20
MICHAEL DE MONTAIGNE'S "OF CANNIBALS"
AS CULTURAL RELATIVISM, CRITIQUE, AND COUNTERPROPOSAL:
AN ISSUE IN THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY
Norris Brock Johnson
Department of Anthropology
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
I am as free as Nature
First made Man;
Ere the base laws
Of servitude began
When wild in woods
The noble savage ran.
John Dryden
The Conquest of Grenada
During the 16th century, sustained contact with New
World and African cultures served as a stimulus for dramat-
ic changes in traditional European worldviews. For many,
contact with "otherness" (Levi-Strauss 1962; Long 1980)
called into question the nature of the European "Self."
The world opened as a mirror. For the most part, Renais-
sance Europeans did not clearly see their own image as they
peered into the alien, aboriginal looking glass of Africa
and the New World.
The Renaissance is a significant period for the ger-
mination of several "protoanthropological" ideas and con-
cepts.  By protoanthropological, I  mean    those ideas
and concepts comprising the intellectual framework around
which the present discipline of anthropology would even-
tually coalesce (cf. Rowe 1964, 1965). For instance, the
21
initial expression of a set of ideas later termed cultural
relativism is frequently ascribed to the Renaissance. In-
variably associated with this Renaissance expression of
cultural relativism is the essayist Michael de Montaigne.
As Margaret Hodgen (1964:185) suggests, Montaigne is an
important protoanthropological figure as he "... strove
mightily to understand the condition of savagery as it was
then found in the New World."
Of concern here is the fact that anthropological in-
terest in Montaigne exclusively centers on his essay "of
Cannibals." Written in 1580, "Of Cannibals" was included
in Montaigne's first volume of essays.   "of Cannibals" re-
counts an incident in 1562 in Rouen, France, where through
interpreters Montaigne spoke with one of three Brazilian
Indians brought back to Europe by merchant seamen. In his
essay, Montaigne recounts how his meeting and conversation
with this Brazilian had a profound effect upon his thoughts
about his own way of life as well as about the way of life
of the Indians. Montaigne tells us he subsequently searched
out merchant travelers and explorers, anyone "reliable," as
he terms it, who might tell him more about these people.
The theme of the essay is the practice of cannibalism on
prisoners captured by the Indians during war. Montaigne
concludes by admonishing his fellow countrymen not to judge
Brazilian cannibalism unthinkingly. He cautions that the
practice of cannibalism is common in Renaissance Europe
and can be judged even more "savage" than its Brazilian
counterpart:
I conceive there is more barbarity in
eating a man alive, than when he is dead;
in tearing a body limb from limb by racks
and torments, that is yet in perfect sense;
in roasting it by degrees; in causing it to
be bitten and worried by dogs and swine (as
we have not only read, but lately seen, not
amongst inveterate and mortal enemies, but
among neighbors and fellow-citizens, and,
which is worse, under colour of piety and
religion), than to roast and eat him after
he is dead (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:259).
This comparative perspective toward the practice of canni-
balism has drawn the sustained attention of historians of
anthropology as a Renaissance example of cultural relativism.
Focusing as they do on the issue of protoanthropologi-
cal cultural relativism, prevailing interpretations of "Of
Cannibals" are fairly consistent. Hodgen's (1964:112-113,
22
191-208) attention to the essay is the most extensive. Mon-
taigne, she asserts, exhibits a response to Brazilian Indian
customs singularly free from then-current forms of European
ethnocentricism. Montaigne, she says, sought to solve two
problems: to "see people as they really are," and to "com-
municate an undistorted view of people." In his brief dis-
cussion of Montaigne, Honigmann (1976:57-59, 73-75) cites
"Of Cannibals" as an example of protoanthropological cultural
relativism. Honigmann's reading of the essay is that, for
Montaigne, "savage" societies possessed their own separate
morality and logic. Particular moral standards such as nega-
tive Eurocentric reactions to cannibalism, he says, cannot
be automatically applied across cultures. Malefijt (1974:
46-47) discusses "of Cannibals" as a protoanthropological
instance of "...studying cultures for their own sake."   Her
emphasis is on Montaigne's argument that his own society
surpasses the cruelty and barbarity ascribed to the Brazil-
ian Indians. Montaigne, she states, recognizes the role of
what we term ecology enculturation in accounting for differ-
ences in human behavior; that is, his explanation for varia-
tion in custom was rendered at the level of geography and
history. Malefijt concludes that Montaigne doubted the ex-
istence of invariable laws applicable to all human societies.
Voget (1975:25) considers "Of Cannibals" in the context of
his larger discussion of the Renaissance opposition between
"civilization" and "savagery." Renaissance thinkers such as
Montaigne, he says, believed that "savages" lived in an apol-
itical state of nature bereft of visible law. Finally, in
her collection of readings on the history of anthropology,
Darnell (1974:85) introduces "Of Cannibals" by citing the
essay's emphasis on cultural relativism. Darnell reminds us
of Montaigne's belief that the morality and customs in his
own society were not the only possible expressions of human
morality and custom. For Montaigne, practices such as can-
nibalism in other cultures were just as cruel, just as rea-
sonable, as were similar practices in Renaissance European
societies.
The problem here is that these prevailing anthropolgi-
cal assessments of "Of Cannibals" assume explicit defini-
tions and understandings of the intricate concept of cultur-
al relativism. It is assumed that cultural relativism it-
self is an accepted intellectual fact. It is assumed, rath-
er than demonstrated, that "Of Cannibals" actually presents
an explanation of Brazilian Indian customs by recourse to
the idea of cultural relativism. Anthropological chroni-
clers of Montaigne do not substantiate claims of cultural
relativism through fine-grained content analysis of, or ex-
tensive recourse to apt examples from, "Of Cannibals" it-
self. Further, they neglect to address the more historical
sources of this presumed cultural relativism as well as the
kind and degree of relativism expressed. For example,
23
assuming cultural relativism we need to ask what accounts
for Montaigne's appreciation of the Indian way of life?
Why was Montaigne so singularly affected by aboriginal New
World lifeways? What was Montaigne's motivation for writ-
ing "Of Cannibals"? What is the relationship of themes
and ideas in the essay to more specific Renaissance circum-
stances of time, place, and person?
This essay reevaluates "Of Cannibals" in terms of its
degree of expression of our present notion of cultural rela-
tivism. In so doing, I conclude that "Of Cannibals" has
been misinterpreted. With particular reference to distinc-
tions framed by Herskovitz (1972) one indeed finds relativ-
ism in "Of Cannibals," but it is not culturaZ relativism.
I argue that "Of Cannibals," reflects moral and ethical,
rather than cultural relativism (cf. Cantril 1955, Hantung
1954, and Kluckhohn 1955 on this distinction). Upon a close
content reading of the essay itself, I feel that claims of
protoanthropological cultural relativism are not justified.
Ideas in "Of Cannibals" we interpret as culturally relativ-
istic are more properly viewed in consideration of the in-
fluence of aspects of Montaigne's life; Skepticism, Sto-
icism, and Socratic thought were important to his writing,
as was the permeating influence of Copernican relativism on
the Renaissance of which Montaigne was a part.
Michael de Montaigne is significant to the history of
anthropology, but his significance has been misplaced; this
is due to prevailing approaches to the study of protoanthro-
pological ideas and figures in general, as well as owing
to shifts in the philosophical underpinnings of relativis-
tic ideas over the last four hundred years, in particular.
An examination of "Of Cannibals" illustrates several con-
ceptual and methodological problems accompanying the study
of the history of anthropology.
Montaigne's Relativism: A Critique
Herskovitz (1972:1-68) distinguishes, and elaborates
upon, three interrelated aspects of the idea of cultural
relativism:  (1) the methodological, (2) the philosophical,
and (3) the practical (cf. also Schmidt 1955). Though by
no means definitive, these distinctions are useful in cri-
tiquing, from our present point of view, the degree of cul-
tural relativism expressed in "Of Cannibals."
As (1) a method of study, relativism requires that
judgments of customs, cannibalism for example, be made with-
in their sociocultural context rather than with respect to
observer criteria. Instead of an ethical argument that can-
nibalism is either "good" or "bad," the cultural relativist
24
would note that cannibalism helps maintain, say, cross-
village ties and therefore is not bizarre but quite func-
tional. The first order of methodological business is
the proper internal ordering of descriptive evidence. When
they are made, considerations and evaluations of customs
different from one's own are viewed as "relative" to the
sociocultural context in which they occur.
In "Of Cannibals," it is reported to Montaigne that
the Brazilian Indians exist in a continual state of war.
Taking prisoners is common. Prisoners are said to be well-
treated and are accorded the dignity of worthy adversaries
defeated in battle. In due time, however, the persons to
whom the prisoners "belong" (as Montaigne terms it, those
capturing them in battle) invite a great assembly of friends
to their village. The important act here begins when ropes
are tied to each of a prisoner's arms. One rope is held by
the "owner" of the prisoner, the other "... by the friend the
owner loves best" (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:258-159). In the
presence of the gathered assembly, the prisoner is killed
by their swords. Then, the prisoner is roasted and eaten
by the assembled guests. Pieces of the prisoner are sent
to friends unable to attend the gathering.
Montaigne's explanation of the custom is that it is
based on "...a desire for revenge--for the remediation of
acts committed by a worthy enemy during war" (Montaigne
1580 [1877]1:259). But how does he know this? Montaigne
further states he heard the Portuguese practice the same
act of cannibalism on their enemies, and for a similar moti-
vation--revenge. The cultural relativism ascribed to Mon-
taigne is his argument that one ought to view both the Por-
tuguese and Brazilian customs as cruel and barbarous--not
one more so than the other:
"I am not sorry that we should here take
notice of the barbarous horror of so cruel
an action," he says, "but that, seeing so
clearly into their faults we should be so
blind to our own" (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:
259).
Methodologically, we are given no information in the
essay on which to base an assumption that Montaigne's mode
of inquiry into the customs of the Brazilian Indians is cul-
turally relativistic. Presented with an opportunity to in-
quire into the meaning of cannibalism to the people who
practice it, as well as into the functions it ostensibly
serves in their society, Montaigne's analysis does not match
the methodological criteria of our idea of cultural relativ-
ism. Speaking through an interpreter to one of the Indians
at Rouen, the discussion is peripheral to Montaigne's stated
25
theme of cannibalism:
I talked to one of them a great while to-
gether, but I had so ill an interpreter,
and one who was so perplexed by his own
ignorance to apprehend my meaning, that I
could get nothing out of him of any moment.
Asking him what advantage he reaped from
the superiority he had amongst his own peo-
ple (for he was a captain, and our mariners
called him king), he told me; to march at
the head of them to war. Demanding of him
further, how many men he had to follow him?
he showed me a space of ground, to signify
as many as could march in such a compass,
which might be four or five thousand men;
and putting the question to him, whether
or not his authority expired with the war?
he told me this remained; that when he went
to visit the villages of his dependence,
they plained him paths through the thick of
their woods, by which he might pass at his
ease. All this does not sound very ill, and
the last was not at all amiss, for they wear
no breeches (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:266).
For reasons having to do with his preoccupation with the
French civil wars, Montaigne inquires of the Indians as to
matters of warfare, clothing, and the size of armies. He
inquires into the function of chiefdomship rather than into
the function of cannibalism. The relationship of cannibal-
ism to other aspects of the Indian way of life remains un-
clear. Montaigne's methodolgical strategy seeks explana-
tion across groups rather than relativistically ("function-
ally") within the group under study. Cannibalism is ex-
plained by way of analogy to similar Portugues practices.
Montaigne's method of inquiry into the practice of cannibal-
ism does not meet our initial criterion of cultural relativ-
ism: that of relating foreign customs to their sociocultural
context.
As (2) a philosophy our concept of cultural relativ-
ism argues that human experience, knowledge, and behavior
are mediated by culture and the enculturative experience.
Cultural relativism also acknowledges the power of ethno-
centricism to tint the mirror through which alien cultural
practices and values are both viewed and interpreted. Hers-
kovitz (1972:39-45) says that after objective examination
of the facts of cultural difference, one is led both to
acknowledgement of the plurality of cultural (value) sys-
tems and an increased tolerance of cultural differences.
26
Seemingly, the philosophical aspect of what we term
cultural relativism is to be seen in Montaigne's awareness
of Eurocentric conditioning causing knee-jerk reactions
among his fellow countrypersons about the matter of Brazil-
ian dannibalism:
...I find that there is nothing barbarous
and savage in this nation, by anything that
I can gather, excepting, that every one gives
the title of barbarism to everything that is
not in use in his own country (Montaigne 1580
[1877]:253)
Montaigne argues for the use of what he terms "reason," what
we might translate as "considered judgment," to get behind
the powerful emotional forces of custom. But an argument
against intolerance and unreflective judgment is not an ar-
gument for cultural relativism. Montaigne's does not truly
argue for an acceptance of the equal plurality of value sys-
tems; as we will see, he makes a comparative value judgment
against Renaissance France. In "Of Cannibalism" Montaigne
does adopt a posture against ethnocentricism, but it is not
with respect to a defense of Brazilian culture so much as it
is a defense of "reason." Montaigne does reflect some of
our current notions about cultural relativism as philosophy,
but he does not practice the philosophy suggested.
As (3) a practice, Herskovitz (1972:47-48) argues that
cultural relativists ought to study cultures "...for their
own sake," as Malefijt (1974:46-47) terms it in her discus-
sion of Montaigne. From this perspective, however, an ex-
amination of "Of Cannibals" finds Montaigne concerned with
the Brazilian Indians not so much for the dispassioned
study of another way of life for its own sake, but for what
the Indians can tell him about his own society--and about
himself. Cannibalism is not so much examined for what the
custom says about the Indians as it is used as a frame of
reference to talk about the state of French society in gen-
eral and the French civil wars in particular:
Their wars are throughout noble and generous,
and carry as much excuse and fair pretense,
as that human malady is capable of; having
with them no other foundation than sole jeal-
ousy of valour. Their disputes are not for
the conquest of new lands, for those they al-
ready possess are so fruitful by nature, as
to supply them without labor or concern, with
all things necessary, in such abundance that
they have no need to enlarge their boundaries
(Montaigne 1580 [1877]:260).
27
The emphasis in "Of Cannibals" is as much on the nature of
French society and its customs as it is on the nature of
Brazilian society and its customs.
As practice, the third phase in constructing a cul-
turally relativistic posture suggests implications for the
conduct of an observer following initial methodological
and philosophical tasks. One ought to study the facts of
other cultures, then become part of those cultures long
enough to understand the meaning and function of their cus-
toms and practices. One ought to distinguish judgments
about factual matters in the culture from judgments concern-
ing values (cf. Bidney 1979; Hantung 1954). Recognition of
a cultural difference, for example, ought not be an advocacy
of it. Montaigne, though, has no qualms about looking at
another culture, actually using it, in order to reinforce
judgments about his own way of life. Rather than practic-
ing the suspension of value judgments, "Of Cannibals" is a
study in moral judgment.
Montaigne, for example, tells us he believes it is
France, rather than the cannibals, that is corrupt and de-
generate:
But there never was any opinion so irregular,
as to excuse treachery, disloyalty, tyrrany,
and cruelty, which are our familiar vices.
We may then call these people barbarous, in
respect to the rules of reason; but not in re-
spect to ourselves, who in all sorts of ways
exceed them (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:260).
Archetypically, Montaigne uses the Brazilian Indians as a
living example of pre-lapsarian (before expulsion from the
Garden) Man existing in a precultural (pre-"civilized")
state of nature. Renaissance France, wracked by civil/re-
ligious war, had obviously degenerated from the Golden Age
exemplified by aspects of the Indian way of life. Montaigne
emphasizes the "purity," "nobility," "fairness," "health,"
and "vigor" reputed as common among the "savages" as the
distance from which a decadent French society had fallen
from a prior pristine state of virtue and morality (cf.
Greene 1957). The "savage" society of the Indians illus-
trates the natural quality of life in an ahistorical state
of nature freed from "civilization." Viewed from the moral
ruins of a France smothered by "inventions" and the customs
of civilization, Montaigne finds his fellow countrymen (as
well as himself, to a degree) pockmarked with disloyalty,
tyranny, and cruelty. Like Locke, Montaigne does not fore-
go the notion that there are universally valid moral rules
and modes of conduct best seen in people adhering more close-
28
ly to the presumed "laws of nature" (cf. Sayce 1972:195).
Unlike Locke, however, Montaigne exhibits a more empathet-
ic imagination and comfortableness with cultural diver-
sity. There are laws, natural laws, serving as a pan-
human frame of reference for the evaluation of all socie-
ties. In particular, Montaigne argues that the Indians
seem to preserve the natural state of a moral society
(the "common order") much better than do his fellow French-
persons. Montaigne argues the moral degeneration of his
own culture as compared with that of the "savages": "...
we ought to call those wild," he says, "whose natures we
have changed by our artifice, and diverted from the com-
mon order" (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:253). According to
Herskovitz (1972:47-48), the practice of cultural relativ-
ism requires an observer's nonintervention with one cul-
ture's interactions with another. But the moral judgment
and devaluation of his own culture leads Montaigne to ar-
gue that Europeans ought to limit their contact with New
World cultures not because of Indian "savagery," but be-
cause of French immorality:
Three of these people [the visitors to
Rouen] not foreseeing how dear their know-
ledge of the corruption of this part of
world will one day cost their happiness and
repose, and that the effect of this commerce
will be their ruin...
(Montaigne 1580 [1877]:265).
Montaigne experiments with the criteria for making moral
judgments, not with the practical means by which moral
judgments might be suspended. "Of Cannibals" does not re-
flect the desired value neutrality associated with the
practice of cultural relativism. One cannot in fact so
easily derive an ought from an is (cf. Schmidt 1955). Cul-
tural relatiVism implies that facts, in and of themselves,
do not justify prescriptive judgment.
Montaigne's Relativism: A Counter Proposal
Examining "Of Cannibals" in terms of contemporary con-
ceptions of the idea of cultural relativism, we find the de-
gree of its expression to be overstated. We cannot account
for "Of Cannibals" through customary evaluations of cultur-
al relativism. My suggestion is that biographic and histor-
ic points of departure provide a more adequate contextual
level of interpretation.
Biographical Sketch
Montaigne was born in Bordeaux, France, in 1533 (cf.
29
Lowenthal 1935). Notable experiences in his childhood, and
the composition of his family, undoubtedly reinforced an ear-
ly awareness of cultural diversity. Pierre Eyquem, his fath-
er, was a French aristocrat. His mother, Antoinette de
Louppes, was the daughter of a Jewish Toulouse merchant.
Michael's brother and sister were Catholics. Pierre Eyquem
sent young Michael off to live in a poor peasant village to
be trained, as he put it, in "common living." This experi-
ence was supplemented by the attention of private French and
Greek tutors. From ages 6 to 13, Montaigne attended the Col-
lege at Bordeaux. At 21, he was appointed Concillor in the
Bordeaux parliament. At 27, he was appointed to the court
of Francis II and undertook frequent travel expeditions at
the King's request. Montaigne actively participated in sev-
eral French army campaigns.  It was only at the age of 38
that Montaigne began a serious intellectual life. From then
until he was 57, Montaigne retreated to his estate in Bor-
deaux. This period of reflection and study produced the
first volume of his Essays published in 1580. At 57,
through suffering from physical ailments, Montaigne began a
period of reflective travel. Believing that purposeful ex-
peditions and sojourns were the truest form of education,
for three years Montaigne traveled widely (and painfully) in-
to Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. A detailed travel diary
was kept and later published. During this period, he com-
pleted additions to the first volume of Essays.   In 1592,
Michael de Montaigne died in bed, at age 60, at his estate
in Bordeaux.
Several major themes and concerns in "Of Cannibals"
can be interpreted by reference to aspects of Montaigne's
life. Much like the relationship between Malinowski's life
and ideas as revealed in his diary (Malinowski 1967), "Of
Cannibals" in part is an exercise in reflexive study. For
example, the values Montaigne routinely attributes to the
New World Indians are categories of significance to his own
life. The Indian traits Montaigne continually emphasizes
of all those undoubtedly related to him include health,
valor, virtue, and courage.
Though of aristocratic parentage Montaigne suffered
life-long poor health. Most painfully, he suffered from
"renal colic" (bladder stones). His life was a stoic ef-
fort to train his body to health and vigor. Montaigne was
afraid of pain, disease, and death. He continually praises
endurance and greatly respects strength of will. A concern
with sickness and health pervades "Of Cannibals":
...as my witnesses inform me, 'tis rare to
hear of a sick person, and they moreover as-
sure me, that they never saw any of the na-
tives, either paralytic, bleary eyed, tooth-
30
less, or crooked with age (Montaigne 1580
[1877]:256).
The physical and biological concerns expressed here also are
metaphorical references to the "poor health" of a France
wracked by religious civil war. We further note a strongly
stated respect for the value of friendship and love illustrat-
ed in the Indian way of life. For most of his life Montaigne
was plagued by insecure personal relationships, tension over
women in general, and with female love relationships in par-
ticular. Though married in 1565 for what he terms "rational
reasons," the strongest relationship in his life was prema-
turely terminated when his male companion, Etienne de la
Boetie, died at the age of 32. Montaigne describes the final
days of his friend's life as Plato described the death of
Socrates. Montaigne saw etched in a presumably unchanging
Indian way of life those virtues, such as male friendship,
he personally most admired and found valuable. He saw as
many similarities between himself and the Indians as he saw
differences (on this important note, see Frame 1955). I
feel this level of mutuality is due more to Montaigne's per-
sonality and personal history than to any objective concern
with the relativity of customs.
Historical Sketch
Montaigne's work customarily is divided into three
phases: Stoicism (1572-1574), Skepticism (1575-1577), and
Epicureanism (1578-1592) (cf. Frame 1955). The fact that
"Of Cannibals" germinated between 1562 and 1580 is of con-
sequence to a contextual understanding of the essay.
What is often taken for cultural relativism in "Of
Cannibals" may also be interpreted as Montaigne's adherence
to Stoic requirements of moderation and restraint as well as
the pervading influence of a philosophy of skepticism. More
specifically, Montaigne found Christian absolutes insuffic-
ient to provide the moral code he so desperately sought for
living in an increasingly violent world, as evidenced by the
grim realities of the French religious wars. I feel Mon-
taigne turned for his moral center to Stoicism with its em-
phasis on self-master, right conduct and virtue, tolerance,
and the primacy of natural law.
In "Of Cannibals" we read of Montaigne's respect for
the bravery, virtue, and vigor of the Brazilian Indians as
well as of his admiration for the virtue and courage ex-
hibited by the men at Thermopylae: "The part that true con-
quering is to play," he says (Montaigne 1580 [1877]:263),
"lies in the encounter, not in the coming off; and the hon-
or of valour consists in fighting, not in subduing." A
lifelong goal was the training of his body and mind to Stoic
ideals of prudence and virtue. In the Brazilian Indians, I
31
feel he saw qualities he was trying to achieve in his own
life--qualities he struggled to encompass, but which he
felt were given to "savages" as a natural birthright. Stoic
qualities of simplicity, restraint, and valor are continual-
ly praised and uncritically ascribed to the Indian way of
life. Montaigne seems to feel that if he had only been
born "savage" rather than "civilized," closer to natural laws
rather than to the deleterious artifices of his own society,
he would have had better opportunity to exemplify his Stoic
ideals (cf. Sayce 1972:192).
Directly influenced by Augustine's Confessions. Mon-
taigne's development of the essay format itself was a vehi-
cle for the further exploration of Self. Socrates was an
important influence on Montaigne's life and thought and is
widely quoted in "Of Cannibals." Again parallel to Malinow-
ski (1967), by way of comparison with other cultures we see
that ideas and concepts in "Of Cannibals" reflect, in part,
the working out of tensions and problems in Montaigne's own
life. The study of the "Other," then, became a mirror accom-
panying the study of the "Self." Montaigne sought Truth. He
discovered Truth neither resides in the heavens nor in other
men, but in the natural laws structuring the diversity char-
acterizing both.
Though Montaigne negatively judges French society with
respect to the Brazilian way of life, there is a more encom-
passing comparison being made in "Of Cannibals." On one lev-
el, he is saying that perceived differences between seeming-
ly alien ways of life are artificial. Montaigne looked into
the glass darkly and, like few others, saw his own reflec-
tion. Through personal effort and struggle to deny the bonds
of what we would term ethnocentricism and the power of cus-
tom Montaigne argues that one can, so to speak, get behind
these particulars in order to apprehend the more universal
categories by which differing ways of life can be judged (cf.
Frame 1979). Montaigne sought a moral code existing apart
from secular religions such as Christianity, which he felt
had failed him. The "rules of reason" to which Montaigne
continually refers are based on his belief in the primacy of
Stoic (i.e., transculturaZ) natural law. Different ways of
life can be judged in terms of each other as well as in terms
of their degree of adherence to "natural" states of being
human:
These nations then seem to me to be so far bar-
barous, as having received but very little form
and fashion from art and human invention, and
consequently to be not much remote from their
original simplicity. The laws of nature, how-
ever, govern them still, not as yet much viti-
ated with any mixture of ours... (Montaigne 1580
[1877]:254).
32
Montaigne admired these "savage" Indians because he deemed
them closer to that prelapsarian state where humans existed
by the rules of natural law rather than by the rules of "art"
(culture/custom) and the artifices of "civilization." Par-
ticular groups of people develop different aspects of "civ-
ilization." Particular groups of people develop different
aspects of human nature and natural law. Human nature and
natural law are the foundation of all particular ways of
life. To Montaigne, the Brazilians expressed more of the
potentiality of human beings to live according to natural
law. Montaigne was saddened that his fellow Europeans had
not better actualized the potential naturally available to
them. -
Accurately judging the degree to which different ways
of life adhere to, or deviate from, natural law is a diffi-
cult task. Montaigne emphasizes the need for a Socratic
knowledge of Self since Self is the mechanism through which
differing degrees of adherence to natural law are closely
approached:  "...how cautious men ought to be of taking
things upon trust from vulgar opinion," he writes (Montaigne
1580 [1877]:249), "and that we are to judge by the eye of
reason, and not from common report."
"Reason" is the road leading to accurate perceptions
of the working of natural law among these newly discovered
"savages." "Common report" refers to the fact that Mon-
taigne feels people in his own society are overwhelmed by
the power of custom and cannot readily perceive "natural"
relationships past what we would term enculturative bound-
aries. People remain blinded by the glaring diversities
masking fundamental unities. But "reason" lies buried in
all people only waiting to be unshrouded through acts of
personal will. Delving into Self as he did, Montaigne
sought to seek out and eradicate the passions, excesses,
"vulgar opinions," and personal idiosyncracies hampering
effective perception and judgment. Montaigne felt that
travel, contact with"Others," and self-knowledge improve
one's critical judgment while negating the effects of "com-
mon report."
Montaigne's awareness of diversity was also condition-
ed by his response to the profound 16th century European
shift from a homocentric/terracentric worldview to a helio-
centric worldview (cf. Cassirer 1944: 14-15). Montaigne's
response to Brazilian Indians owed as much to the astronom-
ical theory of Nikolai Kopernik (Nicolaus Copernicus, 1473-
1543) as it did to Stoicism and Socrates. Published in
1543, 37 years before "Of Cannibals," Copernicus' De Revol-
utionibus Orbium CoeZestiem was a stimulus to the sense of
33
conditionality pervading the essay. Montaigne witnessed,
indeed contributed to, the slow death of the Ptolemaic
worldview. The absolutism of that worldview was not to
be trusted. Montaigne's life was a constant quest for per-
sonal integration and a firm base for faith in the midst
of religious war and intellectual upheaval. Montaigne
struggled against the weight of the Ptolemaic tradition and
medieval Great Chain of Being emphasis on fixity, immutabil-
ity, and final authority. Montaigne's acceptance of divers-
ity in human life reinforced a skeptical orientation toward
an apparent lack of absolutes in the human as well as celes-
tial world. On this level we can profitably read "Of Canni-
bals" not as an effort to generate a theory of cultural rela-
tivism, but as a conscious attempt to dust off lingering
vestiges of Ptolemaic (rather than natural law) certainty.
Remember that in the face of the French civil wars, Chris-
tian absolutism failed to generate moral guides for Montaigne.
In turn Montaigne embraced Copernican relativism. Montaigne's
motives in "Of Cannibals," then, were not entirely academic.
By seeking out variation and diversity in the sociocultural
world, Montaigne helped fan the political fires of skepti-
cism and Copernicanism. "Of Cannibals" neatly fits into the
conditional worldview of post-Ptolemaic, Copernican Europe.
Montaigne was not afraid of diversity, of difference, be-
cause he came to believe instead in the absoluteness of the
natural law behind it.
Montaigne's orientation here is toward skepticism rath-
er than toward what we term cultural relativism. That there
are many different ways of life with many different customs
and many different value and moral systems, ipso facto, is
justification for skepticism. Yet again, an argument for
toleration, skepticism, and comparison is not necessarily an
argument for cultural relativism. Montaigne struggled to
reconcile apparent diverstiy with belief in natural law. The
emphasis on comparison and diversity we find in "Of Canni-
bals" is a repercussion of the decentering of 16th century
European Man, from their perceived position as center of the
universe. Indeed, Montaigne argues that using natural law
as a comparative point of departure illustrates that Euro-
peans are further from the prelapsarian center than the Bra-
zilian "savages."  The relativism in "Of Cannibals" is skep-
ticism over Ptolemaic and Christian absolutes coupled with
moral judgments about the degenerating condition of "civili-
zation" in general and European society in particular. Mon-
taigne was also influenced by the 16th century writings of
William of Ockham. Skeptical of the Scholastic synthesis,
both William and Montaigne fell on the side of their being
no absolute, final authority for moral judgment except nat-
ural law.
Montaigne responded affirmatively, as did Giordano
34
Bruno and Leibniz in particular, to the new cosmology. Bru-
no and Leibniz focused on the relationship to Self to an in-
creasingly infinite and changing physical universe (cf. Gos-
selin and Lerner 1977). Montaigne focused on the Self in
relation to an increasingly infinite and diverse human uni-
verse. For Montaigne, the sense of Self expanded both cul-
turally and geographically. The context for self-understand-
ing and human understanding broadened to include other cul-
tures as well as the cosmos. The old pre-Copernican, Euro-
centric Self extended itself to embrace the newly discover-
ed heavens. Other cultures, other moral and value systems,
were examined in part to confirm the truth of Copernicus.
And the truth was that the newly discovered diversity in the
geographic world paralleled the newly discovered diversity
in the astronomical world. On both levels, the Truth is
that the laws of nature celebrate diversity.
Presentism, Historicism, and the Study of Anthropology
Instead of reflecting what we would term cultural rela-
tivism, evidence points toward Montaigne's being an absolu-
tist with respect to his belief in natural laws behind cul-
tural laws. The misreading of "Of Cannibals" and accompany-
ing failure to grasp the subtleties of Montaigne's thought
stems in part from the overemphasis on presentism, and a
corresponding lack of emphasis on historicism, exhibited by
chroniclers of anthropology.
Presentism characterizes those approaches to the his-
tory of anthropology sole Zy motivated to "study the past
for the sake of the present" (Stocking 1963:3). Ideas and
concepts now important to anthropology are not contextual-
ized in the specifics of time and place, but instead move
in a steady stream to the disciplinary present. Personages
are lifted from their sociocultural contexts to demonstrate
the convergent development of present-day anthropological
ideas and concepts. Deductively, historians tend to hunt
and peck until they find what they are looking for. This
approach, of course, is useful in marking out broad histor-
ical trends. As I have used it in the application of Hers-
kovitz's typology, presentism is a valid point of departure
for the microlevel examination of specific people and ideas.
As used here, however, presentism is not employed to legiti-
mize present-day anthropological concepts and ideas. The
content analysis and critique presented here reveals the man-
ner in which Montaigne has been misread. On the other hand
historicism characterizes approaches to protoanthropologi-
cal issues motivated by the desire to "understand the past
for the sake of the past" (Stocking 1963:3). To the extent
methodologically possible, historical approaches consider
and evaluate anthropologically relevant ideas and concepts
35
withing the situational context of specific persons, times,
and places. This essay illustrates the more effective use
of both presentism and historicism. Both approaches are
needed in studying the history of anthropology.
Instead of reflecting cultural relativism, the evi-
dence points more toward Montaigne being what we would
term metaculturally inclined: Montaigne's notion of nat-
ural law is something encompassing our concept of culture.
It is not merely a matter of Montaigne being misread. Pre-
vailing interpretations of "Of Cannibals" reveal more about
the epistemological assumptions girding the loins of pre-
sent-day anthropology than they do about Montaigne. The
latent issues here are the cultural bias implicit in eth-
nography and ethnology as well as the continued commitment
of anthropology to cultural relativism. There are strong
disciplinary taboos with respect to acknowledging the legit-
imacy of supracultural (not merely superorganic) levels en-
compassing the particulars of Culture. Rather than nature,
Culture is our absolute. Montaigne does not abandon the
concept of human nature to the idea that human behavior is
exclusively a function of what we term Culture, as contem-
porary cultural anthropology seems to have done. Montaigne
exhibits a universalistic posture toward the idea of human
nature which is antithetical to our idea of cultural rela-
tivism.
The cultural relativist argues that there are no abso-
lute norms valid for all humankind (Bidney 1979:157). Mon-
taigne argues that natural laws, the laws of ideal human na-
ture, are norms valid for all humankind. He believes it is
the duty of the self-reflective person to seek to enhance
the expression of natural laws. Adherence to the idea and
practice of cultural relativism insures that our own way of
life remains a normative absolute, an inviolate standard
against which there is no appeal. By way of contrast, "Of
Cannibals" tells us that the Brazilian Indians found the
Prance of Charles IX as wanting as did Montaigne:
The king himself talked to them a good while,
and they were made to see our fashions, our
pomp, and the form of a great city. After
which, some one asked their opinion, and
would know of them, what of all the things
they had seen, they found most to be admired?
To which they made answer, three things, of
which I have forgotten the third, and am
troubled at it, but two I yet remember. They
said, that in the first place they thought it
very strange, that so many tall men wearing
beards, strong, and well armed, who were about
the king ('tis like they meant the Swiss of his
guard), should submit to obey a child, and that
36
they did not rather choose out one amongst
themselves to command. Secondly..., that
they had observed that there were among us
men full and crammed with all manner of
commodities, whilst, in the meantime, their
halves were begging at their doors, lean,
and half-starved with hunger and poverty;
and they thought it strange that these
necessitous halves were able to suffer so
great an inequality and injstice, and that
they did not take the others by the throats,
or set fire to their houses (Montaigne 1580
[1877]:266).
Adherence to a strict definition of cultural relativism in-
sures that other cultures cannot critique our practices and
that, indeed, we cannot learn from "them" just as they can-
not learn from "us." Each culture spins in its own self-con-
tained orbit, and moral judgment on the basis of presumably
panhuman needs ares are inhibited. In appealing to the pan-
human realm of natural law Montaigne tried to reduce the sub-
jective, ethnocentric basis of his moral judgments.
For our purpose the crux of the matter involves Mon-
taigne's method of comparing European and Brazilian ways of
life. Montaigne judges these differing ways of life not so
much with respect to each other, but with respect to "natur-
al law." The mode of comparison is vertical. Then these
differing ways of life are compared with each other. With
respect to cultural relativism, our present-day cross-cul-
tural comparisons are more horizontally rendered. Initial-
ly cultures are considered in terms of themselves then com-
pared with other ways of life with respect to "objective"
(etic) criteria, such as "kinship." From our perspective
Montaigne's method is again seen as metacultural rather
than culturally relativistic.
Within American anthropology, what we term cultural
relativism emerged at about the turn of the century. I fol-
low Hatch (1981) in believing that ideas and concepts such
as cultural relativism are situationally conditioned. The
cultural relativism of the Boasians is a unique development
rooted in responses to 19th century unilinear evolutionism
and the Eurocenteredness of Victorian thought.
Contemporary critiques of cultural relativism suggest
a return to an anthropological concern with the basis on
which differing ways of life might be judged (Bidney 195;
Grindal 1979; MacCormack 1979; Maslow 1964; Maslow and
Honigmann 1970; Sapir 1924). If Montaigne were with us,my
sense is he would feel most comfortable with those contem-
orary variations of Stoic natural law whereby mostly moral
37
and value norms presumed common to all humans may yet form
the basis on which the validity of various ways of life,
experiments all, may be judged.
Montaigne's Renaissance humanism in many respects is
similar to the antireZativistic posture of contemporary hu-
manistic anthropology (Johnson 1976). Both approaches
emphasize the metacultural character of human experience and
take for granted the common humanness of both the observer
and the observed (Wagner 1979:3):
In the last analysis, culture is not the mea-
sure of all things; nature is the measure.
There are more things in nature than are com-
prehended through our cultural symbols...
Cultural relativism is a fact of human experi-
ence as conditioned by culture, but it is not
the whole truth (Bidney 1979:156).
For Montaigne as well as for contemporary humanistic anthro-
pologists traits such as dignity, well being, and equality
are not exclusively personal ideals, but remain reflections
of metacultural potentials the rightful property of all hu-
man beings.
REFERENCES CITED
Bidney, David
1959   The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural
Relativism and Cultural Absolutism. In Ethics
and the Social Sciences. Leo R. Ward, ed. pp.
51-76. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press.
1979   Cultural Relativism and the Value of the Human.
Humanitas 15: 153-160.
Cantril, Hadley
1955   Ethical Relativity from the Transactional Point
of View. The Journal of Philosophy 52: 677-
687.
Cassirer, Ernst
1944   An Essay on Man:   An Introduction to a Philoso-
phy of Human Culture. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Darness, Regna
1974   Readings in the History of Anthropology.   New York:
Harper and Row.
38
Frame, Donald M.
1949   A Detail in Montaigne's Thought:   The Source
of Our Ignorance is the Source of Our Happi-
ness. Word 5: 159-165.
1955   Montaigne's Discovery of Man:   The Humanization
of a Humanist. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Gosslin,
1977
Edward A. and Lawrence S. Lerner, eds. and trans.
The Ash Wednesday Supper (La Cena de La Ceneri ),
by Giordano Bruno. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.
Greene, Thomas H.
1957   Montaigne and the Savage Informity.   Yale Review
(Winter): 191-205.
Grindal,
1979
Bruce T.
Synergy: A Theory and Praxis for Human Life. In
The Humanistic Perspective in Anthropology: A
Brief Overview. Bruce T. Grindal and Dennis M.
Warren, eds. pp. 13-41. Washington, D.C.: Uni-
versity Press of America.
Hartung, Frank E.
1954   Cultural Relativity
phy of Science 21:
and Moral Judgments.
118-126.
Hatch, Elvin
1981   Exotic Cultures and Western Thought:   The Rela-
tivity of Values in Anthropology. Draft manu-
script.
Hersovitz, Melville J.
1972   Cultural Relativism:   Perspectives in Cultural
Pluralism. New York: Random House.
Hodgen, Margaret T.
1964   Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Hon igman,
1976
John J.
The Development of Anthropology.
linois: The Dorsey Press.
Homewood, I1-
Norris Brock
Notes toward the Development of a Humanistic
Anthropology. Anthropology and Humanism Quar-
terly 1: 4-8.
Philoso-
Johnson,
1976
39
Kluckhohn, Clyde
1955   Ethical Relativity:   Sic et Non.  The Journal of
Philosophy 52: 663-677.
Levi-Strauss, Claude
1962   Totemism.  Trans. by Rodney Needham.   Boston:
Beacon Press.
Long, Charles H.
1980   Primitive/Civilized:   The Locus of a Problem.
History of Religions 20: 43-61.
Lowenthal, Marvin
1935   The Autobiography of Michael de Montaigne.
London: Routledge and Sons.
MacCormack, John R.
1979   Beyond Relativism.   Manuscript, Institute of
Human Values, Saint Mary's University, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, Canada.
Malefijt, Annemarie De Waal
1974   Images of Man:   A History of Anthropological
Thought. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Malinowski, Bronislaw
1967   A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term.   New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
Maslow, Abraham H.
1964   Synergy in the Society and in the Individual.
Journal of Individual Psychology 20: 153-164.
Maslow Abraham H. and John J. Honigmann
1970   Synergy:  Some Notes of Ruth Benedict.   American
Anthropologist 72: 320-333.
Montaigne, Michael de
1580   [1877] "Of Cannibals."   In Essays of Montaigne:
With Some Account of All Letters Known to Be
Extant. William Carew Hazlitt, ed. Charles
Cotton, trans. Volume 1, Chapter XXX. pp. 249-
266. London: Reeves and Turner.
Rowe, John H.
1964   Ethnography and Ethnology in the Sixteenth Cen-
tury. Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers
30: 1-19.
1965   The Renaissance Foundations of Anthropology.
American Anthropologist 67: 1-20.
40
Sapir, Edward
1924   Culture, Genuine and Spurious.   American Journal
of Sociology 29: 401-429.
Sayce, R.A.
1972   The Essays of Montaigne:   A Critical Exploration.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Schmidt, Paul F.
1955   Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism.   Journal
of Philosophy 52: 780-791.
Stocking, Jr., George W.
1968   On the Limits of "Presentism" and "Historicism"
in the Historiography of the Behavioral Sciences.
In Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the
History of Anthropology. pp. 1-12. New York:
The Free Press.
Voget, Fred W.
1975   A History of Ethnology.   New York:  Holt Rine-
hart and Winston.
Wagner, John
1979   The Humanistic Perspective in Anthropology:   A
Brief Overview. In Essays in Humanistic Anthro-
pology: A Festscrift in Honor of David Bidney.
Bruce T. Grindal and Dennis M. Warren, eds. pp.
3-13. Washington, D.C.: University Press of.
America.