Stability and the Industrial Elite in China and the Soviet Union
A publication of the
Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

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Correspondence may be sent to:
Ms. Joanne Sandstrom, Editor
Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Stability and the Industrial Elite in China and the Soviet Union

CONSTANCE SQUIRES MEANEY
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Preface

A major source of information for this monograph consists of interviews with émigrés from China residing in Hong Kong. A word about the interviewing process is in order. The sessions were conducted at the Universities' Service Centre in Hong Kong between November 1979 and May 1980. The interviews were conducted in Chinese. An assistant was present during the earliest sessions; most, however, were conducted one-on-one. The first sessions also followed a rather detailed questionnaire about factory organization, which I replaced early on with a less structured approach. A great deal of unexpected material, in particular revelations about the Cultural Revolution, had begun to emerge in the course of the interviews. An open-ended approach seemed the best way to bring out this kind of information and make use of it.

I interviewed twenty-four people in two-hour sessions for a total of 162 hours. An additional individual was interviewed in the United States in 1983. The most sessions with a single individual were nine, the fewest, one; the norm was three per person. The majority of the persons interviewed would be classified as intellectuals and had emigrated legally. The former occupations of the interviewees were: nine technicians and engineers employed in factories, among whom two had also worked in research institutes; five factory workers; one deputy factory manager; one staff worker in a factory; three intellectuals who had been sent down to factories after the Cultural Revolution; one member of a work team that spent time in two factories; and five technical or administrative employees in industrial units immediately above the factory level, such as municipal bureaus. The geographical distribution of the units in which the interviewees had worked was: Guangdong Province, ten; Shanghai, four; Tianjin, three; Beijing, two; Yunnan Province, two; Nanjing, one; and Anhui, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Shandong, and Xinjiang provinces, one each. The
numbers total more than twenty-five because some individuals had worked in more than one place.

The interviews were invaluable in providing a source of information about events and organization at the factory level in China unobtainable by other means. In combination with official PRC sources, a fairly small number of interviewees made it possible to draw a general picture of events and organization in the Mao years and especially during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. The picture was originally drawn in 1980 and has been confirmed by later accounts of the period that have appeared in the PRC press and in various individual memoirs published in the West. A portion of the present work, primarily in Chapter 6, appeared under the title "Is the Soviet Present China's Future?" in World Politics 39:2 (January 1987) (© 1987 Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission). I have done some updating in light of events that took place after that writing; my conclusions, however, have remained basically the same.

Many individuals and organizations were helpful in the course of preparing this monograph and the dissertation that was its beginning. With respect to organizations, the Institute of East Asian Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley both provided financial assistance for my thesis research in Hong Kong. The Universities' Service Centre in Hong Kong, under John Dolfin's direction, provided invaluable assistance with my interviewing project during nine months in 1979-80. The Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley provided office space and other assistance in the summer of 1986 and in January-September 1987 for revision of the thesis manuscript.

With respect to individuals, I would first thank the members of my dissertation committee, Chalmers Johnson, Ken Jowitt, and Benjamin Ward. Chalmers Johnson, the committee chair, was instrumental in encouraging me to revise the thesis for publication. Ken Jowitt provided criticism and inspiration at many points. Richard Baum at UCLA provided additional funding for the dissertation, as well as advice and criticism, in the course of a project in which I served as a research assistant. Joyce Kallgren as Chair of the Center for Chinese Studies also gave much advice and encouragement. Special thanks are due John Starr for his ideas and encouragement at the inception of the project. Joanne Sandstrom's editorial work with the final manuscript was invaluable. None of these persons or organizations is of course responsible for the arguments and conclusions I have presented.
I also would like to thank all the friends and colleagues who at one time or another offered criticism, advice, and/or general support. I would especially mention here Jon Unger and Anita Chan, who helped in the preparations for interviewing and living in Hong Kong; fellow scholars at the Universities' Service Centre during my stay in 1979–80; members of an informal dissertation discussion group that met in Berkeley during 1983; Pat Boling; Barbara Geddes; I-Fan Cheng; and my former colleagues at Franklin and Marshall College, Kerry Whiteside and Joe Jucewicz. And finally, I want to thank my husband, Ray Meaney, for his support and forbearance during my long hours spent absorbed in this project.

Constance Squires Meaney is presently a Research and Language Fellow in the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies in Taipei. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley and has taught at Franklin and Marshall College and at the University of California at Davis.
Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMRB</td>
<td>Guangming ribao</td>
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<td>RMRB</td>
<td>Renmin ribao</td>
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Introduction

The third plenum of the eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 1978 marked a watershed in the history of post-1949 China. At the plenum the CCP declared that the party’s main task had shifted from class struggle to carrying out the Four Modernizations. A number of major policy reversals were announced in connection with this shift, which set the stage for the ensuing period under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.

The policy reversals can be divided into two broad categories. The first called for changes in the status of various groups in society, as well as in the role played by ascribed statuses. Intellectuals were declared to be a part of the laboring classes, together with workers and peasants. Landlords and capitalists were said no longer to exist as classes. Political statuses, such as rightists and counter-revolutionaries—which had been assigned to large groups of people in past political campaigns—were removed, and people who had worn these “hats” were rehabilitated. More generally, class background was no longer to be taken into account in the distribution of reward, punishment, and opportunity.

The second category of policy reversals involved a range of rationalizing measures concerning organizational structure, elite recruitment, and control of deviance. These included administrative reforms that serve to separate party and state structures and to specify organizational roles and functions; such reforms would replace a system of diffuse party control. Personnel and incentive policies since the third plenum have called for examinations as a basis for hiring, job assignment, promotion, and wage grade raises, in place of political criteria. Performance is to be closely linked with material reward. Rationalization also includes the repudiation of mass political campaigns, which under Mao served both as a means of controlling deviance and of elite recruitment. Deviance is to be dealt with by means of the legal system or by specialized party organs (for example, the Party Discipline
Inspection Commissions) rather than by mobilizing mass criticism. Joining the party and rising through the ranks on the basis of activism in political campaigns is to be replaced by recruitment of party cadres on the basis of educational level, work performance, and the observance of standardized recruitment procedures. This set of changes marked the ascendance, after thirty years, of policies initiated in the 1950s and abandoned with the Anti-Rightist campaign and the Great Leap Forward; partially resurrected in the early 1960s; and dealt what appeared to be a final blow in the Cultural Revolution.

Updating an earlier work on change in communist systems, one scholar writes that the third plenum marked China’s entrance into a “post-revolutionary phase,” corresponding to that which has existed in the Soviet Union since 1961, when Khrushchev declared the dictatorship of the proletariat replaced by the “state of the whole people.”

Another labels the changes associated with the third plenum “China’s transformation from utopianism to development,” a transformation that involves “the retreat of politics from the control of society... the relationship between political power and society in China is beginning to undergo a change in direction.”

These assertions point to the need for systematic assessments of China’s postplenum policies and politics in a comparative and historical context. Comparative analysis of the politics of “reform” and “conservatism” in Leninist states can provide a framework for identifying issues and trends in China in the 1980s. It should also contribute to the development of more articulated models of change in communist systems. Ideally, such models would assist in identifying recurrent patterns that define societies ruled by Leninist parties while avoiding deterministic explanations that may arise from overly restrictive views of the requirements of modernization or the limitations of Leninism.

**Defining Issues for Leninist States**

We can begin the analysis by specifying a set of issues that arises during industrialization and development in states ruled by Leninist parties and comparing their resolution (or lack of resolution) in China and the Soviet Union. My choice of these issues was influenced by the literature on change in communist systems in general and, in particular, by two analyses of the “post-revolutionary” or “inclusion”


2 Tang Tsou, “Back from the Brink of Revolutionary-‘Feudal’ Totalitarianism,” 58.
phase of Leninist systems, discussed at length in Chapter 1. The issues are, first, the position to be assigned to experts and professionals in socialist development and the character of relations between them and the political elite, and second, the degree of rationalization to be instituted in party and state organizations and in relations between them. We can call these “defining issues” both politically and analytically. Politically, organizational rationalization and policies that encourage experts and professionals present Leninist ruling parties with dilemmas, because they are seen by the party both as prerequisites for, or essential features of, industrial modernization and as threats to the party’s leading role in society and to the maintenance of organizational discipline within the ranks. Thus they become foci of prolonged policy conflicts and tension within the leadership and the elite more generally. Analytically, these issues relate to a larger question of the relationship between the state and the society and economy. It is generally assumed that modernization and development will produce social forces that favor rationalization and professionalism and a corresponding reduction in party domination and in the politicization of social and economic life.

Western specialists thus have viewed social differentiation and, in particular, expansion in the size and influence of the professional classes as conditions that favor economic and political reform in communist states. In the Soviet Union, however, differentiation and professionalization of the party and society did not produce significant change in Soviet orthodoxy. It is only now (1987), some thirty-five years after the death of Stalin, that what one author calls the “conservatism incarnate” of Soviet society and politics has come under serious assault, by Mikhail Gorbachev. The denouement of that particular drama has yet to emerge. In China, on the other hand, the boldness of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the era following the historic third plenum led some people to foresee a turn toward “capitalism” and the “end of Marxism” in the PRC. In 1987, however, following an apparent setback for the forces favoring reform, discussion has turned to whether reform is (a) dead or (b) irreversible. The logic of the first position is that the intractable nature of the Leninist state—its bureaucratic structure and elite and its autonomy from society—is the fundamental reality, and reform is doomed to be a short-lived and limited phenomenon. The logic of the second position is that social forces are (or at some point become) the fundamental reality and that

3 Elizabeth Pond, From the Yaroslavsky Station, 25.
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once undertaken, reforms such as those begun in China unleash social trends that cannot be contained. Thus the present political setback is only a short-lived and limited phenomenon.

In this monograph I approach the topic from a position somewhere between these two poles that emphasize either the role of the "state" or of "society." I have compared the experiences of comparable generations of political and professional ("red" and "expert") elites in China and the Soviet Union and the organizational character of the party-state structure into which they were recruited. I have looked at elites and organization at a micro level—primarily from the vantage point of the industrial enterprise. The industrial-urban sector is the more politically problematic area for a Leninist regime. Policy there affects not only economic matters but also the fundamental character of party control, as suggested in the discussion of "inclusion" in Chapter 1. Middle and lower bureaucratic levels (party and state) in this sector are critical for the implementation of the center's policies; presence or lack of support affects both economic and political outcomes.

The major contrast I have drawn between China and the Soviet Union concerns the degree of co-optation of first- and second-generation elites (both red and expert) into a party-dominated system, a contrast that we might expect to be significant in terms of political outcomes. I have assumed that a high degree of elite co-optation into a well-defined structure of Leninist party domination would favor a conservative (or orthodox) outcome rather than a reform outcome. On the other hand, a low degree of co-optation would favor either a reform outcome or protracted conflict or vacillation, but not a sustained conservative outcome. I further assume that degree of elite co-optation is linked with two conditions: (1) favorable treatment by official policy and opportunities for upward mobility and (2) the organizational coherence and prestige of the Communist Party.

That we would assume there to be a link between favorable treatment and elite co-optation presumably requires no explanation. The linkage between organizational coherence and elite co-optation is suggested by Philip Selznick's model of a Leninist organization. In Selznick's model the central institutional objective of a Leninist party is to create and use members who have the character of "deployable agents." Ideally, the party member is "one who works actively in the party and accepts its discipline, not simply someone who agrees with the program."4 Next, party members are insulated from society at

large by immersion in Marxism-Leninism, which "creates a separate moral and intellectual world for the party member." The member must "see all aspects of the world through political eyes.... This sustains the authority of the leadership, much as ecclesiastical authority may be upheld by asserting the relevance of religious judgment to all human experience."

Finally, a Leninist organization can be seen as a "social system" with unique tensions. These tensions inhere in the fact that "the party is subject to the dual danger of assimilation to existing institutions and isolation from the sources of power." Isolation can occur if the party fails to penetrate groups or organizations that are vital to its interests. Assimilation can occur if, for instance, cadres working in various spheres of society that the party has penetrated, such as trade unions, "place the interests of target groups... above those of the party itself." I would add that the danger is not only a question of cadres serving other interests, but also of their "seeing through the eyes" of some nonparty reference group, rather than through "political eyes." If this occurs, the "leading role of the party" becomes problematic; it can lose its competence as a leadership instrument and its ability to co-opt elites without itself being co-opted, or "contaminated" by unreliable elements.

The Soviet and Chinese Cases

In the Soviet Union old elites were largely eliminated by Stalin in the 1930s at the same time as the crash expansion of industry and of higher education in support of it was underway. This made room for a huge, new "red-and-expert" stratum that was effectively co-opted and "domesticated" under Stalin's despotic rule by a combination of reward and terror. A partial merging of red and expert elites occurred. The organizational environment in industry was such that those recruited were effectively subordinated in a system of multiple hierarchies, with Stalin at the top. Meanwhile, the prestige of the entire system was solidified by the rise of the Soviet Union to the status of military and industrial superpower and victory in the "Great Patriotic War."

In contrast with this, in China under Mao, first- and second-generation professional elites and, finally, large segments of the political elite as well were alienated by a succession of mass campaigns, dur-

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5 Ibid., 26 and 33.
6 Ibid., 13 and 64.
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ing which they were persecuted but not decisively eliminated. They were set against each other by party policies that emphasized ascribed political and social categories rather than training, occupation, and performance in the distribution of rewards. They lived and worked within a structure in which organizational spheres and official roles were ill-defined and shifting. Upward mobility tended to be limited or arbitrary and unpredictable, and recruitment at lower levels became entangled with factionalism at the top. The party organization, pervaded by factionalism and personalistic networks, suffered a major blow to its prestige as a result of the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. This was exacerbated by the party’s perceived failure to produce an impressive level of economic progress. In short, conditions favoring a high degree of elite co-optation within a stable party-dominated system were not present.

The post-Mao PRC leadership (including reformist elements at the top) remains basically Leninist and intends through reforms not to weaken the party but to renew and strengthen it. Its moves in the direction of organizational rationalization and upgrading of the professional classes are part of this goal. However, the timing of the renunciation of class struggle and the upgrading in status of the professional classes by the regime is a potentially critical factor in the success of this effort. The party is attempting to expand and upgrade the professional class and (re)define the party-state relationship at the same time as it is abandoning the functional equivalent of Stalinist terror, the Maoist political campaign, and is doing so in a context where its prestige and credibility remain low. In the Soviet case, professionals were incorporated into the party-dominated system while Stalin was in the process of crushing all opposition and creating an awesome image of state power. Thus I conclude that conservatism (meaning orthodox Leninism) has a weaker elite constituency and a less effective political instrument at its disposal in post-Mao China than was the case in the Soviet Union after Stalin. And thus, while many of China’s “new” policies in fact make the system less Maoist but at the same time more like the Soviet Union, I think it unlikely that China will sustain a stable, orthodox Leninist format over the long term.7

7 By “orthodox” I refer to the type of state that emerged in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev. Essential requirements for classification as “orthodox” Leninism would include recognition of the “leading role of the party” in all spheres and the “correct line” (Marxism-Leninism as applied by the party leadership to explain and evaluate social reality) as the single, authoritative truth. See further discussion in the
Introduction

Structure of the Book

Chapter 1 comments on two earlier treatments of the topic of conflict and change in Leninist systems, both of which point to a set of issues that are central in shaping political outcomes in these systems. The commentary provides a framework for comparison of the Soviet and Chinese cases. Chapter 2 deals with Stalinism and the recruitment of a new red-expert Soviet elite beginning in the 1930s. The character of this elite and the organizational environment into which it was recruited favored a stable, orthodox, party-dominated system in the post-Stalin period.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the Maoist period in China. Chapter 3 notes the Stalinist character of Maoist political organization in industry and points out ways in which mobility, recruitment and reward criteria, and enterprise organization and the party's role before the Cultural Revolution present contrasts with the Soviet case. The contrasts suggest some of the reasons why Maoism ultimately was less able to co-opt a new generation of red experts into a party-dominated system. Chapter 4 deals with Mao's version of "revolution from above," the political campaign (yundong), as it affected industry, culminating in the Cultural Revolution. The net effect of intense, highly personalized, mass-oriented political campaigns with indecisive outcomes was alienation and internal division among red and expert elites and impaired party prestige. This contrasts with Stalin's purges and stabilized despotism, under which emerged a docile new industrial "middle class" that perceived itself in the service of a rising industrial and military power.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the post-Mao era, or "post-revolutionary phase" in China, in which Mao's successors are faced with a political and organizational legacy quite different from that which faced Stalin's successors in the 1950s. Chapter 5 discusses post-Mao policy toward organizational rationalization in industry and the treatment of professionals and presents a case that these show the basically Soviet-oriented (in the sense of orthodox) character or direction of the post-revolutionary phase in China. Chapter 6 deals further with post-Mao politics, as seen in the abandonment of revolution from above. The analysis suggests that despite parallels with the Soviet case noted in the preceding chapter, China is unlikely to experience a prolonged "conservative solution" (à la Brezhnevism) because of the tim-
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...ing of the abandonment of revolution from above and the political context in which it is occurring. The concluding chapter comments upon change and stability in Leninist systems and offers some thoughts on the essential features of Leninism that would have to undergo change in order to talk about a departure from orthodoxy.
CHAPTER ONE

Defining Issues in Leninist Systems

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, scholars of Soviet politics and comparative communism had begun to re-examine the political and social character of the Soviet Union and Soviet-type regimes in the wake of more than a decade of de-Stalinization. They questioned the validity of the totalitarian model (at least in its more rigid forms), which suggested an overly static and monolithic image of politics and society in Communist systems, and proposed concepts more cognizant of the changing nature of these systems. A common theme of this literature was that social differentiation resulting from economic development and the emergence of modern industrial society would prove incompatible with continued dictatorial rule by a self-defined “vanguard party” with a utopian, dogmatic ideology.

In particular, it was argued that the rise of a large stratum of skilled technical and professional personnel, a sort of counterpart to the Western middle class, would work against the long-term viability of a revolutionary regime. Under pressure from the professionals, whose contributions are indispensable for economic growth and development, the party leadership eventually would be compelled to abandon radical social and economic restructuring through “revolutions from above” in favor of more legal/rational modes of operation and a role as balancer of the various interests typical of a modern society. One of the more systematic presentations of this line of analysis was an extended treatment of policy conflict and change in communist systems by Richard Lowenthal, in which he specified three areas of conflict that shape the course of development in communist regimes.¹ These are the interrelated questions of elite dualism, material incentives and rationalization, and revolution from above. I will touch on each of these in turn.

"Elite dualism" refers to a persistent dilemma that Leninist regimes have with respect to the co-optation of technical and professional elites. In the early years of a Leninist regime, there typically exists a dualistic elite, one part consisting of the party elite of revolutionary veterans and the other consisting of technicians and engineers, managers, and administrators retained from the old regime. A communist party coming to power in an economically backward country, such as Russia in 1917 or China in 1949, faces a fundamental dilemma centering on the role of the latter group. On the one hand, ideology calls for eventual creation of a classless society without privileged elites, and much of the party's external support and its legitimacy among the membership is based on this vision. Thus, it is under pressure to eliminate the influence of the old privileged classes, prevent the emergence of new ones, and experiment with systems giving more opportunities to peasants and workers.

On the other hand, ideology also calls for a highly industrialized, technically advanced utopia. Having taken power in a poor country, the party is impelled by a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and nationalist sentiment to undertake rapid industrialization and economic development. This undertaking requires the contributions of technical and professional personnel in industry, who in the earlier days of the new regime are people who enjoyed relatively elite positions in the old society. The party is compelled to tolerate and even favor this group drawn from what it views as the exploiting classes because it needs their skill and expertise to run the system. Thus there is a dilemma of how much influence and autonomy, material reward, and privilege to allow people who are socially unacceptable and politically unreliable but who also are indispensable.

Faced with this problem, the Leninist regime will train a new generation of technical specialists and professionals, who they hope will be loyal to the new order and leadership. But this raises another dilemma, centered on the question of who will be admitted to the new training programs, and on what basis. Ideology would indicate that the children of workers and peasants, not the children of the old middle and upper classes, should be encouraged to enter the new technical/professional stratum; admitting the latter would perpetuate their status and influence and propagate their ideas and social orientations. Middle and upper class children, however, generally do better in school and on entrance examinations than children from less advantaged homes. Thus, the party's dilemma is whether to employ a "merit" system based on grades and examination scores (a system that
favors the children of existing educated elites) or to have quotas and political criteria to assure entrance of worker and/or peasant children in large numbers. There is also a question of whether old academics and specialists trained under the prerevolutionary regime will administer and teach in the communist regime’s universities and technical institutes and, if so, how much authority and influence they should be permitted. Finally, there is the question of recruitment and promotion in the workplace: Should preferment go to those with formal higher education or to individuals (worker-technicians) with experience acquired on the job? What weight should be given to political as opposed to technical credentials?

Lowenthal points to two other areas of tension and conflict typical of Leninist regimes and closely related to the problem of elite dualism. These are, first, the question of material incentives and, second, the party’s launching of revolutions from above. With respect to the first, the question of incentives is particularly acute in industry, where the large administrative and planning apparatus leads to “the emergence of a specialized stratum of engineers, managers, and economic administrators—people who must be given certain privileges to make them contribute to economic development, yet whose consolidation as a privileged class would threaten the attainment of the utopian goal” (that is, the classless society). Because of its developmental goals, the communist regime will be impelled to compromise its commitment to egalitarian ideals and instead encourage the emergence of “economic man, the type that has created the modern industrial society precisely by pursuing his own self-interest.” This emergence of economic man will be accomplished by relying on material incentives and income differentials to favor engineers and technicians, managers, and the more highly skilled workers.

Conditions desired or demanded by technical and professional personnel in order to contribute to the regime’s developmental plans are not confined to material rewards. Professional autonomy and a predictable organizational environment are equally or more important. Material incentives linked to individual performance and achievement are part of a larger constellation of items at issue between party and

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2 Lowenthal discusses these questions in “Development vs. Utopia,” 56–58. For a more detailed presentation, see Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin, chaps. 7 and 8, passim.


4 Ibid., 51.
Defining Issues

technical/professional elites, subsumable under the concept of "rationalization."

The import of policies that favor a technocratic elite and economic man is not lost on the party leadership: the likely result of cultivating a technically and professionally skilled elite is the creation of new centers of social power. The creation of such power not only betrays the vision of an emergent classless society but also threatens the status of the vanguard party, whose legitimating mission lies in leading society toward this goal. Consequently, the regime will "feel compelled again and again to intervene forcibly to prevent the consolidation of ideologically undesirable new class structures" and will initiate repeated "revolutions from above."5

"Revolution from above" refers to radical efforts on the part of the party to restructure society and alter the status of one or another social group or class. One might use the term "revolution from above" to refer both to movements aimed at urban intellectuals and professionals and to attacks on the old or new rural elite, such as the liquidation of the kulaks (rich peasants) in the Soviet Union. The nature of the threat to the party posed by the attacked group, however, differs. The kulaks presented an economic threat to the regime as well as a political threat in the sense of weak party control in the countryside. However, they did not represent a political threat in the sense of being potential rivals for elite status at the national level and in the modern sector. Intellectuals and professionals do. I shall be using the phrase "revolution from above" here to refer to movements directed against professionals (and urban "bourgeois intellectuals" more broadly) unless otherwise specified.

In the long run, Lowenthal maintains, the party's policy dilemmas connected with elite dualism and the related questions of material incentives, rationalization, and revolution from above will be resolved in favor of reward and privilege for the technical/professional elites and abandonment of revolutions directed against them. Because of the central role they must play in the processes of industrialization and modernization, pressures from the professional classes for the abandonment of egalitarian experiments that disfavor them—such as worker control in factories, student control in schools, or higher education admissions policies favoring students of worker or peasant backgrounds—will find a hearing among the party leadership. Pressure to abandon coercive and terroristic tactics toward professional and intel-

5 Ibid., 48.
Defining Issues

lectual elites will also be felt in the party. As industrial development and modernization progress, these pressures will increase, until at some point the Communist Party will turn away from radical experiments in social restructuring and from the tactics of revolution from above in favor of an orientation toward stable economic growth, routinized decision making, and the social status quo.

Such a set of developments marks the beginning of what Lowenthal refers to as the "post-revolutionary phase" in the evolution of communist systems. This phase, as envisioned in the 1960s and early 1970s, implied not only an abandonment of revolutionary egalitarianism in favor of stability, planning, and the status quo, but also some degree of political liberalization. Pressure in this direction would come from the technical/professional elite (including technicians, engineers, and industrial managers) who would expand in numbers and influence as the economy grew more advanced and complex. They would exert influence not only on the party but within it, since by this time a large proportion of the party membership would consist of technical specialists and professionals. Their general orientation toward professional autonomy and authority would thus become more prevalent inside and outside the party and, in the course of pursuing the interests of the various parts of the economy or bureaucracy with which they were identified, they would inject a greater degree of pluralism into the system. In this view of things, over time the role of the Communist Party would come to resemble that of a broker, or balancer, among various (elite) interests, rather than being a monolithic force dictating to society.6

An objection can be raised to this model of change: It appears to imply an inevitable, economically determined trend toward liberalization in Leninist systems or, to put it somewhat differently, it does not account for other outcomes. It assumes that the social forces produced by the imperatives of economic development become increasingly powerful with respect to the state and alter its character; however, the ways in which these social forces may continue to be shaped by the state are not addressed.

The concept of "inclusion" was suggested by Kenneth Jowitt as an alternative to (or modification of) this kind of model of change. "Inclusion" refers to a situation in which the Leninist party, having radically transformed the old society's institutions and culture and consolidated its new order, attempts to guarantee that "the social products of

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6 Ibid.
its developmental efforts identify themselves in terms that are consistent with the party's ideological self-image and organizational definition." The party fears that new groups resulting from its successful modernizing drive might express their own, "political-ideological definitions" of reality, independent of its own. To prevent this development, the party leadership is motivated to "revis[e] the regime's format and its relationship to society from insulation to integration." Changing "from insulation to integration" means that instead of attempting to put distance between party cadres and the rest of society (to protect the organization's integrity as a fighting unit with a mission to transform the status quo), the party now seeks integration with society by "expanding membership in the regime." The party will treat formerly suspect groups, in particular professionals, as reliable components of "the people" and permit them greater autonomy and input into decision making. In connection with this policy line, the regime places greater emphasis on merit and procedural criteria and views organizational rationalization with more favor. Expansion of the decision-making process results in placing "more weight on empirical premises vs. ideological assumptions" and more appreciation of "discussion, consultation, and experimentation."8

In this view the party does all this not as a retreat from its "leading role" in society but in an attempt to exercise this role through co-optation, manipulation, and persuasion rather than through coercion. Although aspects of this model of inclusion bear considerable resemblance to Lowenthal's idea of a post-revolutionary phase, there are significant differences. Inclusion is not portrayed as an irreversible phase of development. On the contrary, as Jowitt observes, the leadership retreated from inclusion-oriented policies in the regimes in which they had emerged and made renewed efforts to assert the primacy of the party and of ideological-political considerations ("mobilization"). This retreat was the result of some "unexpected problems and challenges" that emerged after the turn to policies associated with inclusion. One of these unexpected problems was, in the author's words, a "crystallization in social-psychological if not social-political terms of the professional and skilled strata, and their desire to become the primary support base of the regime."9 In other words, professionals still presented the party with a challenge, or a potential challenge, even if

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7 Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," 71.
8 Ibid., 73.
9 Ibid., 90.
the original question of elite dualism had been resolved. There is a question of who is going to co-opt whom when insulation of the party organization is replaced by integration.

In this model of the dynamics of Leninist systems, the developments associated with inclusion are inevitable in the sense that they will not fail to come up as issues; they do not, however, necessarily constitute a phase in an irreversible historical process of deutoplanization or deradicalization. Economic development and social differentiation alone are insufficient to produce a fundamental shift in the party's orientation. Political decisions can be made by the political elite in an autonomous manner, and in the meantime the party-state shapes the character of social forces, in particular the professional classes. In Jowitt's view, instead of a progressive expansion of inclusion-oriented policies and perhaps "convergence" with Western societies, a process of "neo-traditionalization" or "political corruption" has occurred in the Soviet Union and other Leninist regimes. The party ranks and state bureaucracy are increasingly composed of people with professional backgrounds, but they are thoroughly subordinated within a system that rewards and promotes on the basis of political activism and orthodoxy and personal ties among people who manifest these qualities. There is in fact little professional autonomy and no arena for anything resembling pluralism or interest group politics, even among the elite. Politics consists in large part of the cultivation of connections and patrons within the party apparatus. Party bosses dispense favors to their clients in the manner of "big men" in traditional societies, leading to the comment that any "convergence" in the Soviet system is "more with the peasant-status societies of the Third World than the class societies of the West."11

This line of argument prompted me to wonder whether a retreat from inclusion (with which neo-traditionalization is interrelated) is inevitable, given the characteristics of a Leninist party-state's organization and the associated political culture. Perhaps we should be asking why a system remains in a more or less steady state as well as asking why it undergoes major changes. I argue in these pages that a retreat from inclusion was politically logical (and perhaps inevitable) in the Soviet Union because of the timing and circumstances of the accommodation between party apparat and technical/professional intelligentsia made under Stalin. In Eastern Europe, in turn, the threat of

11 Ibid., 277.
Soviet intervention limited the degree to which departure from the Stalinist model has been possible. But in China, a comparable accommodation between elites did not begin under Mao, in effect leaving this task (if it is to be accomplished at all) to his successors. This means that the inclusion initiative in the post-Mao period is not occurring in the same social or political context as in the Soviet case. The urban-professional elite as a whole is in fact less reliable, from a Leninist point of view: it has not been as thoroughly integrated. The situation is further complicated by the rather incoherent organizational character and fallen prestige of the CCP compared to its Soviet counterpart, which makes inclusion an even more problematic issue from the point of view of the party-state. Its ability to impose desired solutions and to control or manipulate social forces may be expected to be significantly less.
CHAPTER TWO

Stalinism: The New Industrial Elite and Revolution from Above

This chapter provides an overview of several key aspects of Soviet development during the Stalin years as a starting point for examining the Chinese case.¹ These are the recruitment of a new occupational and political elite in the industrial sector and the partial merging of expert and red elites; the organizational structure of industrial enterprises, within which recruitment and socialization of a new generation partially took place; and the nature of Stalin's regime and its relation to society. Analysis of the events of the 1930s suggests that a conservative outcome—the stable, orthodox, party-dominated system that eventually emerged under Brezhnev—was favored by these aspects of the Stalin period, which had the effect of closing off alternatives for his successors.

There was a high level of occupational and political mobility for the new Soviet generation of the 1930s. This was created by the crash expansion of education and industry that began with the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) and was followed by decimation of the ranks of older elites in the purges of the late 1930s. In particular, upward job mobility was available for a massive number of the upcoming generation of the 1930s who received a technical education. Induction into the political elite was possible as well for members of this group, including those with nonproletarian class backgrounds.

This new generation was recruited into an organizational environment in industry that was hierarchical, vertically differentiated, and

¹ The material in this chapter is based on secondary sources and is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the topic. Rather I intend to offer a provisional foundation for comparative analysis with the Chinese case. Of particular value were Kendall Bailes' study of the Soviet technical intelligentsia (Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin) and Jeremy Azrael, Managerial Behavior and Soviet Politics.
orientated toward external controls (coercive and remunerative). Stalinist organization was a distinctive mix of rationalized organization (specialization and structural differentiation; technical expertise as a credential for advancement) and irrational commands. Multiple hierarchies for upward mobility were well defined. Bureaucratic organizations or groups (the party, the security police [NKVD], managers and technicians) were used to check and control other organizations or groups. Strict obedience of subordinates to superiors was demanded. At the same time, production was forced to serve politically determined goals (in particular, unachievably high targets). Political orthodoxy was required and professional autonomy was limited. Professional decisions and job performance could be grounds for accusations of sabotage and severe punishment; sabotage of production ("wrecking") was the leading accusation used against targets of the regime in industry. This organizational environment was such that recruits were effectively subordinated within the political hierarchy (with Stalin at the apex) at the same time as they were rewarded with control over subordinates, with good opportunities for advancement in several well-defined tracks, and with a claim to being part of a monumental and successful effort to build a new Soviet industrial state.

State power during the period in question was consolidated under Stalin in the form of what Lowenthal calls a "stable despotism."\(^2\) Stalin's decisive victory over opposing elements in the party and the massive purges of the 1930s produced a state marked by orthodoxy and an absence of elite factionalism. With respect to the state and society, a sense of the awesome power of the state as well as the leader emerged (or rather, was reinforced, being similar to political culture in earlier times). The new generation elite, professional and political, was trained and recruited during and after the consolidation of the state and of Stalin's personal power. In terms of the framework introduced in the preceding chapter, inclusion of the professional classes began under highly controlled conditions. Revolution from above was abandoned by Stalin's successor only after a new elite had been created and assimilated by the state.

The New Elite

In the Soviet Union the question of elite dualism—a cleavage between elites with political and professional credentials—was resolved.

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\(^2\) Robert Lowenthal, "The Post-Revolutionary Phase in China and Russia,"
in such a way as to produce a new, hybrid group. Within this group political and technical/managerial elites coexisted in an ambivalent but symbiotic relationship. To the extent that technical background became a basis for recruitment into the party and into political jobs (in the party and the police) as well as into professional roles, the two types of elite began to merge. Moreover, the system increasingly removed obstacles to the recruitment of middle-class individuals for higher education and facilitated passing on their status to their children.

**Upward Mobility**

The basic condition for the high degree of upward mobility under Stalin was the launching of his crash program of industrialization under the FFYP, begun in 1928, which rapidly created thousands of new technical and managerial positions in industry and the need for recruits to fill them. This in turn brought an explosive expansion in higher technical education. However, the process of incorporating a new elite with technical backgrounds, as well as a trend toward favoring the middle class over the proletariat, only emerged in the 1930s. Before that, there was a phase lasting roughly from 1927 to 1931 that offers some striking parallels to what was to come forty years later with the Cultural Revolution in China. This clearly suggests the centrality of certain types of conflicts in Leninist systems, although the outcomes differ.

In the late 1920s trials were held in which members of the old technical/professional elite—the “bourgeois specialists”—were the villains. They were accused of “wrecking” (sabotage), supposedly in league with foreign capitalism. On the level of mass action, the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) during this period staged “light cavalry raids” to root out former Czarist officials from the state bureaucracy. The sons and daughters of bad class families (such as kulaks, priests, and merchants) were expelled from universities and secondary schools by local party committees. Working-class access to secondary and higher education was stressed. Many adults without a secondary education but with political credentials (the “party thousands”) were

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196-200, esp. 199. See also T. H. Rigby, “Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies,” 554-556.

3 This characterization is developed in Bailes, *Technology and Society*, 425 and pas-sim.

recruited for university admission. Universities invited workers to participate in the choosing of professors, and worker brigades were organized to assist with the purge of government offices. Large numbers of workers were promoted into directorships and other responsible positions in industry.\(^5\)

These policies, however, were not sustained. A major reversal began in 1931. Most of the “bourgeois engineers” who had been arrested during the wrecking trials were released and returned to positions comparable to those they had held before. Although some of the old specialists were targeted again during the Great Purge of the late 1930s, after 1931 the group as a whole was placed in a favorable position by Stalin. With respect to salaries and benefits, a policy of leveling wage differentials by upgrading the lower levels had been pursued in the 1920s. This was reversed in 1931, at which time wage scales were revised to favor salaried personnel and skilled workers.\(^6\) Engineers (at least in large enterprises) were not only given high pay but also could be given apartments, servants, the use of an automobile, or even a large house. The prestige of technical personnel was also built up by their treatment as models. After 1935 measures against “specialist-baiting” were strengthened. At the same time Stalin singled out the technical intelligentsia as the model for the future. Workers were now to strive to raise themselves to the level of the specialists and thus move toward the classless society. This replaced an earlier idea that class differences should be eliminated by specialists being lowered to the level of manual workers. Bailes notes that the idea of the technical intelligentsia as the heart of the new utopia became a “major myth” in Soviet society.\(^7\)

In addition to these developments, the offspring of existing middle-class families were favored for admission to the future professional elite by an education policy that considered only grades and test scores for admission to higher education after 1931. Admissions quotas for workers and loyal party veterans that had been in effect were discontinued. The trend of de facto favoring the children of professionals rather than workers or peasants was further reinforced in 1940, after which time fees were charged for admission to secondary education.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Lowenthal, “Development vs. Utopia,” 59.
In addition to deproletarianizing admission to higher technical education, the authority of technical specialists vis-à-vis workers in factories and students in engineering institutes and colleges was affirmed. The experiments with worker and student control of the late 1920s did not survive into the 1930s. In 1935, linked with the propagation of the new myth exalting the technical intelligentsia as the vanguard of the future, "technical minimum" examinations were introduced throughout industry. These tied workers' wages to performance on tests of technical competence which were devised and administered by specialists. Wages also depended on output norms—fixed by specialists in norm-setting bureaus—which were continuously pushed upward as a result of the Stakhanovite movement. The Stakhanovite movement in factories was supervised by technical specialists. The above features were accompanied by a series of stringent measures designed to tighten labor discipline and strengthen the hands of managers and specialists in enterprises. Enforcement of these laws was mostly left to specialists.9

The tightening of labor discipline and the enhancement of the status of the technical intelligentsia vis-à-vis workers was followed in 1937 by introduction (or re-introduction) of provisions for hierarchy and deference within the enterprise. Enterprise management was given oral instructions to, among other things, forbid subordinates to sit while reporting to a superior and require workers to stand to show their respect when the manager or chief engineer walked through the shop.10

The Purges

Opportunity for upward mobility expanded suddenly again in the late 1930s as a result of Stalin's purges. Rapid promotion of large numbers of the newly trained red experts was made possible by the purge of the first generation of industrial managers, as well as political officials. Before the purges the posts of enterprise directors were held by old party veterans, the red directors. For the most part they were individuals with little formal training in technical or production matters.11 The liquidation of the old red directors in the Great Purge

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10 Ibid., 322.
11 According to Soviet figures, approximately 20 percent had joined the party before 1917, while about 70 percent joined during the Civil War. There were 52.7 percent of proletarian origin, 9 percent of peasant origin, and 37 percent of official/intelligentsia origin (but only 12 percent with a college education). Azrael,
Stalinism

opened up thousands of new positions, many of which were filled by new graduates from engineering programs. In later years a large sector of the Soviet elite came from this source; in the 1960s and 1970s about two-thirds of the Politburo and Central Committee were individuals with a background of technical higher education.\(^{12}\)

The purges marked a shift in political membership as well as in occupational mobility. Technical and professional workers in industry began to be actively recruited for party membership in the 1930s on a large scale. At the time of the Great Purge, the class struggle focus of earlier policy was deemphasized, and party rules disfavoring the admission of nonproletarian elements were changed. A statute passed by the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 stated that since the exploiting classes had disappeared, the distinctions among workers, peasants, and intellectuals were disappearing as well. With respect to recruitment into the party, 70 percent of new party members between 1939 and 1941 came from the administrative/technical intelligentsia.\(^{13}\)

Appointment to political positions began to include those who had technical credentials in addition to ordinary party membership. After 1939 engineers increasingly became members of local party bureaus or chairmen of shop and factory party committees. Particularly interesting is the fact that engineers joined not only the party, but also the NKVD. This phenomenon resulted from vacancies created in the party and NKVD by the purges, combined (somewhat ironically) with many specialists’ desire to escape the party and police supervision of their work that they experienced in factories.\(^{14}\)

Some qualifications are in order here. First, not all of the changes of the 1930s that we have reviewed here were beneficial to everyone who might be counted a technical/professional. This is particularly true with respect to technical specialists at factory level. They did not necessarily welcome their new role in enforcing labor discipline, as it made them targets of worker resentment. Nor were they particularly happy that the new enterprise directors who had had a technical education were more likely to take an active role in the specialists’ domain

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\(^{14}\) See Bailes, *Technology and Society*, 298. But one does not want to overestimate the influence of engineers and managers in the party; the positions of managers on party committees were apparently mostly honorific. Azrael, *Managerial Power*, 95.
Stalinism

than the old red directors. Before the purges the relationship of the old red directors and the existing technical specialists had been a complex one. On the one hand, the cultural gulf between them made communication difficult. But this situation had its benefits from the specialists' point of view. Often, because of their lack of expertise, the red directors left technical matters to the specialists. It appears that the old directors preferred to work with the old bourgeois specialists, who had long years of experience and with whom they could work out a division of labor. They were less happy with the newly trained red specialists who began to appear in droves in the 1930s; they had little practical experience but more political confidence and saw themselves as inheritors of the revolution, as indeed they turned out to be. In addition, although the new directors had more confidence vis-à-vis subordinate technical specialists, they were more docile vis-à-vis the central political authorities than the old directors had been. The old directors had their own claims to political status not derived from Stalin and had been more likely to defend the interests of the enterprise as they saw them, for example in avoiding the imposition of unrealistically high targets (see discussion below).16

Second, we must not overstate the degree to which professionals with a formal technical education benefited. In fact, in terms of sheer numbers, graduates of technical institutions were not the prime beneficiaries of the purges. Bailes notes that praktiki (individuals promoted from workers to technical positions without formal training) in fact gained more from the purges in a numerical sense (although in a qualitative sense they benefited less than the numbers would suggest, because they tended to be in positions at enterprise level and below while graduate specialists moved into positions above enterprise level). At enterprise level, in 1941 more than 60 percent of engineers and technicians and 76.5 percent of directors were praktiki. There apparently was considerable animosity between the praktiki and the managers with praktiki backgrounds on the one hand and graduates of higher and specialized secondary education on the other. The less-educated feared losing their jobs to the younger educated ones. Since 1928 not only party policy but the law had required promotions and raises for young specialists while seniority had been abolished as a criterion. Despite this, the young educated specialists complained that

15 Bailes, Technology and Society, 305.
16 Azrael, Managerial Power, 101.
17 Bailes, Technology and Society, 288–291.
they were harassed and criticized by the less-educated cadres, put in jobs not in line with their training, and passed over for promotions and raises in favor of praktiki. All this is reminiscent of conditions complained of by technical people in Chinese factories and again indicates the parallels between the two cases in terms of issues.

Nonetheless, we can suggest that in the Soviet case a trend toward professionalization and homogenization in the new generation was taking shape. This created favorable conditions for the assimilation of a new elite with a background in technical training and Marxist (Stalinist) orthodoxy. Although elite dualism had not disappeared, it was being eroded rather than reinforced. As a result of the purges, factory managers and production specialists began to become more homogenous by generation and by training. Insofar as some of these new managers took up party posts, the party apparatus and industrial professionals (encompassing both managers and technical specialists) also became more integrated. When we add the technically educated who went into the NKVD, we see a situation in which the members of several specialized organizational hierarchies increasingly drew on a similar pool of recruits.

Moreover, notwithstanding the large numbers of praktiki in enterprises and problems with them, upward mobility was not effectively blocked for the educated as a group. Many were promoted to positions in the upper reaches of the industrial and political hierarchies. For those who remained at the production level, their authority over workers was established and reinforced by external controls. In the official hierarchy of symbols, the expert was elevated as the model for the proletarians. Finally, the new red-expert cohort was drawn from both the working and middle classes. This was partly due to the shift in criteria for admission in the early 1930s; once in this class, however, they all became well-placed to pass on their elite status because of the new admissions policies for secondary and higher education.

Organizational Structure

Let me turn now to the organizational structure in industry within which recruitment and assimilation of the new elite occurred. Stalin relied on parallel bureaucratic hierarchies, control through differentiated material incentives, and coercion in the form of severe labor laws. We might call this system a "coercive-rationalized" one. It is in

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18 Ibid., 290 and 305–308.
line with Franz Schurmann’s observation that Soviet controls tend to be “external” (not a part of the organizational unit to be controlled) while Chinese tend to be “internal” and that Soviet management is oriented toward control of performance while Chinese management emphasizes control of the person.19

The significance of this observation for our purposes has to do with the ability of the Soviet regime to dominate and socialize the new elite within the organizational hierarchy. This implies a work environment at least partially compatible with the requirements—such as importance attached to professional work and power over subordinates—of recruited personnel with red-expert backgrounds, as an incentive and means of creating a degree of identification with the regime. At the same time it requires mechanisms to ensure that encouragement of professionals is contained within the politically dominated system. In the absence of such mechanisms, there is the likelihood that a professional orientation will creep into the various organizations (the threat of “assimilation” pointed to by Selznick), eroding the party’s claim to leadership in all spheres.

Stalinism effectively accomplished the above two tasks. As already noted, it attached importance to production and technology and elevated managers and specialists over workers. At the same time, managers and technicians worked within a system of police surveillance and party supervision. The system of specialized hierarchies was in some ways comfortable to the new red-expert generation and at the same time facilitated its domination from the top. Stalin’s despotic control of these hierarchies worked against factionalism at the production level and the absorption of the party and police in such activity.

Organization: The Party and Management

The system put into effect in Soviet industry in the 1930s was that of “one-man management.” The enterprise manager under one-man management was to have sole authority over production and personnel matters. (In practice of course this was rather problematic.) Schurmann writes that Stalin saw the system as a means of accomplishing three goals: making central planning operative, making technology dominant, and assuring central political control. One-man management was advocated by the dictator as a means of “mastering technique ourselves,” instead of observing a policy of “non-interference in

technique.” This, Stalin argued, was the “sole guarantor that our plans will be carried out in full”; we must, he said, adopt a policy of “interfering in everything” (through one-man management and the creation of red experts).\(^{20}\) While Stalin condemned “undue interference” by party officials in managerial/technical work, maintaining a permanent party and police presence in enterprises as a watchdog over managers and experts was a cornerstone of his policy.\(^{21}\)

Between 1932 and the purges, the regime criticized party committees in enterprises that did not “concern themselves with the concrete details of production” and managers who saw the party’s job as limited to agitation and propaganda. Plant directors were chided for clamoring for “one-man management, one-man management!”\(^{22}\) Managerial/technical authority with respect to workers was clearly affirmed by the party, but professional autonomy vis-à-vis the political authorities was in fact restricted, as indicated by Stalin’s remarks above. The party controlled the \textit{nomenklatura}, which covered the assignments of plant directors and chief engineers. In addition, the local party secretary had to be consulted on appointments down to the level of foreman. In general, according to former employees, it would have been “unwise” for a manager or technician not to consult with the party and police officials in the factory on any matter involving personnel or discipline.\(^{23}\) In the 1930s, party officials “interfered” with production by such activities as assigning and transferring workers or commandeering them during working hours without the permission of managers. For these reasons they often were seen as nuisances by managers and specialists. Managers and specialists remained “without a clear definition of their rights and powers” and thus were easier to control.\(^{24}\)

After 1941, however, the party’s role in enterprise management was curtailed. Although party participation in management was never completely curbed and was periodically encouraged, in the postwar period party officials in industry were told to “concentrate on ideological questions.”\(^{25}\) This admonition occurred in conjunction with a


\(^{22}\) Azrael, \textit{Managerial Power}, 93.

\(^{23}\) Bailes, \textit{Technology and Society}, 324–325.

\(^{24}\) Ibid. See also David Granick, \textit{The Red Executive}, 204–205, for an example of conflict between a manager and the enterprise party secretary in the prewar period.

\(^{25}\) Bailes, \textit{Technology and Society}, 104.
change in the character of plant managers produced by the liquidation of the red directors in the purges, and indeed this change in character made the de-emphasis of the party’s role possible. Where formerly directors had been party veterans with, for the most part, little formal training, after the purges these posts were filled by the thousands of new red specialists. Because they were more docile with respect to superiors, strict party supervision was less critical. As Azrael notes, the old directors had claims to independent political status while the new ones owed theirs to Stalin, had been intimidated by the terror, and had risen to elite status by “engaging in hysterical denunciations of their predecessors” as required during the purges.26 But, although there was a (purposeful) lack of clear definition of managerial authority vis-à-vis political authority and a tendency for the party to be interventionist (especially before the purges), the party apparatus itself never turned into the management, a situation which, as we shall see, was the case in China. Even in the 1930s, a separate managerial sphere of competence existed to a degree, as indicated by the very reference to the party “interfering” with management.

Agents of Coercion

The party was not the only relevant actor in the Soviet organizational environment under Stalin. The party was charged with a supervisory role in enterprises; but the organization with real clout in the Soviet case was of course the security police (NKVD in the period in question). Its influence in enterprises was more formidable than that of the party and its interference much less easily avoided. The NKVD maintained sections in all plants and was charged with the surveillance of managers, specialists, and workers. The security sections developed networks of agents among clerical personnel and workers to keep an eye on managers and technicians, especially the ones in nomenklatura positions. If a manager wanted to promote a technician, he customarily would go for “advice” to the NKVD section. If something negative was found in the technician’s dossier, he would not be promoted.27

The NKVD role in enterprises was less open and active than that of the party. It involved itself in quietly gathering evidence in order to intervene when something went wrong, such as an industrial accident. Although the NKVD and the party were concerned with po-

26 Azrael, Managerial Power, 101.
political nonconformity in factories, it appears that the primary focus was on the detection of fraudulent reporting by managers or possible "sabotage" by specialists. The NKVD people were always "sniffing about the plant," in the words of a former specialist. Although managers and specialists resented police surveillance and interference, they had to deal more cautiously and deferentially with them than with party cadres. As another former specialist commented, "the party punishes and favors, it may promote or demote a man. But the NKVD never favors, it only punishes."28

Émigré sources cited by Berliner in discussing the NKVD's role and image in enterprises presented the same picture. The function of the special (that is, security) section was described as paying attention to production-related activities that might be vulnerable to sabotage. The special section kept a dossier on "all key employees" (not all employees, it seems). The special section in enterprises inspired "dread" on the part of other personnel, and its office was described by informants as "'locked behind an iron and soundproof door'—when people are called there 'their knees are trembling.'" A former factory director noted that although formally he was administratively superior, he "could not tell the head of the special section how to handle his secret papers."29

The security police sections in Soviet enterprises were backed up by the severe labor laws enacted in the 1930s. These provided prison sentences for violations of labor discipline; the death penalty was provided for theft of state property.30 As Lowenthal observes, the growth of a huge labor camp system to which millions of kulaks had already been deported lent reality to the threat implied in these laws.31

After Stalin's death the industrial system became less coercive in both the direct and indirect sense. The labor-camp empire was a target of Khrushchev, and the camps receded as a major factor in economic life, altering the climate in industry for workers, specialists, and managers. The police became less powerful, and the legal system more predictable: in general, those who were politically orthodox or inoffensive no longer needed to fear the imposition of severe and/or extralegal sanctions. The climate of fear created by the knowledge that a production mistake or a practice such as faulty reporting could

28 Ibid. The quotations are all on 324.
30 Bailes, Technology and Society, 319.
31 Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia," 75.
result in arrest was dissolved.32

What is important to note about the nature of coercion in the Stalinist industrial model? The party and NKVD were separate organizations and were perceived as such by those whom they supervised. The security sections in enterprises were identified as part of the larger NKVD organization outside the enterprise and were independent (in practice) of the enterprise manager. It was the NKVD, with its "quiet gathering of evidence," that was the primary agent of control, not the party organization. Although "hysterical denunciation of one's peers," noted above, was a behavior induced by the police during the Great Purge, mobilization of public criticism of targets was not a central mode of control as it was in the Maoist version of coercion. Moreover, a major focus of the coercive system was aimed at workers, not professionals, and assisted in maintenance of labor discipline.

I suggest, then, that dreaded though the NKVD sections were, even before its modification after Stalin's death this environment was less incompatible with a technocratic and production orientation and was ultimately less intrusive to technical/managerial personnel than continual political mobilization of the Maoist style, in which questioning of managerial and technical authority over workers was a recurrent element. Combined with the existence of one-man management as a partial base for avoidance of party interference, the organizational environment in which the new industrial elite operated was not one that precluded their co-optation in large numbers. There is also the fact that class background was less of a criterion for reward and punishment than was political reliability and work performance. Notwithstanding the arbitrariness involved in these criteria as applied under Stalin, they may have afforded more control over one's life chances than the ascriptive criteria that became dominant in China. Moreover, the emphasis on production created an atmosphere of heroic effort in which participation was possible for professionals. Taken together, all of this was conducive to the emergence of a rather homogenous and orthodox elite cohort in the Soviet case.

There is another important set of effects that we might hypothesize to have resulted from this organizational environment. These concern not its impact on the mind-set of managerial and technical personnel, but on the coherence of the party at the enterprise level. First, following Selznick's reasoning, we might assume that

32 See discussion in Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia," 77–78; and in Berliner, Factory and Manager, 312–313.
the existence of some measure of structural differentiation and specialization left the party apparatus less vulnerable (though not immune) to losing its distinctive identity as a political leadership organization than it would have been if it had become identical with management and absorbed in routine operational tasks. Overinvolvement in such activities is likely to leave a Leninist party subject to penetration by the interests and world-views of outside reference groups. Second, the party apparatus would have been less identifiable as an agent of coercion because of its separateness from the NKVD. Thus Stalin's successors could curb the police while re-affirming party authority.

Finally, in the Soviet Union it is apparent that the party organization at enterprise level did not become a vehicle for contending groups and individuals, as we shall see that it did in China. Some of the probable reasons for this have already been suggested: it was less involved in managerial and policing activities. Indeed, as one author has noted, the party's total organizational presence in the 1930s was much less pervasive at the enterprise level, compared with what one sees in the 1950s and in the Chinese case. This low profile in enterprises was actually a product of the Soviet party's relative weakness at grass-roots level. But it may have been a plus in terms of coherence as an integrated, centrally controllable organization.

Regime and Society

The relative coherence of the party was also a product of the larger character of regime-society relations under Stalin. The process of co-opting the new red-expert class into professional and political roles occurred in conjunction with the terror of the purges. Indeed, the two sets of events appear inseparable. Dominance of political over managerial authority was not decisively accomplished until late in the 1930s.

Before the purges there was a tendency for managers (the red directors) to become "torn away from the party" and "join production" and for plant party secretaries to have to "court" production-oriented managers to get their attention. Bailes mobilizes considerable evidence to show that a primary motive for Stalin's launching of the Great Purge was to assert the domination of political authorities (party, police, and Stalin himself) over economic bureaucrats at min-

33 See Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, 13, 20, 26, 33, and 64.
Stalinism

isterial level and over managers and technical specialists at the enterprise level. Before the purges the Stalinist mode of industrial "planning," featuring unrealistically high targets and crash production drives, continued to be challenged in these quarters. Ordzhonikidze, an old Bolshevik, a close friend of Kirov before his assassination, and Stalin's commissar for heavy industry, led an effective opposition at the highest levels to the dominance of plan formulation by the Stalinist political mentality ("there are no fortresses Bolsheviks cannot storm"), which resulted in unachievably high targets. Plans had the force of law and could be used to discipline managers and specialists; indeed, disciplining managers was a major function of such targets, in addition to spurring greater production drives. Ordzhonikidze succeeded in having the targets of the Second FYP scaled downward, using figures supplied by specialists as a basis for his more rational projections in the crusade against Stalinist targets. In addition to these activities, Ordzhonikidze also committed himself personally to protecting engineers in enterprises from party and police interference in their work.36

In 1937, after becoming a target of NKVD attention and threats from Stalin, Ordzhonikidze apparently committed suicide. After this Stalin criticized "some comrades" in industry for thinking that work is "the beginning and end of everything" and warned that "some had even begun to doubt the need for the Communist Party, once they had overfulfilled their plans." Molotov spoke of the need for managers to constantly check on the political loyalty of subordinates and to stress political over professional criteria in choosing new cadres. He also criticized managers who used the slogan of "one-man management" to ignore party activists and organizers.37

In the Soviet Union state power and the primacy of politics over professional concerns were asserted decisively, as seen in the fate of Ordzhonikidze and the forces he represented. Moreover, the purges withered not only dissent based on policy disagreement but also factionalism within the party. Stalin's "stable despotism" kept personal networks among high party figures from emerging as contenders for power. Rival groups were thus unable to manipulate the organization and its recruitment processes at the lower levels (such manipulation is precisely what befell the CCP in China).

36 Ibid., 270–286.
37 Ibid. See also Azrael, Managerial Power, 96–98.
Conclusion

The idea that industrial managers would play a major role in political liberalization in the Soviet Union was critically summed up by Azrael. As he observed, this whole line of argument implied a "logic of industrial development" involving increased education and occupational specialization among the populace that would bring about political transformation of communist systems:

The principal "representatives" of the logic of industrial development within the political arena, the most effective agents of political modernization in the actual policy-making process, are the members of the technical intelligentsia, and above all, the managerial elite. Characterized as they are (or are assumed to be) by a comparatively high socioeconomic status, a comparatively high degree of professionalization and comparatively direct access to the political process, the managers emerge as the natural candidates for the role of the "power in the shadows," the "gravediggers" of Communist dictatorship.38

Industrial managers, Azrael observed, emerged from the Stalin years as a "tired and dispirited group" but also, as a result of Stalin's policies, as part of a new class of elite cadres with "immense official prestige, economic preferment, social deference, and transmission of advantages to children." They had experienced real gains. However, the "price of preferment over other groups in society was subservience"; they were to play the role of "faithful servants" who perform any task assigned. Their orientation tended to be authoritarian. They were, after all, "products of the traditionally rigid Russian family, a narrowly specialized educational system, rapid social mobility, and recruited by a dictatorial regime in a centralized bureaucratic work environment."39

As for the younger generation of managers and technical intelligentsia that succeeded this first cohort, Azrael noted that they (in the 1960s) appeared more like "new Soviet men" than "gravediggers of communism." Although they might have been expected to press for "more operational autonomy and procedurally stabilized access to the policy process in their own spheres," they were people recruited for party activism, who "view[ed] Soviet reality through the glow of their own contentment."40 The managerial elite were "charter members of the Soviet 'state bourgeoisie' whose growth Stalin had sponsored from the mid-30s on as a stabilizing element amidst the turmoil of per-

38 Azrael, Managerial Power, 3–4.
39 Ibid., 112–115.
40 Ibid., 162–163.
manent revolution.” Almost twenty years later Elizabeth Pond observed that “today’s technical intelligentsia...are unlikely transmission belts for bringing more individual initiative into Soviet society. Today’s narrow technical and ideological education, plus habitual conformity on the job, do not induce broader intellectual or social curiosity among this technical and political intelligentsia.”

The legacy of the Stalinist period was the creation of a large, new, industrial elite with a distinctive character. It drew from the working and middle classes and was reasonably homogenized. Elite dualism between reds and experts gradually eroded in the direction of professionalization of party, NKVD, and management. Although various group rivalries and conflicts certainly existed, elites in the hierarchy were not fragmented into contentious groups (of reds and experts, of different generations, of leader-follower factions). The character of this elite in the Soviet Union strongly favored a certain type of post-revolutionary phase, while closing off other possibilities. Specifically, it contributed to a large constituency that favored a modified dictatorship, a centralized economy, Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (which it tended to identify with a centralized economy), and elite job security. Reformist elements existed but were relatively weak. A highly stable post-revolutionary system emerged, in which the greatest threat to the party as an organization with claims to Leninist legitimacy and power has been stagnation, both political and economic.

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41 Ibid., 112.
42 Pond, From the Yarsoslavsky Station, 51–53 (quotation on 53).
CHAPTER THREE

Maoism: Mobility and Organization in Industrial Enterprises before the Cultural Revolution

This chapter and the next deal with the Maoist period in China. Because of its reliance on interaction with “the masses,” political education, and transformation of consciousness, Maoism often was perceived outside China as a less coercive and more legitimate, or idealistic, alternative to Stalinism. Since the passing of Mao, many Western analysts have begun to focus on the coercive aspects of the system in practice and have raised the question of whether Maoism was a variety of Stalinism rather than an alternative to it.

My view is that Maoism in the industrial enterprise (and more generally) is legitimately compared with Stalinism. The political bases for this assessment include the systematic surveillance and the use of informers, discussed in this chapter, and the Maoist political campaign, the subject of the next chapter. However, there are some major differences related to the ability of the respective communist parties to co-opt elites into a party-dominated system. Under Mao, the CCP was not able to accomplish this task to the degree that its Soviet counterpart did, and thus it was left without the kind of solid base that supported Soviet orthodoxy.

The last chapter described the creation in the Soviet Union of an occupationally and politically mobile generation in the industrial sector, a group we have characterized as homogenous, orthodox, and docile. They owed their status to Stalin and Stalinism. This sort of cohort did not emerge in China. Maoism did not expand higher education on a comparable scale, and it ultimately relied for enterprise leadership on party veterans. Professionally trained personnel were

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fewer and played less important roles vis-à-vis the party apparatus, and the party retained its rural-guerrilla style. At the same time, elites from before the revolution were retained to a degree not seen in the Soviet case. As we shall see, before the Cultural Revolution members of the old managerial elite retained responsible nonparty positions in many enterprises, and sometimes even in the party. In addition, retention of old elites (party and bourgeois) limited mobility and created generational tensions. All of this contributed to the prolongation, not alleviation, of elite dualism. Finally, there was more division within the ranks of the younger technically trained. In the Soviet case we saw the division between formally educated specialists and praktiki. This sort of difference existed in China as well, but in addition there appears to have been a cleavage between Soviet-oriented (trained in the Soviet Union or in China by Soviet experts) technical people (usually from good class background families) and others. In short, Maoism tended to create fragmentation rather than homogenization among elites.

A second problematic area for the CCP related to elite co-optation concerns the nature of party organization and control in enterprises. It may appear paradoxical to assert that this was a "problematic" area because in China, the party occupied a position of apparently great power within industrial enterprises as well as at the levels above, compared to its Soviet counterpart. By the 1960s decision-making power, with respect to both production and personnel matters, was concentrated in the hands of the enterprise party committee. Other potential power centers—managers, technical experts, security cadres—were prevented from acquiring a bureaucratic base. The party organization penetrated individual and group life on a broad front. This penetration involved control of the social and political status of individuals and manipulation of face-to-face group interaction—Schurmann's "control of the man" rather than "control of performance." But despite the pervasiveness of the party, it was not necessarily an effective Leninist (or Stalinist) organization capable of centrally dominating elite recruits.

The Maoist form of party leadership in enterprises and more generally meant less rationalized organization: lack of role definition and standardized structures, of regularized recruitment channels, and of a stable hierarchy. Power relationships were less institutionally based and uniform; they were more dependent on local conditions and the

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personal characteristics of officials. This system at the grass-roots level existed in the larger context of political relationships, which were hierarchical but not stable and not organizationally dominated by a single despotic figure. I suggest that ultimately this organizational environment proved to be a relatively ineffective vehicle for co-optation.

In the following pages, I will begin with some of the more Stalinist political features of industrial enterprises before the Cultural Revolution. This discussion indicates that we are dealing with an organization comparable to the Soviet one. Then I will discuss sources of weakness (in terms of elite co-optation and party dominance) beneath the appearance of pervasive control and influence. The discussion focuses on trends in mobility and elite composition in the 1950s and 1960s and on enterprise organization and the party’s role.

The Party as Stalinist

The CCP maintained an extensive system of personnel surveillance and dossiers in enterprises. A dossier (dang an) was kept for each person in the factory; family background and political history were recorded, as well as work and personal behavior since joining the enterprise. The content of dossiers was partly routine material, similar to what would be found in a personnel file elsewhere, but it also could contain information on attitudes and behavior deemed to be politically significant. Even the simplest files always included the individual’s family background; in fact, this was the most basic entry. No one was permitted to see his or her own file, including the personnel and security cadres who were in charge of them. The dossiers were kept under lock and key. One informant noted that personnel and security cadres were supposed to be prevented from seeing their own files by a double lock system, for which the party secretary had the second key.

Dossiers varied widely in the extent of their contents. For example, a young worker’s dossier might include nothing more than his or her educational record. This would include class background and probably comments on the student’s political activism, especially if the student had attended middle school. Before the Cultural Revolution,

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3 Dossiers and the work of factory security departments are discussed in Andrew Walder, *Communist Neotraditionalism*, 91–95.

4 This is according to a person who had worked in a labor and wages department. Given the lack of uniformity from enterprise to enterprise, arrangements about the keys probably varied.
according to one informant, most workers' dossiers tended to be of this relatively simple type. Nonetheless, this would appear to differ from the Soviet system at least of the 1930s, in which the NKVD apparently kept dossiers only on key employees. Controls on Soviet workers were in the form of "labor books" in which the work record of each individual, including violations of discipline, were recorded by the technical specialists. This difference in record keeping could be due to the greater mobility of Soviet laborers who, at least until World War II, could leave their jobs; Chinese workers had to remain where assigned.

For party members in Chinese enterprises (cadres and ordinary members) and, to a lesser extent, nonparty cadres, the dossiers were much more extensive. They would include material on the person's history before 1949 (if this applied) and periodic evaluations of personal character, activism, party loyalty, and so forth. When one was under consideration for party membership, the contents of the dossier of course were crucial. Inclusion of a single unfavorable item could result in permanent loss of chances for upward mobility.

Whatever the contents or the rank of the individual, dossiers went with a person if he or she was promoted or transferred to another unit. Everything that had been recorded in the file remained there permanently. This included material on family members. If someone got into serious trouble, it would be entered in the dossiers of spouse, children, siblings, and parents in their respective work units. Hence the necessity, described by a person who had been involved in this work after the Cultural Revolution, of writing letters to the work units of all family members of a person who had been officially rehabilitated, so that their files would show that the stigma had been removed (see discussion of the "five elements," below).

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6 Walder, *Communist Neotraditionalism*, 115.

7 Based on general knowledge of informants about dossiers. See also John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China*, 101–107. The requirement that party members provide information on "the applicant's ideology, character, and personal history" when recommending an applicant was added to the Party Constitution in 1956 in a move to upgrade standards. Lack of such requirements no doubt facilitated widespread falsification of class background (see below).

8 This was the fate of Liang Heng's sisters, who were not permitted to join the Communist Youth League (CYL) in school because their mother had been labeled a rightist. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *Son of the Revolution*, 37–39.
Dossiers were routinely used in the regular distribution of rewards. When an enterprise was going to make promotions from within the ranks, the personnel head typically would go privately to the various department (or shop) heads and ask for recommendations. Eventually, the personnel section would send these recommendations to the party committee, together with a report summarizing the candidate’s class background, political attitude and performance, and work and education record as contained in the file. Compared to the Soviet enterprises of the 1930s, in the 1950s and 1960s in China there was not much mobility in the sense of promotion from the shop floor and up out of the factory altogether. However, informants’ accounts suggest that there was considerable leeway to grant promotions within the enterprise; thus the contents of files did affect an individual’s prospects. Cadre positions at the level of deputy workshop or staff department head did not have to be approved by the bureau at the level above (which is why, one person commented, there were so many deputies of various kinds in enterprises). It also appears that when someone was promoted from worker to a cadre position, the change in grade from worker to cadre rank was not a standardized procedure; rather, it depended on the decision of the enterprise party secretary.

A similar procedure of dossier inspection was involved when employees were evaluated during the national wage adjustments or chosen to be models. The latter status was not only prestigious but could involve benefits such as a special bonus or a paid vacation trip. Dossiers were also inspected before an enterprise employee could travel to another city for a work-related purpose and when employees applied for transfers. Since travel was restricted, opportunities to go visiting and sightseeing were highly sought after. If an enterprise wanted to send someone on a trip, the personnel section would investigate the worker. If there were no “problems,” they would send a report and the person’s dossier to the factory party committee for approval. Transfers were much desired: people frequently worked in positions unconnected with their specialties; spouses often worked in different cities. A person who wanted a transfer first had to “explain his conditions” to the personnel section in the enterprise. The personnel section might ask the security section to investigate the applicant before proceeding. If the applicant was approved by the security section, its report plus the rest of the hopeful transfer’s dossier would progress to the party committees in his or her present unit and in

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9 See Walder, *Communist Neotraditionalism*, 115.
Maoism

prospective new units. If the applicant was a cadre, party or nonparty, the materials would also go to the municipal level organization bureaus. All of these entities would have to approve if the transfer was to be granted.10

The significance of the foregoing is that all these kinds of rewards could be withheld for political reasons. Thus in effect they formed part of a system of political domination. In addition, dossiers were at the heart of the more openly coercive (Stalinist) aspect of the party’s presence in work units. Barnett observed in his study of the bureaucracy that relatively few sanctions actually had to be applied to the populace, since the system of surveillance maintained by the county public security bureau served as an effective deterrent to any kind of behavior defined as deviant by the party.11 Much the same could be said of the enterprise level. Before the Cultural Revolution enterprise employees were subjected to a system of surveillance that took the form of informal observation of behavior during work time by personnel and security cadres and by activists who would make reports to the cadres on any untoward behavior observed, such as comments that could be construed as antiparty. Becoming an activist of this type could eventually result in a promotion from worker to personnel or security cadre.12 Such a situation of course provided an incentive for some people to make a career of watching and reporting on others.13

10 Described by a technical cadre who had undergone the process. See also discussion of transfers in Marc Blecher and Gordon White, *Micropolitics in Contemporary China*, 34–35.


12 Walder (Communist Neotraditionalism, p. 93) comments that security departments are commonly staffed by demobilized soldiers rather than by workers promoted from the shop floor. I did encounter reports of security (as well as personnel) cadres promoted from workers; however, I would agree that the heads of these departments commonly were likely to be former PLA.

13 Informants generally viewed these types of activists as toadies and opportunists, which on the whole is probably correct. However, there is the possibility of such behavior coming from idealistic sources as well. One of my informants apparently was involved in this sort of activism before the Cultural Revolution. He described his feelings at that time as wanting to “do everything for the party” and “warmly loving” (re ai) the party. If one considers the many accounts of people who informed even on their own family members during the Cultural Revolution out of love for the party and Chairman Mao, this kind of self-description becomes more convincing. For example, see the story of “Bing” in Fox Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea*, 221–225.
Maoism

Although all personnel could be subject to surveillance, people who had poor class backgrounds, personal or family history problems, or who had already committed a political error were more carefully watched than others. These individuals were especially aware that seemingly innocuous comments on their part could result in trouble. A person with a complicated file could easily become a target in the event of a new political campaign or could be accused of sabotage if something untoward occurred in the factory. Female employees could be pressured for sexual favors by cadres who had access to the files in return for lenient treatment of some unfavorable item in the file (for example, a concealed bad class background, such as rich peasant). According to one former worker, whose family background contained a "history problem" (a pre-1949 Kuomintang [KMT] connection), personnel and security cadres kept tabs on the home life of suspect people through their contacts with the police in the neighborhood public security stations. They noted such things as who visited the suspect people's homes and tried to find out if they listened to Hong Kong or Taiwan radio stations. Another person with a family history problem described how the activists kept a sharp eye on the behavior and attitudes of people with poor backgrounds in the factory, hoping that they would find something to report to their superiors, thus making a good impression and perhaps eventually being promoted.

People who had been labeled one of the "five (black) categories" were by definition the most suspect. The five categories were landlords, rich peasants, rightists, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements. "Rightists" and "counterrevolutionaries" were people who had been so labeled in political campaigns of the 1950s (see Chapter 4). "Bad elements" referred to people who had been convicted of criminal offenses. The five categories were the special province of the security cadres. As well as being carefully watched in general, they often had to attend special study sessions and write accounts of their "ideological progress." On holidays when the factories were closed they had to remain on the premises under guard by security cadres. In the event of a political campaign, they would be the most likely to become targets, and in general they were treated as pariahs. They also had permanent reductions in pay and benefits. Although there were not large numbers of them, they existed in every work unit and locality and were, as Barnett commented, extremely effective "symbols of the disastrous consequences of being classed as enemies of the regime." 14

14 Barnett, Cadres, 232.
In addition to such kinds of political complications, a work-related problem could under some circumstances become a political problem. For instance, consistently turning out below-standard products or being careless with tools and machinery could be considered a political problem, because it would indicate an incorrect attitude. The individual would be questioned and criticized by the appropriate cadres. If the problem had been relatively serious and the person’s attitude during the talks with cadres was judged to be poor, a formal criticism could be recorded in the dossier. Criticism itself was a major form of sanction, whether or not it went into the dossier. According to one informant, criticism could be administered in the following ascending degrees: “One-on-one criticism from a cadre; criticism in the work group; criticism in a workshop meeting but with your name not mentioned; criticism in a workshop meeting with your identity indicated but your name not mentioned; and criticism with your name publicly brought up.” Criticism was feared and before the Cultural Revolution appears to have been a rather effective substitute for the kinds of legal punishments featured in the Stalinist approach to labor discipline. Again it shows the more personalistic, less standardized character of the Chinese approach. The effectiveness of criticism depended rather heavily on the personalities of cadres. One informant described his former factory manager as someone who was extremely lihai (fierce) and was wont to deliver criticisms that left workers and lower cadres quaking in their boots. But others were less formidable.

There was a certain variance in tone among people who discussed dossiers and related matters. While all agreed on the basic points of the system, some emphasized its policelike character while others described it mainly in terms of routine personnel work. Ordinary people with no particular “problems” probably did not fear surveillance by activists or security cadres before the Cultural Revolution. The system also included some protections. According to one informant, hearsay reports that did get into a dossier were supposed to be distinguished from materials that had been verified by investigation. Nonetheless, since no one could see his or her file, there was always potential uncertainty about what might be there and how it would be treated. In any event, the CCP’s extensive system of surveillance and record keeping, when linked with the threat or actuality of political campaigns (as described in the next chapter) makes the comparison with Stalinism apt.
Mobility, Class Policy, and the Prolongation of Elite Dualism

In the last chapter we saw how a new Soviet generation that emerged in the 1930s contained a large contingent of upwardly mobile people with a technical education—the "new red experts" whom we have described as orthodox, subservient to superiors, and indebted to the regime for their status. Although there are some parallels with China, on the whole such a stratum did not emerge. First, there was less expansion in education and less mobility in general in China. Second, there were more cleavages among those who were educated and between them and people with political credentials. In short, the dilemmas of elite dualism continued to exist in the period leading to the Cultural Revolution. As a result of the party's "class" policy, particularly as it emerged in the 1960s, conditions were not created for red and expert elites to merge into a new, hybrid elite. On the contrary, the two became more separate, and the separation created the conflicts that underlay the Cultural Revolution.

Mobility

In China the initial decision made by the leadership after 1949 to follow the Soviet model was of course not sustained. Following the model would have required the training, Stalin-style, of a huge new contingent of technical and administrative personnel for industry. There was an expansion in the training of engineers and technicians in the earlier part of the 1950s; however, it was small compared both to the Soviet effort begun during the FFYP and to the requirements of Chinese industry itself. A great shortage of trained personnel persisted.\textsuperscript{15} In place of technically trained personnel, the Chinese relied on their large contingent of veteran party cadres to manage industry, particularly those from the Red Army.\textsuperscript{16} After the Great Leap Forward and the abandonment of the Soviet model in industry, the CCP turned toward an emphasis on leadership by party cadres and a group-mobilization approach. In connection with this, an earlier emphasis on recruiting people into the party on the basis of education and skill was supplanted by emphasis on political credentials (loyalty and leadership skills).\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} See Walder, \textit{Communist Neotraditionalism}, 117–118.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 16; Schurmann, \textit{Ideology and Organization}, 283.
Schurmann attributes the failure to follow Stalin’s example in training a huge corps of red experts to the limitations of China’s educational system in 1949 compared to Russia’s in 1917, plus an obsession in the CCP with avoiding the “fetishism of technology” and rational planning in favor of “the wisdom of the masses” and “politics in command,” an outlook that sprang from the party’s guerrilla heritage. In explaining the same phenomenon, Andrew Walder notes the relative organizational strength of the party organization compared to Chinese factory administrations in the early 1950s as well as the effective resistance of enterprise-leading cadres, with their long years of revolutionary experience, to subordinating themselves either to newer party members with technical training but lower rank or to nonparty professionals.

The CCP’s decision not to produce a large new contingent of red experts had a somewhat paradoxical side effect, in view of the apparent dominance of the party created by this option. This was that not only veteran red elites but also various kinds of personnel from the old regime enjoyed more longevity than was the case in the Soviet Union. In spite of the fact that the CCP in 1949 had a much larger grass-roots organization and more experienced cadres than the Bolsheviks had in 1917, their numbers were still insufficient to man all the new administrative and managerial posts required by the new regime and its economic reconstruction and development goals. To meet the new tasks the bureaucracy grew enormously in the 1950s; between 1949 and 1958 the state bureaucracy grew from 720,000 to 7,920,000. Thus it was necessary to retain and rely upon thousands of administrators and managers left over from the old regime. At the same time, the party’s conciliatory policy toward the national bourgeoisie allowed capitalists to remain in charge of their enterprises in the early 1950s, and after the enterprises became state-owned in 1956, many assumed cadre positions in them. They drew wages comparable to their former incomes, as did other individuals deemed valuable for the economy, such as skilled workers and technicians.

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18 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, 279, 283, and 295.
19 Walder, Communist Neotraditionalism, 119.
Equally interesting in terms of elite dualism are the party’s recruitment policies. In 1953–54 education and skill were emphasized as criteria for recruitment. Technical workers were to be actively recruited, and their class backgrounds (they often came from the exploiting classes) ignored. In 1956 a major drive to recruit higher intellectuals (which includes engineers) was launched, replacing an antagonistic attitude that had prevailed in 1955. This turnabout was partly due to a CCP desire to co-opt engineers and technicians so that dependence on Soviet experts could be reduced. In 1956 the party stated that fully one third of all “higher intellectuals” had been recruited into the party. Scientists and engineers were to be recruited if they supported party policies but lacked ideological consciousness; they could remodel their thinking through practical activity and party education. There is evidence that some of this recruitment was for show: Martin cites the example of a factory that was criticized for recruiting an engineer “in a day” so that he could take part in a party oath-taking ceremony. In any event, by the end of 1957 there were actually more intellectuals than workers in the CCP (though fewer than peasants). Martin notes that this distribution reflects a Maoist rather than a Leninist pattern or policy—that is, an emphasis on enlisting all who could be useful to the party (and thereby establishing a presence among the masses) rather than just a small number of ideologically aware individuals.

What does this add up to in terms of mobility? On the one hand, old Red Army veterans dominated enterprise management; newly trained red experts were not rising through the system in droves or pushing them out. This would appear to indicate an ascendance of reds over experts, compared to the Soviet pattern. However, at the same time, old managerial elites were left in factory administrations where they were present. Managerial, technical, and skilled worker personnel from the old regime were specially rewarded with “retained wages.” Party recruitment was extended at this early date to large numbers of technical and engineering personnel, including ones with bourgeois backgrounds. Much of this recruitment undoubtedly was for show. An informant who was an engineer in the 1950s said that the recruitment of intellectuals in 1956 really meant little, because “even if they were in the party they had no power.” But what is important for our purposes is that a homogenizing process (in the direction of pro-

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23 Ibid., 42–43.
24 Ibid., 36–39.
Maoism

Professionalization) was not evident in the patterns of mobility in industry or in the party. Rather, elites with very different backgrounds were recruited or retained.

One additional source of cleavage not present in the Soviet case existed in China in the 1950s. This was the cleavage between technical and engineering personnel trained in the Soviet Union or by Soviet experts in China and those technical people without this connection. The latter tended to include people who were returned overseas Chinese or who came from bourgeois families educated in China before 1949. Whether one was trained by Soviet experts in China apparently was not an accidental product of geography or type of industry, that is, of employment in places where whole Soviet plants had been imported or where Soviet technical assistance was most prevalent (for example, the Northeast).25 Being trained by Soviet experts, as well as receiving a technical education in the Soviet Union itself in the 1950s, according to a recent source, was related to family background: the offspring of “revolutionary cadres, soldiers and martyrs,” workers, or poor or lower-middle peasants were usually selected for this honor, while few came from intellectual families.26 My interview information on the 1950s is limited, but it does indirectly suggest the kind of Soviet-related cleavage among experts asserted by this source. Two informants who experienced the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1956, one as an engineer in a factory in the Northeast and one as a student in an industrial university in central China, described the main criticism voiced by intellectuals during the movement as criticism of “blind following of the Soviet Union.” Both these individuals had been returned overseas Chinese.

In any event, the incompatible groups that were present in the 1950s continued into the 1960s, and sources of conflict increased with the passage of time. A post-revolutionary generation was growing up and seeking upward mobility, imbued with a combination of personal career motivations and idealism (serve Chairman Mao and the party). Competition for scarce opportunities was intense. The question of how much weight should be given to class background as opposed to work and political performance in selection processes for school admission and occupational assignment became increasingly controversial.


Maoism

This issue and its contribution to student participation and factionalism in the Cultural Revolution is well documented. In schools, membership in the Communist Youth League (CYL) became an increasingly important requirement for admission to higher education, and the CYL tended to be dominated by children of cadres who wanted to keep their bourgeois-class rivals out.27 Less note has been taken of the relevance of the issue to industry, where it also was significant. As in the schools, tensions became more pronounced in the 1960s because of the party's class policy.

Class Policy in Enterprises

The period between the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution is generally classified as a period of moderation or pragmatism in post-1949 history. As Schurmann points out, it was a period of pragmatism in economic matters, but at the same time one during which political criteria and the role of the party apparat, downplayed in the recovery from the Leap, were reasserted at Mao's urging.28 "Political criteria" refers to behavioral criteria—activism and (political) "performance" (biaoxian); it also refers to the ascriptive criterion of "class" background.29 Particularly after 1962, the party in workplaces and schools concerned itself with the class and political status of each individual. Probably the single most important item of information to know about a person in the 1960s was his or her chushen (literally, "origin" and variously translated as "class origin," "class background," or "family background"). Class origin was entered in a child's file at school and went with him/her afterward to the work unit.

This crucial label proceeded from an idea of class that was extremely complex and contradictory in conception and still more so in practice. In a monograph on class and class origin in China, Gordon White provides some essential background detail.

In 1950, the Party embarked on a nationwide program which classified Chinese citizens according to their class.... Detailed regulations were is-


28 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, 503–504.

29 See the extended discussion of the importance and distinctive effects of biaoxian as a criterion for reward and punishment for industrial workers in Walder, Communist Neotraditionalism, 132–143 and passim.
sued in 1950 to guide the process of class demarcation in the rural areas. Although urban class structure was also demarcated in the 1950s, the process seems to have been more piecemeal, informal, and unsystematic, with correspondingly more scope for ambiguity in the years to follow.\textsuperscript{30}

The ambiguity in urban class categories referred to by White was reflected in my informants’ comments and ideas about class, as we shall see presently. White goes on to note that a person’s class status, which was assigned according to the source of his income in the three years preceding 1949, involved a considerable extension of the conventional meaning of class:

[Class status] extended beyond broad class categories such as “workers,” “capitalists,” or “landlords.” It was used to differentiate strata within classes (such as “poor peasants”), amorphous economic strata (such as “urban poor people”), and relatively narrow occupational groups (such as “free professionals,” “employees,” “revolutionary cadres,” and “revolutionary soldiers”).\textsuperscript{31}

Children and young people under eighteen were assigned the class categories of their parents. This practice continued into the 1960s.

All the various class labels in China carried a ranking of good, middling, or poor. The distinctions were important because, among other things, people with middling class backgrounds were eligible to join the CYL and the party, while those with poor backgrounds were not. There appears to have been a great deal of confusion and inconsistency in the way class categories were understood and applied, if informants’ accounts are any indication. For instance, there was supposed to be a distinction between small and large bourgeoisie (or, between bourgeois and capitalist). The former (\textit{zichan jieji}) was a middling designation and the latter (\textit{ziben jia}) a poor one. As one person explained, the difference between a small businessman and a large capitalist depended upon such conditions as whether the person had labored himself or not and how many employees he had, but there was no fixed number that automatically made someone a capitalist.

Intellectuals were commonly referred to by informants as a class, more or less interchangeably with bourgeoisie. Intellectuals were supposed to be divided into \textit{gaoji} (high-level) intellectuals, who were ranked the same as capitalists, and professionals such as doctors and lawyers, who were part of a category called “free,” which also included


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 2–3.
Maoism

other self-employed people of all kinds such as artisans and handicrafts people and street vendors. People in the free category were middling classes. If one recalls Hinton’s account in *Fanshen* of the difficulties encountered by work teams in the countryside in trying to apply similar criteria to decide who belonged in the categories of rich peasant, upper-middle peasant, lower-middle peasant, and so forth, one can easily imagine the difficulties involved in deciding whether a businessman belonged in the category of small or large, whether an intellectual should be considered *gaoji* or not, and so forth.

Some informants displayed a rather detailed understanding of the various class distinctions. When discussing these matters, however, quite a few simply referred to good or bad *chushen*, with the latter including all intellectuals and bourgeoisie, as if there were no middling category. This could indicate that all the bourgeois/intellectual personnel in that factory in fact belonged in the large or *gaoji* categories, according to the official definition; the cadres in that factory treated all the bourgeois/intellectual personnel as having bad class backgrounds, regardless of official distinctions; or the informant personally was vague about the distinctions or considered them irrelevant. Whatever the case, it is clear that a considerable potential for confusion and arbitrariness existed in the attribution of poor or middling labels to bourgeois-family personnel in industry.

The question of class labels for urban bourgeoisie and intellectuals was only one aspect of the complex picture in enterprises in the 1960s. There were also people with rural class designations, people with history problems, and people who belonged to the five categories. With respect to rural class designations, many factory workers and cadres originally came from peasant families. These were the relevant categories, in spite of their status as permanent urban employees and residents. Although possibly less ambiguous than the urban classifications, the rural categories of poor peasant (a good *chushen*), lower-middle peasant (good or middling), upper-middle peasant (middling or bad), rich peasant (bad) and landlord (the worst) still offered ample room for confusion or deception. Factory personnel in the city could claim a better rural class background than they actually had. Equally important, they could be suspected of having done so, since only an investigation in the home village could sort this out, if it could be sorted out at all. One activity of the Four Cleanups campaign of

1965, which presaged the Cultural Revolution, was the launching of such investigations. Informants' accounts indicate that not a few cadres and workers had rich peasant or landlord *chushen* that until that time they had passed off as middle peasant.

In addition to having a problematic class background, one could also be identified as having a "history problem" (*lishi wenti*). This designation principally referred to people who themselves or whose family had had any kind of connection with the KMT. It also referred to people suspected of collaboration with the Japanese during World War II. The term "history problem" appears to have been used rather indiscriminately to apply both to people who themselves had KMT connections and to those whose parents or other family members had the problem. In the latter category, cases mentioned in interviews ranged in seriousness from people whose fathers were KMT generals or provincial officials to a person whose deceased husband had once belonged to the KMT Youth League in school. A history problem and a class background problem were frequently, though not necessarily, concomitant. Some old workers, for example, had unobjectionable class backgrounds but KMT connections.

The term "history problem" could also be applied to non-KMT members who were connected in any way with the pre-1949 management of an enterprise. One such case was an enterprise trade union head in the 1960s who had been chief clerk to the factory's boss in the 1940s. Although "history problem" and "(poor) class background" were separate categories and were commonly mentioned as such in interviews, there also was a tendency on the part of informants to equate the two. This was the case with one person who said that the "absolute worst kinds of class backgrounds" in the 1960s belonged to "people who had family members who had killed Communist Party members before Liberation or were in jail for being KMT agents."33

Next worst on this individual's list were people in the five categories. The stigma of the five categories was borne not only by the individuals themselves but also by their spouses, children, and other family members. A designation, such as "rightist's wife," was put in their files in the workplace or school. Although a person with capitalist parents had a bad class background, a person with rich peasant parents had an even worse one, since this category was one of the five elements. As White notes, the five elements consisted of two socioeconomic class categories, two political categories, and one judicial

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33 Interview with member of a Four Cleanups work team in two enterprises.
category. They were indicative of the way in which the original concept of class based on economic status (which in 1949 already allowed special political categories such as "revolutionary cadre") had expanded by the 1960s to include "groups defined in political terms and differentiated by political labels." This policy was reflected in the remarks of people like my informant, above, whose most ready examples of people with class background problems were mostly people guilty of pre- or post-1949 political crimes.

The proliferation of economic and political categories resulted in the phenomenon of people who belonged in more than one category, and this situation created cleavages that cut across occupational groups in enterprises. For all those under the age of about thirty-five on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the relevant class category was not the one that would attach to their own occupation, but rather their chushen, assigned according to their family's pre-Liberation class status. Thus one could be a permanent industrial worker but not belong to the proletarian class. As one might expect, technicians and engineers tended to be of bourgeois family background; people admitted to higher education in China in the 1950s came in large numbers from these families. However, as one would not necessarily expect, many workers also came from bourgeois families. This anomaly resulted from the fact that children from middle-class families in the 1960s were in competition for scarce university spaces with each other and with cadre children; the majority could not be admitted. Many of them (together with cadre children) ended up in factory jobs, which were considered desirable compared to being sent down to the countryside for resettlement. Moreover, since the chushen of younger workers (those under thirty-five) was that of their parents, one found not only bourgeois and revolutionary cadre statuses among the workers but also the whole range of rural statuses, plus the statuses of capitalists and people with KMT connections.

Younger workers with various kinds of nonproletarian backgrounds were not the only ones to be placed in an ambiguous status by the party's class policy. Many cadres had a class designation of revolutionary cadre (or revolutionary soldier), meaning they were already serving as party cadres or in the Red Army before 1949. "Revolutionary cadre" (or soldier) designated the regime's political elite and was not simply a "narrow occupational category." Because party policy made

34 White, Politics of Class, 5.
political membership a determinant of class while at the same time stressing economic status and family background, many old cadres in effect had two class statuses: revolutionary cadre and the class standing of their parents. This was a problem for them because many had various kinds of bad class background, such as landlord or rich peasant.

What effects did these categories have on an individual’s life? A really bad class status was a factor in the application of material sanctions. While workers were virtually never reduced in wage-grade for a work-related problem, by official regulation the five elements were put in a lower wage grade than that of people in comparable positions or even given a minimal livelihood stipend rather than a regular wage. They were not permitted to earn any bonuses. In addition, they were barred from belonging to the trade union. This was not unimportant, because one of the main functions of the union was to assist employees in applying for special hardship pay, sick leave, and the like. Disability payments or payments to dependents in the event of a work-related death were, according to one informant, supposed to be awarded regardless of political status. However, in smaller factories that received less central supervision “you would have trouble getting compensation if you had a bad chushen.”

For people other than the five elements, class status came into play more indirectly. People with good class background were better placed to cultivate good relations with cadres than were people with problems. It is true that a person especially skillful in cultivating personal relations might overcome the effects of a less than good class background. Such an example is reported by Blecher and White in a technical unit, where a worker with a rich peasant background who was good at playing up to cadres was able to obtain better work assignments and vacations and receive less criticism in political campaigns than his background would have prescribed. But in general, people with poor or middling statuses worked from a disadvantage.

An attack on the party’s class policy, written by a young worker and published during the Cultural Revolution, complained that everyone promoted or chosen a model in factories in the few years leading up to the Cultural Revolution had a good class background. As indi-

36 Korzec and Whyte, “Reading Notes,” 266. A technician in my study who had been labeled a rightist in 1957 received one grade lower pay than he normally would have received for the next twenty years, until he was rehabilitated.

37 Blecher and White, *Micropolitics*, 41–42.

cated above, people with middling class backgrounds were in a better position than those with poor ones, but they were vulnerable to charges from people with good class background that they were unworthy to be favored. One informant, a former worker, reported that in his factory, one of the all-factory models before the Cultural Revolution was a young worker with "good work and political performance" and a bourgeois class background. During the Cultural Revolution, the factory party secretary was attacked by workers in the conservative faction (the faction with better class backgrounds; see Chapter 4) for "not paying attention to politics," which included selecting this worker as a model (the party secretary subsequently was found not to have committed any "serious errors," but the worker was not permitted to serve as a model after the Cultural Revolution).

The relevance of class background was greatest, as would be expected, in elite recruitment. Although people with middling 

chushen
could join the party, those with good 

chushen
were the most favored. Party membership, in turn, was strongly linked with occupational mobility, even at enterprise level. Very few cadres at the level of shop or department head were nonparty, and the proportion of party members among lesser cadres (for example, work group heads) was high as well. And as noted above, family background also was related to the opportunity to study technology in the Soviet Union or under Soviet experts in China in the 1950s.

Roberta Martin asserts that "party recruitment was essentially suspended" from 1961 to 1968 because of a shift in the party's priorities after the disasters of the Great Leap from expanding the ranks to economic reconstruction and to educating party members and rectifying leadership failures. The recruitment that did occur was in the army in the early 1960s and then in the period preceding the Cultural Revolution in 1965–66. The latter trend is confirmed by some interview evidence: the Four Cleanups work-team member reported that recruiting new members was a major part of the campaign in enterprises and that eleven new activists who assisted the team in one of the enterprises were inducted into the party. This recruitment drive was apparently associated with Mao and opposed by Liu Shaoqi.

the "Peking Research Group" was actually a young worker whose ambitions were thwarted because of his parents' "political problems" and who was later arrested and executed. Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism, 124–125 and note, 220; based on story in Zheng Ming 24 (October 1979), 20–24.

39 Martin, Party Recruitment, 65.

40 Ibid., 66–67.
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In 1968, after the Cultural Revolution and purge of Liu, recruitment resumed on a mass scale. About half of the CCP's 35 million members were recruited after the Cultural Revolution. It was then that the trend toward favoring good class background (plus youth and political activism) and excluding those with middling class background had its full impact on party composition and political mobility. We will return to post-Cultural Revolution developments in recruitment and promotion in the next chapter, which deals with political campaigns. Here let it suffice to note the continuing contrast with the Soviet case: a trend toward polarization within the ranks of the elite based on ascriptive categories as opposed to a trend toward homogenization and professionalization.

The Party and Its Diffuse Role in the Enterprise

The other problematic area with respect to elite co-optation under Maoism is that of enterprise organization and the party's role. Rationed organization presents a potential threat to a Leninist party because it can create an institutional base for spheres of activity autonomous from political leadership. Combating this threat was especially prominent in the orientation of the CCP under Mao. As we shall see, the Maoist substitute for the rational-coercive Stalinist model created its own problems.

In China there was less reliance on, and more resistance to, the development of a structurally differentiated system than in the Soviet case. In industrial enterprises, management of production and personnel as well as political and security work were consolidated under the direction of the party committee from the 1950s onward. This contrasts with the Soviet creation of a differentiated system of party, managerial, and security hierarchies in which the party is supposed to play an educational and watchdog role, as discussed in the previous chapter.

In the early part of the 1950s, the CCP attempted to introduce one-man management in enterprises. The system, borrowed from the Soviets (see Chapter 2), called for a strict division of labor between party and management. Authority to decide on all measures regarding labor, materials, and finances necessary to fulfill the state plan was to be assigned to the factory manager, who also was to have the power to choose and train personnel and mete out rewards and penalties. The chain of command was to run from the factory manager up to the next highest level in the bureaucracy, not to the factory party commit-
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tee, whose role was to be limited to providing "ideological leadership."41

One-man management met with strong resistance from party cadres, who saw it as a threat to their positions. It is not clear to what extent the system actually was implemented outside the Northeast, where the Soviet influence was the strongest.42 In the protracted critique preceding its official abandonment, one-man management came under fire for its tendency to foster an independent group of industrial professionals. The tendency of the security police to act as an autonomous entity was criticized at this time as well, indicating that the party recognized this as a parallel problem to the one posed by managers.43

After the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, the CCP leadership rejected one-man management as the model for industry, and an arrangement known as the "factory manager under leadership of the party committee" system emerged. With variations, the system remained in effect through the 1960s to the Cultural Revolution. As indicated by its title, this arrangement affirmed a pre-eminent position for the party apparatus in enterprises. Interviews suggest that in practice there was an even greater consolidation of management functions under the party committee than the arrangement prescribed in the official model.

In the "factory manager under leadership of the party committee" system, the manager was subordinate to the enterprise party committee, which had a role in all aspects of decision making and policy implementation. In actuality, the factory manager was subordinate not to the party committee as a whole, but to the party secretary, who clearly was the dominant figure. In the words of Barry Richman, the enterprise party committee was "the key local-control agent responsible for making sure that managerial plans, decisions, operations, and results at the enterprise are formulated and achieved in accordance


42 William Brugger has questioned whether one-man management was implemented even to the degree indicated by Schurmann. See William Brugger, *Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise*, 188–189. My interview material, while mostly covering later periods, suggests that one-man management was implemented in southern China as well as in the Northeast, although the party appears to have retained greater power over personnel matters.

with the best interests of the regime." The factory manager had
day-to-day responsibility in production and technical matters, but the
party secretary had the final word. How this worked when running
smoothly was described thus by one informant:

There was an administrative meeting once or twice a month, attended
by the factory manager, deputy managers, department heads, engineers,
etc. The most important thing was discussing the monthly plan... each department brought up its own special business, and each
deputy manager brought up problems. Sometimes the party secretary
didn't join the meeting because he was busy, so they would send him a
report. Before the meeting the factory manager and the secretary al-
ready would have "exchanged views," so there very seldom were
disagreements.

In the event there were disagreements, the party secretary could over-
ride the manager's instructions to his subordinates, and the subordi-
nates could bypass the manager and go straight to the party secretary.
Authority relations became complicated when the manager had a
higher cadre rank than the party secretary (this was not supposed to
be the case, but it occasionally was).

Although the manager was subordinate in a single chain of com-
mand, the party secretary and the manager each did have his own sys-
tem (xitong) within the enterprise. The manager's xitong included the
workshops and the production and technical staff departments, such as
the planning, technical, accounting, quality control, and construction
departments. The party secretary's system included the trade union,
the CYL, the propaganda department, the workshop and department
party branch secretaries, and usually, as we shall see, the personnel and
security sections. The division of labor between the systems roughly
followed the lines of technical and production matters on the one
hand and human relations matters on the other. For instance, in the
case of a quality or safety problem in one of the workshops, the shop
head would handle the technical aspects of the problem while the shop
secretary would take care of the "thought and attitude" aspect. The
relations between these two types of cadre at the shop level reflected
that between the party secretary and factory manager at the top. The
party organization also concerned itself with such matters as illicit
romances among workers, people who argued on the job, and so forth.

44 Richman, Industrial Society, 266.
45 Interview with former deputy factory manager.
46 Ibid.
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Through the trade union and propaganda departments, the party handled workers’ welfare (for example, special hardship payments) and educational and recreational activities (films, sports, a library, and the like).

Thus, a division of labor between the systems of the manager and the party secretary was not absent in the “factory manager under leadership of the party committee” system. However, the apparent differentiation was diluted by the practice of one cadre wearing two hats, which blurred the distinction between the party and managerial systems. In what appears to have been the typical arrangement, the party secretary served as first deputy factory manager and the manager served as first deputy secretary of the party committee. At the middle level of enterprise management, more often than not the department or workshop head also was the party branch secretary. In some cases, the party committee secretary and the factory manager were the same person.\(^47\) In addition, interviews support the observation made by Richman that factory managers tended to be old party cadres, particularly old cadres retired from the army, whose orientation and background were much the same as the party secretary’s.\(^48\) This was also the case, although to a lesser extent, with the factory’s middle-level departments, such as production, technical, accounting, and so forth. Commonly, the ordinary staff had formal technical or professional training, while the department head was an old party cadre.

**Personnel and Security Work and the Party**

So far, the description of the party’s role in the enterprise suggests it was something of a lightweight: while the manager dealt with day-to-day production matters, the secretary exchanged views with him and his subordinates dealt with human relations, solving workers’ romantic problems, showing uplifting films, and the like. It is precisely in the area of human relations, however, that the party had its chief means of seeing that “results at the enterprise are...in accordance with the best interests of the regime.” This becomes evident when we look at the staffing and placement within the management structure of

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\(^47\) The latter phenomenon was associated with the Great Leap Forward, but it persisted through the 1960s in some factories on which I had information, usually but not always smaller ones (fewer than 1,000 employees).

\(^48\) Richman, *Industrial Society*, 229–230 and 267. One of my informants insisted that “all factory managers are ex-army people!” This is an exaggeration, but perhaps not on a great scale.
Maoism

the personnel and security departments, or sections (the renshi ke and baowei ke). The work of these two sections, which sometimes were combined into one (renbao ke), included ordinary personnel functions together with the more political and/or coercive tasks discussed earlier, such as investigation, surveillance, and, on occasion, arrest of persons for political or criminal offenses.

Some useful information on the subject of personnel and security departments at higher levels appeared in Barnett's study, which is quite relevant for a discussion of enterprises. With respect to personnel departments, Barnett describes the way in which party control in government bureaus was guaranteed by its monopoly of posts in these departments:

Control over personnel policies and assignments are obviously crucial in any large bureaucratic hierarchy. In the government in China virtually all personnel units are staffed entirely by Party men, and in effect they act as extensions into the government structure of the Party's organization departments, which have the power of ultimate decision about government personnel, including both Party and non-Party cadres.

And similarly with the county level security bureau:

It was the only organ in the county government other than the small Personnel Section whose entire staff of administrative cadres consisted of Party or YCL members or candidate members. As a result of these facts, the (security) bureau was regarded by many people as an institution which was basically a Party organ operating within the government bureaucracy, similar in this respect to the Personnel Section. Even though it was a government bureau, it was viewed as the Party's main instrument for enforcing political control over the population as a whole.

My interviews indicate that in industrial enterprises the personnel and security sections were staffed entirely by party members, the same situation as Barnett observed in the higher levels of the bureaucracy. They were the only departments in the enterprises (aside from the trade union, CYL, and propaganda offices) of which this was true. The personnel and security sections commonly were described by informants as "part of the party secretary's xitong." The personnel and security departments in enterprises clearly had the character of party organs. Cadres who made up the personnel and security sections were

50 Ibid., 20.
51 Ibid., 220.
Maoism

not only party members, but people with backgrounds and credentials as activists, not professionals. Many were promoted from the ranks of workers, while the heads of security sections typically had an army background.52

Much of the work of personnel and security cadres in enterprises concerned the maintenance of dossiers. One can see the degree to which personnel/security work was integrated in the party secretary’s system by considering the file-keeping arrangements in different enterprises. (The varied arrangements also show the rather striking lack of standardization in the system.) Arrangements encountered in my study included: (1) all dossiers in the personnel section, (2) worker files in the personnel section and cadre files in a separate organization department (zuzhi ke), (3) cadre files in the personnel section and worker files in the labor and wages department (laodong gongzi ke), which was under the personnel section, (4) same as “(3)”, except the labor and wages department was “partly in the factory manager’s system,” and (5) cadre files in the personnel section and worker files in the security section. There were two enterprises, both in the Northeast, in which personnel and security were described as “in the factory manager’s xitong” and under his control. This suggests that this attribute of one-man management may have persisted or even been the rule in that region.53

In China the party was in charge of security as well as personnel work, that is, the work done by NKVD/KGB organs in Soviet factories. There was some discrepancy among informants about the degree to which security cadres represented the agents of coercion, compared to personnel cadres. One person said that the difference between personnel and security cadres was that the former had no guns, while the security cadres “were armed, had better class backgrounds, did more secret work and had more power”; for example, they could look at dossiers that the personnel cadres weren’t allowed to see. Enterprise security cadres were the ones empowered to arrest serious criminal or political offenders and turn them over to the city

52 See note 12.
53 Organizational charts of enterprises drawn by Richman show the departments responsible for personnel as part of the factory manager’s system in half the cases (six of twelve). See Richman, Industrial Society, 769–783. This may not accurately reflect the real power structure, however, since the personnel departments’ close cousins, the security sections, are not even shown to exist in any of these charts, despite the fact that everyone mentions their presence.
public security bureau. On the other hand, no distinction between the two kinds of cadre was made by other informants, who saw them both as equally threatening or nonthreatening.

Cadres involved in security work would be the other candidates, in addition to industrial managers, for representing a specialized organization or elite apart from the regular party organization—indeed, a much more powerful one than managers. Barnett refers to security cadres in factories as subordinates of the local public security bureau (the *gongan ju*). Informants in my study did refer to the enterprise security cadres as "led by" the *gongan ju*. However, the relationship of these cadres to the security bureau (in the 1960s–70s) appears to have been much the same as the relationship of those in other factory departments to municipal bureaus: the personnel departments were led by the municipal organization bureaus and by the enterprise party committee, the labor and wages department was led by the municipal labor bureau and by the factory party committee, and so forth. The overall impression I gleaned from informants' comments is that security cadres were a much more integral part of the factory's regular party organization than the NKVD sections. They were not perceived as agents of a distinct organization in the same way that comparable departments in Soviet factories were perceived as arms of the NKVD ("the party rewards and punishes but the NKVD only punishes").

**Problems with the Party's Role**

To sum up, the party concentrated production management, personnel, and security functions under its direction. It would thus appear more dominant than its counterpart in Soviet enterprises because this kind of arrangement would work against the development of an institutional base for autonomous elites, such as industrial management or the security police. However, the assumption of managerial functions and blurring of organizational lines and roles could easily cause the party to lose its competence as a political leadership instrument, much as Selznick's analysis would predict.

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55 An exception to this I encountered was that of a collectively owned factory whose manager was its pre-1949 owner, a nonparty member, who was described as more powerful than the party secretary. In turn, the factory's security cadres were described as answerable only to the *gongan ju* and more powerful than either the secretary or the manager, who feared them.
The consolidation of management under one chain of command could result not in leadership by the party apparatus, but rather in its virtual disappearance as a distinctive entity, depending on the background and orientation of the top official. Although these officials tended to be former Red Army veterans of peasant background, this was not uniformly the case. The description of enterprise politics related by a former technician in a medium-sized textile factory, founded in 1955, is illustrative. In this enterprise, the positions of party secretary and factory director were held by the same individual, an "old, experienced administrative cadre" and party member. This cadre not only filled these two roles but also appears to have taken over the usual functions of the personnel-security cadres, who "did not have any power because the factory director managed everything." One had to be favored by this powerful individual to be promoted, even to the low-level position of work group head.

The fact that my informant in conversation referred to this cadre as "the factory director" and not as the party secretary is not coincidental. The director—party secretary often invited nonparty technical people to attend meetings of the production committee, where they were encouraged to speak. Included in their ranks was at least one person who bore the label of rightist. The five elements were not greatly stigmatized under this director's leadership, as the individual's rightist label was not generally known in the factory until the Cultural Revolution. Party business in general was not stressed. This was evidenced by the fact that in contrast with the production committee meetings, the director—party secretary seldom convened party committee meetings. In addition, there were party members who felt they should be included in the production meetings, in particular the personnel/security cadres, but who were excluded by the director. Since party, management, and security hierarchies were not separated, the production orientation of the director essentially erased the distinctive role of political watchdogs and supervisors that both party and security apparatuses were supposed to fill.

In addition to a case such as the above, a second sort of situation uncovered in interviews that would have been a threat to party coherence arose from the fact that old officials had been allowed to retain responsible positions in enterprises. This phenomenon was naturally associated with factories founded before 1949—but it was not necessarily confined to small ones. When this was the case, not only the production management but the party apparatus itself could contain highly suspect personnel, from the point of view of a Leninist party.

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In a medium-sized (1,000 employees) chemical factory described by one informant, the enterprise director was not a party member, and a number of leading cadres in the enterprise director's system were retained officials from the pre-1949 regime, including the factory's old boss.

The presence of nonparty and/or retained cadres in the manager's system might have made the party organization's work more difficult, but in itself would not necessarily have been a threat to its integrity as an organization. However, cadres in the party secretary's system itself—the trade union chief and, even more important, the head of the personnel section—were also retained cadres. The union chief had been personal secretary to the factory's old boss (now a deputy manager) and the personnel chief was a former KMT member. Clearly, there was a problem here if one considers a Leninist organization to be defined by its reliance on disciplined agents who inhabit a "separate moral and intellectual world." Cadres such as these may in fact have supported CCP goals, but as pointed out earlier, a Leninist party requires not members who belong because they agree with the program but members who are committed to observing party discipline as a binding norm in itself.\(^{56}\) It is difficult to assess the pervasiveness of this kind of situation but, as we shall see in the next chapter, rooting out ex-KMT cadres was a prominent theme in the Four Cleanups campaign and the Cultural Revolution. We can infer that although this often involved trumped-up accusations, in fact there really was a significant retention of pre-1949 personnel continuing into the 1960s, which was a genuine reason for launching the Cultural Revolution.

**Conclusion**

We can conclude first that Maoist organization in enterprises is appropriately seen as a variant of Stalinism in view of its coercive aspects: the dossier system, surveillance by security cadres, and the encouragement of informing. It is not in its being a more ideal form of socialist organization that we can most productively attempt to distinguish the two. This points us to the areas of significant difference.

First, there are questions of mobility and elite polarization. A new red-expert industrial middle class was not moving from an expanded educational system into industry as it did in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. After 1962 in China, educated professionals (except the good-

\(^{56}\) See the Introduction, note 4.
class background, Soviet-trained types) were increasingly disadvantaged by the focus on class background rather than performance, training, or occupational category. A dualistic elite continued to exist more or less unaltered at enterprise level: management remained dominated by old party veterans, in particular former Red Army men. This included those who managed production as well as those in charge of personnel and security work. Meanwhile, class distinctions were passed on to the next generation by the party's class policy.

It is useful to note that we are talking about the prolongation of elite dualism, not the decisive prevalence of reds over experts. A return to the Soviet experience is useful here. We noted in Chapter 2 that in the Russia of the 1920s, the red directors of enterprises often became dependent on the old specialists because of the former's lack of production and technical expertise.57 They were likely to identify with the views of the specialists rather than "seeing the world through political eyes," as defined by the party. This situation was ended by Stalin's purge of the red directors and training of new red experts. In China a situation in which the party was constrained to rely in a major way on technical and managerial personnel trained under the old regime persisted longer. Reliance on party veterans who lacked industrial expertise as managers logically could result in their becoming dependent in practice on specialists rather than in dominance of reds over experts. In addition, capitalists remained in their enterprises, as a result of the party's conciliatory policy toward the national bourgeoisie. Large numbers of higher intellectuals were recruited into the party, outnumbering workers.

Clearly, this situation presented a threat of co-optation and corruption of the party organization by the "sugar-coated bullets" of the pre-1949 educated and monied urban elite. Although the sanfan (three anti) campaign of 1951–52 was directed at this problem, its results were less than decisive, as we shall see in the next chapter. In addition, as we have seen, organizational spheres of competence were not clearly defined or standardized (as in the matter of location of personnel files). Power relations depended more on particular individuals and local conditions than on bureaucratic bases, and the individuals were often worlds apart.

This assessment of the pre–Cultural Revolution period suggests that a difference of considerable political significance between elite re-

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57 See Bailes, Technology and Society, 86 and 125; and Azrael, Managerial Power, 48.
Maoism

cruitment under Stalin and under Mao was that in the latter, conditions were not created for the emergence and co-optation of a large cohort of industrial professionals—what we have called a hybrid, domesticated elite in the Soviet case—into a stable, party-dominated system. Rather, the conditions were created for the chaotic, factionalized politics of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, the CCP at enterprise level was a less coherent Leninist instrument than might at first be apparent, and this lack of coherence was to be exacerbated by the events of the Cultural Revolution.
CHAPTER FOUR

Maoism and Revolution from Above

In the preceding chapter we saw that although the party in the years before the Cultural Revolution had a high profile in enterprises, its role was more problematic than it may appear at first glance if we use Stalinism as the point of comparison. The party’s “deployable agents” at factory level were charged with a range of diffuse functions in a setting where roles and spheres of authority were not defined in a regularized manner and where cleavages between elites with divergent social origins and educational backgrounds were growing.

These characteristics were greatly magnified by Mao’s version of revolution from above, the political campaign (yundong) with which this chapter deals. The repeated launching of political campaigns after 1949 was a product of the CCP practice of attempting to control and reshape society by manipulating groups and interpersonal relations, rather than relying on the direct coercion identified with Stalin. This orientation was evident in the everyday practices of industrial enterprises, as we have seen. If major groups were to be used rather than eliminated, then continuous efforts to remold them were necessary, given the party’s goals.

Political movements under Mao had certain distinctive characteristics that caused social and political relationships to become more and more complicated with the passage of time. These included the use of public, face-to-face “criticism and struggle” against targets, which created a highly politicized atmosphere of personal confrontation within workplaces and throughout society; and conversely, the relatively lenient policy of “remolding” rather than purging or liquidating (“cure the illness and save the patient”), which precluded the decisive elimination of groups that had become campaign targets. After the Cultural Revolution the typical lack of a decisive outcome was exacerbated by factionalism in the top leadership. This produced ambiguous and shifting policy directions that alternately favored one or another group at lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy, down to the enterprise.
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Personalized, public confrontation and indecisive outcomes contrast sharply with the methods of Stalinism in the 1930s. In the Soviet case, purges and trials removed targets from their workplaces rather than using the workplace itself as the primary forum for punishment and education. Purge targets were interrogated by the NKVD in private. Confrontations with co-workers who had been induced to denounce the accused also were staged in private, and judgments rendered in trials removed from the workplace.\(^1\) The whole process was secretive and concealed from public view. In China, political campaigns (especially the Cultural Revolution) aimed at maximizing mass involvement. A second contrast is that although Stalin did employ the technique of disfavoring one and then another group, important targeted groups (red directors, Old Bolsheviks) were eliminated. They did not live to fight another day, as did cadres in China, from Deng Xiaoping to the old peasant guerrilla fighters who managed so many factories. Although thousands were eventually rehabilitated under Khrushchev and survivors released from the labor camps, their numbers were proportionally less than surviving political campaign victims in China. They did not include high-ranking figures.

We can observe these two characteristics of Maoism—intense, personal political campaigns carried on in public view with indecisive results—in industrial enterprises in China from the 1950s onward. The Cultural Revolution was in large part a reaction to these two characteristics; it was an effort to settle the ambiguities of the revolution. However, since different groups, from the central leadership down to professionals, students, and workers had mutually exclusive visions of this resolution, it failed to resolve anything and instead displayed the volatile combination of intensity coupled with a nondecisive outcome to an unprecedented degree.

The following pages deal with political campaigns that had an impact in industry, beginning with those of the 1950s and 1960s that set the stage for the Cultural Revolution and finally the Cultural Revolution itself. This cumulative experience shaped the outlook of first- and second-generation elites and ultimately led to a stronger constituency for reforms and a weaker constituency for an orthodox, party-dominated status quo after Mao than was the case in the Soviet Union after Stalin.

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\(^1\) See Eugenia Ginzburg’s description of these processes in *Journey into the Whirlwind*, 48–51, 60–69, 83–97, and 169–174.
The Sanfan (Three-Anti) Campaign

To further the leadership's objective of making use of the skills of old elites while preserving the party from undue influence, the Three-Anti campaign (against "corruption, waste, and bureaucracy") was launched in industry in 1951–52. According to sources interviewed by Frederick Tiewes, removal of holdovers from the KMT regime who were widely employed as factory officials was the primary objective of the campaign. Combatting corruption, waste, and bureaucracy as such was secondary. Moreover, corruption, waste, and bureaucracy were portrayed as the result of the influence of the urban bourgeoisie upon unsophisticated, former peasant guerrilla party cadres who, unduly impressed by the bourgeoisie's magnificent lifestyles and business acumen, absorbed their values, copied their modes of operation, and formed connections with them. Behaviors targeted by the campaign ranged from corrupt business deals to such practices as "sending in," whereby factory party cadres hired hundreds of persons on the personal recommendation of businessmen. Sanfan appears to have been one of the more severe types of campaign. In enterprises, groups of activist workers called "tiger-hunting units" were mobilized by the party to help root out targets. Production was halted for half or whole days to hold struggle meetings, which involved verbal and physical abuse and resulted in an unknown number of suicides.2

Tiewes argues that sanfan largely achieved its objectives—destroying the prestige and influence of the urban bourgeoisie and eliminating large-scale corruption based on connections between party officials and private businessmen. However, he also notes that most of the factory officials from the old regime probably ended up retaining their positions.3 My own interviews indicate that the results of sanfan indeed were not decisive in this regard. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, holdovers from the old regime were still in high positions in factories. The sanfan campaign (and the later sufan campaign against "counterrevolutionaries") did not make a thorough housecleaning. For instance, as we saw in the last chapter, in one medium-sized factory the former laoban (boss) was a deputy manager; the trade-union chief was his former assistant and close associate, as were a number of other cadres; and the personnel chief was a former

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3 Ibid., 159 and 148.
KMT member. In another, smaller factory making a light industrial product, the factory manager himself was the pre-1949 one and was described by my informant as being more powerful than the factory party secretary. A comparable situation would have existed if in the Soviet Union the factory management from Czarist days had still been running some of the enterprises well into the 1930s.

The Anti-Rightist Campaign

The effects of the 1956–57 Hundred Flowers campaign and the Anti-Rightist campaign that followed it were vividly portrayed by Liang Heng in his autobiography. He describes how his mother, a loyal and enthusiastic supporter of the party, was pressed to make criticisms of her unit’s leadership during the Hundred Flowers. Despite the innocuous nature of her “criticisms,” which she only made in an attempt to comply with what the party wanted, she was made a target during the Anti-Rightist campaign, sent to a labor camp, and given the label of rightist. This had disastrous effects on her family for the next twenty years, even though in an effort to save the family her husband denounced and divorced her.4

This set of events, which was suffered by thousands of intellectuals throughout China, occurred in industry as well as in educational and cultural circles. Workers and technical personnel both complied with the party’s request that they make criticisms of the leadership during the Hundred Flowers campaign. However, since intellectuals were the most articulate as well as on the whole somewhat less enthusiastic about party leadership than workers, most people labeled rightists in factories probably came from the ranks of the educated personnel. One common complaint voiced was of “blind following of the Soviet Union.” As we have seen in the previous chapter, there appears to have been a cleavage between those who worked with Soviet experts and admired the Soviet model in industry and those who did not. Such criticism was not necessarily hostile to party leadership, however. One interviewee who was labeled a rightist commented, “I didn’t oppose the party, only some of its policies” (for example, copying the Soviets). According to émigré accounts, however, factories were given a quota: they were told to find 5 percent of their personnel to be rightists during the campaign (this appears to have been the case in Liang’s mother’s unit, a public security bureau, as well). Many innocu-

4 Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution, 8–9 and passim.
ous persons in enterprises as elsewhere thus became targets. The
treatment meted out in factories to rightists, who became one of the
five elements, was described in the preceding chapter. Here it is im-
portant to note that on the one hand, rightists were stigmatized and
subjected to various constraints and sanctions such as extra political
study, surveillance by security cadres and activists, deprivation of holi-
days, and lowering of pay. On the other hand, for the most part they
remained on the job in the workplace. In some cases they were relied
upon by the management and not subjected to all of the sanctions. In
short, they were neither permitted to work and live normally nor were
they decisively removed.5

The Four Cleanups Campaign

The Four Cleanups campaign began in factories in 1964. Its ob-
jectives were to "clean" politics, economics, ideology, and organiza-
tion. The Four Cleanups showed ambiguous and conflicting policy
with respect to both its targets and its methods. Émigré reports indi-
cate that it was unclear whether the focus was to be on political prob-
lems (for example, poor class background or former KMT affiliation),
which would target bourgeois elites, or on economic problems (for ex-
ample, corruption), which would target political elites. One or the
other was emphasized in different parts of the country. This diver-
gence reflected an emergent dissension within the top ranks of the
CCP concerning the proper targets and methods of the Four Cleanups
campaign; this dissension was a precipitating factor of the Cultural
Revolution.6

5 Their situation can be contrasted with that of the Soviet engineers, technicians,
and others who had committed various kinds of "errors" and were consigned to spe-
cial technical institutes staffed by prisoners and isolated from society during the Stalin
years. See Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle.

6 The leadership conflict is analyzed and the development of the Four Cleanups in
the countryside chronicled in Richard Baum, Prelude to Revolution. Some consider
the campaign to be primarily a rural phenomenon; Baum's book deals with the coun-
tryside. Martin Whyte concluded that the Socialist Education campaign (of which the
Four Cleanups was a part), had "less impact in factories... than in rural communes"
and often was nothing more than a "relatively mild propaganda and study campaign."
See Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, 175. My interviews sug-
gest the intensity of the campaign varied among factories. One interviewee asserted
that the Four Cleanups in his factory in Beijing never involved more than study and
discussion. In the main, however, it appears to have been a major political event with
serious repercussions within enterprises.
In addition to the question of targets of the campaign, there was disagreement among the party leadership about the whole nature and method of political campaigns, particularly with respect to the role of the masses. In general, Mao favored rectification of the party through campaigns in which nonparty masses (peasants during the land reform of 1948; intellectuals in the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1956; peasants again in the Socialist Education campaign of the early 1960s, which turned into the Four Cleanups) were mobilized to confront cadres with accusations and/or criticisms. Liu Shaoqi, it appears, favored a more orthodox Leninist approach, in which rectification took place through inner-party criticism; criticism of cadres was not to be a spectacle for the masses to watch, much less join in.\(^7\)

Interviews confirmed the existence of leadership disagreement, manifested at enterprise level. For example, in a factory in Shanghai, the treatment of cadres during the Four Cleanups accorded with the approach identified with Liu. According to a member of the work team that went to the factory, cadres were treated "with great respect." The findings of the work team were not revealed in public. Serious cases of cadre wrongdoing were quietly referred to the municipal bureau for action. In addition, the work team worked with the factory leadership; it did not substitute for them during its stay. The treatment of cadres contrasted sharply with that meted out to ordinary workers who were suspected of wrongdoing. They were subjected to stern interrogations by the team and activists from the factory, and at least one selected to be made an example of in a factory-wide meeting. Liu was later attacked for promoting this type of campaign ("turning the spearhead downward"—that is, toward the masses). In contrast, a former activist from a factory in Tianjin who assisted the visiting work team there described a campaign of the type identified with Mao. The work team substituted for the factory leadership. Workers were mobilized to criticize cadres in open meetings. During these meetings the cadres were required to xizao (take a bath) by confessing their errors in front of the masses until they were judged to have performed successfully. (Unlike the "power seizure" phase of the Cultural Revolution, however, the final judgment was decided by the work team, not by the masses.)

The Four Cleanups not only was indecisive, but in some areas was still in progress at the onset of the Cultural Revolution. The role of Four Cleanups participants in the Cultural Revolution indicates that a cycle was being created by intense, indecisive, repeated campaigns. Many informants reported that a major component of the rebel faction in their factories consisted of former targets of the Four Cleanups, both cadres and workers. These individuals rebelled against enterprise leaders who had been in place during the campaign and against activists who had assisted the work teams. They took the first opportunity to attempt to reverse the verdicts against themselves and retaliate against their former attackers.

The Cultural Revolution

Comparatively speaking, the Cultural Revolution in industrial enterprises (as opposed to schools) has received little attention. One early impression was that the movement was largely kept out of the factories by an alliance of workers and managers, both of whom had a paramount interest in maintaining production.8 A later study of the Cultural Revolution by Hong Yung Lee was primarily concerned with student politics but also devoted some space to analysis of factory politics. The author observed that on the whole, workers were less militant than students, because “unlike the students, who were interested in ‘power,’ the workers were interested in ‘money’.”9 While my interviews do not contest the view that workers tended to be less ideological than students, they do not necessarily support the idea that they were less militant, once mobilized. Mass criticism and struggle against cadres in factories was intense, as we shall see. As one worker, a former member of the rebel faction, commented, “It’s true our criticisms didn’t have a great deal of ideological content. But they weren’t just empty talk... they were based on very concrete things in the factory.”

It is true that in certain respects the Cultural Revolution at enterprise level was less severe than at higher levels in industry or in educational and cultural institutions. Enterprise-level party cadres were in the main “liberated” relatively early, compared to their counterparts at higher levels. Most factory-level cadres were cleared and returned to

8 See Michel Oksenberg, “Industrial Managers and Industrial Workers,” in Michel Oksenberg et al., The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review, 8–12; and Alan P. Liu, Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China.

office by 1969 or 1970 except in a few areas (for example, Anhui, Yunnan, and Tianjin) where unusual situations prevailed. Even in these cases, the factory cadres all appear to have been liberated by 1973. At higher levels many old cadres had to wait until the return of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 for rehabilitation. Except for those with special problems, technical personnel at enterprise level were not subjected to criticism and struggle. Few factory personnel were required to go to May Seventh schools in the countryside. Higher-level intellectuals and those employed in cultural and educational institutions fared much worse.

This relative moderation can be attributed to the need to maintain production. However, interviews indicate that although production appears to have been maintained at a more or less normal level except for a brief period at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, intense criticism and struggle activities could be and were carried on at the same time. For instance, in one interview a former engineer devoted considerable time to an explanation of why his factory in Nanjing had been relatively undisrupted by the movement. He said this was due to the importance attached by the enterprise’s superiors to maintaining continuous production, as well as to the workers’ “lack of interest in politics.” This statement appeared to support the view of factories as relatively undisturbed. However, he later revealed that both the enterprise party secretary and the trade union head had committed suicide in the early days of the Cultural Revolution. This occurred while they were confined on the premises in preparation for being struggle targets in mass meetings.

The foregoing is meant to suggest in a preliminary way that the Cultural Revolution was indeed a major political event in industrial enterprises. What follows is a presentation of some of its particulars, in which we can see manifested the general character of political campaigns in China. In its general outlines, the Cultural Revolution in enterprises corresponded to the unfolding of the movement in the country as a whole. It passed from an initial focus on nonparty targets with bourgeois backgrounds or other “problems” to a phase of rebelling against and overthrowing “power-holders” (that is, party cadres). This was followed by a final campaign to “purify the class ranks” (qingli jieji duiwu), which again turned on people with class and history problems (“dead tigers”). It also targeted rebels who had committed errors during the earlier phases of the Cultural Revolution (“live tigers”).

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The Cultural Revolution represented both a continuation of and departure from past practice. It differed from the past in that for a time, the masses were called on to pass judgment on cadres, in addition to making criticisms (as in the Four Cleanups), and there was no central organizational direction of the movement, only pronouncements in the media.\textsuperscript{10} Party and technical cadres and members of the “mass organizations” in enterprises all were subject to traumatizing experiences, although they were of a different nature.

\textit{Targets of the Cultural Revolution in Enterprises}

The leading cadres in factories—the party secretary and the factory manager, together with their deputies and often the workshop and department heads as well—were uniformly overthrown under suspicion of being “capitalist roaders.” Not all of them became struggle targets: some were only “kicked aside” (\textit{kaobian}) pending determination of their status. During this time they were assigned to labor on the shop floor as ordinary workers. Interviews indicate that cadres who did become targets were subjected to a range of severe treatments. These could include confinement in the factory (in some cases for as long as several years); repeated verbal and physical abuse in mass struggle meetings (as a result of which some died or had their health ruined and others committed suicide); performance of particularly unpleasant and lowly tasks such as cleaning the latrines; and various sorts of humiliation, such as standing at the factory gates each morning to be jeered at by workers as they came in.

Criticisms and accusations in the factories were made in \textit{dazibao} (big-character posters) followed by criticism-and-struggle sessions. Struggle targets were confined when not being dragged out for criticism. Confinement could take more or less unpleasant forms, depending on the attitude of the faction in control of the factory. Cadres and other targets could be confined in a \textit{xuexi ban} (study group) for the purpose of writing self-investigations, or they could be put into the \textit{niu pang} (literally, “cowshed”).\textsuperscript{11} People in the \textit{niu pang}, which one

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} In the 1948 land reform campaign the masses also were called on to pass judgment; this was so demoralizing to cadres that the practice was abandoned until the time of the Cultural Revolution. See Tiewes, \textit{Politics and Purges}, 88–98; and Hinton’s description of the campaign in \textit{Fanshen}.
\item \textsuperscript{11} The \textit{niu pang} did not derive its name from its similarity to a pen for cows, however; the name referred to its being a place for confining \textit{niu guei}—meaning “monsters.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
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informant defined as “the place where they put bad people during the Cultural Revolution,” usually were subjected to repeated verbal and physical abuse. Some informants reported that beatings were carried out by squads of workers formed especially for that purpose. The difference between a xuexi ban and the niu pang depended on the place: in some the study group “changed into niu pang conditions,” while in others, the confined individuals really did engage in study.

Cadres were criticized for a variety of problems, all ostensibly indications of their character as capitalist roaders and followers of Liu Shaoqi’s counterrevolutionary line. Many criticisms did reflect genuine worker grievances. Interviews suggest that these tended to be complaints involving conduct and human relationships, rather than economic dissatisfaction. Many cadres were criticized for “looking down on” or “oppressing” workers, which meant cursing them and behaving in an arrogant and disrespectful manner. Other cadres were criticized for various forms of personal corruption or for wasting factory funds on showy projects. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the type of criticism associated with the Cultural Revolution was the degree to which, as one person commented, “the personal became political.” As another informant said, “Anyone could bring up anything about anybody—in public.” In the dazibao and during criticism sessions, any and all details of the target’s personal life that appeared damaging were brought out. Personnel and security cadres, who had access to worker and cadre dossiers, often revealed their contents to one or the other mass organization (usually the conservative faction) so that they could be used against struggle targets or against members of the opposing faction. This information could include all sorts of material, not only on the individual’s conduct since assignment to the factory but also details of his or her history since childhood and the histories of family members.

Interviews suggest that the “personal becoming political” very frequently meant exposés involving moral conduct. In some cases the items brought up concerned things that would seem minor and that had happened many years before. For example, one party secretary was severely criticized for a brief affair that had happened twenty years previously. In other cases, more serious offenses were involved. If émigré accounts are at all indicative, cadres using their power over the lives and careers of factory workers and staff in order to extract sexual favors appears to have been a common, if not ubiquitous, phenomenon. Such was the case, for example, with a security cadre who used information that a young woman worker had concealed her rich
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peasant background to press her to have relations with him. Other cases involved romantic attachments rather than coercive relationships; such attachments were exposed and criticized as well (probably more so than harassment by security cadres, who were better situated to protect themselves from criticism). The party secretary mentioned above who committed suicide did so because he had been having a long-standing affair with someone employed in the factory. This scandal was going to be brought out in the struggle session, and so, according to my informant’s account, he killed himself because he could not bear to have it become public.

Other criticisms reflected a different orientation. For example, one party secretary was criticized for “not paying attention to politics,” evidence of which was that he had chosen a person with a bourgeois background as a model worker. Another was severely struggled against for “relying on bad people”; in this case, a technician with a rightist label. As these criticisms suggest, the Cultural Revolution was partly aimed at cadre behavior (in both work and personal life) and partly at individuals (cadres and ordinary people) with particular statuses, or “problems,” such as poor class background, a history problem, or being one of the five elements. Some of the behavior for which cadres were criticized—for example, “not paying attention to politics”—was in fact a question of not dealing with people on the basis of these statuses.

As noted earlier, there were enterprises in which the old management and former KMT personnel remained in responsible cadre positions. Most would have been nonparty cadres, but some had become party members. These individuals became targets of the mass organizations, both conservative and rebel (see discussion below.) They were individuals who, from a revolutionary point of view, were justifiable targets and indeed long overdue for attack. But there were many other people, both cadres and workers, with old KMT connections that were very minor who were swept up in the movement to settle accounts with the old regime.

The case of the manager of a small factory in Shanghai is illustrative of the latter. This individual had two “problems”: first, she had concealed her landlord family background, claiming it to have been middle peasant; and second, her late husband (who had died before 1949) had once been a member of the KMT Youth League. During the Four Cleanups an extensive investigation into her history had been carried out. It entailed sending investigators to her home village to ascertain her family’s status, finding and interviewing the persons who
had originally recruited her into the party, and searching out people who had known her husband in the days when he joined the KMT Youth League. As a result of this investigation, it was ascertained that she had broken with her parents at an early age and that her husband, to whom she had been married only a short time, had been in a school in which everyone joined the KMT Youth League as a matter of form. Still, she was demoted in rank. During the Cultural Revolution her case was taken up again; this time the treatment meted out was much more harsh. She was severely struggled against and expelled from the party.

In the middle and latter part of 1967, work teams from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were sent to factories to put an end to factional fighting and excesses against cadres, set up new leadership organs (the revolutionary committees), and conduct the qingli (purify the class ranks) phase of the Cultural Revolution. The latter was supposed to decide decisively which cadres were qualified to serve in leadership positions and also pass judgment on the behavior of participants in the Cultural Revolution. The arrival of the PLA representatives signaled an end to a period of mass action that had been free from central organizational control. Under PLA direction virtually all factory-level cadres eventually were found "not to have committed serious errors" and were "liberated" and restored to their old or comparable positions. Although spontaneous violence was curtailed, this was by no means a "moderate" phase of the Cultural Revolution. The targets of qingli—people with class and history problems plus Cultural Revolution rebels—were confined and subject to severe struggle methods; suicides were common.

Factions, Class, and the Younger Generation

The cadre targets of the Cultural Revolution were not the only sufferers. In the end many of those who participated in the struggle against cadres became targets themselves. Some others who did not become targets but were shunted aside when central control was reasserted felt that they had been used and betrayed. Still others improved their status with promotions but were never secure in their positions, and ultimately fell. In varying degrees, the Cultural Revolution was disastrous for the participants as well. This is important because among the ranks of Cultural Revolution activists were those who normally would have filled the ranks of the new generation of elite, both political and professional.
In enterprises as in schools, mass organizations were formed to carry out criticism and struggle against targets. These organizations everywhere split into opposing groups, or factions. Much of their activity came to be directed more against the opposing faction than against cadres. Enterprises of all sizes as well as the bureaus above them and research institutes attached to them divided into two opposing groups: the “rebel” faction (zaofan pai) and the “conservative” (baoshou pai) faction. In some cases there were further splits, but these were the basic two. In general, one can say that the rebel faction wanted to permanently overthrow “power-holders” (party cadres), while the conservative faction wanted to limit criticism of party cadres and focus on people with bad class backgrounds and history problems. However, the politics of the period were such that these kinds of generalizations do not always hold. For example, one informant reported that in his enterprise, the original rebels ended up defending the cadres who were under attack, while the conservatives wanted to continue struggling against them.

It is not easy to generalize about the bases for factional membership in enterprises. They varied from place to place. Many individuals changed factions as events unfolded. Interviews suggest that many combinations of factors—including age, political status, friendship and clientelistic ties, ideological orientations, and work-oriented issues—entered in. The description of factionalism by a former engineer captures this situation well.

The conservatives thought the leading cadres were basically OK, while the others wanted them overthrown. The conservatives often were people who had good guanxi with leaders; they had been promoted by them. Another factor was that before the Cultural Revolution, there already were a number of cliques (xiao tuanti). There already had been so many political movements, which contributed to the cliques. People who’d been hit earlier had common interests. Peasants [many of the workers in this factory were of rural background] are always forming themselves into two opposing groups—like one family against another—and this was reflected in the factory situation. There also were groups among the cadres, based on their having come in groups from other factories and remaining friends. All these various groups finally formed into two big groups struggling. In other words, the Cultural Revolution was the end of a long, long story.

Notwithstanding the complexities of Cultural Revolution politics, it is possible to offer some general observations. In his study of Cultural Revolution politics, Lee describes members of the rebel faction in factories as coming mainly from occupationally defined, materially disad-
vantaged groups, such as contract and temporary workers, unskilled workers, and apprentices. Under the category of "other" types who joined the rebels, the author refers to people with class and political problems who were "outside the locus of power" in the factory. Although not sufficiently numerous to be definitive, my interviews suggest that this "other" category in fact represented a more important line of political cleavage in enterprises than did occupational categories. For example, temporary workers were prominent in the rebel movement in the earlier days of the Cultural Revolution. Their activities, however, were for the most part outside the factories. They were involved in street fighting, marching on the local labor bureaus, and the like, not in struggling against cadres or with the opposing faction in factories.

The generational and class-related cleavages between groups that began to emerge in the 1960s were reflected in the factional splits of the Cultural Revolution. When asked about the basis for factional membership in enterprises, the typical answer from an interviewee was that the rebel faction in the enterprise consisted of "people with poor class backgrounds or political problems and younger workers" while the conservative faction consisted of "people with good class background, party members, old workers, and some cadres." The discussion of class policy in the previous chapter indicates why this would have been the case: class background had become a major basis for the distribution of a broad range of rewards and punishments. People with less than good class backgrounds were disadvantaged. In particular, many who wanted to be activists were thwarted in their desire to participate in political campaigns, join the CYL, and so forth. For a time, the Cultural Revolution represented an opportunity for people of bourgeois background, of whatever occupation, to be active politically and rebel against the leadership that had disfavored them. The middle phase of the Cultural Revolution gave these individuals their first chance to participate, when it was announced that it was correct for people without good class background to join a mass organization. This emphasis, however, was not to last.

In general, class and political purity became much more important as criteria for reward and punishment after the Cultural Revolution.

13 The character of factionalism in enterprises thus more closely parallels the situation in the schools, as described by Lee and by Chan, Rosen, and Unger, than previously realized. See Chapter 3, note 27.
This trend began after the PLA moved into the factories and the qingli movement got underway; it continued until the post-Mao period. Any hopes on the part of bourgeois class background members of rebel organizations for a system more open to them were short-lived. At the same time, there were pre–Cultural Revolution activists who joined the conservative faction who also ended up alienated, as a result of the period of time during which they were targets of the rebels. For instance, a former worker (mentioned in Chapter 3, note 8) who had been an activist since the early 1960s, served in the army, assisted the factory security section, and, during the Four Cleanups, assisted the work team in his Tianjin factory became a struggle target of the rebel faction in the Cultural Revolution—because, he said, of his activist role in the Four Cleanups. During the struggle a burlap sack was put over his head (so he could not identify his assailants) and he was severely beaten. According to him, the party members and activists who ran campaigns such as the Four Cleanups never indulged themselves in such treatment. This may have been a self-serving description, but in any event, this sort of person also “lost interest in politics” as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

In addition to these kinds of experiences in enterprises, after the Cultural Revolution youth were sent down to the countryside for resettlement, supposedly for life, as a result both of radical changes in the educational system and the regime’s desire to regain control over the youth who had rebelled. Few were able to continue their education; those who were, found its value severely impaired by the anti-intellectualism of the time. Youth of both good and bad class backgrounds were sent to the countryside, although it was easier for the parents of the former, who had connections, to get their children back.14 Many lost one or both parents in the Cultural Revolution and were cast socially adrift.15 In short, Maoism succeeded in alienating large numbers of people with both good and bad class backgrounds

14 The example given by one informant of the influence of personnel cadres in enterprises was a case in which a higher cadre after the Cultural Revolution had two children in the countryside, and an enterprise personnel cadre assisted in having one of them returned to the city.

15 Stories of such youth were the subject of much of the “wounded” literature of the late 1970s. For example, see Jim Yanhue and Wang Jingquan, “Cries from Death Row,” in Stubborn Weeds: Popular and Controversial Chinese Literature After the Cultural Revolution, ed. Perry Link, 96–114. The heroine’s mother died of persecution during the Cultural Revolution, and her father was “exiled for ten years to a cow shed [that is, the niu pang] from which he emerged half dead.”
who before 1966 were (or wanted to be) enthusiastic supporters of the system.

Technical Personnel

So far we have dealt primarily with cadres in leading positions—power-holders—and their attackers. Because of the CCP's staffing of factory administrations with old party veterans, these individuals were for the most part not technically trained. Technical and other educated personnel—the intellectuals—in enterprises were both more and less severely treated than were the leadership cadres. In general, technical cadres were not struggle targets in the Cultural Revolution, but degradation of their status continued for a longer period than did that of the party cadres, who in the main were all liberated by 1970 at the latest. The main types of sanctions applied to technical personnel were the downgrading of the importance of their work, the dilution of their authority over technical matters, and their stigmatization as part of the "stinking ninth category" of intellectuals.

Technical people in China were restricted by the elevation of rival authorities and by shrinkage of the importance attached to technical work as a whole. For a period during the Cultural Revolution (commonly six months to a year), technicians and engineers in factories were sent to work on the shop floor alongside workers. In line with the Maoist principle of downgrading specialization, technical and other professionally oriented departments were abolished. Workers were assigned to perform quality control and other tasks that were formerly the responsibility of technicians and engineers; all work was to be overseen by the revolutionary committee. In some areas of the country, technical personnel from factories were sent to the countryside rather than to the shop floor. This was not an official policy, according to one informant, and was the major indicator of whether a province was more radical than the central leadership.

Specialized departments gradually were restored, most by 1972–73, and technicians returned to specialized work. However, interviewees indicate that they had much less to do than before the Cultural Revolution. Some spent their time trying to keep up professionally by reading such technical journals as they could obtain. A technician formerly employed in a research institute attached to a factory complained that the technicians stopped going to the factory, because unlike before the Cultural Revolution, when workers actively solicited their assistance, after it no one was interested or paid any attention to them.
Connected with the de-emphasis of specialized work was an attempt to limit the authority of specialists by subordinating them to workers or political cadres in matters related to professional work. One organizational device associated with the Cultural Revolution was the "three-in-one team" for technical problem solving and innovation, comprised of technicians, workers, and (administrative) cadres. In these teams, the technicians and ordinary workers chosen for the team were to work together to solve problems, with the cadre having the final say. The purpose of these teams, in line with Maoist principles, was to prevent expertise acquired through professional training from being an autonomous basis of authority in the factory.

Innovations of the Cultural Revolution designed to limit the authority of party cadres vis-à-vis the masses, such as the revolutionary committees, did not in practice do a great deal to alter authority relations. The three-in-one teams, however, coupled with the general anti-intellectual climate of the time, do appear to have circumscribed the authority of technical personnel. As one former technician commented when discussing the teams, "Before the Cultural Revolution, the workers had to obey (ting hua) the technicians. After it, we had to obey them." The administrative cadre on the team was there to see that the technicians listened to the workers. This is perhaps the most striking contrast with the Soviet case, in which, as noted in Chapter 2, the workers were required to show respect for the technicians by, for instance, standing at attention when the chief engineer walked through the factory.

In addition to the upgrading of worker authority, technical cadres after the Cultural Revolution were also further subordinated to political authority. A common arrangement was creation of the position of deputy head for a department, such as the technical section. The deputy head was in charge of political matters and typically was a

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16 With respect to the revolutionary committees, in some cases the former party secretary and factory manager became head and deputy head of the new revolutionary committee, while the "mass representatives" were only tokens. In others, informants' reports indicate, the workers on the committees at first had some genuine power; for example, with respect to who might or might not be "liberated." But their power gradually eroded as the party committee again became the center of power. One means of getting rid of recalcitrant workers serving on the committees was to send them to schools as members of the "Mao Thought Propaganda Teams" who were supposed to supervise the teachers and administrators. Thus they had important and radical work to do but at the same time were out of the factory cadres' way.
young cadre who had risen through activism in the Cultural Revolution. The section head, typically an old cadre with professional expertise (usually but not necessarily a party member) now had to contend with a rival authority in running the section's work and most particularly in making assignments and promotions.

Finally, after the Cultural Revolution intellectuals were stigmatized and reviled as the "stinking ninth category." Technical people in factories (at least of the size and type in my group of sources) were not high-ranking intellectuals and thus were generally spared the fate of becoming struggle targets. As one said, "During the Cultural Revolution the technicians went up and down, but they weren't targets, because they had no power." In general, they also had less problematic family backgrounds than high intellectuals. The latter often came from large capitalist families with extensive overseas connections, while intellectuals employed at factory level were likely to be of more ordinary origins. Nonetheless, they still counted as "stinking intellectuals" who were objects of special suspicion and dislike. Moreover, it appears that there were many ordinary factory technicians and engineers who did have rather large class and/or history problems, such as having fathers who were KMT officers. The new cadres who rose with the Cultural Revolution were often in charge of political matters, and this included keeping an eye on suspicious people in their sections. Reporting counterrevolutionary attitudes or comments on the part of intellectuals with "complicated" backgrounds was a good way for an activist worker to make his mark with superiors and possibly be promoted, as we saw in the last chapter; this became more common after the Cultural Revolution.

Although their position remained degraded throughout most of the 1970s, technical people were not entirely without influence. The first return of Deng Xiaoping brought improvement in the position of the technical/professional segment vis-à-vis workers. For example, quality control departments were restored in 1972–73, as were more stringent work norms. In at least some cases, the ability of three-in-one teams to dilute the authority of technical cadres declined. One engineer reported that he became responsible for convening the three-in-one committee to solve problems. He rarely called them into play, and the technical people dealt with problems on their own, much as they had before the Cultural Revolution.

Technical personnel were not only victims of the Cultural Revolution, however. Many were also participants at an earlier stage. Again it is difficult to generalize about factional membership and its mean-
Maoism and Revolution from Above

ing. But since, as discussed earlier, a desire to be activist on the part of people without good class status was a factor in rebel participation, there was a motive for many technicians and engineers to join the rebel faction. In institutes attached to factories and in industrial bureaus above enterprise level, where intellectuals were employed in large numbers, technical people were prominent in the rebel movement. One informant reported that in his industrial research unit, which included technicians and laborers, the technicians were the first to rebel because “they were the most informed about what was going on politically.” Conversely, at this level many were in the conservative faction as well. In factories, where intellectuals were outnumbered by workers, they appear to have taken a back seat in factional activity. Technicians often tried to remain uninvolved and concentrate on their work, such as it was. Whether or not one could remain uninvolved (that is, join no faction) varied from place to place. It seems that when technical people did join a faction in enterprises, however, it was more likely to have been on the rebel side, primarily because the conservative faction essentially was a group of people who had good relations with cadres and had been favored by them or who had the qualifications to form such relations easily—that is, good class background. They were most likely to be the “ins” of the factory setting. Technical people generally did not qualify as “ins” because of their backgrounds.

However, as seen in the last chapter in the discussion of opportunities to study in the Soviet Union, there were divisions within the ranks of the technically trained themselves, between individuals with good and bad class backgrounds. There were also generational differences. A former member of a technical section in an enterprise in the Northeast described the factional situation as follows:

There were factions in the (technical) section, most importantly shown in the difference between the section head and deputy head. Because the section head’s professional work was good, and his experience long, the people in the section who were relatively good professionally all supported him. The deputy head was only a 1964 graduate. . . . his professional work wasn’t so good, which is why he was into political movements. In general, the young members of the section all supported him. How did the two mobilize the support of people under them in the group? In general, they used the method of promoting people. In 1964, I was promoted to be engineer because the section head trusted me. So of course [during the Cultural Revolution] I also stood by the section head’s side. The ones who graduated later and shouted political
slogans mostly stood by the deputy head. So the relations between the head and the deputy head turned into factional struggle.

It is interesting to note that the informant was a person with class and history problems, while the "ones who graduated later and shouted political slogans" became members of the conservative faction. This result probably was a product of the class policy in education in the 1960s, which had returned to an emphasis on class background in admissions.

Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution

As the foregoing paragraphs indicate, both party cadres and technical personnel suffered a loss of status in connection with the Cultural Revolution. In the case of technical people, this was in some ways comparable to, but in most cases far exceeded, the experience of their Soviet counterparts, who as a class were only affected by "cultural revolution" for the three years 1928-31. After that, as we saw in Chapter 2, their authority over workers was affirmed, technical people were held up as models for the working class, and recruitment into the party or even the NKVD was widespread.

As for party cadres, in China they underwent a type of personalized humiliation in the workplace that has no exact counterpart in the Soviet experience. Interviews indicate that many were chastened or demoralized by their experience as targets of mass criticism and were reluctant to play a leading role after their "liberation."17 Some informants thought this beneficial, as the cadres had been too severe before the Cultural Revolution. More, however, seemed to agree with the statement of one former technician, who commented that if the cadres were too severe before the Cultural Revolution, afterward they were too lenient. This resulted in deterioration of labor discipline. In any case, it is clear that equally traumatic for cadres as being cursed and beaten was the exposure of so much personal material in public; worse still was being confronted with it in a face-to-face setting.

After their liberation, cadres in vast numbers were transferred to other units or to other sections within an enterprise so that they would not be required to work with people who had engaged in face-to-face struggle against them and had become privy to details of their

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17 Jiang Zilong’s description of the demoralized factory party secretary Shi Gan in “Manager Qiao Assumes Office” (Renmin wenxue, no. 2 [1980], trans. in Chinese Literature, no. 2 [February 1980]), 28-30, captures this well.
personal histories. It was felt that they could not play a leading role after such an experience of intense humiliation. As one informant explained, “In a new unit or section people would know about their histories, but the cadres could still lead, because people would know less and also it hadn’t involved face-to-face struggle.” In addition to the politicization of the workplace by various campaigns from the 1950s on, it is the very personal nature of criticism to which party cadres were subjected during the Cultural Revolution, in front of peers and subordinates and party and nonparty members, that particularly distinguishes the treatment of cadres in China.

Perhaps equally damaging in terms of cadre morale and party prestige as the events of the Cultural Revolution itself was the aftermath in the 1970s. As stated earlier, a distinguishing characteristic of the whole Maoist period in China, in addition to the personalized and public character of political campaigns, was the tendency for these campaigns to leave conflicts unresolved. This was especially true of the Cultural Revolution, in which none of the groups, factions, or leaders ended up in a position that was either unassailably secure or decisively excluded.

The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath saw rapid shifts in party policy as a result of conflict in the central leadership. As Lowenthal noted, Mao, unlike Stalin, never succeeded in establishing a “stable despotism.”18 A series of political campaigns was launched in the early to mid-1970s that were focal points of struggle between groups in the central leadership. The “moderates,” associated with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, wanted to direct the campaigns at economic offenders, while the “radicals” (the Gang of Four and their supporters) wanted to return to an attack on “capitalist roaders.” Neither had a decisive victory over the other, and the campaigns were the occasion for factional struggle and jockeying for power at all levels. The terminology of “radicals,” “conservatives,” “moderates,” and so on is confusing, reflecting the chaotic nature of the politics of the time. For example, the “radicals” in the central leadership were aligned with former “conservative” faction members at lower levels, because they both favored emphasis on class background. For the same reason, technicians and others with bourgeois backgrounds who were former rebels saw the “moderates” as their protectors.

Informants’ accounts indicate that in some areas of the country, the qingli movement never really came to an end; rather, the effort to settle accounts once and for all with class enemies continued. Special

groups (zhuan an zu) within factories continued to operate until the Deng Xiaoping era. These groups were charged with reviewing the evidence against people brought up since the inception of qingli. They were made up of personnel and security cadres and worker representatives. Although on the whole the operation of these groups and the succession of campaigns in the early 1970s had the net result of exonerating more and more people, there were always some new cases or problems that surfaced. In this unsettled political climate, an old cadre could never be sure that he would not again come under attack as a capitalist roader.

Mobility and the Old Cadre–New Cadre Split

During the phase of overthrowing and struggling against capitalist roaders, when the old cadres had been pushed aside, many new activists rose to leadership in the mass organizations, both rebel and conservative, moving into the positions vacated by the old cadres. During and after the qingli movement, many of the new cadres from the rebel faction were criticized and demoted. New cadres from the conservative faction had better staying power because of their good class backgrounds. When the old cadres returned to their posts, the new cadres often were given the position of deputy. Old and new cadres vied for power, drawing in their personal networks of followers. Events of the 1970s indicate the degree to which, in addition to class-related or red-expert conflict, a major generational conflict was involved in the Cultural Revolution. This conflict became linked in the 1970s with efforts on the part of the radical faction in the party leadership (the Gang of Four) to push aside old cadres and fill the party with new blood. Noting this link is not to imply that the new generation of cadres should be viewed as ideological “radicals,” but rather to indicate the way in which grass-roots elite recruitment became a focus of power struggle in China. Such a development was largely precluded in the Soviet case by the purges and by Stalin’s organizational domination. It also shows a striking contrast between the type of behavior that allowed a person to move up in the era of Maoist political campaigns as opposed to the Soviet Union of the Stalin era.

With the first return of Deng Xiaoping in 1973, the position of the new cadres became increasingly tenuous. In at least some areas, movements were launched to review the fitness of all the new Cultural Revolution cadres.\(^{19}\) For instance, during such a movement in one factory

\(^{19}\) In the case mentioned here, the masses were mobilized to participate in the review and pass on cadres, but the outcome appears to have been pre-arranged by the factory party secretary.
in Tianjin, a new cadre who was a rebel leader (toutou) and who had been promoted to workshop head and in turn promoted all his followers to be group heads was demoted to ordinary worker by the party committee “in accord with the masses’ demands.” The followers were demoted along with him. In 1975, when the radicals were staging a countereffort against Deng and his forces, the case of this cadre was reviewed by the factory party committee and “it was found that he was worthy to serve again as a cadre.” His followers were all reinstated as group heads. After the fall of the Gang of Four he again was demoted. The unsettled nature of the new cadres’ position is indicated by the fact that throughout the 1970s, none of them had his or her official work grade and salary raised (from worker to cadre rank, or from lower- to higher-ranking cadre).

As the old cadres gradually regained more power, one could probably say that the overall trend of new cadre career movement was downward. However, many new cadres were able to use the vacillating policy coming from the center to try to advance themselves. Reports in the PRC media after the death of Mao and overthrow of the Gang of Four suggest that in 1975 a major effort to replace old cadres with young ones took shape. Apparently this involved “crash recruitment and promotion” of younger cadres, bypassing the normal channels. Numerous examples of this were cited in the criticism campaign against the Gang of Four and their alleged followers. The criticisms often mentioned “smash-and-grabbers” or “people who engage in beating, smashing, and looting” (da za qiang). These individuals had engaged in various kinds of violence during the Cultural Revolution and were said to have spearheaded the move for crash recruitment and promotion in 1975. “Beating, smashing and looting,” according to various informants’ definitions, refers to people (“smash-and-grabbers”) in either the rebel or conservative factions who committed violent acts against members of opposing factions, such as throwing them out of windows or engaging in armed struggle (wudou). It also can refer to leaders of various other activities that were main features of the Cultural Revolution, such as breaking into personnel files. In some cases, it appears to be used to refer to anyone who was a factional leader (toutou).

The reports in the PRC media on crash recruitment and promotion are worth quoting at some length, because the language is so suggestive of an intense generational conflict, of the ongoing and violent nature of Cultural Revolution conflicts, and of the entanglement of all this with elite recruitment.20 In Sichuan, Gang of Four followers were

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20 See also Roberta Martin, Party Recruitment in China, 75–78.
said to have advocated rush recruitment of party members and rush promotion of cadres and “even frenziedly called for ‘breaking open the prisons to welcome back comrades-in-arms and looking for leftists from the labor reform teams’... as a result, an active counter-revolutionary who had just been released from prison was made ‘first secretary’ of a factory’s general party branch.”21 In the Canton rolling mill the gang’s “ringleader” was reported to have “vigorously practiced shock entry into the party and shock promotion of cadres... (he) shouted that they would wage revolution by pushing aside the party committees.”22 In Anhui a former worker who became an official in the provincial personnel bureau was said to have organized shock recruitment and promotion, putting up a poster that said “young people should form the main body” and “unless old cadres are knocked down, the new ones have no leg to stand on; we must promote new cadres in batches.”23 In Zhejiang “gang followers” were said to have demanded that old cadres “should stand aside just as the ripened rice is due for reaping and the fattened pig should submit to slaughtering” and vacate their positions in favor of the “newborn forces”; moreover, they allegedly set free criminals imprisoned as “smash-and-grabbers and murderers who instigated struggle by force” and gave them important positions in industry.24

In Shandong a man who became party secretary at the Xinhua pharmaceutical plant in 1975 reportedly pushed crash recruitment and promotion by extolling Shanghai’s experience; he said that an important reason for the “stable situation” in Shanghai was that “rebels were given positions at the very beginning and the veteran cadres were generally placed behind as assistants, while young cadres were assigned to the forefront.”25 Shanghai, the stronghold of Gang of Four members Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao, represented the prototype for crash recruitment and promotion, according to the reports.

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In 1968 Zhang reportedly put pressure on party organizations by saying, "A junior security cadre (i.e., Wang) from the #17 cotton textile mill could become a responsible person of the workers' revolutionary headquarters. Why can't lower level cadres be promoted to an upper level?"\(^{26}\)

In 1974 Wang was said to have ordered the trade unions to select "rebels" and break personnel rules to promote them to leading groups at various levels in industry. Within two months the responsible persons in many Shanghai party organizations allegedly were forced out; the organization departments that failed to go along with this order were shut down. Following this, "quite a few units made nominations at various levels, and set a timetable to recruit new members into the party and then promote them to higher positions, or promote them first before recruiting them into the party, or recruit them into the party and promote them at the same time."\(^{27}\) As for what sort of persons were favored, Wang reportedly said that "it is nothing to commit killing and arson" and that struggle by force "was what I did also; I like to use such people."\(^{28}\) The veracity of these PRC reports indicating crash recruitment and promotion as a major trend in the mid-1970s is supported by Taiwan sources, which reported that there were some 1.2 million cadres recruited and/or promoted against normal procedures between June and October 1975.\(^{29}\)

It appears that individuals of this type survived into the 1980s. This is indicated by the party rectification campaign that began in 1983, which had as one objective the weeding out of Cultural Revolution types—including "smash and grabbers"—who were said to have "sneaked into the ranks" of the third echelon of younger cadres slated for promotion.\(^{30}\)

**Conclusion**

The Cultural Revolution involved, on the one hand, a desire (associated with workers, technicians, students, and others from bourgeois families who joined the rebel faction), to de-emphasize class background and history problems for the generation who matured after

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1949 and, on the other, a movement (often supported by both rebels and conservatives) to settle accounts and eliminate the influence of holdovers from the pre-1949 regime. It also involved a generational conflict apart from the class question: younger activists wanted an opportunity to replace old veterans and move up the ranks. Had a Stalin-like solution been imposed, old elites would have been decisively (if not completely) eliminated; and a new generation, trained under the communist regime and including diverse class backgrounds, would have progressed up the hierarchy. But this was not to be.

What is the legacy of the events chronicled in the preceding pages? I have suggested that because of these developments, intra-elite relations assumed a character different from those that obtained in the Soviet Union for the comparable period. First, party and professional elites became more polarized, and deep divisions appeared within the ranks of these two groups. Particularly in the case of the party organization, these divisions were generational (between “old cadres” and “new cadres”). Second, recruitment and promotion became even less regularized, and entangled with factionalism. Third, party prestige in China suffered a severe blow in the eyes of its own members, of professionals, and of society in general. This can be contrasted with the prestige and awe accorded Stalin and Stalinism for building an industrial and military giant and emerging victorious in the “Great Patriotic War.” Moreover, Stalin’s autocratic character (the “strong boss”) and imposition of a “stable despotism” in themselves were a source of reverence or respect in the eyes of many Soviets, including professionals.31 Not so Maoism.

The prestige of the Communist Party declined in the eyes of professionals in China because it devalued their work and put inexperienced political activists in positions of power; it promoted activists who made careers out of making trouble for people with family background or political problems; and it lost its claim to their idealism and/or awe by humiliating its own cadres and then falling into an extended period of power struggle and factional infighting. Party prestige suffered in the eyes of its own members and of former activists as well. Old cadres often were demoralized by their experience as struggle targets. They had lost faith in the party as a reliable organization and were conscious of having lost face in the eyes of subordinates and colleagues. Individual cadres and the party organization as a whole

lost prestige, and the loss contributed to demoralization and a diminished sense of mission. As one long-time party member interviewed by Fox Butterfield lamented, “In the old days we talked about the Party with almost a mystical reverence, we referred to it just as the ‘organization’… now the old spirit of self-sacrifice is gone.”

In a similar vein, the Four Cleanups work team member mentioned earlier commented on her diminished view of the party and party cadres as a result of the team’s investigations. Before the movement, she was an enthusiastic supporter and viewed party cadres almost with reverence. She still thought the Four Cleanups was a good campaign (“It was well-managed… under strict party leadership… not like the Cultural Revolution”) and viewed her role in it as an accomplishment. Nonetheless, after becoming privy to various compromising details of many cadres’ lives, her admiration for party cadres diminished. The disillusion with cadres she experienced as a result of the “well-managed” Four Cleanups, when erring cadres were treated with relative respect, would have been multiplied a hundredfold for others like her by the Cultural Revolution, when cadres’ personal conduct and moral character were exposed for a mass audience by people who posted anonymous dazibao or joined in struggle sessions without any central control. My informant described this as luan (chaos), a word with highly negative connotations; it was commonly applied by interviewees to the Cultural Revolution. This view may be more typical of intellectuals than workers. The informant who said that his faction’s criticisms were “not ideological but related to concrete things in the factory” emphasized that their criticisms should not (for lack of ideological content) be characterized as luan.

In any event, after the Cultural Revolution a widespread popular perception emerged that the party had become a haven for venal and power-hungry opportunists. Some informants blamed this on the new cadres. One former engineer characterized them as arrogant and high-handed, having “forgotten their origins.” Others saw a general decline in the level of cadre commitment as a result of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. A man with a technical education who had served as a low-level administrative cadre observed that as the Cultural Revolution went on and “more and more people and their families were drawn in, and there was no organization to depend on, so it more and more became every man for himself, and his family.”

32 Fox Butterfield, China: Alive in the Bitter Sea, 296.
33 Ibid., 305–315 and passim.
Mao's approach to revolution from above differed from Stalin's, and in conception it would appear to be the less inhumane of the two. Instead of resolving elite dualism by liquidating old elites and creating and rewarding a new group, as Stalin did in the 1930s, Mao attempted to leave elites more or less intact and change their outlook (and insulate the party from their influence) through intense political campaigns. Ultimately, this left the political and professional parts of the elite divided, alienated the technical/professional segment, and weakened the hand of party cadres by impairing their morale and prestige. In addition, the successor generation was left lacking in education, blocked in career advancement, and politically disillusioned.
CHAPTER FIVE

After Mao: The Beginning of Institutionalized Leninism?

Although the mobilizational style evident in China’s version of revolution from above was a cornerstone of the CCP’s distinctive and successful mode of operating early on, after the Cultural Revolution it became associated in the public mind with chaos, national backwardness, and creation of a “lost generation” of youth. After Mao’s death, his successors turned sharply away from the policies of the preceding twenty years, including both the type of organization and the political campaigns that we have discussed in the preceding two chapters. This turn of events ushered in what Lowenthal has called the “post-revolutionary phase” (see Chapter 1). The character of this phase in China is the topic of this and the next chapter.

Lowenthal wrote that communist regimes will repeatedly launch revolutions from above to counteract the unwanted social effects of their own policies, which encourage a technical/professional elite and rely on material incentives for the sake of rapid economic development. Eventually, as the economy develops and society becomes more differentiated, these revolutions become too costly, and the regime calls a permanent halt, signifying the advent of a post-revolutionary phase. A post-revolutionary regime, as described by Lowenthal, is characterized by more autonomy for the private sphere, more autonomy for intellectual and artistic life, greater emphasis on rationality, and “encouragement of interest articulation by informal and impermanent bureaucratic groups.” In such a regime the party sees itself as “an indispensable, authoritative arbiter of society’s various interests, recognizing their existence but regulating their expression and limiting their representation while retaining for itself the ultimate right of decision.”

This description was written in the late 1960s. In the Soviet Union the post-revolutionary regime during the ensuing Brezhnev years took the form of a conservative, bureaucratic system dominated by the party apparat. Party dominance has been guaranteed by the system of nomenklatura, whereby all assignments and promotions are controlled by the party apparatus at various levels. In personnel decisions, political considerations such as personalistic ties, devotion to the party ("party spirit"), and ideological orthodoxy have tended to be central, while meritocratic considerations, although certainly not absent, have tended to be secondary.\(^2\) The key difference between Brezhnev’s post-revolutionary system and its Stalinist (and Khrushchevian) predecessors was Brezhnev’s emphasis on “trust in cadres”—that is, on job security for party officials.\(^3\) Trust in cadres made the system more predictable and stable, and in that sense more rational. At the same time, however, it tended to discourage further rationalization; that is, movement in the direction of a greater role for meritocratic criteria in personnel matters or better utilization of expertise and knowledge for scientific, technical, and economic innovation.

As we noted in Chapter 2, the relationship of the Soviet technical-managerial elite to the party apparat has been an ambivalent one. The character of the relationship developed during the Stalin period and retained its essential characteristics under Brezhnev. Professionals have received material rewards and prestige within the system. They have had some degree of autonomy from party interference in their work as well as authority over workers. In return, however, they have operated within the confines of a party-dominated system and ultimately have been dependent on patrons within the apparat for their well-being and advancement.

If we use the Brezhnev era as a prototype, the primary characteristics of a post-revolutionary regime emerge as (1) limited autonomy for the private sphere and for intellectual life; (2) limited pluralism: limit-


ed to the bureaucratic elite and limited to informal, impermanent groups sanctioned by the regime; (3) limited rationality: emphasis on regular bureaucratic procedures for decision making and elite conflict resolution; on planning for orderly economic development; and on the role of expertise and expert personnel, tempered by a demand for ideological orthodoxy, subordination of professionals to party patrons, and a policy of job security for party officials; and (4) party dominance exercised primarily through control of occupational and social mobility (the nomenklatura system) and only secondarily through coercion.

The emergence of this set of characteristics is facilitated by an indication on the part of the Leninist regime that class struggle and radical efforts at social transformation are no longer its orientation: it officially abandons revolution from above as definitive of its stance toward society. Lowenthal pinpoints the year 1961 as a turning point in the Soviet Union. At that time, Khrushchev declared the dictatorship of the proletariat superseded by the “state of the whole people.” The parallel development in China is the CCP’s third plenum of December 1978. At that time, the leadership replaced “class struggle” with “modernization” as the main task of the party and people. Although, according to the regime, class struggle has not entirely died out, the “period of large-scale and turbulent class struggle is over.”

Since the third plenum, China has entered a period in which most of the characteristics of a post-revolutionary phase mentioned above are manifest. Revolutions from above—campaigns by the regime to radically alter the social balance by eliminating or coercing one or another group—have been rejected explicitly. The leadership has abandoned the Maoist policies indicated by the slogan “put politics in command” in favor of an emphasis on material incentives and rationalized organization. Elites with technical-managerial skills and formal educational credentials have been targeted for promotion and prestige and some measure of professional autonomy. The Deng Xiaoping regime has moved toward a posture that includes as many social-occupational groups as possible—particularly the urban educated elite—within the ranks of the politically reliable.

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These liberalizing or rationalizing features, as in the Soviet case, continue to be limited in China by a continued assertion of the leading role of the party and a demand for ideological orthodoxy. Ideologically, in 1979 Deng enunciated the Four Basic Principles (or Four Upholds) to contain the democracy movement that was blossoming at that time; they remain officially in force. The Four Principles are “uphold socialism, uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship, uphold the leading role of the party, and uphold Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong Thought.”6 Assertion of the Four Basic Principles was a prominent feature of the “anti-bourgeois liberalization” movement of 1987.7 Equally or more important, the party apparatus continues to maintain control over the Chinese equivalent of nomenklatura—personnel selection. All this would suggest that a stage of development corresponding along general lines to that reached by the Soviet Union in 1961 with Khrushchev’s declaration of the “state of the whole people” and coming to full realization under Brezhnev is unfolding in the PRC.

Some interpretations of the character of the Deng Xiaoping regime, however, depart from such an assessment. Before the conservative reaction that emerged in China in early 1987, some observers of the post-Mao period saw not a developmental phase within a Leninist system, but the demise of a Leninist regime. There have been a number of developments in China that would prompt such a view. These include (1) the apparent questioning of the relevance of Marxism-Leninism by party officials; (2) the “open door” policy, which involves both the sending of large numbers of Chinese to study in Western countries and the soliciting of foreign investment and managerial know-how in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other open areas, to a degree unprecedented in the communist world; and (3) market reforms, including the decollectivization of agriculture, the encouragement and flourishing of small private enterprises, and the loosening of controls in the state sector of industry, plus stronger material incentives and disincentives for workers and managers. In the fall of 1984 Hu Yaobang, then the CCP’s General Secretary, was reported to have said that “Marxism-Leninism can no longer solve China’s problems.” Some observers concluded that the demise of Marxism-Leninism in the PRC had arrived.8 Various television journal-

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6 Tsou, “Back from the Brink,” 78.
8 See the columns by William Safire and by Flora Lewis in the New York Times, December 10, 1984, p. I:23; and December 11, 1984, p. I:31. The PRC statement was soon “corrected” to read “can no longer solve all of China’s problems.” Reported in
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ists have presented current policies, such as the bonus system, as amounting to a giant step toward capitalism (notwithstanding the fact that China's workers had a bonus system for much of the Maoist period).9

Others, more cautious, have explicitly argued that China under Deng not only remains, but will continue to remain, a Leninist system essentially on Soviet lines.10 Even before the present "conservative backlash," there was a strong basis for this argument, economic reforms notwithstanding. State planning still dominates the industrial economy in China. The political parallels with the Soviets are even stronger. The party controls appointments. A stable, bureaucratic oligarchy surely is the framework in which a massive segment of CCP cadres would feel most comfortable. The mentality of party cadres in China, as in the Soviet Union, may be described by the term "neo-traditional"—strongly oriented toward personalistic considerations and hierarchy.11 Even if Deng and the rest of the top leadership had been uniformly reformist, middle- and local-level cadres possess a considerable ability to derail policies that threaten their interests. Reform in the Soviet Union has in the past been blocked by resistance from entrenched interests among the cadres.12

An even stronger case can be made against an "end of Leninism in China" view if we emphasize that it is not simply a question of China remaining a Soviet-type system. Many post-Mao reforms have aimed, it is true, at making the system less Maoist; they also aim to make it more like the Soviet system (or like China in the 1950s when it was following the Soviet model). This is true of many or most of the rationalizing reforms undertaken since 1976. As one scholar points out in a discussion of Leninist development, the PRC like its Soviet counterpart earlier has undergone a period of transition from charismatic rule and now has embarked on a process of institutionalization, albeit still in an emergent form.13 This suggests that what we have is move-


9 A PBS special by "Adam Smith" in June 1985 expressed this view. In the PBS series "The Heart of the Dragon" (Part 5, "Working," shown June 24, 1985), the bonus system also was treated as a revolutionary change.


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ment toward institutionalized Leninism, not toward capitalism, liberal democracy, or some other non-Leninist form. Furthermore, there has always been the possibility that the leadership that follows Deng will be less reformist, and that more orthodox elements in the party will in the longer run prevail, as was the case under Brezhnev.\(^{14}\) Indeed, it is apparent that Deng’s death is not necessarily a condition for conservative ascendance. In 1985 problems caused by the most recent round of economic reforms strengthened the hand of conservatives centered on veteran party leader Chen Yun to the extent that one source saw a “battle to the death” between reformers and conservatives being lost by the reformers.\(^{15}\) By the summer of 1986 the reformers appeared on the rise again, and the idea of “political reform” was raised in party circles. This, however, was followed by the student demonstrations in December, the firing of Hu Yaobang and of prominent figures such as Liu Binyan and Fang Lizhi, and the antibourgeois liberalization campaign.

What then can one conclude about the character of the post-revolutionary phase in China? I suggest that comparison shows us consistent parallels in the development of the PRC and the USSR but finally leads us to question the appropriateness of a Brezhnevian post-revolutionary phase in China. The possibility that political conditions in China may favor a lasting departure from orthodox Leninism deserves careful attention, in spite of (or indeed because of) the developments as of this writing, which appear to portend in the opposite direction. It is undeniable that many institutional arrangements in the PRC do not differ significantly from those that have existed in the Soviet Union for two to four decades; that since 1979 others have been in a process of becoming more Soviet-like; and that in 1987 the influence within the leadership of those who favor an essentially orthodox Soviet model has increased and may have major policy effects.\(^{16}\)

However, the social and political context in which the institutions exist and in which the orthodoxy versus reform struggle is being carried on departs from its Soviet counterpart in the immediate post-Stalin period in significant ways, as the previous two chapters suggest.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 257–258.

\(^{15}\) China News Analysis 1301 (January 1, 1986).

\(^{16}\) An example would be the recently announced provisional regulations that reintroduce political standards for admission to higher education. See Far Eastern Economic Review (May 14, 1987), p. 16.
I shall return to this theme at the end of the present chapter and in the next. Before proceeding, in the remainder of this chapter I shall make a case for major elements of post-Mao reforms being containable within institutional arrangements of the Soviet type and having parallels in the Soviet experience. To engage in this exercise is not to construct a straw man. It is by analyzing China as a Soviet-type system that we can discern more clearly the features that are different and assess their significance. The areas of post-Mao reform that I examine are those suggested in Chapter 3: enterprise organization, especially the differentiation of party and state structures, and elite dualism and efforts to create a combined red-expert cadre contingent.

Enterprise Organization

Even before the third plenum and the ascendance of Deng Xiaoping, it was apparent that rationalization of enterprise organization was a high priority for the regime. Policies begun under Mao's first successor, Hua Guofeng, did not amount to new departures, but were rather measures aimed at undoing the effects of the Cultural Revolution on industrial organization. To a significant extent, this remained true as of the mid-1980s, although under Deng, a return to policies of the 1950s is more evident. Basically this involves the system moving closer to Soviet practice. When reform in China appeared ready to go beyond the Soviet experience with respect to the separation of party and state spheres in industry, it became a focus of conflict between orthodox and reform factions in the leadership. In this conflict the former dealt the latter a setback in early 1987, a fact that would appear to lend force to the view that the post-Mao system is not destined to break the confines of the Soviet prototype.

Structural Differentiation

The post-Mao leadership has begun to undo the amalgamation of party and state structures and personnel that began after the rejection of the Soviet model in the 1950s and accelerated after the Cultural Revolution. Before the Cultural Revolution this amalgamation could involve the wearing of two hats by factory cadres: the enterprise party secretary served concurrently as the factory manager, and lower-level cadres (workshop heads and staff department chiefs) served simultaneously as branch party secretaries, and so forth. Even when, as was more often the case, the state (managerial) and party posts were separate, after 1955 all important policy matters came under the pur-
view of the party committee and party secretary. Structural differentia-
tion was blurred by the practice of the plant manager serving as a deputy party secretary and the party secretary as deputy manager.

After the Cultural Revolution, "revolutionary committees" (RCs) were set up as the new leading organs of industrial enterprises. The committees originally consisted of old (pre–Cultural Revolution) cadres who had been liberated and returned to their posts after the purify the class ranks movement, the PLA representatives, and representa-
tives of the workers' mass organizations (that is, the factions). After the departure of the army representatives (between 1969 and 1972, depending on the location), the enterprise party secretary served as head of the RC. Since the RC collectively was supposed to take the place of the factory director, the tendency toward party-state amalga-
mation became even more pronounced. In practice, the old factory director often assumed the post of a deputy RC head and the mass representatives had no real power, thus making the arrangement simi-
lar to the pre–Cultural Revolution one. Nonetheless, it was less for-
mal and the relationships were even more dependent on local condi-
tions than in the earlier period.

The RCs were abolished in 1979 and the post of factory manager restored. At first, this was not a departure from pre–Cultural Revolu-
tion arrangements. For example, one informant reported that after the RC was abolished in his enterprise, some effort was made to divide responsibility between the party and managerial systems, but this was only "on the surface"; in practice, things went on much as before. The “new” factory manager was a person who had been a deputy head of the RC, originally a worker, who was promoted during the Cultural Revolution. According to my informant's description, this person was a party member with *sixiang hao* (good thought) and a grade school education only (the sort of new cadre who was especially offensive to technical personnel). In this case, things had not even been restored to the pre–Cultural Revolution status quo. This was in 1979.

By 1984, however, the regime had moved further. In that year the CCP Central Committee's document on reform of the urban economic structure announced a policy shift that did away with the “factory manager under the leadership of the party committee” system, which had been in effect from 1955 to 1966 and was essentially the system reinstated in 1979 after the abolition of the enterprise RCs. The new policy called for a system of the "factory manager assuming all responsibility." It was intended to divide the functions of party and
state in enterprises, primarily by defining and separating the roles of party secretary and factory manager. In fact if not in name, it resembles the system of one-man management borrowed from the Soviets that the Chinese attempted to institute in the 1950s. The system gives managers authority not only over production but also over personnel matters. The party committee and party secretary are to play a supportive role only. For example, according to an official description, the party secretary should take the lead in political and ideological work to convince people to adhere to the manager’s decisions.

It was of course resistance from the party apparatus to this very sort of proposal that had played a large part in scuttling one-man management some thirty years earlier, and it was clear from press reports following the announcement of the new policy that resistance from enterprise party cadres in the 1980s remained considerable. As Xinhua commented, “Some comrades report that since the introduction of the system of the plant manager assuming all responsibility, the work of the party committee has become difficult and the party secretary has nothing to do. . . . Fame, gain, and power probably still weigh on the minds of some cadres who profess love for what they really fear” (that is, reform). It was the continued interference of party cadres with managers who were attempting to exercise their responsibilities under the new policy that in 1986 led to proposals to strengthen managerial authority through legal measures. This would have amounted to a “political reform” and not just an economic reform; it fell victim to the conservative backlash in 1987, as we shall see below.

Task Specification: The Job Responsibility System

A second policy aimed at organizational rationalization closely related to the division of labor between party and state (structural differentiation) is the establishment of responsibility systems in industrial enterprises (not to be confused with responsibility systems in agriculture). Leaders in the post-Mao period have been issuing exhortations to establish job responsibility or personal responsibility systems in

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18 “Proceed From the Overall Situation of Reform, Establish a New Party-Government Relationship,” by Li Xin, party secretary of the Beijing Printing and Dyeing Plant, Xinhua (February 7, 1985), in FBIS, China (February 15, 1985), K2–6.
19 Ibid., K3.
enterprises at least since 1977. Before the ascendance of Deng, the term appeared to be associated with solving production-related problems.

By the 1980s responsibility systems had become identified with the model Shoudu Iron and Steel company and were linked with reforms in cadre evaluation, as well as with solutions for production problems.20 In general, the term appears to refer to a clear division of labor with definition of tasks for cadres and workers at all levels and to standardized rewards and penalties linked to task performance.

In January 1984 a national forum was held on implementation of the job responsibility system in party and government organizations, at which Song Renqiong stated that “establishment of the personal responsibility system and cadre evaluation system is a necessary step to institutionally consolidate and develop the results of administrative reform.” 21 Elsewhere it was specified that units must “clearly define the competence and responsibility of leading cadres and working personnel based on the authorized size, terms of reference, and work tasks of the units concerned after structural reform.” The system was to be linked closely with cadre evaluation and the meting out of reward and punishment.22

The following description of the system of personal responsibility at Shoudu Iron and Steel was one of the more detailed:

Through implementing the system of personal responsibility, the company has required every staffer to share the economic responsibility which it has to the state. Those who fulfill their own quota will be rewarded, while those who fail will be punished. The function, authority, and duty of every post are specified in detail. How well an individual fulfills his task will be reflected in real figures measured through strict assessment, and reward will be offered and punishment inflicted accordingly. Since the rules and regulations have clearly defined the function, authority, and duty of every party and administrative post, the company can get rid of the practice of mixing up party posts with administrative ones and substituting party posts for administrative ones, as well as the phenomenon of the same (post) with different functions, authorities, and duties for party member cadres and nonparty ones.23

21 Xinhua (January 10, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 11, 1984), K16.
22 “Popularize the Job Responsibility System in Institutions,” RMRB (January 21, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (January 27, 1984), K5.
This description reveals two separate but related objectives of responsibility systems in enterprises: to specify the "functions, authority, and duties" attached to every post and to connect performance of the functions and duties with standardized rewards and sanctions. Both of these would complement a division of labor between party and state. If implemented, such a responsibility system coupled with that of the factory manager assuming all responsibility would disrupt the diffuse type of party control that defined the Chinese variant of Stalinism since the mid-1950s, not to mention the kind of arrangements that emerged as a result of the Cultural Revolution. It would move China closer to the Soviet model.

The Soviets have long been apostles of rationalization (in the sense of elaborate job specifications), at least on paper. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Barry Richman was struck by the fact that in Chinese factories no organizational charts could be produced, while in Soviet enterprises, charts showing "job specifications down to the lowest floor cleaner on the night shift" were invariably on hand.24 Indeed, since the 1920s the Soviets have shown a fascination with the idea of rationalization as an almost miraculous solution to a variety of problems.25 A more recent concern with systems analysis and cybernetics appeared to be an updated version of this predilection.26 Elaborate task specification may appear in China as a kind of antidote for organizational and personnel problems left over from the Cultural Revolution. It also represents a revival of the approach oriented toward control of performance, associated with the Soviet model, rather than toward control of the person, associated with Maoism. For example, in the 1950s worker evaluations were based on a set of standards determined by a test developed by Soviet experts in the Labor Ministry. After the Great Leap these were abandoned in favor of the more informal method of comparing workers' performance against each other (instead of against fixed standards) and determining ratings through group discussion (kaihui taolun). Tests were reintroduced after the

24 Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China, 765.
26 See William J. Conyngham, The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management. In general, these rationalization theories and plans do not appear to have had a great impact on the system.
third plenum, a measure that would complement the adoption of job responsibility systems.

With respect to the separation of party and state structures, in particular division of labor between party secretaries and factory managers, Soviet enterprise managers officially have power over production and personnel matters. As we have seen, there are constant conflicts between them and the party secretaries, since in fact their responsibilities overlap. This is particularly true in the area of personnel, in which the manager has authority to make cadre assignments but the party secretary has authority over the assignment of all party members, which includes most cadres. However, there is still a considerable distance between this and the system of party management hitherto practiced in China, in which there could not even be a claim of the party “interfering” with management, since basically they were one and the same. The “factory manager assuming all responsibility” system proposed in 1984 would move China to where the Soviet Union has been since the 1930s.

Limitations on Party-State Separation

The intent of orthodox Leninists in the PRC leadership who support structural differentiation and task specification is to rebuild and strengthen the party organization, which was weakened after the Cultural Revolution and indeed, as we have seen, had problematic aspects even before that. Significantly, however, it appears that some reform elements within the CCP wanted to go further in separating party and state roles, in a way that in fact would have taken the PRC outside the orthodox Soviet model as it has existed to date. The reform in question involved protecting the authority of managers in enterprises as well as the autonomy of enterprises themselves by law.

In September 1986 the overseas edition of Renmin ribao asserted rather lyrically that in more than 730 enterprises in Shanghai, the manager had been given the “major role” in the “reform play,” while the party, administrative agencies, and trade unions had been “singing in unison in the choir” and the manager had “gradually replaced the party secretary as the main character.”27 Despite this optimistic picture, it is apparent that the authority of managers to engage in profitmaking activities for the enterprise and to deal with personnel matters as called for in the urban reform program of 1984 has been

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problematic. Two cases prominently featured in the PRC press were those of Song Beifang, a manager at Zhengzhou Motors who was fired by the enterprise party secretary for being "too successful" in making money for the factory, even though Song had "acted within the law and regulations," and Wang Zepu, a manager at Anshan Iron and Steel who also was fired wrongly.28 Subsequently, there was the case of another manager who was "administratively banished on trumped-up charges" because of his struggle against nepotism and not reinstated even though a court reversed the action against him. Finally, there was a similar case of an engineer at Shoudu Iron and Steel who appealed to an intermediate court against the enterprise's party leaders, but was not reinstated despite the court's ruling in his favor.29 This last case is especially interesting since, as we just saw, Shoudu Iron and Steel has been popularized as a model in carrying out reform policies, such as promoting intellectuals and establishing responsibility systems.

The publicity given to these cases indicates both the obstacles to guaranteeing any meaningful level of managerial autonomy within the confines of the present system and the recognition of this problem by reformers. In the view of one commentator, the urban reform is the main field of political battle between the orthodox and reform-minded in the party, and the crux of this battle was the definition of relationships between managers and party officials at the enterprise, provincial, and central levels. In turn, the most fundamental item at issue between party and managers is control over the hiring and firing of cadres. As mentioned above, this is an unresolved area of ambiguity and conflict in Soviet enterprises.

In June 1986 a document called the "Civil Law's General Rules," a sort of interim measure in lieu of a new Civil Code for the PRC, dealt with the scope of managerial authority. Managerial authority was to be guaranteed by making the manager a "legal person" whose authority is protected by law. Lateral organizations of associated enterprises also could become "legal persons," whose autonomy from external (that is, party) interference would be protected by law. Formalizing the distribution of power by law in this way would have been something heretofore unseen in Leninist states.30

of provincial governors in June 1986, a decision that factory managers would no longer be under the leadership of the party committees was announced.31 These provisions were expected to be written into formal law at the NPC meeting in the spring of 1987, but were postponed.32

In June 1986 Soviet leader Gorbachev announced an outline for economic change that the *New York Times* called "the most extensive restructuring of the economy since Stalin forged the present system in the 1930s." The outline included a plan to ensure the economic independence of enterprises, which apparently would involve legal guarantees.33 The plan is expected to encounter major resistance in the Soviet bureaucracy. Whatever the chances of success there, it is apparent that in China, establishment of a legally defined sphere of activity autonomous from party "interference" is far from being a reality, regardless of market reforms, the opening to the West, and so forth.

**Elite Dualism and the Creation of Red Experts**

The other major area of post-Mao policy of concern here is the treatment of experts and the role of expertise in elite recruitment. Changes in this area parallel earlier Soviet policies. They strive to give a central position to expertise and formal education in the selection and promotion of cadres. Good politics is more or less equated with good work performance, as well as with loyalty to the leadership's new objectives of economic and technical modernization. The goal clearly is to create an elite contingent that is "both red and expert": as in the Soviet case, red versus expert dualism would be overcome and a more homogenous, professionalized elite co-opted. There are two aspects to the effort to create a red-expert corps of cadres in post-Mao China that warrant discussion here. One aspect is upgrading the professional level of existing party cadres; the second is recruiting and promoting intellectuals, both old and new.

**Upgrading the Professional Level of Party Cadres**

In December 1983 a national forum on cadre training work was called by the CCP's Organization and Propaganda Departments. Cadre training work, according to the forum's announcement, is one of the important means for making the ranks of cadres "more revolution-

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31 Ibid., 1317 (September 1, 1986), p. 5.
ary, younger in age, better educated, and professionally more competent," without which there will be "no organizational guarantee" of achieving the Four Modernizations. At the forum, which was addressed by Deng Liqun, it was noted that "training content (for cadres) has been broadened from one-sided emphasis on Marxist-Leninist theory and the party’s policies to a comprehensive study of political theory and general and professional knowledge" and that the "method of training has been changed from mainly relying on party schools and cadre schools to 'socialized schooling' in both centralized and decentralized forms, thereby relying on various institutions of learning." This latter change of method was further elaborated in another report, which said that "not only party and cadre schools but also some college and secondary vocational schools have been running training courses for cadres." Party organizations "should make use of all available channels in society to train cadres... and should tap intellectual resources by relying on intellectuals."

In the fall of 1984 the party’s document on urban reform gave a prominent place to the subject of cadre training and called for development of "a new generation of cadres and creation of a mighty contingent of managerial personnel for the socialist economy." This is a formidable task, since in 1985 only 22 percent of China’s twenty-two million cadres were reported to have a college-level education; five million cadres under the age of 45 (one-fourth of all cadres) had only a specialized secondary education or less. Officials estimated that in order to carry out the modernization program, twelve times the existing number of technical-managerial cadres would have to be trained (from 720,000 to 8.53 million). The level of understanding of

34 Xinhua (December 24, 1983), in FBIS, China (December 30, 1983), K21.
35 "Push Cadre Education Work to a New Stage," GMRB (December 25, 1983), p. 4, in FBIS, China (January 5, 1984), K5. Another aspect of the endeavor to produce cadres who are "professionally more competent" is giving examinations on economic theory and management to leading party cadres. In Hebei, for example, an examination in "economic and political theory" was given in February 1984 to 274 party secretaries of prefect, city, and county committees. Prior to the examination, measures were taken such as inviting experts and scholars to give "lectures and guidance" to the cadres (one might doubt the rigor of the examination, since all 274 of the test-takers passed). Hebei Provincial Service (February 16, 1984), in FBIS, China (February 23, 1984), R2.
Marxism-Leninism was also stated to be low, requiring a major education drive in party schools.37

It is possible that the earlier statement by Deng Liqun, a conservative, about not relying only on party schools and the later emphasis on the schools represents a disagreement within the leadership. In 1986 education of cadres in party schools had expanded and appeared to have assumed a new significance in terms of reform versus orthodoxy. The central party school was reorganized in 1982 and since then lower-level schools have multiplied. The party school curriculum stresses two- or three-year courses, some leading to a master’s degree, and involves about one-half study of Marxism-Leninism and one-half general knowledge and specialized courses. The objective is to “train all-round specialists” and raise the educational levels of cadres. The central school had 1,800 students as of the fall of 1984. To be admitted one had to be appointed to a leadership position and pass an examination.38

There appears to have been a connection between the party schools and forces favoring political reform. At the national party conference in 1985, Hu Qili referred to a list of eight hundred people who are candidates for posts at and above the ministerial level; these apparently were people selected at the party school. According to one source, recruiting from the school was seen by reformers as a way to replace the more personalistically selected “third echelon” of cadres, who have been chosen by senior cadres to move up the ranks. Supporting the idea of a connection is the fact that in the summer of 1986, Wang Zhaoguo (protégé of Deng Xiaoping) lectured to graduates of the central party school on the topic of political reform. Shortly before this time, the school had sponsored a conference in which theory students had prepared more than a hundred papers on the topic of reform of the political system.39

All this would suggest that the role and character of the party schools, as well as the enterprise manager–party secretary relationship, is a focus of political struggle in the mid-1980s and that the training of a new generation of cadres (one that is “more revolutionary, younger in age, better educated, and professionally more competent”) continues to be entangled with high-level factionalism, as it has been since the 1960s.

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37 Beijing Domestic Service (February 3, 1983) in FBIS, China (February 5, 1985), K1.
38 China News Analysis 1315 (August 1, 1986), pp. 1–6.
39 Ibid.
Recruitment of Professionals into the Party

In conjunction with moves to upgrade the level of existing party cadres, since 1978 the official policy has called for recruitment of new members from the roles of professionals, an approach similar to the policy pursued in the mid-1950s. Although the approach of inducting established intellectuals en masse is comparable, it is reinforced by the party's announcement, in connection with the third plenum, that intellectuals are now a part of the laboring classes. Roberta Martin notes that as of 1980, "a sizeable portion of the reported 25 million intellectuals, now designated as members of the working class, were clearly targeted for recruitment."\(^{40}\)

Continuing the emphasis on intellectuals, in December 1983 the CCP's Central Organization Department held a forum on recruiting party members; the forum was attended by personnel from organization departments at provincial and municipal levels and in state organs. The purpose was to exchange experience in the recruiting of new party members over the preceding two years and to discuss future work under the guidelines set forth by the CPC Central Committee's decision on party rectification. The report on the conference emphasized that attention was paid to the necessity of recruiting intellectuals, "especially middle-aged intellectuals," and stated that the number of party members from the ranks of technical and professional personnel in 1982 comprised 23.6 percent of the total recruited, and among these, middle-aged intellectuals made up 70 percent.\(^{41}\)

These themes were echoed later that year in reports from the provinces. In Henan a forum on recruitment held by the provincial organization department reported on the work of recruiting middle-aged intellectuals; it announced that 59,000 new party members had been recruited between 1982 and 1983. Of these, 27.3 percent were technical/professional personnel, 55.4 percent were various kinds of model and advanced workers and pacesetters, and 51.5 percent had educational backgrounds higher than senior middle school. The report on the forum stressed that carrying out recruitment work was an important part of the party rectification drive then in progress.\(^{42}\)

\(^{40}\) Martin, *Party Recruitment in China*, 78.

\(^{41}\) Xinhua (December 13, 1983), in FBIS, *China* (December 19, 1983), K7.

\(^{42}\) Henan Provincial Service (January 17, 1984), in FBIS, *China* (January 23, 1984), P2.
It is important to note that this policy involves not only the inclusion of intellectuals in the party ranks, but also a call for them to receive political education. The above report stated that the "training, education, and evaluation of intellectuals" should be grasped and that intellectuals should "undergo training in the process of party rectification." Although "closed-door-ism" (keeping out intellectuals) should be avoided, the report said, hasty recruitment should be avoided as well; standards must be maintained. At another forum on recruitment in early 1984, in Shandong, stress was placed both on the need to recruit intellectuals and on the importance of "training, educating, and examining the recruits" in order to "continuously enhance their communist consciousness." Again it was mentioned that recruitment procedures and standards must be strictly adhered to.

Although the stress here was on middle-aged intellectuals, they were not the only target of the recruitment drive. In January 1984 the Central Organization Department issued a document calling for greater efforts to recruit college students as party members, noting that as of 1982, only 1.9 percent of college and university students were party members. Among underclassmen, the report said, there often were no party members and among upperclassmen, no party groups.

Promotion of Educated People into Leading Bodies

Perhaps even more important than recruiting professionals into the party is the related policy of promoting them into leadership positions. The policy of promoting educated people applies to leading bodies at all levels, from provincial organizations down to industrial enterprises. In January 1984 Xinhua announced that the work of "adjusting leading bodies" to make them "more revolutionary, better educated, professionally more competent, and younger" at the provincial level had been basically completed by the end of 1983 and that the work of adjusting subprovincial leading bodies down to the municipal level had also in the main been completed. At the provincial level, according to the report, leading members of party committees and governments now included 43 percent with a college education, as opposed to only 20 percent in the past. Among the newly promoted members, 71 per-

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43 Ibid.
44 Shandong Provincial Service (January 23, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 24, 1984), O5; similarly, Hubei Provincial Service (December 18, 1983) in FBIS, China (December 19, 1983), P4.
45 GMRB (January 17, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (February 3, 1984), K7.
cent had a college-level education. At subprovincial levels, persons with a college education now accounted for 44 percent of the leading members instead of 14 percent, as in the past; newly promoted members accounted for nearly half of the total membership of leading bodies and of these, two-thirds had been college-educated. These figures must vary significantly from province to province, because it was later reported that in Heilongjiang Province in 1983, only 12.7 percent of the 921,000 cadres had a college education, while 69.3 percent were below the level of junior middle school. In Sichuan, 40 percent of the 1,450,000 cadres (party and nonparty) in 1983 had an education only at or below the junior middle school level.

The Xinhua report referred to "five major breakthroughs" that had occurred in the process of adjusting leading bodies, which, in addition to "overcoming the idea of promoting people on the basis of seniority" and "breaking down the shackles of the system of life-long tenure for cadres" included correction of the "erroneous ideas of belittling knowledge and looking down on intellectuals" and "breaking with the convention of selecting and promoting leading party and government cadres only from those who work for party and government organs." Instead, "particular attention had been paid to selecting and promoting people...from among professional and technical cadres who have shown excellent political qualities, exquisite organization and management skills, and outstanding leadership." The fifth breakthrough was that "we have changed the method of selecting and promoting cadres in a mysterious manner" and instead are making use of opinion polls and recommendations from rank-and-file party members. Other promotions that exemplify the policy on promoting educated people are a group of engineers who became mayors or vice-mayors of coastal cities; the vice-mayor of Shanghai, a nonparty woman who is a member of a society (the Jiu San society) that enrolls intellectuals who want to build up the country; and the Hangzhou municipal party committee standing committee, in which eleven of seventeen members are university graduates: five engineers, four university teachers, a school principal, and an accountant.

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46 Xinhua (January 23, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 25, 1984), K21. It should be noted that the term "college-educated" is not necessarily restricted to college or university graduates but can refer to anyone with some training past middle school.

47 China News Analysis 1315 (August 1, 1986).

48 Xinhua (January 23, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 25, 1984), K21.

49 China News Analysis 1304 (February 15, 1986).
Promotion of intellectuals has also been publicized at the level of the industrial enterprise. In 1984 the model Shoudu Iron and Steel Company (Shougang) was reported to have 5,251 “intellectuals” employed, of whom 71.7 percent were “nonparty comrades”; of the 56 senior-grade engineers, 27 (40.8 percent) were nonparty. Since the third plenum, it was stated, the company’s party committee had “conscientiously implemented the policy toward intellectuals,” and cadres with an educational level of senior middle school or above now made up more than half the company’s 15,000 cadres. For cadres at or above the level of plant manager and section chief, the percentage of intellectuals had risen from 23 percent, “mostly with a cultural level of technical secondary education” in 1977, to 61.1 percent, “mostly with a higher education level.”

With respect to nonparty intellectuals, at Shougang the “majority” of the 867 cadres promoted in recent years were said to be intellectuals. Of these, 274 (31.5 percent) were nonparty. The number of nonparty intellectuals at plant manager and section chief level increased from a total of one before the Cultural Revolution to 37 in 1983 (17 of these joined the party after promotion). At the workshop level the number of nonparty intellectuals increased to 662, an increase of “several times” over that which was the case before the Cultural Revolution. One example of a recently promoted nonparty person was a rightist technician who, after being rehabilitated in 1979, became head of a repair workshop and subsequently joined the party. Another was a nonparty engineer with a landlord family background who, despite being the co-author of two monographs and the inventor of a widely-used steel-rolling machine, had always been looked down upon as “politically backward.” By 1984 he had been promoted to deputy head of the technical development section.

One of the most significant aspects of the policy being advocated by using this company as a model was the promotion of people with technical backgrounds not only to positions as heads of technical departments, but also to positions as leading cadres in personnel departments. As noted in Chapter 3, personnel departments in enterprises in the PRC have been the special province of the party organization and generally considered part of the party committee’s (not the...
factory manager's) system, along with such departments as security, propaganda, and the trade union. Personnel cadres in industry typically were drawn from the ranks of workers or the PLA and recruited for political activism; rarely if ever were they people who could be classified as intellectuals. But according to the report on Shougang, after the third plenum a nonparty engineer was first promoted to a post as a technical cadre (he had labored as a worker since the Cultural Revolution), then moved on to become manager of an ironworks, and finally last year (having by that time joined the party) was appointed assistant personnel chief of the company. This policy thrust at enterprise level was reinforced by a change affecting organization and personnel departments at the national level announced in early 1984. A Bureau for Scientific and Technical Cadres was created and placed by the State Council under the State Scientific and Technical Commission, where it was to work "in close cooperation with the organization and personnel departments concerned."52 Before this, party organization departments were in charge of all cadre affairs, including scientific and technical cadres. In 1964 a separate bureau to handle scientific and technical cadres was formed (but soon was eliminated with the advent of the Cultural Revolution).53

A further chapter on Shougang was reported by a PRC colleague who told of a woman engineer (and party member since 1958) who was promoted to be chief of the personnel department at the company. This was over the objections of comrades who felt that promotion of an engineer to a managerial position would be acceptable, but not promotion to a position in personnel. Notwithstanding, she retained the position and reportedly was responsible for the promotion of other technical people throughout the company. Finally, after a year or so she was promoted to be a deputy chief in the Beijing party organizational bureau. This is particularly interesting in light of the 1986 report of the engineer fired from Shougang as a result of party machinations.

In any event, the description of policies implemented at Shougang indicates a clear connection between the establishment of responsibility systems and the policy on using and promoting intellectuals. The Xinhua report stressed that a condition for the successful implementation of the policy on nonparty intellectuals was implementation of the responsibility system: "By defining the functions, authorities, and du-

52 GMRB (February 1, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (February 13, 1984), K20.
53 Mentioned in conversation with a PRC economist.
ties of cadres with rules and regulations, the functions and authorities of nonparty intellectual cadres are assured.” The policy at Shougang for assuring equal “authorities and functions” for nonparty with party cadres included the circulation of documents to nonparty as well as party cadres and the inclusion of the former as observers at enlarged party committee meetings on administration and production.

That these kinds of provisions are critical if the upgrading in authority of technical/professional people in industry is to represent any real shift in power relations is pointed up by the account of an election held in a factory in Anhui in 1979, related by an engineer who had emigrated to Hong Kong. The engineer reported that the leading cadres of the factory opposed the election of several nonparty people who were not on the party’s slate to the position of workshop head. The party cadres did not have to risk open opposition to the new cadres, however, because they knew that they could exclude them from seeing important documents and attending party meetings. Thus, the nonparty cadres “wouldn’t know what was going on and would have no power.”

Conclusion

The reforms discussed in this chapter basically parallel Soviet policies that began under Stalin. This is clearly evident in the “factory manager assuming all responsibility” system. With respect to the policy of creating a mighty contingent of red and expert cadres, the intent of this policy is not to relinquish or weaken party control and influence but rather to make it more effective. As we have seen, official directives emphasize that in recruiting intellectuals, “standards are to be maintained,” and intellectuals are to be “trained, educated, and examined” to fortify their “communist ideology and consciousness.” In the Soviet Union, recruitment of intellectuals, including those of the technical-managerial type, so far has had neither the intent nor the effect of creating “technocracy” or rule by intellectuals, but rather the intent and effect of bringing them firmly under party control. Moreover, the higher level of training given to party apparatchiks has had neither the intent nor effect of genuinely transforming them into “experts” but rather the intent and effect of permitting them more effectively to control experts. Without some training, they are too likely to be dependent on experts, as were the old Soviet “red directors”—or the old ex-peasant guerrilla CCP factory directors.

The same can be said for post-Mao educational changes in China, which revived an emphasis on grades and examinations that prevailed
before the Cultural Revolution, especially in the 1950s. This brings the Chinese educational system more in line with Soviet practice since the 1930s. In the Soviet case, the emphasis on grades, examinations, and advanced degrees has neither lessened party control nor changed the party into a technocracy. Higher education has become a minimum requirement for attainment of an official position, while most members of the urban educated elite now are party members. However, education is a necessary but not sufficient factor in career advancement; political skill and loyalty are still the key. As noted by Alec Nove, an *apparatchik* with an education in the Soviet Union is not necessarily an "intellectual" or an "expert"; in the same way that "a man can only play rugby for Oxford or football for Southern California by being a college student, generals have passed examinations at a staff college, but their nature and qualities surely cannot be labeled 'intellectual' for such reasons."

Post-Mao reforms in the areas of party-state differentiation and co-optation of professionals thus have followed, or have attempted to follow, the Soviet tradition in which the latter are co-opted into a party-dominated structure. When reformers attempted to go beyond this tradition in legally formalizing an area (managerial/enterprise authority) outside party jurisdiction as part of a broader discussion of "political reform," they were prevented by opposition from conservatives.

The foregoing would appear to indicate that the post-revolutionary phase in China is destined to follow the path followed by the Soviet Union. However, I would suggest that despite the similarities in policy, there are significant differences in the historical and political context of the immediate post-Mao and post-Stalin periods. These differences are reflected in the political difficulties, discussed in this chapter, with the policies of creating red experts and promoting people with professional credentials. The character of relations between party and professional elites, and the timing of the drive to co-opt the professionals vis-à-vis the abandonment of revolution from above, diverge in the Soviet and Chinese versions of the post-revolutionary phase. Because of this, in the long term we might expect the political culture of the new generation elite now being created in China to depart significantly from that of the Soviet elite created under Stalin, an elite that dominated the Brezhnev period and that only now has begun to leave the stage. It is to this aspect of the post-Mao period that we will turn in the next chapter.

In his original formulation of the "development versus utopia" argument, Lowenthal saw the triumph of the new expert elite over the veteran revolutionary elite and the victory of material over moral incentives as key in producing the conditions for the post-revolutionary phase: the two victories would lead to a change in the party's composition and outlook and a decline in the role of coercion. This amounts to a reversal in the "basic relation between the political system and the evolution of society," despite the retention of most of the totalitarian features of the previous system: "Formerly, the Communist political superstructure was concerned with forcibly transforming the system's economic and social basis....Now, the economic and social basis of the countries under Communist rule...is beginning to transform the political superstructure." More recently, Lowenthal has described the postrevolutionary regime as a stable but stagnant bureaucratic oligarchy, resulting from the triumph of party leaders who wanted regularized procedures for decision making and conflict resolution. This is a continuation of a line of thought found at the end of "Development vs. Utopia," in which the author observes the tendency of the post-revolutionary elite, which has abandoned the "improvisations of dynamic, personal leadership" for the "predictable regularity of bureaucratic procedures," to congeal into a conservative, privileged "new class."

1 Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," 111.
2 Ibid., 112.
The concept of “inclusion,” discussed in Chapter 1, implied a somewhat different dynamic for the advent of a post-revolutionary phase. In this perspective a Leninist regime shifts from a posture emphasizing coercion and struggle against social forces to one that seeks to include as many groups as possible under its auspices, most especially the urban educated elite. In connection with this posture, it focuses more on rational organization and material incentives. The difference between this and Lowenthal’s post-revolutionary phase is that in Lowenthal’s model, particularly the earlier formulation of it, the change in regime posture comes about as a more or less automatic result of economic development. The inclusion model gives more weight to political choice on the part of the elite. The regime chooses to change its orientation, and it chooses from political considerations, to protect its interests: it wants to preempt development of any autonomous social-political elites by co-opting them into the party-dominated system. In fact, Lowenthal’s second formulation of the argument is close to this view; it focuses on party leaders (rather than experts), who, because of a desire for more orderly, institutionalized processes, appear as the critical elements in producing a shift in the regime’s orientation. The “victory of experts” is no longer given a central role.

This latter situation reflects the actual course of events in the Soviet Union. The professional classes in that country have so far not played the liberalizing role once foreseen for them by Western observers. What might this portend for the PRC? I suggest that the fact that increased numbers, improved status, and greater influence for the technical/professional strata in the Soviet Union was compatible with dominance of a strong, conservative party apparat should not be taken to be an iron law of communist development that automatically can be generalized to all Leninist systems. Factors that point in the direction of an alternative outcome in China are the degree of homogenization and co-optation of professional and party elites during the period of revolution from above (the eras of Stalin and of Mao) and the nature and timing of the elements that constitute an abandonment of revolution from above on the part of the regime.

The post-revolutionary phase revolves around the state’s abandonment of a class-struggle posture in favor of a policy of inclusion. The abandonment of revolution from above in the PRC has two central aspects: the redefinition of the class character of Chinese society and of

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5 Kenneth Jowitt, “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes.”
class statuses within it, particularly those of intellectuals and capitalists, and the repudiation of "political campaigns" of the Maoist style. The first involves the social structure (marked by hostile or unreliable "reactionary" classes) that necessitates revolution from above. The second concerns the political tactic employed to carry it out. Both of these developments—the redefinition of class statuses and the abandonment of political methods associated with class struggle—have counterparts in the Soviet experience, but in a different form and sequence.

The End of Revolution from Above in China

Redefinition of Class Statuses

The declaration by the CCP's third plenum of the effective end of class struggle and the switch to modernization as the party's main task can be seen as a parallel to Khrushchev's 1961 declaration of the replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the "state of the whole people." It marked a shift in the regime's objectives from repudiating the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and returning to the status quo ante to one of declaring the advent of a new historical phase. In the new phase, the regime defines the "principal contradiction" in Chinese society not as one between hostile classes but instead between economic/technical backwardness and China's potential.

In connection with the third plenum, a wholesale redefinition took place that affected the status of intellectuals, capitalists, and the former "five elements." In the Soviet Union, although the "state of the whole people" was declared only in 1961, Stalin had removed official strictures against nonproletarian elements joining the party in the late 1930s and had promoted the training and encouragement of the technical/professional classes. Their nonproletarian counterparts in China had a longer wait. Not until 1979, some thirty years after the Revolution, did Mao's successors announce that henceforth, intellectuals were to be considered a part of the "laboring classes," along with workers and peasants. Moreover, as Tsou Tang quotes a Shanghai official, intellectuals were not only to be seen as a part of the working class, but as an advanced part of the working class: they are "that section of the working class which grasps advanced scientific and cultural knowledge earlier than any other sections. They are the treasure of our nation."6 This highly positive view of intellectuals was reflected

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6 Tsou Tang, "Back from the Brink of Revolutionary-'Feudal' Totalitarianism," 66.
subsequently in various portrayals of the heroic intellectual as a labor model that appeared in the PRC press. It is reminiscent of the image of the technical intelligentsia as the prototype for the new utopia propagated by Stalin in the 1930s.

The "striking reversal," in Tsou's words, in the status of intellectuals in China, who during the Cultural Revolution were branded the "stinking ninth category," has a number of corollaries. These include the following policies: intellectuals as a group no longer are to be seen as targets for campaigns to "remold their thinking" or as objects for supervision by workers; nonparty intellectuals are to be allowed input into the political process; and intellectuals are to be favored, not disfavored, for promotion and for recruitment into the party and the CYL.

With respect to the first policy area, the fact that intellectuals no longer need to have their thought reformed is one of the reasons why political campaigns are no longer necessary or appropriate: as Lowenthal observed, discarding the goal of struggle against a particular class leads to a general decline in the use of coercion. Present policy in China represents a revival of the positive assessment of the political reliability of intellectuals made in 1956, antecedent to the Hundred Flowers campaign, which was soon reversed by the anti-rightist campaign and again during the Cultural Revolution. The anti-rightist campaign itself has never been repudiated by the present leadership; however, virtually all of its targets were rehabilitated in the months leading up to the third plenum, thus acknowledging that the policy toward intellectuals had been in error since that time.

Under Deng Xiaoping the regime has been at pains to show that despite the persecutions suffered by intellectuals since 1957, the party's policy has never been to treat them like "aliens." After the upgrading in their status, articles appeared in the press emphasizing that even in the darkest years there were party members who treated intellectuals well and helped them, and that now intellectuals recognize that the party has always truly cared for them. One highly publicized example was the case of An Zhendong, an engineer formerly labeled a counter-

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7 For example, see announcement concerning three posthumous “labor heroes,” two of whom were intellectuals (one scientist, one engineer), Xinhua (March 5, 1983), in FBIS, China (March 10, 1983), K3.
8 See Chapter 2.
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revolutionary who now has been rehabilitated and promoted by the party.\(^\text{10}\)

Another aspect of intellectuals' new status as advanced proletarians who do not need to be reformed or supervised is that the authority of technical personnel vis-à-vis workers in enterprises has been enhanced. As a case in point, there is the fate of the three-in-one teams for technical innovation and problem solving, in which the technicians were supposed to listen to and learn from workers. The teams have not been mentioned since around the time of the third plenum. In the Soviet Union, early ideas of specialists' supervision by workers were abandoned as the 1920s drew to a close, much earlier in the regime.

With respect to the second policy area, the idea of intellectuals and professionals as politically reliable can be seen in the party's United Front policies. The revival of these policies is a major manifestation of the party's turn away from revolution from above: intellectuals, and capitalists as well, are now portrayed by the regime as fit to offer advice on political matters, to shape educational institutions, and to work for the interests of their profession (all at the party's behest, to be sure).

A series of PRC press reports at the end of 1983 provides insight into various aspects of United Front policy in the 1980s. In November and December of that year, a series of national congresses and local forums for the “eight democratic parties” plus the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the “Revolutionary Committee of the KMT” were held to discuss the role of these groups in “serving the Four Modernizations.”\(^\text{11}\) This role, according to the reports, includes providing “social services,” such as “collecting funds from different fields to run schools,” and advising on educational rules for middle schools. They were also asked to “help party committees and governments...and departments and units concerned to implement the party’s policies on intellectuals.”\(^\text{12}\) The latter refers not only to the policy of promoting talented professionals but also to dealing with such problems as “wrong Cultural Revolution verdicts, confiscated goods, and private housing occupied by others.”\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{10}\) RMRB (January 4, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (January 9, 1984), K1.

\(^{11}\) Xinhua (in English) (December 30, 1983), in FBIS, China (January 9, 1984), K23.

\(^{12}\) Tianjin City Service (February 13, 1984), in FBIS, China (February 13, 1984), R4.

\(^{13}\) Xinhua (December 28, 1983), in FBIS, China (January 3, 1984), K7.
A second purpose of these meetings was to solicit the “opinions and suggestions” of nonparty people on the new party rectification campaign, which was getting underway at that time. “I thirst to hear the non-party friends’ opinions on how to achieve success in our Shandong’s party rectification,” the provincial party secretary was quoted as saying.14 According to the reports, criticisms brought up by the nonparty people at the forums as a result of the party’s “thirst to hear the opinions of non-party friends” ranged from criticism of a restaurant in Wuchang, Hubei, for poor service to complaints in Fujian about neglect of “talented people,” such as a returned overseas Chinese cement expert who was “cold-shouldered,” and scientists and technicians in a research institute who couldn’t get enough to eat while they were at work.15

One might certainly suspect that this concern with the democratic parties is all window dressing (calculated to impress Hong Kong or Taiwan compatriots with the party’s liberality) and, given the experience of the Hundred Flowers campaign, one might marvel that nonparty intellectuals solicited for suggestions on party rectification would even venture to offer criticisms about poor service in restaurants. Nonetheless, this activity cannot be dismissed as meaningless. It appears that nonparty people did in fact bring up criticisms in connection with the rectification campaign without producing a reaction like the Anti-Rightist campaign of the fifties. In recent comments on party building, a leading official observed that one of the achievements of the current rectification campaign is that even though some nonparty people made severe criticisms, nonparty persons did not become targets of the campaign as they had in the past. The “severe criticism” mentioned as an example was from a “professor and democratic personage” who complained that veteran cadres were “living in clover,” caring only for houses for themselves and jobs for their children, and said that “corrupt officials are responsible for the destruction of our country.”16 Asking intellectuals to help in “reversing wrong verdicts” of the Cultural Revolution, in addition to working for better working conditions for their colleagues, amounts to delegating some political

14 Shandong Provincial Service (January 18, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 20, 1984), O2.
15 Hubei Provincial Service (January 25, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 27, 1984), P4; Fujian ribao (January 20, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (February 2, 1984), O1.
16 “Bo Yibo Talks About the September Party Representative Meeting,” Ta Kung Pao (February 2, 1985), in FBIS, China (February 7, 1985), W10–12.
role to them, on an individual level.

Finally, it is of particular interest that United Front policies refer not only to "intellectuals" and "democratic personages" but also to former capitalists. The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce is an association of businessmen dating from the pre-1949 period. In 1956 there were about 720,000 people classified as "national bourgeoisie" in China; in 1979 there were still about 500,000. Before the Cultural Revolution former owners of industrial enterprises occupied responsible positions in factories and drew high salaries. They also drew interest on their assets and were allowed to keep their bank accounts and private property. For example, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution a visitor interviewed several former capitalists, one of whom managed his former factory, lived in his fourteen-room house with servants, and was allowed to keep profits from a Hong Kong business of which he was part owner.

Under Deng Xiaoping the financial assets and property of former capitalists confiscated during the Cultural Revolution have been restored and back pay given. They are again at work in enterprises at high salaries and have been given a role in attracting investments in joint enterprises from foreign and overseas Chinese businessmen. An interviewee from a large machine-building factory in Tianjin described a special "united front work" department that was set up in the enterprise in 1978 or 1979, specifically to see to the interests of the former capitalists. This included finding "suitable" housing for them. Former Shanghai capitalists have been asked to set up companies with their assets. In Hong Kong there is a multinational land investment company operating, the chief executive of which is a PRC businessman (a brother of Wang Guangmei, widow of the late Liu Shaoqi) with a personal fortune. He apparently was asked by the Chinese government to operate in the Hong Kong market to bolster confidence in China's intention to promote business there after its reversion to Chinese control. The business role assigned to former capitalists, plus solicitation of the advice of their professional association in political

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18 Ibid., 31.
19 Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China, 894–912.
20 Tsou, "Back from the Brink," 68.
matters, along with the "democratic parties," is a phenomenon without a parallel in the Soviet experience, making the "united front" concept considerably more interesting.

Turning to the third policy area related to redefinition of class statuses, the recruitment and promotion of intellectuals, a survey of press reports in the period following the third plenum suggests both that the Deng regime's intention to press these policies and opposition to them are formidable. Determination on the part of the regime is indicated by the linking of reforms in the treatment of intellectuals with the major party rectification movement that began in 1983, as in the following declaration:

Whether party-member leading cadres can truly implement the policy toward intellectuals and arouse their enthusiasm to promote the four modernizations is an important criterion for testing whether these leading cadres can keep in line with the CPC Central Committee.... Those who resist the implementation of the party policy toward intellectuals and persist in discriminating against, deliberately making things difficult for, attacking, and persecuting intellectuals must be severely criticized. Apart from that, they should be transferred to other work in light of the seriousness of their mistakes. Disciplinary measures also must be taken against those who have made serious mistakes.23

Recruitment and promotion of intellectuals is probably the single most controversial area of present policy, and we will return to it when discussing opposition to Deng's reforms.

Abandonment of the "Political Campaign"

In addition to the redefinition of class statuses, the third plenum saw rejection on the part of the new Deng Xiaoping leadership of the "political campaigns" of the Mao era. As we saw in Chapter 4, the political campaign was part of an effort to control and reshape society and the party by manipulating groups and interpersonal relations rather than relying on Stalin-type purges and terror. Although the campaign had an educative rather than punishment-oriented ethic (as expressed in the slogan "cure the illness and save the patient"), ultimately it became equivalent to the great Soviet purges in the massive destruction (physical and/or psychological) of the lives of both party elites and ordinary Chinese who became targets, particularly in the Cultural Revolution. The technique of mobilizing nonparty masses to

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23 GMRB (January 17, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (January 31, 1984), K4. See also Xinhua (January 24, 1984), in FBIS, China (January 25, 1984), K12.
criticize party cadres, associated with Mao, has been repudiated. Liu Shaoqi and others appear to have favored a more orthodox Leninist approach, in which party leadership was central and any criticism of cadres was an inner-party process. This is still the method involved in party rectification. However, there were certain campaign methods favored by Liu, such as sending work teams from higher levels to lead attacks on local figures, that also implied class-struggle methods and have been rejected by the present leadership.

Before the third plenum and the ascendance of Deng Xiaoping over Hua Guofeng, the campaign against the Gang of Four (which began shortly after Mao's death) was carried on in a style essentially like that of the Mao era. Although there was an attempt to avoid the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the official intent appears to have been for a campaign to be waged in the style of the Three-Anti or the Four Cleanups campaigns. Explicit comparisons to these two campaigns were made in the media. Both were intense campaigns, the results of which included suicides by targets. During 1978 the campaign to root out "the Gang of Four's bourgeois factional network" in the industrial sector included a number of features associated with earlier campaigns, such as the dispatch of work teams who substituted for the enterprise party committee in conducting the campaign; mobilization of the masses for "vigorous exposure and criticism" of the targets in "face-to-face struggle"; and the use of inflamed rhetoric in the media, in which campaign targets are portrayed as personifications of evil (as, for example, "the gang's sinister henchmen" and the like). Intense pressure on family members and others to "educate" or denounce the accused also was reported to be part of the campaign, as in the past.

The third plenum, in addition to announcing the shift of emphasis from political movements to production, proclaimed that the anti-Gang struggle throughout the country was basically completed. Despite this assertion, the drive to remove beneficiaries of the Cultural


Revolution and “Gang followers” continued and in some cases intensified. In line with the policy direction of the third plenum, however, the process was conducted under different auspices and in a different style. The party’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission was now charged with discovering offenders through systematic investigation and regularized procedures. The legal system was to be strengthened and called into play. Mass criticism and “face-to-face struggle” were no longer to be employed. Rectification of the party henceforward was to be an inner-party affair.

The party rectification campaign that began in 1983 continued to have elimination of people identified with the Cultural Revolution as a goal. Throughout the process of rectification, however, leaders repeatedly emphasized how crucial it was that the campaign not become a “campaign” (Mao-style) and that it avoid the “leftist errors of the past.” In early 1985 Bo Yibo stated that an achievement of the campaign so far (in addition to its not being turned against nonparty critics) was that “leftism” had been avoided, meaning it had been recognized that “not everyone must make self-criticisms or ‘pass the test.’” Rectification must “thoroughly repudiate” the methods of the Cultural Revolution, which include “mass criticism” and the idea of “taking class struggle as the key link.”

A report from the province of Shandong on the rectification campaign there noted that the Provincial Party Committee would be sending out “liaison groups” to municipal committees and provincial level enterprises, but that these groups were “not like work teams.” They were to do “political-ideological work only” and were not to replace the local leadership or even exercise leadership jointly with them, as was done in the past (thus in effect rejecting the “Liu-style” campaign as well).

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28 See Xinhua Domestic Service (September 4, 1979), in FBIS, China (September 5, 1979), R4.
29 Beijing ribao (August 23, 1979), 1. Although reliance on the Discipline Inspection Commission and its local offices may be considered a more rationalized approach than the mass political campaign, it leaves much to be desired as an impartial instrument: it appears that its local offices became a tool for obstructing reform by trumping up cases against reformist enterprise managers and subverting the courts. China News Analysis 1317 (September 1, 1986), 6–7.
30 “Bo Yibo Talks About the September Party Representative Meeting,” Ta Kung Pao (February 2, 1985), in FBIS, China (February 7, 1985), W10–12.
31 RMRB (January 25, 1985), 5, in FBIS, China (February 5, 1985), K12.
32 Jilin Provincial Service (February 4, 1985), in FBIS, China (February 7, 1985), S1.
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It should be noted that after the third plenum there still have been criticism campaigns (which are different from the party rectification campaign, a systematic innerparty process focused on the composition and workstyles of the entire party membership), namely the anti-spiritual pollution campaign of 1983 and the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign of 1987. Both of these engendered fear, especially among intellectuals, that they would turn into Mao-style campaigns. The anti-spiritual pollution campaign was brought to a halt early and without bringing major personnel changes. The anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign of course has had prominent casualties, including Hu Yaobang, the reformist academic Fang Lizhi, crusading journalist Liu Binyan, and Zhu Houze, the propaganda chief. Publications have been shut down. Several controversial economic reform measures such as the law guaranteeing managerial autonomy and a bankruptcy law have been shelved. However, the campaign so far has remained limited to a relatively few targets in the party, the criticism has been relatively mild (the targets are not portrayed as personifications of evil), and targets for criticism are not being “dragged out” in each unit, to be subjected to criticism-and-struggle methods. At the time of this writing, then, these criticism campaigns have not revived the class-struggle methods of the past, although as we shall see presently, this policy is not welcomed by everybody.

“Reform” and “Conservatism” in Post-Mao China

Many of the policies pursued by Mao successors as they abandoned revolution from above are not new. Recruitment and promotion of intellectuals, as well as united front policies, were pursued in the 1950s. What is new is that such policies now are being promoted in a context where class struggle has been declared essentially over, where intellectuals have been declared a part of the laboring classes, and where the launching of old-style political campaigns has been renounced. This brings us to the politics of “reform” and “conservatism” in the post-revolutionary phase.

In the Soviet case “conservative” would refer to those who wanted an end to the arbitrary terror and personal domination of Stalinism but no significant change in the system of central economic planning,

33 See discussion on the various objectives and forms of rectification campaigns in Frederick C. Tiewes, Politics and Purges in China, 3-12. See also Gordon Bennett, Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership.
no change in the leading role of the party, and no retreat from orthodoxy. It would include that combination of forces that resisted the organizational reforms of Khrushchev and ushered in the "stable but stagnant" Brezhnev era. In particular, Khrushchev's division of regional party committees into agricultural and industrial committees, as well as his plans to rotate cadres out of office and to set up a new control commission to monitor the party created insecurity and provoked heavy opposition in the party apparat, contributing to his downfall. The apparat at that point included many individuals from the new red-expert elite trained in the 1930s (see Chapter 2). As for those who occupied managerial and technical roles, they do not appear to have played any direct, active role in Khrushchev's downfall; however, as Azrael has argued, they represented an enormously conservative force in their general commitment to centralized planning and heavy industry and to the political system that protected their advantaged status. As for the next generation of managers and engineers in the immediate post-Stalin period, although many had been traumatized by the realities of Stalinism, Azrael notes that their socialization at home, in school, and on the job had left them convinced of the basic legitimacy of the Soviet system and devoted to virtually all of its fundamental principles.

The conservative constituency in the post-Stalin Soviet Union also included those who (lest they themselves become vulnerable) favored criticism of Stalin's excesses and curbing of the KGB but could not countenance demands for further investigation and punishment of Stalinist injustices or the institution of effective legal guarantees against repression. These demands were voiced by those who had been rehabilitated and returned from the labor camps. In this sense, of course, Khrushchev himself was part of the conservative constituency. In short, support for orthodoxy was pervasive among the apparat, the technical-managerial class, and at the top level of leadership and among the upcoming generation as well as the older elite.

In post-Mao China the term "conservative" is particularly confusing, because a large element of the leadership (for example, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Li Xiannian) consists of those who, broadly speaking,

34 Jeremy Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics, 147–151.
favor a return to the system as it was before what they see as the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, with no major departures from that model. Thus they are "reformers" in the sense of favoring departures from late Maoism but according to the definition used in the Soviet case, they count as "conservatives." This group has showed its political strength in the post-Mao era and especially in 1987; but the analysis we have engaged in so far suggests that compared to its Soviet counterpart in the post-Stalin years, its support is less broad. The portion of the present elite (as well as its potential successors) at various levels that is not well assimilated within the framework of Leninist orthodoxy in China is significantly greater than it was in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. This creates a more fluid political situation, in which various kinds of outcomes are plausible, including systemic "reform" (and also including prolonged chaos and instability).

I use the term "reform" advisedly: in the present Chinese context, the word "reform" may refer to organizational rationalization, professionalization, market reforms, and/or political relaxation. A person who supports rationalization only may be seen as a "conservative," while one who supports all four policies would certainly be a "reformer." Many, including Deng Xiaoping himself, support the four items—particularly political relaxation—to only a certain degree. It is not necessary to propose mutually exclusive camps to speak in terms of "conservatives" and "reformers." For the time being, I am using the term "reformer" to signify those elites who support, to some degree at least, all the above types of reform. One also might include those who are alienated from the system and thus could be said to have a latent interest in change.

**Opposition to the Reform Policy on Intellectuals**

Not surprisingly, objections from various quarters to the promotion of intellectuals to any kind of leading position never came to an end despite model examples cited in the PRC press, such as that of Shoudu Iron and Steel in Beijing. A typical article on the problem of intellectuals acknowledged that progress in implementing the policy on intellectuals "has remained very uneven" and, because of "leftist influences," when policies are implemented "some people erroneously hold that intellectuals have been placed in important positions 'to an excessive degree,' that implementation... has 'gone too far,' and that

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intellectuals have been 'too exalted.'”38 Another article commented on the “uneven development” of the policy of promoting “talented people” to the leading bodies of industrial enterprises. “A handful of people,” it said, “due to their inabilities and for fear that some excellent new person will surpass them, raise all types of difficulties” about promotions. Especially in the case of intellectual cadres “a small mistake or carelessness...will be exaggerated by such people as a ‘political problem’ or a ‘problem of stand,’ and the new cadres will be downgraded or dismissed.”39

Objections to the promotion of “talented people” commonly are made on the basis of their “complicated” class backgrounds and social relations. “Complicated” can refer to bad class background, past political problems, or overseas family connections, to name three possibilities. A report in the year following the third plenum on the promotion of a group of engineers to managerial positions and to the party committee of an industrial enterprise noted opposition to this move on the part of people who were worried about the promotees’ “complicated social relations.” The opposition was overcome, the report claimed, after lengthy discussion and education.40

In 1985 the problem remained much the same. The class background issue and the whole question of the reliability and character of intellectuals has scarcely faded, despite the official upgrading of their status. A report from the province of Shandong was revealing: it listed obstacles to the recruitment of “outstanding intellectuals” into the party as the persisting notions of “class struggle as the key link” and “only class origin” (that is, only class origin should count in the distribution of rewards and opportunities), the practice of “giving prominence to politics” and charging intellectuals with being “indifferent to politics,” and holding traditional concepts “about certain characteristics of intellectuals being shortcomings” such as “neat dress and lack of communications ability.”41 The idea that intellectuals “lack communications ability” (that is, of the type valued in party circles) was voiced by one of my informants, an engineer, who said that technical people are never listened to in meetings unless the party secretary especially solicits and respects their participation, because “intellectuals

38 Reported by Xinhua Hong Kong Service (February 26, 1984), quoting an article in Liaowang, in FBIS, China (February 27, 1984), K2.
39 RMRB (February 1, 1984), 1, in FBIS, China (February 7, 1984), K34.
40 Beijing ribao (August 23, 1979), 1.
41 Dazhong ribao (January 17, 1985), 4, in FBIS, China (February 5, 1985), O2.
are not good at speaking.”

Resistance to reforms in the treatment of intellectuals and professionals might be expected to come from several quarters in particular. One group who would be likely to “fear that some excellent new person will surpass them” is older cadres (certainly more than “a handful”) in industry and elsewhere of rural background with little technical knowledge and education. Another group, potentially more troublesome because they cannot be retired on the grounds of age, are “Cultural Revolution” college graduates (1966–70) who make up 21.4 percent of China’s post-1949 college graduates. Because of the educational policies in force during that time, which downgraded examinations, grades, and formal education, many of these people had only a primary school education before entering college. Now, according to a 1985 report, about 10–15 percent of them are professionally capable, 20 percent cannot do their jobs, and the remaining majority need “a few years of training.” The article noted that there is prejudice against them and that even the capable ones have low salaries. These individuals would not be happy about policies favoring people with real (not “Cultural Revolution”) credentials as educated people. They may not have been an influential group in recent years but they are relatively large in number, and young.

A further source of resistance would be factory party secretaries and old-style factory managers (for example, Red Army veterans), a very sizeable group. In August 1984 the party announced that 40 percent of factory directors of the 3,000 largest enterprises and 70 percent of the party secretaries who are not educationally qualified would be replaced within a year. Although to a large extent this group overlaps the category of older cadres who could be retired more or less routinely and thus not constitute a significant opposition, such overlapping does not cover all cases. In fact, the regime has had to admonish enterprise party secretaries to study the example of a new model secretary who actively assisted the new factory manager in promoting intellectuals and to “match words with deeds in reform.”

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42 See also Jiang Zilong’s depiction of fast-talking cadres in “Foundation,” 155–158.
43 China Daily (February 6, 1985), 3, in FBIS, China (February 7, 1985), K15.
44 Qiao Shi, “Jianshihao qiye lingdao banzi,” RMRB, August 26, 1984. Reference with thanks to Professor Jeremy Paltiel, University of Alberta.
45 “Proceed From the Overall Situation of Reform, Establish a New Party-Government Relationship,” by Li Xin, party secretary of the Beijing Printing and Dyeing Plant, Xinhua (February 7, 1985), in FBIS, China (February 15, 1985), K2–6.
ments would not have been necessary if all party secretaries who might be “conservative” and oppose reform were old and could easily be retired.

Many middle-level (that is, below the level of the enterprise party secretary or manager) factory cadres also oppose the promotion of intellectuals. In the example just mentioned, one of the problems that the party secretary reportedly had to handle involved some leading administrative cadres, newly appointed by the factory manager, who were not party members. After their new posts were announced, the non-party cadres “were extremely diffident, fearing that the party committee and party members would not support them.” Their fears were well-grounded, because some cadres who were heads of workshops or staff sections were “disrespectful toward the newly appointed administrative leading cadres and did not cooperate with them.” Moreover, a “handful” of unspecified people opposed the “capable people” slated for promotion and “even concocted slanders against them.”46 Interviews with émigrés indicate that this would not be unusual behavior.

Finally, cadres in personnel and organization departments at all bureaucratic levels would rank high on a list of opponents to the upgrading in status of intellectuals and professionals. These individuals generally have been recruited for their political activism, which for several decades involved paying attention to people’s class backgrounds and political histories; have been drawn preponderantly from the ranks of workers or military with impeccable class backgrounds, not from the intellectuals and experts, with their often problematic class backgrounds; have regarded their work as the special province of the party; and have accumulated a great many connections.47 The press has noted a serious problem with the “conventions of cadres and personnel departments, namely, stressing seniority and connections…stressing ones’ connections means that those who are familiar with personnel departments, those who are old friends of leading cadres in particular, will be promoted first and those with excellent talents who have fewer connections and are unfamiliar with people will usually be given the cold shoulder.”48 It has, to say the least, been difficult for intellectual cadres to be “old friends” with personnel cadres because of the social and political gulf.

46 Ibid.
47 This picture of the typical personnel cadre emerged from interviews.
48 China Daily (February 6, 1985), 3, in FBIS, China (February 7, 1985), K15.
Hu Yaobang as party general secretary was a key figure in implementing personnel policy. The demise of Hu among other things suggests resistance of those engaged in personnel work at the higher levels to reform in this area. Song Ping, appointed head of the CCP's Organization Department in mid-1987, is counted as a conservative.

**Mass Political Campaigns**

With respect to the opposition to abandoning mass political campaigns, press descriptions of party rectification in 1985 indicated that such opposition also was a persisting phenomenon. This is true in spite of the fact that disillusion with Mao-style campaigns is widespread inside and outside the party and was a major factor in the demise of Hua Guofeng, who declined to repudiate them, and the rise of Deng, the most prominent living victim of political campaigns. The article mentioned earlier which stated that in the current party rectification, Cultural Revolution practices must be “thoroughly repudiated” also noted that “taking class struggle as the key link” is still a residual influence and singled out “our comrades responsible for ideological work” as needing to pay heed to this. Another article referred to the fact that “some people think rectification has been perfunctory” because there have been “no mass criticism rallies.”

The presence of significant numbers of middle- and lower-level cadres who will jump at the chance to carry on an old-style campaign was indicated by the anti-spiritual pollution campaign. It was launched in late 1983 and for a time appeared on the verge of becoming a full-fledged “campaign,” as a result of the overenthusiastic response of cadres to Deng’s call to eliminate “spiritual pollution.” The fact that the radical thrust of the campaign was associated with Deng Liqun, the head of the party’s Propaganda Department at that time, together with the subsequent admonitions to “our comrades responsible for ideological work” suggests that a major source of opposition to the abandonment of campaigns has come from propaganda cadres at various levels. However, it is not necessarily limited to this

50 Jilin Provincial Service (February 3, 1985), in FBIS, *China* (February 5, 1985), S2.
51 A similar pattern may be evident in the course of the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign of 1987: reportedly Deng Liqun, a leader in pushing this campaign as well, lost the support of Deng Xiaoping as a result of his “leftist” tendencies and as of July 1987 has himself “become the victim of some sort of campaign” on the part of reformists. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July 16, 1987), 11.
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group. A prime function of political campaigns since the 1950s was to recruit new activists into the party; those recruited tended to be persons with certain types of skills. In the words of the former Four Cleanups work team member, the activists they recruited during that campaign were people from the enterprises who volunteered to help the team in its investigations and who “dared to engage in face-to-face struggle.” A large number of party members who entered the party not only after but also before the Cultural Revolution are people whose main credentials are of this kind; a political campaign would give them a chance to do what they do best.

To sum up, sources of opposition to Deng Xiaoping’s abandonment of class struggle and revolution from above at enterprise level and in the system more generally would include (although not necessarily be limited to) the following, some of which overlap: personnel cadres, propaganda cadres, enterprise party secretaries, old cadres who lack technical skills, Cultural Revolution college graduates without good skills, and the large number of party members and cadres who were recruited and/or promoted for their skill in waging political campaigns. The last category includes but is not limited to cadres promoted in connection with the Cultural Revolution. Notably absent here is a large, contented stratum of political and technical-managerial officials with a common educational background such as we saw in the Soviet case.

Relative Weakness of the Conservative Constituency in China

In the Soviet Union the first post-1917 generation of adults in great numbers joined the ranks of the “new red specialists” trained in the 1930s. These people were rewarded by the system and thus had an interest in its maintenance and reason to be loyal to it. In China the post-revolutionary generation had quite a different experience, as we have seen. Blocked from advancement by old cadres and/or by problematic class backgrounds, in 1966 many joined the Cultural Revolution as activists and overthrew the old cadres in their workplaces or schools and in higher-level party offices. But unlike the Soviet purges that devastated the ranks of the Old Bolsheviks and the veteran red directors of enterprises, among others, the old cadres in China were not permanently eliminated from the scene but in general returned to reoccupy their posts in industrial enterprises, by 1972 at the latest and usually by 1969. Young people who had “rebelled” in answer to Mao’s call were sent down to resettle in the countryside, from whence it was difficult to return. This included young people of good and less
good class backgrounds and meant that potential new *apparatchiks* and specialists both had the experience of being shunted aside (although cadres' children of course had a better chance of being able to return from the countryside by "going through the back door").

The younger generation of that era in China not only were denied the opportunity to become new red specialists enjoyed by their Soviet counterparts but lost out on even a basic education. Many came to see themselves as a "lost generation," the fate of whom became a theme of the "wounded" literature of the late 1970s.52 Those who did go to college and obtain positions now are looked down upon as "Cultural Revolution graduates." Consequently, large numbers of the new generation that in the Soviet Union provided the next wave of top leaders and formed a solid mainstay of the system are more a source of reform sentiment in China, or of alienation.

Exclusion of these youth from a conservative constituency would still leave old cadres (those whose service as cadres began before the Cultural Revolution) and new cadres (youths who were promoted during the Cultural Revolution and did not become part of the "lost generation") as the basis for a status quo constituency. With respect to new cadres, people who rose quickly to cadre positions during the Cultural Revolution and retained them after the old cadres returned have been the target before and after the death of Mao of continuing efforts to weed them out. The campaign to criticize the Gang of Four and root out their "bourgeois factional network" was largely directed at these individuals. The party rectification drive begun in 1983 was intended to finish this job by eliminating any of the "three kinds of people" (a term for various kinds of people who profited unduly from or committed excesses during the Cultural Revolution) who still remained in office and who might "sneak into the new third echelon" of successors to the present generation of cadres.53 The position of the new, Cultural Revolution cadres thus has been precarious, and contrasts with the experience of the group in the Soviet Union who stepped into posts vacated by Old Bolsheviks in the purges. Of course, anyone with responsibility was to some degree in a precarious

52 For example, see Jin Yanhue and Wang Jingquan, "Cries from Death Row," 96–114.

53 See Bo Yibo's comments on the objective of keeping the "three kinds" out of the third echelon in "Bo Yibo Talks About the September Party Representative Meeting," *Ta Kung Pao* (February 2, 1985), in FBIS, *China* (February 7, 1985), W10–12. It is unclear to what extent this objective has been attained.
position under Stalin; however, the newly promoted specialists were never as a group targeted for purging.

With respect to China's old cadres, counterparts of the Old Bolsheviks and old red directors, their position is ambiguous; and despite the presence among them of staunch conservatives (such as, at the top level, Chen Yun), they also provide components for a reform constituency. Tsou Tang has argued that the experience of leaders such as Deng (and others on down to the lower levels) who became the targets of class struggle in the Cultural Revolution and then survived has led them to “search their souls” about how such a miscarriage of the revolution could have occurred and to become open to institutional changes that would prevent a recurrence.54 This I think is a key insight. Stalin's successors of course also wanted to prevent the excesses of the past, but this was from the vantage point of beneficiaries of the excesses, not from the perspective of victims. Thus Khrushchev and his associates could not go along with demands made by people who had survived the labor camps and been rehabilitated by Khrushchev (about seven to eight million people) for more investigation, publication of historical records, and denunciation of crimes of the Stalin era as well as institution of due process of law and other radical changes.55 However shocked Khrushchev and others apparently were to learn of the magnitude of the purges, their own hands were not clean; and unlike Deng and so many others in China, they had not been targets.

Among the old cadres in China who repudiate the Cultural Revolution but oppose institutional changes, many are vulnerable not only for their age but for their predominantly rural, uneducated backgrounds. They are in line for retirement, if not already retired. There are of course the cadres who are not old enough to be retired and who have not been motivated to “search their souls” and look for new institutional forms. Many personnel and propaganda cadres and party secretaries at the middle and lower levels would fall into this category. But although they have a common interest in opposing the upgrading in status and the recruitment and promotion of intellectuals, they are hindered in forming a solid opposition by the fact that they are disunited by the old cadre–new cadre split that resulted from the Cultural Revolution and they are not as a group well-educated. In short, the conservative constituency at lower levels is politically and generationally split and at all levels is generally lacking in educational credentials. More-

55 See Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev.
over, its ranks are diminished because so many of its potential younger members became a lost generation and so many of the older generation (including the top leader himself) became disillusioned with the past for very personal reasons.

There is one more basis for a conservative constituency that we have yet to discuss. It is in fact the closest counterpart in China for the new red-expert class created by Stalin. The possible existence of an influential "Soviet" faction in the PRC leadership and at lower levels has been brought out by events of late 1986 and early 1987. Members of this group would be individuals who studied in the Soviet Union in the pre-Gorbachev era and who are assumed to support traditional Soviet-style planning and ideological rigidity. The most prominent official representing this group is Li Peng, the adopted son of Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao and a deputy prime minister, who has risen rapidly to high position and is reputed to be a candidate to succeed Zhao Ziyang as premier. According to one source, Li, an engineering student in Moscow in the 1950s, has brought about the appointment of ten or more officials with Soviet study backgrounds to important positions, including the minister of public security, the deputy chairman of the People's Bank, and five or more provincial governors or deputy governors.56

Another source refers in greater detail to a clique of Soviet-returned experts led by Li, which has its greatest strength in the State Council as well as positions as chief engineers and heads of various departments and bureaus. At the State Council level their posts include the ministers of the electronic industry, petroleum, weaponry, and communications plus the chairmen of the Scientific and Technical Commission and the Education Commission (Li Peng himself). The Soviet "clique" is said to be weaker at the local level. It is also influential in certain scholarly organizations, in particular various engineering societies, where Soviet-trained experts have replaced older scholars educated in the West who have retired.57

The Soviet-trained returned students, together with a related group of persons trained in China after 1949 by Soviet experts, are said to make up a large portion of the third echelon of cadres slated for promotion into the top leadership. Moreover, according to the report, most of them are people with good class backgrounds (revolutionary

cadre, soldier, or martyr, or worker or peasant), not people from intellectual families. This is a legacy of the class line followed in education after 1949. Good class background would have been particularly important in selecting students to go to the Soviet Union. As a group, they reportedly hold the view that "the Soviet Union of today is tomorrow's China" and have a "superstitious devotion to the planned economy."\(^{58}\)

This group represents the closest counterpart to the new hybrid elite of red experts who were educated in the 1930s in the Soviet Union and became a solid basis for orthodoxy. If the above assessments are correct, it represents an identical tendency in China. However, in China the group comprises a faction, or one group among others, rather than a broad stratum. They must vie with Western-influenced or simply non–Soviet influenced intellectuals. The significance of this apparently was not lost on Li Peng, who reportedly proposed that as many students should be sent to the Soviet Union as to the United States (the idea was vetoed by Deng).\(^{59}\) A further complication for this group is that the "Soviet Union of today" under Gorbachev itself has begun to undergo liberalizing reforms.\(^{60}\)

The Reform Constituency

What of the reform constituency itself? Some of the reasons for its potential strength have already been indicated: the counterparts of people who in the Soviet Union benefited from Stalin's policies in China were alienated in large numbers by Mao's policies. In addition to the groups mentioned above, old professionals and educated people in China generally were heaped with abuse and barred from playing a role in education or exercising authority in production for more than a decade. They have little reason to be attached to a party-dominated, orthodox order, even in a pre–Cultural Revolution form (it was during the 1950s that so many were battered by the Anti-rightist campaign). At the same time, the value to the regime of the existing technical and professional educated classes is even greater than was that of the Soviet "bourgeois specialists" in the 1930s. This is because of the failure under Mao to train a large new generation; for the moment, there are not enough new red experts to rely on, at least not in the numbers required for the modernization goals. In this sense Deng's regime is in

\(^{58}\) Ibid.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 17; translated and reprinted from *China Spring* (June 1986), 16.

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a position comparable to Stalin’s at the end of the 1920s, before the new generation of red experts had been trained. This might not be highly relevant politically if one could assume that now, under the new policies in China favoring intellectuals, the older ones will welcome the chance finally to be co-opted and the younger people who are trained will follow in their footsteps. There is certainly some basis for this view of the future, particularly if we keep in mind that a portion of the group who would count as “intellectuals” in the industrial sector would be the Soviet-trained individuals mentioned above. Nonetheless, assimilation of the technical/professional class is a more problematic matter in China than it was in the Soviet Union.

The problematic nature of the assimilation of professionals in China is a legacy of Maoist policies. Intellectuals in China were subjected to treatment that encouraged them to form a consciousness of themselves as a pariah group. This was passed on from the pre-1949 generation to their offspring by the party’s class policy, which gave people who grew up after 1949 the “class labels” of their parents (or even grandparents). They experienced discrimination, “remolding” and supervision, and the “class struggle” tactics of political campaigns, but at the same time they were not liquidated as a group. In the Soviet Union some old specialists were eliminated in the purges of the 1930s, while the rest were rewarded; in China fewer were eliminated but all were degraded.

In addition to this, the urban middle class in post-revolutionary China has a different composition than that of the Soviet Union because of the retention of elements of the business class. This is not only retention in the sense of their serving as officials but in the sense of their retention as business people. These individuals and families have connections with overseas Chinese, are often Western-educated, and are intertwined with the intellectual class at its upper reaches. This would tend to create a middle class with a more separate identity than its Soviet counterpart had, if indeed we can speak of a Soviet counterpart to this group. Because of the overseas connections, these people in China have other reference groups than just PRC society. This will continue to be the case with the new generation, who already have been sent to the West by the thousands for education. A Taiwan publication maintains that intellectuals in China are waiting for this generation to return and take up responsible positions, at which time they say a new order will emerge.61 Even if this trend is

61 Asian Outlook 19 (November 1984), 15.
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reversed by conservatives, the educated classes will remain divided into
groups who are influenced by different political and economic models
and who split along class lines as a continuing legacy of the old class
policy. A homogenizing process still is not evident.

The Question of Timing

There are many parallels between the immediate post-Stalin era of
Khrushchev and the post-Mao era of Deng. But there are also many
dissimilarities. Deng in at least one important sense is not a valid
counterpart to Khrushchev. The Soviet leader was a beneficiary not a
victim of Stalin's excesses (as were all his contemporaries at the top of
the Soviet hierarchy). A hypothetical parallel for Deng's situation in
Soviet history would be if, say, Bukharin had survived and eventually
become the post-Stalin leader and had then attempted to remove from
office both other old Bolsheviks, whom he had earlier rehabilitated,
and elements of the next generation most identified with Stalin, such
as perhaps Khrushchev and most of the others who became top party
officials with him. This is essentially what Deng is attempting in or-
der to realize his particular vision of the future.

In this effort he has had to turn to the technical-managerial elite
for support more than any Soviet politician has had to. This is be-
cause he must still deal with other "Old Bolsheviks," who were not
eliminated by purges; cannot rely on a younger generation of party
members and cadres tainted and/or made useless by the Cultural Revo-
lution; and is faced with a fair number of people in the party who
would like to see political campaigns revived. Deng has had a com-
plex balancing act to perform. This has become even more obvious
with the firing of his chosen successor, Hu Yaobang, and related
events of 1986-87. To complicate matters further, as a legacy of
Mao's policies, the professional elite remains relatively small and thus
Deng also must train a large new contingent. Hence the large
numbers being sent abroad. In the Soviet case, expansion of the
technical-managerial elite took place not when its support was being
solicited in a delicate political balancing act but rather when Stalin
with the help of the security police was in the process of crushing all
opposition, including any from the industrial sector. Further, the new
Soviet experts in the 1930s were not sent to the West for training but
rather received it from existing personnel—the old specialists. This
had two results: first, the new Soviet elite absorbed traditional
viewpoints and methods of the old pre-revolutionary specialists, not of
Western models, and second, they owed their training to the Soviet state entirely, not to foreign institutions.62

A critical question of timing is involved here. In the Soviet case Khrushchev’s 1961 declaration of the “state of the whole people” was preceded by five years of de-Stalinization, which followed his “secret speech” at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, in which he denounced the “cult of personality” and revealed the nature of Stalin’s crimes against innocent victims. In the years that followed, large numbers of people were rehabilitated; much of the gulag system was dismantled and the powers of the security police restricted.63 However, to some degree Stalin had already abandoned a revolutionary, class-struggle posture (albeit simultaneously with conducting the purges) with respect to the middle classes. In the 1930s restrictions on nonproletarian elements joining the party were removed, and large numbers of professionals were recruited for top positions in industry and into the party.

What this means is that the elements that add up to an end of revolution from above emerged over a protracted period. In the Chinese case the third plenum also followed a period of repudiation of the past, in the form of the campaign to criticize the Gang of Four and blame them for ten years of suffering and chaos, and was associated with a program by Deng Xiaoping to rehabilitate victims of the Cultural Revolution. The regime declared an end to class struggle and to Mao-style political campaigns (the counterpart of Stalinist purges) and also upgraded the status of intellectuals by declaring them a part of the laboring classes. The latter action essentially began a process parallel to what had been started by Stalin in a much earlier phase of Soviet development: the assimilation of professionals into a party-dominated system. In other words, two developments—the partial merging of party and professional elites and abandonment of revolution from above—that took place at different times under very different regimes in the Soviet Union are being attempted simultaneously by Deng Xiaoping. This surely presents a more difficult proposition in terms of maintaining control.

62 There were Western specialists employed in Soviet industry in the 1930s; however, this was not a major influx. The dominant influence on the upcoming generation was the old (Russian) specialists. See discussion in Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin, 422–425.
Conclusion

Deng's alliance with and support of the professional classes in no way suggests that he or anyone in his immediate circle, including even Hu Yaobang, have envisioned an end to the leading role of the party. Official directives emphasize that in recruiting intellectuals, "standards are to be maintained" and intellectuals are to be "trained, educated, and examined" to fortify their "communist ideology and consciousness." Clearly, the leadership hopes to co-opt these groups and thereby gain more control over them, as was the case in the Soviet Union. However, in addition to the social-political factors dealt with in this chapter, our earlier discussion in Chapter 3 suggests that Deng's instrument for producing the desired result is a Communist Party with some major shortcomings as an "organizational weapon."

While the ability of the party leadership to induce people to fall into line should not be underestimated, we have seen that the party at the enterprise level even before the Cultural Revolution showed some shortcomings, in terms of being a dominant Leninist organization. Personalistic ties and networks, operating at local levels and unresponsive to central demands, by all accounts became more pervasive as a product of the disruption and chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Efforts to rectify this sort of problem appear to have had limited success.64 With the present loosening of state control over the economy, all of these types of local threat to the efficacy of the party as a Leninist organization are plainly manifest. In 1985 the leadership appeared frustrated by what it described as the lower levels' repeated refusals to obey central commands to stop taking improper advantage of the new urban reforms.65 It is thus a combination of factors—the composition of the elite, the timing of Deng's abandonment of revolution from above, and the organizational character of the CCP—that suggests that whatever the intentions of Deng, or of those who are more conservative, a "Brezhnevian" post-revolutionary format is not a highly probable outcome for the PRC over the long term. The hallmark of the Brezhnev era was stability built on a broad base of complacency among party and professionals. Although there is a sufficient amount of conservative strength within the CCP to put a brake on reforms in

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64 For example, see "An Invisible Machine—A Negative Example of Perfunctorily Carrying Out Party Rectification," RMRB (February 8, 1984), 4, in FBIS, China (February 10, 1984), K5.
65 Beijing Domestic Service (February 6, 1985), in FBIS, China (February 12, 1985), K11.
China, as is the case at the present writing, it is less broad-based and united than was its Soviet counterpart. Moreover, there is the fact that reform is in the air in the Soviet Union itself. Making this point is not to suggest that reforms are guaranteed to succeed in post-Mao China, but rather to propose that the orthodox alternative will not be sustained.
Conclusion

A conviction underlying this essay is that in studying communist systems, lack of change can be as important an area of inquiry as change. Conservatism, continuity, and stability are equally requiring of explanation as reform, discontinuity, and instability. Thus I began with the question of why the Soviet system after Stalin retained its essential character for a prolonged period and then looked to see if factors that contributed to this result are to be found in China. I was interested not only in why a system such as the Soviet Union might change, but why it would assume a more or less steady state. This approach provides a perspective that is somewhat different from the one provided by taking the Soviet case as a given, a sort of standard model, and then asking why the PRC may not follow this classic form.

It is useful to see Stalinism—both the organizational structure and the mentality—as the product of a particular combination of historical circumstances. The Soviet Union was in a position to impose Stalinism on other regimes and to limit deviation. Variants of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism that might otherwise have emerged, such as in Hungary in the 1950s or Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, were forestalled from developing. China is less vulnerable to Soviet domination. Thus parallel sets of issues emerge as central—questions of elite dualism, of organizational structure, of revolution from above—but in a different context and without the same threat of Soviet intervention.

I have suggested that a combination of factors that supported a conservative (or "orthodox") political outcome and closed off other alternatives in the Soviet Union after Stalin are basically absent in the Chinese case. It is of course possible that conditions favoring a conservative outcome might exist in China that were not present in the Soviet case, thus producing a similar result for different reasons. The present analysis is not intended to exhaust all possibilities, but rather to be a step in a process of sorting out combinations of factors that
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favored change or the status quo in two states with comparable structures.

My account has dealt with the co-optation of elites (at lower bureaucratic levels, particularly in industry) under the respective regimes. Their integration, I have suggested, was related to mobility and recruitment patterns, the organizational coherence of the Communist Party and the role of the top leader, and the character of revolution from above and the timing of its renunciation by the regime. Variations in these areas produced divergent outcomes with respect to the question of elite dualism and related issues; these become part of the political equation in the post-revolutionary phase. I have suggested that a legacy of the Mao period was that in China, second generation party and professional elites in industry (and in the society in general) were less assimilated into the party-dominated system and more divided among themselves than their Soviet counterparts under Stalin. This situation has affected both the internal character of the party organization and its relations with society, and it suggests the existence of a less solid base of support for orthodox Leninism in post-Mao China.

Orthodoxy and Reform

If one argues that orthodox Leninism will not be sustained over the long term in China, what then might we count as a departure from it? So far, I have only argued in terms of what the future in China will not be like ("orthodox," "conservative," "Brezhnevian"). It behooves us to devote some further attention to the question of what after all is meant by "reform" in a Leninist context. In particular, we need to consider economic and political reform and the linkages between them and to distinguish adjustments within an essentially orthodox Leninist system from systemic change. We also want to consider the dynamic of change, which brings up the question of the role of the state versus economic and social forces.

Orthodox Marxism-Leninism has come to be identified with the centrally directed, quota-based economy created by Stalin. It is this system that has formed the primary target for reform on the part of the regimes in China, Eastern Europe, and now the Soviet Union itself. I would argue that economic reform as discussed below does not in and of itself constitute a departure from orthodox Leninism. On the other hand, it does contain the potential for such departure under certain circumstances.
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China has already undertaken a far-reaching program of economic reforms, opening the economy to the West and introducing market elements into the system. These reforms have been controversial in the PRC. The leadership's continued assertions that the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign does not imply any change in the commitment to them indicates that opponents in fact have tried to target the reforms. Thus it is possible that they may not be expanded or even sustained in the future. Despite the opposition generated by the economic reforms, I would not say that at this time they in fact represent a fundamental shift in the character of the system.

A recent article by Joseph Berliner reviewed economic reform attempts in the Soviet Union and discussed probable alternatives for the future. It provides a useful framework for analyzing and comparing the politics of economic reform in China and its implications in terms of orthodoxy. Berliner discusses two varieties of reform, which he terms the "radical" and "liberal" models. The radical model (which he calls "radical" because it is aimed directly at the system of central planning, unlike the "liberal" model) involves decentralization of planning and management, essentially by abandoning directive targets to enterprises, and is the type of reform introduced in Hungary in 1968 with the New Economic Mechanism. The state still owns the means of production, controls investment in plant and equipment, and controls prices through selective regulation. Operation of a true market is limited by a policy of job security and limits on income differentials. The radical model does not include worker self-management systems, such as in the Yugoslav model.

The liberal model retains the traditional planning mechanism for most of the economy, while liberalizing restrictions on private initiative. It essentially amounts to a neo-New Economic Program (NEP). Outside the boundaries of the socialized sector, various kinds of individual or group activity for private profit are allowed; enterprises can

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2 Joseph S. Berliner, "Planning and Management," 350-390. Different models are discussed on 363-381.

3 Berliner does not include a Yugoslav-style system among his four alternatives because he considers the chances of such a model even being proposed in the Soviet Union virtually nil. For various reasons I would also consider it highly improbable in China, in spite of official existence and occasional mention by the present regime of "workers congresses" which are supposed to discuss management matters.
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own capital and rent land from the state. The types of concern that are especially suited for reversion to the private sector are various kinds of small business, such as those engaged in consumer services, handicrafts, small retail shops and restaurants, small construction, and providers of special orders and special services for industry (for example, consulting). Private profit on some level is permitted in agricultural production as well. Since Berliner’s writing, some movement in that direction has been introduced in the Soviet Union itself by Gorbachev.4

The economic reforms undertaken by Deng Xiaoping involve a combination of Berliner’s radical and liberal models. On the one hand, the use of targets is to be abandoned in part of the state sector, not including basic heavy industry (a partial radical model).5 At the same time, the responsibility system in the countryside has essentially decollectivized agriculture, and numerous urban and rural small individual and collective enterprises of the type mentioned above have been encouraged to operate as private businesses (as in the liberal model). In addition, former capitalists are permitted to use their own assets to operate joint enterprises with overseas investors (a further twist to the liberal model).

Both the radical and liberal varieties of economic reform can be controversial in a Leninist state, although Berliner sees the former as the more problematic. With respect to radical reform (that is, abandoning directive targets to state enterprises), political obstacles result from the attachment of powerful groups to central planning, for both personal and ideological reasons. Berliner observed that other than liberal intellectuals, there is hardly any group in the Soviet Union who in fact would be likely to see anything to be gained by instituting a radical model. This includes the technical intelligentsia, industrial managers, economic ministers, and the party and police apparatuses. All, he points out, have an interest of one kind or another in the system as it is. In addition to having an “interest,” party loyalists have an ideological commitment to the existing system. To note such a commitment is not, Berliner comments, to impute some kind of “grand socialist idealism” to the party apparat but rather to acknowledge that “strong party leadership and control of the economy are

matters of deep conviction and believed the only way to run a Marxist-Leninist society," a belief that emerged from World War II years.\(^6\)

A second major obstacle to change in the centrally planned system is not so much direct opposition as it is a "lack of human resources." In the Soviet Union, Berliner observes, "hardly a soul is now alive" who remembers a market system; there is "a vast stock of human capital that supports the operation of a decentralized economy that is lost after a few generations of not having been learned or used." Any decentralizing scheme in the Soviet Union faces the fact that "the notion that somehow the ‘right’ amount of coal can be produced even though no one tells the coal mines how much to produce is not an idea that is easily grasped if one has not lived it." Thus reform was easier to adopt in Hungary because there, central planning had only been in effect for two decades at the time the market reform was adopted.\(^7\)

A final factor in the adoption of radical reform brought out in Berliner’s analysis is the role of nationalism. He points out that in spite of the fact that Hungary had a less long-standing commitment to central planning and more human resources favorable to decentralization than the Soviets, a political configuration favoring centralization would still have been strong there (and in Czechoslovakia, too, which also began a radical reform program). He attributes their nonetheless choosing radical decentralization to the fact that it represented a rejection of the central planning model associated with the Soviet Union and was thus a way of rejecting Soviet domination.

What of the liberal model? This model has the political advantage, as Berliner notes, of offering something for everyone. Unlike the radical model, it retains a state sector to be run by those experienced in and wedded to central planning. At the same time, it allows another sector for those with skills in and predilection for private enterprise to operate. In fact, Berliner notes, a close approximation of it has existed for many years in East Germany, certainly an orthodox Leninist state; such a system can easily be justified within the confines of Marxist-Leninist ideology (as an economic form appropriate for “mature socialism”).\(^8\)

The plan for economic reform being unfolded by Gorbachev in 1986–87 appears to involve elements of both the radical and liberal

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\(^6\) Berliner, "Planning and Management," 386.

\(^7\) Ibid., 373–374.

\(^8\) Ibid., 388 and 380.
models, as in the Chinese reform, although it is not yet clear how extensive the Soviet leader envisions them. China's case shows elements of both the Soviet and Hungarian-Czech economic and political configurations. With respect to the radical form of decentralization, China has had more than thirty years of central planning. There certainly are huge numbers of PRC economic officials who have trouble with the idea that the "right" amount of coal or steel can be produced if no one tells the factories or mines how much to produce. There certainly are large numbers of bureaucrats and managers who have an interest in the system as it is. On the other hand, former capitalists and managers remained on the scene after 1949, and connections have been maintained with overseas Chinese business. One does not want to exaggerate the significance of their influence; for example, since the reforms PRC Chinese have shown considerable difficulty in grasping aspects of competing in a market situation in their efforts to run operations that cater to Western customers. Still, it is less true than in the Soviet case that "hardly a soul now alive" remembers or can conceive of anything other than central planning. The large-scale sending abroad of Chinese for training in Western institutions and the setting up of Western management schools in China, such as the one in Dalian, might be expected to contribute further to this difference. China probably has more human resources to support a decentralized system than the Soviets have had for many decades, even though its professional-managerial class is proportionally much smaller.

There is also more potential support for economic revisionism for nationalistic reasons in China, as in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Leaders in China have a motive to reject a Soviet-type model simply because it is a Soviet model (just as the Soviets have a motive to retain it, simply because it is their invention). Although China is less dominated by the Soviets than are the Eastern European states, a situation that makes for less of an anti-Soviet nationalistic reaction, it also has greater aspirations for a central position in the world. There are, of course, elements in the elite who received training from the Soviets and who believe it to be the best model; they would attribute problems in China's development to Maoism's departures from the model, not to inherent defects in it. But on balance, it would seem logical to expect more support (or at least less op-

9 See, for example, Orville Schell's description of PRC-managed hotels in Beijing and in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in "A Reporter at Large (China)," The New Yorker (November 19, 1984), 86–153.
position) for a radical model in China than in the Soviet Union itself. Having said all this, a radical model, such as the Hungarian, still falls within the confines of orthodoxy. In particular, it is not incompatible with party dominance in the crucial area of control of social mobility and status. This fact emerges in the description of a critical writer who worked in a Hungarian factory after the economic reform. According to his observations, joining the party remained the key to upward mobility; all high officials belonged, and workers with the more choice assignments, which enabled them to earn more with easier work, were all party members or had good relations with party members.10

Liberal decentralization (opening of a private sector alongside the state sector) in the PRC would satisfy the desire to develop a system that could be called uniquely Chinese in character (that is, "socialism with Chinese characteristics") and at the same time, as Berliner says, provide "something for everyone"—entrepreneurial types and central planners. However, this type of reform can, and has, become a political issue because of the opportunities for corruption and/or excessive profit making that it provides. But although it is controversial, so far it cannot be said to represent a qualitative departure from orthodox Leninism because of the relative weight of the two sectors. Although market reform has certainly enlivened the Chinese economy for consumers and small entrepreneurs, the private sector in China remains minuscule in terms of total gross national product (GNP).

I would suggest that adoption and expansion of the liberal economic model, given China's conditions, does have a greater potential to present a threat to orthodox Leninism than it does in the Soviet Union. Berliner notes that the original NEP in Russia, which liberal reform resembles, involved a real political risk that would not be a problem under today's circumstances in the Soviet Union. In a still predominantly rural (80 percent) economy and with a still relatively small Communist Party, a political force might have been generated from the private sector that could have challenged party dominance.11 In China, institution of such a reform carries some of the risk involved with the original NEP, in spite of the fact that the CCP today is not "small" and is certainly more entrenched than the CPSU was in the early 1920s. China remains 80 percent rural, similar to Russia in the earlier period. Agricultural decollectivization means that 80 percent of

10 See Miklos Haraszti, A Worker in a Workers' State, 36, 69, 76, and passim.
the economy is basically out of the state sector. In addition, former capitalists have not been completely eliminated, and they retain their overseas connections. They are more autonomous than any Russian entrepreneurs were in the 1920s. Moreover, the CCP is more loosely organized than the CPSU and thus may be especially vulnerable to assimilation by extraparty elements. This organizational incoherence would be a critical factor in the type of mixed system implied by the liberal model.

Nonetheless, despite their controversiality and potential to generate political change, I would argue that as of now the types of reforms discussed above only amount to modifications within a Leninist system, not the transformation of one. Basically, far-reaching economic reforms of both the radical and liberal variety can be undertaken and leave essential political arrangements untouched. This brings us to the question of what we would consider to be the essential political characteristics of Leninism that would have to be affected in order to discern systemic change.

Orthodox Leninism in the Post-Revolutionary Phase

The primary referent for what we are calling the orthodox post-revolutionary phase is the Soviet system that emerged under Brezhnev. The Brezhnev regime retained the system of economic and political control created by Stalin, minus the terror, arbitrary rule, and “personality cult.” The latter were replaced by the policy of security for cadres (“trust in cadres”). Earlier I listed the essential characteristics of the Soviet system in the Brezhnev era as limited autonomy (for the private sphere and intellectual life), limited (elite) pluralism, limited rationality (in organization), and party dominance built on control of personnel and secondarily on coercion.

The recurrent word in this description of Brezhnevism is “limited,” and the limits on autonomous spheres of activity, pluralism, and rationalization ultimately spring from two notions: the concepts of the “leading role of the party” in all spheres, and of the “correct line” (Marxism-Leninism as applied by the party leadership) as the single authoritative truth. These make up two of the Four Upholds enunciated by Deng Xiaoping to contain liberalization (the other two being “socialism” and the “people’s democratic dictatorship”). The leading role of the party and the idea of the correct line are evident in the institution of nomenklatura and its Chinese equivalent, through which control of personnel is maintained. The party seeks to monopolize leadership selection in every sphere of activity and to ensure that lead-
ing individuals view the world through party-defined "political eyes."

The two concepts of the leading role of the party and the correct line are operative in both the period of revolution from above (Stalinism and Maoism) and the post-revolutionary phases (or versions of Leninism) of their successors. However, analysts have argued that in the post-revolutionary phase, a change begins to appear in the relationship between the political power and society, in which social forces begin to impinge on the party and bring about a modification of its approach to them. In Lowenthal's terminology, "the economic and social base are beginning to bring change in the political superstructure." 12 Indeed, the abandonment of revolution from above (in this view) is already an indication of the increased influence of social forces, in particular the urban-industrial professional classes, vis-à-vis the party-state.

I have suggested in these pages that social differentiation and professionalization in themselves do not necessarily produce substantial liberalizing change in a Leninist state, as demonstrated by the Soviet case. On the contrary, the new classes can be incorporated within and contribute to the orthodox party-dominated system. Moreover, such modifications in the political system as do occur in the post-revolutionary phase may arise more from the party elite's desire for security than from "the victory of experts" or the influence of "the economic and social base." However, as I have attempted to show in my discussion of Maoism and its legacy, the fact that all this can produce a stable orthodox Leninist state that maintains its essentials over a protracted time does not imply an iron law that says this will always occur.

In post-Mao China, the regime's ability to impose and sustain a modified form of Stalinism is limited for reasons discussed at length in these pages. Such limitation does not necessarily imply a trend toward pluralism or liberalization in the sense of "convergence with the West." It might imply a long period of instability or even chaos. But if some kind of accommodation among factions in the leadership and a measure of social stability can be achieved, one might foresee a sort of convergence with some closer kin, such as Taiwan (or other newly industrializing countries). We could describe this type of system as an authoritarian, basically single-party state with a business and trade orientation in the service of national prestige and status.

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One could argue that the key modification required for China to move away from orthodox Leninism would be the party monopoly over careers and thus life chances. It is perhaps this manifestation of the leading role of the party and the correct line that most distinguishes Leninism from other authoritarian systems. Although in Chapter 3 we discussed the system of dossiers and political surveillance as a Stalinist feature, in fact a similar apparatus can exist in a non-Marxist-Leninist state, notably Taiwan. The CCP would not have to get rid of this system to depart from Leninist orthodoxy. The same might be said of censorship and other restrictions, and of single-party dominance; none of these are peculiar to Leninist states. But only in Leninist systems does the ruling party concern itself with personnel down to the level of production on the one hand and throughout the central state bureaucracy on the other. There are no autonomous ladders of mobility. This feature remains even when revolution from above has been abandoned.

Is it realistic even to speculate about a Leninist party giving up the nomenklatura? Such a momentous change would hardly happen in a single reform. However, it could be chipped away by the existence of competitive local elections, a reasonably large private sector, and some approximation of civil service examinations for the state bureaucracy. None of these by themselves would end the party monopoly, but all of them in tandem over an extended period would multiply the number of individuals and groups not wholly dependent on party patronage and approval for their positions. This still would not equal full political membership for the populace, but it would be a precondition for it.

Political Membership and Revolution from Above

The post-Stalin and post-Mao periods are marked by the official abandonment of revolution from above; it is this that defines their character as post-revolutionary. Political membership is the fundamental question at issue in revolution from above and its abandonment, both for the party and for its targets. That is, the objective of revolution from above is not so much to preclude material advantages from accruing to an elite, but rather to prevent any group or class from demanding (or assuming they already have) the political status of citizens—that is, status as full members of the state and of “the people,” independent of the party’s judgments. This is why urban professionals and industrial elites present a particular problem for the party: they are especially prone to think of themselves not only as full
members of the society and polity, but as the most prominent or advanced members, with credentials that should bring social and political influence.

There is a separate but related question of political membership that arises between rank-and-file party cadres and members and the central party leadership. There is the danger (from the leadership’s point of view) that party members may see themselves as members who belong to the party because they agree with the its programs (professionals who join the party tend be suspected by the more red of harboring this viewpoint). This is unacceptable to the party center because, as Selznick argues, Leninist party discipline requires cadres who act as “deployable agents” of the organization, accepting discipline and assignments as a matter of principle, not people who just “agree with the program.”

Revolution from above serves two purposes, then, with respect to the question of political membership: it places its nonparty targets outside “the people,” designating them political enemies, and it serves notice on others of their category that their political statuses (and perhaps their lives) are in the hands of the party, regardless of any work or professional contributions they may have made. It also serves to educate party members in the supreme importance of loyalty and observance of discipline, as opposed to limited commitment and occupation of a role, and shows that they too can be treated as enemies if they commit sufficiently grave “errors.”

In the post-revolutionary phase the Leninist regime retreats from and renounces the policy of waging war on whole sectors of the populace (and even party members) whom it has labeled enemies. It turns to a posture of including as many groups as possible rather than excluding major groups. It is particularly concerned with including the urban-professional elite, and it takes various measures to accommodate them. At the same time, it maintains certain limits and tries to incorporate professionals and intellectuals within a framework of orthodoxy and party domination. In post-Mao China the political campaign, Mao’s version of revolution from above, has been rejected by the leadership. So long as it adheres to this policy, the CCP is deprived of its traditional means of correcting deviance and putting the fear of God, so to speak, into the hearts of intellectuals (as well as its own membership). Because of the perceived importance of the technical/professional segment of the intellectuals in promoting


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economic progress, the regime has been more scrupulous about applying the policy to them. This group was specifically excluded as a target of the aborted anti-spiritual pollution campaign of 1983, unlike the less fortunate literary and academic intellectuals, who were required to make self-criticisms and take a different direction in their work. The same pattern is apparent in the anti-bourgeois liberalization critique of early 1987. In any event, the Deng regime's policies favoring intellectuals (in comparison with the Maoist approach) prompted many in the party in 1983–84 to complain that implementation had "gone too far" and that intellectuals had become "too exalted" and inspired "certain comrades" to complain that "we conquered the country, but now the intellectuals are ruling it." The question of political membership has been more consistently divisive in China than in the Soviet Union and promises to continue to be so.

China is a much less developed country economically, not only compared to the Soviet Union as it is today but compared to as it was in the 1950s. Its professional class is smaller. Nonetheless, it has gone further down the road of reform (although not yet outside of Leninism) than the Soviet Union. This move toward reform is a product of disillusionment with party leadership at the mass level, largely due to the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, and of the lesser degree of elite integration within the Leninist format. There is also the greater predisposition of some of the leaders to experiment with the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist model for nationalistic reasons, plus their own experience as victims of the Cultural Revolution. More broadly, the relative strength of the reform force is indicative of the differing balance in party-society relations that has characterized China all along. The power and autonomy of the Stalinist state was unusual. As Lowenthal points out, Mao never established a "stable despotism." Although one could cite various attributes of Mao and of Chinese culture and history that could account for this "failure," this is not necessary for our purposes here. In fact, no one has established a stable Stalinist despotism except Stalin; Stalinist regimes elsewhere would not

14 On the exclusion of "scientific and technical circles" from the spiritual pollution campaign, see Zheng Ming 76 (February 1, 1984), 6-11, in FBIS, China (February 7, 1984), W1.

15 Xinhua Hong Kong Service (February 26, 1984), in FBIS, China (February 7, 1984), K2.

have had or maintained this character without the outside influence of Stalin and Soviet power. As suggested at the outset of this discussion, it is really Stalinism and the stability and persistence of its modified form in the Soviet Union that most needs explaining, more than the reasons why a system modeled on it could possibly change.
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