Col. Vítor Alves

COL. VÍTOR MANUEL RODRIGUES ALVES,
MEMBER OF THE MOVIMENTO DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS,
AND ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 25, 1974

Interviews conducted by
Don Warrin and Deolinda Adao
in 2004

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Major Vitor Alves, at the command post of the Movimento das Forças Armadas, on the morning of April 26, 1974, announcing to the world the Program of the Movement.
**Interview History**

The year 2004 represented the 30th anniversary of the Revolução dos Cravos (Revolution of the Carnations), led by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Movement of the Armed Forces), that toppled the Salazar/Caetano regime on the 25th of April, 1974. In order to celebrate this historic event, Col. Vítor Alves—one of the leading figures in the Movement—was invited to attend the 28th annual conference of the Luso-American Education Foundation, held that year on the UC Berkeley campus. Col. Alves graciously agreed to a brief interview on the morning of his departure. Given the brevity of our exchange, the focus of the interview was restricted to the colonel’s formative years and to the events surrounding April 25.

I was assisted in the interview, which took place in my office on the UC Berkeley campus, by Deolinda Adao. The interview was recorded on video disc and was lightly edited.

The Portuguese Oral History Project seeks to record the life experiences of those natives of Portugal or their descendants who either played an important role in the life of the community or whose lives are in some way representative of the Portuguese-American experience in northern California.

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Don Warrin, Historian
Regional Oral History Office
Berkeley, California
Interview #1: April 5, 2004

Warrin:
So, we’re here with Colonel Vítor Alves in Berkeley and if we can start from the beginning and ask you, first of all, your full name.

Alves:
Vítor Manuel Rodrigues Alves

Warrin:
And if you can tell us when you were born and when.

Alves:
I was born in Mafra on the thirtieth of September in 1935.

Warrin:
Could you tell us a little about your youth and your family?

Alves:
It was a kind of a gypsy one. My parents were public servants and my father was an inspector of the Junta Nacional dos Vinhos and as an inspector he was going around. We moved from place to place. So I’ve been till six, seven years in Mafra where I began studying. Afterwards, I went to Vila Franca de Xira, where I stood till eight, nine. I went to Torres Vedras after where I finished my primary school, and I made all the high school there in Torres Vedras. I began reading very early. I had a grandfather that was very cultured. He had a big library. And he taught me how to read in newspapers. As he had a very big library, I read very much.

Warrin:
Did you find that having had this influence, learning to read early and knowing that there was so much knowledge out there—Did that have an effect on your life?

Alves:
Yes, I’m sure, because my horizons became broader. So, very young I was aware of the problems—not only because I used to read the newspapers—even if our newspapers were not very informing. But I read the newspapers and I read the books. So, the books were selected by my grandfather. He gave me guidance in order to open the horizons gradually, avoiding that I mixed everything. He oriented my readings. And I was—at school—I was more open than the children of my age.

Warrin:
In terms of family influence, was he a major influence in your life? How about your mother and father?
My mother and father gave me the example of the struggle for life. They had no political positions. So, if I have any influence politically, it was from my grandfather first, and from a group of friends later on.

So, at some point, you decided to join the military.

First, I was born in Mafra, and in Mafra is, as I said, the Escola Prática de Infantaria, “infantry mother.” And I was born in [the] convent, inside [the] convent, which is the barracks. And I liked, since [a] boy, I liked to organize things—direct things. So, I had something of command inside myself. And the main reason was, what I have said, to gain immediately my autonomy and not be a burden to my parents because of the other brothers.

How long were you in the military before you went off to Africa?

Four years and some months. I spent three years in military academy. One year in Mafra to make the tirocinio [training], and after that I was placed in Leiria and I made several months there. And from there, I embarked to Mozambique

You were there for five years, I take it?

In Mozambique?

Yes.

Yes, five years in Mozambique, and six years in Angola.

What was your experience like? What years were you in Mozambique?

Mozambique? Since ’57 to ’63. It seems like six years, but they were five years between…
Warrin: ‘57.

Alves: End of ‘57, and in the beginning of ’63 I came to Portugal. I spent three months there and I went to Angola.

Warrin: And in the five years that you were in Mozambique, did you see a change in the local political climate?

Alves: Yes. I saw not only in Mozambique, but all of Africa, because it was the time, of “the winds of change,” as Harold MacMillan said. Everything was changing. So, I had the possibility to assist to these changes. In Africa, in Mozambique, as Angola, as Guiné [Guinea-Bissau]—they could be a part of the movement that was spreading out of Africa.

Warrin: When you went to Angola, had the war begun then?


Warrin: And again, you must have seen some great changes in the six years you were in Angola.

Alves: Yes. I saw many changes—for the better and for the worse. For the better, in these six years that I spent there, I saw more development in Angola than many, many, many years ago. But, during those six years I spent six years of combat and that was for the worst.

Warrin: If we could start to move a little bit toward the antecedents of the 25 de Abril. What was General Spínola’s role at this time?

Alves: At the 25 of April?

Warrin: No, before.
Alves:
He was a lieutenant colonel at the time. He was in Angola. I’ve never been under his command, but he was a battalion commander. As a “combatente”—as a fighter—he was appreciated.

Warrin:
I understand that he had some political ambitions. In 1972 he thought about running against Caetano, as President.

Alves:
Yes, he would have liked, but didn’t happen as you know. Because he was not part of the faithful of the regime. He didn’t belong to the…

Warrin:
Inner circle?

Alves:
Yes. And he was dangerous because he had some ideas of federation for colonies; to make with colonies, I think, federation with Portugal. And that was one thing that didn’t enter in the options of the regime.

Warrin:
In early 1974, he published Portugal e o Futuro [Portugal and the future]. I understand that it was personally approved—the publication—by Marcelo Caetano. I wonder…

Alves:
No, Marcelo, no.

Warrin:
It was not?

Alves:
No, Marcelo, no. The publication of the book depended on—the main authorization was from the Minister of Defense. And the second one, minor, was from the Chief of General Staff because Spinola was Vice-Chief of General Staff. And General Costa Gomes was General Chief of General Staff. And Costa Gomes read, read and approved the book. The Minister of Defense relied on the authorization of Costa Gomes and signed with a cross. And Marcelo yet trusted the Minister of Defense had read the book.

Warrin:
That’s interesting. Shows the importance of reading.
Alves:
But that book, the importance of that book in the Revolution. You must see it with realism. At the time, we had already begun discussions about the Movement of the Armed Forces. We had already the draft of the program of the Movement of the Armed Forces. The book, the general theory of the book, was of the passado, how do you say?

Warrin:
Out of date.

Alves:
Because to do that—the federation he wanted—it should have been thirty years before. But there was one thing very important about that book. Spinola was, as I said, famous among the young officers. And he had even a big group of officers that had been under his command either in Angola or Guinea [Guinea-Bissau]. And it was a strong group. They became, later on, the spinolistas [political supporters of Gen. Spinola]. And that group was reluctant to join the Movement of the Armed Forces. As the book comes, people read it and joined immediately because they felt that we were at the same struggle. As a matter of fact, we were not. The Movement had some objectives—to put an end to the colonial regime was one of them. And his was not. It was a federation, it was “the motherland will continue.” So the true importance of the book was for civilians. The opposition felt that something important was happening. Such a book written by a general of the Army, an Army that was supposed to be the support of the regime, and furthermore that general being the Vice-Chief of General Staff. So that writing was good for the opposition, made it grow, pushed the reluctant officers to join the Movement, and gave an alert, not heard at the international level concerning the military that were in the Movement since the beginning; the book didn’t change our objectives, organization or rhythm.

Warrin:
So it was for public relations in a way, for spreading the idea of discontent to the general public.

Alves:
It was like for the first time appeared someone that was supposed to be a part of the regime to give a kind of answer to what all the countries demanded from Portugal—that was to put an end to colonialism.

Warrin:
I read that many of the officers in Africa foresaw the same problem that happened to the British in India, that the army ended up being blamed for…

Alves:
Yes, we were scapegoats. In India, we have been scapegoats. Salazar said to the military—the few military that were there—to fight the Indian army. He wrote that he rather preferred that they were all killed than to be prisoners. Well, I’m not going to give a name to this position. And during the colonial war, from the beginning, we knew that—we knew from the examples of
France, the United States, the English, too—that a subversive war is never won. We always lose, and military people knew that. But we went, all of us, we went as soon as the massacres of the population took place in ’61. No one said no or escaped. Ten or fifteen officers deserted; but it’s nothing, just to confirm the rule. We went to Africa and fought. The problem was, as we knew, that we wouldn’t win that kind of war; we might create conditions for a political solution. We fought; we obtained superior positions—two times at least—at the end of ’63 and the end of ’67. We created the conditions for dialogue, which means that the regime in Portugal could have called the movements of liberation to speak because we were on top. Not won the war, but we were in a strong position.

**Warrin:**
To make an accommodation to some sort of agreement.

**Alves:**
But, in ’63, we gave that situation, and the regime wouldn’t speak. In ’67, the same thing. So we considered that we were again to be the scapegoats of what was going to happen because Guiné was the first, was much more advanced, and it was clear that we would have lost. And the international community was with the movements of liberation. The Pope received Agostinho Neto from MPLA, and Marcelino Santos from FRELIMO, and Amílcar Cabral from Guiné. The Pope was a very good friend of Portugal, so it was a slap in the face of the regime. And we considered that the regime didn’t want to negotiate. So we would lose and we would be accused. The nation would accuse us of losing the war.

**Warrin:**
And what year would this more or less have been that it became clear enough for officers to start planning something, to start talking concretely?

**Alves:**
’73

**Warrin:**
Not until ’73.

**Alves:**
The problem, it didn’t appear suddenly. In the military academy, after the 50’s, some small groups began discussing the situation. The 25th of April was made by two generations. One generation that’s mine, from the fifties in the military academy. And from the sixties, late sixties, that were our cadets, pupils. We were teachers at the military academy, my generation, and they were our pupils.

**Warrin:**
They were the capitães [captains].
Lieutenants and captains. These two generations, we had talks, we talked very, very much. I was in the military academy with Eanes, with Melo Antunes, with Costa Bras, with Otelo—the most-known names from this group. And as Vasco Lourenço, Marques Júnior, and all the captains that went as troops on the 25th of April, they are from this other generation. The oldest had been speaking among themselves, and later on they spoke with those youngest. And we wrote each other—because I was, for instance, in Angola; Melo Antunes was in Angola also, but miles away. Otelo was in Guinea; Vasco Lourenço was in Guinea; others were in Mozambique; others in Macau; others in Timor. It happened that in ’73—and we never joined since the beginning of the war, it happened by chance—at ’73, the biggest part of those two groups, the few politically aware, joined in Portugal, in the continent. So we took advantage of some mistakes made by the administrative part, the political part, in terms of some laws introducing distortions on the promotions of the officers. We began by catalyzing the discontent and slowly we infiltrated the political idea in the movement. And it took nine months of preparation.

I was wondering how you were able to succeed when the PIDE was infiltrating the secret police.

To infiltrate to the military officers, with the war, it was terribly difficult. Because in Africa, we spoke freely. And then they were there sometimes in our barracks. But we spoke freely in front of them because they couldn’t do anything. If we were all of us to [go to] prison, who was going to fight?

So you had a unique position in a way, as the military and the guardians of the…

That was the reason why it was possible to do what we have done. Only someone or some institution within the system, could jeopardize the system. And by being the owners of the force.

So in a way, Marcelo Caetano was almost a hostage of the military and the situation.

Mainly the youngest, because the youngest were the ones that were going to fight. Because the generals, they were very submissive; they won’t fight [the regime]. They were the true supporters of the regime.

Of course. As you got very close to Vinte e Cinco [April 25], I understand that you worked very closely with Vasco Lourenço and Otelo to coordinate…
We were the three members, elected by our comrades, to be the direction of the Movement of the Armed Forces.

Can you describe Vasco Lourenço?

Vasco Lourenço is a bull, of force, of courage, of perseverance. And he dominated absolutely all the captains of his generation. So he was the man that was the link to all the units. Otelo was the man that made the operational plan and commanded the military action. And I coordinated the political program of the Movement of the Armed Forces.

More the political side. Otelo has been described as very idealistic, a little ingenuous perhaps.

Naive.

Somebody wrote that his hero when he was young was Robin Hood.

Uh-huh. He likes, he adores theater, as an actor.

Unfortunately, Vasco Lourenço was sent off to the Azores. How did you coordinate at the last with him, when he was…?

We didn’t. As soon as he was marked to be exiled in the Azores, we cut the knot as a precaution. He couldn’t do anything in Azores about the movement. It was up to me and Otelo to carry on, and that was what we did.

Evidently he did take over the airport in Ponta Delgada to make sure that Caetano didn’t…

Uh-huh. It was prepared to receive, but it was chosen another island.
Warrin:
And there was actually talk of taking over the Azores to make a public relations…

Alves:
Yes, if something was wrong, he would have done that.

Warrin:
The public was asked to stay in their homes, but they didn’t.

Alves:
I wrote that. It was the first communique. I wrote it because we were afraid. We were not sure that it wouldn’t have any reaction from the loyal forces, those cavalry regiments; that was the enemy when we made the operations plan. The police and the Guarda Nacional Republicana, were very well armed. Much better armed than the army in Portugal, in continental Portugal, so we were not sure what was going to happen. The plan that Otelo prepared was very well-prepared because the idea was to make a show of force, putting so many military units in the street that it…

Warrin:
It intimidated.

Alves:
Yes, and convinced the other ones that it wasn’t worthwhile to try to oppose. But, as I said, we were very much worried, because that was another thing we would like to have done—as we did—without blood. That was the main point for us, and we achieved it; the only blood was made by PIDE.

Warrin:
Yes. You mentioned that there were a few moments of great suspense when the column from Estremoz got delayed and then this frigate positioned itself off the Praça do Comércio and you were afraid it might start shooting.

Alves:
Yes, because we had Salgueiro Maia with his troops in Terreiro do Paço and, if there was some shootings from the ship, that would be problematic at least. The column from Estremoz was foreseen. It should surround the Quartel do Carmo on the Rossio. The Quartel do Carmo was primarily surrounded by Salgueiro Maia, and it was a weak Guarda Republicana and once inside the Carmo, because they made some troops go out to put down... They surrounded Salgueiro Maia’s soldiers; Salgueiro Maia was in a sandwich between the forces of the Guarda Republicana. And it was possible to make that siege to Salgueiro Maia because the unit of Estremoz, that should be where were the Guarda Republicana, they *atrasaram-se*…
Warrin: They fell behind. Salgueiro Maia was interviewed quite a few years later, and he said there were some moments of the Vinte e Cinco that were like a film from Charlie Chaplin. He said that most of his men were so green, so new, they didn’t even know how to shoot. That the metralhadoras, the machine guns, were not loaded; they didn’t have any grenades; and the driver of his jeep as they came into Lisbon stopped at a red light.

Alves: The whole column stopped in the red light because the traffic at two o’clock in the morning was none, but very respectful, the soldiers saw the red light and stopped. That’s a historical fact, but that is true because it was the beginning of a new turn of recruits, of preparation of soldiers, and most of them didn’t know. But we counted on a show of force. We, the military, didn’t want shooting. Remember what I said.

Warrin: Yes.

Alves: So who sees fifty military men with guns in the hands, you never know if he is going to shoot, if he has bullets, if he has not.

Warrin: Right, so it was…

Alves: There were some sergeants and officers, it was people with some years of war. The force was there. It was a big cenário but with force inside—

Deolinda: So it’s on stage, a great play.

Warrin: Very, very well planned theatrically. And theatrical in the sense that a lot of it was a bluff. We should move on. Soon after, you were named a member of the Conselho do Estado, the Council of State, and then…

Alves: Well, you missed—I had a particular preparation on the grounds that some of my comrades had not. I’m not referring to the background, when I was a child. But after my last commission in Angola—I made four missions in Africa, two in Mozambique and two in Angola—and after my last commission in Angola, I came to make the curso de Estado Maior, staff course. It was a course of three years and with a broad preparation—economics, international law, psychology, sociology, law.
Deolinda: Sociology. I am interested in sociology because sociology was not a discipline that was allowed to be studied in the universities. Is that correct?

Alves: Yes.

Deolinda: But in the academy it was permitted?

Alves: Not academy; the staff course. It was an elite—it prepared almost all the generals, future generals of the army. So I had a broad preparation and that’s the reason why I appeared much more, let us say, involved in many things than my comrades.

Warrin: And it might actually go back to your grandfather and his 30,000 volumes and your interest in learning to read very early.

Alves: But I had the preparation, but not as Melo Antunes. He had a deep political preparation. He was the real political man among us.

Warrin: You were very close for a certain period of time, directly after in the political sense, after 1974. And you actually were the adviser to General Ramalho Eanes when he was president. What years was that? Did you begin in 1976?

Alves: 1976 ‘til ’85

Warrin: ‘Til ’85. So you were essentially involved in politics all that time.

Alves: Internal and international.

Warrin: Could you describe a little bit what you did during that time?
If it was necessary, some contacts. For instance, with the political parties, the leaders of political parties, if the president felt that he shouldn’t do that openly. Most of the times—and that was the time of negotiations—it was up to me to do that. Internationally, to speak with the leaders when the president wants to give a message to the president of Angola, to the president of Brazil, so many… Willy Brandt. I am referring to some that I recall now. Well, I was his personal adviser. And, as a matter of fact, when he felt that he should be advised on something, he called me, we talked, I gave my opinion, he followed or not. He was the president, not me.

Of course. You were recently interviewed by *El País*, I believe. You spoke about the triple crisis in the 1960s. There was an economic concentration of power in …

*Alves:* Both political and social.

*Warrin:* And social, and also political isolation in the world. And there were the three D’s—the objectives to democratize society, to decolonize, and to *desenvolver*, to develop economically. And if I can quote you here, you said that the Portuguese Revolution failed in the transformation that was indispensable at the level of the attitude and comportment of citizens. Could you explain that?

From my point of view the cultural aspect of the revolution failed. We were not able to convince people to join to the new ideas, and probably it wouldn’t have been possible. But it was what we felt. We thought it was absolutely necessary to change attitudes and, unfortunately, nowadays, when I am speaking today, many of the cultural traditions—wrong traditions—remain. And even so, the country has developed quite a lot; there are some positive aspects. We have changed since then, but what I feel is we didn’t change culturally so much as we did, with the decolonization, we decolonized; with democratization, we democratized no doubt. Even the development, you go and you see a new country. But what makes the Portuguese little, is not only the size of the country but the *mesquinha* way of…

The smallness of the mind.

And that was why I tried to refer to it was not possible to change. And that’s a big problem that Portugal still has, and I really count on the new generation to change it.

And could you be a little specific in what you mean by “the culture has not changed”?
As I talked, the smallness. The *inveja*…

The envies. The Portuguese nowadays don’t vote for; they vote against. And they do all against. That’s not a way of living and of developing. We were not able to change the mentality of the Portuguese.

Do you feel that is sort of the product of a lack of education, and a lack of a civic form of education that the population as a whole receives? You have a population that was under a paternalistic type of regime, whether all the way through history. Do you really think it will be possible to change it in twenty years, or thirty years?

I wish, I deeply wish that. But, as you said in your remark, we still have those now in democracy, those political, local political men or women that stay for twenty, twenty-six, twenty-eight years in the same place. Those, we call “*caciques*” [“local bosses,” from the term for an Indian chief].

The regional directors or leaders who would sort of organize the voting and the vote results. So, in your opinion, there are regions of Portugal where that is still…

Absolutely. See, it’s impossible in a democracy, in movement, it’s impossible, completely impossible, to have people like Alberto João Jardim. It’s impossible. It’s against the idea of democracy. Democracy is not only to vote. It is to have alternatives, and alternation. And that doesn’t exist in several parts of the country.

So there’s a certain submissiveness on the part of the populace.

Unfortunately, we still have the concept of sheepness, most people are nowadays *desinteressados*…

Uninterested.
00:51:07
Alves:
Uninterested in politics. Well, that’s the end of democracy.

00:51:14
Warrin:
Yes, of course. Well, I think we have to end here because our tape is ending and we also have to get you to the airport. I want to thank you profoundly.

End of Interview