


# **Beyond Afghanistan**



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## **The Emerging U.S.-Pakistan Relations**

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EDITED BY

**Leo E. Rose and Kamal Matinuddin**



INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA • BERKELEY

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A publication of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Although the Institute is responsible for the selection and acceptance of manuscripts in this series, responsibility for the opinions expressed and for the accuracy of statements rests with their authors.

The Research Papers and Policy Studies series is one of several publications series sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies in conjunction with its constituent units. The others include the China Research Monograph series, the Japan Research Monograph series, the Korea Research Monograph series, and the Indochina Research Monograph series. A list of recent publications appears at the back of the book.

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ISBN 1-55729-017-2  
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 89-81688  
Printed in the United States of America  
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## Preface

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A series of very important developments in the southern Asian region in late 1987 and 1988 made a third U.S.-Pakistan bilateral forum appear necessary. In Southwest Asia an accord had finally been reached in April 1988 under which all Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by mid-February 1989. Meanwhile a "ceasefire" in the seemingly endless Iran-Iraq war was negotiated, easing what had been a critical but very complex issue in U.S.-Pakistan relations. In South Asia, India's relationship with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives had evolved along some novel and, in the view of the smaller South Asian states, potentially dangerous lines; a reconsideration of the respective Pakistani and American views of the "proper" Indian role in the region seemed appropriate.

The rather confusing series of developments in Pakistan's domestic politics in the spring of 1988 and the upcoming U.S. presidential election in early November were also seen as having important consequences for both countries' foreign policies, including their interrelationship. While no one had foreseen the death of President Zia-ul-Haq in an air crash on August 17, the subsequent introduction of a new and more open political system in Pakistan was also a subject of great interest and concern to both groups of participants. Although this process of political change in Pakistan was still under way in mid-October 1988 when the conference was held in San Francisco, it did provide the general framework for much of the discussion on all the topics.

The organizers and sponsors of the forum were Lt. General (ret'd.) Kamal Matinuddin, director general of the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) in Islamabad; Professor Robert A. Scalapino, director of the Institute of East Asian Studies; and Mr. Allen Choate, executive director of the Center for Asian Pacific Affairs (CAPA) of The Asia Foundation, which funded the conference and hosted it in the foundation's San Francisco headquarters. Mr. Harry H. Kendall of the IEAS served as conference coordinator. There were fourteen Pakistani and twenty-two American participants, including members of academic and research institutions, government and business organizations, and journalists.

The conference opened with three broad-ranging sessions on Pakistan-U.S. security relations (Rodney Jones, Iftikhar H. Malik, and Nazir Kamal);

economic relations (H. U. Beg and Eugene Staples); and mutual perceptions on the impact of politics and policies on bilateral relations (William Richter and Kamal Matinuddin). The next two sessions dealt with developments in South Asia (Rafique Ahmad, Leo E. Rose, and Richard Sisson) and in West Asia (Andrew I. Killgore and Farooq Hasnat). The final two sessions focused on the critical developments in Afghanistan (Theodore Eliot and Ijaz S. Gilani) and on the Soviet factor in U.S.-Pakistan relations (S. Rifat Hussain and Robert G. Wirsing). The papers and the discussions that followed clearly defined the areas and subjects of convergence and divergence in both countries' policies and interests in current Asian developments and the construction of a firm relationship based on pragmatic considerations in the new world that is emerging.

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# In Memory of President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq

HERBERT G. HAGERTY

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*At the opening of the Third United States–Pakistan Bilateral Forum the participants observed a moment of silence in memory of President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel, and others who lost their lives in the fatal plane crash of August 17, 1988. Subsequently Mr. Hagerty, a career Foreign Service Officer with many years' experience at the forefront of U.S. relations with South Asia made the following personal observations in conjunction with his discussant's remarks on the first two chapters in this volume.*

I wish to commend Professors Iftikar Malik and Rodney Jones for their papers on this critical aspect of Pakistan-U.S. relations. They provide a comprehensive and timely review of the “pressure points” in the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. I wish to associate myself especially with the views expressed by Rodney Jones—and not only because he is generous in quoting and citing the Hagerty family.

I find also the moment of silence with which we opened this session especially appropriate, not just for the very human loss we have all suffered at Bahawalpur but also as a special reminder of the critical importance of the late President to the present Pakistan-U.S. security relationship. In fact, it is impossible to review the overall relationship as it has evolved between our two countries without making it sound like a eulogy to Zia-ul-Haq; so be it, if that is what my remarks seem.

For nearly a decade, General Zia dominated all aspects of the relationship. Like all successful politicians and generals, he was lucky. His luck went beyond an unparalleled record of good monsoons. He had superb gambler's instincts and made the most of his situation by being willing to gamble, but he could also be *steadfast against* the odds, in the face of threats and pressures.

Rodney Jones notes that Zia gave “*predictability*” to the relationship, as important in relations between nations as it is in ties between peoples. It

was especially critical during the last decade in helping both sides to avoid the pitfalls of the past of which I wrote in the paper I gave at our meeting in Islamabad in 1986.

His was a steady hand. He could be counted on to be *steadfast* on the Afghanistan question, almost as the ultimate advocate of the “forward school” of nineteenth-century British strategic thinking. He understood that the security of Pakistan—indeed, of South Asia as a whole—rests heavily on ensuring that Kabul is ruled by a free, and if possible friendly, government. For Pakistan, of course, the problem of Afghanistan began more than two decades before the Soviet invasion of 1979 and has aspects that go back before Partition. Zia understood well that helping the courageous Afghan Mujahideen to stand tall against the Soviet invaders would be but a first step toward solving the problem.

He was *steadfast* in his economic policies, which—in the hands of the same Ghulam Ishaq Khan now acting as his successor—made the most of Pakistan’s scarce resources, mobilized support from abroad, avoided the capriciousness of the Zulfikar Bhutto years, and provided an unparalleled period of domestic growth and stability.

He was *steadfast* also in the search for the right combination that would have enabled him to restore representative government without setting the stage for yet one more cycle of political chaos requiring army intervention. In this, he was like a man on the back of a tiger. To a group of American visitors he once candidly observed—with a disarming grin—that it was “a hell of a lot easier to seize power than to give it back.” He was profoundly suspicious of political parties, which like our own founding fathers, he mistook for the occasion of faction, not its consequence or brokering mechanism. If he was not quite clear on what he wanted, he was certain of what he wished to avoid, and he kept trying to find the right formula for Pakistan, undaunted by rebuffs and false starts.

An important aspect of this effort was the successful local bodies elections he held, on a nonparty basis, for the town and district councils that were to become for some a training ground for the new politics. In the late 1970s, he spoke approvingly of the “Turkish model” for restoring representative institutions while preserving a role for the army. In his days as a corps commander, he instituted lectures on Islam for his officers, and he drew on his Islamic commitment to evoke the virtues and uniting power of Islam in support of what he called “Islamic democracy,” a vague concept that appeared to be a blend of Western parliamentary practice and both the egalitarian and the authoritarian values of Islam.

He was persistent. He moved gradually through a brief coalition with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), giving new life to the Pakistan

Muslim League (PML) and rehabilitating the Jamaat-i-Islami; and he released Wali Khan from Bhutto's long incarceration. After holding both general elections and a referendum on a nonparty basis in 1985, he ended martial law, put a five-year limit on his own term as President, and turned over day-to-day control of government to Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, the PML leader who demonstrated majority support in the National Assembly. Alas, this experiment was interrupted earlier this year when he summarily fired Junejo and followed up by scheduling new national elections. Undaunted, however, he appeared ready to start anew the search for that balance of authority and of representative government "right" for Pakistan.

His *steadfastness and courage* were nowhere better illustrated than in his repeated willingness to stand up to the Russians—alone if necessary. American support was especially important in buttressing this resolve, but so also were the efforts of Pakistan to rally support from its friends, from the Islamic world, the Nonaligned Movement, and in the United Nations. Pakistan under Zia mastered the intricacies of multilateral diplomacy to keep the public pressure on the Russians while reaffirming its support of the Afghan people's fight to be free. It was the checkmate they saw on all sides that eventually led new Soviet leaders to conclude that they must end their military adventure in Afghanistan; and it was Pakistan, under Zia and with our strong support, which negotiated the tough terms of that withdrawal.

Zia understood the limits of the overlap of American and Pakistani interests; he understood that with Soviet withdrawal our interests in Afghanistan would begin to diverge as the United States looks to its larger global concerns in the wake of this and other evidence of change in Soviet policy. It is Pakistan's, not America's, border, and the precise complexion of the successor regime in Kabul would logically be of lesser consequence to the United States so long as the Russians withdrew. Managing the limits of the convergence of Pakistan and America—an old problem for both sides—will be more difficult without Zia.

Zia recognized, in particular, that he had been no more successful than others in converting the U.S.-Pakistan partnership and our shared interests into an all-purpose alignment. Like his countrymen, he worried about India's growing military preponderance in the region. But rather than looking to others, he demonstrated *steadfastness and courage* in his pursuit of a "peace offensive" toward India as a way of easing that threat and overcoming the residue of decades of suspicion. Though far from successful in his pursuit, he persisted, cutting through to reduce tensions by dramatically visiting New Delhi during the traumatic "Brass Tacks"

maneuvers of 1987. In this exercise of statesmanship, he went the extra mile to keep his army and his evolving political process reined in so that both sides could back away from confrontation.

I do not share the fear of some Indians that Pakistan is somehow spoiling for a fight; nor do I share the view of Pakistanis that India wishes to undo Partition or seeks war with Pakistan. Zia understood well that Pakistan cannot provoke or seriously risk war with India. The military lessons of 1965 and 1971 remained too vivid, in his own experience, and too direct. He knew that the U.S. aid packages of 1981 and 1987 do not change that; India's military modernization is so comprehensive that Pakistan cannot begin to keep up—F-16s, Harpoons, and sophisticated antitank and anti-aircraft missiles notwithstanding.

Despite its major economic and technological advances and military preponderance, India too remains a poor country, with its infrastructural "dowry" weakened by political stress, its political leadership weak and, perhaps, its own military an increasingly political force. I see Indian intentions aimed at establishing a political paramountcy in South Asia to match its military, economic, and numerical dominance. That is unpleasant for Pakistan to contemplate, but Zia—always the realist—was prepared to deal with it, as Rodney Jones has asserted.

The "service raj" that ran Pakistan during the Zia years and that facilitated a smooth transition after the Bahawalpur crash has not really been tested in its attitude toward India since Zia's death; and India-Pakistan relations remain something of an Achilles heel in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Elections in the United States and Pakistan this fall (and in India next year) create uncertainties; I foresee weaker leadership emerging in both India and Pakistan. There is a danger that weak governments, unable (and perhaps unwilling) to contain the feelings that run deep on both sides, may be less successful in heading off confrontation and the possibility of accidental "tinderbox" conflict, in the way Zia did. Pakistanis credit us with considerable influence in things South Asian, but in fact the United States has little control over the long shadow these trends cast over Indo-Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan relations.


I will leave it to others, in this forum and elsewhere, to examine the other long shadow over Pakistan-U.S. and Pakistan-India relations that is cast by the prospect of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Our differences with Pakistan on nuclear weapons matters have been with us for many years; they disrupted the relationship in April 1979 and nearly did so again in 1987—even though we had a lot more at stake in the region and in the relationship in 1987 than in 1979. Deft footwork on both sides, and the importance of our strategic partnership on Afghanistan, enabled us to surmount last year's crisis on nuclear weapons. But at some point both

Pakistani policies and the diminished value of our strategic partnership may combine to provide less incentive for such compromise.

I thus see real stresses at the pressure points of Pakistan-U.S. relations as we move into the mature years of the relationship we rebuild in the aftermath of the Soviet folly of 1979. Events will probably occasion memories of unreliability and past perfidy on both sides. These stresses will be difficult to manage, much less control. In these matters, we grew accustomed to counting on Zia; we all will sorely miss his steady hand.

I leave you, and especially my Pakistani colleagues, with two thoughts: the first is that *it is tough not to be loved for yourself*. We Americans have learned this with difficulty and no little pain; we know it well. Zia too appears to have understood this, but many of his countrymen still have to learn the lesson.

Secondly, Eric Severeid said recently, "Old age is not for sissies!" I paraphrase that, as I contemplate the future of this relationship to say, "*Aging relationships too are not for sissies.*"



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# Introduction: Themes and Perceptions on the Bilateral Relationship

ANITA M. WEISS

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Relations between Pakistan and the United States have been both uniquely amicable yet occasionally distrustful. The relationship has been marked on the one hand by a close alliance supporting the Afghan Mujahideen but on the other tarnished by mutual suspicions over Pakistan's nuclear-generating capability. Conflicting emotions have had an impact on phases of the relationship.

As a medium to promote further understanding and cooperation—and perhaps raise the relationship to a level of mutual trust—the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation, in joint cooperation with the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad and the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, has hosted three Pakistan-U.S. bilateral forums since 1984. These forums have brought together scholars, diplomats, planners, and journalists in an arena where ideas could be freely shared and immediately responded to.

What follows in this volume are the conference papers from the final meeting in this series, held in San Francisco October 10–14, 1988, a month before scheduled national elections in both countries. Building upon the exchanges of 1984 in Berkeley and 1986 in Islamabad, the papers here address the most pressing, significant issues in the bilateral relationship, notably security imperatives, mutual perceptions, the implications of the Gulf War and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the Afghanistan conflict, and the USSR factor.

This chapter provides an overview of the final Pakistan-U.S. Bilateral Forum. It is, in effect, a record of the key themes raised in the ensuing dialogues following the paper presentations. The conference format designated a topic for each of the seven sessions around which an American and a Pakistani each presented a paper delineating their respective views on the subject. This presentation was followed by comments from a discussant from each country. The floor was then opened for a larger discussion,

which invariably proved to be lively. Interestingly, some topics such as nuclear proliferation and India's attempts at regional hegemony drew much accord from among each group's representatives, whereas other issues, such as Soviet influence and the future of Indo-Pakistan relations, displayed a marked division of opinion within each group.

The first day was devoted to the theme of Pakistan-U.S. security relations. The morning session addressed the military dimension of the issue, notably arms sales, nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, and the Indian factor in Pakistan-U.S. relations. The afternoon session addressed the economic dimension of the security issue, focusing on bilateral assistance, trade, and economic growth.

The opening session began with Rodney Jones's paper presenting the American view. Jones anticipates difficulties in keeping the bilateral security relationship coherent, given various recent events that have contributed to greater degrees of uncertainties on both sides. The U.S. policy of "resolve and resistance" in its support of the Afghan Mujahideen must be maintained so that the USSR will not be able to "snatch victory from the jaws of defeat." In reviewing the Geneva Accords, Jones commends Pakistan for its role in providing asylum to 3 million Afghan refugees and withstanding the inherent problems associated with this policy. He argues that the broader goals of U.S. security assistance should primarily support the political stability of sovereign states in the region, with an emphasis on economic development, social reforms, and seeing that states follow through on such programs. The military side of security assistance should support arms transfers (e.g., airborne early warning systems) that serve defensive purposes under existing circumstances. High-technology arms transfers should not be a priority; with present resources, there is no way that enough would be transferred to become a significant factor in politically destabilizing the region. The major challenges to the bilateral security relationship lie in resolving four major tensions: (1) the differing Pakistani and American views on how to change the present government in Kabul; (2) the shift in U.S. supply policy to Mujahideen commanders in the field rather than through the government of Pakistan; (3) nuclear non-proliferation, an area in which the Soviet Union has cooperated with the U.S. and in which a drift in U.S. policy could have important repercussions on the bilateral security relationship; and (4) the outcome of the November elections, because of the disturbance potential in American sensibilities raised by some of the rhetoric of the Pakistan People's Party and its allies, though Benazir Bhutto is viewed as more moderate than her father.

Jones is realistic in his assessment of India's growing military power and Pakistan's legitimate concern that even though parity is unlikely, Pakistan needs to make an attack by India expensive. In this regard, the United States

is more likely to seek actively to prevent a war rather than becoming involved if one takes place. Therefore, to manage the bilateral security relationship, both countries should avoid rhetoric and not overemphasize the theme of unreliability. From the American view, Pakistan should seek a constructive relationship with the postwar government in Afghanistan; remain in an ameliorating position in the Gulf conflict; keep a balanced relationship with India; develop a serious program of social development, especially in education; and "put the bomb back in the duffle bag," for that may ultimately prove to undermine the entire bilateral relationship.

Iftikhar Malik responded with a paper outlining Pakistan's security imperatives. There has been much internal imbalance since Independence, manifested in its political system, industrial development, ethnic conflicts, and other areas. To alleviate these imbalances, various institutions must be strengthened so as to diminish the potential of an internal security threat. Regional security imperatives, placed within a global geopolitical framework, focus on the South Asian subsystem (dominated by Pakistan's concerns with India) and its ties to Southwest Asia (overwhelmed by circumstances in Afghanistan). Malik offers a few scenarios of what may occur, given India's ongoing military buildup and its quest for regional hegemony. The U.S. inclination to link Pakistan's request for AWACs with its nuclear program, however, is viewed by many Pakistanis as discrimination. The nuclear issue remains the most sensitive and recurrent roadblock, whereas the outcome of both countries' November elections remains crucial to the relationship.

The American discussant commended both papers for providing a comprehensive review of the pressure points in the bilateral security relationship. He stated that the overall relationship that has evolved must be seen as a eulogy to the late Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, who knew what he wanted, was lucky, and had a superb gambler's instinct. Zia was steadfast in the face of threats and pressures, particularly in standing up to the Soviets on Afghanistan, his support of the Mujahideen, and his efforts to ensure that the rest of the world did not forget about Afghanistan. He was steadfast in promoting and mobilizing domestic economic growth, in pursuing a "peace offensive" toward India, and in his search for "the right combination that would have enabled him to restore representative government without setting the stage for yet one more cycle of political chaos requiring army intervention." The real stresses will emerge with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which may occasion memories of unreliability and past perfidy on both sides. The two most important of these disruptive forces will be the India-Pakistan relationship as the "Achilles heel" of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship and nuclear proliferation.

The Pakistani discussant identified the greatest threat to the bilateral

security relationship as the nuclear issue, on which there has been little accord between the two sides. Recent global and regional developments have affected U.S. policy, and it appears to many Pakistanis that the United States is favoring a bilateral Indo-Pakistan agreement to prevent nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent. He argued that the danger of proliferation has not eased in South Asia, largely because of "India's unresponsive and dogmatic attitude and the implications of its all-round military build-up." He elaborated on the various nuclear programs currently pursued by India and the support India has received from other states. Pakistanis are concerned that the United States may support India as a "regional influential" that could take over some of the regional security role of the United States as it pursues improvement of its relations with India. The Pakistani discussant concluded with thirteen points that must be considered in alleviating the standstill over the nuclear issue, emphasizing the need to make a distinction between India's "going nuclear" and Pakistan's need to create "a technological potential . . . to prevent nuclear blackmail by India in the future or a conventional Indian bid to liquidate Pakistan in its present form." Other points include looking to the Brazil-Argentina Agreement as a possible precedent for resolving the Indo-Pakistan impasse; the need to regard the prevention of nuclear proliferation in South Asia as the responsibility of both India and Pakistan; that any motivation by Pakistan to develop a nuclear weapons capability would be overwhelmingly related to India and that, therefore, talks on Pakistan's No-War Pact should be reviewed and reactivated; a written agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities should be sought in order to introduce a positive factor into the strained situation; and that, ultimately, a South Asian regional Nuclear Free Zone concept should be given careful consideration.

The ensuing discussion showed strong agreement within the Pakistan delegation on the idea that the United States has been unfairly placing the burden of responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation on Pakistan without regard for its strategic security imperatives in relation to India, whereas the blame for nuclear proliferation in the region should, in fact, more appropriately be placed on India. An American agreed that the recent Soviet leasing of nuclear submarines to India—though they are not militarily operational for the purpose of firing on other ships—holds a symbolic importance and encourages India to proceed with a nuclear program in which enrichment plays a part. A Pakistani felt that the Republican party generally takes a more sympathetic attitude toward Pakistan's anxieties about India, but that the Democrats seem more concerned with nuclear nonproliferation and human rights issues.

A strong divergence of viewpoint emerged in the discussion on what constitutes the greatest threat to Pakistan's security: the Pakistani delega-

tion perceives it as coming from India, whereas most Americans see the threat coming from the Soviet Union. An American argued that the real threat, as mentioned in both Jones's and Malik's papers, lies in Pakistan's problems in promoting economic growth, carrying out social reforms, and embarking on some form of participatory democracy. Most participants agreed that a general lack of candor about this issue was displayed.

A debate followed on whether the Afghanistan problem could now be considered as solved or not and the implications for the Pakistan-U.S. security relationship. Both groups of participants tended to agree that it is too early to perceive the issue as "solved." The American participants became animated over their conflicting perceptions of the role of the Soviet Union in the subcontinent. One American was uncomfortable with the Pakistani opinion that the relationship between Pakistan and the USSR could have been a good one if not for the United States. Another American pointed out that as the USSR put its bets on India, this placed limits on a Pakistan-Soviet relationship and, conversely, has been responsible in many ways for the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. A third American noted that, in a broad sense, as long as Soviet foreign policy appeared rigid and, in Asia, largely military in thrust, it was easy to get a broad consensus in response. As the policy becomes more sophisticated and diverse, however, such a consensus becomes dubious. Although the Soviets certainly do want to use more resources for internal reforms, they will not want to jeopardize their security interests and global position. The USSR may "normalize" certain relations, such as with China, but these relations will not become "trusting." These actions will have implications for the future of the Soviet-Pakistan relationship and, therefore, for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship as well.

A Pakistani participant noted Pakistan's effectiveness as a mediator in the Gulf crisis. Pakistan's tilt toward Iran has much to do with Iran's assertion that security in the Persian Gulf is inextricably linked to security in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Pakistan sees Iranian aspirations as a legitimate counter to Indian goals of regional hegemony.

An American posed the question to the Pakistani delegation: What is their conception of a balance of power in South Asia? A Pakistani responded that it does not mean parity, but rather a situation in which a neighbor would find it very costly to violate the integrity of Pakistan. He stated, "We are looking for something to prevent India from carrying out aggression in the future."

The second session addressed bilateral economic relations. Eugene Staples argued in his paper that Pakistan may be approaching a true historic opportunity, a confluence of circumstances created by the probable end of the Afghan war; a new political system on the horizon; the possibility of a

real change in attitudes toward national development, especially in the social sectors; and a liberalization of the political order. Although management of the domestic economy has been good, Staples said, Pakistan must guard against negative trends in the economy by improving its domestic resource mobilization, particularly the tax system; liberalizing and reducing import substitution dependency; reducing corruption; promoting debureaucratization and decentralization; and supporting mass literacy and education. Ultimately, "unless Pakistan begins to reform its basic institutions and to educate its citizens it will simply never catch up with the world, much less transform itself into the proud, successful Islamic society its citizens have dreamed of." Education, he argued, rates as the most critical of all the development subjects and has been seriously and persistently underfunded. Advances in primary education will enable Pakistan to prepare its people to participate in worldwide revolutions in technology and communication and will give Pakistan "its best long-term insurance against the politically disastrous consequences of high levels of open unemployment." Staples also contended that private institutions can be extremely effective in higher education.

The next paper, by H. U. Beg, agreed that other sectors, including education, could not be adequately addressed in Pakistan's development program in the past because of competing claims by more immediate concerns. Following a review of the history of economic relations, Beg addressed the \$2.28 billion bilateral economic aid package for 1988–93, which "concentrates on challenges extending across sectors, reform in the policy framework, institutional and managerial environment, development of human resources and sustainable improvement of physical infrastructure." He criticized U.S. economic strategists for not fully consulting with Pakistan's decision makers in designing the components of the assistance program and for tying aid to U.S. sources without allowing international tendering. Beg supports six avenues for increasing Pakistan's resource base and regards agriculture, energy resources development, and human resources (i.e., providing skills and training to the labor force) as the areas holding the most promise for maximum growth potential.

The American discussant commented that although the United States can do much to contribute to Pakistan's economic development, it is also engaged in a search within its own society to see what changes can make the United States more competitive internationally. He agreed with Staples's argument that limits on Pakistan's growth have much to do with the problems of the country's political economy: Pakistan's growth record is commendable, but it masks an underlying hollowness, especially in education. He agreed with Beg's observation that the U.S. assistance program has a number of important weaknesses. The crux of the issue is the question of

human development and how much the assistance program can and should put into it. This is more than a problem of resources; it is tied to political culture. Even though a resources problem exists, the attitudes of the elites must still be questioned. He pointed out that all the NICs (newly industrialized countries) have a program of universal education and an egalitarian approach to these issues. Some encouraging progress has been made on the educational front in Pakistan, notably via the funds allocated to National Assembly members through the five-point program. He summarized his comments by noting that although there are different ways to achieve national security in postcolonial states, those states with strong economies do not risk being overrun.

The Pakistani discussant focused his comments on the public dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign aid in Pakistan and the tendency to place the blame for many of the country's problems on it. The reason behind this dissatisfaction is that the common man has not benefited as much as elites have from the aid. When the Harvard group interfered in the economy in the 1960s, they promoted a kind of "functional inequality": let the rich get richer so that they can save the country. The 1970s saw many reactions against earlier inequities, resulting in a "nonfunctional equality" that emphasized distribution over outputs. The 1980s have witnessed a search for "functional equality."

The ensuing discussion centered on the issues of developing energy-related technologies, the decentralization of public enterprises, the funding of educational institutions, and the need to incorporate women into Pakistan's development process. A Pakistani participant argued that decentralizing WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) will not generate more energy and that the solution only lies in Pakistan's acquisition of energy-related technologies, mostly through technology transfers. An American pointed out that "local sociological barriers" constrain continued explorations for coal, especially given dacoit activities in the country's interior, nor does nuclear power generation seem to be a viable option. Windmill energy may, however, be effectively harnessed for supplying Pakistan's energy needs. He said that even though solar energy would seem to be an obvious alternative for Pakistan, it requires capital-intensive investments of a scale no Third World state can afford. A Pakistani participant mentioned that there have already been numerous failures in attempting to introduce solar technology in Pakistan. An American noted that the issue of solar energy had come up often in the U.S. AID (Agency for International Development) portfolio, and the general assessment has been that, though expensive, it may well be a viable option in those areas where the cost of bringing in conventional power lines remains prohibitive. The British Petroleum Company is active in this area in Pakistan,

trying to develop solar technology that tea stall owners can use. U.S. AID has initiated a few solar projects, including one on the Makran coast in Baluchistan.

This subject led to a philosophical debate on how growth and economic development are actually achieved. In the prevailing view, energy wastage can be overcome by decentralizing and debureaucratizing many areas of the economy. An American participant noted that American views on how developing countries can achieve growth have undergone significant change in the past few years, arising from their understanding of the development experiences of Japan and the NICs in East Asia. The characteristics favoring growth—promoting universal education, relying on the private sector, and encouraging competitive, export-oriented economies—have become ingrained in American bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. Another American pointed out that East Asia is not characterized by free market economies, since the respective governments played important roles behind the successes of each country. So too could the government of Pakistan play such a role in decentralizing WAPDA, since about one-fourth of power generated is wasted in “administrative losses” caused mostly by corruption and poor management. WAPDA should concentrate on power generation and “spin off” its distribution side. A Pakistani participant agreed with this assessment, noting that with only 1 percent of proposed changes implemented thus far a 10 percent reduction in losses has already occurred.

An American noted that by failing to address the social development requirements of women both practically and symbolically, Pakistan is missing out on an important component of successful economic development and prosperity. Other Americans agreed that the most efficient way to address the needs of women—and one that will have the most powerful impact—is through primary education. One of the values of having big donors provide assistance to primary education programs is that Pakistani government resources are thereby committed to it as well.

The role of education—particularly functional education—in alleviating Pakistan’s economic and energy dilemmas was an underlying theme of the entire discussion. A Pakistani argued that U.S. AID has always been channeled through the state and has not addressed the fundamental need of universal education. An American countered this accusation by stating that when the new AID package was formulated in 1982 in response to the Pakistan government’s identified areas of need, education was not on the list. AID now has a primary education project and a “Center of Excellence” program at the university level. A Pakistani participant took issue with the latter program, however, and its emphasis on developing private universities. He compared the public institution in Lahore, Punjab University,

with the private Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). The former has more than 10,000 students, with over 150,000 students in affiliated colleges, whereas the latter has very few students. LUMS, however, has received millions of rupees under the AID program, but Punjab University has received nothing. Out of 15,000 colleges in Pakistan, however, only 104 specialize in technical education. Pakistan does not need to create elitist institutions, but rather should set up more technical colleges.

The third session was devoted to mutual perceptions. Kamal Matinuddin opened the session by elaborating on those characteristics of Pakistan that interest the United States, including the fact that it is a "rimland" country (i.e., with geopolitical proximity to strategic areas); that it has a large population (110 million); and, notwithstanding its Islamic ideology, it is oriented to the West and enjoys relative stability. He countered critics who charge that Pakistan has blackmailed the United States by asserting that the country has repaid all its debts by the risks it has taken, its ostracism from other nonaligned countries, and its relationship with the USSR. Three issues will continue to affect mutual perceptions: Afghanistan because it will remain in the Soviet sphere of influence; Soviet pressures, which keep threatening Pakistan to "behave" or else; and the Gulf conflict, which is placing Pakistan between Iran—its historic ally—and Iraq. Points of convergence exist on Afghanistan and the drug issue (i.e., eradication of opium poppies and drug smuggling); slight differences of opinion surface on the Gulf crisis and the Indian Ocean, particularly concerning the elimination of nuclear submarines; and large differences exist on the Arab/Israeli problem in the Middle East and Pakistan's nuclear program.

William Richter then addressed the "tone" of American perceptions and the "mental maps"—implicit assumptions concerning what the world is like—of the American public and of American policymakers. The American public tends to deal with countries like Pakistan in terms of stereotypes (usually negative) as they respond to news stories describing crises. Richter used the air crash of August 1988 to observe some of these manifestations in the American press, which included many inaccuracies and misrepresentations about Pakistan. Reactions in the press were surprisingly pessimistic in virtually assuming that martial law would be imposed and overemphasizing the fragility of the Pakistani union. This viewpoint, however, underestimates the changes in the political processes that have occurred in Pakistan, particularly over the past three years. Americans only see the surfacing of regional discontents in elections, neglecting the fact that they also enable the integration of these divergent groups. Overall, Americans do not recognize that there have been significant moves toward democracy in Pakistan in the last five years, nor do they

have a good understanding of the character of the late Zia-ul-Haq, and they tend to see the consequences of his Islamization program as far more extreme than in fact they were. Many Americans hold a crusader attitude of “Islam versus the West,” failing to see the theological links among Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. American academics have done little to rectify these misconceptions, for most of those who deal with South Asia continue to be either India-based or India-biased.

The Pakistani discussant agreed that Americans often credit General Zia for things he didn't do, but also criticize him for matters he had no control over. Americans do not understand the history of Pakistan's state structure that underlies its tendency toward martial rule. British India had various authority structures in place in different regions: the parts that became Pakistan had either been the most bureaucratically ruled under the British or had never enjoyed representative rule of any kind. The American regard for Zia as a “deterministic character” is very doubtful, and he was caught up with thinking about how to remain in power. The Pakistan People's Party was not the stumbling block thwarting elections; it was, rather, the martial law government itself.

The American discussant saw much convergence in the views of both papers. Pakistan and the United States are united in their views on Afghanistan and support of the Mujahideen, though obviously Pakistan has a more direct interest in who rules in Kabul, the Pushtoonistan issue, and the future of the Mujahideen. This *is* an unfair world, a hierarchically arranged one, and it is the Americans who always tell the Pakistanis what they must do to improve relations with the United States. This reality has become a part of political discourse in Pakistan, including the perversity of U.S. aid, priorities, inadequateness, and the like, which draws many Pakistanis to question their country's relationship with the United States. As Agha Shahi, the foreign minister, once said of the relationship, “It's not an embrace, it's a handshake.” The nuclear issue and the mutual perceptions of it are complex. Pakistan and the United States share a concern in India's growing influence in the Indian Ocean. Whereas Pakistan's fears regarding nuclear weapons are focused on India, however, the United States must take India's fears of China into consideration.

The subsequent discussion was clearly dominated by the efforts of American participants to explain how their compatriots—though not themselves—view Pakistan. They focused their comments on perceptions of Islamization, Pakistan's political institutions, and how these subjects are reported about in the American press. One American commented that after the plane crash the American press focused much attention on General Zia's Islamization program but made no distinction between this and Khomeini's program and did not note how much of a gradualist Zia

was. Instead, the press resurrected images of lashings and other events that played on Americans' fears of Islam rather than truly informing them about it.

There was disagreement among the American participants about Pakistan's political institutions: some believed that the U.S. government should strongly support any move toward greater participatory democracy, but others stated that the United States should guard against becoming too closely aligned with the nascent political institutions. The latter sentiment derives from the question of the extent to which to which democratic institutions may be able to relieve problems of ethnic conflict: expecting these institutions to do so may be placing too much pressure on them. Another American, however, noted that Pakistan's own history denies the claim that ethnic conflict can be suppressed through authoritarianism. The example of India—the "noise" of India's democracy—supports the claim that democracy may well prove to be the most viable way to deal with ethnic conflicts. An American argued that U.S. press commentaries on the plane crash were at least three years out of date because the press is headquartered in New Delhi and reporters only come to Pakistan when a crisis comes up. The fact that they are based in India also clouds their perceptions of events in Pakistan. Another American agreed that the focus of the press was very narrow, but noted that the prevailing view in Pakistan was that the plane crash had important domestic implications, which contributes to the American perception that things happen quickly in Pakistan and without sense. State Department officials did not help change this perception by questioning if there was going to be continuity or imposition of martial law.

The Pakistani participants, however, were more concerned with discussing the different perceptions of nuclear nonproliferation. One Pakistani participant noted that many Pakistanis see the U.S. attitude toward nonproliferation as inconsistent, incorrect, and not credible, and that the Americans view it as a technical problem instead of seeing it as a political issue linked to security considerations. An inconsistency emerges in American policy on nonproliferation when the United States refuses to assist certain countries such as Yugoslavia that have signed the NPA (Nonproliferation Agreement) to develop technology for nuclear generation. An American expressed the opinion that Pakistan is perhaps overreacting to India's aspirations to be the regional superpower; that India will find its military involvement in northern Sri Lanka a sobering experience, similar to the American experience in Vietnam and the Soviet venture in Afghanistan; and that this discovery will temper India's designs. A Pakistani participant agreed that India is unwilling to accept Pakistan's proposals that South Asia be a Nuclear Free Zone because of China, but a start must

be made somewhere. Pakistan has forwarded six proposals and has asked India to offer a new one if they cannot agree to any of them. Thus far, India has not even agreed to a ban on attacking each other's nuclear facilities.<sup>1</sup>

A Pakistani participant expressed surprise and regret over the comment by an American participant that democracy may not be so good for Pakistan. This kind of thinking, he stated, underscores American misconceptions about Pakistan's political process. The root of the ethnic problem lies in the availability of channels of expression for disparate groups to voice their concerns. Military governments in fact constrain groups, except those that can express their interests through the military. The American who had stated that opinion noted the dramatic, inequalitarian character of Pakistani society and wondered how democracy could really work, given this scenario.

An American participant argued that the bilateral relationship shows a greater maturity now than in the past, but it is asymmetrical. It seems that Pakistanis understand U.S. issues much better than Americans understand anything about Pakistan. The latter, unfortunately, regard Pakistan in terms of single issues: the nonproliferation treaty, Afghanistan, India, and so on. There appeared to be a consensus among all participants on this final point.

Session four was launched with a joint paper by Richard Sisson and Leo Rose on the prospects of Pakistan's relationship with India following the resolution of the Afghanistan crisis. Perceptible differences are now apparent in this relationship, and conditions that inflamed national passions in the past have receded in the last two decades. References to the undermining of Pakistan's sovereignty by India have been lacking in recent elections, and both the Kashmir and Siachen Glacier disputes are no longer primary concerns on both sides. Though it is likely that both governments will continue to publicize periodic confrontations, it seems that Kashmir or the Siachen Glacier may be an *excuse* for initiating hostilities, whereas in reality they will not be the *cause*. Similarly, Sisson and Rose argued that neither support for transborder separatists—in actuality, “the failure . . . to exercise full control and supervision over nationals of certain ethnic origin from the other country in its territory”—nor nuclear proliferation will be the cause of a future war. It appears that both sides have decided to have a nuclear weapons capability, and no third state can deter them; the superpowers must “define their own security policies in Asia in terms that make nuclear weapons seem both unnecessary and unattractive to India and Pakistan.”

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<sup>1</sup>This has since changed, with the signing of an agreement between Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi at the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit in Islamabad in late December 1988.

The latter instead perceive the most crucial issue as hegemony, and in this context the other issues take on their significance to Pakistan. The question of nuclear proliferation and foreign entanglements is central to the treaty of peace and friendship offered by New Delhi, and most Pakistanis interpret the proposal as a long-term campaign on India's part to assure its hegemonic position in the subcontinent. Pakistan's sense of isolation on the Sri Lankan crisis, however, will not make it seriously reconsider the treaty. Though India, in a symbolic way, enjoys a hegemonic position in South Asia, Pakistan will be able to constrain this hegemony a bit.

Rafique Ahmad responded with the Pakistani view of the Indo-Pakistan relationship. He struck a popular chord when he stated that Pakistanis think that most Indian intellectuals still see Pakistan as a historical accident that will ultimately disintegrate. As South Asia is, in fact, not a single cultural entity, the two distinct social systems of Hinduism and Islam remain a source of tension in the area. South Asian Hindus continue to expect India to safeguard their interests, and South Asian Muslims expect the same of Pakistan. Therefore, given these deep-rooted bipolar differences, serious problems can easily develop unless a balance of power is maintained between the two countries. Ahmad disagreed with the American view that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is providing a viable forum for discussions and did not believe it would play an important economic or political role in the subcontinent. Instead, he urged the conclusion of a regional coexistence pact, establishment of a South Asian regional Nuclear Free Zone, encouragement of mass media to play a more effective role in promoting understanding between diverse groups in the region, and more extensive cultural exchanges.

The American discussant agreed with the premise behind the Sisson and Rose paper, that there are really no disputes between India and Pakistan in a real sense: most, even the intractable ones, have been shelved. Many disputes, including evacuee property, the creation of Bangladesh, and Junagadh, are virtually dead, and he recommended deciding the Siachen dispute by a coin toss. Because India believes it was "taken" in the resolution of the Indus water dispute, however, it is now reluctant to go beyond bilateral discussions. The important remaining conflicts are nuclear proliferation and the increase in conventional armaments. As equality in power cannot be achieved, Pakistan needs a viable deterrence, which will most likely improve further in the future.

The Pakistani discussant felt that both sides shared many similar views on Indo-Pakistan relations. He disagreed with Ahmad, though, on the premise that fundamental differences exist between Hindus and Muslims and suggested we look for other reasons behind the different perspectives.

India has not been wise in a number of its stances on Afghanistan, especially in its desire to return to the pre-1978 times of Zahir Shah and in Rajiv Gandhi's public declaration that an Islamic fundamentalist government would not be permitted to exist in Afghanistan. He therefore asserted that Pakistanis should grant less to India's wisdom and deviousness than they do. India has relied on military power to obtain political and economic influence in the region, but its socioeconomic capacity cannot support that influence. He agreed with Sisson and Rose in their assertion that India is learning a lesson in Sri Lanka, but Pakistanis are still concerned that this lesson may not be severe enough. From Pakistan's viewpoint, the United States has two opportunities to act in this context: (1) It can clearly pick one of the two countries as an ally. The Soviets are seen as a much more credible ally with India than the United States is with Pakistan. (2) It should not adopt a "Nixon Doctrine" stance that would seek to exercise influence through regional powers. Pakistan is seriously concerned that the United States may give that hegemonic role to India.

In the ensuing discussion it became apparent that the views of the paper presenters and formal discussants were not shared by the majority of participants. A number of Americans felt that their compatriots had been overly optimistic about Pakistan's relations with India and that the Siachen Glacier dispute, which involves China as well, is of greater importance than they have granted it. A Pakistani participant agreed with this sentiment that the United States often downplays issues that Pakistan feels are important. As an American added, a distinction must be made "between passions and analytical facts . . . we shouldn't write off the potential of a Pakistan-India dispute because we can preach sermons that they shouldn't occur." An American noted that most Pakistanis perceive India as the enemy and that they become quite passionate about the Siachen dispute. A Pakistani participant added that Rajiv Gandhi has called Pakistan the biggest terrorist organization in the world and that no Pakistanis think that India has changed its colors. "Passions run so deep in Pakistan," he said, "that we'd rather lose our hockey matches to anyone but India!" Other Pakistanis referred to the "expansionist designs of India" and to the still-prevalent popular tendency to blame many of Pakistan's problems on India.

From the discussion, it became clear that an important concern of the Pakistani participants was how the Americans expected Pakistan to deal with India and its hegemonic aspirations. After the resolution of the Afghanistan issue, the United States will place less policy emphasis on Pakistan, but Pakistan will still have to confront its dilemma with India. Most agreed that the USSR is perceived as a better ally to India than the United States is to Pakistan. For example, the Soviets are giving India a

power plant and this is not considered a threat to nuclear proliferation, but when Pakistan asks for the same thing, the United States regards it as nuclear proliferation. Many also felt that the United States is encouraging India to be the preeminent power in the region. They pointed to the fact that the United States did not condemn India's actions in Sri Lanka. An American agreed that the United States, by acquiescence and friendly gestures behind the scenes, essentially supported India's attempts to resolve the Sri Lankan situation. An American believed that President Jayawardene came to the decision that the issue could be resolved only through Indian interference; the United States came to the same conclusion. A Pakistani participant disagreed with this assessment, arguing that the Indians started the whole problem and that Sri Lanka only signed the agreement because they feared an all-out attack by India.

The Indian "Brass Tacks" involvement in Sri Lanka prompted an American to argue that if nuclear arms are considered to be a deterrent in U.S.-Soviet relations, why would they not be considered a deterrent in Indo-Pakistan relations? He argued that the difference is that the Americans and the Soviets, no matter what the crisis, have *always* stayed in communication with each other. However, when a crisis breaks out between India and Pakistan—and this was true with the Indian attack on Sri Lanka—there is sometimes no communication for days at a time, increasing the possibility that a nuclear weapon could be used.

A related issue raised in this discussion was the propensity of a weak government to start a war. An American noted that the critical factor is the *kind* of weakness: in the past, the Indian government had been able to quarantine conflict and regional conflicts appeared only episodically, but neither situation exists any longer. Another American noted that India and Pakistan may both have relatively weak governments and that some Indians have worried that Rajiv may start a war with Pakistan as a prelude to the elections. Both sides, however, realize there are no longer any "cheap" wars and that an armed conflict would probably not achieve their objectives anyhow. The two governments may use the populist rhetoric of a possible war, but this sort of talk does not reflect their true perceptions. A Pakistani agreed that both sides must understand that they cannot conquer the other and that Pakistan's fears of India may be exaggerated: if India cannot manage its Punjab or Gurkha problems, how could it manage the incorporation of Pakistan? Another Pakistani replied to the Americans that Pakistan will possibly have a weaker government after the elections, but it will be a democratic government, which is the crucial issue at this point for many Pakistanis.

Session five addressed the impact of divergent views on Gulf and West Asian issues on the Pakistan-U.S. bilateral relationship. Andrew Killgore,

dividing his paper into four parts, began with a historical overview of the Iran-Iraq war and categorically stated that Iraq has won it. He reckons that both sides have learned a bitter lesson and have enough oil to reconstruct their economies: a future war between them, therefore, is unlikely. Second, he noted that eight wars have been fought on the Arab-Israeli dispute, which has virtually been a fifty-year war. If the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) unambiguously recognizes the existence of Israel, he expects the possibility of a two-state solution following the November elections in the United States. The final two parts concerned superpower responses to Middle East conflicts and the existing problems in Lebanon.

Farooq Hasnat argued that Pakistan looks at the Middle East from an entirely different perspective than the United States. Pakistan does not construct its attitude based on issues, but rather as a member of that region. Instead of dealing with each country on a bilateral basis, he constructed a typology of five subsystems and discussed their relations with Pakistan: the Persian Gulf; the non-Arab Middle East; the core of permanent tensions in Israel; the Maghreb; and the periphery of the region. The Persian Gulf is the most important subsystem to Pakistan, and the Iran-Iraq war has dominated all relations in this region since 1980. The war started because some of the countries in the area could not reconcile their domestic situations with the new institutions inside Iran, which, in Pakistan's view, did not lose the war. The Pakistan view is that this low-intensity war posed no danger to other parts of the Middle East until the arrival of U.S. ships in mid-1987. The conflict then gained an international character that directly threatened Pakistan's security. The U.S. naval presence was an irritant for Pakistan; the security of the Gulf should be the responsibility of the Gulf states alone. Pakistan could not play a decisive role in resolving the conflict because it was viewed as too close to the United States, and this enforced aloofness was detrimental to Pakistan's relations with both Iran and Iraq. Three factors strongly affect U.S. policy in the region: (1) U.S. military might in the Gulf may become embarrassing to its allies; (2) the U.S. has lost its prewar monopoly on supplying arms; and (3) Arab allies now also have ties with the Soviet Union. Russian strategy will now be to supplement their efforts wherever U.S. influence has lapsed.

The Pakistani discussant focused his reply on the American paper, with which he disagreed. The Algiers Accord of 1975, one of the most comprehensive peace agreements in recent times, was an unbiased bilateral agreement between Saddam Hussein and Iran. It stipulates that the boundary between the two countries is in the middle of the Shatt al-Arab River (referred to as Karun River in Iran). The risk in the peace accord now is that Iraq may try to gain in negotiations what it could not achieve on the battlefield; a renegotiation of these boundaries is not called for. He

disagreed with the American view that reconstruction may be more problematic for Iran than for Iraq: Iran owes no money for its war expenses, but Iraq's debt is over \$50 billion.<sup>2</sup> The six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that formed against the threat of Iran will continue with a vital security agenda of its own. The capacity of its members for innovative political initiatives (e.g., Kuwait's reflagging of its tankers) reflects a degree of sophistication to survive and moderate their positions. The GCC has become, therefore, a significant regional actor that may guard against any hegemonistic attempts in the Gulf. Iran is now rapidly gaining diplomatic stature in the West and may acquire weapons from the British, French, and Soviets. It may someday get U.S. arms, but for now this possibility is overshadowed by bitter memories. On the whole, however, the Arab-Israeli issue ties all these threads together.

The American discussant noted that the two papers show an important divergence in perspective. To the Pakistanis, the geographic area is right there, part of its own vital interests. For the United States, however, Pakistan's relative importance in the area depends on the issues. The United States does not view Pakistan's relations in the Middle East as a counterweight to its problems with India, though the Pakistani typology underscores that it certainly is conceptualized as such in Pakistan. He disagreed, however, with the Pakistani opinion that the Western powers support Iraq; he argued instead that a jockeying of position had taken place to get both Iraq and Iran to the negotiating table. He disagreed with his compatriot on two points: (1) Iran did not win the war, but this is not the same as saying that Iran lost; and (2) Israel cannot be forced to reach a settlement for a two-state system; such a resolution is probably a long way off. Although he found the Pakistani view on alliances valuable and agreed that the Pakistani role of training advisors throughout the region has been critical, he disagreed that the two-state solution may automatically change the charter of the PLO. He disagreed with the comments made by the Pakistani discussant regarding the political sophistication of the GCC because the Gulf states have shown little political initiative that was not promoted by anybody else; the GCC, furthermore, remains dependent on Saudi Arabia. He summed up his responses by pointing out that what the United States does in the Middle East is generally different from what it would like to do. Now, with cutbacks to foreign service and defense caused by the Gramm-Rudman bill, the United States simply does not have the resources to do what needs to be done. Finally, he felt that it would be

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<sup>2</sup>This issue later surfaced in the November 1988 OPEC quota negotiations, when Iraq argued that it must be allowed a quota equal to Iran's in order to rebuild its economy.

unreasonable to discuss the possibility of expanded economic assistance to Iran "as long as the present radical government is in power in Teheran." He hoped that Pakistan might be able to play a role in bringing the Iranians back to their senses.

The final comment underscored a major shift between American and Pakistani perspectives on the Gulf conflict, proving to be an ideological thread permeating all dimensions of the ensuing discussion. The two most important differences emerged on the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf (and, by extension, its Middle East policy) and on Iran.

An American participant pointed out that U.S. policies stem from a desire to keep the USSR out of the region, protect oil supplies, and ensure the independence and territorial integrity of Israel. The reflagging of the tankers was intended to keep out the Soviets because Iran now could not attack the tankers. A Pakistani replied that the two sides have no dispute about objectives, but how to achieve them remains problematic. Instead of protecting the oil supplies, the U.S. actions obstructed them and inflamed the situation. An American disagreed with this assessment and argued that if the Pakistanis are concerned about India's naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, don't they see the American presence in the Gulf as a counter to that? In response, a Pakistani pointed out that people get concerned whenever Americans move in large numbers around Pakistan and this accentuates domestic problems, especially adding "fuel to the fire" of anti-American groups in Pakistan.

A Pakistani argued that Pakistan was concerned not only with the presence of the U.S. ships but with their intent: to harass Iran. This remark underscored the second key difference, that the Americans view Pakistan as tilting toward Iran, whereas the Pakistanis feel the United States should shift its position to become more neutral. The U.S. should also "lower the profile of rhetoric about Iran," because this is very embarrassing for Pakistan. Pakistan's friendship with Iran is no recent development and is a vital part of its relationship to the Gulf. The war presented Pakistan with a difficult dilemma in balancing relations, and there was much sympathy in the country for Iran's humiliation in the no-win situation. A Pakistani argued that Pakistan's position has been consistently neutral, but that Iran looked suspiciously at Pakistan's stance and has now changed its perceptions of Pakistan's position. Another Pakistani reminded the group that Iran currently shelters 2 million Afghan refugees and that, practically speaking, some coordination must be made between this group and the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. They pointed out finally that a connection exists among the issues of proliferation, Pakistan's fears of India, and the Gulf in that India and Israel have been cooperating to undermine—or possibly destroy—the reactor at Kahuta. An American

agreed that Pakistan's ties with the Gulf affects its position in relation to India and anticipated that Pakistan will consequently play an even more significant diplomatic role, especially with Iran, in the future.

An American countered a statement he had heard that "the U.S. let the war between Iran and Iraq continue" by arguing that the United States, a peripheral player in the war, did not have the capacity to do that. As long as the present government is in control in Iran, it is not in their interest to reach accommodation with the United States. An American noted that the United States in fact supported Iran until a year and a half ago and does agree that Iraq clearly began the war. A Pakistani recognized that the U.S. policy has been to sustain an indigenous state in Iran, particularly to keep the Soviets from invading it as they did Afghanistan, and saw a divergence of interests between the United States and Israel, which wanted to see the weakening of an Arab country, Iraq.

An American noted that the Americans and Pakistanis were really "talking past each other" because they were looking at different matters. The Americans still look at single issues and don't link them to larger foreign policy concerns, making the same kinds of mistakes now that "lost" Iran in the first place.

Another issue raised was the "subtle intrusion" of the Soviet Union into the region. A Pakistani noted that maintaining relative neutrality may have improved the Soviet image there. The USSR has also compromised its stance and is exploring avenues for greater ties as it moves away from simply trying to promote political change. A Pakistani argued that the concept of keeping the Soviets "out" of the Middle East makes no sense because historically they always have been involved in the region.

An American questioned if it was true that Pakistani policy toward Saudi Arabia has been changing and relations have become less close. A Pakistani agreed that it appeared that way toward the end of the war, but this is no longer true. Another Pakistani discussed the specific minor areas of disagreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, concluding that relations are in a state of flux and should not be linked to specific issues.

A brief discussion followed on differences in the Arab-Israeli issue. An American found the relationship between the Indian and Israeli nuclear positions interesting and noted that India is trying to improve relations with the Arab states possibly as a means to counter Pakistan. He wondered if, in fact, Israel would try to "cut a deal" with the Indians. A Pakistani felt that the United States and Pakistan are moving closer on this issue, because Pakistan's support for Afghanistan has overwhelmed its previous support for the Palestinians. Little accord was reached, however, and as one American concluded, "This is an issue where we have fundamental differences which won't be reconciled, and we walk around it."

The concluding day of the forum directly addressed the two topics permeating all previous discussions: the conflict in Afghanistan and the Soviet factor. Theodore Eliot opened session six with the assertion that the Soviet withdrawal and the expected reemergence of Afghanistan as an independent state will certainly have a major effect on Pakistan-U.S. relations. Following an overview of the current scenario in Afghanistan, Eliot argued that the Soviets are withdrawing for a variety of reasons and that it is too early to assess if the era of Soviet expansionism has ended or not; a major uprising in Eastern Europe would put that to the test. Following the withdrawal, Eliot expects a coalition government in Afghanistan, probably Islamic in orientation but very different from Iran's. Such a government will be tempered by Afghan and tribal tradition and attempts at economic reconstruction. The pre-1978 elites will probably not play a major role (except in technical assistance), for the Mujahideen will feel that they did the fighting and should reap the rewards. Though it is doubtful that Najibullah's government can remain in power very long after the withdrawal, both the United States and Pakistan must be cautious in backing any single faction in a power struggle. Neither the USSR nor India will have much influence on the Mujahideen: India will try to make peace with Afghanistan, but this will take time. To minimize this possibility, Pakistan must put aside the Pushtoonistan border dispute. The major challenges will lie in resettling the refugees back in their villages, reconstructing the devastated economy, and removing the millions of land mines scattered throughout the country. The Pakistan-U.S. relationship will be affected because the American focus will increasingly move to other issues. Eliot urged American policymakers to remember the importance of supporting Pakistan and that the close understanding which exists now between the two countries will take much work to sustain after the Afghanistan crisis is resolved.

Ijaz Gilani reported on Pakistani perceptions of selected issues, particularly regarding how these perceptions have been affected by the Afghanistan situation. Because the Pakistan government has followed a "rather quiet Afghan policy" domestically, the population is not particularly informed or supportive of new initiatives. Most Pakistanis initially endorsed supporting the refugees, but this support declined somewhat as the costs for hosting the refugees increased and political opposition to the government's Afghanistan policy became more widespread. Overall, however, the support remains, despite Soviet and Afghan attempts to provoke local sentiments through violence (e.g., bomb blasts). In Gilani's discussion of the various dimensions of Pakistani opinion of the Afghanistan issue, two significant points emerged: (1) the Soviets became the more distrusted nation (over India); and (2) despite the close cooperation

between Pakistan and the United States on Afghanistan, the general perception remains that Americans have a bias against the Muslim world in general and are therefore only slightly ahead of the USSR and India on trustworthiness. Gilani concluded with three possible scenarios for Afghanistan's future. The first predicts the continuation of a PDPA (Democratic Party of the Afghan People) government, as the Mujahideen were not opposed to the Saur revolution of 1978 but rather to the Soviet military intervention the following year. The second would see a return to the pre-1978 status quo, restoring the royal house, the technocratic elite, and the local khans to their former power. Advocates of this second scenario believe that the United Nations supports it as well. The final scenario predicts that a new set of forces will rule in the future because Afghanistan has changed irreversibly. Advocates have different visions of what that more self-conscious and politically Islamic state would be like, however. Gilani argued that one thing is certain: there is no possibility of peace in Afghanistan in the near future, because an extended struggle will occur "before a new future emerges from the rubblized territory and a destroyed social order."

The American discussant received applause when he expressed gratitude for Pakistan's support of U.S. policy and for the Mujahideen who were able to "bring us to this point of historic accomplishment." He predicted that the Soviets will withdraw faster in the second phase, scheduled to begin November 15, 1988. The Mujahideen have deliberately moderated their assaults within the country because they prefer to promote defections rather than inciting the Najibullah government to fight against them. He said that the United States recognizes that Islam will play a greater role in Afghanistan's future and that it will welcome this: though not understanding the inspiration of Islam for the Mujahideen, Washington respects it. The United States has questioned the election of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar as a future leader in Afghanistan only because it doesn't know enough about anyone to pick a leader. Since U.S. policy has been to rely on Afghan self-determination, the United States has no business being a kingmaker, either. The United States and its allies hope to provide resources to help reconstruct Afghanistan and have been impressed with Pakistan's role in the peacemaking process. He told the Pakistani participants, "You are popular and well liked, and the Afghan equation has been a very important contribution. That is an image I hope we can build on in the future." Americans, however, do not believe that Pakistan's security will be served by a move to a nuclear environment since conventional weapons are sufficient. Some members of Congress feel that Pakistan has been less than candid on the nuclear issue and that this position threatens to jeopardize the closeness that has developed over the Afghanistan issue.

The Pakistani discussant disagreed with his compatriot's assessment of Pakistani opinion on the refugees and argued that this was actually the official view. Popular opinion is that the refugees have promoted substantial social tensions and have been a great strain on the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They have caused many problems, straining every aspect of social life and ecology while hoarding arms and creating a "culture of Kalashnikovs" and lawlessness. The United States has achieved its objective in getting the USSR to withdraw, but it has not helped Pakistan get rid of the Afghan refugees. He wondered why Pakistan was drawn into a senseless conflict in a war of proxy between the two superpowers. In addition, misconceptions about Afghanistan abound: (1) policymakers never expected the USSR to withdraw its troops, but even though the Mujahideen have been largely responsible for convincing them to do so, one should also not believe that the Soviets have been defeated; (2) Najibullah's government was not expected to last, but it is still in power and the PDPA enjoys substantial middle-class support; and (3) the refugees are from border areas, not areas of direct fighting, and have always come to Pakistan whenever there have been changes in the Afghanistan government. Many Americans, he noted, have said that if Pakistan does not accept the refugees, Pakistan itself may endure a civil war with the refugees' guns turned inward. Expressing the hope that Eliot's statement that "no good deeds go unpunished" will not be true for the NWFP, he concluded by stating categorically that it is up to the Afghans, and not outsiders, to form a government.

In the ensuing discussion little rapport was reached within the two contingents, though all seemed to agree that it will be a long time before peace comes to Afghanistan. Most speculation concerned the composition of a future government, U.S. policy, and the fate of the 3 million refugees currently in Pakistan. A Pakistani stated that a revolution has in fact occurred in Afghanistan in that the people have changed their own government; neither the United States nor Pakistan should shape it. If the United States continues to insist on helping the Mujahideen, it will be perpetuating the war. An American put forward the idea that the Najibullah government will remain in power because the opposition will not be able to reconcile moderates and fundamentalists. Will Iran play a role in this scenario? A Pakistani said that if the PDPA does remain in power, the United States can use leverage with the Soviets to constrain their Afghan clients. An American agreed that, in principle, everyone supports the notion that the United States should be impartial regarding a future government, but how, in that case, should aid be channeled? Aid would certainly lend weight to whichever government receives it. Clandestine aid (which the Mujahideen now receive) remains a possibility, and the threat of cutting off that

aid makes the United States a major player in the future. An American noted that the future Kabul government is likely to be pro-Afghan, not pro any other government.

An American was glad that the Pakistani discussant had expressed a very legitimate view, especially one often voiced in the NWFP: What would the consequences have been had the United States *not* backed the Mujahideen? But how else can the refugees return *without* supporting the Mujahideen now? Participants agreed that there is a difference in opinion in Pakistan regarding the effect of the Afghan war and the refugees on the country. A Pakistani raised the concern that once the Soviets complete their withdrawal, the United States will forget the Afghan matter and will not ensure peace in Afghanistan, the return of the refugees, or reconstruction of the country. He reminded the Americans that much needs to be rebuilt on the Pakistan side of the border as well. An American responded by asserting that Congress has supported the (overt) cross-border program of humanitarian assistance and has budgeted nearly \$100 million for 1989. Congress will not abandon the effort simply because the war is over, but it is searching for a way to channel this assistance.

Many Pakistanis raised the issue that the United States can do a great deal to ensure the return of the refugees, including putting pressure on India and the USSR, discussing the issue in international journals, and so on. An American disagreed that a precondition of the refugees' return home is an end to the war; rather, it is that the Kabul government assure stability in the countryside, and this can only be done through an alliance government, not Najibullah's.

An American felt that the Soviets still hope to play a considerable role in Afghanistan, especially in the northern tier. They will use economic assistance and training programs as an alternative to military commitment, underscoring the fact that they were not wholly defeated. Another American felt that relations will have to become normal between Afghanistan and the USSR in five to ten years because they share a long border.

The final issue discussed was the potentially destabilizing effect on the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship if the issue of Pushtoonistan and the Durrand line is raised by the new government in Kabul. Both groups believed the issue must be settled; many of the Pakistanis already consider it done. An American asserted that the United States does not wish to raise the issue and recognizes the existing border. It may not have disappeared in the minds of the Afghans, however, and some effort may be needed to finally put it aside. He reminded the forum that this issue gave the Soviets their opportunity in Afghanistan because Daoud turned to them in the 1950s as well as in the 1970s on this matter; consequently, its importance should not be minimized.

The final session analyzed the Soviet role in South Asia, particularly in the context of its effect on Pakistan-U.S. relations. Rifat Hussain argued that Pakistan's relationship with the USSR has a direct bearing on its security, particularly since Pakistan's orientation is Indocentric. He elaborated on the seven phases of the Pakistan-USSR relationship. The current one (dating from 1987), identified as "partial détente," is characterized by disaffection, enmity, and distrust. The lack of good relations, however, is not caused by ideological opposition, since Pakistan enjoys a close friendship with China. The great determining factor in a future scenario of Pakistan-USSR relations will be the U.S. attitude toward Islamabad. Three other factors may contribute to a thaw in relations: (1) the fact that the withdrawal of Soviet troops is removing a major irritant between the two countries; (2) the probable scaling down of American interest in the region; and (3) the "Gorbachev factor."

Robert Wirsing, in the concluding paper presented at the forum, evaluated current trends in the USSR's relations with Pakistan and India. He argued that no particularly significant grounds exist for animosity between Pakistan and the USSR, though they have been accentuated by Soviet support for India and now Afghanistan. The troop withdrawal, therefore, may well serve to vastly improve relations, especially since it will probably be high on the Soviet agenda to win Pakistan's support of a regime in Kabul that the USSR likes. Pakistan's priorities will be persuading the Soviets to agree to the Durand line and other borders. Although many Pakistanis would like to see their country take a more nonaligned stance, this will probably not occur, for four reasons: (1) there will probably not be an early cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan, and this will remain a "festering sore" in Pakistan-USSR relations; (2) the Soviet withdrawal—and, in some respects, its abandonment of the PDPA—shows a substantial dissolution in the Brezhnev doctrine and raises reservations about the reliability of the USSR as a strategic partner; (3) despite political changes within Pakistan, it is doubtful that the new government will overrule the Pakistan military's assessment of its position along its northwest border; and (4) most important is the India factor and the fact that any dramatic changes in Pakistan's relationship with the Soviet Union would immediately cause a change in the Soviets' relationship with India. Though the Indo-Soviet relationship will probably change to some degree, it will remain close—although India will play a more autonomous, self-assertive role. Unquestionably, the Soviet withdrawal will put a lot of pressure on the Pakistan-U.S. alliance.

The Pakistani discussant observed that the two presentations contained a certain degree of complementarity and that Hussain's interpreta-

tion of the phases in the relationship conforms with Soviet perceptions. Pakistan needs to determine its policy requirements: Is it seeking a strategic reorientation or a lessening of tensions with the USSR? The former is highly doubtful, even with a new government in power in Pakistan, particularly since no real possibility exists that the strategic relationship between India and the Soviet Union will be compromised. An improvement in Pakistan-Soviet relations, however, may well bring pressures on India as Gorbachev, on a few occasions, has set the tone for encouraging more peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, if future U.S. administrations face financial problems in giving aid to Pakistan, then Pakistan will have to become more self-reliant and is likely to seek greater accommodation with the Soviets. Though the Soviets will probably not offer economic assistance immediately, given their own internal economic problems, this may be a factor in reorienting relations. In addition, the impact of China on this scenario must be considered. Pakistan's relationship with China is a favorable, time-tested one, and a reorientation in Chinese-Soviet attitudes, if it occurs, may counterbalance the situation.

The American discussant felt that the two papers complement each other in that one is a broad sweep of the historical evolution of the relationship, whereas the second is a tightly analytical assessment of future scenarios. The serious internal reforms occurring in the USSR will contribute to a lessening of tensions with East and South Asia. The Soviets, however, will not want to abandon their strategic advantages where these exist, nor give up their identity as a global superpower. They have had some short-term successes with China and will probably hold a summit in 1989. For strategic and other reasons, however, the Indian-Soviet ties will not be deeply disturbed, although India will probably push its economy more toward the West and Japan. Throughout the world, post-World War II alliances are undergoing substantive changes; there is a loosening from alliances to alignments where more flexibility exists on both sides. The degree varies in different relationships, but the question of how to balance these alignments will remain complex for both the United States and the USSR. Because economic orbits have political and strategic connotations, a policy of nonalignment in today's world is a fiction.

In the subsequent discussion, for the most part the subject could only be addressed by bringing in either India or China as factors. It was overwhelmingly agreed that relations with the Soviet Union will not change too much, given the relations between the Soviet Union and India, and that Pakistan's close tie with China is an important part of this scenario because it "checks the India factor." An American expressed the opinion

that Pakistan's good relationship with the United States is a function of its poor relationship with India and that the Indo-Pakistan conflict is responsible for inviting the superpowers back into the region. He felt that improvements in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union, if they occur, will not necessarily improve Pakistan's relations with India. A Pakistani responded by agreeing that even though the Indo-Pakistan rivalry has played a pivotal role in inviting the superpowers back, the superpower rivalry has also affected the dynamics of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

The Pakistanis contrasted their country's relations with China with those it has with the Soviet Union. One participant noted that China was Pakistan's friend because it did not interfere with Pakistan's internal affairs, as they feared the Soviets would. Another Pakistani commented that the Chinese do not interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs because they are already friends and that Pakistan does not have that sort of relation with the USSR. Pakistan shares strategic interests with China in regard to India, and it was unfortunate that the Chinese had a problem in preventing the Indo-Soviet dismantling of Pakistan in 1971. The Soviet Union, however, hopes to include China in peace initiatives, reflective of internal changes caused by *perestroika*, and this may have an impact on Pakistan's relations with the USSR.


Other issues discussed included Russian expansionism, Soviet economic assistance, and the Soviet factor in negotiating a nuclear non-proliferation treaty with India. A Pakistani participant argued that Russian expansionism is an established historical fact indicated by the incorporation of independent autonomous states, and notably Muslim areas, into its empire. Another Pakistani disagreed with this assertion, however, and pointed out the very different nature of the dynamics today. Muslim Soviet Central Asian republics enjoy high rates of literacy and are not rebelling on behalf of their Afghan brothers. An American noted that the model of economic assistance that the Soviets have followed in Pakistan—particularly the Russian-built steel mill in Karachi, which commands at least a \$400 million annual subsidy—is very costly. Private sector assistance, as promoted by the United States, is more effective. A Pakistani responded that such projects are not the only kind of economic assistance the Soviets might offer. A fundamental change in Pakistan-Soviet relations might be brought about by Soviet offers to help develop infrastructural sectors in the country, especially in agricultural areas. An American stated, however, that the USSR is not a major source of economic aid today and that even though it gives aid for strategic purposes, this assistance has substantial limitations. Whereas Soviet interest and involvement with Europe and Asia will continue for many reasons, the “*intrusive elements*” will be Latin

America and Mexico, and this must be taken into consideration in future scenarios.

U.S. and Pakistani participants agreed that both superpowers support nuclear nonproliferation in the subcontinent. A Pakistani felt that the nonproliferation issue is strongly affecting Pakistan's relations with the USSR because the safeguards in a recent Indo-Soviet agreement regarding the supply of nuclear materials have been diluted. Another Pakistani added that the Soviets' agreement after two years of negotiations to supply a nuclear plant to India has not helped nonproliferation. For some reason, after insisting that India first sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and agree to open its plants to inspection, they relented and went ahead with the plant without obtaining those assurances.


A Pakistani argued that something of a consensus exists within Pakistan on China and the Middle East. No internal consensus exists, however, on Pakistan's ties with India, the United States, and the USSR. Three factions are prominent: (1) the elites, who are pro-United States and anti-USSR and India; (2) other groups, who are critical of these positions and question U.S. credibility from its stand in 1965 and the arms embargo; and (3) those marginal political elements in Pakistan who are pro-USSR and India and anti-U.S. Because these three opinion blocs do exist, whenever stress emerges in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship the pro-USSR groups are able to gain momentum.

In the final summation to the Third Pakistan-U.S. Bilateral Forum, it was observed that the United States and Pakistan had reached a consensus on approaching the bilateral relation in the past, though there are differences in orientation for the future. For example, Pakistan might like to see a broad-based government in Afghanistan soon, whereas the Americans are simply happy to see the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Major differences exist concerning India, but stability in the region is a shared objective. Pakistan does not want a change in the balance of power that might induce India to carry out another "adventure." Some key differences exist on Gulf issues: the United States wants to keep Iran isolated, but Pakistan feels that America should realize that it is in Pakistan's interests to have good relations with its neighbors. As for ties with the USSR, differences exist within the Pakistani group, but one point is accepted by everyone: Pakistan cannot afford a confrontational attitude toward the USSR, and it hopes to improve relations at the economic level. Such major differences exist between the United States and Pakistan on the Arab-Israeli problem, however, that there is virtually no use in discussing it. Sharp differences also exist on the nuclear issue, finally, and the two sides do not seem to understand the other's perspective in this matter.



## **Part One**

# **Pakistan-U.S. Security Relations**



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# 1. Beyond Afghanistan: U.S.-Pakistan Security Relations

RODNEY W. JONES

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## Turning Points

What will the future U.S.-Pakistan security relationship be like? Are we now at a major turning point? A cascade of events in 1987–88, punctuated by the death of Pakistan's President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, spelled new uncertainty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and the cooling of the Iranian revolution could have deep effects on U.S.-Pakistan security relations. The new administrations of Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad and George Bush in Washington must deal with a changed situation as the decade of the 1980s draws to a close. To see where the changes may lead us, it is worth reflecting on what shaped the relationship in the period before.

The twin shocks of Iran's revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 galvanized a fresh U.S. commitment to Southwest Asia, rejuvenating the troubled U.S.-Pakistan security relationship.<sup>1</sup> Washington saw Pakistan as one of several "front line" states in the path of Soviet expansion. Pakistan was perceived as an "island of stability" in a sea of instability. These strategic images were easy for American leaders to articulate and for the public to grasp. Support for aid to Pakistan naturally revived in the U.S. Congress. By 1982, Pakistan had become the fourth largest recipient of U.S. security assistance, behind Israel, Egypt, and Turkey.

As late as 1985, it was hard to know whether the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. By 1987, however, it was apparent that the Soviet Union had made such a decision. Moscow became publicly committed, through the U.N.-mediated Geneva Accords of April 14, 1988, to remove its military forces from Afghanistan by February 1989. Half were

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<sup>1</sup>For a contemporary assessment, see Rodney W. Jones, "Mending Relations with Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 4, 2 (Spring 1981): 17–29.

out by August 15, 1988, and the rest were removed on schedule in February 1989.

Late in August 1988, the Iran-Iraq war ceased and a U.N.-supervised ceasefire came into effect, ending nearly eight years of destruction and economic debilitation. An effect of this war, which mobilized Iran for defense, was to make the danger of Soviet armed intervention in Iran seem more remote than in 1979–80. Another was to rechannel, and then deplete, much of the energy unleashed by the revolution against the West.

Iran's postwar needs for reconstruction and international reconciliation will reduce its ardor for exporting Islamic extremism. Iran's threat to the stability of its Islamic neighbors has already diminished. Iran's domestic preoccupations did not prevent fresh sobriety over future dangers from the Soviet Union. Eventually, a professional overhaul of Iran's defense structure could follow.

These external changes alone would make one wonder about the future of U.S.-Pakistan security relations. But the sudden loss of Pakistan's president, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, in the Bahawalpur air crash on August 17, 1988,<sup>2</sup> caused leadership discontinuity even as Pakistan headed for the November 1988 national elections. Uncertainty about political succession in Pakistan thus raised other questions about the future of the relationship.

Given the past importance of this relationship to U.S. interests, this chapter explores the outlook for preserving it in a time of change. There are important benefits to both sides from a steady, sustained relationship.<sup>3</sup> Yet managing this relationship could be difficult for Washington and Islamabad, especially after the Soviet exit from Afghanistan. It will take vision and considerable effort from both sides to succeed. In taking on those tasks, it would be well to remember what the Afghanistan years have meant for both sides.

### Strategic Continuity

Underlying continuity marks U.S.-Pakistan security relations, despite periods of disappointment and even disillusionment. During the Truman and first Eisenhower administrations, the United States came to view

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<sup>2</sup>Although Zia came to power in July 1977 and thus presided when the relationship had descended to one of its lowest points in mid-1979, his skillful stewardship of Pakistan in the 1980s contributed substantially to the manageability, and arguably to the positive results, of the revived security relationship. See Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985).

<sup>3</sup>See Thomas Perry Thornton, "Pakistan: Internal Developments and the U.S. Interest" (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, March 1987).

Pakistan as the easternmost building block of a regional defense arrangement for the Middle East and Persian Gulf. What was an objective of U.S. planning in that early period was transformed unexpectedly into a practical necessity in 1979, with the “loss of Iran” as a regional U.S. ally and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup>

At first some thought this was a Soviet move to take control of the Gulf.<sup>5</sup> Since Afghan airfields are much closer to the Gulf than the Soviet Union, some feared Soviet airlifted troops would use them to wrest Baluchistan—a sometimes dissident province—from Pakistan, creating a Soviet outpost on the Arabian Sea.<sup>6</sup> In retrospect, it appears that the chief Soviet aim of the invasion was a more modest one, to prop up the April 1978 Marxist revolution and unpopular People’s Democratic Party (PDP) regime in Afghanistan. But the danger that Soviet leaders would be further impelled by their own opportunism or would use instability within the region as a pretext for greater encroachment was serious then, and could emerge under new circumstances.<sup>7</sup>

While Soviet policy is easing, a more subtle, long-term challenge remains today: Soviet political-military pressure based on economic and arms transactions with regional states, and alliances with Marxist groups waiting in the wings. Soviet strategy promises to become more sophisticated even as it relies less on military intervention.

### *The Soviet Challenge in Afghanistan*

The *mutual* objective in the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship has been to maintain Pakistan’s safety and territorial integrity against (communist) aggression, meaning resistance to Soviet (and, formerly, Chinese) expansion in the region. On this dimension, the returns on U.S. and

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<sup>4</sup>Devin Hagerty has painstakingly documented the striking similarities between the U.S.-Pakistan “defense relationship” of the early 1950s and the rebuilt security relationship after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See his “The Development of American Defense Policy Toward Pakistan, 1947–1954,” *Fletcher Forum* (Summer 1986): 217–242.

<sup>5</sup>An analysis of earlier Soviet military planning and of the serious practical problems the Soviet Union could face even with modern forces in moving through Iran’s terrain to the Gulf can be found in Joshua M. Epstein, “Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent,” *International Security* 6, 2 (Fall 1981): 126–158.

<sup>6</sup>For a sympathetic treatment of the Baluch peoples and an insightful but overstated account of dissident Baluch elite aspirations for independence, see Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).

<sup>7</sup>For a contemporary assessment, see Rodney W. Jones, “Regional Conflict and Strategic Challenge in Southwest Asia,” in W. J. Taylor, Jr., and S. A. Maaranen, eds., *The Future of Conflict in the 1980s* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), chap. 14, pp. 261–292.

Pakistani investment in the 1980s were large for both sides. The joint exercise of pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan was successful in achieving that aim. The point is worth dwelling on for a moment because, until it began to work, it had so many detractors.

The critics argued that outside political and arms support to the Afghan Mujahideen (resistance) groups would be dangerous and counterproductive. Among other things, they suggested this would: only serve to bleed the Soviet Union, and be a futile gesture against overwhelming Soviet military power; confirm Moscow's pretext for intervention; provoke an expanded and harsher Soviet military effort; lock in an indefinite Soviet occupation; tempt the Soviet Union to invade Pakistan; and so inflame the region that great power crisis and intervention would become a permanent feature. External pressure would not only fail, it would make matters worse.

The outcome has been quite the reverse. The policies of measured assistance, resolve, and resistance that joined the United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states had the desired result. The United Nations proximity talks provided a forum in which negotiations could proceed and ultimately reflect a Soviet change of mind.

These policies were not without risk. They were intentionally low in profile, however, and were based on calculated restraint. This strategy enhanced their effectiveness and reduced Soviet incentives for escalation. Their success depended, to be sure, on the will of the Mujahideen to fight against the Soviet occupation and the Kabul regime. The traditional Afghan villager's toughness and ability to operate in rugged terrain and the loose but effective coordination of dispersed groups were the crucial factors that Soviet might and technical superiority could not overcome. Intermittent resort to a scorched-earth approach only further discredited the Soviet "pacification" effort.

If the policy of pressure depended first on the native Afghan resistance, it depended second on Pakistan. It was effective because of the firm support of President Zia for the resistance groups, the courage of the Pakistani government and armed forces, and the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis for the plight of the Afghan refugees. (If there are any doubts on this score, a comparison of Pakistan's support with Iran's neglect of Afghan refugees should resolve them.) These supportive Pakistani attitudes were harnessed to form a tough negotiating posture with the Soviet Union on the terms of settlement.

Pakistanis accepted with remarkable good grace the temporary settlement of Afghan refugees, whose numbers soon swelled to over 3 million. Most of these refugees within Pakistan were encamped in Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the Administered Tribal Areas,

where a common linguistic and cultural heritage among border tribes on both sides made this influx of population easier to absorb. But Pakistan initially had to find about half the new annual financial support to sustain the refugees. It had to cope with the frictions that were bound to arise locally over grazing land, wood and water rights and, increasingly, competition for employment, particularly in the transport sector.

So large a population influx was sensitive politically as well as a new factor in national security. The longer the refugees were present, the more involved they became in Pakistan's domestic economy and in local or provincial politics. Moreover, their presence was an increased burden on internal security. It was feared they would add new fuel to traditional separatist movements by certain Pakhtun and Baluch tribes in the north and southwest—a problem that fortunately did not intensify. More immediate was the threat from infiltrators—Soviet-trained Afghan spies and saboteurs—aiming not only to divide and demoralize the resistance groups, but also, through bombing campaigns, to intimidate Pakistanis. Finally, provision of sanctuary within Pakistan risked entangling armed Mujahideen groups in violent quarrels with native Pakistanis. In view of these frictions, it is no surprise that some Pakistanis eventually grew weary of the policy of Afghan support.<sup>8</sup> What is remarkable is how unflinchingly loyal the majority remained.

By actively defending its border region from Soviet and Afghan military air and ground intrusions, Pakistan provided the local resistance groups effective sanctuary. It also organized the distribution of foreign arms and other equipment to the Mujahideen and trained them in their use. A weak government in Pakistan would not have run the risks of training and supporting the resistance groups and might even have shied away from defending the administered tribal areas and border districts where most refugee camps were located, undercutting the resistance effort. Islamabad, however, withstood Soviet intimidation and ensured that the Mujahideen could operate safely out of Pakistan, all the while relaxing martial law.

### *The Geneva Accords*

Pakistan's negotiating position in the U.N.-mediated talks took these factors into account. Pakistan's basic conditions for a settlement were: (1) complete Soviet military withdrawal, within a specified time frame (preferably, not longer than five or six months); (2) assurance of the safe return of the Afghan refugees to their homes; (3) restoration of Afghanistan's

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<sup>8</sup>See Robert G. Wirsing's "Pakistan and the War in Afghanistan," *Asian Affairs* 14, 2 (Summer 1987): 57–76, for a thoughtful account that also notes Pakistani soul-searching.

status as an independent and nonaligned country; and (4) formation of a government acceptable to the Afghan people.

The Geneva Accords were signed on April 14, 1988, and entered into force a month later. They formally satisfied Pakistan's first three conditions while leaving the fourth up in the air.<sup>9</sup> The accords provided for a phased but complete Soviet military withdrawal within nine months, by February 15, 1989. Completion of the withdrawal nominally restored Afghanistan's independence, but it did not end the civil war. Although the accords speak of the voluntary return of refugees, their safe return is not guaranteed by any enforcement mechanism and seems unlikely wherever the warfare continues. The formation of a government acceptable to the Afghan people, Pakistan's fourth point, may be a prerequisite to the return of the bulk of the refugees, but this outcome is left to the interplay of political and military forces. Until March 1989, it was widely assumed that the Najibullah regime in Kabul would fall soon after Soviet forces had gone. But the ability of the regular Afghan military to withstand the Mujahideen siege of Jalalabad in March and April 1989 suggests that it may be some time before the political future of Afghanistan takes clear form.

Pakistan played a critical part in achieving the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan withstood the political-military pressure of a superpower and absorbed the risks of hosting a national liberation movement. Naturally, this served Pakistan's own security interests, relieving the coercive weight of a great power on its frontiers. But it was done at Pakistan's volition. It is an extraordinary accomplishment—the antithesis of a modern Munich—politically and symbolically.

## Security Assistance

### *Broader Objectives*

Clearly, the domestic breadth of U.S. support for military and economic aid to Pakistan hinges on the Soviet threat. Hence, a realist must assume that Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to some attenuation in congressional and even executive branch interest in Pakistan. The sense of emergency in Southwest Asia that dominated the late Carter and early

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<sup>9</sup>For a critical assessment of the accords whose public portions are fraught with ambiguities, see Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords," *Foreign Affairs* 66, 5 (Summer 1988): 922–945. The accords consist collectively of three bilateral agreements between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including: (a) "Principles of Mutual Relations . . . Non-Interference and Non-Intervention"; (b) "Voluntary Return of Refugees"; and (c) "Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan," which deals in part with the withdrawal of Soviet uniformed military forces; plus (d) a "Declaration on International Guarantees" signed by U.S. and Soviet representatives. The U.S. and Soviet representatives also countersigned (c) as witnesses, and the United States issued a separate

Reagan years has already declined. The transition to the Bush administration in 1989 will cause at least some loss of institutional memory. It is all the more important, therefore, to take stock of what has been accomplished and be reminded of the broader frame of reference of U.S. regional security policy and the benefits of U.S.-Pakistan security relations.

Westerners need to remember that Pakistan is, in its own way, a regional power. The smaller and militarily weaker states in the Gulf accord Pakistan that status. Pakistan is about the size of California and has nearly 110 million people. Its population is more than twice that of neighboring Iran and more distant Egypt, and five times that of Iraq—the other three Islamic “powers” of the Near and Middle East. The typical Western image of Pakistan as small and remote is an artifact of its juxtaposition with three Asian giants—the Soviet Union, China, and India. In almost any other location Pakistan’s size and influence would be more apparent.

Pakistan has a modern civilian bureaucracy and military organization, and its public and private business sectors possess highly trained and skilled engineers, managers, and entrepreneurs. It has a respectable if not impressive domestic record of economic growth and industrial development. It exports modern technical capabilities, training, and assistance as well as laborers and service workers to the richer oil-exporting states in the Gulf. It contributes directly to development and modernization in those states, to their individual stability, and to the stability of the region.

Pakistan has also come a long way since independence in forging national unity in a highly disparate society.<sup>10</sup> Regional divisiveness remains an important factor in national politics, particularly between Sind and Punjab (or, more precisely, between rural Sind and the center). Regional, tribal, and linguistic loyalties remain causes of urban instability and conflict in rural areas but, by themselves, no longer mortally threaten the country. These conflicting loyalties remain sensitive, along with sectarian differences, largely because neighboring powers can access them as means to interfere. National consciousness has made headway in Pakistan for four decades. Through generational change and demographic shifts, this nation has come to stay.

The security relationship has contributed to Pakistan’s development as well as to its defense. U.S. assistance provided Pakistan a margin of security

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“U.S. statement” in Geneva regarding the “symmetry” of Soviet and U.S. obligations as guarantors and declaring that by acting as a guarantor the United States does not intend to imply recognition of the present (Najibullah) regime in Kabul. The texts of (a) and (d) are reprinted in *Survival* (London) 30, 4 (July/August 1988): 368–370, and the “U.S. Statement” in Klass, “Afghanistan,” p. 945.

<sup>10</sup>For explanation of trends that support this conclusion, see my chapter, “The Military and Security in Pakistan,” in Baxter, *Zia’s Pakistan*, pp. 63–92.

that made it easier, in turn, for Pakistanis to invest in development.<sup>11</sup> This assistance did not, nor could it, neutralize all threats to Pakistan's security—real or perceived. But it appears to have worked, as intended, to strengthen the confidence of Pakistan's leaders in dealing with external security challenges. Freedom to pursue economic and social progress was preserved. Roughly half of the dollar value of recent U.S. assistance went to the civilian economy or relief, granting policy flexibility to economic planners in Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> That Pakistan may need to use its economic resources more wisely—boost savings, for example, and invest in education—are separate points, not defects in the relationship.

A key purpose of the new U.S. security assistance to Pakistan in 1981–82 was to help the Pakistani government withstand Soviet pressure from Afghanistan and to neutralize the risks of Soviet retaliation for Pakistan's support of the Mujahideen. The broader purpose of enabling Pakistanis to consider themselves capable of defending the country against external threats, however, and therefore free to pursue an agenda of national development, will remain after the active Soviet threat from Afghanistan subsides.

These aims of the bilateral relationship are compatible with broader U.S. regional interests. The United States seeks to encourage regional stability, economic development, and democracy throughout South and Southwest Asia. Stability in the region is enhanced not only when Pakistan believes itself to have a stake in it, but also possesses the means to take part in maintaining it. The opportunities for economic progress and political liberalization in Pakistan grow under the same conditions. This point should be prominent in the minds of those who are responsible for the future conduct of U.S.-Pakistan security relations. The same point should be recalled when difficulties in the relationship crop up, as they certainly will.

### *Arms Transfers: U.S. Policy Changes*

U.S. military equipment transfers to Pakistan were interrupted twice by the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. When they resumed in the mid-1970s, they were kept severely limited by U.S. concerns about nuclear prolifera-

<sup>11</sup>The role of Chinese assistance to Pakistan has been similar in effect, and should be acknowledged, although a review of Pakistan's security relations with China is beyond this chapter's scope.

<sup>12</sup>For details regarding the size, military and economic composition, and policy assumptions of the U.S.-Pakistan aid package of 1981–86 and the 1986 follow-on package, see Herbert G. Hagerty, "United States Assistance to Pakistan," prepared for Seminar on U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Pakistan Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, October 27–30, 1986.

tion in Pakistan, financial constraints, and the dearth of warmth in bilateral channels during Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's tenure.

Military aid was also limited by new U.S. policy guidance. The Carter administration introduced new guidelines of "restraint" in arms transfers, inhibiting commercial promotion of arms deals in the hope that this would have a salutary effect on international competition in arms. This approach also made a political issue out of the "first introduction" of a new military capability in a developing region. But its essential feature was to suspend the traditional assumption in U.S. decision making that arms transfers are a normal (and legitimate) instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

During both the Ford and Carter periods, the United States considered making A-7 and F-5 fighter aircraft sales to Pakistan contingent on non-proliferation concessions by Islamabad, and no major aircraft deals were concluded with Bhutto, or Zia, that decade. A warming of U.S. relations with India under Janata Prime Minister Morarji Desai and the military-authoritarian image of Pakistan after the 1977 coup also braked military supply to Pakistan. Afghanistan changed the Carter administration's view of arms sales to Pakistan overnight, and the sale of F-16s was considered. Even so, the Carter administration's proposed two-year security assistance package for 1980–81 was rebuffed by President Zia as "peanuts."

During the years of scant U.S. major military equipment transfers, Pakistan compensated with substitutes from China (e.g., heavy armor, interceptor aircraft, coastal patrol craft) and Western Europe (e.g., helicopters, anti-aircraft missiles, artillery, and submarines). During the same years, a sense of grievance over the unreliability of the U.S. security commitment took root in Pakistan. It was not uncommon among certain Pakistani groups to blame the collapse of the shah's regime and the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan on U.S. unreliability and declining influence in the region.

When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, it more than doubled the annual value of the proposed Pakistan security assistance package and lengthened its duration from two to five years. Washington was affirmative, openly and in private, on commitments to help assure Pakistan's security and territorial integrity against Soviet or communist aggression. Reagan discarded the Carter arms transfer policy and made the U.S. policy machinery more receptive to U.S. participation in cooperative, long-term military modernization in key Third World countries. This altered policy climate also eased the discourse with Pakistan. Willingness to sell Pakistan forty first-line F-16 Falcon fighter aircraft, even before USAF inventories were filled, became the flagship deal in the overall security relationship, with high political and symbolic importance.

### *Advanced Military Equipment Transfers*

Despite the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, actual and proposed U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan after 1982 became highly controversial. The most hotly debated were Pakistani acquisition of the F-16 fighters and Pakistan's inquiry into the availability of airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. Criticism was also focused on Pakistan's acquisition of U.S. Harpoon (naval)<sup>13</sup> and Sidewinder AIM-9L air-to-air<sup>14</sup> missile systems, and on the proposals for selling the Abrams M-1 tank and P-3 (Orion) anti-submarine aircraft.

Opponents of the transfers to Pakistan typically have argued that the more advanced weapons: (1) have marginal or no utility against the Soviet-Afghan threat; (2) could be used only (offensively) against India; (3) would introduce a new level of capabilities, escalate arms competition, and exert a destabilizing effect in the region; and (4) undermine U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Some critics have also advocated human rights and democratic political tests for approving arms transfers. Many of the same arguments will return when Congress considers approval of future Pakistani arms transfer proposals. What are their merits? What will they seem to be, once Soviet forces are removed from Afghanistan?

Credible security relations are based, first, on converging interests and, second, on joint actions and programs that demonstrate commitment and build mutual confidence. This is true in the best of times and between the closest of allies. When a relationship has deteriorated, however, more must be invested to restore it. The Afghanistan crisis brought this relationship back to essentials.

On its side, the U.S. commitment had to be made credible. This required programs based on bipartisan congressional support, signified by the multiyear duration of assistance packages and the F-16 sale. Confidence was built by accommodating Pakistan's proposals for defense modernization instead of judging each request strictly in terms of suitability for use

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<sup>13</sup>The Harpoon is an anti-ship, terminal radar-homing cruise missile with a range of up to 110 kilometers (about 60 nautical miles). This missile is made in two versions, a booster-launched type for surface ships and submarines, and a smaller air-launched version. It entered service with U.S. forces in 1977 and has since been sold to several foreign navies. As of 1987, Pakistan planned to buy a small number (16) of the ship-to-ship version (RGM-84 SSM). *The Military Balance, 1987-88* (London: IISS, August 1987), p. 168. For operational details, see the annual versions of *Jane's Weapons Systems* (London and New York: Jane's Publishing Co.).

<sup>14</sup>The AIM-9L is the third generation of the Sidewinder heat-seeking (infrared homing) air-to-air missile (AAM) and entered service with U.S. forces in 1978. It has a range of about 18 km and an "all-aspect" capability allowing it to be fired head-on at approaching aircraft. Pakistan plans to acquire about 300 of these U.S. missiles and has already deployed French R-530 and R-550 (Magic) AAMs with similar features.

on the western border. Thus U.S. approval of several of Pakistan's naval equipment requests, even if not obviously related to defense from landlocked Afghanistan, was logical as a defense modernization requirement.

In its perceptions of the most likely source of an outright military invasion, Pakistan continued to accord first place to India—ahead of the Soviet Union, even after it occupied Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup> Pakistan's normal defense requirements are based primarily on securing itself against the land invasion, coastal bombardment, and maritime blockade threats from India.<sup>16</sup> They take into account the need for a peacetime shield against Indian political interference in Pakistan's domestic politics (e.g., tensions in Sind) that could compromise Pakistan's stability and independence.<sup>17</sup> Regrettable though it may be that these perceived threats exist, they legitimize a strong defense posture. Since 1971, the premise of Pakistan's military strategy has been essentially defensive.

The controversies over the sale of forty F-16s and of the AEW proposal of 1987 were essentially political. Arguments that these systems would be threatening to India were misleading, and the arguments that they were irrelevant to the Soviet threat were wrong or missed the point. The transfer of the F-16s was a statement about the U.S. commitment to Pakistan's

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<sup>15</sup>The Pakistani military have been frank about this, as in interviews with a RAND analyst during a survey shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: "The central point made by the officers in charge of planning at the Joint Staff Headquarters and by numerous other Pakistanis was that regardless of what happened on the western border, Pakistan's major preoccupation was and would remain India." See Francis Fukuyama, *The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-1584, RC, September 1980), p. 4. For a historical perspective on the same point, see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

<sup>16</sup>This is based on two considerations. Much the larger threat is Soviet, but it is so large militarily that Pakistan alone would be unable—as in an invasion—to deal with its full force. Also, the main Soviet threat, from Pakistan's perspective, forms a long term political-military problem. The probability of a Soviet invasion of Pakistan is discounted. Invasion by India, on the other hand, is rated as more probable, and Indian political-military pressure is constant and intense (e.g., Indian complaints about a "foreign hand" in Punjab, and the fighting on the Siachen Glacier). Having been invaded by India twice and dismembered on the second round in 1971, it would be peculiar if Pakistan did not consider India its chief defense problem. Even though the Pakistani military has long since ceased to imagine that it could defeat India in a test of arms, it has every reason to believe that it can make the cost of a major Indian invasion high and thus can hope to deter such an invasion.

<sup>17</sup>Although the parallel is not exact, the Sri Lankan lesson is not lost on Pakistan. India intervened militarily to attempt to defuse the Tamil separatist insurgency and restore order to the troubled state. This had the reluctant approval of Sri Lanka's president. But the failure of Sri Lanka to cope with internal unrest compromised its independence. Sympathetic groups in India's southern state of Tamilnadu provided sanctuary, training bases, and sustenance for the Sri Lankan Tamil guerrillas.

security that was intended to be read in Moscow, and the sale of AEW aircraft, if it materialized, would have had a similar function. Moreover, the F-16s have proved valuable in countering specific Soviet and Afghan air intrusions,<sup>18</sup> even though Pakistan still has inadequate ground-based and no dedicated airborne radar warning on that border. The AEW capability, especially the E-3 Advanced Warning Airborne Command System (AWACS), would enhance the defensive response of Pakistan's small inventory of modern interceptor aircraft to air intrusions in the mountainous terrain of the north.<sup>19</sup>

The F-16 is a high-performance, air superiority fighter, with outstanding interceptor and good ground attack capabilities for its class of aircraft. As a multirole combat aircraft, it could theoretically be used for offensive missions against India, but to leave the assessment there is misleading. Pakistan's F-16s could perform no decisive conventional offensive mission against India, even if they were all employed in a surprise attack. India and its air force of the 1980s are in no way comparable to Egypt and its ill-protected aircraft of 1967, nor does the Pakistani air force have the preemptive strike capability that Israel's did. India has already deployed an impressive air force strike capability based on the Anglo-French Jaguar and French Mirage-2000. India's operational absorption of Soviet MiG-29s, which are equivalent to F-16s, began in mid-1988, and these will further remove any offensive edge Pakistan was thought to have from F-16s.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>PAF F-16s, for example, shot down two Soviet-origin Afghan SU-21s that had intruded some 10 miles into Pakistani airspace in the summer of 1988, with the capture in one case of the Soviet pilot, who was returned to the Soviet authorities just days before the death of President Zia in August.

<sup>19</sup>The key is quick response by fighter aircraft on combat air patrol or based on alert at airfields near the scene of an intrusion. The AEW capability may provide detection minutes before a hostile aircraft intrudes, and thus call up interceptor aircraft to converge at the likely point of intrusion. For a more detailed review of the issues of AEW transfer to Pakistan, see my "U.S. Security Interests in South Asia: The Pakistan Aid Package," prepared statement for U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (Solarz Subcommittee) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY 1988-89 (Part 5), Hearings and Markup*, Feb. 25, Mar. 3-18, 1987, pp. 352-65.

<sup>20</sup>After examining the ground, air, and air defense balances, it becomes clear that the main efficient mission of a smallish Pakistani inventory of forty, fifty, or even one hundred F-16s would be the defense of Pakistan's skies. Even so, these small numbers—cut further by operational availability rates—would be too thinly spread in a country as large as Pakistan to do much more than defend key cities and critical military installations against the kinds of attacks the Indian air force is capable of mounting over a period of several weeks. In that defensive role, F-16s improve Pakistan's ability to withstand India's current air strike capabilities. In the overall picture, that improvement probably would be significant for Pakistan only at the outset of a war or in a very short war. In a war of several months' duration, it might be only marginal.

An adequate Pakistani AEW capability would, no doubt, make more than a marginal difference to the defense of its narrow airspace by a few F-16s and other, more numerous but less capable, Chinese-origin fighter aircraft. AEW aircraft could function at all hours in any weather, and—over flat terrain of the sea—could give an additional 15 to 20 minutes' warning of an air attack. Their target tracking and communications capabilities would alert ground centers, allowing combat aircraft to be scrambled and vectored into position to intercept attacking aircraft. Scarce interceptor aircraft assets could be used more efficiently, even when some are allocated to defending the AEW platforms. The price to the attacker would rise substantially.

The effect of one-sided AEW capabilities in the hands of a militarily superior power could enhance that power's offensive capabilities against a weaker opponent, particularly in compactly bounded spaces, as illustrated by Israeli-Syrian air battles over Lebanon in the early 1980s. Soviet-manned Moss AEW aircraft said to be supporting India in the 1971 war with Pakistan, which had no comparable system, apparently contributed to the speed and decisiveness of the Pakistani defeat. Even where a military asymmetry is pronounced, AEW capabilities on both sides would tend to improve their respective defensive capabilities. In the South Asian environment, AEW capabilities on both sides would have the effect, overall, of strengthening defensive capabilities and thus generally should favor military stability.<sup>21</sup>

The most persuasive criticisms of the advanced arms transfers to Pakistan—particularly of the F-16s, proposed M-1 tanks, and the E-3 version of the AWACS—are twofold. First, they are expensive first-line systems and probably not the most cost-effective choices for a recipient with limited resources. Pakistan could buy a larger number of modern interceptor aircraft, with comparable air defense capabilities but more flexibility in deployment, if it purchased a somewhat less capable system than the F-16. The Northrop F-5 was suggested as an earlier U.S. alternative. In fact, practicing this very point, Pakistan is purchasing electronically upgraded Chinese aircraft in larger numbers. The M-1 is not only expensive but may be ill-suited for Pakistan's irrigated Punjab terrain; the problem here is that the production line for the M-60 class of tanks, which Pakistan might otherwise prefer, is shut down, and there is no surplus to sell abroad.

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<sup>21</sup>In the event India and Pakistan go nuclear, the role of AEW capabilities could be more complicated. Even so, assuming that each side has such capabilities, their overall effect would be more stabilizing than destabilizing. Instability would not be a product of better warning capabilities, but rather of the offensive potential of nuclear weapons and the inadequacy of air defense against them.

A second criticism also is more easily stated than remedied. Advanced U.S. arms sales to Pakistan do increase India's postulated defense burden and reduce what is available for development. It is not that these U.S. transfers "provoke" similar Soviet offers to India, or similar Indian requests of the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> But they do tend to expedite the approvals within India (and perhaps within the Soviet Union) for deals that have been in the making for some time (e.g., on the MiG-29 yesterday, and the Mainstay AWACS tomorrow). Naturally, these approvals are often announced by India with the rationale that the expenses are compelled by circumstances. The result is not so much that India buys what it did not intend to or proportionally more from the Soviet Union than it otherwise would, but rather that it acquires these purchases earlier than later, spends more in the near term than would have been considered optimal, and thus loses some control over the timing of new defense commitments.

In the final analysis, however, three reassuring points can be made about the probable content of future U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan. First, the United States is precluded by long-standing policies from transferring certain types of arms (e.g., ballistic missiles) that could suddenly affect the stability of the local balance. Second, Pakistan's limited resources will not afford advanced conventional arms transfers from the United States or other Western suppliers at a rate or in a quantity that could be seriously destabilizing. Third, Pakistani military requisitions in the United States are consistent with current understandings of conventional defense modernization and can be supported on that ground.

### Major Challenges

Challenges to U.S.-Pakistan security relations were visible on the horizon—even if no major shocks to Pakistan had occurred. Three are already apparent. First, differences of approach on Afghanistan, which emerged even before the Geneva Accords were signed, could matter. Second, the potential for discord on the issues of democratic liberalization and political order have increased. They cropped up in one form when President Zia suddenly dismissed Prime Minister Junejo and the elected cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly and provincial legislatures on May 29, 1988. Zia promised new national elections and subsequently

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<sup>22</sup>If there is a Soviet response to U.S. transfer competitiveness in South Asia, U.S. *technology* transfers to India, not *arms* transfers to Pakistan, will establish the Soviet frame of reference. Soviet willingness to make advanced arms such as the MiG-29 combat aircraft and T-72 tank available to India long before its European allies have been fully supplied reflects Soviet concern about China. These arms transfers are not an outcome of U.S. export competition—commercial or military—in South Asia.

decreed they would be held on a nonparty basis on November 16, 1988—to follow U.S. presidential elections by about a week. They were held instead on a party basis and brought elements of the former opposition to power. This seemed to defuse the liberalization issue but brought the issues of security policy continuity, governmental stability, and economic performance into the spotlight. Third, nuclear proliferation was bound to become a more central issue in the relationship. Finally, one could not rule out the possibility of renewed Indo-Pakistan conflict as a source of disruption.

Amid these developments, Pakistan faced a huge shock. The death of President Zia and much of the Army high command in the Bahawalpur air crash of August 17, 1988, was an enormous blow. It created immediate uncertainty about political stability within Pakistan. It raised questions regarding the continuity of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. It meant a lapse of predictability in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As of January 1989, the new government of Benazir Bhutto showed hopeful signs that it intends to emphasize policy continuity, but answers to the deeper questions could take a year or two to emerge.

### *Afghanistan Developments*

After the Geneva Accords were signed, U.S.-Pakistani differences of approach existed on three interrelated issues: first, the U.S.-Soviet guarantees of noninterference embodied in the accords meant that U.S.-Pakistani disagreement would arise on adjustments in the subsequent levels and composition of aid to the Mujahideen during the period of Soviet disengagement. It was critical that these differences not escalate because, were they to do so, they might have relieved the pressure for Soviet withdrawal and permitted a Soviet change of mind in the last stages.

Second, Washington and Islamabad did not always see eye to eye on the wisdom of trying to shape the objectives or tactics of Mujahideen operations. On the goal of ensuring rapid and uninterrupted Soviet withdrawal there was agreement. On the tactics that would work best for that purpose, such as on whether the Mujahideen should attempt to rapidly overrun Afghan towns and outposts as Soviet forces vacated, views were not identical. Differences were apparent over how much to rely on the Peshawar-based Afghan political leaders as opposed to the field commanders who led the fighting and controlled territory inside Afghanistan.

Third, Pakistan and the United States seemed to look differently at the question of whether to attempt to shape a future government of Afghanistan directly. Washington believed the Kabul regime's collapse to be inevitable and assumed that indigenous Afghan forces could produce a viable successor, free from Soviet control. Consequently, U.S. priorities

were to resupply the resistance forces and encourage them to coordinate their military operations. Deeper involvement to attempt to shape a successor government was unnecessary. For Pakistan, however, it was a legitimate and direct concern that the new government in Kabul be friendly as well as independent from Moscow and that it be able to create or guarantee safe conditions for the refugees to return. Pakistan had understandable incentives for an activist policy.

Inside Pakistan, however, President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo held diverging views on this point. Zia was more confident of Pakistan's ability, through the Afghan resistance, to foster an Islamic successor regime. Junejo preferred a low-profile approach and was less optimistic that Pakistan could shape the ideological content of a successor government, but he recognized that some Pakistani influence was needed to encourage that Kabul henceforth be friendlier to Pakistan's interests.<sup>23</sup>

Though it is still not clear whether the Soviet Union had a hand in the Bahawalpur air crash of August 17, 1988,<sup>24</sup> nothing could have seemed more to that country's advantage. The death of President Zia removed the top leader who had the inclination and strength to implement an interventionist policy in regard to Afghanistan. For Zia, an activist policy meant support not only for the Mujahideen struggle to expel Soviet forces but for the formation in Afghanistan of an explicitly Islamic type of government.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>This difference might have been one factor in Zia's determination to dismiss the Junejo cabinet on May 29, 1988. Probably a more important one, however, was the perception of Junejo's challenge to the power of the Army and of Zia that spring. The Junejo cabinet's effort to complete and publish the findings of an inquiry into the Ojheri ammunition depot explosion of April 10, 1988, seemed to be directed at Generals Akhtar and Hamid Gul and risked being used politically to discredit the Army. Dismissing the cabinet and National Assembly blocked publication of the report. Additional pressure on the Army erupted from an incident in Rawalpindi in which two junior army officers and a Punjab provincial legislator got into a fight after a traffic accident, and the fight escalated into a minor riot with several military vehicles attacked and burned. See Richard J. Weintraub, "Pakistani Ruler's Ouster of Premier Is Seen as Attempt to Shield Army," *Washington Post*, June 3, 1988.

<sup>24</sup>The initial Pakistani inquiry report released on October 16, 1988, reportedly concluded that the crash of the C-130 carrying President Zia was not caused by weather disturbance, mechanical or structural failure of the aircraft, or an external attack on the plane, but rather pointed to a "criminal act of sabotage perpetrated in the aircraft." Suspicion evidently centered on possible methods that could have been used to "induce incapacitation of the flight-deck crew," such as the discharge of a toxic gas into the cockpit, causing a nearly instantaneous loss of control over the aircraft. The introduction of a sophisticated device in these circumstances would, many assumed, point to a Soviet origin. *Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly*, October 23, 1988, pp. 1, 16.

<sup>25</sup>President Zia firmly and personally backed the Afghan resistance leaders based in Peshawar. In early 1988, when the Soviet Union apparently was eager to conclude a settlement

Zia believed an Islamic government in Kabul would be the best way to immunize Afghanistan from communist power internally, thereby limiting future Soviet influence.

The simultaneous death of General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan removed the pivotal figure in Pakistan's undercover Mujahideen support operation.<sup>26</sup> An immediate concern was that his loss would disrupt resupply and hinder the effectiveness of the Mujahideen groups, pull the ground out from under Zia's forward policy, and vitiate potential Pakistani influence over the shape of a future government within Afghanistan. Even more serious was the danger that a loss of Mujahideen momentum could be exploited by the Kabul regime and residual Soviet forces to wear down and further divide the resistance, thereby blocking efforts to unify resistance groups and create a coherent alternative base for an independent government in Afghanistan.

The smooth transition to the caretaker government of civilian President Ghulam Ishaque Khan in Islamabad, however, kept these matters within Pakistan under control. Support for the Mujahideen through Pakistan was maintained, with some change in the direction of flow of supplies. Shortly after the Geneva Accords went into effect, the United States reportedly urged that foreign support go directly to key resistance commanders and forces operating inside Afghanistan, bypassing the Afghan parties in Peshawar, particularly the contentious Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and Hezb-i-Islami.<sup>27</sup> This policy was a bet not only on the ability of local commanders to overthrow the Kabul regime but on the likelihood that they were better equipped than leaders outside the country to ensure

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agreement provided it exclude the question of forming a successor government in Kabul, Zia tried to persuade Washington to hold up the Geneva Accords until this matter was resolved. After the Geneva Accords were signed, Zia encouraged resistance groups to pursue a forward policy, intensifying pressure on Kabul and occupying other key centers in Afghanistan as Soviet forces withdrew to cause an early collapse of the Najibullah regime and its replacement with an Islamic type of government. Zia committed certain Pakistani units to action in the border areas to protect the rear of resistance operations. Of the seven Peshawar-based Afghan resistance organizations that form the Afghan National Liberation Front, Zia openly favored Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami party, a hard-line but often disputatiously anti-Western organization.

<sup>26</sup>Lt. Gen. Akhtar, as former head of the Inter Services (military) Intelligence (ISI) directorate and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, managed Pakistan's Mujahideen supply operation. In regular contact with President Zia, Akhtar and Maj. Gen. Hamid Gul, the next ISI chief, supervised the flow of weapons and other equipment from U.S. and Middle Eastern sources to the resistance groups and organized training programs for their use and for instruction in military tactics and organization.

<sup>27</sup>Stuart Auerbach, "U.S. Shifts Aid Deliveries to Afghans," *Washington Post*, August 31, 1988, p. A19.

that the political composition of a replacement regime would be broadly acceptable to Afghan groups throughout the country.<sup>28</sup>

### *Elections and Succession in Pakistan*

Based on the results of the November 16, 1988, National Assembly elections, Benazir Bhutto was invited to form a coalition government in Pakistan and assumed her new office on December 2. She is the first woman to become the head of government in an Islamic country. At the age of thirty-five, she is also now the youngest head of government of a major state, and one of the youngest persons ever to become prime minister of a parliamentary government. Zia's unexpected death almost certainly opened the way for Benazir Bhutto's early rise to power. Yet it is also clear that Benazir Bhutto had become a contender. She grew steadily in political skill and stature following her reentry into Pakistan's politics in 1985. Since the election was free and orderly, its outcome signified measured elite as well as popular acceptance of her leadership.

The very fact that Pakistan held direct parliamentary elections and made a full transition back to representative government augers well for U.S. expectations in the bilateral relationship. The United States had repeatedly urged Zia to permit such a shift. By stages, Zia had moved part of the way, but he recoiled by removing the Junejo cabinet in early 1988. That Pakistan held to the course of elections and managed this transition, despite the emergency triggered by Zia's death just a few months before and despite the uncertainties associated with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, testifies to a high level of political maturity under stress. It is particularly significant, in light of Zia's death under peculiar circumstances, that the Pakistani military did not block the election or maneuver to prevent formation of a PPP-led government.

As Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto must deal with major challenges that will test her leadership resilience. To begin with, although her Pakistan People's Party (PPP) stood first in the field in National Assembly seats, it failed to win a clear majority and thus lacks a clear national mandate. The PPP won 93 of the 207 directly elected National Assembly seats (i.e., 46 percent), based on 39 percent of the total popular vote nationwide. The rival Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA)<sup>29</sup> won only 55 of the 207 seats (27

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<sup>28</sup>The best-known local commanders are Ahmed Shah Massoud, who has developed military and political organization for the control of ten northern provinces; Abdul Haq, who has become predominant in the region surrounding Kabul; and Ismal Khan, who is the local power in seven western provinces.

<sup>29</sup>The Islamic Democratic Alliance (officially the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, or IJI) is an electoral alliance of several parties centered primarily on the Pakistan Muslim League (PML),

percent), but with 32 percent of the nationwide vote.<sup>30</sup> To form her government, Bhutto had to form a parliamentary coalition, drawing in numerous “independents” and, perhaps, making accommodations with smaller, non-IDA parties. Coalition politics will limit her strength and freedom of maneuver, at least for a time.<sup>31</sup>

Three other findings emerge from the 1988 election statistics. First, although it won fewer seats, the PPP obtained roughly the same proportion of voter support nationally in 1988 as it did in the elections of 1970 and 1977.<sup>32</sup> In 1988, however, the PPP margin of victory among voters nationwide was caused almost entirely by its disproportionately strong showing in Sind.<sup>33</sup> In addition, it seems the PPP had slipped in strength during intervening years but recovered to its former level of voter support

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whose roots go back to the Independence movement, and the religious Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). Though both of these parties were associated with governments under Zia, the JI had distanced itself in the later years. After Junejo's ouster by Zia from the position of prime minister in May 1988, the PML had split on August 26 into a faction led by Nawaz Sharif of Punjab and a faction led by former Prime Minister Junejo and the Pir of Pagara—whose constituencies are in Sind. The two PML factions resumed cooperation under the Alliance after the Supreme Court decided to overrule Zia's former decree and hold the elections on a party instead of “partyless” basis. The Alliance also drew in a faction of the National People's Party (NPP) headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi of Sind. The NPP broke, as a splinter party, from the PPP in 1986. It was established by senior PPP leaders who had worked with Bhutto's father and were unwilling to accept her leadership when she returned to Pakistan that year. Before the election, the NPP itself had split, with one faction following Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a former governor and chief minister of Punjab.

<sup>30</sup>For survey results, including analysis of social and attitudinal aspects of the vote, see *Gallup Political Weather Report*, “Special Issue of 1988 National Elections,” Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, November 1988.

<sup>31</sup>Of the 207 directly elected National Assembly seats, 57 were distributed among the following categories: 27 to “independents”; 12 to the Muhajir Quaumi Mahaz (MQM); 7 to the Fazlur Rahman faction of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI[F]); and 11 to “others.” The MQM is an urban Sindhi party formed in 1983 to represent the interests of the Urdu-speaking *mubajir* community (refugees from India, mainly from Partition in 1947 or from the Bihari community of Bangladesh, filtering into Pakistan in recent years) and is especially strong in Karachi. The National Assembly also contains 30 “reserved” seats, most of them for women (in this case, indirectly elected) and several for non-Muslim minorities (e.g., Hindus, Christians).

<sup>32</sup>The PPP's proportion of the 1988 National Assembly election vote, 39 percent nationwide, was nearly the same as that in the 1977 election, and comparable to that in the same West Pakistan area (of the formerly undivided country) in the 1970 election. In the 1977 election, however, the PPP had won roughly 60 percent of the National Assembly seats and a similar proportion of the West Pakistan parliamentary seats in the 1970 election. A significant difference in the 1988 election was much lower turnout, only about 40 percent of the total electorate, down from a previously typical level of about 60 percent in national elections.

<sup>33</sup>Regional patterns stood out in the National Assembly poll but even more strongly in the provincial assembly elections, which were held three days later, on November 19. In the

only by demonstrating that it had moved under Benazir Bhutto's leadership toward the center of the political spectrum. Thus, the narrow PPP victory depended on holding the leftist and radical elements, which were associated with the PPP in its heyday, strictly in check.

Second, the rival IDA, which merged the mainstream Muslim League and conservative religious parties, was more successful than its past antecedents in creating the semblance of a two-party contest nationwide. Thus, the 1988 elections may have contributed, as would be expected of regular elections, to a greater measure of political party integration of disparate groups of voters in this pluralistic society.

Third, the IDA ran strongly enough in Punjab, the most populous province, not only to edge out a PPP provincial victory but to form the core of the coalition government in the province.<sup>34</sup> With Muslim Leaguer Nawaz Sharif becoming Chief Minister in this politically and economically dominant province, the stage has been set in Pakistan for a political struggle between the IDA-led coalition in Lahore, on one hand, and the PPP-led federal coalition combined with a solid PPP provincial government in Sind, on the other. This could be a recipe for some instability and may accentuate Punjab-Sind regional polarization. At the same time, it points to a credible nonmilitary alternative, a popularly elected government in waiting, that could come forward from the dominant province if Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's leadership falters.

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national poll, the PPP led in the countrywide total by a margin of 7 percent, but nearly all of this margin derived from the disproportionately strong PPP vote in Sind. In Sind, the PPP polled 46 percent of the total National Assembly vote and won 31 out of 46 available seats. The IDA won only 15 percent of the Sind National Assembly vote and failed to win a single seat there. Elsewhere in the country, the PPP and IDA ran about even. Where they ran even, the PPP did slightly better on seats, suggesting that the split of votes among other parties and independents worked against the IDA more than the PPP. In the Sind *legislative assembly* (provincial) elections, the PPP swept 67 of 100 seats, with 45 percent of the provincial vote. The IDA was wiped out in Sind, winning only 7 percent of the total vote and one seat. The balance in Sind went to smaller parties and independents; these combined took 48 percent of the vote (a higher proportion than the PPP) and won 32 seats.

<sup>34</sup>In the Punjab provincial election, the IDA won 108 seats against 94 for the PPP, out of a total of 240 legislative assembly seats, enabling the IDA, supported by minor parties and independents, to form the government. Punjab contains about 60 percent of Pakistan's total population and thus is the politically dominant province. The IDA took the lead in seats, but the IDA and PPP won nearly equal shares of the total provincial election vote, 33 percent each. About the same proportion, 34 percent, went to "independents" and smaller parties in Punjab.

Electoral support for the PPP was much weaker in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, dropping to 20 and 11 percent of the votes, respectively. The IDA did substantially better in both provinces, with 25 percent of the vote in NWFP and 23 percent in Baluchistan.

Bhutto ran a moderate campaign to win power. Her positions on policy issues were devoid of radical appeals or major shifts from established lines. Since taking over, she has also emphasized foreign policy continuity in her selection of cabinet members. As her Foreign Minister, for example, she chose Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, formerly an Army general who long ago made the transition to diplomatic service and became a master of the craft. Until recently, Khan had served as Zia's Foreign Minister, directing Pakistan's role in the U.N.-sponsored indirect talks with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan. Khan was the real author of the Geneva Accords. Having served in ambassadorial posts in Moscow and Washington, he is well acquainted with the governments and interests of both superpowers.

Khan's appointment provides internal reassurance to the Army that Bhutto will make no sudden, major changes in the Afghanistan policy. Because Khan is highly regarded and a known quantity abroad, his return to the Foreign Ministry is also reassuring. Soviet leaders trust his reliability on commitments, and Americans know him to be a friend as well as a cool-headed defender of Pakistani interests. As before, his experience will give stability to Pakistani foreign policy. He is capable of innovation, and the post-Afghanistan situation is likely to bring out this quality. Bhutto will find him an able mentor as she accumulates her own knowledge and experience.

In domestic affairs, Bhutto has shunned talk of new industry and school nationalizations, actions the private sector dreaded her father for. She has also avoided loose rhetoric on land reform and labor issues that could arouse anxiety within her coalition. There are a series of pressing economic and financial problems her government will have to come to grips with. Revenue from Middle East remittances has fallen, foreign exchange reserves are low, the budget deficit is serious, and the deficit in the external trade account even more so. Servicing Pakistan's indebtedness to international lenders consumes the lion's share of new financial aid. Domestic savings have declined to low levels. Maintenance and new investment in the transportation, power, and irrigation infrastructure have been postponed far too long. But Bhutto's cabinet appointments appear, on the whole, to be of a pragmatic cast, and are an indication these problems will be addressed in a methodical fashion.

### *The Nuclear Issue*

Nuclear proliferation has been a highly divisive issue in U.S.-Pakistan security relations. It contains a deeply disruptive potential. The United States has a profound interest in nonproliferation—a vital security interest—that collides with Pakistan's narrower security calculations. Americans will ask, why provide security assistance to a country whose drive for

nuclear armament puts its security and that of the region as a whole at risk? This issue becomes more prominent for the United States as the Afghanistan problem recedes.

On Pakistan's side, a remarkable unity of view has been maintained on this issue. Pakistanis broadly support a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability to match India's. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto laid the foundation for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program when he headed the government from 1971 to 1977. Under Zia, Pakistan's nuclear technical proficiency apparently matured. Pakistan claimed to have demonstrated initial success with its enrichment process in 1984 and probably separated its first weapons-grade uranium in 1986. Western observers believe that Pakistan has since begun accumulating weapons-grade material in significant quantities and also believe that Pakistan has mastered the technology and a workable design for the construction of a nuclear explosive device from uranium. In 1988 there were rumors, and in early 1989 official reports, that Pakistan had begun to manufacture and test nuclear-capable missiles.<sup>35</sup>

The stage has been set for a collision of wills between the United States and Pakistan over this issue. In November 1988, President Reagan's report to the U.S. Congress, required by the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, recommended that the next phase of the assistance package for Pakistan be implemented. But it noted that the required presidential certification that Pakistan does not possess a "nuclear explosive device" was made only with great difficulty, and that unless Pakistan suspended its related activities, providing such certification in the future may become impossible. In that event, the Pressler Amendment would trigger a cutoff of further security and economic assistance to Pakistan.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has adopted a position on Pakistan's nuclear policy that "sounds" softer than Zia's. Before coming to office, she made statements that suggested she would reevaluate Pakistan's nuclear program, including controversial activities. She hinted that what was appropriate in nuclear policy during her father's time may not be appropriate for Pakistan under changed circumstances. After taking office, she emphasized the peaceful character of Pakistan's nuclear programs and assured others that this is clear in her own intentions. She clearly hoped to avoid confrontation on this issue. The question is whether she can manage to do so if this would require shutting down programs, such as uranium enrichment, or necessitate acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all Pakistan's

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<sup>35</sup>According to the latest news reports, for instance, the Pakistan Army Chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, told his audience at the National Defense College in Rawalpindi that Pakistan recently had tested two locally manufactured surface-to-surface missile types, one with a range of 48 miles and the other with a range of 180 miles. He indicated the missiles could carry payloads of 500 kilograms, which is generally considered sufficient for a nuclear weapon. See *New York Times*, February 6, 1989.

nuclear activities. But it is clear from the Indian and Western press that she will not be allowed to rest on this matter.

There is some irony, however, in how Benazir Bhutto's 1988 election victory has changed U.S. politics on the Pakistani nuclear issue. Some American lawmakers were inclined to press the U.S. aid cutoff threat forcefully only when generals were in charge in Pakistan. They were restrained finally by the U.S. foreign policy need for Pakistan's participation in supplying the Afghan Mujahideen. The Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act is designed to leave a future U.S. administration no maneuvering room with Pakistan on the nuclear issue, once the Afghanistan problem is settled. Now the same American politicians, gratified by Benazir Bhutto's election and the long-awaited "return of democracy" in Pakistan, have themselves begun to wonder whether they were wise to legislate an aid cutoff as the main nonproliferation tool with Pakistan. An aid cutoff could undermine Benazir Bhutto's fledgling government and the prospects for representative government in Pakistan.

Notwithstanding this new interest in Pakistan's democracy, the nuclear issue clouds the relationship. For the United States, nuclear nonproliferation is far too important an issue for lawmakers to play favorites with a particular leader, however personally attractive, or over a reformed political process, however congenial. Thus it seems likely that the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship will be buffeted by annual struggles in the U.S. Congress over how to enforce links between U.S. aid and Pakistani assurances on nonproliferation. Such Pakistani concessions may or may not be forthcoming, and may or may not suffice. In this political brinkmanship, the risk of a disruption of the relationship is high.

These are clinical observations about political realities. My own views on the need for a regional or bilateral solution of the nuclear problem in the subcontinent are well known.<sup>36</sup> Such a solution would require *reciprocal* Indian and Pakistani obligations. Unfortunately, the chances of U.S. policy prevailing on India to grant security concessions big enough to induce a change in Pakistan's ambiguous posture have never been very good. Moreover, U.S. pressure for equal movement by India is less likely to be the controlling feature of U.S. nonproliferation policies toward Pakistan in the next few years.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>See my chapter on "India," in Jozef Goldblat, ed., *Non-Proliferation: The Why and Wherefore* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), chap. 5B, pp.101-123. For a recent assessment, see Rodney W. Jones and Harald Müller, "Preventing a Nuclear Sarajevo: Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia," *Arms Control Today* 19, 1 (January/February, 1989): 15-22.

<sup>37</sup>A barometer of typical U.S. thinking may be found in *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, Report of the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988).

The current status quo, which credits some form of nuclear weapons capability to both Pakistan and India with vague but recognizable deterring effects,<sup>38</sup> might coexist with a continued U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. But the more this ambiguous nuclear status quo is demystified by concrete Pakistani demonstrations and by imaginative media reporting, the more trouble can be expected in U.S.-Pakistan relations. A freeze in Pakistani efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would ease the problems. A bilateral nonproliferation agreement (e.g., reciprocal no-test pledges) between India and Pakistan would be a bigger political breakthrough, defusing a serious cause of regional instability.

Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan might open up a different vein of nonproliferation opportunity, permitting closer U.S.-Soviet cooperation on this problem. The Soviet Union agreed in November 1988 to build for India a 2,000 megawatt nuclear power plant and to supply under safeguards the low-enriched uranium fuel. The agreement also requires India to return the spent fuel to the Soviet Union—an important barrier against Indian misuse of material produced in these reactors. In early 1989, the Soviet ambassador to Islamabad declared Soviet willingness to help install nuclear power also in Pakistan. Offering peaceful nuclear supply in exchange for international control continues to have an underlying nonproliferation logic. Carefully handled, supplier avenues can be used to reduce the threat of proliferation in South Asia and ease U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan.<sup>39</sup>

### *Relations with India*

President Zia's pursuit of a "peace offensive" toward Delhi after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980 failed to remove the underlying tension in the relationship. Indeed, Zia's boldness actually hardened bureaucratic suspicions in Delhi. But Zia clearly tried to reduce the risks of war between the two countries—a critical priority for Pakistan at a time of heightened pressure from Afghanistan. Zia's repeated visits to Delhi for face-to-face talks blunted the potential for dangerous Indian reactions to the Sikh problem in Punjab, especially after the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi in October 1984. Zia spurred the formation and discussions of the Joint Commission. His overtures helped to keep alive the urban middle class "peace lobby" within India, which emerged in the brief Janata

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<sup>38</sup>See "Pakistan's Nuclear Options" in Hafeez Malik, ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), chap. 10, pp. 199–216.

<sup>39</sup>See the observations several years ago in "Nuclear Supply Policy and South Asia," in Rodney W. Jones et al., eds., *The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), chap. 17.

administration of 1977–79.<sup>40</sup> Zia encouraged bilateral visits and exchanges of foreign policy officials, leading journalists, scholars, and entertainers, which did much to rekindle an awareness in the educated layers of each society of a common heritage, shared problems, and similarities of perspective.

Nonetheless, the danger of Indo-Pakistani hostilities has remained just below the surface. The dilemma past Indo-Pakistani wars have imposed on U.S. policymakers could recur. The costs of a long war would be crippling to Pakistan and would cause profound economic setbacks in India. Both fear the consequences of a *long* war. But the incentives for a limited test of military power exist, and they are troubling. More important, mechanisms that could escalate a limited conflict to a large one have been all too apparent.

Pakistan has no inclination whatsoever to initiate military hostilities with India. Its military posture since 1972 has been unequivocally defensive. It has shunned entanglement in the Sikh guerrilla and terrorist activity in Indian Punjab. Pakistan has taken the initiative in periods of high tension—Zia's Delhi visit in January 1987 at the end of the Brass Tacks crisis, for example—to neutralize suspicion, overreaction, or miscalculation. But any government of Pakistan that is seen as incapable of defending Pakistani territory or is labeled subservient to India is vulnerable. Thus, though disinclined to provoke India, Pakistan would not yield to an ultimatum or be openly submissive in order to ward off a threatened attack. When both countries are coiled for armed action, the spring might easily unwind. Provocations are not hard to find.

The recent Brass Tacks episode underscored the point. Indian army exercises in Rajasthan in the winter of 1986-87 were so large—putting the equivalent of four divisions and, reportedly, about 2,400 tanks into motion, within reach of the common border—that Pakistan had to take the precautions of alerting its own forces.<sup>41</sup> Pakistan moved a reserve armored division north from Rahim Yar Khan to reinforce its defenses at a point in Punjab used by India to invade in previous wars, signifying that if

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<sup>40</sup>The visit to Pakistan of the Janata cabinet's Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was formerly a key leader of the Hindu chauvinist Jan Sangh party, was highly successful and therefore had great symbolic significance in reducing tensions between the societies.

<sup>41</sup>See the cover story on Indian Army chief K. Sundarji, the architect of India's military "power projection" posture, and the candid revelations regarding Brass Tacks, in *India Today*, May 15, 1988, pp. 34–43. This article reports that there were also plans in Indian defense circles "to provoke Pakistan into some action which would then give the Indian Army an excuse to launch its own offensive . . . Operation Trident," which would have aimed to wrest away Pakistan-held northern areas of Kashmir. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

there were a contest, Pakistan would focus on Punjab.<sup>42</sup> Simultaneously, skirmishing occurred in the Siachen Glacier area of Kashmir, while an Indian logistics buildup in the eastern sector facing Chinese forces in Tibet was also underway. The danger of miscalculation was serious. Ultimately, the crisis was defused by direct communication. But such demonstrations of military muscle near the border will recur, will be more imposing as Indian military modernization proceeds, and will contain the seeds of conflict.

Another scenario could lead to the outbreak of a major Indo-Pakistani war: it begins with a limited Indian military incursion—perhaps a sabotage raid—against Pakistani nuclear facilities near Islamabad.<sup>43</sup> This is highly feasible, technically, because Islamabad is just a few minutes away by helicopter from Indian positions in Kashmir. To make it clear that India could not limit a conflict beginning this way, Pakistan apparently conveyed to India at the highest levels—when reports of such Indian plans reached a crescendo in 1984—that it would retaliate immediately, and on a much larger scale. That Brass Tacks could have been used as a shield by India for a commando operation against Pakistan's nuclear facility at Kahuta was actually perceived as a danger in the crisis of December 1986.

Among the reasons these scenarios cannot be dismissed are the continuing problems of political violence India faces from extremist fringes of its Sikh minority in Punjab, just over the border from Pakistan. India finds it convenient to blame external forces for this essentially domestic, but admittedly serious, political problem, by pointing the finger specifically at Pakistan.

Pakistan's safety against such Indian appetites will continue to depend as much on Pakistan's diplomatic overtures and the wider international community as on military strength and preparedness. It will also depend on the considerable Indian political and economic disincentives to incurring the costs of another war. To defuse a future crisis, joint Soviet and U.S. influence to dissuade Indian resort to force may be needed.

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<sup>42</sup>Both India and Pakistan have traditionally concentrated their main armored operations in the Punjab. In Brass Tacks, India implicitly was "threatening" Sind, a strategy of cutting Pakistan in half. The Pakistani response indicated they would not be diverted south but would defend the political heartland. For analysis of past and possible Indian and Pakistani military operations, see my "India: Defense Policy, Modern Weapons and Regional Power," in Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth, eds., *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1986), chap. 6, pp. 172–222; Rodney W. Jones, "India's Nuclear Strategy: A Threat to World Peace?" *NBC Defense and Technology International* 1 (May 1986): 66–72; and Rodney W. Jones, "Pakistan's Defense Environment in a Nuclear Age," unpublished paper prepared for Carnegie Task Force, February 1987.

<sup>43</sup>A book based on this premise has been around for some time. See Ravi Rikhye, *The Fourth Round: Indo-Pak War 1984* (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982).

If a new Indo-Pakistani war breaks out, the United States is no more likely today than in the past to take sides; hence the political strain on the security relationship with Pakistan would deepen. If the situation could still be managed, it would be because Pakistan no longer assumes that direct assistance from the United States would be available to sustain or resupply its forces after a conflict with India begins. Pakistan presumably would seek to improvise, much as Iran did in its conflict with Iraq, by tapping a variety of other sources.

While Zia was in power, it was common in India to hear the view that settlement agreements with a "democratic" government of Pakistan would be more dependable than those made with a military government. Skeptical though one may be about this as a general proposition, it could have some meaning today in South Asia. The window of opportunity for Indian initiatives with a popularly elected Pakistani government has opened, but it may stay open only if India makes effective overtures.

It was heartening, therefore, that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made his first official visit to Pakistan in the last week of 1988 to participate in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) conference then held in Islamabad. Benazir Bhutto made her diplomatic debut as chairperson of this SAARC session. The occasion was used by Gandhi and Bhutto to conclude several bilateral accords and to reaffirm the 1972 Simla agreement as a framework for the settlement of bilateral differences. In addition, the oral 1985 agreement between Zia and Gandhi, pledging not to attack the other's nuclear facilities, was formalized. These bilateral breakthroughs between the two youthful prime ministers are encouraging. Rajiv's visit was a constructive gesture with political benefits for Benazir Bhutto. But even more important for the long haul may be an implied rapprochement on security issues embedded in the formalization on December 31, 1988, of the nuclear facility no-attack agreement. This is an important confidence-building measure and, because it requires each side to announce once a year the exact location of all nuclear facilities, also contains an important verification building block.<sup>44</sup>

### *Concluding Reflections*

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and political changes in the surrounding region are altering the context in which the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship was revived in the early 1980s. The relationship will undergo adjustments as both sides come to terms with the new circumstances. The changes underway with Soviet withdrawal should benefit regional security immediately in important ways. But they will not remove

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<sup>44</sup>See Jones and Müller, "Preventing a Nuclear Sarajevo," p. 21.

the fundamental reasons for continued U.S. security assistance and cooperation with Pakistan.

The U.S. strategy for international security in the Persian Gulf and South Asia will require increasing sophistication and flexibility as Soviet policy toward the region begins to rely somewhat less on the military and more on political and economic instruments. But the long-term U.S. interest in security assistance will remain. The objectives for this U.S. assistance include those of enabling regional states to progress economically, to build stable and reasonably open political systems, to develop cooperative relationships with neighbors, and to acquire reasonable means to defend their national territories from aggression. In the U.S. view, these conditions will best serve to limit the advances of Soviet power and of other destabilizing hegemonial forces.

Pakistan is both large and strategically situated and, by regional standards, relatively capable of contributing to regional stability. Its political and economic progress will favor a major contribution to regional security by Pakistan over time. The role that Pakistan has played in creating conditions that have finally led to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan provides a vivid illustration of the strategic benefits of successful U.S. investment in security assistance.

But this graphic illustration should not be permitted to obscure the fact that such success depends on sustained relationships, mutual confidence, and the habits of cooperation that form over long periods. The U.S.-Pakistan security relationship originated long before 1979, the year the need for it suddenly escalated. Despite ups and downs, the equities in the relationship date back to the early 1950s. There is every reason to assume this relationship will matter in the future if it continues to be maintained by both sides.

This chapter has reviewed the most apparent challenges that will test the relationship in the next few years, from political change within Pakistan to the nuclear issue and relations with India. It is often prudent to focus on the difficulties early, to understand them ahead of time in order to manage them more effectively when they arise. When they are approached in this realistic fashion, it is easier to end on an optimistic note.

With a little luck, regional statesmanship will surmount the difficulties or convert the challenges into opportunities. Developments between India and Pakistan at the turn of the year were more than usually encouraging. The gestures by India to the new Bhutto government in Pakistan, and the signing of the nuclear accord, may be steps toward improved relations.

The external consequences of Gorbachev's domestic *perestroika* policies, and of Soviet initiatives toward China and Asia at large, are still to be

assessed. India's "movement" in relation to Pakistan may result as much from these shifts as the flowering of "democracy" across the border or Rajiv's own forthcoming election campaign. Thus the major power shifts in Asia at large could improve the prospects for nonproliferation and regional security in South Asia substantially, and this can be encouraged. Such shifts eventually could reduce the U.S. security requirement in that region. If so, they will further vindicate the rationale of U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan.

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## 2. Pakistan's Security Imperatives and Relations with the United States

IFTIKHAR H. MALIK

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In recent times, security relationships among regional or extraregional partners emanating out of national, regional, and global imperatives have become a norm. The process initially began with the evolution of nation-states in Europe, followed by the young independent republics struggling against such postcolonial legacies as centrifugal forces, border conflicts, economic disparities, uneven regional balance of power, ideological dissensions, conflicts between national and subnational forces, the dominance of "traditional" pressure groups or the evolution of new power-based institutions such as military, further accentuated by successive global rivalries among the superpowers and transnational economic forces. Given such a scenario, security-related studies have attained a significant status. Yet security relationships have been generally viewed academically in terms of global perspective, relegating both internal and regional factors to an insignificant role. Such academic efforts, mostly performed by analysts from the superpowers, ignored regional and sub-regional security subsystems, with the result that holistic academic treatments could not evolve.<sup>1</sup> Such studies led, ironically, to peculiar perceptions that exposed a vast gap in information.<sup>2</sup> In this chapter an effort has been made to address the Pakistan-U.S. security relationship in the context of internal/domestic, regional, and supraregional perspectives

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<sup>1</sup>See, for an example, Zalmay Khalilzad, *Security in Southern Asia I: The Security of Southwest Asia* (Aldershot, 1984); Timothy George, Robert Litwak, and Shahram Chubin, *Security in South Asia II: India and the Great Powers*: (Aldershot, 1984), prefaces in both volumes.

<sup>2</sup>"Security is a relational phenomenon. It involves not only the capabilities, desires and fears of individual states, but also the capabilities and fears of other states with which they interact. Because security is relational, we cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of interdependence in which it is embedded." Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis," in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi et al., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (London, 1986), pp. 4–5.

in order to determine the nature of bilateralism as well as to explore topical issues of contemporary relevance.

Both Pakistan and the United States have entered the fourth decade of a mutual relationship that has been characterized—like similar bilateral relations in the contemporary world—with quite a few ups and downs, “hangups,” and fluctuations. Interspersed with successive phases of hesitation, alignment, detachment, “tilt,” rapprochement, disenchantment, and realignment reflective of the Cold War, détente, the second Cold War and once again détente, the bilateralism mostly stemmed from the national, regional, and global interests of both the countries and has been motivated by objectives like national security and regional stability without compromising national sovereignty. Military aid, economic assistance, cultural exchanges along with a prevailing understanding in geopolitical and diplomatic areas have been some of the prominent areas of “mutuality” that began as a simple, idealistic yet commercial dialogue in 1784 with the arrival of the *United States*, the pioneer ship from the young U.S.A. to this part of the world.<sup>3</sup>

### **Pakistan: The Security Imperatives**

Pakistan was born amid solemn celebrations in a glum atmosphere created by Hindu-Muslim riots in the wake of the world's largest migration of peoples.<sup>4</sup> Its independence coincided with a host of serious national, regional, and international security concerns that have persisted, with some variations, throughout the history of its foreign relations.

#### *Internal Factors*

Pakistan's dilemma in internal perspective with its antecedents from the pre-1947 era can be summed up as “imbalance,” manifested throughout the country's history in every area from the political system to industrial development; from relations between the elites and the masses

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<sup>3</sup>See Holden Furber, “The Beginnings of Trade with India,” *New England Quarterly* (1928), and Tyler Dennet, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922). For a detailed analysis, see Iftikhar Haider Malik, *U.S.—South Asia Relations, 1784—1940: A Historical Perspective* (Islamabad, 1988). For pre-Independence developments, see Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, *The Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), vol. 1, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1960), pp. 633–634; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1950), p. 530; Nicholas Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, vol. 1 (London, 1971), pp. 759–760.

<sup>4</sup>For a contemporary American account of the birth of Pakistan, see Mildred A. Talbot to Walter S. Rogers, August 27, 1947; and Phillips Talbot (Bombay) to Walter Rogers (New York), August 29, 1947, unpublished Talbot correspondence, quoted in Malik, *U.S.—South Asia Relations*, pp. 359–360.

to structural changes and a consensus polity; from the relationship of the majority to the minorities to demographic and economic realities; and from ideology to national sovereignty.<sup>5</sup> Pakistan's failure in its nation building instead of merely state building through a viable political order led to the debacle of 1972,<sup>6</sup> which had a great demoralizing effect on the country's population.

Internally, Pakistan's preoccupation with security is related to the major issues that have an essential impact, both in their national and international perspectives:

1. Evolution of a viable, enduring, all-encompassing political order with the participation of heterogeneous groups in the population, and with equitable power sharing by pressure groups and elites.

2. An egalitarian economic order with nationwide supportive foundations.

3. Thoughtful population planning using diversified means to lessen the pace of urbanization.

4. Development of sociocultural and judicial institutions to play an integrative role in nation making.

5. Development of an indigenous defense system.

6. A well-planned foreign policy supported by enduring ideals and corresponding to national interests in its regional and global outlook.

### *Regional Factors*

Equally important and, in some cases, more decisive has been the regional factor in fashioning and remodeling the political realities in and around Pakistan. Thanks to its geographic location, Pakistan until 1971 was not only part of South Asia but also was contiguous to Southeast Asia. By an accident of history, Pakistan happens to be bordered by three big powers—the Soviet Union, China, and India. After the creation of Bangladesh,

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<sup>5</sup>According to a Pakistani historian the major problem in the break-up of infantile political processes in the country was lack of consensus on national issues, particularly those related to the country's constitution and foreign policy. M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947–58*, vol. 1 (Islamabad, 1986), pp. 220–224. To an American political scientist, on the other hand, the Pakistani political system has been a failure “because the foundations of the state and the requirements of modernization have not yet been bridgeable by any institutional arrangement yet employed.” He acknowledges, however, a number of attempts toward that end, but basically the dilemma has been one of authority and legitimacy within the system. Louis D. Hayes, *The Struggle for Legitimacy in Pakistan* (Islamabad 1986), pp. 3–5.

<sup>6</sup>For a perceptive treatment of the subject, see Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York, 1972).

Pakistan, because of its cultural and geographical proximity and disheartened by a continuing relationship of hatred and war with India, turned more toward Southwest Asia. The oil crises of the early 1970s and the large-scale influx of civilian workers and defense personnel in the Near East manifoldly increased its geostrategic significance. The fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 highlighted Pakistan's location in the "arc of crisis," and the beginning of the Gulf War and Western apprehension about the safe flow of oil to Japan and Western European countries increased it even more so. Whether Pakistan is regarded as a South Asian state or a part of Southwest Asia, its geopolitical significance, added to its human and material resources, does not diminish.

*The South Asian scene.* As with other developing countries, Pakistan's security and stability have been dependent on the prevailing regional geopolitical scenarios around its borders. From the very inception of both republics, the relationship with India has been painful, marred by three wars and a number of localized yet significant skirmishes.<sup>7</sup>

India is the largest state in the South Asian region and, in its central geographical position, separates the other six states, each of which borders India. They all also share, with variations, a sense of awe if not fear of India's geopolitical might, even more so since India's humbling of Pakistan in 1971.<sup>8</sup>

Within the South Asian subsystem or the regional security perspective, which is inherently uneven geopolitically, both Pakistan and India hold key positions. India has the advantage of being the strongest neighbor with its enormous technological and military might—increased after the separation of Bangladesh—and its nuclear detonation. But India has its own problems, such as high rates of unemployment, inflation, poverty, and a continuing threat of ethnonationalist uprising in the Punjab, Kashmir, and elsewhere—along with, of course, the Sri Lankan quagmire. The Balkanization of India is less likely given the nature of its heterogeneous society, which is further cushioned by a well-established federal system. Pakistan has been the hotbed of centrifugal and ethnonationalist movements despite a number of common denominators such as Islam, yet its historical experience proves that given a proper federal representative system with built-in ventilation for dissent, the secessionist movements within the country stand no chance of success without open external aggression—as

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<sup>7</sup>The Indo-Pakistan relationship has been aptly described as "Asia's highest unsolved problem." G. W. Chaudhary, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947–1966* (New York, 1968), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>For further details, see Iftikhar H. Malik, "India-Pakistan Relations: A Historical Appraisal of Divergence," *Regional Studies* (Islamabad, Spring 1983), as reproduced in *Awareness* (Rawalpindi) 1, 1 (Winter 1984): 10–14.

was seen in case of its former eastern wing. Moreover, Pakistan's military power, its positive economic performance, a growing skilled workforce, better prospects for socioeconomic and political integration, and a host of other regional factors like the Afghanistan war, the crisis in Indian Punjab, and events in Sri Lanka have brought the Pakistanis to a realistic conclusion that genuine efforts are needed to set the house in order.

*The Southwestern scene.* In this area Pakistan has followed a policy of close cooperation by basing its case on religio-cultural affinity, geographic proximity, and economic vitality. The support for Muslim countries all the way from Western Africa to Iran has been a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign relations over the various phases of nationalist liberation, "Pak-Islamism," and Pan-Islamism.<sup>9</sup> On the Afghanistan crisis, most of the political forces have implicitly identified with the official policy on the issue,<sup>10</sup> as demonstrated at the Round Table Conference convened by former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) regime under Benazir Bhutto. The Geneva Accords<sup>11</sup> showed a beam of hope, yet Pakistan's internal security scenario remains linked to a greater or lesser degree with developments across its borders.

The Afghanistan crisis has left the following imprint on the country's regional security outlook:

1. Pakistan's air space vulnerability, caused by the massive Soviet buildup in Afghanistan, has resulted in numerous violations.
2. There now exists constant threat to Pakistan's western borders.
3. The Soviet occupation of the Wakhan corridor has brought this country close to the strategic Karakoram Highway.
4. There now exists constant threat of hot pursuit of the Mujahideen by the Kabul-Soviet troops into the very exposed territory of Pakistan.
5. There is fear of a direct escalation of hostilities, given the fluctuating situation on the borders.
6. The New Delhi-Kabul-Moscow axis is being strengthened.
7. India's opportunistic increased pressure on Pakistan's borders, which has led to the drawn-out conflict over Siachen Glacier, a strategically significant area for both Pakistan and China, along with skirmishes in

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<sup>9</sup>For an analytical account, see Arif Hussain, *Pakistan, Its Ideology and Foreign Policy* (London 1966).

<sup>10</sup>The Afghanistan crisis produced a massive amount of historiography on the subject itself and its internal, regional, and global implications. For a review, see Iftikhar H. Malik, "Afghan Crisis and the U.S. Academics," *South Asian Studies* 2, 2 (July 1985): 18–35.

<sup>11</sup>For the text of the Geneva Accords signed on April 14, 1988, see *Globe* (Karachi) 1, 1 (1988): 56–61. For a critique, see Rosanne Klass, "The Accords," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1988): 622–643.

Kashmir, have slowed down the normalization process between India and Pakistan.

8. India's tactical pressure, exerted through military exercises like Operation Brass Tacks on the Sind border, has assumed dangerous proportions.

9. India's propaganda against Pakistani nuclear research has led to a war of nerves.

10. India has depicted Pakistan as a base for "terrorists."

11. India has completed arms deals with the Soviet Union for the latest aircraft, artillery, armored vehicles, and submarines by cashing in on traditional friendship as well as benefiting from the Soviet predicament in Afghanistan.

12. India has insisted on the inclusion of the Kabul regime in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as witnessed in the last meeting of South Asian foreign ministers in Kathmandu.

Given such a precarious scenario, which is further strengthened by the historical roots of enmity and conflict, Pakistan's security dilemma has multiplied with the new local and regional realities. The Gulf War and fears about its regional and global implications pose additional security hazards for a country like Pakistan with its geostrategic location and socio-economic ties not only with Iran and Iraq but also with the other Gulf states. With the U.N.-sponsored ceasefire in sight, Pakistan genuinely feels a sense of relief, yet the situation remains unpredictable as long as tension persists in the Gulf region. To sum up, however, Pakistan's stance on Afghanistan as well as its cautious neutrality in the Gulf War despite all the "pulls and pushes" have served to enhance its regional stature.

Within the regional security spectrum Pakistan's relations with China merit special consideration, since the two nations' bilateralism in the economic, military, geopolitical, and cultural fields transcends their ideological moorings and provides major stability for the regional security subsystem. Pakistan turned toward China in the 1960s out of its regional and global security imperatives when its relations with both the super-powers were weakened because of Delhi's hand-in-glove policy with both Washington and Moscow. China's own isolation and regional imperatives brought it closer to Pakistan given Islamabad's standing in both South and Southwest Asia. The construction of the KKH, the Taxila Heavy Rebuild Complex, and similar other joint ventures besides China's shared position with Pakistan on issues like Kashmir and Afghanistan, further reinforced with numerous summit meetings and mutual facilitation of tourists and pilgrims, have added to the regional balance as a stabilizing factor. With Benazir Bhutto's assumption of power, Sino-Pakistan relations are expected to be even stronger.

A recent additional security concern for Pakistan has been the gradual militarization of the Indian Ocean by the Indian Navy. Pakistan's early pronouncements for a "Zone of Peace" have been futile especially after the Soviet Union leased nuclear submarines to India, ostensibly for "training purposes." The introduction of such sophisticated weaponry has created a new "fluid border" for Pakistan on its southern flank, posing a severe threat to strategic balance in the region.<sup>12</sup> Where increased weaponry helped India in its Monroe Doctrine-type ambitions for regional primacy, it has naturally caused a serious threat to regional security. Seen in the light of India's right of interference in Sri Lanka as a precedent—how justifiable such interference might be on the basis of the Indian–Sri Lankan Accord—and added to a naval preponderance, one can foresee the emerging regional security scenario based on susceptibilities and vulnerabilities. Given the evolution of a democratic order in Pakistan, the PPP administration speaking with more confidence, and the SAARC summit of December 1988 in Islamabad, a further lessening of tensions may result. Yet it is too early to predict any radical shift in regional realities.

### *Global Factors*

In recent international politics, the internal or regional factors have generally caused intervention or involvement by the global powers. The best examples are the Indo-Chinese War of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and, more recently, the Afghan crisis. Like the regional powers, the superpowers always use local "proxies" or regional partners in the furtherance of their interests, as was the case with Bangladesh in 1971 and Sri Lanka in 1987. Similarly, the local secessionist movements depend on the support of external powers (both regional or supraregional). The independence of the subcontinent coincided with the Cold War between the global powers, and gradually the subcontinent became no exception, either. Through tools like economic aid, military assistance, diplomatic persuasion, alliances, cultural pacts, transfer of technology, media, training programs—or indirectly, through third parties, or in collaboration with the local elites, or lately through intervention—South and Southwest Asia were influenced by global powers, creating various security concerns. The warming up of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has

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<sup>12</sup>The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, in its meeting on June 21, 1988, while earmarking aid for Pakistan in 1989, denounced India's acquisition of Soviet nuclear submarines and its testing of surface-to-surface missiles. Pakistan, like the U.S., wants a "regional" solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region, as expressed by its Washington ambassador in a letter to the committee written in response to a protest letter by Ambassador Kaul of India. See *Nation* (Lahore), August 14, 1988.

quite a few impressive achievements to its credit, yet Pakistan's concerns still remain a major preoccupation thanks to the fluid and uncertain internal, regional, and global imperatives, as highlighted by the following scenarios.

### The Domestic Scenario

Pakistan's pursuit of the Islamization process under Zia was intended to achieve national integration besides strengthening its relationship with the Muslim world.<sup>13</sup> These policies were equally aimed at providing legitimacy to Zia's regime, which went through such various phases as military rule (martial law), *shoracracy* (establishment of a nominated Majlis-i-Shoora), controlled democracy (no-party elections of 1985), diarchy (Zia-Junejo dualism), and the presidential caretaking system (after the dissolution of the National Assembly and the dismissal of Junejo on May 29, 1988).<sup>14</sup> Such experimentation during the eleven years since the promulgation of martial law on July 5, 1977, pinpointed Pakistan's quest for an enduring political order. Even when Junejo was Prime Minister, de facto powers were in the hands of General Zia-ul-Haq, who had been very much behind the wheel since 1977. Zia's support came mainly from the following "constituencies":

1. The armed forces
2. A class of *ulema* and *masbaikh* (with the recent exclusion of Jama'at-i-Islami)
3. Strong sectors of such pressure groups as the bureaucracy, the landed aristocracy, and the business community

In addition to these factors, Zia's regime was favored by high agricultural yields and more particularly by dissension and disarray among the political factions (not essentially of their own making). Such domestic factors were further strengthened by regional developments like the Afghanistan crisis and Zia's astute handling of regional and global powers. Since the early 1980s, however, Zia's political opponents had been gearing up for various strategies to oust him from office. The struggle of 1983 led

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<sup>13</sup>As a system of moral principles, Islam provides a basis for social intercourse among the citizenry. It has not, however, proved sufficient to chart the country's political course," Hayes, *Struggle for Legitimacy*, p. 11. Also see Henry J. Korson, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 4, 2 (Winter 1982); Anita Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Lahore, 1987), reprint; and Steven R. Weisman, "The Islamization of Pakistan: Still Moving Slowly and Still Stirring Debate," *New York Times*, August 10, 1986.

<sup>14</sup>See Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Front-Line State* (Lahore, 1985), reprint. For a contemporary journalistic commentary, see Mohammad Waseem, *Pakistan Under Martial Law* (Lahore, 1987).

by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), lacking adequate maneuvers and unity, proved abortive. Zia-Junejo dualism, which came into existence after the no-party elections of 1985, served as a new defense for Zia, but its gradual autonomy proved threatening to the President, who, by a referendum in 1984, had the office tenure extended until 1990, with a yearly extension for his office as Army Chief of Staff being dependent on the Defense Minister, the office held by the then Prime Minister, Junejo. In 1986, with the return of Benazir Bhutto, it appeared as if Zia's system would crumble under public demonstrations since in some quarters parallels were drawn with Corazon Aquino's ascension to the power.<sup>15</sup> Benazir Bhutto fully realized the formidable power base of Zia's regime and moved along with the MRD for a common, long-term struggle instead of a "go-it-alone" approach. Zia's political opponents seemed to have evolved mutuality; even Asghar Khan, formerly of MRD, had begun to urge a united front. In his May 29 broadcast, Zia gave two reasons for Junejo's downfall: (1) mounting corruption and (2) the worsening law and order situation, particularly in Sind. He promised new elections,<sup>16</sup> which led to unprecedented political activity in the country. Various interpretations of the constitutional stipulates concerning the timeframe for the elections as well as Zia's policy options were being discussed until Zia announced on July 20, 1988, his decision to hold the elections on November 16, 1988, justifying the delay as due to floods and pilgrimage.<sup>17</sup> The next day he made it clear in a press conference that the elections would be held on no-party basis.<sup>18</sup> Zia's decisions strengthened unity among his political opponents, who decided to take the matter before the people as well as seeking a judicial redress on the interpretation of the constitution. Zia, in the meantime, accelerated his Islamization policies through the promulgation of the Shariat Ordinance and by creating two full-time commissions to Islamize the education and the economy.

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<sup>15</sup>See Matt Miller, "Bhutto Daughter Rocks Pakistan Politics," *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 1986; Spencer Reiss, "Bhutto's Test of Wills," *Newsweek*, August 25, 1986, p. 41; Richard Weintraub, "Bhutto Sows Chaos, Zia Charges," *Washington Post*, August 31, 1986; Russell Watson et. al., "Calling Bhutto's Bluff," *Newsweek*, September 1, 1986, pp. 31–32; Walter A. Taylor and Peter R. Range, "Pakistan's Violent Turn," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 1, 1986, pp. 21–23. Also see Steven Weisman, "Struggle in Pakistan: The Return of Benazir Bhutto," *New York Times Magazine*, September 21, 1986, pp. 40–48, 110–111; and Donna Foote, "Avenging Angel," *Newsweek*, July 7, 1986, pp. 33–35.

<sup>16</sup>See *Dawn* (Karachi), May 30, 1988. Junejo's growing independence, his convening a meeting of politicians in Rawalpindi on the Afghanistan crisis, the pressure on him to take a stand against certain army generals responsible in the Ojhri Blast, and the civilian-military scuffle in a Rawalpindi locality were taken as additional irritants in Zia-Junejo relations.

<sup>17</sup>*Pakistan Times*, July 21, 1988.

<sup>18</sup>*Nation*, July 22, 1988.

Soon after the dissolution of the Junejo government, his Muslim League, formed after the formation of his government, was in a shambles—a traditional repeat performance of the 1950s and 1960s. A party meeting held on August 13, 1988, to choose the League's new president and unite its various factions (both within and outside the caretaker government) led to a ridiculous scuffle in a metropolitan hotel in Islamabad, causing mutual recrimination along with accusations of "some secret hand" manipulating events.<sup>19</sup> The League was, however, able to strike an alliance with eight other religio-political parties to contest elections under a new name, the IDA (Islamic Democratic Alliance).

Along with political unpredictability, ethno-nationalist factions, especially those in Sind, have been an additional worrisome burden on Pakistan. The riots among various ethnic groups in Karachi and Hyderabad have antecedents in a nonparticipatory system where people, in the absence of a common political ethos, turn toward local, linguistic, and regionalistic affiliations.<sup>20</sup> Uneven economic development, unplanned urbanization, overburdening unemployment, and lack of sufficient representation lead to ethnic riots, and such has been the case in Sind. In such a scenario, as seen earlier, foreign intervention—however meager it might be—poses a serious security threat. Sind is no exception, and India's interference helped speed the deterioration of the situation and its socio-political and economic repercussions for the entire country.

The United States has been supportive of the national integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. Despite serious reservations from various quarters and lobbies, the United States, except for a few periods of mutual distancing, never lost hope in Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> After Nixon's downfall, Pakistan's nuclear program and the state of human rights were the main irritants for

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<sup>19</sup>For a detailed minute-by-minute meeting of the factional scuffles within the Muslim League, see *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Rawalpindi), August 14, 1988; *Jang*, August 14, 1988; *Frontier Post*, August 14, 1988; and *Muslim*, August 14, 1988. Certain political elements have blamed the caretaker Chief Minister of the Punjab, Nawaz Sharif, for bringing in non-Leaguers to "capture" the session. See *Muslim*, August 17, 1988; *Jang*, August 18, 1988.

<sup>20</sup>Mutual suspicions have grown to such an extent that politically quite conscious people have demanded the "depolticization of the army and demilitarization of the nation." Based on an interview with a former member of the National Assembly of Pakistan in Islamabad, August 14, 1988. Intellectuals quoted Jinnah in full-length articles in the national press on Independence Day on issues like party-based democracy, accountability, theocracy, and the social-welfare state. See Khan Zaman Mirza, "Role of Civil and Khaki Bureaucracy and Repercussion of Non-party Polls in Pakistan," *The Muslim Magazine*, August, 1988; Khawaja M. Masud, "Pakistan as Visualized by Quaid-e-Azam," *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), pp. 842–918. Kissinger's "tilt" thesis has been refuted lately. See Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia," *Asian Survey* 8, 4 (April 1980): 339–361.

Americans, whereas India figured very significantly in the latter's global and regional policies, with ever-increasing economic cooperation.<sup>22</sup> Since 1980, the United States with its massive aid program for Pakistan and the Afghan resistance feels committed out of its own global interests to Pakistan's national security. American diplomats may have sidetracked the issue by suggesting innocuously that the internal affairs of Pakistan are that country's own concern, but the fact remains that a stable Pakistan is equally desirable. In an address in 1987 to the Asia Society, Michael Armacost, the Under-secretary of State for Political Affairs, highlighted the following main American policy objectives in South Asia:

- Restore Afghan independence.
- Avert a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent.
- Encourage a reduction of tensions between Pakistan and India.
- Stem the drug trade and forge closer multinational cooperation against terrorism.
- Preserve national integrity in the face of separatist demands.
- Support moves toward democracy and regional and economic cooperation, including the impressive strides made by SAARC.<sup>23</sup>

After the dismissal of Junejo in the summer of 1988, the American concern for Pakistan's future form of government is no secret. The House Foreign Relations Committee had already urged Zia to hold party-based elections in the country.<sup>24</sup> This sort of persuasion, along with the statements by such Congressmen as Stephen Solarz and Charles Wilson, boosted the MRD and other political forces in Pakistan who sensed a change in the U.S. policy toward Pakistan's domestic scenario. The United States is mindful of the fact that, in case of confrontation, the anti-Americanism lying at its lowest ebb since 1980<sup>25</sup> may escalate to severe proportions, jeopardizing the very foundation of U.S.-Pakistan bilateralism. Moreover, the U.S. presidential elections of 1988 were a major concern for the Islamabad regime and Pakistani political analysts. In case of a Democratic victory, President Zia did not foresee any sudden change in the U.S. policy toward Pakistan, though he believed three major issues might crop

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<sup>22</sup>See William J. Barnds, "United States Policy Toward South Asia: Shifting Perceptions and Policy Choices," *Pacific Community* 8, 4 (July 1977): 645–659.

<sup>23</sup>U.S. State Department *Bulletin*, vol. 87, no. 2124 (July 1987), p. 75.

<sup>24</sup>"American Congress for Party-Based polls in Pakistan," *Muslim*, August 10, 1988.

<sup>25</sup>For a very perceptive analysis, see Ainslee T. Embree, "Anti-Americanism in South Asia: A Symbolic Artifact," in Alvin Rubinstein et al., *Anti-Americanism in the Third World* (New York, 1985), pp. 131–150.

up: (1) Pakistan's nuclear program, (2) drug trafficking, and (3) regional developments.<sup>26</sup>

Political opposition to Zia had intensified during his more than eleven years in power, during which he kept the political forces at bay through martial law, an ambiguous referendum in 1984, no-party elections in 1985 (later allowing the formation of the official Muslim League in the assemblies), dissolution of the set-up on May 29, 1988, and finally his decision to hold no-party elections on November 16, 1988. Zia's abhorrence of political parties, in the wake of his various alternatives to a democratic participatory system, strengthened the MRD and made his removal a focal point for his opponents. Ethno-regionalist and sectarian conflicts were blamed on Zia's ad-hocism and his bypassing of political processes. With his death in a plane accident on August 17, 1988, however, the political parties, having learned from their past experiences, tried to adhere to new political realities in terms of programs and manifestos to muster wider public support and votes. The succession of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as Acting President under the Constitution augured well for the country and was hailed by most Pakistani political factions. After the party-based elections on November 16, 1988, for the National Assembly and on November 19 for provincial assemblies, the transfer of power sent a sense of relief coursing through the length and breadth of Pakistan, leading some to believe that the armed forces have finally accepted an apolitical role. Despite unfounded rumors of more martial law soon after Zia's well-attended funeral, Ishaq Khan held elections on the scheduled date, and the Pakistan People's Party emerged as the plurality party with 93 seats; the IDA trailed behind with 55 seats. Benazir Bhutto, the first woman Prime Minister in Muslim history, took over at the age of thirty-five. Relations with the United States, India, and the Soviet Union and its policy on Afghanistan have figured prominently in the Pakistani press, but the new Prime Minister has declared she will continue the policies on Afghanistan as well as maintaining a close relationship with the United States. The Mujahideen felt a sense of loss in the demise of Zia and Pakistan's top-brass military leadership, yet the direct parleys between the Mujahideen and the Soviets held in early

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<sup>26</sup>"Zia's Interview," *Nation and Nawa-i-Waqt*, August 14, 1988. Given the centrifugal tendencies and a centralist system, many studies express uncertainty about Pakistan's viability despite the country's economic development, considering it "less a nation than a highly unstable political amalgam. Even the most carefully crafted democratic federalist system would encounter difficulty in preserving national unity while accommodating such diverse interests." Ted Galen Carpenter, "A Fortress Built on Quicksand: U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan," *Policy Analysis* (Cato Institute) 80 (January 5, 1985): 9.

December 1988 in Islamabad and Saudi Arabia pinpoint positive developments in the region.

### The Indo-Pakistan Security Scenario

A history of hostility, Hindu-Muslim riots, the Kashmir dispute, wars, the separation of Bangladesh, military buildups, suspicions about each other's nuclear capabilities, the role each plays in the other's internal affairs, the attitude each displays toward regional issues like Afghanistan, and the relationships of each with superpowers are some of the main irritants between Pakistan and India despite recent efforts for normalization strengthened by summit meetings under the auspices of the SAARC:

The ability of India and Pakistan to forge stronger bilateral ties is fundamentally hampered by mutual suspicions. Each fears that its neighbor is fanning ethnic rivalries. Each is wary of external defense relationship of the other with outside powers. While legitimate concerns are at stake, such perceptions are often exaggerated and inflamed by hyperbolic rhetoric.<sup>27</sup>

But it is not so simple, because Pakistan's long exposed borders, its strategic vulnerability to future India incursions, and most of all the South Asian security scene with India's clear-cut supremacy and its resultant hegemonistic desire to be reckoned as *the* regional power all cause India to be perceived as a serious threat within Pakistan. India's armed forces total 1.3 million, making it the fourth-largest military power in the world, whereas Pakistan has around .5 million, pushing it down to the thirteenth position on the ladder. The ratio of conventional weapons between the two countries is 2:1; in surface warships, 3.4:1; and in combat aircraft, 2:1. Needless to say, India's recent purchase of Russian nuclear submarines has further imbalanced the security scenario because Pakistan's 7,500 km coastline is exposed to a sophisticated and much larger Indian Navy. Similarly, Pakistan's acquisition of F-16 aircraft does not create much deterrence thanks to India's five times bigger air capability. India's Mirage-2000s especially mean that Pakistan's F-16s are "matchless" no more.<sup>28</sup> India's claims for regional preeminence, its insistence on an Indian-sponsored resolution of regional problems (not excluding the use of force, as seen in Sri Lanka), its criticism of Pakistan's security relationship with the United States all stem from that country's advantageous geostrategic position along with its military strength. Pakistan's internal

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<sup>27</sup>Michael Armacost's address in U.S. State Department *Bulletin*, vol. 87, no. 2124 (July 1987), p. 76.

<sup>28</sup>Farhat Hussain, "A Comparative Analysis of the F-16 and Mirage-2000 Aircraft," *Strategic Studies*, 6, 4 (Summer 1983): 62–71.

vulnerabilities, its exposed borders, its sensitive location in a fluctuating regional subsystem given the pressure from the other side of its eastern and western borders alike multiply its security dilemma.

Pakistan, furthermore, cannot match India's vast territorial advantage. In case of war, Pakistan's aircraft cannot carry out an attack, whereas entire territory and defense installations are within easy reach of its Indian counterparts. India's defense expenditures from 1971 to 1980 exceeded those of Pakistan by four times (\$30.8 billion to \$8.2), and its defense budget for 1986–87 was almost \$9 billion, three times larger than that of Pakistan. In weapons procurement as well as indigenous production, India is far ahead of Pakistan without forgetting its ambitious space program under the auspices of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).<sup>29</sup> Pakistan's ground forces consist mainly of infantry divisions, with 400 jeeps and 1,200 trucks per division which, added to bad road conditions and thin railway backup, could hamper mobility in case of war. Similarly, the Pakistan Army is numerically far smaller than the Indian Army and is mostly equipped with Enfield or AK-47 rifles that need upgrading. Pakistan's navy (see Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) as well as its air force need to be equipped with the latest weaponry. Pakistan badly needs another port and the construction of the Indus Highway on the western side of the River Indus as an alternative supply line.

History is witness to the fact that the South Asian region has always been invaded from the northwest or from the Indian Ocean—a legacy inherited by present-day Pakistan that multiplies its security dilemma. With a clear geomilitary imbalance in the region, U.S. support for Pakistan's security and integrity becomes an imperative, of course without risking an arms race. Such assistance is needed to rebuild the regional balance of power that has been upset since the 1970s. Pakistanis, however, feel a bit disillusioned after seeing the record of bilateralism during the crucial decade of the 1970s when internal and regional developments necessitated a more encouraging response from the country's Western ally. During this time Pakistan was relegated to a nonpriority status, with the United States becoming an active supporter of the Indian leadership for the entire

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<sup>29</sup>For further details, see Robert G. Wirsing, "Pakistan-India Military Balance: Instability and Imbalance in the Sub-Continent," *Journal of Defence and Diplomacy* 1, 5 (1987). According to another study, India's military spending has increased by 150 percent in the last five years and "India's advantages are increasing. India has recently announced a 23 percent rise in its defense spending during 1987–88. It will spend 125.12 billion rupees or roughly \$9.8 billion. While Pakistan's budget for this period is not yet fixed, the Indian military budget should be *four times that of Pakistan*" (italics added). For details and precise statistics, see Anthony H. Cordesman, "U.S. Strategic Interests and the India-Pakistan Military Balance," report (Washington, D.C.), June 11, 1987, p. 11.



**Table 2.2**  
The Sources of Indian and Pakistani Arms Imports: 1979–1983

Source of Arms Transfers	India	Pakistan
<b>Soviet Bloc</b>		
USSR	3,400	20
Czechoslovakia	120	0
Poland	0	0
Rumania	5	0
Subtotal	3,525	20
<b>Western and Non-Soviet Bloc</b>		
United States	40	550
France	80	550
United Kingdom	875	10
Federal Republic of Germany	5	190
Italy	50	50
People's Republic of China	0	390
Other	120	80
Subtotal	1,170	1,820
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,695</b>	<b>1,840</b>

SOURCE: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).

**Table 2.3**  
The Balance of Indian and Pakistani Military Manpower

Category	India	Pakistan
<b>Total Active Armed Forces</b>	<b>1,260,000</b>	<b>480,600</b>
Army	1,100,000	450,000
Air Force	113,000	17,600
Navy	47,000	13,000
<b>Total Reserve Forces</b>	<b>240,000</b>	<b>513,000</b>
Army	200,000	500,000
Air Force	?	8,000
Navy	?	5,000
Territorial Army	40,000	0
<b>Paramilitary Forces</b>	<b>255,000</b>	<b>164,000</b>
National Security Force/Guard	112,000	75,000
Border Security Force/Frontier	90,000	65,000
Assam Rifles/Pakistan Rangers	37,000	15,000
Indo-Tibetan Border Police	14,000	0
Northern Light Infantry	0	7,000
Coast Guard	2,000	2,000

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1986–1987*.

region. During his visit to New Delhi in 1974, Henry Kissinger observed that the “size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and world affairs.”<sup>30</sup> Such open encouragement for India and that too after its dismemberment of Pakistan and recent nuclear detonation signaled a major shift in American policy toward South Asia, causing nervousness in Pakistan. It was undoubtedly the beginning of a “tortured relationship”<sup>31</sup> that underwent a reassessment during the second Cold War in the 1980s. Even in the mid-1980s, a regular lobbying campaign was conducted within the United States to “bypass” Pakistan by further strengthening the relationship with India so as to put political and diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union.<sup>32</sup> Following the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of December 1987, the Geneva Accords, and the Moscow Summit, Pakistani political analysts again fear a “cooling down” in bilateralism. Even at the height of the Afghan crisis, the major Pakistani query to the Americans concerned the prospective U.S. role in case of an Indian invasion of Pakistan.

From the regional balance of power to the support of India’s leadership, American policy postulates in South Asia led to an air of uncertainty. Recently, the American stance on regional resolution of Indo-Pakistan issues, despite agreeing with the official Pakistani viewpoint, still encourages India’s ambition for an assertive regional role. India’s military strength, its geopolitical advantages, a tacit or “natural” recognition or support for its regional preponderance added with the transfer of sophisticated technology all increase regional instability by helping India in its hegemonic goals. Such a scenario, which poses a direct threat to Pakistan and to the regional subsystem, will have an adverse effect on U.S. global interests in the region as well:

1. A powerful Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean would have both a regional and an extraregional impact.
2. A Monroe Doctrine–type situation may lead an ambitious India on expansionist and interventionist ventures at the expense of small states who, with no exception, maintain security relationships with the United States.

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<sup>30</sup>Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, “Toward a Global Community: The Common Course of India and America,” U.S. State Department, *Bulletin*, November 25, 1974. Also see Barnds, “United States Policy Toward South Asia,” pp. 645–659.

<sup>31</sup>See Norman D. Palmer, “The United States and Pakistan: A ‘Tortured Relationship,’” paper read at the First Bilateral Conference, Arlington, Virginia, June 7–10, 1981.

<sup>32</sup>For details, see Selig Harrison, “Key Issues in United States South Asia Policy,” testimony prepared for the hearing of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 2, 1985. Also Carpenter, “Fortress Built on Quicksand.”

3. An enhanced regional role substantiated by a powerful military might completely destroy the regional subsystem, leading to unending instability and global conflict.

4. India may dominate the market by acquiring unilateral economic powers.

5. The geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf region and around the Indian Ocean on a larger scale could worsen, unleashing the forces of instability.

6. This situation might lead in turn to a nuclearization of the region out of sheer threat perceptions.

Such and many more possible scenarios underscore the need for a balance-of-power approach until the normalization in Indo-Pakistan relations is complete. As long as India does not acknowledge the basic concept of the equal sovereignty of neighboring nation-states and continues to amass military power along with its proclaimed ambitions for a regional and then extraregional primacy, the domestic and regional security scene will remain precarious.

Another major threat to Pakistan's security has come from the northwest, which has been accentuated lately with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot imagine confronting a superpower militarily, yet its resolute stand on the Afghan issue and its major role in the efforts for the resolution of stalemate have enjoyed wide support in world opinion. Even if it so desired, Pakistan could not remain unaffected by the crisis because of its geographic and ethno-cultural affinities with the Afghans. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops, considered impossible only a few months back, is now a reality, with half of the troops having been withdrawn by August 15, 1988.<sup>33</sup> Violations of Pakistani airspace and strafing and missile attacks on Pakistani territory, however, have registered a tremendous increase, causing speculation about Moscow-Kabul intentions. According to some reports, the Soviets, hard pressed by the Mujahideen, even halted their withdrawal for three months.<sup>34</sup> Pakistan's F-16 aircraft downed an Afghan MiG fighter equipped with cluster bombs and arrested its Soviet pilot. In the spirit of the Geneva Accords, the pilot was handed over to the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad on August 17, 1988.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Despite mutual accusations of violations of the Accords, the implementation proceeds satisfactorily. Both President Zia-ul-Haq and the Secretary General of the United Nations expressed their satisfaction over the phased withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The Soviet withdrawal is making Najibullah's situation precarious, with mounting pressure from the Mujahideen. See "The Soviets at the Halfway Mark," *Time*, August 22, 1988, p. 10, and *Muslim*, August 10, 1988.

<sup>34</sup>A BBC report quoted in *Jang* (Rawalpindi), August 18, 1988.

<sup>35</sup>*Dawn* (Karachi), August 18, 1988.

However, some Soviet prisoners held by the Mujahideen inside Afghanistan refused to be repatriated, which further infuriated the Soviets. The visit of Pakistan's foreign minister to Moscow in mid-August 1988, meant to soften the Soviet attitude toward Pakistan in the wake of threats, apparently was less than successful.

In the meantime, the Soviets are pulling out of Afghanistan and the Mujahideen have intensified their efforts to capture major garrison towns and provincial capitals. Their successes have caused more desertions from the Kabul forces, and it appears that after a long-drawn battle they may eventually capture Kabul. Amid rumors of the replacement of Najibullah, raising high hopes among the leaders of the Afghan Interim Government (IUAM), Cordovez put forth his formula of a coalition government to be established by all groups through a *jirga* (council). The IUAM leadership has already rejected this proposal because they do not want to have anything to do with communists or Soviet lackeys and wish to take the entire credit for the eventual Soviet ouster from Afghanistan. Recently, both at the United Nations and in Soviet-Mujahideen parley, there seems to be a consensus for a broad-based government in Afghanistan.

Where the Soviet withdrawal has been a great achievement of the resistance, it is equally a result of Pakistan-U.S. strategic cooperation. President Reagan himself took the entire credit while spearheading the campaign for George Bush. Without a willing Pakistan, however, neither the Mujahideen nor the Reagan administration could do much to move the Russians out of Afghanistan. Academically speaking, the U.S.-Pakistan-Mujahideen tripolar relationship has negated a number of theses about Soviet invincibility challenging the very uncertainty of their eventual withdrawal. Hypotheses about Afghans' disunity, the futility of their struggle because of their bipolarization into fundamentalists and moderates, and supposedly the tribal character of the desperate guerrilla warfare all stand negated.<sup>36</sup>

Similarly, the role of Islam as a dynamic source of inspiration for such an enduring struggle in odds against a superpower has emerged as a tenable reality.<sup>37</sup> Given the increased pressure from the Mujahideen<sup>38</sup> on

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<sup>36</sup>For a case study depicting Afghan warfare as an aimless stalemate engendered by local feudal and tribal norms, see Arthur Bonner, *Among the Afghans* (Durham, 1987). Selig Harrison does not need to be quoted again.

<sup>37</sup>For a convincing study, see Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Durham, 1987).

<sup>38</sup>The Mujahideen have increased the frequency of their attacks on Kabul, whereas many important towns like Kandhar, Parwan, and Jalalabad are mostly in a state of siege. Recently they conquered Kenduz, a few miles from the Afghan-Soviet border; though it was subse-

the Kabul regime, the Soviet Union, in the wake of its accusations about Pakistan's violations of the Accords, may resort to various strategies to boost its Afghan allies. One of the scenarios, which is already being viewed with concern in Pakistan, is the Indian efforts to have "a piece of pie" in the Afghan quagmire.<sup>39</sup> Naturally, India fears Pakistan's increased influence in Afghanistan. After Najibullah's "successful" tour of India in May 1988, there are reasons to believe that a New Delhi-Kabul-Moscow alliance could emerge in a more assertive form, much to the detriment of regional stability and Pakistan-U.S. security relations. This, of course, would have its regional repercussions in the form of Chinese reaction as well as opposition from Iran and other Muslim countries.

In another possible scenario, New Delhi, without any direct involvement in Afghanistan, might increase its military pressure on Pakistani borders, drawing justification from the alleged Pakistani role in India's troubled Punjab. Pakistan has frequently denied its involvement in the Sikh Khalistan movement, which, of course, has its own domestic and international roots.<sup>40</sup> The recent summer troubles in occupied Kashmir, where pro-Pakistan demonstrations have led to riots, could further fan India's anxieties about Pakistan.<sup>41</sup>

The bomb blasts and the resultant casualties within Pakistan carried out by Afghan saboteurs have levied a heavy loss in both people and property. Since 1982, 635 lives were lost in 1,033 blasts, with 2,334 people receiving serious injuries. Property losses run in the billions. There has been a dramatic increase in such acts of subversion since 1984, with the highest toll in 1987. A blast at the Ojhri Ammunition Dump on April 10, 1988, caused unprecedented damage in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. More than 150 lives were lost and 1,000 citizens were injured as volleys of rockets and missiles fell on these localities. The fire at the depot and intermittent explosions went on for days, with Pakistan incurring a

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quently recaptured by the Soviet-Kabul troops, the siege continues. Resistance commanders inside Afghanistan like Ahmad Shah Masud and Abdul Haq want to avoid bombardment of cities, fearing huge civilian losses. IUAM, however, is finalizing its preparations to shift its headquarters inside Afghanistan. President Zia's death may cause some setbacks, but in the light of the inaugural address by Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Pakistan's foreign policy remains unchanged. See Richard Weintraub as reproduced in *International Herald Tribune*, August 21, 22, 1988.

<sup>39</sup>For further discussion on the recently mounting Indian official interest in Afghanistan, see Chani Erabic, "Moscow: Handing Down Job to India," *Muslim*, August 12, 1988.

<sup>40</sup>See Ian Mulgrew, "The Punjabi Connection, Tigers of the Faith: Sikhs in B.C. Confront Their Tangled Loyalties," *Saturday Night* (Toronto), January 1988, pp. 21-30.

<sup>41</sup>Text of first telecast to the Nation by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan August 18, 1988, as reproduced in *Nawqa-i-Waqt, Jang*, and *Pakistan Times*, August 19, 1988.

weapons loss worth billions.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, the death of President Zia-ul-Haq, the U.S. Ambassador, and twenty-nine other persons including six generals and many other ranking officials in a C-130 plane, presumably an act of sabotage, is the latest proof of the regional instability and dire threats to Pakistan's security.

Thus, regional security—endangered as it is by internal, regional, and extraregional factors—remains precarious. Pakistan, a U.S. ally, remains under constant threat from a regional power on its eastern and southern borders that possesses ever-increasing military strength and from a hostile government on its western border that enjoys the complete support of a superpower. Pakistan's efforts to acquire modern equipment for its armed forces—including Abram tanks, high-caliber howitzers, surface-to-air missiles, swift armored carriers, sufficient equipment for high-altitude warfare, more frigates and patrol boats, better radar facilities, and the upgrading of its modest air fleet—reflect the urgency of deflating the regional imbalance. Given Pakistan's vulnerability in an air attack from any direction, it is imperative that the Pakistani Air Force, otherwise an efficient division, be equipped with better detective capabilities such as wide-range radars and the Advanced Warning Airborne Command System (AWACS).

### The AWACS

Pakistan's efforts to bolster its own defense stemmed from its geopolitical vulnerabilities in the wake of numerous Afghan air incursions that exploited shadowy spots on Pakistan's radar facilities, which have been incapacitated by its mountainous region as well as by jamming. The Afghan aircraft have been carrying on "sneak attacks as they remain undetected due to undulating rows of overlapping hills along the border."<sup>43</sup> Pakistan was able to buy forty F-16s, but the limited surveillance capability of its aircraft—much to the benefit of low-flying Afghan aircraft in their hit-and-run sprees—made Pakistani border areas favorite and frequent targets. By the time the Pakistan Air Force could respond, the Afghan aircraft were already back at their bases. Pakistan has not been able to maintain a Constant Air Patrol (CAP) to supervise intrusions on its 1,500-mile border,

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<sup>42</sup>There have been conflicting views about the factors and forces responsible for the blast since the inquiry committee report has not been made public yet. After the ouster of Junejo, which itself is presumably related at least partly to the wide-scale blast, the matter seems to have been hushed up. Generally, it has been assumed that the dump was used to provide American weapons to the Mujahideen and had received a large-scale consignment including Stingers just before the implementation of the Geneva Accords.

<sup>43</sup>A Defense Analyst, "Acquisition of AWACS by Pakistan—I," *Pakistan Times*, August 17, 1987.

whereas the entire Afghan Air Force, thanks to generous Soviet assistance and manpower, is offensively poised against Pakistan. Pakistan's security concerns from all three sides underscored the urgency of its need for the AWACS. U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger during his visit in 1986 offered Pakistani authorities the following assurances: "We are looking at every way we can to get capability to Pakistan as quickly as possible."<sup>44</sup>

With a multiple increase in Afghan raids on Pakistan, Pakistani authorities began pressing the U.S. government for the purchase of AWACS. On April 27, 1987, the American press published the text of a secret letter from Prime Minister Junejo to U.S. President Reagan requesting the early supply of AWACS on "lease." The letter was brought to Washington by Senator Gordon Humphrey, who besides visiting Kabul had held long interviews with the Pakistani leaders. Humphrey found the Soviets living unscathed and was told that, given Kabul-Soviet pressure, Pakistan might be driven into a retreat. Junejo had linked the improvement in Pakistan's air defense capability with better prospects for the Mujahideen. Junejo had quoted increased public criticism of the official failure to protect lives in Pakistan. The American press viewed the lukewarm American response to the Pakistani request as caused by suspicions about Pakistan's nuclear program. Compared with India, however, "Pakistan was being put to an unequal test" while India's recognition of the Kabul regime largely went unnoticed by Washington.

President Zia told Senator Humphrey in their four-hour meeting that Stinger missiles had already improved the Mujahideen's efficiency to a considerable extent; bringing the war into the capital and breaking the tranquility of Kabul might compel the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. Under such circumstances, the *Washington Post* observed:

The Prime Minister's letter on President Reagan's desk cannot wait long for a reply. If the response is negative, it will signal Pakistan that the Reagan Doctrine is a victim of paranoia over an Islamic bomb while states all around Pakistan are building or enlarging stockpiles of their own. That would dim hope of pressuring Gorbachev to end the Soviet occupation. And it would mean failure for Gordon Humphrey's resourceful political journey to put a touch of steel into the backbone of a declining administration.<sup>45</sup>

Junejo's request for the lease of the AWACS meant that American personnel would operate the aircraft and signaled a shift as well from

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<sup>44</sup>"Pakistan to Purchase U.S. Radar Aircraft," *International Herald Tribune*, October 13, 1986.

<sup>45</sup>Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "A Secret Plea from Pakistan," *Washington Post*, April 27, 1987.

Pakistan's early stance for purchase instead of lease. The letter, written on April 16, was somehow released to the American press even before it could be delivered.<sup>46</sup> In Pakistan, the prime minister's request and its "leakage" to the press were analyzed in the perspective of Zia's "hardline" Afghan position that stressed the importance of a double-pronged policy on the crisis. "We should try to reduce our vulnerability and explore all diplomatic avenues to persuade the Soviet Union to relent. The leakage of the letter has hurt our self-esteem. But maybe it is better to know the realities than live on an inflated image of oneself."<sup>47</sup>

Linking Pakistan's request for the AWACS with its nuclear program and unilaterally conditioning it with India's objections was viewed in the Pakistani press as a carrot-and-stick policy. Such a view was further strengthened when the Reagan administration began "urgently" considering Pakistan's request to lease radar planes. Armacost acknowledged Washington's awareness "of Indian concerns that such sales tilted the balance of military power" but still felt that it "gave Islamabad the alternative of conventional weapons to nuclear arms."<sup>48</sup> In the meantime, both Afghanistan and India, trying to preempt U.S. willingness to lease the planes, called it "gunboat diplomacy toward both India and Afghanistan." The statement was made by Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil at a banquet in honor of his visiting Indian counterpart, Narain Dutt Tiwari.<sup>49</sup> In the meantime, Richard L. Armitage, Undersecretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, felt that leasing the radar planes would affect U.S. military preparedness. Characterizing Pakistan's security needs as "genuine," he still called it a "real dilemma" that would be difficult to justify before the Congress under American law. If, however, Congress waived legal prohibitions on leasing the planes either from U.S. Navy or Air Force inventories, it would have "definite and serious impacts" on their operations. To certify to Congress that such planes were not needed by the U.S. military meant, in Armitage's view, changing the federal law. Armitage's memorandum was intended for Representative Stephen Solarz as a response to a congressional inquiry. Solarz himself was reported to have said: "If reports that the Administration is serious about going ahead with the

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<sup>46</sup>Elaine Sciolino, "Urgent Request Made for U.S. Surveillance Aircraft," *New York Times*, April 28, 1987.

<sup>47</sup>"Prime Minister's Letter to Reagan," editorial, *Nation*, April 29, 1987.

<sup>48</sup>Undersecretary of State Armacost urged India and Pakistan to sign a regional nuclear nonproliferation pact—an objective that underlined U.S. policy "to forge a durable and balanced relationship with the two nations." See Armacost's address to The Asia Society on April 30, 1987, in U.S. State Department, *Bulletin*.

<sup>49</sup>Quoted in *Washington Post*, May 4, 1987.

lease are accurate, then it is about to take a step that is incompatible with our security requirements.”<sup>50</sup>

Prime Minister Junejo, in his letter to President Reagan, had requested the lease of radar planes preferably in a month's time. In the meantime, Pakistan's defense secretary had visited the United States to pursue the request, but—given the pressure from India, that country's friends in the United States, and the American official assessment—it was expected that the U.S. government would reject Pakistan's request. Instead, it was believed that the U.S. government would persuade Pakistan to buy aerostat radars mounted on tethered balloons, considered to be more economical. It was also felt that the leasing of airborne surveillance systems would cost Pakistan tremendously in addition to security concerns about the personal safety of American personnel. The United States was reluctant to lease both Grumman's Hawkeye E-2C (operated by the U.S. Navy) and Boeing's AWACS, called E-3A (operated by the U.S. Air Force). Such an arrangement would, according to American strategists, generate similar requests from other U.S. allies besides upsetting India.<sup>51</sup>

Yaqub Khan, in his visit to the United States in the third week of May, 1988, was still hopeful about a positive American response. To him the main problem was the selection of a more suitable system for Pakistan from the Hawkeyes and the AWACS. In the meantime, a speculative debate took place in Pakistan about the real imperatives of U.S. policy toward Pakistan given the stalemate in Afghanistan, the American naval presence in the Gulf that was leading to skirmishes with Iran, and the increased propaganda blitz from both India and the United States against Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. Some quarters believed that the American hesitation to sell or lease radar planes to Pakistan was caused by Pakistan's reluctance to provide military bases to the United States on its soil.<sup>52</sup> Wide-ranging

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<sup>50</sup>For details, see Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Aide Hesitant on Pakistan Request,” *New York Times*, May 7, 1987.

<sup>51</sup>James M. Dorsey, “U.S. Not Expected to Lease Radar Aircraft to Pakistan,” *Washington Times*, May 14, 1987. Two weeks later, however, Don Oberdorfer reported in the *Washington Post* that the United States might be willing to lease radar planes to Pakistan. According to the report, Yaqub Khan was asked not to insist on the AWACS but rather to settle for less sophisticated Hawkeyes and on lease as well since the manufacturer might take more than 36 months to supply them. The Gulf War was cited as the main excuse in the U.S. reluctance to lease the system. See *Washington Post*, May 28, 1987. Pakistanis, however, insisted on the acquisition of the AWACS and were not prepared to accept the Hawkeyes, even if the U.S. government, as suggested by Robert Peck in his testimony on May 21, was prepared to lease preceded by its demonstration by the U.S. Navy at Karachi. Such conflicting reports came at a time when a Pakistan Air Force F-16 was downed by the Afghan Air Force, apparently confirming Pakistan's air security pores.

<sup>52</sup>“What Price AWACS?” editorial, *Muslim*, May 30, 1987.

opinions—from the role of pro-Indian and Israeli lobbies to the very credibility of the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan over the past decades—were afloat in Pakistan. The Zia-Junejo regime, hard pressed by internal bomb blasts and air strafing, came under severe attack from the various political factions, which demanded a reassessment of the Afghan policy.

The Pakistani request for the AWACS was not to be covered by the U.S. aid package that had been on the congressional agenda during the days when the issue of radar planes was being widely discussed in both countries. In Pakistan, it was suggested that Pakistan must acquire the AWACS<sup>53</sup>; the response from Washington, however, was not at all encouraging. Stephen Solarz went to the extent of suggesting that even the AWACS would not deter Afghan air raids and advised instead supplying Stinger missiles, anti-aircraft batteries, and hanging balloons, “which I believe would be helpful to Pakistan.”<sup>54</sup> Whatever the reasons, Pakistan’s case for radar planes was put in cold storage. The aid-related issue, nuclear proliferation, and the Afghan crisis overshadowed the AWACS issue to a large extent.

In the 1988 aid package, U.S. military sales to Pakistan amounting to \$260 million mainly addressed other defense requirements, excluding the AWACS.<sup>55</sup> In the meantime, India has been able to acquire the Ilushin-IL76 from the Soviet Union as in 1971, when India was able to jam Pakistani radar systems using the Soviet Tupolev-126 Moss it had leased. Pakistan’s air vulnerability, the multiple Afghan incursions, India’s preparedness, and most of all fear of a repeat of 1971 all remain a constant threat to Pakistan, given the fragile and uneven South Asian subsystem.

### The Nuclear Issue

The nuclear issue is perhaps the most sensitive, recurrent, and disturbing roadblock in the Pakistan-U.S. security relationship. At times, it has led to acrimonious conflict that has jeopardized the very existence of bipartisan relations. After the Indian detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, it has been assumed that the subcontinent is on the threshold of a nuclear race. Pakistan, during Carter’s presidency, was an open target for growing

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<sup>53</sup>See, for example, Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan, “The AWACS Debate Another View,” *Muslim*, August 20, 1987. Senator Javed Jabbar demanded “a full dress debate on the feasibility or otherwise of acquiring frigates for the Pakistan Navy and an AWACS system for aerial surveillance.” *Dawn*, August 25, 1987.

<sup>54</sup>Quoted in *Muslim*, August 23, 1987. Junejo was still optimistic; in an interview with the *Washington Times*, he referred to the U.S. Defense Secretary’s acknowledgment of Pakistan’s need for radar planes. See *Frontier Post*, September 30, 1987, and *Dawn*, September 30, 1987.

<sup>55</sup>Ghani Erabic, “No AWACS for Pakistan,” *Nation*, May 11, 1988.

American criticism of its nuclear research; given relations with the Muslim countries, it was presumed that Pakistan was engaged in the preparation of an "Islamic Bomb." Pro-Israel and pro-India lobbies exploited American official apprehension of a nuclear race in South Asia. Bhutto was frequently quoted as a proof for Pakistan's "sinister" uranium enrichment program.<sup>56</sup> The Carter administration was critical of Pakistan on two counts, first, its allegedly military-oriented nuclear program and, second, its record of human rights. Both policy objectives stemmed from the American domestic political scenario as well as a growing acceptance of Indian "hegemony over the subcontinent."<sup>57</sup> Such perceptions and pressures added to Pakistan's security dilemma.

In the early 1980s, with the restrengthening of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Pakistan's nuclear program frequently surfaced as an irritant. Senators Alan Cranston and John Glenn and representatives such as Stephen Solarz together with many academics, journalists, and strategists put up regular resistance against the U.S. aid program to Pakistan. Various scandalous stories pop up regularly in the U.S. media and in the media of Pakistan's neighbors as well.<sup>58</sup> Sometimes such sensational commentaries are well timed to thwart American aid for Pakistan. "Kahuta" has become an enigma, and James Bond-style Pakistani characters are discussed by special panels to determine the extent of Pakistani advancement in its procurement as well as enrichment of uranium. But one can say that all suppositions about Pakistan's nuclear capability have been guesswork given to Congress with President Reagan's verification based on American intelligence sources. In the meantime, Pakistan has kept everybody guessing, given the pressure from inside the country and external restraints. It is a dilemma that will confront every future regime in Pakistan, given the regional imbalance in security matters along with the domestic lobbies for going nuclear.

Pakistan, like India, is not a signatory to a Nonproliferation Treaty, but it

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<sup>56</sup>"We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change." Bhutto, as quoted in Rodney Jones, *Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb and South Asia* (Beverly Hills, 1981), p. 8. For an early work on the subject, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear Power," *Asian Survey* 16 (June 1976); also Richard Cronin, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia," *The Middle East Journal* 37, 4 (Autumn 1983).

<sup>57</sup>See Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and South Asia," *Current History*, April 1979.

<sup>58</sup>See Bob Woodward, "Pakistan Reported Near Atom Arms Production," *Washington Post*, November 4, 1986; "U.S. Warns Pakistan Nuclear Effort Could Harm Ties," *Washington Post*, November 5, 1986; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Pakistan's Bomb Could Kill Us All," *Washington Post*, November 9, 1986.

has offered a regional NPT to India. The response, however, has been muted. Pakistan has strong reasons for either going or not going nuclear as long as a solemn assurance of its security both from India and its allies on Pakistan's western borders is not forthcoming. The institutionalization of India's nuclear program, spread over three decades before Pakistan began its modest energy-oriented research, gives the former a clear-cut edge that, added to a history of mutual hostility, India's geopolitical advantages, and Pakistan's increasing security vulnerabilities, motivates a section of Pakistani elites to lobby for the acquisition of nuclear capability as a deterrent. But another faction fears an unending arms race in an area where one-fifth of the world's population negotiate a marginal existence. The debate continues inconclusively; whenever the United States suspends aid to Pakistan or India takes on an offensive posture, the internal pressure increases.

Along with domestic realities, regional imbalance, and the very question of sovereignty stands another major factor related to the entire issue. Whenever there is any external prodding on nuclear matters, Pakistanis feel as if their very sovereignty as an independent nation-state is being questioned. In the latter half of 1987, when the U.S. Congress was under pressure to put a cap on assistance to Pakistan, the nuclear issue re-emerged, much to the chagrin of Pakistanis, and it seemed as if a consensus within diversified Pakistani political groups and opinion sections was evolving either to look for alternatives or simply to go nuclear. Pakistanis feel a sense of discrimination whenever the U.S. "leans hard" on them on the nuclear issue, simultaneously ignoring India's nuclear capabilities, its stance on Afghanistan, and its "dillydallying" with the Soviet Union while stockpiling its own armories. Pakistanis feel a strong tinge of condescension directed toward their security needs when the U.S. government seems to be constantly appeasing the Indians. They have ample proofs to substantiate their grudge against their ally. Such feelings lead many in Pakistan to predict the transitory nature of U.S. interest in Pakistan, which in a post-Afghanistan and post-Gulf era would subside, leaving Pakistan alone once again as in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, "permanence" in the American relationship with India remains a *fait accompli*. The U.S. policy of regional solutions to regional problems augurs well for Pakistan, yet it leaves equally a sense of isolation. Moreover, India prefers a resolution of regional issues on its own terms, given its objectives as the sole regional power.

In certain Pakistani quarters U.S. aid to Pakistan is regarded as "conditional" in view of the situations in Afghanistan and the Gulf and not a "guaranteed commitment" for Pakistan's security and integrity in the long term. For such opinion groups, the nuclear issue could affect bilateralism

in the near future once the “issues” are no longer present or the Democrats in Washington appease India once again at the expense of Pakistan. The United States, on the other hand, assures Pakistan of its concern for South Asian security yet feels restrained to make a commitment that might involve it physically in any regional conflict. American strategists might use the nuclear card to press Pakistanis, but they know they cannot go too far, and the policy of upgrading Pakistan’s defense capabilities through conventional weapons is basically meant to deter Pakistan from moving all out for nuclearization. One is tempted to say, however, that along with Indo-Pakistan relations, the nuclear issue remains a preoccupation for both the allies with a vast divergence in perceptions and information. Sometimes the nuclear issue seems to have become a recurrent stalemate in the 1980s for both countries. Long before the approval of the next aid package and the expiration of the six-year waiver on congressional amendments, the U.S. media began publishing stories in 1987 about “Pakistan’s covert nuclear program.”<sup>59</sup>

On February 28, 1987, a controversial story attributed to a Pakistani scientist, A. Q. Khan, was carried by the *Observer* (London) in which Khan was quoted as saying that Pakistan had the atom bomb and would use it “if our existence was threatened.” Khan stated further, “America knows what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of some foreign newspapers.” Khan’s interview, though denied by him personally<sup>60</sup> and by the Pakistani authorities, provided fuel for speculation at a time when Leonard Spector, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment, asserted that Pakistan possessed all the necessary components of the bomb or remained just short of it. Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington denied the assertion by saying: “This is absolutely clear. We are not going to have a bomb.” Senator John Glenn of Ohio, chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, wrote a letter to Reagan to stop providing military aid to Pakistan until it provided an assurance that it was not making a bomb. Defense Undersecretary Richard Perle had tried to persuade the Committee that a delay in aid should be taken only as the last resort; otherwise it could make Pakistan work even harder in developing atomic weapons. Glenn, basing his arguments on A. Q. Khan’s interview, had recommended the suspension of \$684 million in aid for Pakistan beginning October 1, 1987.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>See Leonard S. Spector, *The New Nuclear Nations* (New York, 1985), pp. 113–130.

<sup>60</sup>A. Qadeer Khan, in a letter to the editor, denied making the remarks attributed to him. *Observer*, London, March 1, 1987. Also *Muslim*, March 1, 1987.

<sup>61</sup>John H. Cushman Jr., “Pakistan’s Nuclear Effort Worries U.S.,” *New York Times*, March 6, 1987.

Robert Peck, Deputy Secretary of State, while defending the administration before the House's Asia Committee and responding to Senator Glenn's letter, felt that the U.S. government was no longer able to obtain "reliable assurances" from Pakistan. Given the strategic significance of Pakistan, however, he suggested: "We should avoid public confrontation and legislative ultimata of standards Pakistan must meet." He also mentioned Pakistan's stance that it had "neither the means nor the intention" of acquiring nuclear weapons "of any kind."<sup>62</sup> In an editorial, the *Washington Post* questioned the basic premise of American foreign policy and suggested that Pakistan and India both must be made to sign a nonproliferation treaty and, in the meantime, Senator Glenn's suggestion for aid suspension be considered "useful, so long as the Administration is prepared to hang tough."<sup>63</sup>

In Pakistan there was resentment against the suggestion of imposing unilateral restrictions on the "peaceful aim and orientation of the nuclear programme." Minister Noorani's statement—"We shall not be browbeaten nor cajoled"—was widely hailed in the press.<sup>64</sup> The *New York Times* admonished Pakistan in an editorial: "It has lied to the United States about not having a nuclear weapons program, and for years the United States has bought the fiction." The comments suggested that the United States must make India sign the nonproliferation treaty "and accept safeguard monitoring, as Pakistan says it is willing to do." And to Pakistan the United States must say, "Stop your nuclear program where it stands, or U.S. aid will end. And this time, finally, we mean it."<sup>65</sup> In a letter, the Pakistani ambassador protested against this misrepresentation of the Pakistani nuclear program, which was "devoted entirely to peaceful purposes."<sup>66</sup>

Although President Reagan appeared concerned about Pakistan's security dilemma, Congress was "poised for a fight over aid to Pakistan

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<sup>62</sup>David B. Ottaway, "Pakistani Nuclear Arms Called into Question," *Washington Post*, March 6, 1987. Three days later, Charles Redman further suggested that making threats against Pakistan might prove counterproductive.

<sup>63</sup>"Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1987.

<sup>64</sup>"Reflecting Popular Will," editorial, *Muslim*, March 10, 1987; "Mr. Noorani's Statement and NPT Pressures," editorial, *Nation*, March 10, 1987.

<sup>65</sup>*New York Times*, March 13, 1987.

<sup>66</sup>The Indian diplomats, seizing the opportunity, started demanding a ban on U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, including the AWACS and the F-16. See *Washington Post*, March 14, 1987. Another leading article in an influential newspaper accused Pakistan of stockpiling nuclear weapons and thereby causing an arms race in the region besides jeopardizing U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations. See Don Shannon, "Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Race Will Harm U.S.-Soviet Talks," *Los Angeles Times*, March 14, 1987.

because of its work on developing a nuclear bomb." The whole issue was viewed in light of the Afghan crisis, the progress at the Geneva talks, and the Indo-Pakistan arms race. Senator Alan Cranston was reported to have introduced legislation in the Senate "that would call for a 50 percent cut in military assistance" along with limiting the waiver to two years instead of six.<sup>67</sup> Pakistan, without going too far, was reaffirming its pronouncements about its low-grade research-oriented enrichment program meant for peaceful purposes. In February, Pakistan had witnessed Operation Brass Tacks on its borders as well as U.S. Ambassador Dean Hinton's criticism of Pakistan's nuclear program. Such objections "raised doubts among some about the reliability of Washington as a friend."<sup>68</sup>

The somersault in the U.S. Congress and media on Pakistan's allegedly clandestine nuclear program found an impetus with the arrest of a Pakistani-Canadian, Arshad Pervez, in Philadelphia on July 10, 1987, on charges of trying to export sensitive U.S. materials to Pakistan. The members of the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee, in a closed-door meeting with Armacost, put the Reagan administration on notice, which had itself already asked Pakistan for an explanation on a matter that could jeopardize all U.S. aid to Pakistan.<sup>69</sup> Many congressmen, such as Representative Solarz and Senators Claiborne Pell, John Kerry, and Christopher Dodd, were pressuring for an aid cutoff even before the accused was formally found guilty of the charge or determined to be an agent of the Pakistani regime.

Another severe blow to U.S.-Pakistan relations on the sensitive nuclear issue occurred when David F. Levi, the U.S. attorney in Sacramento, announced the indictment of a Hong Kong businessman, Leung Yiu Hung, and two Americans for illegally shipping oscilloscopes worth \$2.05 million to Pakistan in 1982 and 1983.<sup>70</sup> Arshad Pervez, pleading not guilty, explained that he had no links with the Pakistan government and had been deliberately framed in the case.<sup>71</sup> Pakistan's foreign secretary denied official involvement in the steel alloy issue related to Pervez, blaming the Soviet Union and Afghanistan for sponsoring a campaign to discredit

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<sup>67</sup>Elaine Sciolino, "Nuclear Issue Refuels Debate on Pakistan," *New York Times*, March 15, 1987.

<sup>68</sup>Steven R. Weisman, "Pakistan Objects to U.S. Pressure Against Atomic Program," *New York Times*, March 22, 1987.

<sup>69</sup>Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Aid to Pakistan in Jeopardy, Senators Warn," *Washington Post*, July 22, 1987.

<sup>70</sup>Michael R. Gordon, "Three Indicted for Exporting Bomb Materials to Pakistan," *New York Times*, July 18, 1987; *Muslim*, July 22, 1987.

<sup>71</sup>*Pakistan Times*, August 16, 1987.

Pakistan.<sup>72</sup> Despite the Reagan administration's assurances that it would vigorously pursue the issue with Pakistan, on July 31 the Senate recommended full funding of assistance to Pakistan in 1988, but with a suspension of 105 days. Senate Resolution no. 266 was followed by a similar resolution passed by the House of Representatives on August 3, 1987.<sup>73</sup>

Prime Minister Junejo addressed the nation on August 14, expressing confidence in U.S.-Pakistan relations though "our enemies want us to fight our friends."<sup>74</sup> A wave of resentment over the issue surged through the country, and the U.S. linkage of aid with the nuclear program was considered an interference with Pakistan's sovereignty. In his visit to the United States, Junejo held "very direct, very frank talks" with Reagan in New York and gave his word to the President that Pakistan had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.<sup>75</sup> Though there was conflicting news about the beginning of a six-week suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan from October 1,<sup>76</sup> the prosecution in Philadelphia found no proof of the Pakistan government's involvement in the Arshad Pervez case.<sup>77</sup> Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh lobbied against the American aid program to Pakistan on a visit to Washington and in a meeting with Solarz was given an assurance by the latter that the aid program would be linked to the nuclear issue.<sup>78</sup> President Zia, on the other hand, claimed in Ankara that Pakistan's nuclear program was independent of American aid and "the two have no connection."<sup>79</sup>

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, seeing U.S.-Pakistan relations in limbo, pressed the American government to seek "substantial assurance" from Pakistan before resuming aid. He expressed his happiness over the congressional decision to put restrictions on the new aid package.<sup>80</sup> Gandhi's

<sup>72</sup>Barbara Crossette, "Pakistan Denies Involvement in Steel Alloy Issue," *New York Times*, July 17, 1987. A commentator observed: "All these false and baseless cases were used for sensational propaganda against Pakistan to oppose the U.S. economic aid and military sales program for Pakistan." *Frontier Post* (Peshawar), July 17, 1987.

<sup>73</sup>*Nation*, July 31, 1987. Both Pakistan and India were asked to sign the NPT.

<sup>74</sup>*Nation*, August 14, 1987. Minister Zain Noorani expressed similar feelings while on a visit to the United States. See *Frontier Post*, August 28, 1987; *Muslim*, August 31, 1987.

<sup>75</sup>*Muslim*, September 23, 29, 1987. Junejo blamed India for hatching the entire plot. *Frontier Post*, September 29, 1987.

<sup>76</sup>*Dawn*, October 2, 1987; *Muslim*, October 2, 1987.

<sup>77</sup>It was reported on the authority of the Voice of America. *Frontier Post*, October 5, 1987.

<sup>78</sup>*Muslim*, October 10, 1987.

<sup>79</sup>*Dawn*, October 8, 1987.

<sup>80</sup>*Dawn*, October 10, 1987. In a speech Rajiv Gandhi asserted that Pakistan was engaged in a "futuristic, clandestine and deliberate effort to acquire nuclear weapons" and that "Islamabad's drive must be halted." *Muslim*, October 21, 1987.

visit to Washington, according to the *Washington Post*, had made it "more difficult for Pakistan to obtain resumption of economic and military assistance."<sup>81</sup> Pakistan feared an Indo-U.S. convergence on the nuclear issue, especially when Solarz claimed to have credible reports of Pakistan's nuclear expertise to build a device.<sup>82</sup> Pakistani leaders urged the United States to follow a policy of nondiscrimination on Pakistan's nuclear program avoiding "double standards."<sup>83</sup> Benazir Bhutto, speaking at Karachi's Institute of International Affairs, claimed that her father had lost his life as well as his government for Pakistan's nuclear program.<sup>84</sup>

After much diplomatic activity, however, on December 12 the Senate cleared a \$4.02 billion aid package for Pakistan with a six-year waiver along with the deletion of all references to India contained in the bill recommended by the Senate Appropriation Committee.<sup>85</sup> On December 17 Congress approved the bill but with a two-and-a-half year waiver of a nuclear nonproliferation law.<sup>86</sup> On December 18, Pervez was convicted by a jury for conspiring to export illegally Maraging steel 350 and beryllium to Pakistan.<sup>87</sup> The next day, Representative Solarz was once again up in arms, urging Reagan to terminate aid to Pakistan.<sup>88</sup>

Reagan's approval of the aid package in January 1988 arose from the Republican administration's recognition of Pakistan's strategic location and America's own interests in the region; it was aimed at avoiding regional instability and stemmed from a belief that the aid package would dissuade Pakistan from manufacturing nuclear devices.<sup>89</sup> The divergence between both countries over the nuclear issue, however, reverberating in the Congress and media, signals a lack of proper realization of Pakistan's internal and regional security imperatives. The issue is not closed forever, either, because domestic developments inside both Pakistan and the United States and similarly future regional and international events will have their due impact on "bipartisan" relations. Regional stability and the

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<sup>81</sup>"Mr. Gandhi was very persuasive on Capitol Hill." Quoted in *Nation*, October 23, 1987.

<sup>82</sup>*Dawn*, October 24, 1987.

<sup>83</sup>See Zia's press conference in Bangkok, *Muslim*, October 25, 1987.

<sup>84</sup>Quoted in *Muslim*, December 2, 1987.

<sup>85</sup>*Dawn*, December 1, 2, 1987.

<sup>86</sup>*Muslim*, December 18, 1987.

<sup>87</sup>*Muslim*, December 19, 1987. Judge Giles, in his remarks, ironically called Pakistan "a nation of Arab terrorists." See "Arshad Pervez's Exchange with Judge Giles," *Muslim Magazine*, August 12, 1988.

<sup>88</sup>*Nation*, December 20, 1987.

<sup>89</sup>Michael Wines, "Reagan OKs Aid to Pakistan Despite Nuclear-Smuggling Charge," *Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 1988.

South Asian security subsystem, however, will remain largely contingent on India's policy objectives toward its neighbors and to what degree that country is ready to accept a nonhegemonistic role in the region based on mutual accommodation, sovereignty, and traditional integrity of the individual states through the SAARC and on signing the nonproliferation treaty with Pakistan. Such a regional solution to the regional problems in the larger interests of the peoples concerned can alleviate the atmosphere of mutual mistrust and uncertainty. India in particular and all South Asia from Afghanistan to Bangladesh in general can be helped to realize such an atmosphere, given proper support by the global powers.

Following Zia's death, the United States once again reaffirmed its support for Pakistan's integrity,<sup>90</sup> reiterated its desire for democratization within the country,<sup>91</sup> and through diplomatic messages to the Soviet Union and India restated its security commitment toward Pakistan.<sup>92</sup>

During the closing months of 1988, a number of vital developments have taken place in the United States, Pakistan, and South Asia with an enduring impact that will be seen in the near future. The election of George Bush as the U.S. President on November 8, followed a week later by a massive mandate for Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party in the national elections in Pakistan, has coincided with significant developments in the region. Whereas Prime Minister Bhutto reaffirmed her support for continuity in Pakistan's policies toward Afghanistan, the Soviets introduced SCUD missiles in Afghanistan to halt the Mujahideen, producing a strong reaction from both Pakistan and the United States. However, direct dialogue between the Soviet diplomats and the Mujahideen leaders—largely because of Pakistani efforts—followed by Gorbachev's reiteration of Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 have raised hopes on both sides of the Durand line.

Interestingly, with the ascension of a mass-based government in Pakistan, the number of Afghan air violations and bomb blasts in major urban centers in Pakistan have registered a considerable decrease. The PPP holds the power in the center and in Sind; it has coalition arrangements with other parties in the North-West Frontier Province and has accepted an

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<sup>90</sup>See press statement by Secretary of State George Shultz on August 20, 1988, in *Muslim, Dawn*, and *Nation*, August 21, 1988.

<sup>91</sup>Certain Urdu newspapers headlined the news, whereas others displayed it prominently on their front pages. See *Jang*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Muslim*, *Frontier Post*, August 24, 1988.

<sup>92</sup>See Stuart Auerbach, "Following Zia's Death, Rumors are Rife in Pakistan," *Washington Post*, August 25, 1988; and Mark Fineman, "Rumors, Theories Abound for Cause of Zia Plane Crash," *Los Angeles Times*, August 25, 1988.

opposition government in the Punjab, which augurs well for an interdependent political setup with its built-in checks and balances. The political parties will need more mutual accommodation over an extended time to stabilize the democratic order within Pakistan in the years to come. Democratic Pakistan has better prospects for internal security and regional stability and can go a long way to ensure enduring Pakistan-U.S. bilateralism. Resolution of the Afghan crisis, a predictable relationship with India based on mutuality in the spirit of the Simla Accord, and a lessening of the arms race and distrust will have, undoubtedly, a direct bearing on internal, regional, and extraregional security-related factors and forces.

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### 3. U.S.-Pakistan Security Relations: Nuclear-Related Issues

NAZIR KAMAL

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Pakistan's nuclear program has been a particularly thorny issue in U.S.-Pakistan relations for over a decade. A lessening of American preoccupation with Afghanistan will present new challenges to U.S.-Pakistan relations. The management of the nuclear issue will require well-conceived policies and a carefully conducted diplomacy on both sides. Efforts are now necessary to strive for a workable relationship in the interest of strengthening South Asian security and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

#### I

The Ford administration made a major effort in 1976 to discourage Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. The failure of this effort was followed by substantial pressure on France to renege on its contract with Pakistan. Initial difficulties were overcome with the change of government in France. In 1976, the U.S. Congress introduced the punitive Symington Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. This was followed by the Glenn and Solarz amendments in 1977 and 1985, respectively, which intensified the focus of attention on Pakistan's nuclear program and raised the pitch of controversy. In 1979, Pakistan's pursuit of uranium enrichment technology caused a termination of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear program began to receive frequent publicity, sometimes distorted or lacking in perspective. Since 1981, however, the Reagan administration succeeded in its determined efforts to contain congressional pressures to impose stringent conditions for continued U.S. aid to Pakistan.

In 1987, the question of a waiver of the Symington Amendment to enable the legislative passage of the Reagan administration's second-year \$4.02 billion aid package to Pakistan got off to a portentous start. In a sense, the process began with the statement by the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Dean Hinton, at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, in

February 1987. The crux of his carefully prepared statement was to urge Pakistan to accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear facilities on a unilateral basis, which was widely understood to mean that Pakistan should embrace a nonproliferation policy regardless of India's nonadherence.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, the controversial incident involving Kuldip Nayar's alleged interview with Dr. A. Q. Khan occurred. This was followed a few months later by the Arshad Pervez case, which caused a furor, seriously threatening the stability of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pressures rapidly arose in the U.S. Congress to link military and economic assistance to Pakistan with "verifiable" measures to ensure that Pakistan was not producing weapon-grade enriched uranium. Thanks largely to Pakistan's importance in the success of U.S. policy on Afghanistan and the bipartisan support for such a policy in Congress, a major potential threat to the stability of U.S.-Pakistan relations was averted.

## II

The saliency of the nuclear issue is hardly likely to diminish. Unlike some positive trends in Africa and Latin America,<sup>2</sup> the danger of proliferation has not eased in South Asia. This has been largely because of India's unresponsive attitude and the implications of its all-round military buildup. Equally important at the present juncture is the changing context of U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India in the wake of several global and regional developments in the recent past. The most notable of these are (1) the multifaceted improvements in U.S.-USSR and East-West relations, (2) the cessation of the Iran-Iraq war and moves toward reconstruction in the Gulf, and (3) the partial withdrawal and the prospect of complete Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Geneva Accords.

The statement in September 1988 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, indicated that the U.S. military aid relationship with Pakistan would diminish in deference to other issues after the completion of Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup> On the nuclear issue, Ambassador Oakley mentioned more reassuringly that the United States would pursue a regional approach. Similarly, though supporting the regional approach, a recent Senate staff report has said that the nuclear issue could become a

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<sup>1</sup>See Ambassador Hinton's speech in U.S. Information Service, *Official Text*, Islamabad, February 16, 1987.

<sup>2</sup>See John Redick, *Nuclear Restraint in Latin America: Argentina and Brazil*, Occasional Paper 1, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (England: Department of Politics, Southampton University, June 1988).

<sup>3</sup>*The Muslim*, September 18, 1988.

top-priority issue once the Geneva Accords were successfully implemented by the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the regional approach will dominate both congressional attitude and official U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India. It is not clear whether additional measures will continue to be sought from Pakistan in a bilateral context.

The bilateral context for dealing with the nuclear issue has a limited potential. The potential could diminish further if the United States were to reduce its military aid and downgrade its security relationship with Pakistan. The probable consequences of a bilateral approach would be a damaged U.S.-Pakistan relationship with no compensatory gain on the nonproliferation front.

The nuclear issue would present fewer problems if the United States were to limit itself to its core concerns within the framework of a regional approach. The problem could become almost intractable if the United States should seek to control Pakistan's uranium enrichment activities, particularly through "verifiable" measures that involve intrusive inspection on a unilateral basis. In this regard, it is important to recognize the difference between developing a limited technological potential and possessing a nuclear deterrent.

Quite often, Pakistan's activities are perceived or portrayed in terms of an implacable drive to acquire nuclear weaponry. Pakistan has made at least half a dozen proposals to India, including provisions for intrusive measures, on the basis of reciprocity. India's response has been disappointing, even toward the proposal that the verbal pledge made jointly by the Indian and Pakistan leaders in 1985 not to attack each other's nuclear facilities should be made more binding and thus more credible through a written agreement. Such an agreement would not compromise India's nuclear option. Yet India has not been forthcoming on this limited confidence-building measure

### III

Of late, there has been a move toward the regional approach in the United States. In a major foreign policy speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April this year, George Bush reportedly said that if elected as President he would work toward a *bilateral* (emphasis added) Indo-Pakistan agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia.<sup>5</sup> In a similar vein, Kathleen Bailey, assistant director in charge of nuclear issues for the Arms Control and Disarmament

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<sup>4</sup>See, for example, *Khaleej Times*, August 29, 1988.

<sup>5</sup>Reported in *Pakistan Times*, April 17, 1988.

Agency (ACDA), declared: "The time has come for a concerted effort by India and Pakistan to avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons."<sup>6</sup> She added that the United States stood ready to play an active and "positive" role and that nonproliferation would be pursued within the framework of South Asian security. The crystallization of a balanced approach would help to stabilize U.S.-Pakistan relations.

The regional approach has also gained ground in the U.S. Congress. Recently there has been some sharp criticism of India's nonproliferation approach as well as a visible shift toward the regional approach that Pakistan has been pursuing for many years through its numerous proposals. The most recent of these Pakistani overtures has been the offer of a South Asian comprehensive test ban treaty, initially announced in the U.N. General Assembly in September 1987 and reiterated several months later at the inaugural session of the third South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit meeting held in Kathmandu, Nepal. The Senate staff report, prepared by Peter Galbraith, envisages a nuclear-free zone for South Asia that would include parts of China and the Indian Ocean.<sup>7</sup> Presumably, the strictly South Asian concept has been modified to accommodate some of India's long-standing preoccupations.

On the nongovernmental side, the Report of the Carnegie Task Force is, on the whole, a welcome development because it is based on a broader regional and extraregional framework and contains some useful recommendations.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, the individual work of some of its members has also helped to sustain the trend toward a more balanced approach toward India and Pakistan.<sup>9</sup>

The strong circumstantial evidence regarding India's clandestine purchase of Norwegian heavy water through private West German sources a few years ago was recently given due publicity. According to disclosures at a press conference by several West German opposition members of a parliamentary inquiry committee, India bought "several hundred" tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union, Norway, and China during 1980-85.<sup>10</sup> Specific mention was made of at least three consignments originating from Norway in 1982-83 totaling over 40 tons of heavy water.

Similarly, India's accumulation of large quantities of unsafeguarded plutonium for the alleged purpose of building a stockpile for fueling its

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<sup>6</sup>U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control Update*, May 1988, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, *Khaleej Times*, August 29, 1988.

<sup>8</sup>See Carnegie Task Force Report, *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, 1988.

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, Geoffrey Kemp, "India Has Low-Yield N-Warheads: Post," *Times of India*, March 28, 1988; and the dissenting views of Rodney Jones and Robert Wirsing in Carnegie Task Force Report.

<sup>10</sup>See, for example, *Times of India*, July 16, 1988.

fast-breeder reactors in the future has attracted attention and caused some concern. Figures on India's stockpile of plutonium vary. The Carnegie Task Force's estimate ranged from roughly 120 to 250 kilograms of plutonium by 1987—sufficient for about 15 to 50 nuclear bombs.<sup>11</sup> Professor Sharma of the Jawaharlal Nehru University has provided a substantially higher estimate. He has claimed that India already has enough plutonium for 50 to 100 bombs.<sup>12</sup> The chief of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, M. R. Srinivasan, reportedly told *The Times* New Delhi correspondent that "India's stockpile of plutonium outside international safeguards was expected to be thousands of kilograms in the next 10 years."<sup>13</sup>

#### IV

Since Pakistan's concerns are predominantly India-related, there is much that India can do—and therefore should be persuaded to do—toward deflating the proliferation threat. Pakistan's concerns are overwhelmingly focused on the military threat that India poses to Pakistan at present and may do so increasingly in the foreseeable future, when India might combine its distinct conventional superiority with a nuclear deterrent. Reducing Pakistan's motivation to go nuclear is one aspect of the problem. The other is India's own intention and its steadily growing capability for a nuclear deterrent of extraregional dimensions. Such a capability could emerge well within a decade. The lack of such a capability perhaps explains better why India has not gone nuclear since its 15-kiloton Pokhran test in 1974.

India's nuclear policy is more complex and a matter of much greater and longer-term concern than Pakistan's. Pakistan appears to be a secondary factor in India's nuclear policy. The China factor and the notion of acquiring a big-power status are the more important factors, which greatly extend the context for dealing with the nuclear issue and compound the nature of the problem. As far as the "chain reaction" effect is concerned, a decision by India to go nuclear would probably cause greater repercussions than a similar decision by Pakistan, for the following reason: India would be capable of fielding a nuclear deterrent of greater size and range, which would pose a potential threat to a wider circle of countries, especially if it occurs in combination with an extraregional conventional capability toward which India is moving at an accelerated pace.

There is a fairly widespread view that the nuclear threat in South Asia emanates from Pakistan—that is, India is unlikely to go nuclear unless

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<sup>11</sup>Carnegie Task Force Report, p. 11, table 2.

<sup>12</sup>Reported in *Frontier Post*, May 18, 1988.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

Pakistan takes to the nuclear path. The proliferation threat is, however, more complex and needs to be viewed in terms of both the present and future.

India would perhaps rather go nuclear at a time when it can field a nuclear capability commensurate with its self-image and transregional ambitions. This may not be possible in the immediate future, but the threat will loom increasingly large in the next few years. The drift may then become inexorable and Pakistan's motivations a matter of secondary concern.

As far as the immediate future is concerned, several considerations need to be brought into some balance. Pakistan has put the ball in India's court through its various proposals, even though a nuclear nonproliferation policy will not necessarily take care of the former's underlying problems with the latter's growing military superiority. Similarly, in response to a Pakistani move, India can field a nuclear deterrent at very short notice and one that would be superior to Pakistan's. Indeed, a Pakistani decision to go nuclear might well be perceived by India—today or even later—as the safest way for it to deploy its fast-developing capability, since Pakistan is likely to be regarded as the “culprit” in such a situation. Interestingly, some prominent Indians have been trying to goad Pakistan into going nuclear. India can influence Pakistan's decision by actions designed to create a particularly difficult politico-military environment. In other words, Pakistan's problems and predicaments are acute, whereas India is in a relatively comfortable position.

## V

For a number of reasons Pakistan has been legitimately concerned about the threat posed by India's military might. Indo-Pakistan relations are littered with pronouncements and actions by India that have exacerbated the concerns arising out of its continued all-round military buildup. Despite substantial U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, India has managed with Soviet support to extend its military superiority.

Apart from a substantial quantitative lead in air power, an overall qualitative edge has long existed in India's favor. A significant gap has recently opened up that is almost certain to grow much wider. In a fairly comprehensive monograph devoted exclusively to the Indo-Pakistan military balance, Anthony Cordesman wrote in 1987: “The Indian Army and Air Force are so superior [to Pakistan's] that they would soon dominate the air and the ground, and this superiority will continue even if the United States should make major increases in its military aid.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Anthony Cordesman, *United States Strategic Interests and the India-Pakistan Military Balance*, June 11, 1987. (Reprint issued by the American Center in Islamabad.)

Since Cordesman made this observation, India has added at least forty Soviet MiG-29s to its arsenal under a deal that will enable India to acquire a total of 160 MiG-29s in several years.<sup>15</sup> The first batch of MiG-29s was delivered within four months of the deal's signing. The MiG-29 has been compared favorably with the U.S. F-16, especially the lesser version that Pakistan has in its inventory. In late 1987, India also reportedly received delivery of about a dozen more Mirage-2000s from France, adding to its stock of forty such aircraft.<sup>16</sup>

Pakistan's inventory of sophisticated combat aircraft consists of thirty-nine F-16s, which will be augmented by about a dozen more in the near future.<sup>17</sup> This limited inventory compares very poorly with over 150 sophisticated combat aircraft already obtained by India and another 120 MiG-29s it will be receiving within two years.<sup>18</sup> In addition to its growing air and land superiority, India has already acquired a blue-water navy and is proceeding apace toward enlarging its capability. This is an area in which Pakistan compares even more poorly with India.

Early this year, India acquired a nuclear-powered submarine, *INS Chakra*, on a four-year lease from the Soviet Union.<sup>19</sup> Reportedly, India has contracted for the delivery of several more such submarines from the Soviet Union over the next few years.<sup>20</sup> A recent Southampton University study has observed that India perceives the leasing arrangement

as a stepping stone to developing its own nuclear submarine reactor and hull construction capabilities. This process has been underway for some time, but progress on the reactor has been slow, and thus the lease is a method of gaining experience with the operational aspects of nuclear submarines before an indigenously constructed model is available. In short, India now appears to be in much the same position as Britain and France were in the late 1950s.<sup>21</sup>

To allay nuclear proliferation-related concerns in the U.S. Congress that were spawned partly by the obscure nature of the Indo-Soviet deal, the Indian ambassador to the United States, Pratap Kaul, has maintained that

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, *Times of India*, May 2, 1988.

<sup>16</sup>See, for example, *Hindustan Times*, May 4, 1988, and *The Military Balance*, 1987–88 (IISS London).

<sup>17</sup>A letter of offer was reportedly made in May 1988. See *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, (Washington, D.C.: Copley, July 1988), p. 43.

<sup>18</sup>*Times of India*, May 2, 1988.

<sup>19</sup>*Times of India*, February 4, 1988.

<sup>20</sup>Reports vary on numbers: from 1–2 to 4–6. See, for example, *Dawn*, February 6, 1988; and Shekar Gupta, "Beefing up the Indian Navy," *The Nation*, January 7, 1988.

<sup>21</sup>Ben Sanders and John Simpson, *Nuclear Submarines and Non-Proliferation: Cause for Concern*, Occasional Papers 2 (England: Southampton University, 1988).

such concerns have been met "by sealing the reactor unit and transporting the spent fuel back to the USSR under safeguards."<sup>22</sup> The disclosure is unlikely to mitigate public concern, if only because of the deal's unprecedented nature and its reinforcing effect on perceptions of India's ambitious and almost single-minded pursuit of military dominance in the region and perhaps further afield. The lease of the *Chakra* evidently forms part of India's drive to become a full-fledged naval power. The rationale is not simply limited to India's perceived requirements of defending its 200-mile economic zone under the new Law of the Sea Convention. In justifying the acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine—the only Third World country to have done so—Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated that India did not want to lag behind the modern naval powers of the world.<sup>23</sup> The comparison was not with other regional states nor was it limited to China.

The procurement of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine was followed some months later by the successful test flight of Prithvi, India's supersonic surface-to-surface ballistic missile, which is capable of delivering nuclear weapons with high accuracy at a range sufficient to pose a grave threat to Pakistan. The test flight appears to have been a major success, "better than what most people imagined," according to an official from the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization.<sup>24</sup> The Prithvi is apparently faster and more lethal than its Soviet, Chinese, and Israeli counterparts.<sup>25</sup> It is reportedly twice as fast as the Soviet Scud used in the Iran-Iraq war. The Prithvi can deliver 1,000 kilograms of explosives beyond a distance of 150 kilometers. Significantly, it is looked upon as the forerunner to an IRBM capability by India. At less than \$1 million apiece (the estimated price by 1990), this nuclear-capable missile will be ten times cheaper than India's deep-penetration strike aircraft, such as the Jaguar.<sup>26</sup>

The Prithvi is part of a multifaceted project launched five years ago. Substantial progress has been reported toward the development of deployable surface-to-air (SAM), air-to-air, and anti-tank (ATM) missile technology.<sup>27</sup> The flight-tested Indian SAM Trishul has been earmarked for deployment by 1990. The Indian ATM Nag (Serpent)—being perfected as a state-of-the-art weapon—is expected to be deployed by the early 1990s.

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<sup>22</sup>*Times of India*, September 8, 1988.

<sup>23</sup>*Times of India*, February 4, 1988.

<sup>24</sup>*India Today*, March 31, 1988, p. 170.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>See, for example, *Times of India*, February 4, 1988.

India has also actively pursued a space satellite program for the past decade. After the success of its initial satellite launch vehicle (SLV) tests in the early 1980s, Indian scientists had reportedly estimated that the advanced satellite launch vehicle (ASLV) would have a "maximum range of around 6,000 km—far enough to carry a nuclear payload into China, depending on weight."<sup>28</sup> At the same time, Frank Barnaby, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), was quoted in NATO's *Atlantic News* as saying that India's ASLV "could be made powerful enough to carry a 400 kg warhead for 5,000 km."<sup>29</sup> The ASLV tests in March 1987 and more recently in July 1988 have underscored a desire to expedite the program. On the eve of the most recent test, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) chief said that India had "no option but to skip some experiments. We have to take calculated risks."<sup>30</sup> It remains to be seen whether the 1988 failure has delayed India's plans for fielding a significant nuclear deterrent by the mid-1990s—an approximate date frequently mentioned by Bhabani Sen Gupta, one of India's well-known observers.<sup>31</sup>

China's recent supply of CSS-2 intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles to Saudi Arabia has led K. Subrahmanyam, an influential hardliner and former director of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, to conclude that China could make a similar transfer to Pakistan as part of an alleged Sino-American conspiracy to develop a so-called Islamic nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union, in whose Muslim republics "there has been political unrest."<sup>32</sup> In response to this unlikely and thoroughly hypothetical scenario, Subrahmanyam has urged his government to expedite India's indigenous missile program. Curiously, he has also said that India should simultaneously explore the possibility of obtaining SS-20 delivery systems from the Soviet Union before these are scrapped under the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) accord.

India's defense budget has climbed rapidly in recent years to about \$10 billion in 1988, which is approximately four times greater than Pakistan's. In recent years the Soviet military aid to India, provided on particularly favorable terms, has been averaging \$1 billion a year—far outstripping U.S. assistance to Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> India's growing confidence and belligerence are

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<sup>28</sup>Frank Barnaby, director of SIPRI at the time, quoted in *South*, October 1984, p. 16.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>*India Today*, July 15, 1988, p. 120.

<sup>31</sup>See the proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia held at ISSI, in *Strategic Studies*, special issue (Winter 1987). Also see, for example, *Times of India*, May 8, 1988.

<sup>32</sup>*Times of India*, April 5, 1988.

<sup>33</sup>*Times of India*, May 2, 1988.

reflected *inter alia* in its distinctly more strident tone and a number of disturbing acts: for example, its military air transport fleet's uninvited "food drop" to Tamil in Sri Lanka in mid-1987 (shortly before the Indo-Sri Lankan accord on the Tamil separatist problem); its highly conspicuous and continuing efforts to seize the Siachen Glacier; and its unprecedented military exercise conducted under Operation Brass Tacks, in which India sent 200,000 troops to the Rajasthan border with Pakistan in early 1987.<sup>34</sup> Brass Tacks brought the military forces of the two countries dangerously close to war. It was undertaken at a huge financial cost, despite serious budget deficit problems.

According to Ravi Rikhye, a defense analyst associated with the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, the operation was "originally intended as a massive strategic deception to focus U.S.-Pakistani attention on [its southern border of] Sind while India went for [Pakistan's] northern areas."<sup>35</sup> Two other Indian analysts have tried to put the operation in some perspective by suggesting that the action was minimally designed to scare Pakistan with India's military might.<sup>36</sup> Brass Tacks' additional aim, according to them, "was to provoke Pakistan into some action which would then give the Indian army an excuse to launch its own offensive." This analysis seems to fit rather well with India's recent adoption of "Dissuasive Deterrence"—an aggressive strategic-military doctrine fashioned by the charismatic General Sunderji, India's former army chief.<sup>37</sup> Whatever the nature of the Indian action, it is clear that India had little hesitation in playing the dangerous game of brinkmanship with a smaller and weaker neighbor with whom it had fought several wars over the past four decades.

## VI

Pakistan's search for a regional solution to the danger of nuclear proliferation in South Asia has proved almost futile. Recent U.S. efforts to elicit India's interest in regional nonproliferation measures have reportedly revealed that at the very least India would want the China factor to be taken into account. According to reports, however, India has simultaneously expressed its clear preference for the global approach, which it would be very reluctant to abandon.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>See, for example, *The Muslim*, March 3, 1988.

<sup>35</sup>See Robert Wirsing, "The Siachen Glacier Dispute—III: The Strategic Dimension," *Strategic Studies* (ISSI Islamabad), Autumn 1988.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>See special writeup in *India Today*, May 1988.

<sup>38</sup>See *Times of India*, May 8, 1988. Also see Indian Ambassador Kaul's statement in *Times of India*, August 8, 1988.

In multilateral forums India has vented more fully its opposition to Pakistan's proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone. The opposition has not been simply directed at the Pakistani concept. It has been of a more fundamental nature. A similar attitude has also characterized India's posture on the question of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime by obtaining nuclear-related security assurances from the nuclear weapon states. In sharp contrast, Pakistan has been actively involved in efforts to achieve this objective and has adopted a moderate attitude to induce progress toward strengthening the global nonproliferation process over an issue whose resolution has been pending since the inception of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

India's objections and its attitude are such that willy-nilly a solution may have to be sought in a wider context. One such context could be an expanded version of the Nuclear Free Zone proposal. The 1988 Senate staff report has broached the subject of a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone extending into parts of China and the Indian Ocean—an approach it arguably considers achievable.<sup>39</sup> If India rejects this proposal, which it is likely to do, an alternative approach could be considered.

So far, the Nuclear Free Zone concept has been pursued in terms of specific regions in Asia. It may prove necessary to examine whether the proposals for South Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia could be combined into a single concept. In principle, all the states in the adjacent regions support the Nuclear Free Zone concept, which has seen some revival.

There has been some softening of India's semigovernmental attitude. This has come after expressions of concern that Pakistan, supported by a battery of nonproliferation proposals, had stolen a march on India's sluggish diplomacy.<sup>40</sup> The proposal a year ago by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, the new director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, marks an improvement over his predecessor's dismal outlook and confounding proposals.<sup>41</sup> The proposal by Jasjit Singh is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, it seems to merit some serious attention and a focused exchange of views on the subject.

Jasjit Singh has conditionally supported the regional approach to nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. His core proposal is that the renunciation of the nuclear option by India and Pakistan should take place

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<sup>39</sup>See *Khaleej Times*, August 29, 1988.

<sup>40</sup>See, for example, K. Subrahmanyam, "Countering Zia's Proposals," in *Times of India*, April 8, 1988.

<sup>41</sup>Jasjit Singh, "Case for S. Asian Zero Option," *The Hindu*, August 25, 1987. For Subrahmanyam, see "Countering Zia's Proposals."

in the context of a wider "Asian Denuclearized Region." All intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles should be removed from within this region. The "Asian Denuclearized Region" has been defined in terms of the range of intermediate-range missiles from the boundaries of the subcontinental states. The proposal's scope would probably cover the entire Chinese mainland, in which case it would involve the scrapping of scores of Chinese CSS-2s and CSS-1s.<sup>42</sup> Israel would have to forgo its Jericho missile. Similarly, Iraq and Saudi Arabia would have to relinquish their Soviet Scud and Chinese Dongfeng missiles, respectively. Apparently, the proposal's prohibition is not limited to land-based missiles. As such, it would also affect the air- and sea-launched cruise missile deployments of the superpowers. Another issue in this context would be the fate of dual-capable missiles, both intermediate and shorter range—for example, India's own Prithvi.

The verification system for implementing such a scheme would need to be both expansive and highly intrusive, and it would involve the participation of a large number of countries from across and beyond the Asian continent. Presumably, satellite monitoring facilities would have to be made available to such a multilateral mechanism.

## VII

India's diplomacy on global and regional arms control issues deserves close attention, especially with respect to regional aspects, since progress in this area could greatly ease the danger of nuclear proliferation in the short run and perhaps also over the long term if India's nonproliferation declarations should later prove real. The importance of conventional arms control for containing proliferation trends in South Asia needs to be emphasized. India's growing conventional military superiority over its neighbors has been a cause of serious concern to Pakistanis and an argument for those who advocate the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.

One way of dealing with the Indian military threat would be to correct the imbalance, at least to the extent of denying any state a decisive superiority over the other. Another way could be to contain the threat posed by superior military power through arms control and confidence-building measures. A third approach could consist of elements of the first and second approaches.

Although by far the largest and strongest of the South Asian states, India

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<sup>42</sup>According to *The Military Balance*, 1987–88 (IISS London), the Chinese IRBM arsenal consists of about 60 CSS-2s (Dongfeng or DF-3s). According to SIPRI's *Yearbook* for 1988, China has between 85 and 125 CSS-2s. The two sources have roughly similar estimates

has done little to assuage the threat perceptions of its smaller neighbors. India's unsympathetic and unimaginative behavior at the bilateral and regional levels has been matched by a fairly inflexible attitude in multi-lateral forums concerned with global arms control issues, whether nuclear or conventional.

Efforts to promote regional arms control in the context of a global disarmament process have been made in the United Nations for at least a decade and are still continuing despite setbacks. One of the major contributory factors for the failure of the recent United Nations Third Special Session on Disarmament (SSODIII) has been the impasse on the regional arms control issue.<sup>43</sup> Most Third World states share the concern of the United States and other Western states about the need for a balanced treatment of nuclear and conventional disarmament issues. India's hard-line stance, however, and its influence within the nonaligned group have been mainly responsible for the lack of consensus among the U.N. member states.

India's dogmatic and unbalanced approach is reflected in its overwhelming focus on nuclear disarmament. India's latest position is contained in a major document it submitted to SSODIII in May 1988.<sup>44</sup> The Indian "action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and a non-violent world order"—the most elaborate document released so far—has given little importance to regional arms control or to conventional aspects of a global disarmament process. India's disarmament scheme is largely a formula for rapid nuclear disarmament by the superpowers and seems geared much more toward improving its own power-political position in the international hierarchy than toward initiating a carefully conceived process of restructuring world order along universalist lines. The "moral high ground" that India may have held two or three decades ago has become increasingly inapplicable and misleading. One major consequence of this has been the diminished significance and credibility of the nonaligned movement in the disarmament field, hampered as it is by requirements of consensual diplomacy in an extremely "heterogeneous" setting.

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regarding China's MRBM inventory—approximately 50 CSS-1s, which China is reportedly phasing out in favor of updated CSS-2s.

<sup>43</sup>See, for example, Lynn Hansen (ACDA official), "U.S. Wants Updated Statement, Will Not 'Reaffirm' SSODI," *Disarmament Times*, special issue, May 31, 1988, New York. Also see Nazir Kamal, "The United Nations Third Special Session on Disarmament: Views of an Outside Observer," *Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990s* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, May 1988).

<sup>44</sup>United Nations General Assembly document, "Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and a Non-Violent World," A/S-15/12, May 24, 1988.

For a number of years the issues of regional arms control and conventional disarmament measures have been the subject of regular General Assembly resolutions. Except for the one adopted in 1987, India has been perhaps the most consistent opponent of such resolutions. India's implicit consent to the 1987 resolution was made possible by a watered-down reference to regional arms control outside Europe. Some Third World states, such as India, continue to call vehemently on the superpowers to demonstrate their special responsibility toward the global disarmament process while rejecting indirect references to themselves by the superpowers and many other states for acceptance of similar responsibility in the regional context.

India's highly circumspect approach to the issue of regional arms control or conventional disarmament seems indicative of its power-political ambitions not only in relation to South Asia but also within a wider spatial sweep. If India cannot be persuaded to eschew such stereotypical pursuits (which fundamentally contradict its nonaligned rhetoric), it should be urged to show greater interest in limited arms control and confidence-building measures—of a kind that can effectively reduce the danger of military aggression and threats in the subcontinent but without necessarily any loss to India's military potential or its capability to project power extraregionally.

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have evolved over the years into an useful element of the East-West politico-military equation in Europe. Since the Stockholm Conference of 1986, potentially significant CBMs have been put in place after the tentative beginning in the mid-1970s following the Helsinki agreements. The United Nations has also sought to promote this approach within a wider multilateral framework. The concept of CBMs is flexible. A large body of literature exists on its theory and practice, which can be imaginatively adapted to meet the requirements of different regions.

Pakistan has also made unrequited moves in this direction. In 1986, for example, a proposal was made to India for limits on military exercises and provision for exchange of observers at large maneuvers. India flatly rejected the idea. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said: "I don't think there is any question of observers or threshold limit. These are exercises that we carry out for our purposes . . . and we cannot have any observers for our exercises."<sup>45</sup> Interestingly, not long after this statement, India launched its Operation Brass Tacks.

Unless a major nuclear nonproliferation regime can be achieved or realistically attempted, limited CBM measures could go a considerable

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<sup>45</sup>*The Arms Control Recorder*, 454.B.65, November 1986.

way toward easing nuclear tensions. A development along these lines would also help to push forward the Indo-Pakistan normalization process from the morass in which it has been stuck in recent years. In turn, this could improve the future prospects of substantive progress on the non-proliferation front.

An additional gain from this indirect approach would be a lessening of the enormous defense-related pressures on the national budget. It should be mentioned in this regard that unhappily all the South Asian states are still in the low-income group of developing countries. Both India and Pakistan face serious budget deficit problems, which are growing at least partly because of the impact of the arms race on defense expenditures. Pakistan has been spending about 30 percent or more of its national budget on defense in an effort to prevent India from acquiring an overwhelming military superiority. Although India's defense expenditure represents a smaller proportion of its national budget, in absolute amount it far exceeds Pakistan's outlay, and the gap has increased.

A comparison in percentage terms is unrealistic between large and small countries such as India and Pakistan—the structural situation being inherently and significantly in favor of the larger state. If anything, the percentage differences highlight the predicament of the smaller state and the enervating pace of military buildup that the larger neighboring state can set at a greater cost to its adversary than to itself. South Asia is a splendid example of the relative irrelevance of comparisons in percentage terms, which the Indian ambassador to the United States recently tried to make in an effort to deflect congressional concern over India's acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine.<sup>46</sup>

## VIII

The contrast between Pakistan's bilateral and regional proposals to promote nuclear nonproliferation and India's unwillingness to compromise its ambitions for a big-power status has also existed on the non-proliferation issue. Lately, India has indicated a possible interest in joining a renegotiated Nonproliferation Treaty whose mandated twenty-five year duration will expire in 1995.<sup>47</sup> This development may appear to hold some

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<sup>46</sup>*Times of India*, August 8, 1988.

<sup>47</sup>India's possible interest in joining a renegotiated NPT was first indicated in a testimony by Eric Fersht before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 1985. India's Ambassador Dubey reportedly promised to "seriously consider" India's participation in a renegotiated NPT at the time of the second NPT review conference. See *The Arms Control Recorder* 602.B.94, 1985. The "offer" could well be a shrewd diplomatic ploy to mitigate criticism of India's policy and exploit differences among the NPT parties in order to undo a treaty regime intensely disliked by India.

promise of a reassessment by India of its traditional hostility toward the treaty. Such an expectation could, however, prove to be overly optimistic, if not altogether illusory.

India's diplomacy in the various forums of the United Nations system—where such matters are frequently discussed—suggests that a renegotiated NPT would reintroduce the sharp differences that continue to exist between India and the nuclear weapon states. It is unlikely that the superpowers would be prepared to take the risk involved in trading “a bird in hand” for “two in the bush.” Furthermore, in its present form, the NPT seems to enjoy considerable support and commitment in the United States. The partial success of the previous NPT Review Conference has probably strengthened such an attitude. Additionally, the NPT has been advantageous to the nuclear weapon states because it was negotiated essentially among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. A renegotiated NPT on a more multilateral basis is almost certain to be far less favorable to the superpowers, particularly in view of the Indian approach.

There is, however, one long-standing approach to nuclear nonproliferation that India continues to support. In December 1987, India, Sweden, Mexico, Greece, Tanzania, and Argentina called upon the nuclear weapon states to negotiate a comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaty. The Stockholm Declaration of the Six-Nation Initiative, formed in 1984, stressed that a CTB would be the “single most effective measure” not only for containing the nuclear arms race but also for “preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which have so far refrained from acquiring them.”<sup>48</sup>

For many years the CTB question was plagued by controversy over the technical feasibility of adequate verification and the Soviet resistance to intrusive verification procedures. Both these problems have become increasingly manageable, and the nonnuclear states have also become more open to the sensitive issue of compliance. The main problem today is the change in the attitude toward a CTB under the Reagan administration. It remains reduced to a nebulous long-term goal. The bilateral understanding between the superpowers during the Washington Summit in December 1987 has failed to accomplish much toward restoring the traditional diplomatic status of a CTB. The shift of U.S. policy on this issue was initially occasioned by nuclear force modernization plans adopted in the early 1980s and increasingly since then by the grandiose “Star Wars” program. The difficulties with the progress of the “Star Wars” program, both financial and technical, have led to some decline of enthusiasm. But it is too early to assess the impact this might have on the U.S. attitude toward a CTB.

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<sup>48</sup>United Nations document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/807, February 19, 1988, p. 3.

The widespread expectation in the 1960s that the NPT would prompt the superpowers into concluding their CTB negotiations expeditiously has not been met at all. Considerable pressure by most NPT parties since the mid-1970s has made little impact, despite fears in the early 1980s that the resentment of many nonnuclear weapon states could unhinge the NPT policy. Negotiations for a CTB have not been resumed since their suspension in 1980, ostensibly in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter administration was already under considerable internal and external pressures not to proceed toward a CTB. In 1981, the Reagan administration promptly terminated this process. The U.S. policy has also contradicted the stipulation concerning a CTB contained in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) to which both India and Pakistan are parties.

As a result of technological advances in recent years, particularly in computer-based simulation, a CTB would not be able to prevent the development of nuclear devices of small explosive power. In any case, since the capability for timely detection and identification of nuclear explosions is generally believed to be above a 1-kiloton threshold, a CTB cannot be expected to prevent or purportedly prohibit nuclear tests below that threshold.

Nevertheless, a CTB can severely restrict a potential nuclear arms race and serve as a major disincentive. It can be reinforced by additional agreements of a bilateral or limited multilateral nature. Significantly, a CTB is an approach that alone could entice India into a nonproliferation regime. A CTB would also greatly strengthen the existing system which is largely and insecurely dependent on the NPT. Additionally, by removing a major long-standing complaint of most nonnuclear weapon states, a CTB would greatly improve the conduct of multilateral diplomacy between the nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament and related issues.

## IX

In recent months, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger have been actively trying to influence the course of U.S. global and regional policies in the post-Reagan period. They have also been involved, along with a number of other influential personalities, in the Pentagon-commissioned report on a long-term military strategy for the United States.<sup>49</sup>

Brzezinski has called for the continuation of U.S.-Pakistan security collaboration regardless of a Soviet pullout from Afghanistan.<sup>50</sup> He has

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<sup>49</sup>U.S. Defense Department, *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988.

<sup>50</sup>See, for example, *Frontier Post*, May 4, 1988.

argued that "a weakened Pakistan could yield the Soviets geopolitical benefits that Soviet arms have not been able to gain in Afghanistan." Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Brzezinski has asserted, will not end the Soviet Union's long-standing ambitions to dominate the Gulf and the Indian Ocean waters. He is concerned that the congressional attitude and official U.S. policy toward Pakistan could harden over the nuclear issue in the postwithdrawal period. He is also concerned that the "temptation to sacrifice some aspects of the U.S.-Pakistan connection for the sake of better relations with India" could prove stronger.

More recently, in "A Memo to the Next President," Kissinger has argued that Third World regional influentials such as India should be drawn into a "new international order" in which they can take over some of the regional security role of the United States.<sup>51</sup> He believes that divergent Indo-Soviet interests will emerge in the 1990s that would "impel" India toward the United States.

Kissinger's thinking reflects his long-standing penchant for the classic balance of power system. He sees a multipolar world emerging over the next decade, with countries such as China, Japan, and India affecting the power balance in Asia to a much greater extent than currently. Kissinger would like the United States to play the balancer's role in Asia and has tried to draw an analogy with the role played by Britain at the height of its power in relation to continental Europe in the nineteenth century.

Briefly, Kissinger's outlook seems somewhat simplistic both from conceptual and operational points of view. For instance, Britain's role as balancer had a different function and spatial context. It was meant to prevent any one power or a combination of powers that could threaten Britain's global supremacy from emerging in continental Europe. The balancer's role was also made possible by the absence of preoccupation with any one power or challenges from a coequal power in a worldwide context.

As far as South Asia is concerned, Kissinger's scheme for India's involvement in "burden sharing" with the United States presents a potential incongruity. On one hand, he wants India to assume some of the security functions performed by the United States in the broad region. On the other hand, he defines the proposed U.S. role of balancer in terms of "support for the weak against the strong and potential victims against potential aggressors."<sup>52</sup> It is not readily clear how India can be drawn into a scheme that could prove restrictive to its major-power ambitions, particularly in its own region where it is the object of widespread threat

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<sup>51</sup>*Newsweek*, September 19, 1988. Also see *Times of India*, September 13, 1988.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 26.

perceptions. Kissinger's scheme would also require India to trade its convenient pro-Soviet policy for one that would involve participation in a containment of its erstwhile ally that also happens to be a land-based superpower located close to its borders.

Notwithstanding the changes in Soviet posture under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union continues to be perceived as the source of undiminished danger to the United States in Kissinger's scheme. In short, his prognosis is rather general and ambitious, as well as arguable in some important respects. For these reasons, it would be perhaps difficult to translate Kissinger's prescriptions into a coherent and sustainable policy.

On the important question of Afghanistan, Kissinger and Brzezinski hold similar views on the nature of Soviet ambitions in the neighborhood. Kissinger, however, seems to attach more importance to Indo-U.S. relations for countering Soviet influence inside Afghanistan in the postwithdrawal period. Again, Kissinger's treatment of the issue is a little fuzzy. He talks about America's "short attention span" and Pakistan's domestic preoccupations over the next few months as reasons for turning to India. *Inter alia* he does not address the evident convergence of Indo-Soviet views on Afghanistan's evolution in the postwithdrawal period. Nor does he discuss the progress of U.S.-USSR talks on regional issues such as Afghanistan.

## X

There is a growing U.S. interest in a further improvement of relations with India. The trend has been increasingly discernible for the past few years, despite the Afghanistan imbroglio. The United States has for long coveted a better understanding with India. Circumstances for making yet another major diplomatic effort in this direction have improved and could improve further. Yet a close Indo-U.S. relationship faces difficulties—the most important being India's eminently productive and tested relationship with the Soviet Union.

The nuclear issue in U.S.-Pakistan relations could present new challenges if the India factor begins to exercise greater influence over U.S. policy toward Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. A complex situation could emerge between the United States on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other.

A decline of U.S. military aid to Pakistan in the postwithdrawal period has already been indicated by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Oakley. A substantial reduction of such aid could have the dual effect of depriving the United States of an important leverage on the nuclear issue as well as exacerbating Pakistan's perception of its security situation. The latter consequence could be addressed, at least to some extent, if a more benign Indian attitude toward Pakistan becomes one of the major objectives of

better Indo-U.S. relations. It is not at all certain, however, whether U.S. influence can achieve such a result. The complexity of this issue would require close attention in the conduct of U.S.-Pakistan relations. It is not at all certain, however, whether U.S. influence can achieve such a result. The complexity of this issue would require close attention in the conduct of U.S.-Pakistan relations and some U.S. sensitivity to Pakistan's concerns in this respect. As far as the question of leverage is concerned, its loss would not be complete but it could be significant enough.

Let me conclude by making a number of comments aimed at strengthening U.S.-Pakistan relations, stabilizing Indo-Pakistan relations, and improving the prospects of preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia over the short and medium term, if not hopefully further into the future.

1. Though the situation has improved in Africa and Latin America, conditions in South Asia have yet to take a positive turn. There are encouraging signs that South Africa may finally join the NPT. In recent years, Nigeria's concerns about South Africa's nuclear capability had given rise to some domestic pressure for initiating efforts to deny nuclear monopoly to South Africa. The nonproliferation process made considerable progress after the joint declaration of December 1986 by the presidents of Brazil and Argentina. In an accompanying statement, the two leaders announced their "determination to reinforce the necessary mechanisms so that nuclear science and technology in both countries become effective factors in reassuring the interests of peace, security and development."<sup>53</sup> More specifically, they called for institutionalized efforts "to protect the region from the risk of the introduction of nuclear weapons."

2. In recent years the onus appears to have fallen almost squarely on Pakistan. The pressures have been unfairly great and unhelpful to the nonproliferation process. A departure from this flawed approach may also help to shake India's indifferent, self-assured, and overbearing attitude. India has tested a nuclear device and is fast developing its potential for deploying a major nuclear deterrent. This is taking place alongside unabated conventional military buildup. These parallel exertions by India are mutually supportive, and an appropriate time for consolidating its position as a major power could come in the mid-1990s or thereabouts.

3. Whatever motivation Pakistan might have to go nuclear would be overwhelmingly India-related (notwithstanding the fanciful notions of some India analysts and publicists about the nature of Pakistan's so-called nuclear ambition and their interpretations of the background to Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs). By comparison, India's motivations are not only intraregional but also extraregional. Whereas India's attitude

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<sup>53</sup>Redick, *Nuclear Restraint*, p. 6.

could prove decisive in dissuading Pakistan from going nuclear, Pakistan's ability to prevent proliferation by India is extremely limited, except perhaps over the very short term, at the present juncture.

4. The Nuclear Free Zone concept could be considered in its modified form in the South Asian context or within a wider spatial framework. The former should, however, take precedence, if only because it would be technically more manageable. The nonproliferation effort should not be simply directed toward the short term; it should also be oriented toward the medium and long term. Efforts toward these ends should be made simultaneously and with a realistic sense of perspective. The nuclear issue should be addressed with due regard to both the legitimate security concerns of states and the problem posed by power-political ambitions. A distinction should be made between "going nuclear" and creating a technological potential of sorts.

5. American ability to promote nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia would depend greatly on that country's adoption of a regional approach and the maintenance of a stable and predictable relationship with Pakistan. The U.S. support for a modified concept of a Nuclear Free Zone for South Asia is aimed at accommodating India's concerns regarding China and the Indian Ocean. The United States should similarly seek to accommodate more serious Pakistani concerns about India. The growing U.S. interest in strengthening its relations with India—a process that could resume in earnest early next year—should not put at undue risk the need for a balanced treatment of the nuclear issue.

6. The Indo-Pakistan agreement signed by Gandhi and Bhutto in late December 1988 not to attack each other's nuclear facilities should be stressed in order to introduce a positive factor into the strained situation and improve the atmosphere for pursuing more substantive measures. This could be regarded as a first step of both side's interest in the nonproliferation process.


7. Unless India goes nuclear, Pakistan's concerns would be primarily related to the threat posed by India's conventional military superiority. In such circumstances, which exist at the moment, the nonproliferation effort should be marked by a two-pronged approach, directed at nuclear *as well as* conventional issues. Both India and Pakistan should review the form and content of their earlier talks on war prevention and normalization. Simultaneously, talks on regional arms control and confidence-building measures should be encouraged and strongly supported. The issue should be given prominence.

8. Force reduction by ratio presents some problems of operationalizing an objective criteria for assessing external security needs and for establishing the comparability of weapons and force structures. The

principle, however, could be considered for selective application, where such difficulties might be easier to address. Alternatively, substantive measures could be pursued through the progress of multilateral diplomacy conducted in U.N. forums on regional arms control issues as well as other measures to strengthen the organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, which is its primary function.


9. Finally, South Asia is both an extremely poor and a densely populated region. It has a long way to go toward achieving a reasonable level of prosperity and well-being for its fast-growing billion-plus inhabitants, who constitute as much as one-fifth of mankind. The region is gravely burdened with the "heat and dust" of interstate and intrastate conflicts and crises as well as other miseries. South Asia can ill afford the risks and costs associated with competitive nuclear buildup or the sense of confrontation that could easily arise. The conventional force situation, which is bad enough, would also grow worse. An all-out effort for peace should be made with the active support of outside states, whose sympathetic understanding should be sought.

In this connection, a start could be made through a joint Indo-Pakistan or collective South Asian declaration setting forth the common objectives of peace and prosperity. The declaration could be of a general nature, if India should reject or resist any commitment toward a regional disarmament process. In an effort to appease India, such a process could be placed in a global context, but not to the extent of "burying" the regional approach. Similarly, no categorical commitment for any specific measure may be sought. This would at least constitute a first step in the right direction.



## **Part Two**

### **Pakistan-U.S. Economic Relations**



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## 4. Knowledge and Institutional Reform: Long-Term Challenges in the Pakistani Economy

EUGENE STAPLES

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A new, uncertain political order faces Pakistan's old and unpostponable economic and social agenda, the resolution of which will require national consensus and political will. This is the dilemma of Pakistan, where historically consensus and political courage have seldom coexisted.

One of the ironies of President Zia's death on August 17, 1988, is that his vision of what Pakistan must do to achieve satisfactory internal growth and development had grown clearer in recent years. In combination with the opportunities opening in the probable end of the Afghanistan war, which for eight years has swirled around and inside Pakistan wreaking economic and social havoc, that clearer view of development priorities offered real hope for progress on basic issues. In particular, Zia and many of the elites appeared finally to be realizing the horrendous long-term costs to Pakistan of continuing its neglect of education.

Lofty goals and promises have never been absent from the Pakistani national conscience in spite of the political disasters and administrative mismanagement the nation has suffered. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) country development strategy statement for 1988–1993, written last year in Islamabad and subsequently leaked and widely quoted in the Pakistani press (one commentator called it “painfully honest”), describes the vision, the paradox, and the potential in these terms:

Pakistan's founder, Jinnah, dedicated his life to establishing a state that would unite Islam and his Westminsterian vision of democracy: yet Pakistan has suffered greatly from both religious discord and martial law. The official Islamic ideology, as expressed at high levels of government and by a host of *mullabs*, is conservative and ascetic. At the same time, much of the Pakistani society today is as consumption-oriented as an American shopping mall. . . . The economy, fueled by Gulf remittances, smuggling,

heroin and the Afghanistan war, has boomed for eight years. The government meanwhile cannot mobilize money enough to remedy crippling inadequacies in education, health, family planning services and infrastructure. The potential is equally clear. Underlying the contradictions is a fierce drive for self-betterment by most elements of the society. The Pakistani workers in the Gulf, who over the past 13 years have sent tens of billions of dollars home to their mostly poor and rural households, are tough, hardworking and self-sacrificing. The trading and industrial classes display tenacity and imagination in money making. The Pakistani civilian and military bureaucracies at their best are impressive. Throughout the society there exists a widespread, if frequently unsophisticated, yearning for democracy and justice and a far deeper devotion to the idea of Pakistan than the cacophony of national ethnic politics might suggest. The national endowment in land, water, and minerals is fragile but of enormous value if properly managed.<sup>1</sup>

President Zia's dismissal of the government of Prime Minister Junejo in the spring of 1988 and his call for new elections had reflected his own sense of urgency for putting the political and economic house in order. The reality is that the Pakistani elites cannot postpone much longer the achievement of a consensus about what must be done. Not only are danger signals flying in regard to the near-term future of the body politic and the economy; the long-term danger is that unless Pakistan begins to reform its basic institutions and to educate its citizens it will simply never catch up with the world—much less transform itself into the proud, successful Islamic society its citizens have dreamed of. Education in Pakistan has drifted while the larger world moves into a period of related revolutions in communications, technology, trade, finance, and investment, the combined impact of which is to make education and scientific and technological skills more critical than ever to a country's competitiveness.

In addition to macroeconomic reform, Pakistan must deal with a number of institutional and administrative reforms required to free up the natural energy and talent latent in the society. The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto period, as Javed Burki has written,<sup>2</sup> left the Pakistani political economy in a state of confusion from which it has recovered only slowly. The deceptively high gross national product (GNP) growth rates of recent years disguise the need for institutional reforms that in many cases are more difficult to carry out than economic policy changes.

The conventional view of the Pakistan economy over the past several

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<sup>1</sup>*Country Development Strategy Statement FY 1985–93*, Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, April 1987).

<sup>2</sup>Shaheed Javed Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto: 1971–1977* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 142–168.

years had been that indeed, given the political realities they have had to work with, the Pakistani technocrats have done well. Aggregate economic growth performance over the past nine years has averaged more than 6 percent. This past year produced real gross national product (GDP) growth of 5 percent. Inflation was held to 4 percent, and because of improvements in the terms of trade the current account deficit dropped to 2 percent of GNP. The government has performed well in maintaining agricultural procurement prices at close to international parity; private sector investment has risen significantly, constituting 70 percent of total investment in the 1984–87 period, and a number of steps have been taken to deregulate such industries as cement, nitrogenous fertilizer, and vegetable cooking oils.

The negative trends established earlier in the Bhutto and post-Bhutto periods continued upward as well. The consolidated federal and provincial budget deficit increased to 9 percent of GDP in fiscal year 1987. Defense and interest payments now amount to over half of all Pakistani government current expenditures, and, because of the heavy demands for government spending, government dissavings actually reached a negative 1.5 percent of GNP in fiscal year 1987. Pakistan remains heavily reliant on the export of traditional commodities—rice, cotton, and cotton textiles. Worker remittances from the Gulf are generally thought to be declining. Although private savings remain relatively strong at 14 percent, given the government's poor record in public savings this is regarded as insufficient to attain the 6 percent annual growth rates the politicians and technocrats believe politically necessary.

For six years the World Bank–led consortium has urged Pakistan to improve domestic resource mobilization. This past year the Bank's concerns became so urgent that it informed the Pakistan government at the highest levels that continuing failure to bring the budget deficit down would risk serious reductions in Bank lending. At the April 1988 consortium meeting in Paris, the Bank presented the outlines of a scenario for budget reduction that would require increasing the government's revenue-raising capacity, improving government savings, and protecting recurrent expenditures for economic and social services. Important elements of the program included improvement of the tax system, increase in spending on economic and social infrastructure, reduction of subsidies, reducing government employment levels by attrition, disinvestment of public enterprises, and improvement in the revenue-sharing arrangements between the federal and provincial governments.

Generally speaking, Pakistani technocrats have no quarrel with this agenda and, indeed, many would see it as more their own than the Bank's. What has been lacking is the political will. In 1987 and 1988 no one in

Islamabad really believed, for example, that a National Assembly, the majority of whose members were landlords, would approve even a moderate income tax on agricultural income, although this constituted a major recommendation of the National Taxation Reform Commission and tax evasion by attribution of income from whatever source to fictitious agricultural activities is notorious. In the budget presented immediately after the dismissal of the Junejo government in the spring of 1988, the then Finance Minister Mehboob ul Huq, citing the absence of parliament, again avoided a confrontation on the issue of agricultural income taxation, instead calling for a gradual increase in other tax revenues and reducing dependence on domestic as well as foreign borrowings. His package included simplification of tax-assessment procedures, elimination of the discretionary powers of tax officials, and additional sales taxes and customs duties. Huq also sought to move public sector corporations off budget and to begin the promised program of privatization and disinvestment. The long-awaited opening of limited private banking in the form of private investment companies is to take place. The shortcomings of the Pakistani tax system are well documented. Tax revenues over the past several years have amounted to only 13 percent of GDP, an extremely low figure in comparison to other countries at Pakistan's stage of development and in view of the deficiencies of public investment in both economic and social infrastructure. The deterioration of highways, railways, and the fundamentally important irrigation networks is visible to the naked eye of a traveler in Pakistan. And prolonged underinvestment in public education, particularly at the primary levels, threatens to keep Pakistan in the lower ranks of the developing nations for decades.

The task of a new government is thus formidable. The economic and social policy agendas are long. But the opportunity afforded by the end of the Afghanistan war and the emergence of a reasonably strong elected government is real, and possibly unique. The new government must use this opportunity to arrive at a better understanding with the political and economic elites on economic and social goals and the economic and fiscal means to achieve them.

There are some grounds for hope that this can be done. Over the past several years, for example, the deficiencies in the public education system have become a matter for wide debate at all levels of Pakistani society. Under the Junejo government a moderate but real increase in allocations for education took place, with the percentage of GNP allocated to education rising from 1.5 percent in the early 1980s to about 2.5 percent today. (For comparison, Pakistan now spends about 10 percent of current overall combined public expenditures on the social sectors. Most developing countries are in the 15–20 percent range.)

The macroeconomic policy reform agenda under discussion internally in Islamabad and with major donors is based on much Pakistani and external economic analysis and is comprehensive and thoughtful. The Pakistani bureaucracy has demonstrated its skills in monetary and exchange rate management and, given adequate political support, is well qualified to manage the trade and monetary aspects of policy reform. A number of critical items on the reform agenda, however, and one or two that do not figure at all, deserve particular comment.

Outstanding among these is corruption. Press reports from Islamabad quoted President Zia as listing increasing corruption as one of the central reasons for dissolving the government of Prime Minister Junejo. In his opening address to the National Assembly in April 1988, Zia said, "People are fed up with corruption. More than half the complaints people send to my secretariat are about bribery and favor-seeking. It has assumed alarming proportions over the past three years. Not only rates of bribery have gone up, people also demand a bribe openly."<sup>3</sup> It is instructive to recall that Zia in his farewell address as Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1985 said that his greatest failure was in controlling corruption and that the then-new Prime Minister Junejo selected corruption as a major problem for attack in his own early speeches. Clearly neither succeeded in the three years that followed.

There are some obvious reasons for the spread of corruption throughout the Pakistani economy: the existence of a huge black money economy stemming from drugs, arms traffic, smuggling, and illegal Gulf remittances; low salaries in the civil service; and a long list of investment controls and paper requirements for any citizen who needs an investment license, a telephone, or a gas connection. In various public statements former Finance Minister Huq estimated the cost of government corruption at around \$2.5 billion annually. He argued, persuasively in the view of many, that the most efficient way to reduce corruption overall was to dismantle most of the controls. Widespread international evidence testifies that this, in fact, is the right way to go. The World Bank's 1987 World Development Report puts it concisely: "For many developing countries the biggest problem is that the nominal rules of the game do not correspond to the real rules, which are unclear and unstable."<sup>4</sup> In Pakistan, the real rules frequently require entrepreneurs to bribe, either with money or favors, to move papers through the various control systems, or to obtain infrastructure connections.

In addition to a major decontrolling of the economy and possibly even

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<sup>3</sup>*Insight*, June 13, 1988, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup>World Bank, *World Development Report 1987* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1987).

a serious effort at debureaucratization, which would require a highly difficult restructuring of the civil service, its duties and its rewards, a new political order in Pakistan must begin to decentralize the planning, funding, and implementation of development. Virtually every political crisis in Pakistan's history has left in its wake increased power in the hands of the central government and the Islamabad-based bureaucracy. In Pakistan's early days, for example, basic control of the primary schools rested with the union councils: today the schools are run by the provinces, local participation is minimal, and virtually all the money and ideas come from the federal government, since the provinces are so deeply in debt to the federal government.

In fiscal year 1987, the federal government transferred almost three quarters of a billion dollars to the provincial governments to meet their budgetary deficits. The provinces, according to the 1973 constitutional demarcation, are required to bear the bulk of responsibility in providing public services. But their expenditures far exceed their revenue base, and a major task of the 1990s is to revitalize the provincial resource mobilization base. If the provinces were to tax and retain agriculturally derived income above a certain level, for example, and were effectively to collect user charges for irrigation and other services and to retain those funds, a far more responsive, better funded, and better managed planning and implementation process would come into place. The more imaginative of the provincial politicians are well ahead of Islamabad in thinking about alternatives. In 1988, Nawaz Sharif, then Chief Minister of the Punjab, as an example, actively sought private sector investment in and management of major toll highways.

A number of the large, centrally run public utilities are likewise candidates for decentralization. Chief among these is WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority), which is responsible for large-scale water resource planning and development and virtually all power generation and distribution. WAPDA, which has never undergone a serious management reform, now employs more than 100,000 people and is widely regarded as inefficient and corrupt. In WAPDA's defense it must be said that the utility's charter of autonomy has become largely a myth as far as top-level management decisions are concerned. All senior-level appointments must be approved in Islamabad, in many cases by the Prime Minister. There is growing sentiment in the government in favor of separating the water and power wings of WAPDA and spinning off the power distribution responsibilities to regional authorities. There is active interest in encouraging major private investment in power generation, and possibly eventual private distribution as well. The matter is critical: the growing shortage of electric power has been the most serious problem facing industry for the

last ten years. A U.S. AID-sponsored study estimated the annual amount of value added in manufacturing lost because of power unavailability (popularly known as load shedding) at \$500 million. The energy sector absorbs 38 percent of the entire annual development plan, with power receiving 20 percent—more than health, housing, education, sanitation, agriculture, and population planning combined. Improvement in energy and power management is vital.

Similar management reforms are needed in the irrigation bureaucracies, on whose efficient functioning Pakistan depends both for food and its major exports of rice and cotton. U.S. AID and the World Bank are engaged in a long-term major project with the central government and the four provinces to improve irrigation management across the board—from inventory control of tool and machinery storage and equipment to better monitoring of performance in delivery of water and a major program in training engineers.

Of all the development subjects in which long-term improvement in performance is needed, however, education rates as the most critical. Pakistan is the poorest performer in Asia in terms of spending on education, ranking with the African nations rather than the cohorts with whom Pakistan ordinarily expects to be compared. Only one quarter of the population knows how to read and write, female literacy rates in the rural areas are estimated at from 4 to 6 percent, only half of the country's primary school age children even start school, and only 16 percent start secondary.

Education has been seriously and persistently underfunded: until the recent increase to 2.5 percent, the country had never allocated more than 2 percent of GNP to education. In 1987, the World Bank reported "most disappointing results: in the implementation of the Sixth Plan (1983/1984–1986/1987) education program: only 39 percent of the spending targets had been implemented because of both low financial allocations and poor managerial capacity."<sup>5</sup>

At the higher levels, university quality is widely acknowledged to have declined. At the same time, in order to meet political demand for degrees the number of universities has increased from seven in 1950 to twenty-one in 1986. The causes of poor quality include low faculty salaries, politicization of campus life to the point where rival political groups periodically stage armed battles, the consequent and frequent closing of faculties and entire universities, and corruption in the examination processes.

The problems of the Pakistani education system are by no means new or unknown to the Pakistani elites. Indeed, as concerns primary education,

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<sup>5</sup>World Bank, *Pakistan Sixth Plan Progress and Future Prospects*, February 1987, p. 6.

a distinguished American economist who worked with the Planning Commission in the 1960s to help prepare the Third Five Year Plan's education chapter has commented that the chapter could be reproduced verbatim today in its descriptions of the problems, changing only the numbers relating to the size of the populations concerned.

Four factors underlie the consistent underfunding and poor management of education: (1) Education was not perceived by the country's elites, civilian or military, as important for the masses; (2) this perception was based in part on the belief that the masses were not themselves clamoring for education, and indeed there was some reason until recently to believe that the more backward areas of Pakistan were not wholeheartedly committed to the idea of secular education, particularly for females; and (3) other economic development requirements—dams, roads, and development of the increasingly costly energy sector—came first. A fourth and ubiquitous factor has been the requirement to respond to the demands of military spending, which in turn are fueled by what is seen in Islamabad as the seemingly endless hostility of India (this is, of course, seen differently in New Delhi) and more recently, of course, by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's defense expenditures by any measure are among the highest in the world.

The root cause, of course, has been the reluctance of any recent government—whether it was Bhutto's, Zia's, or Junejo's—to face the domestic resource mobilization problem squarely with either the country's elites or its masses.

National perceptions, however, are changing. Many of the elites now perceive clearly that Pakistan must remedy its educational deficiencies. President Zia, for example, visited Korea in 1985 and was enormously impressed with that nation's development performance. The then Finance Minister Huq, who helped organize the trip, made sure that Zia saw the developmental connections between Korean education, which is very well funded and managed, and Korea's spectacular economic growth. Prime Minister Junejo made education a central feature of his own development program. At the level of the ordinary citizen, a traveler today in the rural areas of Pakistan will see and hear much evidence of increased popular demand for education, brought about in large part by the opening up of rural society through the large-scale rural labor migration to the Gulf and the related videocassette revolution that has swept through Pakistan. Indeed, recent evidence indicates particularly rapid growth of demand for education among the conservative Pathan groups in the North-West Frontier Province.

Since Pakistan will continue to face severe general resource constrains,

political will based on popular understanding of the importance of education will be required to find the funds to improve education. The rapid growth of private education since the return to private hands of schools nationalized under Bhutto further suggests quite directly that a great many Pakistanis are prepared to pay one way or another for decent education. (Some observers estimate that as much as 10 percent of Pakistani education now takes place in private schools.) The fact that a majority of national and provincial assembly members chose to build schools with the development funds made available to them under Prime Minister Junejo's Five-Point development scheme offered additional evidence of the political popularity of educational spending.

The economic development case for improving and expanding primary education in Pakistan is greatly strengthened by the kind of careful analysis and argument presented in a recent paper by Derek Byerlee, an economist with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico. Dr. Byerlee, who has carried out extensive research in rural Pakistan over the past several years, concludes that improvement in education is a basic requirement for Pakistani farmers to be able to continue the progress of the Green Revolution. Faced with increasingly complex multiple cropping systems and fertilizer technologies to deal with, Dr. Byerlee finds that "most farmers are not able to compute nutrient doses, especially for phosphate and compound fertilizers. . . . The critical importance of farmer information and skills in maintaining productivity increases in post-green revolution agriculture has far-reaching implications."<sup>6</sup>

The social development implications of education are, of course, widely documented in experience throughout the world, in particular the relationships between levels of education, especially female, and health and fertility patterns. With infant mortality still at far higher levels than any Pakistani would wish to accept, and with a continuing population growth rate of 3 percent (which means that the current population of 100 million will double by the year 2015), the social development case for education investment appears unassailable.

A notable recent document arguing strongly for both improved education and a strong family planning program is the National Agriculture Commission report, produced by a distinguished group of farmers, public servants, and private citizens under the leadership of Dr. Sartaj Aziz. The

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<sup>6</sup>Derek Byerlee, *Maintaining the Momentum in Post-Green Revolution Agriculture—a Micro-Level Perspective from Asia*, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural Economics, International Development Paper No. 10, 1987.

report reminds its readers of the fundamental importance of agriculture to the Pakistani economy—including much of its industrial sector. Agriculture “contributes 26 percent of the GDP and provides employment to over half the country’s labor force. Agriculture and agro-based products account for 80 percent of the country’s total export earnings and the sector supplies many of the major industries with raw materials. In turn, the sector consumes 33 percent of the industrial finished goods. Almost 70 percent of the country’s population continues to reside in the rural areas.”<sup>7</sup>

The report’s basic recommendation is that Pakistan agriculture move toward a more complex and diversified pattern of production of both food and new cash crops that will afford much greater export possibilities. To accomplish this, the report argues, Pakistan will require both greater technical skill on the part of its farmers and a reduction in population growth rates. “One major reason for the gap between the urban and rural incomes and standards of living is the low rate of literacy and lower quality of education in the rural areas. Raising the standard of literacy in the rural areas is an essential condition for the success of all the rural development programs designed to improve the rural incomes and standards of living.” The report further recommends improved training in agricultural education at the secondary and higher levels and strongly urges that a major share of genuine responsibility for planning and carrying out rural development be vested in a new system of village development institutions.

In the area of family planning and population growth, the report comments: “The Commission . . . strongly supports policies to reduce the population growth rate and in fact the proposed agricultural strategy is predicated on the assumption that population growth rates will be brought down substantially below the current levels.”

Improving mass education will require a lot of money over a long period of time—the 2.5 percent of GNP for education overall is far short of education investment rates in developing countries with which Pakistan must compete. Because of concern about growing unemployment, it will be tempting to spend more money in the short term on technical education at the secondary and higher levels than on primary. But it is essential that primary education receive the lion’s share of education spending. It is here that the deficit is greatest; it is also here, as an impressive body of economic analysis of global experience demonstrates, that economic and social benefits are the greatest.

A recent World Bank survey (“Primary Schooling and Economic Development: A Review of the Evidence”) concludes:

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<sup>7</sup>Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, *Report of the National Commission on Agriculture*, March 15, 1988.

The case for investment in primary schooling is overwhelmingly that it makes people more productive at work and in the home. It goes far beyond the attainment of short-run consumption or equity goals, and far from being an obstacle to higher rates of economic growth, it helps to achieve them. In addition, primary schooling facilitates the attainment of other objectives of social policy, particularly in the fields of fertility control, improvements in health, nutrition, literacy and communications, and the strengthening of national culture. The evidence suggests that the economic and social returns to investment in primary schooling in most developing countries are higher, at the present time, than other forms of educational investment.<sup>8</sup>

The report emphasizes qualitative as well as quantitative improvement and gives particular importance to upgrading the quality of teachers.

In order to improve quality in the system, a genuine decentralization of management responsibilities back to the local communities most concerned with the results of education will have to take place. Whether management should be vested at the district or union council level remains to be argued out, but some genuine degree of local interest and participation must be encouraged and allowed.

A current large World Bank project in primary education has attempted to deal with quality, quantity, and decentralization questions, to date with limited success. The large U.S. AID program expects to add its muscle to the task this coming year with a major primary education project basically concerned with quality. The donors are counting on a real and continuing Pakistani commitment. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that for many consortium members a simple test of the development intentions of the Pakistan government in 1990 and beyond will be to look at the government's primary education allocations and expenditures and to visit a few rural schools.

The higher levels of Pakistani education are beset by a host of difficult problems, many of them also found across the border in India and elsewhere in Asia. Their resolution needs not to be as difficult as with the deficiencies found at the primary level. The secondary system functions reasonably well. The universities are in bad shape and bad odor with the public—overcrowded, politicized, violent, and underfunded. But in spite of the general malaise a number of centers of excellence at the university level continue to demonstrate with their research and teaching that quality education can be maintained under conditions of extreme difficulty. The Institute of Business Administration at Karachi University is an

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<sup>8</sup>Christopher Colchough, *Primary Schooling and Economic Development: A Review of the Evidence*, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 399, 1980, p. 19.

example: it has never closed its doors during campus violence, and its graduates continue to be warmly welcomed in executive-level jobs in Pakistan and throughout the Gulf.

Another sign of hope in the higher education sector is the willingness of the government to allow through its chartering rights, and indeed to encourage, private university development. There are now two outstanding examples, the Aga Khan University Hospital in Karachi, which is part of the international Aga Khan university system, and the Lahore University of Management Sciences, founded by a far-sighted Punjabi industrialist, Babar Ali, and a group of Lahori businessmen who believe international quality management education essential for Pakistan to compete in the great world. At least two groups of scientists, public-spirited citizens, and businessmen are working on plans for a private science and technology institute that would endeavor to set standards for research and education in those fields. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whose career as civil servant, technocrat, and cabinet minister has been among the most distinguished in Pakistan's history, has been involved in this planning, and Abdus Salam, Pakistan's Nobel Prize-winning theoretical physicist, is lending his support to one of the groups.

The universities also possess relatively more ability to raise funds than do primary schools, and a promising new kind of figure is emerging in Pakistan today: the university vice-chancellor as entrepreneur and fundraiser. But only the government can muster and apply the political power to raise university fees and to insist that they be collected. Over the long term, requiring students to pay for some reasonable part of the costs of university education is essential in improving the financial condition of the public universities. This would doubtless improve university discipline as well. It is generally accepted that as this policy is put into effect, scholarship facilities for genuinely poor students must be provided.

Improvement in the performance of the education system will afford Pakistan its best long-term insurance against the politically disastrous consequences of high levels of open unemployment. In spite of growing public concern over unemployment, the relationships between education and employment are not very clearly understood in Pakistan. Prime Minister Junejo's government, which to its lasting credit began to increase education allocations, was inclined to seek direct answers to the problem of unemployed doctors and engineers by putting them on the public payroll, thereby compounding the country's already perilous budget deficit problems. Even the more sophisticated among the Pakistani technocrats, concerned about the endlessly increasing population, the large numbers of young entrants every year into the labor force, and the bleak prospect that the Gulf employment boom has seen its best days, are inclined to seek quick remedies by expanding technician training schools.

This disregards both evidence inside Pakistan that graduates of such schools are not particularly sought after by industry and the large body of evidence gathered worldwide that technical training by government schools is both extremely expensive and difficult to fit to the needs of industry or agriculture. Establishing quality in primary education remains the core problem for a Pakistani education strategy.

The overall education strategy Pakistan should consider is thus a great push in primary education—quality and quantity; maintenance of relatively adequate performance at the secondary levels and improvement wherever possible; and university reform at the tertiary level. As for research and technology adaptation, Pakistan is fortunate to have a small number of highly competent scientists and engineers who can help the country take advantage of the scientific and technological revolutions sweeping the world. Molecular biology and bioengineering require relatively modest investments, for example, and it is heartening to observe that a dynamic Pakistani biologist, Dr. Sheikh Riazuddin, recently launched a Center for Research in Applied Molecular Biology at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. Dr. Riazuddin, who returned to Pakistan from a promising career at Johns Hopkins University, is a full-fledged member of the international research networks in molecular biology and boasts two Nobel Prize winners on his Center's international board of directors.

The political and intellectual atmosphere in Pakistan is possibly more conducive to systemic change than it has been for many years. There is much freedom, for which former Prime Minister Junejo deserves full credit, to discuss and argue points of view both in the press and in the national and provincial assemblies. There is great discontent with corruption and a wide demand that the bureaucracy work more honestly and efficiently. A feisty private sector has demonstrated that, given less onerous government policies on licensing procedures and import and export controls, it will invest, produce goods for domestic consumption, and export—and in the process create economically viable employment. The Afghanistan war, with all its undesirable domestic consequences, is almost certainly grinding through its final phases—as a Soviet occupation war, at least, although the border situations on both the west and the east will clearly preoccupy Pakistan for the foreseeable future. Pakistan's geopolitical location is doubtless unenviable. But it is not the first or only country that has had to face hostility on its borders while undertaking economic and social development. One of the models Pakistanis look at with envy, Korea, produced both guns and butter and in doing so has managed to move, albeit slowly and uncertainly, toward democracy as well.

A legitimate question is whether Islamization will interfere with economic and social development in Pakistan. President Zia's drive to Islamization, which many Pakistanis regarded as at least partly political in

inspiration (although few doubted the genuineness of Zia's religious devotion), clearly did not affect his belief that Pakistan must as well be productive, scientific, and advanced. The *mullabs* certainly influence public attitudes, as anyone ever resident in Pakistan can testify. But most of the Pakistani economic and social development agenda is not centrally affected by religious considerations. Islamic banking has proved to be not all that different from traditional banking. Religious studies as part of education have always been accepted as proper in an Islamic state, and it is clearly possible, even in today's sadly deteriorated educational system, to receive an excellent education in the sciences or the arts with religious instruction as part of the curriculum. Islam as a religion offers both a vision of brotherhood and a view of the role of private property that may be particularly well suited to a broad-based growth process in the hands of political leaders who wish to use it for that desirable purpose.

In an essay written a quarter of a century ago on how to judge the developing societies, Edward Shils stated, "We are interested in the success or failure of the elites in seeking to create a coherent and stable society."<sup>9</sup> These new societies, Professor Shils believed, had to achieve a "moral consensus" in leadership and institutions.

That is the test for the coming new order in Pakistan. Will the elites achieve a consensus? If so, will they then act to carry out the reforms so visibly and urgently needed?

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<sup>9</sup>Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 25.

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## 5. Pakistan-U.S. Economic Relations

H. U. BEG

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Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan, under the dictates of growth imperatives, has developed a broad-based relationship with the world economy through trade, capital inflow, and exchange of human capital and expertise. The United States, which figures predominantly as a donor and also in trade between the two countries, began providing direct economic assistance to Pakistan as far back as 1951. It has also made contributions to the aid program through the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations.

The strategy of U.S. assistance to Pakistan has changed over time; likewise the composition of the assistance and its focus on various sectors have also undergone change. During the 1950s, the focus of assistance was on helping Pakistan overcome the economic consequences of Partition. Aid covered infrastructure, technical support to meet the skill shortages, and PL-480 concessional sales that generated local currency for public investment. By the early 1960s, Pakistan had overcome the basic problems pertaining to Partition. During the 1970s, the focus of U.S. assistance was on water management and fertilizer imports.

An economic assistance package of \$1.62 billion negotiated in 1981 covered the period from 1982 to 1987. It included agriculture and rural development, energy, area development, and the social sectors (Table 5.1). About 11 percent of the funds under this program were earmarked for technical assistance. In agriculture, \$448 million out of the total allocation of \$634 million was for provision of computers, vehicles, heavy machinery, and research equipment as well as purchase of fertilizers, edible oil, wheat, and the like. In the energy sector, \$205 million was intended for rural electrification and \$100 million for energy commodities and equipment. In the health sector, \$41 million was earmarked for malaria control and \$30 million for primary health care.

Recently, a 1988–93 Economic Aid Package of \$2.28 billion has been negotiated between the two countries. This program is intended to provide assistance for implementation of the new schemes of the Seventh

**Table 5.1**  
**U.S. Economic Assistance Program**  
**for Pakistan (1982–87)**

Sector/Project Title	Amount Provided (U.S. \$millions)	Percent of Total Economic Assistance
<u>Health, Population, Education, and Training</u>	226.05	17
Malaria control II	41.00	
Primary health care	60.00	
Population welfare planning	65.05	
Social marketing of contraceptives	20.00	
Development support training	40.00	
<u>Energy</u>	356.40	26
Rural electrification	204.70	
Energy planning and development	51.70	
Energy commodities and equipment	100.00	
<u>Agricultural and Rural Development</u>	634.60	47
Agricultural research	3.20	
On-farm water management	9.50	
Irrigation systems management	67.00	
Ag. commodities and equipment	448.00	
Forestry planning and development	18.00	
Transformation and integration of provincial agricultural network	33.00	
Management of agricultural research and technology	20.00	
Food security management	27.00	
Agricultural sector support project	8.90	
<u>Area Development</u>	105.10	8
Tribal areas development	22.00	
Baluchistan area development	45.00	
NWFP area development	31.00	
Roads resources management	7.10	
<u>Other Projects</u>	20.00	2
Project design and implementation fund	20.00	
<u>PL 480 Title-I</u>	309.00	
Total Economic Assistance	1,342.15	100

Five-Year Plan. The avowed strategy of the program concentrates on challenges extending across sectors; reform in the policy framework, institutional and managerial environment; development of human resources; and sustainable improvement of the physical infrastructure.

Although it is generally appreciated that the United States is playing a vital and constructive role in the economic development of Pakistan, some areas of U.S. strategy come under criticism and require reorientation. The first point of criticism is that Pakistan's decision makers are not fully involved in designing the components of the assistance program. The second point is that the aid is tied down: contracting is done without international tendering with the result that the cost of projects runs much higher than world market prices—all agricultural commodities and equipment, for example, are bought from U.S. sources. Most of the pesticides for the malaria control program and the chemicals for primary healthcare come from the United States. A sizeable component of the project cost is spent on American experts. Technical assistance, training in the United States, the import of commodities from the United States, and salaries for U.S. experts cover, on an average, 85 percent of the funds obligated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) for each project. Imposition of quotas on textile imports into the United States obstructs the utilization of the full potential of the textile industry in Pakistan. The Trade Law promulgated in August 1988 is mentioned by critics as a statute accommodating protectionists because of the discretionary powers it contains.

Nations, like individuals, have their own identities. In many ways they are unique and have distinguishing characteristics; they have their peculiar resource endowments and their own spectrum of problems. This perspective is reflected in the interaction of nations within the world economy. They have to play their respective role, which is mainly guided by their own national priorities. Some factors of economic growth, such as physical and human capital, cross national frontiers. This mobility is essential for optimal deployment of world resources and helps maximize economic gains at the national level.

The Pakistan economy is predominantly agricultural; over one-fifth of its gross domestic product (GDP) derives from agriculture. This sector not only meets the domestic requirements of the economy but also produces for export. The American economy possesses modern technology and is capital intensive. It produces surpluses in both agriculture and manufacturing. The pattern of mutual trade of these two countries reflects a secular complementarity: Pakistan exports agro-based commodities to,

and imports manufactured items from, the United States; the latter has also exported agricultural commodities to meet shortages in the domestic agricultural output in Pakistan.

The trade between the two countries has expanded with the growth of their respective economies. Apart from reflecting the resource endowment of both economies and their respective stage of economic advancement, the trade statistics reveal that the trade balance has consistently been against Pakistan. The adverse trade balance was \$219.5 million in 1986–87, which was 59 percent of Pakistan's exports to the United States in the same year. Mutual trade during the last eight years is given in Table 5.2.

Pakistan-U.S. economic relations could be better understood if reviewed in the overall economic perspective of Pakistan's economy. Pakistan has low levels of savings and investment. The domestic savings rate has averaged 6.2 percent of GDP during the last one and a half decades. The national savings rate has not exceeded even 12 percent on the average, though home remittances are also included in the national savings according to the methodology of estimating savings used in Pakistan. These low savings rates are explained primarily by high propensities to consume in both the private and public sectors. It is interesting to note that the public sector's savings in most of the years have never been higher than even 2 percent of GDP. The investment rate has ranged from 16 percent to 17 percent of national income, compared with 25 percent and 21 percent for low-income and lower middle-income (oil-importing) countries respectively. Even this low level of investment is not matched by the national savings, and the gap is filled through net resource inflow. Workers' remittances, which covered much of the gap since 1974, have begun to decline from their peak of \$3 billion during 1983–84. During the last three years, exports have picked up and now finance around 70 percent of imports. Nevertheless, this gain is continuously offset by decline in home remittances. The deficit in the current account has remained over \$1 billion. The country must depend heavily on foreign aid not only to meet the deficit in the current account but also to service foreign debt and interest. The debt service liability (as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings) is 19 percent. With the increase in the level of outstanding debt to \$12.4 billion, the debt-servicing liability will continue to grow. The current low level of net resource inflow of 16 percent will go down further.

The domestic resource problem (i.e., the savings-investment gap) is, in fact, reflected in the external sector's disequilibrium (i.e., the balance of payments gap). Its fundamental cause is rooted in the adverse fiscal imbalance in the government sector. For historical and political reasons, a large number of activities are funded by the government, which has taken

**Table 5.2**  
**U.S.-Pakistan Trade 1979-87**  
**(U.S. \$million)**

Year	From Pakistan to U.S. (Exports)	From U.S. to Pakistan (Imports)	Trade Balance
1986-87	373.582	593.070	- 219.488
1985-86	318.189	671.318	- 353.129
1984-85	260.020	721.679	- 461.659
1983-84	241.716	648.017	- 406.301
1982-83	162.911	520.731	- 357.820
1981-82	179.819	497.819	- 318.000
1980-81	178.747	590.989	- 412.242
1979-80	121.323	527.202	- 405.879

almost full responsibility for providing services in the fields of education, health, and other social sectors as well as in the physical infrastructure. On the other hand, it has failed to increase the resource base. My analysis of Pakistan's public finance leads me to draw the following conclusions:

1. Tax revenue is low. The tax system is inelastic. The tax base is also low. Agricultural income is exempt from income tax. Tax holidays, tax concessions, and escape routes have created big holes in the system.
2. No real tax effort is being made by the provincial governments.
3. Tax evasion takes place on a massive scale.

In my view, it is necessary that

1. all escape routes for tax avoidance be closed by eliminating tax holidays and tax concessions,
2. tax evasion be tackled as a national issue (tax rates may be lowered, but everybody should pay the tax owed),
3. agricultural income be taxed by the provincial governments,
4. a multiple sales tax be levied (to start with, it may be a very small percentage of the turnover),
5. the prices and tariff of items administered by the government be fixed in such a manner that they at least recover the cost, and
6. subsidies be given only to those members of society who are below the poverty line.

The thrust of the 1988-89 budget is in this direction. The budget has assumed many initiatives, but their successful implementation depends on the political climate and the cooperation of the business community.

Though Pakistan's economy is faced with structural problems that create budgetary deficits, it has achieved sustained growth in the real sectors of agriculture and industry. It must expand its social and physical

infrastructure for future growth, but it must also initiate processes to reduce the persistent gaps in the balance of payments and the budget. To have sustained growth and to reduce deficits in the financial sectors is a difficult task for which, apart from continuous domestic effort, Pakistan needs foreign assistance, especially on highly concessional terms.

I quote here the provocative views of Daniel Bell:

We have today an international economy, heavily interdependent. Yet while the international economy is increasingly integrated, many polities are fragmenting. The process is accordion-like, expanding and contracting at particular moments. In Belgium the fragmentation is linguistic and national; in Canada it is linguistic; in Northern Ireland it is religious; in Spain it is based on local nationalism; in Nigeria it is tribal. In any of these nations the divisions follow the historic "fault lines" of these countries. But because it seems to be happening in so many different places, one ought to suspect a common underlying problem. It is, I believe, this: the nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life.

The nation-state is too small for the big problems because there are no effective international mechanisms to deal with the problems of capital flows, commodity imbalances, the loss of jobs and the several demographic tidal waves that will be developing in the next 20 years. But it is too big for the small problems because the flow of power to a national political center means that the nation-state becomes increasingly unresponsive to the variety and diversity of local needs, and local political centers lose the ability to effectively control resources and make their own decisions.<sup>1</sup>

Pakistan, though a young nation-state, possesses compactness in terms of its social organization, traditions, and physical infrastructure. It has one culture; its religion, Islam, is the founding basis of its culture. It has a language that is understood and spoken all over the country. It has one grid system for gas and electricity. It has one network of canals and rivers and one system of roads and railways. It has, therefore, the spiritual and physical ability to arrest divisive forces, tackle ethnic problems, and achieve its growth potential.

Though Pakistan's economy in general has an all-round potential for development, on the criterion of comparative advantage I have identified three areas of maximum growth potential. These are:

1. Agriculture
2. Energy resources development, particularly the discovery of petroleum and gas
3. Human resources

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<sup>1</sup>Daniel Bell, "The World in 2013," *Dialogue*, March 1988.

Pakistan has large, fertile agricultural plains whose history is rooted in ancient legend. Despite improvement in yields, agricultural production is still far from its potential. There is room for expansion in agricultural production mainly through stepping up yields. This can be done by timely and adequate supply of irrigation water, fertilizers, and insecticides; agricultural extension services; and new and improved seeds. In fact, the sky is the limit for growth in this sector.

In the 1960s, Pakistan experienced the Green Revolution, the result of the application of biochemical technology. We used high-yield seeds of wheat, rice, and maize. We supplemented them with large doses of fertilizer, enabling our economy to register a record growth level. Pakistan was cited as a model for other developing countries. Recently, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has evolved a new high-yield variety of cotton known as *Nayab* that has enabled Pakistan to double its cotton production in a short span of three years. If a similar strategy is adopted for other crops, there is no reason why Pakistan cannot double its agricultural output in two to three years.

An enormous quantity of water is being wasted in defective water courses. The improvement of canals and water courses requires a huge investment.

Our livestock and dairy sector has often been mentioned in our development plans and measures have been planned in the past. This sector needs to be reorganized on modern lines. There is also an urgent need for modern genetics technology, which could increase the productivity of this sector both in terms of high meat and milk yields.

The National Commission on Agriculture has recently (March 1988) examined the goals of the agricultural strategy, and I recommend that U.S. assistance be provided in the form of modern technology to achieve the goals set by the Commission. The United States should give specialists to help Pakistan achieve self-sufficiency in grains, sugar, and pulses and reduction in dependence on edible oil imports.

Energy consumption is used as an alternative barometer for measuring a country's standard of living. In this area Pakistan has remained behind many other developing countries of the world. The industrial sector—especially small-scale industry, which has the potential for offering employment—is suffering because of the inadequate supply of energy. Farmers do not get a timely supply of energy to run their irrigation tubewells.

The petroleum requirements of the country are met mostly with imports and a large part of hard-earned foreign exchange is spent on such imports. At present, about 55 percent of total energy requirements are met through oil and gas. With the economic growth envisaged during the

remaining part of the current century and the rapid increase in energy consumption, the structure of energy demand and supply in Pakistan is likely to undergo radical changes. Unless proper emphasis is placed on the development and exploitation of indigenous energy resources, Pakistan will continue to face pressure on its balance of payments to meet the energy demand. Petroleum and gas resources go untapped because of inadequate exploratory and drilling activities. Besides financial assistance, there is also a great need for helping Pakistan acquire modern technology for exploration and discovery of oil and gas. The success ratio, though increased from 1:13 during the Fifth Plan to 1:2 during recent years, has not produced sufficient oil. The drilling effort must be appreciably increased in order to tap indigenous energy resources. This goal can only be met if the United States provides Pakistan with the latest modern technology. The effort of the private sector is not sufficient to produce the amount of oil needed.


On one hand, human beings are dynamic factor of production; on the other, they are the end goal of economic development. A healthy, educated, and active population contributes more to the progress and prosperity of a country than any other factor. The contribution they are able to make is a direct result of their efficiency, productiveness, and effectiveness. Unskilled people living in hunger and poverty make little contribution to economic advancement. Open unemployment in Pakistan is estimated at a very low level because a person who has worked for even an hour or two in a week is counted as employed. Nevertheless, underemployment is estimated at around 30 percent of the workforce. The literacy rate is very low; most of the labor is unskilled. The efficiency and productivity of the workforce can be enhanced by addressing the problem of malnutrition, providing health facilities, and imparting technical skills. By improving the growth of labor-intensive sectors like agriculture and small-scale industries, employment opportunities can be expanded. Reduction of unemployment is a gigantic task and requires a massive amount of physical capital. The United States can contribute a great deal in this area, too, by granting economic assistance for providing skills and training to the workforce in Pakistan.

The proposals discussed in this chapter can be implemented under the existing U.S. economic policy in Asia. In my opinion, they require no shift but simply a reordering of priorities, with a change in emphasis among the different sectors of the economy.


The United States has adopted a multipronged economic policy in Asia. Apart from serving economic interests, this policy is integrated into the overall U.S. foreign policy. It is based on the recognition of a significantly increased economic relationship between the United States and the Asian

countries. The economic interests of the United States lie in the rapid growth of Asia because it offers vast prospects for expansion of U.S. markets in developing Asian countries. The main political gain derived through this economic policy is the promotion of democratic forces in the region.

I am sure the economic relationship between the two countries can be so designed that the national interests of Pakistan and the United States meet at an optimal point. This has happened in the past even during situations of conflict of interest in the subcontinent. After independence in 1947, India and Pakistan disputed the matter of control over the rivers; the World Bank, the United States, and a number of developed nations intervened and the end product was the Indus Basin Treaty. Two dams were constructed over the rivers Jhelum and Indus. Contractors and engineering consultants came from all over the world to provide services and commodities and naturally earned their profits. Then as now, Pakistan was able to harness the forces of nature to increase its growth potential.



**Part Three**  
**Mutual Perceptions**



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## 6. An American Perspective on Pakistan Political Developments and Their Impact on Pakistan-U.S. Relations

WILLIAM L. RICHTER

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The crash of a C-130 aircraft near Bahawalpur, Pakistan, on August 17, 1988, dramatically underlined the importance of bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan. The death of Pakistani president Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, U.S. ambassador Arnold Raphel, and other officials of both countries in the still unexplained air crash symbolized the extent to which the fates of the two countries have been linked for most of the past decade and indeed in varying degrees for much of Pakistan's forty-one-year history as an independent nation.

American reporting of the August 17 event also illustrated, in a variety of ways, the importance of mutual perceptions in the relations between the two countries. Initial reports, even those in the United States' leading newspapers and on nationwide television networks, portrayed images as reflective of American stereotypes of Pakistan as they were of actual developments within the country. Of less significance but still illustrative of the level of misperception—Pakistani names were misspelled and governmental positions erroneously reported.<sup>1</sup>

The media reports also revealed the concerns that Americans had regarding the implications of Zia's death for U.S.-Pakistani relations and American interests in the region. The most widely discussed issue was the impact this event and subsequent political developments might have upon Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and upon the Afghan conflict generally. India's reactions and the implications for Indo-Pakistani relations were also noted, as was the issue of nuclear proliferation, the thorniest problem in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. With respect to Pakistani domestic politics and policies, speculation was greatest concerning the prospects for an

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<sup>1</sup>Even the *New York Times* listed Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's first name as *Gulam*, and another newspaper referred to him as Ghulam Is-Haq Khan, obviously confusing his name with that of Zia ul-Haq.

orderly post-Zia transition to some form of stable government, the implications of Zia's death for his Islamization program, and the question, as one commentator phrased it, of whether any Pakistani government could "hold together the nation against persistent internal rivalries and ethnic independence movements in the individual provinces."<sup>2</sup>

The impact of mutual perceptions on the bilateral relations of two countries like the United States and Pakistan is an extremely complex subject.<sup>3</sup> This chapter addresses a part of that question by focusing upon American perceptions of domestic political developments in Pakistan and assessing their potential impact on relations between the two countries.

It should be noted at the outset that, in general, Pakistani domestic politics and policies are less salient to American policy makers and the American public than strategic and security issues such as Afghanistan and nuclear proliferation.<sup>4</sup> However, three of the domestic concerns are sufficiently important, as we noted with reference to press reports following Zia's death, to merit investigation: political order, Islamization, and ethnic integration. With respect to each of these issues, we shall first look more closely at reactions to the air crash of August 17, then provide some historical perspective on each issue, then assess future prospects and their implications for U.S.-Pakistani relations.

### The Search for Political Order

Two dominant attitudes were clearly discernible in the initial American reactions to the deaths of President Zia and Ambassador Raphel. First, the American media generally portrayed Pakistan to be a harsh military dictatorship in which the vacuum left by President Zia's demise would

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<sup>2</sup>Dennis Hevesi, "Mohammad Zia ul-Haq: Unbending Commander for Era of Atom and Islam," *New York Times*, August 18, 1988, p. A11.

<sup>3</sup>For diverse approaches to the subject of perceptions in international relations, cf. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Michael W. Suleiman, *The Arabs in the Mind of America* (Brattleboro Vt.: Amana, 1988); and Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi, eds., *The Structure of Political Geography* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 328–349. On bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan, cf. Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain, eds., *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985); Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose, eds., *Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Social, Political, and Economic Factors* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988); Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982); William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972); Ataur Rahman, *Pakistan and America: Dependency Relations* (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1982).

<sup>4</sup>These subjects are covered in other chapters in this volume.

inevitably be filled by another military strongman. Henry Kamm, writing in the *New York Times*, predicted that, "given the military's preponderance since independence in 1947, it seems likely that General Zia's sweeping, authoritarian powers will be claimed by the army." Kamm further quoted Paul Kreisberg, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an old South Asia hand, as saying "I just see no other possibility."<sup>5</sup> Americans, including some noted experts on the region, seemed genuinely surprised when Pakistan's leadership responded to the crisis with order, calm, and effectiveness.

The second reaction, expressed as it became evident that a military takeover would not be immediately forthcoming, was one of positive encouragement and congratulations to the government of Pakistan for the successful manner in which it had managed the crisis. The State Department "expressed satisfaction that the Pakistan Government had not tried to restrict the civil liberties of its citizens,"<sup>6</sup> Secretary of State George Shultz expressed admiration for the new government's "commitment to the constitutional process,"<sup>7</sup> and Assistant Secretary Richard W. Murphy "said American officials were encouraged that Pakistani officials had reaffirmed the November date for Pakistan's elections."<sup>8</sup>

A strangely discordant note was sounded by former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post* on August 26, Mr. Brzezinski warned:

The Pakistanis should not be pressured by outsiders to move precipitously toward "democracy," for that could actually intensify domestic tensions, given the deep-rooted ethnic and political hatreds inherent in Pakistan's domestic politics.

A period of political consolidation will now be needed, and only the Pakistanis should determine what form it must take. Even if the younger surviving senior officers should now move to create a transitional regime, Pakistan deserves the West's sympathetic encouragement and not strident lectures.<sup>9</sup>

Brzezinski's argument was by no means an unfamiliar one, but it appeared strange both in its timing—well after the transitional process

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<sup>5</sup>Henry Kamm, "An Unclear Succession: Zia's Dominance Leaves No One in Line But Military Is Likely to Maintain Control," *New York Times*, August 18, 1988, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup>Robert Pear, "U.S. Sends Experts to Aid Crash Enquiry," *New York Times*, August 19, 1988, p. A8.

<sup>7</sup>Karen DeYoung, "Shultz Arrives in Pakistan for Zia Burial," *New York Times*, August 20, 1988, p. A11.

<sup>8</sup>Jeff Gerth, "Victims of Crash Praised in Capital," *New York Times*, August 22, 1988, p. A1.

<sup>9</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Help Pakistan Stay on Course," *Washington Post*, August 26, 1988, p. A21.

appeared to be under effective civilian control—and in contrast with the widespread official praise for Pakistan's adherence to orderly and constitutional processes during the period of crisis.

These various reactions to events in Pakistan reflect, at least in part, the ambiguity of political authority that has existed in Pakistan for the last few years. Pakistan has been neither a completely constitutional representative democracy nor an absolute military dictatorship, but rather an unclear mixture of the two. To understand this ambiguity, it is helpful to recall some of Pakistan's troubled political history and particularly to review some of the major features of the eleven years of Zia's rule in Pakistan.

Lawrence Ziring has appropriately described Pakistan as a political enigma.<sup>10</sup> Despite more than four decades of independence and frequent reiteration of commitments to democratic values, it has yet to develop a clearly viable representative political system. The first two general elections were preludes to disaster. The first, in December 1970, resulted in the 1971 Bangladesh war that split the country in two. The second, in March 1977, resulted in a massive protest movement that weakened the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and paved the way for General Zia's martial law regime.

The ambiguity of Zia's rule in Pakistan was evident from the time of his military takeover the morning of July 5, 1977. He declared that his sole objective was to hold elections and to return power to civilian hands within ninety days, yet in the same breath promised to further the cause of Islamization in Pakistan. Despite his own protestations that he had no political ambitions, and the assessments of knowledgeable observers that he would not last more than eighteen months, he ultimately remained in power longer than any other Pakistani leader.

It is possible to interpret all of this merely as skillful manipulation and deception by a person who was willing to use the promises of religious and political reform to hold on to power.<sup>11</sup> By this interpretation, Zia was a devout Machiavelli in the guise of a polite, unassuming, and devout general.

Alternatively, Zia may be seen as a remarkably effective tactician but poor strategist, as one who reacted to events and conditions but failed to comprehend the longer-term consequences of his actions. This interpretation accepts, almost at face value, most of Zia's statements concerning his values and intentions. From this perspective, Zia did intend to hold the

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<sup>10</sup>Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980).

<sup>11</sup>See Salamat Ali, "A Law Unto Himself: Master Manipulator Who Dominated Politics and the Military," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 1, 1988, pp. 19–21.

elections he originally scheduled for October 1977 but ultimately cancelled them because of political pressures and apprehension of undesirable consequences that had not been anticipated at the time of the July coup.<sup>12</sup> By the same token, his subsequent maneuvers can be seen as attempts to create political conditions whereby he might retire gracefully from political life without jeopardy either to himself or to his major religious or political values.

In accordance with this assessment, it is possible to distinguish three or four phases of Zia's rule.<sup>13</sup> During the first, from the 1977 coup until the cancellation of the November 1979 elections, Zia attempted to find some formula by which he might hold elections and ensure that a moderate to conservative civilian government, friendly to his Islamization policies, would come to power. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP) remained the major stumbling block, even after Bhutto's execution in April 1979.

The cancellation of the 1979 election and the imposition of a considerably harsher martial law, including strict censorship, marked the beginning of the second phase.<sup>14</sup> During this period, Zia tested a variety of alternative ideas for restructuring Pakistan's policy, from a military-based system, following the Indonesian model, to a religious-based system drawing upon the country's ulema and other religious leaders, to a basic-democracy system resembling that of Ayub Khan in the 1960s. The ultimate outcome of this speculation was the creation of the 300-member Majlis-i-Shura (Federal Consultative Assembly) in 1981. The Majlis, though appointed rather than elected, nonetheless provided a form of representative assembly that partially deflected criticism of prolonged military rule and provided cooperative politicians both exposure and patronage.

During the same period, changes in the nature of the political opposition brought about a more unified resistance to the martial law regime, in the form of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). A marriage of strange bedfellows, the MRD combined the forces of the PPP, now led by Benazir Bhutto, with those of several of the parties that had most actively battled against her father in the 1977 elections.

The third phase of Zia's rule began with his announcement, August 12,

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<sup>12</sup>This is discussed in some detail in my "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Martial Law Regime," *Pacific Affairs* 51:3 (Fall 1978):406-426. Discussions with President Zia in July 1985 were also supportive of this interpretation.

<sup>13</sup>William L. Richter, "Pakistan's Politics in the 1980s," paper presented at conference on Pakistan, Columbia University, April 16, 1987.

<sup>14</sup>Cf. William L. Richter and W. Eric Gustafson, "Back to Square One," *Asian Survey* 20:2 (February 1980):188-196.

1983, of a new timetable for elections and a planned return to parliamentary democracy. Elections to the national assembly were to be held prior to March 1985, a date which the MRD charged was unjustifiably late and which they regarded as a further prolongation of military rule. Fueled by the discontent of both the MRD and Sindhi regional groups, violent protest erupted and lasted for several weeks. Ultimately, however, the regime restored order and proceeded with its democratization process.

Although not originally a part of his 1983 plan, the plebiscite conducted on December 19, 1984, provided Zia a secure base from which to effect the rest of his plan during 1985. The plebiscite, held on typically short notice and under conditions that firmly discouraged both negative responses and any organized boycott, asked Pakistanis to indicate whether they approved of President Zia's Islamization policies. On the basis of the reportedly overwhelming "yes" vote, and despite very low turnout, Zia interpreted the plebiscite as a mandate for him to remain in the presidency for another five years, to 1990. In effect, the plebiscite served to insulate him from whatever political uncertainties might emerge from the following general elections.

The elections of February 1985 were held on a nonpartisan basis and were boycotted by the MRD, but otherwise they were relatively fair and successful. They made possible the reestablishment of the national and provincial assemblies, the election of the national Senate by the provincial assemblies, the appointment of civilian governments at the federal and provincial levels, and—on December 30, 1985—the termination of martial law.

Early in 1986 political parties were once again allowed to function legally. During subsequent months Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo played an increasingly prominent political and policy role in Pakistan. Although President Zia continued to hold ultimate authority, he appeared gradually to allow Junejo increasing latitude in both domestic and foreign affairs.

The United States, it should be noted, publicly (and apparently privately as well) encouraged and endorsed each of these steps in Zia's democratization process. The expanded security relationship established in 1982 made democratization a political asset. Congressional and public criticism of human rights violations and prolonged military rule were deflected by pointing to the use of American "leverage" in bringing about orderly improvement in the situation.

Then, on May 29, 1988, Zia abruptly dismissed the Junejo government, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, and announced that national and provincial elections would be held later in the year. Several factors appear to have been important in spurring these abrupt actions.

Zia's own explanation stressed the failure of the Junejo government to combat the problems of corruption and law and order and to press forward rapidly enough with the processes of Islamization. There were grounds for both charges, given the growth in patronage under the civilian government and its failure to pass a constitutional amendment making Islamic (Shariah) law supreme, but critics questioned these explanations. Corruption, they noted, had not started with the civilian government. Lawlessness, while a growing problem, did not justify such radical political action.

As for Islamisation, what can one say about it? Short of reconverting the entire population to Islam there is not much that the Junejo government could have done about it. True, he did not succumb to the pressures of the fundamentalist fringe which was trying to push the Shariat Bill and the 9th Amendment but for that he deserves the thanks of the vast majority of the Pakistani people.<sup>15</sup>

The real reasons for Junejo's dismissal, these commentators argue, was an increasing split between the prime minister and the president on policy and personnel matters. Junejo reportedly took a softer line on negotiations at Geneva and was less sympathetic to support for the more fundamentalist Mujahideen factions.<sup>16</sup> Junejo "took his position as Minister of Defence too seriously" by questioning military promotions, threatening Zia associates involved in the earlier Ojhri munitions camp disaster, and planning cuts in the military budget.<sup>17</sup> Reactions to the Junejo dismissal were mixed. Opposition politicians were critical of Zia's reassertion of his military-based power against the civilian order but welcomed the prospect of contesting elections. Meanwhile, Zia delayed for nearly two months his announcement of November 16 as the date for the elections and went back on his initial indication by announcing that political parties would not be permitted to contest the polls. He also attempted to dislodge Junejo from leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), apparently in order to have a loyal "government party" as a viable contender in the elections. The consequence of this was, at least temporarily, a two-way split in the PML, with one wing led by Junejo and the other by the Punjab chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif.

Zia's death suddenly increased the amount of uncertainty surrounding the November elections but at the same time removed one potential

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<sup>15</sup>Ayaz Amir, "Islamabad Diary: Haven't We Been Here Before?" *Dawn*, June 12, 1988, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup>See Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics," *Asian Survey* 29:2 (February 1988):199-200.

<sup>17</sup>Laurent Zecchini, "The People Stay Cool While President Zia Makes Up His Mind," *Guardian*, July 3, 1988, p. 13.

impediment to their being held fairly and freely. Zia had earlier announced that the November elections would be held on a nonpartisan basis, like those in 1985. Just before the fatal air crash, Benazir Bhutto had filed a court petition challenging the ban on parties. The courts ultimately accepted parties, and President Ishaq went along with the decision. The national election ultimately became a battle between Benazir Bhutto's PPP, which split with its erstwhile MRD allies, and a PML-led nine-party alliance called the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance, or IJI).

The PPP emerged with a plurality of 93 seats in the 237-member national assembly, formed a parliamentary alliance with the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), and succeeded in having Benazir Bhutto named prime minister. The IJI, which secured 55 seats in the national assembly, won a plurality in Punjab and put together a coalition government in the provincial assembly under Nawaz Sharif as chief minister. Chief ministers in the three smaller provinces were Syed Qaim Ali Shah (PPP) in Sind, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (PPP) in North-West Frontier Province, and Zafarullah Khan Jamali (IJI) in Baluchistan.

One factor that helped to ensure successful elections in 1988 was that all of the party leaders appeared to perceive their common interest in preserving both the electoral and constitutional authority generally. Any major law and order breakdown would have been an obvious invitation to the military to intervene. Benazir Bhutto was particularly careful not to allow demonstrations to become unruly or pressure upon the government to reach provocative proportions. She also made every effort to assure the military and the United States that she did not intend to be a threat to their respective interests. Her subsequent support of Ishaq for election to a full term as president and her reappointment of Sahibzada Yaqub Khan as Pakistan's foreign minister were also seen as positive moves toward continuity and reconciliation.

In many respects, the prospects for representative constitutional government following the 1988 elections are greater than they have been at any earlier point in Pakistan's history—if the military, the politicians, and other key political players continue to exercise responsible restraint.

That such a prospect is even thinkable is in large part the result of the political reconstruction that has taken place in Pakistan since 1985. If Zia had died suddenly sometime before that, say in 1982, it is hard to imagine any other consequences than another general as successor and further continuation of martial law. The restoration of constitutional and political institutions and the development of some levels of confidence and trust have at least made a more positive political future possible. At the same time, Zia's own removal from the scene eliminated one of the most problematic questions surrounding the elections. Ironically, these may have been Zia's most important legacies to Pakistan's future political order.

## **Islamization: The Search for an Islamic System**

Several American commentaries following Zia's death either stressed his Islamic fundamentalism or speculated on what the fate of his Islamization policies might be in his absence.<sup>18</sup> Islamic reform had clearly been a significant part of General Zia's political agenda throughout his eleven years in power. Just as clearly, Islamization has attracted considerable interest among American scholars, journalists, and others.

In the United States, public perceptions of Islam, especially "resurgent" Islam, tend to be colored both by recent events in other Muslim countries and by deeper historical and cultural factors. It is difficult for many Americans to react to Pakistan's Islamization programs without being affected by their memories of events in Iran, Lebanon, Libya, and elsewhere in the Islamic world during the past decade. More deeply, there is often influence as well of the "crusader mentality" by which Europeans and other Westerners have defined Muslims as adversaries for centuries.<sup>19</sup> One manifestation of this underlying antipathy to Islam has been the occasional practice, in the United States and elsewhere, to couch discussion of Pakistan's nuclear program in terms of the potent phrase, "Islamic Bomb."<sup>20</sup>

Whatever the impact of these attitudes on congressional debate and other discourse in the United States, official reaction to processes of Islamization in Pakistan has generally been neutral and muted. Mindful of the adverse consequences that any criticism of Islam might engender, the United States has treated the subject with caution and respect.

Islam has been a key factor in Pakistan's politics since independence. As Mumtaz Ahmed notes,

From its early beginnings, Pakistan's rulers have used Islam to legitimize their authority. . . . Thus, the early chaotic parliamentary regimes, Ayub Khan's development-oriented dictatorship and Yahya Khan's wayward dictatorship, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's populist corporatism, and General Zia-ul-Haq's conservative authoritarianism all relied on the same social forces, and shared more or less the same ideological bases of legitimacy. They all

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<sup>18</sup>Henry Kamm, for instance, states that, under Zia, "Alcohol was virtually banished, flogging became a routine punishment, and such severe Islamic penalties as amputation for thievery and stoning for adultery were instituted." Kamm, "Unclear Succession." While flogging has been used, particularly during the strictest martial law periods, the amputation and stoning punishments have not actually been meted out.

<sup>19</sup>See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979).

<sup>20</sup>Major General D. K. Palit and P. K. S. Namboodiri, *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979). A public television program entitled "The Islamic Bomb" was prepared by the British Broadcasting Corporation and broadcast in the United States in November 1980.

invoked Islamic ideology in order to legitimize their authority; to sanctify their policy goals; and to control their opponents.<sup>21</sup>

However, the emphasis on Islam in Pakistan's politics has not remained constant throughout this period. After reaching a low point in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it rapidly rose again to prominence in the 1977 elections and their turbulent aftermath. In response, Bhutto instituted several Islamic reforms, including the banning of alcohol and changing the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday. Islamization subsequently became a cornerstone of the new martial law regime which supplanted Bhutto on July 5, 1977.<sup>22</sup>

Attempts under Zia to create a more Islamic polity, economy, and society in Pakistan have been manifested in several different ways, as Ahmad notes.

In economics, Islamic revivalism has expressed itself in such measures as the compulsory collection of *Zakat* and *'usbr* taxes, introduction of [an] interest-free banking and investment system, legal restrictions on the appropriation of private property, and denationalization of certain business and industrial enterprises. In the legal sphere, revivalism has meant the reintroduction of Islamic penal laws, and the Islamic law of evidence. Further ordinances have provided for the establishment of a Federal Shari'a Court as well as local Qazi Courts to hear criminal and civil cases under Islamic law. . . .

Cultural expressions of Islamic revivalism have included the banning of dance clubs; the imposition of strict sexual morality; the observance of Islamic moral standards in the production and screening of TV programs; the revision of school and college textbooks to express an Islamic bias; increasing allocations for Arabic and Islamic instruction; the establishment of an international Islamic University in Islamabad; . . . obligatory prayer breaks during working hours in government and private offices; emphasis on the Urdu language and national dress in government offices, and a kind of moral aversion, at least theoretically, against Western culture. International Islamic cultural exchanges have increased, and Islamic religious festivals and holidays are celebrated more enthusiastically.<sup>23</sup>

How effective these various reforms have been has been an issue of considerable scholarly interest. Studies have generally concluded that whatever Islamic social transformations were intended by Zia have been

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<sup>21</sup>Mumtaz Ahmad, "Ideology, Power and Protest: Toward Explaining Islamic Revivalism in Pakistan" (photocopied typescript, n.d.), p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>William Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 19:6 (June 1979):547-557.

<sup>23</sup>Mumtaz Ahmad, "Ideology, Power and Protest," pp. 1-2.

modest at best. "Nine years after the promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances" of 1979, Charles Kennedy has observed, "one conclusion emerges: the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances has had only a marginal impact on Pakistan's criminal law system."<sup>24</sup> Similarly restrained assessments have been made by Richard Kurin with respect to the impact on village life and by Ann Mayer and Grace Clark regarding Zakat and Ushr.<sup>25</sup> Islamization has had both symbolic and substantive impact, but the former has been more evident.

Following his dismissal of the Junejo government in May, President Zia issued on June 15 an ordinance that extended the powers of the Shariah courts to strike down existing laws found to be in conflict with Islam. Viewed sympathetically, the ordinance was merely a substitute for the Shariah bill that had languished in parliament. Less charitably, it was seen as another attempt by Zia to exploit Islam to maintain his political position. Even many supporters of Islamization criticized the move as superficial and deceptive.<sup>26</sup>

The future of Islamization in Pakistan is certainly a reasonable question to raise in the wake of President Zia's death.<sup>27</sup> If the civilian political order remains in control, it seems reasonable to assume that pressures for further Islamization will be greatly reduced in Zia's absence. The new assembly, with its PPP government, is going to be even less amenable to further Islamic reform than was the previous one, in which the PML constituted the majority and the Jama-at-i-Islami a significant minority. There is even some likelihood that the June ordinance, which constitutionally requires legislative confirmation, will be allowed simply to lapse.

However, there appears at present little to justify an expectation that a new government would seek the rapid elimination of those reforms that have become established over the past decade. Even the PPP has avoided

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<sup>24</sup>Charles H. Kennedy, "Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances," *Asian Survey* 28:3 (March 1988):315.

<sup>25</sup>Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamization and Taxation in Pakistan"; Grace Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr as a Welfare System"; and Richard Kurin, "Islamization: A View from the Countryside"; all in Anita Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 59–77, 79–95, 115–128, respectively.

<sup>26</sup>Hussain Haqqani, "Legal Entanglements: Zia Raises Hackles with New Efforts to Expand Islamic Law," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 30, 1988, pp. 30–31.

<sup>27</sup>I have addressed this question several times since 1977. See "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 19:6 (June 1979):547–557; "Pakistan" in Mohammad Ayooob, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (London: Croom Helm, 1981) pp. 141–162; "Prospects for Political Freedom in Pakistan," in Raymond D. Gastil, ed., *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1981* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 111–125; and "The Political Meaning of Islamization in Pakistan: Prognosis, Implications, and Questions," in Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, pp. 129–140.

attacking Islamization, except to criticize Zia for exploiting it to remain in power. Such an attack might alienate various political groups, stimulate public protests by ulema, and indirectly serve as an invitation for military intervention. If constitutional government survives the coming months, the focus of Islamic debate is more likely to shift to the search for compatibility between Islam and representative democratic institutions.

What are the implications of this scenario for U.S.-Pakistan relations? On a governmental level, the direct impact would seem to be minimal, given the previously noted reluctance of U.S. public officials to comment on Islamization throughout the Zia era. Among the general American public, a reduced emphasis on Islamic reform is likely to remove, or at least reduce, one source of misunderstanding and misperception of Pakistan by Americans.

Perhaps the most important impact of Zia's death on an Islam-related policy area will be with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistani support of the Mujahideen. Zia's support of the most fundamentalist element among the Mujahideen, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami, and his more hard-line stance on negotiations had put him at odds with both the civilian politicians and the United States. A more moderate position on the part of his successors is likely to have positive implications for maintenance of some strategic consensus with the United States during the coming months.

### **Integration: The Search for a United Pakistan**

The image of an ethnically divided Pakistan, potentially threatened with further disintegration if political conditions should deteriorate, is fairly widespread in the United States, at least among those who are aware of Pakistan at all. To some extent, this perception reflects the content of the news which Americans receive concerning Pakistan. I am unaware of any systematic study of American or international news coverage of Pakistan, but it would seem safe to predict that ethnic and political conflict would constitute a major component. If the analysis extended back to 1971, the Bangladesh War would no doubt constitute the longest sustained news coverage of Pakistan in the American press. These popular impressions of Pakistan have been reinforced by scholarly research<sup>28</sup> and by the notion that Pakistan is an "artificial" country destined sooner or later to split apart into its "natural" ethnic components.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup>See Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).

<sup>29</sup>This argument was most evident at the time of the Bangladesh War, when observers in the United States and elsewhere interpreted a united Pakistan as having been a lost cause from the beginning.

Pakistan has undeniably had a wide range of problems with ethnic integration. The most salient, from the early 1950s until the civil war, was that between the two wings of the country, although Pushtun nationalism in the North-West Frontier Province was also a problem.

Since 1971, the more prominent problems of integrating regional ethnic groups have been in the two southern provinces, Baluchistan and Sind. The unpublicized civil war in Baluchistan in the early 1970s and the 1983 antigovernment protests in Sind were only the outcroppings of deeper underlying strata of discontent in both provinces.

It is common to refer to these outbreaks of regional separatism as reactions to Punjabi domination of Pakistan. Certainly, Punjab contains roughly two-thirds of the country's population, and Punjabis have held more than their share of positions within the government and the military. However, the situation is much more complex than this simple formulation would suggest. In Sind, for instance, the ethnic pattern is complicated by the presence of large numbers of Mujajirs (postpartition immigrants from India)—now including Biharis (later immigrants from Bangladesh)—who have at times clashed with and at other times cooperated with the indigenous Sindhi-speaking population. Moreover, the migration to Karachi of large numbers of Pushtuns has created further tensions, which occasionally erupt into violence. Some of the most violent encounters in recent years have been between Pushtuns and Muhajirs/Biharis.

The "Punjabi dominance" theme also ignores significant ethnic differences within Punjab province. Peripheral areas of the province, in the south and east, have occasionally expressed their discontent over the "domination" of the Punjabi core, the districts around Lahore. There have arisen at least two abortive movements to redraw provincial boundaries, one to reestablish the formerly separate status of Bahawalpur, the other to create a Siraiki-speaking province out of Punjab's southern divisions.<sup>30</sup>

Much of Pakistan's ethnic conflict is sectarian rather than linguistic or territorial in nature. The successive actions taken by Bhutto and Zia to isolate, and in effect excommunicate, the Qadianis (Ahmedias) has created a bitterly alienated minority and has engendered violent outbreaks between Qadianis and the majority community. Similarly, there has been recurrent conflict between the larger minority Shia community and the majority Sunnis. Only days before Zia's own death two top Shia leaders were assassinated, and Shias in parts of Pakistan reportedly celebrated the news of Zia's demise.

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<sup>30</sup>William L. Richter, "Regionalism in Central Pakistan: The Bahawalpur Suba and Siraiki Movements," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D. C., March 23, 1980.

What are the prospects for ethnic integration in Pakistan? Is the country destined to suffer periodic clashes or even further territorial disintegration? How will Zia's death affect these processes? What are the implications for U.S.-Pakistani relations?

A key element in national integration, too frequently unrecognized as such, is the capability of a country's political institutions to translate regional, ethnic, and other grievances into public policy alternatives and to resolve those choices in ways accepted as legitimate and authoritative by the general public. This is precisely the capability that Pakistan has had greatest difficulty in developing. It may be plausibly argued that if Pakistan had established an effective, constitutional, representative government in the early 1950s, the 1971 civil war might never have occurred.

The future of Pakistan's "national question" is therefore intimately related to the future of Pakistani representative democracy. In the short run, an election campaign will provide regional groups, in Sind and elsewhere, opportunities to articulate their demands and to mobilize public support. In the long run, only recognizably fair elections will provide the necessary authoritative verdict on those demands and the channels for effective action. Another military coup might have the immediate effect of suppressing ethnic and other discontent, but also would probably have the longer-term liability of destroying once again the potential mechanisms for resolution and integration.

To the extent that Zia's death reduces the pressures toward further Islamization, and to the extent that such pressures have in the past been responsible for both sectarian and regional concerns, this ethnic conflict factor may be reduced.

As in the case of Islamization, the United States hesitates to comment publicly on such a sensitive subject as internal ethnic conflicts in Pakistan. However, it seems safe to assume that U.S.-Pakistani relations will be more harmonious to the extent that such conflicts are minimized.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

On the mental maps of most Americans, Pakistan is likely to be a peripheral and indistinct element, if on the map at all. For these people, perceptions of Pakistan are likely to be negative and reflective of news coverage that has emphasized dictatorship, disasters, human rights abuses, and the war in Afghanistan. Even more knowledgeable individuals, including members of Congress and other policy makers, are likely to perceive Pakistan more in relation to its neighbors than to its internal politics.

Nonetheless, Pakistan's internal politics and policies are important factors in the bilateral relations of the two countries and are likely to become more so as the Afghan conflict becomes less salient. This essay has

reviewed aspects of the subject. Aspects that have not been covered—such as Pakistan's position as a major source of illicit drugs—could very easily rise to greater prominence.

Both the American public and the American government have expressed firm support for Pakistan's continued progress toward a more representative, democratic, and effective political system. The 1988 Pakistani elections were a crucial step in that direction.

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## 7. Mutual Perceptions of Pakistan and U.S. Policies as They Affect Bilateral Relations

KAMAL MATINUDDIN

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Some strategic thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic have begun to express the view that South Asia is likely to become peripheral to U.S. strategic interests and that U.S.-Pakistan relations will become strained after Soviet troops have withdrawn totally from Afghanistan and now that the Iran-Iraq war has ended. In a recent seminar in Islamabad organized jointly by the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS), London, and the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, most of the participants voiced a similar opinion, forcing the director of the IISS to conclude that it is generally accepted that U.S. military assistance to Pakistan will be scaled down as the Soviet troops cross the Amu Darya. It was felt that the focus of attention will now shift to nuclear issues and the so-called human rights problem.

This chapter examines the possibilities of a shift in U.S. and Pakistan policies in view of the altering geostrategic environment and a change in the administration in both countries. In doing so, it highlights the strategic importance of South and Southwest Asia while identifying U.S. long-term interests in this region. It brings out the points of convergence and divergence in the foreign policies of the two countries. Can the United States and Pakistan be termed long-term strategic partners? Are their security concerns of a temporary or a permanent nature? What are the chances of a realignment of security relationships among the superpowers and their allies in South Asia? What effect the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Sino-Soviet détente, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the cease fire in the Gulf, and Gorbachev's recent seven-point proposal for peace in the Asia-Pacific region will have on the future policies of the United States and Pakistan are some additional questions that will be addressed.

The basic thrust of this paper will be that (1) the relationship between

Pakistan and the United States will endure beyond the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, (2) the irritants and points of contention will not substantially diminish the attitudes that have developed over the decades, that both need each other to serve their own and their common interests, and (3) the emphasis may shift but the commitment to Pakistan's security will remain.<sup>1</sup>

My position is based on the theory that the United States will maintain its global aims of containing the Soviet Union; that its policy of ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz will not be altered; that India's ambitions of dominating the Indian Ocean from Indonesia to the East African coast will clash with the U.S. presence in the area; that Washington will need friends and allies in South Asia to check Soviet ambitions and to exercise some restraint over Indian designs in this strategic sector of the globe.

### **Factors that Determine Bilateral Relations**

It is true that bilateral relations should not be taken for granted. "There are no permanent friends or permanent enemies," as an oft-quoted phrase in international relations runs. What, then, are the interests that define and sometime alter the relationship between states? These are: (1) strategic interests, (2) economic considerations, (3) political support, (4) ideological differences, (5) attitude and approaches to regional conflicts, and (6) domestic pressures, including nuclear proliferation and other such issues, which either party considers vital to its goals and objectives. Any change in these elements could change the relationship between states.

### *Strategic Interests*

U.S. foreign policies—and, for that matter, Soviet foreign policies—are formulated on the assumption that they have a right to protect, preserve, and promote their strategic interests in other countries by covert or overt means, even if the use of military force becomes necessary.<sup>2</sup> Nations that are striving for or have already achieved a dominant position by virtue of their military and economic strength consider it their right to intervene in the internal affairs of their neighboring countries and in the case of global powers in distant lands as well.

This is the fundamental truth that dictates the foreign policies of those

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<sup>1</sup>*The Nation* (Lahore), September 21, 1988. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan delivered on September 20, 1988.

<sup>2</sup>Hafeez Malik, ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 2.

who have the military and economic clout to influence events in other parts of the globe. The nations of the world can be grouped into superpowers, who enjoy a special status and whose actions often go unchallenged; middle powers, who desire to extend their hegemony over weaker neighbors; and smaller states, who find it difficult to maintain their political independence or their ideological moorings. The interests of superpowers quite often seem the only thing that matters in this interdependent world.

It will not be far wrong to say that no part of the globe is excluded from American strategic interests. Emphasis on various areas of strategic significance do alter, however, depending on whether there is a Democratic or a Republican President in the White House. It will be fair to assume that what was of vital interest to Reagan might not have received that much attention from Dukakis if he had become President. According to George McGhee, "Strategic interests, like beauty, lie in the eye of the beholder."<sup>3</sup> But it will be a sad day for a superpower if it changes its policies on the whims and fancies of a single individual, however important that person might be.

*The Strategic Significance of Pakistan.* The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is not likely to diminish the geostrategic significance of Pakistan. Along with Afghanistan and Iran, it will remain a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Arabian Sea. It will continue to provide a shield against the possibility of another Soviet adventure. Pakistan also controls the entry and exit into the Gulf, the lifeline of the Western industrialized countries. It is adjacent to two nuclear powers—the USSR and China—and to a country that has already demonstrated its nuclear potential—India. It is linked to China by the world-famous Karakorum Highway and almost joins the Soviet Union at the Wakhan Corridor. It provides a strong flank for the Muslim world and can serve as a bridge between the United States and Iran. It is capable of blocking the hegemonistic designs of its eastern neighbor. The Indian Ocean, which will soon become a bone of contention between the United States and India, laps its shores. It is surrounded by the trouble spots of the world, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Indian Punjab, and Sri Lanka. It is both a South Asian and Southwest Asian power and serves as a link between the two regions. For all these reasons, Pakistan enjoys a highly strategic position in South and Southwest Asia.

The strategic importance of Pakistan in U.S. eyes can only be truly assessed if it is clear where the United States wishes to draw the line beyond which it would not permit the Soviet presence. Is it the Amu Darya, the Khyber Pass, or along the Arabian coast? If the Soviets are to be kept out of reach of the strategic waterway of the Gulf, they should be prevented

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

from advancing southward beyond the Oxus. It should be obvious, therefore, that Pakistan will continue to play a significant role in U.S. strategic interests in this region. If the United States wants to contain communism in the subcontinent without getting directly involved, it presently has no other option but to strengthen Pakistan militarily. Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States would therefore remain as long as the Soviets continue to follow policies in this region that are deemed harmful to U.S. interests.

Pakistan's strategic significance has been expressed by various U.S. leaders at different times in the following remarks: "Pakistan is occupying one of the strategic areas of the world"; "Pakistan is vital to meeting the basic strategic objectives of the region"; "Pakistan is an essential anchor in the Southwest region";<sup>4</sup> "the United States regards as vital to its national interests the preservation of the integrity of Pakistan."<sup>5</sup> These statements more than adequately bring out the strategic significance of Pakistan.

### *Economic Considerations*

Pakistan has a reasonable share of natural resources but a limited infrastructure to exploit its economic potential to the fullest extent. Since Independence it has felt the need for economic and technical assistance from friendly countries to support its development activities. With the help of financial assistance from its own nationals working abroad and from foreign loans, it has raised its standard of living, which today is the highest in South Asia.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan needs, however, a faster pace of industrialization and a greater measure of self-sufficiency.

Its seventh Five-Year Plan needs a massive input of foreign aid and foreign investment. If that is not forthcoming from its traditional partners, the country will be forced to turn to others to satisfy its urgent requirements for power generation, heavy industries, modernization of its agriculture, and indigenous defense capability. With a relatively stable investment climate, Pakistan can be a haven for U.S. investors regardless of the changing strategic environment.

### *Political Support*

Bilateral relations between states are often sustained because of a common approach to political issues in respective areas of interests.

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<sup>4</sup>Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain, eds., *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley, Calif: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985), p. 2.

<sup>5</sup>See Karachi Agreement of 1959, signed between the governments of the United States and Pakistan.

<sup>6</sup>*Asia Week* (Hong Kong), September 23, 1988, p. 6.

Pakistan and the United States have always opposed communism and other expansionist philosophies. Both countries have worked together to denounce use of force to solve political disputes. Their views on the Afghanistan conflict and the Kampuchean issue are the same.

Pakistan has not been overly critical of the U.S. presence in Diego Garcia as it could be a check on the increasing strength of unfriendly navies. All this cannot be said for the other major power in South Asia, whose political attitude is not only opposed but even harmful to the United States. It is hard to understand, therefore, why “friends” and “foes” should be treated alike.

This does not mean that Islamabad and Washington see eye to eye on every political problem in the world. There are differences, and some of these are very sharp indeed, as in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the question of apartheid, but these have existed before and will continue without seriously altering policies toward each other.

### *Ideological Differences*

Pakistan’s Islamization program and its desire to follow the tenets of its religion have been misunderstood by most Americans. Some of the pronouncements made by responsible people in Pakistan have given the impression that Pakistan is slipping back to the medieval period, which could become an obstacle toward a healthier relationship between the two countries. A closer examination of the steps that Pakistan has taken to mold its daily life in accordance with Islamic values will reveal that the changes that have occurred will not affect the country’s external relations. Even inside Pakistan no hands have been chopped off, no one has been stoned to death. Women are free to choose their vocation. Pakistan today has the first Muslim woman Prime Minister.

Regardless of what Rajiv Gandhi says about Pakistan’s so-called fundamentalist attitude or fears in the Christian world because of the actions of Khomeini, Pakistan’s ideology is purely for home consumption. There is no question of its being exported to other countries, and it should never be linked to radical ideologies of other nations. U.S. policymakers and intellectuals should not be misled on this account. The manufacture of the so-called Islamic Bomb and its presumed transfer to Libya for use against Israel is all a figment of the imagination of biased minds.

### **Recent Developments that Could Affect Future U.S.-Pakistan Policies**

#### *Post-Geneva Developments*

Of the recent developments that could affect U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relations, the Geneva Accords appear to be the most important. May 15 will

become a milestone in the history of human conflict. It is on this day that a superpower began to pull back its troops, frustrated by the determined resistance of a brave and fiercely independent nation. Although the Soviets appear not to have achieved their objectives, it would be incorrect to assume that they have given up Afghanistan—or, for the matter, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)—altogether. I believe that this is a tactical withdrawal. Their age-old objective of maintaining a strong hold over Afghanistan remains. Some influential writers are of the view that "as long as Pakistan remains allied with the West and China [on the Afghanistan issue] Moscow will make a sustained effort to destabilize Islamabad."<sup>7</sup> This is not a very happy situation for Pakistan.

The Geneva Accords have been rejected by the Afghan Mujahideen, who have declared their intention to continue their struggle till the PDPA is eliminated.<sup>8</sup> Since the two superpowers have agreed on a "negative symmetry," that is both the USSR and the United States have the right to supply arms to their "allies" if the other does so, peace is not likely to return to Afghanistan in the near future.

The Soviets have so far fulfilled their part of the Geneva Accords by withdrawing half of their forces—i.e., 55,000—from Afghanistan by August 15, 1988. Although they have momentarily halted their withdrawal, it is hoped that all Soviet troops will recross the Amu Darya by February 15, 1989, as planned. (The recent deployment of 30 MiG-27s in Shindand near Kandahar and the placing of Scud [SSI] missiles with a 250-km range around Kabul are signs of a possible change in the Soviet commitment.)

Most Western diplomats and some senior journalists with whom the author has had the opportunity to discuss the postwithdrawal scenario hold the view that Washington will lose interest in the Mujahideen and perhaps even in Pakistan once Afghanistan has been totally evacuated by the Soviet army. It is true that the free world's attention is focused on Afghanistan mainly because of the presence of Soviet troops in that country. American public opinion and especially Congress may tend to down play the significance of the continued struggle of the freedom fighters against a communist regime after the main "show" is over. If this happens, the Afghan resistance movement could die down, leaving the field open for the Soviets to reenter. The U.S. decision to challenge the forward march of the Soviets toward the Strait of Hormuz can only be achieved if a

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<sup>7</sup>The Ojhri Camp disorder, the Bahawalpur air crash, the frequent air and ground violations across Pakistan's western border, and the increase in subversive activities bear witness to this fact.

<sup>8</sup>Repeated statements made by Afghan leaders at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, including the president of the interim government of the Mujahideen, Engineer Ahmad Shah, in the presence of the author.

truly nonaligned, neutral Afghanistan emerges after nine years of Soviet occupation. The Mujahideen, both the so-called fundamentalists and the moderates, are determined to eliminate the PDPA. To achieve this, they will need the continued support of Pakistan, the United States, and other friendly nations even after the departure of the Soviet soldiers. There should, therefore, be no change in the Afghan policy in Washington or Islamabad until a political solution acceptable to all factions in Afghanistan is found.

A communist government in Afghanistan, even without the presence of Soviet troops, will encourage and further the Sovietization of Afghanistan. Already the Soviets have created enough of an infrastructure in that country that they are looking forward to keeping Afghanistan in their sphere of influence even after the guns have fallen silent in the Hindu Kush.

This process of Sovietization has been underway ever since the Soviets entered Afghanistan. In those areas where the Kabul regime had control, drastic changes in the military, political, economic, educational, and sociocultural fields were introduced to transform Afghanistan into a Soviet satellite. At the political level, the government and the party have been merged, with the party supreme. On the economic front the Afghan economy has become almost entirely linked with the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan. The entire gas production of northern Afghanistan is piped to the neighboring republic of the Soviet Union. All consumer goods are imported from the USSR; Moscow has signed 230 agreements with Kabul for various economic projects, many of them with non-PDPA elements, to enable the Soviets to retain contact with the Afghans even if Najibullah and his team falls. Afghanistan now depends for over 90 percent of its foreign assistance on its northern neighbor. Ideological education, both at the schools and universities, has been introduced. According to some sources, more than 50,000 Afghans have gone to the USSR for training in the last eight years.<sup>9</sup>

If the United States, Pakistan, and other freedom-loving countries lose interest in Afghanistan after Gorbachev withdraws his soldiers across the Oxus, it will be difficult for the Mujahideen to overthrow the present communist regime or even form a broad-based government in Afghanistan in which the noncommunists could have the upper hand. If that comes to pass, Afghanistan will remain under the control of the Soviet Union and another domino on the periphery of the communist "empire" will have fallen. It is therefore imperative for the new U.S. administration to continue its political and military support of the Mujahideen.

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<sup>9</sup>For a fuller account of the Sovietization of Afghanistan, see article by Naseem Rizvi in *Strategic Studies* 11, 4 (Summer 1988):31-45.

Pakistan, which has been providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees, is bearing the economic, political, and social burden of the 3.2 million foreigners on its soil. Because of their presence, Pakistan has been subjected to threats, warnings, and border violations by the Soviets and their puppet regime in Kabul. Between May 15 and August 31, 1988, there were 77 air violations, 210 ground violations, and 61 instances of subversion and sabotage. One hundred precious lives have been lost; in addition, wanton destruction of property has occurred.<sup>10</sup>

Pakistan will find it difficult to implement the Geneva Accords in letter and spirit and still permit its territory to be used for supporting the Mujahideen by the United States. Recent border violations are pressures being applied to force the new government in Pakistan to change its present Afghan policy and strictly adhere to the terms of the Geneva agreement. Those in the State Department and the Pentagon may like to keep this in mind while formulating future policies toward Pakistan. It is gratifying to note that Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski are both of the opinion that the American-Pakistan collaboration should continue even if the Soviet forces are eventually withdrawn from Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>

### *Demise of President Zia*

The second major event that could have a profound effect on U.S. and Pakistan policies is the sad and sudden demise of President Zia-ul-Haq, who was a very close friend of the United States. During his eleven years as President he established very close ties with Washington and, despite his dislike of Western-style democracy in Pakistan, he obtained a heavy share of economic and military assistance. This was because of his uncompromising attitude toward the Soviets and his principled stand on the Afghanistan issue. In his address to the nation on May 30, 1988, Zia observed: "Relations with the United States, China and the Islamic countries are central to our foreign policy."<sup>12</sup> It was the first time that he had placed the United States ahead of China.

Unfortunately, Zia is no longer on the scene. The country is divided between those who support his policies and those who are not in favor of the status quo. The future policies of Pakistan, which could affect bilateral relations between Islamabad and Washington, will depend on the type and character of the new government in power. Though no radical shift should

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<sup>10</sup>*Pakistan Times*, September 9, 1988.

<sup>11</sup>Afzal Mahmood, former Pakistani ambassador to Burma, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Prospects and Problems," *Globe* (Karachi), June-July 1988, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7.

be expected, the possibility of a softening of attitude toward Moscow could be on the cards if those opposed to Zia's policies on Afghanistan either come into power or form a strong opposition group in the next national assembly.

Regardless of who sits on the government benches, however, the close ties with the United States built up over the years are likely to continue. Most of the political parties in Pakistan as well as the armed forces realize the importance of the United States in fulfilling Pakistan's security and economic needs. Undue emphasis by the U.S. Congress, however, on certain issues on which there is a unanimity of views in all sections of society in Pakistan may force the future government in power to also look elsewhere for material assistance. Continued threats to destabilize Pakistan could lead to finding some sort of accommodation with the super-power just across Pakistan's northwestern border. Even the late President expressed the necessity of improving trade relations with the USSR and directed his minister of planning to visit Moscow for this purpose.<sup>13</sup>

#### *The India Factor in U.S.-Pakistan Relations*

There can be no two opinions on the fact that the United States would like to, and should, maintain cordial and friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. It is also true that an Indo-Pakistan military balance is vital to the United States. But what we are witnessing today is the acceptance by the major powers of India's dominant position in the subcontinent.<sup>14</sup> We are also seeing a yawning gap between the military potential of these two countries, especially in the field of indigenous defense production capabilities.

The introduction of nuclear power submarines in the Indian navy has also brought about a major qualitative change in the security environment of the Indian Ocean littorals.

The three nuclear submarines acquired by India not only pose a threat to the security of Pakistan but also belie the statements of Indian leaders who have sworn to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. It is also a step toward nuclearization of the region and communicates the Soviet Union's continued interests in this region. India has developed a three-fleet navy, each self-sufficient with a balanced mix of surface ships, aircraft carriers, frigates, destroyers, logistical ships, submarines, missile boats, and naval air crew able to operate independently that will ensure India political,

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<sup>13</sup>President Zia's after-dinner speech at the Soviet ambassador's dinner at Islamabad; the author was present on the occasion.

<sup>14</sup>Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan-U.S. Security Relations," *United States-Pakistan Relations*, p. 4.

military, and diplomatic overlordship from Indonesia to the east coast of Africa.<sup>15</sup> Summit Ganguly, an Indian writer, also says that "India sees itself not only the pre-eminent regional power but also a potential global power."<sup>16</sup>

India's military power is totally disproportionate to its defense needs. President Zia-ul-Haq was apprehensive of the growing military strength of India and remarked on one occasion that Pakistan could not remain unconcerned about nearby developments, particularly on its frontier.<sup>17</sup> He is reported also to have said: "We will not allow India to bully us."<sup>18</sup> This last statement reflects the view of the entire Pakistani nation regardless of their political views.

Henry Kissinger also notes, "It cannot be in America's interest to have an Asian power or group of powers so strong that it can dominate the rest. The U.S. weight should be on the weaker side, especially with respect to matters that can, over time, affect global balance."<sup>19</sup> It appears, however, that the United States wants India now to play a bigger role in the region. The Indian lobbyists, the most important of whom is Rajiv Gandhi himself, are strongly advocating a readjustment in U.S. policies in South Asia with the tilt being now toward India. This is regardless of the fact that Rajiv Gandhi threatened the United States with dire consequences not long ago for helping in the modernization of Pakistan's armed forces.

It should not be forgotten that the other smaller countries of South Asia, who are too weak to stand up to New Delhi, look up to Pakistan to keep India in check.

They are not happy with any scenario assigning India the role of the regional policeman. The military dimension in the India-Pakistan adversary relationship is of critical importance. Although another war between the two is not likely, Pakistan's friends must ensure that India does not gain a military predominance that would force Pakistan to seek other means to make an adventure by its hostile neighbor extremely costly.

The pressure on Pakistan must be viewed in terms of maintaining a military balance that would ensure peace and stability in the subcontinent. The United States does not have to think in terms of balancing its support

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<sup>15</sup>*Pakistan Horizon* 41 (April 1988):12. For a more detailed analysis of India's naval expansion, see A.J. Tellis in *Naval Forces* 8, 5 (1987):36-49.

<sup>16</sup>Summit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, Westview Special Studies and South-East Asia, p. 152.

<sup>17</sup>*Pakistan Horizon* 41 (April 1988):13.

<sup>18</sup>Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 1.

<sup>19</sup>Henry Kissinger in *Washington Post*, January 1987. Also see *Asia Year Book*, 1988, p. 70.

to the two major nations of South Asia. This uniform policy appeals to many and may be in the U.S. interest, but I fail to understand the logic of putting India and Pakistan at the same level. Pakistan has been in the forefront in supporting U.S. policies in the region. Pakistan has earned the anger of the Soviet Union, the bitterness of Iran, the ire of Afghanistan, the animosity of India, and the hostility of many Third World countries, some of which are Muslim nations, because we were alleged to be pursuing U.S. interests. India, on the other hand, has been in the Soviet camp. It supports Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. It looks after Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean. It has derived the benefits of friendship with both the United States and the USSR. Why, then, should Pakistan be treated on a par with India?

Although the United States does not see India as a Soviet surrogate, it should acknowledge that India is heavily dependent on the USSR for its military hardware and technology and its heavy industries. "The Soviets have provided a substantial amount of weaponry to India during the past decade at decidedly low rates"; this is the assessment of an Indian analyst.<sup>20</sup> India also has a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. It has not condemned Moscow for its troops in Afghanistan and will remain friendly with our northern neighbor to be able to put pressure on Pakistan. No amount of hobnobbing with India will wean it away from Moscow. Technology transfer by Washington would not change India's aim of keeping the American military presence out of the Indian Ocean and its littorals.

### *The Soviet Factor*

The Soviets are most unhappy with Pakistan because of the support it provides to the Mujahideen. They have accused Islamabad of harboring, equipping, and training the "rebels" in Pakistan territory. They threaten Pakistan with dire consequences in the country continues to allow itself to be used as a conduit for U.S., Chinese, and Saudi weapons. The late President Zia was warned not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan when he visited Moscow to attend the funeral of President Chernenko. In 1984, the Pakistan ambassador in Bangkok was threatened by then Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa of the USSR. The latter's exact words were: "Convey this to your government that if you don't change your present Afghan policy we will teach you such a lesson that you will not forget us for the next 150 years."<sup>21</sup> The Ojhri Camp disaster, the Bahawalpur air crash, and the bomb blasts in various cities could well be an

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<sup>20</sup>Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, p. 156.

<sup>21</sup>The author was then Pakistan ambassador to Thailand.

implementation of the scheme to destabilize Pakistan by the combined efforts of Moscow, Kabul, and Delhi. The present and former foreign ministers of Pakistan have both been threatened directly by top Soviet officials during recent visits to Moscow. Aslam Khattak, Senior Minister in the present caretaker Government in Pakistan, received a written warning from the chargé d'affaires of the Soviet embassy in Islamabad.<sup>22</sup> Geographical constraints do not permit such a confrontational attitude toward a superpower so close to Pakistan's border. The new government in Pakistan will probably attempt to lower the temperature somewhat. Presently, however, it is difficult to breathe freely in this tense atmosphere.

### *The Nuclear Issue*

Of all the irritants in the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, the most persistent and the most difficult is the question of the latter's nuclear program. The future of military and economic assistance is often placed in jeopardy whenever this issue is highlighted in a U.S. media considered by many Pakistanis to be unduly influenced by pro-Israeli interests or by the pro-India lobby in the Congress.

Whereas Pakistan insists that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes, influential people in the United States are convinced that Pakistan is going ahead toward the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. According to Leonard Spector, an "authority" on nuclear proliferation, both India and Pakistan possess adequate nuclear material to manufacture atomic bombs at will. The former is much farther ahead in the nuclear field than the latter.<sup>23</sup>

Whatever the facts may be, Indo-Pakistan security concerns are such that no amount of argument with or pressure on the present or future government in Pakistan could force them to accept a nuclear monopoly by India. Pakistan could be compelled to look for a nuclear deterrent if India does not agree to discuss several proposals put up by Pakistan, including, among other suggestions, the simultaneous signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by both India and Pakistan. If India continues with its massive nuclear weapons program, which includes not only the manufacture of nuclear weapons but also its delivery means, acquisition of nuclear weapon platforms, and an indigenous nuclear industry outside international control, the Pakistan nation would tighten its belt to secure future generations from living under the threat of a nuclear India.

The only solution to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the

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<sup>22</sup>*Dawn*.

<sup>23</sup>*Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, Report of the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security, 1988, pp. 11, 16.

subcontinent is to follow a regional approach. Happily, former President Reagan and many others in the United States have realized the necessity of promoting such a policy in South Asia.<sup>24</sup>

### **U.S.-Pakistan Policies: Future Prospects**

The future of Pakistan-U.S. bilateral relations depends largely on what policies the United States will adopt in the coming years, especially after the U.S. elections in November 1988. Although the present administration has assured Pakistan of continued American support,<sup>25</sup> much will depend on which issues are emphasized in the future.

#### *U.S. Domestic Policies*

A number of domestic issues such as stabilizing the economy, drug control, social welfare, protection of the environment, education, civil rights, AIDS, and medical care will emerge in the United States that may demand a change in existing policies. Although the majority of these problems do not have a direct bearing on the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, a few may yet affect its future policy toward that country—for example, the U.S. policy on the stability of its economy. Today it is the largest debtor country in the world.<sup>26</sup> This alone may force the United States to reconsider its aid policies toward Pakistan and other countries. There are concerns in Islamabad that the United States may even reduce the special aid package agreed to during the Reagan tenure.

Emphasis may shift to drug control. This should not worry Pakistan unduly for, though it is true that a percentage of drugs do pass through Pakistan, it is in the interest of Pakistan itself to reduce the drug traffic as much as possible. This antisocial activity occurs not because of a lack of governmental control but because of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the areas where these drugs originate. The tribal areas of Pakistan's frontier province are largely unsettled, with a minimum of government authority over the tribes that inhabit these areas and whose main source of income is illegal trade because of a lack of any other occupation. Cultivation of the poppy is the easiest solution because the

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<sup>24</sup>U. S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel's statement on the regional approach. Also see Pakistan Permanent Ambassador Shah Nawaz's speech to the United Nations on the Third Special Session on Disarmament (SSODIII), *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), June 14, 1988.

<sup>25</sup>When presenting his credentials to the Pakistani president, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley underscored his country's continued strong support to Pakistan. *Daily Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 2, 1988.

<sup>26</sup>Cassandra Balchin, "Future U.S. Defense and Foreign Policy," *Daily Muslim* (Islamabad), November 3, 1988.

province is arid and cannot easily sustain any other form of cash crops unless special efforts are made and money is invested.

With help and support from the United States and other friendly countries, however, alternate sources of income can be made available, such as small cooperative farms, cottage industries, construction of dams to provide water for irrigation, and cultivation of crops other than the poppy. With U.S. cooperation, such steps would check the growth of drugs. The tribal people are very religious and would follow the tenets of their religion if they do not affect their livelihood. Because Islam forbids the use of alcohol or any other intoxicant, they can therefore be persuaded to comply with the Islamic injunction, provided alternate sources of income are available.

Tighter control can also be expected after the Afghan issue is settled completely because a large quantity of poppy is cultivated on the other side of the border, which will be controlled once an Islamic government is established within Afghanistan. With 2 million addicts in Pakistan<sup>27</sup> the issue of drugs is as much a domestic concern for us as it is for the United States, and the present and future government in Pakistan would certainly cooperate in controlling the drug traffic through Pakistan.

The question of civil rights in other countries sometimes attracts a great deal of attention from the American public. Stories of political prisoners, women being beaten up by the police, harsh punishments, and draconian laws are played up. Some domestic policies in Pakistan have unfortunately left this impression in the United States. An objective assessment of conditions in Pakistan would reveal, however, that such anxieties are unjustified. Pakistanis today enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and equality among all its people that many countries with which the United States has good relations cannot boast of.

### *Regional Policies on States other than South Asia*

U.S. policies toward some states outside South Asia—for example, in South America, the Middle East, and Africa—are also likely to have their impact on Pakistan-U.S. relations.

Although U.S. policies in South America do not really affect our bilateral relations, they do highlight a divergence of views on world affairs. Pakistan believes in respect for the sanctity and sovereignty of a country's independence and does not approve of the use of force, overt or covert, to solve political disputes. The present U.S. policy of supporting antigovernment forces in certain areas is not viewed with favor in Pakistan.

The greatest gap between the policies of Islamabad and Washington,

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<sup>27</sup>Tariq Ali, *Bandung File Programme*, Channel 4, British TV, August 21, 1988.

and the one that causes the most concern, is the latter's whole-hearted support for Israel. The Arab-Israel conflict puts Pakistan and the United States on opposite sides. Pakistan recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and supports their demand for an independent state. The United States, on the other hand, chooses to ignore and even brand the PLO as a terrorist organization, a position that is viewed with concern in Pakistan. The ongoing atrocities being committed by Israeli soldiers against Palestinian women and children in the occupied West Bank and Gaza are condemned by each and every person in Pakistan. They cannot understand why the United States does not put pressure on Israel to stop such barbaric actions. If the Muslim nations choose to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by the PLO whenever it comes about, Pakistan will be forced to do so as well.<sup>28</sup> This will further strain Pakistan's relations with the United States.

The U.S. support of the racist regime in South Africa is also in direct opposition to Pakistan's support of SWAPO and other black majority organizations fighting for human rights. The recent success of the American-sponsored talks involving Angola, Cuba, and South Africa and the guerrilla organizations of SWAPO and UNITA on the Namibian independence is encouraging. This support would certainly help to inspire pro-U.S. feelings not only in Pakistan but also elsewhere around the world.

### *U.S. Policies on South Asia*

U.S. policy toward South Asia has generally revolved around: (1) maintenance of peace and stability in South Asia to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating and securing the landbridge between Eurasia and Africa; (2) keeping the Soviets out of the whole of South Asia, especially Pakistan and India; (3) securing the stability of oil flow from the Gulf; (4) obtaining facilities for CENTCOM; and (5) economic interaction. South Asia, with a population of 1 billion, provides the United States with a large market for its goods and a large potential for transfer and sale of sophisticated technology. By and large, Pakistan would go along with these policies, except that the threat from India to Pakistan is not fully appreciated by the United States. This will remain a point of discussion between Washington and Islamabad.

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<sup>28</sup>The PLO has now declared the creation of the state of Palestine and has implicitly accepted the existence of Israel by accepting U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. Pakistan is among the 34 countries that have recognized the Palestinian state. The United States, while acknowledging that this is a step toward the ultimate solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, has not looked at this unilateral action by the PLO with any satisfaction.

*Policies on Global Issues*

There are reports that U.S. global policies in the 1990s will be determined more by its economic than its military strength. According to these reports, the United States is now unwilling to sustain its role of global responsibility and favors a policy to trim arms spending and limit American involvement in foreign countries, maintain a low military profile, and concentrate more on issues at home.

U.S. policy on the strategic defense initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") issue would have little effect on our bilateral relations. Even if the new administration decides to reduce funds for research on SDI, it will use the amount saved to advance its defense in other areas. U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan will not be affected by a change in policy on the SDI.

Over the past four decades, the United States has followed a policy of global responsibility leading it to commitments far beyond its shores, afflicting on itself what has been termed as "imperial overstretch," that is, foreign commitments and military responsibilities that go beyond its economic capacity to sustain them. The United States may take Gorbachev's recent proposals seriously and examine the impact on its global commitments if it decides to reduce its military presence in South and Southeast Asia. This could help in reducing tension between the two superpowers. Military assistance to friends and allies in this region may then be affected, but economic assistance to keep political leverage will still be in the U.S. interest.

American leaders must try to understand the peculiar circumstances in which most of the countries are placed, without which the United States will fail to appreciate their fears and aspirations. Congress must also realize that while its friends are greatly benefited by U.S. support, they would not be happy with any U.S. interference in their internal issues.

There is every reason to believe that American policies toward Pakistan will not substantially alter, although the U.S. policy of a "special relationship" may change as the focus of attention shifts from Afghanistan to other trouble spots on the globe and as other issues between Islamabad and Washington take center stage.

The peaceful, smooth, and constitutional transition to a civilian government after the Bahawalpur air crash and the free and fair elections held in November along constitutional lines point toward a new era in Pakistan's political institution building. Also, the army's assurance to confine itself to its constitutional role should now convince those in the U.S. Congress who are opposed to a military ruler in Pakistan that we believe as much in democratic traditions as others in our region.

*Points of Convergence and Divergence in U.S.-Pakistan Policies*

To sum up the policies of the U.S. and Pakistan that affect bilateral relations, it will be useful to list the points of convergence and divergence in present policies. The areas where the two countries show convergence in their policies are:

1. *Afghanistan.* Both countries have a common objective as far as the situation in Afghanistan is concerned. Both seek withdrawal of the Soviet forces; the return of Afghan refugees with dignity and honor; allowing the Afghans to determine their own political future; and the restoration of the country's traditional status as a neutral, nonaligned state.

2. *South Asia.* Pakistan is currently on a "peace offensive" as it seeks to improve relations with India through a "No War Pact" and normalization of trade, communications, cultural, and other relations. As friends of both Pakistan and India, the previous U.S. administration tried to strike a balanced American relationship—termed an "integrated approach"—with India and Pakistan in order to decrease the opportunity for Soviet adventurism in South Asia. Both Pakistan and the United States are agreed on the improvement of relations between the two South Asian neighbors, which will contribute toward a regional framework of peace and security in South Asia.

When it comes to the question of military aid, however, especially sophisticated equipment/technology transfer, it has been difficult for the Americans to ensure a mutually satisfactory balance between India and Pakistan.

3. *Indian Ocean.* The United States and Pakistan would not like the Indian Ocean to come under the control of the Soviet Union or India. The U.S. presence in this vital region not only ensures freedom of navigation but gives them the facility needed for CENTCOM. The Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept, now supported by Gorbachev in his latest peace proposals for Southeast Asia, needs careful examination by both the United States and Pakistan.

4. *The Persian Gulf.* Both want the ceasefire to hold in the Gulf and would like to see a lasting settlement between Iran and Iraq achieved through the efforts of the United Nations. The U.S.-Iran hostility, however, acts as a brake on the improvement of ties between Islamabad and Tehran.

5. *Drugs.* The war against illicit narcotic drugs is a major issue of common interest for both the countries, and both are now cooperating effectively in dealing with poppy production and clandestine heroin labs. Both are agreed that war be waged not only against the small growers, processors, couriers, and dealers, but also against the unscrupulous financiers and managers of this corrupt trade. I therefore feel that this is a point of convergence and not divergence, as is often argued.

6. *Southeast Asia.* Both countries have a common interest in improving and expanding relations with China and would like an early withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

7. *Economic Assistance.* Both have a common interest in, and agreement on, raising the level of economic and social development and seeking an end to terrorist activities that have achieved alarming proportions in Pakistan particularly and in South Asia generally. In this regard, both support the efforts of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and believe it to be an important vehicle for improvement of the region.

Areas in which a divergence of views occur are:

1. *The Nuclear Issue.* Pakistan's persistent drive to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the U.S. objective of inhibiting nuclear proliferation falls like a shadow over Pakistan-U.S. relations. Pakistan's insistence that its nuclear program is essentially peaceful is regarded with some skepticism in U.S. circles. In recent times, however, there has been considerable U.S. support for Pakistan's proposals on declaring South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone and on seeking a regional goal of nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia.

2. *India.* Pakistan's concerns about the threat from across both its western and eastern borders force it to seek military assistance from its friends. This complicates American relations with New Delhi.

3. *Middle East.* U.S. perceptions in the Middle East, its support for Israel, and a disconcerting attitude toward the Palestinians is another area of divergence. The U.S. insistence that it will not deal with the PLO because it is a terrorist organization does not coincide with the Pakistan view, which regards the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.

4. *South Africa.* Support for apartheid in South Africa is another area where the two countries do not see eye to eye.

5. *"Human Rights" and "Democracy."* The Jewish and Indian lobbies in the United States play this issue up out of all proportion. Military rule in Pakistan (now no longer in effect) did become a source of embarrassment at times, especially when democratic norms were violated or not adhered to at all. With the general elections due in November and the chances of having a parliamentary system of government, matters should greatly improve.

## Conclusion

Bilateral relations between nations depend on the nature of policies they follow toward each other and toward their respective allies and adversaries. The greater the commonality of interests, the more supportive will be their policies. National policies, however, do not remain

constant as is often assumed. They shift in response to changes in the external environment and internal pressures.

U.S.-Pakistan relations have had their ups and downs because of unforeseen developments that have taken place at home and abroad from time to time and particularly in the region of South and Southwest Asia. Pakistan has greatly benefitted from its friendship with the United States during the period the two countries have come close to each other. Pakistan was able to modernize its armed forces and overcome some of its financial difficulties. But, as the Americans say, there is no such thing as a free lunch and nations like people rarely give something for nothing. Stephen Cohen quotes Senators Cranston and Pell, who, according to him, complain that Pakistan is "blackmailing" the United States, receiving what it wants and not giving what the United States wants from it.<sup>29</sup> I would like to remind him and others who hold similar views that although Pakistan may not have returned the "debt" in full, Islamabad has had to pay a price for its alliance with Washington. Membership in a military pact kept it out of the more popular Non-Aligned Movement. Peshawar became a target for a Soviet IRBM because of the U-2 incident. Since Pakistan was working against Moscow's interests, the Soviets encouraged Afghanistan to raise the question of Pakhtunistan off and on. Pakistan's role in establishing friendly relations between the United States and China in 1971 annoyed the Soviet Union, which signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India the same year that ultimately caused the breakup of Pakistan (mistakes made by Pakistani leaders notwithstanding). The U.S.-Iran hostility made it difficult for Pakistan to regain its traditional close ties with the new leaders in Tehran.

There is no doubt that mutually supportive policies in Afghanistan have forced the Soviets to commence the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan and have momentarily removed the threat to Pakistan's western border from a superpower. They have also helped in securing the second U.S. aid package (with certain reservations) of \$4.02 billion. On the other hand, Pakistan's neighboring superpower will not easily forget and forgive the role Pakistan has played in supporting an anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. Pakistan itself today is divided into those who support and those who oppose the government's present Afghan policy. The law and order situation in major cities has considerably deteriorated because of the proliferation of weapons, commonly known as the Kalashnikov culture. Some factions in Pakistan are, therefore, critical of the government's present policies, which they feel are only to support U.S. interests. The

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<sup>29</sup>Stephen Cohen, "U.S.-Pakistan Security Relations," *United States-Pakistan Relations*, p. 29.

majority, however, and that includes several political parties, support the need for a continuation of close, friendly ties with the United States.

Pakistan's geostrategic position, its Western orientation, and its need for military and economic assistance will, I am sure, compel the new administrations in the two countries to follow policies that will maintain and even enlarge on the existing close and friendly ties. Howard Shaffer, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, told the author and the panel of Research Fellows of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, recently, "The primary goal of U.S. policy in South Asia is stability,"<sup>30</sup> and we agree with him. Let us jointly work toward that mission.


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<sup>30</sup>Telepress interview by Lt. Gen. Kamal Matinuddin, the then Director General, ISSI, with Dr. Howard Shaffer, "U.S. Policy on South Asia," September 21, 1988.



## **Part Four**

### **Pakistan-India Relations and South Asia**



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## 8. Pakistan and South Asia: The India Relationships

LEO E. ROSE and RICHARD SISSON

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The objectives we set initially in the preparation of this chapter were twofold: first, to discuss Pakistani perceptions, as we understand them, of their country's geopolitical and strategic interests in the broader Asian context in the late 1980s; and (2) to analyze the policy options available to Pakistan as an integral member of the South Asian regional system—that is, more specifically its relations with the government of India. In our conclusion, we intended to consider the convergences and divergences in Pakistani and Indian views on these subjects as reflected in the policy positions adopted by Islamabad and New Delhi on critical South Asian issues.

We still propose to follow this broad outline but, inevitably, the tragic event of August 17, 1988, has made it necessary for us to focus on the post-Zia-ul-Haq period.<sup>1</sup> In India and the United States—as well as other countries whose interests are deeply involved—there was a good deal of confusion and uncertainty about the future course of both domestic and international politics in Pakistan. And most outsiders are not used to this kind of situation in the Pakistan of the 1980s, at least on foreign policy issues. By 1980, after some experimentation with the alternatives available to his government, President Zia had defined the basic principles and objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy in precise, pragmatic terms. Subsequently, he adhered to these with a quiet but firm persistence through the greater part of a decade under a wide variety of circumstances in regional and Asian politics and, occasionally, under intense pressures from both external and internal forces.

Though President Zia was staunch in his adherence to the principles underlying his foreign policy, he demonstrated a considerable degree of

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<sup>1</sup>For details on the Pakistani official report on the air crash, see *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Near East & South Asia* (FBIS-NES), October 17, 1988, pp. 55–56, and *ibid.*, October 18, 1988, pp. 58–59; also *Pakistan Times* (Overseas Weekly), October, 1988.

openness and flexibility in devising strategies and tactics to achieve his objectives. Whether some of these were the appropriate policies that best served Pakistan's interests will be long debated in Pakistan and elsewhere. But we would suggest that Zia's consistency-cum-openness on foreign policy matters will be viewed, in retrospect, with appreciation by both friendly and somewhat less than friendly governments to whom the relationship with Pakistan is important. In India, there had been a tendency to describe some of Zia's seemingly attractive proposals on controversial issues in Indo-Pakistani relations (e.g., the No-War Pact and the mutual inspection of nuclear facilities proposals) as clever propagandistic stunts that were not intended to be taken seriously.<sup>2</sup> But it is interesting to note New Delhi never really tested Zia's sincerity in making these offers—albeit for good Indian reasons, as acceptance would have required major modifications in New Delhi's regional security and foreign policy. Despite the assumption in India that Zia was indulging in some very clever game playing, it was nevertheless reassuring to New Delhi that on the critical issues in Indo-Pakistani relations they were dealing with a government in Islamabad that had a well-defined policy but that was also open-minded about alternatives in the bargaining process.

Presumably there is in New Delhi as in Washington, Moscow, Kabul, and Tehran, concern over whether post-Zia Pakistan will continue to demonstrate this combination of firmness on principles and flexibility on strategies no matter what kind of political system may eventually evolve. There is also, of course, considerable diversity in the views expressed across the political spectrum in Pakistan and uncertainty about which of these many voices will predominate in the 1990s. In our view, however, there are good reasons to conclude that for some time to come the foreign policy as defined by Zia in the 1980s will continue without major changes other than several that Zia had already set in motion, and with the basic factors that were critical to the formulation of this policy continuing to dominate the decision-making process.

We are not suggesting, of course, that Pakistan's foreign policy over the next five years will be a carbon copy of the 1980–88 policies in all key respects. This is not plausible because the late 1980s are yet another period

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<sup>2</sup>Ashok Kapur presents an excellent analysis of Indian perspectives on India's preeminent role in the region in his "The Indian Subcontinent: The Contemporary Structure of Power and the Development of Power Relations," *Asian Survey* 28, 7 (July 1988): 693–710. Perhaps the most comprehensive study of India's regional policy is Raju G. C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). For a Pakistani view on this subject, see Noor A. Hussain, "India's Regional Policy: Strategic and Security Dimensions," in Stephen Philip Cohen, ed., *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp. 24–49.

in Pakistan's history when some key aspects of the international environment that, in effect, set the boundaries for the country's regional and broader international policies are changing rapidly and in critical respects. A reevaluation of Pakistan's regional and extraregional policies, thus, is essential, and indeed was already underway by mid-1988. What should be noted, however, is that the limitations imposed upon the Zia government in the formulation of foreign policy by both internal and external considerations cannot be ignored by the successor Benazir Bhutto regime. Regardless of the political coalitions and leaders that emerge as the dominant power in Pakistan in the 1990s, we would suggest that their foreign and regional policies will not diverge in their essentials from those Zia would have adopted if he were still in office.

### **The Indo-Pakistani Relationship**

Most of the public attention directed at the negative aspects of the relationship between India and Pakistan in the 1980s has focused on a broad range of specific issues: Kashmir and the Siachen Glacier "confrontation"; support of "separatist" and/or "terrorist" elements in the other country; nuclear proliferation issues; Afghanistan; economic relations; and the efforts to construct a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), to list several of the more contentious subjects on which Islamabad and New Delhi have some different perceptions of their respective interests. We would suggest, however, that underlying the disagreements on these specific issues are the more broad-based differences between the two governments on basic regional and transregional security issues. These were quite clearly indicated in the respective positions assumed by Islamabad and New Delhi on such matters—by the former in the No War Pact offer first made by President Zia in 1981 and by the latter in its counteroffer of a "treaty of peace and friendship" and, even more specifically, in the letters that accompanied the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 29, 1987. Let us look at these briefly.

President Zia's No War Pact offer borrowed a term that Prime Minister Nehru had employed frequently in the 1950s, but without some of the basic policy implications that New Delhi attached to the concept.<sup>3</sup> Zia was prepared to extend the commitment against the use of force in Kashmir

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<sup>3</sup>Walter K. Andersen, "Indo-Pakistani Relations: The Security Dimension," in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han, eds., *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1989), pp. 345–368. For a comprehensive analysis of the "No War Pact vs. Treaty" issue, see Douglas C. Makeig, "War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process," *Pacific Affairs* 60, 2 (Summer 1987): 271–72.

that had been incorporated in the 1972 Simla Agreement to the full range of Indo-Pakistani relations. But he was not prepared to concede the Indian insistence on (1) bilateralism in the negotiation of Indo-Pakistani disputes, nor (2) to commit Pakistan to avoid all foreign—that is, extraregional power—entanglements in what could be defined, no matter how ambiguously worded, as security arrangements.

The seven-point “treaty of peace and friendship” that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proposed in response to Zia’s offer included not only a renunciation of the use of force against each other but several other basic principles as well.<sup>4</sup> Bilateralism, as defined by New Delhi to mean that disputes would not be referred to any international forum except on the basis of a mutual agreement, was integral to the Indian proposal. Another clause in the proposed Indian treaty text defined—in rather ambiguous terms—the concept of a common regional policy as an objective. But in the Pakistani interpretation, this implied acceptance of the Indian perception of a South Asian system by the other states in the region. A third principle, stated more explicitly, would obligate Pakistan to avoid anything that could be defined as a security relationship with an external power, referring principally to a U.S.-Pakistan alignment but possibly also to Pakistan’s relations with China and, perhaps in the future, with the Soviet Union and the Islamic states to the west. Pakistan, of course, was not prepared to accept a treaty on these terms with India because they ran counter to the basic strategic principles of its foreign policy and were seen as constituting an unacceptable infringement on its sovereign rights and powers.

Most Pakistanis seem to interpret New Delhi’s treaty proposal as an integral part of a long-term campaign to have India’s “hegemonic” status in South Asia accepted by the other South Asian states. The quiet but determined resistance to India’s alleged hegemonic aspirations by the other regional states has been viewed as reinforcing Pakistan’s rejection of a treaty that included this principle. The signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in July 1987, in which one of the letters of accompaniment included a mutual pledge “not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity and security,”<sup>5</sup> was thus seen as very unfortunate, for Islamabad interpreted it

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<sup>4</sup>Leo E. Rose, “India and Pakistan: Relations with East Asia, the United States, and the USSR,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Chen Qimao, eds., *Pacific-Asian Issues: American and Chinese Views* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), pp. 228–230.

<sup>5</sup>The text of the July 29, 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and the “Exchange of Letters” that accompanied the argument were published by the Government of Sri Lanka and distributed by the Sri Lankan embassy in Washington, D.C.

as a concession to the Indian insistence that the other South Asia states avoid any type of security relationship with an outside power. The Sri Lankan government's insistence that it had retained its full independence on such matters and the strongly critical position on the Accord taken by the two major candidates in the presidential elections held in Sri Lanka in December 1988 provided some reassurance to Pakistan. But India's military intervention in the Maldives in October 1988 to prevent a coup against the government of the republic and the silence with which the other South Asian states have responded to these developments in Sri Lanka and the Maldives has been noted with concern in Pakistan.

Although Pakistan regrets its somewhat enhanced isolation on the vital "Indian role in South Asia" issue, this is not likely to induce *any* successor government to the Zia regime to reconsider seriously its own position on this question. And it is possible that developments outside the region such as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the termination of the Iran-Iraq War may lessen the pressure upon Pakistan to seek a broad-based settlement with India. But it is also possible that the probable improvements in Pakistan's geostrategic situation, if combined with a peaceful and effective installation of a democratic government and political system, would induce New Delhi to adopt a more open-ended position on an agreement with Islamabad, perhaps even to the point of accepting the No War Pact proposal without major modifications. This could have important advantages for both countries and, under the unusual global international circumstances now prevailing, might well be encouraged by the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, all of whom now see no potential benefits for themselves in regional conflicts in the subcontinent.

We will now indulge in brief analyses of several of the more specific issues in Indo-Pakistani relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The background to these disputes is well known and does not require elaboration; we will therefore focus on their threat potential and the role they play in domestic and regional politics in both countries.

### *The Kashmir Dispute*

"Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus," and for the governing circles in both New Delhi and Islamabad, Santa has often used the pseudonym "Kashmir dispute." On appropriate—and at times inappropriate—occasions in international forums, Pakistan will note, usually in a pro forma manner, that the Kashmir dispute has yet to be resolved according to the terms of the 1951 U.N. Security Council resolution—that is, by a popular referendum. India then will respond, in an equally pro forma style, that raising this issue is a violation of the 1972 Simla Agreement. The matter ends there, as neither government pushes the issue any further and no one

else in the international community has the slightest interest in wasting time once again on futile efforts to resolve this dispute. Both governments still earn some, though probably a declining number, of brownie points with their political public in this way. But neither find it as powerful and useful a political issue in domestic politics as they did in the 1960s and early 1970s. It is inaccurate, we would argue, to define these occasions as threatening or, indeed, even a serious complication to the realities of Indo-Pakistani relations.

That the Kashmir dispute has been, in effect, relegated to the sidelines in real terms if not rhetorically by both countries is suggested by the fact that the primary point of "confrontation" between the two military forces in Kashmir is an area that was virtually never mentioned prior to the mid-1980s—the Siachen Glacier. In three Indo-Pakistani wars in which Kashmir was a primary area of contention, neither India nor Pakistan ever bothered to move forces into this "highly strategic" area, as it is now called. Nor was the 1951 ceasefire line or the 1972 Line of Control, which divided the old Kashmir State into India- and Pakistan-controlled areas, ever extended up to the Siachen Glacier except in very imprecise geographical terms that took a point on the demarcated ceasefire line to the south of the glacier and merely specified that the line should run north. If applied precisely on this basis, the ceasefire line would have run through the glacier in ways that made no geophysical sense. Pakistan ran the line somewhat to the northeast of the starting point and India to the northwest, thus incorporating the glacier on their side of the line. But until the mid-1980s this was not a point of contention between the two states, much less an area of confrontation, since neither side maintained more than a few border guards in this region that runs at 18,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level.

Although it is probable that both governments will continue to publicize the periodic small-scale confrontations between the military contingents that have the unfortunate fate of being assigned to this extremely difficult area, it seems safe to conclude that the glacier could serve as the *excuse* given by either power for initiating hostilities on a broader scale, but it would not be the real cause.<sup>6</sup> And, indeed, as long as India and Pakistan maintain reasonably stable internal political systems, another war

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<sup>6</sup>In the most thorough study to date on the Siachen Glacier dispute, Robert Wirsing takes a gloomier position on the possibility of the controversy over the glacier serving as the *primary* cause of another Indo-Pakistani conflict. See his "The Siachen Glacier Dispute—I: The Territorial Dimension," *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad) 10, 1 (Autumn 1986): 49–66; his "The Siachen Glacier Dispute—II: The Domestic Political Dimension," *Strategic Studies* 11, 3 (Spring 1988): 83–97; and his "The Siachen Glacier Dispute—III: The Strategic Dimension," *Strategic Studies* 12, 1 (Autumn 1988): 38–54.

over Kashmir seems extremely remote. Rajiv Gandhi has at times (usually just before an election in north India) expressed concern over Pakistan "redoing 1965," but that line has disappeared once the domestic political factor that inspired it was over.<sup>7</sup> The recent spate of troubles faced by the Kashmir government headed by Farooq Abdullah and supported by the Congress party has revived once again allegations of Pakistani intervention in support of anti-Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir, but it is also recognized that the principal causes for the crisis are the failures of the state and central governments' development programs and the presence of massive corruption.

In Pakistan, President Zia usually exercised more restraint than his predecessors in using Kashmir for domestic political reasons. But a cursory survey of Pakistani papers in the period between the dismissal of Prime Minister Junejo and Zia's death showed an unusually large number of articles on Indian "misrule" in Kashmir Valley. Once again, it is the domestic public that is the target of such statements, and on no occasion has the Kashmir dispute as such reemerged as a serious issue in relations between the two states. Though at times in the past the Soviet Union has urged India and China has encouraged Pakistan to take confrontationist positions in their Kashmir relationships, this has not been the case in the late 1980s, and this modification in Moscow's and Beijing's policies also serves as a deterrent of some significance in the formulation of policy by both the Indian and Pakistan governments.

### *Support of Transborder "Separatists"*

If one only noted the governmental statements and press reports on what are seemingly internal sociopolitical, regional, and ethnic disputes in India and, somewhat less extensively, in Pakistan, the conclusion would be drawn that these are all primarily the work of "foreign hands." This applies to the Punjab crisis in India, which, according to the typical Indian line, may not have been started by Islamabad but has been sustained by Pakistani support. A more balanced perception of this subject may finally have emerged by late 1988 in some sections of the Indian press, which now merely notes that Sikhs can take refuge in Pakistan and acquire arms on the very open black market there but does not necessarily classify this as a Pakistan government policy.<sup>8</sup> In Pakistan, somewhat similarly, some forms of Indian complicity in domestic upheavals, in particular in Sind and its two main urban areas, Karachi and Hyderabad, have often been alleged or

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<sup>7</sup>See "Jammu and Kashmir: A Summer of Torment," *India Today*, October 15, 1988, pp. 18–21.

<sup>8</sup>See, for instance, the long article by Ramindar Singh in *India Today*, August 31, 1988, pp. 70–72.

at least suggested, but on no very substantive evidence that has yet been made public.

After working our way through the substantial verbiage on these and other reports on transborder support of separatists and terrorists in both countries, we have concluded that the main complaint of both the Indian and Pakistan governments has been over the failure of their counterpart to exercise effective control and supervision over nationals of certain ethnic origin from the other country in its territory. This almost certainly has been correct, but then it may be too much to ask and expect. It would, for instance, obligate the Pakistan government to introduce measures that could seriously affect the democratization process now underway, which New Delhi supports, verbally at least. Some forms of control over the activities of foreign nationals are, of course, consistent with a democratic system and the reasonably open cultural and tourist exchange program that India has long pressed on Pakistan with some success. But there are grounds for doubt that such measures would be viewed as sufficient by the neighboring state, and some basically antidemocratic measures that would also discourage exchange between the two countries would be required to control the transborder movement of dissidents and terrorists. Under the circumstances, therefore, perhaps the most that the Indian and Pakistan governments can be expected to do on the "terrorist" issue is to carefully exercise restraint on their part, stringently apply their laws on the activities of foreign nationals in their territory, abide by the rather ambiguous terms of the resolution on terrorism adopted by SAARC in 1987, and concentrate on political resolutions of the domestic conflicts in their own societies that have led to terrorism.

Let us conclude our discussion of this subject with one illustration of the way in which Indo-Pakistani disagreements can intrude into domestic politics in rather ludicrous ways. In mid-summer 1988, when one of the authors was in New Delhi, he was astounded and disturbed by the strong suspicions expressed by a number of well-informed and usually quite moderate and sensible Indian commentators that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would utilize the "Pak-support-of-Sikh-terrorists" and the "Siachen Glacier" issues to launch a preemptive military strike at Pakistan. As the argument ran, Rajiv would use a victory in the war to extract public enthusiasm for his government and party in the ensuing election, which was due by December 1989 but could be called earlier. This seems highly unlikely, however, in part because (1) a "victory" over Pakistan would not be as easy and comparatively cheap as in 1971 and (2) the Indian public shows little inclination to respond enthusiastically once again to such tactics because it is now very skeptical of almost everything the Indian government says and does. Nor is there any evidence that Rajiv Gandhi considers his position so threatened by opposition forces (which tend to

fall apart on their own initiative) as to require such desperate measures—or that he would indulge in such if he did. And no one even in India with any understanding of the current power balance in South Asia seriously suggests that Pakistan might initiate a military action even for narrowly selfish political purposes because the consequences would almost certainly be disastrous for the government in office, both internally and externally, as well as on the battlefield.

### *Nuclear Proliferation*

There are relatively few controversial global international issues on which Pakistan and India are in basic agreement, but the nuclear issue is one of the notable exceptions. Most Pakistanis, in our observation, would agree with the former Indian Foreign Secretary, M. Rasgotra, when he says:

Nuclear non-proliferation is a myth propagated by nuclear weapon powers to perpetuate their monopoly of nuclear weapons and to retain control of the world market for peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 is the twentieth century's most audacious humbug.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, Pakistanis might reject Rasgotra's statement that "other proposals put forward by Pakistan from time to time—a nuclear free zone in South Asia, mutual inspection of Indian and Pakistani nuclear facilities, simultaneous acceptance of international inspection and safeguards, etc.—are but variations on the NPT theme and India can hardly be expected to entertain them."<sup>10</sup>

What seems apparent to us is that both India and Pakistan have made firm decisions to achieve nuclear weapon capability and neither will be deterred by any plausible pressures that third powers might seek to apply. The real question, therefore, is whether both governments will continue to exercise restraint in the actual production of nuclear weapons. Mutual confidence on the part of both powers on this matter will considerably lessen the volatility of the nuclear issue in their interrelationship as well as in their relationship with major external powers.

It seems reasonably safe to assume, however, that both India and Pakistan will emerge as nuclear powers over the next decade, and the question then becomes one of determining whether these weapons will be a *causus belli* or a deterrent to hostilities.<sup>11</sup> Kenneth Waltz's arguments for

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<sup>9</sup>Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issues: The South Asia Context," *U.S.I. Journal* (New Delhi) 68, 491 (January-March, 1988): 42.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>11</sup>For a thorough survey of both Pakistani and Indian views on "nuclear proliferation," see the Special Issue of *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad) on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia,"

the latter seem reasonable in this case, and Rosgotra's point that there is no reason to assume that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be any more likely than nuclear wars between the existing nuclear powers is well taken.<sup>12</sup> A few hardline Indian analysts have argued that Pakistan would use a nuclear weapon threat to launch a conventional war in Kashmir, but this scenario ignores India's superiority in conventional forces as well as its much more advanced and impressive nuclear capabilities and appears so unlikely that even most Indians have not bought the line. What the major external powers must do is define their own security policies in Asia in terms that make nuclear weapons seem both unnecessary and unattractive to India and Pakistan.

The general trend of Soviet, Chinese, and American policies in South Asia would seem to be doing this by reducing both the scale and the nature of their involvement in the region. Though this will not reverse Indian views on the necessity of developing a nuclear capacity as a counter to China's nuclear arsenal nor Pakistan's determination to avoid a situation in which India is the *only* nuclear power in the subcontinent, the recent proposals to include China in the negotiations on "nuclear disarmament" should have a positive effect on Indian and Pakistani decision making on nuclear issues.

### *Afghanistan*

The Afghan resistance to the Soviet-imposed and supported regime in Kabul was one of the major developments in South Asia in the 1980s on which the Pakistan and Indian governments disagreed, publicly at least. But this did not intrude into their relationship significantly—except indirectly because of India's objections to the renewal of the limited strategic alignment between Pakistan and the United States and the American military sales to Pakistan that were, initially, a response to the mutually perceived Soviet threat from Afghanistan. Ironically, it was in the context of the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan now under way and the emergence of the successor Afghan government issue that Afghanistan has begun to assume a more direct role in Indo-Pakistani relations.

New Delhi has never been happy with its virtual total exclusion from any role in the Afghan conflict, but then that was a consequence of the largely noncritical position the Indian government took, and in essence maintained, to Soviet aggression against a nonaligned neighbor. This was

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10, 4 and 11, 1 (Summer and Autumn 1987 combined issue). An article that focuses on U.S. policy on the nuclear issue in South Asia is S. P. Seth, "The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and the United States," *Asian Survey* 28, 7 (July 1988): 711–728.

<sup>12</sup>Kenneth N. Waltz, "Presidential Address," American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, September 1–4, 1988, Washington, D.C.

recognized in India and reluctantly accepted as unavoidable if the close relationship with the Soviet Union was to be maintained in a period when Moscow was beginning to review all aspects of its Asia policy. But this position was no longer sufficient nor persuasive when Gorbachev, during his visit to New Delhi in November 1986, told the Indians bluntly that (1) the USSR was reconsidering all aspects of its Afghan policy, including its military intervention program, and (2) India should no longer act on the assumption of Soviet military and political support in any confrontations with China and Pakistan.

One of the themes in the quiet and very gradual Indian redefinition of its foreign policy subsequently has been the decision that India must become more involved in Afghanistan developments. But how to do this has been a perplexing problem given the bad repute of India with most Afghans, including even some supporters of the Kabul regime and members of the small but important Hindu/Sikh banker/moneylender community in Afghanistan. The problem assumed enhanced proportions in New Delhi with the April 1988 Geneva Accords that set the terms for the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. This was seen by most Indians as a Pakistani victory that could further complicate India's geostrategic interests in the subcontinent's northwest and Pakistan's acceptance of the "proper" relationship between India and the other South Asian states.

But what, then, should New Delhi do? It is our understanding that the Government of India made a sensible, if unannounced, decision in early 1988 to try to work with Pakistan and other governments in encouraging the formation of a broadly representative government in Kabul that would maintain working relations with all the outside powers but with no distinct tilt toward any one of them. In the efforts at instant implementation of a highly sensitive policy, however, New Delhi took a series of insensitive actions. A "summons" to president Zia to come to India to discuss Afghanistan just at the final stage of the critical negotiations of the Geneva Accords was made in a manner that could only have aroused deep suspicions—possibly incorrectly—in Islamabad. The incredible invitation to Najibullah (who has once again become a good Muslim) to make a state visit to New Delhi in May, followed by the "unannounced" visit of the Afghan foreign minister to Delhi in early September for talks with Rajiv and Narashimha Rao, has also severely complicated New Delhi's efforts to serve the role of a quiet mediator in Afghanistan. There was also Rajiv Gandhi's indiscreet statement about the unacceptability of a "fundamentalist Islamic" government in Kabul,<sup>13</sup> made at a time when India has been trying to expand and improve relations with a number of Islamic states in

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<sup>13</sup>See Karan Thapar, "Afghanistan: Turning on the Heat," *India Today*, August 31, 1988, pp. 64–67.

Southwest and Southeast Asia that could only have viewed the expression of such views very negatively. The general impression in New Delhi that no one knows what is going on there or why basically contradictory policies and statements have become the norm in what was, until recently, a reasonably well-organized and efficient decision-making process, may have been evident again.

Despite all these developments, we would still suggest that there may be more convergences than divergences in Pakistani and Indian interests in the post-Soviet Afghanistan. What Pakistan requires, in our view, is an Afghan political system broadly acceptable to most sections of the very heterogeneous Afghan society that would (1) provide the conditions in Afghanistan that would encourage the refugees to return and (2) come to terms with Pakistan on a border settlement and end the periodic interference in Pakistani domestic politics that has marked relations between the two countries since 1947. The Peshawar-based coalition would certainly have to be an integral part of any Afghan government, but it is most unlikely that the more "extremist" elements in this coalition could, under existing circumstances within the country, form an effective government. A broad-based coalition would be an acceptable compromise resolution of an extremely difficult problem and might well serve both Pakistani and Indian interests if they could cooperate, quietly at least, to do what they can to encourage an effective representative government in Afghanistan.

### SAARC

Neither Pakistan nor India responded with much enthusiasm to the 1979–80 Bangladeshi proposal for the establishment of some sort of South Asian regional system, but agreed to go along with the effort. By 1987, both countries were somewhat more positive in their appraisal of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. In the first place, SAARC had been carefully defined as an organization with no responsibilities for critical regional political and security issues and thus was not seen as a potential complication to their respective views on power interrelationships within South Asia. Also, the SAARC summit meetings had been transformed into very useful settings where the top leaders—e.g., Zia and Rajiv—could discuss critical issues in their countries' relationship informally and in a format that did not elicit objections from critical political forces in their own country.

President Zia appeared to appreciate the opportunities presented by the various SAARC forums to engage in quiet but frank dialogues with his neighbors, in particular India. Pakistan also had benefitted from the gradual expansion of relations with the other SAARC states that was the consequence of the development of a regional system in South Asia. The

question arises, however, as to whether Pakistanis will once again prefer to see their country identified more as a Southwest Asian than a South Asian country now that both the Afghan and Iran-Iraq wars approach resolution. Islamabad's concerns over the broader regional significance of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and the Maldives episode as well as some trends in intraregional economic and political relations might now reinforce this reluctance to be too deeply involved in a South Asian system. But with elections and the formation of a new government, the primacy of Pakistan's relations with India on political, security, and even economic issues will once again be self-evident. The SAARC summit meeting scheduled to be held in Islamabad in late 1988 should not only reinforce Pakistan's identification with the region but also provide the new political leadership in the country with useful opportunities to hold bilateral discussions on a range of issues with Prime Minister Gandhi of India.

### *Economic Relations*

Not many features of Indo-Pakistani relations over the past decade can be viewed in positive terms, but their economic relationship does show some encouraging aspects. Overall, it has been India that has pressed for expanding economic ties and Pakistan that has viewed this prospect with some skepticism. But the course of developments in Southwest Asia and in the broader global economic environment has made South Asia, and in particular India, of somewhat greater importance to the Pakistan economy. In any case, presumably for both economic and political reasons, Indian and Pakistani subcommission meetings are scheduled for the latter months of 1988. Although once again these may involve more discussion than substantive agreement, it is not without significance that both Islamabad and New Delhi considered it useful to revive negotiations on their economic ties in the context of basic political changes in Pakistan that cannot avoid having an impact on Islamabad's India policy.

### **Concluding Observations**

Our analysis suggests that there will be continuity in Pakistan's foreign policy in the post-Zia era. This we believe will apply whether or not a democratic political system is established and survives. Pakistan will continue to maintain a posture that is conducive to maintaining its autonomy in foreign relations. Though hegemonic in terms of its relations with the other regional powers, India is also constrained with respect to the imposition of its will on Pakistan.

Conditions that inflamed national passions in the past have receded during the past two decades. Politics in both India and Pakistan have become increasingly "domesticated." Although the Kashmir issue and the

bogey of the "foreign hand" reappear at critical times, they do so at a much more muted level than in the past. Elections in India are increasingly fought over local and regional issues rather than over foreign and international ones, and the same principle applied in the 1988 national and provincial elections in Pakistan. Domestic unrest within India also has served to focus energy and resources on these internal matters. Though reference to Pakistani support of Sikh terrorists is made periodically, distinctions are also drawn between the policy of the Pakistan government and the availability of weaponry on the free market in a society trying to become more free. Though the immediate international context (e.g., Afghanistan) has been of important consequence in Pakistani politics and in relations among social groups within Pakistani territory, efforts to institutionalize a new type of regime appear to be serving to focus attention on internal concerns rather than international ones. The contrast between 1988 and 1971 is striking in this regard. In 1971, relatively minor incidents—the enclave dispute and the Ganga hijacking—were used for powerful political mileage by Bhutto in his efforts to develop political support by fomenting hatred of India. In 1988, a major and tragic incident—the deaths of President Zia and important associates and advisors—was met with a calm and considered response, by both the government and most of the opposition.

India may enjoy a hegemonic position in South Asia, but Pakistan's international attachments westward and the deterrent provided by a combination of conventional forces and incipient nuclear capability will lessen the probability of armed hostilities between India and Pakistan. The level of nuclear production will be a function of mutual confidence. The issue over the next decade will not be "whether," but "how much."

Finally, though suspicious of each other's intent, Pakistan and India appear to have started to perceive and tacitly acknowledge areas of common interest in the South Asian region. The most important are the desirability of stable regimes on their borders and the desirability of the absence of a physical presence of great powers in the region.

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## 9. Hegemony, Bipolarity, or Multipolarity? Key to a Durable Peace in South Asia

RAFIQUE AHMAD

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The basic theme of this chapter is that ideally speaking the key to a durable peace in South Asia lies in the even distribution of power among South Asian states. This is the essence of multipolarity. However, a multipolar peace strategy appears to be a distant goal. A more realistic approach in the coming decades seems to be to develop and maintain a balance of power between Pakistan and Bharat (the present Republic of India), two equally deep-rooted and powerful poles of South Asian sociocultural forces. Peace and security in the region will remain disturbed if attempts are made to impose hegemony of one state over the other.

The theme will be developed as follows. First, the weakening grip of big powers on global affairs will be examined. Second, following the argument that what is true at the global level is equally true at the regional level, the fallacy of the concept of "Big Brother" in South Asia will be exposed. Third, the main elements of the strategic importance of South Asia in global and regional contexts will be analyzed. Fourth, the central position that relations between Pakistan and Bharat occupy in the South Asian scenario will be examined, with special reference to the role of the superpowers and Bharat's open but unsuccessful bid to assume leadership in the region. Last, elements of a possible strategy of durable peace and security in South Asia, in the forthcoming decades at least if not for all time, will be identified, and the prospects of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Indo-Pakistan power parity as instruments of this strategy will be spelled out.

### II

First, a few words about the weakening grip of superpowers on global affairs, a phenomenon loaded with far-reaching implications for the entire world, including South Asia. During the past seven decades the world has

gradually moved from pre-World War I British hegemony to the post-World War II bipolarity of the United States and the USSR, now giving place to what geopolitical experts call multipolarity, implying a more even distribution of power among a larger number of states.<sup>1</sup> Some of the major events that demonstrate the limits of global bipolar powers are:

1. The withdrawal of superpower forces from Vietnam and Afghanistan.
2. The emergence of China as a power in its own right and the Sino-Soviet split.
3. The oil crisis of the 1970s, which increased the importance of North-South and South-South issues over East-West issues.
4. The abandonment of the dollar-gold link in 1971 and its weakening impact on American economic power.
5. Continued productivity crises in the USSR and the relative diversion of the Soviet mind from external commitments to internal reforms.
6. The growth of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization Islamic Countries.
7. The formation of socioeconomic regional markets and groups, including the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and SAARC.
8. The rise of Japan and the NICs (newly industrialized countries) in East Asia.
9. The end of nuclear or even intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) supremacy for the superpowers.

Although the United States and the USSR still enjoy military dominance in the world, it is unlikely that they will repeat, at least in the near future, the mistake of direct involvement in a large-scale regional operation as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Their strategy in the recent past has been to strengthen their relative position in strategically important areas through sympathetic or needy local regimes or groups.

The aforementioned events, which contain unmistakable signs of the superpowers' declining influence, may have been caused by different factors in the regions involved, but two apparently opposite though actually mutually reinforcing developments seem to have played an important role. One is the feeling of the unity of the human race created by rapidly spreading revolutions in the fields of technology and mass communication, which have cut across hegemonic concepts and tendencies; the other is the consciousness among different countries, specially those of the Third World, of the richness and historical depth of their diverse

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<sup>1</sup>E. Mortimer, "Change in Superpowers' Grip on Global Affairs," *Financial Times* (reproduced in *Dawn* [Karachi], September 20, 1988.)

cultural patterns and value systems that they jealously wish to preserve.

The world is thus moving, at one and the same time, toward technological unity and cultural diversity. Both developments, however, have contributed in their own way toward making countries conscious of the possibilities of political and cultural equalities. Cultural coexistence is thus as much a flavor of the coming decades as political multipolarity, in spite of the big powers' continuing military predominance. Many present-day regional or local conflicts, in fact, can be more meaningfully explained with reference to this, rather than any other, phenomenon.

### III

Perhaps the desire for cultural and sociopolitical coexistence is nowhere so manifest as in South Asia. There is a widespread conceptual fallacy among geopolitical experts that South Asia is a single sociophysical entity and that its division into multiple states, especially in the shape of Bharat and Pakistan, has been the root cause of regional troubles since 1947. On the contrary, it is the nonacceptance of the multinational character of South Asia by some important powers and particularly by Bharat, with its unconcealed policy of playing the role of a minisuperpower, that is responsible for tensions and conflicts in the region. In the pursuit of this hegemonistic policy Bharat has been wittingly or unwittingly assisted by the world news media and at least by one superpower. This circumstance seems to be caused by general misconceptions about the true nature of things in South Asia. We should not be content with superficial appearances but should go deeper to have a correct perception of errors.

For example, there is a widespread conceptual fallacy about the use of the term *India*. Politically speaking, the modern state of India is much smaller than the India of past centuries as described in books of history, archaeology, geography, anthropology, mythology, and travel. A large number of modern writers tends to ignore this important reality and considers the modern Republic of India as synonymous with the historical subcontinent of India. This misperception occasionally leads to imperfect, and at times distorted, conclusions about the nature of events taking place in this part of the world.

Historically, the word *India* stands for all those areas that lie south of the Himalayas and east of the Sulaiman and Hindu Kush ranges. Seen from this angle, India, like Europe, consists of distinct political and linguistic entities but, unlike Europe, it has far greater religious, cultural, and racial diversity. The modern sovereign states of Bharat, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and even Burma are essentially Indian

states, although only Bharat officially uses the word *India*.<sup>2</sup> These states owe their existence to a variety of deep-rooted religious, linguistic, cultural, and political factors. It is probably to overcome this confusion about the vast subcontinent (or, more accurately, continent) of India that the more acceptable phrase *South Asia* has gained wider currency in modern sociopolitical literature. This phrase broadly conveys the same meaning as the word *India* used by writers and historians from ancient times.

The current political posture of Bharat (i.e., the Republic of India) is based upon this fallacy. The policymakers of Bharat do not conceal their intention of playing the role of Big Brother in the subcontinent as the British rulers did before them, forgetting that the age of the imperially imposed artificial political unity—which derived its strength from a vast network of global colonialism that Bharat obviously does not possess—has vanished. To become a superpower in this era, a nation needs a distinct and compact socioideological structure containing elements of universal appeal. India, with its caste-ridden, mythology-based, multiracial, and multilinguistic society hardly possesses such elements. Further, this is an age of national sovereignty, and only mutual respect for such sovereignty can lead to the creation of a system of relationships between countries and peoples in which a life of dignity and well-being becomes the inalienable right of all. The nonacceptance of this reality is the root cause of the unhappy relations between the Republic of India on one hand and other sovereign states of South Asia on the other.

Within South Asia itself, in spite of its multinational character, two distinct forces—Islam and Hinduism—have played a relatively more dominant role in the affairs of the region. Islam and Hinduism are not mere religions in the narrow sense of the term; they represent two distinct social systems.<sup>3</sup> Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's following two observations need the attention of geopolitical experts:

We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of 100 million and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions. In short, we have our own distinctive

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<sup>2</sup>*Constitution of India* (Delhi: Eastern Book Company, 1983), clause 1(1). In this chapter the term *Bharat* (adopted by the Indian Constitution) is used instead of the word *India* to distinguish the Republic of India from the historical *India*.

<sup>3</sup>For a bird's eye view of this reality, the Western reader is referred to an excellent but long-forgotten book by Beverly Nichols, *Verdict on India* (London, 1944).

outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.<sup>4</sup>

The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry, nor dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmen derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes.<sup>5</sup>

South Asian history bears sufficient testimony to this analysis. The great Mughals and the British were regional superpowers in their own day, but South Asia reverted to its multinational character in 1947. This reversion has taken the shape of the emergence of several states, small and big, each one of which ardently wants to preserve and develop its distinct social and political personality.

In the center of this reversion process, however, lie two relatively more important power poles, that is, Pakistan and Bharat. India's claim to play the role of Big Brother is explicit and is based on its (1) ancient Hindu heritage, (2) large size in terms of area and population, (3) relatively more developed technological and industrial structure, and (4) recently built-up military strength. Pakistan's claim to be a power in its own right is implicit and is rooted in its (1) centuries-old Islamic character, which gives it the advantage of strong multidimensional links with the Middle East, (2) commanding geographical position in Southwest Asia and the Arabian Sea overlooking the strategic Gulf area, (3) ancient racial, cultural, and commercial links with the Central Asian Soviet and Chinese republics, (4) higher gross national product (GNP) and per capita growth rates in South Asia, (5) vast potential for agricultural, mineral, and industrial development, and (6) large, technical-minded, highly mobile, dynamic, and hardy workforce.

Almost all major events in South Asia since 1947 have revolved around these two power poles. Generally speaking, Hindus of the region look toward Bharat for inspiration, guidance, and active participation in their affairs; likewise, Muslims of the region expect Pakistan to safeguard their interests. Bharat's recent military intervention in Sri Lanka, thoroughly disliked by the Buddhists who are in the majority, has strengthened the position of the Hindu Tamils. Similarly, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan was considered the natural place of refuge by millions of fleeing Afghan Muslims, in contrast to Bharat, whose friendship ties with

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<sup>4</sup>S. Q. Ahsan, *Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1988), p. 98.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 46.

the USSR are well known. Even Bangladesh, which was forcibly separated from Pakistan in 1971, has reverted, because of its predominantly Muslim character, to a policy of a relatively closer, more brotherly relationship with Pakistan. Apart from two direct military confrontations in 1965 and 1971 over the Kashmir and Bangladesh issues, Pakistan and Bharat have followed diametrically opposed policies in many spheres of international and regional relations.

The purpose of these observations is not to highlight the negative character of Indo-Pakistan relations but simply to point out that, within the South Asian set, the bipolar subset of Pakistan and India is a deep-rooted cultural and political reality. Unless a balance of power is maintained between these two poles, peace and security in South Asia will remain disturbed.

#### IV

While talking of peace and security in South Asia, we may also talk of the vital strategic importance this region occupies in world affairs. In this age of mass awakening and increasing socioeconomic international relations, global peace is no longer a divisible phenomenon. Although the world is divided, from the point of view of geographical and political affinities, into a large number of regions and subregions, disturbance in one region leads to disturbances in other regions, though with varying degrees of intensity. Some regions, however, are more vital to world peace than others. South Asia falls within this category because of the following major dimensions:

1. South Asia's compact physical location gives it a commanding position in Asia for busy air, land, and sea links among Europe, Africa, and Southwest Asia on one hand and Japan, Northeast and Southeast Asia, and Australia on the other.

2. It looms large, at least north of the equator, on the horizon of the great Indian Ocean, which encompasses Africa; Southwest, South, and Southeast Asia; and Antarctica. The significance of this geopolitical reality is that a peaceful Indian Ocean is unthinkable without a peaceful South Asia, and vice versa.<sup>6</sup>

3. It guards the sea routes to (a) the Persian Gulf, whose oil supplies are vital to the world economy, and (2) the Mediterranean Sea and Pacific Ocean, which are linked commercially through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca, respectively.

4. It serves as a watchdog over all the land routes from Central Asia to

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<sup>6</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Lt. General A. I. Akram, "South Asia and the Indian Ocean," *Pakistan Times*, February 15 and 22, and March 1 and 8, 1988.

the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, a centuries-old target of Russian expansion.

5. With a population of over a billion and large areas of unutilized land, mineral, sea, and other physical resources, it has the potential of becoming a strong competitor in world markets if it is able to acquire modern production technology on a mass scale. It has also the potential of becoming the largest single world market for consumption of goods and services, provided its per capita purchasing power rises rapidly in the coming decades.

6. With a rich heritage of civilizations, arts, crafts, and sciences and conscious of their vital geographical positions, South Asian countries want to play a more assertive and independent role in world affairs than countries of many other underdeveloped regions.

Because South Asia is a land of multidimensional geostrategic importance, as explained earlier, peace in this region is also a multidimensional phenomenon, involving global, regional, and bilateral realities.

At the global level, ever since the elimination of British rule in 1947, the United States and the USSR have been trying to woo South Asian countries, especially Bharat and Pakistan, to their camps, with varying degrees of success. This courtship has taken the shape of economic grants and loans and the supplying of military hardware. Recently, in view of the prolonged Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the South Asian mainland and harbors have assumed added significance in the superpowers' struggle for domination in the region. Thus, without an East-West guarantee of peace, tensions in South Asia cannot come to an end.

Regionally speaking, Bharat's bid to play the role of a hegemonic power has been the main obstacle to the restoration of peace in the area. In the initial years of independence Bharat invaded and annexed part of Kashmir (a Muslim area), the states of Junagadh and Manavador (which had acceded to Pakistan), the state of Hyderabad (one of the oldest pre-British States), Sikkim, and Portuguese Goa. It waged two wars against Pakistan, one in 1965 and the other in 1971, when it succeeded in forcibly separating the country's eastern wing—though it could not annex this wing because of the latter's predominantly Muslim character. Bharat's recent military intervention in Sri Lanka is another example of its hegemonic policies. There is hardly any South Asian country with which India does not have some sort of quarrel or conflict.

Within the region itself, the most important bilateral condition of peace relates to the establishment of strategic parity between Pakistan and Bharat. As explained earlier, a deeper look at South Asian history shows that these two countries are not merely a creation of the year 1947, when they acquired freedom, but possess centuries-old distinct sociocultural personalities. Bharat's refusal to reconcile to this reality, and the tacit

approval of this stand it gets from misinformed quarters and powers, stands in the way of the promotion of bilateral peace in the area.

South Asia's strategic position is such that a durable peace cannot be maintained on its mainland and ocean unless the superpowers as well as regional and bilateral powers accept the principle of coexistence, equality, and mutual respect.

## V

A peaceful equilibrium of relations on the lines suggested may appear to be a long-term, idealistic dream. The process of its realization can be started, however, if an equilibrium of relations on the basis of equality can be achieved between two South Asian power poles, namely, Pakistan and India in the forthcoming decades. It will, therefore, be instructive to take a deeper look at the pattern of relationship between these two countries and the factors that have determined the shape of this pattern.

The origin of Indo-Pakistan conflict can be traced to the encounter between Hindu and Muslim cultures that began over a thousand years ago and that has profoundly affected the social values, institutions, and behavioral patterns of their adherents. This factor should not be underestimated, for it continues to exercise tremendous influence even today.

To a mind nourished by Western culture, the following observations of an ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan may sound unbelievable, but truth is stranger than fiction:

Muslims and Hindus have met at a thousand points, on battlefields and at festivals, around marketplaces and in homes, on spiritual heights and in the lowlands of mundane affairs. They have learnt from each other, interacted with each other, and penetrated each other; their tongues have mixed to produce new and rich languages; in music and poetry, painting and architecture, in styles of dress, and in ways of living they have left their mark on each other. And yet they have remained distinct with an emphasis on their separateness. They have mixed but never fused; they have coexisted but have never become one. Hindu and Muslim families that have lived in the same neighborhood for generations can be distinguished at a glance from one another. The clothes, the food, the household utensils, the layout of homes, the manner of speech, the words of salutation, the postures, the gestures, everything about them will be different and will immediately point to their origin. These outer differences are only the reflection of an inner divergence. For among the varied social groups of mankind it is difficult to imagine a more striking contrast than that between Hindu and Muslim social organization.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>M. Chaudhri Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 1. The first chapter of this book should be read by all who want to have a deeper look at the historical foundation of the South Asian scenario.

The major reason for the persistence of this contrast and the non-emergence of a synthesis of Hindu and Muslim cultures lies in their diametrically opposed religions and social philosophies. Divine plurality and a rigid hierarchical caste system in which the accident of birth determines a man's status are the foundation of Hinduism.<sup>8</sup> As against this, divine unity and casteless human brotherhood are the essence of Islam. Without going into the deeper meaning of these philosophies, it is sufficient for us to remember that, whatever the cause, Islam and Hinduism in South Asia represent two distinct sociocultural forces that have been unable to absorb each other in spite of a thousand-year encounter. Thus, they have no other peaceful choice but to coexist on an equal footing.

The famous two-nation theory that led to the division of British India into Bharat and Pakistan derived its rationale from the inevitability of coexistence of the Hindu and Muslim cultures. The Muslims, represented by Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Muslim League, favored this theory; the Hindus, represented by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru's Indian National Congress, opposed it.<sup>9</sup> The insistence of Hindu leaders on the existence of only one nation in India derived its strength from the knowledge that their community, constituting three-fourths of the total population in India, would always remain in the majority and would thus have a hegemonic grip on South Asian affairs. By the same token, the insistence of Muslim leaders on two nations derived its strength from the knowledge that their community, holding the majority in western, northwestern, and northeastern India (consisting of the present territories of Pakistan and Bangladesh), would be able to preserve its sociocultural existence and save itself from the hegemony of the Hindus only if it acquired independence in contiguous territories in which it was in the majority. The emergence of Pakistan and Bharat as two independent states in 1947 could be interpreted as the victory of the concept of cultural and political coexistence, but Bharat has yet to reconcile itself to this reality. For example, on the verge of independence in June 1947, Nehru's Indian National Congress passed a resolution dubbing the doctrine of two nations as false and hoping that it would be discredited and discarded by all.<sup>10</sup> Twenty-four years later, in November 1971 (a few weeks before attacking East Pakistan), India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi challenged the existence of Pakistan by saying that Indian leaders had always believed that

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<sup>8</sup>For a comparison of the world's great religions see H. Smith, *The Religions of Man* (New York, 1959); A. C. Bouquet, *Comparative Religion* (Pelican, 1941), and *Newsweek*, September 19, 1988.

<sup>9</sup>For authentic details, see I. H. Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi, 1965).

<sup>10</sup>V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (London, 1968), p. 384.

Pakistan should not have been created and that the Pakistan nation had no right to exist.<sup>11</sup>

The deep-rooted historical and cultural prejudices explain why post-1947 Indo-Pakistan relations have been marred by armed conflicts, tensions, and misgivings about each other's long-term intentions. No doubt there have been moments of sanity when dialogues were initiated and disputes settled. Such moments, however, have occurred comparatively less often than outbreaks of animosity.

To list the major animosity-creating areas first, note the following events and issues:<sup>12</sup>

1. The lingering Kashmir dispute, which caused the wars of 1948 and 1965.
2. Bharat's direct military intervention in the domestic crisis of East Pakistan in 1971 and the forcible separation of this area from West Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>
3. Bharat's annexation of the states of Junagadh and Manavadar, which had acceded to Pakistan.
4. Continuing riots against minorities, particularly Muslims, in spite of Bharat's claim to be a secular state.<sup>14</sup> Although Pakistan has recently witnessed ethnic riots in Karachi and some other cities, minorities, including the Hindu minority of Sind, have enjoyed peace and security.
5. Bharat's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974, which provoked Pakistan to speed up its own nuclear program. It is interesting to note that whereas Bharat's nuclear test went almost unnoticed, Pakistan's modest program has invoked sharp discriminatory reactions from the super-powers and from Bharat.
6. Mutual suspicions about each other's support of separatist tendencies. Bharat blames Pakistan for assisting the successionist Sikhs, and Pakistan suspects India of being behind the ethnic riots in Sind.
7. Bharat's military and technological build-up with a view to assuming the role of South Asia's policeman is viewed with alarm by its neighbors, particularly Pakistan, which itself, as explained earlier, is a

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<sup>11</sup>*Daily Telegraph*, December 4, 1971.

<sup>12</sup>For details, see M. D. Chughtai, *Political Dimensions of South Asian Cooperation* (Lahore: Centre for South Asian Studies [CSAS], Punjab University, 1988).

<sup>13</sup>See Syed Farooq Hasnat, "Indian Intervention in East Pakistan," *South Asian Studies*, January 1984, pp. 57–82.

<sup>14</sup>During the period 1948–80, more than 7,600 anti-Muslim riots were reported to have taken place in various parts of Bharat. See T. P. Wright, Jr., *Methodology of Research on Indian Muslims* (Lahore: CSAS, 1985), table 4. In 1983, a great massacre of Muslims took place in Assam. For details, see *The Assam Massacre, 1983* (Lahore: CSAS, 1984).

power pole with firm historical and cultural roots, further strengthened by the recent developments in Afghanistan.

8. The Hindu leaders' continuing condemnation of two-nation theory indicates that they have not yet become reconciled to the idea of socio-cultural and political coexistence with Pakistan. This naturally breeds animosities between people of both countries.

9. India's operations in North Pakistan's Siachen Glacier pose the latest threat to peace in the Karakorum region adjacent to China.

As for the silver lining in the dark clouds of Indo-Pakistan relations, the major instances of peaceful settlement have been (1) the Liaquat-Nehru Pact of 1950, (2) the Indus Water Treaty of 1962, (3) the Tashkent Declaration of 1966, (4) the Simla Agreement of 1972, and (5) the Sallal Dam Agreement of 1978. A few agreements relating to trade and commerce have also been signed from time to time, but the total volume of trade has remained low. There was a marked improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations during the late 1970s when Morarji Desai's Janata government was in power.<sup>15</sup> The recent establishment of the SAARC can also be considered an important step toward diffusing bilateral and multilateral tensions.

It is difficult to predict the future, but past experience suggests that obstacles to peaceful coexistence between Bharat and Pakistan are not insurmountable. The key to the removal of obstacles lies in the acceptance by policymakers and thinkers of historical realities and factors that have shaped the great South Asian Muslim and Hindu cultures.

Indo-Pakistan domestic differences are also reflected in their external relations, for Bharat is generally considered to be a Soviet ally, especially after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971. Pakistan is regarded as being inclined toward China and the United States, from whom it receives economic support and military hardware. These inclinations, however, do not follow any rigid pattern, for both are important members of the Non-Aligned Movement and both at times follow independent policies. For example, Indian Premier Morarji Desai refused to oblige Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin when the latter asked him to teach Pakistan a lesson for its sympathy with the Afghan Mujahideen.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, Pakistan has maintained a totally independent policy regarding the nonrecognition of Israel and pursuit of a modest nuclear program in spite of American pressure.

The interests of superpowers do not necessarily coincide with those of

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<sup>15</sup>Rafique Ahmad, ed., *Pakistan-India Relations* (Lahore: CSAS, 1988); see Agha Shahi's inaugural address.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

Bharat and Pakistan. One of the major aims of Bharat's foreign policy is to have itself recognized as the principal power of South Asia. In contrast, Pakistan seeks to resist Bharat's hegemonic and expansionist designs and draws on its sociocultural relationship with the Islamic world to play an independent and constructive role in promoting coexistence in South Asia.

Global powers have their own imperatives and priorities, however. Currently, both the USSR and the United States are busy examining what is called Mikhail Gorbachev's grand design of Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation.<sup>17</sup> The main focus of the Soviet proposals appears to be on a superpower understanding regarding (1) Northeast Asia, where military forces of the USSR, China, Japan, the United States, and the two Koreas are ranged in a state of preparedness, (2) East Asia, consisting of the Philippines (having a U.S. military base), Vietnam (having a USSR naval base), and China, and (3) the Indian Ocean.

The South Asian mainland does not figure probably because the USSR is already committed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. In the Indian Ocean, the United States has a full-fledged naval base on the island of Diego Garcia (1,200 miles south of India's southernmost tip), and the USSR in Somalia's Berbera post overlooking the entrance to the Red Sea: hence Gorbachev's proposal for an Indian Ocean conference before 1990 such as the United Nations has been planning for years.

The essence of Gorbachev's scheme is to attain a balance of power in Asia between the United States and the USSR so that a new superpower détente is established. It remains to be seen whether the United States agrees with this proposal and becomes ready to review its current commitments. In case some sort of superpower détente is established, what would be its effect on South Asia? So far as the mainland is concerned, a power vacuum may emerge that Bharat, with its present military build-up supported by its friendship treaty with the USSR, may try to fill. As regards the Indian Ocean, Bharat may like to assume, in the words of Henry Kissinger, some of the security functions now exercised by the United States and may attempt to prevent the emergence of some other major power in the Indian Ocean.<sup>18</sup> Thus, on both the mainland and ocean Bharat may seek to establish its hegemony, a situation that for reasons explained earlier will not be acceptable to Pakistan. This will naturally cause tension and conflicts in South Asia.

To attain durable peace in South Asia détente between Pakistan and

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<sup>17</sup>For analytical details, see M. B. Naqvi, "Asia-Pacific Region: New Gorbachev Initiative," *Dawn* (Karachi), October 20, 1988; and C. Balchin, "Gorbachev's Asian Initiative," *The Muslim* (Islamabad), September 26, 1988.

<sup>18</sup>See *Newsweek*.

Bharat is essential in the same way as it is essential between the United States and the USSR at the global or Asian level.

## VI

The foregoing analysis of the South Asian scenario suggests one external and three internal approaches to the attainment of effective and durable peace in the region.

The external instrument of peace can be in the shape of the global superpowers' direct management of affairs in the region. This, however, is neither desirable nor feasible in view of the disastrous consequences of the big powers' intervention in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Further, all South Asian countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, which strongly resents such interventions. There are also signs of the big powers' diminishing hold on world affairs, as explained earlier.

The internal instruments of peace can be three: hegemonic, multipolar, and bipolar.

Bharat is eager to play an increasing hegemonic role, and its goals are similar to those of Britain east of Suez before 1947. There are serious impediments in the way of this role. First, hegemony, whether of a global or a regional power, is no longer acceptable to the people and particularly to the younger generation below the age of twenty years, which constitutes more than 40 percent of the South Asian population. Second, Pakistan is another potentially strong claimant to regional power in view of its distinct geographical and Islamic traits. Third, in terms of area and influence the modern state of Bharat is not synonymous with the great British Indian Empire. Fourth, below the surface cover of technological and military advances there are serious problems of poverty, ignorance, unemployment, ill health, resources deficiencies, and linguistic and ethnic riots, all of which taken together produce a weakening influence on Bharat's economy and society. Last, Bharat currently has unhappy relations with almost all neighboring countries. Thus, any attempt to impose Bharati hegemony on South Asia is bound to produce negative results.

From the multipolar point of view, the ideal key to a stable and durable peace lies in the even distribution of power among South Asian states. As discussed in detail, each country in the region has its distinct sociocultural personality that it jealously wants to safeguard. The recent formation of SAARC is a step in the right direction. The SAARC Charter explicitly seeks to promote peace, stability, amity, and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and those of Non-Alignment, particularly respect for principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, nonuse of force, and noninterference in the internal affairs of each other's states and peaceful settlement

of all disputes.<sup>19</sup> The Charter also provides that decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.<sup>20</sup> This provision safeguards smaller states against hegemonic decisions at the multilateral level.

SAARC has a long way to go before becoming an effective instrument of peace and stability. It did not play any role in preventing Bharat from sending armies to Sri Lanka. The major areas of lingering conflict in South Asia are Kashmir, the Indo-Bangladesh dispute over the distribution of Ganges waters and the nationality of Assamese migrants, Sri Lanka's rebellious Tamils, the India-China border, landlocked Nepal's problems of transit facilities, and Bhutan's independent status. The common factor in all these disputes is Bharat, whose hegemonic designs are well known.

SAARC's economic prospects are also not very bright. For example, in quantitative terms, South Asia, including Bharat, has a small place on the trade map of the world. Similarly, except for water, power, manpower resources, and available land, the region does not possess adequate resources to meet the increasing requirements of its 1 billion people. Further, the present dimensions of intraregional trade are also small. Except for Nepal and Bhutan, mutual trade between SAARC countries ranges from 3 to 10 percent of their total foreign trade.

Bharat has surplus capital goods and has also successfully followed the policy of attaining self-sufficiency in all types of goods. This means that only one-sided trade can take place between Bharat and other countries, a position that may not be acceptable from the point of view of intraregional cooperation, for it can continually lead to balance of payments difficulties. This clearly implies that the key to the success of SAARC experiment lies in Bharat's abandonment of its policy of self-sufficiency. It is doubtful if Bharat will do so because of the probable unfavorable repercussions on its employment and industrial sectors.

In the future, SAARC's role will primarily consist of providing a forum for mutual dialogues rather than offering solutions to problems and preventing hegemonic policies to flourish.

The bipolar approach, finally, implies that, within the South Asian set, the bipolar subset of Pakistan and Bharat is a deep-rooted cultural and political reality and unless balance of power is maintained between these two poles peace and security in the region will remain disturbed. In spite of Bharat's claim of secularity, Hindus of the region look to it for leadership; similarly, Muslims of the region expect Pakistan to safeguard their interests. Most of the major events in South Asia before and after 1947 have revolved around the power poles of Hinduism and Islam. This

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
<sup>19</sup>Clause I, SAARC Charter, *South Asian Studies* 1, 1 (January 1986): 113.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, Article, X, Clause I, p. 117.

circumstance explains why it is generally believed that the key to a permanent and satisfactory peace in the region lies in the hands of Pakistan and Bharat. In terms of area, population, military strength, and certain other factors Bharat is a bigger country, but in terms of physical location, historical depth, racial and cultural links with the vast Central Asian and Arab worlds, a large workforce, and economic resources Pakistan has an equally strong claim to be a South Asian power in its own right, as proved, *inter alia*, by its recent highly courageous stand on the Afghanistan issue.

In light of the analysis presented in this chapter, any viable strategy of durable peace in South Asia must contain at least the following elements:

1. Acceptance of the right of all sociocultural identities to live in peaceful coexistence on equal footing.
2. In pursuance of this right, adoption of the norm that power will be evenly distributed among all South Asian States, big or small. This is the essence of multipolarity.
3. As a first immediate step toward fulfilling this norm, maintenance of balance of power between Pakistan and Bharat, which together represent the most influential bipolar subset within the overall South Asian multipolar set. This is absolutely necessary if Islam and Hinduism—the two major sociocultural forces of South Asia—are to live and flourish side by side. This bipolar balance may gradually give place to multipolar balance as suggested in 1 above.
4. To achieve the above goals, conclusion of a specific Peaceful Coexistence Pact between all South Asian states; this pact should also provide for greater sociocultural exchanges.
5. Encouragement of the mass media, especially radio and television, to play a more effective role in promoting understanding and cordial relations between people of the region on the basis of equally respectable sociocultural diversities.
6. Establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the mainland and seas of South Asia in order to discourage hegemonic tendencies.



**Part Five**  
**Problems of Peace and Security**  
**in West Asia and the Gulf**



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## 10. Problems of Peace and Security in West Asia and the Gulf

ANDREW I. KILLGORE

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### The Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War is ending. Iraq and its supporters won; Iran lost. The outcome might seem surprising, given Iran's threefold advantage over Iraq in population and territory, but the war gradually assumed the dimensions of the Arab world against Iran, Syria's and to a lesser extent Libya's support of Iran notwithstanding.

The deep origins of the war go back more than 4,000 years to Sargon of Akkad, who created the first Semitic empire when he established hegemony over the non-Semitic Sumerian city-states. Behind the present war and the many others that have preceded it through the centuries lies the great geographic divide, roughly the Zagros Mountains today, separating the desert/tribal areas (the Arabs) and the settled plateau country (Iran-Persia). That divide has always been marked by deep cultural differences and misunderstandings, manifested today by oft-noted mutual antipathies between the Iranians and the Arabs. These misunderstandings, however, do not have to lead to war if the ill-considered outside meddling of recent years can be avoided in the future.

The recent origins of the war go back about twenty years to the Kurdish revolt in Northern Iraq. The Shah of Iran, Israel and, after 1967, the United States were secretly helping the Kurds. The real purpose was not to

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\*The term *Middle East* should be substituted for *West Asia*. Iran, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, Israel, and the Arabs are situated in the Middle East, a time-honored term in general use since World War I, while West Asia is new, ill-defined, and obscurantist. The use of the description *West Asia* in the context of a discussion of Arab-Israel relations seems to leave out Egypt and the rest of the Arab countries situated in Africa. In fact, these countries are deeply affected by the dispute, as we are in the United States where it is of overriding foreign policy interest. Failure to resolve the Arab-Israel issue has exacerbated both the Iran-Iraq struggle and the violence in Lebanon.

promote Kurdish interests but to use the Kurds to put pressure on Iraq in favor of Iran. The focus of the pressure was the Shatt al-Arab River, Iraq's only real outlet to the Persian Gulf. On May 30, 1972, less than a month before my arrival in Tehran as political counselor, the United States told the Shah he could buy all the nonnuclear American weapons he wanted. Given the circumstances in the Persian Gulf at that time, this meant that the United States had made the reckless decision to promote the Shah as our surrogate in the Gulf.

In 1971, the Shah had already forcibly seized Arab-owned islands in the Gulf and (with Israel and the United States) was committing secret aggression against Iraq by helping the Kurdish revolt. My government denied to me that we were involved in such an irresponsible misadventure, but I suspected, correctly, that we were doing just that.

The Shah as U.S. surrogate made little geopolitical sense for the United States for two reasons. Iran was nearly twice as populous as all the Arab states on the Gulf combined and potentially at least twice as strong militarily. This meant that Iran had the latent capability of going it alone in the Gulf and telling the United States that we were no longer needed. This is no ivory tower nightmare, given the fact that 70 percent of the noncommunist world's oil is found in the Gulf and that the Shah was well known to harbor grandiose visions of creating a new Persian empire that would rival that established by Cyrus the Great in the sixth century B.C.

The Nixon Doctrine at that time envisaged supporting local friends in various parts of the world to reduce direct demands on U.S. resources. But the Shah's frenzied purchase of U.S. weapons (eventually reaching \$25 billion) made less and less sense each year. In his book, *All Fall Down*, former National Security Council aide Gary Sick called the weapons sales policy "inexplicable." In fact, it can be understood only in terms of advancing Israel's aim of creating a Tel Aviv-Tehran axis to intimidate the Arabs. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, always zealous to promote Israel's interests, successfully pushed this ill-advised policy.

The intimidation worked when Iraq made the agonizing decision in 1975 to cede to Iran partial control over the Shatt al-Arab River. The Kurds' erstwhile "friends" betrayed them immediately as outside assistance stopped. The Kurds then took a fearsome beating at the hands of the Iraqi army. The Kurdish-Israeli-Iranian-American war against Iraq can thus best be understood as a proxy war over control of the Shatt al-Arab River. Iraq lost that one to superior force but, of course, would try to get it back by force if a suitable occasion ever presented itself.

The occasion came when the Shah's regime collapsed from weight of armaments and neglect of economic development. The Iranian army also collapsed, or appeared to, and Iraq invaded Iran along the Shatt al-Arab in

September 1980. Iraq had made a monstrous mistake. Iran rallied, the fighting went back and forth for eight years, and 500,000 died.

### *The Future for Iran and Iraq*

Both sides have learned a bitter lesson. Neither can conquer the other. Iraq cannot conquer Iran because it is simply too small by itself and cannot get the support of the other Arabs in any schemes of conquest. Theoretically, Iran could defeat Iraq, given its preponderance of size and population. But any attempt to do so, as proven in the present struggle, will be opposed by the other Arabs.

Most observers believe the religiously based regime will survive in Iran, but given its incompetence and self-inflicted wounds one has to wonder for how long. Certainly any notion of exporting the Shiite brand of religious fundamentalism to the mainly Sunni Arabs is unrealistic, if for no other reason than that the taking and holding of hostages deeply alienated the tribal-oriented Arabs, who found kidnapping and imprisoning in the name of Islam profoundly disturbing. Two Gulf rulers have passionately asserted to me that the Islam propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini and his regime is not true Islam but a perversion.

The Iraqi economy is relatively stronger than the Iranian. Its internal cohesion is also stronger. Only 20 percent of its population, the Kurds, are not ethnically/linguistically Arabs, whereas perhaps 40 percent of Iran's people—the Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis—are non-Persian. Iraq has perhaps the second largest oil reserves in the world, ranking only behind Saudi Arabia. Its economy is well balanced. Its Baathist regime is essentially secular and nonideological. All in all, its chances of joining the developed nations look promising.

Iran's economic and political future seems less certain. The ratio of natural resources to population (around 50 million) is less favorable than in Iraq. The present political system is ideologically inflexible and will probably have to be changed to meet the needs of the people. A strong man, a man with a sword, is likely to emerge as Iran's ruler sooner or later—sooner, in my opinion.

At all costs, the two countries will have to avoid a future war. If the United States and the world community would work to internationalize use of the Shatt al-Arab River, the risk of future war would be reduced. Under such an arrangement, Iran and Iraq would both be represented, and all their merchant shipping would have guaranteed use of the waterway.

### *Related Gulf Issues*

The Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman), created in response to the threat

from Iran, will not be disbanded. Iraq will continue to stay outside so as to soften the appearance that the GCC is anti-Iranian.

The Gulf Arab countries will feel less vulnerable in the future than in the past. The Iranian threat, they believe, will have been contained for a long time to come. The past threat from Iraq, which several years ago promoted subversion against traditional Arab rulers in the Gulf via the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) is also greatly eased inasmuch as these same traditional rulers helped save Iraq from defeat. The \$75 billion owed them by Iraq dramatically emphasizes that Iraq could well have lost the war without their help.

The past fear of these countries that the United States, under the influence of Israel, would always favor Iran is now eased. Friends and officials in Qatar and Bahrain told me in March 1988 that they believed the Iran-contra scandal had sobered the United States. The heavy presence of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf convinces them that the United States finally realizes the value of maintaining good relations with the Gulf Arabs.

The Gulf Arabs will now arm themselves as never before, at the same time quietly welcoming a larger American naval presence in the Gulf than was maintained in the past. Before and during the Iraq-Iran War they felt militarily helpless, and they cannot now expect to establish the strength to hold off a determined assault from Iran or Iraq. Nevertheless, they do have the capability, working together through the GCC, of making any would-be Gulf aggressor hesitate to attack any one of them. The United States can gain many billions of these military sales if it has the courage to face down the Pavlovian negativism of the Israel lobby to U.S. military sales to the Arabs.

The role of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in regulating oil production and influencing oil prices will be enhanced in the post-Iran-Iraq War period. Decreased military expenses will ease pressure for larger exports. International borrowing will be easier for both countries, with paybacks stretched out to years of higher oil prices expected in the mid-1990s.

### **Arab-Israel Relations**

Arab relations with political Zionism began to deteriorate seventy-one years ago when Britain issued the euphemistically worded Balfour Declaration, promising to look with favor on a "Jewish national home" in Palestine for the Jewish people. In plain English, this document envisaged turning an overwhelmingly Palestinian land into a Jewish state. Eight wars and hundreds of thousands of casualties later, Israel, the national home promised by Britain, and the Arabs approach a climax in their struggle. Indications are clear that the half-century-long test of strength is being

concluded. Peace on the basis of two states in Palestine, one Jewish and one Arab, is not far away.

### *Eight Wars*

Eight wars have brought Israel and the Arabs, who overwhelmingly support the Palestinian cause, to accept the reality that further wars will avail them nothing. It is of course possible that Israel will try some last desperate maneuver to keep all of Palestine. But such an attempt is bound to fail.

The first four wars were disastrous for the Arab side and great triumphs for Israel, used here to mean the state established in 1948 as well as the Jewish settlers in Palestine before the state was created. The fourth war, the June 1967 War, in which Israel easily and decisively defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, was one of the most notable military victories of history. The last four wars, however, have been of ambiguous outcome, with Israel's superiority over the Arabs being increasingly challenged.

In the first war, the 1936–1939 Arab revolt, the Palestinians lost thousands of lives in a vain attempt to stop Jewish immigration into Palestine. Palestinian ranks were divided at that time, the British Army with Jewish support was too strong, and Hitler's persecution of the Jews had created an unstoppable impetus for Jews to get to a place of safety, which for many of them meant Palestine.

The Arab-Israel war of 1948–1949 was an unmitigated disaster for the Arabs. They had rejected the United Nations 1947 partition plan for Palestine that awarded 53 percent to Israel, 47 percent to the Palestinians, and set up Jerusalem and Bethlehem as a separate entity. Israel accepted the partition but immediately set out to seize more territory. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria lost militarily in the 1948–1949 struggle, and 700,000 Palestinian refugees lost their homes and their country, hustled out by Israeli arms and terror.<sup>1</sup> In this war and others, the Arabs overestimated their own strength and underestimated Israeli strength and resolve.

The third war, in October 1956, was more of the same. Israel captured the Gaza Strip and swept through the Egyptian army to the Suez Canal. Britain and France were allied with Israel, but the decisive military victory was Israel's alone. President Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw, but that country's military superiority over the Arabs was never so clearly evident.

Even though Egypt lost the 1956 war, President Jamal Abdul Nasser ironically emerged as a great Arab hero. He then overplayed his hero hand both politically and militarily. And in the June 1967 War, Israel simply

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<sup>1</sup>Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (New York: Pantheon, 1987), pp. 83–118.

crushed Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, capturing and retaining the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Syria's Golan Heights.

A watershed had been reached in the turbulent relations between the Arabs and Israel. The latter's military superiority had been unmistakably established, even in the eyes of a giant Arab world reluctant, and even ashamed, to admit it. Israel's former image of a little David fighting against an Arab Goliath began to disappear.

A new sense of realism about military power balances gradually seeped into Arab consciousness. Israel's 1967 victory had been so easy and so overwhelming that, in another irony, Israel's coldly logical appreciation of its own military superiority began to be supplanted by overconfidence and arrogance. So, nearly twenty years after Israel was created, a critical line had been crossed. Israel had come to believe that it could take and keep whatever it wanted of Arab lands. The Arabs, on the other hand, at last understood their own military weakness after the loss of four painful tests of strength with Israel.

#### *After the 1967 Watershed Year*

The little-known War of Attrition (1969–1970) was an attempt by Egypt to use its superior numbers from the west side of the Suez Canal against a strategically overextended Israeli army holding the east bank of the waterway. Bombardments and raids across the canal by Egypt cost Israel 400 to 500 lives. Israel eventually “won—however, with deep raids into Egypt by its air force. Egypt lost thousands of lives, many of them civilian, before a ceasefire was agreed upon.

Israel did win the fifth war, but its thinly held line on the Suez Canal front had proven inadequate against the larger Egyptian forces. Egypt's surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) near the canal had hampered the Israeli air force, but deeper raids, sometimes against Egyptian civilian targets, exacted such a toll that President Nasser was glad to accept the ceasefire. The War of Attrition forced Israel to face for the first time its weakness in numbers, and Egypt perceived that, except for Israel's air superiority, Israel was no match for Egypt on the Suez front.

The sixth war, in 1973, drenched Israel and the Arabs (plus, significantly, the United States) in a flood of realism. Israel all but lost this “war of many names,” called the Yom Kippur War in Israel, the Ramadan War in the Arab world, and the October War in the United States. In a coordinated surprise attack, Egypt struck across the Suez Canal at Israeli-occupied Sinai and Syria hit the Golan Heights, controlled by Israel since the 1967 War.

Good Arab SAMs defenses neutralized Israeli air superiority over the fighting front while the ground attack cost the Israeli army dearly. A gigantic U.S. military air bridge from Europe and the United States even-

tually turned the fighting in Israel's favor but not before Israel lost 3,000 dead, a devastating number to a small country, surpassing by four to one, in relative terms, U.S. losses in Vietnam.

The shocking cost of the October War made peace between Egypt and Israel simply a matter of time. In its aftermath Israel saw that the Sinai Desert, previously regarded as a buffer against Egyptian power, was a dangerous trap in which its overextended forces could always be hit by surprise. Egypt, its pride restored by a relatively good showing in the fighting, saw that the United States would not permit Israel to be defeated. In President Anwar Sadat's words in agreeing to stop the fighting, "I cannot fight the Americans."

Peace came via the Camp David Accords, and formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt were established in 1978. But relations remained cool because Israel did not carry out its undertakings under the Accords to grant autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Instead, Israel speeded up Jewish settlements in these areas, demonstrating that even though Israel had stared cold reality in the face with respect to Egypt, it still harbored maximalist illusions that, with Egypt safely on the sidelines, Israel could retain "Samaria" and "Judea," its terms for the West Bank, destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once and for all, and force peace with Lebanon on its own terms.

The 1982 Lebanon war, seventh on the tragic list, was fought in Lebanon, but its main goal was to gain permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza by delivering a knockout blow against the PLO. Although PLO chairman Yassir Arafat and his fighters were ousted from Lebanon, Israel was in fact a very heavy loser.

The world for the first time saw Israel as clearly an aggressor; the bombardment of Beirut for forty-one days cost Israel heavily in world esteem, and its own people were deeply divided by a war that many Israelis regarded as unnecessary for Israel's security.

The world watched the astonishing spectacle of the Israeli army in retreat from Lebanon under suicide attack by individuals and small groups. The advance into Lebanon and the slow retreat from it cost Israel more than 600 lives, a loss three-fourths as large, in relative terms, as our losses in Vietnam. It also cost Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin both his job and his reputation. Israeli national morale, on which the country's military prowess was based, also suffered.

The eighth war in a half-century-long search for a mutually recognized equilibrium between Israel and the Arabs began last December 9 in the Gaza Strip. That was the uprising, or *intifada*, as it is called in Arabic. Some Palestinians are now using the term "revolution," *thawra* in Arabic, rather than "uprising."

About 500 Palestinians have been killed, more than 20,000 wounded, and perhaps 25,000 imprisoned. But rocks are still thrown, roads are blocked, tires are burned, and work stoppages continue. Palestinians are paying a heavy price, and Israel suffers from loss of income and declining prestige in the world community, including the United States.

King Hussein has disengaged Jordan from the West Bank and has clearly removed himself as a future negotiator for the Palestinians. The uprising continues, the PLO has declared the West Bank and Gaza an independent Palestinian state, and the Palestine National Council has accepted Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries. The concomitant renunciation of terrorism by the PLO led to the opening of a dialogue between the United States and the PLO. Israel is resisting peace negotiations but will eventually have to do so or face world and U.S. criticism for refusing to negotiate.

As indicated earlier, the writer believes relations between the Arabs and Israel are coming into equilibrium. An Israeli ambassador has been exchanged only with Egypt, but real relations are barely satisfactory. Relations between Morocco and Israel and between Jordan and Israel are satisfactory, but diplomatic ties do not exist. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states do not threaten Israel but do help finance both Syria and the PLO.

Syria has a credible military posture plus a grudge against Israel for holding Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. Relations between the two countries are calm on the surface, but each must assume that the other is a dangerous potential enemy and stay heavily armed and constantly alert. Syria will never accept the loss of the Heights, so the Golan problem will have to be settled when the Palestine problem is resolved. Otherwise bitter enmity between Syria and Israel will persist and endanger improving relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The two superpowers will not tolerate this, in my view.

Israel faces hostile feelings, not only of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but Palestinians everywhere. Israel has to recognize that Arabs and Arab-Americans are getting better organized to fight Israel's influence in the United States. And Israel sees evidence that its stock is falling among Americans as a whole, stemming from the Israeli army's repressive measures against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank and Gaza and from its resistance to peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Finally, Israel's relations with its own Palestinian citizens, perhaps 18 percent of the country's total population, are deteriorating.

### *Can the Extremists Block Peace?*

A nightmarish scenario would include, say, the assassination or attempted assassination of King Hussein and an attempt to "transfer" the

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Jordan and Lebanon. The assassination, or attempt, would logically come from hard-line Israelis determined to oust the Palestinians and keep the occupied areas at all costs. A fanatical Palestinian rejectionist determined never to agree that Israel could have any part of Palestine could similarly do the foul deed. In the confusion Israeli settlers in the West Bank assisted by the Israeli army would hustle West Bankers across the Jordan River at gunpoint. In the present state of world and American opinion, an outcry of revulsion would stop the expulsions. It could also be expected that more liberal elements of Israeli society would oppose the expulsions in such a way that the army and the settlers would have to desist or begin killing their Jewish coreligionists.

Other scenarios can be imagined but the time has passed, in my view, when Israel can hope to retain the West Bank and Gaza.

### **Superpower Responses**

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are handicapped in responding to developments in the Arab-Israel dispute and the Iran-Iraq War. The Soviets have little room for initiatives on their own but generally seek to take advantage of mistakes made by the United States. U.S. responses are often muddled by domestic politics, but our potential for action is almost unlimited.

#### *The Soviet Union*

The USSR long ago lost in the Middle East whatever allure its system may earlier have had as a way of developing and managing an economy. Very few Soviet manufactured goods are found in the Middle East, and Russia's inability to feed its citizens adequately is widely known.

The Soviet Union's atheistic ideology leaves religiously oriented Middle Easterners cold. Its expansionist policy to the south, a *Drang nach Süden*, is an old phenomenon well known to and feared by Turks, Iranians, and Arabs. Its basic attraction has been as a source of military arms to Israel (in 1948–1949), to Egypt and Syria (especially 1967–1973), to Iraq (before, but especially after 1980), and to Syria and Libya (for a long time).

Between the first and second truces in the 1948–1949 Arab-Israel War, Czechoslovakia, at the behest of the USSR, supplied arms to Israel. These arms turned the fighting in Palestine in favor of Israel, enabling it to retain not only the territory allotted it by the United Nations Partition Resolution of 1947 but to gain extra territory at the expense of the Palestinians.

Far better known is the Soviet role in supplying arms to the Arabs. The June 1967 Arab-Israel War highlighted Arab military inferiority. Israel conquered and kept the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and

the Golan Heights. Egypt and Syria sought arms from the USSR to regain their land. The United States might have pressured Israel to return the conquered territories. When it did not, Russia seized the opportunity and stepped in to help the Arabs with arms.

Egypt's 1969–1970 War of Attrition against Israel made possible by Soviet supplies of arms failed. But arms and especially SAMs continued to pour in from Moscow. In the 1973 Arab-Israel War, Egypt and Syria almost defeated Israel, but the United States mounted a huge military air bridge from Europe and thus saved Israel. The shocking impact of that war eventually led to negotiations under which the Sinai was returned to Egypt.

Syria, however, still longed to get back the Golan Heights. The United States might have worked out an arrangement under which a demilitarized Golan Heights posing no threat to Israel was returned to Syria. When we did not, Syria armed itself heavily with Soviet arms. These enabled the Syrian army to give a reasonably good account of itself in the Bekaa Valley against Israel in 1982. The situation now is that Syria, with big arms deliveries from the Soviet Union over the past five years, has achieved greater military strength. Syria is unlikely to attack Israel, but its potential for doing so means Israel has to maintain a military preparedness to fight.

Russia's heavy supply of arms to Iraq has reaped hard currency rewards for Moscow. In fact, sale of arms to various Arab countries is the Soviet Union's usual response to tensions stemming from the Iran-Iraq War and from the Palestine problem. In the case of sales to Iraq, it also represents a hard-eyed Soviet assessment that the Arab world is of greater potential value to the Soviet Union than is Iran.

### *The United States*

We chose the Shah as our surrogate in the Persian Gulf. When his regime collapsed, it was replaced by a hostile government. When Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, our declared policy of neutrality made sense. But when Iran seemed to be winning, neutrality threatened our real interests. A not-unlikely scenario makes that clear. Assuming that the Iraqi army collapsed and Iran seized Iraq's rich North Rumeila oil fields, a week's military campaign could then have taken Kuwait's Burgan oil field for Iran. We would then have faced a hostile government in Tehran in control of perhaps one-half of the noncommunist world's oil.

We now know that Israel was shipping arms to the Ayatollah Khomeini government as early as 1981. Israeli shipments continued in subsequent years. In 1985, the United States also shipped arms, supposedly to Iranian "moderates" who, in gratitude, were to induce their supporters in Lebanon to release American hostages.

The United States should not have tolerated Israeli arms shipments to Iran because a victory by the hostile country would have threatened our interests. And certainly we should never have swallowed the Israeli line that Iranian “moderates” would help us. The whole sordid mess, the Iran-contra scandal, damaged the United States politically in the Middle East and elsewhere. At home it became perhaps the worst foreign policy scandal in U.S. history. Israel and its supporters in the United States were guilty of leading a naively trusting President Reagan to take steps in the Iran-Iraq War that actually harmed American interests.

The shock of the Iran-contra scandal led the United States to place American flags on Kuwaiti tankers and to position large American naval contingents in the Persian Gulf. These actions signaled to Iran that the United States could not accept an Iranian victory in the Iraq-Iran War. So, after six and a half years of ambiguity and actually pro-Iranian moves, the United States took decisive action to preserve its interests. Partly as a consequence, the terrible Iran-Iraq War is finally coming to an end.

U.S. responses in the Arab-Israel context have assured Israel's security, but at a big cost to the United States in Arab goodwill. A strong case can now be made that Israel's external and internal problems are aggravated by American economic and diplomatic support. President Eisenhower forced Israel to return the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula taken in the 1956 Arab-Israel War. The United States gained some credit with the Arabs and enhanced its reputation for opposing aggression, especially as our French and British allies had colluded with Israel in attacking Egypt.

Israel kept its conquests in the 1967 Arab-Israel War with the tacit consent of, and increased economic support from, the United States. Israel paid a price for overreaching in the 1969–1970 War of Attrition with Egypt. In the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Israel paid a terrible price in manpower losses. In the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel badly miscalculated and lost heavily in human casualties and even more severely in international goodwill and self-esteem.

A pattern developed in which the United States supported Israel even when it was clear to many, including many Israelis, that Israel was overplaying its hand. The Lebanon War illustrated this fact. Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in violation of international law but with tacit American support, illustrated it even more dramatically. Now Israel faces the *intifada* in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Repressive measures by Israel have not stopped the uprising, which continues despite killings, beatings, deportations, and imprisonments. The United States tacitly supports the repression by continuing its large economic and military grants to Israel. No doubt, however, Israel is suffering in public opinion in this country.

The dialogue between the United States and the PLO that began recently in Tunis will, presumably, expand eventually into negotiations to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute. The overwhelming vote (more than 150 to 2) to transfer from New York to Geneva the venue for a speech to the United Nations by PLO Chairman Arafat represents the world view that it is time to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute. Israel will ultimately have to negotiate in good faith with the Palestinians or lose its standing and, in time, risk its financial subsidy from the United States.

### **Lebanon**

From the beginning Lebanon had a built-in instability, a political system that assigned disproportionate power to a minority Christian portion of the population as against the majority Muslims. Internal tensions resulting from this disparity were apparent in the early 1950s. By 1958, a short civil war broke out in which the United States was heavily involved. The latest civil war, which has lasted since 1975, brings to mind Europe's Thirty Years War because of its religious, national, and international components.

Lebanon's internal political fragility has attracted external meddling and vulnerability to other tensions in the area, especially to those stemming from the Arab-Israel dispute and the Iran-Iraq War. The Khomeini regime in Iran has armed and encouraged the Shiite population in Lebanon, probably changing forever the days when this 40 percent of Lebanon's population will accept an inferior political and economic status.

Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was aimed primarily at so weakening the Palestine Liberation Organization that Israel could retain the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, the losses for Lebanon were devastating. A total of 20,000 were killed, most of them Lebanese. Israel's apparent expectation that it could place a Christian-dominated government in power that would then make peace with Israel failed. The PLO was weakened but has subsequently recovered.

Syria's army occupies much of Lebanon, including Beirut. The Israeli army and its surrogates occupy the southern slice of the country including Lebanon's Litani River, whose waters Israel has long coveted. Removal of these armies awaits an overall political settlement, including especially resolution of the Palestine problem.

Looking into an admittedly murky future for Lebanon, solution of the Arab-Israel dispute would give at least some promise, where essentially little exists now, that tranquility could return to the country. Most of the camp-dwelling Palestinians in Lebanon would probably return to the West Bank if that area were to become independent. The reason is that they enjoy few privileges in Lebanon, and they would enjoy citizenship back

home. Return to Palestine, if accompanied by compensation for their losses incurred in leaving Palestine, would probably do the trick.

The exodus of 250,000 Palestinians would ease some tension in Lebanon, but by no means would it guarantee a solution of Lebanon's internal problems, nor the ambitions of outsiders to meddle there for their own reasons. The internal situation is too tangled to work itself out without some compelling external development. Such a development would be a gradual end of the Cold War, a basic decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to end their mutual hostility and to tolerate no peripheral disputes that might disrupt their goal. In my view, that is the direction events are taking. A fundamental U.S.-USSR settlement is probably on the horizon. This means that disputes that have thrived in the turbulent wake of the Cold War, including the chaos in Lebanon, are heading for settlement.

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## 11. Pakistan's Vital Environment: The Middle Eastern Region

SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

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The environmental considerations of Pakistan's foreign policy will be considered here in the context of global adjustments and readjustments, in terms of the frequency of Pakistan's interactions with the international actors as well as regional forces. The frequency of interactions between Pakistan and the Middle East depends either on its planned policy projections or on reaction to developments in the regional as well as international spheres. Pakistan has shifted its emphasis on various factors in the external environment from time to time as developments occurring in its dealings with external situations make necessary a degree of change in the policy orientations.

The first fluctuation in the global system was caused by the decline in the Bipolar Universal System in the middle 1960s. The second came with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. The third was the emergence of the Persian Gulf countries in economic strength from 1973 onward. In fact, the changes in the global system have been a continuous process. Pakistan's relations with the Middle Eastern countries, however, matured to the extent that they attained a pattern of uniformity, as far as the desires of the Pakistani masses are concerned. The national interest, as perceived by the Pakistani people, is linked with the developments occurring in the Middle Eastern nations. In Pakistan's hours of reverses or achievements, the Middle Eastern region can be singled out as that part of the global system which maintained a relevance for Pakistan that no other region was able to demonstrate.

The "Principles of Policy" sections in all three constitutions of Pakistan (1956, 1962, 1973) have stated that Pakistan must make special efforts to develop its relations with Muslim countries. Nations like Lebanon and Cyprus have important bonds within the policy framework of Pakistan's national sentiments that cannot be ignored; because of the legislative mandate, the establishment of relations with these countries became a

constitutional necessity. Even during those times in the country's history when the constitution was abrogated or suspended, relations with the Middle Eastern nations were very closely maintained. It can be argued that the success rate, as expressed in the legal document, has not been perfect because of the practical realities existing in the complex relationships of the international order. It cannot be ignored, however, that the feeling of connection the Pakistani masses share with the regions on their western borders has never been forgotten nor diminished.

Furthermore, security realities have been such that since Independence Pakistan has been obliged to focus attention on the western side of its borders. This was especially the case when it came to forming a security alliance. In this context, it should be mentioned that Pakistan aligned itself with Iran and Turkey in institutional cooperation and understanding, first in the form of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954, which was later followed and supplemented by the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964. The latter understanding did not proceed or expand because of reasons that in no way reflected lack of trust or confidence among the three countries; rather, the circumstances arising from the sudden economic activity in the Persian Gulf region and its consequences created an unbalanced level of development in the region. The CENTO arrangements had outlived their usefulness and therefore had to be done away with. Once again, lack of a spirit of cooperation among the three nations was not the reason for the collapse of the security understanding that had existed among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.

At present, the RCD structure is being replaced by yet another agreement in the form of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The structure of this regional organization has been established, and it is speculated that with the easing of tension in the Persian Gulf region the ECO will become operative in its full capacity—along with the possibility of including more regional countries like Oman, Afghanistan (when the regime becomes independent of foreign influence), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and even Saudi Arabia.

The Arab countries of the region did not join Pakistan in any institutional system (though there is a broad-based understanding existing within the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC]), but Pakistan's relationship with most of the Arab world has remained friendly. In some instances, noninstitutional relationships gained more significance, such as Pakistan's longlasting and tested contacts with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, and other countries of the region. Pakistan has given consistent support to the people of Palestine and has voiced support in clear terms for the just cause of the Palestinians in the occupied territories

of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. On a number of occasions, Pakistan has proclaimed its concerns about the brutal methods used by Israel to crush a popular uprising in the occupied territories.

Pakistan's relationship with the Middle Eastern societies has not been one sided. Numerous examples can be cited in which much-needed economic and military assistance was provided to Pakistan by Arab as well as non-Arab countries. The support received from Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Libya in the wars of 1965 and 1971 with India came as a welcome source of strength for the security and integrity of Pakistan.

### **Pakistan and its Link to the Middle East**

Pakistani concerns for the Middle Eastern region, its social, economic, and political interests along with cultural and spiritual closeness with the people of the area, has led to that region's position of permanent priority in Pakistan's foreign policy behavior. In short, the Middle East region is an area of *immediate attention*—a category that is extremely important for preserving Pakistan's security, economic, and political interests.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the Middle Eastern countries are also concerned in turn about Pakistan's political stability and well-being. Just before the military take-over of July 5, 1977, emissaries of the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were sent to help ease the political crisis in Pakistan. The involvement of a foreign country in the domestic affairs of another can be permitted only when the relationship between the two societies is effectually close.

Pakistan's contact with the Arab countries, further, has shown a remarkable improvement since 1971. The reason for these closer relations has been described in the following way:

[After 1971] the change in the relationship between Pakistan and the Arab world can be traced as much to the appearance of new leadership as to altered regional power balances and strategies. It also arises from urgent domestic requirements in Pakistan and the revised developmental needs of the Arab countries and Iran. Whatever the causes, Pakistan and the Middle East have converged economically, politically and psychologically. While the relationship is still evolving, it rests on a mutuality of interests that promises to be enduring.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For details on Pakistan's environment, see Syed Farooq Hasnat, "Environmental Typologies and Pakistan's Security," in *Security for the Weak Nations: A Multiple Perspective*, Syed Farooq Hasnat and Anton Pelinka, eds. (Lahore: Izharsons, 1986), pp. 67–81.

<sup>2</sup>M. G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," *Orbis* 22, 3 (Fall 1978): 595.

### *Geopolitical Location*

The geopolitical location of Pakistan fits well in the overall strategic considerations of the Middle Eastern region in general and the Persian Gulf subregion in particular. Pakistan's role in the Middle East is of obvious importance particularly because of its situation at the entrance of the Gulf of Oman and the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz along with its coastline touching the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Pakistan's strategic importance is further enhanced by the common borders it shares with two of the three major powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and nearly 1,000 miles of frontier with India—a country with ambitions to stretch itself well beyond its territorial boundaries.

Two of Pakistan's provinces have a close affinity with the Middle Eastern countries of Afghanistan and Iran. The most sensitive ethnic/administrative area, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), has always been regarded by the Pakhtuns on both sides of the border as a province possessing a similar culture and ethnic stock (apart, that is, from the powerful uniting elements of a Muslim nationhood). In the future government of Kabul, the links between Afghanistan on one hand and Pakistan in general and the NWFP in particular on the other will be heavily bracketed in economic, social, and security linkups.

Baluchistan, Pakistan's biggest province in terms of geographic dimensions, has similar tribal, ethnic, and linguistic ties with Iranian Baluchistan. The borderline between the two provinces is 832 kilometers, and the coast of this province runs along the Arabian Sea.<sup>3</sup> Pakistan's future developmental plans as well as improvement of its naval facilities on the coast of Makran will need regular coordination with the administrators and planners of Iranian Baluchistan. For this, an understanding with the Iranian government becomes a necessary policy coordination factor if desirable results are to be achieved. It is generally believed that the province of Pakistani Baluchistan has tremendous potential in fulfilling the agricultural, mineral, industrial, and security needs of Pakistan.

The potential fifth province, consisting of the "Northern Areas," is also inhabited by the people who are very closely linked with their ethnic cousins in Iran as well as Turkey. In contrast, the Pakistani and the Indian Punjab, when compared, are full of opposing trends. The script of the Pakistani and Indian Punjabi language is entirely different; Pakistani Punjabi uses the Persian alphabet, the Indian Punjabi Sanskrit. In fact, in

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<sup>3</sup>*Facts about Pakistan*, rev. ed. (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1988).

1947, the pre-independent Punjab was divided on the basis of the “two-nation theory,” in which it was determined that the Hindus/Sikhs on one hand and the Muslims on the other had so much diversity in their sociocultural base that it was not possible to categorize them as a homogeneous group. The factors mentioned, along with past historical hostilities that have run deep since Independence, add another testimonial to the absence of common sociocultural and security links with the South Asian country on Pakistan’s eastern border.

### *Defense and Security Connections*

Pakistan’s cultural and emotional ties cannot be a sole factor of attachment with the Middle East. There are geostrategic variables as well that “propel [Pakistan] to play an active role in West Asian politics.”<sup>4</sup> The armed forces of Pakistan are numerically the largest among the members of the Middle Eastern region, perhaps with the exception of Turkey. Moreover, Pakistan’s technological expertise in armament manufacturing is an asset not only for its security needs but also for other countries of the region. A large number of Pakistani technocrats and skilled and semi-skilled workers are actively participating in developmental activities in these countries. With some Pakistan has had a fairly long history of understanding in the fields of finance, banking, defense, and security matters.

The growing Indian armament industry—in particular, its naval potential—is bound to clash with the tremendous armament build-up in the Middle Eastern countries. The Persian Gulf nations will be affected by the Indian naval pressure in a more direct confrontation as the increasing Indian population, along with its growing military “superiority” and tendency to establish hegemony, can encourage Indian planners to penetrate the eastern flank of the Middle Eastern region. A clash of interests between the Indians and the countries on Pakistan’s western frontiers has a very high rate of probability in the not-too-distant future. In any such conflict or tension, Pakistan will become a vital factor for the security of the Middle Eastern societies. A combination of Indian-Israeli intentions are a reality that must be taken seriously by the leaders and the people of West Asia. It is an open secret that the Israelis along with the Indian military strategists have plans to damage the progress of the Pakistani peaceful nuclear program. It is because of Pakistan’s vigilance along with promises

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<sup>4</sup>Syed Mehtab Ali Shah, “West Asia: Its Problems and Emerging Pattern,” *Pakistan Horizon*, 41, 1 (January 1988): 94.

of harsh retaliation that both interested partners have not as yet ventured to do so.

All these factors, when combined, add strength to the notion that Pakistan cannot be ignored in any future relationships to be established in the Middle East, especially in the defense sector. Pakistan's interaction with the Middle Eastern states in various fields of mutual interest can serve the common interest of all the countries of West Asia, which lies in ensuring the security of the region from outside adventurers—and, at the same time, discouraging any regional country from trying to hegemonize the region. In this regard, Pakistan's special worries are focused on the activities of the state of Israel, which has demonstrated historically that it will flex its muscles whenever the need arises. We can quote as a recent example the Israeli threat to the Saudi Arabians when the latter obtained long-range missiles from China. Pakistan's second, equally important concern is with the strengthening of "Arab nationalism," which inclines toward a rapport with racism, as demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq war. The trend is designed by the ruling elite of certain countries to achieve their narrow aims. The hatred shown toward fellow citizens but non-Arab Kurds by bombarding them with chemical weapons reminds Pakistanis of the gas chambers of World War II.

From these observations, we deduce that the events now occurring in the Middle Eastern nations cannot be ignored by Pakistan, as they carry with them a fallout that affects foreign policy formation. Moreover, they seriously threaten the security concerns of Pakistan. It may be either by the Soviet invasion as well as its influence in Afghanistan or by the American armada in the Persian Gulf region that Pakistan's security will be directly threatened.

### **The Subsystems of the Middle East**

The Middle East region can be subdivided into at least five subsystems. The following subsystems have acquired a personality of their own and their problems are unique to their peculiar circumstances, although overlapping cannot be avoided because these subsystems also function in a wider arena. Examples are the Arab League, the OIC, OPEC, and so on. However blurred the boundaries may be between these subsystems, the fact remains that Pakistan's foreign policy options cannot be accurately analyzed unless we follow the scheme set forth here.

The subsystems of the Middle Eastern region are (1) the Persian Gulf, (2) the non-Arab Middle East, (3) the core of continuing tensions, (4) the Maghreb, and (5) the periphery. These systems are arranged here in a manner identifying Pakistan's security, political, and economic affairs. As

already mentioned, the significance of the subregional systems is based on the frequency of interaction that Pakistan exercises with these clusters of nations—either individually or in a multilateral understanding. Geographical closeness is not strictly the reason for the significance of a particular subregion for Pakistan's foreign policy concerns.

### *The Persian Gulf Subsystem*

The Iran-Iraq War has dominated the activities of the Persian Gulf since the end of 1980. Pakistan's political, economic, and social relations seriously coincided with the policies directed toward the Gulf conflict. Initially, the war was a regional affair, but with the arrival of American and Western European warships in large numbers in mid-1987, the conflict took on an international character, thus generating a series of consequences for Pakistan in particular.

The origin as well as the end of the war has tragic repercussions for the regional and international communities. The war started because some of the Persian Gulf countries could not synchronize their domestic policies with that of the newly established democratic institutions in neighboring Iran. The attack by the Iraqis was supported by the Western powers because "new Iran" had declared an independent foreign policy.

Although the Arab countries of the region along with their allies in and outside the Middle East were able to establish harmony in their foreign policy toward Iran, the contradictions could not be concealed. Mutual suspicion and competition for the leadership of the Arab world as well as personal dislikes were exposed even during the peak intensity of the war. The international forces had come to the aid of their allies, but they could not demonstrate a common objective—the Chinese, for example, were able to break the monopoly of the United States and Western Europe as arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait, and even Oman moved closer to the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that these Gulf nations severely opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Iran accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 (passed on July 20, 1987) on July 18, 1988, and the implementation of the ceasefire in the Persian Gulf took place on August 20. The ceasefire was followed by talks starting on August 25, between the representatives of Iran and Iraq in Geneva under the auspices of U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.

The issues involved in the final settlement between the two countries are highly complex, ranging from divergent political and social attitudes to a lengthy eight years of bitter war behind them. The main problem the Secretary General faces will be to enforce the ceasefire Resolution 598 in its full context. The Iranian position is that the resolution includes Clause

6, which promises to inquire “into who was to blame for starting the eight-year war.”<sup>5</sup> The Iraqis are aware of their weak position on this account and therefore will try to wriggle out of this clause. The official Iraqi policy position is that the Algiers Accord of 1975, which settled the boundary dispute in the Shatt al-Arab waterway between the two countries, does not exist anymore. The reason given is that the Accord was signed under duress. The Russian political analysts disagree with the Iraqi “logic” and instead observe: “The question has arisen as to the ownership of the Shatt-al-Arab; it would be only proper to recall the Algiers Accord. It was not imposed by imperialist powers. It was formulated by friendly countries proceeding not only from economic considerations but also from a concern for peace.”<sup>6</sup> The details of the negotiations are going to be tedious and require patience and perseverance for an ultimate positive outcome. It should be remembered, however, that ceasefire does not correspond to the elimination of tensions in the region.

Iranian acceptance of Resolution 598 came as a surprise for most analysts as well as for the people of Iran and other Persian Gulf countries. There was a difference of opinion amongst the Iranian leadership regarding acceptance of the resolution, and a debate to this effect has been going on since that time. The head of the Iranian mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Sirous Nasseri, made it clear that there were “two schools of thought in the Iranian leadership—those in favor of conciliation and those who prefer a defiant stance.”<sup>7</sup> To an inquiry regarding the sudden change of policy, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Mohammed Besharati, replied: “It might have looked so to [the] people, but it wasn’t so for the Iranian government. That was the reason we had never rejected the 598 Resolution.”<sup>8</sup>

After the ceasefire was announced, a new chain of events began to unfold. Even before the ceasefire had actually been implemented, the foreign minister of Oman paid a seven days’ visit to Iran during which he met nearly all the important leaders of that country. The representatives of both countries discussed new possibilities of cooperation with each other, and different avenues were explored. Another Gulf country, the United

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<sup>5</sup>*Saudi Gazette*, August 11, 1988. Clause 6 of the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 598 reads: “[The Security Council] requests the Secretary General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible.”

<sup>6</sup>Yakov Borovi and Dmitry, “Shatt al-Arab: The Price of Those 192 Kilometres, *New Times* (Moscow), no. 37 (September 1988), p. 7.

<sup>7</sup>*Saudi Gazette*, August 11, 1988.

<sup>8</sup>*Khaleej Times*, August 8, 1988.

Arab Emirates, immediately sent messages to the Iranians for the improvement of relations. Even Kuwait, which had become an active partner of Iraq during the war, established contacts with the regime in Iran. The Saudis also softened their diplomatic stance toward Iran. There is every indication that the material and economic support the Iraqis received from the Arab countries will not be available to them in the future. The reasons for these postwar changes rise from a number of causes.

Although the Arab countries of the Gulf were apprehensive of the developments in Iran, as already mentioned, at the same time they would not accept the ruthless Baathist regime of Iraq to dictate policies in interregional as well as extraregional affairs. Still further, Iran has proven to the entire region that it has the capacity to withstand the consistent joint pressure exercised during the war. In other words, Iran is too important a country to be ignored by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. At least two of the Gulf nations, Oman and the UAE, were compelled by circumstances to give verbal support to the policies of the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council. Left to themselves, these two countries would have displayed different policies.

Given past experience and as the present developments are taking place, there are fairly strong indications that the post-ceasefire Persian Gulf regional system will be based on new alignments. The change in policies by the Arab countries will be a serious setback for the Iraqis, who were able to enjoy material as well as military support from their fellow Arab regimes during the eight-year war with Iran.

Under the circumstances, we can identify at least three factors that concern U.S. interests in the region: (1) The U.S. naval presence in the waters of the Persian Gulf will serve no other purpose than to embarrass their allies inside and outside the region. If they insist on the showing of their military might in the Gulf, the Americans will invite a backlash from the regional nations, and in this context the pressure on the ruling elites by the general population of the Arab societies will increase. The people of these countries will certainly question the logic of the American show of naval force when the direct military threat of Iran no longer exists. (2) The U.S. government, in the ultimate analysis, has lost the edge it enjoyed before the Iran-Iraq War. The Americans had attained a position of near monopoly in the supply of armaments to their Arab allies in the Persian Gulf, but the strains and tensions of war drifted events into a different direction. During the closing stages of the war, the Chinese were able to introduce themselves as effective arms merchants, a role they have been trying unsuccessfully to fill for decades. (3) The establishment of contacts by the Arab allies with the Soviet Union is also a development that needs serious evaluation by American planners. All three outcomes are the result

of the overcommitment of American interests in the area along with the rising expectations of the regional countries—a situation that the United States might not be able to tackle with assurance.

Even in the past, when conflicts in the Persian Gulf regional subsystem were at their peak, the American naval presence in the area was a source of annoyance for the policy planners of Pakistan. Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1987, stated: "The growing involvement of the great powers in the Gulf carries grave portents." He went on to say that the "security of the Gulf is the responsibility of the states of the Gulf themselves." The premises on which Pakistan was basing its argument for the removal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan was weakened by the American military hostility in the region, especially when Iran's oil platforms were destroyed and their ships attacked. The government of Pakistan issued a strongly worded statement at the time of the downing of the Iranian airline civilian plane on July 3, 1988, which cost 290 innocent lives, including more than 45 children.

The shocking factor in the merciless massacre of the Iraqi Kurds has been the apathetic attitude of the people of the Western European countries and the United States, who were the main supporters of Iraqi policies in the Gulf war. When the Iraqis continued the massacre by using gas bombs even after the war was over, however, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution on September 8, 1988, condemning Iraqi brutality and passed a bill to impose sanctions against that country.<sup>9</sup> Instead of persuading Iraq to refrain from barbaric acts against its Kurd citizens, the Arab League denounced "Western criticisms of Iraq" and assured Iraq of its support.<sup>10</sup> An editorial in the *Washington Post* describes American disillusion with their ally in the Persian Gulf war. The editorial stated:

Perhaps Iraq cannot see that the gas is going to add yet another element of bitterness and unforgiveness to the passion of the Kurds in years to come. In any event, the gas makes it out of the question for the United States and any other country with a pretense of respect for basic decencies to accept the ostensibly newly "moderate" Iraqi government as a partner in the post-Gulf-war world.<sup>11</sup>

In another comment in the *New York Times*, the plight of the Kurds and the indifferent attitude of world opinion was discussed at length. In the

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<sup>9</sup>*The Economist*, September 17, 1988, p. 49.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>"Gassing the Kurds," Editorial, *The Washington Post*, quoted in *Guardian Weekly*, September 18, 1988.

writer's opinion, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Third World states did not utter a word of protest because of their selfish interests.<sup>12</sup>

During the Persian Gulf war, the Americans needed Iraqi contacts in the Gulf to oppose Iran as much as the Iraqis needed American support. At the same time, however, the Iraqis saw to it that they did not drift away from the Soviets. The Iraqi regime did not oppose the USSR invasion of Afghanistan and abstained whenever it came to United Nations voting on that country.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, a "careful" contact was established between the two countries through occasional exchange of visits and messages.

The Soviet strategy during the war and even after the ceasefire will be to supplement its efforts whenever they find the Americans have lapsed. In the recent past, as noted, because of U.S. overinvolvement in the region, the Persian Gulf regimes had begun to fear a backlash from their populations. To counter the impression of being too closely connected with the United States, they have begun to act as if they prefer to follow a policy of comparative neutrality between the two superpowers. The Saudis, who do not even have diplomatic relations with the Soviets, had arranged a visit of their foreign minister to Moscow by the end of 1987.<sup>14</sup> By responding to the Gulf Arab countries, the Soviets were hopeful that opposition to their Afghan policy might relax. The Russians at one stage even supplied Iraq with long-range missiles that were used against the Iranian cities. The aim was to placate the Arab countries of the Gulf at the time when the American image among the Arab masses had been damaged as a consequence of their policies toward the Palestinians.<sup>15</sup>

Pakistan's overreliance on the United States, especially in the field of military material and huge economic aid, restricted its maneuvering capacities in directing its policies in the Persian Gulf region. Pakistan's diplomatic activities were curtailed toward its Western neighbors because the country was perceived as moving too close to U.S. policies and therefore untrustworthy. Under these circumstances, the Pakistani government could not even play the role of honest broker in the Persian Gulf conflict. The crisis had taken on proportions that called for extraordinary diplomatic skills and a popular/strong national leadership. Ironically, Pakistani policymakers chose to remain aloof from the war. This aloofness,

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<sup>12</sup>"Shame on Baghdad," *The New York Times*, Editorial, quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, September 12, 1988.

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 42/15, November 9, 1987.

<sup>14</sup>Aly Mahmoud, "Saudis Move Closer to Soviet Union," *Tehran Times*, February 2, 1988.

<sup>15</sup>Syed Farooq Hasnat, "Iran-Iraq War and the Regional Security System of the Persian Gulf," *Strategic Studies* 40, 4 (Summer 1988): 65.

which in no way corresponded with the concept of active neutrality, created misunderstandings not only with the Iranian regime but also with such friendly Gulf states as Saudi Arabia. It could not be predicted that the Saudis would abruptly ask for the withdrawal of Pakistani armed personnel from their territory.

The ultimate tragedy of Pakistan's role in the Persian Gulf war has been that it lost control over the events. It can be argued that Pakistan along with Turkey could have applied pressure to end the Gulf war long before it had prolonged itself to eight years. The continued combined efforts of these two countries could have generated a force difficult to ignore by the countries of the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps the only commendable policy position that Pakistan adopted was to invite the Iranian President to Pakistan. As a consequence, trade and a wide range of cooperation agreements were signed between the two nations on October 29, 1987.<sup>16</sup> During the last phase of the Gulf War, the Iranian government was able to convince the Pakistani government to grant it port facilities at Karachi and from there to transfer goods to Iran by railway and trucks. Iran cannot be ignored in Pakistan's security concerns, nor can the importance of that country be undermined in its role in the Persian Gulf regional system. On the other side, it can be argued that more efforts should have been applied to create a policy of better understanding toward Pakistan's western neighbor.

The Pakistani planners must give serious thought to the position they adopt after the ceasefire becomes effective. Past mistakes can be amended by making serious efforts to adopt a role in that region that Pakistan not only deserves but was able to execute in the past. Iran is now starting its reconstruction program, and there is plenty of goodwill in that country for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan for its part can respond in a manner that can ultimately lead toward more cooperation and coordination of policies between the two countries as well as other regional partners in the Persian Gulf regional subsystem.

### *The Non-Arab Middle East Subsystem*

I have already briefly described the fundamentals on which the ties among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey are based. I discussed Pakistan-Iran relations while dealing with that country under the Persian Gulf regional subsystem. Here I intend to expose those factors that are relevant to

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<sup>16</sup>*Jang* (Urdu Daily), October 30, 1987.

Pakistan's relations with Iran in a different perspective. Pakistan's President Mohammad Ayub Khan, addressing the Iranian Senate in November 1959, said:

Our two nations are no strangers to each other, our friendship is nothing new. Our links are steeped in history. We share the same faith and are heirs to a common cultural heritage. Your language and literature has for centuries been a source of inspiration to our people. We have drunk deep at the fountain of the Iranian culture and it has left indelible marks on our every day life. . . . Your classics are our classics. Your heroes are our heroes, your friends are our friends and our enemies are your enemies. It is not only through a common culture and religious heritage that our nations are linked together—historically we have been one nation in the past, geographically we have a common border and ethnologically we are of the same stock.<sup>17</sup>

These are equally applicable to Turkish society. I would like once again to emphasize here that geographical proximity is not an absolute condition for political, economic, and social integration, although such a geographical setting can become a helpful factor for regional cooperation. Other ingredients, as highlighted while quoting the speech of President Ayub Khan, are the basic conditions for a commonality of purpose and policies.

Pakistan's support of Turkey on the Cyprus question goes back to 1963 when the Pakistani foreign minister said: "We are with Turkey in her moments of crisis and whenever cooperation may be needed from Pakistan [it] will be extended in the fullest measure."<sup>18</sup> Pakistan gave its full support to Turkey once again when the latter's army moved in Cyprus to put an end to an attempt by Greek Cypriots to merge their island nation with Greece in 1974. When Prime Minister Junejo visited Turkey in July 1986, he reaffirmed to the Turkish leaders Pakistan's support for the establishment of "an independent, sovereign, bi-zonal bi-communal, Federal Republic of Cyprus."<sup>19</sup> No other country has supported Turkey on Cyprus in such clear terms as Pakistan has done.

There has been a constant exchange of views between the two countries on various issues. Both have supported each other's policy

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<sup>17</sup>*Iran: Neighbor, Brother, and Friend*, The Department of Films and Publication, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1967, p. 12, as quoted in Zia H. Hashmi, *Iran, Pakistan and Turkey: Regional Integration and Economic Development* (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1979), p. 71.

<sup>18</sup>Naveed Ahmed, "Pakistan-Turkey Relations," *Pakistan Horizon* 34, 1 (First Quarter, 1981): 119.

<sup>19</sup>"Chronology," *Pakistan Horizon* 39, 4 (Fourth Quarter, 1986).

positions. A press statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Junejo's visit stated:

The two Prime Ministers emphasized the importance of diversification and expansion of two-way trade between Turkey and Pakistan, the promotion of joint ventures and cooperation between the two countries in the public and private sectors and the conclusion of an agreement between the two governments to facilitate direct shipping services.<sup>20</sup>

Both Iran and Turkey granted support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue whenever the need arose. On March 6, 1955, the Iranian representative to the United Nations, supporting the Pakistani position on Kashmir, said: "Ninety percent of the people of Kashmir are Muslims and have ties of common culture, tradition and religion with Iran. As such the Muslim world and in particular, the people of Iran cannot remain indifferent to their lot." We should not forget that these sentiments were expressed when the regime in Iran was pursuing secular policies. On September 8, 1965, during the war with India, the Turkish Prime Minister issued a statement condemning the Indian hostilities and "therefore, the suffering felt by Pakistanis are shared by the Turkish nation." Similar support was extended by the Iranians. This support to Pakistan was not confined to verbal statements but extended far beyond.

The goodwill between Iran and Turkey on one hand and Pakistan on the other has been tested by the tide of history. The common purpose of friendship between these three non-Arab countries was necessary at the time when President Nasser of Egypt was advocating the concept of Arab nationalism to its maximum. At that moment in Middle Eastern history where the problem of the leadership of the Arab nations had become a source of stiff contention between different Arab countries, relations among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey flourished.

Arab leaders, when they advocate pan-Arabism to its "extreme," do not realize that by taking such steps they not only isolate themselves in their tackling of much bigger problems, such as the Palestinian issue, but ultimately isolate themselves in the international and regional arenas.

Assessed from the security as well as the economic and political interests of Pakistan, relations with these two non-Arab countries are serious and deep. A stronger Iran as well as Turkey would always be a source of satisfaction for the security of Pakistan. In any protracted war with India in which the Indian navy blockaded Pakistan's ports, the only reliable supply line by rail and road would be through Iran and Turkey. Under these compulsions, Pakistan must adopt a policy of actively

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<sup>20</sup>*Dawn*, July 19, 1986.

strengthening the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and expanding it to include such other subjects as joint ventures in defense production and adoption of a common position in regional as well as international matters.

All the three countries have expressed their desire to strengthen and promote collaboration on a multilateral basis. In January 1984, the Iranian government proposed to revive the RCD but under a new nomenclature.<sup>21</sup> On September 10, the Pakistani Federal Cabinet gave its approval and the same response came from the Turks. The prime ministers of Pakistan and Turkey agreed that “the framework of cooperation being evolved by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) would make a meaningful contribution towards further expanding the scope and scale of cooperation between the three brotherly member states.”<sup>22</sup>

The Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his desire that the ECO “should work more actively for boosting cooperation among Turkey, Pakistan and Iran.”<sup>23</sup> The Iranian government has always been keen to advocate better relations between the three countries with the ECO as its foundation. On a visit to Pakistan in January 1986, the President of Iran said that the ECO should become a kind of broad-based Common Market. For its part, the Pakistani government showed equal interest in this multilateral cooperation. The President of Pakistan described it as a “milestone” in the promotion of economic relations between the three nations.<sup>24</sup>

The ECO has shown increasing activity since 1986. A number of discussion sessions are held on a regular basis to explore possibilities of coordination in such fields as shipping, airlines, farm machinery, tariff preference, telecommunications, joint ventures, and other economic related matters. The High Council of the organization met in Tehran in June 1987 and made certain important decisions—for example, to “introduce a system of tariff preferences among member countries to promote inter-regional trade.” A Foreign Office spokesman said that the Council meeting “considered the measures to boost trade among the three countries. In this connection a time bound program of tariff preferences was agreed to be initiated by the end of this year [1986] on experimental basis.”

Apart from the formation of the ECO and its present limited purpose,

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<sup>21</sup>After the Revolution the Iranians expressed apprehension about the RCD, but the organization was never dissolved. In fact, the ECO started from the point where the RCD faded away.

<sup>22</sup>Press Statement issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Junejo's visit to Turkey, July 13, 1986; *Dawn*, July 14, 1986.

<sup>23</sup>*Dawn*, July 27, 1986.

<sup>24</sup>Sabiha Hasan, “Pakistan Foreign Policy Quarterly Survey,” *Pakistan Horizon* 39, 1 (First Quarter, 1986): 15.

Pakistan has also been dealing with these two countries on a bilateral basis. Because of Pakistan's involvement with the crisis in Afghanistan and its "overconcentration" on normalization of ties with India, relations with these two countries were insufficiently nurtured to be able to fulfill its national interests. Only during the last months of President Zia-ul-Haq's rule were the people of Pakistan spared the agony of unsuccessful and unwarranted policy with the country's eastern neighbor. Because of the misjudged policies, much lost ground has to be regained in pursuit of the desired policy direction.

Pakistan and Iran are already joint owners of two textile mills in Bolan and Lasbela in Pakistani Baluchistan. Although the mills are closed at present, the workers have been paid regularly for the last several years. In more favorable circumstances in the future, the project may start functioning again. Similarly, the Turkish government has shown keen interest in cooperating with Pakistan in the manufacture of arms and investing in the armament industry in Pakistan. The Pakistan-Turkish interest in joint armament ventures goes well back in history. In a treaty signed between the two countries on April 2, 1954, it was agreed in Article 4 that

consultation and co-operation between the contracting parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points: (a) Exchange of information for the purpose of deriving joint benefit from technical experience and progress. (b) Endeavors to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the parties in the production of arms and ammunition.<sup>25</sup>

The basic advantage of joint ventures and policies is that these can become an effective deterrent force for the security of all three countries. The basis of Pakistan's relations with Iran and Turkey are embedded in fertile soil. The foundation on which cooperation between these three neighboring non-Arab countries can be built are the realistic considerations that promote their mutual interests.

Although the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis goes back three wars in history, a new dimension was added on December 9, 1987, when an uprising sparked rioting on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The occupied areas, with a population of 1.3 million, protested against an incident—a truck accident that killed four Palestinians—that in routine terms was of little consequence. There are a number of underlying reasons why the revolt was triggered.

Relations between the Palestinian population of these two territories and the illegal Israeli settlers have always been tense, with cases of

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<sup>25</sup>*Treaties and Alliances of the World*, 4th ed. Compiled and written by Henry W. Degenhardt; a Keesing's Reference Publication (Essex: Longmans, 1986), p. 407.

mistreatment and violent clashes between the two communities in which a number of lives have been lost. With the passage of time, the Israeli authorities made special efforts to encourage Jewish settlements with the purpose of legitimizing their illegal control over the occupied territory. The increase in Jewish settlers had been dramatic. For example, the number had risen from 3,000 in 1977 to about 40,000 by the end of 1987. This is in addition to the about 80,000 Jewish residents of East Jerusalem. To make matters worse for the Palestinians of the occupied areas, there is a plan by the Jewish Agency to equalize the population of the two communities by the year 2000.

Before the uprising, the "forgotten Palestinians" were in a state of disarray. The pressures on the Palestinian people had mounted enormously in equal proportions from both "friends" and foes. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, accepted by the United Nations as the "sole representative of the Palestinians," is now faced with multitudinous problems. First, it has to cope with the Zionists in the form of the state of Israel. Second, the circumstances leading the stalemate in Lebanon indicate that the Palestinians do not have dependable allies. Third, it must adopt some sort of a compromise that maintains a balance between preserving their right to exist as a nation with a homeland (which is at present unacceptable to Israel) and simultaneously adhering to a policy of moderation to achieve this by accepting otherwise "unpopular devices."

The infighting within the ranks of the PLO along with the lack of seriousness among the concerned Arab states left no option for the Palestinians of the occupied territories but to rely on their own might and resources. Since 1967, the occupation had become more and more unbearable for the Palestinians, especially the youth. Israeli soldiers had been tough and unreasonable whenever a protest was launched by the Palestinians, however genuine it might have been. To make matters worse, the "settlers" kept themselves busy by methods of vigilantism. The extreme elements terrorized the helpless Arab population with their sophisticated weapons, while the Arabs responded with rock barrages and buckets of boiling water from the rooftops. The Israeli soldiers were available to support the atrocities of the Jewish occupiers.

The uprising of the Palestinian people in the Israeli-occupied areas compelled international forces to react in order to examine the possibilities of a permanent solution to the problem. The Israeli argument of "crushing" the movement in due course of time has lost its creditability even with its closest friend, the United States.

The then U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, made a series of trips to the Middle East in March, April, and June of 1988 to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Shultz met a number of leaders with whom he

had a series of discussions and reaffirmed on April 5 that "direct negotiations between Israel and its neighbors should be held." Shultz, representing the American government, was of the view that the Palestinians should be represented with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He explained his peace plan in the following words: "The basis of any negotiating process is [the U.N. Security Council] Resolution and its call for the exchange of territory for peace."<sup>26</sup>

Israel, however, stuck to its old stand that it would not negotiate with the PLO. The Jordanian side, on the other hand, said that it would insist on an international conference giving weight to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as well as the parties to the conflict. A statement issued by the Jordanian government said that Jordan as a sovereign country is ready to attend an international peace conference with all concerned parties. Jordan, it was made clear, would not represent the Palestinian people at the conference and would not negotiate as a substitute for the PLO in a settlement of the Palestinian issue.<sup>27</sup>

### *The Core of Continuing Tensions Subsystem*

The Palestinian response to Shultz's peace initiative so far has been one of rejection. The Palestinians regard the American peace plan as a ploy to defuse the popular uprising in the occupied territories. At the same time, however, in June 1988, the PLO proposed to Israel for negotiations for settlement of the problem. The Israelis rejected the offer, saying that they would talk only with Jordan regarding the Palestinian problem.<sup>28</sup>

On July 30, 1988, King Hussein of Jordan dissolved the parliament, which was half comprised of members from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. In another move, the King of Jordan took other steps, such as scrapping the developmental program for the West Bank. In other words, as the Jordanian politicians said: "The move was intended to leave the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the Palestinian people's sole representative in any Middle East peace negotiations."<sup>29</sup> By the middle of September, the Palestinian leadership was exploring the possibilities of setting up a Palestinian state on the West Bank and forming a government in exile. According to one opinion, the latest developments would "lead to a two-State solution within Palestine—a Palestine State and Israel. This would automatically amend the original PLO charter which envisages a

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<sup>26</sup>*Khaleej Times*, June 5, 1988.

<sup>27</sup>*Dawn*, June 20, 1988.

<sup>28</sup>*Dawn*, June 18, 1988.

<sup>29</sup>*Khaleej Times*, August 1, 1988.

single secular state for the whole of Palestine. It would thus eliminate the long-standing Zionist objection that Israelis cannot be expected to negotiate with a people who stand for the liquidation of Israel.”<sup>30</sup>

The youth of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have clearly strengthened the PLO leadership. The emergence of Islamic groups within the uprising has also added a new dimension to the Palestinian issue. Although the PLO has projected a secular identity, the new situation “remains too fluid to allow for fixed strategies.”<sup>31</sup>

Pakistan has always supported the Palestinian struggle for an independent homeland. A recent statement by the Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his concern for the Palestinians, who have become a victim of terror and brutal treatment by the Israeli forces. The statement stressed that the “Government and people of Pakistan reiterate their strong and unequivocal condemnation of Israel’s inhuman and barbaric actions.”<sup>32</sup>

For the success of the peace talks acceptable to all concerned parties, the United States must persuade Israel to give full autonomy to the occupied land as a gesture of goodwill. In the second stage, the United Nations should be allowed to administer the West Bank and the Gaza Strip until a final settlement is concluded. This gesture might become the forerunner of a comprehensive and permanent peace in the Middle East.

### *The Maghreb Subsystem*

The five Maghreb states of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania have a fairly long history of distrust and conflict with each other. The regional as well as international alignments have been of diverse nature and so has been the economic and governmental structure of each nation. Recent months, however, have seen a series of activities designed by the five North African, Middle Eastern, and Maghreb subsystem nations to create an atmosphere of trust with each other.

The major cause of tension was the problem of Western (Spanish) Sahara. Moroccans claimed the territory as the Spanish withdrew in November 1975. The Algerian-backed Polisario Front proclaimed an independent Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976. The other half of the Western Sahara was given to Mauritania, but as the Polisario guerrillas increased their pressure the Mauritanian government, feeling the economic burden in defense expenditure, withdrew its claim from the

<sup>30</sup>“PLO and Israel: New Options,” Editorial, *Dawn*, September 10, 1988.

<sup>31</sup>Sajid Rizvi, “Palestinians: What Ferment, What Form?” *Turkish Daily News*, February 13–14, 1988.

<sup>32</sup>“Statement of the Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo,” January 25, 1988; *Dawn*, January 26, 1988.

southern sector in 1979. In the recent past, the parties to the conflict—Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria—have agreed to conduct talks as arranged by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The Libyan government has been the most active partner in advocating the “merger” objective. In the past, attempts were made by the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, with other Arab as well as non-Arab countries for either a merger scheme or confederation or even abolition of visas. The basic Libyan desire was to form a confederation with the Egyptians. The initial success of this plan after Nasser’s death in 1970 led to a Federation of Arab Republics among Egypt, Libya, and Syria, but no solid foundation was laid for a long-term organizational structure. Soon after this attempt at unity, in fact, there was a total break of relations between Egypt and Libya. Perhaps the Libyan leader was too idealistic for the Egyptian leaders, who at that time were giving thought to making some kind of settlement with the Israelis.

Pakistan’s relations with Libya flourished from the February 1974 Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore to the time of Prime Minister Bhutto’s deposition in 1977. Muammar Qaddafi was given a rousing reception by the people of Pakistan and a “half million people greeted the charismatic colonel on his arrival in Karachi.”<sup>33</sup> At a public meeting in the Lahore sports stadium (which even today retains the name Qaddafi Stadium) the Libyan leader announced: “Our strength is your strength, our resources are your resources.”<sup>34</sup> He signed the cooperation agreement and stayed in Pakistan beyond his scheduled program.

Pakistan provided manpower to Libya, which also included military and air force instructors. According to one assessment, “In 1981 Tripoli was the city with the largest percentage Pakistani population outside Pakistan (though less in number than in London, their proportion to the local population was higher in Tripoli).”<sup>35</sup>

Relations between the two countries, however, began to deteriorate after 1977, and the Libyan government was alleged to have given refuge to a terrorist organization, al-Zulfiqar. The government of Pakistan could not find enough evidence that this organization was funded by the Libyan government.

By 1986, the Libyan government made gestures signaling a desire to improve relations with Pakistan. The cause that might have triggered this change of attitude was the Pakistani condemnation of the U.S. attack on

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<sup>33</sup>Weinbaum and Sen, “Pakistan Enters the Middle East,” p. 602.

<sup>34</sup>*Dawn*, February 26, 1974.

<sup>35</sup>Devlet Khalid, “Pakistan’s Relations with Iran, Arab States,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 5, 3 (Spring 1982).

Libya. The statement issued on April 15, 1986, by Prime Minister Junejo read as follows:

I am dismayed and distressed by the bombing raids carried out by U.S. aircraft against targets in Libya, a brotherly Islamic state.

The Government and people of Pakistan share the profound grief of the people of Libya at the unwarranted action taken by the U.S. Government. We extend our sincere sympathy at the grievous loss of life and destruction of property suffered by the Libyan people.<sup>36</sup>

Pakistan's policy (before 1977) toward the Maghreb region was of a high-level frequency. In February 1977, Prime Minister Bhutto offered his services to mediate between Algeria and Morocco. It was an indication that Pakistan considered the Maghreb region an important focus of its foreign policy options. This support goes back to 1974, when Pakistan supported Morocco in clear terms when that country developed tensions with Spain. The readjustments that are taking place in that region in pursuit of regional unity are of great interest to Pakistan, which is aware that unity at a microlevel in the Middle East region can lead to broader cooperation.

### *The Periphery Subsystem*

Pakistani contacts with certain Middle Eastern states have not been active. This circumstance can be attributed either to the underdevelopment of the economic systems of the countries or the fact that the security interests of Pakistan do not demand active coordination with them. Pakistan does not have much in common with South Yemen. Although close to the coast of Pakistan, this Arab country is under the control of the Soviet Union to an extent that even the day-to-day activities of the Democratic Republic of Yemen are dictated by the USSR.

Despite Soviet efforts, South Yemen remains underdeveloped, and its political system operates on a tribal basis. The coup of January 1986 and the civil war that followed are reminders of the malfunction of political institutions in that country. South Yemen has become a liability for the Soviets, in both economic and military terms. In international relations, South Yemen has always voted against the resolution for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, whereas an Eastern European country like Romania abstained on this matter.

The President of North Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, paid an official visit to Pakistan in December 1986. The Yemeni delegation included twelve members headed by the Minister of Economy, Supply and Commerce. The visit resulted in the establishment of a Joint Ministerial Commission for the

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<sup>36</sup>*Pakistan Times*, April 16, 1986.

expansion of trade as well as joint efforts to promote understanding in educational and cultural sectors. At the commission's first meeting on February 27, 1988, a protocol was signed confined to trade and technical ties between the two countries. This understanding between the two countries was the first of its kind.<sup>37</sup>

Pakistan has limited interaction with the other peripheral states, but a comment by Pakistan's former foreign minister is appropriate here. Writing on Pakistan's relations with Somalia, he notes that Somalia supported Pakistan in the Security Council during the 1971 war with India in spite of the heavy Soviet pressure to discourage that country. According to the writer, the Somalian act to support Pakistan in its crucial period in history is a "remarkable testimony to the solidarity of the Muslim countries with Pakistan."<sup>38</sup>

## Conclusion

The challenge confronted by the Middle East regional system at the macro level, and that of its subsystems at a more confined level, has complicated implications. A variety of issues must be confronted and those also of a nature that carries with it a series of reactions. The sociopolitical structure of the countries of the region is such that the investigation to find a solution to the problem of war and peace, conflict and accommodation becomes a difficult exercise.

We have oil-producing "superrich" nations with either few or inadequate institutions to support their newly acquired wealth. Most of the countries (with the exception of Iran, Turkey, and Israel) do not even have a concept of institutions that can fulfill the desires of their population. There are no legislative bodies in which the representatives of the people can discuss problems of mutual interest; in most, the whims of either a ruling family or a highly centralized party control the affairs, in defiance of human rights, dignity, and respect. The malfunction of political institutions in particular remains the cause of most of the problems.

A society cannot achieve genuine integration when people belonging to different sects, ethnic groups, and economic backgrounds are not channeled toward a common goal. Attempting to eliminate an ethnic minority with poison gas has not succeeded in the past, nor will it achieve the desired results in the future. Half-hearted attempts to establish popular institutions in the Middle Eastern countries could not prove successful and failed at various times in the past.

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<sup>37</sup>*Dawn*, February 27, 1988.

<sup>38</sup>Agha Shahi, *Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Progressive Publications, 1988), p. 322.

Another problem the Middle East nations confront is their heavy dependence on foreign resources. This dependence is either on extra-regional powers or on the multinational corporations. The oil-rich nations, in particular, have become the biggest buyers of armaments from different sources, especially the Western world. These nations have armed themselves to the teeth, but the unfortunate fact is that these activities are carried out with no thorough assessment of their consequences. Although their armament arsenal might impress an observer on paper, in reality it is a self-defeating exercise. Acquiring arms without technology even to maintain these systems has made these countries totally dependent on foreign powers. This dependence promotes outside interference in political as well as in defense arrangements.

On the other extreme, there are countries facing enormous problems of poverty and ignorance. Because of lack of financial resources, a proper solution is yet to be found to overcome such deficiencies.

The Middle East societies comprise a variety of ethnic and racial components that in most cases overlap each other. This criss-crossing of ethnic, racial, and religious groups and sects has been a source of tension in the region in the past, and these elements in the management of relations between the states of the Middle East have been exploited by interested parties. There are frequent examples where the ruling elites of a country have been able to extend their influence beyond their geographical boundaries. An easy solution to this problem is yet to be discovered.


With the increase in regional tensions, the interests of the extraregional powers became focused on the area. The involvement of the superpowers increased after the 1973 oil embargo as the dependency on oil by the Western nations and Japan intensified. The United States was able to enhance its capacity and influence to help manage these problems. The Soviets, on the other hand, enjoyed a marginal influence over events, especially after the shift in policy by the Egyptians after 1973.

Because of its effectiveness in managing regional developments, the United States has to accept the major responsibility for the tensions created in the form of Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the solving of the Lebanon puzzle; and the easing of tensions in the Persian Gulf region by withdrawing its naval forces. To begin with, U.S. policymakers must make an extraordinary gesture toward Iran in the form of releasing its frozen assets and declaring total neutrality in the affairs of the Persian Gulf. The United States should encourage its "dependent" allies like the Saudis, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt to expand their political institutions so that the common people can be involved in decision making in their respective societies.

The Middle Eastern countries must be convinced in turn that they

should have less dependence on the extraregional powers as well as on the armament industrial interests of the conventional as well as the newly emerging arms exporters. That goes for economic as well as for procurement of armaments in huge quantities.

The only viable source of strength and prosperity lies in the mutual arrangements in which the Middle Eastern region along with Pakistan can establish a collaborative system. A system based on the principles of trust and equality and, above all, the utility of self-sufficiency must become the guideline for the policymakers of the Middle Eastern region. In order to achieve that, the ruling elites must "open up" their societies by establishing viable socioeconomic and political systems. The involvement of the masses in the affairs of policy making is a basic guarantee for a stable society. In this respect, Pakistan must play its part in encouraging the establishment of a broadbased unity, relying on better understanding of the masses and governments of the entire Middle Eastern region.



**Part Six**  
**The Afghanistan Conflict**



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## 12. Afghanistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations: An American View

THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.

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Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the reemergence of Afghanistan as an independent state will have an important effect on relations between Pakistan and the United States. This chapter will examine the current situation in Afghanistan, prospects for the future of that country, and the international repercussions of the Soviet withdrawal. It should be stressed at the outset that it is being revised for publication in January 1989, when the Soviet withdrawal is not complete, the internal political situation in Afghanistan is in flux, a new government is just getting established in Pakistan, and George Bush is just taking over the American presidency. The observations here are therefore highly speculative, informed only by the author's personal experiences in Afghanistan and by the writings and speculations of his Afghan acquaintances and of foreign observers of the Afghan scene.

### **The Current Situation**

#### *Military*

The Soviets appear to be withdrawing their ground forces in accordance with the Geneva Accords of April 14, 1988. In fact, as they indicated at that time, during the summer they withdraw about half the forces that were in Afghanistan as of the date, May 15, when the Accords came into effect. The withdrawal is scheduled to be completed by February 15, 1989, and it appears that the Soviets intend to meet that deadline.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviets have not, however, hesitated to employ their forces in situations where the Afghan resistance has moved into major towns in the wake of their withdrawal. They have struck back with both ground and air forces in support of their Afghan ally, the puppet government headed by Najibullah in Kabul, and these actions have included air strikes by Soviet

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<sup>1</sup>Statements concerning current events are taken from news reports.

aircraft based in the Soviet Union. Soviet actions have resulted in heavy civilian casualties as well as in the retreat of resistance forces. As the Soviet withdrawal progressed, they also launched heavy air attacks on resistance strongholds along their evacuation routes.

The Soviets have also continued to provide the Najibullah regime with military equipment and supplies. The Soviets have been supplying ammunition, armored fighting vehicles, transport aircraft, artillery, and SCUD surface-to-surface missiles. In May 1988, they announced that they were leaving behind "facilities and equipment" valued at \$1 billion.<sup>2</sup> Subsequent shipments have increased that amount substantially.

When the Geneva Accords were negotiated, the United States proposed that the Soviet Union join in a moratorium on further shipments of military supplies to any of the Afghan parties. The Soviets declined to accept this proposal, and the United States therefore insisted on exercising its right to continue to supply the resistance.<sup>3</sup> In his speech before the U.N. General Assembly on December 7, 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev belatedly proposed a cessation of arms deliveries to the belligerents.<sup>4</sup> He linked this proposal to a ceasefire that was rejected by the Afghan resistance.

The Soviets have attempted to build a record of what they term Pakistani and American violations of the Geneva Accords. The Najibullah regime has, as of this writing, handed scores of protests to the Kabul office of the U.N. Good Offices Mission on Pakistan and Afghanistan (UNGOMOPA). Pakistan and the United States have denied any violations.

As has been the case throughout the Afghan war, the Soviets have pressured Pakistan to cease its support of the resistance. Cross-border air attacks on Pakistani territory have continued. Soviet official pronouncements are severe. For example, a statement on August 16, 1988, said that "the Soviet Government states with the utmost determination that Pakistan's continuation of its obstructionist line toward the Geneva agreements cannot continue to be tolerated. In that event, the Soviet Union reserves the right to take the measures which the situation dictates."<sup>5</sup>

As the withdrawal deadline approached, Soviet diplomacy went into

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<sup>2</sup>Statement of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael H. Armacost, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 1988, Department of State press release no. 1087.

<sup>3</sup>Statement of Secretary of State George Shultz, April 11, 1988, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1988, p. 54.

<sup>4</sup>From the text of Gorbachev's address carried in the *New York Times*, December 8, 1988, p. A6.

<sup>5</sup>Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report—Soviet Union* (FBIS-SOV), August 16, 1988, pp. 20–21.

high gear. Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov was appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan and engaged in a frantic shuttle of diplomacy, including talks in Islamabad with Pakistani officials; in Islamabad, Teheran, and Taif with leaders of the resistance; with exiled Afghan King Zahir in Rome; and with the Najibullah government in Kabul. Foreign Minister Shevernadze and Defense Minister Yazov each visited Kabul in January 1989. At the United Nations Gorbachev appealed not only for a ceasefire and a halt to arms shipments but also for an international conference and a U.N. peacekeeping force. All this activity was aimed at finding a place in a future Afghan government for the Soviets' protégés. The resistance, now convinced that they had won the war, that the Soviets were leaving, and that the Najibullah government would fall, rejected all these proposals.

The Soviet government has also found it necessary to explain to the Soviet people why it is withdrawing its forces with no assurance that the the most revealing pieces appeared in *Izvestia* on December 23, 1988. Written by "Political Observer" A. Bovin, it merits quotation at some length. Bovin says that he went to Afghanistan in November asking the

same old damned question. Why was it that the people who took power in April 1978 failed to make use of it and, by enlisting the support of the people and the peasants, pull Afghanistan out of its backwardness and restructure society on new and fair principles? Why was it that the huge and all-around assistance from the Soviet Union, including the sending of an army of 100,000 men, failed to produce the consolidation and stabilization of the post-April political regime?<sup>6</sup>

Bovin attempts to answer his questions for the enlightenment of his readers. He says that the "good intentions" of those who carried out the April 1978 "military coup" "were blocked by the euphoria, the dogmatic and vulgar interpretation of Marxism, and the detachment from reality that followed the seizure of power." He mentions in this regard the Kabul regime's "persecution of religion, the scornful attitude toward tribal traditions, the hasty nationalization of many medium and small enterprises, the mass repressions that claimed as victims the Islamic clergy, the intelligentsia and entrepreneurs, and the monopolization of power by a narrow clique." All these problems, he adds, were aggravated by the split in the Communist Party. He concludes this part of his analysis by saying: "Outside interference in Afghanistan's affairs did play a significant and fateful role. Nevertheless, the main reasons why the peasants took up arms and joined the counterrevolutionaries *were not external but rather domestic*" [italics added].

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<sup>6</sup>FBIS-SOV, December 23, 1988, pp. 24–26.

In subsequent years, Bovin continues, the Kabul regime performed better but continued to fail "to gain the trust of the mass." As a result, "it proved impossible to halt the flywheel of anti-government actions." He then discusses the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He "guesses" at its motives. First, he says, it was "to help a friendly regime in its struggle against outside interference." Second, it was "to prevent what was seen as a perfectly possible U.S. military presence in a region we considered to be so sensitive." "At that time," he writes,

I perceived the introduction of troops as an inevitable evil which would produce the maximum effect with minimum losses. But events turned out altogether differently. Despite our intentions, we found ourselves involved in an exhausting civil war. The intention was to fire at the "internal counterrevolution," but our bullets hit the Afghan peasantry. Initially the Soviet military presence served as a tonic to the new power, consolidated it and helped the recreation of the Afghan armed forces, but on the whole and taking a broad look at everything, the effect of the presence of Soviet troops and their participation in combat operations was negative. We ourselves presented the counterrevolution with powerful means to influence mass awareness: foreign interference engendered patriotism; the arrival of "infidels" set religious intolerance in motion. Against such a background, even a draw would have been a miracle. There was no miracle.

Continuing to describe the Soviet dilemma, Bovin writes that "if we did not withdraw, there would be no [national] reconciliation; and if we did withdraw, then reconciliation might or might not take place. This is the situation at the end of 1988 as far as I can understand."

This is an extraordinary confession of Soviet failure that would clearly not have seen the light of day before Gorbachevian *glasnost*. It confirms this author's long-held view that the principal reason for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to preserve in power a pro-Soviet regime, a variant of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is a clear admission that the Soviets failed in this objective, that they could not win the war against the Afghan resistance.

### *The Internal Political Situation*

Since the signing of the Accords in Geneva on April 14, 1988, there has been little progress in establishing a new political order in Afghanistan. The Najibullah regime has continued to call for a government of "national reconciliation" and has in fact pointed to the existence of five "independent" parties participating in the politics of its "Republic of Afghanistan" as well as to the fact that a nonmember of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is serving as Prime Minister. The regime urges the resistance to join in this "coalition government."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup>FBI-NES (Near East & South Asia), July 12, 1988, p. 44.

The resistance leaders have not been fooled by this effort by Najibullah to stay in power and have firmly rejected joining in a coalition with the communist regime. Among other things, the resistance knows that Najibullah's Prime Minister, Hasan Sharq, is a long-time sympathizer of the Parcham wing of the PDPA.<sup>8</sup> The resistance leaders have adopted a policy of waiting for the Soviets to withdraw in the belief that Najibullah and his cohorts will fall from power soon thereafter.

The United Nations mediator, Diego Cordovez, who painstakingly stitched together the Geneva Accords, was replaced in the autumn of 1988 by the Secretary General himself, Perez de Cuellar. Cordovez had lost credibility with the resistance leaders both because they had been excluded from the Geneva talks and because, in their eyes, his later proposals for coalition governments had appeared overly solicitous of the Najibullah regime. But even after his departure from the talks, the United Nations has been unable to bring about any rapprochement between the Kabul regime and the resistance or to spur the resistance into establishing an alternative government. As with Soviet diplomacy, U.N. diplomacy has foundered on the reality that the Soviets have lost the war and that the resistance will not compromise with the Soviets or their puppets in Kabul.

For their part, the resistance leaders continue to discuss among themselves future political arrangements in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of the Najibullah regime. As of January 1989, the Alliance parties in Peshawar were ostensibly planning to set up a council of the seven Alliance parties, resistance commanders inside the country, and other Afghans in exile abroad. The Alliance had also opened discussions with the Shiite resistance groups headquartered in Teheran. Arguments continued over the number of members of such a council that would be allocated to different groups, the only constant being that each of the seven Alliance parties would be equally represented. The failure of the resistance leaders to agree on a new governmental structure or a means for forming a government gives cause for great anxiety about prospects for fighting among the resistance groups after the Soviets leave. Such anxiety caused Western countries, including the United States, to withdraw the personnel from their embassies in Kabul in late January 1989.

### *Resettlement and Reconstruction*

There are approximately 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and perhaps another 2 million in Iran. An additional perhaps 2 million people have moved from the countryside into the major towns of Afghanistan, especially to Kabul. In addition, much of Afghanistan's prewar educated elite now resides in Europe and the United States.

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<sup>8</sup>The author knew him well when Sharq served in the Daoud government.

The Geneva Accords anticipate the return of the refugees to Afghanistan with the assistance of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. But very few to date have returned home. In the first place, they await the end of the fighting and the ouster of the communist regime from Kabul. They want assurance of safety and security, which they cannot have as the war continues even though large areas of the country have effectively been liberated.

An incredibly difficult problem affecting the return of the refugees concerns the innumerable antipersonnel mines that have been planted by both sides, but particularly by the Soviets, during the war. Some estimates place the number of mines in the millions, and these include everything from highly sophisticated mines, which are activated by vibration, to small toys that blow off the hands of children who pick them up. There have been reports of some refugees who have returned only to be injured or killed by mines in their home areas. Such reports dissuade other refugees from returning home.

The Soviets have shown great sensitivity to the problem of the mines. They claim that they are removing their minefields from areas they are evacuating and blame the resistance for most of the mines that remain.<sup>9</sup> But it is plain that the Soviets would be unable in the existing military situation to remove many of the mines even if they sincerely wished to do so.

At the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the former High Commissioner for Refugees, has undertaken the enormous task of coordinating relief and rehabilitation programs for the returning refugees. He has estimated the financial need for such programs to be almost \$1.2 billion for the first eighteen months, followed by an additional \$840 million for the ensuing three years for reconstruction programs. His first report covers short-term and longer-term needs in the areas of repatriation, food aid, agriculture and irrigation, health, communications, and power supply.<sup>10</sup> He asks for donations from the international community to support his efforts. Some pledges have already been made, and some countries, notably the United States and France, have begun aid programs inside the liberated areas of Afghanistan. But the ongoing war and the lack of an internal political solution have made large-scale assistance efforts impossible.

The United States has made clear that it will not permit its assistance to be channeled through the Najibullah regime. The resistance agrees with this policy, and some Western governments have said the same. In demanding compensation from the Soviets, the resistance has also, not surprisingly,

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<sup>9</sup>FBI-SOV, August 30, 1988.

<sup>10</sup>United Nations document SC/CONF., June 10, 1988.

stressed that Soviet aid should not benefit the Najibullah regime. The United States has stated that Soviet aid should be given through the United Nations.<sup>11</sup>

Other than to call for Soviet compensation for the enormous damage their military action has inflicted on Afghanistan,<sup>12</sup> the resistance has not had much to say about reconstruction. In the meantime, organizations that hope to get a piece of the very large pie that the United Nations hopes will be available are gathering in Pakistan.

Despite present difficulties, postwar Afghanistan's need for assistance is massive. More will be said about that need later in this chapter.

### *International Aspects*

The Soviet Union, at least while Gorbachev is in power, appears firmly committed to withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan. That does not mean that the Soviets intend to abandon their interest in Afghanistan, an interest that goes back to the establishment of the tsarist empire in Central Asia in the last century.

Soviet efforts to tie Afghanistan's economy to the Soviet Union also continue. During the visit of Foreign Minister Shevernadze to Kabul on August 4–7, 1988, a new long-term agreement was negotiated with the Najibullah regime on economic, technical, and commercial cooperation. The agreement would include provisions for joint ventures and direct ties between Soviet republics, cities, and ministries and their Afghan counterparts, especially in the northern part of the country.<sup>13</sup> The Soviets have already linked much of Afghanistan's northern electric power grid to that of Soviet Central Asia and have established a satellite communications facility in Afghanistan so as to bind closer Afghan and Soviet communications. They continue to exploit the natural gas deposits of northern Afghanistan. According to Najibullah, 2,000 Afghans are being sent annually to the Soviet Union to study.<sup>14</sup> The aim is to have these Afghans return home trained to help manage the country's economy and convinced of the need to tie Afghanistan closely to the USSR.

Pakistan has borne a tremendous burden throughout the ten-year Afghan struggle against the communists. It has sheltered, as mentioned earlier, some 3 million refugees on its soil and has been a major provider of social services for the refugees in addition to giving them the land on which they and their livestock live. It has not been easy—politically or

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<sup>11</sup>The statements in this paragraph are based on a briefing given in the Department of State on August 5, 1988, by the Bureau for Refugee Programs.

<sup>12</sup>FBIS-NES, August 16, 1988.

<sup>13</sup>FBIS-NES, August 9, 1988.

<sup>14</sup>FBIS-SOV, August 16, 1988.

economically—for Pakistan's government to provide for the refugees, and tensions between the refugees and Pakistanis have risen in recent years as many refugees have become competitors in commerce.

Pakistan has also had to suffer repeated cross-border bombing and terrorist attacks on its territory from the Soviets and the Kabul regime's forces. American sources believe that about one-sixth of all terrorist incidents in the world in 1987 occurred in Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> Aside from the loss of life these attacks have caused, they have added to resentment within Pakistan against support for the resistance.

Despite these difficulties, the government of President Zia-ul-Haq was stalwart in his support for the refugees and the resistance. It saw assistance to the refugees as a brotherly duty. It saw the absorption of Afghanistan into the Soviet empire as a threat to Pakistan's own national security. It was aware that the refugees would return home only when the fighting ended and a noncommunist government acceptable to the masses of refugees had been installed in Kabul. It therefore not only assisted the refugees but permitted the flow of arms and ammunition across its territory to the resistance fighters. Even following the Geneva Accords and despite Soviet protests, Pakistan has continued to follow these policies. The new government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has continued the Afghan policy established by her predecessor.

The United States has also been firm in its support of the resistance. Its aims have been unchanged since the Soviet invasion in December 1979. As reiterated by Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost, these aims are:

- Rapid and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops;
- Restoration of Afghanistan's independence and nonaligned status;
- Return of the refugees in safety and honor; and
- Self-determination for the Afghan people.<sup>16</sup>

In accordance with these aims, the United States has been supplying arms and ammunition to the resistance. In fact, it was the supply, beginning in the fall of 1986, of shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the resistance that made a major contribution to changing the military balance and to persuading the Soviets that they could not win the war.

On the question of the internal arrangements in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, the American position has also been consistent. As stated by Armacost, "We believe that Afghanistan's future political course must be left to the Afghan people themselves to decide. The United States

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<sup>15</sup>Statement of Secretary of State Shultz, April 11, 1988, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1988, p. 54.

<sup>16</sup>Statement of Undersecretary Armacost, cited in footnote 2.

has no blueprint for Afghanistan. Nor do we favor any group or individual. The experience of the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in this one suggests that the Afghans do not take kindly to efforts by outsiders to choose a government for them."<sup>17</sup>

The United States has also been a major contributor to assistance programs for the refugees. In the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, it budgeted \$119 million in humanitarian assistance, \$49 million of which is channeled through U.N. agencies for refugees in Pakistan, with the remainder being provided primarily to people in the resistance-controlled areas inside Afghanistan. The latter includes assistance in education, health, and rural development and is administered through the Alliance in Peshawar.

In the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1988, the United States intends to continue its aid at about the same level. In addition, it hopes to provide about \$23 million in direct food aid, for a total of \$142 million.<sup>18</sup>

Other international players have had smaller roles. Iran has sheltered, as mentioned earlier, perhaps 2 million refugees. Because international relief operations have not been permitted in Iran, this figure is at best a guess, but nevertheless represents a substantial burden on Iran. Iranian support for the resistance has been limited, however, to pro-Khomeini, Shiite groups in the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan. The Iranians have not permitted any military supplies for other resistance groups to transit Iranian territory.

China has been supportive of the resistance and has made it clear to Moscow that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a major precondition to an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. China has supplied some military aid to the Afghan resistance.

The wealthy Gulf Arab states have also been supportive of the Afghans, mostly in making funds available for refugee relief and for the purchase of arms by the resistance. Some Western European countries, notably France, have engaged in humanitarian assistance activities.

India has not been helpful to the Afghan cause. It has abstained in the annual votes of the U.N. General Assembly calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, thereby placing it in a small minority not condemning the Soviet invasion. (The vote in 1987 was 123 votes for, 19 votes against, and 11 abstentions on the General Assembly resolution.)

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Statement of Richard S. Williamson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 1988, Department of State press release no. 1087.

## The Future

### *The Soviet Withdrawal*

The fundamental assumption in this chapter is that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan will be withdrawn. The reasons for this assumption have already been given.

### *Internal Political Settlement*

I have written elsewhere that it is extremely difficult for any foreigner to understand internal Afghanistan power equations because no foreigner can hope fully to understand all of the familial, tribal, and ethnic ties that bind Afghans together or separate them from one another.<sup>19</sup> The best this section can achieve is to mention some of the factors that will affect the forthcoming struggle for power in Afghanistan.

In the first place, it seems highly improbable that the Najibullah regime can stay in power for long after the Soviet forces leave the country. That regime has been maintained in power by Soviet armed force. Its base of support in the country is restricted to the inner circle of the PDPA and to those members of the internal security forces who know that they would be prosecuted by a triumphant resistance. The hangers-on of the regime in the bureaucracy and the armed forces are likely to defect to the resistance as soon as it is clear that the resistance will win the war. The internal divisions within the Najibullah regime, between and within the Khalq and Parcham factions, are likely to hasten the demise of the regime.

It is much more difficult, however, to predict the shape of the next Afghan government. The seven parties in the Peshawar Alliance are divided, representing different strains in Afghan political tradition, including royalist and tribal, and different views of the role of Islam in the governance of the country. They are also divided by style of leadership, with, for example, the Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a party in the Leninist mold, in contrast to the more loosely organized Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani. Each of the seven parties has its own forces and commanders inside the country, some of whom have fought

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<sup>19</sup>Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., "Gorbachev's Afghan Gambit," Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1988. One foreigner whose insights into Afghan politics is extraordinarily perceptive is Olivier Roy, whose book, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), deserves a careful reading by anyone who wishes to understand the factors that will play a role in a post-Soviet Afghanistan. I have drawn on his work in this section of this chapter.

against each other as well as fighting the communists. Divisions between these parties are often bitter.

The seven parties have also disagreed on the system that should be used to establish a new, noncommunist government. About all they can agree on is that a new government must be Islamic in the sense that Afghanistan's legal system should be based on the Shariah. But two of the parties appear to favor a role for former King Zahir, who has been in exile in Rome since 1973, whereas the others reject this idea. For some of the parties whose power base is in the Pushtun tribes, a *loya jirgab* (tribal council) is the preferred means for choosing a new national leadership. For those less tribally based, this traditional tribal system is rejected. In any case, it would also not be in the Afghan political tradition to convene a *loya jirgab* without the result being assured in advance.

It is not at all clear what role the military commanders of the resistance will play, whether they will follow the orders of their mentors in the seven parties or will make deals on their own. There have already been some reports of alliances in the field between commanders of different parties. There have also been reports of arms stockpiling. It seems logical that arms would be stockpiled for the final push against the Najibullah regime. But there are suspicions that one or more of the parties—in these reports the suspicion usually falls on Hekmatyar—is stockpiling for a civil war among the resistance groups. It would, in any case, not be surprising if some of the more successful commanders were to insist on a role in the establishment of a new Afghan government.

A further complication concerns the Shiite groups of the central Hazarajat region, which has been virtually independent of Soviet or Kabul control from the beginning of the war and some of whose political leaders are in Teheran. At least two of these groups have a close tie with the Khomeini regime. How they will play their cards vis-à-vis the non-Shiite and other Shiite groups remains an open question. It needs to be stressed, however, that Shiites comprise no more than 15 percent of the Afghan population and that most belong to the minority Hazara ethnic group.

It should also be noted that the Peshawar and Shiite parties are woefully short of managerial and technical talent required to run the country. A lot of this talent is now in the United States and Western Europe. Most resistance leaders would probably welcome back the technical experts but are much less likely to welcome the former political elite that has been living abroad during the fighting. And it is an open question how many of these exiles will be willing to return from their new lives in the West to the insecurities, for themselves and their families, of Afghanistan, despite their undoubted patriotism.

Given all these uncertainties, what can be said about the future internal

politics of Afghanistan? First, there is likely to be a period, perhaps of months, of infighting, some of it violent, between the parties. This will be accompanied by the settling of scores with the hatchetmen and collaborators of the communist regime. There is likely to be an early push on the major towns, with the greatest prize of course being Kabul. Two commanders, Shah Massoud of the Rabbani party and Abdul Haq of Yunus Khalis' Hezb-e-Islami, are the best positioned to move on the capital.

Whichever group or alliance of parties takes Kabul will be faced with the extremely difficult task of consolidating its power elsewhere in the country. Whatever technique it uses—armed force, a *loya jirgab*, some form of national election, or other means—is likely to take a long time. And it should be remembered that a strong, centralized regime is not an Afghan tradition and that compromises among competing power bases will have to be made.

It is also likely that a new regime will be strongly Islamic in its approach to governance, customs, and the law. This does not mean it will necessarily be radical in its approach. Far more likely than a radical Islamic regime such as that existing in Iran will be a regime that attempts to combine Islamic tradition with the political and cultural traditions of Afghanistan, be they tribal or ethnic, and with the need to modernize the Afghan economy. The people of Afghanistan are likely to judge their new government both by its adherence to Islamic principles and by its ability to improve their standard of living without disturbing their traditions.

One of the interesting questions for the future of Afghan politics is the relationship among ethnic groups. The Soviets and the Najibullah regime have been giving favors to the northern areas and their Uzbek and Turkoman inhabitants and have been playing off the minority groups against the hitherto dominant Pushtuns.<sup>20</sup> Yet in the resistance groups there has been a high degree of cooperation between ethnic groups—with the exception of the Hazara, who have played their own game in their mountain fastness. Whether this cooperation will continue or whether the Pushtun leaders will try to recreate their pre-1987 dominant position remains to be seen.

Finally, it needs to be said that in some respects the internal politics of Afghanistan have been permanently changed by ten years of struggle against the Soviets and their puppets in Kabul. The old elite, including the ruling Mohammadzai family of King Zahir (1933–73) and his cousin and brother-in-law President Daoud (1973–78), will not return to power. (If by any remote chance the king returns, it will be as a figurehead.) The

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<sup>20</sup>See, for example, Hasan Sharq's statement in TASS, August 18, 1986. FBIS-SOV, August 19, 1988, pp. 20–21.

tribal khans may also be losers in the power game as many of their people have fled the countryside, and the khans have not had their usual role as intermediaries with the authorities. Whether the old system will be restored in the tribal areas is unclear, but in any case the khans will have to work to regain their former roles. Whether the former educated, technical elite will return is also, as mentioned, an open question.

There is, then, a new elite emerging. Some of it is in the political parties. Some of it is in the leadership of the resistance forces in the field. Most members of this elite have been exposed through education or family background to an Islamic tradition. Most are eager for power but have little experience in public administration. Their principal problem will be the reconstruction of a country devastated by war.

It is interesting to note some Soviet opinion on the future internal arrangements in Afghanistan. The *Izvestia* article by Bovin quoted earlier concluded that "the near future is clear-cut. Passions are running too high, and excesses, flare-ups and violence cannot be ruled out. However—a return to the patriarchal system, stagnation and poverty is barred. Afghanistan will not flee into the past. Rather it will seek to find its bearings in the present and in the future." Another *Izvestia* commentary in December 1988 imagined "a qualitatively different situation developing in the country following the withdrawal of Soviet forces; old alliances might start to collapse and new ones to emerge. A certain diffusion of power will take place, and its consequences are totally unknown."<sup>21</sup>

### *Reconstruction*

The refugees in Afghanistan and Iran will not return home and reconstruction efforts cannot be seriously undertaken until a new government is in power in Kabul and a degree of security is restored to the countryside. Aid donors are now organizing for the time when they must swing into action. One of the most encouraging developments has been the choosing of Sadruddin Agha Khan to head the United Nations effort. His experience, talents, and prestige suit him for this most difficult task.

For it is clear that the United Nations must take the lead. No bilateral donor can do the job as well because—particularly, of course, in the case of the major powers—its motivations will be suspect. Despite the well-known inefficiencies of the United Nations, it will have to take the lead role, and other donors, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, should use this organization as the channel for the bulk of their assistance.

That being said, it is equally clear that the United Nations will have to use the services of governmental and nongovernmental agencies that have

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<sup>21</sup>FBIS-SOV, December 22, 1988.

had experience working with the Afghan refugees and across the border in liberated areas of Afghanistan. Many of these agencies have people on their staffs with years of experience in assisting Afghanistan. The United Nations will have to coordinate these efforts if aid resources are to be used to their maximum potential. Such a role for the United Nations hopefully will make unnecessary the establishment of a large U.N. bureaucracy for the Afghan aid effort.

The most urgent needs of the returning refugees lie in the areas of agriculture and public health. They will be returning to areas where villages, roads, irrigation systems, and livestock have been destroyed. There is a very real danger of famine before the first crops can be brought in. As refugees start their journeys home, therefore, they should be provided with adequate food and water to tide them over. They will then need draft animals and seed and technical assistance in restoring irrigation systems and drinking water supplies. Care will have to be exercised so that the distribution of emergency food supplies does not depress agricultural prices and create disincentives for production of food as opposed to other crops.

In the area of public health, programs should be undertaken before refugees leave their camps to make certain that they receive the necessary immunizations. Supplemental feeding programs should be undertaken for women and children. Drugs and first aid should be available for refugees in transit to their homes. The existing public health infrastructure in the refugee camps will have to be recreated inside Afghanistan until permanent facilities can be established.

There is a critical need for training of Afghans to carry out these immense tasks of resettlement and reconstruction. The training has already been started by many aid donor agencies but needs to be stepped up. This includes training in agriculture, engineering, health care, teaching, and other areas. Trained Afghans now living in Europe and the United States should be asked if they would be willing to assist, at least on a short-term basis, in the training programs as well as in the delivery of aid inside Afghanistan.

Though it is possible the financial needs stated by the United Nations may be too high—bearing in mind the limited absorptive capacity of the Afghan economy and the need to exercise care not to stimulate inflation or corruption—it is still clear that the financial needs are immense. The international community will have to make a concerted and sustained effort to meet these needs. Pakistan will also continue to have a special role in providing facilities for the transit to Afghanistan of aid and of donor personnel, and this role may also require some international financial support.

A special mention of the situation in Kabul is necessary here. The capital is swollen by the influx of over a million war refugees. As the Soviets depart and the resistance noose tightens around the city, food and fuel shortages have appeared. An international effort may be required to sustain the city in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet departure. The United Nations, as of this writing, is gearing up for such an effort, while the resistance is insisting that any aid to Kabul while Najibullah is still in power be matched by aid to resistance-controlled areas.

Finally, it should be stressed that we are discussing a long-term aid program here. The international community must be prepared to assist Afghanistan over a period of several years.

### *International Political Implications*

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the reestablishment of an independent Afghanistan will have important repercussions on international relationships in the region and between the nations of the region and the two superpowers.

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union will have to work out a new *modus vivendi*. The new Afghan government will have to find a way to live in peace and cooperatively with the Soviet Union despite the bitter memories of the last ten years. Such a reconciliation will take time, but it will eventually have to happen, if only because the two countries share such a long border and because their economies have become linked in so many ways. Afghanistan will need to continue to use Soviet transit facilities; it will want to market many of its exports to the USSR; and it will want to receive Soviet assistance in developing its economy. For its part, the Soviet Union will continue to have an interest, as it did prior to 1978, in a developing Afghanistan that will be a peaceful and nonaligned neighbor.

Two pressing questions will influence the short-term course of Afghan-Soviet relations. One is whether the Soviets will continue the high-altitude bombing they undertook in the fall of 1988 and have continued through January 1989 in order to shore up the Najibullah regime and to cover their troop withdrawal. This bombing has further poisoned the already bitter Afghan attitude toward the Soviets. Second, the question of Soviet assistance for reconstruction remains. It is not clear that the Soviets will in fact provide assistance either bilaterally or through the United Nations despite their offer of some \$600 million to the U.N. effort. It is equally unclear whether the resistance, having called for massive Soviet reparations and being totally opposed to the presence of Soviet technicians in Afghanistan, will accept Soviet assistance.

Afghanistan and Pakistan will also have to establish a firmer, long-term

relationship. Afghan irredentism over Pushtunistan and the Pakistan-Afghan border will have to be put aside. Pakistan will have to resist temptations to interfere in internal Afghan politics. The two nations, which have established a new, brotherly relationship over the past ten years, will have to build on that relationship to put aside past differences and work together in the interest of regional security and stability. Hopefully, they will dust off the record of the talks on Pushtunistan that took place in 1977 and 1978 between President Daoud and, first, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and, then, President Zia-ul-Haq.<sup>22</sup>

An Iran that hopefully is beginning to move toward a more moderate, traditional role in regional politics can also play a constructive role by supporting a new Afghan regime even if its Shiite partisans do not play a major role in that regime. Afghan-Iranian relations have long been plagued by historical and cultural differences. Both countries will have to make new efforts to overcome these differences. This process will be helped by the fact that there are no serious bilateral problems between them. Having good relations with both, Pakistan can play a helpful role in the process.

Afghan-U.S. relations should in due course return to a normal state. The United States should continue to support the independence, nonalignment, and economic development of Afghanistan. Budgetary pressures and other priorities will inevitably mean that the American aid effort for Afghanistan will not fully meet Afghan desires. But that effort will hopefully be a large one, at least through the first years of reconstruction. In an important respect and aside from humanitarian considerations, the United States owes a debt to the Afghan resistance that halted the Russian imperialist advance into Southwest Asia.

The Soviet Union can, as a result of its withdrawal from Afghanistan, expect an improved climate for its relations with the United States and China. It will also no doubt attempt to improve relations with Pakistan despite its failed efforts to pressure Pakistan to cease support for the Afghan resistance. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will continue their past policies of encouraging differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hopefully, they will see it in their interest to encourage regional stability, but they will no doubt attempt to increase their influence in Pakistan as a new era of Pakistani-American relations emerges.

India has severely damaged its relations with a new Afghan government by its pro-Soviet policies in the past ten years. The Soviets and the Indians would no doubt like to see India play a role in Afghanistan in the future, and the Indians have a continuing interest in keeping Pakistan involved with

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<sup>22</sup>For a description of these talks, see Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan* (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp. 109–148.

Afghanistan. This Indian attitude is another reason why it is in Pakistan's interest to strengthen its ties with Afghanistan.

Finally, there is the question of future relations between Pakistan and the United States. They will change substantially as the Afghan war winds down and the two countries' mutual interest in the Soviet withdrawal is satisfied. Inevitably, Americans will begin to focus more on other aspects of the bilateral relationship: Pakistan's nuclear program; drug trafficking; the human rights and democratic aspects of Pakistan's internal politics; and the effects of U.S.-Pakistani ties on American interests vis-à-vis India and Israel.

This changing focus will clearly affect the relationship, and it will take skillful management by both governments to move smoothly into a new era. For its part, the United States will have to maintain its awareness of Pakistan's exposed strategic position and that country's important role in the stability and security of Southwest Asia and the Gulf region. It will have to bear in mind that a supportive American policy is the best means for the United States in its efforts to deal with bilateral issues. And for its part, Pakistan, which had certainly learned this lesson in the period immediately prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, will have to entertain more modest expectations of American assistance while relying more heavily on strengthened relations with the nations of the region in meeting its security needs.

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## 13. Afghanistan Conflict and Prospects for the Future

IJAZ S. GILANI

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In keeping with the purpose of the bilateral forum, I have tried to view the Afghanistan crisis from the Pakistani perspectives, of which there are admittedly many. Accordingly, I have divided this chapter into two sections. The first reviews three different scenarios about the future of Afghanistan, each of which has certain adherents among the Pakistani elite and foreign policymakers. The second looks at the Afghanistan crisis from the perspectives of the general public. It relies extensively on data from public opinion surveys conducted by this author over the last ten years.<sup>1</sup> In the light of these data, the chapter attempts to explain the manner in which the Afghan crisis has influenced the shaping of foreign policy attitudes in Pakistan.

### **Prospects for the Future of Afghanistan**

#### *Perspectives Among the Elite*

Futurology is always hazardous, but this has been particularly so in the case of the Afghanistan conflict. Until very recently, only a handful of analysts expected the Afghan conflict to settle eventually in favor of the resistance. Those whose prognosis about the future turned out to be faulty included both supporters and opponents of the Afghan resistance. A noted American correspondent, Henry Bradsher, concluded his book, generally favorable to the Afghan resistance, with the following note:

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<sup>1</sup>The survey data reported in this chapter were provided by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion and were gathered under the supervision of this author. These are nationally representative surveys conducted through in-person interviews with a sample of approximately 1,700 scientifically selected households in 175 localities across the country. These localities, which include 100 villages and 75 urban blocs, were selected through a two-stage probability sampling technique. For results based on samples of this size, one can say with 95 percent confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects could be 3 percentage points in either direction. The National Urban Surveys were typically conducted in 75 urban localities, with a sample size of 1,000 respondents.

On one point there was sad agreement: the indefinite prospect of conflict between what most of the world viewed as Russian colonialism and an Afghan struggle for independence. That means indefinite pain and suffering for Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

An Indian scholar and journalist, Bhabani Sen Gupta, held out an equally bleak picture for the Mujahideen:

Eventually, the Saur revolution will be saved, and it will have to address itself to the Herculean task of rebuilding the ravaged and devastated Afghanistan. The Afghan revolution is still a tentative revolution. Time, however, is on its side.<sup>3</sup>

Louis Dupree, the dean of Afghanistan watchers, was so frustrated by the enterprise of projecting the future of the country that his last assessment was punctuated by this caution: "I use 2010 A.D. [as a projection date] because by that time I shall be dead and I cannot be publicly condemned for being wrong again!"<sup>4</sup>

Given the extent of uncertainty, there are at least three scenarios for the future prospects of Afghanistan, all of which have some adherents in Pakistan.

### **Three Scenarios for the Future of Afghanistan**

#### *Scenario 1: Continuation of the PDPA*

The first scenario predicts the continuation of a PDPA government in Kabul even after the departure of Soviet troops. The proponents of this scenario argue their case on the premise that the Mujahideen have not been able to take either Kabul or even several provincial capital by storm after the Soviets left them. They believe that the Soviet military presence is the principal objection against which the Afghan nation had risen. The resistance was not, they would argue, against the Saur revolution of Taraki, but against the Soviet intervention that put Karmal in power. The proponents expect that a PDPA government, which might replace its present leadership by more popular and competent leaders, could withstand a resistance that would have lost both its principal legitimacy and foreign support. They are also hopeful that after the Soviet withdrawal, infighting

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<sup>2</sup>Henry Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press Policy Studies, 1985).

<sup>3</sup>Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Afghanistan: Politics, Economics, and Society* (London: F. Pinter, 1986).

<sup>4</sup>Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan 2010 A.D.: The Worst Possible Scenario Prelude to Balkanization?" *Transitional Perspectives* 12, 3 (1986).

among various groups of the Mujahideen would sufficiently enfeeble them to be eventually discredited in the public and crushed by the regime.

This scenario envisages that refugees would be divided on the issue of returning to Afghanistan, but that a majority would return in due course. Those left behind would likely be politically the most active, and their activism and frustration would create problems for Pakistan in the future.

### *Scenario 2: Restoration of the Old Order*

This outcome is pictured by those who, as one distinguished Indian put it, would like to turn back the clock and restore the pre-1978 (pre-Saur revolution) status quo. The proponents of this scenario draw their principal inspiration from their belief that a return to the 1978 status quo would be blessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. It is also believed to be a position preferred by the Indian government. A former foreign secretary of India wrote:

A broad consensus exists among contending and interested powers that a return to the pre-1978 status quo would be a satisfactory solution to the crisis over Afghanistan. The problem is how to turn back the clock.<sup>5</sup>

The proponents were also encouraged by the endorsement from then U.N. mediator Cordovez, whose idea of a neutral government headed by the former King Zahir Shah, or someone supported by him, came very close to this view of the future. The proponents are hopeful that their plan to restore the 1978 status quo would be endorsed by a Grand Assembly, *loya jirgah*, if it could be held. Hence their major emphasis is first to establish a neutral government that would summon the *loya jirgah* and restore the old order. They regard this as a process for establishing a broad-based government in the country.

Those who support this view of the future regard it as the most peaceful transition out of the present state of bloodshed, which they believe has exhausted the general population. As Cordovez put it: "People underestimate the pragmatism of the Afghan people. Afghans are tired of the war because they have been fighting for eight years."<sup>6</sup> The scenario predicts that even though important political organizations in the Afghan alliance would reject this view of the future, it could win many adherents among the resistance inside the country, especially in resistance centers led by tribal and traditional leaders but also, to a limited degree, among the younger radical commanders. These commanders, they believe, would prefer to participate in the old order in order to escape control by their party leaders after the fall of the Kabul regime.

<sup>5</sup>Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," *Foreign Policy* 47 (Summer 1982).

<sup>6</sup>Voice of America Report, June 1988.

According to this scenario, most of the refugees would return, leaving only a handful of fundamentalist fighters behind in Pakistan. Present in certain variants of this view is a strong anti-Mujahideen sentiment. An Indian writer, drawing on Selig Harrison's writings, puts his views in a recent dispatch from California:

Afghan communists are secular and modern. The forces in the opposition who have so far received favored treatment by Pakistan and the U.S.A. are fanatic, backward-looking obscurantists.

Soviet Russia by its involvement in Afghanistan and America by its counterinvolvement have created a Frankenstein in the region. One hopes that the leaders in Moscow and Washington are sane enough to see the danger and wise enough to cage the monster and put it to sleep.<sup>7</sup>

The correspondent of the London daily *Independent* assumes a more threatening posture:

It is not just a matter of evicting a foreign army, but what follows when that army has gone? Only one or two parties are fighting for freedom in any western sense. The programmes of the fundamentalist parties would undermine the freedom that many women have achieved under the PDPA.

It remains for the Afghans to decide how they define freedom, not the West, but the decision they reach should affect whether supplies to them are continued.<sup>8</sup>

### *Scenario 3: The Emergence of a New Order*

Proponents of a third scenario agree on one point, that Afghanistan has been irreversibly changed by the Soviet intervention and the resistance to it. They agree, therefore, that the future will no longer be a replica of the past. They also agree that given the nature of a decade-long struggle, the future of Afghanistan will be more self-consciously and politically Islamic than it was in the past. Beyond that, however, they have different visions of a future Afghanistan.

The most eloquent and precise narration of this view is found in one of the last writings of the late Professor Syed B. Majrooh:

A simple restoration of the status quo ante will not work and consequently any political set-up for the future will have to take into consideration the new political and social conditions of the country. It is a rule that Afghanistan is not the same and will never be the same again.<sup>9</sup>

Majrooh noted four developments that led him to make his assertions:

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<sup>7</sup>Robi Chakravorti, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, June 4, 1988.

<sup>8</sup>Mark Urban, *War in Afghanistan* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

<sup>9</sup>Syed B. Majrooh, "The Future Government of Afghanistan," *Free Afghanistan* (London: Autumn 1987).

1. The displacement of almost half the population, outside the country and inside it, as a result of which the centuries old social structure had been seriously destabilized

2. Disruption of the rural economy, which allowed partial self-sufficiency of the rural population

3. Emergence of new leadership in the shape of three new figures: Mujahideen or freedom fighters, resistance commanders, and leaders of political organizations

4. The breaking of the magical charm of central authority under the royal family

Majrooh's analysis is persuasive. The "scorching of the earth," "rubble-ization of Afghanistan," and other descriptions of the Afghan tragedy indicate the destruction not only of the country and its population but also of the old order along with it. A new generation unfamiliar with the "magical charm" of the old regime is perhaps unwilling to be subjected to it. Along with the decimation of the population, the old order has lost its social and economic base. The charm of the past has not been replaced by the revolutionary charisma of any one leader or organization. The future Afghanistan is therefore a natural arena for the contest of different bases for legitimation as well as leaders who embody those notions of legitimacy.<sup>10</sup> The contest is likely to operate on several planes at the same time: traditionalism and modernism, pluralism and centralization, radicalism and moderation, and many other contrasts that would spring up in a revolutionary situation.

Proponents of this scenario include both optimists and pessimists. The optimists believe that the new revolutionary situation will eventually crystallize in the establishment of a more egalitarian, more democratic, and more pluralistic Afghanistan, which would be in conformity with the underlying tribal and Islamic ethos of the society. The pessimists see a Lebanization of Afghanistan in which different factions would engage in brutal massacres of each other and perhaps even partition the country.

This picture of the future includes a variant that envisages a strong Islamic radical government in a future Afghanistan. Such a variant inspires some and frightens others; it introduces as well an element of intense polemical debate on fundamentalist Islam. Many observers, however, underrate the significance of this debate beyond Afghanistan's borders. As Alvin Rubinstein puts it: "Nor is there a threat from a spill-over of Islamic fundamentalism. If Khomeini has failed to resonate in Soviet Central Asia, how much less likely to succeed is any home-spawned, tribal Afghan variation."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup>R. Maley, "Struggle for Legitimation in Afghanistan," *Asian Survey*, January 1987.

<sup>11</sup>Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Speculations on a National Tragedy," *Orbis* 4 (1987).

The third scenario seems to this author to be the most realistic. In all probability, the future of Afghanistan is rather bleak and involves extended struggle before a new order emerges from the ravaged territory and destroyed social order. In the meantime, the only consolation is that in the past ten years the Afghan nation has proved many a discouraging forecast of their future utterly wrong.

### **Perspectives Among the Pakistani Public**

During the ten years between 1978 and 1988, when Pakistan embarked upon a massive and risk-prone foreign policy initiative on Afghanistan, there was very little by way of government policy to inspire public enthusiasm or much effort to mobilize popular endorsement. In this respect, Pakistan's support for the Afghan struggle stands in sharp contrast to the Arab support for the Palestinian cause.

One result of having followed a rather quiet Afghan policy has, however, been that the general public in Pakistan is not particularly informed on the Afghan issue. The average Pakistani has endorsed the Afghan policy without forming any well-defined views on it or showing much concern about its nuances. Opinion data show that the public views the Afghan struggle as an Islamic *jihad*, a surrogate war of the super-powers, and a national struggle of the Afghans all in the same breath. Besides their native wisdom in avoiding hair-splitting controversies, this state of affairs also shows that one of the major foreign policy initiatives of Pakistan has remained outside the realm of popular debate.

Though no government effort was made to mobilize public opinion in favor of its Afghan policy and the public remained relatively uninformed, there was a strong reservoir of quiet support for the Afghan cause. This expressed itself in very tangible form on two crucial issues: first, the conflict of interest between the refugees and the local populations in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan rarely turned into violence. The refugees were often supported even by those who otherwise questioned the wisdom of Islamabad's Afghan policy (29 percent in 1985, 37 percent in 1986). Second, the effort to provoke public opposition to the Afghan policy through sabotage and terrorism did not pay off. Public support remained quite stable, and even when it wavered this behavior was rather transient.

The Afghan issue would be regarded by many as one that helped President Zia to prolong his rule: people did not want to rock the boat while he was busy with this crucial matter. But even here, the issue was not in the forefront of people's consciousness. Zia's Afghan policy did not figure very prominently when the general public was asked to recall what they had most liked about the late President. It might, however, have

helped him build his strong Islamic credentials in the public subconsciousness.

Public attitudes on the Afghan issues have several dimensions, including views about the refugees, the relative strength of the Afghan regime and the Mujahideen, the credibility of Soviet intentions to withdraw forces, and approval and disapproval of the Geneva Accords. Also important are the public attitudes toward important allies and adversaries of Pakistan on the Afghan issue.

The subject of public opinion toward refugees merits particular attention because, according to many analysts, denial of the Pakistani public's support of the Afghan cause was one of the cornerstones of Soviet strategy against the Mujahideen.<sup>12</sup> In the beginning, support for the refugees enjoyed almost unanimous endorsement. Gradually, however, it lost some ground. In the first public opinion survey conducted on this subject in 1980, 2 percent of the respondents were in favor of supporting the refugees. Over the years, as the costs of hosting several million refugees increased and as political opposition to the Afghan policy of the government became more widespread and vocal, support for refugees began to decline, reaching a low of 57 percent in 1986. Support for refugees arose on both political and humanitarian grounds, and thus many who would otherwise disagree with the government's Afghan policy did not object to humanitarian support for the refugees. Support for the refugees began to increase again in 1987 when the prospects for the success of the resistance—and along with it the chances for the refugees to return to their homeland—began to appear brighter. In 1988, 68 percent favored continued support.

Public attitude toward the refugees had an interesting pragmatic dimension. The opponents of the Afghan policy had persuaded a majority to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Afghan refugees were drug pushers and gun runners. Yet their belief in this accusation against the Afghan refugees did not prevent them from continuing to favor support for the refugees and their cause.

The common theme that Afghan refugees should return to their homeland when conditions are appropriate is reflected in public opinion data on the subject. A majority (54 percent) fears that they will remain in Pakistan. While maintaining their support, Pakistanis are not keen that the refugees be integrated into Pakistani society, and a majority (78 percent in 1986) opposes granting of citizenship rights to them.

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<sup>12</sup>Marvin Weinbaum, "Soviet Strategies, Afghan Refugees, and Pakistan's Security," unpublished paper, October 1987.

### *Views on the Resistance and the Regime*

The general public in Pakistan has been quite consistently optimistic about the outcome of the Afghan conflict, perhaps reflecting their faith rather than any knowledge about the situation. This was, of course, in great contrast with the views of the intellectual and political elite of the country, most of whom pictured the outcome of the Afghan resistance in very bleak terms.

In a public opinion survey conducted in January 1980, soon after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a majority of Pakistanis believed that the resistance would succeed in its struggle against the Afghan regime. In June 1988 the majority was 60 percent.

### *Views on the Soviet Threat and the Geneva Accords*

Long before bomb blasts, generally attributed as threats from the Afghan regime and its Soviet mentors, began to test the Pakistani public in a battle of nerves, public opinion data reflected a strong resolve among the Pakistanis to resist intimidation on the Afghan issue. In a survey taken in 1980, the respondents were asked to give their views on whether the Afghan struggle should be supported, and if support should continue in the face of serious threat from the Soviet Union. Only 6 percent of a national sample were in favor of not supporting the Afghan resistance.

During the years when the Afghan struggle peaked and bomb blasts began to cause serious trouble, the resolve to support the Afghan cause considerably weakened but still remained high. In the process the Soviet Union earned considerable ill-will and distrust among the Pakistani public. That country was viewed as the principal threat to Pakistani security, even greater than Pakistan's traditional adversary, India (49 percent vs. 23 percent in 1986). It was only in 1987, after the Soviet Union made unambiguous statements that it wanted to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and reduced its threatening posture, that opinion in Pakistan began to change. By June 1988 only 19 percent of respondents believed the USSR a greater threat than India. The level of distrust against the USSR slightly declined, and the public began to view its economic and military aid offers in a positive light. Most important, a large section of the Pakistani public began to believe that the Soviet Union was sincere in its promise to withdraw from Afghanistan. Gorbachev's intended charm seemed to have made an initial impact.

*Geneva Accords:* Public opinion reaction to the Geneva Accords was generally positive among those who held a view on this subject and reflected the public desire to be relieved of the Afghan problem. It also reflected the public tendency to go along with government initiatives on the Afghan issue. It must be noted, however, that most of those who

supported the signing of the Geneva Accords believed them to be in the interest of the Mujahideen. If a particular policy was viewed as being against the interests of the Mujahideen, public views would perhaps be much more sharply divided.

### *The Afghanistan Crisis and Views About the United States*


During the years of the Afghan struggle, the United States has been Pakistan's principal ally in general, but most specifically on the Afghan issue. Yet even though the relationship has generally proceeded rather smoothly, there is no evidence that the two countries have developed a strong sense of trust in each other.

Support on the Afghan issue seems to have raised American standing in Pakistani public opinion. But differences on the nuclear issue showed that this raised standing was rather fragile. What Americans had gained through the Afghan issue was lost, at least partly, in 1986–87 because of the controversy on the nuclear issue and the disinclination of the Pakistani public to accept aid with strings attached. This trend is clearly indicated in the time series data on Trust in Nations. The United States rose on an index of trustworthiness from 19 percent to 31 percent between May 1985 and May 1987. Between May and September of 1987, it declined to 22 percent. A recent survey (June 1988) showed it still at 22 percent.

Conceivably, the United States and Pakistan are locked in mutual distrust that is partly structural—the asymmetrical political and economic capabilities of the two can hardly vouch for a relationship of trust—and partly a result of policy differences on issues that both countries consider central to their interests. Divergence of views on the Middle East, Islamic civilization, and the nuclear issue are pertinent cases in point.

The underlying relationship of distrust between the United States and Pakistan has led Pakistani opinion to view American support for the Afghan struggle with considerable suspicion. A third of Pakistanis agree with the thesis that America would continue to fuel the Afghan conflict to serve its own interests. It should be a matter of some concern to American policy makers that after a decade of generous assistance to the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets, Americans are viewed in Pakistan as not significantly less threatening to the Muslim world than the Soviets. Sixty-nine percent believed the Soviets to be a threat to the Muslim world as against 52 percent who hold this view about the United States.

**Part Seven**  
**The USSR Factor**



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## 14. The Soviet Role in South Asia: Potential for Change

ROBERT G. WIRSING

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The signing of the Geneva Accords on April 14, 1988, and commencement a month later of the phased Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan marked a turnabout in Moscow's policy that was bound to provoke questions about the Soviet Union's longer-term prospects and intentions in the surrounding region. The shift in policy seemed to indicate Moscow's belated recognition that its absorption of a major political setback in Afghanistan was the only realistic alternative to prolonged and debilitating military stalemate. It seemed aimed, at least in part, at rescuing *détente* with the United States, even at the price of diminished Soviet prestige in the region adjoining the USSR's soft Central Asian underbelly.

Moscow's decision obviously relieved a major sore point in its relations with New Delhi, whose calculated ambivalence in regard to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had isolated India from the mainstream of international opinion on the issue. It also promised to reduce some of the pressure on Pakistan, which had incurred Soviet displeasure by acting as conduit for Western, Chinese, and Arab arms supplies to the Afghan guerrillas, and it even raised the possibility that Moscow would seize the opportunity to seek major improvement in its relations with Islamabad.

Dramatic as it was, Moscow's decision to pull its forces out of Afghanistan gave few unambiguous clues to Moscow's future role in South Asia. The withdrawal was obviously a retreat, but it could be interpreted simply as a tactical maneuver, an abandonment of direct military intervention in favor of other (political, economic, or diplomatic) measures for achieving Soviet objectives, just as well as it could be described as a basic redefinition of those objectives. Furthermore, the withdrawal from Afghanistan was not necessarily the precursor of a sweeping strategic retreat from the entire region. Moscow's stake in the Indian subcontinent and in the countries of the Gulf seemed far too great for that. Equally evident was the fact that the Soviet role would be shaped in future not merely by Moscow's own interests in the region, but by opportunities opening from domestic

and interstate developments within the region itself as well as by the direction taken in the triangular rivalry in South Asia among the USSR, the United States, and the People's Republic of China.

In this context, recent developments in Pakistan's internal affairs—in particular, President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's abrupt dismissal of the elected government of Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo on May 29, 1988, and Zia's subsequent death in an air crash on August 17—added immeasurably to the atmosphere of uncertainty hovering over the region. So, too, did the quickening pace of high-level discussions aimed at improved relations between Moscow and Washington, and between Moscow and Beijing. Some of these developments seemed to point in the direction of a more benign Soviet role in South Asia. Other developments, however, including escalating warfare on the border between Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), pointed rather emphatically in the opposite direction. Taking stock of these contradictory developments in the light of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, this chapter reexamines the Soviet role in South Asia and assesses the potential for change in this role. It argues that marked deviation from the established pattern of Soviet involvement in South Asia, given the nature of geopolitical rivalry in the region and, in particular, the present state of Moscow's relations with Pakistan and India, is unlikely.

### Soviet Relations With Pakistan

Soviet relations with Pakistan have never been close.<sup>1</sup> Trade between them has never amounted to much more than a trickle. Soviet economic assistance has been limited to a few, albeit conspicuous, projects; and only for a fairly brief interval following Soviet mediation at Tashkent of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war did Soviet military aid to Pakistan figure significantly in their relationship. Pakistan's joining of a U.S.-sponsored anti-Soviet alliance system in the early 1950s, within only a few years of independence, left Pakistan with little room for maneuvering between the superpowers and gave a decidedly pro-Western orientation to its foreign policy. This orientation was increasingly questioned by Pakistanis, especially after President John F. Kennedy rushed military supplies to India after the brief India-China border war in autumn 1962, but it was never really abandoned.

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<sup>1</sup>For additional discussion of Soviet-Pakistan relations, see Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain, eds., *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985): 128–139; Ali T. Sheikh, "Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Afghan Crisis," in Noor A. Hussain and Leo E. Rose, eds., *Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Social, Political, and Economic Factors* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988): 45–74; and Syed Riffat Hussain, "Pak-Soviet Relations Since 1947: A Dissenting Appraisal," *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad): 64–88.

Pakistan's opening to China in 1963 and subsequent development of close relations with Beijing angered Washington and undoubtedly contributed to the cooling in U.S.-Pakistan relations that culminated with the arms embargo in 1965; but President Yahya Khan's instrumental role in helping to arrange Dr. Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in mid-1971, from the American perspective, largely compensated for Pakistan's earlier aberrant behavior.

From the Soviet perspective, in contrast, Pakistan's increasingly close relationship with China was an almost wholly negative development. According to Pakistan's ex-Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, so concerned was the Soviet Union "over what was perceived to be a shift in the balance of power in favor of the United States and so irritated by Pakistan's role that it threw its support behind India and the secessionist movement in East Pakistan, and Indian interference in Pakistan's internal crisis in 1971."<sup>2</sup>

Pakistan's brief flirtation with the USSR in the late 1960s thus foundered on the hard realities of the surrounding geopolitical context, including Moscow's deepening conflict with China and the steep increase in Indo-Soviet bonds in the military and other fields. Thereafter, whatever resentment Pakistanis felt for America's seeming indifference toward Pakistan always had to be measured against the formidable power of India and the ever broader scope of the Indian security relationship with the Soviet Union. Given the circumstances, even an unreliable U.S. ally generally seemed better than none at all.

Soviet-Pakistan relations sank to their lowest point ever following Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. The intervention prompted Islamabad to appeal for a renewal of U.S. military assistance, which had been suspended by the Carter administration as punishment for Pakistan's alleged efforts to acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Even while rejecting the Carter administration's offer of \$400 million in aid as "peanuts," President Zia quietly began assisting Washington's covert activity in support of the anticommunist Afghan rebels.<sup>3</sup> The Reagan administration's offer of a \$3.2 billion security assistance package in 1981 led to a vast enlargement of Pakistan's role in support of the Afghan resistance forces. By 1988, Islamabad had reportedly funneled over \$2 billion in covert U.S. military aid to the resistance

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<sup>2</sup>Agha Shahi, "Pakistan's Relations with the United States," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies* 3, 1 (March 1985): 3. See also Muhammad R. Azmi, "Pakistan's Soviet Policy: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *Asian Profile* 15, 2 (April 1987): 171-172.

<sup>3</sup>According to retired Major General Nasirullah Babar, Governor of the North-West Frontier Province when Zia took over in 1977 and Inspector General of the Frontier Corps in the early 1970s, Pakistan began facilitating U.S. covert assistance to the Afghan resistance fighters in May 1979, even prior to Soviet military intervention. Interview, Peshawar, March 1986.

effort.<sup>4</sup> Moscow-Kabul authorities gradually heightened counterpressures on Pakistan, including stepped-up air and ground attacks on guerrilla bases in Pakistan's border areas as well as a broadened campaign of terrorist bombings against civilian targets. Desirous that the war be contained insofar as possible within Afghanistan and that its own involvement be kept indirect, Islamabad strove to avoid excessive provocation of the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, Pakistan's aid to the Afghan rebels clearly played a major role in forcing Moscow ultimately to accept a political defeat in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union's decision to pull its forces out of Afghanistan obviously presented an occasion for improvement in Soviet-Pakistan relations. Fully implemented, the Soviet decision would eliminate what was by far the principal source of antagonism between them. Diplomatic relations had never been severed, and even at the height of the war Moscow had continued to offer economic aid, including completion of a giant steel mill at Karachi. Moreover, strong incentives to use the occasion of the Soviet force withdrawal for the purpose of improving relations clearly existed on both sides.

Soviet incentives stem directly from the Geneva settlement itself, which left dangling the question of Afghanistan's post-withdrawal governmental framework. The ruling party in Kabul, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was naturally unwilling to commit itself in the course of negotiations to any formula that included its own political extinction. Islamabad's civilian leadership, for its part, had publicly confessed the view that Pakistan could not insist in the final stages of the Geneva talks on the induction of an element that had never been included before.<sup>6</sup> The Afghan resistance forces or Mujahideen, having been excluded from a direct role in the negotiations, simply refused to be bound in any way by the settlement. Under the circumstances, retention of power in Kabul by Moscow's Marxist allies obviously depended to no small extent on Pakistan's willingness to rein in the guerrilla forces. How to assure Pakistan's consent to such a step was the problem. Since Moscow's threats of retaliation had not brought Islamabad to heel in the past eight years, there were obvious grounds for thinking that positive inducements might be a more productive approach.

Pakistan had multiple incentives of its own for seeking improved

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<sup>4</sup>Robert Pear, "Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1988, p. 1Y.

<sup>5</sup>See Robert G. Wirsing, "Pakistan and the War in Afghanistan," *Asian Affairs* 5, 2 (Summer 1987): 57-75.

<sup>6</sup>*The Muslim* (Islamabad), March 10, 1988.

relations with Moscow. The direct and indirect costs of the war, including the phenomenal growth of a violent culture of drugs and guns throughout Pakistan, had been high; and Moscow seemed fully capable, with or without troops in Afghanistan, of driving them yet higher. The war had exposed the extreme vulnerability of Pakistan's northwestern border and enhanced the potential for foreign meddling among the discontented Pakhtun and Baluch ethnic minorities of its borderland provinces. With regard to the 3 million or so Afghan refugees presently in Pakistan, prospects were very slender that repatriation could be arranged successfully without the strong cooperation of the authorities in Kabul; and that, barring a shift to a more accommodating diplomacy in Islamabad, did not seem likely to be forthcoming. Pakistani leaders could not help but imagine, moreover, that the country's defense of its eastern border with India would be considerably easier were there less danger of India's military collusion with its Soviet ally.

No less important, perhaps, was the sentiment of many educated Pakistanis that improved relations with the USSR were the only practical way to relieve what many judged was a dangerous and unwise dependence on the United States. Agha Shahi, who resigned his position as Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1982, was an especially outspoken advocate of such a move. In an article published in mid-1987, for example, Shahi argued that Pakistan should seriously examine the proposal for a conference on security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region made by Soviet leader Gorbachev in his Vladivostock speech of July 18, 1986. "Despite Pakistan's membership in American-sponsored military alliances, and American military aid," wrote Shahi, "Pakistan remains vulnerable to external attack and internal destabilization. Its sense of insecurity, in no small measure, has stemmed from its adversary relationship with the Soviet Union by reason of its membership in CENTO and SEATO and the consequent close relationship that developed between the Soviet Union and India."

Current differences with the Soviet Union, said Shahi, arose because of the Afghanistan situation. "Once the Soviet Union withdraws its troops from that country," he argued, "it would be able to play an important role in assuring a state of peaceful coexistence between India and Pakistan." Pakistan, he suggested, would then be able to reciprocate by playing "a constructive role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference with nearly half its membership drawn from Asia, in promoting consideration of the relevance of the conference for security and cooperation in Asia-Pacific to the security situation in the Middle East and the Gulf region."

Raising a theme persuasive among both leftwing intellectuals and rightwing Islamist groups in Pakistan, Shahi pointed out that if the USSR

withdrew its forces from Afghanistan, "the Gorbachev initiative would not be without appeal to the Muslim states of Asia, particularly the Arab countries, as offering the possibility of mitigating to some extent their sense of insecurity from the military power and nuclear arsenal of Israel through participation in a continental grouping which would link the Soviet Union more closely with their security concerns."<sup>7</sup> Shahi's reasoning was echoed in one form or another by most elements of the political opposition in Pakistan and was presumably not without supporters within the government.

The appointment as envoy to Moscow in late July 1988 of Pakistan's very highly regarded Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar was an indication, perhaps, that Islamabad planned to give higher priority to reducing friction between Pakistan and the USSR.<sup>8</sup> Zia's death soon thereafter prompted intense speculation about a possible breakthrough in their relationship. According to some analysts, Zia's motives for dismissing the Junejo government had included resentment of concessions to Moscow allegedly orchestrated by the civilian-run government in negotiating the Geneva Accords.<sup>9</sup> With Zia's passing, gone was the architect of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. Gone also was perhaps Pakistan's staunchest ally of the Afghan resistance movement plus a willing collaborator with U.S. policy in the region.<sup>10</sup> Left behind was a government probably weaker and possibly more susceptible to Soviet pressure.

For a number of reasons, however, the probability of a dramatic improvement in Soviet-Pakistan relations, even less of Pakistan's sudden transformation from conduit of Western arms for the Mujahideen into conduit between the USSR and the Islamic world for Gorbachev's strategic ambitions in the Middle East, seemed fairly slight.

First, Agha Shahi's argument that "an Afghanistan settlement would remove the main cause of tension between Pakistan and the Soviet Union and transform the Durand line once again into a border of peace and tranquility" was unduly optimistic about the probable effects of a settle-

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<sup>7</sup>Agha Shahi, "Pakistan-India Relations and Superpowers' Policies," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 10, 4 (Summer 1987): 14.

<sup>8</sup>*The Muslim*, July 29, 1988.

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, Pran Chopra, "Zia's Grand Design," *Indian Express* (New Delhi), June 14, 1988; and Husain Haqqani, "Zia's Hands-on Leadership," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 23, 1988, pp. 20–21.

<sup>10</sup>The loss to Pakistan's Afghanistan policy stemming directly from the air tragedy may have been even greater than this, since, according to one source, "along with Zia, the aircraft explosion killed almost all the senior military officers who had backed the President on this issue." Sheila Tefft, "Pakistan's Political Limbo," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 23, 1988.

ment.<sup>11</sup> Unquestionably, the Afghanistan war was the main cause of tension between them, but the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan did not of itself give convincing evidence that Moscow intended to abdicate from the commanding economic and military role it had played in Afghanistan since the mid-1950s. On the contrary, there was ample evidence that Soviet leaders were striving hard to buttress the PDPA regime and that they were prepared to go to great lengths to assure continuity in Soviet-Afghanistan relations, no matter what happened to the Afghan regime's leader, President Najibullah, or for that matter, the PDPA. Moscow reportedly planned to leave several thousand civilian and military advisers in the DRA after the departure of Soviet troops, and it was making aggressive use of its economic power to achieve what seemed to many the virtual integration of northern Afghanistan's economy with that of the Soviet Central Asian republics.<sup>12</sup> Prospects for the restoration of genuine Afghan independence and self-determination, the ostensible aim of the Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, were, in fact, extremely dim. As Rosanne Klass pointed out in the summer 1988 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, no precise definition was agreed at Geneva in regard to what constituted a "complete" Soviet military withdrawal. "Since 1978, and especially since 1986," she observed,

hundreds of agreements, treaties and protocols have been concluded between the Afghan regime and the USSR and Eastern-bloc countries, particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria and, in the last year or so, between individual Soviet republics, oblasts and cities and their Afghan counterparts. These give the Soviets and their allies total control of Afghanistan's economy, its rich natural resources, education, media and other social and political institutions. Political and economic structures are being set up to control and possibly detach the mineral-rich provinces north of the Hindu Kush ranges from the southern areas which have been so devastated by the war.<sup>13</sup>

Along with many other observers, Klass contended that prospects for the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan were not bright.<sup>14</sup> She questioned, moreover, whether the agreement's commitment to Afghanistan's territorial integrity was consistent with what she claimed was the USSR's de facto annexation of the Wakhan Corridor—

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<sup>11</sup>Shahi, "Pakistan-India Relations and Superpowers' Policies," p. 10.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Joseph Newman, Jr., "The Future of Northern Afghanistan," *Asian Survey* 28, 7 (July 1988): 729–739; and Bernard Weinraub, "Russians Leaving an Afghan Legacy," *The New York Times*, August 31, 1988, p. 4Y.

<sup>13</sup>Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords," *Foreign Affairs* 66, 5 (Summer 1988): 938.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 940. See also Robert G. Wirsing, "Repatriation of Afghan Refugees," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 12, 1 (Fall 1988).

the 185-mile-long panhandle created by the British to supply a buffer between the British Indian empire and tsarist Russia.<sup>15</sup> If it were annexed, this would mean, of course, that Pakistan henceforth would share a border with the Soviet Union in an area of rapidly mounting military accessibility and strategic importance.<sup>16</sup>

Shahi's statement was also quite misleading about the previous history of the 1,500-mile-long border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Peace and tranquility had, in fact, never been among its leading characteristics. From the start, armed clashes, interference with trade and transit, and exploitation of the discontents of border tribesmen had been the rule.<sup>17</sup> Afghanistan deeply resented the fact that Pakhtun-settled territory had been included within Pakistan's northwestern and western borders at the time of independence in 1947. Its support for the Pakhtunistan independence movement in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, from the Pakistani point of view, masked its own irredentist aspirations. For its part, Pakistan had certainly not been above meddling in Afghanistan's internal affairs and from time to time had lent a hand to antigovernment destabilization activities in Afghanistan. In fact, the guerrilla organizations that fought the Soviets in the 1980s from bases in Pakistan were the direct offspring of groups originally mobilized by Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1974—five years before the Soviet military intervention occurred.<sup>18</sup>

The well-established pattern of Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan was unlikely to face fundamental alteration simply by virtue of Moscow's withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan seemed prepared to observe the commitment to noninterference in each other's internal affairs made in the Geneva agreement. For Pakistan, in fact, interference in the form of political and military support of the resistance was still very much the cornerstone of its Afghanistan policy.

To be sure, Pakistan's present capacity to manipulate the anti-Kabul guerrilla forces, in the face of serious and persistent divisions among them, was easy to exaggerate. Indian analysts, in particular, not infrequently succumbed to hyperbole in describing the scope of strategic opportunity for Pakistan implicit in the Soviet withdrawal. Pran Chopra, for example, postulated a Pakistani "grand design" for dominating Afghanistan through aggressive leadership of the rebels that would have allowed a glory-seeking

<sup>15</sup>Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords," p. 938. See also Fahmida Ashraf, "The Strategic Wakhan," *Strategic Studies* 9, 2 (Winter 1986): 48–67.

<sup>16</sup>For additional discussion of this point, see Robert G. Wirsing, "The Siachen Glacier Dispute—III: The Strategic Dimension," *Strategic Studies* 12, 1 (Fall 1988).

<sup>17</sup>For background, see S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 68–90, 205–208.

<sup>18</sup>Babar, interview.

President Zia to “go down in history as the architect of Greater Pakistan.”<sup>19</sup> There was no doubting his argument, however, that Pakistan hoped to use the Mujahideen forces to shape the future course of events inside Afghanistan.

Soviet-backed Kabul, in turn, was giving ample sign of willingness to fight back. The deepest Afghan air strike into Pakistani territory of the war—an attack by seven Afghan fighter-bombers on Pakistani villages about 30 miles east of the Afghan border—took place early in September 1988, nearly five months after the Geneva Accords were signed.<sup>20</sup> Terrorist bombings of civilian targets within Pakistan continued unabated. There was considerable speculation, moreover, that Kabul and Moscow may have had a hand in the death of Zia.<sup>21</sup> In any event, Soviet military intervention, while vastly exacerbating the tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan, certainly did not cause it. Mutual interference in each other's affairs antedated the arrival of the Soviets and—regardless of whether the Geneva Accords placed a ban on it—was most likely to continue after their departure.<sup>22</sup> Chances were fairly slim, in other words, that Afghanistan would soon cease to be a festering sore in Soviet-Pakistan relations.

Second, both the political defeat implicit in the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan as well as the increasingly apparent Soviet inclination to shift the blame for the defeat to Moscow's hapless Afghan colleagues have inevitably spurred second thoughts about the value of Soviet assurances to its allies. Though the precise extent of Moscow's present commitments to the PDPA regime was far from apparent, there were ample indications that they did not include a guarantee of Soviet military rescue from ultimate collapse.<sup>23</sup> The possibility was surfacing, in fact, that the Soviet Union was

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<sup>19</sup>Pran Chopra, “Zia's Grand Design.” See also Bhabani Sen Gupta, “Future of Soviet-Pak Relations,” *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), June 24, 1988.

<sup>20</sup>*The New York Times*, September 2, 1988, p. 6Y. The government of Pakistan announced at the end of July 1988 that there had been 92 violations of its air space since the Geneva Accords had come into force on May 15. *The Muslim*, August 1, 1988.

<sup>21</sup>See, for example, Mark Fineman, “Zia's Death Creates Rampant Speculation,” *The State* (Columbia, SC), August 29, 1988.

<sup>22</sup>Few observers expect a major change in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy to emerge from the victory of the People's Party of Pakistan (PPP) in the general elections of November 1988. Benazir Bhutto, the country's new Prime Minister, took a position on Afghanistan during the election campaign that was barely discernible from that of the government. Her appointment of Sahabzada Yakub Khan to the post of Foreign Minister, a position he held under Zia, was one indication that there was to be no sharp break with the past.

<sup>23</sup>See, for example, Paul Quinn-Judge, “Soviet General Downbeat on Afghan Government Prospects,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 25, 1988; Bill Keller, “A Big Afghan Town Is Seized by Rebels,” *The New York Times*, August 17, 1988. p. 4Y. Note, however, Soviet deployment in Afghanistan in October of about 30 MiG-27 ground attack planes plus

even prepared to tolerate the replacement, or at least substantial dilution, of the PDPA regime so long as Moscow could reach an accommodation with its successor. This de facto abridgment of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which obligated the USSR to come to the defense of its fraternal Marxist allies, seemed to put Moscow, when it came to reliability, in about the same awkward position as the United States occupied relative to its allies.

It did not seem very realistic, therefore, to urge Pakistan to relieve pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan in the expectation that Moscow would respond, as one Pakistani scholar rather extravagantly argued it might, with "a Soviet guarantee against the perceived Indian threat and Afghan irredentism."<sup>24</sup> Having declared rather forthrightly its reservations about protecting client states with Soviet military power, Moscow was hardly in a position to give credible guarantees of Pakistan's lengthy and hotly contested borders. What Pakistan had consistently failed to get from the United States, it was not likely soon to get from the USSR.

Third, the dominant role of the military in Pakistani politics was likely to incline Islamabad to continue to weight strategic criteria over political popularity in deciding security policy. No doubt, strong popular support had developed in Pakistan in recent years, particularly since the emergence of the civilianized regime under Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, for a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The round-table conference on the Afghanistan issue summoned by Junejo in February 1988, for example, indicated that virtually the entire top leadership of the country's political opposition gave Pakistan's facilitation of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return to Afghanistan of the refugees clear precedence over the reconstitution of the government in Kabul along non-Marxist lines. Perhaps Junejo's reluctance to press the Soviets on the issue of an interim government in Afghanistan, as noted earlier in the discussion, figured among Zia's motives in dismissing Junejo and his cabinet. Zia's death along with some of his closest military associates obviously reopened the issue. In Pakistan's unsettled domestic political environment, strong questioning of Pakistan's support of the Afghan guerrillas was bound to occur. Barring the military's complete abdication of political power, however, an event few seasoned observers of Pakistan expected, popular demands were not likely to override the strategic compulsions that have almost always given the edge to the military in the debate over national priorities. These strategic compulsions now included an openly hostile Afghan regime, armed to the teeth and desperately struggling for its political survival, and a bitter civil war raging

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advanced long-range (Scud) missiles. Robert Pear, "Soviets Are Said to Deploy Missiles in Kabul That Can Hit Pakistan," *The New York Times*, November 2, 1988, p. 4Y.

<sup>24</sup>Azmi, "Pakistan's Soviet Policy," pp. 167-178.

from one end of Afghanistan to the other, the outcome of which no one was in a position to predict with any certainty. Under the circumstances, Pakistan's disengagement from the struggle simply in order to pacify public opinion was most unlikely.

Lastly, Moscow seemed incapable of establishing its political bona fides in Islamabad without putting serious strains on its highly valued alliance with India. India had protested fiercely when the USSR struck an arms deal with Pakistan in the late 1960s and was virtually bound to do so again were Moscow tempted a second time. In principle, there was no bar to Moscow's simultaneous courtship of India and Pakistan. In practice, however, it ran up against the intractability of the rivalry between these two subcontinental powers. Their rivalry had survived the jolt to regional security stemming from the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan; chances were good that it would survive the Soviet military withdrawal, too. No doubt, the shifting global and regional context of Indo-Soviet relations held at least the possibility for a change in Soviet policy toward India such that might ease the task of India-Pakistan and hence Pakistan-Soviet reconciliation. Whether any such trend was coming into sight is an especially important and controversial question requiring closer examination.

### **Soviet Relations with India**

Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan undoubtedly put the Soviet Union's carefully nurtured relationship with India under unusual strain. New Delhi's initial defense of Moscow's intervention—excusing it on grounds that it had been undertaken “at the request of the Afghan Government”—had seriously embarrassed the government; and New Delhi's widely noted abstentions from international condemnations of the Soviet intervention did little to bolster its claim to leadership either within its own region or among the nonaligned nations. Privately, Indian officials confessed to strong misgivings about the Soviet military action, and there were numerous indications that these were discreetly communicated to Moscow. There was no evidence, however, of any strong domestic pressure on the government to change its policy. On the contrary, New Delhi's quickly taken decision to avoid public criticism of the intervention and to deflect some of the blame for it to Pakistan and its American ally apparently had widespread public support.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, as the war dragged on India's generally pro-Soviet policy on Afghanistan remained remarkably intact.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram Panda, “Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy,” *Asian Survey* 23, 3 (March 1983): 261–279.

<sup>26</sup>Thomas Perry Thornton, “India and Afghanistan,” in Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *The Red Army on Pakistan's Border: Policy Implications for the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 67.

Many Western observers, along with some members of the Indian political opposition, accused New Delhi of sacrificing India's long-term interest in Afghanistan's independence to the momentary advantages of its alliance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet military action in Afghanistan, they argued, posed unique dangers for India, threatening to undermine its hard-won dominance in its own region as well as to provoke increased great-power rivalry in the subcontinent. "The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan," wrote S. Nihal Singh, former editor-in-chief of India's leading English-language daily, *The Indian Express*, "has been the greatest blow to India's regional and long-term interests. Implicitly, Moscow is now claiming to be a South Asian power."<sup>27</sup>

A few observers even saw in the magnitude of the Soviet threat to the region incentive for New Delhi and Islamabad to make common cause. Rodney Jones, for example, argued that Pakistan's existence today on only one side of the subcontinent, the diminishing appeal of Pakistani irredentism in Kashmir, and a gradual thaw in Sino-Indian relations had already made the promotion of Indo-Pakistan reconciliation a live alternative for India. The same option, he said, "is more feasible today for Pakistan because of the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. *This is a situation far more promising for diminished rivalry than any since India and Pakistan became independent* [italics added]."<sup>28</sup>

The fact of the matter, it seems, was that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan simply did not inspire a radical change in either Pakistani or Indian threat assessments. Moreover, the primacy of the USSR in Indian security calculations plus the incompatibility of Pakistan's security policy with Indian regional aspirations, as Thomas Thornton observed, created little stimulus for a constructive regional approach to Afghanistan.<sup>29</sup>

One reason for India's seeming passivity relating to the war in Afghanistan was the relatively easy fit that existed between the reasons Moscow claimed underlay its military action and New Delhi's own well-established public interpretation of the region's fundamental security problems. The logic on both sides rested on the assumption that Western (especially American) connivance with weak revisionist state or substate forces within the region accounted both for the region's political instability and

<sup>27</sup>S. Nihal Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of Indo-Soviet Relations* (Riverdale, Md.: The Riverdale Company, 1986), p. 237.

<sup>28</sup>Rodney W. Jones, "India: Defense Policy, Modern Weapons, and Regional Power," in Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth, eds., *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 208–209.

<sup>29</sup>Thornton, "India and Afghanistan," pp. 63–70. "India's chances of guiding a regional approach to a successful solution are small," Thornton concluded, "in part because of Indian shortcomings, but even more because of the sheer intractability of the issues involved."

for the common resort to armed violence. Another reason was the fact that the intervention substantially strengthened New Delhi's bargaining position with the Soviet Union. Having incurred the vast displeasure of practically the entire world for its Afghan adventure, Moscow needed New Delhi's diplomatic support more than ever. For this support, it was apparently prepared to pay heavily. Indian Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow in June 1980 reportedly included chastisement of the Soviets for their errancy in Afghanistan. The discussion, however, also laid the groundwork for a \$1.6 billion Soviet arms sale to India—the largest ever.<sup>30</sup>

Ironically, New Delhi's bargaining position with the United States may also have benefited from India's insistence on equating Soviet "intervention" with American "interference." Beginning in late 1984, and apparently without any prior sign from New Delhi of intent to modify its pro-Soviet stand on Afghanistan, Washington mounted a major effort—including approval of the sale of advanced dual-purpose technologies—to improve relations with India. Among its declared objectives was the desire to move India toward a more genuine nonalignment. For India, at least, Soviet aggression evidently had a silver lining.

Obviously, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had a dark side for India. For one thing, it had supplied the Reagan administration with its principal justification for a massive military aid program for Pakistan. For another, it had undermined whatever hope New Delhi retained for the unhindered application of American nonproliferation sanctions against Pakistan. Even in this respect, however, the Soviet action was not an unmitigated disaster for India. By strongly bolstering the armed forces of Pakistan's other traditional adversary, Afghanistan, Moscow had forced Pakistan to redeploy at least some of its forces on the Afghanistan border. Moreover, by vastly enhancing the potential for Indo-Soviet military collusion on Pakistan's highly vulnerable northern borders, Moscow significantly weakened Pakistan's ability to withstand Indian pressures on the disputed border in Kashmir.<sup>31</sup>

The Soviet Union's withdrawal of its armed forces from Afghanistan was no more likely, in and of itself, to stimulate subcontinental reconciliation than had the act of intervention. On the contrary, it seemed to be opening a new arena of conflict between India and Pakistan. With the commencement of Soviet withdrawal in mid-May, New Delhi made it plain that India was not indifferent to the character of the regime that would rule in Kabul after the Soviets left. Whereas Islamabad clearly backed the

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid. p. 58.

<sup>31</sup>On this point, see Wirsing, "The Stachen Glacier Dispute—III: The Strategic Dimension."

more militantly Islamic elements among the resistance, New Delhi publicly declared them completely unacceptable.<sup>32</sup> Early in 1988, in a dramatic move aimed apparently at establishing Indian bona fides with Afghan moderate groups, India's Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh reportedly met with ex-King Zahir Shah in Rome; and in May, in an even more dramatic move, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi hosted Afghanistan's embattled President Najibullah in a much-publicized visit to New Delhi.<sup>33</sup>

Actual Indian capabilities for controlling events inside Afghanistan seemed, in reality, quite meager. Nevertheless, New Delhi appeared genuinely fearful of losing out entirely in Afghanistan, not simply because that might mean another militant Islamic regime in its neighborhood but because it would signal a more thorough defeat for India's Soviet ally than either New Delhi or Moscow wished to accept. New Delhi had given very few indications that it was preparing, as one Pakistani journalist asserted, to take over in Afghanistan where the Soviet Union had left off.<sup>34</sup> Evidence was mounting, however, that the Indo-Pakistan rivalry was rapidly taking on a severely divisive Afghan dimension.

Viewed in these terms, the Soviet Union's withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan thus seemed likely to have at best a neutral, at worst a negative impact on India-Pakistan relations. The scaling down of its own role in Afghanistan seemed to correspond with a scaling up of theirs. That development was a reminder that the Indo-Pakistan rivalry remained among the most resilient and pervasive geopolitical facts in the region. It was also one more indication, if one were needed, that mending fences between Pakistan and the Soviet Union might not be easy.

Viewed from a broader perspective, however, the probable future path of Indo-Soviet relations could not be adduced simply from Moscow's decision to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. The downgrading of Afghanistan that appeared to take place in Moscow's foreign policy outlook under Gorbachev obviously had to be considered in the context of Moscow's retention of very extensive economic and military ties with India. The continuing importance attached to these by both Moscow and New Delhi, apart from anything that happened in Afghanistan, would clearly be a major determinant of the Soviet Union's future role in South

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<sup>32</sup>See, for example, Elaine Sciolino, "Gandhi Faults Islamic Rule for Kabul," *The New York Times*, June 11, 1988, p. 4Y.

<sup>33</sup>For differing Indian points of view on Najibullah's visit, see Dilip Mukerjee, "Afghan Power Struggle: Case for Indian Neutrality," *The Hindustan Times*, May 11, 1988; Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary: Najibullah Visit and After," *The Times of India* (New Delhi), May 12, 1988; and S. Viswam, "Delhi to Help Stabilise Kabul," *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), May 7, 1988.

<sup>34</sup>Ghani Eirabie, "Moscow: Handing Down Afghan Job to India?" *The Muslim*, August 12, 1988.

Asia. Inevitably, the question was beginning to crop up whether either India or the Soviet Union, or both, reacting to domestic and global opportunities and pressures, would seek fundamental change in their relationship. Plausible scenarios in reply to this question would appear to fall into three broad categories.

1. One scenario, advanced by most Indian and Western observers, at least until recently, was that Indo-Soviet bilateral ties, relieved of the strain of the Afghanistan fiasco and cushioned by a quarter of a century of enormous mutual benefit, would continue essentially unchanged into the indefinite future. This possibility drew sustenance from the unique geopolitical complementarity that seemed to exist between India and the Soviet Union. India, on one hand, gained materially both from generous Soviet economic assistance and from the supply of advanced and relatively low-cost Soviet weaponry; it gained as well from at least implicit Soviet assurances of help in the event of Chinese aggression. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, gained international legitimacy and a major opening to the nonaligned movement through its friendship with democratic India; it also enlisted a major political ally against the spread of American influence on the Asian rimland.

Benefits were not necessarily distributed equally on both sides, however. Indeed, among those convinced of the durability of the Indo-Soviet relationship were many who considered India too passive in the relationship, given to compromising its independence to satisfy its more aggressive Soviet partner. S. Nihal Singh, for example, considered Soviet economic military leverage dangerously asymmetrical and the relationship, in terms of Indian regional interests, increasingly constrictive. Even he conceded, however, that the relationship, notwithstanding increasing areas of divergence between the two countries, would continue to be close.<sup>35</sup>

2. A second scenario, rooted in quite opposite inferences from present trends, was that the Indo-Soviet relationship was approaching a critical threshold in its evolution and that it was not likely to be maintained much longer at its present level. Momentous convergent developments—including a general thaw in great-power (U.S.-Soviet, Sino-Soviet, and Sino-Indian) relations, a much reduced threat of superpower military confrontation stemming from the war in Afghanistan, and a gradual movement within the South Asian region toward routinized regional cooperation—threw serious doubt on the relevance to either the Soviet Union or India of a continued special relationship. Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had driven home to Indians the narrow limits of Soviet

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<sup>35</sup>Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear*, p. 242.

sensitivity to Indian regional interests. Now, with Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan seemingly assured, Indian dependence on the USSR appeared likely to grow even less attractive to Indians.

One reason for this slackening of affection was that India's hard-earned conventional military dominance in the region no longer seemed in as much jeopardy as it had at the start of the decade. The Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan would largely eliminate the menace from that quarter, and there was nearly universal expectation that a diminished Soviet threat in Afghanistan would dampen enthusiasm in the United States for meeting Pakistan's demands for sophisticated arms. Should present trends continue, in other words, India's overall security environment was likely to experience marked improvement, hence to provide less justification for a posture of passive dependence on Moscow. Another reason was that India's apparent determination to shed its image of economic and technological backwardness seemed to leave it no alternative but to expand its contacts with the economically and technologically much more dynamic West.

Coincidentally, a development of this kind would not be entirely out of harmony with what many professional analysts increasingly said were Moscow's own policy priorities—namely, downscaled involvement in regional conflict and concentration on its own domestic economic reconstruction. Charles William Maynes, editor of *Foreign Policy* magazine, observed not long ago, for example, that

it seems probable that under most scenarios the Soviet Union will display less interest in becoming involved in the Third World in the coming decade than it has in the last. The reasons reflect both greater Soviet understanding of the realities there and the fact that the Soviets have less money to spend. . . . The issue of cost is particularly important when the Soviet Union is trying to marshal its resources for domestic reform.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, Moscow quite conceivably would welcome some relief from its huge strategic subsidy of Indian economic development and military modernization programs. Washington, too, seen from this angle, would benefit from the encouragement of Indian independence—even from the United States. Indeed, for those inclined to this second scenario, virtually any gain for the South Asian region was a gain also for the superpowers.<sup>37</sup>

3. There was a third scenario, in my opinion the most plausible of the

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<sup>36</sup>Charles William Maynes, "America's Third World Hang-Ups," *Foreign Policy* 71 (Summer 1988): 129.

<sup>37</sup>"The pursuit of global U.S. interests in South Asia proper," wrote Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoerber Rudolph, "must in the first instance take account of regional forces and determinants. Contrary to prevailing conventional explanations, it is more often the case that what is good for the region is good for U.S. interests than that what serves U.S. global interests serves

three, that the Soviet Union and India would remain closely associated, especially in the military realm, but that India would assume a much greater share of responsibility for maintaining regional security. Like the second, this scenario allowed for a more independent Indian foreign policy posture and for some curtailment in at least Soviet economic assistance to India. Unlike the second, however, it held that the extensive overlap in Indo-Soviet strategic interests that had helped to forge their alliance in the first place would remain intact—and act to reinforce their military cooperation—in spite of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. In further contrast with the first scenario, this one assumed a more aggressive Indian insistence on regional dominance, a gradually widened Indian definition of its regional sphere of influence, and, as a consequence, broader grounds for increasing friction with the United States and its Western allies.

Lending support to this scenario was Ashok Kapur's recent discussion of emerging power relationships in the Indian subcontinent. According to him, an Indocentric power structure and security management system had gradually emerged in South Asia. With it had come a southward and a power projection orientation in Indian diplomacy and military development as well as a growing tendency to intervene in regional affairs, as in Sri Lanka.<sup>38</sup> In these circumstances, India's requirements for advanced military weaponry were not likely to diminish. Neither, then, was the importance to India of its special relationship with the Soviet Union. Viewed in this light, India's growing conventional military might, in particular the fact that it was "openly aspiring for naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean,"<sup>39</sup> could pose a serious challenge, at least over the long run, to Western interests in the region. Whether the United States would be well advised to recognize India as the regional hegemon certainly would be an awkward question for Washington to contend with in the coming decade.<sup>40</sup> Not the least awkward element in the question would be the role the USSR continued to play in underwriting India's emergence.

### **Implications for U.S. Policy**

The move to end the USSR's direct military role in Afghanistan was almost certain to impact heavily on the relationship between the United

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regional interests." "The United States, India, and South Asia," in John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1983* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 112.

<sup>38</sup>Ashok Kapur, "The Indian Subcontinent: The Contemporary Structure of Power and the Development of Power Relations," *Asian Survey* 28, 7 (July 1988): 709.

<sup>39</sup>Maynes, "America's Third World Hang-Ups," p. 133.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 133.

States and Pakistan. Even at the height of the Afghanistan war, when conventional wisdom still clung to the view that time was on the side of the Soviet army, there were severe strains in the relationship. Islamabad's insistence on plowing ahead with its covert program of nuclear weaponization had gone deeply against the grain of Washington's nonproliferation objectives; and the Pakistani leadership's less than wholehearted commitment to parliamentary democracy had raised troubling questions not only about Pakistan's long-term political stability but also about the moral basis of Washington's support for the military-dominated regime. Notwithstanding Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance fighters, more than a few influential American voices were heard demanding a cutoff in American aid to Pakistan, even at the risk of undermining U.S. policy in Afghanistan, unless Islamabad proved more faithful to its professed peaceful nuclear intentions.<sup>41</sup> Some even went so far as to demand complete U.S. disengagement from the Pakistani "quicksand" no matter what Islamabad did.<sup>42</sup> In the short run, of course, a major U.S. disengagement from Pakistan was most unlikely. With time apparently having run out on the Soviet army in Afghanistan, however, the Reagan administration's principal defense for massive infusions of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan—the Soviet threat—was virtually bound to become more difficult to sustain. Mounting pressure on the U.S.-Pakistan alliance seemed inevitable.

Consideration of the various forces underlying the Soviet role in South Asia, it seems to me, cautions against yielding too readily to these pressures. No doubt, the Soviet leadership has suffered a major defeat in Afghanistan. No doubt, too, the reverberations of that defeat will be felt throughout the Soviet army and society, and in every Soviet satellite and client state. But, in the face of mounting evidence that the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan is likely to be vastly more conditional than was that of the United States in Vietnam, it is misleading in the extreme to say, as did Graham Allison in a *Foreign Affairs* article advocating a more receptive U.S. response to Soviet policy overtures, that Gorbachev had "accepted defeat, with only the fig leaf of calling it stalemate and without even

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<sup>41</sup>For examples, see the editorial, "Stop Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb," *The New York Times*, March 13, 1987, p. 30Y; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Why Fuel a Pakistani Bomb?" *The New York Times*, April 23, 1987, p. 25Y; and Howard Wolpe and Mel Levine, "Pakistan and the Bomb: A History of Deception," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 17, 1987, p. 14. See also *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, Report of the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988).

<sup>42</sup>Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Fortress Built on Quicksand: U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan*, Policy Analysis No. 80 (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, January 5, 1987).

demanding a decent interval.”<sup>43</sup> Even worse is the suggestion in the same article that Washington, by its failure to help the Soviet Union “extricate itself from Afghanistan with minimum embarrassment,” missed an opportunity to produce a diplomatic settlement in Central America.<sup>44</sup>

Notwithstanding any leverage that might have been gained in Central America, it would clearly be very difficult to assure the USSR of “minimum embarrassment” in Afghanistan without putting the Afghan resistance in great jeopardy, without squandering whatever progress has already been made toward the attainment of Afghanistan’s independence, and without severely undermining the interests of our ally, Pakistan. Surely, minimizing Soviet embarrassment is not what got the Soviets to agree to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. It is not the best way, in my judgment, to make sure that the ultimate political settlement within Afghanistan does not concede what has already been won.

In the same way, I think, it will be important to resist the temptation to defer to India “as the natural arbiter of political conflicts” in the subcontinent.<sup>45</sup> South Asia is far from having achieved a regional order based on the consent of the smaller states of the region.<sup>46</sup> India-Pakistan relations, in particular, remain highly polarized. Pakistan has shown very little willingness to submit peaceably to an Indian-orchestrated regional order, and India has certainly displayed very little inclination to make the kinds of concessions to its neighbor that might bring that about. Deference to India is no guarantee of regional peace. Neither is it a guarantee against the spread of Soviet influence. In the future, that may have as much to do with India’s own ambitions in the South Asian region and beyond as with the strategic aims of the Soviet Union. An Indocentric structure of power in South Asia, as we discussed earlier, might conceivably rest upon an Indo-Soviet strategic alliance.

The Soviet Union’s military withdrawal from Afghanistan has upset practically all conventional explanations of the course of events in South Asia. For some time to come, the direction of events is likely to remain unusually murky. Under the circumstances, U.S. policy toward South Asia faces difficult times. Making its way among the policy minefields laid by partisans of one or another school of thought will tax Washington’s imagination and ingenuity. One hopes that the “test” of Mikhail Gorbachev’s intentions in South Asia is given without favor to any side.

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<sup>43</sup>Graham T. Allison, Jr., “Testing Gorbachev,” *Foreign Affairs* 67, 1 (Fall 1988): 27.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.* p. 31.

<sup>45</sup>Francine R. Frankel, “Play the India Card,” *Foreign Policy* 62 (Spring 1986): 166.

<sup>46</sup>Kapur, “The Indian Subcontinent,” p. 695.

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## 15. Pakistan-American Relations in Soviet Perspective: An Evaluation

SYED RIFAT HUSSAIN

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The history of Pakistan's quest for security over the last four decades is marked by two overarching but mutually reinforcing themes: Pakistan's policy of varying degrees of strategic alignment with the United States on one hand and a relationship of disaffection bordering on enmity with the USSR on the other.

To be sure, there is nothing natural about this prevalent pattern of Pakistani attitudes of amity and enmity vis-à-vis the two superpowers. If anything, these Pakistani perceptions point to an underlying geopolitical anomaly in Islamabad's strategic outlook: being friends with one superpower thousands of miles away while at odds with the other that is almost next door. To what extent have Pakistan's adversarial relations with Moscow been shaped and influenced by Islamabad's closeness to Washington? This chapter approaches the subject of Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union in the context of this central question. It argues that a major cause of disaffection between Islamabad and Moscow has been Pakistan's policy of strategic alignment with the United States. Moscow's manifest inability to appreciate Pakistan's security dilemma stemming from the latter's sense of strategic vulnerability against oversized, overbearing, Soviet-backed, hegemonic India has further exacerbated estrangement between the two countries. Thus, confronted with implacable Indian hostility in the early 1950s, Pakistan was forced to look toward Washington as a source of economic and military help.

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 only accentuated this historic Pakistani sense of vulnerability, for this move raised the not-too-unrealistic specter of a two-front security bind for Islamabad. Again, out of strategic compulsions, Islamabad was forced to turn toward Washington. The critical difference between the first and the second "coming together" of Islamabad and Washington, however, would seem to be that the latter has been characterized by a high degree of pragmatism on both

sides and is mutually perceived as a marriage of convenience par excellence. In view of its highly contingent character, this latter-day Pakistan-American alignment is bound to undergo a major shift in the wake of the Soviet military pullout from Afghanistan and leadership changes in Islamabad and Washington.

Historically, Pakistan's relations with the USSR have never been friendly.<sup>1</sup> At best, they have been correct. The causes of this estrangement and disaffection between the two countries are as numerous as they are longstanding. From the Soviet viewpoint, Islamabad's strategic relationship with Washington and Beijing, declared enemies of Moscow; its inability to help the Kremlin extricate itself from the Afghan quagmire; and its Islamic vocation constitute the primary causes of the animosity between the two countries. Former Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan Smirnov, in his valedictory speeches in 1984, mentioned three major Soviet grievances against Islamabad. These, in his words, were: "the increase in Pakistan's involvement in the events in Afghanistan; discrimination against the Soviet Embassy staff and other missions; and anti-Soviet propaganda in Pakistan."<sup>2</sup>

In Pakistan's view, Moscow is a hegemonic superpower determined to impose its *diktat* over immediate smaller neighbors. Moreover, Moscow supports Pakistan's chief adversary, India, and was directly responsible for Pakistan's dismemberment at the hands of the latter in 1971. Also, in Moscow's continued military presence in Afghanistan, Islamabad envisages an impending threat to its own security. If Pakistan has assumed the mantle of a "frontline" state in the 1980s, Islamabad argues, then it was mainly because of an externally imposed condition created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Additionally, Islamabad feels that Moscow has been totally insensitive to its security needs and compulsions emanating from Pakistan's difficult geostrategic location and its deeply rooted conflicts with two of its immediate neighbors, India and Afghanistan. Mounting public Soviet criticism of Pakistan's sovereign right to acquire

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<sup>1</sup>For an excellent historical analysis of Pakistan-Soviet relations, see Raghunatha Ram, *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan* (New Delhi: Chang & Company, Ltd., 1983). Recent discussions of this subject are: Mehrunnisa Ali, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties since the Afghanistan Crisis," *Asian Survey* (September 1983): 1025-1041; Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain, eds., *U.S.-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985), pp. 128-139; Yuri Gankovsky et al., "Soviet Relations with Pakistan," in Hafeez Malik, ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 182-199.

<sup>2</sup>*The Muslim*, November 19, 1984.

nuclear capability is further seen in Islamabad as an instance of Soviet efforts to perpetuate nuclear hegemony in the world.<sup>3</sup>

Given these conflicting perceptions of interests, roles, and outlooks, it is not overly surprising that Islamabad and Moscow have found themselves at odds with each other over the last four decades. What follows is a historical treatment of this phenomenon of Pakistan-Soviet troubled coexistence in the context of the vagaries of Soviet-American strategic competition in South Asia. In the twin interests of brevity and clarity, we have divided our discussion of the history of Pakistan-Soviet relations into the following seven sequential phases, distinguished by subtle but significant variations in Soviet strategic posture, policy goals, and objectives toward Pakistan:

1. Benign neglect (1947–1952)
2. Cold War (1953–1963)
3. Positive neutrality (1964–1969)
4. Overt hostility (1969–1973)
5. Peaceful coexistence (1974–1979)
6. Cold War II (1979–1985)
7. Partial détente (1986 to date)

### **Benign Neglect (1947–1952)**

Pakistan's inception in 1947 went almost unnoticed in the Soviet Union. The only reported comment made by Stalin was not very flattering: "How primitive it was to create a state on the basis of religion."<sup>4</sup> Despite this Soviet attitude of implied hostility, soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1948, Moscow invited Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan for a state visit.<sup>5</sup> By virtue of this invitation, Pakistan became the first country of the British Commonwealth whose leader had been invited to visit the USSR. This visit, however, never materialized.<sup>6</sup> Instead of going to Moscow, the Pakistani premier undertook an extended tour of the United States in 1950. In Washington, Liaquat

<sup>3</sup>*The Muslim*, July 16, 1986. Also see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Moscow's Warning to Pakistan—What Does It Mean?" *The Muslim*, August 3, 1986.

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in Ram, *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan*, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup>Scholarly opinion is divided on the question of why Liaquat never availed himself of the opportunity to visit Moscow. K. Sarwar Hasan argues that "it was the realization of economic dependence upon the U.S. that prompted Liaquat Ali Khan to postpone, in effect abandon, his projected visit to the Soviet Union and go to the United States instead." K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan," *Pakistan Horizon* (December 1951): 156. Raghunath Ram attributes Liaquat's decision not to go to Moscow to a lurking Pakistani suspicion of future Soviet intentions, since Moscow had "sanctioned an anti-capitalist strategy in 1949

Ali Khan not only spoke out against communism but eulogized his American hosts as “the world’s greatest philanthropists.”<sup>7</sup> While stressing the geostrategic importance of his country as a bulwark against communist expansion in Asia, Liaquat Ali Khan opined that, given its “Islamic way of life,” Pakistan was not likely to become a fertile ground for communism.<sup>8</sup>

These anticommunist utterances, however, did not invite an immediate Soviet backlash, as was evident from the continued exchange of trade, cultural, and medical missions between the two countries.

During the 1950 Korean War, Pakistan endorsed<sup>9</sup> the U.N.-sponsored, American-backed military action against North Korea, a friend and military ally of Moscow. Pakistan-Soviet relations took a negative turn in 1951 when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan implicated Moscow and the minuscule Communist Party of Pakistan in the famous Rawalpindi Conspiracy case against his government.<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to note that this allegedly

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against the countries of the South and South East Asia including Pakistan.” Ram, *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan*, p. 15. F. M. Innes, a former Indian civil servant and an advisor to the Pakistan Central Commercial Committee in the early 1950s, suggests that Liaquat wangled the invitation from the Soviet Union in order to counter the invitation of President Truman to Nehru in May 1949 to visit the United States. F. M. Innes, “The Political Outlook in Pakistan,” *Pacific Affairs* (October 1955): 251–257. J. P. Jain takes a similar view and describes Liaquat’s acceptance of the Soviet invitation to visit Moscow as a “ruse to draw the attention of the Western powers towards Pakistan.” J. P. Jain, *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Karachi, London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 101. G. W. Choudhry blames the Pakistani bureaucracy for sabotaging Liaquat’s prospective visit to Moscow. G. W. Choudhry, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Sub-Continent* (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 14. Ayesha Jalal attributes Liaquat’s inability to visit Moscow to “the strength of the old imperial connection at the official level” in Pakistan. She states: “Pakistan’s officials in the Foreign and Defence Ministries acting in close concert with the Commonwealth Relations Office and the State Department made sure that Liaquat not only postponed his visit but boarded a plane to the United States instead.” Ayesha Jalal, “Constructing a State: The Interplay of Domestic, Regional, and International Factors in Post-Colonial Pakistan,” *Colloquium Paper* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1986), p. 30.

<sup>7</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan as cited in S. M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1974), p. 130.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>9</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan’s forceful support for the U.N. action in Korea, among other things, may have been influenced by his expectation of a similar strong U.N. stand on the Kashmir issue later on. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 14.

<sup>10</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan told Parliament on March 21, 1951, that the conspirators had planned to invite advisory missions from a “certain foreign country” to set up a communist state. *Dawn* (Karachi), March 22, 1951.

Soviet-backed conspiracy, which involved the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Akbar Khan, and other senior army officers, was uncovered barely two months after General Mohammed Ayub's appointment as first Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan armed forces. Ayub was believed to be "pro-American" and Washington "seemed reassured" by his elevation to this important and coveted post.<sup>11</sup> Following this episode Pakistan imposed restrictions on the movement of the Soviet personnel inside Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

Despite these negative developments in their bilateral relations, Moscow adopted a posture of strict neutrality vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> This was reflected in Moscow's nonparticipation in the U.N. Security Council discussion of the Frank Graham report in 1951. Nor did Moscow publicly endorse the Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan on the so-called Pakhtunistan issue.<sup>14</sup>

### Cold War (1953–1963)

During this phase Pakistan-Soviet interactions were marked by high degrees of tension, suspicion, and ideological hostility. The primary cause of this intense mutual antagonism lay in Soviet opposition to Pakistan's increased involvement in the American efforts (especially after the outbreak of the Korean War) to organize the area militarily as a bulwark against further communist aggression in Asia. These American efforts were symbolized by the "Dullesian quest for a vital link in the alliance chain that the United States engineered on the rimland of the communist world."<sup>15</sup> Two interlocking anticommunist military alliances, CENTO and SEATO, were created in 1954 and 1955, respectively. Along with NATO, these alliances ran the entire length of the Eurasian perimeter. In South Asia, Pakistan became the regional focal point of this American policy of containment largely because it offered a "centrally positioned landing site for possible operations against the USSR and China."<sup>16</sup>

Besides its strategic location, Pakistan had all the attributes of a model client-state: "She was perfectly willing to exchange base rights treaty

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<sup>11</sup>Jalal, "Constructing a State," p. 41.

<sup>12</sup>Ram, *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan*, p. 53.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>15</sup>Lawrence Ziring, "South Asian Tangles and Triangles," in Lawrence Ziring, ed., *The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors, and the Great Powers*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 1.

<sup>16</sup>R. D. Campbell, *Pakistan: Emerging Democracy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 116.

commitments, and the U.N. vote, for a reliable flow of weapons and political support against India.”<sup>17</sup> Before opting for Pakistan, Washington had tried to build up India as the anticommunist power in the area, but this attempt failed largely because India adhered to a policy of nonalignment that was shaped by Nehru’s resurgent Asianism, on one hand, and the widespread perception of the Indian governing elite that its alliance with the leading “dynamic imperialist power” would “deprive India of its ability to look at each issue on its merits and make up its own mind on important foreign policy issues” on the other.<sup>18</sup>

In 1954, the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, and the latter also became a member of SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan’s accession to these anti-Soviet military alliances inevitably evoked a hostile Soviet response. What seems to have worried Moscow the most at the time was the potential U.S. use of its military bases in Pakistan for a nuclear strike against the Soviet heartland. As John Foster Dulles used the apocalyptic language of massive nuclear retaliation against the Soviet cities, Moscow grew increasingly hostile toward the American military presence in Pakistan. Thus, in March 1954 a Soviet protest note was handed over to the Pakistan *chargé d'affaires* in Moscow. While repeating the earlier charge that Pakistan had granted military bases to the United States, the note warned that Pakistani activities would harm its relations with the USSR and that “responsibility for such a situation would rest squarely upon Pakistan.”<sup>19</sup> Four years later, in April 1958, Moscow warned Pakistan in another protest note that in view of its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union “grave consequences” would inevitably await Pakistan “if its territory will be allowed to be used for the establishment of military bases for the purpose of using them against the Soviet Union.”<sup>20</sup> This harsh Soviet criticism of Pakistan’s joining of anti-Soviet alliances also occasioned a historic shift in Moscow’s attitudes of neutrality on the two crucial issues of Kashmir and Pakhtunistan.

In December 1955, Soviet Premier Bulganin and First Secretary Khrushchev visited India. During this visit Premier Bulganin denounced the Baghdad Pact and SEATO as aggressive military alliances. In a speech at Srinagar on December 10, Khrushchev condemned the “aggressive” policies of the “ruling circles of Pakistan” and observed:

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<sup>17</sup>Stephen P. Cohen, “U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis,” *Pacific Affairs* 49, 1 (Spring 1976): 54.

<sup>18</sup>Howard Wriggins, “The Range and Scope of U.S. Interests in South Asia,” in Ziring, ed., *The Subcontinent in World Politics*, pp. 217–218.

<sup>19</sup>Cited in Jain, *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p. 51.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 52.

Their policy is based not on the vital interests of their people and their state but is dictated by the monopolistic circles of other countries. The present government of Pakistan frankly publicizes the fact that it is particularly close to American monopolistic circles, and this government was one of the first participants—one of the initiators of the notorious Baghdad Pact. This was not created in the interests of peace. It was to build American bases on its territory.<sup>21</sup>

Krushchev in turn declared that Kashmir was “one of the states of Republic of India which has been decided by the people of Kashmir.”<sup>22</sup> One week later, on December 16, 1955, at a dinner in Kabul, Afghanistan, Premier Bulganin declared: “We sympathize with Afghanistan’s policy on the Pakhtunistan issue.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, Soviet denunciations of Pakistan’s role in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact went hand in hand with its political support for India on the Kashmir issue and for Kabul on the Pakhtunistan question.

Then tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations caused by Pakistan’s adherence to the anti-Soviet military alliances were aggravated after the October 1958 military coup d’etat in Pakistan. Soon after coming into power, Field Marshal Ayub Khan not only ostentatiously endorsed the American doctrine of the containment of communism in Asia but also called attention to the need for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences and to cooperate in the defense of the subcontinent.<sup>24</sup> As a bulwark against a breakthrough from the north (i.e., from the USSR and China) toward the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, Ayub Khan proposed a joint Pakistani-Indian mutual defense agreement in April 1959.<sup>25</sup> Moscow grew apprehensive over the logic and drift of Ayub’s strategic thinking, which sought to resurrect the British imperial idea of the strategic unity of the Indian subcontinent as a possible deterrent against Soviet expansion. Thus, when the Ayub regime entered into negotiations with the United States in early 1959 with a view to concluding a bilateral military pact between the two countries, Moscow expressed its alarm. *Pravda* described this Pakistani move as “playing with fire,”<sup>26</sup> and the Soviet Defense

<sup>21</sup>*The Times* (London) December 12, 1955.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>*New Times* 52 (Supplement), December 22, 1955, p. 26.

<sup>24</sup>Norman D. Palmer, *South Asia and United States Policy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 206–207. Even before his accession to power in 1958, Ayub Khan as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army had suggested a pro-Western policy to his political superiors. At his advice, a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed on May 19, 1954, between Pakistan and the United States. See George J. Lerski, “The Foreign Policy of Ayub Khan,” *Asian Affairs* (March/April 1974): 255–274.

<sup>25</sup>Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (Lahore, London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 126–129.

<sup>26</sup>*Pravda*, November 22, 1958.

Ministry paper, the *Red Star*, stated that “the establishment of American bases in areas proximate to the Soviet frontiers constituted a grave threat to the security of the Soviet Union.”<sup>27</sup> It threatened that “the Soviet Union had all the modern weapons needed to destroy the aggressor’s bases wherever they may be.”<sup>28</sup>

Pakistan-Soviet relations touched an all-time low in 1960 after the famous U-2 incident.<sup>29</sup> Reacting sharply to the fact that the American U-2 plane had flown from the U.S. military base in Peshawar, Pakistan, Premier Khrushchev bluntly warned Pakistani diplomats at a Czech Embassy function in May 1960: “If you continue to let the Americans fly from your air bases into Russia, then we will not only shoot down the U.S. planes, but will have to aim our rockets at your bases as well.”<sup>30</sup> Four days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko summoned the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow and handed him a protest note and warned that “if similar provocation were repeated, the Soviet Union had the necessary means to render harmless bases providing such facilities.”<sup>31</sup>

### **Positive Neutrality (1964–1969)**

Besides bringing Pakistan-Soviet relations almost to the breaking point, the U-2 incident also marked the turning of the tide of their mutual hostility. Pakistan realized the grave dangers to its physical security that

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<sup>27</sup>*Red Star*, November 23, 1958.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.* Undaunted by these Soviet criticisms and warnings, the Ayub regime concluded the Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the United States in March 1959. Under this agreement, America committed itself to the “preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan” and in return for this undertaking received a “written promise of unfettered access to the Peshawar base for ten years.” Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup>The U-2 flights from Pakistan provided extremely important information about Soviet military affairs. According to William J. Barnds, “The communication facility at Peshawar enabled the United States to learn much about Soviet missile developments. The atomic detection stations supplied useful if less critical information about Soviet and perhaps Chinese nuclear tests.” William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 252. According to Selig Harrison, the name of the American base at Badaber, near Peshawar, was “Headquarters, 5235th Communications Group, USAF” and from here America could “listen in” on the “Soviet military communication system, and monitor key defense testing-sites in Central Asia. Tyura Tam, the Soviet Cape Kennedy, was only 675 miles away, and the rest of major Russian military research centers were all concentrated in the desert vastness of Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan.” As quoted in Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*, p. 196. According to Agha Shahi, at the time of the U-2 incident, the foundation of “U.S.-Pakistan [ties] was so solid that when Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatened to drop an atom bomb on Peshawar . . . President Ayub Khan’s reaction was ‘So what?’” Agha Shahi, “Pakistan’s Relations with the United States,” in Malik, *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, p. 164.

<sup>30</sup>*Dawn*, May 11, 1960.

<sup>31</sup>*Izvestia*, May 14, 1960.

emanated from its increasingly unpopular policy of strategic alignment with the United States and as a consequence began thinking about adopting a more even-handed approach toward Moscow. The emerging "Friends not Masters"<sup>32</sup> thinking of the Ayub regime also derived from Pakistan feelings of severe disenchantment with Washington. By the mid-1960s it had become apparent that the United States had failed to satisfy Pakistani economic needs. Nor had Washington been able to exert any concerted diplomatic pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute between the two countries in accordance with the U.N. resolutions, which had called for a plebiscite. These difficulties were compounded by American unwillingness to offer credible security guarantees to Pakistan against the rising military threat from India.<sup>33</sup>

In August 1960, barely three months after the U-2 incident, Moscow renewed its earlier offers of help to Pakistan for oil exploration, and in early 1961 an agreement to this effect was reached between the two countries. The oil pact of March 1961 was followed in August 1963 by a barter agreement providing for a total trade of 10 million rupees.<sup>34</sup> On October 7, 1963, a civil aviation pact was concluded between the two countries under which the Soviet Union, for the first time, granted rights to an airline to operate services through Moscow to points beyond. In June 1964, an agreement on a cultural and scientific exchange program for the year 1964 and a credit agreement providing for a Soviet loan of \$11 million were signed. Moscow also began adopting a more balanced stance on the Kashmir issue. For instance, in the 1964 U.N. Security Council debate on the question of Kashmir, the Soviet Union acknowledged the existence of a dispute between India and Pakistan and urged both parties to settle the issue. This statement was in sharp contrast to its previous unqualified support for India.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, during his visit to India in 1964 Soviet leader Mikoyan called for Indo-Pakistan normalization and maintained that "relations with India would not be at the expense of relations with Pakistan."<sup>36</sup>

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto visited Moscow in January 1965 for high-level talks with the Soviet leaders on the future of Pakistan-Soviet relations. Commenting on Bhutto's visit, Moscow Radio

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<sup>32</sup>Title of Ayub Khan's political autobiography.

<sup>33</sup>For an excellent discussion of this growing Pakistani disenchantment with Washington, see Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, pp. 14–17.

<sup>34</sup>Mohammed Ayub, "Pakistan's Trade Relations with the Soviet Union," *International Studies* (July/October 1966): 52.

<sup>35</sup>See Zubeida Hasan, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India," *Pakistan Horizon* 21, 4 (Fourth Quarter 1968): 346–348.

<sup>36</sup>Selig Harrison, "Troubled India and her Neighbour," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1965): 323.

said: "We are sure that as a result of this visit, the first visit of the Pakistani Foreign Minister to the USSR, the spheres of our cooperation will expand and this visit would be of great importance in strengthening the relations between the two countries."<sup>37</sup> Bhutto's visit was followed by President Ayub Khan's eight-day state visit to the Soviet Union in April 1965—the first ever by a Pakistani head of state. Premier Kosygin described Ayub's visit as a "momentous event in the history of Soviet-Pakistan relations."<sup>38</sup> The Soviet Press also hailed the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit as indicative of the "dawn of a new era in Pakistan-Soviet relations."<sup>39</sup> In Ayub's own judgment, the visit was a success as it involved the "general recognition on both sides that the meeting might prove to be a turning point in our relations and that there were tremendous possibilities of cooperation."<sup>40</sup>

The visit did prove to be a turning point. This was immediately reflected in Moscow's posture of neutrality toward the Indo-Pakistan "miniwar" over the Rann of Kutch in April–May 1965. In its statement on May 8, 1965, the Soviet news agency TASS called on both India and Pakistan not to weaken each other and expressed the hope that "India and Pakistan will solve their differences through direct negotiations."<sup>41</sup> Similarly, at the conclusion of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union on May 19, 1965, the Indo-Soviet joint communiqué significantly omitted specific references to Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch—two issues of vital political importance to the Indian Prime Minister. At the time of the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965, Moscow again gave a forceful demonstration of its new approach of balanced relations with both India and Pakistan. Throughout the period of war Moscow maintained a policy of strict neutrality on the issues that had triggered this war and stressed that "it is hardly appropriate . . . to seek to determine who is right and who is to blame."<sup>42</sup> On September 4, 1965, Soviet Premier Kosygin, in an unprecedented diplomatic initiative, called on both India and Pakistan to cease military operations immediately and offered Soviet good offices for mediation between the two countries. This Soviet offer of mediation was repeated on September 7 and 11, 1965.<sup>43</sup> After some initial

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<sup>37</sup>*Pravda* as reported in *Dawn*, January 26, 1965.

<sup>38</sup>*Pravda*, April 4, 1965.

<sup>39</sup>*Pravda*, April 11, 1965.

<sup>40</sup>Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, pp. 168–69.

<sup>41</sup>*Pravda*, May 9, 1965.

<sup>42</sup>George Lerski, "Foreign Policy of Ayub Khan," p. 270.

<sup>43</sup>*Pravda*, September 12, 1965.

hesitation Pakistan accepted the Soviet offer on November 25, 1965.<sup>44</sup>

In early 1966, Soviet Premier Kosygin successfully acted as an “honest broker” between India and Pakistan at Tashkent. His efforts resulted in the signing of the famous Tashkent Declaration on January 10, 1966, between India and Pakistan.

After Tashkent, Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to register improvement. The high point was reached in 1968 after Premier Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan, when Moscow agreed in principle to supply arms to Pakistan, including MiG jets, IL-28 bombers, tanks, and guns.<sup>45</sup> The Soviet decision to finance a \$200 million steel mill in Karachi gave a further boost to this warming-up trend.

In the first half on 1969, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechkov officially visited Pakistan as head of a high-powered military delegation. During this visit he reportedly said, “Pakistan should be strengthened against its enemies.”<sup>46</sup> During the same visit, the deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Navy, Vice-Admiral N. I. Smirnov, mentioned at an official dinner that a strong Pakistani navy “would be a powerful precondition for peace in this part of the Indian Ocean littoral.”<sup>47</sup>

### Overt Hostility (1969–1973)

This trend toward cordial relations was, however, halted as a result of two major developments. One was Moscow’s enunciation of an Asian Collective Security Plan in 1969 in the immediate aftermath of Sino-Soviet border clashes and Pakistan’s flat refusal to endorse this proposal because of its anti-Chinese overtones.<sup>48</sup> The second was Pakistan’s role as an intermediary in President Nixon’s historic “opening” to China in 1971.<sup>49</sup> The Sino-American rapprochement was perceived by Moscow as “ganging up” of these powers against the USSR. Forced to respond to this sudden shift in the Asian power balance, Moscow decided to solidify its extensive economic and military links with India. According to Pakistan’s ex-Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, the Soviet Union was so concerned “over what was

<sup>44</sup>Tahir Amin, “The Tashkent Declaration—A Case Study—Third Party’s Role in Resolution of the Conflict,” *Islamabad Papers* (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, March 1980), p. 38.

<sup>45</sup>Robert C. Horn, *Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship: Issues and Influence* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 24.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup>Chourdhy, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p. 66.

<sup>49</sup>Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 914. Kissinger notes that he and President Nixon both felt “profoundly grateful” to Pakistan for its role as an intermediary for U.S. contacts with China.

perceived to be a shift in the balance of power in favor of the United States and so irritated by Pakistan's role that it threw its support behind India."<sup>50</sup> This ultimately resulted in the twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation that the two countries signed in August 1971.<sup>51</sup> Although not a formal military alliance, the treaty nevertheless committed the two countries to closer cooperation. From the Soviet standpoint, the treaty's chief benefit was that "it enabled Moscow to deal with a number of its concerns, notably, fear of China and the incipient Sino-American rapprochement."<sup>52</sup>

In March 1971, civil war broke out in East Pakistan that threatened the very existence of Pakistan. Soviet President Podgorny wrote a letter to President Yahya Khan on April 2, 1971,<sup>53</sup> expressing concern over the reported gross violations of human rights in East Pakistan that had been committed by the central government and urged Yahya to seek a political solution of the problem. In a strongly worded response, President Yahya not only denied that there had been any violations of human rights in East Pakistan but also told Moscow not to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs.<sup>54</sup> In early December 1971, following Indian military interference in the eastern wing of Pakistan on behalf of the Bangladesh movement, full-scale war broke out between the two countries. During this brief encounter, Moscow airlifted large quantities of sophisticated military supplies to New Delhi, staged a naval demonstration in the Bay of Bengal, and vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistan.<sup>55</sup> With this firm Soviet military and diplomatic support, India made short work of the Pakistan garrison in East Pakistan and achieved a military victory in the west as well.

In the years following the tragedy of East Pakistan, Pakistan-Soviet relations haltingly moved toward rapprochement. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972. This visit was important because it took place against the immediate backdrop of the East Pakistan debacle,

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<sup>50</sup>Agha Shahi, "Pakistan's Relations with the United States," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies* 3, 1 (March 1985): 3.

<sup>51</sup>See Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance of Power," *Asian Survey* (June 1972): 463-474. Text of the treaty is given in *Pakistan Horizon* 24, 4 (1973): 163-166.

<sup>52</sup>Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, p. 39.

<sup>53</sup>Note from President Podgorny to President Yahya Khan dated April 2, 1971, *Pakistan Horizon* (2nd Quarter 1971): 149-150.

<sup>54</sup>Note from President Yahya Khan to President Podgorny dated April 5, 1971, *ibid.*, p. 151.

<sup>55</sup>Marin Leighton, "Soviet Options and Opportunities in Southern Asia," in Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman, eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1987), p. 791.

which had left Pakistan defeated, divided, and humiliated. India held 94,000 Pakistanis as prisoners of war and controlled large chunks of Pakistani territory in the west. Bhutto was aware that without Moscow's diplomatic help he could get neither the Pakistani territory nor people back from India. To make things worse, Bhutto's longstanding and vehement opposition to the Tashkent Agreement that Kosygin had helped negotiate between India and Pakistan in 1966 was a matter of public record.<sup>56</sup> Only too recently in his famous speech before the U.N. Security Council on December 13, 1971, Bhutto had characterized Tashkent as a sell-out favoring the Indians "so much so that their Prime Minister had died of jubilation."<sup>57</sup>

Under these conditions one could hardly expect Bhutto's visit to Moscow to be a pleasant one, and it was not. Bhutto was accorded a cool welcome; Kosygin asked him to make a "realistic assessment" of the situation in South Asia—apparently a nod in the direction of recognizing Bangladesh—and observed that Moscow would not forget or forgive the past so easily. Then he told Bhutto with brutal frankness: "If history were to be repeated, we would take the same stand because we are convinced that it is the correct one."<sup>58</sup>

Predictably, Bhutto failed to secure any promise of help from Moscow concerning the release of Pakistani POWs from India. This visit, however, did result in an increase in the scope of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. Moscow offered to construct a 1 million ton—capacity steel mill near Karachi and agreed to provide \$435 million in credits for the project.<sup>59</sup> It further conveyed its willingness to help in the laying of a high-voltage electric transmission line and the establishment of a powerful radio station.<sup>60</sup>

### Peaceful Coexistence (1974–1979)

Bhutto visited Moscow again in October 1974. By this time he had signed the Simla Accord with India, normalizing relations between the two countries, and had also pulled Pakistan out of SEATO. These moves were

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<sup>56</sup>Addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on March 9, 1969, Bhutto had claimed that he "had fought tooth and nail against the Tashkent Declaration." Quoted in Amin, "The Tashkent Declaration," p. 69, n. 36.

<sup>57</sup>*The Times* (London), December 14, 1971.

<sup>58</sup>Quoted in D. Shah Khan, "Pakistan and Balkanization," *Tempo* (Karachi) 6 (July/August 1975): 6.

<sup>59</sup>K. D. Kapur, *Soviet Strategy in South Asia: Perspectives on Soviet Policy Towards the Indian Sub-Continent and Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1983), p. 224.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 235.

duly appreciated in Moscow, as evident from the cordial welcome accorded to Bhutto. Premier Kosygin described Bhutto's visit as a new "major step" in the direction of the strengthening of good neighborly relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that "an advance to a higher level" would be made "in all fields" of Pakistani-Soviet cooperation.<sup>61</sup> The joint communiqué issued at the end of Bhutto's visit significantly omitted any reference to issues such as Pakhtunistan and Bangladesh. Although Moscow did not endorse Bhutto's proposal for a nuclear-free South Asia, it did urge Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their disputes by negotiations on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence.

This call for a negotiated settlement of disputes between Islamabad and Kabul was significant. It was issued at a time when a major tribal revolt had broken out in the province of Baluchistan<sup>62</sup> and relations between Kabul and Islamabad were very tense after Sardar Daud's return to power through a military coup d'état in July 1973. Daud was an avowed champion of the cause of Pakhtunistan, and Bhutto had criticized Daud's government for its hand in the uprising in Baluchistan.<sup>63</sup> That Moscow should urge both Islamabad and Kabul to seek a negotiated settlement of the problem was, in political terms, a concession to Pakistan because it reflected a more neutral stance by Moscow toward the Pakhtunistan issue.

The imposition of martial law in Pakistan in July 1977 and Bhutto's arrest and subsequent execution by the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq seemingly did not adversely reflect on the developing course of amity between Moscow and Islamabad. On the thirtieth anniversary of Pakistan's independence in 1977, President Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin sent messages to Pakistan expressing hope for peace and progress.<sup>64</sup> Comments appearing in Soviet news media also commended Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO and hailed the process of rapprochement in Indo-Pakistan relations, which was seen as contributing directly to regional peace and security.

## **Cold War II (1979–1985)**

Strain began to reemerge in Pakistan-Soviet relations following the Soviet-backed communist putsch in Kabul in April 1978. As a consequence, Pakistan felt exposed from the north and began supporting the insurgents

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 236.

<sup>62</sup>Selig Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).

<sup>63</sup>Kapur, *Soviet Strategy*, p. 296.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

fighting against the communist regime of Taraki in Kabul. On March 19, 1979, *Pravda* accused Pakistan along with China and others of “reactionary machinations against the democratic Afghanistan.” A high-level delegation led by Mahmood Haroon, Minister of the Interior, visited Moscow in 1979 to allay Moscow’s apprehension regarding Islamabad’s alleged complicity in the counterrevolutionary activities against the Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul.<sup>65</sup> Moscow remained unconvinced, however.<sup>66</sup>

In October 1979, two months before the Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs advisor, Agha Shahi, led a high-level delegation to the United States for talks with American officials in Washington. During a review of the regional situation, Agha Shahi told the Americans that the Afghan Revolution had affected Pakistan profoundly. The historical role of Afghanistan as a buffer had disappeared, he said, and Pakistan found itself ill-prepared and ill-equipped to meet the military threat. Shahi then pleaded with the Americans that “the time to do something is now.”<sup>67</sup>

The Soviet military action in Afghanistan in December 1979, involving over 100,000 of its military troops, marked the beginning of a virtual “cold war” between Moscow and Islamabad. In this Soviet military move into Afghanistan, Islamabad saw the elimination of a valuable strategic buffer and a possible Soviet military drift toward its own borders. From Pakistan’s security viewpoint, it was a nightmarish situation. The Red Army now stood perilously close to the Khyber Pass, traditional gateway of invaders from the north. This Soviet military move was also perceived in Washington as a geostrategic threat not only to Pakistan but also to the Persian Gulf area. The downfall of the Shah of Iran and his replacement by an anti-American, fundamentalist Islamic regime there further heightened the American sense of regional insecurity in the area. As part of its efforts to contain the threat of Soviet expansionism, symbolized by the invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration deemed it essential to bolster its regional security framework.

Pakistan, largely because of its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, once again emerged as the linchpin of this new “trend towards increased American military presence in the region [and] towards greater utilization of available facilities”<sup>68</sup> in the strategic zone of Southwest Asia. For the

<sup>65</sup>Mehrunnisa Ali, “Soviet-Pakistan Ties,” p. 1026.

<sup>66</sup>A. Petrov, “Provocations Continue,” *Pravda*, June 1, 1979.

<sup>67</sup>*Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den (46): U.S. Intervention in Islamic Countries, Pakistan-2* (Teheran: Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, 1981), p. 121.

<sup>68</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski’s interview with *The Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 1980.

sake of regional stability, the Carter administration upgraded its conversations with Islamabad. Washington offered to “shove aside” the divisive issue of Pakistan’s nuclear program; it reaffirmed its 1959 defense commitment to Pakistan; and in early 1980, Carter offered Islamabad \$400 million in military and economic assistance to be spread over the next two years.<sup>69</sup> However, “years of difficulty over arms sales, a deep sense of betrayal at the imposition of arms embargoes [and] perceived hypocrisy in U.S. non-proliferation”<sup>70</sup> made Islamabad wary of instantly embracing the Carter offer.

Islamabad seemed to reject American entreaties until a new Republican administration led by Ronald Reagan gained control of the White House. In early 1981, after complex and protracted negotiations, the Zia regime accepted the Reagan offer of \$3.2 billion in economic and military assistance. Pakistan’s renewed security relationship with Washington was a marriage of convenience par excellence. Hemmed in between a hostile India and a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan, Islamabad found Washington’s military and economic assistance reassuring and important in safeguarding the nation’s security. Moreover, Washington’s support for Pakistan would cause Moscow to rethink its policies before coercing or subverting the Muslim nation. From the American standpoint, the provision of security assistance to Pakistan also offered several advantages. First, it succeeded in regaining Pakistan’s support at a time when the United States seemed about to lose all influence in the area. Second, it opened up the prospects of “U.S. access to Pakistan’s military installations under agreed conditions.”<sup>71</sup> Third, it helped keep Pakistan diplomatically active in sustaining international opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, by increasing the transfer of conventional weapons to Islamabad, Washington hoped to deflect Pakistan from exercising its nuclear option.

The renewal of Pakistan’s flagging security links with Washington produced the expected hostile response from Moscow. The Soviets charged that Islamabad was using a “mythical Soviet threat” to acquire American arms, that the “real aim” in acquiring American weapons was to “attack India.”<sup>72</sup> Moscow argued that American aid to Pakistan was aimed at building a “long-term foundation for a policy of interference in the affairs

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<sup>69</sup>Jeral A. Rosati, *The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), p. 144.

<sup>70</sup>Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, p. 100.

<sup>71</sup>Robert G. Wirsing, “The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications for the United States,” *Asian Survey* 25, 3 (March 1985): 286. Also see Lawrence Lifschultz, “From the U-2 to the P-3: The U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,” *New Left Review* 159 (September/October 1986): 71–80.

<sup>72</sup>*Pravda*, January 8, 1980.

of both Pakistan and other Near East and Middle Eastern countries.”<sup>73</sup> According to TASS, the aid package for Pakistan was only “a ploy to provide the Afghan insurgents with arms, thus turning Afghanistan into a base against the USSR.”<sup>74</sup> At the end of President Zia’s visit to Washington in December 1982, *Izvestia* accused Pakistan of conducting “an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” and noted that its “arms build-up exceeds its defense needs” and that its “efforts to create a nuclear weapon cannot fail to alarm its neighbors.” *Izvestia* also warned Pakistan that its use “as a blind tool of American imperialist policy in the region is not only fraught with serious consequences for peace in the South and Southwest Asia, but also harbors a threat to the security of the people of Pakistan themselves.”<sup>75</sup> Further, Moscow criticized Pakistan for its lack of sincerity in seeking a negotiated settlement of the Afghan issue through Geneva parleys.

This strategy of verbal threats against Pakistan was also accompanied by Soviet efforts to exert indirect military pressure on Pakistan in order to force a change in the latter’s pro-Washington tilt. This was reflected in the vastly increased frequency and intensity of the cross-border raids, air violations, and artillery barrages mounted from Afghanistan.

Over the Matani incident in April 1985, in which several Russian soldiers got killed, Moscow reacted angrily and described the incident as “an act of war against the Soviet Union.”<sup>76</sup> A *Pravda* article warned the Pakistani leaders that those responsible, sooner or later, would have to “answer for their recklessness.” In Moscow, the Pakistani Ambassador was handed an official protest against the detention of Soviet soldiers on Pakistani soil, along with a demand for the return of the bodies, which Moscow put at twelve.<sup>77</sup> Islamabad replied with a flat denial that any Soviet soldiers were detained in Pakistan. Gorbachev warned President Zia of the dire consequences if Islamabad continued its present Afghan policy.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the focal point of discord between Moscow and Islamabad became Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its increased security links with Washington.

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>TASS, July 7, 1980.

<sup>75</sup>*Izvestia*, January 25, 1985.

<sup>76</sup>*Pravda*, May 22 and August 30, 1985.

<sup>77</sup>Arthur Bonner, *Among the Afghans* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 169.

<sup>78</sup>Lawrence Lifschultz, “The Afghan Impasse,” *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, June 30, 1985, p. 169.

### **Partial Détente (1986 to date)**

In 1986, Moscow renewed its efforts to woo Pakistan. The succession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union in early 1985 became the major cause of this new Soviet approach. Through a volley of well-timed foreign policy initiatives such as arms control, Sino-Soviet relations, Asian security, and the Afghan War, Gorbachev began the cultivation of friends at home and enemies abroad. In the South Asian context, the Soviet peace offensive centered on an end to the Afghan conflict, which Gorbachev had described as a "bleeding wound" at the 27th Party Congress held in February 1986. To underscore Soviet seriousness in closing this "bleeding wound," Moscow indicated it was prepared to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, given a proper agreement between Kabul and Islamabad.

Following Gorbachev's landmark "window to the East" speech in Vladivostok<sup>79</sup> in July 1986, in which he announced the withdrawal of six regiments of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Moscow sent Anatoly Volkov to Islamabad as a special envoy of the Soviet leadership.<sup>80</sup> During his visit to Islamabad in late August, Volkov briefed Islamabad about Gorbachev's new Asian peace initiative and also discussed the state of bilateral relations between the two countries.<sup>81</sup> Volkov's visit to Pakistan was important because it marked the resumption of annual consultations between the two countries that had been suspended since 1983.

In his speech to the United Nations on September 26, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze hinted at the possibility of a "fresh" Soviet approach to Afghanistan. Instead of merely reiterating the hackneyed Soviet position calling for "an end to outside interference," Shevardnadze stated that "the Soviet Union is in favor of seeking new solutions and a fresh approach, unobscured by prejudice, that would help to identify ways of solving the problem with due regard for the legitimate interests of the Afghan people and of its friends and neighbors."<sup>82</sup> The reference in Shevardnadze's U.N. speech to the concept of the "legitimate interests" of Afghanistan's neighbors was interpreted by observers as an indication of a flexible Soviet posture on Afghanistan and proof of Moscow's increasing desire to mend fences with Pakistan, Iran, and China.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>*Pravda*, July 30, 1986.

<sup>80</sup>*The Muslim*, September 1, 1986.

<sup>81</sup>*The Muslim*, September 5, 1986.

<sup>82</sup>*The Muslim*, September 26, 1986.

<sup>83</sup>Maleeha Lodhi, "Moscow Hints at Fresh Approach on Afghanistan," *The Muslim*, September 28, 1986.

Unmistakable evidence of this growing Soviet desire to seek rapprochement with Islamabad was provided by Gorbachev's remarks and public statements during his much-publicized maiden visit to India in the last week of November 1986. Contrary to the expectations of his Indian hosts, who had hoped to use this occasion to browbeat Pakistan with Soviet backing, Gorbachev adopted a conciliatory tone and highlighted the need for peace and friendship with neighbors. Thus, in replying to a question at a joint press conference with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi on November 28, 1986, Gorbachev said:

We are all neighbors—the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan. And I think that neighbors should always live in peace with one another and help one another to build their relations in a spirit of understanding. We stand for good, friendly relations with the Pakistani people, and approaches to achieving such relations should be worked out. Other ways lead to unpredictable consequences.<sup>84</sup>

To another question regarding suggestions for improving the understanding between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, Gorbachev replied:

We are known to have always cooperated with Pakistan and to have made our contributions to lessening of tension in that area of Asia even in the difficult times. We are prepared to act in this manner today as well. We hope that Pakistan will also think over its position from the point of view that the normalizing of the situation in the region is in the general interest.<sup>85</sup>

Along with this tone of conciliation toward Pakistan, Gorbachev also emphasized the fact that Moscow had no “expansionist designs” on Afghanistan and that it was interested in a political solution “that would ensure the existence of a nonaligned, neutral, and independent Afghanistan.”<sup>86</sup>

Realizing that a transition in Soviet thinking on Afghanistan was underway and that Moscow's peace overtures needed to be reciprocated, Islamabad sent Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar to Moscow on December 6, 1986, for a three-day visit.<sup>87</sup> In Moscow, Sattar is reported to have held “frank” and “useful” talks with Shevardnadze on the issue of Afghanistan.<sup>88</sup> Sattar's visit to Moscow set in motion a series of high-level talks between

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<sup>84</sup>“Stability and Security a Common Concern: Visit of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to India November 25–28, 1986,” *Documents and Materials* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), pp. 55–56.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>87</sup>*The Muslim*, December 7, 1986.

<sup>88</sup>*The Muslim*, December 10, 1986.

the two countries centering on the question of Afghanistan. On January 16, 1987, a high-level Soviet delegation led by First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly G. Kovalev arrived in Islamabad for talks with the senior officials of Pakistan's Foreign Office on the issue of Afghanistan and Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations.<sup>89</sup>

In early February 1987, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan visited Moscow and held talks with his counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze. These parleys were described as "highly beneficial" and helpful in fostering better understanding between the two countries vis-à-vis their respective positions on the issue of Afghanistan.<sup>90</sup>

One consequence of this intensive diplomatic dialogue between the two countries was the narrowing of differences on the critical issue of the time frame for withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Thus, at the seventh round of Geneva proximity talks held in March 1987, both Islamabad and Kabul agreed to a time frame of less than a year as against the initial gap of some two and a half years.<sup>91</sup> But this positive development, which raised hopes of an early solution of the Afghan imbroglio through Geneva parleys,<sup>92</sup> was soon overshadowed by the mounting tension in Pakistan-Afghan relations triggered by the massive Afghan bombing of the border villages of Pakistan in March 1987. In these Afghan raids several hundred people, mostly Afghan refugees, were killed.<sup>93</sup> In retaliation against this Afghan bombing, on March 30, 1987, the Pakistan air force jets shot down an Afghan transport plane, Antonov-220, with forty passengers on board.<sup>94</sup> These events were accompanied by massive bomb explosions in the cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi that caused heavy loss of human life, including the death of a prominent Pakistani religious leader, Ehsan Elahi Zaheer. In the wake of these bomb explosions and increasing Afghan violations of the Pakistani air space, President Zia-ul-Haq publicly blamed Kabul and Moscow for an "increase in terrorist activities in Pakistan."<sup>95</sup> In

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<sup>89</sup>*The Muslim*, December 17, 1986.

<sup>90</sup>*The Muslim*, December 23, 1986.

<sup>91</sup>*The Muslim*, March 12, 1986.

<sup>92</sup>Maleeha Lodhi, "Inching Towards a Historical Compromise," *The Muslim*, March 20, 1987.

<sup>93</sup>Ahsan Ali Khan, "Is There a Method in Afghan Raids?" *The Muslim*, March 20, 1987.

<sup>94</sup>*The Muslim*, April 1, 1987.

<sup>95</sup>In his annual address to the joint sitting of the Majlis-i-Shoora (Parliament) on April 19, 1987, President Zia-ul-Haq stated: "The Soviet Union had taken two steps recently, one being the announcement of the withdrawal of its forces while the other was increase in terrorist activities along the western borders of Pakistan and within Afghanistan." Zia further observed that the "Afghans were fighting not for themselves but also for Pakistan and the cause of freedom." For the full text of this speech, see *The Pakistan Times*, April 20, 1987, p. 6.

mid-April 1987, the Pakistan air force lost one of its highly prized F-16 warplanes to Afghan jets during a dogfight.<sup>96</sup>

These escalating tensions with Afghanistan led Pakistan to request from the Reagan administration the Advanced Warning Airborne Command System (AWACS) on lease on an emergency basis.<sup>97</sup> Islamabad's quest for AWACS from Washington invited sharp and hostile reaction from New Delhi, Kabul, and Moscow. The Indian Minister for External Affairs, N. D. Tewari, visited Kabul in early May 1987. During this visit Tewari and Afghan leader Najibullah jointly voiced their concern over the proposed supply of AWACS to Pakistan and criticized this move as "a serious threat to regional security."<sup>98</sup> In a public display of its displeasure with the Reagan administration over the supply of AWACS to Pakistan, the Indian government postponed a week-long scheduled visit of its External Minister to Washington.<sup>99</sup> Moscow also criticized Islamabad's quest for AWACS from Washington. The Soviet news agency TASS dubbed this Pakistani move as "unbelievable obstinacy and provocation."<sup>100</sup> A spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Gennady Gerasimov, also described the deployment of AWACS system in Pakistan as an "unfriendly step" that "cannot remain unnoticed by the Soviet Union."<sup>101</sup>

Amid these mounting stresses and strains in Pakistan-Afghan relations, which brought the Geneva parleys on Afghanistan to a virtual standstill, Moscow emitted new signals of its willingness to seek a negotiated settlement of the Afghan imbroglio. These included the idea of a round-table conference involving representatives of the Mujahideen, the United States, Pakistan, the USSR, and the Kabul regime, a shortened time frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and a possible role for ex-king Zahir Shah in the interim government.<sup>102</sup> These signals were followed by Najibullah's public endorsement of the proposal of a coalition government in Afghanistan, announcement of a change in the name of the country from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Republic of Afghanistan, and a new Afghan constitution proposing a presidential form of government.<sup>103</sup>

In March 1987, Ronald Timerbaev, the USSR's first deputy permanent

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<sup>96</sup>*The Muslim*, April 30, 1987, and May 3, 1987.

<sup>97</sup>*The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), April 30, 1987.

<sup>98</sup>*The Nation* (Lahore), May 8, 1987.

<sup>99</sup>*The Muslim*, May 9, 1987.

<sup>100</sup>*The Frontier Post*, May 6, 1987.

<sup>101</sup>*The Frontier Post*, May 13, 1987.

<sup>102</sup>Malecha Lodhi, "Is Moscow Trying a Third Track on Afghanistan?" *The Muslim*, June 25, 1987.

<sup>103</sup>*The Muslim*, June 29, 1987.

representative at the United Nations, publicly admitted that the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan was a "mistake" and expressed the official Soviet desire to pull troops out of Afghanistan.<sup>104</sup> At the December 1987 Washington summit, Gorbachev reportedly proposed a one-year timetable that called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.<sup>105</sup> Similar views were expressed by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in January 1988, shortly after his visit to Kabul.<sup>106</sup> This important Soviet concession on the time frame and withdrawal issues was capped by Gorbachev's February 8 announcement that Soviet troops would start exiting Afghanistan by May 15, provided a peace agreement was signed in Geneva by March 15. The U.N.-sponsored proximity talks in Geneva between Afghanistan and Pakistan had been going on since 1982.

This flood of Soviet "peace" overtures on Afghanistan ultimately convinced Washington of the sincerity of the Soviet desire to leave Afghanistan. During his visit to Moscow in late February 1988, the U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, stated: "I do not have the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union has decided that it wants to leave Afghanistan." Shultz also assured Gorbachev that the "U.S. administration will do its best to insure that the next round [of Geneva talks] will be a concluding one."<sup>107</sup>

Following these assurances, Washington undertook a "strenuous effort to persuade Pakistan to drop its reservations" and "accept the Kabul regime as co-signatory and sign."<sup>108</sup> Islamabad had been insisting on the idea of having an interim government, headed preferably by ex-King Zahir Shah in place in Kabul, as a precondition for signing the Geneva Peace Accords. Faced with this American diplomatic pressure, President Zia caved in and reluctantly went along with the Geneva deal.<sup>109</sup>

Concomitantly, Najibullah was summoned by Gorbachev to Tashkent in early April 1988 and was advised to accept the U.N. peace plan. On Soviet insistence, Kabul also agreed to drop its objections to a reference in the Geneva documents to the Durand line (the long-disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan) as "internationally recognized."<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>Cited in Charles Dunbar, "Afghanistan in 1987: A Year of Decision?" *Asian Survey* 28, 2 (February 1988): 153.

<sup>105</sup>*The Washington Post*, December 9, 1987.

<sup>106</sup>In his interview with the Kabul regime's Bakhtar News Agency in Kabul on January 6, 1988, Shevardnadze indicated that the withdrawal could be over by the end of 1988. *The New York Times*, January 7, 1988.

<sup>107</sup>*The New York Times*, February 23, 1988.

<sup>108</sup>Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1988): 936.

<sup>109</sup>See Selig Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1988): 31-60.

<sup>110</sup>*Financial Times*, April 9-10, 1988.

The Peace Accord on Afghanistan was finally signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988, between Islamabad and Kabul with the two superpowers as its coguarantors. In essence, the Geneva Accords called on the Soviets to remove their forces from Afghanistan within nine months, 50 percent of their troops to be removed in the first three months. Although it did not provide for a formal ceasefire, the agreement called for a ban on "encouraging or supporting rebellious activities" across internationally recognized borders. It also allowed the two superpowers to reserve the right to arm their respective "allies" should there be a violation of the one-year moratorium on arms deliveries.

As expected, the process of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan that began on May 15 became messy and violent. Among other things, it led to an increased Soviet diplomatic and political pressure on Pakistan to comply with the terms of the Geneva Accords and cease its alleged support of the Afghan resistance. At the June summit talks, Gorbachev reportedly accused Pakistan of violating the terms of the Geneva Accords and threatened to "undertake the most resolute retaliatory steps" if the United Nations failed to take effective measures to stop Pakistan from aiding the rebels.<sup>111</sup> Moscow repeated this threat of taking "measures as are necessitated by the situation" on August 16, just two days before the C-130 plane crash in which President Zia, along with the American Ambassador Arnold Raphel, was killed.<sup>112</sup> While denying the idea of any Soviet role in President Zia's violent death, a *Pravda* article noted with a measure of satisfaction that the "Pakistani President had fallen victim to his own policies" since "it was he who had released the genie of terrorism."<sup>113</sup> These Soviet allegations of Pakistan's continued violations of the Geneva Accords were followed by Afghan bombings of several Pakistani villages near Peshawar in early September, in which over a dozen people were reportedly killed.<sup>114</sup> The purpose of these acts of aerial bombing was to force a reevaluation of the late President Zia's interventionist policy on Afghanistan by the successor regime in Islamabad. Moscow hoped that by reducing the level of Islamabad's undercover support for the Afghan resistance, it could perpetuate the military status quo and wear down the resistance to a point where it would become amenable to the idea of sharing power with pro-Soviet forces in Kabul.

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<sup>111</sup>Paul Lewis, "Soviet Says Pakistan Broke Afghan Withdrawal Accord," *The New York Times*, June 3, 1988. Also Edward Gorman, "Irate Kremlin May Suspend Afghanistan Troop Pull Out," *Times of London*, June 15, 1988.

<sup>112</sup>See *The Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1988.

<sup>113</sup>*Pravda*, as reported in *The New York Times*, August 24, 1988.

<sup>114</sup>"Kabul Escalates," *The Nation*, September 3, 1988.

Zia's death marked the end of an activist phase of Islamabad's Afghan policy. His successor, Ishaq Khan, reaffirmed Pakistan's desire to promote peace in the region and emphasized Islamabad's strict adherence to the Geneva Accords. These pronouncements, however, were not taken seriously in Moscow. In early November 1988, the Kremlin announced its decision to suspend the pullout of its forces from Afghanistan. This decision to stall the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops was accompanied by reports of increased flow of Soviet weaponry into Afghanistan, including the deployment of Scud missiles and ground attack planes around Kabul.<sup>115</sup> These Soviet actions caused disappointment in Washington and were widely interpreted as designed to "intimidate Islamabad."<sup>116</sup>

The harshest Soviet indictment of Pakistan's alleged role as a staging area and main source of supplies for the Islamic guerrillas was issued during Gorbachev's November 1988 visit to India. In a policy statement in New Delhi on November 20, 1988, Gorbachev accused Washington and Islamabad of intending "to rescind" from the Geneva agreements and reverting to "some kind of military relationship" among the states.<sup>117</sup> In an obvious reference to Pakistan, the Indo-Soviet joint statement issued at the end of Gorbachev's three-day visit to India on November 21, 1988, noted that the two governments "deplore the obstructionist policy of certain forces" that were "violating the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan."<sup>118</sup>

By early December, this hardening of Soviet posture on Afghanistan seemed to be giving way to renewed Soviet emphasis on diplomatic efforts to seek an Afghan political settlement. This was evident from Moscow's decision to hold direct talks with the Afghan Mujahideen, a step that Moscow had long refused to take. On December 4 and 5, in Taif, Saudi Arabia, high-level talks were held between the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and newly appointed Ambassador to Kabul, Yuli Vorontsov, and the leader of the Seven-Party Mujahideen Alliance, Burhannuddin Rabbani. These talks were essentially held on the issue of Soviet prisoners held by the Mujahideen but later covered a much wider range of issues pertaining to the internal settlement in Afghanistan. These parleys, described as "beneficial" by Vorontsov, were to continue later on in Pakistan.<sup>119</sup> These

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<sup>115</sup>Robert Pear, "Soviets Are Said to Deploy Missiles in Kabul That Can Hit Pakistan," *The New York Times*, November 2, 1988.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.* It should be noted that the Soviets denied that they intended to use the Scud missiles against targets inside Pakistan.

<sup>117</sup>Umashankar Phadnis, "Gorbachev Attacks U.S., Pakistan," *Dawn* (Karachi), November 20, 1988.

<sup>118</sup>As reported in *The Pakistan Times*, November 21, 1988.

<sup>119</sup>*The Muslim*, December 7, 1988.


Soviet-Mujahideen "reconciliation" talks took place against the backdrop of a significant leadership change within Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto, Co-Chairperson of the Pakistan People's Party, became the new Prime Minister on December 2, 1988. In her maiden press conference, Benazir Bhutto expressed her sincere desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>120</sup> She also reaffirmed Islamabad's commitment to abide by the terms of the Geneva Accords. These positive trends crystallized in Gorbachev's December 6 call before the United Nations for a complete ceasefire in Afghanistan from January 1, 1989, to enable the establishment of a broad-based government in that country.<sup>121</sup> Moscow also emitted signals of its willingness to abide by the Geneva Accords troop withdrawal deadline of February 15.


The Taif talks coupled with changes in Soviet attitudes may well become the first step toward a historic compromise between the Soviet Union and the Mujahideen that would bring into existence a transitional government acceptable to both sides and thus capable of ensuring lasting peace in Afghanistan. An end to the Afghan conflict will definitely bring improvements to Pakistan-Soviet relations, which historically have been marred by mutual suspicion, disaffection, and political hostility.

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<sup>120</sup>*The Muslim*, December 3, 1988.

<sup>121</sup>For a full text of Gorbachev's U.N. speech, see *The Muslim*, December 9, 1988.





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# Postscript

WILLIAM L. RICHTER

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The Third U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Forum was held on the eve of several important historical events, most of which were anticipated by conference participants in the essays that have been included in this volume. The most notable developments were the Pakistani and American elections and the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, but events elsewhere are also relevant to U.S.-Pakistan relations and security in the South and West Asian regions.

## **Elections in Pakistan and Their Aftermath**

The remarkable skill with which Pakistan's leadership handled the post-Zia crisis following the fatal air crash in August 1988 was demonstrated further in the conduct of the November elections. The Supreme Court of Pakistan agreed to the holding of the elections on a party basis. Preelection partisan maneuvering included the withdrawal of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) from the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and the formation of a loosely-knit anti-PPP coalition called the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI, or Islamic Democratic Alliance), led by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Although the campaign was as intense as any in Pakistan's past, the politicians generally appeared to heed Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's call for restraint. The PPP, for instance, objected to a last-minute requirement that voters present identification cards, arguing that women, the poor, and rural voters, all of whom were expected to be more pro-PPP, would be less likely to have such cards and would therefore be disfranchised. Despite this objection, however, the party avoided any rash action such as boycotting the elections. Partially as a consequence of the voter identification card requirement, turnout in the November elections was lower than in the 1985 nonparty elections.<sup>1</sup>

In the national election, the PPP won a plurality of 93 of the 205

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<sup>1</sup>Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics," *Asian Survey* 29:2 (February 1989):203.

Muslim seats, with 39 percent of the popular vote. The IJI won 55 seats with 32 percent of the vote. The Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), representing the predominantly Urdu-speaking post-1947 immigrants from India, won 13 seats. The remaining 54 seats were scattered among other parties and independents. Ultimately, the PPP and the MQM forged an alliance, based upon a 55-point agreement, which provided Benazir Bhutto her necessary majority for the formation of a national government. After extensive discussions with various party representatives, Acting President Ishaq Khan swore her in as prime minister on December 2.

The provincial elections provided quite mixed results. The PPP secured a majority in Sind and became a coalition partner in both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In Punjab, however, the IJI won 108 of the 240 contested seats and formed the government, returning Mian Nawaz Sharif as chief minister.<sup>2</sup>

In a spirit of compromise and continuity, Prime Minister Bhutto supported the reelection of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as president. She also appointed as foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, who had served in the same capacity under Zia. Both moves were highly regarded by many Pakistani and foreign observers but also widely interpreted as concessions to the continuing power of the military. The implications of these various internal developments for U.S.-Pakistan relations have generally been quite positive. American policy makers can take pride in Pakistan's democratic achievements and need no longer apologize for supporting a military dictator. Although Benazir Bhutto began her rule with a series of highly symbolic actions—including commuting death sentences and abolishing the National Press Trust—she has been neither as radical nor as arrogant as was her late father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. She has continued to consult with the United States on a variety of foreign issues, including Afghanistan policy. In short, the elections appear, at least in the short run, to have strengthened U.S.-Pakistan relations.

### **The American Elections**

The United States also held elections in November, but the consequences were not nearly so dramatic as in Pakistan. The election of George Bush as president was well received in Pakistan. Bush's foreign experience, his having previously visited Pakistan, and the anticipated continuity of Reagan administration commitment to Pakistan were all points in his favor among Pakistanis. His appointment of James Baker as

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<sup>2</sup>See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Pakistan Elections: Foundation for Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1989).

secretary of state was also highly regarded. On a less positive note, the lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful ordeal of John Tower as Bush's nominee for secretary of defense and the accompanying delays in filling high-level State and Defense Department posts left the United States somewhat less prepared in the foreign policy field for the time being.

In December 1988 President Reagan again certified to the United States Congress that Pakistan was not manufacturing nuclear weapons, but with some expression of concern over the indications that point to just such a capability.<sup>3</sup> The United States now tends to echo Pakistan's call for a regional solution to the nuclear proliferation issue and to encourage Indo-Pakistani discussion of this matter.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto met with President George Bush at Emperor Hirohito's funeral in Tokyo in February and planned a visit to the United States in June 1989.

### The Afghan Conflict

The Soviet Union completed its scheduled withdrawal of its remaining troops in Afghanistan by the February 15 deadline specified in the April 1988 Geneva Accords. The Najibullah government in Kabul not only did not immediately fall, however, but maintained a remarkably strong resistance to rebel attacks in the weeks following the Soviet departure.

Both the Kabul government and Moscow continued to seek a negotiated settlement by which they might retain some stake in Afghanistan. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pakistan in pursuit of this objective, and Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov was also active in the diplomatic offensive. Meanwhile, the Mujahideen leaders, particularly those based in Peshawar, spurned such overtures and attempted to form a provisional government in anticipation of the military defeat of the Najibullah government. A *Sboora* (consultative assembly) was held in Peshawar and provisional officials selected, but the enterprise suffered from disputes over representation of the Iran-based Mujahideen as well as some doubt over whether the provisional government would be able to govern.

Although the initial Mujahideen strategy following the Soviet departure appeared to be to fight a war of attrition against the Kabul regime, avoiding high-casualty frontal attacks, the Peshawar-based groups subsequently began a major attack on Jalalabad, the major city lying between Kabul and the Khyber Pass. The fall of Jalalabad was clearly seen as an important step

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<sup>3</sup>Nayan Chandra, "See No Evil," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 5, 1989, pp. 11–12; see also John J. Fialka and Thomas F. O'Boyle, "West German Firms Admit Supplying Nuclear-Weapons Material to Pakistan," *Wall Street Journal*, April 21, 1989, p. A8.

toward the collapse of Kabul, but what had been projected as a relatively easy military objective proved to be a costly adventure. Thousands of Mujahideen were killed, and the political consequences of the prolonged siege might even outweigh the loss of life. On April 23, 1989, the *New York Times* carried an article arguing that the whole Jalalabad campaign had been planned by the Pakistanis, in the presence of at least one American official but not including Afghans,<sup>4</sup> a charge that was promptly denied by Pakistani officials.<sup>5</sup> Regardless of the validity of the accusation, the Battle of Jalalabad threatened to force some rethinking of Mujahideen, Pakistani, and American strategy concerning the "endgame" in Afghanistan.

### Indo-Pakistani Relations

Reactions in India to the Pakistan elections and to Benazir Bhutto's becoming prime minister were highly positive. Coverage of the elections in the Indian press was extensive and generally accurate. Public elation in India over Bhutto's victory was so evident that it might be difficult for the new Pakistani government to live up to the high expectations of improved relations.

As if to confirm at least some of those expectations, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi met in Pakistan in December in conjunction with the annual meeting of the leaders of the countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The two prime ministers met several times, signed three formal agreements, and expressed a desire to maintain the "momentum for peace" that their talks had begun.<sup>6</sup> Their agreements included the signing of a treaty not to attack one another's nuclear facilities, as well as matters dealing with cultural, educational, and economic issues.

### West Asian Developments

During the third bilateral conference one of the American participants predicted that events in Southwest Asia, particularly with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, might move rapidly in the direction of settlement, perhaps as dramatically as change had come about during the previous year in both Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. Although the turmoil of the *Intifada* (uprising) continued in the Israeli-occupied territories long after the conference, there were indeed some important developments, particularly in the United States' stance toward the Palestine Liberation Organization. After initially denying PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat a visa to attend the

<sup>4</sup>Henry Kamm, "Pakistanis Report Ordering Attacks by Afghan Rebels," *New York Times*, April 23, 1989, p. A1, A16.

<sup>5</sup>*Washington Post*, April 24, 1989, p. A22.

<sup>6</sup>Salamat Ali, "A Hint of Hope," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 12, 1989, pp. 10–11.

United Nations session in New York, the United States subsequently agreed to begin direct contact with the PLO, following its acceptance of the PLO's statement concerning the use of violence to achieve its ends. This increased American flexibility toward the PLO would help to reduce one important difference between the United States and Pakistan regarding that region.

The continuing potency of Islam as an issue upon which to mobilize public protest was demonstrated again by the Salman Rushdie affair. Following Ayatollah Khomeini's demand for the novelist's death because of the allegedly anti-Islamic passages in his *Satanic Verses*, anti-Rushdie riots also took place in Pakistan, apparently engineered by the Jama'at-i-Islami and other groups intent upon stirring up public opinion against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The United States was not directly involved in the affair, except in the issuance of an official statement condemning Khomeini's death threats against Rushdie, but the whole matter illustrated once again some of the potential for cultural misunderstanding over such an issue.

### **Sino-Soviet Relations and the Subcontinent**

The process of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which had been underway for some time, made some significant progress in May 1989 with Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. The Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was an important precursor to such a display of warmer relations. In anticipation of his Beijing visit, Gorbachev visited India in November 1988, amid much pomp and ceremony but also amid a considerable amount of Indian uncertainty over the implications of Sino-Soviet rapprochement for Indo-Soviet relations. Secretary Gorbachev sought to reassure the Indians that normalization of relations with the Chinese would not undermine the longstanding Indo-Soviet friendship, but some Indians remained skeptical.

Certainly the Soviets appeared not to regard Indo-Soviet friendship as a major impediment to improving ties with China—or with Pakistan. Even before the last Soviet troops were out of Afghanistan the Soviet Union was moving forward with overtures to Pakistan, including the possible construction of an atomic power plant in Pakistan.<sup>7</sup>

In the post-Afghanistan era, or at least the post-Soviet occupation era, the relations between the two major communist countries and the two major South Asian countries are likely to continue to evolve in the direction of greater flexibility. The Soviet Union will seek to maintain its

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<sup>7</sup>*Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly*, January 15, 1989, p. 3.

special relationship with India while attempting to improve USSR-Pakistan ties. Similarly, China and the United States will seek to maintain their special relationships with Pakistan while attempting to improve those with India. There are risks, to be sure, during such a period of flux, but there are also opportunities for the resolution of long-standing disputes on several fronts.

### **Summary**

The Third Bilateral U.S.-Pakistan Conference took place during a period of dramatic change in Pakistan and of perhaps less dramatic but nonetheless notable change in the United States and elsewhere in the world. Events during the months following the conference continued to evolve rapidly. In such a changing environment, policy makers in both Pakistan and the United States will be challenged to maintain the relationship that has been developed between their two countries and to adapt to the new circumstances.

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## Contributors

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
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
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