78
CASTE AND CLASS IN GERMANY: A STUDY
OF THE POWER POLITICS OF LABOR
MIGRATION FROM 1955-1980
Uli H. Linke
Department of Anthropology
University of California
Berkeley, California
Stratification is a characteristic of all complex soc-
ieties. Inequality in power and privileges, in prestige and
status, and in differential access to goods and services is
however, more rigidly controlled in some societies than in
others. The Indian caste system is an often cited example of
a more extreme case of institutionalized inequality. Berreman
(1960:120) defines such a system as "a hierarchy of endogamous
divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent."
In contrast, class organized societies such as the United
States are distinguished by the existence of economically
based strata which persist as categories independent of the
mobility of individual members. Characteristically, class
membership constitutes an achieved rather than an ascribed
status. In ideational terms, caste determines group membership
by criteria defined as intrinsic to the individual's structur-
al position in the economy; class defines it in extrinsic
terms.
Despite this apparent contradiction of the principles of
caste and class stratification, we find they can in fact co-
exist in time and space. Berreman (1960) has addressed this
phenomenon in his discussion of race relations in the South-
ern United States where color is a mark of caste. The emer-
gence of caste systems is then not confined to a particular
point on the social-evolutionary spectrum. Rather, in given
historical circumstances it may become economically and politi-
cally advantageous for the power elite to institute and pee-
petuate a caste system. Using the example of contemporary
Germany I will analyze the creation of caste in a class soc-
iety. More specifically, I will discuss the introduction of
79
foreign workers into the German industrial economy and their
centrally controlled ascription to a caste status.
The process of caste formation in Germany began in the
early 1950's, when the recruitment of migrant workers across
political boundaries began. This initial stage, which might
be termed "a contractual caste system," was characterized by
the assignment of foreign workers to an inferior political
and economic status. For approximately two decades German
employers and the state regarded this status as temporary be-
cause the recruitment of foreign workers was at first designed
to alleviate labor shortages at the lowest occupational levels
during a period of rapid economic growth. However, in the
early 1970's when jobs became scarce as recession progressed,
and Germany stopped its foreign labor recruitment program,
the "temporary" caste system became institutionalized in the
German society. By 1975 the economically active foreign pop-
ulation was reduced through deportation to half its former
size, but the number of foreign residents in Germany had in-
creased as workers sent for their families.
The temporary caste with its rational contractual basis
has been transformed into a permanent caste system based on
considerations of social status. These two stages in the
formation of caste, the creation of the original contractual
caste system and its development into a more fully developed
status caste, will be the focus of my discussion.
The Political Economy of Germany's
Contractual Caste System
Germany's labor migration policies and its recruitment of
foreign workers to a contractual caste status were strictly
demand oriented, designed to adjust the labor process to econ-
omic fluctuations.
In the post-war era, Germany's expansive economic growth,
coupled with an unfavourable demographic situation and a more
facile upward mobility of the German workers, contributed to
an ever increasing demand for labor in low paying, highly
monotonous, menial and socially undesirable tasks. This sit-
uation manifested itself most clearly between 1955 and 1960,
when the first mass recruitment of foreign workers began. A
relatively recent report by Ernst Klee (1975:26) indicates
that during this time span approximately 220,000 vacancies
emerged in such menial jobs.  In satisfying their demand for
labor through the recruitment of foreign workers, German em-
80
ployers assigned the majority of migrants (85%) to tasks
which demanded little skill and which were predominantly man-
ual such as packaging, carrying and cleaning. Wolfgang Weber
(1980:50) has pointed out that only 15% of the foreign labor-
ers in contrast to 39% of the German work force performed
tasks demanding any sort of skill (for further reference, also
see the study by Nermin Abadan-Unat, 1976:22). It refers to
data obtained in 1963, according to which 40.8% of all Turk-
ish migrants did not use a single tool (not even a shovel)
at work. Another 45.3% did not operate a machine. Jobs as-
signed to foreign workers, however, required a great degree
of physical endurance as work conditions were often distin-
guished by noise, heat and monotony. Abadan-Unat (1976:22)
makes clear that 47% of all Turkish workers were employed in
occupations distinguished by these criteria. Weber's analysis
(1980:44) indicates that most foreign workers carried out
assembly line jobs. In constrast to 13% of the German workers,
over 30% of them were assigned to work operations which change
at least once every minute. While only 25% of the migrants
were responsible for operations which changed no more than
once every hour, we find 41% of the German workers in charge
of such tasks. Furthermore, most foreign workers received
little or no training on the job. A joint study by Schrader,
Nikles and Gried (1979:91) reveals that in the early 1970's,
the training time migrant workers received on the job ranged
from 2-5 days for women, and 4-10 days for men. An earlier
study by Abadan-Unat (1976:22) points to an even shorter
training period in 1963. Ursual Neuman's report (1980:76)
suggests that of all Turkish workers, approximately 44% re-
ceived no training on the job at all. These factors not only
perpetuated the migrants' occupational status, but also sup-
pressed them to the lowest income brackets in the German econ-
omy (for further reference see Neumann 1980:71). From these
observations we may conclude that the caste status of foreign
workers in Germany initially emerged in the occupational
sphere.
In this early period, however, caste assignation was
temporary. The recruitment policies and training programs,
the payment system and work contract itself, all emphasized
this temporary status. Employers hired foreign workers only
on a short term basis. The local labor offices issued work
permits which were valid for only two years and could be re-
newed or terminated in conjunction with economic demands
(Klee 1975:26-27; Kowalski 1980:30; Mayer 1975:443).
This system proved advantageous for employers in se-veral
ways. The policy of unskilled job prescription and the limit-
ed duration of work contracts provided employers with the nec-
essary flexibility in adjusting their labor force to fluctu-
ations in the economy. They could dispose of their foreign
81
employees without generating organizational problems in the
production process. They could capitalize on the migrant
workers' productive utility without incurring rising labor
costs or increased expenditures in mechanizing the production
process. Furthermore, employers could expand the migrants'
out-put productivity through threats of deportation when the
effort they invested into their jobs began to decline.
The conditions necessary for the establishment of a con-
tractual caste system had been secured politically in the
late 1950's. Labor movements to Germany were centrally con-
trolled and the recruitment of foreign workers became govern-
ment policy. The ascription of migrant laborers to a con-
tractual caste became an administrative directive. It was
formulated in the policy of 'rotation' adopted by the German
National Labor Office which had been entrusted with control
over the introduction of foreign labor. This concept implied
that migrant workers should not under any circumstances be
permitted to remain in Germany beyond a limited period of
time. The National Labor Office secured the temporary mobil-
ization of foreign labor politically through international
bilateral agreements. These treaties specified that foreign
workers could be released and legally deported in accordance
with the fluctuations of the economy. Such agreements were
ratified with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey
(1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and
Yugoslavia (1968).
Invariably, while granting some protection to the foreign
workers, the policies of the National Labor Office gave prior-
ity to the requirements of German employers and the wider in-
terests of the German economy. Its primary concern was with
"quantitatively and qualitatively satisfying demands for man-
power in Germany" (Krane 1979:5).
The bureaucratization of the recruitment process was ac-
companied by an ideological system which further facilitated
the migrants' ascription to a contractual caste.1 State ad-
ministrators responded to the employers' labor demands with
an efficiency which rested on the rationally pursued objecti-
fication of those human beings most affected by their policies.
They classified, categorized and distributed foreign workers
in the German economy relative to their labor capacities and
skills. Stripped of their individual identities, migrant
workers were converted into instrumental commodities. Bur-
eaucrats and employers not only came to perceive, but to
treat migrant workers as if they consisted of no more than
productive bodies harnessing labor power shich could be tem-
porarily mobilized and adopted to the demands of the German
economy.
82
Once foreign workers arrived in Germany, their whole ex-
istence became subject to state control. Their permanent in-
tegration into German society was inhibited by legal stipu-
lations which restricted their choice of domicile, confining
them to dormatory life and collective housing provided by
the employers (Klee 1973 and 1975; Mayer 1975:443; Neumann
1980:58; Rhoades 1978:565; Schrader et al. 1979). These
conditions were intentionally created to discourage family
reunions and to inhibit the migrants' future planning.
Foreign workers were issued residence permits which, being
limited in duration, facilitated their periodic forced re-
turns to their home countries. In accordance with section
2.1 of the Foreigners Law, all migrant workers must acquire
a residence permit which is issued by the German Aliens' Reg-
istration Office (Aus1anderamt).   Since the beginning of June
1978, this permit is granted only provisionally for the dur-
ation of one year. Thereafter, it becomes subject for renew-
al and may be extended for another two years. After five
years of residence in Germany, foreign workers should be
granted an unlimited residence permit. After eight years,
this status may become unconditional. Naturalization is
theoretically granted after ten years of residence, however,
this occurs only in exceptional cases.
The initial extension of the residence status was con-
ditional on proof of housing accomodations which met local
regulations, on the migrants' proficiency in spoken German,
on their children's regular attendance in school and, most im-
portantly, it was tied to the possession of a work permit
(Foreigners Law section 2). Consequently, during times of
economic decline, when the work permit could be revoked, the
residence status was automatically terminated as well. Accoun-
tability and appeal procedures against administrative decisions
were blocked through additional legal stipulations and the am-
biguity of policy directives contained in the Foreigners Law.
Here I refer particularly to section 10 of the Foreigners Law
which states that residence and work permits will be issued
only as long as "the interests of the Federal Republic of
Germany are not impaired" by the further presence of the ap-
plicant. My research indicates that the generality of this
clause allows administrators to revoke residence and work per-
mits for rather arbitrary reasons. During times of economic
decline, they may increase deportation rates by charging mi-
grants with minor affenses such as traffic violations, resid-
ing in housing accomodations which are inadequate in accord-
ance with legal regulations, drinking in public, or the use
of a knife in domestic quarrels. Similarly, when foreign,
workers threaten to become a burden on government spending
through illness or injuries received at work, they can be
readily sent home.
83
State intervention in migratory movements, however, not
only secured the mobility of foreign labor. By means of the
Foreigners Law with its administrative regulations, the state
also ascribed migrant workers to an exclusive sphere of activ-
ity within which their productive utility could be maximized
by the employers. Administrators could make the residence
and work permit conditional on a particular job at a particu-
lar firm. Consequently, when foreign workers attempted to
change employers to escape suppressive work conditions, to
attain higher wages or to move into higher skilled jobs, they
could be prevented from doing so with threats of deportation.
Often, the movement of workers between jobs bids up their
wages. By controlling this movement and therefore wage rates,
the German state confined foreign workers to a low occupation-
al status. This measure, however, served the interests of
capitalists as a class rather than individual employers.
Furthermore, in denying migrant workers the right to par-
ticipate in elections on all levels, the German state suppress-
ed the expression of political concerns on both individual
and collective levels. Section 6 of the Foreigners Law also
denies migrants the right of public assembly and political
organization. As such, it restricts their freedom of speech.
These stipulations reduce the migrants' ability to resist
wage suppressions.
While the wage rates and occupational status of foreign
workers was thus kept relatively low, the size distribution of
income shifted in favor of the German population. The devel-
opment of the migrant workers' contractual caste status pro-
vided German workers with greater occupational and social
mobility.
In a relatively recent study, Jurgen Habermas (1973:82)
has pointed out that the increase in and the leveling of the
standard of living among the German population decreased the
workers' effort on the job. The development of a contractual
caste system seemed to promote marginal productivity among
German workers. Habermas did not acknowledge that this phen-
omenon could be counteracted only through the achievement or-
ientation and greater labor effort of the migrant population.
During times of economic expansion, the German state there-
fore needed to secure the effective competitive pressure
migrant workers could exert on the German working class in
order to retain high levels of productivity. Empirical
studies indicate that foreign workers do in fact strive for
the same occupational and educational opportunities as their
German colleagues (Neumann 1980; Schrader et al. 1979:100-101).
The migrant workers' achievement orientation should not sur-
prise us if we take account of the fact that most of them
84
were recruited from a skilled, urban and industrial labor
force. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that adminis-
trators selectively extracted those workers from the indigen-
ous economies who had previous contact with industrial pro-
duction. For instance, Neumann (1980:56,74) points out that
prior to 1970 only 37% of all Turkish migrants were employed
in the agricultural sector; 18% had been engaged in the pro-
vision of services. However, more than 62% were drawn from
the industrial sectors of the Turkish economy. Administrators
seemed to favor the import of qualified foreign workers. Klee
(1975) makes clear that on the average unskilled Turkish ap-
plicants waited up to seven years to gain admission to Germany.
Skilled and literate workers waited no longer than two years.
A report by Abadan-Unat (1976:11) indicates that only seven
years after Turkey consented to the export of its citizens to
Germany, it had been depleted of 26% of its skilled labor
force. By 1971 more than 46% of its qualified labor had been
recruited to Germany.
While striving for the same educational and occupational
opportunities as their German colleagues, a majority of mi-
grants also expressed the desire to remain in Germany (Weber
1980:43). Furthermore, statistics compiled by the Bundes-
minister fur Arbeit und SoziaZordnung (1980:IIa 5-28707-6)
indicate that every second migrant lived in Germany for more
than eight years.
The foreign workers' equal access to education, occupa-
tional opportunities and higher wages was, however restricted
through their ascription to a contractual caste. Consequently,
they could only realize their goals by working relatively
longer hours, by accepting shift work and those tasks which
the German workers regarded as demeaning. As a result of re-
cruitment policies and the establishment of a contractual
caste system, the migrant workers were manipulated into assum-
ing a competitive position in the economy.
The Formation of a Status Based
Caste System in Germany
The original temporary caste system with its rational
contractual basis gradually transformed into a permanent mode
of institutionalized inequality based on considerationsmof
social status.
The increasing scarcity of jobs resulting from the re-
cession of the early 1970's coupled with the competitive pres-
85
sure foreign workers exerted on the market generated resent-
ment against the migrant population among the German labor
force. Although the German state put a sudden halt to foreign
labor recruitment in 1973, and considerably reduced the for-
eign work force by means of deportation, it soon became clear
that migrant workers had become inextricably wedded to the
German economic system. Today, four million foreigners have
made Germany their country of choice. Of the total labor
force in Germany more than 9% are migrant workers.
The permanence of the foreign population and their compe-
tition on the labor market leads particularly among the "low-
est social strata" to resistance against any kind of social
integration of the migrants and their families. Studies in-
dicate that it is most noticeable among the unskilled, semi-
skilled, and low ranking German employees who are threatened
by unemployment and who compete with foreigners for jobs and
education (see Reimann 1979:80). With decreasing job quali-
fications, the resentment against the presence of migrant
workers seems to grow (Anagnostidis 1975:127-128).
At the job and in interaction with their German colleagues,
migrant workers are thus confronted with the fact that their
marginal economic and political status is duplicated in the
social sphere. Perceived as threats to job security and in-
come, they are banned to the lowest ranks in both the occu-
pational and social hierarchies. In interpersonal communi-
cation the German workers' resentment against migrant workers
is manifest in stigmatization, stereotyping and avoidance.
The emergent prejudice structure characteristic of the
formation of a caste system based on considerations of un-
equal social status also found expression in mass support for
repressive legal and administrative measures directed at the
foreign population. In this way, the state's ascription of
migrant workers to a caste gained legitimacy. Its careful
control over the migrants' existence was thus maintained.
The implications of this process for the development of caste
become even more apparent when one realizes that approximately
8% of the total labor force in Germany is not only foreign
but also unskilled. In other words, more than 88% of all for-
eign employees have been forced to assume a marginal occupa-
tional and social position in German society.
The public's criticism of "over foreignization" is as
much confirmed by the institutionalization of the caste sys-
tem as it is exploited in the interest of the economy. In
legitimating its control over foreign workers, the German
state can continue its policy of stabilizing intervention in
the economic system. Employers can retain high levels of
labor input at minimal cost.
86
German workers thus responded to the emergent class-
caste conflict in a manner beneficial to both state and cap-
italist interests. The exploitative basis of the emergent
caste system did not provoke questions of legitimation be-
cause the politics of capital were concealed by the growing
xenophobia in which caste is now embedded. Considerations
of social status associated with the caste-class conflict
effectively veiled the incompatibility between the require-
ments of the state apparatus and the occupational system, on
the one hand, and the interpreted needs and legitimate ex-
pectations of German workers, on the other.
In maintaining a system of caste-class conflict, the
German state withheld from public consciousness the persis-
tence of inter-class contradictions. Prejudices manifest in
the stigmatization of migrant workers misdirected challenges
to the legitimacy of the politics of capital. These were
not perceived as having priority "among other dangers to be
warded off." The relationship between the subjects and ob-
jects of power remained perceptively misconstrued.
NOTES
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Susan Berry, George
DeVos and Hadi Esfahani for their insightful comments and
constructive criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.
1 Rhoades (1978) provides a more detailed historical study
of the emergence of the characteristics of this "migration
ideology."
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