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Valentin V. Fedoulenko

RUSSIAN EMIGRÉ LIFE IN SHANGHAI

An Interview Conducted by

Boris Raymond

Berkeley
1967

V. V. Fedoulenko in Shanghai



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PREFACE

In March, 1966, the Center for Slavic and East European Studies authorized funds for a pilot project to be undertaken by Boris Raymond for the preservation of information on the Russian Revolution and the Russian emigration. As proposed by Mr. Raymond to Professor Gregory Grossman, Chairman, Center for Slavic and East European Studies, the scope of the project would be to:

- a. explore the possibilities of gathering written and printed material for the Bancroft Library and initiating an inventory of similar collections;
- b. begin the compilation of a bibliography on the general topic of Russian emigrants in the Orient and in California; and
- c. conduct a series of interviews with carefully selected members of the Russian community whose recollections of the past would be of permanent historical value.

The work of the project was carried out by Mr. Raymond during the summer of 1966 under the supervision

of a faculty committee appointed by Professor Grossman consisting of Professor Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Department of History, and Professor Oleg Maslenikov, Department of Slavic Languages. Three oral history interviews were conducted, with Alexandr Lenkoff, Valentin V. Fedoulenko, and Professor George C. Guins. Mr. Raymond prepared a bibliography of works on the Civil War in Siberia and the Far Eastern Russian emigration that were available in San Francisco collections. A start was made on bringing in materials for the California Russian Emigré Collection in the Bancroft Library.

In his report to the faculty committee at the conclusion of his part of the work, Mr. Raymond proposed an expansion of the project with an emphasis on the study of the history of the Russian emigration in the Far East and on the study of the history of the present structure of the Russian community in San Francisco. He concluded:

Such a study seems important because it represents (1) an example of how a whole stratum of a nation made the adjustment to conditions of exile and how it preserved and expanded the values it already held; (2) it sheds light on the character of the group that left Russia and furnishes a measure of the value of the human material that was lost to Russia because of the Revolution; (3) it sheds light on the problems faced by later anti-Communist refugee groups (Chinese, Hungarian, Cuban); (4) it sheds light on the political events of the twenties, thirties, and forties in the Far East; (5) it sheds light on the causes, strengths, and weaknesses of the anti-Communist fight by the White Russian movement; (6) it is invaluable as one important phase of an eventual definitive study of the Russian Revolution; (7) it sheds light on the cultural contribution that Russians have made and are making to California history.

The destruction of most of the major centers of this Far Eastern emigration (Harbin, Tientsin, Shanghai), the rapid dying off of the émigrés, and the sustained loss of documents which is constantly occurring, make it imperative that such a study, if done at all, be done within the next few years.

This group of three interviews with Russian émigrés is the second unit in a Russian émigré series. The first unit was proposed and conducted in 1958-59 by Dr. Richard Pierce under the faculty supervision of Professor Charles Jelavich and Professor Riasanovsky.

Four interviews were done then, with Paul Dostenko, Boris Shebeko, Michael Schneyeroff, and Elizabeth Malozemoff (interviewed by Alton Donnelly), and some Russian émigré papers were collected at that time. The interviews have been handled through the facilities of the Regional Oral History Office of the Bancroft Library.

Willa Klug Baum
Head, Regional Oral History Office

15 July 1967

INTRODUCTION

Valentin Vassilievich Fedoulenko is very well known to the Russian emigré population of San Francisco for his activities in helping to bring several thousand refugees from the Philippine Islands into California between 1948 and 1952. He was at the time vice-chairman of the Russian Emigré Association in the Tubabao Camp, where the emigrés had been moved just before the Communist Chinese occupied Shanghai in 1949. His efforts on the behalf of the emigrés, even after his arrival in California, especially in cooperation with the then Senator William Knowland, are an important and interesting facet of history.

Mr. Fedoulenko has shed some interesting light on the events surrounding the formation of the White and anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia, the rise and fall of Admiral Kolchak, a member of whose personal bodyguard he had been, and the rise and fall of the Merkulov government of the Russian Maritime Provinces in 1922, where he served under Admiral Stark in a highly sensitive capacity. Finally, Mr. Fedoulenko had much

interesting information on the growth and development of the Russian emigré colony in Shanghai between 1922 and 1948, a colony of which he was one of the original members.

This series of interviews took place during the months of July, August, and September, 1966, in the living room of Mr. Fedoulenko's house in San Francisco where he lives with his charming and hospitable wife. During these interviews, customarily, we sat around their large dining room table, on which were scattered copies of old articles, photographs, and notes. Towards the end of each interview, Mrs. Fedoulenko would come in and remove all this material, replacing it with cups of coffee, pieces of pastry, cut hams, and other ingredients of old Russian hospitality. Our formal interview over, Mr. and Mrs. Fedoulenko would talk about personal happenings that had taken place during their very long and happy life together. Retired for several years now from his job with one of the local airlines, Mr. Fedoulenko is extremely proud of the fact that during the short years he worked in the United States he had been able to acquire and pay for his house and car. The car, as he often remarked with a twinkle in his eye, was not of the latest model, but neither were he or his wife.

Because of his somewhat restricted knowledge of the English language, I conducted these interviews in Russian. At the

end of the whole series, I translated the Russian interviews, word for word, into English and had these English translations transcribed by the Regional Oral History Office. These transcriptions were then gone over first by myself, and then by Mr. Fedoulenko who corrected and verified the whole text. My leaving Berkeley prevented me from going over the manuscript for a final check of Russian to English spelling.

Mr. Fedoulenko has deposited copies of some Russian emigré publications in the California-Russian Emigré Collection of the Bancroft Library, and he plans to deposit other relevant papers there later.

Boris Raymond (Romanoff)
Interviewer

December 1967

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These interviews were given in Russian by V. V. Fedoulenko and translated into English by Boris Raymond

ARMY YEARS, WORLD WAR I

Family, Schooling, and Commission

Fedoulenko: I was born in 1894 on the 22nd of February in Kazan. My father worked in the Zemstvo, in the city administration. He was the secretary of the city council in Kazan. He also had an insurance business. My mother was born in Ourzum, in the Viatskaia gubernia. Her family had at one time been Old-Believers* and had been resettled by Ivan the Terrible from Novgorod. They got to Viatskaia gubernia, where there were many of them, and there my grandfather got from his father a small business enterprise. Later he became Orthodox. However, I still remember the old "molelnia" [prayer room] in their house. They were very religious people. Unfortunately, my maternal grandfather died early. His children were bankrupted by their uncle, who had been made guardian of the estate but who, using his guardian's prerogatives, "took them to the cleaners," so to say. So they moved to Kazan. My mother's brothers were older than she. They went to work, one as a teacher; the second ended up as a monk. Her youngest brother was drafted into the army during the Russo-Turkish War. At the end of the war he was

*Old-Believers (starovery) - A persecuted religious sect in Russia, dating back to Peter the Great's church reforms.

Fedoulenko: trained by the army as a medic, entering such a school.

Finally, he became administrator of forests on an enormous estate in the Urals which belonged to the Dernidoff-San Donato family. I spent several summers there. The wildness of the forests and mountains there was fantastic. This was in 1907-1909. I was then a gymnasium student.

Raymond: How was it that you decided to enter the gymnasium rather than some other school?

Fedoulenko: This was a completely accidental matter. My father had received only a fourth grade education. He wanted very much that his children go to the gymnasium and then enter the University. This was his great desire, and he worked very hard to give his children an education. For him the gymnasium was the model. Other schools, such as the realschule, were not so popular then; there was only one such school in Kazan. There were, however, three gymnasiums. Then two more were built. Kazan was a town of students and teachers -- Kazan University, higher courses for women, the theological seminary, and other types of schools were there.

There were three sons in our family; I was the youngest. There were two other children who had died in their infancy. My oldest brother died during the war from typhus and pneumonia. The middle brother later became an attorney in Kazan. His career ended only under the Bolsheviks. He

Fedoulenko: went to Moscow after the October Revolution; there he was arrested and spent time in jail, where he contracted typhus. Then I heard indirectly from his ex-wife, who had married someone else by then. She wrote me from Turkestan that he had survived and had gone to the Kuban, where our family had originally come from. My forefathers were Kuban Cossacks, and I still belong to the Cossack stanitsa in San Francisco, by tradition.

My mother died in Tomsk during the retreat of Kolchak. She died of typhus, which was very frequent there. My father died in Kazan after he had buried my mother in Siberia, but he lived there only for six months. While there, he lived with our old nurse, in her house. At that time there was a horrible famine in Kazan -- people were dying from hunger and illness.

When I finished the gymnasium, I entered the University of Kazan, but I had little opportunity to study because the war had started. The declaration of war found a great response of patriotism among the people -- also in my soul. I did not like the Germans for many reasons. I knew that they were enemies of Russia, and I knew how they behaved towards our history, how they laughed at the origins of the Russian state and our princes. I went to war consciously "ideino."*

* ideino-full of ideals

Raymond: When you entered the University, you were planning to study what?

Fedoulenko: The Juridical faculty.

Raymond: How old were you?

Fedoulenko: I was then almost twenty.

Raymond: When you entered the army, were you commissioned?

Fedoulenko: Yes. My father had suggested that I enter a military school, so I chose the Moscow Alekseevskoe Military Infantry School because the course was only eight months. The artillery school had a minimum of one year's course. I was afraid that I would not be able to get to the war in time, so I chose the infantry school. On graduating, I took a vacancy in the active army. This was in 1914, the fifth of December. I was assigned to the Fourth Koporskii Regiment of the First Army Division. But then I left this regiment because they sent all the young officers to the rear echelon of the regiment (OBOZ), as the regiment had suffered much during the defeat of General Samsonov [at Tannenberg]. Therefore it was sent for regrouping in the Libau region. There we were guarding the seacoast. We did not like this at all, and we raised a scandal. The chief of staff of the regiment had a talk with us and said, "May the devil take you. If you want to fight we will send you away from us." So in

Fedoulenko: a few days we were transferred to the 269th Novorzhevski Regiment, which was an excellent regiment with a fine group of officers. I was very happy to have been assigned to it. I was then a praporshchik.*

Morale Early in the War

Fedoulenko: All of 1915 was one complete struggle. This year was a very heavy year. Already by the middle of 1915 our artillery was becoming short of ammunition, but the morale of the soldiers was still excellent. The regiments were amazing. Our regiment was never sent back for some kind of rest or regrouping or tranquilization. It fought magnificently; the soldiers were amazing. During the July [1915] battles, when there were only 800 men left in the regiment out of 4,000 -- during this terrible time when the Germans had made a breach between the First and the Tenth Armies -- during this moment, our whole division was thrown into the breach. The artillery was almost silent; it did not have enough shells. And that is the light artillery. As for the heavy artillery, we did not see it at all. We fought primarily with rifles and bayonets. We only had four machine guns per regiment. Can you imagine what a paucity of armaments there was?

*praporshchik - second lieutenant.

Fedoulenko: However, despite these defects, the spirit of the army was amazing. The Germans had eighteen machine guns per regiment, as I remember it, four to five times as many as we had. So we tried to choose moments when we could rush at them with our bayonets, so as to inflict some casualties on the Germans. One day we went into the attack eight times. This was a very costly tactic. However, we were able to retard and almost stop the German advance. In three and a half days the German divisions which had broken through were unable to advance far enough to cause a catastrophe to our army. We kept them at a standstill during this period, retreating very gradually, a mile or so a day, but with very heavy casualties.

Raymond: How did the ordinary soldiers react to the shortages?

Fedoulenko: Primarily the young officers grumbled about this. The soldiers were very disciplined, and they did not even imagine that there could be as much equipment as the Germans had. Take for example the airplanes. We had almost none. The Germans had many. I heard simple soldiers make such jokes as, "Your excellency, look. There is our airplane." When I looked up I saw a blackbird, and this soldier said, "Those are our airplanes." That was their attitude. Our soldiers were

Fedoulenko: so little acquainted with aviation that when one of our airplanes did fly over, they assumed that it was German and promptly shot it down by rifle fire on their own initiative. For this they were dressed down properly by the regimental commander.

Raymond: How did the officers explain the shortages?

Fedoulenko: You see, the young ones were well aware that in modern war, power comes primarily from technology. Only then can one have success, and commanding abilities alone are not enough. Simple soldiers did not understand all this; they simply swore because the Germans had this or that, but we had nothing, only rifles.

During some fierce fighting in March of 1915, when several companies of our regiment were thrown into an unsuccessful attack on German barbed wire positions, there were such heavy casualties among the officers and men of the regiment that after some half hour or so of the battle I was already commanding two companies, and I had started as commander of a half company. Can you imagine the casualties, and how fast I had to adjust? The man who took over the regimental command after the commander was wounded, immediately ordered us to stop. We dug in and took not a step forward. We lay in the snow and in the marshes for hours, hugging the earth,

Fedoulenko: because there were twelve machine guns and artillery firing at us. After a snowstorm started, we crawled back. I was not wounded; it was just like a miracle.

During the fighting in July, 1915, our morale was excellent. There were many individual acts of heroism among the soldiers. In 1914, 1915, and 1916, our soldiers were amazing. I was in the northern front throughout the fighting, in the very same regiment. We were sent here and there to plug up gaps in our lines. After the July battles, out of fifty officers only six remained. We were regrouped into one battalion. I commanded one company. I was then made a porutchik.* In a couple of weeks, when we were retreating towards Grodno, we received replacements -- a second battalion -- and I was made battalion commander. You can see how big the shortage of officers was. A young boy who had been on the front for some seven months was made a battalion commander. It's true that this did not last long.

In September we were ordered to move towards Sventzan, a small settlement, and we moved towards Vilna on trains. We soon had to dismount from the trains, because the railroad had been cut by a German advance. So we marched on foot. After five or six days we bumped into German troops

*porutchik - lieutenant.

Fedoulenko: deep behind our lines. That was the famous Sintsansky breakthrough. The staff of the Army Corps did not have any communication with the rear at first, because the Germans had cut all our communications. We remained alone. Our two divisions, the 68th and the 25th, continued their advance on Sventzan, however. As we approached Smargoni we were ordered to take it at dawn to keep open the way for the retreating forces. At that time the communications with the rear headquarters were restored. So during this battle at dawn I took part in the attack, and my company broke through the German front line and entered their rear. We took many prisoners, and much equipment . . . also several officers. On the 11th of September, the Germans tried to break through our lines, and once again I actively fought. For this fighting I received my "Georgievskoe Oruzhie."*

During the fighting I received a very serious concussion. But thanks to my good health I was able to jump up and run forward with my revolver, leading my troops in a bayonet charge which lasted some forty-five minutes and which we won. My concussion manifested itself only after the fight. I noticed that I could not sleep well, and I was more irritable than I had ever been before. I remained on the front until December, but then my lungs started acting up. My left lung was hurt. I was sent to

*"Georgievskoe Oruzhie" - The Order of St. George.

Fedou'enko: the Alekseev hospital in Smolensk. Then I was sent to the machine gun school at Orienbaum, which I soon finished, and then I was assigned to the first machine gun regiment as a teacher. In a month blood started coming out of my lung. I became an invalid. I remained in the hospital there for about five months. When I rejoined my regiment, I was placed into a special group which was being readied to be sent to France. I was then commander of a machine gun company with twelve machine guns. We had by then received supplies from France.

Just then Rumania entered the war against us, and all these units were rerouted to the Rumanian front. My regimental commander would not let me go there and gave me a special assignment in a special battalion for the purpose of strengthening the machine gun battalions for the forthcoming spring 1917 offensive. Then the revolution occurred. None of us young officers had any idea that such a horrible thing was going to happen.

Revolution and Changes in the Soldiers

Raymond: Did you not begin to feel even before this any changes in the attitudes of soldiers towards you?

Fedoulenko: None whatsoever. I must tell you that the young soldiers of course did not know me well, but the cadre soldiers, those who had been at the front, all the Cavaliers of Saint George, valued very much their own front line officers. The

Fedoulenko: corruption of the army occurred after the February Revolution, not before. It was the February Revolution which wrecked the army. It was not the army which made the February Revolution. I will tell you about an incident which happened to me. Around the second or third of February, the assistant regimental commander of our regiment came to see me. He told me that he wanted to discuss with me the general situation, and that I would soon receive an appointment as commander of a machine gun company, along with another captain, and that he would be our commander. These two companies were to be sent to Petersburg where there would be some disturbances. "But do not think this is too serious," he said. He then said, "Knowing your enthusiasm and energy, I want to warn you not to shoot at any crowds. If I command 'eight hundred' then aim high so as to fire over the heads of the crowds. Otherwise it would be merciless," he said. He explained that he was against such severe punishments. I replied that I could not obey such an order. I told him about the chaos which I had witnessed during the first revolution of 1905. I told him that I did not want a repetition of this kind of stuff during the war. He then ordered me to obey him, but I refused under the military law because his order was illegal. "As far as I am concerned," I told him, "every rebel and disorder-maker is an enemy of my country." After this

Fedoulenko: conversation, I was not sent with this company, of course. I was left in the same place.

When the revolution did occur, it was totally unexpected. A soldier ran up to me from Orienbaum and told me that in the town a hunt had taken place. The regiment, and the rifleman's school and workers had all uprisen. A 10,000 person crowd advanced on our camp, which was four miles from town. I came out with my cadre soldiers. They wanted to beat me but my soldiers threw me into the ditch to save me.

Raymond: How did it happen that so many soldiers followed the revolutionaries?

Fedoulenko: There was some organization. But as you can gather from the words of the colonel, it appears that a higher-up command was involved. I consider that in the plot, maybe not actively, but at least passively there participated many higher up officers. Thus the role of Khabalov, the military commander of Petrograd district, was unbelievable. He did not take any measures, no energy.

Raymond: How did it happen that the morale of the soldiers suddenly changed?

Fedoulenko: This is natural, the men were tired. As soon as the slews were opened, even one, everything went. Everything was held on a certain level because there was order and discipline. We tried to convince, to explain to the soldiers what the war was all about. I told them very

Fedoulenko: simply. I said that the Germans were our eternal foes, even during ancient times, when they tried to enslave us. I would tell them that even Napoleon's soldiers were half German. The Germans today underpaid us for our wheat, always taking our things and putting them into their own pockets, and overcharging us for their own goods. I spoke about this in simple terms of course. Many of the soldiers understood and believed me. This whole war, I told them, was begun in order to ruin the Slavs, the Russians, the Serbs. I used to tell them this in simple words. Most of the soldiers believed and understood me. In the years 1914-1915 they were magnificent.

I will give you a small example. An officer is wounded. Or even dead. The soldiers would take every measure in order to save or to carry his body away from the enemy. There was a very close tie between the soldiers and the officers. They had an enormous respect and admiration for the Emperor. The question was never even raised. The Emperor was something way up high. I once told a Guards officer, "You in the capital are used to the Emperor, but we, provincials, do not look at him as on an ordinary person."*

Nor were there any rumors about the Empress. I

*
Memoirs attached

Fedoulenko: was a member of the St. George Society (St. George Arms) in St. Petersburg in the fall of 1916. We would go there once a month to the meetings of the Society. The president was General Adjutant von der Flit and there after three hours of meeting, there was served a very elaborate lunch, with waiters in white gloves, an excellent lunch to which we were treated, the so-called Tsar's Lunch. During one of these Lunches, in October of 1916, two Guards officers were sitting next to us. They began to talk about Rasputin; I was shocked by their talk. And I turned to my colonel with a look of amazement on my face. I had of course heard about Rasputin before, but you must understand that for me this was a completely empty thing. A far more important matter was the war. It was a tiny detail in the life of our government, but it was blown up way beyond proportion. And so the two officers suddenly said, "And she . . ." without naming the Empress, and also, "And he, who's a complete weakling . . ." And they continued in this spirit. It is true that such a conversation did not last long, but von der Flit did not stop it . . . and yet he was an adjutant general. As I was returning to Orienbaum with the colonel I asked him why such a filthy thing was allowed, why these two young men who were shaming their Emperor had not been stopped. They had been talking in Russian right in front of the lackeys who could understand them.

Fedoulenko: The colonel waved his hand, "Ah," he said, "the downfall is already beginning. In front of us there is a horrible time coming," he said.

The lower strata of the population lived a moral life. But our summit unfortunately did not find themselves strong enough. In this is the horrible tragedy, that in these agitations there took part not only the summit of society, but even some princes, and many merchants such as Guchkov, or professors such as Miliukov. Even the idiot Rodzianko, who himself was enormously wealthy, a landlord who hated himself. Just as in the French Revolution, everything went in the same way. Later the Tsar's family was so maligned at each step after the February Revolution. In placards, street signs, everywhere. Nasty filth in caricatures. It was a disgusting sight.

Invalided out, Return to Kazan

I was finally relieved from my service in the training regiment; this was already after the February Revolution. The soldiers did not consider me as one of them. I went to the hospital because blood was still coming out of my mouth, and there I was discharged for a very long time. During the day of the Tsar's resignation I was already lying in bed. My orderly brought me the Order of the Tsar that he had abdicated.

Fedoulenko: I was in fact released from military duty, and I went to Petersburg. There it was already difficult. It was still O.K. to wear epaulettes, but I had the St. George Arms. My orderly, who knew me well, said, "Your excellency, let me wear it. Let me carry your gun. You will never give it up, and they will not touch me, a simple soldier." "You're right," I said, "take it." That is how I passed through the capital on my way to Kazan. I was there only seven or eight days, and received through a regular soldier the pay which was due me. Then he put me on the train and I went to Kazan with my faithful orderly who remained with me till the very end, in December of 1917.

Thus I arrived in Kazan. My wounds in the lung opened up every so often because of the contusion I had received. I still have a terrible pain even now, several times a week. It is only habit that keeps me going. Fortunately I am a large man and my body has always been strong.

When I came to Kazan my relatives met me and were very kind to me, my father, mother, and my brother who was an attorney. The very next day the lawyers' association asked to see me, as a live witness of the events of St. Petersburg. I told them what went on there, and I said, of course, that Russia is lost, that we are all finished; I told them that the revolution, within

Fedoulenko: one hour, destroyed all the army, that the infamous Order Number 1 led the soldiers to insult our officers, that even the old men, the generals, were being harmed. One, for instance, was drowned in the Neva River. I told about the beatings, the arrests, the insults to which the officers were subjected. Then I painted all this sad picture of the downfall of our army and of the disgusting sight of the street disorders, of soldiers walking around disheveled and rude, as though on some other planet, something unbelievable. I told the lawyers how almost everybody encouraged this misbehavior. You know, the very next day my brother came to me and said, "You know, Valentin, they consider that you are mentally deranged because of your wounds, that you are unable to see things sanely."

In Kazan there was no experience yet of the bestiality of the Bolsheviks. There they only chased out a General Sandeskii, and even then they did not kill him. He had been the commander of the troops, a terrible old-fashioned marionette, an exclusive boor, an anti-diluvian. They took him, and sent him to Moscow. You can see how everything was still relatively peaceful in the provinces. Even in Moscow it was still relatively peaceful then. The worst was in St. Petersburg. This was due to the fact that all of the Petersburg replacement battalions were filled by workers from the

Fedoulenko: capital, and among them were many who had been propagandized by the Bolsheviks. This is why it is natural that so many of them committed atrocities.

After I got a little better, the attorneys found me a job in the horse militia, where I worked. I think I was then getting 200 rubles per month; this was pennies, but I could exist. I could not stay in the army anymore because it was necessary for me to get some kind of document from the last machine gun regiment I belonged to; but this I could not get because of my political views, for which I had been in actuality chased out of the regiment. I had refused to give the oath of allegiance to the Kerensky government, and in fact I had never served in the army after the Tsar's resignation, I had only been an invalid.

In the militia I served until the October Revolution. Then after the October Revolution I had to hide for a couple of weeks on a railroad line some place on the Moscow-Kazan railroad. I simply had to stay away from the city of Kazan during the first explosion of this revolution. When they told me that the first explosive situation was over, I returned to Kazan.

Things were still relatively quiet; the Bolsheviks were still in such an infantile state, so to speak, so that there was no great amount of disorder. Once in a while there were incidents, especially when the sailors came.

Fedoulenko: But this was limited and lasted only for a very short time. In general they behaved very decently, no one of us thought that anything would happen.

In January, 1918, I finally got my full discharge from the army and began doing some commercial work in a store where I was at first a salesman and then a manager. This lasted until I ran away from Kazan. With the arrival of the infamous Mouravioff, who was later killed by the Bolsheviks themselves, Kazan became more dangerous. There began to be arrests and killings, but the nationalization of stores had not yet taken place. Finally, just a few weeks before the arrival of the Czechs and of Kappel's White Army, the Bolsheviks divided the city into squares and blocks and even in each quarter began arresting all the officers, the substantial people, including professors. Every white collar was considered a sign of being a bourgeois, and these were all placed in basements and shot. Thanks to the fact that Kazan fell quite unexpectedly to the Czechs and White Army very many people were saved. This happened, I think, at the end of August. The town fell to the Czechs and to Kappel's forces who came from Samara, where volunteers had gathered together. I joined General Kappel's forces in Kazan.

Most of them consisted of young people, of students, of junkers, including even theological seminarists. From among the old front-liners, all the officers that could

Fedoulenko: joined. Just before they took Kazan, I had to, once again, run away because the Bolsheviks were going to arrest me. We all ran north along the Volga, which was a mistake because we never thought that the Whites would occupy the city so easily. Finally we made our way back to Kazan after getting through the front line of the Reds rather far to the east.

I was then already married. My wife was from Kazan and had stayed there. Having returned, we already witnessed the fighting of the Kappel forces against the advancing Reds. At first the resistance was poorly organized. Due to the lack of sufficient replacements the White Army had to retreat for the city. The Czechs were also then retreating. They did not want to defend it, but only to be able to go through. About 60,000 people went out of Kazan, roughly speaking, during one evening and one night. From Kazan I went to Ufa.

In Ufa I already became a member of the staff of the commander-in-chief, General Boldyrev. At that time there was a Directory which ruled there.

Raymond: Before the Czechs occupied Kazan and there was an overthrow of the Bolsheviks, how did they govern the city and the surrounding small towns?


Fedoulenko: In Kazan before August, 1918, there were no large arrests, only small ones. There were arrests of course, but "razprav," and shootings, there were none. Beginning

Fedoulenko: in August there took place a great deal of taking the law into one's hands in the surrounding towns in a terrible way. All of the intelligentsia and the merchant class and the officers were all placed on barges on the Volga, and then these barges were sunk by bombs. In this manner the provincial towns were all beheaded of their intelligentsia, and all of the administrative apparatus of these towns was destroyed.

White Army Staff, 1918

Raymond: In Ufa you were taken into the army staff?

Fedoulenko: Yes, into the staff of the commander-in-chief, General Boldyrev, under the newly formed government in Ufa, the Directory. General Boldyrev was one of the members of this government. This government was left-wing, really a socialist government, but it did not disturb any of us because they were against the Bolsheviks and for us anyone who fought them was welcomed, we gladly joined them and gave them all of our strength. Maybe in our souls we did not sympathize with them, but this played no role in our struggle. We went into the army; many people sacrificed their lives for the common cause. Take General Kappel, he did care who was in the government, he was in the front, commanding the army and gave little heed to whatever the government called itself in Samara or in Ufa. All he cared about was fighting Communism. That



Fedoulenko: is how it was. When we arrived in Omsk, where the government had moved, the Siberians recognized it, quite reluctantly, it is true, and with a great deal of mistrust. There were strong tendencies towards the "right" there. Especially the Siberian Cossacks. Finally this Directory was overthrown and Admiral Kolchak was asked to take over the supreme power. The Admiral refused this post for a long time, did not want to take such an enormous responsibility. He probably felt that he was perhaps not capable of directing such a responsible position. And in fact he was not made for such a role. He was a brilliant seaman, a great explorer of our Baltic and Black seas, a man of rare talents. I knew him personally, as chief of his bodyguards, I saw him constantly. He was very irascible, not very patient, and did not like when his subordinates did not understand him. His inability to control his temper was frequently not very nice. He never abused his subordinates, but he often spoke in a very angry fashion. The fleet knew him very well for this characteristic, but he was loved very much nevertheless. He was popular also among the population. Although not tall, he was, like Suvorov, a gifted man. One felt an inner spiritual strength in him. He was very much admired by the people of Omsk. His entourage, of course, was very weak in the sense of giving him help in governing Siberia. This can very easily be explained.

Fedoulenko: We did not have enough of that layer of society which would have been able to handle governmental work. If one takes our intelligentsia, then one can see that we had only those who were experienced in opposing the government, only those who knew how to criticize. This opposition seldom if ever could come up with any constructive criticism; it could only pick at faults of the government. Under the Kolchak government, we did not have enough even of this type of people, we had almost no governmental type of people in Siberia at all. Most of those surrounding him were unable to grasp what was going on in Russia, and were incapable of giving themselves a clear account of these events. They very frivolously felt that "We would win," but there was for this very little foundation. There was little initiative, little preparation, little effort to accomplish this. In the outskirts it was even worse. If a good man happened to be there, it was fine. If the man was no good, then he would commit all kinds of outrages, and the population would rise up against him. Take Ataman Annenkov, for example; he was a brilliant officer, but he did not really recognize the Omsk government. He obeyed it only in so far as he needed it to obtain money or supplies. His troops supposedly liked him very much, but the population did not because he allowed all sorts of highhanded deeds to take place. Also Ataman Semenov

Fedoulenko: refused to subordinate himself to the Admiral. It took a long time and the efforts of Ataman Dutov, who commanded the Orenburg army, who had to go specially as an envoy from the Admiral to settle this conflict. And even then Semenov, who was under the thumb of the Japanese, recognized the Omsk government, but that only formally. Semenov's entourage was very mixed. He had some decent people around him, but also there were such negative characters that it is frightening to talk about them. They committed such atrocities that the Transbaikalian population began to hate his administration and thereby absolutely helped the Bolsheviks. I was told about these deeds by absolutely loyal white Cossacks from Transbaikalia, here and in Shanghai--Ponamarenko, for instance, told me that although he liked Semenov, many of his helpers committed horrible deeds.

Primarily Kolchak was supported by the merchant class and the intelligentsia, many of whom were sympathetic and tried to help. The peasantry, and even the Cossacks were completely passive. Siberia had not yet experienced the rule of the Bolsheviks first-hand. This despite the fact that the Siberian peasantry was enormously rich. I was amazed at their wealth when I passed through their

Fedoulenko: villages. I had seen the German Boers in Eastern Prussia, but even they were not as well to do as the Siberian peasants. And yet despite all this they were completely passive, as though our fight did not concern them. To the mobilizations they gave insignificant amounts of people. There were many mobilizations.

General Lebedev, the Chief of Staff of Kolchak, had projected the mobilization of 700,000. This army was formed but most of them ran away. There were few officers in general in Siberia, especially elder generals, from the general staff.

My role was very small. I was in the staff of the Supreme Commander. I was then half-incapacitated. In April of 1919 I was sent to Perm in order to heal my lung bleeding so that I would not have to breathe the terrible summer dust of Omsk. There I regained my health, I lived in very excellent conditions for two months. On returning from Perm, I went with the Kamskaia flotilla by ship to Tobolsk and then to Omsk. Thus, because of my health, I was transferred to naval duty on the river flotilla which was stationed near Perm and remained there until Perm fell as a result of the defeat of our troops. This was July of 1919. Then I remained for a whole month on leave in Tomsk where the parents of my wife were. When I finally returned to the naval ministry in Omsk the atmosphere was already

Fedoulenko: very tense because of the defeats our troops had suffered in the Urals in September. These were almost catastrophic. From the Kamskaia flotilla, a battalion and then a full regiment was organized, and all the officers went to the front.

Ivanoff-Rinoff, a cossack general, promised the Admiral that he would mobilize all the Cossacks and stop the retreats. This never happened, however. He was a loudmouth and finally went over to the Bolsheviks after a period of emigration. During peacetime he became a policeman. He duped Kolchak by these promises. Thirty thousand Cossacks was an enormous mass of horsemen with which the whole front could have been breeched, and the Bolsheviks thrown back behind the Urals. What actually happened was that in the very first battle these Cossacks hit the Reds very hard, but they refused to continue fighting. They then became passive and scattered back to their various stanitsas. A few regiments remained, and even these were very small, sometimes consisting of 200-300 men.

The Admiral committed a very serious error in not following the advice of General Diterihs, who had urged him then to immediately retreat to Krasnoiarsk and Irkutsk. General Diterihs was a very clever man. He foresaw much. He argued that Siberia did not yet know the

Fedoulenko: real nature of the Bolsheviks and that if Western Siberia, where the most prosperous peasantry lived, would be occupied by the Reds, and the White armies were retreated to Irkutsk and there fortified themselves and waited, the Siberian population would soon rebel against the Bolsheviks and the White armies would then come back and get the population's support.

Admiral Kolchak categorically rejected this plan. "If we lose Omsk, we lose all," he often said. Therefore when the retreat took place, it was hurried, unprepared, in chaos, with terrible losses.

I retreated together with the naval detachments, when the Admiral had already left Omsk by train on his way to Novonikolaevsk. We were just behind the main army. There was little proper command of the army by then. General Kappel commanded the army, after a while, but during the first days of the retreat there were many separate units. This was the time when Pepelaev's army went over to the Bolsheviks lock, stock, and barrel. This was near Tomsk. It was supposed to be reforming and to take over the covering of the retreat. Instead of that, it rose up against us and went to the Reds. He himself ran away. His general behavior was very silly. Personally he was brave, a Cavalier of St. George, but he could not function well in the civil war. He suddenly became a general during the civil war, for which he was not at all prepared. He imagined he was a big man; his head was turned by this. You know how that can be. Such rubbish took place among us

Fedoulenko: more than once.

We had as leaders some who before had held all kinds of ranks, one who had before been a veterinarian, and then suddenly he was a lieutenant general. The devil knows what was going on!

On course, the whole trouble was that the Admiral did not have proper councilors. He did not apparently realize this at all. Gayda was a terrible enemy of the Admiral; he even started an uprising against him in Vladivostok later. There were many such instances. General Khandzhin was an excellent officer in the German war, a general staff officer, a superb artilleryman, but during the civil war he could not command as he did in the German war. The war was completely different. This was not taken into account by our high command. Any large-scale war has some kind of a front, some kind of administration, a definite rear, a system of supply, of replacements; everything is arranged. All that the command has to do is to act against the enemy. In the civil war nothing was certain. There was frequently no front at all. Not only was there agitation among our soldiers, some detachments would go over to the enemy's side. For instance, why did the front collapse in the spring of 1919? Because the Ukrainian regiments which were formed at the insistence of the French General Janen, in Novonikolaevsk, they all at the first opportunity, as soon as they arrived to the front, went over

Fedoulenko: to the side of the Bolsheviks, thus opening the front-line.

There occurred an enormous gap into which the Bolsheviks threw themselves. From this very moment our bad luck began, our sorrow. What a stupid idea it was to allow the formation of these "national minority" detachments of Estonians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians! These were all people with completely out-of-joint, dislocated brains, a majority of which were bribed by somebody, it's hard to know whom, I don't know who, but apparently by somebody who was acting in order to break up Russia. In general, we were not being helped. Take, for instance, Denikin or Udenitch. The English workers, when ammunition was being sent to these generals, would take some essential part of the weapon out, so that when these arms arrived to us they did not work, or they would send one kind of weapon, and a completely different caliber shell. We, the White forces, we did not yet understand how it was necessary to struggle with the Bolsheviks, what was necessary to do. We were using the methods of the First World War, and this was completely wrong, because the conditions were completely different. Take a division; it is standing at its positions, and its staff is in the rear. Suddenly a guard comes running, and shouts, "Your excellency, the Bolsheviks are in the rear!" This is because there was no continuous front. The local populations had uprisen, or maybe some detachments had broken through. There were such battles, that when the staff of a division had to fight in the front lines, and at the

Fedoulenko: front they did not even know about that.

Retreat to the East

The most important thing was that we did not get any support from the masses of the peasantry. I, for instance, as I was retreating from Siberia, would talk to them in their villages. They fed us well; these were very rich villages. Especially as this was towards the Christmas holidays. During this "Ice March" the peasants would tell me, "Well, we will feed and give you drink, but please get out right away. As fast as possible." One old man told me, "Why are you coming here, what devil sent you here? Get the hell out of here; you are only bothering us, doing us nastinesses." I replied to him, "You old devil, you don't understand what awaits you when the Bolsheviks come; we are fighting for you," I told him, "so that you may have freedom." "Tell this to someone else," he said, "I know better than you what we need." "You will remember me, old man," I told him, "and very soon at that." Well, this is the spirit in which our population greeted us. Take into account, this was a general phenomenon. Even here, in America, does the mass of the people understand? There was such a complete lack of understanding of the danger of Bolshevism, that for instance, when I had occasion to talk to rich people in

Fedoulenko: Vladivostok, owners of mines, I would tell them to sell their possessions immediately, for whatever price--it will all be taken away, anyway, I would tell them. And they would laugh at me. "You are trying to bankrupt us," they would say. "You are telling us such nonsense!" They would not believe me. They would think that the Bolsheviks would not touch them. I would say, "Why don't you believe me, why did we get all plundered, and you will escape? You are not an elect society." But they did not believe me. They remained, and they found out.

Our "Ice March," that was really the Golgotha of the White army. There died, not only from combat but also from typhus, and other diseases, thousands of men. I think that there were as many as 150,000 men in this retreat. The retreat began from Omsk, primarily, when the end was near. This was November 13th-14th, 1919. They were retreating along the line of the railroad, or along roads which ran parallel to it. First by foot, then they found peasant carriages and horses. These were purchased, it is true, with Siberian rubles, which were not worth much. Men would get into these sleighs and start going. Then winter came. The army went without thinking that everything would end so badly. We hoped that General Pepelaev's army would rescue us. But as you know, it collapsed completely instead. When we first came up to the taiga, there was already no hope. In fact, the attitude became that of "save [himself] who can." General Kappel took over the command, but he could not unite the various segments of

Fedoulenko: the retreating armies. There were very poor lines of communication. There was no possibility to unite everything into one pair of hands. With the army there were masses of dependents, wives, children; there were hundreds of children who died, frozen or from disease. The worse phase began after Novonikolaevsk and lasted till the very end.

We had to by-pass Irkutsk but did not succeed, because just as we came up to the city there was an internal Bolshevik uprising which took the city. Our naval detachment tried to go through sooner, but instead it got lost. I left it because the commander of the regiment chose the northern route around Irkutsk. I did not agree. I was not subordinated to him. I was completely independent of him, and was only traveling with him because it was convenient for me to travel with some detachment. I took the men from my staff and told them that I would not go the northern route because that was the region of partisans, of convicts. "You will all get lost there," I said. And so it happened. The regiment had to surrender to the Reds in the region of Balagansk.

I took some Czech train and went east. The Czechs guarded the railroad for their own needs. They did not let us Whites use the railroad facilities. If one got on a train, it was mainly by accident. Or else one paid some kinds of bribes, or else one found some sincere man. For

Fedoulenko: three days I stayed near Irkutsk, on the station Zima.

There was a goods car which was connected with a special Czech train. Quite accidentally, I got on it. In the Novonikolaevsk region I had allowed an elderly man to travel with my group. Well, at the station Zima, he went to search for some train to get on. He was dressed as a peasant. Suddenly he comes running to me. "You know," he said, "my former boss has gotten into a goods car, the Czechs have allowed him. He had bribed them. He said, "There are many people there, but we can stand. He will let us go too."

My wife was already in Vladivostok. The naval ministry had sent her back a long time before. From there we went to Irkutsk. We went through the town in a sealed car, the Czechs would not let the Bolsheviks touch their trains. On the other hand, they would not defend us. In fact they often even gave us away to the Reds. But their own trains they did not let the Reds touch. In Irkutsk I got out of the train because it did not go any further. We had to manage. A part of my command, and others, all scattered. They said, "You know, we can no longer go with you. " They lost their character.

We were all dressed as civilians. I was wearing an old peasant coat and a tartar hat. We had all changed clothing. We had ahead of time prepared passports showing that we were not officers. In this manner everybody left

Fedoulenko: me. I was trying somehow to get out of there because I figured that I would be finished if I did not get away. On the third day, a young man came up to me. This was the end of January, 1920. He said, "I noticed you, you are an officer. Would you like to get away from here?" He was dressed in a new military uniform that looked as though it was Czech, and he spoke Russian with a broken accent.

"I am a junker," he said. "I have been from the simple Czech soldiers to the general, trying to get a train ride east. Everywhere they had refused me. We have concluded an agreement with the Bolsheviks. The Czechs would say, 'Under no circumstances to take any Whites into our trains.'" Only on the third day, towards night, a Czech baker allowed me to get into his car, he let me go up with this young man. By the way, the main bulk of the White army was somewhat behind us, back towards the west, led by General Kappel. So I got on this train, and everything went well. In the morning, other Czech soldiers started coming into the bakery. We had been traveling all night and were only about thirty-five miles away from the place where Ataman Semenov's soldiers were stationed.

These Czech soldiers, seeing us, said to the baker, "What are you doing carrying these vermin? Throw them out immediately." I pleaded for them to let us stay until nighttime so that at least we might have a chance to hide in the dark. They agreed. When night came the young

Fedoulenko: junker, dressed to look like a Czech soldier, went out and found a railroad car which was occupied by some Serbs and Poles. They agreed to let us in with them. In a few hours we were in the territory of Semenov's troops, and the Japanese troops.

As we were approaching Chitá the Czechs warned us that Semenov and they did not get along well at all, and so Semenov's men might be hostile to those who had come with them. For this reason we did not leave the train until we reached the border of Manchuria. Then we arrived at Harbin. The main feeling I had when I crossed the Chinese border was that of happiness at being saved from certain death at the hands of the Bolsheviks. We expected, of course, that we would soon be struggling against the Bolsheviks. We were young then, we all had this hope, and we never thought that the Russian people would be in such a horrible situation that it would not be able to organize a real insurrection against the Reds which would overthrow them. No one could imagine that the Russian people would not succeed in overthrowing them. No one imagined the power of the Bolshevik organization, one that does not exist anywhere [else] in the world.

The Chinese let us cross the border without even searching us. In Harbin I lived for a while in a railroad car. This was in February of 1920. I had a few rubles left, and ate only once a day. My wife was then in Vladivostok, she was almost arrested by the Bolsheviks. The Japanese

Fedoulenko: took a whole group of them, naval officers, wives of officers, and others, and took them on a Japanese ship which was especially sent after them, and took them away to Shanghai, where she lived for eight or nine months without me. This took place while I was still retreating in Siberia. Vladivostok was then ruled by the DVR (Far Eastern Republic). Finally after this Republic, which was Communist in disguise, was overthrown--only then did we come together again. She came from Shanghai, and I from Harbin. I did not stay in Harbin very long because when the DVR was created by the Bolsheviks as a buffer to satisfy Japanese demands that there be no naked Red power in the Far East, the people wanted to overthrow it. The first insurrection failed. But soon when all the armed White forces left Transbaikalia, including the troops of Semenov, they all went to the Maritime provinces. These were the troops that occupied the station Pogranichnia. And the troops of General Kappel occupied the towns of Nikolsk-usuriisk and Vladivostok. All these forces had crossed Manchuria and had re-entered Russian territory in the Maritime provinces. There they settled in individual regiments, everything was preserved as it was supposed to be. They maintained their own command and their own military organization. I was with the fleet in Vladivostok. There was nothing for me to do. There were no jobs available. I was a loader of ships--we had a whole artel of officers who worked as stevedores on the

Fedoulenko: Vladivostok docks. Then I fried coffee on the streets and sold it. I sold mustard and vinegar. Life was pretty terrible. It lasted all of 1920. In 1921 I was recalled again to Harbin.

I stayed there until the overthrow of the DVR in Vladivostok, when the government of Merkulov was started. This was about May of 1921. Admiral Stark, who was appointed commander of the Siberian flotilla, called me to a responsible post with his staff. I served there until the very end of the White rule. This enabled me to get to know the government of the Merkulovs very well.

When the Whites decided to first overthrow the DVR, they failed. The second insurrection was helped very much by Nikolas Merkulov, who was a former captain of the commercial river flotilla on the Amur River. He was an important businessman, a "kupets," and a very rich man. He took a big part in this overthrow, and was included in the government--and it was called the Merkulov government after him. His elder brother, Spiridon Merkulov, was the chairman of this government. He was a very well-educated man, a graduate of the St. Petersburg University, and a member of the Government Duma. His background qualified him to take on this post. His brother Nikolas was his right-hand man. He was the energy behind his brother's brains. These two men helped kick the DVR to hell. The Japanese really helped to overthrow it. All this was in May of 1921. I was in Harbin then and did not take any direct part in the

Fedoulenko: overthrow, but I knew all about it. Between this government and Ataman Semenov there was bad blood, because although the Japanese had wanted to put Semenov in charge, the people and the army, everybody in fact, did not want to accept him.

In about one year's time, people became discontented with Merkulov because the army was not being paid sufficiently and there were shortages of foodstuffs. The masses were unhappy. And the Merkulovs could do nothing about it because the Japanese would not help properly and insisted on being paid in cash for all that they supplied to the government.

VLADIVOSTOK, 1921-1922

Raymond: What did you expect from the future? In general, what were your hopes and what was the atmosphere of life in Vladivostok in 1921 and 1922?

Fedoulenko: There was almost no hope whatsoever. Admiral Stark looked very skeptically toward the future. The struggle against the Communists was a holy task for us. Therefore the slightest chance under the slightest circumstances which we would find, we would go for it. But hope for any great possibility, we did not hope for it. And nobody was really sure of any great successes. We were hoping that there would be an uprising inside of Russia, and then we could help them, having a certain amount of cadres and a certain amount of army which could link itself with the uprising armies of the Soviet Union. This was really the reason for the formation of all these White governments in eastern Siberia. We were absolutely sure that there would be an uprising in Siberia. They did take place, but they were much smaller than we had expected.

Because the army was dissatisfied with the Merkulov government, this army demanded a changed of the head of the state. And General Diterihs was invited to take over, and he headed up the government after Merkulov. This was in

Fedoulenko: the beginning of 1922, in March or April. Merkulov remained in the government but the head of the government became General Diterihs and the army was already under his command. Our army at that time was quite small. I am afraid to say exactly how large, but it had two army corps and then individual separate detachments stationed near the railroad station Grodekoff. The army was not much more than 20,000. Of course, there were Japanese there. Their presence supported or rather, was a barrier against the Bolsheviks coming in. The area I am talking about, which we controlled, was the region of the railroad and of Vladivostok only. Then when we started advancing toward Khabarovsk we widened this White platform but the Japanese did not follow us and did not help us. This took place in the winter of 1921. At first we took Khabarovsk by the White armies. We had a certain amount of success but then the Reds brought in an awful lot of troops and with an awful lot of casualties they succeeded in pushing us away. This was the so-called Khabarovsk March. And this march ended factually by our defeat. I was sick and did not participate in this march myself.

The White Army in Waiting

Fedoulenko: When General Diterihs became the actual head of the government and the army, there were efforts to create a more powerful organization, a more powerful army: a call to arms and all kinds of things, but nothing happened. In this region the peasants did not sympathize with the Whites. They did not know the Bolsheviks and they therefore remained passive to our cause. Later, when the Bolsheviks came, they probably regretted this, but by that time it was too late. It was the same picture as we had witnessed in Siberia two years previously. There were many merchants in Vladivostok. When I told them what the merchants in Russia had suffered, they would not believe me.

Then there were also all kinds of Red partisan detachments who were grabbing the railroad from the Japanese and harassing them, too. They took Nikolsk-Usuriisk and advanced toward Vladivostok. It is true that our army fought bravely and there were many casualties, but we could not hold them. Many of our young troops, cadets and junkers, also took part in this. When the ships transported everything that was possible from Vladivostok, all the families of the sailors and the cadets were loaded on last. It was very difficult to reach Harbin by land and the evacuation had not been properly prepared, so much of the task of evacuation fell upon the fleet. The harbor of Gosiet was most convenient because it was just a few yards from Korea and when we debarked our people from

Fedoulenko: the ships to Gosiet they could just walk across the territory to Korea; and then all of them went to China and ended up in Harbin and Mukden.

Raymond: Did Semenov try to get some influence and some power in the Maritime Provinces at that time?

Fedoulenko: The White army, especially Kappel's troops, did not want anything to do with Semenov and did not allow him to have any role there. The majority of the White soldiers who fought in Vladivostok had been with Kappel's army and had fought the Reds through Siberia. The formation of Kappel's army had begun in Samara when the Czechs occupied that town in 1918. Taking advantage of this, the anti-Bolsheviks organized a committee of the constituent assembly there that was known in abbreviation as KOMUCH. And there Kappel took part in forming the first White army groups which were then subordinated to that committee. This committee consisted of Menshiviks and SRs, but, of course, General Kappel was just an officer who was not a socialist and who was apolitical except that he wanted to fight Bolsheviks. Kappel's troops came towards Kazan, took it, and that is where I joined him. Kappel died before his army reached Irkutsk. After this his army came up to up to Chitá. It was still known as Kappel's army and was considered a separate detachment. Then Semenov accepted them and agreed to maintain their needs and the army received all rights there even though inside they were not particularly happy about Semenov. But

Fedoulenko: this army was so strong for Transbaikalia that Semenov was obliged to take their needs into consideration. Many of them went to Harbin, some of them stayed there; and many troops stayed in Transbaikalia in the army. When the Japanese retreated from Transbaikalia and it fell to the Reds, they gradually made their way to Manchuria, where they were disarmed partially, and went through Manchuria towards Vladivostok--not to Vladivostok, but to the station Grodekovo on the border between Manchuria and the Russian Maritime provinces, where they were reformed into organized military units. Then they went to Nikolsk-Usuriisk and when the overthrow of the Far Eastern Republic took place and the Merkulov government was organized they became part of its army. For example, the third corps of General Molchanov went over to Vladivostok.

Evacuation Flotilla Led by Admiral Stark

Raymond: Let us now go back to the time when Admiral Stark decided to evacuate all of you.

Fedoulenko: Admiral Stark considered that our situation was very unstable and that it was necessary to prepare to leave, and a speedy evacuation should be prepared. He began to organize and fix our small ships. There was no Russian Far Eastern fleet. There were a few old destroyers from the Japanese War, but they could not even be repaired. They were so old that they were hardly seaworthy. It was very dangerous to

Fedoulenko: sail on those ships, but the small mail and messenger ships we could fix, and we did not have to abandon them. In fact, there was not a single large vessel available in the Russian Far Eastern fleet due to our agreement after the war with the Japanese.

The job of evacuating an enormous amount of civilians and army personnel to Posiet on the frontier between Russia and Korea was enormous. This took place in October, 1922, and we sent daily contingents of people aboard the ships available. We knew that the end was near because the Reds were already conducting talks with the Japanese and putting pressure on the Japanese in every way possible for them to evacuate Vladivostok. Inexperience actually helped the Reds in this because they were afraid that the Japanese would take over the Russian Far East. And by themselves, of course, the Japanese could not stay there. They did not. Nor could we stay there without the Japanese, because we just did not have enough forces. When the question was decided to evacuate everybody and when all the flotilla was ready to go to Gensan, Korea, the first port where we could stop in a foreign country, which was not far away from the border, the flotilla gradually began to go away from Vladivostok loaded with supplies and fuel. The admiral had money because of all the collections and taxations which took place in the Maritime Provinces were at his disposal, as well as collections from customs

Fedoulenko: duties.

This enabled us to load up with fuel and food and reach Gensan. After we reached there the question of where to go from there became the order of the day. Admiral Stark said we should go to Pusan and from there to Shanghai. Admiral Stark could not decide where the final destination should be before we left Vladivostok because we knew that nobody wanted to accept us. None of the foreign countries wanted us to come in. We had even at one time thought of going to Kamchatka so as to organize the last point of resistance on Russian soil, but we finally decided not to do so because it would have been insuperably difficult. There were terrible cold spells, there were no positions; we had many children and women with us. The atmosphere was such that we were getting ourselves loaded on the ships and God knew where we would end up. We had no plans, only that we could leave and go anyplace so as to escape the Bolsheviks. Outside of that we had no plans. Whatever would be in the future, anything would be better than to be caught by them. This is what our thoughts were at that time. In Gensan Admiral Stark ordered me to go to Shanghai through Japan to arrange for permission for the Russian ships to enter the harbor in Shanghai. This was a difficult mission because the port of Shanghai was controlled by the English. I finally arrived in Shanghai and there through our former consul,

Fedoulenko: General-Consul Grosse, negotiated for this. Grosse did not help me at all, practically but sent me over to his assistant who told me that he could do nothing at all for me. All the Russian affairs in Shanghai at that time were still in the hands of our consul. Grosse gave me no help. He just refused me any help. In this respect, Grosse was a very unpleasant person; therefore I was forced to address myself directly to the English port authorities. There they gave me amazingly rapid help. They gave me immediate permission for our fleet to enter and to stay in the port for two or three weeks at least, but concerning the question of supplies, that we had to take care of ourselves. "Furthermore," they told us, "you should let the Admiral know that we would like to have him tell us by radio of his exact whereabouts at all times so that we can be prepared for receiving him." They told me that they would let me know when they first received any news from Admiral Stark and then I could go to the harbor and make preparations for receiving him. Then they let me know when the time came and I did go to Wusung harbor and reached Admiral Stark's ships with an English officer. The first ship that arrived was Batareia and the Englishman gave me even a harbor boat with which I was able to greet the Admiral. The first ship that came in was the Batareia and the second was the Baikal with Admiral

Fedoulenko: Stark on board. There were some eight or nine ships involved, even large power cruisers left Vladivostok. This, by the way, was an amazing feat, for Colonel Ushakov who was not even a sailor commanded one of the ships--a marvelous sea voyage from Vladivostok to Shanghai. After all, this was November and the weather was poor. There was quite a lot of bad sea and one of the ships capsized, a ship called Lieutenant Didinoff. The last news by the radio was that it had a collision. They had some twenty or more cadets on board and they all died at sea. It was the only ship that was lost. In Shanghai, from the English and other foreigners, we were first received with curiosity and then even with sympathy, but our consul Grosse categorically refused to give us any help and Madame Grosse, who was visiting one of our ships, started saying, "Why did you come? Go back to your country, the new government will give you work. Here it is very difficult to do any work at all." Our sailors almost threw her overboard for this. We were barely able to save her. Of course after this, this individual never showed up aboard our ships again. Sailors would arrive to the consulate in crowds, demanding that some measures be taken, but nothing took place. Shanghai police guarded the consulate and we were helpless. Then the Admiral turned to the Chinese authorities and delivered an ultimatum of a fashion. He said, "If you do not give us the right to get some coal here and food, enough to get us to the Philippine

Fedoulenko: Islands (where the American government had at that time allowed us to enter Manila harbor) then," said the Admiral, "we will take matters into our own hands here."

President Harding refused to allow us to stay in Manila, but Admiral Stark said that we would all go ashore and just squat there. The International Municipal authorities were afraid of an influx of so many refugees, and the Chinese authorities assigned 20,000 Shanghai dollars to buy us food and coal. However when the coal arrived aboard the ships it was a simple coal dust, a typical Chinese attempt to make profit. We refused to accept this coal, under pressure from the Admiral once again and especially the Municipal authorities, a decent coal was brought aboard ship and a certain amount of food. By this time the Admiral had almost no money; what little money he had he would certainly keep in reserve until he got to Manila. I did not go with Stark to Manila but stayed in Shanghai.

When the flotilla sailed to Manila, two little ships, Ajax and Prince, both went through the Formosa Straights to shorten the way. Ajax floundered and sank to the bottom. Only five men were saved from this. The rest were lost. The five survivors were saved by the other ship under very difficult sea conditions. The rest of the flotilla arrived to Manila safely and there Admiral Stark started trying to make arrangements for the future of his

Fedoulenko: charges. The president of the United States at that time allowed him to take them to America--up to 500 people. And the United States even gave a ship at no charge which carried these men to San Francisco.

In Manila Admiral Stark sold his ships and with the proceeds he divided up the money and gave it to all the sailors in spite of the protests of the Bolsheviks. I also received my share. Some odd dozens of sailors went to Australia, some stayed in Shanghai. The reason why most of us did not want to go to America, for instance why I refused to go to America at that time despite the Admiral's request and offer that I do so was a very simple reason: we did not want to go very far from Russia. We were, after all, expecting an overthrow of the Communist government any time. I received a letter soon after from San Francisco in which one of my friends said, "We are very jealous of you because you are still close to Russia and will be there first when the overthrow comes." This was the main reason why we stayed in China; and we tried to take an active participation in the struggle against the Bolsheviks through issuing books, publishing materials, holding meetings, gathering money and other things. Admiral Stark went to France because his children escaped from the U.S.S.R. to Finland, and after to Paris.

His former shipmates in St. Petersburg had helped smuggle these children to Finland after their mother died.

Fedoulenko: From Finland they were shipped to Paris, where Admiral Stark met them. There, for many years, he worked as a chauffeur and took the lowest positions, having not taken a single penny from the sale of the ships for himself. In his old age, when France was conquered by the Germans, Admiral Stark became head of the Russian Naval Officers Organization in France. He lived in very difficult material conditions because many emigrés in France lived terribly. Sailors from all over the world sent him presents, and finally he died of old age.

SHANGHAI--RUSSIAN EMIGRE LIFE, 1922-1930's

Refugees Assimilated

Fedoulenko: I stayed in Shanghai from the end of 1922 on. When we all arrived in Shanghai, the cadet schools which had left Vladivostok with the fleet remained in Shanghai and the French municipal authorities took them under their wings. In Shanghai there were already at that time charitable organizations which helped us, the Russian refugees. There were at that time already several thousand Russians in Shanghai. And as we landed, the Russians were more or less able to arrange for them to live. There were among us the Siberian and Khabarovsk Cadet Corps, who were protected by the French Consulate, about 200 men at least. They received special houses on the outskirts of town and the French fed them. The mass of the public went to various charitable institutions, one of the most important of which was organized by Madame Sunenberg, who was married to a Russian Finn and had lived in Shanghai for a long time. Her husband was an old settler of Shanghai, a former guards officer of the Semionovski Regiment, a staunch Russian patriot who later became the Finnish consul in Shanghai. She was one of the main organizers of the charitable organizations which helped us. There

Fedoulenko: were arranged for the new arrivals courses in the English language; General Walter was one of the instructors; and then the municipal authorities and the French Concession authorities were asked to give us some kind of jobs. The first steps taken were to admit us into the English and French police force. And then gradually we also began to be hired in such private organizations as the Shanghai Power Company and the various public transportation systems. A whole mass of our people were hired in such a manner and began to work. They began to earn an honest piece of bread. Then the rich Chinese began to hire many Russians to be their bodyguards, where they received very good pay and where they were considered very valuable because of their bravery and devotion. Many of our refugees were engineers and technicians and commercial men. By the end of 1923 there were about 5000 Russians in Shanghai. And by this time they were already thoroughly decently established.

Drunkenness and Crime

Our one big sorrow was that there were many people who had been used to living in a certain rather prosperous way of life and who had found themselves suddenly in terrible conditions and had begun to drink very heavily. During the first ten years we had a terrible problem of drunkenness among our Russian colony in Shanghai. This was our great sorrow. This period, until they all died

Fedoulenko: of drunkenness, we had a horrible time with them. We arranged special houses for them. Professor Bary tried to cure them and some of them were saved. But the main mass--about 70 per cent--were completely lost. They would die very frequently right on the streets, dropping themselves completely to the level of the Chinese and worse. There were, of course, many married men with their families in Shanghai and our colony was fairly normally balanced with the majority of our people being family people. The bachelors were the ones who had the greatest incidence of drunkenness; those with families managed to pull through much better because their families kept them able to see reality more. Many of these made wonderful successes, many of them became well-to-do business men, because credit there was rather easy to obtain from the Chinese firms. But the condition was that everything must be paid within one year; if you didn't pay within one year then you never got any more credit. If you did pay back within one year then you had complete respect and you had all the money you ever needed. Many of our refugees started selling by peddling from door to door. Many of us opened boarding houses and restaurants, schools--for instance the Commercial School was opened even before we came in 1922. There all the Russian youth were studying for almost no tuition costs. Finally, several Realschule and gymnasiums were opened. Out of the 5000 or so people in the Russian colony, there were very few high aristocracy members. The majority was the

Fedoulenko: most simple people, the vast majority, former workers, cossacks, peasants, the very composition of the army was based upon simple soldiers; among the officers on former small middle-class merchants and intelligentsia. The statistics of the police of the French and International Settlements about us Russians were that except for the drunken people our colony was extremely honest and hard-working. It was only later that there had come professional crooks from Harbin. Also, after the gypsies arrived there was an increase in crime. The rumors about Russian prostitutes were completely false, certainly not nearly as true as people think. The truth of the matter was that there were widows or there were many daughters who had old fathers that they had to support and that there was nothing to support oneself with. Well, in these instances these young widows and daughters went to dance in the various bars in the early twenties. They went to dance for pay, taxi dancing. And certain of them danced until, say, 2 o'clock at night and a few of them were unable to withstand the temptation and became prostitutes. And masses of Russian women, the so-called taxi dancers, married foreigners and made them wonderful wives. Many Englishmen and Americans married Russians and were very happy with them.

The Russian Community Organizes

Fedoulenko: In my opinion, from the 1920's the Russian colony in Shanghai very rapidly established itself. Higher technical courses were organized at the end of the 1920's; higher commercial and legal courses were also organized. Under French concession the French university was also organized. The French especially gave us a great deal of help in education. They built a school called College Rémi where many, many Russians studied. And there were many Russian instructors also. For this we are indebted to Monsieur Groboi, who was in charge of the educational department on the French Concession in Shanghai. Most of the Russians settled on the French Concession because things were simpler there, and there were fewer Chinese there, also.

After the first year Russians came from Tientsin and Harbin to Shanghai in floods. And before World War II the Russian colony in Shanghai was as large as 12,000.

Employment

Another avenue of employment that was opened up for Russians was that of working as armed guards. In 1927 there were large-scale Chinese disturbances in Shanghai and a Russian regiment was organized on the International Settlement. Its first commander was Captain Fomin. This regiment was an exemplary one, as though it was a tsarist

Fedoulenko: regiment, truly remarkable. And there was a volunteer corps commanded by Colonel Sovielov. In the French Concession there was organized a Russian Military Police Detachment with General Atamovich and Colonel Ilvar at its head. And then a Fire Department was organized, consisting primarily of Russians on the French Concession.

First, we organized a Union of Traders and later we reorganized this and called it a Russian Chamber of Commerce. And in 1932 we organized a Society of Russian Traders and Industrialists which was later renamed Russian Chamber of Commerce. We had our League of Russian Women, our kindergartens, choices in languages and manual skills. Much of this was gratis and supported by charity and various charitable balls and festivities. Then a woman's professional school was organized under the auspices of the French authorities. There were radio-telegraph schools, and many of whose graduates worked aboard ships plying the China trade. There were professional societies and societies of Russian doctors and lawyers.

One of the first societies which was organized was the Society of Former Members of the Russian Army and Navy, which helped poorer members; and a number of churches, of course, through which much charity work was also done. At the beginning there was a Russian church in Taipei Chinatown which was destroyed in 1927 during the Chinese disturbances. After the first few years it played a

Fedoulenko: big role in the Russian community. The cadet corps stayed in China itself until 1925 or so, and then all moved to Serbia in a body. Very soon we began building a magnificent cathedral on the French Concession thanks to a gift of \$50,000 by Madame Litvinova, who had been the wife of a former Russian trader in Chinese tea before the revolution. She did much good to the Russian colony. It was the Cathedral on the Paul Henri Street on the French Concession. The Cathedral was finished in the early thirties. A Russian Orthodox Brotherhood was organized which later created a hospital in 1923-24, first on a small scale and then larger and larger. This hospital took care of much of the medical need of the Russian colony because, even though on the International Settlement and in the French Concession there were certain free beds available in the hospitals there for us, they were not nearly sufficient. The hospital of the Russian Orthodox Brotherhood received much help from the French Concession authorities who could not place all of the sick in their own hospitals. So they agreed to pay us a certain amount per patient that we placed in our hospital, only third class. This was a purely Russian hospital with Russian doctors and nurses. It was at first called Russian Orthodox Hospital; then it was known as the hospital of the Russian Orthodox brotherhood. It moved from place

Fedoulenko: to place and finally it stayed on the French Concession. During the war, of course, there were many changes in that hospital about which I'll tell you later.

Culture

So in about ten years after we arrived there the Russian colony in Shanghai became quite wealthy. We had some magnificent restaurants, nightclubs; we had our own social clubs in the early thirties, and many of our commercial leaders helped out. We had a very rich musical life and a theatrical life as well. During the first years most of these were amateur spectacles. The performers were Dolin, for instance, and others. Later many professional groups and individual artists were organized. Tomsky organized a permanent artists company. We used the Lyceum Theater, which had been built by the Municipal authorities, for a lot of our opera, theatrical and musical performances, such operas as Prince Igor, Boris Godounoff, and others. There were also many operettas staged there by Russian artists such as Valin, Rozen, Bittuer, Orlovspoya, and Kudinoff, who performed there. At the same Lyceum Theater there were remarkable ballet performances which were organized in the thirties by Savitsky, who was married to a ballerina himself. The ballet performances were extremely popular and very successful among the Russian colony in Shanghai. All of the ballets of Tchaikovsky and others were performed.

Fedoulenko: In other words, the life of the Russian colony in Shanghai in the late twenties and early thirties was very busy, springing out like a fountain from the soil. And even the American depression did not affect us hardly at all. In Shanghai money was unstable and we were taught not to hoard it but rather to spend it. We could not, however, buy houses because houses were fantastically expensive, the Chinese would not sell them and therefore we usually rented houses rather than buying them.

We had almost no taxes to pay and life was truly remarkable for a long time. We did not know such a thing as income tax up to the end, when the merchants had to pay a tiny percentage of their income. We were happy with our lives there and did not want to go anywhere, not to America or anywhere else. In comparison with the Russian colonies of Harbin and Tientsin, in the Far East we considered ourselves as the main representatives and the capital of the Russian Far Eastern emigration. We had more recreation, more conveniences of life, more wealth. It is true that at the very beginning there were many more amenities and a better way of life in Harbin for the Russians, but that lasted very shortly. I had wanted to return to Harbin, but I could not because I was already involved in business, and later, of course, our life in Shanghai became better than theirs. After Harbin fell under the Japanese and Soviet influence, then horrible things happened. The French and British in

Fedoulenko: Shanghai were very decent and the Chinese judiciary to which we were subordinated could be adequately handled. Anyway, our Russian colony did not commit any crimes and therefore we were not afraid of anybody. We were well-liked and extremely honest. A few professional crooks arrived from Harbin and committed crimes and somewhat tarnished our reputation, but we were not judged by their actions on the whole. It is true that we did not produce any very famous people from the Shanghai Russian colony.

Political Activity

As concerns the political currents of the Russian colony, right from the beginning they were all anti-Communist. The Alliance of War Veterans became very active when General Diterihs became its head. This happened at the end of the 1920's. General Diterihs took a very large role in this organization, purely a military organization, a detachment of the Union of War Veterans. It really had no name, but it was active in the gathering of resources and engaged in intelligence work on the other side of the Russian frontier. The Japanese disturbed us most of all because they did not want any national Russian power to take shape in the Russian Maritime Provinces. The Japanese pretended that they helped us, but in fact they disturbed and spoiled our activities. We had a whole organization under General Sakharoff in Harbin and many Transbaikalian

Fedoulenko: Cossacks took part in these organizations. They made a mass of trouble in the 1920's and 1930's on the other side of the Russian frontier. There were many resources in the Harbin Russian colony, and volunteers were taken. There was such a thing as the Fund of the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, to which many contributed; there were volunteer contributions by other organizations--the monarchist organizations, but they were not very important. The left spectrum, the SR's and the Social Democrats, were very weak in Shanghai. The Cadets were very unpopular also. Schendrikov, who was a Social Democrat and participated in the uprisings of the Caucasus, was a Menshevik. He was an enemy of the White movement. In Shanghai he was a lawyer, and partly changed and was not politically active. In fact, there were no political parties among the Russian immigration in Shanghai. There was a Union under General Horvath which was a purely national organization in the twenties. When General Horvath died everything stopped. After Diterihs died much also stopped and these military organizations stopped being so active. Many people became older and the youth was not interested in politics. Of course, there were such organizations as the Musketeers, who came originally from Harbin. They were violent anti-Communists, had their own uniforms, but it was not a very serious movement. There were also Fascists but they did not really receive much sympathy from the Russians because the

Fedoulenko: Shanghai immigration was very healthy in the sense that they loved their country and they did not want to get involved in Communism, Fascism, or Nazism. We were primarily nationalists. They would say to the Fascists, "Why do we have to learn from the Italians, from somebody called Duce? We have our own national Russian heroes." All this went to hell very soon when the war was over. Some of these Shanghai Fascists then became monarchists. All of this was foreign to us. Before the war there were no pro-Japanese organizations in our Russian colony in Shanghai. After the war started it was different. It was the opposite--we had even to raise money for them. We had two Russian newspapers; one was the Zaria and the other was the Slovo. They had practically the same political tendencies, they were right-wing, anti-Communist, but they were also liberal in a way. All of them respected the memory of the emperor. The monarchists issued a small magazine but few paid attention to it. The majority of the Russian colony and the settled element in it did not really discuss the future nature of power in Russia after the anti-Communist restoration. There were no specific commitments that we wanted to make. We were anti-Communist and we would help anybody who was anti-Communist. We felt that the people must decide (whether to) when they would overthrow the Communists. Even the officers in very large measure, although they thought that monarchism fitted the Russian

Fedoulenko: conditions especially well, refused to commit themselves on this issue, just as long as there would be a national Russia. The main problem that we considered was that of restoring national Russia to its rightful place. I did not really think of the question of whether the family of the Romanoffs should be restored, because that which remained does not inspire a very great respect in me. There were many attempts even before the Japanese to unify the Russian immigration into one group. For instance, Grosse was at one time the titular leader of the Russian Shanghai colony by the virtue of the fact that he had been general consul before, but the colony did not trust him. He was not popular; he treated the Russians very poorly; he was a typical Baltic German.

More on Cultural Life, Visiting Russian Performers

Raymond: Mr. Fedoulenko, would you tell me something more of the life of the Russian emigrés in Shanghai, of the various Russian community organizations?

Fedoulenko: The education of the Russian colony in Shanghai took place not only in schools which I have already described but in so many other social institutions. As far as schools were concerned there were numerous purely Russian schools. And there was another one which had been set up by the French

Fedoulenko: Concession authorities. There was a very large organization of Russian Scouts, the Explorers, which was headed by Radetsky-Mikulich. He did a tremendous amount of good in helping to educate the Russian emigré youth through the Boy Scout movement in Shanghai. The first groups of Boy Scouts were organized in 1927. I personally was unable to participate in this work but we looked at it with great favor and sympathy. These Boy Scouts were supported financially by the Russian colony.

The musical life of Russian Shanghai was also very widely developed and played an important educational role for our colony. We had a number of outstanding musical educators from Russia such as Professor Zakharoff, who contributed much to the musical education of our youth. Other outstanding musical figures were professors Aksakov and Slutsky who had been conductor of the Opera in St. Petersburg as well as the Theater of Musical Drama in St. Petersburg.

We had numerous youth concerts given by our Russian artists in Shanghai over the years. The newly built Lyceum Theater in the International Settlement was one of the favorite places for such concerts. Also the Municipal Hall which we used at the beginning before it was torn down. The Lyceum Theater could hold about 800 people, and our colony liked it very much because it was very conveniently built and was extremely inexpensive.

Fedoulenko: In addition, we had the Municipal Orchestra which was maintained by the Shanghai International Settlement and which consisted of predominantly Russian members. Almost 60 per cent of the orchestra were Russians. The director was an Italian, a Mr. Pachi. This began right at the beginning of the Russian immigration into Shanghai in the middle twenties. Before that, most of the musicians had been Portuguese. But when the Russians began to arrive in Shanghai, Pachi began to hire only them because they were, by and large, brilliant musicians having all been educated in the best Russian conservatories of Moscow and St. Petersburg and being men of a large distinction. Pachi even went to Moscow to find a harpist and was able to persuade Soviet authorities to grant an exit permit to one Pavel Bizulin, a brilliant harpist, who played with the Municipal Orchestra for many years.

These concerts were attended not only by members of the Russian colony but by many foreigners--English and French residents of Shanghai. They were also very popular with the students and with the Russian high school youth. These concerts were extremely inexpensive and allowed many of our young people to attend frequently. They did, in effect, contribute a great deal to the musical education of the Russian youth in Shanghai. To give you an idea of the costs, the least expensive seats at the Lyceum Theater, seats which were on the whole excellent, cost only fifty

Fedoulenko: Chinese cents, which at that time was very little. And this enabled almost all members of the Russian colony to attend these concerts. Small surprise that these concerts were always filled with an overflow crowd. In the summer time the Municipal Orchestra played in the large park, Jessfield Park. I myself attended these concerts frequently.

In 1933, in the French Concession, another symphony orchestra was also organized. This, of course, was slightly smaller than the International Settlement orchestra, but it consisted exclusively of Russian musicians. Its musical director was Sarichoff, who had been with the Municipal Orchestra of the International Settlement before. They only took thirty-five musicians into this orchestra. In addition to this, of course, we had a choir and attached to the French Concession Police there was a band composed exclusively of Russians. This group consisted of cadets who had arrived at Shanghai from the various military schools of Siberia and who maintained their schools in China.

Also, I'll tell you that almost all of the restaurants and hotels in Shanghai, that is European ones, then had orchestras and made a practice of hiring almost exclusively Russian musicians. Such restaurants, for instance, as Astor House where Bershadsky was director of the orchestra; another one that was very well known was the Lunar Park where in the early thirties there was a large wind orchestra

Fedoulenko: consisting of Russians, its director was Shut. Another was the restaurant Kavkaz, where Raysky was the director and numerous other places. There was also in the Majestic Hotel the Russian orchestra of Ermolayev. All these musicians were paid quite well and lived quite prosperously.

In the twenties the minimum amount of money necessary to live reasonably well in Shanghai was about 120 Chinese dollars. At that time you could buy a loaf of bread for ten or fifteen cents and could order a very decent meal for forty to fifty cents in an inexpensive restaurant. Of course, the more expensive restaurants charged more. To give you an idea of the standard of living that was developing in the Russian colony, the ordinary policeman would receive about 200 at that time, as a start. I, for instance, paid my help in the pharmacy with 175 to 200 Chinese dollars a month during that time. Life for us at that time was good; everything was inexpensive; the rent was cheap; and one could buy excellent clothes from very good cloth. The most you could reasonably spend for a good suit would be twenty-five to thirty dollars. A decent apartment would cost from thirty-five to a maximum of seventy-five dollars in Chinese money. You see how everything was reasonable.

Raymond: Would you tell me something about the role of sports in the Russian colony in Shanghai at that time?

Fedoulenko: Yes, our community had a great interest in sports. For instance, the Russian organization Sokol had a very important

Fedoulenko: role in our sports and educational life. It was organized in 1930 by Colonel Matrossov. The society had a large hall which was used for various sports events and which was very well equipped. It was first located in the building of the Russian social club on Avenue Foch and then moved to the building of the Russian officers' club on the Rue Massenet; finally they got their own quarters. They had teams which played tennis, football, and soccer, sponsored boxing events, volleyball tourneys, basketball, ping-pong and gymnastics. All the activities were organized in a so-called organization and were very popular among the Russian emigré colony.

Horesmanship was organized by the Russian riding school which was owned by a former Russian cavalry officer. In addition to this there were numerous small groups for such sports as fencing and other minor sports. The Russian Shanghai colony was highly interested in boxing. And a number of Russian Shanghai boxers made international fame. Among the more famous boxers was Alex Shevelev. Many of the Russian merchants supported these activities by furnishing the prizes. Chess was also very popular in the Russian colony and one of the outstanding players was D. Poliakoff, champion of Shanghai, who later moved to California and became the well-known figure in California chess.

The Shanghai Russian Regiment had within it an organized group of wrestlers in the French style. It also had a soccer

Fedoulenko: team and other teams. We also had organized hunts in Shanghai even though there were periods when this would lead us to go far outside of the city limits, and although the hunts were nowhere near as interesting as they had been in Russia, there was still much organized hunting within the Russian colony there. During the twenties it was rather dangerous to leave the city limits because, before Chiang Kai-shek took over the leadership of China, the Chinese generals of the various provinces were constantly fighting with each other and bands of organized brigands called Hunghudzeroamed the countryside around Shanghai. But there weren't that many of them around Shanghai, because it was pretty well defended by international troops. After all, Shanghai was an enormously important industrial and commercial point with over four million people living there and the Chinese tried to keep the place guarded.

I forgot to tell you that the world chess champion, Alekhin, also came to visit Shanghai, and banquets were organized for him.

Chaliapin, the great Russian basso, also visited Shanghai in 1936. He, of course, was not the same man that he had been in St. Petersburg before the revolution. He was already ill, but his mighty strength gave him the ability to sing. His concerts were completely sold out. But I who had heard him in 1916 knew that it was not the same Chaliapin that I had heard sing the role of Boris

Fedoulenko: Godounov in St. Petersburg. I was at that time very sick and blood was flowing out of my mouth, but I still managed to get to the opera and hear him.

The Soviets very rarely sent anybody to Shanghai; in the twenties one singer came by the name of Labinsky. He was the artist of the Moscow Bolshoi Theater but he did not really get much of an attendance in Shanghai because he was elderly and was not really that well known in Russia before the revolution. But from America we had a number of Russian luminaries visit us in Shanghai. Such, for instance, was the ballerina Anna Pavlova. Also Kouzretzova-Benoi has been one, Lipkovskaya--a soprano--and others. The only Soviet ballerina who also came to Shanghai was Marletzova, who came in 1927-28; but she never returned to Soviet Russia after her visit to Shanghai but became an emigré herself and went to America.

Legal Position of Emigrés

The Chinese authorities closed the Russian Imperial Consulate in Shanghai in 1920, and at that time a Russian emigré association was organized. This was on the 23rd of September, 1920. A decree was issued by the president of China and formed the basis for the legal position of the Russian emigrés there. Having closed our consulate, the Chinese deprived us of our extraterritorial rights, and we became subject to the Chinese legal administration

Fedoulenko: and had to take out Chinese passports. Subsequently, however, we were allowed to organize our own institutions, specifically such institutions as the Bureau for Russian Affairs in the same building as the consulate had been and essentially with the same staff. The head of this bureau was the former Consul General of Imperial Russia in Shanghai, Grosse. And there we received all the necessary Chinese documents. Such documents, for instance, as were required for us to move from one Chinese town to another. And this, as far as I can see, was a purely commercial venture for the Chinese authorities because this enabled them to gather additional funds, like charging us for various papers which they issued. German refugees were subjected to the same requirements.

The Chinese courts allowed us to maintain our own Russian former judge, Ivanov, who tried us up to the end of 1923 when his rights were abolished. This is true for both the Chinese part of Shanghai as well as for the International Settlement and the French Concessions. There were no Chinese courts on the French Concessions. Chinese courts were only on Chinese territories, but the Russians who were subjected to trial had to go to these courts even if they lived on the French Concession. If, for instance, I were to kill another Russian on the French Concession I would be forcibly moved by the French authorities to the Chinese part of town and would be subjected to the

Fedoulenko: Chinese court. The Chinese judges and Chinese courts in Shanghai were totally ignorant of Russian customs and laws and there was a complete indecency in the carrying out of justice in these courts. Russians were put in French or the International Settlement jails by the Chinese judges, however, which was a great improvement over sitting in Chinese jails, which were completely impossible. Even so, these jails were terrible.

Dissatisfactions within Emigré Organizations

Anyway, the Emigré Committee was organized out of the Bureau. In 1924 there was organized the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Russian Emigrés in Shanghai. The chief of this organization was former Consul General Grosse. He was, however, not elected to this position but in a sense just took over the power on the strength of his former position. Soon, after a whole series of misunderstandings with him, such as the one I told you about in connection with his behavior of refusing to help the flotilla of Admiral Stark when it arrived in 1922, and his general refusal to help the Russian colony and other Cossacks who arrived after us, a movement was organized to replace him. He was particularly criticized for the manner in which he surrendered the Russian consulate to the Chinese authorities. He had been perfectly willing to

Fedoulenko: surrender everything in the consulate to the Chinese authorities including the portraits of the Imperial Family and the Emperor himself. There was much protest against this and the Cossacks under the leadership of General Glebov rushed into the consulate one day, took all the portraits away forcibly and kept them in their own organization, in the Cossack Union. Then these portraits went over to the Officers' Club and are now in the Russian Society of Veterans in San Francisco and in the Alliance House in San Francisco.

These misunderstandings with Grosse finally caused a move to be made to reform this emigré organization so as to elect the leadership. Grosse, of course, resisted this move and quit the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Russian Emigrés in Shanghai. The new head was the former vice-consul, Limanoff, and there began to be a split in the Russian colony in Shanghai. In general, I blame Grosse for much of this, especially his personal disdain for Russians which is so typical for Russified Balts. We Russians always felt that he had sort of Germanic contempt for us even though he had been a servant of Imperial Russia. Also he completely refused to accept any democratic principles of organization of our emigré groups. It was over these issues that the colony split. He had, of course, his own favorites in the colony who followed him wherever he chose to go. I think it was in 1926 that a very strong

Fedoulenko: expression of distrust for Grosse was stated among the emigré organizations and the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Russians was reorganized and renamed Russian National Society. The head of it was elected. He was named Fomin. I personally knew him very well. He had been chief of staff of the Siberian Flotilla where I had also served, and had served under Admiral Kolchak. He was a large figure in the Russian colony and a very energetic man, but he had a number of enemies also. This was, however, not a division which had anything to do with political parties; it was primarily a personal dissatisfaction with Grosse and the fact that he refused to subject his leadership of the Shanghai colony to elections. Then Grosse, after he left, organized a Russian Emigré Committee of which he remained the chief. There were two organizations, the Russian National Society headed by Fomin and the Russian Emigré Committee headed by Grosse. Later Grosse transferred the leadership of the Russian Emigré Committee to Metzler, who had been the former vice-consul in Shanghai; this was also not an election but an appointment.

Many in the Russian Shanghai colony tried to heal this breach, but it was almost impossible. For instance in 1932 an enormous meeting was organized of the representatives of the Russian social organizations in Shanghai and a directorship of this meeting was elected. This was organized the Council of Russian United Organizations. Chiefly we

Fedoulenko: hoped that all the different sections would enter into this organization including Metzler and Fomin and their respective groups. Metzler refused to join it despite the fact that many respected members of the Russian community had entered it. For instance, Fomin and also the representative of the Society of Russian Physicians in Shanghai. But the breach, the split in the Russian colony, was not healed then. This breach continued until the very end of the Second World War.

Until the arrival of the Japanese these organizations did not play a very important role and not too many people paid any real attention to them because they could not exert any real influence upon our life in Shanghai. They really had no legal status.

Grosse had retained from the former Tsar's treasury 160,000 gold rubles. He did not spend a penny of this money on the Russian colony in Shanghai but supposedly had sent all of this to Girsh, who had been the chairman of the Russian Imperial Ambassadors and was in Europe at the time. This Grosse did despite the fact that the new arrivals into the Russian colony in the beginning of the 1920's were terribly destitute and in need of material assistance. To them Grosse did not give one penny. And this was one of the things that made many Russians extremely dissatisfied with Grosse. After all, we felt that this money had belonged to Tsarist Russia and that we as its subjects who had run

Fedoulenko: away from the Bolsheviki and who had supported the Tsar loyally were entitled to this money, and we needed help and received none. The help that we did receive did not come from Grosse at all, it came for instance from private Russians who had lived in Shanghai before. Mrs. Sunenberg and her husband made a great contribution to the work of Russian charitable organizations during this period in Shanghai. As to what ever happened to all this money that Grosse sent to Europe--none of us could ever find out what happened to it. It remains a deep mystery. Grosse himself died in 1934 in Shanghai.

The United Russian Organization Committee which was formed in 1934 in Shanghai very soon began to fall into uselessness. It had as its original aim to incorporate the two rival factions--the one of Metzler and that of Fomin--into one group. It failed in this because Metzler did not join. And after this the role of General Glebov, a leader of the Cossack troops that had come to Shanghai after we did on separate boats, was also not conducive to the success of this association and it rapidly fell apart. His behavior was not very proper. He had been the leader of the Far Eastern group of Cossacks, he had been a simple Cossack. The ships on which he arrived had been sold. The funds were used for not very clear purposes. Glebov has been accused of buying a boarding house for himself, an automobile, and in less than a year these funds completely disappeared. This reputation did not

Fedoulenko: help General Glebov and did not increase confidence in him. It really undermined his influence in the Russian colony.

The Council of United Russian Organizations was organized in 1934 after enormous expenditure of effort. But after less than one month's existence one organization after the other began to abandon this Council. And after a while the vast majority of organizations that had helped get it together left. The specific reasons were not terribly important and amounted primarily to personality conflicts, stubbornnesses , and envy. To the extent that these Russian organizations did not have any legal rights over the Russian emigrés themselves--to that extent they could never play a very important role in the life of the Russian colony. The Chinese authorities had their own bureau which was charged with issuing passports, papers, and other necessary documents to the Russian emigrés. And they only delegated this authority to the Russian emigré organizations. Their names were sent to the central Chinese bureau organized for this purpose. And those Russian emigrés who did not want to have anything to do with these organizations could go directly to the Chinese bureau and deal directly with it.

Relationship of Other Nationalities with Shanghai Russians

Raymond: Mr. Fedoulenko, could you tell me a little bit about the relationship that other nationalities in Shanghai had to the Russian colony? Let's, for instance, start with the French first.

Fedoulenko: The French in the person of their general consul the Russian colony received from them the most heart-felt co-operation, and for the first period, for instance, the cadet corps were supported and helped by the French authorities. It is true that the Settlement authorities also gave us some help. The French authorities also took many of us Russians into their police force. For instance, all of the cavalry police consisted of Russians. Also there were many Russians working in the French municipality. They were hired there with a great deal of enthusiasm. For instance, the Sanitary Department was almost completely Russian.

Raymond: What about the British?

Fedoulenko: The English are a cold people. I would not say that they were especially enthusiastic about our arrival but they were also very business-like people and looked at this whole thing in purely practical terms. For instance, there was a lot of trouble in Shanghai and there were Chinese riots in the late twenties. However, the French municipal police was able to cope with these troubles; but the International Settlement police had a hard time doing so. After all, the city was enormous. The International

Fedoulenko: Settlement which was controlled by the British needed some special forces, but by the time they would arrive from Hong Kong they would be too late. And furthermore, they needed some permanent forces in Shanghai. Then the English authorities approached the Russian colony and asked us to help form the Russian Regiment in Shanghai. Grosse also participated in the formation of this regiment but no one really sympathized with his activities because he, for instance, would tell the English that the Russians did not seem to be paid very much and other things like that. He was always contemptuous of Russians. Pretty soon all of this matter was taken over by General Glebov, who had the manpower to staff the regiment. The first commander of the regiment was captain of the first rank, Fomin, who was chosen by the municipal authorities. Later Fomin went to work for the Shanghai Power Company and his place was taken by Colonel Timen, and this colonel stayed with the regiment until his retirement just before the war, when his assistant Ivanov took over.

This regiment was in effect Shanghai's own guard troop. At its parades the whole Russian colony and many foreigners would turn out to watch them. It marched better than anybody else, brilliantly. The British did not treat us with contempt or with any nastiness. There were only very rare cases of such behavior by them, only from a few English drunkards. But such cases always ended pretty

Fedoulenko: poorly for the English, then, because our Russians would get together and beat them up. Various cases, incidentally, also occurred after the war with American troops.

Raymond: How did the Americans treat the Russians in Shanghai?

Fedoulenko: That question can be answered very simply. The Americans have a great deal of similarity to the Russians. And especially after the war our relations with the Americans were very warm. The representatives of the American High Command would attend our gatherings very frequently and individual American officers and soldiers would visit our homes and be our guests. In fact the Americans sought out Russian friends. Of course much of the American High Command had gotten wrong information about the Russians originally from Washington. We were portrayed in the darkest colors, but later the Americans found out differently in Shanghai.

Raymond: How did the Chinese treat the Russian emigrés?

Fedoulenko: In Shanghai the Chinese were rather indifferent to us. They did not show any hostility, but also they did not show much interest. The only thing that they valued was the use of Russians as bodyguards for very wealthy Chinese. In the twenties and thirties rich Chinese would only hire Russians as body guards. And these bodyguards soon achieved fame and a fine reputation. There were numerous cases when they fought very bravely and loyally to protect their employers. The majority of these bodyguards were former

Fedoulenko: officers. But the Chinese did not take advantage of the fact that we had been deprived of extraterritorial rights to mistreat us either. Of course, on the other hand, they also did not tolerate any of the kind of mistreatment that many of the Russians who had been in Manchuria were used to giving to the Chinese. We treated them as equals and they treated us in the same manner. I had several Chinese employees in my pharmacy, for instance.

Fedoulenko Becomes a Pharmacist

Raymond: Could you tell me, Valentin Vassilievich, how you became a pharmacist?

Fedoulenko: The whole thing happened completely by accident. When I came to Shanghai with Admiral Stark's flotilla in 1922, he gave me for my efforts and my work and because I had not been paid during that whole period for my service with him in Siberia, a rather large sum of money, which he realized out of the sale of his ships. I did not know what to do with this money and with what to begin. I had at that time very few alternatives. I could have entered the French police or opened some commercial enterprise. Right at that time a doctor came to see me and he suggested to me, "Let's open up a pharmacy." I answered him, "What do I know about a pharmacy?" This was in January of 1923. Until then for the few months that I had been in Shanghai I had been occupied with emigré affairs dealing with Admiral Stark's flotilla.

Fedoulenko: The Flotilla left from Shanghai for Manila just before New Year's 1922-23, the 29th of December, or something like that. The doctor answered me, "We can rent a place for almost nothing. I will open a doctor's cabinet, and you can start selling drugs." This doctor was Russian; his name was Doctor Pukhov. The Chinese authorities at that time did not have many licensing requirements, and he was allowed to practice medicine. The French and English authorities also permitted this. At that time it was fairly easy to obtain large amounts of credit to purchase goods and supplies with which to start our pharmacy. Of course, recommendations were necessary but these I was able to get, so we decided to open our pharmacy. After all, the money involved was not really that enormous. This seemed to me a much better alternative than to work in the police force.

Of course, I knew nothing about pharmacy work, so I had to study. I finally finished a two-year course organized by Russian professors in Shanghai which was approved by the French Municipal authorities, and I received a diploma. Of course, I had opened up my pharmacy even before that but I was then working under the license of the doctor. Unfortunately only a year after we opened the pharmacy we went broke. By that time we were already eating up the inventory which we had bought with borrowed money. We could have lasted perhaps for another four or

Fedoulenko: five months at the most until we had finished eating up all the merchandise. And then the doctor said, "Oh, to hell with you! I'm going to Manila and the Philippine Islands." So the doctor abandoned me and my debts. I didn't have much alternative: I went to the municipal authorities and asked for permission to maintain the pharmacy, which they gave me. So I hired a Chinese pharmacist.

We went broke because my doctor had a very poor personality, he had gotten into a number of fights with various other doctors on whom our trade depended. He was a very unfriendly kind of a person. After he left I immediately went to see all of the Russian doctors whom I knew, and to my Russian friends. I obtained additional credit and promises of help. At that time I was the only Russian pharmacist on the French Concession. That is why the Russian doctors wanted to support me.

And it is with this that I began my own independent career as a pharmacist. Of course, my wife and I for many years lived extremely modestly. In fact we spent not more than \$24.00 a month on food for both of us. You can imagine how we ate even at the inexpensive prices then. Our whole rent was only fifty-five Chinese dollars per month and was both for the store front and for my apartment upstairs. Little by little, with the support of the Russian doctors and of the Russian colony who knew me from the arrival of

Fedoulenko: Admiral Stark's Flotilla, I began to conduct a good trade. In two or three years' time I was already on my feet. Of course I was still completely in debt and it took me eighteen years to pay everything off, but I was able to begin living decently and more securely. I did not pay everything off finally until 1940. In January 1941 I became complete master of my own pharmacy. At first it was located on Avenue Foch and then I moved to Avenue Joffre, but kept the name of Foch Pharmacy. Finally the business grew into such a figure that if I had sold it even before the war I think I could have sold it for about \$15,000.

During the twenties and thirties, Shanghai was a city of exceptional business possibilities. Avenue Joffre was the center of the Russian colony in Shanghai, and most of the retail trade run by Russians was located there. All of this trade was based on very easy credit. As we used to call it in Shanghai, this was business sucked out of one's own thumb. Many of our merchants who gave the appearance of being very wealthy were in fact quite poor but lived and operated on credit. If I had sold my business right after the war I could have probably gotten as much as \$25,000 for it. Not so much the inventory but the location, because at that time they were opening up all kinds of restaurants for American troops. But when I sold my business in 1949, on the 23rd of December, when it was already clear that the Americans would be moving out,

Fedoulenko: I got much less.

I had counted on the supposition that Americans would never move out of Shanghai, but I was obviously wrong. I had expected the election of Dewey, who had promised not to leave China; but they elected Truman, who let the troops be pulled out. So I lost my gamble. And so finally I had to sell my pharmacy for \$7,000 only, and furthermore \$2,000 of that money went for obtaining the permission of transferring my lease on my location to the owner of the real estate where I was renting, and \$1,200 went as commission to the agents who sold the pharmacy--Chinese agents. All I had left was less than \$5,000. I only had one employee, and I gave her \$500.00 and I had 4,000 and some dollars with which to arrive to the United States.

Over the years the pharmacy business had demanded such a great deal of my time that I had not been able to do any other things. At first I used to attend meetings of various committees but later I became disgusted with their perpetual fighting and stopped attending until after the war. Before and during the war I was frequently asked to become politically active again but refused and anyway I was busy almost twelve hours a day in the pharmacy. There were certain social activities, however, that I always attended. By custom, on the 31st of each December we would organize a yearly ball for the Alliance of Veterans of the Russian Army and Fleet. This was a benefit function and

Fedoulenko: the proceeds went for the support of needy officers and soldiers. We also used to attend the Cossack balls which were very popular in Shanghai not only among Russians but even among foreigners. The balls of the St. George Cavaliers organized by them were probably the ones I liked the most. During the day ordinarily they would have a brief church service and then a luncheon in the evenings together with all their families. The attendants would eat dinner and then dance till late into the night.

White Russian Struggles Against Bolsheviks Continue

In connection with White Russian activities against the Soviet Union from China, the center was in Harbin and not in Shanghai. It is true that in Shanghai lived General Diterihs. Before his arrival the military Russian organizations in Shanghai were under the leadership of General Walter. General Walter did not recognize any political activities and refused to allow them and led no active struggle against the Bolsheviks at all. He was simply a general of the general staff and as senior officer headed this committee and worried about their welfare and about their material conditions. When General Diterihs became head of this organization everything became much better organized, and a special department of the Military Alliance was set up. He, of course, immediately began

Fedoulenko: to conduct an active struggle against the Bolsheviks, went to all the towns in China where Russian colonies existed. In Harbin there was an especially large intelligence organization of White Russians. He had a chief of staff and a chief of intelligence with him in Shanghai who were also very active and are still alive. This intelligence activity under General Diterihs was large and lasted for quite a long time, right up to the time Diterihs became sick and finally died. Of course, much harm was done to this activity by the murder of one of the most important intelligence operators in Harbin that we had. He was killed by Martinoff, a Japanese agent, who had been a former White officer but now he became a tool of the Japanese. The Japanese were unhappy that this intelligence operative Argunoff was operating out of Harbin. He was killed in the nastiest fashion by Martinoff late one night. Martinoff claimed that he shot him by accident by pulling the trigger in the pocket of his trench coat, and this supposedly accidental shot struck Argunoff square in the heart. Can you imagine such a remarkable circumstance? This murder was done by the order of the Japanese authorities whose will Martinoff executed because the Japanese found out in some manner that the organization of General Diterihs had established connections with the Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Marshall Blukher. In that army a cell was organized in the staff of the Marshall which was in actuality gradually preparing for an overthrow

Fedoulenko: of Soviet power in the Soviet Far East. It was preparing for the uprising of the Far Eastern army of Marshall Blukher against Soviet authorities. And Diterihs said, "We do not have any demands or claims, you will be directing all these affairs and matters, you will direct the struggle against Bolshevism, you know them, that is, the Bolsheviks, better than we do; we, the White Russians lost and you know them better than we do. We will only seek to pour our forces into your army and join it as anti-Communists who wish to liberate Russia from Bolshevism." This, in fact, is what we who worked with General Diterihs all wanted. The Japanese somehow found out about this and you can imagine how unhappy they were. Imagine if we had succeeded in an overthrow? All of the Far Eastern Soviet Army would have followed Marshall Blukher.

Raymond: Are you saying that Marshall Blukher was connected with this plot?

Fedoulenko: Oh, yes, Blukher was absolutely against the Bolsheviks. And he was killed, Stalin liquidated him.

Raymond: It is now being said that Stalin killed Blukher and the other victims of the purge without any reasons.

Fedoulenko: There were very many reasons and these are by the way the words of General Diterihs himself. I am quoting him. And Martinoff, this scoundrel who murdered Argunoff, he also had a direct role in kidnapping Kaspe in Harbin, and cut off his ear.

Raymond: Was the organization of General Diterihs a pro-Japanese organization?

Fedoulenko: Absolutely not. It was purely a national Russian organization. General Diterihs hated the Japanese just like all of us who worked with him hated the Japanese.

Raymond: How was this organization maintained financially? Where did it get its money from?

Fedoulenko: We collected our own funds. No foreign power gave us any help whatsoever. All the financial dues were sent to the center, of course. I cannot say who was in actual contact with Blukher. I personally had no actual contact with him and I did not go there at that time. Argunoff had his own people in Harbin who got in touch with the staff of Marshall Blukher.

Raymond: What assurances were there that these were not just rumors?

Fedoulenko: Do you happen to know General Petroff?

Raymond: No, I do not know Petroff.

Fedoulenko: Petroff issued a book. He was, by the way, General Chief of Staff of General Diterihs. He lives here somewhere in the provinces. You can find out about him in the Veterans Society. Knowing perfectly well the internal organization of the Communist state and of its intelligence services I of course considered that any kind of an overthrow, either accidental or with some kind of help from us, the Whites, was absolutely impossible. But we hoped that there would be an uprising there, an uprising of the Russian people, of

Fedoulenko: the Red army. It was only this hope that influenced us and directed our actions. We were hoping that the Red army itself would start the uprising. After all, the Moscow Bolsheviks destroyed all of the Red partisan detachments that had operated in Siberia and against whom we had fought. There was an enormous uprising in Siberia in 1921, in Eastern Siberia. And there were many uprisings in Transbaikalia. There were constant uprisings and troubles in the Soviet Union and this was one of the reasons why we wanted to stay close. And when a new uprising would really get started to be able to fuse ourselves into it and go with the people and to fight the Bolsheviks. That was in actuality our goal. And this hope stayed with us to the very end, until the terrible purges that Stalin conducted.

Stalinist Purges, Loss of Hope for an Uprising

Then we began to lose our hope because at that time he destroyed the whole commanding forces of the Red army, changed everything. Everybody that was even in the slightest way disaffected was destroyed by him. In 1937-38 those were the years when I lost hope for an uprising in Russia. All of the discontented, all of the revolutionaries, as they called themselves, were all destroyed. It is true that after a while my hope had grown smaller and smaller but it was still there. And it was only that after the war began,

Fedoulenko: first in Finland and then with Germany, that the hope that the Red army would conduct an uprising came back to me.

Raymond: Do you consider that the Stalin purges of the middle thirties undermined your hopes?

Fedoulenko: Absolutely. Because it destroyed a whole body of officers of the Red army, destroyed all of the old officers who had a great deal of dissatisfaction with Stalin. There was no direct personal contact with the White movement among them except for a very few but that the majority of these, of all the Red army officers, were dissatisfied with their regime and, after all, they were commanders, they had armies under them and they could do something. It was at this time when my hopes disappeared. I had already begun to get older just when the war started between the Germans and the Soviets in 1941. I was then forty-seven years old and of course I was still strong and healthy and could do things but I could not really count on any active struggle in which I could participate and furthermore I had lost faith and had stopped believing in the ability of the Russian people to get rid of the Bolsheviks because I realized that the Russian people had been changed. The Russian people have been completely transformed by a horrible terror, a terrible espionage system. In every family the father would report on the mother and the mother would report on the father, somebody in the family was a spy. It was a horror. When a father of a Soviet family was arrested the

Fedoulenko: mother and the children would deny him and would damn him calling him a swine, a scoundrel and horrible names, and they even changed their names. By this time, 1940, I paid off all my debts. I did not consider that the life of the Russian colony in China would last permanently, because our youth were gradually demanding some kind of solution to this impermanent situation. A great number of them had received a higher education and of course it was rather boring for them to work only in Shanghai and plan to live the rest of their days in Shanghai. Of course Shanghai was a very important center and one could work there quite a lot, but the young people were wanting to go somewhere else where there was more room and freedom--like to America and to Australia. After, I had lost faith in the new revolution in Russia, had already become too old to do much, and it was difficult for me to pick up roots again and leave. And furthermore, our diplomas were not accepted in other countries. So I decided to stay there and after the war I was counting on the fact that the Americans would remain in Shanghai. I thought that I would work till I was fifty-five or fifty-seven and then I would sell the pharmacy and would go to Tsintao to rest. After all, Tsintao had a marvelous climate.

Valentin Fedoulenko 1939



SHANGHAI DURING WORLD WAR II

China-Japan Conflict Opens, 1931

Fedoulenko: The conflict with China began in 1931, on the 18th of September, with incidents near Mukden. The reason for this was an explosion of a railroad. This incident was just a pretext for the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The explosion created no great damage, but the Japanese utilized it to stir up the conflict between China and Japan. The Japanese made a landing in China and after a long period of time of fighting near Shanghai in the Region of Taipei and other regions, finally the Japanese won and the Nineteenth Chinese Army was destroyed. One of the aides of the Chinese, a former Russian officer, Captain Mrachkovsky, served the Chinese. He organized the Chinese resistance near Shanghai in a highly talented fashion and very cleverly. And thanks to him the Chinese forces for a while even had a certain amount of success. He formed a number of armed trains which were able to resist the Japanese. His participation was very secret, and nobody knew about it. After the fighting, he returned to Shanghai and became the head of a spy organization working for the Chinese against the Japanese in Shanghai. He had a radio station, where Chinese as well as Russians worked, which

Fedoulenko: informed the Chiang Kai-shek forces of events in the back of the Japanese. This lasted quite a long time, even into the Second World War. Finally, the Japanese found this radio station, arrested a Chinese, and after terrible tortures this Chinese betrayed the location of the station. Mrachkovsky at that time was a general of the Chinese Army, and when the Japanese armed forces started coming up the stairs to his place he shot himself. When the Japanese came into his bedroom, they said, "This is a samurai." They reacted to his way of death with a great amount of respect, and they felt that he died the death of a true samurai and did not try to touch his family. They respected very greatly such type of behavior. They considered it very noble. This fighting hardly affected the Russian colony, because it took place in the Chinese territory, and most of the Russians lived on the French and International settlements. Russians tried to avoid Chinese territories in general. There were, of course, numerous Russians who worked for the Chinese, but they were, of course, much smaller scale people. Chiang Kai-shek had an enormous number of Chinese spies and knew everything that was going on there throughout the whole war. There was a great deal of sympathy for him among the Chinese. The Japanese behavior towards the Chinese was terrible at that time. They killed them, beat them up, and tortured them. I'm talking about the period before the beginning of the Pacific war. During this period, of course, the

Fedoulenko: Japanese did not touch the Russians or the foreigners.

The next fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese was in 1937, when the Japanese, having occupied Peking, moved towards Tientsin and occupied it on the 29th of July. New detachments were sent by the Japanese to Shanghai, and an enormous army was landed there. This period, of course, was already fairly difficult for the Shanghai population because the Japanese entered the International Settlement with their forces without much ceremony. They were already feeling themselves almost masters. Shanghai suffered much during this fighting. We all remember the 13th of August--Friday, the Bloody Friday of 1937--when one of the Chinese airplanes which had been shot down by the Japanese dropped bombs over the populated areas in Shanghai. He had been trying to hit the airfield but hit instead a square where there were many Chinese near a theater, and there were very, very many casualties there; I don't even remember how many, but over maybe several thousand killed and wounded. Only a few Europeans, about twelve, who had been driving cars in that area, were killed. Also one Russian woman was burned alive. When the fort of Shanghai was shelled, bombs fell on Nanking Road. The economic life of Shanghai was not particularly affected, however, by this fighting because the port was still free and ships from all nations came and went without difficulty. The Japanese did not stop them. They

Fedoulenko: were, in fact, very interested in continuing Shanghai's commercial and industrial activities. The Russian colony really did not feel much hardship during that period.

America Enters War with Japan, 1941

We had been expecting a war between Japan and the United States. There were many dangerous symptoms, and in the Far East these symptoms were very obvious. In fact we thought that the war would start not before January or February of 1942, and we had not expected the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor when it came. We did not think that Japan would dare declare war against the United States. You see, many of us Russians were well aware of what the Japanese economic situation was. We knew about their industry, about their raw material reserves, and other things like that, and we believed that only completely insane people would declare the war against the United States. The army of Japan was not much changed from the Russo-Japanese War. During the First World War they did not have very much fighting, and they were so completely enthused by their victories over the Russians that they had lost their reason. They won against the Russians because we had terrible leadership. Had we had more talented generals, such Russian defeats would not have occurred. But the Japanese did not realize this and felt that they

Fedoulenko: were invincible. They stopped their basic military developments. After this, they refused to see the phenomenal resources of the United States, and few people really expected them to begin the war. Only the insanity of the leaders of Japanese policy, who considered themselves invincible due to their false understanding of the victories over the Russians, led to the war. It is true that during Pearl Harbor they inflicted heavy casualties upon the Americans.

On the seventh of December, the saint's day of my wife, we had a big gathering at home which dispersed at one or two o'clock at night. Everything seemed very quiet. Only the next morning, when I woke up and heard shots from cannon, I called up and it turned out that there had been several small American warships in the Shanghai harbor, and during the fight the English warships began to fire. The American ships surrendered immediately. They had not expected the war and were not prepared. The English were a little better prepared and put up a short resistance. But they were soon captured. From this moment we knew that the war with America had begun. We had not yet seen in the newspapers the details of the attack upon Pearl Harbor. We had heard that the American fleet had suffered greatly and that the airplanes of America had also been damaged.

Conditions of WarJapanese Occupation of Shanghai

Fedoulenko: The Japanese immediately occupied the American and English consulates, took over all the banks, entered the French Concession as well as the International Settlement. They were masters of the city. The French could not resist anything because they already had lost the war to Germany, and France played no role whatsoever at that time in Shanghai. Immediately the English police was demobilized, and they only left a few of the Russian policemen because they needed to have some neutral party--also Germans--to maintain order. The Russian Regiment was also demobilized. They offered no resistance because they had received no orders to do so. They were all disbanded, and that was that. With this, the Russian colony began to suffer economically enormously because all the American and the English firms were closed and the Russian employees in enormous numbers were fired. The Japanese put their own citizens into the banks and other enterprises that they took over, but these enterprises functioned very poorly. The Japanese handled these economic matters in very stupid and clumsy fashions. They were never able to utilize the economic might of Shanghai in a proper fashion. Depleting iron and other resources very badly, they began such stupid things as

Fedoulenko: taking all of the metal sleeping facilities out of houses. They took Pushkin's memorial because it was made out of copper. But having stolen all of these things and destroyed so much of Shanghai, they left everything in disorder. They were not, however, able to take any of these stolen metals to Japan because immediately there took place a submarined warfare against Japanese shipping, and they could not cope with this. All of these things remained in various lots in Shanghai, all of it rusted and useless.

The Japanese took over the administration of the International Settlement but later turned it over to their puppet Wang Chin-wei. Partially, however, they allowed Russians and Irish to remain, but most of the Russians left. On the French Concession the French police was allowed to remain, but it was reorganized under Japanese control. The Japanese did not consider the French enemies because General Petain acted as a neutral in the war. They left the administration of the French Concession under normal administration of the French, but all of the assistants were Japanese and they were the real bosses. After several years--about two years--they kicked out all the French and put Chinese puppets in their places. For instance, the sanitary administration was taken over by the Japanese and later turned over to the Wang Chin-wei administration, under the supervision of Japanese, of course. The Wang Chin-wei group was, of course, collab-

Fedoulenko: orationist.

The Russian colony reacted to this in silence. They could not say anything because with any manifestation of discontent the Japanese would arrest them, put them in jail, and beat them brutally--break ribs--and many died.

Pressure on Russians to Collaborate

The Russian organizations in Shanghai refused to co-operate with the Japanese. The Japanese came to the Emigré Committee, to Metzler, and appointed a Japanese counselor, but their attempts to create the same terrible situation as in Harbin and Tientsin, where the Japanese were really able to gather the refuse of the Russians and make them into collaborationists, did not succeed in Shanghai. Thanks to this, Metzler was killed as one who was obstructing the Japanese efforts to carry out their policy towards the Russians. He was killed by hired Chinese killers. This was even before the war.

After the beginning of the war, the Japanese insisted in the most insolent fashion that the Russian Emigré Committee completely subordinate itself to the Japanese policy. The president of the Emigré Committee, N. A. Ivanov, who had been elected after Metzler had been killed, also refused to collaborate with them and refused to obey them. He received almost daily threats by telephone and

Fedoulenko: by letter that he would be killed. Usually Russian collaborationists talked to him. For instance, a former Soviet Cheka agent got to Shanghai under the name Peack, and also called himself Hovans. He was from Astrakhan. During the Revolution he worked with Bolsheviks, a craven, cruel man--terrible. There were, of course, many others too, but they were small people, people who had been speculators making money by providing the Japanese various types of goods. They worked individually, and the Russian Emigré Committee had nothing to do with any of this. To the contrary, there was a constant struggle. We despised all of them. The unfortunate N. A. Ivanov was killed in 1942 by hired Chinese assassins. There was a fantastic indignation among the Russian colony. There was an enormous demonstration at his funeral; in a very demonstrative way all of the Russian colony followed his coffin. His successor was Colonel Serezhnikov, who was appointed by the Japanese and lasted there as president of the Emigré Committee for one year--a very kind person. But he did not have the will power of Metzler or Ivanov. He furnished only passive resistance. However, under him the Japanese could succeed in doing nothing whatsoever.

In Harbin the Japanese formed a committee of emigrés that was almost like the Bolshevik GPU. They always suspected the Russians, had hostile feelings towards them, did not trust the Russians, and wanted to utilize the Russian

Fedoulenko: émigrés. They forced, in Harbin for instance, the Russian youth to be mobilized. They formed cavalry units of Russian émigrés who were later turned over to the Bolsheviks. They were not pro-Japanese, but they were forcibly mobilized. They succeeded in making the same thing in Tientsin, which was really a nest of criminals. For instance, one of my friends who tried to bring out a library from Tientsin was arrested because the Japanese and the Russian collaborationists wanted to steal this library. They would kill people, torture people. Finally this man was saved by some kind-hearted person and ran away to Shanghai. This Tientsin committee did such comical things as to declare war against the United States and England.

Semenov played no role whatsoever in all of this. He sat in Dairen and played no role during the war. This was due to the fact that the Japanese preferred to collaborate with the worst elements of our colony, because they knew that no decent person would really work with them. So they chose the worst elements and it is this dirty element that created all of the crimes. This is a rather characteristic situation, of course. They were Russian speculators who had made millions in trading with the Japanese. They furnished the Japanese with rubber, with acids, with various other produce that they bought from the Chinese and sold to the Japanese, for which the Japanese paid enormous sums. These

Fedoulenko: speculators bought houses and just before the end of the war these two brothers Molostroff who were speculators flew out in private airplanes to Indochina, then Singapore, and finally to Europe, I think to Spain. They brought out enormous amounts of gold. The Japanese did not stop them because they were of their own band.

When Serezhnikov's term expired, the Japanese set up a phony election in effect appointed General Glebov, the Cossack general who began to collaborate with the Japanese, who drank with the Japanese general. The Japanese gave him an automobile. Glebov furnished this general with some kinds of prostitutes; it was a terrible story. These elections ended up in the victory of Glebov. Then Glebov began to rule over the Russian colony, but he received an enormous resistance from the Russian colony, especially from the Russian merchants--the Chamber of Commerce. Glebov received the right from the Japanese to start gathering taxes from the Russian colony and demanded five million dollars from the Russian Chamber of Commerce. This was, at that time, a very large sum of money. He cynically declared that one and a half millions would go to him, one and a half millions for the Chinese, and two millions to the Wang Chin-wei government. Some of the cowards in the Chamber of Commerce stood behind him; they were really scoundrels, but his main enemy was

Fedoulenko: Gregorieff, who was a very large merchant who offered enormous resistance against Glebov. Even threats by Chinese collaborationists who threatened to arrest him did not take effect. He sent them to the devil and told them, "You may kill me, but I will not work with you." Things became so difficult that he began to suffer from heart attacks, and his last meeting with Glebov when they had a big argument in Glebov's house and where he completely refused to allow the collection of these taxes, he fell down and had a heart attack, and soon died.

This was, I think, in 1944. The funeral for him was also enormous. It was turned into a protest against Japanese policies. It is true that the Japanese representative was in the church and offered official condolences, but that did not really go over much. Glebov was not able to collect these taxes. He, however, received a large loan from a ~~small~~ Russian bank against the future collection of taxes, but when the time came he could not pay because he had received no money. The bank took him to court, but thanks to the Japanese order to the court the bank lost its suit. Chibunovsky was a helper of Glebov. Later it turned out that he was an active Soviet agent. Even under Glebov, however, the Japanese were not able to carry out their program towards the Russian colony. We were all afraid for our youth, but the Japanese did not succeed in doing anything because I think that they were afraid to

Fedoulenko: arm the Russian youth.

Organization for Self-Defense

Glebov's reign continued right up to the very end of the war. The only thing he succeeded in doing was in 1943, when he organized a group called Paocha, a civil defense organization. The Chinese had been organized into this organization earlier. These groups were armed with sticks and stood at their posts at important points in the city which could not be properly maintained by the regular police that had been disorganized and scattered. Europeans were finally mobilized for this.

There were many Russians living on the French Concession and it was decided to organize two such Russian detachments. One was organized from the former French police, which, of course had been loaded with Russians. Gregorieff was nominated to be the chief, and I was made his chief of staff, knowing that we would offer resistance to Glebov. I want to tell you something about my Paocha detachment. We were very happy to organize this group because it gave us the right to meet. The district was divided into five regions. I went to each one of these regions and told people a small speech. At the first meetings the public was very, very hostile to us. They were afraid that it would be something like existed in Harbin, but I very simply explained. I said, "Look. I see your hostile faces. Don't be angry at

Fedoulenko: us, please. Please understand that we have been given the right to organize. Before long perhaps very important events will occur and it is better to have sticks in our hands than nothing at all. We do not at all intend to make soldiers out of you. This is not a military organization but a self-defense organization. Believe me that there will come a time in Shanghai when we will not be able to be defended by the police against theft and disorders. At that time with sticks we will be able to offer resistance and protection to you. The more there are of you in these detachments, the more secure our Russian life will be here." They were about ninety-five per cent of these Europeans of Russian origin. I broke the ice with this speech. But I said to them, "Gentlemen, I cannot direct you as a crowd. You must go through some basic military training, a most elementary training. We will create small companies with chiefs in each company who will give you orders. There will be no parades. We must only prepare ourselves for self-defense." We had about five hundred people mobilized in each of the five regions. All these people were volunteers and did not receive any pay nor wear any uniforms. I was against all uniforms, because I did not want to give any appearance of militarism. After Gregorieff died I became chief of my Paocha detachment. We were officially subordinated to the Chinese authorities. I was, after Gregorieff's death, denounced to the Japanese as a person who was not

Fedoulenko: able to keep my job, and that I was really corrupting the Paocha organization, and that I should be removed. Fortunately this denunciation did not reach the Japanese. It reached the Chinese chief, who was a very decent chap. He was nominally a collaborator but in fact was unsympathetic to the Japanese. He was really an enemy of the Japanese. He called in the Russian policemen and said, "This is the kind of denunciation that was made against Fedoulenko. I trust Fedoulenko, and I'm kicking this denunciatiior out immediately."

The Japanese demanded that we make a parade, but we did not hold the parade. We only once participated in an air raid alert together with the Chinese. They had a very primitive way of extinguishing fires. The Japanese were very stupid about this whole thing.

Glebov was not able to set up the kind of regime that had existed in Harbin. His aides Sereznikov and Bologoff played a very passive role. Yakovlev and Chibunovsky helped Glebov. Yakovlev was a former officer of the Imperial Guards and had been at the St. Petersburg University and made much money in Shanghai. He was a shareholder of the dog races in Shanghai and made a great deal of money, and apparently out of fear he began to collaborate with the Glebov administration. Then he turned to the Soviets. When we were moving out of Shanghai he was working in the Soviet consulate, investigating the Russians.

Our economic situation became worse and worse as the

Fedouleuko: war went on. All English and American firms were closed, as I told you. Masses of unemployed had almost nothing to eat; it was, in fact, famine. At this point, the Russian Chamber of Commerce was able to gather with its own resources a series of feeding places in different parts of town. One such feeding place was in the Officers' Club. They gave out borsch and some kind of kasha also. Many, many people came.

Economic Situation

I saw many people who had been quite well-to-do at one time. They were all poor now. There was nothing to eat for them, and there was no place to work. The only thing that they could have done would have been to be collaborationists or stool pigeons for the Japanese, but they refused to do this. Trade had dropped because there was no merchandise to sell. Speculators obtained things for the Japanese, but the majority of our colony refused to do this. We also gave a very great deal of help to the Russian hospital because all other foreign hospitals were really unable to function properly and our hospital was the only one that could help our colony.

I worked in the pharmacy and was able to sustain myself. Of course I dropped the number of hours from twelve to eight. We worked from nine to twelve and from two to five. At first we were able to sell German merchandise; Germans

Fedoulenko: had pharmaceutical items that came from the Soviet Union.

There was quite a large number of warehouses there from which we still obtained goods for a while, but only in limited quantities. After a while everything was sold and we had to buy local Chinese products and there we all went broke because after the war nobody wanted to take these items and this inventory had to be thrown out. I had a large building but very little stock. I did not fire anybody and ate much of my merchandise up. I did not pay them much, but at least they were able to survive. I had three pharmacists. During peace time this was adequate, but during the war it was too much. But I still kept them on. At the end of the war I had an empty pharmacy. On top of everything I was sick with typhus and should have at the end of the war sold the pharmacy, but I didn't. I was counting on the Americans remaining in China.

In order to maintain General Glebov, the Japanese got him to become an official of the Russian bank which they had allowed to continue after the war. He was receiving pay from this bank for a purely fictitious job.

When Germany attacked Russia in June of 1941 many Russian emigrés in Shanghai felt that the Soviet regime would fall as a result of all the defeats that were being suffered by the Soviet Union. The Germans in Shanghai were telling us, "We are against Communists but not against

Fedoulenko: Russians." Many of the Russians, especially the officers, were sympathetic to this and believed the Germans. Even I thought that perhaps the Germans had become enlightened and wanted to finish off Communism and to create a national Russia in order to have an economic base which was friendly to them and which would be better for them than hostile Soviets. There were many hopes in this direction, and there was organized even a society into which many respected officers entered which was sympathetic to the Germans and which entered into connections with the Germans. But I refused to participate in this because I never could imagine that under any circumstances could I collaborate with the Germans. On the other hand, I did not believe that they could conquer Russia because Russia cannot be conquered. All the hopes of all the countries that tried to conquer Russia always ended in a crash. At first, the Soviets were terribly afraid. You could not see them or hear them. They were in a panic, and they did not pay attention to the émigrés.

When the war started with America a pro-Japanese newspaper was organized by some Russian émigrés. A General Kuzmin, a very talented orator and an officer of the general staff, was head of this newspaper. He was editor. He served the Japanese faithfully. The first of May, which was the day of the Japanese fleet, he sent a young man to me asking me for a donation. I explained to this young man, "What a day you are asking me to contribute to a Japanese newspaper! This is the day of the defeat

Fedoulenko: and destruction of our fleet," I told him, "a day of great disaster for us Russians. Yet your boss, General Kuzmin--how can an officer of the general staff ask me such a thing. I will not give you anything. Let the Japanese kill me; I will not give anything. I consider this a terrible shame." After this I thought I would really be killed. I was afraid that maybe I would be sent to a special house that existed there where they sent all kinds of political undesirables, where prisoners were sent and had to sit in cages. There people were beaten and tortured. Many people died in this house. After two or three days Kuzmin sent me this young man back and asked him to tell me, "I shake Mr. Fedoulenko's hand because he was the only one who refused." You see, what a story. Even Russian collaborationists sometimes had a national feeling.

After the Russian victories near Moscow, many of us began to understand that the Germans were not attacking Russians for reasons of restoring national Russia and destroying Communism. But we began to hear about the terrible atrocities that they were committing there. We soon began to hear that the Germans were not at all the kind of people that they tried to describe themselves as being, and many of us started losing complete faith in them and their intentions. And those who felt that they had been going against Communism became disillusioned.

Youth for Russia, and Some Return

Fedoulenko: In the Russian colony there began to be a pro-Soviet movement, especially among the youth, a gradual growth of interest in Soviet newspapers and in the Soviet club. These began to work actively and there was a radio station run by the Soviets where a former artist called Valin began a very intense propaganda of a patriotic nature among the Russian emigré colony of Shanghai. Our youth grew up in China and there were also many older people. Interestingly enough, these poles of the youth and the very old began to change inside. They were saying that it isn't the Red army but the Russian army that is beating the Germans. Soviet agitation began to receive a great deal of success. There were many lectures, reports, sport events, and other things that the Soviets were sponsoring. About sixty per cent of our youth went to the Soviets, also a lot of quite old people. There began to be splits in families, children against the parents, beginning with 1944. Some of the parents believed in the Germans still and the children believed in national Russia. The children would say, "You did not, you parents, succeed in defending Russia. You were drinking and creating counter-revolutions, and we do not trust you." Many of us met this with a great amount of indignation. It was almost impossible to convince

Fedoulenko: this youth. For instance, I had young pharmacy assistants-- ladies. They took Soviet passports and went to Soviet Russia. Such was the great influence of the Soviets in those years! In the Shanghai colony, there were about 12,000 Russians, and out of this number there were, in 1947 primarily, not less than 5,000 who went to the Soviet Union--almost half. For instance, I knew one very respected naval officer who was very sick and dying and he said, "Well, I am hopeless. I want to die in my homeland." By the way, all the youth and even the older ones who went there all ended up in concentration camps. They were arrested and sent to camps. Everything was taken away from them. Many took as much as two pianos and all kinds of goods and furniture. All was taken from them when they got to the Soviet Union. For instance, one of my pharmacists, whom we tried to convince not to go there--I even christened her daughter--went there. We even got into a fight just before they left. I received through a third party a letter from this pharmacy assistant. She wrote, "I feel very good; I feel excellent. I now weigh already 100 pounds." When she left she weighed 140 pounds. You understand what she was trying to say? "Mr. Fedoulenko, you were completely correct in everything. Please send me a parcel." They took their furniture and everything; all of that was taken away from them. They lived in terrible circumstances.

They all left after the war even when there were already

Fedoulenko: Americans there. They did not want to go to America or anywhere else. They would say, "We are Russians. We will prepare a new Russia for them." They would say, "And then you can come to live with us in your old age." They had such illusions, you see. The Soviet authorities did this in order to destroy the emigrés so that there would be no more emigrés. Their main task was to decompose us and to take our youth away. This was especially important for them.

I explained the difference between Shanghai and the Russian situation in Harbin and Tientsin because Shanghai always lived with foreigners and was relatively secure from the Japanese pressures until right during the war. In Tientsin there were relatively few Russians and they were not able to offer resistance. Harbin, however, was completely under control of the Japanese, and the Russian emigrés did not have a chance really to resist. That is why Shanghai was in a privileged situation, and our colony, of course, had been free and had learned to think in free terms. We lived in Shanghai as completely free men. We had a free press, could write everything that we wanted to; there was a completely democratic form of administration, and in the Russian colony, if there were differences they were primarily individual, personal differences. There were not even any great party splits. For instance, the Socialists had absolutely no success whatsoever in our Russian colony in Shanghai, and the Fascists had a very tiny

Fedoulenko: group. They wanted to collaborate with the Japanese during the war, but the Japanese did not welcome them particularly. They were a small and meaningless group. Even the monarchists were completely unsuccessful. The composition of our emigration there came from Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, a middle-class, as the French would say, bourgeoisie. They were not high society, and they were democratically oriented. They remembered that in Siberia life was very free and they had become used to this freedom, and they took to the democratic life completely naturally in Shanghai.

Collapse of the Japanese Army

When the war with Germany was drawing to a close, it was clear that the Allies were winning, and the Japanese had already lost their heart. Everything was collapsing around them. Their military equipment was terrible. We saw, for instance, in Shanghai, how they moved their heavy artillery. They would pull these heavy guns with ropes by hand in the most primitive fashion. Everything was shabby. Their uniforms were in terrible fashion. Some wore black shirts; some wore black pants, obviously using ancient supplies. They had very few machine guns, very little artillery; ammunition was nothing. They had brave fliers, but their equipment was terrible. Once over Shanghai a Japanese plane was flying, and its engine fell on Chinese

Fedoulenko: houses in Taipei. When we first saw American airplanes like silver in the sky, enormous numbers of them, bombers together with fighter planes, it was almost like a fairy tale over Shanghai. If it hadn't been for the dropping of the atomic bomb, and the Japanese had not surrendered, Shanghai would have probably been destroyed. It was a city that was doomed. The Japanese had built a lot of fortification. On each roof they tried to put some kind of machine guns, and blockhouses were built in the city. They wanted to resist everywhere. As I found out later, American aviation had been ordered to bomb all these places. Only one place was supposed to be spared, and that was the big Russian cathedral. We were all convinced that we would all become completely paupers, with all our property destroyed. I took the remnants of my goods and took them to friends who lived near the cathedral, hoping that something would be left. It was only the sudden armistice that saved us.

Two Japanese companies walked on the Avenue Joffre and stopped right in front of our pharmacy. These Japanese soldiers were so poorly disciplined by then; they came into the pharmacy, took off their pants, and relieved themselves right there. On the street they misbehaved completely. There was no discipline. They had no culture. About a year before the end of the war two American or British war prisoners ran away from the Shanghai internment camp. They were hidden by Russians and saved by Russians. Former

Fedoulenko: Russian naval officer Waksmoth saved them, Anatol Waksmoth. He is now in Australia. He stayed with them for three days, and you can well imagine what a terrible danger he was in.

When we heard that the American air forces were planning to bomb Shanghai, I had organized a plan through the Paocha self-defense organization to lead the Russians out of Shanghai. This, of course, we had to keep completely secret from the Japanese because if they had found out they would have retaliated terribly against us. They did not want anyone to know in what a desperate situation they were; nor did they want us to know what victories the Americans had gained. Of course we had excellent information about the developments of the war; although the Japanese tried to keep us completely in the dark we received this information through secret radios. I had a friend, for instance, who had a radio to which she listened at night to hear the news of American army and naval units. Only the chiefs of the regions knew about this plan. But fortunately there was no such bombing.

During the war I did not have any personal contacts with either English or American intelligence but I did have contacts with the French. But the French man later left for Indochina and my connections with him were interrupted. He, of course, was an officer of the French general staff and, I am sure, had close connections with

Fedoulenko: economic intelligence work. They were interested to find out what the Germans were buying from China near the Soviet Union. This was, of course, before 1941. I helped him in this. The Germans trusted me because I was buying German goods and thought that I was favorably inclined to them. His name was Captain Le Jan. Of course the consulate remained but it did not function at all.

When the Japanese emperor declared that he was willing to find peace under any conditions, part of the Japanese military refused to accept this or refused to believe that his took place. And at a meeting in a cinema in Shanghai on Avenue Joffre there took place a bitter fight among the Japanese between those who wanted to and those who refused to obey the emperor's order to surrender. There was a very tense situation which could have led to much unnecessary bloodshed. In only two or three days did they decide to surrender. By this time the Japanese troops in Shanghai were poorly disciplined, poorly dressed--holding up their pants with ropes. When finally the armistice was declared there was a tremendous amount of rejoicing in Shanghai. After all, the Japanese rule was horrible, especially for the Russian colony. The Russian colony celebrated the peace with great enthusiasm. I lived across the street from the French club, which was occupied by the Japanese during the war. During the war I had been ordered to put paper over all of the windows facing that club so that I could not see what went on in the club and in the garden of the

Fedoulenko: club. They had been training there for some kind of resistance. So I had to live for two years with pasted up windows and never opened them because it was very dangerous. When once we went out on the roof when the American planes were flying over, immediately from the house across the street a Japanese started waving guns at us. They did not want us to see what was flying over Shanghai.

After the war the joy of the end of the war was changed into a great deal of anxiety because our Emigré Committee was closed because under General Glebov it had collaborated with the Japanese. We remained in a very strange situation. Even though he had very little support, this had, after all, been the official organization. Many of our social leaders and our military leaders had, after all, failed to organize a resistance to him. At first after the end of the war the Japanese forces remained there to maintain order, but very rapidly the Americans landed and took over. After the war there was no longer any International Settlement or a French Concession, and soon Chiang Kai-shek occupied the city completely. It became a purely Chinese city.

Bolsheviks Urge Return to Russia

This panic in the Russian colony was accentuated by an enormous agitation by the Bolsheviks, who agitated that all emigrés have to go back to Russia, that everything was

Fedoulenko: forgiven, that Stalin was calling us back, that the churches were restored, that military ranks had been restored; and there were many fools who swallowed this and took Soviet passports. But of course over half of our colony did not buy this because they were not used to having any trust in Bolsheviks.

A group of Cossacks got together. Bologov, who had been an aide to Glebov and had been in effect the second vice-president of the Emigré Committee, took over the obligation to reform this Committee. Besides this Soviet agitation, our ranks were confused by the behavior of our own church, which behaved very strangely. For instance, Archbishop Victor, the head of our church in the Far East, took a Soviet passport. Our Shanghai archbishop, John, subordinated himself to Victor, and in our Shanghai churches they mentioned the Moscow patriarch. The Bolsheviks arranged a showing of a movie where they showed the elections of the patriarch in Moscow. Archbishop John went there and many people followed him. It is true that he left after the session, but many remained and there was a big banquet. Many drank a lot and made all kinds of speeches. It was a disgusting spectacle. In this respect he played a very poor role. Later of course, he came to San Francisco. This is the Archbishop John who recently died in San Francisco. He did not take a Soviet passport, but he did subordinate himself to Victor and mentioned the Moscow patriarch in his services. Because of the fact that he had a large following, many of them because of his

Fedoulenko: influence took out Soviet passports. He did not say, "Do not take Soviet passports." We had, because of this, a large misunderstanding with him.

Cossacks, the cadets, and a number of social leaders and military people decided to create something new. Sixty Cossacks said that we would follow Bologov. There was a meeting gathered in the former lodgings of the Emigré Committee, and it was decided to organize a new Committee, because we wanted to return to ourselves our emigré status in China. We knew all along that the Bolsheviki were demanding from the Chinese that all of the Russian emigrés in China be put under the protection of the Soviet consul. You can imagine what this meant. General Chiang Kai-shek categorically refused this to the Bolsheviki. This great step must be especially noted. You know that in Europe and even in America the political refugees from Communism at that time had no protection. You know that even in America a hundred and some refugees from Soviet Russia were returned. In Europe tens of thousands of refugees were returned to Russia. That is why the behavior of General Chiang Kai-shek was so exceptionally noble in relation to us.

New, Untainted Emigré Association Begun

We began immediately to try to obtain through a Chinese lawyer, who had been a secretary of the Kuomintang party,

Fedoulenko: Chinese permission for us to start a new emigré association. According to the Chinese constitution of the Kuomintang they first elected a temporary administration. There were only thirty-six people who first dared to sign the petition to Chiang Kai-shek. The rest of them were afraid. But I signed. Previously to this I played no role in the Committee at all. They asked me because I had had no collaborationist taint to me during the war. I had not taken part in any of the nastinesses of the collaboration with the Japanese, and that's why those who had gathered there asked me and sent me a delegation that I enter this organization as a man who was necessary at this given time. I understood the situation and entered. There were many others of the same conviction as I--almost everybody in fact. There might have been a few who had been a little shaky during the war, but none of them had been openly collaborating. We immediately began to register those of the Russian colony who wanted to be members of the Association. At this time of course all of the Russian newspapers had been closed.

The Russian Emigré Association in Shanghai opened its own newspaper right after the war because at that time in Shanghai there were only Communist Russian newspapers which spread false information among the emigration, disturbed our tranquility and feelings, and caused a lot of trouble. This paper that we started was called the Slovo. It began in 1947 and then the Chinese, for purely commercial reasons because

Fedoulenko: they wanted to have their own Russian newspaper on which they could make money, closed up. They created all kinds of difficulties for us. We, of course, protested and continued to issue our newspaper, but finally the Chinese authorities closed our newspaper, for purely material, economic interests, not for political ones, and started issuing a small Russian newspaper owned by Chinese. It was called Russian-Chinese Newspaper. The representatives of the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek in the International Relief Organization [IRO] in Geneva, a Mr. Wong, was supposed to be defending our interests, instead of that he informed Geneva that the Russians were not at all threatened in China and that all these attempts to move out were totally unnecessary. He tried to throw cold water on our protests and our efforts to get help to get out of Shanghai before the Communists came.

Right after the war Zaria and Slovo were closed. We did not even have a press, but we started sending out letters and by word of mouth and by personal contact we tried to inform the colony of this. This was very easy to do because the masses wanted to join us. This was in April of 1946; and in May we had a meeting of 1,020 people who had registered. We elected an administration and Bologov was elected chairman and I was vice-chairman. This is Gregory Bologov; he is now in San Francisco. He had always been a member of the Emigré Committee, a Cossack. I, as a freshman, was not much experienced,

Fedoulenko: but my presence was necessary, and with all my forces I tried to help. Bologov was elected because he had a gift of a wonderful ability to speak. He was a natural orator; he could light fire in a mass of people. He had a demagogical approach, but he was able to steer the masses to action, and this we needed. The rest of us could speak, but we spoke mostly academically, and we could not influence the crowds. After all, many of the people in the colony were very simple people. The majority of our émigrés were from the lower classes; there were not so many intelligentsia.

Spiritual Mission in China

With the church we had to conduct some very unpleasant talks, and we influenced Archbishop John so that he stopped all his activities with the Soviets. He could not get in touch with the Holy Synod because it was in Munich. We asked Metropolitan Anastasy after five months, when we were able to get in touch with it, to make our Archbishop of Shanghai the head of the spiritual mission in China because we did not recognize Archbishop Victor, and we asked that he move out of the Peking cathedral. He came several times to Shanghai and conducted spiritual services there. The Chinese helped us in this matter. We were not afraid because we knew that behind us stood the Chinese police.

I want to tell you that Victor and other people who occupied such important posts went over to the Bolsheviks

Fedoulenko: very easily. He was a young officer during the Civil War, a lieutenant, I think of the Cossack forces. He did not represent anything and ended up in the emigration, as all of us, without a penny to his name and not knowing anything; and he started working with this special mission in Peking. He was a drunkard, loved to drink. How he conducted himself there I don't know, but his passion for drinking stopped temporarily and he became a monk. Metropolitan Innokentii, who was head of the mission at that time, began to teach him and got him interested in spiritual work and began to like him. He gradually increased him in rank and he made him a priest. Victor at that time behaved very well, conducted beautiful services, and was very respected. Later, Innokentii made him into a bishop and his successor in the Peking spiritual mission. When Innokentii died, Bishop Victor was made Archbishop and became head of the Peking mission. I heard from one priest who is now here, who was at that time in Peking with Victor and was friendly with Victor. He told me in Shanghai how they in Peking used to drink at night. During the day Victor was one kind of a person and at night he was a drunkard. He became extremely fat. Apparently his moral principles were very weak, and when the Japanese fell, he easily and without much obstacle went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. Thanks to this, many of the other spiritual leaders went over also. He later went to Russia and received some position. He was not even persecuted there. For instance,

Fedoulenko: Archbishop Nestor, who was in Harbin and went over to the Bolsheviks, and whom they greeted at first, later was arrested and sent to a concentration camp where he sat for many years. After five years they let him out and kept him in a monastery. Later he was restored and received some kind of position. Two or three years ago, I understand, he died.

Victor is still in Russia as far as I know. Thanks to the help of Metropolitan Anastasy, Bishop John was made Archbishop and in fact became the nominal leader of the spiritual community in China. By order of Metropolitan Anastasy, Victor was fired, but he still remained in the cathedral in Peking. After this a certain amount of church peace was restored. For instance, the services in memory of the Red Army and things like that were stopped.

Goals of Association

The Emigré Association, from the very first days of its work, decided not to hold any charitable balls or collections. We decided that this was not a solid and a firm base for financing. We decided to introduce taxation against our colony--regular taxation. And our Emigré Association conducted charitable work and helped the poor. Thanks to this system, we were rapidly able to create a fund of money. We knew everybody who received what kind of salary and imposed taxation. Of course, this was tiny compared to what we pay here--a very

Fedoulenko: small percentage. Gradually we increased this. The second year of our existence we already had 5,000 members; in the third year we had 6,000; this despite the fact that about 5,000 went over to the Soviets. Thanks to this growth we had a large fund of money with which we could organize a decent hospital and pay decent money to those who worked there. We created a house of aged for the men and a house of aged for the women; and highly respected people directed this work. Before the war these things were maintained by charitable contributions and social affairs. These were highly unpleasant for the Russian colony and a great nuisance to us. The new method was much more efficient. We were able to restore the activities of the scout organizations, the so-called sport group, an orchestra, and even bought a truck to transport our football team and many other things. They also organized a children's camp; and everything was very businesslike. We were able to do these things through the good work of the members of the directorate of the Association and of a very strong support from our membership. In 1947 there grew an opposition to the administration, but it was a very small opposition and purely personal--such things for instance as Vorobohuk who was sore at us because we had not elected him to the committee--small personal items like this. Several Cossacks were hurt and angry at Bologov because he had not thanked them properly for some service that they had performed.

Fedoulenko: Schendrikov, the former socialist, was also elected to it.

Few people liked his socialist convictions and his moral behavior, which was not very worthy of a lawyer, and he had to leave the Committee.

Right after the arrival of the Americans the economic condition of the Russian colony improved greatly. The Americans took many of the Russians to work for them. They had an enormous staff, and many people could find work and they also received excellent wages. They were chauffeurs, cooks, clerks, mechanics, everything. The Russian colony began to live again. Our bank functioned; we had many meetings, organizations; and above all our relations with the Americans were very close and very good. We, of course, had contact with the Americans through the Russian officers who had become Americans and had come into Shanghai as American military personnel. Bologov, Fomin, and I prepared a long report about the condition of the Russian colony in Shanghai which was given to the commander of the American forces--General Wedemeyer--and the American consul in Shanghai. We gave them a report of what we were. Unfortunately I do not have a copy of this document. It might be that Bologov has a copy. Unfortunately, all our archives were lost when we were moving to Tubabao.

Departure from Shanghai Begins, 1947

Fedoulenko: In 1947 those who wanted to go to the Soviet Union started leaving. Of course many of those who took out Soviet passports threw them away, and I would say that in the end only about 3,000 left. The reason for this was that they became disillusioned with the Bolsheviks and saw what they really were. They found out that if they went to the Soviet Union they would be imprisoned. They had received letters from those who had gone to the Soviet Union--letters which had secret codes. From these letters the whole horrible truth of returning to Russia was discovered. About 2,000 at least threw away the Russian passports. There were approximately 1,000 of these who got to Tubabao. The rest were able to arrange for visas into different countries; after all, many could buy visas to Chile, to Paraguay, and to Australia. Disillusionment became very obvious. As far as I know there were no attempts to send Russian emigrants to the Soviet Union in order to conduct intelligence work. Our military intelligence organization had been so destroyed and our future was so unknown that about this we couldn't even think. We could not conduct any active political work by this time against the Communists; we were just anti-Communists. And the accusation by the Soviets that many of the Whites who had returned were agents was absolute bunk. I do not know of anybody of our formerly active emigrés who went to the Soviet Union who was an agent against the Soviet

Fedoulenko: Union.

My decision to go to America was as with everybody else after the war; they all wanted to go to the United States. It was a general desire after the war. Before the war we did not want to go because we lived well in Shanghai and there was no need for us to go to America. But after the war we felt that it was very clear that our days in China were numbered, especially after the arrival of General Marshall on the mission to Chiang Kai-shek. The behavior of General Marshall was so terrible--a grown, old man after forty years of the existence of the Bolsheviks could not understand that one could not come to any agreement with the Bolsheviks. And he suggested that China make a coalition government between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the Communists. Excuse me, only an idiot could make such suggestions, or a man who could not understand anything about politics and was not interested in politics. After all, he was not a fool. I don't understand how a man who occupied such a terribly responsible position could go for such rubbish. By the way, General Wedemeyer had a completely different position. Russian military officers sent a petition to General Wedemeyer which said that this would be the ruin of China and the Far East, and Wedemeyer was completely in agreement with this. And everything happened as he predicted--a war in China, in Korea, and a complete destruction of nationalist China. The accusation that the Chinese generals

Fedoulenko: were worthless--that is true. They were worthless; they were thieves, but squeeze is something that is taken all over the world, even now you see this in the American army in Vietnam. We too have our thieves. So it was in China and Shanghai with the Chiang Kai-shek generals.

When the war was over there were only 250,000 Communist soldiers. These Chinese Communist soldiers were poorly dressed and poorly armed. 'When, however, the negotiations with General Marshall were finished, there were a million and a half Communist forces. They took over the Japanese equipment and much American equipment. We did not interfere in this in Shanghai, but we saw what was happening, and we could foresee the very sad end of the Marshall negotiations.

First Attempts to Emigrate

Literally we began to ask all the consulates to send us someplace, to Latin America, to Australia, to Canada, to the United States. We wrote letters, reports with requests. We asked Russian emigrants who were already living there to help us. MacArthur knew all about this. Before our evacuation to Tubabao, several thousand people left Shanghai. Of the pure emigrés to Tubabao, many left. There were two nationalities then who were not part of our Emigré Association, and about 900 to 1,000 former Soviet citizens. There were about 5,500 Russian emigrés, members of our Association,

Fedoulenko: who went to Tubabao. After all, the International Relief Organization did not finish the evacuation from Shanghai. They are afraid to give you exact figures. There were approximately 4,000 members of the Russian Emigré Association. About 500 stayed in Shanghai for various personal reasons. Some could not liquidate their houses; some could not sell their business; and there were some factory owners, vodka manufacturers who remained to liquidate their enterprises but were liquidated themselves.

We had connections with Catholic organizations, with Protestant organizations, I personally was connected with the organization through Pastor Wildcock, who tried to get all of our Russian colonies into Argentina, but unfortunately his attempts were not successful. The project was to send all of those willing on three or four ships to Argentina. We were willing to go for anything as long as we could get out of China. The Protestant organizations, Pastor Gurov, tried to get us admitted into Australia. He was a former Russian who became a Methodist--a very wonderful person. He had great hopes to get many of us to Australia, but nothing very much happened at first. Most of the countries were very skeptical of us. Information about us was so distorted and so wrong. It was given to America, to the English, to Canadians--I don't know by whom, but I'm sure by our enemies. It was very difficult for the emigrés to receive visas to America. Many of those who

Fedoulenko: had Soviet passports had an easier time because American authorities would say, "Well, if they aren't suitable for our country, we know where to send them. We can send them back to the Soviet Union. But those who are stateless, where are we going to send them if they turn out to be bad material?" Finally one American major managed to convince the American consulate in Shanghai to give us more application forms so that we could begin applying. We had a very difficult time with the medical inspection. After all, many of us, most of us, had gone through civil war, were wounded, and had been sick and because of this very frequently we were not allowed to enter, especially because of various spots that were discovered on our lungs. No matter what explanations we made, the official would say, "Well, rules are rules." We had to go through one year probation period. Some waited and succeeded in getting out, but some could not. This was especially in connection with tuberculosis. We had to have guarantees, affidavits, before we would be admitted to the United States. At the end of 1948, when the situation in China became highly critical and the Chinese Communists were coming closer and closer to Shanghai, we were terribly worried and we were sending telegrams and reports wherever we could.

Evacuation to Tubabao, 1949

Fedoulenko: From January 1, 1949, we were gathered into a hall and IRO declared to us that they had received a telegram which declared that all members of the Russian Emigré Association would be moved to the Philippines, in the number of 6,000 people. At that time, Bologov was already on Tubabao, and I became Chairman. When this was declared there was a tremendous elation. We would be able to go to the Philippines from Shanghai and then gradually go somewhere. The first ship went from Shanghai on the 14th of January, 1949, taking 500 Russian emigrés--members of our Association. We sent primarily children and family people and youth, of course. The second ship was delayed for a while and left on the 6th of February, and there were several airplanes which also transported some of us to the Philippines.


Difficulty with the IRO

Right in the middle of this evacuation we received bad news from Tubabao that the first contingent that came there had landed on an empty shore. They were given old tents and told, "Go ahead and organize yourselves." But this was temporary. We would go under any conditions. We understood that the IRO could not organize the camp right

Fedoulenko: away, but then gradually the camp started to organize itself.

The Russian electricians, plumbers, carpenters organized everything rapidly. They built an electric station, a waterworks, well-organized bathrooms. They paved roads. The IRO paid for the evacuation. At this moment, in February, we heard that there were disturbances in Tubabao because the chief of the IRO was very unsympathetic to us. We convinced Bologov to go ahead, and he flew away on an airplane to Tubabao. I succeeded in sending out two more ships and then suddenly I was notified that the evacuation had stopped. Mr. Clark, who was the representative of the IRO in Shanghai, an Englishman, frightened us terribly. We had a meeting of our Association, and all of our Committee went to see him. He met with us and I told him, "Your decision to stop the evacuation amazes us because we received from you yourself from Geneva that Geneva had authorized the evacuation of 6,000 people." I don't know why he made this decision. And I told him, "We cannot agree with your decision to stop the evacuation, and I want to know what you have to say about this." He answered, "The Philippine government cannot take all of you emigrés. First those who have arrived must be sent away to various countries, and then we can gradually let others of you come in." We said to him, "Mr. Clark, you are laughing at us. We are political emigrés. In two or three months Communists will arrive

I. R. O. TUBABAO CAMP



Fedoulenko: in Shanghai, and then they will send us all to concentration camps where we will all die. How can you tell me such nonsense. I want to warn you," I said to him, "I still have a lot of people here. These people are in such a condition that I cannot give you any guarantee for you nor for your building. They might very well just decide to attack your building and destroy it because they have nothing to lose. Don't joke with us, Mr. Clark," I said to him. I told him, "Without your authority I sent a telegram to Geneva and to New York and to President Truman and also to San Francisco to our Russian organizations telling them what you are doing. I also sent a telegram to Tubabao." I said, "I've been sending telegrams everywhere." I told him, "Be careful, because it will be very bad for you. Don't think we are small people." Then after these threats, in several days, I received the news that the evacuation would be continued. He obviously received orders from Geneva. I don't know what his aims were. This is a dark matter, literally a dark matter. I don't know who was putting pressure on him. I think however that it was a Bolshevik ploy. They had to stop us because they wanted to destroy all of the Russian emigration to China. This conflict was terrible because all of the responsibility lay on my shoulders. You can imagine what a terrible thing it was and what I went through. I was telling Clark with desperation, "It is very easy for us to shoot ourselves. Our lives will be worth

Fedoulenko: nothing if the Communists come." By this time I had sold my pharmacy. I sold my pharmacy in December of 1948 for \$7,000 and after all the expenses I had \$5,000 left. All of us lived just waiting for the moment to leave Shanghai. I said, "Whether or not there will be an evacuation, I'll still leave. I'll go to Formosa if I have to." We had plans to take a ship over by force. We had our own captains, our own mechanics; everything was organized and ready. We had commands of sailors. At that time there were at least 2,000 Russian members of the Association still left, at least 2,500, I think. They wanted to take a ship if we had to and just go to Formosa. We would have stopped at nothing, even force. Everything was ready. Our desperation was terrible. At this time there were no Soviets left in Shanghai except those who had thrown away their Soviet passports or agents who were writing in newspapers telling us that in Tubabao there would be snakes and crocodiles and we would all die. I finally received a letter from a military attache of the Americans in Shanghai who finally found me and told me, "Mr. Fedoulenko, I want to tell you that you must leave Shanghai for Tubabao right away, because I was informed from there that in the first place you are needed there and secondly it's dangerous for you to remain here. If you stay until the last ship, you will be arrested and after the ship has gone you will be let out."

Fedoulenko: By that time the Chinese authorities were very unreliable. Most of the Chinese officials were going over to the Communist side, and one could not rely on them. I then left on the last but one ship. I arrived on Tubabao on the 6th of April, 1949; that means I left Shanghai about the first of March, 1949.

Some Left Behind

There remained approximately 800 people. There was one more ship, in which 300 of our people and some other nationalities left. There was supposed to be one more ship, but the IRO did not send it. We don't know what happened to the people who did not leave. The airplane flights had stopped already--in February. I believe some of them received visas to Australia. The remainder fell under the Communist rule, and only the old ones and the invalids were sent out. The evacuation of these old people took about five years; some of them are still leaving via Hong Kong, but these are primarily old people from Harbin. As for the active Whites of the 500 that remained, we never heard from them. I received a letter afterwards. For the first year after the Communists took over they did not pay much attention to the Russians. One was publicly executed on the Shanghai airfield for supposedly being an American spy. Many of the rich Chinese were murdered. Towards the end, while I still had my pharmacy, a number of Russians who could not

Fedoulenko: get out of Shanghai came to me and asked me for poison.

I feel that the responsibility for the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek government and the takeover of China by the Communists was due not only to Chiang Kai-shek himself but was also the fault of those who surrounded him and even of those who did not give him proper support, such as the English and American authorities. After all, China was always the country of bribes. That was how they lived. Everything was purchased, including ranks and position, by bribe. The Americans approached this question very incorrectly. Chiang Kai-shek himself had lost faith and confidence because he did not feel any support from America, and American actions caused him to be unsure of himself and at the same time there was a fantastic agitation from the side of the Communists. This indecision caused many of the generals of Chiang Kai-shek to go over to the side of the Communists, just in case, a typical Chinese attitude. Because after all, they would buy and sell and switch their loyalties rather easily.

FROM TUBABAO TO SAN FRANCISCO, 1949 TO PRESENT

Conditions of Refugee Camp

Fedoulenko: When I arrived in Tubabao I was impressed by the camp because I saw the working, happy people who had hope and who were waiting to go to America, to Australia, to build a different and new life. These people felt that they had been saved. The attitude of the Filipinos to us was wonderful. Captain Tini, one of the Filipino commanders in Tubabao, was a real friend.

When I arrived in Tubabao I found that it was in a more or less organized state. Everybody had tents. There were separate tents for families; there were tents for groups of single men and women. Everything was being fixed up. Streets had already been laid out, electrical and water works had been organized and so was a police force, and further they even set up a court. If a Russian was being tried, then there would be a Russian judge; if another person were being tried, then there would be other judges, because there we had Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and quite a number of other nationalities. If there was a Ukrainian or a Pole who was being tried, then the judge would be of the same nationality. These

Fedoulenko: laws that we set up were organized by the IRO. The police was armed, of course, only with sticks. All of the Russians on the police force were former policemen in Shanghai.

In the camp there were eleven nations and by recommendation of the IRO each nation elected a committee member which sat as an Administrative Council for the camp. The Russians being the largest group, the president of the Council was a Russian. This Council was the administrative head of the camp, the "ministry" of the camp. Bologov was the president of the Council. All this was organized before I came, and I was not a member of this Council.

The camp was divided into regions and each region elected its own administrative unit. There were over five and a half thousand people in this camp. There was an attempt to keep the nationalities together in groups. IRO helped us in this respect. The cooks were elected, so were the bakers. Each region assigned its own workers for work. Everybody up to fifty-five was mobilized for work, and women up to fifty, beginning with seventeen or eighteen. The easier work in the kitchen over making tea was given to the women, of course. Each region had its own kitchen and huge tanks of water where hot water was boiled.

The bathrooms were arranged very cleanly and very neatly. There were even special bathrooms for cripples. Hygiene was organized in the strictest fashion and was maintained by the regional chief as well as by the IRO officials. Each man had

Fedoulenko: to work, and he did not get paid for this. It was, in effect, a sort of a commune. A very interesting experiment. I lived there for approximately fourteen months. The police were not paid either.

When the IRO organized the resettlement of the camp's members into different countries, it did not have enough of a staff to do the clerical work and they would take people from our camp, and of course then they would pay them. There were about fifteen such people working there, and they received a small salary. Also, engineers who worked in the camp received certain special compensations--for instance, those who laid out the waterworks. There were some who were paid well, and others didn't get paid at all. Then, of course, most of the people didn't receive a penny for anything. Everything was free. Food was free, clothing was free, and even shoes were free. We received, however, quite a bit of parcels from Russians in America and from elsewhere. They sent us medicine, clothing, and many other things.

We were restricted to the camp and could only go to the beach outside of the camp. We had to have a special permit to go into the neighboring town. And it was not that difficult to get a permit. The Filipinos were very courteous and hospitable people. They gave us permits rather easily and treated us very well. In fact it was rather advantageous for them to have us there because we spent quite a bit of money. And there were soon many Filipino traders close

Fedoulenko: to the camp who built little shack with small stores where they sold all kinds of items to members of the camp. They even organized small restaurants and all kinds of other things. Of course we had a church in the barracks made out of wood. There was even a special region for the monks and nuns as well as for the main cathedral there. It was a distance away from the main part of the camp, but we would go there on foot. It was a former Catholic church. There was also an excellently equipped hospital in wooden barracks where the Russian doctors helped. Of course there was an IRO doctor who was a Chinese, but he was a complete crook who did not understand anything about medicine, had never been a doctor, and was a graduate of an administrative medical school, which has nothing to do, of course, with medicine. IRO didn't particularly care one way or another, and incidentally, in this respect the IRO treated us very poorly. It was absolutely impossible to get any streptomycin for tuberculosis; one had to have somebody send it from America; IRO did not furnish any such medicines. Of course we had many Russian doctors there who worked for free in the hospital. It is interesting to note that the engineers were paid for work but the doctors were not. I don't really know why. For instance, the dentists received money for their work. For instance, if he had to fill your tooth with gold, why he had some gold and he would sell it to you, and therefore he made some extra money. But the regular medical doctors were not paid.

Fedoulenko: We were fed rather poorly even though the cooks were Russians. Rations were very small, and when Senator Knowland came and saw what we were eating he had a hard time finding anything in the soup besides water. He told the chief of the camp that of course with this kind of soup one cannot feed people. And besides soup we got rice or kasha. We got meat very seldom--two or three tiny little pieces of meat in the soup. Of course the children were fed very well. They received milk, and they got special rations. There was special attention for them from the IRO; this we must say in truth. But for the grownups the food was very poor, especially for Russians who had been used to eating a lot in Shanghai after the war. It was very hard to buy any meat in the Philippines because the hens would not lay any eggs that had anything in them. I bought a dozen eggs at first, and of them almost none had anything edible inside. These crazy chickens in the Philippines flew around like blackbirds and didn't attend to laying eggs. They are used to flying there, because otherwise all kinds of snakes would eat them up. Anyway, they were not our kind of Russian hens. Of course we had some young people who would catch these hens in the jungles and eat them. There were a lot of rats there who were dangerous for the health. As far as the Soviet rumors that had been spread in Shanghai that there would be python snakes and crocodiles--of course we didn't have any in the camp. I did see a snake once close to the camp and I told the snake, "What the devil are

Fedoulenko: you doing here?" and she up and ran away. Of course there were many scorpions in the camp, but nobody died of them. And there were also centipedes; they were terrible, but again, they never did more than infect the skin. There were no crocodiles, of course, in the jungle. There were a lot of bats and once a whole group of them attacked a man who was sleeping outside, but again these were not serious things. Fortunately there were no mosquitoes at all to bother us. The reason for this was that sanitation facilities were excellent, and very strict control was maintained. All garbage and refuse was being gathered up very carefully and taken outside of the camps and buried. The climate was terrible, of course, just murderous. The wet period, the rainy period where the rain fell upon us like sheets of water and went on for days and days without stopping, was something we had not been used to. Of course we had paved our streets so we could move from one place to another, but it was terrible anyway. All done by Russian hands. Those who had money were able to purchase wooden floors for their tents. The others just trampled the ground down. Even those who didn't have money were able to get different pieces of wood from the Filipinos when these were being brought for building various barracks and other items in the camp. Everybody had cots, of course, and each family had its own tent, or two single women would have a tent. If it was for a family then the tent would be larger.

Fedoulenko: There were no serious trials. The most important thing was drunkenness again. People were able to obtain terrible Filipino liquor. Vodka was unobtainable, and whisky was very expensive, but this Filipino stuff really made people drunk very fast. These drunks would be brought, after they sobered up, to court and the court would send them to a small barracks with windows where they would sit for a length of time. Of course they were fed there. It was a terrible situation with two very beautiful and educated women who were terrible drunks--something awful--unbelievably beautiful women who were really alcoholics. They came from Shanghai, and there was always trouble with them. Finally, after a long time, they were forced to behave. But there were no such things as big robberies or murders or anything like that. I would say that on the whole the people in the camp really helped themselves very well. Of course one of the reasons for this was that we did not allow any of the real Shanghai criminals to become members of our Emigrant Association and therefore did not bring them with us to Tubabao. They remained there in Shanghai. Our committee absolutely refused to accept any of the major criminals, and if they were excluded they could not come in with us. Finally IRO brought some sixty stateless people who were unworthy of being emigrés, and they stayed in the camp too. They were not allowed to go to Australia or America; I think they went either to Paraguay or to Chile, someplace. ~~That~~'s where also collaborationists went. For

Fedoulenko: instance, there was a murderer who had killed a priest in Harbin. We never accepted him, but finally IRO brought him over and I think he went over to Chile. Despite all these mistakes of the IRO, the camp lived in a remarkably moral manner. The IRO, however, did help us; for instance we organized a theater. We built a barrack which was like a real theater with benches, a stage, and it was very successful, especially during the time when there was no rain.

There were many schools there for small children, not a high school. Although we had many teachers and some professors, it was very difficult to organize everything for higher education. The kids of fourteen and fifteen didn't go to school, but the parents supervised them very strictly and there were no examples of bad behavior. We had a strong moral tone, and the teenage girls were most of the time helping their parents, fixing the tents, sewing, helping to do cooking, and things like that. They would also take care of the smaller children.

At first we just had cold showers, but after a while we were able to arrange for even hot showers. After about twelve o'clock at night the camp all went to sleep and nobody was allowed to walk around.

From the very first days we had difficulties with the International Relief Organization. Most of these IRO administrators had come from Europe where they had gotten used to considering camps as prisons and camp inmates as criminals, and that is why

Fedoulenko: they treated us in a very cavalier and rude fashion. We put a stop to this very rapidly, however. They wanted to make obedient slaves out of us, but we told them, "We are democrats; we are used to living in freedom in Shanghai and under democratic conditions. We are not criminals; we are just the same kind of people as you are. We demand a correct and proper relationship with us." We told them that we were there accidentally because of the Communists, and after a long and stubborn struggle we were able to accomplish this, especially with the help of the Philippine chieftains, and we were able to get rid of the poor, bad IRO personnel.

Thanks to our vigilance we were able to stop a terrible betrayal on the part of the IRO. We by accident found out by getting a report which had been sent to Geneva where 1,800 of our emigrés were portrayed as invalids and ne'er-do-wells. This was a complete provocation and a complete lie, just as it was written of one of my friends who was living in San Francisco--a certain Mr. K. Algazin--that he didn't have a leg. The American authorities before he was given a visa asked him to walk. Several times he had to walk up and down the streets and the American man said, "What kind of wonderful wooden leg do you have?" Then he explained that he didn't have a wooden leg. The purpose for this nastiness was that we would be sent as an undesirable element to Austria, to DP camps there. I'm convinced that the hand of the Bolsheviks played a part here. They wanted to destroy us; that was one of their great ambitions.

Fedoulenko: In this terrible, nasty report, they also said that we were scoundrels, and of course no country would want to accept such. When we found out about this we immediately turned for help to the Philippine authorities to find out what was wrong, what was the reason for such terrible denunciations. We sent protests and telegrams and the Filipinos said, "We would defend these people; we would even send our soldiers to prevent them from being forced to be evacuated to Austria." For this we are very grateful to the Filipinos.

Senator Knowland Observes

In November, 1949, Senator Knowland visited the camp and for this we were very grateful. He helped improve the conditions of the camp--food, tents, many other things. He sent new tents, and he influenced the administration of the IRO greatly. We had already been in touch with Senator Knowland from Shanghai. We discovered which senators were really anti-Communist and this opened the road to us. Friends in America and California told us about this, especially California senators like Knowland. He was the principal anti-Communist senator. We wrote to him from Shanghai, telling him who we were and what we were. Having heard that we had been moved to Tubabao, he decided to visit us. We showed him of whom our camp consisted--of different specialities and abilities. For instance, a group of agricultural workers, of farmers, and another

Fedoulenko: group of carpenters, of mechanics, of doctors, of teachers, and of people of other specialities. There was a group of engineers, for instance. So we had something to show him actually. He was there for a whole day with us and categorically promised to really help us and to try to get us to come into the United States. We also succeeded in getting some of the Russians permitted into Australia and a special Australian commission came to visit us. But they chose only young people. They did not want any of the old ones--absolutely refused to have old ones. If you were over fifty-five you had no chance at all to get to Australia. If you were parents and you had grown children, then of course they would allow it, but not otherwise. They took 1,800 people from our camp. A few people got visas to France, to Santo Domingo. But there was a pretty terrible situation there. Although many wanted to go, fortunately very few actually succeeded in getting there, because in Santo Domingo conditions were terrible on the part of Santo Domingo government. The Russians who got to Santo Domingo were arrested, completely stolen from, and it was with great difficulty that we succeeded in getting them out of Santo Domingo. The nasty dictator did whatever he wanted to with our Russians. We finally succeeded barely to snatch them out from the clutches of the dictator. If he found out that you were rich, then you were completely robbed. "I like what you have given to me," --that was his attitude. Of course there was a lot of work; for instance the draftsmen worked very

Fedoulenko: nicely, but even they ran away from that country. The Dutch West Indies in Guiana, South America, gave a few visas; I think it is called Surinam. Few people went there. That was it. The rest of them were hoping to get to America. Ninety per cent wanted to go to America, ninety-five per cent even. After everybody who could got their quotas, there were about 1,500 Russians and another 1,000 of other countries left in the camp. These we finally, after a long time, were able to get to America--over 1,000 through the World Social Church Service and the Methodist Federation. Others came by affidavits--about a thousand.

When Knowland came to us in 1949 there were practically no chances for us to get to America. There was a bill that was passed through Congress, but for some reason or other we had not been included in this bill, and there were almost no chances for us to get here. I don't really know why; they probably forgot us. Knowland was with us in November of 1949. He, of course, promised to give us all the co-operation possible. We did not discuss the bill with him, of course. This was due unfortunately to the fact that we had entrusted all of this matter to Archbishop John who came to Washington with a translator and turned to the commission in charge of this in the Senate of the United States; and he gave a report. Of course they turned him down in January of 1950. I don't really know why, but as it was reported later, his general outside appearance did not create a very favorable impression. They

Fedoulenko: said that he had a very strange appearance and that he gave a negative impression to the commission, and that is why, I think, they turned us down. Then we were forced to appeal directly to Senator Knowland, who received from us first a telegram and then a very exact report. He replied to us by telegram that he would do everything that he could. And in April of 1950 he gave a report to the Senate about us, and the Senate passed an amendment in accord with Knowland's report, and we of course received a right of 4,000 people to come from the camp. There was an enormous, unbelievable rejoicing in the camp, but unfortunately after this rejoicing there was a period of disappointment because there were about 1,500 people in camp who had no friends or relatives in America to give them either affidavits or assurances. These assurances were a legal form which was necessary and required for admission to the United States. To receive assurances was not very easy. We again turned to Archbishop John, who turned to the Church World Service. He did not give us any direct reply but said that you have deviated from pure orthodoxy and for this God is punishing you. Do you understand what I am trying to say? In fact, he refused to give us additional help, turning to this large organization. So we remained in a very difficult situation.

Interesting the San Francisco Colony in Tubabao Refugees

Fedoulenko: Our only hope was on the Russians in San Francisco, who at that time had plans to organize an association of Russian charitable organizations, who would turn to the United States authorities for help, who would send requests to the State Department to give us assurances for the individuals who could not get assurances by themselves. Because of the personal qualities of the leaders of this federation, such as V. Borzoff, who was very unpopular with many because of his rudeness, many of the Russian organizations did not want to join this federation, and everything was being stopped. It was only after my arrival when I addressed all the organizations at the Russian Center that something happened. I told them that I did not particularly like Borzoff, but I had to work with him because our task was to help the people who still remained in Tubabao. "I would work with anybody as long as this would help get the people out of Tubabao. I am doing this for the sake of saving the people, and I am willing to collaborate with anybody."

I arrived here on the 17th of June, 1950. I received a visa as an ordinary immigrant. Two of my classmates sent me affidavits. At that time in Tubabao without any assurances there remained Russians who waited for affidavits, waiting in their turn, and stateless people. Bologiv remained there as the representative of the colony. He was not admitted readily at

Fedoulenko: first.

When I came to Manila on my way to America, then when I was saying good-bye to a Mr. Thompson who was the chief director of the IRO, he told me that he was very happy for my sake, that I was going to the United States, but that he had some bad news for me. He told me that the amendment that passed Congress gave our people very little chance because despite the fact that 4,000 people were admitted we would only get about 700 visas because the IRO would use this number to admit people from all of the Pacific Ocean areas, including Japan and even Canada. I told him, "Mr. Thompson, we're used to struggle, and I guarantee you that we will continue to struggle for the right of our people to enter the United States."

In Tubabao there were people not only from Shanghai but from Tientsin, from Harbin, from every place in China where Russians lived. There were there five associations: Shanghai, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Hankow, and Peking. From Harbin there was no association, just individual people. They were not a separate organization but entered our Shanghai association. Those Russians who lived in Japan--there were very few of them--were fairly prosperous and they didn't have any terrible problems. When I arrived here with all these difficult things facing me in June of 1950 with my wife, I was met only by my friends. None of the people of the Russian community were particularly interested, and the Russian newspapers did not mention my arrival. Only in the end of August, the Cossacks under the push of Mr. Petrov, being incensed by this silence

Fedoulenko: placed a small notice about my arrival. Soon after my arrival I received from the five emigré organizations in China an authorization to ask for the admission of those Russians who were still on Tubabao. I was requested to co-ordinate my activities with Borzoff. Very soon I became convinced that the Russian emigré organizations surely would not be able to cope with this task. It could not really fulfill this task because the federation had not been confirmed by the government. This would not become apparent until September. On the face of it there was a lot of indifference and a fear of taking responsibility on the part of the responsible members of the Russian charitable organizations in the matter of the Russian emigrés of our camp. Working through the press and through articles of Zaitsev in the local newspapers--a man with whom I began to collaborate closely in this matter--we called for an increase in the obtaining of affidavits from the Russian colony to help us. Nikolai Ivanovich Mamontov and V. Ponomarenko, both Cossacks, helped us greatly both personally and with the help of the house of St. Vladimir. A Mr. Barsky was able to obtain a number of affidavits for us. Of course a number of others did the same thing. The San Francisco Russian population gave us the largest number of affidavits, besides people from Tubabao--actually the help of local citizenry. There were about 1,500 individual affidavits obtained for entry.

The name of the federation was the Russian Charity

Fedoulenko: Federation of San Francisco whose president was Nikolaievsky, owner of the sewing mills. The director was Barzov, who is an engineer but a very unpopular man thanks to his character, which is terrible. After one of our meetings I met his father at the Russian Center, an old man, a former director of a gymnasium, a very respected person. He greeted me and said, "I am really very happy to get to know you and I wanted to see you because I am amazed how you can possibly work with my son." I replied to him, "You know I work with everybody, but we work together like two dogs on a chain we are constantly fighting each other." This organization is no longer functioning. It was a temporary organization in order to bring these immigrants from Tubabao. In September 1950, when it was recognized by the American government, it began functioning. The members of the directory were Barzov, Barsky, Gromoff, and Petroff. Loginoff was a paid secretary. They themselves could not bring anybody and could not give guarantees. Even though they had the legal right to do it, they could not personally guarantee. So what we did was tell the Russian community in San Francisco that whoever wanted to bring their relatives or their friends were perfectly welcome to do so. And they could do so under the auspices of the Russian Charity Federation. More than 450 people were brought in by this federation.

Indifference of Some Russian Organizations to Refugee Plight

Fedoulenko: I must say that I was amazed by the attitude and indifference of some organizations, the Russian organizations, to the plight of the Russian refugees. For instance, I asked the Russian Center to give me some free use of their basement which was empty. I told them that I would be able to place eight or nine people in this area, I had my own beds and my own mattresses and everything--all they needed was lodging and I would be able to give them minimal amounts of funds to sustain them until they got settled. To my amazement the president of the Center, Bikoff, and his aide Trei told me, "Excuse us, but we are not a charitable organization but a club. We cannot help you with anything." You see what the attitude was.

Even the churches did not help us very much, they gave us no help whatsoever in fact. I asked the Archbishop Tihon to give us some help but he did not do anything. I also asked Archbishop John Shakouski for his help to bring in one person from Harbin, a daughter of a priest who had been taken by the Bolsheviks to Siberia. He also refused me. I don't even know on what basis he refused, he never answered me personally but just had this message transmitted that he could not help.

In the meantime General Varguin, who was active in the Troitsky church and in the Russian Center, very much wanted to

Fedoulenko: help and said, "We have 360 parishioners. I will talk to the archbishop. Maybe we can get some of these refugees brought in, maybe even as many as two per parishioner." "This would be marvelous," I said. "I am ashamed of the Russian colony because nobody wants to help, not even the churches." The professors in Berkeley did not give much help either. None of them helped whatsoever.

When I came here I saw that the question of the salvation of our people in the camp was in unworthy hands and that the Russian organizations here, despite all their effort and writings and addresses to American authorities could not realistically give us real help. We are very grateful to them for this work, but to obtain the assurances--the 1,500 assurances--that we had to have for friendless and familyless people, for this they could not really do anything as individuals. In order to save these 1,500 people I struggled for two and a half months getting acquainted with the local situation, and finally I decided to turn to the American church organizations. I went to Pastor Gurov, an old Shanghai Russian Cossack who was a Protestant. He was a great humanist and a very sincere person. I asked him, "In what way did you succeed in getting 150 sectarians from Tubabao?"

Methodist Committee of Aid

Fedoulenko: He told me that this was done through the Methodist Committee of Aid. I asked him if he could give me an address so I could turn myself to them. He said, "Of course, with great pleasure. And I will also give you not only the address but also the address of my daughter, Lena, who is now in New York. Write to her and write a report and give her an idea of what the camp is, and she will see what she can do. This will be even better than if you go yourself," he said. Then she turned to the bishop of the Methodist Church, read to him everything that I sent, and gave personal information to him; and the bishop turned her down. He said, "We have received information about the camp of Tubabao--that it is a terrible group of people. We have heard that they are all drunks, and pro-Soviets, and criminals, and that the women there are something like port prostitutes." This is what the bishop said to her. Then she wrote me a letter in desperation, telling me about this. And then I said to her by letter, "Ask the bishop where he heard this." And he replied, "From the State Department and the IRO and the World Church Social Service." I am sure that Bolsheviks and collaborators of Bolsheviks gave this information to the State Department. Then I wrote to her another letter asking her to again address herself to the bishop. She is a very modest woman, who again explained to the bishop. She

Fedoulenko: caught him in this way: she said, "You don't believe Fedoulenko. Of course you don't know him." The bishop said, "Why should I believe Fedoulenko when I have information from such reliable sources in the State Department?" Then she said--very clever woman--"Would you believe me?" The bishop said, "Of course I would believe you." And then she said, "I am also from Tubabao." Of course the bishop did not know this--this old bishop. He jumped up from the chair and came up to her with tears in his eyes and said, "You are calling me to fulfill the precepts of Christ and here I am turning you down." Thanks to this we had complete success. The bishop said, "Tell Fedoulenko I will guarantee at least 100 assurances immediately." Then he called her in the next day and said, "I will give you 200 more assurances." He immediately made a list of people, and 314 people were admitted. I wrote directly to Dr. Warfield of the Methodist Church, asking him to admit 314 persons because I could not divide the families and he said, "Of course."

These assurances took a long time, but still they came through. An assurance is something as follows: if you are trying to get a certain person in, you have to undertake the obligation to meet him, to arrange for his lodgings, and to get him a job. This was a responsibility that you undertook for one year. If you gave an affidavit then it was a question of five years. This, of course, is something that frightened a lot of people because they took the responsibility of maintaining a person for a whole year at least. But I must tell you that

Fedoulenko: it turned out that our people from Tubabao turned out beautifully. Many people swore at me because I was making blacklists and things like that but I had to be very careful. It was very difficult to choose people. But none of the people that I chose turned out badly. I then wrote to Warfield, asking him to give us some more assurances, and he did. I told him that there were several hundred more who remained there--there were still some 1,200 remaining. Warfield replied to me, "We have been trying to get more, but we will wait for the first ship to come." When the first ship arrived it brought a small number of people. This was in November of 1950. You see how fast everything went. These ships were special IRO ships--commercial ships, passenger and cargo ships, but they were large and good ships. Everybody had plenty of room and could bring their luggage with them without any problems. They fed us well, but of course we had to do all the work aboard the ship--cooking and things like that. This was not a pleasure trip; there was a lot of work. They did not sit on their hands aboard the ship. It was a work trip but of course the happiness of the people was enormous.

When the first group arrived they turned out to be wonderful people, and the Methodists thanked me for bringing such good people in. For instance, two daughters had a blind father, and Dr. Warfield arranged for his coming too. We got several more Cossacks who were over seventy years old without any families, but the Methodists and I after many problems managed to get

Fedoulenko: them settled. Because Bologov was still there I in fact became the representative of the refugees from Tubabao in America. Of course there were others, but it fell on me to do the main work. I personally could not get a job because I was too busy with the Methodist committee and Church World Service. They told me that if we wanted to get these people in I should do all of the heavy work--that meant making all of the affidavits to be filled out.

Financing the Evacuation

They gathered \$2,500 in Tubabao which I was given in order that I be able to get the refugees into this country, but these funds remained in Tubabao and they were spent there. I was obligated to spend the money of the emigrés. But there was so little of it that if I had done so then I would have nothing left very soon. Therefore from the emigré monies I only spent \$900 during the whole year. I spent that by giving small subsidies to people who had just arrived and who were penniless, and of course my mail expenses were enormous because I had to send packages by special delivery almost daily because speed of course was essential. I also had to send many telegrams and I had to travel a lot.

For instance the Association of Protestant Ministers asked that I arrive to give them a report. I went with a good translator. The group of ministers arranged a very nice supper

Fedoulenko: for me and then the Episcopal pastor who picked me up in San Francisco and who drove me back introduced me and I gave them a short speech. There were pastors from all kinds of denominations including Catholics. They asked me all kinds of questions, questions dealing with theology as well as those of matters dealing with the Tubabao refugees. This meeting was a complete triumph because after it all of them endorsed the idea of helping the Tubabao refugees. From then on the Church World Service became very co-operative and helped me get numerous settlers in Tubabao sponsored to the United States. This activity was so time-consuming that I of course could not start working. This lasted until spring, 1951, when the last ship arrived from Tubabao. After that there was nobody left in Tubabao except a few sick people who were sent to France.

All this time I had to live on the few dollars that I had obtained from selling my pharmacy in Shanghai. I had to buy a car, and I bought a house. It was a shame to tell the others that I could no longer continue working on the refugee problem and to stop my work in midstream. When finally I was finished with my task I was returned the \$900 that I had advanced for the expenses, and that is all.

I spent over \$4,500 in that one first year. That was all of my savings. My wife after eight months residence here went to work in a sewing factory. But all this is not very important. The most important thing was that we managed to

Fedoulenko: get all of the refugees here. Many of the refugees from Tubabao never knew who was getting them out of the camp. I also encountered much unpleasant attitudes from the IRO. The IRO office in Tubabao inquired from the World Church Service and the Methodist Organization on what basis they had given me the right to bring people in from abroad. The IRO claimed that they had the right to do so only. The Church World Service sent me a copy of their letter as well as a copy of the answer to the letter. Bologov arrived here in March of 1951. The World Church Service was composed of Episcopal, Methodist and other Protestant denominations. They helped us very much. When the first ship arrived, Mr. Blair was in charge of greeting this first ship; he was from the Tolstoy Foundation. He asked me, "Are you a Methodist?" I said "No, I am a Greek Orthodox." He said, "Well, it's impossible, I won't believe you. Because only a Methodist could have influenced the Methodist organizations as much as you have." The next day I met him for lunch at the Palace Hotel and he promised to give me 100 assurances from the Tolstoy Foundation. I was able to obtain finally 150 assurances from that foundation. The Countess Tolstaia did a tremendous amount of work on this. She personally spent much time and raised much money to obtain these necessary assurances.

Employment Opportunities

Raymond: What percentage of all those for whom you obtained assurances and entry permits turned out to be problems?

Fedoulenko: In fact there were almost none such. There were a few due to advanced age, for instance. There was an old lady who was eighty-two whose husband had died and whose son had died suddenly so she was left without any means of support. But those were very minor instances. Nobody lost any of the money that they had guaranteed. But those who could work all went to work. There were almost no loafers in our colony. And none of those who signed guarantees for the admission for these refugees from Tubabao lost any money. This can be explained by the fact that for the first time in their lives these refugees found such working conditions in America about which they had not even dreamed in China or in the Philippines and to them working in America was truly a great joy. That's why this situation inspired them. Even a simple janitor here received enormous amounts of money by our standards in China. That is without any specialization, without any special knowledge. We can't even compare the way we lived here to the way we lived in the Far East. And of course we came here at a time when there was no unemployment and things were quite prosperous. They could have never obtained the kind of houses they did here in the old days in China. Take, for instance, the beautiful cathedral that we built. It's only due to the very, very exceptional

Fedoulenko: American possibilities that the Russians from China were finally able to live so decently. Every morning when we wake up we say, "God bless America, God save America," and we are afraid for America, for its welfare, maybe even more than pure blooded Americans because we have lived through two revolutions and we know what a revolution is. And they may not.

As soon as I was finished with my work with the refugees I started working with the help of some of my Shanghai colleagues in Pan American. An experienced pharmacist, I was given the job of cleaning the silver and the coffee urns in their cafeteria. But I was very happy to work. For some reason these coffee urns weren't being cleaned properly and when I started cleaning them they were very happy with me. So I worked there for nine years till I retired, and thanks to this I was able to buy this house, to stand on my own feet. I have a car, of course an old one, but still it's a fine car. Just imagine, at my age, I was able to establish myself in so few years. Unfortunately I was not able to get my pharmaceutical certificate accepted here because it was Chinese. Just a year before that many of the Chinese who had arrived at San Francisco had submitted false certificates and therefore the State government for its own protection had refused to accept these Chinese pharmaceutical certificates. I tried to arrange things through the University of California but was not able to. I am now retired. Had I arrived a few years earlier I would have been able to become a pharmacist, but I was too late.

The Russian Colony in the Bay Area Today

Raymond: Mr. Fedoulenko, we have talked about many things in these interviews and we have now reached the end. Nearly fifty years have passed since you have left Russia. In your opinion what will happen with this last refuge of the Russian Far Eastern Emigration, San Francisco?

Fedoulenko: You see this is what I think. It is a very special kind of nature. In Shanghai before the war many of our youth tended even to be ashamed of the fact that they were Russians. And then suddenly after the Russian victory over Hitler there was a tremendous metamorphosis and all these youth started taking Soviet passports and identifying themselves with Russia very strongly. We lost over fifty per cent of our people to the Soviets. This is all due to our expansive Russian nature, given to sudden enthusiasms and to fits of depression. It is very similar to what is happening in America today. The young people are very rapidly becoming Americanized and they don't even speak Russian any more. But this proves nothing at all because I don't think that they are lost to Russia. It is true that the youth think completely differently from the way we thought, but I am not one of those antiquated mothbags who refuse to recognize any change. The Russian immigration here will of course remain here but it will have a different character. Take for instance the Russian Center, this is a very valuable building. It is worth about \$30,000.

Fedoulenko: This will not be thrown away. Of course the people there will start talking English not Russian, but they will be Russian by character and attitude. For instance the fact that there is a new Russian Club being started in the Peninsula now, and members can only be those who were born in Russia. This is very interesting, after fifty years, a new club is being started in Burlingame. Up to fifty per cent of Burlingame is occupied by Russians. This has an enormous influence on the young Russians around. It is said that in Palo Alto there is even a Russian millionaire. This is why I think the Russian immigration here will not be completely wiped out but will remain.

Raymond: What do you think was the most important contribution that our immigration was able to give to California?

Fedoulenko: It has given California some very honest and excellent workers in the first place. If you consider that all the institutions where Russians worked have the highest regard for them--beginning with the very simple uneducated workers through the professors. They were all excellent workers and honest. They almost never deceived or loafed on the jobs. This is of course due to the wonderful working conditions here. After all, the pay is fantastic by our standards of the past. You know capitalism has great advantages. This is very intelligent of them to pay well; they get good workers. There are also exceptional people like Sikorsky, of course, and musicians of many kinds who have made a special contribution.

Fedoulenko: We have spent forty years in China where a special attitude and culture was developed by us. This attitude and culture is not the same as that of Californians who are native born. This experience which we brought with us is primarily that we are all anti-Communist. I must tell you that Senator Knowland in the Senate when he was fighting for the bill that would allow us to enter said, "We must bring them in because we do not have to educate them about what Bolshevism is; they know perfectly well what it is." This, you see, is the very first contribution that we can make: we are sworn enemies of Bolshevism. And if you Americans are ever going to fight with the Bolsheviks we will be on the front lines with you. You know how many of us volunteered to go to Korea. They did this out of a sense of duty, not because they were drafted. As for the future, remember many, many Russians are studying at the universities and are beginning to form good cadres of doctors, lawyers, and are giving a cultural contribution to the life in California. I personally intend to remain here in California until the end of my life. I have no hopes of ever being able to go back to Russia. Even if there was such a hope it would be much too late for me to go if there was a non-Communist Russia. Even so, everything has changed so very much there that I could not possibly be there; it would be very unpleasant for me to be there. The people have become completely different from what they used to be. The Americans are much closer to me, I can understand them much better than

Fedoulenko: the Russians in Russia. Even if there were a Nationalist Russia today it would take five, ten or more years to change the people from the poison that the Bolsheviks have put into them. It would require a whole generation, and I am too old. Yes, I have sunk my roots here and have become an American. That is why we value American citizenship so much. I value it. We all value it because we have worked and we are tired of not having any rights. For years we were changed from one place to another without any kind of rights and no protection from a nation. And now I am a citizen and I do have rights. Many of our Russians were ashamed of being Russian because that meant that they had no citizenship. I do not condemn them for that. In America I never felt any feeling that I was being discriminated against in America for being an immigrant, just the opposite. There were a few instances when I first came. I would speak in Russian on a street car and some American would say in English, "I wish to the devil they would not speak this rotten language." But they identified this language with Communism and did not understand. And of course I understood how they felt myself. All my life, all my culture was Russian; I deeply love Russia. Some of my best days, because I was young, were in Russia and therefore I cherish these memories and live by them. Because of this I am very much attached to Russia, but the qualities of life in America are marvelous, the freedom we have, our rights, we can work as we are able. Of course, the future Russia will probably be a magnificence

Fedoulenko: and an enormously wealthy country, and will some day flourish.

But when it will happen, only God knows.

Краткая записка о прохождении службы капитана Валентина Васильевича
Федуленко.

Родился в 1894 году, февраля 22, в г.Казани.

Окончил 2-ю Казанскую гимназию.

Окончил Алексеевское военное училище по I-му разряду
и выпущен с производством в чин прапорщика.....1 декабря 1914 г.

В Действующей Армиис 5 декабря 1914 г.

Уволен в отставку по болезни от полученной контузии.....27 января 1918 г.

В Белую Армию вступил в г.Казани.....в сентябре 1918 г.

После перерыва борьбы с большевиками на Российской земле
эвакуировался за границу с эскадрой адмирала Старка.....26 октября 1922 г.

Бенат на девице Екатерине Сергеевне Хворовой.....5 ноября 1917 г.

За участие в делах против неприятеля в I Великую Войну имею

награды:Георгиевское оружие,"Русский Инвалид" №248.....от 17 сентября 1915 г.
-подпоручику 269 пех.Новоржевского полка,Валентину Федуленко,за то,
что в бою 11 сентября 1915 года,у д.Городзименты,командуя ротой и будучи пос-
ланим батальонного резерва для отбития противника,двинулся с ротой и,увлекая
за собой нижних чинов,мужественно бросился в штыки на противника и обратил
его в бегство.Когда же был обойден противником с фланга и в тыл,то повернул
роту назад и вторичной штыковой контр-атакой уничтожил противника и занял
свои позиции."

Св.Владимира 4-й степени с мечами и бантом за взятие города
Сморгоны.....7 сентября 1915 г.

Св.Станислава 2-й степени с мечами

Св.Анны 3-й степени с мечами и бантом


Св.Станислава 3-й степени с мечами и бантом

Св.Анны 4-й степени с надписью "За храбрость"

За гражданскую войну награжден знаком отличия Военного ордена

"За Великий Сибирский Поход" I-й степени за №15603.....22 сент.1921 г.

Верно:капитан



September 11-th 1967.

Mrs. Wella Baum, Head
Regional Oral History Office

Dear Mrs. Baum :

According to your letter at July 5-th 1967, herewith to enclose my photo and magazine " Military school of crown-prince of Russia Alexis", where I have been study in 1914.

Other material I will send to you next year.

Your coopertion is indeed very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours

V. Fedoulenco

Valentin Fedoulenco

1431, 11-th Avenue
San Francisco, California, 94122.

Шанхай 2 апреля 1946 г.

Меморандум

о гибельном положении русских белых эмигрантов в Шанхае.

Этот меморандум представляется высшим представителям военных и гражданских властей США в г.Шанхае и является последним отчаянным призывом о помощи людям не по своей вине оказавшимся на краю гибели и беспомощными среди многолюдного Шанхая. Русские эмигранты представляющие этот меморандум, уверены в том, что только представители народа Соединенных Штатов Америки, занятого в данный момент грандиозной борьбой страждущему человечеству во всех концах мира, поймут нас и захотят помочь нам, что только такое мощное государство, как США, сможет разрешить эту задачу по крайней мере, хотя она по размеру и является ничтожной по сравнению с тем, что делается США в других направлениях ее гуманитарной работы.

Переходя к изложению всего вопроса по существу его мы должны сказать, что правовое и экономическое положение русских эмигрантов за последние годы очень осложнилось и ухудшилось. Причинами этого явились следующие обстоятельства:

- 1.-Уничтожение Международного Сеттльмента и Французской Концессии и образование огромного числа безработных.
- 2.-Усиление советского влияния в Китае путем организации мощной Китайской коммунистической партии, фактического филиала Москвы.
- 3.-Упорное стремление Советского правительства во что бы то ни стало уничтожить русскую эмиграцию в Китае.

Все вместе взятое создает угрожающее положение для русской эмиграции, проживающей в Шанхае. Советская пресса ведет яростную ~~жестокую~~ атаку на эмиграцию в целом, и в частности на возглавителей Российской Эмигрантской Ассоциации. Изод дня в день, вот уже более трех месяцев обильно изливается гнусная провокация ~~инвективный~~ и ложная клевета на эмиграцию и никто ее не останавливает, наши газеты все были закрыты по требованию коммунистов. Творится произвол и насилие над теми людьми, кто уже более четверть века пишет, говорит и предупреждает человечество о надвигающейся опасности международного коммунизма, стремящегося к мировой революции, т.е. к разрушению старого культурного мира и постройке на его осколках нового мира, где в основу будет заложено насилие, грабеж, произвол, рабство и прочие "прелести" коммунизма.

Во время последней войны Российская эмигрантская колония испытала страшную нужду и в большом проценте вдала полуголодное существование за счет распродажи своих вещей. После войны положение значительно улучшилось, главным образом за счет массового устройства на службу при американских войсках и учреждениях занятых ликвидацией последствий последней войны и частично в иностранных фирмах. Все это дало возможность Российской эмиграции в Шанхае передохнуть, немного подкормиться. Но это явление временное. Уйдут американские войска и наступит катастрофа.

Для Российской эмигрантской колонии в Китае было бы самым лучшим выходом из этого трагического положения массовое переселение в США, Канаду и Австралию, где эмигранты могли бы заняться мирным трудом. Российская эмиграция к труду привыкла и трудиться будет и там, куда она будет принята, она всегда окажется полезной, тем более теперь, когда у эмиграции есть кое какие знания и опыт, а, особенно, она всегда будет врагом коммунизма. В Шанхае мы много подружились над развитием и процветанием бывшей французской концессии, хотя и прибили мы в подавляющем большинстве без всяких средств и знаний иностранных языков. Наша молодежь усердно училась и многие успели окончить университеты и сделаться инженерами, докторами.

Возврата на родину у нас нет т.к. для многих это принесет немедленную гибель и для остальных обрекает себя на постепенную полуголодную смерть от тяжелого непосильного рабского труда и побоев в концлагерях, где миллионы лучших русских людей безжалостно уничтожаются до сих пор во имя укрепления некавказного тоталитарного режима диктатуры коммунистической партии Ленина-Сталина.

Помогите нам уйти от этого вновь надвигающегося на нас кошмара, насилия и смерти. Помогите нам на помощь, спасите оставшуюся российскую эмиграцию от полного уничтожения и дайте нам возможность снова продолжать борьбу с мировым злом-коммунизмом.

Российская Эмигрантская Ассоциация в г.Шанхае.

Boris Raymond was born of Russian parents in Harbin, China, in 1925. His father, Dmitry Romanoff, had been a young officer of the Imperial Guards during the first World War. After the Revolution he found himself in Siberia, in the ranks of Admiral Kolchak's White armies, with which he eventually retreated through Siberia to China, where Mr. Raymond was born. His maternal grandfather, Boris Ostroumoff, played a prominent role in Manchuria as General Manager of the Chinese Far Eastern Railroad; he was mentioned by Professor Guins in his interview.

Mr. Raymond was educated in ^{French} ~~Irish~~ and British schools in Tientsin, Shanghai, and Saigon. In April, 1941, he came to San Francisco, where he graduated from George Washington High School in 1943.

After serving in the United States Army and seeing combat as an infantryman in Europe, Mr. Raymond returned to California, where he began his studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He received the B.A., M.A. (Sociology), and M.L.S. degrees from this institution. In 1964 he joined the University Library staff as Russian bibliographer. He is presently [1967] Assistant Director of Libraries, University of Manitoba in Canada, where he is continuing his research on the history of the Russian emigration.

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