

Normalization with China

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A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes

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To Shijuro

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Acknowledgments

I decided to write this book out of a desire to examine Japanese foreign policymaking in a comparative context. Rather than continuing to study the various aspects of Japan's relations with China, which I started some twenty years ago, I attempted to analyze the process of foreign policy-making both by the United States and by Japan. Normalization with China provided an excellent case for a comparative study. Without the support and encouragement of many friends in the United States, however, I would not have been able to obtain the information and insight necessary to deal with the U.S. normalization process. I wish to express my appreciation to William H. Gleysteen, John Holdridge, Paul Kreisberg, Robert Oxnam, and Cyrus Vance for sharing their precious time with me. Particularly, I wish to thank Michel Oksenberg not only for his incisive observations but also for arranging for me to interview Leonard Woodcock, without whose generous support I would not have been able to grasp the negotiating process leading to the U.S. normalization with China.

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Preface

The main purpose of this study is to arrive at a better understanding of the foreign policies of the United States and Japan. The normalization of relations of the two countries with the People's Republic of China offers a challenging case to compare the basic assumptions of the foreign policies of the two countries and the decision-making process involved.

Starting from a closely coordinated position to contain the spread of communism in Asia, the United States and Japan gradually moved away from their rigid stance to seek rapprochement with China. The fact that the United States and Japan followed a parallel course in the 1970s does not imply that they had a common strategy or that they shared a basic approach toward China. To begin with, Japan had established economic and cultural ties with China but had refrained from moving further because of its political security relations with the United States. For Japan, the China issue was intimately connected to the question of alignment with the United States. To the United States, China was part of the global security issue and, therefore, was closely linked to U.S. strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union. The fact that normalization was brought into the open by the unilateral action of President Richard Nixon greatly strained ensuing relations between the United States and Japan.

For both the United States and Japan, normalization with China was a highly divisive issue in domestic politics. While sustained pressure in the United States came from the rightist pro-Nationalist groups, that in Japan was exerted by the leftist pro-China organizations. Behind the respective groups were systematic maneuvers by the Nationalists and the Communists to turn political developments to their favor. The present study does not deal with the Chinese part in the normalization process. The perceptions, policies, and decisions on the part of China in dealing with the rapprochement and normalization with the United States and Japan would be fascinating to examine. It would certainly add much to the understanding of the U.S.-Japan-China relations of the 1960s and 1970s.

There is no doubt that President Nixon's initiative in seeking rapprochement with Beijing provided the greatest impetus to induce the structural change in world politics from cold war bipolar to complex multipolar power relations. Undoubtedly, there were developments in the United States as well as in Japan that were leading toward closer contact with the People's Republic. Without Nixon's bold stroke of leadership, however, the necessary changes would have taken much longer to arrive, and Asia might have undergone a much longer period of unrest and

uncertainty. By focusing on the processes that led to the normalization within the United States and Japan, the present study also attempts to suggest the linkage between the microscopic examination of decision making in national foreign policy with the macroscopic analysis of changes in world politics.

1. U.S.-China Relations 1949–71

The United States and China fought together as allies in World War II. Yet for two decades after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the two powers had no relations with each other. Except for a limited ambassadorial channel in Warsaw, there was no official exchange between the United States and China. Neither was there any contact at the non-governmental level, whether economic or cultural. Total estrangement was the overall condition that the two countries had to overcome as President Nixon took the initiative for a rapprochement with China.

Events that led to the isolation were indeed tumultuous. At the end of World War II, the United States tried to prevent the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, and U.S. General George Marshall made a genuine attempt at negotiating a settlement between them. When the Nationalists fled the mainland in 1949, however, the Truman administration made clear that it did not intend to intervene and issued a white paper entitled "United States Relations with China," in which it made known its position that the result of the Chinese civil war was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Although the United States was not prepared to extend immediate recognition to the new government in Beijing, and urged the allies not to be precipitous in doing so, it had no intention of ostracizing Beijing from the international community.

It was the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 that fundamentally changed the course of relations between the United States and China for the following two decades. In February 1950 China had already decided to align with the Soviet bloc and signed the Sino-Soviet defense treaty, which was directed against Japan and any other state that collaborated with Japan, namely, the United States. When the war broke out, the United States intervened in Korea in order to respond to what it perceived as a broad military challenge by the Soviet bloc. As the Korean War progressed it brought the United States and China into direct military conflict. The United States reversed its previous policy toward China and intervened again in the Chinese civil war by interposing the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland in order to neutralize the Taiwan Strait.

The Korean War left the United States and China with mutual suspicion and animosity. Thereafter, U.S. Asian policy was designed to contain the military and political threat posed by China, which was regarded as an integral part of a monolithic Soviet bloc. The Nationalists in Taiwan, on the other hand, turned into an ally in an anticommunist confrontation. During the Eisenhower administration, the United States signed a mutual defense

treaty with the Nationalist government and thereby assumed formal responsibility to defend Taiwan. The United States provided extensive military assistance in 1955 and again in 1958 to help Taiwan defend the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu against the threat of Communist Chinese attack.

In the years following the Korean War, especially under the leadership of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the United States embarked on a crusading anticommunist policy directed against China. The United States continued its nonrecognition of the Beijing government and carried over this policy to the United Nations, where it opposed the representation of Beijing. It kept up the policy of enforcing an embargo on China trade and of forbidding American travel to the mainland. It systematically built up a network of bilateral military alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; with Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan to form the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); and with Australia and New Zealand to organize ANZUS. The Chinese reacted by supporting smaller communist nations on its periphery, such as North Korea and North Vietnam, as well as by mobilizing neutralist and socialist forces in various countries in a united struggle against "American imperialism." The strong cleavage in domestic Japanese politics, for example, was a reflection of the larger U.S.-China confrontation that unfolded in the international arena. The government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party could not diverge from the American containment policy against China. The opposition parties and pro-China groups promoted normalization of relations with China and the abrogation of security ties with the United States.

The strongly anticommunist tenor of American policy was undoubtedly in response to the violent international developments that engulfed the Asian region. The victory of the Chinese Communists in the civil war both angered and frustrated the American public. While externally supporting the policy to contain the spread of communism, internally too they looked for ways to cope with communist influence. Seizing upon the political opportunity to launch an anticommunist campaign, Senator Joseph McCarthy levied severe attacks on communist sympathizers, whom he accused of betraying the United States and of "losing China." With the loyalty question interjected into the China issue, many China specialists were purged from the diplomatic and academic fields. The effects were devastating on the Foreign Service, which not only lost its able specialists, but also turned extremely cautious in its dealings with China because of the bitter experiences of the McCarthy era.¹

Exactly how large a part the China lobby played in the overall rightist

¹A. T. Steele, *The American People and China* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 41.

shift in the politics of the 1950s is not easy to ascertain.² However, it was widely reported that the influence was overwhelming and that McCarthy had close contact with Alfred Kohlberg, the leading China lobby activist, who provided him with both funds and information. Kohlberg based his activities on the American China Policy Association, which issued letters, pamphlets, and brochures targeted to the members of Congress. Although it is hard to say how much these publications influenced congressional members in their attitude toward China, it should be noted that aside from McCarthy, there were many ardent supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists in Congress, including Senators Owen Brewster, Styles Bridges, James O. Eastland, William F. Knowland, Patrick McCarran, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, H. Alexander Smith, and Congressman Walter H. Judd.

The China lobby was a complex association of individuals and groups whose common purpose was to secure the backing and support of the United States for the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. At the "inner core" were those Chinese and Americans "whose personal interests were immediately dependent upon a continuation of American aid to Chiang." The others consisted of "a kaleidoscopic array of affiliates who were increasingly allied to the Chiang regime in their sympathies." They included those who were anticommunists, those who had missionary interests in China, or those who seized on the issue to fight against the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.³ The activities of the China lobby were carried out through publications such as *China Monthly: The Truth about China* and *Plain Talk*, as well as through contributions by individuals to existing magazines and newspapers. The most active of the lobby organizations was the American China Policy Association, established in 1946 and operating under Kohlberg's leadership. Another organization established expressly for the purpose of exerting pressure for greater American aid to Chiang Kai-shek was the China Emergency Committee. It was succeeded by the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China, which operated from 1949 to 1952.

The major goals of the China lobby were twofold. The first and the primary interest until 1949 was to secure increasing United States financial aid to the Nationalists. The second, which became more and more important after the Communist victory on the mainland, was to prevent U.S. recognition of the Beijing government. While the outbreak of the

²Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), was first published in 1960. Its distribution was enjoined because of pressures from the China lobby. It is the best critical account of the role and the impact of the China lobby. See also Stanley D. Bachraek, *The Committee of One Million—"China Lobby" Politics 1953-1971* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

³Koen, *China Lobby*, pp. 28ff.

Korean War settled the issue of recognition for years to come, the China lobby became increasingly concerned over the prospects of Communist representation in the United Nations. In 1953, the China lobby was represented by the Committee of One Million, which was organized to exert pressure in an effort to forestall any change in the China policy. The committee succeeded in obtaining one million signatures on petitions addressed to the president opposing Chinese representation in the United Nations. Well-known senators and representatives served as patrons of the committee, including Senators Paul H. Douglas, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, H. Alexander Smith, and Congressman Walter H. Judd. Again in 1961, the committee circulated its second petition in opposition to Chinese representation in the United Nations and to any extension of diplomatic recognition.

The Korean War, the effects of McCarthyism, and the dominant pressure of the pro-Nationalist groups froze the China policy of the United States. A. T. Steele attributes the static nature of U.S. policy first to a "kind of congressional paralysis, based on the assumption that any suggestion of change would provoke a hostile public reaction"; second, to the "reluctance of the administration and of influential private groups to take the initiative in encouraging a new look at the China situation." "The nagging fear of the 'pro communist smear'" was an important factor that inhibited opinion leaders from raising questions.⁴

By the end of the 1950s, however, some questions began to be raised on the policy assumption that China was permanently locked into the Soviet bloc. The first significant voice asking for the reexamination of the existing policy came from Senator Clair Engle of California. In May 1959, he called for the development of a new and more conciliatory approach to China. The same year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested a group of scholars to seek alternative approaches to U.S.-China relations. Prepared by Robert A. Scalapino of the University of California, the Conlon Associates report outlined a step-by-step program of change in the China policy that would ultimately bring about Chinese representation in the United Nations and recognition of the Nationalists as the Republic of Taiwan. The report drew harsh criticism from the Committee of One Million but received favorable reactions from academic circles. In 1960, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Council on Foreign Relations issued studies on possible approaches to an accommodation with China.

The arrival of the Kennedy administration did not bring about any innovation in the China policy. But it is important to note that the Kennedy Democratic coalition contained elements that had been critical of the

⁴Steele, *American People*, pp. 205-7.

Dulles policy of containment and isolation of China. In a mood that became more tolerant of divergent views, a search for alternative approaches developed among those concerned with the China policy, in the State Department, in Congress, and among academics. In 1962, an organizational change took place within the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department. Mainland China was separated from the Republic of China as a new desk charged with Mainland China Affairs and was staffed with a new generation of post-McCarthy China careerists trained in Hong Kong and elsewhere.⁵ The appointment of Roger Hilsman in 1963 to the post of assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs brought new vigor to the office in a direction seeking détente with Beijing.

Hilsman's China speech of December 13, 1963, delivered in San Francisco two weeks after the assassination of President Kennedy, was a watershed event. While carefully reiterating the close and friendly commitment of the United States to the Nationalist government and people in Taiwan, Hilsman expressed his determination "to keep the door open to the possibility of change and not to slam it shut against any development which might advance our national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China."⁶ The Hilsman speech was a joint effort of the China specialists that had been brought into the State Department. According to James C. Thomson, who participated in the drafting, "the dual intent of the speech was both to speak, across years of hostility, to various possible echelons of Chinese and to test the American domestic political climate." Reaction to the speech from the press and Congress was much better than had been expected.⁷

Thereafter, the main efforts of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs were concentrated on easing the passport restrictions on travel to mainland China. On December 11, 1965, the first significant unfreezing of the China policy took place in a modification of the China travel ban. Scholars, reporters, and medical doctors were to be made exceptions to the existing restrictions. Once the travel ban was modified, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs directed its attention to the easing of the trade ban. It also sought ways to alter the rigid position on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

In Congress, too, changes began to surface in the discussion on China. By the middle of the 1960s, many of the congressional leaders who had

⁵James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of U.S.-China Policy 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," *China Quarterly* (London) 50 (April-June 1972):226.

⁶Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, December 13, 1963.

⁷Thomson, "On the Making of U.S.-China Policy," p. 230.

been associated with the China lobby had either died or retired. Senators McCarran, McCarthy, and Bridges had all passed away. So had Alfred Kohlberg, who had lobbied Congress in an effort to assure support for the Nationalists. The only remaining activist was Congressman Walter H. Judd. In March 1965, the Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, under Clement J. Zablocki's chairmanship, held hearings on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Its recommendations included the initiation of cultural exchange activities between scholars and journalists of the two countries.

Of particular importance was the series of hearings that took place in both houses of Congress in the spring and summer of 1966. Senator J.W. Fulbright, in announcing the initiation of hearings on China and on the American attitude toward China, emphasized the importance of preventing war between the United States and China caused by lack of mutual understanding and knowledge. He urged Americans "to be open-minded and inquisitive, to set aside ideological preconceptions and try to learn all that we can about the Chinese and their behavior and attitudes."⁸ A distinguished number of China specialists were invited to the hearings, including John K. Fairbank, Doak Barnett, Donald Zagoria, Robert A. Scalapino, and others. The hearings were nationally telecast, and a large viewing public was exposed to the history of the Chinese revolution, as well as of U.S.-China relations.

In the same year, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was organized, chaired by Robert Scalapino. The purpose of the committee was to call on a wide range of business, labor, and religious groups to discuss the China question. Among the academics the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China was formed in order to promote exchanges between scholars of the two countries. A modest upsurge was apparent in public interest in the China question. Of all the national regions, San Francisco was most outspoken in expressing itself in favor of improved relations and trade with the mainland.⁹

In a study of American public attitudes toward China published in 1966, A.T. Steele found that the "majority of the American people would favor a peaceful solution of outstanding differences with Communist China, if it could be had on just and honorable terms." Polls conducted by the Social Research Center of the University of Michigan had shown an "overwhelming endorsement of the suggestion of negotiation with Peking on Asian problems."¹⁰ The finding revealed a clear correlation between the perceived deterioration of the Vietnam situation and the support for

⁸Statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 7, 1966.

⁹Steele, *American People*, p. 980.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 104.

rapprochement with China, and public desire for reexamination of U.S. Asian policy.¹¹ As to U.S. support for Chiang Kai-shek, there was a marked change in American readiness for assistance. Whereas in 1951, 58 percent of those surveyed approved of U.S. assistance to the Nationalists in an attack on the mainland,¹² in 1964, 62 percent were against helping the Nationalists—either because they feared American involvement in war or because they thought that the attack by the Nationalists could not be successful.¹³ Steele concluded that “clearly the Nationalist government on Taiwan . . . is today regarded by most Americans as no more than a local regime. Nowadays, when Americans speak of China they usually mean Communist China.”¹⁴

Nevertheless, when it came to the question of policy changes involving trade, or diplomatic recognition, or representation in the United Nations, opinion polls showed division in the public attitude.¹⁵ The public was willing to move toward an accommodation with Communist China, but it was not ready to face the hard choices that involved reformulating relations with Taiwan. In fact, there were no indications either in the government or among academics and journalists that they were thinking in terms of severing relations with Taiwan. The 1960s witnessed a shift in American policy and public attitude toward accommodation with China. The U.S. assumption was indeed that of “two Chinas” as the country moved toward rapprochement.

The following two years, 1967 and 1968, did not provide any new opportunities for the Johnson administration. The impact of the Cultural Revolution deprived China of active involvement in international affairs. The war in Vietnam demanded the overriding attention of President Johnson. In the absence of any bold initiative from the president, the United States could not embark on steps for a new China policy distanced from the legacy of the Chinese civil war, the Korean War, and the cold war.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 271ff.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 97–102.

2. Japan-China Relations 1949–71

Japan's relations with China in the decades following World War II were characterized by active involvement of nongovernmental groups in an attempt to promote closer ties between the two countries. These groups were diverse in their composition—economic, political, cultural—but were united by a strong belief that normalization of relations with China was essential for peace and security in Asia and that trade in China was necessary for the regeneration of Japan. The main organizations among the pro-China groups were the Japan China Trade Promotion League, the Japan International Trade Promotion Association, the Japan-China Trade Promotion Diet Members Union, and the Japan-China Friendship Association.¹

Japan's postwar policy toward China was virtually determined by the policy of the United States. Having failed to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists in the civil war that followed after the end of World War II, the United States disengaged itself from China when the Korean War brought the two into direct military conflict. Thereafter, the United States stepped up worldwide efforts to counter threats from communist countries. Japan was converted from a defeated enemy to a strengthened ally, to build up defense forces with which to contribute to U.S. security efforts. The fact that the San Francisco Peace Conference was held in the wake of a heightened East-West confrontation in Asia conditioned the way in which Japan was to terminate the state of war with China. While Japan signed a peace treaty with the United States and its major Western allies, it was left to conclude peace separately with China, with no specific designation as to which Chinese regimes it was to deal with. In practice, however, Japan had no choice. The security treaty that Japan signed with the United States at the time of concluding the peace treaty locked Japan firmly in the anti-Communist, pro-Nationalist posture adopted by the United States. The government aligned itself strongly with the United States against China and the Soviet Union, although Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's earlier intentions had been to keep the options

¹On the role of the various nongovernmental groups, see Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan's Postwar Economic Diplomacy with China: Three Decades of Non-Governmental Experiences," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1987; Nitchū Yūkō Kyōkai, ed., *Nitchū Yūkōundō Shi* (History of Japan-China friendship movement) (Tokyo: Seinen Shuppan sha, 1975).

open in view of the tremendous importance of the China market for Japan.² Domestic politics followed the sharp East-West division, with the conservatives supporting the pro–United States, anti-Communist line and the opposition calling for the abrogation of the security treaty with the United States and closer ties with China and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese policy at the time was to concentrate on developing a campaign of “people’s diplomacy,” directed primarily at leftist groups and business people. Of particular significance was the Chinese decision in December 1952 to return Japanese prisoners of war still in China, through nongovernmental pro-China organizations. The repatriation process was a boost to the pro-China groups and set them up as intermediaries for exchange-of-persons programs, which became invaluable tools of the “people’s diplomacy.” The Chinese also cultivated ties with business people in an effort to remove or reduce the restrictions imposed on the China trade as a result of the Korean War. The first breakthrough came in the form of a nongovernmental trade agreement signed on June 1, 1952, between the Japan China Trade Promotion League and the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade. A series of nongovernmental agreements was signed in the course of the 1950s.³

Although the government approached the China issue with caution, it was basically in favor of closer relations with China, especially on trade. Yoshida solicited the support of Murata Shozo, former president of Osaka Shosen and wartime Japanese ambassador to the Philippines. Murata went to China in 1954 and formed and became the head of the Japan International Trade Promotion Association, which included conservative politicians on the board. The government policy was one of keeping economic relations separate from political relations and allowing trade to develop with an overall view to improved relations with China. Initially, the Chinese side went along with this policy, although their goal was to build on the bases of nongovernmental trade relations, to establish contacts with many varied “people’s organizations” in Japan, and to move Japanese public opinion in favor of normalization of political relations. Most important among China’s contacts in the 1950s was the relationship with the Socialist Party, which was the leading opposition party. Socialist Party leaders visited China and produced joint communiqués calling for normalization and basic changes in Japan’s China policy.

²On Yoshida Shigeru’s decision involving the signing of the peace treaty, see Hosoya Chihiro, “Yoshida Shokan to Ei-bei-chū no Kōzō” (The Yoshida letter and the structure of British-U.S.-China relations), *Cbūōkōron* (Tokyo), November 1982.

³Four nongovernmental trade agreements were signed, on June 1, 1952, October 29, 1953, May 4, 1955, and March 5, 1958.

In the period 1957–60, however, China began to exert strong pressures on Japan and became heavily embroiled in Japanese domestic politics. Several reasons can be cited as contributing to this shift. The most obvious was the change in China's overall policy toward a more militantly radical position. The arrival of the Kishi government was another important factor, as it strengthened ties with the United States as well as with the Nationalists on Taiwan. However, A. Doak Barnett argues that the shift was based also "on Peking's misjudgment of the political situation in Japan—and China's ability to exploit it."⁴ China resorted to various means of exerting economic pressure, stalling trade talks and even abruptly terminating all existing contracts and economic relations in May 1958. Politically, it concentrated its propaganda efforts on the repudiation of Kishi and the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In March 1959, Socialist Party leader Asanuma Inejirō visited Beijing and denounced U.S. imperialism as the "common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese peoples." The statement cost the party heavily, as it was taken to reveal the party's total commitment to Chinese united-front strategy.

China played a major part in exacerbating the political crisis that developed over the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. The revision issue was a complex one that consisted of diverse objectives and motivations. Prime Minister Kishi had perceived it largely in nationalist terms to bring about greater equality and reciprocity between Japan and the United States in their treaty obligations. The Japan China Friendship Association, together with labor unions and pro-China groups, was at the forefront of the movement to prevent the revision of the security treaty. The abrogation of the security treaty and the restoration of Japan-China relations became the twin objectives of the opposition parties and movements. China took an active part during the crisis, inflaming the opposition through sending messages and participating in rallies. There were mass meetings held in some thirty Chinese cities at the time to show solidarity with the Japanese people fighting in opposition to the U.S.-Japan military alliance.

The opposition parties were so firmly committed to the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the promotion of normalization of relations with China that they could not easily come to grips with the political strategic changes that led to the U.S.-China rapprochement of the 1970s. Throughout the 1960s, however, the opposition continued to press the government to repudiate the American policy of containment of China and to take positive measures leading to normalization with China.

⁴A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 103.

After the 1960 crisis, new developments were discerned in Japan-China relations. In Japan, a group of pro-China politicians, who were to take an increasingly large part in promoting rapprochement with China, emerged among the conservative Liberal Democratic Party members. This group was represented by former prime minister Ishibashi Tanzan, who became alarmed by the strained Japan-China relations and visited Beijing in September 1959. His visit was followed by that of Matsumura Kenzō, who became the doyen of the pro-China group within the Liberal Democratic Party. He was accompanied by Takeyama Ichirō, Ide Ichirō, Furui Yoshimi, and Tagawa Seiichi, all of whom became actively engaged in promoting the China issue. Together, these politicians formed a pro-Beijing faction within the party, which developed into the Asian-African Problems Research Association in 1965. This group stood in opposition to the pro-Taipei Asian Problems Research Association, which was organized in 1964. The fact that a clear division grew within the Liberal Democratic Party over the China issue was to have significant bearing on the decision-making process involving normalization later by the Tanaka government.

On the Chinese side, the Sino-Soviet conflict came into the open in 1960. The Soviet Union withdrew 1,390 technicians from China and abrogated over three hundred bilateral agreements and contracts. The economic depression that followed in China eventually impelled the Chinese leadership to look at trade with Japan in economic terms. Rather than insisting upon the 1958 three political principles⁵ as the prerequisites for developing significant economic relations, Zhou Enlai disclosed a set of less stringent principles governing trade with Japan to a visiting representative of the Japan-China Trade Promotion League.⁶ The main point of the new policy was to allow trade to Japanese firms deemed “friendly” to China, on the basis of nongovernmental agreements and contracts, in the absence of official agreement between the two governments.

The “friendly trade” formula was designed for political manipulation on the part of China. A participating Japanese firm was expected to accept

⁵The “three political principles” of July 7, 1958, stipulated that the Japanese government should (1) immediately abandon words and actions hostile to the People’s Republic of China; (2) cease to participate in a “plot to create two Chinas”; and (3) refrain from obstructing the normalization of relations between the two countries.

⁶The “three principles of trade,” made known in August 1960, outlined three forms of trade between Japan and China as follows: (1) trade guaranteed by an official agreement between the two governments; (2) trade supported by nongovernmental agreements and contracts between private Japanese firms and appropriate Chinese corporations; and (3) trade specially designed to suit the interests of small Japanese enterprises wholly dependent on Chinese supplies of raw materials and arranged by particular organizations, such as the Japan Council of Trade (Sohyo) and the All China Federation of Trade Unions.

the “three political principles” and the “principle of inseparability of politics and economics.” The designation of a “friendly firm” was left to the “friendly organizations,” such as the Japan-China Trade Promotion League and the Japan International Trade Promotion Association. In short, the system had a built-in pressure-exerting mechanism whereby the Chinese could influence the course of the “friendly trade” through the pro-Chinese intermediaries.

In addition to the “friendly trade,” which consisted largely of small-scale business, a semigovernmental trade agreement was concluded in 1962 with long-term trade expansion in view. The arrangement was made between Zhou Enlai and Matsumura Kenzō, with Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s support and endorsement. The L-T trade agreement was based on a five-year trade program and took its name from the names of the signatories, Liao Cheng-chieh, deputy chief of the Chinese Staff Office of Foreign Affairs, and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, wartime vice-president of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Company and one-time director of the Economic Planning Agency. It envisaged export and import transactions at an annual average of \$180 million and maintained permanent missions in Tokyo and Beijing. The Japanese mission in Beijing consisted of Ministry of International Trade and Industry officials and staff from business organizations. The Chinese side treated the mission staff as government representatives.

Under the L-T agreement, trade expanded between Japan and China, involving major firms. At one point, a contract for the export of a vinyl plant was agreed upon, with government approval of the use of Export-Import Bank credit for the plant purchase. These developments caused a strong reaction from Taipei. The Satō government became subject to intense cross-pressure from Taipei and Beijing. Especially during the Cultural Revolution, China’s relations with Japan deteriorated as Japanese businessmen and journalists were arrested and mistreated. The Sino-Soviet conflict also contributed to an open split between the Chinese Communist Party and the Japanese Communist Party, causing the leftist groups in Japan to fractionalize. The Japan-China Friendship Association split apart, and many of the pro-China organizations and “friendly firms” purged Communist Party members. As a result, the pro-China groups came under the influence of leftwing elements within the Socialist Party and of the pro-Beijing members of the Liberal Democratic Party, all of whom were totally committed to the Chinese cause.

The role of the pro-Beijing members of the Liberal Democratic Party merits special attention. The main leaders were Matsumura Kenzō, Fujiyama Aiichirō, Furui Yoshimi, and Tagawa Seiichi, and the group consisted of some eighty Diet members, mostly from the Kōno, Matsumura, and Ono

factions. They were in close contact with business leaders such as Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Okazaki Kaheita, who took an active part in the negotiation of trade agreements. These conservative politicians and businessmen were committed to the promotion of closer ties with China, whether out of nationalism, pan-Asianism, or wartime sense of guilt. They were not necessarily anti-American or against the security treaty itself, but their priority lay in the normalization of relations with Japan's largest neighbor.

The trade agreement that succeeded the L-T was known as the "Memorandum Trade agreement" because it was based on a memorandum that was renegotiated each year. Furui, Tagawa, and Okazaki spent weeks negotiating the terms of the political communiqué that formed the most important part of the agreement. Invariably, the Chinese side would introduce strong terms that expressed Chinese disapproval of the policy of the Satō government. The negotiators searched for wordings that might be acceptable to the Chinese but would not wholly undermine their position as members of the Liberal Democratic Party.

However, it is important to note that the negotiators of the Memorandum Trade agreement assumed the function of intermediaries. They frequently conceded the Chinese demands or placed stringent conditions on the Japanese firms on trade and exchange matters. Of particular political importance was the exchange of journalists that was negotiated through the good offices of the Matsumura group in 1964. The memorandum at the time assured the freedom of information and placed no restrictions on reporting activities. In fact, the Chinese soon started to apply political tests to Japanese journalists, expelling those they considered biased or unfriendly in their reporting. When the L-T agreement was terminated and the Memorandum Trade agreement was negotiated on a yearly basis, the Chinese began to exact commitment on the part of the journalists and their newspapers and of television stations at home to abide by the three political principles and the political communiqué issued at the time of the trade agreement. Tagawa was severely criticized for compromising with the Chinese demand to control the exchange program itself in line with the political principles. In fact, the exchange program that started with nine journalists representing nine companies was reduced to one *Asahi Shinbun* correspondent in 1970.⁷ The effect of the compromise was a dangerous one, as it introduced the likelihood of providing structurally biased news to the Japanese public. In terms of trade as well as of reporting, the Chinese benefited by the willing response of the

⁷In the controversy involving the exchange of journalists, see Miyoshi Osamu and Etō Shinkichi, *Chūgoku Hōdō no Henkō wo Tsuku* (Criticizing the biases in the China report) (Tokyo: Nishin Hōdō Shuppanbu, 1972), pp. 107–73.

Japanese collaborators to compromise in order to gain access to sources of goods and information.

When China enunciated a set of new criteria for trade contracts with Japanese firms in April 1970,⁸ the pro-Chinese intermediaries in the Japan International Trade Promotion Association and the Memorandum Trade Office made all-out efforts to turn the business community away from Taiwan and South Korea and to commit themselves exclusively to the China market. By 1964 Japan had already become China's primary trading partner, and economic relations expanded rapidly thereafter. However, increasing trade did not produce political results. While Japan became the primary trading partner of both Taiwan and China, its security interests continued to lie in the defense of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, as was pronounced clearly in the 1969 Sato-Nixon communiqué. It was in order to terminate such a state of affairs that the Chinese leaders decided to place new strictures on the Japanese firms to force them to a choice between severance of economic relations with Taiwan and South Korea or participation in the China market.

Those business corporations that already had stakes in the China market were the first to accept the new conditions. Manufacturers of fertilizer, steel, and industrial machines led the way, followed by a number of trading firms based in the Kansai area, which had a smaller share in the Taiwan and South Korea markets. While successfully pressing the business community to become committed to the China market, China launched its so-called ping-pong and invitational diplomacy and sought to win the support of the business community and the general public outside the limited circle of the pro-China groups. Decisions by the head of Toyota Motors to visit China, and the meeting of Keizai Dōyūkai top leaders with the visiting director of the Chinese People's External Friendship Association, were landmark events in the spring of 1971 that attested to the rapid pace at which the business community began to gravitate toward Beijing.⁹

Among the political leaders, Chinese efforts to win supporters also showed remarkable success. On December 9, 1970, Diet members from all the major parties joined forces to organize the suprapartisan Dietmen's League for the Restoration of Ties with China (*Nitchū kokko kaifuku sokushin giin renmei*) and set out to mobilize all pro-Beijing forces.

⁸Zhou Enlai's "four conditions" of April 19, 1970, stated that (1) no trade would be allowed to those who assisted Taiwan and South Korea, (2) no trade would be allowed to those who invested in Taiwan and South Korea, (3) no trade would be allowed to those who produced weapons for the American war of aggression against Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and (4) no trade was intended with American companies in Japan.

⁹For a detailed account of the developments in the business community in reaction to Zhou Enlai's "four conditions," see Sadako Ogata, "Business Community," pp. 185–91.

Toward the end of March 1971, the Dietmen's League and the Japan Socialist Party jointly sponsored a People's Congress for Restoration of Diplomatic Ties between Japan and China (Nitchū kokko seijōka kokumin kyōgikai) and also attempted to cooperate with the Kōmeitō-sponsored organizations.

There is no doubt that it was President Nixon's announcement that he would visit Beijing on July 15, 1971, that provided the final momentum in the mounting tide to realize the normalization of relations with China. The business community moved ahead, dispatching mission after mission of top business leaders to China. Within the Liberal Democratic Party, Miki Takeo was the first factional leader to travel to Beijing (in April 1972). Nakasone Yasuhiro also took the position of urging the government to negotiate with the People's Republic, with normalization in view. Prime Minister Sato found himself left behind both by the business community and by a growing number of political leaders. China, in the meantime, took full advantage of the favorable tide in Japan, and accelerated the campaign of "invitational diplomacy." In the course of 1971, a record number of 5,718 Japanese were invited to China. Those who went were no longer confined to pro-China groups, but encompassed influential Japanese regardless of their past positions.

In hindsight, once Nixon announced his visit to Beijing, the normalization of Japan's relations with China seemed like a foregone conclusion. However, the process leading to the eventual conclusion of normalization was wrought with complex uncertainties. The full scope of the new American policy for China could not be easily ascertained. The Chinese negotiating position could hardly be forecast. The political division over the China issue had to be fought out, especially within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party itself.

3. Nixon and the Shanghai Communiqué

In 1969, Richard Nixon came to the White House determined “to direct foreign policy from the White House.”¹ Relations with China were not on the top of the foreign policy agenda, but the need to reevaluate U.S. policy toward China was a major concern.

To the post of secretary of state, Nixon appointed William P. Rogers, whom he had known well as attorney general in the Eisenhower administration. Nixon gave high credit to Rogers as a “strong administrator” and a “resourceful negotiator” who could get along well with Congress. Nixon “felt that the almost institutionalized enmity between Senator Fulbright’s Foreign Relations Committee and the White House had become damaging to the national interest and [he] thought Rogers could thaw that freeze.”² For the post of national security adviser, Nixon chose Henry Kissinger, with whom he had not been in close contact until then but of whom he had known as a foreign policy adviser to Nelson Rockefeller. In their initial talks together, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the need for a major reorganization of the foreign policy decision-making structure. Kissinger was aware that Nixon had not intended to count on Rogers to direct foreign policy. He observed that “Nixon considered Rogers’ unfamiliarity with the subject an asset because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in the White House.” He wrote in his memoirs that “few Secretaries of State can have been selected because of their President’s confidence in their ignorance of foreign policy.”³

Kissinger’s first task was to revitalize the National Security Council system centered in the White House. Kissinger turned to Morton Halperin to work out a system that concentrated nearly all power in the hands of the national security adviser. Halperin proposed a system that strengthened the role of the national security adviser by providing him with the power, first, to decide the agenda of the National Security Council meetings; second, to review the various option papers prepared by the bureaucracy; third, to order directly the State Department and other agencies to prepare option papers on specific subjects designated as the National Security Study Memoranda. Moreover, the president’s policy decision was to be made after a National Security Council meeting and was to take the form of

¹Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 340.

²*Ibid.*, p. 339.

³Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 26.

a highly classified National Security Decision Memorandum written by Kissinger and his staff.⁴ Kissinger submitted the reorganization proposal to Nixon; it was approved. The reorganized system provided a mechanism for the president to intervene on major policy decisions at their evolving stage. It eliminated the influence of the bureaucracy over the National Security Council. In particular, it deprived the secretary of state of any substantive role. It assured the national security adviser “the sole control of the flow of documents for the President to study.” Under this system, Kissinger could summarize all the papers going to the president, prepare covering memoranda, and present recommendations. In effect, Kissinger, together with the president, could make decisions.⁵

The decision-making structure that emerged with the inauguration of Nixon was to determine the conduct of U.S. foreign policy during his administration. There were many pressing problems—the settlement of the war in Vietnam, the state of the Western alliance, the explosive situation in the Middle East, the irritant relations with Japan over Okinawa.⁶ However, Nixon was greatly concerned with the need to modify U.S. policy toward China. He urged Kissinger at their initial meeting to read his 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs*, in which he had raised the issue. He was said to have expressed his wish to the members of the transition team in late 1968 that “one of the goals of his administration would be to recognize China.”⁷

In his inaugural address, Nixon made a veiled reference to the new administration’s willingness to communicate with China, but he did not take any clear public steps in the first few months. After twenty years of virtual isolation and intermittent hostility, it was not easy to initiate moves for rapprochement with the Chinese. Nixon himself was interested in keeping his intentions alive. He sent a memorandum to Kissinger on February 1 in which he urged that “we give every encouragement to the attitude that the administration [is] exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese. ‘This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints from this direction,’” he noted.⁸ Kissinger spent the next few months studying and reviewing U.S. policy toward China. Small steps were also taken to signal China the U.S. interest in establishing contacts.

⁴For the developments leading to the approval of the NSC reorganization, see Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), pp. 26–29; Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 77–85.

⁵Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 35f.

⁶Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 343.

⁷Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 351f.

⁸Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 169f.

The first interagency study of China policy was requested by Kissinger on February 5. The departments and agencies concerned were to examine the following:

1. The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic of China;
2. the nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
3. the interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China;
4. alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.⁹

The outcome of the review, which was known as National Security Study Memorandum 14, was the first concerted governmental study on China. After reviewing possible options for the United States, it recommended that the president “move toward a two-Chinas policy, preserving ties with Taiwan while gradually establishing a better understanding with Peking.”¹⁰ Kissinger, however, was dissatisfied with the general thrust of NSSM-14. He felt that the “paper paid heavy attention to the conventional Chinese-American bilateral problems. No reference was made to the global implications of Sino-Soviet tensions and the opportunities for us in the triangular relationship.” He “thought the issue should be posed differently.”¹¹

On March 28, Kissinger asked for a second study on “trade with Communist China,” which was designated NSSM-35. The study was triggered by a memorandum sent by Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson to the president earlier that month. In it, Richardson proposed “the lifting of certain restrictions on trade with and the freeing of travel to China.” Nixon was said to have reacted affirmatively.¹² Up until then, under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the State Department had undertaken several studies on policy measures to improve relations with China. In 1962, the Policy Planning Staff had produced a two-volume study on China. The Bureau of East Asian Affairs had prepared a series of modest unilateral actions to initiate some movement in the frozen diplomatic situation. In 1965, a partial ban was raised on travel to China. In 1968, a group of senior officials had suggested that the United States review the controls on Chinese assets in the country. By 1969 there was an accumulated list of possible initiatives toward China and a large number of internal studies to support them.

NSSM-35 was prepared by a National Security Council staff group

⁹Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 169f.

¹⁰Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: Viking, 1978), p. 112.

¹¹Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 178.

¹²Szulc, *Illusion*, pp. 113f.

headed by John Holdridge, who had been seconded from the State Department to serve as Kissinger's top China expert on the council, with the cooperation of the State Department's Asia specialists. The main question that the study addressed was the "plan for dismantling the controls on trade with China." There were two opposing views among the specialists who undertook the review. The acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, Robert Barnett, and other Asian specialists favored the abolition of the whole machinery of trade controls. Others, supported by Bryce Harlow and William Macomber, respectively Nixon's and the State Department's liaison with Congress, favored a piecemeal approach of "gradually peeling off layers of trade restriction." In the end, the latter approach prevailed and the recommendations were incorporated into NSSM-35. It proposed to the president that the first step be taken to permit American travelers to spend up to one hundred dollars on any goods of Chinese origin.¹³

While the administration was engaged in an extensive review of the China policy, Sino-Soviet hostility intensified, taking a military turn. Armed clashes were reported on Damansky/Chenpao island in the Ussuri River, causing heavy casualties. Both sides claimed victory, blamed the other for initiating the fighting, and continued their military buildup. These developments were taken by the administration as posing new challenges to U.S. policy. Kissinger writes in his memoirs that "ironically, it was heavy-handed Soviet diplomacy that made us think about our opportunities." Ambassador Dobrynin called on Kissinger on March 11, gave him "a gory account of the atrocities allegedly committed by the Chinese and an extended briefing." To Kissinger's comment that the incident was "a Sino-Soviet problem, Dobrynin insisted passionately that China was everybody's problem." Again on March 22, at the first private meeting of U.S. Paris negotiators with the North Vietnamese, Xuan Thuy "volunteered the surprising outburst that the United States had nothing to gain by seeking to take advantage of the divisions between the Soviet Union and China. The Vietnamese would rely on themselves." The United States had not raised the issue anywhere to the Vietnamese concerning a Sino-Soviet rift. Lin Pao's political report to the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on April 1 also impressed Kissinger. It showed that "Chinese preoccupation with the Soviet, rather than the American, danger seemed to be growing." Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet fighting took place along the Amur River in May and expanded on the Sinkiang border in June.¹⁴

In July, Kissinger recommended and Nixon ordered a study of the Sino-

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 114f.

¹⁴Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 171–76.

Soviet rivalry. NSSM-63 focused on the benefits that the rivalry brought to the United States. The memorandum stated that war between the Soviet Union and China would drastically reduce their capabilities to conduct policies against the United States, but it fell short of pursuing the full implications of such a war for the national interests of the United States. A few months later, Kissinger decided to commission from his own National Security Council staff a study of contingency plans for the United States in the event of a Sino-Soviet war.¹⁵ Kissinger was “very worried that war [was] going to break out and that [we’d] be caught unawares.” He was not satisfied with the NSSM study and ordered the preparation of “a complete scenario: what American reactions should be toward the Soviet Union and China, what the United States could do in the United Nations, how it would affect the Vietnam war and American troops in Indochina, and so on.”¹⁶

Both Nixon and Kissinger had perceived the opening of China in a strategic context in relation to the Soviet Union. As the Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified, however, they came to see it more and more in terms of its impact on the structure of international relations and of the possible development of a new triangular power balance separating the two communist states. Within the government, Kissinger found three different views on how to deal with China in light of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. The “Slavophile” position argued that the highest priority should be given to improving relations with the Soviet Union, and therefore efforts to increase contacts with China should be avoided. The “Sinophile” group insisted that relations with the Soviet Union should not be a major factor in shaping U.S. policy toward China. The “realpolitic” approach urged the expansion of contacts with China because the Soviet Union would be more likely to be conciliatory if the United States sought rapprochement with China.¹⁷ The “Slavophile” and the “Sinophile” groups represented respectively the area specialists within the State Department. Nixon and Kissinger sided with the “realpolitic” approach.

On August 14, when the National Security Council met for the first time to examine the China policy under circumstances of growing Sino-Soviet tensions, Nixon startled those present by clearly identifying U.S. national interests with the cause of China. He observed that the Soviet Union was “the more aggressive party” to the conflict and stated that “it was against [U.S.] interests to let China be ‘smashed’ in a Sino-Soviet war.” Kissinger described the Nixon argument as a “revolutionary thesis,” for the president was in fact declaring that the United States “had a strategic interest in the

¹⁵Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, pp. 96f.

¹⁶Szuc, *Illusion*, p. 201.

¹⁷Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 182.

survival of a major Communist country, long an enemy, and with which we had no contact.”¹⁸

With tensions multiplying between China and the Soviet Union, the need for contact with China appeared more and more urgent. The White House and the State Department, despite their differing perspectives, collaborated in the attempt to open up channels of communication with the Chinese throughout 1969 and until the beginning of 1970. Nixon made his initial move early in 1969 while on his first foreign trip as president. In Paris he discussed the issue of China with President Charles de Gaulle. Nixon states in his memoirs that de Gaulle brought up the subject of American normalization with China and that he and de Gaulle agreed on the need for more communication with China as it became a nuclear power and grew in strength.¹⁹ De Gaulle on his part instructed his ambassador to China, Etienne M. Manac’h, to convey to the Chinese America’s interest in forming a new relationship.²⁰

The occasion for a first diplomatic signal to China was Rogers’s trip to Pakistan. Pakistan was an ideal state to act as intermediary between the United States and China, as it had good relations with both countries. On May 24, Secretary Rogers discussed China at great length with President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and asked whether Pakistan could help the United States set up secret contact with Beijing. He specifically requested the president to relay the U.S. intention to the Chinese.²¹

China was very much on Nixon’s mind as he prepared for his tour across the Pacific and on to Europe in July. The China experts in the State Department argued for some kind of overt gesture toward China in preparation for his trip; Nixon concurred. On July 21, three days before his departure, the department announced the modification of certain of its trade and travel controls to China. These measures came out of recommendations that had been included in the earlier NSSM-35. The new regulation permitted American tourists and residents abroad to purchase limited quantities of goods originating in Communist China. It authorized automatic validations of passports for travel to Communist China for members of Congress, journalists, teachers, scholars and students, scientists and medical doctors, and the representatives of the American Red Cross.²² Once these measures were announced, the president started to talk publicly about China. At every stop during the grand tour in July and

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Nixon, *Memoirs*.

²⁰Szulc, *Illusion*, p. 116.

²¹Ibid.

²²*Asabi Shinbun* (evening edition), July 22, 1969.

August, Nixon made known his readiness to open communication with the Chinese. To President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, he spoke freely of his belief that China should not be kept isolated and asked the president to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. To President Ceausescu of Romania on August 2 and 3, he repeated his firm belief in the need to open up China and asked the president to act as a channel of communication to the Chinese.

On August 8, Secretary Rogers, though unaware of the president's approaches to Yahya Khan and Nicolae Ceausescu, made a major speech at the National Press Club in Canberra in which he declared U.S. interest in improving relations with China. Referring to the measures that liberalized purchases of Chinese goods and travels to China, the secretary stated that "Communist China obviously has long been too isolated from world affairs. This is the reason why we have been seeking to open up channels of communication. Our purpose was to remove irritants in our relations and to help remind people on mainland China of our historic friendship for them." While denying any intention of abandoning support of the Republic of China, the secretary firmly expressed the desire to "enter into a useful dialogue and to [reduce] tensions" with the People's Republic.²³

By the middle of August, the United States conveyed, through public statements, intermediaries, and administrative actions, its intention to enter into communication with the Chinese. There was a sense of urgency in the desire to come into contact with China, because of growing tensions along the Sino-Soviet border. Two initiatives taken by the United States at about that time merit special attention. One was taken through back channels, the other through official. Kissinger, in response to the Pakistani request that the United States take some specific action in order to prove to Zhou Enlai the seriousness of American intentions, conveyed U.S. willingness to withdraw the two American destroyers patrolling the Taiwan Strait—a step he had worked out with Richardson and which was approved by the president. To make certain that the Chinese understood the meaning of the signal from the United States, Kissinger authorized U.S. officials in Hong Kong to leak the decision to the Chinese.²⁴

A second initiative took the form of an attempt to reactivate the Warsaw channel, which had been closed since the Chinese had canceled the meeting scheduled for February 20, 1969, after the defection of a Chinese national in Europe. Kissinger instructed the American ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, on September 9 to take the next social occasion to inform China's ambassador to Poland directly that the United States was

²³Szulc, *Illusion*, pp. 119ff.

²⁴Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 186f.

prepared for serious talks. After nearly three months, Stoessel succeeded in being invited to the Chinese embassy by the chargé d'affaires, Lei Yang. There they agreed to set January 20 of the following year as the date to renew ambassadorial talks.

Two meetings at the ambassadorial level took place in Warsaw at the beginning of 1970. Instructions for Stoessel's first meeting in January were drafted by Paul H. Kreisberg, who was considered one of the most knowledgeable China experts in the State Department. These instructions were cleared by Rogers and Kissinger. Stoessel was told to propose to the Chinese that "a high-level administration representative fly to Peking for more detailed talks." The goal was to seek ways "to normalize relations" with China and "to find a way of putting Taiwan on the back burner." He was to make it clear that "some American forces could be removed from Taiwan, thus meeting one of the main requirements of the Chinese."²⁵ To Stoessel's proposal, Lei Yang read out a formal statement that expressed China's willingness "to consider and discuss whatever ideas and suggestions the U.S. Government might put forward." He stated that "these talks may either continue to be conducted at the ambassadorial level or may be conducted at a higher level or through other channels acceptable to both sides."²⁶ The Warsaw meeting in January stood as a breakthrough in the frozen relations that had existed between the United States and China for twenty years. The United States made it clear that it was ready to reduce its military presence in Taiwan in return for a commitment to future high-level talks with China. China accepted the proposal.

At the second Warsaw meeting, on February 20, Lei Yang conveyed the government's positive response, although it was still somewhat general. The two emissaries continued their conversation concerning channels for future talks, Taiwan, Vietnam, and related subjects. Kissinger in his memoirs writes of the growing dissent he faced from the State Department's East Asian Bureau and how he had to override their hesitation before the February meeting. Paul Kreisberg, however, denies that the bureau received any critical comments from the White House either for the January or for the February meetings in Warsaw. In fact, he found the wording of his own draft adopted in the Shanghai communiqué, to the effect that the United States "will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."²⁷ The lines in the Kissinger memoirs, however, reveal Kissinger's growing impatience over the slowness of the communication through the Warsaw channel, as well

²⁵Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 360f.

²⁶Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 687f.

²⁷Statement by Paul Kreisberg to the author on November 6, 1984.

as over the need to cope with the State Department's views. He writes about how he "redoubled [the] search for less constrained channels" while he waited for the February meeting. He also refers to the favorable message he received from the Chinese through the Pakistani ambassador, Agha Hilaly, on February 22, and to the suggestion he made to "open a channel more suitable for confidential exchanges than the Warsaw talks." Kissinger's primary concern at that time was to open high-level talks in Beijing. He was confident that "the road to Peking was open if we were prepared to travel it with skill and delicacy." He believed that "the mere opening of talks would revolutionize international relationships" and was ready to bid for bold steps.²⁸

The State Department, on the other hand, was more cautious about proceeding on to high-level talks in Beijing without prior progress on bilateral issues. The department's view was presented in a memorandum from Secretary Rogers to the president on March 10 in preparation for the March meeting. Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, discussed his anxieties with Kissinger and summarized the points in a personal note, which stated that "to go to Peking without such clarification poses serious risk of our being used by Peking for its own purposes in its relations with the Soviets without any compensating gains either in terms of our bilateral relations with the Chinese or in progress toward a relaxation of tensions elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia." Furthermore, he argued, discussion on the modalities of a meeting should not be made "unless we have made a firm and final decision to go ahead with such a meeting. To make such a commitment at this point would thus weaken our ability to press the Chinese now to commit themselves further on their own intentions and negotiating position at a higher-level meeting."²⁹

The internal wrangling delayed the United States in proposing the date for the next meeting. China then came up with counterproposals, which resulted in further postponement. By the time the agreed upon date of May 20 drew near, the United States had started the operations in Cambodia. China announced that it no longer considered it suitable to hold a meeting with the United States on the scheduled date and postponed it indefinitely. Given the difference in the expected outcome of high-level U.S.-China talks in Beijing, it was perhaps inevitable that the State Department and the White House could not agree on the tactics for the Warsaw talks. To the State Department, the most important objective was to make substantial gains in the host of bilateral problems that lay between the two countries.

²⁸Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 680–88.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 691.

To Nixon and Kissinger, the visit itself was viewed as an end. It was expected to bring about a traumatic effect on Hanoi, Moscow, and capitals throughout the world.

Once tension over Cambodia subsided, Kissinger again started looking for back channels. He instructed the U.S. military attaché in Paris, General Vernon Walters, to approach his Chinese counterpart; he was not successful. At the same time, Kissinger felt relieved that the Warsaw channel had broken down. He wrote in his memoirs that the May 20 cancellation “was providential” because the White House interest in talking to Beijing “about common geopolitical concerns could not be dealt with—or perhaps even understood” in Warsaw.³⁰

In the end, it was the Pakistani channel that brought about the breakthrough. Ever since Nixon’s visit to Pakistan in August 1969, the Pakistanis had proved encouraging and supportive. Kissinger set up a confidential contact point with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, Agha Hilaly. To the Pakistani suggestion in October 1969 to convey some specific sign of U.S. willingness to improve relations, Kissinger, with the approval of the president, indicated readiness to withdraw two destroyers that had been on patrol in the Taiwan Strait. Before the Warsaw meeting in January, and again after the second meeting in February, President Yahya Khan through Ambassador Hilaly informed Kissinger that the Chinese were encouraged by the U.S. initiatives. On December 8, three weeks after President Yahya Khan’s visit to China, Ambassador Hilaly visited Kissinger with President Yahya Khan’s missive, which contained Zhou Enlai’s invitation welcoming President Nixon’s special envoy to Beijing. Kissinger and Nixon were elated by the Chinese proposal and were in complete agreement to accept the invitation. A week later, a message was sent through the Pakistani channel that the president was prepared for high-level talks in Beijing.

It would take another four months, however, before further communication arrived from Zhou Enlai confirming Chinese willingness to accept the president’s special envoy or the secretary of state or the president himself. In the meantime, the United States continued to send conciliatory signs to China. The president’s second Foreign Policy Report of February 25, 1971, for the first time referred to China by its official name. The State Department was not unaware of the back-channel developments, but pursued its own efforts to open relations with China. In fact, the White House and the State Department were making parallel endeavors. On March 15, the State Department announced the termination of all restrictions on the use of U.S. passports for travel to China. The Chinese also

³⁰*Ibid.*

mounted their signal. The high point arrived on April 6 when they invited the American ping-pong team that was participating in the World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya to visit China. On April 14, the United States announced the first breach in the trade embargo against China, approving the sale of French dump trucks containing American-made engines and transmissions.

Zhou Enlai's response to the president's December 16 message finally arrived on April 21; in it he explained that "owing to the situation at the time it has not been possible to reply earlier." He furthermore stated that "contacts between the People's Republic of China and the United States are being reviewed. However, if the relations between China and the USA are to be restored fundamentally, the US must withdraw all its Armed Forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area. A solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high level responsible persons of the two countries." It was for such stated purpose that China reaffirmed its willingness to receive in Beijing "a special envoy of the President of the US (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the US Secy of State or even the President of the US himself."³¹

What exactly were the factors that caused the Chinese delay cannot be determined. There must have been ideological, political, and bureaucratic opposition to an approach that was to deviate so drastically from the past. Lin Biao and top radical leaders were probably among those opposed. Any declared American intention to withdraw from Vietnam might not have been taken at face value, especially in view of the fact that the United States supported the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos in February. It seems safe, however, to surmise that it was the uncertain prospect of the forthcoming negotiations that contributed most to the hesitation.

When the Chinese first sent over an invitation for President Nixon's envoy to Beijing, the purpose of the talks was "to discuss the subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan." For a long time China had urged the United States to withdraw its troops from Taiwan as well as to sever its relationship. Kissinger's reaction to the first invitation was to downgrade the reference to Taiwan as "a standard formula, perhaps to ensure against leaks or bad faith in Washington." To him the most important part of the message was the invitation to Beijing. He felt that the Chinese leaders would not resort to the invitation of an American emissary unless they were "driven by some deeper imperative than the future of one of China's provinces."³² Kissinger probably gave much less importance to the Taiwan issue than those experts who had dealt with China over the years.

³¹Ibid., p. 714.

³²Ibid., p. 701.

To Kissinger, the importance of Taiwan lay in its possible linkage with the settlement of other important international issues, notably relations with the Soviet Union. This is why in response to Zhou Enlai's first message Kissinger insisted that "the meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question, but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions." With regard to the question of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan, he stated that the policy of the United States was to reduce it "as tensions in [the] region diminish[ed]." Kissinger explains in his memoirs that the proposed withdrawal formula was "designed to encourage Chinese interest in a settlement of the war in Vietnam by tying troop withdrawals from Taiwan to an end of the conflict in Indochina."³³

The April message from Zhou Enlai reiterated the importance of the Taiwan issue. Zhou stated that "the US must withdraw all its Armed forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area." Kissinger noted with some optimism that though the Chinese still designated the subject of the meeting to be Taiwan, "the emphasis was on withdrawing our forces rather than abandoning our relationship" with Taiwan. He therefore believed that the Chinese were not after the United States for impossible concessions. Rather, he felt that they were seeking to discuss at the highest level the fundamental reorganization of the strategic alignment. Nixon and Kissinger were both convinced and optimistic that they "were beginning to see the outline of a new international order."³⁴

Now that the invitation was confirmed, the big question was whom to send to Beijing. A long list of candidates was discussed, which included David Bruce, George Bush, Elliot Richardson, and Nelson Rockefeller accompanied by Alexander Haig. Nixon decided on Kissinger, who writes that he was chosen in the end because Nixon felt that "I understood our policy best, and that being familiar with my complicated chief, I would be able to arrange the sort of Peking visit for him with which Nixon would be most comfortable." Another important consideration was that "of all the potential emissaries I was the most subject to his control." The choice was a great relief for Kissinger himself, for after being involved in the arrangements he found himself in a position "to bring the enterprise to fruition."³⁵

Kissinger left Washington on July 1, on what has now become a well-known secret trip to Beijing. He was accompanied by John Holdridge, a Foreign Service Officer on secondment to the National Security Council and a China specialist; Dick Smyser, another Foreign Service Officer and a

³³Ibid., p. 702.

³⁴Ibid., p. 714–16.

³⁵Ibid., p. 717.

Vietnam expert; and Winston Lord, formerly of the State and Defense departments and Kissinger's special assistant. The entire trip was arranged secretly without the knowledge of the State Department. The ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland, was called back to Palm Springs in May, on what he was to explain to the State Department as "private business," to cooperate in the technical arrangement for Kissinger's stopover on his way to Beijing. Initially, Secretary Rogers was only informed that Kissinger was to take a lengthy "information trip" through Asia. It was only on July 8, the day before Kissinger reached Beijing, that the president disclosed to the secretary that Kissinger was on his way to Beijing as a result of a "last minute decision in response to an invitation [Kissinger] had received while in Pakistan."³⁶ Kissinger defends the secret procedure on the basis of the exigency of the time as well as the lack of confidence of the president in his secretary of state.³⁷

Kissinger's July trip was the beginning of a series of negotiations that terminated the years of estrangement between the United States and China. On July 15, President Nixon, in a nationwide television statement, disclosed Kissinger's recent meeting with Zhou Enlai and the president's acceptance of an invitation to visit China before May 1972. The president's announcement caused worldwide repercussions, forcing political reorientation at various international levels. In the meantime, discussions continued in preparation for the president's visit. Kissinger visited Beijing again in October to settle the major issues to be negotiated during the presidential visit, including the preparation of a communiqué to be issued at the end. The arrangements for Kissinger's second visit as well as the presidential visit were made through General Walters and the Chinese ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, as had been agreed upon between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Forty-six meetings were carried out between Walters and Chen in complete secrecy. Instructions to Walters were drafted by Kissinger, approved by the president, and carried by hand to Paris by a member of the White House Situation Room staff. Walters reported directly to Kissinger, using a special back-channel code system without disclosure to anyone in the embassy, including the ambassador. Kissinger himself met Huang Chen in Paris three times, each time after being virtually smuggled into Paris by Walters.³⁸ Discussions in Paris dealt with the technical aspects of preparing for the presidential visit. The Paris meetings provided the channel through which China was kept informed of the developments between the United States and the Soviet Union follow-

³⁶Ibid., p. 739.

³⁷Ibid., p. 728.

³⁸Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 527–50.

ing the former's announced rapprochement with China. The Soviet Union became suddenly eager for a summit meeting with the United States, and Kissinger felt it important that the Chinese understand U.S. policy objectives and know what actions were being taken.³⁹

While preparations for the president's trip were carried out in secret, the administration faced one issue that had to be dealt with in the open. This was the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. For twenty years the United States had fought this question procedurally, first by a simple motion for postponement, later by submitting a resolution that designated it an important question that required two-thirds majority approval by the General Assembly. In the fall of 1970, however, the United States found that the lineup for the support of their traditional maneuvers was rapidly eroding. Although the United States was able to win the vote on the important-question resolution, for the first time the Albanian resolution for seating the People's Republic won majority support by a vote of fifty-one to forty-nine, with twenty-five abstentions. The General Assembly of 1971 was expected to be critical.

To cope with the situation, the State Department worked out a dual-representation formula in which the admission of the People's Republic would be accepted but the expulsion of the Republic of China would be prevented by making the latter an important question requiring two-thirds majority support. Kissinger observes that the State Department promoted the dual-representation formula in the belief that it had the advantage of pleasing those who opposed the expulsion of Taiwan. The department repeatedly sought to make its position known openly in January, April, and June through issuing a policy statement. Nixon and Kissinger were mainly concerned with the damage that such a statement might cause in the opening of relations with China. Nixon therefore delayed any such statement from Rogers until August 2. By then negotiations involving Nixon's trip were well advanced. Zhou Enlai told Kissinger that dual representation in any form would be unacceptable to Beijing, but gave Kissinger the impression that the issue of being represented in the United Nations was not a pressing one for him. Having become convinced that the United Nations price would be manageable, Nixon approved a statement by Rogers that the United States would promote the formula of dual representation in the forthcoming General Assembly.⁴⁰ The United States, together with Japan and Western supporters, fought hard to collect votes. On October 25, the vote on the important-question resolution was defeated, with fifty-five in favor, fifty-nine against, and fifteen abstentions. The

³⁹Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 768.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 772–74.

Albanian resolution passed by an overwhelming majority. The question of Chinese representation was settled in the United Nations in advance of the Nixon trip to China. Member states of the United Nations were moving with the changing tide.

Nixon left for Beijing on February 17, 1972. Secrecy and deliberate exclusion of the State Department from substantive negotiations continued to characterize the U.S. negotiations with China throughout the presidential visit. At the beginning, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai worked out an arrangement by which members of the delegations were divided into groups that would deal with specific topics. At the very top level, a summit meeting between Nixon and Mao Zedong took place, from which Secretary Rogers was excluded. The Chinese side did not invite the secretary, nor did Nixon or Kissinger request his inclusion. The summit had not been assured beforehand, and it was only upon his arrival that Nixon was granted a meeting with Chairman Mao. President Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai held daily sessions attended by Kissinger, Winston Lord, and John Holdridge. Concurrently, the secretary of state and the Chinese foreign minister conducted meetings dealing with trade and the exchange of persons. Nixon told Kissinger to arrange sessions in a way that would ensure that the State Department members of the delegation would be fully occupied elsewhere while he discussed sensitive issues with the top Chinese leaders.⁴¹ Nixon even told Zhou that the State Department had to be kept away because of leaked information. Another session dealing with the drafting of the communiqué was held between Kissinger and the deputy foreign minister, Qiao Guanhua, while the rest of the delegation went sightseeing.⁴² Kissinger states that he had recommended that Assistant Secretary Marshall Green join the communiqué negotiations but that the president turned it down. The net result was that the final draft communiqué was shown to Secretary Rogers only after it was agreed to by the Chinese. However, Rogers found it unsatisfactory and presented a sizable number of amendments prepared by his staff. In particular, Green's insistence that the lack of any mention of America's treaty obligations with Taiwan still in force would have disastrous consequences both at home and abroad led Nixon and Kissinger to try to renegotiate the communiqué with the Chinese. The Chinese agreed to incorporate minor amendments, but refused to consider any changes in the section related to Taiwan. Kissinger had to suffer the consequences of his own making. He found a

⁴¹Ibid., p. 1057.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 1070f.

way out by reaffirming the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan in his briefing to the press.⁴³

What, then, was the substance of the negotiations that Nixon and Kissinger carried on with the Chinese? Neither Nixon's nor Kissinger's memoirs shed much light on the substance. However, even from the limited available materials, it may be possible to surmise that Nixon and Kissinger attempted to negotiate a series of trade-offs with the Chinese. From the beginning of the communications between the United States and China, the Chinese claimed that U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan would be the primary objective of the talks. The United States held that the discussions should not be confined to Taiwan but should encompass other international issues. What the United States sought was Chinese concessions in Taiwan in exchange for assurance of a favorable international political role and security.

When Kissinger was chosen to serve as the president's emissary to Beijing, he undertook an elaborate process of preparing briefing papers. Kissinger presented Nixon with a covering memorandum in which he proposed the arguments to be put forth. He stated that he would concentrate on the "fundamentals of the international situation that had brought about [his] visit, on the conjunction of purposes that each side seemed to wish to confirm." "Within the framework" he intended to discuss "China's international role, some form of understanding not to resort to force in [U.S.-China] bilateral relations, the reduction of [U.S.] forces on Taiwan, and Chinese perceptions of the Soviet Union." He was also to "seek some moderating influence on Indochina." The president studied the briefing book thoroughly and made the following comments on the eve of Kissinger's departure. Although they are introduced in an informal and almost casual manner in Kissinger's memoirs, they represent Nixon's personal instructions to Kissinger. "He wanted me to stress that if pressed he would 'turn hard on Vietnam.' He thought I should keep in play a 'possible move towards the Soviets,' showing a subtle understanding of the triangular diplomacy. He wanted me to emphasize that China's fear of Japan could best be assuaged by a continuing US-Japanese alliance."⁴⁴

Seymour Hersh argues that though Kissinger gave the impression in his memoirs that "he and Zhou held a series of philosophical and contemplative discussions, there is evidence that Kissinger did, in fact, follow Nixon's advice." Hersh's thesis is that "Kissinger arrived in China with a major

⁴³Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 497–99.

⁴⁴Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 735f.

political concession on Taiwan's status, as well as a commitment to announce the withdrawal of all American troops from the island." The purpose of the negotiation was to receive "China's pledge of cooperation to urge North Vietnam not to end the war by force and to accept a negotiated settlement that would leave the reviled Nguyen Van Thieu still in power," and he was successful in getting the assurance.⁴⁵ He was successful also because China was prepared to accept the bargain.

Kissinger indicates that from the very first session that he had with Zhou Enlai on his first trip, "more time was spent on my explaining our policy in Indochina" than on Taiwan. Kissinger had thought that even if China could not do much to help the United States directly, the trip itself would have a profound impact on the war in Vietnam. It would show the American people that the government was capable of a bold move for peace and would undermine Vietnam's psychological offensive.⁴⁶ However, Hersh argues that Kissinger in fact followed Nixon's advice and warned China of further escalation of the war against North Vietnam. He asked for Chinese acquiescence. Hersh proves his point on the basis of the interviews he conducted in Hanoi in 1979, as well as from the publications of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. The July 1971 Kissinger-Zhou meeting was depicted as a "watershed" in Vietnamese-Chinese relations. Three days after Kissinger's departure, Zhou Enlai himself flew to Hanoi to assure the Vietnamese that U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam was the priority objective. Nguyen Co Thach, however, was said to have understood that the Chinese "at heart, wanted to make use of the Vietnam question for the settlement of the Taiwan issue first.' China subsequently did begin to exert extreme pressure on Hanoi to accept a political compromise in Saigon, and thus to accept a continued Thieu regime."⁴⁷

In fact, in the Shanghai communiqué China did not go beyond expressing "its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal," the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples.⁴⁸ At the time of Zhou Enlai's farewell call on Nixon in the early morning of February 28, Zhou affirmed support for Hanoi, but on "an historical debt incurred by the Chinese Empire several centuries before. Clearly China might make some material sacrifices; it would not run the risk of war to discharge such a debt. China had refrained from avowing any special link

⁴⁵Hersh, *Price of Power*, p. 375.

⁴⁶Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 749.

⁴⁷Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 375f.

⁴⁸The Shanghai communiqué of February 27, 1972.

to Vietnam in the communiqué because it did not want to leave the wrong impression.” Zhou told Nixon that “Dr. Kissinger can bear witness that we have exerted extreme restraint since July of last year.” Yet he indicated that “the key to easing tensions in the world does not lie there and Mr. President and I and Chairman Mao all understand that.” Kissinger could conclude from the talks with the Chinese that “the war in Vietnam would not affect the improvement of our relations. The avowal of restraint and of the fact that the key to easing tensions did not lie in Indochina left no doubt that Peking’s priority was not the war on its southern border but its relationship with us.”⁴⁹

But what were the concessions that the United States made on Taiwan? U.S. withdrawal of all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait was the condition Zhou Enlai outlined in his April message. Kissinger felt that this condition was susceptible to solution, as it was not obliging the United States to abandon its relationship with Taiwan. At the first meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing, Kissinger records that the subject of “Taiwan was mentioned only briefly.”⁵⁰ Yet the issue of Taiwan caused increasingly greater difficulty as Kissinger negotiated the drafting of the communiqué on his second visit. As far as the question of troop withdrawal was concerned, the Shanghai communiqué essentially incorporated the formula that Kissinger had used in replying to Zhou Enlai on December 16 and that had been used in many interagency studies in the past. It was the formula that linked troop withdrawal with the peaceful solution of the Taiwan problems and the reduction of tensions in the area in general and in Vietnam in particular.

As far as Taiwan is concerned, what Nixon did was to postpone the settlement of the issue. Kissinger writes in his memoirs that Nixon “expressed his hope of completing the ‘normalization’ process during his second term. He did not state our conditions for this.” He clearly indicates that “Nixon repeatedly affirmed that he could make no ‘secret deals’ on Taiwan; he made none.”⁵¹ In a recent memoir by Brzezinski, however, the gist of Nixon’s conversations with Zhou Enlai concerning Taiwan has been revealed for the first time. Paraphrasing from the memorandum of conversation between Nixon and the Chinese in Beijing, Brzezinski refers to them as “Nixon’s five points.” Whether the points were in the nature of a “secret deal” or not, they represent a clear and important set of conditions that the United States intended to support. The “five points” read as follows:

- (1) We would acknowledge the Chinese position that there is one China

⁴⁹Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1087.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 749.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 1073.

and that Taiwan is a part of it; (2) we will not support a Taiwan independence movement; (3) as we leave Taiwan, we will ensure that Japanese do not come in to replace us; (4) we will support any peaceful solution to the Taiwan situation; we will not support Taiwan in any military action against the People's Republic of China; and (5) we will seek normalization and try to achieve it.⁵²

In the Shanghai communiqué, the Chinese government affirmed that "the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair" and that "all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan." Furthermore, it stated that it "firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of 'one China, one Taiwan,' 'one China, two governments,' 'two Chinas,' an 'independent Taiwan' or advocate that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.'" The United States declared that it "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." In short, the United States was recognizing a fact that both Beijing and Taipei had agreed on, namely, that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China."⁵³ The commitments made in Nixon's five points, however, showed that the president went further in assuring the Chinese that the United States would not be part of any political or military movement that would lead to the independence of Taiwan. In the past, China's greatest concern with regard to Taiwan was that the United States would turn it into an invincible military fortress. With Taiwan's increasing political and economic stature, separation of Taiwan from China with a clear international status became China's growing nightmare. In putting off the Taiwan issue for the future, Nixon was assuring the Chinese that the United States would not help Taiwan in the direction of greater independence.

Nixon made further assurance to the Chinese in the third of his five points, that as the United States left Taiwan "we will ensure that Japanese do not come in to replace us." The full significance of this point might be best understood in connection with Nixon's instructions to Kissinger on the eve of his secret departure that "China's fear of Japan could best be assuaged by a continuing US-Japan alliance." At the time, Chinese policy toward Japan was to "firmly [oppose] the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly [support] the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan."⁵⁴ President Nixon writes in his memoirs that he argued that an armed Japan in

⁵²Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p. 198.

⁵³The Shanghai communiqué of February 27, 1972.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

mutual defense relations with the United States would be in the security interest of China. "If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless, they would have to turn to others for help or build the capability to defend themselves. If we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where they were concerned."⁵⁵ Whether Nixon and Kissinger in fact "warned Chou En-lai that they would permit Japan to develop nuclear weapons if China did not agree to rapprochement,"⁵⁶ they were in fact negotiating a concession on the part of China to accept an armed Japan under the control of the United States. In other words, Nixon's third point relating to Japan could be assured only under the condition of the continued existence of U.S.-Japan security relations. A new interpretation of controlling Japan was given to the strategic significance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by President Nixon.

The Chinese also made serious concessions on Taiwan in order to reach rapprochement with the United States. In negotiating the Shanghai communiqué, they agreed not "to attack—or even mention—[the United States] defense treaty with Taiwan in the statement of its own position."⁵⁷ Moreover, they were persuaded to accept a moderately worded communiqué by Nixon and Kissinger for domestic political reasons as well: "If the Chinese made a strongly belligerent claim to Taiwan in the communiqué, [Nixon] would come under murderous cross fire from any or all the various pro-Taiwan, anti-Nixon, and anti-P.R.C. lobbies and interest groups at home." If these groups joined hands and turned the China initiative into a partisan issue and defeated Nixon, neither he nor his successor would be able to continue developing a close relationship with China.⁵⁸ On the other hand, a successful summit with the Chinese would certainly enhance Nixon's political chances. In his second term Nixon committed himself to the achievement of normalization. It is important to realize that the Chinese concession on the Taiwan question was made on the basis of a strong expectation that the United States under the leadership of President Nixon would make positive efforts to solve the Taiwan issue within the near future.

The fundamental reason that lay behind the Chinese concession was certainly the strategic necessity. After all, it was the intensification of the Sino-Soviet tension that turned the Chinese toward accommodation with the United States. It was the danger of China's being "smashed" in a Sino-Soviet war that aroused the United States to rapprochement with China.

⁵⁵Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 563–66.

⁵⁶Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 380–82.

⁵⁷Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1075.

⁵⁸Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 571.

China and the United States were brought together by a growing concern over the expansion of Soviet military power. They were able to endorse their common position in the Shanghai communiqué that “neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” The term “hegemony” was first introduced by the United States when it outlined “the key joint positions” for the communiqué during Kissinger’s second visit,⁵⁹ but without the antisoviet propagandist implications that the Chinese were to attach later on.

The Chinese were anxious to have the United States join in a much more clear-cut policy of confrontation against the Soviet Union. In fact, Mao Zedong indicated to Kissinger his displeasure with what he took to be American ineffectuality in resisting Soviet expansionism.⁶⁰ Kissinger felt that the Chinese had to be made to understand that the United States had “no vested interest in permanent hostility with Moscow unless Moscow challenged international equilibrium.”⁶¹ Moreover, Kissinger’s basic understanding of the U.S. position as a nuclear superpower was that it had to exercise restraint in its relations with the Soviet Union. He wrote in his memoirs that “no amount of distrust of the Soviet Union could endorse adoption of the traditional balance-of-power politics of resolving crisis by confrontation. There could be no higher duty than to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war.” In conducting foreign policy, therefore, he had to recognize “that at home and among our allies we could gain support for firm action in crisis only if we could demonstrate it was not of our making.”⁶² What the United States “could not do was to give Peking veto over our relationship with Moscow any more than we could give a veto to the Soviets over our relations with China.” What Kissinger and Nixon attempted was indeed “a three-dimensional game,” which if they failed might drive China to an accommodation with the Soviet Union or tempt the Soviet Union to a preemptive attack on China.⁶³ At that time the Chinese decided to live with this game, but as the United States began to accommodate itself more and more to a détente with the Soviet Union, their disappointment over the new relationship with the United States would grow and would bring about new uncertainties.

⁵⁹Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1075.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1060.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 1076.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 1076.

4. Satō, Tanaka, and Normalization

President Nixon's broadcast on July 15 announcing his visit to China caused worldwide repercussions, particularly in Japan. The shock was devastating to the Satō cabinet and the mainstream leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party. They had staunchly defended the policy of close alignment with the United States, had restrained the domestic political demands to normalize relations with China, and now found themselves left behind by unilateral U.S. action. The question of normalization with China was predominantly a political issue that involved relations with the United States. Nixon's sensational announcement put the Satō cabinet in an extremely difficult position and fueled the pressure for speedy normalization.

Prime Minister Satō Eisaku himself was numbed by the news, which reached him only a few minutes before the actual announcement was delivered to the American people. Other members of the Liberal Democratic Party, notably the party secretary, Hori Shigeru, were shaken by the turn of events. Those in the Foreign Ministry charged with Asian affairs were also taken aback. Prime Minister Satō had been assured by President Nixon at the summit meeting in October 1970 that they would continue close consultations on the question of China. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi had conferred with Secretary Rogers on June 9, 1971, and had confirmed their close collaboration with regard to the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations. The Asian Bureau had sent one of its officials to Washington earlier in the year to consult with Marshall Green and had been reassured that the United States and Japan would jointly advance toward normalization without outbidding each other.¹ There was thus a widely shared sense of betrayal on the part of the government leaders who faced the new U.S. initiative.

The immediate effect of the "Nixon shock," as it became known, was a determination on the part of Japan to move forward in the normalization process. The reaction is best summarized in the following terms by a Foreign Ministry official who played a key role in the normalization. "There was resentment over the fact that the United States had gone ahead of Japan in opening up contact with China. Unless Japan got ahead of the United States in the actual normalization, the people would not accept such a verdict."² Satō himself began to search for intermediaries. Unlike the

¹Statement by a member of the Asian Bureau to the author.

²Ibid.

situation in the United States, there was no shortage of back channels for communication with China.

It is perhaps not accurate to characterize Satō Eisaku simply as a hardline opponent to normalization. Satō had taken up the reversion of Okinawa as the primary foreign policy issue for his cabinet. He considered the return of the Northern Islands to be the next political agenda.³ Though domestic pressure, led by the opposition political parties and the mass media, for speedy normalization mounted, he did not think he could accomplish both issues when he was already in the seventh year of his administration. Besides, Chinese attacks on the Satō cabinet were severe. There was expressed refusal by the Chinese to deal with the Satō cabinet. Under the circumstances, whatever steps he took should be understood as his attempt to prepare for the policy change his successor would have to undertake. For his successor, Satō had had Fukuda Takeo in mind for some time.⁴

Satō tried in various ways to signal his desire to enter into contact with China. On January 22, 1971, for the first time he used China's official name, the People's Republic of China, in his opening statement to the Diet. In April during the fervor of the Ping-Pong diplomacy, Satō tried to dispatch to China Noda Takeo, chairman of the Committee on China Problems (*Chūgoku mondai iinkai*) and a leading member of the mainstream Liberal Democratic Party. Satō accepted the suggestion of his personal secretary, Kusuda Minoru, to set up a group of scholars to study the formulation of a new China policy.⁵ In August, when a high-ranking Chinese mission came to Japan to attend the funeral services for Matsumura Kenzō, the leading pro-China member of the Liberal Democratic Party, Satō tried to contact Wang Guoquan, vice-president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, who led the mission. At the Diet, however, Satō worked hard to prevent the Dietmen's League for the Restoration of Ties with China from passing a resolution. Pro-China Liberal Democratic Party members were also represented in this league. This supraparty resolution recognized the government of the People's Republic of China as the only government

³Kusuda Minoru, *Satō seiken 2797 nichi* (2797 days of the Satō administration), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gyōseimonдай kenkyūsho, 1978), p. 393.

⁴Statement by Kusuda Minoru to the author on September 11, 1984.

⁵Kokusai kankei kondankai was an informal advisory group to the cabinet secretary and included the following members: Ishikawa Tadao, Imabori Seiji, Ichiko Chuzo, Umesao Tadao, Etō Shinkichi, Kamiya Fuji, Kōsaka Masataka, Nakajima Mineo, Yamazaki Masakazu. The group held its first meeting on August 26, 1971, and held monthly meetings. When the Tanaka cabinet was formed, Tanaka did not feel the need for such an advisory group, so the group was taken over by the Foreign Ministry and continued as *Gaikō seisaku kondankai*. Statement by Kusuda to the author.

representing China and Taiwan as a part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, and stated that the Japan–Republic of China Peace Treaty should be abrogated. The Liberal Democratic Party Committee on China Problems, on the other hand, prepared a draft resolution which, while recognizing the People's Republic of China as the only government representing China, accepted the existence of two governments as a historical fact. The differences in the policy position of the two drafts were such that no compromise was possible. In the end, neither resolution was passed.

In the meantime, the Liberal Democratic Party secretary, Hori Shigeru, worked behind the scenes to solicit the possibility of visiting China to initiate discussions for normalization. Aside from Hori, there were several others who were mobilizing various channels through which to mediate between Satō and the Chinese government. There was at least a Hong Kong channel in which Consul General Okada Akira was personally involved.⁶ There was another channel through Watanabe Yaeji, director of the Memorandum Trade Office. Hori seemed to have encouraged the Okada and Watanabe channels.⁷ He himself, however, undertook to prepare a letter addressed to Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and requested the Tokyo governor, Minobe Ryōkichi, to deliver it personally. The letter was drafted jointly by Kusuda Minoru and his close associate Nakajima Mineo, a China specialist at the Tokyo University of Foreign Languages and a member of the newly organized study group dealing with China.⁸

In the letter Hori stated that he was writing in his capacity as the secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party and that he wished to visit China in order to prepare the way for intergovernmental talks aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. He expressed his recognition of the Chinese position along the lines that had been agreed upon by the Committee on China Problems when it prepared a draft resolution for the Diet. There were some important differences, however. Instead of recognizing Taiwan as “a part of the territory of the People's Republic of China,” as had been expressed, the letter stated that Taiwan is “a part of the territory of the peoples of China.” Nor did it specify that the People's Republic of China was the “only” government representing China. When Zhou Enlai received Hori's letter from Minobe on November 10, he

⁶Okada Akira, *Mizutori gaiko hiwa* (Inside stories of attempts to contact China) (Tokyo: Chuokoron sha, 1983), pp. 148–151.

⁷Tagawa Seiichi, “Hori shokan” (The Hori letter), *Nitchū keizai kyōkai kaibō* 91 (February 1981):66f.

⁸Nakajima Mineo, “Hori shokan wa watashi ga kaita” (The Hori letter was written by myself), *Bungeishunjū* (Tokyo), October 1982, pp. 147–50.

publicly disclosed the message and criticized the content as not meeting the conditions that China had been advancing. He interpreted the letter as leading to a “two-Chinas” solution. Chou made it clear at that time that China had no intention of dealing with Satō.⁹ The episode of the Hori letter drew strong criticism from his party members, including both the pro- and the anti-China groups. They accused Hori of hasty action without obtaining a party consensus before taking such a serious step. They also disapproved the choice of his emissary, as governor Minobe was supported by the opposition Socialist and Communist parties. Judging from the important position that Hori occupied in the party, as well as his proximity to Satō, it is safe to assume that Hori’s attempt was fully endorsed by Satō. Its significance lies therefore in the fact that it represented a shift in the attitude of the Satō cabinet, even if it did not depart from the two-Chinas policy or produce any concrete result.

An immediate policy decision that the Satō cabinet faced in the fall of 1971 related to the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations. Ever since the support for the Albanian resolution to seat the People’s Republic of China and to expel Taiwan recorded a majority of fifty-one to forty-nine in the fall of 1970, support for the U.S. and Japanese efforts to prevent Chinese representation was clearly ebbing. Nixon’s forthcoming trip to China added to the further erosion of the campaign. It should be noted here, however, that although the United States was engaged in the process of developing relations with the People’s Republic of China, it had no intention of altering its relations with Taiwan. Nixon clearly states in his memoirs that “regardless of what happened in the UN, I was determined to honor our treaty obligations by continuing our military and economic support for an independent Taiwan.”¹⁰ As a new strategy to tide over the 1971 General Assembly, the State Department was promoting a dual-representation formula that advocated Beijing’s entry into the United Nations but opposed the expulsion of Taiwan. Both Nixon and Kissinger had been concerned over Beijing’s reaction to the U.S. proposal, but gathering from Zhou Enlai’s reaction that such a move would not obstruct U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, approved the department’s strategy. Secretary Rogers gave a statement on August 2 formally announcing the forthcoming proposal from the United States at the United Nations. The Department of State, through the Japanese Mission in New York, pressed Japan to collaborate in the efforts by becoming a cosponsor to the resolutions on dual representation and on the procedure of making

⁹Tagawa, “Hori shokan,” pp. 60–65. The copy of the hand-written letter is contained.

¹⁰Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 556.

the expulsion of Taiwan an important question requiring a two-thirds majority.

Within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, a careful evaluation of overall U.S. policy toward China was taking place in the aftermath of the "Nixon shock." The point at issue was the interpretation of the announced intention of the United States "to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries." Consul General Okada writes in his memoirs that a special meeting on China took place on August 30, 1971, preceding the meeting of the heads of missions of the Asia and the Pacific regions. Those attending were Vice-Minister Mori; Deputy Vice-Ministers Hogen and Yasukawa; the director-general of the Asia Bureau, Sunobe; the director-general of the UN Bureau, Nishibori; the director-generals of other bureaus; the ambassador to Taiwan, Itagaki; the ambassador to the United States, Ushiba; the ambassador to the Soviet Union, Nakagawa; and others, including Okada himself. Okada states that he pressed for Japan to promote early normalization and argued in favor of the Chinese entry into the United Nations, but found himself virtually alone.¹¹ It is true that at the time, those within the Foreign Ministry who favored early normalization were in the minority. A notable exception was Hashimoto Hiroshi, director of the China Section of the Asian Bureau. Hashimoto was a China specialist who served in that post for an unusually long term of nearly six years and reflected the views of some of the younger staff of the bureau. The United Nations Bureau, particularly the director of the Political Section, Amau Tamio, was in favor of continuing support for the Nationalist representation. Deputy Vice-Minister Hogen himself was not in favor of making any move toward normalization and had a strong influence over the decisions of the ministry. The others took a position of wait and see, as they did not expect the Nixon visit to produce any immediate move for normalization. Rather, they interpreted it as a step in a long process that might eventually lead to restoration of relations. As far as the United Nations representation question was concerned, therefore, they were willing to follow the positions taken in the previous years.¹²

Opinion was divided within the Liberal Democratic Party as to the position Japan should take on the question of Chinese representation at the forthcoming General Assembly. The dual-representation formula was based on the concept of "two Chinas," to which the Chinese strongly objected. The procedural proposal to designate the expulsion of Taiwan as an important question also seemed to prevent the entry of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, as China would certainly not sit

¹¹Okada, *Mizutori gaikō hitwa*, pp. 146f.

¹²Statement by a member of the United Nations Bureau.

at the United Nations together with Taiwan. Antimainstream leaders, such as Miki Takeo, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Nakasone Yasuhiro, opposed the idea of Japan's supporting such a move. Among the cabinet members, the justice minister, Maeo Shigesaburō, and the agriculture minister, Akagi Munenori, held critical views on such a position. The top leaders of the Satō cabinet and the Liberal Democratic Party met on September 4 but failed to finalize Japan's position. They adopted the basic position of accepting China's entry into the United Nations, but protecting Taiwan's seat. They could not decide on whether to cosponsor the resolutions in the United Nations.

Satō requested Foreign Minister Fukuda, who was heading the delegation, to attend the Eighth Japan-U.S. Joint Trade and Economic Conference in Williamsburg on September 9 and 10 to consult further with the United States and gain their reading of the situation in the United Nations. In Williamsburg, Fukuda was asked by Secretary Rogers to cosponsor the resolutions. He returned, however, without making any commitments. When the cabinet and the party failed to reach any consensus on September 21, the issue of the Chinese representation question was left to the personal decision of the prime minister. On the same day, the prime minister summoned from the Foreign Ministry the deputy minister, Mori, and the director-general of the United Nations Bureau, Nishibori, to ask for their reading of the situation. Nishibori recalls that by then, however, Satō's mind seemed to have been made up, as he found Kusuda already preparing for Satō's statement to be delivered the following day.¹³ On September 22, Satō announced his decision to cosponsor the two resolutions. He had his decision conveyed to the United States government through the Foreign Ministry and immediately held a press conference at which he explained the reasons underlying his decision. He stated that the dual-representation formula represented an interim step that recognized the situation as it existed. He was not confident about the outcome of the vote, but the decision was taken in order to fulfill an international trust and obligation.¹⁴ As soon as the decision was announced, attacks poured in from various quarters—from within the party, the opposition parties, and the press.

Kusuda believes that Satō had his mind made up from the very beginning. The United States had strongly urged his support. He and many members of his party felt morally obligated to defend Taiwan. The reason Fukuda did not commit himself at Williamsburg was that Satō did not want to tarnish Fukuda's image by making him the one responsible for a decision that might lead to a disaster. In fact, party secretary Hori commissioned Kusuda to telephone Fukuda in Williamsburg to return undecided.¹⁵ Satō

¹³Statement by Nishibori Masahiro to the author on September 18, 1985.

¹⁴Kusuda, *Satō seiken 2797 nichi*, vol. 2, pp. 275–79.

was fully aware that a defeat in the United Nations voting was possible and that this might turn into a movement to topple the Satō cabinet.

The results of the United Nations voting on October 25 were disastrous. The important-question resolution on the expulsion of Taiwan was defeated by a vote of fifty-five to fifty-nine, with fifteen abstentions. The Albanian resolution passed by an overwhelming majority of seventy-six to thirty-five, with seventeen abstentions. As a result, the dual-representation resolution was not even voted on. The opposition parties immediately made statements welcoming China to the United Nations and started to rally for the resignation of the Satō cabinet. On the next day, they resolved to present a nonconfidence resolution on Foreign Minister Fukuda to both houses of the Diet. They also decided to present a nonconfidence resolution on the minister of international trade and industry, Tanaka Kakuei, for his handling of the textile negotiations with the United States. The resolutions were defeated, but twelve pro-China Liberal Democratic Party members, including Fujiyama Aiichirō, Furui Yoshimi, and Tagawa Seiichi, absented themselves at the time of the voting and thus showed their alignment with the opposition party.

Although the government was able to defend itself in the Diet, the defeat in the United Nations was decisive in shifting the political tide toward normalization. Tōgō Fumihiko, who at the time was deputy vice-minister dealing with political issues, recounts that the outcome of the Chinese representation question in the United Nations was the turning point after which Japan started to move unmistakably toward normalization.¹⁶ The manner in which the outcome of the United Nations decision was upheld in Japan and in the United States presents a clear contrast. Whereas the reaction in the United States, particularly in Congress, was marked by bitterness against the United Nations, the reaction in Japan was to accept the United Nations decision as the final verdict. In fact, Satō had earlier confided to the cabinet secretary, Takeshita Noboru, that even if Japan lost in the United Nations the people would follow the UN outcome and make the necessary adjustment because “the Japanese people are UN-centered.”¹⁷

The China representation case demonstrates the stark difference in the place of the United Nations in the foreign policymaking of the United States and Japan. When Satō conferred with Nixon in San Clemente on

¹⁵Statement by Kusuda to the author on September 11, 1984.

¹⁶Tōgō Fumihiko, *Nichibei gaikō sanjūnen—Anpo, Okinawa to sono go* (Thirty years of U.S.-Japan diplomacy—security treaty, Okinawa, and thereafter) (Tokyo: Sekai no ugokisha, 1982), p. 204.

¹⁷Statement by Takeshita Noboru to the author on September 27, 1982.

January 6 and 7 of the following year, he stated that Japan could not disregard the entry of China into the United Nations when considering Japan's bilateral relations. Nixon agreed that the United States also recognized the Chinese entry into the United Nations. But he drew a clear distinction between UN and U.S. policy toward China. He stated that the United Nations could not determine the policy of a major power in matters of this sort. The purpose of his trip to China was to open up a channel for communication and to bring about détente, not to undertake normalization.¹⁸

Satō fully realized the need to change his China policy but decided to wait and see the effects of the Nixon visit. While confronted with mounting political demands for normalization with China, he concentrated his efforts on finalizing the reversion of Okinawa. Within the government, the Treaty Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to examine the legal problems involved in restoring relations with China. China had already clarified, through the first Kōmeitō delegation that had visited China in June and July 1971, its conditions for achieving normalization in the so-called three principles for the restoration of relations. These principles stated:

1. The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government.
2. Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory, or a province, of the People's Republic of China; and
3. The so-called Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty is illegal, void, and should be denounced.

The first point did not present any legal difficulty, but the second and third posed serious problems, since Japan's legal position was that the peace treaty with the Republic of China was legal and that it effectively terminated the state of war between Japan and China. Japan, however, renounced Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty without any reference to its ultimate disposition. In the view of the Treaty Bureau, bridging the gap between the Chinese and the Japanese positions seemed hardly possible. Besides, there were economic and other existing relations with Taiwan that had to be safeguarded even after the normalization.¹⁹ There were many pro-Taiwan members in the Liberal Democratic Party who opposed severing relations with Taiwan. The main concern of the

¹⁸Kusuda, *Satō seiken 2797 nichū*, vol. 2, p. 322.

¹⁹Kuriyama Takakazu, "Some Legal Aspects of the Japan-China Joint Communiqué," *Japanese Annual of International Law* (Tokyo) 17 (1973).

Foreign Ministry was to take a cautious stand, in order not to put itself in a disadvantageous negotiating position vis-à-vis China.

The issue of the legal position of Taiwan became a hotly debated point in the Diet. Attempting both to send inviting signals to China and to protect his negotiating position, Satō expressed his view that “the territorial rights of Taiwan belong to the People’s Republic of China”—in other words, that “Taiwan is a part of the territory of the People’s Republic.” Foreign Minister Fukuda, representing the position of the Foreign Ministry, however, denied such an interpretation but explained that Taiwan would become so after normalization was completed. Such a discrepancy in the statements of the two ministers caused an uproar in the Diet so that the government was forced to issue a unified view, which veered closer to the position of Fukuda.²⁰ A week later, on March 6, the government formulated its three-point position on Taiwan, which represented the Satō cabinet’s final policy with regard to undertaking normalization with China. The three points stated:

1. Japan considers that since it has renounced all right and title to Taiwan by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is unable to pronounce whether or not Taiwan is a part of China.

2. Japan fully understands the stand of the government of the People’s Republic of China that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China in view of what has taken place in the past, and also of the fact that the People’s Republic of China has come to represent China in the United Nations.

3. Based on the above understanding, the government will make all efforts to achieve the normalization of relations with China.²¹

Satō’s signals received no response from China. In the meantime, not only the opposition party members and the pro-China groups but also various members within the Liberal Democratic Party mounted their attack on the government. Normalization was turning into a succession issue as prospective successors began to rally around it. Of the main faction leaders, Ōhira Masayoshi, upon assuming the leadership of the Kōchikai faction on September 1, 1971, urged that Japan should recognize China as the legitimate government and attempt to establish contact. He conferred secretly with Wang Xiaoyun, the managing director of the Chinese People’s External Friendship Association and one-time chief representative of the Liao Chengzhi Trade Office, when he visited Japan as leader of the Chinese Ping-Pong team sent to the World Meet in Nagoya.

²⁰Nagano Nobutoshi, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei no akushū* (The shaking hands between the Emperor and Deng Xiaoping) (Tokyo: Gyōseimondai kenkyūsho, 1983), pp. 12–18.

²¹*Asahi Shinbun* (evening edition), March 6, 1972.

Miki Takeo met with Wang and also with Wang Guoquan, who visited Japan at the occasion of Matsumura's funeral. He succeeded in getting himself invited to China and became the first of the main-faction leaders to travel to Beijing, a highly visible act that signified his willingness to support the People's Republic. Nakasone Yasuhiro also took the position of urging the government to negotiate with the People's Republic with a view to concluding a peace treaty. The two leading contenders for the presidency, Fukuda Takeo and Tanaka Kakuei, did not come out in clear support for normalization. As foreign minister, Fukuda was extremely cautious in specifying the conditions for negotiations. Besides, he had to contend with many Taiwan supporters in his faction. Tanaka had one advantage over Fukuda in that he represented the Ministry for International Trade and Industry, which had always taken a more positive policy toward China. However, he also refrained from expressing open support lest it cost him votes at the coming party election.

Once Satō was crowned with the formal reversion of Okinawa on May 15, 1972, all contenders to his succession began to agitate openly. The agreed feeling was that Satō already had been given his share of achievements, and that the China issue should be handled by his successor. Failing to control the factional strife, Satō announced on June 17 his intention to retire. He had hoped Fukuda would succeed him, but since Tanaka, who also belonged to his faction, decided to run for the presidency, he gave up any attempt to name his successor. Rivalry between Fukuda and Tanaka turned increasingly intense. Tanaka, Fukuda, Ōhira, and Miki each presented his candidacy for the office of party president. Originally, Miki had thought of allying with Fukuda, but having sensed in the course of his trip to Beijing that China was not prepared to carry out normalization with Fukuda, gave up the idea and looked to the other two.²² Tanaka decided to seek the support of the Ōhira and Miki factions. It is said that Miki strongly urged the commitment to normalization as a condition for forming the three-faction coalition. He demanded an agreement that the tripartite coalition clearly recognized that the People's Republic of China was the only authentic government representing China, that Taiwan was a part of its territory, and that a peace treaty would be concluded with the People's Republic.²³ Furui Yoshimi and Tagawa Seiichi, pro-China members of the Liberal Democratic Party who for long had been promoting close relations with China through their involvement in the Memorandum Trade agreement, played an active part behind the scene. Their plan was to achieve

²²Usami Shigeru, "Jimintō seiken no taichū seisaku no hensen" (Changing China policy of the Liberal Democratic Party), *Kokusai Mondai* (Tokyo) 153 (December 1972):17.

²³Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shobei*, p. 21.

normalization under the Tanaka cabinet. Furui in particular kept in close touch with Ōhira. Zhou Enlai, also seemed to have looked to Tanaka as the prime minister to bring about the restoration of relations. He made political maneuvers and sent a secret message, through the Komeito delegation in May 1972, that if Tanaka were elected and wished to undertake normalization, he would welcome him to Beijing. With such a message coming from China, Furui and Tagawa busied themselves in clearing the way for immediately establishing contact between Tanaka and the Chinese.²⁴ Thus China became the rallying point around which political alignments were formed.

Tanaka won the presidential election and formed his cabinet on July 7. After the first cabinet meeting, Tanaka announced that the cabinet would expedite the process for normalizing relations with China. Ōhira, who became foreign minister, expressed the readiness of either the prime minister or the foreign minister to visit China. He also stated the need to continue stable economic and cultural relations with Taiwan after normalization and referred to the prospect that the Japan–Republic of China peace treaty would lapse after the conclusion of normalization with the People’s Republic.²⁵ This was the first clear expression on the part of the Japanese government that it was ready to accept the principle of “one China.” Two days later, on July 9, Zhou Enlai publicly welcomed the formation of the Tanaka cabinet and its policy to aim at early realization of normal relations with China.

Upon assuming office, Ōhira summoned Hashimoto Hiroshi, director of the China Section of the Asian Bureau, to start preparing for normalization. A core group consisting of the director-general of the Treaty Bureau, Takashima Masuo; the director of the Treaty Section, Kuriyama Takakazu; and Hashimoto was formed within the ministry to plan for the negotiations.²⁶

At the time, the actual contact with China was undertaken by the opposition party members and the pro-China members of the Liberal Democratic Party. In mid-July, Tanaka, through the Socialist Party leader Sasaki Kozō, who was visiting Beijing, conveyed his determination to deal with the Taiwan issue. This message immediately led Premier Zhou Enlai to express his readiness to welcome a Tanaka visit to Beijing.²⁷ The Chinese

²⁴Mainichi shinbun seijibu, *Tenkanki no anpo* (Security treaty at a turning point) (Tokyo: Mainichi shinbunsha, 1979), pp. 154–62. Tagawa Seiichi, *Nitchū kōshō hiroku* (Secret record of Japan-China negotiations) (Tokyo: Mainichi shinbun, 1973), pp. 336–44.

²⁵Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei*, pp. 24–25.

²⁶Statement by a former official of the Asian Bureau to the author.

²⁷Mainichi shinbun seijibu, *Tenkanki no anpo*, p. 23.

terms for negotiating normalization with Japan, however, were brought back by Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu of the Kōmeitō, who was also eager to play an intermediary role in the normalization. The Kōmeitō had already played a significant role by passing on the “three principles for the restoration of relations” the previous year. Takeiri decided to lead a second delegation in July 1972. Before leaving for China, Takeiri conferred many times with Tanaka and Ōhira, but he failed to gain any clear idea as to the precise conditions on which the government expected to carry out the negotiations. Strong opposition still existed within the Liberal Democratic Party against abandoning relations with Taiwan.

Takeiri recounts that he presented all the demands and apprehensions which he thought had been held by the Liberal Democratic Party. After a series of three extended meetings with Zhou Enlai and other Japan specialists such as Liao Cheng-chih and Wang Xiaoyun, Takeiri received from Zhou Enlai a memorandum that summarized the Chinese negotiating position.²⁸ The memoranda brought back by Takeiri facilitated the preparatory work of the Foreign Ministry, as they served as the Chinese proposals on which to prepare Japan’s position.²⁹ Takeiri’s role in the normalization process may be in part comparable to the secret mission undertaken by Henry Kissinger the previous year. Of all the channels for communication that existed between China and Japan, China’s choice of Takeiri is worth noting. The Chinese were probably aware that a prolonged negotiation at the Foreign Ministry level would play into the hands of the pro-Taiwan groups. Therefore, they preferred a way to accomplish swift political settlement. The Chinese entrusted Takeiri with the task of carrying back the negotiating text because he was in close contact with Tanaka and also because he could be trusted to observe secrecy.³⁰

The text brought back by Takeiri included important concessions that helped the government to prepare quickly for the restoration of relations. An important assurance was given that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would not hinder the normalization. Takeiri’s memorandum included the Chinese waiver of demands for reparation, the Japanese understanding of the “three principles for the restoration of relations,” the Japanese and Chinese denial of seeking hegemony in the Asia and Pacific region, the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty, and other agreements related to commerce, navigation, meteorology, fishery, science, and technology. A joint statement was proposed as a means to announce the restoration of

²⁸Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Nishikawa Jun, “Taidan: Nitchū fukkō zengo o kataru” (Discussion on events before and after normalization), *Nitchū keizai kyōkai kaibō* 23 (April 1975):4–6.

²⁹Statement by a former official of the Asian Bureau to the author.

³⁰Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shobei*, p. 27.

diplomatic relations.³¹ Arrangements concerning the timing of Tanaka's visit and other technical matters such as the number of the accompanying press, the availability of access to satellites, accommodations, and so forth were also worked out. Complete secrecy was observed with regard to all aspects of the substantive talks between Takeiri and the Chinese government.

³¹The original text of the Chinese proposal conveyed through Takeiri is contained in *ibid.*, pp. 29–32, and reads as follows:

1. The state of war between the People's Republic of China and Japan is terminated on the day this statement becomes public.
2. The Japanese government fully understands the three principles of the People's Republic of China, and recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Based on this, both governments will establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.
3. Both parties will state that the establishment of relations between China and Japan corresponds with the longtime desire of the peoples of the two countries, and with the interest of the peoples of all countries in the world.
4. Both parties agree to settle relations between China and Japan on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Disputes between China and Japan will be settled through peaceful discussion on the basis of the five principles, and without resort to the use or threat of force.
5. Both parties state that neither China nor Japan should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and are opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
6. Both parties agree to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
7. The Government of the People's Republic of China renounces its right to demand war reparations from Japan in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples.
8. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan, with a view to further promoting economic and cultural relations between the two countries, and to expanding interchanges of peoples, will, as necessary and taking account of the existing arrangements, conclude agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, weather, fisheries, (postal service) and science and technology before the conclusion of the treaty of peace and friendship.

Zhou Enlai presented the following three points for understanding to Takeiri separate from the points to be included in the joint communique: 'The proposal was not accepted, because it was not Japan's practice to conclude secret treaties.

1. Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China. The liberalization of Taiwan is China's internal affairs.
2. After the announcement of the joint statement, the Government of Japan shall withdraw from Taiwan its embassy. Effective measures will be taken to have the embassy and consulates of the Chang Kai-shek group withdrawn from Japan.
3. Appropriate considerations will be given to investment and business by Japanese groups and individuals in Taiwan at the time of Taiwan liberation.

While preparing the government for the forthcoming negotiations, Tanaka took two significant international steps to smooth the way: He set out to obtain U.S. approval and to seek the understanding of Taiwan. At the time, there was growing apprehension on the part of the United States over the haste with which Tanaka seemed to be approaching the China question. Those in the State Department attempted to ascertain how far Tanaka intended to commit himself in the course of negotiating for the restoration of relations with China. They were particularly concerned that once Japan recognized Taiwan as a part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan might be considered to be outside the area of the Far East covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as had been agreed between Nixon and Satō in November 1969. How much the United States found itself inhibited from controlling the pace of Japan's rapprochement with China is not certain. There was intense pressure in Japan for Japan to achieve normalization ahead of the United States. The Tanaka cabinet and the Liberal Democratic Party leaders, as well as those in the Foreign Ministry who were engaged in the preparation for normalization, believed that it was a matter of survival in domestic politics to achieve normalization before the United States did.³² This was perhaps the kind of atmosphere faced by the under secretary for political affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, when he recounts that "after this 'Nixon shokku' as the Japanese called it, there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our two governments."³³

The first summit meeting between Tanaka and Nixon took place in Honolulu on August 31 and September 1, 1972. To Tanaka, the main objective of the meeting was to make the necessary adjustment of views between the two countries on the issue of normalization with China. Tanaka believed that such a step was absolutely necessary before the final arrangements to visit Beijing were made. The more urgent purpose for the summit on the U.S. side was to discuss the trade gap between the two countries and to gain Japanese commitment to take measures to redress the balance. As to the question of China, the United States was in no mood to encourage Japan in a swift restoration of relations. In view of its own experience, it assumed that the Japanese efforts by Tanaka would take a year, starting with Tanaka's visit, which would be accompanied by a statement of intention analogous to the Shanghai communiqué.³⁴ At the Honolulu summit, Tanaka reaffirmed to Nixon that Japan would pursue

³²Statement by a former official of the Asian Bureau to the author.

³³U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 554.

³⁴Hirano Minoru, *Gaikō kisha nikki* (Diary of a diplomatic correspondent), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gyōsei tsūshinsha, 1978), pp. 28–30.

normalization on the assumption that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would be “faithfully and fully” implemented. In other words, Japan specifically stated that it would not allow its break with Taiwan to alter the security position of Taiwan as assured by the security treaty.³⁵ Japan made it clear that it was pursuing normalization for reasons of its own national interest, and the two countries confirmed that they would not sacrifice their common interests. A major change in Japan’s postwar foreign policy took place. Two incompatible objectives that had divided Japanese domestic politics for more than two decades—maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and restoration of relations with the People’s Republic of China—were being reconciled.

The question of seeking understanding with the Republic of China was a task of immense difficulty for the Tanaka cabinet for two reasons, one external, one internal. Externally, the Republic of China was the government to which Japan owed a debt of gratitude. It was widely remembered that at the end of the war, Chang Kai-shek had appealed to the Chinese to be generous and to assure the Japanese armed forces and civilians safe return. Though the Nationalist government had since then been forced to move to Taiwan, close ties continued between Taiwan and Japan in the form of economic and cultural relations. Internally, Tanaka’s greatest task was to achieve consensus between the pro-Taiwan and the pro-Beijing factions within the party. He established on July 24 a 312-member Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (*Nitchū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai*) under the chairmanship of Kosaka Zentarō. The purpose of the council was to adopt a decision to guide the cabinet in establishing relations with the People’s Republic. After countless proposals and discussions by the various factions, the council adopted a five-point decision. By this decision, a mandate was given to Tanaka to proceed with the negotiations. However, a significant proviso was added, which read that “in view of the close relationship between Japan and the Republic of China, negotiations should be conducted giving sufficient consideration to the continuation of that relationship.” There was no clarification as to whether diplomatic relations were included in the relationship to be continued.³⁶

It was in order to convey the sentiment of the proviso and to moderate the reaction that Shiina Etsusaburō was dispatched to Taipei in his capacity as vice-president of the Liberal Democratic Party and special envoy of the government of Japan. Tension was already mounting in Taiwan, and the authorities were ready to use every available means to prevent Japan from

³⁵Mainichi shinbun seijibu, *Tenkanki no anpo*, p. 208.

³⁶Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōbei*, pp. 45f.

achieving rapprochement with China. The leaders were especially aggravated by the July 7 statement of Foreign Minister Ōhira, forecasting the lapse of Japan's treaty with the Republic of China once normalization was achieved. Shiina was unable to gain any support or approval from Chiang Jinguo. Upon return, Shiina advised Tanaka to be cautious in the negotiating process and not to accept too readily the Chinese demands on Taiwan.³⁷ Shiina's mission was not a success, but it fulfilled a necessary step in the preparation for normalization.

To Beijing, Tanaka sent an official twenty-three-member delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Kosaka Zentarō. Kosaka's function was to explain to the Chinese leadership the difficulties faced by the party because of the internal division over Taiwan. Tanaka also secretly commissioned Furui Yoshimi and Tagawa Seiichi to go to Beijing to negotiate the Japanese draft text for the joint communiqué, which was prepared by the Foreign Ministry. There were important differences between the Chinese and the Japanese positions over the expression referring to the termination of the state of war and the treatment of the "three principles for the restoration of relations." The differences could not be solved by the special emissaries and had to await the negotiations to take place during Tanaka's visit. Furui and Tagawa at least were able to convey the thinking of the Japanese government and thus to prepare the Chinese for the negotiations that would take place.³⁸

From September 25 to 30, Prime Minister Tanaka visited China on the invitation of the premier of the State Council, Zhou Enlai. The purpose of the visit was to establish friendly relations between the two countries by negotiating and solving the question of the restoration of relations between Japan and China. From the very outset, Tanaka's trip was to realize the restoration of relations. As such it was a trip that was in marked contrast to that undertaken by Nixon earlier in the year. Tanaka's visit to Beijing produced a nine-article joint communiqué in which Japan and China announced the restoration of their relations. The document represented a compromise that reflected the nature of the complex issues involved in the negotiations. In the course of the visit, Tanaka held four extended meetings with Zhou Enlai and one meeting with Mao Zedong. Foreign Minister Ōhira and the negotiating team from the Foreign Ministry conferred with the Chinese minister for foreign affairs, Ji Pengfei, and his team and worked out the final communiqué.

The main points at issue were the treatment of the territorial status of Taiwan and the legality of the peace treaty with the Republic of China. The

³⁷Ibid., pp. 47–50.

³⁸Tagawa, *Nitchū kōshō hiroku*, pp. 359–68.

Foreign Office is said to have prepared three alternative plans for the negotiation. The director-general of the Treaty Bureau, Takashima, decided to present the first plan, which incorporated the demands in full. The approach was legalistic. On the question of “the termination of the state of war,” Japan maintained the position that the peace treaty with the Republic of China had been legally concluded under international law. It argued that it could not terminate anew the state of war that had already been effectively terminated. On the question of the territorial status of Taiwan, Japan found it possible to follow the precedents of other countries that had established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic. The British government had “acknowledged” the Chinese position on the status of Taiwan; the United States government had “acknowledge[d] that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” and pronounced that the United States did “not challenge that position.” But the particular problem Japan faced was that it could not acknowledge the illegality of the peace treaty with the Republic of China and therefore could not “understand and respect” the “three principles for the restoration of relations” as a whole. Takashima’s argument caused strong reaction from the Chinese and brought about a temporary impasse in the negotiations.³⁹

The final text of the communiqué compromised two basically conflicting positions. Without making explicit reference in paragraph 1 to the state of war, the termination of “the abnormal state of affairs” was declared, together with “realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations” in the preambular paragraph. As to the territorial status of Taiwan, Japan stated that it “fully understands and respects” the Chinese position that “Taiwan is an inalienable part” of its territory, but added a clause stating that “it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.” By the addition of this clause Japan found its way out of the hardly reconcilable gap by shifting “the focus of the entire issue from a legal pronouncement on the present status of Taiwan to the question of what the status of Taiwan should be.” In other words, Japan felt it consistent with past history, as well as with the peace treaty, to take the position that Taiwan should be returned to China, as was intended by the Cairo and Potsdam declarations.⁴⁰ Another point that the Japanese negotiators pursued was the elimination of the reference to the “right” to demand reparation from Japan. It had been known that China was willing to forego the demand for reparation, but the Chinese had insisted on renouncing their “right to

³⁹Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei*, pp. 59–66.

⁴⁰Kuriyama, “Some Legal Aspects,” p. 47.

demand reparation.” A compromise was reached here also, as the final text stipulated in paragraph 5 that “it renounces its demand.”

The Japanese negotiators concentrated their main efforts on the legal issues relating to the termination of the state of war and the establishment of diplomatic relations. They were enormously relieved that they were able to protect their national interests in the communiqué that was finally adopted. They were impressed by the accommodating reaction of the Chinese. Zhou Enlai even expressed his readiness to let Japan maintain its existing interests in Taiwan. Aside from the diplomatic relations that were terminated, economic and other relations with Taiwan were to continue.⁴¹ In fact, the termination of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China was merely announced by Foreign Minister Ōhira at the press conference after the signing of the joint communiqué.

Needless to say, China was anxious to achieve normalization with Japan. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were also in haste to strengthen their strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Nagano Nobutoshi, a longtime diplomatic correspondent of the *Tokyo Shinbun*, who wrote a detailed account of the normalization process, argues that in fact the Chinese gained the recognition of two important principles without the Japanese realizing their full implications.⁴² The joint communiqué included the denial to seek hegemony, in paragraph 7, and the intention of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship, in paragraph 6. The Japanese negotiators were opposed to the reference to hegemony because they did not consider it to be a legally solid concept. However, they accepted it as *quid pro quo* for their gains and took it on face value that it was not directed against any third country. The conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship was also considered redundant by the Japanese negotiators, for nothing seemed to be left unsaid after the joint communiqué. There was no clear indication by the Chinese as to the content of the treaty of peace and friendship. But the Japanese were led to believe that it was to be a treaty of the good-neighbor type that China had concluded with India in 1954 in which the “five principles of peace” were the mainstay. There was no indication that the hegemony clause would become the important constituent of the treaty of peace and friendship. The Japanese negotiators in the Foreign Office did not foresee the difficulties that were to arise in a few years.⁴³ Nagano blames the oversight on the great rush with which Tanaka carried out the normalization negotiations. The rush was primarily due to domestic political considerations: Tanaka was attempting to forestall the possibility

⁴¹Mainichi shinbun seijibu, *Tenkanki no anpo*, pp. 265–67.

⁴²Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōbei*, pp. 69–74.

⁴³Statement by a member of the Japanese negotiating team to the author.

of intervention by the pro-Taiwan group within the Liberal Democratic Party, concentrated in the Fukuda faction. The Foreign Ministry may not have been given the chance to examine thoroughly and to negotiate carefully every detail of the legal document.⁴⁴ But within the time constraint the contribution of the Foreign Office was to negotiate the document, restoring the relations between the two countries without invalidating the peace treaty concluded with the Republic of China and without foreclosing existing nondiplomatic relations with Taiwan.

On September 30, Tanaka returned triumphant. No diplomatic accomplishment in the postwar years handled by the conservative party government had been heralded by all the opposition parties. With the exception of the hard-core pro-Taiwan members of the Liberal Democratic Party, everyone approved the normalization as a great historic achievement. It was the "Nixon shock" that had caused the unleashing of all political and economic forces in the direction of normalization. The fact that rapprochement with China was assured within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement made it possible for the Liberal Democratic Party and the government to take the initiative in the final round. The actual process leading to normalization, however, was intensely political. Normalization became the central issue around which the coalition was formed among the Tanaka, Ōhira, and Miki factions in order to unseat Satō. China itself influenced the political process by refusing to deal with Satō and by using Takeiri to entice Tanaka. Tanaka's great rush to achieve normalization within three months after he came to office was to capture the momentum presented both nationally and internationally. Normalization was, therefore, a political triumph of the Tanaka cabinet.

⁴⁴Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei*, pp. 338f.

5. Normalization Under the Carter Administration

The Sino-American rapprochement under President Nixon triggered a sequence of events that brought considerable stability to East Asia. The most outstanding effect was the normalization of relations between Japan and China. China thereafter ceased to call for the dissolution of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. On the Korean peninsula too, the Chinese began to move toward contributing to the maintenance of stability. With regard to Indochina, peace negotiations between Vietnam and the United States progressed, culminating in the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973, though the agreement remained precarious as Vietnam continued its infiltration into the bordering countries. In the spring of 1973, the United States and China even began to cooperate in the attempt to build a coalition regime in Cambodia between Lon Nol and the Khmer Rouge.

Rapid developments took place in the bilateral relations between China and the United States on official and nonofficial fronts following the Nixon trip. The American and Chinese embassies in Paris and Ottawa were the sites of discussions on a variety of specific issues, including a possible agreement to settle mutual claims dating back to the late 1940s. Through contacts between private American organizations and quasi-official Chinese organizations, exchange visits between a wide variety of people increased to number some 8,000 Americans and about 500 Chinese by the end of 1974. Sino-American two-way trade expanded rapidly from about \$5 million in 1971 to almost \$934 million in 1974. The climactic development in the few years following the Nixon visit was the agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China to establish liaison offices in Beijing and in Washington. The Chinese decision to establish a mission in Washington signified a major compromise, since China had been insisting that it would never establish diplomatic missions in the capital of any country in which the Nationalists were represented. The agreement therefore signified the desire on both parts to maintain the momentum brought about by the breakthrough in early 1972.

However, two reservations that the Chinese had held from the beginning developed more and more into a sense of bitterness in 1974–75. The first related to the continued reluctance of the United States to disengage from Taiwan. It should be recalled that in the Shanghai communiqué, the United States did not explicitly recognize the Chinese claim to Taiwan, or

commit itself to withdraw completely from it. China, on the other hand, did not renounce the use of force in the settlement of the Taiwan question, while the United States reaffirmed "its interest in a peaceful settlement." Yet compromise was reached because both parties saw that they were serving their broader interests by this action. More important is the fact that the Chinese side believed that Nixon in his second term was committed to achieve normalization. Contrary to this expectation, when they found that the United States did not withdraw all troops from Taiwan nor take steps to terminate military assistance, they were deeply disappointed. The fact that the United States appointed a senior American diplomat to Taiwan as ambassador and allowed the opening up of two new Nationalist consulates in the United States was further regarded as a sign of reluctance. The Chinese officials began to indicate directly and indirectly their sense of dissatisfaction over what appeared to be the United States lack of earnestness in implementing the Shanghai communique.

The second issue that contributed to the growing rift was the Chinese sense of betrayal by the progress in the American détente with the Soviet Union. With SALT I, the Vladivostok agreement of December 1974, grain sales and technology transfer, and finally the Helsinki accords of mid-1975, the Chinese felt that the United States had strengthened its strategic position because of rapprochement with China. During Kissinger's repeated visits to Beijing during these years, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai would urge the United States to "take the lead in organizing an anti-Soviet coalition. It should stretch from Japan through China, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to Western Europe."¹ The course that Kissinger chose, however, was to improve relations with both the People's Republic and the Soviet Union. Kissinger wrote as follows in a report to Nixon on his way back from Beijing:

With conscientious attention to both capitals we should be able to continue to have our mao tai and drink our vodka too. Peking, after all, assuming continued hostility with the USSR, has no real alternative to us as a counterweight (despite its recent reaching out to Japan and Western Europe as insurance). And Moscow needs us in such areas as Europe and economics. But this is nevertheless a difficult balancing act that will increasingly face us with hard choices. We are useless to Peking as a counterweight to Moscow if we withdraw from the world, lower our defense, or play a passive international game.²

It was precisely the United States withdrawal from the world because of domestic politics, and the loss of the presidential leadership caused by

¹Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 55, 67.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 70f.

Watergate, that checked any further momentum for pursuing normalization.

President Ford's visit to China, December 1–5, 1975, should be regarded as an attempt by both countries to maintain relations at their existing levels rather than to explore any substantive expansion. When Kissinger went to Beijing to arrange for the presidential visit, he was greeted with public criticism of the U.S.-Soviet détente. He tried to counter the deteriorating U.S.-China relations by pushing certain military ties with China. The Ford administration approved the British sales to China of Rolls-Royce Spey jet engines and a Spey factory to build engines in China. In other words, the United States showed its readiness not to stand by the COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) regulations that could block the transfer of strategic technology to communist countries.

President Ford, however, was not prepared to grapple with normalization. The fall of the noncommunist regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia earlier in the year made it difficult for Ford to proceed to upgrade American relations with a communist regime. The political costs for Ford seemed too high as he faced the 1976 elections and criticism from the Republican right wing. In China, too, a period of uncertainty followed after the illness and death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, the death of Mao Zedong in September, and the intense struggle between the pragmatists and the radicals over the leadership succession. The overall result was the coming of a period of freeze in U.S.-China relations.

China was not high on the list of priorities of the Carter administration, which took office in 1977. The issues that demanded highest attention were the conclusion of a new SALT agreement, the revival of the Middle East negotiations, the completion of the Panama Canal treaties negotiations, and a host of bilateral and multilateral problems.³ This is not to say that Carter had no intentions of carrying out normalization. In the early days of the Carter administration, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance commissioned a small team of China specialists from the State Department, including Richard Holbrooke, Anthony Lake, and William Gleysteen, and

³Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), pp. 51f. The studies commissioned by the first informal session of the NSC were as follows: Panama; SALT; Middle East; South Africa and Rhodesia negotiations; Cyprus and the Aegean; mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations; economic summit and trilateral policies; North-South strategy; European policy; comprehensive military force posture; intelligence structure and mission; arms sales policy; policy toward Korea; Philippines base negotiations; nuclear proliferation.

⁴There is a discrepancy in the dates on which the study was initiated, in Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 76; and Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 197. A source close to the study team stated to the author that in December, the team had no

from the National Security Council staff, including Michel Oksenberg, to study the normalization question.⁴

Before examining the actual process that completed the U.S. normalization with China by the Carter administration, it may be useful to take a short look at some of the organizational characteristics of Carter's foreign policy structure. Whereas in the Nixon administration the president was determined to reduce the influence of the State Department and, together with his National Security Council adviser, attempted to maintain complete control over the foreign policy mechanism, Carter opted for "a collegial approach," in which appropriate cabinet members would be involved in discussing the issues as equals, after which the president would make the decision.⁵ The recently published memoirs of President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski indicate, however, that they were all conscious of the complexity involved in actually carrying out a "collegial" process. In selecting Brzezinski as national security adviser, Carter had been warned that Brzezinski was "aggressive and ambitious" and "might not be adequately deferential to a secretary of state," but he decided to appoint him because of his outstanding qualities. Moreover, Carter believed that the different strengths and personalities of Vance and Brzezinski would allow natural competition between the State Department and the National Security Council, and that he could gain by weighing their diverse views before reaching a final decision.⁶

The natural competition that Carter foresaw between Vance and Brzezinski had the potentiality to grow out of proportion. Vance "was determined to bring the department and the Foreign Service more fully into the process of developing and implementing policy." He believed that in order for foreign policy to be enduring, it had to be rooted in the institution that was in charge of implementing it. He was quite clear in his mind as to how to protect his prerogative and presented two conditions to the president in agreeing to the appointment of Brzezinski as the national security adviser. These conditions were "first, that it be made clear that [Vance] would be the president's spokesman of foreign policy, [and] second, that [Vance] must be able to present to [the president] [his] own unfiltered views before [the president] made any foreign policy decision."⁷ As time went on, however, the relationship between Vance and Brzezinski

access to the files of the Nixon and Ford administrations. The study was undertaken only in the early months of 1977.

⁵Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 59.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁷Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 34f.

would increasingly deteriorate, especially as the latter tended to assume a greater role as policy spokesman.

Brzezinski also tried to establish his position based on the National Security Council organization. Because of Carter's preference for limiting the size of the government apparatus, only two committees were set up in the National Security Council. The first was the Policy Review Committee, which dealt with foreign policy, defense policy, and international economic issues. It was to be chaired by the secretary of the department in charge of the issue involved, usually State. The second was the Special Coordination Committee, which handled intelligence policy issues, arms control, and crisis management. Brzezinski proposed that it should be chaired by the national security adviser "on the grounds that these matters potentially involved jurisdictional conflicts between interested agencies." In terms of the concentration of power in the national security adviser, Brzezinski had considerably less leverage than Kissinger. President Carter did not want any "Lone Ranger" in his administration. But in the rounding up of the National Security Council discussions and formulation of the presidential directive, Brzezinski made certain that the authority would be left to him.⁸ Vance objected to this arrangement and requested that he be given the right to review the summaries and presidential directives prepared by the National Security Council in draft before they were presented to the president. To Vance's great regret, the president did not accept this argument, on the basis that he had to prevent the possibility of leaks in handling sensitive documents.⁹ The National Security Council was to maintain its authority over the departments. Under the Carter administration, the foreign-policymaking system at times revealed aspects of bureaucratic rivalry, rather than the predominance of the National Security Council over State.

At the working level, the China specialists in the State Department and the National Security Council collaborated closely in preparing the China policy of the Carter administration. The first few months after the inauguration were spent in studying the voluminous memoranda of conversations between the previous administrations and the Chinese. Since not all the materials were available in Washington, some had to be sought elsewhere, as presidential papers were kept in the libraries of the respective past presidents. From a memorandum recovered, the Carter administration came to know that Nixon had stated to Zhou Enlai in 1972 that "he strongly desired to normalize relations with Peking and intended to do so in his second term if he was reelected that November." This was a pledge that had been unknown to the administration until then. In reporting this

⁸Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 58–63.

⁹Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 36–38.

fact, administration officials “underscored that in their opinion the Nixon statement was clearly a statement of intention and not a binding agreement or a formal understanding with the Chinese.”¹⁰ The existence of the Nixon statement, paraphrased by Brzezinski in his memoirs as “Nixon’s five points,” however, was to serve as the basis on which the Carter administration developed its normalization policy.¹¹

In April and May of 1977, the Carter administration’s China policy began to take shape. Based on the review by the China experts, Vance presented to Carter on April 15 a memorandum in which he outlined his view on the normalization issue. The thrust of the memorandum was “to seek normalization on acceptable terms,” by which Vance meant “to establish diplomatic relations with Peking” that would not “jeopardize the well-being and security of the people of Taiwan.” He therefore did not think it possible simply to accept the three conditions that the Chinese had been advancing for normalization: “cessation of diplomatic relations with Taipei; withdrawal of U.S. military forces and installations from Taiwan; and abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty.”¹²

Parallel to the review undertaken by Vance, the State Department under Richard Holbrooke prepared the first extensive interagency memorandum on China for the president—Policy Review Memorandum 24, Part I—in May 1977. The memorandum “recommended that normalization be pursued within the framework established in the conversations of the previous seven years.” It argued that unless full diplomatic relations were established, the existing cultural and economic relations with China would stagnate, and that the Chinese would no longer trust U.S. intentions to normalize.¹³ On June 27, the Policy Review Committee agreed to recommend that Carter seek normalization if the United States felt confident that this would not damage Taiwan. The assurances that Carter decided to seek from Beijing were:

First, that normalization would not prevent the United States from selling arms to Taiwan; second, that the American people could continue, unimpaired, unofficial cultural, economic, and other relations with the people

¹⁰*New York Times*, April 11, 1977.

¹¹Brzezinski writes that Vance regarded as premature Brzezinski’s recommendation that Nixon’s five points should be reaffirmed and transmitted by Carter to the Chinese (*Power and Principle*, pp. 198f). A source close to the Carter administration stated to the author that Vance had not known of the existence of the five points when asked by a TV interviewer whether there had been any secret agreement with the Chinese over normalization. He therefore had replied in the negative. Thereafter Vance continued to regard the five points as not constituting anything in the nature of a “pledge.”

¹²Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 76f.

¹³Michel Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” *Foreign Affairs* 61(1) (Fall 1982):181.

of Taiwan; and third, that at the time of normalization the United States could make a unilateral, uncontested statement concerning its expectation that the Taiwan issue would be settled peacefully.¹⁴

Carter records in his memoirs that “the Taiwan influence was very strong in the United States, particularly in Congress.” He recounts that “a flood of invitations came to [his] relatives and neighbors around Plains for expense-paid vacation trips to Taipei” as he began to win a few primaries in 1976. Those who were invited were urged to persuade Carter to forget about fulfilling U.S. commitments to China.¹⁵ As Vance tried to canvass congressional reactions on the normalization issue through Holbrooke, he also found that, though supportive of normalization, “Congress felt strongly that we should continue to assist Taiwan in defending itself.” He therefore concluded that the postnormalization link of the United States to Taiwan was the central issue and that unofficial relations with Taiwan should be assured, including the provision of weapons. Though the China experts were skeptical that the People’s Republic would acquiesce in such conditions, he felt that they were essential for congressional acceptance.¹⁶

In late August, Vance left for Beijing as the first high-level Carter administration official to visit China. At the July 30 meeting that laid out the instructions for Vance’s China trip, the president authorized him to indicate U.S. interest in normalization. He said that “if the Chinese were prepared to accept his package, he was ready to normalize, but if they were unwilling, then so be it. He would go no further.” Vance carried with him a draft recognition communiqué, but he was not in a position to make substantial concessions as far as U.S. relations with Taiwan were concerned. The main reason for the reserved position was the looming Panama Canal treaties debate that was to take place in the Senate. The president did not wish to risk a single vote on the treaties.

Vance characterized his 1977 trip as being “exploratory” and not “aimed at finding a ‘final solution’ to the question of establishing full ties with China.”¹⁷ In Beijing, Vance laid out the conditions on which the United States would be able to normalize relations, which included certain assurances, such as to assign some governmental employees to the nonofficial entity to be set up in Taiwan. The Chinese did not accept the proposals put forth by Vance. They criticized the United States for having regressed from the positions set out by the previous administrations. Vance left

¹⁴Ibid., p. 182.

¹⁵Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 187f.

¹⁶Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 77.

¹⁷“Vance and Japanese Discuss Peking Trip,” *New York Times*, August 27, 1977.

China without presenting the draft communiqué for discussion.¹⁸ The Chinese side reacted strongly to the Vance visit, particularly because of a reported impression written in Washington by John Wallach, the diplomatic correspondent for the Hearst chain, that the secretary found the Chinese showing some “flexibility” in their stance with regard to Taiwan. Shortly after, on September 6, Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping said in an interview with executives and directors of the Associated Press that “the discussions with Mr. Vance represented a retreat from proposals advanced by former President Gerald R. Ford and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.” He claimed that President Ford had promised that, if reelected, “he would resolve the Taiwan problem in the same way as the Japanese had done.” He also stated that “his discussions with Mr. Kissinger about Taiwan had been based on the idea that eventually it would be the United States that would have to make the moves necessary to normalize relations.” The position of Vance by contrast was to expect that “both sides would have to make efforts for normalization.”¹⁹ Considering that at that time Deng had just recently been restored to office, he probably could not afford to appear “flexible” on the issue of Taiwan. His statement reflected the determined position of the Chinese that they would not negotiate normalization on a “two-Chinas” principle. It also revealed a sense of impatience toward the United States for continuing to postpone its final decision.

Michel Oksenberg ascribes the Chinese confrontational approach at the time of the Vance visit, in part at least, to the lack of firmness of the Carter administration’s overall foreign policy. “Normalization to Beijing would signify a further Chinese tilt toward the United States, and the Chinese were seeking the sense of strategic orientation which the Nixon Administration had earlier provided. In August 1977, the signs were more in the other direction—of an Administration oblivious to the Soviet global design.”²⁰ Within the administration, Carter and Vance were basically critical of pursuing a policy of a strategic triangle. Carter believed that “too many of our international concerns were being defined almost exclusively by the chronic United States-Soviet confrontation mentality, which seemed to [him] shortsighted and counterproductive.”²¹ To Vance, “China constituted a political, economic, and cultural weight in the world that the United States could not ignore. Better relations would help our foreign policy across the board . . . not simply one that might be a useful

¹⁸Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 81f.

¹⁹“Teng Says Vance Trip Set Back Normal Ties,” *New York Times*, September 6, 1977.

²⁰Oksenberg, “Sino-American Relations,” p. 183.

²¹Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 188.

counterweight to the Soviet Union." Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, by contrast, tended to take an interest in China primarily because of mutual security concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.²²

At the time, the administration was deeply engaged in the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Soviet action in the Third World and particularly in Africa pressured the administration to take a more determined stance. By the beginning of 1978, serious disagreements broke out between Vance and Brzezinski over Soviet and Cuban actions in the Horn of Africa. Vance, committed to the successful conclusion of the SALT talks, saw the Soviet action as "attempts to exploit targets of opportunity" and therefore felt that they should be dealt with in the local context.²³ Brzezinski believed that Soviet action was part of a larger design and that the Soviet Union had misused détente to gain its geopolitical and strategic advantages. He therefore insisted upon a strategic response.²⁴

As Brzezinski began to review the Carter administration's foreign policy in the light of the Soviet strategic offensive, the question of China came to command greater attention. Already in early November 1977, the Chinese through two channels had invited Brzezinski to visit China. Michel Oksenberg, who played a part in promoting Brzezinski's invitation,²⁵ observes that in the months following Vance's visit, the Chinese started to show signs of seeking to improve relations with the United States. They turned to Brzezinski as "the official whose views more closely corresponded to their own." Through inviting Brzezinski, they attempted to "play upon the institutional rivalry between the National Security Council staff and State" and to prod the United States toward normalization.²⁶ The invitation to Brzezinski did indeed cause bureaucratic commotion in Washington. The State Department showed strong resistance. Vance made known his objection to the trip. He was concerned that "a highly publicized trip would bring into sharp relief the question of who spoke for the administration on foreign policy." Besides, he feared that Brzezinski might become involved in the question of normalization with the Chinese before the administration was adequately prepared for it.²⁷ Brzezinski argued that his visit would recapture the much needed momentum for

²²Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 79.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 84f.

²⁴Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 203f.

²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 202f.

²⁶Oksenberg, "Sino-American Relations," p. 183.

²⁷For the controversy over Brzezinski's trip, see Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 202–6; and Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 114f.

improved relations with China. The issue of Brzezinski's visit turned into such a controversy that Carter continued to postpone any decision. It was only in mid-March, after passage of the Panama Canal treaties in the Senate came in sight, that the president finally authorized planning for Brzezinski's trip to proceed.

As Brzezinski became more involved in the China issue, the Carter administration as a whole became more involved in the question. From early 1978, steps were taken to relax controls on exports to China. Science adviser Frank Press began planning for a broad-based government exchange program in the field of science and technology. Brzezinski himself began to hold regular conversations with Ambassador Han Xu, the acting head of the Liaison Office. These developments were all backed by strong presidential support.

Carter's own decision to achieve normalization began to evolve in early 1978. The first clear indication of his intention was revealed at a meeting with Leonard Woodcock, the United States ambassador in Beijing, while he was in Washington for consultation. Woodcock recounts that at an exclusive meeting on February 7, the president supported his plan to achieve normalization along the line agreed upon by the Policy Review Committee the previous June. After serving in Beijing for nearly half a year, Woodcock had come to the conclusion that the opposition between China and Taiwan was neither sharp nor imminent, so that the issue at hand was to obtain a reasonable assurance for the security of the people in Taiwan. He observed that the Chinese, on the one hand, could not deny their right to liberate Taiwan by force. The United States, on the other, could not agree to abandon Taiwan. The only course left to the United States, therefore, was to recognize the People's Republic and make a unilateral reservation to take action, including the provision of arms, to protect the security of Taiwan if threatened. Woodcock had aired his views to visiting Americans as well as to the Chinese. Having received no adverse reaction, he became increasingly convinced that negotiations for normalization could proceed along the lines outlined. At their meeting Carter and Woodcock also discussed the question of the timing. At the time, it was considered that a parallel treatment with the SALT negotiations was not necessarily harmful, but that normalization should not be carried out too close to the 1978 congressional elections.²⁸ The question of the timing of achieving normalization was a major issue from the viewpoint of domestic politics. It had to be placed carefully in order not to detract any vote from the Senate approval of SALT II. Prior to Brzezinski's trip, no decision had been reached on which—normalization or the signing of SALT II—should come first.

²⁸Statement by Leonard Woodcock to the author on April 4, 1984.

With the Brzezinski trip set for May, the administration stepped up its planning for normalization. On May 10, Vance presented a memorandum to the president in which he outlined the terms for normalization, as well as the negotiating scenario. The recommendation largely followed the terms agreed upon the previous June. Steps to be followed with regard to Taiwan were specified and included the closing down of the embassy in Taipei, the termination of the U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, the withdrawal of the remaining military personnel and installation, the termination of all official relations with Taiwan, and the removal of all U.S. government representation in Taiwan. The United States was to insist on continuing sales of selective arms for defensive purposes and on retaining economic, cultural, and other unofficial ties with Taiwan. It was to publicly reaffirm interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Leonard Woodcock would start giving the U.S. position in “a series of presentations” and continue the negotiations during the summer. He was also to “discuss the mode and timing of a joint communiqué establishing diplomatic ties, the necessary legislation for implementing the arrangement, and the visit of a very high Chinese official to Washington at or shortly after the announcement of normalization.” The president approved the negotiating strategy. Brzezinski was to discuss the question of normalization during his trip and to tell the Chinese that Ambassador Woodcock would begin the talks.²⁹

Even more than the question of normalization, Brzezinski was determined from the very beginning to engage in a broad political-strategic examination of the global situation. Exactly when and how far Carter began to focus on the China question as a central issue in U.S. global policy is difficult to determine. However, it can be surmised that the changes in the international situation resulting from problems in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere led him to be persuaded more and more by Brzezinski's strategic arguments. The president's instructions to Brzezinski, which were drafted by Brzezinski but revised and signed by the president on May 17, focused directly on the issue of strategic cooperation between the United States and China. The presidential instructions, which are reproduced in full as Annex I to Brzezinski's memoirs, authorized him to make the following presentations:

You should stress that we see our relations with China as a central facet of the U.S. global policy. The United States and China share certain common interests and we have parallel, long-term strategic concerns. The most important of these is our common opposition to global or regional hegemony by any single power. This is why your visit is not tactical; it is an

²⁹Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 115f.

expression of our strategic interest in a cooperative relationship with China, an interest that is both fundamental and enduring. . . .

Your basic goal should be to convey to the Chinese our determination to seek peace with the Soviets, to compete effectively with the Soviets, to deter the Soviet military challenge, and to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies. . . . You should stress that I see the Soviet Union as essentially in a competitive relationship with the United States, though there are also some cooperative aspects. That competitive relationship is enduring, deep-seated, and rooted in different traditions, history, outlooks, interests, and geopolitical priorities. Hence the competition will not be terminated quickly—and the United States is prepared to compete for as long as necessary. At the same time, the reality of nuclear weapons dictates not only the need for restraint but also for greater cooperation, especially in arms control. SALT is not a product of weakness but the consequence of prudence.³⁰

From the overall context quoted above, Brzezinski was instructed to explain to the Chinese a whole range of specific foreign policy objectives. With regard to the question of technology transfer to China, Brzezinski was to indicate to the Chinese that the United States did not object to possible arms sales by the European allies. The rationale behind such an attitude was clear: “We have an interest in a strong and secure China—and we recognize and respect this interest.” Brzezinski was also to brief the Chinese on the military balance between the United States and China and on the status of SALT negotiations. With reference to normalization, Brzezinski’s mission was essentially one of reassuring the Chinese of U.S. determination to move forward. He was authorized to “reiterate U.S. acceptance of the three Chinese key points and reiterate the U.S. five points” and make clear to the Chinese the conditions already agreed upon by the administration.³¹

Brzezinski arrived in Beijing on May 20 accompanied by a party of ten. Four of the members were selected to be on hand to brief the Chinese: Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council, on strategic issues relating to the U.S.-Soviet balance; Morton Abramowitz of the Defense Department, on overall military intelligence; Richard Holbrooke of the State Department, on the expansion of cultural and economic cooperation; Ben Huberman of the National Security Council, on expansion of scientific cooperation. Michel Oksenberg was to assist him on the overall presentation.³² While in Beijing, Brzezinski had the chance to engage in extensive conversations not only with Foreign Minister Huang Hua but also with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and Prime Minister Hua Guofeng. In

³⁰Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, Annex I.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²*Ibid.*, p. 209.

the course of the talks, Brzezinski tried hard to convey the impression to the Chinese that “the United States has made up its mind on this issue [of normalization].” His trip proved successful as the Chinese began to show increased interest in contacts with the United States and to cease public criticisms of U.S. foreign policy after his return. It was the strategic rationale of Carter’s China policy articulated by Brzezinski that won the response of the Chinese leadership. Two other factors that probably prompted a positive response were “Deng Xiaoping’s consolidated power position and China’s increasing security concerns on its southern flank.”³³

In Washington, however, the press reaction to Brzezinski’s China trip caused renewed confrontation between Brzezinski and Vance. In an interview on “Meet the Press,” on May 28, Brzezinski criticized the Soviet behavior as maintaining “a vitriolic worldwide propaganda campaign against the United States” and encircling and penetrating the Middle East and Africa. He also called for “demonstrated resolve” on the American side.³⁴ Carter himself showed concern over the statement. Vance was deeply upset for two reasons. At the level of policy, he was disturbed that Brzezinski “allowed his trip to be characterized as a deliberate counter-move by the United States at a time of worsening relations with Moscow.” To Vance, who followed a parallel approach in dealing with the Soviet Union and with China, “loose talk about ‘playing the China card’” was always dangerous. It was particularly so when the United States was engaged in serious SALT negotiations.³⁵ At the level of responsibility, Vance had insisted from the outset of the administration that the secretary of state should be the president’s public spokesman, and he reminded both Carter and Brzezinski that the administration should speak with one voice. Vance’s determination to maintain the State Department’s part in the negotiation process was considered to have derived from the precedents of the Nixon administration. Secretary Rogers was completely bypassed by National Security Adviser Kissinger in preparing for the president’s visit and negotiating the Shanghai communiqué.³⁶

In spite of these differences, Vance and Brzezinski cooperated in working out the normalization. On June 20, the president met for an important review session on China, attended by Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, and presidential aide Hamilton Jordan, and instructed them to aim for a December 15 normalization date. Vance had written a memorandum to the president on June 13, recommending a mid-December target for public

³³Oksenberg, “Sino-American Relations,” p. 185.

³⁴Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 185.

³⁵Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 116.

³⁶Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 193.

announcement. He also had recommended that if SALT were completed before the end of the year, congressional action on normalization should precede the SALT ratification debate. Two other important procedural points were decided at the June 20 meeting. First, the negotiations were to be “kept very confidential.” The president was fully aware of the danger of leaks, as he wrote on the bottom of the memo to Vance: “Cy—Devise special procedures; leaks can kill the whole effort. We should limit the dispatches and the negotiating information strictly—maybe just to the PDB group. Avoid any public hints of degree of progress. I don’t trust (1) Congress, (2) White House, (3) State, or (4) Defense to keep a secret. . . . JC.”³⁷ The U.S.-China negotiations were again to follow the strictly secret procedure of the Nixon administration. Wrong leaks at the wrong time could invite criticisms from the Soviet Union, from Taiwan, from Congress. The administration felt confident that it could deal with Congress and public opinion after the completion of normalization.

The second procedural point that was decided was to carry out the discussions with the Chinese slowly, in sequential order. Proposed by Vance, this negotiating process would allow the United States to unfold its position at a deliberate speed, starting from the less controversial, and to prolong the negotiations if the Chinese would not meet the minimum terms. It would also allow the Chinese time for extensive consultation among the leadership after each proposal—a process in line with the methodical and careful decision making of the Chinese.³⁸ The negotiating strategy as agreed upon on June 20 was followed till the end. Instructions for Woodcock were prepared by Oksenberg and Holbrooke, working closely with Brzezinski and reviewed by Vance. The president himself supervised the process in great detail. The negotiating process itself was a joint effort of the administration’s top foreign policy machinery. It was carried out as planned.³⁹

On July 5, Woodcock met with Foreign Minister Huang Hua and proposed a process by which they would meet approximately every two weeks and discuss the major issues involved. Over the next few months, the United States made the presentations of its position in seven sequences. They were arranged in order of increasing controversy, as follows:

1. U.S. determination to carry out full range of economic, scientific and cultural relations with Taiwan after normalization;

³⁷Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 224. The PDB group referred to those who had access to the president’s daily brief. They were the president, vice-president, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski.

³⁸Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 117.

³⁹Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 224f; Oksenberg, “Sino-American Relations,” p. 186.

2. nature of postnormalization presence on Taiwan, which will be unofficial;
3. how to go about terminating defense treaty with Taiwan—abrogation under treaty provision;
4. congressional legislation required to sustain unofficial relationship with Taiwan;
5. unilateral expression of expectation that Taiwan issue will be resolved peacefully and that this will not be contradicted;
6. arms sales to Taiwan to continue; and
7. joint communiqué.⁴⁰

Negotiations took the form of each side presenting its position on the given issue. At the following meeting, positions on the preceding issue would be repeated and then positions on the next issue would be presented. There were three points in which agreements were hard to reach. These related to the inclusion of the antihegemony clause, the sales of arms to Taiwan after normalization, and the mode of terminating the defense treaty with Taiwan.⁴¹

A particularly sensitive point related to the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. On September 19, Carter held a meeting with Ambassador Chai Zemin, the new head of the Chinese Liaison Mission in Washington, and strongly stated the U.S. right to sell arms to Taiwan. On October 3, when Vance met Huang Hua at the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, Huang proved adamant on the question of arms sales and showed great rigidity during a meeting that lasted for three hours. For a while thereafter, the Woodcock–Huang Hua negotiations slowed down somewhat. Obviously there were domestic constraints as China tried to weigh its course carefully. An added factor of some relevance was the Vietnamese overtures to the United States.

At the time, new developments were taking place between the United States and Vietnam. Through the summer and early fall of 1978, Vietnamese relations with China had deteriorated rapidly. By September, a major armed conflict between the two countries was becoming increasingly likely. This situation encouraged the Chinese to improve relations with the United States as they engaged themselves in negotiations for normalization. The situation also prompted the Vietnamese to seek normalization with the United States. The State Department favored negotiating with both the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Holbrooke conferred with Nguyen Co Thach in New York on September 29 and discussed the possibilities for normalization. The Vietnamese formally dropped their

⁴⁰Woodcock statement to the author.

⁴¹Ibid.

demand for reparation payments as a condition for normalization and carried on further talks with the United States. Within the Carter administration, Brzezinski became extremely critical of the State Department initiative, as he feared the adverse effect on the negotiations with China, which were already at an important stage. He prompted the president to prevent the move toward normalization with Vietnam until after an agreement with China was concluded.⁴²

The president was faced with conflicting advice from the State Department and the National Security Council. He decided to take a few weeks to reassess the situation and to observe the reaction of the Chinese. On October 11, he met with Woodcock and Brzezinski and made clear that he would not move on Vietnam. Aside from Brzezinski, some of his friends in Congress felt that the normalization with China was already a full agenda to manage in Congress. Woodcock advised the president that in view of China's strong animosity toward Vietnam, normalization could not go forward with China parallel to that with Vietnam.⁴³ Because of the "paramount importance" of the China move, Carter "decided to postpone the Vietnam effort until after we had concluded [our] agreement in Peking." The opportunity did not repeat itself, since Vietnam subsequently invaded Cambodia and concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Carter asks rhetorically in his memoirs "whether by a more positive response to Vietnam's earlier overtures we could have prevented these last two moves." Though he states negatively that it was "very doubtful," he leaves a sense of uncertainty. He admits that he "will never be sure."⁴⁴

Whether or not the United States in fact foreclosed an alternate course of development in Asia, the Carter administration's choice to pursue normalization with China had a decisive impact on world politics, and on the Indochina situation in particular. With renewed determination, the Carter administration prompted the Chinese with a proposal for a target date for normalization, a draft communiqué on normalization, and an invitation to a high-level official to visit Washington. At the December 4 meeting, Woodcock recalls that he felt that a breakthrough might be at hand. The Chinese indicated for the first time that they would not contradict the U.S. statement with regard to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. They also informed Woodcock that Deng Xiaoping would receive him soon.⁴⁵ In Washington, Brzezinski pressed the Chinese for a rapid decision. He argued that if there were a delay in reaching a

⁴²Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 228f.

⁴³Woodcock statement to the author.

⁴⁴Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 194f.

⁴⁵Woodcock statement to the author.

normalization agreement, the overloaded congressional calendar would not be able to accommodate a debate on China before SALT or before a possible summit meeting between Carter and Brezhnev.⁴⁶

Woodcock met Deng Xiaoping for the first time on December 13. Deng immediately stated that he accepted the draft communiqué in its English version. He also said that he would accept the invitation to visit the United States. The breakthrough had come. Normalization was achieved between the United States and China. Upon receiving the news, President Carter decided to move promptly with the public announcement. Brzezinski called in the Chinese ambassador to inform Deng of the U.S. proposal to make the announcement immediately in order to forestall the risk of piecemeal leaks to the news media.⁴⁷ What advice Brzezinski made to the president on this score is not known, but Vance, who was suddenly summoned home from Jerusalem in order to be in Washington in time for the presidential announcement, expressed considerable irritation in his memoirs for having been left out of the decision to move up the announcement.⁴⁸

As final preparations were made for the announcement and for the text of the communiqué, further clarification became necessary on the question of the arms sales. It had become known that the Chinese were operating on the assumption that the United States would discontinue the sales of arms to Taiwan immediately. Clarifying messages had to be sent to Deng by Brzezinski through the Chinese ambassador in Washington that the United States would continue after a one-year moratorium during which the defense treaty would be abrogated. Woodcock had to seek another meeting with Deng on December 15 in order to make clear the U.S. intention to continue arms sales after the one-year moratorium. Woodcock tried to persuade the Chinese that the United States would be restrained on the subject of the defensive arms in their statement, but had to reaffirm this position for internal political reasons. Woodcock recalls clearly Deng's final statement, "We will never agree." But Deng did not block the normalization from taking place.⁴⁹

As announced on December 15–16, the final agreement between the United States and China was embodied in three documents: a joint communiqué issued simultaneously in Washington and Beijing, a unilateral statement by the Chinese government, and a unilateral statement by the United States. Further details were provided by Hua Guofeng at a press

⁴⁶Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 229.

⁴⁷Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 199.

⁴⁸Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 118f.

⁴⁹Woodcock statement to the author.

conference in Beijing and by President Carter in his address to the nation, as well as background briefings by administration spokesmen. The joint communiqué announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China as of January 1, 1979. It declared the ending of U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the maintenance of cultural, commercial, and unofficial relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan. Both the United States and China opposed any country's seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese made clear in their statement that "the question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization" and affirmed that "the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country . . . is entirely China's internal affair." The United States, on the other hand, while announcing that it would terminate its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan after one year, expressed its confidence "that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future" and that the United States "has an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves." Future relations between the United States and Taiwan were to be maintained through unofficial representations, in line with the precedents of the Japanese formula. Administration spokesmen told the press after the president's announcement that the United States would continue to deliver military equipment already purchased by Taiwan during 1979 and would continue to make available to Taiwan "selected defense weaponry" even after the formal defense agreement expired. The Chinese announced in their statement that Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping accepted the invitation of the United States government to visit the United States in January 1979.

The central issue in the normalization negotiations was the question of Taiwan. From the outset, the Carter administration was determined to gain assurances from the Chinese that normalization would not prevent the United States from selling arms to Taiwan, from maintaining unofficial cultural, economic, and other relations with the people of Taiwan, and from taking an interest in the peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. The Carter administration succeeded in achieving its objectives. The insistence on continuing the sales of defensive arms to Taiwan was the most important achievement. The Chinese did not regard the continuing military relations between the United States and Taiwan as conforming to the principles of normalization.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, they agreed to normalize

⁵⁰The Chinese formally objected to the United States decision to sell arms to Taiwan, in a statement given by Chairman Hua Guofeng to the press on December 16, 1978.

relations because at that time they believed in the importance of consolidating their strategic needs. Brzezinski, like Kissinger, viewed China primarily in the global strategic context. They both minimized the importance of the Taiwan issue and believed that they could set it aside. The question of Taiwan in fact had greater implications both in American domestic politics and in Chinese policy objectives. By allowing a postponement of the Taiwan issue, China felt that the United States owed it a debt. Taiwan was put off at the time of Nixon's visit. It was again allowed to lapse at the time of normalization.⁵¹ The issue of the security of Taiwan, particularly the continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, remained as a potential irritant in postnormalization U.S.-Chinese relations.

Deng's visit to the United States in January 1979 ushered in a period of expanding relations. Scores of treaties, agreements, and protocols were concluded in the next few years. Deng's visit, however, also proved that China was determined to take full advantage of the newly established strategic relations with the United States, for which they had paid a considerable price. Before departing from Washington, Deng requested a private meeting with the president, at which he expressed the need to counter the expanding Soviet influence in Indochina. He stated that the Chinese "consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson." While assuring that the "lesson" would be limited in scope and duration, he asked the United States to provide "moral support." It was the United States that faced a severe test in global politics when China took military action against Vietnam in February. The United States tried to steer a delicate course, criticizing Chinese action, together with the Vietnamese action in Cambodia, while warning the Soviet Union that any organized Soviet military move might force the United States to develop wider relations with the Chinese.⁵² The United States found itself used by China as a new card in its strategic politics and had to cope with the changed situation.

Domestic reaction, particularly congressional reaction, severely tested the new China policy of the Carter administration. The public reaction to the administration's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China was favorable. A Gallup poll completed in January indicated that 58 percent of those polled who were aware of Carter's decision were in favor of establishing relations with China, and 24 percent were opposed to the move. However, as many as 47 percent of those who were aware of Carter's decision thought it wrong to end relations with the Chinese Nationalists.⁵³ The press reaction also showed a similar pattern. While many editorials

⁵¹Statement by William Gleysteen to the author on November 16, 1983.

⁵²Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 4-8-14; Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 120-22.

⁵³*New York Times*, January 14, 1979, "Gallup Poll Indicates Majority of Americans Back Tie with Peking."

endorsed Carter's act as "realistic and hopeful," a number expressed concern over the future protection of Taiwan and showed remorse over the betrayal of Taiwan.⁵⁴ In Congress, too, the majority of congressmen were supportive of normalization. What aroused them most, however, was the manner in which the Carter administration undertook normalization.

Congress took the surprise announcement of normalization of December 15 as an affront to its position and prerogatives in the formation of foreign policy. Just a few months earlier, Congress had passed an amendment to the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 in which it expressed the view that the president should consult with Congress before making any changes that might affect the security of Taiwan. Carter carried out negotiations for normalization in strict secrecy. In the White House, only Brzezinski, Vice-President Walter Mondale, Hamilton Jordan, and Michel Oksenberg were involved in the developments. In the State Department, Vance, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Richard Holbrooke, and the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, William Gleysteen, were aware of the progress. In Beijing, Ambassador Woodcock personally carried out the negotiations; consequently the embassy staff were just as shocked as anyone else when they learned of the breakthrough on December 15.⁵⁵

In considering the constant preoccupation of the Carter administration with congressional reaction to the normalization negotiations, one wonders why Carter decided to withhold consultation and risk congressional backlash. Vance recounts that he argued in favor of talking to congressional leadership in secret in view of the existence of the Senate resolution requesting consultation. The president sided with Brzezinski in opposing consultation with Congress, and thus decided to risk the possibility of offending the Congress rather than of facing the likelihood of allowing leaks and complicating the negotiating process.⁵⁶ Besides, Carter believed it possible to handle Congress and public opinion, given the successful completion of normalization.⁵⁷ He did not seem to appreciate the widespread public concern for the fate of Taiwan. He regarded those who supported Taiwan as "right-wing political-action groups . . . still insisting that somehow the United States should help the descendants of Chiang Kai-shek retake the mainland."⁵⁸ He was not, therefore, going to accommodate to congressional pressure.

Carter was determined that the package of legislation to govern future

⁵⁴Compiled by the China Council of the Asia Society, *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: A Collection of Documents and Press Coverage*, January 1979.

⁵⁵Woodcock statement to the author.

⁵⁶Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 118.

⁵⁷Gleysteen statement to the author.

⁵⁸Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 210f.

relations with Taiwan should not be substantially modified by Congress. He repeatedly warned the Congress that he would veto the Taiwan legislation "if it is modified to violate my commitments to the PRC or if the security language with Taiwan exceeds that in the treaty itself," thereby "leaving it illegal to deal with Taiwan in any effective way."⁵⁹ Congress, on the other hand, focusing on the "practical implications" of normalization, found that the administration had not given sufficient thought to future relations with Taiwan. Senator Jacob Javits states that the position of most members of Congress was that "the acceptability of the arrangements worked out with Beijing depended upon the establishment of a viable basis for our future relations with Taipei."⁶⁰

The 96th Congress, convened in January 1979, was devoted primarily to China. In order to devise a legal arrangement that assured the future security and well-being of the people of Taiwan, Congress debated the Taiwan bill and made numerous amendments and changes. The principal modifications provided by Congress were as follows: first, language was added to the act to demonstrate more clearly American support for the security of the people of Taiwan; second, along with the president, Congress was specifically designated to take part in determining the types and quantities of defensive arms and services to be given to Taiwan, and the president was required to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the well-being of Taiwan; third, provisions were made that allowed American investors in Taiwan to continue to receive guarantees from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; fourth, a precise definition was given to the term "Taiwan" to give its government legal standing under U.S. law; fifth, several amendments were made that gave Congress a strong role in the oversight and supervision of U.S. relations with Taiwan. The secretary of state was required to present semiannual reports to Congress on the status of U.S.-Taiwan relations.⁶¹

The Taiwan Relations Act as finally amended passed both houses and became public law on April 10. Though Carter had threatened to veto any substantive modification of his proposals, he took no such steps and succumbed to congressional action. Of particular importance was the enunciation by the Act that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." The language represented a much more explicit commitment on

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Jacob Javits, "The Taiwan Relations Act," *Foreign Affairs* 60(1) (Fall 1981):56.

⁶¹*Executive-Legislative Consultations on China Policy 1978-1979*, Congress and Foreign Policy Series no. 1, pp. 8-13; and *Taiwan Enabling Act*, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1st session, pp. 7f.

the arms sales than what had been provided by the administration during the negotiations. To China, the legislative process was a sobering experience. It learned the intensity of the American interest in Taiwan and how it was possible to “attempt to arbitrarily impose a country’s domestic law on international relations and to use a domestic law to unilaterally negate its international commitments.”⁶²

In fact, the question of “two Chinas” or “one China, two governments” was to linger on. Throughout 1979 and 1980, and especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States moved closer to China and even took steps toward military ties. Nevertheless, the arrival of the Reagan administration with a strong anti-Soviet but an equally strong pro-Nationalist commitment brought back renewed tensions in U.S.-China relations. It was only after the U.S.-China joint communiqué of August 17, 1982, that basic understanding was reached on American sales of arms to Taiwan. President Reagan, who had charged President Carter during the presidential campaign for having made unnecessary concessions to Beijing in the normalization process, two years later reaffirmed the terms of the accord and went further toward resolving the issue of arms sales. It is an irony of history that normalization on the basis of strong and lasting relations between the United States and China was finalized by the Reagan administration.

⁶²Huan Xiang, “On Sino-U.S. Relations,” *Foreign Affairs* 60(1) (Fall 1981):44f.

6. Fukuda and the Peace and Friendship Treaty

The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China accelerated new developments. Internationally, it plunged Japan into a strategic power game of a kind that Japan had not experienced in postwar times. In achieving rapprochement with China, President Nixon was able to gain détente with the Soviet Union. It was now Japan's turn to attempt to establish its position between China and the Soviet Union. As time went on, however, the government became more cautious in weighing the implications of normalization vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Internally, the pro-Taiwan members of the Liberal Democratic Party reasserted their strength and pressured the government for greater restraint in the course of negotiating treaties concerning aviation, navigation, trade, and fisheries, as agreed upon between Tanaka and Zhou Enlai.

Ever since the late 1960s, the Sino-Soviet conflict had introduced a contentious element into Asian politics. Though China accused both the Soviet Union and the United States of superpower "hegemonism," the inclusion of the "antihegemony" clause in the Shanghai communiqué altered the context of its usage. "Antihegemony" began to take on an anti-Soviet significance. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, countered China by proposing the formation of an Asian collective security scheme. The Chinese and the Soviet Union pushed hard to lure Japan into an "anti-hegemony" position or into an "Asian collective security scheme." The Japanese position was one of maintaining an equal distance from both countries. It should be remembered, however, that concluding a peace treaty with the Soviet Union was a major objective of Japanese postwar foreign policy, together with normalization of relations with China. Both Sato and Tanaka turned their attention toward the Soviet Union as power relations in Asia became more fluid after Nixon's visit to China.

When Satō succeeded in concluding the reversion of Okinawa from the United States, he expressed his readiness in his policy speech of January 1972 to undertake the negotiations for the peace treaty with the Soviet Union. His idea was to use the Soviet leverage in pursuing normalization with China. Tanaka, having achieved normalization with China, attempted to use the Chinese leverage to accelerate the negotiations with the Soviet Union. But neither Satō nor Tanaka envisaged entering into a relationship of playing one against the other, once the basic objectives of

normalization and peace treaty conclusion were attained. Balance of power was not a game the Japanese leaders aspired to.

The Soviet Union's overtures to Japan during the course of 1972 and 1973 were quite conspicuous as it deviated from its high-handed approach to Japan in the past. In January 1972, Gromyko visited Japan to resume the Japan-Soviet foreign minister's conference, which had been suspended for five years. The purpose of his visit was to prevent Japan's rapprochement with China, a development that had been foreseen following Nixon's trip to China the previous year. He not only agreed to start negotiations for the peace treaty with Japan, but also refrained from reiterating the usual position that all territorial issues between the two countries had already been settled. The Japanese side did not insist on including the territorial issue in the communiqué that was drawn up at the end of his visit. The Japanese interpreted the Soviet commitment to enter into the peace treaty negotiations to imply Soviet readiness to deal with the territorial problems.

When Tanaka achieved normalization with China, he sent Foreign Minister Ōhira to Washington and Moscow in October to explain the normalization process. In Moscow, Ōhira was criticized by Gromyko, who claimed that the Sino-Japanese joint communiqué signified the formation of a defense alliance between Japan and China which was aimed at the Soviet Union. He was particularly critical of paragraphs six and seven of the joint communiqué. He stated that the former committed Japan and China to a relationship with no use of force, and the latter was directed against Soviet "hegemony" in the Asia-Pacific region. Ōhira defended the communiqué by pointing to the clause that stated that normalization "is not directed against any third country."¹ However, no understanding was reached between them. These exchanges brought to the mind of the Japanese government the contentious nature of the "antihegemony" issue.

Nevertheless, Ōhira was able to gain an agreement with the Soviet Union to start negotiating with Japan for the conclusion of a peace treaty. After a series of diplomatic exchanges, which at times veered close to a breakdown, Prime Minister Tanaka visited Moscow October 7–10, 1973. At the end, Tanaka and Brezhnev adopted a joint communiqué in which the two countries stated their readiness to examine ways to expand cooperation in trade, fishery, agriculture, science and technology, and in the development of Siberia. Of particular importance to the Japanese government was the reference to the "settlement of unsolved problems since World War II" for the establishment of friendly relations between the two

¹Hirano Minoru, *Gaikō kisha nikki* (Diary of a diplomatic correspondent), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gyōsei tsūshinsha, 1978), pp. 108f.

countries.² The Japanese side interpreted the clause to mean that the Soviet Union agreed to include the territorial question in the course of the negotiations, since the territorial question was the most outstanding of the “unsolved problems that it had continued to raise.” The Soviet side continued its cautious policy of not committing itself to any clear course of action. What seemed clear was its interest in continuing the negotiations. As new relations between Japan and China unfolded, the Soviet Union was obliged to pay greater attention to developments in East Asia.

Developments in the postnormalization relations between Japan and China, however, slowed down somewhat in the follow-up phase. Japan’s main reason was the influence of the pro-Taiwan members of the Liberal Democratic Party, who tried to minimize any adverse effects of normalization on Taiwan. The efforts of the government were concentrated on the conclusion of the agreements on trade, aviation, navigation, and fisheries, as specified in the Japan-China joint communiqué. The intention of the government was to deal with the practical agreements first and then eventually to undertake the peace and friendship treaty.³

The negotiations on the civil aviation treaty prompted great controversy. It will be recalled that at the time of negotiating normalization, the Liberal Democratic Party had authorized Tanaka to proceed on the condition that sufficient consideration be given to the continuation of a close relationship with the Republic of China. The pro-Taiwan members interpreted the continuation of flights to and from Taiwan as falling within the terms of this condition. The Japanese side sought ways to maintain the Taiwan flights, while the Chinese side opposed any arrangements that implied reciprocity between Japan’s flag carrier, Japan Air Lines, and Taiwan’s flag carrier, China Air Lines. Failing to reach any agreement after a series of governmental negotiations, Ōhira visited Beijing in early January 1974. He tried to work out a compromise by proposing, among other things, the setting up of a private air line on the part of Japan to deal with the Taiwan flights. The Chinese were determined that the term “China” should not be used by Taiwan’s China Air Lines and that the Nationalist flag should not be flown by them. Upon return, Ōhira prepared a six-point policy formula in the name of the Foreign and Transportation ministries and presented it to the joint meeting of the Liberal Democratic Party’s foreign affairs committee and the Policy Affairs Research Council’s foreign, transportation, and aviation subcommittees. The proposed formula included negotiation of a nongovernmental aviation agreement with Taiwan

²Japan-Soviet Union joint communiqué, October 10, 1973.

³For a general study on the process leading to the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty, see Chae-Jin Lee, “The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty,” *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver) 52(3) (Fall 1979).

and the use of the Haneda Airport by China Air Lines. As to the name and the usage of the flag by China Air Lines, Japan was not to ask for a change against Taiwan's will, but would make clear Japan's understanding in a separate statement. When the Japanese government referred to China Air Lines, it would call it "China Air Lines (Taiwan)."⁴

Nadao Kōkichi, the president of the Japan–Republic of China parliamentary group, and the members of the rightist Seirankai were incensed by Ōhira's proposed formula. Seirankai held a major rally in Tokyo and threatened to undermine the Tanaka government. The maneuvers by the pro-Taiwan groups reenforced the position of Taiwan. This in turn aroused Beijing, which criticized Seirankai and the rightist groups in Japan for promoting a "two-Chinas" formula. Fujio Masayuki, a Seirankai member and a staunch supporter of Taiwan, attempted to block the negotiation by leaking the content of the governmental negotiations.

At the meeting of the top cabinet members and the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, Tanaka made the decision to approve the draft Japan-China aviation treaty as negotiated between the two governments. Two days after the signing of the treaty on April 20, Ōhira made a statement with regard to the Japanese interpretation of the Nationalist flag. He stated that the flag flown by the air line did not fall under the category of a "national flag" in the usual sense. Taiwan reacted strongly against the Ōhira statement and terminated flights of China Air Lines the following day.⁵ The position of the Taiwan government was that it could tolerate the claim by the People's Republic that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of the territory, or a province, of the People's Republic of China," or even concede Japan the right to "fully understand and respect" this claim. But it could not

⁴Nagano Nobutoshi, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei no akushū* (The shaking of hands between the emperor and Deng Xiaoping) (Tokyo: Gyōseimondai kenkyūsho, 1983), p. 118. The six points were as follows: (1) A Japan-China aviation treaty will be concluded immediately on the basis of the Japan-China joint communiqué. At the same time, the Japan-Taiwan air route will be maintained by concluding a nongovernment agreement. (2) The Japanese private company to fly the Japan-Taiwan route will not be Japan Air Lines. (3) The Japanese government will not demand a change in the name and flag of "China Air Lines," but will express the government's understanding of the company name and flag in a separate way. (4) "China Air Lines" will use Haneda International Airport. Until the Narita Airport is opened, both the Chinese and the Taiwan airlines will be using the Haneda airport, but adjustments will be made concerning the timing. (5) The flights of "China Air Lines" using Osaka Airport will be moved to some other airport that Japan and Taiwan agree on. (6) The offices and other services of "China Air Lines" in Japan will be commissioned to representative offices and other businesses. However, necessary considerations will be given to the safety of air traffic and the stability of the livelihood of the employees.

⁵"China Air Lines (Taiwan)" flights were resumed with the conclusion of a Japan-Taiwan nongovernmental aviation agreement on July 9, 1985.

accept Japan's making its own independent judgment on the status of Taiwan.⁶

The reaction of the pro-Taiwan groups in the Liberal Democratic Party was vehement. When the treaty was presented to the Diet on May 7, it received the unanimous support of all present—because those who opposed the treaty had decided not to be present at the meeting. Altogether some eighty members, including Kishi, Funada, forty members of the Fukuda faction, as well as members of Seirankai, were among the absent. The aviation treaty issue signified the depth of the cleavage within the Liberal Democratic Party. The pro-Taiwan groups continued to attack Tanaka and Ōhira over their handling of foreign affairs. Under the circumstances, the government thought it best to take time before tackling the negotiations for a peace and friendship treaty.

The Chinese, however, expressed interest in expediting the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. Domestic developments in both Japan and the United States were moving against Prime Minister Tanaka and President Nixon. Nixon had to resign on August 9 after the Watergate scandal. Tanaka's financial dealings were coming under public scrutiny. The Chinese leadership was concerned that its relations with Japan might suffer a setback if Fukuda, with so many pro-Taiwan members in his faction, were to succeed Tanaka. China proposed to start the preliminary talks for the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty on the occasion of Vice-Minister Han Nianlong's visit to Japan on November 12.

Han Nianlong conferred with Vice-Minister Tōgō Fumihiko and presented a broad framework for the treaty. It is said that the Foreign Ministry was relieved to be assured that the Chinese side did not intend to involve the Taiwan issue in the treaty negotiations. However, the proposal contained the "antihegemony" principle.⁷ Tōgō recalls that when the Chinese side referred to the inclusion of the "antihegemony" principle, he immediately responded that since a peace and friendship treaty should deal with long-term relations of peace and friendship between Japan and China, the opposition to the hegemony of third countries was not an issue appropriate for the treaty.⁸ The Foreign Ministry decided, however, to keep the Chinese "antihegemony" proposal a tightly guarded secret in order to avoid any international repercussion. No reference to "antihegemony" appeared in the Japanese newspapers at that time.

Nevertheless, it is not certain whether the Foreign Ministry foresaw

⁶Hirano, *Gaikō kisha nikki*, vol. 3, pp. 15f.

⁷Ibid., p. 255.

⁸Tōgō Fumihiko, *Nichibei gaikō sanjūnen* (Thirty years of Japan-United States diplomacy) (Tokyo: Sekai no ugaki sha, 1982), p. 211.

how serious an impact the “antihegemony” proposal would have on the negotiations that were to follow. In fact, the negotiations were to be prolonged for three years and nine months. In the meantime, Tanaka resigned on November 26 and was succeeded by Miki Takeo. Miki appointed Miyazawa Kiichi as foreign minister and decided to take up the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty with China as a priority item in his foreign policy. He had been an early promoter of normalization among the Liberal Democratic Party leaders. He was also an optimist who did not grasp the international political significance of the “hegemony” issue. Nor did he trust the bureaucratic caution of the Foreign Ministry. On January 16, a second meeting took place between Tōgō and Ambassador Chen Chu. The meeting coincided with Miyazawa’s visit to Moscow upon the invitation of the Soviet Union to discuss the Japan-Soviet peace treaty. The Soviet Union was timing its negotiations with Japan with the Japanese-Chinese negotiations in view.

The content of the Tōgō-Chen meeting was not disclosed by the Foreign Ministry. However, on January 23, *Tokyo Shinbun* scooped the Japanese government’s “antihegemony” position and turned the question into a highly contested public issue. The article wrote that incorporating Article 7 of the Zhou-Tanaka joint communiqué in the main body of the treaty caused enormous difficulties for the Japanese government. It argued that in the view of the government the first part of the article, which stated that “normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries,” might be harmless, but the second part, which referred to the opposition “to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish such hegemony,” should not be brought into the treaty. Such an inclusion might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as the formation of “a de facto anti-Soviet alliance treaty, and might cause undesirable effect on the treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union.”⁹ As the pros and cons were weighed, the *Asahi Shinbun* in an editorial on April 20 issued a strong warning that the inclusion of the “hegemony” clause might signify a fundamental change in Japanese foreign policy by recognizing Soviet foreign policy as aggressive. It urged the government to exercise caution and perseverance in the course of the negotiations.¹⁰ A broad consensus was growing among the political and media leaders. Socialist and Communist leaders shared the view with many in the Liberal Democratic Party that no clause should be included in a bilateral treaty that reflected a particular political alignment of the time.¹¹

⁹*Tokyo Shinbun*, January 23, 1975.

¹⁰*Asahi Shinbun*, April 20, 1975.

¹¹Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri expressed pessimism over the possibility of concluding a peace and friendship treaty without reference to “antihegemony.” He had firsthand knowledge of

Miki tried to break the impasse by devising a compromise formula in reference to “hegemony.” He was intent on concluding a peace and friendship treaty during his tenure in office. He attempted a new interpretation by presenting “antihegemony” as a universal principle for peace in which no state imposed its will on another by force. He was to try to persuade China to share his interpretation.¹² He sent his personal emissaries to China to convey his intentions, and he tried to convince the Chinese that he was quite willing to accommodate to the Chinese position. With little faith in the Foreign Ministry, Miki made extensive use of personal and informal channels.

It was at the annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York that Foreign Minister Miyazawa met twice with the Chinese foreign minister, Qiao Guanhua, and attempted to push the negotiations. He was under Miki’s instructions to seek ways with the Chinese to break the impasse. At the first meeting, Miyazawa presented a four-point understanding of “hegemony” which had been worked out carefully in the Foreign Ministry. These four points, which became known as Miyazawa’s four principles, were as follows:

1. Hegemony will be opposed not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also anywhere else.
2. Antihegemony is not directed against a specific third party.
3. Antihegemony does not mean any common action by Japan and China.
4. A principle that is in contradiction to the spirit of the United Nations Charter cannot be accepted.¹³

Qiao Guanhua argued against the Japanese interpretation and expressed the Chinese preference for sticking to the Japan-China joint communiqué rather than concluding a peace and friendship treaty without reference to “hegemony.” With no progress gained, a stalemate over the treaty negotiations was to continue over the next two years.

However, Japan made one more attempt as a follow-up to the New York ministerial meetings. In November, the Foreign Ministry prepared a draft treaty that included the “antihegemony” clause while incorporating Miyazawa’s four principles. The draft was sent to China through the Japanese Mission to the United Nations. The Chinese did not respond to the revised proposal. When finally asked why, by Ambassador Ogawa in Beijing, they stated that the text was a retrogression from the joint communiqué and

the Chinese intentions and had brought back the Chinese proposals for normalization that included “antihegemonism.”

¹²Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shobei no akushū*, p. 155.

¹³Ibid., p. 164.

therefore unacceptable to the Chinese. Thereafter, the negotiations between Japan and China were suspended for more than two years. Nagano Nobutoshi, a *Tokyo Shinbun* correspondent who covered the Foreign Ministry and wrote an intensive study of the process leading to the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty, argues that the presentation of the revised proposal was the greatest failure made by the Miki cabinet in its negotiations with China. The inclusion of the “antihegemony” clause, regardless of the incorporation of the Miyazawa principles, meant that Japan’s agreed upon reference to “antihegemony” was put on record. As a result, it led to the inclusion of the “antihegemony” clause in the main body of the treaty as a matter of course when it reached the final negotiating stage in 1977.¹⁴

What kept the treaty negotiations from making progress, however, was fundamentally the domestic political developments in China. With the successive deaths of Premier Zhou Enlai, Marshal Zhu De, and Chairman Mao Zedong, China plunged into a period of fierce political struggle. Vice-Premier Deng and others were dismissed by the “Gang of Four” led by Mao’s widow. After their purge, Premier Hua Guofeng became chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and undertook the reestablishment of the new leadership group. Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua was replaced by Huang Hua. The political struggle also affected the treaty negotiations with Japan. Deng Xiaoping’s criticism of Qiao Guanhua’s negotiations with Miyazawa was probably a reflection of the political cleavage that grew at the time.¹⁵ Under the circumstances, it was hardly possible for China to initiate any diplomatic move toward Japan.

Within Japan, too, political instability prevented Miki from taking diplomatic initiatives. The prime minister had to confront the Lockheed scandals and intense factional strife. The general elections for the House of Representatives on December 5, 1986, resulted in a great loss to the Liberal Democratic Party. Miki resigned on December 17, to take the responsibility for the defeat. Personally, Miki had tried to expedite the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty with China. Foreign Minister Miyazawa, who proved much more cautious in dealing with the “antihegemony” issue, won the confidence of a broad spectrum of the Liberal Democratic Party, including that of the pro-Taiwan groups.

On December 24, Fukuda’s cabinet was formed. His premiership was based upon an interfactional compromise: Fukuda would precede as the prime minister, to be succeeded by Ōhira after two years. It was well

¹⁴Ibid., p. 167.

¹⁵Ogawa Heishirō, “Kyo kanka moto gaishō no fukkatsu” (The return of Qiao Guanhua, former foreign minister), *Toowa* (Tokyo) (Summer 1983).

known that the Fukuda faction consisted of many pro-Taiwan members. For Fukuda to follow his factional line was to invite opposition by many others, namely, the Ōhira and Tanaka factions and other pro-China groups. The Fukuda cabinet vacillated in coming up with a clear China policy, for internal factional reasons. Fukuda himself was said to have realized the eventual need to conclude a peace and friendship treaty with China. From a fairly early stage of his cabinet, he had a small group organized within the Foreign Ministry to carefully go over the existing problems and to seek new approaches to the question. This group met monthly and consisted of the vice-minister, heads of the Asia and Treaty Bureaus, and a few others.¹⁶

In July 1977, Chinese domestic politics took another turn. Deng Xiaoping was brought back to power as vice-premier and vice-chairman of the Communist Party. His return encouraged expectations on the part of those Japanese who were pushing for the reestablishment of closer ties with China. On October 20, the Council to Promote the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty was organized with Kosaka Zentarō as chairman. The main objective of the council was to exert pressure on Fukuda to take early action on the treaty question. The business community also looked to the pragmatic modernization course that was advocated by Deng Xiaoping. In January, Fujiyama Aiichirō visited China to discuss Chinese economic needs. He brought back the message that China was in need of energy, steel, chemicals, and so forth and looked to Japan for cooperation. The business community also began to demand government action. The conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty was expected to pave the way for long-term economic agreements, such as the export of industrial plants.

In the fall of 1977, Fukuda began to move quietly to undertake treaty negotiations with China. He stated at a press conference on November 20 that conditions were moving slowly toward the resumption of negotiations. He called back Ambassador Satō Shōji from Beijing to give a report on the Chinese prospects. Satō, who had served as vice-minister, had been posted to Beijing in June. At that time, the prime minister had told him that no new developments were likely to take place and that Satō was to wait quietly in Beijing for awhile. Satō realized immediately that the order from the prime minister to return home signified a change in policy. He contacted Han Nianlong and Liao Chengzhi in order to feel out Chinese interests. He felt that the Chinese leadership had become more flexible on the “antihegemony” issue and reported to Foreign Minister Sonoda and Prime Minister Fukuda on his findings.¹⁷

¹⁶Statement of Owada Hisashi to the author on September 8, 1984.

¹⁷Statement of Satō Shōji to the author on February 6, 1986.

Satō reported that the time was ripe for Japan to pursue treaty negotiations with China. He observed that China was now embarked on a modernization course that required contacts with Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. Japan had little to gain from concluding the treaty, as such a treaty could not bring any security assurance to Japan or provide Japan with a “China card.” China, on the other hand, could benefit both economically and politically and play a “Japan card” usefully through demonstrating close relations with Japan. Nevertheless, Satō recommended the initiation of treaty negotiations for the following two reasons: first, to undertake diplomatic negotiations when Japan was in a more advantageous position; second, to forestall the politicization of the treaty issue by the pro-China groups. Fukuda instructed Satō to proceed slowly and with care. Until a breakthrough became imminent, the Foreign Ministry was to take full charge of the negotiations.¹⁸

There were two reasons for Fukuda’s cautious approach. First was the division within the Liberal Democratic Party, which necessitated extreme sensitivity in handling the negotiation process. Second was the presence of Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, whose ambition was to undertake the conclusion of the treaty himself. Sonoda seemed relatively untroubled by the delicate situation within the party. In order to keep the treaty negotiations under control, therefore, Fukuda made it clear that the negotiations had to proceed carefully by the ministry officials and thus forestalled early involvement by the foreign minister.¹⁹

Upon receiving a report from Ambassador Satō in early January that preliminary talks with Han Nianlong were in sight, Fukuda decided to make clear his intention to proceed with the negotiations. In his policy speech at the resumed session of the Diet on January 21, 1978, he stated that he had endeavored to conclude the peace and friendship treaty with China in a way acceptable to both countries. He expressed his judgment that “the time for proceeding with the negotiations seemed to be maturing” and said that he would make additional efforts to expedite the process.²⁰

In Beijing, Satō carried out two meetings with Han Nianlong on February 14 and March 4. The purpose of the talks was to review each other’s position and in particular the question of “hegemonism.” While engaged in preliminary talks at the governmental level, China invited Kōmeitō to send a delegation to Beijing. Although it is not possible to determine the exact Chinese motivation underlying the invitation, it is

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Statement of Owada Hisashi.

²⁰Prime Minister Fukuda’s policy statement to the Diet, January 21, 1978.

probably safe to predict that the Chinese side was anxious to grasp the thinking of the Fukuda cabinet through a channel they knew and trusted. As in 1972 when they conveyed their conditions for normalization through Chairman Takeiri of Kōmeitō, China sent, through Kōmeitō Secretary-General Yano, a four-point opinion on the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. This message included recognition that opposing “hegemony” did not signify the undertaking of a joint action by China and Japan. They admitted that both countries possessed their respective foreign policies and that they should not interfere in each other’s internal affairs. The Chinese showed readiness to resume negotiations and expressed their desire for a prompt decision by Fukuda. They also stated their willingness to invite Foreign Minister Sonoda to visit China if he wished.²¹

Fukuda did not respond to the message brought back by the Kōmeitō mission. However, he held a meeting on March 22 with the top officials in charge of foreign affairs, in order to examine the timing and the basic policy with regard to the peace and friendship treaty negotiations. Those present included Foreign Minister Sonoda, Cabinet Secretary Abe Shintarō, Vice-Minister Arita, Deputy Vice-Minister Takashima, and the relevant bureau directors of the Foreign Ministry. It was the first substantial meeting on the treaty involving Fukuda himself. Fukuda was briefed on the major problems to be faced in the course of the negotiations. As to the controversial question regarding “antihegemony,” thirteen alternative texts had been prepared. Fukuda examined every one of them and chose the thirteenth, which stated that “the present treaty shall not be directed against a specific third country.”²² The policy preparation for the negotiations was completed. The next day, Fukuda started canvassing his party leaders. He requested Ōhira, who was secretary-general of the party, to undertake the coordination of party opinion. Fukuda himself dealt with the diehards in order to gain their approval. The party debate was intense, and consensus could not be reached easily.

A critical incident took place on April 12, which stiffened the position of those who opposed the signing of the treaty of peace and friendship. A group of Chinese fishing boats armed with machine guns approached the Senkaku Islands. Some of them entered Japan’s territorial waters and ignored the Japanese coast guard’s order to leave the area. The question of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands was an issue that had not been settled between Zhou Enlai and Tanaka in 1972. The Japanese position was that the Senkaku Islands formed a part of the South-West Islands, which belonged historically to Japan. Both the People’s Republic

²¹Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōbei no akusbu*, pp. 210f.

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 216f.

and Taiwan became interested in the islands after a scientific exploration by ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) in 1968, which reported the discovery of petroleum resources in the continental shelf surrounding the islands. To Tanaka's request to clarify the territorial question, Zhou is said to have avoided it, characterizing the islands issue as minuscule. His attitude was to maintain the Chinese claim on the islands without attempting to take any steps for a solution.

The Japanese government approached the incident with great care. Fukuda instructed the Foreign Ministry to protest to the Chinese government, while making clear his position to dissociate the incident from the treaty negotiations. Those Liberal Democratic Party members in opposition to the treaty took the occasion to strengthen their criticism of Chinese behavior and urged the government to take concrete action. The Chinese government reaction was to refute the Japanese protest on the basis that the Chinese fishing boats were in China's territorial waters. However, in a few days, the Chinese began to take a conciliatory attitude and to explain the incident as accidental. Thereafter, the fishing boats began to leave the area.

Fukuda, however, felt that he could not expedite the treaty negotiations without clarifying the Senkaku Islands issue. He himself left for the United States for a meeting with President Carter and instructed Ambassador Satō to take up the question at a high level. At a meeting with Vice-Minister Han Nianlong on May 10, Satō was able to obtain Chinese assurance that the problems concerning the Senkaku Islands would be dealt with from the viewpoint of the overall importance of Japanese-Chinese relations. The vice-minister also agreed to develop Chinese-Japanese relations and to endeavor to conclude the treaty of peace and friendship in accordance with the joint communiqué. Through the process of solving the Senkaku Islands incident, Satō was able to grasp the sense that the Chinese were anxious to accelerate the negotiating process, even at the expense of leaving the territorial question of the Senkaku Islands unresolved.²³

Once the Chinese position became clear, Fukuda decided to make the final arrangements by solidifying support within the party. On May 16, he summoned the main opponents, such as Nadao Kōkichi, Machimura Kingo, and Fujio Masayuki, and solicited their support. He also requested Ōhira to endeavor to gain consensus support from the party members. The Liberal Democratic Party had been seriously divided over the treaty issue. More than half of the members were in opposition to the conclusion of the treaty, if not to any hasty undertaking of the question. Basically, these members believed that there was very little merit to the conclusion of a

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 234–36.

peace and friendship treaty with China. They thought that the inclusion of an “antihegemony” principle might involve Japan in a Sino-Soviet conflict, and some expressed preference for concentrating greater efforts on strengthening relations with the United States and other countries in the free world. Those who advocated expediting the negotiations felt that the time for concluding the treaty was already overdue and that the treaty would help stabilize the situation in Asia. Those party members who opposed the treaty were concentrated in the Fukuda and Nakasone factions, while those who supported the promotion of the treaty negotiations were in the Tanaka, Ōhira, and Miki factions.²⁴

To round up the party opinion the Executive Council, which is the highest policy-making body of the Liberal Democratic Party, held a meeting on May 26. After much criticism was aired, the chairman of the council, Nakasone Yasuhiro, proposed that the party present two broad guiding principles to the government. These principles were, first, that Japan should neither interfere in the Sino-Soviet conflict nor allow the conflict to influence Japan, and thus maintain its integrity and interest. Second, Japan should maintain its territorial rights and follow a policy of protecting its own national security as well as the peace and stability of Asia.²⁵ A consensus emerged to formally support the undertaking of the treaty negotiations. The fact that Fukuda allowed sufficient time for the opposition to articulate their views helped bring about the consensus. Besides, those who opposed the treaty were mindful of the fact that they could not afford to undermine the political position of Prime Minister Fukuda himself. Now that the party position was solidified, Fukuda instructed the government to open talks with China. Ambassador Satō formally notified Han Nianlong on May 31 that Japan was ready to reopen the treaty negotiations. The Chinese government accepted the Japanese proposal and indicated a preference for starting the negotiations in early July, with Vice-Minister Han Nianlong as head of the delegation. Satō returned to Japan for consultations.

Japan and China held fourteen meetings from July 21 to August 8 in Beijing and negotiated the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. From the beginning, the treatment of “antihegemony” was the central issue. The original negotiating text prepared by Japan already included the “antihegemony” clause, preceded by a qualifying sentence. It read as follows:

²⁴*Asahi Shinbun* ran an opinion poll on April 5–9, 1978, of Liberal Democratic Party members of parliament with regard to the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty with China. Of those who responded, 167 expressed reservation while 148 supported expediting the negotiations. *Asahi Shinbun*, April 12, 1978.

²⁵Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei no akusbu*, pp. 237f.

The present Treaty is not directed against any specific third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

The important differences between the proposed text and article seven of the Japan-China joint communiqué were the addition of the terms “specific” and “or in any other region.” These additions were intended to dilute any anti-Soviet effect that the treaty might have.²⁶ The Chinese side rejected the Japanese proposal as being too accommodating to the Soviet design. It presented a counterproposal that read as follows: “The present Treaty is not directed against any third country that does not seek hegemony.” The Japanese side could not accept the Chinese version, but both sides continued to exchange proposals with minor revisions.

At the end of July a deadlock occurred. The top officials of the Foreign Ministry held a meeting to prepare a new proposal to break the impasse. Deputy Vice-Minister Takashima drafted a new “third country” clause, which Owada Hisashi, the prime minister’s secretary, on confirmation by the Foreign Ministry, rewrote. Fukuda approved the new version, which was sent to Beijing as the revised Japanese government proposed text. This version was favored because it was easy to understand and was considered to be in line with Fukuda’s avowed omnidirectional foreign policy. At the end it was the Takashima text which the Chinese accepted, and it became Article IV of the peace and friendship treaty. It read as follows: “The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.”²⁷

As the treaty negotiations reached the final stage, the director-general of the Asian Bureau, Nakae Yōsuke, returned from Beijing to seek instructions. The Foreign Ministry wished to have the foreign minister in Beijing to direct the final stages of the negotiations. The role of Sonoda in the process of the negotiations merits special attention. It is recalled that the prime minister made clear from the beginning that the Foreign Ministry was to carry out the preliminary negotiations. When the treaty negotiations were resumed in July, again the prime minister instructed that Ambassador Satō and the Foreign Ministry were to be in charge of the negotiations. Fukuda, who was sensitive to intraparty reaction, carefully managed to keep Sonoda from running the negotiations. Sonoda himself was committed to an early conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. He was also anxious to handle it himself. The long delay imposed on him by the prime minister was a frustrating experience. Sonoda recounted in

²⁶Ibid., pp. 250–53.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 253–66.

magazine interviews later that he tried to push Fukuda into quick action. He also claims that at the time of the May summit meeting, he asked President Carter through Secretary Vance to urge the prime minister to expedite the conclusion of the treaty.²⁸ Whether Sonoda actually made such a request cannot be verified. But Foreign Ministry officials close to the prime minister at the time deny recalling any such pressure from President Carter.

It was, therefore, with great relief and joy that Sonoda left for Beijing on August 8 to negotiate the treaty in its final phase. At the second ministerial meeting, held on August 9, Huang Hua announced the Chinese acceptance of the revised Japanese government text, that is, the Takashima text. Thereafter, the treaty negotiations advanced rapidly. The treaty had a preamble and five articles. In the first article, the two countries expressed their obligation “to develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship.” In the second article, they declared that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each was opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. The third article dealt with the advancement of economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The fourth contained the “third countries” clause, and the fifth stipulated the provisions with regard to entry into force and termination.²⁹

A last-minute hitch that complicated Sonoda’s task in Beijing was the demand by the opponents to the treaty within the Liberal Democratic Party to clarify the Chinese attitude toward the Senkaku Islands and the Sino-Soviet defense alliance. They voiced their criticism when the Executive Council of the Liberal Democratic Party met to examine the final version. Foreign Minister Sonoda was thus obliged to raise these issues at his meeting with Deng Xiaoping on August 10. Deng stated that the latest incident in the Senkaku Islands area was accidental and confirmed that the islands would be left as they were for the time being. It was again a postponement of the solution, which China decided to adopt without settling the territorial issue. As to the Sino-Soviet defense alliance, Deng expressed his intention to notify of the nonextension of the treaty in April and to terminate it in accordance with the treaty provisions.³⁰ Having taken care of the apprehensions of the Liberal Democratic Party diehards, Sonoda signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China on August 12. Six years had passed after the normalization of relations between the two countries.

²⁸Sonoda Sunao, “Kihaku no nitchū jōyaku kōshō” (The spirited Japan-China treaty negotiations), *Nikkei Business* (Tokyo) 278 (November 3, 1980).

²⁹Treaty of peace and friendship between the People’s Republic of China and Japan.

³⁰Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōbei no akusbu*, pp. 284–88.

The questions to be addressed are these, then: What were the determining factors in the treaty-concluding process, and what effects did the treaty exert upon international political relations in East Asia? Who gained what from the conclusion of the treaty? There is no doubt that the consolidation of the Chinese domestic situation was the most fundamental factor underlying the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty between Japan and China. Deng Xiaoping's modernization course prompted China to improve its relations not only with Japan but with the United States and other Western countries. Once the Chinese showed some signs of flexibility over the "antihegemony" issue, as well as a willingness to undertake negotiations with Japan, Fukuda decided to proceed. But in the decision-making process involving the negotiations, the determining factor was opinion within the Liberal Democratic Party. Fukuda paid great attention to building up support within the party, and these efforts affected both the timing and the process of the negotiations.

As to the impact of external forces, the Soviet factor was the most significant, in that the controversy over the treaty centered on the question of "antihegemonism." It was well known that China envisaged the treaty to a great extent in terms of the strategic benefit it would gain from enhanced treaty relations with Japan. The prevailing opinion within Japan, however, was to stand outside the Sino-Soviet conflict. Fukuda characterized the basic tenor of his foreign policy as *zenhoi*, or omnidirectional, which meant that Japan's relationship with every state should be based on the respective merit of friendship with each nation. Japanese foreign policy was based on the principle that Japan would neither antagonize anyone nor use one country against another.³¹ The relationship that Fukuda tried to establish with China and the Soviet Union was not only to keep an equal distance from the two, but to keep each set of relationships from being affected by the other.

It is not hard to imagine that neither China nor the Soviet Union nor the United States was interested in establishing the kind of omnidirectional relationship that Fukuda tried to promote. Ever since 1976, when the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty emerged on the Japanese diplomatic agenda, the Soviet Union had threatened Japan with the possible unfavorable repercussions that the signing of such a treaty might bring to Japan. On November 26, 1977, a few days after Fukuda had announced his readiness to resume the treaty negotiations, an article appeared in *Pravda* announcing that the Soviet Union would be entitled to take "countermeasures" to protect its own interest if Japan proceeded to conclude a peace treaty that included an "antihegemony" clause. From that time on, the taking of countermeasures became a constant theme in the

³¹Statement of Owada Hisashi.

Soviet attack against Japan's signing of the treaty. On June 19, the new Soviet ambassador to Japan, Dmitrii S. Polianskii, presented Vice-Minister Arita Keisuke with a note that stated that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to Japan's signing the treaty.³²

In the end, the Soviet Union was not successful in preventing Japan from concluding a treaty of peace and friendship with China. What the Soviet Union was able to do, according to Kimura Hiroshi, was to influence Japan in three ways. First, it was able to delay the treaty process. Second, it succeeded in making the Japanese work hard to minimize the effects of the "antihegemony" clause by inserting a "third party" clause into the treaty. Third, it made some Japanese feel that Japan should make more serious efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Kimura argues that the Soviet Union failed to produce any direct influence on Japan because it kept on pressing hard "without providing any alternative or attractive incentive whatsoever to encourage the change of policy on the part of Japan."³³ Besides, there were hardly any coercive measures that the Soviet Union could actually take without proving themselves to be hegemonous.

Of all the incentives that the Soviets might have offered, the one that would have had a direct impact on Japan was the settlement of the Northern Territories issue. For a brief period during the Tanaka cabinet, there was some hope that the prospects for normalization with China might pressure the Soviet Union to make concessions. In 1972 and 1973, as Japan drew closer to China, the Soviet Union did make various overtures to Japan. This was why Tanaka went to Moscow to seek Soviet accommodations to the long-held Japanese territorial demands. However, since the Soviet Union ultimately made no concessions on the territorial issue, and even strengthened its military buildup in the Northern Islands, Japan was left to proceed to consolidate its relationship with China. Any attempt at playing the "China card" was thus short-lived. Fukuda's omnidirectional policy was an attempt to keep Japan uninvolved in divisive international political alignments.

American influence on Japan over the treaty issue was much less direct than Soviet influence. At the time that Japan was engaged in preparing for the treaty negotiations, the Carter administration was moving ahead with the negotiations for normalization. The issue that the United States had to

³²For the Soviet role with regard to the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, see Kimura Hiroshi, "The Conclusion of the Sino-Japan Peace Treaty (1978): Soviet Coercive Strategy and Its Limits," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (England) 18(2-3) (Summer-Autumn 1985). For the impact of the treaty on the Soviet Union, see Peggy L. Falkenheim, "The Impact of the Peace and Friendship Treaty on Soviet-Japanese Relations," *Asian Survey* 19 (December 1979).

³³Kimura, "Conclusion of Peace Treaty," pp. 159f.

tackle was quite different from that faced by Japan. The United States had to deal with the future security and status of Taiwan and with its continued right to safeguard Taiwan through sales of arms. It is probably accurate to state that in general the United States favored a treaty of peace and friendship between Japan and China. President Carter is said to have spoken in favor of it at the summit meeting with Fukuda. When National Security Adviser Brzezinski went to Beijing on May 20, he emphasized the long-term strategic importance of U.S. relations with China. He said that the U.S. position was to regard "close friendship between Japan and China" as "complementary and reinforcing to the close friendship between the United States and Japan." He also promised Huang Hua that he would urge Fukuda to expedite the signing of the treaty with the "antihegemony" clause.³⁴

Brzezinski states in his memoirs that he assured Fukuda "that the United States did not object to the inclusion of that clause [antihegemony] and that it favored an expeditious conclusion of the treaty." He asserts that he thus impressed the Japanese and led them to conclude the treaty shortly afterwards.³⁵ It is difficult, however, to take his avowed influence over Japanese decision making at face value. To begin with, there is no indication from the policy debate in Tokyo that the U.S. attitude toward "antihegemony" was an issue of much concern. The "antihegemony" clause had already been included in the Shanghai communiqué, and it was widely known that one important component of the U.S. rapprochement with China was the idea of counteracting Soviet strategic designs. Moreover, it is recalled that Fukuda had already decided upon the conditions for negotiations in early March, considerably earlier than Brzezinski's visit. What had kept Fukuda from accelerating the negotiations was the opposition within his party and the expression of Chinese readiness to respond to the Japanese position. The United States, therefore, was hardly in a position to determine Japanese policy on this issue.³⁶ It is, however, ironic to note that the continuing assumption of major U.S. influence over Japan was to lead Brzezinski to believe that the United States was able to influence Japan to take a position of strategic significance together with the United States and China against the Soviet hegemony. The Soviet Union on the other hand

³⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), pp. 216–18.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 218.

³⁶Owada recalls that he explained to Brzezinski and Michel Oksenberg the basic thinking of Japanese foreign policy and the reason why Japan could not join in an "antihegemony" lineup. Subsequent studies on the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty tend to take Brzezinski's assertion at face value and conclude that United States pressure led Fukuda to decide to conclude the treaty.

observed that it was the United States that pushed both Japan and China to accelerate the conclusion of the treaty.

Regardless of the Japanese intentions, international political events subsequent to the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty strengthened the strategic relations between China and the United States. The most important developments were the signing of the Vietnam-Soviet friendship treaty on November 3, 1978, and the normalization of U.S.-China relations on January 1, 1979. As Japan became more and more drawn into the U.S.-China strategic relationship, tensions grew between it and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union became even more determined to refuse to deal with the Northern Territories issue and expanded the deployment of Soviet troops to these islands.

As far as Japan is concerned, the diplomatic gains from the treaty were limited. Even with regard to its relations with China, no provisions in the peace and friendship treaty provided anything more than what had been established through the Zhou-Tanaka joint communiqué. Domestically, however, the conclusion of the treaty eliminated a source of intense political contention among the Liberal Democratic Party members, which had lasted since the normalization by Tanaka. Particularly, the fact that the treaty was accomplished by Fukuda, whose faction contained the largest number of opponents to normalization, resulted in bringing about support from an opposing source and therefore contributed to the stable development of Japan-China relations. In this sense, Japan's major benefit from the treaty was the elimination of division in domestic opinion and politics. The business community, which had become interested in the prospects for increased economic activities that the modernization policy of Deng Xiaoping promised, welcomed the treaty as the legal framework that assured the expansion of economic relations.

For China, the treaty brought great benefits, on the external as well as the internal front. Externally, it was able to achieve an international document with "antihegemonism" as its main provision. The demonstrable effect on the Soviet Union was enormous, especially after China achieved normalization with the United States. However, the main objective in establishing close relations with both Japan and the United States, according to Ambassador Satō, was to bring about an international environment that would enable the pursuit of Deng Xiaoping's modernization policy. China was in need of a secure international environment both in the north against the Soviet Union and in the south against Vietnam. It was, moreover, in need of capital, technology, and trade. Japan and the United States were the necessary partners to help Deng carry out his policy objectives. That was why Deng made the enormous concession to the United States to let

arms sales to Taiwan continue even after normalization.³⁷ It was the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping and his policy objectives that determined the parallel developments leading to the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty with Japan and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.

³⁷Statement of Satō Shōji.

7. Conclusion

No two countries could have approached the same foreign policy objective with such different perspectives and through such contrasting processes. From a common commitment to contain communist expansion in Asia, the United States and Japan reversed their policy toward China and in the course of the 1970s succeeded in normalizing relations. What triggered the change was the strategic initiative taken by President Nixon to open up channels of communication with China, although within Japan the political pressure for normalization had been mounting for a long time.

In concluding the study of the normalization process, three questions must be addressed in order to bring the examination into a clearer context. The first question relates to the basic foreign policy perspectives of the two countries. The second concerns the decision-making processes, and the third deals with the impact of normalization on U.S.-Japan relations.

It is a well-known fact that Nixon and Kissinger perceived the opening with China in the strategic context of containing the Soviet Union and eventually gaining détente. Although pressure was growing against the rigid China policy of the past, from liberal scholars and journalists, it was not the domestic situation that prompted Nixon's action. Nixon and Kissinger saw in the intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry an opportunity to break into the monolithic Soviet bloc and to obtain greater leverage in dealing not only with China but also with the Soviet Union.

In the realistic appreciation of power politics and the audacity with which they pursued their policy goals, Nixon and Kissinger were unrivaled by most postwar American leaders. Yet it is important to recognize that the cold war had introduced a strategic-military component into the American foreign policy outlook, and Nixon and Kissinger were acting within the tradition of an enhanced American leadership in a tense bipolar world. Before normalization was even envisaged, Nixon perceived U.S. interest in protecting a communist China against Soviet domination. Thus, once China responded to the U.S. overtures to counter an expanding Soviet military power and political domination, the United States and China could form a relationship that might be characterized as a quasi-strategic alliance. In fact, the strategic interest shared by the United States and China overrode all other impediments against normalization, especially when the perceived Soviet threat intensified. The Shanghai communiqué of February 28, 1972, and the normalization of relations on January 1, 1979, both

came in the wake of a growing Soviet threat that led China to give priority consideration to strategic needs over the settling of bilateral issues, notably the Taiwan question.

It is important to note how the strategic interests of the United States are backed up by military measures under changing political and security situations. In 1975, under severe Chinese criticism, Kissinger, whose basic approach to strategic moves was more diplomatic, decided to extend military ties with China in order to prevent further deterioration of U.S.-China relations. Others, such as Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1975 and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski under the Carter administration, focused more directly on the growing military dangers of Soviet power and were prepared to extend assistance in military-related technology and arms to ensure a strong China in the event of a global war. As a result, in a sharpened cold-war context when cold-war advocates took the lead, China was held as a quasi-ally of the United States with which military ties were to be augmented. However, in a *détente* context in which reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union commanded priority attention, a more cautious approach was pursued, thereby provoking disappointment and dissatisfaction. The strategic-military nature of U.S.-China relations contained elements of ambivalence that prevented these relations from making rapid progress. The unsettled nature of the Taiwan question was an added irritant to the smooth development of relations between the two countries.

In the case of Japan, there is a conspicuous absence of strategic-military thinking in the Japanese perception of foreign policy. The fact that the military alliance with the United States through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty served as the primary guarantee of Japanese security left the Japanese in a peculiar political state of mind. To begin with, the defeat in World War II and the enactment of the peace constitution after the war developed an aversion not only against nuclear weapons but also against the use of military means in foreign relations. Moreover, the conservative coalition that governed Japan almost continuously after the war based its security policy on the military alliance with the United States through the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Japan's foreign policy was essentially geared to support U.S. global as well as regional policy in Asia. Between a strong pacifist sentiment and a total commitment to the security arrangements with the United States, Japan's foreign policy options were necessarily limited. Controversies over foreign policy were in substance domestic debates to gain political advantage, on the part of the government as well as of the opposition parties.

The normalization question was one of the most controversial political

issues in postwar times. It was promoted by a coalition not only of opposition party members and various left-wing groups, but also of pro-China, antimainstream members of the Liberal Democratic Party. Any unilateral move by Japan toward normalization with China would have had global strategic implications. But those who pressed for normalization were motivated primarily by the desire to improve bilateral relations between Japan and China. Those who called for the termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in favor of normalization were really not prepared to undertake a systemic change in the international political order. Normalization was simply the best political issue with which to fight the government.

This is why it became necessary for the Liberal Democratic Party to take the lead in the normalization process, once the United States reversed its containment policy toward China and started to open channels of communication. When Satō failed to obtain any positive response from the government in Beijing, Tanaka, Ōhira, and Miki joined to unseat Satō and to form a new government, which placed the highest priority on the settlement of the Chinese question. They were united in the conviction that it was politically unsustainable to let the normalization issue linger on any longer and that Japan had to conclude the process at least ahead of the United States.

There is another point of difference in the foreign policy perspectives of the United States and Japan that merits careful examination. As a global power, the United States tends to tailor its policy to developments at the global level. Japan, on the other hand, inclines to concentrate its attention on changes in the immediate neighboring region. At times the difference in the basic perspectives causes policy conflicts of a sort that cannot easily be overcome. In the course of the normalization, Nixon and Kissinger approached China in order to bring about a major change in the global power structure. There is no evidence that either of them carefully weighed the implications of their action on the Asian countries. Their assumption was that the countries in the region would adjust to the *fait accompli* even if it were at the expense of local or regional interests. Japanese leaders were soured by Nixon's unilateral action, a sentiment that took a long time to overcome. Prime Minister Satō was unseated from his post, and Prime Minister Tanaka had to make great haste to move on with the normalization with China.

In spite of the sense of betrayal suffered by the "Nixon shock," Japan took cautious measures with regard to the United States and Taiwan as it prepared itself for the normalization. Tanaka visited Nixon in Honolulu in September 1972, before his visit to Beijing, to gain the understanding and approval of the United States. Tanaka also dispatched Shiina Etsusaburō to

Taipei in his capacity as vice-president of the Liberal Democratic Party and special envoy of the government to help smooth over the repercussions in Taiwan.

When it came to dealing with the Sino-Soviet conflict, however, Japan proved extremely reluctant to become involved in the strategic power feud. In contrast to the United States, which tried to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and to gain leverage over the two countries, Japan endeavored for years to avoid becoming identified with either of them. This was the main reason behind the prolonged negotiations over the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. China insisted on the inclusion of the "antihegemony" clause in the treaty. Prevailing opinion within the Liberal Democratic Party as well as the public at large was that Japan should remain outside the Sino-Soviet dispute. Fukuda's *zenboi* or omnidirectional foreign policy implied not only that Japan would keep an equal distance from the Soviet Union and China, but also that Japan would maintain good relations with every country on its own merit, without using one country against another. Promoting international realignment or balancing power were undertakings that did not inspire the Japanese policy makers. Whereas the basic foreign policy perspectives of the United States were global, universalistic, and drawn to causing systematic change, the Japanese approach was regional, particularistic, and prone much more to reacting to change.

The reaction of the United States and Japan toward the outcome of the UN decision on the question of Chinese representation also reflected the basic foreign policy views of the two countries. While the United States viewed the United Nations as an instrument of its foreign policy, Japan looked to it as the epitome of the international will. Nixon could not allow the voting in the United Nations to affect U.S. bilateral foreign policy. In Japan, however, the UN decisions signified the changes that were taking place in world politics. Japan, therefore, had to follow suit.

Turning now to the question of the decision-making processes, we can observe many similarities in the United States and in Japan. To a great extent, it was the nature of the issue involved that conditioned the political processes in both countries. Some of the common features are: first, the dominant role played by the presidents and prime ministers; second, the relatively limited contribution by the bureaucracy, that is, the State Department and the Foreign Ministry; third, the use of outsiders as intermediaries to contact the Chinese; fourth, the strong impact of domestic pressure groups.

The normalization of relations with China was a major foreign policy decision that reversed the postwar Asia policy of the United States and Japan and that caused a major systemic change in world politics. As such,

the issue could have been dealt with only at the highest level of political leadership, whether in the United States or in Japan. In the United States normalization was the result of President Nixon's extraordinary personal initiative. The fact that Nixon himself conceived the idea of opening up communication channels with China made the issue especially important for him. Moreover, his disdain of the State Department and his determination to direct foreign policy from the White House resulted in the revitalization of the National Security Council system as well as the strengthening of the authority of the national security adviser. In such a role, Kissinger was the perfect match. Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in their secret diplomacy through an elaborate use of back-channel communication.

In the beginning, the White House and the State Department collaborated in their attempts to open up channels of communication. They had to look abroad for intermediaries—presidents de Gaulle of France, Yahya Khan of Pakistan, Ceausescu of Roumania—in view of the twenty years of severed relations that had inhibited official relations between the two countries. The only existing official channel, the Warsaw channel, proved unsatisfactory to Kissinger because of the slowness of the response gained through this channel and particularly because of the need to cope with the State Department's cautious approach. The department was not against normalization, but felt it necessary to make progress on such bilateral issues as Taiwan and Vietnam before proceeding to a high-level meeting in Beijing. To the White House a high-level meeting was a goal in itself because of the enormous impact it might have abroad as well as at home. Kissinger made all efforts to put the State Department outside the communication channel and embarked upon what has become the best-known secret trip to Beijing.

Although Prime Minister Tanaka did not exclude the Foreign Ministry from the decision making involved in normalization, the ministry was kept in the background at the preparatory stage. Normalization was an exceptional political decision that had brought together the coalition of the Tanaka, Ōhira, and Miki factions, and Tanaka and Ōhira were determined to carry out the decision on their own. Foreign Minister Ōhira resorted to the unusual step of commissioning directly a small group of middle-echelon officials within the ministry to undertake the preparation for the normalization. The central figure in this group was the director of the China Section, Hashimoto, who had promoted normalization within the ministry. He was joined by the director-general of the Treaty Bureau and the director of the Treaty Section. The fact that legal experts formed the core of this group reflected the legal concern of the ministry in dealing with the normalization question. The Foreign Ministry as such did not

assist the foreign minister in the preparation for normalization. The fact that the ministry was divided over the normalization issue, with the upper echelons supporting the "two-Chinas" solution, prevented it from taking effective command. At the same time, the fact that a small preparatory group could be set up within the ministry reflected the extraordinary political situation with which the bureaucracy had to deal with an unusual degree of flexibility.

In contacting Beijing in preparation for the normalization, Tanaka also had to resort to intermediaries outside the government. However, what distinguished the Japanese process from that in the United States was the abundance of intermediaries within the country. A long period of unofficial relations between Japan and Beijing had left an ample supply of those who were in contact with Beijing and who frequently competed with each other for recognition. Of all the channels, Tanaka gained most from the Socialist Party leader and the Kōmeitō leader, Takeiri, both of whom were able to extract from the Chinese their conditions for normalization. In a sense, a multipartisan effort by the opposition parties and the pro-China members of the Liberal Democratic Party was instrumental in preparing Tanaka and Ōhira for the forthcoming negotiations. The Sino-Japanese negotiations in Beijing were carried out in a great rush under strong political pressures to complete normalization.

Another serious reason for Tanaka's rush was the fear of a backlash from the pro-Taiwan group. The opposition parties and left-wing groups played the predominant political role in pressing the government to normalize relations with China. Yet the influence of the pro-Taiwan group was not by any means negligible, especially within the Liberal Democratic Party. Although ultimately the pro-Taiwan group could not prevent normalization from taking place, its influence was significant in view of the consensual nature of the decision making within the Liberal Democratic Party. Some eighty pro-Taiwan Diet members, concentrated mainly in the Fukuda faction, exercised a decisive say over the government policy by withholding till the end the granting of the final approval to proceed. It was only just before departing for Beijing that Tanaka obtained an all-party mandate to go ahead with the normalization on condition that sufficient consideration be given to maintaining a close relationship with Taiwan. The term "close relationship" was subject to different interpretations. After normalization was attained, however, the pro-Taiwan group made all-out efforts to delay or block the conclusion of treaties of trade, aviation, navigation, fisheries, and so forth. The drawing-out of negotiations over the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty was also caused in part by the opposition by the pro-Taiwan group.

In the case of the United States, political pressure came almost

exclusively from the pro-Taiwan group. Although the public was prepared for a "two-Chinas" solution, sentiment in support of Taiwan was widespread, especially in Congress. The administration, therefore, had to be constantly on guard as to how far it could proceed in the normalization process. This is why President Nixon postponed the settlement of the Taiwan question at the time of his visit to Beijing, and also why President Carter insisted on the right of the United States to sell arms of a defensive nature to Taiwan. When Carter presented to Congress a package of legislation to cover the new unofficial relations with Taiwan after normalization, Congress made substantial amendments that reaffirmed the continued interest of the United States in the security of Taiwan and the well-being of its people. The Taiwan Relations Act of March 1979 was passed by a large majority of 339 to 50 in the House and 85 to 4 in the Senate. The wide margin proved that congressional interest in Taiwan was not limited to the pro-Taiwan group but extended over to liberals as well. Another reason for the strong congressional reaction was Congress' indignation over what many congressmen felt to be inadequate consultation by the administration on normalization. Institutional rivalry between the legislative and executive branches also made a significant impact on the decision making of the China policy. The built-in factor of checks and balances in the American political system affected the process by introducing the element of institutional conflicts among major decision-making actors. In the Japanese process, the conflicts were political and required constant consultations and adjustments.

One additional observation might be in order on the role of the bureaucracy in the course of the normalization. Neither the State Department nor the Foreign Ministry played an active role until intergovernmental relations were established with China. Once liaison offices were set up between the United States and China, the State Department could take part in the negotiations for normalization in the Carter administration. After normalization, the Foreign Ministry became the principal actor in negotiating treaties and agreements, including the peace and friendship treaty by the Fukuda cabinet. The exclusion of the bureaucracy, the use of back channels, and the resort to outside intermediaries that characterized the decision-making processes leading to normalization were at least in part the outcome of the unusual political circumstances under which the United States and Japan approached China.

The last question to be addressed is the significance of normalization on U.S.-Japan relations. No American action left a more profound impact on Japanese foreign policy in the postwar period than the unilateral decision by President Nixon to go to Beijing to seek rapprochement. The impact went far beyond the immediate reaction of sourness or of rushing to move

ahead of the United States. It changed the meaning of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and forthwith the alliance itself.

It is not certain how far President Nixon foresaw the regional implications of his strategic initiative. His preoccupation at the time was global. Aside from his major concern over the termination of the war in Vietnam, his interest in the region was to protect the existing bilateral security arrangements with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. It will be recalled how Nixon tried to maintain the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty intact as he approached China. His argument to Zhou Enlai was that the treaty was an instrument that would keep an armed Japan under the control of the United States, which would be in the security interest of China.

Between the United States and Japan, however, the real issue was Taiwan. The United States and Japan had been in agreement that the treaty coverage extended to Taiwan. Tanaka's rapid move toward normalization raised serious concern on the part of the United States. In his great rush, might Tanaka make premature concessions over Taiwan? To begin with, there were fundamental differences between the United States and Japan with regard to the treatment of the Taiwan question. To the United States, the question meant the gaining of assurance of the security and well-being of the Taiwanese in exchange for normalization. To Japan, the question of Taiwan involved the settlement of the issue of the termination of the state of war with China. Normalization, therefore, signified Japan's readiness to terminate its diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and to open up new diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. This is not to imply that Japan was unconcerned about the security of Taiwan. Japan's assumption, however, was that the United States would continue to take full responsibility for Taiwan. Tanaka's assurance to Nixon of Japan's commitment to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty must be understood in the context of the complex nature of the Taiwan question. It is worth noting that when Tanaka expressed his support for the treaty in Honolulu, he did it in general terms. Neither Tanaka nor Nixon sought to clarify the specific status of Taiwan under the security treaty. To attempt to have done so would have made it politically impossible for either Japan or the United States to proceed with normalization.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was thus kept intact. Theoretically, therefore, the United States retained the right to use its bases in Japan to fulfill its defense commitment to Taiwan. Obviously, Japan did not intend to have to confront such an eventuality. The basic function of the security treaty evolved into a military alliance against the Soviet Union, especially after Soviet military power became more pronounced in Asia in the 1980s. As a bulwark of the containment policy of the United States and Japan, however, the security treaty ceased to exist. The postnormalization policy

of Japan in Asia was to develop stable bilateral relations with China, as well as with the other countries in Asia. Of particular significance in this connection was Japan's recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1973. Paralleling the political developments, Japan expanded its economic relations throughout the region. Trade with China grew rapidly, as did personnel and technical exchanges.

Similar developments took place between the United States and China. However, what distinguished the U.S. relation with China from the Japanese was the strategic-military component. The United States approached China with a strategic objective, and its relations grew closer whenever strategic interests drew them together. The United States had "an interest in a strong and secure China." Japan, on the other hand, possessed an interest, not in a "strong and secure China," but in a stable one. Japan's basic position did not necessarily support an expanding military relation between the United States and China. Nor was it the intention of Japan to be drawn into a global united front against the Soviet Union. This possibility was what tormented Japan in its prolonged opposition to the inclusion of the "antihegemony" clause in the peace and friendship treaty.

The normalization with China touched off two developments with major political implications. At the global level it broke the global bipolar structure and brought in a strategic triangle among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. At the regional level, it led to the emergence also of triangular relations among the United States, China, and Japan. Japan's influence in the region had already been growing, largely through its economic power. However, the political lessons learned in the course of normalization led Japan to seek closer relations with a variety of countries in Asia and eventually in all parts of the world. While carefully maintaining strong ties with the United States, Japan set out on a more independent and varied diplomatic course.

The normalization process of the United States and Japan with the People's Republic of China has provided an extraordinary opportunity to examine the foreign policies of the United States and Japan at several levels. First, because the two countries coped with a common issue within a common time frame, it gave a genuine basis for a comparative study in policy-making processes. Second, it also led to the analysis of the changing nature of the relationship between the United States and Japan as they moved from a rigid cold war to a more flexible security and political alliance relation. Third, it suggested the possibility of linking an actor-oriented decision-making analysis with the study of systemic change in world politics. The initiatives taken by President Nixon developed into a major restructuring of power relations at the global as well as the regional level.

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