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CONFERENCE

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Berkeley, California
energy at our command. His weapons have been those of the lawyer; his normal opposition, the apathy of legislatures and the inflexibility of courts. A graduate of Harvard Law School, in 1904, he was for ten years a practicing lawyer in Chicago before he stepped into the national spotlight as Chief Counsel for the Railway Unions in the Federal Government Injunction Suit of 1922. Later, he was to co-author the Railway Labor Act passed by Congress in 1926 and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933; his ideas contributed much to the genesis of the Federal Trade Commission, the Clayton Act, and the Child Labor Amendment. Under the late President Roosevelt, he served as Chairman of the National Recovery Administration Board in 1935, setting forth the legal principles underlying the philosophy of the N.R.A., and winning fame as a defender of the cause of social and economic justice. Indeed, he has been called Labor's most effective legal champion in all its history.

It gives me pleasure, therefore, to present Mr. Donald R. Richberg, a distinguished attorney of Chicago and Washington, D.C., now, in a manner of speaking, retired from public life.

Mr. Richberg!

...Loud applause...

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Donald R. Richberg, Co-author,
Railway Labor Act of 1926 and
National Industrial Recovery
Act; Chairman, National Recovery
Administration Board, 1935.

MR. RICHBERG: Thank you, Dr. Sproul.
Dr. Spruol, ladies and gentlemen. I am moved by a headline in today's papers to recount a little incident in my life in connection with a man quite well known to fame: Mr. John L. Lewis.

I had many associations over many years with Mr. Lewis and at times I may have been of quite considerable service to him, although never professionally employed. But I remember one time when I was in the public service when I incurred Mr. Lewis' extreme displeasure. In fact, certain legal principles which I gave as counsel for the NIRA at that time were very offensive to Mr. Lewis, and in his customary "restrained and moderate" language, he issued a statement to the press in which he said "(I had) betrayed Labor and turned against the breast that (had) suckled (me)."

I was not entirely familiar with that location, but I thought I understood what Mr. Lewis meant!

I restrained a natural inclination to make any answer for quite a time, and one day a few weeks later I happened to be going in to see the President when Mr. Lewis was coming out. We met in the office of dear old Secretary McIntyre. I said as Mr. Lewis was coming out, "John, I don't know why you got so irritated about my opinions a few weeks ago." And he looked at me with considerable surprise and he put his arm around my shoulders in a most affectionate way and he said, "Why, Don, there was nothing personal in that!"

If I find at the present time that I must say some things that sound a little unkind about some very good friends of mine with whom I have worked in what I thought was a common cause many
times, I hope you will all understand that there is "nothing personal" in what I say!

It was nearly fourscore and seven years after the election of Abraham Lincoln when we found ourselves as we are today: facing the problem again as to whether any nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created free and equal... can long endure."

An irreconcilable conflict between free labor and slave labor brought about, and was ended by, a civil war. The subjection of workers to the political-economic tyranny of employers was made unlawful in the United States. But today there is a new and growing tyranny of labor organizers and labor politicians—a rapidly expanding laborarchy—that seriously threatens the endurance of a nation conceived in liberty.

This is my short answer to the question: "What is the extent of the public interest in labor disputes?" There is, of course, an unending public concern with all controversies which threaten either to disturb the peace and good order of society or to bring injuries and suffering to innocent people. The progress of civilization has been achieved primarily by establishing peaceful procedures for the settlement of domestic conflicts, and by requiring all citizens to submit their unsettled disputes to the compulsory arbitration of public officials and to refrain from trying to settle them by the compulsory arbitration of private force. That sort of compulsory arbitration we call "the administration of justice".
The studies, the courage and the toil of scientists and philosophers would have been largely in vain if a social intelligence and idealism had not created systems and mechanisms of law and an orderly society within which free men could seek and gain the rewards of service to others. Materialistic, commercial-minded men are inclined to forget that their liberty of self-advancement is only preserved by our society because of the idealistic theory that in a free economy private gain is the just reward for a service to others. If it were regarded as right for the strong to oppress and exploit the weak, why should we have policemen and courts? Why should we protect any liberty except the anarchistic freedom of the brutal, the ruthless and the cunning to compel gentler, kinder and finer men and women to serve them?

The Pharoahs, the Caesars, the feudal lords, the brigands and slave drivers have been brushed aside, as political idealists have organized popular governments and a public police to maintain the greatest possible freedom for all and to defeat and to repress those private armies that are always being organized to obtain the greatest possible freedom and power for a few.

But, unhappily, the same individualism which makes men willing to die for liberty, makes them also hostile to those restraints upon their individual freedom which are necessary to preserve the freedom of others.

The successful businessman, having used his competitive freedom to defeat competitors, becomes a would-be monopolist,
seeking to dictate prices to consumers and wages to labor, inspired by a lofty confidence in the benevolence of his intentions, the rightness of his judgments and the justice of his rewards.

The successful politician, having used his political freedom to defeat his opponents, becomes an autocrat, seeking to perpetuate his dynasty, confident that, in its purposes, its methods and its wisdom it will surmount all previous records of public service.

The successful labor organizer, having used economic and political freedom to defeat all opposing tyrannies, becomes a labor monopolist aiming at the centralized control of all labor, all wages, all production and inevitably all prices, exalted by the strange delusion that a ruling class of labor politicians—a laborarchy—will be less destructive of individual liberty and more productive of mass security and prosperity than any previous breed of tyrants.

If these labor leaders, and the self-proclaimed liberals who give them unquestioning support, were genuine libertarians, they would be ardently demanding the enactment of laws to provide for the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes. Every true liberal must know that only by the establishment of an administration of justice under law can the liberties of the masses and the liberties of the individual be maintained.

Controversies between individuals or between groups, which threaten injury to others, and particularly those which are injurious to the community, must be settled voluntarily or by the
intervention of public authority. That political principle must
be enforced, with no exceptions for persons or classes, if the
idealisms of individual liberty, of equal justice under law, and
of government by the consent of the governed, are to be sustain-
ed. In a word, the ways and means for the peaceful settlement
of industrial disputes must be created and maintained by law, if
this nation, "conceived in liberty," is to endure.

Let me make it quite plain at the outset that I do not pro-
pose to argue with those who question or deny the idealisms which
are fundamental to our form of government. Nor do I propose to
argue with irresolute, confused and timid reformers who are
afraid to have the government, which represents all the people,
assert the supremacy of public force over the private forces
which are organized to advance the special interests of one eco-
nomic class of people.

There are those who honestly fear a strong government. In
this day when individual man-power has become so gigantic that a
few ruthless men might wipe out a great city, there are still
backward-looking people who chatter incoherently about the best
government being the least government. There are still political
imbeciles who think it is safer to leave labor dictators like
John L. Lewis free to force the nation to submit to the demands
of private interest, than to empower the government to force Lew-
is and his followers to submit to the demands of the public
interest.

But, enough time has been wasted in futile debating with the
conscious and unconscious enemies of our society. It is now the time for action by men and women who retain faith in our institutions and whose vision has not been impaired by ignorant prejudice or learned petit-pointing. It is the time for discussing, not whether the lawless campaigns of labor unions against the general welfare shall be stopped, but what is the wisest, most effective procedure for stopping them.

Therefore, we must reject at the outset the counsel of those who are ever ready to palsy the strong arm that is raised to check or to punish the evildoer. There is a beautiful appeal to our finer feelings in the argument that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and that we should return good for evil and that human beings should be persuaded to do right and not forcibly prevented from doing wrong.

In truth, a beautiful, appealing argument can be made in favor of abandoning all attempts to govern people by organized public force—an argument in favor of a universal effort to accept the Sermon on the Mount as a political constitution. However, it is well to recall that He who delivered the Sermon scourged the moneychangers from the Temple and vigorously announced that He had come, not to bring peace but a sword for the destruction of evil.

It is also well to remember that, throughout the world and within our own borders, every existing civilization has been founded and developed under the protection of publicly-controlled force designed ostensibly for the advancement of the common good.
Fascism and Communism give examples of the oppressive and selfish uses of political power, offsprings of the military tyrannies of bygone ages. But all the potential evils of centralized power are a lesser menace to our society than the anarchy of a continuing warfare for private gain between factions and classes and individuals unrestrained by any legal obligations to protect and to promote the general welfare.

So let us begin our search for a new labor law, however, with a clear understanding that we are seeking to preserve a free economy, liberty of contract and a competitive regulation of wages, prices and production. We are not seeking, but we are resolved to escape from, that political regulation of industry which is the objective of those modern radicals who are ready to sacrifice individual liberty to gain an illusory security. Unless we have lost faith in our long-accepted national ideals we must rely fundamentally on the voluntary agreements of free men for the fixing of wages and prices and for arranging the terms on which they will work together or exchange their products. We must not encourage or require the compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes, except as a last resort and a necessary defense against lawless injuries to the general welfare.

We are seeking to find a way for the peaceful and just settlement of economic conflicts of interest without permitting any private monopolist to exploit us for selfish purposes or any public authority to regiment us into the service of even an evangelistic ruling class.
The first step in reestablishing competition and voluntary agreements as the regulators of industry is to outlaw the organization and coercive operation of labor monopolies that are now legalized by federal law. In the early days, when labor unions were struggling for existence against big business organizations which created practical monopolies of employment, it seemed reasonable and desirable to free the unions from the restraints of the anti-trust laws. To legalize labor combinations in restraint of trade appealed to many as the logical way to combat big business monopolies whose control of the labor market appeared to be also legalized.

In recent years, federal law has favored the growth of labor monopolies, not only by special privileges and immunities conferred upon labor unions, but also by special restraints imposed on management. Under this political favoritism we have made lawful the stifling of competition and the domination of industry by labor organizations unrestrained by any legal obligation even to avoid needless, wilful and intolerable injuries to millions of helpless, innocent people. And this has been pointed out very bluntly by the Supreme Court in many recent cases.

We are indeed fortunate that more serious harm has not been done by our toleration of these anti-social conspiracies which have been legalized. A certain amount of foresight, and a well-grounded fear of public resentment, have restrained a great many powerful unions from the full use of their extraordinary privileges. The ambitions of many labor bosses have also been
moderated by rivalries between unions, by the menace of unorga-
nized workers, and by the uncertainty of their control over mas-
ses of undisciplined and unwilling followers who have been con-
scripted into the closed shop unions which they would not volun-
tarily support.

Yet, despite these weaknesses in labor unions, which have
newly come into their monopolistic powers, they have made it evi-
dent in the past year (in the one year of 1946 it has been made
very clearly evident) that we have been nourishing the growth of
economic monsters that are capable of vast destruction. Even be-
fore they have reached maturity they have shown that they are
able and willing to rule or ruin our commerce and are able and
willing to paralyze our industries to achieve their selfish aims.
We have ample evidence that these economic monstrosities can, by
industrial paralysis render the government itself impotent to
protect the American people at home or to serve them faithfully
in international relations. I hate to think of the harm that has
been done to our international relations by the industrial war-
fare of the past eighteen months.

Such a private power cannot be successfully regulated. It
cannot be tolerated. It must be destroyed.

The creation or operation of a labor organization which is
capable of dominating the commerce of the nation, or of a com-
munity, in any industry of public concern, must be made unlawful;
and the law must be enforced by the full use of all the powers of
government. That is the first step in the protection of the
public interest against the evils that have arisen and will con-
tinue to arise out of unsettled labor disputes.

The destruction and prevention of labor monopolies must not, however, bring about the destruction or crippling of labor unions in their useful efforts to protect and promote the welfare of the wage earners in a free, competitive economy. Big business has not been destroyed by anti-monopoly laws. Nor is it any answer to assert falsely that the anti-trust laws have not been enforced. They have been enforced; and the labor unions are the loudest advocates of more and stricter enforcement. They agree that business is made more healthy and the people more prosperous by the destruction of monopolistic controls. Yet the most vicious and injurious monopoly controls over business that are in effect today are those which are maintained by labor unions, alone or in conspiracy with employers.

Labor monopolies, like all other private monopolies are indefensible. The wage earners themselves will be the first to profit by their destruction.

But, when the government takes away from labor unions the monopolistic power to enforce good wages and working conditions it must give the workers some other assurance that they can obtain economic justice. They must not be left unprotected against cut-throat competition or the oppression of mean and hard employers. The power of organized money to dictate terms to helpless workers must not be reestablished. The long and sordid record of industrial greed and cruelty warns us against any lazy, or shall
I say, laissez faire, solution of our problem. And here I may
say that I am speaking from something over forty years of experi-
ence fighting this battle in behalf of workers.

And so it becomes the duty of the government to establish
peaceful procedures upon which both employers and employees can
rely for a prompt and just settlement of their differences. This
does not mean the creation of labor courts to which disputes must
be submitted for compulsory decision. Such a procedure would
mean the end of collective bargaining and voluntary agreements.
It would mean more and more governmental control of wages, pro-
duction, and then prices—and thus, inevitably, bring about a
politically-regulated economy.

The object of our new labor law must be to keep open the way
to genuine collective bargaining and to require both employers
and employees to use and to exhaust all possible means of reach-
ing voluntary agreements before taking any aggressive action
against each other. We have had a law on the books for nearly
twelve years which has required employers to bargain collective-
ly; but the Wagner Act has left the unions free to attack without
warning or good cause—a freedom which has been outrageously
abused. Isn't it about time to require the unions also to make
an honest effort to preserve the peace before starting a civil
war?

The law furthermore should require employers and employees,
involved in disputes, which are of public concern, to refrain
from aggression until public representatives have had a fair
opportunity to induce an agreement, either by mediatory persuasion or by an impartial investigation and a public report upon the controversy. It has been conclusively proved by over twenty years' experience under the Railway Labor Act that these legalized procedures will assure the peaceful settlement of the vast majority of industrial disputes.

Since I find even in educated audiences such a complete ignorance on the subject of what the Railway Act has done, I merely call your attention to the record of the fifteen years prior to the outbreak of the war during which uncounted thousands of disputes were settled by agreement, and out of something over three thousand that finally went into mediation, something like a third was settled by mediation agreement and something like a thousand were settled in other ways and something like five hundred were settled by voluntary arbitration, and only twenty-six reached the final stage of an emergency board, the recommendations of which in every case were accepted. And so you have a practically strike-less record. And that is a record that has not been matched under any industrial relations law in this or any other country.

I do not wish to bore you with any more statistics, but you can investigate and find the facts if you are interested.

It should not be necessary to spend the next year or two convincing the Congress that this Act of 1926 has been the only labor relations legislation in American history that has promoted and preserved industrial peace. Also, lengthy arguments should not be needed to convince any intelligent person that peace in
one industry cannot be indefinitely preserved, even by a sensible law, if industrial warfare is to be legalized and encouraged in every other industry. But it does seem necessary to point out that those who in recent years have been working night and day to discredit the Railway Labor Act include all the trouble-making elements in America, from the avowed Communist who are the professional enemies of industrial peace, on through the labor racketeers, the fellow travelers, and other misguided liberals, and—last but not least—those academic perfectionists who think that expounding petty criticisms and untested theories gives better evidence of scholarship than drawing practical conclusions from practical results. (Laughter and applause)

I have to pay a tribute to some of my old professors! (Laughter)

To those who are honestly seeking a way to industrial peace, the path is not obscure. Study the Railway Labor Act and the extraordinary record of its successful operation. Revise it so as to correct weaknesses that have developed and so as to apply its principles to the problems of other industries that are fundamentally the same but different in detail. Then, by the passage of a comprehensive Federal Industrial Relations Act (following the pattern of the Railway Labor Act) establish the ways of peace in all industries subject to national regulation and establish the legal obligation of employers and employees to make every reasonable effort to preserve the peace. Thus, at long last, we may seriously undertake our long-neglected task of
civilizing our industrial relations. And to the "doubting Thomas" let me point out that the establishment of the obligation upon employers and employees to preserve the peace which was successfully used in the railroad industry was not the result of any extraordinary peaceful, beautiful situation in the railroad industry, because it happened to be one of the worst strike-torn industries in the country at the time the act was passed. And it was not the result of the fact that there were a lot of fine, strong unions in the railroad industry, because as a matter of fact, there were a great many unions fighting for their lives in the railroad industry and many crafts that were very inadequately organized. So all the beautiful arguments that you will hear from time to time as to the reasons why the Railway Labor Act philosophy can not be applied to other industries break down upon facing them with the facts.

It must be admitted that the ending of labor monopolies and the reestablishment and enforcement of genuine collective bargaining will not insure the peaceful and just settlement of all labor disputes. There are profound economic conflicts in the interests of employers and employees which will lead from time to time to disagreements which can hardly be decided except by some form of coercion.

In the same way, there are other social conflicts which would lead to violence and a brutal decision if the modern state did not make the preservation of an orderly society more important than the liberty of an individual to fight out his quarrels
regardless of the injury done to others. But this is the law of the modern state; and so—-even a mother and father who have separated, with each wanting the custody of a child, must submit this controversy to the final and binding decision of public authority.

Can it be suggested that any issue of wages or working conditions is as important to a worker as would be the custody of his child? Can it be argued that although men and women are not permitted to use force to retain a child, or a wife or a husband, they should be permitted to wage civil warfare to decide whether a wage should be increased five cents or seven cents an hour—-or whether a worker should be paid for taking a bath, before or after going to work? (Laughter)

The proposition that economic justice cannot be obtained except by leaving men free to coerce and intimidate one another is absurd on its mere statement. If force must be the final arbiter of any dispute, then the underlying principle of a civilized society compels us to establish a public force controlled by a public law as the arbiter and to prohibit the use of private force and the application of any private law to dictate the decision.

Thus, by a logic that cannot be evaded, we come to our last resort for the settlement of an industrial dispute that cannot be left unsettled and that in its consequences deeply concerns the public interest. Such a dispute would be one which threatened to stop the production or distribution of an indispensable product. Our new labor law must provide for the creation of an impartial
tribunal for the decision of such an unsettled controversy. That decision must be written by law into the cooperative agreement of the parties so that they may continue to work together for mutual benefit and may continue their service to the society which is protecting their freedom and security.

Let it be emphasized again, however, that this use of compulsory arbitration must be made the exception and not the rule in the settlement of labor disputes. There must be no encouragement of management or labor to shirk responsibility and to blame their failures on public arbitrators, as lawyers often do when they lose cases which they should have settled without litigation.

For this reason there should be no permanent tribunal with open doors inviting quarrelsome persons into the judicial arena. The costs of litigating should be imposed on the parties in accordance with the reasonableness of their contentions and the time-saving efficiency of their presentations. The public arbitrators should be required to avoid any drastic changes in existing relations and should be restricted to the application of prevailing standards which have been established by voluntary agreements. The new conditions imposed should be made effective only for a sufficient period to provide a fair test of their justice. Finally, the public arbitrators should be required to avoid authorizing any changes in existing labor relations that might be detrimental to the interests of the consumers or to the general public interest.

By such limitations upon the authority of public arbitrators,
industrial disputants may be encouraged to settle their own disputes and to avoid the risks of an exterior decision which may be very disappointing. Most important of all, these discouraging restrictions will assure the fixation of wages and working conditions generally by voluntary agreements which will establish prevailing standards which public arbitrators can apply in the exceptional cases submitted to them. Thus the dangers of political wage-fixing will be largely avoided.

You have been very patient. There are a multitude of problems presented by industrial disputes in which the public interest is deeply involved. There should be no attempt to solve all these problems by legislation—-not even by laws giving administrative commissions the authority to bless or curse management and labor with paternalistic controls! To preserve a free economy we must be as vigilant against nourishing political overlords as against tolerating economic monopolists.

But, to sum it up, let me say, It is the function and duty of a government, organized to preserve freedom and to protect the general welfare, to maintain the supremacy of public law and order. It is the duty of such a government to destroy or else rigidly to control any private organization that is being used or may be used to deprive citizens of their liberties or of their protections from wanton or deliberate injury. This duty our federal government and our state governments have long neglected. No public official who is willing to continue this evasion of responsibility and this violation of his own oath of office, is
worthy of any further public confidence.

There is no partisanship in this assertion except a resolute and unqualified partisanship for the maintenance of self-government under the Constitution of the United States.

...Loud and sustained applause...

PRESIDENT SPROUL: In 1941, the United States of America was faced with the most fateful decision in its history -- the choice of immediate cooperation from within or immediate destruction from without. Our life as a nation hung in the balance. There is no need to tell you how magnificently the American people rose to the occasion. But it was given to one man in particular to see that their decision was carried out, and he, among others, did his job so successfully that the United States, within the short space of four years, became the most powerful military force the world has yet seen.

It is difficult even yet to measure this tremendous achievement -- the transformation of a peaceful, non-militant nation into a great and bristling arsenal of defense and offense. But it is clear that to accomplish this, Labor and Management had to be united in one common front; all peacetime strains and fissions made obsolete; and the utmost gotten from everyone. All this, and in the shortest time possible, was done by the Chairman of the War Production Board and Office of Production Management, who is now President of the Independent Society of Motion Picture Producers. He is to be our next speaker. It is an honor to present to you the brilliant administrator, Mr. Donald Marr Nelson.
... Loud applause ...

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Donald N. Nelson, President, Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers; formerly Personal Representative of the President, and Chairman, War Production Board.

Mr. Nelson: Mr. President, Mr. Richberg, ladies and gentlemen.

President Sproul: Mr. Nelson.

Mr. Nelson: Don, you were certainly right about what you told me before dinner.

You know, he had the audacity to tell me that he was going to make his speech so strong that, no matter what I said, it would sound mild to you! (Laughter)

I call that an "unfair act". He started his talk by giving you a little word picture of John Lewis. I should like to give one.

I hope, Donald, he does not say to you what I heard him say once.

When I served my first term in government, it was in NRA and part of it under Don. He was a great boss, I can assure you of that, and very hard to disagree with. But this particular time we were having one of those forums which are very popular in Washington at times, and in which each party has a chance to come up to the stage to give his ideas. We had one day for Management when Management could come in and tell all about the administration of NRA and its importance, and so forth. Then
the next week, on the same day of the week, we had Labor to give its side.

We had a Labor Board, if you remember, Don, that was made up of some very fine men--mostly college men!--and they went to work to get up this program for Labor. Each was to prepare a paper.

So they started out. It went to the first paper and the second and the third, and John Lewis was to give the climax--a paper that summed it all up.

The first paper, as I remember it, was delivered by the International President of the Bartenders' Union. And he could not pronounce most of the words that were written!

It went on down through the whole gamut, and finally it came to John to sum up the whole program for Labor. He started out and read the first part of the paper very oratorically, and he began to slow down as he got into the speech. And finally, he took it dramatically in his hands, tore it up, threw it on the floor, and said, "Damn rot! Written by college boys!" (Laughter)

I can assure you that he was not in very much favor with the Labor Board of the NRA from that point on.

I do not believe it is very difficult to make a case that the public interest is very much involved and very much interested in all labor disputes. Certainly it is clearly apparent that in those disputes which threaten their very existence, such as in the mining of coal, in transportation of all kinds, in public utilities, the public is the innocent bystander and suffers more than either party to the dispute. And certainly in that case the
public is vitally interested.

If I know the public, and I think I do (I have dealt with them all my life, particularly in the Middle West and out here on the Coast where I am living), the public is getting pretty sick and tired of becoming involved in disputes out of which they see no way for themselves and it is going to insist, in my belief, without any question, that some form of mediation or arbitration or some compulsory form of settlement comes about so that they will not have their lives thrown topsy-turvy.

I know many labor leaders who I think are just as fine men as I know in management. (Laughter) I know some in management who I think are just as bad as some of the labor leaders I know. But I have been in hopes (maybe it was through my idealism) that intelligent labor in this country—and there is a lot of it—would know, as they ought to know, one basic fact about the American people which I think anybody who lives among the American people will recognize as a basic fact, and that is that they hate dictators. They will not stand for anybody in this country being so strong that they can rule their lives and make them do things which they think are not in their best interests.

I can assure you of that. It does not make any difference whether they are men of Management who they feel are too strong, men of Government, or men of Labor. And the one fear that I have, that I want to present to you tonight (it is a fear and a very acute one), is that the public opinion will get so aroused as a result of what it has seen going on, it will insist on labor
legislation that is too severe.

I do not believe that you can make it too severe. The Wagner Act and the way in which it was administered were too severe. The National Labor Relations Act could not last; it has to be modified.

You say, "Well, why do you say that?"

When I was serving this term in government in the early days, I got acquainted with most of the policy-makers. I knew them pretty well and I know their line of thought, and I can assure you that they thought that labor was abused in this country. It was browbeaten, it was downtrodden, and the only way it could get an advantage equal to that of organized management, as they saw it, was to give Labor special emphasis. As a matter of fact, I think if there is anything disorganized in this country, if you get to know it well, it is management and industry. I never saw any two industrialists who would say the same thing about the same thing, even in this labor situation.

At any rate, in order to bring up the power of labor to a point where they felt it was equal to management (and they felt that that was the only way that the economy could be properly run), they believed it would have to be given special emphasis. The Wagner Act was discussed pro and con and finally it was passed.

I have never believed (and there are many people in Management who do not agree with me and there are many people in Labor who do agree with me) that the Wagner Act in itself is so bad in
so far as what it says. But the way in which it was administered was bad. And anyone who knew the American people and knew this scene could tell early in the game that it was going to result in disaster.

I can recall to you, because I have never forgotten it, a luncheon in which four of us from Industry met with John Lewis and Sidney Hillman. We tried to show them all afternoon that the Wagner Labor Relations Act was being administered as partisanship. Not partisanship from the standpoint of Labor, mind you, but partisanship from the standpoint of the CIO, one branch of Labor. And you will find many people in the AFL who in those days were just as vehement against the way the Act was administered as were many from Management. We tried to get them to see that that Act, unfairly administered, would result in great harm to Labor.

Sidney saw it. He was a very smart, keen, alert fellow, and I think it is very bad for the labor movement, a great loss, that Sidney passed on. But John could not see it.

I should like to say this off the record.

(Remarks outside the record.)

Mr. NELSON: The principle of collective bargaining is a sound one. There must be collective bargaining. I think Management today comes to the conference table in collective bargaining much more open-minded than many men from Labor do. I have said before, and I repeat it because I think it is pertinent, that men of Industry have accepted collective bargaining. But what they do resent, and I think quite rightly, is collective
bullying.

Perhaps that is what you mean, Don, by "monopoly". I do not know. It certainly can not be when a party comes to the table, with the power to control the situation, and without any discussion demands a certain figure. To me that is not collective bargaining. Collective bargaining consists of two people, with open minds, sitting around the table listening to each other's reasons why certain things can or can not be done, and out of it trying to find something that will work for the common good of the employee, of the customer and of the employer.

Too often we lose sight of the fact that in this country less than a third of our population belongs to unions, a third of them are farmers, we will say very roughly, and a third of them are people who live on fixed incomes--school teachers, policemen, firemen, women, widows living on pensions, men living on pensions. I would not want these figures contested, because they are not exactly right.

This thing just can not be in the interest of the economy without deliberately inflating it, much in the manner of one of those ratchets that we have often seen. It is level here and then it moves up at this side, and then these people all suffer at a point where they can not begin to buy, and then something moves them up and then they move. At this point another person says: "Look! Our conditions are so bad that we can not allow our cost of living to go up further." It costs men to get their laundry done and their cleaning done and it costs more of
everything else in the community. Then it costs the farmer more for the things that he produces because he has to pay more for the things that he buys. It will be an endless ratchet, and it can not go on.

The public has to consider all these things of increased cost. This great, high cost of living of which we are so proud in this country, and it is so much ahead of everything that we have in the world, came through the desire of people to keep costs down—not as a result of wages paid. That is not the point at all. Wages and costs do not have the direct relationship if we produce more. But believe me! (and I may say it again and again while I am talking to you, because I believe it is just as fundamental as anything that I know of), you can not work less and produce less and at the same time expect to have a healthy economy. It is not a question of wages paid. It is a question of production.

There are all kinds of artificial restrictions on production which are put on today by unions. I was not able during the war to get all that I wanted, even in the interest of winning the war, and we are here today constantly thinking in terms of negotiating for less and less work and getting more and more pay. And it only results in higher and higher prices.

There is a relationship between wages paid, cost of goods produced, and profits and the cost at which things are sold. Our living standards in this country were brought about because industry and labor during a long period of time worked hard together to
bring things to lower prices, not at lower wages. Henry Ford
brought down the prices of automobiles and at the same time was
paying more in Detroit than any other automobile manufacturer.
But the people he got, appreciating the fact that they were ade-
quately paid, produced for Henry Ford and he produced a car which
the masses of the people could buy.

I could go on and give you instance after instance from my
own experiences as a merchant. The thing that we have to do in
this country to keep on improving the standards of living (and
to me that is the great strength of a democracy) is to produce
more and sell it for less and less all the time. And it can be
done. I have seen it done. Where there are no artificial restric-
tions it can and will be done.

It is amazing what Industry can do. I was out today at the
Cutter Laboratories. You know, penicillin was one of the things
that we had to produce very fast after it was once decided that
penicillin was a great wonder drug and could do wonders for the
soldiers and later for the civilians. We set about in WPB to get
the maximum amount of production. At that time it was selling
for about twenty dollars for 100,000 units, which were a normal
dose. Today they told me the price of penicillin had been reduced
to thirty-two cents for 100,000 units. They are working on ways
to produce more and more—not at less wages, but learning ways to
do it.

I believe that can be done, and I am not being idealistic in
that. I know from experience it can be done. But it has got to
be done with a will on both parties—a will on the part of Management and a will on the part of Labor to do it, and to sit around the table and find out how to do it, in the interest of Industry and in the interest of this country.

There never was a time when we, all of us, no matter who we are, should work as hard as we know how to maintain in this country a healthy capitalistic system. Call it "the American" system if you wish, or "free enterprise." I do not care what you call it, but it is at least that thing under which we are growing up, that has been kind to this nation, that has produced the kind of nation we love because we can afford to have those things that we call Liberty and Freedom. We may not agree with the ideas that others have of Liberty and Freedom. But I am not stressing that so much as I am the living standard of this country which is the envy of all of the whole world. And it was produced very largely by that combination: scientists, yes; engineers, yes; manufacturers; the working man, the employee. It was produced by that combination trying to find ways to get the things that the people wanted at a lesser cost so that they could have more of them.

Out of some thirty-five years of merchandising experience, I can assure you that, with the exception of very few things, the less people pay for them, the less for which they can buy them, the more you will produce. And what is it we are after? Better homes, yes; refrigerators; automobiles; better roads—everything that will keep on increasing this standard of living of ours. It has not reached a peak, but we can go even farther today in the
solution of this problem of living together, not alone Management and Labor living together, but all different nationalities living together and erasing that intolerance. And this labor dispute is a kind of intolerance on both sides often. But we have to erase that and prove that this system that we are living under, that has given us these living standards, is the best in the world.

If we go on with labor disputes of the kind that we have had, without some kind of way to have them settled, I can assure you they will do more harm to this country in convincing us that we need some other kind of system than the Communists of Russia can do from the outside. That is factual.

How do we go about doing it? Yes, I think the laws have to be revised. I think there has to be equality under the law. I think a law that is established in a democracy can not be a law that is one-sided, that protects one group and does not protect another. I do not mean by that when I say "protect," management. Management is pretty largely able to protect itself, but not without great conflicts.

I wish you would reread the opening preamble of the Wagner Labor Relations Act. Believe me, it was enacted to bring about peace. But because of one-sided administration, it has done the reverse.

Many laws that were passed by our Congress, particularly in the period from 1933 on, were acts that set up very broad general principles and they then turned over to the administrator the power to define what the Act really meant, and the administrator
promulgated regulations under the Act. And it is chiefly the regulations under the Act that have, in my opinion, brought about that almost unanimous feeling of both Management and Labor. Certainly it is true of that segment of labor that belongs to the A.F. of L, that the Wagner Labor Relations Act has to be overhauled. And I believe, in order to get rid of many of the bad regulations, it has to be overhauled.

I think there are other Acts that have to be revised in some way. And I am not one who believes in compulsion by law because it does not work unless people are for it. The law establishing Prohibition did not work because the people were not for it. And other laws that may be enacted may set certain standards, but they won't be enforced. We have acts of injunction today, but they are not enforced. Certainly in the southern part of this great State they have not been enforced because they can not be. In many of these things large numbers of people are involved and they intend to violate because they do not believe in them. The only way that I know that you can enforce them is with something like a concentration camp.

I have always been opposed to concentration camps, and when these compulsory labor laws came up during the war I fought them on the basis that they could only be enforced by concentration camps. The reason fundamentally I was opposed to a concentration camp is this: that we might be able to put the other fellow in today, but tomorrow I might be in there, and I would not like to set the precedent! (Laughter)
But certainly there are acts needed to set certain standards just as certain standards are set for Management, because we saw them violated by Management and we had to set up those Acts that require public accounting and an SPC to investigate to see that the accounting is correct and that right financial statements are issued by the company and that it did certain honest things—honest for the employees, the customers, and the stockholders. Management could not violate those standards.

In the same way, there have to be certain standards set up for the operation of a union. You can not have in a democracy little autocracies running all around themselves. It won't work. It just won't work.

The members of a union have to have more voice in the management of that union. I dislike to use the word "racketeers" but racketeers do get in. I saw them in Chicago. I was head of the Greater Chicago campaign at one time when we had to drive them out of unions in Chicago. But I do not say that that is true of all unions. Do not misunderstand me, because I believe in unions. I know that is an exceptional thing. But I think there are certain things concerning the operations of unions in which the employees who do belong should have a voice. I think that no strikes should be countenanced unless a strike vote has been taken—a secret strike vote—and that it be cast by a majority of the people who belong to the union. I saw one called just the other day when there were present in the hall only twenty per cent of the people in the Union, and it was called by a majority of the twenty per
I do not call that democratic. The others stayed away deliberately. They did not want to strike. Most of them went back to work in the next day or two because they did not want to strike. And still because twenty per cent were there and the majority of the twenty per cent said, "We will strike," all of them had to leave their jobs at least the first day, and then they began to trickle back. And then what happened? There began to be violence and some of the members who went back began getting arms broken and legs broken, and one fellow, an instructor in a certain very important plant down there who could train others to take jobs, got both arms broken, a leg broken, and his ribs fractured right out in front of the plant. And I had a firecracker bomb put in my own mailbox. I don't know why. I did not belong to the Union. I was just sitting looking on. But that is what the postal inspector said. Those are abuses that have to be corrected. There is no question about it.

I want to see this problem solved voluntarily, if possible, as Don said. I hope that it can be done voluntarily. But there have to be mechanisms set up that insure the peaceful collective bargaining of both Management and Labor. It is not enough to say to Management today, "You must bargain collectively."

There are all kinds of disputes. There are disputes for wages; there are disputes for working conditions, although not so many of them today; there are disputes for organization, and some of your real mean ones involve organization. You have had them
right here in your own town. You know a little bit of what I am talking about. And there are jurisdictional disputes.

Now, certainly in a jurisdictional dispute there can be no question but what there must be some way that that can be settled. There is no single mechanism that can settle a jurisdictional dispute if the two unions which are involved in it do not want to settle it, both of them being affiliated with the A.F. of L. It is happening in Los Angeles now, for nine months last year, another five months this year. And there is not a single mechanism provided. Believe me, I appealed to everybody, because it was costing us more money, it was interfering with production, and it was disastrous. I wired Mr. Schwellenbach, I wired Dr. Steelman, I wired the Governor, I wired the Mayor, I wired the A.F. of L., I wired John Lewis, and I wired everybody that I could. All that happened was that the Western Union got a little more money!

(Laughter)

I assure you, there has been no attempt to settle that strike. A fight has been going on between two members of the A.F. of L.

I do not speak of this because I am with Industry. I am not bringing to you one of my own troubles. I am only saying that jurisdictional disputes as such have no reason and no right and must be settled by some force if it will not be settled by the union itself. Sure it ought to be tried first. My record is clear. I tried. It can't be settled.

In these disputes a relatively small number of employees are
members of the union. The union calls them out and raises a picket line around the plant, and then everybody else runs out and will not observe it. Industry suffers and the public suffers.

For what? An organizational dispute. If a union is good and it is right (and I will say this to any union leader in the country), it ought to earn the people coming into it and not, by strike, force people to come into it. That is an obligation of any union. It is an obligation to prevent that sort of thing.

Why do I talk so earnestly about this? I am not anti-union. I believe in unions. I believe you have to have good organized unions where employees can band together for their common good and work in the interest of the industry. I should like to see, for example, public opinion directed at the abuses brought on by either Management or Labor so that the public can decide what ought to be done. That to me is the great thing of a democracy. But you try to get at the facts of any dispute. Try to read about it in the papers and try to get at the facts. Is it because the paper does not publish them, as we are told? No. The papers try to get the facts, but there are many red herrings drawn across the trail and pretty soon you do not even know what it is about, and neither does the employee. But still it goes on. That should not be. That can not be. There should be a way of getting public opinion to bear on these issues. I should like to see these panels in cities where the public has confidence in the membership of the panels find out the facts in incipient disputes and tell them to the people as fact and not as red herrings.
I want to see this thing settled. And why? I want to see this country keep on as a great industrial nation. It has a real competitor in this world today. I have been over to Russia twice, I have seen their factories; I have seen the incentive systems that they have to make people work. Some of them are voluntary systems that call for paying more money if they produce more; call for state decorations which they prize very much because it brings them more food and better clothing and better living conditions. There are all kinds of monetary and honorary inducements. But behind it all is the element of fear that if you don't do it, something will happen to you. And they try to bring the lower worker, the worker who produces less in Russia today, up to the average of the higher worker.

Russia is going to be an industrial competitor. And, Don, I am not predicting war. I don't know anything about that today. It is in the hands of God, I guess. But certainly Russia is an industrial competitor. They have factories, they know mass production, they are working hard, they have great engineers, they have great scientists, and they have great plant managers today because their plant managers live better than our plant managers, relatively. The plant manager of Magnitogorsk, where I stayed overnight, lived much better relatively than his employees than does Eugene Grace in comparison with his employees. I assure you of that. And Magnitogorsk is the big steel plant in Russia. I played billiards with him on his own billiard table.

But here in this country there is a tendency which I have
seen for a long time, and it must stop if we are to remain strong and virile, as strong and virile as we were when we came to fight the last war—a fight of which every American is proud because he had an industrial system made up of management that knew how to do it and did it, and made up of employees who knew how to do it and did it. But we have a little trouble, some exceptions that you may have read about. Ninety-five per cent of American workers, I will assure you, are just as fine people as you will ever find in this country. However, we have gotten into a system, I am afraid, which causes us to think in terms of "feather-bedding". It is a word that may be too technical. It is a system where you try to put more employees in the plant and bring down the production of the plant to the average or below instead of up to the top. You have to employ more people. And that is the basis of many disputes. A man may lay twelve or fourteen hundred bricks a day because he can and does it to give a good day's work and may want to. But he produces three hundred or four hundred because that is his day's work, in order that all of them should be employed. And that runs your costs up terrifically high.

I want to see industry remain strong and virile, because I think truly (and don't think in this that I am a pessimist), that at least one way to preserve peace is to be strong, to be so strong that people will fear to attack us.

That is not power politics. Don't get me into that discussion. I am not going to get onto it at all. It is not power politics about which I am talking at all. It is the ability of a
nation to protect itself if called upon, not to go around the
world waving and wagging its power and saying, "Here I am! You
can't lick me! I am going to do this!"

That is not what I am talking about. That is not it at all. And
that won't happen in the United States. But the fact that we
are a strong nation, the fact that we are building up our living
standards, the fact that we are outstripping the rest of the
world in the objectives of a democracy, namely, to provide a
better social life and better standards of living for more people
through working together to do it, always seemed to me to be the
best definition I can find of a democracy. That is why I come to
you and talk about those things that in my experience will help
make this situation better, because I am proud of this country.
It has been very good to me. I started out as a poor boy in the
country and was able to make a fair degree of success because of
the system under which we live. I want to see it continue; I
want to see it strong. If I keep emphasizing that, it is just
because I am so earnest and sincere about it.

Thank you.

... Loud and sustained applause ...

PRESIDENT SPROUL: In the tradition of our meetings on this
campus, outside the classroom, of course, I shall make no attempt
to tell this audience what it should think as a result of what it
has just heard. I shall merely arrogate to myself the privilege
of thanking both speakers, in your behalf as well as mine, for
the tone and quality of the discussion.
The meeting is adjourned.

...WHEREUPON, at 9:45 p.m., an adjournment was taken until 10:00 a.m., March 20 1947...
SECOND DAY -- THURSDAY MORNING SESSION

... The Thursday morning session of the First Annual Industrial Relations Conference of the Institute of Industrial Relations and University Extension, Berkeley Campus, University of California, convened in Room 113, Agriculture Hall, at 10:00 a.m.; Monroe W. Deutsch, Vice President and Provost, University of California, presiding ...

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT DEUTSCH: Ladies and gentlemen. As Provost of this particular Campus, I am very glad to join in the welcome extended to you last night by the President of the University. We are indeed grateful to the Governor and the Legislature for making it possible that the Institute of Industrial Relations be established at the University of California on its two main campuses. I hesitate to say whether either is to be regarded as the "right wing" and the other as the "left wing".

Certainly we all realize that two of the main problems involving the peace of the United States at this time lie in the field of international relations and the field of industrial relations, and conferences such as this in which representatives of
Labor and Management and the public meet together to express frankly their views on solutions of these problems are, of course, of primary importance. Saying that is, of course, "bringing coals to Newcastle".

I have always been much impressed by the phrase in the Preamble of the Constitution which declares that one of the main purposes in setting up our government is to promote the general welfare, and surely nothing is more conducive to the general welfare than the solution of the problems with which you are dealing today.

This Conference is jointly under the auspices of the Institute of Industrial Relations and University Extension, which is concerned with problems of adult education and rightly places in the forefront the study of industrial relations.

The topic for discussion today is certainly one which has been in the forefront for a considerable period of time, and certainly no discussion of industrial relations can be complete unless the role of government is clarified.

We are happy to have you with us on the Campus at this time. This Conference forms part of our Charter Week exercises and it is certainly appropriate that when the University of the State is celebrating its founding, it at the same time contributes to the solution of problems which involve the State of California as well as the nation as a whole.

You are cordially welcome. My only regret is that the duties of an administrator make it impossible for me to remain
through these sessions and do the things which I should like to
do. I am particularly sorry because I recall very vividly at
the time our speaker, Mr. Leiserson, was with us as Weinstock
Lecturer and delivered an admirable address which was published
by the University. But absence at this time is one of the penal-
ties one pays for the administration of a University such as ours.

We welcome you to this First Conference, which will in the
course of years be followed by many succeeding conferences, and
we trust will play their part in helping at least in some measure
(we are not so optimistic as to say that any one conference will
solve the problem) the solution of these problems which are so
important to the wellbeing not only of Labor and Management but
of the people of the United States as a whole.

In my inability to remain through this session, I am very
grateful to have Professor Wellman, the Director of our Institute
of Agricultural Economics, preside at this meeting.

... Applause ...

HARRY R. WELLMAN, CHAIRMAN, FACULTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, PRESIDING

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: The topic for discussion this morning is
The Role of Government in Industrial Relations. The speaker is a
man of wide experience. He received the B.A. Degree from the
University of Wisconsin in 1908 (I do not suppose he minds that
I say how long ago), and the Ph.D. Degree from Columbia University
in 1911. From 1924 to 1939 and again from 1943 to 1944 he was
Chairman of the National Mediation Board, and from 1939 to 1943
he was a member of the National Labor Relations Board. He also
served in the beginning as Secretary of the NRA, the National Recovery Administration. At the present time he is Visiting Professor and Director of Labor Organization Study at Johns Hopkins University.

I am pleased to present Dr. William H. Leiserson.

... Loud applause ...

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

William H. Leiserson, Director of Labor Organization Study, Johns Hopkins University; formerly Chairman, National Mediation Board, and Member, National Labor Relations Board.

DR. LEISERSON: The great obstacle to orderly development of public policy with respect to industrial relations is the tendency of each generation to consider its labor problems unique.

There is a general impression, for example, that active government participation in labor relations began with the New Deal laws protecting union organization and encouraging collective bargaining. And the more ardent New Dealers have been inclined to think labor history began in 1933. As a matter of fact, labor relations have been controlled by law and government in this country since the beginning of our history. Nevertheless, recurring periods of labor turmoil and widespread strikes continue to succeed each other over the years, and each generation repeats the cry for something that will "really solve" the labor problem.

Our concern being the relations of free workers and free employers, I propose to begin the discussion with a text from the prophet of free, private enterprise, Adam Smith. I read from
To rarely hear... of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour... To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals... Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour...

"Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen; who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour. Their usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions; sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act... (to)... frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands.

"The masters upon these occasions are just as clamorous upon the other side and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against combinations of... labourers and journeymen..."

That sounds pretty modern.

Apparently people were fighting the same devils when the good book was published in 1776 that we are fighting today. Though writing in England Smith described as well the labor relations that prevailed in the United States and the role the government has played in them down to recent times. Today many employers think the situation has been reversed. The law, they say,
especially the National Labor Relations Act, bears with greatest severity on them rather than on the laborers; and the magistrates' hands have been tied by the Norris-LeGuardia Act. But they still do not cease to call aloud for the assistance of the government, only now their clamorous cries are directed to the Congress rather than to the magistrates.

Like Adam Smith, however, we must not be misled by the clamor of those who have been masters. The picture is not as dark as they paint it. No employer has gone to jail for violating the Labor Relations Act, but workers are still going to jail for their "unfair labor practices," for disorderly conduct in connection with strikes, for mass picketing, as well as for the violence they resort to in desperate efforts to bring their disputes to a speedy decision.

To understand what really has happened to our industrial relations in recent years, we need to look back at least a hundred years. During the first quarter of the 19th century property qualifications for voting were abolished and manhood suffrage established in most of our states. This fact probably has more to do with our present labor troubles than most of the other causes we ascribe them to. It brought relaxation of the laws against combinations of working people, and soon led to legalizing of unions and of the right to strike. Certainly public control of industrial relations today is primarily conditioned by the fact that Labor has votes, and has learned how to use them.

Legalizing unions and strikes was helpful to wage-earners,
but largely ineffective in safeguarding their interests, so long as employers had the equal right to destroy their unions, to refuse to deal with them, to discharge or discriminate against employees for talking unionism. It was the vote of workers, aided by the support of the general public which sympathised with their cause, that changed this condition by laws designed to equalize their rights and bargaining strength with those of industrial  

managements.

But like most remedies for social ills, this remedy has created new problems equally serious. Although many workers and unions are still weak in relation to their employers, some unions have so grown in power that they are in a position to dictate terms of employment, and they have demonstrated their ability to shut down whole industries like coal and steel, transportation and other public services.

There has been a natural reaction of anti-labor public opinion which finds expression in Congress and state legislatures in a flood of bills to restrict and regulate the activities and practices of union organizations, and to abolish some of their privileges. The unions want no labor relations legislation at all. Although they strongly advocate and prepare programs for general social legislation, in respect to their own activities, they take a completely laissez faire position. They want to be let alone.

Some legislation directed against unions is bound to be passed. The negative attitude of organized labor has made this
inevitable. But little effort is being made to study the experience with the laws that have been passed, and with the policies of the Labor Relations Board, the War Labor Board, and other government agencies, to find out what measures were helpful and constructively directed toward peace and amity in labor relations and which tended in the opposite direction. A brief examination of what we have been doing about our labor relations in the last decade or so will make plain, I think, why failure to study this experience is likely to result in legislation that defeats its own purposes.

II

When Congress adopted the Labor Relations Act in 1935, it laid the foundation for a national labor policy that was at once a wage policy and a policy of governing labor relations. It chose to avoid government setting of rates of pay and other details of employment contracts. It sought instead to equalize bargaining power between industrial managements and their labor forces, and leave them free to agree on terms by the process of collective bargaining. Congress recognized that individual bargaining meant, in effect, management dictation of terms of employment. By eliminating employers' unfair labor practices, it tried to establish what the law refers to as "actual liberty of contract," and thus avoid also dictation by government officials. Wages and working rules would be determined by collective agreement and mutual consent.

That the Act has been eminently successful in accomplishing
its immediate objectives is obvious. The bargaining power of
workers has been enormously increased by encouraging and protect-
ing union organization; and all the major industries now recog-
nize and deal with unions. But the collective bargaining policy
was adopted not because freedom to organize and equality in nego-
tiating labor contracts were regarded as ends in themselves.
The underlying idea was that the public interest in industrial
peace and justice in labor relations would be furthered by such a
policy. This is made plain by Section 1 of the Act which recites
that the practice of collective bargaining is necessary for the
following among other reasons: (1) to remove "certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest;" (2) to stabilize compe-
titive wage rates and working conditions; (3) to secure "friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as
to wages, hours and working conditions."

But what happened to these larger purposes? Apparently the
policy in this respect worked to ends opposite of those intended.
Certainly work-stoppages did not become less frequent, and the
attitudes of management and labor less bitter and more friendly.
Perhaps the explanation is that no provision was made for dealing
with the problems that would arise when collective bargaining
ends in disagreement. The law compels bargaining, but not
agreement. Its requirements are satisfied when the Labor Rela-
tions Board succeeds in joining managers and workers in a vow to
bargain collectively. Was the assumption that they would live
happily ever after?
The Labor Relations Act does not deal with the subject matter of collective bargaining - wages, hours, working condition. Because the government provided no adequate machinery and policies for securing peaceful and friendly adjustment of disagreements about these vital matters, industrial strife was stimulated.

When the National Defense Program got under way, a rash of strikes broke out over the country about just such problems. A Labor Division was hurriedly set up in the Office of Production Management to deal with them, which duplicated the major facilities of the U.S. Conciliation Service. Both proved ineffective, and a third agency was hastily created, the National Defense Mediation Board. This board soon found itself making decisions, in the form of recommendations, which fixed wages and granted "maintenance of membership," among other conditions. If the recommendations were not accepted by either party the Government took over the industry. Thus voluntary mediation ended up in a form of compulsory arbitration, and John Lewis' coal miners wrecked this when the Board decided against a closed shop in the captive coal mines.

Then came the war; and it will be recalled that the War Labor program did not start out to be a compulsory program with the government fixing details of the labor bargain. The pledge not to strike or lockout was made and the War Labor Board was established by agreement of representatives of labor and industry. This voluntary method, after the manner of collective bargaining, was proposed and accepted as a substitute for compulsory legislation passed by the House of Representatives and pending in the
By 1943, however, Congress had given the War Labor Board, which was thus voluntarily set up, the power and the duty to "provide by order the wages and hours and all other terms and conditions (customarily included in collective bargaining agreements) governing the relations of the parties" to labor disputes. Directive orders supplanted collective bargaining as the method of adjusting labor relations and fixing terms of employment. To be sure, some compulsion was necessary under war conditions, but it was not foreseen and not planned. We drifted into it while struggling to maintain voluntary methods.

The Smith-Connally Act which formalized this compulsory policy, also provided for a so-called cooling off period, for government-conducted strike votes, for plants to be taken over by the government, for prohibition of strikes in such plants, and for other restrictions. But despite this law, if not because of it, labor strife increased, and mines or factories operated by the government have been shut down by strikes just like privately managed enterprises.

After the war ended the government wanted to get out of the business of dictating terms of labor contracts. An Executive Order authorized free bargaining about wages provided no price increases would result from such action. But by that time collective bargaining had become a lost art, and the government itself did not know the part it had to play in it. As a result, we had the great national strikes last year with lost working time.
breaking all records. And we ended up by government fact-finding boards setting the pattern of wage increases after all.

So our legislative and administrative methods of controlling labor relations have gotten us much that we didn't want, and what we wanted most we didn't get.

III

There are many who think that when powerful and well-financed national labor organizations are pitted against great employing corporations, the inevitable result is either industrial war on a grand scale or collusion against the consuming public; and however reluctant the government may be to dictate terms and conditions of employment to both management and workers, public necessity and public opinion will force it to do so. This view is expressed in the current demands for labor courts, and other devices for outlawing or restricting strikes and subjecting labor controversies to compulsory arbitration of some kind.

But this was substantially what we had during the war period. Yet 1944, at the height of the war, saw the greatest number of strikes on record up to that year. The lost time was not very great, but the actual number of strikes was the greatest on record. Both individual and collective bargaining were all but done away with and terms of employment were fixed by government fiat. Free managements and free labor unions could not be maintained under this policy, and because most employers and unions have learned the lesson, they are joined in opposition to such a program. Public exasperation with their inability to settle controversies
peacefully any force some kind of compulsory arbitration; but the experience of other countries as well as our own makes plain that only a police state can make this system of compulsory arbitration work in practice.

There is much popular support, also, for the view that unions have built up powerful labor monopolies which need to be made subject to anti-trust laws as monopolistic business combinations are. "Coal operators (we are told) cannot combine to choke off our supply of coal until they get the price they want, (but) mine workers can combine to stop production until they get the wage they want. The owners of an electric light company are obligated by law to give continuous service, even though losing money, but employees of such a company, through a union, are allowed to shut that service down and plunge a whole community into darkness and danger." Such actions by labor unions are permitted, so the argument goes, because the unions have been given a special license to violate the law against monopolies. Labor should be brought within the law.

But not only labor unions, farmers' organizations too are exempted from anti-trust laws. Unquestionably unions are combinations to restrict competition among workers, to raise and standardize wages and working conditions through whole industries; and farmers organize to standardize products and raise prices. In fact, the Government lends money to combinations of farmers to help them withhold their products until they can get the prices they want. If that were proposed for labor unions it would be
called "one-sided". These government policies with respect to labor and agriculture were established by law to deal with economic and social evils brought on by competition among farmers and workers, just as the anti-trust laws were directed against the evils of business monopolies. To say they are special licenses to violate the law and to compel wage-earners (or farmers) to compete and underbid each other is to ignore history and the progress that has been made since the combination laws of Adam Smith's days.

Closely related to the fear of union monopoly is the fear of industry-wide bargaining. To prohibit such bargaining is one of the main demands employers are pressing on Congress. But the very purpose of union organization is to standardize wages and working conditions so that employers will earn their profits by good management, and not by paying less for labor than their competitors. That is why any bona fide union, even though it gets started locally, soon spreads out and strives to organize the whole trade or industry. Economic forces have pressed our unions to become the national organizations that most of them are. A law prohibiting formal labor contracting on an industry basis can only result in unions insisting on the same terms from each separate employer. This is the current actual practice, and the unions usually have their way; which means of course that the terms agreed upon in the first plant or two, sets the standards for the whole industry. But because employers are reluctant to organize nationally for labor bargaining, strikes multiply to
force all competing employers to adopt the same standards.

So far as this reluctance is due to fear of anti-trust laws, it seems to have little basis in fact. All industries have their national trade associations for dealing with trade problems, but most of them shun labor problems. These organizations have frequently come into conflict with the Sherman Act. But I know of no employers' association that has ever been prosecuted as a monopoly, if it confined itself to dealing with labor -- defined by law as not an article of commerce. The lack of employers' organizations for labor bargaining is, I think, a distinct weakness in our industrial relations.

To be sure there are dangers to the public in possible nation-wide strikes, or collusion against consumers between industry-wide organizations of employers and workers. The purpose of public control of industrial relations is to provide safeguards against such dangers. But if we are to have unions at all, they will be national unions, and in industries whose markets are nation-wide they will bargain nationally. It seems as futile to try to stop this, as to compel employers to sell only to local customers or to prevent a multi-plant corporation from having a common labor policy for all its plants in all the States.

Public opinion generally, despite its condemnation of union abuses and reckless use of the strike weapon, still feels that freedom of workers to combine in labor unions for bargaining purposes is somehow connected with the maintenance of democratic political institutions, and with free private enterprise. Even
those who favor the strongest "anti-union laws" are careful to provide in their bills for "full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing." No better proof of this public feeling is needed than the policy of the Western Allies in defeated Italy, Germany, and Japan. Among the first steps taken to build democracy in the former Nazi and Fascist countries was to proclaim freedom for workers to form and join unions. Revival of suppressed free labor movements has been stimulated and organization of new self-governing unions encouraged. Apparently those who framed the policy felt that democracy could not be built in those countries without union organizations like those that thrive under free governments. And it is to be noted that this policy has brought no public opposition in the United States.

Plainly the tumultuous labor relations we have experienced since the Wagner Act was passed, and the failure of government efforts to reduce industrial strife, have not changed the minds of most of our people as to the soundness of the policy of protecting labor's right to organize and encouraging the practice of collective bargaining.

IV

The foregoing indicates, I think, that any constructive program for controlling labor relations must be predicated on continuation of the collective bargaining policy Congress adopted with the Wagner Act. Yet the problems which have aroused the public to the need of more government control have grown out of
this policy. What, then, is needed in the way of additional controls and improvements to make the policy work to the public end stated in the Act itself: reduction of industrial strife and unrest, stabilization of wage rates and working conditions, and friendly adjustment of industrial disputes?

In trying to perfect the policy we must understand the limitations of the tools we use—the limitations of "government control." There is a common misconception that the government is all powerful. If it passes a law, say to forbid certain kinds of strikes or some customary management or union practice, and the law has teeth in it, it is thought that the prohibited practices will really disappear, except for a violation here and there for which those responsible can be punished. Then there is the notion that if the government or the public does control, the results are necessarily fair and good and in the public interest.

But relations between teachers and public schools are completely controlled by public authorities. They license teachers and they frown on unions among them. Strikes to force changes in salary scales fixed by legislatures or boards of education are obviously illegal. Nevertheless, beginning in Norwalk, Connecticut, last summer, a wave of such unlawful strikes has shut down schools in many cities throughout the country. In Buffalo, at least, even the principals, who are part of the management of these schools, joined the strikers. There is much opinion that the public, or the taxpayers, have not done right by the teachers, and usually the strikers have triumphed over the authorities.
rather than suffered punishment for their unlawful revolts. Who will say that government control of teacher relations has been in the public interest during the recent period of high price of provisions, as Adam Smith put it? And who is in a position to say that the illegal strikes, picketing, and closing of schools have not contributed as much as government controls to improving teacher relations and meeting the public responsibility for education of the young.

Government control may have just as bad effects as lack of control. And the government alone cannot fairly and effectively control industrial relations any more than it can maintain law, order and justice generally without the aid of self-governing organizations or institutions like the family, the church, professional societies, trade associations, better business bureaus, etc., and the codes and traditions they develop. Private governments, the political scientists call them, and industrial managements and labor unions are such private governments. When these enter into collective bargaining agreements they set up joint industrial governments which institutionalize labor relationships with codes, traditions and norms of conduct that are the basic elements of social control. Despite temporary breakdowns when strikes occur, such industrial governments are maintaining law, order and justice in industry today to an extent that the public government alone could never achieve.

Just as international law has been slowly developing over the years through conferences, agreements, decisions and
precedents, so industrial law has been developing through similar collective bargaining customs and practices; through union agreements, and decisions and precedents made in administering and interpreting them. If we would have effective public control, the Government must build its program on this private industrial law, and on the methods by which it is made and developed. What happens when this necessity is disregarded is well illustrated by the public furor over the billion dollar portal-to-portal suits. These, by the way, though following the course of law in the courts, seem to be regarded as greater threats to the economy of the nation than the strikes that unions carry on. And that was because the law was not based on the practices and custom that unions and employers had built up among themselves.

The National Labor Relations Act has freed the forces that make for union organization and collective bargaining, and thereby it has contributed greatly to the private industrial law making through which government control is made practical and effective. Its basic provisions must therefore be retained, and government policy grounded in them. But the Act has also developed some abuses which obstruct rather than promote agreement between labor and management. It is folly, therefore, to hold that no changes in it are necessary. But if the collective bargaining policy is to achieve its purposes, any amendments made must strengthen such bargaining, not weaken it. The public interest requires collective bargaining to be strengthened if it wants to avoid dictation either by management or by government officials. Private interests would be furthered if the collective bargaining policy were weakened.
To strengthen this policy, therefore, an amendment is needed that will require unions to bargain collectively, as well as employers, on the assumption that unions exist primarily for bargaining purposes,—which is true enough—the obligation was imposed only on employers. But this stimulated a take-it-or-leave-it attitude on the part of not a few unions, and the omission needs to be corrected.

Similarly the Act does not make it an unfair labor practice for a union to discriminate against employers who form or join employers' associations. Neither does it encourage organization among employers as it does among working people. There is no good reason why the Act should not treat management and labor alike in these respects, and an amendment to this effect would strengthen the bargaining policy. To make sure of such equal treatment, some countries define labor unions as organizations either of employers or workers for collective bargaining purposes. As our unions have grown in membership and power, some of them have tipped the scales with more bargaining strength than the employers. This tends to make the unions headstrong, conciliation and mutual agreement more difficult. The collective bargaining policy, however, is predicated on equal bargaining power. Many proposed amendments would weaken unions as a means of equalization. This would be a backward step. It would lessen responsibility, and stimulate warfare rather than industrial law making. The constructive way is to encourage employers to organize to match the strength of the unions.
Another change in the Act is necessary to prevent interference by a minority with the functioning of a union chosen by a majority to act as collective bargaining representative. Some unions have called strikes to compel employers to deal with them after they had lost elections which resulted in another union being certified as the legal representative. This is contrary to the policy of the Act, and should be made an unfair labor practice. A closely related problem is the practice of a few unions to boycott products made by members of another union which has been legally designated bargaining agent. This too can be met by defining the practice as unfair under the Act. There is reason to believe, also, that a more precise definition of bargaining units would also be helpful.

These are examples of the types of amendment that we must always be prepared to adopt in order to strengthen the collective bargaining policy of the law. By the same tokens we must be ever watchful to reject amendments that are constantly being offered that would have the contrary effect. For example, there are proposals for taking away rights of employers, unions and their officers under the Act, if they misbehave in certain ways. But it would be as absurd to say that the management of a corporation or its officers shall not be allowed to act for the owners because they have committed some unfair labor practice, as to prohibit a union or its officers to represent or bargain for the employees. Certainly bargaining and adjustment of disputes would not be furthered by such legislation. Proposals of this kind
would promote disorder. They can not control industrial rela-
tions.

I have mentioned the futility of trying to stop the growth
of industry-wide bargaining. A safeguard against its abuse has
already been provided by the Supreme Court in its decision that
if unions conspire with employers to fix prices or monopolize
articles of commerce they are as guilty as the employers, and
subject to the same penalties. Protection against dangers that
might grow out of legitimate bargaining on an industry basis, can
be provided by the administrative and judicial agencies which con-
ciliate, mediate, arbitrate and otherwise direct the process of
collective bargaining, which I shall presently describe.

But the public interest is furthered by the wider bargaining
because it provides a sounder base for industrial government. It
extends the area of law and peace over a whole industry, just as
the King's law and peace were extended over a whole nation to sup-
plant the petty rule and warring of feudal lords. It provides
administrative and judicial procedures for settling and deciding
controversies in accordance with law. The collective agreement is
the constitution of this government, and the customs, precedents
and decisions constitute the body of common industrial law.
Periodical conferences of representatives of management and labor
provide new laws.

On a small scale such governments exist also in the plant or
plants of a single employer. But the smaller the scale, the less
stable the governments; and the traditions of common interest in
the industry of both management and labor are slower to grow in
the smaller scale. Also the small scale governments can rarely
afford a permanent independent judiciary in the form of an umpire,
impartial chairman, or adjustment board. This institution grows
only under industry-wide governments, or where a great employing
corporation operates many plants covering large sections of the
country.

In this connection, a realistic program of government control
would correct a weakness in the judicial system of the private
industrial governments, and at the same time provide a means for
embodying the private industrial law into the public law. Con-
trary to the practice in other countries where compacts between
managements and unions are treated as gentlemen's agreements, in
the United States they are legal contracts enforceable in the
courts. The common complaints about violations of union con-
tracts make plain that ordinary courts are not equipped to admin-
ister justice under industrial laws. On the other hand, the
judicial processes developed under union agreements are still in
rudimentary form. The judges are still in the circuit riding
stage, temporary itinerant referees, arbitrators, umpires.

Nothing illustrates better the need of an organized system
of industrial adjudication than the dispute between John Lewis
and Secretary of the Interior Krug which brought on the recent
coal strike. The question about which they differed was whether
the agreement between the union and Mr. Krug could or could not
be cancelled before the mines were returned to private ownership.
That was the simple question. This obviously was justiciable under the terms of the contract. But when the case got to the courts, the issues were about injunctions, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and about a lot of other things in which lawyers are learned. The simple question has not been answered yet. Punitive remedies for violations of agreements can help little because in the course of their working relationships both managers and employees are unwittingly violating agreements almost every day. The need is for an independent judiciary to apply and interpret the industrial law developed under the customs and practices of collective bargaining agreements.

This does not require an elaborate system of labor courts established by the Government. An Act of Congress is needed, however, requiring every union contract to include a provision that all grievances arising under it, and all disputes about its meaning shall be settled by arbitration if they cannot be adjusted by mutual consent. Then if they fail or are unable to set up their own arbitration system, there should be made available an industrial arbitration tribunal to which either party may refer cases for final and binding decisions. This is not compulsory arbitration in the ordinary sense of the term. It would merely substitute an effective industrial judicial system for deciding disputes about contracts arising under labor agreements in place of the regular courts which theoretically are already empowered to decide such issues. Public opinion both among unions and managements favors such adjudication of disputes under agreements.
The government would wisely extend their own custom and practice, and make certain that the judicial system works to prevent work-stoppages.

V

But when agreements expire or are to be revised, or new agreements are to be made, the differences are not justiciable. These controversies have been causing our greatest industrial wars, since the Labor Relations Act has made strikes for union recognition unnecessary. True, most disputes of this kind are settled peacefully by collective bargaining, nevertheless it is the disagreements about making or changing contracts that bring on the great strikes and labor crises, and pose the most difficult problems of public control.

In international affairs we have learned that wars cannot be prevented unless we organize for peace, and establish orderly methods and procedures for consultation, investigation, conciliations, mutual adjustment and voluntary arbitration. But we have not yet learned that we need similar machinery, organized methods and established procedures to prevent industrial governments from breaking down when the contracts which set them up expire in the legal sense of the term. Instead, we have been content with haphazard government intervention by the U.S. Conciliation Service, or by so-called fact-finding boards, as often after the wars are on as before they have begun. Actually the contracts do not really terminate. For the seniority, pension, promotion, transfer and work-assignment rules provided in the agreements are
permanent rights that continue in effect until changed by mutual consent. There is no hiatus in reality between agreements. And this is the most powerful factor that collective bargaining provides for maintaining industrial peace.

The Labor Relations Act compels bargaining. Why should not conciliations or mediation also be compelled? The principle is the same. As already indicated, much of the criticism of this law is not justly ascribed to the lack of adequate mediation machinery. Whenever a critical labor situation, as during the defense and war periods, or during the wage and price strikes of last year, new boards are created, and these usually drift into compulsory arbitration, because methods, procedures and traditions of mediation have not become established.

For the very reason that a program of Government control based on collective bargaining cannot compel agreement, it must compel mediation and organize an adequate administration of it. Once this is done, the absurdity of laws requiring so-called cooling off periods and government-conducted strike votes will become evident. Mediation machinery, if properly designed and operated, settles disputes, not strikes. There is an important distinction between the two; and the measure of the effectiveness of this method of control—mediation—is the number of strikes it prevents, not the number it settles; for the strike itself is a method of settlement—the war method.

If, therefore, strike notices have to be filed at any time before the whole process of mediation is completed, and this sets
the time for the expected cooling to begin, the effect is to heat rather than cool tempers during the periods of collective bargaining or conciliation when cool heads are most needed. This is what happened under the Smith-Connally Act, and disagreements and strikes were thus stimulated.

What is needed is a mediation period after bargaining has ended without agreement. But this requires that the government must be ever ready with an established organization and procedures, and expert mediators trained in the methods by which differences between management and labor are ironed out. If the Government is prepared to meet its responsibilities in these respects, both parties customarily agree to maintain the status quo until all mediation proceedings have been completed. Here again is an industrial custom which needs to be embodied into public law. Government mediation must require, therefore, that while a dispute is in process, management shall not change the conditions out of which it arose, and workers or unions shall not attempt to force a change. Because the Government has failed to do this, the propaganda slogan "no contract, no work" has become popular and caused many unnecessary strikes.

Whether the mediation organization is headed by a board or a single administrator is immaterial. The important thing is that managements and unions, and the government too, shall have obligations, duties to perform in connection with mediatory efforts to settle disputes before they break out in strikes. In addition to maintaining status quo while cases are in process, there are
other responsibilities that must be imposed on the parties to disputes, if mediation is to be effective in preventing strikes. The negative requirement of the Wagner Act that they shall not refuse to bargain collectively needs to be translated into positive specific duties.

There must be the duty to exert every effort to make and maintain collective labor agreements; to give adequate notice in writing of proposed changes in agreements; to arrange joint conferences promptly for negotiating the changes or new proposals; to exert every effort to settle all disputes, whatever their nature, in such conferences between authorized representatives of employers and employees; the duty to refer all unsettled disputes to the appropriate government agency for mediation or other assistance. Some of these are commonly stipulated in union agreements with employers, but those referring to obligations to the government are not common. I propose that they should be prescribed by law.

We hear frequently that what mediation machinery we have needs to be strengthened. But this can only mean jobs for more mediators unless responsibilities like these are met by both management and workers in connection with the government's conciliatory efforts. But legal penalties will be of little help in enforcing them. What is most needed are habits of law and order in settling labor controversies, and these can best be established by orderly procedures provided by a mediation agency with appropriate methods for handling different kinds of disputes,
and then pressing and exercising the parties in meeting their obligations in connection with the mediation process. Unions say they want to use the strike only as a last resort. But this is not possible without government mediation measures of the kind suggested.

Other measures such as voluntary arbitration and what is called fact-finding need to be integrated into the mediation system. They are really a part of it, and they have been much less effective than they might be, because they have been haphazardly used, and their places and functions in the system have been ignored. Fact-finding, for example, is a useful emergency procedure when all mediation efforts have been exhausted and voluntary arbitration cannot be secured. But if a board really found and published all the facts, the effect would be to defeat the purpose of securing a peaceful settlement. People would draw different conclusions from the facts, and much of the public might conclude that the Board’s recommendations were wrong. This emergency procedure, therefore, requires that the dispute shall be arbitrated, with the decision put in the form of a recommendation. If such decisions are well publicized, and are not frequently made so that public attention can be centered on them, then pressure of public opinion is mobilized to secure acceptance of the recommendation, provided the men who made it are well known and respected for their impartiality.

There is no assurance, of course, that partisan and political pressures will not prevent the maintenance of an adequate
mediation organization to avoid strikes by settling disputes. But here again, industry-wide and other large-scale bargaining have valuable contributions to make. Wherever such bargaining has existed for a long time, and permanent arbitrators adjudicate disputes arising out of the agreements, it is customary to invite these industrial judges to assist as mediators in negotiating new or revised agreements. They know the problems of the industry, and both parties have confidence in them if they have functioned well as arbitrators. Sometimes the adjudication functions are entrusted to an adjustment board representing labor and management in the industry as a whole, with or without a neutral umpire.

Here are the elements of a complete mediation system within nation-wide industries. Instead of discouraging bargaining machinery of this kind, Government policy would serve public interests better if it encouraged them, as it does farmers, processors and distributors to organize co-operatives. Such industrial home rule arrangements, I think, hold the greatest promise for effective maintenance of labor peace. If industries, or groups of industries, were helped to develop their own mediation systems, with the kind of impartial conciliators they would jointly select, then the Government's mediators and arbitrators would have to be men of equal caliber and experience. They could neither influence nor help the top men in the industrial setup if they were not; and both management and labor would have a direct interest in seeing to it that government mediators are
top-notch men.

VI

This completes the improvements that seem to me to be immediately necessary to make government control based on a collective bargaining policy work more effectively to safeguard public interests. The compulsions in the proposed amendments to the Labor Relations Act, the obligatory mediation, and the adjudication of disputes about interpretation of agreements, are nominal, not punitive, and are based on the customs and rules developed through the collective bargaining process.

I offer no suggestions for regulating unions by law, not because they must be kept free of all government regulation, but because we do not know enough about their internal affairs at present, to devise effective regulations that will not do more harm than good. The Smith-Connally Act provided that every strike ballot shall have printed on it the question: "Do you wish to authorize this interruption of war production?" That is a fact. The assumption was apparently that union officials were the fellows who wanted to strike and the members did not want to strike, and if the Government took a secret ballot on this question, the workers would mostly vote "No." But what most of them did was to vote "Yes," because the framers of the law did not know what kind of animal a union was and what kind of people union people were. The attempts to outlaw closed shops, without providing for the needs they meet, have proved futile in the states, and a federal act is not likely to fare any better. I
see no objection to requiring unions to register, and file finan-
cial reports, constitutions, etc.; or to requiring that partisan
political contributions shall be voluntary. This has been tried,
but the laws have not changed labor relations for the better,
particularly. It is just pecking away at the union.

Our courts have been regulating unions for very many years.
They hear and decide numerous cases in which members or local
unions complain of violations of union constitutions or by laws,
arbitrary expulsion from membership, and autocratic practices by
union officials. But whether a statute will accomplish any more
than the court decisions have done, we do not know. If, however,
such legislation is to be adopted to improve labor relations, we
would have to regulate the internal affairs of management as well
as unions. For the same kind of autocratic practices occur with-
in the management hierarchies, as within union organizations.
Management of a large corporation has two or three thousand
people as part of the management staff. They arbitrarily dis-
charge people; there are favoritism and other things just like in
the unions. If we are going to regulate one, we shall have to
regulate the other. Both are responsible for bad labor relations.
Until we can be reasonably certain of the effects of regulatory
legislation on both management and union, it would be better to
study the subject a little more rather than to try to adopt the
law.

I conclude, therefore, with suggesting that the predominantly
voluntary methods outlined above offer the best course of action.
for perfecting government control of industrial relations founded on a collective bargaining policy. To those who think that laws with teeth in them can improve human relations like those between workers and managers, this will be unsatisfactory. The only answer I can give is that in democratic countries, strong laws providing for compulsory settlements and restrictions on strikes have proved less effective in maintaining peace and amity in labor relations, than the apparently weak voluntary, conciliatory methods.

As a wise Englishman told me once, a democratic government must be very, very careful not to expose its own impotence.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Dr. Leiserson's comprehensive and brilliant address will no doubt evoke, I hope, a spirited discussion and perhaps some pointed questions from the floor.

Before opening the session for questions from the floor, certain persons have agreed to present formal statements on Dr. Leiserson's paper. I should like to call first upon the President of the California Building and Construction Trades Council, Mr. Frank McDonald.

DISCUSSION

Frank McDonald, President, California Building and Construction Trades Council.

MR. McDONALD: I am on a ten-minute limit and I have told the Chairman, if I get enthusiastic and go beyond it, to stop me.
As I understand it, organized labor is on trial in the University of California for two days. Labor, I believe, has "generously" been accorded about 60 minutes in which to defend itself.

Last night Messrs. Richberg and Nelson, in a widely advertised meeting, talked in Wheeler Hall and their overflow audiences. Today, in a non-advertised meeting, Dr. Leiserson is accorded the privilege of speaking in a room that accommodates about 100 people.

I make these remarks rather pointedly because they tend, in my opinion, to confirm the fear that Labor has had when the appropriation was made for the Industrial Division of the University of California, that it would become a pro-employer propaganda medium. I hope time will prove me and my colleagues wrong.

We are mindful of the fact that for centuries universities taught the distinction and the difference between master and men and trained men in the methods necessary to keep the servant in his place. We regard it as a heritage of the old and ancient philosophy of the earth-born and the heaven-born.

Last night Messrs. Richberg and Nelson dealt, in my opinion, most partisanly with effects in labor's struggles. They followed closely the national anti-labor propaganda program.facetious reference was made to one man out of the millions who are members of Labor. They pillorized John L. Lewis. They said nothing about the degradation, the poverty, the misery, the danger, and the disease to which miners, their wives and children, have for generations been condemned in America.
To the uninitiated, to the unsuspecting in the audience they made "splendid" talks. To those who look to cause rather than effect they were joining in the propaganda to keep Labor down, to take from it the gains it has made.

Lewis was bitterly criticized in the paid press for his efforts in behalf of his men in the health and welfare program. Those who are informed know that in southern states laws are not enforced to protect the lives of working men. They also know that in the miserable shacks constituting the groups of "homes" there is neither sanitation nor sewage, and that hundreds and hundreds of miners, their wives and children, have died of disease because of an exposure that we do not tolerate in California.

If safety and sanitary laws are good enough for the progressive states, they must be enforced in the southern states and we will eliminate the necessity of miners or any others striking for safety and sanitation to protect their lives.

The history of man is a recital of the struggle of men to own and control the lives of their fellowmen. When ownership of man was prohibited by law, the struggle to control their fellowmen and to take from them their belongings and products continued down the ages until today. The brutal, the unscrupulous, the tricky, the treacherous have ever struggled to exploit their fellowmen. Throughout the ages laws have been promulgated by the exploiters to legalize their efforts, to exploit their fellowmen.

The splendid presentation of Dr. Leiserson tends to clarify the atmosphere at this time of prejudice and misunderstanding.
that has been incited during recent years by the paid propaganda of those who exploit their fellow human beings. Personally, I believe that we owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Leiserson for his splendid presentation. I regret that he is not accorded the privilege of publicity and Wheeler Hall so that all might hear him.

When the aristocracy forced King John to sign the Magna Carta, that charter only proclaimed the rights of the aristocrats, the then free men. It did not give freedom to the servants in England, nor to the chattel slaves owned by the aristocrats. Notwithstanding that, our Declaration of Independence in '76 proclaimed that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that to secure these rights governments are instituted amongst men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, the fact remains that servitude of white men and chattel slavery of colored men then existed in the Thirteen Colonies, and that chattel slavery was only abolished in 1865. During all these preceding years our Courts unanimously upheld chattel slavery and our law enforcement officers enforced the right of the master.

May I say in comparison that when the slaves tried to escape and ran away, when the bloodhounds were turned on their trail, the propaganda was that they were "vicious and dangerous" men. No publication of that period said that they were the victims of lashings by the knot and the whip, of long hours, of servitude,
of inadequate food, and of a hovel in which to sleep. No! We were blind to those conditions.

I am not talking of generations ago. Eighty-two years ago the Emancipation Proclamation was proclaimed giving chattel slaves freedom in America. What succeeded it? A system of peonage maintained in the southern states and which still maintains to a great degree even today. Our progress is not as rapid as we proclaim it.

The brutal exploitation of men, women and little children forced the growth and development of trade unionism in America. That trade unionism was the most potential force in the advancement of America. It was a potent factor in making it possible for the youth of today to gain a university education.

We clearly see the great injustices of yesterday, but our vision is clouded when we regard labor’s problems of today. The heritage of the ages seems to be the right of everyone to sit in judgment upon working men and women, and to proclaim our judgment of what should and should not be done to our fellow human beings because they are working men and women.

I believe that ninety-five per cent of the citizens of the United States have not read the Charter of the United Nations which was ratified by our Government and fifty-four other nations. That Charter, in effect, declares that wars are traceable to and the result of the poverty and degradation of the masses in each nation. That Charter declared that “With a view of creating conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations, based upon respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people, the United Nations shall promote a higher standard of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development".

I wish that declaration were taught in every school and university in America. If wars, wars that have cursed us throughout the ages, are the result of degradation and poverty, may it not be well to pause and consider the efforts that are now being made in America to break down the standards that labor has built up for the American people as well as for itself.

For many years the American Federation of Labor has advocated free collective bargaining, voluntary conciliation and arbitration. The American Federation of Labor Unions, which year after year have renewed their agreements with employers, have not found it necessary to resort to arbitration, notwithstanding that most of their agreements contain a stipulation for arbitration, because their negotiations with their employers throughout the years have been conducted upon a fair and friendly basis of negotiations. Dr. Leiserson's findings confirm the wisdom, practicability and justice of voluntary agreements, conciliation and arbitration. It is to be hoped that, notwithstanding the unfair anti-labor agitation, the Congress and the State Legislatures will see the wisdom of such procedure.

We know that our Government and other Governments and industry use both the first and secondary boycotts. We believe that
there is a danger to the rights of free men in the restrictive proposal with regard to the right of the toilers to use both primary and secondary boycotts. We believe in free enterprise. We believe, more, in the rights of free men. We regard with apprehension the many proposals that are being made to restrict and abrogate the present constitutional rights of free American toilers. We believe that these proposals conform very, very closely to restrictions that are imposed upon workmen under the domination of Communistic governments. We trust that such Communistic restrictions will not be imposed upon free American workmen.

I thank you!

... Loud applause ...

DR. WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. McDonald.

My forecast that we would have "spirited discussion" has not failed for the first speaker!

The second person to discuss the paper is an attorney for the United Employers of Oakland—an active attorney in the industrial relations field.

Mr. Paul J. St. Sure.

J. PAUL ST. SURE,
Attorney-at-Law,
Oakland, California.

MR. ST. SURE: After having heard Frank McDonald's speech, I am sorry that I missed the preceding portions of this session, and I should like to be able to hear the rest of them.

I did not realize that there was an underlying controversy or an apparently growing one as between the interests of Management
and Labor in this particular Conference. Certainly I find myself, if Dr. Leiserson's views represent the views of Labor, in the position of betraying my own kind because I find myself in rather complete agreement with the things that he has discussed this morning. I do not take that to be any compliment to Dr. Leiserson; rather, I take it to be a compliment to myself that I can go along with the experience of a man of the background that he has and the practical knowledge of the workings of government in the field of labor relations.

I agree particularly with Dr. Leiserson's views about industry-wide bargaining and about the desirability of employer organizations being strengthened, improved. Dr. Leiserson's comment was that employers generally seem to be opposed to that theory. Perhaps our experience here on the Pacific Coast has been somewhat different to that of the rest of the country. We do have larger areas; we do have larger labor market areas; we have a wider reach for the products that we process; and we have come to find here, in not only narrow industrial groups but even in diverse groups, that there is wisdom and, we think, common value in discarding the theory that labor is a competitive commodity. We have come to believe that as competitors we can eliminate that particular factor of competition and try to deal, and usually successfully deal, with strong labor unions upon the basis of strong industrial representation on the employers' side.

Some of us have been quite concerned about the proposals before the Congress to outlaw that kind of bargaining—concerned about it
because some of us feel, as you do, Doctor, that that type of reasoning is based upon lack of experience and lack of knowledge. And I think upon the general subject upon which you have touched, the punitive and restrictive type of labor legislation, some of which is before Congressional committees today, many of us on the Coast have the view that it will not furnish the answer; that it will perhaps increase the difficulties of collective bargaining in a free system. And certainly in that particular I cannot disagree with your conclusions.

I particularly go along with the idea that we certainly should have more experience before we try to, as we would like to say in this country, "pass a law on the subject."

With regard generally to the voluntary place of government in the field of labor relations, certainly I would agree that the mediation processes ought to be strengthened. One difficulty today, I think, is that the mediation system as we have it set up has become too frequently just one step to get behind us, like the 30-day notice under the Smith-Connally Act, like the attempts at mediation before War Labor Board disputes, of certain procedures that you must get through and therefore you say, "Call in a Conciliator." Indeed, I have had labor union representatives tell me that their International and other union requirements compel them to call in the Conciliation Service, and then indicate that "Of course you know it doesn't mean much. We have discussed the issues. But we have got to get behind us that particular procedure before we actually have a strike vote taken or before we
I think that that is wrong. I think that there should be a definite strengthening of the mediation process and the strengthening of the personnel of the mediation service, to remove it from pressures which exist today or seem to exist in order to drive to a result, to get at a series of meetings rather than remove some of the fundamental differences.

How that can be accomplished I am not sure, but I do believe that the type of suggestion which is made, that during a period of mediation there is going to be a status quo maintained, the sort of experience that we had during the War Labor Board period, would be desirable if coupled with it be a true mediation-conciliation process.

Just how you can accomplish the requirement of "status quo", I think we might have some difficulty with, because if we lay aside these matters of compulsion and punitive regulations, one wonders just what would be the result of a bare requirement that the parties should maintain the status quo.

With regard to the entire field of arbitration (I speak personally, I suppose because I was asked to comment personally upon this address of this morning), I am one of those who has long gone along with the view that compulsory arbitration was an undesirable thing, both from the point of view of Management and of Labor, but I find myself somewhat weakening in my opinions on that subject. I find it difficult to continually agree with the original conviction that I had that these things about which we
quarrel, the many items in labor contracts, are so sacrosanct that at least the factual portions, the determination of who may be reasonably right and who may be reasonably wrong, can not be settled in some fair tribunal. After all, we do have sufficient confidence in our Courts in this democratic system to allow them to judge our liberties, our lives, our domestic relationships, to determine the custody of our children, to dispose of our property, and yet somehow we shy away completely from the thought that we should apply to any system of judicial determination or a settlement of any part of labor disputes by compulsion. After all, too, the legal processes in this country are compulsory. Any citizen may have another citizen into court to answer to a particular charge or to adjudicate a particular issue.

As I say, I have not any terminal conviction on the subject, but I find my original thinking shaken by considerations of a comparison of the things that we are prepared to submit to the judicial process and the things that we are apparently unwilling to place in the same type of pattern; these things which have to do with industrial relations.

I do have the view that, as Dr. Leiserson suggests, it would be very helpful if we had labor courts at least for the purpose of determining these questions of contract interpretation. I think those labor courts would have the real value of bringing together this itinerant circuit-riding type of precedent we are establishing. It certainly would have a tendency to avoid disputes about establishing procedures and customs and practices to which others
could look for the purpose of making up their minds as to the
right or wrong of a particular dispute. But I wonder whether that
same formula could not to some degree be carried further into the
establishment of a tribunal, not on the fact-finding theory alone
but upon the theory of determining certain factual disputes, at
least declare a rule of the situation which might be a guide for
determination of final settlements.

I do not visualize, of course, that we can by such a process
compel people to work or compel employers to maintain their es-
tablishments. But at least it might be helpful to allow the
people who are sometimes caught in the middle, the community, to
know who is right or wrong from the point of view of what should
be done.

Some years ago I had an experience in Washington where one
of the secretaries of the late President Roosevelt told me that
he was greatly confused about certain controversial matters then
before the Congress. He said, "Of all people I think that I
should be in a position to make up my mind. I am very close to a
man for whom I have great respect. When I hear his opinion that
this or that should be done, I am inclined to believe it. Then I
pick up the press or I hear the debates in Congress or I hear the
opposition party's claims and contentions, and I find myself a
little bit shaken in my original judgment, because whatever my
Boss said was white they say is black." And he said, "I wonder
what the poor people over the country are thinking about these
controversies. I wonder how they can possibly make up their
minds as to the right or wrong." He said, "I wish there were some tribunal in this country, some group of men, sufficiently free from pressure, some group of men sufficiently respected, that they might periodically analyze issues and make a declaration which would not be compelling and forced upon them except upon the result that it would have through public opinion, some group that could say, 'This we believe to be right and this we believe to be false and this we believe to be real'."

Of course he was being philosophical. Perhaps I am being philosophical, too, when I suggest that in some forum of some kind we ought to be able to find a means for determining some of these matters which are so controversial; some forum which could have a consistency, if you please, a policy, and which could only so long as it had the confidence of the public help labor and management determine these issues which bring about such losses. And I would have it apply equally. The question of whether or not we would regulate unions and not business has never appealed to me. I think that we need not more laws to try to control either but, perhaps, less laws and an equalization of the application of those laws straight across the board.

Thank you.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. St. Sure.

The third person to discuss the paper or make some comments thereon will be Mr. Louis Goldblatt, Secretary-Treasurer of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.
LOUIS GOLDBLATT

Secretary-Treasurer, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (CIO).

MR. GOLDBLATT: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. I did have some prepared notes which I had intended to use in discussing Dr. Leiserson's address, but I have some of the same feelings that Frank McDonald had about this entire session and I thought that these notes would not do much good, because there were so many "curve balls" pitched last night that our entire staff, which is now chasing all over the Campus, has not caught even half of them; and I am terribly fearful that answering one or two of the calumnies or canards against organised labor does not do an awful lot of good, particularly when some people, unfortunately, and the press particularly, always assume that if you have not made an awful lot of noise about so high against labor, therefore you have agreed with the accusations.

I unfortunately not only feel these apprehensions about my prepared remarks and the addresses made last night, but I have the additional disadvantage of trying to talk against the accustomed eating habits of the American people.

I thought that Dr. Leiserson's address this morning was honest, an attempt to do a fair appraisal of labor relations in this country, and particularly the role of government. There are a number of aspects of his speech where I can not find agreement, and in particular I am concerned about the general tendency of
both his address, plus those addresses of the people last night, plus others who will most likely speak on this program, to assume that there is a "labor" problem—when the fact of the matter is that this country is faced with the worst, most damnable employer problem that it has ever had in its whole history. That is the problem facing this country and it is a mighty serious one.

For example, as Dr. Leiserson said, there ought to be a law which compels unions to bargain. I suppose that can not mean much one way or the other. But it is about as meaningless as a law stating that it is a good thing for a person to have three square meals a day if you want to be healthy. It does not mean a thing. Ninety-nine per cent of the battles are the result of refusal of employers to bargain. And to even raise the issue that there ought to be a law which compels a union to bargain gives a certain amount of substance, a certain amount of tenability, to the whole vicious, lying campaign around which the press and the employers have organized their program with the deliberate objective of creating these fictions of "labor monopolies", "irresponsibility of labor", "labor refuses to bargain", "labor dictatorship", "labor anarchy". That is part of the entire smoke screen, without which the big business interests in this country can not succeed in their plans of smashing labor and driving down the living standards of the workers. They have got to have these canards; they have got to have these things.

I can well understand why Dr. Leiserson may suggest that the inclusion of such a regulation can not do any harm. Perhaps it
will satisfy some of these people who are screaming for the car-
cass of labor.

I don't blame you. I think that they are perfectly good
intentions on your part. You know mighty well, Dr. Leiserson, as
does anybody else here who has one iota of collective bargaining
experience, that unions always want to bargain collectively. So
people think, "Well, may be we will throw them a bone."

That, in my opinion, can be a serious error because of this
terrific menace not only to organized labor but to the people as
a whole in this present anti-labor drive.

This anti-labor drive has a very real purpose:
1. Drive down the standard of living of the workers lower
than what it is today--and it is low enough.

2. Smash any vestige of freedom of speech, expression or ac-
tion not only on the part of labor but of people at large.

3. To divert attention from the monopoly practices of big
business which have intensified multifold both during the war and
after the war, and

4. To divert attention from the predatory campaigns of
American monopoly in other parts of the world.

Those things and those plans of the employers require a
scapegoat, and the NAM and others who have organized this plan
determined upon labor as the scapegoat.

I think Mr. St. Sure is completely sincere in his remarks
about agreement with Dr. Leiserson, but the phenomenal and mar-
velous and beautiful thing to behold about the employers through-
out the country is that the left hand never knoweth what the right hand doeth. You can hardly find a single employer who says he agrees with these campaigns against organized labor. Nail them down! I have. There are others here. George Behrs will tell you he does not agree with everything that is being done at Washington. He heads the San Francisco Employers Council. Mr. St. Sure will tell you that he does not agree with everything that is being done at Washington. He heads the Oakland Employers Council. Get a single employer and he will tell you the same thing. I know Mr. Heynemann will tell you the same thing. Then how does it happen that the NAM is successfully putting across this program to assassinate labor?

I know that there is a philosophical theory that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. I never thought it applied to employer organizations. And never do you hear these self-same employers talk down about those schemes of the NAM, their friends in Congress, the Republican Party and their assistants in the Administration, and what they plan to do against organized labor. It is impossible, I say, and that is the reason I have to give up these notes to try to recover all these "curve balls" that are being pitched at organized labor.

Let me give you one example. Donald Nelson last night spoke with great feeling about the jurisdictional strikes. Donald Nelson represents a group of motion picture employers. I know a little bit about that industry. I worked in it on and off during the time I was going to school, and my family has worked in the
industry since 1915, my dad particularly.

I know that in 1933 the IATSE lost a strike. I know that at the end of 1933 and the early part of 1934 an attempt was made to form an independent industrial union in Hollywood. I know that because I signed up and I tried to get other people to sign up. I also know this: that just about the time we got 1500 people signed up Willie Bioff and Browne suddenly got a backdoor agreement with Joe Schenck and the employers, and anybody who didn’t like them was booted out. And it was a closed shop agreement. And the jurisdictional strikes provoked in Hollywood are provoked entirely by the employers. Every single thing that has happened in the Hollywood labor situation has been dictated by the employers. And when in 1939 the workers tried to break away from the gunmen rule of Bioff and Browne, the movie moguls gave those mobsters the free run of the studios. And, incidentally, I don’t blame the A.F. of L. for people like Bioff and Browne. I don’t blame them at all. Those were the gunmen foisted on the workers by the employers. That finally came out in the courts and the bribery by Joe Schenck and the rest of the movie moguls came out in the courts in the form of income tax evasion. But every single bit of that jurisdictional dispute was provoked by the employers, and in 1939 when the workers tried to break away from those company unions dominated by gangsters and set up an independent union called the United Studio Technicians Guild, Bioff and Browne and his mobsters had the free run of Hollywood in those studios. And anybody who didn’t like it got a kick in the
head or a blow in the teeth, paid for by the employers. And Donald Nelson weeps about jurisdictional strikes!

I happen to know about situations of that sort. Jurisdictional strikes, ninety-nine per cent of the time, are provoked deliberately by employers to smash unions. And that is the situation in Hollywood today where they are using one organization, which I know from my own experience most members in the A.F. of L., are mighty unhappy about. That is the vestige of the Browne-Bioff machine headed by Brewster and others down there, using the vestige of that machine to smash democratic A.F. of L. unions in the Hollywood studios. And the employer is responsible for every bit of it.

That is just one example. But if we were allowed the time as the employers have been allowed the time in this so-called "industrial relations forum"; if we had been allowed anything like the time, we could document point by point these canards against labor and challenge any person who appears here to set up impartial committees to go back and study the records and facts. And if a single statement that we make is proven a lie, we will resign from union office.

That is the sort of challenge we are willing to put before these peddlers of hate against the labor movement. But the time has not been allowed. This is an "impartial" forum. And I say, wittingly or unwittingly, this forum has become a part of the whole national hysterical drive in an attempt to scoop up the American people in a wave of hate against labor unions. And the
unfortunate thing is that many people are becoming victims of it, including the speaker who is supposed to close this Conference; the so-called representative of labor in the Cabinet of the United States.

Our Union happens to have had a great deal of experience with one of the most vicious and effective weapons of the employers against organized labor, and that is what we call "red-baiting". At one time they used to call them "anarchists", another time they used to call them "socialists". I am sure that they had a name for it in the time of Pharaoh and in the time of Caesar--labels they tried to attach to people in an attempt to break their union. Now they use the word "Communism".

Our organization has had plenty of experience with this red-baiting. They hounded and persecuted the President of our organization for twelve solid, un stinting years. For twelve years they hounded, red-baited and persecuted Harry Bridges. And even after the matter was disposed of in the Supreme Court of the United States, that never stopped for one moment. Why? Because he was Harry Bridges? Bosh! If he was another longshoreman pitching cases on the waterfront, would they bother with him? Of course not! There was only one sole and solitary purpose: to smash and destroy the fighting strength of our organization, an organization that has not done too much good for its membership. I will admit it right here and now. Perhaps it has done a lot in comparison with what other organizations might have done, but it is still very little because they do not have the security, the
guarantees of a livelihood, the prospects for a future, and the happiness to which all workers are entitled. But they want to destroy even that small modicum of protection which the workers happen to have, and they made their target Harry Bridges. We know exactly what they had in mind. The NAM put it so simply anyone should be able to understand it. They said that because of higher prices there would in all likelihood be a wave of strikes. The NAM, through its crystal ball, predicted that prices were going to drop after OPA was destroyed, but those things have not happened.

Then their second premise is, Communists are in favor of strikes!

Now, the syllogism is complete. Therefore a striker is a Communist! And that is the NAM program and propaganda, hoping to accomplish the destruction of labor unions, a frightening of the working people through this anti-red hysteria, when every thinking person knows that there is no question of Communism, Socialism, Anarchism, Voodocism or any other kind of an ism in this country just as long as the economic system under which we live provides people with a minimum of essentials of decency, of food, clothing, shelter and a little bit of a break in getting some of the sunshine of life. And if the economic system fails to do that, any person is entitled to his or her opinion as to what changes ought to be made. But they know full well the economic system here is not going to do just that, but that all the things point to another crash and they hope that now they will stamp out every seat of discontent, every voice of honesty and decency, any voice
of protest against the economic hardships that the monopolists are going to bring around this country. And it is pretty sad when the Secretary of Labor makes the iniquitous proposals that he has about outlawing the Communist Party, when that is nothing but the same pattern of red-baiting designed to destroy labor unions. If the Secretary's program, plus some of the bills proposed in Congress for the discharge of so-called "subversives" (as determined by the employers, of course) and bills to determine who can and who can not be an official of a labor union, is made effective, I will tell you right now that about eighty per cent of our Union is subject to discharge and all of the officials are not eligible to hold office. Because in the sense that we have said and said again that we are opposed to red-baiting, we insist that there be government planning for protection of individual workers and we do not believe in the unbridled free enterprise that dominates and oppresses the people; that we do believe in the freedom of small peoples everywhere in their right to self-determine their own destinies and governments. And on every one of those counts we are as guilty as sin, and all that the Secretary of Labor has done is to join the pack. He lost his head and joined the pack.

That is easy to do. We are sincerely hopeful that the big majority of people will not lose their heads, will not join the pack, will realize that the big problem in this country is an employer problem. And unless labor unites, unless the people all over this country who are interested in progress and democracy and decency unite with organized labor, these monopoly plans of capital
may well be disastrous to this entire nation!

... Applause...

CHAIRMAN WILLMAN: Thank you, Mr. Goldblatt.

I am sorry to have to shut off further discussion, but as Mr. Goldblatt said, people seem to insist upon eating.

I should like to make one or two announcements.

First, may I simply in explanation say that Dr. Kerr and the Faculty Advisory Committee would like very much to have had this meeting and the meeting this afternoon in Wheeler Auditorium and to have advertised it widely. It was not possible because of the fact that we have 22,000 students on this Campus and some of the classes run into 900 and 1,000, and Wheeler Auditorium is occupied both this morning and this afternoon by classes running that large. Some day, perhaps, we shall have adequate buildings to take care of the classes and at the same time take care of a large conference in the daytime.

The meeting this evening has been changed from Wheeler Auditorium to the Men's Gymnasium because of the fact that some 200 or 300 people were unable to get either to Wheeler Auditorium or Room 113. So the meeting this evening will be in the Men's Gymnasium.

For eating places it is rather difficult about the Campus. Dr. Kerr has arranged for eating facilities at the Durant Hotel for people who are attending the Conference here today. The Durant Hotel is on Durant Street just east of Telegraph. So if you will go through Sather Gate, Telegraph Avenue to Durant Avenue and...
turn east to the Durant Hotel, those of you who care to may eat there.

The meeting will be recessed until 2:00 o'clock.

... WHEREUPON, at 12:15 P.M., a recess was taken until 2:00 P.M. of the same day. ...
SECOND DAY -- THURSDAY AFTERNOON SESSION

... The Thursday afternoon session of the First Annual Industrial Relations Conference of the Institute of Industrial Relations and University Extension, Berkeley Campus, University of California, convened in Room 113, Agriculture Hall, at 2:00 p.m.; Dr. Harry R. Wellman, Chairman, Faculty Advisory Committee, University of California, presiding ...

CHAIRMAN WILLMAN: We have a full afternoon, so I think we should get started on time.

The first topic for discussion this afternoon is Collective Bargaining and Economic Progress.

The speaker is exceptionally well known in Labor-Management circles. He has served his country well. In 1938 he was a member of President Roosevelt's Commission on Industrial Relations in Great Britain and Sweden; from 1941 to 1942 he was Chairman of the National Defense Mediation Board; and from 1942 to 1944 he was Chairman of the National War Labor Board; then in 1945 he was appointed Director of Economic Stabilization. At the present time he is Chairman of the Labor Committee of the Twentieth Century Fund. I am pleased to present Mr. William H. Davis.
... Loud applause ...

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

William H. Davis, Chairman,
Labor Committee of Twentieth Century Fund; formerly Chairman,
National War Labor Board and
Director of Economic Stabilization.

MR. DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. I have been asked to speak on the subject of Collective Bargaining and Economic Progress.

I suppose that the most important question in America today, and possibly a basically important question for the world today, is, How can we establish and maintain, or perhaps I should say merely maintain at the moment that high level of industrial production which represents a substantially full use of our manpower resources? How can we achieve and maintain a division of the products which will keep the machinery running at a high level and eliminate, or at least greatly moderate, the "boom and bust" cycle which we have enjoyed for many years? And I think that collective bargaining is very closely related to that basic question.

I have noticed with regret in the last year (I have been on the sidelines completely so I could take time to notice and also have the opportunity to regret) that the rational discussion of these problems which lie before us has been screened almost completely by an alarm, and every time I have spoken anywhere the last year the question has been, "Well, what are we going to do about strikes?"

I do not want to minimize that question, and I think the
strikes in 1946 should not be minimized. They were very harmful. They delayed our conversion, which some of us had done a lot of work to try and speed up, and they made me pretty mad. But they did not terrify me and I do not think there is any reason why they should have terrified anyone. And I gathered from the remarks of my very dear friend Mr. Loeser, this morning that they did not terrify him. But they have screened the discussion. I think we saw that last night. And so I felt that I could contribute most today by not starting with a discussion of, What are we going to do about these strikes? but to try really to lay before us the basic resources which we have here in America for self-government and then come back at the end to, What are we going to do about strikes? because I think the time has come in America when we must drag out our capacity for self-government and look it over and see what it is good for.

We have been in more than one crisis since 1789 and have had occasion to haul out this capacity, and it has served us pretty well. It got us through the war. I have sometimes said lately that you would think we lost the war. But we did not. We won it. And on the whole, I will say we won it in spite of the War Labor Board! That's something! But I think we ought to look it over.

The War Labor Board had its troubles, but we got along. I will have to admit that the damned thing backfired in 1946, but we got through that, too. And now we come to the time, however, when we are bedeviled by this question, in a voice of alarm and by too much excitement on both sides, especially at the extremities.
As I said the other day, I wish for a couple of years the extremists on both sides would hire themselves a hall and fight it out between themselves and not in the paths of the American people, who want very, very much to go ahead. And that's my recommendation, too.

There were some remarks made last night, as there usually are, about either lawyers or professors, and they included remarks about the "learned liberals" who had some knowledge of Labor-Management matters derived from mediation, fellows like Bill Leiserson, and there was this tone of derogation.

I thought, after all, perhaps if you take in this field of labor the total of those people, you will have 1400, let us say, out of 140,000,000 people. So that is 1 to 100,000. And what I am interested in is the 140,000,000. I think that they can get ahead with, and in spite of if necessary, the professors and the "learned liberals". At any rate, it is what they think that counts.

It is hard for me to know exactly where to start a discussion of our resources, but I am going to this. I recall an article written by Carl Becker, who was then at Cornell. It appeared in the Yale Law Journal. It was entitled "Some Generalities That Still Glitter". Carl Becker undertook in that article to spell out the basic pillars of democracy and, as I remember it (and I remember it pretty well), he identified the three basic pillars of democracy in this way:

The first one was the recognition of the value of the
individual as such, the dignity of the individual.

The second was a recognition of the value of persuasion and its superiority over force.

The third one was the recognition of the value of the truth and the obligation which we all have to search for the truth and, having found it, to share it with our fellowmen.

I do not think that but a very small percentage of the American people would find fault with Carl Becker's enumeration of the basic principles of democracy.

Where do we get those principles? From where do they come? How do we get that way?

It goes back a long time, ladies and gentlemen, and I shall go back two thousand years and indulge in a little philosophy (it is all my own, you see) and take you to the banks of the river below or outside of Athens, to a grove and under the trees on the banks of the river Socrates and the others were persuading Timaeus to venture for them his guess about the origin of the gods and the creation of the universe.

It was a joint discussion, and in self-defense I am going to read to you a very modest remark of Timaeus. The remark is this, and I want it applied today:

"If then, Socrates, we find ourselves in many points unable to make our discourse in every way wholly consistent and exact, you must not be surprised. Nay, we must be well content if we can provide an account not less likely than in others. We must remember that I who speak and you who are my audience are but men, and we should be satisfied to ask for no more than the likely story."
With that introduction he propounded this proposition. He said:

The origin of the universe, the creation of a cosmos out of chaos, came about when reason persuaded necessity (the Greek word means many things: random force, chance) to order the greater part of things for good. Then, his cosmology went on, they created demi-gods and they were endowed with reason, and the demi-gods were authorized to create mankind.

You see, the supply of reason was considerably depleted by that time! They created mankind. They endowed him, according to Timaeus, with what reason was left—insufficiently perhaps, but also with a passion for creation, and left to him the minor part.

That story always interested me very much. Here we have the picture. I should like to push it a little further. I hope there are no scholastic philosophers present, but to make my point throughout about the 140,000,000 people, I should like to put it this way:

Let us assume that the major part of which Timaeus spoke about having been put into order for good is that part of the universe which we observe as the physical universe, which obeys the laws which we more or less and increasingly understand, or think we do; and that the minor part that was left for completion was the mind and will of men, the part of the universe which is the non-physical part, because we observe that that minor part has not been ordered for good.

Now I shall illustrate that. You have a hundred men and you
want to bring them into order. You can put uniforms on them, you can make them look alike; you can stand them up against the wall. But you can't make them think alike by force—only by persuasion. If you stand them against the firing wall, you still do not know that their minds are in order and all you can do is shoot them, which consists of reducing them to the physical universe, moving them out of the non-physical universe, and then no doubt they will obey the physical laws.

My point is this: if to point the thing up, assume that something like that is the order and that mankind is actually a participant with the Creator in the completion of the orderly arrangement of the minor part; and you see then where these ideas came from. That is not too unlike a portmanteau picture, perhaps, of Platonism. But you see where the ideas came from. If you entertain such an idea as that, you can not fail to have regard for the human being as such, if it is only sympathy, because, you say, "Well, we are all in the same boat, with the same job. It affects us all the same. We hope the Creator sticks with us."

As Mr. Browning put it:

"Here is work enough to watch
The master work and catch
The tricks of the proper trade,
The tricks of the tool's true play."

But for people who have any such idea as of the worth of the individual as that, it is natural to feel that the dignity of the individual is of primary importance. And so of the value of persuasion.
Last night there was a slurring reference in Mr. Richberg's remarks to those liberals who preach persuasion in preference to force. I think I know who he was shooting at. But I did not invent the idea. Plato did not invent it. It preceded Plato. And all the history of mankind has confirmed it. It is a hard rule that you make progress in human affairs by persuasion and not by force.

I have been in positions where I wished it were different, but I have never found it so. And that is the rule and that is where we got it. That is where Carl Becker got it. And now the value of the truth has come to be since Plato's time a highly developed systematized, scientific research. We now have developed scientific methods of truth-finding which consist of a high imagination coupled with checking of observations. And it has gone pretty far.

You may say, "What has all that got to do with collective bargaining and economic progress?"

I asked myself, Are those resources still available to the American people? As it happens, there have been occurrences recently that left no doubt about that. I had a funny experience about it.

Mr. McKinnon of San Francisco wrote an article that was published in the Journal of the Bar Association. He had been making some speeches, and he pointed out in the article that there was prevalent in some circles in America, more than he liked, a theory that the old rights of man were unreal and did not exist. He
opposed himself very vigorously to that idea in this article, which is well worth reading, and he wound up, as I remember it, by saying that his opinion was that the rights of man did exist, that they had found full and, he hoped, eternal expression in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, and he expressed the view that the man on the street in America still believed in liberty.

Well, I thought so, too. But it was not long after that that I saw an article in the Atlantic Monthly written by the President of that publishing company. The title of it was "The Right to Strike". It was quite a philosophical article and it took the position that there is no such thing as human rights; that the idea of trying to write a Bill of Rights as they are now trying to do in UN was a foolish waste of time; that they are "documents of confusion", which was the expression used, and that there are no rights that do not give way to the rights of the public.

It was a doctrine that was expressed very temperately in a way, in philosophical tones, but would have served Mr. Hitler just as well as a somewhat more violent doctrine than he expressed. It upset me quite a bit, because I was born and brought up in New England and I learned about the Bill of Rights on my mother's knee and I also learned there that the Atlantic Monthly had some sort of special connection with Divine Providence, which was never defined but never questioned! And so it was quite a shock to me and I felt like getting up and ejaculating a very
emphatic "No!"

I was in that upset state of mind when I read in the papers Mr. Lilienthal's statement to Senator McKeelar, and I want to read it. He said:

"I believe, and I so conceive the Constitution of the United States to rest upon, as does religion, the fundamental proposition of the integrity of the individual and that all government and all private institutions must be designed to promote and protect and defend the integrity and the dignity of the individual. That is the essential meaning of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and it is essentially the meaning of religion."

As I say, I felt better. Then when I observed the reaction across the country to Mr. Lilienthal's remarks, which was not indefinite, I concluded that Mr. McKinney was right when he expressed the opinion that the man on the street in America still believed in liberty. So I think I need not argue with this audience, perhaps, that those resources are available to us.

My friends, it is those beliefs really that make these people so terrified about the strikes of 1946. It is because fundamentally they are opposed to tyranny and they think they have been tyrannized by the labor unions, and they are opposed to it and they get frightened about it. So, really, if you are an optimist you can see that there is a sign of good even in that.

How does that go for collective bargaining? and to get back from Greece to home.

Well, don't you see that those three propositions of Mr. Becker's "Generalities Still Glitter" are the very fundamentals
of collective bargaining? Collective bargaining is based on the respect for the individual. Men sit around the table as equals. It is based on the values of persuasion over force, and it is based upon the search for truth. That could be improved on its technique and I am coming back to that. So I said, "Well, I am feeling pretty good now. We have got quite a lot of evidence of these resources." And apparently they extend into collective bargaining. And I notice that President Truman, when he sent his message to Congress the first of the year, said, "And collective bargaining is still the national policy." And did anybody on the Hill say No? In all the discussions before the committees of Congress there has not been a significant submission (I think this is correct) which has been opposed to collective bargaining. Nor has there been a significant submission either by Management or Labor or anyone else that is in favor of government decree.

So that on the evidence before us, pessimists or optimists, you can say with the greatest of assurance that today the great body of the American people, leaving off the extremists, believe that collective bargaining, that is, industrial self-government, and free contract are superior to regulating our economy by government decree.

That is what they believe, whether they are right or wrong or not, and that is our asset for going ahead with the solution of this problem. We would be crazy not to go ahead in the direction that is indicated by that overwhelming opinion.

As we go ahead, you know, my friend Van Salenquin, in Boston
and Harvard, made a very nice remark. He is asking for maturity in this subject, mature thinking. He said, "A mature mind is one that faces the facts of life as something to be handled rather than something to be hated."

That is a very practical remark. I think it was Tennyson, perhaps, (someone may check me) who said, "As one lamp lights, another grows less; so noblest cancels least noblest."

That is a great remark, but unfortunately it is equally true of ignobleness, which spreads like a fire. And so the pessimist is the guy who puts the weight on ignobleness and the optimist is the guy who puts the weight on nobleness; and the mature mind, of which we had an example this morning, stands in between.

I am going to read Alfred Whitehead's remark and then get away from philosophy. Whitehead said:

"The worth of men consists in their liability to persuasion. They can persuade and can be persuaded by the disclosure of alternatives, the better and the worse. Civilization is the maintenance of social order by its own inherent persuasiveness as embodying the nobler alternative. The recourse to force, however unavoidable, is a disclosure of the failure of civilization either in the general society or in a remnant of individuals."

And so I say that collective bargaining, which is the chosen method of America, is well defined in that sentence. And you sit around the table, if you are mature, or we will when we are mature; argue the thing through, argue the thing out; put the alternatives on the table and choose the better and reject the worse. And that is what I think we should get after. I think we are on the
very of a new era in human relations. In fact, we are either on
the verge of a new era or we are sunk. But I think we are. We
are well on our way, and we had better keep going.

And so I say almost the same thing that Dr. Leiserson said
this morning. In all these considerations of laws to pass or
things to do, there is one infallible criterion, and that is,
Will it strengthen or weaken collective bargaining?

That may sound like an extreme position to take on collective
bargaining, but I say to this audience that that is the way that
the thing was set up from the beginning. That is the only way
you can create progress. And so I say that is a good and suffi-
cient criterion.

Now I shall get away from the philosophy of labor relations
or metaphysics, perhaps somebody will say, to collective bargain-
ing as a science.

There you have, I think, two principles upon which the sci-
ence can base itself by substantial agreement in this country
today. One of them is the principle that we want to do it by
collective bargaining, not by government decree. The other prin-
ciple is a newer one and yet I think it is in the picture. We
know from experience that we can produce at a very high level.
The technological problems have been solved to a point where we
can produce as much as we want--full utilization of our resources.
We do not know how to distribute that production so as to keep
the thing going without the "boom and bust". But it is now begin-
ing to be seen that that question is a cold, objective question
of economics and social government. There was a time, if you did not get more than your share on this earth, you would starve to death. It was a matter of life and death to get more than your share. That is not true in America any more, so the thing cools off. I do not know the answer, but part of the problem of collective bargaining is, What is that economic division of the total product which will keep the machine running at its highest speed? And a great deal of study has been devoted to it and is being devoted to it. As I say, the novel feature of it is that it is now beginning to be seen to be a proposition without "heat", that what you need is "light" about it, and that there is a division that is best for the producer, for the consumer, and the worker.

I think that those two principles can be said to be accepted as fundamental principles of the science of collective bargaining.

But here is what happens. You have principles and in this country particularly you have great organizations. That is, collective bargaining goes on not between individuals but principally between large organizations. As soon as you have an organization, you have pressure within and peculiar to that organization, and pressures differ depending on the nature and the purpose of the organization.

Professor Bakke at Yale, for instance, has been studying that subject, is doing special research on it, and it is being studied everywhere. But we all know it is so. The reason I have gotten kicked around frequently (no doubt Dr. Leiserson has) is
that they say, "What are you doing in here? You are a do-gooder. What do you know about labor relations?"

And I have to admit the soft impeachment. Because what happens is this:

I shall use the name of Sol Bloch. I use his name because I know him quite well and I know his views. No matter what I would say, he would get up and make a reply and he would remark: "Well, Davis doesn't know anything about the pressures of a labor organization and he doesn't know what our policies are."

I was talking to him the other day and I said: "Sol, do your opponents know what they are?"

He said: "No, I don't think they do."

I said: "Do you know what your opponents' policies are?"

"No, we don't. They keep them to themselves."

"Well, do you know what their pressures are?"

Well, he is an imaginative fellow and he undertook to say that he did!

The point I am making is that if you are going to have a science of collective bargaining you must study the pressures within the organizations and the way in which those pressures (because it can all be related to physics) modify the agreed principles to produce different policies. And collective bargaining consists in sitting down around the table and in one way or another shape those pressures to policies on which the two sides can agree. That is, genuine collective bargaining.

All over the country that study is going on. That is what
this Conference here is about. And it is going on in every big
college in the country, in the labor organizations, in the big
organizations of management like the CED, the American Management
Association, the Society for Advancement of Management, National
Planning Association, and so on.

I think it would be a very good thing if this institution
or some wealthy institution could devote enough money to it, to
have somebody sit down and give us a picture of what is going on
in these studies and how far they have gotten. In the physical
sciences where I was trained, you come pretty near finding out,
at least, what is the generally accepted doctrine about electromagnetism. You may not be able to understand it, but you find
some accord. They change that frequently, but that is all to
the good. But you can not find that in the science of collective
bargaining. So I am all in favor of keeping at that in a scien-
tific spirit.

I think if my friend George Taylor were here he would say,
"Well, Bill, what are you talking about? You see, this matter of
fixing wages is a specialist's matter. You have got to do (this,
that and the other)." He would give you an expert's advice on
it. And so it is in every science. The practitioner is differ-
ent from the scientist.

There was an old German expression that said that "A scienc-
tist is a man who knows everything and can't do anything. An
engineer is a man who can do everything and doesn't know anything." And that is pretty accurate, and it is the nature of the thing.
You can not be both. So I am all in favor of developing these scientists, even if they can not do anything at the bargaining table.

That brings me to the art of collective bargaining. And it is a great art. There we get into two things: procedures and personalities. Both are of controlling importance.

It is the beginning of wisdom to understand that social science is founded on routine, and unless you have routine in collective bargaining, unless you have agreed procedures, you make no progress. I am inclined to think at this stage of the game they are superior in importance to the personalities, in spite of the tremendous importance of personalities. But at any rate we have to develop the procedures in the faith that collective bargaining is inherently capable of solving the problem, and with the criterion that everything you do, every rule you make, every law you pass, if you pass any, should be tested by the question, Does it strengthen and not weaken the process of collective bargaining?

That would be my platform. I think that that art is really the most rewarding art that is known to man, and it is pleasant in some ways, goodness knows! I got my share of being kicked around. I am an amateur in the game. I went in it because I loved it and I got kind of toughened up. I remember saying to my wife, who was worried about me in 1943, because she thought I was going to break down, "My dear, you know that I am a very gentle person," at which she smiled. I said, "Down here in
Washington, I have gotten so, if I don't get a bucket of blood by noon, I feel anemic!"

I hope some day we shall get to a point in collective bargaining where it won't be so bloody. But I shall say this to you: Don't let anybody go out from here with the thought that I have said it is an easy game or the solution is an easy one. To paraphrase Churchill, We may not have blood, but we shall have sweat, and being engaged in human relations, we are going to have tears. But who wants an easy road? My goodness! If the Creator intended us to march forward on an easy road, he would have given us no reason or a passion for human relations, because neither one would be of any use to us. What did they say in the Declaration of Rights? One of our inalienable rights is the pursuit of happiness. No one wants an easy road to happiness.

So with that declaration of faith in the possibilities of collective bargaining and an attempt to lay down a general criterion, I return, as I promised I would, to the question, What are you going to do about these strikes?

In the first place, a strike in the ordinary industrial relationship is, as you know, a part and a very useful part of the machinery of collective bargaining. I think Bill Leiserson would agree with me that in the last fifteen minutes of big controversies it is the right to strike or the threat of a strike, the possibility of a strike, that is the instrument with which the controversy is settled. It is always present at the conference table. It is the thing that puts a limit on unreason and it is
the thing that holds the parties in the last fifteen minutes to the full responsibility of making their own decisions. And without that responsibility you do not have collective bargaining.

Don't I know that! Having been Chairman of the War Labor Board for several years! What we did to collective bargaining! If there is some place that you can take the "baby" in the last fifteen minutes, one side or the other is going to think that that is a better place than to sign the contract that is on the table and you don't have collective bargaining.

So the strike in the ordinary, everyday round of affairs is the way you settle the thing finally. It is like my going into a store to buy a pair of socks. The fellow shows me socks and he says, "$1.50". I say, "I don't want them. It is too much."

Well, we haven't done any business. He hasn't sold the socks and I haven't got any socks.

I go out, however. The world is still revolving. I go around town looking for socks, and I find I can't get any socks for less than $1.50. So I get more reasonable and I think, "Well, maybe I will go back and buy those socks." But maybe by the time I get back the fellow has found that he can't move the socks at $1.50 and he offers them at $1.25.

That is what the strike does frequently. Besides that, it teaches people the realities of existence and usually results in a period of stable peace.

Don't think that I am an advocate of strikes. In 1944 we were having the "quickie" strikes all over the country. People
went out knowing the War Labor Board would order them back and they would go back in a day or two.

It is one thing to do that and it is another thing to lay down your tools when you do not know when you are going to pick them up again. So knowing that, I said in a moment of madness, "What this country needs is a first-class strike."

Well, the papers throughout the country were full of it: "Davis favors strikes in wartime! He must be a Communist!"

However, that is what the country did need. Goodness knows! we got it, and I think it is quite plain that with all the harassments, with all the tumult and the shouting, it was a very good thing for our constitutions. We are much better off that we had them. I am convinced of that. We are not on the brink of disaster. The labor movement in this country is not a horrible monster with unlimited power. In fact, my guess is that it is in one of the weakest positions in which it has been in my time. And the country is not in danger. We have plenty of time to think it over.

I should like to go back for a minute to this matter of the science of collective bargaining and the procedures of the art. Take a paper like Dr. Leiserson's today. Here is a man who knows what he is talking about. He has a mature mind, if you will excuse me. He faces the facts of life as something to be handled and not something to be hated, and he lays down a program in that paper which, in my judgment, could well be taken by the country as something to go on and go into every big industry in this
country. I don't mean to go to Washington, but go to the industries, to labor and management in the industries and say, "Boys, how about this paper of Dr. Leiserzon's as a procedure to start on in this scheme of collective bargaining?"

I think it would be a great thing. They would modify it in different places. But it faces the facts of the situation.

So I come to the conclusion, you know, that strikes are not such a bad thing in their place. They are all right.

Then I got into this dispute about the right to strike. I told you about that. Mr. McKimmon in the Atlantic Monthly dragged it off into a question of the basic rights of man. And when you get off there, there is no doubt about the answer in this country. But the fact of the matter is that, in my judgment, this very interesting discussion of basic human rights has nothing to do with this question of, What are you going to do about strikes? I want to tell you what I mean by that.

There are certain cases in which the procedure of interrupting production and sifting the thing out while the other fellow gets more reasonable or you get more reasonable (good technique in many cases or in most cases) is simply not available. Nobody knows that better than the mature leaders of Labor in America. I think such a situation as that exists on the subways of New York. All you have to do is to look at the map of New York to know that if you did not have a transit system, you might as well give Manhattan Island back to the Indians, and you would be lucky to get back your $24.00. You simply could not live there. So
you can not shut down the subways; you can not shut down the railroads. When Mr. Whitney's outfit started it, the President came out that Friday afternoon and said, "The government will use all the powers of government to keep the railroads running." And they ran. So did Mr. Whitney! I think he is a pretty wise fellow.

So actually, then, those who know anything about the history of Labor in America can cite more cases than one. Actually the fact is that the government always steps into those cases, and it has to if it is to be a government at all. Then people's rights are not in question. The point is that the technique is not available. Then wise people who have mature minds and who know that in their hearts will sit down around the table and try to work out in each industry of that character a substitute for strikes. And that is what we should be doing in these cases. It can be done. It should be industry by industry, because the labor leaders know what they are up against.

My goodness! It was a policemen's strike, the only one I ever heard of in America, and policemen have as much right to strike theoretically as anybody else, that made Mr. Coolidge President. Well, no one could call that a commonplace event! Everybody feels that sort of thing, you see, so that there is this material for working it out.

Somebody is going to say, "Yeh, but suppose they don't work it out? Suppose in the last analysis they shut down the railroads?"

Well, I say, "The President will do what the President has always done. He will come in and keep the railroads running."
I was a little facetious about that one time. I got in trouble. I said that one of the virtues of our Constitution was that the President's powers remain undefined although ample for the emergency. The result was that in our history, and we have had emergencies since we began, each time we have had a President with the courage to act and save the Union—usually unconstitutional or extra-constitutional. Then after the Union is saved and the emergency is over, the thing gets into the Supreme Court and they say that the thing is unconstitutional and save the Constitution.

That is not so facetious as it seems. Let me put it another way. We have these undefined powers of the President which are ample to the emergency. People say they ought to be defined. All right. By whom? By Congress, within limits. Suppose Congress says, "In such an emergency the President is authorized to do (so-and-so)." The first thing would have to be seizure, just because you can't make people work for a private employer. So it would be seizure.

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution says the Congress shall pass no law depriving the citizens of the United States of life, liberty or property without due process. So the first thing Congress has to do is to set up due process. And the Second Amendment says, If you take a man's property you must make fair, just compensation for it, and the Supreme Court has said that a man's labor is a property right. So I say, If Congress is going to pass any law on the subject it should be a law which does not
become effective until there has been a declaration of national emergency. If Congress wants to join with the President in that declaration, all right. You have got to have that in. Otherwise, the collective bargainers will know beforehand where to go to get out of the hole they are in, and if they know it beforehand it is always going to be more attractive to one side than the other, and there goes your collective bargaining.

But, then, if the emergency is declared and there is seizure, it must be constitutional seizure and something must be set up to fix the just compensation to management and labor because of the property of theirs that has been seized. I think such a provision as that would never be used, probably. In fact, I do not advocate it. I would leave it to the President's emergency powers, as we have done now since 1789 and gotten along. But if anybody wants a law, that is the kind of a law I would like.

That is my answer to, What are you going to do about strikes?

When it comes to amendment of the Wagner Act, I will go along with what Dr. Leiserson has said completely. I put it this way: the purpose of the Wagner Act was to secure a better division of the income of the American people. In 1935 when the Act was passed we had all been through the NRA. It was the only time in my life I ever knew economists to be all agreed on one thing, and they were all agreed then that our trouble was maldistribution of the national income. The declared purpose of the Wagner Act was to improve that distribution. The method employed was to stop
employers from interfering with self-organization of employees. It worked pretty well, as statistics show, but it is now said that the result either of the Act or its interpretation has been to throw the balance the other way, to unbalance it in favor of labor and against management. But the declared purpose was to improvement the distribution of the national income and the method was to redress the unbalanced power at the bargaining table. But if the bargaining table is now unbalanced in favor of labor against management, it ought to be corrected because that was not the intention of the Act.

But I agree with the President and with Dr. Leiserson and others who say, If you are going to amend the Wagner Act at all, let a study be made. Here is an Act of Congress which introduced into our social system certain rules for a certain purpose. There has been built up on it a great deal of law and it needs the study of experts. You do not amend a thing like that, retaining its basic purpose, by shooting at it. You look at it and say, "Is this thing being carried out in a way that serves the purpose? If it is not, how do we need to change it?" You do not need to change it any more than you have to. In other words, it is a matter to be done with your brain and not with your heart completely. I would not leave the heart out. So on the Wagner Act I would advocate a study.

On this matter of prohibiting industrywide collective bargaining, it is hard for me to speak. Anybody who knows anything about my views knows what they are. The basic trouble with it
is that you can find out by looking at the Act itself. There are
two pages of things that are forbidden to American citizens. You
must not do this, you must not do that. No one of them has the
slightest tinge of moral turpitude. They are things that they
have been doing, that they think they have the right to do. The
history on the subject has shown success in almost every case of
industrywide bargaining, and so the bill tells all these people,
"You can't do that."

Well, you can not pass a law like that in a democracy and
get away with it. As Dr. Leiserson said, all you do is to expose
the impotence of democratic government. So that is enough to
condemn it. And besides that, Are we cowards? Here we are en-
gaged in a process, a great adventure, in which the ultimate pur-
pose is to bring into order these social forces, to order them
for good. The more of that we do, the better.

It happens that in this industrywide bargaining the forces
are at a high level. That fact creates danger, risk, but it
creates at the same time opportunity. The higher the level of
the forces, the greater the opportunity for creative results.

And so I say, Unless we are cowards we shall not run away
into chaos from that opportunity. And the question is, Have we
the guts to be great in that field?

Thank you very much.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Only a man who has thought deeply on those complex problems
could give us the wisdom Mr. Davis has given us this afternoon.

To discuss Mr. Davis' paper we have three people. The first is Mr. George Bahrs, President of the San Francisco Employers Council.

Mr. Bahrs!

... Loud applause ...

GEORGE O. BAHRS,
President, San Francisco Employers Council.

MR. BAHRS: It is a difficult task to follow such a figure as Mr. Davis. However, I do want to make these observations on his address of this afternoon:

He stressed the point that over a period of time the policy of the government of this country is that our industrial relations problems shall be settled through the processes of collective bargaining, and he believes that we should continue along that path toward a solution of our industrial relations problems.

In that I agree with him and I believe that his statement is peculiarly significant in advocating collective bargaining as against any form of compulsory adjudication such as a labor court, compulsory arbitration, or a board of some kind, because Mr. Davis himself sat at the head of the most powerful tribunal for the determination of labor controversies that this country has ever seen.

For my part, I believe in collective bargaining as a solution to our problems and I would work a long time at improving the processes of collective bargaining before I would abandon them.
for any form of compulsion.

There are many, many reasons which can be listed as arguments against the formula of compulsory arbitration. I think one of the most practical and effective was mentioned here this morning by Dr. Leiserson. You will find a reference to it, not only on the part of management but by labor itself, in the American Federationist a month or so ago, in which it was pointed out that Australia has had a system of compulsory arbitration for a period of years and it was called the most strike-ridden country in the world. In proportion to population, Australia has had twice as many strikes during the past four years as has had the United States.

Mr. Davis views with a great degree of detachment, I think, more from the viewpoint of a philosopher or an historian, tracing the events in the evolution of our processes of collective bargaining. Unhappily, it is not my assignment to view that in such a detached manner. I am obliged to be an active participant in the processes and I hope that some corrections can take place during a time when I can witness them.

If it is to be the considered policy of our government that we are to settle our disputes or our differences by collective bargaining, I think that we should realize all of the implications of that statement. If we are going to have collective bargaining inevitably we are to have strikes. Organized labor believes that the right to strike is implicit in the processes of collective bargaining. And I want to say that I do not disagree
with that statement. I believe that if the processes of collective bargaining were to be simply the presentation of a list of demands or requests of an employer and he had the opportunity to check off those to which he agreed, those to which he did not agree, and hand them back to the union, the process would be more or less an idle process.

The National Association of Manufacturers, which is one of the outstanding spokesmen for American industry and which has been mentioned this morning, has issued a forthright statement on this subject to the effect that where there is a bona fide difference of opinion following genuine collective bargaining, employees should be free to strike provided that there is no contract standing in the way.

I think that we ought to realise frankly what this process is. If you have collective bargaining and if collective bargaining breaks down and if it is followed by a strike, the issue is settled not necessarily by who is right but by who is the strongest, who can hold out the longest, or who can lean out the window the farthest.

The first definition I ever heard of "collective bargaining" was given to me by a labor representative who said that "collective bargaining is a process whereby both sides sit around the table and the strongest side gets everything it wants."

It is not our concept of the most civilized way of settling our differences, but it has this one outstanding virtue: if the parties have a difference and they hammer out a settlement through
the processes of collective bargaining, whether it is with a strike or without, the product is their "baby" and they will love it and they will work under it far better than if some person from the outside took them and knocked their heads together and handed them a solution. That is the one major virtue of the collective bargaining process.

Mr. Davis in his discussion of the subject made reference to force versus persuasion. As far as I am concerned, the collective bargaining, carrying with it the right to strike, is to me a form of forceful persuasion.

This process unquestionably produces an impact on our public and an impact on our economy which is costly, but so far as I can see, it is one of the prices that we will have to pay for the liberties that we enjoy in this country. If it is to be the studied and continued policy of the government to provide that collective bargaining shall be the method by which we settle our differences of opinion in industrial relations matters, then I believe it is up to the government to write a set of rules that will be binding upon both sides of the collective bargaining process. I do not believe that you can settle all our problems by writing a law, and I would like to make it very plain that I am quite sure that we can not settle everything all at once time. I think we have to take a practical approach to the problem and work at it one step at a time.

With reference to legislation, let us consider what laws we have bearing on the subject of our industrial relations.
There are three principal statutes: the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act. For brevity let me say that the Clayton Act, in effect, excludes labor organizations from the definitions of combinations in restraint of trade. In effect, the Norris-LaGuardia Act exempts labor organizations from the equity powers of the Federal Courts. By a combination of the texts of those statutes and the application of them by the Courts, Labor has been given very substantial immunities from the processes of the law. And we finally come to the Wagner Act, designed to create the processes of collective bargaining. And what do we find? We find a long set of prohibitions and injunctions upon employers: "You shall not do this", "you shall not do that", "you must do this". And we can not find one word in the Wagner Act directed against labor organizations, nor in fact any provisions of the Wagner Act which make the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board binding upon labor organizations.

If you are going to have collective bargaining coupled, as I say, with the right to strike, I want to make this observation: that you can determine in advance the outcome of any economic contest by setting the rules. It is just like setting a pinball machine or one of the "one-armed bandits". If you set the rules in a certain way as to shackle one side and leave the other side free, clothe the other side with immunity, you know in advance what the outcome is going to be and it does not make any difference which side is shackled and which side is free.

If we intend to achieve a relative stability in our indus-
trial relations through the processes of collective bargaining, then we must set up a climate or a set of circumstances whereby the bargaining strength of both sides is relatively equal.

Mr. Leiserson in his remarks this morning advocated legislation furthering the development of employer bargaining groups. That is a difficult question and it is one which the public ultimately will have to decide. If we strengthen the bargaining groups and if we strengthen the labor groups, it may be that the contests will be bigger and fiercer to the point where the public will feel that it will not be tolerated. If that is not the process that we will follow, then inevitably we must enact legislation that will counterbalance on the part of labor the restrictions that are now placed upon management.

And so I say to you, to summarize my remarks, if we are going to rely on collective bargaining and if we hope to achieve a relative stability, the first step would be by dealing out an even-handed justice in writing the rules of the game for both sides.

Thank you.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. Bahrs.

The next speaker will be Mr. A.F. Gaynor, Grand Lodge Representative of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks.

Mr. Gaynor.

A.F. GAYNOR

Grand Lodge Representative, Brotherhood of Railway Clerks.
MR. GAYNOR: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Davis, Dr. Leiserson, and friends. I think that one of the greatest statements made by Mr. Davis leaves us with this thought: that we should hold our heads while all others around us are losing theirs.

It seems that the 80th Congress, which has been in session since January 4, has spent its entire time trying to do something about what I consider a ghost or something that somebody has magnified into something like that which was placed in front of us when we were children: a boogieman.

Here we have organized labor, composed in the main, I would say, of approximately 14,000,000 workers—ten per cent of the American people—and we find the Congress of the United States spending their entire time trying to find out about or do something about these ten per cent.

Sure we have had some strikes! We have had strikes by the Railway Brotherhoods, two of the largest, the Trainmen and the Engineers. And they violated the Railway Labor Act. They should not strike. But there was a law passed saying that you can not strike. And what happened? They struck just the same. You can't make laws to send people to heaven and you can't make laws to keep workers on the job.

Another thing that rather disgusts me is that every time they start talking about regulating labor, the first thing I find or read in the paper is that all of a sudden they have got up a bunch of Communists in the labor movement who are causing all the trouble.
Well, take it at its worst. I belong to a union--2,000 employees at the General Office of the Southern Pacific. Do you know how many members attend the meeting? The most that ever attend any meeting is 60 or 70 out of 2,000. They have democracy. They are not fined if they do not attend. But I do not find any Communists in General Office Lodge 890.

I was the Business Agent. They said I was a Communist because I tried to get Tom Mooney and Billings out of jail.

Well, I say the Communists can take over General Office Lodge 890, have 30 employees attend the meeting, and they have the majority. If the labor unions want to take over the Communists, let the members attend the meetings and run the meetings themselves. If they don't run them, maybe the Communists will come in and run them. But I hate to see every time they talk about labor and labor's problems, the first thing they want to do is to bring in the Communist issue and bring that into labor. I sometimes wonder whether they are trying to help the labor movement or hurt the labor movement. And I say it is regrettable, too.

Let me mention first the former Secretary of Labor, Madame Perkins. You know, the employer groups gave her an awfully bad time, but I loved the Madame. She was one woman who would keep her mouth shut! And she did. You could heckle her and haunt her and rib her, but she held her head. And I remember a luncheon that I attended at the Commonwealth Club, and somebody was attempting to heckle the Madame. It was about Bridges, because he was a Communist. They heckled her because she wouldn't do anything about
it. She said, "You want me to say that Mr. Bridges is an undesirable citizen and say that he should be deported?" And of course, a few of the people at the luncheon said, "Yes", "Yes", "Yes". So Madame Perkins held her finger up and she shook it at them. She said, "No, you don't. The judge of desirability is not of this world."

Who is to say, then, who is desirable or what is desirable? They are discussing labor legislation, and all of a sudden the man who is supposed to be a friend of labor in the President's Cabinet, the present Secretary of Labor, starts off on a tangent with the rest of the groups chasing a bunch of Communists.

Let us concentrate on one problem, if we want to, and that is labor. We talk about the Railway Labor Act. I heard a great deal of that last night. I heard a great deal about the Railway Labor Act. Let me just give you some background of your present speaker. It will take me about thirty seconds.

I went to work for the Southern Pacific in 1919 in the General Office. I am on leave there working for the Brotherhood. I spent my entire life in the railroad industry and I have worked under the Railway Labor Act. And I will tell the workers of America that the last thing you should get saddled with is the Railway Labor Act as it is now written. (Applause)

Perhaps it has some good points to it. I can not find very many laws in the books that have not good points in them. But what is the story? Let me give you the story and you can watch this play develop in about ten days, because the Railroad Brother-
Brothertions are going to open the fight for increased wages. We are going to file for 20 cents an hour within the next ten days. Let me give you the Act.

We will file within the next ten days for a wage increase. Say we file on April 1. Under the Railway Labor Act we have to serve 30 days' notice that we want a raise. So we file for a raise to take effect May 1.

We meet with the Management and the Management says, "No." That takes five minutes. We say, "Will you handle it on a national basis?" They will say, "Yes." We have to wait for all the Brotherhoods to say that—about 40 or 50 of them.

So about June 15 they will meet in national handling, and unanimously they will all sit around the table and they will say, "No." And that will take five minutes.

Then there will be mediation and they will get a mediator to come in there and he will spend another ten or twelve days with them, and that will get us to within August 15. And they will say, "No," "No," "No." The Mediator will report back and say, They won't go any place. Neither side will give."

So then we take a strike vote. The Railroad Brotherhoods immediately spend thousands of dollars, and we go around taking strike votes. The word gets passed out, "Oh, you won't have to go out on strike. The President will appoint an emergency board and then they will decide it." The strike vote takes 60 days. That brings us to around October. The Emergency Board must report and it takes them about 20 days. So they get together on November 15,
In the meantime the workers are on your neck and they get on the Business Agent's neck. And if you are a Business Agent, like I am, you will end up with ulcers!

So far the Emergency Board meets and they decide for some reason or another, "We are not prepared. It will take us 30 days to get all prepared for this." That brings us into December 1. So somebody wants to get home for Christmas. Then they meet after Christmas. You have hearings that last 30 days. That brings us to February 1. The hearings are over. It takes 30 days to get a decision. The Committee hands the President a decision as to whether you got 20 cents an hour.

Well, that would be all right if you got 20 cents an hour retroactive to the prior year. But it is a year later and the Emergency Board report says, "No, we will make it 20 cents back to January 1." In the meantime the railroad workers have hooked their furniture and sold their bonds—all for peaceful industrial relations.

You can't have a union shop, maintenance of membership; you can't have a thing under the Railway Labor Act. Will the employers go in and say, "Amend it. Give them a closed shop."?

We have 2,000 of the employees of the Southern Pacific who are members of the union. We have 3,200 employees. 1,200 get a free ride. They won't join. They laugh at it.

The members come in and say, "We want this, Gaynor." "I can't do a thing for you."

"To heck with you! We won't pay any more dues."
Then 16, 15, 20 drop out of the union. You are continually kept in hot water.

Well, all right. Maybe that is what you want. I will tell you, boys, you fellows who are going to college to study industrial relations. I will tell you what you never want to do: Never be a Business Agent for one of the railroad brotherhoods.

Mr. Davis said something about putting the extremists of both sides into a hall. With that I agree. I would hire another hall across the way, and I say this speaking personally. There are a lot of officers of labor unions who speak for us in the halls of Congress and who are every day getting the front page. I would have the hall across from the extremists and I would put the labor men who do the talking in that hall and then I would retire them on full pay, and I would elect younger men to take their places. That is what we need.

Let me tell you this much. I do not live in the glories of yesterday or the theories of tomorrow. I live in the realities of today. The realities of today are these:

There is an out-and-out attempt to shackle organized labor, 14,000,000 people, ten per cent of the American people. If the Congress of this United States and the people of this United States want Communism, I say, Shackle labor and you will get it quicker than any other way. I say, Let's go back and sit down and be reasonable.

And another thing. I do not want any more negotiating with management. I do not want any more negotiating with management.
I want negotiations with ownership. And I will tell you why. I have been doing business in the General Office of the Southern Pacific for the last 27 years. Ten years of that time I have been on full time. And you know, a doctor told me once, "Gaynor, if you got out and played a little golf, forgot these things once in a while, you would be better off." And I did. I never could find out who you would meet on the golf course, but I finally found some of the Southern Pacific officials play golf and I would meet them on the golf course. But they, too, were not getting too much money because they were using the same course I was, and that was the public golf course. They told me, "What you want for the membership is right but we can't do a thing for you. The orders come from New York. Frankly," they said, "we as officials are glorified office boys for the management, and if we don't do what the management wants we have no union to protect us. They just fire us."

Now, watch the pattern. It is ownership that curtails and ties the hands of their management. The Southern Pacific Company, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, United States Steel, some of the mining companies, are all run by the same people, and back in New York they set the labor policy and you never see the man who sets it. For all I know, he may be a Communist!

I want to meet that ownership. They send the front men out here and these front men say, "Yes, you could come in and talk yourself deaf, dumb and blind." And sometimes I do, and the answer is mimeographed: the answer is, No.
That is the truth. Then while the man is negotiating with us and saying, "We love labor," "We are for labor," this, that and the next thing, they have their lobbies in Washington trying to cut the pins from under you. That is exactly what goes on.

I say sincerely, if ownership will negotiate with us, then we will get some place. And if those who own these big industries where you have had your strikes—steel, automobiles, mines, transportation—will come out in the open and face the leaders of labor in the open and sit down and negotiate man to man, not the office boys but the ownership, we will get some place. And when they set that pattern of labor negotiations, the pattern they set is followed by every other industry in the United States. The small industries follow the pattern of the big industries, because the small industries hope some day to be big industries. And that is what goes on.

Let us negotiate with ownership and not management.

That is about all I have to say on it. I want to express my thanks for the privilege of saying these few words. I say this personally: Please don't be too critical of me. I come from a minority group. I am an Irishman who came out from Ireland in 1914. As I told a friend of mine, the best thing they can say of me is that I am Chairman of the River Shannon Branch of the Communist Party! But I want to say this: I came out here in 1914. Whether it is to my failing or my credit or what it is, I want to say sincerely I have no promotion card or graduation from any school. The closest I ever got to a college is right here today.
My experience has been actually out in the field fighting the
battle of the people with whom I went to work in the railroad
industry.

I am like Mr. Davis. I am not afraid of anything. Nothing
scares me. And I want to say that we went through a great war.
Labor did a splendid job. It is just regrettable that after they
have done this splendid job and that from the ranks of labor came
the soldiers who fought the war and the women who did the job
behind the scenes, brickbats are being hurled at them. The
greatest part came from poor families. They have to work to make
a living. And out of the homes of these workers come the priests,
ministers, rabbis of our churches, and with those people to lead
us, those people going into public office, I am quite hopeful
that the dark cloud we see today is just a veil hiding the great
sunshine of a great America which I see in the not too distant
future!

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMEN WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.

Mr. Arthur C. Miller, Regional Attorney, Social Security
Board, formerly Vice-Chairman of the Tenth Regional War Labor
Board, will continue the discussion.

Mr. Miller!

... Applause ...

ARTHUR C. MILLER,
Regional Attorney, Social Security
Board, formerly Vice-Chairman,
Tenth Regional War Labor Board.
MR. MILLER: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. I was talking with Mr. Davis yesterday and he made the remark that he made here today: that he considers himself an amateur. I made a quick mental comparison of his experience with mine and suggested rather hopefully that that was a relative term. Since then I have been thinking about it and trying to invent a somewhat lower classification into which some of the rest of us might fit, and I suggest tentatively novice apprentice, so far as this field is concerned.

I should like to say, in the first place, that I am hopeful at least that the very thoughtful and thorough presentations made by Dr. Leiserson and Mr. Davis have brought the perspective of this Conference a little more in line with the title of the subject that was supposed to be discussed last evening.

Like Mr. Davis, I am not a person who believes in sudden calamity and I got the impression from what I heard last evening that there was at least an overtone that, somehow or other, we were immediately confronted with some such awful prospect.

It seems to me also that Mr. Davis and Mr. Leiserson have given you a very good report, so to speak, on the progress of the development of collective bargaining and have taken stock of the situation as it exists today. In fact, they have covered that ground so well and said so many things with which I thoroughly agree that I do not intend to detain you very long.

There is one other slant on this matter of our labor policy as of this time which it might be worthwhile injecting.
A good many years ago Judge Holmes, in one of his early dissenting opinions, pointed out that it is the economic policy of the law in democratic countries to favor free competition on the theory that in the long run it is worth more than it costs, and he added that "Of course, competition inevitably brings as an end result combination." He thought that that policy as of that time ought to be applied to competition in the labor relations field as well as in the business field generally, but as of that time the judges generally did not agree with him and it is only comparatively recently that the policy has been applied to competition between labor and capital over a division of the share of the joint product. The proposals for drafting changes in that policy such as, for example, the proposal for prohibiting various kinds of strikes or for compulsory arbitration, are pretty clearly retrogressive steps, and it seems to me they can only be justified on the theory that the cost of competition in the labor field has become too great. As I read the arguments, the people who advocate that sort of program attach great importance to the industrial disputes of the last year or so.

It seems to me that that is making a great deal more of those disputes and what they cost us than an examination of the facts would justify. In fact, it would be rather remarkable if during that period, when practically all other economic relationships were very disturbed, there had not been a very considerable disturbance in the labor relations field.

Another thought that occurred to me in connection with this
matter of the cost of competition is this:

It seems to me that anybody trying to appraise what strikes and labor disputes may cost in terms of lost production and consequent disruption of social values ought to take it in the context of other things that result in loss of production and the destruction of social values. I have no statistics, but I have no doubt that the production loss due to the depression of the 1930's probably would far exceed all of the production ever lost from industrial disputes in this country, and the production lost from sickness and disability and industrial accidents probably on an average exceed losses due to industrial disputes. But of course strikes and lockouts are very dramatic and the public attention is focused on those events, and we do not find people perhaps as much disturbed about some of these other things.

It seems to me that the President was right in his message to Congress when, in commenting upon the labor relations situation, he made recommendations for improvements in our arrangements for social insurance against the hazards of illness and disability and unemployment in order to provide an environment in which collective bargaining may better operate.

Finally, I should like to comment on one suggestion that has been made here as to what if any legislative action ought to be considered or undertaken at this time.

At least, since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act the Federal Courts, as Mr. Behrs pointed out, have been pretty well out of the picture. But generally speaking, to the Courts has
fallen the task of fixing the outside limits of this area of competition and State Courts have been busily grinding out decisions over the years in which they have given their views as to the limits they think ought to be placed upon concerted action by labor unions. Judge Holmes pointed out long ago that judges and lawyers are by no means people with the sort of training best able to find solutions for problems which he characterized as "distinctly legislative". And it seems to me that again the President was correct in recommending that a careful study be made by a commission of some of these many problems on the periphery of this area of competition with a view to framing legislation of the sort that Mr. Leiserson spoke of this morning. Certainly the record of the courts is not so conspicuously successful as to justify the recommendations of some people that the whole matter be returned to them.

I understand there is some time left for questioning if we have not overstepped the mark too far, and I think that I shall close now and permit that to go on.

Thank you.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: I wish that there were time for questioning, but we are running slightly behind schedule.

I shall declare a ten-minute recess at this time. Please return promptly at 4:00 because we shall resume discussions promptly at 4:00 o'clock.

... Short recess ...
CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: The next speaker, who will discuss the subject of A Possible Solution for the Issue of the Closed Shop, is not entirely new to us. He was on the staff of Reed College and at the University of Washington. At the present time he is Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Chicago. He is the author of two well known books: one, "Real Wages in the United States," and the other, "The Theory of Wages".

In 1942, at the age of 50, he enlisted as a private in the United States Marine Corps and advanced to the rank of major. He served not in the relative shelter of a chair in Washington but, rather, with a combat regiment. He was wounded slightly on Peleliu and seriously wounded at Okinawa. He was awarded a Bronze Star.

The high esteem in which he is held by economists in the United States is indicated by the fact that this year he was elected President of the American Economics Association.

I take great pleasure in introducing Professor Paul H. Douglas.

... Loud applause ...
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR THE ISSUE OF THE CLOSED SHOP

Paul H. Douglas, Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Chicago; Author, "Real Wages in the United States" and "The Theory of Wages".

DR. DOUGLAS: Ladies and gentlemen. I have chosen a very ambitious subject: "A Possible Solution of the Issue of the Closed Shop." I know that you are all looking at me with eyes of wonder as a person with lack of intellectual restraint to venture upon such a topic as this. I hope, however, that you will bear with me.

Certainly, one of the most important issues in the field of labor relations upon which men and women of good will divide is that of the so-called closed shop. Those favorable to unionism commonly argue that the closed shop is necessary in order to ensure genuine collective bargaining. If the employers are free to hire non-union men, then it is contended, they will upon one pretext or another gradually drop the active union men and replace them by non-unionists. What was once a union shop will, it is contended, sooner or later cease to be such. When the percentage of active union men has been greatly reduced and that of the non-unionists built up, then it is said, the employers, who tend to accept collective bargaining merely because it is forced upon them, will feel free not to renew the union contracts. In the struggle which ensues the employer will, it is alleged, have the strategic advantage and the final results will be non-union shops which in most cases will be closed to union men. It is,
therefore, argued that the closed shop is necessary to buttress and to protect the permanence of collective bargaining.

The employers are likely to object to this, that these are false suspicions and that they would not try to take such an unfair advantage of the unionists since they are not opposed to collective bargaining as such, but merely to the closed shop. To this the advocates of unionism are likely to make the same reply as the inimitable Mr. Dooley is supposed to have made in his saloon on "Archeay Road" in my city of Chicago when his friend, Mr. Hennessy, similarly protested that "these open-shop min ye monshum say they are f'r unions iv properly conducted." To this Mr. Dooley retorted, "Shure -- iv properly conducted. An' there we are! An' how would they have thim conducted? No strikes, no rules, no contracts, no scales, hardly any wages, an' damn few members."

Now let us take the case of the opponents of the closed shop. They contend that this practice violates the fundamental rights of both the employers and the individual workers and unwarrantedly restricts the liberties of each. Thus it is said that if the employer is compelled to accept the closed shop he is virtually placed at the mercy of the unions and their officials. It is feared that in practice his right to discharge for inefficiency will either be seriously impaired or abrogated. Inefficient men, it is charged, can be kept on the job and plant discipline ruined. Once the power of the union is fastened upon the employer, it is alleged that restrictive practices and "feather-bedding"
rules will be imposed which will be designed to create as many jobs as possible and give security to those who wish to work slowly. Wild-cat strikes can start over minor grievances and disrupt production and the instigators escape scot-free. It is charged that union officials, however well intentioned, cannot be expected to control or discipline their members when they overstep decent limits because they depend upon the votes of these members for continuance in office or election to higher posts. Those leaders who do try to hold the rank and file to responsibility for high output and steady work are quickly labeled as "company stooges" and are forced out of office. They are replaced by others who tend to become demagogic defenders of individual workers, whether right or wrong.

It is thus argued that the closed shop means an all-round hampering of business initiative and efficiency. The experience of England, Australia and New Zealand is frequently cited in support of this argument. In these countries the closed shop is widespread and at the same time the general pace of work is beyond question much slower than it is in the United States.

It is furthermore contended that individual rights are violated when men are compelled to join a union when they do not wish to do so. While in the past, multitudes of men have refrained from joining unions because of their fear that if they did they would be fired or discriminated against, it is nevertheless true that there are others who conscientiously do not wish to join specific unions and some who are opposed to unions as such.
Thus workers may believe that the policies and leadership of a union may be corrupt and that they should keep out. They may honestly disagree with specific policies, such as the wage, production or shop practices of the union and not wish to support them by paying dues. They may think that the union is either too "tough" or not "tough" enough in time of strikes. They may disagree with the political orientation of their specific unions and as sturdy Republicans object to the union aiding the Democrats or vice versa. If by any ill chance, the union should be afflicted with Communist leadership and used to favor the foreign policy of Soviet Russia, it would be natural for loyal Americans to object and not wish to give it aid and comfort. Finally, there are those who object to unionism as an institution, even when purged of its abuses, and still other rugged individualists and lone wolves who are constitutionally antipathetic to group action of any kind.

It is argued, therefore, that it is at once unfair and a violation of civil liberties to compel those men to join a union against their will. If a union is really so helpful as its supporters contend, why, it is asked, cannot it depend for its membership upon the voluntary choices of the workmen rather than upon coercion? If a given workman wishes to resist the levelling processes of unionism, and prefers to remain outside and forgo its benefits, should he not be at liberty to do so?

It should, moreover, be recognized that there are also workers who, while perfectly willing to join a union themselves,
nevertheless do not want to have the closed shop fastened upon a plant or industry. They may, for example, fear that if the company hires men referred to them by the union office, they may be discriminated against by the union leaders who may instead give the jobs to their personal favorites and supporters. They may also fear that the union will not furnish them with sufficient protection against capricious and unjust expulsion, and in such an event, with the closed shop in effect, loss of membership in the union means at the least, loss of one’s job. If indeed the closed shop were universal, this would mean that the expelled man would find it almost impossible to get work anywhere in his industry and extremely difficult to get any job at all. He would be like the kin-wrecked men of early feudal times who had nowhere to attach themselves and who wound up as the armed retainers of the lords, the tyrants and the professional condottiere.

There are also ardent unionists who believe that unionism will be stronger and more virile if it is based purely on the voluntary membership of men who join from their own choice. Such men, it is said, will take a greater interest in union affairs than will indifferent or sullen workers who are coerced into joining and who then tend to content themselves with paying dues (or having these checked off from their pay) but who seldom attend meetings or vote.

Finally, there are some philosophically-minded workers who favor unionism as a counterpoise to the power of employers, but who do not want it to become overpoweringly dominant.
For these and many other reasons as well, there are men within the union movement itself who, while believing in collective bargaining, do not believe that this should carry with it the closed shop. But these men are either in the minority within the unions or they are chary about expressing their doubts in an intellectual climate which is hostile to their opinions.

The reply of the advocates of the closed shop to these objections customarily takes the form of (1) deprecating the possible abuses which the closed shop might entail, and (2) maintaining that men who profit from the work of an organization have the obligation to belong to and help support it. To a consideration of this second point, I now turn. The advocates of the closed shop point out that unionism protects all workers against capricious and unjust discharge and discipline by management; that it has undoubtedly reduced the hours of work and that it increases the wage rates of those employed. Why, it is asked, should men profit as workers from these gains and yet refuse to support the organization which has brought them about? To permit men to do so, would, it is contended, allow them to reap without costs what others have sown with sacrifice and effort. This would embitter the true-blue believers in unionism and lead to strained relations within the shop. At the same time, the fact that the non-unionists could get most of the material advantages of unionism without any of its costs, would induce the laggards to do likewise. These men, it is pointed out, would then begin to drop out of the unions and these would soon disun-
Just as the political state has found it necessary to levy taxes upon citizens to support the schools who may not have children of their own to educate or who may not believe in public school education itself, so it is said, the burdens of unionism should be similarly shared. In time of war, moreover, nearly all countries have discarded the volunteer method of raising armies and have come to require military service or its equivalent from appropriate adult males irrespective of the personal desires and even the conscientious scruples of those who do not wish to give it. Great Britain and the United States were in this last war quite generous in their treatment of the conscientious objector, but have properly insisted that if these are to be spared from violating their scruples against the taking of life, they shall, at the least, be compelled to render equivalent peaceful service to the nation. They have, however, found that the purely volunteer system does not produce sufficient men to fill the armies and to defend the country and that to use it concentrates the casualties upon the bravest and most unselfish of the youth with a consequent adverse selective effect upon the community and the next generation. They, therefore, have adopted compulsory military service in time of great national emergency as the best means of compelling the lazy, the selfish and the indifferent to do their share in helping to defend the nation which in turn protects them.

Turning to other historical analogies, readers of Benjamin
Franklin's *Autobiography* will remember how he started separate voluntary cooperatives in Philadelphia for policing purposes, to put out fires, and to sweep and light the streets. Similarly, the studies of Beatrice and Sidney Webb on the evolution of British local government show how these functions together with the actual construction of highways, etc., started on a voluntary basis. The difficulty with all such attempts is obvious. The patrolmen found it hard to inquire whether the citizen who was being attacked by the footpad was really a member of the cooperative, and difficult to withhold aid from him if he were not. The fire company found it ridiculous to refuse to put out a fire in the house of a non-member or to drive a bargain with him for membership as his house was burning down. In order to protect their own members from the spread of the flames, they had to try to put out the fires at their source. Similarly, the street lamps by night, like the sun by day, shed their beams upon non-members and members alike and the latter found themselves compelled to pay for the aid which was given to the former. The result was that in all of these cases, the work of the voluntary cooperatives was taken over by the local government which then levied compulsory taxes to pay for the cost of what was for the general benefit. So, it is argued, should the expenses of maintaining protective organizations for labor be borne by all labor and not merely by the most idealistic and self-sacrificing.

The opponents of the closed shop counter the force of this analogy by declaring that it has nothing to do with the case.
They assert that the state is the only organization, in liberty-loving nations, which is given compulsory powers. It exercises these powers for purposes which the majority adjudge to be in the public interests. But to give to private societies composed of one set of men the power to conclude agreements with employers which will force other men against their will to join these bodies is violating, it is said, the fundamental right of an individual to decide for himself, to which groups, if any, he wishes to belong. If such agreements can be made to force men into unions, cannot they be similarly made to compel men to belong to one church, one fraternal organization and one political party?

At this point, it would be well to leave the formal argument. Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the closed shop is an issue upon which good men can disagree and over which, when impelled by conflicting economic interests, they may violently conflict.

II

Before turning to a possible reconciliation of these opposite sets of values and interests, it is perhaps appropriate to discuss briefly the changes which have been introduced by the National Labor Relations Act and also to review various devices which have been developed to soften the impact of the closed shop.

There would seem to be little doubt that the Wagner Act has somewhat weakened the case for the closed shop. By its outlawing of certain specified "unfair labor practices," that act threw
certain legal protections around union membership and activity which when absent, as formerly, were used to justify the establishment of the closed shop. Thus the act provides that it is an unfair practice for an employer:

(1) "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their right to unionize and bargain collectively, or

(2) to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization by "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employer."

If it can be proved that a union man has been discriminated against because of these reasons, the National Labor Relations Board can order him reinstated and paid damages equal to the wages he has lost. The employers, therefore, cannot legally use their power of discharge to break up a union. Since they are not able to fire union men in the first place because of their union activity, then why is it now necessary to provide through the closed shop that these men must be replaced by other unionists? Has not the main reason for the closed shop therefore been removed?

While there is some force to this contention, it would seem to be only partially true. For in the first place, the law can only sift out and deal with the most obvious cases of discriminatory discharge. There is a fine art to getting rid of men whom one dislikes and most employers and managers are rapidly becoming expert practitioners of this art. Unionists can be dropped for
minor infractions of rules which would pass unnoticed if committed by an anti-unionist. In industry, the non-conformist must commonly attain a height of personal and productive virtue to which the non-unionist workman can sometimes hardly dare aspire.

A second point is connected with layoffs caused by seasonal or cyclical declines in business. At such times it is easy for the employers, unless restrained by other rules, to pay off old scores and guard against future dangers by concentrating the layoffs from among the active union men. This is especially hard to detect and to prevent when a large number are being laid off.

This tendency can indeed be checked by the introduction of seniority systems and this is perhaps the chief driving force behind the establishment of such systems. But so far as my observation goes, the introduction of seniority systems generally, although by no means universally, follows the establishment of the closed shop and is a further manifestation of increasing union control. It is doubtful if seniority would be widely adopted were unions to be weak. And it is because the proponents of the closed shop want to make unions strong that they insist upon it.

While the Wagner Act has, therefore, somewhat weakened the case for the closed shop, it has only done so in part. There is still danger that many employers would be greatly tempted to let union men out if they could replace them with non-unionists. It is also probable that this could be managed with sufficient subtlety as to escape prosecution.

If the Wagner Act has somewhat weakened the arguments of the
advocates of the closed shop, certain modifications in that institution should have softened some of the objections of its opponents. Thus it was over thirty-five years ago at the instance of the late Louis D. Brandeis that the famous protocol for the women's clothing industry provided that in hiring, union men should be preferred, but that 1 "employers shall have freedom of selection as between one union man and another and shall not be confined to any list, nor bound to follow any prescribed order whatever." This gave the employer greater freedom and did not oblige him to hire everyone whom the union sent. This provision has been widely copied in a number of industries. It is often accompanied by a further provision that if after a stated period of time, the union is unable to provide a satisfactory workman for an opening, the employer is then free to hire a non-union man.

In recent years, a still further modification has been introduced in the mass production industries in the form of the so-called "union shop." Here the employer is permitted to hire anyone he wishes, whether non-unionist or unionist. It is merely stipulated that after a given period, the non-unionists are to join the union if they are to retain their jobs.

There is still another classification of closed shops which cuts across the previous differentiations. This is according as to whether the union dues are collected by the union itself or compulsorily deducted from the pay of the workers by the employers.

and then turned over en bloc to the union. The latter form is the check-off system which is in effect in coal mining and certain other industries.

Finally, there is the so-called "maintenance-of-membership" provision which the National War Labor Board introduced as a compromise during the war. This permits those who were not members of the union on a given date to continue in their status and still hold their jobs. But it also prevents those who were union members on a given date after a transitional "escape period" from resigning from the union or allowing their membership to lapse. While this decision respected the conscientious objections of those who were not originally union members, it prevented those who were already members from changing their minds and bound them by their past decisions. Maintenance of membership, therefore, permitted those who already had strong objections to unionism to stay outside of these organisations and yet not be deprived of their jobs. But it provided that the unions be protected against any future backsliding on the part of their members.

Taken as a whole, therefore, while these modifications of the closed shop soften its import, they do not change its fundamental character. It is still a device whereby men, as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment are compelled to join or refrain from leaving a union.

III

There is one final observation which I should like to make before I turn to the constructive part of my paper. It is this,
The determination as to whether or not the closed shop shall be put into effect is now primarily made in individual cases according to the relative bargaining strength of the union and the employer. It is something which the union can impose, along with other terms, under threat of a strike, even though the workers in a particular plant or company are not deeply in its favor. And yet if the demand is once made by union leaders, the rank and file may feel obligated to walk out if it is not granted (a) because the closed shop issue is involved with other terms about which the workers are deeply concerned, or (b) because of loyalty to the general cause of unionism which they may feel is involved, once the issues narrow down to a test of strength. Moreover, once the strike is called, the union does not depend solely upon the loyalty of the immediate workers involved, but it can call also on the loyalties and resources of workers employed by other companies to impose its will upon the employer in question. It can do this (a) by having these other workers and members contribute to the financial support of those out on strike, (b) by manning the picket lines with members largely recruited from outside, and (c) by using these outside unionists to enforce secondary boycotts against the products turned out by the concern in question.

It may often be possible, therefore, for union leaders by using, or tacitly threatening to use, these methods to induce employers to yield on the closed shop issue despite the fact that it may not be warmly desired by the men immediately concerned.
On the other hand, if the union is comparatively weak in finances and in outside connections, it may frequently be possible for the employer to prevent the closed shop from coming into being even though the mass of the workers feel an intense need for the protection which it would give. In other words, with the issue determined under the power struggle of collective bargaining, the closed shop is frequently obtained where the workers need and desire it least and is often denied where the workers need and desire it most.

IV

A Possible Reconciliation

I should now like to make a suggestion which may possibly improve the situation. This is to take the issue of the closed shop out of the area of collective bargaining and make it (like the determination as to whether the workers want collective bargaining and if so, through whom) a condition antecedent to collective bargaining. Stated briefly, it consists in letting the workers themselves decide, in a free and fair election, whether or not they want the closed shop. I hasten to add that this suggestion is in no sense original with me. So far as I know, it was first advanced by Mr. Arthur S. Meyer, the experienced chairman of the New York State Board of Mediation, who deserves a great deal of credit for his informed ingenuity in this as in so many other matters.

There is sound precedent for this step in the development which the Wagner Act effected in the field of representation.
Prior to that act, it was common practice for employers to refuse to bargain collectively with those who claimed to represent their workers on the ground: (1) that the employees did not really desire to bargain collectively, and (2) that in any event, the workers did not desire the particular union concerned or its representatives to act for them. Such, for example, was the attitude taken by Judge Gary of the U.S. Steel Corporation and by other leading steel companies during the big organizing campaign in steel in 1919.

Now, the tragedy of the situation prior to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act was that there was no mutually acceptable way of determining what the workers really wanted. It was always possible for employers to discount the fact of workers signing applications for union membership by either questioning these signatures or by claiming that they were obtained under duress and did not represent the real desires of the workers. In some cases, this was true, but even when it was false, there was no way of proving that this was so.

The result was that commonly the issue as to whether the workers wanted to bargain collectively through given representatives could only be determined by a strike. This not only interrupted production and bred ill will, but it was no sure test as to what the workers wanted. For the results were determined by the comparative strength of the contestants rather than by the real desires of the employees. The strike was indeed a no more effective method of determining these facts than was trial
by combat a way of rendering individual justice in feudal times or war a means of deciding equitably between nations.

Now, while there are incompleteness in the Wagner Act and doubtless some abuses in its administration, I submit that it was a mighty step forward when it made the issue of whether or not the workers desired collective bargaining a matter of ascertainable fact rather than one of negotiation by the interested parties or a matter of combat. It provided instead that when the issue was in doubt, the workers themselves should vote on what they wanted in fair and impartially supervised elections. And while the Labor Relations Board has been bitterly attacked by employers on many grounds, I have never known it to be criticized for the way in which it has conducted these elections. Whatever other changes may be made in the act, I do not believe that this feature will be abolished, unless a tidal wave of blind reaction should sweep over our country.

I should like to ask why the same procedure should not be applied to the issue of the closed shop. Instead of letting it be decided by an economic combat, why should it not be decided instead by referendum? Then when the parties sit down to negotiate the terms of a collective agreement, they can confine themselves to questions of wages, hours and working conditions without having the situation muddied by the issue of the closed shop. There may be vital defects in this plan, but I confess that up to date it seems to me to be essentially sound.

There are, of course, certain details which would be
essential to a satisfactory working out of any such plan. First, I take it that it is obvious that in a plant or industry which is adopting collective bargaining for the first time, such a referendum should follow and not precede the election to choose a bargaining agent. If the workers reject the idea of collective bargaining outright, then there is obviously no need to submit the further issue of the closed shop to the workers.

Secondly, the issue should only be submitted to referendum if the bargaining representatives who have been chosen make this as a demand upon the employers. If, for any reason, they do not raise the issue, it is probably infinitely better to let the sleeping dogs lie. Employers should not, however, have the power to agree or be forced into agreeing to such an arrangement without referring the matter to the workers by a referendum.

Third, the precise nature of the type of closed shop desired should be carefully and succinctly described by the union in writing and printed on the ballot. The voters themselves would, however, only vote "yes" or "no" on the proposition itself. This requirement that the precise proposition be defined would in turn be a force which would tend to prevent the unions from proposing the more obnoxious forms of the closed shop and would tend to lead to the more reasonable forms being proposed.

Fourth, in view of the tremendous importance which the choice of the closed shop might have upon the affairs of a business, I believe it is only proper that the employers should have the right to acquaint the workers with their own preferences and
the reasons why they believe as they do. As a matter of fact, I believe they, as well as national unions, should have that right in connection with the choice of a bargaining unit. But the case for this is much stronger in the issue of the closed shop, where what is at stake is a limitation of the employer's right to hire and retain. Such a right to propagate should, of course, be exercised soberly by all parties, without undue defamation or excessive expenditures. These are all problems in the political state for which perfect answers have certainly not as yet been found. If we can approximate the restraints which are now imposed in connection with governmental elections, we will be doing well and we will certainly be effecting a big improvement over the present situation.

Fifth, if the proposal is adopted, it will, I think, be admitted that workers should be protected against discrimination for any lawful activities during the referendum process.

Sixth, decision by a majority vote would seem the only equitable method. This is the method which we use in political democracy and to require more than this would be to give to members of a minority a greater importance than those of a majority.

Seventh, it would be unfair to have such a decision made once and for all. For if the workers vote the closed shop into being, abuses may develop in its operation which may cause the employees to change their minds. The door should not be closed to such a possible change of opinion. Electors should no more be given the power to vote for a perpetual closed shop than to vote.
for a President for life. Conversely, the workers might turn down a closed shop at one period, but later, on the basis of more experience, become convinced that it would be desirable. In my judgment, they should be given that chance.

If course, these elections should not be allowed to occur so frequently as to keep a plant or company in a continuous electioneering uproar. The chief task of industry is not to hold elections for the delight of the participants, but to get on with the job of production. I would suggest, therefore, that the referenda should not be held more frequently than once every four years and then only at the request of either party. This will make both sides watch their step and be more on guard to prevent possible abuses from developing than if having once won an election, they were to be in power forevermore.

Eighth, a pressing issue is what should be the unit for voting. In view of the fact that convictions may vary widely between plants and companies, it would seem unwise to let this issue be decided on an industry-wide basis and that instead the unit should not be broader than the company, or at most a cluster of companies under unified control and management. This is without prejudice to the possibility that it may be desirable in matters of wages, hours and other working conditions to have industry-wide bargaining and agreements.

Ninth, a very important final issue is whether any such referendum is to apply to concerns which do not now have the closed shop or whether the issue can be opened up afresh in
firms where this is already established. To the degree that the unions come to favor any such plan at all, they will obviously tend to want only the former of these alternatives. For this would permit them to hold what they have already obtained through collective bargaining and by strikes and to expand their area of control through elections. And yet this would seem to be unfair in those cases where the workers in given enterprises have tired of the closed shop and would like to make a change. If the principle suggested is sufficiently fair so that workers not yet under it may adopt it for new plants, it would seem only just that workers in plants where it has been adopted should be given the chance to make a change, if they so desire. If this is not done, the opponents of the closed shop may properly object that it is a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose proposal.

V

Some Important Conditions

There are, however, at least two very important conditions which should be attached to any such proposal. These are designed to protect the public and the individual worker against certain abuses which the closed shop may bring.

1. The first is that in order for a union recognized as a bargaining agent to ask for a referendum on the closed shop, it must itself be an "open" union. To combine the closed shop with an artificially "closed" union would permit the insiders to wring monopoly gains from the public and at the same time would force those denied entrance into poorer paid industries where their
addition to the social product would be less. It would, in my judgment, be both unwise and improper for the state to protect or to foster such an anti-social arrangement. While a large degree of autonomy and self-determination should be granted to industrial units to which the state may properly delegate certain powers of self-government, these should not be allowed to degenerate into an exploitation of the public. The interests of a particular occupational group, particularly in those cases where the demand for the product is relatively inelastic, frequently conflict with those of the public and the public interest is not protected by giving to occupational groups a completely free rein. This is one of the chief objections to a syndicalistic or guild regulated society. We need to keep the occupations open in order to get the best distribution of ability and to produce at non-monopoly prices the goods which the public wants. Just as the existing farmers, doctors and lawyers should not have the power to determine how many should enter their occupations, nor business men the power to bar competitors, so workers should not have the power to lock the gate on qualified men who wish to enter.

As is well known, there are some unions which unreasonably restrict entrance into their ranks by one or more of the following methods: (a) by imposing an outright prohibition upon entrance or narrowly restricting it; (b) by requiring the payment of unreasonably high initiation fees; (c) by requiring a period of apprenticeship appreciably longer than that which is required to learn the trade or perform the tasks required; (d) by
limiting the number of apprentices so rigidly that not enough workers are provided to meet the demands of the public for products at competitive prices.

The first of these unreasonable requirements can be prevented by an outright prohibition. The others are far more difficult to define and to regulate. Certainly initiation fees of $250, $500 and even more than this are unreasonable and should not be allowed. While it is hard to pick out a definite figure as the dividing line as between what is "reasonable" and "unreasonable," in the matter of initiation fees, I am inclined to believe that rough justice would be done by fixing the maximum initiation fee to be charged by a union at approximately $25. So far as I know, there are few unions in the mass production industries which now charge more than this and the imposition of such a maximum would prevent those now in the unions from making it more difficult for later comers to enter.

A further protection which in my judgment should be included is to provide that no one should be denied entrance into a union because of race, color, religion or sex. As is well known, some international unions bar negroes explicitly from membership and in other cases this is done by the local unions. In many other cases, this is done not by formal rule, but by accepted informal practice and by "gentlemen's agreements". In some unions also it is probable that persons of other races and religions are at times denied entrance. There is also a fairly frequent discrimination against women as such.
It is, in my judgment, impossible to justify such discrimination in a democracy which does not believe in dividing its members into citizens of different grades. Under the closed shop, if unions in considerable numbers bar negroes and women from membership, they distinctly limit the employment opportunities of these groups and put them at a grave economic disadvantage. If unions are allowed to expand their membership by including the unwilling, they should not be permitted to restrict their membership by excluding workers because of race, religion or sex. As a matter of fact, this is forbidden by the State Labor Relations Act of Pennsylvania and by the State Fair Employment Practices Acts of New York and New Jersey.

There are abuses connected with the apprenticeship requirements of unions. These are, however, confined to only a minority of the skilled crafts engaged in manufacturing and other industries affecting interstate commerce. Conditions vary so greatly between these crafts as regards (a) the number of jobs a worker should master, (b) the length of time needed to learn each job properly and (c) the number of workers required that it would, I believe, be foolish to attempt to fix the proper limits by statute or even by administrative rulings.

The task of administering any such provisions for referenda will be difficult enough even at best and it would seem unwise to overload the administrative body with such a variety of perplexing tasks for which it will quickly have to find definitive answers. A great step forward will be made if the outright
prohibition or explicit limitation of entrance be prohibited together with the elimination of excessive initiation fees.

2. A second basic condition should be to provide some impartial review of cases of expulsion from unions operating under these closed shop provisions. Some unions, like the International Typographical Union, carefully safeguard the rights of their members in this matter. There are other unions, however, where I have become convinced from such study of individual cases as I have been able to give, grave abuses have occurred. These instances of abuse seldom find their way into the literature of trade unionism, but they are no less real. Men have been victimized because they have honestly opposed the policies of officers in charge of the unions and once expelled, have found it difficult to obtain employment. The granting by the state to the unions of the right to require union membership of the unwilling if it be approved by a majority vote would be a further grant of power by the state which would make of unions even more quasi-public bodies than they now are. It is a truism both of ethics and of law, however, that no persons or institutions should have rights without corresponding duties or privileges without commensurate responsibilities. Men who join a union under these circumstances should be protected against capricious or unjust expulsion by the union just as much as against discharge by their employers for union or collective bargaining activities. Such abuses should be directly forbidden by law and some of the necessary safeguards should be spelled out in the act itself.
These might include the provision that (a) the charges against any member should be stated in writing, (b) the accused person should have the right to appear in his own defense, engage counsel, and summon and cross-examine witnesses, (3) if found guilty, the accused should have the right of appeal to higher union bodies including the international officials, and (d) he should also have the right to appeal to local representatives of the National Labor Relations Board, State Labor Boards, or such body as administers the act. The costs of such appeals should, of course, be kept very low and every effort made to settle appeals quickly.

The question may well be raised if certain other compensatory protections should not also be introduced into any such law. Among these possible provisions might be (a) a requirement that the union itself must hold periodic and secret elections at least once every four years, (b) that local, district and national unions make an annual financial statement to their members as to the amount and general nature of the receipts and expenditures during the given years.

There is little doubt that unions should take more steps toward reform in these lines. Whether they should be required to effect such changes as a prerequisite for having the privilege of having the closed shop made subject to the results of a referendum is, however, a moot point. The mere fact that the workers will have the right to vote on a closed shop and to reject it if they do not like the union in question will force the unions to do some housecleaning in order to gain votes. If this can be
done voluntarily, so much the better since it will free the governmental supervisory body from an added administrative load. But if sufficient reform is not effected in this manner within a decent interval of time, then serious thought should at least be given as to whether this should not be required by law.

It will be asked, of course, if the unions should not also be asked to forego the imposition of restrictive rules and practices or what is popularly known as "feather-bedding." There is little doubt that there are some such abuses. It is highly desirable that these be removed. The subject is, however, so complicated and it is so hard to define what are "reasonable" and what "unreasonable" restrictions, that it would not seem wise to include them in the proposed act. It is important not to overburden the administrative machinery and not all abuses can be removed at any one time. Gross and unreasonable restrictions, particularly when they involve the fixation of prices, can still be prosecuted under the Sherman Act as was done when Thurman Arnold was in charge of this work. Perhaps it would be well to leave the matter in this status for a period until it is seen whether the situation is being cleaned up.

VI

A Last Word

I am aware that the zealots on both sides of this issue of the closed shop and of unionism in general will probably regard this proposal as a subterfuge which avoids a decision on the relative merits of unionism and the closed shop as such. Those
who regard unionism as essentially evil in its effects upon production and upon the relationships between employers and workers and who believe that under no circumstances should a man be forced to join a private association against his will, are likely to object to letting such a moral issue be decided by a majority vote of the workers. To these men, unionism is itself something evil which should be stamped out and even if the workers want to extend it, no compromise should be made.

The more extreme advocates of unionism and the closed shop may take a similar position. Believing firmly in the righteousness of their cause, they are likely to believe that unionism is "good" for all workers, irrespective of whether the workers themselves believe it to be or not. This school may, therefore, favor the compulsory extension of the closed shop by collective bargaining or legal enactment and scorn a process under which the workers, exposed to opposing propaganda, might decide against them.

There may also be unionists who will think that the conditions which I have attached are too onerous. Many, for example, will probably not want the principle of the referendum applied to those plants which already have the closed shop since they may be fearful that under such an arrangement unionism will lose more than it will gain. They may also oppose action by the state in keeping the unions "open" and in protecting the members against unjust expulsion. They may, therefore, regard the practical price of these conditions as too great for any benefits which unions may
Conversely, there may be many employers who believe that they will have a better practical chance to overthrow the closed shop through state and national legislation forbidding it than to take the chance of having it voted in as well as out by the worker.

Both groups may, therefore, on principle and in practice, reject the method of popular choice as the advocates and opponents of slavery finally came to reject the doctrine of "squatter sovereignty" advanced between 1848 and 1860 by Lewis Cass and finally by Stephen A. Douglas. Cass and Douglas strove to make slavery a local issue under which the inhabitants of a territory could decide for themselves by majority vote whether or not they would permit the institution of slavery within their borders. The Southern advocates of slavery and their Northern allies were not content with this. They wanted to extend slavery into the territories even though the inhabitants did not want it and finally they legalized their position through the Dred Scott decision. Indeed, many of them wanted to extend slavery as a national institution into the free states themselves as was evidenced in the boast of Senator Toombs, of Georgia, that he intended to call the roll of his slaves from the foot of Bunker Hill Monument. On the other hand, Lincoln and his followers wanted to prevent, by national action, the spreading of slavery into the territories and the extreme abolitionists, such as John Brown, wanted to free the slaves in the Southern States. Under the terrific pressure of these conflicting forces, the attempt by Douglas and his
followers to localize the problem by letting the territories decide for themselves was defeated.

And yet it is permissible to ask, as George Fort Milton, Avery Craven, and J.G. Randall have done, whether the program of Douglas was not after all wiser than it has seemed. Because the extremists on both sides would not let it operate, we got the Civil War, which Douglas was trying to avoid. This war freed the slaves which was a great ethical gain, and it preserved the Union, but it did so at a terrific cost in life, hardship, and bitterness between sections which even now, after the passage of nearly a century, is still acute. And while the Negroes have been freed, they are still grievously oppressed politically, economically, and socially. It is, at least, possible that we might have made more enduring progress if we had moved less hastily and drastically. And yet to do this, the extremists on both sides would have had to maintain a patience and a moderation which in practice it is hard for those with sharply differing ideologies to display.

It is well to remember the sad, but trenchant, dictum which Justice Holmes expressed in his fascinating correspondence with Sir Frederick Pollock: "As between two groups, each equally convinced with the righteousness of its own cause, I see no ultimate arbitration but force." Perhaps this is so, but if it is true, it means that incessant civil and international war is the inevitable consequence of sharp differences of opinion and of moral judgments. I cannot believe that this is either necessary
or desirable in the present instance. The peace, harmony and
high productivity of this nation is far more important than the
issue of the closed shop. Certainly this is a far less pressing
moral issue than was slavery. It would be a great mistake to let
ourselves be torn apart by strikes to establish the closed shop
or by blanket legislative prohibitions of its existence. There
seems to me to be sound merit, therefore, in Mr. Meyer's proposal
to let the issue be decided plant by plant and company by company
in the time-honored and democratic way of free elections. It is
because of our free elections and our willingness to abide by the
results that we do not have revolutions or the secret police in
this country. We have built up a political process by which moral
issues can be submitted to the people and their judgments record-
ed and put into effect. We have gone on the basis that as Justice
Holmes once said, the "test of truth is its ability to establish
itself in the competition of the market." This competition
should be freed from gross misrepresentation and coercive force
but can we not trust in the essential fairness of men when given
the facts and the arguments to winnow out the truth from error?
Men and causes which depend upon getting the permanent approval
of the voters have to purge themselves of gross abuses in order to
survive. Public opinion operates to keep our political parties
comparatively decent. If allowed to express itself, it would, I
think, purge unionism from many of its abuses and help further
to protect the individual workers from being victimized by their
employers.
Most young men tend to be impatient with what the lawyers term procedural matters and to be far more interested, instead, in substantive issues. Only the latter seem to the young to have vitality. But as time passes and men grow older, it dawns upon them that a great part of our progress has been made through transforming substantive issues of conflict into accepted matters of procedure. For it is in this way that society peacefully disposes of issues which, if not so handled, would tear it apart. May there not be a moral guide for action in this fact?

... Loud applause ...
CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Dr. Douglas, we want to thank you for a
penetrating analysis of a very complex problem.
The discussion will be continued by Mr. John F. Shelley,
President of the San Francisco Labor Council.

Mr. Shelley!

... Applause ...

JOHN F. SHELLEY
President, San Francisco Labor Council.

MR. SHELLEY: Mr. Chairman and Friends. May I add my commen-
dation and compliments to the very thoughtful and well prepared
paper presented by Professor Douglas. It certainly indicates a
great deal of thought on the subject, and I say that with a great
deal of sincerity as one who is a very ardent and strong champion
of the closed shop.

I want to start out by admitting that there are abuses to
the closed shop; that there are persons in position of leadership
in Labor who do not do the right thing. I want to say that
Labor is not any more perfect than Management or that any indi-
vidual in Labor who assumes a position of leadership is to be ex-
pected to be the perfect human being. They are subject to the
human frailties as everybody is.

I also want to comment on the issue that is quite often
raised by those who are, in my own humble opinion, not motivated
by the best interests of society or by the idea of being fair or
just to their workers, but are really pointing out the few defi-
iciencies that exist in Labor and who try to give the impression
to the general public of the country, to those in labor and out of labor that that is the general situation.

We can always find something to criticize. When we discuss the closed shop, I think we should bear in mind some of the background as to why labor asked for the closed shop in the first place. I am going to try to avoid a repetition because Professor Douglas has gone into great lengths with respect to some of the background, the various types of language that were used to solve the problems in contractual relationships and to the views on both sides.

Labor unions originally never asked for what is generally termed a "closed shop". Frankly, that is a misnomer except in very few cases. They did not ask for a union shop, but they established themselves by dint of hard organizational effort and they were able to negotiate a contract for a given period. And lo and behold! just as Professor Douglas pointed out, when the next negotiating period came up to renew the contract they were confronted with the change that they did not represent the people in the plant.

Upon examination of the situation, it was found, perhaps, that they did not. And this occurred time after time.

What happened? What happened was just this: that during that intervening period when a contract was in effect, without any provision in that contract requiring the workers to be a member of the union and allowing the employer to hire whomever he chose without their joining the union, there was a very definite campaign
carried on by management to decimate the union and people were taken into employment with the understanding that they would not join the union, or it was very subtly made known to them that they would be better off and better treated if they did not join the union.

As a protective measure (and every single forward step that Labor has made in its history has been protective steps that they felt were necessary because of hard, bitter experience) unions then, in this country particularly, started in to require that a clause be written into the contract that the people remain members of the union, and that if the union were unable to supply satisfactory help on the request of the employer, he could hire whomsoever he wished but they must become members of the union so that the breakdown of the union organization once accomplished could be avoided.

The real strong union does not need a closed shop. That point was made and that point is true. There are unions in existence right in this area that do not need a closed shop, do not demand it, do not have it in their contract because they have been able through a simple preference of employment clause to keep up their relationship and keep up their union. But in some industries where there is small employment or the workers are divided into various groups, the closed shop has been necessary for the very existence of those unions. It would be fine if all the persons on the management side of the table and those on the labor
side of the table could approach this problem with the thinking that Professor Douglas has given to the paper he has presented this afternoon. Like Gus Gaynor, who spoke earlier, I arrive at my conclusions through some 12 or 13 years of experience in the field, and even right at the present time I regret to say that there are some employers who are more hypercritical in their attitudes towards dealing with their employees than they are sincere. There are those unions which have struck for a union shop, which would give the employer the right to hire any person he wished, whether in the union or out of the union, provided that they eventually become a member of the union. There is no restriction on his employment, on the right to employ; no requirement that he go to the union to hire persons if he felt that there was nobody there out of work that he wished, but simply throwing it wide open. And during some years past that has been refused. First the employer said, "Well, I do not want to be required to hire just from the union." When unions have then backed off from that and said, "You can hire whom you wish but we don't want to find the situation changed after we have organized the workers, they must join the union," then he objected to the new people joining the union.

During the War Labor Board period when the requirement for a closed shop was very neatly gotten around or sidetracked by the maintenance of membership formula, with due regard to the fine, careful thinking of William Davis on the subject, some of the weaker unions which had been unable to achieve union shops or closed
shops or such clause or any clause approaching any type of employment relationship with the union, even preference of employment to any extent, received maintenance of employment decisions in awards from the War Labor Board. And to bear out my charge that some employers are hypercritical in their public statements as to how interested they are in their employees' welfare, lo and behold! some of those employers right today are seeking to even take that away from the employees to whom that protection was granted.

The average union does not make an issue of the closed shop as the basis for a strike. It has been done through the years, but I can not recall of one where that was the sole issue or has been the major issue in some years past, even prior to the war period. Usually, if that is one of the issues and other issues are satisfied and they are content or feel that the employer is not embarked on a program of decimating the union or weakening the union, they are satisfied to keep a relationship whereby they can build up on their effort. Where you do find the issue on the closed shop a strike issue, and they are infrequent, you can always rest assured, according to my personal experience, that that employer or that group of employers has or have not been playing the game in dealing with the union and it was their requests again based upon the same type of thinking which was the basis for the original demand for union shop or closed shop.

I am not prepared to say at this time that the formula proposed by Professor Douglas is the answer to the controversy over
the closed shop question. There are, as he points out again, employers who just resist any such relationship, and yet there are employers also who have had closed shop relationships for a number of years, who by their own statement across the table and publicly have said they would not surrender such a relationship with the unions with which they have had that relationship through the years. It has brought stability to their own industry, it has been a source of getting better trained people, it has been a source of conducting their personnel problem on a much more organized and stabilized basis.

I do feel this, as one from Labor; that the period through which we are going at the present time may not be as black as some of us are inclined at times to view it, because the very fact that there is a concentration on the entire Labor subject leads me at times to think that some thought is being given to the entire field of labor relations out of which may come a better understanding of the whole thing. We have in this country gone through, it is true, a period of trying each other's strength out, and up until the enactment of the Wagner Act, which certain people are trying now to amend into oblivion, there was no express policy in labor relations. I think the very fact that the Act is being discussed so widely, its effectiveness or alleged ineffectiveness on the part of some, means that there is now thinking on the part of this relationship. It is possible that as time goes by Labor itself (I say this sincerely and I hope it will not be looked upon just as words, because so much of what
many Labor men have said is just looked upon as words by those who have not had the practical insight with the problem) will be looked upon generally as the forthright champion, in spite of its inefficiencies at times and despite the errors that may be committed by leaders in some Local Unions, for democracy and the right of the workers and that organization to express their own will.

Much has been said at times about the use of the closed shop to force a strike without the workers having their say on it. I know that the general practice is not only having a vote of the workers but having a vote by secret ballot before a strike is called and having a vote of all of the workers in a particular shop on a particular industry. The general solution proposed by Professor Douglas may be something to be considered. I can see shortcomings in it because of experiences we have had with elections in the past, where they were used to delay and delay and create endless delay so that the sentiment for the union or the sentiment for a given request might be broken down.

The general thinking on Labor's part justifying the closed shop was pointed out again, and that is that it is certainly unfair, it is certainly unjust for a portion of the workers in a given industry to get the reward and get the benefit of the improvements that are fought for and secured by the majority without that minority paying their share of the load. It has been pointed out time and again that we do not operate that way in our tax systems or in the systems for solving our social problems where we
impose social security laws, unemployment insurance laws. In such cases the taxes are distributed equally by all who share in the benefits.

M ay I point out a very definite example where the lack of any requirement to belong to the union becomes a problem and indicates why labor insists on union shop or closed shop provisions in contracts. Persons employed by the City and County of San Francisco (and I have had some experience with this), persons employed by the State of California, whose wages and working conditions are set by the legislative body, the State Legislature, in regard to State employees or by the Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco when employees of that governmental organization are involved—there are many unions in those fields. There are A.F. of L. unions, there are many A.F. of L. craft unions, there are many CIO unions, and it is a strange thing how often the situation follows year after year. It will come along towards budget time or every two years under their various wage stabilization acts and wage standardization acts, when the various department heads are making up the budgets for their employees, and the employees of the departments will suddenly realize that they are not going to get very much consideration, that the consideration is being given to the taxpayer and the thought is, "Let's keep the tax rate down," in spite of the fact that living costs may be going up. Then they will look around for a medium by which they can express their desires as employees, and they just do not have a medium. They were in a union when they went
on the job or shortly after they went on the job, and because they did not have to continue in the union they said, "Well, I will save that dollar or dollar and a half a month and I will stay out of the union." Then there was a great rush back into the union, and the union representatives go in and make the representation and the arguments to the governmental body and probably get some improvement in the situation that might have been accorded before. And, very frankly, some time thereafter the membership drops off again and the union struggles along with a minority membership.

That is a typical example of what exists today in a general way as to why labor wants union shop or closed shop, where they meet the resistance of employers in private industry.

The effort to outlaw the closed shop, speaking from a personal observation, I am sure will not be successful because the minute the thing is written on the statute books there are those employers and those in management who will use the situation simply to break down the unions. And it has been the experience in two of the States that have had the statutes outlawing the closed shop on their books long enough now, judging from conversations I have had with men from those States in the past month or two, that after a given period management embarked on a program to a great extent of either knocking wages down or not meeting the rising cost of living or taking away working conditions that have been granted through the years. As a result, the workers in those areas are becoming more and more embroiled and becoming just wilder about their situation than they have ever have before.
There are those, again on both sides, who perhaps will never be converted to any middle approach to the problem, one that will recognize the need of the workers, the right of the workers, and one that will succeed in eliminating abuses on both sides and one that will recognize management's rights. But the thoughts that we have had presented on the subject today will protect the rights of the workers and will aid in the development of production of this country.

CHAIRMAN WFLLMAN: We are happy, Mr. Shelley, that you could stay with us.

Continuing the discussion, we shall call on Mr. Richard Lyden, International Representative, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.

Mr. Lyden?

RICHARD LYDEN

International Representative,
International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union (CIO).

MR. LYDEN: Ladies and gentlemen. I find myself in wholehearted accord with Jack Shelley who just spoke to you. I find myself not in disagreement with Professor Douglas in the presentation that he made here today in respect to at least the final proposal that he made, which is that perhaps it would be a good thing to have a referendum before a closed shop were granted to workers.

I say I find myself not in disagreement with that proposal, but I am not in disagreement with him because it impresses me as
being something that most earnest labor leaders seek. They seek to establish democracy within their union structures, and usually they find themselves in conflict with employers precisely over the question how they go about asserting a democratic right.

I have had the experience of having organized a group of workers who had paid their initiation fee, paid dues for a period of a year. We went through a National Labor Relations Board election. The majority, mind you, had paid dues into the union for a period of a year. When the final vote was tallied, we lost the election overwhelmingly. We lost it because on the day that the election was held the employer went out among the workers, made them promises, bribed certain of the workers, that he would pay them increased wages. As I say, the result was that we lost the election.

My own union is the Warehouse Union, which is part of the Union that is best known as "Harry Bridges' outfit" around the Bay Area. The Warehouse Union has 18,000 members in the Bay Area. We have a system of democracy based upon the idea that those 18,000 members should all participate in the living fabric of the Union. The way in which they participate is that they are obliged to attend one membership meeting a month. In San Francisco usually we have two meetings in the Civic Auditorium. The workers are obliged to attend one of those meetings. There is a fine imposed of $1.00 if they do not attend. The workers themselves voted the fine. They voted it by 6 to 1 on a referendum ballot.
We have no quarrel with the principle of democracy, and I do not think that that is the issue here. The thing that concerns me about this session is the fact that I do not find here any kind of a dynamic approach to a problem that is essentially a living problem. It involves a living relationship between employers and workers. It involves a question of that share of the good things of life that workers shall have, that they require, in order to live decently as against those things that the employers reserve for themselves. And this produces a conflict about which I would be the last to deny.

George Bahrs was here from the Employers Council. He gave you a lecture, though he would never call it that, on the facts of life. He did not call it a "class struggle", but he told you essentially that one of the problems that workers face, that keeps them in conflict with employers, is the fact simply that in order to get more money, if the employer denies it, they themselves have to come in open conflict with them; they have to, as we say, "hit the bricks". And in our Union we have done that. But the thing that concerns me even more than that is the fact that there appears to be no recognition here at all that it is not the closed shop as such, it is not the question of industry-wide bargaining, it is none of these things that is concerning the Congress of the United States today. It happens that last November there was a big electoral change, an electoral change that was indicated even at the time when Roosevelt was still alive, and this change produced in American life a new relationship in forces
where the employers, the National Association of Manufacturers, if you would like to name it, the monopolists of America, being in a new position politically and economically, made their determination that they were going to seize this opportunity to take advantage of the working people of America. That is the situation in which we find ourselves.

And I am quite amazed at some of the reactions that I have heard expressed here. There are some labor people apparently who think there is no jeopardy. I think there is jeopardy both for labor and for the American people. I see no good in the recommendations that Taft makes, whether they be on the "Ball and Chain" Bill, or whether they be on one of the other bills. I think that they all jeopardize labor and the American people.

I think that there are two purposes to this major offensive of reaction:

1. One purpose very clearly and the immediate purpose is to head off the second round of wage increases for the workers of America. That is one immediate purpose. And the purpose becomes clear when every day before the Senate Labor Committee or the House Labor Committee a new bill is put forward. "In the event that the workers should commit this indiscretion, then we have this bill." And that bill will be put forward first on the docket to meet that problem. And I am surprised to find in the ranks of American Labor so much lack of courage, so much willingness to concede that this situation is all right, one that should be put up with.
The fact of the matter is that the workers of America need further wage increases today as they have never needed them before. They need them for the very simple reason that price control has been utterly destroyed by a combination of reactionary Republican and Democratic forces in the Congress. That is why they need and must have wage increases. And you have a situation where it is to the tactical advantage of the reactionaries in Congress to put forward one day one bill and another day another bill, so that they can keep us from concentrating our attention on any major bill that they might hope to wind up with. The effect of it has been that the loud-mouthed bellowing of people like Taft and so on, has driven certain labor leaders to a position of cowardice where, instead of seeking gains for workers, gains to which workers are entitled, they have extended their agreements—actually extended their agreements—for periods without getting benefits for the workers. And I think that that is cowardice. If the workers are entitled to increases, then believe me! we in our Union are going to seek them.

The second purpose is to divert attention from a thing that has come to pass, perhaps somewhat unbeknownst to most American people—a situation where during the war the monopolists of America succeeded in tightening and extending their control of the American economy to the point where corporate profits have increased steadily during the war and now after the war to the point where it is anticipated by the end of the year they will have tripled over what they were prior to the time that the war
In my opinion, this offensive of reaction is determined to divert attention from this new stranglehold that American monopolists have been able to achieve.

Finally, it is my impression that no one bill will be introduced in Congress sufficiently bad to unite all of Labor, because if a bill is introduced that is that bad and that reactionary and that catastrophic to the labor movement, it will create by its very nature the pre-conditions for the national unity of all Labor, A.F. of L., CIO and Brotherhoods. And that far the reactionaries are determined not to go.

It seems to me that these essentials are things that should be examined in a dynamic society. It seems to me that it is our obligation to see this change of forces, political and economic, that has taken place in American life; to estimate it; to weigh it; to see what it means; to evaluate its effects on each and every one of us individually, worker or non-worker. And when we have seen this, if it can be estimated as anything less than a peril for the American people, because, in my opinion, the American people are in retreat, then I am ready to concede that our position is the wrong position.

In connection with this whole wave of reaction which has swept the country, sometimes creating panic and hysteria, making workers feel quite desperate, putting them in very desperate moods, if you like, at certain times, there has come with it an attack upon the civil liberties of people in America--attacks such
as the alleged Secretary of Labor has made upon one minority group with the idea of further dividing the workers so that they will be less able to fight back.

Professor Douglas has said in his remarks he thought there should be no discrimination permitted in unions. Believe me, we have none in our Union! We have a constitutional prohibition against it, whether it be for race, sex, religious or political affiliation. And we have "political affiliation" in there deliberately, because we will not tolerate people in our Union who are in there to divide them on this kind of basis--this or any other kind of basis. And the Secretary of Labor has made one of these attacks and newspapers have played the game of the carrot and the club during the whole period of this offensive, where they have dangled the carrot out and said, "All right. It won't be so rough on you of organized labor if you follow the carrot, but in the event you don't we're for bludgeoning you people for all we can. We are for heading you off from a second round of wage increases." And with it at the same time the lie is disseminated that further wage increases mean further price increases. And that's just not true!

I wish to end just on this note, and I have written this part down:

I am greatly but badly impressed with the learned and the detached and the refined atmosphere that I found here today in these cloistered halls. I am badly impressed because I do not think people ought to be learned or detached when they stand in
the presence of a lynching bee such as the one unleashed against organized workers in America. I do not think men and women should dignify with an air of impartiality the present annihilative attack that has been launched by the National Association of Manufacturers against the mighty right arm of American democracy, its trade union movement. I do not think that decent or comparatively decent people have any business weighing with an air of refinement whether labor will be devoured or merely dismembered partially or perhaps only mortally wounded.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. Lynden.
The discussion will be continued by Mr. Ray B. Wiser, President of the California Farm Bureau Federation.

RAY B. WISER,
President, California Farm Bureau Federation.

MR. WISER: Mr. Chairman, and ladies and gentlemen.

It is extremely interesting that I am attending this Conference today as apparently a low farmer in the midst of this great discussion on issues affecting employers and employees. There is a rather interesting observation that as such our great group of people are not only workers, but in some cases are employers, but at no time in our industry is there a period of time when we do not have more people working in it who are self-employers than those who are receiving wages. And that is true in California as well as in the other States of the Union.

I have wondered today somewhat why I have become a farmer,
and I recall the incident very well when I was 12 years of age and was asked the question of the determination of what my future occupation might be. I recall so well that I decided to join my Local 4-H Club, and after doing so, I went to my leader to discuss the matter of the type of project and what type of agriculture we would move into. After a thorough discussion we decided to become dairymen.

This leader said to me, "The first thing that will be essential is for you to buy a cow in order to get started."

I had no money. I came from an exceedingly poor family. I had six pairs of shoes in my lifetime before I was 12 years of age. Hence, from the standpoint of the endeavor, I immediately wondered how I would raise money to buy a cow. I finally determined to go down and see my Dad's banker.

I walked into the bank and said, "Mr. Banker, I have decided to become a farmer. The fact is, I have decided to become a dairy farmer and I want to borrow $100 to buy a cow."

The banker said, "That's very fine. But what security have you got to offer for the $100?"

And I had none. So after looking through those austere bars somewhat, I said, "I will have to think this matter over for a little while."

I walked out and went down the street. In a couple of hours I came back in and said, "Mr. Banker, I have got to have $100 to buy a cow. I have decided to become a farmer. I have decided to become a dairy farmer and I must have the money. And, Mr. Banker,
Just as sure as I live, I will pay you back the $100."

The banker said, "That's very fine, but suppose you die? What then?"

I said, "Well, Mr. Banker, if I die and go to heaven I will mail it to you, but if I die and go to hell I will hand it to you."

Needless to say, we got the money and hence we are in agriculture.

Dr. Douglas has presented an unusually broad perspective of an issue which is dominating the national scene. I think we can all agree that the address we have just heard is eminently fair to both sides of this issue. In fact, I am tempted to say that Dr. Douglas, at least in this address, leans somewhat to the right. I mean this as a compliment because Dr. Douglas' views on economic and social issues are rather well known, and he is, indeed, a friend of labor, although certainly not a prejudiced one.

The impression that I gained from listening to Dr. Douglas is that he approves of the closed shop, as an ideal, but is rather opposed to it as a practical expediency. I feel certain that even among the workers of this country the same mixed feelings and emotions prevail. If the closed shop were organized on a voluntary or majority basis, no one could have a legitimate quarrel with it. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The closed shop, as its name plainly indicates, is an involuntary or a compulsory issue. Wherever it exists, workers have no choice.

There is a wide space, always, between ideal programs and practical ones. The practical program must take into considera-
tion the human equation. For this reason the suggestions outlined by Dr. Douglas appeal very much to me. Whether or not labor would subscribe to these suggestions is quite a different thing. In all probability, the program of reconciliation, outlined by Dr. Douglas, would be vigorously opposed by most labor unions as well as by many employers, and yet, what Professor Douglas has pointed out is most fundamental and the key to our future industrial relations.

I am trying to view this problem along the same broad lines ably expressed by Dr. Douglas. I am not trying to confine my remarks to the viewpoint of an employer, or to reflect the viewpoint of labor itself. It seems to me that there is something much bigger involved, and that is our conception of what comprises individual freedom, and its place in our democracy. When you force a human being to do that which he does not want to do, or which he has the privilege of not doing, you take from him certain inalienable rights, the preservation of which may even transcend the material advantages gained for him by certain compulsory practices.

If the closed shop were suddenly outlawed, and if the Wagner Act were suddenly removed from our statutes, no one knows what percentage of American workers would voluntarily organize and join labor unions. If this is true, then it is obvious that, no matter what the advantages of the closed shop may be, workers are forced into this labor category, and stay within it simply because there is no way for them to escape the domination of their labor leaders.
There is another point which should be considered. While the closed shop may be beneficial to workers generally, it is damaging to our economy as a whole. It has caused strife between labor and industry, and even between segments of labor itself. It has reduced rather than increased the output of labor and industry by creating labor monopolies and destroying competition. In many cases, it appears to have given rise to political racketeering and violent law-breaking. In terms of general welfare, the closed shop has been a restrictive rather than a constructive force, in many instances operating against the best interests of the individual worker as well as society in general.

Naturally, the closed shop, as well as the entire labor union movement, developed out of conditions which labor felt were unfair to workers. In many instances, labor was justified in its grievances. But no economic group, under our free enterprise system, and our democracy, is justified in taking the law into its own hands, and in laying down its own rules and regulations for the behavior of free men and women. To prevent a person from working, simply because he does not believe in a closed shop, is contrary to our conception of economic freedom and of democracy.

As a matter of political expediency, Congress may find it impractical to ever enact a law outlawing the closed shop. This has been done in several states although the constitutionality of such measures is being questioned. However, the temper of the 80th Congress on labor issues has been brought to a sharp edge because of the industrial strife and so-called labor racketeering.
which has prevailed during the past few years. Unless this strife is eliminated, and unless this appearance of racketeering is stopped, Congress may be compelled to pass very drastic legislation, aimed at curbing the activities and programs of all unions, good and bad alike.

Unions as well as employers could do much to establish permanent industrial peace by respecting their mutual obligations. Both parties to a contract must fulfill and execute the conditions of that contract. Where such obligation and responsibilities are lacking, chaos results, and one or the other of the groups is eventually destroyed. This condition cannot be permitted. The responsibility of each group to the other, and to society as a whole, is paramount.

For that reason, I would like to see labor and management conciliate the differences between them for the good of each other and for the good of the country as a whole. This can and should be done. Each group should recognize the other’s contributions to general welfare. Many unions and many employer groups have recognized and assumed this responsibility. Others have not. Other nations, notably Sweden, have made a marked success of cooperative labor-management policies and programs. Under such conditions, there is no occasion for strikes, no excuse for any unfair practices on either side, no occasion for unlawful actions, no need for compulsion, or the deprivation of the rights and the freedoms of the individual, whether he represents labor or management.
... Applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Thank you, Mr. Wiser.

To close this discussion, I should like to call upon a very wise man, Dr. Lynn White, Sr., Professor of the San Francisco Theological Seminary and former Chairman for many years of the Industrial Relations Section of the Commonwealth Club.

Dr. White.

... Loud applause ...

LYNN WHITE, SR.,

Professor, San Francisco Theological Seminary.

DR. WHITE: Mr. Chairman, you said I was a "wise man". I hope I can prove it.

I am the thirteenth speaker today on this program and the last one. I want to underline what an Irishman once said when a conductor of his train sat down beside him in his seat and he asked the conductor, "Which is the most dangerous car to ride in on the train?"

The conductor said, "The last one."

Then said Pat, "Why the devil don't they leave the damned thing off?"

That is the question that is uppermost in my mind. If I can not leave the car off, I will reduce it to the dimensions of the caboose by pointing out the outline of what I would like to take thirty minutes to say.

The first thing that I have to say is this: modern man will henceforth seek his security in community, since the vast majority
of us are wholly unable to provide our security individually.

May I say the word "community" is a New Testament, not a Marxian, term. Mr. Davis showed that he knew some Greek. The word is "koinonia".

That is what I am standing for, and everything is going to be judged by whether or not it contributes to community.

Collective bargaining has been shown, it seems to me, to be a great contributor to community--not "a community", not "the community", but to community.

I recall hearing Mr. Roger Babson (no radical) say some years ago in Berkeley in a church, "Some day all of us will be Socialists, but we're not good enough to be that now." And he said that at a time when if you called a man a "Socialist," you had to smile in order to survive!

I should like to take his suggestion and say that conceivably the time will come when all shops will be closed shops, but they will be shops that conform in general to those eleven conditions which Professor Douglas has so brilliantly discussed.

The words "closed shop" have now a very bad name just as "Socialist" had a bad name once.

Professor Douglas has shown himself a brave man in saying, "I want to moralize, democratize and even civilize the closed shop."

Neither he, young as he is, nor I, young as I am, will ever live to see that closed shop civilized completely, but I believe that the evolution of our society is moving to ever more and more
complete control of areas by the groups who are equipped to control those areas.

These shops will not become closed until they prove, not by theory but by experience, that they will be fit tools of collective bargaining and that they will also give to the workers that security without which they will never have any freedom. And as our society becomes increasingly stratified functionally, though the classes, I think, will always be kept open, open at the top and open at the bottom (you can fall through the bottom as well as climb to the top), men are going to find their freedom, which is but an identical twin of their security in community.

I am grateful to Professor Douglas for the courage he has shown in giving us this pattern idea, which is going to be put into circulation by the Institute and which is going to hasten the day when the closed shop is fit to become universal as it is not fit now.

Of course, ample provision must be made for conscientious objections. May I presume to say that my Church, which is the Presbyterian Church, has taken very definite action on that point. I wish that it might become a generally accepted one. Conscientious objection to joining unions should in some way, which is, I think, not clear yet to any of us, be provided just as conscientious objection to killing your fellow men is provided by our Selective Service Act. The Seventh Day Adventists, for example, in one of the Midwestern cities, have been exempted from union membership by the labor movement there provided they would pay the
equivalent of their dues to some designated charity. I hope you

can tell us more about that or tell me, but probably the meeting
will break up very soon if I do not stop. But that seems to me
to be a suggestion of a way out.

I sat last summer for one hour on a roof up near St. Helena
talking to a Seventh Day Adventist carpenter. He was shingling
the roof and he said, "I am against joining a labor union because
that means controversy and that means strife, and we want peace."

I said, "How do you get along?"

He said, "Here they just let us do it because we do not work
for less than they work for."

You see, there are the gains that they get without paying.

I say that that is a situation which some day will be clarified.

But I wish my labor union friends would get the patience which my
old minister had when he said to me as I left for the Theological
Seminary in New York: "Remember this: all you can do for some
people who want to use the church but will never do anything but
use it is to christen them when they are born, marry them when
they are in love, and bury them when they are dead. But," he
said, "do that. That is your job as a minister of the church and
don't say, 'I'll do nothing for you unless you will do everything
required of a member of the church.'"

Something of that freedom, of that patience, is what you
labor men need. And you will win by it.

The last thing I want to say refers to Professor Douglas' very humble, modest failing to discuss "feather-bedding". I
should like to hear him at length on this question: When is a "feather bed"?

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

... Loud applause ...

CHAIRMAN WELLMAN: Thank you, Dr. White.

Time is late. The meeting this evening will be in the Men's Gymnasium.

I know that I speak for the entire audience in thanking our speakers and the people who have discussed their papers.

The Conference is adjourned.

... WHEREUPON, at 5:45 p.m., an adjournment was taken until 8:15 p.m. of the same date. ...
SECOND DAY -- THURSDAY EVENING SESSION

... The Thursday evening session of the First Annual Industrial Relations Conference of the Institute of Industrial Relations and University Extension, Berkeley Campus, University of California, convened in the Men's Gymnasium, University of California, Berkeley, California, at 8:15 p.m.; the Hon. Earl Warren, Governor of California, presiding...

DR. WELLMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, the University is pleased and honored to have as Chairman of this meeting the Hon. Earl Warren, Governor of the State of California.

Governor Warren!

... Loud applause ...

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

GOVERNOR WARREN: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. This is a very heartening sight to see so many people here interested in this First Annual Industrial Relations Conference of the Institute of Industrial Relations of the University of California. Since the day Dr. Sproul and I first talked about the establishment of an Institute of this kind, I have always looked forward to the day when I could attend one of your conferences. I never
thought, however, that the first one I attended would be one as large or as enthusiastic as this one is, and I never thought that I would have the pleasure of introducing as important a personage as I have the privilege of introducing tonight.

I believe that this Institute is most important and fundamental to the life of our State. There is no relationship other than that of the family that is more important in our complex civilization than the relationship of employer and employee. There is no relationship that must be kept on an even keel as much as that relationship. It has seemed to me through the years that we have studied every phase of business and industrial life seriously except our industrial relations. I look forward to the day when we shall not only teach the subject in the University, we shall not only have conferences such as this, but that we shall also have in all of the high schools of the State a forum where people can study this important relationship. I think we are well on our way to do that when this First Annual Industrial Relations Conference attracts as many interested people as have come to this one.

And now it is my very happy privilege to introduce the speaker of this evening, our honored guest who has come a long way to us, to show his interest in this cause: the Secretary of Labor. He has had a very distinguished career for many, many years. He has been a Senator from our neighboring State of Washington. He has been a Judge of the United States District Court in that same State. He has been Chairman of the Board of
Regents of both the University of Washington and Washington State College. He has been a man of important business himself. He has been interested in the work of important labor unions. He has had an interest in everything that would bring him experience in this field of industrial relations. For the last two years he has been Secretary of Labor.

At this time I take great pleasure in presenting to you the Hon. Louis B. Schwellenbach, Secretary of Labor!

... Loud and sustained applause ...

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The Hon. Louis B. Schwellenbach,
Secretary of Labor, formerly United States Senator from Washington and United States District Judge.

SECRETARY SCHWELLENBACH: Governor Warren, ladies and gentlemen. I accepted with alacrity the invitation to come to the State of California to participate in this Institute Conference. To a greater extent than most anybody knows, the universities and colleges of the country have come to recognize a responsibility which is theirs in an effort to bring about successful, peaceful relationship between Management and Labor. And I am proud of the fact (even though we talk about California once in a while in not such high terms up in the State of Washington, nevertheless we are from the Pacific Coast) that here in California you have started this movement under such propitious circumstances. I am particularly grateful for the fact that the Governor of your State, a man who is recognized throughout the country not merely
as a man of ability but also a man of the highest integrity, a
man whose reputation might be the ambition of any individual in
the country, has shown me the personal privilege of coming here
to introduce me to this audience.

During the last year and a half our Nation has faced the
most difficult and complicated economic problems of its history.
These arose because of the necessity for the reconversion of our
economy from war to peace. Outstanding among these problems were
those which arose because of differences between industry and
labor. I would be the last to attempt to minimize the importance
of these conflicts. I was in no sense surprised that these
differences arose. What has surprised me most has been the appar-
ent belief that it would be possible completely to rearrange our
-economy and at the same time avoid any strife between industry
and labor.

Increasingly throughout the conflict our economy has been
g geared to war--patterns of production and employment underwent
profound changes. The wage and salaried workers of America were
called upon to meet the huge and unprecedented demand for war
equipment while maintaining a remarkably high level of civilian
goods and services.

This achievement, which hastened the day of final victory,
was more than a triumph of men and machines. This achievement
proclaimed the enduring strength of our democratic traditions and
our devotion to the principles of human freedom.

For remember that our participation in World War II was so
vast and intricate that it required much greater control and direction of the national economy than we had ever experienced in the past. Yet the measures which we adopted and the methods which were used owed much of their success to the very fact that they did reflect both unity of purpose and faith in the free American way of life.

The period of reconversion, with all its trials and difficulties, called for a basic decision. The government and people of this nation faced a choice between continuing war controls and resuming the free pattern of life. In many respects, and especially in the field of labor relations, that was not an easy choice. But I am convinced, and I think the record proves beyond a doubt, that the return to free collective bargaining was a wise one—the only choice for a nation conceived in liberty.

I certainly need not remind this audience that the problem of industrial relations is fundamentally a problem of human relations. And by the same token, laws which seek to regulate or control this relationship should not neglect or overlook this fundamental aspect.

I mean to discuss some of these proposals with you, but first I want to set in true perspective certain important facts. One of the most outstanding is the immense productive capacity which this nation has developed. America at war was able to maintain production for civilian needs at record levels and also turn out war materials with an annual value exceeding 60 billion dollars. America at peace is moving toward an era of unprecedented output.
This huge production potential, enlarged by technological advances already under way, points to higher levels of living than we have ever known. The great task that lies before us is to achieve an economic balance and stability which will promote the wise use of all our resources in men, materials and machines.

If that achievement is to be of lasting benefit—if it is to endure down through the years, it must have as its basis the American ideal of a free democratic economy—free for management to exercise its natural function, free for labor, so that all who are willing and able to work can find jobs under satisfactory conditions. By definition this excludes abnormally long hours of work or wage scales that impose substandard living conditions. It demands a firm basis of mass purchasing power among the nation's wage and salaried workers—since these groups comprise such a large segment of our economy.

Put in this way, the problem seems simple, but in reality any program which seeks a sound economic balance must reckon with other less tangible factors. Some of these factors are still not clearly understood, some of them are deeply rooted in the habits and customs of our people. The decisions which we reach and the programs which we adopt must fit the pattern of a free society.

It is common knowledge that much of the labor legislation which is before Congress was offered as a means of curbing labor and "restoring equality" at the bargaining table. Are such "curbs" needed to give us a better economic balance? Is there a real danger that labor through collective bargaining, will demand
and get too large a share of the national income? A share so large that industry could not function successfully?

This involves a question around which most of the debate between representatives of industry and labor has been waged. Each side in this debate has employed economists. These economists have made studies, have issued reports, the American public has been deluged with figures, all of which has resulted in confusion, disputes and strife. I am not an economist. However, it seems to me that the problem is of such a nature that one need not be an economist in order to arrive at a correct conclusion concerning the issues. I think the most important thing is that those who attempt to reach a correct conclusion be not special pleaders for either side of the controversy. The labor economists say that with living costs increasing, wage increases are necessary in order to maintain the standard of living of the American workers. No thoughtful person can combat the correctness of that position. On the other hand, the economists for industry say that wages form an important part of the cost of production. Therefore any wage increase must be reflected in the price of the products produced by those who have secured a wage increase. No thoughtful person can combat that philosophy. Therefore, what do we have? A constantly increasing spiral of wages and prices from which nobody benefits. The editors of our papers and of our magazines, most of our commentators and columnists, have argued that there is a very simple answer which should be recognized by labor. That is, that labor should realize that any wage increase
simply reflects in a higher price for the products of labor and that therefore labor should be satisfied and desist from making demands for increase in wages. What these gentlemen neglect to say is that industry also should recognize that with every price increase there follows as a necessary corollary a further demand for wage increase. Therefore the value of price increases is only temporary and ephemeral. What both industry and labor should understand is that ultimately they together are going to price the products which they produce out of the market, which will be a disaster not only to each of them, but to our whole national economy.

The President's Council of Economic Advisors and President Truman's Economic Report to the Congress had this to say concerning it:

"Chief among the unfavorable factors is the marked decline in real purchasing power of great numbers of consumers...

"If price and wage adjustments are not made—and made soon enough—there is danger that consumer buying will falter, orders to manufacturers will decline, production will drop, and unemployment will grow—--".

This is another way of saying that our free nation cannot keep the balance sheet of industry in the black if the balance sheet of labor is in the red. Look, for example, at what has happened since V-E Day to the buying power of factory workers who represent about 30 percent of all workers who are not on farms.

Moreover, the financial news indicates that management
itself is concerned over this same situation.

There is one further point I wish to make before discussing specific labor legislation. The Department of Labor has consistently maintained that this whole question of labor-management relations and legislation bearing upon it cannot be treated as a thing apart. We must never forget that industrial strife is a symptom of basic economic maladjustments. Therefore, legislation designed to promote industrial peace must also be geared to the larger national purpose which seeks increased security and well-being for all of our people.

I have not taken the position, nor do I take the position, that I oppose every piece of legislation which attempts to restrict the activities of labor unions. The organized labor movement in the United States has grown by leaps and bounds in the last 10 years. It is but natural that such rapid growth would bring with it abuses which, if the labor movement is not willing to correct, the Government must correct. Certainly the employer and the public should not be penalized by the inability of labor unions to agree as to which union has jurisdiction in a certain plant or factory or industry. In 1934 we in the Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act which gave to labor unions the machinery by which it could be determined what was the proper bargaining agent for the employees of any employer. Organized labor hailed this Act as its Magna Charta. It should be compelled to use the Act and to accept the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, not only in reference to disputes between
employers and workers, but also in reference to disputes between the various branches of organized labor. Particularly, as the President pointed out in his State of the Union message, labor should be prevented from using the secondary boycott as a device to thwart the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. With the growth of the labor union movement, it is certain that unions should be compelled to make public their financial transactions. As a matter of fact, most of the unions do this already.

A study made by the Labor Department shows that among 25 international AFOfL organizations, 22 provide for regular reports on finances either directly to the local unions or to the union's convention and three provide for regular publication of financial reports. Of the 36 CIO international unions, 31 provide for regular financial audits by a certified public accountant. Thirty publish financial reports available to anyone and five provide for financial reports to local unions or to members.

I agree also that labor unions should be made subject to suit in the event of violation of contract upon their part. The fact is that in 35 of our 48 States, they already are subject to such suits, both in the State Courts and the Federal Courts. The only objection I have taken to the legislation proposed on this point is that it is so designed as to set labor unions apart from everyone else or from every kind of organization in the country by allowing suits in Federal Court, regardless of the amount in controversy and in defiance of the constitutional provisions that jurisdiction of such private suits in Federal Courts shall be
limited to those controversies in which there is a diversity of citizenship as between the parties.

There are several bills before the Congress which feature the creation of a mediation board. Some would set up a board outside the Department of Labor; others would set up a mediation board within the Department but would make the board practically independent and give to it the work of conciliation and mediation now being carried on by the Labor Department's Conciliation Service.

I am opposed to these measures because I do not believe that either approach will promote industrial peace. There are several compelling reasons for my conclusion.

The establishment of such a board would interfere with and disrupt not only the work of the Conciliation Service, but a much larger area of voluntary collective bargaining between labor and management.

Inevitably, both sides would tend to carry important issues directly to the board without making any serious effort to reach a voluntary agreement among themselves. During the war we saw this happen time and time again—the parties were so anxious to have "their dispute" reach the National War Labor Board in Washington that in thousands of cases the preliminary negotiations were little more than a dress rehearsal for the big scene in Washington.

That is one of the reasons why the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American
Federation of Labor, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations all strongly oppose the creation of a mediation board.

And these four groups know the value of the U.S. Conciliation Service because they have had a great deal of experience with it. Last year, for instance, Commissioners of Conciliation aided in the peaceful settlement of 13,000 industrial disputes. What's more, in 90 percent of the disputes where Commissioners were called in before work had halted, no stoppage occurred.

Last year our Conciliators also helped settle 3,400 strikes. Nearly two-thirds of these had begun before either side asked the Service to step in.

Moreover, as you know, all of these settlements were reached by voluntary methods, carried on with the friendly help of an impartial "moderator".

I am convinced that we would be very unwise to jeopardize or by-pass this highly useful machinery in order to set up a mediation board. But there is another reason why such a board would fail of its purpose. The solution of labor disputes is such a many-sided and complicated task that no board--regardless of the character, ability and experience of its members--would have the necessary background to mediate the enormously varied range of disputes that arise along our industrial front.

Now let us examine a very different set of proposals--those designed to prevent industry-wide bargaining or to enact other restrictions which will limit the scope of a given union agreement within an industry. We here on the West Coast have had con-
considerable experience with agreements of this sort. We know how flexible such contracts are and what a wide range of problems and conditions they are designed to meet. And I believe most of you share my belief that these bargaining systems have helped bring stability into industrial relations and that they indicate maturity of development.

The avowed purpose of limiting proposals is two-fold. They seek to prevent complete or widespread shut-downs as the result of a labor-management dispute; and they seek to protect employers within an industry from the economic pressure which unions might otherwise be able to exert.

So far as the first purpose is concerned, I see no reason to suppose that a ban on industry-wide bargaining will achieve it. Witness the fact that there was no industry-wide contract in steel when the industry was sharply curtailed early in 1946. Nor would such a prohibition cope with the problems raised by disagreements affecting such public utilities as gas, light or local transportation companies.

In this connection, I would like to cite a study recently made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics entitled "Area of Bargaining with Associations and Groups of Employers". This compilation shows the important industries which now bargain on a national or industry-wide scale, those which bargain by geographic or regional areas and those bargaining within a city, county, or metropolitan area.

The study clearly indicates that proposals which would narrow
the scope of bargaining, either within an industry or a geographic area, would also disrupt established procedures in such industries as glass and glassware, dyeing and finishing textile, hosiery, lumber, maritime, metal mining, rubber, men's clothing and women's clothing, paper and pulp—to name only some of the more important sectors. In most of these industries area-wide bargaining has worked very well and employers themselves are not desirous of a change.

As I look back over the troubled period of reconversion, I find little reason to think that these proposed limitations would have contributed anything substantial toward industrial peace.

This desire to localize negotiation seems to rest somewhat on the belief that both sides are more apt to reach a peaceful settlement under such conditions. My experience since V-J Day does not bear this out. Time after time when local union committees and their employers were deadlocked, I have called upon the heads of international unions, and they were able to reach a settlement.

Regarding the second purpose—to restrict the economic power of unions at the bargaining table—I can see no justification for this approach unless it can be demonstrated that labor is receiving a disproportionate share of the national income. To date, I have seen no evidence to support this view.

In this connection, it is only fair to say that some employers feel that organized labor now threatens management's "right
to manage." While I do not question the sincerity of this viewpoint, I do believe that such fears are based upon a lack of real familiarity with the collective bargaining process. Because of the increase in union membership during the war and because of changes in union and business management, many representatives of both groups got their first taste of free collective bargaining in the last year.

Undoubtedly there were instances where one side or both took extreme positions, but I do not think this fact warrants any curtailment of the sort proposed. Moreover, I am convinced that those limitations would encourage further strife. It is significant, too, that the trend of successful bargaining has been to increase the range of subjects which are open for discussion. For example, many employers who once objected to discussing anything but wages and hours, have found by experience that grievance machinery, safety and health and other matters are proper subjects for collective bargaining.

Witness, also, the recent letter which President Truman received from the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion—discussing a report on the guaranteed wage, the Board unanimously concluded:

"Adoption of guaranteed wage plans should not be the subject of legislative action, but should be referred to free collective bargaining.....

"Stabilization of employment and its effectuation through wage or employment guarantees, wherever possible, are matters of
mutual concern to employers and employees. Each party has the
definite responsibility of seeking to stabilize operations within
a plant or industry in order to advance the level of general
economic security of the nation...."

Another group of proposals is aimed at the closed shop and
kindred forms of union security. By forbidding any contract which
makes membership or non-membership in a labor organization a con-
dition of employment, these bills presumably would outlaw the
closed shop, the union shop, maintenance of membership and
possibly preferential hiring.

As of last April, 77 percent of the workers in this country
who belonged to organized labor and worked under union contract
would have their status changed by these bills. Here are the
figures, by type of agreement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed Shop</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Shop</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of membership</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferential hiring</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neglecting other considerations, it is plain that such pro-
posals would open the doors to prolonged industrial chaos in
America. Union security is the very heart of these contracts.
In many cases these security provisions were won after long
struggles and against the bitterest opposition from open shop
employers. Given this historical background, and the undeniable
fact that some employers still are anxious to get rid of unions,
I do not see how a ban on union security could fail to provoke
industrial strife.
But I also know that many employers, after direct and long experience with union security clauses, found that they were desirable and would object seriously to any legal ban on such provisions.

Let me be more specific and cite some definite examples. The National Foremen's Institute, Inc., an advisory service on labor matters for employers, recently surveyed the attitude of 1,000 companies that have some form of "closed shop." The Foremen's Institute reported--in some astonishment--that nearly one-fifth, 19.2 percent, of these employers believe that closed shop contracts made for better relations between employers and employees. Less than 15 percent reported that union security clauses had worsened labor relations in their plants. The remainder, almost two-thirds of the employers, could see little difference one way or the other.

In case you think the Foremen's Institute poll was not typical, let me refer you to a very recent issue of Business Week. This magazine sent its reporters to interview businessmen on this subject. Altogether, their reporters talked to employers who manufactured just about everything from aircraft to razor blades. Each one had some form of union security--and what was the result?

Fifty-eight percent said that the effect of such elimination would be bad for management.

There is one particular reason why many businessmen should prefer some form of union security. So far as I know, every authority in the field of industrial relations favors the
inclusion in labor contracts of provisions for handling grievances.

As some of you will recall, there was no dispute at the President's Labor-Management Conference on Industrial Relations in November 1945, on this question. Enlightened employers and enlightened labor unions have come to recognize through experience the necessity of including in their contracts sound provisions for the settlement of minor disputes—even up to the point of providing a terminal point in the form of arbitration or an umpire system where disputes within the operation of the contract can be decided. These are the day-to-day disputes, the inevitable frictions that are bound to arise where men work together. In the overall scheme of things, any single one may be unimportant. But unless they are handled properly, they breed discontent and frictions which in a short time would break down good industrial relations.

I doubt if you could find a management representative who is active in the field of labor relations who would question that conclusion. Now, if through a ban on union security, a substantial proportion of employees in any establishment would fall outside the union which has done the bargaining and would be compelled to deal individually on every grievance, the most substantial advance that has been made in industrial relations in many years would be lost.

The question of democracy in unions is another case in point. Of course, the affairs of unions should be conducted democratic-
ally. And this does not always hold true. Yet here, as in every other phase of human relations, the preponderance of evidence must be given great weight. My own experience and observation leads me to conclude that union rules and practices are not behind other segments of American life in the practice of democracy.

In this connection, let me cite a recent article by Joseph Shister of Yale University. Entitled "The Locus of Union Control in Collective Bargaining," the article appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics for August 1946.

One of the points which the author makes in his summary and conclusions is of particular interest. I quote:

"The ultimate control over collective bargaining in most unions does rest with the rank and file... True, the full power of settlement is sometimes vested in the negotiators, but the significant point is that this power is voluntarily entrusted to the leaders by the rank and file in most instances. It is true further that (especially) in national negotiations, the actual control over the bargain—in practice—rests with a small sub-committee of the negotiating group. But here again the condition has been brought about by necessary structural conditions, and was not imposed on the rank and file by leadership."

A third group of legislative proposals revolve around amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. In general, these bills would "equalize bargaining power" and seek to discourage strikes by depriving workers of certain rights they now have under the Act.
Passed in 1935, the Wagner Act has been attacked and defended in court and out. As you recall, its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court early in 1937. During the next ten years a great body of law has been developed in interpreting the Act and its meaning. In many respects, the provisions of this law are enmeshed with the collective bargaining process itself and it is very difficult to know just how far-reaching any given change might be. So much is involved—including the attitudes of many employers when and if a new power equation is created. Therefore, I have strongly urged the Congress that this whole question be made the subject of a special study by a Commission, as the President recommended in his State of the Union Message.

It goes without saying that such a study should look closely into the basic causes of labor disputes. And I would further recommend the kind of approach that I have indicated, paying close attention to the real goal this nation seeks in the years ahead—secure abundance in a world at peace.

Right here I would like to add a word or two about compulsory arbitration. To some people this looks like a fair and simple solution to the strike problem. But let me remind you again—if compulsory arbitration is to succeed in eliminating walkouts and lockouts, it can only do so by abolishing or restricting the right to contract.

Compulsory arbitration simply means that the Government writes a contract for the parties. Proponents of such legislation seem to believe that Government intervention would apply
primarily to wages, perhaps even to hours, but not much else because they hold that these are the most frequent matters in dispute. But many labor agreements contain numerous detailed provisions concerning working conditions, safety measures, benefits and grievance procedures. Disputes can and do arise over these matters. The arbitrator, if the dispute is to be settled must arrive at a just and equitable settlement. Those who are most strongly opposed to Government control and planning have not been slow to point out the impossibility of Government effectively regulating the infinite details of economic activity.

The principle of compulsory arbitration does violence to our whole Anglo-Saxon concept of law. Many people say that it is customary under our system when two people have a dispute to take that dispute into Court and let the Court decide which side is right and which is wrong. So far as contractual relations between parties is concerned, it has never been within the purview of the Court's power to write contracts for people. Once contracts have been written and agreed upon, the Courts will interpret and enforce them, but no Court has attempted to write contracts. That is what those who advocate compulsory arbitration would have the Board of Arbitration or a Court do for the parties.

Where they are confused in their thinking is the realization that under our Anglo-Saxon concept of law our Courts do not write contracts. When I sat on the bench there might be cases when the equity side of the Court was brought into use, where rights had
been created through usages and practices. But outside of those situations no Court ever tries to write a contract. And this argument that is presented so frequently and was presented just yesterday, as I read the press (I have not seen the Bills introduced by two prominent Senators), that we should set up a system of labor courts in this country, is completely and absolutely contrary to our system of judicial process. Let me give you an example.

We have a young couple going together. They are congenial. They are very healthy. They enjoy the same things. They would make an ideal married couple. The young man decides that he wants to marry the young lady and she says, No. He cannot take her into court and, just because they have all of these different attractivenesses for each other, and have some court say, "You have got to marry this man." That is her right to decide.

The same thing is true of the writing of any sort of a contract. The great majority of the cases which would come before the courts or come before any board of compulsory arbitration would be cases which would involve the Government itself writing a contract between the parties.

There are some certain disputes which the courts could decide. They are disputes involving the interpretation of a contract or disputes involving the enforcement of a contract after it was entered into. But there is only one trouble when our courts or any board of arbitration attempt or attempts to decide questions of that kind. After the system has been working for
about six months either the court or the arbitration board gets so far behind that it is not possible for the court or the arbitration board successfully to handle the problem.

Ordinarily if you have a dispute with somebody that you want to take into the Federal Court, you expect that it will not come to trial for six months. I know that when I was on the bench I got so that cases were being disposed of six weeks after the cases were filed, and the lawyers all came in and objected because they said that they could not convince their clients that they were entitled to very much of a fee because I got rid of their cases so fast. But the ordinary litigant who goes into court expects that it is going to take him six months in the trial court, another six or eight months in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and another year or two to take it to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Labor disputes are too "hot". They involve too much of the human relations to be subjected to that sort of delay. And every board that we have ever set up, starting back with the Interstate Commerce Commission in the 1890's, has resulted in such and similar delays.

What happened during the war? We had a lot of strikes during the war. I think that the War Labor Board did one of the finest pieces of work that any board has ever done in the history of the United States. I have great respect for its membership and the integrity and the ability and the skill which they used. But they got so that they were at least four and a half months to
nine months behind on cases. What did the unions decide to do? They had Case No. 4983 on the Board's calendar; they knew that if they went out on strike they would get it to be No. 1 on the Board's calendar. So they simply went out on strike and that would happen with any board or any court that you try to set up.

It must also be realized that if an arbitrator writes a contract which, by increase in wages or by any other device, increases the cost to the employer, it will then be necessary for the arbitrator or for some governmental agency to determine what price the employer may charge for the products which he manufactures and sells. Just as sure as night follows the day the second step must follow the first. You can not have control over industrial relations in the form of compulsory arbitration without going on to the next step of price control, then on through the various steps until we have a complete control of our economy. And I do not think any of the people who advocate compulsory arbitration would want that complete control of our economy.

The Government cannot control the industrial relations side of the problem without controlling all of the other steps and the manufacture, distribution and sale of the goods produced. Therefore, those who unwittingly believe that there is a simple answer through the medium of compulsory arbitration have not looked further down the road which must be followed if such compulsory arbitration is to be effective. I don't think the American people want such a planned economy as the compulsory arbitration proposal would require.
Both management and labor oppose such an extension of control for they know that if a free enterprise economy is to be preserved, the terms of labor-management agreements should not be dictated by Government. This relationship touches the most vital activity of an overwhelming majority of our adult population. Freedom to contract in the sense that parties are free to refrain from entering into contracts, even where public policy requires the setting of some of the terms, is basic to the preservation of a free society.

My position on certain boycotts and other unlawful combinations should be well known. As President Truman said in his State of the Union Message, the use of the secondary boycott to further jurisdictional disputes or compel employers to violate the National Labor Relations Act is indefensible. But as the President’s recommendation pointed out, not all secondary boycotts are unjustified. He carefully distinguished between boycotts intended to protect wages and working conditions from those in furtherance of jurisdictional disputes.

The bills dealing with this subject go far beyond the President’s recommendation. They are aimed at all boycotts. I strongly urge that legislation dealing with this matter be so drawn as to come within the purview of the President’s recommendations.

The months that followed V-J Day were anxious ones for industry and labor—and unhappy ones for the Secretary of Labor! During the war, to a very large extent, the normal processes of
collective bargaining had given place to patriotic sanctions, including the no-strike pledge and a wide range of wartime controls. Necessarily this meant that many problems were left unsettled and many questions remained unanswered.

When Japan surrendered, these old questions rose to plague us. But unless I am very much mistaken, we have come a long way since August 1945. Both labor and management have a much more constructive attitude. The nation has boldly reaffirmed its faith in freedom, its regard for human dignity and human rights. Let us keep these principles constantly before us as we move into the world of tomorrow.

Thank you very much.

... Loud and sustained applause ...

GOVERNOR WARREN: Mr. Secretary, I am sure that everyone present in this hall this evening is grateful to you, as I am, for your very frank, your very earnest, and your very comprehensive address this evening. I for one am more convinced than I was before that you have not only one of the most important positions in our national government but also one of the most difficult. I am convinced more than I was before that we shall never have good industrial relations by choosing up sides and fighting things out to the bitter end. I am more convinced than before that we can not permanently improve our industrial relations just by the strained discussions that we have across the bargaining table. Our relations must be bettered by forums of this kind where in good spirit we can exchange ideas, philosophies,
and aims. And that is the reason I am so happy to know that this Institute of Industrial Relations is getting the wonderful start that it is. [End of Quote]

I wish for you, Mr. Secretary, all success in your very important work. I know all of these people thank you for the trouble that you have taken to come across the continent just to help us get started. We wish you a very pleasant trip back to the seat of the national government.

Good night, ladies and gentlemen!

... WHEREUPON, at 9:20 p.m., the First Annual Industrial Relations Conference of the Institute of Industrial Relations and University Extension was concluded. ...
Our relations must be bettered by forms of this kind where in good spirit we can exchange ideas, philosophies, and aims. And that is the reason I am so happy to know that this Institute of Industrial Relations is getting the wonderful start that it is.