THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS
H. G. Barnett
The history of technology affords ample evidence that inventions are new
combinations of familiar parts, and students of the subject have repeatedly em-
phasized this fact in one way or another. Speaking of Selden's 1895 automobile,
Chain notes that all its essential elements, including its engine, gears, drive
shaft, and tires, had already been invented. "It was the integration of these
indispensable elements already known into a new working arrangement or pattern
that constituted the essence of the new invention."l And, as Kroeber says, if
we seek the origins of the component elements we find them emerging from still
earlier forms:  "The more analytically facts are gone into, the more difficult
it is to isolate many really basic inventions. More and more do they resolve
into combinations of old elements, or into modifications that are reapplications
of other old elements. What is new is often a new function, which is culturally
significant because it is socially accepted, and which we can name."2 Stressing
the inventor's dependence on the past, Kaempffert, also, draws attention to the
Composite character of new devices: "It is because they are invariably composed
of familiar inherited elements that man! inventions seem almost disappointingly
obvious when they are first disclosed."s  Taking the important step of recogniz-
ing the extensive inventory upon which an inventor may draw, Hart remarks that,
"To create a social innovation is to combine into a living structure elements
previously existing in the human organism, the natural environment, and the cul-
ture fabric."4
It is generally appreciated, then, that inventions are new only in the
sense that they are new configurations of old elements. What has rarely been
specified, however, is the manner in which these new patterns take shape. Usu-
ally the process by which they come into being is hinted at by a term that sug-
gests an organic or a mechanical analogue. -It is called a metamorphosis, a
mutation, a fusion, a reconstellation, or a truncation, without identification
of the elements involved in the alteration or a disclosure of the properties
which permit their realignment. In the few such analyses that have been made
the conclusion has been that there is more than one kind of process. Thus
Kroeber distinguished between invention by stimulus diffusion, reduction-segre-
gation, and displacement;5 Herskovits between gradual change by the accumula-
tion of small variations and abrupt change initiated by the impingement of un-
forseen internal and external events;6 and Linton, along with many others,
between basic and derived inventions.7
It is the thesis of the present paper that there is more unity in the
seeming diversity of element reorganization than has yet been realized by stu-
dents of socio-cultural change, and that it can be characterized more signifi-
cantly in its own terms than by resort to an analogy with a mechanical or a
biological system. Obviously this unity must reside in the identity of the
process by which the reorganization of elements takes place and not in its
multiform manifestations.   The analysis of a large and unselected sample of
cases has led to the conclusion that this process can be described in the
following way: it is that mental action by which a detached element of one pre-
existing configuration (antecedent) replaces a partially equivalent detached
element of another pre-existing configuration (antecedent) to form a third con-
figuration with some properties in common with its antecedents but with others
that are peculiar to itself.
An unfamiliar perspective is required in order to recognize the universal-
ity of this process. In the first place, it must be granted that a new combina-
tion is necessarily a recombination. That is to say, before it can occur there
must be an analysis of two existing complexes so that a part of one can be united
with a part of another. This cannot fail to be so, because nothing exists in
complete isolation from everything else. The bonds between familiar things may
be physically tenuous or entirely absent; but this is the least important con-
sideration, since physical conjunctions are only one aspect of the interconnect-
edness which men conceive the universe of their experience to have. A thing, an
event, an act, or a thought must be related to another thing, event, act, or
thought; otherwise it can have no meaning. That to which it is related may be
nothing more conspicuous than its background or setting, no more tangible than
a thought; but there is some context from which it is disassociated preparatory
to being reassociated.
It must further be granted that the analytic and associative acts which
are essential to an invention are mental functions. They are imaginary or sym-
bolic slicings of experience through the medium of ideas about it. It would not
be necessary to emphasize this point were it not that in speaking of these pro-
cesses as they relate to objects it is easy to evoke the image of a mechanical
operation. They do not belong to that order of phenomena. Recognizing a rat
is an analytic process, for it requires that the animal be distinguished from
its environment; but it does not entail any physical manipulation of those refer-
ents. Thinking of a rat in place of a lion on an heraldic shield as a symbol of
courage and nobility is an associative process, and it likewise has nothing to
do with the physical relation existing between the two animals or a shield.
This undistinguished invention illustrates the fact that analysis can occur in-
stantaneously; and while it is logically prior to a recombination of the analyzed
parts the two can be practically simultaneous. It also illustrates the important
point that analysis can take place in the very act of perception without the
awareness of the perceiver. As Bartlett says, "although perceiving is rarely
analytical or piecemeal in its method, yet it is a kind of analysis, since always
there are some features of the perceptual situation which take the lead over
others. These dominant details are a kind of nucleus about which the rest clus-
ter."9
The inventive detachment and recombination of elements is therefore a psy-
chological process and its rules are those of mental and not physical action sys-
tems, regardless of how they must conform to the latter if and when they are
implemented in material form. The difference between these two realms of action
is a matter of everyday observation, and every inventor faces it when he attempts
to build a workable model of his mental recombination. Some ideational combina-
tions are physically impossible, others must be modified radically before they
can be materialized. Contrariwise, there are innumerable displacements and com-
binations of elements in the natural world that have no mental counterparts;
which is to say that they are not inventions. There are certainly instances
26
when they have been conceptualized for the first time and have had intellectual
or practical importance attached to them. Then we have what is commonly called
a discovery. But again the newness lies in a mental reorganization of concep-
tual elements such that one replaces another in a habitually established set.
This step is essential whether it precedes or follows the play of physical for-
ces.10 Nature does not invent and therefore its mechanics should not be con-
fused with the process of creative thinking.
It is necessary to abandon a mechanical view of invention for yet another
reason; namely, that it tends to picture the recombination process as a sever-
ing and joining of things at their "natural" boundaries. This is a most mis-
leading conception, for it is precisely in their disregard of conventional
units that inventors differ most from their less imaginative contemporaries.
They see complexes where others see wholes, or vice versa. Some of them, of
course, actually do break things up and reassemble the pieces. Others do not;
they do no more than imagine how it might be done. More importantly they envis-
age partitionings that overlap and intersect object boundaries. They jigsaw
their cognitive field in patterns which ignore conventionally established out-
lines within it. The results are primarily and fundamentally new ideas and not
new things. Consequently, they take shape in accordance with psychological
principles which have little or no relation to the material properties of ob-
jects or to the way in which they behave under the laws of physics and chemis-
try,  Percepts and concepts of experience can and frequently do ignore complete-
ly the definition of things established by "common sense" or by the convention-
alized procedures of "objective" science--and thus often lead to reinterpretations
of the nature of things.
It is easy in retrospect to wonder at the stubbornness or blindness of
men that has prevented them from seeing the world structured in a way other
than that dictated by custom, and to note how a failure to take a thing out of
a familiar context and put it in another has forestalled change. So firmly do
things become bonded together by tradition that it requires uncommon insight
or rashness to perceive them as complexes composed of detachable parts that re-
main together only because they have "always" been that way. Sails were the
exclusive property of ships--until a forgotten minor genius hitched one to ice
skates, a parsimonious board of directors of the South Carolina Railway Company
grafted one to a railcar in 1829, and a company in California rigged one to a
squat tricycle to initiate the sport of "sand sailing." Kites are for boys--
and for eccentric gentlemen like Benjamin Franklin, who used one to capture
electricity; and George Pocock, who obtained a patent for attaching one to a
carriage in 1826; and an anonymous Solomon Islander, who tied a lure to the
tail of one and succeeded in catching fish with it. 'When Thomas Newcomen built
his atmospheric engine--the precursor of the steam engine--he constructed a
rocking beam to transmit power from the engine to a pump used to draw water
from mines. This cumbersome and inefficient contrivance was adopted by James
Watt and others after him for almost one hundred years in the fixed belief that
Some kind of overhead beam, instead of a direct-acting connecting rod, was es-
sential to the performance of a power-driven machine. For no better reason,
and for approximately the same length of time, the cylinders of steam engines
were fixed in a vertical rather than a horizontal position, thus contributing
to the preservation of the rocking beam tradition and to the inflexibility of
the entire complex--which, of course, was regarded as a unit.ll
27
As was suggested earlier, such venerable complexes are not held together
by bars, bolts, and tubes alone. For centuries horses were harnessed to lordly
war chariots, not ridden and not put to the bovine task of drawing carts and
plows. They were associated with aristocrats, and therefore with luxury and
pomp. They continued to be linked with adventure and sport until relatively
recent times. And so it was with bronze in ancient history. It was a costly
metal and therefore the exclusive possession of the rich and powerful. It was
so firmly entrenched with ritual, heroism, and authority that iron, when it be-
came known in Europe and the Near East, was rejected as a lowly instrument of
peasants, ruffians, and barbarians.12
When two previously undifferentiated units are analyzed preparatory to
their recombination, the parts of each are apprehended as being held together
by some specific relationship. These relationships give distinctness to the
parts, and they are crucial factors in the recombination process, the reason
being that when one part replaces another it assumes the relationship that the
replaced part had to its matrix, context, or associate--that is, the remainder
of the analyzed unit--regardless of the relationship which the replacing part
had to its matrix, context, or associate. The significance of this character-
istic of the recombination process must be emphasized because frequently it is
precisely the assumption of a new relationship by one part with respect to
another that constitutes the most striking feature of an invention. It makes
a difference, for example, whether a passenger car rolls on top of rails or is
suspended from them; whether air is compressed by or compresses a piston in a
cylinder; whether a waterfall causes a wheel to turn or a turning wheel makes
a water-lift; whether parents treat their children as equals or as dependents.
Relationships are extremely varied in their nature, as varied in fact as
the human mind can conceive them to be, for they are mental constructs. There
is no external source for their apprehension, no stimulus for high, low, first,
more, less, or any other conceptual connection between the sensory elements of
our experience. That which we call the relation between things is a mental;
contribution to the external situation. It is an interpretation. And yet it
inheres in the nature of the stimulus and is immediately knowable. Spearman
lists this property of the mind as one of his three cognitive principles. He
calls it "the  eduCtion of relations," by which he means that the presentation
of two or more stimuli at once and spontaneously tends to evoke a knowing of
the relation between them. 13 It is an unmediated and an inseparable aspect of
the apperception of things.
Despite their importance we have a very underdeveloped terminology for
the identification of relations. This is owing partly to their indeterminate
number and the shadings which they are conceived to have. It is also owing to
our bafflement when we attempt to isolate clearly those relations we feel to
be present. Some of our everyday experiences involve very complex sets of re-
lationships which we sense but cannot express: the relationships between a
parent and his child, between a moving automobile and the pavement over which
it moves, between a politician and his constituents, between the legs and body
of a running animal. We do grasp such relationships, even if intuitively and
fleetingly. An appreciation of their significance is necessary in order to
comprehend the range of inventive recombinations, for they constitute one con-
trol on the number of patterns that are possible.
28
It is evident that when an inventive recombination occurs the elements of
the new combination directly or indirectly become substitutes for the elements
of the original combinations which they have displaced by their union. If AB
Is one pre-existent analyzed combination and XY the other, one invention made
possible by their recombination would be XB. In that case X displaces and
therefore substitutes for A and at the same time B displaces and substitutes
forY. But it makes a difference whether X or B is the active substituting
element because of the relationship factor.  If X is the active displacer then
it joins B in the same relationship as did the displaced A. If, on the other
hand, B actively displaces Y it assumes Y's relationship to X, and that can re-
sult in a totally different XB. There are therefore two possibilities for the
formation of the XB combination. The same holds true for the combination of A
andY. In addition to these four possibilities there are just two others.   One
occurs when both X and Y replace and substitute for A and B with the assumption
of the relationship between A and B; the other when both A and B replace and
substitute for X and Y with the assumption of the relationship between X and Y.
These six patterns exhaust the possibilities of the XYAB pjradigm and it
is believed that all inventions, as well as many creations that are not gener-
ally considered to be such, conform to one or another of them. The maximum of
six is established by the relationship factor acting in conjunction with one
other control. This is the inventor's conception of equivalence or similarity,
for substitution takes place in accordance with his apprehension of a common
1lactor In a pair of parts of existing combinations. In other words, recombina-
tints are not made in random fashion; they result from the substitution of one
thing for something like it. X is substituted for A because, as conceived by
the inventor, it has something in common with A. Hence it is natural that there
should be a substitution. Similarly for Y and B.1h  Their common properties may
be physical, or functional, or abstract. They may be generally accepted as
such; or, as sometimes happens, the perception of them may be attributed to the
insight of a genius; or, as more often happens, they may be regarded as fanta-
sies of amusing, absurd, frivolous, or even a dangerous people. Frequently
equtions are made below the threshold of what is considered to be inventive
simply because the identity of X's and A's or of Y's and B's is taken for gran-
ted, as when one wheel is substituted for another wheel, their admitted differ-
ences being ignored by common agreement. This is precisely the juncture at
wfhich- a division is often made between "significant" and "insignificant" inven-
tions, and the reason why, as Kaempffert says, "many inventions seem almost
disappointingly obvious when they are first disclosed." It is also why there
is a lack of agreement on what constitutes an invention. The process itself is
a routine, commonplace event. All of us resort to it daily. If we do not have
a hammer available when we need one we use anything like a hammer that we have
at hand; it may be our fist, a stick, a stone, or a shoe heel. Our impression
of newness in what we call an invention is a function of the degree of similar-
ity that we accord the substitute with reference to that for which it substi-
tutes. And it is obvious that the measure of similarity is individually and
culturally variable.  Sometimes an inventor's conception of a resemblance and
therefore of the possibility of a substitution is so "far-fetched" that he is
regarded as a crackpot; in other instances his equation is so obvious that nei-
ther he nor anyone else thinks of him as an inventor.
The displacement occasioned by a substitution Inevitably entails the dis-
carding of the former contexts or associates of both of the replacing elements
29
as far as that invention is concerned. Thus the union of the X and B of the
XYAB paradigm automatically detaches them from A and Yo This of course does
not mean that they will never again be associated with A and Y. What normally
happens in a successful invention is that the-elements it displaces continue to
exist as alternatives. In some instances they retain that status indefinitely,
particularly if they have an advantage over their new competitor under certain
circumstances; in other instances they become obsolete and in time are forgot-
ten entirely. These side effects of an invention may be regarded as desirable
or undesirable; they may be deliberate or unforseen; they may be "gains" or
"losses" depending upon one's point of view.
In those instances on which we have relatively complete information all
the characteristics of the inventive process that have been described are clear-
ly present. A good example comes from the fusions between automotive and man-
powered vehicles during the 1890's.  The earliest safety bicycles were too cum-
bersome to have wide appeal, so their manufacturers set about reducing their
weight and the friction of their moving parts in all ways possible. They intro-
duced ball bearings, tubular frames, wire spokes, pneumatic tires, and thin
wheel rims. But, by the end of the century the bicycle began to lose its appeal
so its designers turned their attention to its competitors, the steam, electric,
and gasoline driven carriages. Into these vehicles they built their familiar
tubular frames, chains, sprockets, and ball bearings, sometimes with little or
no modification. Thus, the first Locomobiles (formerly "Stanley Steamers")
offered to the public in Washington, D.C. in 1899 were equipped with bicycle
wheels.l1  If we apply the symbolism adopted above to this example, X would be
a horse drawn carriage body, with its heavy wooden wheels Y; A would be a bicy-
cle frame, and B its wheels. XB would then be the invention with respect to
this particular feature of the Locomobile; Y the abandoned wagon wheels (which
Daimler and Selden retained in their first gasoline wagons); and A the by-passed
bicycle frame that was eliminated from this strain of powered vehicleso The
wheel substitution and other evidences of the crossing of bicycles and buggies
appeared in such automobiles as the Benz of 1885, the Franklin of 1903, the
Haynes of 1895, and Henry Ford's first, as pictures of these vehicles clearly
show,16 Meanwhile, marriages were being contrived between gasoline powered ve-
hicles~Y and bicycles B that bore issue in some form of "motorcycle" XB through
the substitution of the motor X of the automobile for the pedal and foot power
A of the bicycle.  The details of this new breed of vehicles show unmistakable
signs of their mixed parentage.  There was, for example, the Hitchcock Quadri-
cycle which carried a car seat for two mounted on the frames of two bicycles
and was driven by a two-cylinder "naphtha" engine.17
Speaking in more general terms, horses X, taken from other tasks Y, have
replaced men A in turning millstones, presses, waterlifts, and treadmills B.
On treadmills the X's have replaced other sources of power A to drive mine
pumps, railway cars, boats, and--if a Frenchman in 1825 had had his way--an air-
ship B. Waterwheels X have relieved both men and beasts A in the operation of
millstones, bellows, and machinery B; and in turn have given away to steam and
electric power (new X's). At the end of the last century, compressed air X,
acting on a piston B, substituted for steam A in a variety of devices ranging
from railway engines to rock drills and it became a strong competitor with elec-
tricity. Then at about that time a temperamental upstart, the gasoline engine
X, moved in to power the universe of rolling, floating, and flying objects B in
place of steam, electricity, and air as well as the labor of men and beasts A.
30
It may readily be conceded that this replacement formula expresses well
enough the inventive process in many instances, especially those in which a
part oftan earlier invention substitutes for a part of another; but how about
the "really fundamental" ones?  It is easy to see that one form of power has
substituted for another, but how was the first step taken to harness power,
and hov did it involve a double analysis and a recombination? The answer to
these questions all bear directly upon what has been said earlier about the
nature of analysi s.
Innumerable people have known that vapors emitted from crevices in cer-
tain parts of the earth are inflammable. About 1684, John Clayton verified
reports of this phenomenon in Lancashire and then proceeded to produce such a
gas himself. Conjecturing that there was a relationship between the gas, the
earth's heat, and the coal deposits in nearby mines, he applied heat to coal B
placed in retort X--in which alchemists had boiled and roasted an indefinite
number of Y's--as a substitute for the earth A. Then, in a second step, he
caught the released gas X in a bladder B, formerly used for many A's, instead
of letting it escape into the atmosphere Y. He punctured the bladder with a
pin, brought a candle fj me near the vent, and so produced the precursor of
gas lights and burners.
Following Torricelli's announcement in 1643 that the atmosphere exerts a
pressure at sea level approximately equal to that of a thirty-inch column of
mercury there were a number of attempts to devise an engine to put this pres-
sure to work. The problem was to create a vacuum into which a piston would be
forced by atmospheric pressure. In 1654 von Guericke constructed a pump B
which would draw air X instead of water A from a closed container.l19 In 1680
Hvgens suggested that gunpowder be used instead of a pump to create a vacuum.
The engine he built for experimental purposes consisted of a cylinder and a
piston, the latter being attached to a counterweight. A small charge of gun-
powder was exploded beneath the piston, thus forcing it to one end of the cyl-
irder. Most of the gas generated by the explosion escaped through valves; as
the remainder cooled the piston moved into the vacuum thus created and in doing
so raised the counterweight.20  Denis Papin, who was Huygens' assistant, was
dissatisfied with the imperfect vacuum created by this method and turned his
thoughts to steam as a substitute for gunpowder. In 1690 he reported his rea-
soning in these words: "Since it is a property of water that a small quantity
of it turned into vapour by heat has an elastic force like that of air, but
upon cold supervening is again resolved into water, so that no trace of the
said elastic force remains, I concluded that machines could be constructed
wherein water, by the help of no very intense heat, and at little cost, could
produce that perfect vacuum which could by no means be obtained by gunpowder."21
Papin constructed an atmospheric engine based on this reasoning and demon-
strated its ability to raise a counterweight in the presence of the members of
the Royal Society in London. There is some doubt as to whether Thomas Newcomen
knew about this scientific toy, but in any event he constructed a heavy-duty
replica of Papin's laboratory exhibit and put it to work pumping water X from
mines instead of raising blocks A. It thus replaced horses on treadmills, and
in: time, through Watt's efforts, became a steam engine.
Huygens' experiments with gunpowder suggested the use of its explosive
force as a source of controlled power, and apparently efforts were made to
31
construct such a machine, using gunpowder and other unstable compounds, through-
out the seventeenth century.  Despite these early attempts the internal combus-
tion engine came after the steam engine and was developed as a substitute for
it.  In 1799 LeBon btilt a workable machine powered by exploding coal gas. In
1859 Lenoir $ubstitut ed benzene for gas and at the same time substituted his
piston and combustion chamber for the comparable elements of a steam engine.
His invention "closely resembled a horizontal double-acting steam engine, with
a cylinder, piston, connecting-rod, and a fly-wheel, in which the gas merely
took the place of steam, the mixture being fired by means of an electric "ark
passed between two points inside the cylinder at the appropriate moment."
Lenoir took the further step of mounting his engine B, which until this time
had been secured to a stationary base A, on a carriage or a wagon X as a substi-
tute for horse or steam power Y, thus producing the first vehicle driven by an
internal combustion engine.23
As these examples are intended to show, all the elements of the ABXY pat-
tern are present even in the most fundamental inventions, but at times some of
them seem to be absent because they are taken for granted; or because pre-
existent connections between A and B or between X or Y seem remote or inconse-
quential; or because the XY or AB bonds are so intimate that it is difficult to
see how analysis could be involved, The fact that steam and gasoline engines
were anchored to stationary bases before they were put on wheels may seem too
obvious to mention; yet the dissociation of the engine from its immovable base
constituted a major departure from tradition and few men even thought of it, or
.if they did they rejected the idea as impractical. It is even more difficult
to distinguish two events or to isolate two attributes or states of a thing; and
it may be equally difficult to appreciate that this, too, is an analytic proc-
ess. When James Watt invented his steam condenser he did not separate one part
of the Newcomen engine from another part. Instead, he analyzed the machine into
its two phases--heating and cooling--and substituted a separate cylinder, act-
ing solely as a condenser, in place of the steam-reducing phase of the single
Newcomen cylintder.  Likewise when he went on to invent a real steam engine, in-
stead of the atmospheric reactor bequeathed him by Newcomen, he did not physi-
cally separate one end of the Newcomen cylinder from the other, but distinguished
between the air and steam pressure phases in it and substituted steam for air,
thus making both ends of the cylinder the same and creating a double action pis-
ton powered on both strokes by steam.24
It is not uncommon for parts to be substituted for wholes. All that is
necessary is that they be considered to be equivalent for the purposes at hand.
This happens regularly with abbreviations of words and acts. It has given li-
cense to the writing of "Washington, D.C." instead of "Washington, District of
Columbia," to the ending of letters by some people with "I am, sir, your obedi-
ent servant, etc., etc.," and to a man s touching his hat instead of tipping it
to a lady.  It is this same process that Kroeber has called invention by reduc-
tion-segregation.  One example that he gives is the development of the alphabet
out of a mixed pictographic-ideographic-phonetic system of writing. The Egyp-
tians used such a mixed system in which a word was spelled out phonetically and
reiterated by an ideogram "as ii to make sure that one representation would be
read if the other were missed."5 The alphabet is believed to have evolved out
of this system or one like it, possibly among a neighboring Semitic people, by
the eliminati6n of all but phonetic symbols.   If this is indeed true the process
32
was one of substituting a part, the phonetic element, for the whole of the
ideographic-pictographic-phonetic complex that previously was considered to be
necessary, upon the realization that the part was equal to the whole and could
therefore function independently in place of it. Our writing "thot" instead
of "thought" offers a parallel.
There is a further involvement that must be taken into account to appre-
ciate the generality of the proposed pattern of analysis and recombination.
This is the fact that parts and functions of living organisms, including man,
are often key elements in the ABXY paradigm. This has been implicit in much
of what has been said about the substitution of machines for men and animals,
but there are other aspects of the process that deserve particular attention.
A very considerable part of our technology has come into being through man's
efforts to protect, strengthen, or maintain the physical or mental potentiali-
ties with which he is equipped as a member of the human species. Paleolithic
men had a very limited stock of artificial devices. In the main, they used
their own bodies to contend with their environment, but they did employ sticks
and stones as substitutes for their fists and teeth in battering and crushing
their way to survival; and they used fire and caves as substitutes for an inade-
quate body covering. There have been thousands of inventive steps in between
those elementary substitutions and the complicated machines that we use today
to master our enemies and our environment; but there has been an unbroken con-
tinuity, one step building on others which preceded it. 1Many modern inventions
have as their purpose the restoration of body parts or functions that have for
some reason failed us. In this category would fall our prosthetic devices:
artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, and hair, as well as our eyeglasses and hearing
aids.  Then there are the prophylactics and curatives which guard us from death
and disability by substituting for deficiencies in our organic apparatus--
stimulants, vita ins, enzymes, and tranquilizers.
Some organic substitutes are made to look like the part they are to re-
place, but this is by no means necessary, and often a better substitute can
be contrived if formal resemblances are ignored. After many centuries men who
had visions of flying finally abandoned attempts to imitate the flapping of
bird's wings and made their airfoils rigid. John Fitch's model of a ship driv-
en by a steam engine imitating the rowing action of galley slaves was somewhat
more realistic, but not so successful as the paddle wheels adopted by other
inventors of his day.=7 All that is required of a substitute is that it have
something in common with that which it replaces; and this need be no more than
the capacity to produce the same ultimate result. Adding machines and type-
writers bear little resemblance to our brains or limbs, but do accomplish some
of the same purposes.
Mlany body substitutes strike the public as ridiculous or impious tinker-
ings with nature. Among the more innocent invaders of the human domain in the
last twenty years have been U.S. patents issued for an automatically released
ammonia spray to keep the drowsing motorist awake; kits of snore stoppers for
heavy sleepers; an automatic wiper for eyeglasses and for vanity case mirrors;
weighted ice cubes to keep their chill away from the lips of highball drinkers;
an electrically heated toilet seat; and a headband with a prong in front to
hold the cigar of a preoccupied card player.28 All of these manifestations of
progress have drawn their elements from other contexts and are designed to
33
substitute for some attribute or function of the human organism through an
equation of their effects.
As might be expected at this point, no significant distinction can be
drawn between inventions which involve people and things and those which in-
volve people only. Departures from custom with respect to interpersonal rela-
tions, communications, eating habits, and other traditional patterns of behavior
originate with the equation and substitution of an analyzed part of one habitual
unit of behavior with the aralyzed part of another, just as with things. It is
not-4tsual to speak of novel--and sometimes shocking behaviors--as inventions;
but inasmuch as the process by which they are cordeived is the same as for new
combinations of things, it is convenient and appropriate to have a term which
will comprehend all instances. Innovation is a suitably neutral term and it
will be employed throughout the remainder of this paper when no distinction is
intended between the conception of new things, acts, beliefs,.or ideas.
Some years ago the linguist Edwar Sapir pointed of that Americans are
gradually abandoning the word "whom" in favor of "who."   That is, in those
instances in which our language traditionally demands an expression such as.
'"Whom did you see?" Americans who know that this is the "correct" form, but
who insist on saying "Who did you see?" are consciously replacing "whom" A by
its equivalent "wio"X in the context of "did you see?" B instead of retaining
it in its proper context, such as "was that man?" Y. The substitution of "who"
for "whom" is an implicit admission of their equivalence for such speakers, and
the equation can be substantiated by questioning. There are, of course, manyr
people who do not know that tradition dictates a difference in usage for the
two forms of this pronoun. They are not innovating, but simply following the
new tradition.
Coded communications of all sorts clearly follow the pattern of equation
and substitution. In these instances, as when a number "stands for" a letter
of the alphabet, the equation is arbitrary; that is, it is made such by defini-
tion. Similarly with gesture languages, shorthand transcriptions, and the many
forms of gibberish such as pig Latin. Slang and teen-age expressions are inno-
vations which are more directly comparable with the "whow for "whom" substitu-
tion in that the replacement of a customary expression by a new one is an indi-
vidual departure which may or may not become popular.
Strange as it may seem, imitation is innovation, for when it happens one
person identifies himself X with another person A and instead of doing what he
is accustomed to do Y he does what his paragon B does. The reason this seems
to be anything but innovative is that in many instances no one questions the
equation of the one person with the other. But there are numerous occasions on
which the equation and its consequences are considered to be scandalous, pre-
sumptuous, or ridiculous.  In this category would fall children behaving like
adults and vice versa; natives incongruously garbed in alien finery; social
climbers and passers of class boundaries--not to mention outright imposters.
Novel behaviors may originate not only through person for person substitu-
tion but through the equation and substitution of situations traditionally con-
sidered to be different. Not long ago the funeral of a famous hand leader was
attended by a display of jubilation that most Americans feel should be reserved
34
for a joyous occasion. Oddly enough from their standpoint, that was the senti-
ment of the mourners too.  It was a joyous occasion. A more consequential in-
stance of situational equation occurred in the 1920's when a University of
Illinois football player decided to become a wrestlero He resorted to the fly-
ing tackle in the ring, as he was accustomed to do on the football field, and
so initiated the lunging strategies of hippodrome wrestlers today.30
The copying of objects, like the imitation of people, involves the inno-
vative process and it therefore inevitably produces something new. No natter
how diligent the copyist, his replica X will depart in some manner from his
model A, the degree of acceptable deviation being controlled by X's suitability
in. context B. Such reproductive variation is not confined to things but ap-
pears in news reporting, rumors, songs, and artistic designs. It is most strik-
ing when the copying takes place across cultural boundaries, for then different
conceptions of equivalence are juxtaposed.
The acceptance of something new, since it is imitation, operates by the
same equation-substitution process as does the conception of it. Hence diffu-
sion, acculturation, and assimilation are different manifestations of the same
phenomenon. Diffusion is acceptance and acceptance is diffusion, the one term
being conventionally applied to the description of. a collective response to
something new, the other to an individual reaction. Psychologically there is
no difference, and in both instances the accepted thing undergoes modification
in transmission. This fact can be overlooked only if we arbitrarily treat some
modifications as trivial, or if we ignore the change of context and association
that necessarily occurs when an idea or thing is adopted by one person from
another. It follows from this that stimulus diffusion is not peculiar in pro-
ducing inventions. All diffusion does.31
The categorical syllogism is a form of reasoning based on two premises
which contain three and only three terms between them, It is a means of infer-
ence by which a relationship between two of the terms is deduced through the
elimination of the third term which is common to both premises: all spiders
are poisonous. This insect is a spider. Therefore this insect is poisonous.
Translated into the symbols of the innovative formula this can be stated as A
is B. X, whatever else (Y) it may be, is A. Therefore X is B. This is the
form that mrany arguments take, and it is the basis for many beliefs, and the-
ories, and the experiments that are sometimes undertaken to prove them. The
members of the Indian Shaker Cult assert that medicine heals sickness; their
rituals are medicine; therefore their rituals heal the sick. In the middle
ages it was believed that a lodestone could attract an estranged wife to her
husband as it did bits of metal. It is not easy to fathom the basis for the
equation of iron filings and alienated wives, but the same may be said of many
novel ideas. Possibly some of Benjamin Franklin's contemporaries felt the
same about kites and church spires. At any rate he found enough similarity
in them to test his premise that lightning was an electrical spark leaping to
earth through an elevated conductor. Most anthropologists believe that the
ancestors of the American Indians must have arrived in the New World by way of
Bering Sea. They reason that a primitive people without sea-going vessels and
a knowledge of navigation would not have been able to cross the Atlantic or
Pacific Oceans. The first immigrants to America were such a people; therefore
they could not have reached America by traveling across the open sea.
Inventors with a serious purpose have often labored to produce something
that their contemporaries regard as a ludicrous contraption. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that other innovators have adopted the same formula to create some-
thing which they think is funny and hope that the public agrees with them.
Hence, we have inventors of chin-driven fans for gum-chewing secretaries and
crank operated boxing gloves to be used for pounding the bottom of catsup bot-
tles--again the familiar pattern of substituting an X for an A. Slapstick
comedians, punsters, and cartoonists regularly resort to this formula, even
though they may not be aware of it as such. Their appeal lies in the incongru-
ity of their XB associations, which means the oddity of equating X with A.
Whether this be considered an infantile form of humor or not, examples of it
are not lacking in our literary classics. Witness Mrs. Malaprop's prescription
for the education of a young lady: "Observe me, Sir Anthony, I would by no
means wish a daughter of mine to be a progeny of learning: I don't think so
much learning becomes a young woman; for instance, I would never let her meddle
with Greek, or Hebrew, or Algebra, or Simony, or Fluxions, or Paradoxes, or
such inflammatory branches of learning--neither would it be necessary for her
to handle any of your mathematical, astronomical, diabolical instruments. But,
Sir Anthony, I would send her, at nine years old, to a boarding school, in order
to learn a little ingenuity and artifice. Then sir, she should have a super-
cilious knowledge in accounts;--and as she grew up, I would have her instructed
in geometry, that she might know something of the contagious countries.. .
So far an attempt has been made to select illustrations of innovations
requiring only one substitution. In many instances, however, innovations are
made by equating and substituting some Y for B as well as X for A. The particu-
lar Y that is substituted may not have been previously associated with X. In
any event, by replacing B it comes to be joined to X in the same relationship
that originally linked A and B. This double substitution produces what may be
called an analogy. Theoretically this pattern of innovation is at least as
common as is the one involving a single substitution and in practice it may be
more so. It certainly predominates among mechanical inventions, the reason be-
ing that in order to combine X with B it is usually necessary to alter B so that
it more nearly approximates the physical properties of Y before the new combira-
tion is workable.
Analogies are innovations not only because Y has never before been related
to X as it is inconsequence of the double substitution, but also because neith-
er X and A nor Y and B are ever identical, only alike in some respect. The over
all result is that the form of AB is preserved but the content or substance may
be markedly different. Innovations of this kind are made throughout the gamut
of things, theories, beliefs and behaviors. In the history of science Faraday's
demonstration of electromagnetic induction, leading to the invention of the
electric motor, generator, and transformer, was based on two analogies between
the parallel and reciprocal effects of magnetism and electricity. He confirmed
Oersted's discovery of the intimate relationship between the two phenomena and
reasoned, first, that if magnetism A could induce magnetism B, then electricity
X could induce electricity Y; and second, if a fixed electrified coil A could
rotate a pivoted magnetized needle B, then a fixed magnet X could rotate a mov-
able electrified coil y.32  Ohm's demonstration of the nature of the flow of
electrical energy throughea conductor was based on analogy with Fourier's demon-
stration of the nature of heat conduction. Just as the flow of heat A through
36
a metal conductor is proportional to the difference in temperature B between
its ends, so the flow of electricity X is proportional to the pressure (vol-.
tage) differential Y between the ends of its conductor.33 General theories
are derived in this way--the so-called inductive method--from repeated obser-
vations on a series of reaffirming XY's; and they end up with a statement
about the relationship between the common features of all X's and A's and all
Y's and B's to the disregard of their particularistic and distinguishing prop-
-ertie:s.
With respect to things rather than theories, Lenoir's gas engine was
analogous, even in its details, with a steam engine. It was just different
enough (as Y is to B) to run on gas X in place of steam A. Westinghouse's
railway car brake was a miniature piston and cylinder Y like that of a steam
engine B, but activated by compressed air X instead of steam A.3h Cayley's
glider was modeled on a bird's body with inorganic wings X and a tail Y in-
stead of the bones and muscles of their counterparts (A and B.)35 The wings
and tail of this device were analogous because they represent a retention of
form along with a replacement of substance. This is an extensively exploited
formula for innovation. It accounts for all the counterfeits, fakes, ersatzes,
and'imitations that, whether contrived for deception or not, look like some-
thing which they are not because they retain the interpart relations but not
the materials of their prototype AB. Also conforming to it are a varied
assortment of translations and transpositions, as when a musical score is
"arranged" by the introduction of novel embellishments on its X's and Y's
while retaining the relationships (melody, rhythm, tempo) between the original
A's and B's.  Similarly for the substitution of content (sense data) in com-
munication systems, as when a message is transmitted in Morse code, not by
the tapping of a telegraph key, but by light flashes or tape perforations.
The origin of the commissioned form of government provides an example of
an analogy in the field of institutional innovations. In 1900 Galveston,
Texas was struck by a hurricane and tidal wave which so severely disrupted
facilities that the bicameral city government was unable to discharge its re-
sponsibilities. During the crisis a committee of businessmen undertook to
find a solution to the administration problem. They proposed that a commis-
sion of five persons (X) be appointed to govern the city (Y) as nearly as
possible as a board of directors (A) manages the business of a corporation
(B). It is reported that they "did not at th$6time realize that they were
inventing a new form of political structure."it  This is a significant obser-
vation, for it means that these men, like thousands of other innovators before
and after them, were unaware of their role simply because for them X was A and
Y was B. It is also significant that these innovators were businessmen, for
that fact throws light on their choice of a prototype AB. In other analogies
the source and nature of AB is more apparent:  In 1949 a Chicago attorney
founded Divorcees Anonymous; in 1923 Ohrbach's clothing store in New York in-
stituted a "cash and carry" plan; and in 1951 the Oklahoma City Police Depart-
ment established a charge account system for a select list of traffic-law
violaters.
Parodies, burlesques, and ballets are analogies. So are the numerous
items in the proliferating business of pet care whereby owners--or alert
entrepreneurs--identify dogs, cats, and other creatures X with their masters
37
A to pave the way for pet hospitals, hearing aids, tranquilizers, crutches,
eyeglasses, tooth brushes, motels, powder rooms, cocktail bars and horoscopes--
all Y's that are not quite the same as their B counterparts for human use.
From the area of deliberate humor comes such analogical creations as a cartoon
depicting a cave man spanking his child for "defacing" a wall of their home
with a drawing of a woolly mammoth that is one of a kind now highly prized as
examples of prehistoric art.
If-the differences rather than the similarities between X and A and be-
tween Y and B are emphasized in a double substitution the result is what may
be called a parallel instead of an analogy. In these innovations it is still
the similarities between X and A and between Y and B which bring them into con-
Junction, but at the same time their differences set them apart. Their novelty
lies in the fact that their XY components are different from AB and yet they
are linked by a relationship that is transposed from the AB prototype. XY may
already exist as a unit, in which case it is then paired off against AB as an
alternative or as an insight that opens up possibilities for new developments
paralleling those of AB: infrared radiation X sensitizes lead sulfide and other
chemicals Y as light waves A sensitize silver nitrate and other chemicals B, so
suggesting the possibility of heat photography and infrared chemical analysis.
Perhaps more often neither of the elements of a parallel exists and they must
be constructed on the suggestion of their AB counterparts: the contests be-
tween married women X for the title of Mrs. America Y have doubtless been mod-
eled on the Miss America contests AB with the appropriate distinctions embodied
in the new title.  In science particularly XY parallels frequently emerge from
a discrimination between subcategories of A and B: whales A and fish X are
different enough despite their resemblances to warrant their being placed in
different classes B and Y; isotopes A and X are distinct enough to have radical-
ly different potentialities B and Y.
The balance between analogies and parallels is delicate, and what is an
analogy to one person may be a parallel to another. At times this is inten-
tional; XY is enough like AB to satisfy those who cannot have AB yet dissimilar
enough to satisfy those who have some preclusive interest in it.  Exclusive
clubs and their imitations are good examples; so are the numerous dichotomous
pleasures of the rich and the poor, the young and the old, the fit and the un-
fit. A practically universal category of parallels is the one founded on dif-
ferential sex interests and prerogatives, among them entertainments, occupations,
dress, and speech. Toy designers and ingenious parents exploit the potentials
of parallel innovation by manufacturing diversions for the young that are enough
like adult forms to satisfy youngsters but different enough to keep them out of
mother's kitchen and father's tool box. Humorists have also discovered that the
scientifically respectable device of discriminating subcategories of A and B can
have a risible effect: Junior, when cautioned that he would have to improve his
table manners if he were to be permitted to spend the weekend with his friend,
scornfully replied, "You don't think I eat like this with people do you?"
If it is granted that the patterns of simple and double substitution
prompted by conceptual similarities adequately characterizes and comprehends
the range of phenomena here cal led innovation, we are led to consider several
implications of this formulation of the innovative process. They can be dis-
cussed with reference to its multiplicative, its valued, and its adaptive aspects.
38
One of the most obvious characteristics of social, cultural, and techno-
logical change is its quantitative variation. The change is of two kinds:
variability in the number of innovations at different times, and variability
in the number of people who accept an innovation over a given period,  The
reasons for these differentials are beyond the scope of the present inquiry;
but given the fact that an innovation has been made we can directly relate the
process by which it came into existence to some of the ordinary features and
consequences of its acceptance.  More precisely, whatever the conditions and
the motivations for them may be, the mechanics of innovation and the extensions
of its use are the same. Hence trends, cycles, and pattern duplications are
quantitative manifestations of the innovative process.
In a trend, either the number of people X accepting an innovation B
increases or decreases; or the number of B's with which X is associated dim-
inishes or increases; or the number of X's with which B is associated increases
or decreases. Often these alternatives are simply different ways of saying the
same thing. In any event, they all involve numerical variations in the equa-
tion and substitution of persons and things.  If it can be said, for example,
that there is at present a trend toward motorization, this means that gasoline
or other engines B are being fitted to many X's, ranging from launches to lawn-
mowers (with perhaps baby carriages and wheelbarrows yet to come), all of which
have something in common with, and can therefore be substituted for, older
engined vehicles A. Sturtevant's invention of a suction fan B to remove dust
from shoe factories A started a trend toward dust removal from homes and other
places. And not only do such fans B now suck dust A but anything like dust,
such as bulk grain X from boxcars. While it may seem inappropriate to speak of
a trend in the latter instance, the impropriety derives from considerations
that are irrelevant from the standpoint of the mechanism by which the extension
of vacuum power has been accomplished. Similarly with fads, those short-lived
waves of mass identifications of the self X with another person A which result
in sudden rises and declines in the adoption rates of A's distinctive traits B.
Fads are trends from the standpoint of process even though they may be differ-
ent enough in other respects to deserve separate terms. Oddly enough, obsoles-
cence is another quantitative manifestation of the innovative process. It is
simply that aspect of it which occasions the displacement of old items A in
favor of new ones X. Thus after 1880, as one person after another X equated
himself with a user A of electric lights B--or as they equated electric lights
B with gas lights Y--there was a progressive obsolescence of gas illumination.
Another numerical change occurs when an equation of X with A results in an ex-
tension of their identity through X's assumption of not one but many of the B's
previously associated with A. From the equation of women X with men A there
have emerged over the past fifty years in the United States, female lawyers,
railroaders, bartenders, bank tellers, and business executives--all formerly
male prerogatives B--and the end is not yet in sight.
As in innovation itself, trends and pattern multiplications may be viewed
as either simple or 'compound substitutions, depending upon our estimate of what
constitutes similarity and difference between X and A and between Y and B. If
we think that a Standard Oil Credit Card is no different from a Diners Credit
Card, or that Divorcees Anonymous is no different from Alcoholics Anonymous,
and that Smokers-Anonymous (recently founded in England) is "just another copy"
of the same idea, then we declare them to be instances of simple substitution.
39
But if we insist on their differences, as their innovators and adherents are
likely to do, they are parallels.
Many studies of change deal with problems that emerge from a concentration
upon a particuJar facet of the innovative process, the problems being chosen be-
cause of their social or psychological significance. They are evaluative ap-
proaches that seek to rate innovations among themselves or with reference to
their consequences. It has been said, for example, that an invention is a
"break with the past," and many attempts have been made to distinguish this
kind of change from "trivial modifications" and so to establish a dichotomry,
commonly called "basic" and "derived."  Yet if innovation is the combined
analytic-synthetic process here proposed, it follows that such distinctions are
no more than reflections of points of view about what is fundamental. So, too,
with attempts to weigh the elements of stability and upset in an innovation.
Both elements, of course, are present in every innovation and their social or
psychological impact depends upon the subjective assessment of their respective
magnitudes.  Discussions of change in terms of gains and losses are also evalu-
ative approaches, as is evidenced by the frequent laments over the passing of
displaced customs--including, we must not forget, the custom of manual labor.
Beyond this a reckoning of debits and credits in change overlooks the fact
that every innovation at one and the same time represents mutual gains and los-
ses. As X gains B it loses Y and causes B to lose A in whatever degree XB comes
to dominate or supercede XY and AB. The attempts that have been made to dis-
tinguish between inventions and discoveries are also essentially evaluative,
Whether couched in terms of luck or insight, discovery usually connotes a lesser
achievement than does invention. 'While it may be convenient to retain the two
terms, it is impractical to distinguish the phenomena to which they supposedly
relate because they are not distinct in origin. Both are innovations. No nat-
ter how random the search for some X, or how unexpectedly it looms, it must be
equated to some A and so be related to some B before its potentialities can be
appreciated. And even "blind" searches are never entirely random; they are con-
ducted under the constraint of some hypothesis AB, however vaguely it may be
formulated.
The innovative process is an adaptive mechanism. It is the means by
which human beings adjust to changes of situation, whether the changes are ini-
tiated by events within themselves or external to them. It yields artifacts
and artifices; that is, man-made things and behaviors. But there are good rea-
sons for maintaining that it is not restricted to these manifestations, and that
it is not an exclusively human function.
One of the primary conditions for the survival of any organism is its
ability to generalize upon its experiences; that is, to treat two or more things
as the same instead of each one as unique. This is another may of saying that
classification is essential to survival; and this means, in human terms, that a
present experience X must be recognized, that is, equated to a previous one A
before it can evoke the response--any response--B which assigns it to the same
category as A. Often we must infer that this equation-substitution process
takes place on the assumption that equivalent stimuli evoke similar responses
in order to provide a rationale for the repetition of responses. If we accept
the inference we are led to the further conclusion that animals as well as men
classify their experiences; and, presumptively at least, by the same process.
ho
Furthermore there is no point in the scale of organic life where we can draw
a line which delimits this reaction to diversity in experience. Whether in all
instances it is a cognitive process is arguable, but so is the nature of cog-
nition itself.  In any event, the process seems to manifest itself in an unbro-
ken continuum, ranging from the reflexive reactions of the most elementary
forms of life, through the limited but undeniably inventive adaptations of apes,
to the prodigious array of artificial devices created by man.
All of this puts a new complexion on what are ordinarily called inven-
tions. In this broader perspective they are those manifestations of the inno-
vative process for which praise is reserved.  They are, moreover, subjectively
selected aspects, for it is notorious that one man's panacea may be a crackpot
idea to another. Hence the difficulty of framing generally satisfactory defin-
itions of invention. Perhaps an even more disturbing consequence of this per-
spective is that it humanizes inventive genius by robbing it of some of its
glamour. For the truth is that every man is an inventor many times over. The
problem is not to invent something, but to invent something that someone wants.
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35. Ibid,o pe 1780
36. Chapin, F. Stuart.    p     0o cito, po 338.