

ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

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ARISTOTLE
" ON THE ART OF POETRY

*A REVISED TEXT
WITH CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY*

BY

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PREFACE

THE Translation, which faces the text in the present volume, is added in compliance with what seems to be now almost the rule with Greek texts of this description. The custom is perhaps one more honoured in the breach than the observance; but there is something to be said for it in the instance of the *Poetics*, because they are read by many whose study of Aristotle begins and ends with this one work of his. And there are certainly difficulties of a special kind throughout the book, which require a version or even a paraphrase to explain them. Aristotle's mode of statement here is often elliptical, allusive, and overcharged with meaning; and he not unfrequently omits to indicate the connexion of ideas in his sentences and paragraphs, so that the logical relation between them is left for us to perceive as best we can. Under these circumstances the freedom of a paraphrase may be at times the only means of making his statement intelligible to the modern reader. If Bernays thought it necessary to adopt this method of interpretation in a rendering of the *Politics*, there is still more reason for its adoption in one of a book like the *Poetics*. I have accordingly not scrupled to recast many of Aristotle's sentences, and also to insert here and there words or short clauses, in order to make the sense and sequence of ideas clearer—as I suppose he would have done himself, if

he had foreseen the modern reader, and the difficulties and obscurities he might find in his writings.

The Commentary has extended to a greater length than was originally contemplated owing to the accumulation of passages to be quoted from Aristotle or other writers in illustration of the language and terminology of the Poetics. It is hoped that they may prove of use to those who approach the text without previous study of Isocrates or the Rhetoric and other Aristotelian treatises. I venture to think, too, that some of the quotations will be seen to settle the meaning of certain passages which are not always rightly interpreted, and that others may serve to confirm the traditional text, and vindicate it from some of the doubts and suspicions which have been so freely cast on it. If the language of a passage is found from parallels elsewhere to be in accordance with the usage of Aristotle or other Greek writers, it is evident that corrections based on the assumption of its faultiness may be at once put out of court.

The Introduction is mainly on the two questions which divide the critics of the text at the present moment, the relation between the MS. known as A^c and the Renaissance MSS., and the value of the Greek readings which are, or are believed to be, recoverable from the Arabic Version. I have endeavoured to show that the new light we think to get from this Oriental quarter is often that of a mere ignis fatuus, and that the utmost caution is to be used before we allow ourselves to follow its guidance, when the Arabic text diverges in any serious degree from that of our Greek authority.

Aristotle's theory of epic and tragic poetry, as put before us in the Poetics, is presented with such ad-

mirable brevity that I have not deemed it necessary to go over the ground in a preliminary survey of the contents of the book. Nor have I ventured on a discussion of the problem of his general theory of Poetry and Art, as it would require a volume by itself to deal with a matter of such extreme complexity, and we should be taken away at times in the course of the inquiry into regions of thought remote from the avowed subject of the Poetics. The statements and hints in the book would have to be eked out by the aid of others in other writings, wherever passages are to be discovered which have, or seem to have, some sort of aesthetic import; and the data thus collected would have to be made to hold together as parts of a consistent theory. Aristotelian Theories of Art constructed in this way are not unlike the Aristotelian systems of Logic, of which we have seen so many; the parts are Aristotle's, but the synthesis is always to some extent our work, not his. And I cannot repress a suspicion that if he could come back to life again, he would be surprised to find how large a meaning we are able to read into some of his more incidental utterances. We must not forget, too, that the very idea of a Theory of Art is modern, and that our present use of this term 'Art' does not go further back than the age of Winckelmann and Goethe. Aristotle recognizes various analogies between the plastic arts and certain forms of poetry and music; he sees in them, for instance, a common element, 'imitation', by which he generally means the portrayal of humanity and life, 'what men do or suffer'—though the term has no doubt a wider sense in places even in the Poetics. And there are other ideas also in his writings which we should regard as coming under Aesthetics. But they were most of them already

current in his time ; and there is very little to show that he had ever thought them out sufficiently to reduce them to system even in his own mind.

The book taken as it is, with perhaps an occasional side-light from some of his other works, is intelligible enough ; after a brief introduction he gives us in outline all that he has to say on the subject immediately before him, the technique of the Drama and the Epic. He tells one in fact how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the Rhetoric he tells one how to make a good speech. And in doing this he has succeeded in formulating once for all the great first principles of dramatic art, the canons of dramatic logic which even the most adventurous of modern dramatists can only at his peril forget or set at naught.

It is but right to remember, however, that Tragedy, as Aristotle himself conceives it, is still in many important points and characteristics the Greek form of that art, and that it is limited in various ways by the conditions and conventions of the Greek theatre, not only in the accidents of its stage presentation, but also in its form and structure, its motives and its subjects ; so that even as literature Aristotle's ideal play would have been an essentially Greek play. But if I am not mistaken, his theory has some further limitations. His ideal play would seem to be in many respects a compromise between the play of the great era and that of his own day ; he was writing for men of a generation living some seventy years after the death of Euripides, and there is the mark of the age on a good deal of what his theory lays down or assumes. The diction of the tragic dialogue, he thinks, should approximate to that of conversation, the choice of words being like that in the stylistic prose of oratory—as we

may presume it was with Theodectes and some of his contemporaries. Though he disapproves in a well-known passage of the intercalary chorica of the Drama of the time, this is a merely academical expression of opinion and a counsel of perfection; it is clear that he has practically come to regard the Chorus as a sort of negligible quantity, and that that is the ultimate explanation of his persistent silence about it. Even in his theory of the Plot, which he has worked out with so much thought, he is ready to make concessions to the weakness of the audiences in an age which had become too humanitarian to accept the strong situations allowed in the older Tragedy. I mention this because one is apt to forget that in the seventy years before Aristotle Tragedy must have undergone many changes, though perhaps not for the better, and that we cannot always expect to reconcile the practice of the older poets with his rules, or his rules with the practice of the older poets. If his theory of Comedy had come down to us, we should probably find it more applicable to the New Comedy than to that of Aristophanes.

An editor in these days can hardly hope to do much to advance the interpretation of a book which has been so carefully studied and re-studied by a long succession of editors and translators, many of them among the more illustrious names in the history of classical learning. And apart from editions and translations, we have now an incalculable number of contributions to the criticism and illustration of the book, scattered about partly in special articles and monographs, and partly in other writings, which have often no direct or overt relation to the Poetics themselves. The references in the *Adnotatio Critica* and Commentary will show the extent to which I have been able to use this sporadic literature.

My first and chief debt is to Vahlen, whose *Beiträge* mark, as all know, an epoch in the modern history of the Poetics, and whose edition has done so much to put the criticism of the text on its true basis, and to keep it within the limits of philological reason. If I have not always found it possible to accept his views on doubtful points or passages, it was assuredly not through any lack of regard for them, or in forgetfulness on my part of his very great services to Aristotelian learning. Speaking of predecessors, an English editor may be permitted to render his tribute of recognition to his English predecessors, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, and Twining. Goulston's paraphrase, with the marginal commentary which accompanies it, is in a sense the most helpful of the earlier versions, since it is a definite attempt to explain the logical sequence of Aristotle's ideas, and thus to deal with difficulties of a kind of which the sixteenth-century interpreters would seem to have been unconscious. Tyrwhitt needs no eulogy; his Poetics, both in the translation and in the notes—the one fault of which is that they are so few—show a combination of originality and scholarship which puts him in the first rank among the scholars of the period between Bentley and Porson. And as to Twining, whatever one may think of his translation, his commentary must always have a value as the work of a remarkably well-read man—one familiar, as few are now, with all the best literature, whether ancient or modern.

It is difficult for me to say how much this book owes to the kind assistance of my old friend, Mr. A. O. Prickard, late Fellow of New College, who besides consenting to read the proofs gave me throughout on countless doubtful points the benefit of his own very accurate

knowledge and long study of the *Poetics*. In the Translation, I think, there is hardly a page to be found without amendments due to his insight and fine sense of language.

I have to thank Mr. R. W. Chapman of Oriel for much timely help in the last stage of the preparation of this volume. It is perhaps needless to add that the present, like so many other Oxford books, is not a little indebted to the attention it has received from the vigilant Corrector of the Clarendon Press.

I. B.

INTRODUCTION

I

The form and structure of the existing Poetics.

THE text of the Poetics has been supposed to have suffered more seriously than most prose Greek texts in the process of transmission ; and many scholars accordingly have allowed themselves a very free hand in dealing with its difficulties. One cannot help suspecting, however, that not a few of their doubts and suspicions start from a certain preconceived idea, inherited from the Middle Ages, of the general character of the Aristotelian writings—that the ‘master of them that know’ could never for a moment forget his logic ; that his mind worked with all the sureness of a machine ; and that a treatise of his must not only have been written throughout on the straightest lines, but also have left his hands as free from oversights and inconsistencies as a modern published work is expected to be. The untenableness of these assumptions, as thus stated, is obvious, and no one, I imagine, would confess to them in so many words. But it is impossible to read much of the current criticism on the Poetics without seeing that its working hypothesis is in many instances what I have said.

Aristotle, with all his scientific formalism, is even as a thinker much more human than we are apt to suppose ; his writing, too, is marked by great inequalities, passages of admirable lucidity and finish being often followed by a stretch of text in a style so curt and crabbed as to be the despair of his interpreters, ancient as well as modern. The Poetics begin fairly well, but as the work advances there are signs of failing attention to form, and the statement becomes in places little better than a series of notes. The continuity also of the exposition is frequently broken by

parentheses, sometimes on matters of very minor importance for the immediate argument. The digression on the *λύσις ἀπὸ μηχανῆς* in chap. 15 is a clear instance of matter out of place. We may explain it psychologically, as arising by a natural association of ideas out of the preceding context (15, 1454^a 33-6); but its logical place was assuredly not in a chapter devoted to the *ῥῆθη*. Hermann went so far as to take it out of its present setting, and insert it after *τέλους* in 18, 1455^b 32, not seeing that in thus removing one difficulty he was only creating another.

Judged by our modern standards of literary correctness the Poetics are perpetually open to criticism; but the anomalies and informalities, if I may use the word, are too numerous to be removed by the ordinary emendatorial artifices. Among these anomalies of language or thought the following may be noted:—

(1) The anticipatory use of technical terms, which are defined afterwards; e. g.

ἀπλοῦς μῦθος: its meaning is assumed in 9, 1451^b 33; and it is defined later on, in chap. 10.

λόγος (as a term of grammar or logic): defined in 20, 1457^a 24; but the term had appeared before this in the same sense in 20, 1457^a 6.

λύσις: used without explanation in 15, 1454^a 37, and defined in 18, 1455^b 26.

περιπέτεια and *ἀναγνώρισις*: used in 6, 1450^a 34, and explained afterwards in chap. 11.

To account for this kind of procedure I have suggested elsewhere (Festschrift für Th. Gomperz p. 164) that most of these and similar technical terms may have been already sufficiently recognized and established in the language of the period, and that Aristotle only defines them for a special reason, in the interest of scholastic precision or clearness. This postponement of explanation, however, is not peculiar to the Poetics. We have an instance in the Nicomachean Ethics, where *προαιρέεσθαι*, *προαίρεσις*, and *προαιρετική* are assumed in Bk. II and explained afterwards in Bk. III. Another instance is the use of *κάθαρσις* in Pol. 8. 6, the term being in the next chapter (8. 7, 1341^b 38) regarded as one requiring explanation.

(2) Variations of terminology. Aristotle does not always adhere to the same terms even when dealing with the same technical ideas. || Thus in chap. 1 he has two terms for the musical element in poetry, *μέλος* and *ἄρμονία*; and two for the literary element also, *μέτρον* and *λόγος*. In the same way in chap. 18 the intrigue in a play is termed *δέσις* in one place and *πλοκή* in another.

(3) Inconsistency in the use of terms. —The following are some of the instances of it:—

ἄπλοῦς μῦθος: the opposite of the *πεπλεγμένος μῦθος* in 10, 1452^a 12, and that of the *διπλοῦς μῦθος* in 13, 1453^a 13.

ἐπεισόδιον: sometimes a dramatic 'act', sometimes an 'insertion'.

ἐπεικῆς: in 15, 1454^b 13 it is said that the tragic hero should be, and in 13, 1452^b 34 that he should not be, *ἐπεικῆς*.

μιμῆσθαι: in 3, 1448^a 20 and elsewhere it includes the narrative form of imitation; in 24, 1460^a 8 it excludes it.

ὅμοιος, said of a dramatic personage, has one sense in 2, 1448^a 6 and another in 15, 1454^a 24, ^b 10.

πάθος, though generally used in the theatrical sense defined in 11, 1452^b 11, has in two passages (17, 1455^a 31; 19, 1456^a 38) another sense, that of 'feeling' or 'emotion'.

συλλαβή: its use in 21, 1458^a 2, though recognized in common parlance, is not in accordance with the definition in 20, 1456^b 35.

These and similar inconsistencies of language are obviously mere accidents of expression, which mislead no one; and it would have been easy to remove them on revision, if the *Poetics* had ever undergone that process. But, if I am not mistaken, there is evidence, at any rate here and there, of a more serious kind of inconsistency, actual inconsistency of thought.

(4) Inconsistency of thought. The following seem to be instances of this:—

In 2, 1448^a 4 we are told that the tragic personage is not *ὅμοιος* but *βελτίων ἢ καθ' ἑμᾶς*, and in 13, 1453^a 5 that he must be *ὅμοιος*, one like ourselves. The discrepancy is not difficult of explanation. In chap. 2 Aristotle is thinking only of the distinction between Tragedy and Comedy. In chap. 13, on the other hand, where the question before him is the emotional effect of Tragedy, he has come to see that, if we

are to 'fear' for the tragic hero, he must be ὅμοιος, more or less like ourselves—that being the condition of our human sympathy with him. Aristotle appears to have been not unconscious of the change of view, since in the summary in 13, 1453^a 16 he modifies his second formula, and writes ἢ οἷον εἶρηται [i. e. ὅμοιος] ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος, where the alternative ἢ βελτίονος is obviously intended to bring the statement into line, as far as can be, with that in chap. 2.

In 13, 1453^a 22 he approves of a drama with an unhappy ending even when kinsmen are concerned, and declares it to be the theoretically best form of tragedy, ἢ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία. But in the following chapter (14, 1454^a 4) he tells us that there is something better than this: when kinsmen are concerned it is best for the unhappy ending to be evaded by means of a timely Discovery. It is clear that he has become aware of there being something *μιαρόν* in the ordinary tragic situations, and feels that it is to be avoided or reduced to a minimum.

In 23, 1459^b 1 the superior Unity in the two Homeric poems as compared with the later epics is distinctly asserted on the ground that the action in the latter is at best only a *μία πράξις πολυμερής*. In 26, 1462^b 8, however, a different view is taken of the Iliad and Odyssey, which are said to be each made up of several actions or parts; in other words, the action in them is conceived as being what Aristotle had previously described as a *μία πράξις πολυμερής*. The exigencies of the argument in chap. 26 have betrayed him into a statement at variance with that in chap. 23; and he has omitted to bring them into formal concordance by modifying one or the other.

In 24, 1459^b 8 in his desire to find points of agreement between epic poetry and Tragedy he tells us that the species of the Epic correspond with those of Tragedy, i. e. with those enumerated in 18, 1455^b 32. But with the text as it stands in the tradition the correspondence cannot be made out. The only possible way of bringing the two statements into harmony is that adopted by Vahlen, who has to assume a lacuna in 18, 1455^b 34 and also to accept a very arbitrary and improbable conjecture, *τερατῶδες*, in 18, 1456^a 2.

(5) Lapses of memory. That his memory was sometimes at fault is the only explanation of his misleading account of the Peripety of the Oedipus in *I, 1452^a-24*, and of his misquotations from the Iliad in *25, 1461^a-16*. But there are also, I think, signs of haste and inexactitude even in some of his references to matters within the Poetics themselves—
at any rate in the following instances:—

6, 1450^b 13 *ὡςπερ πρότερον εἴρηται*. The reference is to 6, 1449^b 34—where a different definition is given.

18, 1455^b 32 *ποσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη*.

18, 1456^a 11 *ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται*.

The second and third of these three references are clearly inexact, and have even created a doubt as to the soundness of the text. At the same time one cannot but see that the first reference, that in 1450^b 13, is equally open to criticism, though no one seems to have thought it necessary to suggest an alteration of text in that passage.

Difficulties and anomalies of **this** description, i.e. in isolated passages, are not peculiar to the Poetics; they are certainly to be found from time to time in other Aristotelian writings, e.g. in the De Anima, the Rhetoric, and perhaps even the Nicomachean Ethics. I may now leave them, and pass on to a larger question, the difficulties in the general plan and structure of the whole. The scheme of the work as a whole is admirably simple and logical, comprising five main parts or sections:—

1. A preliminary discourse on Tragedy, epic poetry, and Comedy, as the chief forms of imitative poetry, and the subject of the inquiry that is to follow (chaps. 1-5).

2. Definition of a tragedy, and the rules for its construction (chaps. 6-22).

3. Rules for the construction of an epic (chaps. 23-4).

4. Enumeration of the criticisms to which an epic or tragedy may be subjected, and of the various possible replies to them (chap. 25).

5. A comparison of epic poetry and Tragedy, showing the artistic superiority of the latter (chap. 26).

The chief difficulties usually found in the book are in the contents and arrangement of the second section, that dealing with the rules for the construction of a tragedy. Read as it stands, with its matter in the traditional order, the main points in it may be said to be in brief as follows:—

1. Definition of a tragedy (6, 1449^b 24).
2. Analysis of a tragedy into its qualitative parts, *μῦθος*, *ἦθος*, *διάνοια*, *λέξις*, *μελοποιία*, *ὄψις*; the two last being set aside as not coming within an Art of Poetry (chap. 6).
3. The *μῦθος*: the general rules for the construction of a *μῦθος*, and the Unity of action required in every form of it (chaps. 7–11).
4. A note or postscript on the quantitative parts of a tragedy (chap. 12).
5. The special rules for the tragic *μῦθος* viewed as a means of producing the emotional effect of Tragedy (chaps. 13–14).
6. Rules for the *ἦθος* of the tragic personages, with a parenthetic note on the use of the *μηχανή* in Drama (chap. 15).
7. Appendix to the foregoing: i. the various forms of Discovery; ii. certain additional rules to be remembered in practice in the construction of a play (chaps. 16–18).
8. The *διάνοια* of the tragic personages (chap. 19).
9. The *λέξις* in Tragedy: i. the ultimate constituents of language; ii. the different kinds of terms; iii. the characteristics of the language of poetry, and the limits to be observed in the use of poetical words and forms (chaps. 20–22).

The above is a synopsis of this section as it might be read by any one prepared to accept the text in the form in which it has come down to us. The doubts which have been thrown on it are of two kinds: (1) the genuineness of certain chapters is questioned; and (2) the order in which the materials now appear is thought to deviate more or less from that of Aristotle himself.

1. The chapters which so many scholars reject as interpolations are chap. 12 and chap. 20. The argument on the other side I must reserve for the Commentary (on 12, 1452^b 14 and 20, 1456^b 20), as the question is too complex to be dealt with in an Introduction.

2. The difficulties in the traditional order of the matter have been met by a free use of transposition. Hermann, for instance, transfers the paragraph on the λύσις ἀπὸ μηχανῆς from chap. 15 (1454^a 37-^b 8) to chap. 18, inserting it there after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους in 1455^b 32. Susemihl goes further: he lifts the whole of chap. 15 out of its place, in order to make it come immediately after chap. 18. They were both only following *haud passibus aequis* in the steps of Daniel Heinsius, who went to much greater lengths in this direction. The following comparative table may give an idea of the liberties Heinsius took in his rearrangement of the text:—

Heinsius, c. vii	= chap. 12.
„ c. xiii	= chap. 16.
„ c. xiv	= 11, 1452 ^b 9-13 + 13, 1452 ^b 30 sqq.
„ c. xv	= chap. 14.
„ c. xvi	= 13, 1452 ^b 28-30 + chap. 17.
„ c. xvii	= chap. 18.
„ c. xviii	= chap. 15.

The changes Heinsius ventured were never wholly motiveless, but the section as thus reformed by him is almost a *reductio ad absurdum* of this mode of critical procedure. The underlying assumption is that Aristotle, having planned out his work from beginning to end with careful prevision and in accordance with a severely logical scheme, must have thought of everything he had to say in its predestined logical place, and was incapable of saying anything except in its logical place. We have no right to assume this of Aristotle; he was not writing, like Isocrates, for the great world, or with the responsibilities of publication ever before his eyes. But the chief objection to the procedure of the transpositionists is that no *vera causa* can be assigned for the structural disorder it presupposes. Our ordinary experience of MSS. and the textual faults they sometimes present supplies nothing analogous, nothing that will serve to explain the phenomena. The only conceivable hypothesis is that the Aristotelian materials survived at first simply on loose tablets, or sheets, as we should say; that each one of these contained a definite piece of text of varying

length, sometimes that of a chapter, and sometimes that of one of the sections or paragraphs of a modern edition; and that the whole was put into its present shape by an early editor. All this, however, is mere surmise. And if there ever was an early editor with a free hand to arrange the materials as he thought fit, the presumption is that his logical instinct would have led him to the same view of the position of chap. 15, for instance, as Heinsius, Susemihl, and others have taken in modern times.

II

The lost Second Book.

Victorius was the first to see that the treatise now known as the Poetics is only the surviving portion of a larger work. The fact is sufficiently assured by the note in the index of Aristotelian writings in Diogenes Laertius (5, 21), who describes the work as being in *two* Books:

πραγματείας τέχνης ποιητικῆς ἄ β̄.

We have no further direct testimony to the existence of a Second Book. The additional evidence which is sometimes quoted, that of the Arabic version of the index ascribed to Ptolemaeus 'the Philosopher' (v. Berlin Aristotle 1470^b), may be set aside without discussion, as having little or nothing to do with our present Poetics (Rose, Aristotelis Fragmenta ed. Teubn. p. 20; Littig, Andronikos von Rhodos 1 p. 38).

Our present Poetics, if we may take the work at its face value, as a fairly complete and consecutive whole so far as it goes, may be regarded as Bk. I of the original treatise. There are certainly indications of there being more to follow; and its concluding paragraph also is in form exactly like the summaries which Aristotle so constantly introduces in other writings, to mark a transition from one section of his general subject to another. That there was even in the latest Aristotelian schools some faint tradition of another

Book is shown by the reference in Eustratius on the Ethics (p. 320 Heylbut) to Poet. 4, 1448^b 30, who speaks of the passage as being ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητικῆς [i. e. ἐν τῷ ᾧ περὶ ποιητικῆς]. As for Bk. II, one thing is quite clear, that it was wanting in the common archetype of Σ, the MS. before the eighth century Syriac translator, and A^c, our oldest Greek MS. We cannot fix the date of its disappearance; it is practically certain, however, that the loss must have occurred during the papyrus period of the text, when Bk. II was still on a separate roll, so as to be easily detached from Bk. I, which was on another roll. The view of Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 48) is that it survived into the fifth century, and that the statement in Proclus [v. Fr. V note] of the Aristotelian *Catharsis* theory was based on a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's text. The actual words of Proclus hardly justify such a conclusion:—

τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παρασχὸν αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμὴν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων . . .

It will be observed that Proclus refers not only to Aristotle but also to other apologists for the Drama; it is quite possible, therefore, that it was from one of the latter rather than Aristotle himself that he derived his knowledge of the Aristotelian idea of *catharsis*. And in the context in place of the Aristotelian term he substitutes as synonyms ἀφοσίωσις and ἀπέρασις—neither of these words being found either in this or in any other sense in the extant writings of Aristotle.

In Byzantine times Bk. II was so completely forgotten that the inscription of the existing Poetics in A^o is simply Περὶ ποιητικῆς, and not Περὶ ποιητικῆς ᾧ, as it would have been if the memory of Bk. II had survived. There is no evidence to show that the later Grammarians knew of Bk. II, or of the theory of Comedy which must have formed part of it. But there is evidence showing it to have been unknown to them. The so-called Tractatus Coislinianus (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 50-3) preserves a definition of Comedy, which has no doubt a certain Aristotelian look; any one can see, however, by simple inspection that it is nothing more than

an adaptation, or rather, as Bernays calls it, a travesty, of the well-known definition of Tragedy in the existing Poetics (6, 1449^b 24):—

TRACT. COISL.

κωμωδία ἐστὶ μίμησις πράξεως
γελοίου καὶ ἀμοίρου μεγέθους τε-
λείου χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων
ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι, δρώντων καὶ <οὐ>
δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλω-
τος περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

ARISTOTLE.

ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις
πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας
μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ
χωρὶς ἐκάστου [SO A^c] τῶν εἰδῶν
ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι'
ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου
περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

It is evident that neither the compiler of the Tractatus nor the older writer from whom he may have been borrowing had the genuine Aristotelian definition of Comedy before him, and that the gap in knowledge had to be filled up by means of the above sorry fabrication. The same marks of origin are observable in what the Tractatus says of the 'matter' of Comedy:—

κωμωδίας ὕλη, μῦθος ἦθος διάνοια λέξις μέλος ὄψις (comp. Poet. 6, 1450^a 9);

and of the parts into which Comedy is divided:—

μέρη τῆς κωμωδίας τέσσαρα, πρόλογος χορικὸν ἐπεισόδιον ἔξοδος.
πρόλογός ἐστιν μῦθον κωμωδίας τὸ μέχρι τῆς εἰσόδου τοῦ χοροῦ.
χορικόν ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ μέλος ἀδόμενον ὅταν ἔχη μέγεθος
ἰκανόν. ἐπεισόδιόν ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ δύο χορικῶν μελῶν. ἔξοδος ἐστι
τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει λεγόμενον τοῦ χοροῦ (comp. Poet. 12).

The date of this *rechauffé* cannot be determined; but an approximation to that of its 'source' may perhaps be hazarded, as the same enumeration of the 'parts' of Comedy appears in Tzetzes (Kaibel, C G F. 1 p. 21; comp. p. 28), who quotes it as that of a certain Euclides—a grammarian of doubtful date but apparently of the classical period. It would seem, therefore, that even at the time of this Euclides Bk. II of the Poetics was lost or inaccessible. It is difficult to believe that, in the course of a comparatively short treatise, Aristotle repeated himself in the purely mechanical fashion of these later compilations on Comedy.

Although Bk. II is now lost, there are indications in Aristotle himself which may give us some idea of the ground it must have covered. It may be taken to have comprised (1) the discussion on Comedy promised in Poet. 6, 1449^b 21, and (2) the *Catharsis* theory to which reference is made in Pol. 8, 7, 1341^b 32 (v. Fr. V). What we are told in more than one passage in the Rhetoric (v. Fr. III) is enough to show that τὰ γελοῖα, the appointed subject of Comedy, must have been considered and examined with the same analytical care as in the treatment of τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά in the surviving theory of Tragedy. And if his theory of Comedy was on much the same lines as that of Tragedy, Aristotle must have had something to say on the μῦθοι of Comedy, and also on the ἥθος and λέξεις of the comic personages. The strange expression in Fr. IV, τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντότατον, may perhaps have been in its original setting an illustration of the possibilities in the way of diction in Comedy. As for the *Catharsis* theory, the only place we can imagine for it would be, as Vahlen (*Aristotelische Aufsätze* 3 p. 10) has seen, at the end of Bk. II. In such a position it would come in naturally enough, as a final word on the whole subject of the Drama, justifying the existence of both Tragedy and Comedy in reply to the polemic of Plato in the Republic. The discussion itself can hardly have been a brief one. The subject was too large and too controversial to be disposed of in some one or two short chapters.

III

History of the Poetics.

The history of the book in the classical period is obscure. Much of its teaching and terminology survives in the later literature of compilation, but the book itself seems to have been after a time either ignored or but little studied. There are no traces of an ancient commentary on it, and comparatively few citations, acknowledged or unacknowledged, in ancient writers. Several of the citations, too, are manifestly

second-hand. This may be said also even of the reminiscences of Aristotelian ideas in Polybius, and in the *Ars Poetica* of Horace; for there is reason to think that Polybius was only following Eratosthenes, and Horace his Greek authority, Neoptolemus of Parium. The more important of the 'Testimonia' are noted in their place in the Commentary. Many other more latent references are to be found in the Grammarians, as may be seen from the texts collected in the following monographs:—

Trendelenburg: *Grammaticorum graecorum de arte tragica iudiciorum reliquiae* (Bonn 1867).

Westphal: *Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien* (Leipz. 1869).

Kaibel: *Die Prolegomena ΠΕΡΙ ΚΩΜΩΔΙΑΣ* (Berl. 1898).

Adam: *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos* (Wiesb. 1889).

Carroll: *Aristotle's Poetics*, c. xxv, in the light of the Homeric Scholia (Baltimore 1895).

Apart from the fact of our oldest Greek MS. (A^c) having been written somewhere about the year 1000, there is little or no indication of any interest in the book among the Greeks of the Middle Ages. It is clear, however, that it found readers in the East, as it was translated into Syriac in the eighth century, and from the Syriac into Arabic in the eleventh. The Commentary of Averroes, which was based on this Arabic version, was rendered before long into Hebrew, and also, under the title of *Aristotelis Poetria* (Jourdain, *Recherches Critiques*² p. 141), by Hermannus Alemannus into Latin. Roger Bacon (*Op. Mai.* 1 p. 101 Bridges) knew the work of Hermannus, but not the Greek Poetics or any Latin version made directly from the Greek. The Poetics were not among the many Aristotelian and other philosophic Greek books which found translators in the thirteenth century, when the Latin occupation opened up the Byzantine world to the Westerns. The Rhetoric was translated at this time, but its fellow treatise was left out in the cold.

The modern history of the book begins in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Greek text itself now became known among the learned in Italy; and at the end of the century (1498) the first translation from it, that by

G. Valla, was given to the world. It is difficult to see why the Poetics were not included in the great Aldine Aristotle of 1495-8. The many Renaissance MSS. which we still have are enough to show that the book must have been accessible and in the hands of not a few of the earlier humanists. Valla certainly had a MS. to work on. Politian is known to have been a former possessor of one of the Laurentian MSS. (LX. 14); and his acquaintance with the book is proved by his reference to a well-known passage (Poet. 1, 1447^b 21) in his *Panepistemon* (1483): *Tum illa obscuriora poematum genera, ithyphallicum, manerus [i. e. maneros] borimus, lytierces [from Athenaeus]. Et itē qualis centaurus ille Chaeremonis : quae communi vocabulo poemata dicuntur.*

The *editio princeps* of the Greek text appeared at length in 1508 in what is usually reckoned as Vol. I of the Aldine *Rhetores Graeci*. It was no little misfortune to learning that, instead of following one of the better apographs, the editor, Demetrius Ducas, sent the text forth in a form which is an almost ideal instance of what a first edition should not be. Who was responsible for the systematic corruptions in the Aldine we cannot now say; one may suspect, however, that the chief offender was no other than Ducas himself—more especially as he claims credit in his preface for the pains he had taken in the correction of the texts in the new volume: *ταύτην τὴν βίβλον, he says, πολλὰ πονήσαντες καὶ μοχθήσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις οἷς ἐνετύχομεν τοῖς φιλολόγοις διωρθώσαμεν.* The general characteristics of this Aldine text will be examined further on. Here it may be enough to note that the prestige of an Aldine caused it to hold its ground for more than three centuries as a sort of *textus receptus*; it was, in fact, with some few minor improvements, accepted by editor after editor, and scholar after scholar. In 1555 an effort was made to dislodge it from this position by Gu. Morel, whose recension was based on the MS. now known as Parisinus 2040, a fairly faithful apograph of A^c. Morel's edition, however, notwithstanding his great name among his contemporaries, left little or no mark on the general criticism of the book; its readings are all but ignored in the *Variae lectiones* in Sylburg's edition (1584). Several of the sixteenth

century editors (Paccius, Madius, Robortellus, Victorius) had access to MSS.; but they did little more than turn to them from time to time for a new reading in some particular passage; it does not seem to have occurred to them to raise the larger question of the value and credentials of the Aldine text. Even Victorius, who had had A^c in his hands before it left Florence, and was fully aware of its great antiquity, failed to see its superiority as a basis for the text to the Aldine vulgate. Writing in 1560 he says: *Videram ipse olim ac diligenter tractaram volumen quoddam antiquissimum in quo . . . hic etiam liber esset, nihilo melior illic ille multis locis quam pervulgatus quilibet typisque excusus erat. Quare desperavi aliquid boni inde posse expectari.* And as late as 1831 Bekker, with a fairly complete collation of A^c before him, retained nevertheless not a few of the Aldine emblemata. This illusory idea of the value of the Aldine lasted on until 1839, when Ritter at last raised his voice against it, and set it aside as based on a MS. 'non solum multis vitiis librariorum culpa depravatum, sed etiam ab Aldo aliisque eruditibus Italiae viris modo correctum modo interpolatum et corruptum.' It remained for Spengel (1865-6) and Vahlen (1867) to carry Ritter's theory a step further by recognizing the unique authority of A^c as the one record of the Greek textual tradition, and the ultimate parent of all our Renaissance texts. There is no doubt a tendency just at present to question this conclusion owing to the effect on opinion of the recently published Arabic Version, which is found to confirm some of the better readings in the Renaissance MSS.; the fact is supposed to imply the survival into Renaissance times of some memory of a text independent of that in A^c. The point will have to be considered at length in a later section of this Introduction.

IV

The existing data for the constitution of the Text.

If we may disregard for the present the testimony of the Renaissance MSS., as being all of them apographs of the MS. known as A^c, our authorities for the textual tradition

of the Poetics are reduced to two, (1) A^c, and (2) in a less definite way, the traces and indications of another Greek text recoverable from the Arabic Version and the surviving fragment of the lost Syriac Version.

A^c.

A^c, i. e. Parisinus 1741, is part of a volume which contains not only the Poetics but also the Rhetoric and several post-Aristotelian works on Rhetoric. In the sixteenth century it was examined by Victorius, while it was still in Florence. Since then it has been repeatedly collated; first by an unnamed friend of Burgess (perhaps Coray) for the critical Appendix to Tyrwhitt's edition (1794); then by Bekker for the Berlin Aristotle (1831); and lastly by Vahlen and others. A description of it, with a full account of its history, will be found in M. H. Omont's Introduction to the facsimile edition of the text published in 1891 by M. F. Allègre. The date of this fine specimen of Byzantine calligraphy is saec. x-xi.

It is hardly possible to overrate the critical value of the texts in the volume. For the non-Aristotelian writings preserved in it it is our first, if not our only, textual authority. In the case of Demetrius *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* it is acknowledged to be the archetype of the later MSS., which 'are all derived from P. 1741, the better readings they present pointing rather to individual emendation than to difference of descent' (Rhys Roberts, after Usener). Usener recognizes it as our one great authority for the text of the various treatises of Dionysius included in the volume, and puts aside the later MSS. as being all of them 'apographa exempli Parisini'. Though it cannot be shown to be of such unique importance for Aristotle's Rhetoric, it is confessedly our best source for the text, and a more faithful representative of the common archetype than any of the later MSS. or the version of William of Morbeka (v. Roemer, Praef. p. xxv).

In the Poetics A^c must always claim the premier place, even if the Arabic Version now and then supplies a better reading or corrects some of its more patent scribal errors. Its general

credibility as a fairly faithful record of a much older text is sufficiently obvious. (1) It retains errors which go back to the uncial stage of the text; e. g. Διδόμενα for Ἀιδόμενα in 1456^a 28, ἸΔίασ for Ἰλιάς in 1462^b 3, Μαθημάτων for Παθημάτων in 1449^b 28. (2) It retains in places traces of an antique spelling¹; e. g. πάνμικρον and πανμέγεθες in 1450^b 37-9, ἔνχρα in 1461^a 2, πλέω in 1461^a 26. (3) Although the text of the ancient archetype was constantly misunderstood by the scribe responsible for accents and breathings, there are but few signs of an attempt to alter the actual letter of the original *scriptura continua* in order to accommodate it to his misconceptions of its meaning.

The following synopsis of errors in A^c may incidentally serve to indicate the kinds of assumption on which the more convincing corrections of the text are based. An asterisk is added when the amended reading is known to be confirmed by the Arabic Version or the Syriac fragment.

1. Confusions through similarity of letters:—

Διδόμενα=Ἀιδόμενα* 1456^a 28; Δειλίαν=Ἀεί, λίαν 1461^b 28; ἸΔίασ=Ἰλιάς 1462^b 3; Μαθημάτων=Παθημάτων* 1449^b 28; ἔΠει=ἔΤι 1455^b 19; Πρωιάδεσ=Τρωιάδες 1459^b 7; οΗσ=ὄψις 1456^a 2 and 1458^a 5.

2. Confusions through similarity of pronunciation; a few typical instances must suffice:—

ε and αι: ται=τε 1454^b 4, 1458^a 28; σκεπταίαι 1461^b 25.—κε=καί 1457^b 14; φαγάδενα 1458^b 23.

η and ι: οὐχί=οὐχ ἦ 1448^b 18; τιλέμαχον 1461^b 5.—σαλαμίνη 1459^a 25; μηγνύη 1460^a 2.

η and ει: ἄν εἴη=ἀνῆει* 1455^a 27; εἴδει=ῆδει 1460^b 31.—δι)=δεί 1459^b 8, 1460^a 23; ἦ or ῆ=εἶ 1460^b 16 (etc.).

η and οι: τῆσ=τοῖς 1455^a 1; εἴπηι=εἴποι 1458^b 32; μηγνύη=μιγνύοι 1460^a 2.

ι and ει: πειθανόν (passim); εἶδεῶν 1456^b 3, 1458^b 18.—ὄψισ=ὄψεις 1450^a 13; ἰαμβίον (passim).

ο and ω: τὸ=τῶ (passim); τοῦτο=τούτω 1451^b 4; γλοττῶν 1458^a 26.—οὔτω=οὐ τὸ* 1451^a 36; χωροῦ=χοροῦ 1452^b 19; ἐπιτιμᾶ τῶι=ἐπετιμᾶτο 1455^a 26.

¹ Comp. Meisterhans, Gr.³ p. 112, and Crönert, Memoria graeca Herculaneensis p. 57.

3. Omission of *iōta mutum*, a frequent phenomenon not only in *τραγωδία, κωμωδία, ᾄδειν*, etc., but also in the inflexions of nouns and verbs:—

κοινή=*κοινῆ* 1447^b 15; *ἀρετή*=*ἀρετῆ* 1448^a 3; *ἡ πλείστη*=*ῆ πλείστη* 1454^b 20; *ἡττήθη*=*ῆττήθῆ* 1456^a 23.

4. Omission of final N:—

οὐ=*οὐν* 1447^b 28, 1461^a 1; *ἐπεισοδίου*=*ἐπεισοδιοῦν* 1455^b 1; *νίπτρω*=*Νίπτρων* 1460^a 26; *οἶνοχοεῦν*=*οἶνοχοεῦειν* 1461^a 30; *αὐτὸ*=*αὐτὸν* 1453^a 1; *ὀρώντα*=*ὀρώντ' ἄν* 1455^a 27.

5. Confusions through general resemblance:—

σατυριακοῦ=*σατυρικοῦ* 1449^a 20; *κίνησις*=*μίμησις* 1459^b 37; *ἀνάλογον*=*ἄλλογον* 1460^a 13; *ἀναγνωρίσει*=*ἀναγνώσει* 1462^a 17.

6. Errors through assimilation of terminations:—

πλειόνων συνδέσμων=*πλειόνων συνδέσμφ* 1457^a 29; *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι* *σημαίνοντος*=*ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος** 1457^a 33; *ἄλλου δὲ τούτου ὄντος*=*ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος* 1460^a 23; *τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν*=*τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν* 1460^b 9.

7. Errors in accents and breathings, these being often added on mechanically and without regard to rule or sense:—

μέγεθος 1451^a 15; *περιπετεῖαι* 1452^a 33; *ἀμφιβόλια* (= *ἀμφιβολία*) 1461^a 25; *θόιναται* 1458^b 24.—*Μεροπή* 1454^a 5; *Ἄγαθῶν* 1454^b 14; *κυκλωπᾶς*, i. e. *κύκλω πᾶς* (= *Κύκλωπας*) 1448^a 15; *ἔνα λείψει* (= *ἐναλείψει*) 1450^b 1; *πάν μικρὸν* (= *πάνμικρον*) 1450^b 37; *ὥσ τοῦ* (= *ὥστ' οὐ*) 1451^b 23; *ἀλλ' ὥσ γε* (= *ἄλλως τε*) 1456^a 4; *ἀφήρη μὲν ὄντι* (= *ἀφηρημένον τι*) 1458^a 3; *οὐδένα ἦθη* (= *οὐδέν' ἀήθη*) 1460^a 11; *τότε νομίζον* (= *τότ' ἐνόμίζον*) 1461^a 3.

8. Haplographia:—

προσημαίνει 1457^a 17; *συμβάλεται* 1458^b 1; *κόμι* 1458^a 15; *πανύχιοι* 1461^a 17.

9. Omission of letters or syllables:—

ἄκ *πλήξεω* 1455^a 17; *ἄ* *μαρτηῖσθαι* 1460^b 28; *τί* (= *ῥτι*) 1461^b 1; *ῶι* *δίπουν* 1462^b 2; *χ* *ῶνίδου** 1448^a 34; *ῥτε* (= *οἶ τε*) 1452^b 12; *λυ* *ῥκεῖ** 1455^b 29; *ἄ* *ῥθρον* 1456^b 21; *κινούντα* *ῶι* 1461^b 30; *ἡδονῆ* (= *ῆδιον ῆ*) 1462^b 1.

10. Omission of words:—

*τοιαῦται** 1447^a 25; *ἀνώνυμος** 1447^b 9; *λύσις** 1455^b 31; *ῆ* 1460^b 11, 1461^a 9; *οὐ οἱ οὐψω** 1450^a 30, 1455^b 17; *οὐδέν** 1456^a 28; *ὀ* 1448^a 12, 1451^a 6; *τὸ* 1456^b 26; *τοῦ* 1461^a 19; *οἶ* 1462^a 3; *καὶ ἄ* 1448^a 25; *καὶ Σ** 1458^a 9; *ῆ μῆ* 1460^b 27.

11. Transposition, more especially of little words liable to omission :—

τὴν κατὰ = *κατὰ τὴν* 1447^b 15; *τὸ κατὰ* = *κατὰ τὸ* 1457^a 19; *ἡ μία* = *μία* ἢ 1462^b 3; *καὶ ταύτησ* = *ταύτης καὶ* 1451^a 32; *ἂν οἶ* = *οἶ ἂν* 1453^a 37.

12. Dittographia :—

τούτουσ = *τούς* 1455^a 34; *ἔπειτα τὰ* = *ἐπεὶ τὰ* 1460^a 14; *ἔτι δὲ ἔτι δὲ* 1459^b 7; *θείη θείη* 1462^b 2.

13. Repetition of words from the context :—

ὅτι 1448^b 35; *ἂν* 1458^a 24, 1460^b 7; *δὲ* 1456^a 12, 1462^a 1; *ὄσοισ* 1459^a 13; *ἡμαρτήσθαι* 1460^b 28; *οὔτε* 1460^b 36; *ἐστὶ* 1462^a 7.

14. Marginalia in the body of the text. The following would seem to be instances of the intrusion of such adscripts :—

ἐποποιία 1447^a 28; *πέντε* 1450^b 16; *παράδειγμα σκληρότητοσ* 1454^b 14; *ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου* 1455^b 7.

15. Double readings in the text :—

1449^a 8 *κρίνεται ἡ ναί*: it may be supposed to represent ^{ηναι} *κρινεται*, i. e. *κρίνεται* and *κρηῖναι* (= *κρίναι*).

1449^a 11 *φauλλικὰ* = *φauλα*, i. e. *φauλα* (which is implied in the Arabic Version) and *φauλλικά*.

1452^a 3 *καὶ μάλιστα καὶ μάλλον*, i. e. *μάλιστα* and *μάλλον*.

1457^b 14 *ἀερύσσασ* = *ἀρύσσασ*, i. e. *ἀρύσσασ* and *ἐρύσσασ*.

1461^a 33 *σημαίνουε* = *σημαινοι*, i. e. *σημαῖνοι* and *σημαίνε*.

16. Errors due to an attempt to emend :—

1450^b 39 *παμμέγεθεσ*] *πᾶν μέγεθοσ* A^c—the compound having been misread as two words.

1451^a 28 *οἶαν λέγομεν*] *οἶαν λέγομεν* A^c—apparently through OIAN having been misread as *οἶ ἂν*.

1455^a 2 *ἀπολόγφ*] *ἀπὸ λόγων* A^c—another instance of a misunderstood compound.

1455^a 16 *ποιῆσαι παραλογισμός**] *ποιῆσαι παραλογισμόν* A^c.

1455^a 26 *ἐπετιμᾶτο*] *ἐπιτιμᾶ τῶ* A^c.

1457^a 17 *τὸ δὲ βαδίζει*] *τὸ δὲ βαδίζειν* A^c.

1457^a 22 *βιάδιζε*] *ἐβιάδιζεν* A^c—to make it harmonize with the preceding *ἐβιάδισεν*.

1457^a 27 *τῷ βυδίζει*] *τῷ βυδίζειν* A^c.

1461^b 2 *εἰρηκότοσ*] *εἰρηκότεσ* A^c—to accommodate it to the preceding *καταψηφισάμενοι*.

This last kind of error is assuredly a very serious one, because it implies a corrector who, instead of emending the text, left it worse than he found it. But corruptions like the above are not numerous; the general impression the MS. must produce is that it is a faithful record of a genuine textual tradition. A large proportion even of its mistakes have the stamp of antiquity upon them, since they often carry one back to the papyrus period of the text, before the accents and breathings were superimposed on the uncial *scripturā continua*. One of its more obvious faults is its tendency—which it shares with its fellow MS. of the Rhetoric—to omit words or little groups of words. The Arabic Version, which occasionally supplies the missing word or words, shows that the fault must have been in certain passages of comparatively late origin. There are other passages, however, in which the text underlying the Version seems to have been equally defective; in which case the common omissions point to omissions in the common archetype.

The Arabic Version.

Though the Arabic Version (A. V.) seems to have been long known to the French Orientalists, it was reserved for one of our own countrymen, Dr. D. S. Margoliouth, to face the manifold difficulties of the Arabic text, and give it to the world in a printed form in his 'Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam' in 1887. All students of the Poetics owe him a debt of gratitude for making the chief results of the Version accessible to them from the first by translating a series of select extracts into Latin, and by indicating in his notes the use that may be made of the Arabic renderings for the confirmation or criticism of the Greek text.

In the absence of a complete translation our estimate of the A. V. must be based on Dr. Margoliouth's notes and extracts; we may, however, supplement them to some extent from an article in *Philologus* LV. by O. Immisch, who had before him a German translation (by Socin) of a longer and more consecutive specimen (1449^a 9-31) of the Arabic Version. The interpretation of the text (which survives in

a single MS.) is, I understand, beset with difficulties. Even in the thirteenth century it was felt to be no easy matter by Hermannus Alemannus, an experienced translator from the Arabic, who gave the following as his excuse for evading the work of translation: *Postquam cum non modico labore consummaveram translationem rhetoricae Aristotelis ex Arabico in Latinum, volens manum mittere ad eius poetriam tantam inveni difficultatem propter disconvenientiam modi metrificandi in Graeco cum modo metrificandi in Arabico et propter vocabulorum obscuritatem et plures alias causas, quod non sum confisus me posse sane et integre illius operis translationem studiis tradere Latinorum* (Aristot. Rhet. lat. Ven. 1481 f. 1).

The use of the A. V. for us is that we are often able to look beyond it, so as to recover the readings of a Greek MS. which was at least three centuries anterior to A^c. But it must always be remembered that it was not made directly from the Greek, but from a now lost Syriac translation of the Greek; it is, therefore, the version of a version, and we have thus to discern the original text as best we can, through the distorting medium of two Oriental translations. In such a work, too, one must not always expect the close literalness we find in medieval Latin translations of Greek writings; nor need we assume a very exact knowledge of Greek on the part of the Syriac interpreter. And in the instance of the Poetics some allowance has to be made for the misconceptions of an Oriental without an idea of the nature of the subject-matter of the treatise. The possibilities of Oriental ignorance may be seen writ large in the Paraphrase of Averroes, which was based on the A. V. Averroes is fairly at home in the more philosophical and grammatical parts of the book; but its meaning, as a theory of Greek Tragedy, was from first to last a hopeless enigma to the great Aristotelian of Cordova.

A word or two must be said here on one of the more marked characteristics of the A. V., its tendency to amplify the text by alternative renderings. Thus in 1449^a 16 ὑποκριτῶν is represented by 'the hypocrites and dissemblers' ('Heuchler und Versteller', Socin), and χοροῦ in the following line by 'chori et cordacis' (Margoliouth), or 'the dance and the

roundel' (Socin). In 1449^a 19 τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων becomes 'primus creavit ex parvis fabulis magnitudinem sermonis et vociferationem et tumultum in sermone', i. e. with three alternative renderings for μέγεθος. Again in 1453^b 36 ἡ γὰρ πράξει ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδóτας ἢ μὴ εἰδóτας is expanded into 'necesse est enim aut faciat aut non faciat, cum faciat autem ut faciat sciens aut inscius sed scire destinans, praeterea aut scientibus aut insciis'; this plethora of words being primarily due to the translator's inability to make up his mind about the accusatives εἰδóτας ἢ μὴ εἰδóτας—whether they were to be taken as appositional to the subject, or as the object, of πράξει. It is clear that amplifications like these may be put down to the Syrian, the original translator—more especially as such alternative renderings are said to be not uncommon in Syriac translations from the Greek (v. Ryssel, Ueber den textkritischen Wert der syrischen Uebersetzungen griechischer Klassiker, II. p. 49).

In any use we may make of the A. V., two facts must always be borne in mind: (1) that the existing text, as it stands in the one MS. which preserves it, is disfigured by corruptions; and (2) that the Arabic translator was not incapable of misunderstanding the Syriac original. This Syriac original is no longer extant, but we need not suppose it to have been free from faults of its own; it is quite possible that its text was at times faulty, as also that the Syrian himself may have either misread or misinterpreted the Greek text before him. This last suspicion seems to be confirmed by the one fragment that survives of the Syriac Version, an excerpt from Poet. 6, 1449^b 24–1450^a 9. I give it as rendered into Latin by Dr. Margoliouth (A. O. p. 54), with the Greek of A^c *en regard* for purposes of comparison.

Tragoedia est imitatio actionis
eximiae perfectae cui est mag-
nitude sermone iucundo absque
una quaque specierum quae in
partibus agunt; neque per polli-
citationem sed per misericor-
diam et metum temperans pas-

POETICS

*Ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις
πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας
μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ
χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς
μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγ- 5
γελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαι-

C

siones et faciens purgationem eorum qui patiuntur. Facitque hoc quidem sermo iucundus cui est magnitudo [l. rhythmus] et harmonia et melos; illud vero quod sine speciebus quod propter metra perficiuntur partes nonnullae; rursus alias quod per melos dum recitant, efficiunt imitationem actionum. Necessario erit pars tragoediae decor personae; tum inter haec opus musicum et elocutio; his enim facit imitationem. Dico autem elocutionem quidem ipsam compositionem metrorum: opus musicum vim apertam quam tota possidet. Quoniam imitatio actionum est, agitur vero ab hominibus agentibus iis quos necessitas cogat ut quales homines sint consuetudinibus suis et ingeniis; per enim haec etiam narrationes esse dicimus quales; [et] naturā aptae quae existant duae causae ipsarum narrationum, ingenium et consuetudo sunt; secundum enim haec eae quoque inveniuntur scopum attingentes omnes per haec et a scopis aberrantes. Est autem fabula narrationis imitatio. Dico autem fabulam compositionem actionum; consuetudines vero, qualis quisque eorum qui narrant sit et dicatur; qui se tales esse ostendunt ingeniis suis, et talem esse opinionem suam apparet. Necesse est ergo ut sint unicuique tragoediae partes sex, quas supra diximus; secundum vim ipsam Tragoediae.

νοῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος, τὸ 10 δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἕνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιῶνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον 15 τραγωδίας ὃ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος, εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιῶνται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξις μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ 20 τὴν δύναμιν φανεράν ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, 25 διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιίας τινας, πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι 30 πάντες. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις· λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τούτον, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἦθη, καθ' ὃ ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν τοὺς 35 πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγοντες ἀποδεικνύασίν τι ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγωδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἢ 40 τραγωδία.

It will be seen that in l. 7 the difficult word *τοιούτων* is ignored. In l. 5 the translator must have misconstrued the passage, taking *δρώντων* with the preceding *εἰδῶν*. He represents *πράττοντες* in l. 13 by 'dum recitant'; *πράξεις* in l. 26 by 'narrationes'; and *τοὺς πρᾶττοντας* in l. 35 by 'qui narrant'. He expands *εἶναί φημεν* in l. 35 into 'sit et dicatur'; in l. 14 he adds 'actionum', and in l. 40 'quas supra diximus'. And in l. 20, and again in ll. 36-8, his translation is obviously very wide of the mark. If the above, therefore, is a fair specimen of it, the Syriac Version cannot have been an accurate piece of work. This criticism, however, only applies to the translation as a translation. Our problem is to look beyond all this, so as to recover the Greek text—we may for short call it Σ —which the Syriac renderings would seem to presuppose. The following Σ readings recovered in this way deserve especial attention:—

l. 4. *χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν* Σ , as also A^o .

l. 5. *οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου*] *οὐ δι' ἐπαγγελίας ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλέου* Σ —anticipating thus the twofold corruption in P^a (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine.

l. 7. *παθημάτων* Σ —confirming the corrector's reading in P^a against A^o 's *μαθημάτων*.

l. 11. *χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι*] *χωρὶς τῶν εἰδῶν* Σ —anticipating the corruption in P^a Aldine.

l. 29. *καὶ κατὰ ταύτας*] *κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ αὐταὶ* Σ .

If the language of the fragment will bear the pressure thus put on it as a means of recovering the Σ readings, it is clear that the Σ text must have been at times faulty enough and vitiated by corruptions of a kind from which A^o is comparatively speaking exempt. The Σ readings, therefore, so far as they can be ascertained, must be considered on their individual merits, without any general assumption of their antecedent superiority to those of A^o . The greater antiquity of Σ is no decisive mark of superiority. In Plato an editor may have to follow an eleventh century MS. (T) in preference to the Clarkianus. For Strabo the eighth century Grotta Ferrata palimpsest is 'nullius pretii' according to Cobet (Misc. Crit. p. 87) by comparison with the Paris MS. of the eleventh century.

The fallibility, however, of the Σ text may be seen on a larger scale in some of the readings recovered from the A.V. The following instances will show that Σ must have had errors of its own, and in many passages errors of a very arbitrary description, which would sadly mislead us, or defy emendation, if we had not A^c to set things right.

- 1447^a 27 ὀρχηστῶν] ὀρχηστρῶν Σ .
 1448^a 13 παρφθίας] τραφθίας Σ .
 — ^a 21 ἀπαγγέλλοντα] ἐπαγγέλλοντα Σ . Similarly in 1449^b 26 the Syriac (v. supra) presupposes ἐπαγγελίας, not ἀπαγγελίας.
 — ^b 19 χροϊαν] χῶραν Σ .
 — ^b 27 ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια] The A.V. ‘postea panegyricum et laudem aliorum’ implies ὕστερον ἐτέρων ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια as the reading of Σ .
 1449^a 11 φαλλικὰ] φαῦλα Σ . The A^c reading φανλλικά is a conflation of φαῦλα and φαλλικά.
 — ^b 16 ἔπεσιν] ἄπασιν ἔπεσιν Σ —a conflation of two readings.
 1450^b 12 καθόλου τι] καθότι Σ .
 — ^b 34 ἐπεὶ] ἐπὶ Σ (and again in 1451^a 31 and 1453^b 11).
 1451^a 7 οὐ] ὁ Σ .
 — ἐκατὸν] ἕκαστον Σ .
 — ^b 21 ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεί] ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν ὃς ἂν θῆ Σ .
 — ^b 26 ὀλίγοις γνώριμα om. Σ , through the homoeoteleuton.
 1452^a 8 ἀνδριάς] Ἀνδρέας Σ .
 — ^b 4 ἕτερον] ἐταῖρον Σ .
 — ^b 34 δεῖ] ἀεὶ Σ (also elsewhere).
 1453^b 14 οὖν] οὐ Σ .
 1455^a 2 ἀπολόγῳ] ἀπὸ λόγων Σ (with A^c).
 — ^a 33 εὔπλαστοι] The rendering in A.V., ‘simplices,’ implies ἄπλαστοι in Σ —an instance of the confusion of *a* and *eu* common in the minuscule script.
 — ^b 25 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν—δέσειν om. Σ .
 — ^b 34 οἶον—ἠθικὴ om. Σ , through the homoeoteleuton.
 1456^a 25 εἶνα δεῖ] ἐν ἄδη Σ .
 1459^b 23 ἴδιον] Ἰλιον Σ .
 1460^a 2 μιγνύοι] μὴ γνοίη Σ . The reading of the archetype of Σ and A^c was perhaps μὴ γνοίη; the Σ reading arose through a confusion of *oi* and *u*, which is of comparatively late date.
 — ^a 11 οὐδέν] ἀθήη] The A.V. rendering ‘non introducens rem non assuetam’ seems to imply οὐδέν ἀθηες—which would anticipate the corruption in P^a Aldine.

1460^a 13 ἀλογον] ἀνάλογον Σ (with A^c).

1461^a 18 ἀθρήσειεν] ἀθροίσειεν Σ—an instance of the confusion of η and οι, which points to the Byzantine period.

It is clear, from the above series of readings recovered from the A. V., that the Σ text was not free from corruptions, and also that some of its errors were of recent date, of the Byzantine rather than the classical period. There are a few instances, too, of glosses intruded into the text. Thus in 1454^a 31 Σκύλλη is represented in the A. V. by 'Scylla *maritima*', and in 1454^b 27 οὐλῆς by 'pustula *quae fuit in pede eius*'. And in 1461^a 17 we find Σ adding *ἱπποκορυσταί*, to make the quotation agree with the passage in Homer.

These indications of the Σ text, as known from the A. V., may be combined with those already observed in the Syriac Fragment, as leading to the general conclusion that, even if Σ were before us in its integrity, its readings would still have to be considered one by one on their merits. Its antiquity, as dating from the eighth century, would be only one element in the critical situation; we should still have to submit its readings to the usual tests; to judge of each by reference to the sense, the context, and the various criteria, internal and external, of philological probability. And we must never for an instant lose sight of the fact that after all Σ is not quite the same thing as an actual Greek MS. A Greek text recovered by art and inference from a version of a version—each of them in an Oriental language—is exposed at times to doubts and suspicions of a kind from which that of A^c is free.

Now that the first surprise of discovery is over, we may view the new readings, which seem to be implied in the A. V., with equanimity. Only a few of them need be accepted as of positive critical value; many of them are obviously either no improvement on the traditional text, or so illusive or misleading as to be almost a libel on the memory of Aristotle. The chief result of the A. V., in our present state of knowledge of it, is that it is seen to confirm a certain number of the emendations already suggested by Renaissance or modern scholars. It gives the sanction of tradition to *φυσικόν* (for *μουσικόν*) in 1447^b 16; to *ἀπόπλου* or *ἀνάπλου* (for

ἀπλοῦν) in 1454^b 2; to παραλογισμός in 1455^a 16; to κρατεῖσθαι in 1456^a 10; to κεκρᾶσθαι in 1458^a 31. It confirms the excision of ἐποποιία in 1447^a 28; of ὅτι in 1448^b 35; and of πέντε in 1450^b 16. It confirms some of the additions also that have been made in the A^c text; e.g. that of a negative in 1450^a 30 and 1455^b 17; that of τοιαῦται in 1447^a 25; that of ἀνώνυμος in 1447^b 2; that of λύσις in 1455^b 31; that of καὶ Σ in 1458^a 9; and that of καὶ εἰ ἀδύνατον (or something equivalent) in 1461^b 12. And besides all this it preserves in two instances traces of an orthography which, whether Aristotle's or not, was certainly antique, Κλνταιμήστρα in 1453^b 23, and Μενέλεως in 1454^a 29.

The better and more convincing of the readings recovered from the A.V. have all one noteworthy characteristic in common: they fall quite naturally into their place in the A^c text, and imply directly or indirectly the existing context; so that the area of disturbance in each instance is of the most limited extent. I am aware that the A.V. is often supposed to reveal in places indications of more extensive textual divergences, and to throw doubt on the soundness of larger portions of our existing Greek text. The only answer is that the evidence, such as it is, of the A.V. may be taken sometimes too seriously. One must never forget that its text is not always certain; that it is the version of a version; that the Arabian may have misunderstood the Syriac, and the Syrian the Greek text; and lastly, that they were both working in the dark, and dealing with matters wholly outside their own literary experience. However we may explain it, the fact itself is indisputable, that in a considerable number of passages, in which the existing Greek text is perfectly sound and satisfactory, the renderings in the A.V. have little or no recognizable relation to it. Many of these renderings we may safely disregard, as representing not a different form of Greek text, but the aberrations of one or other of the two Orientals. In cases of doubt, the antecedent probability must always be on the side of the readings of A^c. The A.V. suggests or confirms a certain number of minor and occasional improvements; but that is for the present at any rate the practical limit of its service. For anything beyond

that its evidence is insufficient—not clear enough to enable us to reconstruct the Σ text, and not certain enough to justify any considerable departure from that in A^c .

V

The Apographa.

The Renaissance MSS. of the Greek text, now usually known as the 'Apographa', require discussion because the whole question of their value and position has been recently reopened. Instead of acquiescing in Spengel and Vahlen's view of the unique importance of A^c as the ultimate source of the texts of the 'Apographa', many seem more than half inclined to think that some at any rate of the better readings in them, more especially those confirmed by the Arabic Version, point to the survival in the fifteenth century of another textual authority, a now lost Greek MS. independent of A^c and free from certain of its errors. The evidence, however, in favour of this remote possibility is as nothing compared with that which tells against it.

Our knowledge of these MSS. is not so complete as one could wish. For Urbinas 47 (B^c) we have a collation in Bekker's Aristotle, and for Riccardianus 46 one by Landi in the *Studi Italiani* 3 p. 68; I have also collations of my own of two Paris MSS., Parisinus 2038 (P^a) and Parisinus 2040 (P^b). But for the rest we have still to rely on the *Variæ lectiones* at the end of Tyrwhitt and in Susemihl, and the occasional record of the readings of individual Apographa in Vahlen's notes.

The first and most obvious fact to be noticed in the Apographa is their textual divergence. Whereas in some of them the text is but one remove from that in A^c , in others it is seen to be constantly deviating from that, and moreover in a very marked degree. But there is one thing that must be said of them all, that their deviations from A^c are manifestly due in a large proportion of instances to a desire to amend the older text, or present it in an easier form. Many of the simpler among the amended readings we may put

down to copyists of the better class, since the scribe of a Renaissance MS. was often a scholar by profession and quite capable of improvising a simple correction of an ordinary clerical error. But this was certainly not the only cause of the appearance of amended readings in the MSS. of this period. As the Renaissance scholar annotated his books just as we do, one may well suppose that some of the textual suggestions thus made on the Poetics have survived and found a place in the text of later transcripts.

The sporadic origin of many of the improved readings scattered up and down the long series of Renaissance MSS. is easily shown. Several of them are not an original part of the text of any known MS.; e. g. *παθημάτων* in 1449^b 28, in which the *π* is due to correction in P^a and Laurentianus LX. 21; and *ἐπετιμάτο* in 1455^a 26, and *Αἰγεί* in 1461^b 21, which are both of them from the margin, not the text, of Riccardianus 16. Others again are found in the text of only one or at most two MSS.; e. g.

1448^b 35 *ἀλλὰ καὶ* Riccard. 46. 1451^a 17 *τῷ ἐνὶ* Guelferbytanus and Riccard. 46. 1455^a 16 *παρалоγισμός* Riccard. 46.—^a 27 *ἀνῆει* Guelferbytanus (and marg. P^b).—^a 34 *ἐκστατικοί* Riccard. 46.—^b 19 *ἔτι* Riccard. 16. 1457^a 22 *βάδιζε* Riccard. 16.—^a 29 *συνδέσμφ* Riccard. 16. 1458^a 9 *καὶ Σ* add. Riccard. 16.—^a 31 *κεκρᾶσθαι* Riccard. 46.—^b 25 *ἀεικίης* Riccard. 46. 1460^a 30 *Δάιος* Riccard. 16.—^b 1 *ποιήσειε* Riccard. 46.

The Apographa, as I have said, fall into two main classes, according as they deviate but slightly, or in a more marked degree, from the text in A^c. It may be shown of each, with such probability at any rate as this kind of matter allows, that their texts presuppose that in A^c, and that the better lections they occasionally supply were originally due to conjecture. In order to simplify the inquiry, one may take B^c (Urbinas 47) and P^b (Parisinus 2040) as types of the first class, and P^a (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine as types of the second.

(1) B^c P^b supply a certain number of very simple and necessary corrections of the A^c text; e. g.

1447^b 28 *οὐν*, for *οὐ*. 1448^b 38 *ὁ*, for *τὸ*. 1453^b 22 *δρᾶ*, for *δρᾶν*. 1455^b 1 *ἐπεισοδιῶν*, for *ἐπεισοδίου*. 1456^a 12 *λέγω*, for *λέγω δέ*.

1459^b 37 *μίμησις*, for *κίνησις*. 1460^a 14 *ἐπεί*, for *ἔπειτα*.—^b 32 *ἦ εἶ*, for *ἦ η* (sic). 1461^a 19 *ἀντί* (τοῦ). 1462^a 8 *ὁ ὀπούντιος*, for *ὁ πούντιος*.

These readings, however, do not stand alone; they are only a few out of a large number of alterations, the general quality and character of which may be inferred from the following specimens:—

1448^a 10 *πάσας*, for *ταύτας*.—^b 35 *δραματικῶς*, for *δραματικὰς*.—^b 37 *ὑπῆρξεν*, for *ὑπέδειξεν*. 1451^a 8 *κλεψύδραν*, for *κλεψύδρας*.—^a 35 *ἐπίδηλον* (ὄς). 1455^b 30 *δὲ*, for *μὲν*. 1456^b 17 *μὴ* (ποιεῖν). 1457^a 3 *ἦν μὴ ἀρμόττη*, for *ἦν μὴ ἀρμόττει*.—^a 19 *σημαίνουσα*, for *σημαῖνον*. 1458^b 4 *λεγόμενον*, for *γιγνόμενον*. 1460^b 17 *αὐτή*, for *αὐτῆς*. 1461^a 34 *ὠδικῶς* or *ὠδικῶς*¹, for *A^os ὠδιῶς* (i.e. *ὠδὶ ἢ ὠς*).—^b 21 *αἰγιώγη*, for *A^os αἰγιήγη* (i.e. *Αἰγεί ἢ τῆ*).

If one compares the two sets of readings, one cannot but see that they are all on the same lines, and inspired apparently by the same motive; the only visible difference between them is that the first group represents the successes, and the second the failures of a Renaissance corrector. But after all the deviations in B^c P^b from the A^c text are few and far between, and of no great moment. The two MSS. are as a whole faithful reproductions of the A^c text, following it even in its accidental faults and errors with an exactness which admits of but one explanation, namely that they are really and truly Apographa, copies of the text of the older MS. we still have, made either from the MS. itself or from some direct transcript of it.

(2) The type of text represented by P^a Aldine reveals the same tendencies in a more pronounced form, as the corrector here has allowed himself to go to far greater lengths. It is to be observed that in several places the P^a text was, as originally written, in agreement with A^c, and that it was then altered (apparently by the same hand) to bring it into closer conformity with that now represented by the Aldine. As an explanation of this one may perhaps suppose that the Aldine additions appeared at first as mar-

¹ This portentous corruption originated in a mere misreading of the text of A^c, the tenth century *η* being read as a *κ* (comp. Bast, Comm. Pal. p. 716).

ginalia, and were thus neglected by the scribe of P^a, who had to work them in afterwards, when he came to revise his transcript. This point of difference, however, need not be taken into account, since the general agreement between the two texts is so marked that they may very well serve as representatives of one and the same recension.

One thing is quite clear, that the immediate basis of the P^a Aldine was an Apograph with a distinct textual affinity to B^c P^b. The following omissions will show this:—

1449^a 2 παραφανείσης—κωμωδίας : om. P^a Ald. with P^b.

1456^a 2 ὄησ A^c : a lacuna here in B^c P^b and in P^a : om. Ald.

1457^a 33 πλὴν—ἀσήμερον : om. P^a Ald. with B^c P^b.

Several of the actual readings also in P^a Aldine point to the same conclusion:—

1451^a 6 τοῦ A^c : τοῦ δὲ P^a Ald. with B^c P^b.

1454^b 37 ἤτοι τῆι A^c : τρίτη ἢ P^a Ald. with P^b.

1456^a 31 ἡ εἰ A^c : ἡ P^a Ald. with P^b.

1458^a 10 ἐκ τούτου A^c : ἐκ τούτου ἀφώνων B^c : ἔκ του τῶν ἀφώνων P^a Ald.

1460^a 11 οὐδέν' ἀήθη] οὐδένα ἦθη A^c : οὐδὲν ἀήθη B^c P^b : οὐδὲν ἀηθες P^a Ald.

1461^a 33 σημαίνοιε A^c : σημαίνειε Ald. with B^c P^b : σημήνειε P^a.

— 34 ωδιωσ A^c : ὠδικῶς (or ὠδικῶς) B^c P^b : ὠδί πως P^a Ald.

The above instances of agreement may suffice as a proof of the dependence of the P^a Aldine text on that represented by B^c P^b; I pass on, therefore, to consider the differences between the two texts. The note of the P^a Aldine text is its utter disregard of the textual tradition. Every page of it betrays the hand of a reviser; we can almost see him at work, adding or omitting words, altering forms, and often rewriting clauses or sentences, so as to smooth away every sign of difficulty in the older text. All this was said long ago by Ritter, but for reasons already mentioned one cannot even now take the point for granted. The modern apparatus criticus, which gives only the better lections of the Apographa, is often a snare to the unwary reader, who sees their successes, and does not see their failures. It may be worth while, therefore, to look into the

P^a Aldine text more closely, in order to realize what sort of thing it is, and how it has come to be what it is.

(1) P^a Ald. add words freely; e. g.

1447^a 25 οὔσαι <τοιαῦται>.

— ^b 22 <οὐκ ἦδη> καὶ ποιητήν.

1448^a 25 <καὶ ᾄ> καὶ ὦς.

1449^a 3 οἱ <δὲ>, to disguise the omission (with P^b) of the preceding clause παραφανείσης—κωμωδίας.

1449^a 29 <περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τσαῦτα> ἔστω, to fill up a lacuna in P^b.

— ^b 27 <ἀλλὰ> δι' ἑλέου.

1450^a 30 <οὐ> ποιήσει.

1452^a 3 καὶ μάλιστα] μάλιστα <τοιαῦτα>.

1453^b 18 μέλλων <δείκνυσι>.

1454^a 19 προαίρεσίν τινα <φαῦλον μὲν ἔαν φαύλην>.

— ^b 34 A lacuna after ἐκείνος δέ, and then <ταῦτα οὖν> αὐτὸς λέγει.

1455^a 30 συναπεργαζόμενον <ποιεῖν>.

— ^b 13 ἐπεισόδια <σκοπεῖν>.

1459^b 9 παθητικὴν <δεῖ εἶναι>.

1460^b 21 ὅποιαν οὖν A^c] <ταῦτ' οὖν> ὅποια ἂν ᾖ.

1461^a 34 <τὸ δὲ> ποσαχῶς.

— ^b 13 ἀλλὰ <καὶ πρὸς τὸ> βέλτιον.

1462^b 6 <ἀνάγκη> ἢ βραχέως.

— ^b 7 <ἔαν δὲ πλείους> λέγω.

— ^b 8 συγκειμένη <οὐ μίαν, or οὐ μία>.

Some few of these insertions we may accept, as filling up real defects in the traditional text. But it must be seen that, as they appear in P^a Ald., they are only part of a series of similar additions, and may be presumed to have had a similar origin and motive. The fact of the reviser having been able to supply the missing word in some three or four instances is no proof that he must have found it in a then existing MS.

(2) Here and there the words thus added dispossess a portion of the original text. Thus in 1448^a 5, where ἀνάγκη μιμῆσθαι is added, the preceding ἢ καὶ τοιούτους is omitted. The same thing has happened in 1455^b 31, where the added word λύσις has usurped the place of καὶ πάλιν ἢ αὐτῶν. The phenomenon is easily explained if we may suppose a scribe, with a revised text before him, to have taken some of the reviser's marginal or interlinear additions not as addenda but as corrections of the text.

(3) P^a Ald. are apt to ignore words in cases of difficulty. Thus they omit *τοιούτους ὄντας* in 1454^b 13, *ὡς ῥήτοι* (i. e. *ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι*) in 1461^a 12, and *δελίαν* (i. e. *ἀέι, λίαν*) in 1461^b 28. In this way the reviser has also removed most of the ditto-graphies which disfigure the A^c text.

(4) The P^a Ald. text embodies a long array of textual depravations. The following specimens may perhaps give some idea of their general character and motive:—

1449^a 28 *ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς ἕκαστα*] *ἐπεισοδίων πλήθει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἕκαστα* P^a Ald.

1449^b 29 *χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι*] *χωρὶς τῶν εἰδῶν* P^a Ald.

1450^a 17 *κακοδαμονία*] *εὐδαιμονία* P^a Ald.

1453^b 33 *ὁ Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος*] *ὁ ἀλκμαίωνος ἀστυδάμαντος* A^c: *ὁ Ἀλκμαίωνος Ἀστυδάμας* P^a Ald.

1454^b 13 *ἐπεικείσ ποιεῖν παράδειγμα σκληρότητος* A^c: *ἐπεικείας ποιεῖν παράδειγμα ἢ σκληρότητος δεῖ* P^c Ald.

1460^a 11 *οὐδέν' ἀήθη*] *οὐδένα ἤθη* A^c: *οὐδέν ἀήθη* B^c P^b: *οὐδέν ἄηθες* P^a Ald.

In some instances P^a Ald. no doubt supply readings which we accept as improvements on those in A^c; e. g. *ὦν* for *ὡς* in 1452^b 28; *⟨ἐκ⟩πλήξεως* in 1455^a 17; *ἐκάστου* in 1456^a 6; *δέη* for *δ' ἦ* in 1456^b 4. Readings of this kind, however, do not, all told, constitute a tithe of the peculiar readings in P^a Ald.; and there is nothing to mark them off from the rest except the fact that they happen to be successes. As the reviser, whoever he may have been, was evidently a man of some learning, and also of no little ingenuity of a certain rough-and-ready order, one need not be surprised to find in the multitude of his conjectures at any rate some few that have hit the mark.

Looking, therefore, at the actual texts of the Apographa, as seen in these typical instances, and the tendencies which they reveal, I think the facts point very clearly to the conjectural origin of all the improved readings in the later manuscripts. The doubt now thrown upon this view is largely resolvable into a feeling that some at any rate of these textual improvements are too good and too unexpected to be regarded as the suggestions of Renaissance scholars. The underlying assumption here is an injustice

to these early scholars. Their weakness in dealing with texts was want of critical caution and method; apart from that they had many of the gifts required for the work of textual emendation. They were often men of great natural ability, of surprising learning, and if anything, more completely at home in the classical languages than the moderns. We all know that in Latin the 'Itali' have left a permanent mark on many of our Latin texts. But there is no reason to suppose that the learned Greeks of that age, or their Italian pupils and followers, were as scholars on a much lower level, or that in the correction of Greek texts their limit was reached when some of the more patent clerical errors in them were cleared away. One has only to reflect what Chalcondyles did for the Homeric Hymns (v. Allen and Sikes, *Introd.* p. xxxiii) and Musurus for Hesychius. In the case of the Poetics, however, the work of revision cannot be connected with any one name. The book was even in the fifteenth century in the hands of many; so that the more striking of the amended readings, which we now gather up from various Apographa—a few from one, and a few from another—may very well have been the happier efforts at emendation of various acute and scholarly readers in the early Renaissance period of the study of the text.

The doubt as to the truth of Spengel and Vahlen's view of the Apographa has had new life put into it through the publication of the readings implied in the Arabic Version, which is found to confirm a certain proportion of the better readings in these manuscripts. A suspicion, accordingly, has arisen that some of these better readings may perhaps have survived in some now lost Greek MS., independent of A^c, and have found their way into the Renaissance manuscripts from that source. All that a coincidence, however, of this kind can be said to prove is the goodness of the readings; for it is no uncommon thing for a good conjecture to be confirmed by a newly-discovered document. In the Poetics the Arabic Version confirms several of Vahlen's emendations, as also many that were made in earlier days by Madius, Victorius Heinsius, and others. It confirms the <σὺ> μακρός

of Vulcanius in 1455^b 17 just as much as the (οὐ) ποιήσει of P^a Ald. in 1450^a 30. And in the latter instance the insertion of the negative would be no great feat, if one happened to remember the parallel in the Rhetoric, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον (3. 2, 1404^b 3). Another P^a Ald. reading confirmed by the Arabic Version is οὔσαι (τοιαῦται) in 1447^a 25, but it loses its significance when one sees the reviser restoring *μάλιστα* (τοιαῦτα) in 1452^a 3, and observes his predilection for such stop-gaps. In 1454^b 2, where A^c has *περὶ τὸν ἀπλοῦν*, the rendering in the Arabic Version is *de conversione navium*, which supports in equal measure both the *ἀνάπλου* of P^a and the *ἀπόπλου* of Riccardianus 16. Which of the two, then, is to be supposed to have got into the text from the hypothetic lost Greek MS.? The question may be dismissed at once, when one reflects how easily *ἀπόπλου* or *ἀνάπλου* might occur to any one familiar with the Second Book of the Iliad.

The truth is that not a few of the more striking of the Apograph readings may be accounted for without difficulty, if one is at liberty to assume some critical ingenuity and a fair acquaintance with literature on the part of the early correctors. *Λάιος*, for instance, in 1460^a 30 implies nothing more than a knowledge of the Oedipus Tyrannus; and *Αἰγεί* in 1461^b 21 could hardly be missed by a reader who remembered the story of the Medea. *συνδέσμῳ εἰς* in 1457^a 30 is immediately suggested, not only by the context, but also by several parallels in other Aristotelian writings. In 1451^a 17 *ἄπειρα τῷ ἐνὶ* (for *γένει*) *συμβαίνει* stares one in the face, if one happens to have in mind the *ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίῃ* of the Physics. *παθημάτων* in 1449^b 28 may very well have been suggested by the parallel in the Politics; *ἑκστατικοί* in 1455^a 34 by that in the Problems; and *ἀεικῆς* in 1458^b 25 by the passage in the Homeric Scholia, in which it was independently discovered many years afterwards by Gu. Morel. Some of the amended readings, no doubt, show a higher degree of critical insight; e.g. *βάδιζε* (for *ἐβάδιζεν*) in 1457^a 22, *παραλογισμός* in 1455^a 16, *ἀνῆι* in 1455^a 27, *ἀρύσας* in 1457^b 14, and *μίμησις* (for *κίνησις*) in 1459^b 37. The provenance of these five instances is to be noted. The first is from Riccar-

dianus 16 ; the second from the margin of the Guelferbytanus ; the third from Riccardianus 46 (and marg. P^b) ; the fourth from the Leidensis and *ex emendatione* Vaticanus 1400 ; and the fifth from B^oP^b. If they had ever existed together in the text of some one older and better MS., it is difficult to imagine how they came to be preserved in this separate way, one in one MS. and another in another.

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

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SIGLA

A^c = cod. Parisinus 1741

* = littera in codice deleta

Ar. = interpretatio Arabica, vel ex ea eruta
scriptura Graeca

apogr. = apographa quaedam

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

1447^a Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἦν τινα
 δύνάμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους
 10 εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἔξειν ἢ ποιήσις, ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ
 ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς
 αὐτῆς ἐστὶ μεθόδου, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶ-
 του ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας
 ποίησις ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς
 15 ἀλληλικῆς ἢ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν
 οὔσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον· διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν,
 ἢ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἐτέροις μιμείσθαι ἢ τῷ ἔτερον ἢ τῷ ἐτέ-
 ρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι
 καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν
 20 διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας), ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς,
 οὕτω καὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται
 τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ'
 ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις· οἷον ἁρμονία μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώ-
 μεται μόνον ἢ τε ἀλληλικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ καὶ εἴ τινες
 25 ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι (τοιαῦται) τὴν δύνάμιν, οἷον ἢ τῶν
 συρίγγων· αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας αἱ

1447^a 12 λέγομεν A^c (utramque scripturam agnoscit Ar.) 13
 τραγωδίας A^c (in 1449^a 37 τραγωιδίας. ceteris in locis ἰῶτα mutum
 deest in hoc similibusque vocabulis) 17 γένει] ἐν Forchhammer
 21 καὶ Parisinus 2038: καὶ A^c 25 τυγχάνουσιν A^c τοιαῦται
 add. apogr. (confirm. Ar.) 26 αἱ Reiz: οἱ A^c: οἱ (πολλοὶ)
 Heinsius

ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations.

I. Just as form and colour are used as means by some, who (whether by art or constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others; so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony—used, however, either singly or in certain combinations. A combination of rhythm and harmony alone is the means in flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e.g. imitative piping. Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imita-

τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἡ δὲ [ἐποποιία] μόνου τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τούτοις εἶτε

1447^b μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων εἶθ' ἐνὶ τινι γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων (ἀνώνυμος) τυγχάνει οὔσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν

10 ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τιῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν—πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς

15 κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικὸν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν· οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιη-

20 τήν. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν καθάπερ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυρον μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων, καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρη-

25 μένοις, λέγω δὲ οἶον ῥυθμῶ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἢ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις καὶ ἢ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἢ τε τραγωδία καὶ ἢ κωμωδία· διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

28 ἐποποιία seclusit Ueberweg (om. Ar.) 1447^b 9 ἀνώνυμος add. Bernays (confirm. Ar.) τυγχάνει οὔσα Suckow: τυγχάνουσα A^c
 15 κατὰ τὴν Guelferbytanus: τὴν κατὰ A^c κοινῇ A^c 16 φυσικόν Heinsius (confirm. Ar.): μουσικόν A^c 22 καὶ] καὶ τοῦτον vel οὐκ ἦδη καὶ apogr.: καίτοι Gomperz, Rassow 24 αἱ Aldina 1536: αἱ Riccardianus 16: οἱ A^c 28 οὖν apogr. (confirm. Ar.): οὐ A^c
 29 οἷς Victorius: αἷσ A^c

tions; for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may represent men's characters, as well as what they do and suffer. There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony, in prose or in verse, and if in verse, either in some one or in a plurality of metres. This form of imitation is to this day without a name. We have no common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and a Socratic Conversation; and we should still be without one even if the imitation in the two instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse—though it is the way with people to tack on 'poet' to the name of a metre, and talk of elegiac-poets and epic-poets, thinking that they call them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but indiscriminately by reason of the metre they write in. Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from their metre; so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a poet. We should be in the same position also, if the imitation in these instances were in all the metres, like the *Centaur* (a rhapsody in a medley of all metres) of Chaeremon; and Chaeremon one has to recognize as a poet. So much, then, as to these arts. There are, lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, e.g. Dithyrambic and Nomic poetry, Tragedy and Comedy; with this difference, however, that the three kinds of means are in some of them all employed together, and in others brought in separately, one after the other. These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.

1448^a Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη 2
 δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἦθη σχεδὸν
 ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἦθη
 διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἦτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας
 5 ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ
 κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἵκαζεν.
 δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει
 ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἔσται ἕτερα τῷ ἕτερα μιμῆσθαι
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ
 10 κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ τῷ
 περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὀμηρος μὲν
 βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἠγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος (δ) τὰς
 παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλιάδα
 χείρους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς
 15 νόμους, ὥσπερ * * γᾶς, Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος,
 μιμήσαιτο ἂν τις. ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγω-
 δία πρὸς τὴν κωμῶδιαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἢ δὲ
 βελτίους μιμῆσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

Ἐτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων 3
 20 μιμήσαιτο ἂν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ
 μιμῆσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα † ἢ † ἕτερόν τι γιγνό-
 μενον ὥσπερ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μετα-
 βάλλοντα, ἢ πάντα ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργούντας τοὺς

1448^a 3 κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ A^c 8 τῷ] τὸ A^c 10 ἔστι] -στι in
 litura A^c τῷ scripsi : τὸ A^c : om. Parisinus 2038 12 ὁ add.

Parisinus 2038 13 δειλιάδα A^c (η superscripsit m. rec.) 15

ὥσπερ [in fine versus] γᾶς κυκλωπᾶσ A^c : ὡς πέργας ^{καὶ} κύκλωπας Parisinus
 2038 : ὡς πέργας καὶ κύκλωπας codex Robortelli : ὥσπερ Ἄργας
 Κύκλωπας Castelvtrus : ὥσπερ θεοὺς Ἄργας, Κύκλωπας Vahlen (1874) :
 ὥσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας Vahlen (1897). plura deesse existimo 16
 ταύτῃ Casaubonus : αὐτῇ A^c 21 (ἢ) ὅτε Zeller ἢ] ὅτε δὲ
 Reiz 22 τὸν secluseram 23 πάντα Casaubonus : πάντασ A^c

A byed

II. The objects the imitator represents are actions, with ² agents who are necessarily either good men or bad—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind. It follows therefore, that the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves. It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing objects with this point of difference. Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer's personages, for instance, are better than we are; Cleophon's are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the *Diliad*, are beneath it. The same is true of the Dithyramb and the Nome: the personages may be presented in them with the difference exemplified in the . . . of . . . and Argas, and in the Cyclopes of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day.

epic
~~tragedy~~
 drama
 comedy

III. A third difference in these arts is in the manner in ³ which each kind of object is represented. Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either (1) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does; or (2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or (3) the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.

μιμουμένους. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησις ἐστίν,
 25 ὡς εἶπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε (καὶ ἂ) καὶ ὡς. ὥστε τῇ
 μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη μιμητῆς Ὀμήρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μιμοῦνται
 γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ
 μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας ἄμφω. ὅθεν καὶ δράματα καλεῖ-
 σθαί τινες αὐτὰ φασιν, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας. διὸ καὶ
 30 ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς κωμωδίας οἱ Δω-
 ριεῖς (τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμωδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς οἱ τε ἐνταῦθα ὡς
 ἐπὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σι-
 κελίας, ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητῆς πολλῶ πρό-
 τερος ἂν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος· καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔνιοι
 35 τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ) ποιούμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα σημείου· αὐτοὶ
 μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιοικίδας καλεῖν φασιν, Ἀθηναίους
 δὲ δήμους, ὡς κωμωδοὺς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν λεχθέντας
 ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνῃ ἀτιμαζομένους ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως·
 1448^b καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοὶ μὲν δρᾶν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ πράττειν προσ-
 αγορεύειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ πόσαι καὶ
 τίνες τῆς μίμησεως εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

Ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννηῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτία 4
 5 δύο τινὲς καὶ αὐταὶ φυσικαί· τό τε γὰρ μιμείσθαι σύμφυτον
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι
 τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθή-
 σεις ποιεῖται διὰ μίμησεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν
 τοῖς μίμημασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον
 10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἂ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν, τούτων τὰς
 εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον

25 καὶ ἂ add. apogr. 32 δημοκρατείας A^c 34 Χιωνίδου
 Robortellus (confirm. Ar.): χωνίδου A^c fort. τραγωδίας <δ'>
 35 αὐτοὶ Spengel: οἱτοὶ A^c 36 Ἀθηναίους Spengel (occupavit
 Anonymus in minore ed. Oxon. a. 1760): ἀθηναῖοι A^c 1448^b 5
 αὐταὶ Parisinus 2038: αὐταὶ A^c 6 τούτω* A^c

As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their means, their objects, and their manner.

So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin to Homer, both portraying good men; and on another to Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting and doing. This in fact, according to some, is the reason for plays being termed dramas, because in a play the personages act the story. Hence too both Tragedy and Comedy are claimed by the Dorians as their discoveries; Comedy by the Megarians—by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara became a democracy, and by the Sicilian Megarians on the ground that the poet Epicharmus was of their country, and a good deal earlier than Chionides and Magnes; even Tragedy also is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In support of this claim they point to the words 'comedy' and 'drama.' Their word for the outlying hamlets, they say, is *comae*, whereas Athenians call them *demes*—thus assuming that comedians got the name not from their *comoe* or revels, but from their strolling from hamlet to hamlet, lack of appreciation keeping them out of the city. Their word also for 'to act,' they say, is *dran*, whereas Athenians use *prattein*.

So much, then, as to the number and nature of the points of difference in the imitation of these arts.

It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to 4 two causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The truth of this second point is shown by experience: though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the

θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μαυθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἤδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνου-
 15 σιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὄρωντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωρῶντας μαυθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκα-
 στον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκείνος· ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχη προεωρακῶς, οὐχ ἢ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπερ-
 γασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινα ἄλλην αἰτίαν.
 20 κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμείσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστι φανερόν) ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες καὶ αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὸν προάγουτες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχε-
 διασμάτων. διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη ἢ ποίησις·
 25 οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. τῶν μὲν οὐχ ἢ πρὸ Ὀμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιούτου ποίημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλούς, ἀπὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου ἀρξαμένους
 30 ἔστω, οἷον ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐν οἷς κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον ἱαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον—διὸ καὶ ἱαμβεῖον καλεῖται νῦν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ ἱάμβιζον ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἡρωικῶν οἱ δὲ ἱάμβων ποιηταί. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὀμηρος
 35 ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτως καὶ τὰ τῆς κωμωδίας σχήματα πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιάς

12 ἀτιμοτάτων A^c

13 τούτου vel τούτων apogr.

18 οὐχ ἢ

Hermann: οὐχὶ A^c

27 ἄτεροι Spengel

30 μαργείτησ A^c31 ἱαμβίον (bis) A^c

35 ἀλλὰ Riccardianus 46, Bonitz (confirm.

Ar.): ἀλλ' ὅτι A^c

36 οὕτω apogr.

38 ὁ] τὸ A^c

fort. (ἦ) Ἰλιάς

forms for example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning—gathering the meaning of things, e. g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen the thing before, one's pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some similar cause. Imitation, then, being natural to us—as also the sense of harmony and rhythm, the metres being obviously species of rhythms—it was through their original aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part gradual on their first efforts, that they created poetry out of their improvisations.

Poetry, however, soon broke up into two kinds according to the differences of character in the individual poets; for the graver among them would represent noble actions, and those of noble personages; and the meaner sort the actions of the ignoble. The latter class produced invectives at first, just as others did hymns and panegyrics. We know of no such poem by any of the pre-Homeric poets, though there were probably many such writers among them; instances, however, may be found from Homer downwards, e. g. his *Margites*, and the similar poems of others. In this poetry of invective its natural fitness brought an iambic metre into use; hence our present term 'iambic,' because it was the metre of their 'iambus' or invectives against one another. The result was that the old poets became some of them writers of heroic and others of iambic verse. Homer's position, however, is peculiar: just as he was in the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the dramatic character of his imitations, so too he was the first to outline for us the general forms of Comedy by producing not a dramatic invective, but a dramatic picture of the Ridiculous; his *Margites*

1449^a καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγωδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμωδίας. // παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας καὶ κωμωδίας οἱ ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὁρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τῶν λάμβων κωμωδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ μείζονα καὶ ἐντιμότερα τὰ σχήματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄρ' ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ, αὐτὸ τε καθ' αὐτὸ κρίναι καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος. γενομένης (δ') οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς—καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμωδία καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά ἂ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα—κατὰ μικρὸν ἠδὲξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς· καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ 15 τραγωδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τότε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέξεως γελοίας διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὄψῃ ἀπεσεμνύθη, τότε τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῆ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκείου μέτρον εὔρε· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖον ἐστίν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου, πλείστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς

1449^a 6 μείζονα apogr.: μείζον A^c 7 ἄρ' ἔχει Vahlen: παρέχει A^c: εἰ ἄρα ἔχει Parisinus 2038: ἄρα ἔχει Riccardianus 46 8 κρίναι Forchhammer: κρίνεται ἢ ναί A^c 9 γενομένη apogr. δ' add. Riccardianus 46, Bekker αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ apogr. 11 φαυλλικά A^c: φαῦλα (ut videtur) Ar. 12 διαμένειν A^c 15 αὐτῆς apogr.: αὐτῆς A^c 20 σατυρικοῦ A^c 21 et 25 ἰαμβίον A^c 26 ἰαμβία A^c

in fact stands in the same relation to our comedies as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to our tragedies. As soon, however, as Tragedy and Comedy appeared in the field, those naturally drawn to the one line of poetry became writers of comedies instead of iambs, and those naturally drawn to the other, writers of tragedies instead of epics, because these new modes of art were grander and of more esteem than the old.

If it be asked whether Tragedy is now all that it need be in its formative elements, to consider that, and decide it theoretically and in relation to the theatres, is a matter for another inquiry.

It certainly began in improvisations—as did also Comedy; the one originating with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which still survive as institutions in many of our cities. And its advance after that was little by little, through their improving on whatever they had before them at each stage. It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form. (1) The number of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue, or spoken portion, take the leading part in the play. (2) A third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles. (3) Tragedy acquired also its magnitude. Discarding short stories and a ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric stage, it assumed, though only at a late point in its progress, a tone of dignity; and its metre changed then from trochaic to iambic. The reason for their original use of the trochaic tetrameter was that their poetry was satyric and more connected with dancing than it now is. As soon, however, as a spoken part came in, nature herself found the appropriate metre. The iambic, we know, is the most speakable of metres, as is shown by the fact that we very often fall into it

ἀλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λε-
 28 κτικῆς ἀρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίω πλήθη. . καὶ τὰ ἄλλ'
 30 ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται ἔστω ἡμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ
 γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἔργον εἶη διεξιέναι καθ' ἕκαστον.

Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἶπομεν μίμησις φαν- 5
 λοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρ-
 35 τημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἶον
 εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον
 ἀνευ ὀδύνης. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ
 δι' ὧν ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ
 1449^b σπουδάξεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν· καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδῶν
 ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθέλουται ἦσαν. ἦδη δὲ
 σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ
 μνημονεύονται. τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ
 5 πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγγόηται. τὸ δὲ μύ-
 θους ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις] τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ
 Σικελίας ἦλθε * *, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἦρξεν
 ἀφέντος τῆς λαμβικῆς ιδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ
 μύθους. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῆ τραγωδία μέχρι μὲν τοῦ
 10 (διὰ) μέτρου μεγάλου μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἠκολούθησεν·
 τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι, ταύτη
 διαφέρουσιν· ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει—ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται
 ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ
 ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ—καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει, καίτοι

28 ἄλλα ὡς apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἄλλωσ A^c 34 γέλοιον
 (bis) A^c 1449^b I κωμῳδῶ scripseram: κωμῳδοῖς conl. Bernhardy
 6 Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις seclisut Susemihl 7 lacunam
 indicavi; intercdisse videntur ἦσαν γὰρ Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις ἐκεῖθεν
 8 εἰδέασ A^c 9 μὲν τοῦ Tyrwhitt: μόνου A^c 10 διὰ add.
 Ueberweg 11 τῷ] τὸ A^c 12 μὲν] μὲν γὰρ apogr. 14
 τοῦτο pr. A^c

in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice. (4) Another change was a plurality of episodes or acts. As for the remaining matters, the superadded embellishments and the account of their introduction, these must be taken as said, as it would probably be a long piece of work to go through the details.

(As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of 5 men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.)

Though the successive changes in Tragedy and their authors are not unknown, we cannot say the same of Comedy; its early stages passed unnoticed, because it was not as yet taken up in a serious way. It was only at a late point in its progress that a chorus of comedians was officially granted by the archon; they used to be mere volunteers. It had also already certain definite forms at the time when the record of those termed comic poets begins. Who it was who supplied it with masks, or prologues, or a plurality of actors and the like, has remained unknown. The invented Fable, or Plot, however, originated in Sicily, with Epicharmus and Phormis; of Athenian poets Crates was the first to drop the Comedy of invective and frame stories of a general and non-personal nature, in other words, Fables or Plots.

Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in a grand kind of verse. It differs from it, however, (1) in that it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form; and (2) in its length—which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that. This, I say, is another point of difference between them, though at first the practice in this respect was just the

15 τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίουν καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταυτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς
 τραγωδίας—διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας
 καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία
 ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ
 20 ἐποποιίᾳ.

Περὶ (μὲν) οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ 6
 κωμωδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν· περὶ δὲ τραγωδίας λέγωμεν
 ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὄρον
 τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας
 25 καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκά-
 στῶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγ-
 γελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
 παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν
 ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς
 30 εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἕνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα
 διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶ-
 του μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τραγωδίας ὃ τῆς
 ὄψεως κόσμος, εἴτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
 ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην, τὴν τῶν
 35 μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανεράν
 ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ
 ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ
 τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς
 1450^a πράξεις εἶναι φαμεν ποιάς τινας, πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν
 πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ

16 ταῦτα A°

21 μὲν add. apogr.

23 ἀναλαβόντες Bernays :

ἀπολαβόντες A°

25 ἐκάστῳ Reiz (occupavit versio Paccii) :

ἐκάστου A°

28 παθημάτων corr. apogr. (*perturbationum* Pac-

cicius ; confirm. Syriaca interpretatio ap. Margoliouth A. O. p. 55) :

μαθημάτων A°

34 ταύτην scripsi : αὐτὴν A°

36 πᾶσιν Madius

1450^a 1 πέφυκε δὲ αἷτια Parisinus 2938

2 ταῦτα Reiz

same in tragedies as in epic poems. They differ also (3) in their constituents, some being common to both and others peculiar to Tragedy—hence a judge of good and bad in Tragedy is a judge of that in epic poetry also. All the parts of an epic are included in Tragedy; but those of Tragedy are not all of them to be found in the Epic.

Reserving hexameter poetry and Comedy for consideration 6 hereafter, let us proceed now to the discussion of Tragedy; before doing so, however, we must gather up the definition resulting from what has been said. A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with (incidents arousing) pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. Here by 'language with pleasurable accessories' I mean that with rhythm and harmony or song superadded; and by 'the kinds separately' I mean that some portions are worked out with verse only, and others in turn with song.

I. As they act the stories, it follows that in the first place the Spectacle (or stage-appearance of the actors) must be some part of the whole; and in the second Melody and Diction, these two being the means of their imitation. Here by 'Diction' I mean merely this, the composition of the verses; and by 'Melody,' what is too completely understood to require explanation. But further: the subject represented also is an action; and the action involves agents, who must necessarily have their distinctive qualities both of character and thought, since it is from these that we ascribe certain qualities to their actions. There are in the natural order of things, therefore, two causes, Character and

τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν
 πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις· λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον, τὴν
 5 σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἦθη, καθ' ὃ ποιούς τινας
 εἶναι φαμεν τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγον-
 τες ἀποδεικνύασιν τι ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. ἀνάγκη
 οὖν πάσης τραγωδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ' ὃ ποιὰ τις ἐστὶν
 ἢ τραγωδία· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἦθη καὶ λέξις καὶ
 10 διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται,
 δύο μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ μιμοῦνται, ἔν, ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται, τρία,
 καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς
 εἰπεῖν κέχρηται τοῖς εἵδεσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν καὶ
 ἦθος καὶ μῦθον καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύ-
 15 τως. μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις·
 ἢ γὰρ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πρά-
 ξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας * * καὶ ἢ κακοδαιμονία
 ἐν πράξει ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποι-
 ότης· εἰσὶν δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἦθη ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς
 20 πράξεις εὐδαιμονες ἢ τούναυτίον. οὐκ οὖν ὅπως τὰ ἦθη μι-
 μῶσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἦθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι
 διὰ τὰς πράξεις· ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος
 τῆς τραγωδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ
 μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἠθῶν γέ-
 25 νοιτ' ἄν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγωδίαί
 εἰσὶν, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γρα-
 φέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πο-
 λύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἢ δὲ Ζεῦξιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν

3 ἔστιν δὲ conieceram

collocandum

ἢ δὲ εὐδαιμονία coni. Vahlen

tanus (m. I), Spengel

12 ὡς εἰπεῖν fortasse post ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν

13 ὄψισι A^o

17 intercidesse καὶ κακοδαιμονίας,

21 συμπαραλαμβάνουσι Guelferby-

27 πολύγνωστον et πολύγνωστοσ A^o

Thought, of their actions, and consequently of their success or failure in their lives. Now the action (that which was done) is represented in the play by the Fable or Plot. The Fable, in our present sense of the term, is simply this, the combination of the incidents, or things done in the story; whereas Character is what makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents; and Thought is shown in all they say when proving a particular point or, it may be, enunciating a general truth. There are six parts consequently of every tragedy, as a whole, that is, of such or such quality, viz. a Fable or Plot, Characters, Diction, Thought, Spectacle and Melody; two of them arising from the means, one from the manner, and three from the objects of the dramatic imitation; and there is nothing else besides these six. Of these, its formative elements, then, not a few of the dramatists have made due use, as every play, one may say, admits of Spectacle, Character, Fable, Diction, Melody, and Thought.

II. The most important of the six is the combination of the incidents of the story. Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they include the Characters for the sake of the action. So that it is the action in it, i. e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing. Besides this, a tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without Character. } The tragedies of most of the moderns are characterless—a defect common among poets of all kinds, and with its counterpart in painting in Zeuxis as compared with Polygnotus; for whereas the latter is strong in character, the work of Zeuxis is devoid of it. And

ἔχει ἦθος. ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῆ ῥήσεις ἠθικὰς καὶ λέξει
 30 καὶ διανοία εὖ πεπονημένης, (οὐπω) ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγω-
 δίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις
 κερηρμένη τραγωδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πρα-
 γμάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ
 τραγωδία τοῦ μῦθου μέρη ἐστίν, αἵ τε περιπέτεια καὶ ἀνα-
 35 γνωρίσεις. ἔτι σημείον ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρό-
 τερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν ἢ τὰ
 πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν
 ἅπαντες. ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τρα-
 γωδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἦθη (παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστιν καὶ
 1450^b ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις
 φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκο-
 γραφήσας εἰκόνας)· ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην
 μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια· τοῦτο δέ
 5 ἐστὶν τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα,
 ὕπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον
 ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας, οἱ
 δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστιν δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ
 τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὅποιά τις ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ προαι-
 ρεῖται ἢ φεύγει—διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσι ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν
 10 οἷς μηδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων—
 διάνοια δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ ἡ
 λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὡς περ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξις εἶναι τὴν
 διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ
 15 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν

29 λέξει καὶ διανοία Vahlen: λέξεσ καὶ διανοίασ A^o
 (ni fallor) add. Ar.: οὐ add. apogr. 31 ἢ] ἡ A^o
 τι] τισ A^o 12 ἐν λόγῳ scripsi: μὲν λόγων A^o

30 οὐπω
 1450^b 10

again: one may string together a series of characteristic speeches of the utmost finish as regards Diction and Thought, and yet fail to produce the true tragic effect; but one will have much better success with a tragedy which, however inferior in these respects, has a Plot, a combination of incidents, in it. And again: the most powerful elements of attraction in Tragedy, the Peripeties and Discoveries, are parts of the Plot. A further proof is in the fact that beginners succeed earlier with the Diction and Characters than with the construction of a story; and the same may be said of nearly all the early dramatists. We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot; and that the Characters come second—compare the parallel in painting, where the most beautiful colours laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait. We maintain that Tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake of the action that it imitates the personal agents. Third comes the element of Thought, i. e. the power of saying whatever can be said, or what is appropriate to the occasion. This is what, in the speeches in Tragedy, falls under the arts of Politics and Rhetoric; for the older poets make their personages discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians. One must not confuse it with Character. Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose of the agents, i. e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious—hence there is no room for Character in a speech on a purely indifferent subject. Thought, on the other hand, is shown in all they say when proving or disproving some particular point, or enunciating some universal proposition. Fourth among the literary elements is the Diction of the personages, i. e. as before explained, the expression of their thoughts in words, which is practically the same thing with verse as with prose. As for the two remaining parts, the Melody

[πέντε] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκείου τῆς ποιητικῆς· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν
 20 τῶν ὄψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἔστιν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν 7
 τινὰ δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγωδίας ἔστιν. κείται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν τραγωδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μί-
 25 μησης ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος· ἔστιν γὰρ ὅλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος. ὅλον δὲ ἔστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἔστιν, μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τελευτὴ δὲ τούναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ
 30 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν· μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. δεῖ ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εἶναι μύθους μὴθ' ὀπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἀρχεσθαι μὴθ' ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρησθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἰδέαις. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν
 35 πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἔστιν, διὸ οὔτε πάμμικρον ἂν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῶον (συγγεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη) οὔτε παμμέγεθες (οὐ γὰρ
 1451^a ἅμα ἢ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἶον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη

16 πέντε induxit Spengel (om. Ar.): πέμπτον apogr. 17 ἀπεχνώ-
 τατον A^c 18 ἢ apogr.: ὡς A^c: ἴσως Meiser 23 δὴ scripsi:
 δ' A^c 34 εἰδέαισ A^c 37 πάμμικρον Riccardianus 16
 (perexiguum Averroes): πᾶν μικρὸν A^o 39 παμμέγεθες Riccardi-
 anus 16: πᾶν μέγεθος A^o

is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of Tragedy. ⁵

The Spectacle, though an attraction, is the least artistic of all the parts, and has least to do with the art of poetry. The tragic effect is quite possible without a public performance and actors; and besides, the getting-up of the Spectacle is more a matter for the costumier than the poet. ⁶

Having thus distinguished the parts, let us now consider ⁷ the proper construction of the Fable or Plot, as that is at once the first and the most important thing in Tragedy. We have laid it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude; for a whole may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it. A well-constructed Plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes; beginning and end in it must be of the forms just described. Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible either (1) in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity; or (2) in a creature of vast size—one, say, 1000 miles long—as in that case, instead of

ζῶον ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ζῶων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω
 5 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευ-
 του εἶναι. τοῦ μήκους ὅρος (ὁ) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἕκατον
 τραγωδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἠγωνίζοντο,
 ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ †φασιν†. ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν
 10 φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, αἰεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδη-
 λος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος· ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς
 διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ
 ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυσ-
 τυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς
 15 ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους.

Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἰς οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται. ἐὰν 8
 περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν
 ἐνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἓν· οὕτως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλαὶ εἰσιν,
 ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες εἰκόασιν
 20 ἁμαρτάνειν ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἑρακλῆϊδα Θησηϊδα καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα πεποιήκασιν· οἴονται γάρ, ἐπεὶ εἰς
 ἦν ὁ Ἑρακλῆς, ἓνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι προσήκειν. ὁ δ'
 Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκεν
 κάλῳς ἰδεῖν, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσειαν
 25 γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἶον
 πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι
 ἐν τῷ ἀγερωῷ, ὧν οὐδὲ θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον
 ἢ εἰκὸς θατέρου γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἶαν
 λέγομεν τὴν Ὀδύσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιά-

1451^a 3 συστημάτων scripsi: σωμάτων A^c

6 ὁ add. Bursian

9 ἄλλοτε φασίν A^c: ἄλλοτ' εἰώθασιν M. Schmidt

17 ἐνὶ apogr.

(confirm. Ar.): γένει A^c

18 οὕτω apogr.

27 οὐδὲ scripsi:

οὐδὲν A^c28 ἢ Spengel: ἦν A^c: ἦν ἢ apogr.29 λέγομεν A^c

the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder. Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole made up of parts, or a beautiful living creature, must be of some size, a size to be taken in by the eye, so a story or Plot must be of some length, but of a length to be taken in by the memory. As for the limit of its length, so far as that is relative to public performances and spectators, it does not fall within the theory of poetry. If they had to perform a hundred tragedies, they would be timed by water-clocks, †as they are said to have been at one period †. The limit, however, set by the actual nature of the thing is this: the longer the story, consistently with its being comprehensible as a whole, the finer it is by reason of its magnitude. As a rough general formula, 'a length which allows of the hero passing by a series of probable or necessary stages from misfortune to happiness, or from happiness to misfortune,' may suffice as a limit for the magnitude of the story.

The Unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, 8 in its having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action. One sees, therefore, the mistake of all the poets who have written a *Heracleid*, a *Theseid*, or similar poems; they suppose that, because Heracles was one man, the story also of Heracles must be one story. Homer, however, evidently understood this point quite well, whether by art or instinct, just in the same way as he excels the rest in every other respect. In writing an *Odyssey*, he did not make the poem cover all that ever befell his hero—it befell him, for instance, to get wounded on Parnassus and also to feign madness at the time of the call to arms, but the two incidents had no probable or necessary connexion with one another—instead of doing that, he took an action with a Unity of the kind we are describing as the subject of the *Odyssey*, as also of the *Iliad*. The truth is

30 δα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἢ μία μίμησις ἐνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστι, μῆς τε εἶναι ταύτης καὶ ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· ὁ γὰρ προσὸν
35 ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐστίν.

Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενό- 9
μενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ
1451^b ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμμετρα διαφέρουσιν (εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων)· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέ-
15 γειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. ἐστὶν δὲ καθόλου μὲν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἅττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὗ στο-
10 χάζεται ἢ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κωμωδίας ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον γέγονεν· συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων οὕτω τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασιν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ λαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον
15 ποιούσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστὶ τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα οὕτω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατὰ, τὰ δὲ γε-


32 ταύτης καὶ Susemihl (ed. 1) : καὶ ταύτησ A^c 36 οὐ τὸ ἀπογρ. (confirm. Ar.) : οὕτω A^c γενόμενα Riccardianus 16 : γινόμενα A^c

1451^b 4 τοῦτο A^c, Spengel τῷ] τὸ Spengel 10 τὸ] τὸν A^c 13 οὕτω] οὕπω (ni fallor) Ar. 14 περὶ τῶν ἀπογρ.

16 πειθανόν A^c.

that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.

From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's ⁹ function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i. e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters; by a singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when their plot is already made up of probable incidents that they give it a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the historic names; and for this reason: what convinces is the possible; now whereas we are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which has not hap-



νόμενα φανερόν ὅτι δυνατά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦν ἀδύ-
 νατα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἐνίαις μὲν ἐν
 20 ἢ δύο τῶν γνωρίμων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πεποιη-
 μένα, ἐν ἐνίαις δὲ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεί· ὁμοίως
 γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πεποιήται,
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον εὐφραίνει. ὥστ' οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ζητητέον
 τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὓς αἱ τραγωδίαί εἰσιν, ἀντέ-
 25 χεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώ-
 ριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅμως εὐφραίνει πάντας.
 δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων
 εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσῳ ποιητῆς κατὰ τὴν μί-
 μησίην ἐστιν, μιμείται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. κὰν ἄρα συμβῆ γενό-
 30 μενα ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν ἦττον ποιητῆς ἐστὶ τῶν γὰρ γενομένων
 ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι καὶ
 δυνατὰ γενέσθαι, καθ' ὃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητῆς ἐστίν.

τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις
 εἰσὶν χεῖρισται· λέγω δ' ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπει-
 35 ὄδια μετ' ἀλλήλα οὐτ' εἰκὸς οὐτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τοιαῦτα
 δὲ ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι' αὐτούς, ὑπὸ
 δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ
 ποιοῦντες καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μῦθον πολ-
 1452^a λάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ
 μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἢ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φοβερῶν
 καὶ ἐλεεινῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα [καὶ μᾶλλον]
 ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἀλλήλα· τὸ γὰρ θαυ-
 5 μαστὸν οὕτως ἔξει μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ
 τῆς τύχης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατα

19 ἐνίαις] ἐν ἐνίαις apogr.

21 οὐθ' ἐν A^c

'Ανθεί Welcker :

ἀνθεί A^c23 ὥστ' οὐ] ὥσ τοῦ A^c

ἀν εἴη M. Schmidt :

εἶναι A^c

33 ἀπλῶν] ἄλλων Tyrwhitt

37 κριτάς apogr.

38 παρατείνοντες apogr.

1452^a 3 καὶ μᾶλλον induxit Spenge

pened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else it would not have come to pass. Nevertheless even in Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions; and there are some without a single known name, e. g. Agathon's *Antheus*, in which both incidents and names are of the poet's invention; and it is no less delightful on that account. So that one must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact, to do so, as even the known stories are only known to a few, though they are a delight none the less to all.

It is evident from the above that the poet must be more the poet of his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch as he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates. And if he should come to take a subject from actual history, he is none the less a poet for that; since some historic occurrences may very well be in the probable and possible order of things; and it is in that aspect of them that he is their poet.

Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a Plot episodic when there is neither probability nor necessity in the sequence of its episodes. Actions of this sort bad poets construct through their own fault, and good ones on account of the players. His work being for public performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot beyond its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence of incident.

Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the marvellous in them than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is

δοκεῖ ὅσα ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες φαίνεται γεγονέναι, οἶον ὡς ὁ ἀνδρὶς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος ἐν Ἄργει ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αἷτιον τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Μίτυι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπροσθέν· ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 10 οὐκ εἰκῆ γενέσθαι· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοιοῦτους εἶναι καλλίστους μύθους.

Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι· 10
 καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ὧν μιμήσεις οἱ μῦθοί εἰσι ὑπάρχου-
 σιν εὐθὺς οὔσαι τοιαῦται. λέγω δὲ ἀπλῆν μὲν πράξιν ἧς
 15 γινομένης ὥσπερ ὄρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς ἄνευ περιπε-
 τείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένη
 δὲ †λέξις† μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἢ
 μετάβασις ἐστίν. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συ-
 στάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνει
 20 ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι ταῦτα· διαφέρει
 γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε.

*Ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πρατ- II
 τομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ
 λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδί-
 25 ποδι ἐλθῶν ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ
 πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας ὅς ἦν, τοῦναντίον ἐποίησεν·
 καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ
 Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν
 πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι. ἀναγνώρισις
 30 δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν
 μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ
 δυστυχίαν ὀρισμένων· καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἅμα
 περιπέτεια γίνωνται, οἷαν ἔχει ἢ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν

9 μήτι A^c13 ὑπάρχουσι A^c

17 δὲ λέξις] δὲ ἐξ ἧς Riccar-

dianus 16: δὲ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς Vahlen: δ' ἐστὶν ἧς Sussemlil: fortasse
 reponendum πεπλεγμένην δὲ λέγω ἧς

20 ταῦτα] τὰναντία Bonitz

33 γίνονται A^cοἷαν scripsi: οἶον A^c

an appearance of design as it were in them; as for instance the statue of Mityls at Argos killed the author of Mityls' death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. A Plot, therefore, of this sort is necessarily finer than others.

Plots are either simple or complex, since the actions they represent are naturally of this twofold description. The action, proceeding in the way defined, as one continuous whole, I call simple, when the change in the hero's fortunes takes place without Peripety or Discovery; and complex, when it involves one or the other, or both. These should each of them arise out of the structure of the Plot itself, so as to be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents. There is a great difference between a thing happening *propter hoc* and *post hoc*.

A Peripety is the change from one state of things within the play to its opposite of the kind described, and that too in the way we are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events; as it is for instance in *Oedipus*: here the opposite state of things is produced by the Messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove his fears as to his mother, reveals the secret of his birth. And in *Lynceus*: just as he is being led off for execution, with Danaus at his side to put him to death, the incidents preceding this bring it about that he is saved and Danaus put to death. A Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil fortune. The finest form of Discovery is one attended by Peripeties, like that which goes with the Discovery in *Oedipus*. There are

μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνώσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ
 35 τὰ τυχόντα ἔστιν ὡς ὕπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ πέ-
 πραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνώσις. ἀλλ' ἡ μά-
 λιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἡ εἰρημένη
 ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώσις καὶ περιπέτεια ἢ ἔλεον
 1452^b ἔξει ἢ φόβον, οἷων πράξεων ἢ τραγωδία μίμησις ὑπόκειται·
 ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 συμβήσεται. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώσις τιῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώσις,
 αἱ μὲν θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ἢ δῆλος ἄτερος
 5 τίς ἐστὶν, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνώσις, οἷον ἡ
 μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστη ἀναγνώσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως
 τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνου δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἔδει
 ἀναγνώσεως.

δύο μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί, περιπέτεια
 10 καὶ ἀναγνώσις· τρίτον δὲ πάθος. τούτων δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν
 καὶ ἀναγνώσις εἴρηται, πάθος δὲ ἐστὶ πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ
 ὀδυνηρά, οἷον οἳ τε ἐν τῷ φανερωῷ θάνατοι καὶ αἱ περιω-
 δυνίαι καὶ τρώσεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

Μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδеси δεῖ χρῆσθαι 12
 15 πρότερον εἵπομεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται
 κευχωρισμένα τάδε ἐστίν, πρόλογος ἐπεισόδιον ἔξοδος χο-
 ρικόν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον, κοινὰ μὲν
 ἀπάντων ταῦτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κόμμοι.
 ἔστιν δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ
 20 παρόδου, ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας τὸ μεταξὺ
 ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν, ἔξοδος δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας
 μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστι χοροῦ μέλος· χορικοῦ δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἢ

35 ὡς ὕπερ Spengel: ὡσπερ A^o 36 ἢ] εἰ A^o 1452^b I οἷον
 A^o 3 ἐπεὶ δὴ Parisinus 2038: ἐπειδὴ A^o 4 ἄτερος apogr.:
 ἕτερος A^o 7 ἐκείνου scripsi: ἐκείνω A^o 9 περὶ om.
 Riccardianus 46 12 οἳ τε] ὅτε A^o 19 προχωροῦ A^o

no doubt other forms of it ; what we have said may happen in a way in reference to inanimate things, even things of a very casual kind ; and it is also possible to discover whether some one has done or not done something. But the form most directly connected with the Plot and the action of the piece is the first-mentioned. This, with a Peripety, will arouse either pity or fear—actions of that nature being what Tragedy is assumed to represent ; and it will also serve to bring about the happy or unhappy ending. The Discovery, then, being of persons, it may be that of one party only to the other, the latter being already known ; or both the parties may have to discover themselves. Iphigenia, for instance, was discovered to Orestes by sending the letter ; and another Discovery was required to reveal him to Iphigenia.

Two parts of the Plot, then, Peripety and Discovery, are on matters of this sort. A third part is Suffering ; which we may define as an action of a destructive or painful nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings, and the like. The other two have been already explained.

✓ The parts of Tragedy to be treated as formative elements in 12 the whole were mentioned in a previous Chapter. From the point of view, however, of its quantity, i. e. the separate sections into which it is divided, a tragedy has the following parts : Prologue, Episode, Exode, and a choral portion, distinguished into Parode and Stasimon ; these two are common to all tragedies, whereas songs from the stage and *Commoe* are only found in some. The Prologue is all that precedes the Parode of the chorus ; an Episode all that comes in between two whole choral songs ; the Exode all that follows after the last choral song. In the choral portion the Parode is the whole first statement of the chorus ; a Stasimon,

πρώτη λέξις ὅλη χοροῦ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χοροῦ τὸ ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου, κόμμος δὲ θρήνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ 25 ἀπὸ σκηνῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν (ὡς εἶδеси) δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἶπαμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

Ἐν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνι- 13
στάντας τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔρ-
30 γον, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἶη λεκτέον τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις. ἐπειδὴ οὖν
δεῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγωδίας μὴ ἀπλῆν
ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτην φοβερῶν καὶ ἔλεεινῶν εἶναι
μιμητικὴν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεως ἐστίν),
πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μετα-
35 βάλλοντας φαῖνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, οὐ γὰρ
φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἔλεεινὸν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μιαιρὸν ἐστίν· οὔτε τοὺς μο-
χθηροὺς ἐξ ἀτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίαν, ἀτραγωδότερον γὰρ τοῦτ'
ἐστὶ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δεῖ, οὔτε γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον
1453^a οὔτε ἔλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἐστίν· οὐδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν
ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φι-
άνθρωπον ἔχει ἂν ἢ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε
φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστίν· δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ
5 περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ
περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ὥστε οὔτε ἔλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἔσται τὸ
συμβαῖνον. ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος
ὁ μῆτε ἀρετῆ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη μῆτε διὰ κακίαν
καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι'
10 ἀμαρτίαν τινα τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία,
οἶον Οἰδῖπου καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν

23 ὅλη Susemihl, Westphal : ὅλου A^c 25 ὡς εἶδеси add. apogr.

28 ὧν Parisinus 2038 : ὡς A^c δεῖ] -εἰ in litura A^c 1453^a I
αὐτὸν Parisinus 2038 : αὐτὸ A^c II οἰδίπους apogr. (confirm.
Ar.) : δίπουσ A^c

a song of the chorus without anapaests or trochees; a *Commos*, a lamentation sung by chorus and actor in concert. The parts of Tragedy to be used as formative elements in the whole we have already mentioned; the above are its parts from the point of view of its quantity, or the separate sections into which it is divided.

The next points after what we have said above will be 13 these: (1) What is the poet to aim at, and what is he to avoid, in constructing his Plots? and (2) What are the conditions on which the tragic effect depends?

We assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the Plot must be not simple but complex; and further, that it must imitate actions arousing pity and fear, since that is the distinctive function of this kind of imitation. It follows, therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided. (1) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply odious to us. The second is the most untragic that can be; it has no one of the requisites of Tragedy; it does not appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor on the other hand should (3) an extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation. There remains, then, the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgement, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity; e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the men of note of similar families. The perfect Plot, accordingly,

ἐπιφανείς ἄνδρες. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον ἀπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, καὶ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τούναντίον
 15 ἔξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἢ οἴου εἶρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηριθμοῦν, νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλισται τραγωδίαι συντίθενται, οἷον
 20 περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ Οἰδίπου καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δευῶν ἢ ποιῆσαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστι. διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδῃ ἐγκαλοῦντες [τὸ] αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνουσιν ὅτι τοῦτο
 25 δρᾶ ἔν ταῖς τραγωδίαῖς καὶ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἶρηται ὀρθόν· σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τρα-
 30 γικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται. δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστὶν σύστασις, ἡ διπλὴν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσεια καὶ τελευτῶσα ἔξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν· ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ'
 35 εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἐστὶν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμωδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἱ ἂν ἔχθιστοι ὦσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγισθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενός.

20 Ἀλκμέωνα scripsi : ἀλκμαίωνα A^oA^o 33 βελτίωσι καὶ χείρο+σιν A^o35 ἔστιν A^o37 οἱ ἂν Bonitz : ἂν οἱ A^o

24 τὸ seclusi

31 ἢ

34 θεατῶν Riccardianus 16

39 ἀποθνήσκει A^o

must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that. Fact also confirms our theory. Though the poets began by accepting any tragic story that came to hand, in these days the finest tragedies are always on the story of some few houses, on that of Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or any others that may have been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror. The theoretically best tragedy, then, has a Plot of this description. The critics, therefore, are wrong, who blame Euripides for taking this line in his tragedies, and giving many of them an unhappy ending. It is, as we have said, the right line to take. The best proof is this: on the stage, and in the public performances, such plays, properly worked out, are seen to be the most truly tragic; and Euripides, even if his execution be faulty in every other point, is seen to be nevertheless the most tragic certainly of the dramatists. After this comes the construction of Plot which some rank first, one with a double story (like the *Odyssey*) and an opposite issue for the good and the bad personages. It is ranked as first only through the weakness of the audiences; the poets merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate. But the pleasure here is not that of Tragedy. It belongs rather to Comedy, where the bitterest enemies in the piece (e. g. Orestes and Aegisthus) walk off good friends at the end, with no slaying of any one by any one.

1453^b Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως 14
 γίνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πρα-
 γμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνουτος. δεῖ γὰρ
 καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὄραν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν
 5 ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν
 ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἄπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ
 Οἰδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευά-
 ζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ
 φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρα-
 10 σκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγωδία κοινωνοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ
 ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ
 τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρα-
 σκευάζειν τὸν ποιητὴν, φανερόν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμα-
 σιν ἐμποιητέον. ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται
 15 τῶν συμπιπτόντων, λάβωμεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ ἢ φίλων εἶναι
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις ἢ ἐχθρῶν ἢ μηδε-
 τέρων. ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν, οὐδὲν ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε
 ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλων, πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος· οὐδ' ἂν
 μηδετέρως ἔχοντες· ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλαίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ
 20 πάθη, οἶον ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸς πατέρα ἢ μήτηρ
 υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸς μητέρα ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον
 δρά, ταῦτα ζητητέον. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρειλημμένους μύθους
 λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, λέγω δὲ οἶον τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθα-
 νούσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέ-
 25 ωνος, αὐτὸν δὲ εὐρίσκειν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆ-
 σθαι καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τί λέγομεν, εἴπωμεν σαφέστερον.
 ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ

1453^b 8 ἀτεχνότερον A^c 15 δὴ Spengel: δὲ A^c 20 οἶον εἰ
 Sylburgius 21 ἀποκτείνει ἢ μέλλει A^c 22 δράν A^c 23
 Κλυταιμνήστραν Ag. 24 ἀλκμαίωνα A^c 26 εἴπωμεν A^c

The tragic fear and pity may be aroused by the Spectacle; 14 but they may also be aroused by the very structure and incidents of the play—which is the better way and shows the better poet. The Plot in fact should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity at the incidents; which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story in *Oedipus* would have on one. To produce this same effect by means of the Spectacle is less artistic, and requires extraneous aid. Those, however, who make use of the Spectacle to put before us that which is merely monstrous and not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch with Tragedy; not every kind of pleasure should be required of a tragedy, but only its own proper pleasure.

The tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear, and the poet has to produce it by a work of imitation; it is clear, therefore, that the causes should be included in the incidents of his story. Let us see, then, what kinds of incident strike one as horrible, or rather as piteous. In a deed of this description the parties must necessarily be either friends, or enemies, or indifferent to one another. Now when enemy does it on enemy, there is nothing to move us to pity either in his doing or in his meditating the deed, except so far as the actual pain of the sufferer is concerned; and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another. Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within the family—when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother—these are the situations the poet should seek after. The traditional stories, accordingly, must be kept as they are, e.g. the murder of Clytaemnestra by Orestes and of Eriphyle by Alcmeon. At the same time even with these there is something left to the poet himself; it is for him to devise the right way of treating them. Let us explain more clearly what we mean by 'the right way.' The deed of horror may be done by the doer knowingly and consciously, as in the old poets, and in Medea's murder

ἐποίουν εἰδότας καὶ γινώσκοντας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης
ἐποίησεν ἀποκτείνουσαν τοὺς παῖδας τὴν Μήδειαν· ἔστιν δὲ
30 πρᾶξαι μὲν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πρᾶξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἴθ' ὕστερον
ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους· τοῦ-
το μὲν οὖν ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγωδίᾳ οἶον
ὁ Ἄλκμειν ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὁ ἐν τῷ
τραυματίᾳ Ὀδυσσεῖ. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ μέλλον-
35 τα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν
ποιῆσαι. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως. ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξαι
ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν
γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι χεῖριστον· τό τε γὰρ
μιαρὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικόν· ἀπαθὲς γάρ. διόπερ οὐδεὶς
1454^a ποιεῖ ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ ὀλιγάκις, οἶον ἐν Ἀντιγόῃ τὸν Κρέοντα
ὁ Αἴμων. τὸ δὲ πρᾶξαι δεύτερον. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα
μὲν πρᾶξαι, πράξαντα δὲ ἀναγνωρίσαι· τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν
οὐ πρόσσεστιν καὶ ἢ ἀναγνώρισις ἐκπληκτικόν. κράτιστον δὲ
5 τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἢ Μερόπῃ
μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνε-
γνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἢ ἀδελφῇ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ
ἐν τῇ Ἑλλῃ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν μητέρα ἐκδιδόναι μέλλον ἀνεγνώ-
ρισεν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὅπερ πάσαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλὰ
10 γένη αἱ τραγωδίαι εἰσίν. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης
ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εὗρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς
μύθοις· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς οἰκίας ἀπαντᾶν
ὅσαις τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβέβηκε πάθῃ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν
πραγμάτων συστάσεως καὶ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μύ-
15 θους εἴρηται ἱκανῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἦθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἐν 15

33 Ἄλκμειν ὁ Victoriuss : ἀλκμείωνος A^c

34 τὸ Bonitz : τὸν A^c

1454^a 6 ἀνεγνώρισε* A^c

of her children in Euripides. Or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship, and discover that afterwards, as does the Oedipus in Sophocles. Here the deed is outside the play; but it may be within it, like the act of the Alcmeon in Astydamas, or that of the Telegonus in *Ulysses Wounded*. A third possibility is for one meditating some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relationship, to make the discovery in time to draw back. These exhaust the possibilities, since the deed must necessarily be either done or not done, and either knowingly or unknowingly.

The worst situation is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the deed, and leaves it undone. It is odious and also (through the absence of suffering) untragic; hence it is that no one is made to act thus except in some few instances, e.g. Haemon and Creon in *Antigone*. Next after this comes the actual perpetration of the deed meditated. A better situation than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance, and the relationship discovered afterwards, since there is nothing odious in it, and the Discovery will serve to astound us. But the best of all is the last; what we have in *Cresphontes*, for example, where Merope, on the point of slaying her son, recognizes him in time; in *Iphigenia*, where sister and brother are in a like position; and in *Helle*, where the son recognizes his mother, when on the point of giving her up to her enemy.

This will explain why our tragedies are restricted (as we said just now) to such a small number of families. It was accident rather than art that led the poets in quest of subjects to embody this kind of incident in their Plots. They are still obliged, accordingly, to have recourse to the families in which such horrors have occurred.

On the construction of the Plot, and the kind of Plot required for Tragedy, enough has now been said.

μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ἦ. ἕξει δὲ ἦθος μὲν ἔαν
 ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῆ φανερόν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαί-
 ρεσίῳ τῶα [ἦ], χρηστὸν δὲ ἔαν χρηστήν. ἔστιν δὲ ἐν
 20 ἐκάστῳ γένει· καὶ γὰρ γυνή ἐστιν χρηστή καὶ δοῦλος,
 καίτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ὄλως φαῦ-
 λόν ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμόττοντα· ἐστιν γὰρ ἀνδρείον
 μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμόττον γυναικίῳ τὸ ἀνδρείον ἢ
 δευνὴν εἶναι. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ
 25 χρηστὸν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἀρμόττον ποιῆσαι ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
 τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν. κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ἦ ὁ τὴν
 μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτιθεῖς, ὅμως ὁμα-
 λῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν
 ἦθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου οἶον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστη, τοῦ
 30 δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττουτος ὃ τε θρήνος (ὁ τοῦ) Ὀδυσσεῶς
 ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥήσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου
 ἢ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕοικεν ἢ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ
 ὑστέρᾳ. χρῆ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσιν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν
 πραγμάτων συστάσει ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός,
 35 ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον
 ἢ εἰκός καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.
 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ
 1454^b μύθου συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μη-
 χανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλον. ἀλλὰ μη-
 χανῆ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἕξω τοῦ δράματος, ἢ ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ
 γέγονεν ἢ οὐχ οἶον τε ἀνθρωποῦ εἰδέναί, ἢ ὅσα ὑστερον ἢ

18 ποιῆ] -ῆι in litura A^c 19 ἦ om. Parisinus 2038 22 τὸ
 Riccardianus 46, Vahlen (ed. 1): τὰ A^c 23 γυναικίῳ τὸ scripsi:
 γυναικί**τῶι A^c: γυναικί τὸ apogr. 29 ἀναγκαίου Marcianus 215:
 ἀναγκαῖον A^c μὲν ἕλεος (i.e. Μενέλεως) Ar. 30 ὁ τοῦ addidi
 35 et 36 ἢ ἀναγκαῖον Hermann 1454^b 2 ἀπόπλον Riccardianus
 16: ἀπόπλον Parisinus 2038 (Ar. de conversione navium): ἀπλοῦν
 A^c 3 ἐπὶ τὰ apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἔπειτα A^c 4 οἶονται A^c

In the Characters there are four points to aim at. First 15 and foremost, that they shall be good. There will be an element of character in the play, if (as has been observed) what a personage says or does reveals a certain moral purpose; and a good element of character, if the purpose so revealed is good. Such goodness is possible in every type of personage, even in a woman or a slave, though the one is perhaps an inferior, and the other a wholly worthless being. The second point is to make them appropriate. The Character before us may be, say, manly; but it is not appropriate in a female Character to be manly, or clever. The third is to make them like the reality, which is not the same as their being good and appropriate, in our sense of the term. The fourth is to make them consistent and the same throughout; even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imitation as presenting that form of character, he should still be consistently inconsistent. We have an instance of baseness of character, not required for the story, in the Menelaus in *Orestes*; of the incongruous and unbefitting in the lamentation of Ulysses in *Scylla*, and in the (clever) speech of Melanippe; and of inconsistency in *Iphigenia at Aulis*, where Iphigenia the suppliant is utterly unlike the later Iphigenia. The right thing, however, is in the Characters just as in the incidents of the play to endeavour always after the necessary or the probable; so that whenever such-and-such a personage says or does such-and-such a thing, it shall be the probable or necessary outcome of his character; and whenever this incident follows on that, it shall be either the necessary or the probable consequence of it. From this one sees (to digress for a moment) that the Dénouement also should arise out of the plot itself, and not depend on a stage-artifice, as in *Medea*, or in the story of the (arrested) departure of the Greeks in the *Iliad*. The artifice must be reserved for matters outside the play—for past events beyond human knowledge, or events yet to come, which require to be

5 δέεται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἀποδί-
 δομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὄραν. ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πρά-
 γμασι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ
 Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους. ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγω-
 δία βελτιόνων, ἡμᾶς δεῖ μιμῆσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογρά-
 10 φους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφὴν ὁμοίους
 ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμού-
 μενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα
 ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν
 [παράδειγμα σκληρότητος], οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα Ἀγάθων καὶ
 15 Ὅμηρος. ταῦτα δὲ διατηρεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ παρὰ
 τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ·
 καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐστὶν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλάκις· εἴρηται
 δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἰκανῶς.

Ἀναγνώρισις δὲ τί μὲν ἐστὶν, εἴρηται πρότερον· εἶδη 16
 20 δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνολογία καὶ ἡ πλείστη
 χρῶνται δι' ἀπορίαν, ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν
 σύμφυτα, οἷον “λόγχην ἣν φοροῦσι Γηγενεῖς” ἢ ἀστέρας
 οἷους ἐν τῷ Θυέστη Καρκίως, τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα, καὶ τούτων
 τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον οὐλαί, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, τὰ περι-
 25 δέραια καὶ οἷον ἐν τῇ Τυροῦ διὰ τῆς σκάφης. ἐστὶν δὲ καὶ
 τούτοις χρῆσθαι ἢ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, οἷον (ὁ) Ὀδυσσεὺς διὰ
 τῆς οὐλῆς ἄλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως
 ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἕνεκα ἀτεχνό-
 τεραι, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περιπετείας, ὥσ-
 30 περ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις, βελτίους. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ πεποι-

7 τὸ] τω pr. A^c 14 παράδειγμα σκληρότητος seclisut Ritter
 Ἀγάθων apogr.: ἀγαθῶν A^c 15 δὴ A^o: δεῖ vel δὴ δεῖ apogr.
 τὰ παρὰ τὰς vel τὰς παρὰ τὰ apogr.: τὰς παρὰ τὰς A^c 20 ἡ
 πλείστη A^c 22 φοροῦσιν A^c 24 περιδέραια Parisinus 2038:
 περιδέραια A^c 25 οἷον apogr. (confirm. Ar.): οἶ A^o 26 ὁ
 addidi

foretold or announced; since it is the privilege of the Gods to know everything. There should be nothing improbable among the actual incidents. If it be unavoidable, however, it should be outside the tragedy, like the improbability in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles. But to return to the Characters. As Tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man, we in our way should follow the example of good portrait-painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in portraying men quick or slow to anger, or with similar infirmities of character, must know how to represent them as such, and at the same time as good men, as Agathon and Homer have represented Achilles.

All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and further, those also for such points of stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since in these too one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, has been said on the subject in one of our published writings.

Discovery in general has been explained already. As 16 for the species of Discovery, the first to be noted is (1) the least artistic form of it, of which the poets make most use through mere lack of invention, Discovery by signs or marks. Of these signs some are congenital, like the 'lance-head which the Earth-born have on them,' or 'stars,' such as Carcinus brings in in his *Thyestes*; others acquired after birth—these latter being either marks on the body, e.g. scars, or external tokens, like necklaces, or to take another sort of instance, the ark in the Discovery in *Tyro*. Even these, however, admit of two uses, a better and a worse; the scar of Ulysses is an instance; the Discovery of him through it is made in one way by the nurse and in another by the swineherds. A Discovery using signs as a means of assurance is less artistic, as indeed are all such as imply reflexion; whereas one bringing them in all of a sudden, as in the *Bath-story*, is of a better order. Next after these are (2)

ἡμέναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, διὸ ἄτεχνοι. οἶον (ὁ) Ὀρέστης ἐν τῇ
 Ἴφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης· ἐκεῖνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς
 ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει ἃ βούλεται ὁ ποιητὴς ἀλλ'
 35 οὐχ ὁ μῦθος· διὸ τι ἐγγὺς τῆς εἰρημένης ἁμαρτίας ἐστίν, ἐξῆν
 γὰρ ἂν ἔνια καὶ ἐνεγκείν. καὶ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Τηρεῖ ἢ
 τῆς κερκίδος φωνῇ. ἢ τρίτη διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι
 1455^a τι ἰδόντα, ὥσπερ ἢ ἐν Κυπρίοις τοῖς Δικαιογένοισι, ἰδὼν γὰρ
 τὴν γραφὴν ἔκλαυσε, καὶ ἢ ἐν Ἀλκίμου ἀπολόγῳ, ἀκούων
 γὰρ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ μνησθεῖς ἐδάκρυσεν, ὅθεν ἀνεγνω-
 ρίσθησαν. τετάρτη δὲ ἢ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, οἶον ἐν Χοηφόροις,
 5 ὅτι ὅμοιός τις ἐλήλυθεν, ὅμοιος δὲ οὐθεὶς ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ Ὀρέστης,
 οὗτος ἄρα ἐλήλυθεν. καὶ ἢ Πολυίδου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς
 Ἴφιγενείας· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν Ὀρέστην συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι ἢ τ'
 ἀδελφῇ ἐτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμβαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ
 Θεοδέκτου Τυδεῖ, ὅτι ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐρήσωσιν υἱὸν αὐτὸς ἀπόλ-
 10 λυται. καὶ ἢ ἐν τοῖς Φινειδαῖς· ἰδοῦσαι γὰρ τὸν τόπον συννε-
 λογίσαντο τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν
 αὐταῖς, καὶ γὰρ ἐξετέθησαν ἐνταῦθα. ἔστιν δὲ τις καὶ συν-
 θετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θατέρου, οἶον ἐν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τῷ
 ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ
 15 ἐωράκει, τὸ δὲ ὡς δὴ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριούντος διὰ τούτου
 ποιῆσαι παραλογισμὸς. πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἢ ἐξ
 αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι' εἰκό-

31 ὁ addidi 35 διὸ τι ἐγγὺς scripsi: δι' ὅτι ἐγγύς A^c: διὸ ἐγγύς
 τι Vahlen 37 ἢ τρίτη Spengel: ἦτοι τῆι A^c αἰσθεσθαί A^c

1455^a 1 τοῖς Marcianus 200: τῆς A^c 2 ἀπολόγῳ Parisinus 2038:
 ἀπὸ λόγων A^c 4 Χοηφόροις Victorius: χλοηφόροις A^c 6 Πολυίδου
 Tyrwhitt: πολυείδου A^c: πολυείδου apogr. 10 Φινειδαῖς Reiz:

φινειδαῖς A^c 13 θατέρου Bursian (praeunte Hermanno):
 θεάτρον A^c 14 τὸ μὲν] ὁ μὲν apogr. τὸ alterum om. apogr.

15 δὴ Tyrwhitt: δι' A^c 16 παραλογισμὸς Riccardianus 46,
 Vahlen (confirm. Ar.): παραλογισμὸν A^c 17 ἐκπλήξεως Parisinus
 2038: πλήξεως A^c εἰκόντων A^c

Discoveries made directly by the poet ; which are inartistic for that very reason ; e. g. Orestes' Discovery of himself in *Iphigenia* : whereas his sister reveals who she is by the letter, Orestes is made to say himself what the poet rather than the story demands. This, therefore, is not far removed from the first-mentioned fault, since he might have presented certain tokens as well. Another instance is the 'shuttle's voice' in the *Tereus* of Sophocles. (3) A third species is Discovery through memory, from a man's consciousness being awakened by something seen or heard. Thus in *The Cypriote* of Dicaeogenes, the sight of the picture makes the man burst into tears ; and in the *Tale of Alcinous*, hearing the harper Ulysses is reminded of the past and weeps ; the Discovery of them being the result. (4) A fourth kind is Discovery through reasoning ; e. g. in *The Choephoroe* : 'One like me is here ; there is no one like me but Orestes ; he, therefore, must be here.' Or that which Polyidus the Sophist suggested for *Iphigenia* ; since it was natural for Orestes to reflect : 'My sister was sacrificed, and I am to be sacrificed like her.' Or that in the *Tydeus* of Theodectes : 'I came to find a son, and am to die myself.' Or that in *The Phinidae* : on seeing the place the women inferred their fate, that they were to die there, since they had also been exposed there. (5) There is, too, a composite Discovery arising from bad reasoning on the side of the other party. An instance of it is in *Ulysses the False Messenger* : he said he should know the bow—which he had not seen ; but to suppose from that that he would know it again (as though he had once seen it) was bad reasoning. (6) The best of all Discoveries, however, is that arising from the

των, οἶον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι καὶ τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ·
εἰκὸς γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα. αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται
20 μόναι ἄνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ δεραίων. δεύτεραι
δὲ αἱ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ.

Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπερ- 17
γάξεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ
ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὄρων ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς
25 πραττομένοις εὐρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λαυθάνοι
[τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. σημείον δὲ τούτου ὁ ἐπετιμᾶτο Καρκίνωφ.
ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνήει, ὁ μὴ ὄρωντ' ἂν τὸν
θεατὴν ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν δυσχερα-
νάντων τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν. ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχή-
30 μασιν συναπεργαζόμενον· πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς
φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσι, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος
καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα. διὸ εὐφυοῦς ἢ
ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ μανικὴ· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὐπλαστοὶ οἱ δὲ
ἐκστατικοί εἰσι. τοὺς τε λόγους καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους
1455^b δεῖ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιοῦντα ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπεισο-
διοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν. λέγω δὲ οὕτως ἂν θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθ-
όλου, οἶον τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης καὶ ἀφα-
νισθείσης ἀδήλως τοῖς θύσασιν, ἰδρυνθείσης δὲ εἰς ἄλλην
5 χώραν, ἐν ἣ νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους θύειν τῇ θεῷ, ταύτην ἔσχε
τὴν ἱερωσύνην· χρόνω δὲ ὕστερον τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθεῖν

18 τὸ scripsi: ὁ A^c 20 δέρεων A^c: περιδεραίων apogr. 24
ἐνεργέστατα A^c ὁ om. Parisinus 2038 25 λαυθάνοι τὸ A^c:
λαυθάνοιτο apographa plura (τὸ Vahleno teste deletum est in nonnullis)
26 ἐπετιμᾶτο marg. Riccardiani 16 (confirm. Ar.): ἐπιτιμᾶ τῶι A^c
27 ἀνήει Guelferbytanus (confirm. Ar.): ἂν εἴη A^c ὄρωντ' ἂν
Vahlen: ὄρωντα A^c 31 χιμαζόμενος A^c 34 ἐκστατικοί
Riccardianus 46 (et Paccius in versione; confirmare videtur Ar.):
ἐξεταστικοί A^c τοὺς τε Parisinus 2038: τοῦτοσ τε A^c 1455^b 1
ἐπεισοδίου A^c 2 παρατείνειν Riccardianus 46: περιτείνειν A^c

incidents themselves, when the great surprise comes about through a probable incident, like that in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles; and also in *Iphigenia*; for it was not improbable that she should wish to have a letter taken home. These last are the only Discoveries independent of the artifice of signs and necklaces. Next after them come Discoveries through reasoning.

At the time when he is constructing his Plots, and engaged on the Diction in which they are worked out, the poet should remember (1) to put the actual scenes as far as possible before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is appropriate, and be least likely to overlook incongruities. This is shown by what was censured in Carcinus, the return of Amphiaraus from the sanctuary; it would have passed unnoticed, if it had not been actually seen by the audience; but on the stage his play failed, the incongruity of the incident offending the spectators. (2) As far as may be, too, the poet should even act his story with the very gestures of his personages. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing; distress and anger, for instance, are portrayed most truthfully by one who is feeling them at the moment. Hence it is that poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion. (3) His story, again, whether already made or of his own making, he should first simplify and reduce to a universal form, before proceeding to lengthen it out by the insertion of episodes. The following will show how the universal element in *Iphigenia*, for instance, may be viewed: A certain maiden having been offered in sacrifice, and spirited away from her sacrificers into another land, where the custom was to sacrifice all strangers to the Goddess, she was made there the priestess of this rite. Long after that the brother

τῆς ἱερείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνείλεν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τινα αἰτίαν [ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου] ἔλθειν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐφ' ὅ τι δὲ ἔξω τοῦ μύθου ἔλθων δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισειν, εἴθ' ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴθ' ὡς Πολυίδος ἐποίησεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἰπῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα μόνου τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιῶν· ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκειὰ τὰ ἐπεισόδια, οἶον ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστη ἡ μανία δι' ἧς ἐλήφθη καὶ ἡ σωτηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασι τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἡ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὀδυσσεΐας (οὐ) μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν· ἀποδημούντος τινος ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ μόνου ὄντος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν οἴκοι οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ χρήματα ὑπὸ μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθεὶς, καὶ ἀναγνωρίσας †τινὰς† αὐτὸς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς διέφθειρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.

Ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγωδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις, τὰ 18
 25 μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις ἢ δέσις, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ λύσις—λέγω δὲ δέσιω μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους ὃ ἔσχατόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν * *, λύσιω δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους—ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ τῷ Θεοδέκτου
 30 δέσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις καὶ

7 ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου seclisut Duentzer 10 πολυίδος A^o 15
 δράμασι aprog. : ἄρμασι A^o 17 οὐ add. Vulcanius (confirm.
 Ar.) μικρὸς aprog. 19 ἔτι Riccardianus 16 (confirm.
 Ar.): ἐπεὶ A^o 22 τινὰς] fort. ὅτι 28 εἰς εὐτυχίαν
 <συμβαίνει ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν> (ut videtur) Ar.: εἰς εὐτυχίαν <ἐκ
 δυστυχίας συμβαίνει ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν> conl. Vahlen:
 <εἰς δυστυχίαν συμβαίνει ἢ> εἰς εὐτυχίαν Gomperz 29 λυγκεῖ
 aprog. (confirm. Ar.): λυκεῖ A^o

of the priestess happened to come; the fact, however, of the oracle having for a certain reason bidden him go thither, and his object in going, are outside the Plot of the play. On his coming he was arrested, and about to be sacrificed, when he revealed who he was—either as Euripides puts it, or (as suggested by Polyidus) by the not improbable exclamation, ‘So I too am doomed to be sacrificed, as my sister was’; and the disclosure led to his salvation. This done, the next thing, after the proper names have been fixed as a basis for the story, is to work in episodes or accessory incidents. One must mind, however, that the episodes are appropriate, like the fit of madness in Orestes, which led to his arrest, and the purifying, which brought about his salvation. In plays, then, the episodes are short; in epic poetry they serve to lengthen out the poem. The argument of the *Odyssey* is not a long one. A certain man has been abroad many years; Poseidon is ever on the watch for him, and he is all alone. Matters at home too have come to this, that his substance is being wasted and his son’s death plotted by suitors to his wife. Then he arrives there himself after his grievous sufferings; reveals himself, and falls on his enemies; and the end is his salvation and their death. This being all that is proper to the *Odyssey*, everything else in it is episode. (4) There is a further point¹³ to be borne in mind. Every tragedy is in part Complication and in part Dénouement; the incidents before the opening scene, and often certain also of those within the play, forming the Complication; and the rest the Dénouement. By Complication I mean all from the beginning of the story to the point just before the change in the hero’s fortunes; by Dénouement, all from the beginning of the change to the end. In the *Lynceus* of Theodectes, for instance, the Complication includes, together with the presupposed inci-

πάλιν ἢ αὐτῶν, (λύσις) δ' ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου
 μέχρι τοῦ τέλους. * * τραγωδίας δὲ εἶδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα (τοσαῦτα
 γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη), ἢ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἧς τὸ ὄλον
 ἐστὶν περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, ἢ δὲ παθητικὴ, οἷον οἱ τε
 1456^a Αἴαντες καὶ οἱ Ἰξίονες, ἢ δὲ ἠθικὴ, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ
 Πηλεὺς· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις, οἷον αἱ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προ-
 μηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν ἄδου. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πει-
 ρᾶσθαι ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλείστα, ἄλλως τε
 5 καὶ ὡς νῦν συκοφαντοῦσιν τοὺς ποιητάς· γεγυότων γὰρ καθ'
 ἕκαστον μέρος ἀγαθῶν ποιητῶν, ἐκάστου τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ
 ἀξιοῦσι τὸν ἕνα ὑπερβάλλειν. [δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τραγωδίαν
 ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν οὐδενὶ ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ· τοῦτο
 δέ, ὧν ἢ αὐτὴ πλοκὴ καὶ λύσις. πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εἶ
 10 λύουσι κακῶς· δεῖ δὲ ἄμφω αἰεὶ κρατεῖσθαι.] χρὴ δὲ ὅπερ
 εἴρηται πολλάκις μεμνήσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποικὸν σύ-
 στημα τραγωδίαν—ἐποποικὸν δὲ λέγω [δὲ] τὸ πολὺμυθον—
 οἷον εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιῶι μῦθον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ
 διὰ τὸ μῆκος λαμβάνει τὰ μέρη τὸ πρέπον μέγεθος, ἐν
 15 δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺν παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει. ση-
 μείον δέ, ὅσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὄλην ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ
 μέρος ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης, (ἢ) Νιόβην καὶ μὴ ὡσπερ Αἰσχύλος,
 ἢ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἢ κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέ-
 πεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ· ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς

31 πάλιν obelo notat M. Schmidt λύσις δὲ ἢ Parisinus 2038:
 δὴ A^o: δὴ (ἀπαγωγή, λύσις δ' ἢ) conl. Vahlen: δὴ(λωσις, λύσις δ' ἢ)
 Christ 32 excidisse 1456^a 7—10 (δίκαιον—κρατεῖσθαι) vidit Susemihl
 33 καὶ τὰ] κατὰ Tucker 1456^a 2 τέταρτον ὄψις scripsi (cf. ad
 1458^a 5): τέταρτον ὄψις A^o: τερατῶδες Schrader 4 ἄλλως τε
 aragr. (confirm. Ar.): ἀλλ' ὡς γε A^o 6 ἐκάστου Parisinus 2038:
 ἕκαστον A^o 7 v. ad 1455^b 32 8 οὐδενὶ Tyrwhitt (in versione):
 οὐδέν A^o 10 κρατεῖσθαι Vahlen (confirm. Ar.): κροτεῖσθαι A^o
 12 δὲ alterum om. apogr. 17 ἢ add. Vahlen 18 ἀγαθῶν pr.
 A^o (et Ar.)

dents, the seizure of the child and that in turn of the parents ; and the Dénouement all from the indictment for the murder to the end. Now it is right, when one speaks of a tragedy as the same or not the same as another, to do so on the ground before all else of their Plot, i. e. as having the same or not the same Complication and Dénouement. Yet there are many dramatists who, after a good Complication, fail in the Dénouement. But it is necessary for both points of construction to be always duly mastered. (5) There are four distinct species of Tragedy—that being the number of the constituents also that have been mentioned : first, the complex Tragedy, which is all Peripety and Discovery ; second, the Tragedy of suffering, e. g. the *Ajaxes* and *Ixions* ; third, the Tragedy of character, e. g. *The Phthiotides* and *Peleus*. The fourth constituent is that of ‘Spectacle,’ exemplified in *The Phorcides*, in *Prometheus*, and in all plays with the scene laid in the nether world. The poet’s aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest, if possible, or else the more important and the major part of them. This is now especially necessary owing to the unfair criticism to which the poet is subjected in these days. Just because there have been poets before him strong in the several species of tragedy, the critics now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one of his predecessors. (6) One should also remember what has been said more than once, and not write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i. e. one with a plurality of stories in it), by attempting to dramatize, for instance, the entire story of the *Iliad*. In the epic owing to its scale every part is treated at proper length ; with a drama, however, on the same story the result is very disappointing. This is shown by the fact that all who have dramatized the fall of Ilium in its entirety, and not part by part, like Euripides, or the whole of the Niobe story, instead of a portion, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or have but ill success on the stage ; for that and that alone was enough

20 ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζονται ὡν βούλονται θαυμαστῶς·
 τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν
 ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ πονηρίας (δ') ἔξαπατηθῆ, ὡσπερ Σίσυ-
 φος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἠττηθῆ· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο
 εἰκὸς ὡσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει, εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ
 25 καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἓνα δεῖ ὑπολα-
 βεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ ὄλου καὶ συναγω-
 νίζεσθαι μὴ ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὡσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. τοῖς
 δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ἀδόμηνα (οὐδὲν) μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης
 τραγωδίας ἐστίν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα ἄδουσιν πρῶτον ἄρξαντος
 30 Ἀγάθωνος τοῦ τοιούτου. καίτοι τί διαφέρει ἢ ἐμβόλιμα
 ἄδειν ἢ εἰ ῥῆσιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἀρμόττοι ἢ ἐπεισόδιον
 ὄλον;

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ 19
 λέξεώς καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν
 35 τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης
 τῆς μεθόδου. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ
 τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀπο-
 δεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἶον
 1456^b ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος
 καὶ μικρότητα. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι ἀπὸ
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεῖν ἢ δεῖν ἢ
 μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέη παρασκευάζειν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον δια-
 5 φέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ
 ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ

22 δὲ add. Riccardianus 16 23 ἠττήθη A^o 24 <καὶ>
 εἰκὸς ὡσπερ Riccardianus 46 et (ut videtur) Ar. 28 ἀδόμηνα
 Madius (confirm. Ar.): διδόμηνα A^o οὐδὲν add. Vahlen
 (confirm. Ar.) 33 ἤδη] ἠδ' A^o: εἰδῶν (ut videtur) Ar.
 34 καὶ Hermann (confirm. Ar.): ἢ A^o 1456^b 2 σμικρότητα
 Parisinus 2038 (et fort. Ar.): μικρότητα A^o 3 εἰδεῶν A^o
 4 δέη Parisinus 2038: δ' ἢ A^o

to ruin even a play by Agathon. Yet in their Peripeties, as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire—a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e. g. Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrongdoer worsted. This is probable, however, only in Agathon's sense, when he speaks of the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass. (7) The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and take a share in the action—that which it has in Sophocles rather than in Euripides. With the later poets, however, the songs in a play of theirs have no more to do with the Plot of that than of any other tragedy. Hence it is that they are now singing intercalary pieces, a practice first introduced by Agathon. And yet what real difference is there between singing such intercalary pieces, and attempting to fit in a speech, or even a whole act, from one play into another? ✓

✓ The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains 19 to consider the Diction and Thought. As for the Thought, we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric, as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry. The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to be effected by their language—in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize or minimize things. It is clear, also, that their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity or horror, or have a look of importance or probability. The only difference is that with the act the impression has to be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker, ✓

τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαίνοιτο ἢ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον; τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, 10 ἃ ἐστὶν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικῆν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλή καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιούτου. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνώσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. 15 τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτηῆσθαι ἂ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμῶ, ὅτι εὐχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν “ μῆνυ ἀεῖδε θεά ”; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησὶν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξις ἐστίν. διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὄν θεώρημα.

20 Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τάδ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχείου 20 συλλαβῆ συνδεσμος ἄρθρον ὄνομα ῥῆμα πῶσις λόγος. στοιχείου μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ γίνεσθαι φωνή· καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί, ὧν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοιχείου. 25 ταύτης δὲ μέρη τό τε φωνήεν καὶ τὸ ἡμίφωνον καὶ ἄφωνον. ἐστὶν δὲ φωνήεν μὲν (τὸ) ἄνευ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, ἡμίφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, οἷον τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ Ρ, ἄφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον φωνήν, μετὰ δὲ 30 τῶν ἐχόντων τινα φωνὴν γινόμενον ἀκουστόν, οἷον τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Δ. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασίν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις καὶ δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύ-

8 φαίνοιτο Carolus Bigg : φανοῖτο A^o ἢ δέοι Vahlen (ed. 2) : ἡδέα A^o (et Ar.) : ἦδη Castelvetrus 21 ἄθρον A^o : in codice post ῥῆμα positum huc transtulit Spengel (confirm. Ar.) 23 συνθετῆ apogr. (et Ar.) 26 τὸ add. Reiz

if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under this head is the turns given to the language when spoken; e. g. the difference between command and prayer, simple statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criticized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's 'Sing of the wrath, Goddess'?—which Protagoras has criticized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry.

The Diction viewed as a whole is made up of the following ²⁰ parts: the Letter (or ultimate element), the Syllable, the Conjunction, the Article, the Noun, the Verb, the Case, and the Speech. The Letter is an indivisible sound of a particular kind, one that may become a factor in an intelligible sound. Indivisible sounds are uttered by the brutes also, but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the term. These elementary sounds are either vowels, semivowels, or mutes. A vowel is a Letter having an audible sound without the addition of another Letter. A semivowel, one having an audible sound by the addition of another Letter; e. g. S and R. A mute, one having no sound at all by itself, but becoming audible by an addition, that of one of the Letters which have a sound of some sort of their own; e. g. D and G. The Letters differ in various ways: as produced by different conformations of in different regions of the mouth; as aspirated, not aspirated, or sometimes one

τητι ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ· περὶ ὧν
καθ' ἕκαστον [ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. συλλαβὴ
35 δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἄσημος συνθετὴ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνῆν ἔχου-
τος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α συλλαβὴ καὶ μετὰ τοῦ
Α, οἷον τὸ ΓΡΑ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρησάμεν τὰς διαφορὰς
τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστίν. σύνδεσμος δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὐ-
1457^a τε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνῆν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων
φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
μέσου], ἢν μὴ ἀρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ' αὐτόν,
οἷον μὲν δὴ τοῖ δέ· ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φω-
5 νῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν
φωνήν, * * ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ
τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἷον τὸ ἀμφὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνῆν
μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν] πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ
10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ὄνομα δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ
συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ'
αὐτὸ σημαντικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα ὡς καὶ
αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεοδώρῳ τὸ δῶρον
οὐ σημαίνει. ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρό-
15 νου ἧς οὐδέν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αὐτό, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ὀνομάτων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκόν οὐ σημαίνει τὸ
πότε, τὸ δὲ βαδίζει ἢ βεβάδικεν προσσημαίνει τὸ μὲν τὸν
παρόντα χρόνον τὸ δὲ τὸν παρεληλυθότα. πῶσις δ' ἐστὶν

34 ἐν seclisit Spengel 1457^a 2-3 καὶ—μέσου seclisi 4
μέν] μὲν. A^c δὴ τοῖ scripsi: ἦτοι. A^c δέ] δέ. A^c 5
σημαντικῶν Robortellus: σημαντικόν A^c 6 lacunam indicavi, huc
transferenda esse suspicatus ea quae infra leguntur, οἷον τὸ ἀμφὶ καὶ
τὸ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 7-9 οἷον τὸ ἀμφί—φωνῶν seclisi 7 ἀμφί
Hartung: φ. μ. ἰ. A^c περὶ] π. ε. ρ. ἰ. A^c 17 ποτὲ Spengel
βυδίζει apogr. (confirm. Ar.): βαδίζειν A^c προσσημαίνει Parisinus
2038: προσημαίνει A^c

and sometimes the other; as long, short, or of variable quantity; and further as having an acute, grave, or intermediate accent. The details of these matters we must leave to the metricians. (2) A Syllable is a non-significant composite sound, made up of a mute and a Letter having a sound (a vowel or semivowel); for GR, without an A, is just as much a Syllable as GRA, with an A. The various forms of the Syllable also belong to the theory of metre. (3) A Conjunction is (a) a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union, and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches) must not be inserted at the beginning of it; e. g. μέν, δὴ, τοί, δέ. Or (b) a non-significant sound capable of combining two or more significant sounds into one; e. g. ἀμφί, περί, etc. (4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech, its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle. (5) A Noun or name is a composite significant sound not involving the idea of time, with parts which have no significance by themselves in it. It is to be remembered that in a compound we do not think of the parts as having a significance also by themselves; in the name 'Theodorus,' for instance, the δῶρον means nothing to us. (6) A Verb is a composite significant sound involving the idea of time, with parts which (just as in the Noun) have no significance by themselves in it. Whereas the word 'man' or 'white' does not imply *when*, 'walks' and 'has walked' involve in addition to the idea of walking that of time present or

ὀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἢ μὲν κατὰ τὸ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ ση-
 20 μαίνου καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἷον
 ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἷον κατ'
 ἐρώτησις ἐπίταξις· τὸ γὰρ ἐβάδισεν; ἢ βιάδιζε πτώσις ῥή-
 ματος κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ εἶδη ἐστίν. λόγος δὲ φωνῆ συνθετῆ
 σημαντικῆ ἢς ἕνια μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τϜ (οὐ γὰρ
 25 ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, οἷον ὁ
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρισμός, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι
 λόγον, μέρος μέντοι ἀεί τι σημαίνουν ἕξει) οἷον ἐν τῷ βιάδι-
 ζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἰς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὁ ἐν
 σημαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ πλειόνων συνδέσμων, οἷον ἢ Ἰλιάς μὲν
 30 συνδέσμων εἰς, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῷ ἐν σημαίνει.

Ὀνόματος δὲ εἶδη τὸ μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ἀπλοῦν δὲ λέγω ὁ 21
 μὴ ἐκ σημαίνοντων σύγκειται, οἷον γῆ, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν· τούτου
 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημαίνοντων
 σύγκειται. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα καὶ
 35 πολλαπλοῦν, οἷον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μεγαλειωτῶν, Ἐρμοκαί-
 1457^b κόξανθος * *. ἅπαν δὲ ὀνομά ἐστὶν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ
 μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑψη-
 ρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ὧ χρῶνται
 ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ὧ ἕτεροι ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι καὶ γλῶτ-

19 κατὰ τὸ Reiz: τὸ κατὰ A^o 22 ἐβάδισεν;] notam interroga-
 tionis add. Tyrwhitt βιάδιζε Riccardianus 16: ἐβάδιζεν A^o
 27 βιάδιζει Parisinus 2038 (confirm. Ar.): βιάδιζειν A^o 29
 συνδέσμων Riccardianus 16: συνδέσμων A^o 30 τῷ apogr.:
 τὸ A^o 31 εἶδη] εἶ- in litura A^o 33 ὀνόματι Spengel,
 Vahlen (confirm. Ar.): ὀνόματος A^o 35 μεγαλειωτῶν scripsi:
 μεγαλιωτῶν A^o: μεγαλείων ὡν Vahlen: Μασσαλιωτῶν (ex Ar. de
 Massiliotis) Diels ἔρμοκαί· κόξανθος A^o 1457^b I ubi
 lacunam indicavi addit Ar. qui supplicabatur dominum caelorum
 (vel Iovem), unde ἐπευξάμενος Διὶ πατρὶ restituit Diels; nescio an
 exemplum lateat nominis quadruplicis 2 ἀφηρημένον Spengel

time past. (7) A Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word means 'of' or 'to' a thing, and so forth, or for one or many (e. g. 'man' and 'men'); or it may consist merely in the mode of utterance, e. g. in question, command, etc. 'Walked?' and 'Walk!' are Cases of the verb 'to walk' of this last kind. (8) A Speech is a composite significant sound, some of the parts of which have a certain significance by themselves. It may be observed that a Speech is not always made up of Noun and Verb; it may be without a Verb, like the definition of man; but it will always have some part with a certain significance by itself. In the Speech 'Cleon walks,' 'Cleon' is an instance of such a part. A Speech is said to be one in two ways, either as signifying one thing, or as a union of several Speeches made into one by conjunction. Thus the *Iliad* is one Speech by conjunction of several; and the definition of man is one through its signifying one thing.

Nouns are of two kinds, either (1) simple, i. e. made up of 21 non-significant parts, like the word γῆ, or (2) double; in the latter case the word may be made up either of a significant and a non-significant part (a distinction which disappears in the compound), or of two significant parts. It is possible also to have triple, quadruple or higher compounds, like most of our amplified names; e. g. 'Hermocæixanthus' and the like.

Whatever its structure, a Noun must always be either (1) the ordinary word for the thing, or (2) a strange word, or (3) a metaphor, or (4) an ornamental word, or (5) a coined word, or (6) a word lengthened out, or (7) curtailed, or (8) altered in form. By the ordinary word I mean that in general use in a country; and by a strange word, one in use elsewhere. So that the same word may obviously be

5 ταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ·
 τὸ γὰρ σίγνον Κυπρίους μὲν κύριον, ἡμῶν δὲ γλώττα. με-
 ταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶ-
 δους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν
 10 ἐπὶ εἶδος οἶον “νηὺς δέ μοι ἦδ’ ἔστηκεν.” τὸ γὰρ ὀρμῆν ἐστὶν
 ἐστάναι τι. ἀπ’ εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος “ἢ δὴ μυρί’ Ὀδυσ-
 σεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν” τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολὺ ἐστὶν, φῖ νῦν ἀντὶ
 τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ’ εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἶον “χαλκῶ
 ἀπὸ ψυχῆν ἀρύσας” καὶ “τεμῶν ἀτειρέι χαλκῶ.” ἐνταῦθα
 15 γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι εἴρηκεν.
 ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστὶν. τῷ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν
 ὁμοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον
 πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ
 ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν ἀνθ’
 20 οὗ λέγει πρὸς ὃ ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οἶον ὁμοίως ἔχει φιάλη πρὸς
 Διόνυσον καὶ ἀσπίς πρὸς Ἄρη· ἐρεῖ τοῦνν τὴν φιάλην ἀσπίδα
 Διόνυσου καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην Ἄρεως. ἢ ὁ γῆρας πρὸς
 βίον, καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεῖ τοῦνν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆ-
 ρας ἡμέρας ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου
 25 ἢ δυσμὰς βίου. ἐνίοις δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὄνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνά-
 λογον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται· οἶον τὸ τὸν
 καρπὸν μὲν ἀφιέναι σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἐπὶ τοῦ
 ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ἡλίον καὶ
 τὸ σπείρειν πρὸς τὸν καρπὸν, διὸ εἴρηται “σπείρων θεοκτίσταν

6 fort. σίγνον 10 ὀρμῆν (-in in litura) A^o 11 ἦδη μυριόδυσ-
 σεὺς A^o 12 μύριον A^o 13 fort. πολλά 14 ἀρύσας καὶ
 Tyrwhitt (ἀρύσας Leidensis et corr. Vaticanus 1400, καὶ Laurentianus
 LX 21): ἀρύσασκε A^o τεμῶν A^o: ταμῶν Bekker (ed. 3)
 ατηρει A^o 16 τῷ scripsi: τὸ A^o 27 ἐπὶ M. Schmidt:
 ἀπὸ A^o (et Ar.)

at once strange and ordinary, though not in reference to the same people; *σίγυφος*, for instance, is an ordinary word in Cyprus, and a strange word with us. Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is the 'standing' of a particular kind of thing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought,' where 'ten thousand,' which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number.' That from species to species in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in 'Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw,' both words meaning to 'take away' something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put B in lieu of D, and D in lieu of B. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the 'shield of *Dionysus*' (D+A), and the shield as the 'cup of *Ares*' (B+C). Or to take another instance: As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A). One will accordingly describe evening (B) as the 'old age of the day' (D+A)—or by the Empedoclean equivalent; and old age (D) as the 'evening' or 'sunset of life' (B+C). It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but for all that they will be metaphorically described in just the same way. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act (B), however, stands in just the same relation to its object, sunlight (A), as sowing (D) to the seed-corn (C). Hence the expression in the poet, 'sowing around a god-created

30 φλόγα.” ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι
καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν
οἰκείων τι, οἶον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἄρεως ἀλλ’
ἄϊωνον. * * πεποιημένον δ’ ἔστιν ὁ ὄλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ
τινῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής, (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα)

35 οἶον τὰ κέρατα ἐρνύγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητήρα. ἐπεκτεταμένον
1458^a δὲ ἔστιν ἡ ἀφηρημένον τὸ μὲν ἔαν φωνήεντι μακροτέρῳ
κεκρημένον ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῆ ἔμβεβλημένη, τὸ δὲ ἂν
ἀφηρημένον τι ἢ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἶον τὸ πόλεως
πόληος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηληιάδεω, ἀφηρημένον δὲ οἶον τὸ
5 κρῖ καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ “μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ.” ἐξηλ-
λαγμένον δ’ ἔστιν ὅταν τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπη
τὸ δὲ ποιῆ, οἶον τὸ “δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν” ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν.

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ
δὲ μεταξὺ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὅσα τελευτᾶ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ (καὶ Σ) καὶ
10 ὅσα ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται (ταῦτα δ’ ἔστιν δύο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θήλεα
δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων εἰς τε τὰ αἰὲ μακρά, οἶον εἰς Η
καὶ Ω, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α· ὥστε ἴσα συμβαίνει
πλήθῃ εἰς ὅσα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα· τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ
(τῷ Σ) ταῦτά ἐστιν. εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα τελευτᾶ,
15 οὐδὲ εἰς φωνήεν βραχύ. εἰς δὲ τὸ Ι τρία μόνον, μέλι κόμμι
πέπερι. εἰς δὲ τὸ Υ πέντε. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ
Ν (καὶ Ρ) καὶ Σ.

32 ἀλλ’ ἄϊωνον Victori- : ἀλλὰ οἶνου A^o (et Ar.) 33 definitionem
κόσμον hic deesse vidit Madius 35 ἔρνυγας Victori- : ἐρνύτας
Aldina 1536 1458^a 2 ἦ] ἡ A^o συλλαβῆ ἔμβεβλημένη A^o
3 ἀφήρη μὲν ὄντι ἡ A^o πόλεος A^o 4 πηλείδου Parisinus
2038 : πηλέος A^o 5 ὄψ Victori- : ὄησ (i.e. ΟΨΙΣ) A^o
ἐξηλαγμένον A^o 9 καὶ Σ add. Riccardianus 16 (confirm. Ar.)
II αἰὲ A^o 13 πλήθει apogr. 14 τῷ Σ add. anon.
ap. Tyrwhittum : καὶ Σ Reiz 15 κόμμι Riccardianus 16 :
κόμμι A^o 16 ταῦτα (καὶ Α) καὶ Ν (καὶ Ρ) καὶ Σ coni. Morelius

flame' (D+A). There is also another form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing the alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it one of the attributes naturally associated with its new name. An instance of this would be to call the shield not the 'cup of *Ares*,' as in the former case, but a 'cup *that holds no wine*.' * * * A coined word is a name which, being quite unknown among a people, is given by the poet himself; e.g. (for there are some words that seem to be of this origin) *ἐρνύγες* for horns, and *ἀρητήρ* for priest. A word is said to be lengthened out, when it has a short vowel made long, or an extra syllable inserted; e.g. *πόλῆος* for *πόλεως*, *Πηληιάδew* for *Πηλείδου*. It is said to be curtailed, when it has lost a part; e.g. *κρῖ*, *δῶ*, and *ὄψ* in *μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ*. It is an altered word, when part is left as it was and part is of the poet's making; e.g. *δεξιτερόν* for *δεξιόν*, in *δεξιτερόν κατὰ μαζόν*.

The Nouns themselves (to whatever class they may belong) are either masculines, feminines, or intermediates (neuter). All ending in N, P, Σ, or in the two compounds of this last, Ψ and Ξ, are masculines. All ending in the invariably long vowels, H and Ω, and in A among the vowels that may be long, are feminines. So that there is an equal number of masculine and feminine terminations, as Ψ and Ξ are the same as Σ, and need not be counted. There is no Noun, however, ending in a mute or in either of the two short vowels, E and O. Only three (*μέλι*, *κόμμι*, *πέπερι*) end in I, and five in Υ. The intermediates, or neuters, end in the variable vowels or in N, P, Σ.

Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφὴ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σα-22
 φεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ
 20 ταπεινὴ· παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφῶντος ποιήσις καὶ ἡ
 Σθενέλου. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἢ τοῖς
 ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη· ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλώτταν καὶ μετα-
 φορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἀλλ' ἂν
 τις [ἂν] ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἡ αἰνίγμα ἔσται ἢ βαρβα-
 25 ρισμός· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἰνίγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ
 γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστὶ,
 τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι—κατὰ μὲν οὖν
 τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἶόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ
 δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται—οἷον “ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκόν
 30 ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα,” καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν
 βαρβαρισμός. δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως τούτοις· τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει μηδὲ ταπεινόν, οἷον ἡ γλώττα
 καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ εἰρημένα
 εἶδη, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος
 1458^b συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ σαφὲς τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν
 αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομά-
 των· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ
 τὸ εἰωθὸς γιγνόμενον τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοι-
 5 νωνεῖν τοῦ εἰωθότος τὸ σαφὲς ἔσται. ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγου-
 σιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ δια-
 κωμφοδοῦντες τὸν ποιητὴν, οἷον Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς
 ῥᾶδιον ποιεῖν, εἴ τις δώσει ἐκτείνειν ἐφ' ὅπόσον βούλεται

24 ἂν om. apogr. ποιῆσαι A^o 26 Ὑλοττῶν A^o 27
 λέγοντα] λέγον τὰ A^o 28 τῶν (ἄλλων) ὀνομάτων (ut videtur) Ar.
 οὐχοῖονται A^o 29 μεταφορῶν scripsi: μεταφορὰν A^o ἴδον A^o
 πυρὶ χαλκόν Victorius: πυρὶχαλκον A^o 31 κεκρᾶσθαι Riccar-
 dianus 46 (confirm. Ar.): κεκρίσθαι A^o 1458^b 1 συμβάλλεται
 A^o: συμβάλλονται apogr. 6 ἐπιτιμῶντες A^o

The perfection of Diction is for it to be at once clear **22** and not mean. The clearest indeed is that made up of the ordinary words for things, but it is mean, as is shown by the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand the Diction becomes distinguished and non-prosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms, i. e. strange words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that deviates from the ordinary modes of speech.—But a whole statement in such terms will be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle, if made up of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words. The very nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their metaphorical substitutes); e. g. 'I saw a man glue brass on another with fire,' and the like. The corresponding use of strange words results in a barbarism.—A certain admixture, accordingly, of unfamiliar terms is necessary. These, the strange word, the metaphor, the ornamental equivalent, etc., will save the language from seeming mean and prosaic, while the ordinary words in it will secure the requisite clearness. What helps most, however, to render the Diction at once clear and non-prosaic is the use of the lengthened, curtailed, and altered forms of words. Their deviation from the ordinary words will, by making the language unlike that in general use, give it a non-prosaic appearance; and their having much in common with the words in general use will give it the quality of clearness. It is not right, then, to condemn these modes of speech, and ridicule the poet for using them, as some have done; e. g. the elder Euclid, who said it was easy to make poetry if one were to be allowed to lengthen the words in the statement itself as much as one likes—a procedure he

†λαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει† “Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶ-
 10 νάδε βαδίζοντα,” καὶ “οὐκ ἂν γ’ ἐράμενος †τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλ-
 λέβορον†.” τὸ μὲν οὖν φαίνεσθαί πως χρώμενον τούτῳ τῷ
 τρόπῳ γελοῖον· τὸ δὲ μέτριον κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν με-
 ρῶν· καὶ γὰρ μεταφοραῖς καὶ γλώτταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 εἶδεσι χρώμενος ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τὸ
 15 αὐτὸ ἂν ἀπεργάσαιτο. τὸ δὲ ἀρμοττόντως ὅσον διαφέρει ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρεῖσθω ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέ-
 τρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν μετατιθεῖς ἂν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα
 κατίδοι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγομεν· οἶον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσαντος λαμ-
 20 βεῖου Αἰσχύλου καὶ Εὐριπίδου, ἐν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μετατιθέν-
 τος, ἀντὶ κυρίου εἰωθότος γλῶτταν, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν
 τὸ δ’ εὐτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ ἐποίησε
 φαγέδαια ἧ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,
 ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσθίει τὸ θουῶται μετέθηκεν. καὶ
 25 νῦν δέ μ’ ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικῆς,
 εἴ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθεῖς
 νῦν δέ μ’ ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδῆς·
 καὶ
 δίφρον [τε] ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν,
 30 δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεῖς μικράν τε τράπεζαν.

9 fortasse mutato ordine ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, λαμβοποιήσας Ἐπιχάρην
 Bursian: ἤτει χάριν A^o ἶδον A^o μαραθῶνα δὲ A^o 10
 ἂν γεράμενος A^o 12 μέτριον Spengel: μέτρον A^o 14 ἐπὶ
 τὰ] ἔπειτα A^o fort. γελοῖοτερα 15 ἀρμοττόντως Tucker:
 ἀρμόττοντος A^o: ἀρμόττον apogr. 18 εἰδέων A^o 19 ἰάμβιον
 A^o 20 μεταθέντος apogr. 23 φαγέδαινα apogr.: φαγάδαινα
 A^o: φαγέδαιναν Hermann 25 δὲ μεῶν A^o ἀεικῆς Riccardianus
 46, Morelius (confirmare videtur Ar.): ἀειδῆσ A^o 27 δὲ μεῶν A^o
 μικρός τε apogr.: μικρὸς δὲ A^o 29 τε prius om. apogr.: τε*
 (nisi forte ται fuerat) A^o: τ’ αἰκέλιον reposuit Vahlen

caricatured by reading Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶνάδε βαδίζοντα, and οὐκ ἂν γ' ἐράμενος τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλλέβορον as verses. A too apparent use of these licences has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in that; the rule of moderation applies to all the constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even with metaphors, strange words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them improperly and with a view to provoking laughter. The proper use of them is a very different thing. To realize the difference one should take an epic verse and see how it reads when the normal words are introduced. The same should be done too with the strange word, the metaphor, and the rest; for one has only to put the ordinary words in their place to see the truth of what we are saying. The same iambic, for instance, is found in Aeschylus and Euripides, and as it stands in the former it is a poor line; whereas Euripides, by the change of a single word, the substitution of a strange for what is by usage the ordinary word, has made it seem a fine one. Aeschylus having said in his *Philoctetes*:

φαγέδαινα ἧ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,

Euripides has merely altered the ἐσθίει here into θοινᾶται.

Or suppose

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὔτιδανός καὶ ἀεικής

to be altered by the substitution of the ordinary words into

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικός καὶ ἀειδής.

Or the line

δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν

into

δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεῖς μικράν τε τράπεζαν.

καὶ τὸ “*ἡόνες βοώσω, ἡόνες κράζουσιν.*” ἔτι δὲ Ἀριφράδης τοὺς τραγωδοὺς ἐκωμᾶ, ὅτι ἂ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἶποι ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τούτοις χρωῖται, οἷον τὸ δωμαίων ἄπο ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ δωμαίων, καὶ τὸ σέθεν καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ δέ νιν καὶ τὸ
 1459^a Ἀχιλλέως πέρι ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις ποιεῖ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ἐν τῇ λέξει ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκείνος δὲ τοῦτο ἡγνύει. ἔστιν δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόν-
 5 τως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυίας τε σημείον ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν. τῶν δ’ ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλᾶ μάλιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἱ δὲ γλωτ-
 10 ται τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς, αἱ δὲ μεταφοραὶ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς ἅπαντα χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμῆσθαι ταῦτα ἀρμόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοις κἂν ἐν [ῥοῖσι] λόγοις τις χρῆσαιτο· ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος.
 15 περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως ἔστω ἡμῖν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδαῖς συνιστάναι δραματικούς καὶ περὶ μίαν πράξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχου-
 20 σαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἕν’ ὥσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὄλον ποιῆ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δῆλον, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς

31 τὸ ἴωνος βοῶσις ἢ ἴωνος A^c ἀριφράδης A^c 32³ εἴπη
 A^c 1459^a 4 τὸ] τῶι A^c 6 π, ἄλλου A^c 10 et 12
 ἰαμβίσις A^c 13 κἂν Riccardianus 46, Harles: καὶ A^c
 ὅσοις om. apogr. τις apogr.: τί A^c 20 fort.
 ὄλον <ὄν> 21 ποιεῖ A^c ἱστορίας τὰς συνθέσεις [sic]
 Riccardianus 46: ἱστορίας τὰς συνθέσεις Dacier

Or *ἡόνες βοόωσιν* into *ἡόνες κράζουσιν*. Add to this that Aripgrades used to ridicule the tragedians for introducing expressions unknown in the language of common life, *δωμαίων ἄπο* (for *ἀπὸ δωμαίων*), *σέθεν, ἐγὼ δέ νιν, Ἀχιλλέως πέρι* (for *περὶ Ἀχιλλέως*), and the like. The mere fact of their not being in ordinary speech gives the Diction a non-prosaic character; but Aripgrades was unaware of that. It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.

Of the kinds of words we have enumerated it may be observed that compounds are most in place in the dithyramb, strange words in heroic, and metaphors in iambic poetry. Heroic poetry, indeed, may avail itself of them all. But in iambic verse, which models itself as far as possible on the spoken language, only those kinds of words are in place which are allowable also in an oration, i. e. the ordinary word, the metaphor, and the ornamental equivalent.

Let this, then, suffice as an account of Tragedy, the art imitating by means of action on the stage.

As for the poetry which merely narrates, or imitates by 23 means of versified language (without action), it is evident that it has several points in common with Tragedy.

I. The construction of its stories should clearly be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living

συνήθεις θείναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιείσθαι
 δήλωσι· ἀλλ' ἐνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα
 ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. ὥσπερ
 25 γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένετο
 ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη οὐδὲν
 πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς
 χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἐν
 οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο
 30 δρῶσι. διὸ ὥσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν
 φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μὴδὲ τὸν πόλεμον
 καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὄλον·
 λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι,
 ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ.
 35 νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβῶν ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν
 πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις [dis]
 διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἕνα ποιούσι
 1459^b καὶ περὶ ἕνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ
 Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν
 Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας μία τραγωδία ποιεῖται ἑκατέρας
 ἢ δύο μόναι, ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς
 5 Ἰλιάδος πλεονόκτω, οἷον ὄπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκλήτης,
 Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος, πτωχεία, Λάκαιαι, Ἰλίου πέρις
 καὶ ἀπόπλους, καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες. ἔτι δὲ [ἔτι δὲ] 24
 τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἢ
 γὰρ ἀπλήν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν· καὶ τὰ
 10 μέρη ἕξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταῦτά· καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν

22 θείναι scripsi: εἶναι A^o 25 σαλαμίνη A^o 26 ναύμαχος
 A^o 28 μετὰ θάτερον Parisinus 2038: μετὰ θατέρου A^o 31 τῷ
 Riccardianus 16: τὸ A^o 33 μέγα pr. A^o 36 dis deletum in A^o;
 οἷς Riccardianus 16 1459^b 2 Κύπρια Reiz: κυπρικὰ A^o 4 μόνασ
 pr. A^o 7 πρωϊάδεσ pr. A^o ἔτι δὲ bis A^o 8 δεῖ] δὴ A^o

creature. Nor should one suppose that there is anything like them in our usual histories. A history has to deal not with one action, but with one period and all that happened in that to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have been. Just as two events may take place at the same time, e. g. the sea-fight off Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes come after the other with no one end as their common issue. Nevertheless most of our epic poets, one may say, ignore the distinction.

Herein, then, to repeat what we have said before, we have a further proof of Homer's marvellous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, though it was a whole with a definite beginning and end—through a feeling apparently that it was too long a story to be taken in in one view, or if not that, too complicated from the variety of incident in it. As it is, he has singled out one section of the whole; many of the other incidents, however, he brings in as episodes, using the Catalogue of the Ships, for instance, and other episodes to relieve the uniformity of his narrative. As for the other epic poets, they treat of one man, or one period; or else of an action which, although one, has a multiplicity of parts in it. This last is what the authors of the *Cypria* and *Little Iliad* have done. And the result is that, whereas the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* supplies materials for only one, or at most two tragedies, the *Cypria* does that for several, and the *Little Iliad* for more than eight: for an *Adjudgment of Arms*, a *Philoctetes*, a *Neoptolemus*, a *Eurypylus*, a *Ulysses as Beggar*, a *Laconian Women*, a *Fall of Ilium*, and a *Departure of the Fleet*; as also a *Sinon*, and a *Women of Troy*.

II. Besides this, Epic poetry must divide into the same 24 species as Tragedy; it must be either simple or complex, a story of character or one of suffering. Its parts, too,

δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων· ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειω καλῶς. οἷς ἅπασιν Ὀμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκά-
 15 τερον συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἢ δὲ Ὀδύσεια πεπλεγμένου (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἠθική·
 πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις λέξει καὶ διανοία πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν.

Διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἢ ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκουσ ὄρος ἱκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συννοῦσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ
 20 τέλος. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττους αἱ συστάσεις εἶεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλήθος τραγωδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων παρήκοιεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ τι ἢ ἐποποιία ἴδιον διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα
 25 πολλὰ μέρη μιμῆσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινώμενα, ὅφ' ὧν οἰκείων ὄντων αὐξεται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὸν
 30 ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ταχὺ πληροῦν ἐκπίπτει ποιεῖ τὰς τραγωδίας. τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἥρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἤρμοκεν. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγητικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο· τὸ γὰρ ἥρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ
 35 ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν—διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ με-

13 ἱκανῶς apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἱκανὸς A^o πονημάτων A^o 15
 ἀναγνωρίσεις Christ ἠθικόν corr. rec. A^o 16 γὰρ A^o: δὲ
 apogr. πάντας apogr. 21 πρὸς δὲ apogr. (confirm. Ar.):
 προσθε A^o 29 fort. [τὸ] ἀγαθὸν 32 ἤρμοκεν A^o 33
 διηγηματικὴν apogr.

with the exception of Song and Spectacle, must be the same, as it requires Peripeties, Discoveries, and scenes of suffering just like Tragedy. Lastly, the Thought and Diction in it must be good in their way. All these elements appear in Homer first; and he has made due use of them. His two poems are each examples of construction, the *Iliad* simple and a story of suffering, the *Odyssey* complex (there is Discovery throughout it) and a story of character. And they are more than this, since in Diction and Thought too they surpass all other poems.

There is, however, a difference in the Epic as compared with Tragedy, (1) in its length, and (2) in its metre. (1) As to its length, the limit already suggested will suffice: it must be possible for the beginning and end of the work to be taken in in one view—a condition which will be fulfilled if the poem be shorter than the old epics, and about as long as the series of tragedies offered for one hearing. For the extension of its length epic poetry has a special advantage, of which it makes large use. In a play one cannot represent an action with a number of parts going on simultaneously; one is limited to the part on the stage and connected with the actors. Whereas in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simultaneous incidents; and these, if germane to the subject, increase the body of the poem. This then is a gain to the Epic, tending to give it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds. Uniformity of incident by the satiety it soon creates is apt to ruin tragedies on the stage. (2) As for its metre, the heroic has been assigned it from experience; were any one to attempt a narrative poem in some one, or in several, of the other metres, the incongruity of the thing would be apparent. The heroic in fact is the gravest and weightiest

ταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ * * ἡ διηγημα-
 τικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον
 1460^a κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτο-
 πώτερον εἰ μιγνύοι τις αὐτά, ὡσπερ Χαιρήμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς
 μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἢ τῷ ἠρώφῳ, ἀλλ' ὡσ-
 περ εἴπομεν αὐτῇ ἢ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ
 5 αἰρεῖσθαι. "Ὀμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ
 δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν.
 αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι
 κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου
 ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα
 10 φρομιασάμενος εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι
 ἦθος, καὶ οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθη. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς
 τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν
 τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυ-
 μαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα· ἐπεὶ τὰ περι-
 15 τὴν "Ἐκτορος δῖωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανεῖν, οἱ
 μὲν ἔστῳτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
 ἔπεσιν λαυθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἠδύ· σημεῖον δέ, πάντες
 γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν
 δὲ μάλιστα "Ὀμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.
 20 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν

36 excidisse videtur ταύταις vel ταύτῃ (cf. Twining ad loc.) 37
 μίμησις apogr. : κίνησις A^c ἰαμβίον A^c 1460^a 1 κινητικὰ
 καὶ corr. Riccardianus 46, Vahlen : κινητικαὶ A^c 2 μιγνύοι
 Parisinus 2038 : μιγνύει apographa pleraque : μῆγνύη (fuit μὴ γνύη ;
 -η fin. in litura) A^c : μὴ γνοίη Ar. 3 τῷ] τὸ A^c 4 αὐτῇ]
 αὐτῇ A^c 5 αἰρεῖσθαι Bonitz (confirm. Ar.) : διαιρεῖσθαι A^c
 11. οὐδέν' ἀήθη Victorius : οὐδένα ἀήθη Riccardianus 46 : οὐδένα
 ἦθη A^c 13 ἄλογον Victorius : ἀνάλογον A^c (et Ar.) δι' ὃ
 Parisinus 2038 : διὸ A^c 14 ἐπεὶ apogr. : ἔπειτα A^c (et Ar.)
 20 fort. ἄνθρωποι

of metres—which is what makes it more tolerant than the rest of strange words and metaphors, that also being a point in which the narrative form of poetry goes beyond all others. The iambic and trochaic, on the other hand, are metres of movement, the one representing that of life and action, the other that of the dance. Still more unnatural would it appear, if one were to write an epic in a medley of metres, as Chaeremon did. Hence it is that no one has ever written a long story in any but heroic verse; nature herself, as we have said, teaches us to select the metre appropriate to such a story.

Homer, admirable as he is in every other respect, is especially so in this, that he alone among epic poets is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the poem. The poet should say very little *in propria persona*, as he is no imitator when doing that. Whereas the other poets are perpetually coming forward in person, and say but little, and that only here and there, as imitators, Homer after a brief preface brings in forthwith a man, a woman, or some other Character—no one of them characterless, but each with distinctive characteristics.

The marvellous is certainly required in Tragedy. The Epic, however, affords more opening for the improbable, the chief factor in the marvellous, because in it the agents are not visibly before one. The scene of the pursuit of Hector would be ridiculous on the stage—the Greeks halting instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking his head to stop them; but in the poem the absurdity is overlooked. The marvellous, however, is a cause of pleasure, as is shown by the fact that we all tell a story with additions, in the belief that we are doing our hearers a pleasure.

Homer more than any other has taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right way. I mean the use of

τουδι ὄντος τοδι ἦ ἢ γωμομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστιν,
καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι ψεῦδος. διὸ
δεῖ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι
ἢ γενέσθαι ἦ, προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθές
25 ὃν παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν. πα-
ράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων. προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ
ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα· τοὺς τε λόγους
μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μη-
δὲν ἔχειω ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος, ὥσπερ
30 Οἰδίπους τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι πῶς ὁ Λάιος ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν
τῷ δράματι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἡλέκτρῳ οἱ τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλου-
τες ἢ ἐν Μυσοῖς ὁ ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἦκων.
ὥστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνήρητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γελοῖον· ἔξ ἀρχῆς
γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους, ἂν δὲ θῆ καὶ φαίνηται
35 εὐλογωτέως ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄτοπον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσ-
σεΐᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκθεσιω ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτὰ δῆλον
1460^b ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητῆς ποιήσειε· νῦν δὲ τοῖς
ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητῆς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον. τῇ δὲ
λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσι καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς
μήτε διανοητικοῖς· ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἢ λίαν λαμπρὰ
5 λέξις τὰ τε ἦθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας.

Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ 25
ποίων [ἂν] εἰδῶν ἔστιν, ὧδ' ἂν θεωροῦσιν γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν.

21 τοῦ διόντος pr. A^c τοδι ἦ ἢ apogr.: τὸ δι' ἦν pr. A^c (corr.
τὸ δι ἦ, vel ἦ) εἰ] ἦ in textu A^c 23 δεῖ Riccardianus 46,
Bonitz: δῆ A^c ἄλλο codices Robortelli: ἄλλου A^c (ἀλλ' οὐ-
corr.) 24 ἦ Jortin: ἦ A^c 25 ὄν m. rec. in litura A^c
26 τούτου codex Robortelli νίπτρω A^c 27 ἀπίθανα A^c 30
fort. (ὁ) Οἰδίπους Λάιος Riccardianus 16: ἰόλαος A^c 33 οστε
pr. A^c ἀνήρητο A^c γελοῖον A^c 1460^b I ποιήσειε
Riccardianus 46, Heinsius: ποιήσει A^c 5 τὰ τε] τὰ δὲ A^c
7 ἂν ante εἰδῶν om. apogr.

paralogism. Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B, is or happens, men's notion is that, if the B is, the A also is—but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, B, that on the assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is to add on the B. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent. Here is an instance, from the *Bath-story* in the *Odyssey*.

A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. The story should never be made up of improbable incidents; there should be nothing of the sort in it. If, however, such incidents are unavoidable, they should be outside the piece, like the hero's ignorance in *Oedipus* of the circumstances of Laius' death; not within it, like the report of the Pythian games in *Electra*, or the man's having come to Mysia from Tegea without uttering a word on the way, in *The Mysians*. So that it is ridiculous to say that one's Plot would have been spoilt without them, since it is fundamentally wrong to make up such Plots. If the poet has taken such a Plot, however, and one sees that he might have put it in a more probable form, he is guilty of absurdity as well as a fault of art. Even in the *Odyssey* the improbabilities in the setting-ashore of Ulysses would be clearly intolerable in the hands of an inferior poet. As it is, the poet conceals them, his other excellences veiling their absurdity. Elaborate Diction, however, is required only in places where there is no action, and no Character or Thought to be revealed. Where there is Character or Thought, on the other hand, an over-ornate Diction tends to obscure them.

As regards Problems and their Solutions, one may see 25 the number and nature of the assumptions on which they

ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μιμητῆς ὁ ποιητῆς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἢ τις
 ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμείσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθ-
 10 μὸν ἔν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἶα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἶά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ,
 (ἢ) οἶα εἶναι δεῖ. ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἢ καὶ
 γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς· καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστι,
 δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτῇ
 15 τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία,
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 προεῖλετο μιμήσασθαι * * ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία· εἰ
 δὲ τῷ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ
 δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, ἢ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἁμαρτημα
 20 (οἶον τὸ καθ' ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην) ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται
 ὅποι' ἂν οὖν, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς
 προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. πρῶτον μὲν τὰ
 πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην· (εἰ) ἀδύνατα πεποιήται, ἡμαρτημα
 ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς, (τὸ γὰρ
 25 τέλος εἴρηται) εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ
 μέρος. παράδειγμα ἢ τοῦ Ἔκτορος δῖωξις. εἰ μέντοι τὸ
 τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον (ἢ μὴ) ἦττον ἐνεδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ
 τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, [ἡμαρτησθαι] οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ
 ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτησθαι. ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ
 30 ἁμαρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβη-

8 ἢ] εἰ pr. A^o 9 τὸν ἀριθμὸν apogr.: τῶν ἀριθμῶν A^o 11 ἢ add.
 apogr. 16 εἰ] ἢ pr. A^o 17 exciderunt fort. ἦμαρτε δὲ δι' εἰ
 Riccardianus 16, corr. Parisinus 2038: ἢ A^o 18 τῷ corr.
 Parisinus 2038: τὸ A^o 20 ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται induct Duentzer
 21 ὅποι' ἂν οὖν scripsi: ὅποιαν οὖν A^o: ὅποιαν οὖν vulg.: ὅποιαν οὖν
 Winstanley fort. ἐπιτιμήματα (τὰ) 22 τὰ] τὰ (εἰ superscr.
 m. rec.) A^o 23 εἰ add. Parisinus 2038, Vahlen 24 αὐτῆς
 apogr.: αὐτῆσ A^o 27 ἢ μὴ add. Ueberweg: ἢ add. corr. A^o,
 apogr. 28 ἡμαρτησθαι (μαρτησθαι pr. A^o) seclusi

proceed by viewing the matter in the following way. (1) The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, ²or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or ³as they ought to be. (2) All this he does in language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of words, since the use of these is conceded in poetry. (3) It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art. There is, however, within the limits of poetry itself a possibility of two kinds of error, the one directly, the other only accidentally connected with the art. If the poet meant to describe the thing correctly, and failed through lack of power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But if it was through his having meant to describe it in some incorrect way (e. g. to make the horse in movement have both right legs thrown forward) that the technical error (one in a matter of, say, medicine or some other special science), or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, his error in that case is not in the essentials of the poetic art. These, therefore, must be the premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms involved in the Problems.

I. As to the criticisms relating to the poet's art itself. Any impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of things are faults. But from another point of view they are justifiable, if they serve the end of poetry itself—if (to assume what we have said of that end) they make the effect of some portion of the work more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is an instance in point. If, however, the poetic end might have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness in such matters, the impossibility is not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can, entirely free from error. One may ask, too, whether the error is in a matter directly or only accidentally connected

κός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἦδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα
 οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν
 ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ, οἶον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς
 ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἶους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἶοι εἰσῖν, ταύτη
 35 λυτέον. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασί, οἶον τὰ περὶ θεῶν·
 ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον [οὔτε] λέγειν οὔτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔτυχεν
 1461^a ὡσπερ Ξενοφάνει· ἀλλ' οὖν φασι. τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον
 μὲν, ἀλλ' οὔτως εἶχεν, οἶον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὄπλων, “ἔγχεα
 δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος.” οὕτω γὰρ τότε ἐνομίζον,
 ὡσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς
 5 ἢ εἴρηται τι μὴ πέπρακται, οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ
 πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦ-
 λον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὃν ἢ
 ὅτε ἢ ὄτω ἢ οὐ ἔνεκεν, οἶον ἢ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γέ-
 νηται, (ἢ) μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν
 10 λέξι ὀρώνα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἶον γλώττη “οὐρήσας μὲν πρῶ-
 τος” ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνοους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλα-
 κας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, “ὅς ῥ' ἢ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός,”
 οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ
 εὐεῖδὲς οἱ Κρήτες (τὸ) εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι· καὶ τὸ “ζωρό-
 15 τερον δὲ κέραε” οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ
 θᾶπτον. τὰ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἶον “ἄλλοι μὲν

31 εἶδει pr. A^o 32 ἦ] η pr. A^o εἰ ἀμιμήτως] ἡ ἀμιμητως
 (corr. ἀμιμήτωσ) A^o 33 ἴσως] οἶους m. rec. in marg. A^o
 34 Εὐριπίδην Heinsius: εὐριπίδησ A^o 36 οὔτε alterum om.
 Parisinus 2038: οὕτω Riccardianus 16 1461^a 1 Ξενοφάνει
 vel ξενοφάνης apogr.: ξενοφάνη A^o οὖν Tyrwhitt: οὐ A^o
 φασί. τὰ δὲ Spengel: φασι τάδε. A^o 2 ἔνχεα A^o 3 τότε
 νομίζον pr. A^o 6 εἰ] ἦ A^o 8 οὐ ἔνεκεν] οὖν ἔκεν A^o ἦ] εἰ
 apogr. 9 ἦ add. corr. A^o, apogr. 12 ὅς ῥ' ἢ τοι Vahlen:
 ὡς ῥῆτοι (corr. rec. ῥ') A^o ἔην] εἰ ἦν A^o 14 τὸ addidi
 15 κεραι εἶου pr. A^o 16 τὰ Spengel: τὸ A^o

with the poetic art; since it is a lesser error in an artist not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than to produce an unrecognizable picture of one.

II. If the poet's description be criticized as not true to fact, one may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as described—an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they were. If the description, however, be neither true nor of the thing as it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it is in accordance with opinion. The tales about Gods, for instance, may be as wrong as Xenophanes thinks, neither true nor the better thing to say; but they are certainly in accordance with opinion. Of other statements in poetry one may perhaps say, not that they are better than the truth, but that the fact was so at the time; e. g. the description of the arms: 'their spears stood upright, butt-end upon the ground'; for that was the usual way of fixing them then, as it is still with the Illyrians. As for the question whether something said or done in a poem is morally right or not, in dealing with that one should consider not only the intrinsic quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who says or does it, the person to whom he says or does it, the time, the means, and the motive of the agent—whether he does it to attain a greater good, or to avoid a greater evil.

III. Other criticisms one must meet by considering the language of the poet: (1) by the assumption of a strange word in a passage like *οὐρήας μὲν πρῶτον*, where by *οὐρήας* Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And in saying of Dolon, *ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός*, his meaning may perhaps be, not that Dolon's body was deformed, but that his face was ugly, as *εὐειδής* is the Cretan word for handsome-faced. So, too, *ζωρότερον δὲ κέραει* may mean not 'mix the wine stronger,' as though for toppers, but 'mix it quicker.' (2) Other expressions in Homer may be explained as metaphorical; e. g. in *ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὖδον*

ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὐδον * * παννύχιοι.” ἄμα δέ φησιν
 “ ἦ τοι ὄτ’ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων
 †τε ὀμαδόν†.” τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ (τοῦ) πολλοὶ κατὰ μετα-
 20 φορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολὺ τι. καὶ τὸ “ οἷη δ’ ἄμμο-
 ρος” κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. κατὰ
 δὲ προσφῶδιαν, ὥσπερ Ἴππίας ἔλυσεν ὁ Θάσιος, τὸ “ δίδομεν
 δέ οἱ” καὶ “ τὸ μὲν οὖν καταπύθεται ὄμβρω.” τὰ δὲ διαιρέ-
 σει, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς “ αἴψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μά-
 25 θον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέρητο.” τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολία,
 “ παρῶχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ.” τὸ γὰρ πλείω ἀμφίβολόν ἐστιν.
 τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν
 φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποιήται “ κημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέ-
 ροιο” καὶ χαλκῆας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἴ-
 30 ρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἶνοχοεῦειν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἴη
 δ’ ἂν τοῦτο γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά
 τι ὑπεναντιώμα τι δοκῆ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν
 σημαῖνοι τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον τῷ “ τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο χάλ-
 κευον ἔγχος” τὸ ταύτη κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται—ὥδι ἦ
 35 (ὥδι) ὡς μάλιστ’ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἦ
 1461^b ὡς Γλαῦκων λέγει, ὅτι ἔνια ἀλόγως προυπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ
 αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὁ

17 post εὐδον intercidisse suspicor πάντες πανύχιοι pr. A^c

19 τε ὀμαδόν] θ’ ὀμαδον Sylburgius; haud scio an integer versus
 (Il. 10. 13), αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπήν ὀμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων, sit resti-
 tuendus τοῦ add. apogr. 20 οἷη pr. A^c (οἷη m. rec.) 24

θνήτ’ Morelius: θνητά A^c 25 ἀθάνατ’ (εἶναι) Riccardianus 46

ζωρά Victorius: ζωά A^c κέρητο (i superscr. m. rec.) A^c

ἀμφιβόλια pr. A^c 27 τὸν κεκραμένον apogr.: τῶν κεκραμένων

A^c 30 οἶνοχοεῦει A^c πινόντων pr. A^c 31 ὄνοματι

ὑπεναντιώματι (fuit -ίω-) δοκεῖ A^c 33 σημαῖνοι Vahlen (ed. 1):

σημαίνοιε A^c: σημήνειεν apogr. οἶον τῷ scripsi: οἶον τὸ A^c

35 ὥδι add. Riccardianus 46, Vahlen 1461^b 1 ὅτι] τί A^c

(marg. m. rec. ὅτι) 2 εἰρηκότος Riccardianus 46: εἰρηκότεος A^c

(ἅπαντες) παννύχιοι, as compared with what he tells us at the same time, ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδῖον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων †τε ὀμαδόν†, the word ἅπαντες, 'all,' is metaphorically put for 'many,' since 'all' is a species of 'many.' So also his οἷη δ' ἄμμορος is metaphorical, the best known standing 'alone.' (3) A change, as Hippias suggested, in the mode of reading a word will solve the difficulty in δίδομεν δέ οἱ, and τὸ μὲν οὖν καταπίθεται ὄμβρω. (4) Other difficulties may be solved by another punctuation; e. g. in Empedocles, αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο. Or (5) by the assumption of an equivocal term, as in παρῶ-χηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ, where πλέω is equivocal. Or (6) by an appeal to the custom of language. Wine-and-water we call 'wine'; and it is on the same principle that Homer speaks of ἡ κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο, a 'greave of new-wrought tin.' A worker in iron we call a 'brazier'; and it is on the same principle that Ganymede is described as the 'wine-server' of Zeus, though the Gods do not drink wine. This latter, however, may be an instance of metaphor. But whenever also a word seems to imply some contradiction, it is necessary to reflect how many ways there may be of understanding it in the passage in question; e. g. in Homer's τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος one should consider the possible senses of 'was stopped there'—whether by taking it in this sense or in that one will best avoid the fault of which Glaucon speaks: 'They start with some improbable presumption; and having so decreed it themselves, proceed

τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμῶσω, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ἢ τῇ αὐτῶν οἴησει. τοῦ-
 το δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περι' Ἰκάριον. οἴονται γὰρ αὐτὸν Λάκωνα
 5 εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐντυχεῖν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς
 Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα. τὸ δ' ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ οἱ Κεφαλλή-
 νες φασιν· παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν Ὀδυσσεά
 καὶ εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰκάριον· δι' ἀμάρτημα δὲ τὸ
 πρόβλημα εἰκὸς ἐστίν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν
 10 ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν.
 πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἰρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ
 ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατὸν * * τοιούτους εἶναι οἴους Ζεῦξίς
ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέ-
 χεω. πρὸς ἅ φασιν τᾶλογα· οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλο-
 15 γόν ἐστίν· εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. τὰ δ' ὑπε-
 ναντίως εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
 ἔλεγχοι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥστε
 καὶ αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς ἅ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται.
 ὀρθῇ δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία, ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγ-
 20 κης οὔσης μῆθ' ἐν χρήσῃ τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ
 Αἰγεί, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστη (τῇ) τοῦ Μενελάου.
 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς
 ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἄλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὡς

3 ἐπειτιμῶσιν pr. A^c αὐτῶν Parisinus 2038: αὐτῶν A^c 4
 πέπονθε* A^c περ' ἰκάριον A^c 5 τιλέμαχον A^c 6 Κεφαλλήνης
 Tyrwhitt: κεφαλήνης A^c 7 αὐτῶν pr. Vaticanus 1400: αὐτῶν A^c
 8 δι' ἀμάρτημα Madius (*errore* Valla): διαμάρτημα A^c 9 (εἶναι)
 εἰκὸς Hermann II πειθανόν A^c 12 ἀπίθανον A^c καὶ
 εἰ ἀδύνατον intercidisse con. Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) οἴους
 Parisinus 2038: οἴον A^c 15 ὑπεναντίως Twining: ὑπεναντία ὡς
 A^c 18 φρόνιμος apogr.: φρόνημον (corr. φρόνιμον) A^c 19
 ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία Vahlen: ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία A^c 21 Αἰγεί ἢ
 τῇ margo Riccardiani 16: αἰγείητη A^c τῇ addendum con.
 Vahlen

to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his statement conflicts with their own notion of things.' This is how Homer's silence about Icarius has been treated. Starting with the notion of his having been a Lacedaemonian, the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. Whereas the fact may have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses was of a Cephallenian family, and that her father's name was Icadius, not Icarius. So that it is probably a mistake of the critics that has given rise to the Problem.

Speaking generally, one has to justify (1) the Impossible by reference to the requirements of poetry, or to the better, or to opinion. For the purposes of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility; and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist ought to improve on his model. (2) The Improbable one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not improbable; for there is a probability of things happening also against probability. (3) The contradictions found in the poet's language one should first test as one does an opponent's confutation in a dialectical argument, so as to see whether he means the same thing, in the same relation, and in the same sense, before admitting that he has contradicted either something he has said himself or what a man of sound sense assumes as true. But there is no possible apology for improbability of Plot or depravity of character, when they are not necessary and no use is made of them, like the improbability in the appearance of Aegeus in *Medea* and the baseness of Menelaus in *Orestes*.

The objections, then, of critics start with faults of five

παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν
25 εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτάει, εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα.

Πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἢ ἐποποιικὴ μίμησις ἢ ἡ τραγικὴ, 26
διαφορήσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἦττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύ-
τη δ' ἢ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστὶν αἰεί, λίαν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ
(πρὸς) ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτικὴ· ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων
30 ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῆ, πολλὴν κίνησιω κινουῦνται, οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι
αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι ἂν δίσκον δέη μιμείσθαι, καὶ ἔλκοντες
τὸν κορυφαῖον ἂν Σκύλλαν αὐλώσω. ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγωδία
τοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὡς καὶ οἱ πρότερον τοὺς ὑστέρους αὐτῶν ᾤοντο
ὑποκριτάς· ὡς λίαν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα πίθηκον ὁ Μυνησκος
35 τὸν Καλλιππίδην ἐκάλει, τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πω-
1462^a δάρου ἦν· ὡς δ' οὔτοι [δ'] ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἢ ὅλη τέχνη
πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικέως
φασὶν εἶναι (οἶ) οὐδὲν δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγι-
κὴν πρὸς φαύλους· εἰ οὖν φορτικὴ, χείρων δῆλον ὅτι ἂν εἴη.
5 πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτι-
κῆς, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημείοις καὶ ῥαψφδοῦντα,
ᾧπερ [ἐστὶ] Σωσίστρατος, καὶ διάδοντα, ᾧπερ ἐποίει Μνασί-
θεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἅπασα ἀποδοκιμαστέα,
εἴπερ μηδ' ὄρχησις, ἀλλ' ἡ φαύλων, ᾧπερ καὶ Καλλιππίδην
10 ἐπιτιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν ἄλλοις ὡς οὐκ ἐλευθέρας γυναῖκας μιμου-
μένων. ἔτι ἡ τραγωδία καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτῆς,
ᾧπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγνώσκου φαυερὰ ὅποια

25 σκεπταίαι A^o 26 βελτίων A^o 28 δ' ἡ apogr.: δὴ A^o
αἰεί, λίαν Vahlen: δειλίαν A^o 29 πρὸς addidi 30 κινουῦνται
apogr.: κινούντα A^o 1462^a I δ' alterum om. apogr. αὐτούς
Hermann: αὐτοῦσ A^o 3 οἱ add. Victorius σχημάτων τὴν
apogr.: σχημά | τα αὐτὴν (τα αὐτὴν m. rec. in loco macula deformato)
A^o 4 εἰ] ἡ A^o 5 μὲν (οὖν) Parisinus 2038 7 ἐστὶ
induxit Duentzer διάδοντα apogr.: διαδόντα A^o 8 ὁ πούντιος
A^o 10 ἐπιτιμᾶτο pr. A^o 11 αὐτῆσ A^o

kinds: the allegation is always that something is either (1) impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory, or (5) against technical correctness. The answers to these objections must be sought under one or other of the above-mentioned heads, which are twelve in number.

The question may be raised whether the epic or the tragic 26 is the higher form of imitation. It may be argued that, if the less vulgar is the higher, and the less vulgar is always that which addresses the better public, an art addressing any and every one is of a very vulgar order. It is a belief that their public cannot see the meaning, unless they add something themselves, that causes the perpetual movements of the performers—bad flute-players, for instance, rolling about, if quoit-throwing is to be represented, and pulling at the conductor, if Scylla is the subject of the piece. Tragedy, then, is said to be an art of this order—to be in fact just what the later actors were in the eyes of their predecessors; for Mynniscus used to call Callippides 'the ape,' because he thought he so overacted his parts; and a similar view was taken of Pindarus also. All Tragedy, however, is said to stand to the Epic as the newer to the older school of actors. The one, accordingly, is said to address a cultivated audience, which does not need the accompaniment of gesture; the other, an uncultivated one. If, therefore, Tragedy is a vulgar art, it must clearly be lower than the Epic.

The answer to this is twofold. In the first place, one may urge (1) that the censure does not touch the art of the dramatic poet, but only that of his interpreter; for it is quite possible to overdo the gesturing even in an epic recital, as did Sosistratus, and in a singing contest, as did Mnasiheus of Opus. (2) That one should not condemn all movement, unless one means to condemn even the dance, but only that of ignoble people—which is the point of the criticism passed on Callippides and in the present day on others, that their women are not like gentlewomen. (3) That Tragedy may produce its effect even without movement or action in just the same way as Epic poetry; for from

τίς ἐστιν· εἰ οὖν ἐστι τὰ γ' ἄλλα κρείττων, τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀναγ-
 καίου ἀυτῇ ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐπο-
 15 ποία (καὶ γὰρ τῷ μέτρῳ ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι), καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν
 μέρος τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς ὄψεις, δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίσταν-
 ται ἐναργέστατα· εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώ-
 σει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἔτι τὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι μῆκει τὸ τέλος
 1462^b τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἀθροώτερον ἥδιον ἢ πολλῶ κεκρα-
 μένον τῷ χρόνῳ, λέγω δ' οἶον εἴ τις τὸν Οἰδίπουν θείη
 τὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσι ὅσοις ἡ Ἰλιάς)· ἔτι ἦττον μία ἢ
 μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν (σημεῖον δέ, ἐκ γὰρ ὁποιασοῦν
 5 μιμήσεως πλείους τραγωδίαί γίνονται), ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἔνα
 μῦθον ποιῶσιν, ἢ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μείουρον φαίνεσθαι, ἢ
 ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μῆκει ὑδαρῆ· λέγω δὲ οἶον
 ἐὰν ἐκ πλείονων πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς
 ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ
 10 ἔχει μέγεθος (καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα συνέστηκεν ὡς ἐν-
 δέχεται ἄριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μιᾶς πράξεως μίμησις)
 —εἰ οὖν τούτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης
 ἔργῳ (δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ
 τὴν εἰρημένην), φανερόν ὅτι κρείττων ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον τοῦ
 15 τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἐποποιίας.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ ἐποποιίας, καὶ αὐτῶν
 καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τί διαφέρει,
 καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἢ μὴ τίνες αἰτίαι, καὶ περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ
 λύσεων, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα. * * *

14 αὐτῇ pr. A^c 17 ἀναγνώσει Madius (e codd. quibusdam):
 ἀναγνωρίσει A^c 18 ἔτι τὸ conl. Jortin, Winstanley : ἔτι τῷ A^c
 ἐλάττωνι A^c 1462^b 1 ἥδιον ἢ Madius (confirm. Ar.) : ἡδονῆ A^c
 2 τὸν δίπουν pr. A^c θείη bis A^c 3 τὸν] τὸ pr. A^c ἡ Ἰλιάς
 Riccardianus 16 : ἡ Ἰλιάς (fuit ἰδίασ) A^c μία ἢ Spengel : ἡ μία A^c
 6 μείουρον Parisinus 2038 : μούουρον A^c 7 τοῦ μέτρου] συμμέτρω
 Bernays 9 post Ὀδύσσεια add. ἃ apogr. 10 καίτοι ταῦτα
 τὰ apogr. : καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα A^c 18 ἦ] εἰ A^c

the mere reading of a play its quality may be seen. So that, if it be superior in all other respects, this element of inferiority is no necessary part of it.

In the second place, one must remember (1) that Tragedy has everything that the Epic has (even the epic metre being admissible), together with a not inconsiderable addition in the shape of the Music (a very real factor in the pleasure of the drama) and the Spectacle. (2) That its reality of presentation is felt in the play as read, as well as in the play as acted. (3) That the tragic imitation requires less space for the attainment of its end; which is a great advantage, since the more concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one with a large admixture of time to dilute it—consider the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, for instance, and the effect of expanding it into the number of lines of the *Iliad*. (4) That there is less unity in the imitation of the epic poets, as is proved by the fact that any one work of theirs supplies matter for several tragedies; the result being that, if they take what is really a single story, it seems curt when briefly told, and thin and waterish when on the scale of length usual with their verse. In saying that there is less unity in an epic, I mean an epic made up of a plurality of actions, in the same way as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have many such parts, each one of them in itself of some magnitude; yet the structure of the two Homeric poems is as perfect as can be, and the action in them is as nearly as possible one action. If, then, Tragedy is superior in these respects, and also besides these, in its poetic effect (since the two forms of poetry should give us, not any or every pleasure, but the very special kind we have mentioned), it is clear that, as attaining the poetic effect better than the Epic, it will be the higher form of art.

So much for Tragedy and Epic poetry—for these two arts in general and their species; the number and nature of their constituent parts; the causes of success and failure in them; the Objections of the critics, and the Solutions in answer to them.

FRAGMENTA



I.

Aristoteles Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 37: τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμῖαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμῖαι. λέγω δὲ κύρια τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις. τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἶδη μεταφορᾶς καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλείστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Simplicius in Categ. 36. 13 Kalbfleisch: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς συνώνυμα εἶπεν εἶναι ὧν πλείω μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα λόγος δὲ ὁ αὐτός, οἷα δὴ ἐστι τὰ πολώνυμα, τό τε λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὸ φᾶρος.

II.

Aristoteles Poet. 6, 1449^b 21: περὶ κωμωδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.

III.

Aristoteles Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^b 33: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων,

ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Idem Rhet. 3. 18, 1419^b 2: περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιμω ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθεῖρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλῳτι τὸν δὲ γέλῳτα σπουδῇ ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὐ· ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἐτέρου.

Conf. Cicero de Oratore 2. 58: *Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi . . . turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter . . . nec insignis improbitas et scelere iuncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos maiore quadam vi quam ridiculi vulnerari volunt; miseros inludi nolunt, nisi se forte iactant; parcendum autem maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas qui diliguntur. haec igitur adhibenda est primum in iocando moderatio; itaque ea facillime luduntur quae neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt; quam ob rem materies omnis ridiculorum est in iis vitiis quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum neque eorum qui ob facinus ad supplicium rapiendi videntur; eaque belle agitata ridentur.*

IV.

Antiatticista in Anecdotis Bekkeri 101. 32: κυντότατον: Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ ποιητικῆς τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντότατον.

V.

Aristoteles Pol. 8. 7, 1341^b 32: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινας τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ

τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τιθέασιν, φάμεν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκα ὠφελείας τῆ μουσικῆ χρήσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτου δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν, πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντοίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερόν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρῶς τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατοκώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρῆσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταῦτό δὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Conf. Aristoteles Pol. 8. 6, 1341^a 21: ἔτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροῦς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν.


Proclus in Plat. Remp. I p. 42 Kroll: εἰπεῖν χρῆ . . . δεύτερον, τί δήποτε μάλιστα τὴν τραγωδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμικὴν οὐ παραδέχεται [scil. Plato] καὶ ταῦτα συντελοῦσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἃ μίτη παντάπασιν ἀποκλίνειν δυνατὸν μίτη ἐμπιπλάναι πάλιν ἀσφαλές, δεόμενα δὲ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀκρόασεσιν ἐκπληρουμένην ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν . . . p. 49: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον [scil. πρόβλημα]—τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ τὴν τραγωδίαν ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ κωμωδίαν ἀτόπως, εἴπερ διὰ τούτων δυνατὸν ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιπλάναι τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλήσαντας εὐεργὰ πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχειν

τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας—τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παρασχὸν αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμὴν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων οὕτωςί πως ἡμεῖς ἐπόμενοι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν διαλύσομεν . . . p. 50: δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμηχανᾶσθαι τινὰς τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἀπεράσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προσπαθείας συντείνειν, τούναντίον μὲν οὖν ὥστε χαλινοῦν καὶ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστέλλειν· ἐκείνας δὲ ἄρα τὰς ποιήσεις πρὸς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον ἐχούσας ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθῶν τούτων προκλήσεσι πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς ἀφοσιώσιν εἶναι χρησίμους. αἱ γὰρ ἀφοσιώσεις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ' ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις, σμικρὰν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἐχούσαις ὧν εἰσιν ἀφοσιώσεις.

Iamblichus de Myst. I. 11: αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχείαν [ita Bernays; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμετροῦ προαγόμεναι χαιρούσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεύθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμωδία καὶ τραγωδία ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη καὶ μετρίωτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.

VI.

Philoponus in Aristot. de Anima p. 269, 28 ed. Hayduck: διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ὅτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τουτέστι τὸ τέλος, διττόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ δὲ ᾧ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ποιητικῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ Περὶ γενέσεως εἶπεν.



COMMENTARY

τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς. The εἶδη meant are epic poetry, Tragedy, and Comedy, as is clear from 6, 1449^b 21, where the main subjects for consideration in the Poetics are enumerated. Lyric poetry, apart from an occasional reference to the Dithyramb and Nome, or the chorica in Tragedy, is ignored in the existing Poetics; and there is little or no reason to suppose it to have been discussed in the lost portion of the book. The probability is that, from the importance of its musical element, it belonged in Aristotle's classification of the arts to the theory of μελοποιία rather than to that of poetry proper. The work of the two lyric poets Phrynichus and Timotheus is put under the head of μελοποιία in Metaph. a 1, 993^b 15; and in the Problems, where Phrynichus is said to have been a μελοποιός rather than a tragedian (Probl. 18. 31, 920^a 11 Διὰ τί οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον ἦσαν μᾶλλον μελοποιοί; ἢ διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τῶν μέτρων;), the same view is implied of the lyric parts of Tragedy. It is to be remembered too that Aristophanes in Ran. 1250 makes Euripides begin his criticism of the chorica in Aeschylus by calling him a κακὸς μελοποιός.

For the antithesis in the text comp. 26, 1462^b 16 καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν.—Top. I. 15, 106^b 37 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων [scil. ὀνομάτων], ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ ἡ πτώσις ἢ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθῆσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτώσις, καὶ αὐτό.—Eth. E. 7. 15, 1248^b 22 δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις.

ἦν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει = ὅ τι δύναται ἕκαστον: comp. Pol. 5. 2, 1302^b 5 τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν. . . δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως. Each species of poetry has its special capacities, which enable it to do what the rest either cannot do at all or cannot do so well and effectively. Other Aristotelian instances of δύναμις with a sense approximating to our 'function' or 'effect' will be found in Bon. Ind. 206^b 29.

συνίστασθαι is a passive in 26, 1462^a 16, and probably also in 24, 1460^a 28. That it is a passive in the present passage is shown

1447^a 9 by the parallels, τοὺς συννεστῶτας εἶ μύθους in 7, 1450^b 32, and οὕτω συννεστάναι τὸν μῦθον in 14, 1453^b 4.

^a 10 καλῶς ἔξειν: 13, 1453^a 12 τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον.—24, 1459^b 12 τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. As anything good of its kind may be said to be καλόν, so anything that is in the condition in which it ought to be is said to καλῶς ἔχειν (comp. Bon. Ind. 360^b 38).

ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων, scil. ἡ ποίησις. Many of the translators, however, suppose the subject to be ἕκαστον εἶδος ('ex quot et cujusmodi partibus constant singulae species,' Goulston). The question is considered in chap. 6 in reference to Tragedy, and in 24, 1450^b 10 in reference to epic poetry.

^a 11 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ μεθόδου: Soph. el. 33, 183^b 12 δεδήλωται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς μεθόδου τῶν λόγων ἐστίν. The meaning of μέθοδος, a favourite word with Aristotle, has been discussed by Waitz, Org. 2 p. 297 (comp. Bon. Ind. 449^b 43).

^a 12 λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κτέ. The language here is very like that in Soph. el. 1, 164^a 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων . . . λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων (comp. De sensu 1, 436^a 6; De part. an. 1. 5, 646^a 3; 2. 10, 655^b 28; Eth. E. 1. 7, 1217^a 18; Rhet. 1. 13, 1373^b 1). In order to determine the definition of poetry, or rather of Tragedy as the highest form of the art, Aristotle starts with the assumption that Tragedy, together with certain other allied arts, comes under the general head of μίμησις, 'imitation,' and then proceeds by successive divisions of this genus to note one by one the various points which differentiate it from the rest. (1) Tragedy has language, metre, and music as its means of imitation; the music in it, however, comes in only from time to time, in the choral parts—which distinguishes it from the Nome and the Dithyramb. (2) It represents noble personages—which distinguishes it from Comedy. (3) It has a dramatic form—which distinguishes it from the Epic. These with other differentiae less clearly accounted for are combined in the definition of Tragedy at the opening of chap. 6. The logical order here exemplified is what Aristotle regards as the natural order of procedure: Phys. 1. 7, 189^b 31 ἐστὶ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρώτων εἰπόντας οὕτω τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια θεωρεῖν.

^a 13 ἐποποιία κτέ. This enumeration of imitative arts comprises the four great species of poetry distinguished by Plato in Rep. 394 c, together with two purely musical arts, ἀλητική and καθαριστικὴ

These last may be supposed to be added partly on account of the 1447^a 13 manifest analogy between them and poetry, both being imitative arts appealing to the ear, and partly also on account of the historical connexion of poetry with music (comp. Cicero De Orat. 3, 174 *musicī, qui erant quondam idem poetae*). Even Plato occasionally merges the one in the other. In the Republic μουσική includes poetry, and in Symp. 205 c poetry includes τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν.

ἢ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις: ^b 26 ἢ τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις.— Plato Gorg. 501 E ἢ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις.—502 B ἢ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις.

διθυραμβοποιητικὴ. Plato cites the Dithyramb as an instance of ^a 14 the non-imitative type of poetry: Rep. 394 c τῆς ποιήσεως . . . ἢ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγωδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἢ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὔροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστα πού ἐν διθυράμβοις. By Aristotle's time, however, the Dithyramb (as also the Nome) had lost its original form, and become 'imitative' or semi-dramatic, a sort of musical counterpart of the Drama, dealing with the same kinds of subject as Tragedy, and with solos by professional singers corresponding to the speeches of the tragic actors. This change in the character of the Dithyramb is noted in Probl. 19. 15, 918^b 18 οἱ διθύραμβοι, ἐπειδὴ μιμητικοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὐκέτι ἔχουσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρότερον δὲ εἶχον· αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ἐχόρευον αὐτοί· πολλοὺς οὖν ἀγωνιστικῶς ᾄδων χαλεπὸν ἦν, ὥστε ἐναρμόνια μέλη ἐνῆδον· μεταβάλλει γὰρ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς τῷ ἐνὶ ῥῆον ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ τῷ ἀγωνιστῇ ἢ τοῖς τὸ ἦθος φυλάττουσιν (comp. Bergk, Gr. Litt. 2 p. 529, and Wilamowitz, Euripides Herakles¹ 1 p. 79). In this mention of the Dithyramb, therefore, Aristotle does not cite it as a type of lyric poetry in general (as is often supposed), but as representing an imitative or dramatic form of lyric—a lyrical *μίμησις* or picture of life and manners. A certain approximation to this later form of Dithyramb is to be seen in Bacchylides (Comparetti, Mélanges Weil p. 30).

τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη: De Caelo 3. 1, 298^b 2 τὴν πλείστην ^a 15 τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 279). The αὐλός was the accompaniment of the Dithyramb and the κιθάρα of the Nome. That, however, is not the reason for this reference to them, as it is clear from ^a 23 that Aristotle is thinking rather of music without words, i.e. of that which was termed in antiquity ψιλλὴ αὐλῆσις and ψιλλὴ κιθάρισις. Plato in the Laws (669 E) sets his face against this purely instrumental music, which had evidently attained

1447^a 15 to a high degree of perfection in his time, on the ground that it ends in a mere display of technical execution (*θαυματουργία*) and a 'brutish noise' (*φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον*). Aristotle's language in Pol. 8. 6, 1341^a 11 τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, seems to imply that there was in his view some truth in Plato's criticism. In the present passage accordingly, instead of saying ἡ αὐλητική, or ἡ αὐλητικὴ πᾶσα, he adopts the qualified form of expression, τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη, in order to show that he is not unaware of there being exceptions to the rule.

^a 16 *μιμήσεις*. The general meaning of *μιμείσθαι* is either 'to do what another has done', or 'to make something like something else', i. e. to represent by means of a copy or counterfeit of some sort. The primitive sense of the word must have been 'to play the *μῦμος*,' to reproduce the language, tones, gestures, etc., of another—a sense which survives in the use of the term for the imitation of persons by actors on the stage. In actual use the word is wide enough to include the counterfeiting of movement and attitude by the dancer, that of voice and sound by the singer and musician, that of the forms and colours of things by the sculptor and painter, and even the representation of things in words, as in speech and literature. A noteworthy variation, however, is to be observed in the application of the word to a work of literature. Owing to the traditional associations connected with it Plato in the Republic opposes *μίμησις* to narrative, restricting it to the dramatic mode of statement, in which the speaker effaces himself, as it were, and identifies himself with his personages: Rep. 393 B οὐκοῦν διήγησις μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἐκάστοτε λέγῃ [scil. Ὅμηρος] καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἄλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὡς τις ἄλλος ὢν, ἄρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ λέξιν ἐκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα; Φήσομεν τί γάρ; Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμείσθαι ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ᾧ ἂν τις ὁμοιοῖ; Τί μὴν; Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δέ γε μηδαμῶς ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτειτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἢ ποιήσις τε καὶ διήγησις γενοῦντα εἴη.—394 B τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἢ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγωδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἢ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὐροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστα πονεῖν ἐν διθυράμβοις—ἢ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχού δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι. In his use of *μιμείσθαι* in

the Poetics Aristotle has fallen into a grave inconsistency, as he distinctly makes it in one place (3, 1448^a 21) include narrative, and in another (24, 1460^a 9) exclude it.

τὸ σύνολον qualifies πᾶσαι, what is said of the class as a whole being opposed to the specific differences which reveal themselves in it on closer examination; comp. Plato Soph. 220 B ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου [scil. γένους ἢ θήρα] σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀλιευτικῆ; ©ΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἀρ' οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;

τῷ γένοι ἐτέροις. Forchhammer's correction τῷ ἐν ἐτέροις is^a 17 supposed to be confirmed by the use of the preposition to denote the means or vehicle of imitation in^a 22 and^b 29, and also elsewhere (3, 1448^a 20 etc.). The sense, however, is just as well expressed by the simple dative, as it is for instance in the immediate context in^a 18 and^a 26; and as the means under consideration, λόγος, ἄρμονία, and ῥυθμός, differ in kind, they are rightly described as γένοι ἕτερα. There is no need to restore <τῷ> γένοι; Aristotle not unfrequently omits the article in this and cognate formulas, e.g. in Top. I. 7, 103^a 13 γένοι ταῦτά, in H. A. 2. 1, 497^b 9 and Metaph. I 10, 1059^a 14 γένοι ἕτερα. In An. post. 2. 15, 98^a 26-28 we find him saying τῷ γένοι and γένοι, and in Eth. N. 10. 5, 1175^a 25 τῷ εἶδει and εἶδει without perceptible difference of meaning. The distinction in fact between γένοι ἕτερα and τῷ γένοι ἕτερα is not greater than that between 'different in kind' and 'different in their kind' in English. A confirmation of Forchhammer's reading has been seen in the fact that in 8, 1451^a 17 A^c has τῷ γένοι instead of the true reading τῷ ἐνί. The two cases, however, are not quite parallel. ΤΩΓΕΝΕΙ=ΤΩΙΕΝΙ assumes only a very familiar kind of corruption, whereas ΤΩΓΕΝΕΙ=ΤΩΙΕΝ leaves an important part of the word (the termination) unexplained. It is also to be observed that the comparison in the next line, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι κτέ., seems to presuppose γένοι ἐτέροις, as χρώματα καὶ σχήματα and φωνή, which appeal to different senses, are marked instances of things γένοι ἕτερα (comp. An. post. 2. 13, 97^b 34). There is no doubt a certain inelegance in τῷ γένοι ἐτέροις μιμείσθαι, but it is not greater than that in Phys. I. 7, 191^a 1 διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, or that in Plato Rep. 534 B διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας.

ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἐτέρως. The distinction is already in Plato, Rep. 398 B ἄ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.

1447^a 18 καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Other instances of parallelismus antitheticus will be found in 3, 1448^a 22, 6, 1449^b 26, 15, 1454^a 30, 24, 1460^a 16.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the difference of means in these arts by pointing to the difference of means in a larger group of imitative arts. The distinction between the arts that address the eye and those that address the ear is frequently noted by Plato in similar terms, e. g. in Rep. 373 B οἱ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικὴν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπέρηται, ῥαψῳδοὶ ὑποκριταὶ χορευταὶ κτέ. (comp. Rep. 603 B; Crat. 423 D; Gorg. 474 E). It is assumed also in a number of Aristotelian passages (e. g. in An. post. 2. 13, 97^b 35; Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118^a 3; Pol. 8. 5, 1340^a 34). Aristotle has a special reason for saying ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, because the great imitative capacity of the voice is what renders language and poetry possible, together with many of the arts subsidiary to the latter: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 21 ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἢ τε ῥαψῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε.

^a 19 πολλὰ is not otiose. The art of the painter or sculptor has certain limits; it can represent many things; but there are some (e. g. character and feeling) that it can only imperfectly or indirectly express (Pol. 8. 5, 1340^a 32; comp. Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1). The theory in Lessing's Laocoon is based on an idea already in Aristotle.

μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες: Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1 σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμῆσθε.

οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας is thrown in parenthetically, like the very similar remark in 8, 1451^a 24, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν. As opposed to τέχνη, συνηθεία means much the same as ἐμπειρία, with which it is coupled in Eth. N. 8. 7, 1158^a 14 δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, and in 10. 10, 1181^a 9 οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί. The contrast is between the skill depending on mere practice or habitude, and that directed by a consciousness of the rules and principles of the art which deals with the particular subject. On this distinction see Metaph. A 1, 980^b 28, and Mill's Logic Bk. II. ch. 3 (1, p. 214, ed. 4).

^a 20 ἕτεροι δὲ corresponds to a foregoing τινές in Eth. N. 1. 1, 1094^b 18 ἤδη γὰρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν.

Compare also Plato Rep. 349 D μουσικὸν δὲ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ 1447^a 20 ἄμουσον;

διὰ τῆς φωνῆς = τῇ φωνῇ. Aristotle has allowed himself to repeat the prepositional construction used in the parenthesis. The emendation of Madius, διὰ τῆς φύσεως, besides making too much of a merely incidental remark in a parenthesis, leaves χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι without an antithesis; it ignores in fact the whole point of the analogy to which attention is drawn, the diversity of means. The diversity of means, λόγος, ῥυθμός, and ἄρμονία, in the group of imitative arts under consideration is said to be like the diversity of means, χρώματα καὶ σχήματα and φωνή, observable in a larger group of imitative arts.

ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἄρμονίᾳ. The three terms had already ^a 22 appeared in the same sense in Plato's analysis of the song or choral in Rep. 398 D τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστὶ συγκείμενον, λόγῳ τε καὶ ἄρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ (comp. Laws 661 C; 669 D). His terminology, however, is not always quite the same; he sometimes says ῥυθμός καὶ μέτρον (Phil. 17 D, Gorg. 502 C) or μέτρον καὶ ῥυθμός (Rep. 601 A) in lieu of ῥυθμός; and μέλος, 'melody' or 'tune', in lieu of ἄρμονία (Rep. 400 A, Gorg. 502 C, Laws 656 C, etc.). Aristotle also, in more than one passage in the Poetics (1, 1447^b 25; 6, 1449^b 31), has put μέλος in place of ἄρμονία; and in one instance (6, 1449^b 29) he combines the two terms as synonyms. It is clear, therefore, that in its present application ἄρμονία means no more than 'melody' or 'tune'. ῥυθμός is properly 'time' or 'pace'. It is a very general word, since it includes the element of rhythm in language and in the movements of the dance, as well as that in music; comp. Plato Laws 665 A τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει [scil. εἶπομεν ὡς] ῥυθμός ὄνομα εἶη, τῇ δ' αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἄρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ ξυναμφότερον κληθεῖη.— 672 E Ὅλη μὲν που χορεία ὅλη παιδευσίς ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοὶ τε καὶ ἄρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν . . . τὸ δὲ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δ' ἴδιον. ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἢ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις (see also Symp. 187 B and Phil. 17 C). The various applications of ῥυθμός are thus summarized in Aristoxenus (p. 411, 8 Marquard): ἔστι δὲ τὰ ῥυθμιζόμενα τρία· λέξις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική. Plato's view as to the great imitative capacities of rhythm and harmony and music generally may be seen in Rep. 399 A sqq., in Laws 668 A sqq., and more briefly put, in Laws 798 D τὰ περὶ τοῦς

1447^a 22 ῥυθμούς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικὴν ἐστὶ τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων. The point is recognized with equal clearness by Aristotle in Pol. 8. 5, 1340^a 18, ἐστὶ δ' ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν . . . (^a 38) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν . . . (^b 7) τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.

^a 23 ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένους: a reminiscence of Plato Laws 669 D διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρὶς, λόγους ψιλούς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῆ καθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι.

χρώμεναι, scil. ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

^a 25 τυγχάνουσιν. On the construction with καὶ εἰ see Vahlen, Beitr. 1, p. 35. Mr. Newman in a note on Pol. 2. 1, 1260^b 31 seems to doubt the necessity of restoring the indicative in this and other similar places in Aristotelian texts.

ἢ τῶν συρίγγων. The word to be supplied is apparently μίμησις—not τέχνη, as is assumed in HSt. s.v. σύριγξ, and in Bon. Ind. 735^a 39. The Platonic ἢ τῶν λόγων τέχνη in Phaedr. 260 D is not a true parallel. For a similar genitive after μίμησις comp. Lucian De salt. 64 ἢ μίμησις τῆς ὀρχήσεως.

^a 26 αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ κτέ. is an unnecessary clause, as ὀρχηστική is not one of the arts in the list in ^a 13; it will be observed too that there is a change in the form of expression, μιμοῦνται, instead of χρώμεναι with ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν understood. The clause would seem to have been originally an afterthought, worked in by Aristotle as soon as he saw that there was an art that used rhythm alone. His giving a reason for this mention of ὀρχηστική may be supposed to imply a consciousness of its being a new point, and one requiring demonstration.

αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν. The traditional reading οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν has been corrected into ἐνιοὶ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Twining; into οἱ <πολλοὶ> τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Heinsius; and into οἱ <χαριέντες> τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Zeller. It is assumed that Aristotle may have wished to recognize the fact, of which Plato had spoken in Laws 795 E, that dancing is sometimes a mere exercise of the body and without dramatic meaning. A much simpler correction, however, is αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, with μιμήσεις (rather than τέχναι) understood from the context.

Aristotle is thinking of the professional dancers, who told a story in 1447^a 26 pantomime, by the mere movements and attitudes of their bodies (comp. Sittl, Die Gebärden der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244).

σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν: the rhythms in their movements, in the^a 27 succession of their σχήματα, their gestures or attitudes (see on 26, 1462^a 3). The emphasis is on ῥυθμῶν; that the attitudes of the dancer might be dramatic, and represent 'what men do or have done to them', was too obvious to require saying. Aristotle is insisting on the 'ethical' significance which rhythm imparts to the dance. On rhythm as expressive of character and temperament see Pol. 8. 5, 1340^a 18 and the Platonic passages referred to on^a 22.

ἦθη: the character and temperament of the personages represented, as distinct from their πάθη καὶ πράξεις, 'what they do or have done to them'. The meaning of πάθη καὶ πράξεις is sufficiently shown by 9, 1451^b 11 τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν, and 13, 1453^a 22 παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι (see also on 11, 1452^b 11). πάθη is generally assumed (e. g. in Bon. Ind. 557^a 49) to denote in this passage 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The words πάθη καὶ πράξεις cover the whole ground of the story in the dance; so that Aristotle, if he had cared to anticipate the term used later on in 6, 1450^a 4, might have said here, without difference of meaning, ἦθη καὶ μύθοις.

ἢ δὲ [ἐποποιία] κτε. Suckow's correction, τυγχάνει οὖσα, is to be found in his Form der Platonischen Schriften p. 53. With it, and the readings implied in the Arabic Version, the whole passage becomes intelligible and in harmony with the context. We were told at the outset in^a 22 that the three means of imitation, ῥυθμός, λόγος, and ἄρμονία, may be employed either singly or in certain combinations. Having just spoken (1) of imitation ἐν ἄρμονίᾳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ, and (2) of imitation ἐν ῥυθμῷ alone, Aristotle passes on (3) to imitation ἐν λόγῳ—whether alone, or in combination with rhythm or metre, and finally (4) to imitation ἐν ἄρμονίᾳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ. This exhausts the possibilities, since it is evident that ἄρμονία alone, and the combination ἄρμονία + λόγος, need not be taken into account. The third of his four heads Aristotle divides, and recognizes three possible forms of means, (1) λόγος alone, (2) λόγος + some one kind of metre, and (3) λόγος + a plurality of metres. In other words he distinguishes between (1) imitations in prose, (2) imitations in some one metre (hexameters, trimeters, etc.), and (3) imitations in a plurality of metres. Of this large and well-

1447^a 28 marked class of imitative literature, which includes the Mime, the 'imaginary conversations' of Socrates, the Epic, and Chaeremon's *Centaur*, Aristotle observes that it has 'remained to this day without a distinctive name'. The common fact here is *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ*, but there is, he says, no one common name connoting the common fact and equally applicable to all the kinds within the class.

Those who retain *ἐποποιία*, with the addition of *ἀνώνυμος* at the end of the sentence, suppose it to mean 'word-poetry' (*Wortdichtung*, Bernays, *Zwei Abhandl.* p. 81). Such a special and unique sense, however, for a term like *ἐποποιία* is highly improbable, and also against the analogy of all the similar compounds (e.g. *λογοποιία*, *μελοποιία*, *μυθοποιία*, *ὀνοματοποιία*), in which the *-ποιία* means simply the making of something, just as much as in *ἀρτοποιία*, *ὄδοποιία*, *παιδοποιία* and the like. And even if the word could bear its new meaning, it would be inappropriate here, as the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversation' were prose imitations—not poems. To a Greek of Aristotle's time the idea of a prose poem would have seemed a contradiction in terms.

^a 29 τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις = τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις *ψιλοῖς*: comp. 2, 1448^a 11 τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν. *ψιλοῖς*, which in this connexion means *χωρὶς ἁρμονίας*, 'without melody' (v. Tyrwhitt ad loc. and Bon. Ind. 433^b 29), differentiates this group of imitative arts from the semi-musical arts considered later on, at the end of the chapter; comp. Plato *Phaedr.* 278 c *ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾧδῇ συντέθηκε*, and *Laws* 669 D (quoted on ^a 23). *λόγοις ψιλοῖς* has been taken by several (including Bon. Ind. 862^b 31) to mean 'prose' in the present passage—a sense which *ψιλὸς λόγος* has no doubt in a good many instances, e.g. in *Rhet.* 3. 2, 1404^b 14, 33. But there is nothing in the general meaning of the word to necessitate this interpretation here. *ψιλός* means simply 'by itself', without some accessory, whatever the accessory thus excluded may happen to be (v. HSt. s. v.).

ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. *μέτρα* has to be understood in the concrete sense of 'kinds of verse', i. e. as equivalent to *λόγοι ἔμμετροι* or *λόγοι + ῥυθμός*. Aristotle remembers that the literary form of imitation is generally in verse, and accordingly adds ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. The addition, however, has a sort of reflex influence on the general term *λόγοις* which precedes it, and by the contrast it suggests gives the word for the moment the special sense of 'prose', as distinct from verse. Other instances of a general term with its meaning

modified by what follows will be found in 22, 1458^a 28 and 25, 1447^a 29 1460^b 11. The logical scheme of the statement in ^a 29—^b 23 may be thus exhibited:—

Language	{	prose	{	in some one kind of metre
without music		verse		

Plato has the same division in *Laws* 810 B, where he is protesting against the divorce of poetry and literature from music: *πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλυρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ' ἄνευ [ῥυθμῶν τμημάτων¹], ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητῶμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ' ἡμῖν ἐστί παρά τινων . . . καταλελειμμένα.* Here *ἄλυρα* corresponds to Aristotle's *ψιλοῖς, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ' ἄνευ* to his *τοῖς λόγοις ἢ τοῖς μέτροις*, and *κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον τητῶμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας* to his *μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς*.

ἀνώνυμος: *Phys.* 5. 2, 226^a 26 ἢ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κίνησις^b 9 ἀλλοίωσις ἔστω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπέξευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα . . . ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον, καθ' ἑκάτερον δ' αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις.—*De anima* 2. 7, 418^a 26 ὁρατὸν δ' ἔστιν χρώμα τε, καὶ ὁ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν.—*H. A.* 10. 40, 623^b 5 ἔστι δέ τι γένος τῶν ἐντόμων, ὃ ἐνὶ μὲν ὀνόματι ἀνώνυμὸν ἐστίν.—*Pol.* 3. 1, 1275^a 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. For other instances see *Bon. Ind.* 69^b 2. Aristotle has often to speak of a class as being still without a name, because its existence has not yet been recognized by ordinary thought (comp. Bernays, *Zwei Abhandl.* p. 81).

τυγχάνει οὔσα. Similarly in *De sensu* 5, 447^b 7 Thurot would restore *ὑπάρχει οὔσα* for *ὑπάρχουσα*.

ὀνομάσις κοινὸν: scil. *ὄνομα*; comp. *Meteor.* 4. 9, 387^b 2 οὐ γὰρ^b 10 κείται ὄνομα κοινόν.—*H. A.* 4. 7, 531^b 22 οὐκ ἐπέξευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα οὐδέν.

τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους. The surviving fragments (*Kaibel, CGF.* 1 pp. 152 and 182) show that the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus were in prose (comp. Bernhardt, *Gr. Litt.*³ 2. 2 p. 533). And as their very name is suggestive of *μίμησις*, Aristotle points to them as an indisputable example of prose-imitation, *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ χωρὶς ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ*. A very similar view of them is implied in a fr. of the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν* (72 Teubn.): *οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους τοὺς καλουμένους*

¹ These two words seem to represent a gloss, *ῥυθμῶν τητῶμενα*.

1447^b 10 Σώφρονος μίμους μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις, ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξάμενου τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων (v. Bernays, *Zwei Abhandl.* p. 82; Kaibel l. c., p. 152). The fr. makes it clear that Aristotle saw a certain affinity between the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversations' of Alexamenus; and with it before us, it is not difficult to divine the reason for the juxtaposition of the Mime and the Σωκρατικὸς λόγος in the present passage of the Poetics; the two things differed in name, but at the same time they had an essential element in common, that of being prose-imitations, μιμήσεις ἐν λόγῳ, and not (like poetry) ἐν μέτρῳ.

^b 11 τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους. As used here and in *Rhet.* 3. 16, 1417^a 20, the term Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι must be taken to cover the ground of the whole of this species of literature, the 'Socratic Conversations' not only of Alexamenus, but also of Plato, Aeschines and the rest (comp. Joel, *Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil.* 8, 468). A certain resemblance between the Platonic Dialogue and the Mime is presupposed in the story (Duris fr. 45 in Müller, *FHG.* 2 p. 480) of Plato having been a zealous student and imitator of Sophron. It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Teichmüller's view, that Aristotle's intention was to contrast the Mime and the Dialogue, and insist on the difference between them.

οὐδὲ εἶ: De interpr. 11, 20^b 25 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώτησις μία οὐδ' ἐὰν ἢ ἀληθής.—14, 24^a 3 οὐδὲν διοίσει οὐδ' ἂν καθόλου τιθῶμεν τὴν κατάφασιν.—Soph. el. 11, 171^b 12 τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐριστικά . . . οὐδέ γ' εἴ τί ἐστι ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθές.

At this point Aristotle runs off into a digression (comp. 9, 1451^b 1) in order to minimize the importance of the element of metre in the imitative forms of literature. Even if a mime and a dialogue were both written in verse, either in some one (^b 11-12) or in several kinds of metre (^b 20), they would still be without a common name connoting the μίμησις in them, which is their essential point of agreement. The writer of such a versified mime or dialogue might no doubt be described in ordinary parlance as an ἐποποιός or ἐλεγειοποιός, or by some similar name indicating the kind of verse in which his work happens to be written. Names of this kind, however, are misleading, since they imply that the verse rather than the μίμησις embodied in it is the essence of the literary form of imitation. Metre, in Aristotle's view, is only one of the accidents of poetry; and the use of it does not make a writer like Empedocles a poet in any true sense of the word.

ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς. There is no need to understand, 1447^b 14 still less insert, τοὺς μὲν before ἐλεγειοποιούς (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 265); comp. the instances cited by Vahlen (ad loc.); to which may be added Soph. el. 21, 178^a 3, Metaph. Δ 28, 1024^a 33.

οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν = ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν. For the position of the negative comp. Plato Phaed. 77 E ὡς δεδιότων . . . πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.

Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ. In a fragment (fr. 70 Teubn.) of the dialogue^b 18 περὶ ποιητῶν he is declared to have been a master of all the resources of epic language: Ὀμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικὸς τ' ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος. This is not inconsistent with the present passage; Aristotle's meaning is that, though Empedocles may be a poet in his form, he is not a poet in his matter. A philosophic poem comes under the head of what the ancients termed *didascalice*, its purpose being to teach or instruct, rather than to interest us in a *μίμησις*, a picture of life and manners. That Empedocles was not in any real sense a poet is implied in Plato Theaet. 152 E καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμωδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὀμηρος—where Empedocles, it will be observed, is put into distinct contrast with Homer. This view of him is more clearly stated in later writers, e.g. in Plutarch, De aud. poet. 16 C τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηριακὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος λόγοι εἰσὶ κεκηρημένοι παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὥσπερ ὄχημα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πρὸς διαφύγῳσιν.—Schol. Dionys. Thr. p. 166. 13 Hilgard οὐκ ἔστι ποιητῆς ὁ μέτρῳ μόνῳ χρώμενος· οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ τὰ φυσικὰ γράψας, οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ ἀστρολογίας εἰπόντες, οὐδὲ ὁ Πύθιος ἐμμέτρως χρησιμωδῶν.

ποιητῆν. The poet is tacitly assumed to be a μιμητῆς ἐν μέτροις^b 19 (comp. 24, 1460^a 7; 25, 1460^b 8).

ὁμοίως recalls the idea of the original assertion in^b 9, οὐδὲν ἂν^b 20 ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους. Vahlen quotes Eth. N. I. 12, 1101^b 21 δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν—where οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος is to be understood. ὁμοίως often represents the apodosis of a conditional sentence (v. An. pr. I. 9, 30^b 1; I. 14, 33^a 12; I. 38, 49^a 22; De caelo I. 4, 271^a 13; 2. 4, 287^a 19; De anima I. 1, 402^b 8). The equivalent τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

1447^b 20 is used in just the same way in An. pr. 2. 24, 69^a 11 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κἄν εἰ διὰ πλείων τῶν ὁμοίων ἢ πίστις γίνοιτο.

^b 21 *Χαιρήμων*. For the little that remains of his *Κένταυρος* see Nauck, TGF.² p. 784. Aristotle terms it a *ραψωδία* as though it were a sort of epic; and it is clear that in 24, 1460^a 2 he still regards it as coming under that head. If Athenaeus 608 ε speaks of it as a *δρᾶμα πολύμετρον*, the explanation is that such a bizarre experiment in literature might very well be placed in more than one class. The title was no doubt taken from its subject; not from its monstrous combination of metres, as Welcker imagines (Nachtrag zu der Schrift über die Aeschylische Trilogie p. 71). There were several comedies (Kock, CAF. 3 p. 698) and also an ode (by Lasus of Hermione) with this or a very similar title.

^b 22 *ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων*: to be taken with *μικτήν* (comp. Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 2 p. 42). *ἀπάντων* must be an exaggeration, since it is inconceivable that every kind of metre was represented in Chaeremon's poem. Similar instances of overstatement are to be found in ^b 28 (*πᾶσιν*), in 18, 1455^b 33 (*τὸ ὅλον*), in 22, 1458^a 24 (*ἅπαντα*), and in De anima 2. 6, 418^a 11, 19 (v. Rodier ad loc.).

καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον has been altered in some apographs into *〈οὐκ ἤδη〉 καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* and in others into *καὶ 〈τοῦτον〉 ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον*. Various other corrections have been recently suggested, e. g. *κατὰ 〈τοῦτο〉 ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (M. Schmidt), *δικαίως ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (Ueberweg), *καίτοι ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (Rassow and Gomperz). Susemihl omits the clause (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 38), but finds a place for *προσαγορευτέον* by inserting it after *ποιητὴν* in ^b 20.

The clause (if we retain the reading of the MS.) seems to come in in much the same way as that in ^b 18, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν*. As an illustration of the third of his three possibilities (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 4) Aristotle cites Chaeremon's *Centaur*; and his assumption is that, as a work of this description is a *μίμησις* (comp. ^b 21 *ποιεῖτο τὴν μίμησιν*) and also in verse (^b 22 *ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων*), the author is a *μιμητῆς ἐν μέτροις*, and therefore rightly regarded as a poet, though popular language does not give him a special name of the type of those considered in the preceding section (^b 13-19). The argument, therefore, will come to this: If a mime and a dialogue were written in a medley of metres, the writers would have to be recognized as poets; but we should have no common

name for the two works themselves, notwithstanding their similarity 1447^b 22 in form as well as nature. Some such meaning seems to be demanded by the general logic of the argument, which is directed to show that not only the prose forms of the literary 'imitation', but also the various poetic forms of it are 'to this day' without a general name (^b 9 *ἀνώνυμος τυγχάνει οὕσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν*). The only difficulty is to see how the clause *καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* is brought in. Vahlen (ad loc.) takes it as following after the apodosis implied in *ὁμοίως*—'adnecti non positae sed cogitatae apodosi sententiam (*καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον*)'. I suspect that it was primarily meant to apply to Chaeremon, and that it is loosely subjoined to what is said of him in the context, as an assertion of his claim to be ranked among the poets in spite of his metrical absurdities.

The question may perhaps be asked: If it was possible to give *ποιητής* the sense assumed for it in this chapter and elsewhere, why did not Aristotle recognize the word *ποίημα* as an equally legitimate 'common name' for all the various species of verse-imitation? The answer may perhaps be this, that he thought it to be (like *ἐποποιός*, *ἐλεγειοποιός*, etc.) too directly suggestive of the metrical form (comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^b 30), which he puts aside as only one of the accidents even of the poetical 'imitation'.

The term 'Poet', as used by most of the ancients, is the subject of a valuable inquiry by H. Weil (*Études sur l'antiquité grecque*, p. 237), who shows that the nearest modern representative of it is 'author' or 'composer'. Its primary meaning is the man who writes the words, or composes the music, in contradistinction to the rhapsodists, actors, singers or musicians, who present the work to the public (comp. Plato Rep. 373 B *ποιηταὶ τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψωδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, κτέ.*). But as the literary work which had to be thus recited or sung was by custom in verse, the 'poet' was also a writer of verses. The idea of verse in fact became part of the conventional meaning of the word—as also of the verb *ποιεῖν*, which often means to write or say in verse; the compounds, likewise, *ἐποποιός*, *ἐλεγειοποιός*, etc., all denote writers of some kind of verse. *ποιεῖν* is thus opposed to *λέγειν*, to speak in prose, and the *ποιητής* either to the *συγγραφεύς*, who writes prose, or to the *ιδιώτης*, the ordinary man who speaks in prose. Another association attaching to the word had its origin in the matter with which early Greek poetry was connected. The poet was distinguished from the historian or chronicler by the fact

1447^b 22 that he was so constantly dealing with a remote or legendary past, in the treatment of which there was ample room for play of imagination. All the great poetical subjects are classed by Plato under the general head of 'myths' or fictions (Rep. 377 A and 382 D; comp. Xenophanes fr. 1, 21 Diels); and it was an understood thing that a free use of fiction was one of the privileges of the poet: Solon fr. 29 Bergk *πολλὰ ψεύδονται αἰδοί.*—Isocrates 195 D *τῶν γε παλαιῶν καθόδων αὐται μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, ἄς παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκούομεν. οὔτοι γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν γεγενημένων τὰς καλλίστας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν καινὰς συντιθέασιν* (also Horace A. P. 9). This recognition of an element of fiction in poetry is perhaps the nearest approach the ancients make to our idea of 'poetic creation'. The ordinary conception in antiquity of the poet was that he was, just like the painter (v. Poet. 15, 1454^b 9, and 25, 1460^b 8), an imitator, and that his work was not so much a creation as a copy, more or less faithful, of something already existing in legend or life.

^b 25 *μελεῖ* = *ἁρμονία* in the scheme in ^a 22.

μέτρῳ, which now takes the place of the original term *λόγῳ* in ^a 22, has the concrete sense of 'verse' or versified language, i. e. as equivalent to *λόγος ἔμμετρος* or *λόγος + ῥυθμός* (comp. 4, 1448^b 21). It is an ill-chosen word, therefore, as it says too much, and, if understood strictly, would make the *ῥυθμῶ*, with which the enumeration begins, a superfluity.

^b 28 *αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.* As Teichmüller points out, *πᾶσιν* repeats the *πᾶσι* in ^b 24, *χρῶνται* having to be supplied. The antithesis is between *ἅμα* and *κατὰ μέρος*; so that in lieu of the latter Aristotle might have said *οὐχ ἅμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος.* Comp. Meteor. 1. 14, 351^a 28 *ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐ κατὰ μέρος τὰτα συμβαίνει πάσχειν, ἀλλ' ἅμα πᾶν ἀκμάζειν καὶ φθίνειν ἀναγκαῖον.*—Plato Theaet. 189 E *ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει* (also Bon. Ind. 455^b 14 and 571^b 47). Aristotle's language would naturally imply that, whereas the three means of expression, language, metre, and music, are inseparable in the Dithyramb and Nome, they appear separately and by turns in the Drama. This, however, is an overstatement (see on *ἀπάντων* in ^b 22), as it is only the musical element that comes in intermittently, in the choral parts of the play (6, 1449^b 30).

1448^a 1 *μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας:* comp. 1, 1447^a 28; 3, 1448^a 27; 6, 1449^b 36; 1450^b 3, 9; 1451^b 29. This is to all appearance another reminiscence of Plato: Rep. 396 c *μιμού-*

μενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα.—603 c 1448^a 1
πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμείται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἐκουσίας
πράξεις.

ἡ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους is explained by what follows, κακία γὰρ^a 2
καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἡθὴ διαφέρουσι πάντες (comp. 5, 1449^a 32). This,
Aristotle adds, is the primary and most universal distinction between
man and man; nearly all other distinctions of character may be
classed under this one common head.

ἀκολουθεῖ: De part. an. 2. 1, 646^a 17 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις^a 3
ἀκολουθοῦσιν.

κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ κτέ. Pol. 5. 2, 1303^b 15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν
ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετῇ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ.

ἦτοι βελτίονας . . . τοιούτους, scil. μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι. We^a 4
have been prepared for this distinction by the preceding ἐπεὶ
μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ
φαύλους εἶναι; but the third possibility, that the personages repre-
sented may be on the same level as ourselves (ἢ καὶ τοιούτους), is
a new point, which is felt to require a word of proof. Aristotle
accordingly reminds us of a similar fact in painting (^a 5): the
personages in the works of Dionysius are just like ourselves
(ὁμοίους). The three possibilities being thus generally established,
Aristotle proceeds to say, by way of corollary (δῆλον δὲ^a 7), that
the same distinction is to be seen in the poetical arts, in epic, lyric,
and dramatic poetry (^a 11), and that it constitutes also the essential
point of difference between Tragedy and Comedy (^a 16). That
μιμοῦνται may be supplied from the protasis (^a 1) after ἢ καὶ
τοιούτους in ^a 5 is assumed by all the older translators. Vahlen
illustrates the construction from Metaph. Δ 7, 1017^a 13 τὸν γὰρ
ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τὸν
λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, τὸ μὲν (scil. λέγομεν) ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ
αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασιν κτέ. Other instances of a verb having to be
understood in the principal from a subordinate clause will be found
in Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2, p. 574; an exact parallel, however, to
the construction in the present passage is still wanting. The
only alternative is to suppose the apodosis to begin at δῆλον δὲ (^a 7)
—in which case it will be necessary to restore δῆλον δὲ, and to
take the words ἦτοι βελτίονας κτέ. as appositional to the ἢ σπου-
δαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι in ^a 2. The clause, however, that follows,
ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς (scil. μιμοῦνται), seems to show that ἦτοι βελτίονας
κτέ. = ἦτοι βελτίονας . . . μιμοῦνται.

ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς. Plutarch, who defines poetry as a μιμητικὴ^a 5

1448^a 5 τέχνη καὶ δύναμις ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ, quotes a saying, commonly attributed to Simonides, ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι φθεγγομένην τὴν ποιήσιν, ποιήσιν δὲ σιγῶσαν τὴν ζωγραφίαν (De aud. poet. 17 F, with Wyttenbach's note). The comparison, which reappears in Poet. 6, 1450^a 26, ^b 1; 15, 1454^b 9; 25, 1460^b 8, and indirectly elsewhere, is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (v. Rep. 377 E, 597 E, 603 B, 605 A etc.).

γραφεῖς. The Attic form γραφῆς has survived in the text of Meteor. 3. 2, 372^a 7, and De sensu 3, 440^a 8.

Πολύγνωτος: comp. 6, 1450^a 27.

^a 6 Παύσων: Pol. 8. 5, 1340^a 36 δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικός. If he was the same as the Pauson of Aristoph. Ach. 854, he must have had a certain sort of affinity to our modern caricaturists (comp. Hor. Ep. 2. 1, 264; Aelian V. H. 4. 4); it will be seen also that Aristotle regards his work as the analogue of that of the parodists and comic poets in literature.

Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἶκαζεν. ὁμοίους, as the context shows (comp. τοιοῦτους in ^a 5), means 'like ourselves', neither better nor worse than the average man. εἰκάζειν (=to produce an εἰκὼν or portrait) is practically synonymous with μιμῆσθαι, the word ordinarily used by Aristotle even of a painter. In 1, 1447^a 19 he has the more precise expression, μιμῶνται ἀπεικάζοντες. The Dionysius meant is Dionysius of Colophon. It is a disputed point (Overbeck, Schriftquellen 1136) whether he is to be identified with the painter of whom Pliny N. H. 35. 113 says: *Contra Dionysius nihil aliud quam homines pinxit, ob id anthropographos cognominatus*. The epithet ἀνθρωπογράφος would certainly seem peculiarly applicable to Aristotle's Dionysius, as a realistic painter, whose gods and heroes were too like ordinary men.

^a 8 ἕτερα is qualified and explained by the τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον that follows. The personages represented differ in the way just described, i.e. as being either better or worse than, or on the same level as, the ordinary man. For the neuter ἕτερα see on ^a 19.

^a 9 ὀρχήσει: Plato Laws 814 E δύο μὲν αὐτῆς (scil. ὀρχήσεως) εἶδη χρῆ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωματῶν ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον (comp. also 655 C; 798 D). For the kind of dancing Aristotle has in mind here see on 1, 1447^a 27.

αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει: see on 1, 1447^a 15.

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν is a general expression 1448^a 10 for the group of purely literary imitative arts, which were described in 1, 1447^a 29 as using τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. Ψιλομετρία—a term misunderstood by later writers (v. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe p. 116)—means verse without music (χωρὶς ἁρμονίας; see on 1, 1447^a 29). The qualifying addition ‘without music’ might no doubt have been appended to τοὺς λόγους also; but it is more wanted where it is, so as to distinguish the verse that was simply recited from the verse that was sung. From this point onward Aristotle ignores the prose imitations (the Mime and the Dialogue), and deals only with ‘poetry’, the versified forms of imitative literature (μίμησις ἐν μέτροις; see on 1, 1447^a 23).

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους = ἐν τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, the preposition being understood from the preceding context (comp. Bon. Ind. 630^a 40). The restoration of τῷ for τὸ in 25, 1461^a 33 admits of the same explanation. For τὸ περὶ τι in the sense of ‘the class comprising’ see Plato Soph. 221 B (with Campbell’s note), Symp. 205 C, Rep. 394 B.

Κλεοφῶν. In 22, 1458^a 20 his diction is said to be ταπεινῆ.^a 12 Aristotle notes elsewhere the ludicrous effect his occasional attempts at fine language produced owing to the incongruity between the expression and the matter he dealt with: Rhet. 3, 7, 1408^a 10 τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἢ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾗ . . . τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ’ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐλόγων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγεται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ’ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ δνόματι ἐπὶ ἡ κόσμος. εἰ δὲ μή, κωμωδία [‘a comic joke’, Casaubon on Ath. 3, 12] φαίνεται, οἷον ποιῆ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἶπειν ἂν πότνια συκῆ. In the present passage we are told that his personages were ‘like ourselves’ (ὁμοίους), neither better than the ordinary man, like those in Homer, nor worse, like those in a parody. From the context as well as the company in which he is placed it is plain that he is to be regarded as a sort of epic poet. He is taken as the representative of the prosaic Epic—the Epic of the commonplace, as distinct from the noble Epic of Homer and the debased Epic known as parody. His work being put under the head of ψιλομετρία, ‘verse without the accompaniment of song,’ he cannot have been in Aristotle’s view either a lyric or a dramatic poet (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). The notion that he was the writer of a dialogue entitled the ‘Mandrobulus’ is based on an erroneous interpretation of Soph. el. 15, 174^b 19 (see J. of Phil. 12 p. 17).

Ἠγήμων: see Brandt, Parodorum epicorum reliq., p. 37, and

1448^a 12 Kock, CAF. I, p. 700. Parody was an element in the humour of the Old Comedy, as also of Epicharmus; and there were certainly others before Hegemon who travestied Homer. What Aristotle means, however, is that Hegemon was the first to take up parody as a special form of poetical literature (Schrader, Rh. Mus. N. F. 20, p. 186). According to Athenaeus 699 A (comp. 407 A) he was the first to present a parody in the poetical contests in the theatre: *πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἡγήμων, καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐνίκησεν ἄλλαις τε παρωδίαις καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ.*

^a 13 *παρωδίας*. A *παρωδία*, in Aristotle's sense of the word, is a mock epic, a poem on an ignoble theme in epic language and metre.

Νικοχάρης: he may perhaps be the same as the comic poet of the same name (Kock, CAF. I p. 770). We know nothing more of his work, and there is some uncertainty even as to its title. *Δελιάς* (which is assonant to *Ἰλιάς*) would mean, as Twining says, the 'Poltroniad'; *Δηλιάς*, either the 'Tale of Delos', or the 'Tale of Delium'; it is practically impossible to say which.

^a 15 *ὥσπερ * γᾶς κτέ*. It is important to bear in mind that in A^o the *ὥσπερ* here ends a line, and that the *γᾶς* stands at the beginning of another. The better apographs have either *ὡς περγᾶς* or *ὡς πέργας*. The reading *ὡς Πέρσας καὶ Κύκλωπας* was probably due to a corrector who knew of the *Πέρσαι* as a nome of Timotheus; it may be seen in the process of genesis in the text of Parisinus 2038. In his latest edition (comp. Hermes 12, p. 192) Vahlen puts a colon after *νόμους*, and suggests that *ὥσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας* should be restored—on the supposition (1) that Timotheus and Philoxenus may represent the ignoble Nome and Dithyramb, and (2) that instances of the opposite were not wanted, as the Nome and Dithyramb were so generally associated with noble subjects. However attractive this explanation may be, Vahlen's reading fails to account for the accent in the traditional *ὥσπερ γᾶς* of the Paris MS. Castelvetro was probably right in recognizing in *γᾶς* the second half of *Ἀργᾶς*, the name of one notorious in antiquity as the writer of a debased kind of nome (Meineke, FCG. 3, p. 388). If we accept Castelvetro's suggestion, a question naturally arises as to the extent of the lacuna before the *γᾶς* of the MS. The original statement may have been something like what Vahlen formerly supposed, *ὥσπερ <θεοὺς Ἀρ->γᾶς*; but it is quite as likely that more than this has been lost, and that the text, when entire, gave the name of another writer of nomes, who

was put in contrast with Argas, and also the name of a common 1448^a 15 subject differently treated by the two poets (ὡσπερ <— καὶ Ἀρ- > γᾶς); so that this clause may have said of the Nome what the next (Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος) says of the Dithyramb. If it be objected that, on this hypothesis, Aristotle ought to have considered also, as a third possibility, the 'realistic' or intermediate type of Nome and Dithyramb, the reply is that, if it ever existed, it was of no real importance for his purpose. He is simply preparing us for the distinction in the Drama between Tragedy and Comedy; and when he comes to the subject of the Drama in ^a 16, we see that he omits to recognize an intermediate or 'realistic' drama, in which the chief personages were ὅμοιοι, like the ordinary man.

Κύκλωπας. Polyphemus must have been a stock-subject in literature, as there were dramas with the title Κύκλωψ, dealing with him and his story, by Epicharmus, Aristias, and Antiphanes, as well as the existing play of Euripides. The plural here, as Düntzer points out, denotes not several Cyclopes, but Polyphemus as treated in different poems. For the Κύκλωψ ἢ Γαλάτεια of Philoxenus see Bergk, LG.⁴ 3 p. 609, and Schmidt's Diatribe in dithyrambum, p. 54. It seems to have been a covert satire on the elder Dionysius, who had offended the poet; we may suppose, then, that Philoxenus made his Cyclops an ignoble personage, χείρων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς. We have no evidence even of this indirect kind as to the Polyphemus of Timotheus (see Bergk l. c. p. 620; Schmidt l. c. p. 102), but it is a natural inference from what Aristotle implies in the context, that he was not like the Cyclops of Philoxenus.

ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ. Vahlen retains the traditional ἐν αὐτῇ^a 15 δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ, taking it to mean 'in ipsa quam dico differentia'.

βούλεται: this is their general tendency and intention, though^a 18 there may be exceptions to the rule (comp. Bon. Ind. 140^b 41).

τῶν νῦν replaces the ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς in ^a 4. Aristotle is thinking more especially of the chief personages in Tragedy, who belong in most instances to the heroic age; comp. 13, 1453^a 20 and Probl. 19. 48, 922^b 17 ἐκεῖνοι [i. e. the tragic actors as distinct from the chorus] μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μιμηταί, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνου ἦσαν ἡρώες· οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὧν ἔστιν ὁ χορός.

τούτων τρίτη διαφορά. τούτων = τῶν λεχθεισῶν μιμήσεων in ^a 7; ^a 19 comp. 1, 1447^b 29 τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν. Vahlen supposes the words to mean 'harum quas recenseo differentiarum tertia'.

1448^a 19 ἕκαστα τούτων: the objects with the possibilities of difference described in chap. 2. Though the objects of the poetic imitations are properly persons, the neuter is used as a more general way of designating them; it reappears in the context in τὰ αὐτά (^a 20) and ἕτερόν τι (^a 21), as well as in the formula (repeated from 1, 1447^a 17) ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἄ καὶ ὧς in ^a 25.

^a 20 τὰ αὐτὰ μιμείσθαι. The subject understood with μιμείσθαι is τὸν μιμούμενον; and the participles which follow in ^a 21–22, to describe the differences of manner, are in apposition to that. In ^a 23, however, where Aristotle is dealing with the Drama, in which there is a plurality of imitators, he has to put the participles in the plural (ὧς πράττοντας), and the subject, instead of being left to be supplied, is definitely mentioned, and in the plural (τοὺς μιμουμένους, ^a 24).

^a 21 ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα κτέ. The amended reading of this passage (<ἦ> ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον is anticipated in Goulston's paraphrase, 'aut ut interdum eas exponat poeta, et interdum ipse alium quid, i. alia persona, fiat.' The ἦ which the MS. has before ἕτερον may very well be supposed to have been omitted (comp. 25, 1461^a 9), and then re-inserted in the wrong place, as a correction of ὅτε δὲ (comp. my 'Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics', p. 18).

ἕτερόν τι. Ulrich's correction ἕτερόν τινα (suggested by Plato's ὧς τις ἄλλος ὧν in Rep. 393 c) is the result of a curious oversight. As Aristotle began by speaking of the objects imitated in the neuter (τὰ αὐτὰ μιμείσθαι: see on ἕκαστα τούτων in ^a 19), he was bound to describe the imitator as identifying himself, not with 'some one else', but with 'something else' (ἕτερόν τι).

The statement in the text in ^a 21–24 is on the same lines as that in Plato Rep. 392 D–394 D; its very terminology is a reminiscence of Plato's; and it would be a mere enigma to us, if we had not the key to it in the Republic. Plato distinguishes between three forms of διήγησις: (1) simple narration, in which the poet speaks throughout *in propria persona*; (2) imitative or dramatic narration, in which he effaces himself as it were, and speaks in the person of another; and (3) the mixed manner, narrative and dramatic by turns, which we see in Homer. Aristotle's ἀπαγγέλλοντα recalls Plato's δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (Rep. 394 c); and his ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον the Platonic ὧς τις ἄλλος ὧν (Rep. 393 c). The combination also of the two manners in Homer (ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον) is a point

which Plato works out and explains at some length: *μέχρι μὲν 1448^a 21* *τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν, 'καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιοῦς, Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δῶν, κοσμήτορε λαῶν,' λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητῆς καὶ οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὦν ὁ Χρῦσης λέγει καὶ πειράται ἡμᾶς ὃ τι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα (Rep. 393 A). Plato's concluding formula for the Homeric or mixed mode of representation, *τὰς διηγῆσεις ποιῆσθαι . . . τὰ μὲν μιμουμένους τὰ δὲ μὴ* (Rep. 394 D), is the all but exact equivalent of Aristotle's *μιμῆσθαι . . . ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*. At the same time it must be admitted that there are certain noteworthy points of differences between the two statements. (1) With Plato the term *μιμῆσθαι* is restricted to the dramatic mode of representation; whereas Aristotle uses it in a much wider sense (see on 1, 1447^a 16). (2) The order also, in which the three possibilities are arranged, is different, since Aristotle takes them, not in the order of logic, but in that of time; and begins with Homer and the Homeric manner. And (3) when he comes (in ^a 23) to the third possibility, the purely dramatic form of expression, he is apparently thinking more of the actors than of the dramatic author himself (v. on ^a 23). Aristotle's general view in fact of the Epic is that it comes under the head of narrative, as distinct from dramatic, imitation (5, 1449^b 11 *τῷ . . . ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι*; comp. 6, 1449^b 26 *δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας*); and in his two chapters (23 and 24) specially dealing with epic poetry the Epic in *ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις* (23, 1459^a 17; 24, 1459^b 36)—the Drama being *ἡ ἐν τῷ πράττειν μίμησις* (22, 1459^a 15). This, however, does not prevent him from recognizing the Epic (as Plato had done before him) as a quasi-dramatic form of poetry. Every epic is said to have a quasi-dramatic element in it to some extent (*μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα*, 24, 1460^a 9), and the Homeric Epic has it in a very marked degree. Homer is said to reduce the element of narrative to a minimum (*ὀλίγα φρομισάμενος*, 24, 1460^a 9; comp. *ἐλάχιστα λέγειν*, ^a 7), taking every opportunity of making his personages come forward and speak for themselves, just as though they were characters in a play and on the stage (*εὐθύς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος*, 24, 1460^a 10). The 'mixed manner' of Homer, therefore, is acknowledged in chap. 24, as clearly and in much the same way as it seems to be in the words of the present passage (as amended), *ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*.*

1448^a 21 If the traditional text be retained (with Ritter, Vahlen, and others), it has to be read thus: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμῆσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα—ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον ὡσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα—ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους. According to this view the words ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα have to be taken as a general description of the narrative as opposed to the purely dramatic manner (πάντας ὡς πράττοντας κτέ.), the parenthesis recognizing the two possibilities within the sphere of narrative poetry. This interpretation of the passage (1) implies, to my mind, too wide a divergence from the scheme in the Republic; and (2) it practically assumes that ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα means no more than ἀπαγγέλλοντα or ἢ ἀπαγγέλλοντα; it also involves (3) what seems to me a hardly tenable interpretation of the concluding clause (see on ^a 23).

^a 22 ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα: another instance of parallelismus antitheticus (see on 1, 1447^a 18); it is the converse in sense of that in De caelo 2. 6, 288^a 31 εἶτε . . . ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό. It is not necessary to bracket the article before αὐτὸν, though the omission would certainly bring the present statement into closer conformity with that in Plato Rep. 393 A-D, and make the antithesis to be between what the poet says *in propria persona* (comp. 24, 1460^a 6, 11) and what he says in an assumed character.

^a 23 ἢ πάντα ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους. πάντα, the correction of Casaubon (De Sat. Poesi p. 82 Rambach), was tacitly adopted by Goulston. It is in apposition to the τὰ αὐτὰ in ^a 20, and serves to distinguish the Drama from the Epic, which is at best only partially dramatic. If πάντας be retained, it has to be taken with τοὺς μιμουμένους as the object after μιμῆσθαι understood from ^a 21. μιμῆσθαι, however, is already provided with an object, viz. τὰ αὐτὰ (^a 20); and τὰ αὐτὰ is much too important logically to be ignored through a change of construction. In chap. 2 Aristotle has shown how the subjects of the representation may differ. He tells us now that there are possibilities of difference also in the mode or manner of the representation, even when the subjects are the same (τὰ αὐτὰ); these differences of manner are indicated by the circumstantial participles in the clauses which follow τὰ αὐτὰ μιμῆσθαι ἔστιν. It will be observed that in this third participial clause the participles are in the plural, and that the grammatical subject, instead of being understood, as it was in ^a 20, is expressed, and also in the plural, τοὺς μιμου-

μένους. The explanation of the change of number is probably 1448^a 23 this, that Aristotle is thinking for the moment of the actors rather than of the poet himself. There are certainly several passages in the Poetics, very closely resembling that before us, in which the reference must be to the actors, a play being conceived to be something which 'they act', i.e. with a plurality of imitators concerned in it: comp. 6, 1449^b 26 δρώντων; ^b 31 πράττοντες ποιούνται τὴν μίμησιν; 1450^a 21 πράττουσιν. The suggestion that τοὺς μιμουμένους refers to the actors is due to E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 18. The clause, with the reading πάντας, is generally supposed to mean 'aut omnes qui imitatione exprimuntur quasi agentes et operantes imitari' (Tyrrhitt), τοὺς μιμουμένους being taken as a passive in the sense of the 'personages imitated'. The use of the present of μιμῆσθαι as a passive is not impossible, but there is, as far as I am aware, no clear instance of it¹; it may be observed too that in 15, 1454^a 26, where Aristotle wants a present passive of μιμῆσθαι, he does not say ὁ μιμούμενος, but has recourse to a periphrasis, ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων.

ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις κτέ. Comp. 1, 1447^a 16 διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλή-^a 24 λων τρισὶν κτέ. The preposition here (unlike that in the following ἐν οἷς) denotes the sphere within which the poetic imitation works. ταύταις is the real subject of the proposition (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 628), and preparative to the enumeration that follows, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὧς (comp. De caelo 2. 2, 285^a 11). The whole statement, therefore, is practically the same thing as ταῦτα δὴ, τὰ ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὧς, τρεῖς διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν αἷς ἢ μίμησις ἐστίν, or as Bon. Ind. 546^a 57 puts it, ἐν αἷς δὴ διαφοραῖς ἢ μίμησις γίγνεται, αὗται τρεῖς εἰσιν, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὧς.

ὥστε τῇ μὲν κτέ. is a sort of corollary to what was said in chap. 2^a 25 and the opening section of chap. 3. Aristotle is now once more viewing plays in their relation to the authors, and the actors are ignored. In chap. 6 there are several instances of his passing unconsciously from the one point of view to the other. Thus in 6, 1449^b 26, 31, 1450^a 10, 21, ^b 11 the reference is to the play as acted; whereas in 6, 1449^b 34, 1450^a 25-37, ^b 7 it is to the play as a literary production, the work of the poet.

πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται. The dramatic poet, instead of giving^a 27 us a merely verbal description of the incidents, makes his person-

¹ The passage in Plato Rep. 604 E (if μιμούμενον be retained) admits of another interpretation.

1448^a 27 ages appear on the stage, and go through a semblance of action. The difference between Aristotle's language here and in ^a 23 is to be noted: the dramatic poet μιμῆται πράττοντας; the actor μιμῆται ὡς πράττων.

^a 28 δρῶντας. This reminds Aristotle of a current explanation of the word *drama*, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας, and leads him off into a digression on the claim of the Dorians to the discovery of the Drama. This claim, he says, they support by an appeal to language; they maintain that not only κωμῳδία but also the general term δρᾶμα are words of Dorian origin. The statement here being quite sufficient for its purpose, it is not necessary to suppose (with Egger) a lacuna in the text, on the assumption that a Dorian etymology of τραγωδία also must have been mentioned. The present passage is clearly the ultimate source of the corresponding statements in the grammarians: Anon. De Comoedia (Kaibel, CGF. I p. 6) τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἠρῆσθαι φασιν ὑπὸ Σουσαρίωνος· τὴν δὲ ὀνομασίαν ἔχειν οἱ μὲν ὅτι περὶ τὰς κώμας περιμόντες ἦδον καὶ ἐπεδείκνυντο, μήπω πόλεων οὐσῶν ἀλλ' ἐν κώμαις οἰκούντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ ἀντιλέγοντές φασι μὴ κώμας καλεῖσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἀλλὰ δῆμους, καὶ κωμῳδίαν αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν ἐπεὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκώμαζον. —Diomedes 486 P. (=Kaibel, l. c. p. 57) *Comoedia dicta ἀπὸ τῶν κωμῶν; κῶμαι enim appellantur pagi, id est conventicula rusticorum . . . vel ἀπὸ τοῦ κώμου, id est comisatione, quia olim in eiusmodi fabulis amantium iuvenum κῶμοι caneabantur* (v. Reifferscheid, Suetonii Reliq. p. 7).

^a 31 οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. On the Megarian Comedy see Meineke, FCG. I p. 18. The doubts about it raised by Wilamowitz (Herm. 9 p. 319) have been examined by Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsber. 1888 p. 12) and Zielinski (Gliederung der altattischen Komödie p. 243). The Megarian claim to Comedy is noted by the anonymous commentator on Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123^a 24 (p. 186 Heylb.): διασύρονται γὰρ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται αὐτῆς ὡς παρ' αὐτοῖς πρῶτον εὑρεθείσης, εἰ γὰρ καὶ Σουσαρίων ὁ κατάρξας κωμῳδίας Μεγαρεὺς ἦν) κτέ.; his parenthetical recognition of it, however, has no independent value, as it is obviously only an amplification of the words in the text. It will be observed that Aristotle says nothing about Susarion either here or in chap. 5—where he expressly tells us that the earlier history of Comedy is not known.

^a 32 τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας. Megara is said to have expelled the tyrant Theagenes about B. C. 600.

οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας, the Megarians of Megara Hyblaea—literally, the 1448^a 32
Megarians 'on the Sicilian side'. For this use of the preposition
comp. Pol. 8. 7. 1341^b 28 οἱ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, 'those on the philo-
sophic side'.

^{Ἐπίχαρμος}. In 5, 1449^b 6 he and Phormis are said to have ^a 33
been the first to discard the Comedy of personalities; so that from
this point of view he was the forerunner of the New Comedy, i. e.
of what Aristotle regards as Comedy proper. Plato had already
given him the premier place in Comedy: Theaet. 152 Ε τῶν
ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμωδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος,
τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος. The Sicilian origin of Comedy is often
asserted by post-Aristotelian writers: Theocritus Ep. 17. 1 ὁ τὰν
κωμωδίαν εὐρῶν Ἐπίχαρμος.—Solinus 5. 13 *Hic* [scil. *in Sicilia*]
primum inventa comoedia.—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ
κωμωδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἀπὸ Σικελίας· ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦσθην
Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμις [see on 5, 1449^b 6]· κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθηναῖζε
συνηξήθη.—Prol. de Comoedia 3=Kaibel CGF. 1 p. 7 Ἐπίχαρμος·
οὗτος πρῶτος τὴν κωμωδίαν διερριμμένην ἀνεκτέησθε πολλά προσ-
φιλοτεχνήσας.—Suidas Ἐπίχαρμος: εὔρε τὴν κωμωδίαν ἐν Συρακούσαις
ἅμα Φόρμῳ. The whole question has been discussed by Bentley,
Wks. 1 p. 251 Dyce, and by Welcker, Kl. Schr. 1 p. 273.

Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος. From this mention of them here, as ^a 34
also from the allusion to them further on, in 5, 1449^b 3, it is
clear that Aristotle knows of no Attic writers of Comedy earlier
than Chionides and Magnes; and even these apparently are mere
names to him (see on 5, 1449^b 4). The comedies usually ascribed
to them (Kock, CAF. 1 pp. 4-9) were no doubt the work of a much
later age (comp. Wilamowitz, l. c. p. 335). As regards Chionides,
his appearance as a comic poet has been placed as early as
B. C. 487 on the strength of the statement in Suidas: Χιωνίδης,
Ἀθηναῖος, κωμικὸς τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας· ὃν καὶ λέγουσι πρωτα-
γωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας, διδάσκειν δὲ ἔτεσιν ὀκτώ
πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν. Magnes, who is known from an inscription
(694 Dittenberger²) to have been exhibiting a play at the city
Dionysia in or shortly after B. C. 464 (v. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 475),
is expressly described by Suidas as a much younger man than
Epicharmus: ἐπιβάλλει δ' Ἐπιχάρμῳ νέος πρεσβύτη. The chrono-
logy of the life of Epicharmus is beset with difficulties. He is
said to have lived to a very great age (90, or even 97), and to
have 'flourished' at the time of Gelo and Hiero, the tyrants of
Syracuse (B. C. 485-467); we may very well suppose him, however,

1448^a 34 to have written comedies before this period, as also to have lived beyond its limits. Suidas' statement that he was producing comedies at Syracuse six years before the Persian war (i. e. in B. C. 485: comp. Clinton FH. 2³ p. 31), when 'Euetes, Euxenides, and Myllus were performing at Athens' (*ἦν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν ἔτη ἕξ διδάσκων ἐν Συρακούσαις· ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις Εὐέτης καὶ Εὐξενίδης καὶ Μύλλος ἐπεδείκνυντο*), is of some importance, as showing that Epicharmus was conceived to be coeval with a generation at Athens anterior to Chionides and the regular drama which began with him (comp. Usener, Rh. Mus. 28 p. 423). There is no very serious difference, therefore, between Suidas and Aristotle as to the priority of Epicharmus.

καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας = τῆς δὲ τραγωδίας. Vahlen illustrates the change of construction by Soph. el. 11, 171^b 8 *συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς καὶ σοφιστικὸς ἔστιν εἰς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς . . . καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κτέ.*—where *καὶ ὅσοι* seems to stand for *ἕτεροι δὲ ὅσοι*; comp. also Hartung, *Lehre v. d. Partikeln* 2 p. 410. It would be a very simple alteration, and an improvement to the sense, to read *καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας* (<δ') *ἔνιοι* (J. of Phil. 10 p. 67).

ἔνιοι, i. e. the Sicyonians: Herod. 5. 67 *τά τε δὴ ἄλλα οἱ Σικυώνιοι ἐτίμων τὸν Ἀδρηστον καὶ δὴ πρὸς τὰ πάθεα αὐτοῦ τραγικοῖσι χοροῖσι ἐγέραιρον, τὸν μὲν Διόνυσον οὐ τιμῶντες, τὸν δὲ Ἀδρηστον.*—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. *καὶ τραγωδίας εὐρεταὶ μὲν Σικυώνιοι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ποιηταί.*—Suidas: *Θέσπις, Ἰκαρίου πόλεως Ἀττικῆς, τραγικὸς ἑκαδέκατος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου γενομένου τραγωδιοποιοῦ Ἐπιγένους τοῦ Σικυωνίου τιθέμενος, ὡς δέ τινες, δεύτερος μετὰ Ἐπιγένην· ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτὸν πρώτον τραγικὸν γενέσθαι φασίν* (comp. also Suid. s. v. *Οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον*). On Epigenes see Bentley, Wks. 1 p. 286 Dyce, and Bernhardt, Gr. Litt. 1⁵ p. 430.

^a 36 *περιοικίδας*: Pol. 6. 5, 1320^b 6 *αἰεὶ γὰρ τινὰς ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους.* As understood at Athens the term *κώμη* meant a quarter of the city, as distinct from the outlying townships (*δήμοι*): Plato Laws 746 D *φρατρίας καὶ δήμων καὶ κώμας.*—Isocrates 149 A *διελόμενοι τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατὰ κώμας τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δήμων* (v. also Photius Lex. s. v. *κώμην*, and Suidas s. v. with the commentators).

^a 37 *κωμφοδὸς* . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ *κωμάζειν*. The connexion is indirectly implied in the juxtaposition of the two words in the law cited (or interpolated) in Demosthenes 21. 10 *ἢ πομπῇ καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ ὁ κῶμος καὶ οἱ κωμφοδοὶ καὶ οἱ τραγωδοί.*

^b 1 *καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν κτέ.* The argument comes practically to this:

'Plays confessedly represent *actions*: now if they had been originally 1448^b 1 an Athenian invention, one would expect them to have been called *πράγματα* rather than *δράματα*; *πράττειν* being the ordinary Athenian word for *to act*.' That Aristotle does not accept this view of *δρᾶν* and *πράττειν* is indirectly shown by his own use of the words. He has just said (^a 27) *πράττοντας καὶ δρῶντας*, and in his definition of Tragedy (6, 1449^b 26) his word is *δρώντων*, though he might easily have said *πραττόντων*.

τῆς μιμήσεως is the genitive after *τῶν διαφορῶν*. Vahlen illus-^b 3 trates the order by Plato, Phil. 17 c *ἐπειδὴν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὅποσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς*.

εὐκασι. Setting aside the antiquarian questions raised in^b 4 chap. 3, Aristotle asserts that the birth of poetry was due to large natural causes. The origin of poetry generally (*γεννηῆσαι μὲν ὅλως*) is attributable to the imitative instinct in all men. The origin of the two great kinds of poetry (*διεσπάσθη δὲ*^b 24), of which Tragedy and Comedy were the ultimate developments, is attributable to the personal tendencies and differences of character in the individual poets (*τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη*^b 24).

αἰτίαι δύο. The two causes are those mentioned in the immediate context, *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι* (^a 5) and *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι* (^a 8). These Aristotle regards as two distinguishable facts in human nature; it will be observed too that he proves the second point by a formal argument, which he has not thought necessary to do in the case of the first. *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι*, instead of coming in as a mere afterthought after *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι*, involves a different idea, and relates to a different class of persons—the public interested in works of art, as distinct from the artists who produce them. Aristotle is perfectly aware that the cultivation of an art implies not only artists but also a public to accept and reward their work (comp. Teichmüller, *Aristot. Forsch.* 2 p. 203).

μιμητικώτατον: Probl. 30. 6, 956^a 14 *Διὰ τί ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον*^b 7 *μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ζῷῳ; . . . ἢ ὅτι μιμητικώτατον; μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο*. Vahlen illustrates this use of the neuter singular by De somn. 3, 457^b 24 *καταπίπτονσι . . . οἱ ἄνθρωποι, μόνον γὰρ ὄρθον τῶν ζῶων*, and Pol. I. 2, 1253^a 16 *τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τᾶλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ . . . αἰσθησιν ἔχειν*.

μαθήσεις: Quintilian 10. 2, 1 *Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. nam ut invenire primum fuit estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi. atque omnis vitae ratio sic constat, ut quae probamus in aliis facere*

1448^b 7 *ipsi velimus. sic litterarum ductus, ut scribendi fiat usus, pueri sequuntur; sic musici vocem docentium, pictores opera priorum, rustici probatam experimento culturam in exemplum intuentur; omnis denique disciplinae initia ad propositum sibi praescriptum formari videmus.*

^b 9 σημεῖον. A σημεῖον is that which proves or confirms a proposition; an αἴτιον, something that explains or gives a reason for it. Aristotle defines a σημεῖον in An. pr. 2. 27, 70^a 7 σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἐνδοξος· οὐ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὐ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι (comp. Bon. Ind. 677^b 1).

^b 10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: 're ipsa' (Tyrwhitt; v. Bon. Ind. 286^a 43 and Schwegler on Metaph. A 3, 984^a 12). τῶν ἔργων here is often rendered by 'works of art' ('in operibus opificum', Victorius).

ἀ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν: Rhet. I. 11, 1371^b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μαθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἶον τό τε μεμμημένον [μμητικόν Vet. Vers.], ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητικὴ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὔ μεμμημένον ἦ, κἂν ἦ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μαθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.—De part. an. I. 5, 645^a 11 καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν [i.e. τῶν ζώων τῶν μὴ κεχαρισμένων] θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἶον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστῶτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτέρων ζώων ἐπίσκεψιν. Plutarch also (De aud. poet. 18 A; Qu. conv. 5. 1, 674 A) has a good deal to say on this point.

^b 12 ἀτιμωτάτων: De anima I. 2, 404^b 3 ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν [i.e. νοῦν] τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμωτέροις.—De part. an. I. 5, 645^a 15 (see on ^b 10).

^b 13 καὶ τοῦτο. For the conjunction comp. 13, 1453^a 17 σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγόμενον.—De somno 3, 456^b 28 σημεῖον δὲ τούτων καὶ τὰ ὑπνωτικά.—Meteor. 2. 8, 367^a 11 τεκμήριον δ' ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ γιγόμενον.—Xenoph. An. I. 9. 29 τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου καὶ τὸδε.

^b 16 θεωροῦντας μαθάνειν: comp. Rhet. I. c., and Plato Rep. 475 D οἱ . . . φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμαθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι. Belger (De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica componenda Platonis discipulo p. 45) finds some further traces of Plato in this portion of the Poetics. Our pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or other work of imitative art is explained here

to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery 1448^b 16 or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture (comp. Probl. 19. 5, 918^a 3).

οὐχ ἦ. οὐχὶ for οὐχ ἦ is found in K^b in Eth. N. 8. 12, 1161^a 1, ^b 18 and in D (the Marcianus) in An. post. 1. 23, 84^b 8.

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῶν τοῦ μιμείσθαι. This has been supposed ^b 20 to stand somewhat loosely for the two things previously mentioned, τὸ μιμείσθαι and τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι; but a little reflexion will show that Aristotle has not fallen into any such inexactness of language. What he is now considering is the evolution of the poet; and he tells us that the imitative aptitude of the poet is only a higher and more developed form of that natural aptitude for imitation which is common to all mankind. There is no reason why he should also remind us at this point of the naturalness of the pleasure that we derive from poetry and other kinds of imitation.

καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ seem to be added as an after-thought, in recognition of the historical connexion between music and poetry. Except in its lyric forms, however, poetry was now no longer combined with music; in Aristotle's view, also, even metre is at the most only one of its accidents (1, 1447^b 11). A very different view has been taken of these words by Tyrwhitt and Vahlen—and long before their time by Averroes and Sigonius (Emend. p. 152)—who suppose harmony and rhythm to be the second of the αἰτίαι δύο φυσικαί mentioned in the early part of the chapter (^b 5). There are two objections to this interpretation: (1) it ignores the significance of the distinction between τὸ μιμείσθαι and τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι (v. on ^b 4); and (2) if τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ are to bear this emphasis, one would expect them to be brought in in a less incidental way, and with a reason of some sort to justify the position ascribed to them. As the matter is in Aristotle's opinion of such secondary importance, he does not stop to show that our sense of harmony and rhythm is natural, or to explain how it has come to be natural to us (comp. Probl. 19. 38, 920^b 29). Metre is said to be a mode of rhythm in Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^b 28, ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμὸς ἐστίν, οὐ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά [[?] τμημάτα]. On the difference between them see Cicero Orator 67, Quintilian 9. 4, 45, and Schol. Hephaest. p. 144 Gaisf.

ἕξ ἀρχῆς is much the same thing as ἐν ἀρχῇ (Eucken, Sprachgebr. ^b 22 p. 10). If it may be taken not with ἐγέννησαν but with the

1448^b 22 participle, the antithesis between ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες and προάγοντες will be not unlike that in *Metaph. A 2, 982^b 13* ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες.

αὐτὰ: loosely used for 'their work' or 'performances'; it anticipates what is termed in the next line 'their improvisations'. προάγειν is here (and again in 4, 1449^a 13) a transitive verb; in the Aristotelian passages in which it seems to be intransitive (= προϊέναι) an object can generally be supplied without difficulty from the context (comp. *Bon. Ind. 633^b 10*). The meaning of the word in the present context is to 'advance', or 'carry a stage further' (comp. *Plato Polit. 262 c*), as may be seen from the parallel in *Soph. el. 33, 183^b*, in which the gradual progress or advance of Rhetoric and other arts is described: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὐρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἶον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηἰξήκασιν.

^b 23 αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. On the verb αὐτοσχεδιάζειν = 'to speak off-hand, without premeditation or previous study' see *Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. s.v.* The fact is described in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes 54* θεὸς δ' ὑπὸ καλὸν ἄειδεν, ἐξ αὐτοσχεδίας πειρώμενος, ἥτε κοῦροι ἤβηται θαλίησι παραιβόλα κερτομέουσιν, ἀμφὶ Δία Κρονίδην καὶ Μαιάδα καλλιπέδιλον. A similar view of the origin of poetry is implied in *Quintilian 9. 4, 114* *poema nemo dubitaverit imperito quodam initio fusum et aurium mensura et similiter decurrentium spatiorum observatione esse generatum, mox in eo repletos pedes.*—*Maximus Tyr. 37. 4* Ἀθηναῖος δὲ ἡ μὲν παλαιὰ μούσα χοροὶ παιδῶν ἦσαν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, γῆς ἐργάται κατὰ δήμους ἰστάμενοι . . . ἄσματα ἄδοντες αὐτοσχέδια (comp. on 4, 1449^a 9, and *Bentley, Wks. 1 p. 250 Dyce*). The phallic-song, in which Aristotle finds the germ of Comedy, was sometimes described as an ᾠδὴ αὐτοσχεδῖος (see on 4, 1449^a 12).

^b 24 διεσπάσθη δὲ corresponds with the γεννηῆσαι μὲν ὅλως in ^b 4. κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη: comp. *Plato Rep. 396 c sqq.*

^b 25 τὰς καλὰς . . . πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων. As *Düntzer (Rettung der aristotelischen Poetik p. 129)* and *Bernays (Zwei Abh. p. 28)* have shown, this is not a tautology, as the actions of those who are καλοὶ (τῶν τοιούτων) are not always καλαὶ πράξεις; comp. *Plato Rep. 396 c* μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἦττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ τινος ἄλλης ξυμφορᾶς.

ψόγους has the same concrete sense of 'invectives' in Plato 1448^b 27 Laws 829 c *ἐγκώμια τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν*. The earliest, as well as the most eminent representative of this kind of literature, was Archilochus, the *ψογερός Ἀρχίλοχος βαρυλόγους ἔχθεσιν παινωόμενος* of Pindar (Pyth. 2. 100).

ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια: Plato Rep. 607 A *ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*.—Etyim. Gud. s. v. *ὕμνος*: *Ὑμνος ἐγκωμίον διαφέρει καθὼ δὲ μὲν ὕμνος ἐπὶ θεοῦ λέγεται τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων*. On hymns and encomia as very primitive forms of Greek poetry see Bergk, Gr. Litt. I p. 423.

εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλούς, scil. *τοιούτους*; comp. Goulston's version, ^b 29 'verisimile autem est, qui talia condiderint, extitisse multos.' Aristotle says this because he thinks that even in those days the baser sort (*οἱ εὐτελέστεροι* ^b 26) were probably in a majority; he has no romantic illusions as to the superiority of the men of an earlier age (Pol. 2. 8, 1269^a 5). On the pre-Homeric poets, to whom Aristotle refers, comp. Sextus Emp. Adv. math. I. 204 *οὐχ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται ποιητῆς ἀρχαιότατος εἶναι Ὅμηρος· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ Ἡσίοδον προήκειν τοῖς χρόνοις λέγουσιν, Δίον τε καὶ Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον καὶ ἄλλους παμπληθεῖς*: see also Bernhardy Gr. Litt. I^b p. 308. Aristotle, however, was quite aware that the writings which bore the names of these legendary poets were not really by them (H. A. 6. 6, 563^a 18; see Bernays, Dialogue d. Aristot. p. 95).

ἐκείνου δὲ Μαργίτης: Eustratius on Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141^a 14 (p. 320 ^b 30 Heylb.) *παράγει . . . καὶ τινα ποίησιν Μαργίτην ὀνομαζομένην Ὀμήρου. μνημονεύει δ' αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος καὶ Κρατίνος καὶ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τῷ ἐπιγράμματι καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν εἶναι Ὀμήρου τὸ ποίημα*. On the Margites, which Aristotle thus attributes to Homer, see Kinkel, EGF. p. 64. This statement in the Poetics does not throw any light on the question of the original form of the Margites, whether the iambic lines in it were a primitive part of the poem, or subsequently added by Pigres (see Goettling, Op. Acad. p. 167, and Hiller, N. Jahrb. f. Phil. 1887 p. 13 for a discussion of it); it stands in a parenthesis, and must not be taken in any direct connexion with the *ἐν οἷς . . . ἱαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον* that follows.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to writings more or less like the Margites by post-Homeric poets—not to other minor poems of a light order attributable to Homer himself, as Bergk (Gr. Litt. I p. 775) suggests.

1448^b 30 ἐν οἷς = ἐν δὲ τούτοις, scil. τοῖς ψόγοις, the relative beginning a new sentence, as in 24, 1459^b 12 οἷς ἅπανιν.—Phys. 8. 3, 253^b 12 πρὸς οὓς . . . οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.—Metaph. © 3, 1046^b 33 οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.—Λ 8, 1074^b 8 ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον.

κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον: 17, 1455^b 10 κατὰ τὸ εἰκός.—Rhet. 1. 1, 1355^a 22 and 9, 1367^b 12 κατὰ τὸ προσήκον (opposed to παρὰ τὸ προσήκον).—Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123^a 20 παρὰ τὸ δέον. The reading of the Aldine (and of Parisinus 2038), καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον, has been accepted by Bon. Ind. 357^b 48.

^b 31 ἦλθε: the verb has the same sense in Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133^a 20 ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλήλυθε.—Pol. 1. 9, 1258^a 6 τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν.

ἱαμβεῖον καλεῖται: Strabo 422 Cas. ὁ μὲν (scil. ὁ δάκτυλος) ὕμνοις ἐστὶν οἰκεῖος ὁ δ' ἱαμβος κακισμοῖς.—Proclus Chrestom. 7, p. 346 Gaisf. τὸν ἱαμβον τάττεσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ λουδορίας τὸ παλαιόν' καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἱαμβίζειν κατὰ τινα γλῶσσαν λουδορεῖν ἔλεγον . . . ἔοικε δὲ ὁ ἱαμβος τὸ μὲν παλαιόν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ψόγον καὶ ἔπαινον γραφομένων ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι' ἐπεὶ δὲ τινες ἐπλεόνασαν ἐν ταῖς κακολογίαις τὸ μέτρον, ἐκείθεν τὸ ἱαμβίζειν εἰς τὸ ὑβρίζειν ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας ἐκπεσεῖν.—Schol. Hephaest. 6, p. 182 Gaisf. ἐκλήθη δὲ ἱαμβος, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ μέτρον παρονομάζεται ἱαμβικόν, ἐπεὶ περ οἱ ὑβρίζειν καὶ λουδορεῖν τινὰς βουλόμενοι τούτῳ ἐχρῶντο τῷ μέτρῳ' ἱαμβίζειν γὰρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ὑβρίζειν.—Suetonii Reliq. p. 19 Reiff. *Iambus est carmen maledictum . . . appellatum est autem παρὰ τὸ ἱαμβίζειν, quod est maledicere.*

^b 33 τῶν παλαιῶν. The reference is apparently to Homer and Archilochus, as the first and greatest representatives of the two great directions in poetry; comp. Velleius Paterc. 1. 5 *Neque quenquam alium, cuius operis primus auctor fuerit, in eo perfectissimum praefer Homerum et Archilochum reperiemus.*—Dio Chrysost. Or. 33, p. 5 R. δύο γὰρ ποιητῶν γεγονότων ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ αἰῶνος, οἷς οὐδένα τῶν ἄλλων συμβάλλειν ἄξιον, Ὅμηρον τε καὶ Ἀρχιλόχον, τούτων Ὅμηρος μὲν σχεδὸν πάντα ἐνεκωμίασε . . . Ἀρχίλοχος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἦκε [fort. ἦξε], τὸ ψέγειν. Their pre-eminence is implied in the juxtaposition of the two names in Heraclitus fr. 119 (42 Diels), τὸν τε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ραπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

^b 34 τὰ σπουδαῖα . . . ποιητῆς: comp. Plato Apol. 18 B τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής.

^b 35 οὐχ ὅτι εὖ, scil. ἐποίησεν. Homer 'wrote well', as a master of

the art of poetic expression (comp. 24, 1459^b 16; 1460^b 1); his poems are 'imitations', or pictures of human life, which distinguishes them from those of Empedocles and others (comp. 1, 1447^b 15); and they are moreover 'dramatic imitations', i. e. not unlike those in the Drama (comp. 24, 1460^a 5). In this way, then, Aristotle intimates that Homer not only dealt with the same kind of subject as Tragedy (τὰ σπουδαῖα), but also anticipated the dramatic manner.

σχήματα . . . ὑπέδειξεν, 'marked out for us the great outlines of Comedy'. σχῆμα has the same sense in 5, 1449^b 3, and in Plato Laws 5, 737 D σχήματος ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς. For the use of ὑπέδειξε comp. Rhet. 3, 2, 1404^b 25 ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.—Ath. Pol. 41 Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν, Ἐφιάλτης δ' ἐπετέλεσεν.—Isocrates 268 A ταῦτα πρᾶττοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποδεικνύοντες.

οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας. The sense is that, when Homer passed from σπουδαῖα to φαῦλα, his treatment of the latter was more akin to that in the comic poets than to that in the *ιαμβοποιοί*; Margites with him was only ridiculous—not vicious or held up to obloquy as vicious, as a writer of ψόγοι would have made him. A ψόγος dwells on some serious vice of character; whereas Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, deals only with those lesser faults which we are able to laugh at (see on 5, 1449^a 33). This view of the Margites is not quite in harmony with that in 4, 1448^b 30, where it is regarded as a ψόγος, the first known instance of the kind.

With οὐ ψόγον Vahlen supplies ποιήσας from the δραματοποιήσας that follows. This is legitimate enough, but hardly necessary, as δραματοποιεῖν, 'to write, or describe, as a dramatist would' (see on 22, 1458^b 9) is just as applicable to ψόγον as it is to τὸ γελοῖον (comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'non vituperium sed ridiculum dramatice exprimens'). The meaning Aristotle attaches to it may be seen from μμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν in 35 (v. ad loc.).

ὥσπερ Ἰλιάς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια. Vahlen illustrates this insertion of the article before Ὀδύσσεια by De resp. 17, 478^b 28 ἔστι δὲ θάνατος καὶ ἡ φθορὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς μὴ ἀτελέσιν, and Rhet. 3, 13, 1414^b 13 ἔσται οὖν . . . διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις, and a number of other passages in Aristotle (comp. also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 240 G). On the other hand Spengel would restore the article before Ἰλιάς on account of its appearance in the parallel in 26, 1462^b 8 ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα

1448^b 38 *μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια* (comp. also 24, 1459^b 14 *ἡ μὲν Ἰλιάς . . . ἡ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια*). There is as a rule nothing exceptional or anomalous in Aristotle's usage in reference to the article with the titles of books. He is apt to omit it, just as Athenaeus does, when the title is given in the actual form which it would have as the heading of a MS. (comp. Apollonius Synt. 1, 26), after the preposition *ἐν*. The Poetics supply a number of examples of this usage, e.g. 16, 1455^a 2 *ἐν Ἀλκίονου ἀπολόγῳ*.—24, 1460^a 35 *τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ ἄλογα*.—14, 1454^a 1 *ἐν Ἀντιγόνη*.—16, 1455^a 4 *ἐν Χοηφόροις*.—24, 1460^a 31 *ἐν Ἠλέκτρᾳ*.—^a 32 *ἐν Μυσοῖς*.—25, 1461^b 21 *ἐν Ὀρέστῃ*. In 24, 1460^a 30, however, the traditional text omits the article with a title in the nominative; for it is clear that *Οἰδίπους* in this place means the Oedipus Tyrannus, in the same way as with us 'Hamlet' may mean the play, not the person. In many places in which the article is omitted, the title is used in a general sense as a common noun; thus in Soph. el. 24, 180^a 21 *δός μοι Ἰλιάδα* means 'give me an Iliad' (i.e. a copy of the Iliad). Instances of this in the Poetics are 8, 1451^a 20 *Ἡρακλῆίδα Ἡησιῆδα*, 'a Heraclid, a Theseid'.—^a 24 *Ὀδύσσειαν*, 'an Odyssey'.—23, 1459^b 3 *Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας*, 'a poem like the Iliad or Odyssey'.—^b 4 *Κυπρίων*, 'a poem like the *Κύπρια*'. I am inclined to think, therefore, that Spengel was right in suggesting *ὥσπερ <ἡ> Ἰλιάς* in the present passage; and also that in 24, 1460^a 30 the true reading must be *ὥσπερ <ὁ> Οἰδίπους*.

1449^a 3 *ἐκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν* recalls the distinction drawn in 4, 1448^b 24 between the two great forms of poetry, the higher and the lower.

κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν: 4, 1448^b 24 *κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη*.

^a 4 *ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμωδοποιῶν ἐγένοντα*. Vahlen compares De part. an. 2. 13, 657^b 34 *ἡ δὲ τῆς φυλακῆς πάντα σκληρόφθαλμά ἐστιν*, and Herod. 7. 62 *ἀπὸ τῶν πύλων μιμητῆροι ἦσαν*.

^a 7 *ἔχει . . . τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς*. For the dative comp. Meteor. 1. 3, 339^b 5 *πῶς ἔχει τάξει πρὸς τᾶλλα*.—De anima 2. 3, 414^b 33 *τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι*.

For the sense of *εἶδεσιν* in this passage, Vahlen (Beitr. 1 p. 22) compares that of *σχήματα* in the account of Comedy in 4, 1448^b 36 and 5, 1449^b 3. *εἶδη* seems to mean the formative constituents of Tragedy, the forms it must embody in order to realize its nature in its completeness. Aristotle assumes that Tragedy has by this time attained to its natural form (^a 15 *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*); but he declines to consider the question whether there is still a possibility

of improvement in the treatment of its various formative constituents. The suggestion that the εἶδη here meant are the same as the μέρη distinguished in chap. 6, from another point of view, is due to Madius. εἶδος in the sense of a formative constituent is perhaps unique in Aristotle, but there are certainly a few instances of it in Plato Rep. iv (comp. Campbell, 2 p. 298), where the three faculties in the soul are sometimes described as εἶδη (434 D, 439 E, 440 B) and sometimes as μέρη (442 B, C). The alternative interpretation is to take εἶδη in the logical sense of 'species'. This view, though not improbable in itself (comp. 18, 1455^b 32), is hardly reconcilable with the use of εἶδη in 6, 1450^a 13 as a designation for the μέρη with which the chapter is dealing.

αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτό κρίναι. On the reading here see J. of Phil. 5^a 8 p. 117. The conjunction serves to connect κρίναι with ἐπισκοπεῖν, the second clause being complementary to the first (comp. 6, 1450^b 3). Similarly in De anima 3. 3, 427^b 15 φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις, the second clause (αὐτή τε κτέ.) is explanatory of the first. κρίναι has been taken as an infinitive of limitation by Vahlen, who quotes H. A. 9. 38, 622^b 20 τῶν δ' ἐντόμων ἐργατικώτατον ζῶων ἐστί, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα συγκρίνεσθαι πάντα, τό τε τῶν μυρμήκων γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν. As far as I can see, an infinitive of limitation would not be quite in place in a passage like the present.

For the antithesis between καθ' αὐτό and πρὸς τὰ θέατρα comp. Top. 5. 1, 128^b 16 ἀποδίδοται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ αἰεὶ ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ.—Cat. 6, 5^b 16 οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι (comp. Bon. Ind. 212^a 2). κρίνειν has an indirect question after it in Metaph. A 4, 984^b 31 τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρῆ διανεῖμαι . . . ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον.

γενομένης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς = γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς. Having begun with γενομένης . . . αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς, scil. τῆς τραγωδίας, Aristotle sees that the same is true of Comedy, and adds a parenthesis to show that; after which he says in ^a 13 ηὐξήθη, just as though γενομένη . . . αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ had begun the clause. For another instance of a gen. abs. in lieu of a nominative see 17, 1455^b 3 (comp. Bon. Ind. 149^b 26 and Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 110). A parenthetical addition of very similar form is found in 5, 1449^b 12, and also (with Christ's punctuation) in Metaph. ① 10, 1051^b 11. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is used adverbially (comp. Pol. 7. 16, 1334^b 29, and Plato Criti. 112 E) in the same

1449^a 9 sense as ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Several of the recent editors and translators, however, accepting the reading *γενομένη* of certain apographs, take ἀρχῆς and αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς together as meaning an ‘improvisational beginning’. This certainly simplifies matters, but it may be doubted whether ἀρχῆ αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ would naturally bear that meaning.

^a II τῶν ἐξαρχόντων. ‘ἐξάρχειν τὸν διθύραμβον, ἢ τὰ φαλλικά, ii dicebantur qui choro utrivis canendo praeiverunt; qui, ut verisimile est, ab initio poetae ipsi fuerunt’, says Tyrwhitt, quoting Archilochus (fr. 77 Bergk) ὡς Διωνύσοι ἀνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος οἶδα διθύραμβον. By the ἐξάρχων here Aristotle means the poet-composer, who supplied both words and air, and taught them to the chorus—not as is sometimes supposed, the κορυφαῖος, who was only one of the chorus (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 325). ἐξάρχειν διθύραμβον is practically a synonym for διδάσκειν διθύραμβον, the expression in Herodotus i. 23.

It is clear that Aristotle has in his own mind a general view of the historical development of early Greek poetry, but he tells us as little as possible about it—in fact no more than is absolutely necessary for present purposes. The intention of the Poetics is to give us a theory of the Epic and of the Drama (see on 1, 1447^a 8), not a treatise on the history and archaeology of the Drama. The Epic having been traced to its origin (4, 1448^b 23–33), Aristotle turns to the question of the rise and progress of the Drama. Both forms of Drama, he thinks, arose out of lyric or choral poetry. Tragedy began when the author of the dithyramb came forward with an ‘improvisation’, i. e. with a ῥῆσις or spoken statement, which he improvised in the interval between the two halves of the song of the chorus—that being the origin of the two great constituents of a Greek drama, a spoken part and a sung part, an actor and a chorus. This is a sufficient account of the facts; and there was no need for Aristotle to go off into a multiplicity of historical or antiquarian details. His silence on such points is no proof of his ignorance of the legendary history of Attic Tragedy. The allusion in τῶν ἐξαρχόντων in the text is probably to Thespis, whom he is known to have mentioned, in a fragment (probably of the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν*) preserved by Themistius Or. 26, 382 Dind.: οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιῶν ἦδεν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεύρεν; (comp. Heitz, Fr. Arist. 19 and Bernays, Dial. d. Aristot. p. 139). Here the ‘hymn to the gods’ corresponds with

the Dithyramb; and the 'prologue and speech' introduced by 1449^a 11. Thespis may be identified with the improvisations of the actor-poet, which transformed the Dithyramb into Tragedy. It is clear from Aristotle's confession of ignorance as to Comedy in 5; 1449^a 37 that he knows more of the history of Tragedy than he actually tells us, and that he is not aware of there being any serious lacuna in it (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 320).

φαλλικά: Photius Lex. Φαλλικόν ποιήμα αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ἀδόμενον.—Hesychius Φαλλικόν ὄρχημά τι οἱ δὲ μέλος ἄλλοι ᾠδὴν αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ἀδομένην. In these phallus-songs, which were a widespread institution in Greece (comp. Heraclitus fr. 127, and Herodotus 2, 48), Aristotle sees the origin of Comedy; it arose, he thinks, through the author of the song 'improvising' some scurrilous tale—no doubt in the interval between the parts of the song—and becoming in this way the forerunner of the single actor of the earliest form of Comedy. It will be observed that he supposes Tragedy and Comedy to have developed on exactly the same lines. A coarse and irregular Comedy, not unlike what Aristotle seems to be assuming, is known to have survived in certain parts of Greece even in post-Aristotelian times (Athenaeus 621 E sqq.).

προαγόντων: see on 4, 1448^b 22.

μεταβολᾶς: 5, 1449^a 37 αἰ τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις.

ἡ τραγωδία. The word is repeated, because Comedy is in a somewhat different position (5, 1449^a 38).

ἐπαύσατο. For the tense of the participle (misunderstood by Elmsley on Eurip. Heracl. 721) comp. An. post. 2. 1, 89^b 27 εὐρόντες γὰρ ὅτι ἐκλείπει πεπαύμεθα.—Meteor. 1. 3, 339^b 32 θεωρήσαντες ἂν τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα . . . ἴσως ἂν ἐπαύσαντο ταύτης τῆς παιδικῆς δόξης.—De mem. 2, 453^a 24 οὐ γὰρ ῥαδίως παύεται κινήσεια.

φύσιν: Pol. 1. 2, 1252^b 32 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φάμεν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. On φύσιν in the sense of the natural form of a thing see Bon. Ind. 838^a 41.

καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος. There is no need to assume a lacuna here (with Ueberweg). Having shown how Tragedy began with a single actor (^a 11), Aristotle proceeds to note the introduction of a second, and after that, of a third actor. The increasing prominence of the actor is in his view the most significant fact in the evolution of the Drama; the other points

^a 13

^a 14

^a 15

1449^a 15 mentioned are either of minor importance or the direct consequence of the change in the number of actors. A difficulty may perhaps be found in the language in the text, as the *καί*, with which the statement begins, cannot be taken as connecting *ἤγαγε* etc. with the *ἐπαύσατο* or the *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν* in the preceding sentence. The difficulty disappears if one observes that the emphasis there is on the participial *πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα* (comp. 5, 1449^b 2 *ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης*), which repeats the idea of the *κατὰ μικρὸν ἠῤῥήθη* in ^a 13. The *καί* in fact is explanatory, introducing a series of statements in support of the original assertion that Tragedy underwent many changes before attaining to its ultimate form.

ὑποκριτῶν. The actor is called a *ὑποκριτής* not (as is so often said) because he answered the chorus, but because he was the poet's spokesman, who interpreted his text to the public (see Heimsoeth, *De voce ὑποκριτής*, and Sommerbrodt, *Scaenica* p. 259, 289). The term must have acquired this sense at the time when, by a division of labour, the poet left the acting to others, instead of being himself the performer of his pieces, as he originally was according to *Rhet.* 3. 1, 1403^b 23 *ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον*. The position of the *ὑποκριτής* in fact was analogous to that of the *ῥαψῳδός*; they were both of them intermediaries, who interpreted the words of a poet to the public. It is to be noted that in describing the rhapsodist in the *Ion* Plato in one place terms him a *ἐρμηνεύς* and in another a *ὑποκριτής*, apparently without any difference of meaning: *Ion* 530^c *τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἐρμηνεῖα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι*, and 535^e *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατῆς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος . . . ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺν ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής*. For the sense of the derivative *ὑποκριτικῆ* see on 19, 1456^b 10.

^a 16 *Αἰσχύλος*: comp. the Aristotelian survey of the progress of the Drama in Themistius *Or.* 26 p. 382 Dind. (v. on ^a 11): *οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιῶν ἦδεν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξέειπεν, Αἰσχύλος δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν καὶ ὀκρίβαντας, τὰ δὲ πλείω τούτων Σοφοκλέους ἀπελαύσαμεν καὶ Εὐριπίδου*; There is no doubt a discrepancy between this and the statement in the text about Aeschylus, but it need not disturb us, unless we assume Aristotle to have been incapable of a change of opinion even on a small matter of learned research. Ancient opinion was divided on the point: *Vita Aeschyli*

(Dindorf, Poet. scen.^b prol. p. 3): ἐχρήσατο δ' ὑποκριτῆ πρώτῳ μὲν 1449^a 16
Κλεάνδρῳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον αὐτῷ προσήψε Μυννίσκον τὸν
Χαλκιδέα· τὸν δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν αὐτὸς ἐξεῦρεν, ὡς δὲ Δικαίαρχος ὁ
Μεσσήγιος, Σοφοκλῆς·

τὸν λόγον: the portion recited or spoken, as opposed to τὰ^a 17
τοῦ χοροῦ, the portion sung (τὰ ἀδόμενα in 18, 1456^a 28); comp.
the use of λόγοι in 6, 1450^b 6, 9 in the sense of the speeches or
ρήσεις in a play. Λόγος is a word with a Protean variety of
meanings even in the Poetics. In 1, 1447^a 22 (etc.) it means
'language', as opposed to metre and music; in 6, 1450^b 15
'prose', as distinct from verse; in 22, 1459^a 13 an 'oration', as
opposed to a poem; in 15, 1454^a 18 (comp. 19, 1456^a 37, 16),
the 'language', as distinct from the action, of the personages; in
17, 1455^b 17 (comp. 34; 5, 1449^b 8; 24, 1460^a 27), the 'story',
as distinct from its setting in the actual poem. And in 20, 1457^a 23
it is one of the technical terms of Aristotelian logic or grammar.

πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, 'made it assume the leading part'^a 18
in the play'. For this metaphorical use of πρωταγωνιστής comp.
that of the derivative πρωταγωνιστεῖν in Pol. 8. 4, 1338^b 29 ὥστε
τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριώδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ
τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. Instances of this extension of meaning
(which is common enough in later Greek) will be found in HSt.
s.v. πρωταγωνιστής and πρωταγωνιστέω. Aristotle is apt to use
technical terms of theatrical origin in their popular sense (see on
14, 1453^b 8 χορηγίας) even in a book like the Poetics.

σκηνογραφίαν: i. e. Sophocles was the first to have the screen
behind the actors painted to represent the façade of a palace or
a temple, or whatever else the play required as its background.
The improvement here ascribed to Sophocles was sometimes attrib-
uted to Aeschylus (Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 142; Haigh, Attic
Th.³ p. 181).

ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος: comp. ^a 28 ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη. τὸ μέγεθος^a 19
is apparently a nominative *extra structuram*, like an item in an
inventory. There are some fairly well-established instances of this
anomalous use of the nominative (Bon. Ind. 46^b 41; Meisterhans,
Gr.³ p. 203; Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 45). τὸ μέγεθος=its magni-
tude, or extent, i. e. the length now usual in Tragedy. The word,
however, is not always a purely neutral term; as the opposite of
μικρότης (comp. the ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων in the context), it may very
well mean a 'considerable length' (or 'size'), so as to suggest an

1449^a 19 idea of the importance or dignity of the object; comp. Eth. N. 4, 4, 1122^b 32 μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.—Pol. 5, 10, 1313^a 7 τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. The ἀπεσεμνύθη in the next line shows this to be at any rate by implication the sense of μέγεθος in the present passage.

Aristotle evidently had in his own mind a clear and precise conception of the origin of Tragedy, though it is difficult for us to recover more than fragments of it from a statement so brief and allusive as that in the text. He merely tells us (1) that the most primitive tragedies dealt with short stories; (2) that the language of the primitive actor, instead of being serious and solemn, was sportive or jocose, and (3) in trochaics, not in iambs. By way of explanation of this last point, he adds that, as Tragedy was originally akin to the satyric drama, the language of the primitive tragic actor had still something of the rhythm of the dance about it. Aristotle's idea of the original tragic actor may possibly have been that he also was made up as a satyr (comp. Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles¹ 1. p. 87). He certainly mentions one characteristic of the stage-satyr, his jesting language, and seems to imply another, viz. his dance-like movements (comp. Welcker, Nachtrag zu der Schrift ü. d. Aesch. Tril. p. 337).

ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων: such as might be told, for instance, in a single act. For the asyndeton comp. 5, 1449^b 12; De anima 3, 2, 426^b 24; De sensu 3, 440^a 8 (οἷον ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφῆς ποιοῦσιν ἑτέραν χροάν ἐφ' ἑτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφουσιν); Metaph. ① 10, 1051^b 11 (ed. Christ).

^a 20 ὁψὲ ἀπεσεμνύθη. The time meant is presumably the age of Phrynichus.

^a 21 ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβείου ἐγένετο: Rhet. 3, 1, 1404^a 30 οἱ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιοῦντες . . . ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιώτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.

^a 23 ὀρχηστικώτεραν: 24, 1459^b 37 τὸ δὲ ἱαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν.—Rhet. 3, 8, 1408^b 32 τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἠρώως σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἱαμβὸς αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἢ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακιώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ ῥυθμὸς τροχαῖος τὰ τετράμετρα.—Longinus 41. 1 μικροποιοῦν δ' οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ὡς ῥυθμὸς κεκλασμένος λόγου καὶ σεσοβημένος, οἷον δὴ πυρρίχιοι καὶ τροχαῖοι καὶ διχόρειοι, τέλειον εἰς ὀρχηστικὸν συνεκπίπτοντες. ὀρχηστικός in this

connexion means practically μιμητικός ὀρχήσεως, just as ἠθικός in 1449^a 23 the Poetics (see on 6, 1450^a 29) means μιμητικός ἤθους. Similarly λεκτικός=μιμητικός λέξεως (comp. 21, 1459^a 12), πρακτικός=μιμητικός πράξεως, and παθητικός = μιμητικός πάθους.

λέξεως, 'speech' as opposed to song (comp. on 21, 1459^a 12).

αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις: 24, 1460^a 4 αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἀρμόττον^a 24 αὐτῇ αἰρεῖσθαι.—De caelo 3. 8, 306^b 15 ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ τοῦτο σημαίνειν ἡμῖν.—Hippocrates 3 p. 606 K. ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ ἑωυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας, οἷον τὸ σκαρδαμύσσειν καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα ὑπουργεῖ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀπαιδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐοῦσα καὶ οὐ μαθοῦσα τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖ.

λεκτικόν: 21, 1459^a 11 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμῆσθαι ταῦτα ἀρμόττει ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσαιο. Comp. also Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 30, 3. 8, 1408^b 32 (quoted on^a 21 and^a 23). The term is sufficiently explained by^a 26 πλείστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

διάλεκτῳ, 'talk', 'converse', as in Plato Symp. 203 A διὰ τούτου^a 26 πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους: comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^b 34 μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες, and 3. 2, 1404^b 34 πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται. For the general meaning of διάλεκτος see on 22, 1458^b 32. Horace's *alternis aptus sermonibus* (A. P. 81) is a distant echo of this statement of Aristotle's. Cicero also observes that ordinary speech constantly falls into iambs: Orator 189 *senarios vero et Hipponacteos effugere vix possumus; magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio.*

λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας. ἀρμονία here seems to mean 'pitch' (τόνος)^a 27 as in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403^b 31 (v. Monro, Modes of ancient Greek music p. 15). Aristoxenus recognizes a similar distinction between the musical and the conversational μέλος: λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογῶδες τι μέλος, τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν προσωδιῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· φυσικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι (p. 24 Marquard).

ἐπεισοδίων: see on 12, 1452^b 20.

^a 28

ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται is added to explain the main^a 30 statement, τὰ ἄλλα . . . ἔστω εἰρημένα (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 495). For the general form of the sentence Vahlen compares Metaph. Γ 3, 1005^b 19 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ' ἂν, ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα.

κοσμηθῆναι = ἐπικοσμηθῆναι. Certain elements in a play Aris-

1449^a 30 *tote* dismisses as *κόσμοι*, decorative accessories rather than structural parts of the work. With this use of *κοσμεῖν* we may compare that of *ἡδύνειν* in 6, 1449^b 28 and 24, 1460^b 2, to denote the addition of accessories designed to make the work agreeable to us.

^a 32 *ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία κτέ.* The progress of Tragedy having been sketched, the next point to be considered is the progress of Comedy (^a 37–^b 8). The statement is introduced by a definition (^a 32–37) based on hints already given in preceding chapters as to the nature of Comedy. In 2, 1448^a 16 Comedy was said to deal with personages worse than the average man (*χείρους*, = *φανλότεροι* in the present passage); and in 4, 1448^b 36 its subject was assumed to be *τὸ γελοῖον*. These two points Aristotle reconciles and combines in a rough provisional definition (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.), before proceeding to the question more immediately before him, that of the *μεταβάσεις* of Comedy. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose this defining clause to be out of place. If we try the experiment of transferring it to another place, by putting it for instance after *λόγους καὶ μύθους* in ^b 8 (with Thurot), or after *ἐποποιία* in ^b 20 (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 48), it will be found that little or nothing is gained by this disturbance of the traditional order (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 1 p. 34).

ὥσπερ εἴπομεν: in 2, 1448^a 17 and 4, 1448^b 37.

^a 33 *πάσαν κακίαν*: Plato Rep. 490 D *ὄραν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πάσαν κακίαν.*—Demosthenes 18, 279 *τὸ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἑμ' αὐτὸν ἀγῶνας ἐάσαντα νῦν ἐπὶ τόνδ' ἤκειν καὶ πάσαν ἔχει κακίαν.*

ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον: a compressed statement, practically equivalent to *οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ καθ' ἓν τι εἶδος κακίας τοῦ γὰρ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον*. The personages in Comedy are worse than most men, but only in one particular respect, as presenting a certain harmless deformity or ugliness of character, which makes them ridiculous only—not objects for blame or aversion. It is, in Aristotle's view, the harmlessness of the evil in them that makes them fit objects of laughter.

^a 34 *τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον κτέ.* Two kinds of possible objects of laughter are implied in the text. (1) An act is *γελοῖον* when it is of the nature of a harmless mistake or blunder (*ἀμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον*); and (2) a person is *γελοῖος* when he presents some moral or physical deformity of the same harmless kind (*αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον*). The negative element here is a very essential part of the definition. Plato also, who thinks that the spectacle of human ignorance is the

true object of laughter in Comedy, explains that, to be laughable, 1449^a 34 the ignorance must be harmless (*ἀβλαβῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις* Phil. 49 E).

As *γελοῖα* are the basis of all Comedy, Aristotle must be assumed to have devoted a section of his theory of Comedy (in the lost Second Book) to the causes and conditions of laughter, in the same way as we find him analysing τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν in chaps. 13–14 of the existing Poetics. It is not impossible that several traces of his theory survive in Cicero's discussion of the 'Ridiculous' in *De Oratore* 2, 58–59, which seems to be on distinctly Aristotelian lines. Part of it has been quoted under Fr. III.

ἀμάρτημα: see on 13, 1453^a 16.

αἰσχος (like the adj. *αἰσχροῦς*) includes moral as well as physical^a 35 deformity. Though the illustration in^a 36 relates to physical ugliness, Aristotle is really thinking of the ugliness of character in the personages of Comedy, who have been described as being *χείρους τῶν νῦν* (2, 1448^a 17). Their visible ugliness is part of their *ὄψις* (see on 6, 1449^b 33), which lies outside the limits of the art of the poet himself.

ἀνώδυνον: comp. ^a 37 *ἄνευ ὀδύνης*. *ὀδύνη* is a pain that one feels strongly: Plato *Crat.* 419 c *ὀδύνη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένη ζοικεν*. The Stoic definition (Diog. Laert. 7. 112) was *ὀδύνη λύπη ἐπίπονος*, translated by Cicero (*Tusc.* 4. 8) by *aerumna aegritudo laboriosa*.

εὐθὺς: 'to take the first instance that occurs'; in 10, 1452^a 14^a 36 it means *suapte natura* (Bon. Ind. 296^a 13).

τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον. For the masks in Comedy see Pollux 4, 143, and Haigh, *Att. Th.*³ p. 242.

αἰσχροὶν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον: Plato *Rep.* 506 c *βούλει οὖν αἰσχροὶ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανὰ τε καὶ καλά;*

κωμῳδῶν. The correction *κωμῳδῶ*, which I have now relegated^b 1 to a note, was suggested by Tyrwhitt's interpretation of *ἐθελονταί*, the word being intended to bear the sense of the comic actor, i. e. the actor-poet, since Aristotle is referring to the time when the actor was the poet himself (comp. *Rhet.* 3. 1, 1403^b 23). This sense of the word in the Greek of Aristotle's period has been contested by Mr. H. P. Richards (*Class. Rev.* 14 p. 201); but I think he has carried his negation too far¹, more especially as we find

¹ Prof. E. Capps also (*Trans. of the American Philological Association* 31 p. 117) is unable to accept Mr. Richards' view.

1449^b I the corresponding word *τραγωδοί* in the sense of the tragic actors in Poet. 22, 1458^b 32 (v. ad loc.). The traditional doctrine of the grammarians was that *κωμῳδοί* was used for the actors as well as for the members of the chorus in Comedy: Ammonius π. διαφ. λέξ. p. 86 Valck. *Κωμῳδὸς καὶ Τραγωδὸς λέγεται ὁ χορευτῆς καὶ ὑποκριτῆς* (v. also p. 138; comp. Rohde, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 408). That *κωμῳδοί* may refer to the actors even in strict Attic seems to be shown by Plato Phaedr. 236 c *ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν, ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις*, in illustration of which W. H. Thompson quotes Aristoph. Eq. 286 sqq. and 361 sqq. For Aristotle's time, however, the use seems to be pretty clearly established by the language of his contemporary, Chares of Mytilene (ap. Ath. 538 F): *ὑπεκρίθησαν δὲ τραγωδοὶ μὲν Θεσσαλὸς καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Ἀριστόκριτος, κωμῳδοὶ δὲ Λύκων καὶ Φορμίων καὶ Ἀρίστων*. And half a century after Aristotle this was the normal sense of the term, as is proved by inscriptions of the period (Dittenberger, Syll.² p. 517, 519; Lüders, Die dionysischen Künstler p. 187-97), in which the *κωμῳδοί* or actors are expressly distinguished from the *χορευταὶ κωμικοί*, who had taken the place occupied by the chorus in the older Comedy. The history of the word, therefore, runs parallel with that of the comic chorus. Whether the comic chorus in its original form was actually extinct or only verging on extinction at the time when Aristotle was writing the Poetics, it is impossible to say (comp. E. Capps, American J. of Archaeology x p. 319); but there is evidence that, whatever its form may have been, it was no longer a very important part of a comedy. And if that was the fact, the gradual restriction of the term *κωμῳδός* to the actor would be the natural result of the absence or diminished importance of the chorus in the Comedy of the period.

^b 2 *ὀψέ ποτε*. Aristotle seems to have had a definite date in his mind. He conceives the history of Attic Comedy to begin with Chionides, who is said to have exhibited as early as b. c. 487 (see on 4, 1448^a 34); but the formal recognition of it by the state must have come later, probably about b. c. 465 (Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles¹ 1 p. 51; comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 503).

ἔθελονταὶ ἦσαν. 'Intelligi potest de Choro, sed etiam de poetis, secundum illa quae ex Aelio Dionysio [fr. 150 Schwabe] protulit Eustathius ad Il. K v. 230. 'Ἐθελοντῆς ὁ αὐθαιρέτως τι ποιῶν ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἔθελονταὶ διδάσκαλοι, δραμάτων δηλαδή, ὅτε τις μὴ λαβὼν χορὸν μηδὲ χορηγητὴν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα παρέιχε.'

Et sic fortasse rectius. Hinc enim poetarum, nascente Comoedia, 1449^b 2 conditio difficilis maxime apparet, quod non modo Chorum docere sed etiam conducere, nutrire, vestibis alioque omni apparatu instruere necesse haberent' (Tyrwhitt). A somewhat similar use of the term seems to have survived at Thebes, where *ἑθελοντής* is said to have been the name for the actor in a rude species of burlesque (Sosibius ap. Ath. 621 D)—presumably because the performance was at his own charge and risk. The alternative to Tyrwhitt's interpretation is to suppose the reference to be either to volunteer *χορηγοί* (comp. Demosth. 21. 13 *ὑπεσχόμεν ἐγὼ χορηγήσειν ἑθελοντής*, and Hesych. *ἑθελοντάς· τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ χορηγούς*), or as Usener (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 424) has suggested, to volunteer actors and chorus-singers.

σχήματα: comp. 4, 1448^b 36 and Bon. Ind. 740^a 24.

^b 3

οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς, scil. *τῆς κωμωδίας*. It has been thought that the form of expression here may imply some slowness to grant the name *ποιητής* to a comedian (Neil on Aristoph. Eq. 507).

μημονεύονται. As soon as Comedy became a state institution, ^b 4 an official record of the successful poets must have been kept in the public archives; the successful *χορηγοί* also sometimes set up a similar record on their own account in temples (Pol. 8. 6, 1341^a 35; comp. Bernhardt, Gr. Litt.³ 2. 2 p. 152).

ἀπέδωκεν: De sensu 2, 438^b 17 *ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνὶ τῶν στοιχείων*. In Plato Laws 2, 669 c *ἀποδοῦναι* and *προσαρμόττειν* are treated as synonyms.

προλόγους. The term is defined in 12, 1452^b 19. The introduction of a 'prologue' in Tragedy was sometimes said to have been due to Thespis: Themist. Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. *Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογον καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν*. It was obviously a significant moment in the history of the Drama when the play, instead of beginning with a choral song, opened with a statement spoken by an actor.

πλήθη: comp. the use of *πλήθη* in 4, 1449^a 28 and 21, 1458^a 13. ^b 5 The plural is in keeping with that in *προλόγους* and *μύθους* in the context.

μύθους: see on ^b 9.

Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμυς. These words, which were first bracketed ^b 6 by Susemihl (Rh. Mus. 18 p. 376), cannot be retained where they stand. No appropriate verb can be supplied with them; for though Aristotle might have said *μύθους ἀπέδωκε*, he could hardly have meant to say *μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκε*. And even if *ἀπέδωκε* is to be understood, there is an awkward asyndeton in *τὸ μὲν ἐξ*

1449^b 6 ἀρχῆς, which on this assumption should surely be τὸ μὲν <οὖν> ἐξ ἀρχῆς, as is actually read in certain of the apographs. From the reminiscence of this passage (comp. Welcker, Kl. Scr. 1 p. 330) in Themistius Or. 27 p. 406 Dind. καὶ κομωδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας (ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦσθην Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμος), κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συννηξήθη, it would seem that the words Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος were originally part of a clause which came in after ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν, and that what Aristotle wrote was something like this: τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν (ἦσαν γὰρ Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος ἐκεῖθεν), τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης κτέ. (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 118).

Φόρμος, sometimes called in later writers Φόρμος. On the two forms of the name see Lobeck Pathol. serm. gr. prolegomena p. 502. All that is known of him will be found in Grysar, De Doriensium comoedia p. 76 (comp. Bernhardt, Gr. Litt.³ 2. 2 p. 520, and Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 148).

^b 7 Κράτης: his 'floruit' may be put about B.C. 450. For the fragments of his comedies see Kock, CAF. 1 p. 130; Meineke, FCG. 1 p. 58.

^b 8 ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας. 'Ac mihi quidem hoc Aristoteles significare voluisse videtur, cum Cratinus ceterique antiquiores comici certos quosdam homines in fabulis suis exagitassent populoque ridendos propinassent, Cratetem primum apud Athenienses extitisse qui Epicharmi exemplo comicae poesios materiam a singulorum hominum irrisione ad generales morum notationes rerumque descriptiones traduceret. . . Quod autem lacesse consuetudinem omisisse Crates ab Aristotele dicitur, id plane fragmenta fabularum confirmant, in quibus nihil prorsus reperias ex quo certos quosdam homines eum carpsisse intellegatur' (Meineke l. c. p. 59). The 'iambic form' of Comedy is the Old Comedy, which, from the personal nature of its satire, was only one remove from the 'invective' of Archilochus and the Iambographers (4, 1449^a 4). It is thus characterized in Horace Sat. 1. 4. 1: *Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae Atque alii, quorum comoedia prisca virorum est, Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus aut fur, Quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui Famosus, nulla cum libertate notabant.*

καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους is the opposite of περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ποιεῖν (see 9, 1451^b 14). The implied antithesis is between a story about some particular person, e.g. Alcibiades, and one about (for instance) 'a man', or 'a man of such and such a type'

(ὁ τοιοῦδε, Rhet. 1. 2, 1356^b 30), i. e. as we should say, 'a 1449^b 8 character', the representative of a possible class. A 'character' is a coherent group of qualities disengaged from the various accidents which coexist with it in the concrete individual; it is therefore in the nature of things something general and attributable to several, whereas the individual as such is unique. Aristotle's view is that the personages in Crates, as in all the higher forms of poetry, are 'characters', i. e. more or less idealized personages, not real men as in History, the *Ψόγος*, and the Old Comedy. How these abstracts of human personality come to get proper names attached to them in the Drama is a point which Aristotle considers at some length in 9, 1451^b 13-22 (comp. 17, 1455^b 12).

μύθος: i. e. his stories were as imaginary as his personages. ^b9 A *μῦθος* according to Plato Rep. 377 A is a *λόγος ψευδής* (either taken from legend or invented by the poet himself), though there may be some element of truth in it.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία κτέ. At this point, the evolution of the Drama having been sketched, Aristotle inserts a provisional note on the points of agreement and difference between Tragedy and epic poetry, which anticipates to a certain extent the longer statement in chaps. 23-24. The two points of agreement had been already intimated, the first in 4, 1448^b 34, and the second in 5, 1449^a 20.

μέχρι μὲν τοῦ . . . εἶναι: 7, 1451^a 10 *μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι*.—Top. 8. 1, 155^b 7 *μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦ εὐρεῖν τὸν τόπον ὁμοίως τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἢ σκέψις*. The construction *συνακολουθεῖν μέχρι* occurs in Phys. 1. 5, 188^b 26 *μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι*—where also *συνακολουθεῖν*, just like *ἀκολουθεῖν* here, is the opposite of *διαφέρειν* (188^b 30: comp. Bon. Ind. 26^a 23). In these and similar instances the preposition *μέχρι* is to be understood as inclusive of that which is mentioned as the limit (comp. Eucken, Sprachgebr. p. 17). A difficulty has been found in *ἡκολούθησεν* (by Thurot and Spengel), on the ground that it would be more natural to speak of Tragedy following the Epic than of the Epic following Tragedy. This view assumes that *ἀκολουθεῖν* must mean to 'follow after' in order of time, whereas the word may very well mean 'go with' (comp. Rhet. 1. 6, 1362^a 29), i. e. 'agree with'. The aorist seems to imply that the fact has been already recognized.

μὲν τοῦ. With the traditional reading *μόνου* (retained by Vahlen) the infinitive *εἶναι* which follows is out of construction.

1449^b 10 <διὰ> μέτρον μεγάλο. For the preposition comp. 1, 1447^a 27 διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν.—^b 11 διὰ τριμέτρων.—^b 16 διὰ τῶν μέτρων.—6, 1449^b 30 διὰ μέτρων. As here used, μέτρον μέγα seems to mean a large kind of verse, one fitted for a large subject (comp. 4, 1449^a 6 μείζονα σχήματα). The hexameter is a metre of this description (24, 1460^a 3); and Aristotle may be presumed, I think, to have taken the same view of the tragic iambic as corresponding to the μέγεθος of the tragic stories, and the gravity of the tragic diction (comp. 4, 1449^a 19). Vahlen, retaining the manuscript reading μέχρι μόνου μέτρον μεγάλο, takes μέτρον μέγα to mean 'spatium magnum sive fines ampli'; this, however, is hardly probable with τὸ μέτρον in the sense of 'metre' in the very next line (comp. Gompertz, Zu Aristoteles' Poetik 1 p. 25).

The following are some of the attempts at emending this passage: μέχρι μόνου μέτρον μετὰ λόγου (the Aldine, and corr. Parisinus 2038¹); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μέτρῳ [μετὰ λόγου] (Tyrrhitt); μέχρι μόνου τοῦ διὰ λόγου ἐμμέτρον μεγάλου (Ueberweg); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ [μέτρον μεγάλου] (Christ).

μίμησις . . . σπουδαίων: as was said in 4, 1448^b 34. σπουδαίων is presumably neuter (comp. 4, 1448^b 34, and the note on 3, 1448^a 19).

^b 11 τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν, scil. τὴν ἐποποιίαν. ἀπλοῦν is the opposite of ποικίλον (comp. Bon. Ind. 76^b 12); the contrast is between the one metre of the Epic (v. 24, 1459^b 32) and the variety of metres in Tragedy.

ταύτη. In illustration of the construction Vahlen quotes 23, 1459^a 30 ταύτη θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη . . . τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον . . . ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὄλον.—Pol. 7. 15, 1334^a 41 οὐ ταύτη διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν.—Plato Rep. 605 A τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν . . . ταύτη ὁμοίωται.

^b 12 ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει: scil. διαφέρει ἢ ἐποποιία. Having laid this down, however, Aristotle remembers that the difference did not always exist; he accordingly repeats his original proposition by a resumptive καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 660), in order to introduce a qualifying clause, καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον κτέ. The clause marked as a parenthesis is equivalent to ἢ μὲν γὰρ κτέ. (actually found in some apographs), and is similar in form to that in 4, 1449^a 19 (v. ad loc.).

¹ Perhaps also the Arabic translation (Margoliouth, A. O. p. 54); it is certainly implied in the paraphrase 'metrico sermone' of Averroes (p. 359 Heidenhain).

τῷ μήκει. Aristotle is thinking of a very obvious fact, viz. that 1449^b 12 an epic (the Iliad or Odyssey, for instance) runs to several thousand lines, whereas a tragedy rarely exceeds some 1,600. This difference he never loses sight of; he notes it in 17, 1455^b 16, and (in a context just like the present) in 24, 1459^b 17 (διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μήκος ἢ ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον); and he returns to it in his concluding chapter (26, 1462^a 18), where the comparative merits of the two forms of poetry are under discussion. These parallels, as Teichmüller has seen, are enough to show that μήκος must denote here not the *ambitus actionis*, the imaginary duration of the action of the poem, as is often supposed, but rather the real length of the work itself, a length to be measured by the number of lines the work would take up in a book, or the hours it would need for recitation. It has the same sense in 7, 1451^a 6 and in 24, 1459^b 18. A reason for this difference of length, one quite sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, is given in the parenthesis, ἢ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα κτέ. He regards it as the natural consequence of another kind of difference, viz. the fact that the action in a Greek tragedy is as a rule kept within a limit of some 24 hours, whereas that in an epic may extend over weeks, or even years. There being this difference, therefore, in the extent of the action, the quantum of matter to be included in the story, it is only natural that there should be a corresponding difference in the length of the literary statement in the two instances, and that an epic poem accordingly should be of greater length than a tragedy. A certain correspondence between the length and the quantum of matter in a poem is recognized in 26, 1462^b 2. Assuming this correspondence, Aristotle explains the great length of an epic, as compared with a tragedy, as due to the great length of time over which the epic action extends. In other words, he passes from the idea of the actual length, the actual time required for the recitation, to that of the imaginary time covered by the action of the poem; and he does this on the tacit assumption that the two things are so closely connected that the one may serve to explain the other (comp. Ueberweg, Aristoteles über Dichtkunst p. 57). Teichmüller's theory, that Aristotle is referring in the parenthesis to the time of the actual recitation or performance¹, and thinking

¹ The idea of some of the older dramatic critics, that in a perfect drama the actual time of the performance and the supposed time of the action of the piece would coincide, is not unlike that which Teichmüller reads into the text of Aristotle.

1449^b 12 of the series of dramas (a trilogy or tetralogy) presented on the stage in a single day, may be set aside at once, not only on archaeological grounds, but also because it assumes an impossible sense for ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου.

πειράται means much the same thing as βούλεται in 2, 1448^a 18. The same anxiety to avoid overstatement is to be seen in ὅτι μάλιστα and ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν in the context.

- 13 μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου cannot be, as Teichmüller imagines, a way of describing the natural day of 12 hours or so; the periphrasis is deliberately chosen in order to make it clear that the solar day of 24 hours is meant. A περίοδος of the sun is not its half-circuit, but its circuit, i. e. the time it takes to come round again to an assumed starting-point. For other Aristotelian instances of this sense of the word see Bon. Ind. 582^b 29. The statement in the text was often quoted in former times as evidence for the assertion that the so-called 'Unity of Time' was one of Aristotle's rules for the Drama. 'The stage', says Sydney in his *Apology for Poetry* (p. 63 Arber), 'should always represent but one place; and the uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by Aristotle's precept and common sense, but one day.' What Aristotle actually says is not a precept, but only an incidental recognition of a fact in the practice of the theatre in his age. The same is true also of the 'Unity of Place', which was believed to be implied as a rule in 24, 1459^b 25. The 'Unity of Action', however, is very emphatically asserted in chaps. 8-11 and elsewhere.

μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν = 'to vary, or depart, from that only a little', i. e. 'to exceed that limit only a little'. The reference is not to variation within the limit, but to variation beyond it.

- ^b 15 τὸ πρῶτον. In the earliest drama, says Aristotle, the Unity of Time was not observed with strictness, any more than it is in epic poetry. This passage has been discussed by M. Maurice Croiset (*Rev. des Études grecques* 1 p. 373; comp. Heimsoeth, *De tragœdiæ graecae trilogiis* p. iv), who suggests that Aristotle may be referring to the period anterior to the institution of the trilogy, when a long tragic story, instead of being dealt with in three tragedies, may be supposed to have been told in one. It is clear that the action in such a play would be very like that of an epic, and cover a longer time than 24 hours. One may ask how in the absence of some device like the modern curtain the lapse of time between act and act could be sufficiently indicated; and one may also ask whether there was the same chorus throughout the

performance. These are difficulties which we have now no means 1449^b 15 of answering.

ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις. The preposition shows that Aristotle is thinking not of the time of the performance, but of something within the play, the imaginary time of the action in it (Ribbeck, Rh. Mus. 24, 135); comp. 13, 1453^a 25 τοῦτο δρᾶ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις.

μέρη: i.e. the constituents enumerated and distinguished in 6, 1449^b 31 sqq. The parts peculiar to Tragedy are melody and 'spectacle' (24, 1459^b 10).

διόπερ κτέ. Similarly in chaps. 23–24, before explaining the differences between epic poetry and Tragedy, Aristotle is at some pains to show that a good epic will have much the same structure as a good tragedy, and that in most respects the same canons of construction are applicable to it (23, 1459^a 17–24, 17). The corollary ends at ἐπὼν; what follows (ἃ μὲν γὰρ κτέ.) is a reason in support of the main statement (16).

περὶ . . . τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς: in chaps. 23–24.

περὶ κωμωδίας: in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.

ἀναλαβόντες: Top. 6, 14, 151^b 19 καλῶς εἰρημένον ὄρον ἀναλαβεῖν. —Meteor. 1. 3, 339^a 33 ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θέσεις . . . λέγωμεν.—1. 8, 345^b 31 ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἀρχὴν ἡμῖν.—Rhet. 1. 13, 1373^b 27 ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον = τὸν γινόμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. — For the hyperbaton comp. Metaph. Θ 3, 1047^a 12 τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὃ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται.—Eth. N. 8. 16, 1163^b 18 εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὃ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ (also Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 616)¹.

ὄρον τῆς οὐσίας: the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp. Metaph. Z 13, 1039^a 19 δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάσαι ἢ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὄρον ἢ μάλιστα.—De part. an. 1. 1, 642^a 26 ὀρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν.—4. 5, 678^a 34 τῷ λόγῳ . . . τῷ ὀρίζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν.

ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία κτέ. The definition, which is in logical form, *per genus et differentias*, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that.

¹ There is no hyperbaton in An. post. 1. 34, 89^b 14 πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἷτια τὰ μέσα δ' ἰδὼν τὰ ἄκρα ἐγνώρισεν, which has been cited as an instance of it. The sense-shows that δ' ἰδὼν is to be taken with τὰ ἄκρα, and that the accusatives before it are the object of ἐγνώρισεν.

1449^b 24 (1) That Tragedy is a *μίμησις* was said in 1, 1447^a 13; and that it is a *μίμησις πράξεως* is implied in 1, 1447^a 28. (2) *σπουδαίας*, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and 4, 1448^b 34—*καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης* being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in 4, 1449^a 19. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in 1, 1447^b 24–8; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in 3, 1448^a 23–28. But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it, *δι' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου*, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term *προαιρετική* in the definition of virtue in Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106^b 36, and reserving the formal explanation of *προαίρεσις* for 3. 4, 1111^b 4. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (De anima 1. 1, 403^a 25; Metaph. H 2, 1043^a 14).

^b 25 *τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης*. The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (7, 1450^b 24). We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a *τελεία πράξις*, but from the explanatory *μέγεθος ἐχούσης* Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the *μέγεθος* mentioned already in 4, 1449^a 19 as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.

ἡδυσμένω: Plato Rep. 607 A *εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μούσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπαισιν, ἡδονὴ σοὶ καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσεται*. The word is taken from cookery (comp. De sensu 4, 442^a 10). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive *ἡδυσμα*, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidas in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^a 19 *οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἄλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις* ('the sauce with him is the dish'). Said of language *ἡδυσμένος* implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as *κοσμηθῆναι* in 4, 1449^a 29 meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp. 6, 1450^b 11) may perhaps be recognized in Plutarch Erot. 769 C *λόγω ποιήσις ἡδύσματα* (τὰ) *μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα*, and also in Strabo 818 Cas.

φλυαροῦσιν ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ῥυθμὸν [ἦ] ἤδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερα- 1449^b 25
 τείαν προσφέροντες. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare,
 Hamlet 2. 2 *I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to
 make the matter savoury.*

ἐκάστω τῶν εἰδῶν: scil. τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, understood from ἡδυσμένῳ.
 Similarly in Isocrates 190 D περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς
 τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μετα-
 φοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν
 ποιήσιν one may supply τῶν ὀνομάτων with εἶδεσι. For another
 instance of this allusive use of εἶδος see 25, 1461^b 22. In what
 follows (^b 29) ἐκάστω τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by τοῖς εἶδεσι; the read-
 ing of the MS., ἐκάστου, seems to have arisen through χωρὶς having
 been mistaken for a preposition. The juxtaposition of χωρὶς and
 ἐκάστω is just like that in Pol. 7. 1, 1323^b 41 καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστω καὶ
 κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν (comp. χωρὶς ἕκαστον in De caelo 2. 12, 292^a 13,
^b 27). The implied antithesis in the present passage is between
 'each separately' (χωρὶς), and 'all together, and at once' (ἅμα:
 comp. De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322^a 13, and Metaph. E 4, 1027^b 23).
 Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the ἡδυσμα of metre in
 the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on
 1, 1447^b 28). ἐκάστω, therefore, is loosely put for ἐκατέρῳ (comp.
 Pol. 3. 12, 1282^b 38, and HSt. s. v.).

δρώντων: scil. τῶν μιμουμένων, the subject being omitted as it is ^b 25
 in ^a 13, ^b 31, 1450^a 10, ^a 21, and 26, 1461^b 29. Other Aristotelian
 instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in Bon.
 Ind. 149^b 29. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me,
 supplies μίμησις with δρώντων, comparing 3, 1448^a 29 μιμοῦνται
 δρώντας.

οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας: scil. μιμουμένων.

δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου means practically δι' ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, 'by ^b 27
 piteous and alarming scenes'; comp. Goulston's paraphrase, 'per
 misericordiam metumque factis expressum'. The more abstract
 form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for τῶν
 τοιούτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this
 connexion comp. ^b 30 διὰ μέτρων περαίνεσθαι.—De part. an. 3. 4,
 666^b 15 περαίνονται [scil. αἱ κινήσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἔλκειν καὶ ἀνιέναι.—
 Plato Gorg. 450 D διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι.—Rep. 392 D δι' ἀμφο-
 τέρων περαίνουσιν (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85). This excite-
 ment of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of
 Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its
 κάθαρσις of such emotions.

1449^b 27 τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν, 'its catharsis of such emotions', just as ποιέσθαι τὴν μίμησιν (1, 1447^a 22; 6, 1449^b 31) means 'to make *their* imitation, and ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν (4, 1448^b 18), 'to produce *its* pleasure' (comp. 4, 1448^b 7, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.² 2. 1 p. 593). The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in Pol. 8. 7 (v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed. Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general.

The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of κάθαρσις. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away'; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation.

I.

This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion¹. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage: 'Ex his quae de Musica dicuntur [i.e. in Pol. 8. 7], colligere licet, opinor, Aristotelem similem quandam ratiocinationem de poesi etiam

¹ See H. Weil, Ueber die Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles, Verhandl. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel, p. 140 (comp. his Études sur le drame antique, p. 158); the article of Bernays is reprinted in his Zwei Abhandlungen p. 1. I have shown elsewhere (J. of Phil. 27 p. 267) that the pathological interpretation of κάθαρσις was not unknown in Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et 1449^b 27
 metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo
 nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra
 levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus
 esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis
 species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.'

To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's
 condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic.

One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of
 the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (*τὸ θρηνηῶδες*,
τὸ ἐλεεινόν) and our faculty for laughter; and that its effect is to
 gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken
 or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (Rep. 605 c-606 c).

As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be
 ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the
 assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional
 effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed
 to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment.

Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read
 in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to
 recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics

on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In Pol. 8. 6,
 1341^a 21, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead
 of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains
 that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply
 orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing
 of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction: *οὐκ*
ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικόν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιού-
τους αὐτῷ καιροῦς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται
ἢ μάθησιν. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here
 between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of
 certain other kinds of music; and that *κάθαρσις* is in Aristotle's
 view connected with the former rather than with the latter. A
 much more important passage, however, is that in Pol. 8. 7,

1341^b 32, which will be found in extenso among the Fragments
 of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division
 of 'airs' into *ἠθικά*, *πρακτικά*, and *ἐνθουσιαστικά μέλη*¹, and a similar

¹ The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character,
 and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp. Pol. 8. 5,
 1340^a 6); (2) that which imitates action (comp. Plato Rep. 399 A), and moves
 us to it; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion
 termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'.

1449^b 27 classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. [There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree (*ισχυρῶς*) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions. Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (*κατοκώχιμοι*) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (*καθισταμένους*: comp. Bon. Ind. 356^a 35 and 375^a 8), just as though they had undergone a cure or *catharsis* at the hands of a physician (*ὡσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως*). The same sort of treatment (*πάσχειν*) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings; all want a certain *catharsis*, a pleasurable relief (*κουφίζεσθαι*) from emotion. And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind.] The sense of *κάθαρσις* in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on 8. 6, 1341^a 23: 'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'; and again in that on 8. 7, 1342^a 6 (*τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον*): 'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur' (comp. J. of Phil. 27 p. 269)¹. The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine,

¹ To the passages in Italian writers quoted in this article I may add one from A. S. Minturnus (1559), De Poeta p. 64: 'Quamobrem cum miserabiles horribilesque eventus Tragoedia spectandos ad perturbationum vacuitatem in medium proferat, non est profecto, si miserationem! commovet pavoremque infert, quod morbos animi alere atque augere videatur. An Platoni, nedum Aristoteli Musica probatur, quae nisi motus in animo cieret, nunquam sane eum purgaret. Nam afflatu furoris qui essent concitati, cum modis ac numeris canticisque sacris, qui ad animi expiationem adhiberi solebant, uterentur, his quidem ita expiabantur, ac si aliqua potione purgarentur; Homerica poesis, quod vim mentis et ad miserandum et ad timendum permoveat, improbanda est? Scilicet ad depellendam aegrotationem, quae veneni instar habet, vis cients in corpore motiones medicina vehementis noxiaeque naturae excitatur; ad morborum expiationem animus commoveri non debet!' The parallel statement in his Arte Poetica p. 77 is: 'Nè più forza haurà il Physico di spengere il fervido veleno della infermità, che'l corpo affige, con la velenosa medicina; che 'l Tragico di purgar l'animo delle impetuose perturbationi.'

as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for *ιατρεία* (*ὥσπερ 1449^b 27* *ιατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως*), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning (*πάθος, πάσχειν, ἰσχυρῶς, κίνησις, κατοκώχιμοι, καθισταμένους, κομφίζεσθαι, καθαρτικά*)¹. In Greek physiology and pathology *κάθαρσις* is a very general term for a physical clearance or discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some *περίττωμα*, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm. The *κάθαρσις* of the soul as described in the *Politics* is a similar process in reference to certain emotions (*πάθη*)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate *κάθαρσις*. With some adaptation of the statements and hints in *Pol.* 8. 7, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men (*τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς*) they are present in a disquieting degree (*ἰσχυρῶς*). With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity (*ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν*); but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a *catharsis* to lighten and relieve the soul (*κομφίζεσθαι*²) of the accumulated emotion within it; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief. This, then, may be taken as Aristotle's answer to the Platonic argument in the *Republic*; it shows that the pleasure we derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure (*χαρὰ ἀβλαβής*). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed throughout the *Poetics* (see especially 14, 1453^b 11), but its precise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or elsewhere, by Aristotle. It falls naturally enough, however, into its place in the classification of pleasures in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of the nature of cures or remedies (*ιατρεῖαι*) to remove the disquietude

¹ Nearly all these terms are to be found in the *Oeconomia* Hippocratis of Foës; see Döring's *Kunstlehre des Aristoteles* p. 319 for a discussion of them.

² *Comp. Probl.* 4. 30, 880^a 31 *ὅς οὖν πολὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη πολλὰκις ἐπιθυμῆν τούτους ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι κομφίζονται γάρ.*

1449^b 27 arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind (Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152^b 34; 7. 15, 1154^b 17). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an *ιατρεία* or *κάθαρσις*, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as *ιατρεύοντα ἡδέα*. A further point in his idea of *κάθαρσις* may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A *catharsis* in the medical sense of the word is an *ιατρεία*, and only for occasional use; and its analogue, the *παθημάτων κάθαρσις*, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect¹. In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp. E. Müller, *Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten* 2 p. 378).

In the phrase *παθημάτων κάθαρσις* the genitive after *κάθαρσις*, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle's physiological writings (v. Bon. Ind. 354^b 22); and it is found also in other authors, e.g. Hippocrates 1 p. 104 K. *πτύλων καθάρσεις*.—p. 654 *καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος*.—3 p. 502 *τῶν ἀπὸ πλευμόνων καθάρσεις*.—Thucydides 2. 49 *ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς*.—Demosthenes 64. 12 *κάθαρσις αἵματος*.—Polybius 5. 100. 6 *ἀνακάθαρσις πύματος*. The same construction is found with *κάθαρσις* (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind: Plato Phaed. 69 B *κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων*², 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul (*ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων*).—Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 F *τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις*.—Iamblichus De myst. 1. 12 *κάθαρσις παθῶν*.—Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham) *ἡ τῶν λυμαινομένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις*.—p. 134 *κάθαρσις τῆς οἴσεως*.—p. 194 *ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους*.

¹ Comp. what is said of the flute and its cathartic music in Pol. 8. 6, 1341^a 21.

² Aristotle's *τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν* may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato.

The idea of *κάθαρσις*, in the sense of a working-off of emotion 1449^b 27 brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the *Politics*.

(1) In his very curious chapter on the *ἀκροθώρακες*, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 A) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνηδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [ἐκκαλεῖ Emperius], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ [ἐξερᾶ Bernays] καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικὸν ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἄν καὶ τὸν οἶνον, ὅταν σφόδρα ταραξῆ καὶ παροξύνῃ τὸ ἀκμαῖον καὶ θυμοειδές, αὐθις καταδύοντα [? καταλύοντα], καὶ καθιστάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς πορρωτέρω μέθης προῖοῦσαν ἡσυχάζειν.

(2) The language in Aristides Quintilianus *De Musica* 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn), on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—

διὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχουσαι φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων ποιήσις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελωδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται.

(3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of *κάθαρσις*. In *De myst.* 3. 9 (ed. Parthey), writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere *ἀποκάθαρσις*, a working-off or evacuation (*ἀπέρασις*) of some morbid product within the soul:—

ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρείαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον. οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρῶτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δὲ αὐτοῦ συνίσταται ἢ πᾶσα ἄνωθεν ἀρχῇ καὶ καταβολῇ.

There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage har-

1449^b 27 monizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula, ὡςπερ ἰατρίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage is in De myst. I. 11 :—

αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντη μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [so Bernays; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμενοι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαίρομεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη καὶ μετρώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.

The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity; that they require an occasional outlet (comp. ἀποκαθαίρομεναι) to keep them quiet; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (τὰ οἰκεία πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the *catharsis* of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (μετρώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of *παθημάτων κάθαρσις* now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing.

(4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original.

Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus

reconstructed in outline : The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. 1449^b 27 Proclus τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect ; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus δέομενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp. παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus πάθη . . . ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν . . . ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with ἀποκάθαρσις or ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term, κάθαρσις.

II.

Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day. Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i. e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of κάθαρσις. The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows¹ :—

(1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.).

(2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.).

(3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary

¹ Comp. Twining² 2 p. 3, and Weil l. c. p. 135.

1449^b 27 woes of the theatre ; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.).

(4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl).

(5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann).

The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind. But as with every virtue, according to Aristotle, there are on either side of it extremes of excess and defect, between which it stands as a mean, Tragedy, if it is to turn pity into virtue, must be able to purify us from both extremes of pity ; and it must do the same thing with fear likewise.'¹ The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them ; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece ; the performance of Tragedy was too

¹ ' Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich diesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht : so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein ; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen. Das tragische Mitleid muss nicht allein, in Ansehung des Mitleids, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher zu viel Mitleid fñhlet, sondern auch desjenigen, welcher zu wenig empfindet. Die tragische Furcht muss nicht allein, in Ansehung der Furcht, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher sich ganz und gar keines Unglücks befürchtet, sondern auch desjenigen, den ein jedes Unglück, auch das entfernteste, auch das unwahrscheinlichste, in Angst setzt' (Hamb. Dram. St. 78). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him (v. Zerbst, Ein Vorläufer Lessing's in der Aristotelesinterpretation p. 29), Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement.

occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers (v. supra, p. 176). (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e. g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται (Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103^b 21). We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (Poet. 14, 1453^b 11). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of *catharsis* of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true *raison d'être* of the theatre.

ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος. The καὶ is explanatory, μέλος being added^b 29 as a synonym to explain ἁρμονία (v. on 1, 1447^a 22).

διὰ μέτρων is opposed to διὰ μέλους: comp. Probl. 19. 31,^b 30 320^a 12 διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τῶν μέτρων.—Plato Symp. 187 D μέλεσσι τε καὶ μέτροις.—Lysis 205 A οὐ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος.—Isocrates 191 B ταῖς ἰδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις.

1449^b 31 *πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν*, scil. *οἱ μιμούμενοι*. Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on 3, 1448^a 23). *πράττοντες* recalls the idea of the *δρώντων* in the preceding definition of Tragedy.

^b 33 *ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος*. *ὄψις* is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or *mise en scène*; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre'. This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the *actors* when got up in character by the *σκευοποιός* or costumier (see on 6, 1450^b 20). Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula *ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος* implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on 4, 1449^a 29), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v. 6, 1450^b 16), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v. 14, 1453^b 7). The term *ὄψις* like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166).

μελοποιία (properly the making of *μέλη*) replaces the original term *μέλος* as a synonym for it; comp. 6, 1450^b 16, and Pol. 8. 7, 1341^b 23 *τὴν μουσικὴν ὀρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὔσαν*.

^b 34 *λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην* is to be compared with *λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον* in 6, 1450^a 4 (v. ad loc.). A definition is given because *λέξις* is a term with several meanings (v. on 21, 1459^a 12). The present definition describes the *λέξις* in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in 6, 1450^b 13, views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.

^b 35 *μέτρων* has the concrete sense of 'verses', like *τοῖς μέτροις* in 1, 1447^a 29 (comp. on ^b 30).

^b 36 *πᾶσαν*. *πᾶσιν*, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus (fr. 165 Diels), *ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν*. But no change is really wanted; instead of defining *μελοποιία* Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι κτέ. Comp. *μίμησις πράξεως* in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its *ὄψις*, *λέξις* and *μελοποιία*, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content. The subject in a

tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as 1449^b 36 agents. The *μῦθος*, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the *ἦθος* and *διάνοια* manifested in the language of the dramatis personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp. 9, 1451^b 7).

ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Intellectual^b 37 as well as moral states are included under *ποιότητες* (Cat. 8, 8^b 29). A little further on, however, in 1450^a 5, Aristotle uses the term *ποιούς τινας* as though it naturally referred rather to the *ἦθος* or moral character. For the antithesis between *ἦθος* and *διάνοια* comp. Pol. 8. 1, 1337^a 38 *οὐδὲ φανερόν ποτερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος*, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the *ἠθικαί* and the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*.

πέφυκεν begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural 1450^a 1 order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his *ἦθος* and his *διάνοια*; these are the inner causes of men's actions, and of the success or failure of their lives. *πέφυκεν* is, like the Platonic *φύσιν ἔχει* (Rep. 473 A, 489 B), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from Pol. 2. 2, 1261^b 7 *οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν*.—4. 12, 1296^b 26 *ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν*, and Demosthenes 14, 30 *τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν*.

κατὰ ταύτας = *κατὰ τὰς πράξεις*; comp. ^a 19 *κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις*^a 2 *εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοῖναντίον*.

τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις. To complete the statement^a 3 Aristotle might very well have added a clause like *τῶν δὲ πρακτόνων τὰ ἦθη καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι*; and it has been suggested (J. of Phil. 5 p. 119) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out. In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point (*τῆς μὲν πράξεως κτέ.*) is enough to suggest it (comp. De interpr. 14, 23^b 30, and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of *μὲν* solitarium comp. 26, 1462^b 5, and Waitz on An. pr. 2. 11, 61^a 19.

τοῦτον (= *τοῦτο*) is preparative and explained by *τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν*^a 4 *πραγμάτων*. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in 22, 1458^a 26

1450^a 4 αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστὶ, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2, 1 p. 74).

^a 6 διάνοιαν, scil. εἶναι λέγω. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that διάνοια is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatis personae (comp. infra ^b 11). The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in 19, 1456^a 34–^b 8—where we are told among other things that the διάνοια of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words. Διάνοια in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like ἦθος, an element in the personality of the dramatis personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do. Hence it is that the general theory of the διάνοια in a play is said (19, 1456^a 34) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of διάνοια in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on ^b 6). The term answering to Aristotle's διάνοια in Isocrates is ἐνθυμήματα, 'arguments': ISOCR. 191 Α μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν . . . ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὁμῶς αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγῶσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας.—319 D καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρα καὶ ποικιλωτέρα τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινότεροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν.

λέγοντες: comp. ^b 6 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων, and ^b 7 πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας. Aristotle is thinking more immediately of the ῥήσεις in a tragedy, and of the intellectual, i. e. the rhetorical or argumentative, capacity they may reveal in the personages.

^a 7 ἀποδεικνύασίν τι: ^b 11 ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.—19, 1456^a 37 τό τε ἀποδεικνύει καὶ τὸ λύνει.—Rhet. 1. 1, 1355^a 5 ἢ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις· τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδείχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν.

ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. The equivalent in ^b 12 is the more general expression, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται, but it is hardly worth while to bring the two passages into unison by restoring here (with Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 155) ἢ καθόλου ἀποφαίνονται, on the assumption that γνώμην may have come in as a gloss. A γνώμη as defined in the Rhetoric is a maxim, or general proposition relating to the conduct of life: Rhet. 2. 21, 1394^a 21 ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπό-

φανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἴφικράτης, 1450^a 7 ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκτὰ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. The corresponding Latin term was *sententia*: Quintilian 8. 5. 3 *Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie . . . sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνώμας appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt, quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis.*

μέρη εἶναι ζξ. An answer to the question announced in 1, ^a 8 1447^a 10 ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων.

καθ' ὃ ποία τις ἐστὶν ἢ τραγωδία. The word μέρος being ambiguous (Metaph. Δ 25, 1023^b 12; Z 10, 1034^b 32), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12. The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as ποία τις—as good or bad, as ἠθική or πεπλεγμένη or παθητική, or whatever else it may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.

οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν = οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν. The ὡς εἰπεῖν which ^a 12 follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after πᾶν in the next line. Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian, οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν (ἀλλὰ πάντες), on which that formerly suggested by myself, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν (ἄπαντες) (J. of Phil. 14 p. 44), was based. οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness. The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in ^a 15, ^a 36, and 18, 1456^a 3, where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts. For the sense of ἔχει in this passage (= 'admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp. 2, 1448^a 7; and for the distinction between it and κέχρηται, Eth. N. 7. 4, 1146^b 32 ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.—1147^a 1 ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας [scil. τὰς προτάσεις] οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος (comp. Bon. Ind. 854^b 37).

εἶδεσι: see on 4, 1449^a 7.

ᾄψεις: see on 6, 1449^b 33.

1450^a 13 πᾶν, i.e. every play; comp. 12, 1452^b 18 ἀπάντων.—18, 1456^a 31 ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο.

^a 15 μέγιστον κτέ. Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the μῦθος. As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the μῦθος or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the μῦθος. The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: 'The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play' (H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379).

ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις = ὁ μῦθος. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp. 4, 1449^a 19; 6, 1449^b 25), it must have a plurality of incidents (πράγματα) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in 17, 1455^b 2 sqq.

^a 17 βίου: Plato Laws 817^b ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν [ῥ γούν] ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγωδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην.—Lycurgus in Leocr. 102 οἱ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. Alcidas described the Odyssey as a καλὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον κάτοπτρον (Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^b 12). Of Menander also it was said: ὦ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμμήσατο; (Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249).

καὶ εὐδαιμονίας: Plato Rep. 603^c πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μμητικὴ βιαιούς ἢ ἐκουσίας πράξεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένου ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι.

^a 18 ἐν πράξει. According to the definition in Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098^a 16 happiness is a certain kind of activity, a ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν. Comp. Phys. 2. 6, 197^b 4 ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πράξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ.—Pol. 7. 3, 1325^a 32 ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξις ἐστίν (also Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098^b 21; Rhet. 1. 5, 1360^b 14).

τὸ τέλος: Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098^b 18 πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος.

οὐ ποιότης: Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173^a 14 οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέρ- 1450^a 18
γεια ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

πράττουσι: scil. οἱ μιμούμενοι. The reference is to the actors^a 21
(see on 3. 1448^a 23) rather than the poets.

συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν, scil. ἐν τῇ μιμήσει, 'they include in the
representation'; συμπεριλαμβάνειν in this sense is not infrequent
in later Greek (v. HSt. s. v.). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to
reject it for the reading of one of the apographs, συμπαρалаμ-
βάνουσιν, though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are
apt to confuse the two prepositions.

διὰ τὰς πράξεις: διὰ in this connexion must mean 'with a view^a 22
to', 'for the sake of', as in Thuc. 2. 89. 4 διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν.

καὶ ὁ μῦθος. The καὶ is explanatory, 'that is to say'.

τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων: modelled on the proverb in Plato^a 23
Rep. 377 A ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, which reappears in Aris-
totle Soph. el. 33, 183^b 22 μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὡσπερ
λέγεται.—Probl. 10. 13, 892^a 29 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου
μέγιστον ἤμισυ γάρ.

τῶν νέων. As it is clear from 14, 1453^b 28 that Euripides is not^a 25
classed among the old poets (οἱ παλαιοί), οἱ νέοι, 'the moderns,'
must mean the poets from Euripides downwards. It is to be
observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter
distinguishes between οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ νῦν, the point noted as
characteristic of 'the moderns' (ῥητορικῶς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας) is
manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him
by the ancients themselves (see on ῥητορικῶς, ^b 8).

ἀήθεις: 24, 1460^a 11 οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθη. ἀήθης is,
like other compounds of *a* privativum (De anima 2. 10, 422^a 26;
Metaph. Δ 22, 1022^b 32), an ambiguous word, as it may mean
either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'.
Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with
personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable.
The language in the illustration which follows from painting,
οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration,
just like that in the saying of Pope, *Most women have no
characters at all*.

τοιούτοι: i. e. ἀήθεις.

^a 26

οἶον . . . πέπονθεν: De gen. an. 5. 3, 783^a 6 ἔστι δ' ἔνια τῶν
ζῴων ἃ μαλακὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ἦττον δὲ λεπτήν, οἶον τὸ τῶν
δασυπόδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν.—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 22
οἶον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνῇ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν.

1450^a 26 γραφέν. For other illustrations from painting see on 2. 1448^a 5.

^a 27 Πολύγνωτον. The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in Pol. 8. 5, 1340^a 37 τὰ Πολυγνώτου κὰν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφένων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικός.

^a 28 Ζεύξιδος. This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in 25, 1461^b 12, would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.

^a 29 ῥήσεις: i. e. the speeches put into the mouths of the personages in a play or poem (comp. 15, 1454^a 31; 18, 1456^a 31). The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.

ἠθικός. In the Rhetoric the ἠθικός λόγος is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's ἦθος, in contradistinction to the παθητικός λόγος, which addresses the feelings, and the ἀποδεικτικός λόγος, which addresses the reason of his audience. In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of ἠθικός is μιμητικός ἦθος, 'expressive of character' (comp. Bon. Ind. 315^b 21)—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics. Thus in 18, 1456^a 1 a certain kind of tragedy is termed the ἠθικὴ τραγωδία, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in 23, 1459^b 16 the Odyssey is described as ἠθική, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in 24, 1460^b 3 certain passages in a poem are termed ἠθικὰ μέρη, as serving to bring out the ἦθος of the personages in the story.

λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημένας, 'made perfect in the matter of language and thought'. The same use of the dative is found in ^a 36 τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν.—24, 1460^b 2 τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν; and in Alcidamas De soph. 12 οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεργασμένοι [scil. λόγοι].

^a 30 (οὔπω) ποιήσει δ' ἦν τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 2 ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον. The Arabic version seems to suggest οὔπω (see on 9, 1451^b 13) rather than οὐ. For the fut. with οὔπω comp. Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135^a 22 ὥστε ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῆ.—6. 13, 1144^b 35 ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφῶς ἔσται. The imperfect in δ' ἦν τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp. Bon. Ind. 754^a 40), the reference being presumably to 6, 1449^b 36, where Tragedy is said to be a μίμησις πράξεως.

ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, scil. ποιήσει, as in Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141^b 18 1450^a 31
 εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα
 ἀγροῦ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίαιαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια [κοῦφα καὶ]
 ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. For the form of antithesis comp. De caelo
 2. 3, 286^a 5 πόρρω δ' οὐχ οὕτω τῷ τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ . . .
 ὀλίγην ἔχει αἴσθησιν, and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad
 loc.) and Schwab (Schanz's Beiträge 4. 1, p. 66).

τούτοις refers back to the ῥήσεις ἠθικαὶ καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ
 πεποιημένοι of ^a 29. Aristotle's point is, that the dramatic effec-
 tiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that
 no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.

ψυχαγωγεί: comp. ^b 17 ψυχαγωγικόν. Said of a work of art the ^a 33
 word means no more than to 'move' or 'rivet the attention', and
 is thus the equivalent of our word 'attract' or (as people now
 sometimes say) 'fascinate'. This sense of ψυχαγωγεῖν is as old as
 Xenophon: Mem. 3. 10, 6 ὁ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζη τοῖς ἀνδρῶ-
 σιν; It is found more than once in Isocrates: 24 D δέδεικται τοῖς
 ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοὺς ἀκρωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ
 συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον οἷς ὀρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους
 μάλιστα χαίροντας.—191 A τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει
 καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχη κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς
 συμμετρίας ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Later writers also often
 use the word in the sense of to 'attract' or 'please'; comp.
 the Antiatticista in Bekker's Anecdota 116 ψυχαγωγεῖν: τὸ τέρπειν,
 and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.

αἱ τε περιπέτειαὶ καὶ ἀναγνώσεις. These are considered later ^a 34
 on in chap. 11. It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two
 terms without explanation, as though they were already part of
 the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause
 comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it
 illustrates (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 282).

συνίστασθαι is apparently a middle in 24, 1460^a 34 also (v. ad loc.). ^a 37

οἶον καὶ introduces not an instance but a parallel from a different
 class of things just like ὥσπερ καί, from which it is often hardly
 distinguishable in sense (comp. Top. 6. 9, 148^a 4; Eth. N. 9. 1,
 1164^a 15; Rhet. 3. 11, 1412^a 11; 3. 12, 1413^b 25). In De
 mem. 1, 450^b 20 and in Plato Phaedr. 255 c οἶον is so completely
 equivalent to ὥσπερ as to have a οὕτως as its antecedent. In
 Poet. 25, 1460^b 33 οἶον . . . ταύτῃ is practically the same thing as
 ὥσπερ . . . οὕτως.

1450^a 38 ἀρχή. A little before this the μῦθος was said to be the τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας (^a 22). From one point of view it is the ἀρχή, as being the necessary basis of every tragedy; from another it is the τέλος, because it is this much more than the characters that Tragedy as a μίμησις πράξεως has to represent.

ψυχῆ: Isocrates 142 c ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία.—261 c πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχὴ πόλεώς ἐστιν.—[Demosthenes] 60. 23 ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχὴ τάληθες εἰπεῖν—Martianus Capella 3, 268 *Est accentus, ut quidam putaverunt, anima vocis.*

^a 39 παραπλήσιον κτέ. This clause Castelvetro and others would transpose and insert after σύστασιν πραγμάτων in ^a 33. It comes in, however, naturally enough where it stands, as an afterthought to illustrate the secondary position (δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἥθη) of the element of character in a play. So also in the sister art of painting, says Aristotle, the colouring is of subordinate importance in comparison with the design which makes the work to mean something and be like something; a portrait is a portrait, and will give us the pleasure of one, even though executed in mere whites and greys; whereas a medley of much more beautiful colours without a design to give them meaning will not produce the same pleasure, because we cannot see that it represents anything. The nature of the pleasure found in a work of imitative art was explained in 4, 1448^b 13.

^b 1 εἰ γὰρ τις ἐναλείψειε κτέ. The sense is thus given by Goulston: ‘si quis tabulam, pigmentis licet pulcherrimis, temere fusimque illeverit; non perinde spectantem oblectet, ac si, albo licet colore, imaginem delinearet certam: pari modo in tragoediis absque constitutione rerum minus valent mores quam morum experts fabula.’ The object left to be understood with ἐναλείψετε is τὸν πίνακα, the ‘panel’ or ‘canvas’, as we should say; ἀλείφειν and ἐπαλείφειν are used in just the same way, in the sense of covering a surface with colour. ἐναλείφειν, it is to be observed, has apparently a different kind of object in De gen. an. 2. 6, 743^b 23 οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον (‘painters first sketch the outline of the figure before proceeding to work it out in colour’). χύδην means ‘without system or order’, i.e. without a design to give form and sense to the whole. The direct opposite of this unmeaning medley of the most beautiful colours (εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην) is a portrait in plain whites and greys (λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα); in what follows,

therefore, *εἰκόνα* serves as an antithesis to *χύδην* (comp. Vahlen, 1450^b 1 Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 166) and *λευκογραφήσας* to *τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις*. *λευκογραφεῖν*, as a derivative from *λευκογράφος* (a word no longer to be found), is to 'paint monochromes in white', i.e. in shades of white and grey (it would seem) on a dark ground. Zeuxis, whom Aristotle has just mentioned in ^a 27, was among other things a painter of monochromes in white—*pinxit et monochromata ex albo* (Pliny N. H. 35. 64; comp. Brunn, Gr. Künstler² 2 p. 55). A portrait, however, even though it be a mere monochrome in whites (comp. *λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα*), will have a meaning, and give the mind the intellectual pleasure which accompanies the recognition of the meaning (comp. 4, 1448^b 15); whereas a medley of beautiful colours has no meaning, and the pleasure it gives the beholder is of a wholly different order (comp. 4, 1448^b 18 οὐχ ἢ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ . . . τὴν χροιάν). The antithesis, therefore, is simply between beautiful colours without an *εἰκὼν*, and an *εἰκὼν* without any beauty of colour. Vahlen's view of the import of these words is somewhat different. He thinks that *λευκογραφήσας* may denote the preliminary sketch (like *ὑπογράφειν* in the above-quoted passage in the *De gen. an.*) in white, which is afterwards filled in with colour, when the picture comes to be finished; so that the clause may be taken to describe two stages in the process of painting, (1) *λευκογραφεῖν εἰκόνα*, and (2) *ἐναλείφειν φαρμάκοις*, and serves to illustrate the order of procedure in Tragedy, where the *μῦθος* is said to come first, as the *ἀρχὴ τῆς τραγωδίας*, and the *ἤθη* second: 'orationis formam sic accipio, εἴ τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα εἰ ἐναλείψει φαρμάκοις', ut *χύδην*, h. e. *nulla ante delineatione facta, et λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα inter se opponantur*'. This very subtle interpretation seems to me to read more into Aristotle's words than is required for the argument.

ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως κτέ. supports the statement (^a 38–39)^b 3 before the parenthesis by recalling the general fact on which it is based (v. ^a 20–23).

τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. As the intellectual quality of the *dramatis*^b 4 *personae* comes out mainly in what they are made to say, *διάνοια* is provisionally explained (see on ^a 6) as a power of making the best of one's case or of saying the right thing.

¹ Aristotle would perhaps have said: *οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειε καὶ εἰ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα οὕτως ἐναλείψειε τοῖς φαρμάκοις*.

1450^b 5 τὰ ἐνόητα, scil. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, as in Isocr. 292 E ὑπισχνούνται τοιοῦτους ῥήτορας τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἐνόητων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παραλιπεῖν (comp. Bon. Ind. 250^a 56). The whole expression τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα covers the same ground as that in Rhet. 2. 22, 1396^b 5, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα.

^b 6 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων has been taken to mean 'in soluta oratione' (Paccius), and 'in orationibus' (Valla) or 'in eloquentia', 'bei der Beredsamkeit' (Vahlen). The explanation, however, in the context, ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας (^b 7), is enough to show that the λόγοι Aristotle has in mind are the λόγοι in a play, i. e. the ῥήσεις put into the mouths of the personages. This is apparently the sense the word bears in the next sentence also, τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὁ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων (^b 9).

τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον. Aristotle seems to be thinking of what is said in a play by the chief personages (e. g. the tragic hero), and of the kind of intellectual capacity (διάνοια) revealed in their statements. One has to remember that the chief personages in ancient Tragedy are not ordinary men, and that the tragic hero is expressly said by Aristotle (13, 1453^a 10-21) to be always in the best tragedies a man of great position and lineage. In a play, therefore, such personages might very well be made to speak πολιτικῶς, 'like statesmen', and to show a statesmanlike power of saying what is appropriate to the situation before them (τὰ ἀρμόττοντα). But it would also be possible to make them speak ῥητορικῶς, 'like rhetors', with something of the rhetor's cleverness in seizing on the various possible points that may be urged on the occasion (τὰ ἐνόητα, i. e. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα). Though ῥητορικὴ stands in a certain relation to πολιτικὴ (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356^a 27), the distinction between them is a very real one with Aristotle; πολιτικὴ is with him the practical wisdom of the statesman (Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141^b 23), and ῥητορικὴ only a form of the art of argumentation—a δύναμις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356^a 33), or a δύναμις περὶ ἐκάστου τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (Rhet. 1. 2, 1355^b 26). There is no reference to πολιτικὴ in chap. 19. Aristotle may perhaps have felt that the practice of the later dramatists (οἱ νῦν) was too firmly established to admit of change, and that the tragic personages accordingly must still be allowed to speak ῥητορικῶς, as they did in the Tragedy of his time.

^b 7 ἀρχαῖοι: the dramatists anterior to Euripides (see on 6, 1450^a 25).

πολιτικῶς . . . λέγοντας, which Valla rendered by 'civiliter dicentes', is often taken to mean 'to speak the language of civil life', like ordinary citizens, as distinct from the professional orator. But as the context shows that the ability to speak πολιτικῶς implies something of πολιτικῆ in the speaker (comp. Newman on Pol. 2. 11, 1273^b 12), πολιτικῶς would seem rather to mean 'like a πολιτικός'—the statesman being assumed to say that which is befitting (τὰ ἀρμόττοντα) without any ostentation of rhetorical cleverness (comp. HSt. s. v. πολιτικός). Vahlen (Symb. phil. Bonn. p. 175) supposes the expression to coincide in sense with the ἠθικῶς λέγειν of Rhet. 3. 17, 1418^a 38, which means ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως λέγειν, as opposed to ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν (Rhet. 3. 16, 1417^a 23). The objection to this interpretation is twofold. (1) Aristotle is to all appearance not contrasting διάνοια with ἦθος, but distinguishing between the two forms it may assume in the dramatic ῥήσεις. (2) πολιτικῶς λέγειν can hardly be identical with ἠθικῶς λέγειν; the personages in Comedy speak ἠθικῶς, but it would be a paradox to say of them that they speak πολιτικῶς, in the sense of there being something of πολιτικῆ in their utterances.

ῥητορικῶς. Euripides is termed by Aristophanes (Pax 534) a^b 8 ποιητῆς ῥηματίων δικανικῶν. Quintilian also (10. 1, 68) thinks the study of his plays one of the best preparations for the bar: *Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, iis qui se ad agendum comparant utiliorem longe fore Euripidem. namque is et sermone . . . magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiis densus et in iis quae a sapientibus tradita sunt paene ipsis par, et dicendo ac respondendo cuilibet eorum qui fuerunt in foro disertis comparandus.*

ἦθος. A statement is said to have ἦθος in it when it reveals the moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do or not to do. ἦθος is an element in oratory also, as the credibility of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of his character. The language in the text may be compared with that in Rhet. 2. 21, 1395^b 13 ἦθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δῆλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γινώμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιούσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ' ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνώμαι, καὶ χρηστοθήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιούσι τὸν λέγοντα.—3. 16, 1417^a 16 ἠθικὴν δὲ χρῆ τὴν διγῆσιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιῶν. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιῶν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιῶν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιῶν τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἦθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.

1450^b 9 *δοποιά τις*. This (the reading of A^o) is very rightly retained by Vahlen, who translates the clause by 'quod aperiat voluntatem, qualia quis in quibus apertum non est aut appetat aut fugiat'; the explanation is added to show that *προαίρεσις* is to be taken in a wide sense, which may include aversion as well as desire. For an explanatory clause of this form comp. 16, 1455^a 10 *συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν*, and Plato Rep. 535 A *μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷους ἐξελέξαμεν*;

ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον is added because there are situations in which the moral purpose of the agent is too obvious to require to be revealed in an 'ethical' speech; see 19, 1456^b 7 for a parallel statement on the subject of *διάνοια*.

προαιρεῖται. Though the usual opposite of *φεύγειν* is the simple verb *αἰρεῖσθαι* (Bon. Ind. 18^b 3), there is a certain propriety in *προαιρεῖται* in a clause explanatory of *προαίρεσις*. The word is found in a similar antithesis in Eth. N. 10. 1, 1172^a 25 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν*.

^b 9* *διόπερ κτέ*. In the Rhetoric we are told that a mathematical argument does not admit of any colouring of character, because the facts with which it deals are indifferent to us—not objects of either desire or aversion: Rhet. 3. 16, 1417^a 19 *διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἡθῆ, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν*. In like manner a speech in a play may be on a subject wholly indifferent to the speaker, and in that case there is no room for any infusion of *ἡθος* into his statement.

^b 12 *καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται* replaces the *ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην* in ^a 7 (v. ad loc.).

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ κτέ. On the reading which I have ventured to introduce into the text see the J. of Phil. 5 p. 119¹. It is clear that the four elements in a tragedy, the *μῦθος ἡθῆ διάνοια* and *λέξις*, belong to it as a work of literature, and that the music and 'spectacle' are accessories, which attach to it only when it comes to be acted on the stage. Apart from these accessories, a tragedy is, like an epic (comp. 23, 1459^b 10), a *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ* (see on 1, 1447^a 29), and all the elements which constitute it are *ἐν λόγῳ*. *τὰ ἐν λόγῳ*, therefore, is a comprehensive designation for the four literary elements, as distinct from the non-literary elements (*τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν* ^b 15), the music and 'spectacle', with which the enumeration concludes. If *τῶν μὲν λόγων* be retained, the genitive

¹ Comp. Markland's *ἔστιν ἐν ὑπολόγῳ* for *ἔστι μὲν ὑπὸ λόγῳ* in Lysias 4. 18, and Canter's *ἀκοὴ ἐν ἡμῖν* for *ἀκοὴ μὲν ἡμῖν* in Clem. Al. Str. 7. 36, 852 P.

has to be taken as an objective gen. after λέξις. Valla renders the 1450^b 12 words by 'orationum dictio', Paccius by 'sermonum dictio', and Goulston by 'ipsarum orationum elocutio'. The main difficulty, however, is in the particle, which has never been satisfactorily explained. Vahlen formerly (Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 181) connected the clause with that which follows in ^b 15 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κτέ., supposing the sense to be 'viertens für die Dialoge (τῶν λόγων) die sprachliche Form; für das übrige (τῶν λοιπῶν) die Melopöie'. His later view (1885) is that the μέν in τῶν μέν λόγων may be an instance of μέν solitarium, and that Aristotle may have meant at first to append something about the μέλη (τῶν δὲ μελῶν . . .). Such a division of the fourth part, it seems to me, is wholly inconsistent with the general scheme of the six parts, which is throughout this chapter so clearly before Aristotle's mind, as well as with the express mention of the μελοποιία in its proper place in the next sentence.

ὡσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται. If the reference is to 6, 1449^b 34, where ^b 13 the λέξις is defined as ἡ τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσις, Aristotle must have forgotten the exact terms of his previous formula. The point, however, is practically the same in both instances; λέξις is to be understood in the sense of 'diction' or 'expression in language', and not in any of the other senses which the word might bear (see on 23, 1459^a 12).

διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας = διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, i. e. by means of the words ^b 14 or language of the speaker. As the ὄνομα, which includes the verb and the adverb as well as the noun, is the directly significant part of all language, ὀνομασία means practically the same thing as vocabulary or language.

ἐρμηνείαν, 'communication', 'expression'; the Latin equivalent for it is *interpretatio*. After ἐρμηνείαν we may supply τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, the spoken word being the outward sign or expression of a thought in the mind: De interpr. 1, 16^a 3 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. On the meaning of ἐρμηνεία in Aristotle see Waitz, Organon 1 p. 323, and Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft² 1 p. 235.

ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν = ταὐτὸ δύναται, 'is practically the same ^b 15 thing' (see on 1, 1447^a 8).

[πέντε]. Similar instances of an intrusive numeral will be found ^b 16 in Rhet. 1. 2, 1356^a 21, and 1. 13, 1373^b 3 (v. Roemer ad loc.). Vahlen accepts the correction πέμπτον, in the sense of *quinto loco*: 'reliquarum autem partium (h. e. quae post illas quattuor iam

1450^b 16 reliquae sunt duae) quinto loco μελοποιία gravissimum est condimentum, ὅψις autem ad poeticam artem omnino non pertinet'.

μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων: see on 6, 1449^b 25 (ἡδυσμένῳ). For the pleasure given by music comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339^b 20 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων.—1340^a 2 δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλέης.—^b 15 οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνῆδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων [? ἡδυσμάτων] ἐστίν. Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 157) supposed that a further statement on the subject of music, like that in the Anonymus De Comoedia (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 52), μέλος τῆς μουσικῆς ἐστὶν ἴδιον, ὅθεν ἀπ' ἐκείνης τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς ἀφορμὰς δεήσει λαμβάνειν, may have dropped out after ἡδυσμάτων.

^b 17 ψυχαγωγικόν: see on ^a 33.

ἀτεχνότατον: 13, 1453^b 7 τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀτεχνος is frequently used in the sense of 'depending on means outside the art itself'; comp. Rhet. 3. 16, 1416^b 18 σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνον, οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης. The opposite of it in this sense is ἐτεχνος (Bon. Ind. 119^b 4).

^b 18 ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις κτέ. The tragic effect may be produced by a good tragedy even without any actual performance of it on a stage, i. e. as a mere work of literature (comp. 14, 1453^b 4, and 26, 1462^a 11). The reading of A^c here, ὡς γὰρ, is defended by Vahlen, who translates it by *quia enim* (*wenn nämlich*), on the assumption that the apodosis is omitted in the same way as in Eth. N. 8. 6, 1157^b 3 οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ [scil. φίλοι εἰσίν].—8. 10, 1159^b 10 οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις [scil. διαμένουσιν], and certain more or less similar passages. The present passage (with the reading ὡς γὰρ) does not seem to me to be a genuine parallel. On behalf of the amended reading (ἡ γὰρ) it has to be remembered that a confusion between ἡ and the compendium for ὡς is not so uncommon in MSS. of a certain date (Bast, Comm. Palaeogr. p. 780).

ἄνευ ἀγῶνος. ἀγών is generally rendered by *certamen* or 'contest', but it is not clear that that is the sense Aristotle attaches to it in the present and other places (7, 1451^a 6; 13, 1453^a 27) of the Poetics. It seems to mean rather little more than a 'public performance'. Similarly ἀγωνίζεσθαι in 7, 1451^a 8 and 24, 1460^a 9

means apparently 'to perform in public', *συναγωνίζεσθαι* in 18, 1450^b 18 1456^a 26 'to take part in such a performance'; and *ἀγόνισμα* in 9, 1451^b 37 a 'work to be performed in public'. The word *ἀγωνιστής*, likewise, in Pol. 8. 7, 1342^a 18 and Probl. 19. 15, 918^b 28, means no more than a 'public' or 'professional performer' (comp. *πρωταγωνιστής* etc.). In Rhet. 3. 12, 1413^b 4 *ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις* means the style allowable in public speaking, as distinct from the *γραφικὴ λέξις*, the more formal style required for a purely literary work. The idea of contest or competition, therefore, is not always a recognizable element in the meaning of this group of words (comp. Nitzsch, *De historia Homeri* 2 p. 113).

ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν: 13, 1453^a 27 ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγῶνων.—Probl. 19. 15, 918^b 28 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστής.—Rhet. 3. 12, 1413^b 8 ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἢ ὑποκριτικωτάτη κτέ. The present clause shows that the *ῥῥις* is ἡκιστα οἰκείον τῆς ποιητικῆς; the next, that it is ἀτεχνότατον.

ῥῥων: for the plural see on 6, 1449^b 33.

^b 20

σκευοποιῶν, the theatrical costumier, who enabled the actors to appear in character by supplying the masks, dresses, and other paraphernalia of their make-up; comp. Aristophanes Eq. 230 καὶ μὴ δέδιθ'· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξηκασμένος. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέου γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἤθελε τῶν σκευοποιῶν εἰκάσαι (v. Schol. ad loc.).—Aelian V. H. 2. 13 οἱ σκευοποιοὶ ἔπλασαν αὐτὸν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεικάσαντες.—Pollux 4. 115 σκευὴ μὲν ἢ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν στολή . . . σκευοποιὸς δὲ ὁ προσωποποιός.—2. 47 ἢ δὲ νέα κωμῳδία καὶ προσωποποιὸν εἴρηκεν ὃν ἢ ἀρχαία σκευοποιὸν ἐκάλει (v. Meineke, FCG. 4 p. 680). For *σκευή* in the sense of the make-up of actors see Eurip. Suppl. 1054, Aristoph. Ran. 108, Plato Rep. 577 v.

κεῖται: as has been stated in the definition of Tragedy in 6, ^b 23 1449^b 25 (comp. Bon. Ind. 380^b 43).

τελείας καὶ ὄλης. Although there is strictly speaking a certain ^b 24 distinction between the idea of 'complete' (*τέλειος*: v. Metaph. Δ 16, 1021^b 12) and that of 'whole' (*ὄλος*: v. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023^b 26), the two terms are so closely allied in sense as to be all but synonymous: Phys. 3. 6, 207^a 7 ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω. οὐ δὲ μηδὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὄλον· οὕτω γὰρ ὀριζόμεθα τὸ ὄλον, οὐ μηθὲν ἄπεστιν . . . ὄλον δὲ καὶ τέλειον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάμπαν ἢ σύνεγγυς τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.

ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος: see on 4, 1449^a 19 and 6, 1449^b 25.

^b 25

1450^b 25 μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος, 'of no size,' as we say, means the same thing as *πάμμικρον* in ^b 37 (Sauppe ap. Teichmüller, *Aristot. Forsch.* 1 p. 54), just as in 6, 1450^a 28 οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος means practically 'has but very little character' in it.

^b 27 μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. By a 'beginning' Aristotle does not mean something without antecedents, but only something that may be detached as it were from its antecedents, and viewed apart from them as the first term in a new series of events.

^b 28 μετ' ἐκείνο δ': comp. ^b 30 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο.—^b 31 καὶ μετ' ἐκείνο.—*An. pr.* 1. 4, 25^b 35 καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν.

^b 34 ιδέαις. *ιδέα*, 'form,' 'sort,' or 'kind,' is frequently used, just like *εἶδος*, which has much the same sense, without any genitive to explain it. Instances of this allusive, or rather evasive, use will be found in 5, 1449^b 8, in 19, 1456^b 3, and in 22, 1458^b 18. It is a favourite term with Isocrates also: 24 C ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ιδέαις ταύταις κατεχρήσαντο.—36 A χρῆ δὲ δοκιμάζειν τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ιδέαις ἀπάσας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις κτέ.—319 D ταῖς ἄλλαις ιδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὄλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν.—*De perm.* § 183 τὰς ιδέας ἀπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. For instances from other authors see Campbell's *Essay on Plato's use of language*, *Rep. of Plato* 2 p. 301.

τὸ καλὸν κτέ. Having just laid it down that the *μῦθος* must be a complete whole, Aristotle assumes that it must also be a beautiful whole, and proceeds to show that, if it is to be that, it must be of a certain magnitude, neither too long nor too short. Beauty, he says, depends on two conditions: the beautiful object must be (1) large enough to allow of our seeing the orderly arrangement of its parts, and (2) not so large as to be incapable of being taken in as a whole in one *coup d'œil*. With this we may compare *Metaph. M* 3, 1078^a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον—where *τάξις* corresponds with the first, and τὸ ὀρισμένον with the second of the two conditions in the present passage. For the form of the opening statement comp. *De long. vitae* 5, 466^a 26 τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ζῶα καὶ φυτά.

ζῶον: 23, 1459^a 20 ἵν' ὥσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὄλον ποιῆ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν. The analogy between a literary whole and a living organism is postulated in *Plato Phaedr.* 264 C ἀλλὰ τότε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ

μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ' ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα 1450^b 34 (comp. Hermias and W. H. Thompson ad loc., and Dionysius Hal. 5, p. 381 R.); and also in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415^b 7 ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦ [scil. ὁ ἀκροατής], οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχη ὡσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν [scil. ὁ λόγος]—where the exordium of a speech is likened to the head of a body. The same assumption underlies many of the terms of early grammar or rhetoric, e.g. κῶλον, ἄρθρον, σύνδεσμος (see on 20, 1456^b 38), ἀκέφαλος, κολοβός, μείουρος (see on 26, 1462^b 6). I am unable, therefore, to accept Susemihl's view, that ζῶον both here and in chap. 23 means a picture or statue (*Gemälde, Bild*)—though it certainly has that sense in a passage not very unlike this in form, in Plato Polit. 277 B ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὡσπερ ζῶον τὴν ἐξῶθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν ἰκανῶς ἔχειν κτέ. It seems to mean here a living, as distinct from an artificial, whole, as it clearly does in another Aristotelian passage, Top. 1. 15, 106^a 20 τῷ καλῷ τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῶου τὸ αἰσχροὺν [scil. ἐναντίον], τῷ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας τὸ μοχθηρόν. In saying καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν Aristotle passes from the living wholes called ζῶα to a large kind of whole, 'everything made up of parts', a formula wide enough to include the creations of human art as well as those of nature. This addition is of some importance for the argument; it prepares us for the application of the general law to the case of the μῦθος, which, as a σύστημα or σύστασις πραγμάτων (comp. 6, 1450^a 15), is a πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. I may add that the conjunctions in Aristotle's statement (καὶ . . . καὶ = cum . . . tum) seem to imply that the stress is really on the second of the two points.

πρᾶγμα, a 'thing': Top. 1. 5, 102^a 18 ἴδιον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ^b 35 μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῃ δ' ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν.—De anima 3. 8, 432^a 3 πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον.—Plato Crat. 390 D Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν.

ταῦτα = τὰ μέρη, implied in συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν.

μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν: De gen. an. 2. 6, 745^a 5 ἔστι γάρ^b 36 τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις πέρασ τοῦ μεγέθους.—Pol. 7. 4, 1326^a 35 ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων φυτῶν ὀργάνων.

μεγέθει: Eth. N. 4. 7, 1123^b 6 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία,^b 37 ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ

1450^b 37 *σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ*. Similarly in Pol. 7. 4, 1326^a 33, speaking of the size of the *καλλίστη πόλις*, Aristotle explains that τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.

τάξει. According to Top. 3. 1, 116^b 21, beauty is thought to consist in *συμμετρία* (τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις *συμμετρία* δοκεῖ εἶναι); and according to Metaph. M 3, 1078^a 36 in *τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον*. In the beauty of a *μῦθος*, however, there is no room for the idea of *συμμετρία*. A well-constructed story involves a certain order in its incidents and a limit of length; but there is nothing in it directly corresponding to the symmetry or proportion which is one element in the beauty of a living creature.

^b 38 *συγχέεται*. The reason for our not seeing any beauty in a very minute creature is that we perceive it as a whole too quickly to discern the parts and the order and symmetry there may be in them. *συγχέεται* = 'becomes blurred, or indistinct', as in H. A. 7. 5, 585^b 34 *συγκεχυμένον μέλαν*, and the other passages noted in Bon. Ind. 709^b 43.

θεωρία, 'sight' or 'view' (comp. Bon. Ind. 329^a 31).

^b 39 *ἀναισθήτου χρόνου*. There is no necessity to bracket *χρόνου* (with Bonitz). The time a thing takes to be seen may be of perceptible or of imperceptible duration; and in the latter case it may very well be described as an *ἀναισθητος χρόνος*, a time too short for one to be conscious of its duration. This expression, *ἀναισθητος χρόνος*, appears in the definition of the 'sudden' or 'instantaneous' in Phys. 4. 13, 222^b 15 τὸ δ' ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναισθητῷ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν (comp. Probl. 3. 10, 872^b 9). The equivalent in the Analytics is *ἄσκεπτος χρόνος*: An. post. 1. 34, 89^b 10 ἡ δ' ἀγχίνου ἐστὶν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου, οἷον εἴ τις ἰδῶν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν αἰεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. The converse of all this is the assertion in Probl. 19. 21, 919^a 32, that the longer the time is, the more perceptible it is: *πλείων ὁ χρόνος ὁ τοῦ βαρέος, οὗτος δὲ μάλλον αἰσθητός*. According to the stricter psychology of the De sensu (7, 448^a 24) there is no such thing as a *χρόνος ἀναισθητος*.

οὔτε *παμμέγεθες*: comp. the rule for the size of the *πόλις* in Pol. 5. 2, 1302^b 35 and 7. 4, 1326^a 35.

1451^a 2 οἷον εἰ κτέ. refers back to *παμμέγεθες*. Other instances of an illustration with οἷον (= e. g.) at some distance from the main statement will be found in 18, 1456^a 13; 19, 1456^b 11; 20,

1457^a 27; 22, 1458^a 29; 26, 1462^b 7. Comp. Soph. el. 24, 1451^a 2
180^a 20 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἦμισυ εἰπόντες τοῦ ἔπους δός μοι Ἰλιάδα
σημαίνομεν, οἶον τὸ μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά; and Eth. N. 1. 9, 1099^b 2
ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἶον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας,
κάλλους.

ὄστε marks the apodosis (comp. 9, 1452^a 10 and Bon. Ind. ^a 3
873^a 31).

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων. The argument proceeds on the
assumption of an analogy between a beautiful whole that addresses
the eye, and one that addresses the mind; and the conclusion is
that as the one is εὐσύνοπτον, so the other must be εὐμνημόνευτον.
At this point Aristotle changes his construction, repeating his
original statement (1450^b 34) in the form required for an argument
from analogy, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῶων . . . οὕτω
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων, with συστημάτων as a short equivalent for the
foregoing ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. A σύστημα is
a product of combination, something that comes into being
through a union, natural or artificial, of parts into a whole;
a state, for instance, is a σύστημα (Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168^b 32) as
being due to a combination of classes or individuals, and a ζῶον is
a σύστημα (De gen. an. 2. 4, 740^a 20), as being an organized
whole of parts. The present passage, however, implies a more
restricted sense of σύστημα, as though the term were properly
applicable only to a whole that is made, as distinct from an organic
whole, which grows to be what it is. This or some similar sense
is suggested by the passage also in Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168^b 32 ὥσπερ
δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα,
οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος—where the implication is that a man is not a
σύστημα proper, though his composite nature gives him a certain
resemblance to one.

. The difficulty in the manuscript reading *σωμάτων* is that the word
would have to be understood in one of two senses, either in that of
'material substances', or in that of 'living bodies'. The first
interpretation is out of the question, since beauty is in the *τάξις* or
σὺμμετρία τῶν μερῶν, and, therefore, in the form, not in the matter,
of things. The second, which makes ἐπὶ τῶν *σωμάτων* and ἐπὶ τῶν
ζῶων mere synonyms, leaves us without any equivalent for the
ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν of his original statement
(1450^b 34), which was, if I am not mistaken, far too important
for Aristotle's argument to be ignored in any *résumé* of it (comp.
J. of Phil. 5 p. 120).

1451^a 3 ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων: see on 1450^b 36.

^a 4 εὐσύνοπτον, 'easily taken in as a whole by the eye', as opposed to εὐμνημόνευτον (^a 5), 'easily taken in as a whole by the memory'. The word, however, is metaphorically used as equivalent to εὐμνημόνευτος in 23, 1459^a 33, as also in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409^a 35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἦδεῖα δ' ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθὴς . . . εὐμαθὴς δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος.

^a 6 ὄρος (ὁ) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας: the limit in practice, in contradistinction to the theoretic limit of length, ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὄρος (^a 9). In actual practice the length of the play is determined by the conditions of the public performances (ἀγῶνες) in which it will be presented on the stage; the time it is to occupy there is fixed by custom and convention rather than theory.

^a 7 τὴν αἰσθησιν, scil. τῶν θεατῶν (see on 15, 1454^b 15); comp. 4, 1449^a 8 πρὸς τὰ θέατρα. The language here, though quite general, seems to refer more especially to the power of attention in the audiences.

ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι: an extreme instance like the μυρίων σταδίων ζῶφον in ^a 2. The subject of ἀγωνίζεσθαι, if expressed, would be 'the performers', ἀγωνίζεσθαι τι in stage matters being synonymous with ὑποκρίνεσθαι τι; comp. Demosth. 19, 246 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δρᾶμα . . . Μόλων ἠγωνίζετο.—250 ἃ ἠγωνίσω καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξήπιστασο.—337 τὰ Θυέστου . . . ἠγωνίζετο (see on 6, 1450^b 18). In the sense of 'contend', as said of the dramatic poet, it would require an instrumental dative (τραγῳδίας) after it. The personification implied in Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'si centum tragoedias in theatro certare oporteret', is (I think) questionable in Aristotle. Goulston takes ἀγωνίζεσθαι as a passive (= *agti*), as it certainly sometimes is.

^a 8 πρὸς κλεψύδρας. For the preposition comp. fr. 468 Teubn. μέτρον τί ἐστιν ὕδατος πρὸς μεμετρημένον ἡμέρας διάστημα ῥέον . . . πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ἠγωνίζοντο οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγῶνες.

^a 9 ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτὲ φασιν. The idea of tragedies having been at some date or other timed by the clepsydra is to my mind highly improbable, and there is no hint of such a thing elsewhere. The language also here is not free from difficulties. Tyrwhitt translates it by 'quemadmodum aliquando alias etiam factum esse perhibent'; and Vahlen (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1897 p. 639) by 'wie man sagt, dass sie auch sonst gespielt haben'. To get this out of the words, and make them relate to Tragedy,

or rather the past history of Tragedy, it becomes necessary to 1451^a 9 supply (with Vahlen) an *aorist* infinitive, ἀγωνίσασθαι, from the preceding imperfect ἠγωνίζοντο, and also to make ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε mean simply 'once' or 'formerly', though its natural meaning would be 'at a certain other time'. Two instances have been pointed out of ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε: Xenophon Anab. 6. 4. 12 ὑμᾶς δεῖ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μαχουμένους εἴ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε [= 'si unquam alias']; Lucian Hermot. 24 ἤδη γάρ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε [= 'alias quondam'] πρεσβύτου ἀνδρὸς ἤκουσα διεξιόντος. These, however, are not enough to show that ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε can only refer to an indefinite past or future; with a verb in the present it may very well refer to the indefinite present also, and have the sense of 'at certain other times', just in the same way as ποτέ, with a present, means 'at certain times' in Soph. el. 16, 175^a 27 συμβαίνει δέ ποτε καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν, and in the familiar antithesis of ποτέ and αἰεί. M. Schmidt's correction, εἰώθασιν (for φασιν), though perhaps too bold, yields an unimpeachable sense, 'as is regularly done at certain other times', i.e. by another class of ἀγωνισταί, the pleaders in the law-courts. As a variation on it, to make the sense clearer, I would suggest ὅσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοι εἰώθασιν.

ὁ δὲ . . . ὄρος is appositional to what follows.

ὁ μείζων, scil. μῦθος; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'quo maior est^a 10 fabula.'

σύνδηλος is explained in the reference to this passage in 24, 1459^b 18 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὄρος ἰκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος.

ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κτέ. A reminiscence apparently of the language^a 12 of Plato Rep. 423 B Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἶη καὶ κάλλιστος ὄρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἀρχουσιν, ὅσῳ δέ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιῆσθαι . . . Τίς, ἔφη, ὄρος; Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξανομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὐξέειν, πέρα δὲ μή.

κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων, scil. τῶν πραγμάτων (see on 6, 1449^b 26). The consequents must be always the natural or necessary effect of the antecedents. A well-constructed μῦθος is a consecutive whole, not a mere series of incidents which happen to follow one after the other in actual order of time (comp. 10, 1452^a 19); and it is this that differentiates it from a history or a biography (comp. 9, 1451^a 36), which records everything that may have befallen a community or an individual, however loose and separate the various incidents were in themselves

1451^a 12 (comp. 23, 1459^a 23). The poetic story in fact must satisfy our sense of logic, incident following after incident as its necessary and inevitable, or as its probable and natural consequence. The technical meaning of the terms *εἰκός* and *ἀναγκαῖον* in Aristotle may be seen from An. post. 2. 27, 70^a 4 τὸ μὲν εἰκός ἐστι πρότασις ἔνδοξος· ὁ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἴσασι οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον, ἢ ὄν ἢ μὴ ὄν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἰκός, οἷον τὸ μισεῖν τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους.—Rhet. 1. 2, 1357^a 34 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστὶν (τὸ) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον . . . τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.—Metaph. Γ 5, 1010^b 28 τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.—Δ 5, 1015^a 34 τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν. The distinction between the two terms had been already recognized by Plato: Theaet. 149 c εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.—Tim. 40 E ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαῖων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν. They were, it would seem, already established in the rhetorical terminology of the sophists (Stallbaum on Tim. 40 E).

^a 13 εἰς εὐτυχίαν κτέ. This is obviously meant to apply only to the tragic hero, not to the secondary personages in the play, about whom Aristotle has very little to say. Though he acknowledges the legitimacy of a transition from misery to happiness as a dramatic motive—it will be remembered that it is the motive in the Iphigenia in Tauris (comp. 17, 1455^b 12 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἢ σωτηρία)—he does not think it so distinctively tragic or so effective in Tragedy as the opposite kind of transition, that from happiness to misery (13, 1453^a 14 sqq.).

^a 14 μεταβάλλειν. The synonym for this in 13, 1453^a 2 is μεταπίπτειν. The implied subject of μεταβάλλειν is 'the tragic hero'; comp. 13, 1452^b 34 οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικέεις ἄνδρας δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, and 14, 1453^a 1 οὐδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν.

^a 16 μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἰς κτέ. See Schoemann, Opusc. Acad. 3 p. 31. ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται: i. e. certain post-Homeric poets, whose theory apparently is inferred from their practice (comp. ^a 21).

^a 17 πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρα: De caelo 1. 9, 278^a 19 ὀρώμεν . . . πλείω καὶ ἄπειρα ὄντα τὰ ὁμοιοειδῆ. Vahlen (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 184) quotes also Plato Theaet. 159 A ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα.—Tim. 31 A πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἓνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον;

τῷ ἐνί: Phys. 2. 5, 196^b 28 τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἐνί συμβαίη. On the strength of this parallel

τῷ ἐνί in the present passage is taken as a neuter¹ by Vahlen, who 1451^a 17 translates the clause accordingly by 'in unam rem innumera cadunt'. This interpretation, it seems to me, misses the point—the distinction Aristotle assumes between the many things that befall the individual (πολλά τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει), i.e. that he suffers or has done to him, and the many things that he does (πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλαὶ εἰσιν^a 18). That τῷ ἐνί is masculine here is shown not only by περὶ ἓνα (^a 17), πράξεις ἐνός (^a 18), and ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη (^a 25) in the context, but also by the parallel in 23, 1459^a 23, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἓνα ἢ πλείους.

ἐνίων, which has been questioned by Spengel and others, is an^a 18 understatement of a kind not so uncommon in Aristotle (see on 6, 1450^a 12). The sense is: In the infinite variety of things that befall the individual in the course of his life there are some [i.e. many] which it is impossible to bring into relation with the rest, as parts of one connected whole. The qualifying ἐνίων is like ἐνίστε in 23, 1459^a 27 οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίστε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἐν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων has been rendered by 'ex quorum aliquibus' (Tyrwhitt), or 'quorum ex quibusdam' (Hermann). In the parallel, however, in Dem. 18. 12 περὶ ὧν ἐνίων both Weil and Goodwin regard ἐνίων as appositional; and the same view has been taken of the word in Dem. 19. 260 (τὰς ἀκροπόλεις αὐτῶν ἐνίων), and in Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 34 (περὶ ὑμῶν ἐνίων). Another instance of this same ambiguity is in Meteor. 1. 3, 339^b 9 πολὺ καὶ τῶν ἀστρων ἐνίων ἐλάττων ἐστίν (comp. L. Dindorf in HSt. s. v. ἔνιος). There is a clear instance of the appositional use of ἐνιοι, in a different case, in Poet. 9, 1451^b 19 ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἐνίαις μὲν κτέ.

πάντες εἰόκασιν ἀμαρτάνειν: comp. 23, 1459^a 29, 37.

^a 19

Ἡρακλῆϊδα. Several Ἡράκλειαι were known in antiquity (Kinkel, ^a 20 EGF. 1 p. 212, 249, 254).

Θησιγίδα: Kinkel, 1 p. 217.

προσήκειν = 'must be', 'ought to be' according to the fitness of^a 22 things, as in Meteor. 1. 3, 340^a 26, De anima 1. 5, 411^b 15, Rhet. 2. 2, 1379^b 3, and Plato Rep. 362 c.

Ἐδύσσειαν: for the absence of the article see on 4, 1448^b 38. ^a 24

οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη: i.e. his poem was not made to cover the whole ground of the life of Ulysses, but only a selected section of it, a limited group of incidents sufficiently ^a 25

¹ The version in the Paraphrase of Averroes, *uni rei multa accidunt*, implies the same interpretation.

1451^a 25 coherent and connected to form a single action of the requisite kind (*μίαν πράξιν οἷαν λέγομεν* ^a 28). The unity in the story of the *Odyssey*, as Aristotle conceives it, may be seen from his survey of the poem in 17, 1455^b 17. The sense of the *οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα* in the text may be illustrated by the very similar expressions in 18, 1456^a 13 *τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιεῖν μῦθον*, ^a 16 *πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὄλην ποιεῖν*, and 23, 1459^a 32 *τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖν ὄλον*.

οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν, scil. *αὐτῷ συνέβη*. This and the second incident, *μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ*, are given as examples of two disconnected events in the life of Ulysses (*ὧν οὐδὲ θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θατέρου γενέσθαι*, ^a 27). The antithetic particles (*μὲν*, *δέ*) imply a difference between them; the one (*πληγῆναι*) is a *πάθος*, and the other (*μανῆναι προσποιήσασθαι*) a *πράξις*—a distinction which the preceding context (see on ^a 17) shows to have been already present in Aristotle's mind. I have ventured to restore *οὐδέ* in place of *οὐδέν* for two reasons, partly because with *οὐδέν* the verb (*γενέσθαι*) seems to have two subjects (*οὐδέν* and *θατέρου*), and partly because the *ὧν* being followed by *θατέρου* and *θατέρου* naturally refers to the two incidents just mentioned. It has been urged, as one of the difficulties in this statement, that the wounding of Ulysses is actually part of the *Odyssey*, being described at considerable length in the story of the Discovery in *Od.* 19, 392–466. The Discovery is certainly part of the action of the *Odyssey* (v. 17, 1455^b 21), but the incident on Parnassus is in a very different position; it comes in as an episode (v. 17, 1455^b 23), not as one of the series of incidents which form the action of the poem. The action in the *Odyssey* (summarized in 17, 1455^b 17 sqq.) extends over a space of some six weeks; but the encounter of the boy Ulysses with the boar belonged to a period of his life not covered by the *Odyssey*. The second incident, his feigned madness, is said to have been part of the story in the *Cypria* (Kinkel, *EGF.* p. 18). Bergk (*Gr. Litt.* 1 p. 711) thinks there may have been some epic in which both incidents were included. The superior unity of the Homeric Epic is emphatically reasserted in 23, 1459^a 30.

^a 27 *ὧν* = ἀλλὰ τούτων.

^a 28 *μίαν πράξιν οἷαν λέγομεν*, 'a single action of the kind we are describing', i. e. one that forms a coherent and closely connected whole. The opposite of this is the *μία πράξις πολυμερής* of the inferior epics (23, 1459^b 1). The reading of *A^c*, *οἷαν λέγομεν*, may have arisen through *OIAN* being misread, and taken to stand for *οἷ ἄν*.

διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι has been rendered in various ways— 1451^a 34 by ‘*diversum reddatur vel moveatur*’ (Victorius), by ‘*dissolvatur et luxetur*’ (Heinsius), and by ‘*differatur et moveatur*’ (Tyrwhitt). The general sense is clear: when a part in a whole is removed, by being transferred to another place or withdrawn altogether, the continuity of the whole is broken at that point. Both *διαφέρεσθαι* and *κινεῖσθαι* seem to be (as Heinsius must have seen) metaphors from surgery. *διαφέρεσθαι* may be regarded as a synonym for *δίστασθαι*, the term in use in medical Greek for the diastasis of a limb as distinct from a complete luxation (*ἐξίστασθαι* or *ὀλισθάνειν*); comp. Hippocrates 3 p. 132 K. *ὀκόσα δίσταται καὶ ὀκόσα ὀλισθάνει*. If this view is correct, the *κινεῖσθαι* which follows will mean to be ‘dislocated’. Hippocrates often has *κινεῖσθαι* and *κίνημα* in the sense of ‘displacement’ as an equivalent for *diastasis* (comp. 3 p. 81 K. *ἤν δέ τι κινήθῃ ἐκ τῆς χώρης*).

προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν: comp. *Metaph.* A 10, 1076^a 2 *οὐθὲν γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα* [scil. *οὐσία*] *τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὐσα ἢ μὴ οὐσα*, and *Plato Rep.* 449 D *μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὄλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον*. For this use of the participle see Goodwin, *Syntax of Gk. moods and tenses* § 829 (b).

οὐδὲν μόνιον: it is not a part of the whole, but an accident or^a 35 addition to it; comp. *De gen. an.* I. 4, 717^a 34 *οὐθὲν γὰρ εἰσι μόνιον τῶν πόρων οἱ ὄρχεις, ἀλλὰ πρόσκεινται καθάπερ τὰς λαίας προσάπτουσι αἱ ὑφαίνουσαι τοῖς ἰστοῖς*. In *Metaph.* Γ 5, 1010^a 30 *οὗτος* [scil. *ὁ περὶ ἡμᾶς τόπος*] *οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόνιον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν*, the phrase means practically ‘as as nothing compared with’, just like *οὐδὲν μέρος* in *Isocrates* 90 E *εἴ τις ἀθρήσειε καὶ σκέψαιτο τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμφοράς, οὐδὲν ἂν μέρος οὐσαι φανεῖν τῶν . . . ἡμῶν γεγενημένων*.

φανερὸν δὲ κτέ. In Aristotle’s view a history is a chronicle, or^a 36 register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves (23, 1459^a 21). The present distinction between a history, in this sense of the term, and a poetic story is a corollary to what he lays down in chaps. 7–8 on the unity and logical coherence of the parts in a well-constructed story. The action in such a story is a *πρᾶξις μία καὶ ὅλη* (a 32), i. e. a whole with a beginning, middle, and end (7, 1450^b 26); each incident resulting from something that goes before it, and the entire series from the state of things presupposed, as the *ἀρχή* of the whole, at the opening. Given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the

145^a 36 beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation. Hence it follows that the incidents in the poetic story are not only possible but also always possible, because they are such as may or must happen at any time, whenever the man and the circumstances are found together. Aristotle accordingly notes two great points of contrast between history and poetry: (1) whereas the former is a record of actual events (*τὰ γενόμενα*), the latter describes rather possible incidents of another kind, *τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* (^a 38); (2) whereas the one tells us what is true only of some particular person (or persons) at a particular time, the other tells us something universally true (*τὰ καθόλου* ^b 7), something that will hold good at all times of . . . persons of the same type in a similar set of circumstances.

^a 38 *τὰ δυνατὰ*, scil. *γενέσθαι* (comp. ^b 32). The qualifying *κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* excludes the third kind of *δυνατά*, viz. *τὰ γενόμενα*. These also are obviously possible (see ^b 17 and *De interpr.* 13, 23 ^a 7), but as mere *γενόμενα* they belong to history rather than poetry. A little further on, however (^b 29), Aristotle explains that under certain conditions even historic incidents may be a legitimate subject for poetry.

^b 1 οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν κτέ.: see I, 1447 ^b 11, where it is shown that metre is only one of the accidents of poetry.

^b 4 *διαφέρει*, scil. *ὁ ἱστορικὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ*.

^b 6 *σπουδαιότερον* is the opposite of *φαιλότερον*. In Plato also *σπουδαῖος* (v. *Ast*, *Lex.* s.v.) is applied to things in the sense of *ἄξιος σπουδῆς*, 'of serious value or interest', as the opposite of either 'trivial' (*φαιλός*) or 'ludicrous' (*γελοῖος*: see on 4, 1448 ^b 34). Poetry, as Aristotle conceives it, is 'more philosophic', because of the large and generalized view of human nature which it implies; it tells us in effect what all men of a certain character may or must do in a certain set of circumstances, whereas historic truth is limited to particular times and persons. A great master of rhetoric, Diderot, has enlarged on this text in a well-known passage in his *Éloge de Richardson* (*Œuvres* t. 3 p. 18 ed. 1821): 'O Richardson! j'oserai dire que l'histoire la plus vraie est pleine de mensonges, et que ton roman est plein de vérités. L'histoire peint quelques individus; tu peins l'espèce humaine: l'histoire attribue à quelques individus ce qu'ils n'ont ni dit, ni fait; tout ce que tu attribues à l'homme, il l'a dit et fait: l'histoire n'embrasse qu'une portion de la durée, qu'un point de la surface du globe; tu

as embrassé tous les lieux et tous les temps. Le cœur humain, 1451^b 6 qui a été, est et sera toujours le même, est le modèle d'après lequel tu copies. Si l'on appliquait au meilleur historien une critique sévère, y en a-t-il aucun qui la soutînt comme toi? Sous ce point de vue, j'oserai dire que souvent l'histoire est un mauvais roman; et que le roman, comme tu l'as fait, est une bonne histoire. O peintre de la nature! c'est toi qui ne mens jamais.'

μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου. μᾶλλον implies a qualification, which re-^b 7 appears in another form in ^b 9 οὐ στοχάζεται ἢ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη. Poetry deals with 'characters' rather than actual individuals, and with universal rather than particular truth. Its universality, however, is somewhat disguised by the proper names it attaches to its characters, which acquire in this way a certain resemblance to the real personages of history. A reason for the retention in Tragedy of traditional names is given further on, in ^b 15.

τὰ καθόλου . . . τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον. The present explanation of the terms may be compared with that in De interpr. 7. 17^a 39 λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλείονων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. comp. also Rhet. 1. 2, 1356^b 28 οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ (οὐ) τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε.—2. 4, 1382^a 4 ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ αἰεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλία ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη. For a similar use of καθόλου see 17, 1455^b 1. The element of 'universality' in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time (^b 11); and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, 'characters', in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each. The novel, however (owing in some degree to its length), admits of characters of a subtlety and complexity which would have been simply impossible in the ancient Drama. The Greek dramatist was practically restricted to the larger and more obvious types of character, which did not require much explanation to make them intelligible to his public in the brief space of time allotted to his work.

1451^b 10 *ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη* = *καίπερ ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη*; comp. 25, 1461^a 30 *οὐ πινόντων οἶνον*. The characters in the Drama are 'universals', i. e. types of character rather than actual individuals; that is what poetry really means them to be, notwithstanding the individualizing proper names it attaches to them. The alternative rendering of *ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη*, 'in giving names to its personages' ('dum nomina imponit', Heinsius), would imply that the names were definitely chosen as significant of character. This would be true to some extent of those in Comedy (see infra on 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα), but not of those in Tragedy. As abstracts of character the personages ought to have general names, like those in Theophrastus, instead of the individualizing proper names given them in Drama.

For the use of the middle verb in this connexion comp. 21, 1457^b 34 and Homer Od. 8. 552 *οὐ μὲν γάρ τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμὸς ἐστ' ἀνθρώπων . . . ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τίθενται, ἐπεὶ κε τέκωσι, τοκῆς*.

^b 12 ἦδη: i. e. now that the New Comedy has taken the place of the Old (see on 5, 1449^b 8), Comedy instead of satirizing individuals (like Cleon or Socrates) tells imaginary stories of imaginary personages labelled with imaginary names.

^b 13 διὰ τῶν εἰκότων. The same use of the preposition is found in 26, 1462^a 16 δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται. It denotes the basis or chief ingredient in a compound, as it often does in later Greek, e. g. in expressions like τὸ δι' ἀλόης, τὸ διὰ κολοκυνθίδος, etc. in the medical writers; comp. also Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 14 R. διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις.

οὔτω, the reading of A^c, is too idiomatic to be lightly surrendered (comp. Bon. Ind. 546^b 13). The Arabic version is said to imply not οὔτω but οὐ; the same Arabic word, however, which Dr. Margoliouth renders by *nequaquam*, would seem to occur also in the Arabic text in 6, 1450^a 30, where it may be taken to represent οὔπω. One may suspect, therefore, that the Greek reading before the Syriac translator in the present passage was οὔπω, a mere corruption of οὔτω.

τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα. Ritter has a note here on the names of the characters in the New Comedy. Aristotle's point is this. In the Old Comedy the names of the chief characters were already fixed and prescribed for the poet, because actually borne by the persons whom he wished to satirize. Socrates, Cleon, Agathon, Euripides are instances of such names in Aristophanes. But in the New Comedy the names were not thus fixed. In calling a

soldier Thraso or Pyrgopolinices, for instance, the poet did not 1451^b 13 mean to satirize some actual person of that name; the name was a matter of choice or accident—invented it may be by the poet himself, or borrowed by him from his predecessors or from life. Such names may no doubt be stock-names, or have a certain conventional or etymological appropriateness as suggestive of certain types of character (comp. Dieterich, Pulcinella p. 45); but they obviously stand on quite a different footing from the real names in Aristophanes. Names also like Phormio, Chremes, Menedemus, etc., were in Comedy fictitious names, though outside Comedy they may have been borne by real persons (comp. on ^b 21).

ὑποτιθέασιν, 'lay down as a foundation,' so that the story may look like one founded on fact (comp. 17, 1455^b 12).

ἰαμβοποιοί: see on 4, 1448^b 27 and 5, 1449^b 8. ^b 14

τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται: comp. Evanthius De Comoedia ^b 15 4, 2 (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 66) *omnis comoedia de fictis est argumentis; tragœdia sæpe ab historica fide petitur*. The reading γενομένων has been questioned, but (as it seems to me) without sufficient reason. τὰ γεόμενα ὀνόματα are the already existing names, as fixed in history or legend (γνώριμα ^b 20), in contradistinction to a newly-invented name (comp. τὰ ὀνόματα πεποιήται ^b 22), or one which, whether new or not, is arbitrarily assigned to a character by the poet (τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ^b 13) at the time of writing.

πιθανόν (κόμῳ πιστευόμεν in the next line) is the Greek equivalent ^b 16 of our modern term 'convincing', and practically synonymous with εἰκός (comp. 24, 1460^a 27) and ἔνδοξον (Bon. Ind. 593^a 45). The word was sufficiently established to be applied even by Xenophon to a work of art which has a look of life and reality: Mem. 3. 10, 7 ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι. In 17, 1455^a 30 πιθανός is said of a person, the poet who writes 'convincingly'. The adv. πιθανῶς has the same sense in Aristophanes Thesm. 266 ἀνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτοσσι καὶ δὴ γυνὴ τό γ' εἶδος ἦν λαλῆς δ', ὅπως τῷ φθέγματι γυναικιεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς ('play the woman well and convincingly').

ἐνίαις: see on 8, 1451^a 18 for this appositional use of the word. ^b 19

Ἄνθεϊ was first suggested, somewhat tentatively, by Welcker in ^b 21 his Gr. Tragödien p. 995. 'The Flower' would certainly be a very strange title for a Greek tragedy. The play being on a purely fictitious story, the names also of the characters, instead of being taken over from legend or history, were fictions, and due to the choice of the poet himself. But they need not be supposed

1451^b 21 to have been new or newly-coined names. 'Ανθεύς, for instance, seems to have been known already in mythical history as the name of certain legendary personages; and not so very long after Agathon's time it was actually borne by an Athenian citizen (Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* 953). In this respect, therefore, it was in just the same position as so many of the names in Comedy, Chremes, Menedemus, Phormio, and the like.

^b 23 εὐφραίνει: an incidental recognition of pleasure as the immediate end of Tragedy (see 14, 1453^b 12, and Döring, *Kunstlehre des Aristoteles* p. 104). εὐφραίνειν serves as a transitive to χαίρειν: Top. 2. 6, 112^b 21 ἔτι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμβεβηκὸς ἔθηκεν ὡς ἕτερον διὰ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διηγεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τῷ εὐφραίνεσθαι φήσει συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἂν αὐτῷ φαίη συμβεβηκέναι.—Eth. E. 3. 2, 1231^a 6 τῶν ὁσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν. The word may describe the pleasurable effect of anything, e. g. that of a painting (Poet. 6, 1450^b 2), of music (Pol. 8. 5, 1339^b 24), and of odours (Eth. E. l. c.; Rhet. 3. 4, 1407^a 10).

ὥστ' οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ζητητέον. Spengel suggested that the εἶναι of the MS. should be bracketed. In these negative statements of result with ὥστε οὐ, which are so common in Aristotle, the verb is usually either in the indicative, (1) expressed or (2) understood, or (3) in the potential optative, as the following passages from the *Organon* may suffice to show: (1) An. pr. 1. 36, 48^a 36 ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται μέσον τοῦ Α Β.—Top. 8. 11, 151^b 30 ὥστε οὐ τῷ ταῦτ' εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμὸς [comp. Poet. 22, 1458^b 5]. (2) An. pr. 1. 32, 47^a 35 ὥστ' οὐκ εἴ τι συμβαίνει τεθέντων τινῶν, πειρατέον ἀνάγειν εὐθύς.—Top. 6. 5, 142^a 4 ὥστ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὀρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος [comp. *Metaph. Z* 12, 1038^a 12]. (3) An. post. 1. 12, 77^b 12 ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμετρήτοις περὶ γεωμετρίας διαλεκτέον.—An. pr. 1. 16, 36^a 14 ὥστε οὐδεὶ ἢ οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Β ἐνδέχουτ' ἂν ὑπάρχειν.—Top. 6. 12, 149^b 2 ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμιγμένον.—Soph. el. 6, 168^b 4 ὥστ' εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμὸς τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος. Two instances of εἶναι for ἂν εἴη are to be found in MSS. of great antiquity and value, one in Par. A of Plato (*Tim.* 17 B), and the other in K^b of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (8. 2, 1155^b 20). The error may have arisen either from the omission of ἂν, a word very apt to be lost in MSS., or through ὥστ' οὐ being misread and turned into ὡς τοῦ (as it has been in fact in A^c).

τὰ γνώριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν. It may be observed here that 1451^b 25 Antiphanes, who belonged to the generation before Aristotle, was not of the same opinion on this point (v. fr. 191 Kock).

δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων refers back to the distinction drawn in the ^b 27 earlier part of the chap. (1451^b 1-5) between a poetic story and a history; a history was said to be still a history even if put into a metrical form. From this Aristotle once more (v. 1. 1447^b 11) draws the conclusion that the story is a more essential part of a poem than the language or versification.

ὅσῳ ποιητῆς κτέ. is added as a further reason for regarding the ^b 28 story (rather than the verse) as the great and essential thing in a poem. The argument, which might have been more clearly stated, tacitly assumes what we have been told of the μῦθος and its pre-eminent importance in chap. 6. The poet's function, says Aristotle, is to imitate (ποιητῆς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν), and it is actions that he imitates (μιμείται δὲ τὰς πράξεις): but the μῦθος in a poem is what represents the action (τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις, 6, 1450^a 4); the μῦθος therefore is the poet's first business, and he must be accordingly a ποιητῆς τῶν μύθων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μέτρων.

ποιητῆς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν: 1, 1447^b 15 οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. Vahlen, in the discussion on this chapter in his Beiträge, maintains that μίμησις may involve the idea of a poetic reconstruction of the traditional materials: 'Also die nach dem Gesetz der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Nothwendigkeit vollzogene dichterische Umbildung (μίμησις) des gegebenen, von Sage oder Geschichte überlieferten Stoffes macht den dramatischen Dichter aus' (Beitr. 1 p. 29). Such a meaning can hardly be ascribed to μίμησις (see on 1, 1447^a 16); it is rather part of the general idea of ποίησις (see on 1, 1447^b 23), which in the case of a traditional story implies a certain free handling of the materials to adapt them to the purposes of poetry (comp. 14, 1453^b 25).

κἄν ἄρα συμβῆ γινόμενα ποιεῖν. Up to this point the subject of ^b 29 a poem has been assumed to be always a μῦθος, a fictitious story (see on 5, 1449^b 9), either invented by the poet himself (^b 12, ^b 21) or adapted from legend. Aristotle, however, now remembers that there may be such a thing as an historical play, one with incidents taken from actual history (γινόμενα). Such incidents, he explains, are legitimate subjects for poetry, if they admit of being exhibited as probable and natural, as well as actual occurrences. It is only

1451^b 29 in this aspect, and on this condition, that they are admissible in poetry; as so many mere facts they belong to the domain of history. *καὶν ἄρα* = *καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα*, the *ἄρα* implying that the supposition is not very probable (Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 324).

^b 33 τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων κτέ. An episodic story, as here defined, offends against the rule of unity and consecutiveness of incident laid down in chap. 8. Aristotle's theory is that in a well-constructed story every incident is wanted (8, 1451^a 32); so that a plot with irrelevant incidents violates a fundamental principle of dramatic construction. Plots of this faulty kind, he adds, are sometimes produced even by good poets through the practical exigencies of the theatre; as a play is expected to be of a certain length, if the story proves too short, it may have to be artificially lengthened out by the insertion of superfluous episodes. Tyrwhitt points to the Prometheus as an instance of this: 'Fabulae ἐπεισοδιώδους luculentum satis exemplum habemus Promethea Aeschyli. Episodia enim Oceani, 284-396. et Iûs, 563-885. nec inter se, neque cum fabula principali ullam habent connexionem aut necessariam aut verisimilem . . . Satis manifestum est et Io et Oceanum, et ipsas etiam Oceanidas, quae chorum constituunt, in id tantum sine ulla verisimilitudine induci, ut argumentum tenue in iustam Tragoediae magnitudinem extendant.' The episodic plot is mentioned here because of its resemblance to a history, since its incidents have no more necessary interconnexion than those in a chronicle. The paragraph, therefore, is a very natural sequel to the preceding discussion (^b 1-32); and it is in its right place where it stands. Those who wish to find another place for it do so mainly on the ground that the text presupposes the distinction between the ἀπλοῦς and the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος explained in the next chapter. This anticipatory use of a technical term, however, is not so uncommon in Aristotle. Thus—to say nothing of his use of *κάθαρσις* in 6, 1449^b 28—we find him talking of *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις* or *ἀναγνωρισμός* in 6, 1450^a 34 and 10, 1452^a 16, and giving an explanation of them afterwards in chap. 11. Besides this it has to be remembered that the expression ἀπλοῦς μῦθος need not be assumed to have been an invention of Aristotle's; for it may very well have been merely adopted by him as one of the already existing terms of dramatic criticism (see *infra* on ἐπεισοδιώδεις, and on 6, 1449^b 33, 1450^a 34). Another difficulty was found in the text by Tyrwhitt, who proposed to remove it by reading τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μύθων, a suggestion which the Arabic Version is believed to

confirm. The traditional reading τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων is supposed 1451^b 33 to restrict the fault in question to the ἀπλοῦς μῦθος, whereas the same fault was no doubt quite possible in the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος also. No such restriction, however, is involved in the text. All that Aristotle implies here is a distinction between the worst form of the ἀπλοῦς μῦθος and the worst form of the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος. The worst fault in the one is the irrelevant episode. That in the other is no doubt the ἀναγνώρισις διὰ σημείων, which is so emphatically condemned in 16, 1454^b 20 as the least artistic of Discoveries.

ἐπεισοδιώδεις. An ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος is a plot in which the continuity of the action is not maintained. That the term was fairly established in this sense is shown by the metaphorical use of it in *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076^a 1 ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιούσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρα συμβάλλεται οὔσα ἢ μὴ οὔσα.—*N* 3, 1090^b 19 οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἢ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὔσα . . . ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία.

τὰ ἐπεισόδια: for the origin of the term see on 12, 1452^b 20. ^b 34 In this definition of the ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος, as also in 4, 1449^a 28 and 18, 1456^a 31, ἐπεισόδιον has the technical sense given it in 12, 1452^b 20 ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὄλον τραγωδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὄλων χορικῶν μελῶν, 'an episode is all that comes in in the interspace between two entire choral songs'. In other words the ἐπεισόδια together with the πρόλογος and ἔξοδος are the acted parts of the play, the 'acts', as we should say. The term, however, often has the more general meaning of an 'insertion'; a sense which takes us back to the early days of the Drama, when Tragedy was still essentially choral, and the episode, or acted part, was only a sort of interlude in the singing. There are several instances even in the *Poetics* of this sense of the word. In 17, 1455^b 13 the accessories worked into the story are termed 'episodes'—the process of working them in being ἐπεισοδιοῦν (*v.* 17, 1455^b 1; 24, 1459^b 30); and in 23, 1459^a 36 the Catalogue of the Ships is said to be one of the 'episodes' in the *Iliad*. The adj. ἐπεισοδιώδης in the present context involves the same notion; the ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος is one with acts or incidents inserted into it, i. e. only loosely connected with the main course of the story.

ὑποκριτάς. κριτάς, the reading of certain of the apographs, has ^b 37 an air of plausibility, but it is difficult to see how the judges, whatever their weaknesses, could be responsible for the particular fault under consideration, the undue lengthening out of the story through the insertion of irrelevant episodes. The statement in

1451^b 37 the text has to be read in the light of that in 7, 1451^a 6, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the theoretical and the practical limit of length, and explains that the latter depends on conditions imposed by the public performances (*πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν*). As every play, as an acting play (comp. *ἀγωνίσματα* in the context), has by custom to be of a certain length, the poet, if his story proves too short, may have to spin it out (*παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες*) by the insertion of additional incidents, which will break the sequence of the story (*διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς*, 1452^a 1). *διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς*, 'with a view to the actors,' may be taken as equivalent to *διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν*, 'because the play has to be acted' (comp. Ueberweg ad loc.); the more concrete form of expression makes an antithesis to the *δι' αὐτοῦς* in 36. A much less probable interpretation of these words is that the actors are assumed to put pressure on the poet to make him provide them with parts of sufficient importance.

ἀγωνίσματα: see on 6, 1450^b 18; comp. Schol. Eurip. Phoen. 88 ὃ κλεινὸν οἴκοις: ἡ τοῦ δράματος διάθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἀγωνιστικώτερα γίνεται· τὰ γὰρ τῆς Ἰοκάστης παρελκόμενά εἰσι· καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ θεάτρον ἐκτέταται (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte tragica iudiciorum rel. p. 91).

^b 38 *παρατείναντες*. The story being too short, they stretch it out, as it were, to make it fill up the time. This can only be done in two ways, either by a diffuse treatment of the incidents (comp. 26, 1462^b 2-7), or by the insertion of additional incidents not wanted for the main purpose of the story. A similar combination of a present and an aorist participle is found in 16, 1455^a 2 ἀκούων . . . καὶ μνησθείς, and in 22, 1458^b 19 ποιήσαντος . . . μετατιθέντος.

1452^a 1 *διαστρέφειν . . . τὸ ἐφεξῆς*: comp. Aeschylus Suppl. 1017 ἔχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέψω φρενός. The sense is that a side incident is introduced, one not in the natural course of the story—not in line with the rest.

ἀναγκάζονται. They do so because they cannot help it, not like the inferior order of poets, through their own fault (*δι' αὐτοῦς*). For another instance of *ἀναγκάζεσθαι* see 14, 1454^a 12.

^a 3 *καὶ μάλιστα*. The *καὶ* emphasizes *μάλιστα* (comp. De sensu 3, 440^b 12; De part. an. 1. 5, 643^a 24; also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 133). At this point Aristotle recognizes a new element of interest in Tragedy, the element of surprise, but only incidentally, in order to bring it under the canon of construction laid down in

chap. 7. The φοβερὰ καὶ ἔλεεινά of Tragedy, he says, have the 1452^a 3 very greatest effect on the mind, when they come in unexpectedly, but at the same time as the natural or necessary consequence of incidents within the play itself (δι' ἄλληλα).

τὸ θαυμαστόν, the element of the marvellous, is recognized as ^a 4 a legitimate source of interest in Tragedy in 24, 1460^a 12. Teichmüller has a lengthy discussion on it (Aristotelische Forschungen 2 p. 282 sqq.).

οὕτως, i. e. if they come about δι' ἄλληλα, through incidents in ^a 5 the preceding part of the play.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης. Aristotle treats the two terms here as synonymous, though a distinction is drawn between them in Phys. 2. 4—6 (Bon. Ind. 780^b 33; comp. Torstrik, Hermes 9 p. 425).

ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες: De caelo 2. 8, 290^a 33 ἡ φύσις . . . ἔοικεν ὡσπερ ^a 7 ἐπίτηδες ἀφελείν πάντα δι' ὧν ἐνεδέχεται προίεναι καθ' αὐτά.

ἀνδριάς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος κτέ. Excerpted by the compiler of the ^a 8 De mirab. ausc. 156, 846^a 22. The same story is told, apparently from another source, by Plutarch, De sera num. vind. 553 D καὶ τὸ Μίτυος τοῦ Ἀργείου κατὰ στάσιν ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνδριάντα χαλκοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ θεᾶς οὔσης ἐμπεσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτυν καὶ ἀνελείν. A certain Mityos of Argos is mentioned in [Demosthenes] 59, 33 in connexion with an occurrence which took place in B. C. 374.

θεωροῦντι is usually understood to mean 'when he was looking ^a 9 at it' ('spectanti incidens,' Tyrwhitt; comp. Bon. Ind. 328^a 5). But as the parallel in Plutarch has θεᾶς οὔσης, Dacier would seem to be right in translating it by 'au milieu d'une grande fête', taking it in the sense of 'being present at a θεωρία, or public spectacle'.

ὅστε: see on 7, 1451^a 3. ^a 10

εἰςὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων κτέ. Chap. 10 is a sequel to 9. 1452^a 1—11, ^a 12 and an application of its results. The real point is not in the formalistic distinction between the two kinds of μῦθοι, with which it opens (^a 12—18), but in the assertion that follows, viz. that even the complex story comes under the general canon of construction laid down in chap. 7, and that the element of surprise (the ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια) must be, like everything else in a play, part of the unity of the whole, the natural or necessary consequence of something before it (ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων ^a 19).

εὐθὺς: see on 5, 1449^a 36. ^a 14

ὡσπερ ὄρισται, i. e. in chaps. 7—8. ^a 15

περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ: see on 6, 1450^a 34. Both terms are explained in the next chapter.

1452^a 17 δὲ λέξις. The editors generally acquiesce in the corrected reading δὲ ἐξ ἧς, in lieu of which Vahlen has δὲ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς, and Susemihl δ' ἐστὶν ἧς. I have suggested that Aristotle may possibly have written πεπλεγμένην δὲ λέγω ἧς, on the supposition that λέξις may be taken to represent λεγῆς.

^a 18 ταῦτα, i. e. ἀναγνωρισμὸς and περιπέτεια.

^a 20 ταῦτα. If any correction is wanted, αὐτά or τὰ μετ' αὐτά is perhaps simpler than either τὰ ὕστερα (Gomperz) or τὰναντία (Bonitz)—though this last has certainly the great advantage of supplying an easy explanation of the καθάπερ εἴρηται in 11, 1452^a 23. The objection to ταῦτα is its supposed inelegance and superfluity. It is not more inelegant, however, than the γίγνεσθαι that immediately precedes it (ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι . . . ὥστε . . . γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα); and its apparent superfluity is a common phenomenon with demonstratives in Greek (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 660).

διαφέρει τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε. Aristotle's construction after διαφέρει is not always quite the same as that in the present passage. (1) The disjunctive is sometimes doubled: Rhet. 1. 15, 1375^b 20 οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κείσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι [comp. Poet. 9, 1451^b 1; 18, 1456^a 30]. (2) It may be replaced by a καί: An. post. 1. 11, 77^a 13 τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λαβεῖν—or by τε καί: Soph. el. 18, 177^a 6 διαφέρει δὲ πλείστον ἐρωτώμενόν τε καὶ μὴ λύειν λόγον. (3) A clause also with εἰ may take the place of one with the infinitive: De interpr. 9, 18^b 36 οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαφέρει εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον.—Soph. el. 17, 176^a 6 οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἤρετο κτέ. [comp. Poet. 18, 1456^a 30].

^a 22 περιπέτεια, as a stage-term, seems to mean a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act [v. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 168]. Apart from the stage it has the sense of a sudden change of fortune in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^b 10, καὶ αἱ περιπέτεια [repentinae mutationes, Goulston] καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σφύζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων [scil. ἡδύ]. πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταῦτα; and that of a reversal of the natural order of things in H. A. 8. 2, 590^b 13¹. This same idea of an unforeseen reversal of fortune is implied also in the adj. περιπετής in Herod. 8. 20 περιπετέα τε ἐποίησαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα, and in

¹ Bekker's punctuation of this passage requires to be amended, as the whole statement from καὶ τις συμβαίνει in ^b 13 to σαρκοφάγα ἐστὶν in ^b 20 is a digression. The clause that precedes it, οἱ δὲ κάραβοι κρατοῦσι μὲν τῶν μεγάλων ἰχθύων (^b 12), is answered by νέμονται δ' οἱ κάραβοι τὰ ἰχθυῖα in ^b 20.

Eurip. Andr. 982 περιπετείς ἔχεις τύχας, καὶ ξυμφορὰν τήνδ' ἐσπεσοῦσ' 1452^a 22 ἀμνηχανεῖς. Every tragedy, according to Aristotle (7, 1451^a 13), describes a transition from happiness to misery or vice versa; but in the 'complex story' the change, however gradual it may be, seems to the hero to come upon him all at once, by a sudden reversal of the state of things; he thinks himself a happy man (let us say) at the beginning of an act, and a miserable man at the end of it. It has been argued, however, by Vahlen (Beitr. 2 p. 6), and more recently by Dr. Lock (Class. Rev. 9, 251)¹, that a περιπέτεια in Aristotle's sense of the term is something different from this—that it is conceived as arising when a man's actions (τῶν πραττομένων) are found to have consequences the direct opposite of what the agent meant or expected. The language in ^a 25 (v. ad loc.) hardly justifies such a very artificial interpretation of a word like περιπέτεια, which must be presumed to have been already an established and well-understood term of dramatic technique (see on 6, 1450^a 34, and comp. 10, 1452^a 15). If we refrain from putting pressure on isolated points, the general sense and connexion of ideas in Aristotle's statement is sufficiently clear. He begins by assuming (1) a working definition of περιπέτεια (ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἴρηται), with an addition to remind us (2) that even an incident like this (καὶ τοῦτο δὲ) is in a well-constructed play κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, i. e. the natural or necessary consequence of antecedents in the story (10, 1452^a 18–20), as it is for instance (3) in the Oedipus Tyrannus (^a 24–26), and (4) in the Lynceus (^a 27–29). In the O. T. the sudden fall of Oedipus is the consequence of the revelation of his parentage (δηλώσας ὅς ἦν ^a 26), and the revelation of his parentage the consequence of the presence of the messenger from Corinth (ἐλθὼν ^a 25). Similarly in the Lynceus the sudden change of situation—the salvation of Lynceus and death of his enemy (^a 29)—is the consequence of certain incidents in a previous act (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ^a 28). This second instance—which seems to be added as a reminder that the περιπέτεια may be a turn for good (comp. τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι ^a 29) as well as a turn for evil—is too clearly described to leave any opening for any subtleties of interpretation. Aristotle's language puts before us an act or scene, which begins with Lynceus being led off for execution (ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενος ^a 27) and ends with his salvation (σωθῆναι ^a 29). This was the περιπέτεια—the εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή (^a 22)—of the Lynceus;

¹ Pye anticipated this suggestion in his Commentary on the present passage.

1452^a 22 and as it came about according to Aristotle through incidents in the preceding portion of the play (*συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων* ^a 28), it was in conformity with the great law of construction laid down in the preceding chapter and elsewhere.

^a 23 *καθάπερ εἴρηται* may be taken (with Vahlen) as = *κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους*, i. e. *εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν*, as was said in 7, 1451^a 13, and tacitly assumed in 6, 1450^a 3, ^a 17. If we accept Bonitz's correction in 10, 1452^a 20, the reference will be to that passage.

καὶ τοῦτο δὲ κτέ. By omitting the stop before these words Vahlen makes them part of the definition of *περιπέτεια*. But it is much more natural to take them as an additional clause, like that in 10, 1452^a 18 *ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι κτέ.*—in which case the illustrations from the O. T. and Lynceus are given as instances not of *περιπέτεια* in general, but of the kind of *περιπέτεια* which accords with Aristotelian principles of construction.

ὥσπερ λέγομεν: 'in the way we are saying', what follows being the explanation of this. The reference is to the formula at the end of chap. 10, *ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος γίνεσθαι ταῦτα.*

^a 24 *τῷ Οἰδίποδι*: Soph. O. T. 924. The Oedipus Coloneus is never mentioned in the Poetics or elsewhere in Aristotle.

^a 25 *ἐλθὼν κτέ.* 'Bene factum est quod ipsam tragoediam adhuc superstitem habemus, nam alioqui ex Aristotelis verbis credere deberemus Nuntium eo consilio venisse ut Oedipum a metu circa matrem liberaret' (Tyrwhitt). It is to be remembered that the Messenger in the O. T. arrives in the scene (911–1085) preceding the peripety (1110–1185). Even after the announcement of the death of Polybus Oedipus is not quite freed from his old anxieties, as Merope, his supposed mother, is still living; all further disquietude on that account the Messenger seeks to allay by his assurance that Oedipus was no son of Merope but a foundling, whom he had himself received from one of the servants of Laius. This disclosure is enough for Iocasta (1056); but neither Oedipus nor the chorus has as yet any suspicion of its import. It is only in the next scene (1110–1185) that he learns the whole truth, and thus falls, all at once as it were, from happiness into misery. This is in brief the peripety in the O. T.; and it is, as Aristotle says, the natural result of the arrival of the Messenger and his disclosure in the preceding scene. Vahlen and others point to this passage, *ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανῶν . . . τοῦναντίον ἐποίησεν*, as evidence for their contention, that a peripety is said to take place when something

done by a man with a certain end in view has consequences of a 1452^a 25 directly opposite kind. If that were the meaning, the peripety in the O. T. would surely be a fact in the life of the Messenger, not the turning-point in that of Oedipus.

εὐφρανῶν : O. T. 934 sqq.

ἀπαλλάξων κτέ. : O. T. 989 sqq.

δηλώσας ὅς ἦν : O. T. 1016 sqq. It is this that leads to the ^a 26 examination of the Servant in the following scene, which is the immediate cause of the catastrophe.

τοῦναντίον : not the opposite of what the man intended, but the changed situation. The meaning is sufficiently shown by the use of τὸ ἐναντίον in the first line of the chapter.

Λυγκεῖ : the Lynceus of Theodectes ; comp. 18, 1455^b 29 and ^a 27 Nauck, TGF.² p. 801. It is clear from Aristotle's account that it must have been a play with a 'double plot' (v. 13, 1453^a 30).

τὸν μὲν συνέβη κτέ. The construction is changed in order to ^a 28 show that the new situation was the result of something that had gone before it, some incident in a preceding scene (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων).

τῶν πεπραγμένων : comp. 10, 1452^a 19 ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν κτέ., and 18, 1455^b 30 δέσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις.

ἀναγνώρισις. Aristotle has already laid it down in 10, 1452^a 18 ^a 29 that the Discovery should arise ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου, and he does not repeat his rule in the present chapter. He assumes that in ^a 37 (ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου), and also later on, in chap. 16, which is a sort of appendix to this discussion (see esp. 16, 1455^a 16).

πρὸς εὐτυχίαν . . . ὀρισμένων : comp. Eurip. fr. 218 ed. Nauck ^a 31 (TGF.² p. 424) φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ δοῦλον ὡς ἀπανταχῇ γένος πρὸς τὴν ἐλάσσω μοῖραν ὤρισεν θεός.

περιπέτεια. The plural is used, just as in 6, 1450^a 34, 18, ^a 33 1456^a 19, 24, 1459^b 10, to denote the concrete instances of περιπέτεια, as actual incidents in plays. The formal incongruity of number in the juxtaposition of ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια in the present passage is certainly not greater than that in 9, 1451^b 3 μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων, or Thuc. 2. 4. 2 λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμω βαλλόντων. See also the instances quoted on 19, 1456^b 1 (μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα).

οἶαν. Bon. Ind. 50^a 26 would restore οἶαν for οἶον in Magna mor. 2. 8, 1207^b 18. If (with Vahlen) we retain the MS. reading

1452^a 33 οἷον (= e. g.), it becomes necessary to understand περιπέτειαν after ἔχει.

ἢ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι, scil. ἀναγνώρισις.

^a 34 πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα. The καί here means 'even', not 'and', as is often assumed by the interpreters. Aristotle distinguishes between three possible forms of Discovery, according as it relates to (1) persons, (2) things, or (3) acts or deeds. In dealing with the second form he adds that the things recognized may be even of a very casual kind, καὶ τὰ τυχόντα—thinking perhaps of objects like certain of the σημεῖα mentioned in 16, 1454^b 21 sqq.

^a 35 ἔστιν ὡς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει. If we adopt Vahlen's suggestion, ἔστιν, (ὅσ') ὡςπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει, we have to dis sever τὰ τυχόντα from ἄψυχα, and take ὅσ' ὡςπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει as an explanation of it. It is not easy to see how τὰ τυχόντα, i.e. concrete things of some sort or other, can be said to 'happen' or 'come about' (συμβαίνει) in a particular way. Spengel's reading ὅπερ εἴρηται aptly recalls the idea of ἀναγνώρισις as defined at the beginning of this paragraph, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνώσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν. As this recognition of 'things' however is not a μεταβολή εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, but at best only a means to that, Aristotle throws in the qualifying ἔστιν ὡς ('in a way', 'in a sense')—an expression that always implies some reserve or limitation; comp. Phys. 2. 5, 197^a 10 ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δόξειεν ἂν γίνεσθαι.—De anima 3. 2, 425^b 22 καὶ τὸ ὄρων ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται.—De mem. 1. 450^b 20 ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο;—Eth. N. 5. 12, 1136^b 30 καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει. The construction πρὸς ἄψυχα συμβαίνει is sufficiently assured by the parallel in Pol. 7. 17, 1336^b 31 συμβαίνει δὲ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίαις καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων—where ταῦτὸ τοῦτο recalls a previous statement just in the same way as the ὅπερ εἴρηται in the amended text of the present passage (comp. J. of Phil. 14 p. 45).

^a 36 πέπραγε is transitive, as often in Aristotle, if our existing texts are to be trusted (comp. Bon. Ind. 632^a 17).

ἀναγνωρίσαι: see on ^b 5.

^a 37 μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου: comp. 10, 1452^a 18 γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου. As the relationship between the parties is presupposed, the discovery of it in the course of the play is a very natural kind of incident.

μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως is explained by what follows, ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις κτέ.

ἢ ἔλεον ἔξει ἢ φόβον. The grammatical subject is ἀναγνώρισις, 1452^a 38 καὶ περιπέτεια being overlooked (see on 26, 1462^a 16). The Discovery will produce pity, when it synchronizes with the πάθος or anguish of the hero, as it does in the O. T. ; but may also only suggest the coming of evil, in which case it will arouse fear. It is to be remembered that pity arises through the spectacle of suffering actually present and before us ; whereas fear is apprehension of evil still to come (see on 13, 1452^b 32).

ἔτι δε καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν κτέ. is a further reason for ^b 2 saying that the discovery of relationships is ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως (^a 37). If the play has a happy ending, like the Lynceus (^a 27) or the Iphigenia in Tauris for instance, such a Discovery will be a very natural way of bringing that about ; and it is equally natural in the O. T. and other plays with an unhappy ending.

τιῶν ἔστιν ἀναγνώρισις. For the emphatic position of the in- ^b 3 definite pronoun comp. Soph. el. 13, 173^b 3 ἢ τε ὄρεεις τινὸς ὄρεεις καὶ ἢ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον.

ἀναγνωρίσαι, scil. τίνες εἰσίν (to be supplied from the preceding ^b 5 δῆλος ἄτερος τίς ἐστιν), 'to reveal who they are', 'to make themselves known'—not as Tyrwhitt renders it, 'se invicem agnoscere'. The simple verb γνωρίζειν has (just like our English 'discover') two meanings, that of 'to learn' (= γιγνώσκειν) and that of 'to make known' (= γνώριμον ποιεῖν or δηλοῦν). The first sense reappears in certain of the compounds (προγνωρίζειν, συγγνωρίζειν), and the second in others (διαγνωρίζειν, ἐπιγνωρίζειν). ἀναγνωρίζειν recalls both senses of γνωρίζειν, sometimes meaning 'to recognize', and sometimes 'to reveal'. (1) It means to 'recognize' in 14, 1453^b 31 ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, and (with φιλίαν or some such word understood) in 14, 1453^b 35, 1454^a 3, 6, 8. This is the sense of ἀναγνωριῶντος also in 16, 1455^a 15—where τὸ τόξον is understood, as the context (τὸ τόξον γνώσεσθαι) will show ; and of ἀναγνωρίσαι in 11, 1452^a 35 εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἀναγνωρίσαι, 'utrum fecerit aliquis an non fecerit agnoscere' (Ritter). Another instance is in the passive, ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς, in 16, 1454^b 27. (2) On the other hand the word must mean 'reveal' in 16, 1454^b 32 ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης, 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' (Ritter), and in the parallel in 17, 1455^b 9, where ὅτι Ὀρέστης or some equivalent has to be understood after ἀνεγνώρισεν (comp. 17, 1455^b 21). The same sense is found in the passive in the present context (^b 6), τῷ Ὀρέσθῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη, which means 'was revealed to Orestes', rather than 'was recog-

1452^b 5 nized' by him; and also (if I am not mistaken) in *ἀεγνωρίσθησαν* in 16, 1455^a 3. A third sense has been found for *ἀναγνωρίσας* in 17, 1455^b 21, on which see note.

^b 6 *Ἰφιγένεια*: comp. 16, 1454^b 32. The reference is to Eurip. Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

τῷ Ὀρέσῳ is probably not a dative of the agent but equivalent to *πρὸς τὸν Ὀρέστην*.

^b 7 *ἐκείνου* is to be taken as a genitive after the *ἀναγνωρίσεις* that follows in ^b 8 (comp. *τινῶν* ^b 3, and *θατέρου* ^b 4). For a genitive depending on a following genitive compare *ἐκάστου* in 18, 1456^a 6 (v. ad loc.), and Plato Rep. 534 B *λόγον ἐκάστου . . . τῆς οὐσίας* [comp. Campbell, Rep. of Plato 2 p. 185].

^b 9 *περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ*. There is no reason to delete the preposition. The *μῦθος* being a *μίμησις πράξεως* (comp. esp. 10, 1452^a 13), two parts of the *μῦθος* (the *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις*) are said to relate to certain portions of the *πρᾶξις*, i. e. to the kind of incidents already considered in the preceding statement (10, 1452^a 12—11, 1452^b 8). The *μῦθος* in fact has a *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις* because the *πρᾶξις* which it represents is conceived as having them. It will be observed that the 'simple plot' of 10, 1452^a 12 is now tacitly set aside, no doubt on account of its inferior dramatic value (v. 13, 1452^b 31).

^b 11 *εἴρηται*, 'has been already described, or explained'; comp. 25, 1460^b 24 *τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται*.—De anima 2. 8, 420^b 21 *τὸ δ' αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρησεται*.—Eth. N. 4. 7, 1127^a 18 *οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηται*.

πάθος δ' ἐστὶ πρᾶξις κτέ. The term *πάθος* requires definition because of the variety of senses attaching to it. In ordinary language it often involves the idea of great suffering, and has the concrete sense of a great trouble or affliction of body or mind: Metaph. Δ 21, 1022^b 19 *πάθος λέγεται . . . αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι*. *ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται* (comp. Bon. Ind. 557^a 26). The sense the present definition gives the word was probably one already established in theatrical usage (see on 6, 1450^a 34). The *πάθος* is, just like the *ἀναγνώρισις* and the *περιπέτεια*, one of the incidents of the play and as such part of the *πρᾶξις* or action. Aristotle defines it accordingly as a *πρᾶξις* of a certain kind, a *πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά*. Apart from the theatre the terms *πάθος* and *πρᾶξις* are natural opposites (comp. 1, 1447^a 28 and Eth. N. 5. 7, 1132^a 9).

πρᾶξις φθαρτικῆ ἢ ὀδυνηρά κτέ.: compare the enumeration of 1452^b 11 'things piteous' (ἐλεεινά) in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^a 4 ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων. ἔστι δ' ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωματῶν καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια κτέ.

ἐν τῷ φανερωῷ θάνατοι: i. e. violent deaths on the stage, before the^b 12 eyes of the spectators, such as Horace condemns in A. P. 185 (comp. Tumlriz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles, p. 16).

περιωδύναι signifies bodily agonies, as the context shows; comp. Eth. E. 1. 5, 1215^b 18 πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, δι' ἃ προίενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους περιωδύνιας χειμῶνας.

ὅσα τοιαῦτα serves to include the less physical forms of pain.^b 13 In the Oedipus Tyrannus, which Aristotle so constantly holds up as the perfect model of a tragedy, the πάθος is the mental anguish of Oedipus (O. T. 1317 sqq.) much more than the physical horror of his self-inflicted blindness.

Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 167) and Bernhardy (Gr. Litt. 2. 2^a 14 p. 236), as well as most of the recent editors of the Poetics, agree with Ritter in rejecting chapter 12 as an interpolation. The reasons advanced by Ritter against it are threefold:—(1) that it breaks the continuity of the main discussion; (2) that it gives us a string of names and definitions of the external accidents of Tragedy, which it was not at all necessary for Aristotle's purposes to consider—'non nisi nuda nomina exhibentur, quorum descriptio non ex fine tragoediae proposito, non ex interna eius forma et constitutione, id quod deceret philosophum, sed ex habitu illius externo petitur'; (3) that the form of the conclusion, a mere repetition of the opening sentence, betrays the hand of an interpolator. These arguments, however, which are hardly so conclusive as has been supposed, ignore a good many points which have to be taken into account in the general balance of probabilities. (1) There is the mark of style; the terminology in κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κχωρισμένα is Aristotelian, and the brevity of these clear-cut definitions can hardly be said to be un-Aristotelian. (2) Aristotle may very well be conceived to have felt that the 'parts' κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν were not only of great technical importance but also too obvious and too recognized to be passed over in silence; and further that, as certain of them (πρόλογος and ἐπεισόδιον) had been already mentioned in the book, a short note

1452^b 14 explaining what they were might be expected. (3) Besides this, it has to be borne in mind that the very term 'parts', in the present sense of the word, had actually appeared in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449^b 25 ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. In the analysis also of Tragedy in 6, 1450^a 7 ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγωδίας μέρη εἶναι ζῆ, καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγωδία, the only motive for the qualifying clause καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγωδία is to distinguish the parts under consideration from another series of parts of a different kind—the μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσόν of the present chapter. It is clear that Aristotle was already thinking of these latter; and the clause added prepares us, as it were, for a more formal recognition of them.

The doubt as to the genuineness of this chapter is often supposed to be confirmed by the difficulty of reconciling one or two of its definitions with the known facts of the Drama as seen in the works of the three great tragedians. If we look at the structure of our surviving Greek tragedies, certain of these definitions are either inadequate or untrue. 'It is not true to say that the stasimon is distinguished from the parodus by the absence of anapaests and trochaics. Anapaests are far from being universal in the parodus, while they occur not uncommonly at the beginning of stasima . . . and in the Medea one of the stasima (1081-1115) is anapaestic throughout. Again, the ordinary trochaic metre is frequently found in stasima, while trochaic tetrameters are equally unknown both to the stasima and the parodi of tragedy' (Haigh, *Tragic Drama of the Greeks* p. 356; comp. Westphal, *Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien* p. 57). The question, however, on which so much ingenuity has been expended, admits of another answer if one remembers Aristotle's purpose in writing. His work is, in intention at any rate, a practical treatise, an *Art of Poetry*, not a record of learned research; and it was written for the benefit of the men of his own day, and with reference to the theatrical conditions of the time. Although he thinks that in certain particulars the existing practice of the stage should be reformed by a return to that of the older dramatists, the general assumption in the Poetics is the theatre as it was in the middle of the Fourth Century. One of the chief difficulties a student of the older Drama finds in this chapter is in a point relating to the Chorus. We do not know much of the economy of the later Tragedy; but one thing is fairly ascertained, that the chorus was no longer what it had been in the age of Sophocles and Euripides.

Aristotle himself tells us (18, 1456^a 28) that its songs, instead of 1452^b 14 forming a more or less integral part of the play, had degenerated into mere lyrical intermezzi (*ἐμβόλιμα*). This, however, can hardly have been the only change it had undergone. The probability is that the dramatic dance also had been curtailed, and that, when once in its place in the orchestra, the chorus simply sang its pieces without any accompanying dance. What the comic poet Plato (fr. 130 Kock) said of the choruses of his day :

ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀρχοῖτ' εὖ, θέαμ' ἦν· νῦν δὲ δρῶσιν οὐδέν,
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπόπληκτοι στάδην ἐστῶτες ὠρῶνται,

was presumably as true of those of Tragedy as of the rest in Aristotle's age. If it was true of Tragedy, however, the new state of things would naturally imply a new technique in the treatment of the *χορικά*; the so-called *στάσιμα* would be what their name in fact suggests, stationary songs, as opposed to the *πάροδοι* or entrance-songs; and there would accordingly be no place in them for verses in a metre of movement. The definition of the *στάσιμον*, therefore, as a *μέλος ἄνευ ἀναπαύστου καὶ τροχαίου* may not be quite so paradoxical as it seems at first sight (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64). The difficulty we find in this instance seems to be really due to the grammarians having transferred the word *στάσιμον* from the later to the earlier Tragedy, where the position of the 'sung parts' (as Aristotle calls them) was the same, though their structure and dramatic importance were not the same. This conclusion is confirmed by the way in which the ancients dealt with this chapter. The explanations of *πάροδος*, *στάσιμον*, etc., in the grammarians (to be seen in Westphal l. c. and elsewhere) reproduce the definitions in the text, but with modifications manifestly due to a desire to re-shape them into conformity with the actual facts of the great Drama, that of Sophocles and Euripides. 'Duodecimi capitis circumscriptio cum haud quaquam ad omnes tragoedias quadraret, pars eorum qui postea id genus tractarunt eam additis aliis notionibus amplificare, pars eam vocibus accuratius terminatis emendare, pars eam aliquo modo varietati rerum quae apud poetas observatur adaptare studuerunt, unde haud paucae dissensiones manarunt' (L. Schmidt, De parodi et stasimi nominibus p. viii). This may perhaps be taken as evidence not only for the antiquity of the definitions in this chapter (comp. Consbruch, Comm. in honorem Gu. Studemund p. 223), but also for their having made their appearance in a work of considerable authority at the time.

1452^b 15 πρότερον: in chap. 6.

εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται: Metaph. Δ 25, 1023^b 12 μέρος λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον εἰς ὃ διαιρεθεῖη ἂν τὸ ποσὸν ὁπωσοῦν.

^b 18 ἀπάντων. The sense of this sentence seems to be rightly understood by Tyrwhitt (who is here only following Goulston): 'Atque hae quidem communes sunt tragoediarum omnium; propriae vero quarundam sunt e scena cantus et κόμμοι, sive planctus.' For the neuter ἀπάντων comp. πᾶν in 6, 1450^a 13 and ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο in 18, 1456^a 31. Hermann with less probability supposes χορευτῶν to be understood (comp. Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 361). Others, understanding δραμάτων, imagine Comedy as well as Tragedy to be meant.

ταῦτα. It is not clear whether this refers to all the parts mentioned, or only to the two chorica, the πάροδος and στάσιμον. I incline to the second alternative, notwithstanding the arguments that have been urged against it (Klein, De partibus formisque quibus tragoediam constare voluerit Aristoteles p. 5). Aristotle is thinking primarily of the parts sung; and by a very natural association of ideas he passes from the parts sung by the chorus first to the lyrical passages sung by an actor (or actors), and then to the dirges sung by an actor (or actors) and the chorus in conjunction.

τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, the solos (μονωδία), duets, and trios sung by the characters on the stage. These dramatic lyrics are recognized in Probl. 19. 15, 918^b 26, and contrasted with the songs of the chorus: τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ ἀντίστροφα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτῆς ἀγωνιστῆς καὶ μιμητῆς, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἦττον μιμεῖται (see also Probl. 19. 30, 920^a 8—48, 922^b 16). Comp. Suidas Μονωδία: ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς ψδῆ ἐν τοῖς δράμασι. καὶ μονωδεῖν τὸ θρηνεῖν. μονωδία λέγεται ὅταν εἰς μόνος λέγῃ τὴν ψδῆν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ ὁ χορὸς.

^b 19 πρόλογος. The term, which appears several times in Aristophanes, is used in the sense the present definition gives it in 5, 1449^b 4, and in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415^a 8 τὰ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταῦτο δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια . . . (^a 18) καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ (οὔ) τὸ δράμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που.

^b 20 ἐπεισόδιον may be compared with ἐξόδιον (from ἐξοδος); it seems to be derived from ἐπίσσοδος, in the sense the word has in Sophocles O. C. 729 ὀρῶ τιν' ὑμᾶς ὀμμάτων εἰληφότας φόβον νεώρη τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου ('my coming in upon you'). This seems to me a more

probable explanation than those noted by Haigh, Tragic Drama 1452^b 20 of the Greeks p. 353.

παρόδος. For the definitions of it in the grammarians see ^b 22 J. Aschauer, Ueber die Parodos und Epiparodos in der griechischen Tragödie p. 5. As the negative part of the definition of *στάσιμον*, *ἀνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου*, must be supposed to differentiate it from the parodus, it seems clear that in the view of the writer of this chapter anapaestic and trochaic passages were not out of place in the parodus. In the existing Greek tragedies, however, trochaic passages are all but unknown in the parodi, though they are common enough in Comedy: there is no instance of them in Sophocles or Euripides, and apparently only one in Aeschylus (Persae 155). All this points to the conclusion (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64) that it is a later form of Tragedy that Aristotle is thinking of, and that the practice of the tragedians in this matter had changed since the time of Euripides. For the actual use of trochaics in the tragic parodi there is some faint evidence in Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 204 *γέγραπται δὲ τὸ μέτρον τροχαϊκὸν πρόσφορον τῇ τῶν διωκόντων σπουδῇ. ταῦτα δὲ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν οἱ τῶν δραμάτων ποιηταὶ κωμικοὶ καὶ τραγικοί, ἐπειδὴν δρομαίως εἰσάγωσι τοὺς χορούς, ἵνα ὁ λόγος συντρέχη τῷ δράματι.*

λέξις ὄλη. Ever since Twining's time there has been a tendency ^b 23 to press the meaning of *λέξις*, and distinguish it from *μέλος* (comp. K. O. Müller, Kleine deutsche Schriften 1 p. 510); it is supposed to stand for recitative, or to be a general term including recitative and song. This interpretation is hardly reconcilable with the language of the adjacent definitions. (1) The definition of the *στάσιμον*, as a *μέλος ἀνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου*, presupposes the possibility of a *μέλος* with anapaests and trochaics; (2) the definition also of *ἐπεισόδιον*, as that which is *μεταξὺ ὄλων χορικῶν μελῶν*, will not apply to the first *ἐπεισόδιον*, if the parodus which precedes it is not to be regarded as a *μέλος* (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 58). *λέξις ὄλη* is to be compared with the *μέρος ὄλον* in the preceding definitions of *πρόλογος*, *ἐπεισόδιον* and *ἔξοδος*. The traditional reading *λέξις ὄλου χοροῦ* involves a distinction between the entire chorus and individual *χορευταί*, which would probably have had very little meaning in Aristotle's day, when the chorus had practically ceased to take a serious part in the action of the play.

στάσιμον. For the origin of this technical sense of the word it is usual to refer to Aristophanes Vesp. 270 *ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ στάντας ἐνθάδ', ὦνδρες, ἄδοντας αὐτὸν ἐκκαλεῖν*, as showing that

1452^b 23 *στάσιμον* meant the song sung when the chorus had taken up its position in the orchestra; and to Ran. 1280 *μή, πρίν γ' ἂν ἀκούσῃς χεῖτεράν στάσιν μελῶν*—where the Scholiast explains *στάσιν μελῶν* by *στάσιμον μέλος ὃ ἄδουσιν ἰστάμενοι οἱ χορευταί*. The interpretation, however, of this second passage is by no means clear, as *στάσις μελῶν* may very well mean a 'set of songs', a *σύστημα μελῶν*. The general sense of the adj. *στάσιμος* is 'without movement' or 'action' (= *ἀκίνητος*), and hence 'steady', 'stable', 'quiet'. The *στάσιμον*, accordingly, should be the 'stationary song', as distinct from the *πάροδος*, a song of movement. This is exactly what Plato Comicus implies in his description of the chorus of his time (see above); and it is in accordance with the statements of the grammarians, e. g. that in Schol. Eurip. Phoen. 202 *τοῦτο τὸ μέλος στάσιμον λέγεται ὅταν γὰρ ὁ χορὸς μετὰ τὴν πάροδον λέγῃ τι μέλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνήκον ἀκίνητος μένων, στάσιμον λέγεται τὸ ἄσμα*, and that in Schol. Soph. Trach. 216 *τὸ μελιδάριον οὐκ ἔστι στάσιμον ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὀρχοῦνται*. If we may suppose that in Aristotle's time the chorus after the *πάροδος* stood motionless in its place in the orchestra, the songs in this part of a tragedy would be rightly termed *στάσιμα*; and the absence of anapaests and trochaics would be a good formal mark of distinction between them and the *πάροδοι*.

^b 24 *ἀναπαίστου*: not the foot itself, but the verse or verses made up of it.

τροχαίου: trochaic verse or verses, in the same way as *ἴαμβος* often means an iambic verse. The reason for the exclusion of the trochaic tetrameter is that, as one of the *κινητικὰ μέτρα*, it has a special fitness for the dance (see on Poet. 4, 1449^a 21).

^b 30 *τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις*, i. e. in the discussion in chaps. 7–11, which dealt with the *μῦθος* in general and its unity of structure. Aristotle now turns to the question of the particular form of *μῦθος* required to produce the emotional effect of Tragedy (pity and fear).

^b 31 *μὴ ἀπλήν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην*: see the explanation of these terms in 10, 1452^a 12–18. The finest kind of tragedy involves a complex plot, because the element of surprise (comp. 9, 1452^a 4, and 14, 1454^a 4) in the complex plot accentuates the tragic impression (comp. 6, 1450^a 33 and 9, 1452^a 4). It may be observed, as an instance of Aristotle's inconsistency in matters of language, that in 13, 1453^a 13 the *ἀπλοῦς μῦθος* is the opposite of the *διπλοῦς*, not (as here) of the *πεπλεγμένος μῦθος*.

^b 32 *φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν*: as was assumed in the definition of Tragedy (6, 1449^b 27), and again in 9, 1452^a 2 and

11, 1452^a 38. φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεινά (scil. πράγματα) is a comprehensive designation for the incidents distinctive of Tragedy, just as γελῶια describes those of Comedy. A tragic scene may be either φοβερόν, 'alarming', suggestive of coming evil or danger to the hero, or ἐλεινόν, 'piteous', a representation of his anguish and suffering. Fear (the opposite of hope) relates to the future; pity to evil or suffering actually present and before us. In Aristotle's time the definition of fear was 'expectation of coming evil', προσδοκία κακοῦ (Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115^a 9), or προσδοκία μέλλοντος κακοῦ (Plato Laches 198 B); or, as he puts it in Rhet. 2. 5, 1382^a 21, λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. In pity on the other hand the evil or suffering, instead of being possible and prospective, is actual and before our eyes as it were: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385^b 13 ἔστω δὲ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ (comp. Tumlriz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 15). The distinction between the φοβερά and ἐλεινά in a play may be seen in the Oedipus Tyrannus, in which we are gradually prepared for the piteous incidents of the catastrophe by a series of premonitions of coming evil in the earlier scenes. The sympathetic interest we are thus made to take in the fortunes of the tragic hero depends, according to Aristotle, on one condition, his being more or less like ourselves (ὅμοιος), i. e. neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally wicked. This ethical similarity is what renders fear for another possible with us, as we are told in the context, 13, 1453^a 5 φόβος περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον; and in the Rhetoric the same is said of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^a 24 τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι . . . κατὰ ἤθη. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to amplify the present statement by further illustrations from the corresponding chapters of the Rhetoric (2. 5 and 2. 8). The general point of view, however, in the two discussions is not the same. The pity and fear of the Rhetoric are the pity and fear of the judges whom the rhetor is addressing; it is part of his art to work, it may be, on their fears, and deter them from an adverse decision by showing how injurious its consequences may be to them and theirs. But the apprehension the tragic poet arouses in us is not of this personal description; it is a disinterested fear for another, the danger that arouses it being that of the hero, not that of the audience in the theatre. The point being so obvious, it is strange to see a diametrically opposite view taken by a critic of such distinction as Lessing. 'Aristotle's fear (he tells us) is not the fear which the impending evil of another arouses in us for

1452^b 32 that other; it is the fear that arises for ourselves from our likeness to the sufferer; it is the fear that the misfortunes, which we see hanging over him, may befall ourselves; it is the fear that we may ourselves become the pitied object' (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). The rhetoric of Lessing's statement may perhaps conceal the underlying confusion of thought: he has confused our fear that something *will* happen with our recognition of the possibility that something *may* happen to us. This latter is the general condition of all sensibility to pity and fear; but it is not a *πάθος*, and cannot, therefore, be identical with either of these emotions (comp. Tumlriz l.c. p. 7; Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. 2. 2³ p. 783). Lessing has an equally paradoxical view of the Aristotelian *ἔλεος*—one inspired, if I am not mistaken, by Hobbes rather than by Aristotle himself. He thinks that according to Aristotle 'the feeling of pity is impossible without fear for ourselves . . . fear is a necessary ingredient in pity' (Hamb. Dram. St. 77); one of his modern followers even goes so far as to assert that the Aristotelian pity is only 'a disguised fear' ('eine verkappte Furcht', Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 310). This rapprochement of the two feelings is not warranted by the texts in the Rhetoric¹. A distinction between them is implied not only in the present, but also in other passages of the Poetics; comp. *ἔλεος καὶ φόβος* (6, 1449^b 27; 14, 1453^b 12), *ἢ ἔλεον ἔξει ἢ φόβον* (11, 1452^a 38), *οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον* (scil. *ἔχοι ἄν*, 13, 1453^a 3), *φοβερὸν καὶ ἔλεινόν* (9, 1452^a 2; 13, 1452^b 32; 14, 1453^b 1), *οὔτε ἔλεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν* (13, 1453^a 1,

¹ The logical weakness of Lessing's reasoning at times may be seen from his interpretation of Rhet. 2. 5, 1382^b 26, where the enumeration of *φοβερά* is summed up in a brief formula, *ὡς δ' ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐφ' ἐτέρων γινόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεινά ἐστιν*—'speaking generally, one may say that all evils are fearful, which arouse pity when they befall or are about to befall others'. On the strength of this Lessing tells us that with Aristotle pity necessarily involves a feeling of fear: 'So dachte Aristoteles von dem Mitleiden, und nur hieraus wird die wahre Ursache begreiflich, warum er in der Erklärung der Tragödie nächst dem Mitleiden, nur die einzige Furcht nannte. Nicht als ob diese Furcht hier eine besondere von dem Mitleiden unabhängige Leidenschaft sey . . . sondern weil, nach seiner Erklärung des Mitleids, dieses die Furcht nothwendig einschliesst; weil nichts unser Mitleid erregt, als was zugleich unsere Furcht erwecken kann' (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). But the fact that a particular kind of evil (e.g. a painful death) is in one relation a cause of fear and in another of pity is not enough to show the substantial identity of the two feelings, or to prove that one of them includes the other. Aristotle's *φοβερά ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐλεινά ἐστὶν* is not an analysis of the feeling of *φόβος*, but merely an attempt to determine the kind of facts to which it relates.

6). It will be seen from the instances just quoted that in the 1452^b 32 formula 'pity and fear', pity comes first, whereas in the corresponding formula *φοβερά* often precedes *ἐλεεινά*. The explanation may perhaps be this, that Aristotle (like Plato) assumes a tragedy to be a picture of human suffering (*πάθος*); so that the excitement of pity is its primary and essential purpose, the element of fear coming in as a sort of secondary matter, to quicken our sympathy with the tragic hero, and prepare us for a catastrophe. In a play like the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, which Aristotle has so constantly in mind, the *φοβερά* precede the *ἐλεεινά* and lead up to them; but the great tragic interest is in the later scenes, in which Oedipus becomes an object of pity.

πρῶτον μὲν is answered by *οὐδ' αὖ* in 1453^a 1 (comp. Plato^b 34 Symp. 219 E; Laws 935 A).

The connexion between the main points in the discussion in this and the next chapter is as follows. After laying down (1) the general rule that, if a tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in us, the tragic hero must be a man of a certain type of character (13, 1452^b 34), Aristotle adds (2) that the tragic effect is enhanced by the play having an unhappy ending (13, 1453^a 12), and (3) weakened by a 'double plot', in which the unhappiness of certain of the personages is balanced by the happiness of others (13, 1453^a 30); and (4) that stories of horror in which kinsmen are involved have an especial tragic interest and value (14, 1453^b 14). This last leads him off (5) into a discussion on Discovery and its place in a play (14, 1453^b 26); the conclusion being (6) that, where kinsmen are concerned, the best form of tragedy is one in which a timely Discovery prevents the actual perpetration of the contemplated deed of horror (14, 1454^a 4).

ἐπιεικεῖς, the opposite of *μοχθηρός* in^a 36; in ordinary usage *ἐπιεικής* is often synonymous with *σπουδαῖος* or *χρηστός* (comp. 15, 1454^b 13), and opposed to *φαῦλος* (comp. 26, 1462^a 2) and similar terms (Bon. Ind. 271^b 36). The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in 13, 1453^a 8 *ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη*. Aristotle tells us that a man of great worth and virtue is not sufficiently like ourselves (*ὄμοιος*) for the purposes of Tragedy, because his sufferings will create an overpowering feeling of indignation or disgust instead of pity. It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on 13, 1453^a 16), or his present use of the term *ἐπιεικής* with that in 15, 1454^b 13.

1452^b 34 Besides this, according to the Rhetoric it is quite possible for one who is *ἐπιεικής* to be an object of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385^b 34 *κἂν οἴωνται τινὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν* (scil. *ἐλεούσων*). All this may perhaps show that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in Aristotle.

^b 36 *μιαρόν*: as an offence to our moral or religious feelings; comp. 14, 1453^b 39, 1454^a 3.

^b 38 *φιλόανθρωπον*. The situation having no *πάθος*, actual or prospective, does not arouse any kind of tragic emotion; it does not appeal to our 'philanthropy', or our pity, or our fears. It is assumed here that τὸ *φιλόανθρωπον* has some sort of tragic value, but not the same as τὸ *ἐλεεινόν* or τὸ *φοβερόν*. τὸ *φιλόανθρωπον* is that which appeals to the *φιλόανθρωποι*. The *φιλόανθρωπος*, or tender-hearted man, is able to feel a certain commiseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of τὸ *φιλόανθρωπον* accords with the use of the term in the context (1453^a 3; comp. 18, 1456^a 21), as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of *φιλανθρωπία*, 'fellow-feeling', 'kindliness', 'tender-heartedness' (comp. L. Schmidt, *Ethik der Gr.* 2 p. 277). A certain affinity between *φιλανθρωπία* and pity is recognized in Rhet. 2. 13, 1390^a 19, where the tender-heartedness of the young is said to make them easily moved to pity: *ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντες εἰσὼν ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ ταῦτὸ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν* (comp. Tumlirz l.c. p. 13). A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as *φιλόανθρωπον* is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what *φιλανθρωπία* meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of τὸ *φιλόανθρωπον* in Aristotle.

1453^a 2 *μεταπίπτειν*: comp. the use of *μεταβάλλειν* in 7, 1451^a 14 (and passim), and that of *μεταβαίνειν* in 18, 1455^b 27.

^a 4 *περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον*. *περὶ* = 'in the case of', i.e. as we say, 'for'; the preposition enables Aristotle to join *φόβος* and *ἔλεος* in the same construction. For this use of *περὶ* comp. Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115^a 22 *εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παιδᾶς ἢ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται*.—Plato Rep. 539 A *ἵνα μὴ γίγηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι*.—Lysias 168, 39 *περὶ τοὺς οὐδὲν ἔχοντας κακὸν ἐλεημονέστατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι*.

ἀνάξιον: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385^b 13 ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαينو-1453^a 4
 μὲν κακῶ φθαρτικῶ ἢ λυπηρῶ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κὰν αὐτὸς
 προσδοκῆσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον
 φαίνηται.

δυστυχοῦντα: for the participle see Goodwin, Synt. of Gr. Moods
 and Tenses 829 (δ). Another instance of the construction will
 be found in 14, 1453^b 23.

περὶ τὸν ὄμοιον. This disinterested fear, which rests, just like^a 5
 pity, on a basis of sympathy, is not recognized in the Rhetoric,
 where the point of view from which the emotions are considered
 is different (see on 13, 1452^b 32). The antithesis in the text,
 ὁ μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἔστιν ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὄμοιον, is too strongly put,
 since pity also is περὶ τὸν ὄμοιον, as one may see from Rhet. 2. 8,
 1386^a 24 καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἡθῆ, κατὰ
 ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη.

δι' ἀμαρτίαν τινά: ^a 16 δι' ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην. ἀμαρτία in the ^a 10
 Aristotelian sense of the term is a mistake or error of judgement
 (error in Lat.), and the deed done in consequence of it is an
 ἀμάρτημα (erratum). In the Ethics an ἀμάρτημα is said to
 originate not in vice or depravity but in ignorance of some
 material fact or circumstance: Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135^b 12 τὰ μὲν
 μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστιν ὅταν μήτε ὄν μήτε ὄ μήτε φ' μήτε
 οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξει ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτω ἢ οὐ
 τούτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα ψήθη . . . ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη
 γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα
 (comp. Rhet. 1. 13, 1374^b 6). This ignorance, we are told in
 another passage, takes the deed out of the class of voluntary acts,
 and enables one to forgive or even pity the doer: Eth. N. 3.
 2, 1110^b 31 οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου
 ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην),
 ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἢ πράξις ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ
 ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη (comp. Thuc. 1. 32. 5). In thus making the
 tragic story turn on an ἀμαρτία Aristotle is probably thinking
 more immediately of the Oedipus Tyrannus (comp. 14, 1453^b 29).
 It is strange that the ἀμαρτία or ἀμαρτία μεγάλη, of which Aristotle
 is speaking, should have been taken by Tumlriz (l. c. p. 25) and
 others to mean not an error of judgement, but some ethical fault
 or infirmity of character, like those indicated in 15, 1454^b 12.
 The Sophoclean Oedipus is a man of hasty temper (comp. O. T.
 807), but his ἀμαρτία was not in that, but in the 'great mistake'
 he made, when he became unwittingly the slayer of his own father.

1453^a 12 ἀνάγκη ἄρα κτέ. is a corollary to what has just been said on the construction of the καλλίστη τραγωδία; two other forms of Tragedy, which had often been adopted by poets, are pronounced to be of inferior tragic quality and value.

τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον: comp. the expressions in the context, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς καλλίστης τραγωδίας (13, 1452^b 31), and ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία (13, 1453^a 22).

^a 13 ἀπλοῦν . . . διπλοῦν: see on 13, 1452^b 31. The meaning of διπλοῦς in this connexion is explained later on, in ^a 31.

^a 16 ἡ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χειρόνος. No reason is given for this significant addition, but the intention of it is clear enough; it is an attempt to bring the present conception of the tragic hero as being ὅμοιος, like ourselves, of only average character and virtue, into line with that in certain other statements about him. Apart from this chapter, in fact, the general assumption in the Poetics is that the tragic hero should be not like the average man, but better than that—βελτίων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς (2, 1448^a 4, 18; 16, 1454^b 9; comp. 25, 1460^b 34). For the purposes of the present chapter, however, which deals with the emotional effect of Tragedy and its conditions another and a somewhat different conception of the tragic hero is required; if we are to pity him and fear for him, he must be, like Oedipus and the pathetic characters in Euripides, a personage of a very human type, one like what we are ourselves. It would take some discussion to reconcile the two views, and explain away the inconsistency of language into which Aristotle has drifted.

^a 17 τὸ γινόμενον: Meteor. 1. 14, 352^b 19 δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ γινόμενον.—2. 8, 367^a 11 τεκμήριον δ' ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ γινόμενον περὶ ταύτας τὰς νήσους.—De resp. 21, 480^b 26 μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον.—Pol. 7. 14, 1334^a 5 μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς λόγοις.—Xenophon Hiero 9. 3 ὡς δὲ ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχει, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα (= 'quod vere fit, die Erfahrung': Sauppe, Lexil. Xenoph. p. 25).

^a 18 ἀπηρίθμουν: perhaps a metaphor from the counting of money, in which each coin has to be accepted and allowed to pass as good. 'ἀπαριθμεῖν nova significatione dicit . . . est ergo ἀπαριθμεῖν recevoir, mettre en conte, et approuver'. (Casaubon, in Musei Oxon. litt. conspectus 1 p. 28.) In HSt. it is rendered by 'narrare', and in Liddell and Scott by 'recount'.

^a 20 Ἀλκμέωνα. On this (the Attic) form of the name see HSt. s. v. and Meisterhans, Gr.³ p. 35. It survives in A^o in Rhet. 2. 23, 1397^b 3 and it is implied in Ἀλκμεωνίδης, the form the patronymic always has in the Ath. Pol.

Εὐριπίδη. Aristotle's conclusion as to the best form of Tragedy 1453^a 24 enables him to say a good word for Euripides, who had been blamed by critics for the unhappy ending of many of his plays. He insists that the procedure of Euripides is right, and points in confirmation to the eminent success of his plays on the stage, where in spite of all his faults Euripides is acknowledged to be the most moving and the most tragic of the tragedians. With this we may compare the estimate of Euripides in Quintilian 10. 1. 68 *in affectibus vero cum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui in miseratione constant facile praecipuus*. There is a long discussion of this passage by Neidhardt, Diss. Halenses 3 p. 279.

αὐτὸ: the object after ἐγκαλοῦντες, and preparative to ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾶ. For the construction comp. Eth. N. 4. 1, 1120^b 17 ἐγκαλείται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἀξιοὶ ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.—9, 1168^a 32 ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει.

τοῦτο δρᾶ: comp. 23, 1459^a 29 and Bon. Ind. 205^a 42.

ἀγώνων: see on 6, 1450^b 18.

^a 27

τραγικώταται: i. e. as arousing most directly the two distinctively tragic emotions of pity and fear (comp. 13, 1452^b 33 τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μμήσεως ἐστίν). Similarly in the context (^a 29) Euripides is termed τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν, because he is the greatest master of the art of arousing these same emotions (comp. Neidhardt l. c. p. 281).

αἱ τοιαῦται = αἱ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσαι.

^a 28

ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν. The proper management Aristotle has in mind is often supposed to be that of the actors, stage-managers, etc., responsible for the execution of the piece. This interpretation, as was long ago pointed out by Düntzer (Rettung d. aristot. Poetik p. 159), makes the clause a superfluity, since it is obvious that, to succeed on the stage, every play requires fairly good acting and an adequate presentation. After ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν we have to supply ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (comp. εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, scil. Euripides, in the next line); the sense is that the poet, having chosen a good tragic subject, must handle it with all due skill and care to secure a satisfactory result (comp. 14, 1453^b 25). κατορθοῦν is practically synonymous with εὖ οἰκονομεῖν, the term which replaces it in the context (^a 29).

τὰ ἄλλα. An admission that Euripides, though a master of ^a 29 emotional effect (τραγικώτατος), is not always equally admirable in his treatment of the other points in a tragedy. His artistic shortcomings are often noted in the Poetics. His plots are directly

1453^a 29 or indirectly criticized in 14, 1453^b 28, in 15, 1454^b 1, and in 16, 1454^b 31; his characters in 15, 1454^a 28-32, and in 25, 1461^b 20; and his choruses in 18, 1456^a 27.

οἰκονομεί. This seems to be the first instance of the use of the word in literary criticism. In the grammarians and writers on style *οἰκονομία* (*οἰκονομεῖν*, *οἰκονομικός*, etc.) is the regular technical word for the disposition of the materials and management of the various points in an oration or a poem (v. HSt. s. v., and Trendelenburg, *Gramm. gr. de arte poetica iudiciorum* rel. p. 91 and p. 149).

^a 31 ὑπὸ τινῶν. A reference perhaps to the critics who are said to have disapproved of the sad ending of so many of the tragedies of Euripides (supra^a 24).

σύστασις ἢ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα. Aristotle has to use the periphrasis *σύστασιν ἔχουσα* instead of the simple *συνεστῶσα*, since *διπλῆ συνεστῶσα* would not have conveyed the sense required. Though there is a certain inelegance in this juxtaposition of *σύστασις* and *σύστασιν*, the reading is sufficiently certified by the very similar repetition of *φύσις* in several Aristotelian passages: *De part. an.* 2. 8, 653^b 33 ἢ τῶν ὄστων φύσις . . . σκληρὰ τὴν φύσιν οὔσα.—*De gen. an.* 5. 5, 785^a 23 φύσει λευκοτέραν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν τῶν περῶν φύσιν.—*Eth. N.* 7. 15, 1154^b 20 φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξι τῆς τοιαύδε φύσεως, and in the Platonic *Epinomis* 990B οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἰκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι μὴ θανμαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως (comp. Lobeck on *Sophocles Aj.* 277, cited by Vahlen).

^a 32 καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια: see the synopsis of the *Odyssey* in 17, 1455^b 16-23.

καὶ τελευτῶσα κτέ. explains *διπλῆν τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα*, as is sometimes the case with the second of two words or clauses coupled by *τε καί* (v. Ast, *Lex. Plat.* 3 p. 365, and Torstrik on *De anima* 1. 2, 405^a 27).

^a 34 θεάτρων: comp. 4, 1449^a 9 πρὸς τὰ θέατρα.—*Plato Laws* 700E τὰ θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντ' ἐγένοντο.—*Aristoxenus ap. Ath.* 632B τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαρβάρωται. *θέατρον*, in the sense of 'the audience', is common enough, but the above quoted passages show that the word may be used in the plural also, in the sense of 'the audiences'. The audiences in these days, says Aristotle, are too weak to like the strong situations of the great Tragedy.

^a 35 κατ' εὐχὴν ποιούντες τοῖς θεαταῖς: *Plato Gorg.* 502A χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.

ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη. The οὐχ here negatives the proposition, and 1453^a 35 not the proximate word, αὕτη. Bäumlein, Gr. Partikeln p. 308 followed by Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 179), quotes a very similar passage from Isocrates 4, 130 ἔστι δ' οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἀποτρέπειν, and explains the position of the negative as due to a desire to avoid the collocation οὐδ' ἔστι (i. e. οὐ δέ ἐστι). αὕτη (= τοῦτο) is the subject with its gender assimilated to that of the predicate (v. on 6, 1450^a 4).

ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἡδονή: 'the pleasure of Tragedy', as we should say (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 336). For this use of the preposition comp. Top. 1. 15, 106^a 37 τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν ἡδονῇ.—Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173^b 28 αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἡδοναί.—Plato Rep. 582 B τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναί ἡδονῆς. For the absence of the article see Bon. Ind. 546^a 51.

κωμωδίας οἰκεία. The conclusions of the Orestes and Alcestis^a 36 of Euripides were said to verge on Comedy (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poetica iudiciorum rel. p. 36).

ἐκεῖ γὰρ κτέ. The reference is probably to the Orestes of Alexis or some other comedy on the same subject (comp. Kock, CAF. 2 p. 358).

*Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν κτέ. Aristotle now passes on to the second of the^b 1 two points announced at the beginning of chap. 13, πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον (13, 1452^b 29).

ὄψεως: see on 6, 1449^b 33. We may suppose him to be thinking of such theatrical artifices as the fearful appearance of the Furies in the Eumenides, and the rags and tatters of certain of the heroes of Euripides.

πρότερον, 'naturally prior', i. e. better, as in Aristoph. Ran. 76^b 3 and Plato Lach. 183 B. This sense of πρότερον is recognized in Cat. 12, 14^b 6 εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμότερους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν παρ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι. Compare also the use of πρώτη in^a 30 and^a 33.

ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. As the poet is an imitative artist in language, a μιμητῆς ἐν λόγῳ (v. on 1, 1447^a 28), it follows that the poetic effect has to be produced by language, and not by means other than language.

ὄρᾶν: i. e. ὄρᾶν τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα.^b 4

φρίττειν denotes the cold shudder (φρίκη: v. W. H. Thompson^b 5 on Plato Phaedr. 251 A) experienced in moments of intense fear or horror. This may arise even from the mere thought of something horrible: De motu an. 7, 701^b 22 διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται

¹⁴⁵³ ^b5 νοήσαντες μόνον. And it is often said to arise from what one hears: Aeschylus Ag. 1242 τὴν μὲν Θυέστον δαίτα παιδείων κρεῶν ξυνήκα καὶ πέφρικα.—Sophocles El. 1408 ἤκουσ' ἀνήκουστα δύστανος ὥστ φρίξαι.—Trach. 1044 κλύουσ' ἔφριξα.—Plato Rep. 387 B τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτοῦς τ καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρουσ καὶ ἀλίβαντας καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς † οἶεται † πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

^b8 ἀτεχνότερον: see on 6, 1450^b 17. In such instances the effect depends too much on the 'σκευοποιός (or costumier), and too little on the poet himself.

χορηγίας. The word has been taken to mean 'adminiculum' (Valla), 'impendium' (Paccius), 'choragi opera et sumptus' (Heinsius), 'suppeditatio aliena' (Tyrwhitt), 'expensive apparatus' (Twining, Hermann), 'apparatus' (L. and S.), and 'Unterstützung durch äussere Mittel' (Ueberweg, after Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 20). This last rendering, which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's, is probably right. It aptly points the contrast between the means supplied by the poet himself, and those which are outside his art and have to be furnished by others; and it is also in accordance with Aristotle's use of χορηγία and χορηγεῖν in the Ethics and Politics (v. Bon. Ind. 852^b 52 and 60). Thus in Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178^a 24 he says τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δέεται (scil. ἢ τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετῆ), and in I. 11, 1101^a 15 (comp. 10. 9, 1179^a 11) τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργούντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένον. More than one, however, of the recent interpreters of the Poetics seem to have assumed (with Heinsius) that in a discussion on matters theatrical χορηγία must be supposed to retain its original theatrical sense, that of the service of a choregus. The answer to this is that we constantly find Aristotle even in the Poetics using the technical terms of the theatre in the more general sense they had or had acquired in ordinary language. Instances of this are ἀγωνίζεσθαι (24, 1460^a 9), συναγωνίζεσθαι (18, 1456^a 26), πρωταγωνιστής (4, 1449^a 18), ἐπισόδιον (17, 1455^b 23), ἐπεισοδιῶν (17, 1455^b 1), ἐπεισοδιώδης (9, 1451^b 34), ἀπὸ μηχανῆς (15, 1454^b 2), ἐκ περιπετείας (16, 1454^b 29), ὑποκριτικά (20, 1457^a 21). It seems to be agreed too that the duties of the choregus were mainly, if not entirely, with the chorus, and that he had nothing to do with the make-up of the actors (A. Müller, Gr. Bühnenalterthümer p. 336).

^b9 τὸ τερατώδες. The reference here is to the appearance of certain of the more monstrous creations of Greek mythology. Such

abnormal personages required on the stage a peculiar make-up 1453^b 9 and special masks: Pollux 4. 141 τὰ δὲ ἔκσκενα πρόσωπα Ἀκταίων ἐστὶ κερασφόρος . . . ἡ Ἄργος πολυφθαλμος, ἡ Εὐίππη ἡ Χείρωνος ὑπαλλαστομένη εἰς ἵππον παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ (comp. Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 204). In existing plays we have a clear instance of a personage of this kind in the βούκερως παρθένος, Io, in Prom. 588 (comp. 674), and in the Furies in the Eumenides, who are said to look more like Gorgons than women (Eum. 48). The prominence of such figures in the dramas of Aeschylus was noted by the ancients: Vita Aeschyli (p. 2 Dind.) ταῖς τε γὰρ ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἐκπληξίην τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται.

τὸ τερατώδες on the stage may be φοβερόν, and thus a means—though an illegitimate one (supra^b 7)—of producing a tragic effect (φόβος). When it does not serve this dramatic purpose (τὸ τερατώδες μόνον), however, it is out of place in Tragedy, since the pleasure it gives us is not the true tragic pleasure, which depends on the excitement of pity and fear (τὴν ἀπ' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου ἡδονήν^b 12), and on that alone. Aristotle does not stop to explain our pleasure in τὸ τερατώδες, but it is easy to supply the omission, if one remembers that anything of the nature of a τέρας is marvellous (θαυμαστόν; comp. Herodotus 4. 28 and Plato Hipp. mai. 283 c), and that the marvellous is recognized by Aristotle (τὸ θαυμαστόν ἡδύ, 24, 1460^a 17) as one of the great causes of human pleasure (see on 9, 1452^a 4).

κοινωνοῦσιν = κοινὸν ἔχουσιν (Bon. Ind. 400^a 39).

^b 10

φανερὸν. The argument here may be thus restated: A play is^b 13 essentially a μίμησις πράξεως (6, 1449^b 36 and passim); if it is to arouse pity and fear, therefore, it must do that through the ἐλεεῖνὰ καὶ φοβερά in its πράξις (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν), not through merely material accessories supplied *ab extra* by others (comp. supra^b 7).

τούτο: i. e. τὸ ἐλεεῖνὸν καὶ φοβερόν. For similar instances of this allusive use of the neuter of the demonstrative, which is so common in all Greek (Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 35), see 13, 1453^a 24; 17, 1455^a 26; 24, 1460^a 8.

ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρά. Aristotle amends his question^b 14 ποῖα δεινὰ by the alternative ποῖα οἰκτρά. The tragic poet is not concerned with δεινὰ in general, but only with those calculated to arouse pity (οἰκτρά). ἢ = *vel potius*, as in De anima 2. 5, 417^a 5 ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις καθ' αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις (v. Pacius ad loc. and Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 297). As Aristotle proceeds to show, the deed of horror (τὸ δεινόν) may be either actual or only

1453^b 14 contemplated; and if actual, it may be either within the play itself, and identical with the πάθος (v. 11, 1452^b 11), or anterior to the action of the play, and distinct from the πάθος. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, the deed of horror, the slaying of Laius, takes place before the opening of the play, the action of which is made up (1) of a series of φοβερά (alarming incidents) leading up to the catastrophe, and (2) a πάθος, which consists in the agony and remorse of Oedipus (see on 11, 1452^b 13).

^b 16 τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις = τὰς δεινὰς πράξεις. With such actions there are three possibilities: the parties concerned (the slayer and the slain, for instance) may be either (1) friends, or (2) enemies, or (3) indifferent to each other; in all three situations there is something δεινόν, but it is only the first that is felt to be especially piteous; it is therefore at once δεινόν and οἰκτρόν, and thus eminently adapted for the purposes of Tragedy (τὰυτα ζητητέον^b 22).

^b 17 ἄν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν, scil. τοιαῦτα ποιῆ, understood from the preceding εἶναι . . . τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις. In many instances the ellipse is not so easily supplied, e. g. in Rhet. 1. 6, 1363^a 27. (ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ) καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἅ μηδεὶς, καὶ τὰ περιττά.—Rhet. 2. 23, 1397^b 20 καὶ ὅτι εἰ μηδὲ Ἐθρσεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδ' Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδ' Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἐκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος (comp. Vahlen on the present passage).

οὐδὲν ἐλεεινόν, scil. ποιεῖ. There is nothing in the deed then to call forth pity either for the doer or the sufferer. That the doer of the deed may sometimes claim our pity, is not distinctly said, but it is clear from the instances which follow, Orestes, Medea, Oedipus, etc.; it is incidentally recognized also in the analysis of 'the involuntary' in Eth. N. 3. 1, 1109^b 31 ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκούσιος ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιος συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλεον (comp. 3. 2, 1111^a 1).

^b 18 μέλλων, scil. ποιεῖν, just as in ^b 21 μέλλη = μέλλη ἀποκτείνειν. The alternative οὔτε μέλλων is added because pity may be aroused by the spectacle of impending, as well as by that of actually present anguish: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^b 1 τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα (comp. 2. 5, 1382^b 26).

πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος: i. e. in this, as also in the following case (οὐδ' ἂν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες), the spectacle of suffering humanity may arouse a certain human feeling (akin to pity) for the sufferer (see on 13, 1452^b 38), but it is not, in the proper sense of the term, 'piteous', since the moral condition of pity is wanting; we cannot say that the man ought not to suffer (comp. 13, 1453^a 4).

When the parties, however, are related to one another (*ὅταν δ' ἐν 1453^b 18 ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη*), the evil comes from a quarter from which it was not to be expected, and the situation is 'piteous' as well as horrible; comp. Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^a 11 (*ἐλεεινόν ἐστι*) τὸ ὄθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι πράξει [*ὑπάρξει Vahlen*] *κακόν τι συμβῆναι*.

ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις. *φιλία* here practically means 'cognatio' (comp. ^b 19 Bon. Ind. 818^b 10).

ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. As defined in 11, 1452^b 11 *πάθος* includes ^b 21 other forms of suffering besides violent deaths.

τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν, 'the slaying of Clytaemnestra.' ^b 23 For this use of the participle see on 13, 1453^a 4 (*δυστυχοῦντα*). On the alternative spelling *Κλυταιμνήστρα* see Roscher's Lex. s. v. and Vitelli, Studi Italiani 1 p. 239. There is hardly a trace of it in the MSS. of Homer (Ludwich, Homericæ I-V p. 5; comp. Wilamowitz, Commentariolum grammaticum IV p. 11).

αὐτὸν: emphatic as in 9, 1451^b 36; 21, 1457^b 34; 24, 1460^a 6. ^b 25 *εὐρίσκειν* is followed by an infinitive in 14, 1454^a 11 *εὔρον* . . . *παρασκευάζειν*, and (in the middle) in Eurip. Med. 195 *οὐδεὶς λύπας ἤυρετο μούσῃ καὶ πολυχόρδοις ᾠδαῖς πάνειν*.

εἰδὸτας καὶ γινώσκοντας, scil. *πράττοντας*. Instead of saying ^b 28 *ἔστι γίνεσθαι τὴν πρᾶξιν ὑπ' εἰδόντων καὶ γινωσκόντων*, Aristotle introduces the qualification in the clause with *ὥσπερ*, which thus becomes a substantive part of the statement (comp. 11, 1452^a 23; 18, 1456^a 27; 21, 1457^b 24).

γινώσκοντας: Rhet. 2. 1, 1378^a 14 *ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γινώσκοντας*.—Demosth. 10. 17 *ταῦτα τοίνυν ἕκαστον εἰδὸτα καὶ γινώσκοντα παρ' αὐτῷ κτέ*.

Εὐριπίδης: see on 6, 1450^a 25.

Μήδειαν: Eurip. Med. 1236. ^b 29

ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους: comp. 15, 1454^b 8. Sophocles is ^b 31 named because there were others who had dramatized the Oedipus story (Nauck, TGF.² p. 967) as well as Sophocles.

μὲν οὖν: see on 22, 1458^a 25. ^b 32

ἔξω τοῦ δράματος: 15, 1454^b 7 *ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας*.—17, 1455^b 8 *ἔξω τοῦ μύθου*.—24, 1460^a 29 *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος*. There is a reference to this form of dramatic construction in Eth. N. 1. 11, 1101^a 32 *τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις*.

ὁ Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος: Nauck, TGF.² p. 777 and 964. ^b 33

τῆ τραυματίᾳ Ὀδυσσεῖ: another name perhaps for the *Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀκανθοπλήξ* of Sophocles (Nauck l. c. p. 230).

ἀναγνωρίσαι, scil. *τὴν φιλίαν*, as in ^b 31 (see on 16, 1454^a 32). ^b 35

1453^b 38 τὸ τε γὰρ μιαρὸν κτέ.: i. e. it offends our moral sensibilities (see on 13, 1452^b 36) as a sin against the laws of natural affection; and it is untragic also, through the absence of the element of suffering.

1454^a 1 ποιεῖ ὁμοίως, said of a dramatic personage, recalls the idea of γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι in 1453^b 38.

ἐν Ἀντιγόῃ: Soph. Ant. 1231.

τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἰῶμων, scil. τοῦτο ποιεῖ, i. e. μέλλει ἀποκτείνειν ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ (comp. ^a 6), as is implied in Goulston's paraphrase, 'Creontem patrem Haemon sciens perimere conatus est, nec perfecit tamen.' The ellipse is not unlike that in ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν in 1453^b 17.

^a 2 βέλτιον, scil. τοῦ γινώσκοντα πράξαι.

^a 4 ἐκπληκτικόν. ἔκπληξις is a very general term for the loss of self-possession that may result from a mental shock. In use, however, it often has the more special sense of extreme surprise; the definition of it in fact in Top. 4. 5, 126^b 17 is θαυμασιότης ὑπερβάλλουσα, 'admiratio exsuperans' (Pacius). The Discovery is said both here and in 16, 1455^a 17 to be 'astounding', just in the same way as a περιπέτεια—which in a play is so intimately connected with the Discovery—is said in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^b 10 to be θαυμαστόν. The affinity of sense between ἐκπληκτικόν and θαυμαστόν is indirectly shown by the fact that Aristotle describes the 'pursuit of Hector' in the Iliad in one place as θαυμαστόν (24, 1460^a 14), and in another as ἐκπληκτικόν (25, 1460^b 25). I cannot agree with Tumlirz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 34), who supposes that, as used in the Poetics, the terms ἔκπληξις and ἐκπληκτικόν denote the excitement or tension with which the audience awaits the Discovery.

κράτιστον = *potissimum*. Aristotle's view of the construction exemplified in the Iphigenia in Tauris is presumably this, that the full effect of Tragedy is attained in the most artistic way, without the adjunct of physical suffering, and with the minimum of offence to our moral sensibilities. His ultimate preference for this construction is intelligible enough in itself; and we have been prepared for it to some extent by his recognition throughout this chapter of the legitimacy of a situation like that in the Iphigenia, in which the deed of horror, though contemplated, is not actually carried out (comp. μέλλων 1453^b 18, μέλλη ^b 21, μέλλοντα ^b 34). The criterion which now determines the relative value of these

possible situations in Tragedy is a moral one, their effect not on 1454^a 4 the emotions, but on the moral sensibility of the audience. The first of the four situations is set aside as *μιαρόν*, 'morally offensive' (1453^b 38); the second (*τὸ γινώσκοντα πράξει*; see on ^a 2) also is *μιαρόν*; the third just avoids being that (1454^a 3), because the unholy deed is done in ignorance; the fourth, however, in which a timely Discovery saves us from the rude shock to our moral feelings which is inevitable even with the third kind of plot, is pronounced to be *κράτιστον*. This seems to be the rationale of the present classification, and the explanation of the discrepancy between the statement in the text and that in 13, 1453^a 24. In chap. 13 Aristotle was thinking only of the emotional effect of tragedy as produced by the most obvious means; here he comes to see that the same effect may be produced in a finer form without their aid. It is his somewhat tardy recognition of the necessity of avoiding *τὸ μιαρόν* that has caused this change of view.

ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ: a play of Euripides (Nauck, TGF.² p. 497). ^a 5 It is referred to in Eth. N. 3. 2, 1111^a 11 *οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν ἰδὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη*.

ἐν τῇ Ἴφιγενείᾳ: comp. 17, 1455^b 9. ^a 7

ἐν τῇ Ἑλλῃ. Nothing more seems to be known of the play ^a 8 Nauck p. 837).

διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο reverts to what was said as far back as 1453^b 19—^a 9 12; the whole of the intervening statement (1453^b 22 *τοὺς μὲν οὖν—1454^a 8 ἀνεγνώρισεν*) is a digression. Other digressions of considerable length are found in chap. 1 (see on 1, 1447^b 11), in chap. 9 (see on 9, 1451^b 27), in chap. 15 (see on 15, 1454^b 8), and in chap. 22 (see on 22, 1458^a 31).

πάλαι: in 13, 1453^a 19. Aristotelian instances of *πάλαι* in a back-reference may be seen in An. post. 2. 19, 100^a 14 (comp. 13, 97^b 7), in Phys. 8. 3, 254^a 16 (comp. 253^a 32 and ^b 10), in Pol. 2. 4, 1262^b 29 (comp. 1262^a 26), and 3. 11, 1282^a 15 (comp. 1281^a 42).

ζητούντες: comp. Metaph. Θ 6, 1048^a 30 *διὸ ζητούντες καὶ περὶ* ^a 10 *ούτων διήλθομεν*.—Xenophanes Fr. 18 (Diels) *οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητούντες ἐφευρίσκουσι βίμων*. Quintilian (5. 10. 120) has a very similar observation on the discovery of the various forms of argument in oratory: *Neque enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inveniremus, sed dicta sunt omnia antequam praeciperentur, mox ea scriptores observata et collecta diderunt*.

1454 ^a 12 ἀναγκάζονται: comp. 9, 1452 ^a 1. They are obliged to keep to these well-known stories (comp. 9, 1451 ^b 23), because they have not the art to discover or invent new ones equally fitted for the purposes of Tragedy.

^a 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . πάθη: see 14, 1453 ^b 19–22.

^a 17 χρηστὰ. χρηστός, which, as Aristotle tells us in the context (^a 20), may be applied to anything good of its kind, is replaced in ^b 13 by ἐπιεικής; it is equivalent to σπουδαῖος as used in 2, 1448 ^a 2, the common opposite of both being φαῦλος or πονηρός.

^a 18 ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη: in 6, 1450 ^b 8.

^a 21 τὸ μὲν χεῖρον: Pol. I. 5, 1254 ^b 13 τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον.—H. A. 9. 1, 608 ^b 8 διόπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς ἐλεημονέστερον καὶ ἀρίδακρυ μᾶλλον, ἔτι δὲ φθονερώτερον καὶ μεμψιμοιρότερον καὶ φιλολοῖδορον μᾶλλον καὶ πληκτικώτερον ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον κτέ. In the Politics we are told that owing to the weakness of the rational faculty in them, the virtue of which women are capable is not so high as that of a man (Pol. I. 13, 1260 ^a 20). Rhet. I. 5, 1361 ^a 6 summarizes the Greek idea on this point: θηλειῶν ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας.

ὅπως φαῦλον. In the Politics, where the slave is viewed as a being of the very lowest intellectual and moral capacity, Aristotle allows him only the bare modicum of virtue required to enable him to do his work: ἀρετῆς δέεται μικρᾶς καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων (Pol. I. 13, 1260 ^a 35).

^a 22 τὸ ἀρμόττοντα, scil. τὰ ἦθη ποιῆσαι (see on ^a 24 τρίτον τὸ ὁμοιον). In the individual character there must be nothing at variance with that of the class to which the individual belongs; in a woman, for instance, there should be nothing 'unwomanly'. The opposite of ἀρμόττον in ^a 30 is ἀπρεπὲς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττον. This same use of the term is occasionally found in later criticism, e. g. in Schol. Soph. El. 126 τὸ 'εἴ μοι θέμις τάδ' αὐδᾶν' λίαν ἠθικὸν καὶ ἀρμόζον γυναιξίν.

^a 23 γυναικείῳ, scil. ἦθει; comp. Plato Laws 790 A γυναικεῖά τε καὶ δούλεια ἦθη. ἦθος in this connexion practically means a 'character', i. e. one of the personages, just as it does again further on in 24, 1460 ^a 11. An approximation to this sense is found in Plato, who uses the word now and then for a man or other creature possessing character: Phaed. 81 E ἐνδοῦνται δέ [scil. αἱ ψυχαί], ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη, ὅποῦ ἄτ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκῆναι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας . . . μεμελετηκότας . . . εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων.

ἐνη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι [v. Stallb. ad loc.].— 1454^a 23
 ep. 496 B γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος.— 503 C τὰ βέβαια
 αὐτὰ ἦθη (comp. Festschrift Th. Gomperz dargebracht p. 165).

ἀνδρείααν. On the ἀνδρεία of women see Pol. I. 13, 1260^a 22
 and 3. 4, 1277^b 21. In the present passage, however, Aristotle
 finds a certain incongruity in the idea of an ἀνδρεία γυνή, as though
 the affinity of ἀνδρείος with ἄνδρες were still felt.

δεινήν has been rightly explained by Günther (Grundzüge der^a 24
 ag. Kunst p. 280) as meaning 'clever', i. e. 'clever in speech
 and argument' ('tüchtig im Reden', 'beredt')—a quality which
 according to Greek notions was quite out of place in a woman
 (Pol. I. 13, 1260^a 30; 3. 4, 1277^b 23). That this rather than
 'terrible' is the meaning of δεινήν here is shown by the illustration
 1^a 31, ἡ τῆς Μελανίπης ῥῆσις, where the reference is to the
 εὐλόγητος or rhetorical 'cleverness' of the speech put into the mouth
 of Melanippe by Euripides.

τὸ ὅμοιον, scil. τὸ ἦθος ποιῆσαι, as is implied in the clause of in-
 terpretation, τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ χρηστόν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἀρμόττον
 ποιῆσαι. Instead of saying ὅμοια, to correspond with ἀρμόττοντα
 1^a 22, Aristotle lapses into the singular ὅμοιον, through the influ-
 ence, as it would seem, of the singular in ἀνδρείων μὲν τὸ ἦθος in
 the context. In the absence of an example in^a 28 sqq. to illus-
 trate the neglect of this canon, the meaning of ὅμοιον is not very
 clear; but a hint of it may be gathered from the language in the
 dialogue in 1454^b 10 ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν, where
 ὁμοίους (said of a portrait) means 'like the original'. This may
 very well be the sense of ὅμοιον in the present passage; the literary
 portrait produced by the poet should be 'like the original', i. e. like
 what the personage in question is in history or legend (comp.
 1454^b 12). The fact of ὅμοιος being used in a somewhat different
 sense in 2, 1448^a 6, 12 and 13, 1453^a 5 only shows how
 attentive Aristotle is at times to uniformity of language.

ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 'in the present sense of this term (ἀρμόττον)'.^a 25
 ὁμαλόν: i. e. the character should always remain the same, with-^a 26
 out change or modification in the course of the play. The canon
 appears in Horace A.P. 126 *servetur ad imum* [scil. *persona*] *qualis*
incepto processerit, et sibi constet. The logical scheme of these
 or canons of character may be presented thus: the ἦθος of the
 dramatic personage should be (1) *χρηστόν*, not inconsistent with
 goodness of disposition; (2) *ἀρμόττον*, not inconsistent with the
 ethos of the class to which the personage belongs; (3) *ὅμοιον*, not

1454^a 26 inconsistent with the received idea of the particular personage; (4) ὁμαλόν, not inconsistent with itself.

ἀνώμαλός τις. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of Achilles, as a character subject to sudden changes of mood; comp. fr. 168 (Teubn.) Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος, and Eustathius on Il. 24, 569 (v. Roemer, Bavarian Academy, Sitzungsber. 1884 p. 297).

ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων, as the explanatory καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποθεῖς shows, means the original of the dramatic portrait, the personage as known from history or legend.

^a 29 μὴ ἀναγκαίου: 'not required for the purposes of the story'. The gratuitous *πονηρία* of Menelaus in the *Orestes* is noted again in 25, 1461^b 20; the Scholiast also on the *Orestes* more than once draws attention to the evil nature Euripides has given him (τὸ κακόηθες τῆς γνώμης). On the reading ἀναγκαίου see J. of Phil. 14 p. 46. I am not able to quote an Aristotelian instance of ἀναγκαῖος as a feminine, but it is certainly good Attic, and common enough in Plato. Though Aristotle's tendency was to treat such adjectives as of three terminations, his practice varied in the case of several (e. g. βέβαιος, ἐκούσιος, ἐλευθέριος, ἴδιος, τέλειος), if our existing texts are to be trusted.

^a 30 <ὁ τοῦ> Ὀδυσσεύς: comp. τῆς Μελανίππης in the next line. The article has to be restored in like manner before Ὀδυσσεύς in 16, 1454^b 26 and Ὀρέστης in 16, 1454^b 31. In all other passages in the *Poetics*—and they are very numerous—the rule laid down by Fitzgerald (Selections from the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, p. 163) as to the use of the article in Aristotle with the names of *dramatis personae* is duly observed. The same is true of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see my *Textual criticism of the Nic. Ethics* p. 52), and *Politics*. In the *Politics* ὁ Σωκράτης is regularly used for the Socrates in Plato's dialogues, and in 2. 4, 1262^b 11 ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης means the Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*. The rule in fact is observed in twenty passages in the *Politics*, and ignored in two only, in 8. 3, 1338^a 28—where we may restore <ὁ> Ὀδυσσεύς, and in 8. 7, 1342^b 23—where the true reading is probably <τῷ> Σωκράτει. Similarly in the *Rhetoric* there are at least eighteen instances of the observance of the rule and but two exceptions, viz. 2. 23, 1400^a 27—where we may restore <ὁ> Ὀδυσσεύς (comp. 3. 15, 1416^b 1 and ^b 12), and 3. 14, 1415^b 30—where the correction <ὁ> Σωκράτης is confirmed by the parallel in 1. 9, 1367^b 8.

ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ: comp. 26, 1461^b 32. The Scylla Aristotle has in 1454^a 31 mind has been often supposed to be a tragedy of Euripides. But there is apparently no mention elsewhere of a tragedy with this title by Euripides (comp. Wilamowitz, *Analecta Eurip.* p. 159), and the language in 26, 1461^b 32 seems to point rather to a dithyramb. All discussion has been set at rest by Gomperz's recovery among the Vienna papyri of a fragment of some ancient critical treatise, which mentions the *θρήνος* of Ulysses (i. e. a portion of the Scylla) as the work of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus: εἰσὶν δὲ τινὲς οἱ ὄν μὲν προτίθενται οὐ μειμῶνται [δὲ], ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καλῶς, εἰ τυγχάνοιεν ἐνέχοντες ἔννοιαν καὶ παράδειγμα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Τειμόθεος ἐν τῷ θρήνῳ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεῶς εἰ μὲν τινα μεμῶται καὶ τὸ ὁμοίον τινα οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ (v. Gomperz, *Vienna Academy Anz. der phil. hist. Classe* 1886, v; comp. Wilamowitz, *Timotheos* p. 111). To this Aristotle appends a second instance, one from a tragedy, as though conscious of the first being not quite to the point.

ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥήσις, in the *Μελανίππη ἡ σοφὴ* of Euripides (Nauck, *TGF.*² p. 509). The rationalistic argument put into her mouth against the popular idea of monsters (*τέρατα*) was in Aristotle's view (see on *δεινὴν*^a 24) an exhibition of cleverness out of place in a woman.

ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια: *Iph. Aul.* 1211 sqq. and 1368 sqq. ^a 32

χρῆ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥθεσιν κτέ. There should be a unity of character just as there should be a unity of action in every play. This incidental reference to the action reminds Aristotle of a point (the use of the *μηχανή*) which had not been considered in his general theory of the plot in chaps. 8—11. ^a 33

τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός: comp. especially 9, 1451^a 38 and 10, ^a 34 1452^a 24.

ἡ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός, scil. εἶναι (Bon. Ind. 239^a 22; see on 24, ^a 35 1459^b 9).

λύσεις: see 18, 1455^a 24, 1456^a 9, where the *λύσις* (the un-^a 37 raveling, or *dénouement*) is distinguished from the *δέσις* or *πλοκή* (the *knitting*, or *intrigue*). This is the first appearance of these terms in this sense, though they may be presumed to have been already well established in the technical language of the theatre (see on 10, 1452^a 15).

ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ: *Eurip. Med.* 1317. ^b 1

μηχανῆς. On the mechanical contrivance, whereby a god or other personage was suddenly brought on, or removed from

1454^b I the stage, see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*³ p. 209. Aristotle regards a *dénouement* effected by such means as an inartistic way out of the difficulty, or else allowable only in certain exceptional cases (^b 3-6). A similar view of the *μηχανή* is implied in Plato *Crat.* 425 D οἱ τραγωδοποιοί, ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορώσιν, ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς κατὰ φεύγουσι θεοὺς αἶροντες. From this theatrical use the term is sometimes metaphorically extended to matters apart from the stage, when a difficulty is solved by means which savour too much of artifice or miracle. Thus even in the present context (^b 2) the sudden appearance of Athene in *Il.* 2. 166 is said to be ἀπὸ μηχανῆς; and in *Metaph.* A 5, 985^a 18 reason is said to come in as a *deus ex machina* in the cosmogony of Anaxagoras: Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῆν χρῆται τῷ νῶ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν.

^b 2 τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλου: *Il.* 2. 155; comp. Porphyry on *Il.* 2. 144, p. 26 Schrader: ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ παραγίνεται ἀπὸ μηχανῆς [so cod. Townl.] ὥσπερ καθεύδοντα τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ἐγείρουσα. His note on *Il.* 2. 73 (where Agamemnon tries the feeling of his army) is worth quoting as a typical attempt to reconcile Homeric practice and Aristotelian theory: διὰ τί ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ἀπεπειράτο τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ οὕτως ἔπραξεν ὥστε ὀλίγον τὰ ἐναντία συμβῆναι ἢ ἐβουλεύετο; καὶ τὸ κώλυμα ἀπὸ μηχανῆς; ἡ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ ἐκώλυσεν ἔστι δὲ ἀποίητον τὸ μηχανήμα λύειν ἄλλως εἰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μύθου. φησὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης (*Ft.* 142 Teubn.) ποιητικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μμείσθαι τὰ εἰωθῶτα γίνεσθαι καὶ ποιητῶν¹ μᾶλλον τὸ κινδύνους παρεισάγειν· εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ ἐκ λοιμοῦ πεπονημένους καὶ τῷ μῆκει τοῦ χρόνου ἀπαυδήσαντας . . . μὴ εὐθὺς παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξοδον ἀλλὰ πειραθῆναι ἠγήσασθαι δεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἔχουσιν . . . ἡ δὲ λύσις οὐκ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς· ὅταν γὰρ διὰ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνηται, οὐ μηχανῆ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἀμ' [ῥ' ἀλλ'] ὅτε πρόσκειται θεός· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' εἰπὼν ὁ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι εἰς θεὸν ἀνέθηκε τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα διανοηθῆναι ταῦτα δρᾶν ἢ πράξαι ἂν εἰκὸς ἐστίν (p. 24-25 Schrader).

ἀλλὰ μηχανῆ κτέ.: 'μηχανῆ breviter dicit pro θεῷ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς' (Ritter). This clause (which ends apparently with θεοῖς δρᾶν in ^b 6) is a digression within a digression; Aristotle remembers

¹ Instead of καὶ ποιητῶν (for which various corrections have been proposed) I would restore κάποιητρον (v. J. of *Phil.* 28 p. 252). The sense is: 'Though as a rule it is artistic to represent what is usual, and inartistic (ἀποίητρον) to introduce hazardous situations (κινδύνους), still under the circumstances there is a certain propriety and probability (εἰκὸς δὲ) in the Homeric story.' If this view is correct, the quotation from Aristotle's *Ἀπορ. Ὀμ.* does not end at the words κινδύνους παρεισάγειν, as is supposed by Rose and Heitz.

hat the appearance of a god on the stage may be necessary for 1454^b 2
 a certain purpose, to reveal matters of interest which lie outside
 the play itself as being either anterior or subsequent to the action
 of the piece. This may be taken as a tacit apology for the proce-
 dure of Euripides, who opens several of his plays with a prologue
 delivered by a god to explain the historical antecedents of the
 situation, and concludes others with a sort of epilogue, in which
 a god announces the future fortunes of the personages (see Haigh,
 Tragic Drama p. 246-7). A distorted reminiscence of this state-
 ment may be recognized in the Horatian precept, A. P. 191 *nec
 deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus incidarit*.

ἄλογον is a general term for that which cannot be seen to be^b 6
 either necessary or probable (see above 1454^a 36 *ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός*),
 in other words for that which does not admit of explanation, that
 which we find unaccountable. It is of frequent occurrence in the
 later chapters of the Poetics (see esp. 24, 1460^a 28 and 25,
 1461^b 14). The clause continues the statement in 1454^a 37-^b 2.
 No improbability can be allowed within the story (*ἐν τοῖς πρα-
 γμασιν*) of the play, unless it happens to be in the part only pre-
 supposed and not actually presented on the stage (*ἔξω τῆς τραγω-
 δίας*). Bonitz (Ind. 343^a 32) seems to take a different view of
 the clause, connecting it with that which immediately precedes it,
μηχανῆ χρηστέον κτέ. The rule in the text is repeated in very
 similar terms in 24, 1460^a 27.

μηδὲν εἶναι, scil. *δεῖ*, understood from^a 37.

ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας: see on 14, 1453^b 32.^b 7

τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι: see 24, 1460^a 29.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κτέ. At this point Aristotle returns to the subject of the^b 8
ἦθος, which according to his theory (1454^a 17-26) should be at
 once *χρηστά*, *ἀρμόττοντα*, *ὅμοια*, and *ὀμαλά*, in order to meet any
 doubt that may arise as to the possibility of an *ἦθος* being at once
χρηστόν and *ὅμοιον*. He shows that the corresponding difficulty
 has been solved in a sister art, that of the portrait-painter, who
 without sacrificing the likeness makes a man look handsomer than
 he is (*ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν*); so that, if the painter
 can do this, there is no reason why the literary artist also should
 not be able to represent a tragic personage truthfully, with any
 infirmities of character which form part of the received idea of him
 (*ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἦθῶν*
^b 12), and at the same time as a good man (*ἐπιεικεῖς*^b 13).

βελτιόνων: see 2, 1448^a 4, 11, 18.^b 9

- 1454^b 9 ἡμᾶς, 'we poets', as is shown by what follows in ^b 11 οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν. Aristotle speaks as though his hearers were poets, and studying the art of poetry for practical purposes. The Poetics in fact, whatever else they may be, are a practical treatise on Poetry; and the assumption throughout is that one is to learn from them how to write a good poem. Similarly in Rhet. 1. 8, 1366^a 12 ἡμᾶς means 'we orators' (δέοι ἂν τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς).
- ^b 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι. Aristotle might no doubt have said ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι. Vahlen illustrates the construction from Soph. el. 16, 175^a 27 συμβαίνει δέ ποτε καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ' ὃ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνεῖραι διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν, and other parallels in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 546^b 25).
- ^b 12 ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους, 'too quick or too slow to anger'; the contrast is like that between ὀξύς and ῥαθύμος in Eth. E. 8. 5, 1240^a 1 ἀνομοίους χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλους καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας is added in order to include all similar defects of character, i. e. defects which are not incompatible with a general goodness of disposition.
- ^b 14 [παράδειγμα σκληρότητος]. For the reason for bracketing the two words see J. of Phil. 14 p. 47. If they are not an ordinary 'adscript', they may possibly represent a marginal note by Aristotle himself to indicate that a second instance, one of σκληρότης [obstinacy?], was to be added. According to Galen (t. 18. 2 p. 879-80 K.) notes of a very similar description were to be found embedded in the text of Hippocrates.
- Ἄγαθων: perhaps, as Tyrwhitt suggests, in his Telephus (Nauck, TGF.² p. 764).
- ^b 15 διατηρεῖν. This quasi-imperative use of the infinitive (without δεῖ or χρῆ) is common enough in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 343^a 22). For the compound διατηρεῖν comp. Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178^a 13 διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ.—Aeschines in Ctes. 6 ὅταν διατηρηθῶσιν οἱ νόμοι.—Philemon 94. 6 Kock ὅς γε ταῦτα πάντα διατηρεῖ. At this point Aristotle sums up by saying that the rules laid down for the μῦθος and ἤθη in a play must be observed throughout by the poet. But besides these general principles of construction, it is necessary in practice to consider the spectators (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 2 p. 204) and the impression (αἰσθήσεις) the work is likely to make on them when presented on the stage, as it is easy to produce a bad impression through some fault of practical stage-craft. This seems to be the sense of the present

passage; Aristotle, however, avoids details, and refers to another 1454^b 15 writing of his for a fuller explanation of his precept. The incident mentioned in 17, 1455^a 26 may perhaps be taken as an instance of the kind of fault he has in mind.

τὰ παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις. For παρὰ in a sense approximating to that of διὰ see Bon. Ind. 562^a 10 and Bernays, *Dialogue des Aristot.* p. 138. αἰσθήσεις means the impression produced on the spectators, i.e. as we should say, the stage-effect of a play. The qualification, however, τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας τῇ ποιητικῇ, limits the responsibility of the poet to that part of the stage-effect which directly depends on his own art (ἀκολουθούσας τῇ ποιητικῇ); so far as it depends on that of others—actors, costumiers, and the like—it is not within his province (6, 1450^b 17). This interpretation, which is as old as Victorius, is much more probable than that of Bernays and others, who suppose the reference in the text to be to the business of the costumier and stage-manager. Throughout the *Poetics* Aristotle resolutely ignores all such matters as outside the art of poetry proper; and it is inconceivable that he should have given them any special attention in a work like the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν* (ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις). For the plural αἰσθήσεις comp. ὄψεις in 6, 1450^a 13, ^b 20, and Kühner, *Gr. Gr.*³ 2. 1 p. 17.

ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις: i.e. in the now lost dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν*, as Bernays following Victorius has shown (*Dialogue des Aristot.* p. 27; comp. Bon. Ind. 226^b 35). The reference must be to a work (1) by Aristotle himself, (2) published and written for publication, and (3) on a kindred subject.

This and the next two chapters form a sort of Appendix; they discuss a series of special points and rules of construction which had been omitted in the sketch of the general theory of the *μῦθος*. If these afterthoughts seem out of place here, it is to be remembered that there is an even stronger instance of matter out of place in 15, 1454^a 37. An excursus on the different forms of Discovery is justified not only by the great dramatic interest of the Discovery (6, 1450^a 33), but also by the important part it plays in 14, 1453^b 30.

εἴρηται πρότερον: 11, 1452^a 29.

ἢ πλείστη χρῶνται: *Pol.* 7. 11, 1330^b 11 οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώ-^b 20
μεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς
τὴν ὑγίειαν.—Hippocrates 1 p. 40 K. οἷς εἴθισται ὁ ἄνθρωπος πλεί-
στοισί τε καὶ αἰεὶ χρῆσθαι.

- 1454 ^b 22 **σύμφυτα** : comp. H. A. 7. 5, 585 ^b 31.
λόγῃην κτέ. From some unknown play (Nauck, TGF.² p. 855); the allusion is to the mark said to have been visible on the **Σπαρτοί** of Thebes. The accusative **λόγῃην** Aristotle seems to regard as an instance of *attractio inversa*, since he continues the construction by saying **ἀστέρας** instead of **ἀστέρες**.
- ^b 23 **Καρκίνος** : Nauck, TGF.² p. 797. For the ellipse of the verb (**ἐποίησε**) see on 14, 1453 ^b 17.
ἐπίκτητα : De gen. an. 1. 17. 721 ^b 29 οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ σύμφυτα προσεικότες γίνονται τοῖς γονεῦσιν οἱ παῖδες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα· οὐλὰς τε γὰρ ἐχόντων τῶν γεννησάντων ἤδη τινες ἔσχον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις τῶν ἐκγόνων τὸν τύπον τῆς οὐλῆς, καὶ στίγμα ἔχοντος ἐν τῷ βραχίονι τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπεσήμηνεν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι τῷ τέκνῳ . . . τὸ γράμμα.
- ^b 24 **οὐλαί** : as in Od. 19. 392 and Eurip. El. 573.
τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. The term in the New Comedy for tokens of this kind was **γνωρίσματα** (see on 17, 1455 ^a 20).
- ^b 25 **ἐν τῇ Τυροί** : a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.² p. 272). With **οἶον** we have to understand **ἡ ἀναγνώρισις γίνεται**—the construction changing, as sometimes happens when a second instance of not quite the same order is introduced by **οἶον**; comp. De anima 2. 10, 422 ^b 5 **σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὔσαν τὴν γλώτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγρὰν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀφή γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὄταν προγευματίσας τις ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἐτέρου, καὶ οἶον τοῖς κάμουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρότητος αἰσθάνεσθαι.**—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 ^b 18 **διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιούντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως· τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τοῦναντίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλευόντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἶνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους, καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου φωνῇ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἄλλότριά.**
- ^b 27 **ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ** : Od. 19. 386–475.
- ^b 28 **ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν** : Od. 21. 205–225. The distinction Aristotle finds between the two instances is this: whereas the scar is seen by Euryclyia by accident and in the natural course of things, with the herdsmen Ulysses directly points to it **πίστεως ἔνεκα**, in order to convince them of the truth of his disclosure: Od. 21. 217 **καὶ σῆμα ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι δεῖξω, ὄφρα μ' ἐν γνῶτον πιστωθῆτόν τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ, οὐλήν, τὴν ποτέ με σὺς ἤλασε λευκῷ δόντι.** In one of his lost writings, perhaps the **Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά**, Aristotle criticized this Discovery as resting on an error of logic: **Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, φασίν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιούτου ἀναγνωρισμοῦ, λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τὸν**

ποιητὴν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πᾶς οὐλὴν ἔχων Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν (fr. 208 1454^b 28 Heitz; Porph. in Od. p. 126 Schrader).

πίστεως ἔνεκα, scil. χρώμενοι τοῖς σημείοις.

ἐκ περιπετείας: 'repentino quodam casu' (Victorius), as in^b 29 Polyb. 32, 22 οὐ τύχη τὸ πλεῖον συνεργῶ χρώμενος οὐδ' ἐκ περιπετείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγχινοίας καὶ φιλοπονίας. The ordinary interpretation of αἱ ἐκ περιπετείας, 'quae ex peripetia oriuntur' (Tyrwhitt), makes it refer to the περιπέτεια or turn in the story, and assumes the Discovery in the Odyssey to be consequent on the Peripety, whereas it is rather one of the means to it. It is to be remembered (1) that περιπέτεια is not always a term of the theatre in Aristotle (see on 11, 1451^a 22); and (2) that even in the Poetics he is very apt to use such terms in the sense they bore in ordinary speech (see on 14, 1453^b 8 χορηγίας).

ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις: Od. 19, 392 (comp. 26, 1460^a 26). On this,^b 30 the earliest mode of citing Homer, see Bergk, Gr. Litteraturgeschichte 1 p. 496.

ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης: 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem'^b 32 (Ritter), as the context shows, ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει κτέ.; comp. the parallel in 17, 1455^b 9 θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν . . . εἰπὼν ὅτι κτέ. For the senses of ἀναγνώριζειν in the Poetics see on 11, 1452^b 5.

διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, scil. ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ἰφιγένεια. The reference is to Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

αὐτὸς λέγει: Iph. Taur. 800 sqq. In Aristotle's view this latter^b 34 Discovery is very like that in Od. 21. 205: just as Ulysses points to his scar to convince the herdsmen, so Orestes, to convince his sister (comp. 808 ἔχεις τι τῶνδέ μοι τεκμήριον;), makes a statement showing his familiarity with their family history and the old home in Argos (comp. 822 ἂ δ' εἶδον αὐτός, τάδε φράσω τεκμήρια).

διό τι ἐγγύς. Vahlen restores διὸ ἐγγύς τι, which is no doubt the^b 35 more usual order when τι is connected with an adverb. But there are certainly some instances of the order in the text, e.g. Thuc. 7. 57. 1 οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον.—Xen. Hiero 1. 21 ἧ οὖν ὄρας τι τοὺς τυράννους ἧδιον . . . ἰόντας;—Cyr. 1. 6. 11 οἶε τι, ἔφη, ἦττον τοῦτο εἶναι αἰσχρόν;—Plato Prot. 327 B οἶε ἂν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον κτέ.

Τηρεῖ: Nauck, TGF.² p. 257.

ἢ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή, the actual expression of Sophocles (as it^b 37 would seem) is to be compared with the Euripidean ἰστότονα πηνίσματα, κερκίδος ἀοιδοῦ μελέτας in Aristophanes Ran. 1315—

1454^b 37 where the allusion is to the humming-sound of the shuttle in its passage to and fro (comp. Dict. of Antiq.³ 2 p. 767). In *κερκίδος φωνή*, however, there is a suggestion that the shuttle told Philomela's story for her; comp. Achilles Tatius 5. 5 ἡ γὰρ Φιλομήλας τέχνη σιωπῶσαν εὔρηκε φωνήν· ὑφαίνει γὰρ πέπλον . . . καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν [scil. Πρόκνην] ἃ πέπονθε τῇ κερκίδι λαλεῖ. In Aristotle's view a disclosure by such means as these is quite as inartistic as that of Orestes in the Iphigenia (800).

διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα. Vahlen (omitting the comma) supposes this to be the same as τῷ διὰ μνήμης αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα, and explains it thus: 'τῷ αἰσθέσθαι . . . non tam percipiendo significat quam offerendo obviando quod sensibus percipi possit, ut quae in exemplis dicuntur κλαῦσαι, δακρῦσαι.' τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα accordingly has been taken to mean 'when the sight of some object awakens a feeling' (Butcher), or 'indem ein Anblick schmerzliche Empfindungen wachruft' (Gomperz). It is more natural, however, to take τῷ αἰσθέσθαι in the sense of 'by becoming conscious of' (comp. Bon. Ind. 754^a 43 for the aorist), and as an equivalent for τῷ μνησθῆναι. The connexion between the two terms may be seen from De mem. 1, 450^b 18 ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο [i. e. the impression left by experience] καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. In default of a word corresponding to our 'consciousness', Aristotle has to use αἴσθησις and αἰσθάνεσθαι in lieu of it (Bon. Ind. 21^a 1; comp. my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 65). In the illustrations which follow the emphasis is on the participles ἰδών and ἀκούων . . . καὶ μνησθείς, not on ἔκλαυσεν and ἐδάκρυσεν; the actual manifestations of the awakened memories (ἔκλαυσεν, ἐδάκρυσεν) are only the accidents, which happen to be found in the instances under consideration. ἰδόντα is a circumstantial participle (comp. μεταβαλοῦσα in 4, 1449^a 14). It is loosely put for 'seeing or hearing' (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2. p. 570).

1455^a 1 ἐν Κυπρίοις: Nauck, TGF.² p. 775. Nothing more is known of the play.

^a 2 ἐν Ἀλκίνοῦ ἀπολόγῳ: Od. 8. 521 sqq. (comp. 8. 83 sqq.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417^a 13 the designation covers the ground of Od. 9-12. See on 1454^b 30 for this mode of citing Homer.

^a 4 ἐν Χοηφόροις: Aesch. Choeph. 168-234 (comp. Eurip. El. 520). Electra reflects on what she sees, and concludes that it is her brother Orestes who has come home. It will be observed that in

the other instances of ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ the discovery is 1455^a 4 made by the party who overhears the reflexion of the other.

ὁ Ὅρέστης. For the article compare Herod. 1. 68 συνεβάλλετο^a 5 τὸν Ὅρέστεια . . . τοῦτον εἶναι.

Πολυίδου. It is agreed that this was the Attic form of the name^a 6 (Kock, CAF. 1 p. 508; Schulze, Qu. Epicae p. 111). As literary criticism was part of the business of a sophist, the probability is that this suggestion of the 'Sophist Polyidus' was propounded in some critical discussion on the technique of the dramatists; it is quite unnecessary to suppose him to have been also a dramatic poet (with Welcker, Gr. Trag. 1043), or to identify him with a certain dithyrambic poet of the same name (with Bernhardt, Gr. Litt.³ 2 p. 756). Aristotle reverts to this suggestion in 17, 1455^b 10.

Τυδεΐ: Nauck, TGF.² p. 803. Nothing more is known either^a 9 of this or of the other two plays mentioned, the Φινεΐδαι (Nauck p. 841) and Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος (Nauck p. 839). It is impossible to say who the personage here referred to was (comp. Tyrwhitt on 11, 1452^a 27).

ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ: comp.^a 4 ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ. Vahlen, who^a 13 connects this directly with συνθετή, supposes the two factors in the Discovery to be a συλλογισμός on the side of the one, and a παραλογισμός on the side of the other of the two parties: 'quae [scil. ἀναγνώρισις] ut ex simplici unius ratiocinatione prodire, ita composita esse potest alterius ex syllogismo, paralogismo alterius' (comp. also the discussion in his 'Zur Kritik Aristotelischer Schriften' p. 16). The illustration, however, from the Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος does not seem to imply anything more than an erroneous inference by one party (παραλογισμὸς ὁ θατέρου) from some statement made by the other. The reasoning in this instance Aristotle appears to regard as the illogical parallel to that in the Choephoroe: just as the recognition of Orestes by Electra came about through a συλλογισμός on her part, so that of A by B, the two personages in the Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος, is supposed to come about through a παραλογισμός on the part of the latter. The fallacy to be found there may have arisen from the ambiguity of the word 'know'. A having said 'I shall know the bow', B may have taken this to mean that he would 'know it again' (ἀναγνωριούντος)—which was not true (comp. ὁ οὐχ ἑωράκει). In our ignorance of the play and its plot it is idle to speculate further as to the way in which the actual Discovery may have been worked

1455^a 13 out in it. The present is one of many passages showing Aristotle's affection for the forms of logic even when dealing with matters of poetry (see on 16, 1454^b 28).

θατέρου: comp. 11, 1452^b 4. The error in the text of A^o (θεάτρου) is the converse of that in the inferior MSS. of Plato's Laws 659 A (θατέρου for θεάτρου).

^a 15 ὡς δὴ κτέ. Both text and interpretation here are in the highest degree doubtful. ὡς δὴ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριούντος seems to be practically an object-clause after ποιῆσαι; for this use of the gen. absol. with ὡς see Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 93, or Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 917 (comp. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 281). After ἀναγνωριούντος we may understand τὸ τόξον, from τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι in the preceding line—the distinction between γνώσεσθαι and ἀναγνωριούντος being like that between λήψις and ἀνάληψις in De mem. 2. 451^a 20 οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἢ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λήψις.

διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι. ποιῆσαι here may perhaps have the sense of 'suppose' or 'assume' (comp. Herod. 7. 184; Xenoph. An. 5. 7. 9; Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 136). The comma usually placed after τούτου has been removed in order that διὰ τούτου may be connected with ποιῆσαι, so as to mean 'through' or 'in consequence of this statement'; comp. the use of διὰ in Soph. el. 1, 165^a 1 ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων. If the comma is retained, ἀναγνωριούντος διὰ τούτου must mean either 'would reveal himself by this' (see on 11, 1452^b 5), or 'would recognize him by this'. Butcher, keeping παραλογισμόν, and reading with Bekker and the Aldine ἐποίησε instead of ποιῆσαι, translates the clause thus: 'This remark led Odysseus to imagine that the other would recognize him through the bow, thus suggesting a false inference.'

^a 18 οἶον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι: comp. 15, 1454^b 7 οἶον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι—where a certain incident in the story of the O. T. is said to be ἄλογον, just as here another is said to be εἰκός. That the Discovery in the O. T. is probable was shown in 11, 1452^a 26 (δηλώσας ὅς ἦν).

τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ: Iph. Taur. 582.

^a 19 ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα is 'dare epistolam' (comp. Iph. Taur. 770 ἐπιστέλλει), not as Bon. Ind. 281^a 44 says, 'addere epistolam'. The dative of the person *to whom* is omitted, for reasons which a reader of the play will easily understand. It is omitted also for the sake of brevity in Herod. 3. 43 γράψας δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἐπέθηκε

(scil. τὸ βυβλίον), which Valckenaer explains as meaning ‘tradidit 1455^a 19 epistolam in Aegyptum perferendam’.

αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται μόναι κτέ. The difficulty in this clause is obvious, and it has long been recognized. Vahlen’s explanation is as follows: ‘haec planissima sunt quamquam a Spengelio prave intellecta. neque enim hoc voluit illas agnitiones unicas esse quae careant indiciis et monilibus, sed hoc dicit: hae ἀναγνωρίσεις per se solae sunt (constant) sine illis extrinsecus adminiculis ascitis. et haec quidem sic universe significantur verbis τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περιδεραιῶν, quoniam ea nunc non attinebat singillatim per suas species referre.’ The real crux of the passage, however, is in σημείων; as used at the beginning of the chapter, in the account of the first species of Discovery (ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων ἀναγνώρισις, 1454^b 21), the term denotes a visible mark or token; but the absence of a σημείον of that description is obviously not peculiar to this fifth and best Discovery — ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. Twining plausibly suggests that Aristotle may be using σημείων in a more general sense, and that it denotes here—as it might very well do—anything that serves as a ‘sign’ in the less artistic forms of Discovery. Thus in the second of these the statement of Orestes is a sort of σημείον; in Euripides it is actually described as a τεκμήριον (see on 1454^b 34). The same may be said of the tears (ἔκλαυσεν, ἐδάκρυσεν) in the third species of Discovery. As for the fourth (ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ), to judge from the instances, it may depend on a sign (comp. τεκμήριον, Aesch. Choeph. 205), or it may result from a reflexion overheard, which thus serves as a sign. In comparison however with that in the O. T. or Iphigenia, all these forms of Discovery are in Aristotle’s judgment more or less artificial (comp. πεποιημένων), and thus of inferior artistic value.

δεραιῶν: comp. Eurip. Ion 1431 δέραια παιδὶ νεογόνῳ φέρειν.—^a 20 Menander (Lefebvre, Fragments d’un MS. de M.) Ἐπιτρέποντες 28 κάκκειμενον παιδάριον εἶρον νήπιον ἔχον δέραια καὶ τοιοντοῖ τινὰ κόσμον.—86 δός μοι, γύναι, τὰ δέραια καὶ γνωρίσματα.—Alciphron Ep. 3. 63 μετὰ τῶν σπαργάνων δεραῖά τινὰ καὶ γνωρίσματα περιθείσαι.

δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους κτέ. This begins a series of supplementary ^a 22 rules for the guidance of the dramatic poet in practice. When writing his play in the study he must (1) see the various incidents in it as it were, so as to anticipate the impression they are likely to produce on the stage; and also (2) feel to some extent the

1455^a 22 various emotions of his personages, if his picture of emotion is to be convincing (1455^a 23-34). After these five further rules are added in the course of this and the following chapter. —

συναπεργάζεσθαι: comp. ^a 30 *συναπεργαζόμενον*, and Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^a 31 *ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ ἐσθήτι καὶ ὄλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι*. *συναπεργάζεσθαι*, 'to finish off', stands in the same relation to *ἀπεργάζεσθαι* as *συμπληροῦν* and *συντελεῖν* to *πληροῦν* and *τελεῖν*. It is to be remembered that in Aristotle's view (6, 1450^a 36; 9, 1451^b 28) the language is but a secondary matter by comparison with the *μῦθος*. Plutarch's story of Menander's mode of working may be worth quoting: De gloria Ath. 4, 347 E *λέγεται δὲ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ τῶν συνήθων τις εἰπεῖν* 'Ἐγγὺς οὖν, Μέανδρε, τὰ Διονύσια, καὶ σὺ τὴν κωμωδίαν οὐ πεποίηκας; τὸν δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, *Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔγωγε πεποίηκα τὴν κωμωδίαν*. *ᾠκονόμηται γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις* [= 'the plan'] *δεῖ δ' αὐτῇ τὰ στιχίδια ἐπάσαι*.

^a 23 **πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον**: De mem. 1. 450^a 4 *ὁ νοῶν, κὰν μὴ ποσὸν νοῆ, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ' οὐχ ἢ ποσόν*.—Probl. 40. 14, 957^a 22 *τό τε ἐνύπνιον ἐστὶν ὅταν διανοουμένοις καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθεμένοις ὑπνος ἐπέλθῃ* (comp. Bon. Ind. 509^b 30).

οὕτω repeats the idea of *πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον*; what follows, *ἐναργέστατα ὄρων κτέ.*, is added as an explanation.

ὄρων. Vahlen retains the article before *ὄρων*, and supposes an hyperbaton like that in 6, 1449^b 23. The article, however, is certainly not wanted, and may easily be explained as a dittographia.

^a 26 **Καρκίνῳ**. The play referred to is assumed on the strength of this statement to have been entitled the *Amphiaraus*. Nothing more is known of it than what Aristotle here tells us, that the incongruity of a certain incident in it was observed and resented by the audience.

^a 27 **ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνήει**: 'e templo exibat' (Paccius), 'e fano exiit' (Victorius), 'e templo ascenderat' (Tyrwhitt), 'had left the temple' (Twining), 'ex delubro redibat' (Ritter), 'was on his way from the temple' (Butcher), 'hatte das Heiligtum bereits verlassen' (Gomperz).

ὁ μὴ ὄρωντ' ἂν τὸν θεατὴν κτέ. The sense is: If the incident had not been visibly before them, as part of the action of the piece (*τὰ πραττόμενα*), the incongruity would not have been noticed by the audience (*τὸν θεατὴν*: see on 26, 1461^b 28); but they could not help observing it when actually put before their eyes on the stage. To guard against this kind of mistake, therefore, the poet

should in his mind's eye see his various incidents beforehand, so as 1455^a 27 to anticipate the impression they will make in the theatre. In the same way we are told in another place (24, 1460^a 15) that the absurdity in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad would be observed on the stage, though it passes unnoticed in the poem.

ὅσα δὲ δυνατόν : comp. ^a 23 ὅτι μάλιστα.

^a 29

τοῖς σχήμασιν : the attitudes and gestures in which great emotion finds expression. The meaning here is apparently this : If the poet is to portray great emotion convincingly, he must feel it himself ; and if he feels it, he cannot but express it to some extent in gesture as well as in word. Aristotle, therefore, does not agree with the theory that the poet should write in cold blood, and that poetry is a matter of pure art and intellect ; his view rather is that some emotional excitement is one of the conditions required for a strong and convincing picture of passion. With this we may compare the Horatian maxim, *Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi* (A. P. 102), and that of Pope (Eloisa to Abelard 366), ' He best can paint 'em [i. e. their woes] who can feel 'em most ' ; or the perhaps even weightier dictum of Wordsworth (Pref. to Lyrical Ballads), ' It will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time, perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings with theirs.' How consonant all this is with the actual experience of many great imaginative writers may be seen from the evidence cited by Biese, *Das Metaphorische in der dichterischen Phantasie* p. 24 (Berl. 1889). In the *Carpentariana* p. 193 a story is told of Domenichino as showing that the same emotional excitability is not unknown even among painters : ' Le Dominiquin avoit coûtume de jouer, pour ainsi dire, le rôle de toutes les figures qu'il vouloit représenter ; & de dire tout haut ce que la passion qu'il leur donnoit, pouvoit inspirer. Lorsqu'il peignoit le Martyre de S. André, le Carache le surprit comme il étoit en colere, parlant d'une voix terrible & menaçante ; & il travailloit pour lors à un Soldat qui menace le Saint. Après que l' enthousiasme fut passé, le Carache courut l'embrasser, & lui avoua qu'il avoit été ce jour-là son Maître ; & qu'il venoit d'apprendre de lui, la véritable manière de réussir dans les expressions.'

πιθανώτατοι . . . οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν : Quintilian 6. 2. 27 *In iis* ^a 30 *quae verisimilia esse volumus, simus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur affectibus.* In the next clause *χειμαίνει . . . καὶ χαλεπαίνει*

1455^a 30 . . . ἀλθινώτατα explains πιθανώτατοι, and ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ . . . ὁ ὀργιζόμενος corresponds with οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. For the meaning of πιθανός see on 9, 1451^b 16.

ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως. The same use of ἀπό is found in Eth. N. 4. 4, 1122^b 13 ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.—Meteor. 2. 3, 359^a 7 ὥστε τὰ πλοῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀγωγίμων βάρους ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποταμοῖς ὀλίγου καταδύνειν, ἐν δὲ τῇ θαλάττῃ μετρίως ἔχειν.—Mech. 22. 854^b 7 ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείον ἀπέχη τοῦ ὑπομοχλίου ὁ μοχλός, ῥᾶον κινεῖ καὶ πλείον ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσχύος τῆς αὐτῆς.

^a 31 ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν: De insomn. 2, 460^b 3 ῥαδίως ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δ' ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ' ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι.

χειμαίνει . . . χαλεπαίνει are intransitive (comp. HSt. s.v. χειμαίνω). The usual interpretation is that of Victorius, who makes them mean 'fluctuare facit alium' (or 'excitat fluctus in animis auditorum') and 'ad iram commovet'. As far, however, as the present passage is concerned, any such reference to the feelings of the audience is out of place; the poet is not supposed to make them angry (for instance), but to put before them a picture of anger which they can accept as sufficiently like reality (see on 19, 1456^b 1). The clause in fact is only an amplification of the πιθανώτατοι οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσιν which precedes it.

χειμαζόμενος: comp. infra ^b 21 χειμασθεῖς. The subst. χειμών is similarly used of mental distress or agitation in Epicurus, p. 62, 18 Usener, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, where it is the opposite of ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία (comp. Lobeck, Phryn. p. 387, and the Index to Meineke's FCG. p. 1148).

^a 32 ἀλθινώτατα, which qualifies χειμαίνει as well as χαλεπαίνει, is emphatic, as its position shows. It is stronger than πιθανώτατα, the word which Aristotle might very well have used in this context.

διὸ εὐφυοῦς κτέ. Aristotle's curt and allusive statement needs some little expansion to bring out his meaning. It may perhaps be rewritten thus: the imaginative power of identifying oneself for the time with one's personages, which poetry demands, is a matter not of art, but of nature and temperament; it requires a natural gift or else a touch of madness in the poet's mental constitution. This natural gift consists in a certain impressionability of soul; and the illusions of madness arise from a distempered form of the same quality.

εὐφυοῦς. εὐφυής (more fully εὐφυῆς πρὸς τι) is a general term

for one with a natural gift and aptitude for something, as distinct 1455^a 32 from one who acquires a power by training or study; comp. 22, 1459^a 7, and Top. 3. 2, 118^a 22 *φιλοπονείν ἀρνούμεθα, ἵνα εὐφυεῖς εἶναι δόξωμεν*. The word is of frequent occurrence in Plato, as well as in Aristotle, and it is occasionally found in Isocrates also. In the present passage the poetic imagination is tacitly assumed to be a matter of nature, and to be the outcome in some instances of a healthy, and in others, of an unhealthy nature. The alternative *εὐφροῦς ἢ μανικοῦ* might be largely illustrated from Probl. 30. 1, where the connexion between 'great wit' (as Dryden calls *εὐφύια*) and madness is considered at length. The writer of the Problem (one of Aristotle's immediate followers, as it would seem) shows that they have a common physiological basis—that the 'melancholic temperament' underlies all exceptional ability, and that a more or less morbid form of it is to be seen in madness, and in certain states of mind akin to madness, e.g. enthusiasm and 'ecstasy'; comp. esp. Probl. 30. 1, 954^a 34 *πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ . . . νοσήμασιν ἀλίσκονται μανικοῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιαστικοῖς, ὅθεν Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάκιδες καὶ οἱ ἔνθεοι γίνονται πάντες . . . Μαρακὸς δὲ ὁ Συρακοῦσιος καὶ ἀμείνων ἦν ποιητής, ὅτ' ἐκσταίη*. A close relation between genius and madness is implied also in Rhet. 2. 15, 1390^b 26 *καὶ ἐνίστε ἂν ἢ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διὰ τινος χρόνου ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἀναδιδωσιν' ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφύα* ['clever', 'quick-witted'] *γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη . . . τὰ δὲ στάσιμα* ['steady', 'painstaking'] *εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα*.

ἢ μανικοῦ. The alternative here is a rationalistic recognition^a 33 of the ancient idea of the poet being 'possessed' and 'inspired' at the moment of poetic creation. Plato plays on this idea in his 'praise of madness' in Phaedr. 245 A *ὅς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητῆς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελής αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονούντος ἠφανίσθη*; and he returns to it in other dialogues (comp. Apol. 22 B, Meno 99 C, Ion 533 E sqq., Laws 719 C). For the survival of the notion in later literature see W. H. Thompson's note on Phaedr. 245 A.

οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ. The singulars which precede are practically equivalent to plurals, *εὐφύων . . . μανικῶν* (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 86).

εὐπλαστοί, 'capable of assuming a variety of moods', i. e. as we should say, 'impressionable' or 'emotional'; comp. the Platonic *ἀπαλή ψυχὴ* in Phaedr. 245 A *τρίτη δ' ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχὴ τε*

1455^a 33 καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχὴν, and the explanation of Hermias (p. 98 Couvreur) ἀπαλὴν δὲ λέγει τὴν εὐπλαστον καὶ εὐπαθῶς ἔχουσαν πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θείου. The word is properly used of material substances which, instead of being hard and rigid, are easily made to take various shapes; comp. De gen. an. 3. 11, 761^a 32 πολὺμορφα τὰ ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῆ τό τε γὰρ ὑγρὸν εὐπλαστοτέραν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν τῆς γῆς (also Plato Rep. 588 D). A metaphorical extension of meaning, not unlike that in the text, is found in Plato Laws 666 B ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον, ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθην γίνεσθαι, μαλακώτερόν τ' ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα, γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστοότερον εἶναι. This impressionability of soul, which marks the poetic genius (εὐφυής), may be explained on the principles set forth in Probl. 30. 1, where the melancholic temperament is said to show itself in a certain variability of mood (ἀνώμαλοι εἰσιν οἱ μελαγχολικοί), and a general capacity for strong feeling (ἡ φύσις δῆλη ρέπουσα πρὸς τὰ πάθη).

^a 34 ἔκστατικοί describes the extreme form of the emotionalism of the melancholic temperament; some of the 'melancholic' are apt to be so completely carried away by their feelings as to be actually beside themselves for the time. According to Probl. 30. 1 a tendency to this description of 'melancholy' was observable in most of the poets (τῶν περὶ τὴν ποιήσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι, 953^a 28); a certain Maracus of Syracuse—like our own Christopher Smart and others—was said to have been at his best in moments of derangement, Μαρακὸς ὁ Συρακούσιος καὶ ἀμείνων ἦν ποιητής, ὅτ' ἐκσταίῃ (954^a 38). Among Aristotelian instances of ἐξίστασθαι, ἔκστασις, and ἔκστατικός, as terms of mental pathology, the following may be noted: De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325^a 19 οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μαινομένων ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὥστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον.—H. A. 6. 22, 577^a 12 ἐξίσταται καὶ μαινεται.—Cat. 8, 9^b 36 ἢ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὄργη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα [scil. ποιότητες]· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὄργιλοι τε καὶ μανικοί.—Probl. 30. 1, 953^a 17 ἡ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔκστασις [said of Hercules slaying his children in his madness].—^a 22 ὁ μὲν [i. e. Ajax] ἔκστατικός ἐγένετο παντελῶς.—^b 14 τῶν μελαγχολικῶν ὅσοι ἔκστατικοί. Theophrastus H. P. 9. 13, 4 has ἔκστατικός in the active sense of producing ἔκστασις: γίνονται δὲ τινες τῶν γλυκειῶν [scil. ριζῶν] αἱ μὲν ἔκστατικά καθάπερ ἡ ὁμοία τῷ σκολύμφῳ περὶ Τεγέαν, ἣν καὶ Πάνδειος ὁ ἀνδριαντοποῖδς φαγὼν ἐργαζόμενος ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἐξέστη· αἱ δὲ θανατηφόροι κτέ. This technical

use of these words is perhaps another proof of the influence of the 1455^a 34 language of Hippocrates (v. Foes, *Oeconomia Hippocratis* s.v. ἔκστασις) on that of Aristotle and his school.

ἐξεταστικοί, the reading of the MS., is surely impossible in a context like the present. ἐξετάζειν denotes to 'scrutinize' or 'examine', i. e. to exercise one's critical faculty on something. It is clear, however, as any reader of *Probl.* 30. 1 must see, that Aristotle is not thinking here of the critical but of the imaginative power of the poet, and that he wishes to distinguish two forms of it, one springing from a healthy, and the other from a more or less morbid state of mind. An instance of the corruption of ἐκστατικός into ἐξεταστικός is found in the MSS. of Aspasius' commentary on the *Nic. Ethics*, p. 136. 3 ed. Heylbut. Mr. A. O. Prickard has pointed out to me a similar corruption in *Longinus* 38. 5 (ἐξετάσεως for ἐκστάσεως).

τούς τε λόγους: comp. 24, 1460^a 27. A new point is introduced in the same way in 24, 1460^a 26 (προαιρέισθαι τε δεῖ), and in several places in the later Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (e.g. 8. 1, 1155^a 11, 16; 9. 1, 1164^b 1, etc.). This is the third of Aristotle's supplementary rules (see on^a 22). It will be observed that he now changes his construction, infinitives taking the place of the preceding participles, just as though he had begun by saying δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάντα καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργαζόμενον ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι . . . καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργάζεσθαι. For λόγος in the sense of the argument in a play or poem comp. 17, 1455^b 17 and 24, 1460^a 27 (also *Aristoph. Pax* 148, and *Hesychius* λόγος ἡ τοῦ δράματος ὑπόθεσις).

ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου: i. e. to set out in a general form, to reduce it^b 1 to its simplest terms by ignoring its accidents, its personal and other accessories. On the logical or philosophic use of ἐκτίθεσθαι in Aristotle see *Vahlen, Beitr.* 2 p. 83 and *Poste's Sophistici Elenchi* p. 153 (comp. *Maier, Syllogistik des Aristoteles* 2. 2 p. 142).

ἐπεισοδιῶν, scil. τοὺς λόγους, as in *Rhet.* 3. 17, 1418^a 33 δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιῶν ἐπαίνειν. It means to work in the accessory incidents (ἐπεισόδια; see on 9, 1451^b 33) into the story as outlined in the preliminary sketch.

τῇ θεῷ. The goddess meant is Artemis, τῇ whom *Iphigenia*^b 5 had been offered in sacrifice (τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης^b 3) at Aulis.

ἀνείλεν ὁ θεὸς . . . ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ. The reading here was practically^b 7 settled long ago by *Düntzer* (*Rettung d. Aristot. Poetik* p. 180). Aristotle is merely reproducing in his own form the statement in

1455^b 7 Iph. Taur. 82, where Orestes, in an address to Apollo, is made to say: ἐλθὼν δὲ σ' ἠρώτησα πῶς τροχηλάτου μανίας ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἐς τέλος πόνων τ' ἐμῶν· σὺ δ' εἶπας [= ἀνείλεν ὁ θεός] ἐλθεῖν Ταυρικῆς μ' ὄρους χθονός [= ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ], ἔνθ' Ἄρτεμις σὴ ξύγγονος βωμοὺς ἔχει, λαβεῖν τ' ἄγαλμα θεᾶς . . . λαβόντα δ' . . . Ἀθηναίων χθονὶ δοῦναι. This incident in the previous history of Orestes is outside the actual story or plot of the Iphigenia (ἔξω τοῦ μύθου); all that is really essential for the dramatic situation is that τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθεῖν τῆς ἱερείας.

^b 8 ἔξω τοῦ μύθου, which seems to have been explained by the adscript ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου, is equivalent to ἔξω τοῦ δράματος (see on 14, 1453^b 32), outside the action of the piece.

^b 9 ληφθεῖς = συλληφθεῖς (comp. Breimi on Lysias in Eratosth. § 16). ἀνεγνώρισεν, scil. ὅτι Ὀρέστης (see on 11, 1452^b 5).

^b 10 Πολύιδος: see on 16, 1455^a 6.

^b 12 ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα: 9, 1451^b 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασιν. The proper names are required to serve as a basis for the story, and impart to it an appearance of reality. Aristotle seems to speak for the moment as though the whole story, names and all, were of the poet's creation, as it was in the New Comedy and in certain tragedies (9, 1451^b 11, 19). If the stories, however, were traditional, the chief names were generally part of the tradition, and taken over from it by the dramatist. A reason for the retention of historic names in Tragedy has been given in 9, 1451^b 15.

^b 13 ἐπεισοδιοῦν: comp. ^b 1 ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν.

ὅπως δὲ ἔσται. Another, perhaps the only other Aristotelian instance of this quasi-imperative, is in Rhet. 3. 18, 1419^b 6 ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. Aristotle addresses his audience (see on 15, 1454^b 9), as he does in the concluding paragraph of the Sophistici Elenchi (33, 184^b 3), and exhorts them to bear in mind the rule he is pointing out.

οἰκεία: appropriate to the person. The madness of Orestes in the Iphigenia is a return of that which seized him just after the murder of his mother (Iph. Taur. 83); his purification also is naturally suggested by his guilt as a matricide (Iph. Taur. 1031 sqq.).

^b 14 ἡ μανία: Iph. Taur. 281 sqq.

^b 15 τῆς καθάρσεως: Iph. Taur. 1163 sqq.

^b 18 παραφυλαττομένου: comp. the use of φυλάττειν in Hom. Od. 4 670 ὄφρα μιν αὐτὸν ἰόντα λοχῆσομαι ἧδὲ φυλάξω ἐν πορθμῷ.

1455^b 24 *Ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγωδίας κτέ. The fourth of these supplementary rules. The complication and dénouement are of such paramount importance, that two tragedies with the same sort of complication and dénouement should be regarded as substantially the same, however different they may be in other respects. It is quite possible to succeed in the one point and fail in the other; but they are both of equal moment, and require equal attention from the poet. This view of the drift of the paragraph assumes that the sentence *δίκαιον . . . κρατεῖσθαι* in 1456^a 7-10 should follow after *μέχρι τοῦ τέλους* in 1455^b 32. A mere definition of *δέσις* and *λύσις* would have no place in these chapters, unless it were made to lead up to some practical precept, such as we have in *δεῖ δὲ ἄμφω αἰεὶ κρατεῖσθαι* in 1456^a 10.

δέσις . . . λύσις: see on 15, 1454^a 37.

^b 25 *ἔξωθεν*: see on 14, 1453^b 32.

ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις. It is not necessary to transpose *πολλάκις* and insert it after the preceding *τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν*. The *δέσις*, says Aristotle, comprises not only the presupposed part of the story (*τὰ ἔξωθεν*, or *τὰ προπεπραγμένα*), but also in many instances (*πολλάκις*) some portion of the action within the play. In the *Iph. Taur.* the *δέσις* extends as far as l. 391. In the *O. T.* on the other hand the entire *δέσις* is presupposed, the *λύσις* beginning with the opening scene.

^b 29 *Λυγκεῖ*: see on 11, 1452^a 27. The Lynceus is cited as an instance of a play with a *δέσις* partly presupposed and partly within the limits of the action of the piece.

^b 30 *τοῦ παιδίου*, Abas, the child of Lynceus and Danaus' daughter *Hypermnestra*.

^b 32 *τραγωδίας δὲ εἶδη κτέ*. The fifth of the supplementary rules. There are four species of Tragedy—each arising apparently (like the species of Democracy in *Pol.* 4. 12, 1296^b 27) through the prominence in it of some one of the several elements in a play. Aristotle insists that for an ideally good tragedy all these elements of interest are wanted, and that in so critical an age none can be neglected with impunity (*μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν κτέ.* 1456^a 3). The species he is now talking of, or at any rate three out of the number, were probably no discovery of his; terms like *πεπλεγμένη τραγωδία*, *παθητικὴ τραγωδία*, and *ἠθικὴ τραγωδία* may very well be supposed to have been already sanctioned and current in the technical language of the theatre (comp. on 9, 1451^b 33). If the *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις* are

'the whole thing' (as we say), the play is *πεπλεγμένη*; if the 1455^b 32 element of *πάθος* is especially prominent, it is *παθητική*; if it is mainly a portraiture of character, it is *ἠθική*; and if it depends largely on the 'spectacle', it is 'spectacular'. This last species Aristotle recognizes as a fact, but as there was no derivative from *ὄψις* corresponding to our 'spectacular', he has to change his form of expression and speak not of the fourth 'species', but of the fourth element (*τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις*), with instances, however, (*αἷ τε Φορκίδες κτέ.*) relating to the species of drama in which the element of *ὄψις* was prominent (see J. of Phil. 14 p. 50). These four elements have been already considered, though not quite so directly as Aristotle's language would imply. The *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις*, which are assumed to go together (comp. 11, 1452^a 32), and the *πάθος* have been distinguished already as elements in the *μῦθος* (comp. 11, 1452^b 9); and they are counted here as two parts of the play because each is the prominent factor in a distinct species of tragedy. Two other parts are mentioned, the *ἦθη* and the *ὄψις*, apparently for the same reason. If nothing is said of the remaining 'parts' of Tragedy, the reason is obvious; there was no existing species of Tragedy that could be described as consisting mainly of *διάνοια* or *λέξις* or *μελοποιία*. Vahlen and others assume a lacuna in ^b 34 (after *ἀναγνώρισις*), on the supposition that Aristotle must have had something to say about the *ἀπλῆ τραγωδία*. The *ἀπλῆ τραγωδία*, however, is not a species in Aristotle's present sense of the term; and if we are to find a place for it in the text, the same logic would require a recognition of the *ἀήθης τραγωδία* (6, 1450^a 25), as being the logical opposite of the *ἠθικὴ τραγωδία* in the passage before us. The insertion too, which is due to a desire to bring the present statement into line with that in 24, 1459^b 8, makes it necessary to adopt a highly improbable correction, *τερατῶδες*, in the context (1456^a 2).

τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη. In lieu of *τὰ μέρη* Tyrwhitt suggests *τὰ μύθων*, and Ueberweg *τὰ μύθου* or *τοῦ μύθου*—which would mean, if I understand Tyrwhitt's note correctly, that the *ἠθικὴ τραγωδία* is based on an *ἠθικὸς μῦθος*. This, however, can hardly be right, if one remembers the sharp distinction drawn between *ἦθος* and *μῦθος* in 6, 1450^a 4. The present passage, due allowance being made for the Aristotelian brevity of expression, is intelligible enough in itself; the difficulty is to bring it into harmony with what is said elsewhere in other parts of the book. *τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη*, no doubt, implies a previous

1455^b 32 statement, which it is impossible to find in the earlier chapters; and the passage in 24, 1459^b 9 implies that a ἀπλή as well as a πεπλεγμένη τραγωδία had been recognized among the four species of Tragedy in the passage before us. Difficulties of this kind it is better to acknowledge than to remove at the cost of reforming the text. The truth is that Aristotle is more human than we commonly suppose—that his memory is sometimes at fault, and also that he sometimes writes down what occurs to him at the moment, without stopping to reflect whether it is quite reconcilable with what he has said elsewhere. Though there are chapters in the Poetics, more especially in the early part, which are models of careful drafting, I think it clear that, as the work advances, the statement is not always equally admirable, and that it would require a great deal of revision to make it consistent throughout. The difficulty in the reference τσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη is not unlike that in ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται in 6, 1450^b 13, and ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις in 18, 1456^a 10.

^b 33 ἢ μὲν πεπλεγμένη κτέ., appositional to the preceding εἶδη τέσσαρα (comp. 16, 1454^b 20; 21, 1457^a 31).

^b 34 παθητική. No definition is given, as though the term (as also ἡθική in the next line) were sufficiently understood without one.

1456^a 1 Αἴαντες: see Nauck, TGF.² p. 963 for a list of plays entitled Αἴας.

Ἰξίονες: see Nauck p. 965.

Φθιώτιδες, a play by Sophocles (Nauck p. 282).

^a 2 Πηλεός. The reference is perhaps to the Peleus of Sophocles (Nauck p. 239) rather than that of Euripides (Nauck p. 554).

τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις is closer to the MS. reading than Schrader's τὸ δὲ τερατῶδες, which has been so generally approved by recent editors. The unmeaning οησ of the MS. here, and again in 21, 1458^a 5¹, is but one remove from ὄψις as it might be written in an uncial MS. (OHC = O+IC). The illustrations no doubt refer to the 'kind' instead of the 'part' brought into prominence in the kind. A certain formal incongruence, however, is not uncommon with instances introduced by ὄλον (comp. 16, 1454^b 25; 25, 1461^a 24; Eth N. 4. 4, 1122^a 27; Rhet. 3. 3, 1405^b 35);

¹ See J. of Phil. 14 p. 50. The οησ of the MS. in the second instance has been supposed to represent ΟΠΣ, and in this way ὄψ. In early inscriptions ψ may appear as φσ or πσ (Meisterhans, Gr.³ p. 3; Hoffmann, Gr. Dialekte 3 p. 612); but, as far as I am aware, there is no trace of this mode of writing in the manuscript tradition of a classical author.

Aristotle is often content to note the fact, and leave us to see its 1456^a 2 logical relation to what precedes.

Φορκίδες, a satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 83).

Προμηθεύς, probably another satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 62). There is a good deal to be said, however, in favour of Bergk's suggestion (Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753) that the plural *Προμηθεΐς* should be restored in the text.

ὄσα ἐν ᾄδου. The reference may perhaps be to plays like the ^a 3 *Ψυχαγωγί* of Aeschylus (Nauck p. 87). In these last instances, owing to the nature of the subject and situation, the *ὄψις*, the make-up (see on 6, 1449^b 33) of the strange personages introduced, may well be supposed to have been a great feature in the play. Aeschylus, who was an innovator in matters of stage-apparatus (Sommerbrodt, *Scaenica* p. 183), is said to have made large use of this device: *Vita Aeschyli* (p. 2 Dind.) *ταῖς τε γὰρ ὄψει καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται*.

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κτέ. A reminiscence of Aristotle's language here may be traced in Polybius 16. 20. 2: *διὸ δεῖ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι πάντων κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν· καλὸν γάρ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῇ πλείστην ποιείσθαι πρόνοιαν*.

ἐκάστου is masculine, 'each of his various predecessors'—the ^a 6 genitive being dependent on *ἰδίου* as in 5, 1449^b 16, 13, 1452^b 33, and 19, 1456^a 35. For the hyperbaton see on 6, 1449^b 23.

δίκαιον κτέ. This and the next sentence (*πολλοὶ — κρατεῖσθαι*) are ^a 7 probably out of place (see above, on 18, 1455^b 24).

ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν. The point here, the conditions ^a 8 under which two tragedies may be said to be the same or not, is very like that in *De anima* 2. 4, 416^a 5 *χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταῦτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις*, and in *Pol.* 3. 3, 1276^a 18 *πῶς ποτε χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἕτεραν*.

οὐδενὶ ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ, 'ob nihil aeque ac ob fabulam' (Tyrwhitt). The dative *οὐδενί* is to be taken with *λέγειν* in the sense of 'by reason of' or 'on account of'; comp. *De anima* 2. 4, 416^a 5 (quoted above).—*De sensu* 7, 447^b 24 *φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ἡ ψυχῇ οὐδενὶ ἐτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ᾄμα*.—*Eth. N.* 3. 12, 1117^a 32 *τῷ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται*. The construction in *ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ* ('equally with the story') is normal (Kühner, *Gr. Gr.*³ 2. 1 p. 411); but I am not able to point out an exact parallel. It may be compared, however, with

1456^a 8 that in Eth. N. I. 4, 1096^a 23 τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, and in Plato Parm. 150^A ἐξ ἴσου τῷ ἐνὶ δι' ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη; and with the use of ὁμοίως in Pol. 3. 11, 1282^b 8 ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι, and elsewhere. ἴσως has the sense of 'equally' in Pol. 4, 14, 1298^b 23 (Bekker), in Plato Laws 805^A, and in Demosth. 10. 74 (v. Weil ad loc.).

τοῦτο δέ (= τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ) introduces an explaining clause of similar form in De gen. et corr. I. 6, 323^a 17 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε πᾶν τὸ κινεῖν ποιεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιθήσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι τοῦτο δ' οἷς ἢ κίνησις πάθος.

^a 9 ἢ αὐτῇ. Aristotle, thinking only of the identity of the two tragedies, omits to recognize the possible alternative ἢ ἄλλη (comp. 19, 1456^b 4).

^a 10 κρατεῖσθαι = 'obteneri'. Vahlen illustrates this use of the word from Pol. 7. 13, 1331^b 37 δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις, and Dion. Hal. 5. 556 τῆς δὲ σαφηνείας καὶ τῆς ἐναργείας ἀμφοτέρους κρατεῖν ἀπεφηνάμην. Comp. also Polyb. 16, 20. 2 (quoted above on ^a 3).

χρῆ δὲ κτέ. The sixth of Aristotle's supplementary rules.

^a 11 εἴρηται πολλάκις. Though some hint of this may perhaps be discerned in 5, 1449^b 12 and 17, 1455^b 15, the reference here is clearly one of Aristotle's oversights (see on 18, 1455^b 32); it is not true that he has more than once laid down the rule μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποικὸν σύστημα τραγωδίας. πολλάκις, 'more than once', is the opposite of ἅπαξ (comp. Meteor. 2. 3, 356^b 27) as well as of ὀλιγάκις, just as πολλά is the opposite of ἐν as well as of ὀλίγα (Metaph. I 6, 1056^b 23).

μεμνήσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. For the conjunction Vahlen quotes Eth. N. I. 7, 1098^a 26 μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρῆ καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν.

σύστημα, scil. πραγμάτων. The μῦθος or story has been repeatedly described as a σύστασις πραγμάτων (v. 6, 1450^a 15, 32, ^b 32, etc.).

^a 12 ἐποποικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, scil. σύστημα. The common punctuation (with a full stop before, and a comma after it) makes this clause the beginning of a new sentence. It is clear, I think, that it is a parenthesis, and that the illustration οἷον εἴ τις κτέ. (comp. 26, 1462^b 2) refers back to the principal statement, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποικὸν σύστημα τραγωδίας in ^a 11. For other illustrations at some distance from the statements to which they relate see on 7, 1451^a 2.

πολύμυθον. The assumption here is that the story in the Iliad 1456^a 12 is a *πολύμυθον σύστημα*, one with a plurality of stories in it (comp. 24, 1462^b 8). It is not easy to reconcile this with what we are told in a later chapter (23, 1459^a 30) where the unity of story in the Iliad is emphasized.

ἄσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ἔλην ἐποίησαν. We do not know to whom^a 16 Aristotle is referring; it is just possible that Agathon may have been one of the number. For the tragedies entitled Ἰλίου πέρσις (or simply Πέρσις) see on 23, 1459^b 6.

Ἀγάθων. Aristotle's sense of the importance of Agathon is^a 18 shown by his many quotations from him (Bon. Ind. 4^b 5), as well as by the present and other references in the Poetics (9, 1451^b 21; 15, 1454^b 14). The context (^a 21) implies that the pathos in Agathon's situations was not always of the most legitimate kind; and in the next paragraph (^a 29) he is said to have set a bad precedent in the treatment of the Chorus. But whatever his artistic shortcomings may have been, we have evidence enough even in Aristophanes of his success with his own generation. There is a good deal of point, therefore, in what Aristotle is saying in support of his rule (*μη ποιεῖν ἐποποικὸν σύστημα τραγωδίας*), that 'even Agathon failed' when he neglected it.

ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ, 'in this, and in this alone'—a pregnant use of^a 19 *μόνος* like that in *De somno* 2, 455^a 27 *διὸ καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀφή μόνῃ πᾶσιν*.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι. I cannot think it necessary to bracket these words (with Susemihl). As *περιπέτεια*, which is the mark of the 'complex' story (10, 1452^a 16; comp. 11, 1452^a 32), is directly suggestive of it, *ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις* is practically equivalent to *ἐν τοῖς πεπλεγμένοις πράγμασι*. Aristotle adds *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι*, in order to make his statement cover the whole ground by including both forms of plot. The failure of these unsuccessful poets, he says in effect, was really due not to any fault of execution, but to an initial mistake in their choice of subjects; they forgot the limitations of the Drama, and undertook to dramatize a story too long and too complex for the purposes of the stage.

ὧν βούλονται, 'the effects they desire'. The kind of effect, which^a 20 is explained in the next clause (*τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλόδηρον*), may not be of the best order; but it is that which, in their anxiety to please their public, they wish to produce.

τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλόδηρον. For the change of number^a 21 in *τοῦτο* comp. 19, 1456^a 35; it is the converse of that in 17,

1456^a 21 1455^a 33 (comp. Bon. Ind. 490^b 17). Aristotle's theory is that the tragic situation should be *ελεεινόν*—which implies that the sufferer does not deserve his misfortunes (13, 1453^a 4); he incidentally admits, however, that it may be only *φιλόανθρωπον* (see on 13, 1452^b 38), as it is, for instance, when the sufferings of the wicked are put before us in such a way as to arouse a certain commiseration or human feeling for the sufferers. The later Tragedy would seem to have affected this inferior form of tragic motive.

ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο κτέ. The illustrations which follow were probably taken from actual plays. The tragedies Aristotle has in mind must have involved a strong *περιπέτεια* with all the interest and excitement attending it; they failed, however (we are told), in spite of this and other attractions (comp. *στοχάζονται ὦν βούλονται θανμαστῶς*), through an initial mistake in their subject, which was one more fitted for an epic than a play.

^a 23 ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός: comp. 25, 1461^b 15. The reference is to the sophistical saying of Agathon (fr. 9 Nauck²), *τάχ' ἂν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι, βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα*, which Aristotle has examined in *Rhet.* 2. 24, 1402^a 10. There is some variation of text here, as another reading, *ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο <καὶ> εἰκός*, is believed to underlie the Arabic Version. With the *καί* the clause adds a further point in favour of these unsuccessful plays: the kind of incident just mentioned is said to be 'probable also'. Without the *καί* the clause involves a criticism or condemnation, not unlike that in 13, 1453^a 35 (*ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη κτέ.*), 'this is probable, however, only in Agathon's non-natural sense of the word'. A qualification of this kind (introduced by *ὥσπερ* or *καθάπερ*) is found more than once in this same chapter (^a 17 and ^a 27), and again in 21, 1457^b 24; comp. also *Metaph.* B 2, 998^a 2 *ἄπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμήν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρους*.—*Rhet.* 1. 5, 1361^b 4 *πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται*.

^a 25 καὶ τὸν χορὸν κτέ. The seventh and last of these practical rules. It reappears in the well-known precept of Horace *A. P.* 193 *Actoris partes chorus officiumque virile defendat, neu quid medios intercinat actus, quod non proposito conducatur et haereat apte*.

^a 27 Εὐριπίδη. For the dative (conventionally rendered by *apud*) comp. *Pol.* 8. 5, 1339^b 8 *οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἄδει καὶ καθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς*.—*Plato Rep.* 389 E *οἷα καὶ Ὀμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει*.—*Laws* 706 D *Ὀδυσσεὺς γὰρ αὐτῷ [scil. Ὀμήρῳ] λαιδορεῖ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα*. The tacit assumption here is perhaps this, that the choral songs in

Euripides, though no mere ἐμβόλιμα (like those in the later Drama), 1456^a 27 were not always very closely connected with the action of the piece. A tradition of this criticism survives in the grammarians. The chorus in Phoen. 1019 the scholiast condemns as irrelevant: πρὸς οὐδὲν ταῦτα· ἔδει γὰρ τὸν χορὸν οἰκτίσασθαι τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Μειοικέως ἢ ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν εὐψυχίαν τοῦ νεανίσκου. ἀλλὰ περὶ Οἰδίπου καὶ τῆς Σφιγγὸς διηγεῖται τὰ πολλακίς εἰρημένα. A more general condemnation is found in the scholiast on Aristoph. Ach. 443: καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸν Εὐριπίδην διασύρει. οὗτος γὰρ εἰσάγει τοὺς χοροὺς οὔτε τὰ ἀκόλουθα φθεγγομένους τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἀλλ' ἱστορίας τινὰς ἀπαγγέλλοντας, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, οὔτε ἐμπαθῶς ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ ἀντιπίπτοντας. The Roman poet Accius also must have been of the same opinion, to judge from the mutilated fragment of his Didascalica in Nonius 178, 23, *sed Euripidis, qui choras temerius in fabulis * * **

τὰ ἀδόμυνα: the choral, as opposed to τὰ λεγόμενα, the spoken^a 28 parts of the play. In [Demosthenes] 60. 9 τοὺς τῶν ἀδομένων ποιητὰς is a way of describing the lyric poets; comp. also Plato Rep. 398 D οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δῆπου διαφέρει [scil. τὸ μέλος] τοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου λόγου.

ἐμβόλιμα: 'carmina intercalaria' (Budaeus). The word is^a 29 usually a term of chronology, as in Herod. 1. 32 and 2. 4. With the grammarians it seems to have meant 'interpolated': Hesychius ἐμβόλιμα ἔπη· τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν ὡς ἀλλότρια καὶ νόθα ἀθετούμενα. Cicero has the very similar word ἐμβόλιον in Ep. ad Q. Fr. 3. 1, 24, in the sense of an 'insertion' or 'interlude' (v. Ernesti, Lex. tech. gr. p. 118).

Twining's note on this passage is well worth quoting: 'It is curious to trace the gradual extinction of the Chorus. At first, it was *all*; then, relieved by the intermixture of dialogue, but still *principal*; then, subordinate to the dialogue; then digressive, and *ill connected* with the piece; then borrowed from *other pieces* at pleasure—and so on, to the fiddles and act-tunes, at which Dacier is so angry.'

λέξεως καὶ διανοίας. This is the usual order of the two terms in^a 34 the Poetics (v. 6, 1450^a 9, 14, 29 and 24, 1459^b 16). The only instance of the reverse order, which is that of their logical importance (6, 1450^b 12; comp. Rhet. 2. 26, 1403^a 36), is in 24, 1459^b 12 ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. For the meaning of διάνοια see on 6, 1450^a 6.

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν: comp. Phys. 4. 14, 222^b 31 τὸ θᾶπτον καὶ^a 36

1456^a 36 βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστι μεταβολήν. In Bon. Ind. 369^a 28 κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν is explained as equivalent to *διανοητικά*.

ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κτέ. In the Rhetoric three kinds of speech are recognized, according as the aim of the speaker is (1) to gain the confidence of his audience by creating in their minds a favourable idea of himself and his general credibility; or (2) to work on their feelings; or (3) to convince their reason: Rhet. I. 2, 1356^a 1 τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἡθελί τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι κτέ. The present summary notes the second and third of these three εἶδη, but ignores the first, though there is certainly nothing to exclude that sort of speech from the rhetoric of Tragedy.

^a 38 πάθη. The instances οἶον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον κτέ. are added, because up to this point πάθος has usually meant 'suffering' or 'calamity' (II, 1452^b II).

^b I ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν ἢ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. According to Tumlriz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 28) this shows that Aristotle supposes Tragedy to arouse anger and other emotions as well as pity and fear in the mind of the spectators. There is no such reference here to the spectators; the effect meant is that on the hearer on the stage. One might just as well say that the arguments put into the mouth of a personage (τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι κτέ.) are addressed to the spectators, and not to some other personage in the play. The rhetoric of the speaker in a tragedy is dramatically directed to the hearer on the stage, i. e. to another of the dramatis personae. When Plato says of Euripides ἐπίσταται . . . ῥήσεις . . . ποιεῖν . . . οἰκτρὰς καὶ τούναντιον αὖ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς (Phaedr. 268 c), he does not suppose him to threaten the hearers of his pieces.

μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, scil. παρασκευάζειν. The clause is an afterthought, as its logical place would be after τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν. The corresponding formula in Isocrates 42 c is τὰ τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι; and in the Rhetoric αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν: Rhet. 2. 26, 1403^a 20 τὸ δ' αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδίκον. The reading μικρότητας is retained by Vahlen, who defends the change of number by quoting (among other instances) De part. an. 4. 5, 679^b 37 διαφέρει τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν.—680^a 29 ἐν τῷ ψύχει καὶ ταῖς ἀλέαις.—Plato Laws 734 A μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν.—

779 B ὁμαλότητί τε καὶ ὁμοιότησιν.—860 B πλήθει καὶ μεγέθεισιν. 1456^b 1
It is difficult, however, to explain the change of number with two words so closely related as μέγεθος and μικρότης, and in a formula so technical as the present. The sense also of the plural μικρότητας is obscure, as it does not seem to fall under any of the heads recognized by Bernhardt, Synt. p. 62 or Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 17.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: comp. 15, 1454^a 18 ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις. ^b 2
Aristotle is quite aware that there is a rhetoric of action as well as a rhetoric of words. The διάνοια of the dramatis personae may be shown in their acts; they may do things, just as they say things, with a view to exciting pity, fear, etc., or with a view to creating an idea that something is or is not true, etc.; and whichever mode of expression be used, they have to follow, according to Aristotle, the same method and principles.

ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, scil. τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἢ τοῖς τῆς ^b 3
διανοίας μέρεσιν. For the meaning of ἰδέα see on 7, 1450^b 34. ἀπό denotes here the logical starting-point.

μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα. Aristotle might have expressed himself more ^b 4
fully by saying μεγάλα ἢ μικρὰ ἢ εἰκότα ἢ ἀπίθανα (comp. on 18, 1456^a 9).

ἄνευ διδασκαλίας = ἄνευ λόγου, ‘sine doctis opera’ (Tyrwhitt) ^b 5
it is explained by what follows, τί γὰρ ἂν εἶη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον; The party instructed or informed here is one of the dramatis personae, who learns the mind of another either through some act of his, or through some statement by him in words.

τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, scil. ἐλεεινά, δεινά, μεγάλα κτέ.

παρὰ τὸν λόγον. For the preposition comp. ^b 13 and 15, ^b 6
1454^b 15.

εἰ φαίνονται ἢ δέοι. The traditional εἰ φαίνονται (which would have ^b 7
to be taken as equivalent to εἰ μέλλοι φαίνεσθαι) is against the rule laid down by Madvig, Gr. Synt. p. 119 Eng. tr. There is not much to choose between Vahlen’s ἢ δέοι and Castelvetro’s ἢδη. ἢ δέοι, however, is somewhat nearer the manuscript reading ἢδέα, and much more probable than either Tyrwhitt’s ἢ δεῖ or Spengel’s ἢ διάνοια. It means ‘in the required light’, i.e. as ἐλεεινά, or δεινά, etc. If things appear of themselves in this light, without the aid of the rhetorical art of the speaker, the speaker is not wanted. The present remark may be compared with that in 6, 1450^b 8 ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτέ.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν. Having briefly considered the διάνοια, ^b 8
the intellectual or rhetorical power revealed in the speeches of the

1456^b 8 dramatic personages, Aristotle passes on to their λέξις, the diction or language in which they are made to express themselves. This point he investigates under three heads:—(1) the parts or constituents of the diction as a whole; (2) the various kinds of names in it; and (3) the limits within which unusual names or forms of names are admissible in poetry. Before entering on this line of discussion, however, he sets aside a matter which might perhaps seem germane to his subject, the elocutionary element in the spoken language. The word βαδίζει, for instance, according to one's tone in uttering it, may mean 'he walks', or 'does he walk?'; and ἄειδε may be uttered as a command ('sing!') or as a prayer. These and similar distinctions, in Aristotle's view, belong to the language as spoken rather than to the language as written, and thus come within the province of elocution (ὑποκριτική) rather than that of poetry or literature proper.

^b 9 τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως means literally the different 'attitudes' or turns of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken. The same idea underlies the expression σχήματα λέξεως of the grammarians, as one may see from Cicero Orator 83 *Verborum collocationem illuminat iis luminibus quae Graeci quasi aliquos gestus orationis σχήματα appellant*.—Quintilian 9. 1. 13 *Si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic* [scil. σχήματα] *appellandi sunt*, σχῆμα = 'gestus' occurs in 17, 1455^a 29 and 26, 1462^a 3 (comp. 1, 1447^a 27). Aristotle's σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, however, must not be identified with the σχήματα λέξεως or 'figures of speech', as we call them, of later writers. A 'figure of speech' is a literary artifice, a deviation from the simple and usual mode of expression for purposes of literary effect; Quintilian defines it as a *conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione* (9. 1. 4), or as an *oratio a simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa* (9. 3. 3; comp. Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. p. 338). In a 'figure of speech', as compared with the simple form of expression (e.g. 'Macedonia's madman' and 'Alexander'), we have a difference of words without any difference of sense; whereas in the Aristotelian σχήματα τῆς λέξεως we have the same words and a different sense—the difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation.

^b 10 ὑποκριτικῆς. ὑπόκρισις, the Latin *pronunciatio*, means 'delivery' or 'elocution'. In the Rhetoric two styles of oratory are distinguished, the 'graphic' style in which the sense is fully expressed by the actual language, and the 'hypocritic' style, which requires

certain artifices of elocution to bring out the meaning: Rhet. 3. 12, 1456^b 10 1413^b 17 τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφηρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιούντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, ὅσον τὰ τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ (τῇ) ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτικὰ (comp. 3. 12, 1414^a 5).

ἀρχιτεκτονικήν. The ἀρχιτέκτων is properly the master-builder,^b 11 who knows the scheme of the whole work and directs the artisans and others under him: Plato Polit. 259 ε ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικὸς ἀλλ' ἐργατῶν ἄρχων . . . παρεχόμενός γέ που γνῶσιν ἀλλ' οὐ χειρουργίαν. Aristotle recognizes a similar distinction in other arts, even in medicine: Pol. 3. 11, 1282^a 3 ἰατρὸς ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικός. The 'architectonic' form of ὑποκριτική involves a knowledge of its rationale and general principles, as distinct from the empiric knowledge possessed by rhapsodists, actors, orators, and other practitioners.

ὅσον τί ἐντολὴ κτέ. refers back to τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως in^b 9 (comp. on 7, 1451^a 2). The classification in the text originated with Protagoras, who is said to have distinguished four (or perhaps seven) fundamental differences in our mode of speech: Diog. Laert. 9. 53 διείλε τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα, εὐχολῆν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολήν—οἱ δὲ¹ εἰς ἐπτὰ, διήγησιν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολήν ἀπαγγελίαν εὐχολῆν κλήσιν —, οὓς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων. —Quintilian 3. 4. 10 *Protagoram transeo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi, quod εὐχολῆν dixit, partes solas putat.* It will be seen that Aristotle has arranged the σχήματα in pairs; one kind of speech may be made by a difference of intonation to mean either a command or a prayer, another either a simple statement or a threat, another either a question or an answer, and so forth with the rest. Aristotle's instances may be compared with those in Dion. Hal. 5. 46 R. τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι λέγομεν, τὰ δ' ὡς πυνθανόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὡς εὐχόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπιτάττοντες, τὰ δ' ὡς διαπορῶντες, τὰ δ' ὡς ὑποτιθέμενοι, τὰ δ' ἄλλως πως σχηματίζοντες.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν κτέ. The argument here comes^b 13 practically to this: That these σχήματα τῆς λέξεως are something outside the art of Poetry itself is shown by the fact that ignorance of them is not one of the usual charges brought by hostile critics against a poet; Protagoras' criticism on the first line of the Iliad may be dismissed as too trivial to deserve attention.

¹ οἱ δέ = οἱ δέ φασιν, 'according to others', as it so often does in the grammarians.

- 1456^b 14 ἐπιτίμημα : see on 25, 1460^b 6.
καὶ ἄξιον : Pol. 2. 11, 1272^b 32 ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν (comp: Riddell, 'Digest of Idioms' § 132).
- ^b 16 ἄειδε. The imperative as such merely expresses a bidding (κελεύειν), but a tone of authority may turn it into a command (ἐπιτάττειν; comp. Schmidt, Handbuch der lat. u. gr. Synonymik p. 51). Protagoras professed to understand Homer's ἄειδε in this dictatorial sense of the imperative, on the assumption that it was to be read as 'ἄειδε!' Aristotle's answer is that if ἄειδε gets this sense, it is through the fault not of the poet but of the reciter. An echo of the criticism ascribed to Protagoras survives in Schol. Ven. A on Il. 1. 1, where ἄειδε is said to be an instance of the poetic use of the imperative for the optative: ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἤτοι ἄδειαν ἢ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει [i. e. Homer] τὰ προσακτικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν.
- ^b 20 τῆς δὲ λέξεως κτέ. This whole chapter has been condemned by Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry. Aristotle's divisions, however, are not always quite the same as ours, as his relegation of the theory of the simple sounds in language to 'metric' in the De Partibus (2. 16, 660^a 7) is enough to prove. The writer of the chapter takes the same view of the simple sounds, and tells us that they need not be discussed at any length in a book like the Poetics. The main difficulty, accordingly, is in his assumption that in some way or other the other 'parts of speech' come within the scope of a work on poetry. He may perhaps have thought that some analysis of language in general was logically required as a preparation for the theory of poetical language in the next two chapters, which are unquestionably germane to the main subject of the book. And apart from this one has to remember the historical connexion between grammar and poetry in Greek antiquity. Grammar seems to have originated in Greece in the criticism and interpretation of poetry; its relation to poetry was felt and acknowledged even in the time of Dionysius Thrax, who begins his treatise with the definition, γραμματικὴ ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεύσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων (p. 5 Uhlig). That certain matters of grammar come under the cognizance of poetry is implied apparently in De interpr. 4, 17^a 5, when a distinction is made between the logical and the extra-logical

forms of statement: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι] ἀφείσθωσαν. 1456^b 20
 ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειότερα ἢ σκέψις (comp. Pacius
 ad loc.). The *a priori* objection, therefore, to this chapter is not
 quite so conclusive as it might seem at first sight. The chapter
 itself, whether an original part of the Poetics or not, has more than
 one mark of date about it. ἄρθρον and πῶσις have not yet
 acquired their usual sense of 'article' and 'case'; λόγος still
 retains its peculiarly Aristotelian meaning, and the definitions of
 ἄρθρον, σύνδεσμος, ὄνομα and ῥῆμα seem to have been framed with
 conscious reference to it (see on 1457^a 10); the general terminology
 and logical forms throughout the chapter are Aristotelian; and
 there are also several isolated points and allusions which would
 be wholly unintelligible if it were not for the parallels and illus-
 trations we are able to find in the unquestioned writings of
 Aristotle.

ἀπάσης, 'taken as a whole', as opposed to the parts into which
 it may be divided; comp. Meteor. 4. 1, 379^b 5 ἢ θάλασσα κατὰ
 μέρος μὲν διαιρουμένη τάχα σήπεται, ἅπανα δ' οὐ.—Plato Theaet.
 147 E τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν.—Gorg. 502 C εἴ τις περιέ-
 λοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέρος κτέ.—Laws 737 E δύο μέρη τοῦ
 παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. The Latin *omnis* is used in just the same way in
 Caesar B. G. 1. 1 *Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres*.

τὰ μέρη. Aristotle's μέρη τῆς λέξεως is an anticipation of our
 'parts of speech'; but the term covers more ground; his list of
 μέρη comprises three distinct kinds of 'parts': (1) the elements
 into which words are analyzable (στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή); (2) the
 various kinds of words (σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, etc.); and (3) the λόγος
 —the actual λέξις being a series of λόγοι. It includes, therefore,
 all the elements of language in every stage of analysis, from the
 simplest sounds to the proposition. It is only under the second of
 the above heads, i.e. in his classification of words, that Aristotle
 deals with the 'parts of speech' of later grammar. This passage is
 cited by Ammonius on the De Interpretatione: λόγου μὲν ταῦτα
 [i.e. articles, conjunctions, etc.] οὐ μέρη, λέξεως δὲ μέρη, ἧς καὶ ὁ
 λόγος αὐτὸς μέρος, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ποιητικῆς εἴρηται (p. 12
 Busse); and there is more than one reference to it in Boethius on
 the same book: *Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scripsit locutionis
 partes esse syllabas vel etiam coniunctiones tradidit* (2, p. 6 Meiser).
 —*In opere vero de poetica non eodem modo dividit locutionem, sed
 omnes omnino locutionis partes adposuit, confirmans esse locutionis
 partes elementa syllabas coniunctiones articulos nomina casus verba*

1456^b 20 *orationes. locutio namque non in solis significativis vocibus constat, sed supergradiens significationes vocum ad articulatos sonos usque consistit* (2, p. 8).

The classification before us which distinguishes words into *σύνδεσμοι*, *ἄρθρα*, *ὀνόματα*, *ρήματα* and *πρώσεις*, is an advance on that in the lost Aristotelian work known as the *τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή* (fr. 127 Teubn.), which recognized only three kinds of words, *ὀνόματα*, *ρήματα*, and *σύνδεσμοι*. This lost book is mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian in their sketches of the history of the 'parts of speech'; but they both ignore the present chapter of the Poetics. The omission, instead of justifying Ritter's athetesis of the chapter, merely shows that the Poetics were but little read in certain periods of antiquity.

^b 21 *ἄρθρον*. That the word has to be transposed is shown by the position of the explanation in the following statement about it (1457^a 6).

^b 22 *στοιχείον*: comp. Metaph. Δ 3, 1014^a 26 *στοιχείον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρῶτον ἐνπάρχοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἶδει εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἢ φωνῇ καὶ εἰς ἃ διαίρεται ἔσχατα, ἐκείνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει αὐτῶν*. *στοιχείον* was properly a letter of the alphabet; it was Plato (v. Eudemus ap. Simplic. in Phys. 1 p. 7. 13 Diels) who gave it the philosophical sense of 'element', which it so often has in Aristotle. The present definition shows the influence of the philosophical associations connected with the word; a *στοιχείον* is defined as an indivisible voice-sound capable of serving as a constituent, or element, in an intelligible voice-sound (*συνετῇ φωνῇ*). In thus describing it as a 'sound' Aristotle implicitly distinguishes it from the *γράμμα*, or written symbol which stands for the sound (comp. Metaph. B 4, 1000^a 2); the distinction, however, is very far from being generally observed in Aristotle (see Diels, *Elementum* p. 33). The two terms are treated as synonyms in Plato *Crat.* 426 D.

^b 23 *συνετῇ*. The alternative reading *συνθετῇ* has been accepted by several editors, as also by Steinthal (*Gesch. d. Sprachwissenschaft*³ 1 p. 253) and Diels (*Elementum* p. 33). The main argument in favour of *συνθετῇ* is that, as defined in ^b 34, the syllable is a *φωνῇ συνετῇ*, and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (*Bon. Ind.* 702^b 39) as a synthesis of *στοιχεῖα*. This is true enough. But it has to be remembered on the other side that Aristotle often speaks of the *στοιχεῖα* as *στοιχεῖα φωνῆς* (*Bon. Ind.*

702^b 35)—where *φωνή* means the same thing as the *συνετή φωνή* 1456^b 23 of the present passage. And if we assume *συνθετή* to be the original reading, the excepting clause (*οὐ πάντα δὲ κτέ.*), which puts the 'indivisible sounds' of the brutes into a different category, is irrelevant. Aristotle's argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these 'noises' of theirs are directly significant in themselves (*De interpr.* 2, 16^a 29); they are not *στοιχεῖα φωνῆς*, because they do not combine as elements to form a *φωνή συνετή*. The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human speech exist as elements in speech, and they have no meaning in themselves; the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions—not in the 'elements' which analysis reveals in them (comp. Vahlen, *Beitr.* 3 p. 220). *φωνή συνετή* is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term 'word'. It may be taken as including not only the *φωνή σημαντική*, the word that stands for something, but also the *φωνή ἄσημος*—words like *ἀμφί*, *περί*, *μέν*, *δέ*, etc. (Aristotle's *ἄρθρα* and *σύνδεσμοι*), which stand for nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech.

ταύτης δὲ μέρη κτέ.: Plato *Crat.* 424 C ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ^b 25 *πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ εἶδη τὰ τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα. οὕτως γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα;*—Phil. 18 B *ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἀπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεὺς τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δὲ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τὰ τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἐνὶ τε ἐκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχείῳ ἐπωνόμασεν.* Here Plato's *μέσα* are Aristotle's *ἡμίφωνα*. In later theory the *ἡμίφωνα* and *ἄφωνα* of Aristotle come under the more general designation of 'consonants', *σύμφωνα*: Sextus *Emp. Adv. math.* 1. 100 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν [scil. τῶν στοιχείων] φωνάεντα προσαγορεύουσι τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ φωνάεντα μὲν ἐπτά, α ε η ι ο υ ω, σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπά . . . 102 τῶν δὲ συμφώνων τὰ μὲν ἡμίφωνα ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα.*

φωνήεν. The word had been already used by Euripides, fr. 578 ed. Nauck² *ἄφωνα φωνήεντα συλλαβὰς τιθεῖς ἐξήηρον ἀνθρώποισι*

1456^b 25 γράμματ' εἰδέναι. It may be observed that both Plato (Theaet. 203 B) and Aristotle (Metaph. N 6, 1093^a 13) recognize the vowels as being seven in number.

^b 26 ἄνευ προσβολῆς: the opposite of μετὰ προσβολῆς in the next line. The difference between the vowels and consonants is that the latter imply a certain προσβολή as the condition of their becoming audible, whereas no such προσβολή is required to make the vowels audible. The sense of the word προσβολή as here used is far from clear. It has been taken to mean *additio* (Valla), *adiectio* (Paccius), *ictus* (Victorius), *percussio* (Robortello), and *allisus* (Goulston); Castelvetro, who renders it by *percossa*, confesses that he does not know what it means. The idea of most interpreters is that the term refers in some way or other to the physical mechanism of speech; to the impact of the tongue, for instance, on the parts within the mouth, or something of that sort. Twining, who translates it by *articulation* (with Batteux), tells us in a note that it is 'literally *percussio*: i. e. of the tongue against the palate or teeth, the lips against the teeth or against each other, and all other modes of consonant articulation'. In support of this physiological interpretation Vahlen (Beitr. 3 p. 224) quotes De part. an. 2. 16, 660^a 2 ὁ λόγος ὁ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων σύγκειται, τῆς δὲ γλώττης μὴ τοιαύτης οὔσης μηδὲ τῶν χειλῶν ὑγρῶν οὐκ ἂν ἦν φθέγγεσθαι τὰ πλείστα τῶν γραμμάτων τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γλώττης εἰσὶ προσβολαί, τὰ δὲ συμβολαὶ τῶν χειλῶν; and argues to show that προσβολή may be used here in a sense wide enough to include the συμβολή τῶν χειλῶν, as well as the προσβολή τῆς γλώττης, of the De Partibus. This view, however, is open to more than one objection. (1) It is hard to see how, in the absence of some explanation in the context, προσβολή can stand for προσβολή γλώττης, or can be taken to include the notion of συμβολή χειλῶν. (2) Such a reference to the physiology of articulation would be out of place in the definition; the differences in the mechanism of articulation are a separate point, which Aristotle recognizes apparently for the first time in another section further on in the chapter (^b 31 ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασί τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις). I think that Valla was probably right in taking προσβολή in the sense of *additio* or *adiectio*, i. e. as equivalent to προσθήκη—the word actually used by Lucian in a very similar context to mark the distinction between the vowels and semivowels (Iud. Voc. 5, 88 R.). It may be observed, too, that προσβάλλειν and προστιθέναι are synonyms in Antiphanes fr. 206 Kock. The general

sense, then, according to this view of προσβολή, will be that the vowels are audible by themselves (ἄνευ προσβολῆς); whereas the semivowels and mutes (the consonants) require the support or addition of a vowel (μετὰ προσβολῆς) to make them audible. This was certainly the distinction in later grammar: Dionysius Thrax p. 11 Uhlig σύμφωνα δὲ λέγονται ὅτι αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν οὐκ ἔχει, συντασσόμενα δὲ μετὰ τῶν φωνηέντων φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ.—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. I. 102 ἄφωνα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ . . . μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συνεκφωνούμενα.—Diomedes 418 P. *mutae dictae quod per se sine adminiculo vocalium non possunt enuntiarī.*

ἡμίφωνον: Aristoxenus (quoted below).—Dionysius Thrax p. 12^b 27 Uhlig ἡμίφωνα δὲ λέγεται [ὅτι] παρόσον ἦττον τῶν φωνηέντων εὐφωνα καθέστηκεν ἔν τε τοῖς μυγμοῖς καὶ σιγμοῖς.—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. I. 102 ἡμίφωνα μὲν ὅσα δι' αὐτῶν ῥοῦζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τινα παραπλήσιον ἦχον κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν ἀποτελεῖν πεφυκότα.—Diomedes 416 P. *Semivocales dictae quod dimidium eius potestatis habent: etenim per se enuntiantur, sed per se nec syllabam nec plenam vocem faciunt.* Plato only knows the semivowels as τὰ μέσα (v. supra on 24).

ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν. Apart from the vowels the semivowels have some sort of sound as noises, not a distinctly audible voice-sound (φωνὴ ἀκουστή) like the vowels; this it is that distinguishes them from the mutes, which have no sound at all by themselves. Comp. Plato Theaet. 203 B τό τε σῆγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον ὄλον συριπτούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων.—Aristoxenus ap. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 72 R. τῶν μὴ φωνηέντων ἃ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ψόφους ὁποίους δὴ τινὰς ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκε, ῥοῦζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων ἦχον δηλωτικούς, ἃ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπάσης ἄμοιρα φωνῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ οὐχ οἷά τε ἠχέισθαι καθ' ἑαυτά· διὸ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν ἄφωνα τινες ἐκάλεσαν, θάτερα δὲ ἡμίφωνα.

ἄφωνον. In the definition μετὰ προσβολῆς serves to distinguish^b 28 the mute from the vowel; the idea of it, however, is repeated in a more explicit form in μετὰ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν. The expression τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν is wide enough to include the semivowels as well as the vowels. The semivowels are audible by themselves, though only as noises (comp. Plato Phileb. 18 c ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος); and a semivowel is sufficient to make a mute audible, though only as a noise—not as a φωνὴ ἀκουστή. Aristotle carefully chooses his words, therefore, in saying γινόμενον ἀκουστόν; since ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, 'with

1456^b 28 an audible voice-sound', would have been true only of the combination of a mute and a vowel.

^b 31 ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει. Of the five differences here noted the first and second relate to the physiological mechanism of speech; the remainder come under the head of προσφθία—a term which with the ancients included breathing and accent, as well as quantity (see on 25, 1461^a 22).

σχήμασιν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις. Plato (Tim. 75 D) is aware of the function of the teeth, lips, and tongue in the formation of speech, and has also described (Crat. 426 E) the various movements of the tongue in the utterance of certain letters (comp. Xenophon Mem. 1. 4, 12). From Alexander's comment on Metaph. N 6, 1093^a 23 (p. 883 Hayduck) we learn that these points in the physiology of speech had long before this engaged the attention of Archinus, the statesman to whom Athens owed the introduction of the Ionic alphabet in 403 (see Usener, Rh. Mus. 25 p. 591).

For the σχήματα τοῦ στόματος comp. De audib. 800^a 16 ἀναπνέομεν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀέρα πάντες τὸν αὐτόν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἐκπέμπομεν ἀλλοίως διὰ τὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀγγείων διαφορὰς . . . ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ τε ἀρτηρία [i. e. wind-pipe] καὶ ὁ πνεύμων καὶ τὸ στόμα. πλείστην μὲν οὖν διαφορὰν ἀπεργάζονται τῆς φωνῆς αἱ τε τοῦ ἀέρος πληγαὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ στόματος σχηματισμοί.

For the τόποι τοῦ στόματος as factors in articulation see more especially H. A. 4. 9, 535^a 28; De part. an. 2. 16, 660^a 1; 3. 1, 661^b 14; and Metaph. N 6, 1093^a 23 (with Alexander's note).

^b 32 δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι . . . καὶ τῷ μέσῳ. The καὶ τῷ μέσῳ in the next line belongs equally to each of the three pairs of opposites, and not merely to the last of them.

The meaning of δασύτης and ψιλότης in speech may be seen from De audib. 804^b 8 δασεῖαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φωνῶν ὅσαις ἔσωθεν τὸ πνεῦμα εὐθέως συνεκβάλλομεν μετὰ τῶν φθόγγων, ψιλὰ δ' εἰσὶ τοῦναντίον ὅσαι γίνονται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκβολῆς; and from Dion. Hal. 5 p. 85 R. ταῦτα [i. e. τὰ ψιλὰ] μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐαυτῶν δύναμιν ἔχει μόνην, τὰ δὲ δασέα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προσθήκην. ψιλός, 'without addition' (see on 1, 1447^a 29), means in this connexion 'without aspiration'. The threefold distinction in the text, as applied to the mutes, passed on to the grammarians, and became an accepted part of grammar (comp. Dion. Thrax, p. 12 τούτων [scil. τῶν ἀφώνων] ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, κ̄ π̄ τ̄, δασέα δὲ τρία, θ̄ φ̄ χ̄, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, β̄ γ̄ δ̄ μέσα δὲ εἶρηται ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστὶ δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασέων ψιλότερα, and Priscian 549 P.); and it still appears in our familiar

division of mutes into *aspiratae*, *mediae*, and *tenues*—where the 1456^b 32 *tenues* represent the ψιλὰ of the Greeks.¹

μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι. The intermediates (μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels *a*, *i*, *υ*: Dion. Thrax p. 10 τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων μακρὰ μὲν ἐστὶ δύο, ἡ καὶ ᾠ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, εἰ καὶ ὄ, δίχρονα δὲ τρία, ᾠ ἰ ὑ· δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συστέλλεται.—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 100 τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφορὰς· δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυγχάνειν, τὸ ἡ καὶ τὸ ᾠ, ἰσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τὸ εἰ καὶ τὸ ὄ, τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, ᾠ ἰ ὑ, ἅπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικὰ καλοῦσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὅτε μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὅτε δὲ συστέλλεσθαι (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R., and Aulus Gellius 16. 18. 5).

ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι. A third kind of difference is to be seen^b 33 in the differences of accent. Accent with Aristotle is a part of προσφδία (see on^b 31), but he has no special name for it; the word τόνος in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403^b 29 relates to the tone or key in which something may be said, and not, as is sometimes supposed (e.g. by Cope), to the syllabic accent in words. Aristotle's intermediate accent is clearly that conventionally indicated by a circumflex, as standing between the acute and grave, and having thus something of the nature of both. This was the received view of the phonetic value of the 'circumflex' in antiquity, though the names by which it was known referred to the form of the mark rather than the nature of the accent itself; comp. the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 531 Keil *Ammonius Alexandrius qui Aristarchi scholae successit ὀξύβαρην vocat, Ephorus autem Cymaeus περίσπασιν, Dionysius Olympius [read: Olynthius] δίτρονον, Hermocrates Iasius σύμπλεκτον, Epicharmus Syracusius κεκλασμένην; verum ea nunc ab omnibus περισπωμένη Graece vocatur, apud nos flexa, quoniam primo erecta rursus in gravem flectitur.* For further illustrations of the notion of the circumflex in antiquity see Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fragmenta p. 13, and Wilmanns, De Varronis libris grammaticis p. 187. It is to be observed that (like Plato Crat. 399 A) Aristotle ignores the circumflex in the passage in Soph. el. 23, 179^a 14 εἰ παρὰ προσφδίαν ὀξείαν [scil. ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ], ἢ βαρεῖα προσφδία λύσις,

¹ This technical use of *tenuis* may be traced back to Lascaris, who naturalized it among the moderns; but it is not easy to see how Lascaris came by it. He may possibly have remembered the language of the pseudo-Sergius 4 p. 526 Keil: *Crassitudo [i.e. δασύτης] in spiritu est . . . nam omnes voces au aspirando facimus pinguiores aut sine aspiratu pronuntiando tenuiores.*]

1456^b 33 εἰ δὲ παρὰ βαρεῖαν, ἢ ὀξεῖα, and speaks as though the only substantial difference in accent were that between acute and grave. His view of it in fact was probably very like that ascribed to the Peripatetic Athenodorus in the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 529 Keil *Athenodorus duas esse prosodias putavit, unam inferiorem, alteram superiorem; flexam autem (nam illa nostra lingua περισπωμένην vocamus) nihil aliud esse quam has duas in una syllaba.*

^b 34. [ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς: comp. infra ^b 38. The preposition has to be bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by Aristotle himself (comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753). He leaves the subject to the μετρικοί, just as he does in the parallel in *De part. an.* 2. 16, 660^a 7 ποίας δὲ ταῦτα [scil. τὰ γράμματα] καὶ πόσας καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν. The theory of metre, in its primitive form, took cognizance of many matters which we should relegate to grammar or phonology. It started, like grammar, with the στοιχεῖα or elementary sounds in language (Longinus Prol. in Hephaest. p. 142 Gaisf. τοῦ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος); and, as the passage in the *De Partibus* intimates (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R.), it dealt with the whole question of the number and nature of these elements.

συλλαβή. As here defined a συλλαβή is a combination of a mute and a 'letter with a sound', i. e. either a vowel or a semivowel (see on ^b 28), to make the mute audible. An instance of the first combination is BA (see *Metaph. Z* 17, 1041^b 13); of the second ΓΡ (comp. *Metaph. N* 6, 1093^a 22), where the Γ becomes audible at any rate as part of a complex 'noise'. In the further combination ΓΡΑ we have an articulate, as well as an audible, sound—a φωνὴ ἀκουστή, not a mere ἀκουστόν. Aristotle, however, does not stop to note the difference. The meaning given to συλλαβή in the Aristotelian definition is apparently the proper technical sense of the term: Dionysius Thrax p. 16 Uhlig συλλαβή ἐστὶ κυρίως σύλληψις συμφώνων μετὰ φωνήεντος ἢ φωνήεντων, οἷον κάρ, βοῦς· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς φωνήεντος, οἷον ᾠ, ἦ (see also Charisius 2 P., and Marius Victorinus 2470–5 P.). In ordinary speech, however, the term was often used to denote the units of sound or 'syllables' (as we say) into which a word, a foot, or a verse is divisible. Plato, for instance, speaks of ΣΩ as the 'first syllable' in *Socrates* (*Theaet.* 203 c), and of words as 'made up of syllables' (*Crat.* 424 E συλλαβὰς συντιθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται); words also like ἐῶ and ἦια etc. were said to

be disyllables, trisyllables, etc. Aristotle has lapsed into this use ^b 34 of the term even in the Poetics, in 21, 1458^a 2, where the *a* in Πηληιάδεω is regarded as a συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη (see note on the passage); and it is by no means uncommon in other Aristotelian writings; see Cat. 6, 4^b 33; De interpr. 4, 16^b 31; De gen. an. 1. 18, 722^a 32; Metaph. N 6, 1093^b 1; Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 31 (comp. Bon. Ind. 710^b 45; and for the general history of the term Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 126).

It is to be observed that Aristotle ignores the φωναὶ συνθεταὶ called diphthongs; for the ancient view of them see Blass, Aussprache³ p. 20.

φωνῆν ἔχοντας includes the semivowel as well as the vowel (see ^b 35 on ^b 28).

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α = τὸ γὰρ ΓΡ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ Α. ^b 36

τῆς μετρικῆς: see on ^b 34. As the foot is made up of syllables, ^b 38 the theory of the συλλαβὴ belonged to metre just as much as to grammar: Aristides Quintil. 1. 20, p. 28 Jahn ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς μετρικῆς ὁ περὶ στοιχείων λόγος, εἶθ' ὁ περὶ συλλαβῆς, εἶθ' ὁ περὶ ποδῶν, εἶθ' οὕτως ὁ περὶ μέτρων.—Longinus Prol. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf. τοῦ δὲ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέτρων ὄρου, ὡς Ἡλιόδωρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐφαιστίωνι κατακολουθήσομεν ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς ἀρξάμενοι. By τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς Aristotle probably meant not only the familiar distinction of syllables into long and short, but also the finer differences the ancient theory of rhythmic recognized in the times of syllables, when the time of the consonant or consonants in them is taken into account (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 1. 1 p. 300).

σύνδεσμος. The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the ἄρθρον) is confessedly corrupt. Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp. Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft² 1 p. 263); and Vahlen, besides bracketing ἡ φωνῆ—μέσου in 1457^a 8-10, has to assume two lacunas, one after συντίθεσθαι in 1457^a 2, and another after δηλοῖ in 1457^a 7.

At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are φωναὶ ἄσημοι, and others φωναὶ σημαντικαί; these latter being the nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The σύνδεσμοι and ἄρθρα, however, are said to be φωναὶ ἄσημοι; i. e. they convey no meaning when

1456^b 38 uttered by themselves. If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex *φωνή σημαντική*, called a *λόγος* a little further on in the chapter (1457^a 23). It is necessary, therefore, to go back to his idea of *λόγος*, and consider the various forms of *λόγοι* which he either recognizes or may be presumed to have recognized. *λόγος* in the present sense of the term has no exact English equivalent, though 'speech', 'discourse', or 'phrase' is sometimes conventionally made to stand for it. According to the definition in 1457^a 23 it is a significant combination of significant words, e. g. of two (or more) nouns, or verbs (including what Aristotle would call their *πτώσεις*), or of a verb and a noun, or of a noun and a verb. A *λόγος*, in Aristotle's sense of the term, does not necessarily involve predication. The instance he gives in 1457^a 25 of a non-predicative *λόγος* is a definition, that of 'man', e. g. *ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν*—where the combination of the three nouns is equivalent to 'man', and may replace it as one of the terms of a proposition. This form of *λόγος* is the *λόγος ὀνοματώδης* of *An. post.* 2. 10, 93^b 31. Under this same head we may include certain other forms of expression, e. g. *βαδίζει χαίρων* (a combination of two verbs), and *οἰκοῦσι νῆσον* (a verb + a noun). A more complex instance of the same type would be a combination like *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι*, where the terms are combined into one by the copulative, and *οἰκοῦσι περὶ δυσμάς*, where the terms are hyphenated together by the preposition¹ (comp. Hartung, *Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst* p. 284). The other form of *λόγος* is that which involves predication—the *λόγος ἀποφαντικός* of the *De Interpretatione* (4. 17^a 2 seqq.). If we may work out the hint in *De Interpretatione* 5, 17^a 20, we may divide the *λόγοι* of this description into two kinds, the simple and the composite, and take the example in 1457^a 28, *Κλέων βαδίζει*, as the type of the simple predicational *λόγος*. It is not so easy to find an Aristotelian instance of the composite predicational *λόγος*; but its nature is indicated in general terms in the passage in the *De Interpretatione*: it consists of two or more simple predicational *λόγοι* combined in some way or

¹ With the Stoic grammarians the prepositions were classed originally under the *σύνδεσμοι*, and afterwards distinguished from the others as *προθετικοὶ σύνδεσμοι*.

other into one single λόγος. How, then, and by means of what 1456^b 38 kinds of words is this combination effected? The De Interpretatione ignores this question. We may perhaps supply the omission, however, by reflecting for a moment on the structure of complex sentences and observing the different relations of the parts or members to the whole. In some instances the simple λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί are merely co-ordinated, and held together by copulative or similar conjunctions, as in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται, Κλέων μὲν βαδίζει Σωκράτης δὲ κάθηται, Κλέων βαδίζει ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης κάθηται (comp. συνδέσμων εἰς in 1457^a 30); in others they are subordinated to one another, and form a sort of organic whole knit into one by words which indicate relation and interdependence. This last point in the theory of the λόγος would have to be recognized in any grammatical analysis of the sentence and its construction. I venture to suggest that it may have been actually present in Aristotle's mind at the time of framing his definitions of σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:—

σύνδεσμος δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἣν μὴ ἀρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τίθεναι καθ' αὐτόν, οἷον μὲν, δὴ, τοί, δέ. ἣ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ ἐκ 5 πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν, (οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἣ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἣ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν], πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι 10 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου.

The words bracketed after συντίθεσθαι in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after τίθεσθαι in l. 9; and the clause ἣ φωνὴ—φωνῶν in ll. 8–9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of σύνδεσμος in l. 1 (comp. Düntzer, Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194). It will be seen also that the illustration οἷον τὸ ἀμφί—τὰ ἄλλα is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of σύνδεσμος—a view which has been anticipated by Hartung. Two kinds of σύνδεσμοι, then, are recognized in the text as amended. The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in a λόγος does not affect

1456^b 38 the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if Κλέων and βαδίζει are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition Κλέων βαδίζει is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a μέν, a δέ, a δή, or a τοί. Little words of this description are what the grammarians called 'expletives'. Though they stand at the beginning of the λόγος, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not *per se* (καθ' αὐτόν), but *per accidens*, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other λόγος before or after it. In contradistinction to these Aristotle recognizes a second species of σύνδεσμος (l. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the λόγος into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of λόγοι, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjunctions. Aristotle's σύνδεσμος, therefore, whatever else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjunction, and also certain particles. The sense of the word ἄρθρον is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of connexive required for a particular kind of λόγος. The kind of λόγος Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the ἄρθρον in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a λόγος may be assumed to be a composite proposition, and moreover one of a more complex form than that in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθεται and the like. The two constituent propositions in it are either intimately connected by being related in such a way that the one is the beginning and the other the end of the whole; or they are in some way divided or separated one from the other. With this we may compare the definition of the 'period' in Rhet. 3, 9, 1409^a 35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. As a conjectural interpretation of this statement it may be suggested (1) that the ἄρθρα which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjunctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjunctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives. The kinds of proposition which involve the use of such words as these are ignored in Aristotle's logical writings, but it seems to me that he may very well have had something to say of them in an analysis like that

in the present chapter of the forms and constituents of ordinary ^{1456^b 38} speech. I am not unaware of the lacunas that may be found in this interpretation of the Aristotelian *ἄρθρον*. It must be taken for what it is worth, and with many allowances, as an attempt to recover the rough draft of an all but lost chapter of early grammar. For a discussion of the textual and other difficulties in these two sections I may refer to Vahlen's *Beiträge*, 3 p. 229 and 306, and Schömann's *Animadversiones ad veterum grammaticorum doctrinam de articulo* (*Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V p. 5*).

Both *σύνδεσμος* and *ἄρθρον* were terms taken by grammar from anatomy (see on 7, 1450^b 34); the former is properly a 'ligament', and the latter a 'joint'. The language in the text as to the function of the *ἄρθρον* or joint-word, ἡ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος . . . δηλοῦ, recalls that in the passage in *De anima* 3. 10, 433^b 21, which describes the physical joint as the means of locomotion in the animal: τὸ δὲ κινεῖν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχὴ (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα (comp. *J. of Phil.* 17 p. 64). The joint-word in grammar, therefore, would naturally imply a more structural and organic connexion than is to be found when the *λόγοι* are simply strung together by *σύνδεσμοι*. I should add that the instances of *σύνδεσμοι* in *Rhet.* 3. 5, 1407^a 20 are *μὲν* and *δή*, together with *γάρ*, *τέ*, *καί*, and apparently *ἐπεὶ* [*? ἔτι*]; and that a distinction not unlike that in the text between the two kinds of *σύνδεσμοι* is implied in *Probl.* 16. 20, 919^a 22 ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐνίων ἐξαιρεθέντων συνδέσμων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος Ἑλληνικός, οἷον τὸ τέ καὶ τὸ καί, ἐνιοὶ δὲ οὐθὲν λυποῦσι διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι πολλάκις, εἰ ἔσται λόγος, τοῖς δὲ μή.

κωλύει, scil. ποιεῖσθαι.

φωνῶν: i.e. φωνῶν σηματικῶν.

1457^a 1

^a 2

λόγου. The term is explained in ^a 23. Aristotle is using it ^a 3 without explanation, as though it were a familiar and well-understood word. Just before this (in ^a 1) he employed the periphrasis *φωνῆ μία σηματική* in lieu of it.

καθ' αὐτόν is to be taken with *λόγου* (comp. *Top.* 8. 11, 161^b 19). The *λόγος* as such is tacitly distinguished from the *λόγος* as brought into relation with some other *λόγος* by the insertion of a word which is no integral part of it *per se*. καθ' αὐτό is the opposite of *πρὸς ἕτερον* or *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (*Bon. Ind.* 212^a 3).

διορισμός seems to mean here 'separation' or 'disjunction', a ^a 7

1457^a 7. metaphorical extension of the sense it has in the *De Partibus*: 3. 10, 672^b 14 τοῦ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἐστὶ (scil. τὸ διάζωμα) τοῦ τε περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν τόπου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν.

^a 9 πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου does not necessarily mean any more than this, that some of the ἄρθρα have one and others another of these three possible places in the complex form of λόγος. πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι implies that the rule is general and not always observed in practice.

^a 10 ὄνομα. In this definition συνθετή differentiates the ὄνομα from the στοιχεῖον, σημαντική from the ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος, ἄνευ χρόνου from the ῥήμα, and what remains (ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν κτέ.) from the λόγος. In a λόγος (e. g. ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν, or Κλέων βαδίζει) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an ὄνομα, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter; Θεόδωρος for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift: *De interpr.* 2, 16^a 19 ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνῆ σημαντική κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος.

The general term ὄνομα must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the ἄρθρα. A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an ὄνομα, as it is for instance in 21, 1457^b 25; 22, 1458^b 20; 25, 1461^a 31; comp. *De interpr.* 3, 16^b 19 αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα ὀνόματά ἐστι [scil. τὰ ῥήματα] καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἴσθησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν), ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ οὕτω σημαίνει. It is a ῥήμα proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.

^a 12 οὐ χρώμεθα: comp. 21, 1457^a 33 πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος. The construction in the clause may be seen from Vahlen's paraphrase, ἐν τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἠγοούμενοι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαίνειν. The participial ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαῖνον is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448^a 37 and 26, 1462^a 10.

^a 13 τῷ Θεοδώρῳ: i. e. 'the word Θεόδωρος'; comp. infra^a 28 ὁ Κλέων, 'the word Κλέων'.—Plato *Crat.* 392 D τὸν Ἀστυνάκτα, 'the name Astyanax'; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on Cicero *De Oratore* 2, 193. In the *De interpr.* we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative, ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος.

τὸ δῶρον: i.e. the word δῶρον implied in Θεόδωρος. As the 1457^a 13 parallel in the De interpr. is ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, it has been proposed to restore here τὸ δῶρος for τὸ δῶρον. The two cases, however, as Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since δῶρος does not exist as a separate word, as ἵππος does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning (οὐ σημαίνει).

ῥῆμα: De interpr. 3, 16^b 6 ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, ^a 14 οὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς, καὶ ἔστιν αἰετῶν καθ' ἑτέρον λεγομένων σημείων. λέγω δ' ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα· προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν . . . 16 τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ῥήματος· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέριξ. In this passage (though not in De interpr. 10, 19^b 13) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as πτώσεις, the verb in the logical theory of predication being always in the present (comp. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like Κλέων or Κορίσκος is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With Plato, it may be observed, the ῥῆμα includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v. Crat. 399 A).

προσσημαίνει. Boethius, In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser, ^a 17 translates this by *consignificat*, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word συσσημαίνεν.

πτῶσις, as a term of grammar, has not yet acquired the special ^a 18 sense of 'case' which it has in the grammarians; and there is no equivalent for it in our modern terminology. We may perhaps translate it by 'modification' or 'mode'. Given a word, a noun or a verb, with a certain meaning, a πτώσις of it embodies that meaning with some secondary idea superadded. It does not necessarily involve a difference of form; βαδίζει; as a question, is a πτώσις of the affirmative βαδίζει, 'he walks', and δῶρον as an accusative a πτώσις of δῶρον as a nominative. In most instances, however, a πτώσις is distinguished from the original noun or verb by some difference of form, e.g. by a difference of termination. Under the general head of πτώσεις Aristotle includes the following species of words:— (1) the oblique cases of all nouns, as compared with the nominative, e.g. Φίλωνος etc. from Φίλων (De interpr. 2, 16^a 33). (2) The nominative also of common nouns; it is a πτώσις through the idea of number which it suggests: thus ἄνθρωπος is 'a man', and

1457^a 18 ἄνθρωποι 'several men'. (3) The forms involving a distinction of gender, e.g. οὗτος, αὕτη, τοῦτο and the like (Soph. el. 14, 173^b 27). (4) The paronymous adjectives, e.g. χαλκοῦς from χαλκός (Rhet. 3. 9, 1410^a 32), ἀνδρείος as compared with the substantive ἀνδρία (Rhet. 1. 7, 1364^b 36; Cat. 1, 1^a 14). (5) The comparatives and superlatives as compared with the positive adjectives, e.g. βέλτιστος from ἀγαθός (Top. 5. 7, 136^b 30). (6) The adverbs as compared with the corresponding adjectives, e.g. δικαίως from δίκαιος (Top. 1. 15, 106^b 29; 5. 7, 136^b 15). (7) The past and future tenses of the verb (De interpr. 3, 16^b 16); and presumably also the forms embodying distinctions of person, number, voice, etc. To these must be added (8) τὰ ὑποκριτικά, the modifications of sense words may acquire through differences in the mode of enunciation. This synopsis of the different uses of the term in Aristotle may be sufficient to show that πτώσις with him is a logical rather than a philological conception, and that it is only in certain of its applications that it corresponds to our declension or inflexion or derivation. It is the sense rather than the word itself that is conceived as derivative; a πτώσις takes its meaning, i.e. the fundamental part of it, from the primary word; and the idea of this latter is involved in any explanation we give of the πτώσις; Φίλωνος for instance means 'of Φίλων', and γραμματικός means 'possessing γραμματική'—both being accordingly πτώσεις, the one of Φίλων and the other of γραμματική. With Aristotle's use of πτώσις we may compare Varro's equally heterogeneous instances of 'declinatio': *a Terentius Terenti, ab equo equiso, ab homine homunculus, a mamma mammosae, a prudentia prudens, a pugnando et currendo pugiles et cursores* (L. L. 8, 14).

^a 21 ἄνθρωπος: Phys. 3. 7, 207^b 8 ἄνθρωπος εἰς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ πολλοί.

τὰ ὑποκριτικά: see on 19, 1456^b 10.

^a 22 ἐπίταξιν: see on 19, 1456^b 16.

βάδιζε: to be read as βάδιζε!, i.e. as a dictatorial imperative.

^a 23 λόγος. The definition is framed to distinguish a λόγος from an ὄνομα; see above on ^a 10, and comp. De interpr. 4, 16^b 26 λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κειχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἐστίν ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, εἴαν τι προστεθῆ. The clause ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all λόγοι; the σύνδεσμοι

and ἄρθρα are φωναὶ ἄσημοι. For the meaning of λόγος and the 1457^a 23 various forms of λόγοι see on 20, 1456^b 38 (also Bon. Ind. 433^b 48).

οὐ γὰρ ἅπας, κτέ. An indirect reproof, perhaps, to Plato, who ^a 24 seems to speak as though a λόγος were always in the form of a proposition: Soph. 262 A οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.

ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρισμός: e.g. ζῶον περὶ δῖπον (Top. I. 7, ^a 26 103^a 27) or ζῶον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (Top. 5. 2, 130^b 8).

ἐνδέχεται ἅνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. This is the λόγος ὀνοματώδης of An. post. 2. 10, 93^b 31—a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp. De interpr. 11, 21^a 29). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what Aristotle calls a definition (comp. Metaph. Z 4, 1030^a 14).

εἰς δὲ ἔστι λόγος διχῶς. That a λόγος, in spite of its composite ^a 28 nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in ^a 23 λόγος δὲ φωνῆ συνθετὴ κτέ. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of λόγοι. A definition (a λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing (ἐν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e.g. Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp. De interpr. 5, 17^a 16 ὁ ἐν δηλῶν λόγος), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The Iliad is an extreme instance of such a λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of λόγοι, is more than once noticed by Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms: De interpr. 5, 17^a 8 ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος [? πρῶτως] λόγος ἀποφαντικός κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί] πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἰς . . . ἔστι δὲ εἰς λόγος ἀποφαντικός ἢ ὁ ἐν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἰς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἐν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι.—An. post. 2. 10, 93^b 35 λόγος δ' εἰς ἔστι διχῶς, ὁ μὲν συνδέσμῳ, ὡσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἐν καθ' ἐν δηλοῦν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—Metaph. H 6, 1045^a 12 ὁ δ' ὀρισμός λόγος ἔστιν εἰς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνός εἶναι (comp. also Metaph. Z 4, 1030^b 9).

1457^a 29 ἐκ πλειόνων, scil. λόγων.

^a 31 ἀπλοῦν . . . διπλοῦν: see 20, 1457^a 12, and De interpr. 2, 16^a 19 (quoted above on 20, 1457^a 10). In the De Interpretatione (2, 16^a 23) the general term for a compound is *συμπελεγμένον ὄνομα*.

The Rhetoric has more than one reference to this chapter on the species of names: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 36 οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἴας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.—3. 2, 1404^b 5 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τᾶλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.—^b 26 ὄντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τσαυτ' ἐχόντων εἶδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ χρηστέον . . . τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγον λέξιν.

^a 33 ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου. Aristotle is probably thinking here of words like *ἀμφιλογος*, *περιβλέπειν*, *σύνδικος*, *ὑποπτος*, etc., compounded of a noun or verb (or a πτώσις of the same) and a preposition, which is in his classification a *φωνῆ ἀσημος*.

^a 35 *μεγαλειωτῶν* is all but identical with the reading in A^c, *μεγαλιωτῶν*, and simpler than Tyrwhitt's *μεγαλείων* ὡς or Vahlen's *μεγαλείων ὄν*. A *μεγαλειωτὸν ὄνομα* would be a name that has been 'made grand', an exaggerated or amplified name. Though a verb *μεγαλειοῦν* is not found in extant literature, it is a legitimate derivative from *μεγαλείος*, which is sometimes used of words (e. g. in Xenophon Mem. 2. 1. 34); and it is presupposed in the LXX. word *μεγαλείωμα*. After *μεγαλειωτῶν* we may supply *οἶον* = e. g. For similar instances of the omission of *οἶον* see 25, 1461^a 26; An. pr. 1. 4, 26^a 8; De gen. et corr. 2. 5, 332^b 14; Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133^a 7; Rhet. 3. 5, 1407^a 38; 3. 6, 1408^a 6 (etc.).

In lieu of *μεγαλιωτῶν* (or *μεγαλειωτῶν*) the Arabic version is said to imply *Μασσαλιωτῶν*—a reading which has met with the approval of Diels (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsber. 1888 p. 53) as well as others. An expression like τὰ πολλὰ τῶν *Μασσαλιωτῶν*, however, is certainly not free from difficulty. The general view seems to be that it is practically equivalent to τὰ πολλὰ τῶν *Μασσαλιωτικῶν*; so that Aristotle is to be credited with the statement that the majority (τὰ πολλὰ) of the proper or other names in use at Massilia were of the abnormal type described in the text. There is, as far as I know, no hint of anything of the kind in any ancient writer; and it is to my thinking too im-

probable to be believed without very distinct evidence. The recent 1457^a 35 translators, who accept the new reading, must have felt the difficulty, as they tone down the expression by a free rendering of τὰ πολλά, making the clause mean either 'like so many Massilian expressions' (Butcher), or 'wie jene massaliotischen Namen' (Gomperz). It has to be remembered also that it was hardly necessary for Aristotle to go as far as Marseilles for instances of such names. They were certainly not unknown in Athens (Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen 2 p. 29); and to judge from their appearance in Plautus, they must have been common enough in the later Attic Comedy.

Ἑρμοκαϊκόξανθος: a compound of three river-names, Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus (comp. Dindorf in HSt. s.v., and Letronne, Étude des noms propres grecs p. 62). After this the Greek text must have lost something, as the Arabic version, as translated by Margoliouth, renders the passage by *Ermocaicon Xanthus qui supplicabatur Dominum caelorum (or Iovem)*, which Diels supposes to represent an hexameter line, Ἑρμοκαϊκόξανθος, ἐπευξάμενος Διὶ πατρί. I hesitate to adopt this very attractive conjecture, though it has been accepted by both Butcher and Gomperz, because the context seems to me to suggest rather a second instance of the same kind of word, a τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα of some sort. Some such compound as ἐπευξιθεῶναξ, if one may venture to invent the word, would represent the general sense of the Arabic. As these abnormal compounds were characteristic of the Dithyramb (see on 22, 1459^a 9), and not uncommon in Comedy, it is difficult to see why Aristotle should have had recourse to what would seem to be an epic or a mock epic for an instance of a τριπλοῦν ὄνομα.

ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομα κτέ. The present survey of the vocabulary of^b 1 poetry may be compared with that in Isocrates 190 D τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλὰ δέδονται κόσμοι· καὶ γὰρ . . . οἷόν τ' αὐτοῖς . . . δηλώσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν.

κύριον. The κύριον ὄνομα is the established and familiar term for a thing, as distinct from the γλῶττα, the μεταφορά and the other ξενικὰ ὀνόματα (see on 22, 1458^a 22). In actual usage, however, the κύριον ὄνομα is more especially opposed to the metaphor. As the metaphor is an ἀλλότριον ὄνομα (infra^b 7), the κύριον ὄνομα is much the same thing as the οἰκείον or 'proper' name for the thing; comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον [= i. e. τὸ

1457^{b 1} οἰκεῖον] καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. Hence it is that in Latin *proprie* often represents the *κυρίως*, and *propria nomina* the *κύρια ὀνόματα* of Greek writers. Horace has an attempt at a more literal translation of the latter term in A. P. 234 *Non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum verbaque, Pisones, satyrorum scriptor amabo*. In Isocrates 190 D-E the designation for the words in common use, in contradistinction to those belonging more especially to poetry, is τὰ τεταγμένα or τὰ πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα.

^{b 2} κόσμος. The term reappears in 22, 1458^{a 33}. As Aristotle's explanation is lost (see on ^{b 33}), the technical sense to be attached to it is a matter of conjecture. In Isocrates 190 D (see above on ^{b 1}) the metaphor, the strange word, and the coined word are grouped together under the general head of *κόσμοι*; and Aristotle himself in the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404^{b 5} and 1405^{a 14}) uses the verb *κοσμεῖν* in an equally wide sense, to denote the embellishment of style by means of metaphor and other unusual forms of expression. In the present passage, however, it is clear that the term *κόσμος* must have a special meaning, since instead of including the *γλῶττα*, the *μεταφορά*, etc., it is expressly distinguished and made to stand apart from them. The only positive hint we have in the Poetics of the sense of the term is in 22, 1459^{a 11}, where it is said to be allowable not only in epic poetry, but also in oratory and in the iambic parts of Tragedy: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμείσθαι ταῦτα ἀρμόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρῆσταιτο· ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος. Aristotle is generally supposed to be referring to the *epitheton ornans*; in support of which interpretation Tyrwhitt and others point to the use of *κόσμος* in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408^{a 13} μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμωδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἶπειεν ἂν πότνια συκῆ. This passage in the Rhetoric, however, does not justify this view. *πότνια* is regarded there as a *κόσμος*, not because it is a certain kind of epithet, but because it is a *γλῶττα* (v. on ^{b 4}), and therefore one of the unusual words which according to the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404^{b 5}) serve to embellish the style. An *epitheton ornans* need not be of this kind; in *γάλα λευκόν*, for instance, the epithet is a *κύριον ὄνομα*. As the *κόσμος*, according to the classification in the text, is a special kind of word, distinguished from the *κύριον ὄνομα* on the one side and the *γλῶττα*, *μεταφορά*, etc., on the other, we may perhaps suppose it to be the ornamental synonym, a word,

for example, like Πηλείδης for Achilles, Ἡφαιστος for fire, ὄλεθρος 1457^b 2 for one who causes destruction—the kind of word which in the ancient classification of tropes came under the heads of synecdoche, antonomasia, and metonymia (comp. Volkmann, Rhetorik der Gr. u. Röm.² p. 421-5). If Aristotle's κόσμος does not include such synonyms, he has ignored what he elsewhere (Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 39) knows to be an important element in the poetic vocabulary. Cicero De Oratore 3. 167 distinguishes between the 'coined' word, *factum verbum* (Aristotle's πεποιημένον ὄνομα), the 'transferred' word, *translatum verbum* (i. e. μεταφορά), and the 'ornamental equivalent', *ornandi causa proprium proprio commutatum*; this last being apparently identical with the κόσμος of the Poetics. We must not forget that Aristotle recognizes some words as being more beautiful than others: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^b 6 καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν [scil. δεῖ μεταφέρειν]. κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν, ὥσπερ Δικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ [i. e. either in its sound or in its associations], καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως—with which we may compare the definition of Theophrastus (ap. Demetr. De eloc. 173), κάλλος ὀνόματος ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ δὴ ἢ τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐντιμον (v. Rabe, De Theophrasti libris περὶ λέξεως p. 44). It would be strange if this very obvious artifice of poetical expression were overlooked by Aristotle in a book like the Poetics.

γλῶτταν. The term is sufficiently general to include foreign,^b 4 dialectical, and also obsolete words—all words (or senses) in fact which require explanation, because outside the limits of ordinary Attic Greek (comp. Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 33 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν [i. e. the tragedians] ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν). For instances in the Poetics see 22, 1458^b 21 and 25, 1461^a 10; others are to be found in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^a 7, where the use of γλῶτται in prose is said to be a frigid affectation: μία δὲ [scil. αἰτία ψυχρότητος] τὸ χρῆσθαι γλῶτταις, οἷον Δυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σίννις ἀνὴρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀπασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον.

μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ: De caelo 1. 3, 269^b 26 ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶν τὸ^b 5 φερόμενον ἢ κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ κουφότῳ ἔχειν ἢ βάρος ἢ ἄμφω, μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ δέ.

σίγνον. The gloss in Hesychius is σίγνοι τὰ ξυστὰ δόρατα, ἢ^b 6 τοὺς ὀλοσιδήρους ἄκοντας (comp. Schol. Plat. Amat. p. 87 R. and Apoll. Rh. 2. 99). The word exists in a variety of forms (HSt. s. v. σιβύνη). That it belonged to the Cyprian dialect is said also

1457^b 6 by Herodotus 5. 9 *σιγύννας δ' ὧν καλέουσι Λίγνες . . . τοὺς καπήλους, Κύπριοι δὲ τὰ δόρατα*, and by Schol. Apoll. Rh. 2. 99 *σιγύννουσ δὲ καλοῦσιν οἱ Κύπριοι τὰ ἀκόντια*. I suspect we should restore *σίγυνος* in the present passage, as there seems to be no trace elsewhere of a neuter form. Herwerden also (Lex. gr. suppl.) tacitly assumes *σίγυννος* as the nominative in Aristotle.

μεταφορά. *μεταφέρειν*, said of a word, means to transfer it from its proper object to another more or less like that (v. 22, 1459^a 8 and Bon. Ind. 462^a 1). The substantive *μεταφορά* has two meanings, (1) the abstract sense of transference (e. g. in the present passage, and infra^b 30), and (2) the concrete sense of the word in its transferred or metaphorical application (e. g. supra^b 1; 22, 1458^a 22, 25, 33, etc.).

Metaphor, according to Aristotle, consists in transferring a word from the object to which it is appropriate to another kind of object more or less like it; comp. 22, 1459^a 8, and Top. 6. 2, 140^a 9 *ἡ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ πως γινώριμον τὸ σημαϊνόμενον διὰ τὴν ὁμοίότητα· πάντες γὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατὰ τινα ὁμοίότητα μεταφέρουσιν*. Four kinds of similarity are noted in the text, that between genus and species, that between species and genus, that between species and species, and that between a thing and its analogue—where there is a similarity of relations. The present classification of metaphors is assumed in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 3 and 3. 10, 1410^b 36.

^b 9 λέγω δέ, scil. ἐπιφοράν, ἢ μεταφοράν.

^b 10 νηὺς κτέ.: Od. 1, 185 and 24, 308.

^b 11 ἐστάναι τι: comp. infra^b 16 ἀφελεῖν τι. In the present passage, however, the indefinite τι is the subject of the infinitive, in the same way for instance as in Phys. 5. 1, 224^a 23 τῷ τούτου τι μεταβάλλειν (intr.), and in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^a 12, 13. It is just as much the subject as τούτο is in Eth. N. 3. 7, 1114^b 11 τὸ καλῶς τούτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφύια. Compare also Metaph. Θ 4, 1047^b 13 τὸ γὰρ σε ἐστάναι νῦν ψεύδος μὲν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ. The traditional rendering of ἐστάναι τι is 'a kind of standing' (*stare aliquod*, or *stare quoddam* in the old versions), but it has not the sanction of Tyrwhitt and Hermann, who translate ἐστάναι τι simply by *stare*; which shows that they were not insensible to the grammatical objection against making the τι qualify an infinitive. See infra on^b 16 (ἀφελεῖν τι).

ἢ δὴ μυρὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς κτέ.: Il. 2, 272.

^b 13 ἀπ' εἶδους: Rhet. 3. 11, 1413^a 14 καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ' εἶδους ἐπ' εἶδος εἰσιν· οἷον ἂν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγά-

γῆται εἶτα βλαβῆ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος φησι τὸν λαγῶ. ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ 1457^b 13 εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν. See Rhet. 3. 10, 1410^b 14 and 11, 1411^b 26 for other instances of this description.

The two quotations in the text, which have been supposed to be fragments either of some epic poet (Kinkel, EGF. p. 72) or of a parodist (Brandt, Parod. gr. rel. p. 112), were probably both of them from the Καθαρμοί of Empedocles. The second, *τεμῶν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ*, is, as Vahlen has pointed out, identical with part of the Empedoclean line (fr. 143 Diels), preserved by Theo Smyrnaeus: Arithm. p. 20 Gelder (=p. 15 Hiller) ἡ τῶν πολιτικῶν [Πλατωνικῶν Hiller] λόγων παράδοσις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχει καθαρμόν τινα . . . ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κρηνάων ἄπο πέντ' ἀνιμῶντά φησιν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ δεῖν ἀπορρύπτεσθαι, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἀπὸ πέντε μαθημάτων δεῖν φησι ποιῆσθαι τὴν κάθαρσιν. The exact form of the verse of Empedocles is perhaps irrecoverable, but it is not difficult to see that Theo's ἀνιμῶντα is a prosaic substitute for the *τεμῶν* preserved by Aristotle (comp. Diels, Hermes 15, 173). ἀτειρήs—a favourite epithet with Empedocles (v. Diels, Index p. 232)—is a reminiscence of Homer. The same may be said also of *χαλκός*, if it meant, as it probably did in Empedocles (v. Bullialdus ad loc. p. 128 ed. Gelder), a brazen urn, such as was used in certain rites. Aristotle elsewhere refers to Empedocles in a way which implies that his poems might be assumed to be familiar to every one (v. on ^b 24). As he regards him as a master of metaphor (μεταφορικὸς fr. 70; see on 1, 1447^b 18), there is a special propriety in his quoting instances of metaphor from the writings of Empedocles.

ἀφελῆν τι. The recent interpreters seem to agree in supposing ^b 16 this to mean 'a kind of removing' (*auferre aliquod* in Lat.), though a very different view was taken of it by Victorius, Heinsius, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, Hermann, and Ritter, who represent it by *auferre aliquid* or *auferre quiddam*. The now usual rendering implies that the infinitive is treated as an ordinary substantive, with the indefinite pronoun attached to it in the same way as in ἡδονή τις, γένεσις τις, and the like. There is no recorded instance of this construction in classical Greek. In the parallels in the Sophistici Elenchi (22, 178^a 12 sqq.) the *τι* in ποιεῖν τι, πάσχειν τι, and αἰσθάνεσθαί τι is assuredly (as Pacius saw) the object after these verbs. Aristotle's assumption is that a generic may be supplanted by a specific term, when it comes to be applied to a special kind of object. Thus ἐστάναι, said of a ship, is

1457^b 16 supplanted by ὀρμεῖν, and ἀφελεῖν, said of water, by ἀρύσαι. If he had had the instance cited in ^b 27 before him here, he might very well have said τὸ σπεῖρειν ἀφιέναι τί ἐστι—where the *τι* would have represented the accusative, τὸν καρπὸν, of the later passage.

τῷ δὲ ἀνάλογον (comp. Metaph. I 4, 1070^b 17) replaces the κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον in ^b 9, ἐπιφορὰν being again understood. Analogy or proportion is thus defined in Eth. N. 5. 5. 1131^a 31, ἡ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. In the statement in the text the general form of analogy, B : A :: D : C, is illustrated by an example:—φιάλη (B) : Διόνυσος (A) :: ἀσπίς (D) : *Ἄρης (C). Metaphor consists in giving the φιάλη (B) the name belonging to its analogue (D), viz. ἀσπίς, or vice versa. This transference of a name, as Aristotle proceeds to tell us (καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν, ^b 19), is sometimes softened by an explanatory addition to the word in its new application. The addition may be either (1) positive or (2) negative. Thus instead of simply speaking of the shield (D) as a cup (B), we may (1) add the term to which the shield is properly related (C), i. e. Ares, and thus call the shield the ‘cup of Ares’ (B + C); or (2) we may add a negative epithet, to show that the word is used in a non-natural sense, and describe the shield as ‘a cup that holds no wine’ (φιάλη ἄουος). A string of metaphors from analogy is quoted in Rhet. 3. 10, 1410^b 36 τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἕαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλῃ κτέ. The use of such metaphors, as serving for instance to give life to a description of things inanimate, is considered at length in Rhet. 3. 11; comp. esp. 3. 11, 1411^b 32 ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμῆ οἶον ἐν τοῖσδε, “αὐτίς ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδεται λᾶας ἀναιδῆς”, καὶ “ἔπτατ’ οἰστός”, . . . καὶ “αἰχμητὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσοντο μαιμώωσα”. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμφυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον.

^b 18 ἐρεῖ: comp. infra ^b 21, 23, and εἶρηκεν and λέγει in the context (^b 15, 20). The subject, if one must be supplied, is ‘the poet’, just as in the parallels in the Topics it would be ‘the disputant’.

^b 19 προστιθέασιν. Instead of the metaphor pure and simple, i. e. ‘cup’ for shield, they add on to it the term to which the proper word (i. e. shield) supplanted by the metaphor (i. e. cup), is relative. The shield being relative to Ares, the metaphor may be softened

by describing it as 'the cup of *Ares*'. In the Greek here *ἀνθ' οὗ* 1457^b 19 λέγει = τὸ ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει τὴν μεταφοράν, 'the original term supplanted by the metaphor'; and it has to be taken as the subject of the *ἔστι* in *πρὸς ὃ ἔστι*; the clause, therefore, might have been thus given: *προστιθέασιν τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἔστι τὸ ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει τὴν μεταφοράν*; comp. Castelvetro's rendering (in his Basel edition), 'aggiungono la cosa a che ha riguardo quello, in iscambio di che dice'; and Tyrwhitt's, 'adjiciunt illud, ad quod relativum est id, pro quo translatum dicit.' The distinction here described, between the metaphor with a qualifying addition (positive or negative) and the metaphor without it, is recognized in *Rhet.* 3. 11, 1412^b 32 αἱ εἰκόνες . . . τρόπον τινα μεταφοραί· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὡσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά· οἶον ἡ ἀσπίς, φαμέν, ἔστι φιάλη **Αρεως* καὶ (τὸ) τόξον φόρμιγγε ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δ' εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἀπλοῦν. For the singular λέγει v. supra on ἐρεῖ, 118. For the difference of number in *προστιθέασιν* comp. 4, 1448^b 17; 26, 1461^b 30; *Eth. N.* 5. 8, 1132^b 34 ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει (see Vahlen on 26, 1461^b 30, and Kühner, *Gr. Gr.*³ 2, 1 p. 87).

ἐρεῖ τοίνυν κτέ.: *Rhet.* 3. 4, 1407^a 14 (Roemer) αἰεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν^b 21 μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναί καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα [καὶ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οἶον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπίς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην **Αρεως*. φιάλη **Αρεως* was the bold metaphor of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus (fr. 16 Bergk=22 Wilamowitz). The idea was doubtless suggested by the similarity of shape between a shield and the φιάλη which Dionysus sometimes had in his hand in ancient art.

ἢ ὡσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλής. The actual words of Empedocles, which^b 24 Aristotle supposes us to know, are not to be found among his extant fragments; all that can be said of them is that they must have been something like γῆρας ἡμέρας but different from that in point of phraseology. The metaphor in *Emped.* 20. 5 Diels, *περὶ ῥηγγῶν βίου*, is not sufficiently like this to be what Aristotle had in mind. This allusive way of referring to something supposed to be known to the reader is not uncommon in Aristotle; see 17, 1455^b 9 (εἶθ' ὡς *Εὐριπίδης*), 25, 1460^b 36 (ἔτυχεν ὡσπερ *Ξενοφάνει*); comp. *Metaph.* Γ 5, 1010^a 5 οὕτω γὰρ ἀρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὡσπερ *Ἐπίχαρμος* εἰς *Ξενοφάνην*.

ἔσπεραν βίου: Alexis fr. 228 Kock ἥδη γὰρ ὁ βίος οὐμὸς ἔσπεραν ἀγει.

1457^b 25 **δυσμας βίου**: Plato *Laws* 6, 770 A ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου.

ὄνομα κείμενον, an existing or established name, as in *Top.* 6. 2, 140^a 3 ἐπι εἰ μὴ κειμένους ὀνόμασι χρῆται, οἷον Πλάτων ὀφρυόσκιον τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἢ τὸ φαλάγγιον σηψιδακές, ἢ τὸν μυελὸν ὄστεογενές· πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφές τὸ μὴ εἰωθός; comp. also *Top.* 2. 1, 109^a 28 εἰσὶ διτταί [scil. καὶ ἀμαρτίαι], ἢ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ τῷ παραβαίνειν τὴν κειμένην λέξιν . . . οἱ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ὀνόμασι τὰ πράγματα προσαγορεύοντες, οἷον τὴν πλάτανον ἄνθρωπον, παραβαίνουσι τὴν κειμένην ὀνομασίαν (comp. *Bon. Ind.* 380^b 31).

Metaphor is often a way of supplying the deficiencies of ordinary language (*Meteor.* 4. 3, 380^a 18, ^b 28; *Rhet.* 3. 2, 1405^a 36; *Quintilian* 8. 6, 5, 18). In the present passage Aristotle reminds us that, if one of the terms in an analogy has no special name of its own, it may still be described in just the same way as in the preceding instances (ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται), i. e. by a metaphor softened or explained by the mention of that to which the nameless thing or act is relative. Thus the sowing (B) of seed (A) on the part of the husbandman is analogous to the scattering (D) abroad of light or flame (C) on the part of the sun. This act of the sun has no special name; but we may metaphorically call it 'sowing' (B), and then qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the act (D) itself is relative, viz. 'flame' (C), and speak of the sun as 'sowing flame'—σπείρων φλόγα (B+C). σπείρων φλόγα is a qualified metaphor on exactly the same lines as φιάλη Ἄρεως (see on ^b 16); the only difference is that in the one case there is an ὄνομα κείμενον for the thing meant (viz. ἀσπίς), whereas in the other such a name does not exist in actual language.

^b 27 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον: for the preposition, comp. *Pol.* 3. 1, 1275^a 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. Aristotle's use of ἀνώνυμος has been already considered (on 1, 1447^b 9).

^b 28 πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον. Aristotle, unconsciously passing from one sense of ἥλιος to another, is now using it as the prosaic equivalent for the word φλόξ in the poetical quotation in the next line, i. e. in the sense of sunshine or sunlight, the meaning ἥλιος has in *Herodotus* 8. 23 ἅμα ἥλιῳ σκιδναμένῳ πᾶσα ἡ στρατιὴ ἐπέπλεε ἀλῆς ἐπὶ τὸ Ἄρτεμισιον, and in several well-known expressions.

^b 29 πρὸς τὸν καρπὸν. Castelvetro's πρὸς τὸν <ἀφιέντα τὸν> καρπὸν, which has been accepted by several editors, rests on the assumption that the analogy in Aristotle's mind was simply that between sowing (B) on the part of the husbandman (A), and the nameless

act, the emission of light (D), on the part of the sun (C). In 1457^b 29 that case the epithet *θεοκτίσταν* in the quotation must be taken to represent the addition required to soften the metaphor.

διὸ εἴρηται: comp. *ὄθεν πεποιήται* and *ὄθεν εἴρηται* in 25, 1461^a 28, 29. Quotations similarly introduced will be found in Rhet. 2. 9, 1387^a 33, and in 2. 10, 1388^a 7, 15. That in the text was perhaps from a tragedy (Nauck, TGF.² p. 856).

ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ κτέ.: see above on ^b 16.

προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον, scil. *ὄνομα*, as in Pol. 4. 7, 1293^a 39 *πέμπτη δ' ἐστίν* [scil. *πολιτεία*] *ἢ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν*. The more usual construction in Aristotle is *προσαγορεύειν ὀνόματι*. In saying *προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι* he seems to have fallen into a false antithesis. *φιάλη*, in the illustration, is *ἀλλότριον* in relation to the shield, and *ἄοινος* negatives something *οἰκείον* in relation to a cup. Words like *ἄοινος* come under the general designation of *στερήσεις* (Bon. Ind. 699^b 42). The free use of them in the metaphors of poetry is noted in Rhet. 3. 6, 1408^a 6 *ὄθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσι, τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν. εὐδοκιμῆ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλυρον*. The instance in Rhet. 3. 11, 1413^a 1 is *φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος*, a way of describing a bow.

πεποιημένον. A *πεποιημένον ὄνομα* is a word coined by the ^b 33 poet for the occasion, and in this respect unlike the words hitherto considered (the *κύριον ὄνομα*, the *γλῶττα*, and the *μεταφορά*), which are parts of an already existing vocabulary. Such coining of new words was termed *ὀνοματοποιία* (Volkman, Rhetorik² p. 425).

καλούμενον: comp. 21, 1458^a 6 *ὀνομαζόμενον*.

τίθεται. For the middle comp. H. A. 7. 12, 588^a 9 *διὸ καὶ τὰ* ^b 34 *ὀνόματα τότε τίθενται, ὡς πιστεύοντες ἤδη μᾶλλον τῇ σωτηρίᾳ*.—Rhet. 3. 13, 1414^b 15: *δεῖ δὲ εἶδος τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι*.

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα is a parenthesis giving a reason for the instances that come after it; comp. 25, 1460^b 24, and the note on Eth. N. 5. 1, 1129^a 29 in my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 43; also Kühner, Gr. Gr.² 2 p. 853.

ἐρνήγας, scil. *καλεῖ* or *λέγει*, to be understood from *τίθεται* in the ^b 35 preceding line; comp. Top. 6. 2, 140^a 3 (quoted on ^b 25), Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^a 7 (quoted on ^b 4), and Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141^a 9 *τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδί-*

1457^b 35 δομεν, ὄιον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιὸν [scil. λέγομεν].

We do not know where Aristotle found the word, and there is no evidence for the form of the nom. sing.; the correction of Victorius, *ἔρρυγας*, assumes it to have been *ἔρρυξ*, like *ἄντυξ*; but it is just as likely that it was *ἔρρυγη*. An explanation of the word survives in Hesychius: *ἔρρυτας* [sic]: *ἔρρη. βλαστήματα. κλάδοι*. The form in Hesychius, with a τ instead of a γ, has been defended by Meineke as the acc. pl. of a Cretan word *ἔρρυς* (= *ἔρρος*) supposed to be implied in *Ἐπιρρύτιος*, a Cretan name for Zeus according to Hesychius s. v. (see note in M. Schmidt's ed.). Aristotle's view of it, however, is that it is a coined word, not a γλωττα as a Cretan word would be; it is to be remembered too that he shows himself elsewhere (25, 1461^a 14) not wholly unfamiliar with the Cretan dialect.

ἀρητῆρα. The reference is no doubt to the use of the word in Pl. I. 11 οὐνεκα τὸν Χρῦσσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα. Hesychius has the same explanation: *ἀρητῆρα. ἱερέα*.

ἐπεκτεταμένον κτέ. The three kinds of word remaining for consideration are abnormal only in form. As they are substantially the same as the usual words, they are said to be intelligible to all (22, 1458^b 4), i.e. they do not require explanation as a γλωττα might do. The *ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα* is the ordinary word lengthened out in one or other of two ways, either through the lengthening of a syllable normally short, or through the insertion of an extra syllable. Aristotle's standard being Attic, he regards *πόλῃος* for instance as a lengthened form of *πόλεως*. *ἐπεκτείνειν* has this same sense in *Metaph. Δ 4, 1014^b 17 εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας λέγοι τὸ υ* (in the word *φύσις*).

1458^a 4 Πηλείδου. The reading of A^c, Πηλέος, is retained by Vahlen, who marks a lacuna after the word. M. Schmidt fills up the assumed gap by the following restoration: τὸ Πηλέος <Πηλῆος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου> Πηληιάδεω. It is quite as easy, however, to suppose Πηλέος to have got in by assimilation to the preceding πόλεως (or πόλεος, as it is in A^c); and it must be admitted that a second instance of this sort of lengthening is hardly wanted. As regards Πηληιάδεω for Πηλείδου, Aristotle's view apparently is that the -ά- in it is epenthetic, a συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη (v. on 20, 1456^b 34). Its other deviations from the normal word (-ηι- = -ει-, and -εω = -ου) would be, according to ancient theory, instances of

διαίρεσις, 'resolution', with a lengthening of vowels in the resolved 1458^a 4 diphthongs.

ἀφηρημένον. As the *ἀφηρημένον* is the opposite of the *ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα* (v. supra^a 1), we may take the term to include (1) a word with a shortened vowel, and (2) a word shortened by the omission of a syllable, whether in the beginning, middle, or end of it, i. e. a word which in the terminology of the grammarians has suffered *ἀφαίρεσις*, *συγκοπή*, or *ἀποκοπή*. Aristotle's examples, however, *κρῖ*, *δῶ*, *ὄψ*, are all instances of *ἀποκοπή*—the term he himself uses with reference to this class of words in 22, 1458^b 2; comp. Strabo's (364 Cas.) explanation of *Μέσση* in Il. 2. 582: *ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀποκοπὴν δέχονται τὴν Μεσσηνῆν . . . παραδείγμασι δὲ χρῶνται τοῦ μὲν ποιητοῦ τῷ κρῖ καὶ δῶ καὶ μάψ, καὶ ἔτι ἥρωσ δ' Αὐτομέδων τε καὶ Ἀλκιμος ἄντι τοῦ Ἀλκιμέδων . . . παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ δὲ μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ, ἢ ὄψις*. It is clear that Aristotle's *ἀφηρημένον ὄνομα* covers a wider ground than the *ἀφαίρεσις* of the grammarians, and that it must include their *ἀποκοπή* and *συγκοπή*. In the preliminary statement in 21, 1457^b 2 the shortened word is termed the *ὑφηρημένον*, not the *ἀφηρημένον ὄνομα*. In the interests of uniformity—which one can hardly suppose Aristotle to have ignored in a matter so technical as this—one must either read *ἀφηρημένον* in 21, 1457^b 2 (with Spengel), or restore *ὑφηρημένον* throughout the present section. Some of the grammarians seem to have used *ὑφαίρεσις* (v. HSt. s. v.) for the dropping of a letter in the middle of a word.

μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ: Empedocles fr. 88 Diels. The^a 5 reading of the MS. *οησ* (see on 18, 1456^a 2) must represent *ὄψις*, a gloss on *ὄψ* (comp. Strabo 364, quoted above on^a 4).

ἐξηλλαγμένον. The 'changed' word is in regard to some one part of it the invention of the poet. To that extent, therefore, it has a certain affinity with the 'coined' word, the *πεποιημένον ὄνομα* (21, 1457^b 33).

δεξιτερόν κατὰ μαζόν: Il. 5. 393 (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5.^a 7 4, p. 677 D, and Athenaeus 423 E).

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων κτέ. Up to this point names have been^a 8 viewed in reference to their origin, sense, or form. Apart from these aspects, however, they may also be classified according to their gender, and distinguished as masculine, feminine, and neuter. This classification of names according to gender will be seen to be founded on the terminations of the nominatives in Attic. The primary distinction between masculine and feminine termi-

1458^a 8 nations seems to have been generalized from the names of objects in which there is a visible distinction of sex, and more especially from the names of men and women (comp. Aristoph. Nub. 682). Thus nouns ending in the consonants N, P, Σ, Ψ, Ξ are regarded as normally masculine, because names like Δίων, Νέστωρ, Πάρις, Πέλοψ, Κόραξ, are names of males; those ending in the vowels Η, Ω, and Α (long or short) are normally feminine, because Ἑλένη, Κλειώ, Ἥρα, Μοῦσα are names of females. The names of sexless things (the neuters, as we call them) Aristotle terms τὰ μεταξύ, because as a class these words occupy an ambiguous position, their final letters being sometimes those of the masculines and sometimes those of the feminines. Thus δένδρον, ἦτορ, τεῖχος, and ending in the consonants N, P, Σ, have what Aristotle regards as masculine terminations; whereas κάρα, τέρμα, etc., have feminine ones; the other neuters also, μέλι, γόνυ, etc., as ending in vowels, show a certain affinity with the feminines. This seems to be the rationale of the present scheme of genders; and it is in essentials the same as that of the grammarians, though theirs no doubt is both fuller and more systematic, and leaves fewer facts to be treated as anomalies or exceptions (comp. Dionysius Thrax p. 15 Uhlig). Aristotle's classification is based on that of Protagoras, who distinguished nouns into masculine, feminine, and σκεύη (Rhet. 3. 5, 1407^b 7 Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη)—the last of the three terms meaning with him not 'things' but 'names of things', as it does also in Aristotle, in Soph. el. 14, 173^b 39 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενας κλήσιν. In Soph. el. 14, 173^b 19 we are told that Protagoras said it was a solecism to make μῆνις and πῆληξ feminine, evidently because he thought Σ and Ξ to be normally masculine terminations, just as Aristotle does. Aristophanes, Nub. 658, ridicules this new ὀρθόπεια of Protagoras in the matter of gender. Stilpo is said to have disputed the propriety of speaking of Athene as a θεός: μὴ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὴν θεὸν ἀλλὰ θεάν· θεοὺς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἄρρενας (Diog. Laert. 2. 116).

^a 9 ὅσα τελευτᾶ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ (καὶ Σ). This may seem an overstatement, as there are neuters which have these endings (see ^a 17). The explanation is to be found in Aristotle's view of the neuters: he does not conceive them as having terminations peculiar to themselves, but as holding an intermediate position between the two main classes, some of them having a masculine and others a feminine termination.

ἐκ τῶν φωνήεντων is equivalent to a partitive genitive (comp. 1458^a 11 Pol. 5. 1, 1302^a 4; Rhet. 1. 9, 1367^a 36; 10, 1369^b 7). Van Cleef, Index Antiphonteus p. 58, has noted several instances of this use of ἐκ in Antiphon.

τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς A, 'in A among the vowels capable of^a 12 being lengthened'. The remaining dichronous vowels (see on 20, 1456^b 32), I and Y, are said a little further on to be found in the terminations of neuters (^a 15).

ἴσα . . . πλήθη. πλήθη is 'numbers', as the plural of *πλήθος*, *numerus* or *summa*. It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore πλήθει from certain of the apographs.

οὐδὲ εἰς φωνήεν βραχύ. It is to be remembered that there is no^a 15 Greek noun ending in E or O. A neuter pronoun, like τοῦτο or τοιοῦτο (comp. Herodian 2 p. 764 Lentz), would be in Aristotle's classification (see on 20, 1457^a 18) not an ὄνομα proper but a πτώσις ὀνόματος.

τρία. No mention is made here of κίκι, which Plato had used in Tim. 60 A. This and sundry other words of the same order (see Lobeck, Phryn. p. 288) may perhaps have been in Aristotle's view not sufficiently naturalized to require recognition.

πέντε. The old editions (with some few of the apographs)^a 16 explain this by adding τὸ πῶν τὸ νᾶπυ τὸ γόνυ τὸ δόρυ τὸ ἄστυ after πέντε. The nouns ending in Y are certainly more than five in number (comp. Herodian 1 p. 354 Lentz). We may perhaps suppose Aristotle to have arrived at this number by ignoring words like γλάφυ, δάκρυ, μέθυ, μῶλυ, φῖτυ as antiquated, and taking account only of those which formed part of the existing Attic vocabulary.

τὰ δὲ μεταξύ: see above on^a 8. Our word 'neuters', which represents the οὐδέτερα of the grammarians, points to the difference between the neuters and the masculines and feminines; Aristotle's τὰ μεταξύ to their resemblance; they are said to occupy an intermediate position, because in their terminations some of them resemble the masculine and others the feminine nouns; they have in fact no distinctive terminations of their own.

εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν (καὶ Ρ) καὶ Σ. The text, as thus amended, acknowledges the neuters ending in P (ὑδωρ, ἦπαρ, etc.); but it apparently says nothing of those ending in A (κῦμα, ποίημα, κάρα, etc.). It has been proposed accordingly to insert καὶ A after ταῦτα, so as to complete the list of neuter endings (comp. Herodian 2 p. 646 Lentz τελικὰ οὐδετέρων ὀνομάτων ἕξι, ā, ī, ū, ῥ, ῥ, ū).

1458^a 16 It is just possible to keep to the traditional text here, by supposing that in a statement so loosely drafted as this ταῦτα was meant to recall not only the two vowels (I and Y) just considered, but also A, which has been described in the preceding context (^a 12) as one of the ἐπεκτεινόμενα or dichronous vowels. In that case ταῦτα will stand allusively for τὰ ἐπεκτεινόμενα, and include A as well as I and Y.

^a 18 λέξεως: 6, 1450^b 13 λέγω δὲ . . . λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν. In this chapter Aristotle does not deal with style in general, but only with the portion of it which relates to the choice of words, the ἐκλογή ὀνομάτων of the grammarians; his aim is to describe the poetic vocabulary, and determine the limits to the use of exceptional words and expressions in poetry. This chapter is referred to in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 28, where the language of oratory is contrasted with that of poetry: ἐτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφείκασιν· διὸ γελοῖον μμείσθαι τούτους οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἴας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

λέξεως ἀρετὴ κτέ.: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 1 ὠρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μῆτε ταπεινὴν μῆτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἢ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τᾶλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν.

^a 20 ταπεινὴ. For ταπεινὴ as the opposite of σεμνὴ (^a 21) comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 3, 8, Isocrates 35 c, and the antithesis between τὸ ταπεινόν and τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές in Rhet. ad Alex. 3, 1423^a 31. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 15 R. finds an instance of meanness of diction even in Homer, in the language in Od. 16. 1-16: διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτωνπέπλεκται πᾶσα ἢ λέξις, οἷς ἂν καὶ γεωργὸς καὶ θαλαττουργὸς καὶ χειροτέχνης καὶ πᾶς ὁ μηδεμίαν ὥραν τοῦ λέγειν εὖ ποιούμενος ἐξέτοιμον λαβὼν ἐχρήσατο. λυθέντος γοῦν τοῦ μέτρου φαῦλα φανήσεται τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄζηλα· οὔτε γὰρ μεταφοραὶ τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἐνεῖσιν οὔτε ὑπαλλαγαὶ

οὔτε καταχρήσεις οὔτε ἄλλη τροπικὴ διάλεκτος οὐδεμία, οὐδὲ δὴ γλωτ- 1458^a 20
ται πολλαί τινες οὐδὲ ξένα ἢ πεποιημένα ὀνόματα.

Κλεοφώντας: see on 2, 1448^a 12.

Σθενέλου. This Sthenelus is presumably the tragic poet men-^a 21
tioned more than once by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1313 and fr. 151
Kock). It is doubtful whether a single line of his has come down
to us (Nauck, TGF.² p. 762).

ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικόν: Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^a 15 ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ
τὸ εἰωθός [scil. τὰ ἐπίθετα], καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. It will be
observed that Aristotle is now using ἐξαλλάττειν in a large sense, to
denote all possible deviations from the ordinary forms of expression
(πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον, ^a 23), instead of restricting it to the kind of
deviation presented in the ἐξηλλαγμένον ὄνομα (21, 1458^a 6).

τὸ ἰδιωτικόν=τὸ εἰωθός or τὸ κύριον; but the point of view is not
quite the same. τὸ ἰδιωτικόν is the language of the ordinary man,
the prosaic as opposed to the poetic mode of expression; the
antithesis of ἰδιώτης and ποιητής is already in Plato (Phaedr. 258 D,
Symp. 178 B, Laws 890 A). Isocrates 203 D has ἰδιωτικὰ ὀνόματα,
but in a different sense.

ξενικοῖς. In Plato (e. g. in Crat. 401 B, 417 C) a ξενικὸν ὄνομα is^a 22
a non-Attic word or form, what Aristotle calls a γλωττα (see on
21, 1457^b 4); Isocrates 190 D (quoted above on 21, 1457^b 1) uses
ξένα ὀνόματα in the same sense. Aristotle's ξενικὰ ὀνόματα, how-
ever, is a wider term; it comprises all the various deviations from
the usual form of expression (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον ^a 23)—the
μεταφορά, the ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα, etc., as well as the γλωττα. In
the Rhetoric also τὸ ξενικόν is the general opposite of τὸ εἰωθός:
Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^a 15 ἐξαλλάττει τὸ εἰωθός, καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν
λέξιν.—3. 12, 1414^a 26 τὸ εἰωθός καὶ ξενικόν. The attraction such
unfamiliar words have for us is explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 8:
τὸ ἐξαλλάξει ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν [scil. τὴν λέξιν]. ὥσπερ γὰρ
πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσι
καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ
γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἤδη δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν.

ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα is an exaggeration, like ἀπάντων in 1, 1447^b 22.^a 24
All that Aristotle really means is that too much metaphor, or an
undue proportion of strange words makes the sentence an enigma
or a 'barbarism'. τοιαῦτα=ξενικά, or ἐκ ξενικῶν.

This passage is quoted in a fragment attributed to Longinus
(Rhet. Gr. 1, 325 Spengel): ὅτι ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοὺς πάντα μετα-
φύροντας αἰνίγματα γράφειν ἔλεγεν.

1458^a 25 μὲν οὖν ‘saepe usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur’, Bon. Ind. 540^b 42; comp. 14, 1453^b 32, and Vahlen’s note on the present passage.

αἰνίγμα. The puzzle in a riddle Aristotle explains as arising from the presence of metaphors, i. e. of words used in a transferred sense. The element of metaphors in riddles is noted again in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^b 4 καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εἰς ἠνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορᾶς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς (μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται), ὥστε δῆλον [ῥ δηλοῦν] ὅτι εἰς μετενήκεται.—3. 11, 1412^a 24 καὶ τὰ εἰς ἠνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα μάθησις γάρ· καὶ λέγεται μεταφορᾶ [ῥ μεταφορᾶ]. Quintilian also (8. 6, 14) speaks of the riddle-like effect of too much metaphor: *Ut modicus autem atque opportunus eius usus illustrat orationem, ita frequens et obscurat et taedio complet, continuus vero in allegorias et aenigmata exit.*

^a 26 **τε γάρ** is practically no more than γάρ in this and many other Aristotelian passages (comp. Bon. Ind. 750^a 5, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 244).

ἰδέα: equivalent here to οὐσία (see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 406).

^a 28 **τῶν ὀνομάτων.** ὄνομα has been used before this as a generic term including the metaphor, etc., as well as what Aristotle calls the κύριον ὄνομα (see 21, 1457^b 1). When opposed, however, to the metaphor, as in the present passage, it may easily mean *the* name (as we say) for the thing, i. e. its proper name, its κύριον ὄνομα. It recurs in this more specific sense in 22, 1458^b 2 and ^b 16. It is not so absolutely necessary, therefore, to adopt the emendation of Heinsius, τῶν <κυρίων> ὀνομάτων, or the reading which the Arabic Version is believed to imply, τῶν <ἄλλων> ὀνομάτων. For other instances of the same use of general terms in a restricted sense see on 1, 1447^a 29 (ἧ τοῖς μέτροις).

^a 29 **κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν,** scil. σύνθεσιν. The correction μεταφορῶν seems to be required not only by the form of the antithesis, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν, in the preceding line, but also by the meaning. It is the combination of metaphors that produces the sense of impossibility (comp. ἀδύνατα συνάψαι^a 27) which is of the essence of an αἰνίγμα.

ἄνδρ’ εἶδον κτέ.: a line traditionally ascribed to Cleobulina, fr. 1 Bergk. The riddle is partially explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 35 οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀνόνημα [(ἐπὶ) τὰ ἀνόνημα?] ὀνομασμένως, ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι συγγενές, οἶον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκμοῦντι “ἄνδρ’ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ’ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα”. ἀνόνημον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ’ ἄμφω

πρόσθεσίς τις· κόλλησιν τοῦνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. 1458^a 29
 χαλκός, as a name for what we conventionally call a 'cupping-glass', is a metaphor derived from the material of which the instrument was often made in antiquity. Celsus 2. 11 has a description of the brazen cupping-glass and its mode of action: *Aenea* [scil. *cucurbitula*] *altera parte patet, altera clausa est . . . in aeneam linamentum ardens conicitur, ac sic os eius corpori aptatur imprimilurque donec inhaereat . . . ubi inhaesit, si concisa ante scapello cutis est, sanguinem extrahit; si integra est, spiritum* (comp. Aristot. Probl. 9. 9-12, 890^b 7-37; Mayor on Juv. 14. 58; and the monograph of K. P. I. Lampros, *Περὶ σικυῶν καὶ σικυάσεως*, Athens 1895).

κόλλησαντα: a metaphor ἀπ' εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος (see 21, 1457^b 13).^a 30
 For the tense of the participle see Goodwin, *Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses* § 148.

ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός: a mere repetition of the ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός in ^a 25, and brought in also without syntactical connexion with the context. The words may be the residue of a longer statement now lost, or a stop-gap to disguise a lacuna, or a rough note by Aristotle himself to indicate a point to be worked out at length at some future time.

βαρβαρισμός is the opposite of ἐλληνισμός. ἐλληνίζειν in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 238^b 53) means to speak Greek like a native, i. e. correctly, and βαρβαρίζειν to speak it like a foreigner, whether through the use of 'strange words' (γλωτται), or through that of strange or unauthorized forms of words. That βαρβαρίζειν had this wide sense is clear from the explanation of σολοκίζειν ('to speak incorrectly') in Soph. el. 3, 165^b 20 τέταρτον δὲ σολοκίζειν ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον (comp. Bon. Ind. 688^a 54). In later theory, however, 'barbarism' denotes more especially a faulty use of particular words, and 'solecism' a fault of construction or syntax: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 210 βαρβαρισμός ἐστὶ παράπτωσις ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ σολοκισμός ἐστὶ παράπτωσις ἀσυνήθης κατὰ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθος (v. Volkmann, *Rhetorik*² p. 396). Quintilian (1. 5, 8) distinguishes three senses of 'barbarismus' in Latin: *Barbarismus pluribus modis accipimus: unum gente* [? genus], *quale fit si quis Afrum vel Hispanum latinae orationi nomen inserat . . . alterum genus barbarismi accipimus quod fit animi natura . . . tertium est illud vitium barbarismi cuius exempla vulgo sunt plurima, sibi etiam*

1458^a 30 *quisque fingere potest, ut verbo cui libebit adiciat litteram syllabamve vel detrahat, aut etiam aliam pro alia aut eandem alio quam rectum est loco ponat.*

^a 31 δει ἄρα κεκράσθαι πως τούτοις, scil. τὴν λέξιν; the language of poetry should have some admixture of unusual words or forms in it. Similarly in the Rhetoric a certain combination of familiar and unfamiliar words is said to be an element of pleasure in a speech: Rhet. 3. 12, 1414^a 25 καὶ τὸ ἡδέϊαν [scil. τὴν λέξιν εἶναι] τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει ἂν εὔμιχθῆ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν. In the text τούτοις refers back to the ξενικά in ^a 22; all from ἀλλ' ἄν τις in ^a 23 to βαρβαρισμός in ^a 31 is digression. For the qualifying πως in this connexion comp. Probl. 30. 1, 954^b 27 εἰν δέ πως κραθῶσι.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, scil. ταῦτα, i. e. τὰ ξενικά. The οἶον prefixed to the list of ξενικά which follows is the appositional and explanatory οἶον, *nempe* or *scilicet* (comp. Bon. Ind. 502^a 7). There is a reference to this place in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 5: τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινῶν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τᾶλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

^a 34 εἶδη, scil. ὀνομάτων.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος συμβάλλεται: Isocrates 156 B οὐ γὰρ ἐλάχιστον μέρος τὰ γένη ταῦτα συμβάλλεται πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν.—Hippocrates I p. 525 K. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος συμβάλλεται ἀστρονομίῃ ἐς ἡπυρικήν.

^b 1 συμβάλλεται. The singular verb may be explained by supposing the real subject to be τὰ ἐπεκτεταμένα καὶ ἀποκεκομμένα καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένα ὀνόματα rather than the various processes they exemplify. Other instances of a singular verb with several subjects in the plural will be found in Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 81. The anomaly in the present instance is not so harsh as it might have been, as the verb precedes its subjects, and is also at some distance from them: it may be illustrated also by the common use of ἔστι, ἦν, and γίγνεται followed by a plural subject (see Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 68). Vahlen quotes a similar construction with δοκεῖ in H. A. 4. 9, 536^a 17 δοκεῖ δὲ . . . ὥσπερ λύχνοι φαίνεσθαι οἱ ὀφθαλμοί.

^b 5 ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγουσιν κτέ. In this long digression, which extends to ἐκείνος δὲ τοῦτο ἡγνόμεν in 1459^a 4, Aristotle insists on the literary value and effect of the various poetical forms of expression, and defends their use by the poets. He first answers the critics of the epic (^b 7-31), and then those of the tragic diction (^b 31-1459^a 4).

^b 7 τὸν ποιητήν, the poet, whoever he may be. It is evident, how-

ever, that Aristotle is mainly concerned with Homer (comp. Bon. 1458^b 7 Ind. 609^b 57); the licences he considers are all epic licences; and the instances quoted in ^b 9—10 were presumably meant to caricature the Homeric hexameter. It was generally admitted that Homer was ready enough *metri gratia* to take great liberties with language (see Ludwich, Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik 2 p. 127; Schulze, Qu. epicae p. 3). Throughout this chapter Aristotle is thinking quite as much of the epic poet as of the tragedian, though his theory of the Epic is still to come (in 23—24).

Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος. Nothing further is known of him. As a surmise, which must be taken for what it is worth, I would suggest that he may possibly be the Euclid who was Archon in the year 403, when the reformed alphabet was officially adopted at Athens. At that moment considerable attention seems to have been devoted to questions of phonetics (see on 20, 1456^b 31); and the anomalies and licences of Homeric metre may very well have been one of the facts to which the reforming party pointed in proof of the need of a fuller alphabet.

ὡς ῥάδιον ποιεῖν = ὡς ῥάδιον ὄν ποιεῖν. For the omission of ὄν see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses 875. 1.

ἐκτείνειν. From the definition of the *ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα* in 21, ^b 8 1457^b 35 it is clear that Aristotle is referring not only to the lengthening of a short vowel but also to the insertion of an extra syllable in a word.

ιαμβοποίησας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει. The sense of these words and ^b 9 their connexion with the lines which follow have been a difficulty with the interpreters from the days of Victorius, who gives up the passage in despair. Goulston renders them by 'qui etiam in ipsa oratione soluta iambica confecit'; Tyrwhitt by 'in ipsa oratione soluta cavillo facto'; M. Schmidt by 'ihr Verfahren in seinem eignen Ausdruck persiflirte'; Ueberweg by 'er legt den Spott in die Redeform selbst (durch Sylbenverlängerung) hinein'. Vahlen's interpretation (which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's) is 'iambum sive carmen probrosum et cavillatorium faciens mero sermone pedestri (*in purer prosa*)'. It is not so easy to see how ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει can mean the same thing as ἐν ψιλλῇ λέξει; nor is *ιαμβοποίησας* quite the same thing as *ιαμβον ποιήσας*. Perhaps the simplest solution of the difficulty is to transpose *ιαμβοποίησας*, placing it after ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, and then take the two lines of parody which follow as its object. *ιαμβοποιεῖν τι* may very well mean to 'write, or say, something as an *ιαμβοποιός*' (i. e. as a

1458^{b9} caricaturist), just in the same way as *δραματοποιεῖν τι* means to 'describe as a *δραματοποιός*' (4, 1448^{b37}), and *λογοποιεῖν τι* to 'describe as a *λογοποιός*'.

Ἐπιχάρην κτέ. This and the next quotation are given as specimens of prose which by a liberal use of epic licences may be made to read as verse. By the artifice of lengthening two short syllables *Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον κτέ.* becomes an hexameter—the lengthening required with *Ἐπιχάρην* being like that in *ἐπίτονος* in *Od.* 12. 423. *βαδίζειν*, it may be observed, is not an epic word. How the second instance was to be read as a verse is not equally clear, the text here being obviously corrupt. If we may suppose *ἐλλέβορον* to be a scribal error for *ἐλλεβόρου*, the parodist may have proposed to read this as *ἐλλεβόροιο*.

Μαραθῶνάδε. The accentuation in *A^o* (*Μαραθῶνα δέ*) is in accordance with the rule of Apollonius and Herodian (*La Roche*, *Homerische Textkritik* p. 221).

^b 11 *φαίνεσθαί πως χρώμενον*: *De gen. et corr.* 1. 10, 328^{b10} *φαίνεται γάρ πως καὶ μικτὰ ἡρέμα.* A visible use of these artifices is one thing and a discreet use of them (*τὸ μέτριον*, ^b 12) another. For the antithesis comp. *Pol.* 5. 11, 1314^{b28} *περὶ τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς [scil. δεῖ] τούναντίον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιούσιν* οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς ἔωθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἢ ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μετριάξειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle lays down the same rule for oratory: the orator must use all the arts of language, but with discretion, so as not to allow his use of them to become too apparent: *Rhet.* 3. 2, 1404^{b18} *διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιούντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκῶτως* (comp. also 3. 7, 1408^{b4}).

τούτῃ τῷ τρόπῳ, scil. *τῆς διαλέκτου*; comp. *οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου* in ^b 6, and *τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῃ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι* in 21, 1457^{b30}. *Vahlen*, who supplies *ἐπεκτάσει* after *χρώμενον*, takes *τούτῃ τῷ τρόπῳ* as equivalent to *τούτον τὸν τρόπον*.

^b 12 *τὸ δὲ μέτριον.* If the traditional reading, *τὸ δὲ μέτρον*, be retained, we have to understand *μέτρον* in the sense of 'measure' or 'limit'. The objection to this interpretation is that *μέτρον* has the sense of 'metre' in the immediate context (^b 16), and that any other sense would be somewhat confusing in a passage dealing with 'metrical' licences. *τὸ μέτριον*, on the other hand, is certified

by more than one parallel in the Rhetoric: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^b 32 1458^b 12 εἰλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.—3. 3, 1406^a 16 ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχαζέσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μείζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῆ λέγειν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἠδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζουσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις. In another passage, Rhet. 2. 14, 1390^b 8 ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἔλλειπουσιν, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον, we find Aristotle passing from the idea of τὸ μέτριον to that of τὸ ἀρμόττον just as he does here in the context (^b 15).

κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408^a 36 τὸ δ' εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἀπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν.

ἀπρεπῶς. In the Rhetoric an unsuitable metaphor is said to be ^b 14 one of the faults which make the style of an orator 'frigid': Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^b 5 τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμωδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς) αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν.

ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα. ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα, which has been bracketed (by Gomperz), seems to be wanted to keep up the parallelism with what is said in ^b 5 sqq. on the subject of the epic licences, which Euclid had parodied and turned to ridicule. Aristotle's reply to Euclid is that it is quite possible to misuse metaphors, etc., for the same purpose, ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα (comp. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^b 5, quoted above). The comparative ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖότερα would be more in accordance with usage (comp. Stallb. on Plato Symp. 214 E).

τὸ δὲ ἀρμολτόντως. This is considered (1) in reference to these ^b 15 epic licences (ἐπέκτασις, ἀποκοπή, ἐξάλλαγή), and (2) in reference to the use of metaphor, etc. (^b 17).

ὅσον διαφέρει: Isocrates 87 C καίτοι μ' οὐ λέληθεν ὅσον διαφέρουσι τῶν λόγων εἰς τὸ πείθειν οἱ λεγόμενοι τῶν ἀναγινωσκομένων.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρεῖσθω: because these metrical licences are so ^b 16 marked a feature in the epic diction (see on ^b 7). The proof here is not unlike that by which Isocrates 191 A shows the literary value of metre: οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν· ἂ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχη κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. γνοίη δ' ἂν τις ἐκείθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἦν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκίμωντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπη, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδέεστερα τῆς δόξης ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.

- 1458 ^b 16 τῶν ὀνομάτων : i. e. the normal words, the words themselves, as distinct from the ἐπεκτάσεις, etc., of them (see above on ^a 28).
- ^b 18 ἰδεῶν. For ἰδέα = εἶδος, 'species', see Waitz, *Org.* 2 p. 416, and Bon. *Ind.* 338 ^b 34. In *De caelo* 1. 7 Aristotle says, within the space of a few lines, πεπερασμένων εἰδῶν (274 ^a 32) and ἰδέας πεπερασμένας (^b 2) without perceptible difference of meaning.
- ^b 20 ἔν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα. A verb taken by itself, i. e. apart from a subject, may be termed an ὄνομα (see on 20, 1457 ^a 10).
- ^b 21 κυρίου εἰωθός. Though κύριον and εἰωθός ὄνομα are often used as synonyms, there is a certain difference between them, as the εἰωθός ὄνομα may be a metaphor. ἐσθίει in the line of Aeschylus (^b 23) is the word in general use (τὸ εἰωθός), but it is a metaphor, and therefore not a κύριον ὄνομα (see on 21, 1457 ^b 1) in the stricter sense of the term. By comparison with θοινᾶται, however, it is the κύριον ὄνομα. Aristotle gets out of the difficulty by terming it the κύριον εἰωθός, the usual κύριον, because it has by custom and use come to be treated as a κύριον ὄνομα, and is no longer felt to be a metaphor.
- ^b 22 εὐτελής. The epithet is applied to a certain kind of word in *Rhet.* 3. 7, 1408 ^a 13 (see on κόσμος, 21, 1457 ^b 2), and in the passage from Dionysius quoted above on ^a 20.
- Αἰσχύλος: Nauck, *TGF.*² p. 81 and 618.
- ^b 24 θοινᾶται, which is not uncommon in poetry, is regarded by Aristotle as a γλῶττα (see on 21, 1457 ^b 4). It is explained in Hesychius, θοινᾶται· εὐωχεῖται.
- ^b 25 νῦν δέ μ' ἔων κτέ.: *Od.* 9. 515 νῦν δέ μ' ἔων ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκικτος.
- ἀεικής. The traditional text of the *Poetics* has ἀειδής, and that of Homer ἄκικτος—with an ancient variant, however, ἀεικής. The restoration of ἀεικής in the quotation, as the reading which Aristotle must have had before him, is believed to be confirmed by the Arabic Version. ἀειδής is open to two objections: (1) it is the word actually used in ^b 27 in Aristotle's paraphrasis of the Homeric line; (2) it is also a late word, and in the sense which it seems to bear here, that of 'unsightly' or 'ugly' (= δυσειδής), not to be found in pre-Aristotelian Greek. On the other hand, if the old poetical word ἀεικής had to be interpreted as an epithet of a person, ἀειδής in its later sense might very well be chosen to represent it.
- ^b 29 δίφρον ἀεικέλιον κτέ.: *Od.* 20. 259. Several of the manuscripts of the *Odyssey* read παραθείς in lieu of καταθείς.

ἡίονες βοόωσιν : II. 17. 265.

1458^b 31

κράζουσιν : comp. Demosthenes 18. 132 βοῶν ὁ βάσκανος οὗτος καὶ κεκραγῶς.

***Ἀριφράδης** is perhaps the Aripgrades whose name occurs in Aristophanes, and who is said to have been a *κιθαρωδός* by profession (Bergk, *De rel. com. Att.* p. 232). It is not necessary to suppose him to have given expression to this criticism in a book.

τοὺς τραγωδοὺς : i. e. the tragic actors, who are made responsible^b 32 for what the poet puts into their mouth. It will be observed that the expressions singled out for censure are taken apparently from the dialogue of Tragedy; there would have been no point in saying that the language of the choral part was *παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον*. A similar use of the word *τραγωδοί* is found, a few years after Aristotle's time, in Diphilus, fr. 30 Kock ὦ τόνδ' ἐποπτεύουσα καὶ κεκτημένη Βραυρῶνος ἱεροῦ θεοφιλέστατον τόπον, Λητοῦς Διὸς τε τοξόδαμνε παρθένε, ὡς οἱ τραγωδοὶ φασιν, οἷς ἐξουσία ἔστιν λέγειν ἅπαντα καὶ ποιεῖν μόνους.

τῇ διαλέκτῳ, the spoken, as distinct from the written language. *διάλεκτος* has the same sense in 4, 1449^a 26 πλείστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, and in *Rhet.* 3. 1, 1404^a 33 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν. The ordinary meaning of the term in Aristotle is either 'speech' (i. e. articulate language) or 'mode of speech'.

ἐγὼ δέ νιν : Sophocles *O. C.* 986. The rest of the instances in^b 34 the text were no doubt taken from existing plays (v. Nauck, *TGF.*² p. 856).

ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων : the *ἐπεκτάσεις*, *ἀποκοπαί*, and *ἐξαλλαγαὶ* 1459^a 4 τῶν ὀνομάτων mentioned in 1458^b 2 before the digression (1458^b 5 — ἡγνόμεν 1459^a 4).

καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις is a sort of afterthought.^a 5 Aristotle remembers that, as artifices of poetic expression, these are in just the same position as the forms of language he has been considering, and admit of the same justification.

πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον. In the Rhetoric metaphor is shown to hold an equally important place in the diction of oratory (*Rhet.* 3. 2, 1404^b 32 sqq.).

μεταφορικόν : comp. the eulogy of Empedocles as a master of^a 6 poetic expression in fr. 70 (Teubn.) from the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν* : καὶ Ὀμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικός τ' ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος.

1459^a 6 With this use of μεταφορικός, i. e. as applied to a person, Vahlen compares that of ἐνθυμηματικός in Rhet. 1. 1, 1354^b 22, etc., and of συλλογιστικός in Top. 8. 14, 163^b 30.

^a 7 εὐφύιας τε σημείον. εὐφύια means a gift of nature, i. e. an aptitude not to be acquired by education or study; see on 17, 1455^a 32, and comp. Eth. N. 3. 7, 1114^b 6 φῦναι δὲ ὡσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα ἢ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται. καὶ ἔστιν εὐφύης, ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ὁ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἶον τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφν τοιούτων ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἶη εὐφύια. The originality shown in metaphor is noted also in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 9 καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου. This power, according to Aristotle, depends on a rapid and intuitive perception of similarity in difference, i. e. of the resemblances between things not obviously alike; comp. Rhet. 3. 11, 1412^a 10; δὲ μεταφέρειν . . . ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἶον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ <τὸ> ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου. For the kinds of similarity underlying metaphors see 21, 1457^b 7.

εὖ μεταφέρειν. Aristotle is apparently setting aside far-fetched metaphors (Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 35; 3. 3, 1406^b 8), in which the underlying resemblance is not so real and clear as it should be.

^a 8 τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν. For other instances of concurrence of identical forms of the article see Soph. el. 13, 173^b 15; Meteor. 1. 3, 341^a 30; De resp. 2, 471^a 7; Metaph. N 2, 1089^a 14.

τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων κτέ. A very similar distinction is made in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^b 1: χρησιμωτάτη ἢ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιῶσι οὔτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις· αἱ δὲ γλώτται τοῖς ἐποποιῶσι· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὐθαδές· ἢ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβεῖοις· τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται.

^a 9 τοῖς διθυράμβοις: comp. the fr. of Philodemus published by Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsberichte 123 p. 66): τὸ μακροσύνθετον ἀνιᾶν μὲν ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ ἢ τοῖς ἔπεσι . . . ἄλυπον δ' ἐν τῷ διθυράμβῳ.—Demetrius De eloc. 91 ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνθετα ὀνόματα, οὐ τὰ διθυραμβικῶς συγκείμενα, οἶον θεοτεράτους πλάνας, οὐδὲ ἄστρον δορυπυρον στρατόν, ἀλλ' εὐκότα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας συγκειμένοις.

^a 10 τοῖς ἠρωικοῖς: comp. 23, 1459^b 34.

τοῖς ἱαμβεῖοις: i. e. the tragic dialogue (v. 4, 1449^a 24).

^a 12 λέξιν μιμείσθαι. Instead of its usual sense of diction or language, λέξις in this passage must mean (like διάλεκτος in 1458^b 32) the spoken as distinct from the literary language. The present statement, therefore, is in harmony with that in

Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 33, where Tragedy is said to have learnt to 1459^a 12 reject words outside the ordinary spoken language (ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν). With this use of λέξις we may compare that of λέξις, λεκτικὸν μέτρον, and λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία in 4, 1449^a 23-8; and also that of λόγος in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 30 ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοίωταρον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων. Goulston renders λέξις here by *vulgaris sermo*; Bonitz (Ind. 427^b 31) by *sermo pedestris*, on the assumption that it stands for ψιλὴ λέξις, as it no doubt sometimes does. In 4, 1449^a 23 λέξις is the opposite of 'song'.

ἐν λόγοις has been taken to mean 'in common speech, or conversation' ('in familiari colloquio', Goulston), 'in prose' ('oratio pedestris', Bon. Ind. 433^b 20), and 'in speeches' ('in orationibus', Tyrwhitt). Though it is not always possible to determine the exact meaning of a word like λόγος (v. on 4, 1449^a 17), the balance of probability is rather in favour of Tyrwhitt's 'in orationibus'. Aristotle's meaning would seem to be this, that the tragic dialogue (ἐν ἱαμβεῖοις) is limited to the same species of words as oratory (ἐν λόγοις)—those found in the language of common life (λέξις), viz. the κύριον, the μεταφορά, and the κόσμος. The appropriateness of the κύριον and μεταφορά for oratory is distinctly affirmed in the Rhetoric, and for the same reason, that they are in common use: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν· σημείον δέ, ὅτι τοῦτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις (comp. Isocrates 190 E). The reference in the text to the language of 'speeches' may serve to remind us of the fact that even in Aristotle's time the theory of literary prose was still studied mainly in connexion with oratory, and as part of the art of Rhetoric. According to the canon here laid down by Aristotle, the highly-coloured diction of Aeschylus would be inappropriate in Tragedy; and he tells us elsewhere that it was eschewed by the dramatists of his time: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 33 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφέικασιν [i. e. the tragedians] ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμων . . . ἀφέικασιν. From the days of Euripides in fact (comp. Aristoph. Ran. 939) the language of Tragedy had been approximating to that of ordinary life; and in Aristotle's age there was probably no very serious difference between it and that of the Comedy of the period.

κόσμος: see on 21, 1457^b 2. The parallel in the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404^b 31, quoted above) ignores the κόσμος.

1459^a 15 τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως. A tragedy is something to be acted, an epic something to be recited or read. This makes a fundamental distinction between them, though Aristotle admits that as a work of literature a tragedy is quite possible without performance on a stage (6, 1450^b 18; 26, 1462^a 12, 17).

^a 17 περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς κτέ. The natural division in the matter of this and the next chapter would be at 24, 1459^b 17, so as to make διαφέρει δὲ the beginning of the second half of the discussion. Throughout these two chapters Aristotle has Homer constantly in view; if he mentions other epic writings, it is only to show their artistic inferiority to the Iliad and Odyssey. The general intention of the present statement is to bring the Epic under the rules of construction laid down for Tragedy. Though the enumeration of the points of agreement and difference between the two is so much longer than that in 5, 1449^b 9–20, it ignores one characteristic of the Epic, its being a *μίμησις σπουδαίων*—on which no little stress was laid in the earlier chapters (3, 1448^a 26; 4, 1448^b 38 sqq.). Taking this for granted, it would seem, Aristotle proceeds to insist (1) that a good epic must conform to the tragic rule of Unity of story (1459^a 18–^b 7); (2) that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy (1459^b 8–10); and (3) that it involves the same literary elements (1459^b 10–17). After this he passes on to its points of difference, its length (^b 17–31), its metre (^b 31–1460^a 4), its form (^a 5–11), and its greater tolerance of *ἄλογα* (^a 11–^b 5). A valuable discussion on Aristotle's theory of the Epic will be found in Schoemann's *Opuscula* (3 p. 30). For traces of Aristotelian ideas in later Greek writers see Adam, *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos* (Wiesbaden 1889).

περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς. *περί* = 'as for', or 'as regards' (comp. *Metaph. H* 6, 1045^a 7).

διηγηματικῆς, scil. *μιμήσεως*, understood from ^a 15 (comp. 24, 1459^b 33, and the note on 1, 1447^a 27 αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν). The *καί* that follows is the appositional *καί* (=i. e.), which is so common in Aristotle.

ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς may be compared with 6, 1449^b 21 τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς. ἐν μέτρῳ, 'in verse (= ἐν λόγῳ ἐμμέτρῳ), is the opposite of ἐν τῷ πράττειν, just as in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449^b 26 δι' ἀπαγγελίας (scil. *μιμουμένων*) is the opposite of δρώντων.

^a 18 συνιστάναι δραματικούς. A predicative adjective after *συνιστάναι*

is found also in 24, 1459^b 14, 1460^a 34, and in Plato Phaedr. 1459^a 18 268 D τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὄλφ συνισταμένην. For the construction συνιστάναι περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν comp. 8, 1451^a 28 περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἶαν λέγομεν τὴν Ὀδύσειαν συνέστησεν. δραματικούς, which means properly 'such as is required for a drama' (comp. 4, 1448^b 35), is explained by what follows (καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν κτέ.) as referring more especially to the Unity of the dramatic story. Aristotle now definitely applies to the Epic the rule of Unity laid down for Tragedy in chaps. 7–8; its applicability, however, has already been assumed in the digression on the Epic in 8, 1451^a 19–29.

ὡσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὄλον. If it is permissible to restore ὄλον <ὄν> here, ^a 20 the expression will be equivalent to οὔσα ἐν ὄλον ὡσπερ ζῶον (see Bernhardt, Syntax p. 337, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 202 b). For the meaning of ζῶον see on 7, 1450^b 34.

καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις θεῖναι is another instance of ^a 21 parallelismus antitheticus; it is the negative complement of the precept in ^a 18 δεῖ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι δραματικούς, the construction being δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους . . . συνιστάναι δραματικούς . . . καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας [scil. αὐτοῖς] ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις θεῖναι. For the position of δῆλον comp. De sensu 3, 440^b 14 ὅτι ἀνάγκη μίγνυμένων καὶ τὰς χροῶς μίγνυσθαι, δῆλον, καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ πολλὰς εἶναι χροῶς. ὁμοίας θεῖναι may very well mean 'to regard as like them' (comp. Bon. Ind. 761^a 27). According to this view of the text, the general sense of the passage is shortly this: Epic stories should be in structure like those of Tragedy (δραματικούς), and not, as is so often supposed (see 8, 1451^a 21 and 9, 1451^b 4), like the records of ordinary history. This latter point, however, Aristotle puts in a somewhat different form, 'One must not assume our ordinary histories to be like them'; he inverts the order of the terms, in fact, as he sometimes does in comparisons introduced by ὁμοίως (see Vahlen ad loc., and my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 63). The reading εἶναι, which I have altered into θεῖναι¹ (on the assumption that EINAI represents ΘΙΝΑΙ), makes him say that our ordinary histories should not be like tragedies or epics, as though there were something in the practice of the historians that he wished to set right. The absurdity of such a notion was felt by one of the Renaissance correctors and by Dacier; but the correction they proposed, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίαις τὰς συνθέσεις εἶναι, is to my mind too artificial, and

¹ The same correction was made by Francken in Lysias 10. 18.

1459^a 21 too great a departure from the reading of the MS., to deserve a place in the text. In saying *ιστορίας τὰς συνήθεις* Aristotle seems to be aware of there being exceptions to the rule. We have been told in 9, 1451^b 30 that a poetical subject may sometimes be found in history.

^a 23 *ἐνὸς χρόνου*: comp. ^b 1 *περὶ ἓνα χρόνον*. Aristotle's conception of a history is that it is a sort of chronicle (see on 9, 1451^a 36) recording all the various occurrences within a certain period of time, however loose and separate they may have been in themselves. As an instance of such a disconnected event he cites Gelo's defeat of the Carthaginians in 480; it happened about the same time—Herodotus 7, 166 says on the same day—as the Battle of Salamis, but it obviously had no connexion with that battle, or with the issue of the Persian War. And the same would have to be said, if it had taken place just before or after Salamis (*ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις* ^a 27). In this way Aristotle reasserts the point on which he has insisted in the earlier chapters (8, 1451^a 27; 10, 1452^a 20), that two events may come in succession without forming part of one single action.

^a 25 *ἐν Σαλαμῖνι*: Rhet. 2. 22, 1396^a 12 *τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν*. Comp. Thuc. 1. 57, Isocr. 112 A, Aeschines in Ctes. 222 for this use of the preposition.

^a 29 *τοῦτο δρῶσι = ὁμοίας ιστορίας τὰς συνήθεις τιθέασι* (v. ^a 21).

^a 30 *ἤδη*: 8, 1451^a 23 sqq.

^a 33 *εὐσύνοπτος*: see on 7, 1451^a 4.

^a 34 *ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα κτέ.* Vahlen supposes *ἔδει* or *ἀναγκαῖον ἦν εἶναι* to be understood from the *ἔμελλεν ἔσσεσθαι* in the preceding clause. The sense of the passage is clear enough: The Trojan War was a real whole in itself (*ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος = ὅλον*; v. 7, 1450^b 26); but Homer declined to deal with it in its entirety (*ποιεῖν ὅλον*), through a feeling apparently that it was too long for his purpose (*λίαν μέγας*; comp. 7, 1451^a 5), or if not too long (*τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα*), too full of matter through the variety of incident in it (*καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ*). The explanation of the grammatical difficulty may perhaps be that Aristotle has lapsed into obliqua oratio. *λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας κτέ.* is virtually oratio obliqua, like the clause of explanation in 3, 1448^a 33.

μετριάζοντα is intransitive, as it generally is in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 463^b 23). For the dative with it comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314^b 33 *μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις*.

^a 35 *ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβῶν*: comp. Bon. Ind. 82^b 49, and Plato Rep.

392 E οὐ κατὰ ὄλον ἀλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ 1459^a 35
 δηλώσαι δὲ βούλομαι. By this ἐν μέρος in the history of the Trojan
 War Aristotle means the 'Wrath of Achilles' and its consequences ;
 see Adam l. c. p. 43.

αὐτῶν = τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πραγμάτων, a construction κατὰ
 σύνεσιν such as we often find with pronouns (comp. 13, 1453^a 24,
 23, 1459^a 29, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1, p. 54). Vahlen quotes
 Eth. N. 4. 1, 1120^a 2 δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας
 φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων [= τῶν χρημάτων, implied in τῆς οὐσίας]
 ὄντος.

διαλαμβάνει : comp. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 543 R. τὸ διαλαμ-^a 37
 βάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοειδεῖαν ἰδίαις μεταβολαῖς καὶ ξένοις ἐπεισοδίοις.
 The proper meaning of the word is to 'break the continuity of'
 a thing, as in Phys. 4. 6, 213^a 32 οὐκ ἔστι διάστημα . . . ὃ διαλαμ-
 βάνει τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ὥστε εἶναι μὴ συνεχές. Its present meaning,
 that of to 'break the uniformity of', or 'diversify', is found also
 in Plato Phaed. 110 B γῆ . . . χρώμασι διειλημμένη. Closely
 allied to this is the sense in Pol. 7. 12, 1331^a 20 τὰ δὲ τεῖχη
 διειλήφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις—where it denotes to 'break
 the line of' the walls, not the walls themselves.

The use of episodes as giving an element of variety in the Epic
 is noted again in 24, 1459^b 30. An echo of Aristotle's approval
 of Homer's episodes survives in Eustathius on Il. 3. 230, p. 409,
 20 R. : οὕτως εὐμηχάνως Ὅμηρος τὰς ἕξω τε [?] ἕξωθεν] τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ
 ἱστορίας ἐπεισοδιάζει τῇ ποιήσει καὶ ταῖς μεθόδοις αὐτὴν καταποικίλλει
 τῶν ἀφηγήσεων, and in the Schol. on Od. 1. 284 : τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας
 οὐκ ἐχούσης ἐξ αὐτῆς ποικιλίαν ἰκανὴν τὸν Τηλέμαχον ἐξελεῖν εἰς
 Σπάρτην καὶ Πύλον ποιεῖ, ὅπως ἂν τῶν Ἰλιακῶν ἐν παρεκβάσει
 πολλὰ λεχθείη διὰ τε τοῦ Νέστορος καὶ τοῦ Μενελάου (comp. the
 second Schol. ad loc. : ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὴν [scil. τὴν ἀποδημίαν Τηλε-
 μάχου] πεποίηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς ποικιλίας λόγων καὶ ἐξαλλαγῆς ἰδεῶν, ἵνα
 μὴ μονότροπος ᾖ τῆς ποιήσεως ὁ τρόπος).

περὶ ἓνα ποιοῦσι κτέ. : i. e. they write just like chroniclers (comp.
^a 23) or biographers (comp. 8, 1451^a 21). In some of the inferior
 epics, however, there is, says Aristotle, a certain Unity of story ;
 but it is not of the right kind (comp. 8, 1451^a 28 περὶ μίαν πράξιν
 οἷαν λέγομεν), as the action there consists of a plurality of parts
 (πολυμερῆ), each of them easily detached from the rest of the
 work. The consequence is that several tragedies may be made
 out of a single epic of this type ; whereas the Iliad or Odyssey
 does not supply materials for more than one or two. This

1459^a 37 emphatic assertion of the Unity of action in the Homeric epic, and of its affinity in this respect to Tragedy, is not quite in harmony with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In 18, 1456^a 13 the story of the Iliad is said to be a *πολύμυθον σύστημα*, one with a plurality of stories in it, and therefore incapable of being successfully dramatized in one single tragedy. And in 26, 1462^b 8 we are expressly told that the action in the Iliad and Odyssey is made up of several actions (*ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων*) and of many parts (*ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη*); in other words, it is conceived to be a *μία πράξις πολυμερής*, and not so unlike that of the inferior epics as is assumed in the present passage.

^b 1 *μίαν πράξιν* = *περὶ μίαν πράξιν* (comp. 8, 1451^a 28).

ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας: Herodotus 2. 117 *δηλοῖ ὅτι οὐκ Ὀμήρου τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεά ἐστι ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινός*.—Athenaeus 334 B *ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας ἔπη, εἴτε Κύπριός τις ἐστὶν ἢ Στασίνος ἢ ὅστις δὴ ποτε χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος*. For the ancient ideas as to the authorship of the *Κύπρια* see Welcker, *Ep. Cycl.* 1 p. 279 (comp. Wilamowitz, *Phil. Untersuch.* 7 p. 337).

^b 2 *τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα* = *ὁ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα* (comp. Bon. Ind. 109^b 48). The book is treated as anonymous even by Pausanias (3. 26, 7 and 10. 26, 2) and by several of the grammarians who quote from it (comp. Wilamowitz l.c. p. 341).

^b 3 *Ἰλιάδος*, 'a poem like the Iliad' (see on 4, 1448^b 38).

^b 4 *ἢ δύο μόναι*. The reference here is apparently rather to the Odyssey with its *διπλῆ σύστασις* (13, 1453^a 31); the double story would supply a subject for two tragedies, one dealing more especially with the fortunes of Ulysses, and the other with those of the Suitors.

ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαί. Welcker, *Gr. Trag.* p. 873, gives a list of the plays supposed to be based on stories in the *Κύπρια*. An abstract of the poem survives in the *Chrestomathy* of Proclus (Kinkel, *EGF.* 1 p. 16).

τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος πλέον ὀκτώ. The names in Aristotle's list of possible tragedies are sufficient indication of the ground covered by the *Μικρὰ Ἰλιάς* as he knew it; it is clear that the poem must have taken up the story of the war at the death of Achilles, and carried it down to the departure of the Greeks after the sack of Troy. The Fragments also show that it must have included the last scenes of the war and the division of the spoils. Some difficulty may perhaps be felt from the fact that the abstract in Proclus (Kinkel l.c. p. 36) makes the Little Iliad end somewhat

abruptly with the admission of the Wooden Horse within the walls, 1459^b 4 and that, to complete the record of the war, he subjoins an abstract of what he regards as a distinct poem, an Ἰλίου πέρισις sometimes ascribed to Arctinus. In all probability this Ἰλίου πέρισις was only the concluding part of the Little Iliad under another name (comp. Wilamowitz l. c. p. 350).

ὄπλων κρίσις: Proclus l. c. ἡ τῶν ὄπλων κρίσις γίνεται καὶ^b 5 Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ βούλησιν Ἀθηνᾶς λαμβάνει, Αἴας δ' ἐμμανῆς γενόμενος τὴν τε λείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν λυμáινεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀναίρει. Besides the existing Ajax of Sophocles, there was a ὄπλων κρίσις by Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF.² p. 57), based presumably on this section of the Little Iliad.

Φιλοκτῆτης: Proclus l. c. μετὰ ταῦτα Ὀδυσσεὺς λοχίσας Ἐλεον λαμβάνει, καὶ χρήσαντος περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τούτου Διομήδης ἐκ Δήμνου Φιλοκτῆτην ἀνάγει· ἰαθεῖς δὲ οὗτος ὑπὸ Μαχάονος καὶ μονομαχίσας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ κτείνει. Several lost plays are recorded as bearing this title (Nauck l. c. p. 968; Welcker, Kl. Schr. 4, p. 180); and we still have the Philoctetes of Sophocles.

Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος: Proclus l. c. καὶ Νεοπτόλεμον Ὀδυσσεὺς^b 6 ἐκ Σκύρου ἀγαγὼν τὰ ὄπλα δίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς· καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς αὐτῷ φαντάζεται. Εὐρύπυλος δὲ ὁ Τηλέφου ἐπίκουρος τοῖς Τρωσὶ παραγίνεται, καὶ ἀριστεύοντα αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνει Νεοπτόλεμος. A Νεοπτόλεμος is mentioned in Suidas' list of the plays of Nicomachus (v. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 1015, and Kayser, Hist. Trag. Gr. p. 316). There is no record of Εὐρύπυλος as the title of a tragedy.

πτωχεία, Λάκαιναι: Proclus l. c. Ὀδυσσεὺς τε αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτὸν κατάσκοπος εἰς Ἴλιον παραγίνεται καὶ ἀναγνωρισθεὶς ὑφ' Ἑλένης περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τῆς πόλεως συντίθεται, κτείνας τέ τινας τῶν Τρώων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀφικνεῖται. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα σὺν Διομήδει τὸ Παλλάδιον ἐκκομίζει ἐκ τῆς Ἰλίου. The story of Ulysses entering Troy in the guise of a beggar is briefly told in Od. 4. 247 ἄλλω δ' αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἤσκει δέκτη, ὃς οὐδὲν τοιοῦς ἔην ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν. τῷ ἴκελος κατέδν Τρώων πόλιν κτέ.; and referred to in Eurip. Rhes. 503 ἦδη δ' ἀγύρτης πτωχικὴν ἔχων στολὴν εἰσῆλθε πύργου (comp. Plautus Bacch. 936). There is no tradition of πτωχεία as the title of a tragedy. Λάκαιναι was the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.² p. 210), turning apparently on the carrying off of the Palladium, with which Helen seems to have been associated in some form of the legend (v. Roscher's Lexicon 1, 1944); the title was no doubt taken from the chorus of Laconian women, whom we may suppose to have been brought in as Helen's handmaids.

1459^b 6 Ἰλίου πέρσις: one play certainly is mentioned as having this title, the Ἰλίου πέρσις of Iophon. There was also a Πέρσις ἢ Πολυξένη attributed to Nicomachus, and a Πέρσις attributed to Cleophon (comp. Meineke, Hist. Com. Gr. p. 497).

^b7 ἀπόπλους may very well have been the title of a play, but if it was, no record has come down to us of one so named. The closing scene of the war, the division of the spoils and the fate of the Trojan captives, was naturally fitted for Tragedy, as one may see from the abstract in Proclus of the final section of the Ἰλίου πέρσις: ἔπειτα ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν Πολυξένην σφαγιάζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τάφον. καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀστυνάκτα ἀνελότους Νεοπτόλεμος Ἀνδρομάχην γέρας λαμβάνει [comp. Μικρὰ Ἰλ. fr. 18]: καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ λάφυρα διανέμονται. Δημοφῶν δὲ καὶ Ἀκάμας Αἴθραν εὐρόντες ἄγουσι μεθ' ἑαυτῶν [comp. Μικρὰ Ἰλ. fr. 17]. ἔπειτα ἀποπλέουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες. Welcker (Gr. Trag. p. 179) suggests that ἀπόπλους may possibly have been an alternative title for the Polyxena of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.² p. 245), the scene of which, as we know from Strabo (10, 470 Σοφοκλέης ποιήσας τὸν Μενέλαον ἐκ τῆς Τροίας ἀπαίρειν σπεύδοντα ἐν τῇ Πολυξένη), was placed at the time of the departure of the Greek host. Whether we accept this suggestion or not, it seems pretty clear from the position of the title in Aristotle's list that the ἀπόπλους must have related to the concluding act of the war, and not (as Vahlen thinks) to the withdrawal of the Greek fleet to Tenedos before the treachery of Sinon.

καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες. Having thus run over the eight sections of the Μικρὰ Ἰλιάς and mentioned a tragedy, actual or possible, in connexion with each, Aristotle appends two additional names to show how easily the list might be enlarged. The first is a Σίνων—the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.² p. 251); the second a Τρωάδες—the name of a still extant play of Euripides. A Σίνων proves the possibility of more than one tragedy on the seventh section of the poem; and a Τρωάδες proves the same of the eighth. One can hardly doubt that Aristotle means the existing play of Euripides, the scene of which is placed at the time of the ἀπόπλους or departure from Troy (comp. Troad. 18 πολλὺς δὲ χρυσὸς Φρύγιά τε σκυλεύματα πρὸς ναῦς Ἀχαιῶν πέμπεται μένουσι δὲ πρύμνηθεν οὖρον, ὡς δεκασπόρω χρόνῳ ἀλόχους τε καὶ τέκν' εἰσίδουσιν ἄσμενοι).

ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη κτέ. As a further point of resemblance Aristotle observes that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy; and he illustrates this in ^b 14 by noting the difference between the

Iliad and Odyssey. This statement about the four species is not 1459^b 7 quite consistent with that in 18, 1455^b 32 (where see note); as there was no such thing as a 'spectacular' epic, Aristotle makes out the parallelism by recognizing the ἀπλή ἐποποιία as a distinct species of epic. The difficulty here is like that in τσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη in 18, 1455^b 32 (where see note); we have to admit that Aristotle has been carried away for the moment by his desire to find coincidences and correspondences.

δεῖ ἔχειν, 'must necessarily have', 'in the nature of things has',^b 8 or 'involves'. ἔχειν stands in a certain antithesis to κέχρηται in^b 12 (comp. 6, 1450^a 13); epic poetry has in it these various possibilities; and they are all to be seen in actual use in Homer.

ἀπλήν, scil. δεῖ εἶναι. δεῖ is easily supplied from what precedes,^b 9 just as it is in 15, 1454^b 13 (where ποιεῖν=δεῖ ποιεῖν), and in Rhet. 3, 14, 1414^b 26 (where ἐκδοῦναι=δεῖ ἐκδοῦναι: comp. Bon. Ind. 146^a 50). The ellipse of εἶναι may perhaps seem more difficult to explain; it is, however, occasionally found in Aristotle not only after δεῖ (comp. 25, 1460^b 34, and Bon. Ind. 239^a 16), but also in other constructions, as Vahlen shows in his note on this passage. A very strong instance of the omission of εἶναι is that in Eth. N. 7, 14, 1153^b 2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῆ ἐμποδιστικὴ [scil. εἶναι].

καὶ τὰ μέρη κτέ. This has been assumed from the first (see 5, 1449^b 16), and needs no demonstration. Aristotle, however, avails himself of the opportunity to add that a good epic, just as much as a tragedy, requires not only a story but also a powerful story, one with elements of surprise and suffering in it; and that the language and thought in it also demand the same care as in Tragedy. After this, reverting to the four μέρη indicated in^b 10, he reminds us that they are all to be found in perfection in Homer (οἷς ἅπασιν Ὀμηρος κέχρηται, ^b 12): (1) as regards the μῦθος, the Iliad is a story of suffering (παθητικόν), and the Odyssey a story of surprises (πεπλεγμένον); (2) as regards the element of ἦθος, the Odyssey is full of character (ἠθικὴ); while as regards (3) the λέξις and (4) the διάνοια, Homer's two poems confessedly surpass everything of the kind in these matters.

καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων, as is the case with^b 10 the complex tragedy (comp. 10, 1452^a 16; 13, 1452^b 31).

ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. Aristotle adds as an^b 11 afterthought (ἔτι) that a good epic requires not only an effective story, but also effective language. In the speeches in an epic the

1459^b II same rhetorical art is wanted as in a play (τὰς διανοίας ἔχειν καλῶς); and the diction, both in the speeches and elsewhere (comp. 24, 1460^b 3), demands the same care and elaboration (τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς). It may perhaps be thought that Aristotle was logically bound to recognize the element of ἦθος also, so as to remind us in some way or other of the rules laid down in chap. 15 as equally applicable to the ἦθη in a good epic. To supply the supposed omission Bursian wished to restore in the text ἔτι <τὰ ἦθη καὶ> τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. The difficulty arises from a misconception of the clause beginning καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δέ τε καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων, which is taken as a proof of the existence of the four μέρη in an epic—a point which hardly needed demonstration (see 5, 1449^b 16). The real purpose of the clause is to make us see the possibility of a πεπλεγμένη and a παθητικὴ ἐποποιία, as assumed in ^b9. A similar explanation of the ἠθικὴ ἐποποιία is not equally necessary (see on 18, 1455^b 34); and if it were, it would require a fuller statement than is supplied by Bursian's insertion.

^b 13 πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς. For the combination of adj. and adv. comp. 24, 1460^a 9 ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις.—Eth. N. 8. 1, 1155^a 8 μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη.—Hippocrates 1 p. 557 K. ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἀσθενέα.—Isocrates 36 D ἐκόντας καὶ προθύμως.

καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον: a reminiscence perhaps of Plato Hipp. min. 363 B ἑκάτερον γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὀδυσσεά εἴη πεποιῆσθαι τὸ δ' εἰς Ἀχιλλέα. It will be observed that Aristotle does not find every perfection in one poem; in his view the Iliad is παθητικόν, without being πεπλεγμένον or especially ἠθικόν, and the Odyssey πεπλεγμένον and ἠθικόν, without being especially παθητικόν. καὶ γὰρ καί= 'etenim et'.

^b 15 ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου. 'Agnoscitur Telemachus ab Nestore, a Menelao, ab Helena. Agnoscitur Ulysses a Cyclope, a Phaeacibus, ab Euryclea, a subulcis, a Telemacho, a procis, a Penelope, denique a patre' (Hermann).

ἠθική: a characteristic noted by Longinus 9. 15 as showing the Odyssey to have been the work of Homer's later years: προσιστορεῖσθω τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδυσσειαν, ὅπως ἢ σοι γινώσκων ὡς ἢ ἀπακμὴ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ποιηταῖς εἰς ἦθος ἐκλύεται. τοιαῦτα γὰρ πονεῖ τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσεῶς ἠθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα οἰκίαν, οἰονεὶ κωμωδία τίς ἐστὶν ἠθολογούμενη. For the change of gender (παθητικόν . . . ἠθική) comp. Eth. N. 4. 3, 1121^b 13 ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος τ' ἐστὶν . . . καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle now passes on from the construction (comp. ^b 14 *συνέστηκεν*) to the literary execution of the two Homeric poems. We should expect here *καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτέ.*, to correspond with the preceding *καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων κτέ.* The clause is apparently a reason for something which, though unsaid, was present in Aristotle's mind—something like *καὶ ἄλλα ἔχει ἀγαθά.* Another instance of the same type is in 24, 1460^b 4 (comp. Bon. Ind. 146^b 15, and Waitz, Org. 2 p. 470).

λέξει. The graphic vigour of Homer's metaphors, for instance, is recognized in Rhet. 3. 11, 1411^b 31.

καὶ διανοία refers more especially to the rhetorical skill in the speeches in Homer. Cicero says of him that he is *ornatus in dicendo ac plane orator* (Brutus 40); Quintilian also (10. 46) eulogizes his mastery over all the arts of rhetoric.

πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν: the subject is not 'Homer' (as is generally assumed) but 'these two poems', understood from *τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον* in ^b 14. There is no need, therefore, to restore *πάντας* (from sundry apographs), or to take *πάντα* as practically equivalent to *πάντας*.

διαφέρει: comp, 5, 1449^b 11.

^b 17

συστάσεως, scil. *τῶν πραγμάτων*.

ὁ εἰρημένος, in 7, 1451^a 3. The epic story must be *εὐσύνοπτος* ^b 19 (comp. 23, 1459^a 33), and not of a length which would make it impossible for the mind to take it in in its entirety; it must be a whole but not too long a whole. This condition, Aristotle adds, will be fulfilled (*εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο*), if one's epic is of about the length of a trilogy, and thus considerably shorter than the Iliad and Odyssey. Here again he shows himself mindful of the practical purpose of his treatise; he evidently thinks that an epic on the old Homeric scale of length would prove too great a strain on the memory and attention of the literary public of his own time. Apollonius Rhodius may have been mindful of Aristotle's view when he limited his Argonautica to four Books.

εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο: Top. 8. 1, 156^a 9 *εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἴ τις μὴ μόνον* ^b 20 *τὰς ἀναγκαίας* [scil. *προτάσεις*] *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς ταύτας χρησίμων τινὰ συλλογίζοιτο* (comp. also An. post. 2. 13, 97^b 33; Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^b 31).

πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγωδιῶν κτέ. 'Res ipsa unius poetae ^b 21 *tragoedias una trilogia comprehensas intelligi postulat. Haec interpretatio quum mensurarum aptam comparationem continet, tum alia etiam ratione ad epicae poeseos naturam accommodata*

1459^b 21 est. Eo facilius enim tres unius poetae tragoediae coniungi potuerunt, quod his trilogiis saepe perpetuitas quaedam argumenti continebatur, cuius illustre exemplum in superstitibus fabulis habemus Aeschyli Oresteam, e deperditis novimus Philoclis Pandionidem . . . et Aeschyli Lycurgiam' (Hermann). On this subject see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*³ p. 13.

^b 25 τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς κτέ. An indirect recognition of the Unity of Place as a fact in normal Greek Tragedy. Only one part of the story, that immediately connected with one single place (represented by the stage) and one set of persons (represented by the actors), can be told in a play; whereas an epic may include incidents occurring at one and the same time in other places and in connexion with other personages.

^b 27 ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα corresponds with διὰ τὸ . . . μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κτέ. in ^b 23.

^b 28 ὄγκος = weight, as suggestive of dignity or importance (comp. on μέγεθος, 4, 1449^a 19). A little further on (^b 35) the adj. ὄγκώδης is applied to the hexameter, as a weighty or impressive metre. In *Rhet.* 3. 6, 1407^b 26 Aristotle—without defining the term—has a discussion on 'weightiness' of style (ὄγκος τῆς λέξεως) and the kind of language which produces that effect.

ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν κτέ. The advantage its length gives the Epic over Tragedy is twofold, (1) greater grandeur of scale, and (2) greater variety of incident. If we bracket the article before it, ἀγαθὸν becomes a quasi-predicate, as in *Rhet.* 2. 20, 1394^a 2 καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὐρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπὸν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾶον. ἀγαθὸν in the sense of 'an advantage' occurs in *Rhet.* 1. 2, 1356^b 18 ἐκότερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς. For the preposition comp. Plato *Rep.* 462 A τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν . . . εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν.—*Xenophon Cyr.* 2. 1. 27 ἀγαθὸν . . . εἰς τὸ μὴ ταραττεσθαι.

^b 29 τὸ μεταβάλλειν = εἰς τὸ μεταβάλλειν. μεταβάλλειν, being followed by ἐπεισοδιοῦν, is probably transitive, 'to produce a change of mind or mood' in the hearer, as it is for instance in *Probl.* 30. 1, 953^a 39 ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις ὅτι παντοδαποὺς ἀπεργάζεται [scil. ὁ οἶνος], θεωρῶν ὡς μεταβάλλει τοὺς πίνοντας. The sense may be illustrated by the use of the verb in *Pol.* 8. 5, 1340^a 22 (where it is intransitive), μεταβάλλομεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων [i. e. certain rhythms and airs]—which is explained by what follows (^a 40), ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν.

ἐπεισοδιοῦν, scil. τὴν ποίησιν; comp. 23, 1459^a 36, and note on 1459^b 30 17, 1455^b 1.

ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισιδίοις. The episodes supply an element of variety breaking the monotony of the story. ἀνομοίοις means 'dissimilar', 'unlike one another', as in the formula πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόμοια in H. A. 4. 1, 523^b 12 (comp. Plato Tim. 83 c), and in Phys. 3. 5, 205^a 19 εἰ δ' ἀνόμοιον τὸ πᾶν, ἀνόμοιοι καὶ οἱ τόποι.—Pol. 3. 4, 1277^a 5 ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἢ πόλις.

τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον κτέ. The necessity of change is explained in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^a 25: τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ: εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίνεται μεταβάλλειν τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ [= τὸ ὅμοιον] ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστῶσης ἕξεως. ὅθεν εἴρηται "μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκὺ". Comp. also Cicero De Inv. 1. 41 *Variare aulem orationem magno opere oportebit; nam omnibus in rebus similitudo est satietatis mater.*

ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἤρμοκεν. The iambic is said to have become^b 32 established in Tragedy in the same way (see 4, 1449^a 24). Similarly in Pol. 8. 6, 1341^a 37 experience is said to have led to the rejection of the flute as part of a liberal education: ὕστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη [scil. ἡ αἴλησις] διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συντεῖνον.

διηγητικὴν. The editors prefer the reading of sundry apographs,^b 33 διηγηματικὴν, the form which appears in the context,^b 36, and in 23, 1459^a 17. There is no reason, however, why Aristotle should not say διηγητικὴ μίμησις, as διηγητικός is certainly a good Aristotelian word (v. Eth. N. 3. 13, 1117^b 34). He shows perhaps too little regard for uniformity in such matters. Thus we find him speaking in^b 34 of the ἡρωικόν, and a few lines further on (1460^a 3) of the ἡρῶον μέτρον; and in the Rhetoric ξένος and ξενικός are both used of language without perceptible difference of meaning (v. Bon. Ind. 493^a 45, ^b 24),

στασιμώτατον: comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340^b 9 (quoted on 1460^a 1),^b 34 and 8. 7, 1342^b 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης.

γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα: comp. 22, 1459^a 9.^b 35

περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ * * ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων. Before^b 36 ἡ διηγηματικὴ some such word as ταύτη or ταύταις seems to have dropped out; the point apparently is this, that epic goes beyond all other kinds of poetry (περιττὴ τῶν ἄλλων) not only, as has been already shown, in the matter of length, but also in the admission of γλώτται and μεταφοραί; the clause, therefore, as emended, comes in naturally enough to confirm the preceding statement, γλώττας

1459^b 36 καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα. Vahlen acquiesces in the traditional text, and explains it thus: 'non recipit διηγηματικὴ μίμησις aliud metrum quam heroicum: nam heroicum est metrum gravissimum ac ponderosum maxime, eximia autem etiam narrativa imitatio prae ceteris'. It seems to me that this explanation, besides assuming περιττὴ γάρ to stand for περιττὴ δέ, hardly does justice to the καί before ἡ διηγηματικὴ. For the gen. τῶν ἄλλων, due to the comparative sense of περιττὴ (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1, p. 391), comp. Xenophon Cyr. 8. 2. 21 τῶν ἀρκούντων περιττά.—Hiero 1. 19 περιττὰ τῶν ἱκανῶν.—Antiphon Tetral 2. 4. 6 περισσὸν τούτων.

1460^a 1 κινητικά, as opposed to the hexameter, which has just been said to be στασιμώτατον. The antithesis is like that in Pol. 8. 5, 1340^b 9 οἱ μὲν γὰρ [scil. τῶν ῥυθμῶν] ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικώτερας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριώτερας.

ὄρχηστικόν: see on 4, 1449^a 23.

πρακτικόν. This is what Horace meant when speaking of the iambic as *natum rebus agendis* (A. P. 82). The word has the same sense in the classification of tunes in Pol. 8. 7, 1341^b 32: τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσιν τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐθνουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες. For the meaning of πρακτικός in this connexion see on 4, 1449^a 23.

ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον carries on the idea of ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο in 1459^b 34.

^a 2 Χαιρήμων: see on 1, 1447^b 21.

^a 3 ὥσπερ εἴπομεν: in 4, 1449^a 24.

^a 4 αὐτῇ = μακρᾷ συστάσει.

^a 5 Ὅμηρος. In 5, 1449^b 11 and 6, 1449^b 26 the narrative form (ἀπαγγελία) was noted as one of differences between the Epic and Tragedy; and it has been also assumed in this discussion on the Epic, in 23, 1459^a 17. Aristotle now passes on to this, but without any formal introduction or hint as to the connexion in his statement. His aim apparently is to show that, although narrative is an element in every epic, it is reduced to a minimum in the best Epic, that of Homer; so that this point of difference is not so serious as might be supposed. The semi-dramatic character of Homer's mode of statement is directly or indirectly recognized in 3, 1448^a 21, and in 4, 1448^b 37 (see note on the passage). In his reference to the practice of the 'other poets' (οἱ μὲν οὖν

ἄλλοι, ^a 8) Aristotle must be supposed to mean 'not only the more recent epic writers, like Antimachus and Choerilus, but also the immediate continuators of Homer, the Cyclic poets' (Bergk, Gr. Litt. I p. 830).

ὁ δὲ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτόν is emphatic, as in Top. 8. 2, 157^a 29^a 6
πειρατέον ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀνοματοποιεῖν αὐτόν.—Pol. 8. 5,
1339^a 42 ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς;

ἀγωνίζονται: see on 6, 1450^b 18.

^a 9

μιμούνται: see on 1, 1447^a 16.

ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις: De gen. an. 1. 19, 727^b 28 ὀλίγαις καὶ ὀλιγάκις συμβαίνει.—3. 5, 756^a 17 ὀλίγα δὲ καὶ ὀλιγάκις.—Eth. N. 7. 11, 1151^b 30 ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις (v. Bon. Ind. 503^a 37).—Plato Rep. 491 B ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας. For instances of other combinations of the same kind see on 24, 1459^b 13.

εἰσάγει: a metaphor from the stage, as may be seen from the Platonic use of the word (v. Ast, Lex. s. v.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417^b 7 and 3. 17, 1418^a 32 it denotes the introduction of a person into a speech.

ἦθος: see on 15, 1454^a 23.

^a 11

οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθη: an instance of parallelismus antitheticus not unlike that in Plato Phaedr. 277 A καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλ' ἔχοντες σπέρμα. With ἔχοντα the affirmative ἕκαστον has to be supplied (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 567). ἦθη, as used here in the plural of an individual, means 'points' or 'traits of character', as we say, 'characteristics'. It has the same sense in Plato Rep. 402 D ὅτου ἂν ξυμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις . . . τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα.

δεῖ μὲν οὖν. μὲν οὖν marks a transition to a new point (Bon. Ind. 540^b 58). A fourth difference in epic poetry as compared with Tragedy is its great tolerance of ἄλογα; it can admit improbabilities which on the stage, where everything is actually seen, would ruin the success of a tragedy. This gives it a distinct advantage over Tragedy, as the 'improbable' is an element in the 'marvellous' (τὸ θαυμαστόν), and the marvellous is a cause of pleasure to us (ἡδύ). It will be observed that pleasure is once more posited as the immediate end of poetry.

ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις: as has been assumed in 9, 1452^a 4 and 14, 1454^a 4.

τὸ θαυμαστόν: see on 9, 1452^a 4.

^a 12

τὸ ἄλογον: see on 15, 1454^b 6.

^a 13

1460^a 14 διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν: comp. 17, 1455^a 27.

τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑκτορος δῖωξιν is explained by the participial clause in apposition (comp. Bernhardt, Syntax p. 472); the reference is to the statement in Il. 22. 205 λαοῖσιν δ' ἀνένευε καρῆτι διος Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐδ' ἔα ἰέμεναι ἐπὶ Ἑκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμνα. Aristotle reverts to this incident in 25, 1460^b 26, where he suggests an explanation to save the credit of Homer. An echo of the criticism in the text survives in Schol. Ven. B on Il. 22. 205, Μεγακλείδης [v. Schrader, Porphyr. Q. H. in Il. p. 414] πλάσμα εἶναι φησι τοῦτο τὸ μονομάχιον· πῶς γὰρ τοσαύτας μυριάδας νεύματι Ἀχιλλεύς ἀπέστρεφεν;

^a 17 τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 10 διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ [scil. οἱ ἄνθρωποι] τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν. A reason is given in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^a 31: καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.

^a 18 προστιθέντες, 'with additions'; the same absolute use of the word is found in 26, 1461^b 30 (προσθηῆ).

δεδίδαχεν κτέ. Another of Homer's merits is said to be his mastery of the artistic lie—one that has something true super-added to make it seem credible. In illustration of this Aristotle points to the story in Od. 19. 164–248; where Ulysses astutely adds certain particulars (203–248), which Penelope knows to be true, and which beguile her into accepting the first part of his story as true. The connexion between this and the preceding section (^a 11–18) is left unexplained, and it is certainly far from being obvious. If one may imagine the association of ideas in Aristotle's mind, it may perhaps have been something like this, that τὸ θαυμαστὸν is a truth with a πρόσθεσις of falsehood, and the lie artistic (ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ) a falsehood with a πρόσθεσις of truth; so that the one is as it were the converse of the other.

^a 20 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός, 'i. e. the use of paralogism'. παραλογισμός is like παραλογίζεσθαι (v. infra on ^a 25) an ambiguous term; it may mean either a fallacious argument (ψευδῆς συλλογισμός) or a deception caused by such an argument (ἀπάτη διὰ ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ)—this latter being apparently its sense in the present passage, where it comes in to explain ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. The distinction, however, is probably clearer to us than it was to Aristotle himself. The general assumption in his logical writings is that an argument is addressed to some one—to a hearer who

has to be convinced or refuted; a fallacious argument is not only 1460^a 20 logically incorrect but also calculated to mislead the hearer who fails to see the fallacy in it.

οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι. The artifice depends for its success on a natural weakness of the human intellect, our readiness to infer the presence of the thing from the presence of a 'sign' of it, or the truth of the antecedent from the truth of the consequent. The 'fallacia consequentis' is considered at length in Soph. el. 5, 167^b 1: ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολουθήσιν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦδε ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοδὶ ᾗ, καὶ τοῦδε ὄντος οἴονται καὶ θάτερον εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ὅθεν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν μέλι ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἔπεισθαι τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα τῷ μέλιτι καὶ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει τὴν γῆν ὕσαντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχον, κἂν ᾗ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὕσαι τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. ἔν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσίν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλαβον ὅτι καλλωπιστῆς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὀράται πλανώμενος. πολλοῖς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει. It is recognized as one of the arts of rhetoric in Rhet. 2. 19, 1392^b 16, and more fully in 2. 24, 1401^b 9, 20.

ἄνθρωποι or <οί> ἄνθρωποι seems to be required here; comp. the parallels in 1, 1447^b 13; Phys. 4. 6, 213^a 23, 27; Metaph. A 2, 982^b 12; Rhet. 1. 1, 1355^a 15, and 3. 2, 1404^b 9.

τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. τοῦτο has been taken to refer to τὸ πρότερον, ^a 22 the antecedent, which, though not true, we imagine to be true. But it probably refers rather to the mode of argument, which is 'false', i.e. logically incorrect; comp. An. pr. 1. 17, 37^a 2; 1. 46, 52^b 28; Rhet. 2. 23, 1400^b 2.

πρῶτον = πρότερον. Vahlen illustrates this from Top. 3. 5, ^a 23 119^a 22. For instances in other writers see Sauppe's Lexil. Xenophont. p. 112 and HSt. s. v.

προσθεῖναι, scil. τοῦτο τῷ ψεύδει, i.e. to provide the lie with ^a 24 a πρόσθεσις of truth, in order to beguile the hearer into accepting it as true.

παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ: i.e. we on our side are quite ready ^a 25 to draw the false inference, which a lie of this kind is calculated to suggest. παραλογίζεσθαι has a noteworthy diversity of senses in Aristotle, sometimes meaning to draw a false inference, sometimes (with an acc. pers.) to deceive or beguile by a fallacy, and sometimes (as a passive) to be so deceived or beguiled (comp. Bon. Ind. 565^a 11); and it is not always easy to see the sense intended. In

1460^a 25 the present passage the word must have the first of these three senses, as the emphasis on the pronoun in ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ points to something that we ourselves are supposed to do: we on our side, knowing the truth of the consequent (διὰ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθὲς ὄν), are ready enough, owing to a natural infirmity of the human mind, to infer the truth of the antecedent; which is what the skilful deceiver wants us to do.

^a 26 παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων is a note more fitted for the rough draft of a lecture than for a book (see on 15, 1454^b 14 and 22, 1458^a 30). The quotation or explanation is left to be supplied afterwards. How it might have come in may be seen from the parallels in Rhet. 2. 23, 1399^a 7 παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;” and Rhet. 3. 16, 1417^a 29 παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκῆδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἡ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα, “μητρὸς δ’ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων οὐκ ἔστ’ ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ”.

ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων: Od. 19. 164–260 (see on 16, 1454^b 30). Penelope was the victim of a ‘fallacia consequentis’, as her only reason for accepting Ulysses’ statement in 164–200 as true was her recognition of the truth of that in 220–248.

προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ κτέ. Aristotle returns to τὸ ἄλογον (^a 13–17) and its general inadmissibility in the Drama. The illustrations in ^a 30–32 show him to be now thinking only of Tragedy; the rule here laid down is a restatement of one already formulated for Tragedy (15, 1454^b 6); and the distinction between ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος and ἐν τῷ δράματι has no immediate relation to the technique of the Epic.

^a 27 ἀδύνατα εἰκότα κτέ. According to 9, 1451^a 38 the subject of the poetic story should be something that is possible as being either probable or necessary, τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. In the present passage Aristotle considers two inferior kinds of subject, one that is εἰκός without being δυνατόν (ἀδύνατα εἰκότα), and one that is δυνατόν without being εἰκός (δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα). The former, he says, is poetically preferable to the latter; poetry demands not so much truth as a passable semblance of truth (comp. 25, 1461^b 11).

λόγους: i. e. the μῦθοι or stories embodied in the play or poem (see on 4, 1449^a 17). τοὺς λόγους, which is the subject of ἔχειν in ^a 29, is apparently the subject of συνίστασθαι also. συνίστασθαι, though a middle in ^a 34 (comp. 6, 1450^a 37), must be a passive

here, as it certainly is in 26, 1462^a 16 (see on 1, 1447^a 9). The 1460^a 27 same rule has already appeared in a slightly different form in 15, 1454^b 6.

ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος: see on 14, 1453^b 32.

^a 29

Οἰδίπους. The article seems to have dropped out before the name (see on 4, 1448^b 38). ἔχει has to be supplied from the ἔχειν in the preceding line.

^a 30

τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, scil. τὸν Οἰδίπουν, just as in 16, 1455^a 19 βούλεσθαι means βούλεσθαι τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν, the names being understood from the titles of the plays. In some instances, however (16, 1455^a 1, ^a 3, ^a 10), the personages referred to are not indicated even in this indirect way. The fact of Oedipus remaining for years in ignorance of the circumstances of the death of Laius is an improbability in the O. T.; but in Aristotle's view it is not so serious a fault as it might seem, since it is all anterior to the action, and outside the play itself.

ἐν Ἡλέκτρᾳ: Sophocles El. 660 sqq. The precise fault Aristotle saw in the story is not quite clear; as the stress, however, seems to be on τὰ Πύθια, the probability is that it was the anachronism in the reference to the Pythian games; the fault is noted by the Scholiast on El. 682 (οὐπω ἦν ἐπὶ Ὀρέστου ὁ Πυθικὸς ἀγών: comp. Schol. on El. 47, 49), who may be assumed to be reproducing a traditional criticism. The alternative is to suppose the absurdity to consist in Clytaemnestra having to learn the news for the first time from the παιδαγωγός: 'an credible est nullum Argivum hominem ludis interfuisse, qui spectare Orestae exitium posset; cum ex universa Graecia eo fieret concursus?' (Robortello).

^a 31

ἐν Μυσοῖς: probably in the Μυσοί of Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF.² ^a 32 p. 47). The personage described as ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἦκων was no doubt Telephus, a favourite subject for Tragedy (comp. 13, 1453^a 21). His long-maintained silence, which was an element of improbability in the play, passed into a proverb in the later Comedy: Amphis fr. 30, 6 Κοκκ ἔκλυψεν ὥσπερ Τήλεφος πρῶτον σιωπῆ—καὶ δικαίως τοῦτό γε· ἅπαντες ἀνδροφόνοι γάρ εἰσιν ἐνὶ λόγῳ.—Alexis fr. 178 K. δειπνεῖ δ' ἄφωνος Τήλεφος, νεύων μόνον πρὸς τοὺς ἐπερωτῶντάς τι.

συνίστασθαι, which seems to have the same subject as θῆ in ἀν δὲ ^a 34 θῆ, must be a middle here (see on ^a 27).

ἀν δὲ θῆ, scil. τοιοῦτον μῦθον ὁ ποιητής, or perhaps (as Bon. Ind. 751^a 25 suggests) τὸ ἄλογον ἐν τῇ συστάσει τοῦ μύθου. The usual

1460^a 34 punctuation of this passage is *ἀν δὲ θῆ, καὶ φαίνεται εὐλογωτέρως, ἐνδέχασθαι καὶ ἄτοπον*, which Tyrwhitt, with the old reading *εὐλογώτερον* before him, supposes to mean ‘sin constituat quis et rationi consentaneum magis videatur, admittere etiam aliquid absurdi’ [*scil.* oportet]. Vahlen, who takes the same view, thinks that *εὐλογωτέρως* may stand for *εὐλογωτέρως ἔχειν* (comp. Bon. Ind. 306^a 16), that *δεῖ* may be supplied with *ἐνδέχασθαι* from the context (^a 34), and also that *ἐνδέχασθαι* may mean ‘admittere’, like *δέχασθαι* or *ἀποδέχασθαι*. With the amended punctuation the following will be the general drift of the passage: having just declared a certain procedure to be wrong (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους*), Aristotle adds that in a certain case—*ἀν δὲ θῆ καὶ φαίνεται εὐλογωτέρως ἐνδέχασθαι*—it is not only wrong but also absurd (*καὶ ἄτοπον*). With *ἐνδέχασθαι* we may supply *θεῖναι*, from *ἀν δὲ θῆ*; comp. 25, 1461^a 34 *ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται* (where *σημαίνειν* is understood from the preceding *ποσαχῶς ἀν σημαῖνοι*), and An. pr. 1. 15, 34^a 34 *ὑπαρχέτω τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ἐνδεχέσθω* (where *ἐνδεχέσθω* = *ἐνδεχέσθω ὑπάρχειν*). For the use of *ἄτοπον* comp. De div. per somn. 1, 462^b 20 *τό τε γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πέμποντα* [*scil.* τὰ ἐνύπνια], *πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογία, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ φρονιμωτάτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχοῦσι πέμπειν ἄτοπον*.

^a 35 *ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα*. In Od. 13. 116 sqq. Ulysses is said to have slept on even when the Phaeacians were setting him ashore. Porphyry ad loc. (p. 115 Schrader) recognizes the difficulty in the story, and quotes the explanation of Heraclides Ponticus: *τὴν τῶν Φαιάκων ἀτοπίαν, καθ’ ἣν τὸν Ὀδυσσεΐα καθεῖδοντα μὴ διωπνίσαντες εἰς τὴν γῆν κατέθεντο, τοῦ τε Ὀδυσσεΐως τὸν ἄκαιρον ὕπνον διαλύειν πειρώμενος ὁ Ποντικός Ἡρακλείδης φησὶν ἀτόπους εἶναι τοὺς ἐξ ὧν εἶρηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς μὴ στοχαζομένους περὶ τοῦ παντὸς τρόπου τῶν Φαιάκων κτέ.*

^b 2 *ἀφανίζει*: see Bon. Ind. 127^a 1. The sense is that the attractiveness of the accessories (*ἡδύνων*; see on 6, 1449^b 25) disguises the inherent absurdity of the situation.

^b 3 *ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσι*. The meaning of these words has been supposed to be explained by what follows, *καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς μήτε διανοητικοῖς*; comp. Goulston’s version of the clause, ‘in partibus fabulae ignavis, iis scilicet quae neque moratae sunt neque sententiis munitae’. The sense, however, may very well be, ‘in the parts in which there is no movement, and no ethical or rhetorical interest,’ i. e. in the purely descriptive parts. For the form of the statement comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 2 *σαφῆ . . . καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπερ τὸ ἀξίωμα*.

Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων κτέ. On the matter in this chapter see 1460^b 6 M. Carrol, 'Aristotle's Poetics c. xxv. in the light of the Homeric Scholia' (Baltimore 1895). It is added as a sort of Appendix, in recognition of the fact that a poem, when once before the world, may be exposed to criticism. A 'Problem' was originally a question propounded for discussion, whether in schools or in social gatherings such as Plato supposes in his dialogues. The general logic of such discussions is examined and reduced to formula in the Topics; but Aristotle takes no account in the Topics of the particular kind of Problem with which he is now dealing, the literary or critical Problem. This kind of question turns on some difficulty in a poem, which an adverse critic will censure as a mistake. By an analysis of the postulates and conditions of poetry Aristotle is able to determine and classify not only the various possible grounds of censure (*ἐπιτίμησις*), but also the various possible lines of defence, by indicating the solution (*λύσις*) or solutions applicable to each kind of objection. In illustrating the methods of defence he takes his instances mainly from the Homeric poems. Homer had long been a mark for criticism. Every kind of defect had been discovered in his two poems, offences against morality, absurdities, contradictions and other faults of construction, and even errors of language; the result being that Aristotle's contemporary Zoilus, the 'Homeromastix', was able to write a regular treatise (of considerable magnitude, it would seem) *κατὰ τῆς τοῦ Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως*, on the manifold faults in Homer. The position of Aristotle himself in this controversy is clear: he is on the side of the apologists, and an opponent of the kind of criticism represented by Zoilus. He is ready to meet the critics on their own ground with an answer of some sort or description for almost every difficulty they can start. The fragments of his *ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*, a systematic work on this subject (fr. 142—178 Teubn.), exhibit the same tendency, and reveal him as a master of all the arts of critical casuistry.

ὡδ' ἂν θεωροῦσι γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν. For other Aristotelian instances of this repetition of *ἂν* see Bon. Ind. 41^a 60.

ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the various kinds of *λύσεις* by laying down a series of postulates, which may supply the defence with arguments to meet the attacks of the critics. In the first place, he tells us, as the poet is an imitator in much the same way as a painter is that, one must remember that his imitation or picture of things may be either of things as they are (or were), or

1460^b 8 of things as they should be, or of things as they are said or supposed to be. Secondly, as an imitator in language, the poet has by custom more liberty in the use of words than is allowed to a prose writer. Thirdly, if the technical correctness of his description of a thing is questioned, it is to be remembered that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, and that the right in poetry is not the same thing as the right in other arts or sciences, in politics for instance. At the same time, as the matter of poetry brings it into relation with other arts and sciences, their standard of correctness cannot be ignored in poetry. An offence, however, against their rule of correctness may often be condoned; and in certain cases it even admits of justification (^b 24), if it is seen to conduce to the poetical effect.

ζωγράφος ἢ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός: see on 2, 1448^a 5. The term *εἰκονοποιός* comprises the sculptor as well as the painter of portraits.

^b 10 οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν. In chap. 2 Aristotle was speaking of persons only. In the present passage he uses the neuter in order to include the poetic descriptions of things and acts. The order of the words ἦν ἢ ἔστιν is intentional, stories of the past being regarded as the normal subjects of both epic poetry and Tragedy (see on 2, 1448^a 18). It may be observed that in 1461^a 2 Aristotle avails himself of the distinction implied in οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, and suggests that a certain incident, which had been criticized in Homer, may have been probable enough in Homeric times.

οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, scil. εἶναι (which covers the ground of both ἦν and ἔστιν). The difference between the two things (οἷά φασιν, οἷα δοκεῖ), so far as there is one, is like that between τὰ λεγόμενα and τὰ δοκοῦντα—‘what people usually say’, and ‘what people usually think, or suppose’.

^b 11 οἷα εἶναι δεῖ: comp. ^b 34.

λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ. λέξις is properly a generic term, including the metaphor, the strange word, etc. Here, however, Aristotle adds ἢ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ., in order to remind us of the fact that these various unusual forms of expression are a recognized part of the poetic vocabulary. The practical effect of the addition is to modify the sense of λέξει, and make it stand for κυρία λέξει, just as in 1, 1447^a 29 (v. ad loc.) the addition of ἢ τοῖς μέτροις has a reflex influence on the preceding word λόγοις, limiting it for the moment to the sense of ‘prose’. The generic word ὄνομα likewise is occasionally used in a context which gives it the more

specific sense of *κύριον ὄνομα* (see on 22, 1458^a 28). It is hardly 1460^b 11 necessary, therefore, to restore <κυρία> λέξει with Heinsius, or λέξει <ἢ κυρία> with Twining, or λέξει <ἢ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν> with Vahlen.

πάθη τῆς λέξεως: i.e. the modifications seen in the ἐπεκτετα-^b 12 μένον, the ὑφηρεημένον, and the ἐξηλλαγμένον ὄνομα (21, 1458^a 1), which, though substantially identical with the ordinary words (22, 1458^b 4), are distinguished from them through some deviation of form. The term πάθος is used in this same sense by Theophrastus in a fragment of his Περὶ λέξεως (Rabe, De Theophrasti libris περὶ λέξεως p. 6): τίς ἢ κυρία λέξις, τίς δ' ἢ μεταφορική; καὶ τίνα τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς, οἷον τί ἀποκοπή, τί συγκοπή, τί ἀφαίρεσις;

δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα: a recognition of what were afterwards known^b 13 as poetic licences. Aristotle has already shown their use and legitimacy in poetry (22, 1458^a 34).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ. The kind of criticism Aristotle has in mind is one sufficiently familiar to us moderns; we know that a picture, for instance, is often censured for errors of anatomy, and a novel for errors of history or archaeology. In Aristotle's view technical accuracy in such points, though desirable (^b 27), is neither the one thing nor the first thing needful in a poem. Poetry, as a distinct art, has an end, a procedure, and a correctness of its own; and it is thus quite possible for a description in a poem to be poetically right, even though it may be wrong in some technical detail.

τῆς πολιτικῆς. Πολιτικῆ, as the art which deals with human life^b 14 and conduct, might easily seem to stand in a very intimate relation to poetry, which has to depict human life and conduct (comp. 6, 1450^a 16 μίμησις πράξεως καὶ βίου); and as a matter of history the connexion between the two arts was posited in the common notion of the older poets being authorities on all questions of πολιτικῆ, and the great teachers of moral and political wisdom (comp. Plato Rep. 598 D, 606 E; also Dümmler, Kl. Schriften 1 p. 30). It is not without reason, therefore, that Aristotle takes πολιτικῆ as his instance here, and emphasizes the distinction between the 'political' and the 'poetical' standard of right.

It may perhaps be thought that in affirming this distinction Aristotle anticipates the idea of 'Art for Art', and regards poetry as raised above the limitations imposed on all ordinary human activities by social or moral law. Such a notion would ill accord with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In Aristotle's view

1460^b 14 a deviation in poetry from the ethically right is, just like one from probability or truth, an exceptional procedure, and to be condoned only when it is seen to be necessary for the ultimate poetical effect. The tragic hero, if one is to feel pity for him in his misfortunes, should be a good man—either better than, or at least as good as, the average of mankind. The secondary personages too should be each good in their way, unless the plot happens to require a character of a lower type; in which case his baseness should be no more than is wanted for the evolution of the story. (Even Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, has its ethical limitations: the comic personage, though by hypothesis worse than the average man, is worse only up to a certain point; his faults of character or conduct being such as may be laughed at, i.e. they do not excite anger or abhorrence in the normally minded spectator in the theatre. (The tacit assumption throughout the Poetics is that the theatrical public is on the whole normal in its moral instincts and sympathies, and that the poet should never lose sight of the fact.) Readers of the Nicomachean Ethics will remember that in the Aristotelian hierarchy of arts all the other arts are regarded as subordinate to πολιτική, the supreme art, which deals with the whole social and moral order of the State, and that there is no hint of the so-called 'aesthetic' arts being outside its purview and control.

^b 15 αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττῆ ἁμαρτία. The argument may be thus restated: There is always a twofold possibility of error in the poet's μίμησις or description of things. (1) Starting with a correct idea of the object to be described, he may fail to express his own meaning; in which case his art as a poet (or μιμητής) is at fault, and his faulty description is a sign of artistic or literary incapacity. (2) On the other hand the error may be simply due to his starting with an erroneous idea of the object; in which case it arises not from lack of descriptive power on his part, but from insufficient knowledge of something outside poetry, and it is thus in the accidents rather than the essentials of the poetic art. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 33, 182^b 33 ἀπορία δ' ἐστὶ διττῆ, ἢ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς . . . ἢ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, to show that an article is not wanted before ἁμαρτία.

^b 17 ἀδυναμίαν: comp. 16, 1454^b 21 δι' ἀπορίαν. δι' ἀδυναμίαν is practically equivalent to δι' ἀτεχνίαν, through lack of artistic power—art being with Aristotle a kind of δύναμις or power (v. Bon. Ind. 207^b 6).

εἰ δὲ τῷ προελεῖσθαι κτέ. I have not been able to follow Vahlen 1460^b 18 in his general view of this passage, which in his edition reads thus:—

εἰ δὲ τὸ προελεῖσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον (ἄμ') ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα οἷον τὸ καθ' ἱατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται] ὁποιοῦν, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν.

This reading requires us to take *μὴ ὀρθῶς* as standing for *μὴ ὀρθῶς εἶχεν*, and *ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ.* as a short way of saying *ἀλλὰ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι οἷον τὸν ἵππον κτέ.* It is, however, much simpler to suppose that *μὴ ὀρθῶς* = *μὴ ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι*, and to take *ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ.* (scil. *μιμήσασθαι*) as a concrete instance of the opposite of *ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι*. The insertion also of *ἄμα* before *ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα* is unnecessary; these words (as the tense of the participle is enough to show) suggest a picture; and the fault in the picture consists in the horse in motion being depicted with *βοῖη* right legs thrown forward, instead of only one of them. As regards the clause *ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται*, which Vahlen (after Düntzer) excises as a dittographia of the *ἀδύνατα πεποιήται* in ^b 23, it seems to me that the words are wanted for two reasons, (1) to enable us to supply *πεποιήται* after *τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα*, and (2) to give the statement the requisite breadth. The error in the poet's picture or description (comp. *πεποιήται*) may be in matters which come under the cognizance of some special art or science (*τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα*), but it may also be in matters of a less distinctly technical nature. Aristotle adds *ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται ὅποι' ἂν οὖν* in order to include this latter kind of error. The instance of it in the context (^b 26) is the absurdity (comp. 24, 1460^a 15), or rather the offence against common sense, in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad. That given in ^b 31 of the other form of error is a mistake in natural history, i. e. in a matter of technical knowledge. The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of error is a very real one, at any rate in controversy (v. on 25, 1461^b 24).

τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, scil. *μιμήσασθαι*. In Aristotle's view this is a mistake in natural history, and inconsistent with the general law of the diagonal movement of the legs of quadrupeds walking as laid down in the *De incessu an.* 14, 712^a 24 : *κινεῖται δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθια πρὸς τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κατὰ διάμετρον' μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ὀπισθεν κινουῦσιν, εἶτα τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ὀπισθεν . . . εἰ δὲ τοῖς δεξιοῖς ἀμφοτέροις πρῶτοις [scil. ἐποιοῦντο τὴν κίνησιν], ἕξω*

1460^b 18 ἄν ἐγίγνωτο τῶν ἐρεισμάτων καὶ ἐπιπτον ἄν. He was apparently unaware of the fact that the legs of the horse are actually in the position assumed to be impossible in certain stages of the amble and the rack. A horse with legs in this position is to be seen in modern art in Meissonier's 'Cavaliers en marche' (*Exposition Meissonier*, No. 114—Paris 1893). Illustrations from the life will be found in E. Muybridge's 'Animal Locomotion'—Philadelphia 1872-93.

^b 21 ὅποι' ἄν οὖν, scil. ἧ̄ or πεποιημένα ἧ̄. For the omission of the verb comp. Soph. el. 17, 175^b 27 ὅποτέρῳ γὰρ ἄν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.—Eth. N. 3. 10. 1115^b 19 ὡς ἄν ὁ λόγος.—Pol. 6. 3, 1318^a 22 ὃ τι ἄν οἱ ὀλέγοι (also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 255). We should expect simply ὀποιοῦν, the formula ordinarily used by Aristotle in passages like the present.

οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν (scil. ἡ ἁμαρτία τῆς ποιητικῆς) is the apodosis, and the opposite of that in the preceding clause (^b 17), αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία. The general sense of the passage (with the reading τῷ προελεσθαι) is briefly this: If it was through a mistake in his original conception of the thing that either the technical error, or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, the error in that case does not belong to the art of the poet *per se*, but only *per accidens*.

ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα κτέ. A Problem in Aristotle's sense of the term is only a kind of question (v. on ^b 6); but the mere fact of a question being raised in reference to the poet's work involves the possibility of an answer unfavourable to him, i. e. of an ἐπιτίμημα, a censure or condemnation of what he has said. We have had ἐπιτίμημα in this technical sense in 19, 1456^b 14, and the verb ἐπιτιμᾶν in 17, 1455^a 26, in 19, 1456^b 16, and in 22, 1458^b 6. The criticisms to which a poem is exposed Aristotle examines under the three heads indicated in the preceding statement (^b 7-21), but in reverse order: (1) the strictures passed on the poet's descriptions of things (^b 22-32); (2) those relating to the kind of subject he has chosen to depict (^b 32-1461^a 9); and (3) the faults found in his language (1461^a 9-31). After that he shows in what way or ways each kind of criticism has to be answered.

^b 23 τὰ πρὸς αὐτήν τὴν τέχνην, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐπιτιμήματα, the censures relating to the artistic execution in his imitations.

⟨εἰ⟩ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται. Ueberweg suggests that the traditional ἀδύνατα πεποίηται (without the insertion of εἰ) may be a rhetorical

way of putting the supposition, such as might be used in an actual 1460^b 23 debate or discussion. In the course of this chapter Aristotle more than once writes as if he were simply reporting a possible debate (v. on^b 33 ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ, and on 1461^a 1 ἀλλ' οὖν φασι).

ἡμάρτηται is the natural opposite of the ὀρθῶς ἔχει in the next line; comp. Eth. E. 2. 11, 1227^b 21 ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.—Eth. N. 8. 12, 1160^b 30 αὕτη μὲν οὖν [scil. ἡ ἀρχή] ὀρθῆ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη.—Eth. N. 6. 10, 1142^b 10 ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία.—2. 2, 1104^b 32 περὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός.

τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἶρηται: a reason for the statement that follows^b 24 (see on 21, 1457^b 34). For the use of εἶρηται (which has been very unadvisedly questioned and altered into εὔρηται, αἰρεῖται, εἴληπται, or τηρεῖται) see on 11, 1452^b 11.

εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον κτέ. is appositional to εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ^b 25 τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς. Vahlen compares Metaph. E 3, 1027^a 30 εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντ' ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτιὸν τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι.—Plato Gorg. 522 C εἰ ἐκείνὸ γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὠμολόγησας, εἰ βεβηθηκῶς εἶη αὐτῷ κτέ.; and Hyperides Euxen. 23, 24, Lysias 3, 38. The clause only gives an illustration, not a complete account of the end of poetry. That surprise is one of the legitimate effects of poetry was definitely said, though the point is nowhere demonstrated, in 24, 1460^a 11; it has been assumed also in 9, 1452^a 4, in 14, 1454^a 4, and in 16, 1455^a 17. For the meaning of ἐκπληκτικώτερον see on 14, 1454^a 4.

(ἢ μὴ) ἦττον: Metaph. K 5, 1062^a 25 δόξειε δὲ κὰν οὐχ ἵππον^b 27 εἶναι φάσκων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ οὐχ ἦττον ἀληθεύειν ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον.

ἡμαρτῆσθαι here seems to be a dittographia of the ἡμαρτῆσθαι^b 28 in the next line (J. of Phil. 14, p. 52).

δεῖ γὰρ κτέ.: comp. the parallel statement as to the avoidance of ἄλογα in 24, 1460^a 28. The general rule is that the descriptions in poetry should be in accordance with the technical standard of correctness; but at the same time there are cases in which some sacrifice of technical accuracy may be requisite to produce the poetic effect (^b 24; comp. 1461^b 11 πρὸς τὴν ποιήσιν), and in these the end justifies the means. This is the only direct answer to an objection of this kind. But if such an answer is not possible, it may perhaps be urged, in mitigation of censure at

1460^b 28 any rate, that the technical error is in a minor matter (^b 31), and as such, a venial fault in an imitative art.

^b 29 ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀμάρτημα κτέ. is not a λύσις proper, but an attempt to minimize the offence. In a λύσις proper the point to which the opponent has taken exception is shown to have another aspect, and to be right (ὀρθῶς ἔχει ^b 24) when viewed in that other aspect.

^b 30 τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην: in matters belonging to his art, i. e. the art of poetry, as distinct from matters outside poetry, and only accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) connected with it. Vahlen draws attention to the change of construction, κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός instead of τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For the appositional clause after ποτέρων comp. Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164^a 22, and Rhet. 3. 5, 1407^b 15.

^b 31 ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει: H. A. 4. 11, 538^b 18 κέρατα ἔλαφος θήλεια οὐκ ἔχει.—De part. an. 3. 1, 662^a 1 τῶν ἐλάφων οἱ μὲν ἄρρενες ἔχουσι κέρατα, αἱ δὲ θήλεια οὐκ ἔχουσιν. The hind seems to have often been represented as having horns not only by poets (v. Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fr. p. 61), but also by artists; comp. the Scholiast on Pindar Ol. 3, 52: ἐπιμελῶς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὴν θήλειαν ἔλαφον κέρατα ἔχουσαν εἰσάγουσιν, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν θηλάζουσαν τὸν Τήλεφον γράφουσι καὶ πλάττουσιν.

^b 32 ἀμιμήτως is the opposite of μιμητικῶς. In Probl. 29. 10, 951^a 6 (the only Aristotelian passage in which it recurs) ἀμίμητος is the opposite of μιμητός; but it is not uncommon with negative words of this type to have two senses, an active as well as a passive; ἀναίσθητος, for instance, is the opposite not only of αἰσθητός but also of αἰσθητικός. The negative idea in this and similar privative terms must not be pressed too far (see on ἀήθεις 6, 1450^a 25); ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν only means that the picture did not adequately express the artist's meaning, i. e. did not express it in a way to be understood by others. A failure of this kind, which arises δι' ἀδυναμίαν, through lack of artistic capacity (see above on ^b 17), is inexcusable in a μιμητής, whose work must be intelligible, if it is to give us the pleasure of a μίμημα (v. 4, 1448^b 15).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle passes on to the ἐπιτιμήματα which come under the first of the three heads in the survey in ^b 8 sqq. The objector is supposed to urge either that the poetic picture is not true to fact (comp. οἶα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ^b 10), or that it is not better than the reality (comp. οἶα εἶναι δεῖ, ^b 11), or that it is not in harmony with tradition or opinion (comp. οἶά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ ^b 10). The answers to these criticisms may take the follow-

ing forms:—(1) If not true to fact, the picture is perhaps better 1460^b 32 than the reality; (2) if neither true to fact nor better than the reality, it is perhaps in accordance with opinion; (3) if not in accordance with opinion, it is perhaps true to fact. There are thus three λύσεις for this class of ἐπιτιμήματα. Aristotle omits to mention a fourth λύσις, the plea of poetic necessity (πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν, 1461^b 9), which is, wherever possible, a valid answer to almost any criticism.

ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ = ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ εἶναι, just as in the next line οἶους δεῖ^b 33 = οἶους δεῖ εἶναι (comp. Bon. Ind. 239^a 16). The answer is vividly introduced by ἀλλά, the word the defender himself might use in an actual discussion.

οἶον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς: see on 6, 1450^a 37. A similar remark is attributed to the poet Philoxenus, Φιλόξενος ὁ ποιητῆς εἰπόντος τινός, διατὶ Σοφοκλῆς χρηστὰς παρεισάγει τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτὸς δὲ φαύλας, εἶπεν, Ὅτι Σοφοκλῆς μὲν οἶας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οἶαι εἶσιν (S. Maximus Conf. 2 p. 632 Combef.).

ταύτη λυτέον. Having introduced an illustration (the saying of^b 34 Sophocles), Aristotle adds ταύτη λυτέον, repeating the sense of the words preceding the illustration. This is an instance of what Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 209, terms the Binary structure with comparisons, when 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it.' For other Aristotelian instances see Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 1 p. 6, and my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 27.

ὅτι οὕτω φασίν = λυτέον ὅτι οὕτω φασίν εἶναι. The construction^b 35 λύειν ὅτι ('to refute by saying that') is found in Soph. el. 24, 179^b 34 ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες ὅτι ἅπας ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος.—Rhet. 2. 25, 1402^b 34 οὕκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκόσ.—Fr. 166 (Teubn.) ἔστι δὲ λύειν . . . ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν.

τὰ περὶ θεῶν: i. e. the poetic statements about Gods, though neither true nor better than the truth, may perhaps be said to be sanctioned by opinion, and to be what people are in the habit of repeating of the Gods.

ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει, scil. ἐστίν, 'as they are in the view of Xeno- 1461^a 1 phanes' (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1, p. 421). Other Aristotelian instances of this use of the dative are De caelo 3. 8, 307^a 16 Δημοκρίτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ὡς γωνία τις οὕσα τέμνει ὡς εὐκίνητον.—De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325^b 15 Ἐμπειδοκλεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσις, οὐ δῆλον. Xenophanes, we must remember,

1461^a 1 was the first to lift up his voice against Homer and Hesiod, as the great exponents of a false and immoral conception of the Gods (see fr. 10–12 Diels).

ἀλλ' οὖν = 'but at any rate' (Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 160; comp. Bon. Ind. 33^b 33).

^a 2 ἔγχεα δέ σφιν κτέ.: Il. 10. 152 ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος ἐλήλατο. The difficulty here is thus stated in a fragment of the Ἐπιτομήματα Ὀμηρικά (fr. 160 Teubn. = Porphyr. in Il. l. c. p. 145 Schrader), where the same solution is suggested: φαύλη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρας στάσις· καὶ δὴ πανταχοῦ θόρυβον ἤδη πεποιήκε νύκτωρ ἐν μόνον πεσόν. λυεῖ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων ὅτι τοιαῦτα αἰεὶ ποιεῖ Ὀμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε. ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἰάπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις· πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων. A similar justification of Homer, by reference to a primitive custom still surviving among barbarians, is found in fr. 166 (= Porphyr. in Il. 24. 15, p. 267 Schr.): διὰ τί ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς τὸν Ἐκτορα εἶλκε περὶ τὸν τάφον τοῦ Πατρόκλου παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα ποιῶν εἰς τὸν νεκρόν; . . . ἔστι δὲ λυεῖν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπάρχοντα ἀνάγοντα ἔθη, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ περιέλκουσι περὶ τοὺς τάφους.

^a 3 σαυρωτῆρος. If the form in the quotation in the Ἐπιτομήματα Ὀμηρικά is to be trusted, Aristotle's text of Homer would seem to have had σαυρωτῆρας, the reading of Aristophanes.

^a 4 καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς = πότερον καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 532). The objection Aristotle is now considering is the moral objection, the criticism that something said or done by a personage in a poem was not morally right (οἷον εἶναι δεῖ 1460^b 11). His point is that, before admitting the validity of such an objection, it is proper to take the circumstances of the word or deed into account, e. g. (1) the person to whom it was said or done, (2) the moment, (3) the instrument used, and (4) the motive in the mind of the speaker or agent. Eth. N. 3, 1, 1111^a 4 contains a fuller statement of the circumstances that may lead us to modify the severity of our moral judgements (comp. fr. 174 Teubn.).

^a 7 πρὸς ὃν κτέ.: i. e. πρὸς ὃν . . . ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔλεξεν ὁ πράττων ἢ λέγων.

^a 8 ὅτε. Plutarch (De aud. poet. 26 F) defends the four lines in Il. 9. 458–61, which Aristarchus is said to have excised, as being πρὸς τὸν καιρόν; comp. Porphyr. in Il. 9. 203, p. 135 Schr. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτι νύξ.

μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ: An. pr. 2. 22, 68^a 35 αἰρετώτερον δὲ τὸ μείζον 1461^a 8 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔλαττον κακὸν ἢ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μείζον κακὸν (comp. Rhet. 1. 10, 1369^b 25).—Porphyr. in Od. 13, 119, p. 117 Schr. πολλάκις γὰρ τῶν ἐν μιᾷ πράξει καὶ δυσχερὲς ὑπάρχει τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστιν αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν φευκτόν· διόπερ οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις.

τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν κτέ. Aristotle's examples show that the^a 9 difficulties coming under this head are of every possible kind; the one point they have in common is that they turn on language, and may be met by the discovery or adoption of another interpretation of the language in the incriminated statement.

διαλύειν is simply a synonym for λύειν (Bon. Ind. 184^a 43; ^a 10 HSt. s. v.).

γλώττη: i. e. by taking some word in the passage as a γλώττα (see 21, 1457^b 4). For the instrumental dative, of which there are so many other instances in the context, comp. Soph. el. 24, 179^b 38 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διτῷ λύουσι τοὺς συλλογισμούς.

οὐρήας μὲν πρῶτον: Il. 1. 50 οὐρήας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπάχετο καὶ κύνας ἀργούς. The difficulty the ancients found here was to understand why the mules were made to suffer first (v. Porphyr. ad loc. p. 4 Schrader). Aristotle's interpretation of οὐρήας, which survives in Hesychius (s. v. οὐρέϊς and οὐρήας), is condemned in Schol. Ven. A on Il. 1. c. (presumably from Aristonicus): ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς τινες οὐρήας τοὺς φύλακας· ἀντιδιαστέλλει γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῖσι, and again on Il. 10. 84: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι οὐρήων βούλεται λέγειν τῶν φυλάκων, καὶ οὐκ ἐκράτησεν τοῦ σχήματος· οὐρον γὰρ λέγει ὡς κούρον τὸν φύλακα, οὐρέα δὲ τὸν ἡμίονον.

ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος: Il. 10. 316 ὅς δὲ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ^a 12 ποδώκης. The question raised was apparently this: How could Dolon, if ill-shaped, have been swift of foot? The answer of Aristotle is that εἶδος κακός may have meant in Homer not 'ill-shaped', but simply 'ugly' or 'ill-looking'; he suggests that εἶδος may have been used not in its normal sense of 'shape', but in a strange sense (as a γλώττα) corresponding to that of the derivative εὐειδής in the Cretan dialect. His explanation of the word reappears in Schol. Bachm. on Il. 2. 58: εἶδος ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, and in Hesychius (s. v. εἶδη): εἶδος . . . ὄψις, πρόσωπον.

τὸ γὰρ εὐειδές κτέ. The traditional reading τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ ^a 13 Κρήτες εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι is supposed to mean that the word εὐειδές is applied by the Cretans to that which is εὐπρόσωπον; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'Cretenses εὐειδὲς vocant quod facie

- 1461^a 13 speciosum est', and Vahlen's 'vocabulo quod est εὐειδὲς Cretes εὐπρόσωπον appellant'. The difficulty however is in the absence of the article with the subject, which produces an intolerable ambiguity. I have accordingly ventured to restore (τὸ) εὐπρόσωπον on the analogy of Aristotelian usage in the context (τὸ ἄκρατον . . . τὸ θᾶπτον) and in 6, 1449^b 29, as also elsewhere, e. g. in Metaph. Δ 29, 1025^a 11 τὸ χλωαίνειν τὸ μμείσθαι λέγων. Vahlen quotes a number of passages from other writers in defence of the vulgate, but as it seems to me, they are not all quite to the point; those from Plato (Theaet. 190 A and Crat. 410 C) at any rate may very well admit of another interpretation. The more important of his instances were discussed by W. Dindorf, Preface to Demosthenes p. lxii ed. Teubn. In two of them the anomaly may be removed at once by the same expedient, the insertion of a second article: Demosthenes 23, 33 τὰ γὰρ ἄποινα (τὰ) χρήματα ὀνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί.—Xenophon Mem. 3. 14. 7 ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ὡς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ (τὸ) ἐσθίειν καλοῖτο.
- ^a 14 ζωρότερον κτέ.: Il. 9. 202 μείζονα δὴ κρητῆρα, Μενoitίου νιέ, καθίστα, ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε. Porphyry's note on this is: ἀπρεπές· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ κῶμον ἤκουσιν ἀκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι· τὸ γὰρ ζωρότερον εἶναι τάχιον κτέ. (p. 135 Schrader). Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 F tells us that this was one of the many Homeric statements to which Zoilus took exception.
- ^a 15 ἄκρατον. The comparative ἀκρατότερον is the usual equivalent for ζωρότερον in the Homeric Scholia, and in the lexicographers: Apollonius Lex. p. 81 Bekk. ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον.—Hesychius ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον. ἔνιοι δὲ τάχιον. The reading ἄκρατον, however, is sufficiently certified by Ath. 423 E τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ' Ὀμήρῳ 'ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιρε' οὐκ ἄκρατον σημαίνειν φασίν, ἀλλὰ θερμόν . . . ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ εὐκρατον, ὥσπερ τὸ δεξιτερὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιῶ (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 D).
- ὡς οἰνόφλυξι: comp. Probl. 3. 5, 871^a 27 διὰ τί οἱ οἰνόφλυγες τρέμουσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὄσω ἂν ἀκρατοποτῶσιν;
- ^a 16 ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα κτέ.: Il. 10. 1 ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν εὐδον παννύχιοι must be the passage Aristotle had in mind; but he seems to have mixed it up with that in Il. 2. 1 ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἰπποκορυσταὶ εὐδον παννύχιοι. The difficulty in the passage was its inconsistency with Il. 10. 11–13 (on the revelry and other signs of life among the Trojans), ἧ τοι ὄτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειε, θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλά, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι

πρό, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοπήν ὄμαδόν τ' ἀνθρώπων. Aristotle's 1461^a 16 solution, it will be observed, consists in saying that πάντες may mean practically no more than 'many', and be an instance of the metaphorical substitution of a specific in lieu of a generic term (v. 21, 1457^b 8). The word πάντες, therefore, must have appeared somewhere or other in the text of the Aristotelian quotation (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). Gräfenhan found a place for it by writing πάντες instead of ἄλλοι, and Tyrwhitt by restoring πάντες ὁμοῦ for παννύχιοι. A simpler expedient would perhaps be to suppose the passage, as Aristotle remembered it, to have run thus: ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι εὐδον (ἅπαντες) | παννύχιοι.

ἦ τοι ὄτ' ἐς πεδῖον κτέ. : Il. 10. 11-13 (quoted above). The ^a 18 omission of the line θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἴλιόθι πρό may very well be due to Aristotle himself; it is difficult, however, to hold him responsible for the form the next line has in the MS., αὐλῶν συρίγγων τε ὄμαδόν—which the editors (following Sylburg) have made into αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὄμαδόν (or ὄμαδον); he must have known that the meaning thus given to ὄμαδος was not in accordance with Homeric usage. The accentuation too of the word in the manuscript (ὄμαδόν) is difficult to account for. I think that it may perhaps represent ὄμαδόν, i. e. ὄμαδον with an enclitic after it; so that the reading in the MS. may be the wreckage of an older reading, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐ(νοπήν) ὄμαδόν (τ' ἀνθρώπων), in other words, of the line as it appears in the ordinary text of Homer.

τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ (τοῦ) πολλοί. Porphyry on Od. 12. 374^a 19 (p. 113 Schrader) records a similar interpretation of πάντα in Il. 3. 277: ἐναντίον τοῦτο [scil. Od. 12. 374] τῷ Ἡελίῳ θ' ὅς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις· ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ ἐχρῆν ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πάντα ἐφορῶντα. λύοιτο δ' ἂν ἢ τῇ λέξει· τὸ γὰρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλείστα κτέ.

οἷη δ' ἄμμορος : Il. 18. 489 (= Od. 5. 275) οἷη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι ^a 20 λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῦ (said of the Great Bear). The astronomical difficulty in the line, which even led some of the Homeric critics of antiquity to alter the text (v. Strabo p. 3 Cas. and Apollonius Lex. p. 29 Bekk.), is thus stated by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 225 Schrader): ἀνιστόρητόν ἐστι τοῦτο· κατηγοροῦσι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἄρκτου λόγον φάσκοντος οἷη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῦ· καθόλου γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἄρκτικῷ μὴ δύνειν. Aristotle's solution (which is not mentioned in the Scholia or elsewhere) is to take οἷη as a generic in the place of a specific word, i. e. as an

1461^a 20 instance of a kind of metaphor already recognized in 21, 1457^b 7
(ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος).

^a 21 τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 7. 14, 1153^b 35 διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας [scil. τὰς ἡδονάς] μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. For the substitution of μόνον, as a synonym for οἴη, compare the use of κωλυθῆναι in ^a 34 to represent Homer's ἔσχετο.

κατὰ δὲ προσωδίαν, scil. δεῖ λύειν (or διαλύειν), understood from ^a 9 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὄρωντα δεῖ διαλύειν. κατὰ means 'by reference to', as in κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως in ^a 27; it is the equivalent of the instrumental dative we find elsewhere in the context (see on ^a 10) with λύειν (or διαλύειν).

Προσωδία with Aristotle comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader. For accent as a form of προσωδία see Soph. el. 4, 166^b 1 (v. infra on ^a 23); 21, 177^b 35; and 23, 179^a 14. Breathing is distinctly said to come under this head in Soph. el. 20, 177^b 3 τὸ ὄρος καὶ ὄρος τῇ προσωδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἕτερον. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταῦτον ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ἦ καὶ ὡσαύτως, κάκει δ' ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταῦτά. That quantity also was regarded by Aristotle as a part of προσωδία may be inferred from the position of μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι in the enumeration in 20, 1456^b 32 (v. Schmidt, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 188). His idea of προσωδία, therefore, agreed with that of Choeroboscus (Scholia in Dionys. Thracis art. gramm. p. 124 Hilgard), ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς προσωδίαις τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη· ἔστι γὰρ τόνος, χρόνος, πνεῦμα (comp. Egger, Apollonius Dyscole p. 29, and Schmidt, l. c. p. 185).

^a 22 Ἰππίας. The view of Sengebusch (Hom. Diss. prior p. 206) is that he lived in the second half of the fifth century, and may perhaps be identified with the Hippias of Thasos mentioned by Lysias (13. 54 and 61) as one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants. Schrader (Porphy. in Il. p. 413) doubts whether there is any sufficient evidence for this date.

δίδομεν δέ οἱ. The parallel in Soph. el. 4, 166^b 1 (v. on ^a 23) shows that δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι was the reading in Aristotle's Homer in Il. 2. 15, where our existing vulgate has Τρώεσσι δὲ κῆδ' ἐφῆπται; the reference too in the parenthesis, ὥσπερ Ἰππίας ἔλυνε ὁ Θάσιος, shows that Hippias must have had the same reading before him. It is clear that we have in this instance at any rate

a real variant, and not one of Aristotle's misquotations. *δίδομεν* 1461^a 22 *δέ·τοι εὖχος ἀρέσθαι* occurs in Il. 21. 297, but in a context very unlike that of Il. 2. 15. The deceptive dream of Agamemnon in Il. 2. 8 sqq. had been criticized by Plato Rep. 382 ε, as making Zeus a deceiver; and it was felt to be a difficulty by several of the grammarians (v. Porphyr. in Il. l. c. p. 23 Schr.). As the half-line *δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι* seems to credit Zeus with a direct lie, this was doubtless the difficulty which Aristotle and Hippias thought to remove by the artifice of reading ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ not as *δίδομεν*, but as *διδόμεν*, i. e. as an infinitive in the sense of an imperative, so as to shift the actual falsehood from Zeus himself to the Dream-god (comp. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Hom. p. 128 ed. Peppmüller).

τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπίθεται ὄμβρω: Il. 23. 327 ἔστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον^a 23 τ' ὄργυι ὑπὲρ αἴης, ἣ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης· τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπίθεται ὄμβρω. Our text of Homer embodies the suggestion of Hippias, οὐ for οὔ. The objection to the older mode of reading the word (οὔ) was probably this, that the statement was against scientific truth, oak and pine being held to be among the woods least liable to rot through moisture (Theophr. H. P. 5. 4, 3).

The view of Hippias is given with greater fullness in Soph. el. 4, 166^b 1: *παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσωδίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥάδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα “τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπίθεται ὄμβρω”. λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσωδίᾳ λέγοντες τὸ ΟΥ ὀξύτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν “δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι”, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο δίδόναι. On this passage Alexander, or rather Michael Ephesius (p. 33 Wallies), has a comment which, besides serving to explain the passage in the Soph. el., is not without interest for the history of the early criticisms on Homer: *τινὲς οὖν ἐκάκιζον τὸν Ὅμηρον, περισπωμένως τὸ οὐ ἀναγινώσκοντες καὶ λέγοντες ἄτοπόν τι αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διὰ τούτου, ὡς λέγοντα δῆθεν ὅτι τοῦ ξύλου ἐκείνου . . . τί μὲν κατασῆπεται τί δὲ οὐ κατασῆπεται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐδήλωσεν ἐναργῶς, τὸ τί δὲ οὐ κατασῆπεται λέγουσιν ἄντικρυς δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τοῦ εἰρημένου, τοῦ “οὐ τὸ μὲν καταπίθεται” . . . ἐπιδιορθοῦνται δὲ τούτους [ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς], ὡς αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ῥητορικῇ [read with Vahlen, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς] φησιν, Ἰππίας ὁ Θάσιος μὴ περισπωμένως ἀναγινώσκων τὸ οὐ ἀλλ' ἀποφατικῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὀξύτερον εἰρηκεν, ἵνα ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἡ πεύκη τὸ δένδρον οὐ καταπίθεται ὄμβρω . . .**

1461^a 23 τὸ δ' ἕτερον [scil. παράδειγμα] τὸ ἐπαγόμενον, τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὃ φησὶ τὸν Δία εἰπεῖν τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι", οὐδαμοῦ κείται ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι . . . εἰσὶν οὖν τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς τὸν ὄνειρον ὅτι βὰς ταῦτα εἶπε τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὅτι δίδομεν αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τὴν νίκην. φασὶν οὖν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἀμαρτάνει ὁ ποιητὴς εἰσάγων τὸν Δία διαλεγόμενον ταῦτα τῷ ὄνειρῳ καὶ τρῶπον τινὰ ψευδόμενον, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι θεοῦ. οἱ γοῦν ἐπιδιωροθούμενοι τοῦτόν φασιν ὡς οὐ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὁ Ζεὺς ἔλεγε τὸ εὖχος δοθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄνειρῳ κατὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀναγινώσκουσι δὲ οὕτως, "δίδομεν δέ οἱ", ἀντὶ τοῦ σοί, τῷ ὄνειρῳ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς νοῦς ἐστὶ κἂν ὁ τόνος ἀναβιβασθείη κἂν περισπασθείη ἢ ἀνωνωμίᾳ ἢ οἷ. ποῦ γοῦν [? οὖν] ἐστὶν ἡ ἀμαρτία; ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ "δέ οἱ" ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ "δίδομεν" . . . εἰ γοῦν [? μὲν οὖν] τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι" ἀναγνῶ τις τὸν τόνον θεῖς εἰς τὸ δι, τὸν Δία ποιεῖ ψευδόμενον, ὡς ὑπισχνούμενον διδόναι τὴν νίκην καὶ μὴ εἰς ἔργον ἐξάγοντα τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν· εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ δο τὸν τόνον θεῖς ἀναγνῶ τὸ ἐξῆς, καὶ τὸν Δία τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπολύσει, καὶ τῷ Ὀμήρῳ περιποιησεται τὸ ἀνέγκλητον, ὡς τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντος τῷ ὄνειρῳ καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος διδόμεναι αὐτὸν τὸν ὄνειρον τὸ εὖχος τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός. καὶ γοῦν ὁ ὄνειρος ὑπισχνεῖται τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι τὸ εὖχος καὶ ψεύδεται, καὶ οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτός.

It will be observed that in the explanation of Il. 23. 328 in the Soph. el. the negative οὐ is said to be distinguished from the pronoun οὐ by being pronounced *δξύτερον*, i. e. *δξύτόνως*. This takes us back to a time when οὐ was oxytone wheresoever it occurs (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ I. I p. 331), as it was held to be by more than one of the grammarians: Herodian I p. 504 Lentz τὰ εἰς οὐ περισπῶνται, πανταχοῦ, ἀγχοῦ, . . . καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ [? τὸ] ἰδοῦ τὸ δεικτικόν, ἰοῦ τὸ σχετλιαστικόν, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἀρνητικόν· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνεπέᾳ δξύνεται.

τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, scil. λυτέον. Διαίρεσις—a wider term than our 'punctuation'—is the opposite of σύνθεσις (comp. Soph. el. 4, 166^a 23), and includes every sort of break in reading, even one only just enough to keep words from being taken together in construction. The kind of difficulty to which this solution is applicable, may be seen from the instances in the Sophistici elenchi, ἐγὼ σ' ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον (4, 166^a 36), and ἀρ' ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; (20, 177^b 14)—where the words are ambiguous and admit of being construed in two different ways. With this may be compared what Aristotle says in the Rhetoric (3. 5, 1407^b 14) on the ambiguities in Hera-

clitus: τὰ γὰρ Ἑρακλείτου διαστιζέαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι 1461^a 23 ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίνονται”. ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ αἰεὶ πρὸς ὀποτέρῳ <δεῖ> διαστιζέαι. On the beginnings of formal punctuation in Greece see Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 506, and Meisterhans, Grammatik³ p. 11.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. The passage here quoted appears in the editions^a 24 of Empedocles in a somewhat different form, αἴψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι, ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους (fr. 35, 14-15 Diels); and it is known that Theophrastus read it thus, as he adduced it to show that ζωρότερον in Homer meant τὸ κεκραμένον: Athenaeus 423 F Θεόφραστος δ’ ἐν τῷ περὶ μέθης ζωρότερόν φησιν εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον. This is not the place to consider either the reading recognized by Theophrastus or his interpretation of ζωρότερον and ζωρά. Aristotle has a different reading, ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο; and any difficulty that may have been found in it he meets by simply affirming the possibility of another διαίρεσις, another way of construing the words. He does not dispute the meaning which was assigned to ζωρά; his assumption presumably was that ζωρά=ἄκρατα (v. ^a 15). The positive ζωρός no longer existed in Attic; but in Ionic the comparative ζωρότερον was to be found in Herodotus and Hippocrates, in the sense of ‘having but a small admixture of water’: Herod. 6, 84 Κλεομένηα δὲ λέγουσι ἠρότων τῶν Σκυθῶν . . . μαθεῖν τὴν ἀκρητοποσίην παρ’ αὐτῶν . . . ἔκ τε τόσου, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἐπεὰν ζωρότερον βούλωνται πιεῖν, “ἐπισκύθισον” λέγουσι (where ζωρότερον πίνειν=ἀκρατοποτεῖν).—Hippocrates 2, 654 K. οἶνον, ἣν μὴ τι κωλύη, πίνειν ζωρότερον παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τέσσαρας ἡμέρας. There is one instance of it in Attic prose, in Theophrastus Char. 4, 9 δεινὸς φαγεῖν καὶ ζωρότερον πιεῖν (‘ungemischten Wein zu trinken’, R. Meister). Aristotle does not say what the question was that had been raised by the critics; it may be supposed, however (comp. Hermann ad loc.), to have turned on the πρὶν before κέκρητο, which owing to its ambiguous position may be construed with either ζωρά or κέκρητο. If one construes it with κέκρητο, the clause will mean ‘things pure had been before that mixed’; but in that case an objector might very well urge the inconsistency between this and the statement in the preceding line, in which Empedocles speaks of the ‘mortal’ forms as assumed by the elements only when mixed up together in the actual world (comp. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.

1461^a 24 1^b p. 784). On the other hand, if the *πρίν* be taken with *ζωρά*, the sense will be 'things before that pure were found mixed up together' (for the tense of *κέκρητο* v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 1. 1 p. 152; Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 52); and the objection of the critic is answered. The integrity of the text of the present passage has been doubted in recent times by several scholars of distinction. Bergk (Kl. Schriften 2 p. 86) has suggested *ζωρά τε πρίν τὰ κέκρητο*; Gomperz (Hermes 31 p. 469) *ζωρά τε ἂ (i. e. θ' ἂ) πρίν κέκρητο*; and Diels (on Emped. l. c.) *ζωρά τε τὰ πρίν ἐκρητο* (on the analogy of *ἔπλητο*).

^a 25 *ἀθάνατα*. As Aristotle is so apt to curtail his quotations, it is hardly necessary to restore *ἀθάνατ' <εἶναι>*. For the omission of *εἶναι* see on 24, 1459^b 9.

τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολία, scil. *δεῖ διαλύειν*. Aristotle now passes on to another kind of ambiguous statement, one capable of two interpretations through the presence of an ambiguous term. Such a term is said to be *ἀμφίβολον* (^a 26; comp. Rhet. 3. 5, 1407^a 32); and its effect is *ἀμφιβολία*. *ἀμφιβολία* is here the same thing as what Aristotle often calls elsewhere *ὁμωνυμία*. It may be noted, as an instance of his variations in the use of technical language, that in Soph. el. 4, 165^b 26 *ἀμφιβολία* is distinguished from *ὁμωνυμία*, and used to describe the ambiguity arising from some ambiguous collocation of terms.

^a 26 *παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ*: Il. 10. 251 *ἀλλ' ἴομεν μάλα γὰρ νύξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς, ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρώχωκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτῃ δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται*. The reading *πλέω*, which still survives in some of the MSS. of Homer, and was a recognized variant in antiquity, has a certain interest as showing the affinity of Aristotle's Homer with that of Zenodotus, who is known to have admitted forms like *ἀμείνω* for *ἀμείνων*, *γλυκίω* for *γλυκίων*, and *κρείσσω* for *κρείσσων* (La Roche, Hom. Textkr. p. 302; Lobeck, Path. Elem. 2 p. 281).

The problem was to explain how, if *more* than two-thirds of the night had gone, a third could be still left. According to Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147 Schr.) this was one of the earliest difficulties found in Homer: *τῶν παλαιῶν ζητημάτων ὠμολόγηται εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο, ἐν οἷς φησιν "ἄστρα . . . λέλειπται"*. *πῶς γάρ, εἰ αἱ δύο μοῖραι ἐξήκουσιν αὐταὶ τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέων, ἢ τριτάτῃ μοῖρα λέλειπται, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον*; Among the many solutions he mentions is one from the Aristotelian *Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά* (fr. 161 Teubn.), *ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς αἱ δώδεκα μοῖραι εἰς δύο ἴσας μερίδας μερίζεσθαι δύνανται,*

εἰς ἕξ, ἠϋξήθη δὲ καὶ πλέον γεγονός θάτερον μέρος, ἄδηλον δὲ τὸ πόσαι 1461^a 26 ὥραις (καὶ γὰρ μιᾷ καὶ δύο καὶ τρισὶ καὶ πλείοσιν ἢ αὐξήσις δύναται γίνεσθαι) ἀφορίζων ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ἀόριστον τοῦ πλείονος πόσον ἦν καὶ ὅτι β ὥραις ἠϋξήθη, ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι τριτάτῃ μοῖρα λέλειπται, ὡς ὀκτὼ μὲν γενέσθαι τὰς παρωχηκίας ὥρας, καταλείπεσθαι δὲ τέσσαρας, αἴπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ ὅλου τρίτον. This highly artificial interpretation, which makes πλέω νῦξ τῶν δύο μοιράων mean 'the greater part of two-thirds of the night', can hardly be what Aristotle has in mind, as he distinctly says that the solution of the difficulty may be found in recognizing πλέω as an amphibolous word, i. e. in giving it not its usual sense of 'more', but some different sense. This other sense was probably that of 'full', which is mentioned by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147) as the suggestion of a certain Metrodorus: Μητροδόωρος μὲν οὖν τὸ πλείον δύο σημαίνειν φησὶ παρ' Ὀμήρω· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνθηες . . . καὶ τὸ πλήρες, ὡς ἐν τῷ σὸν δὲ πλείον δέπας αἰεὶ ἔσθηκε, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλείαι τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι. νῦν οὖν τὸ πλέον ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρες εἰρήσθαι· πλήρης γὰρ ἢ νῦξ τῶν δύο μοιρῶν γεγονυῖα παρώχηκε, τριτάτῃ δ' ἔτι περιλέλειπται. Aristonicus seems to have accepted this interpretation of πλέω as ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρης (Schol. Ven. A. II. 9. 71); and it survives also in the gloss of Hesychius πλέω· πλήρης.

τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 4, 166^a 14 εἰσὶ δὲ^a 27 τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἰς μὲν ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοῦνομα κυρίως σήμαινῃ πλείω, οἶον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων· εἰς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν.

τὸν κεκραμένον is to my mind a much more probable correction here than the others that have been suggested, τὸ κεκραμένον (Madius), πᾶν κεκραμένον (Bursian), (ὅσα) τῶν κεκραμένων (Vahlen), τῶν κεκραμένων (οἰονοῦν) (Tucker). τὸν κεκραμένον, with οἶνον in close proximity in the context, means τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνον. There is the same ellipse in Aristoph. Eq. 1187 πιεῖν κεκραμένον τρία καὶ δύο (comp. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk. 32); and it is certainly not uncommon with ἄκρατος (comp. ἀκρατοσύτης, etc.). The general sense then of the whole passage will be this: In common parlance a mixture of wine and water is said to be 'wine'; and on the same principle Homer's 'tin' may be an amalgam of tin and another metal. Aristotle is apparently replying to some critic who took exception to the idea of the greaves being made of so soft a metal as tin, a point which modern archaeologists also have some difficulty in explaining (comp. Helbig, Das homerische Epos¹ p. 196).

1461^a 27 οἶνον: Plutarch Coni. praec. 140 F τὸ κρᾶμα καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος οἶνον καλοῦμεν. The fact is recognized and explained in De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 321^a 35 τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξει, οἶον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ σύνολον μίγμα.

^a 28 κνημῖς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέριοι: Il. 21. 592.

^a 29 χαλκίας. Aristotle adduces this use of χαλκίης, to justify the language in Il. 20. 234, on the assumption that by a similar extension of meaning οἰνοχοεῖν may be used for the serving out of nectar as well as that of wine. χαλκίης and its cognates are often found in this more general sense in the literature after Homer: Schol. Ven. B. Il. 19. 283 παλαιὰ ἢ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκῶν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον. ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκίας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους.—Pollux 7. 106 χαλκεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ σιδηρεῖν ἔλεγον, καὶ χαλκίας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. The language in these two passages may be a distant reminiscence of Aristotle's words.

^a 30 οἰνοχοεῖν: Il. 20. 234 τὸν καὶ ἀηρέψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεῖν. On the other hand, we are told elsewhere (Il. 5. 341) that the gods do not drink wine, οὐ πίνουσ' αἴθοπα οἶνον. For the infinitive—actually found in the Homeric text—comp. An. post. 2. 30, 97^b 6 τοῦτο δ' εἶρηται μὴ διαφέρειν.—Top. 2. 3, 110^a 33 οὐτ' εἰ παντὶ οὐτ' εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν εἶρηται.

^a 31 εἶη δ' ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. Aristotle apparently prefers to explain Homer's use of οἰνοχοεῖν as a metaphor; referring, it would seem, to the μεταφορὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον considered in 21, 1457^b 16 sqq.

δεῖ δὲ κτέ. This is a general word of caution very like that in ^a 4. Just as we have to consider all the attendant circumstances before condemning an act as wrong or immoral, so too, when the question turns on a word, we should consider its context and its possible meanings in the context before pronouncing it to be improper; we must be quite sure of our interpretation before passing an adverse judgement on the poet.

^a 33 οἶον τῷ = οἶον ἐν τῷ, the preposition being understood from the preceding ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ (see on 2, 1448^a 10).

τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος: Il. 20. 267 οὐδὲ τότ' Αἰνείαιο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο· ἀλλὰ δύο μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε κυλλοποδίων, τὰς δύο χαλκίας, δύο δ' ἐνδοθι κασσιτέριοι, τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην· τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο μείλιον ἔγχος. The difficulty found here may be seen from the note of Porphyry (p. 244

Schr.): τῆς γὰρ χρυσοῦς πτυχὸς δοκούσης πρώτης εἶναι, εἶ γε κόσμον 1461^a 33
 ἔνεκα τὴν χρυσὴν εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ ὀρώμενον πρώτην ἐνέθηκεν, ἵπ'
 αὐτὴν δὲ στερεότητος ἔνεκα τὰς δύο χαλκᾶς, μαλάγματος χάριν καὶ
 τελευταίας τὰς κασσιτερίνας, πῶς δύο τε διέκοψε πτύχας, καὶ ἐν τῇ
 χρυσῇ πτυχί ἔξω οὔση καὶ διατμηθείσῃ ἐνεσχέθη τὸ δόρυ; The
 answer of Aristotle was perhaps this, that the plate of gold sufficed
 to stop the course of the spear, though the spear-point actually
 pierced it and indented the underlying plates of brass. This is
 practically the same as the solution quoted from Autochthon in
 Schol. Ven. B and Eustathius ad loc. Aristarchus also is said to
 have acknowledged its plausibility: Schol. Ven. A II. 20. 269 ἵνα δὲ
 μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἠπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἠβητηκέναι, φησὶν ὅτι τῆς
 χρυσοῦς πτυχῆς πρώτης κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κειμένης νοητέον τὸ δόρυ
 τῆς πλείονος ὀρμῆς ἐγκοπτὴν εἰληφέναι [= Aristotle's κωλυθῆναι], δια-
 κεκόφθαι μέντοι τὸ σάκος ἕως τῆς τρίτης πτυχῆς, ὃν τρόπον ἐπὶ τῆς
 πτυχῆς Μενελαίου λέγει " ἢ οἱ πλείστον ἔρυστο, διὰ πρὸ δὲ εἴσατο καὶ τῆς".

κωλυθῆναι: Metaph. Δ 23, 1023^a 17 ἔτι τὸ κωλύον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ^a 34
 ὀρμὴν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ
 κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν
 οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ' ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.

ἐνδέχεται, scil. σημαίνειν (see on 24, 1460^a 34).

ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδί = πότερον ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδί (see on ^a 4). The clause, with
 the punctuation given in the text, is appositional to ποσαχῶς ἂν
 σημαίνειν (see on 25, 1460^b 25). For ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδί comp. An. pr. I.
 31, 46^b 28 ἀγνοεῖται τὸ πότερον ὠδε ἢ ὠδε ἔχει.—Soph. el. 18,
 177^a 5 ἀναυροῦντες ἢ ὠδε ἢ ὠδε.—Rhet. 3. I, 1404^a 10 διαφέρει
 γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδί εἰπεῖν.

μάλιστ' ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι. The comma (or colon) which recent^a 35
 editors place after this I have removed in order that μάλιστα
 may be taken with κατὰ τὴν κατασκευῆν; comp. Metaph. A 8,
 989^a 30 μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον ὃν ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν
 κτέ. (also Phys. 7. 3, 245^b 6; Metaph. Z 16, 1040^b 10).

κατὰ τὴν κατασκευῆν = ἐξ ἐναντίας or ἐναντίως. The ἢ ὡς which
 follows Vahlen illustrates from 22, 1458^b 3 ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ
 κύριον.—An. post. I. 17, 80^b 35 ληπτέαι ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ
 προτάσεις.—De caelo 2. 2, 285^b 25 ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι
 λέγουσιν.—Meteor. I. 12, 348^b 12 τοῦναντίον ἢ ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας
 λέγει. A similar construction is found after a comparative adverb
 in Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118^b 23 μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. The clause ὅτι
 ἔνια κτέ. is explanatory of ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, 'the way described by
 Glaucon', and apparently a quotation.

1461^b 1 Γλαύκων. Aristotle is probably referring to the Glaucōn mentioned as an authority in Homeric matters in Plato's *Ion* 530 D, where the rhapsodist says of himself: *καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητροδώρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πρότετε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ.* The absence of a local appellative here seems to imply that the Glaucōn in question was an Athenian. If this inference is right, we cannot identify him with the Γλαύκων ὁ Τήμιος of *Rhet.* 3. 1, 1403^b 26 or with Glaucus of Rhegium (comp. Hiller, *Rh. Mus.* 41 p. 398); he may perhaps be the same as the Glaucus or Glaucōn (v. Düntzer, *Retting der aristot. Poetik* p. 227) mentioned by Porphyry on *Il.* 11. 636 (p. 168 Schr.) along with other early interpreters of Homer.

^b 2 αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι resumes the idea of *ἐνια ἀλόγως προουλαμβάνουσιν*, and anticipates that in *τῇ αὐτῶν οἴησει*. The common rendering, 'postquam ipsi condemnationis sententiam tulerint' (Tyrwhitt), gives *καταψηφισάμενοι* a sense too near to that of the *ἐπιτιμῶσιν* in the following line. The probability is, as Vahlen has seen (comp. *Bon. Ind.* 376^a 56), that it means in the present instance to 'decide', or to 'affirm' or 'accept' something. As a term of politics *καταψηφίζεσθαι* is the opposite of *ἀποψηφίζεσθαι* (to reject a proposal): *Pol.* 4. 14, 1298^b 36 *ἀποψηφίζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφίζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντετραμμένως ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεὶ.*
εἰρηκότος, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ (see on 6, 1449^b 26).

^b 3 τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε: *De anima* 1. 5, 410^b 27 *τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεισι καλουμένοις λόγος.*

^b 4 τὰ περὶ Ἰκαρίων. The question which Aristotle regards as based on a mere assumption, survives in Porphyry on *Od.* 4. 1 (p. 40 Schr.) *διὰ τί ὁ Τηλέμαχος εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐνένυχε τῷ Ἰκαρίῳ; καίτοι ἄλογον ἐλθόντα τῷ πατρὶ τῆς μητρὸς μὴ ἐνένυχεῖν*, and in *Schol. Od.* 1. 285 (comp. *Schol. Od.* 2. 52) *πῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντηγχάνει Ἰκαρίῳ;* The assumption of the critics, that the father of Penelope (called in Homer *Icarius*) was a Lacedaemonian, Aristotle meets by quoting on the other side the Cephallenian tradition which made him a Cephallenian. This same solution of the difficulty reappears incidentally in *Schol. Od.* 15. 16 *ὅτι Ἰθακήσιος ὁ Ἰκάριος, οὐ Σπαρτιάτης, ἀδελφὸς Τυνδάρεω . . . ὁ δὲ*

Ἰκάριος ἐκ Μεσσηνίας ἦν τῆς Κεφαλληνιακῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὄραται ἐν 1461^b 4 Ἰθάκῃ ἀναστρεφόμενος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Λάκων ὄθεν οὐδὲ ἐνέτυχεν αὐτῷ Τηλέμαχος ἐν τῇ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἀποδημίᾳ (comp. E. Meyer, *Hermes* 30 p. 265).

τὸ δ' ἴσως: comp. An. post. 1. 9, 76^a 29; Soph. el. 1, 165^a 10. ^b 6

Κεφαλλῆνες. Though the form Κεφαληνία is found in the text of H. A. 8. 28, 605^b 27, there is little doubt that Aristotle must have written the word with a double λ. This is the normal spelling in Attic Inscriptions (Meisterhans, Gr.³ p. 96), and also in literature, according to Eustathius on Dion. Perieg. 431, τοὺς δὲ Κεφαλλῆνας καὶ τὴν Κεφαλληνίαν ἐν δυοῖ ἁλλ' ἡ παλαιὰ χρῆσις ἅπαντα ἔχει.

παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι. For the preposition comp. Plato Polit. ^b 7 310 c γαμοῦσί τε παρὰ τούτων.—Isocrates 386 A ἐγγυμὲν ἐκ Σεριφῶν παρ' ἀνθρώπων πολὺ πλείονος ἀξίων ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν, ἐξ ἧς ἐγένετο Σώπαλις.

Ἰκάδιον. The name is presumably the same as Εἰκάδιος, on ^b 8 which see Fick, *Gr. Personennamen*² p. 296.

εἰκός ἐστιν, scil. εἶναι (see on 24, 1459^b 9). The alternative is ^b 9 to take the clause (with Madius) as meaning 'it is through an error that the question (i. e. the objection), seems probable and reasonable'.

ὅλως δὲ κτέ. This concluding paragraph, in intention at any rate, puts the main points in the preceding discussion into a more general form. The language in ^b 23 is to be noticed; ἀδύνατα is clearly used as the opposite of the οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἄλογα of the οἷα φασι καὶ δοκεῖ, and βλαβερά of the οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in 25, 1460^b 10. Some of the points in the previous statement are either passed over or only just hinted at. On the other hand two new points are introduced: the plea of poetical necessity, instead of being limited to 'impossibilities' (comp. 25, 1460^b 23), is indirectly said to be an excuse for the 'improbable' and the 'morally offensive' also (comp. ^b 19 ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία); and besides this we have the dialectical rule of caution in ^b 15, which might very well have found a place in the main discussion, as a pendant to that in ^a 31. The whole chapter in fact, however excellent in substance, is hardly a model of logical arrangement.

τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν. Vahlen takes these words together in the sense of 'the impossible in poetry', and supposes only two solutions to be recognized, those denoted by πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. The chief objection to this view is that

1461^b 9 it seems to exclude the solution given in 25, 1460^b 24, where poetical necessity is said to justify even 'impossibilities'. The reason that follows, *πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν κτέ.*, adds a very necessary qualification, viz. that the impossibility has to be disguised and made credible (*πιθανόν*) by arts of expression; comp. 24, 1460^a 27 *ἀδύνατα εἰκότα*, and 24, 1460^b 2 *ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον*. A second solution is by reference *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον*—a point which Aristotle illustrates here from painting, and not as in 25, 1460^b 33 from poetry. A third is by reference *πρὸς τὴν δόξαν*, i. e. by showing that the impossibility has been accepted and sanctioned by opinion (comp. 25, 1460^b 10 *οἳά φασι καὶ δοκεῖ*, and 1460^b 35 *οὕτω φασίν*).

πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν: Meteor. 2, 3, 357^a 26 *πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπὼν* [scil. Empedocles] *ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἰκανῶς (ἢ γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικόν)*, *πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἰκανῶς*.—Fr. 147 (Teubn.) *οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἔργου ἦν ἡ τούτων μνήμη*.

^b 10 *ἀνάγειν*, to explain by reference to something (comp. Bon. Ind. 42^a 37).

^b 11 *αἰρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον*: 24, 1460^a 26 *προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα*.

^b 12 *οἶους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν*. In 25, 1460^b 18 also the allusion is apparently to a picture. We have been told in an earlier chapter (6, 1450^a 27) that the personages of Zeuxis lacked character, i. e. that he sacrificed expression to beauty. The criticism implied in the present passage is that they are 'impossibilities', in other words, of an impossible beauty, not like real men and women (i. e. not *οἳα ἦν ἡ ἔστω*, 25, 1460^b 10). The answer to this is that they are, like the characters in Sophocles (25, 1460^b 33), better than the reality, what men and women ought to be. This justification of Zeuxis, which recalls what has been said elsewhere of Polygnotus (2, 1448^a 5), and of Homer (15, 1454^b 14), may very well represent Aristotle's own view of him and his work. It was certainly a common view of him in antiquity (comp. Maximus Tyrius Diss. 32. 5).

^b 13 *ἀλλὰ βέλτιον* (scil. *τοιούτους εἶναι*) is a vivid way of putting the respondent's answer to the objection (see on 25, 1460^b 33).

τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν. As Aristotle says in 15, 1454^b 9, a true artist, instead of keeping too closely to his model, will make his portrait more beautiful than the real man.

^b 14 *πρὸς ᾧ φασι τᾶλογα*, scil. *δεῖ ἀνάγειν*. It will be seen that a *δέ* is wanting, and also that the next clause (*οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ*

ἄλογόν ἐστιν) comes in without a conjunction. This may perhaps 1461^b 14 be taken as another sign of the Poetics being in places only the rough draft of a book (see on 22, 1458^a 30). It would have been easy on revision to make the text read thus : πρὸς δ' ἃ φασι τᾶλογα ἀνάγοντας οὕτω τε λυτέον καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν. For the ellipse comp. 25, 1460^b 35 ὅτι οὕτω φασίν, scil. λυτέον.

τᾶλογα. The first appearance of the word in this chapter, though it has been used more than once in chap. 24. τὸ ἄλογον, said of a fact or statement, means that which we cannot account for, and thus find a difficulty in accepting as either true or possible (see on 15, 1454^b 6). There is an obvious distinction between it and τὸ ἀδύνατον, that which is not and cannot be true, the one being only 'improbable', and the other 'impossible'. The charge of improbability according to Aristotle may be met in two ways : one may urge (1) that the statement criticized has the sanction of opinion (ἃ φασιν), or (2) that the incident was not so improbable, if one remembers the time (ποτέ) when it is supposed to have occurred. These two solutions have already appeared in the main discussion in 1460^b 35-1461^a 4, but in answer to a somewhat different allegation, that of untruth (ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ 1460^b 33). A third answer, the plea of poetical necessity, is indirectly suggested in 1461^b 19.

ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογον : comp. fr. 164 (Teubn.) λύων οὖν ὁ Ἄριστοτέλης τὸ τάλαντον οὔτε ἴσον φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀφωρισμένῃ χρῆσθαι σταθμῶ, and the passages quoted above on 25, 1461^a 2. For the emphatic ποτέ comp. Top. 3, 2, 117^a 36 αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἢ δὲ ποτὲ χρησίμη (also Top. 5, 1, 128^b 20).

εἰκὸς γὰρ κτέ. See on 18, 1456^a 23 (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκὸς). 1461^b 15 The maxim being Agathon's, it might be quoted for controversial purposes when better arguments were not to be had.

τὰ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in 1461^a 9-31. The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind. In the second (εἶδος κακός^a 12), fourth (ἄλλοι μὲν^a 16), eighth (αἰψα δὲ^a 24), and eleventh (οἶνοχοεύειν^a 30) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third (ζωρότερον^a 14) and sixth (δίδομεν^a 22), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth (οἶη^a 20), seventh (οὖ^a 23), and ninth

1461^b 15 (πλέω^a 26) one against scientific or other truth; and in the first (οὐρήας^a 10) and tenth (κασσιτέροιο^a 28) one against general probability. The formula, therefore, ὑπεναντίας εἰρηκέναι, instead of being restricted to logical incompatibilities, seems to include words and phrases which in the view of the critic are at variance with other standards of judgement. That it was meant to bear this wider sense is shown by the fuller formula in the context, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν [scil. ἐναντίως εἰρηκέναι] ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (^b 18).

^b 16 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι. The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτέοι?) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative ὥσπερ σφαῖρα in De anima 3. 11, 434^a 13, where κινεῖται is probably to be supplied from the κινεῖ which precedes the comparison (see J. of Phil. 17 p. 67). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in Metaph. I 2, 1053^b 14 πῶς δὲ γνωριμωτέως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως (scil. λέγουσιν). The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in ^a 4 and ^a 31. Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one's opponent—which is sometimes a genuine confutation (ἔλεγχος ἀληθινός), and sometimes only the semblance of one (ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος: v. Bon. Ind. 235^b 42). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine ἔλεγχος is found in Soph. el. 5, 167^a 23 ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.—26, 181^a 1 τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὀρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου . . . ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

^b 18 ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν κτέ. = ὥστε καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὑπεναντίας εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere,

or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In 1461^b 18 saying *ὁ ἄν φρόνιμος υποθῆται* Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see ^b3 sqq.). The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in Soph. el. 15, 174^b 19 *ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν*. In the note on this passage in his edition Vahlen supposes the clause to mean *ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν*, scil. *σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν*—as though Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed *ἐπεναντία* and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the *ἐναντιώματα* in a genuine confutation, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confutation in argument may be only a sham confutation.

ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία. For the datives see Bon. Ind. 166^a 61, ^b 19 281^b 24, and 875^a 53.

μὴ ἀνάγκης οὐσης: 15, 1454^a 28 *παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου οἶον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστη*. The plea of poetic necessity was indirectly recognized as a valid answer to certain criticisms in 25, 1460^b 24, and before that in 15, 1454^a 28; comp. also 24, 1460^a 12.

Αἰγεῖ: Eurip. Med. 663. The appearance of Aegeus is in Aristotle's view (1) *ἄλογον*, because no sufficient reason can be given for it, and (2) unnecessary, because no use is made of it in the after-part of the play. The explanations of certain of the editors of Euripides are hardly an adequate answer to Aristotle's criticism. ^b 21

ἐν Ὀρέστη: see on 15, 1454^a 29 (*μὴ ἀναγκαίου*).

ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν. The various heads under which the ^b 22 faults in poetry have been classified are termed *εἶδη*, because they represent distinct 'kinds' of faults. It is one thing to say of something that it is *ἀδύνατον*, another that it is *ἄλογον*, and another that it is *βλαβερόν* (etc.). For this use of *φέρειν* comp. 19, 1456^b 14 *ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται*.—An. pr. 2. 26, 69^b 1 *φέρεται ἢ ἔνστασις*.—An. post. 1. 14, 79^a 19 *φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις*.—Rhet. 2. 18, 1391^b 24 *δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστει φέρουσιν*.

1461^b 23 ὡς ἀδύνατα, scil. ὄντα τὰ εἰρημένα.

βλαβερά: the opposite of the οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in 25, 1460^b 11. The word may be a reminiscence of Plato's condemnation of certain legends in Rep. 391 D οὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὐτ' ἀληθῆ . . . καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά: πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἐγγνώμην ἕξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ "οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι".

ὑπεναντία: the ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα of 1461^b 15.

^b 24 παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην must refer, as Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in 25, 1460^b 16 sqq. It is to be observed that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distinguished in the early part of the chapter (25, 1460^b 20), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility. κατὰ τέχνην is apparently used as an equivalent for the καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην in 25, 1460^b 19. The older interpreters understand the passage differently. Goulston makes it mean 'tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate discedunt', thus giving κατὰ τέχνην a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as ἰατρική, πολιτική, etc. Heinsius (after Victorius) renders it by 'ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura'—just as though the text had either κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (which Hermann wished to restore) or κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the ἐπιτιμήματα considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν. The precise meaning of this is far from clear. Goulston's paraphrase¹ is 'ex antedictis formarum numeris, seu specialibus differentiis'; and Vahlen's 'aus den genannten Zahlen oder Stücken' (Beitr. 4, 389). To illustrate the sense of ἀριθμῶν Tyrwhitt quotes Isocrates 224 D ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν ἐξ ὧν ἀριστ' ἂν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειεν.—Plutarch De aud. 45 C τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἓνα καιρὸν ἡκόντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τινὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιτελεῖται;

¹ Goulston may possibly have remembered the expression τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἐκάστου τῶν νοσημάτων in Hippocrates 2 p. 27 K. as interpreted by Foes, Oec. Hippocr. p. 92.

comparing also the similar use of *numeri* in Latin. Another of 1461^b 24 Tyrwhitt's quotations is perhaps more directly to the purpose, Eurip. Ion 1014 ὁ δεύτερος δ' ἀριθμὸς ὃν [ὢν L. Dindorf] λέγεις τί δρᾶ;—to which may be added Eurip. Heracl. 997 εἰδὼς μὲν οὐκ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλ' ἐτητύμως ἄνδρ' ὄντα τὸν σὸν παῖδα, and the passage in Aristotle (cited by Teichmüller) in De gen. an. 3. 10, 760^a 33 αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ γίγονται, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν γεννώσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἢ γένεσις. It would seem from these instances that ἀριθμός may sometimes have the sense of an item or term in a series, and that ἀριθμῶν in the present passage may thus stand for 'points enumerated'¹. If this interpretation is possible, the reference in ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is to the list of assumptions in the opening of this chapter. Twining draws attention to the parallelism between the language in the text, αἱ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, and that in 1460^b 21 ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα . . . ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. The advantage of this view of the reference in ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is that it simplifies the explanation of the next clause, εἰσὶ δὲ δώδεκα (scil. οἱ ἀριθμοί). It is usual to explain the number by adding up the various λύσεις actually found and described in the preceding discussion (1460^b 21-1461^b 21), and counting in statements like those in 1460^b 29 and 1461^a 4, 31 (v. ad loc.), though they are hardly λύσεις in the present sense of the term (see on 1460^b 29). If we look back, however, to the opening paragraph in the chapter, it will be seen that Aristotle begins by laying down a series of postulates concerning poetry. The first is that, as the poet is an imitator, the poetic picture may represent either οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν or οἷα φασι καὶ δοκεῖ or οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. There are thus, if we separate the alternatives (as Aristotle himself has done in the course of the discussion), five possibilities, οἷα ἦν, οἷα ἔστιν, οἷα φασι (εἶναι), οἷα δοκεῖ (εἶναι), οἷα εἶναι δεῖ; and they are each of them available in reply to criticism; if the critic, for instance, says that the picture is not of things οἷα εἶναι δεῖ, it is a valid answer to reply that it represents οἷα ἦν (v. 1461^a 2) or οἷα ἔστιν, etc. The second postulate is that, as poetic language is not quite the same as ordinary speech, it may have to be explained by certain arts of interpretation. This point is merely indicated in 1460^b 11-13; the statement there has to be supplemented from

¹ The word seems to bear the same sense in [Dion. Hal.] Ars Rhet. p. 414 R. γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἷς εἰπομεν, τοῖς ἐπτά—where ἀριθμοῖς represents the τόποι of p. 400.

1461^b 24 that in 1461^a 9-31, where we are told that six modes of interpretation of the written letter of poetry (*γλώττη, κατὰ μεταφοράν, κατὰ προσωδίαν, διαιρέσει, ἀμφιβολία, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως*) are available, and may be legitimately assumed, whenever a *λύσις* of difficulties arising from the poet's language is wanted. The third postulate is that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, apart from that of every other art or science—which implies, as the next section (1460^b 23-29) explains, that a description may be poetically right, even though it involves some impossibility, or offends against some technical standard of correctness. The various assumptions, therefore, in this series of postulates may serve as major premisses for the apologist; and as a matter of fact every one of them appears in some form or other in the specimen *λύσεις* in this chapter. It will be seen, too, that they are just 12 (5 + 6 + 1) in number.

1461^b 26 Πότερον δὲ βελτίων κτέ. The interpretation of this chapter has been considered at length by Gomperz in *Eranos Vindobonensis* p. 71 sqq. Aristotle rounds off his theory of Tragedy and epic poetry with an appendix on a question which was, no doubt, often discussed in his time, that of the comparative value of the two forms of art. In the view of certain critics Tragedy was artistically inferior to epic poetry (comp. Plato *Laws* 658 D). The reasons for this view are stated (1461^b 27-1462^a 4), and then shown to be inconclusive (1462^a 4-14); after which four positive arguments are adduced as turning the scale in favour of Tragedy. The case against Tragedy may be put into the form of an enthymeme ἐκ σημείων: The inferior art is one that addresses an inferior public; Tragedy addresses an inferior public; it must, therefore, be the inferior art. The truth of the minor premiss is shown by the evidence, or rather the practice, of actors and other public performers, who may be presumed to know their public and to have taken the measure of its intelligence.

1461^b 27 φορτικῆ, 'common' or 'vulgar' (comp. Twining ad loc.), as in *Pol.* 8. 5, 1340^b 9 *τούτων* [i.e. τῶν ἦθος κινητικῶν ἐχόντων ῥυθμῶν] οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.—*Pol.* 8. 6, 1341^b 11 οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς. διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν. καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος. ὁ γὰρ θεατῆς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικῆν. Comp. also Aristophanes *Vesp.* 66 *κωμωδίας δὲ φορτικῆς σοφώτερον,*

and the Platonic passages in Ast, Lex. s. v. The word is some- 1461^b 27 times taken here in the sense of 'extravagant' or 'overdone' ('überladen', Bernays, Zwei Abh. p. 182).

τοιαύτη, i.e. ἤτρον φορτικῆ; comp. An. post. 1. 24, 85^a 29 εἰ δὴ βελτίων μὲν ἢ καθ' αὐτό [scil. ἀπόδειξις], τοιαύτη δ' ἢ κατὰ μέρος . . . καὶ βελτίων ἂν ἢ κατὰ μέρος ἀπόδειξις εἴη—where τοιαύτη recalls the idea of the καθ' αὐτό which precedes. The form of argument in this chapter of the Posterior Analytics is very similar to that in the present section of the Poetics.

θεατᾶς. The term is sometimes used even of the audience of ^b 28 a purely musical performance (Pol. 8. 7, 1341^b 16; Plato Gorg. 502 A).

ἀεὶ. For the position of the word comp. Eth. N. 1. 5, 1097^b 19 ἀγαθῶν τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον ἀεὶ.—Pol. 4. 14, 1298^b 40 ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεὶ.

λίαν qualifies the following φορτικῆ (Bon. Ind. 430^b 15). For the insertion of δῆλον ὅτι comp. Bon. Ind. 173^b 31.

〈πρὸς〉 ἅπαντα. The traditional reading, ἢ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη, ^b 29 which is explained as meaning 'the imitation which extends to every circumstance' (Twining), or 'quae motu et gestibus omnia similat' (Vahlen), does not fit into the argument in this passage, though it may perhaps seem to be confirmed by Plato Rep. 397 A. The logic of the present argument requires not ἅπαντα but πρὸς ἅπαντα (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 121). The sense is that Tragedy is φορτικῆ because, instead of appealing to a select public (πρὸς θεατᾶς ἐπιεικεῖς, 1462^a 2), it is πρὸς ἅπαντα, or as we are told a little further on, πρὸς φαύλους (1462^a 3). For this use of ἅπαντα ('any one and every one') comp. Top. 8. 14, 164^b 8 οὐχ ἅπαντι δὲ διαλεκτέον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα γυμναστέον.—Soph. el. 5, 167^a 10 παντὶ θεωρῆσαι ῥάδιον. Aristotle's estimate of the average θεατῆς in the theatres may be seen from 13, 453^a 34, and from the distinction in Pol. 8. 7, 1342^a 18 ὁ θεατῆς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ φορτικός ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος. Plato had an equally mean opinion of the theatrical public of his day: Gorg. 502 c οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολλὸν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι [i.e. those of the tragedians]; . . . νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ἠύρηκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιούτον οἷον παιδῶν τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων (comp. Laws 658 D).

οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, scil. τῶν θεατῶν, understood from πρὸς ἅπαντα (see on 6, 1449^b 26).

1461^b 30 προσθῆ: used absolutely in the sense of 'adds something' (comp. 24, 1460^a 18).

κινούνται: for the change of number see on λέγει in 21, 1457^b 19.

οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταί: i.e. indifferent flute-players, in their anxiety to make the music intelligible, accompany it by a sort of pantomimic movement of the body. According to Theophrastus (fr. 92 Wimmer) this combination of music and pantomime originated in Sicily: Θεόφραστος πρῶτόν φησιν Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Καταναῖον αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ποιῆσαι τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα (ὅθεν σικελίζεν τὸ ὄρχεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς), μεθ' ὃν Κλεόλαν τὸν Θηβαῖον. Other references to it will be found in Sittl, Die Gebärden der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244.

^b 31 δίσκον μιμῆσθαι seems to mean 'to imitate the act of throwing a quoit'.

^b 32 Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν, 'play music descriptive of Scylla'. Aristotle may be referring to, the dithyramb mentioned in 15, 1454^a 31; but the probability is that he is thinking rather of a purely instrumental piece of music (see on 1, 1447^a 15) on the same subject. In the Greek αὐλεῖν τινα = δι' αὐλήσεως μιμῆσθαι τινα, in the same way as ὄρχεῖσθαι τινα = δι' ὄρχήσεως μιμῆσθαι τινα.

^b 34 Μυννίσκος. On Mynniscus of Chalcis (the protagonist in some of the later plays of Aeschylus) and his younger contemporary, Callipides, see Völker, Diss. Halens. 4 pp. 153, 177. In calling Callipides an 'ape' Mynniscus may have meant no more than this, that his acting was so exaggerated as to be ridiculous and a mere caricature, the ape being a sort of caricature of humanity (comp. Top. 3, 2, 117^b 17 σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον εἶη ὁμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ).

^b 35 Πινδάρου. Nothing further is known of this actor (Völker l.c. p. 155).

1462^a 3 σχημάτων: the attitudes or postures assumed by the dancer. In the dance, which, it is to be remembered, was a species of acting (see on 1, 1447^a 27), σχῆμα had the technical sense explained by Plutarch, Qu. conv. 9. 15, 747 c-e ἡ γὰρ ὄρχησις ἔκ τε κινήσεων καὶ σχέσεων συνέστηκεν, ὡς τὸ μέλος τῶν φθόγγων καὶ τῶν διαστημάτων· ἐνταῦθα δ' αἱ μοναὶ πέρατα τῶν κινήσεών εἰσι. φορὰς μὲν οὖν τὰς κινήσεις ὀνομάζουσι, σχήματα δὲ σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις, εἰς ἃς φερόμεναι τελευτῶσιν αἱ κινήσεις, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Πανὸς ἢ τινος Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἶδεσιν

ἐπιμένωσι . . . ἐν ὀρχήσει τὸ μὲν σχῆμα μιμητικὸν ἐστὶ μορφῆς καὶ 1462^a 3
ιδέας, καὶ πάλιν ἢ φορὰ πάθους τινὸς ἐμφαντικὸν ἢ πράξεως ἢ δυνάμεως
(comp. Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 216).

ὑποκριτικῆς : see on 19, 1456^b 10.

^a 5

σημείους : i.e. the significant movements, of hand or head for ^a 6
instance, by which the spoken word may be accompanied (comp.
Aristoxenus p. 411, 13 Marquard, and Ath. 628 D; see also
Sommerbrodt l. c. p. 213).

ῥαψωδοῦντα. The ῥαψωδός is tacitly assumed to be a kind of
ὑποκριτής (see on 5, 1449^a 15).

Σωίστρατος . . . Μνασίθεος. Nothing further is known of either. ^a 7
It is evident that the one was a rhapsodist and the other a profes-
sional singer.

διάδοντα. As Tyrwhitt (quoting Theocritus 5. 22) points out,
διάδειν is 'certatim sive in certamine canere'; it implies that
Mnasitheus sang, no doubt as a κιθαρωδός, in an ἀγών, i.e. in
a public performance in the theatre. The word is explained in the
Lexicon in Bekker's Anecdota 37, διάσασθαι τὸ διαμιλλήσασθαι ἐν
ᾧδῇ τινι. The same idea of competition is found in διαθεῖν,
διακολακεύεσθαι, διαπίνειν, etc. Gomperz aptly compares the say-
ing ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic (Stob. Fl. 4. 112), Διογένης
ἔλεγε διαπαλαίοντας μὲν πολλοὺς ὄραν καὶ διατρέχοντας, διακαλοκαγα-
θίζομένους δὲ οὐ.

ἀποδοκιμαστέα. ἀποδοκιμάζειν, 'to reject as inadmissible', is the ^a 8
opposite of δοκιμάζειν, 'to approve, or sanction' (Pol. 8. 7,
1342^a 34; comp. Bon. Ind. 80^b 48).

φαύλων, 'turpium personarum' (Victorius)—not as Paccius ^a 9
renders it, 'ineptorum', as we hardly need to be told that bad
acting is to be rejected. What Aristotle means is clear from his
instance: Callipides in his impersonations of the heroines of
Greek Tragedy, did not make them move and deport themselves
like ladies. The assumption here is that character comes out in
movement, and that some sorts of movement are naturally noble
and others ignoble; comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340^b 7 τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον
ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον
οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ
δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.

διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερά ὅποια τίς ἐστίν : comp. infra ^a 17 ^a 12
τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, and 6,
1450^b 18 ἢ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκρι-
τῶν ἐστίν. But though Aristotle draws a line between a tragedy

1462^a 12 as literature and its stage presentation (comp. 14, 1453^b 2), he has no idea of a reading as distinct from an acting tragedy; a tragedy with him is essentially something to be acted. The notion of a reading play has been found in Rhet. 3. 12, 1413^b 12, in the use of the word *ἀναγνωστικοί* of Chaeremon and others. The term, however, merely denotes a fact of style; these writers were *ἀναγνωστικοί* because their language could be read by any one, not requiring any special arts of elocution to bring out the meaning (comp. Demetrius De eloc. 193).

^a 14 *ἔπειτα* corresponds with the *πρῶτον μὲν* in ^a 5. There is the same or an even greater interval between the words in Metaph. N. 2, 1089^a 15, in Pol. 5. 11, 1314^b 14, in Aeschines in Tim. 161, in Isocrates 197 A, and in Alcidas De Soph. 3. The answer to the opponents of Tragedy is twofold: (1) that their reasoning is not quite conclusive; and (2) that they ignore a whole series of facts which tell in favour of Tragedy. The series begins with *διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐποποιία*, and ends with *ἔτι ἦττον μία ἢ μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν* (^b 3); all that follows as far as *μίμησις* in ^b 11 is a justification of this last proposition. To this, however, is added a further point, *ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ* (scil. *διαφέρει*), in the short formula which summarizes this part of the argument in ^b 12, *εἰ οὖν τούτοις διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ*.

^a 15 *τῷ μέτρῳ*: as for instance in Soph. Trach. 1009, Phil. 840, and Eurip. Troad. 590 (Tyrwhitt).

οὐ μικρὸν μέρος, scil. *ἔχει*.

^a 16 *δι' ἧς* refers to *τὴν μουσικὴν*, which is the more important of the two things (comp. 6, 1450^b 16). The neglect of *καὶ τὰς ὄψεις* in the construction is not unlike that of *καὶ περιπέτεια* in 11, 1452^a 38. Other instances to be explained on the same principle are Soph. el. 16, 175^a 21 *ιδεῖν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν* (i. e. *ιδεῖν . . . τὴν μοχθηρίαν*), and De anima 3. 7, 431^b 7 *λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα* (i. e. *λογίζεται . . . τὰ μέλλοντα κτέ.*).

^a 18 *τὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι . . . εἶναι*, scil. *ἔχει*; comp. 24, 1460^a 30 (ὁ) *Οιδίπους* (scil. *ἔχει*) *τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι*. The same construction is found after *λαμβάνειν* in Isocrates 225 A *τὸ μηδένα τῶν μαχίμων ἀνευ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων γνώμης ἀποδημεῖν . . . ἔτι δὲ τὸ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροῦντας τῶν κοινῶν προσταγμάτων ἀμελεῖν, μηδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἐκείθεν ἅπαντα ταῦτ' εἰλήφασιν*.

^b 1 *πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ*: Plato Critias 121 A *πολλῷ τῷ θνητῷ καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακεραννύμεν*. The lengthiness of the statement is

said to dilute the pleasure of the story and make it thin and watery 1462^b 1 (b 7 ὑδαρῆ). The clause which follows (λέγω δ' οἶον κτέ.) is an illustration of this: if the matter of the Oedipus Tyrannus (see on 11, 1452^a 24) were treated at great length, in a poem as long as the Iliad, for instance, it would be only a thin and diluted pleasure that we should derive from it in its amplified form.

ἡ Ἰλιάς, scil. κείται, understood from the preceding θείη. b 3

πλείους τραγωδίαι: comp. 23, 1459^b 2. b 5

ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, scil. οἱ ἐποποιοί; another instance of μὲν solitarium (see on 6, 1450^a 3 τῆς μὲν πράξεως). In order to provide an antithesis, the old editors, with certain of the apographs (e.g. Par. 2038), re-write the text after ὑδαρῆ (b 7) thus: <ἐὰν δὲ πλείους,> λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐὰν ἐκ πλείονων πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη, <οὐ μία>, ὥσπερ κτέ.; and both Vahlen and Gomperz assume a lacuna after ὑδαρῆ. All that Aristotle has to show, however, is that the epic μίμησις is in the nature of things ἦττον μία; and he does this by an indirect argument, by insisting that an epic is always a failure, if the dramatic rule of Unity of action is too strictly observed in it.

μείουρον. Although μούρον is the spelling both here and else- b 6 where in the principal MSS. of Aristotle, the evidence (v. HSt. s. v.) is on the whole in favour of the alternative form μείουρος—that in use in the writers on metre¹. Both spellings are found in the existing text of Galen, but his explanations (8 p. 524 and 9 p. 509 K.) show that he connected the first syllable with μειῶν; so that μείουρος must have been the form he had before him. The proper sense of the word is said to be 'contracted, or thinning away, at the end': Etym. Magn. μούρον· τὸ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς λεπτινόμενον. In Greek medicine σφυγμὸς μείουρος (or μούρος) meant a tapering-off pulse: Galen 8 p. 524 K. ἔστω τοῖνυν ὁ μὲν δευτέρου σφυγμὸς τοῦ πρώτου βραχὺν μικρότερος· ὁ δὲ τρίτος τοῦ δευτέρου τοσοῦτῳ πάλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τέταρτος τοῦ τρίτου τῷ ἴσῳ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἄχρη πλείονος ἐφεξῆς γενέσθω. τοὺς τοιοῦτους σφυγμὸς μειουρίζοντάς τε καὶ μειούρους καλοῦσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς ὄξυ τελευτώντων σχημάτων τοῦνομα μεταφέροντες. In metre an hexameter which 'halts' through a metrical deficiency at the end, like the Homeric Τρῶες

¹ Eustathius on Il. 12. 208 recognizes both forms: Ἐν δὲ τῷ "Ἐρρίγησαν . . . ὄφιν" στιχηρὸν ἔστι πάθος, ὃ λέγεται καὶ μουρία διὰ διχρόνου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ μειουρία διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου, ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει πυρριχισθέντος τοῦ σίχου καὶ συστολῆν παθόντος κατὰ μυδὸς οὐράν, ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν οὐραίου ἦτοι τέλους ἄκρου.

1462^b 6 δ' ἐρρίγησαν, ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν (Il. 12. 208), was termed a στίχος μείουρος (Athenaeus 632 E; comp. Schol. Hephaest. 194-6 Gaisf.). The Latin rendering of it in this sense is *ecaudis*. Aristotle has the word in a physical sense in two places of the *De Partibus*, 3. 1, 662^a 24 and 4. 13, 696^b 34, where the carnivorous fishes are said to have an ἀνερρωγός, and the non-carnivorous, a μούρον στόμα. In both passages μούρον στόμα denotes a mouth with a narrow orifice, i.e. one with an opening small by comparison with the interior cavity, just as ἀνερρωγός στόμα means one with a wide orifice. In the *Rhetoric*, where it is a term of literary criticism, μούρος is applied to a clause or period which seems too short and to end abruptly: *Rhet.* 3. 9, 1409^b 17 δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν [= τὸ μούρον] προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἔτι ὀρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῆ παυσάμενον, οἷον προσπταίειν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. This is apparently the sense of μείουρος in the present passage also—where it is usually rendered by 'curtus' (Tyrwhitt), 'truncatus' (Hermann), 'in extremo imminutus' (Victorius), or the like. The general meaning is clear enough: If the epic poet takes a story that is one in the strict dramatic sense of the term, and tells it with befitting rapidity and without diffuseness, the result will be that it will seem to end up too soon. The assumption is that an epic is naturally, and is always expected to be, a work of considerable length (comp. 5, 1449^b 12; 24, 1459^b 17; 24, 1460^a 3).

^b 7 τῷ τοῦ μέτρον μήκει. In lieu of this Bernays suggested τῷ συμμέτρῳ μήκει. As the hexameter, however, has been said to be the only metre fit for a long poem (24, 1460^a 3), it is possible that τῷ τοῦ μέτρον μήκει may be meant to stand for τῷ τοῦ μέτρον οἰκείῳ μήκει, the length one ordinarily associates with this description of verse. The rendering of Gomperz, 'wenn er der Länge des epischen Versmasses entspricht', has met with the approval of Zeller (*Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.* 9 p. 539).

ὑδαρή: Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 659 R. ὑδαρῆς τε γὰρ καὶ ἀσθενῆς καὶ ψυχρός ἐστιν (scil. ὁ λόγος). Similarly in *Pol.* 2. 4, 1262^b 15 Aristotle describes affection as becoming a ὑδαρῆς φιλία when spread over too large a circle of friends or relations.

λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη illustrates the principal statement, ἦττον μία ἢ μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν (^b 3); for the position of the illustration see on 6, 1450^a 34. The main

point is proved by showing that even the best epics, those of 1462^b 7 Homer, are made up of a plurality of actions, each of them of some magnitude and importance by itself:

τοιαῦτα μέρη: i. e. sections embodying so many distinguishable^b 9 πράξεις or stories.

καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει. It is usual to write here (<δ>) καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει with certain of the apographs; but a subject (τὰ μέρη) may easily be supplied from the preceding τοιαῦτα μέρη (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 35, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 234).

καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα. The error here in A^c, καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα^b 10 ποιήματα, is fellow to that in it in Rhet. 1. 2, 1358^a 16 καὶ τοῖαυτα (sic) for καίτοι ταῦτα.

εἰ οὖν τούτοις κτέ. In summing up the series of reasons intro-^b 12 duced by διότι in^a 14 Aristotle changes his construction, treating them as a series of assumptions. Here also, at the last moment as it were, he recognizes another and an even more important point of superiority, the superior emotional effect of Tragedy (τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ). An additional argument is introduced in just the same way in De caelo 2. 14, 297^b 17, and 3. 5, 304^b 19, and in De part. an. 2. 10, 656^a 9.

τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ. In Aristotle's view epic poetry has the same end as Tragedy; and its immediate effect (ἔργον) is the same in kind, the pleasurable excitement of the emotions of pity and fear. The affinity of the Homeric Epic and Tragedy in this respect was acknowledged in antiquity by the ancient commentators on Homer (Adam, Die aristotelische Theorie vom Epos p. 33 sqq.) as well as by Plato (Rep. 605 c). Aristotle's view is that the difference between them is mainly one of manner; so that apart from that they are fundamentally alike—with the same literary elements, the same canons of procedure, the same emotional effect, and the same ultimate end and justification.

τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονήν: Pol. 8. 5, 1339^b 32 ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν^b 13 τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν.

αὐτὰς: i. e. Tragedy and epic poetry. The pleasure they give is essentially the same (see above on^b 12), though Tragedy gives it in a finer and more concentrated form.

τὴν εἰρημένην: 13, 1452^b 32 and 14, 1453^b 10.

περὶ μὲν οὖν κτέ. This list of points in the preceding theory^b 14 of Tragedy and epic poetry is preparatory to a discussion on another matter, no doubt the theory of Comedy (see 6, 1449^b 22). Summaries of the same type are constantly introduced by Aristotle^b 16

1462^b 16 as connecting links between one discussion and another; see more especially De gen. et corr. 2. 1, 328^b 26; Meteor. 1. 14, 353^a 25; De mem. 2, 453^b 8; H. A. 3. 1, 509^a 26; Eth. N. 7. 15, 1154^b 32; Pol. 6. 1, 1316^b 31; Rhet. 2. 1, 1377^b 15. To judge from these parallels, the next paragraph must have opened with *περὶ δὲ κωμωδίας λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν* or some equivalent formula.

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON 6. 1449^b 27

THE following synopsis of versions and paraphrases of the clause δι' ἔλεον καὶ φόβον περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may give some idea of the variations of opinion at different times in regard to this much-debated passage. The extracts without references are to be understood to come from commentaries or translations.

1527. Paccius: 'per misericordiam . . . atque terrorem perturbationes huiusmodi purgans.'

1549. Segni: 'conducendo l'espurgatione degli affetti . . . per via di misericordia et di timore.'

1559. Minturnus (De Poeta p. 63): 'tragica poesis id sibi potissimum proponit, ut misericordia captanda incutiendoque terrore animum a perturbationibus expiet.' Comp. his Arte Poetica (1564) p. 77.

1560. Victorius: 'per misericordiam et metum conficiens huiuscemodi perturbationum purgationem.'

1570. Castelvetro: 'induca per misericordia e per ispavento purgazione di così fatte passioni.' In his commentary he explains this as meaning that: 'la tragedia con le predette passioni, spavento e misericordia, purga e scaccia dal cuore degli huomini quelle predette medesime passioni.'

1572. Piccolomini: 'a fine che . . . col mezo della compassione e del timore, si purghino gli animi da così fatte lor passioni & perturbationi.'

1587. Riccobonus: 'per misericordiam et metum inducens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1588. Denores (Poetica f. 6^r): 'per purgar gli spettatori col diletto che nasce dalla imitatione, & dalla representatione dal terrore, & dalla misericordia.'

1590. Rossi (Discorsi f. 21^r): 'per purgare gli animi, con la compassione, & con lo spavento da simili affetti.'

1596. Pinciano (Philosophia antigua poetica p. 332): 'Tragedia dixera yo que es imitacion activa de accion grave, hecha para limpiar los animos de perturbaciones, por medio de misericordia y miedo.'

1610. Heinsius: 'ut . . . per misericordiam et metum inducat

similium perturbationum expiationem.' Comp. his De Tragoediae constitutione p. 29 ed. 1611.

1613. Benius: 'per misericordiam et metum peragens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1621. Gallutius (Virgilianae Vindicationes p. 252): 'Id igitur ait Aristoteles Tragoediam agere ac veluti finem intueri: ut sicut affecta corpora purgatis atque abstersis curantur humoribus, ita animum sanet ipsa, duobus affectibus nominatim, commiseratione ac metu purgatis, hoc est, ab ea liberatis exsuperantia, a qua animi quaedam aegrotatio promanabat.'

1623. Goulston: 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum eiusmodi vehementes animorum perturbationes undequaue purgans expiansque.'

1626. Ordoñez: 'conduciendo la expurgacion de los afectos . . . por via de misericordia y terror.'

1633. Gonçalez de Salas (Nueva Idea de la Tragedia antigua p. 11): 'de modo sea imitada la Accion [p. 17: 'de modo sea su Representacion'], que mueva a Lastima, y a Miedo, para que el animo se purgue de los affectos semejantes.'

1640. Mesnardière (Poétique p. 8): 'qui produit par elle mesme la terreur et la pitié, et qui sert à modérer ces deux mouvemens de l'âme.'

1671. Milton (Pref. to Samson Agonistes): 'Tragedy . . . said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions.' But his Latin version of the words is: 'per misericordiam et metum perficiens talium affectuum lustrationem.'

1692. Dacier: 'qui . . . par le moyen de la compassion et de la terreur, achève de purger en nous ces sortes de passions et toutes les autres semblables.'

1705. Anon.: 'which . . . by means of Compassion and Terror perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.'

1753. Curtius: 'welche . . . uns vermittelt des Schreckens und Mitleidens von den Fehlern der vorgestellten Leidenschaften reiniget' (comp. Bullinger, Metakritische Gänge p. 24).

1763. Moor (On the End of Tragedy p. 42): 'And thus, says Aristotle, Tragedy, by calling in Musick to its aid in exciting Pity and Terror, proposes to CHARM away, out of human life, such calamities as are exhibited in the Drama.'

1768. Lessing (Hamburgische Dramaturgie St. 77): 'Die Tragödie ist die Nachahmung einer Handlung, die . . . vermittelt des Mitleids und der Furcht die Reinigung dieser und dergleichen Leidenschaften bewirkt.'

1771. Batteux: 'pour opérer . . . par la terreur et par la pitié la purgation de ces mêmes passions.' Comp. his paraphrase in the Mém.

de l'Académie des Inscriptions for 1771: 'qui se fait . . . par un spectacle de terreur et de pitié, pour nous faire ressentir ces deux passions purgées de ce qui les rend désagréables.'

1775. Anon.: 'with Terror and Pity, effectually purifying such like Passions.'

1789. Twining: 'effecting through pity and terror the correction and refinement of such passions.'

1792. Pye: 'effecting through the means of pity and terror the purgation of such passions.'

1794. Tyrwhitt: 'per misericordiam et metum hujusmodi affectuum purgationem efficiens.' In his note he explains the meaning to be that 'affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri' (comp. Matthiae, Misc. Phil. 2. I, p. 24).

1798. Buhle: 'um durch Mitleid und Furcht die Veredlung gewisser Leidenschaften zu bewirken.'

1802. Hermann: 'miseratione et terrore harum et similium perturbationum purgationem perficiens.'

— Sahl: 'ut per misericordiam metumque velut lustrationem quandam talium calamitatum perficiat.'

1811. Taylor: 'through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions.' In the Introd. to the ed. of 1818 the meaning is said to be that 'the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form the catastrophe of the tragedy.'

1821. Gräfenhan: 'durchgehends durch Mitleid und Furcht, die im Zuschauer erregt werden, die Reinigung eben solcher unwillkürlich entstehenden Gefühle bewirkend.'

1824. Weise: 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht eine Reinigung dieser Gemüthsbewegungen bewirkt.'

1826. Goethe (Nachlese zu Aristoteles Poetik): 'die . . . nach einem Verlauf aber von Mitleid und Furcht mit Ausgleichung solcher Leidenschaften ihr Geschäft abschliesst' (comp. Stisser, Norden Progr. 1884).

1839. Ritter: 'miseratione ac metu perficiens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1848. Weil (Verh. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel p. 140): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten eigenthümliche Reinigung.' In 1889 (Études sur le drame antique p. 162) thus in French: 'La tragédie est l'image d'une action . . . qui, par la pitié et la crainte, accomplit la catharsis propre aux émotions de cette nature.'

1849. Egger (La Critique chez les Grecs p. 321): 'employant la terreur et la pitié pour purger les passions de ce genre.'

1857. Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 21): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt

durch (Erregung von) Mitleid und Furcht die erleichternde Entladung solcher (mitleidigen und furchtsamen) Gemüthsaffectionen.'

1858. Saint-Hilaire: 'arrivant, tout en excitant la pitié et la terreur, à purifier en nous ces deux sentiments.'

1859. Stahr (Aristoteles und die Wirkung der Tragödie p. 32): 'welche . . . durch Mitleid und Furcht (die beiden nothwendigen Elemente jeder solchen Handlung, welche keiner tragischen Dichtung fehlen dürfen) die reinigende Erleichterung von solchen Erleidnissen zu Wege bringt.'

1865. Susemihl: 'und dies Alles in einer Weise, dass diese Darstellung durch Furcht und Mitleid eine Reinigung eben dieser Affecte erzielt.' In his ed. of 1874: 'eine Reinigung von eben dieser Art von Affecten erzielt.'

1869. Ueberweg: 'welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die (zeitweilige) Befreiung von derartigen Gefühlen zum Enderfolg hat.'

1875. M. Schmidt: 'so angelegt, dass sie durch Furcht und Mitleid eine von derartigen Affecten reinigende Wirkung übt.'

1876. Barco: 'la quale per via della pietà e del terrore libera l'animo da siffatti sentimenti.'

— Doering (Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 254): 'Durch Mitleid und Furcht, d. h. durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht, vollbringt die Tragödie die Katharsis der jenen gleichartigen Affekte.'

— Manns (Emmerich Progr. p. 5): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten (oder . . . die solchen Mitteln) eigenthümliche Reinigung' (comp. his Lehre des Aristoteles von der tragischen Katharsis und Hamartia p. 25).

1878. Reinkens (Aristoteles über Kunst p. 158): 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung von solchen Affekten bewirkt.'

1883. Ruelle: 'opérant par la pitié et la terreur la purgation des passions de la même nature.'

1885. Günther (Grundzüge der tragischen Kunst p. 258): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Rührung und Erschütterung die gerade auf derartige Seelenzustände sich erstreckende Gemüthsklärung.'

1887. Baumgart (Handbuch der Poetik p. 424): 'welche die Kraft besitzt, durch die Empfindungen des Mitleids und der Furcht die Läuterung der entsprechenden Gemüthsbewegungen zu vollenden.'

1891. Wecklein (Ueber die Stoffe und die Wirkung der griechischen Tragödie p. 35): 'die Tragödie ist eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Erleichterung von dieser Art von Gemüths-erregungen erzielt.'

1892. Bosanquet (History of Aesthetic p. 64); 'producing by (the stimulation of) pity and fear the alleviating discharge of emotions of that nature.'

1894. Bernardakis (Mon édition d'Euripide p. 60): 'qui par la pitié et la crainte mène à sa fin l'expiation des faits de mal qui causent cette pitié et cette crainte.'

1895. Butcher: 'through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.'

1896. Laehr (Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles p. 65): 'Eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung derartiger Gefühle . . . vollbringt.' Explained in p. 69 as meaning: 'die Tragödie vollbringt durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung aller derartigen Gefühle.'

1897. Gomperz: 'eine Darstellung, welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die Entladung dieser Affecte herbeiführt.'

1899. Hatzfeld et Dufour: 'opérant par la pitié et la crainte (au théâtre) la purification des passions de ce genre (dans la réalité).'

INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

The references are to Bekker's pages and lines as given in the margin of this edition of the text. The first two figures are omitted; so that Bekker's 1456^b 36, for instance, becomes here 56^b 36.

A + after a reference means that the word recurs more than once in the context.

- A 56^b 36; 58^a 12
 ἀγαθός 50^a 28; 54^b 9; 56^a 6 — opp.
 φαῦλος 51^b 37; 56^a 6; 59^b 29; 60^b
 2 ἀγαθόν 56^a 6; 59^b 29; 60^b 2
 — opp. κακόν 61^a 8
 ἄγαθων 51^b 21; 54^b 14; 56^a 18, 24,
 30
 ἀγγελία 54^b 5
 ἄγειν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο 49^a 17 ἄγεσθαι
 ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενος 52^a 27
 ἀγερωῶ 51^a 27
 ἀγροῦν 59^a 4; 60^a 6 ἡγρόνηται 49^b
 5 ἀγροῶν opp. εἰδῶς 53^b 30;
 54^a 2
 ἄγνοια opp. γνώσις 52^a 30; 56^b 13 δι'
 ἄγνοιαν 53^b 35
 ἄγών 50^b 18; 51^a 6; 53^a 27
 ἀγωνίζεσθαι 51^a 8; 60^a 9 — κακῶς
 56^a 18
 ἀγωνίσματα ποιούντες 51^b 37
 ἄδειν 56^a 29, 31 αἶδε 56^b 16
 ἄδόμενα 56^a 28
 ἀδελφή 54^a 7; 55^a 8, 11
 ἀδελφός 53^b 20; 54^a 7; 55^b 6
 ἀδήλων 55^b 4
 ἀδαιρέτος 56^b 22, 24
 ἄδικος 56^a 23
 ἐν ἄδου 56^a 3
 ἀδυναμία 60^b 17
 τὸ ἀδύνατον 61^b 9 ἀδύνατον πιθανόν
 61^b 11 ἀδύνατα 51^b 18; 60^b 20,
 23; 61^b 23 — εἰκότα 60^a 27
 ἀδύνατα συνάψαι 58^a 27
 ἀειδής 58^b 27
 ἀεικέλιον 58^b 29
 ἀεικής 58^b 25
 ἀήθη 60^a 11 ἀήθεις τραγωδίαί 50^a 25
 ἀθάνατα 61^a 25
 Ἄθηναῖοι 48^a 36, 11
 Ἀθῆνησιν 49^b 7
 ἀθρήσειεν 61^a 18
 ἀθροῦτερον 62^b 1
 Αἴαντες 56^a 1
 Αἰγυῖς (Eurip.) 61^b 21
 Αἰγισθος 53^a 37
 Αἶμων (Soph.) 54^a 2
 αἶνιγμα 58^a 24 +
 αἰρείσθαι 60^a 5
 αἰρετώτερον 61^b 11
 αἰσθανομένων 61^b 29 αἰσθῆσθαι 54^b 37
 αἰσθησις 51^a 7 αἰσθήσεις 54^b 16
 αἰσχος 49^a 35
 αἰσχροῦς 49^a 36; 61^a 13 τὸ αἰσχρόν
 49^a 34
 Αἰσχύλος 49^a 16; 56^a 17; 58^b 20, 22
 αἰτία 48^b 4, 19; 55^b 7; 62^b 18
 αἰτίασις 55^b 31
 αἰτιος 52^a 8 αἰτιον 50^a 1; 51^b 16
 — dist. σημείον 48^b 12
 αἶψα 61^a 24
 ἀκολουθεῖν 48^a 3; 49^b 10; 52^a 28; 53^a
 34; 62^b 7 — ἐξ ἀνάγκης 54^b 16
 ἀκούειν 55^a 2; 59^b 30 — opp. ὀραῖν
 53^b 5, 6
 ἀκουστός 56^b 27 +
 ἄκρατον 61^a 15
 ἀκριβοῦν 48^b 11; 50^a 36
 ἀκρόασις 59^b 22
 ἄκρον 57^a 2, 10
 ἀληθής 60^a 24, 33, 36 ἀληθῆ λέγειν
 58^b 19
 ἀληθινώτατα 55^a 32
 Ἄλκιβιάδης 51^b 11
 Ἄλκινου ἀπόλογος 55^a 2
 Ἄλκμέων 53^a 20, 24 — ὁ Ἀστυδά-
 μαντος 53^b 33
 ἄλλ' οὖν 61^a 1
 ἄλλοτε 51^a 9
 ἀλλότριον ὄνομα 57^b 7, 31
 ἄλογα 61^b 19
 ἄλογον 54^b 6; 60^a 13, 29, 36; 61^b 14,
 20, 23 μέρη ἄλογα 60^a 28 ἄλο-
 γως 61^b 1
 ἄμα 47^b 28; 51^a 1; 52^a 32; 59^b 24, 27
 ἄμαρτάνειν 51^a 20; 53^a 24; 54^b 17
 ἄμαρτησθαι 56^b 15; 60^b 23 +
 ἄμαρτημα 49^a 34; 60^b 19, 30; 61^b 8
 ἄμαρτία 54^b 35; 60^b 15, 17 — opp.

- κακία 53^a 10 — opp. μοχθηρία
53^a 16
ἀμείνων 53^b 3
ἄμετρα 51^b 1
ἀμιήτως 60^b 32
ἄμωρος 61^a 20
τὸ ἀμφί 57^a 7
Ἄμφιάρως 55^a 27
ἀμφιβολία (λύειν) 61^a 25
ἀμφίβολον 61^a 26
ἀν repeated 60^b 7
ἀνάγειν πρὸς τι 61^b 10
ἀναγινώσκειν 62^a 12
ἀναγκάζεσθαι 52^a 1; 54^a 12
ἀναγκαῖος 54^a 29; 62^a 13 ἀναγκαῖον
dist. εἰκός 51^a 13, 27, 38, 39; 52^a 24;
54^a 34 +
ἀνάγκη 48^a 1; 49^b 37; 50^a 7; 52^a 10;
53^a 12, 15, 37; 59^a 22; 60^a 23, 39;
61^b 19 — dist. εἰκός 51^b 35 ἐξ
ἀνάγκης 49^b 32; 50^b 27, 30; 54^b 16
— dist. κατὰ τὸ εἰκός 52^a 20
ἀναγνωρίζειν 52^b 5; 53^b 35; 54^a 3, 6, 8;
55^a 15, 29 — φιλιαν 53^b 31 — εἰ
πέπραγέ τις 52^a 36 — ὅτι Ὀρέστης
54^b 32 (comp. 55^b 21) ἀναγνω-
ρισθῆναι 52^b 6; 54^b 27; 55^a 3
ἀναγνώρισις 52^a 29 +; 54^a 4, 19;
59^b 15 — conj. περιπέτεια 50^a 34
(comp. 52^a 32); 52^b 10, 11; 55^b 34;
59^b 11 ἀναγνωρίσεως εἶδη 54^b 20
βελτίστη ἀναγνωρίσις 55^a 16
ἀναγνωρισμός 52^a 16, 17
ἀνάγνωσις 62^a 17
ἀνείλεν ὁ θεός 55^b 7 ἀνήρητο 60^a 33
ἀναίσθητος χρόνος 50^b 39
ἀναλαβόντες 49^b 23
ἀναλίσκεσθαι 55^b 20
ἀνάλογον ἔχει 48^b 38 τὸ ἀνάλογον
57^b 9, 16 τὸ ἀνάλογον 57^b 25
ἀνανεύων 60^a 16
ἀνάξιος 53^a 4, 5
ἀναπαίστου 52^b 24
ἀνδρείος 54^a 22, 23; 56^a 23
ἀνδριάς 52^a 8
ἀνεκτά 60^a 36
ἀνε ἀναπαίστου 52^b 23 — χρόνου
57^a 11
ἀνηκέστων τι 53^b 35
ἀνήρ 58^a 29 — opp. γυνή 60^a 10
— ἐπιεικής 52^b 34 — ἐπιφανής
53^a 12 ἀνέρες (Hom.) 61^a 17
Ἄνθ'εἰ 51^b 21
ἀνθρωπος 54^b 4 τὸ ἄνθρωπος 57^a 16
ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἀνθρώπος 57^a 21 ἀνθρώ-
που ὀρισμός 57^a 26, 30 ἀνθρώποι
47^b 13; 48^b 6; 60^a 20 — opp.
πράξις καὶ βίος 50^a 16
ἀνῆι ἐξ ἱεροῦ 55^a 27
ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις 59^b 30
ἀνομοιότητος 48^a 10
ἀντέχεσθαι 51^b 16, 24
Ἄντιγόνη 54^a 1
ἀντιποιούνται 48^a 30
ἀνώδυνον αἰσχος 49^a 35
ἀνώμαλος 54^a 26 +
ἀνώνυμος 47^b 9; 57^b 28
ἄξιος 56^b 14; 60^a 5
ἄξιόσι 56^a 7
ἄινοις 57^b 33
ἀόριστος 49^b 14
ἀπαγγέλλειν 48^a 21; 60^a 18, 31
ἀπαγγελία 49^b 11 δι' ἀπαγγελίας
opp. δρώντες 49^b 26
ἀπαθές 53^b 39
ἀπαλλάττειν 52^a 25
ἀπαντᾶν 54^a 12
ἀπηρίθμουν μύθος 53^a 18
ἀπεικάζοντες 47^a 19
ἀπειλή 56^b 12
ἄπειρα 51^a 17
ἀπεργάζεσθαι 58^b 15
ἀπεργασία 48^b 18; 50^b 19
ἀπίθανον 61^b 12 — opp. εἰκός 60^a 27
ἀπλοῦς μῦθος 51^b 33; 52^a 12; 53^a 13
(comp. 59^b 14) ἀπλῆ πρᾶξις
51^b 33; 52^a 14 — σύνθεσις 52^b 31
— τραγῳδία, ἐποποιία 59^b 9 ἀπλᾶ
πράγματα 56^a 20 ἀπλοῦν μέτρον
49^b 11 — ὄνομα 57^a 31 ἀπλῶς
51^a 11
ἀποβαίνει παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν 56^a 15
ἀπογενέσθαι opp. γενέσθαι 61^a 9
ἀποδεικνύειν 50^a 7, 11; 56^a 37
ἀποδημούντος τινος 55^b 17
ἀποδιδόναι 49^b 4; 54^b 5, 10
ἀποδοκιμαστῆα 62^a 8
ἀποθνήσκειν 52^a 27, 29; 53^a 38, 23;
55^a 11; 60^a 30
ἀποκοπᾶι ὀνομάτων 58^b 2
ἀπόκρισις 56^b 12
ἀποκρύπτει 60^b 4
ἀποκτείνειν 52^a 8, 28; 53^b 21, 29;
54^a 6
ἀπολαβῶν μέρος 59^a 35
ἀπόλλυται 55^a 9
ἀπόλογος 55^a 2
ἀπόπλους 54^b 2; 59^b 7
δι' ἀπορίαν 54^b 21
ἀπεσεμνύθη 49^a 20
ἀποτυγχάνουσι opp. τυγχάνουσι 50^a 3
ἀποφαίνεσθαι γνάμνην 50^a 7 — καθό-
λου τι 50^b 12
ἀποφήσαι 57^b 31
ἀπρεπές 54^a 30; 59^b 34 ἀπρεπῶς
58^b 14

Ἀργᾶς 48^a15
 ἐν Ἀργεῖ 52^a8
 ἀργοῖς μέρεσι 60^b3
 ἀρετῆ ὀρρ. κακία 48^a3; 53^a8 — λέ-
 ξεως 58^a18
 Ἄρης 57^b21, 22, 32
 ἀρτήρα = ἱερέα 57^b35
 ἄρθρον 56^b21 — def. 57^a6
 ἀριθμός 60^b9 ἀριθμοί 61^b25
 Ἀριστοφάνης 48^a27
 Ἀριφράδης 58^b31
 ἀρμονία 47^a22 +; 48^b20; 49^b29
 λεκτικῆ ἁρμονία 49^a28
 ἀρμόττειν 56^a31; 57^a3; 59^a9, 12
 ἤρμοκε 59^b32 ἀρμόττον 50^b5;
 54^a22 +; 60^a4 κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον
 48^b31 ἀρμοττόντως 58^b15
 ἄρρενα ὀνόματα 58^a8 +
 ἀρῦσαι (= ταμεῖν) 57^b14, 15
 ἀρχαῖος 58^b7; 59^b20 οἱ ἀρχαῖοι
 50^b7
 ἀρχεσθαι 47^a12; 48^b29 — ὀρρ.
 τελευτᾶν 50^b33 ἀρχαντος 56^a29
 ὁ ἀρχων 49^b2
 ἀρχῆ def. 50^b27 — conj. ψυχῆ
 50^a38 — ὀρρ. τέλος 57^a6
 (comp. 55^b26, 28); 59^a20, 32,
 19 — ὀρρ. τελευτῆ 50^b26 ἐν
 ἀρχῇ 57^a3 ἀπ' ἀρχῆς 49^a9 κατ'
 ἀρχάς 48^a25 ἐξ ἀρχῆς 48^b22;
 49^b1, 6; 60^a33
 ἀρχιτεκτονικῆ 56^b11
 ἄσχημον ὀρρ. σημαῖνον 57^a33, 34
 ἄσημος φωνῆ 56^b35, 38; 57^a4 +
 ἀσθένεια 53^a34
 ἀσθενικός 58^b27
 ἀσπίς 57^b21 +, 32
 ἀστέρας 54^b22
 ἄσπεως 48^a38
 Ἄστυδάμας 53^b33
 ἀσύμμετρος 61^a13
 ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ 57^b14
 ἀτεχνος 54^b31 ἀτεχνότερος 53^b8;
 54^b28 ἀτεχνότατος 50^b17; 54^b20
 ἀτιμαζομένου 48^a38
 ἀτιμώτατα θηρία 48^b12
 ἀτοπον 60^a35; 61^b5 τὸ ἀτοπον
 60^b2 ἀτοπώτερον 60^a1
 ἀτραγυδότατον 52^b37
 ἀτυχεῖν ὀρρ. εὐτυχεῖν 52^b2
 ἀτυχία ὀρρ. εὐτυχία 52^b37
 αὐλεῖν Σκύλλαν 61^b32
 αὐλησις 48^a9
 αὐληταί 61^b31
 αὐλητικῆ 47^a15, 24
 ἐν Αὐλίδι 54^a32
 αὐλῶν 61^a18
 αὐξεται 59^b28 ἠδέξθη 49^a13

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου 52^a5
 αὐτός 47^a8, 26; 51^b36; 53^b25;
 55^a9, ^b11, 21, 22; 57^b34; 58^a8;
 60^a6 +, ^b15 +; 61^b2, 30; 62^b16
 καθ' αὐτόν 57^a3 καθ' αὐτό 49^a8;
 57^a12 +
 αὐτοσχεδιάσματα 48^b23
 αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ 49^a9
 ἀφαιρεῖν 51^a34; 57^b16; 58^a3 ἀφη-
 ρημένον ὄνομα 58^a1, 4
 ἀφανίζει 60^b2 ἀφανισθείσης 55^b3
 ἀφιέναι καρπὸν 57^b27 ἀφήμενος
 49^b8
 ἀφικνεῖται 55^b21
 ἀφωνος 60^a32 ἀφωνον ὀρρ. φωνῆν
 ἔχον 56^b35 — ὀρρ. φωνῆν,
 ἡμίφωνον 56^b26, 28; 58^a14
 Ἀχιλλεύς 54^b14 Ἀχιλλεύως πέρι
 59^a1
 ἄψυχα 52^a34

βαδίζοντα 58^b10 τὸ βαδίζει 57^a27
 τὸ βαδίζει ἢ βεβάδικε 57^a17 τὸ
 ἐβάδισεν ἢ βάδιξε 57^a22
 βαρβαρισμός 58^a24 +
 βαρύτης ὀρρ. ὀξύτης 56^b33
 βελτίων 54^b9, 30; 61^b26 + — ὀρρ.
 χείρων 48^a4, 12, 18; 53^a16, 33
 τὸ βέλτιον 61^b10 βέλτιον 54^a2;
 60^b36; 61^a1, ^b13 — ὀρρ. χείρων
 54^b26 βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις
 55^a16
 βίος 50^a17; 57^b23 +
 βλαβερά 61^b23
 βλέποντα 61^a6
 βοῶσιν 58^b31
 βούλεσθαι 48^a18; 54^b34; 55^a19;
 56^a20; 58^b8
 βραχύ 58^a15 ἐπὶ βραχύ 48^b14
 βραχεύως 62^b6
 βραχύτης ὀρρ. μήκος 56^b32

τὸ Γ 56^b30
 γῆμαι 61^b7
 Γανυμήδης 61^a30
 γελοῖος 49^a36; 60^a15 λέξις γελοία
 49^a20 τὸ γελοῖον 48^b37; 49^a34;
 58^b14 γελοῖον 51^b25; 58^b12;
 60^a33
 γεννηῆσαι 48^b4, 23
 γένος (= kind) 47^b8; 54^a20 — ὀρρ.
 εἶδος 57^b8 + — (= race) 53^a11;
 54^a10 γένει ἕτερα 47^a17
 γῆ, ἀπλοῦν ὄνομα 57^a32
 Γηγενεῖς 54^b22
 γῆρας 57^b22 +
 γίνεσθαι dist. εἶναι 50^b28; 60^a22,
 24 τὸ γιγνώμενον 53^a17 τὰ

γενόμενα 51^b17, 29, 30 — dist.
 οἷα ἂν γένοιτο 51^a36, ^b4 γενό-
 μενα ὀνόματα 51^b15
 γινώσκων conj. εἰδώς 53^b28, 38 γνώ-
 σεσθαι τὸ τόξον 55^a14
 Γλαύκων 61^b1
 γλῶττα 57^b1, 6; 58^a22+, ^b13+;
 59^a5, 9, ^b35; 60^b12; 61^a10
 — def. 57^b4
 γνώμη 50^a7
 γνώριμος 51^b20, 25; 61^a21
 γνώσις opp. ἄγνοια 52^a30; 56^b13
 τὸ ΓΡ, τὸ ΓΡΑ 56^b36
 γράμματα ἐπιθεῖναι 55^a19
 γράφειν 54^b11; 60^b32; 61^b13
 γραφεῖς 48^a5; 50^a26
 γραφή 55^a2 — Ζεύξιδος 50^a28
 γραφικὴ 50^b1
 γυναικείω 54^a23
 γυνή 54^a20; 60^a10 — ἐλευθέρα
 62^a10
 τὸ Δ 56^b31
 ἐδάκρυσεν 55^a3
 Δαναός 52^a28
 δασύτης opp. ψιλότης 56^b32
 δέ 57^a4 δ' οὖν 49^a9
 δεικνύμενον βραχέως 62^b6
 ὁ Δειλιάδα ποιήσας 48^a13
 δευῖα 53^a22 — dist. ἐλεεινά (etc.)
 56^b3 — dist. οἰκτρά 53^b14 τὸ
 δευῖον 53^b30 δευῖν γυνή 54^a24
 δεῖσθαι 53^b8; 54^b5; 62^a3
 δεξιὸν 58^a7 τὰ δεξιὰ 60^b19
 δεξιτερόν, ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν 58^a7
 δεραίων 55^a20
 δέσις opp. λύσις 55^b24+
 δεύτερος 50^a39; 53^a30; 54^a2, 22,
^b30; 55^a20; 57^b17+
 δέχεσθαι 59^b36
 δῆ 57^a4
 δῆλος τίς ἐστιν 52^b4 δῆλον 50^b9
 (Γ); 51^b12
 δηλοῦν 50^b8; 52^a26; 57^a7
 δήλωσιν ποιείσθαι 59^a22
 δημοκρατία 48^a32
 δῆμοι = κῶμοι 48^a37
 διὰ τὰδε dist. μετὰ τὰδε 52^a21
 διφδοντα 62^a7
 διαιρεῖσθαι 52^b15, 27
 διαιρέσει (λύειν) 61^a23
 διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν 59^a37
 διακαυμφοδύντες τὸν ποιητὴν 58^b6
 διάλεκτος 58^b6, 32 — ἢ πρὸς ἀλλή-
 λους 49^a26
 διαλύειν 61^a10
 διαμένει 49^a12
 διανοητικά (opp. ἠθικά) μέρη 60^b4

POETICS

διάνοια 50^a2+ — def. 50^a6, ^b4
 — conj. λέξις 50^a30; 56^a34+;
 59^b16 διάνοιαι καὶ λέξις 59^b12
 διάνοια dist. ἦθος 49^b38+; 50^b11
 ἦθη καὶ διάνοιαι 60^b5
 διαπονεῖν 60^b3
 διαπορήσειεν 61^b27
 διεσπᾶσθη 48^b24
 διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς 52^a1 διε-
 στραμμένον 49^a36
 διατηρεῖν 54^b15
 διαφέρειν 51^a23, ^b2; 52^a20; 53^a8;
 58^b15; 62^b12 διαφέρεσθαι καὶ
 κινεῖσθαι 51^a34
 διαφθείρειν 55^b23
 διαφορά 48^a16, 19 διαφοραὶ 47^b29;
 48^a24, ^b2; 56^b37 διαφορὰς ἔχειν
 48^a8
 διδασκαλία 56^b15
 διδάσκειν 60^a4, 18
 διδόναι τοῖς ποιηταῖς 60^b13 — χο-
 ρὸν 49^b2 — ἐκτείνειν 58^b8 δι-
 δομεν δέ οἱ 61^a22
 διεξιέναι 49^a31
 διηγηματικὴ μίμησις 59^a17, ^b36
 διήγησις 56^b11; 59^b26
 διηγητικὴ μίμησις 59^b33
 διθυραμβικῶν ποιήσις 47^b26
 διθυραμβοποιητικὴ 47^a14
 διθύραμβοι 48^a14; 59^a9 οἱ ἐξάρ-
 χοντες τὸν διθύραμβον 49^a11
 Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν 61^a30
 διέστηκεν 48^a17
 Δικαιογένης 55^a1
 δίκαιον 47^b19; 56^a7
 δικαιοσύνη 53^a8
 δῖλου (δὲ ὄλου) 59^b15; 60^a8
 Διονύσιος 48^a6
 Διονύσος 57^b21, 22
 διορίσαντες 51^a12 διορίσθαι 47^b23;
 50^b21
 διορισμὸς λόγου dist. ἀρχή, τέλος
 57^a7
 διπλοῦς opp. ἀπλοῦς μῦθος 53^a13 δι-
 πλή σύστασις 53^a31 διπλοῦν
 ὄνομα 57^a12, 32; 59^a5, 9
 δίσκον μιμεῖσθαι 61^b31
 διττὴ ἁμαρτία 60^b15
 δίφρον 58^b29, 30
 διχῶς 57^a28
 δῶκοντες 60^a16
 δωξίς 60^a15, ^b26
 δοκεῖ 53^a33; 57^b34; 60^b10
 Δόλων 61^a12
 δόξα 61^b10, 35 παρὰ τὴν δόξαν 52^a
 4 ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ 53^a10
 δοῦλος 54^a20
 δράματα 48^a28; 55^b15; 56^a15 ἐν

B b

τῷ δράματι 60^a 31 ξέω τοῦ δράματος
53^b 32; 54^b 3
δραματικοί (μῦθοι) 59^a 19 δραματικά
μμήσεις 48^b 35
δραματοποιήσας 48^b 37
δρᾶν 53^a 25, ^b 22; 59^a 30 — syn.
πράττει 48^b 1 δρᾶντες conj.
πράττοντες 48^a 28, 29 — opp.
δι' ἀπαγγελίας 49^b 26
δύναμις 47^a 9, 25; 49^b 35; 50^b 15,
18 παρά τὴν δύναμιν 51^b 38
δυνατὸν 51^b 16; 55^a 29; 57^b 5; 61^b 12
δυνατά 51^a 38, ^b 17 +, 32 δυνατὰ
ἀπίθανα 60^a 27
δυσμᾶς βίου 57^b 25
δυστυχεῖν 53^a 4
δυστυχία opp. εὐτυχία 51^a 13; 52^a 32,
^b 35; 53^a 2 + εἰς δυστυχίαν τε-
λευτᾶν 53^a 25
δυσχερανάντων 55^a 28
τὸ δῶ 58^a 5
δωμάτων ἀπο 58^b 33
Δωρεῖς 48^a 30
δῶρον 57^a 13

ἐγγίεσθαι 53^b 19
ἐγγύς 50^b 38; 54^b 35
ἐγκαλοῦντες 53^a 24
ἐγκώμια 48^b 27
ἐγχειροῦντες 50^a 35
ἐγχοσ 61^a 2, 34
ἐγὼ δέ νιν 58^b 34
ἐθειλονταί 49^b 2
ἐθος τῆς λέξεως 61^a 27
εἰδέναι 54^b 4; 56^b 10; 60^a 24, 30 εἰδῶς
53^b 28, 37 οἶδε 49^b 17, 18
εἶδος 49^b 26, 30; 57^a 23; 58^a 34; 60^b
7; 61^b 22 — opp. γένος 57^b 8 +
— dist. μέρος 62^b 17 — synon.
μέρος 50^a 13; 52^b 14, 25 εἶδη
ἀναγνωρίσεως 54^b 19 — θεωρίας
56^b 9 — ὀνόματος 57^a 31;
58^a 34, ^b 14 — ποιητικῆς 47^a 8
— τραγωδίας 49^a 8; 55^b 32; 59^b 8
εἶδος ἔην κακός 61^a 12
εἶκαζεν ὁμοίους 48^a 6
εἰκῆ 52^a 10
εἰκονογράφοι 54^b 9
εἰκονοποῖός 60^b 9
εἰκῶν 48^b 11, 15; 50^b 3
εἰκός 48^b 29; 51^a 28, ^b 31; 55^a 7, 19,
^b 10; 61^b 9 — (in Agathon) 56^a
24; 61^b 15 — dist. ἀναγκαῖον
51^a 12, 38, ^b 9; 52^a 24 (comp. ^a 20);
54^a 34, 36 — dist. ἀνάγκη 51^b
35 — παρά τὸ εἰκός 56^a 25; 61^b 15
εἰκόστα 51^b 13; 55^a 17; 56^b 4; 60^a
27 — opp. ἀπίθανα 60^a 27

εἶμαρτο 55^a 11 εἶμαρμένη 55^a 11
εἶναι dist. γίνεσθαι 50^b 28; 60^a 22 +
ῖ om. 51^b 31
εἰρηκός 61^b 2; εἰρηται 52^b 11; 57^b
29; 60^b 25; 61^a 16, 20 — dist.
πέπρακται 61^a 5 εἰρημένον 61^b
16 — dist. πεπραγμένον 61^a 6
εἰς λόγος διχῶς 57^a 28 πράξεις ἐνός
51^a 18 ἐνός χρόνου 59^a 23 τῷ
ἐνὶ 51^a 17 περὶ ἕνα 51^a 17; 59^a 23
τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅλον 51^a 1
εἰσάγει ἄνδρα 60^a 10
εἰώθασι 47^b 17 εἰωθός conj. κύριον
ἄνομα 58^b 21 τὸ εἰωθός 58^b 4, 5
ἐκβαίνειν ἀρμονίας 49^a 27
ἐκδιδόναι 54^a 8 ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις
54^b 18
ἐκθεσις 60^a 36
ἐκπίπτειν 55^a 28; 56^a 18; 59^b 31
ἐκπληκτικός 54^a 4; 60^b 25
ἐκπληξίς 55^a 17
ἐκστατικοί 55^a 34
ἐκτείνειν 58^b 8
ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου 55^b 1 ἐξετέθησαν
55^a 12
Ἔκτορος διωξίς 60^a 15, ^b 26
ἐκτός opp. ἐν σώματι 54^b 24
ἐκφέρειν διὰ μέτρων 47^b 17
ἐλαττον ἀμάρτημα 60^b 31 — μήκος
62^a 18 ἐλάττους συστάσεις 59^b
20 ἐλάχιστον 58^a 34; 60^a 7
ἠλάττωσε 49^a 17
ἐλαφος 60^b 31
ἐλεγείων 47^b 12
ἐλεγειοποιός 47^b 14
ἐλεγχοί (οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις) 61^b 17
ἐλεεῖν conj. φρίττειν 53^b 5
ἐλεεινός 53^b 17 — dist. φοβερός 52^a
3, ^b 32, 36; 53^a 1, 6, ^b 1 ἐλεεινά
dist. δεινά (etc.) 56^b 3
ἐλεος 56^b 1 — conj. φόβος 49^b 27;
53^b 12 — dist. φόβος 52^a 38;
53^a 3, 5
ἐλευθεραὶ γυναῖκες 62^a 10
ἐλθεῖν 48^b 31; 49^b 7; 55^b 6, 8 ἐλή-
λυθε 55^a 5, 6
ἐλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον 61^b 31
ἐλλέβορος 58^b 10
Ἐλλη 54^a 8
ἐμβεβλημένη συλλαβή 58^a 2
ἐμβόλιμα 56^a 29, 30
ἐμμετρα 50^b 14; 51^b 1
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς 47^b 18; 57^b 24; 61^a 24
ἐμπεσῶν 52^a 9
ἐμποιητέον 53^b 14
ἐν 47^a 17, 22, ^b 29; 49^b 33
ἐναλείψειε φαρμάκους 50^b 1
τὸ ἐναντίον 52^a 22 τὸναντίον 52^a

- 26; 50^a20 τὸναντίον (adv.)
 50^b29; 53^a14 ἐξ ἐναντίας 53^a
 32
 τὸ ἐναργές 62^a17 ἐναργέστατα
 55^a24; 62^a17
 ἐνδέχεσθαι 58^a29; 60^a12, 35; 60^b
 29; 61^a34; 62^b10 — εἶναι 57^a
 26 — ὑπάρχειν 60^b27 — μι-
 μεῖσθαι 59^b24
 ἐνεργούντας conj. πράττοντας 48^a23
 ἐνόητα 50^b5
 ἐντιθεμένων εἰς τὸ μέτρον 58^b16
 ἐντιμότερα 49^a6
 ἐντολή 56^b11
 ἐντυχεῖν 61^b5
 ἐξαγγέλλεται 60^b11
 ἐξαλλαγαὶ ὀνομάτων 58^b2
 ἐξαλλάττειν 49^b13; 58^a21 ἐξηλ-
 λαγμένον ὄνομα 57^b3; 58^a5
 ἐξάμετρα 49^a27 ἢ ἐν ἐξαμέτροις
 μμητική 49^b21
 ἐξαπατηθῆναι 56^a22
 ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον 49^a11
 ἐξεστι 62^a15 ἐξῆν 54^b35
 ἐξέρχονται 53^a38
 ἐξοδος 52^b16 def. 52^b21
 ἐξω τοῦ δράματος 53^b32; 54^b3 — τῆς
 τραγωδίας 54^b7 — τοῦ μυθεύματος
 60^a29 — τοῦ καθόλου, τοῦ μύθου
 55^b7, 8 — μελοποιίας 59^b10
 ἐξωθεν 55^b25
 εἶοικε 51^a23; 52^a9 εἰοίκασι 48^b4;
 51^a19 εἰοικε τῇ ὑστέρᾳ 54^a32
 ἔοργεν 57^b12
 ἐπαινέσθαι 60^a5
 ἐπεισόδιον 49^a28; 51^b34; 52^b16;
 55^b13 +; 56^a31; 59^a35, 36,
 30 — def. 52^b20 — opp.
 ἴδιον 55^b23
 ἐπεισοδιῶν 55^b13; 59^b30 — conj.
 παρατείνειν 55^b1
 ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος 51^b33, 34
 ἐπέκτασις 58^a23, 22
 ἐπεκτείνεσθαι 59^b23 ἐπεκτεινόμενα
 opp. αἰεὶ μακρὰ φωνήεντα 58^a12
 ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα 57^b2, 35;
 58^a3
 ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι 55^b20
 ἐπιδηλον 51^a35
 ἐπικτής 54^b13 — opp. μοχθηρός
 52^b34 — opp. φαῦλος 62^a2
 ἐπικτήτα opp. σύμφυτα 54^b23
 ἐπισκοπεῖν 49^a7; 60^b22; 61^a32
 ἐπιστολής 54^b34 — πέμψις 52^b7
 ἐπίταξις 56^b17; 57^a22
 ἐπιτάττει 56^b16
 ἐπίτηδες 52^a7; 58^b14
 ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα 55^a19 ἐπιτιθε-
- μένη ὀνόματα 51^b10 ἐπιθέμενος
 55^b22
 ἐπιτιμᾶν 56^b16; 58^b6; 61^b3 ἐπι-
 τιμᾶσθαι 55^a26; 60^b33; 62^a10
 ἐπιτίμημα φέρειν 56^b14; 61^b22
 — λύνειν 60^b21
 ἐπιτίμησις 61^b19 ἐπιτιμήσεις καὶ
 λύσεις 62^b18
 ἐπιφανείς 53^a12
 ἐπιφορὰ ὀνόματος 57^b7
 Ἐπιχάρην 58^b9
 Ἐπιχάρμος 48^a33; 49^b6
 ἐπιχειρήσαι 59^a32
 ἐποποιία 47^a13, 28; 49^b9, 14 +; 55^b
 16; 59^b8, 18 +; 60^a13; 62^a2, 12,
 14, 15, 16
 ἐποποικὸν σύστημα 56^a11, 12 ἐπο-
 ποιική μίμησις 61^b26
 ἐποποιός 47^b14; 62^b4
 ἐπη 49^a5, 16, 18; 58^b16; 60^a17;
 62^b3
 ἐράμενος 58^b10
 ἐργαζομένους 61^a29
 ἔργον 48^b10; 62^a18 πολὺ ἔργον
 49^a31 ἔργον τραγωδίας 52^b29;
 50^a31 — τέχνης 62^b13 — ποιη-
 τοῦ 51^a37 — πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥη-
 τορικῆς 50^b6
 ἔρει 57^b18 +
 Ἐριφύλη 53^b24
 ἐρμηνείαν 50^b14
 Ἐρμοκαϊκόξανθος 57^a35
 ἐρνύγας = κέρατα 57^b35
 ἐρώτησις 56^b12; 57^a22
 ἐσθίει 58^b23, 24
 ἐσθλά ἔοργεν 57^b12
 ἐσπέρα 57^b23 +
 ἔσχατον 55^b27
 ἔσωθεν 55^b25
 ἔτεροι 48^b27 ἔτερα 47^a17; 48^a8
 γένει ἐτέροις 47^a17 ἐτέρως 47^a
 17
 ἔτη πολλά 55^b18
 εὖ 48^b35; 50^a30, 32; 53^a29; 56^a9;
 59^a7 τοῦ εὖ ἢ μή 62^b18
 εὐδαιμόνες 50^a20
 εὐδαιμονίας 50^a17
 εὐδον παννύχιον 61^a17
 εὐειδές 61^a14
 εὐθύς 49^a36; 52^a14; 60^a10
 Εὐκλείδης 58^b7
 εὐλαβεῖσθαι opp. στοχάζεσθαι 52^b28
 εὐλογατέρας 60^a35
 εὐμνημόνευτον 51^a5
 εὐπλαστοί 55^a33
 εὐπρόσωπον 61^a14
 Εὐρύπιδης 53^a24, 29, 28; 55^b9; 56^a
 17, 27; 58^b20; 60^b34; 61^b20

- εὑρίσκειν 49^a 24; 55^a 9, 25 — (with inf.) 53^b 25; 54^a 11
 Εὐρύπυλος 59^b 6
 εὐσύνοπτος 51^a 4; 59^a 33
 εὐτελής opp. καλόν 58^b 22 εὐτελέσ-
 τεραι opp. σεμνότεραι 48^b 26
 εὐτυχεῖν opp. ἀτυχεῖν 52^b 2
 εὐτυχία opp. ἀτυχία 52^b 37 — opp.
 δυστυχία 51^a 13; 52^a 31, 35; 53^a 2,
 10, 14 (comp. 55^b 28)
 εὐφραίνειν 50^b 2; 51^b 23, 26; 52^a 25
 εὐφροῦς ἢ ποιητικὴ 55^a 32
 εὐφρίας σημειῶν 59^a 7
 εὐχεσθαι 56^b 16
 εὐχή 56^b 11 κατ' εὐχὴν ποιεῖν 53^a 35
 ἐφεξῆς 50^a 29; 51^a 13; 52^b 30 τὸ
 ἐφεξῆς 52^a 1 ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις
 59^a 27
 ἔχειν ἄλλως 58^b 3 — ἀνάλογον 48^b
 38 — ἱκανῶς 49^a 7 — καλῶς
 47^a 10; 53^a 12; 59^b 12 — μηδε-
 τέρας 53^b 19 — ὁμοίως 57^b 20,
 28 — ὀρθῶς 60^b 24 — ὄτως
 55^b 19; 61^a 2 — ὥσπερ 61^b 6
 ἔσχετο 61^a 33
 ἔχθρα opp. φιλία 52^a 31
 ἔχθρος 55^b 22 — opp. φίλος 53^b 16,
 17 ἔχθιστοι 53^a 37
 Ζεῦξίς 50^a 27, 28; 61^b 12
 ζητεῖν 51^b 25; 53^b 11; 54^a 10, 34 ζη-
 τητέον 51^b 23; 53^b 22
 ζωγράφος 60^b 8
 ζῶον 48^b 7; 50^b 34, 38; 51^a 3, 4;
 59^a 20
 ζωρά 61^a 25 ζωρότερον 61^a 14
 Η 58^a 11
 Ἡγήμων ὁ Θάσιος 48^a 12
 ἦδη 51^b 12
 ἦδονῆ 48^b 18; 53^a 36, 12 — οἰκεία
 53^b 11; 59^a 21 — οὐχ ἢ τυχοῦσα
 62^b 13 ἦδοναί 62^a 16
 ἦδύναον 60^b 2 ἦδυσμένος λόγος 49^b
 25, 28
 ἦδύ 60^a 17 ἦδιον 62^b 1 ἦδιστον
 48^b 13
 ἦδυσμάτων 50^b 16
 ἦθικος 60^b 3 ἦθικὴ τραγωδία 56^a
 1 — ἐποποιία 59^b 9 — ἦ' Ὀδύσ-
 σεια 59^b 15 — ῥήσις 50^a 29
 ἦθογράφος 50^a 28
 ἦθος 48^a 2, 3, 24; 50^a 14, 19; 54^a 17 +;
 60^a 11 — conj. διάνοια 49^b 38;
 50^a 2 — dist. 50^b 8, 9 (2) ἦθος
 ὑποτιθεῖς 54^a 27 — (in a picture)
 50^a 29 ἦθη 50^a 5 +; 54^a 16 +,
 13; 60^a 11, 15 — dist. διάνοια
 50^a 5 — conj. πάθη καὶ πράξεις
 47^a 28 — opp. πράξεις 50^a 19 +
 ἠιόνες 58^b 31
 ἠλέκτρα 60^a 31
 ἠλιος 57^b 28 περίοδος ἡλίου 49^b 13
 ἡμέρα 57^b 23, 24
 ἡμόνοιοι 61^a 11
 ἡμίφωνον 56^b 25, 27
 Ἡρακλήϊδα 51^a 20
 Ἡρακλῆς 51^a 22
 Ἡρόδοτος 51^b 2
 ἠρωικὸν μέτρον 59^b 32, 34 ἠρωικά
 48^b 33; 59^a 10, 11
 ἠρῶον μέτρον 60^a 3
 ἠττηθῆν 56^a 23
 θανάτου αἰτίας 52^a 9 — αἰτίας 55^b
 31 οἱ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ θάνατοι 52^b 12
 Θάσιος 48^a 12; 61^a 22
 θάττον 61^a 16
 θαυμασιώτατα 52^a 6
 θαυμαστόν 52^a 4; 60^a 12 + θαν-
 μαστῶς 56^a 20
 θεά 56^b 17
 θεατῆς 55^a 28 θεαταί 53^a 35; 55^a
 29; 61^b 28; 62^a 2
 θεατρα 49^a 9; 53^a 34
 Θεοδέκτης 55^a 9, 29
 Θεοδώρῳ 57^a 13
 θεοκρίσταν φλόγα 57^b 29
 θεός 55^b 7 ἢ θεός 55^b 5 θεοί
 54^b 6; 60^b 35; 61^a 17
 θεοπέσιος 59^a 30
 θεωρεῖν 48^b 11, 16; 56^b 34, 37; 59^a 8;
 60^b 7 οἱ θεωροῦντες 51^a 1 θεω-
 ροῦντι ἐμπέσων 52^a 9 θεωρεῖσθαι
 55^b 2; 58^b 16
 θεωρήμα 56^b 19
 θεωρία 50^b 38; 51^a 1, 2 εἶδος θεωρίας
 56^b 9
 θήλεια ἔλαφος 60^b 31 θήλεα δνόματα
 58^a 8 +
 θηρίων μορφαί 48^b 12 — φαναί 56^b
 24
 Θησιδα 51^a 20
 θνήτ' 61^a 24
 θοινᾶται 58^b 24
 θρήνος 52^b 24; 54^a 30
 θύειν 55^b 4, 5 θύεσθαι 55^a 8, 13 +
 Θυνέστης 53^a 11, 21 — (Carcinus)
 54^b 23
 τὸ I 58^a 15
 ἱαμβεῖον 58^b 19 — μέτρον 48^b 31;
 49^a 21, 25; 59^b 37 ἱαμβεία 49^a
 26; 59^a 10, 12
 ἱαμβίζον 48^b 32
 ἱαμβικὴ ἰδέα 49^b 8

- ἰαμβοποίησας 58^b9
 ἰαμβοποιοί 51^b14
 ἰάμβων 49^a4 — ποιηταί 48^b33
 ἰατρικόν 47^b16 ἰατρική 60^b20
 ἰδέα. ἰαμβική ἰδέα 49^b8 αἰνίγματος
 — 58^a26 ἰδέαι 50^b34 — (= εἶδη
 ὀνόματος) 58^b18 ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
 ἰδεῶν 56^b3
 ἴδιος 49^b16; 52^b18, 33; 54^b10; 55^b
 23; 56^a6, 35; 59^b23
 τὸ ἰδιωτικόν 58^a21 τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικόν
 58^a32, ^b1, 4; 59^a3
 ἰδρυνθείσης 55^b4
 ἰερέα 57^b35
 ἰερείας 55^b7
 ἱεροῦ 55^a27
 ἱερωσύνη 55^b6
 Ἰκάδιος 61^b8
 ἰκανός 59^a16 — ἴρος 51^a14; 59^b
 18 ἰκανῶς 49^a8; 54^a15, ^b18;
 59^b13
 Ἰκάριος 61^b4, 8
 ἰκετεύουσα 54^a32
 Ἰλιάς 48^b38; 59^b3 ἡ Ἰλιάς 51^a29;
 54^b2; 56^a13; 57^a29; 59^b14; 62^b
 3, 8 ἡ μικρὰ Ἰλιάς 59^b2, 5
 Ἰλιου πέρις 59^b6 πέρις Ἰλίου 56^a
 16
 Ἰλλυριοί 61^a4
 Ἰξίονες 56^a1
 Ἰππίας 61^a22
 ἵππον 60^b18
 ἔσταναι 57^b11 ἔστηκεν 57^b10
 ἔσπυρες 60^a16
 ἱστορία 51^b3 — οἱ ποίησις 51^b6,
 7 ἱστορία συνθήσις 59^a21
 ἱστορικός οἱ ποιητής 51^b1
 ἴσως 56^a8; 61^a1, 11, ^b6
 Ἰφίγενεία 55^a7 — (Eurip.) 52^b6,
 7; 54^a7, ^b32; 55^a18 τὸ καθόλου
 τῆς Ἰφίγενείας 55^b3 ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι
 Ἰφίγενεία 54^a32
 καθαροί 55^b15 — παθημάτων 49^b
 28
 καθ' ἕκαστον 49^a31 56^b34 τὸ καθ'
 ἕκαστον 51^b7, 10 περὶ τῶν καθ'
 ἕκαστον 51^b14
 καθόλου 49^b8; 50^b12; 55^b1 — οἱ
 καθ' ἕκαστον 51^b7+ τὸ καθόλου
 τῆς Ἰφίγενείας 55^b2 ἕξω τοῦ κα-
 θόλου 55^b8
 κακία οἱ ἀρετὴ 48^a3; 53^a8 κατὰ
 πᾶσαν κακίαν 49^a33
 κακοδαμονία 50^a17
 κακός 61^a12 κακόν οἱ ἀγαθόν
 61^a9 κακῶς 56^a10, 18
 καλούμενον (ὄνομα) 57^b33
 Καλλιπίδης 61^b35; 62^a9
 καλόν οἱ εὐτελές 58^b21 — ζῶον
 50^b34, 38 καλαί πράξις 48^b
 25 τὸ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει
 50^b37 καλῶς ἔχειν 47^a10; 53^a12;
 59^b12 — ἰδὲν 51^a24 — χρῆ-
 σθαι 53^b26 — εἴρηται ἢ πέπρακ-
 ται 61^a4 καλλίων 51^a11; 52^a
 10 καλλίου γράφειν 54^b11 κάλ-
 λιστος 50^b1; 52^a32, ^b31; 53^a
 19 καλλίστη κατὰ τὴν τέχνην
 τραγῳδία 53^a23
 Καρκίνος 54^b23; 55^a26
 καρπός 57^b27, 29
 Καρχηδονίων μάχη 59^a26
 κασιτέροιο 61^a28
 καταδεεστέροις 50^a31
 καταλείπη 58^a6
 κατάλογος (εἰδῶν) 59^a36
 καταντικρὺ ἢ ὡς 61^a35
 καταπύθεται 61^a23
 καταθείς 58^b29, 30
 καταπεπλεγμένον τῆ ποικιλίᾳ 59^a34
 καταψηφισάμενοι 61^b2
 κατηγορία 62^a5
 κατίδοι 58^b19
 κατρωθῶσιν 53^a28
 κείται 50^b23 κείσθω 56^a35 ἔνο-
 μα κείμενον 57^b25
 κελύσαι 56^b17
 Κένταυρος (Chaeremon) 47^b21
 κέραε 61^a15
 κερᾶσθαι 58^a31 κερραμένον 61^a
 27; 62^b1 κέρητρο 61^a25
 κέρατα 57^b35; 60^b31
 κερκίδος φωνή 54^b37
 Κεφαλλῆνες 61^b6
 κιθάρις 48^a10
 κιθαριστοῦ ἀκούων 55^a3
 κιθαριστική 47^a15, 24
 κινεῖσθαι κινήσιν 61^b30 κινεῖσθαι
 conj. διαφέρεισθαι 51^a34
 κίνησις 61^b30; 62^a8, 11
 κινήτικα (μέτρα) 60^a1
 ἔκλαυσεν 55^a2
 Κλεοφῶν 48^a12; 58^a20
 πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἀγωνίζεσθαι 51^a8
 Κλέων 57^a28
 Κλυταμνήστρα 53^b23
 κνημῖς 61^a28
 κοινός 52^b24 κοινόν 47^b10, 17;
 58^b12 κοινά οἱ ἴδια 52^b17
 κοινῆ 47^b15
 κοινωνεῖν 48^b14; 53^b10; 58^b4
 κολλήσαντα 58^a30
 κόμμι 58^a15
 κόμμος 52^b18 — def. 52^b24
 κόρη 55^b3

κορυφαῖον ἔλκειν 61^b 32
 κοσμηθῆναι 49^a 30
 κόσμος (ὁ τῆς ὕψους) 49^b 33 — (ὄνυ-
 ματος εἶδος) 57^b 2; 58^a 33; 59^a 14
 κράζουσι 58^b 31
 κρατεῖσθαι 56^a 10
 Κράτης 49^b 7
 κρείττων 62^a 13, ^b 14 (synon. βελτίων
 61^b 26) κρείττους 48^a 6 (synon.
 βελτίους 48^a 18) κράτιστον 54^a 4
 Κρεσφώντης 54^a 5
 Κρέων 54^a 1
 Κρήτες 61^a 14
 τὸ κρῖ 58^a 5
 κρίσις (ὄπλων) 59^b 5
 Κύκλωπες 48^a 15
 κυλιόμενοι 61^b 31
 Κύπριοι 57^b 6 — (Dicaeogenes)
 55^a 1 Κύπρια 59^b 4 ὁ τὰ Κύπρια
 ποιήσας 59^b 2
 κύριον ὄνομα 57^b 1 +; 58^a 19, 34, ^b 3,
 18 +; 59^a 2, 14 παρά τὸ κύριον
 58^a 23 κυριώτερα 50^b 19
 καλύει opp. ποιεῖ 57^a 1, 8 οὐδὲν κω-
 λυεῖ 51^b 31 κωλυθῆναι 61^a 34
 κομᾶζειν 48^a 37
 κῶμαι (= δῆμοι) 48^a 36, 38
 κομφοδεῖν 58^b 32
 κομψοδία 47^a 14, ^b 27; 48^a 17, 30, 31;
 49^a 2, 10, 32, 38, ^b 22; 51^b 12;
 53^a 36 τὰ τῆς κομψοδίας σχήματα
 48^b 36
 κομφοδοιοί 49^a 4
 κομφοδοί 48^a 37; 49^b 1

 Λάιος 60^a 30
 Λάκαινα 59^b 6
 Λακεδαίμων 61^b 6
 Λάκων 61^b 4
 λαμβάνειν 53^b 15; 56^a 14 — παρ'
 ἄλλου 59^a 7 ληφθῆναι 55^b 9, 14
 λαμπρά λέξις 60^b 4
 λανθάνειν 49^a 38, ^b 1; 55^a 25, 28;
 60^a 17
 λέγειν 49^a 26; 50^a 6, ^b 5, 7; 51^a 37,
^b 1 +; 54^b 34; 60^a 7 λέγειν ἢ
 πράττειν 51^b 9; 54^a 35 ὁ λέγων
 50^b 10; 56^b 6, 7 ὁ πράττων ἢ
 λέγων 61^a 7 ψευδῆ λέγειν 60^a 19
 οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταί 49^b 3
 ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται 57^b 26
 λεκτική ἁρμονία 49^a 27 λεκτικὸν μέ-
 τρον 49^a 24
 λέξις 50^a 9, 14, ^b 13; 55^a 22 — def.
 49^b 34; 50^b 13 — (synon. λόγος)
 49^a 17; 49^a 23 (comp. 56^b 6) ἐν
 αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει 58^b 9 τὰ περὶ τὴν
 λέξιν 56^b 8 sqq. σχήματα τῆς

λέξεως 56^b 9 λέξεως μέρη 56^b
 20 — ἀρετῆ 58^a 18 λέξις conj.
 διάνοια 50^a 29; 56^a 34; 59^b 12,
 16 — conj. ἦθη 50^a 36 — dist.
 μελοποιία 49^b 33 λέξις γαλοῖα 49^a
 19 — λαμπρά 60^b 5 — σαφῆς
 58^a 18 — σεμνή 58^a 21 λέξις
 χοροῦ 52^b 23 ἐν τῇ λέξει 59^a 3
 λέξιν μμείσθαι 59^a 12 ἔθος τῆς
 λέξεως 61^a 27 πάθη τῆς λέξεως
 60^b 12 πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὄραν 61^a 10
 λέξει ἐξαγγέλλεσθαι 60^b 11 τῇ
 λέξει διαπονεῖν 60^b 3 †λέξις†
 12^a 17
 λευκογραφῆσας εἰκόνα 50^b 2
 λευκόν 57^a 16
 λῆψις (παιδίου) 55^b 30
 λῖαν 59^a 33; 60^b 4; 61^b 28, 34
 λόγος dist. ῥυθμός, ἁρμονία 47^a 22
 — ἠδυσμένους 49^b 25, 28 — dist.
 πρᾶξις 54^a 18 (comp. 35) ἐν λόγῳ
 47^a 22 (50^b 12?) τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
 56^b 6 ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρα-
 σκευασθῆναι 56^a 37 λόγος opp. τὰ
 τοῦ χοροῦ 49^a 17; 50^b 6, 9 (2) λό-
 γοι dist. μέτρα 47^a 29 — dist. ψι-
 λομετρία 48^a 11 — dist. ἐμμετρα
 50^b 15 ἐν λόγοις 59^a 13 λόγος
 (= μῦθος) 55^b 17 λόγους ποιεῖν
 49^b 8; 55^b 1 — συνίστασθαι 60^a 27
 λόγοι πεποιημένοι 55^a 34 λόγος
 (= one of the μέρη λέξεως) 56^b 21
 — def. 57^a 23 + λόγον ἀρχή
 etc. 57^a 3, 6 Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι
 47^b 11 οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλεγχοί
 61^b 16 ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λό-
 γοις 54^b 18 ἄλλος λόγος 49^a 9
 λόγῃν 54^b 22
 λοιπός 50^b 15; 53^a 7 οἱ λοιποὶ 56^a 28
 Λυγκεύς 52^a 27 — (Theodectes)
 55^b 29
 λύειν 61^a 22 — opp. πλέκειν 56^a 10
 — opp. ἀποδεικνύειν 56^a 38 — μῦ-
 θον 53^b 23 — ἐπιτίμημα 60^b 22
 λυτέον 60^b 35
 λυπηρῶς 48^b 10
 λύσις opp. πλοκή 56^a 9 — opp.
 δέσις 55^b 24 + — μῦθον 54^a 37
 — conj. πρόβλημα 60^b 6; 61^b 24
 — conj. ἐπιτίμησις 62^b 18

 Μάγνης 48^a 34
 μαζόν 58^a 7
 μαθήσεις ποιείσθαι 48^b 7
 μάθον 61^a 24
 μανήναι 51^a 26
 μακρός 55^b 17 μακρά σύστασις 60^a 3
 μακρὸν φωνῆν 58^a 1, 11

- μάλλον 51^o7, 27; 52^a3, 5; 53^a13, 16;
 56^a28, 35; 60^a12; 62^b14 ἄλλα
 μάλλον 53^a36 ἄλλα πολλὸν μάλλον
 50^c31 μάλλον, ἤττον 60^b27 μά-
 λιστα 48^b11+; 49^a24; 50^b4;
 52^a3, 37; 56^a3; 59^a9, ^b36;
 60^a13, 19, 28; 61^a35 ὅτι μά-
 λιστα 49^b12; 55^a23; 59^a12;
 62^b11
 μανθάνειν 48^b13, 16
 μανία 55^b14
 μανικῶ (dist. εὐφυῶς) ἢ ποιητικῇ
 55^a33
 Μαραθῶναδε 53^b9
 Μαργίτης 48^b30, 38
 μάχη 59^a26
 μεγαλειωτῶν 57^a35
 μεγαλοπρέπεια 59^b29
 Μεγαρεῖς 48^a31
 μέγας 49^b10; 59^a33 μέγα 59^a4
 μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα 56^b4 ἐν μεγάλῃ
 δόξῃ 53^a10 δι' ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην
 53^a16
 μείζων (μῦθος) 51^a10 μείζον ἀγαθόν,
 κακόν 61^a8, 9 μείζονα (σχήματα)
 49^a6
 μέγιστον 50^a15, 23, 33, ^b16; 53^a27;
 56^a4 πολλὸν μέγιστον 59^a6 πρῶ-
 τον καὶ μέγιστον 50^b23
 μέγεθος 49^a19; 50^b26; 51^a11, 12 ἐν
 μεγέθει 50^b37 ὄρος μεγέθους
 51^a15 μέγεθος ἔχειν 49^b25;
 51^a4; 62^b10 ἔχειν τι μέγεθος
 50^b25 μέγεθος λαμβάνειν 56^a14
 — ἐπεκτείνειν 59^b23 — καὶ μικρό-
 τητα παρασκευάζειν 56^b1 — εὐ-
 σύνοπτον 51^a4 — τὸ πρόπον 56^a
 14 — τὸ τυχόν 50^b36 τῷ με-
 γέθει μετριάζειν 59^a34
 μεθόδου 47^a12; 56^a36
 μέουρον 62^b6
 Μελανίππη 54^a31
 Μελέαγρος 53^a20
 μέλι 58^a15
 μέλλειν 47^a10; 59^a33 — dist. ποι-
 εῖν (etc.) 53^b18, 21, 34, 38; 54^a6,
 8; 55^b9
 μελοποιία 49^b33, 35; 50^b16; 59^b
 10 — (synon. μέλος) 50^a10
 μέλος synon. μελοποιία) 50^a14 — dist.
 ῥυθμῶς, μέτρον 47^b25 — dist. ῥυθ-
 μός 49^b29 — dist. μέτρα 49^b
 31 ἁρμονία καὶ μέλος 49^b29 μέ-
 λος χοροῦ 52^b22, 23 — χορικόν
 52^b21
 μὲν 57^b4
 Μενέλαος 54^a29; 61^b21
 Μερρόπη 54^a5
 μέρος 55^b27; 56^a14, 37, ^b25; 58^b
 12; 59^a35, ^b25+; 60^b26; 62^b
 9 — opp. τὸ ὅλον 51^a33 κατὰ
 μέρος opp. ἅμα 47^b28 κατὰ μέρος
 opp. ὅλη 56^a16 οὐ μικρὸν μέρος
 62^a15 οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος 58^a
 34 μέρος τραγωδίας, ἐποποιίας 49^b
 16; 50^a8, 11; 55^b33; 59^b10 καθ'
 ἕκαστον μέρος 56^a6 μέρη κατὰ
 τὸ ποσόν 52^b15 sqq. μέρος ὅλον
 τραγωδίας 52^b19 μέρη dist. εἶδη
 62^b17 μέρη μύθου 50^a34; 52^b
 9 — τῶν πραγμάτων 51^a32, 33
 — ἄλογα 60^a28 — ἀργά (opp.
 ἱθικά, διανοητικά) 60^b3 — λέ-
 ξειως 56^b20 μέρος σημαντικόν
 etc. 57^a11, 15, 24, 27
 μέσον opp. ἀρχή, τελευτή (τέλος)
 50^b26, 31; 59^a20 — opp. ἄκρα
 57^a3, 10 — opp. ὀξύ, βαρῦ, etc.
 56^b33
 μετὰ χρόνον 57^a14 μετὰ τάδε dist.
 διὰ τάδε 52^a21
 μεταβαίνειν 55^b27
 μεταβάλλειν 49^a20; 51^a14; 53^a13;
 59^b29 μεταβάλλων 48^a22; 52^b
 34; 53^a9 μεταβαλοῦσα 49^a14
 μετάβασις 49^a37; 52^a16, 18; 55^b
 28
 μεταβολή 52^a23, 31 πολλὰς μετα-
 βολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα 49^a14
 μεταξύ 52^b20 ὁ μεταξύ 53^a7 τὰ
 μεταξύ (ὀνόματα) 58^a9, 16
 μεταπίπτειν 53^a2
 μεταπιθέναί 58^b18, 20, 24, 26 — dist.
 ἀφαιρεῖν 51^a33
 μεταφέρειν 59^a8
 μεταφορά 57^b2, 30; 58^a22+, ^b13, 17;
 59^a10, 14, ^b35; 60^b12 — def.
 57^b6 κατὰ μεταφοράν 61^a16+,
 31
 μεταφορικός 59^a6
 μετριάζοντα τῷ μεγέθει 59^a34
 μετρικῆς 56^b38 μετρικοί 56^b34
 τὸ μέτριον 58^b12
 μέτρον 47^b13, 18; 59^b33, 35; 62^a15,
^b7 — dist. ῥυθμός, μέλος 47^b25
 — ἀπλοῦν 49^b11 — οἰκείον 49^a24
 — ἥρωικόν 59^b32 — λαμβείον,
 τετράμετρον 48^b31, 32; 49^a21, 25;
 59^b37 — στασιμῶτατον, ὀγκω-
 δέστατον 59^b35 κατὰ τὸ μέτρον
 59^b18 — opp. κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν
 47^b15 εἰς τὸ μέτρον ἐντιθέμενα
 58^b16 μέτρον μεγάλον 49^b10
 μετὰ μέτρον opp. ἀνευ μέτρον 51^b3
 ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῇ 59^a17 μέτρα
 47^b17, 22; 48^b21; 51^b28 — dist.

μέλος 49^b30 — dist. λόγοι 47^a29
 τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων 47^b20 (comp. ^b8)
 γίνος τῶν μέτρων 47^b8 μέτρων
 σύνθεσις 49^b35 εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι
 51^b2
 μέχρι 47^b9; 49^b9; 51^a10; 55^b27 +
 Μῆδεια 53^b29; 54^b1
 μηδέτεροι opp. φίλοι, ἐχθροί 53^b16
 μηδέτερος 53^b19; 60^b35
 μήκος 49^b12; 56^a14 — opp. βρα-
 χύτης 56^b32 ἔχειν μήκος εὐμνη-
 μνευτον 51^a5 μήκος συστάσεως
 59^b17 μήκος ὕρος 51^a6 59^b18
 ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει 62^a18 τὸ τοῦ
 μέτρου μήκος 62^b7
 μῆκύνεται 55^b16
 μῆνιν αἶδε 56^b16
 μήτηρ 52^a26; 53^b20, 21; 54^a8
 μηχανή 54^b2 ἀπὸ μηχανῆς 54^b1
 μαρόν 52^b36; 53^b39; 54^a3
 μαγνύαι 47^b8, 20; 60^a2 μεμιγ-
 μένοις opp. χωρῖς 47^a23
 μικρός 58^b27, 30 οὐ μικρὸν μέρος
 62^a15 κατὰ μικρὸν 48^b23; 49^a
 13 μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν 49^b13
 μικροὶ μῦθοι 49^a19 μικρὰ Ἰλιάς
 59^b2, 4
 μικρότητα 56^b2
 μικτή 47^b22
 μιμῆσθαι 47^a17 +; 48^a8 +, ^b5, 20;
 59^a12; 60^a9, ^b9, 17; 61^b29
 οἱ μιμοῦμενοι 48^a1, 24 μιμοῦν-
 ται ἀπεικάζοντες 47^a19 μιμῆσθαι
 πρᾶττοντας 48^a1, 28 — δρώντας
 48^a28, 29 — πράξεις 48^b25; 51^b
 29 — πολλὰ μέρη 59^b25 — χεί-
 ρους, βελτίους 48^a18 — σπου-
 δαίους 48^a26 — ὀργίλους (etc.)
 54^b11 — ἐλευθέρας γυναῖκας
 62^a10 — ἦθη 50^a20 — δίσκον
 61^b31
 μίμημα 48^b9, 18
 μίμησις 48^a24; 52^a13, ^b33 — πρά-
 ξεις 49^b24, 36; 50^a4, ^b3, 24; 51^a
 31; 52^a2 — μιᾶς πράξεως 62^b
 11 — πράξεων 52^b1 — πράξεως
 καὶ βίου 50^a16 — φοβερῶν καὶ
 ἑλεεινῶν 52^a2 — ἀνθρώπων 50^a
 16 — τῶν πρᾶττότων 50^b3
 — ἐνός 51^a31 — σπουδαίων 49^b
 10 — βελτίων 54^b8 — φαν-
 λοτέρων 49^a32 ὁ τῆν μίμησιν
 παρέχων 54^a27 μίμησις ἢ ἐν τῷ
 πρᾶττειν 59^a15 — ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν
 62^b4 — διηγητική 59^b33
 — διηγηματικὴ 59^b36 — ἐπο-
 ποιική, τραγικὴ 61^b26 αἱ δια-
 φοραὶ τῆς μίμησεως 48^a24, ^b3

ποιεῖσθαι μίμησιν 47^a22, ^b13, 21,
 29; 49^b31; 59^b33 διὰ μίμησεως
 48^b8; 53^b12 τὸ τέλος τῆς μίμη-
 σεως 62^a18 κατὰ τῆν μίμησιν
 opp. κατὰ τὸ μέτρον 47^b15; 51^b
 28 μίμησις 47^a16; 48^a7 μίμη-
 σεις δραματικὰς ποιεῖν 48^b35
 μιμητής 48^a26; 60^a8, ^b8
 μιμητική (ἢ ἐν ἐξαμέτροις) 49^b21
 — ἐν μέτρῳ 59^a17 — φοβερῶν
 καὶ ἑλεεινῶν 52^b33 μιμητικά
 51^a30 μιμητικώτατον 48^b7
 μνηστῆρας 56^a11 μνησθεῖς 55^a3
 μῆμοι 47^b10
 Μίτυς 52^a8, 9
 Μνασίθεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος 62^a7
 διὰ μνήμης 54^b37
 μνημονεύονται 49^b4
 μνηστήρων 55^b20
 μόνος 48^a3, ^b35; 55^a20, ^b19; 56^a
 19; 59^b4; 60^a6
 μόριον 47^a11 — τοῦ ὅλου 51^a35;
 56^a26 — τοῦ αἰσχροῦ 49^a34
 μόριόν τι τραγωδίας 49^b32 μῦρια
 49^b26 — τῶν ῥυθμῶν 48^b21
 μορφαὶ θηρίων 48^b12 ἴδιαν μορφήν
 ἀποδιδόντες 54^b10
 μουσική conj. ὄψεις 62^a16
 μοχθηρία conj. κακία 53^a9 — conj.
 ἀλογία 61^b19 — opp. ἀμαρτία
 53^a15
 μοχθηροὶ opp. ἐπεικεῖς 52^b36 δίφρον
 μοχθηρόν 58^b30
 μυθεύματος 60^a29
 μῦθος 47^a9; 50^a4 +; 51^a5; 53^a37;
 54^a12, ^b1, 35; 56^a8, 28 — πρά-
 ξεις μίμησις 51^a31; 52^a13 — def.
 σύνθεσις τῶν πραγμάτων 50^a
 4 — synon. σύστασις πραγμάτων
 50^a32 (comp. 54^a14) — synon.
 τὰ πράγματα 50^a22 — conj. πρά-
 ξεις 51^b33 — synon. πράξις 52^a
 37 σύστασις τοῦ μύθου 52^a19
 μῦθος ποιεῖν 49^b5, 9 μῦθον
 ποιητής 51^b27 μῦθον συνησθάναι
 51^b13; 52^b29; 53^b4; 55^a22;
 59^a18 — λύνειν 53^b22 — ἀν-
 αἰρεῖν 60^a33 — ἓνα ποιεῖν 62^b6
 — ὅλον ποιεῖν 56^a33 — παρα-
 τεῖνειν 51^b38 — ἀπαριθμεῖν 53^a
 18 λύσει τῶν μῦθων 54^a37 μέρη
 μῦθου 50^a34; 51^a32; 52^b9 μῦθος
 εἰς 51^a16, 22; 62^b5 — ἀπλοῦς
 51^b33; 52^a12 — πεπλεγμένος 52^a
 12 — δραματικὸς 59^a19 — ἐπει-
 σοδιώδης 51^b34 — παρειλημένος
 53^b22 — παραδεδομένος 51^b
 24; 53^b25 — καλῶς ἔχων 53^a

12 — εὐσυνεστῶς 50^b32 — καλ-
 λων 52^a11 — ὁ τυχῶν 53^a
 18 μικροὶ μῦθοι 49^a19 μῦθος
 opp. ἦθη 50^a38 opp. μέτρα 51^b27
 ἔξω τοῦ μύθου 55^b8 ὁ τοῦ Οἰδίπου
 μῦθος 53^b7
 Μυννίσκος 61^b34
 μυρῖ 57^b11 τὸ μυρίον πολὺ 57^b
 12 μύριον σταδίων 51^a2
 Μυσία 60^a32
 ἐν Μυσοῖς 60^a32

τὸ Ν 58^a9, 17
 ναυμαχία 59^a26
 νεῶν κατάλογος 59^a36 νηῦς 57^b10
 νεκρῶν μορφαί 48^b12
 νεοκτεύκτου κασσιτέρειο 61^a28
 Νεοπτόλεμος 59^b6
 οἱ νέοι 50^a25
 Νικοχάρης 48^a13
 Νιόβη 56^a17
 Νίπτρα 54^b30; 60^a26
 νομιζόμενα 49^a12 ἐνόμζον 61^a3
 νόμος 55^b5 νόμοι 48^a15 νόμων
 ποιήσις 47^b26
 νῦν 48^b32; 62^a10 — opp. τότε
 61^a4 — opp. πρῶτον 53^a18 ἔτι
 καὶ νῦν 49^a12 μέχρι τοῦ νῦν
 47^b9 οἱ νῦν 48^a18; 50^b8 νῦν
 δέ 59^a35; 60^b1
 νύξ 61^a26

τὸ Ξ 58^a10, 13
 Ξενάρχου μίμοι 47^b10
 ξενικὸν ὄνομα 58^a22
 ξένους θύειν 55^b5
 Ξενοφάνης 61^a1

ὄγκος ποιήματος 59^b28
 ὄγκωδέστατον 59^b35
 ὄδονηρὰ πράξις 52^b12
 ὄδύνης 49^a37
 Ὀδύσσεια 51^a24; 59^b3; 60^a35 ἦ
 Ὀδύσσεια 49^a1; 51^a29; 53^a32;
 55^b17; 59^b15; 62^b9
 Ὀδυσσεύς 54^b26; 57^b11; 61^b7 — (ἐν
 τῇ Σκύλλῃ) 54^a30 — ὁ τραυματίας
 53^b34 — ὁ ψευδάγγελος 55^a13
 Οἰδιππος 53^a11, 20 — (Sophocl.)
 52^a24+; 53^b7, 31; 54^b8; 55^a
 18; 60^a30; 62^b2
 οἴεσθαι 51^a16, 21; 56^b16; 60^a20;
 61^b4, 33
 οἷη δ' ἄμμορος 61^a20
 οἷησι 61^b3
 οἰκείος 55^b13; 59^b28 τῶν οἰκείων
 τι 57^b32 οἰκείον τῆς ποιητικῆς
 50^b17 οἰκία ἡδονή 53^a36, ^b11;

59^a21 — φύσις 49^a4 οἰκεῖον
 ὄνομα 58^a2 — μέτρον 49^a24 οἰ-
 κεία ἦθη 48^b24
 οἰκία (synon. γένη) 53^a19; 54^a12
 οἰκοὶ 55^b17
 οἰκονομεῖν 53^a29
 οἰκτρά dist. δεινά 53^b14
 οἶνον 61^a27, 30
 οἰνόφλυξιν 61^a15
 οἰνοχοεῦεν 61^a30
 οἴχεται τὸ ἐν 51^a1
 ὀλιγάκις 49^a27; 54^a1; 60^a9
 ὀλίγος = μικρός 58^b25, 29 ὀλίγοι
 opp. πάντες 51^b26 οὐκ ὀλίγοι
 50^a12 ὀλίγα 60^a9 περὶ ὀλίγας
 οἰκίας 53^a19
 ὄλος 50^b25; 56^a13, 16; 59^a32 — def.
 50^b26 τελεία καὶ ὅλη πράξις 50^b
 24 πράξις μία καὶ ὅλη 51^a32 μία
 πράξις ὅλη καὶ τελεία 59^a19 τὸ ἐν
 καὶ τὸ ὅλον 51^a2 ζῶον ἐν ὅλον
 59^a20 τὸ ὅλον 51^a34; 55^b
 33 μόριον τοῦ ὅλου 51^a35; 56^a
 26 ἡ ὅλη τέχνη 62^a1 ὄλος
 χορός 52^b23 μέρος ὄλου 52^b
 19 + ἐπεισόδιον ὄλου 56^a31 ὄλα
 μέλη 52^b21 ὄλας 48^b4; 50^a26,
^b10; 54^a21; 57^b33; 60^b29; 61^b9
 ὀμαδόν 61^a19
 ὀμαλόν (ἦθος) 54^a26 ὀμαλῶς 54^a
 27
 ὀμβρῶν 61^a23
 Ὀμηρος 47^b18; 48^a11, 22, 26, ^b34;
 51^a23; 54^b15; 59^a31, ^b12; 60^a
 5, 19 οἱ πρὸ Ὀμηροῦ 48^b28 ἀπὸ
 Ὀμηρον ἀρξάμενοι 48^b29
 πρὸ ὀμαμάτων τίθεσθαι 55^a23
 ὀμοιοὶ 55^a5; 59^a21 τὸ ὀμοιον
 59^a8, ^b31 περὶ τὸν ὀμοιον 53^a5,
 6 ὀμοίους (opp. κρείττους, χείρους)
 εἰκάζειν 48^a6, 12 ὀμοίους ποιεῖν
 54^b10 ὀμοιον (dist. χρηστόν,
 ἀρμόττον) ἦθος 54^a24 ὀμοίως
 48^b14; 49^b15; 50^b2; 51^b21;
 54^a1 — ἔχειν 57^b17, 20, 28
 — λεχθήσεται 57^b26
 ὄνομα 48^a35; 52^a30; 57^b1; 59^a
 13 ὄνομα dist. ῥῆμα 56^b21;
 57^a16+ — def. 57^a10 — (in-
 cluding ῥῆμα) 61^a31 ὀνόματος
 πᾶσις 57^a19 ὀνόματος εἶδη 57^a
 31 (comp. 58^a34, ^b14, 18) ὀνο-
 μα κύριον, ξενικόν 58^a19, ^b3 ὀνο-
 μα (= ὄνομα κύριον) 58^a28, ^b2,
 16 ὄνομα οἰκεῖον 58^a2 — ἀλ-
 λότριον 57^b7, 31 — κείμενον
 57^b25 — ὀνομαζόμενον 58^a6
 — καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινῶν 57^b

- 33 *ὀνόματα* dist. *πράγματα* 51^b
 22 — *τὰ τυχόντα* 51^b13 — *γε-
 νόμενα*, *γνώριμα* opp. *πεποιημένα*
 51^b15, 20 *ὄνομα* ἀπλοῦν, διπλοῦν,
 τριπλοῦν etc. 57^a31 sq. — δι-
 πλοῦν 59^a5, 9 *ὀνόματα* ἄρρενα
 etc. 58^a8 sq. *ὄνομα* τίθεσθαι
 57^b34 — *ἐπιτίθεσθαι* 51^b10
 — *ὑποτιθέναι* 51^b13; 55^b13
 — *μετατιθέναι* 58^b20+ — *προσ-
 αγορεύειν* 57^b31
ὀνομάζειν 47^b10, 14 *ὀνομαζόμενον*
 (*ὄνομα*) 58^a6
ὀνομασία 50^b14
ὀξύτης opp. *βαρύτης* 56^b33
ὄπλων κρίσις 59^b5 *τὰ περὶ τῶν ὄπ-
 λων* 61^a2
Ὀπούντιος 62^a8
ὄραν 48^b10, 15; 53^b4; 54^b6; 55^a15, 24,
 27 *ὄραν εἰς τι* 60^a14 — *πρὸς τι*
 61^a10 *ιδεῖν καλῶς* 51^a24 *ιδῶν*
 55^a1, 10
ὄργην 56^b1
ὄργιζόμενος 55^a32
ὄργιζους καὶ βρόθιμους 54^b12
Ὀρέστης 53^a20, 37 *ὁ Ὀρέστης*
 (Eurip.) 52^b6; 53^b24; 54^a29,
 31; 55^a5, 7, 14 *ἐν Ὀρέσθῃ*
 61^b21
ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρος 61^a3 *ὄρθόν* 53^a
 26 *ὄρθῃ ἐπιτίμησις* 61^b19 *ὄρ-
 θῶς* 58^b5; 60^b18 *ὄρθῶς ἔχειν*
 60^b24, 28
ὄρθότης 60^b14 — *ἡ κατὰ τέχνην*
 61^b24
ὄρισται 52^a15 *ὄρισμένοι πρὸς εὐτυ-
 χίαν* 52^a32
ὄρισμός ἀνθρώπου 57^a26
ὄρμώντες 49^a3
ὄρμειν 57^b10
ὄρος οὐσίας 49^b23 — *μήκους* 51^a
 6, 10; 59^b18 — *μεγέθους* 51^a
 15
ὄρχησις 48^a9; 62^a9
ὄρχηστῶν 47^a27
ὄρχηστικόν 60^a1 *ὄρχηστικωτέρα*
 49^a23
οὐδὲν ἤττον 51^b3, 23, 30; 57^b26 *οὐ-
 δὲν μάλλον* 56^a28
οὐλή 54^b24, 27
οὐψ 50^a30; 51^b17
οὐρήσας μὲν πρώτων 61^a10
οὐσίας 49^b24
οὐτιδανός 58^b25
ὄψ = *ὄψις* 58^a5
ὄψέ 49^a20 *ὄψε ποτε* 49^b2
ὄψις 50^a10, 16; 53^b1+; 56^a2;
 59^b10 *ὄψεως κόσμος* 49^b33 *ὄψ-*
εις 62^a16 *ὄψεων ἀπεργασία* 50^b
 20 *ὄψεις ἔχειν* 50^a13
παθήματα 59^b11 *παθημάτων κάθαρι-
 σις* 49^b28
παθητικόν 59^b14 *παθητικῆ τραγωδία*
 55^b34; 59^b9
πάθος 53^b20; 54^a13 — *def.* 52^b
 11 *κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος* 53^b18 *πά-
 θη καὶ πράξεις μιμείσθαι* 47^a28 *πά-
 θη* (scil. *ἔλεον, φόβον* etc.) *παρα-
 σκευάζειν* 56^a38 *οἱ ἐν τοῖς*
πάθεσιν 55^a31 *πάθη τῆς λέξεως*
 60^b12
παιδίου λήψις 55^b30
παῖδας ἀποκτείνειν 53^b29 *ἐκ παίδων*
 48^b6
πάλαι 54^a9
οἱ παλαιοὶ 48^b33; 53^b27
πάλιν 49^b30; 60^b4
παμμέγεθες 50^b39
πάμμικρον 50^b37
παννύχιον 61^a17
πάντως 51^b23
παρὰ τὸν λόγον 56^b7
παράδειγμα 58^a20; 60^a26, 26
 — *πονηρίας* 54^a28 — *σκληρό-
 τητος* 54^b14 *τὸ παράδειγμα ὑπε-
 ρέχειν* 61^b13
παραδεδομένοι μῦθοι 51^b24; 53^b25
παρειλημμένοι μῦθοι 53^b22
παραλογίζεται ἡ ψυχὴ 60^a25
παραλογισμός 55^a13, 16; 60^a20
παραπλήσιον 50^a39
παρασκευάζειν 49^a18; 53^b7+; 54^a
 11; 56^a37, 36 — *πάθη* 56^a
 38 — *ἐλεηνά* (etc.) 56^b4
παταίνειν μῦθον 51^b38 — *λόγον*
 55^b2
παραφανείσθαι 49^a2
παραφυλαττομένον 55^b18
παρόντα χρόνον 57^a18
παρελληλυθότα χρόνον 57^a18
παρέχων τὴν μίμησιν 54^a27
παρήκοιον 59^b22
παρείσθω 56^b18
ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ 53^a26
πάρδος 52^b17+
παρῶχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ 61^a26
παρῶδιος ποιεῖν 48^a13
τὸ πᾶν πολὺ τι 61^a20 *τὸ πάντες*
ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοὶ 61^a19 *κατὰ πᾶ-
 σαν κακίαν* 49^a33
πάσχειν 53^b6; 61^b4 — *πρὸς τινα*
 50^a27 — *dist. πράττειν* 51^b
 11 — *dist. ποιεῖν* 53^a22
πατέρα 53^b20
ἐπαύσατο 49^a15

- Παύσων 48^a6
 πεδίον τὸ Τρωικόν 61^a18
 πείρας (ἀπὸ τῆς) 59^b32
 πειρᾶσθαι 49^b12; 56^a3
 Πελοποννήσῳ 48^a35
 πέμψις ἐπιστολῆς 52^b6
 πέρι 58^a16
 περαίνουσα κάθαρσιν 49^b27 μέρη
 ἅμα περαινόμενα 59^b27 περαι-
 νεσθαι διὰ μέτρων, διὰ μέλους 49^b30
 τὸ περί 57^a7
 περιδέραια 54^b24
 περιεργάζεσθαι σημείοις 62^a6
 περίοδος ἡλίου 49^b13
 περιουκίδας 48^a36
 περιπέτεια def. 52^a22 ἐκ περιπε-
 τείας 54^b29 περιπέτεια conj.
 ἀναγνώρισις (ἀναγνωρισμός) 50^a34;
 52^a15, 17, 33, 38, 49, 10; 55^b34;
 59^b10 περιπέτεια dist. ἀπλᾶ
 πράγματα 56^a19
 περιττῆ 59^b36
 περιωνύμια 52^b12
 πέρισι Ἰλίου 56^a16 Ἰλίου πέρισι
 59^b6
 Πηλείδων Πηληιάδων 58^a4
 Πηλεύς 56^a2
 πιθανόν 51^b16 πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον
 61^b11 πιθανώτατοι 55^a30
 πίσθηκος 61^b34
 Πίνδαρος 61^b35
 πινόντων 61^a30
 πιστεύομεν 51^b17
 πίστews ἕνεκα 54^b28
 πλάνη 48^a38
 πλείω, πλέω 61^a26 [see πολύ]
 πλέκειν opp. λύειν 56^a9 πεπλεγ-
 μένον 59^b15 πεπλεγμένοι μῦθοι
 52^a12 πεπλεγμένη πράξις 52^a
 16 — σύνθεσις 52^b32 — τρα-
 γωδία 55^b33; 59^b9
 πλήθος τραγωδιῶν 59^b21 — ὑποκρι-
 τῶν 49^a16 πλήθην 58^a13 — ὑπο-
 κριτῶν 49^b5 — ἐπεισοδίων 49^a28
 πλὴν 56^b4.
 πληροῦν 59^b31
 πληγῆναι 51^a26
 πλοκή opp. λύσις 56^a9
 ποιεῖν 53^b28+; 54^a1; 55^b10; 57^a
 5 opp. πάσχειν 53^a22 dist.
 μέλλειν 53^b18 opp. κωλύειν 57^a
 1, 8 ποιεῖν ἡδονήν 48^b18; 59^a21
 (comp. 62^b13) — ἐπίδηλον 51^a
 35 — τοῦναντίον 52^a26 ποιεῖν
 (conj. δρᾶν, πράττειν) 48^b1 ποιεῖν
 (= invent) 51^b20, 22; 58^a7 πε-
 ποιημένον ὄνομα 57^b2, 33 πεποιη-
 μένοι λόγοι 55^a34 πεποιημένα
 ἀναγνωρίσεις 54^b30 πεποιημένα
 σημεῖα 55^a20 ποιεῖν (as a poet)
 47^b14; 50^a35, 37; 53^a35, 28,
 29; 54^a25, 13; 56^a11+; 58^b8,
 22; 59^b27; 60^a3, 23; 61^a
 28 — ποίημα 51^a21 — μύ-
 θους 49^b6, 9 — ἓνα μῦθον 62^b6
 — λόγους 49^b8; 55^a34 — ψόγους
 48^b27 — παρῳδίας 48^a13 — μι-
 μήσεις δραματικές 48^b35 — ἰαμ-
 βεῖον 58^b19 — ἀγανίσματα 51^b
 38 — ῥήσεις 50^a30 — Κέν-
 ταυρον 47^b21 — τὰ Κύπρια
 59^b2 — περί τινα 51^b15; 59^a
 37 — πράξις 51^b36 — ἀδύ-
 νατα 60^b23 — γενόμενα 51^b
 30 — ὅσα συνέβη 51^a25 — τὸν
 πόλεμον ὄλον 59^a32 — οἴους δεῖ
 60^b34 ποιεῖν (= δρᾶν) 49^b15 ποι-
 εῖσθαι δῆλῳσιν 59^a22 — σημεῖον
 48^a35 — τὴν μίμησιν 47^a21
 (and passim) — τὰς μαθήσεις
 48^b8
 ποίημα 48^b29; 51^a21; 59^b13; 62^b
 10 ποιήματος ὄγκος 59^b28
 ποίησις 47^a10; 48^b23, 24; 49^a23;
 51^b10; 58^a20; 59^a37 — opp.
 ἱστορία 51^b6 πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν
 ἀνάγειν 61^b10, 11 ἑκατέρα ἡ ποίησις
 49^a3 ποίησις τῆς τραγωδίας 47^a
 14 — διθυραμβικῶν, νόμων 47^b26
 ποιητῆς 47^b15+; 48^a33, 34; 51^a20,
 30, 32; 53^a18, 30, 34, 13; 54^b
 31, 34; 56^a5; 60^a7; 13 — opp.
 φυσιολόγος 47^b19 — opp. σκευο-
 ποιός 50^b20 — opp. ἱστορικός
 51^b1 — conj. ζωγράφος, εἰκονο-
 ποιός 60^b8 — conj. γραφεύς
 50^a26 — conj. εἰκονογράφος
 54^b11 — ἥρωικῶν, ἱάμβων 48^b
 33 — μῦθων, μέτρων 51^b27,
 28 οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ 49^b
 3 ποιητῆς ἀγαθός 56^a6 — ἀ-
 μείνων 53^b3 — φαῦλος 51^b36;
 60^b1 οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ 50^a37 οἱ
 πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν 59^a29 μόνος
 τῶν ποιητῶν 60^a6 ποιητοῦ ἔργον
 51^a37 ὁ ποιητῆς (= Homer) 57^b
 34; 58^b7; 60^b2
 ποιητικῆ 47^a8; 48^b4; 50^b18; 54^b16;
 56^b14, 18 — opp. πολιτικῆ,
 ἱατρικῆ etc. 60^b14, 20 — opp.
 ἄλλη τέχνη 56^b18 — opp. ὑπο-
 κριτικῆ 62^a5 — εὐφους ἢ μανι-
 κοῦ 55^a33
 ποικιλία 59^a34
 ποιότης 50^a18
 πόλεμον 59^a31

πόλεων 49^a 12 πόλεως πόλιος 58^a 3
 πολιτική 60^b 14 πολιτικῆς ἔργον
 50^b 6 πολιτικῶς opp. ῥητορικῶς
 λέγειν 50^b 7
 πολλάκις 51^b 38; 54^b 17; 55^b 25;
 56^a 11
 πολλαπλοῦν ὄνομα 57^a 35
 Πολύγνωτος 48^a 5; 50^a 27
 Πολύιδος ὁ σοφιστής 55^a 6, ^b 10
 πολυμερῆ 59^b 1
 πολὺμυθον σύστημα 56^a 12
 πολὺ 57^b 12 πολλὸ ἔργον 49^a 30 πο-
 λύ τι 59^b 23; 61^a 20 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολὺ dist. ἐξ ἀνάγκης 50^b 30 οἱ
 πολλοί 59^a 29 πολλά opp. ἐν
 57^a 20 πολλά καὶ ἀπειρα 51^a
 17 πολὺ (adv.) 52^a 21; 56^a 15;
 59^a 5 πλείους τραγωδία 62^b 5
 — πράξεις 62^b 8 — φωναί 57^a
 1 + — λόγοι 57^a 29 περὶ ἓνα
 ἢ πλείους 59^a 23 πλείονων μᾶς
 57^a 4 τὸ πλείω ἀμφίβολον 61^a 26
 τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη 47^a 15
 πλείστη 54^b 20
 πονηρία 54^a 28; 61^b 21 μετὰ πονη-
 ρίας 56^a 22
 πονηρὸν 53^a 1
 ποσαχῶς 61^a 32, 34
 Ποσειδῶνος 55^b 18
 τὸ ποσόν 52^b 15, 26
 ποτέ 61^b 14 τὸ πότε 57^a 17 ποτέ
 καὶ ἄλλοτε 51^a 9
 πρᾶγμα ὁ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν 50^b
 35 ἢ φύσις τοῦ πράγματος 51^a
 10 αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα 55^a 17 τὰ
 πράγματα συνίστασθαι 50^a 37 παρα-
 γμάτων σύστασις 50^a 15, ^b 22; 53^b 2;
 54^a 34 — synon. μῦθος 50^a 32;
 54^a 14 πραγμάτων σύνθεσις 50^a
 5 τὰ πράγματα (synon. μῦθος) 50^a
 22; 37; 53^b 5, 13; 54^b 6 ἀπλᾶ
 πράγματα 56^a 20 τῶν πραγμάτων
 μέρος 51^a 33 πράγματα dist.
 λόγος 56^b 2 — dist. ὀνόματα
 51^b 22
 πρακτικόν 60^a 1
 πράξις 50^a 18 +; 51^a 18, ^b 29; 52^a 13;
 53^b 16, 27 γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξιν
 53^b 27 πράξις opp. ποιήτης 50^a
 18 — dist. λόγος 54^a 18 — dist.
 πάθος 47^a 28 — conj. βίος 50^a
 16 πράξις τις 50^a 18 πράξις
 ποιά τις 50^a 1 — καλή 48^b
 25 — φαρμακὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά 52^b 11
 (comp. ^b 1) πράξεων αἰτία 50^a
 2 πράξεως μίμησις 49^b 36; 50^a 4,
^b 3; 51^a 31; 62^b 11 πράξις μία
 51^a 19, 28; 59^a 22; 62^b 11 — μία

πολυμερῆς 59^b 1 — μία καὶ ὄλη
 51^a 32 μία πράξις ὄλη καὶ τελεία
 59^a 19 πράξις σπουδαία καὶ τελεία
 49^b 24 — τελεία 52^a 2 — τε-
 λεία καὶ ὄλη 50^b 24 — conj.
 μῦθος 52^a 37 — ἀπλή 51^b 33; 52^a
 14 — ἐπεισοδιώδης 51^b 33
 πράττειν 50^a 21; 53^b 30 + εἰ πέ-
 πράγῃ τις ἢ μή 52^a 36 τὰ πεπρα-
 γμμένα 52^a 29 πράττειν τὸ δεινόν
 53^b 30 μέρος ἅμα πραττόμενα 59^b
 24 αὐτὰ τὰ πραττόμενα 55^a
 25 πραττομένων μεταβολή 52^a
 22 πράττειν dist. λέγειν etc.
 51^b 9; 54^a 35; 61^a 5, 6, 7 — dist.
 πάσχειν 51^b 11 conj. ἐνεργεῖν, δρᾶν,
 ποιεῖν 48^a 23 (comp. 49^b 31), 27,
^b 1 ὁ πράττων 50^a 6, ^b 4; 60^a
 14 πράττεται ὑπὸ τινῶν πρα-
 τόντων 49^b 37 ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττειν
 μίμησις 59^a 15 πράττοντας μιμεί-
 σθαι 48^a 1 πράττοντες ποιοῦνται
 τὴν μίμησιν 49^b 31
 τὸ πρόπον εὐρίσκειν 55^a 25 πρόπον
 μέγεθος 56^a 14 προπόντως 59^a 4
 πρὸ τοῦ opp. ὑστερον 54^b 3
 προάγειν 48^b 23; 49^a 13
 προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας δεῖσθαι
 54^b 5
 προαιρέσθαι 60^a 26, ^b 17, 18 opp.
 φεύγειν 50^b 9 (1)
 προαίρεσις 50^b 9; 54^a 18
 προβεβληκότα 60^b 19
 πρόβλημα 60^b 22; 61^b 9 περὶ προ-
 βλημάτων καὶ λύσεων 60^b 6 sqq.
 προγεγεννημένων 52^a 19
 πρόλογος 49^b 4; 52^b 16, 19
 Προμηθεύς 56^a 2
 προεωρακῶς 48^b 17
 προπεπραγμένα 55^b 30
 προσαγορεύειν 47^b 15; 48^b 1 προ-
 σαγορεύσαντα 57^b 31 προσαγο-
 ρεῦτόν 47^b 23
 ἀνευ προσβολῆς 56^b 26 μετὰ προσ-
 βολῆς 56^b 27, 29
 πρόσεστι 54^a 4 προσόν 51^a 34, 35
 προσήκειν 51^a 22; 56^b 34
 προσποιήσασθαι 51^a 28
 προσσημαίνει χρόνον 57^a 17
 προστιθέασιν 57^b 19 προστιθέντες
 60^a 18 προσθέναι 60^a 24 ἂν μὴ
 αὐτὸς προσθῆ 61^b 30
 κατὰ προσφθίαν λύνειν 61^a 22
 πρόσωπον 49^a 36, ^b 4 τὸ πρόσωπον
 αἰσχροῦ 61^a 13
 πρότερος 48^a 33; 53^b 3 οἱ πρότερον
 opp. οἱ ὑστεροί 61^b 33
 πρωταγωνιστήν 49^a 18

- πρώτος 48^a 13, ^b 37; 49^a 16, ^b 7; 50^a
 37; 52^b 23; 56^a 29; 59^b 13 τὰς
 πρώτας μαθήσεις 48^b 8 πρώτος
 opp. δεύτερος etc. 53^a 30, 33; 54^b
 20 ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχεσθαι
 47^a 13 πρώτων καὶ μέγιστον 50^b
 23 τὸ πρῶτον 49^a 22, ^b 15 πρῶ-
 τον (adv.) 47^a 12; 48^b 27 πρῶτον
 μὲν opp. νῦν δέ 53^a 17 — opp.
 ἔτι 60^b 22 — opp. εἶτα, ἔπειτα
 49^b 31; 62^a 5 — opp. αὖ 52^b 34
 προπολαμβάνουσι 61^b 1
 Πρωταγόρας 56^b 15
 πτώσις 56^b 21; 57^a 18, 22
 πτωχεία 59^b 6
 τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλοντες 60^a 31
 πυρὶ κολλήσαντα 58^a 29
 πωσις 58^a 31, ^b 11

 Ρ 56^b 28; 58^a 9, 17
 ῥάδιον 58^b 8
 ῥαθύμους 54^b 12
 ῥαψοῦντα 62^a 6
 ῥαψοδίαν 47^b 22
 ῥήμα 56^b 21; 57^a 14, 22 + πτώσις
 ῥήματος 57^a 19
 ῥήσις 54^a 31; 56^a 31 — ἠθική 50^a
 29
 ῥητορικὴς ἔργον 50^b 6 ἐν τοῖς περὶ
 ῥητορικῆς 56^a 35 ῥητορικῶς 50^b 8
 ῥυθμός 47^a 26 — conj. ἄρμονία 48^b
 21 — conj. λόγος, ἄρμονία 47^a
 22, 23 — conj. μέλος, μέτρον 47^b
 25 — conj. ἄρμονία καὶ μέλος
 49^b 29 ῥυθμοὶ 48^b 21 σχηματι-
 ζόμενοι ῥυθμοὶ 47^a 27

 Σ 56^b 28; 58^a 9 +
 ἐν Σαλαμῖνι 59^a 25
 σάρκας 58^b 23
 σατυρική ποίησις 49^a 22 ἐκ σατυρικοῦ
 μεταβαλεῖν 49^a 20
 σαυρωτήρος 61^a 3
 σαφήνειαν 58^a 34
 σαφής opp. ταπεινή λέξις 58^a 18 τὸ
 σαφές τῆς λέξεως 58^b 1, 5 σαφέ-
 στερον εἰπεῖν 53^b 26 σαφεστάτη
 λέξις 58^a 18
 τὸ σέθεν 58^b 34
 σεμνή λέξις 58^a 21 σεμνότεροι opp.
 εὐτελέστεροι 48^b 25
 σημαίνειν 52^a 30; 57^a 14 +; 61^a
 32 σημαίνον 57^a 13 + ἐν σημαί-
 νειν 57^a 29, 30
 σημαντική φωνή 57^a 1 + σημαντικὸν
 μέρος 57^a 12
 σημείον 49^a 25; 50^a 35; 53^a 17;
 55^a 26; 56^a 15; 60^a 17; 62^b

- 4 — dist. αἴτιον 48^b 9 ση-
 μείον εὐφύσις 59^a 7 — μέγιστον
 53^a 26 — ποιούμενοι 48^a 35 ση-
 μεία σύμφυτα etc. 54^b 21; 55^a 20
 σημείους περιεργάζεσθαι 62^a 6
 Σθενέλου 58^a 21
 σίγυρον 57^b 6
 σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους 61^a 29
 ἐκ Σικελίας 48^a 32; 49^b 7 ἐν Σι-
 κελίᾳ 59^a 26
 Σίνων 59^b 7
 Σίσυφος 56^a 22
 σκάφης 54^b 25
 σκευοποιῶ τέχνη 50^b 20
 ἀπὸ σκηνῆς 52^b 25 ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς
 52^b 18 ἐπὶ σκηνῆς 60^a 15 ἐπὶ
 τῆς σκηνῆς 55^a 28; 59^b 25 ἐπὶ
 τῶν σκηνῶν 53^a 27
 σκηνογραφίαν 49^a 18
 σκληρότητος παράδειγμα 54^b 14
 σκοπεῖν 61^b 16 σκεπτέαι 61^b 25
 σκεπτέον 61^a 5
 Σκύλλαν αὐλεῖν 61^b 32 ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ
 54^a 31
 σοφιστοῦ 55^a 6
 Σοφοκλῆς 48^a 26; 49^a 19; 53^b 31;
 54^b 8, 36; 55^a 18; 56^a 27; 60^b
 33; 62^b 3
 σοφός 56^b 22
 σπείρειν 57^b 29
 σπουδάξεσθαι 49^b 1
 σπουδαῖος opp. φαῦλος 48^a 2, 27; 49^b
 17; 61^a 6 σπουδαία πράξις 49^b
 24 σπουδαῖα opp. γελοῖα 48^b 34;
 49^b 10 σπουδαιότερον 51^b 6
 σπουδῆς ἄξιον 56^b 14
 σταδίων 51^a 2
 στάσιμον 52^b 17, 23 στασιμώτατον
 59^b 34
 στοιχεῖον 56^b 20 +
 στόματος σχήματα καὶ τόποι 56^b 31
 στοχάζεσθαι 51^b 9; 52^b 28; 54^a 16;
 56^a 20
 συβοτῶν 54^b 28
 σύγκειται 57^a 25 +; 58^a 10 συγ-
 κειμένη 62^b 8
 συγχεῖται ἢ θεωρία 50^b 38
 συκοφαντοῦσι 56^a 5
 συλλαβή 56^b 21, 34, 36; 58^a 2
 συλλογίζεσθαι 48^b 16; 55^a 7, 10; 61^b 2
 ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ 55^a 4, 21
 συμβαίνειν 52^a 35, ^b 3; 54^b 1; 58^a
 12; 60^a 13 τὸ συμβαῖνον 48^b 9;
 53^a 7 τὰ συμβαίνοντα 53^b 6 συμ-
 βαίνειν περὶ τινα 59^a 23 — τινί
 51^a 17, 25; 54^a 13 συμβαίνειν
 with inf. 48^b 16; 51^a 13, ^b 29; 52^a
 19, 28 συμβαίνειν τινί with inf.

- 51^b8; 53^a21; 55^a8, ^b6 κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός opp. καθ' αὐτήν 60^b16
 (comp. ^b30)
 συμβάλλεται 58^b1
 συμπαραλαμβάνουσι 50^a21
 συμπιπτότων 53^b15
 σύμφυτον 48^b5 σύμφυτα σημεῖα
 54^b22
 συναγωνίζεσθαι 56^a26
 συναπεργάζεσθαι 55^a22, 30
 συνάπτειν 47^b13; 58^a27
 σύνδεσμος 56^b21, 38 συνδέσμῳ εἰς
 57^a29, 30
 σύνδηλος 51^a10
 συννετή φωνή 56^b23
 συνεχούς καὶ μίας 52^a15
 συνήθεια opp. τέχνη 47^a20
 συνήθεις ιστορίαι 59^a22
 σύνθεσις μέτρων 49^b35 — ὀνομά-
 των 58^a28 — πραγμάτων 50^a
 5 — τραγωδίας 52^b31
 συννετή (ἀναγνώρισις) 55^a12 — φωνή
 56^b35; 57^a11 +
 συνιστάται μῦθον 47^a9; 51^b12; 52^b28;
 55^a22; 59^a18 — Ὀδύσειαν 51^a
 29 συνίστασθαι (pass.) 47^a9;
 60^a28; 62^a16 συνεστάναι 50^b32,
 35; 51^a32; 53^a4; 59^b14; 62^b
 10 συνίστασθαι (midd.) 50^a37;
 60^a34
 σύνολον 47^a16
 συνοράσθαι 59^b19
 συντίθενουσι πρὸς τέλος 59^a27
 συντίθεσθαι 53^a19; 57^a2
 σύντομα 55^b16
 συνίγγων 47^a26; 61^a18
 σύστασις 53^a3, 23; 59^b21 σύστα-
 σις πραγμάτων 50^a15, 32, ^b22;
 53^b2; 54^a14, 34 — μῦθου 52^a19
 μακρὰ σύστασις 60^a3 συστάσεως
 μήκος 59^b17 διπλῆ σύστασις 53^a31
 σύστημα 51^a3 — ἐποποιικόν 56^a11
 σφόδρα 53^a1
 σχεδὸν αἰεὶ 48^a2 — ἅπαντες 50^a
 37 — οἱ πολλοὶ 59^a29
 σχήματα 49^a6 — κωμῆδίας 48^b36
 σχήματά τινα ἔχειν 49^b3 σχήματα
 opp. χρώματα 47^a19 — τοῦ
 στόματος 56^b31 — τῆς λέξεως
 56^b9 σχήμασι συναπεργάζεσθαι
 55^a29 σχημάτων δέσθαι 62^a3
 σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν 47^a27
 σωθῆναι 52^a29; 55^b22
 Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι 47^b11
 σῶμα 54^b24; 61^a13
 Σωσίστρατος 62^a7
 σωτηρία 55^b12, 14
 Σώφρονος μίμοι 47^b10
 ταμεῖν = ἀρύσαι 57^b15 τεμῶν χαλκῶ
 57^b14
 ἐν τάξει 50^b37
 ταπεινός 58^a18, 20, 32
 τεταγμένα 50^b35
 ταχύ 59^b31
 ἐκ Τεγέας 60^a32
 τελεία πράξις 49^b25; 50^b24; 52^a2;
 59^a19
 τελευταῖον 54^a5
 τελευταῖν 50^b33; 53^a26, 32; 58^a9, 14
 τελευτή 50^b26, 29 ἐπὶ τελευτῆς 53^a
 38
 τέλος dist. ἀρχή etc. 57^a7; 59^a20, 32,
^b20 μέχρι τέλος 55^b29, 32 τὸ
 τέλος πράξις τίς 50^a18 — μέγισ-
 τον 50^a23 — τῆς τραγωδίας 50^a
 22 (comp. 60^b24 +) — τῆς μιμή-
 σεως 62^a18 ἐν τέλος 59^a27,
 29 τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνειν 62^b15
 τερατῶδες 53^b9
 τετράμετρον 49^a21, 22; 59^b37
 τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα 57^a34
 τέχνη 47^a21, ^b29; 50^b20; 60^b
 15 ἢ ὅλη τέχνη 62^a1 τὸ τῆς
 τέχνης ἔργον 62^b12 τῆς τέχνης
 ἐστὶ 51^a7 ἀπὸ τέχνης opp. ἀπὸ
 τύχης 54^a10 διὰ τέχνης opp. διὰ
 συνηθείας 47^a20 διὰ τέχνην opp.
 διὰ φύσιν 51^a24 κατὰ τέχνην 61^b
 24 κατὰ τὴν τέχνην 53^a22; 60^b
 28, 30 πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην
 60^b23 καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην 60^b19
 Τηλέγονος 53^b33
 Τηλέμαχος 61^b5
 Τήλεφος 53^a21
 Τηρεὺς 54^b36
 τιθέται 57^a3, 9; 59^a22 ἂν δὲ θῆ
 60^a34 τιθέναι εἰς μέτρα 51^b2
 (comp. 58^b16) — ἐν ἔπειν
 62^b2 τιθόμενα εἰς μέτρα ἀκρόασιν
 59^b22 τίθεσθαι ὄνομα 57^b34
 — πρὸ δμμάτων 55^a23
 Τιμόθεος 48^a15
 τις, τι 49^b32; 50^a7, 18, ^b11, 25;
 51^a33, ^b3; 52^b8; 53^a10; 54^a19;
 56^b30; 61^a20 τινές 48^a29; 53^a
 13, 31
 τὸ δ' ἴσως ἔχει ὡς περ οἱ Κεφαλλῆνές
 φασιν 61^b6
 τοι 57^a4 τοιγαροῦν 59^b2
 τόξον 55^a14
 τόπος 55^a10 στόματος τόποι 56^b32
 τότε opp. νῦν 61^a3
 τραγικόν 53^b39; 56^a21 τραγική
 μίμησις 61^b26; 62^a3 τραγικώτα-
 ται 53^a27 τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιη-
 τῶν 53^a30

τραγωδία conj. ἡ ἐν τῷ πράττειν μίμησις
59^a15 ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιήσις
47^a13 τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον
52^b29 (comp. 62^a11) δ ἦν τῆς
τραγωδίας ἔργον 50^a30 ἀπὸ τρα-
γωδίας ἡδονή 53^a35 καλλίστη
τραγωδία 52^b31; 53^a19, 23
τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι 49^a5
τραγωδοῦς 58^b32
τράπεζαν 58^b29, 30
τραυματίας Ὀδυσσεύς 53^b34
τριμέτρων 47^b11
τριπλοῦν ὄνομα 57^a34
τρόπος 47^a18, ^b24; 48^a9; 57^b30;
58^b6, 12
τροφοῦ 54^b27
τροχάϊου 52^b24
Τρωάδες 59^b7
Τρωαῖόν 61^a18
τρώσειν 52^b13
τυγχάνειν opp. ἀποτυγχάνειν 50^a
3 — τοῦ τέλους 62^b15 ὅπου,
ὀπόθεν, ἔτυχεν 50^b32, 33 ὡς ἔτυχε
59^a24 ἔτυχε 60^b36 τὸ τυχόν
50^b36 ἡ τυχοῦσα ἡδονή 62^b13
τὰ τυχόντα 51^b13; 52^a35 οἱ
τυχόντες μῖθοι 53^a18
Τυδεὺς 55^a9
Τυρά 54^b25
ἀπὸ τύχης 52^a6 — opp. ἀπὸ τέχνης
54^a11

Υ 58^a16
ὑδαρῆ 62^b7
υἱός 53^b20, 21; 54^a6, 8; 55^b20
ἕμους 48^b27
ὑπάρχειν 50^b36; 52^a13; 60^b27; 62^a
14 ὑπάρχοντα 58^a27
ὑπεναντίος 61^b3, 23 τὰ ὑπεναντία
55^a26 ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα 61^b16
ὑπεναντίωμα 61^a32
ὑπερβάλλον 61^b34 — τινός 56^a7
— τινά 59^b16
ὑπερέχειν 61^b13
ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου 49^b13
ὑπέδειξεν 48^b37
ὑπόκειται 52^b1
ὑποκριτάς 61^b34 ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος,
πλήθη 49^a16, ^b5 ἄνευ ὑποκριτῶν
50^b19 ἓνα τῶν ὑποκριτῶν 56^a
26 τὸ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος 59^b26
διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς 51^b37
ὑποκριτικὴ 56^b10; 62^a5 ὑποκριτικά
57^a21
ὑπολαβεῖν 56^a25, ^b15; 61^a35
παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν 56^a15
ὑποτιθέναι ὀνόματα 51^b13; 55^b12

— ἦθος 54^a27 ὁ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑπο-
θῆται 61^b18
ὑστέρα 54^a33 οἱ ὑστεροὶ opp. οἱ
πρότερον 61^b33 ὑστερον opp.
πρότερον 60^a21 opp. πρὸ τοῦ
54^b4 χρόνον ὑστερον 55^b6
ὑφηρεμμένον ὄνομα 57^b2
φαγέδαινα 58^b23
φαίνεσθαι 52^b35; 53^a28; 56^b5, 8;
58^b11, 21; 59^a31, ^b34; 60^a15;
62^b6
φαλλικά 49^a11
φησί 56^b17; 61^a17 φαμέν 50^a1, 6
φασίν 48^a29, 36; 53^a13; 60^b10, 35;
61^a1, 28, ^b7, 14; 62^a3
φανερὸν 49^a14 φανερὰ 49^b35; 61^a
12 ἐν τῷ φανερῷ 52^b12
φαρμάκος 50^b2
φαῦλος 54^a21 — opp. καλός 48^b
26 — opp. σπουδαῖος 48^a2; 61^a
6 ἡ φαῦλον κίνησις 62^a9 φαῦλος
(opp. ἀγαθός) ποιητής 51^b36; 60^b
1 — αὐλητής 61^b30 — (opp.
ἐπικεικός) θεατής 62^a4 φαῦλη (opp.
σπουδαία) τραγωδία 49^b18 — (opp.
χρηστῆ) προαίρεσις 54^a19 φαῦλον
(opp. χρηστὸν) ἦθος 54^a19 μίμη-
σις φαυλοτέρων 49^a32
φέρειν ἐπιτιμήματα 56^b14; 61^b22
ἐνεργεῖν 54^b36
φεύγειν opp. προαιρεῖσθαι 50^b9 (2), 10
φθαρτικόν 49^a32 πράξις φθαρτικῆ ἢ
ὀδυνηρά 52^b11
Φθιώτιδες 56^a1
φιάλῃ 57^b20 + ^b32
φιλάνθρωπον 52^b38; 53^a2; 56^a21
φιλία opp. ἔχθρα 52^a31 ἀγνωρι-
σαι φιλίαν 53^b31 ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις
53^b19
Φιλοκτήτης 59^b5; 58^b22
Φιλόξενος 48^a15
φίλοι opp. ἐχθροί 53^a38, ^b15
φιλοσόφοις 48^b13 φιλοσοφώτερον
51^b5
Φινεΐδα 55^a10
φλόγα σπείρειν, ἀφίνα 57^b27, 30
τὸ φοβερὸν opp. τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον
53^b9 τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἔλεινόν
53^b1 φοβερά καὶ ἔλεινά 52^a2,
^b32 οὔτε ἔλεινόν οὔτε φοβερὸν
53^a1, 6
φύβος 52^a26; 56^b1 dist. ἔλεος
53^a5 ἀπὸ ἔλέου καὶ φόβου 53^b12
δι' ἔλεον καὶ φόβου 49^b27 ἢ
ἔλεον ἔχειν ἢ φόβον 52^b1 οὔτε
ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον ἔχειν 53^a4
φοροῦσι 54^b22

Φορκίδες 56^a 2
 Φόρμος 49^b 6
 φορτική (μίμησις) 61^b 27, 29; 62^a 4
 φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν 53^b 5
 φροισασάμενος 60^a 10
 φρόνιμος 61^b 18
 φύλακας 61^a 11
 πέφυκε 50^a 1, 2^b 28, 29; 56^b 23; 57^a 5
 πεφυκυῖα 57^a 2, 9 πεφυκότες 48^b 22
 ἐφύοντο 61^a 24
 φυσικόν 47^b 16 αἰτία φυσικαί 48^b 5
 φυσιολόγον 47^b 19
 φύσις. αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις 49^a 24; 60^a 4 κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος 51^a 10 κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν 49^a 4 κατὰ φύσιν 47^a 12; 48^b 20 διὰ φύσιν 51^a 24 ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως 55^a 30 ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν 49^a 15
 φωνὴ ἀκουστή 56^b 27, 28 — συνετή 56^b 23 — ἀδιαίρετος 56^b 22, 24 — συνθετή 56^b 35; 57^a 10 + — ἀσημος 56^b 35 + — σημαντική 57^a 1 + φωνὴν ἔχον 56^b 29, 30 ἐκ πλείονων φωνῶν 57^a 2 + διὰ τῆς φωνῆς μιμείσθαι 47^a 20 κερκίδος φωνή 54^b 37
 φωνῆεν 56^b 25; 58^a 1, 11, 15

χαίρειν 48^b 8, 11, 15
 Χαιρήμων 47^b 21; 60^a 2
 χαλεπαίνει 55^a 32
 χαλκίας 61^a 29
 χάλκεον ἔγχος 61^a 33
 χαλκόν 58^a 29 χαλκῶ 57^b 13, 14
 χαριζόμενοι 60^a 18
 χειμαζόμενος 55^a 31 χειμασθεῖς 55^b 21
 χειμαίνει 55^a 31
 χείρων 54^a 21 — opp. βελτίων 48^a 4 +; 53^a 17, 33; 62^a 4 — opp. κρείττων 48^a 6 χείρον (adv.) opp. βέλτιον 54^b 26 χείριστον 53^b 38
 χείρισται 51^b 34
 Χιωνίδης 48^a 34
 Κοιφόρους 55^a 4
 χορηγίας δεόμενον 53^b 8
 χορικόν 52^b 16, 22 χορικά μέλη 52^b 21

χορός 49^a 17, 11; 52^b 19 +; 56^a 25
 χρήματα 55^b 19
 χρήσιμα 59^a 11
 χρῆσθαι (said of persons) 47^b 24; 49^a 22; 50^a 13; 52^b 14, 26; 54^b 21, 26; 56^b 3; 57^a 12, 3, 13, 30; 58^b 11, 14, 33; 59^a 5, 13, 35, 13; 61^b 20 — (said of things) 47^a 23, 11; 50^a 32, 33; 58^a 2, 22; 62^a 15 — καλῶς 53^b 25 — βέλτιον ἢ χείρον 54^b 26 χρῆστέον 54^b 3
 χρῆστός 54^a 20 χρῆσθῆ προαίρεσις 54^a 19 χρῆστὸν ἦθος 54^a 17 +
 χροιάν 48^b 19
 χρόνος παρὼν, παρεληλυθός 57^a 18 — ἀναίσθητος 50^b 39 ἐνὸς χρόνου 59^a 23 περὶ ἓνα χρόνον 59^b 1 ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις 59^a 28 κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους 59^a 25 ἀόριστος τῶ χρόνῳ 49^b 14 κεκραμένον τῶ χρόνῳ 62^b 2 χρόνῳ ὕστερον 55^b 6 ἄνευ χρόνου 57^a 11 μετὰ χρόνου 57^a 14
 χρώμασι μιμείσθαι 47^a 18
 χυδῆν 50^b 2
 χύων 55^b 4
 κευχωρισμένα (μέρη) 52^b 16, 27
 χωρίς 47^a 23; 49^b 25, 29 χωρίς ἀρμονίας 47^a 26

τὸ Ψ 58^a 10, 13
 ψέγουσι 58^b 5
 ψευδάγγελος 55^a 14
 ψευδῆ λέγειν 60^a 19
 ψεύδος 60^a 22, 23
 ψιλομετρία 48^a 11
 ψιλοῖς (λόγοις) 47^a 29
 ψιλότητι 56^b 32
 ψόγος 48^b 27, 37
 ψυχαγωγεί 50^a 33
 ψυχαγωγικόν 50^b 17
 ψυχῆ 60^a 25 οἶον ψυχῆ 50^a 38
 ψυχῆν ἀρῆσας 57^b 14

Ω 58^a 12
 ὠδί 61^a 34, 35
 ὠσπερανεί 60^b 8



INDEX TO THE COMMENTARY

The references are to the marginal numbers, the first two figures of which are here omitted.

- Accent 56^b 33
 Adjectives compounded with a privative ambiguous 50^a 25; 60^b 32
 — some with two terminations in Aristotle 54^a 29
 Adscripts in the text 50^b 16; 54^b 14; 55^b 7
 Agathon 56^a 18
 Apollonius Rhodius 59^b 19
 Archilochus 48^b 33
 Archinus 56^b 31
 Aristotle, overstatements in 47^b 22
 — his condemnation of τὸ μαρὸν in Tragedy 54^a 4
 — his view of the evolution of the Drama 49^a 11, 19
 — his view of the peripety of the Oed. Tyr. 52^a 25
 — Passages in Pol. and Rhet. emended: 50^b 19; 52^b 19; 56^b 30; 58^a 25, 29
 ‘Art for Art,’ an idea not sanctioned by Aristotle 60^b 14
 Article, concurrence of identical forms of 56^a 8
 — possessive sense of 49^b 27
 — with names of dramatis personae 54^a 30
 — with titles of plays and books 48^b 38
 Barbarism and Solecism 58^a 30
Carpentariana quoted 55^a 29
 Casaubon quoted 53^a 18
 Chaeremon’s *Centaur* 47^b 21
 Cleophon 48^a 12
 Comparisons, binary structure with 60^b 34
 — inversion of terms in 59^a 21
 Comedy, names in 51^b 13
 Cupping-glass, the brazen 58^a 29
 Diderot quoted 51^b 6
 Dithyramb and Nome of Aristotle’s time 47^a 14
 Ellipse of εἶναι 59^b 7; 60^b 10; 61^b 9
 Ellipse of ἦ 60^b 21
 — of subject in nom. sing. 57^b 18
 — of subject with gen. abs. 49^b 26; 61^b 29
 — other forms of 53^b 17; 54^a 1; 61^b 18
 Empedocles 47^b 18; 57^b 13; 61^a 24
 Epicharmus 48^a 33, 34
 Euclides 58^b 7
 Euripides 50^a 25, 28; 53^a 24, 29; 54^b 2; 56^a 27; 59^b 17; 61^b 21
 Eustathius emended 59^a 37
Fallacia consequentis 60^a 20
 Fear, in the Rhetoric and Poetics 52^b 32
 ‘Figures of speech’ of later writers 56^b 9
 Gender of words 58^a 8
 General Terms used in a special sense 47^a 29
 Genitive depending on a genitive coming after it 52^b 7
 Glaucón 61^b 1
 Grammar and Poetry 56^b 20
 History in Aristotle’s view a sort of chronicle 51^a 36; 59^a 23
 Homer 48^b 35, 37; 60^a 5
 — Aristotle’s text of 58^b 25; 61^a 3, 16, 22, 26
 Hyperbaton 49^b 23
 Illustrations at some distance from the statement illustrated 50^a 34; 51^a 2; 56^a 12; 62^b 7
 ‘Imitators’, in the Poetics sometimes the poets and sometimes the actors 48^a 23
 Jones (H. A.) quoted 50^a 15
 Language of Tragedy in Aristotle’s time 59^a 13
 Lessing 47^a 19; 49^b 27 (pp. 156, 160); 52^b 32

- Literary whole: analogy between it and a living creature 50^b34
 Longinus 55^a34; 58^a24; 59^b15
 Lyric poetry ignored in the Poetics 47^a8
- Margites, original form of 48^b30
 Megarian Comedy 48^a31
 Menander's mode of working 53^a22
 Metre, importance of, minimized by Aristotle 47^b11
 Metric, ancient 56^b34, 38
 Music, Plato's view of instrumental 47^a15
- Names of dramatis personae 51^b10, 13, 21
 Names of personages meant supposed by Aristotle to be known to us 60^a30
 Names: triple compounds not unknown in Athens in Aristotle's age 57^a35
 Neuter nouns, Aristotle's view of the 58^a9, 16
 Number: singular and plural in juxtaposition 53^a33; 56^b1
- Parallelism antithetic 47^a18; 48^a22; 59^a21; 60^a11
 Parenthesis giving a reason for something after it 57^b34
 'Parts of Speech' 56^b20
 Plutarch emended 49^b25, 27 (p. 157)
 Poet, meaning of the term 47^b22
 Poetic imagination and its physiological conditions 55^a32 sqq.
 Poetry: the two causes to which its birth is attributed 48^b4
 Polyphemus in literature 48^a15
 Pope quoted 50^a25; 55^a29
 Porphyry emended 54^b2
 Preposition not repeated 48^a10; 59^b29
 Prose poem: an idea unknown to the Greeks of Aristotle's age 47^a28
- Protagoras 56^b11, 16; 58^a8
 Pseudo-Sergius emended 56^b33
- Qualification introduced in subordinate clause with *ὡσπερ* 53^b28
 Quintilian emended 58^a30
- Reading play, idea of a, not in Aristotle 62^a12
 Repetition of the same word not always avoided 53^a31
 Rhythm significant of character 47^a26
- Shakespeare quoted 49^b25
 Sophron and Xenarchus, the mimes of, in prose 47^b10
- Telephus 60^a32
Tennes = Greek *ψιλά* 56^b32
 Theatrical terms already current in Aristotle's time 49^b33
 — used in a more general sense 53^b8
 Theophrastus 49^b27 (pp. 157 sq.); 61^b12, 30
 Timotheus 48^a15; 54^a31
 Twining's summary of the history of the Chorus 56^a29
- Unities, the Three, how far recognized by Aristotle 49^b13
 'Universality,' the element of, in Greek Tragedy 51^b6
- Verb in singular with plural subjects 58^b1
 — understood in the principal from a subordinate clause
- Women, Aristotle's estimate of 54^a21, 24
 Wordsworth quoted 55^a29
- Zeuxis 61^b12
 Zoilus 60^b6
-
- ἀγών* and its derivatives, sense of, in the Poetics 50^b18
αἰδής = *δυσαιδής* a late word 58^b25
ἀναγνωρίζειν 52^b5; 55^b21
ἀριθμοί = 'heads enumerated' 61^b24
ἁρμονία 47^a22; 49^a27
αὐτοσχεδιάματα 48^b23
- γελοία*, Aristotle's idea of 49^a34
- δέ* after a participial clause 55^b21
διά 51^b13
διάνοια 50^a6
διαφέρει, construction with 52^a20
- εἶδος*, a 'formative constituent' 49^a7
 — allusive use of 49^b25
εἴρηται 52^b11

- ἐνδέχεται with verb understood from context 60^a 34
- ἐνοι, appositional use of 51^a 18
- ἐπεισθῶν 51^b 34; 52^b 20
- ἐπειτα corresponding to a πρῶτον μέν at some distance 62^a 14
- ἔστιν ὡς 52^a 35
- εὐφρησίας, εὐφρία 55^a 32; 59^a 7
- ἔχειν, κεχρησθαι 50^a 12
- ἡδυσμένος 49^b 25
- ἡθικός 50^a 29
- ἦθος, a character 54^a 23
- ἦ ὡς 61^a 35
- θεατής 53^a 27; 61^b 28
- θέατρα, audientes 53^a 34
- ἰδέα, allusive use of 50^b 34
- ἴσως 56^a 8
- κάθαρσις : objective gen. after it 49^b 27 (p. 156)
- καθόλου 49^b 8; 51^b 7
- καί giving emphasis 52^a 3
- Κεφαλῆνες, orthography of 61^b 6
- κινεῖσθαι as a term of surgery 51^a 34
- Κλυταιμνήστρα, orthography of 53^b 23
- κωμωδός, meaning of the term in Aristotle's time 49^b 1 [comp. J. B. O'Connor, Chapters in the history of Actors and Acting in ancient Greece.—Chicago, 1908]
- λέξις, the spoken language 59^a 12
- λόγος, meanings of, in the Poetics 49^a 17
- as a term of Aristotelian logic or grammar 56^b 38 (p. 270)
- μείωρος, orthography of 62^b 6
- μέν solitarium 50^a 3; 62^b 5
- μιμῆσθαι, uses of the term 47^a 16
- μίμησις : Vahlen's view of its sense in the Poetics 51^b 28
- οἶον with a second instance and a change of construction 54^b 25
- formal incongruence not uncommon with instances introduced by οἶον 56^a 2
- illustrations introduced by οἶον often at some distance from the statement illustrated 51^a 2
- οἶον καί introducing a parallel 50^a 37
- ὁμοίως representing the apodosis of a conditional sentence 47^b 20
- ὄνομα a wide term in Aristotle 57^a 10
- ὄπως with fut. indic. as an imperative 55^b 13
- ὀρχηστικός : meaning of this and similar terms in the Poetics 49^a 23
- ὄψις 49^b 33
- πάλαι in back-references 54^a 9
- πέφυκεν as an impersonal 50^a 1
- προσφθία 61^a 21, 23
- πτῶσις : no modern equivalent for it as used by Aristotle 57^a 18
- ῥυθμός 47^a 22, 27
- συνιστάναι with a predicative adj. after it 59^a 18
- ὑποκριτής 49^a 15
- ψυχή, metaphorical use of 50^a 38
- ὥστ' οὐ, constructions with 51^b 23

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