notion of a static precolonial Moroccan society, but the notion dies hard. Scholars of the second perspective view the independence movements as reflecting the differing repercussions of the colonial eras. Tunisia's colonial era was longer, more intense than Morocco's (Abun-Nasr 1971b; Berque 1967; and Moore 1970:38). The third interpreta'tion centers the nature of nationalist movements in the ideological orientation of the political elites. Tunisia's elite is depicted as more progressive, Morocco's as more tied to the past (Halstead 1964 and 1967; Basu 1978). Whichever standpoint one adopts, Morocco is consistently characterized as a rather fiercely rigid and traditional society which entered the twentieth century in the grip of the past. Morocco's colonial era is judged to have been brief and is not perceived to have struck at the heart of the country's sociopolitical order. The religious orientation of its political elites is thought to reflect the country's traditionalism. Tunisia, on the other hand, is portrayed as the more open society, open before the coming of the French, open after their departure. The short-lived attempt at Constitution (1861-66) and Khayr al-Din's reforms of the 1870s are cited as cases in point. The greater length of the colonial era is thought to have kept Tunisia on its progressive pathway. The secularism of its nationalist elite is seen to reflect Tunisia's moder- nity. While not denying the import of structural changes induced by colonialism nor the import of political elite orientation, I would argue that it is informative to reevaluate the independence movements in the context of their reexamined precolonial pasts. PRECOLONIAL TUNISIA It is ironic that precolonial Tunisia is so often interpreted as the more flexible society. If one examines specific domains of existence, Tunisia consistently emerges as more rigid. Power was institutionalized. A clear-cut elite existed. Overarching organizational structures dom- inated the country as a whole. The Social Order In terms of social groupings, Tunisia was more stable. Its population was largely seden- tary, and consisted of a circumscribed power elite and a subjugated peasantry. The population could be characterized in terms of clearly ranked social groupings. An institutionalized social hierarchy existed, and lines of economic, political, and religious power converged in it (Bill 1972; L.C. Brown 1974; Green 1978). At the top stood the ruling class of the Husainid dynasty, from which the bey emerged. Next came a well-circumscribed high ulama. Next came the middle-rung administrators of mixed Turkish and Arabic descent, and so forth. In Nos. 63-64 61 COMBS-SCHILLING Tunisia, ascribed social status significantly channeled the positions to which one could aspire. Compared to Morocco, social mobility was limited. The Economic Order Tunisia's economic order also was systematized. Wealth centered in land. Land was the dynasty's patrimony; members of the dynasty were important landowners in the countryside. The bey could dispose of large stretches of land as he saw fit. The bey granted 100,000 hec- tares of fertile land, the Enfinda, to his reformist prime minister, Khayr al-Din Pasha (1873- 77). In 1877-78 al-Din fell from power. In 1878 he sold the land to a Marseilles company in the scandalous Enfinda affair, and left for Constantinople, where he served briefly as grand vizier (Ziadeh 1969:19). Religious leaders also were important landowners. Thanks to the institution of waqf habous land, they controlled 25-30% of Tunisia's arable land (Davies 1978). In the nineteenth century the polity as a whole came to depend upon taxes from land and agriculture for its existence while urban areas and commerce were left largely untaxed (Davies 1978). Religious Organization Religious organization also was highly institutionalized in precolonial Tunisia. (See Green 1978 for an impressive book-length study of the Tunisian ulama; L.C. Brown 1972 and 1974 are also important.) An "amazingly cohesive and uniform" religious hierarchy encompassed the country as a whole (Brown 1972:54). At the top stood the Hanafi Shaikh al Islam followed by the Maliki mufti. Thereafter came ramified hierarchies of administrative, judicial, and scho- larly personnel. Religious personnel can be divided into two tiers, the high- and low-level ulama. High ulama, centered in Tunis, distinguished themselves by position and religious learning as well as by speech and dress. They spoke a formalized version of Arabic. They wore special robes and headgear, a red chechia and a white turban, which signaled their status as reli- gious elite (Green 1978:50). Entry into the high ulama was restricted, not as restricted as in the Ottoman center but more than in the Moroccan one. While purportedly there existed a systematic bureaucratic route to administrative position, in fact high-level positions were dominated by key families. One of the most striking cases was the al-Bakri family, who had provided the principal imam of Zitouna mosque in unbroken succession for 190 years (Abdullah al-Hidda quoted in L.C. Brown 1972:64). The dominance of key families increased during the 1800s. Five families who occupied 40% of all offices in 1873 controlled 50% of all ulama positions by 1915 (Green 1978:95). The trend was thus toward denying important religious positions to men of humble and provincial birth "while reserving them more and more for scions of Tunisi ulama dynasties and for representatives of the capital's economic and bureaucratic elites" (ibid.). There was some mobility into the top ulama, but without high-level connections, advance- ment was slow. One bright scholar, Uthman Ibn al-Makki, had spent ten years as a teaching assistant, and then sixteen years as a second-class professor. When asked when he was likely to be promoted to the first class, al-Makki replied, "After the last cat from the Nayfur household" (ibid.: 91). An important aspect of Tunisia's religious hierarchy, one which distinguished it from many other Muslim countries, was that the formal leaders incorporated local-level religious manifestations, saints and brotherhoods, into their domain. Courses in mysticism were a regu- lar part of the curriculum of Zitouna mosque/university. Leaders of brotherhoods and heads of saintly lineages attempted to institutionalize their power by sending their sons to Tunis and Zitouna to become members of the learned elite (L.C. Brown 1972). Hence, Tunisia's high 62 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE6 ulama stood at the top of a ramified organizational network which included scholars and administrators as well as saints and sufis. Religious income, position, and legitimacy were dependent upon pragmatic political power. The bey made religious appointments, dispensed religious incomes, and dismissed reli- gious personnel at will. Although at times the ulama voiced dissent from the bey on minor points, their structural position left them upholding his legitimacy. In Tunisia, one finds none of the forceful opposition of nineteenth-century Iranian ulama. The Iranian religious leadership was also highly institutionalized, but importantly, it was economically independent of political power. Political Organization The relative clarity of Tunisia's precolonial economic, social, and religious orders was reflected in as well as dependent upon the political domain. Comparatively speaking, the coun- try was highly centralized and bureaucratized. Tunisia was divided into forty rural and twenty urban administrative units, governed by sixty qaids appointed by the bey (Hermassi 1972:8-55). Tunisia's centralization occurred during Ottoman times. In the 1500s, thanks to their skill with firepower and their legitimacy as protectors of Muslims against the infidels, the Ottomans established central political orders in many Middle Eastern countries. Tunisia's Husainid dynasty inherited the Ottoman position and remained in the Ottoman camp. During the late 1700s and throughout the 1800s centralization and bureaucratization efforts greatly increased. Political power emanated from the center, from the bey himself. He monopolized the means of physical coercion, the means of production, the forms of political administration. He controlled the military, made political and religious appointments. Ultimate legislative and judi- cial authority was his. The degree of control the bey exerted over the peripheries varied in time and place; nonetheless, political power was firmly in his hands. Although religious and political leadership were intertwined, the bey was not fundamen- tally a sacred figure. The bey's Islamic legitimacy rested on a single base, on his role as tem- poral ruler of a state in which Islam could flourish. The position lacked the diverse undergird- ing that was a part of the Moroccan sultanate. The bey was not the country's spiritual leader. He was not the mediator of God's grace to humanity. He was not sherif; lineal descendant of the Prophet. He was not even Arab, for that matter (the Husainids were Turkicized Greeks). The bey was not holy warrior, not caliph. Friday prayers were not said in his name (a gesture reserved for the Ottoman sultan). The bey's legitimacy lay in the realm of pragmatic power, undergirded by ulama association. As long as the bey was leader of a state in which Islam flourished, he was legitimate. When he failed in that task, his legitimacy was lost. PRECOLONIAL MOROCCO The Social Order Precolonial Tunisia was characterized by a sedentary population linked systematically, if sometimes sketchily, by means of overarching political, economic, and religious institutions. Morocco's population lacked such locational as well as organizational stability. Nomadism con- tinued well into the twentieth century. Migrations, individual and collective, characterized the country from the time of its Muslim inception and were particularly marked in the 1800s. With the decline in overland trade, nomads of Morocco's peripheries descended upon the more set- tled areas. The great Ait Atta conquests in southern Morocco are a particularly striking exam- ple of population shifts (Dunn 1973). Famines, political unrest, and outbreaks of plague, typhoid, and typhus were also reasons for population shifts, as was the common familial Nos. 63-64 63 COMBS-SCHILLING strategy of trying to place family members in as many different economic niches as possible. Individuals moved between social groups. Social groups themselves moved, and the lines of social group formation were fluid. Kinship, territory, and religious affiliation were alternative idioms in which local-level organization was phrased. Their use varied in time and place. In the area in which I lived, there was in the precolonial era a periodic alternation between patrilineal tribal organization, saints, and strong-arm men. Local organization was diverse and flexible, and local-level groupings had a large degree of political autonomy. Overarching integrative structures were largely absent. This is one reason Morocco is frequently labeled a tribal society. Just as rigid lines of social groupings are not easily drawn in Morocco, neither are clear- cut lines of social hierarchy. Hierarchy existed; that is, at any given point some people had more status than others, but that status was hard to maintain through time. Institutionalized mechanisms for the transmission of social ascendancy were largely lacking. Burke (1976) claims that in rural areas (most of Morocco in the 1700s and 1800s) social dominance was difficult to maintain for more than three generations. Jamous (1981) claims that for the north, a single generation was more typical. With the death of a status-holder came the collapse of his personal constellation of power and the demise of his family's social standing. Fes, Morocco's most important precolonial city, was no exception to this pattern. As Cigar notes, key political, social, and economic issues and loyalties were expressed in terms of vertically organized groups, such as Andalusian and Bildiyyin, rather than in terms of horizontal socioeconomic levels (1981:56). People were first and foremost members of their local group- ings. Their interests and loyalties for the most part lay within those groups. Further complicating social ranking in Morocco was the lack of congruency between economic, social, and political power. Wealth could confer social standing, but it was not the only resource that could do so. Sherifian and Andalusian descent, piety, or learning often were more important in this respect (Cigar 1981:57). Likewise, political power was not necessarily based on wealth. It could come from political appointment. In Morocco, social ascendancy was achieved rather than ascribed. Social mobility was marked. Some have argued that sherifian descent (descent from the Prophet Mohammed through his daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali) was the basis of a social class, but this simply was not the case. There was no clear-cut category from whom the socially high and mighty consistently came. At any given moment, sherifs existed at the top of power constellations as well as at the bottom. Sherifian descent was neither necessary nor sufficient for the conferral of social status. It was not comparable to Husainid descent in Tunis. The Economic Order Morocco's precolonial economic order also lacked a stable elite and overarching integra- tive institutions. At least until the late 1800s, Morocco did not constitute a class society (Burke 1976; Cigar 1981; see Seddon 1977 for an opposing view). Morocco did not consist of an insti- tutionalized landed elite which dominated a subjugated peasantry. Land itself was a question- able basis of wealth and power, partly because of political unrest, partly because of the nature of the land itself (Von Sivers 1981). During the 1700s and 1800s, land prices were low, indi- cating weak demand. Morocco's fertile plains were actually underpopulated during this period (Burke 1976). The population was concentrated in the peripheries, in mountains and desert. Dynastic power and wealth did not lie in land. By the mid-1600s collective royal lands in northern Morocco apparently had been divided into private holdings and sold (Cigar 1981:65). Dynastic taxes concentrated on commerce. Wealth was based in commerce, but commerce was not a stable source of economic might. It was subject to enormous vagaries as trade routes shifted, the value of goods changed, and European products increasingly began to dominate the market. It was not until the late 1800s that the commercial elite of Fes began to solidify its economic power and translate it into other domains (Cigar 1981). For the most part, this 64 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE6 change resulted from commercial and governmental reactions to increasing European economic penetration, not from the transference of centuries-old dominance into new domains. Religious Organization The same themes of lack of an institutionalized elite and lack of overarching integrative organizations characterize Morocco's religious sphere (Burke 1972; K. Brown 1972). Strictly speaking, Morocco did not have a formal ulama, a clearly designated religious leadership. Local areas, including the great cities of Fes, Marrakesh, and Sale, had their own religious elite, but they were largely autonomous of each other. Furthermore, the composition was not stable through time, nor was the route to religiosity clearly paved, as illustrated in the composition of the religious leadership which signed the bay'a, the oath of allegiance to a new sultan. Scholar- ship, sherifian descent, mystical knowledge, piety, brotherhood affiliation, notable deeds, and family descent, all could be bases of religious renown. Like political, economic, and social dominance, religious position had to be earned (see Gellner 1969 for a fine description of that earning). While the sultan might confirm religious authority in local areas and thereby add to its import, he did not create it. Until 1906, the power of religious appointment did not even nominally lie in the sultan's hands (Burke 1972:107). In some areas, particular families managed to institutionalize their positions through time, such as the saintly lineages of the Ahansal (Gellner 1969), the Sherqawa (Eickelman 1976), and the sherifs of Wazzan (Michaux-Bellaire 1909 and 1911). However, these institutions were local, not national, and were subject to change. Furthermore, by no means was all of the Moroccan countryside organized along saintly lines (Cornell 1983). Certain religious brotherhoods also were socially and politically important during Morocco's history, such as the Dila, the Derqawa, and the Nasiriyya (Drague 1951; Hammoudi 1980). They formed ramified networks of local authority in the country, but their membership was circumscribed. They could not be mistaken for a hierarchical religious organization of the country as a whole. They too were subject to enormous changes through time. While sharing structural characteristics with Morocco's economic and social domains, reli- gious affiliation exhibited an important difference. Diverse and changing religious manifesta- tions linked Moroccans to a universal faith, which received orienting focus in the politico- religious position of the sultanate. In the religious sphere, lack of organizational unity was not echoed by lack of symbolic unity. Organizational disunity was complemented by confessional focus. To some degree, the Islamic focus compensated for the lack of institutional integration in the society. Political Organization In organizational terms, precolonial Morocco was neither centralized nor bureaucratized (see Hermassi 1972:8-55). No overarching administrative structure encompassed the country as a whole. Even after the bureaucratization efforts of the last century, Morocco's central administration consisted of only five viziers and sixty secretaries in 1900 (Burke 1969:88). Pragmatic political power was not the prerogative of the center. The sultan did not monopolize the means of production, exchange, nor physical coercion. The sultan's military consisted of tribal forces, forces not different in kind from those available to local leaders. Power was nego- tiated, not meted out. Center and peripheries were contenders in a complex political game. Briefly stated, at any given moment, the Moroccan sultan held only part of the country in his administrative control. Moulay Ismail (1672-1722) was the only Alawite sultan who extended control to most of the countryside. In the administratively incorporated regions, he collected taxes, made appointments, and obtained obedience through direct military means. Nos. 63-64 65 COMBS-SCHILLING However, while at any given time only part of the country was under the sultan's direct admin- istrative control, his political authority was far reaching. Areas might lie outside the administra- tive formation yet within the polity. Beyond the pale is the wrong image. As Dunn (1977) has shown expertly for southeastern Morocco, the sultan, by means of letters of investiture, the appointment of arbitrators, and personal connections to local powerholders, directly influenced the pragmatic political game in local areas. Precolonial Morocco was a polity, but one that falls outside typical Western paradigms of organizationally centralized and bureaucratized states. There was political continuity and unity to the country as a whole. The continuity and unity lay in the politico-religious position of the sultanate. While the political authority of Tunisia's beylik clearly rested in the pragmatic sphere, much of the Moroccan sultan's power and authority lay elsewhere. It rested on a diverse and potent base of Islamic legitimacy (Laroui 1977 finely deciphers these multiple bases). The sul- tan was wali and iman, friend of God, spiritual intermediary, dispenser of God's grace to the nation. The sultan also was sherif, physical intermediary between the populace and the Pro- phet. He was caliph, the rightly elected ruler of a state in which Islam could flourish. He also was mujahid, holy warrior and upholder of the Qur'an. Communal prayers in the Friday mosque were said in his name. The sultan was spiritual center of the country as a whole. As spiritual center he claimed political authority, and as political center he claimed religious power. The two were intimately intertwined. The base of the sultanate's power and authority gave the position a certain distance from quid pro quo evaluations. In Easton's terms, the sultanate rested on "diffuse" rather than "specific" support (1965:273-274). Diffuse support centers in a "relatively stable set of predispositions that are manifested in the form of emotive attachments and sentimental identifications with the symbols of the political system" (Elder and Cobb 1983:15). Continual failure of the system can lead to an erosion of support, but momentary fluctuations do not have much effect on the system's overall legitimacy. As Siegel and Hoskin (1977) have shown, the reservoir of supportive sentiment distances evaluations of the government from current perfor- mance. In the Moroccan case, the diffuse bases of support for the sultanate should not be taken to mean that the sultan actually embodied these characteristics. Rather, firm belief in the characteristics themselves gave the sultans a certain license to transgress them while still retain- ing popular support. The combined bases of support provided a staunch political foundation. Colonial power-holders and historians recognized that the sultan had legitimacy in areas outside his direct administrative control. Indicative were incidents in which the sultan's army was defeated and his advisors were killed, while the sultan himself was escorted safely back to his capital. Something was at base here besides unqualified dissent. However, French colonial- ists, and scholars who have followed their lead, interpreted this legitimacy as existing solely in the religious sphere. They assumed that the population accepted the religious arm of the sultan but not his political authority. There is something fundamentally amiss in this kind of interpretation. It reflects a separa- tion of political and religious authority which existed in French minds, but not in Moroccan. It appears more accurate to say that what those Moroccans were rejecting was a political form, not the sultan's political authority. After all, what distinguished the sultan from any other religious leader was that he stood at the head of a large-scale political entity. The political basis of his legitimacy was not to be undermined. The French consistently mistook the sultan's lack of direct administrative control for lack of political allegiance by the Moroccan populace. Throughout the 1800s European observers continually predicted the imminent downfall of the sultanate. It would, they said, collapse of its own dead weight. Yet the sultanate persisted. Morocco was the last of the Maghrebi countries to be colonized, 88 years after Algeria, 31 years after Tunisia, just as, three hundred years ear- lier, Morocco was the last of the Maghrebi countries to be submitted to Ottoman assault and the only one successfully to remain outside the Ottoman camp. The reasons for lack of coloni- zation do not lie simply on the colonizer's side. 66 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE When the French finally entered Morocco, they assumed that the country would easily fall under their military control. After all, was not most of the country outside the sultan's political grasp? Again, they misunderstood the nature of the Moroccan polity. The French Protectorate began officially in 1912, but the country as a whole was not subjugated until 1934, by which time the independence movement was already underway. Resistance to the colonial takeover was fierce in Morocco while in bureaucratized, centralized Tunisia, resistance was comparatively weak. Tunisia's coherent institutions, including its beylik and its ulama, were easily coopted, while Morocco's fluid organizations were not. Morocco's lack of institutional clarity proved an asset in resisting the colonial onslaught and in building anticolonial resistance. These charac- teristics proved more problematic in the postcolonial age, but in building a nationalist move- ment they were remarkably effective. THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS RECONSIDERED Tunisia's Route to Independence In the precolonial context, Morocco's and Tunisia's differing routes to independence became explicable within a framework different from the usual evolutionary one. The struc- tural clarity of Tunisia's precolonial system made it vulnerable to colonial assault. The bey's political power and his political legitimacy depended on his leadership of a state in which Islam could flourish. With the advent of colonialism, the bey became the figurehead of a state in which Muslims suffered, the infidel ruled, and-what was worse-ruled through Tunisian hands and with the support of the Tunisian ulama. The bey was in a structural stranglehold. By the simple fact of colonialism, he was illegitimate in power and authority. Pragmatically centered, yet pragmatically impotent, the bey lacked alternative bases of legitimacy from which perhaps he could have mobilized the population against the French. Severed from the population, the bey's continuance in position rested solely on his alliance with the colonial power. It was for this reason that in Muslim/French conflicts, the bey consistently ended up on the side of the French, widening the gap between himself and the population. This was true even of Amir Muhammad al-Habib, who before his accession to the throne had been actively involved in the anti-French movement and had held Nationalist meetings in his home (Ziadeh 1969:121). However, once he became bey, his anti-French voice ceased. Though opposed to the French in individual ideological terms al-Habib was dependent upon them in structural terms and did not fly in the face of that reality. It is interesting that, in con- trast, the Moroccan sultan, Mohammed V, handpicked by the French and ideologically not opposed to them before taking the position, became the focal point of resistance once he held it. The sultan's diverse bases of legitimacy kept him from structural stranglehold. For many of the same reasons the Tunisian ulama, like the beylik, were eliminated as a potential focal point of anticolonial opposition. Structurally, their position was also inextricably bound to pragmatic political power. The ulama were unable to disentagle themselves from the pragmatic bond, even when the power-holder was France. To maintain their institutional posi- tion, they had to rely on the French. Hence the religious establishment perceived Muslim reformists and secular Tunisian ideologues as greater threats than the infidels. The ulama too often ended up on the wrong side in Muslim/French conflicts, for example, in the 1910 strike of Zitouna University students (when the ulama sided with the French against the students); in the Jallaz cemetery riots of 1911 (after which key members of the ulama went to the French and made a formal apology for the incident); and in the ulama's reaction to reformism. In Morocco, religious scholars typically greeted reformism with open arms. In Tunisia, the ulama reacted violently to it. In 1904, they brought Tunisia's most prominent reformist, al-Tha'alibi, to trial, accusing him of heresy. Some wanted his death; the French imprisoned him instead (Green 1978:185-187). Nos. 63-64 67 COMBS-SCHILLING Although in unhealthy alliance with the French, the Tunisian ulama were the legitimate spokesmen for Islam and continued to monopolize the means of public religious expression. Given the ulama's stance, Islam as the public voice of political dissent was disenfranchized. Islam's power-holders had sullied its credence in the political arena, although in personal terms, Islam remained important. The voice of dissent as well as the leadership had to come from outside the precolonial formations. A newly emergent political elite fired by secular nationalism served as the focus. Undoubtedly, this anticolonial elite was sincerely drawn to liberal notions of democracy, political parties, and union representation. However, in historical terms, Tunisia's secular national route to independence represented a sociocultural push as well as an intellectual pull. Anticolonial leaders did not come from Tunis, Tunisia's precolonial center. Rather, they originated from provincial areas. Most were professionals, doctors, lawyers, journalists; many were educated at Sadiqia College, a Western-modeled institution established by Khayr al-Din in 1875, in an attempt to incorporate knowledge and training from the West into Tunisia's educa- tional system. Sadiqia was the training ground for Tunisia's civil servants, members of the pro- fessions, and political liberals (Hermassi 1972: 112,121; Green 1978:103-117). Many of Tunisia's anticolonial leaders went on to France for further training. Once they became politi- cized, nearly all gave up their professions to work full-time for independence. Habib Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour party were the focal points of resistance (Ferhat Hached, leader of the Tunisian union movement, also was important; tragically, he was assas- sinated in 1952). Bourguiba was a fiery young French-trained lawyer, politically astute and organizationally tireless. In 1934, he broke with the past, with the old Destour ("Constitu- tion") party, which had been established in 1920. In Bourguiba's eyes, the Destour were too accommodating; independence would not be won with their program. In establishing the Neo- Destour, Bourguiba maintained a link with the 1861-66 Constitution but called for a new kind of movement, one that would take to the streets to achieve independence. Ideology played a key role in Tunisia's nationalist movement. Given the structural hold of the power elite, the call for the liberal ideals of freedom and democracy rang true. The Neo- Destour was the mechanism for popular mobilization, and the intensity of its organizational effort is striking. As Hermassi says, every square inch of the country was covered as the party incorporated the population into its framework (1972:123). In its anticolonial effort, Tunisia's political formation was marked by the coherency of its elite, their ideology, and their organiza- tion. In 1938, the young Neo-Destour spearheaded public opposition to the French policy of arresting nationalist leaders. The culmination came on April 9, 1938, which is now celebrated as Martyrs' Day. A protest demonstration had been organized in front of the Palace of Justice. The protesters were dispersed, only to return the next day in the thousands. French soldiers opened fire, killing 122 and wounding 86 (Lejri 1974:11:211). Popular hostility was crystallized and focused through the Neo-Destour. Other key events in the Tunisian nationalist movement included the 1945 Manifesto, in which total independence was demanded; the 1946 labor union merger into L'Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail; and the 1947 labor union strike. In 1953, anti-French guerilla warfare was begun. Morocco's Route to Independence Morocco's independence stands in polar contrast to that of Tunisia. In the Maghreb's far west, independence centered on Islam as the voice of political dissent and the sultan as focal point of resistance. The Islam expressed was far reaching, able to encompass widely varying organizational forms and conceptual images into a single universal faith. Lack of organizational and ideational clarity also characterized the sultanate, a powerful but diffuse national symbol capable of mobilizing a highly diverse constituency. "Hay el malik," "Long live the king," served as rallying cry for the population as a whole. For many Moroccans, the sultanate 68 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE represented the heart of Islam as well as the heart of the nation. The sultan was national sym- bol of the present, tie to the past, and link to the divine. An attack on the sultanate was reason for personal action. While in Tunisia, the political elite, their ideology, and their political party were the focal points of independence, in Morocco they played important but secondary roles. Concentrating exclusively on them skews one's understanding of anticolonialism. In Morocco they were sup- porting cast. Front stage center stood the sultan. For the most part the elite's influence on the population was mediated through the sultan himself. Morocco's political elite tended to come from leading families of Fes, who, in response to increasing European penetration, had esta- blished their economic and political dominance in the late 1800s. In Tunisia, the colonial era resulted in dispersal of the power of the indigenous elite. In Morocco, colonialism created a stable elite. The intellectual orientation of Morocco's elite was largely toward religion instead of secular nationalism. Centering in Salifiyya reformism, its goal was to rid Islam of the accre- tions of the ages and thereby return Moroccans to the purity of the early faith. Allal al-Fassi, trained in the millennium-old Qarawiyyin mosque/university, was its most important spokesper- son. The ideological orientation made itself felt by means of its influence on Mohammed V, who was sincerely moved by some of its tenets. For the most part Salifiyya reformism remained an elitist orientation, important in influencing intellectuals but not in mobilizing the masses, for whom the sultanate itself served as focal point. In large part, it was the diversity of the sultanate as well as its store of cultural credence that allowed the sultan to play this role. For the democratically inclined, he was caliph, rightly elected ruler. They spoke of the bay 'a, the precolonial oath of allegiance, as an indigenous democratic institution. Other Moroccans emphasized the sultan's role as spiritual intermediary. Others stressed his import as link to the Prophet, as tie to the past. Others combined the bases of legitimacy. Moroccos's sultan was intertwined with his population through numerous links. He was not solely dependent upon administrative power. Morocco's sultanate can be seen to have had 1200 years of continuity. Since its Muslim inception in the 700s and 800s, six dynasties have had central authority. The current dynasty, the Alawites, have been at national center since 1664. Mohammed V was their twentieth ruler. In 1927, French colonialists designated the 14-year-old Mohammed ben Youssef as Morocco's new sultan. They had secluded him from early childhood, controlling his education and choos- ing him over his two brothers because of his apparent docility. After settling the office upon him, the French continued to control his movements and surround him with French advisors, some of whom became Mohammed's close friends. Nonetheless, it was this handpicked, closely guarded Mohammed V who spearheaded independence. The diversity and flexibility of his position allowed Mohammed V to assume the central anticolonial role. Although the French did not conquer the whole of Morocco until 1934, nationalism was being discussed by young intellectuals in Rabat and Fes in the late 1920s. The year 1930 was a critical date for the begining of the drive for independence. On May 16, 1930, France, in direct abrogation of the Protectorate agreement, promulgated a dahir, or legal ruling, which formally separated the Berber speakers, over half the population, from the sultan and his judicial arm. The dahir proclaimed that Berbers lay outside the domain of sacred Islamic law. For Berbers, customary law would be applicable in civil cases. In criminal proceedings, the French criminal code would apply. The French assumed that the Berbers would accept the dahir with open arms. From the French perspective, the Berbers' tie to Islam and to the sultanate were simply veneers over an inherently democratic and potentially French population. As so often was the case in North African colonial history, France was seriously off the mark. Once the population became aware of the dahir-in large part thanks to the efforts of young nationalists-the popu- lar reaction was intense. Whatever the nature of actual legal practices, the Berbers did not want to be separated from their sultan or their faith. In Morocco's cities, people entered mosques and prayed the prayers of disaster. Everyone knew who the disaster was-the French-but their name was left unspoken. People prayed the latifs, prayers recited when Islam is in peril. A popular version went: "Ya latif, 0 Savior, protect us from ill treatment by fate and allow Nos. 63-64 69 COMBS-SCHILLING nothing to divide us from our brothers the Berbers" (Halstead 1967:180-181). The notion espoused by some political scientists that through the Berber dahir, the young nationalists were able to revive a dead institution, the sultanate, and use it for their purposes misplaces causal forcefulness. The sultanate was not dead. At question was the efficacy of the particular occupant, not the position itself. What the nationalists did was help the young Mohammed V begin to act as rightful sultan. They neither created nor controlled the legi- timacy of the position itself. Over the years of the anticolonial struggle, the nationalists bor- rowed more from the legitimacy of the sultanate than the sultan ever borrowed from them. During the 1930s, influenced by the ideals of young reformists as well as the expectations of his people, Mohammed ben Youssef came to occupy in person the position that had been conferred upon him by France. With increasing firmness, Mohammed V became Morocco's national leader, its rightful Commander of the Faithful, amir al mu'minun After the Berber dahir, the now 18-year-old Mohammed V actively began seeking contact with his people and knowledge of their predicament. He began reading the work of Allal al- Fassi. In 1934, the year Bourguiba established the Neo-Destour, the sultan met al-Fassi. Another important event also occurred that year. France planned a routine visit of the sultan to Fes. The sultan's arrival was greeted by a spectacular popular ovation. Mohammed V was already the people's leader; they wanted him to lead. The ovation caused such concern among the French that they cancelled the sultan's visit to the Friday mosque and hustled him back to Rabat (Ashford 1961:36). Spontaneous riots resulted, and people were jailed. The young sul- tan learned of the jailings and demanded redress from the French for this and other grievances which had come to his attention. With the move toward, and then commencement of, World War II, Morocco's struggle for independence slowed. However, the 1942 meeting between the sultan and President Roosevelt raised high hopes for Moroccan national autonomy. During the war Moroccans fought on the side of France. After the sacrifices of the war, Moroccans expected but did not receive greater political control of their own affairs. A party of opposition was formed, with the sultan's blessing. It was called Istiqlal, which means "independence." The sultan's 1947 Tangier speech was a critical demarker for the second phase in the independence movement. In April 1947, Mohammed V visited Tangier, the first Moroccan sul- tan to do so since 1899. He was scheduled to deliver a speech, which was to close with a phrase, supplied by the French, lauding the Protectorate and the Franco-Moroccan alliance. However, a few days earlier an incident occurred in Casablanca which caused a popular uproar and deeply troubled the sultan. A Senegalese soldier, part of the French military force in Morocco, had molested an Arab woman in the street. A riot ensued, in which 83 persons were killed and several hundred wounded. Given the incident, the sultan found himself unable to articulate the final laudatory phrase. Instead, he concluded with a plea for the legitimate rights of the Moroccan people, and with the desire for Moroccan inclusion in the Arab League. Since the French had already given the earlier version of the speech to the press, the sultan's action was blatant. The battle was joined between the legitimate national ruler and the pragmatic power-holders. Unlike the organizationally intense Bourguiba, Mohammed V ground the Protectorate to a halt by withdrawing from action, by refusing to sign the dahirs, the legal rulings, the French put before him. The French cajoled, pleaded, and threatened, but the sultan stood steadfast. The facade of the French Protectorate was shattered. While claiming to support Moroccan institutions, the French had consistently pursued their own aims, a policy somewhat masked by the sultan's compliance in signing dahirs. When the sultan refused to comply, the Protectorate myth was shown for what it was. France found itself in dilemma. By law, it could not implement actions without the sultan's signature, and yet he would not sign. France pursued a variety of ill-fated strategies, then finally decided to replace the sultan. On August 20, 1953, France dethroned Mohammed ben Youssef, exiling him and his family, first to Corsica, and then to Madagascar. The sultan 70 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE7 maintained his noncooperative stance until the end, refusing to sign the abdication papers. His elderly and incompetent uncle, Moulay Arafa, was put in the sultan's place. Compliantly he signed everything the French put in front of him, including, at one point, a menu. Deposing Mohammed V was itself a serious miscalculation, but the French choice of tim- ing makes it one of the most singularly inept events in colonial history. When did the French authorities decide to depose Mohammed V, the enormously popular sultan? On Aid el Kebir, Morocco's most important religious holiday, the day above all others when the good of the nation was intertwined with the sultan's actions. Aid el Kebir, the Great Feast Day, commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Ishmael, and God's beneficence in providing a substitute ram. On the day of the festival, heads of households throughout the country sacrifice a ram to mark their continuing relation- ship with the divine. Yet the household sacrifices must await the national sacrifice. It is the sultan who slays the first ram, the sacrifice upon which the good of the country as a whole depends. On this day, when religiosity, personal faith, economic well-being, sense of self, and tradition are directly linked to the reigning sultan, France expelled Mohammed V. France expected strong popular reaction to this move. A quarter of a million French troops were on Moroccan soil, ready for action. Again France miscalculated. Instead of organ- ized rebellion, the Moroccan response was very different. On the night of the exile, Moroccans spontaneously spilled into the streets, gazed at the moon in silence, and swore they saw there the face of Mohammed V. Those who experienced the event still tell of it with emotional fer- vor. France attempted to make of Mohammed V a sacrificial ram. Instead, he was to return a triumphant Ishmael. As the days passed, there were scattered acts of violence, but for the most part, the Moroccan response was to withdraw from action, to refuse to live life as normal (the large-scale jailings of Istiqlal leaders in 1952 probably affected the thrust of popular resistance, but one must be careful about overemphasizing their effect). In any event, Moroccans boycotted life. They closed their shops. They stopped smoking, thereby reducing the Protectorate's income from the tobacco concession by 80%. Most strikingly, Moroccans stopped praying. Muslims refused to enter their mosques and pray their prayers until the prayers could be uttered in the name of the rightful sultan, Mohammed ben Youssef. With the removal of Mohammed V, the French ensured a quick end to the colonial era. Compromise was no longer possible. The population had turned viscerally against them. The thrust of Moroccan popular resistance proved effective. The French could hardly imprison peo- ple for not opening their shops, not smoking, not saying their Muslim prayers, and yet this was where their resistance lay. Beleaguered by its colonies (France had been soundly defeated in Vietnam in 1954), France gave up. On November 17, 1955, amid incredible jubilation, Mohammed V returned to his people. His first words called upon the deity to bless his home- land. On March 2, 1956, eighteen days before Tunisia, Morocco became the first Maghrebi country to win formal independence from France, somewhat to the dismay of Tunisia's anticolonial elite who had fought so long, so hard, and so firmly within the accepted bounds of French political discourse. On March 20, 1956, Tunisia gained its own independence. With independence began the difficult task of nation building for the reserved and pious Mohammed V, and the passionate and persuasive Habib Bourguiba. Nos. 63-64 71 COMBS-SCHILLING Table 1 Tunisia and Morocco Compared Category Morocco Tunisia Focus of Sultanate Newly emergent Independence political elites Islam Secular nationalism Political party Colonial era 1912/1934-1956 1881-1956 Precolonial Hereditary monarch, Hereditary monarch, political center the sultan the bey Precolonial No overarching political Institutionalized political structure encompassing administrative form country as a whole bureaucracy Base of monarch's Temporal leader of a Temporal leader of a legitimacy state in which Islam state in which Islam could flourish could flourish Spiritual intermediary Dispenser of grace to the nation Lineal link to Mohammed Elected ruler Holy Warrior Precolonial Diverse and mobile Sedentary population social population organization No institutionalized Social hierarchy social hierarchy Achieved status Ascribed status Significant mobility Restricted mobility Precolonial Wealth in commerce Wealth in land economic organization Lack of institu- Economic elite tionalized elite Lack of overarching Overarching economic economic organization organization Taxes On commerce On land/agriculture Precolonial No national religious National religious elite religious elite organization Lack of overarching Institutionalized religious hierarchy religious hierarchy: Hanafi Shaikh al Islam, Maliki mufti Key events in 1930 Berber dahir 1934 Neo-Destour party independence 1947 Tangier speech 1938 Martyr's Day movements 1953 Exile of the sultan 1945 Manifesto 1947 Labor union strike 1953 Guerilla warfare 72 KAS Papers ISLAM, POWER, AND CHANGE SUMMARY The independence movements of Tunisia and Morocco have been examined in the con- text of their precolonial pasts. Turning the typical interpretation on its head, I argue that precolonial Tunisia was the more rigid, the more structured society while precolonial Morocco was more flexible. In Tunisia the existence of a clear-cut political and religious power elite, their organizational institutionalization, and their single foundation in pragmatic power meant that Tunisia's precolonial power-holders could not disentangle themselves from the pragmatic bond, even when the power-holder was France. Hence of necessity the independence move- ment had to emerge from outside precolonial structures. Precolonial Morocco, on the other hand, was marked by the flexibility of its national center. Not singly based in pragmatic power, the voice of Islam and the position of the sul- tanate were able to distance themselves from the power-holder when the power-holder was France. The diverse bases of the sultanate's legitimacy, as well as the tendency for the popula- tion to separate legitimate political authority from political form meant that the sultanate could emerge from the colonial tie unsullied in a way that the Tunisian beylik could not. Hence Morocco's diverse and flexible past proved effective in dealing with a changing colonial present. In the postcolonial era, the situation has again radically altered. Both countries are marked by continuity with as well as disjuncture from their pasts. Wherein lie the solutions to current problems is difficult to say, but in that quest, North Africans, like the rest of us, look to the past as well as the present in trying to build a world that can be. REFERENCES CITED Abun-Nasr, Jamil 1971a A History of the Maghrib. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1971b The Independence Movement of the Maghrib. Tarikh 4:54-67. Ashford, Douglas E. 1961 Political Change in Morocco. 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