THOUGHTS ON CAVALRY, GUERILIA WA1RFARE AND THE FALL OF EMPIRES1
James F. Downs
Marian Smith in her 1951 article dealing with warfare among North
American Indians, complains that warfare is perhaps one of the least studied
areas of human activity. This paper is prepared to repeat the complaint,
suggest some possible reasons for the situation, and explore in brief some
principles which seem useful in analyzing the effect that warfare and mili-
tar-y activity have had on the course of human history.
One of the most important reasons for this neglect, it seems to me,
has been the overuse of the words finvasion? and "conquest" to explain every
change in head form, shift in tool type, new ceramic technique or abandoned
settlement which has occurred. However, now that the anthropologist is con-
scious of the dynamics of culture change it appears that we can profit-ably
devote some portion of our attention to war as an element in culture history.
I suggest that by failing to consider warfare with the same attention we have
given to kinship, economics, irrigation and ritual we have allowed a number
of simplistic explanations to creep into culture-historical thought which are
based on misconceptions about the nature and dynamics of war.
Smith suggests that cultural bias has made it difficult to assess war-
fare objectively and I can but agree with this idea. War is an activity
which produces a profound paradox. Although it requires skill and training
and is apt to produce lasting and important consequences, it is an activity
in wihich all men, or at least all European and American men, no matter how
inexperienced, may take part. It is indeed a paradox that anyone seems to
feel qualified to take up arms or to enter into a love affair, while few
people would as lightly undertake many far less significant activities.
At the same time, there also seems to be a tendency among Western
scholars to relegate discussion and investi gation of war to the professional
military man . . . a tendency stemming, perhaps, from the European tradition
of an exclusive military aristocratic class.
The nature of the data available to students of military behavior
certainly must contribute to the situation. One would, I am sure, be hard
pressed to find in the world's literature an unbiased view of a single war.
Reporters of wars appear to report from three viewpoints. The victor (or
his scribes-) may use the account to enhance his own prestige by describing
the power of the enezy, his own close relationship with God or his own bril-
liance.  The defeated, on the other hand, must explain away his defeat, using
such excuses as the barbarity of the victor, surprising technical superiority,
the treachery of allies, corruption of political figures or incompetence of
subordinates. The memoirs of military figures in our own Civil War or of
Axis and Allied leaders in Yorld Var II provide us with a complete spectrum
of excuses for failure.
10O
The third viewpoint, that of an observer who is not involved on either
side of a conflict, which should be objective, is perhaps the least valuable.
Such reporters inevitably disparage and discount the wars of foreigners, and
campaigns of non-European nations have been haughtily written of as the sense-
less skirmishing of savages, without plan or reason and certainly beneath con-
tempt.
As the title of this paper implies, I am here concerned with more
specific problems . . . actually two problems which can be examined independent-
ly as they bear on yet a third question.
I am not suggesting that every case of a civilization passing into the
hands of an alien people can be explained in simple military terms, but I do
believe that where a military element is present we must give it full weight.
Culture history is replete with instances where centers of civilizations have
fallen to or been brought under the control of ruder, less civilized peoples.
The ci-vilized Near East was successively overrun by Guttitts, Kassites, Syrians,
Ass;yrians, Hittites and Persians . . . each of these peoples barbarianiwhen
compared to their victims. Mycenean Greece gave way to the Dorians. Civilized
Crete fell before less civilized Greeks.  Egypt was subjugated by the rude
Hykssos. The Shang Chinese were replaced by the unlettered Chou Chinese. The
great empire of the Sung was overwhelmed by Mongol herdsmen. In the New World,
the Valley of Mexico appears to have been the scene of repeated encroachments
by barbarian tribes.
This repeated situation presents another paradox* Civilized societies
are, compared to barbarian tribalists, seemingly better prepared for war. A
stable agricultural basis, relatively greater control over a larger population,
specialization permitting a military class, superior technology, all of which
are part of a civilized society, would seem to make such a society invulnerable
to the homogeneous, less stable tribal society.
One wiy of explaining away this contradiction has been to rely on a
literary device v O . to speak of savage hordes or t"wolves from the fold";
phrases which contribute to a picture of irresistible waves of unciVilized war-
riors sweeping with flame and sword into the lives of the helpless civilized
peoples.  Such explanations may still the question, but they provide little
understanding of the process.
My purpose is not to criticize literary style but to examine some
attempts at analysis.  One of the most common attempts at analysis has been
the technological explanation. If, for instance, the Hittite possessed iron
words and his enemy did not, this fact is used to explain his military success.
So simple and clear cut is this kind of explanation that one is tempted to
accept them writhout question. However, the European conquest of the New World
provides-us with ample evidence- that the possession of metal armDr, and even
firenrs, are not guarantees of victory., even -iwen confronted with an enemy
using stones. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this was the stinging defeat
inflicted upon Di Soto in 1539 at the hands of the Tascalusa Indians. De Soto,
a veteran of Pizzarols campaign against the Peruvians, was forced to retreat
with a large number of wounded when the Indians fell upon his force after a
seemingly friendly welcome. Certainly the technological stiperiority of'tje
106
Spanish over the Indian was even greater than the difference between bronze
and iron in the ancient Near East.
Perhaps the most common explanation given for barbarian success in the
Old World is the use of the horse, either as cavalry or to pull chariots. The
second use of the horse, as a puller of chariots, can be discounted as a key
factor when we consider that the vehicle appears to have been most important
as a cornreyance for warriors into the line of battle where they dismounted and
fought on foot. Recorded attempts of the Persians to use the chariot as a com-
bat vehicle were failures, even when the chariot was equipped with scythes on
the wheels. There is no argument that as a conveyance the chariot was an
important factor in ancient warfare, but only inasmuch as it brought well
trained, equipped and courageous soldiers into the line of battle.
Cavalry, on the other hand, would seem to be a vital factor. Time and
again in history, mounted troops have been victorious against -infantrymen.
However, the question would appear to be more complex than whether or not the
horse was employed. Let us look for a moment at a description of such a con-
test.  Lamb, recounting the Mongol invasion of China, says: "The Mongol
cavalry divisions nosed out the scattered forces of the empire, composed main-
ly of foot soldiers and rode them down making havoc with their arrows shot
from the back of a hard running horse into the close packed ranks of infan-
try."   What this stirring sentence does not make clear is that the Mongol
divisions owed their presence inside the Great Wall, not to their horses but
to the fact that the Mlongols had won the support of the half Sinatized border
barbarian tribes to whom the keeping of the gates had been entrusted.  (I
must add, however, that Lamb does not ignore this political fact, but -that it
is obscured by the more colorlul and dramatic phrases such as those quoted.)
Moreover, what would appear to have been a whirlwind campaign takes on a
totally different cast if one remembers that the Mongol conquest of China
required 45 years to complete.
A more certain indication of cavalry superiority is perhaps the vric-
tory of the Persian, Darius, over the army of his brother Cyrus. Cyrus had
enlisted the famous Ten Thousand Greek infantrymen as mercenaries to serve as
the center of his line, with lightly armed Persian infantry and cavalry on
their flanks. Darius had in his force a large body of cavalry which swept
away the inferior cavalry and Persian infantry of Cyrus, forcing the Greeks
to begin their historic retreat. Despite his victory., Darius was never able
to break the ranks of the Greek hoplites and, though it retreated, the phalanx
was never broken. Before we credit the cavalry with too large a share of this
victory, it is well to remember that seventy years later another Greek phalanx,
this time supported by dependable allies, defeated the Persians at the battle
of Plataea.
Th 53 B.C. the Roman Legions under Crassus were routed by a numeri-
cally inferior force of Parthian cataphracts and light mounted archers. The
issue here, when the battle is examined, is not horse against infantry, but
logistic superiority.  The Parthian general had been defeated before by
Romans who waited out showers of arrows, safe behind shields and armor, :until
the Persian quivers were empty and then carried-home an irresistible charge.
107
This time he carried reserve missiles into battle on camels so that the legion-
naires were never able to take advantage of the empty quivers, which this time
never became empty.
One more example; in 1066 the mounted knights of Normandy defeated the
pedestrian Saxons at Hastings. Some historians explain the victory in terms
of the Normans' use of the horse. Others have claimed that the Saxons were
exhausted by an all night march . . .. and periodically British students, weighted
down with chain mail, have made the march to prove or disprove the theory.
However, an examination of the tactical situation makes other explana-
tions unnecessary. Stalemated by the Saxon entrenchments, the Norman horseman
made a retreat, real or feigned. Then the undisciplined Saxons smelled victory
they surged into the field, scattered, without protection on their flanks, and
were promptly overridden by the Normans. The same device was used by the Spar-
tans and Alexander more than a thousand years earlier.
What each of these examples proves is that victory is most often
explained in tactical rather than technical terms.
A roster of the great military commanders reveals the same fact. No
great military leader has ever contributed substantially to military technology.
Alexander added a few feet to the spear of the hoplite and increased the armor
of the mounted Companions. No major change in weapons or equipment was devel-
oped under the Romans. The armies of T'ang dynasty, which campaigned as far
as India, marched with the ko, a pike which was the basic weapon of the Shang
sbldier 2,200 years before. Charlemagne may have been among the first European
knights to use the stirrup, but if so, it was after he was proclaimed emperor.
Frederick the Great had arms no different from those of his enemies, but he did
develop radically different troop dispositions. Napoleon contributed a field
gun mounted on wheels and pulled by large teams, an innovation adopted so rap-
idly by his enemies as to be neutralized.  In short, military success appears
to have little or no correlation with superior or different technology, unless
of course such a difference is vast; and in such a case factors of economics,
social organization, population are probably more important than military factors.
Nonetheless, there remains the repeated success of mounted troops over
infantrymen to be explained. If we canmot apply simple technological explana-
tions, it seems that the kind of analysis which has been useful in other fields
of anthropological investigation may be helpful. Military institutions repre-
sent only a single facet of a society. Let us look again at the contrast
between a barbarian and a civilized society. One of the clearest differences
is that tribal society tends to be more homogeneous with each man participating
in most of his culture's complement of male activities. In a society where war
played a significant role, this means that every man was a warrior. The civil-
ized group, on the other hand, tends toward class stratification and toward
specialization of these classes- in different spheres of activity.
One of the possible specializations is the development of a military
class . . . although this may vary from the rather broad base which we see in
the Near East and Greece to the exclusive military aristocracy of Medieval
Europe and pre-reformation Japan. Or the military arts may become the property
108
of all freemen in a society, but a neglected property, utilized only in war-
time.  In either ease, a great deal less of the potential of a civilized com-
munity is devoted to the arts of war.  Military. classes are seldom, if ever,
the lower classes. Although such levels may supply the men for the ranks,
those who are devoted to perfecting themselves in the military arts and sci-
etices are inevitably the upper classes. It is among those with wealth we find
men able to purchase the armor and weapons of the professional soldier.   Thus,
if the horse is part of the cultural inventory and used in war, it is not sur-
prising that the well-to-do upper class military specialist will be mounted.
In a tribal society with every man acting as a soldier, if the horse is pre-
sent, it seems probable that e'very man will be mounted in battle. The coordi-
nation of wealth and a mounted military class can be seen today wherever
cavalry units are maintained. Because of the expense of animals and the time
required to train troopers, horse units are kept at full strength, while
.infantry utnits tend to be kept understrength, the ranks to be filled in time
of war by volunteers or conscripts.
'What this discussion would suggest, then, is that whenever mounted
troops appear in battle, the horsemen are apt to be the best trained and
-best armed soldiers in the field.
I have already mentioned the military organization of the Near East
and Greece which could be likened to the militia or the National Guard of
later periods. In China and Japan we see much evidence of conscription and
military corvee at a relatively early date.  The Westerners, farmers or land4-
holders, we can assume reacted to wartime service in the manner of later day
militiamen . . . willing to fight short term wars, but unwilling to be drawn
from their homes and primarxy occupations for any len'th of time. Two Japan-
ese sayings illustrate the attitiue of the Asian conscript: "The wretchedness
of a soldier is not different from that of a slave" . . . "of all the forms of
forced labor that of a soldier is most bitter."  Can we be surprised that it
took soldiers thinking as these sayings suggest eight hundred years to subdue
the wild Ainu and savage Kumasu tribesmen?
It should be remembered, however, that societies which did not develop
mounted tactics (and in which the horse usually served only minor purposes in
other aspects of life), men like the Scots, Swiss and the Japanese after the
thdrteenth century v . . societies in which no status symbolism was assigned
to the mounted fighter... have developed infantry' organizations which had
little to fear from mounted troops. But such units were rare.   Perhaps the
rarest of all military commodities has always been a well trained and well
disciplined infantry.unit. The reasons for this I think are clear from the
foregoing material.
The point that I am trying to emphasize is that when we examine the
question of relative military power between civilized and uncivilized groups
we must examine the tactical situation as it related to other socio-cultural
factors.
Some writers have tnded to discount totally the military factor in a
situation in which a barbarian society overcomes a civilization. To assign
the downfall of the civilization to internal weaknesses inherent in the
109
structure of the civilization fails to meet the question of how barbarians could
defeat civilized men in battle, and, by implicatiorvatLleast- suggests that bar-
barians could not have brought about the fall from which they benefit. Wittfogel,
for instance, says: '"the tendency toward disorder and uprising grows. In the
case that neighboring nomadic societies have reached a point of relative concen-
tration and high aggressive striking power, the decadent irrigation civilization
is- oterrun by nomadic conquerors . . . either way however, it is an inner crisis
mechanism which loosens up the oriental social structure a3d prepares it for
civil war or defeat from the outside" (emphasis supplied).'
It is not my purpose to dispute this kind of analysis . ... I would like
to point out, however, that this and other explanations based on some structural
crisis mechanism overlook the possible effect that barbarian military activity
may have had on the decline of the civilization. Here we face the question
directly; how can an uncivilized, technologically inferior, .poorer, barbarian
society have an important military effect on a civilization in its' strongest
phase and thereby contribute the crisis which makes it possible for an eventual
barbarian victory?
The key to the question is summed up, I think, in a sentence by Adcock
in his series of Sather lectures delivered on this campus several years ago.
Discussing the Greek defeats and victories in wars against the tribal peoples
on their borders, and the changes this brought about in Greek tacti s he says:
"They had different ways of life and different ways of waging war."'   The point
that he was making was that different cultural traditions include different
views of warfare both in its aim and its methods, and when two differing tradi-
tions meet in battle, victory is apt to go to the side having the tradition
best suited to the situation. Traditions of warfare also have traditions of
ef,t cyI      wA,cts, ~~tt?t,  %mi*es following different wart    itions m
well not agree who won or los  a battle. . . without such agreement no war can
come to !n end.
Now let us look at the military situation of ancient civilizations in
the light of the above remarks. In the Eastern civilizations, as pointed out
earlier, there was a dependence on conscript peasants to fill the ranks of
infantry led by nobles in chariots (using the bow, which in the Far East seems
to have played an important role as a military status symbol as well as a
weapon). With the.abandonment of the chariot this leadership role was takln
over by mounted men; particularly in Japan at a later date. In the Near Eastern
civilizations the armies appear to have been composed of farmer-soldiers, .mili-
tiamen, under the direction of men who might best be called specialists in
leadership. At Lagash, for instance, in addition to the general levy there was
a special corps of men who tilled the lands of the temple, maintained irriga-
tion ditches, and -who in time of war were armed by the temple and led by their
peacetiue foremen. This tradition of a special corps continued in the Mediter-
ranan until at least the time of Alexander; and in the Middle East it often
played a role in economics. The primary tactic of such militia forces was what
Adcock described as a mass duel. Soldiers in ranks met other soldiers in ranks
with swords, shields and spears. Those who fell in the front rank were replaced
by men from the rear ranks. Victory depended on weight, often the weight of a
running charge . . . if possible the weight of a downhill charge. There was
little room for generalship in such a battle. A leader could dispose his troops,
110
but once the battle was joined, maneuver on command was almost unimown.  More-
over, wars between city states had to be fought in periods of agricultural
inactivity. The field of battle was determined by the desire of both armies
to avoid receiving a downhill charge.  The defending forces preferred to fight
near home so that in case of defeat they could retreat to the shelter of the
city walls. Such an army, protected by its amor and shields, standing beside
neighbors under the walls of the city, would have been more than a match for
barbarians, even  mted barbarians. These men were used to a short battle,
terminated when one side broke ranks and ran. There was no pursuit. How
would the rush of a barbarian force appear to such men? A sudden rush, a
shower of arrows or javelins, just as those described in the battles between
Athens and the Aetolians, followed by a withdrawal . . . would more than like-
ly appear as a victory to the ailitiamen of the ancient city. On the other
hand, the barbarian, satisfied perhaps with the casualties inflicte,, the
livestock runn off, or outlying houses burned, might well be celebrating vic-
tory himself.
Let us now picture the effect of a continuing series of barbarian
raids on a civilized society. It must have been impractical if not impos-
sible to call up the entire militia to meet each band of barbarians as it
appeared . . *. particularly barbarians who refused to fight in a tdivilized
mazmer.*  Tm-solutions seem probable.   The special corps could be called up
to wet sradic raids. The consequence, of course, would have been that the
public works tasks assigned to the special corps would remain undone. The
other solution would be a conscious or unconscious reorganization of the armed
forces so as to. del with barbarian tactics more effectively. While this
might increase the effectiveness of the civilized army against barbarians, it
would waken it when confronting the armed forces of other civilized grups.
This situation is admittedly speculative, in the absence of specific investi-
gatioi for.the Near East, but we have evidence for the Far last which would
.seem to support the hypothesis. In the closing years of the Shang Dynasty
there--are records of a nmber of successful expeditions against western bar-
barians. These expeditions are-recorded as successes, but do not seen to have
extended the dmain of the Shang Kings. One is forced to speculate that per-
haps the barbirians didn't know they had been defeated. Creel has suggested
that these victories taxed the Shang potential to the degree that the less
civilized Chou people were able to overwhelm the Shang empire and adopt Shang
culture.
Four centuries later we read these two poetic laments of peasant sol-
diers in the service of the by now civilized Chou kings. "What plant is not
wil$Ing? What man is not taken from his wife? Alas for us soldiers.
treited as though we were not fellowmen". . e and: "we cannot rest dr bide/
because of the Hsien-yun. The year is running out. But the king's business
never ends.      How should we dare stop or tary.  In one month we have had
three alams."11  One does not have to look for a crisis mechnim to accowt
for- discontent and rebellion . . . the raids of the Hsien-yun, victories or
not, provide us with an answer.
The situation of continual guerilla warfare harrying the borders of
a civilization might well contribute to discontent and disorganization, but
why, we may ask, did the relationship change from one of raiding and resisting
111
to outright conquest on the part of the barbarians, a conquest culminating in
the adoption of civilized culture by the barbarians. Generally this is explained
in terms of a growing envy on the part of the barbarian have-nots when confronted
with the wealth and comfort of the civilized haves. 'What is forgotten is that
the life of the nomad seems always to have an appeal to at least some sedentary
agriculturalists. We must remember that the civilized society had, in addition
to the problem of attacks from the outside, to deal with the problem of defection
to the barbarians. Lattimore has pointed out that the Great Wall of China was
built as much to keep Chinese in as to keep barbarians out. Certainly we have
seen in recent North American history the willingness of Indian farmers to
abandon agriculture for equestrian hunting. We also can point to the willingness
of farmers of the civilized Europe and the eastern seaboard of North America to
flee the comforts of civilization for the freedoms of the frontier. Such popula-
tion shifts from civilized to uncivilized areas carried civilized techniques,
attitudes and aspirations to the barbarian, and one can suggest that in time the
influence would be felt amng the barbarians themselves who would decide to con-
quer and adopt, rather than raid and exploit.
What I have suggested in the foregoing paragraphs is that barbarian
tribal peoples would probably have been able to use guerilla warfare as a sue-
cessful offensive tactic against an agrarian civilization. We are apt to view
guerilla warfare as the hopeless tactic of native peoples resisting European
invasion, or conquered populations harassing oppressors. In either case, gue-
rilla tactics seldom are able to obtain a victory without the suport of conven-
tional forces. However, when employed against an agrarian ci'vilization, fought
An the fields which were the very foundation of the civilization's economic Sys-
tem, there is every reason to believe that it would be effective, leading to a
break down of irrigation and other public works, reduction of agricultural out-
put, growing urest and dissatisfaction among the peasant soldiers. Its effec-
tiveness would be reduced as- epires formed, based in part of trade, with its
more easily defensible ports, market cities and way stations, and able to incor-
porate peoples of 'varying military traditions and develop a more flexible
military force. The shift from agrarian and commercial empires to industrial
civilizations reduced guerilla war to a tactic which, wile it might be employed
with some success as evidenced in Algeria,6 Malaya and Indo-China, cannot bring
about victory without- conventionally organized forces which can strike directly
at the factory cities, defended by regular military forces. It is this inability
of guerilla forces to strike the final victorious blow, and the differing tradi-
tions of war in which both sides disagree on exactly what constitutes a battle
won or lost, which in part explains the continued fighting in Algeria today.
While I have suggested a number of explanations of recurring events in
history I would prefer they be viewed as suggestions arni not dignified as hypoth-
eses. What I have in fact tried to do s to illustrate the importance of exam-
ining the nature of war in the same detail and depth, and with the same methodo-
logical rigor as is devoted to other aspects of culture.
112
ENDNOTES
(1)  This paper, in a slightly abbreviated form, was read at the Fourth
Annual Kroeber Anthropological Society Meeting, May 21, 1960,
Berkeley, California.
(2) Lamb, Harold, 1952, Genghis Khan. Garden City, p. 87.
(3) Wittfogel, Karl A., 1939, Theory of Oriental Society in Fried, M. A.,
Readings in Anthropology, Vol. II, New York, p. 110.
(4) Adcock, F. E., 1957, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War.
Berkeley, pp. 117 ff.
(5) Waley, Arthur, 1946, Chinese Poems, London, pp. 28-29.
(6) The Roman recruitment of Germanic warriors, the Chinese alliance with
biorder barbarians, the  Spahi, janissaries, sepoys, Indian and
Philippine sc-outs and KATSUA are examples of this tendency to recruit
soldiers of various backgroundsfor special service.
113