Transferring Technology to China
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Transferring Technology to China

Prosper Giquel and the Self-strengthening Movement

Steven A. Leibo
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To the memory of
Barbara (Shane) Leibo and
for my wife
Sara Zaidspiner-Leibo
Foreword

It is rare when a single human being during his or her lifetime grapples with many of the central issues of a major period in world history. It is even more unusual when such an individual is neither monarch nor millionaire, but a minor military official serving halfway around the world from his homeland. The Frenchman Prosper Giquel was such a man. The late nineteenth century found him standing at the interface of European and Chinese civilization as China entered a new era in which the lofty isolation of the ancient empire would give way to the irresistible pressure of imperialism.

In this unprecedented historical setting, Prosper Giquel's unique blend of talents enabled him to move beyond his role as an agent of imperialism to become a conduit through which cultural influences passed readily. His career dealt directly with many of the issues that subsequently emerged as the principal foci of East-West relations in the twentieth century: military cooperation, transfer of technology, language acquisition, intercultural education, and internal negotiations. His talents as a linguist and an intercultural communicator, and above all his deep human concern for the Chinese with whom he worked, enabled him to set a civilized and productive tone in East-West relations. If such a tone was disappointingly discordant in Giquel's day, today it is our best hope for intercultural cooperation.

But Giquel's accomplishments came at a high cultural cost. Dealing with this issue, Dr. Leibo's work passes beyond the scope of a period study in Chinese-European relations and confronts a problem as old as the coming of foreigners to China: sinicization. Like many who had arrived before him to change China, Giquel succumbed, after prolonged exposure, to the powerfully seductive forces of Chinese civilization. Cultural influences gradually mitigated his imperialist biases and molded his perspective in ways that ultimately led his countrymen to view him as a cultural defector to the Chinese.

Students of late nineteenth-century China will find fresh perspectives in this volume on many of the major events of that era. Employing Giquel's personal diary and extensive correspondence gleaned from major European archives, Leibo retraces Giquel's involvement with China from
the occupation of Guangzhou in 1858 to the Sino-French War of the mid-1880s. We see the Sino-French contingent that aided in pacification of the Taipings as a crucible in which the Chinese and foreign components of the Self-strengthening Movement were fused. We view the giant Fuzhou Dockyard, as its founders did, as an educational institution. And we learn of a Chinese educational mission to Europe that was a quiet success.

In contemporary East-West relations there is probably no issue more pressing than the transfer of technology. Like the Self-strengthening Movement of the nineteenth century, the Four Modernizations Campaign, the principal economic policy of the People's Republic of China, is heavily dependent on the acquisition and assimilation of foreign technology. There is no place better than the pages of history in which to discover the pitfalls that can beset this complex intercultural process. Giquel's activities in China provide a close view of the transfer of technology with its many frustrations and infrequent satisfactions. The significance of this study for those involved in technical and educational relations with China can hardly be overstated.

In these pages the reader will find an unexpected bonus, the unfolding of an intensely human drama. Giquel's career in China, an unending struggle for the advancement of the Chinese, culminated with cruel irony. In 1884 French ships laid waste the Fuzhou Dockyard, the principal monument to this Frenchman's labors for his adopted homeland. In the last months of his life, however, Giquel must have been heartened by the news that Franco-Chinese relations had been re-established and that a new educational mission had set out for Europe.

Dr. Leibo began this study as a doctoral dissertation in the Department of History at Washington State University. He brought to his work a rich background in European history and languages and a keen understanding of the development of modern China. His discovery of Giquel's personal papers and his careful and comprehensive use of European archival materials have resulted in a study of Sino-Western interaction that abounds with new information for the specialist. The general reader will find his analyses of intercultural problems provocative and a valuable mirror for contemporary events.

Thomas L. Kennedy
Washington State University
July 1983
Acknowledgments

A large number of teachers, archivists, friends, and organizations have contributed to this study. Joachim Remak of the University of California at Santa Barbara first introduced me to the subtleties and humility necessary to the field. At Washington State University, Thomas L. Kennedy contributed enormously to my training in East-West relations and my understanding of the Chinese Self-strengthening Movement. Two other historians, Immanuel C.Y. Hsü and Joseph Chen, have also improved my knowledge of China. Howard C. Payne aided enormously in my development as a European historian. My debt to Professor Payne cannot easily be repaid. Additionally Taketsugu Tsurutani, Robert Grathwol, and Marianne Bastid offered invaluable guidance during the early stages of the research and writing for this work.

The research for this book would not have been possible without the award of a Fulbright Fellowship, which allowed a year’s work in Paris. While in Europe I became indebted to a number of institutions including the Bibliotheque Nationale, the Archives National, the Archives de l’Armée de Terre, the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, and the Service Historique de la Marine. I am particularly grateful for the interest and support I received from the staff of the naval archives.

In Great Britain, the staffs of the School of Oriental and African Studies, the British Museum, and the Public Record Office helped profoundly.

Though most of this monograph is based on European archives, several American libraries have helped in its preparation. At Washington State University the library staff offered important assistance. Elsewhere, the staff at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the Hoover and Green libraries at Stanford, and the library at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign are to be commended.

Prosper Giquel’s granddaughter, Madame la Baronne d’Ussel, deserves a special word of thanks for giving me access not only to Giquel’s papers, but to the hospitality of her home. I hope my efforts to explain her grandfather’s career meet with her approval.

A number of other people have provided substantive support. Wu Yung-ming offered invaluable help with Chinese sources, and Lewis
Chere offered important advice on chapter seven. Debbie Weston worked with me on a companion volume translation of Giquel's 1864 diary, and Fred C. Bohm, Lee Ann Smith-Trafzer, Cliff Trafzer, Fritz Blackwell, and Bob Swartout provided the support one must have to complete a project of this size. My wife, Sara Zaidspiner-Leibo was a major aid in the editing of the final manuscript, and I am very grateful. Last but not least, my mother, Barbara (Shane) Leibo, who died while the research was being carried out, told me I could do it. That is, after all, the best support anyone can ever offer. To her memory this work is warmly dedicated.

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M. PROSPER GIQUEL,
FONDATEUR DE L'ARSENAL DE FOU-TCHÉOU, MORT À CANNES, LE 20 FÉVRIER.
(Dessin de M. Vuillier, d'après photographie de M. Walery.)
Introduction

The history of nineteenth-century Sino-European relations is often presented as a litany of opium wars, unequal treaties, gunboat diplomacy, and imperialist adventures. These features were unquestionably principal aspects of European-East Asian relations in the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, some Westerners and East Asians quietly worked to offer East Asia the advantages that European technology and science could provide. During the nineteenth century industrialization among non-European peoples was a rarity; in the modern world it is widespread, and the transfer of technology is a basic aspect of international relations. It is important to recognize that the nineteenth century, despite its frequent emphasis on imperialistic incidents and gunboat diplomacy, had, as a "minor chord," transfers of technology similar to that experienced today. Indeed, the study of the human questions associated with the transfer of technology and the role of foreign advisers in nineteenth-century China provides a fresh perspective to the study of international relations of that day, a perspective that can deepen and extend the understanding derived from the study of formal diplomacy.

Important as government-to-government relations are, emphasis on these formal contacts often distorts the broader questions of international relations. Dr. Edward V. Gulick, the author of *Peter Parker and the Opening of China*, has concluded that Parker's career as a medical missionary, if not part of the narrow definition of diplomatic relations, was clearly a "major form of international relations."¹ In the same vein Prosper Giquel's career falls into the category, now increasingly studied, of these "foreign/Western experts" who sought, as Jonathan Spence has written, "to change China."

¹ In Spence's book *To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960*, we have a fascinating account of several generations of Western advisers who devoted themselves to trying to Westernize China.


Most students of East Asia are familiar with the works on Charles "Chinese" Gordon. Other nineteenth-century China hands, such as Robert Hart and Halliday Macartney, have also attracted the study of writers. More recently scholars have begun writing case studies contributing to a general history of the role played by foreign advisers in East-West relations. Robert Swartout's insightful study of Owen Nickerson Denny in Korea, Edward Beauchamp's work on William Elliot Griffis in Japan, and Adrian Arthur Bennett's monograph on John Fryer are excellent examples.

Probably the most remarkable feature of Giquel's career in China was that his length of stay, language skills, and ties to influential Chinese statesmen, such as Zuo Zongtang, Shen Baozhen, Li Hongzhang, and Zeng Jize placed him in the midst of almost every major event of mid-nineteenth century Sino-Western relations. Beginning with his position as a member of the Allied expeditionary force in the Second Opium War, Giquel's career evolved as Sino-Western relations did. Changing from combatant against the Qing dynasty to a supporter of the dynasty against the Taipings, Giquel eventually became a major figure in the effort to transfer Western military technology from Europe to China. Later, as a director of the European Educational Mission, he worked to develop China's ability to produce and innovate Western-style technology.

Prosper Giquel came neither from Great Britain nor from the United States, the two dominant Western powers in East Asia. He was from France, and that too adds interest in his role. Several English nationals played significant roles in East Asia. Robert Hart of the customs service and Halliday Macartney of the Nanjing Arsenal are among the most prominent. Among the Americans the careers of Frederick Townsend Ward, John Fryer, and William A. P. Martin are well known. Few French

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7 Adrian Arthur Bennett, John Fryer: The Introduction of Western Science and Technology into Nineteenth Century China (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asia Research Center, Harvard University Press, 1967).

8 Holger Cahill, A Yankee Adventurer (New York: Macaulay, 1930); for Fryer, see the
advisers had such influence with the Chinese. Giquel’s experiences provide information leading to an understanding of the role of Westerners, not simply Englishmen or Americans, in China.

The evolution of Giquel’s world view, as his role changed from a parochial French naval lieutenant to an officer of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service and ultimately to a respected, if controversial spokesperson for Chinese causes, also marks him as unusual. Even more remarkable was his lifelong attempt to balance his evolving identification with the Chinese with his effort to remain loyal to France. Giquel’s efforts, over a twenty-five-year period, to reconcile the loyalty he felt to his Chinese employers with the patriotism he felt to his French homeland was a dilemma that other long-term foreign advisers have encountered, and continue to encounter. In fact, Giquel’s dilemma was not unique to nineteenth-century China. A great many individuals, both Western and Chinese, who worked in the multicultural world of the China coast, experienced a process of hybridization that transformed many of their attitudes and personalities. Paul Cohen, in particular, has described at length those Chinese who inhabited, as Cohen writes, “intellectual and cultural frontiers, outposts of intercultural collision where parochial (traditional) commitments were subjected to constant challenge.”9 Cohen, working to portray the career of Wang Tao, the nineteenth-century Chinese modernizer, emphasizes those archetypical “littoral” Chinese of the coast who served as the principal conduit through which their more tradition-bound countrymen learned of each other.

For Prosper Giquel the situation was to be especially acute. He was to become progressively more enamored with Chinese civilization. But unlike many Westerners who adapted themselves completely to sinification, Giquel struggled throughout his career to retain the respect of his own countrymen and to enhance France’s position in China while still dedicating himself primarily to serving the Chinese. It was this dual loyalty, stirred not by his sinification but by the more complex hybridization, that forced Giquel to walk a tightrope throughout his career. In another age his task might have been easier, but as Giquel’s career grew to a close, his homeland and adopted country moved toward a military clash. For Giquel that would be the ultimate test of his loyalties.

As important as the specifics of Giquel’s career are to our understanding of nineteenth-century China, study of his activities through

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the use of archival material in France and Great Britain as well as Giquel’s private papers has also allowed important new primary sources to be uncovered and analyzed. From the details of the Guangzhou occupation through intervention in the Taiping Rebellion and self-strengthening, Giquel’s career provides a vehicle through which important aspects of nineteenth-century China have become clearer.

Although no books or articles have heretofore dealt with Giquel’s career, a large number of complementary studies have elucidated issues pertinent to his activities in China. Paralleling Giquel’s years with the Ever-Triumphant Army, we have Richard J. Smith’s *Mercenaries and Mandarin: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China.* It is certainly the best recent full-length study of the Anglo-Chinese Ever-Victorious Army. It places Giquel’s career with the Ever-Triumphant Army within the context of European intervention in the Taiping Rebellion.

While Giquel’s specific activities during the self-strengthening period have not been studied, considerable scholarly effort has been focused on the Fuzhou Dockyard and its imperial commissioner, Shen Baozhen. David Pong’s 1969 dissertation, “Modernization and Politics in China as Seen in the Career of Shen Pao-chen,” as well as the works of Gideon Chen and Chang Yu-fa, have enriched our understanding of this crucial self-strengthening facility. Knight Biggerstaff and John L. Rawlinson have contributed studies on early Chinese educational programs and naval development. Although these works have increased our understanding of the Fuzhou Dockyard, none has exploited French archival sources to complement and enrich the Chinese-language materials on which they are based. It is hoped that this study of Giquel, based on original French archival materials, will rectify this lacuna.

The question of the effectiveness and commitment of nineteenth-century Chinese attempts at technology transfer has been a fundamental

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feature of self-strengthening historiography. Writers such as Mary C. Wright, Joseph R. Levenson, Stanley Spector, and Franz Michael have emphasized the "impossibility" of Confucian-trained scholars truly committing themselves to substantive borrowing from the West. Moreover, these writers have suggested that most self-strengthening efforts were merely limited projects of competing regional "proto-warlords" such as Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang. More recently, several writers including Thomas L. Kennedy, David Pong, and Kwang-Ching Liu have emphasized the non-regional progressive commitment of many of the self-strengtheners. Thomas L. Kennedy in particular has contributed, among many works, two studies on self-strengthening: the first, a historiographical essay on the period and the second, his monograph on the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai. Just as Richard J. Smith's study of the Ever-Victorious Army offers parallel insights into the significance of the Franco-Chinese Ever-Triumphant Army, Kennedy's *The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860–1895* offers an invaluable context within which to evaluate Giquel's activities at Fuzhou.

Prosper Giquel's long-term goals were clear: to help China to strengthen and modernize and thus to take her place as an equal in the modern world, and to have his own country, France, serve as a conduit for the technology needed to accomplish these ends. Each would benefit. French technology would be purchased and French skills admired. China would find the means to protect herself from any and all aggressors. For Giquel, that meant from France as well. A less committed individual might never have attempted such a balancing act. Prosper Giquel, deeply devoted both to China and to France, took on the task and spent his lifetime trying to reconcile these dual loyalties. How successful he was is a central theme of this work.


16 See the work cited above.

The Making of a China Hand

It all started poorly. The French and English forces had bombarded Guangzhou for more than twenty hours, since the previous day, December 28, 1857. From within the city the defenders fired cannon shot ineffectually toward the allied fleet. On the previous day the Westerners had occupied several strategic points around the city. That night the troops slept in a field. The commanders agreed that the naval bombardment would cease at 9 A.M. on the twenty-ninth. Unfortunately the timing, always difficult under such circumstances, was off. The troops arrived at the walls at eight, an hour early. If the Chinese artillery had been ineffectual, the allied fusillade was not. The soldiers found themselves under fire from their own ships. And the ladders they carefully carried with them were too short to scale the city's walls. Precious time was lost trying to find material to lengthen them.

It was a strange battle scene. Crowds of Chinese stood about in the morning cold watching the allied troops advance. The Europeans were possibly aware that the Chinese officials had promised 100 taels, about 750 francs, for each foreign head turned in.

About nine, as the firing ceased and the ladders were finally ready, the French and then English forces hurriedly clambered up the walls. There was little resistance. The Chinese had not anticipated such a rapid

5 Gros to Walewski, January 3, 1858, Correspondance consulaire et commerciale (hereafter cited as CCC), vol. 23, fol. 6; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (hereafter cited as AE); Moges, Souvenirs d'une Ambassade en Chine, p. 107. One Chinese tael was equivalent to 8 francs, U.S.$1.60, or 6s 8d British.
assault. Beneath the allies lay the huge metropolis of Guangzhou. To the rear the allied ships lay at anchor and scores of Chinese coolies hired in Hong Kong carried supplies for the invading forces. Not until January 5 would the allied patrols enter the city. But Guangzhou was in their power. After years of resistance to an English presence in the city, Britain and her French ally forced the issue. Guangzhou would now be occupied and governed by them.

Among the Frenchmen who had taken part in the assault was Prosper Marie Giquel, a twenty-two-year-old lieutenant in the French navy. Giquel was rather young when he first viewed Guangzhou's walls, yet the assault had not been his first military experience. Born November 20, 1835, in Lorient, France, Giquel had studied at the Cherbourg Naval Preparatory School and the French naval college. Later he fought in the Crimean War at the siege of Sebastopol. There the nineteen-year-old Giquel had served in an artillery battery and had been awarded the rank of Chevalier in the revered French Legion of Honor.

By age twenty the young officer had already shown most of the traits that characterized his later career. His naval college reports regularly comment on his energy and enthusiasm for work. Although he was not always at the top of his class, he was consistently able to get along well with his teachers and classmates. His health was delicate and would remain so for the rest of his life. Because Giquel had had to curtail his formal training at the naval college because of the Crimean War, his training was not as extensive as it might have been. He had shown a talent for languages, however, and learned English well before being assigned to China.

6 Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 123.
7 London Gazette, Supplement, February 26, 1858.
8 Career Summary, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, Service Historique de la Marine, Vincennes (hereafter cited as SHM, Vincennes).
9 "Rôle de combat des batteries de la marine au moment de la prise de Sebastopol," GG 2 39, fol. 1-5, SHM, Vincennes; Career Summary, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
11 Médard, "Médard Report," BB 4 1556, p. 3, SHM, Vincennes. This thirty-five-page report, written in 1898, was produced by a former member of the dockyard staff. Half in typescript, half in longhand, it is somewhat critical of Prosper Giquel and was written at the request of the French Navy. Médard is listed as a professor in Giquel's 1874 list of employees found in his The Foochow Arsenal, and its Results, from the Commencement in 1867, to the end of the Foreign Directorate, on the 16th of February, 1874, translated by H. Lang (Shanghai: Shanghai Evening Courier, 1874), p. 37.
12 Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
On January 13, 1858, after the battle for Guangzhou was over, Giquel was assigned as an aide to Martineau des Chesnez, the French representative to the Allied Commission then being organized to govern Guangzhou.\(^{13}\) Although the French and English forces collaborated against Russia in the Crimean War, Giquel's assignment with the Allied Commission was his first significant work in a truly multinational setting. Before his term in Guangzhou ended he would work regularly with English, French, and Chinese nationals. The international views that characterized his later life would begin to take shape. Nevertheless, Prosper Giquel's initial contact with China was the customary European military experience of war and violence. He was part of the gunboat diplomacy that marked so much of Sino-European interaction of the period. If he later disapproved of this approach it was due to his growing familiarity with the Chinese and his understanding of the limitations of that European policy. But these impressions came after years of experience.

The Occupation of Guangzhou and the Opium Wars

It had been reasonably easy for the few thousand allied expeditionary troops to capture Guangzhou. The superior military technology of the Europeans gave them an enormous advantage over the city's defenders. Despite Guangzhou's size and the thousands of soldiers assigned to its defense, the allies suffered only ten deaths and approximately one hundred casualties.\(^{14}\) The occupation and governance of the huge metropolis was quite another matter.

It was obvious that the European military forces could not govern the city directly. In the entire allied force, there were perhaps three people who spoke enough Chinese to communicate with the local population.\(^{15}\) Within a few months another interpreter, Robert Hart, a consular representative at Ningbo and later head of the Chinese maritime customs, arrived.\(^{16}\) The decision was made to create a three-tiered government. Chinese officials would directly administer the city. An Allied Commission would supervise them. French and English military

\(^{13}\) Lt. Ribours to Giquel, January 13, 1858, Giquel family papers, Château de Bois-Dauphin.

\(^{14}\) Gros to Walewski, January 3, 1858, Correspondance politique (hereafter cited as CP), Chine, vol. 23, fol. 6, AE; Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 124.

\(^{15}\) Elgin to Clarendon, January 9, 1858, British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter cited as Accounts and Papers), XXXIII, 2571 (1859), p. 140.

commanders would be based at Guangzhou. These occupation forces would not evacuate Guangzhou until 1861.

The English had long feuded with Governor-General Ye Mingchen. On January 5, 1858, they took him prisoner and a few weeks later shipped him to British India, where he died. Provincial Governor Bo-gui, a rival of Ye Mingchen, was willing to work with the British and claimed there would be no problem inducing the rest of the administrative staff to return to work. Simply allowing the Chinese to administer the city was not enough, however, to insure trouble-free occupation. It was important that Guangzhou’s administration be normalized as soon as possible, as looting had begun.

The Allied Commission was created to oversee Bo-gui and his staff. The commission had three members: Harry Parkes, the local English consul; Colonel Holloway for the Royal Navy, and Captain Martineau des Chesnez, who represented the smaller French contribution to the occupation force. In addition to their principal assignment of supervising Bo-gui, they were to establish a legal tribunal to deal with civil and criminal problems related to foreigners and to organize a police force. They also coordinated communication between European military commanders and local Chinese officials.

On January 9, only four days after Ye’s capture, Bo-gui was formally installed as governor of the city. Real power, however, clearly lay with the European military commanders and their appointed agent, the Allied Commission. Bo-gui, in fact, arrived late to the ceremony since his jailers had delayed releasing him. It was unclear at first whether the city could be governed. Although not actively antagonistic in the first days, the population was uncooperative. The allies even considered firing a few more shots at Guangzhou to “encourage” the city’s inhabitants. Eventually they decided against this.

Within a month the commission had organized its activities. Language inadequacies, however, remained a principal source of difficulties. Harry Parkes, then twenty-nine years old, had first sailed for China when he was thirteen and was the only member of the commission

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18 Gros to Walewski, January 8, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 23, fol. 10, AE.
22 Gros to Walewski, January 3, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 23, fol. 8, AE.
who spoke Chinese. Some writers have suggested that Chesnez also knew Chinese, but this seems in error. Chesnez was probably selected for his knowledge of English. The commission originally planned to assign three Chinese linguists to the staff, but it is uncertain how many they were able to hire. A week after the formal establishment of the new government Prosper Giquel began working with Chesnez. Like Chesnez, he was probably appointed because of his knowledge of English.

The commission was, in a sense, an intermediary between the Chinese who administered the city and the local military commanders who held real power. Each day they received formal orders from the allied military commanders and after first meeting among themselves, met with Bo-gui. They set up an elaborate means to supervise Bo-gui's activities and controlled all access to the governor, who lived in the inner division of the official yamen. Each of Bo-gui's proclamations was approved in advance and every visitor subject to the approval of the allied sentries. Parkes, Chesnez, and Holloway also had offices in the yamen. The commission's tribunal dealt only with those legal cases involving foreigners; Bo-gui's staff continued to deal with purely Chinese legal issues.

One of the duties of the commission was to organize a local police force led by foreigners. The initial group envisioned by the allies was quite small. Only forty English and twenty Frenchmen were assigned. Within a month the English, with more men to spare, raised their contribution to 155 men. The numerically inferior French raised their contribution to thirty. A large number of Chinese worked with them. At first soldiers in full uniform patrolled the streets, but these caused too

24 Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 125.
25 Dossier Individuel, Martineau des Chesnez, CC 7 1702, SHM, Vincennes.
26 Gros to Walewski, February 8, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 25, fol. 210, AE.
27 D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], December 12, 1858, BB 4 763 Marine, fol. 20, Archives Nationales (hereafter cited as AN).
28 Minutes of the Allied Commission Meeting, January 11, 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII, 2571 (1859), p. 149.
30 Seymour, Straubenzee, Genouilly, "Regulations to be observed by the Commissioners," encl. 3, January 7, 8, 1858, no. 14, FO 17 294, fol. 117-120, Public Record Office (hereafter cited as PRO).
31 Commission Notes, January 11, 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII, 2571 (1859), incl. 2 in no. 83, p. 149.
32 Parkes to Elgin, February 13, 1858, Accounts and Papers, XXXIII, 2571 (1859), p. 190.
much alarm. Mixed groups of French, English, and Chinese were then substituted and proved to be more effective and less disruptive.\(^{33}\) Aware that tensions continued in the city, the commission made several "police stations" defensible.\(^{34}\)

These mixed Franco-Chinese and Anglo-Chinese units, which patrolled Guangzhou in the early months of 1858, were among the earliest examples of Sino-European "military" cooperation. Prosper Giquel was an early commander of the Franco-Chinese police, and the experience proved invaluable four years later when he organized a Sino-French contingent to battle the Taipings. In those early months in Guangzhou, Lieutenant Giquel began to learn spoken Cantonese and used materials prepared by English missionaries to begin the study of the written language. Within three years he was an official translator for the commission.

Initially the occupation of Guangzhou seemed to be accepted. By mid-January the city was returning to normal, and many shops were reopened.\(^{35}\) During the first month allied troops severely flogged some Europeans for looting, and the residents were reported to be impressed with the Westerners' willingness to punish their own.\(^{36}\) Governor Bo-gui was pleased when he was informed that if the city were attacked by Chinese rebels, the allies would defend it. He was probably less pleased with the allied motives, as they had no intention of turning the city over to any Chinese group, Qing or rebel, until the emperor ratified a new treaty.\(^{37}\) Nevertheless, Bo-gui was reassured that he wouldn't lose the city another time to the Taipings.

In February the blockade of Guangzhou was lifted. There was every reason to believe that affairs were running smoothly, and the British even considered leaving a mere two hundred marines to guarantee the occupation.\(^{38}\) By mid-1858 the French had only a few hundred men in the area.\(^{39}\) This sense of security proved to be false.

The residents of Guangzhou had resisted the opening of their city to foreigners for years and despised those mandarins who acceded to English

\(^{35}\) Gros to Walewski, January 13, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 23, fol. 41, p.s. of July 14, AE.
\(^{36}\) Hurd, *The Arrow War*, p. 126.
\(^{37}\) Gros to Walewski, January 8, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 23, fol. 23, AE.
\(^{38}\) *London Gazette*, Supplement, February 26, 1858.
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demands. Their submission during the first weeks of the occupation is understandable in light of the bombardment and the impressive Western military presence. After several weeks, however, as the number of allied soldiers was reduced and Bo-gui continued apparently in charge, many perceived how vulnerable the allied occupation really was.

In the spring of 1858, with the support of Qing officials in the rest of the province, guerrilla fighting began around the city. By April the situation was out of hand and consideration was given to reestablishing the blockade. Assassination attempts were commonplace. Harry Parkes, the only one of the commissioners who spoke Chinese, couldn’t even walk about without an armed escort. For the next six months, as tensions rose, European business in the Guangzhou area slowed to a crawl.

The antagonism continued throughout the summer. Despite the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin in June 1858, incidents between Europeans and Chinese occurred daily. Violent attacks happened in daylight. The sepoys, Indian auxiliaries of the British, got along very poorly with the local residents and were dying at the rate of one to two a day. At night the Europeans, in ostensible control of Guangzhou, huddled behind their defensive walls. Hostile volleys were fired at their inner city defense stations and at Guangzhou’s city walls. In mid-June the French vice-consul’s ship was set ablaze. The allied forces retaliated by burning several suburbs. The population retaliated by hurling bombs at the Europeans that night.

Concerned that allowing Bo-gui to remain nominally in charge had encouraged local resistance, the British considered declaring martial law and removing the Chinese from all administrative responsibility. The plan was not carried out. Given the critical lack of Chinese linguists it would probably have only added to the allies’ problems.

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42 Daily Press Hong Kong, April 19, 1858.
43 Bourboulon to Walewski, October 26, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 22, fol. 195, AE.
44 Bourboulon to Walewski, July 1, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 22, fol. 84–86, AE; Bourboulon to Walewski, August 14, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 25, fol. 216, AE.
45 Elgin to British Foreign Office, no date, 1858, copy submitted to French Foreign Office by Gros, CP, Chine, vol. 25, fol. 155–157, AE.
Clashes continued throughout the summer. In July a major assault against the city walls was attempted. Fortunately, the Europeans inside were able to turn it back. The six thousand allied troops in the area, most of them English, were quite pressed to maintain the occupation. Bo-gui and his staff even tried to abandon their posts but were forcibly discouraged. The allies needed them.

Finally, in the fall the city again calmed. The French military felt that the mandarins had been encouraging the struggle and that China's acceptance of the Tianjin Treaty caused them to call off the struggle at Guangzhou. That may have been the case, but the resistance continued even without official encouragement for months after news of the treaty arrived. It is more likely that resistance was a reflection of popular attitudes rather than proof of the mandarins' ability to incite the populace.

Regardless of why the attacks diminished, it came as a relief to the hard pressed allied forces, especially the French, who were busy with plans for yet another expeditionary mission, this time to Tourane in Indochina. Giquel, commander of the Cantonese-French police force, was among those who temporarily left Guangzhou to take part in the 1859 expedition. When he returned the issue of kidnapping demanded his attention.

The kidnapping of Chinese from Macao, Hong Kong, and Whampoa (an island twelve miles south of Guangzhou) for use as laborers in the Americas was common in the years before Guangzhou's capture. The "trade," heinous in itself, became a major cause of concern for the new government. The Guangzhou population was increasingly alarmed by the kidnappings. Sixty to seventy thousand Chinese had been carried off, including Chinese from elite families. Entire family lines had been disrupted. In April a group of merchants petitioned the English consul asking that the "trade" be suppressed.

The commission and the local military commanders viewed the Chinese alarm as significant. Despite the Treaty of Tianjin, orders for a withdrawal had not been issued, and they were charged with maintaining

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46 Bourboulon to Walewski, August 5, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 25, fol. 101, AE.
47 D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], August 8, 1858, BB 4 763, Marine, AN.
48 Gros to Walewski, August 14, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 25, fol. 217, 220, AE.
49 Bourboulon to Walewski, September 2, 1858, CP, Chine, vol. 25, fol. 256, AE.
50 D'Abouville to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], November 27, 1858, BB 4 763, Marine, fol. 12, AN.
51 D'Abouville to Giquel, April 5, 1859, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
52 Alcock to Bowring, April 6, 1859, F.O. 881 894, incl. 2 in no. 1, p. 4, PRO.
quiet until an acceptable settlement was reached. Local anger regarding the kidnappings threatened to make their task more difficult. The commission was also aware of the need to acquire cheap labor, due partly to the decline of the African slave trade, and found nothing wrong with honest recruitment. But Europeans found kidnapping of upper-class Chinese particularly repulsive, even worse than the black slave trade since its victims were from a “higher” civilization than the African tribal blacks. In April the commission issued a proclamation outlawing kidnapping.

The kidnapping was more than abhorrent. It threatened the general European position in China, especially in Guangzhou. It was not uncommon for Chinese mobs brutally to murder the kidnappers and their Chinese associates. In 1858 the allies had gone through a very difficult summer in Guangzhou. A renewal of guerrilla warfare, aroused by the kidnapping trade, was something no one wished. As Rutherford Alcock, a British consular official, put it in April 1859: “The acts of violence and fraud connected with the coolie trade at this port... have lately reached such a pitch of atrocity that a general feeling of alarm spread through the population, accompanied by a degree of excitement and popular indignation which rendered it no longer possible or safe for any authority interested in the peace of the place to remain inactive.”

By mid-1859 Chinese officials of the province, although aware of the Qing prohibition against emigration, had come to accept voluntary emigration while denouncing the kidnapping. Bo-gui posted a reward in April for the capture of kidnappers. Bo-gui had little choice in recognizing voluntary emigration. He needed the support of the Westerners who were concerned about the kidnappings but who were also interested in obtaining Chinese laborers.

In addition to forbidding private individuals from “recruiting” workers in the Guangzhou region, the government established national emigration houses, the first of which was operated by Mr. Austin, an

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53 Alcock to Bowring, April 12, 1859, Confidential Print, F.O. 881 894, incl. 1 in no. 1, p. 1, PRO; Hale to Winchester, June 21, 1859, Accounts and Papers, LXIX, 2714 (1860), p. 10.
54 “Proclamation of the Allied Commission,” April 7, 1859, Accounts and Papers, LXIX, 2714 (1860), incl. 4 in no. 1, p. 4.
55 Alcock to Bowring, April 12, 1859, Confidential Print, F.O. 881 894, incl. 1 in no. 1, p. 1, PRO.
56 Ibid.
57 Irick, “Ch’ing Policy Toward the Coolie Trade,” pp. 113–114, 176.
58 “Proclamation of Po-kuei [Bo-gui],” April 9, 1859, Accounts and Papers, LXIX, 2714 (1860), p. 5.
The emigration houses were on land since the use of ships as holding vehicles was too closely associated, in the public mind, with the kidnapping trade. The commission appointed emigration inspectors, among them Prosper Giquel, who had the right to inspect the emigration houses at any time. No corporal punishment was allowed in the buildings and the inspectors—Giquel, an Englishman, and several Chinese—made certain that each potential emigrant understood completely the terms of the labor contracts. The commission reserved the right to approve internal regulations for the houses, and any Chinese awaiting transportation was to have the right of appeal to the commission in the event of problems.

The commission was aware of local suspicions and insisted that care be taken to insure that the Chinese and Western language versions of the contracts agreed exactly. Each day Giquel and the other inspectors visited the various emigration houses. Each new recruit was spoken with. The inspectors watched as the contracts were signed and exerted themselves to insure that all regulations established by the commission were carried out. The commissioners insisted that they would not hesitate to close down the houses if they proved likely to threaten the maintenance of peace in the occupied city.

Through the use of licensed English, French, and other national emigration houses the commission was able to establish a voluntary system of emigration. Local Chinese officials were pleased with the efforts to suppress the kidnappings and cooperated. Nevertheless, twelve miles to the south, on the island of Whampoa and elsewhere, Americans, Spanish, and others continued to "recruit" coolie laborers forcibly. These activities remained a major source of concern for the allied commanders.

For the next few years, with various interruptions associated with the renewal of war in 1860, the emigration houses continued as a

59 "Prospectus stating the conditions on which the British Government is willing to Engage Emigrants for her West Indian Possessions," October 13, 1859, CCC, Canton, vol. 2, fol. 148, AE.

60 Bruce to Russell, December 5, 1859, Confidential Print, F.O. 6, no. 7, fol. 31, PRO; "Rules under which houses for reception of Chinese Emigrants...," Accounts and Papers, LXIX, 2714 (1860), no date [November 1859?], incl. 12, no. 6, p. 18, PRO; Allied Commission memorandum, January 24, 1860, Accounts and Papers, LXIX, 2714 (1860), p. 30; Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, no. 2036, SHM, Vincennes.

61 Allied Commission to Perry, March 10, 1860, Confidential Print, F.O. 881 894, incl. 5 in no. 20, p. 153, PRO.

62 D'Abouville to French East Asian naval commander, January 13, 1860, BB 4 763 Marine, fol. 344–345, AN.
voluntary system of labor recruitment. Unfortunately, so did the abhorrent trade in kidnapped Chinese. Giquel spent much of his time interviewing recruits to insure that the individuals had truly volunteered. His superiors were delighted with his growing knowledge of Chinese and the energy he employed in his work. By 1861 he had begun to serve as an official translator of Chinese documents as well.63

**Prosper Giquel and the Chinese Customs**

The Second Opium War finally ended and by the spring of 1861 the allied commanders were preparing to withdraw from Guangzhou, the city they had occupied for more than three years. After an elaborate ceremony, they left in October 1861. As the Allied Commission and the military commanders planned their final withdrawal, Giquel sought a way to remain in China. That opportunity came when Horatio Nelson Lay, inspector general of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, asked Giquel to join the service.

The Imperial Maritime Customs Service had its origins in the 1853–1854 occupation of Shanghai by the Chinese rebel Small Sword Society. The Western consuls at Shanghai were fearful that trade might be adversely affected and established an informal system of collecting the import taxes for the Qing government. In April 1861 Prince Gong officially recognized the customs service by appointing Lay the inspector-general. Although preferring to employ Englishmen, Lay was aware that the service needed to be representative of those Europeans and Americans with whom it would work.64 Having it reasonably cosmopolitan was a way to reduce opposition from the other powers. From Lay’s viewpoint Giquel was an excellent choice. He knew both Chinese and English, and he had already worked with the multi-national Allied Commission. Moreover, the appointment of a Frenchman was sure to please Paris.

In late 1861 Giquel requested leave from the navy to join the customs service. He argued that he wanted to continue his study of Chinese and that the work in the customs service would facilitate that effort. And he pointed out that it would be helpful for France to have a Frenchman in the British-dominated service.65 His superiors agreed and

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63 Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes; Chinese Imperial Proclamation, January 5, 1861, BB 4 787 Marine, fol. 125, AN. Giquel signed the latter as translator.


65 Giquel to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], April 15, 1861, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, no. 3, SHM, Vincennes.
he had no problem obtaining a three-year leave of absence.66

Giquel was assigned to Ningbo, a port in Zhejiang province. Ningbo’s city walls, five miles in length, enclosed an area in which 250,000 Chinese resided. The foreign population numbered about sixty, most of whom were English.67 The customs office had been established in the spring of 1861, despite the resistance of local Chinese officials.68 Giquel’s predecessor was a Mr. Hughes, who remained for a short period to train him.69

Giquel was pleased with the opportunity to improve his Chinese and to direct the customs facility. Nevertheless, his new employers made it clear that his power was quite limited. His request to engage several French sailors as assistants was refused. He was neither allowed to hire anyone new nor to raise salaries without permission from the inspector-general. Additionally, it was understood that the new inspector would refrain from taking part in trade.70

By November 1861 Giquel had established himself in Ningbo. Inspector-General Lay told him privately that their work was really far larger than simply collecting customs revenues: “China, he [Lay] told me has need of the assistance of foreigners to pull itself from the state of disorganization in which it is currently cast. It is we that must render it [China] this assistance. But as we are just beginning we must hold to our titles, at least officially, of customs inspectors.”71 Lay told each of his inspectors to find means to make themselves appreciated by the Chinese authorities. They were to acquire an influence that could later be used for the common goal of modernizing China.72

Giquel found that opportunities to render service to the local Chinese officials arose sooner than expected. Within weeks of his arrival, Ningbo was threatened with capture by the Taipings, who had challenged the Qing dynasty’s control of China for more than a decade.

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66 Coupvent to Giquel, October 8, 1861, order no. 582, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
68 Gerson, Horatio Nelson Lay, p. 117; Harvey to Bruce, September 24, 1862, Confidential Print, F.O. 405 9, incl. 1 in no. 161, fol. 130, PRO.
69 Fitzroy to Giquel, September 17, 1861, Fitzroy letter book, ms. 258361, no page numbers, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (hereafter cited as SOAS).
70 Ibid.; Hart/Fitzroy to Giquel, October 25, 1861, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
71 Prosper Giquel, “Inspectorat étranger des douanes de la Chine” (hereafter cited as “Inspectorat étranger”), June 19, 1863, Memoire et Documents, Chine, vol. 18, fol. 251, AE.
72 Ibid.
The Taiping Advance on Ningbo

The Taiping forces were part of a movement begun a decade before in Guangdong province. Led by the movement’s messianic founder, Hong Xiuquan, the Taipings were energized by a syncretic blend of Protestant and Chinese ideology that served to mobilize Chinese in south and central China against the two-hundred-year-old Manchu Qing dynasty. When Giquel arrived in Ningbo in October 1861, Hong’s highly competent general Li Xiucheng was threatening the city. There were several advantages to the rebels in controlling Ningbo. It was a seaport through which foreign trade could bring valuable ammunition. The potential customs revenue was important; in addition, from there a fleet could be constructed to patrol the local sea coast.  

The allies, especially the English, were concerned that a Taiping occupation would hurt trade. Rear Admiral James Hope, the senior British naval commander in East Asia, had ordered Captain Roderic Dew to proceed to Ningbo the previous May. Dew’s orders were to make a rebel occupation “difficult”—to discourage the rebels as much as possible. Working with Circuit Intendant Zhang Jingqu, Dew organized plans to protect the city.  

Several times that spring Dew warned the Taipings against occupying Ningbo. He even threatened to resist them by force. In June, Dew and the newly arrived French Vice Admiral August Prôtet met with the Taipings at nearby Zhabu to warn them again. Although the Taipings denied that they had plans to assault the port city, their march continued. Dew was also unsuccessful in gaining a substantial reinforcement of local Qing defenses and by late July Qing forces had done almost nothing to defend the city. After Giquel arrived in October, he attempted to bolster the city’s defenses. He also perceived the local officials to be apathetic.  

By late November, just as Giquel was settling in, the Taiping threat became critical. Shaoxing, a city a few days’ march from the port, was

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captured. By November 24 Yuyao, even closer, was in Taiping hands. Finally roused from their lethargy, local Qing officials ordered the area around the city walls cleared. Burning the buildings, it was hoped, would make more difficult a Taiping assault on the city. By the first week in December the Taiping cavalry could be seen from the city's walls. Within Ningbo crowds of Chinese refugees from the countryside jostled with the city's residents. It was obvious that without a spirited defense by the Westerners Ningbo would be lost.

Although the Ningbo foreign community and the Western military commanders preferred the port city to remain in Qing control, they were not willing to take over the city's defense. Hurried meetings were held between the local English and French officials. They decided to proclaim their neutrality while insisting that foreign rights be respected and that the separate foreign enclave not be violated or occupied. At meetings with the Taipings in late November and early December, the allied representatives, among them several local consuls, gained such assurances from Taiping commanders Huang Chengzhong and Fan Ruzeng.

Ningbo's foreign community then set up its own force to police the foreign settlement. By early December the foreigners had clearly indicated their willingness to allow a Taiping occupation of Ningbo. Vice Admiral Hope even thought it might offer some advantages. The European community would, at least, have the opportunity to observe Taiping administration at first hand.

On December 9, 1861, the Taipings occupied Ningbo. Within the Western settlement the situation was chaotic as thousands of Chinese refugees struggled to enter the sacrosanct foreign concession. The allied consuls, hoping to make the best of a difficult situation, announced their intention of keeping both imperial and Taiping forces out. For Giquel

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80 Harvey to Bruce, November 12, 1861, *Accounts and Papers*, LXIII, 2976 (1862), p. 83; Harvey to Bruce, November 26, 1861, Confidential Print, F.O. 405 7, incl. 2 in no. 37, fol. 51–52, PRO.
82 Harvey to Bruce, November 26, 1861, Confidential Print, F.O. 405 7, incl. 2 in no. 37, fol. 51–52, PRO.
83 Meeting Notes, *Accounts and Papers*, LXIII, 2976 (1862), fol. 85–86.
86 Hope to Admiralty Secretary, December 7, 1861, Confidential Print, F.O. 405 7, incl. in no. 36, p. 92, PRO.
the situation was entirely too disorganized to continue operation of the customs office. After consultation with Vice Admiral Prôtet, the ranking French naval officer, and the English and American consuls, he announced the closing of the office until more favorable circumstances prevailed.\(^{88}\)

On December 11, two days after the city's capture, Prôtet, accompanied by an English naval captain and their interpreters, met with Huang and Fan. The foreigners' principal concerns were to ascertain the Taiping commanders' intentions. Prôtet reminded Huang and Fan that the Europeans had not interfered with the city's capture. They expected commerce and their own safety to be guaranteed. Huang and Fan assured their guests that the Taipings wanted friendship. They would not be bothered. As to the capture of Ningbo, it was part of a larger plan to capture the Zhejiang provincial capital, Hangzhou.\(^{89}\) It is not clear whether Giquel served as one of the interpreters. His presence in the city, his knowledge of English, French, and Chinese, and his later close association with Prôtet make it likely that he did.

There was little reason for Giquel to stay in Ningbo. The customs office was closed; and the Taipings, anxious to gain Western favor, did not begin collecting customs revenue for months.\(^{90}\) Moreover, Giquel was sick with bronchitis. He decided to leave for Shanghai. Once there, he found himself additionally weakened with intestinal problems and caught up in another occupation scare.\(^{91}\)

**Prosper Giquel and the Shanghai Expeditions**

The Taiping advance continued after the December 9 capture of Ningbo. By the end of the month Shanghai was threatened. Giquel arrived in Shanghai in late December, and by early January he was involved in the various meetings organized to deal with the crisis.\(^{92}\)

In early January 1862 the Western residents of Shanghai set up a defense committee to organize the foreign and Chinese communities against the Taipings.\(^{93}\) On January 12 a general meeting was held in the

\(^{88}\) Harvey to Hammond, no date, *Accounts and Papers*, LXIII, 2976, p. 90.

\(^{89}\) Minutes of Interview, December 11, 1861, Confidential Print, F.O. 405 7, incl. 2 in no. 41, fol. 55–56, PRO.


\(^{91}\) Giquel to Harvey, December 17, 1861, F.O. 670 70, no. 3, misc. papers, PRO.


British consulate. Giquel, using his Chinese and English, worked as one of the interpreters. Wu Xu, the Qing circuit intendant, cooperated. A principal source of disagreement was whether the foreigners would protect the entire city or merely the foreign enclave as had been done at Ningbo. The English, still concerned about maintaining their neutrality, were interested only in the foreign settlement. The French saw the defense of the entire city as a concern; nevertheless, they were not eager to side openly with the imperial government. Regardless of the personal inclination of those present, Shanghai had only a few thousand English and French regulars. Consequently, it was decided to defend only the walled city and the foreign areas.

By late January the situation had become grave. Local Qing troops had been driven off by the Taipings. The Qing government had few alternatives. It agreed to the request of local Chinese officials to ask the foreigners for help. It was not an easy decision for the Qing court. A year before those same Westerners had occupied the imperial capital at Beijing and driven the emperor from his throne. Even when authorization to seek foreign help was granted in February, it was to be a temporary measure, until imperial troops could again assume the city’s defense. The foreigners were to be used only for the defense of those ports they lived in.

The French were less reticent than the English about openly supporting the Qing dynasty. In late January the French blocked a Taiping effort to capture Woosung on the coast near Shanghai. On February 14 Prôtet, aware of the increase in British local forces, suggested to Vice Admiral Hope that they organize a joint expedition to clear the Taipings from the entire region. By this time Giquel had already begun to work informally as Prôtet’s aide.

In late February the English and French, assisted by the emerging Sino-American contingent of Frederick Townsend Ward, made their first effort to clear Shanghai’s environs of Taipings. Their target was Gaoqiao, a few miles from Shanghai near the coast. The assault party included 160 Frenchmen under Vice Admiral Prôtet, 350 British marines led by Vice Admiral Hope, some imperial troops, and several hundred of Ward’s

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95 Jen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, p. 449.
96 Ibid.
97 Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, pp. 44–46.
99 Career Summary, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
After a three-day battle Taiping commander Tan Shaoguang retreated. The French had contributed by the effective use of their artillery. Giquel, who was serving as Prêtet’s interpreter, commanded a small artillery battery throughout that spring’s campaign.

During the three-day struggle at Gaoqiao, Ward’s group of Chinese and Western mercenaries, which had existed in various forms since 1860, distinguished itself. The advantages of the mixed contingents became more obvious. They could facilitate the use of Western military technology to defeat the Taipings without a major commitment of regular Western troops or material. By the spring of 1862 Ward’s contingent, although the largest mixed unit, was not the only such group working with English and French regulars.

In June 1861 Tardif de Moidrey had begun formation of a small Franco-Chinese artillery unit. Tardif was a captain in the French army and had recently taken part in the occupation of Beijing. Tardif’s orders originated with Vice Admiral Prêtet and were probably the result of Prince Gong’s comments to Bourboulon, the French minister, in April 1861. Prince Gong had indicated an interest at that time in the creation of a French-led mixed unit similar in nature to Ward’s. For the French, it was a marvelous opportunity to augment their influence in China. Nevertheless, Prêtet’s plan to have Tardif organize such a force was without precedent. Prêtet had Tardif feign illness in a Shanghai hospital while his unit departed. Tardif then began work on the mixed contingent that Prêtet had envisioned. Throughout the spring of 1862 Tardif’s Franco-Chinese forces served as an artillery contingent with Prêtet and his English allies. By early summer Tardif’s forces had grown to about 300 men. Giquel commanded a French artillery unit during this campaign.

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102 Career Summary, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
103 Teng, The Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers, p. 306.
106 Faucon to Hamelin, July 17, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, p. 12, AN.
The campaign sought to occupy the cities of Jiading, Qingpu, Songjiang, Nanqiao, and Zhelin. All were in the Shanghai area. This strategy reflected the decision made by British General Charles Staveley, Prôtet, and Hope in April that control of the entire region would be necessary for the protection of Shanghai.\(^{107}\) Ward’s contingent continued to do the bulk of the fighting while the regulars served as support troops and offered the effective aid of their artillery units such as those officered by Prosper Giquel and Tardif de Moidrey.\(^{108}\)

The campaign was costly. In early April Vice Admiral Hope was painfully wounded in the leg.\(^{109}\) The next month, on May 17, French commander Prôtet died leading the charge on Nanqiao.\(^{110}\) His death came as a shock to his men. He was well liked, and the French regulars, including Giquel, took bloody revenge at Zhelin, which they assaulted two days later.\(^{111}\) Giquel was wounded at Zhelin by a spent bullet that struck him in the groin.\(^{112}\)

Prôtet’s death at Nanqiao dramatized the disadvantages for the Western powers of becoming too involved in the Chinese civil war. It could lead to unexpected levels of entanglement. Prôtet had been warned in mid-February by the French naval minister Ferdinand-Alphonse Hamelin against being drawn deeply into the civil war while he worked to insure Shanghai’s security.\(^{113}\) The European governments wanted the Taiping rebellion suppressed, but direct intervention was not necessarily the best way to infuse their more effective military technology into the struggle. Despite Prôtet’s death the campaign was successful and the French and English gradually withdrew from direct involvement.\(^{114}\)

The vice admiral’s death had certainly been a factor prompting the withdrawal of the regular troops. Nevertheless, the growing awareness that the mixed units, especially Ward’s Ever-Victorious Army and Tardif’s Chinese artillery unit, could serve as alternatives to regular intervention

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107 Conference notes, April 22, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, p. 59, AN.
110 Dossier Individuel, August-Leopold Prôtet, CC 7 2055, SHM, Vincennes.
112 Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, piece 14-142, SHM, Vincennes.
113 Hamelin to Prôtet, February 16, 1862, quoted in Tong, “La Politique française en Chine,” p. 266.
was probably more significant. The recognition that the contingents, neither wholly European nor wholly Chinese, could introduce Western military technology and training to the anti-Taiping campaign while avoiding potentially complicated political problems slowly grew in the minds of Western and Qing officials. It was during the spring campaign that Vice Admiral Hope, who had long been antagonistic to Ward’s mercenary group, began to be supportive. The contingents offered the additional advantage of reducing problems associated with Franco-English rivalry in China, an issue that direct involvement by regular troops only exacerbated.  

That same mid-May week that saw Prôtet dead before the walls of Nanqiao brought word of the successful occupation by French and English naval forces of Ningbo. After caring for his wound and preparing a lengthy report on the Taipings, Giquel left Shanghai to return to Ningbo.

Conclusion: The Making of a China Hand

The four-and-a-half years since the twenty-six-year-old Giquel arrived in China had changed him. Arriving in 1857 as a young lieutenant in the French assault forces that captured Guangzhou, Giquel had seen at first hand the power of gunboat diplomacy. Originally, his knowledge of China was extremely limited, but by 1862 he had become something of an expert on the country. He had learned Chinese well and served as an interpreter at Guangzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. Vice Admiral Prôtet, the senior French East Asian naval commander, had relied on his skills. His private analysis of the Taiping rebellion, written at the request of one of his commanders, was thought important enough to be printed anonymously in the *Revue maritime et coloniale*, the official journal of the French navy. In addition, senior French officials had been delighted with his appointment to the Chinese Maritime Custom Service.

Giquel had experienced more than simply a growing familiarity with China and its language. He increasingly worked in environments where French values and viewpoint prevailed less and less. In the Allied Commission at Guangzhou, though assigned to the French commissioner,

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116 Giquel to Commandant, May 27, 1862, GG 1 46, SHM, Vincennes.
117 Ibid.; Anon. [Prosper Giquel], “L’insurrection de Tae-pings en Chine,” *Revue maritime et coloniale* 6 (September 1862): 37–51. The last part of the article, a proclamation by Hong Xiuquan and a section entitled “Resumé des operations militaires des forces Alliés dans la province de Shang-hai,” is not part of Giquel’s original letter.
he had worked closely with Englishmen. At Ningbo his associates and employees were even more cosmopolitan and his direct superiors, first Lay and then Hart, were English. Throughout his career in China, Giquel was to continue working in European rather than purely French settings.

Giquel's experiences had been even more broadening with regard to the Chinese. Arriving in Guangzhou as a member of the assault force, he had been assigned first to police duties and then, as a coolie inspector, to help safeguard the rights of the local Chinese. At Ningbo, when he assumed his duties with the maritime customs, he actually became an employee of the Qing government. During the Shanghai campaigns he had fought on the side of the Qing against the Taipings. Once back in Ningbo, Giquel's direct association with Chinese officials in the suppression of the rebellion would be more pronounced.

By 1862 Prosper Giquel emerged as a recognized specialist on Chinese affairs. His experiences allowed him a broad perspective on the question of European involvement in China. His familiarity with the Chinese eventually led him to contribute to Sino-European dialogue with a sophisticated capacity to understand the Chinese perspective. Whether, in the end, his knowledge would be of use either to Europe or to China was still unknown. What was clear was that by 1862 a new China hand had emerged.
II

The Ever-Triumphant Army

English and French naval forces led by Captain Roderick Dew and Brethon de Caligny had recaptured Ningbo on May 10, 1862. Giquel could return to Ningbo and reopen the maritime customs office he had closed six months before. Soon after his arrival he began organizing a Ningbo-based Franco-Chinese contingent to clear Taiping remnants from the environs of Ningbo.

The exact origins of the Franco-Chinese corps of Ningbo are unclear. Certainly the examples of Ward’s Ever-Victorious Army and Tardif de Moidrey’s Chinese artillery corps served as models for Giquel and his associate, Brethon de Caligny. Both had seen the two corps in action during the Shanghai campaigns. The organization of a similar force to defend Ningbo must have appeared logical.

The Origin of the Franco-Chinese Corps of Ningbo

The only known preliminary accounts of the origin of the Franco-Chinese corps are those of Prosper Giquel. Though Giquel’s three accounts provide rich sources of information concerning the corps, his explanation of its origin differs slightly with each version.

These differences concern the motivation for the corps’ creation and Giquel’s personal role in its establishment. “Inspectorat étranger des douanes de la Chine,” which Giquel wrote in June of 1863, placed the origin of the corps within the context of his activities in the maritime customs service. He reported that Horatio Nelson Lay, his superior, had told each of the customs inspectors to render active assistance to the Chinese authorities. Each inspector was told to find means to make

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himself appreciated by the Chinese authorities and to acquire an influence that could later be used for the common goal of, as Lay put it, saving China "from the state of disorganization in which it is currently cast." Giquel then listed the efforts the inspectors had made in their respective area. George Glover, an American member of the maritime customs stationed at Guangzhou, had equipped and trained local troops. At Fuzhou Baron Eugene-Herman de Meritens had helped reduce the dangers of coastal navigation. It is within this context that Giquel described his own efforts of December 1861 to bolster the Ningbo authorities in their resistance to the Taipings. His efforts, unfortunately, had been in vain. Ningbo was occupied by the Taipings.

On June 4, 1863, Giquel reopened the customs office in Ningbo. He then proposed to the local officials the formation of a small corps to clear the surrounding countryside of Taipings. The commander of the French naval station, M. Kersauson, to whom Giquel had submitted a copy of his plan, agreed to support it. Later Kersauson's successor, Charles Faucon, appointed Brethon de Caligny to lead the contingent. Giquel claimed that his responsibilities with the maritime customs office made it impossible for him to assume command of the contingent himself. Once Brethon was assigned to the project, Giquel's position became subordinate.

Two months later, in August 1863, Giquel wrote a considerably modified version of the contingent's origin and a separate assessment of its value. Writing directly to Napoleon III, Giquel focused on French prestige. He sought to gain support for the corps against a threatened reduction by the Chinese authorities. Giquel stressed the benefits that the contingent could offer to the French, including increased French influence in Chinese affairs and valuable intelligence. Giquel pointedly referred to British willingness to use advisers, such as Lay, to increase English influence in China and expressed his own hope that France could similarly involve herself.

Revue des deux mondes, he placed the origins of the Ningbo Franco-Chinese corps in the context of French-English competition for influence in China. Giquel explained that the French in China had searched for a place where they could make their military influence felt and Ningbo was selected. The port, Giquel explained, was not nearly as important as Shanghai; nevertheless, it was in the middle of the silk districts. French presence in the area offered security to her businessmen. Moreover, Bishop Delaplace, a Lazarist Father, had become quite popular in the region. That made Ningbo all the more important.

Although Giquel's ability to write for his audience is clear from the source materials, the exact origins of the corps are not. Fortunately, enough of the original correspondence remains to cast further light on the formative stages of the contingent. In August, a few months after the establishment of the corps, Giquel wrote Shanghai Consul-General Bennait Eden describing the new contingent. Throughout the letter he portrayed his position as secondary to Brethon's.\(^8\) In commenting on the situation, Giquel stressed the advantages that would accrue to France from placing "agents" in the heart of China. But his ambivalence with respect to the interests of France and China manifested itself even at this early date. He told Eden, as he later explained to Emperor Napoleon III, that he was endeavoring to fill a dual role of working for China and for France.\(^9\)

Shanghai Consul-General Eden offered the best perspective when he described the division of responsibility between Brethon and Giquel. The former trained the corps, whereas the latter organized Chinese support committees and raised funds.\(^10\) Furthermore, an 1862 Chinese imperial memorial spoke of Brethon and Giquel as co-equals in leadership.\(^11\) Chinese perceptions might not, however, reflect Giquel's exact role; since Brethon did not speak Chinese, Giquel was the chief negotiator in all discussions.

Regardless of who held responsibility for the corps, neither Giquel nor Brethon operated in a vacuum, and the interests of the competing European powers, England and France, affected their activities. French involvement, as so often was the case in East Asia, was tied to English

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\(^8\) Giquel to Eden, August 22, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 206–216, AE.

\(^9\) Ibid., fol. 215.

\(^10\) Eden to Minister des Affaires étrangères [Antoine-Edouard Thouvenel], August 29, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 219, AE.

\(^11\) Imperial Memorial of 11th Lune of first year of Tongzhi, translation in BB 4 817 Marine, fol. 152, AN.
activities. In the months after the city’s recapture, the English set up a corps to replace four hundred of Ward’s men who had been temporarily assigned to the city and who were likely to be recalled by Ward to Jiangsu province.\textsuperscript{12}

The efforts of Giquel and Brethon were a response to this British move. During the first few weeks, while the Franco-Chinese contingent was being formed, the question arose whether it might not better be merged with the Anglo-Chinese troops. Commander Faucon, the ranking French naval officer, corresponded with Admiral Ferdinand-Alphonse Hamelin, the former French naval minister, on the issue in mid-July 1863. He explained that the Chinese government thought the Franco-Chinese corps of Ningbo should be merged with Ward’s men. Faucon argued that both English and French forces had recaptured the town and that both should guard it; moreover, he claimed that Ward’s men had committed armed criminal acts during their tenure as guards for the city’s gates. He added that it would be easy enough for the English to turn their trained Chinese over to the Americans, but that the Franco-Chinese, trained with French instructions, could not so easily be transferred. Faucon concluded that “the result of this will be that we will lose the fruit of our efforts and that the instruction of these men, which was undertaken principally with the goal of raising French influence relative to that of the English, will not obtain this end.”\textsuperscript{13}

Throughout the mid-summer of 1862 the contingent’s status remained ambiguous. Giquel wrote Consul-General Eden asking him to obtain French naval permission for Brethon to be appointed officially to head the contingent.\textsuperscript{14} Giquel explained that Faucon lacked the authority to make the appointment. Although Faucon was pleased with the contingent’s first efforts, he felt its organization should be standardized with regular marine and army officers.\textsuperscript{15}

Chargé d’Affaires Michael Alexandre Kleckowski reported to Paris from Beijing that he had been trying to expand French influence, especially in Ningbo, and had done so to counteract the influence of Englishmen such as Captain Dew and Consul Harvey of Ningbo, and the American Frederick Ward. He had asked Prince Gong to have Brethon


\textsuperscript{13} Faucon to Hamelin, July 17, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 305, AN.

\textsuperscript{14} Giquel to Eden, August 22, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 214–215, AE.

\textsuperscript{15} Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], August 15, 1862, BB 4 815, fol. 151, AN.
officially appointed colonel in Zhejiang with orders to train fifteen hundred men under the leadership of French officers. Kleckowski had additionally requested that the circuit intendant of Ningbo be required to cover the costs of the contingent. It was, in fact, the impression of the French Minister of War that the Chinese had specifically requested French instructors and materials.

**Formation and Training of the Corps**

Despite official French interest in the contingent and the hopes of those involved, its early financing and training were uncertain. The scarcity of funds to support their efforts forced Giquel and Brethon to start on a very small scale. Brethon concentrated on organizing local Chinese volunteers and utilizing instructors sent from Shanghai by Consul-General Eden. Tardif de Moidrey’s contingent, with which Giquel had worked during the Shanghai campaigns, supplied Brethon with large numbers of trained troops.

Brethon and Giquel worked well together. While Brethon busied himself with training and organization, Giquel obtained subsidies from Chinese officials and local notables who had been formed into “committees of safety.” Competing for local funds with the Anglo-Chinese troops particularly hampered Giquel’s efforts. They began with a mere four hundred men. Later in the summer, as official supplies proved inadequate, the commanders of the Franco-Chinese contingent personally guaranteed the needed loans. The corps’ success thus became all the more vital to those involved.

The paucity of funds necessitated the use of rifles confiscated from Western gun runners. These rifles were stored at the Shanghai Maritime

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16 Kleckowski to Thouvenal, October 12, 1862, CP, Chine, fol. 38, fol. 358–359, AE.
17 Min. de Guerre to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Thouvenel], November 20, 1862, FADP, Chine, Carton 2, AE.
18 Eden to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Thouvenel], August 29, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 219, AE.
20 Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], October 22, 1862; Brethon de Caligny, Dossier Individuel CC 7 2253, SHM, Vincennes.
21 Eden to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Thouvenel], August 29, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 219, AE.
22 Giquel, “La France en Chine,” pp. 975–976. In his article Giquel merely writes “the commanders” obtained the loans in their own names, but as Brethon and Tardif alternated in command of the corps during the summer it is not clear whether he refers to himself, Brethon and Tardif, all three, or some combination.
Customs Office and no doubt were available to Giquel through his position in the customs. From Giquel's perspective, however, these rifles might better have been sent on to the rebels since they frequently exploded in the faces of his soldiers. The corps found a Chinese armorer who forged replacements for the rifles' brittle cast-iron hammers.

The First Test: The Battle of Yuyao

The immediate task of the Franco-Chinese corps was to force the Taipings away from the region around Ningbo. They set out in July 1862 to take Yuyao, which was about ten miles northeast of Ningbo. Brethon later estimated there were about ten thousand Taipings, including twenty Europeans and two cannon, which were used to harass the imperial forces. Taiping commanders Huang Chengzhong and Fan Ruzeng led the city's defense.

Yuyao presented a formidable challenge to its attackers. There was a large hill at the center of the city, and the walls which surrounded it were three miles in circumference. A canal circled the entire city except for those sections along the river. Gunboats could approach within two hundred yards of the walls. A bridge crossed the river, although to hinder an attack the river had been staked.

The circuit intendant of Ningbo, Zhang Jingqu, Captain Dew, Brethon, and Giquel commanded the allied forces. These included two thousand imperial troops; four hundred Franco-Chinese; and two gunboats, one English, one French. Although Giquel had not originally intended to command the Franco-Chinese corps, he assumed control in the absence of the officer initially chosen. Brethon meanwhile maintained command of the Confucius. The troops of Zhejiang Governor Zuo Zongtang were not present. Zuo was, in fact, quite disinterested in the newly formed contingent and kept his troops stationed in western Zhejiang. Not until more than a year later, during the fall of 1863, did Zuo begin to take an interest in the new contingent.

Giquel to Eden, August 22, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 208, AE.  
Ibid., p. 976.  
Brethon to Faucon, August 8, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 246–247, AE.  
The capture of Yuyao was particularly difficult. Its attackers had to capture the fortified bridge and then seize a well-defended hill within the city.\textsuperscript{31} Extant letters written by Giquel, Brethon, and Dew differ in their accounts of the battle, but for the most part these differences are of timing and emphasis. And Giquel's private account differs markedly from that which he later published in the \textit{Revue des deux mondes}. Privately he said that the attack of July 31 failed because of Morton's impatience. The commander of the Anglo-Chinese troops had waited for neither the Franco-Chinese nor the ships to arrive. As a result, his effort had ended in confusion and demoralization. While Brethon and Captain Dew planned the next attack, Morton made another assault on the city. Giquel was furious and claimed that Morton had lost one European officer and thirty regular troops by the time he withdrew.\textsuperscript{32}

Brethon reported that Franco-Chinese troops supported the imperial troops who advanced in the first wave. He confirmed that he assigned the corps to Giquel while he retained command of the \textit{Confucius} and Captain Dew remained on the \textit{Hardy}. The main attack began on July 31, but poor weather forced postponement until the next day. Brethon does not mention the problem with Morton.\textsuperscript{33}

Captain Dew's account naturally emphasizes his own role. The English commander reported that he had gone up river to lend moral support to the effort. Dew agreed that the first day's efforts failed and wrote that the next day he landed an additional contingent of Guangzhou men who managed to capture the hill.\textsuperscript{34} The Guangzhou forces were composed of former pirates led by Circuit Intendant Zhang Jingqu.

During the second day of the siege the Taipings, apparently emboldened by the previous day's successes, attempted a sortie against their besiegers. Some two thousand rushed from the city and heavy fighting ensued. The allied troops finally cooperated effectively, the rebel sortie was turned, and the city stormed. Ward's troops and the Franco-Chinese entered the city on the heels of the retreating Taipings.\textsuperscript{35}

Dew's account adds that he had ordered the \textit{Hardy} be made bulletproof with cotton bales, and that while the land forces advanced, he

\textsuperscript{31} Giquel, "La France en Chine," p. 976.
\textsuperscript{32} Giquel to Eden, August 22, 1862, CPC, vol. 4, Shanghai, fol. 206–208, AE.
\textsuperscript{33} Brethon to Faucon, August 8, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 244–245, AN; Kuo Ting-i, \textit{T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih} (Chungking and Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1946), p. 919, gives August 2 as the first day of the battle.
\textsuperscript{34} Dew to Vice Admiral Hope, August 4, 1862, Confidential Print, F.O. 405 9, incl. 2 in no. 107, fol. 87, PRO.
\textsuperscript{35} Giquel to Eden, August 22, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 208–210, AE.
The Ever-Triumphant Army

steamed in. Despite the ever-present French-English competition, Dew reported that he had been "ably assisted" by Brethon.36

Though the accounts of the battle for Yuyao are somewhat contradictory, it appears that Tardif de Moidrey, the contingent's later commander, did not take part in the capture of Yuyao. He was, however, in command of the corps later in the month.37

After Yuyao: The Franco-Chinese on Firmer Footing

Having captured the city on August 1, the troops settled in to feast on poultry and rice found there. The looting, which had become commonplace in the campaigns around Shanghai, continued for twenty-four hours. The entire corps remained in Yuyao until August 7.38

The corps' success had opened up a new controversy. The problem was that Ward was the only foreigner specifically authorized by the imperial government to lead troops. Local Chinese who had financed the corps wanted it to work with the American. Brethon resisted Chinese efforts to have the corps merge with Ward's and claimed that he had about three hundred fifty men who were filled with plunder and eager for more. It was his hope that the contingent could grow to one thousand and that Tardif could be sent from Shanghai to lead it officially.39 Giquel, acting as interpreter, claimed that many Ningbo notables came to discuss the question with him. They simply did not know what to do.40 This issue was no doubt the motive for Giquel's efforts to have Brethon officially appointed by the Beijing government and the French naval authorities to the position of commander of the Franco-Chinese corps. Although the ambiguity of the corps' status was to continue until September, when Ward died, the contingent gained considerable prestige after capturing Yuyao and was about to gain more support.41

36 Dew to Vice Admiral Hope, August 4, 1862, Confidential Prints, F.O. 405 9, incl. 2 in no. 107, fol. 87, PRO.
37 Jen in The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, p. 385, refers to Tardif having arrived the second day of the battle. This appears to be an error, possibly caused by confusion arising from the fact that Brethon and Tardif alternated overall control of the contingent during the summer of 1862. Tardif's location at that time was referred to in Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], August 15, 1862, BB 4 815, fol. 150–151, AN, wherein Faucon says that he had to refuse Brethon's request that Tardif lead the contingent because he had been needed in Shanghai.
38 Brethon to Faucon, August 8, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 246–247, AN.
39 Brethon to Faucon, August 8, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 246–247, AN.
40 Giquel to Eden, August 22, 1862, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 4, fol. 210–211, AE.
41 "La France en Chine," p. 976.
Brethon and Dew left Yuyao on August 8. A force of about a thousand men remained to defend the city. The disciplined Chinese who made up the group were from Ward's corps as well as the Franco-Chinese troops of Ningbo. Tardif de Moidrey arrived from Shanghai to command them temporarily. During August he expressed his hopes for the contingent: "[W]ithin two months this corps will become, as ordered, an effective force of 500 men. They will be completely uniformed and instructed. More so, their officers, petty officers and corporals will all be Chinese. This I regard as important. The Europeans, who are the most expensive of these types of troops, could then be reduced to a much smaller number and their responsibilities simply that of supervision."

During the next six weeks, while Brethon was active elsewhere, Tardif commanded the corps and successfully held Yuyao from a Taiping counterattack even as the French forces ironically found themselves fighting their Chinese imperial allies. Giquel had already returned to Ningbo to seek support for the contingent while Tardif had to rescue an arrogant French officer, Jules-August Marolles, who had aroused the anger of the Guangzhou pirates and provoked a clash between them and the Franco-Chinese.

As Marolles explained in a justification written years later, he had been in command of the Déroulède on August 27, when he arrived to help Tardif plan the defense of Yuyao. Grouped in the river were the junks of the Guangzhou pirates who had so effectively aided in the capture of Yuyao earlier in the month. Marolles concluded that their position down river made them useless in a potential fight; moreover, they were blocking his line of fire. When some of them refused his demands to move, he cut their cables. Tension rose for several days as the Guangzhou pirates kept returning to their original berthing positions. On September 9 Marolles set out once again with his men to cut their cables. The Chinese opened fire. Captain Marolles was hit twice, and three of his group were killed. In the ensuing battle Marolles was pushed back to Yuyao, and even Tardif, who ventured out to rescue him, was drawn into the bitter battle.

The entire incident was a significant setback for the efforts of the corps to clear Zhejiang. Many of the Guangzhou pirates passed over to the rebels. Captain Dew blamed the incident on Marolles' bullying, and

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43 Tardif to Faucon, August 3, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 247–248, AN.
45 Dew to Hope, September 15, 1862, F.O. 405 9, Confidential Print, incl. 3 in no. 107, fol. 87–88, PRO.
the French government gave Marolles little sympathy. The incident could not have aided Giquel’s efforts to increase support among the Ningbo gentry for the French-trained contingent.

Giquel’s opinion of Marolles is not available, but in an article published more than forty years later, Marolles purposely downgraded Giquel’s activities. When he did refer to Giquel, Marolles revealed a vehement level of animosity. He grudgingly admitted that Giquel spoke “passable” Chinese and English but said that he showed no interest in the French missionary movement, which was, according to Marolles, the basis of French influence in China. Moreover, in a comment that is probably the worst thing one naval officer could accuse another of, Marolles claimed Giquel was subject to seasickness.

During September the Taiping forces made an attempt to reconquer the countryside of Zhejiang. The towns of Qiqi and Fenghua, both east of Ningbo, were retaken with the aid of their new allies, the Guangzhou defectors. Having captured Qiqi on September 18, Taiping commanders Huang and Fan sent their forces against Ningbo.

To meet the renewed threat to Ningbo, Ward arrived from Shanghai on September 18 and took personal control of the campaign and made the decision to retake Qiqi from the Taipings. Qiqi was recaptured, but Ward’s death during the fighting led to a period of decline for the Ever-Victorious Army. The Franco-Chinese corps under Tardif stayed to guard Yuyao and did not fight at Qiqi. Neither Giquel nor Brethon was present at the battle.

The campaign against the Taipings continued and Ward’s successor set out with the English-Chinese contingent on October 8 for Fenghua, a large, walled city southeast of Ningbo. In mid-October the allied and Chinese contingent converged upon it. The French warship Déroulède, initially commanded by Captain Marolles; the Confucius; and the gunboats Hardy and Flamer were present. Captain Dew arrived a day behind Forrester with the Encounter. During the battle Marolles was wounded, and Paul d’Aiguèbelle, who later commanded the Franco-Chinese contingent and shared responsibility for the Fuzhou Dockyard with Giquel, took command of the Déroulède.

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47 Ibid., p. 5.
48 Wilson, The Ever-Victorious Army, p. 108.
49 North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (hereafter NCH), October 18, 1862.
50 Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], October 20, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 182, AN.
Transferring Technology to China

Despite the statements of some writers, it is evident that neither Brethon nor the Franco-Chinese corps took part in the capture of Fenghua.\footnote{See, for example, Egmont Hake, \textit{Events in the Taiping Rebellion}, pp. 221--222. Contemporaries ranging from Faucon (Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], October 20, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 182, AN) to NCH, October 18, 1862, do not record Brethon’s presence with the contingent. Giquel, who was always willing to build up the prestige of the corps, only mentions, in his 1864 article, Captain Dew’s involvement, p. 977.} While Dew, Forrester, and their French allies on the Déroulède successfully drove the Taipings from Fenghua on October 10, Brethon was in Shanghai and Tardif remained at Yuyao.\footnote{Faucon to unknown. Letter is abstracted in Tardif de Moidrey, Dossier Individuel 15485, Bib. Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes.} Giquel was in Ningbo working on the corps administration.\footnote{Giquel to Verny, October 18, 1862, Château de Bois-Dauphin.}

Shangyou Campaign

After their success at Yuyao and Ward’s death at Qiqi, the Ningbo Franco-Chinese were on a much firmer base both politically and financially. Frederick Ward’s position as the only foreigner authorized by the imperial government in Beijing to command Western-trained Chinese troops had been an impediment to Giquel’s efforts to raise money. With his death much of this problem was resolved. Faucon wrote on October 20, “I have just received word from the Chargé d’Affaires of France at Beijing that the Chinese government has, at his insistence, agreed to my request to place the native troops, drilled by our [illegible] at Ningbo and Shanghai, under the orders of our officers who will have nothing more to do with the English or American adventurers.”\footnote{Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], October 20, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 181, AN.} Faucon reported that he was returning Brethon to Ningbo and sending Tardif back to his infantry group in Shanghai. That fall the Chinese imperial government appointed Brethon Zong-bing (brigade general) in the area of Ningbo. However, the fact remained that employing French military instructors was expensive. The minister of war sent Faucon a price list for hiring French officers. The Chinese would have to pay fees ranging from five hundred francs a month for a soldier to two thousand for a lieutenant colonel. Lieutenants were one thousand francs, and a captain cost nineteen hundred.\footnote{Min. de la Guerre to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Drouyn de Lhuys], received December 4, 1862, FADP, carton 2, AE.}

In Ningbo the merchants who had reestablished themselves since the city’s liberation were impressed with the accomplishments of both
contingents and promised funds for the clearing of the rest of the province. The Ningbo Anglo-Chinese contingent was augmented to fourteen hundred men and the Franco-Chinese, having begun with four hundred, expanded to a thousand. Giquel later wrote that they were finally accepted officially by Beijing and that new subsidies allowed them to begin the next major stage in the campaign, the attack on Shangyou, with better equipment and more confidence.

Although the uncertainty surrounding the French contingent’s separate existence ended with Ward’s death, tension continued between English and French nationals. Charles Gordon, who had heard of Brethon’s return to Ningbo, wrote General Charles Staveley, commander of the local British forces, that Brethon was on his way to resume command of the French contingent but that under no circumstances was he to take control of any of those men under Staveley’s command. If Brethon tried, Gordon advised Staveley to ignore him completely. Colonel J.E. Cooke, who commanded the Anglo-Chinese contingent in Ningbo, commented two days later on November 6: “I have been trying and shall continue to make apparent in the eyes of the mandarins the difference between the men disciplined by the English and French forces.” Cooke claimed that nearly all the officials of Zhejiang wanted French influence eliminated.

On November 17 the allied forces started for Shangyou, a city to the north of Ningbo. It was about twelve miles southeast of Yuyao. They were supported by the Deroulede and an English cannoniere, though neither ship was supposed to do more than offer moral support. The Anglo-Chinese forces consisted of seven hundred men; Brethon led a thousand Franco-Chinese. Giquel described the horror of the march toward the city during which they found countless corpses strewn about to intimidate them. Decapitated and dismembered bodies of men, women, and children lined their path.

To defend Shangyou the Taiping commanders had prepared fourteen entrenched camps. These fortifications were stormed without major

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58 Gordon to Staveley, November 4, 1862, piece 2, no. 157, AD 52386, British Museum.
59 J.E. Cooke to General Brown, November 6, 1862, F.O. 670 72, Ningbo, misc. papers, PRO.
60 Faucon to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], November 23, 1862, BB 4 815 Marine, fol. 208, AN.
61 NCH, November 29, 1862.
difficulty. Only three offered any serious resistance. As the fleeing Taipings retreated toward the city, Giquel received a wound that was to cause him pain and partial paralysis for the rest of his life.

Giquel's account of these events differs from the more contemporary account of the *North China Herald*. Giquel recalled that he had initially commanded the artillery unit of the contingent. He put himself at the head of a group of two hundred men and tried to repeat the successful storming of Yuyao by streaming into the city behind the retreating units. Giquel charged ahead and hoped to cause a panic within the city if he were successful in following them in. Unfortunately, his timing was off and the charge failed. Giquel was blocked outside the gates, his right elbow shattered by a bullet.

The unnamed correspondent of the *North China Herald* wrote that after two days of overpowering the camps outside of Shangyou, the contingents had to deal with the rebel attempt to make a final stand at a bridge four hundred yards from the gate. While Brethon was preparing for a massed attack Giquel charged ahead—not with two hundred men but with thirty—a move the paper described as a dashing but impractical maneuver.

It is hard to accept the *North China Herald*'s contention that Giquel erred in failing to wait for the full contingent. Rather, it seems that Giquel gambled and lost. In the following days the city was taken, but Giquel never recovered the use of his destroyed right arm. Despite the English journal's comments about the unsuccessful charge, Giquel’s actions were described in the best possible light. The overall tone of the article was exceptionally complimentary for the British-owned *North China Herald*'s reporting on a French national.

The Chinese authorities were similarly pleased with reports of the battle. An imperial decree, issued months later, reported favorably on Giquel’s and Brethon’s efforts and mentioned in detail Giquel’s efforts to panic the rebels by following them into the town.

The next day, November 20, with the aid of a thirty-two-pound cannon put in place by Roderick Dew, the city was finally taken. For the Franco-Chinese troops, this completed the first part of their plan to clear the province. With the capture of Yuyao and Shangyou, the Franco-

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63 Ibid.
64 NCH, November 29, 1862.
65 Imperial decree of early January 1863, said to be based on information from Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, enclosed in CP, Chine, vol. 38, 1863, fol. 127–128, AE.
66 NCH, November 29, 1862.
Chinese troops had driven the Taipings from the area between the latter city and Ningbo. Brethon’s initial plan after the Shangyou battle was to hold the city until spring while preparing to attack the next target, Shaoxing. For Prosper Giquel, his shattered elbow ended his immediate involvement in the corps’ campaigns. He returned to Ningbo and his administrative responsibilities with the maritime customs service.

Giquel Departs for France

Giquel’s shattered elbow limited his role in the remaining struggle to capture Shaoxing to supply officer and fund raiser. But Giquel found himself unable to keep up with either his responsibilities to the customs or those to the corps. He decided to return to France to recuperate. In the weeks before leaving, Giquel spent time helping Verny, the French vice-consul at Ningbo, as an interpreter. Verny later regretted Giquel’s departure: his familiarity with Chinese etiquette had eliminated many problems. Verny reported that immediately after Giquel left he sent off a letter to Chinese officials without the proper titles. Giquel’s expertise had previously helped Verny to avoid such clumsiness.

Giquel left for Shanghai in late March or early April 1863 to put his business affairs in order. It appears that he published anonymously some parting advice to his fellow Europeans. There is no certainty that Giquel was the author of the letter signed “Entente Cordiale” published in the North China Herald on May 2, 1863, but considerable evidence suggests that he indeed wrote it.

In the letter Giquel took a European rather than a French perspective when he spoke of the tensions and jealousies that existed between the Sino-French and Sino-English contingents. This perspective was appropriate coming from a former officer of the Guangzhou Allied

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68 NCH, November 29, 1862.
69 Verny to Eden, September 20, 1863, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 5, fol. 17, AE.
70 The letter was written by a member of the Franco-Chinese contingent of Ningbo who, rather than being in Zhejiang with the contingent, was then in Shanghai. It was written in French but by someone who knew English well enough to follow events in the English newspaper; it expresses optimism about the ability of the English and French to work together. Prosper Giquel was in Shanghai that week, knew English fluently, was a regular reader of the NCH, and was throughout his career an experienced partner on many projects with the English—in great contrast to many of his compatriots who detested the English. In only a few years Giquel’s positive opinions regarding English-French cooperation, by then published openly, would cause a scandal in the French community. See Chapter 7. Lastly, as his departure was imminent it is only natural that Giquel decided to offer advice for the future.
Commission and a member of the Maritime Customs Service. He wrote:

Bearing in mind that the Chinese trouble is neither an English or a French question, but essentially one of European interest, it will be allowed that the treaty ports ought not only to be unmolested, but kept so. This result obtained, it has been deemed advisable to extend the line of operation, and foreign powers have authorized some of their officers and subjects to aid and assist the Chinese government by instructing her troops in the art of warfare and fighting in her cause. Unfortunately, however, at this juncture a spirit of jealousy instead of generous emulation appears to animate the different auxiliary corps.... Does not the advantage acquired by either the one or the other of the two rival nations increase that of the other? For Heaven’s sake let us come to a proper understanding on this point.71

As he left East Asia for the first time since his 1857 arrival, Prosper Giquel had gained perspectives and insights far exceeding those of his fellow French officers. Learning Chinese, working with the British attached to the Guangzhou Allied Commission, and then in the Maritime Customs Service, had given him a distinctly European perspective regarding Chinese affairs.

In the future Giquel would find himself increasingly in conflict with French authorities. Although the French were willing to release men like Giquel to serve in the Maritime Customs Service and Brethon for the Franco-Chinese contingent, they still expected these inactive officers to submit to French control. The minister of war expressed this best: "It is still important...that the French who have been authorized to take service with the Chinese not think of themselves as being beyond the authority of our superior officers."72

This insistence on maintaining control over their nationals in Chinese service was to be part of the dilemma of all French employees of the Chinese government who, like Giquel, took their commitments to China seriously. When he returned to China and became even more involved in the intricacies of Chinese government and society, Giquel’s perspective would be so altered as to bring into question his basic loyalty to France itself. Possibly an awareness of this dilemma, of his growing intellectual isolation from his countrymen, prompted Giquel to send his letter to the North China Herald anonymously. In later years he would not be so reticent and would find himself in a storm of controversy.

71 NCH, May 2, 1863.
72 Marechal, Min. de la Guerre, to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], September 30, 1863, FADP, Chine, Carton 2, AE.
Sojourn in France and the End of the Taiping Kingdom

In June, during the last part of the spring 1863 voyage from Alexandria to Marseilles, Giquel met Ferdinand de Lesseps, promoter of the Suez Canal. De Lesseps was impressed with his young traveling companion and encouraged Giquel to submit a report to the French Foreign Ministry on his work in the Chinese customs. Giquel wrote the note, "Inspectorat étranger des douanes de la Chine," and sent it to de Lesseps, who passed it on to the Foreign Ministry with a complimentary cover letter about Giquel.1 De Lesseps mentioned that Giquel would be available if the foreign affairs minister cared to interrogate him further. It is not known whether an interview took place during the next months. It is clear, however, that Giquel soon recognized that he had to modify his explanation of the Ever-Triumphant Army (as the Franco-Chinese corps of Ningbo was becoming known) if he hoped to increase French support of the unit.

Convalescence and Public Writings

Giquel's writings on China had already gained an official French audience. His letter of May 27, 1862, to his commanding officer, which dealt with the Shanghai campaigns of that spring, was selected by the editor of the Revue maritime et coloniale for anonymous publication.2 Giquel had not been involved in the decision of the Revue editor to use his letter as the core of its article "L'Insurrection des Taé-Ping en Chine" published in September 1862. In the summer of 1863, however, he consciously set out to influence French activities in China.

1 De Lesseps to Lhuys, June 19, 1863, MD, Chine, vol. 18, fol. 248–249, AE.
French bureaucracy, both navy and foreign ministry, was increasingly aware of Prosper Giquel. Although many Frenchmen had experience in China, few had developed so extensive an expertise and involvement. In the summer of 1863 the naval minister, Prosper de Chasseloup-Laubat, wrote to his counterpart in the Foreign Ministry, Drouyn de Lhuys, about the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. Chasseloup-Laubat thought that the service should not be staffed exclusively by the English. He mentioned Giquel's position in Ningbo and Eugene Herman de Meritens' assignment to Fuzhou and added that the navy, which had supplied Giquel, should be able to furnish others as well.\(^3\)

The French naval command in China was also interested in gaining official support to use the Ever-Triumphant Army as a tool to increase French influence. Rear Admiral Jean Louis Jaurès, the commander of the Asian fleet, felt that interest was waning in the contingent as the rebellion weakened. Nevertheless, France should still assign capable officers to the contingent to augment overall French influence. Jaurès concluded that the success of the corps had made it a marvelous vehicle to attain French ends.\(^4\)

Giquel had sent in his customs report with an explanation of the new contingent that linked it to Horatio Nelson Lay’s desire to increase the influence of the customs and its inspectors. Having once acquired such influence, Lay had explained to Giquel, they could use the customs as a vehicle for “rebuilding China.” Once in France, Giquel recognized that this approach would not attract French support for the contingent. For the vast majority of his countrymen, both within France and in the Far East, there was only one perspective in which events could be interpreted: the necessity of not losing all influence to the ubiquitous English. Accordingly, Giquel’s report to Napoleon III, “Rapport à L’Empereur sur le Contingent Franco-Chinois de Ningpo,” submitted in August 1863, took an entirely different approach. He now emphasized the advantages the contingent offered for France. For the moment this adjustment of the contingent’s value, from Giquel’s increasingly European-Chinese perspective to a narrowly French orientation, was not difficult. As time passed Giquel’s growing dilemma would become more obvious to all involved.

Before leaving China, Giquel had been in contact with the French legation, hoping to have them try to override the objections of Zuo

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\(^3\) Chasseloup-Laubat to de Lhuys, July 11, 1863, CPC, Chine, vol. 39, fol. 109-110, AE.

\(^4\) Jaurès to Chasseloup-Laubat, June 1, 1863, FADP, Chine, carton 2, misc. papers, AE.
Zongtang,\(^5\) who had been appointed governor-general of Zhejiang in May, to the Franco-Chinese contingent. During the summer of 1863 Giquel's immediate concern was to gain French support against Zuo, who was attempting to reduce the size of the contingent. The Chinese were still uncertain about the efficacy of such troops, their loyalty, and their effect on Chinese regulars. Zuo would not begin to work closely with the Ever-Triumphant Army until the fall of 1863.\(^6\) Giquel, however, saw the contingent as an important element in his view of a modernized China; any reduction of its effectiveness had to be prevented. He claimed that Zuo disliked the contingent because its successes in Zhejiang reflected poorly on his own leadership.\(^7\)

That summer Zuo moved against the contingent. He ordered d'Aiguebelle to reduce the number of troops under his command. D'Aiguebelle wrote Giquel, who was furious that Zuo's suspicions against the contingent were being acted upon. In his report to Napoleon III, Giquel complained:

> The cabinet at Beijing can not have forgotten that it was only a short time ago that it had called upon the assistance of the allied nations against a rebellion which threatened its existence. The naval authorities, in letting their officers go to its [the cabinet's] aid, had not thought that it was to act only in one place and then to be discharged without reason. It was not just Ningbo but China itself that they understood themselves to be aiding. The soldiers, who have worked so generously for the success of the enterprise, have been hired in the name of France and cannot be discharged on the simple whim of a provincial governor.\(^8\)

Giquel claimed that the twenty-five hundred men of the Ever-Triumphant Army had done no more than to push the rebels before them. The contingent was too weak to annihilate the enemy. Giquel suggested that if the unit were disbanded, Ningbo would be retaken by the Taipings and the allies would have to intervene again.\(^9\)

Giquel listed for Napoleon III the commercial and political advantages of the corps for France. After reminding his emperor that the English contingent, the Ever-Victorious Army, had had fewer obstacles placed in the way of its efforts, Giquel ended with a plea for French

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5 “Rapport a L'Empereur,” fol. 5, AE.
7 “Rapport à L'Empereur,” fol. 5, AE.
8 Ibid., fol. 5.
9 Ibid.
support. After complimenting Napoleon’s previous support for French activities in the Far East and the Emperor’s earlier interest in the Ever-Triumphant Army, Giquel requested him to intervene on the contingent’s behalf with the Chinese government. If a more regular source of income were established and the contingent maintained, Giquel promised a new campaign would commence: “Your majesty has already done too much to extend the influence of France not to desire that she take part in the great work in progress now being undertaken in China. It is this which involves me in calling your attention to our enterprise.”

The contingent and individuals involved would be of great service, Giquel claimed: “One of the advantages would be to place into the heart of the provinces those agents who, well placed for acquiring a serious understanding of the affairs of China, would be able, at a given moment, to furnish useful information.”

Giquel said that these agents would gain the confidence of Chinese officials and take considerable part in the future direction of China.

Despite Prosper Giquel’s effort to portray the raison d’être of the contingent in a fashion most likely to gain French support, he made it clear that his motives were not merely those of a French national. He said that he spoke “not as a lieutenant de vaisseau [ship’s lieutenant], but as a Frenchman in the service of the Chinese government who has the desire to work for the interests of the country to which I have offered my services…”

It is not known whether Giquel’s letter aided the attempt to gain French support. D’Aiguebelle was required to go through the planned reduction. However, Napoleon III was interested in the contingent and supported it.

Giquel had not wanted to leave China, and while planning his return and caring for his partially paralyzed right arm, he prepared the first of his two major signed articles on China. “La France en Chine: le commerce français dans le céleste-empire, les opérations du corps Franco-Chinois et les missions en 1863” appeared in June 1864. The article followed the same argument Giquel had presented in his August 1863 report to Napoleon III. Giquel divided French activities in China into three areas of actual or potential influence. Successively he discussed French
commercial activities; military intervention against the Taipings, primarily the Ningbo Franco-Chinese Ever-Triumphant Army; and the Catholic missionaries.

Giquel reminded his readers that the French commercial presence in China was not equal to the English. They had, however, at least begun: "It is with a lively emotion that the French traveler, tired of not having seen until East Asia the colors other than that of the English, arrives at Shanghai and sights the flag of his own country. It is with pleasure that one sees that France occupies an appropriate place in the center of commercial activities." After surveying French accomplishments and limitations Giquel added: "It certainly isn't possible for French merchants, newcomers and prudent to the point of timidity, to launch themselves into huge operations which require large capital investments, audacity and a lot of confidence in success. But it is useful that they see the goal to reach and the benefits they can hope for."

French influence, evidenced by military action, was, according to Giquel, brought about by the weakness of the Qing government. Thus England and France had taken it upon themselves to protect their nationals in China. After summarizing the Shanghai and Ningbo campaigns, Giquel outlined the advantages of having the gratitude of the Chinese for the French intervention against the Taipings. He was scornful of the Chinese troops, and he criticized the Chinese provincial authorities for undermining the foreign contingents to avoid unflattering comparisons with provincial forces. Giquel was certain that military activity was the most significant of the three vehicles of French influence: "[The Ever-Triumphant Army] is the most certain means of extending our political action and commercial relations, and to assure the progress of the ideas of both our religion and our civilization. The English don't err in this, they know that a corps of a few thousand regulars, under the direction of European officers, suffices to impose respect on the innumerable population." With his thoughts clearly on the Zhejiang campaigns, Giquel added emphatically: "France must not, whatever be the difficulties or opposition, abandon the post which she has conquered and paid for with the blood of her soldiers. It is to her that belongs the right to drive the rebels from Hangzhou while the English [Ever Victorious Army] will deliver Suzhou."

16 Ibid., p. 966.
17 Ibid., p. 972.
18 Ibid., pp. 985–986.
19 Ibid., p. 987.
20 Ibid.
For a man who would later be thought to be hostile to the missionary movement in China, his discussion of Catholic missionaries was quite complimentary. He defended them against those to whom he referred as their detractors.21 Though the French missionaries taught their converts Latin rather than French,22 they were, nevertheless, closely associated with France. The faithful looked to France for protection. The missionaries, he added, had often played important roles in military activities. They worked as translators and often supplied food to the indigent created by the fighting.23 He concluded: "One can, therefore, only deny that the missionaries have not served the politics of France by their cooperation in war and by their authority over a certain part of the populations... Their work can only grow."24

Giquel cautioned against the idea of conquering China. Calling Chinese culture the most advanced in the world, Giquel argued that the Westerners should simply take part in the available profits and that their governments should support them. He then added his final thoughts on the stance most appropriate for France: "Firm defense of our rights, choosing trustworthy agents, effective and tenacious protection of those who serve us, a practical spirit, active and persistent. These are the conditions that will conserve for us in the pacifistic commercial struggles the place which we have conquered by force of arms."25

Giquel's first signed article was oriented toward traditional French perspectives. If his private writings had become less narrowly French, his public views did not yet reveal this evolution. The article aroused none of the controversy his next public essay did when it appeared eight years later, again in the Revue des deux mondes.

The Return to China

In February 1864 Giquel asked the naval minister's permission to return to China and that his leave, which had been used largely for recuperation, be extended.26 Although aware of the importance of his

21 Ibid., p. 988.
22 Later, when Giquel began directing language studies at Fuzhou Dockyard, he would regret very much that the French Catholic missionaries had taught Latin instead of French. Had they not done so, there would have been more prepared French/Chinese teaching aids for him to use. See Chapter 6.
24 Ibid., p. 991.
25 Ibid., p. 993.
26 Giquel to Min. de la Marine Chasseloup-Laubat, February 19, 1864, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
activities in China, the navy, while authorizing his request to return, required that he do so at his own expense. On April 19 Giquel left by ship for Alexandria to begin the first stage of his return to China.

On April 21, near the Straits of Messina, Giquel began a journal that he kept faithfully for the following six months. The contents range widely from terse comments on Giquel’s activities to detailed analyses of East Asian events. Though Giquel did not state his intentions in keeping the journal, the reader gains the impression that it is more than a personal diary. Probably, it was to be rough notes for a future article to parallel “La France en Chine.” Unfortunately, he never wrote the article. As he later became involved in the plans for the Fuzhou Dockyard, his energies and writings dealt with more pressing issues.

Unlike his 1857 voyage, when he had sailed as part of the French fleet, Giquel’s trip in 1864 was made as an individual and, in those days before the opening of the Suez Canal, partly by land. Having traveled by train from Alexandria, Giquel arrived in Cairo during late April. He was shocked to read in a local newspaper that his friend Joseph Bonnefoy, Tardif’s successor as commander of the Franco-Chinese corps at Shanghai, was dead. The twenty-eight-year-old commander had died in Cairo just days before Giquel arrived. He lamented: “I learned terrible news. My poor friend Bonnefoy, whose father I just saw a few days ago, died on April 21. Yet another Chinese [European] general dead! That is the third one, and only two remain, and the second isn’t doing well!”

Before leaving Cairo Giquel toured the area. On April 30 he left Suez to continue his voyage. Traveling with a copy of James Bryce’s *A Cyclopedia of Geography*, Giquel recorded his impressions of the trip that took him from Suez to Aden, then to Ceylon, and finally to Singapore in late May. After a short stay Giquel continued on and docked in Saigon on May 25. Having taken part in the original 1859 expedition to Indochina, Giquel noted the growth of the French settlement. Although not officially involved in the French colonization of Vietnam, Giquel visited Indochina many times, and his career was often closely linked to events there, especially twenty years later, when his attempt to arbitrate a dispute between France and China brought his loyalty to France into question.

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27 Min. de la Marine, first direction to Giquel, April 9, 1864, misc. papers, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
28 Giquel Journal, late April 1864. Both Brethon and Tardif had died in the struggle for Shaoxing.
Giquel's impression of his visit to Saigon in 1864 is revealing of his evolving political and racial attitudes. As a French naval officer he no doubt held most of the conventional French imperialist views of his day. Nevertheless, during his years in China, he had become considerably less chauvinistic regarding the English. He was also increasingly sympathetic to the Chinese. His involvement in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service gave him a perspective on East Asian events that went beyond narrow military considerations. In Saigon he was struck by the animosity that existed between the French naval authorities, who administered the area, and the French business community:

Everyone complains a lot about the obstacles the military government has put in the way of his operations. And they have reason to do so. A thousand pin pricks in the form of regulations torment them without end. Should they be convicted of some infraction, they are judged by military tribunals. Should they request concessions of land, they are refused. The official newspaper, the Courrier de Saigon, never stops heaping insults and abuse upon them.

Despite his sympathy for the commercial community, Giquel felt that their inability to form a united front contributed to the difficulties. They had been asked to form a commercial organization, but petty internal disputes ended the effort.

Giquel was particularly interested in the situation of local Chinese. He discussed at length the European claim that the Chinese dominated commerce and described European efforts to harass the Chinese community. Entering Chinese were subject to poll taxes and additional impediments to their activities. Giquel found this anti-Chinese animosity ludicrous. He felt that the Europeans should hire the Chinese to work as their agents and have them act as compradores. Giquel's impression of the foreign community of Saigon was more complimentary to the Chinese than to his fellow Europeans: "The Chinese, in spite of all the nuisances they are subjected to, seem to succeed in their business affairs. Their city, which they call Taigon [Cholon] is located about two leagues [about six miles] from the European city and is very well laid out. Large and beautiful streets are well kept up and run between the houses." By 1864 Giquel was considerably more racially tolerant than most Europeans. But in many ways he was very much a man of his century:

As for the Annamites, they can be found in some little shops, but principally in the inferior positions—as coolies of the European, and

31 Ibid.
even of the Chinese. A big market is held on the shore where the peasants come to sell their produce. They are ugly, dirty and have mouths which are constantly red from chewing betel nut. They deserve the miserable straw huts where they live. For the moment, the "order of the day" is to treat them well. They are perhaps the happiest people.32

Giquel hoped the colony would prosper, but he considered its administration faulty. Moreover, Giquel did not think the establishment of a civil administration for the colony would offer any advantages. In his view, the French government lacked the commitment to make the colony a success. Giquel's solution was to propose that a financial company be charted to stimulate the colony's economy. If he was somewhat pessimistic, he did retain hope:

But it would be sad to think of these three provinces conquered by us being returned to the Annamites. If the past is not encouraging, this is no reason to despair for the future. The messageries [French commercial steamship lines in the Far East], by transporting so many people, and people from all nations, past this sad attempt at colonization, will achieve the effect of drawing public attention to it. Then the old routine will be near its end.33

China Again

In the mid-afternoon of May 29, Giquel's ship anchored at Hong Kong. He was in the land that was becoming his second home. Giquel was struck by the number of new buildings. Both the small British outpost and China herself were going through important changes. Many developments had occurred during Giquel's absence. For the Ever-Victorious Army, which aided Li Hongzhang's military campaigns, the culminating effort was the capture, in December 1863, of Suzhou. The city was a key economic and administrative center for Jiangsu province. Its loss was a major blow to the rebellion. The Ever-Victorious Army's effective use of artillery helped break the defense of the Taiping walled cities.34 This demonstration of Western military technology provided impetus to Li Hongzhang to explore the possibilities of borrowing these skills. Zuo Zongtang was similarly impressed.

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
Zuo had during this period begun working closely with Paul d'Aiguebelle, the commander of the Ever-Triumphant Army since Tardif's death in February 1863. The Ever-Triumphant Army had had its first opportunity to fight alongside Zuo's troops in the capture of Fuyang, a city thirty miles southwest of Hangzhou, in September 1863. In the spring of 1864 Zuo captured Hangzhou, and the Ever-Triumphant Army and its artillery were equally effective.35

After staying only a short time in Hong Kong, Giquel departed for Shanghai. Arriving on June 4, he spent the next four days speaking to the English and French leaders in that city. On June 5, while visiting Harry Parkes, his old associate from the Canton Allied Commission, Giquel met Charles "Chinese" Gordon. It is not known whether they had met before. Gordon had taken command of the Ever-Victorious Army in March 1863, just as Giquel was planning his departure. The two discussed military affairs. Gordon had just disbanded the Ever-Victorious Army save those portions that had been assigned to Governor Li Hongzhang or the English concession at Shanghai. Gordon's thoughts that day were on the demobilization. He and Giquel discussed the Ever-Victorious Army at length. Gordon had been very impressed by the fighting skills of Li Hongzhang's troops during their recent battle for Changzhou in Jiangsu. He felt that Li Hongzhang's imperial troops had been as effective as his own and for that reason agreed to the demobilization.36 Earlier in the year Gordon, along with many Chinese officials, had been concerned that the demobilized units might go over to the rebels.37 Though Gordon had finally agreed to the demobilization he was still, months later, quite doubtful about the quality of his former soldiers.

Gordon told Giquel that the Ever-Victorious Army had been very expensive to maintain, that it included a large number of former rebels, and that the European officers had been such a disreputable lot that their presence could only discredit the Europeans in Chinese eyes.38 That fall, when Giquel himself had extensive discussions with the Chinese officials regarding demobilization of the Ever-Triumphant Army, similar concerns were expressed about the units' postdemobilization conduct.

By the spring of 1864 Li Hongzhang no longer needed the Ever-Victorious Army. The Taipings, however, were strengthening their

35 D'Aiguebelle to Berthemy, March 31, 1864, CP, Chine, vol. 40, fol. 85–86, AE.
36 Giquel Journal, June 5, 1864.
37 Bruce to Russell, February 12, 1864, dis. no. 1, F.O. 881 1269, PRO.
38 Giquel Journal, June 5, 1864.
position at Huzhou, and Zuo still required the help of the Ever-Triumphant Army. Before departing to rejoin the contingent, Giquel spent two days gathering information about recent developments in China. On June 8 he set out for the developing battle at Huzhou in Zhejiang.

The Last Campaign: Huzhou

The boat trip from Shanghai had taken almost a week, and it was not until June 13 that Giquel caught up with Paul d’Aiguebelle and the corps near Linghu. On June 15 he met Governor-General Zuo Zongtang. Giquel gives the impression that this was their first encounter. He found Zuo Zongtang intelligent and energetic but felt he talked too much. The two eventually developed a particularly warm relationship, and Zuo’s later memorials spoke of Giquel with considerable affection.

The most colorful imperial military officer Giquel met was the former Gui Wang (Taiping Returning King), Deng Guangming. Deng, who had only recently switched sides, had had a particularly impressive career as a rebel. A native of Hunan, he had become a Taiping general under Li Xiucheng, the Zhong Wang (Loyal King). Deng had at one time commanded the Taiping forces at Hangzhou and had later held Shimen in Zhejiang until surrendering, in April 1864, to the imperial forces.

Giquel was fascinated with Deng Guangming and visited him several times. According to Giquel, Deng had surrendered in time to preserve the 300,000 taels he had accumulated during his years as a rebel. Deng told of his interest in traveling abroad, and Giquel felt that he was quite intelligent. He was repulsed, however, by Deng’s opium addiction, which was obvious from his appearance. On one occasion they sat down for a long talk about Deng’s former leader Hong Xiuquan, the Tian Wang (Heavenly King) of the Taiping kingdom. Giquel was surprised by the depth of Deng’s continuing faith in the man and the movement he had so recently abandoned:

39 Ibid., June 15, 1864.
41 The term ‘Wang’ or king referred initially to the eight senior associates of Hong Xiuquan. In the later years of the rebellion there were far more.
43 By 1864 standards, 2,400,000 francs ($480,000).
To my great astonishment he held as the incontestable truth that Hong Xiuquan, the founder of the rebellion, had been raised to heaven for forty days and that he had received there the instructions necessary to begin his mission. He believed also, very naively, in the doctrines of his former master. Thus the government of Heaven was composed of the Father of Heaven, the Brother of Heaven (Jesus Christ) and the King of Heaven (the Taiping wang). He also said that his old religion was exactly the same as ours. The good soldier puts up with his position as a renegade tranquilly enough; to numb himself he smokes 120 opium pipes a day. At this rate he will be even more successful; he is going to lose all feeling.\footnote{Giquel Journal, June 23, 1864.}

Giquel and Deng got along well. Giquel spoke highly of the wounds Deng had received in battle and which Deng had taken the trouble to show his French guest.\footnote{Ibid.} The two were frequent companions throughout the rest of the summer.

On June 25 the battalion officers officially assembled to celebrate Giquel’s return. For the first months after his return, Giquel served as second-in-command of the contingent. Both the Chinese authorities and the French naval officers viewed Giquel as the principal lieutenant and potential replacement for d’Aiguebelle, who was ill and hoping to leave.\footnote{Ibid., June 7 and 15, 1864.} During d’Aiguebelle’s frequent absences that summer Giquel often took command of the contingent.

The spring and summer of 1864 witnessed the fall of the Taipings. The capture of Suzhou by Li Hongzhang and the Ever-Victorious Army and the surrender of Hangzhou to Zuo and the Ever-Triumphant Army cut off crucial supplies to Nanjing.\footnote{Tong, “La Politique française en Chine pendant les Guerres des Taiping,” p. 325.} On July 19 that city fell. With the capital’s destruction, the capture of Huzhou would be the final chapter to the organized resistance of the Taipings.

In mid-April the Taiping garrison of Huzhou under General Huang Wenjin withstood a full-scale attack by Zuo Zongtang’s army and the foreign contingents. The city held while remnants of the Taiping forces continued to arrive, and Zuo was still unable to capture the city. The imperial court was clearly dissatisfied; Zuo, passed over in the round of honors offered after the fall of the Taiping capital,\footnote{Jen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, pp. 489–490.} was more determined than ever to capture Huzhou. In early summer Li Hongzhang arrived with his army. He pressured the Taipings at Changxing, a city just north of Huzhou along the coast of Lake Tai. Zuo had not wanted Li’s help but
had given in to Beijing’s demand for a concerted effort. By early summer there were about 150,000 Taiping troops based around Lake Tai.

The force confronting the Taipings was a formidable one. Li planned to attack from the north and was moving south supported by Guo Songlin’s troops and an artillery unit commanded by Colonel Bailey. An imperial flotilla operated on the lake. South of Huzhou the Zhejiang forces, commanded by Zuo and led by the provincial treasurer and acting governor, Jiang Yili, moved north. D’Aigebelle, Shaedelin, and the recently arrived Giquel led the 1,800 Franco-Chinese. Colonel Reynolds with English officers commanded another eight hundred men.

The Huzhou region was full of lakes and rivers easily accessible by steamers, but dense mulberry trees made it difficult to reconnoiter. Giquel often found it very hard to maneuver his troops or to see at any distance because of the thick vegetation. The heat was particularly stifling. Li Hongzhang reported to Beijing that the heat had burst many of his muskets, the howitzers were unreliable, and several cannon had exploded during the fighting for Changxing.

Giquel respected his adversary, General Huang Wenjin, commander of the Taiping forces at Huzhou, who was known as an able general and courageous leader. Huang had established outposts fifteen to twenty miles from Huzhou in all directions. The imperial forces occupied themselves during most of June, July, and August with the capture of these advanced positions. For Giquel and the Ever-Triumphant Army, the summer was taken up with skirmishes and at least one major disagreement with Chinese officials over the use of the contingent to rescue a former Taiping commander who was trapped by the Taipings.

Cai Yuanlong, a former Taiping king, had surrendered to the imperial forces in January 1864. He then joined the Qing cause and changed his name to Cai Yuanji. During the battle for Huzhou, Cai overextended his advance and was trapped by his former associates at Dongpo, south of Huzhou. On July 16 Giquel received word of Cai’s predicament. Giquel noted that the Chinese did not seem particularly upset about the possible loss of Cai and his troops.

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49 Giquel Journal, June 6, 1864.
Bad news from Linghu and Cai Yuanji. Both are surrounded by the rebels. The Tidu [provincial general Gao Liansheng] and the Guwang [Deng Guangming] are rubbing their hands in glee. They say that Cai is an arrogant individual who has constantly declared that he could, without help, hold the advanced positions he occupies. He has even disdained the troops who have been sent at various occasions to support him.\(^{55}\)

Despite Gao Liansheng’s and Deng Guangming’s initial amusement, they realized that something had to be done to save the trapped troops. On July 22 d’Aiguebelle and Giquel were asked to take part in an attempt to rescue the besieged officer.

The Tidu [Gao] came this evening to report that the Futai [Jiang Yili] had arrived from Linghu and that he had seen him. Seven hundred of his troops have been designated to participate in the operations to rescue Cai Yuanji. He asked us to send three hundred of our men. We categorically refused. What creates our prestige, our ability over that of inferior forces, to always dominate the rebels, is the totality of our forces. It is cannon, Manilois [Filipinos], and Europeans which combine to give it its prestige. A minimum portion of this force is nothing and could expose itself by failure to the lowering of the fear that we inspire in the enemy. The poor Tidu seems very annoyed. For a long time we have marched alongside him, and he has had nothing but victories. Will he do as well alone?\(^{56}\)

The next day, after Deng’s troops had broken the encirclement, Giquel traveled to Linghu to explain to Jiang Yili why he and d’Aiguebelle had refused the previous day’s orders. Jiang received him well and Giquel’s explanation was accepted with understanding. The meeting, though, was not completely to Giquel’s satisfaction: “His benevolence, however, cost me a fancy watch worth five hundred francs that he had me give him.”

This refusal to advance at Jiang Yili’s order gives some insight into the relative balance of authority between the French officers of the Ever-Triumphant Army and their Chinese superiors. Giquel and d’Aiguebelle considered orders from both European and Chinese superior officers legitimate. The French naval officers such as Admiral Jaures, however, generally only concerned themselves with personnel issues. The Chinese were more directly in charge of the contingent’s use. Giquel often followed Chinese orders against advancing even when his own instincts suggested action.\(^{57}\) In contrast, he and d’Aiguebelle reserved for

\(^{55}\) Giquel Journal, July 16, 1864.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., July 22, 1864.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., June 27 and August 14, 1864.
themselves a measure of autonomy in making decisions regarding the use of their troops. It is clear from Giquel’s diary that such a fluid “measure of autonomy” had been established regarding employment of the Ever-Triumphant Army. Generally, though, the contingent operated closely under orders from Chinese authorities.58

Throughout July the imperial forces were frustrated by the vigorous Taiping resistance. On July 25 word came that Cai Yuanji had run out of food. D’Aiguebelle, who was fond of Cai, was concerned that a greater effort be made to free the trapped commander. He began lobbying Jiang Yili for action.

Cai was caught in the village of Dongpo59 by Taiping units that controlled the bridges south of him, blocking his retreat. To save him the imperial forces needed to establish temporary bridges to break the blockade. Giquel’s forces were just opposite the village. From the elevated position where his tents were pitched, he could easily see the blocked bridges. The rebels and Cai’s forces were just beyond. The Taipings had covered the main bridge with streamers. During late July provincial general Gao Liansheng tried to establish a portable bridge to cross the canal; however, the canal was almost two hundred feet wide, and erecting the temporary bridge proved difficult.60

For days the imperial and Taiping forces faced each other across the canal while Cai’s men starved. On August 1 ten thousand reinforcements arrived from Jiangsu with artillery, gunboats, and two steam-operated ships. To Giquel their arrival signaled the end of the Huzhou campaign. He and d’Aiguebelle were now ready to commit their forces to freeing Cai. Unfortunately, the efforts of the Ever-Triumphant Army were less successful than Giquel hoped.

At daybreak cannonfire and riflefire began along the entire [allied] line. The wind blowing toward the rebels covered them with a curtain of smoke which was quite favorable to our operations. But alas the men themselves were not as ready as they should have been. The first ones who tried to set up the bridge were killed and the others refused to advance. The gunboats, which had moved forward bravely enough to support them, suffered many casualties and thus pulled back. Their admiral was gravely wounded. All the gunboats escaped. The day was ruined and it was a pity, for the rebels, overwhelmed by

58 Giquel Journal, passim.
59 Both Giquel and Gordon refer to the site of Cai’s problems as Dongpo, a village just north of Linghu in Zhejiang. Kuo Ting-l in T’ai-p’ing t’ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih (Commercial, 1946), p. 1093, says that the site of Cai’s entrapment was Sixi.
60 Giquel Journal, late July, 1864.
our artillery and musket fire, took refuge from our fortifications. The Futai [acting governor Jiang Yili] wept. In order to console him a little we promised to try to storm the rebel lines.\textsuperscript{61}

The rest of the day was even more catastrophic as the contingent's commanders tried to carry out their promise to Jiang.

A pagoda situated at the entrance of an arroyo was riddled by our gunboats. One of the gunners told us that he had advanced to its base and that almost all the rebels decamped. We loaded five hundred men on the gunboats, and imperial soldiers, and set out. Unfortunately, the gunboats, instead of letting them off at the foot of the pagoda, dumped them two hundred meters away, and they had to traverse the distance under enemy fire. The commanding officer was killed and they panicked even though they were not under attack by the rebels. They returned to the arroyo where the gunboats had dropped them off. The gunboats having left, there commenced a frightful scene. Crazy with fear, the men threw themselves into the water, casting aside their guns and clothing to get away, a crazy fear since the rebels were not following them. We were obliged to fire on the gunboats to force them to return to rescue these unfortunates. Their rescue became all the more difficult because as the rebels had appeared on the opposite bank, a lively fire opened up from the bushes which hid them. We managed, nevertheless, to get our group back and came out of the mess with twenty men drowned and seventy rifles lost.\textsuperscript{62}

Frustrated by this catastrophe, Giquel spent the next several days trying to borrow a screw-driven steamer to use against the rebel blockade. He found little support. When he contacted local silk merchants who owned a steamer, they refused to lend it to him.\textsuperscript{63} Giquel then became involved in military operations elsewhere. It was not until August 18 that he heard that Cai had cut his way through with a couple of hundred followers. Of his original four thousand the vast majority had been either killed or captured.\textsuperscript{64}

Military efforts of Giquel and the Ever-Triumphant Army after the abortive attempt to save Cai Yuanji were more successful. During the second week of August Giquel's men and artillery destroyed a Taiping fort at Digang, a village near Huzhou. In the following days their artillery was equally effective against other rebel positions. Giquel was pleased, but in

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., August 3, 1864.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., August 4 and 5, 1864.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., August 17 and 18, 1864. Kuo Ting-I says that seven thousand died (p. 1093).
the absence of Chinese willingness to advance he didn’t see any point in merely killing people.65

During the last ten days of the Huzhou siege the Ever-Triumphant Army contributed substantively to forcing the city’s evacuation through the use of its artillery.66 The final capture of Huzhou was not easily accomplished. The imperial troops pressured Huang Wenjin’s forces but could not break down their resistance. Li Hongzhang’s soldiers, advancing from the north, came within three miles of Huzhou before being driven back. Among the Western casualties was Colonel Reynolds, who had commanded one of the Anglo-Chinese units.67 Almost until the day of Huzhou’s evacuation, Giquel was not certain whether victory was imminent.68

August F. Lindley, an English Taiping partisan, was correct when he wrote of the battle:

The Siege of Hoo-chow-foo [Huzhou] by the imperialists was merely nominal, for, up to the abandonment of that city by the Ti-pings [Taipings], they were never within range of its walls, and were compelled to act almost entirely on the defensive, so repeated and vigorous were the attacks by the garrison and a corps of observation they had encamped outside the place on a neighboring range of hills. Only a few days before the evacuation took place, the garrison succeeded in capturing a number of imperialist stockades, several hundred gun-boats, and three or four thousand men besides inflicting heavy loss in killed and wounded…. Very soon after this victory, the evacuation was effected with consummate skill.69

Li Hongzhang, not Zuo Zongtang, suffered these setbacks described by Lindley.70 Despite Lindley’s certainty that the evacuation had been a complete surprise to the imperial forces, Giquel’s journal makes it clear that they were aware of the impending departure and willing to let it occur. Giquel was discouraged that the Chinese officials did not want a final confrontation.71

65 Giquel Journal, August 17, 1864.
66 W. L. Bales, Tso Tsung T’ang: Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1937), p. 169.
67 NCH, August 20, 1864.
68 Giquel Journal, mid-August 1864, passim.
70 Giquel Journal, August 24 and 28, 1864.
71 Lindley, T’i-Ping Tien-Kwoh, p. 778; and Giquel Journal, August 26, 1864.
For Prosper Giquel the real frustration of those last days of the campaign was his conclusion that the Chinese were more interested in driving the Taipings from Zhejiang than in defeating them with one major effort.

Once on the lake we advanced our gunboats and those of the imperials. If the rebels hope at some point to retreat we will at least be able to cut off their convoy. Everything is useless. The mandarins only wish for one thing: to see the rebels gone. They have a real chance to finish off the rebellion. To allow it to move to the provinces is to perpetuate it indefinitely. But what do they care, let the others suffer.  

On August 18 Huzhou’s commanders Huang Wenjin and Hong Rengan, the Taiping Gan wang (Shield King), concluded that the situation was hopeless. They ordered a retreat eastward toward Guangde in Anhui. The Heavenly King’s son, Tianguifui, had taken refuge in Huzhou after Nanjing’s fall but left on August 4. It was time for the rest to follow. Giquel was aware of the flight of the Heavenly King’s son. He expected Guangde to become the next Taiping capital and speculated that that event would delay the demobilization of the Ever-Triumphant army.

Li Hongzhang was so weakened by the previous week’s defeat that he did not try to attack the retreating army. Giquel wrote of the Ever-Triumphant Army:

As for us, poor unfortunates, we have at our disposition neither boats to transport our troops, nor guides for the countryside. Moreover, we, who have to drag our artillery behind us, can not hope to cover long distances, nor to pursue the enemy with any effectiveness. Nevertheless, like a true Chinese mandarin, I’ll station myself on the route of the enemy’s retreat, and look like I am advancing. D’Aiguebelle has left me definitively and has gone to Hangzhou to settle his accounts. He turned over the command to me.

Giquel was finally in complete command of the small army he had helped form two years before. The Ever-Triumphant Army, however, was disbanded within the following six weeks. Only once more, at Hankou in 1866, would Giquel command Chinese troops.

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72 Giquel Journal, August 26, 1864.
74 Giquel Journal, August 26, 1864.
75 Ibid., August 30, 1864.
The Foreign Contingents in Perspective and the Contribution of Prosper Giquel

In the years since the demise of the Taiping Kingdom a combination of hero worship and misunderstanding has led many in the West to attribute the collapse of the rebellion to the efforts of one contingent, the Ever-Victorious Army and its last commander, Charles "Chinese" Gordon. Even in recent years many writers have persisted in this view despite growing evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, since the 1927 publication of William Hail’s biography of Zeng Guofan, there has been a growing acknowledgment that Gordon was not the sole architect of the Qing victory. It is now generally accepted that the Ever-Victorious Army, working with Li Hongzhang and the Ever-Triumphant Army, which usually fought alongside Zuo Zongtang’s forces, significantly complemented the work of forces led by Zeng Guofan in bringing about the final collapse of the Taiping Kingdom.

While the Ever-Victorious Army had been active around Shanghai and particularly effective at Suzhou, the Ever-Triumphant Army had vigorously pressed the Taipings at Yuyao, Shangyou, and Shaoxing and eventually worked closely with Zuo to take Hangzhou, Fuyang, and Huzhou. Western military intervention after 1860, first in the direct military action around Shanghai and Ningbo and then more indirectly through the disciplined contingents, clearly helped end the rebellion more quickly. Beyond the question of the effectiveness of the various imperial and allied units, the Taiping Kingdom itself was already weakening because of internal dissension and failures in leadership. It is these.

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80 Jen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement, p. 489; Bales, Tso Tsung T’ang, p. 143; and Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, p. 68.

81 Wang, Ch’ing-chi chun-shih-shih lun-chi, p. 333.

developments, along with increased strength on the imperial side and the aid of the contingents, that defeated the Taipings.

Sir William Butler, in his biography of Gordon, makes a point that is generally applicable regarding the contingents. Butler writes that Gordon did not save China but taught the Chinese how to make war. If this is true of Gordon, it is even more true of Giquel. It was the foreign-trained contingents’ demonstration of Western military technology during the civil war that was their greatest immediate contribution to Chinese development. Later, in dealing with the Nian and Moslem rebellions, Zuo and Li showed a new appreciation for the potential of Western technology, though they never again relied directly on foreign-led troops.

The foreign-led contingents’ most significant role was not in ending one era of Chinese history, the Taiping rebellion, but in helping to launch another, the Self-strengthening Movement of the 1860s and 1870s. Within this context Giquel’s career is notable. Unlike Gordon, who soon departed China, Giquel participated in this early stage of self-strengthening and continued to devote himself to expediting the transfer of technology and Western science from Europe to China.

Giquel was honored both by the Tongzhi Emperor (1862–1874) and the city of Ningbo for his work with the Ever-Triumphant Army. As a result of the Huzhou campaign his Chinese rank was raised to Zongbing (lieutenant general). But Giquel’s involvement in the self-strengthening program, its building and educational activities, would be the high point of his career in China. This would bring him the recognition of the Chinese emperor, the coveted Imperial Peacock Feather, and the Yellow Riding Jacket. Gordon was the only other Westerner of the period so honored. Within a year after the demobilization of the Ever-Triumphant Army, Giquel had begun the next phase of his career.

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Prosper Giquel and the Origins of the Fuzhou Dockyard: 1840–1867

Even as many of the foreign commanders, men such as Charles "Chinese" Gordon, prepared their return to Europe, Paul Neveue d'Aiguebelle and Prosper Giquel were being drawn into the next stage of China's development, self-strengthening. After his return to China in mid-1864, Giquel became involved in talks with Governor-General Zuo Zongtang on the possibility of the Chinese producing steamships from dockyard facilities built by the French. Giquel began to play a major role in Zuo's hopes to modernize China's navy.

Experience with the Ever-Triumphant and the Ever-Victorious armies encouraged Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, governor of Jiangsu, and others to seek Western military technology. The deadly effectiveness of Western military ordnance impressed them, as had the advantages of using the Western steamers for transporting troops. This was not, however, the first time that Chinese officials had been exposed to foreign military technologies.

The Chinese Self-Strengthening Movement

Although Jesuit missionaries of the seventeenth century cast Western-style ordnance for the imperial forces in the declining years of the Ming dynasty, Chinese contact with modern Western military technology began at the time of the First Opium War (1839–1842). This clash sensitized elements of the Chinese official class to the inadequacy of their own military when confronted with forces trained and equipped with modern arms. Although the imperial court showed a clear interest in the new technologies, the interest proved to be short-lived. As the sense of

urgency generated by the First Opium War faded, the court occupied itself with more pressing issues. The Taiping rebellion, which had begun in 1851, was now an internal threat.

Although the enthusiasm of the imperial court for Western gunboats and ordnance had proven ephemeral, Lin Zexu, the imperial commissioner for the suppression of opium at Guangzhou, developed a more lasting interest. In 1839 after the court dispatched Lin to Guangzhou to suppress the opium trade, he mounted an intelligence gathering effort aimed at understanding and coping with Western pressures for trade and diplomatic relations. At Lin’s urging, Western materials ranging from geography and history to politics and international law were translated. Lin also espoused the advantages of building rather than simply purchasing Western guns and ships. Although Lin Zexu was discredited by China’s defeat in the First Opium War, his views influenced many of the theorists and activists of the later Self-strengthening Movement, men such as Wei Yuan, Lin’s successor at Guangzhou; Feng Guifen, a scholar and publicist; and Zuo Zongtang. Lin’s son-in-law, Shen Baozhen, became Prosper Giquel’s immediate superior in one of the most important modernization projects of the era, the Fuzhou Dockyard.

Although some Chinese felt disgraced by the outcome of the First Opium War, others considered it merely a temporary setback. Few beyond Lin Zexu’s immediate circle continued, after the initial impact of the defeat had passed, to take the Western threat seriously. Wei Yuan, an associate of Lin’s to whom Lin had turned over his translated materials on Western affairs, was among those few who did recognize the long-term danger that Western power posed for China. In 1844 Wei Yuan published An Illustrated Gazeteer of the Maritime Countries, which was based in part on materials translated at Guangzhou. He hoped to arouse Chinese policy makers to use the traditional stratagem of manipulating one group against another and more importantly, to learn the superior techniques of the “barbarians” in order to control them. Although the ideas of Lin Zexu and Wei Yuan inspired later protagonists of self-strengthening, they were not particularly influential in the years before the Second Opium War and the 1860 capture of Beijing. It took the shock of 1860, when the French

3 Chen, Lin Tse-hsu, p. 3.
5 Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 342.
and English forced Emperor Xianfeng from Beijing, to provide that impetus. Feng Guifen, formerly Lin Zexu’s assistant, had been greatly moved by that event.

Feng’s writings of 1860–1861, *Protest from the Jiaobin Studio*, emphasized China’s need to learn the technical skills of the West in order to control the Western powers in China. Feng regarded as impractical Wei Yuan’s hope that they could be manipulated against each other and insisted that ways be found to transfer the impressive technical skills of the West to China.⁶ Resisting the prevailing mood of intellectual complacency, he called for the creation of schools, arsenals, and shipyards to facilitate the acquisition of Western technology.⁷ Probably the first to use the term *Ziqiang* (self-strengthening), Feng Guifen was determined to learn from the lessons of 1860.⁸ Both Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang read Feng’s work.

The irony of these years was that the West, which had forced many influential Chinese to recognize the inferior state of Chinese military technology, also offered skills that could be useful against both the internal and external enemies of the dynasty. The aid of the West, through both direct and indirect military intervention, had helped to end more quickly the Taiping rebellion. Many thoughtful nineteenth century Chinese must have noted the irony that the West was a source of solutions as well as problems for the Qing dynasty. The intervention of units such as the Ever-Triumphant and Ever-Victorious armies had been helpful. But as the Self-strengthening Movement developed, it included among its goals the desire eventually to eliminate dependence on foreigners while strengthening China’s internal and external defenses.⁹

The Zongli Yamen, the new foreign office organized to deal with the Westerners outside the traditional tributary system, had, as early as June 1863, expressed itself on the need to learn from the West. In a memorial to the throne the ministers of the Zongli Yamen emphasized the necessity of beginning the transfer of technology while it would appear to the foreign powers that such a move was directed purely against the Qing dynasty’s internal enemies.

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⁷ Ibid., p. 786.
In recent years, troops have been used in Kiangsu [Jiangsu], where English and French officers have been hired to teach and drill our soldiers and militia. The foreign officers, then, import the victory-bringing firearms from their countries to the camps for our use, but charge us a big price....When we secure these weapons, they are sufficient to destroy strongholds and break open fortresses so that, wherever we advance, we are successful. All areas south of the Yangtze have been gradually cleared up. The promptness of this result has never been surpassed....At present the military campaign is still going on in Kiangsu and Chekiang [Zhejiang]. If we use this as a pretext, that our soldiers are to learn the manufacturing of weapons in order to suppress the bandits, we shall not reveal any traces of anti-foreign intentions. This is indeed an opportunity which should not be missed. If we begin to learn the manufacturing after the suppression of the bandits, then even if the foreign craftsmen would like to come for the high pay, the foreign officers must become suspicious and hinder them....Thus we should seize the opportunity, at a time when in the southern provinces our military power is in great ascendance and foreigners are delighted to show us their superior techniques, to make a substantial study of all kinds of foreign machines and weapons in order to learn their secret completely.10

The impact of the 1860 capture of Beijing had shaken the dynasty to its core, but it was the powerful Taiping rebellion that forced the Qing government to make important changes in the dynasty’s traditional military policies. Customarily the Qing dynasty relied on central Manchu control of its armies. The Taiping threat was so great by 1860 that the imperial government decided to meet it by making a major grant of power to a local official, Zeng Guofan, the leader of the Hunan militia. He was appointed governor-general of the Liangjiang provinces, where the rebellion was strongest. Zeng had also been made commander of all imperial forces in the lower Yangzi region. This was an exceptional grant of power for the Manchu government to offer a Chinese provincial official.11

Although challenges of the early 1860s convinced some Qing officials of the necessity of seeking new methods to deal with these crises, it is important to emphasize that these individuals, both at the provincial and at the imperial level, tended to be isolated. They were surrounded by associates less willing to accept change. Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang,
aware that the introduction of Western technology could have dramatic effects on the Chinese economy, proceeded cautiously.\(^\text{12}\) They sought not only to safeguard China from internal and external threats but to defend themselves and their self-strengthening projects from more conservative officials.

These Confucian scholar-officials of the 1860s exhibited none of the iconoclasm that informed the revolutionary movement of the late nineteenth century. Although they rejected revolutionary change, they did seek adjustments within the larger traditional society.\(^\text{13}\) In 1867–1868 the Zongli Yamen polled regional leaders regarding the further opening of China to foreign technology. Of seventeen officials questioned only Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan, and Shen Baozhen revealed significant interest in telegraphs, railroads, and steamships. Even Zuo Zongtang appeared reticent, though he did clearly recognize the dangers China faced.\(^\text{14}\)

**Toward a Modern Navy: The Origins of the Western Style Shipbuilding Program**

Few of China’s leaders seriously recognized the need for naval reform. Lin Zexu tried unsuccessfully to produce mechanized ships after the First Opium War.\(^\text{15}\) The Taipings initially employed traditional naval forces, thus making the adoption of Western naval technology a less pressing issue.\(^\text{16}\) And some experimentation was carried out by isolated officials in Guangzhou, Ningbo, and elsewhere, but little was accomplished. The efforts of the various experimenters remained the efforts of isolated individuals.\(^\text{17}\)

Not until the early 1860s did certain Chinese officials seriously interest themselves in Western military technology. Although ordnance was their first priority, they quickly developed considerable interest in Western-style ships as well. Zeng Guofan, the senior provincial official of the period was skeptical about the value of direct military aid from the West. He hoped that the Chinese could learn to make Western-style

\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., p. 820.
\(^\text{13}\) Knight Biggerstaff, “The Secret Correspondence of 1867–1868; The Views of Leading Chinese Statesmen regarding the Further Opening of China to Western Influence,” *Journal of Modern History* 22 (1950): 123.
\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., p. 136.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., pp. 19–22.
ordinance and ships themselves. In the 1850s Zeng had begun to reorganize the Chinese naval forces. By 1861 he had set up a shipbuilding facility at Anqing in Anhui where workers produced, without foreign aid, a small steamship. Unhappily, it proved too slow to be useful. In an 1865 letter to Li Hongzhang, Zeng commented that his workmen had been trying to build steamships for three years but little had come of it. While Zeng Guofan involved himself in these shipbuilding attempts, his principal lieutenants, Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, were pursuing similar efforts.

Among the most significant of Li Hongzhang's self-strengthening projects were the Nanjing and Jiangnan arsenals. The Nanjing Arsenal began production of gun mounts and various types of ammunition in 1865. The Jiangnan Arsenal developed from Zeng Guofan's earlier efforts at Anqing and was also formally established in 1865. It housed an elaborate complex of ordnance factories, a translation bureau, and shipbuilding facilities. It became increasingly obvious to Chinese leaders interested in self-strengthening that they would need to have foreign technical assistance if their hope to produce foreign-style Western technology was to be realized.

Just as Charles Gordon had been Li Hongzhang's principal Western military aide during the Taiping campaign, another Englishman, Dr. Halliday Macartney, a physician by training, now became Li's chief technical adviser. Macartney had left the service of the British army in 1863 to join Li's staff and was the closest counterpart to Giquel during these years of self-strengthening. While Li Hongzhang relied on Macartney's technological advice, Zuo Zongtang, his counterpart and sometimes rival in the south, depended on his associates of the Zhejiang campaign, Paul d'Aiguebelle and Prosper Giquel, to aid his own self-strengthening projects.

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19 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 62.
20 Ibid., p. 64.
21 Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, p. 173.
22 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 50.
To Build or Buy: The First Talks

By the early 1860s many Chinese leaders, despite differences of opinion, wanted to obtain Western-style ships. China could either purchase ships or construct them herself. Each alternative offered advantages and disadvantages and by the end of the decade both procedures had been attempted. The most dramatic and, from the Chinese perspective, frustrating incident was Prince Gong’s attempt to purchase a Western fleet.

In 1862 Prince Gong requested Horatio Nelson Lay, acting inspector-general of the Chinese customs, to purchase and equip English ships for use by China. Lay hired Sherard Osborn, an English naval captain, to command the fleet of eight ships that he acquired. Going well beyond what was acceptable to his Chinese employers, Lay agreed that Osborn would be the sole commander of the flotilla. The captain was to be responsible only to Lay himself, who presumably would speak for the Chinese emperor.

Lay, like so many Europeans on the Chinese coast, even those directly employed by the Qing government, was unable to see himself as truly responsible to the Chinese. As Lay expressed it: “My position was that of a foreigner engaged by the Chinese government to perform certain work for them, not under them. I need scarcely observe that the notion of a gentleman acting under an Asiatic barbarian is preposterous.”

Prosper Giquel would no doubt have disagreed with Lay’s sentiments. Throughout his career he felt himself an employee of the Chinese with all the responsibilities and duties that implied. Nevertheless, Giquel had initially been pleased with the plan for the flotilla. Lay had given him the impression that he would play a major role in its development.

Lay does not mention Giquel in any of the correspondence on the fleet. It is likely, however, that he offered Giquel a role. Lay, if he was insensitive to Chinese sentiments, was well aware of the necessity of involving the several European powers in his China projects. Prosper Giquel, the only French naval officer in the Chinese customs, would have

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26 “Inspecteurat étranger,” fol. 225.
27 Correspondence Respecting... the Anglo-Chinese Fleet, Accounts and Papers, LXIII, 3271 (1864), passim.
been the obvious choice to calm French anxieties. Giquel’s wound and Beijing’s later rejection of the fleet ended Giquel’s potential role in this aspect of the Self-strengthening Movement.

Prince Gong, upon learning of the command structure that Lay had taken upon himself to arrange with Osborn, was quite irritated. He made it clear that the Englishmen were responsible only for the European personnel of the flotilla and that Commander Osborn would be under the authority of provincial officials. This arrangement later worked quite successfully at the Fuzhou Dockyard. Horatio Nelson Lay, however, was considerably less flexible than Prosper Giquel. He and Osborn refused to accept Prince Gong’s plan. The only solution proved to be demobilization of the fleet for which the Chinese had spent 550,000 pounds sterling.

The most obvious result of this fiasco was to encourage the building within China of foreign-style ships. It also spurred men like Zuo Zongtang, already suspicious of the English, to place more faith in the French. Zuo had never worked well with the English and was quite satisfied with his experience with d’Aiguebelle and Giquel. Giquel commented that the Lay-Osborn fiasco turned the Chinese away from the English whom many thought had shown bad faith. Giquel was certain that this development was to France’s benefit.

Since the early 1850s Zuo Zongtang had been interested in having China build a navy. Beginning in 1862 he had used borrowed steamships in the Zhejiang campaign. In 1863 he wrote: “In my humble opinion, we must in the future build steamers, then we can talk about maritime defense.” By 1864 Zuo was convinced that China had to build steamers on her own. Somewhat later, in a letter to Li Hongzhang, Zuo emphasized his point: “From ancient times, whenever there is a war in the southeast, troops sent by sea have accomplished wonders. Steamers, a wonder never before known, are particularly fitted for sea transportation.” Zuo, however, was cautious about accepting Western help: “The method for self-strengthening should be to seek from among

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28 Gideon Chen, Tso Tszung-t’ang, Pioneer Promoter of the Modern Dockyard and the Woolen Mill in China (Peiping: Yenching University, 1938), p. 2.
29 Giquel to Genouilly, June 23, 1867, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, piece 2660 26-a, SHM, Vincennes.
30 Chen, Tso Tszung-t’ang, p. 11.
31 Ibid., p. 13.
ourselves, not seek from among others. He who seeks the help of others will be controlled by others, and he who relies upon himself will have the situation under control."^33

While Zuo sought to obtain Western-style ships in 1864, the French offered China a partnership in their dockyard at Ningbo. Jean Louis Jaurès, the commander of the French East Asian fleet, in January 1863 had chosen Ningbo to build three gunboats, two of which would be named _Le Brethon_ and _Le Tardif_ in honor of the fallen leaders of the Ever-Triumphant Army.^34 Acting Vice-Consul Léonce Verny, a naval engineer and later a founder of the Franco-Japanese dockyard at Yokosuka, Japan, had directed the project.\(^35\) He had twenty-five European carpenters working for him.\(^36\) Verny’s men also trained Chinese workers. Local Chinese officials watched the growth of the small dockyard with interest.\(^37\)

If the Chinese were curious about the French building program, the English were extremely suspicious:

The French are manifesting considerable political aggression at Ningpo [Ningbo]—they have established a sort of dockyard and machine factory. There, having by some means obtained some steam engines, they are constructing a flotilla of gunboats to take the place of the “Lay-Osborn” fleet. The matter looks serious...the idea of the flotilla being entirely in the hands of the French cannot be entertained without grave misgivings. French officers are so quick to take offense—so quick to obtain satisfaction—so imperious, so impractical, and so totally uncommercial that they are viewed by the Chinese with great dread and by foreigners with apprehension....The object of the French in establishing [the] flotilla would seem to be, not the pacification of the country but domination.\(^38\)

Jaurès himself had different ideas about the dockyard. He hoped to have the Chinese operate the dockyard on a permanent basis, yet make it available for French needs. The French did not need more than the few ships already built and Jaurès preferred Chinese control to English or American.\(^39\)

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\(^33\) Teng and Fairbank, _China’s Response to the West_, p. 80.
\(^34\) Jaurès to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], January 4, 1863, BB 4 817 Marine, fol. 43, AN.
\(^36\) Harvey to Bruce, January 20, 1863, no. 8, F.O. 670 73, misc. papers, PRO.
\(^37\) Jaurès to Chasseloup-Laubat, April 14, 1864, BB 4 838 Marine, fol. 77–78, AN.
\(^38\) Hong Kong Trade Report, July 11, 1864, cited in W. Sykes to Russell, July 11, 1864, no. 577, F.O. 17 418, fol. 180–181, PRO.
\(^39\) Jaurès to Chasseloup-Laubat, April 14, 1864, BB 4 838 Marine, fol. 77–78, AN.
When Prosper Giquel returned to China in June 1864 Jaurès viewed him as the most appropriate agent to make the offer. On June 7 Jaurès explained the idea, and the next week d’Aiguebelle and Giquel discussed the plan with Zuo Zongtang:

Speaking on behalf of the admiral, I offered him the Ningbo workshop where we have already constructed four gunboats. He seemed satisfied at first, but upon learning that this worksite has until now served only to construct the ships’ hulls and that the propellers, engine, and cannons have to be bought in France, he refused categorically. In justification, he said that the Beijing government has not yet replied to his requests to build gunboats and that the response could be a long time in coming. During this time the worksite would lie idle, which would displease the admiral. I think that the real reason is that, given the current state of finances in the provinces, he is not ready immediately to undertake the construction of gunboats and fears that by accepting the worksite pressure would be applied to him to this effect.40

Giquel’s journal entry gives the impression that the issue was terminated, but Giquel apparently hoped that things would change over time. At least he gave Admiral Jaurès that impression. Five months later Jaurès was still reporting to the French naval minister, Prosper Chasseloup-Laubat, that Giquel said the Chinese might eventually accept the dockyard.41

Zuo Zongtang was unwilling to assume responsibility for the French dockyard at Ningbo but remained strongly committed to shipbuilding. On October 16 Giquel visited him to discuss demobilizing the Ever-Triumphant Army. After a long talk Zuo invited Giquel to inspect the steam-powered boat that had been built entirely without foreign help:

We chatted for more than two hours. In ushering me back, he showed me a small steamship that a Chinese had constructed himself. The junk has the form of a Ningbo boat. It holds two men, one in the front, the other in the rear. On the whole, the particulars of an engine are there; it is enough to demonstrate how a steamboat works, but no more. The Viceroy Zuo Zongtang went the other day to try it out on Xi Hu [West Lake]. He showed me two instruments that had been used to make the plans. He told me that a sixty-year-old Chinese man had made it; “Excellency,” I replied, “this proves that the Chinese are very perspicacious.”42

40 Giquel Journal, June 15, 1864.
41 Jaurès to Chasseloup-Laubat, November 30, 1864, BB 4 838 Marine, fol. 346, AN.
42 Giquel Journal, October 16, 1864.
Giquel does not mention d'Aiguebelle's presence nor did he evidence any particular personal interest in becoming involved in the project. This contrasts with Zuo Zongtang's better known comments on the West Lake experiment:

When I was in Hangchow [Hangzhou] I looked for engineers to build a small steamer. It was fairly complete, but could not go fast on its trial on the West Lake. Then, it was shown to the foreign artisan, Paul d'Aiguebelle, and the Customs Inspector, Prosper Giquel. They commented that, overall, the steamer was all right, but the engine should have been purchased from the West so that it could give good speed. They showed me the plan of a French steamer, and promised to supervise the construction of such a steamer, thus introducing Western method into China. It happened that at that time the Taiping rebels took Changchow [Zhangzhou] and I had to proceed to Fukien [Fujian], and, therefore, had no time to consider their proposal. When I was in Hangchow [Hangzhou] I looked for engineers to build a small steamer. It was fairly complete, but could not go fast on its trial on the West Lake. Then, it was shown to the foreign artisan, Paul d'Aiguebelle, and the Customs Inspector, Prosper Giquel. They commented that, overall, the steamer was all right, but the engine should have been purchased from the West so that it could give good speed. They showed me the plan of a French steamer, and promised to supervise the construction of such a steamer, thus introducing Western method into China. It happened that at that time the Taiping rebels took Changchow [Zhangzhou] and I had to proceed to Fukien [Fujian], and, therefore, had no time to consider their proposal. When I was in Hangchow [Hangzhou] I looked for engineers to build a small steamer. It was fairly complete, but could not go fast on its trial on the West Lake. Then, it was shown to the foreign artisan, Paul d'Aiguebelle, and the Customs Inspector, Prosper Giquel. They commented that, overall, the steamer was all right, but the engine should have been purchased from the West so that it could give good speed. They showed me the plan of a French steamer, and promised to supervise the construction of such a steamer, thus introducing Western method into China. It happened that at that time the Taiping rebels took Changchow [Zhangzhou] and I had to proceed to Fukien [Fujian], and, therefore, had no time to consider their proposal.

Zuo gives the impression, writing in 1866, two years later, that Giquel and d'Aiguebelle had been equally involved in trying to organize what was to become the Fuzhou Dockyard. It appears, however, that Zuo telescoped events in his account at least as far as Giquel is concerned. Giquel's main concern that day was the demobilization of the Ever-Triumphant Army. Nowhere in his diary of 1864 does he discuss shipbuilding with any personal interest. Giquel was merely hoping, at Jaurès' request, to convince Zuo to accept the French dockyard at Ningbo. Later he objectively commented on the steamship Zuo had proudly shown him. Despite later developments, Paul d'Aiguebelle was far more seriously involved in the early talks on the dockyard project.

In September 1864, after turning over control of the Ever-Triumphant Army to Giquel, d'Aiguebelle spent almost a month planning the dockyard project with Zuo Zongtang. Giquel followed these developments closely but did not take a direct part until a misunderstanding between d'Aiguebelle and the Chinese forced him to intervene. Giquel, as d'Aiguebelle later noted, arrived to clear up the problem caused by d'Aiguebelle's interpreter and the talks were able to resume. Giquel's invaluable language skills must have contributed to the later decision to have Giquel, not d'Aiguebelle, head the dockyard. After Giquel's intervention, Zuo asked d'Aiguebelle to return to France to

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44 D'Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC Ning-Po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 205, AE.
gather information on how best to facilitate the transfer of shipbuilding technology within the budget envisioned by the governor-general. Giquel meanwhile resumed his duties with the maritime customs.

Shanghai, Hankou, and the Nian Rebellion

Though Giquel remained in contact with d’Aiguebelle and Zuo, his main activity during the next year and a half, until late 1866, was in the service of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs offices at Shanghai and at Hankou, Hubei. At Hankou, Giquel once again founded a foreign-style contingent to protect the city from Chinese rebels.

In mid-October 1864 after Giquel had commanded the Ever-Triumphant Army for only a few months, Jiang Yili, acting governor of Zhejiang, ordered its demobilization. Jiang told Giquel to return to his customs position at Ningbo. In 1865 Giquel assumed control of the Shanghai customs office. From there he was sent to Hankou, one of the most important commercial ports in China. Situated at the confluence of the Yangzi and Han rivers, Hankou was about 582 miles inland from Shanghai. The Yangzi at Hankou was almost a mile wide, while the Han narrowed to the width of a modest-sized canal. Europeans had initially had high hopes for Hankou’s commercial potential, but a trade recession reduced the number of foreign residents to about 125 when Giquel arrived in 1866. It was a great contrast to the growing European community of Shanghai.

Incursions by Nian rebels, not trade, were the biggest concern of Hankou residents, and Giquel was drawn into service as he had been at Ningbo. After defeat by the Mongolian Qing General Seng-ge-lin-qin in 1865, the Nians broke into two main groups. In the spring of 1866 the eastern Nians were threatening Hankou, and Walter Medhurst, the English consul, thought there was a real possibility that the city would be taken. An additional complication was the mutiny of a large number of imperial troops, who threatened the city. Both Medhurst and the French consul, P. d’Abry, encouraged Governor-General Guan-wen to organize a foreign contingent similar to those that had successfully fought the

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45 Giquel Journal, October 19, 1864.
46 Prosper Giquel, “Commerce de Shanghai pendant l’Anné 1865,” in Reports on Trade at the Ports in China Open by Treaty to Foreign Trade for the Year 1865 (Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs Press, 1866).
48 Medhurst to Viceroy Kwan [Governor-General Guan-wen], February 2, 1866, no. 26, incl. 2, F.O. 17 456, fol. 43–47, PRO.
Taipings. The Chinese authorities at first resisted the idea. Within a month, however, the two European consuls reported that Governor-General Guan-wen had accepted the idea of forming a contingent of "disciplined troops." The recently arrived Prosper Giquel was the logical choice to lead it.

The corps was established on March 1, 1866. This new Franco-Chinese contingent began with about five hundred men; about ten were Europeans, the rest, Chinese. It eventually included an artillery unit. Giquel’s initial complement of ten officers, all former French non-coms, did not include any Englishmen. Consul Medhurst was nevertheless delighted with the new contingent, for Hankou would be safer. Moreover, Giquel had assured Medhurst that if asked to expand the contingent, he would involve the English.

Throughout the spring and early summer of 1866 Giquel trained the new contingent. That spring Giquel’s primary concern was the lack of adequate artillery. In June he contacted the French naval minister to ask for help in obtaining materiel from France. It was fortunate that the unit never went into battle: by mid-October the needed cannon had still not arrived.

Although Giquel’s involvement in the new Franco-Chinese corps did not lead to another military campaign, this period introduced him to the educational issues that were to be important for the rest of his career. To supplement the military training at Hankou, he established two language schools, one for the instruction of English and one for French. Instruction rather than fighting was the major accomplishment of the Hankou corps.

Giquel’s involvement turned out to be no more than a distraction in the planning for the Fuzhou Dockyard. In early December he left for Fuzhou. After his departure, the program began to decline. Major Martin of the French army replaced Giquel. Later, when Governor-General

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49 Ibid., and d’Abry to Lhuys, February 11, 1866, CPC, Hankow, vol. 1, fol. 272–275, AE.
50 Medhurst to Alcock, February 12, 1866, no. 26, incl. 1, F.O. 17 456, fol. 41–42, PRO.
52 Medhurst to Alcock, March 3, 1866, no. 39, incl. 11, F.O. 17 456, fol. 64–66, PRO.
53 Giquel to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], June 15, 1866, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
54 Giquel to Emile [brother], October 12, 1866, Château de Bois Dauphin.
55 Medhurst to Alcock, March 3, 1866, no. 39, incl. 11, F.O. 17 456, fol. 64–66, PRO.
56 D’Abry to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Moustier], December 10, 1866, CCC, Hankéou, vol. 1, fol. 248, AE.
Guan-wen was transferred, the new Chinese authorities abandoned the idea of a corps.\textsuperscript{57}

**Origins of the Fuzhou Dockyard**

At least as early as 1864, Zuo Zongtang had submitted memorials on shipbuilding.\textsuperscript{58} It was only with his June 1866 memorial that he received a favorable response. The two years between had seen detailed planning for the dockyard. After turning over command of the Ever-Triumphant Army to Giquel during the late summer of 1864, d'Aiguebelle and Zuo began talks on the future dockyard. Zuo soon asked d'Aiguebelle to return to France to gather information that would aid in establishing it. D'Aiguebelle arrived in France in January 1865; on February 19 he sent Zuo a report on the estimated expenses for the proposed project. Giquel, still in China, then began the talks that eventually produced the contract of September 1866 to establish and operate the dockyard.\textsuperscript{59}

In late spring or early summer of 1865 d'Aiguebelle requested and received an audience with Napoleon III. He hoped to explain the project and, if possible, obtain the blessing and aid of Napoleon III.\textsuperscript{60} After his summer 1865 meeting, d'Aiguebelle attempted to obtain an official letter of support from the French emperor.\textsuperscript{61} Although d'Aiguebelle reports that Napoleon expressed support, he failed to get it in writing. Subsequently, the French position was one of hostility to any formal ties to the dockyard.

When d'Aiguebelle finally returned to China in mid-1866, Zuo, explaining that he wanted the project to be a national effort, not his personal one, said that the time was not ripe to begin work. They would simply have to wait until Beijing sanctioned the idea. D'Aiguebelle then sailed for Saigon to await imperial action.\textsuperscript{62} In January 1866 Giquel, temporarily away from his customs duties, sailed to Saigon to investigate the possibility of using Indochinese wood for the proposed project.\textsuperscript{63} But it was the separate memoranda submitted during the late winter of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[57] Contenson, "Corps Franco-Anglo-Chinois," pp. 109–110.
\item[58] Giquel Journal, June 15, 1864.
\item[59] D'Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 14, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 205–206, AE.
\item[60] D'Aiguebelle to Napoleon III, August 29, 1865, Dossier Individuel, Paul Neveue d'Aiguebelle, CC 7 1850, SHM, Vincennes.
\item[61] Ibid.
\item[62] D'Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC, Ning-Po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 205–206, AE.
\item[63] Giquel Journal, January 14, 1866.
\end{footnotes}
1865–1866 by two Englishmen influential in Beijing that provided Zuo Zongtang with the opportunity to act. Both Robert Hart, Giquel’s superior in the maritime customs, and Thomas Wade, a member of the British diplomatic corps, suggested that China make use of foreign naval technology. A month later an imperial decree requested that several Qing officials, among them Zuo Zongtang, comment on these suggestions. On June 25, 1866, Zuo formally proposed establishing what was to become the Fuzhou Dockyard.

In his proposal Zuo emphasized building, not purchasing, Western-style steamships. He argued against purchase, claiming that such ships would probably be old and in need of repair. They would require foreigners to run them, thus leaving them in foreign control. Lastly, Zuo commented, their repair would require the use of expensive foreign shipyards. Zuo strongly favored building the ships in China, and although he recognized the need for the initial involvement of foreigners, he planned to phase them out as soon as possible. This concern is clear from the time limits in the training period he worked out with the foreign specialists and the major emphasis placed on the training program at the Fuzhou facility.

The Qing court was familiar with Zuo’s longstanding desire to begin steamship production. Given the fiasco of the Lay-Osborn flotilla, the court was probably inclined to favor a plan more likely to insure Chinese control of newly acquired Western technology. On July 14, 1866, less than three weeks after Zuo submitted his proposal, the court approved it.

Zuo’s next step was to finalize the plans that he, d’Aiguebelle, and Giquel had been discussing for more than a year. Zuo asked Giquel and d’Aiguebelle to begin official planning for the contract. The talks took about two months. By September 1866 the three had agreed on a contract. There were five main points.

1. The establishment of workshops and building yards suitable for the construction of ships and their engines and appliances
2. The establishment of schools designed for the training of foremen for the construction, and of captains and engineers for the working of the ships and machinery

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Transferring Technology to China

3. The engagement of European staff competent to carry on the works and to teach the Chinese workmen, foremen, and cadets
4. The provision of a Patent Slip, on Labat’s transverse system, similar to that in use at Bordeaux, for the repair of ships
5. The organization of a metal-working forge, capable of rolling into bars and plates the masses of rough iron that the province supplied and the old scrap iron that could be procured in China.

Additionally they agreed that:
1. Within a period of five years, for which the contracts were to last, eleven steamships of the 150-h.p. class and five of the 80-h.p. class should be constructed; the engines for the first two ships of the former class and for all ships of the latter were to be purchased from abroad.
2. Students of the School of Navigation should be capable of navigating in the open seas within sight of the coast at the end of the five-year period.
3. Neither the director, the subdirector, nor any of the foreign staff employed should interfere with the administration of the navy yard.
4. The contracted period should commence on the day when the forge began operation.
5. Giquel and d’Aiguebelle would be awarded 24,000 taels each and the rest of the European employees 60,000 taels on fulfillment of the contracts.

Even as the agreements were reached, however, the dockyard was encountering unexpected opposition.

Within weeks of the completion of the contract the first of several problems arose. On October 14, before plans for the dockyard were fully arranged, Zuo was ordered to Shaanxi and Gansu to suppress a Moslem revolt. Concerned that his departure would cripple the dockyard planning, he delayed his departure for two months. Recognizing that further delay was impossible, he recommended Shen Baozhen as imperial commissioner in charge of work at the dockyard.

Zuo had every reason to expect that Shen would supervise the project well. He was the son-in-law of Lin Zexu, China’s imperial commissioner to Guangzhou during the First Opium War and an early

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69 Ng, “Shen Pao-chen,” p. 6.
advocate of building Western-style ships. Moreover, during the secret correspondence of 1866–1867, when the court polled various provincial officials on further Westernization, Shen had supported using more Western technology and equipment.\(^{70}\) Shen was reluctant, however, to accept the dockyard because of the recent death of his mother. Arrangements were made to allow him to supervise the project unofficially while formally adhering to the mourning period imposed by Confucian practice. Shen assumed his position officially in July 1867.\(^{71}\)

Despite Zuo Zongtang’s success in appointing Shen to the dockyard, truly national support was questionable. The two major issues were funding and the appointment of personnel. In August an imperial edict ordered Ma Xinyi, governor of Zhejiang, and Jiang Yili, governor of Guangdong, to contribute funds to the effort. The edict specifically ordered funds from Guangdong and Zhejiang be used to supplement the Fujian financial base of the proposed project. The interprovincial funding project was never carried out.\(^{72}\) In December 1866 the imperial court again expressed its support for the project. Exceptional honors were offered to those involved if the project could be fully realized. In the court’s view the project was important, and additional funds were promised if they should prove necessary.\(^{73}\)

The appointment of personnel, their lines of authority, and their support for the dockyard often seemed counterproductive. After Zuo was transferred and before Shen’s arrival, management was temporarily in the hands of Zhou Kaixi, the acting provincial treasurer of Fujian, and General Ying-gui, a Foochow Tartar general and the leading Manchu official of the province. At that time the court appointed Wu Tang to succeed Zuo as governor-general.

Wu Tang, an avowed enemy of the project, arrived to assume his duties in 1867. He was convinced that the ships, even if successfully constructed, would be inferior to foreign products and more expensive. He expressed his views to Ying-gui and made concerted efforts to harass the Chinese dockyard officials.\(^{74}\) By mid-1867 morale among the dockyard officials was at its lowest. Zuo Zongtang had departed. Giquel and d’Aiguebelle were still in Europe hiring and making purchases for the dockyard. Many said they would never return.\(^{75}\) Shen Baozhen was still in

\(^{71}\) Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 114.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 90.
\(^{73}\) Imperial Edict, December 30, 1866, trans. in CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 317–318, AE.
\(^{74}\) Ng, “Shen Pao-chen,” pp. 10–11.
\(^{75}\) D’Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC Ning-Po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 206.
mournng. Zhou Kaixi considered resigning.\textsuperscript{76} Under the circumstances Shen, though still not officially involved, complained to the court. Beijing then requested Zuo’s opinion on the matter. Zuo’s reply, which accused Wu of listening to evil men and driving off competent ones, was effective. In January 1868 Beijing transferred Wu Tang to Sichuan.\textsuperscript{77}

Neither Prosper Giquel nor Paul d’Aiguebelle was completely certain that the project would truly be a national one. The Qing government was committed to the project, but its removal of Zuo and the initial appointment of Wu Tang had made the depth of imperial support questionable. D’Aiguebelle was said to have originally been disinterested, since he expected the dockyard to be entrusted to a circuit intendant without real resources.\textsuperscript{78}

Other foreigners also had reservations. The initial appointment of Shen Baozhen in 1866 had worried the European directors, and they had asked that Zuo’s name continue to be added to all memorials to Beijing. It was thought that Zuo’s name would carry far more weight than that of the newly appointed imperial commissioner.\textsuperscript{79} Giquel, however, was a supporter of Shen’s and wrote his brother excitedly when Beijing promoted him. It was a sign, Giquel felt, of the court’s interest in their work.\textsuperscript{80}

**France, England, and the Dockyard Origins**

If neither Giquel nor d’Aiguebelle was completely confident of Beijing’s support, the French government was even less certain of its own stance toward the plans of its two nationals. Giquel, however, found no contradiction in his hope to combine loyalty to France with his work in China and wished to involve France in the project. In September Giquel presented the contract to the French consul-general, Brenier de Montmorand.

Giquel had previously written Montmorand outlining the future of the dockyard. Explaining that he wished to avoid the problems that had led to the catastrophe of the Lay-Osborn flotilla, he pictured the project as the first step toward industrialization in China. Giquel wanted nothing to hinder that progress.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{76} Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 134.
\textsuperscript{77} Ng, “Shen Pao-chen,” p. 11.
\textsuperscript{78} Médard, “Médard Report,” BB 4 1556, p. 1, SHM, Vincennes.
\textsuperscript{79} Chen, Tso Tsung-t’ang, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{80} Giquel to Emile, October 11, 1867, Château de Bois Dauphin.
\textsuperscript{81} Giquel to Montmorand, September 9, 1866, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 147–148, AE.
On September 14 Giquel and two Chinese officials arrived from Fuzhou to meet with the consul-general. Problems arose immediately. Giquel's letter had asked only for Montmorand's notarization of the contract signatures. According to Montmorand's report, considerably more was asked in person. Giquel explained that the Chinese wished the French government to take an official role in the project to guarantee their investment. He requested Montmorand to attach the French emperor's name to the document. This request went well beyond the simple question of verifying the contract.

The idea of having the French guarantee the integrity of the project was in keeping with Chinese custom and certainly complementary to Giquel's desire to work closely with both his countrymen and the Chinese. David Pong, the biographer of Shen Baozhen, has written that the question that arose concerning the significance of Montmorand's signature on the contract was an issue stemming from differing Chinese and French understandings of the notarization process. For the Chinese it meant that Montmorand was guaranteeing the contracts. To the French, Pong writes, "it merely certified the signatures of Giquel and d'Aiguebelle as authentic." Actually, the question was discussed in the original conversations between Giquel and Montmorand in unmistakable terms. Giquel, who understood both the Chinese and the French interpretations, made it clear to Montmorand that the Chinese did want an official French guarantee of the integrity of the project and the Europeans involved. There was apparently no misunderstanding stemming from imprecise cross-cultural communication, as Pong and others such as Gideon Chen have implied.

Montmorand was appalled by Giquel's request. Although he recognized that Giquel wanted France involved to ensure the project's success, the consul-general was irritated with Giquel for suggesting an action that might eventually cause Napoleon III embarrassment. There was, after all, no certainty that the dockyard would be a success. Montmorand made it clear that no more than a notarization was possible.

As soon as Giquel left his office Montmorand sent dispatches to his superiors in China and in Paris. He explained the proposed project and cautioned against involvement. Henri de Bellonet, the French minister to China, was equally concerned. He sent Paris a broadside denouncing the

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82 Montmorand to Lhuys, September 14, 1866, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 141, AE.
84 See also Chen, Tso Tsung-t'ang, p. 23.
85 Montmorand to Lhuys, September 14, 1866, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 141, AE.
project: the plans were poorly drawn, the Qing court was not as interested as Giquel claimed, and the Zongli Yamen viewed the project as a provincial one. Finally, Bellonet insisted, the eventual failure of the dockyard would embarrass France. The minister added that the English did not let their active duty officers become involved in such schemes and suggested that d’Aiguebelle and Giquel should resign their commissions.  

The Foreign Ministry ratified Bellonet and Montmorand’s stand against any official French role. The government then considered following Bellonet’s suggestion regarding the naval commissions. This was an especially serious situation for Giquel, since he had been on leave for five years. During the summer of 1866, before the final talks about the dockyard began, Giquel had already been told either to resume active duty or resign.

On September 19 Giquel turned for help to Pierre-Gustave Roze, the ranking French naval commander in East Asia, whom he had known for several years. Giquel wrote explaining the Fuzhou project and requesting that the admiral use his influence to extend Giquel’s leave. The project was just commencing, Giquel pointed out, and the plans included the development of iron mines. The mines and various activities associated with the beginning of Chinese industrialization, Giquel assured Roze, would certainly benefit French commerce and industry. Giquel tailored his requests in a fashion most likely to gain French support.

Admiral Roze was supportive. He contacted the French naval minister and reminded him that Giquel’s work was a credit to all French officers. Roze added a personal note claiming that Giquel was so committed to the Fuzhou project that he would rather quit the navy than renounce his involvement. By December the French Naval Ministry was willing to accept the uniqueness of Giquel’s role and agreed that his work was likely to benefit France as well as China. But that did not end the matter. The controversy continued to fill the official correspondence that passed between governmental offices in Paris to French officials in China. And in February 1867 the naval minister sent Admiral Roze letters from

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86 Bellonet to Lhuys, October 2, 1866, CP, Chine, vol. 42, fol. 38-39, AE.
88 Giquel to Roze, September 19, 1866, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, no. 8, SHM, Vincennes.
89 Roze to Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], October 6, 1866, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, no. 8, SHM, Vincennes.
90 Dieudonné, memo no. 9, December 12, 1866, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
the Foreign Ministry questioning whether Giquel should be allowed to 
keep his commission. The naval minister wanted Roze’s opinion of the 
charges against the dockyard project and the dangers for France of even a 
hint of involvement.91

By February 1867 Giquel was back in Paris. Perhaps unaware that 
the naval minister had requested Roze to comment on the situation, 
Giquel sent off an emotional letter to the admiral. He was very distressed 
and attacked Minister Bellonet personally. Claiming that the recent 
increase of French influence in China was due partly to his efforts, Giquel 
held that he had the right to criticize Bellonet’s motives, and he asked 
rhetorically if Bellonet wanted France to leave China. Giquel was 
particularly incensed that Bellonet had said that he should resign and that 
the project had been poorly planned. Giquel felt that despite 
Montmorand’s refusal to do more than notarize the contracts, the French 
official did in general approve of the dockyard plan.92 In defending the 
project Giquel explained that a provincial approach to national 
commitments merely showed that Beijing preferred not to be directly 
involved to avoid embarrassment in the event of failure. The Chinese 
government traditionally operated in that fashion. One had to understand 
that and to remember that the Chinese emperor had approved Zuo 
Zongtang’s proposal. Giquel wanted a letter of support and a character 
reference. Giquel followed up his impassioned letter of February 15 by 
sending Roze an official Chinese memorial listing him as an employee of 
the court itself, not just of Zuo Zongtang.93

Giquel felt caught in the middle. He continued to try to convince 
his government that the Chinese emperor was behind the plan and that he 
himself should be allowed to direct the project unhindered. During March 
1867 Giquel met with the recently appointed naval minister, Charles 
Rigault de Genouilly. Genouilly reiterated Bellonet’s argument that the 
project was no more than a plan of the provincial official Zuo Zongtang. 
Although Giquel showed the naval minister his official certificate as 
director and the official Chinese seal it carried, Genouilly was 
unconvinced; he insisted on withholding judgment on Giquel’s resignation 
until he heard from Roze. If Giquel had not previously known that the 
ministry was waiting for Roze to comment, he certainly knew it then.94

91 Min. de la Marine [Chasseloup-Laubat], to Roze, February 4, 1867, BB 4 867 Marine, 
fol. 462, AN.
92 Giquel to Roze, February 15, 1867, BB 4 1555, SHM, Vincennes.
93 Giquel to Roze, March 9, 1867, BB 4 1555, no. 5, SHM, Vincennes.
94 Ibid.
The entire controversy was a difficult one for Prosper Giquel. A short while later he revealed his feelings in a letter to Genouilly: "It had not been due to a simple act that we [the French] have arrived at the position we occupy in China. It is after numerous services and many [illegible] labors which have cost me the loss of an arm and my health."  

While Giquel struggled to convince his government to let him retain his commission and that the Fuzhou Dockyard project was truly an imperial Chinese effort, Consul-General Montmorand was reevaluating the issue. Hu Guangyong, an important aide to Zuo Zongtang, met with Montmorand. He explained that the Chinese hoped to work with the French, not the English, in this attempt to transfer technology. Hu explained that Zuo much preferred the French to the English and that the Chinese had struggled against the expanding influence of the English. There is little Hu could have said more likely to arouse a positive reaction from Montmorand. Any opportunity for the average French consular official to gain advantage over their English rivals was a precious opportunity indeed.

Hu's visit with Montmorand proved effective. By April 1867 the consul-general was convinced that the Qing government was involved in the dockyard project. Admiral Roze, who had spoken with Montmorand, came to the same conclusion. Roze's subsequent dispatch was very positive and advised that Giquel not be hindered in his work. Finally, on July 27 Giquel had a twenty-minute meeting with Napoleon III. The emperor promised his support for the project and wished Giquel success. On balance Giquel was quite satisfied. Although the French government had disavowed any official ties to the project, neither was there to be overt hostility. For the duration of his service at Fuzhou, Giquel would take pains to keep the French naval command informed of developments at the dockyard. Giquel could still balance the duality of his loyalties to France and to China.

Thus, despite the ambiguities, both the Chinese and the French governments had delineated their relationship to the dockyard project. Governor-General Zuo Zongtang had gained imperial support for the

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95 Giquel to Genouilly, June 23, 1867, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, 3660/26a, SHM, Vincennes.
96 Resumé of conversation between Hu Guangyong and Montmorand, March 7, 1867, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 277–280, AE.
97 Montmorand to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Moustier], April 27, 1867, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 5, fol. 192–194, AE.
98 Roze to Genouilly, July 10, 1867, BB 4 869 Marine, fol. 117–118, AN.
99 BB 4 1555, Fuzhou Dockyard file, in passim, SHM, Vincennes.
proposed dockyard. Once begun it would be, not the dream of a provincial official, but an imperial project with an imperial commissioner at its head. The French were to supply most of the teaching and management staff and much of the technological material.

The relationship of the other governments to the project remained distanced. Nevertheless, Giquel sought to avoid jealousy with other European powers, especially with Britain and Germany. English was to be taught, and Giquel expected to hire some English naval instructors. He even considered having the Germans print the proposed money for the dockyard community as a way of securing further international involvement and support for the project.¹⁰⁰

The plans to involve other nations brought skepticism. Rutherford Alcock, English minister to China, thought it was likely that the “show of liberality” would soon be forgotten. For the English minister, the project was purely French in origin and in “ulterior tendencies.”¹⁰¹ While the several governments considered their respective policies toward the project, issues arising from the dockyard’s own internal management were being resolved.

D’Aiguebelle, Robert Hart, Eugene-Herman de Meritens and the Direction of the Fuzhou Dockyard

The first major issue was the relationship of Paul d’Aiguebelle and Prosper Giquel. In the initial planning for the dockyard in 1864 d’Aiguebelle had been the principal European involved. Giquel took part only to help clear up a misunderstanding caused by d’Aiguebelle’s translator. Subsequently, Giquel’s role became equal to that of d’Aiguebelle, and the initial contracts were signed on that basis. Giquel and d’Aiguebelle were to be equally responsible for the project and receive the same pay.¹⁰²

During the first week in November 1866 an addendum was added to the contract. The Chinese had decided that Giquel, not d’Aiguebelle, should hold the principal European authority because of his knowledge both of Chinese customs and the language.¹⁰³ The decision had been a

¹⁰⁰ Giquel to Montmorand, September 9, 1866, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 147, AE.
¹⁰¹ Alcock to Staveley, September 25, 1866, no. 12, F.O. 17 451, fol. 44–45, PRO.
¹⁰² D’Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC, Ning-Po, Fou-tcheou, fol. 1, fol. 206, AE.
¹⁰³ Giquel had learned Cantonese during his stay with the Allied Commission in Canton. Somewhat later he learned Mandarin. See Zuo Zongtang to Giquel, November 20, 1866, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
difficult one for the Chinese. They felt that they needed both men, Giquel as an administrator and translator and d’Aiguèbelle for his engineering experience.\textsuperscript{104} The previous misunderstanding between d’Aiguèbelle and Zuo, which Giquel had cleared up, obviously played a role in the Chinese decision to give preference to the individual with whom they could speak directly. In addition, Giquel had been aided by his association with Hu Guangyong, which dated from the Huzhou campaign.\textsuperscript{105}

To reduce the tensions likely to develop between the two Europeans, Zuo requested Consul-General Montmorand to arrange for d’Aiguèbelle to recommend Giquel for the first directorship. Montmorand cooperated and the decision was discussed at length in a meeting between him and d’Aiguèbelle during the fall of 1866.\textsuperscript{106} The new agreement provided that Giquel was to have the principal power; however, he could not act without consulting d’Aiguèbelle. Each would have the same salary and be equally responsible for the project. D’Aiguèbelle understandably found the situation bizarre but cooperated initially.\textsuperscript{107} Giquel thanked him privately.\textsuperscript{108} Within two years d’Aiguèbelle would begin moves to disassociate himself completely from responsibility for the project.\textsuperscript{109}

The other major issue was the relationship of the dockyard to the Maritime Customs Service. Robert Hart, the head of the customs service, suggested the project be carried out under the aegis of the maritime customs. Giquel, aware that too strong a tie to France might arouse unneeded problems, accepted the suggestion. Moreover, he was an employee of the customs service and felt loyal to it. When Giquel approached Zuo Zongtang with Hart’s suggestion, the governor-general refused. Zuo explained that he did not want responsibility for the project diffused.

Giquel was willing to have the dockyard organized under either France or the Maritime Customs Service. His principal concern was that the project succeed and that he be allowed to direct it. He had been ready

\textsuperscript{104} Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 154.


\textsuperscript{106} Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 154; and BB 4 1555, no. 1, p. 27, SHM, Vincennes.

\textsuperscript{107} D’Aiguèbelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC, Ning-Po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 205, AE.

\textsuperscript{108} Giquel to d’Aiguèbelle, November 6, 1866, BB 4 1555, no. 1, fol. 30, SHM, Vincennes.

\textsuperscript{109} D’Aiguèbelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC, Ning-Po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 205, AE.
to resign from the navy if that had proved necessary. At this juncture Giquel reluctantly concluded that he should resign from the customs service.\textsuperscript{110} This he did. The dockyard project, and through it the possibility of playing a leading role in the development of China, was becoming his life's work and principal loyalty.

Robert Hart's role in the development of the dockyard is unclear. Consul-General Montmorand claimed that Hart opposed any increase of French influence in China and later privately encouraged Baron Eugene-Herman de Meritens, an employee of the customs service, to undermine the project.\textsuperscript{111} De Meritens, the thirty-two-year-old director of the Fuzhou customs, was especially hostile to the project. In contrast to Giquel, de Meritens had begun his career in the French diplomatic service, trained as a Chinese linguist, and worked successfully at Guangzhou and Beijing before Horatio Nelson Lay hired him for the customs.\textsuperscript{112} Whether on his own or because of Hart's encouragement, de Meritens set out to seize control of the Fuzhou Dockyard project.

On February 21, 1867, de Meritens submitted a report to General Ying-qui in which he questioned the planning of the dockyard.\textsuperscript{113} De Meritens insisted that five years contracted for the project was not adequate time to accomplish the stated goals; moreover, the dockyard would be too expensive and better ships could be purchased abroad. As to the educational program, he claimed that Hart's involvement with language training in Beijing was more likely to be successful. France itself, de Meritens was quick to point out, had disavowed the project.

Although he felt the entire project should be canceled, de Meritens said he was willing to become involved if the Chinese insisted on establishing a dockyard. He suggested that the size of the dockyard output be reduced: from sixteen ships to four. And he would drastically decrease the number of Europeans and shorten the contract time to three years. The latter was a curious suggestion considering that he had earlier criticized Zuo, d'Aiguebelle, and Giquel for allowing only five years to fully train the students and staff.

Referring to Robert Hart, who had suggested that Giquel place the project under the customs service, de Meritens suggested having funds

\textsuperscript{110} Giquel to Montmorand, September 9, 1866, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 148, AE.

\textsuperscript{111} Montmorand to Min. des Affaires étrangères Moustier, March 8, 1867, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 278; and April 27, 1867, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 308, AE.

\textsuperscript{112} Note sur Eugene de Meritens, personnel fiche, AE.

\textsuperscript{113} Meritens to Ing [Ying], n.d., CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 320–326, AE. This is clearly a copy of the letter of February 21, 1867. See Pong, "Modernization and Politics," p. 133.
channeled directly from the customs. Finally, he proposed that Hart be the intermediary between himself and the Zongli Yamen, the agency of the imperial government that supervised modernization projects.\textsuperscript{114} Whether or not Hart directly encouraged de Meritens is unclear, but he could not have been ignorant of de Meritens’ effort.

De Meritens timed his attack well. Zuo Zongtang had left Fuzhou. Giquel and d’Aiguebelle were still in Europe, and Shen Baozhen had not officially begun his duties.\textsuperscript{115} And he had considerable influence with important local French officials. French Minister Henri de Bellonet had in part demanded Giquel’s and d’Aiguebelle’s resignations based on de Meritens’ critical arguments.\textsuperscript{116}

Chinese officialdom, however, was quite unreceptive to de Meritens’ advice. Ying-gui thought the customs officer was simply trying to make a profit for himself.\textsuperscript{117} As mentioned above Hu Guangyong, Zuo’s financial adviser, met with Consul-General Montmorand to discuss the matter.\textsuperscript{118} Zuo was quite angry with these developments and had sent Hu to investigate de Meritens’ exact status. Specifically, Zuo wanted to know whether the French government was supporting de Meritens. And he questioned de Meritens’ claim that Minister Bellonet and the French government wanted him, not Giquel, to control the project.

The consul-general stated that de Meritens could in no way speak for France. Though French, de Meritens worked for China, not France, and his superiors were the Chinese authorities of Fuzhou and the customs officials. Certainly Paris knew of the project, but no action had been taken to replace Giquel or d’Aiguebelle with de Meritens. The French government, Montmorand assured Hu Guangyong, would not interfere. The consul-general explained that de Meritens probably feared a loss of influence in Fuzhou. In any case, Montmorand made it clear that de Meritens spoke only for himself.\textsuperscript{119}

Bellonet reinforced Montmorand’s position when he officially notified the Zongli Yamen that de Meritens had not been told to assist the dockyard.\textsuperscript{120} By mid-April Montmorand had concluded that only the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 134.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Bellonet to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Moustier], October 2, 1866, CP, Chine, vol. 42, fol. 38–39, AE; and Ng, “Shen Pao-chen,” p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 135.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Résumé of conversation between Hu Guangyong and Montmorand, March 7, 1867, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 274–280, AE.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ng, “Shen Pao-chen,” p. 18.
\end{itemize}
English could benefit from the struggle and requested authorization to tell de Meritens to stay away from the project.\textsuperscript{121}

De Meritens, seeing that Bellonet would not support him, claimed that Robert Hart had authorized his actions.\textsuperscript{122} How involved Hart was is uncertain. Shen Baozhen contacted the Zongli Yamen about Hart’s apparent role. On August 8, 1867, Shen wrote: “If Robert Hart has such a desire, the Tsungli [Zongli] Yamen in accordance with reason should refuse him; otherwise, it will interfere with the whole affair of the shipyard.” When contacted, Hart claimed that he had, on several occasions, told de Meritens not to interfere.\textsuperscript{123} By August 1867 Hart may have regretted de Meritens’ activities. It does, nevertheless, seem likely that after failing in his own attempt to gain control of the dockyard, he had at least encouraged de Meritens.

By late summer of 1867 the dockyard project was advancing well. Zuo Zongtang had gained the official patronage of the imperial court, had arranged for Shen Baozhen to be in charge of the project, and had the hostile Governor-General Wu transferred. The French government, despite its unwillingness to become directly involved, had at least been reasonably supportive of Giquel. For Prosper Giquel the project and his own role were of paramount importance. He had been willing to resign from the French naval service and did leave the customs service. The success of the dockyard was uppermost in his mind. If he had worked to gain complete control of the dockyard he had, nevertheless, been willing to compromise, to accept the patronage of either the French government or the Maritime Customs Service. What mattered was that the project succeed.

\textsuperscript{121} Montmorand to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Moustier], April 27, 1867, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 6, fol. 316, AE.
\textsuperscript{122} Ng, “Shen Pao-chen,” p. 18.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., pp. 18–19.
V

Directing the Fuzhou Dockyard

The entire plan of the Fuzhou Dockyard was without precedent in Chinese history. Certainly the idea of transferring two score naval specialists from Europe to China, having them train hundreds of Chinese while constructing not only a complete dockyard but more than a dozen steamships was a formidable goal. Such a task, even under the most favorable conditions, when questions of authority, responsibility, and extraterritoriality had been delineated, would be awesome. That, however, was not the case. Questions of authority between the Chinese and European staff needed to be resolved. The European directors, Prosper Giquel and Paul d’Aiguebelle, struggled between themselves for power. The Chinese needed to absorb unfamiliar scientific knowledge and engineering skills, and the European staff found itself called upon not only to train the Chinese but to treat them equally. Europeans found dockyard directors, especially Shen Baozhen and Prosper Giquel, insistent on amiable relations between the foreigners and their Chinese associates. Many of the new personnel were unable to adjust to this unusual equality. It would take several years to work out these issues.

Early Dockyard Construction

When Giquel returned to Fuzhou in October 1867, he was quite pleased with developments. He and d’Aiguebelle had worked well together in France. They had consulted leading French naval experts on the feasibility of the dockyard plans. The important Le Havre engineering firm of Mazeline had studied their plans and Monsieur Sebillot, a civil engineer later associated with the dockyard, had advised them.¹

Several specialists, metal workers, designers, and a boiler maker accompanied the first director to Fuzhou. Chief Engineer Adrien Marie Trasbot arrived the same month.² Trasbot, who had resigned his position

at the Rochefort Arsenal to go to China, convinced Giquel to expand the approved plans.3

Giquel’s arrival greatly reassured the Chinese dockyard officials. The attacks of Governor-General Wu Tang, the slander of de Meritens, and Zuo Zongtang’s transfer had been demoralizing. Rumors abounded that Giquel and d’Aiguebelle might abscond with the funds entrusted to them. Giquel’s return seemed to put the breath of renewed life back into the project.4

In January 1868, just three months after Giquel’s return, Shen Baozhen organized a formal ceremony to inaugurate the work. It was an important event. Shen Baozhen laid a symbolic stone into one of the construction sites.5 Giquel and Shen felt that their unique attempt to transfer technology had begun.

D’Aiguebelle and various specialists and their dependents arrived on April 10, 1868.6 The new European community included: Giquel and d’Aiguebelle; Adrien Trasbot, the engineer-in-chief; Sebillot, a civil engineer; four engineers (engines, mines, hydraulics, and optics); one professor of English and two of French; two secretaries; an interpreter; and an accountant. Various office workers, foremen, and skilled laborers worked at the site as well. Giquel still awaited the arrival of a carpenter, several artists, and the professors of practical navigation. Giquel was satisfied with his staff.7 They were a well trained, experienced group, and he expected them to accomplish a great deal.

Administering the Dockyard

Imperial Commissioner Shen Baozhen was responsible for the direction and accomplishments of the dockyard. Working with Shen were Hu Guanyong, Zhou Kaixi, and Ye Wenlan. The governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, the Fujian governor, and the Fuzhou Tartar general were to aid Shen. And a committee of a hundred local officials and gentry was established to help keep accounts and discipline in the dockyard.8

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4 D’Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 14, 1869, CCC Ningpo, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 206, AE.
5 Giquel to French East Asian Naval Commander [Roze?], January 18, 1868, BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
6 Giquel to Marie, April 18, 1868, Château de Bois-Dauphin. Thirty-five people arrived with d’Aiguebelle.
7 Giquel to Ohier, April 20, 1868, BB 4 876 Marine, fol. 112, AN.
After Wu Tang was transferred in January 1868, the imperial government appointed no more overtly hostile officials to senior positions at Fuzhou.\(^9\)

Shen Baozhen understood the European directors’ responsibility to be for training and construction plus supervision of the European personnel.\(^10\) Until d’Aiguebelle arrived, Giquel was solely responsible for the work of the Europeans. Until February 1868, when the navy released Dunnoyer de Segonzac to the dockyard, he was the only European who spoke Chinese.\(^11\) Shen gave him office space in his official yamen, and although Giquel found the building noisy, he felt the advantages of being close to the Chinese officials made his work far easier.\(^12\)

Giquel had been named first director and since October had been accustomed to operating on his own. The return of d’Aiguebelle precipitated a struggle that threatened to destroy the blossoming dockyard. A major issue that divided the two was the question of relations with the Chinese officials at the dockyard. D’Aiguebelle, like many Europeans, could accept working with the Chinese but hardly in a subordinate capacity. Giquel, in contrast, viewed himself as an employee of the Chinese, nothing less, nothing more. He saw his role at the dockyard as limited and always regarded himself as answerable to Shen Baozhen.\(^13\) D’Aiguebelle and many Europeans were never able to accept this limited vision of the European director’s role. As he later described the situation:

The internal administration was left to the Chinese who did as they wished according to a heap of pretexts one more bizarre than another. A complacency so remarkable that a mandarin said to me when I arrived, “M. Giquel is in agreement with everything we ask. If we are always right, why do we have European directors?”\(^14\)

Regardless of the veracity of d’Aiguebelle’s view, he simply could not accept working within the Chinese hierarchy as Giquel did. Sometime later, when completion of the first transport was delayed, the Chinese officials, fearful of Beijing’s anger, proposed a solution. The European directors should promise Beijing to submit to punishment if the ship were not completed by a date they themselves would fix. For d’Aiguebelle, the suggestion was absurd. Giquel, far more amenable to the Chinese

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\(^10\) Shen to Giquel, August 6, 1868, BB 4 1555, piece 10; and Shen to Giquel, October 5, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 2, both in misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.

\(^11\) Giquel to Genouilly, August 17, 1867, Dossier Individuel, Dunnoyer de Segonzac, CC 7 2728, piece 5, SHM, Vincennes. D’Segonzac later became assistant director.

\(^12\) Giquel to Emile, November 16 [1867], Château de Bois Dauphin.

\(^13\) Giquel to Shen, October 4, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 2, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.

\(^14\) D’Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tchéou, vol. 1, fol. 206, AE.
Directing the Fuzhou Dockyard

administrative style, agreed to the plan. Shocked by Giquel’s readiness to conform to Chinese custom and fearful of being held responsible for what he perceived as Giquel’s mismanagement, d’Aiguebelle outlined to Giquel all the decisions he refused to be held accountable for.15

By mid-June 1869 Giquel and d’Aiguebelle had worked out an official means of delineating their respective responsibilities. Thereafter, when a decision was circulated with the words “for the directors” or with their signatures, it meant they had agreed. Thus both were responsible for the consequences. If Giquel alone issued an order it could only be signed “for the administration.” He alone would be responsible.16

Actually, during 1868 and 1869 d’Aiguebelle was often absent from the dockyard. He had assigned himself the task of obtaining better and cheaper sources of wood, always a major concern.

The European Dockyard Community and the Chinese

Among the primary tasks facing Shen Baozhen and Giquel was the establishment of harmonious relations between the Chinese and European staff. Shen maintained an excellent rapport with the Europeans; and in December 1867 Ying-gui visited the yard and showed special interest in the foreigners.17

Establishing appropriate relations between European and Chinese employees was an important task during the first years. Giquel later commented:

As may well be supposed, moral difficulties were not less urgent. It was, in fact, to be foreseen that in a staff of more than 80 persons newly arrived from Europe, there would be some who would refuse to act in harmony with a race considered by them to be their inferiors, and that that would be a source of embarrassments.... But, although such experiences may not have been spared it, the Arsenal of Foochow [Fuzhou] has triumphantly resisted them, and its staff has been able to finish to a point the task which was confided to it.18

Giquel was correct that race relations had been a potential source of problem. The contracts signed by the Europeans specifically warned against striking or insulting Chinese workers or officials.19 This warning to

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15 Ibid., fol. 207.
the new staff was not merely pro forma, but a stipulation obtained by the Chinese negotiators of the contract. Once the dockyard was established it was strictly enforced. A European foreman could request punishment for recalcitrant Chinese workers, but it was left to the Chinese officials to carry out any punishments. In June 1868 assistant engineer Thibaudier of the French navy and for many years assistant to Léonce Verny, director of the Yokosuka Dockyard in Japan, visited the dockyard and submitted a report. Discussing race relations he wrote:

> The most formal order has been given to all the employees of the arsenal to treat the Chinese with gentleness. A European who permits himself to injure or strike a native worker is immediately dismissed. In this respect they obtain more obedience and enthusiasm than from the brutality which, unhappily, Europeans all too commonly direct toward the Chinese.

It is reasonable to assume that Giquel, long comfortable with the Chinese, was the leading force in guaranteeing that his European staff would show respect for the Chinese.

The new Europeans found themselves in an unfamiliar environment. The dockyard was run like a military camp, and at first that was a difficult adjustment. Many had never been to China and, like so many Europeans, felt themselves superior to the Chinese. As dockyard employees they had agreed not to communicate directly with Chinese officials and were themselves under the control of the European directors, who had the exclusive contractual right to communicate with Chinese officials. Giquel’s knowledge of Chinese and his position as first director gave him a considerable advantage. Adhering to the letter of the contract and certain of his own judgment, Giquel felt no obligation to serve as a translator when his staff from time to time disagreed with decisions made by the administration.

Despite the often antagonistic and unequal relationship between Europeans and Chinese on the China coast, Giquel was convinced that dockyard staff relations could be different. He was sure of his ability to work with the Chinese, and he expected his staff to conform to Chinese custom, to treat the Chinese well, and to act as responsible members of

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22 D’Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 15, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 206, AE.
the dockyard community. As he wrote one employee:

In coming to serve the Chinese government we have not renounced our rights as French subjects, but we no longer find ourselves in the usual circumstances of Frenchmen who come to establish themselves in these countries. These last come at their own risk and peril. They would be in error if they hesitated for an instant when they feel themselves [unreadable, wounded?] to address themselves to whom it may concern [the consul]. But we who have come to China at the expense of the Chinese, who now pay us, well, I feel that before taking conflict with them to an authority outside of the arsenal the decent thing to do would be to withdraw one's self from one's obligations to them [the Chinese].

Giquel believed that extraterritoriality did not include his employees in their capacity as workers at the dockyard. He vehemently insisted that the treaties did not include individuals brought from France by and at the expense of the Chinese government. Describing how they differed he explained, "They have come to serve the Chinese government in the arsenal. Their travel expenses and their salaries have been, and are still, paid by this same government. They live in the buildings of the arsenal, on the land of the arsenal."^24

In the fourth quarter of the twentieth century we can easily sympathize with Giquel's insistence that personnel questions within a Chinese dockyard should not have been subject to consular interference. When Giquel took this stand, however, it was in contradiction to established practice. Certainly the Chinese authorities agreed with their first director, but hardly any Europeans did. As Giquel sought to fulfill his obligations under the dockyard contract, he found he had to resist the actions of consular officials who, he felt, were undermining his relationship with his employees.

As early as November 1866 the French had considered moving the consulate from Ningbo to Fuzhou to serve the arriving dockyard community.^25 In the spring of 1869 that move was accomplished, and it is

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^23 Giquel to unnamed employee, probably Dr. Vidal, August 8, 1868, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 182, a copy obtained by Consul Simon, AE. Robert Hart, in 1866, had also claimed that foreigners in Chinese service were not responsible to the consular courts. His arguments were not accepted. George W. Keeton, The Development of Extraterritoriality in China (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969; reprint, Longmans Green, 1928), vol. 1, p. 315.

^24 Giquel to Blancheton, March 14, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 21, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.

^25 Montmorand to Min. Affaires étrangères [Moustier], October 19, 1867, CCC, Shanghai, vol. 7, fol. 20, AE.
from that date that one has a record of serious personnel problems. Both d’Aiguebelle and Giquel, according to Consul G. Eugene Simon, had given their workers an impression of independence from the newly established consul. Giquel had actually tried to block its transfer.

Long before his arrival in Fuzhou, Consul Simon was convinced that all was not well at the dockyard. He knew about the tensions between Giquel and d’Aiguebelle and had heard that the directors had alienated their European staff. He knew also that the Chinese were angered by production delays and judged them to be losing faith in the project. In Fuzhou Simon had listened at length to de Meritens’ attacks upon the dockyard. Although he felt that the customs inspector was merely jealous, Simon himself soon took an antagonistic stand.

Simon was impressed neither with Giquel nor with d’Aiguebelle, but he did judge chief engineer Trasbot to be quite effective. Simon thought Trasbot was chiefly responsible for the accomplishments of the dockyard. The chief engineer himself was quite pleased with his role and made no secret of his desire to replace Giquel as first director. Giquel, probably aware of Trasbot’s ambition, was nevertheless satisfied with his efforts and considered the chief engineer quite honest.

Simon thought the Chinese were pleased with his arrival. Explaining that it was his right and duty to conciliate and offer justice to the French employees, Simon expected that to be the limit of his intervention. While Shen Baozhen may have welcomed the arriving consul, his actions made it clear that he agreed with Giquel. When Simon requested permission to place official French announcements in the dockyard, Shen refused. Nevertheless, within weeks after his arrival, Simon put out flyers reminding the dockyard French nationals that, although they worked for the Chinese, they had not renounced their nationality. Additionally, he listed the rights and responsibilities they derived from their status as French nationals in China. Each employee was asked to report to the

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26 Simon to Valette, April 9 and April 20, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 169–178, AE.
27 Simon to Hugeuteau, February 3, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 167, AE.
28 Simon to Valette, March 28, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 166, AE.
30 Giquel to Emile, March 19, 1869, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
32 Simon to Valette, March 27, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 164, AE.
new consul to register.

Within a month of the consulate’s establishment, the first of many struggles between Giquel and the consular officials began. Over the next two years, Giquel, because of his discharge of various employees, was trapped in a whirlwind of legal and personal attacks directed against him by disgruntled employees and hostile consular officers. D’Aiguebelle, de Meritens, and chief engineer Trasbot allied with the new consulate, the jurisdiction of which Giquel and the Chinese refused to recognize. As a result, issues that would otherwise have been routine questions of administration were further complicated.

In May 1869 trouble developed between two dockyard employees, a Monsieur Percebois and his foreman, Brossement. The two Frenchmen had first known and disliked each other in France. According to Percebois, Brossement had abandoned his wife and children “on the pavements of Paris” and run off with the woman he lived with at the dockyard. Percebois’s knowledge of this incident was at the heart of their later antagonism.

During May 1869 the matter reached a breaking point. Angry words were exchanged and on several occasions Percebois walked out of their workshop. Brossement repeatedly reported the worker to Giquel. Having warned Percebois, in late May Giquel dismissed him. The order firing him carried Giquel’s name alone since d’Aiguebelle was not then at the dockyard.

According to the initial contract each worker had signed, there was no right to compensation or travel money if one were dismissed for cause. Accordingly, Giquel refused Percebois the money to return to Europe. Understandably angry, Percebois went to the consulate for help. Consul Simon and his assistant, Ernest Jules Blancheton, felt it their duty to intervene. The consular officers first attempted to have Percebois reinstated. When that effort failed, they aided him in his attempt to sue Giquel for damages.

Percebois’ discharge set the stage for more than two years of struggle between Giquel, his Chinese associates, and the consulate. The central issue was the fundamental question of the consul’s right to

33 Blanchetton to Valette, August 2, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 222–223, AE.
34 “Order of the day,” May 27, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 17, misc. papers, SHM; Vincennes and Brossement to Giquel, May 28, 1869, BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
36 “Contrat d’Engagement,” September 3, 1866, article 10, BB 4 1555, SHM, Vincennes.
interfere in personnel issues at the dockyard, a right neither Giquel nor Shen Baozhen would recognize.

Ernest Blancheton, who became acting consul after Simon left, made several private attempts to have Percebois reinstated. He contacted Ying-gui, who told him that the rules against insubordination could not be disregarded; Percebois would not be rehired.37 Much to Blancheton’s frustration, even Giquel privately conceded that Percebois had been a good worker. Nevertheless, Foreman Brossement had been insulted and Giquel would not reconsider.38

With Blancheton’s help, Percebois began his law suit. He would not accept the charges against him and demanded $1,000 traveling expenses plus $5,600 in damages to cover his unfilled contract. Blancheton set a mid-July date for a consular tribunal to deal with the suit. From the start Giquel’s chances for a fair assessment were negligible. Blancheton planned to preside at the tribunal and had asked de Meritens to act as assessor.39 Neither could be expected to be impartial. De Meritens’ attitude was well known, and Blancheton had already begun what would be a long series of dispatches denouncing the dockyard administration and planning.40

In the months leading up to the trial and during the following summer and fall Giquel and Shen Baozhen used a variety of methods to resist Blancheton’s interference. Weeks before the tribunal Blancheton requested Shen to send the directors and six Chinese workers to testify in court. He refused. He argued that sending the directors would hurt the work of the dockyard because it would reflect poorly on their dignity as managers. Moreover, Chinese workers could not speak French and thus could not understand Percebois’ remarks to Brossement. Finally, Shen reasoned that the dockyard was not a commercial enterprise and, therefore, Blancheton had no right to interfere.41 Ying-gui had already made his position clear. His and Shen’s stand angered Blancheton, who felt Shen had been rude in his refusal to cooperate.42

37 Ying to Blancheton, June 25, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 17, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
38 Blancheton to Vallette, August 2, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 224, E.
39 Hai-fang tang (Facsimile of the maritime defense files) (Taipei: 1957), 2, 179a, cited in Pong, “Modernization and Politics.” The actual unit of money is unclear. The Hai-fang tang uses the term yuan.
40 Blancheton to Valette, July 2, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 199, AE.
41 Shen to Blancheton, July 10, 1869, CCC, Ning-po. Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 233–234, AE.
42 Blancheton to Ying-kuei [Ying-gui], July 23, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 235–236, AE.
Giquel was in complete agreement with his Chinese employers. On July 21, the day of the tribunal, he failed to appear but sent a letter of explanation claiming that the court had no authority to deal with the issue. Giquel reasoned that by approaching Shen Baozhen and Ying-gui, Blancheton had turned the entire incident into a diplomatic question. Thus, it was beyond the jurisdiction of a consular court. D’Aiguebelle undermined Giquel and Shen by taking the stand and accepting the court’s jurisdiction in the matter. He said he knew nothing of Percebois’ firing, since he had been elsewhere when the worker was dismissed. The tribunal absolved d’Aiguebelle of any liability. Chief engineer Trasbot submitted a deposition claiming that Percebois had never refused a formal order from either himself or Brossement. Two other French witnesses, Messieurs Robin and Louis, denied any knowledge of the dispute. No Chinese employees testified.

The court, clearly enraged by the refusal to recognize its authority, ruled against Giquel and ordered him to pay $3,500. The evidence in support of Percebois’ contention of unfair treatment may have been slim, but Blancheton clearly seized the opportunity to demonstrate consular authority. And he was delighted with the ruling. He had proven, contrary to the claims of the dockyard administration, that he could protect European personnel from abuse by the dockyard directors. Blancheton boasted that the Chinese were probably regretting their open encouragement of Giquel’s stand. While Blancheton was following what he perceived to be his duty in protecting French nationals, it is clear that during the struggle to establish his authority, Blancheton turned his work into a personal vendetta against Giquel. As his frustration grew, he committed himself to dislodging the first director.

Shen Baozhen was furious with the ruling. He assumed Blancheton was acting with malicious intent. His belief that Blancheton’s conduct was based on more than the merits of the suit is substantially correct. The contracts did not specify a means of appealing dismissals, and it was
only natural that Percebois had gone to the consulate when he felt himself wronged. Nevertheless, it is clear from Blancheton’s correspondence that he was more concerned about establishing his authority than about the specific merits of Percebois’ complaint.\(^50\) Giquel was quite upset about the judgment against him. His primary income was his monthly salary, and the large assessment hurt. Despite the difficulty, he did eventually pay the fine, though Shen Baozhen urged that he refuse the court’s demand.\(^51\) Giquel used that summer and early fall to prepare his appeal.

Once Giquel lost the case, he changed his tactics. Giquel now claimed, with considerable truth, that he acted merely as an agent for the Chinese and was thus not financially responsible for the contracts. The original contracts had made it abundantly clear that d’Aiguebelle and Giquel, in purchasing and hiring, operated only as agents of the Chinese government.\(^52\)

On October 4, 1869, Giquel addressed a letter to Shen Baozhen asking him to define, for the record, their respective responsibilities. The problem, Giquel explained to Shen, was that Blancheton misunderstood Shen’s position, assumed that Giquel alone controlled decisions at the dockyard, and thought consultation with Shen was a mere formality. Giquel reviewed the legal problems that had resulted from Percebois’ discharge and the difficulty of paying the settlement from his dockyard salary. He needed help, and only Shen could help establish his defense. Giquel requested clarification on the specific responsibilities of Shen Baozhen and the European directors in the hiring and firing of European employees.\(^53\)

The next day Shen replied:

The European directors have been appointed for the organization and functioning of the dockyard. The dockyard is a Chinese enterprise and an imperial commissioner was put at its head. If the French consul could interfere at will in the administration it would be a French not Chinese dockyard. The director [Giquel] is charged with the discipline of the European personnel. If an employee will not recognize his authority he must inform me. As to discharging an employee, I have the sole power to do so. The director cannot himself take such an act.\(^54\)

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\(^{50}\) Blancheton correspondence, July 1869, passim, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, AE.

\(^{51}\) Pong, “Modernization and Politics,” p. 162.

\(^{52}\) “Contrat d’Engagement,” et al., BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.

\(^{53}\) Giquel to Shen, October 4, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 2, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.

\(^{54}\) Shen to Giquel, October 5, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 2, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
Shen further pointed out that at one point he had refused Giquel’s wish to have another former employee reinstated, and he reiterated his belief that Blancheton had no right to interfere at the dockyard. At the same time, Shen insisted that Blancheton could hold neither Giquel nor the Chinese authorities responsible for dockyard affairs.

The French appellate court at Saigon was not sympathetic to Giquel’s appeal. They confirmed Blancheton’s right to intervene and disregarded Giquel’s claim not to be the principal contracting or discharging agent of the dockyard. The court did reduce the assessment de Meritens had awarded Percebois but required Giquel to compensate the worker for his trip to Saigon for the hearing.^^

Departure of Paul d’Aiguebelle

During this period relations between d’Aiguebelle and Giquel became more tense. D’Aiguebelle felt that Giquel had taken on too many responsibilities and had done so without consideration of the dockyard’s supplies or capabilities. Additionally, he was convinced that Giquel allowed the Chinese too much say in decision making. And while the French officials Simon and Blancheton judged d’Aiguebelle to be jealous of Giquel and irritated at his flaunting of his good relations with the Chinese, it seems that the issue of responsibility for dockyard affairs was at the heart of the conflict. The earlier agreement detailing the administrative responsibilities of each did little to allay d’Aiguebelle’s fears of being held liable for decisions that he had no part of. At Hu Guangyong’s recommendation d’Aiguebelle was assigned to the recently launched training ship the Wannian Qing as director of the fleet’s military organization in June 1869.

Despite the transfer, Shen Baozhen still considered d’Aiguebelle a valuable member of the project. Shen corresponded with d’Aiguebelle over the new situation; and when d’Aiguebelle insisted that he no longer be held responsible for dockyard failures, Shen replied that he recognized that the transfer changed the situation. Shen, however, remained noncommittal on d’Aiguebelle’s continuing responsibility.

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55 Saigon Appellate Court Judgment, December 3, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 246–251, AE.
56 D’Aiguebelle to Zédé, February 14, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 204–209, AE.
57 Simon to Valette, April 20, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 175, AE.
59 Shen to Giquel, July 6 and 18, 1869, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
In July 1869, after d'Aiguebelle's transfer, when he claimed ignorance of Percebois' dismissal and the court had absolved him of liability in the case, the relationship between Giquel and d'Aiguebelle had been virtually destroyed. That summer and fall Giquel and d'Aiguebelle continued to argue over the issue. In December Giquel issued another circular saying that henceforth all notices coming from the management would be issued by him alone. Finally, the situation became completely intolerable. In March 1870 d'Aiguebelle left. Initially he went north to join Zuo Zongtang. Later d'Aiguebelle worked to obtain foreign arms for Zuo's military campaigns.

The fall of 1869 saw Giquel involved with yet another conflict, that with engineer Trasbot. Up to that time both Giquel and Shen had been impressed with Trasbot's work. In 1868 Shen had reported to the Zongli Yamen that Trasbot was conscientious in the performance of his job and a fair disciplinarian. Shen requested Trasbot's Chinese rank be raised from fourth to third rank.

The incident involving Trasbot began as the Wannian Qing, the first ship built at the dockyard, was being prepared for its trial run. On September 18, 1869, prior to the test, a scuffle occurred and the Chinese physically took control of the new steamer. Trasbot was furious and immediately contacted Giquel. It was terribly imprudent, he claimed, to turn the ship over to the inexperienced Chinese. He feared they would damage it and insisted that the ship was not yet finished. Trasbot wanted an immediate apology from Shen Baozhen and threatened to go to the consul if he were not satisfied.

Giquel sympathized with Trasbot and told him it was all a misunderstanding. Giquel had hired a European pilot without realizing that the Chinese had engaged one of their own. The Chinese were under the impression that a Chinese pilot would do the tests. Since Shen had returned the Wannian Qing to the Europeans for the completion of the tests, there was no need to demand an apology. In the future, Giquel promised, the steamers would stay in European hands until certified and delivered.

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60 Court Judgment, Fuzhou tribunal, July 21, 1869, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 225, AE.
61 Dockyard Circular, December 5, 1869, BB 5 1555, piece 1, fol. 48, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
64 Trasbot to Giquel, September 18 and 20, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
65 Giquel to Trasbot, September 22, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
Although Giquel understood well Trasbot's anger, he further pointedly warned Trasbot against seeing the consul on the matter.\textsuperscript{66} Accepting his employee's right to consult with the consul on some issues, Giquel insisted that the newest problem was an internal matter entirely beyond Blancheton's jurisdiction. Giquel explained to Trasbot that the first director alone was responsible to the Chinese for the \textit{Wannian Qing}. It would be a very serious matter if Trasbot attempted to bring in an authority other than himself. Giquel felt that he had cleared up the misunderstanding and expected it to go no further.

Trasbot responded angrily that it was obvious Giquel would not pass his complaints on to the Chinese. He continued to insist on an apology from Shen Baozhen.\textsuperscript{67} The next day Trasbot ordered his staff not to take part in testing the ship. Giquel angrily threatened Trasbot with the loss of an expected 3,000-tael bonus for the ship's completion. Trasbot refused to reconsider.\textsuperscript{68} An impasse had been reached.

Blancheton then stepped in and told Giquel to transmit Trasbot's complaints to the Chinese.\textsuperscript{69} No development could have done more to inflame the embattled Giquel; nevertheless, he tried to explain the situation to the acting consul. He sent Blancheton a copy of his correspondence with Trasbot and told him Shen felt the problem had already been resolved. Giquel added that Shen had no further interest in dealing with the issue since he had already spoken with the first director and considered him alone responsible to Chinese direction.\textsuperscript{70}

Trasbot refused to forget the issue. He continued to demand an apology from the imperial commissioner and refused to work until satisfied. Giquel, after consulting Shen, discharged Trasbot. By that time the Chinese pilot was apparently no longer available, and Giquel tested the ship himself.

The issue of Trasbot's pay had yet to be resolved. Although he might have denied any settlement, arguing that the chief engineer's intransigence had led to his dismissal, Giquel made what he probably felt was a generous offer. Hoping to satisfy Trasbot and avoid another law

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Trasbot to Giquel, September 23, 1870 [sic, should read 1869], BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
\textsuperscript{68} Resumé of Meeting, September 24, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
\textsuperscript{69} Blancheton to Giquel, September 24, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
\textsuperscript{70} Giquel to Blancheton, September 25, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
suit, he offered him four months pay and a ticket back to Europe. The reconvened consular tribunal of Blancheton and de Meritens ordered Giquel to pay a bonus as well. The court ruled that the ship had been delivered and Trasbot, therefore, had fulfilled his obligation.

For Giquel the situation had become intolerable. That fall he lost his appeal on the Percebois case. The leading Frenchmen in Fuzhou—d'Aiguebelle, de Meritens, and Blancheton—were all hostile. His chief engineer had escalated a minor misunderstanding into a major incident. Each of his enemies wished to unseat him, yet none recognized the limitations of his power as the European director of an imperial Chinese dockyard.

Giquel's Chinese superiors supported him. Shen provided the documentation proving that Giquel was not ultimately responsible for staff dismissals. Both Shen and Ying-gui felt that Blancheton encouraged Trasbot's actions. They tried having Blancheton transferred, but the Zongli Yamen, occupied with more pressing matters, was unable to press the issue. The Zongli Yamen did question the legality of Blancheton's consular appointment and asked Robert Hart if it was appropriate that their own employee, the Chinese customs agent de Meritens, had acted as assessor for the consular tribunal. Nothing came of these efforts. To have offered to compensate Giquel financially for the legal difficulties would have been indirectly recognizing Blancheton's authority. Giquel's Chinese associates were unable to do that.

The Secret Mission of Captain Veron

By early 1870 relations between Giquel and Blancheton were extremely tense. Each had committed himself to discrediting the other. Blancheton had already interfered in Percebois' dismissal and later involved himself in Trasbot's complaints. Having failed to gain relief from the Saigon appellate court, Giquel turned over about $3,000 to the ex-worker. With the new problems caused by Trasbot's dismissal, Giquel had reason by early 1870 to fear complete bankruptcy if he remained as first director.

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71 Giquel to Trasbot, October 8, 1869, BB 4 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
72 Court Judgment, Fuzhou tribunal, October 19, 1869, BB 1555, piece 14, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
74 Ibid., pp. 161-162.
75 Giquel to Blancheton, January 20, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 17, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes; and Pong, "Modernization and Politics," p. 167.
Giquel, unable to gain relief from what he perceived as persecution for maintaining the dockyard as a purely Chinese enterprise, began a campaign to obtain support from the French navy. On leave since 1861, Giquel had maintained close contact with the French naval authorities, and since beginning the dockyard project had consulted regularly with French naval authorities, informing them of all developments and plans. As a French officer Giquel was proud of his work in developing a modern Chinese navy and wished the recognition of his peers.  

Early in 1870 Maudet, the French naval commander in East Asia, decided to act. After consulting with the French minister at Beijing, he planned a confidential mission for one of his officers. Captain Pierre Veron was told to visit Fuzhou secretly and gather information. The minister at Beijing and the consul-general at Shanghai were informed of the mission; Blancheton, however, was not. Maudet informed Giquel of the plan and made it clear he had faith in him. Giquel’s enemies were stirring up trouble, and it was hoped that Veron could gather important information.

On March 3 Captain Veron arrived at the dockyard. Although he had not planned to stay with Giquel, he ended up spending two weeks living with the first director. Throughout his stay, Veron listened to Giquel’s explanation of the frustrating situation and copied all correspondence that had passed between Giquel and Blancheton. Giquel was so angry with Blancheton that Veron thought they would soon come to blows.  

Giquel was delighted with the visit. He had needed the chance to discuss his dilemma with someone. Giquel thanked Commander Maudet for sending Veron and reported that he had told the captain everything he could. He added that despite his relations with Blancheton, he got along well with the Chinese and most of his European employees.  

On March 20 Blancheton spotted Veron as he left Fuzhou. Veron, who had not spoken to Blancheton during his entire stay, ignored him. Later, fearing he may have done the wrong thing, Veron sent Blancheton a short note explaining that he had been asked to gather information incognito, thus his rudeness.

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76 BB 4 1555, passim, and Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
77 Veron to Rochechouart, April 26, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 23, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
78 Giquel to Maudet, March 15, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 19, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
The consular officer was enraged. He was certain that Veron had been sent not to investigate the dockyard but the operation of the consulate. It was not fair, Blancheton reasoned, to send a naval officer who would obviously have a lot in common with Giquel to investigate the situation. He sent off a string of dispatches denouncing the visit and defending himself.80

Although the controversy would continue for much of the following year, Giquel finally believed he had found an effective ally in the French navy. Blancheton was on the defensive. After his superior in Beijing, M. Rochechouart, received Veron’s report, he told the Fuzhou acting consul to avoid all complications that could jeopardize the dockyard. The minister reminded Blancheton that the project employed a large number of Frenchmen. Blancheton was furious with the reprimand and sent off another sharp letter to Veron.81

Giquel was on the offensive. He spent the following months pleading his case to all who would listen. It was absurd, he reasoned, that the courts treated him as a private entrepreneur instead of an employee of the Chinese government. Giquel felt himself being broken financially and saw his authority at the dockyard slipping. Blancheton had made it difficult not only to dismiss employees but even to discipline them.82

In the fall of 1870 the navy was forced by the situation to take a stand on Giquel’s position. Giquel told Dupré, the new East Asian naval commander, that the Chinese were considering having the English assume control of the dockyard. If this occurred, according to Giquel, it would be Blancheton’s fault for having caused so much unrest.83

Commander Dupré concluded that Giquel had become too important not to support. His primary concern was that his position guaranteed jobs to the French dockyard staff. Dupré believed the entire French force would be dismissed if Giquel left the dockyard. He informed the naval ministry that Giquel’s employees were well paid and sent much of their money home. According to Dupré the total figure was about 300,000 francs a year, and in an obvious reference to the Franco-Prussian War

80 Blancheton to Rochechouart, March 30, 1870; and Blancheton to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Daru], April 2, 1870, CCC, Ning-po, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 261–262 and 255–256, AE.
81 Veron to Maudet, May 9, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 24, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
82 Giquel to Maudet, March 15, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 19; Giquel to Dupré, July 17, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 27; Giquel to Dupré, October 8, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 29, SHM, Vincennes.
83 Giquel to Dupré, October 8, 1870, BB 4 1555, piece 29, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
then in progress, Dupré added that France needed the money. To Dupré, Giquel’s position seemed a legitimate way for France to gain influence in China. The commander did not want to see that advantage lost.84

In January 1871 Blancheton was transferred to Guangzhou. Giquel had known his eventual replacement, Victor Gabriel Lemaire, since their service together in Guangzhou under the Allied Commission. Later these two would collaborate on a French-Chinese dictionary.85 After Blancheton’s departure Giquel had no major problems with the consulate.86 Giquel could finally concentrate his full attention on fulfilling the dockyard contract before time ran out.

Conclusion

The struggle with the consulate was a turning point. Giquel had never before been directly challenged in his work by a French agency. He had always assumed that he could work for China while remaining a loyal French citizen. The struggle brought into clear focus the contradictions of his position. Working to resist an official French influence in the dockyard, he had aroused the anger and legal prosecution of the French consular officials. One wonders how different his attitude would have been had France, as he originally requested, accepted an official role in the project.

Nevertheless, his insistence that his employees, having been hired in France by the Qing government, be treated differently from other French nationals, brought him into conflict with the entire body of extraterritorial law then being enforced in China by the Western nations. Giquel’s stand brought him closer to his Chinese associates just as he was becoming more alienated from his fellow Frenchmen. But he had still not fully grasped the dilemma in which he tried to function. If the Fuzhou consular officers had been antagonistic, the naval authorities, proud of their man’s accomplishments and influence, were willing to support him.

Giquel was fortunate to have ties to the French navy. His Chinese associates, however supportive, had been no more able to aid him than they could resist the constant imperialistic demands of the West. It would

84 Dupré to Min. de la Marine [Fourichon], October 4, 1870, Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes.
86 “Note sur Gabriel Lemaire,” personnel fiche, and Rochechouart to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Fauver], January 26, 1871, CP, Chine, fol. 49, fol. 25–26, AE.
be another decade before Giquel was to recognize that the French navy could also threaten and destroy his work in China.

By 1871 most of the internal tensions that had plagued the dockyard were resolved. Visitors, aware of the previous state of turmoil, commented favorably on the new tranquility at the site. Giquel, Shen, and their employees were finally able to concentrate fully on the building and educational programs that were expected to be completed by February 1874, only three years away.

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87 Geofroy to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Rémusat], June 7, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 141, AE; and French East Asian Naval Commander to Min. de la Marine [d'Hornoy], June 2, 1874, BB 4 1395 Marine, fol. 625, AN.
VI

Progress and Accomplishment at the Fuzhou Dockyard

Prosper Giquel’s career prior to the establishment of the Fuzhou Dockyard had been quite diverse: the Allied Commission in Guangzhou, the Maritime Customs, the Ever-Triumphant Army, and his activities in Hankou. Nevertheless, Giquel’s principal role in East Asia was as an educator. He spent his first years in China learning the language and familiarizing himself with Chinese culture. The Chinese civil war gave him the opportunity to work closely with high Chinese officials and to demonstrate the advantages of Western technical skills. He had established a language school in Hankou in 1866. Yet it was during his years as European director of the Fuzhou Dockyard that his role as a facilitator of the transfer of Western knowledge to China became important.

The most obvious accomplishment of the Fuzhou years were the fifteen steamships produced; but these Chinese vessels were in reality no more than by-products of the dockyard’s principal function. The task that Giquel, Shen, and their staffs set was to teach the Chinese all the skills necessary to build, organize, and operate a modern fleet. It is on the success of that task that their efforts should be evaluated.

For Prosper Giquel, as for so many Europeans, progress for China meant the transfer of technical skills from Europe to the Middle Kingdom. It was by means of the dockyard’s schools and later through the Educational Mission that Giquel hoped to revitalize China. From our vantage point in the later twentieth century this may appear to be the height of cultural arrogance. In the context of the nineteenth century, however, it was not necessarily so. Farsighted Chinese such as Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang recognized the necessity of borrowing Western skills if China were to protect herself and her culture. Advisers such as Prosper Giquel, willing to work side by side with the Chinese and familiar with China’s language and culture, complemented the efforts of
these self-strengthening leaders. It was Giquel’s willingness to immerse himself in these Chinese plans, without the pretentions characteristic of so many China-coast Europeans, that enabled him to coordinate the complex educational undertakings of the Fuzhou Dockyard.

**Beyond Ships: Basic Dockyard Goals**

The Fuzhou project was meant to be more than a mere facility to construct Western-style ships. The dockyard was to be the central point in a huge educational complex designed to introduce a wide range of industrial and scientific technology to China. Not content to manufacture from parts produced both locally and elsewhere, the Chinese insisted on learning all the skills and producing all the components necessary to a modern, Western-style fleet. This commitment led dockyard planners to anticipate not merely learning to work well in iron but to use Western technology to exploit the iron ore of the province. And it meant to anticipate not merely learning to navigate but to develop all the requisite optic technologies necessary to produce appropriate instrumentation. This dedication to self-sufficiency made enormous the task of the project directors.

The goals of the dockyard project were formidable. The directors committed themselves to produce a fully operational naval facility capable of building Western-style ships; training engineers, laborers, navigators, and ship’s captains; plus the construction of sixteen steamships. They started literally from scratch, working the land of the site, building the factories and establishing the metal, wood, instrument, and engine shops. Meanwhile they began training, hiring, and housing the workers, teachers, and students as they arrived.

Countless problems slowed the work. There were the struggles with the consulate, competition between Giquel and d’Aiguebelle, supply shortages, and more. The ground level had to be raised and drained. More than a thousand men worked to raise the level of the site while the schools struggled to organize.\(^1\) It was inevitable that errors large and small would occur. A store, built too close to the river, fell in. These and other problems, especially of supply, hurt the prestige of the directors. But even as Giquel’s most ardent critic, M. Médard, the dockyard mathematics professor, later observed, the results were, in the end, better than anyone had ever imagined.\(^2\)

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Critical to the success was the educational program that was the heart of the project. Zuo Zongtang, Shen Baozhen, and Prosper Giquel all viewed the training programs, both those established within the several dockyard schools and those organized more informally among the workshop personnel, to be significantly more important than the actual ship construction.³ This emphasis on human training—an emphasis consistent with Chinese tradition—is the most appropriate reference point for analyzing the dockyard’s accomplishments and role in the Chinese Self-strengthening Movement.

**Formal and Informal Training at Fuzhou**

Confucian literary studies and success in the civil service examinations was the one path to scholarly recognition and governmental position in imperial China. Learning Western languages promised no obvious rewards. The first task for the dockyard organizers was to overcome this problem and to recruit serious Chinese students willing to dedicate themselves to the study of Western languages and science without assurances that their efforts would be rewarded.

The Zongli Yamen, the principal imperial sponsor of the self-strengthening projects, had already organized a school of foreign languages in Beijing, the Tongwen guan. Eventually the Tongwen guan added astronomy and mathematics to the curriculum, but it experienced considerable difficulty in finding qualified students. Few Manchu or Chinese families of the 1860s wished their sons to devote years to a course of study that offered so few definite rewards. And vehement criticism from conservative officials such as the influential Grand Secretary Wo-ren also intimidated those members of the intelligentsia who might otherwise have considered acquiring Western knowledge.⁴ At the Tongwen guan the quality of students tended to be rather mediocre.⁵

The course of study at Fuzhou was quite ambitious. The organizers planned an elaborate system of foreign language study, mathematics, engineering, navigation, and a host of other skills both basic and applied. Each course was to be mastered either through English or French. To be


successful the dockyard would have to attract qualified and dedicated students. Shen and his French directors were able to find such students. The dockyard school began with thirty students in each of the two divisions of French and English.

Almost every visitor, official, and casual observer of the dockyard schools commented positively on the academic commitment of the young Chinese students. The reports indicate that the students were better than those at the Tongwen guan and according to an English visitor of 1873 they came from good homes, some from families of officials. The association of respected officials such as Zuo Zongtang and Shen Baozhen with the dockyard no doubt lessened prejudice against the foreign studies program and may help explain the difference in the quality of students.

Monetary incentives were recognized as a useful motivational tool. Zuo Zongtang wrote: "If we do not pay them well, we cannot impose a strict curriculum; if we do not offer chances of promotion we cannot give them sufficient encouragement." Students received room and board plus four taels per month. Medical care was provided. Additionally, successful candidates were given promotions and increased pay as incentives. Moreover, Giquel demanded a major commitment in advance from both the students and their parents and proposed a set of student regulations. Shen and the imperial court gave their approval. Chief among them were the following:

1. Students would not be admitted unless their parents agreed to a stay of five years.
2. Only sixty days leave a year would be allowed. They were to be divided among a summer holiday and several other holidays. Except for these periods the students were not to return home.
3. Parents could visit only on Sundays. In case of illness students would remain in the infirmary unless gravely ill.
4. After two months a decision would be made on a student’s continued enrollment. Every three months the students would be tested and appropriately rewarded or punished for their progress.
5. Only those under twenty could be admitted. Single students would be preferred.

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7 J.G. Dunn, “Description of the Foochow Arsenal,” Report made at Shanghai, November 9, 1873, F.O. 233 85, no. 3, fol. 2–3, PRO.
9 Ibid., p. 207.
10 Giquel to Shen, n.d., included in Thibaudier, “Arsenal de Fou-tcheou,” p. 44.
Progress and Accomplishment

6. Working hours and rest hours would be determined by the administration. The students were required to follow its orders.

7. Students would be fed by the dockyard and paid five taels per month. Once having learned their assigned European language, their salary would be augmented by from three to five taels per month. It could later be reduced should they fall behind in their studies.

8. A Chinese officer would remain in charge of the students and would inflict punishment if the directors or professors reported them.\(^{11}\)

Giquel went on to remind Shen Baozhen that their goal at the dockyard was, as he put it, "not so much to build ships as to teach the Chinese to build and command them."\(^{12}\) It was to be from the educational advances of the student body that Giquel expected their efforts to be judged. He warned that all the monies spent would be wasted if they could not create a rigorously disciplined student body capable of accomplishing their goals.

Dedication to Western studies was an essential aspect of dockyard education, but the students' continued adherence to traditional scholarship is uncertain. Several writers, including David Pong, John Rawlinson, and Knight Biggerstaff, have maintained that the students occupied themselves with Confucian studies as well.\(^{13}\) According to these writers, generally quoting statements by Shen Baozhen in September 1867, when work had barely begun, the students regularly studied the *Sacred Edicts of Kangxi* and the *Classic of Filial Piety*, plus Chinese essay writing. Shen’s plan, in requiring these studies, was to avoid having his students become too Westernized. According to David Pong, quoting a Western visitor to the dockyard after Shen’s 1875 departure, the students had had to submit regularly to examinations in traditional studies throughout Shen’s term as imperial commissioner.\(^{14}\) The depth of commitment to traditional studies, however, can be questioned. Engineer Thibaudier, who visited in June 1868, a year after the work had begun, wrote:

> At the time of the establishment of the schools they had wanted students to have already undergone all the literary examinations to a rather elevated degree.....The goal they proposed in having people so


cultivated was to have young men who could later become in their 
turn instructors and have their titles as Bachelors or degree holders 
given a special consideration. But with the passing of time, they have 
relaxed these requirements. They have preferred to have students 
who, if having passed fewer Chinese examinations, are younger, 
more docile and better disposed to accepting a new science—students 
who have had absolutely no contact with the objects of [traditional] 
study in their country.  

It seems clear from the various reports that the students of the 
dockyard had, at best, a marginal background in traditional studies. If the 
extent of the students' knowledge of Confucian tradition remains 
somewhat in doubt, what is certain is the commitment these youths from 
Fujian and Guangdong showed to their Western studies. 

Students were expected to master either English or French before 
beginning their technical studies. Several reasons had prompted this 
approach rather than using Chinese as the principal language for 
instruction. Naturally, the number of foreigners able to act as instructors 
would have been extremely limited if only those applicants who knew 
Chinese could be employed. Additionally, the students, coming primarily 
from Guangdong and Fujian, frequently did not speak the Mandarin 
dialect, the language of officialdom and the dialect most Westerners 
studied. In fact, a knowledge of spoken Mandarin had been another of 
the goals the dockyard planners hoped the students could accomplish.  
According to the visiting engineer Thibaudier, that had not been pursued 
any more vigorously than the goal of having the students truly cognizant 
of Confucian studies. Finally, the impression that Chinese lacked the 
appropriate technical terminology to teach Western science reinforced the 
decision to commence work by teaching English and French. 

The French Division 

Most of the instruction was in French. Eventually the students in 
the first French language class took their places in the schools of naval 
construction, design, and apprenticeship. Additionally, the workshop 
activities and less formal training of craftsmen in the fitting, assembly, 
metal working, foundry, carpentry, boiler, and optics workshops were also 
in French. Courses in navigation and engineering were conducted in 
English. Because English had become the language both of the Chinese 

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16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., p. 39.
customs and of naval communication throughout China, the Chinese had specifically requested that instruction in these two areas be in English. Although the French officers and instructors were anxious to demonstrate the advantages of French culture and technology, they agreed to the Chinese request.\(^{18}\) Giquel, conscious that the project might draw unneeded criticism from the English, was especially willing to accept the Chinese request.\(^{19}\)

Some writers have suggested that the best potential students were directed toward the English language division.\(^{20}\) We do know that Yan Fu, an early student and later a translator of English works into Chinese, was allowed to choose which division he wished to attend after his entrance examination received highest honors.\(^{21}\) How the other students were assigned is less clear. The French staff was committed to demonstrating the advantages of its own version of Western science and would never have allowed the English language division to monopolize the talented students. Had Giquel had even an inkling that the brighter students were being funneled into the English division, he would have protested vehemently. Nowhere in the extensive French documentation of the dockyard is the issue even raised.\(^{22}\) There was, however, a difference in the early accomplishments of the French and English divisions.

The problem that faced the French instructors was the absence of basic French-Chinese texts. The English division had readily available teaching materials. The instructional aids had been prepared by several generations of English Protestant missionaries to aid their work and offer ready reference for students. Although France had an equally long missionary experience in China, French Catholic missionaries taught their converts Latin, not French. There were no equivalent elementary French-Chinese teaching aids to rely on.\(^{23}\) To deal with the problem the staff began producing its own works. Giquel and the new consular officer, Gabriel Lemaire, eventually produced a technical French-Chinese dictionary based on material prepared at the dockyard.\(^{24}\)

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18 Ibid., pp. 39–40; Contenson, "Arsenal de Fou-tcheou," 7 N 1665, fol. 6, Armée de Terre, Vincennes.
20 Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, p. 57.
22 Files of BB 4 1555, passim; Prosper Giquel, Dossier Individuel, CC 7 1020, passim, SHM, Vincennes; Archives of Château de Bois-Dauphin, passim.
23 Giquel to Marie, July 4, 1868, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
24 Prosper Giquel with Gabriel Lemaire, Dictionnaire de Poche Français-Chinois, Suivi d'un Dictionnaire Technique des Mots Usités à l'Arsenal de Fou-tcheou (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1874).
In addition to the scarcity of teaching materials in French, the curriculum was too limited. Probably because of his sympathy for the students working in a foreign language, Giquel had expected students to master only basic geometry, descriptive geometry, algebra, and mechanics. Professor Médard, who assumed partial control of the French division in April 1868, argued that such a course of study was insufficient for the goals of the division. Giquel refused to expand the curriculum; but as he allowed Médard considerable classroom autonomy, the professor carried out the expanded program anyway. Giquel later recognized, according to Médard, that he had been too cautious and thanked Médard for carrying out the advanced program despite his interdiction.

The School of Naval Construction, or, as it was often called, the French School, began while Giquel was still in France working out plans for the dockyard’s future. Starting with ten to twelve students, the school operated in a building rented by the staff. The first instructor was a Monsieur M. A. Borel, later secretary to the dockyard European staff. By October 1867, when Giquel returned, the number of students had risen to thirty and would continue to grow. In April 1869 Messieurs L. Rousset, a professor of physics and chemistry, and Médard, a mathematician, assumed control of the students. A month later, when engineer Thibaudier visited the site, there were forty-one students in the two divisions of the French School.

The School of Naval Construction was to train students in the functions and dimensions of the various components of an engine and to teach its construction. They first mastered French. They then studied mathematical skills of arithmetic and descriptive geometry, physics, trigonometry, analytical geometry, and infinitesimal calculus. In later years they were required to take a course in practical hull construction and machinery operation.

The studies in the division were quite demanding. During Giquel’s tenure as director 105 students were admitted. In 1874 only thirty-nine remained. Six had died and another sixty had, for various reasons, not finished.

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26 Thibaudier, "Arsenal de Fou-tcheou," BB 4 1555, pp. 39–40 SHM, Vincennes; Giquel, The Foochow Arsenal and Its Results, p. 17; Giquel to Emile, October 18, 1867, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
27 Giquel, The Foochow Arsenal, p. 17.
30 Biggerstaff, Government Schools in China, p. 211.
The Department of Design was the second department of the French language division. It was to train students to produce plans for naval construction. The department was directed by M. A. Louis; a draughtsman, Kerdraon, assisted him. Students in his department studied French, calculus, geometry, and the principles of perspective. In addition they devoted considerable time to the study of a 150-horsepower engine. In 1871 a group of students was transferred to the School of Naval Construction. In 1872 there were thirty at the design school and in 1873, when Giquel delivered his final report, twenty-two remained. These students spent part of each day in the workshops familiarizing themselves with the practical aspects of their studies. Captain Veron, when he investigated Giquel's conflict with the consulate, was particularly impressed with the students and even submitted copies of their work with his report.

The School of Apprentices was the largest department of the French division of the dockyard. Begun in August 1868, by 1872 it had more than 130 part-time students. These part-time students were workers who complemented their daily activities in the workshops by several hours of study. European shop foremen taught them French and arithmetic. These students were expected to become foremen in the workshops and were examined three times each year. During these examinations the workshop staff—foremen, workers, apprentices, and coolies—were given the chance to demonstrate their skills. Rewards and demotions were based on the results.

Professor Médard commented that, although the apprentices progressed well, it would have been better if they had been instructed by professional educators rather than by the workshop foremen. Giquel, pleased with their progress, felt they would benefit greatly from additional study in Europe. He worked hard to arrange such a program.

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32 Rawlinson, *China's Struggle for Naval Development*, p. 50.
33 Geofroy to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Remusat], June 7, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 138–139.
36 Geofroy to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Rémusat], June 7, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 138–139.
37 Veron, "Veron Report," BB 4 1555, piece 33, p. 12, SHM, Vincennes.
38 Contenson, "Arsenal de Fou-tcheou," 7 N 1665, fol. 6–7, Armée de Terre, Vincennes.
40 Giquel, *The Foochow Arsenal*, p. 22.
The English Division

The English language division was principally responsible for training in the English language, navigation, and engineering. The graduates were expected to operate the Chinese fleet when one was assembled. The school began, as had the French division, in rented buildings. The students were initially instructed by Zeng Hengzhong, an English-speaking Chinese from Singapore. His instruction and the Chinese-English teaching aids probably provided the advantage the students were said to have over those working in French. The English-language students were eventually divided into groups emphasizing theoretical navigation, practical navigation, and engine-room studies.

Professor James Carrol, head of the English division, began instructing thirty students in theoretical navigation in November 1867. The curriculum Carrol followed included English, geography, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry (plane and spherical), navigation, and nautical astronomy. The entire course took three and one-half years. By 1871 twenty-three students had graduated. Another nine completed their studies in September 1873.

Professor Médard commented that, despite frequent praise for the navigation students, he found their studies rather elementary. Médard claimed that Giquel was too fond of Carrol and that the Englishman lacked sufficient training to teach mechanics. Eventually, according to Médard, a Chinese student who had returned from Europe took over that part of the curriculum.

The School of Practical Navigation was also conducted in English. Lieutenant Swainson of the Royal Navy was the first head. The school commenced instruction in 1871, some three years after the School of Theoretical Navigation. For most of its existence it was directed by Captain R.E. Tracy. Captain Luxmore, also of the Royal Navy, assisted him. In late 1871 they obtained a suitable training ship, a German vessel renamed the Jian-wei to replace the gunboat they had been using. The ship’s student body was drawn from Professor Carrol’s dockyard classes and from Guangzhou, where they were recruited by Captain Tracy.

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42 NCH, July 14, 1871.
45 Biggerstaff, Government Schools in China, p. 216; Pong, "Modernization and Politics," pp. 215–216; enclosure in Kuo Sung-t’ao to Derby, August 21, 1877, chart prepared by Giquel, F.O. 17 768, PRO.
Training aboard the \textit{Jian-wei} included seamanship, gunnery, and command. The course took about two years. By the fall of 1873 four students had qualified as captain or mate; another ten were soon expected to qualify.\footnote{Biggerstaff, \textit{Government Schools in China}, p. 216.} Under student control the ship had traveled as far as Singapore. Since the original contracts had only expected students to master sailing within the sight of land, their demonstrated ability to navigate on the open sea far exceeded Zuo Zongtang’s and Giquel’s original hopes.\footnote{Pong, \textit{“Modernization and Politics,”} p. 217.}

The third department in the English division was devoted to engineering instruction. Students were recruited from factories in Shanghai and Hong Kong and had experience working with iron and iron plate. The dockyard instructional staff was to teach them English and an extensive course in mathematics and steam engine maintenance. Mr. Allan, an Englishman, directed their efforts.\footnote{Giquel, \textit{The Foochow Arsenal}, p. 32.}

\textbf{Educational Progress at the Fuzhou Dockyard}

Despite problems associated with frequent absenteeism and the lack of French-Chinese language materials, almost all visitors and staff were impressed by the quality of the student body. One of the earliest visitors, the French engineer Thibaudier wrote in June 1868:

If despite these serious difficulties they have arrived rather rapidly at the present results, it is necessary to attribute this not only to the intelligent energy of the professors but to the extreme application of the students—some of whom are no more than children—who undertake their studies with the acute perseverance and desire to accomplish their goals which characterize the Chinese. All work with great energy, most beyond those hours required by the school.\footnote{Thibaudier, \textit{“Arsenal de Fou-tcheou,”} BB 4 1555, pp. 43–44, SHM, Vincennes.}

Veron, who visited in the spring of 1870, seconded Thibaudier’s enthusiastic report: “According to what I saw I don’t doubt that, when the five years of the contract will have passed, the young men will have fulfilled the conditions of the program.”\footnote{Veron, \textit{“Veron Report,”} BB 4 1555, p. 13, SHM, Vincennes.} Just after Veron’s stay another visitor, an Englishman, reported his favorable impression of the students. Writing in the \textit{North China Herald}, the visitor commented on his astonishment at the accomplishments of the English language school. He was especially impressed with the students’ ability not simply to speak English but to speak it well.\footnote{NCH, April 21, 1870.} Commander Dupré, head of the French
East Asian naval forces, arrived for an inspection the same year. He too was quite impressed with the students’ progress. Much to Giquel’s pleasure the students were, on another occasion, praised by the visiting Russian Grand Duke Alexis, who questioned them on theories of inertia. Apparently satisfied, the Russian praised them at length.\(^52\)

Throughout the early 1870s progress continued to be made. By the spring of 1873 the Chinese took over construction of the ship hulls and engines.\(^53\) In July 1873, as the contract term came to a close, the dockyard went through a major evaluation. Examinations were given in every division, from the formal training programs to the workshops. Giquel and Shen were entirely satisfied with the results. As Shen wrote in his report to the Qing emperor:

> Beginning with the 6th month of the present year [July 1873] examinations of ability were undergone by the Chinese workmen and apprentices of each workshop, under the direction of M.P. Giquel, who has been able, according to the indications that have resulted from these, to nominate as foremen the workmen most skilled in their profession and able to work from given plans, and to associate with them as assistant foremen the workmen who came nearest them. The European masters, having handed over their plans, thereupon withdrew from the workshops to leave the Chinese staff to execute all alone the required works under the guidance of the said foremen and under the direction of the pupils of the School of Naval Construction and of Design apportioned to each workshop. Since then, the work of the Arsenal goes on under these conditions, and the results leave nothing to be desired—a fact that shows that the professional education of the Chinese staff has attained the result sought after.\(^54\)

**Ship Production at Fuzhou**

The dockyard facility did far more than train the officially designated students of the division schools. It was a giant educational organization. Almost every Chinese employee was involved, from the engineering students to the workshop coolies. It was with the physical plant, even as it was being constructed, and with the workers and students, even as they

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\(^{53}\) Lemaire to Broglie, December 9, 1873, CCC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 1, fol. 299 AE.

\(^{54}\) Giquel, *The Foochow Arsenal*, p. 35; French original in BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
were being trained, that the dockyard directors expected, with the help of the European technical staff, to produce the steamships called for by the dockyard contracts.

As the months and years progressed the physical plant became more and more impressive. As a writer in the *North China Herald* noted in 1870:

> We next came to the magnificent new slip, which had been put into its place, and in a short time will be in working order. The work is one of such magnitude that we lay before our readers a detailed account of it. Only one other slip of equal magnitude to that of Foochow [Fuzhou] exists. It is at Bordeaux, where it is used for the repair of the largest transatlantic steamers.\(^{55}\)

The physical plant of the dockyard continued to impress the many official and unofficial visitors. The French minister at Beijing, M. Geofroy, visited in June 1872. The specialized knowledge of a naval officer who accompanied him helped the diplomat appreciate the technical aspects of the dockyard. Geofroy wrote: "The large forges, the rolling mill, the iron foundry, the assembly workshops are not better set up at Toulon."\(^{56}\)

It is perhaps unfortunate that the many ships produced at the dockyard have been the measure of its success. Contemporaries and historians of the Self-strengthening Movement have been critical in their judgments. Two principal criticisms are leveled against the Fuzhou project. The first is that Giquel, never having built a ship, was not qualified to take on such a task. The second is that the ships were obsolete even before they came off the building stocks.

A survey of secondary writings offers examples of such analysis. John Rawlinson, in his study of Chinese naval development, writes, "To be sure, the ships were wooden, most with paddle drive, at a time when iron and screw propulsion predominated in the West. The *Wan Nien Ch'ing* [Wannian Qing, the first dockyard ship; it was produced in 1869 and was screw driven] displaced about 1500 tons; in 1874, HMS *Thunderer* displaced almost 10,000. But, in the Chinese perspective, these ships were impressive."\(^{57}\)

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\(^{55}\) NCH, April 21, 1870.

\(^{56}\) Geofroy to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Rémusat], June 7, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 137–139, AE.

\(^{57}\) Rawlinson, *China's Struggle for Naval Development*, pp. 48 and 52.
leadership and bureaucratic corruption, the ships and guns produced were nowhere comparable in quality to their Western counterparts."^58 Gideon Chen, in his biography of Zuo Zongtang, comments, "With regard to steamship building, although the Foochow [Fuzhou] Arsenal could not compete with those of Western countries, it and the Kiangnan [Jiangnan] Arsenal were the two largest modern dockyards owned by the Chinese in China."^59 Chang Yu-fa, in his important article on the project, takes a similar approach. Chang writes that the ships were obsolete and says that Giquel, not being a specialist, wasn’t qualified to run the dockyard.60 Additional comments have blamed Giquel for not immediately using iron hulls and for producing ships without the latest engine designs. It has even been suggested that he purposefully held back information needed by the Chinese to make the ships truly competitive. Analysis of these charges and the quality of the dockyard’s production requires discussion of what was attempted and accomplished.

Hsu has said that the Chinese were too willing to assume that any and all Westerners were equally capable of advising them on Western technology.61 Later observers have judged Giquel and d’Aiguebelle unqualified for the task. It is true that Giquel was not an engineer. He had studied at the French naval academy for only a year and had never built a ship. But Giquel was not hired to build ships. He was hired to organize, administer, and direct the dockyard. As a French naval officer, an experienced Chinese customs administrator, a Chinese and English linguist, and as one who had helped found and later administer two Franco-Chinese contingents, he was qualified for the position. As a skilled administrator would, Giquel hired specialists for the various tasks required; and although it experienced various personnel problems, the dockyard was regularly advised and assisted by qualified naval engineers. Many engineers visited the dockyard and none left any impression of having found the technical training of the engineering staff lacking.

For the first two years of its existence the chief engineer at the dockyard was Adrien Marie Trasbot, an experienced naval engineer who had resigned his position with the Rochefort Arsenal to accept the appointment in China. The highly competent Trasbot left in the fall of 1869, but the dockyard still had available the services of M. Sebillot, a

^59 Chen, Tso Tsung-t’ang, p. 88.
^60 Chang Yu-fa, "Fu-chow ch’uan-ch’ang chih k’ai-ch’uang chi-ch’i ch’u-ch’i fa-chan," p. 224.
^61 Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 351.
civil engineer who had worked for the engineering firm that Giquel and d’Aiguebelle had consulted in France. Later, M. Arneadeau, who had studied at the French Polytechnique School, and M. Jouvet, who, prior to his position at Fuzhou, had directed an office of design in one of the large French engineering firms, joined the staff. And Gustave Alexandre Zédé, who later became the director of naval construction at Cherbourg, France, worked as an engineer at the dockyard. Although Fuzhou had many technical and personnel problems, the quality of the engineers was not one of them.

A principal criticism of the Fuzhou ships has been that they had wooden rather than iron hulls. It has been said that by 1869, when the first ship, the Wannian Qing, came off the stocks, wooden ships were already obsolete. It is true that production of iron hulls had accelerated after 1860, but the major powers had in no way abandoned construction of wooden or partly wooden ships and would not do so for some time to come. France had spurred the initial race toward composite hulls of wood and iron and completely iron-hulled ships in the late 1860s. Nevertheless, France continued throughout the period to produce gunboats of the Etendard class that were similar to those produced at Fuzhou. Great Britain, emerging as the preeminent nineteenth-century naval power, exerted considerable effort toward building large ironclad warships. Nevertheless, throughout the contract years Great Britain produced wooden gun vessels of the Cormorant, Plover, and Frolic classes.

The Chinese were only beginning their efforts and were not yet prepared to build giant ships such as the ten thousand-ton Thunderer, launched in 1874. Moreover, locating the dockyard at Fuzhou meant that the size of the ships had to be limited because of the navigation problems of the Min River. Giquel was aware of that as early as 1866. Ships built at Fuzhou were smaller and not ironclad but they were not obsolete. The Wannian Qing was far smaller than the Thunderer, but it was able to navigate the shallow harbors and estuaries of the China coast, which the larger British ship could not. To compare the two ships, as Rawlinson does, seems inappropriate.

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63 Ibid.; Dossier Individuel, Gustave Zédé, CC 7 2503, SHM, Vincennes.
65 Naval Institute, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships (New York: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 322.
66 Ibid., pp. 109–110.
67 Giquel Journal, January 14, 1866.
Because the dockyard did not immediately begin producing iron ships, some have suggested that Giquel was either incompetent or trying to withhold valuable technical knowledge from the Chinese. The real situation was far more complicated. The 1860s and 1870s were transitional periods in European shipbuilding. The Fuzhou planners were to start with a staff that could not understand the language of instruction, build a facility from undeveloped land, and commence immediately with ship production. While they struggled to transfer the technology of the mid-1860s to China, European shipbuilding continued to progress. Nevertheless, Giquel was aware of the issue and in 1873 proposed to build a newer model engine, a compound engine, which would be fitted into an iron-ribbed ship. Shen Baozhen refused. Shen's refusal illuminates another aspect of the problem of technology transfer. The ability to operate the dockyard without European supervision was the principal means of demonstrating the success of the project. For this reason Shen was anxious to have the contract filled to the letter and then have the Europeans depart. For the project to succeed politically and to continue after 1874, it was important that the Chinese personnel be able to operate the facility themselves. Any modification, such as that suggested by Giquel, could have forced a continuing dependency on the Europeans and might have doomed the project to failure. Only by avoiding the incorporation of new technology could the Chinese sponsors hope to avoid the impression of failure. Shen probably reasoned that the principle of fulfilling the contract was politically more important than the disadvantages of delaying the new technologies until after the initial contracts had been fulfilled. In a private letter of November 1873, Giquel commented, "The imperial commissioner calculates that building the two ships will occupy the workshops for another year and then at that time, they will have proven that the degree of progress guaranteed [in the contracts] will have been obtained and then he or some other dignitary will be able to propose something new."

Despite the criticism of various writers, especially those of recent secondary accounts, the Fuzhou ships were generally well thought of by contemporaries, especially Westerners. A few quotes suffice to portray the general impression. An English visitor, J.G. Dunn, commented in 1873 that the ships were all of the finest Bangkok teak and that their sterns and bottoms were solid and of great strength. Dunn claimed that they

68 J.G. Dunn, "Description of the Foochow Arsenal," F.O. 233 85, no. 3, fol. 10, PRO.
70 Giquel to Garnault, November 29, 1873, BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.
steamed quite quickly and even sailed well without power. Commenting on the 250-horsepower *Yang-wu*, the most powerful of the dockyard ships, he wrote, "The corvette *Yang-wu* is a fine ship. No European or States ship of the class could be better." At another time he wrote, "We noticed that these ships which were built last autumn by M. Giquel were admirably fastened, and particularly well finished outside and inside. They could not be better finished in London or New York." The influential French naval review *Revue maritime et coloniale* was complimentary as well. In 1876 it analyzed the Chinese naval strength: "The dockyard of Fuzhou, to which is connected a naval school, delivers remarkable products. The ships coming out of its building yard distinguish themselves by their excellent construction and their nautical qualities." Others were more skeptical. In July 1871 a writer for the *North China Herald* wrote: "These, with what [they] have already bought, built, seized, etc., will be able to cope with any vessels that may be sent against them, so at least the Chinese say and evidently believe it, too."

What did the Chinese think of the ships produced at Fuzhou? Among them there was considerable ambivalence about the dockyard's products, and a major controversy even threatened to end the project. The Chinese were quite satisfied with the overall project, the industrial facility, and the schools. The first ships produced, however, received mixed reactions from official circles. When the *Wannian Qing*, a six-gun, screw-driven, 238-foot ship with a 150-horsepower engine was launched, Shen Baozhen was delighted. Chong-hou, the northern commissioner, inspected it and was pleased as well. In 1872, however, Song-jin, of the Imperial Grand Secretariat, denounced both the Fuzhou and the Jiangnan dockyards for being too expensive and producing nothing comparable to Western ships.

Song-jin's attack was not without merit. The dockyard had considerably exceeded the original cost estimates. After Beijing solicited their opinion several officials came to the dockyard's defense. Zuo Zongtang, although no longer directly involved, wrote that the dockyard

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71 J.G. Dunn, "Description of the Foochow Arsenal," F.O. 233 85, no. 3, fol. 8, PRO.
72 Ibid.
73 JGD [J.G. Dunn], "Notes on the Foochow Dockyard," BB 4 1555, piece 41, p. 3, SHM, Vincennes.
74 "La Marine et les forces militaires de la Chine," *Revue maritime et coloniale* 49 (June 1876): 959.
75 NHC, July 7, 1871.
76 Rawlinson, *China's Struggle for Naval Development*, p. 48.
was progressing at a reasonable rate, and the potential of the newly trained students was limitless. They would be able to train others and to develop new methods. Shen Baozhen, much closer to the project, was more realistic in his response. He agreed that the Chinese ships were inferior to those of the West but added that the project had only just begun. A modest start had to be expected. Shen admitted that the enormity and complexity of the project may have caused the French directors to underestimate the costs. But, he added, they had also purchased additional equipment. Others, including Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, were generally supportive. In the end the Zongli Yamen continued its support.

Fuzhou and the End of Formal European Tutelage

In November 1873, a few months before the European staff departed, Giquel, in a letter to the senior French naval official in East Asia, set down his thoughts on the project’s future. He had just delivered his final report to Shen Baozhen and was aware that as he wrote, the dockyard’s Chinese administration was preparing its own report to the Chinese emperor. In his private letter Giquel speculated on the decisions the Chinese would eventually take. He expected the Europeans to be officially discharged. The dockyard would then continue to build a few ships to prove that the Chinese could truly operate the facility on their own. Once that was accomplished, he expected Europeans to be reengaged to begin newer, more sophisticated projects.

Giquel explained that these were his impressions but that the deliberations of the Chinese council, which included Shen Baozhen, the provincial governor, and the Tartar general, were going on without his involvement. In fact, as the dockyard’s future was being decided, Giquel described himself as isolated in his office. He sensed, however, that its future was in doubt. Funds, as so often in the past, were a major problem. Zuo Zongtang, the dockyard’s founder, had been unable to contribute financially. Shan Baozhen was supportive but also unable, according to Giquel, to guarantee the continuation of funds. In fact, Giquel reported that Shen was quite pessimistic.

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79 Ibid., p. 254.
80 According to Giquel, Zuo had tried sending funds to the dockyard, but the money had been withheld by the current governor-general. Giquel to Garnault, November 29, 1873, BB 4 1555, piece 39, SHM, Vincennes.
Sometime ago he said to me rather discouragingly, "China is quite backward, and I don't see any progress at all." But I replied, "The dockyard is progress." "It is true, but it is necessary that it continue on the same footing..." He didn't say anything else, but I understood him to mean that he didn't think this was going to occur. "At Tianjin," I continued, "Governor-General Li [Hongzhang] has created an arsenal, and created a steam navigation company with Chinese captains and administrators. That is progress, isn't it?" "Certainly," [Shen replied], but what if Li disappears? What will become of all this?"\(^8\)

Neither Giquel nor Shen had much hope that the project would be continued with the same energy and commitment that had heretofore motivated it. Giquel commented glumly, "It is a fact that we are going to have our arms and legs cut."\(^8\) He felt that local Chinese officials, with the exception of Shen, lacked any real enthusiasm for the dockyard. His principal hope was that Shen might be named governor-general or that Zuo Zongtang might be reassigned to Fujian.

Giquel wanted to retain the Europeans but could say nothing. Any such suggestion might be interpreted to mean that he did not think the Chinese could operate the dockyard themselves. That would be harmful to the entire project. Giquel planned to leave an "agent" in the dockyard while he directed the proposed Educational Mission to Europe. If foreigners were to be reemployed, he wanted to be in a position to do the hiring and to ensure that his countrymen would be chosen.\(^8\)

Giquel soon learned of the decisions the Chinese had taken and of their satisfaction with what had been accomplished so far. Shen informed him that he was fully satisfied with the dockyard's progress and that awards had been recommended for all involved.\(^8\) Giquel was eventually awarded the official "first rank" and the right to wear the Imperial Yellow Jacket, the most coveted military award of the Qing dynasty.\(^8\)

Large rewards were distributed among the European staff. Giquel received not only the 200,000 francs originally promised, but a larger sum that included the share intended for d'Aiguebelle.\(^8\) Giquel thus had

\(^{81}\) Ibid.
\(^{82}\) Ibid.
\(^{83}\) Ibid.
\(^{84}\) Shen to Giquel, February 15, 1874, BB 4 1555, piece 41, SHM, Vincennes.
\(^{86}\) This amounted to 24,000 taels according to Chen, _Tso Tsung-t'ang_, p. 26; Giquel to Emile, December 30, 1873, Château de Bois-Dauphin. Except for Giquel's December letter there is no other confirmation that he actually did receive the double bonus.
earned the gratitude of the Chinese, their highest military award, and a considerable fortune.\textsuperscript{87}

Continuing Ties: Prosper Giquel and the European Educational Mission

Since establishing the dockyard in 1866, Giquel had anticipated that the later stages of the educational program would include a period of advanced study in Europe. He had hoped that regularizing such activity would make permanent the ties he wished to develop between China and France.\textsuperscript{88} Shen Baozhen had agreed with Giquel on the necessity of an educational program, and in his final report of December 1873 noted:

We should choose among students in the French schools those who are intelligent to be sent to France for further study. They will learn the new methods and theories of shipbuilding. We should choose among the best students in the English schools those who are intelligent to be sent to England to learn the new methods and theories of operation and training.\textsuperscript{89}

In the spring of 1874 Giquel met with Li Hongzhang. Shen's enthusiasm for the mission, his confidence in Giquel, and the latter's good relations with the dockyard students were known to Li. Shen Baozhen had informed Li that his confidence in Giquel was such that he would stake his entire career on Giquel's loyalty to China. If Giquel ever did anything to harm China, Shen promised to terminate his own public career.\textsuperscript{90} During their 1874 meeting, Li assured Giquel that the mission would eventually be organized but that his services were first needed at Shen's side in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{91}

Once the Taiwan crisis had been resolved Giquel and Shen were able to press again for the mission. By early 1875 they finally had their chance. In February the Qing government authorized Shen to begin construction of a steamship with an iron rather than wooden frame. Employing the new technology required further European technical assistance. Giquel was dispatched to France to hire specialists, to make a general study of European shipbuilding, and to investigate models appropriate to Chinese needs.\textsuperscript{92} Giquel expected to hire seven European employees during the

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Giquel to Veron, November 21, 1874, Dossier Individuel, Dunoyer de Segonzac, CC 7 2728, SHM, Vincennes.
\textsuperscript{89} Ng, "Shen Pao-chen," p. 27.
\textsuperscript{90} Ch'u Li-ho, Ch'ing-mo liu-hsueh [Overseas education at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty] (Taipei: San Min Book Store, 1973), pp. 96–98.
\textsuperscript{91} Wade to Derby, June 22, 1874, F.O. 17 674, dep. 118, fol. 51–54, PRO.
\textsuperscript{92} Lemaire to Min. des Affaires étrangères Decazes, February 27, 1875, CCC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 2–3, AE.
As a start on the Educational Mission, he was authorized to take five students, three from the School of Naval Construction and two from the English-language Navigation School, to Europe for further study.

Five students were considerably fewer than the several score Giquel had wanted. Nevertheless, he was quite enthusiastic: "I consider that the departure of these students will do a lot to facilitate the sending of a larger mission." On the eve of their departure Giquel asked Shen for an official title to aid his reception in Europe. He suggested "Former Director of the Fuzhou Dockyard and currently charged with Professional and Naval Instruction." Shen agreed.

In April 1875 Giquel left Fuzhou with his students and plans to engage new employees and purchase materials for the dockyard. He also expected to purchase newer engines for the dockyard engineering staff to study and copy. On board ship members of a French astronomical mission examined his students' navigational skills and announced that they were entirely satisfied. That further confirmed the success of Giquel's educational efforts.

After placing his students in France and England, Giquel carried out his hiring and purchasing tasks. In June 1876 he returned to Fuzhou. His assistant, Dunoyer de Segonzac, who had remained at the dockyard, was waiting with a telegram from Li Hongzhang requesting that Giquel depart immediately for Tianjin to see Li and Shen about leading another, larger, Educational Mission. Apparently the person originally chosen for the mission had died and Li and Shen, as in the past, turned to Giquel for help.

Giquel had been ill again and needed a rest; nevertheless, he was delighted with his new instructions. It was the very mission he had long hoped for. That January, Li and Shen had petitioned the Qing emperor to establish the mission. They claimed the students would obtain training not available in China and that the speed of technological advance—always a critical problem—made it imperative that more direct ties be made with the centers of advancement. The emperor quickly approved a three-year mission of thirty students. Giquel and Li Fengbao, an expectant intendant, were named as supervisors. Giquel had initially

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93 Giquel to Lemaire, March 18, 1875, CPC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 353, AE.
94 Giquel to Shen, March 14, 1875, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
95 Giquel to Lemaire, March 18, 1875, CPC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 353, AE.
96 Segonzac to Krantz, May 10, 1875, piece 43, BB 4 1555, SHM, Vincennes.
97 Segonzac to Veron, April 14, 1876, BB 4 1555, piece 45; Giquel to Fourichon, June 6, 1876, Dossier Individuel, Dunoyer de Segonzac, CC 7 2728, piece 45, SHM, Vincennes.
hoped forty-nine students could be sent for five years of study and was unhappy with the reduced numbers and the length of time. The 1877 mission, including twenty-six students, three apprentices, and a few others, departed in April from Hong Kong. The students were well received in both France and England. Giquel and Prince Gong had requested permission in advance for the students to enter the training programs. By fall Giquel had placed the English-language students either in the Royal Naval College at Greenwich or had found them berths on Royal Navy ships. He had initially hoped to place nine of the students at Greenwich, but the college was unwilling to accept more than six and then only on the proviso that they demonstrated their language skills in advance. More berths on British ships were found for the extra three students as well as those additionally assigned to ships. After some discussion the admiralty agreed that while aboard the ship the Chinese students would be allowed into the wardrooms and be received as supernumeraries.

The French-division students were distributed among institutions of construction, mining, and metallurgy. Many of these students eventually worked at the factories at Saint-Chamond, the Creusot Ironworks, the School of Naval Construction at Cherbourg, the Toulon Naval Yard, and the National School of Mines in Paris.

Prosper Giquel set up the mission headquarters in Paris and for the next decade administered the 1877 Educational Mission and subsequent groups that arrived over the next several years. One group, accompanied by Segonzac, arrived later in the year, and in 1881 yet another group was sent. In 1886, as Giquel lay dying, more students left China destined for further study with the program.

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100 Giquel to [Fuzhou] Consul [Lemaire], March 5, 1877, CCC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 8, AE.

101 Kung [Gong] to Montmorand, January 23, 1873, CP, Chine, vol. 56, fol., 30, AE; Derby to Kuo Sung-tai [Guo Songdao], March 12, 1877, F.O. 17 768, no dis. no., fol. 43, PRO; Dir. Sûreté General pour Min. d'Interieur to Min. des Affaires étrangères, May 8, 1877, FADP, Chine, carton 4, AE.

102 List prepared by Giquel and Li, August 20, 1877, F.O. 17 768, fol. 116–117, PRO; Derby to Kuo, July 9, 1877, F.O. 17 768, fol. 77–78, PRO.

103 Derby to Kuo [Guo], November 9, 1877, F.O. 17 768, no dis. no., fol. 144–145, PRO.


It is difficult to assess the success of such a diverse group of students. Nevertheless, the Educational Mission appears to have been quite effective. As Y.C. Wang, a leading student of the subject has written: "If the mission is to be judged on the basis of the students' subsequent careers, it should be noted that the Fuzhou students became the nucleus of a new naval force after their return to China."\(^{107}\) Li Hongzhang, when he established his own naval academy at Tianjin and his Beijing fleet, showed confidence in the Fuzhou students' training by relying heavily on them for staffing his naval operations.\(^{108}\)

Giquel's direct influence on the dockyard naturally lessened as he spent more time in Europe. He had left Segonzac in the dockyard as his contact. The two of them coordinated the hiring of new specialists and the introduction of new technologies. During Giquel's absences in 1875 and 1876, Segonzac became responsible for arranging the renewal of employment contracts for those Europeans who remained at the dockyard.\(^{109}\) After Segonzac's arrival in Europe in 1877 it was increasingly difficult for Giquel to maintain his direct influence.

While his influence within the dockyard lessened, Giquel remained an important naval aid to Shen Baozhen, who had become governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui as well as Superintendent for Trade for the Southern Ports.\(^{110}\) Giquel's ties to Zuo Zongtang and Shen Baozhen were far stronger than those he maintained with Li Hongzhang, governor-general of Zhili. Nevertheless, Li often used him as a purchasing agent and relied on his political advice on many occasions such as during the Taiwan crisis of 1874 and later during tensions with France. Giquel's support within the Chinese establishment was such that when, in the early 1880s, Li Hongzhang became interested in German shipyards and, consequently, wished no longer to employ Giquel, Zeng Jize, China's ambassador to Paris and London, argued for Giquel's continued employment.\(^{111}\)

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107 Ibid., p. 38.
109 It is not clear how many Europeans worked on the site after February 1874. In March 1875 Giquel noted that once he hired the additional seven employees, there would be fifteen Europeans under his direction. Giquel to Lemaire, March 18, 1875, CPC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 353, AE.
111 Rawlinson, China's Struggle, p. 76.
Although Giquel’s direct ties to the dockyard lessened, he remained actively involved with the Educational Mission and began to involve himself ever more frequently with matters of international diplomacy. Unfortunately, his role as both a political analyst and diplomatic adviser was significantly less successful than his association with the Fuzhou Dockyard and its educational program.

The Fuzhou Dockyard and Chinese Self-Strengthening

Prosper Giquel’s work had been impressive. Despite numerous problems he had organized and administered a large and complex industrial and educational project. He had done so while serving as cultural intermediary between the European specialists of the yard and the Chinese workers and officials in the workshops and administration. An impressive list of visitors, European and Chinese, testified to his enthusiasm and efficiency. If Giquel had at times alienated the French dockyard employees and consular officials, he felt it was in the interest of maintaining the dockyard as an exclusively Chinese facility. He had worked closely with and gained the respect of, the leading Chinese officials of his day: Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, and Shen Baozhen. Zeng Jize was another important supporter. Moreover, Giquel was said to be on especially good terms with the Chinese students of the dockyard.

Unfortunately, Giquel’s hope that the dockyard would become the nucleus for the industrialization of China was not fulfilled. Like other self-strengthening projects, after an impressive beginning it began to decline after the European advisers were withdrawn. There had been opposition from Chinese conservatives for a long time. A principal feature of the decline was the loss of vigorous leadership. Giquel’s ties to the dockyard were reduced, and Shen Baozhen was replaced by officials less interested in the dockyard. The dockyard had produced fifteen ships between 1869 and 1874, but only nineteen more were launched in the next twenty-two years.

The departure of Giquel and Shen from the dockyard weakened the administration deeply, but the progressive deterioration that followed cannot be linked simply to the loss of leadership. The Fuzhou Dockyard remained isolated from Chinese society and poorly understood. Financial

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113 Biggerstaff, Government Schools in China, pp. 219–220.

114 Ibid., p. 219.
problems, which had always plagued the dockyard, forced a drastic curtailment of the building programs. Later directors of the dockyard lacked sufficient rank and influence to insure appropriate fundings. Like many other self-strengthening projects, the Fuzhou Dockyard was hampered by bureaucratic inertia, conservative opposition, and too little enthusiasm for the industrialization process coupled with the pervasive pressures of imperialism. And like many other projects, it did not go far beyond the accomplishments of the earliest years.

Despite the financial problems and bureaucratic inertia that caused the dockyard's decline, after 1874 it demonstrated its great potential by the construction of the Wei Yuan in 1877. The construction of this vessel, China's first iron-framed ship, so soon after the contract ended is strong evidence of the dockyard's capacity for growth.

Giquel's lifelong goal had been to help China progress toward technical modernization and to improve relations between his own country and the Chinese. The Fuzhou Dockyard, with its important ties to French industry and education significantly contributed to these goals. By 1877 Giquel had reason to feel he had been a success. The following decade, however, must have been frustrating indeed as he saw the unraveling of so much that he had worked for.

Diplomacy and Disillusionment

For Prosper Giquel the years from 1874 until his death in 1886 were probably among the most frustrating he had experienced. He spent most of the period in France as director of the Educational Mission and as a critic and commentator on French East Asian policy. Despite the honors gained for his Fuzhou accomplishments, his political activities and writings would provoke denunciations of his being too pro-Chinese.

Had the course of international events in East Asia been different during the last decade of his life, Giquel might have been spared the agony of seeing the Sino-French War. But that was not to be. Giquel, who had devoted so much of his career to trying to reconcile his loyalty to France with his devotion to China, was in his last years sorely tried by the contradictions of his position.

Prosper Giquel and Official France

In February 1874 Giquel ended his active directorship of the Fuzhou Dockyard. Although the period of service had witnessed strained relations with the consular staff, Giquel saw his role in China at least partly directed toward the strengthening of ties between China and France. The French Naval Ministry had been supportive on a host of issues: granting leave to Giquel and the staff, intervening in the 1869–1870 conflict with acting consular officer Blancheton, and submitting highly favorable reports on Giquel’s accomplishments at the dockyard.¹

Throughout the dockyard years Giquel regularly informed the French admiralty of all plans and developments at the Fuzhou site. He frequently received French naval visitors and gave them extended briefings on the project.² At the same time Giquel recognized the

¹ Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes; BB 4 1555, passim, SHM, Vincennes.
² BB 4 1555, SHM, Vincennes, contains many such reports.
limitations on his ability to work closely with the French. In June 1871 when the newly appointed French naval commandant for East Asia requested use of the dockyard to service the local French fleet, Giquel responded that he could offer assistance under unusual circumstances, such as a wreck; but as a rule the Chinese could not make the facility regularly available to the French without fear that they would have to do the same for the other powers.\(^3\)

Giquel's insistence on promoting his own vision of what was best for China, France, and their relations in East Asia had often been evident in his actions at the dockyard. The same can be said for his commentaries on current issues. In 1872 Giquel began publicly to address those political issues critical to the future of European-East Asian relations. In the process he took stands that many of his countrymen found unacceptable. The first issue was the Tianjin Incident of 1870.

**The Growing Controversy**

In June of 1870 Chinese mobs in Tianjin, the largest port city of North China, protesting what they perceived to be abuses of French imperialism, murdered the truculent French consul, ten Catholic nuns, several priests, and a number of Europeans unlucky enough to come in contact with the enraged crowds. The roots of the incident were tied both to the presence of the unpopular foreigners in Tianjin and a long standing belief that the Westerners enjoyed mutilating and consuming Chinese children. At Tianjin, French Catholic nuns came under suspicion from local Chinese because of a willingness to receive children into their orphanage from unscrupulous individuals who, expecting a fee, claimed to have found the children abandoned in the streets. Knowing little of what went on in the orphanage and aware of the high mortality rate among the children—partly due to the weakened condition of children likely to come under the care of the sisters—the Chinese imagined the orphanage to be a macabre establishment. Mutual misunderstandings at Tianjin continued and in June 1870 resulted in the horror of the Tianjin Incident.

Tensions on the China coast were inflamed. For a time, rumors ran through Shanghai that the French employees of the Fuzhou Dockyard had themselves been slaughtered in an uprising.\(^4\) Under considerable international pressure, the Qing court appointed Zeng Guofan to investigate. Zeng braved the wrath of Chinese conservatives by ruling that the orphanage had not been involved in the nefarious activities

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\(^3\) Giquel to Gizolin, June 25, 1871, BB 4 1555, misc. papers, SHM, Vincennes.

\(^4\) NCH, September 15, 1870.
imagined by the populace. Li Hongzhang, who soon replaced the ailing Zeng, supported his conclusions and agreed both to an indemnity and a mission of apology to France.

The French, though shocked by the horrors of the tragedy, were soon overwhelmed by their war with Prussia. The issue was eventually dropped in 1871 when the newly installed French president, Louis Adolphe Thiers, received the mission of apology. On that occasion Thiers announced that France was not interested in seeking executions but in gaining a lasting peace. Many Frenchmen, distracted by the horrors of the Franco-Prussian War and the short-lived but dramatic revolt of the Paris Commune of 1871, felt that the Tianjin Incident had been concluded to France’s satisfaction and benefit. Prosper Giquel believed otherwise.

Giquel was concerned that the appropriate warnings be taken from the lessons of July 1870. As he wrote in “La Politique française en Chine depuis les Traites de 1858 et de 1860,” which appeared in the June 1872 issue of the influential Revue des deux mondes:

The sad events which occurred so suddenly in China during the month of June 1870, and which are known as the Tianjin Massacre, are those from which France should draw the lessons for a wise foreign policy. It is not sufficient that the Tianjin affair be terminated. It is necessary to know if a similar tragedy can occur again and what the means are to avoid it. This time we have found China completely ready to recognize its errors and to make reparations, but it is necessary not to neglect the warning we have been given.

Giquel proposed to examine critically the French situation in China, her commercial interests, her role in safeguarding the missionaries, and to discuss means both to insure French interests and to avoid danger. It is clear that Giquel hoped for the widest possible dissemination of his analysis. The thirty-two-page Revue des deux mondes article was considerably enlarged in a seventy-page booklet under the same title which appeared in Paris the following December.

Methodically surveying the French role in China, Giquel first discussed the France concession at Shanghai. According to Giquel, only

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7 Ibid. Unless otherwise stated the following material is from the article, pp. 5–12.
8 Prosper Giquel, La Politique française en Chine depuis les Traités de 1858 et de 1860 (Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin, 1872).
France had declined to merge her national concession with those of the English and Americans who had created a single, international, essentially neutral, foreign concession. An admirer of the cosmopolitan and locally governed Shanghai international settlement, Giquel urged that the French concession be merged with the others. The French population in Shanghai, he claimed, wasn’t very large. Those Frenchmen who resided there lived throughout the city rather than exclusively in those sections governed by the French consul.

Giquel saw no special advantage to having a separate French concession. Admitting that it might offer some additional security for the Catholic missions that France had undertaken to protect, he pointed out that priests resided in many parts of China and those near Shanghai were in no greater need of security than elsewhere. To Giquel, France’s continuing hold on the Shanghai concession and elsewhere simply exposed her to needless problems and dangers. In a comment included in the December 1872 booklet Giquel reminded his readers that France had paid a high price for awfully little glory gained in Mexico, a clear reference to the recent execution of Maximilian and his short-lived French puppet empire. In a stinging comment in the Revue des deux mondes article Giquel called French unwillingness to take part in the larger Shanghai international community simple “egoism.”

Giquel went on to deal with the question of treaty revision. Here he took yet another unpopular stand as he commented on the recent British government rejection of the Alcock Convention, a proposed agreement between China and England that would have made their commercial relations more equitable. Accepted by the Zongli Yamen, it was rejected by the British government because of opposition from the British merchant community, which disliked the concessions made to the Chinese.

Giquel, writing after the rejection of the treaty, deplored the demise of the first “equal” treaty between China and England. Speaking of those Europeans who demanded the right to trade and live in the Chinese interior while insisting on the maintenance of extraterritoriality, he claimed that such rights, away from the presence of the European consular authorities, were simply unfeasible. Showing considerably more faith in Chinese officialdom than was usual among China-coast Europeans, Giquel argued that the only practical way to allow Europeans into the interior was to have them under the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities. Aware

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9 Ibid., p. 2.
that Chinese criminal practices were unacceptable to Europeans, Giquel merely suggested that a special code be created for them. Once such a code was established it would be enforced by the Chinese officials. Appeal to the mixed courts would be possible only after an initial determination of the case. Giquel reasoned that this approach would protect the Chinese official prestige that extraterritoriality undermined.

Many of Giquel's readers were enraged by his suggestion that the French concession be eliminated and that travelers to the interior place themselves under Chinese jurisdiction. They were no less displeased by his opinion of the French protectorate over Catholicism in China. Giquel tried to explain the issue from a Chinese perspective. The Chinese saw the missionaries as mere French agents and felt nothing but animosity toward them. Giquel enumerated a long list of issues that had alienated the Chinese from the Catholic missionaries and from France, the nation that protected them. The 1860 treaty stipulation that allowed the missionaries to reclaim confiscated property—sometimes lost generations before—created considerable resentment. The unwillingness of the missionary orphanages to open their establishments to public investigation created needless problems and encouraged tragedies such as the one at Tianjin.

Giquel also explained that the practice of allowing Chinese converts to place themselves under the protection of the missionaries and, therefore, beyond the authority of Chinese officials provoked official animosity. One official, whom Giquel quoted, explained that the issue was not Catholicism but having to deal with the native converts who ignored his authority. Giquel said that the missionaries recognized the problem. Offering his French readers pointed analogies, he wrote:

If the Christian congregations have been molested, if resistance has come from the population to the building of chapels, and to the establishment of orphanages, if converts have been imprisoned and held for ransom, we can only see in these facts the inevitable opposition of a country to a foreign religion. Can it really surprise people that the Buddhist priests, the literati and the peasants look poorly upon the symbol which comes to destroy their beliefs—and the prestige of their idols—when in some of our own departments [in France] the Catholics and Protestants can't live in peace?  

11 Ibid., pp. 22–23. Unless otherwise stated the following material is drawn from this part of the article.
12 Ibid., p. 30.
Giquel made clear that in his opinion it wasn’t worth France’s effort to continue as the protector of the missions. Such a position constantly drew the French government into every incident and didn’t strengthen her position in China. He urged that modifications be undertaken to improve the situation. France should encourage the missionaries to work out an acceptable relationship with Chinese officials. That would end the impression that the missionaries were beyond indigenous authority. With respect to the orphanages, Giquel felt that regular inspection would alleviate the suspicions of the Chinese public.

As he surveyed the history of France’s protectorate, Giquel concluded that it had not only involved France in needless incidents but also alienated the Chinese population from Catholicism. He admired the English unwillingness to assume a similar protectorate over the Protestant missionaries. Additionally, he pointed out that the other Catholic powers, Spain and Italy, avoided such involvement. His praise of English conduct in China upset many of his countrymen, as had his willingness to abolish the French concession in Shanghai. His concluding remarks were even more controversial.

Giquel insisted that French unwillingness to recognize Chinese sensibilities exposed the country to needless problems. He warned his readers that any future conflict would see France dealing with a China far stronger than it had been in 1860. China had spent the last decade importing Western military technology and ordnance. Thousands of Chinese had been trained in Western-style warfare. The government possessed large quantities of modern rifles. Its arsenals were growing and Chinese were learning naval technology. They would soon produce iron warships. Giquel urged that France recognize these changes and divorce herself from obligations that created needless tensions. Invoking a sort of “yellow peril” image, Giquel warned the French that their present role in China was leading them down a deadly path.

Giquel’s article roused vehement and indignant responses from his fellow Frenchmen. He was denounced both publicly and privately. In early June 1872, prior to publication of the article, the French minister to China, M. Geofroy, had visited the dockyard and made a favorable report to Paris. Just after sending off the dispatch, Geofroy received that month’s Revue des deux mondes. Enraged by what Giquel had written, he called Giquel’s comments factious, debatable, false, contradictory, and even antipatriotic. Geofroy was furious with the dockyard’s first director. He even speculated that Giquel had suffered a complete aberration of

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13 Ibid., pp. 32–34.
Geofroy deeply regretted having just sent off his positive report and wasn’t surprised that Giquel hadn’t shown him the article during his visit. According to Geofroy, Giquel had shocked the Shanghai French community. He added sarcastically that there was no need to report how the Catholic missionaries had received the article. He was especially angered by the article’s overall pro-Chinese stance.\(^\text{14}\)

The local French newspapers were no less critical. *Le Nouvelliste de Shanghai* feigned surprise that such suggestions came from a Frenchman who knew China well. The idea of merging the French concession with the others especially aroused the newspaper. Although admitting that Giquel was no newcomer to China, it was quick to point out that he hadn’t lived in Shanghai for some time. (Giquel had moved from Shanghai six years before.) Again Giquel was denounced as unpatriotic.\(^\text{15}\)

The French Foreign Ministry reported to the Naval Ministry that their officer, Giquel, had encouraged aggression.\(^\text{16}\) In contacting the Naval Ministry, the Foreign Ministry hoped that the former would ask Giquel to show more reserve in the future.\(^\text{17}\) The Naval Ministry did not respond, and we have no evidence that Giquel was warned.\(^\text{18}\)

The denunciations continued for some time. Francis Gamier, the hero of French exploration in Indochina, took time to criticize the article. Such thinking,” Gamier claimed, would reduce France to a secondary power living in the “shade of the five great powers which were represented in Beijing.”\(^\text{19}\) More than three years later, when Giquel was considered for promotion in the Legion of Honor, an award he had long deserved, the acting consul-general in Shanghai, Comte de Chappedelaine, suggested the honor be lessened by simultaneously offering it to another person, the American consul-general. He reasoned that Giquel was not one to whom one should offer too much prestige.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^{14}\) Geofroy to Rémusat, June 27, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 153–156, AE.

\(^{15}\) *Le Nouvelliste de Shanghai*, June 26, 1872, enclosed CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 156, AE.

\(^{16}\) Geofroy to Min. de la Marine [Pothuau], September 3, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 183–184, AE.

\(^{17}\) Min. des Affaires étrangères [Rémusat] to Geofroy, September 12, 1872, CP, Chine, vol. 51, fol. 185–186, AE.

\(^{18}\) Ibid. Dossier Individuel, Prosper Giquel, CC 7 1020, SHM, Vincennes, contains no reference to the issue.


\(^{20}\) Chappedelaine to Decazes, November 9, 1875, CPC, Shanghai, vol. 7, fol. 437, AE.
Throughout this period Giquel continued to promote French activities in China. Nevertheless, he refused to remain silent in the face of French policies he believed to be contradictory to France's long-term interests or exploitative of China and the Chinese people. To Giquel, France's proper role was to increase commercial ties, exchange educational groups, emphasize diplomatic mission, and maintain a generally equitable relationship. If his 1872 article had angered many, Giquel's activities during the Taiwan Crisis of 1874 did nothing to improve his ties to French officialdom.

Giquel, Shen Baozhen, and the Taiwan Crisis

In May 1874, 3,600 Japanese soldiers and several hundred sailors invaded Taiwan. The official Japanese explanation was that China—which claimed suzerainty over Taiwan—had failed to punish local aborigines for the murder in 1871 of some shipwrecked sailors from the Ryukyu Islands. The diplomatic crisis and the military standoff that followed was complicated by the fact that both China and Japan claimed suzerainty over the Ryukyus. The Chinese court appointed Li Hongzhang to deal with the crisis. On Taiwan the official Qing envoy was to be Shen Baozhen. Giquel went north to confer with Li Hongzhang on ways to respond to the crisis. His assessment of China's ability to meet the Japanese challenge was pessimistic. Nevertheless, Li contacted Shen, suggesting that Giquel accompany the Chinese counterexpedition to Taiwan. Shen agreed.

Shen hoped to gain Western moral support while continuing to strengthen China's military preparedness. He initiated efforts to purchase ironclad warships from abroad; the Fuzhou Dockyard had only just begun to plan construction of such vessels. Additionally, he hoped that a cable from Fuzhou to Amoy could be constructed to facilitate local communication. Shen authorized Giquel to hire additional Western military advisers for the dockyard and the impending expedition.

In June 1874, a month after the Japanese force landed, Shen, Giquel, Segonzac, and two thousand troops arrived on the island. For

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23 Yen, Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations, p. 219.
24 Ibid.
26 Lemaire to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Decazes], July 6, 1874, CPC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 314, AE.
several months international tensions mounted while China and Japan considered going to war. During this time Giquel became involved in a private controversy associated with his role in the expedition.

From the beginning of the crisis Giquel had been involved. As the drama unfolded he had advised Li and accompanied Shen to the island. Many China-coast Europeans expected him to play a major military role if hostilities broke out. Giquel, aware that France needed intelligence on the developing crisis, promised his friend, Gabriel Lemaire, consul at Fuzhou, that he would submit regular reports. He did so throughout the crisis. French officials, no doubt pleased with the information Giquel supplied, were nevertheless irritated by his involvement.

Thomas Wade, the British minister in Beijing, informed London that Giquel was privy to Shen’s plans. Giquel had told Wade what he knew, and the British minister expected him to be drawn deeper into the controversy. According to Wade, Giquel was highly trusted by the Chinese. Giquel’s French superiors, in contrast, were very angry with his activities and upset about his involvement. Geoffroy, the French minister, still vexed with Giquel for the 1872 article in the *Revue des deux mondes*, was especially irritated.

Aware of Geoffroy’s disapproval of his activities, Giquel wrote to Wade asking for his assistance in obtaining the ironclad ships that China needed. Wade felt that Giquel knew that Geoffroy would not cooperate. For Giquel the acquisition of the ships was all important. If the French minister would not help, he was quite willing to go to the English. This insistence on making his services available to China continued to be a problem throughout the summer.

Before his June departure for Taiwan, French authorities had warned Giquel against becoming involved in a Sino-Japanese war. The warnings were frequently reiterated. Not only did Consul Lemaire speak to him, but the French Foreign Ministry, the Naval Ministry, and Minister Geoffroy all sent similar messages. Giquel spent most of June and July on Taiwan and was quite irritated by this “attention.”

27 Lemaire to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Decazes], June 18, 1874, CPC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 312, AE.
28 Wade to Derby, June 10, 1874, Confidential print, F.O. 405 15, dep. 99, fol. 7, PRO; Wade to Derby, June 22, 1874, F.O. 17 674, dep. 116, fol. 33–36, PRO.
29 Giquel to Wade, June 3, 1874, F.O. 17 674, fol. 39–44, PRO.
In late July-early August, Giquel, after receiving the naval minister’s telegram, concluded that his presence on Taiwan was causing too many problems and left the island. He deeply resented the naval minister’s questioning of his activities. Giquel was convinced that the Japanese minister in Paris had aroused the French government against him. Explaining himself to Minister Geoffroy, Giquel reminded the diplomat that despite the tensions, Japan and China were not at war. Besides, Giquel reasoned, he had been able to encourage Shen to build a telegraph to the mainland. If that were carried out Chinese modernization would be aided and France, through Giquel’s work, would gain further influence by providing the appropriate technology. Giquel also pointed out that he had provided important information on the developing crisis. He had expected advice if his activities created complications for France but resented the severe and constant questioning of his judgment.

By the end of the year the situation was settled but hardly in China’s favor. Thomas Wade used his office as British minister to help arrange an indemnity that China paid to the Ryukyuans and the Japanese as compensation for the 1871 murders. China agreed additionally not to condemn the Japanese action, an indirect recognition of Japanese claims on the Ryukyu Islands.

For Giquel, his role on Taiwan offered little satisfaction. The telegraph line he had promoted, like so many other self-strengthening projects, was never realized. He was once again in conflict with French officialdom. Although Lemaire had defended him, the Naval Ministry was critical.

Giquel must have been extraordinarily frustrated by the mistrust so many Frenchmen directed toward him. Just as his outspoken opinions in the 1872 article helped alienate him from many of his countrymen, Giquel’s involvement with the Taiwan crisis caused further questioning of his judgment. Nevertheless, Giquel still worked to offer France whatever advantages his position could gain. He gave intelligence reports to French consular and naval authorities and planned to involve the French in any augmentation of the dockyard’s staff. He struggled to remain loyal to both France and China.

31 Giquel to Geoffroy, August 6, 1874, CP, Chine, vol. 53, fol. 180–181, AE; Giquel to Krantz, November 21, 1874, Dossier Individuel, Dunoyer de Segonzac, CC 7 2728, piece 9, SHM, Vincennes.
32 Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 389.
34 Lemaire to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Decazes], July 6, 1874, CPC, Fou-tcheou, vol. 2, fol. 316, AE; Giquel to Geoffroy, August 6, 1874, CP, Chine, vol. 53, fol. 181–182, AE.
Prosper Giquel and the Sino-French War

Early in his career Giquel became involved with Annam, the issue of conflict that precipitated the Sino-French War. He took part in the initial 1859 French expedition to Saigon and visited the area frequently thereafter. During his 1864 and 1866 stays he prepared lengthy private résumés of his impression of the growing French colony.\(^\text{35}\) His 1864 journal reveals the hope that French influence would grow, although he noted privately that he deplored French treatment of the local Chinese residents.\(^\text{36}\) Twenty years later tensions between France and China over their respective interests in Indochina first threatened, and then dramatically damaged, Giquel’s lifelong effort to bring France and a modernized China closer together.

The origins and development of the Sino-French War of 1883–1885 were complicated by ambivalence on the part of each government. The war was characterized by sporadic fighting and often uncoordinated negotiations. Giquel’s loyalties to France and to China were tested as never before. Torn by the inability of either side to resolve the developing conflict, Giquel was drawn into secret negotiations.

French involvement in Annam dates from the mid-1850s when France, seeking to maintain influence and prestige vis-à-vis the British, decided to mount an expeditionary campaign in Annam.\(^\text{37}\) Fighting and treaties ensued. French expansionism continued to grow, and during the Jules Ferry ministry of 1880–1881 decisions were made to reduce Annam to complete subservience.\(^\text{38}\) Intensifying their activities, the French stationed troops in Hanoi and Haiphong. The Nguyen government of Annam responded by seeking closer ties to China and by continuing to send tribute missions to Beijing. Additional ties were sought with the autonomous local unit known as the Chinese Black Flag Army. By 1882 clashes had occurred between Black Flag troops and the French. Meanwhile, Beijing was quietly sending regular troops into the region.\(^\text{39}\)

\(^{35}\) Giquel Journal, May 25, 1864, January 14, 1866.
\(^{36}\) Ibid., May 25, 1864.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., p. 294.
As tensions grew and war broke out it became critically important that each power effectively communicate with the other. That was a difficult process. In China several groups, each with differing perspectives and power bases, were influential. The French had to deal with the Zongli Yamen, Li Hongzhang, Zeng Jize, and Robert Hart. And Prince Gong, the leading Manchu statesman, was constantly undermined by criticisms of the Qing-Yi, a group of Confucian literati and officials. Prince Gong, in fact, was dismissed from office during the period.

French cabinets, never stable during the Third Republic, were at this time particularly volatile. From 1881 to the war’s end in 1885 there were six different foreign ministers. In early 1883, when the first attempt at a settlement, the Li-Bourée Convention, was being considered, three different cabinets dealt with it. Eventually, Jules Ferry, forming his second cabinet in February 1883, rejected the treaty.

A settlement was reached in June 1885. Robert Hart, through his agent James Campbell in London, managed to bring the respective governments to agreement. During this time informal channels of negotiations were used extensively, and it was in this arena that Giquel was active. He struggled to bring about a reconciliation and used his contacts in each country to search for a means to end the crisis. His efforts as an intermediary were welcomed and solicited by the Chinese. French officials, too, considered Giquel’s opinions valuable; and his efforts, monitored and occasionally spied upon, were tolerated and occasionally encouraged.

Giquel’s earliest known involvement in the developing crisis was his June 1883 letter to Ambassador Zeng Jize and Li Hongzhang. The source of the letter is as significant as the document’s contents. Only half of the letter is available, the extant copy in the French Foreign Ministry. The marginal notation indicates that Giquel had written the letter in Chinese but, wishing to have his calligraphy checked, had taken it to the Chinese embassy for proofreading. During this period agents of the French security service intercepted it but, because of time constraints, managed to copy only half. The agent, who forwarded his copy to the Foreign Ministry, noted that Giquel had signed it with a pencil. His comment may imply that criminal charges against Giquel were being contemplated. What is certain is that Giquel’s absolute loyalty to France was enough in

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41 Ibid., p. 27.
doubt that it was thought appropriate to steal his private correspondence. Given Giquel's willingness to define French East Asian interests in contrast to those officially articulated by the government, it is not surprising that his correspondence would have been targeted for interception.

Giquel wrote the letter in response to Chinese requests that he offer his impression of French intentions. In preparation Giquel spoke to a number of prominent Frenchmen and followed closely the discussions in French newspapers. Parenthetically it is worth noting that Giquel was not hiding his activities. Although we do not have his concluding remarks, enough of the letter is available to understand his approach. He explained that the 1874 treaty between France and Annam had offered France few real advantages. Giquel felt France wished to modify the treaty only in order to rectify its ambiguities. Perhaps trying to reassure Zeng and Li that France was not simply taking control of Annam, Giquel commented that in reality the proposed changes were similar to those concessions France enjoyed in China.

Giquel wanted the Chinese to understand the French point of view in the controversy. He reviewed for Li and Zeng the sorry history of French East Asian commercial activities. Their successes were small and considerably behind the English and the Americans. He spoke of the major commitment French investors had made in Panama and in Saigon and seemed to be asking Zeng and Li to sympathize with the French desire to make the 1874 treaty more advantageous. Giquel went on to tell his Chinese associates that the French were quite committed to changing the treaty. All would go well if Annam agreed. Otherwise, Giquel predicted that the Annamite king would lose his throne as he had already lost control of the Saigon area. Clearly, the letter shows that while Giquel was quite pro-Chinese, he never wanted French influence in Vietnam to wither.

In November and December 1883 Giquel met privately with Zeng Jize. Again he explained the French position. After their November 16 meeting Giquel offered a verbal report to the French foreign ministry. During the subsequent weeks Giquel and Zeng met twice more. On November 19 Zeng arrived at Giquel's home very agitated about the possibility of a full-scale war. Zeng feared that China would again be in

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42 Giquel to Tseng [Zeng] and Li, June[?] 1883, MD, Chine, vol. 19, fol. 457–459, AE.
43 Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism, p. 288, agrees with this argument.
44 Giquel to Tseng [Zeng] and Li, June[?] 1883, MD, Chine, vol. 19, fol. 457–459, AE.
45 Summary of conversation, November 16, 1883, CP, Chine, vol. 63, fol. 21–22, AE.
the position she had faced in 1860 when Western forces occupied Beijing. Nevertheless, he reminded his friend that France would find a quagmire worse than the ill-fated French empire in Mexico. Giquel asked Zeng if he were no longer an advocate of peace, and if not, why not. The excited Chinese ambassador replied that personally he favored peace, but the Zongli Yamen was determined to push the issue to the limit.46

While personally favoring peace, Zeng advised his associates in Beijing to avoid appearing too cautious. China would gain more by a strong stance than by vacillating.47 The French generally saw him as representing a new level of Chinese bellicosity, and Jules Ferry disliked him. His attempts to negotiate were eventually rejected by the French government.48 In the spring of 1884, after several months of fighting in Indochina, the Zongli Yamen, aware of the antipathy between Zeng and the French Foreign Ministry, replaced him. It was done as a goodwill gesture to the French. Zeng Jize, however, retained his position at London and St. Petersburg.49 Although no longer officially involved in the peace negotiations, Zeng continued privately to work for a settlement. Giquel became an active partner in these efforts.

During the spring of 1884 another round of negotiations between Li Hongzhang and a French naval captain, F.E. Fournier, raised hopes for an end to the fighting. The treaty, which called for Chinese recognition of the French treaties with Annam and withdrawal of Chinese troops and forbade negative references to China in future Annamese treaties, was rejected by the French government after the Bac-le debacle of mid-June in which Li’s promise to Fournier that Chinese troops would be withdrawn was blocked by Qing-yi pressure.50 Significant French casualties resulted.

The French were enraged by their losses and viewed the incident as an example of Chinese perfidy. They now insisted on the immediate implementation of the Li-Fournier treaty and payment of an indemnity.51 By July both sides were preparing for an all-out war. One of China’s principal points of vulnerability was the Fuzhou Dockyard. On August 23 the French navy, commanded by Admiral Courbet, attacked the dockyard that had for decades symbolized Sino-French cooperation. Two Americans have left an account of that day’s events:

46 Summary of conversation, November 20, 1883, CP, Chine, vol. 63, fol. 52, AE.
47 Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 400.
49 Eastman, Thrones and Mandarins, p. 113.
50 Ibid., pp. 134–135.
Destruction is on every side. . . . The machine shops are perforated and battered in an extraordinary manner. The tall chimney which marked their position, and was also a guide to the river pilots, withstood the conflagration of Saturday night and Sunday morning, but in the afternoon it fell in ruins. The machinery is twisted and bent out of shape, and probably of no more use. The boiler shop is in the same condition. The engine and pumphouses were not struck by any large shot, but the Hotchkiss balls perforated them and damaged the interior to a great extent. Along the front of the yard is a quantity of wreckage.  

Eleven ships were sunk or damaged before Courbet's troops ended the day victoriously. Of eleven Chinese ships that took part in the battle, nine had been constructed of wood. The Yang-wu, the pride of the dockyard in 1872, was sunk in the first minutes of the battle.  

Giquel had always known that the Chinese would have to advance beyond the wooden ships built during the European directorship of the dockyard, but that point had not been pressed with sufficient urgency. The news of the attack was a terrible blow to Beijing. Especially struck was the aging Zuo Zongtang who, twenty years before, had worked so hard to establish the facility. Although he was in his seventies and ill, the court dispatched him to Fuzhou. A year later, in September 1885, Zuo died.

Giquel was bitterly upset by the continuing diplomatic crisis and the destruction of the dockyard. He had hoped that the Li-Fournier convention could settle the problems. That the French government had not consulted him regarding the war, at least about Fuzhou, was also a source of bitterness. Nevertheless, perhaps aware of the suspicions that surrounded him regarding the extent of his loyalty to France, or stemming from his continuing ambivalence about his dual loyalties, he wrote Adolphe Cochery, the minister of commerce in Ferry's cabinet, on September 8 that the majority of the Chinese literati opposed submitting to French demands. Giquel suggested that another "lesson" in the superiority of French arms was required to convince them. Unofficially, Giquel was considerably less bellicose.

54 Chen, Tso Tsung-t'ang, p. 45.
55 Journal des Débat, February 20, 1886, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
56 Unmarked newspaper clipping, February 21, 1886, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
Prosper Giquel had little more than a year and a half to live. The collapse of the peace negotiations and the attack against Fuzhou had been a traumatic blow. Nevertheless, he thrust himself into private efforts to end the war. If he could not advance Sino-French relations, he could at least try to end the war that pulled them apart. It would be his last contribution.

The Secret Negotiations of the Spring of 1885

Throughout the autumn of 1884 Giquel remained active in the effort to end the war. We lack his private correspondence from the early fall, but fortunately Giquel’s Fuzhou aide, Dunoyer de Segonzac, kept the French Foreign Ministry informed of Giquel’s activities. On September 18 Segonzac wrote a confidential note about Giquel. He said that Giquel felt that “[the French] don’t have a plan to stop the [military] operations; if they bombed twenty places like Fuzhou, they will not induce the Chinese to admit defeat. The best thing to do would be to renounce immediately the indemnity claim in order not to make it an issue in the next election.” Segonzac, Giquel’s friend and an influential adviser to the Chinese, added: “You, who know our friend [Giquel] and his tendency to favor the Chinese, can guess what developments he gives to this theme.”

Even Giquel’s close friend and a man with similar Chinese experience was willing to undercut his efforts by referring to his well-known pro-Chinese attitude.

During the first week of November, Xu Jingcheng, the newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Berlin, asked Giquel for the French peace proposals. Giquel then wrote the Foreign Ministry asking if they could be communicated to him. He promised that if the indemnity were no longer among the French demands, he would use his influence to have the proposals presented to Zuo Zongtang in Beijing. Paul Challemel-Lacour, the foreign minister, deliberately ignored Giquel’s request.

Despite the snub Giquel remained in contact with both parties to the dispute. Later in November, although he had not heard from the Foreign Ministry, Giquel submitted a long report to Ambassador Xu in Berlin. Giquel had attended the sessions of the French Chamber of Deputies, and he based his impressions on these. He reported that although Ferry’s majority was not overwhelming, the premier had received the necessary funding to continue the war. Giquel claimed that most of the arguments

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58 Segonzac to Deveria, September 17, 1884, CP, Chine, vol. 66, fol. 99, AE.
59 Giquel to Min. des Affaires étrangères [Challemel-Lacour], November 6, 1884, CP, Chine, vol. 66, fol. 244, plus decision by minister in marginalia, AE.
advanced in China’s favor had been voiced as articulately as if a representative from Beijing had attended. Ferry had denied that the call for an indemnity was the chief obstacle to peace. The premier insisted that the deaths at Bac-le had been caused by an ambush and not by a misunderstanding. That forced France to demand compensation.60

Giquel told Xu that under no circumstances would France, regardless of governmental changes, allow the termination of the French protectorate over Annam. Only a treaty recognizing that relationship would be accepted by Paris. Giquel suggested various ways to reduce the contact between French and Chinese troops stationed near the Chinese border. As before, he spoke of the necessity of France gaining further trade concessions in Indochina. French public opinion required certain policies; for example, control of those areas thought to contain minerals was essential. As he put it, “Public opinion in France would accept with difficulty the giving up of areas that they suppose—rightly or wrongly—to include mines which will be exploited one day. But they will accept very well a reasonable rectification of the border which China judges necessary for its defense.”61 Giquel optimistically informed Xu that he thought the indemnity, which had been rejected by the Chinese, was becoming less of an issue.

During 1884, while Giquel corresponded with his Chinese associates, both the Americans and the British tried unsuccessfully to mediate the dispute. During the late fall and winter of 1884–1885 Robert Hart, working through his agent James Campbell in London, struggled secretly with the complexities of the war. Zeng Jize and Giquel continued their own work.

The negotiations that ended the war, especially those of Robert Hart and James Campbell, have been dealt with elsewhere.62 Here we shall concern ourselves exclusively with Giquel’s private negotiations with Zeng Jize during the spring of 1885.

Halliday Macartney, whose career so often paralleled Giquel’s, was apparently also involved. His biographer, Demetrius Boulger, has left us an account which, while preserving the essence of the negotiations, appears thoroughly confused on the details. Whether this is due to simple error on Boulger’s part or a desire to protect the reputation of the deceased Giquel is unclear.63 Boulger, in his introduction to the account, offers clues to his motivations.

60 Giquel to Hsu, November 27, 1884, p. 4, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
61 Ibid., p. 13.
62 The reader is directed to the studies of Lewis Chere and Lloyd Eastman, cited above.
But whatever attempts to bring about peace were made in official circles, they did not at first affect the Marquis Tseng [Zeng], whose relations with M. Jules Ferry had been strained, if not embittered, by some want of reason and courtesy on the part of the French Premier. Moreover, there was an impression in some quarters that the Marquis Tseng [Zeng], did not want peace, and consequently no one in England, after his recall from Paris [April 1884] thought of consulting him how to bring it to pass, until a French Gentleman proved that he possessed greater powers of discrimination... but I am not at liberty to give the names, and indeed they would add but little to the interest in the story.64

Boulger describes an elaborate correspondence between the French gentleman, who claimed to be in contact with Ferry, and Macartney. According to Boulger, Macartney did not know him. Although it is possible to believe that Zeng, in these same London spring weeks, worked with two different Frenchmen to produce two model but differing treaties, it is clearly unlikely. Moreover, the French foreign ministry archives hold copies only of those treaties produced by Giquel and Zeng. Since the Boulger version is unreliable, the following discussion is drawn exclusively from the primary documentation available in the French archives.

Jules Ferry asked Giquel to produce a model treaty. Giquel prepared a ten-article political document and another treaty of nine articles to regularize French commerce along the Red River.65

In many respects the treaty Giquel submitted in February 1885 resembles the agreement later signed in June. He wrote that France should maintain order in Tongking and that China was to withdraw immediately. Giquel proposed establishing a zone where neither French nor Chinese troops would enter, although in a cover letter he commented that the article had been negated by the recent French troop advance. He outlined the creation of a commission to establish Sino-Vietnamese borders and suggested transferring local tribes to delineate the frontier more easily. Special trading stations were to be established and maintained as the only legal places for commerce. Finally, Giquel concluded that all treaties already in effect would stand.66

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64 Ibid., p. 371.
66 Ibid., in passim.
In late February 1885 Giquel submitted the treaty for Ferry's consideration. Giquel soon departed for London to show the draft to Zeng Jize. Whether he traveled with Jules Ferry's blessing is not clear. Certainly Ferry was aware of his activities.

In March, Giquel presented Zeng with a somewhat modified version of the model treaty. Where he had previously spoken of an immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Annam, Giquel now substituted a clause on future Sino-French technical relations. He proposed that China, when she began to build railroads on the Chinese side of the border, hire French specialists and spend at least eighty million francs in France. Giquel, an opponent of French demands for an indemnity from China, was aware that such a commitment could prove to be an acceptable alternative to both sides. In a somewhat modified form the article appeared in the June treaty. The question of Chinese withdrawal was dealt with in a model preliminary agreement also agreed to by Giquel and Zeng. It specified that only after a Chinese withdrawal would France end the blockade and pull her troops out of Taiwan.

In London, Zeng reviewed Giquel's treaty and modified the article on future railroad development. He felt that China's promise to hire French engineers should be dealt with in a note independent of the treaty. He agreed, however, to a statement affirming China's willingness to improve transportation in the provinces adjacent to Annam.

We have no definitive information on the foreign ministry's reception of Giquel and Zeng's proposed treaty. Ferry did announce during this period that any negotiations carried on by individuals other than official agents would be ignored. It is worth noting, however, that the treaty signed in June bears a remarkable similarity to the agreements reached by Giquel and Zeng. Neither tribute nor an indemnity was

67 "Préliminaires de paix ou convention d'armistice," March 15, 1884, article 2, CP, Chine, vol. 67, fol. 244, AE.
68 "Projet de Traité entre la France en la Chine," 2nd article modified by Zeng, CP, Chine, vol. 67, fol. 251-252, AE.
70 Patrenotre to Ferry, March 27, 1885, CP, Chine, vol. 67, fol. 315, AE. Throughout this period the French government appears to have been quite ambivalent about Giquel. Despite the frequent snubs there is evidence that the government instigated Giquel's resignation from the Chinese Educational Mission in order to use him as an intermediary (Journal des Débats, February 20, 1886).
71 Boulger, in The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney, has included a treaty that is quite different. It provides for Annam's continuing to send tribute and Chinese troops remaining in Tongking until borders would be established (Boulger, The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney, p. 391; Chere, "The Diplomacy of the Sino-French War," p. 185). It is not clear where the
mentioned. The relocation of local tribes was dropped, but China still agreed to recognize all treaties between France and Annam. The proposed border commission was included as were detailed regulations on trade. Article one required China to disassociate itself from groups such as the Chinese Black Flag Army. Giquel and Zeng's version lacks such an obligation. Nevertheless, there appear to be few significant differences between the treaty proposed by Giquel and Zeng in March and later signed in June.

Even if Giquel's and Zeng's efforts had contributed significantly to ending the war, there were reasons for the French to avoid allowing them too much credit. The French thought Zeng had been disdainful of France's ability to carry on the war. Many French viewed him as an obstacle to peace. Giquel was known as a critic of French East Asian foreign policy. Offering him the additional notoriety of having contributed to the settlement would have perhaps rankled French officialdom. Giquel at least had the satisfaction of seeing peace once again established.

The Last Year

During the last year of Giquel's life he resumed his official duties with the Chinese Educational Mission. Late in 1885 he worked to prepare for the arrival of another group of students. Thirty-three were expected in the spring of 1886. Despite failing health Giquel awaited their arrival anxiously. It was a positive sign that Sino-French relations were again progressing well. On February 20, 1886, in Cannes, where he had been taken for health reasons, Giquel died.

At his funeral held a few days later at the Church of the Madelaine in Paris there assembled the entire staff of the Chinese embassy as well as representatives from the French ministries of foreign affairs and the navy. Dunoyer de Segonzac delivered the eulogy. That spring Segonzac was appointed director of the Educational Mission.

treaty printed by Boulger comes from. No copy of it exists in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry. There only Giquel and Zeng's version is available. It is possible that Boulger simply made an error among several treaties in Macartney's papers.

Treaty of Tientsin, June 9, 1885, Appendix in Chere, "The Diplomacy of the Sino-French War." The author would like to thank Professor Chere for guidance with these complicated negotiations.

72 Treaty of Tientsin, June 9, 1885, Appendix in Chere, "The Diplomacy of the Sino-French War." The author would like to thank Professor Chere for guidance with these complicated negotiations.

73 Unmarked newspaper obituary, February 21, 1886, Château de Bois-Dauphin.


75 Unmarked newspaper obituary, February 21, 1886, Château de Bois-Dauphin.


77 Le Temps, May 15, 1886.
Zeng Jize wrote Giquel's family to express his sorrow: "I must say that in the death of the late Prosper Giquel, the imperial government [of China] have sustained a severe loss which is irreparable. Privately speaking, I have lost a valued friend who did me services that I [will] always appreciate."  

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78 Tseng [Zeng] to Giquel family, March 12, 1886, Château de Bois-Dauphin.
VIII

Conclusion

There is no question that Prosper Giquel was one of the most important Western advisers to serve in nineteenth-century China. For that reason alone his lengthy career is worth consideration by those interested in that critical period of East-West interaction. Moreover, Giquel's career offers yet another example of those transcultural individuals, men such as John Fryer, Wang Tao, and Yung Wing, who served as the principal conduit through which their more parochially bound compatriots learned of each other.

Paul Cohen and Benjamin Schwartz, in speaking of the simplicities that have crept into our understanding of East-West relations, have decried the tendency to write of Western "impacts" and Chinese "responses."¹ They have stressed that neither society was so static as to be that easily categorized. Both societies were caught up in a complex and diversified process of change.² In his book Between Tradition and Modernity,³ Cohen identifies a pattern of littoral Chinese—a coastal milieu of transcultural men, individuals who were steeped in both Chinese tradition and Western learning and experiences.

Among the better known individuals discussed by Cohen are Wang Tao; Yung Wing, leader of the American Educational Mission; and Yan Fu, an early dockyard student, member of the European Educational Mission, and translator of Western materials into Chinese. Culturally, each of these men stood between East and West, was sufficiently hybridized to be receptive to Western ideas and ways, and was able to

² Ibid.
transmit them to their countrymen. A survey of Giquel's career shows that from the Western side his activities followed a similar pattern, which eventually allowed him to play a role in this period of cultural transference.

The Transcultural Milieu of the China Coast

Such scholars as Jonathan Spence, Benjamin Schwartz, Edward Gulick, Adrian Bennett, Paul Cohen, and Rhodes Murphey have tried to leave behind stereotyped images and to emphasize instead the individual aspirations and motives of those individuals who actually played the principal roles in nineteenth century Sino-Western interaction. Especially important among these efforts has been Paul Cohen's attempt, in his study of Wang Tao, to elucidate the lives of those littoral Chinese who through education and experience along the China coast were closely associated with the West. Jonathan Spence, dealing with the West, writes of generations of Western advisers who arrived in East Asia with the goal of changing China to fit their own visions. Here again we have a concentration on these transcultural men, usually neither entirely Western nor wholly Chinese, who lived and worked in the environment Cohen describes as "intellectual and cultural frontiers, outposts of intercultural collision where parochial (traditional) commitments were subjected to constant challenge."*4

Both of these approaches illuminate aspects of Giquel's career in China. The first and most obvious feature of Giquel's personal growth is the hybridization he experienced during his years in China. Arriving as a young man, learning the language, and eventually developing an appreciation and understanding of Chinese perspectives, Giquel was increasingly transformed. He had not, as many may have thought during the tensions of the Sino-French War, simply "gone native." What he had become was something of a Western counterpart of Cohen's littoral men. But what was this littoral man? Cohen portrayed Wang Tao as the archetype.

Because he failed a mid-level Confucian examination, Wang Tao found an official career closed off to him. He then turned to a position with the London Missionary Society in Shanghai. Like other Chinese in Western service and Westerners in the Chinese customs service, Wang was viewed by his countrymen as something akin to a traitor. He then worked through the missionary newspapers to introduce Western values to the Chinese and later, through his association with James Legge's

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*4 Ibid., p. 257.
production of translations of the Classics, to present Chinese traditions to the West. Cohen compares Wang Tao to a host of other littoral individuals who stood with one foot in China and the other in the West. Cohen writes of Wang that his “intensive exposure to the West and to Westerners, while it did not serve to uproot him, did serve to give him perspectives that were not accessible to Chinese of earlier epochs, or for that matter, to most of his contemporaries.” One could certainly say as much for Giquel. Though Western, he certainly inhabited the same zones of cross-cultural tradition about which Cohen, Spence, and Murphey have written.

But what of Giquel’s role within the well-known pattern of Western advisers? Was he no more than another in a long stream of men who had come, in Jonathan Spence’s memorable phrase, “to change China”? Was there anything unique or at least unusual in his experience? It would be hard to deny that the simple length and diversity of Giquel’s career set him apart. His career paralleled the evolution of Western interaction with China. If one were to catalog the variety of Giquel’s activities, one would find that that few other China Hands experienced such a diversity of roles. Gordon might have had more combat experience, Fryer was perhaps more active in the translation of Western materials, and Hart was no doubt more influential in the customs service. But in each of these areas and in others as well Giquel too was active. Nevertheless, sheer longevity of experience was not the only point that distinguished Giquel from his fellow advisers.

Perhaps the most obvious difference between Giquel and other China Hands was his goals. Generations of China Hands, from Matteo Ricci through W. A. P. Martin and Timothy Richard, dedicated themselves to changing China—to Christianizing it. Men such as John Fryer and Halliday Macartney had not been interested in proselytization; nevertheless, on a more personal level, their goals were equally grand. Macartney, the director of the Nanjing Arsenal and the man whose career in China so often paralleled Giquel’s, once told Charles “Chinese” Gordon that he had hoped to acquire an influence equal to that gained by the early Jesuit missionaries to the court at Beijing. At the Jiangnan Arsenal, John Fryer labored for years to translate Western publications, especially materials on science and technology, into Chinese; but he was frustrated by the limited rewards offered by the Chinese. Both men had

5 Ibid., p. 87.
been hired, used, and certainly appreciated, but little more. For Macartney and Fryer that had been a source of discouragement and frustration. By the end of their careers in China, Fryer and Peter Parker, the American missionary-physician turned diplomat, felt bitter toward China. Horatio Nelson Lay, commander of the ill-fated Lay-Osborn flotilla, personified arrogance and condescension in his relations with the Chinese. Generation after generation of missionaries was patronizing, paternalistic, and pious. Each knew what was best for China and each demanded something of the Chinese.

There is no evidence that Prosper Giquel harbored any of these grandiose goals. He had no personal ambition to direct Chinese affairs, no arrogance nor sense of superiority. In fact, Giquel’s modest ambitions and his willingness to assume a subordinate role within the Chinese hierarchy may have been the key to his success. Although Giquel had worked for Zuo Zongtang, Shen Baozhen, and Li Hongzhang, he had not competed for influence as Robert Hart had competed with Li.8

Prosper Giquel’s career ambitions can be listed briefly. He admired Chinese civilization and hoped China would be able to preserve it. Aware of the disruptive influence that contact with Europeans had on Chinese society, he encouraged a lessening of the system of extraterritoriality. To strengthen China militarily, he spent much of his career working to transfer European military and industrial technology. Lastly, he wanted France, the land of his birth, to serve as a technological helpmate enabling China to enter the international family of nations as an equal. That, for Giquel, was the key to true Sino-French cooperation and friendship.

In a letter to Emperor Napoleon III, Giquel once described himself as follows: “I present myself to you not as a naval lieutenant but as a Frenchman in the service of China with the desire to work for the interests of the country to which I have offered my services and above all to be useful, to the weak limits of my power, to the interests of my own country.” That self-description was offered in 1863. Twenty years later Giquel appeared to some to favor the Chinese over the French; nevertheless, there had never been an abrupt shift in his attitudes. Throughout his career Giquel remained willing to walk the tightrope between his two homelands and constantly to confront the dilemma inherent in his dual loyalty.

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Perhaps the most fundamental difference between Giquei and his fellow advisers was attitudinal. Unlike Ricci, Parker, and Martin, he had not used Western science—astronomy and medicine—to promote Christianity. Like Fryer, Giquei offered his help in transferring Western skills for their own sake. Though they derived differing degrees of satisfaction from their roles both Giquei and Fryer were technocrats willing to help China obtain the scientific skills it wanted without insisting on those Western values it rejected. Men such as Giquei and Fryer were willing to cooperate within the ti-yong framework of transferring Western learning for practical efforts (yong) while retaining Chinese learning as the foundation (ti).  

Since Giquei’s principal role in China was through his efforts during the Self-strengthening Movement, it is appropriate to evaluate his achievements and compare them with more recent efforts, especially those of the Four Modernizations Campaign.

From Self-Strengthening to the Four Modernizations

Shen Baozhen’s and Giquei’s work at the Fuzhou Dockyard stressed educational goals rather than vessel construction. Although the work at the dockyard failed to incorporate the latest technology of the 1870s, it did contribute to the technical training necessary if the dockyard were to compete successfully. If the ships were not as modern as some would have liked, neither were they as outmoded as some have suggested. Nevertheless, the Fuzhou Dockyard administration recognized the necessity of advancing the technical sophistication of its operations. Political considerations beyond the control of Giquei and Shen made it impossible to retain the European staff after 1874, but the government did approve the educational missions that Giquei and Shen considered vital components of their overall program. The dockyard’s goal as Giquei once put it was “not so much to build ships as to teach the Chinese how to build and operate them.”

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 is testimony to the failure of self-strengthening efforts at military industrial modernization. From that failure has come a host of efforts to find the roots of error. This has led researchers to focus on obvious problems—to study, for example, the American Educational Mission, which ended in fiasco, rather than the

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considerably more successful European mission. It has been pointed out that the Fuzhou ships were not as modern as some, rather than noting the continuing progress they represented. One wonders, if China had been victorious in 1895, whether a generation of scholars might have forgotten Yung Wing and the Yale mission and focused on the European mission dispatched from Fuzhou.

The failures of China’s Self-strengthening Movement can be understood most clearly from an examination of the broader context of Chinese society that failed to support self-strengthening and assimilate its accomplishments. Projects such as Fuzhou eventually failed because the imperial government and provincial bureaucracy were not sufficiently interested in promoting it. The principal problems that faced the self-strengtheners are remarkably familiar to those who study China’s more recent efforts at modernization.

Among writers dealing with China’s current modernization drive, especially the Four Modernizations program, considerable effort has been made to delineate the fundamentals of modernization. Emphasis has been placed on the ability to transfer technology successfully—to absorb and disseminate it into the larger society. Shannon Brown has written of the necessity of using human capital by improving education at the primary and graduate level as well as sending students abroad; of bringing in the physical capital of technology transfer, the machinery and factories and the development of the appropriate institutions and complementary facilities to absorb and service them; and of the capacity to develop the appropriate environment to promote their use and modification.¹¹

A. Doak Barnett in his work on the Four Modernizations has emphasized the multi-faceted Chinese approach: student educational improvement—large numbers sent abroad; the improvement of internal foreign language training; the dispatching abroad of lower level technicians; and finally, the reemphasis on foreign technicians and scientists as short- and long-term advisers.¹²

How similar was the Self-strengthening Movement, specifically the efforts of Giquel and Shen at Fuzhou to current activities? The first and most obvious difference is that modernization since 1949 has been carried out under a very broad national consensus. From backyard blast furnaces


to the sophisticated revitalization of elitist institutes of pure research, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping have shared a basic commitment to modernize China. Certainly the specifics of modernization valued by Mao and Deng have varied so widely as to make practical advances often impossible. Nevertheless, it needs to be recognized that at the broadest level contemporary China is considerably more receptive to modernization than the Qing government Shen and Giquel faced.

Shen and Giquel had placed their primary emphasis on the development of human capital. In this their values were quite similar to contemporary efforts, and in many ways their concerns fit well into the contemporary policy struggles of today’s China. During the Cultural Revolution, China spurned advisers and depreciated the skills of Chinese trained abroad. A similar attitude was common during the self-strengthening years as well. Self-strengthening produced a modest cadre of Chinese trained in Western learning; China of the 1960s had a generation of such people. In both cases the larger society was unwilling to appreciate and utilize these people. It was a failure of those who directed the society, not of those who arranged the students’ training.

One of the technical pitfalls common to modernization efforts is the time lag associated with the transfer of technology. By the time a developing nation has studied a particular technique and transferred the skills necessary to produce a product, the initiating nation has already advanced beyond that level of technology. That was certainly the case at Fuzhou. Choosing the trusted method of wooden ship construction common in the mid-1860s, Giquel and Shen found that by the 1870s iron ship production was increasingly common in the West.

Efforts at reverse engineering—for example, to purchase an engine and attempt to replicate it—were common but only minimally effective. Such techniques typically produce only sophisticated handicraft skills and force the dependent nation to remain in a continuing state of technological inferiority. Such efforts were common at Fuzhou, and they continued well into the 1960s. The attraction of this method is that it allows immediate “progress” without the necessity of reorganizing a society to develop fully the skills necessary not to copy, but to innovate technologically.

An awareness of the shortcomings of reverse engineering has developed during the Four Modernizations era. But nineteenth-century Chinese modernizers saw the fallacies of reverse engineering as well. Wang Tao was among the earliest to recognize that Western technology was an ongoing process, that it was not static and could not simply be
transferred. Judging from the nature of their plans, it is obvious that the leaders at the Fuzhou Dockyard were aware of these issues.

The dockyard leaders shared a realization that the development of Western naval skills required more than one simple method, more than reverse engineering, more than training in the sciences or the sending abroad of students and apprentices for further training. Giquel and Shen appear to have been aware that all of these efforts were needed if they were to succeed. In many ways the multi-faceted approach to modernization attempted at Fuzhou is similar to today’s efforts.

For modernization to succeed in nineteenth-century China, several conditions needed to be realized. These conditions are no less important today. First in importance is a national commitment. In this regard, it appears that for at least the immediate future, China is willing to make that commitment and to define her priorities and personnel decisions accordingly. In this way newly trained personnel can be used and the isolated enclave of modernization that occurred during self-strengthening can be avoided.

Assuming political stability and a continuing national commitment, the generation of sufficient capital remains critical. The uncertain supply of funds, from a less than enthusiastic Qing government, itself beset by financial demands from the Western powers, severely limited the funding available for projects such as Fuzhou. Today’s China has hardly improved its finances in the last hundred years. China is still beset by difficult financial choices and in dire need of the financial reserves necessary to implement modernization. Today, China is hoping that a combination of efforts including the development of light industries, tourism, coal, and oil will allow the accumulation of the necessary capital. As in the nineteenth century, foreign wars, most recently the ill-fated invasion of Vietnam, have drained away valuable resources that are needed for development.

The ability to absorb the various advanced technologies is another measure of China’s ability to modernize successfully. It is clear that self-strengthening created a series of Western enclaves, many large and impressive but still isolated “islands.” Today’s modernization efforts are more broadly gauged; nevertheless, problems of absorption and integration have been common. The notorious case of the Bao Shan steel complex near Shanghai is an obvious example. Here again, problems similar to those of the nineteenth century continue to challenge Chinese modernizers.

The relative successes of the Fuzhou modernizers is a tribute to the complicated process of modernization, a process of societal transformation.

so complex that it can fail even while succeeding. So it was with self-strengthening. The failures at Fuzhou appeared obvious. But one must not forget that skills were developed, and individuals were well trained. If immediate failure occurred, one must recall that from this training would sprout the roots of China’s twentieth-century efforts at modernization. The lesson provided by the successes and failures of self-strengthening may yet prove an important ingredient of China’s future modernization.

For Prosper Giquel, the man who dedicated his life to seeing that France served as China’s helpmate in the process of modernization, the final satisfaction might well have come in January of 1978 when China, seeking to sign its first formal agreement with a Western country for scientific and technological cooperation, chose France as her first partner. Giquel would have been pleased.
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