MALINOWSKI: EPISTEMOLOGY AND OEDIPUS
John Ingham
University of California, Berkeley
Levi-Strauss (1963) has suggested that the nature of totemism can
be understood as an expression of one of the dimensions of thought: oppo-
sition and integration. In these terms, the disciplines concerned with
human behavior are not a little totemistic in arbitrarily carving their
respective fields out of the continuous human reality. Hence, a persistent
concern has dealt with the problem of the legitimate domain of anthropology.
It was the boldness with which Malinowski saw the inclusiveness of anthro-
pology that deserves attention.
Malinowski's work is still relevant because of its emphasis on con-
tinuity and integration in the explanation of human behavior. But conversely,
the shortcomings of his thinking can be attributed to a lack of significant
conceptual differentiation and opposition. Nevertheless, Malinowski can
serve as a starting point in a critique of the over-weighted use of discon-
tinuity as an explanatory principle.
For example, we can consider the extreme emphasis Leslie White (1945)
puts on discontinuity. He attempts to argue for the empirical autonomy of
culture by making pseudo-philosophical arguments which involve an arbitrary
segregation of various aspects of reality. He attempts to demonstrate an
empirical reality by showing the possibility of an a priori logical reality.
The danger in this is that there is a temptation to place a higher value on
the a priori category distinctions than on actual explanation.
An example of the above can be found in Geertz's (1957) study of a
boy's funeral in a Javanese village. He attempts to show that the "logical-
meaningful" cultural aspects of the ritual must be seen as discontinuous
with the "causal-functional" social aspects of the ritual in order to ex-
plain a conflict that arose between two factions as to the proper burial.
He assumes that it is only the social aspects of the ritual that illuminate
the problem. But actually the reverse is true. As the conflict arose,
both factions were operating in accord with their respective beliefs. There
was a continuity between the two levels rather than the contrary. The a
priori discontinuity was so embedded in Geertz's mind that he failed to see
that his ethnographic case supported the contrary of his own argument.
The assumption of discontinuity in order to delineate areas of in-
quiry is not only justifiable, but is necessary. Different systems must be
seen in their own terms before they can be integrated. This is partly why
Levi-Strauss is so adamant in his insistence on the autonomy of structural
analysis.
However, it is rather defeating to deny the existence of mechanisms
of continuity if they have explanatory power. At this juncture it is in-
structive to see what Levi-Strauss has to say about Malinowski's theory of
totemi sin:
Psychoanalytic theory, which Malinowski implicitly makes use of
[Levi-Strauss is incorrect about Malinowski's use of psychoanalysis;
see below], sets itself the task of teaching us that the behavior of
2
disturbed persons Is symbolic, and that its interpretation calls for a
grammar, i.e., a code which, like all codes, is by its very nature
extra-individual., This behavior may be accompanied by anxiety, but it
is not anxiety that produces it. The fundamental error in Malinowskils
thesis is that it takes for a cause what, in the most favorable circum-
stances, is only a consequence or a concomitant (1963:69).
Actually, impulses and emotions explain nothing: they are always
results, either of the power of the body or of the impotence of the
mind. In both cases they are consequences, never causes (1963:71).
Actually, Levi-Strauss cannot hold that there is an absence of con-
tinuity between naturalistic factors and the structure of thought. He
merely turns his conception of psychoanalysis upside-down: thoughts cause
emotions. Yet, he does not explicate the principles of this continuity in
psychological terms nor does he explain why the relationship should be non-
reversible. But the fact is, that there is a great quantity of evidence
that demonstrates that drive-states do have a determining effect on the
structure of thought. Whatever his sophistication, Mlalinowski was not en-
tirely wrong on this point.
The important thing is not whether these distinctions are logically
justifiable but simply whether they are useful as explanatory devices.
Spiro (1951 clarified only half the problem in arguing that the distinction
between personality and culture is a false dichotomy; the real question is
whether the dichotomy is useful in terms of particular questions. At cer-
tain points differentiation nay be necessary.
Sol Tax (1956) has suggested that anthropology is characterized by
the intercommunication of scholars with different, but related, interests.
But this puts the emphasis in the wrong place. So many types of inquiry
under one rubric reflect, not only the Intercommunication of scholars, but
an underlying continuity in human behavior. Although there are particular
problems with particular solutions, in the long run the viability of anthro-
pology as a discipline will depend directly on comprehending this continuity.
Malinowski clearly recognized the need for integration; he saw that
there must be continuity between man's animal nature and cultural behavior.
He says:
We need a theory of culture, of its processes and products, of its
specific determinism, of its relation to basic facts of human psychol-
ogy and the organic happenings within the human body . . . (1944).
As Kardiner and Preble have observed, it is this side of Malinowski's
anthropology that is both controversial and important:
Malinowski recognised no boundaries. This trait infuriated professional
anthropologists who wanted to establish an independent scientific disci-
pline. . . . He ignored the academic partitioning of the field of human
behavior into cubicles of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, and
moved freely from one medium to another according to the requirements of
the problem (1961:161).
Throughout his work, Malinowski was concerned about the characteris-
tics that differentiated man's behavior from that of pre-hominid animals;
for him the locus of this difference was culture. His theory building can
be understood as an attempt to synthesize knowledge about man's animal and
cultural aspects.
3
Stripped of elaboration, Malinovski's theory of culture is rather
simple. It involves the operation of two principles: function and organi-
zation. Function is always the satisfaction of basic or derived needs. The
basic unit of organization is the instftution. Culture is instrumental; it
satisfies needs. Responses to these needs are organized into various "in-
strumental imperatives of culture" which lead to economic institutions, edu-
cation, - social control through morality and law, and political organization.
The Instrumental act, through reinforcement, also becomes satisfying. The
former, physiological satisfaction, Is related to '"Drive 1" while the latter
is related to the derived "Drive 2." It is obvious that 1alinowski's theory
of culture involves a simple stimulus-response psychology.
Consequently, 1alinowski argued that form was always determined by
function (1944:149); that is, organization is reducible to function (1944:
114, 151). His explafation of how function determines form, inasmuch as
he has an explanation, is ultimately evolutionary and evades the problem
with an apparent tautology: ". . . the moment such devices [culture] have
been adopted, in order to enhance human adaptability to the environment,
they also became necessary conditions for survival" (1944:121). Malinowski
called these "necessary conditions" derived needs and cultural imperatives.
It follows that an evaluation of Malinowski's theory of culture resolves
itself into a consideration of biological needs and the mechanisms of their
permutations and transformations.
Piddington has suggested that: "The specific contribution of the
theory of needs is that it emphasizes, at all levels, the biological deter-
minants of cultural activities and so provides a principle of analysis and
comparison of universal validity" (1957:38). This, without doubt, is one
of the "wide open doors" that Lowie (1937%234) has accused Malinowski of
"battering down." What is objectionable in this kind of biological deter-
minism is not that it is inaccurate, but simply that M?linowski never pre-
sented a systematic theory for explaining specific behavioral facts in
terms of generalized needs. Piddington has attempted to answer this criti-
cism for Mlinowski in the following way:
Why, it is sometimes argued, if all cultures are to be regarded as
responses to the same needs, should there be any variation between
them . . .? The answer is to be found in the variety of ways in which
the less specific needs may be satisfied. And the anthropologist is
not called upon to account for this variety, any more than the palae-
ontologist is always expected to say why from a common ancestral type,
different species have evolved in different directions (1957:39-40).
This, of course, is absurd; cross-cultural variation is one of the things
the anthropologist is called upon to explain. Malinowski was also aware
of the same problem:
The cogency of the functional approach consists in the fact that it
does not pretend to forecast exactly how a problem posed for a culture
will be solved.  It states, however, that the problem, since it is de-
rived from biological necessity, environmental conditions, and the
nature of cultural response, is both universal and categorical (1944:
115).
But not only does Malinowski decline to explain cultural variation,
he denies the possibility:
When an anti-functionalist remonstrates that, after all, there are
cultures where neither spoons nor forks nor knives are used, and that,
4
therefore, function explains nothing, we simply have to point out that
that explanation to the scientific thinker is nothing else but the most
adequate description of a complex fact. The type of criticism levelled
against functionalism, to the effect that it never can prove why a
specific form of drum or trumpet, or table implement or theological con-
cept, is prevalent in a culture, derives from the pre-scientific craving
for first causes of "true causes" (19414:117).
Without disagreeing with Malinowski's assertion that there is no
more to explanation than description, it is still possible to criticize him
on the ground that what he considers description is not adequate. He failed
to see that abstract theorizing can lead to better description, i.e., pre-
diction.
Piddington also notes that another problem which is closely related
to the one above concerns ". . . the precise definition of different needs
and minimal conditions necessary to their satisfaction" (1957:43).   But it
is difficult to see how any significant advance in this direction will en-
hance Malinowski's theory. It is apparent that the classification of needs
can be multiplied indefinitely; it is possible to invent additional needs to
explain each new item of behavior. Consider the following: "The functional
explanation of art, recreation, and public ceremonials might have to refer
to directly physical reactions of the organism to rhythm, sound, color, line
and form, and to their combinations. It would also relate, in decorative
arts, to manual skills and perfection in technology, and magical mysticism
(1944:174). But Piddington notwithstanding, this kind of ad hoc verbalizing
is as sterile as it is non-theoretical.
What is required, and what M1linowskils theory lacks, is a psychol-
ogy that can explain the psychodynamics of needs. Kluckhohn has framed this
kind of problem in general terms:  'A classification is useful to the degree
that it sheds light on the relation of one set of facts to another1" (1960:
134). In other words, what is missing in Malinowski's theory is not a class-
ification of needs, but a systematic statement about how they are dynamically
related to thought.
We have returned to the same problem that Levi-Strauss detected in
Malinowski's functionalism; it is Malinowski's failure to derive cultural
complexity from biological needs that appears to vitiate his entire theory.
But the deficiency is not what Levi-Strauss thinks it to be. Rather, it is
Malinowski's failure to integrate sophisticated psychological thinking into
his theorizing. Parsons has summarized this point well:
. . . even on the basis of learning psychology alone, Malinowski takes
up only the one idea of instrumental learning and altogether ignores the
possible significance of contiguity learning and classical conditioning.
Even more serious, he seems to be guilty of a basic confusion, namely
between the necessary conditions for a process of learning to take place,
and the motivational structure of psychological process after the learn-
ing has occurred. There is no reason to doubt that the motivation of
all secondary drives or derived needs goes back to the genetic history
of the individual to the satisfaction of primary drives. But that in
the mature individual the "ultimate" motive for any specific act of
learned behaviour must be the continuing satisfaction of a specific
drive is certainly not an established psychological doctrine.
Above all, perhaps, the most serious source of the difficulty of
Malinowski's position lies in his failure to consider the problems of
the organization of human personality as a motivational system. He
clearly leaves it as a bundle of biologically inherited basic needs,
about each of which there then develops a cluster of learned instru-
mental patterns of behaviour, . .
Perhaps this aspect of the matter can be summed up by saying that
Malinowski failed to establish a theoretically adequate link between
the observed facts of cultural behaviour and the psychological sources
of motivation to such behaviour (1957:66-67).
Vhat is remarkable about Parsons' criticism is that it is contrary
to general opinion. Murdock (1943:444), Lowie (1937:234) and Herskovits
(1948:48) have credited Malinowski with making positive contributions to
the integration of psychology and the study of culture. The fact is, how-
ever, that these anthropologists are mistaken; Malinowski had little, if
aror, psychological sophistication. LaBarre (1958), Kluckhohn (1943), and
Roheim (1950:167) are in agreement with Parsons' criticism. As Kluckhohn
says: "As for psychology, Malinowski remained rooted in an outmoded be-
haviorism. His publications show no mastery of contemporary learning the-
ory. Psychoanalytic theory he influenced imaportantly, but he was never
analysed, and psychoanalysis failed to become part of his systematic think-
ing (1943:2216).
Palinowski's relation to psychoanalytic theory requires further
examination, but before returning to this aspect of his work, it is neces-
sary to look at the epistemological foundations of his theory. His lack of
psychological sophistication is merely one expression of his general lack of
theoretical inclination. Parsons (1957:70) concluded that Malinowski's con-
tribution to theory was mainly at the "clinical" level, rather than on that
of general theory.  Kluckhohn (1943:209) makes a similar, but more severe,
criticism.
The question that arises, is why Malinowski was such a poor theor-
etician. Was he incapable or does it reflect something more general about
his scientific outlook?
The answer is, that there was always an implicit preference in
Malinowski's thinking for seeing human behavior as paradoxical rather than
determined. There is certainly no lack of the word 'determninism"t in Malin-
owskits writing, but in actuality he was never a thoroughgoing determinist.
In this respect Leach's paper on t"The Epistemological Background to Malinow-
ski's Empiricism" is perhaps the most insightful of the critlques of Malin-
owski's work. Leach's criticism is consistent with that of Kluckhohn and
Parsons; he says that Malinowski had a ". . . bias against abstract theory
which kept his imagination firmly earthbound" (1957:120). But Leach pro-
ceeds to offer an explanation.
He argues that Malinowski was grounded in the epistemology of
William James. Like Malinowski, James did not restrict the bases of scien-
tific belief to rationality (logicality) or plausibility (predictability)
but also maintained that: ", * . we are entitled to believe whatever can
be shown to be biologically satisfying even though the belief in question
may be metaphysical and incapable of verification either by experiment or
rational argument" (19571123). Both James and Malinowski take a proposition
6
to be valid if it is "sensible" and what is sensible to Mlinowski is usual-
ly what is obvious. Leach notes how this aspect of Malinowski's thinking is
related to the kind of naive biological reductionism that was noticed above:
. . . for Malinowski social phenomena exist in order to satisfy needs
of the biological organism. Functions are thus both purposive and posi-
tive and to detect them requires intuitive judgment. Functionalism, in
Nalinowski's hands, became something very like a religious creed; it is
presented to us as sensible (practically useful) rather than reasonable
(logical or plausible). The "truth" of Functlonalism is itself simply
a matter of functional utility (1957:l23-124).
Malinowski's functionalism was part of a general tendency to limit
himself to obvious answers, but when the test of validity is sensibility,
even the obvious i's sometimes incorrect.  More serious, is the fact that
Malinowski's functionalism side-steps a serious quest for the determinants
of human behavior. Leach suggests an explanation for this:
Malinowski, like William James, was a rebel against the mechanistic
implications of late nineteenth-century thought and . . . his "function-
alism," like James's "Pragmatism," was an aspect of this revolt.   0 0.
Malinowski's biggest guns are always directed against notions that
might be held to imply that, in the last analysis, the individual is not
a personality on his own possessing the capacity for free choice based
on reason (Leach 1957:126).
Leach goes on to show how his emphasis on rationalIty is reflected in various
aspects of Malinowski's work including his theories of magic, kinship, and
technology (1957:127-135). Leach makes the point only implicitly, but the
insight to be gained from his raper is that the reason Malinowski never devel-
oped a sophisticated theoretical system is because such a program would have
been short-circuited by his belief in the essential rational and individual-
istic nature of man.  For Malinowski the function of cultural behavior is
obvious because nan is obviously rational.
Malinowskits examples of biological functionalism were usually very
simple and transparent; he carefully avoided applying his functional explan-
ations to subtle and complex cultural phenomena. This explains why Malinow-
ski attacked any interest in the strange or exotic as being unscientific.
He decries the fact "t. . . that non-functional as well as anti-functional
tendencies exist in anthropology. The field-worker with his eye on the
exotic or picturesque Is one example" (1944:149). "The less directly organic
the need to which human behavior refers, the more likely it will breed those
phenomena which have provided the greatest amount of food for anthropological
speculation" (1944h73).
What Malinowski did not like about the exotic was that he could not
explain it in terms of his model of the rational man.
Theory for Malinowski was indeed at the "Mclinical" (- obvious) level
as Parsons has said; his behavioristic empiricism militated against the de-
velopment of a significant theoretical system. And on the other side of
this was the result that Malinowski's view of man was saturated with paradox
and ambiguity. It is fair to say that this state of affairs satisfied Malin-
owski for he was left with his cherished belief that individualism and free-
dom were central in human life. The dialectic Nalinowski saw between
determinism and freedom is nowhere better revealed than in Freedom and
Civ'ilization (1960a) and Crime and Custom in Savage Society. It is clear
7
that he opts for freedom: "The fact is that we, one and all, do feel such
a craving for freedom, and that we demand it with all the emotional insis-
tence of our being" (1960a.70).
Related to this is the fact that Malinowski was not even a consistent
biological reductionist, as the following shows:; #This new artificial en-
vironment obeys a determinism of its own. There exist laws of cultural
process, of the constitution of culture, and of the efficiency of concerted
activities.  Hence culture inevitably becomes a source of new restraints im-
posed upon man" (1960a:34)o This appears to be in conflict with his biolog-
ical determinism, but Malinowski slips between the twin horns of culture and
biology and remains faithful to freedom- "Culture thus provides man with
the wider and larger instrumentality for the satisfaction of all his primary,
that is, biological needs. It also makes him independent of certain envi-
ronmental trammels and dangers. In this there enters that increase in range
of choice and purpose as well as in the efficiency of behavior which we de-
fine as the cultural increment in freedoi' (1960a1lO4). Malinowski is inde-
cisive; he is at once a free agent, culturologist, pseudo-psychologist,
biological reductionist and a master of self-contradiction.
Another aspect of Malinowski's escape from determinism was his pre-
occupation with double standards and inconsistencies in human behavior:
"In a community where laws are not only occasionally broken, but systemati-
cally circumvented by well-established methods, there can be no question of
a 'spontaneous' obedience to law, of slavish adherence to tradition"' (1926:
81). Note the open contradiction in the above and Malinowski's inability to
recognize it.  Or consider the following:  "This, like everything else in
human cultural reality is not a consistent logical scheme, but rather a
seething mixture of conflicting principles" (1926-:121).
Many of Malinowski's detractors have criticized him for presenting
Trobriand life in such manifold complexity. But this kind of criticism is
unconvincing; it was Malinowski's genius to be able to see and record the
complexity of Trobriand life.  If the complexity has remained inexplicable,
the answer is not to discard the facts. That he did not simplify his ob-
servations to fit his theory is to Malinowskils credit. But what he did do
was to simplify his criteria for explanation so that his theory could fit
the data. The deficiency is not that Malinowski detected the apparent in-
consistency and complexity of human behavior, but that he did not really
attempt to explain this complexity.
It is not difficult to criticize Malinowski for not being more the-
oretical, but it is only fair to Malinowski to realize that his conception
of himself and of science in general corresponds with Parsonst evaluation
of him. Malinowski repeatedly emphasized that his theories were merely a
means for facilitating observation (1944:65, 67):  "We see, thus, that al-
though at first sight our definitions may appear 'vague, insipid, and use-
less,' in reality they are condensed formulae which contain extensive
recipes for the organization of perspective in field-work. And this really
is the hallmark of scientific definition.  It must principally be a call
to a scientifically schematized and oriented observation of empirical fact"
(-1944: 115) .
Malinowski's pragmatic empiriclsm comes clearly to the fore; science
is a matter of "'recipes" and not of theory. His answer to the apparent para-
doxes in human behavior was to continue documenting their existence, using
8
traditional, common sense categories. Freedom and paradox were more real
than systematic determinism.
It is now possible to see the relationship of psychoanaly,tic theory
to Malinowski's thinking. The point that needs to be made is one that is
contrary to general opinion; namely, Malinowski had no understanding of psy-
choanalysis. As noted above, LaBarre, Kluckhohn, Parsons, and Roheim share
this opinion.
It is worth pressing this matter because it has important implica-
tions in terms of Mlinowski's general theoretical thinking and also because
many students have the false impression that Malinowski made significant use
of psychoanalytic theory (Lowie 1937:234; Murdock 1943:444; Fortes 1957:161,
165). Others, with equal error, have felt that Ml'inowski brought signifi-
cant negative evidence to bear on psychoanalysis (see, Herskovits 1948:48;
Whiting and Child 1953:13; Linton 1956:99; Kardiner and Preble 1961:221;
Singer 1961:61; Carstairs 1961:537; Kennedy 1961:13).
First, it is important to consider Malinowski Is own opinion of psy-
choanalysis. More often than not he was highly critical. His criticism was
always highhanded, and never came to grips with psychoanalytic theory itself.
His comprehension did not go beyond the popular stereotypes. For example:
Freud and his followers extended the drive which we modestly listed as
sex appetite into a somewhat metaphysical concept of the libido, and
attempted to account for most phases of social organization, ideology,
or even economic interests by infantile fixations of libidinous drives.
In this process they also included the activities of the colon and blad-
der, and thus reduced the prime movers of humanity to the regions and
processes occurring just below the human waist (1944:82).
It would appear that the only difference between Malirowskils concep-
tion of psychoanalysis and his own theory of culture is that in his system
some of the prime movers are just above the waist. But this does give us an
insight into Malinowski's thinking, for it shows that he cannot conceive,
even while being critical, of a theory that is any more complex than his own
simple theory of needs.
On the other side of the issue is the popular belief that Malinowski
made a major criticism of psychoanalytic theory in arguing that the oedipus
complex has a sociological aspect. Linton's acceptance of YValinowski's
"findings" is typical:
0 . o Malinowski was of the opinion that it [the oedipus complex] did
not exist in the Trobriand Islands, where . . . the father is not the
person in authority over the child.  It is nry opinion, shared by a good
many of my psychoanalytically sophisticated anthropological colleagues,
that in such situations the oedipal attitudes are not directed at the
real father, but at the mother's brother, child's closest male relative--
assumes the disciplinary and rewarding functions which, among ourselves,
are assoc iated with biological fatherhood (1i956:99)7
But in point of fact, M1flinowski was not telling the psychoanalysts
something they did not already know. Malinowski's insistence on the socio-
logical origin of the oedipus complex merely shows that he was not acquainted
with the psychoanalytic literature.  From the earliest formulations of the
oedipus complex and after, Freud and his students traced its variations to
9
variations in familial dynamics and conflgurations. That the psychoanalytic
theory of the oedipus complex was always essentially an inter-personal
theory is clear from the fact that later psychoanalysts have found it pos-
sible to discard the notion of its phylogenetic origin without having to
revise the general theory (Fenichel 1945h97; Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein
1951- 16).
Malinowskits thesis is well known:  in a matrllineal society the
family complex consists of incestuous feelings between brother and sister
and hostility and ambivalence directed at the maternal uncle. But why did
Malinowski think this necessitated a critique of Freudian theory?
The answer is somewhat involved and relates to the general epistem-
ology of Malinowski's thought. But the following passage glves an indica-
tion:
to . if, as has been proved, there are no traces of it [the oedipus
complex] either in Trobriand folklore or dreams or visions, or in any
other symptoms; if in all these manifestations we find Instead the
other complex--where is then the repressed oedipus complex to be found?
Is there a sub-conscious below the actual unconscious and what does the
concept of a repressed repression mean? Surely all this goes beyond
the ordinary psycho-analytic doctrlne and leads us into some unknown
fields of metaphysics (1960b:130).
Malinowski's glibness is but an unwitting confession of ignorance. He ap-
pears to think that Freud argued that the unconscious is found undistorted
in dreams, jokes and the like, but in fact this is precisely,what Freud
found not to be true. Malinowski never grasped the distinction between
latent and manifest content because his behaviorism only allowed him to con-
sider meaningful that which he could observe. For exmple- "All that is
said is clearly written on the surface of the myth, and I have hardly at-
tempted any complicated or symbolic interpretationO e e . Then it is clear
that we need not rely so much on roundabout or symbolic reinterpretations
of facts, but can confidently let the facts speak for themselves" (1960b:
106-107). But only a pragmatic emplricist like Nalinowski can hear facts
speaking (ideas of reference?). The truth is either manifest or it is not
truth. This eqplains why Malinowski repeatedly misused psychoanalytic ter-
minology; he habitually used words like t'ambivalence" and "repression'" to
refer to overt behavior rather than to endopsychic processes as the psycho-
analysts intended them to be used.
Hartmann, Kris and Loewensteln have raised a general problem with
respect to the controversy over the presence of the oedipus complex in non-
western cultures:
If we are informed that anthropological data collected in any given
society do not reveal the existence of an oedipal conflict, we are
inclined to raise the question what such statements mean. They assume
obviously that the oedipus complex can be seen by outside observers.
If this was true why did it need psychoanalysis to advance the view
that there was in Western civilization a stage in child development in
which the conflict was typical?  Or is lt that once this has been
stated we can now assume that, with oDen eyes, we won't fail to see
what was previously missed (195115:16).
Although Hartmann, et al., did not make this statement in direct
reference to Malinowsk, it clearly applles.   It is now possible to answer
10
the question as to whv Malinowski thought the Trobriand case implied a cri-
tique of psychoanalysis.   As with everything else, he thought the complex,
if it were there, would be manifest at the behavioral level. He took the
social structure of the Trobr'ianders to be an expression of the complex.
There is some hostility towards the maternal uncle and the fear of
incest with the sister is highly ritualized, but there is nothing repressed
about them. As the mythology shows, these themes are quite overt and con-
stitute part of the daily living of every Trobriander.    Oedipal feelings are
perhaps ontogenetically prior to these social structural sentiments as Jones
(1925) argued in his criticism of Malinowski but Jones was undoubtedly wrong
in explaining social structure as a result of psychological factors alone.
Malinowski was equally mistaken in reversing Jones' argument.
But there is yet another aspect of this problem. Mllnowski has
stressed that the uncle is the primary disciplinarian (1960b:24).    But stu-
dents have been in such a hurry to accept Malinowski's thesis that they have
ignored the basic facts of Trobriand ethnography. In the face of this,
Roheim (1950:175) has been alone in pointing out that because of descent and
residence systems the boy does not even live in the same village with his
uncle. But Roheim's observation can be extended: a second point is that
the boy would not, in any case, consider the uncle as his sexual rival for
the mother as this would imply brother-sister incest0    In fact the uncle is
excluded from all sexual matters relating to a boy's mother:
By the brother's inability to control or to approach, even as a
distant spectator the prlncipal theme in a woman's life--her sex--a
wide breach [sicd1 is left in the system of matriliny. Through this
breach the husband enters into the closed circle of family and household,
and once there makes himself thoroughly at home, To his children he
becomes bound by the strongest ties of personal attachment, over his
wife he assumes exclusive sexual rights, and shares with her the greater
part of domestic and economic concerns (1929:203).
Further, Nalinowski indicates that the maternal. uncle does not take an active
part in disciplining the boy untll well after the oedipal stage (1960a:49).
As Roheim puts it: "So what is he doing in the meanwhile? Just waiting to
develop an avuncular complex?,' (1950:175). Malinowski also indicates that
the father actually does the disciplining before the boy goes to his maternal
uncle (1929:7).
In Freudian theory the father is seen as a rival by his son because
the father has access to his wifels sexuality, not because he acts like a
tyrant vis-a-vis his little boy.   Hence, there is no reason to suspect on
theoretical grounds that the oedipus complex would be absent or substantially
different in the Trobriands.   In fact, in the similar culture of the nearby
Normanby islands, Roheim found obvious oedipal themes in dreams (1932) and
children's doll play (1941).
Although MIlinowski has maintained that there is no trace of the
oedipus complex in Trobriand folklore, this assertion is open to serious ques-
tion.  It is remarkable that only Roheim has noticed it, but great insight
is not required to see that ther'e are oedipal themes in Trobriand folk nar-
ratives.  For example:
A woman named Karawata gave birth to a white cockatoo, who flew away
into the bush. One day Karawata went to the garden, telling her kasesa
(clitoris) to look after the kumkumuri (earth baking oven). The kasesa
11
replies confidently: Kekekeke. But the white cockatoo has seen
everything from the bush; he swoops down and strikes the clitoris,
who cries out plaintively:   Kikikiki, and topples over, while the
cockatoo eats the contents of the oven (1929:408).
The symbolism is transparent:   woman gives birth to son a white cockatoo;
earth baking oven * vulva; and eats contents of the oven u to have inter-
course.
In the story about the "stingaree"' there is a woman wlth five
clitorises who has five sons.   The stingaree utters a "'rIbald and cruel"
ditty and "The stingaree then proceeds to business, copulates with the
old woman and cuts off one of her multiple appendages.   My native infor-
mants, in their commentary affirmed that the va'i [stingaree] had a
penis . . ."(Malnowski 1929:406).    The eldest son then attempts to pro-
tect the mother from the stingaree's next attack but is driven off by the
latter's ditty, as are the other sons on consecutive days until the mother
has only one clitoris left. Then the youngest son protects the mother by
spearing the stingaree to death (Malinowski 1929:4O054O8). Roheim (1950:
175-176) cites both of these myths as oedipal and interprets the stingaree,
of course, as a symbol of the father. The following eth-nographic evidence
can be cited in support of Rohelmls irnterpretationo  the stingaree is con-
sidered to be very deflling (Malinowski 1929:31), excrement is conlsidered
to be disgusting and defiling (192901X44), and one of the most central
aspects of the father-son relationship is the fact that the son, as an
infant, defiles his father with his body-wastes (1929:21, 444).
But Roheim (1950) fails to mention the most oedipal of all Trobri-
and myths, that of Dokonikan, the terrible ogre. As the monster approached,
v . the family decided to fly. The sister, however, at that moment
wounded her foot and was unable to move. She was therefore abandoned
by her brothers, who left her with her little son in a grotto on the
beach of Labati, and salled away in a canoe to the south-west. The boy
was brought up by his mother, who taught him first the choice of
proper wood for a strong spear [D1. then innstructed him in the
Kwygapn      magic which steals away a man's understanding.  The hero
sallied forth, and after havilng bewitched Dokonikan with the Kwoygaponi
magic, killed him and cut off his head (1960bO103-10).
Afterwards, the boy puts the ogre's head in a pudding and gives it to the
uncle, who, overcome with remorse, offers his nephew a number of gifts.
The boy is unsatisfied until he takes the uncle's daughter in marriage.
This marriage is highly improper, although not quite incestuous.   Malinowski
has to admit that Dokonikan symbolizes the father, but says that this part
of the myth comes, in some unspecified way, from an unspecified patriarchal
culture', (1960bO104-105).  But the myth is complete:e parraci'de and incest.
It is submitted that Malinowskl did not like psychoanalytic theory
for the same reason he disliked theory in general.   On the one hand, it
would have implied that human behavrior is systematlcally determined and on
the other, he could not accept notions about the unconscious, the llbido,
and so forth because they had no obvious behavioral counterparts; his prag-
matic empiricism did not allow him to see patterned relatlonships and gen-
eralizations beyond those immediately giaven by his intuition and senses.
It was Malinowski's love for the obvious that led him to praise the sim-
plistic psychologies of Shand and McDougle (1960bl055-157) and to make the
preposterous statement that Havelock Ellis (1931:77) had anticipated most
12
of Freud's discoveries. Malinowski gave credit to psychoanalysis because
it views man as biological as well as experiential (19h4:22), but because
of his distrust of theory he failed to see that psychoanalysis could have
helped him repair the weakest part of his own theory: that is, the prob-
lem of the transformation of biological drives into cultural behavior.
I have tried to look at Malinowski's work in terms of the ramifi-
cations of a particular theme: continuity. We can expect this much: a
rational, unified theory of human behavior may be quite unlike anything we
are now capable of imagining. Malinowski's failing was that he had too
little imagination.
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