Educational Exchanges: Essays on the Sino-American Experience
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Educational Exchanges
Essays on the Sino-American Experience

EDITED BY
Joyce K. Kallgren and
Denis Fred Simon
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Denis Fred Simon
Jan Carol Berris is vice-president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.
Mary Brown Bullock is director of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China.
Warren I. Cohen is professor of history and director of the Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University.
Ainslie T. Embree is professor of history, Columbia University.
Ruth Hayhoe is assistant professor in the Higher Education Group of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education affiliated with the University of Toronto.
Joyce K. Kallgren is professor of political science, Davis campus, and chair of the Center for Chinese Studies, Berkeley campus, University of California.
Patrick G. Maddox is associate director of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University.
Richard Madsen is professor of sociology, University of California, San Diego.
Frank Ninkovich is associate professor of history, St. John's University, New York.
Denis Fred Simon is Ford International Assistant Professor of Management and Technology, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Richard P. Suttmeier is Henry P. Bristol Professor of International Affairs, Hamilton College, New York.
Francis X. Sutton is a retired Ford Foundation officer and was acting president of the Social Science Research Council, 1985-86.
Anne F. Thurston is a consultant to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and China representative for Academic Travel Abroad.
Preface

The conference from which the papers in this volume are derived was jointly planned by Dr. Mary B. Bullock, director of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC); Dr. Douglas Murray, then vice-president of the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, and now president of the China Institute in New York; Professor David M. Lampton, who was on leave from the CSCPRC in 1984–85 to conduct research on exchanges; and the co-editors. In the course of planning the conference it was agreed that Professors Kallgren and Simon would take responsibility for editing a postconference volume. We want to acknowledge the contributions of Doctors Bullock and Murray to the planning of the conference as well their early suggestions with respect to relevant topics to be included in the sessions.

The organization and financing of the conference was made possible by a number of individuals and organizations. We are especially grateful to the East-West Center for hosting our meetings and facilitating the travel of some of the participants. Dr. Victor Li, president of the East-West Center, provided intellectual counsel and the wonderful hospitality for which he and his colleagues are well known. His staff were unfailingly gracious to all of us. Dr. Glenn Shive guided us through the necessary administrative details at the East-West Center and also made a number of very helpful suggestions with respect to participants and topic.

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Individual authors are responsible for the content of their own manuscripts. We are responsible for the selection of the papers.

Joyce K. Kallgren, Berkeley, California
Denis Fred Simon, Cambridge, Massachusetts

November 1986
Examining Exchanges: An Overview

Joyce K. Kallgren
Denis Fred Simon

The rapid growth in the numbers of visiting scientists, students, athletes, political leaders, entertainers, and even military figures from the People's Republic of China to the United States has taken place seemingly without much fanfare. The presence of numerous delegations from all areas of China and all walks of life is so commonplace today that there tends to be relatively little commentary upon them in either the local media or among their fellow nationals. With almost astonishing speed and little disruption, Chinese from the PRC have returned to the educational and social domain of American life. While their numbers remain relatively small in terms of China's population of more than one billion, the fact is that the potential consequences of expanded U.S.-China interactions in the cultural, educational, and scientific areas have raised some important issues for academic, social, and political leaders in both countries.

When the decision was made by PRC authorities to permit the opening to the West and to encourage and, at times, finance the training of students and scholars, American surprise quickly translated into enthusiasm and pleasure at the prospect of greater interaction. One hope was that reciprocity would be forthcoming on the Chinese side so that Americans would also have substantial opportunities for studying and conducting research in China. Heretofore, however, only a small percentage of these expectations has been realized, leaving some individuals dismayed at the slow pace at which the Chinese have responded to American requests for access to Chinese archives, statistical materials, and the like.

Various aspects of the Sino-U.S. exchange experience, especially in terms of its overall development, have been the subject of interest and study. The U.S. government, philanthropic organizations, and to some extent the academic community have been interested in the development process, its characteristics, and its potential impact. In the area of academic exchange, surveys of both Chinese and American participants have been conducted, using statistical information garnered from the visa applications of Chinese visitors as well as data collected through questionnaires and interviews with a number of educational institutions in the United States. The results of these efforts are available in a monograph published by the National Academy of Sciences entitled *A Relationship Restored* (1986).

Similarly, the scientific exchange and technology cooperation dimensions of the Sino-U.S. relationship have also been the object of analysis.
Working on behalf of the Department of State, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier (one of the contributors to this volume) has analyzed the implementation and operation of the science and technology (S&T) cooperation agreement originally signed in 1979. Suttmeier conducted extensive interviews with both U.S. and Chinese officials in order to assess the exchange process and to suggest ways in which government leaders on both sides could work toward making the agreement more beneficial for both sides. A complementary study is currently being carried out by the East-West Center under the auspices of China's State Science and Technology Commission.

In many respects, this monograph is quite different in composition, design, and purpose from these other studies. First, it is a collection of essays that explores the history, development, raison d'être, and consequences of the renewal of Sino-American exchanges using as data, in a number of cases, the education experience of Chinese and American participants. Second, all of the participants have been involved in various aspects of the exchanges; in fact, most have played a central role. The papers are therefore informed by the observations and recollections of those key individuals who have had firsthand experience in initiating or administering important aspects of the exchange relationship. Third, the essays are written largely from the perspective of the American side. While it has proven possible to learn something about Chinese perceptions and attitudes from reports in the PRC press and informal discussions with Chinese colleagues, comprehensive judgments about Chinese viewpoints are difficult to make. Thus, with some exceptions, the essays do not devote major attention to the array of Chinese perspectives on the issues under discussion.

The essays in this monograph (except the paper by Madsen) were originally presented and discussed at the Conference on Sino-American Cultural and Scientific Exchanges held at the East-West Center in Honolulu in February 1985. They reflect the usual intellectual "give and take" that occurs in most conference settings. The conference was characterized, at the time, by sharp disagreements among the participants about the nature of the relationship that had been established, the policies that gave birth to many of the exchange programs, their impact, and their potential implications. Out of the very lively debate that took place at the meeting came both consensus and continued disagreement. The papers in this volume reflect these different opinions and perceptions of the exchange relationship.

The impetus for the Honolulu conference and the publication of this monograph grows out of a concern with and interest in the rapidity of the reintegration of China into the stream of the American education system, research organizations, and social setting. The editors were motivated by a common belief that it was necessary to consider the broader intellectual consequences and policy issues that the proliferation of Sino-American exchanges has raised. While no easy answers are provided to the many questions that emerge in the papers that follow, the reader will walk away
with a greater appreciation of the plethora of critical issues that has come to the surface since 1979.

The volume commences with a discussion of the cultural exchange of ideas, the assumptions that seemingly underlie exchange policy, and some queries about whether it is actually possible to exchange ideas between different cultures. The discrepancies between the current Sino-U.S. relationship and American experience during the early twentieth century appear two-fold. Frank Ninkovich in the chapter “The Trajectory of Cultural Internationalism” sets out for the reader some of the thoughts that characterized the American approach to cultural exchanges before 1940. In a very provocative essay, he analyzes the powerful role of nationalism during this period and establishes the ways in which nationalistic considerations form the unspoken backdrop to the national roles that come into play in the more contemporary periods. Moreover, his essay illuminates the importance of the transition that has taken place in the locus of exchange activity. In the pre–World War II period, much of the exchange work was in the domain of the private sector; today, the lead role has fallen into the hands of the public sector.

In her essay on the pre–World War II period, Mary Brown Bullock surveys the exchange experiences of the United States in China. Drawing on her own research on the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC), she sets out the topography of the 1920s and 1930s. The essay should be read keeping in mind not only the commentary on the role of the PUMC, but also the central role that Bullock plays in her capacity as director of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC.

The current renewal of Sino-U.S. exchanges took place against the background of more than twenty years of mutual hostility and suspicion. On the Chinese side, this is illustrated in the strident denunciation of Western neo-imperialism and the calls for intellectual and technological self-reliance by the PRC leadership during the 1950s and especially during the 1960s and early 1970s. On the American side, there was the McCarthy period together with the intellectual and political attacks engineered by the Committee of One Million, which opposed any renewal of Washington’s ties with Beijing.

Prior to the Communist takeover in 1949, the United States had been engaged in a century-long education exchange program with China that came to an abrupt end with the conclusion of the Chinese civil war. The exchanges in the pre-1949 period were funded largely by American philanthropic organizations together with a portion of the Boxer Indemnity Fund. As American scholars visiting China discovered when they toured Chinese campuses in the 1970s and 1980s, many Chinese men and women recalled in a positive light their memories of the hospitality accorded by such institutions as Berkeley (University of California), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Yale, and Oberlin. This legacy from the pre–World
War II period continues to survive in China today. Setting aside nostalgia, however, there are still some important changes that have occurred between the early twentieth century experience and the most recent phase of exchanges. Moreover, the transition in Sino-American exchanges tells us something about the nature of the American educational and research enterprise itself.

Along with an appreciation of the historical context that informs Sino-American exchanges, a number of other areas demand attention if we are to fully understand the dynamics of the bilateral exchange experience. Given the enmity between the two countries and the absence of formal contacts between 1950 and 1971, there remain many questions about the resources, in the form of foundation and missionary support, that sustained activities in the pre-World War II period. Where did the resources go and what forces shaped American interests with respect to China and East Asia? Warren Cohen's chapter, "While China Faced East: Chinese-American Cultural Relations, 1949–71," explores these questions, providing an integrated picture of the diverse forces that influenced American thinking primarily up to the period of renewal.

A set of related questions with respect to political organizations and funding must be confronted as well. These questions deal with the availability and mobilization of resources for facilitating the development of the exchanges in the 1970s. Where did the personnel come from? What organizations supported the effort on the American side? How did foundations respond? Was their role similar to the pre-World War II experience? Joyce Kallgren writes about three of the key organizations that were and remain central to educational exchanges from the standpoint of formal educational activities (CSCPRC), from a political and elite perspective (the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations), and the more mass-oriented, people-to-people activities (the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association). She places these organizations and their activities within the tradition of American political activism and explains why these "associations" did not disappear when their initial goals were achieved.

The Kallgren chapter is followed by a more intimate discussion of the National Committee written by Jan Berris. Because of her close relationship with the development and growth of the National Committee, Berris is able to provide specific details about the twenty years of National Committee involvement in initiating and managing Sino-American exchanges. Her paper is both thoughtful and provocative in that it reveals a number of heretofore relatively unknown "tidbits" regarding the early phases of U.S.-China exchange relations.

With respect to the 1970s and 1980s, it is easy to underestimate the importance and role of the various major philanthropic organizations. While it is true that their role changed in contrast to the pre-World War II period, as Ninkovich suggests and Cohen shows, throughout the Cold War period the foundations continued to provide funding for contacts with Chi-
nese communities in Asia. In addition, they funded many of the activities arranged by the organizations discussed by Kallgren, and as Berris tells us, they funded the work of the National Committee. The atmospherics surrounding the work of the Ford Foundation are brought to light by Frank Sutton, who has spent most of his professional life associated with Ford.

Up to this point, the essays have set forth, from the American perspective, the history, organizational structure, and funding sources for the period of the renewed Sino-U.S. exchange relationship in 1970. It is now appropriate to take a closer look at the exchange experience. The educational problems of the 1970s and 1980s are also instructive in this regard. Issues such as the establishment of equivalency in educational preparation between the two countries, the allocation of financial support, and the apparent enthusiasm of American universities for accommodating Chinese students and scholars have all raised broad concerns among those who are generally involved in the exchanges field. In a time of scarce resources for all types of such programs, how do we account for the apparent success of many Chinese students in gaining support for graduate training and extended research-related stays in the United States?

In elaborating on the development of Sino-U.S. exchanges, it is important for Americans to recognize that our experience with China is not *sui generis*. It is equally important to explore whether or not Chinese programs vis-à-vis the United States evolved *de novo* or whether they have counterparts in China's relations with other nations. Some of these questions are addressed in the three chapters that follow Sutton's. In a frank appraisal of the reasons underlying American support for educational exchange with China, Thurston and Maddox set before the reader a number of the difficulties implicit in many of the programs, the views of Chinese participants, and the very real funding problems that confront American colleges and universities in their efforts to assist the growing numbers of PRC students and scholars who wish to attend U.S. institutions of higher education.

Taking a more comparative perspective, the next two chapters are designed to remind us that the problems highlighted previously are not unique to the Sino-American experience. Ainslee Embree, in his account of American-Indian exchanges, alerts the reader to many of the same themes discussed by Thurston and Maddox. At the same time, the spontaneous and very decentralized character of the American effort is contrasted with the European experience in dealing with the PRC in the chapter by Ruth Hayhoe. In her discussion of the thinking underlying European initiatives toward China, Hayhoe offers some hypotheses about the interrelationship between economic interests and bilateral exchanges, points that might well be kept in mind in evaluating the American case.

The final third of the volume addresses three central issues. First, the consequences of the exchanges in the humanities and social sciences are discussed by Richard Madsen. So far, it has been in this area where Ameri-
can interest (in contrast to the Chinese orientation) has been highest, with American scholars in the China field seeking to undertake their work in historical archives, museums, cities, and the countryside. Madsen sets out some of the organizational and value problems that are implicit in the contemporary experience. The second issue deals with the counterpart questions in science and technology. The majority of Chinese men and women who have come to the United States under the exchange program are involved in fields related to science and technology. Cooperative research provides a vehicle for imparting many of the West's norms regarding research (e.g., peer review). Even though only a short time has passed, Suttmeier suggests that the U.S. scientific community has already had a significant shaping effect—both positive and negative—on the evolution of S&T organizations and policymaking in the PRC. For better or worse, in both domains the conclusions of the authors are both interesting and potentially troublesome.

Finally, the volume concludes with a discussion of the policy questions that are intertwined in the transfer of technology from the United States to China. Although technology transfer problems are obviously more acute in the case of direct hardware sales, the training of scholars in very advanced fields, their access to well-equipped laboratories, and their exposure to state-of-the-art thinking about important scientific and technological developments all raise potentially important national security and foreign policy questions. This has been particularly true in the case of U.S.-PRC relations as well as U.S.-USSR relations. Some will deny the relevance of these issues. To the contrary, however, Denis Simon's chapter suggests that this should not be the case. Moreover, he argues that, in some but not all respects, the Sino-American technology transfer relationship has proceeded too far too fast in relation to the state of the bilateral political relationship.

The world of exchanges in the pre-World War II period—when there were fewer and less sharp discrepancies in the purposes and goals of the United States—may have been much simpler. In the 1980s, the complexities of issues such as scientific and technological development perplex governments and academics more than ever before. Industrial espionage and advantages in communications, for example, are linked with economic achievement and industrial policy as well as with such goals as educational development and quality of life. Under such circumstances, the overwhelming attention of Chinese scholars and students in the United States contrasts quite sharply with the current humanist and social science interests of most American scholars in China.

All three of the final chapters address some very controversial and important issues. The early chapters made clear that the exchanges were linked to the state of bilateral relations and were bellwethers of diplomatic problems. The organizations that sought to expand international interactions did not, for the most part, have to consider the broader political context and outcomes. To a considerable degree, many of us hope that such
would also be the case today. But in the 1980s and beyond, the substantive content of exchanges will be of concern to governmental bodies as well as universities. In fact, given recent trends in the growth of applied research on American campuses (e.g., Star Wars), the tensions between government and the university are likely to become further exacerbated.

The chapters in this monograph, taken together, provide a sense of history and some insight into the organizations that carried forward the exchange enterprise and offer a series of judgments about the underlying objectives that informed the actions of the individuals and institutions that implemented private and public policies. China will continue to hold a great fascination for Americans, and thus exchanges are likely to expand in the future. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that despite repeated assurances by some Chinese leaders with respect to their commitment to an “open door” policy, the resignation of Hu Yaobang together with new regulations applicable to students seeking to go abroad would seem to indicate a conservatism with respect to exchanges and fuller screening of those permitted to depart for study. The new campaign to criticize intellectuals cannot help but chill aspects of the exchange program. Whether the criticisms will extend to the foreign friends of Chinese scholars is unknown at the time of writing.

In some important respects, China in the future will more closely approximate a typical developing country, plagued with many of the same problems and destined to seek out many of the same solutions. At the same time, the December 1986 student protest and the CCP response will also remind the reader that China is a developing country led by a Communist party. This realization will also serve to limit the degree to which sole reliance can be placed upon the “developing nation” model in any analysis. Under such circumstances, our previous orientation toward China may gradually be changed, especially as issues such as foreign assistance, military cooperation, and trade problems move to center stage in the relationship. This change will have important implications for our treatment of China as a partner in exchanges. The precise changes remain unclear, but one thing is certain, namely, that the controversies of the past are likely to continue. It therefore will be intriguing to follow the course of Sino-American exchanges in the future as China’s modernization moves ahead and the United States seeks to play a role in that modernization. This volume, it is hoped, will provide a foundation for dealing with some of the new issues that are likely to emerge as bilateral relations mature and exchanges proceed.
The Trajectory of Cultural Internationalism

Frank Ninkovich

Although cultural policies are always framed in a political context, international cultural relations also have a historical meaning that transcends immediate political concerns. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which is always tightly corseted by the existential present, the practice of cultural relations has traditionally depended on a panoramic sensibility that extends both backward and forward in time. Therefore, any persuasive reconsideration of cultural relations requires an assessment of how the evolution of practice and principle has affected our conception of the future.

In the search for the larger historical meaning of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), it would be tempting to interpret the rapid and luxuriant flowering of cultural contacts following the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1979 as a natural history marked by a fated continuity. The story line would be simple and in the best Hollywood tradition of happy endings. The period up to the founding of the PRC built a solid foundation, but the erection of the superstructure was halted temporarily by a Maoist-inspired work stoppage. With normalization—the term itself implies that disruption was merely temporary and produced no fundamental changes—the ideological picket lines came down, and the two nations continued to build on the legacy of the past. With an extraordinary burst of interest in exchanges since normalization and the release of long pent-up energies, we seemed merely to be picking up where we had left off in the 1940s. If so, it seems that our larger meaning is to be found in the past, from which we can take comfort in a natural history of continuous, progressive development.

Unfortunately, however, the story is both more complex and less optimistic than the cheery scenario charted above because the cold war was not simply an unscheduled intermission, but a period during which the historical script was rewritten. While the links with the past are undeniably there, in myriad hopes, institutions, and transculturally shared memories, the discontinuities are just as significant, if not more so. Since 1949, American internationalism has undergone a drastic alteration in the sense of historical process that once provided an ultimate meaning to the pursuit of cultural contacts with China. Because this change has been less striking than the high drama played out on the political stage, its meaning and implications for cultural policy remain yet to be addressed.

The most visible evidence of the change is found in the institutional arrangements and practices through which exchanges are conducted. The
philanthropic pioneers of cultural exchange early in the twentieth century viewed the promotion and organization of cultural contacts as a private function. There was, to be sure, from the very beginning a necessary and intimate connection with the government and its foreign policy. But while philanthropists, missionaries, and scholars tended to share with statesmen the same broad liberal ideals of international community, the locus of policy-making in cultural affairs was thought properly to reside in the private sector. To the extent that an expanded governmental presence came increasingly to be thought desirable, it was in the facilitative capacity of a stagehand rather than in a directorial role. Domestically, the government's job was to serve as a clearinghouse, as a national and international switchboard, by providing information and coordinating communication. Abroad, its task was not unlike the function it had assumed in commercial promotion: to keep the stage machinery functioning for a private cast of characters.

The motive behind this private dominance was, quite simply, a fear of state control. An aversion to the politicization and centralization of culture has traditionally been so strong in the United States that a governmental role in cultural policy (Indian affairs always excepted) has been much slower in arriving than in the areas of social and economic policy—this applies equally to the domestic support of the arts and humanities. And even when it did arrive, the public-private relationship functioned less than smoothly, being characterized by conflicting interests, cross-purposes, frequent failures of communication, administrative confusion, and periodic uproars featuring hypersensitive responses to situations that raised questions of final authority.

The suspicion of heavy-handed governmental involvement arose from a body of beliefs deeply rooted in American political culture. Americans have always believed that organizational structures and institutional arrangements could have decisive political consequences. Too prominent a governmental role in international cultural activities would threaten the private and voluntarist conception of authority that served as a substitute for the bureaucratically centralized European models to which Americans have traditionally been averse. This conviction was structurally embedded in the Constitution, whose institutional architecture was designed as much to frustrate the emergence of an overweening center of authority as to create a national government. Subsequent generations would resolve the state/society problem after their own fashion. The localist Jacksonian mentality of the nineteenth century rooted authority in private associations, while the emergence of a modern American nationalism in the early twentieth century came to rest on the unimpeded functioning of new communities of professional and corporate experts.

This domestically rooted opposition to government power had its cosmopolitan corollary in the belief that liberal modernization, which was both cause and consequence of historical change, took place outside the sphere of politics. The history of civilization was, by and large, thought to
be cultural history. This belief in the primacy of culture did not necessarily entail a repudiation of the role of power in international affairs, for the two were widely acknowledged to operate side by side. Even so outspoken an evangelist of force and realism as Theodore Roosevelt would have been quick to agree that there existed a basic, if by no means absolute, historical distinction between cultural and political dynamics. He would have agreed, too, that although it was indispensable in the short run, power was ultimately evanescent. In the long view, it was the highly distilled cultural residues that served both as a potent elixir for continued progress and as the legacy of civilizational greatness. In the international pursuit of modernization, then, it was only logical for the new elites to expect the same degree of professional sovereignty that they had come to possess at home.

When the U.S. Department of State established its Division of Cultural Relations in 1938, it agreed with these nonpolitical assumptions. The new programs were launched with the understanding that private interests would continue to shape policy and that programs would be conducted without regard to the twists and turns of everyday foreign policy. The distinction between policy and administration was sharply drawn, with power radiating upward from a broad base of constituent organizations to a governmental apparatus which was supposed to be a neutral administrative creature with no agenda or appetites of its own. So powerful is the appeal of this organizational ideal that it continues to be rhetorically attractive to the present day, but the symbolism's relationship to practice is somewhat suspect. In the beginning, however, this was a long-range, visionary enterprise, which looked forward optimistically to the time when cultural reconciliation would relegate politics to the trash heap of history.

With its eyes fixed firmly on the stars, this farsighted program soon stumbled over the bumpy terrain of events. Thanks to World War II, no sooner had the organizational pieces been set meticulously in place than they were overturned in favor of a very different pattern. On the one hand, the programs' nonpolitical assumptions were undermined by the war's propaganda requirements. The general belief that the crusade against fascism was a war for civilization produced widespread agreement that, in this case at least, long- and short-range policies, culture, and power, were not antagonistic and could work together. As for institutional developments, the expansion of governmental funding and authority inevitably dwarfed the contributions of private agencies and diminished their influence. The philanthropic foundations and cultural community were soon reduced either to running pilot programs, which, if successful, would be adopted later by the government on an expanded scale, or to serving as subcontractors to which the government farmed out its programs.

Unlike World War I, whose brevity permitted a nearly total administrative demobilization, the bureaucratic structures erected during World War II managed to survive and flourish in its aftermath. The onset of the cold war shortly following the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 made
permanent those changes that, when originally introduced, were thought to be only temporary. Despite the resistance of some purist old-line advocates of a return to strict public-private separation, the idea of cultural relations as an instrument of foreign policy became firmly institutionalized, albeit with a good deal of continuing discomfort and confusion about organizational arrangements and uneasiness over the permissible extent of political intrusion in cultural affairs, problems which continue to exist to the present day (Ninkovich, 1981).

This new order of things did not result in the politicization of culture or the direct control of cultural relations by the government, much as some officials would have liked to see that happen. Even when the unthinkable did occur, namely, secret funding of "private" organizations by the Central Intelligence Agency, the content of cultural programs was relatively untarnished by propagandistic manipulation, though many a nasty controversy swirled around the issue. Indeed, in the socially conservative 1950s, when the liberal commitment to freedom of ideas was severely limited by conformist social pressures, this was one of the few ways in which genuinely liberal movements and individuals arguing on behalf of intellectually and artistically innovative viewpoints—unpopular and therefore undemocratic, to some eyes—could be promoted. As one historian has recently argued, modern art became a symbol of the liberal American commitment to intellectual freedom and cultural novelty more as the consequence of cold war propaganda than of autochthonous artistic developments (Guilbaut, 1983). A decidedly odd policy mixture thus emerged, composed in equal measure of the liberal tabu against cultural control, popular revulsion against the national subsidy of elitist liberal culture, and a complex balance of cold war ideological imperatives.

The assimilation of cultural relations to foreign policy occurred in other ways as well. The power of the purse shaped the flow of cultural programs by geographic region, discipline, scale, and content. More important, though, was the implicit assumption under which this promotion occurred: that if the other side played politics with culture, we had no choice but to do the same. Although masked by administrative chaos and traditionalist rhetoric, the priorities were clear: For the duration, culture would matter less than power. In this strange fashion, within the short space of a decade, the intellectual and institutional arrangements of American cultural policy built up by a half century of deliberate and self-conscious evolution had been reversed. The changes did not take place without debate or resistance, but it was one of the more remarkable features of the cold war that traditional ideas and practices, which like Excalibur appeared to be permanently embedded in America's political culture, were so swiftly (and almost as magically) removed from their secure lodgment.

Contact with mainland China ended just as the cold war consensus was gaining ascendancy, and, as a result, there was no need for a full-dress debate over these issues as they related specifically to China. Even if one
had taken place, it would probably have made little difference, for it was clear that the resumption of cultural contacts following normalization would have to be erected on a political foundation, if only because the Chinese would insist on it—something that in the past they had been powerless to do. The absence of such a debate thirty-five years ago has served to obscure, or at least to render less noticeable and problematic, this shift from private and voluntarist to public and political assumptions.

Thus, one of the first things that strikes the historian’s eye in the new era of cultural interchange with China is the frank acceptance of a political framework which at one time would have been thought intolerable. In place of voluntarism, which was the term previously used to describe associational activity in connection with government facilitation, we now speak of pluralism, which accepts a decisive role for government. As a substitute for the old rhetoric which rejected nationalism as the basis of cultural policy, we now speak of enlightened self-interest as our motivation. Instead of enthusiastically serving the cause of cosmopolitanism, the large corps of China specialists which has emerged since the 1950s seems to be more interested in exchange from a technical, professional, and bureaucratic point of view.

All of this is now accepted in a matter-of-fact, pragmatic way in the name of realism. Certainly there continues to exist an undercurrent of unease about the untoward effects of politics on the exchange process. In an era when it is increasingly difficult to find emphatic means of political retaliation that are at the same time not overly threatening or injurious to oneself, exchanges are very vulnerable to manipulation because of their potent symbolic value and political innocuousness. There is also the possibility of exchange programs foundering suddenly as the result of yet another inclement turn of political weather. But such doubts are overridden by an understanding that if exchanges are to proceed at all, they have to accommodate themselves to political realities. Politics and power for Americans today are facts of life, realities that much of the pre–World War II generation would have rejected.

All these changes notwithstanding, a good case for continuity could still be made, a case rooted in the historical transition from private to public which is characteristic of policy history in just about every sphere of American life in the post–Civil War era. Moreover, to the extent that U.S.-Chinese relations rest on a base of common political interests, it could well be argued that the relationship is more firmly grounded than in the past, when cultural discourse was distorted by an asymmetry of power which precluded normal processes of political give and take.

However understood, this new realism or pragmatism focuses primarily on the organized practice of cultural relations, that is, the institutional methods by which they are conducted. These changes have occurred at the level of social structure, and despite the considerable administrative complexity of the enterprise, their lineaments can be easily traced and comprehended. But their implications for cultural relations in the realm of values...
and historical objectives are not so obvious and have yet to be discussed, much less absorbed, by the cultural community. If we consider these changes in values, there is indeed a natural history to be related, but it is far from being a reassuring tale of continuity.

Early cultural internationalists would have questioned the legitimacy of a marriage between politics and culture. Because they were thought to be different species of behavior, fertile cultural offspring could not issue from a political parent. To restate the problem, politics and power entanglements at a minimum delayed or obstructed, and more likely prevented altogether, the process of cultural integration. In foreign affairs, the power orientation of traditionally informed ruling elites was thought to have become an all-consuming end in itself. At the same time, cultural relations aimed not only at ending the cultural isolation of peoples by eliminating nationalism and ethnocentrism in international relations, but also at the abolition of its diplomatic expression, power politics.

An apolitical style was thought to be essential to the fulfillment of the overriding goal: the creation of a global community in which cultural values held in common transcended the narrow and parochial political imperatives of the nation-state. The unification of mankind, the rediscovery of a common human nature lost following the dispersion of mankind at the Tower of Babel, and the end of the alienated condition that resulted therefrom would be accomplished by the breaking down of the cultural barriers that isolated humanity from itself.

All this was to be accomplished primarily through the interchange of ideas. The diffusion of rationality was promoted by a congeries of educational projects as varied as the expressions of culture itself—in art, literature, the humanities, and the social sciences—but most promisingly of all through exposure to the universalist rationality implicit in the practice of Western science (Bullock, 1985; Ninkovich, 1984). The common professional identity shared by the new cosmopolitan elites and the common language of cosmopolitanism that they spoke would, it was envisioned, enable men to tackle problems from a unified global perspective.

This was nothing less than liberal utopianism. It was more than a static Platonic ideal, however, for cultural internationalism was based on a liberal historical myth of progress, which in its own way was no less compelling in the comprehensiveness and detail of its historical roadmap than its Marxist shadow. Cultural progress in the nineteenth century was left pretty much to the invisible hand of laissez-faire, but the Progressive era gave birth to a new conception of the nature of historical change that replaced the determinist faith in a benign Providence advocated by the cosmologies of the Victorian period. The fin de siècle is known mainly for its upheavals in art, literature, and music, but there took place at the same time a revolutionary reorientation of our basic conceptions of space and time that provided us with a modern historical sensibility (Kern, 1983).
The central concept in this new view of historical process was planning, the guidance of change through the purposeful application of scientific method. The only reason the great philanthropic foundations and later the government became involved in the promotion of cultural relations, after all, was to undertake tasks that otherwise might not be attempted or that would get done inadequately if left to chance. Although the ideal remained a free marketplace where ideas could be exchanged, the emergence of cultural policy was spurred by a recognition that such transactions could best take place within a nurturing institutional environment that would do for ideas what stock exchanges did for capital.

The twentieth century is notable for the emergence of the idea of "social engineering," but the rise of this managerial ethos would have been impossible without its cultural counterpart, which involved nothing less than the scientific management of history: historical engineering, if you will. In other words, cultural relations as a modern enterprise was born of a distinctive historical cast of mind, an attitude toward history. The intellectual ground for this historical myth was first cleared by the Enlightenment ideals of universality and rationality, while its operational code was planted in the array of practices that one scholar has called the "New Liberalism."

When turn-of-the-century progressives thought about cultural relations, they had in mind the flow of powerful world historical currents, the imagined trajectory of mankind. They did not envision cultural relations as a current of historical process separate from or, as it later came to be conceived, as a minor branch of diplomacy. Instead, politics was viewed as a tributary of cultural interaction that would, emptying itself out in the process, eventually merge into an inclusive cultural mainstream. If we place ourselves sympathetically within this historical frame of mind, we can see that the larger meaning of American internationalism in the twentieth century is not found in the details of diplomatic history. Instead, American globalism seems more like the tactical pursuit of a larger historical strategy, a continuation of cultural relations by other means.

Today almost everyone would agree that the old cultural internationalism seriously underestimated the depth and tenacity of cultural traits that lie at the heart of nationalist divisions; that cultural internationalism was incredibly naive in its purist attitude toward the uses of culture as a political tool; and that it was unjustifiably optimistic in its expectations of the quantity and quality of change that cultural methods alone could produce. We have critically recognized these defects and changed our methodology accordingly, but it is not so clear that these adjustments stem, at least partly, from a concurrent, and no less radical, change in our attitude toward history, in our historical—or, since we are speaking in terms of history as myth, metahistorical—frame of reference.

Our break with the past goes far beyond the awareness of political complications, qualifications, and subtleties. To be sure, if we look to the
past and seek to unearth the buried antecedents of today's activities, history construed as tradition can continue to provide us with a reassuring sense of continuity. But once we attempt to focus on history as future, our footing is no longer so secure. For what we see at work today are many of the old processes of cultural internationalism without its objectives, an internationalism of conditioned reflex that lacks the universalist ardor that formerly animated cultural interchange.

It could be argued—most likely by unreconstructed cold warriors—that today we are pursuing the same ends by different means. But it is not my sense that those who possess what might be termed an early post-cold war sensibility really believe that to be so. The end of the cold war in U.S.-Chinese relations represents something far more important than the removal of a historical aberration. Rather, it provides a historical vantage point from which we can discern the end of internationalism as it has traditionally been understood in the United States.

Whether one believed that communism would mellow as a result of containment, collapse of its own accord, or disappear following a final war for civilization, the cold war at the outset was widely assumed to be a temporary political detour, from which the world would eventually rejoin the liberal main road of history. However, what began as a politically heightened expression of the internationalist impulse has turned out altogether differently. The arms race, the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence, the stubborn existence of national and cultural differences, and the increasing preoccupation with power have produced such a marked decline in utopianism that today it strains the imagination merely to recall the firm grip that it once held as a governing ideal.

Since 1945, means have become ends, and the cold war has taken on an institutional permanence. And while it is still fashionable to view the U.S.-Soviet struggle in eschatological, if not apocalyptic, terms, there is no end in sight. Darth Vader and his empire, the Klingons of Star Trek, and other sci-fi bad guys are in one sense popular projections of a future that seems to hold in store an eternal present. Gone is the conviction, once unquestioned, that the building of an international community transcended in ultimate importance the imperatives of the cold war. Unlike the earlier internationalism, there are no ultimate ends, apart from a problematic victory that no one would know what to do with even if it were achieved.

This is not to pronounce the death of internationalism. Old dreams die hard, and there appears to be a good deal of residual internationalism still about. The uproar in the 1960s over revelations of CIA financing of some cultural activities, the persistent complaints over the politicization of some USIA activities, not to mention the continuing, confusing battles over where cultural relations should be located and the resistance to the decision to withdraw from UNESCO, are testimony to the enduring strength of historical memories. But such criticisms are rooted more in the equivalent
of a Kierkegaardian leap of faith than in a well-defined eschatology. In contrast to the clear and inspiring vision with which cultural relations as an organized activity was christened, the future has become a foreshortened object of confusion.

If we conceive of history in dramatic terms as a tale with a conclusion or at least a general direction, we find that a sense of a common destination is absent. The faith in progress is waning, as is the faith in the ability of science and technology to overcome man's fundamental problems (Almond et al., 1982). Just about the only universal idea of common destination is the one that is strenuously to be avoided: a nuclear holocaust. But even in this rather elementary matter, policy is frustratingly complex and controversial.

Our view of the future of Sino-American relations is an excellent gauge of the current mood, for although the present state of Sino-American amity is based in part on the cold war rivalry with the USSR, it offers a glimpse into a post-cold war world in which ideological tensions have been attenuated. The suspicion that Red Chinese ideology was a fragile implant, in contrast to the Russian variety, whose taproots were deeply buried in Russian national history and tradition, seems to have been confirmed, perhaps overoptimistically so. If we make allowances for the political inconveniences inherent in the new relationship, it would seem that the United States and China are at least able to trade in true cultural currency free from the counterfeit nuisance of ideology. But still the future appears problematic and unfulfilling.

Our dissatisfaction stems from a historical irony. It begins with the fact that our understanding of China and ourselves has grown far more sophisticated and cosmopolitan than that of the old internationalists, whose universalism originated in ethnocentrism. But the more truly cosmopolitan we have become, the more nearly we have approached a mutual understanding with China free of the old illusions, and the more closely we have come to agree on the common language of science, the more disenchanted we have become, to use Max Weber's term. Intellectual enlightenment, it turns out, has come at the expense of a badly faded universalist vision. As cultural relations have become more managerial, specialization has narrowed our perspective so that it has become less clear what is being managed. In brief, the cosmopolitan consciousness, which is an essential ingredient of the modern sensibility, is one from which the magic of internationalism is missing.

In retrospect, the worldview of the cultural pioneers was not as modern as they fancied it to be. U.S.-Chinese relations were not characterized by a polar contrast between a modern, rational society and a civilization still covered with the cake of custom. Actually, the American myth of cultural internationalism, insofar as it was an expression of the social gospel, stood closer to the traditional religious world view than to modern rationalism. This helps to explain why those cultural entrepreneurs, many of whom were impelled by a powerful missionary and religious motivation, could be
so enthusiastic about their investment in secular reformation without feeling that they were undermining or corroding their own worldview. They promoted modernity, but they were not moderns.

Weber saw the Protestant ethic as an agent for introducing the scientific and bureaucratic rationality of capitalism, thereby contributing to a progressive disenchantment with a traditional magical worldview. He was aware of the unintended consequences that the overall process produced (Weber, 1958:90, 105–6; Bendix, 1977:139–40)—but he could not have anticipated the details, especially the emergence of a parallel process of reenchantment in which rationalization itself would be mythologized. Thus invested with the magical qualities inherent in the old providential design, rationality, too, became susceptible to being undermined by modernity. This corrosion is so advanced that it now seems obvious that rationalistic and scientific internationalism marked an intermediate, ideologically flawed stage of modernization rather than its culminating phase.

The history of cultural internationalism seems to display all the characteristics of a natural history, a trajectory of rise and decline characterized by radically transformed perceptions and organizational forms that has been common to many ideologies and social movements. We can see this metamorphosis at work in the history of such different social movements as West European socialism, trade unionism, religious movements, and even business ideology. Organizational life cycles typically go through phases of initial articulation and enthusiasm, preliminary organization, political institutionalization, and a stage of “corruption” and decline caused by the paradoxes and problems arising from realistic confrontations and compromises with the facts of life. Theodore Lowi suggested “Jesus, don’t come back,” as a name for the point at which the enthusiasm and charisma of the founders become wholly alien (Lowi, 1971:35–51).

The analogous trajectory of cultural policy began with a formative period of ideological enthusiasm embodied in the tentative efforts of missionaries and laymen. This was followed by the rationalization of dogmas that made possible an expansion of the faith beyond the small circle of initiates and by a phase of philanthropic organization and planning. Next came the achievement of formal political status and permanent institutionalization in public policy. Finally, the process appears to have culminated in a period of organizational complexity characterized by the emergence of bureaucratic pathologies, goal displacement, and loss of the vision that animated the enterprise to begin with (Seliger, 1976; Mayreder, 1917; Gerschenkron, 1968).

The new internationalism, if we can call it that, presently amounts to little more than developmentalism in a world of complex interdependence. Its practical aspect is increasing complexity and ambiguity. From the standpoint of cultural interchanges, its dominating characteristic is the evaporation of not only the certainty but also the desirability of what were once considered ultimate political and cultural outcomes. Do we even want a
world of developed states, as we now plot the implications in our imaginations? As our familiarity with the consequences of interdependence has increased and assumed a practical shape, it has lost the unblemished attractiveness that it possessed as an an ideal. Cultural relations, now institutionally established, seem to be historically rootless.

It is understandable, given the disappointment arising from the puncturing of historical and ideological illusions, that there should be a countervailing search for refuge and certainty in the concept of self-interest. But a cultural policy based on self-interest would be even more illusory, partly because the determination of self-interest is one of the most treacherously difficult things that individuals and nations can attempt. Self-interest is rarely self-evident, nor can it be encapsulated in a stimulus-response formula. Unlike animals, which are genetically programmed to instinctively protect their interests, our concepts are filtered through our cultural apparatus, which, inevitably, introduces the complication of values that a hard conception of interest seeks to avoid. Action without values is not action in the national interest. Even if we accept the legitimacy and necessity of virtuous action in the national interest, there is no satisfying larger meaning. We have already tried and failed to create such a meaning from nationalist perspective when we interpreted U.S.-Chinese relations in ethnocentric terms as a projection of our individual national destiny. We cannot take out of the closet a cloak of historical assurance and legitimacy that we have already outgrown.

We can, however, combine our contemporary understanding of the workings of nationalism, cultural relativism, politicization, and the erosion of idealism into a historical synthesis that provides a larger meaning of sorts. But this ironic approach is of small comfort. Though it has an aesthetic appeal, irony is completely unsatisfactory as a basis for policy. If we wish to avoid both expediency and irony, we must still come to grips with the larger meaning of modern internationalism. There do exist compelling reasons, albeit of a decidedly nonmagical sort, for a continued allegiance to cultural internationalism independent of transient political motives.

A modern internationalism can be reached only after we have successfully worked our way through cultural relativism. Although cultural relativism made its appearance as an anthropological doctrine early in this century, it has taken some time to percolate through the intellectual environment. But once understood, it has become the main instrument for dismantling our historical myth and has made its particularizing presence felt with a vengeance. Just as we were once fixated on the basic identity of human nature and the international harmony of interests, we now seem to be equally mesmerized and even somewhat overawed by an understanding of the vast, perhaps unbridgeable, differences between cultures. Nominalism is so ascendant that at times the prudent awareness of uniqueness and difference is hard to distinguish from its sanctification.
Cultural relativism, fortified by the multiplication of anthropological paradigms, is today a fashionable manifestation of advanced liberal thought. The belief that all cultures are created equal and should be left to develop autonomously in order to preserve their unique, almost sacred, inner cores of meaning (see, e.g., Link, 1984; Becker, 1975:64) appeals to the liberal principles of individualism and equality that are second nature to Americans. But while the resemblance is there, it is fraudulent in essence. Though the disillusioning lessons of liberal adventurism seem to draw us inexorably to its conclusions, an acceptance of cultural relativism would amount to a radical and unwanted rejection of basic liberal tenets. Despite its appeal, even a brief consideration of its weaknesses indicates that it is more a symptom than a cure of internationalism's malaise.

In the first place, can cultures in any meaningful sense be said to have been created equal? The liberal axiom of equality pertains to individuals, not sociocultural wholes. But even if we accept the analogy, as some liberals have, cultural pluralism on an international scale is of a totally different order from the domestic variety. Equality among individuals (indeed, even equality among nations in a balance of power system) presumes a Lockean consensus on basic values, which does not exist among cultures. If no international consensus is possible, how then can cultures interact except through the exercise of various forms of power?

Another source of confusion centers on the related problem of value judgments. Strictly speaking, the term cultural relations is a misnomer that confuses issues. Liberalism's intercultural stance has traditionally been unabashedly hostile to custom. Whereas cultural relativism is tolerant and nonjudgmental, liberalism's claim to authority stems from its rejection of tradition as a fundamental value. It sees nothing sacred in culture. Quite the contrary, some of its deepest values, which center on the liberation of the individual personality from the mystifying tyranny of irrational tradition, have been anticultural. It has advocated a progressive freedom from cultural shackles and conceptual straitjackets as essential for the liberation of the individual personality. Relativism, by contrast, by imposing a critical silence, assumes the legitimacy of cultural domination.

If liberal internationalism was the projection of a historical fantasy (Hunt, 1983:313), it was at least a fantasy constructed of real historical building blocks and not mental Tinkertoys. The greatest irony of the contemporary situation is that our cosmopolitan disillusionment should come at a time when the world is more unified than ever. For all the tenacity of nationalism and sovereignty, internationalism is economically, ecologically, and, alas, militarily, if not fully accomplished, a fact nevertheless. Nations and cultures, no matter how autarchic or reclusive, are everywhere subject to outside influences that define and support as much as they threaten. To rephrase Hegel: Pure culture is pure nothing.

Depending on whether the new realism takes the form of disillusioned withdrawal or hard-boiled engagement, cultural relativism either wishes to
abolish politics altogether or in effect reduces all cultural interaction to politics. The first is only an emotional attitude, unrelated to reality. The fact is that cultures do respond to power, and asymmetrical power relationships have historically been a major instrument of cultural change. But if one eschews tampering with other cultures' values while admitting to the possibility of change through mutual contact, and if one rules out the possibility of the international equivalent of a Lockean consensus, relations are possible only on the basis of interest and power. In the end, relativism reduces cultural relations to politics. Rather than achieving the autonomy of culture, cultural relativism sanctions its subjugation.

Culture is to liberalism in the twentieth century what nationalism was in the nineteenth. Just as conservatives then turned liberal doctrines of nationality to their own purposes, it is clear that an analogous misappropriation could take place with culture on the basis of relativist premises. By accepting pseudoliberal tenets, liberal internationalists would be promoting what they originally sought to eliminate. One questions whether they wish to go this far, especially as the relativist syndrome was prompted in the first place by a revulsion against the excessive use of power. Disencha\nted they may be, but today's liberals are not heretics at heart.

We have been disillusioned by the myth of uniformity, but the same fate is bound to befall our preoccupation with cultural uniqueness. The relativist enchantment with the universality of difference is in its own way no less reductionist and fallacious than the internationalist fascination with unity and identity. It is natural that the one should follow hard on the heels of the other, but it by no means follows that the end of the harmony of interests should be equated with internationalism's senescence. Quite the contrary, it is more sensible to suppose that American internationalism has only begun to leave an adolescence in which enthusiasm and disillusionment were essential for maturation.

Irony is the end result of complexity, not of its initial emergence. There is no need to understand the fine print of rhetorical theory to recognize that our historical imagination has been dominated by very simple images grounded in master metaphors of likeness and uniqueness. Nor should it take much persuading to see that our imagination need not—indeed cannot—remain imprisoned by these images. Similarities and differences remain to be combined into larger and more complex patterns of historical meaning, into a dialectical conception of a whole with discrete parts. Without taking into account the possibility of extraordinary calamities, internationalism as an ideology and as a practical process has quite a way to go before it suffers from the disasters predicted by our futurologist Nostradamuses and succumbs to its self-generated ironies.

The pattern of the emerging relationship between parts and whole remains far from clear, but the internationalist direction is plain enough. Instead of seeking to abolish conflict by creating or reinstating a fictive harmony of interests, and instead of accepting the chaos of diversity, the
task today has become the cooperative management of cultural and political differences. This entails continued adherence to some essential tenets of cultural internationalism: the belief in the autonomous power of ideas, in the universality of meaning, and in a common destiny. At the same time, we must recognize that the old dilemmas between policy and administration, between ideas and interests, and between culture and power that were presumably "solved" by the politicization of cultural relations have in fact not been solved at all. These perplexities are among the fundamental generative problems of our civilization, and they must be challenged and surmounted anew in novel policy situations. With internationalism comes all its difficulties, more formidable than ever because they can no longer be ideologically concealed.

What troubles us today is not so much complexity as the absence of a self-assured sense of historical mission. There have of late been eloquent calls for "the care and repair of myth." But even if it were possible to trade one myth for another, the truth is that we do not want to recapture the blind self-confidence of the past. However much we may feel nostalgic for the certainties of the old-time religion and its sense of a transcendent goal, we realize that ultimate ends are more appropriate to God's realm than to our own. Even when looked at from a religious frame, if the enchantment with modernization was really a secularized faith in historical process, it was a species of idol worship and maybe even an exotic form of sacrilege. In any case, as a practical matter ideology as faith breeds zealotry. It is one of the more salutary results of the cold war, one that remains to be fully appreciated, that we have learned not to take our beliefs absolutely seriously.

This comes finally to a choice of optimism over pessimism; but if so, it is an optimism which is in its own way firmly grounded in our traditional Western understanding of history as a process that moves from simplicity to complexity, but still moves forward. And it remains the only idealistic alternative to the historical equivalent of the Protestant need for justification through faith. The larger meaning of cultural relations arises largely from the intellectual necessity of such a meaning, from the conviction that, historically, the process is far from complete. To feel oneself part of a naturally unfolding story is transcendence and larger purpose of a sort, and all that we have a right to expect.

References


American Exchanges with China, Revisited

Mary Brown Bullock

President Ronald Reagan's May 1984 visit to Beijing was replete with symbolism, but few moments were as poignant as when Zhou Peiyuan, the veteran scientist-diplomat, welcomed the American leader to the Great Hall of the People (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], April 30, 1984:B3). It had been a long journey for the "returned student" from Tsinghua College to the University of Chicago to the California Institute of Technology to this podium. For Zhou Peiyuan, the student, symbolized the main thrust of American cultural policy toward China during the first half of this century: to expose a new generation of Chinese to American science and education and thereby inculcate both American values and long-lasting political and cultural ties. The selection of Zhou, now white-haired and over eighty, to introduce Ronald Reagan to the Chinese people and to share the head banquet table with Premier Zhao Ziyang highlighted today's extensive scientific and educational relationship. The irony of close educational ties between an ideological communist country and a pluralistic democratic one or the anomaly of highly touted scientific relations between the world's largest underdeveloped country and the world's most technologically advanced one almost seems irrelevant. For the moment at least, cultural relations in its most inclusive sense—in the realm of ideas, science, technology, and education—has once again become a central component of U.S.-China relations.

Zhou Peiyuan and others of his generation have played key roles in renewing Sino-American relations and in leading domestic scientific and educational reforms which draw from their American educational experience. In doing so, they have partially vindicated an earlier era of Sino-American cultural relations. Americans of the early twentieth century expected that inductive, scientific thinking and American higher education would assist China's modernization by creating a "strong and democratic China" with close political and commercial ties to the United States. We well know that China did not become "just like Kansas City," and the long interregnum in U.S.-China relations provided early evidence of a failed cultural diplomacy. In "losing China" politically, the assumption was not only that cultural ties were forever broken, but that they had also contributed to "our loss."

This is a modification of a colloquium paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 1984, titled "Scientific and Educational Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China: An Historical Perspective."
We might have known better, for the span of a quarter of a century, even a century, is far too short to assess intercultural exchange. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., was personally involved in conceptualizing and funding many American activities in China during the first half of the century. Shortly after the nationalization of all American commercial and educational institutions by the new communist government, he was unwilling to dismiss a century’s experience. Writing to a friend in the idiom of that earlier era, he observed: “But who are we to say that this might not be the Lord’s way…” (Rockefeller to Mary Ferguson, 1951, quoted in Bullock, 1980).

There were few with such a long-term vision. I cannot recall anyone who predicted the renewal of cultural relations between China and the United States in patterns that so strikingly resemble the first half of the twentieth century. Nor are there many who seek some understanding of the dynamics of Chinese science and education in terms of the institutional and normative legacy of a Western, especially American, influence (Hayhoe, 1984a and 1984c). Even fewer have sought to understand the resurgence of Christianity, the tenacity with which families and communities have clung to their foreign religious practices and beliefs. On the contrary, many writers, including myself, have argued that the elitist, treaty-port, foreign-dominated, ideological, and reformist nature of American cultural relations with China in the pre-1949 period diminished its influence (Buck, 1980; Wang, 1965; West, 1972). These observations remain pertinent, for they also accurately describe much of today’s interaction. But they need to be balanced with a new look at some factors which contributed to the strength of the American cultural legacy in China.

By focusing on the natural sciences and higher education, this chapter explores the tenacity of the pre-1949 legacy on both sides of the Pacific. Cultural history, as an integral part of U.S.-China relations, has been too frequently overlooked or narrowly identified with the missionary movement. Yet the American scientific and educational role in China during the first half of the twentieth century greatly exceeded that of any other Western country. Its emphasis on the basic sciences and liberal arts was challenged by Chinese nationalism during the 1920s and 1930s, presaging the political rejection of the 1950s. The assertions of nationalism vis-à-vis Western ideas and institutions remains a salient force. Nonetheless, a broad secularization of American educational interests, the constant flow of Chinese students to the United States, the early priority attached to the natural sciences, and the American commitment to institution-building had profound consequences for the professionalization of science and the indigenization of Western higher education in China. It is this complex legacy, far transcending the careers of Western-trained intellectuals themselves, which begins to explain the resonance between China and the United States and today’s extensive cultural relationship.
The Secularization of the American Educational Role in China

Shortly before traveling to China in the spring of 1984, President Reagan met with a group of Chinese students studying in the United States. Ignoring the advice of his counselors, he compared their presence in the United States to that of an earlier generation of Chinese students funded by the Boxer indemnity scholarships. Reagan lauded both the Chinese and American governments of that time for their farsighted commitment to educational exchanges and expressed his hope that the numbers of Chinese students in the United States would continue to expand.

For all the myths that surround American generosity in remitting the Boxer indemnity funds for educational scholarships (Hunt, 1972), this was a political decision that marked the emergence of a secular, as distinct from religious, American educational involvement with China. This new cultural approach embraced not only the U.S. government but major centers of American academia. Close links existed with the missionary community whose spirit of service infused it, but in time the newly created institutions collectively defined a different kind of cultural relationship with China and greatly modified the missionary educational role as well. This new American cultural relationship came to be dominated by science and education. As evinced by Reagan's remarks, our policies today continue to be informed by the cultural consensus which emerged during this period.

Several factors account for the changes in American cultural orientation toward China which occurred early in the century, especially the broad appeal of science and higher education. Fundamentalist theology was falling to a low-water mark, and religious organizations, domestically and abroad, were increasingly attentive to hospitals and schools. Scientific discoveries and institutional changes were transforming American higher education, especially training in medicine and the natural sciences. The modern-day American research university and medical college with an emphasis upon laboratories and basic research, Harvard and Johns Hopkins being their models, were taking shape. The Progressive era had dawned, and a new confidence was at hand that education, distinctly liberal American education, could reform society, individuals, and politics. All of these currents were reflected in the emergence of a secular, as distinct from religious, motivation for American cultural involvement abroad, with explicit links to expanding American economic interests (Israel, 1971; Brown, 1976).

During the early twentieth century, China appeared as a particularly appropriate tabula rasa for American scientific and reform interests. The Boxer Rebellion and the loss of American missionary lives dramatized for the people at home the heroic nature of American involvement. The open-door policy of Secretary of State John Hay reinforced an idealized image of America's special interests in China. Rumblings of reform within the Qing
dynasty, later manifested by the abandonment of the traditional examination system and the tentative introduction of Western education, reinforced the concept that America's contribution to China's modernization should be through science and education. Inspired at the beginning by missionary zeal, the American educational commitment to China by 1920 embraced a diverse constituency—including both religious and secular scientific and educational leaders from all parts of the country as well as officials of the U.S. government. If missionaries, primarily evangelists, typified American cultural brokers of the nineteenth century, then educators—including missionaries, but also representatives of the full array of American academia—are their twentieth-century successors.

The underlying American rationale, which remained widespread for nearly three decades, was clearly stated in a proposal to President Theodore Roosevelt concerning the remission of the Boxer funds. Edmund J. James, president of the University of Illinois, reflected a broader American political and academic sentiment when he wrote:

> China is upon the verge of a revolution. . . . Every great nation in the world will inevitably be drawn into more or less intimate relations with this gigantic development. . . . The United States ought not to hesitate. . . . The nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial influence. (James, 1907)

Drawing China into an American orbit via education became a widespread goal. What is noteworthy today is that while the long-term mission was to instill democratic values, Western science was to be the civilizing medium. William Henry Welch, a key architect of the Rockefeller program in China, put it succinctly: "It is of fundamental importance that China should come to understand the influence of the experimental method and the verification of hypotheses on the progress of western civilization" (Welch, 1928:171).

This correlation between inductive scientific thinking and a reformed Chinese polity was central to the thinking of many of the American individuals and institutions that became actively involved in China. It appears in the writings of individuals as divergent as John R. Mott, Abraham Flexner, John Dewey, Charles W. Eliot, Paul Monroe, Roger Greene, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.—each of whom contributed both to the institutional and conceptual structure of early twentieth-century American cultural relationships with China (Eliot, 1913). Alternatively crassly pragmatic (Chinese students will assist in opening the China market) and highly philosophical (Chinese students will imbibe a new conception of the phenomenon of nature), the operational implications of such a cultural approach were relatively straightforward: the need to strengthen education, especially in the natural sciences, both for Chinese students in the United States and in educational institutions in China.
Modified during the 1930s by a new emphasis upon the social sciences and humanities and in the 1940s by a two-front ideological war (Ninkovich, 1981 and 1984), this broad American commitment to Chinese education endured until 1949. American universities were mobilized almost from the outset. Although racial discrimination was a serious problem throughout the first half of the century, particularly with regard to housing, work restrictions, and social life, the university community, in contrast to local political or labor groups, appears generally sympathetic to the Chinese. For example, in 1909 the U.S. Bureau of Education commissioned John Fryer, the Shanghai scientific translator who had retired to the University of California, to survey nearly one hundred American colleges and universities to ascertain their potential reaction to Chinese students. Given the high tide of anti-Chinese sentiment and the relatively few foreign students in American universities at the time, the responses are noteworthy. All were willing to substitute Chinese for the customary requirement of Latin or Greek, most offered some forms of special housing or academic assistance, and about a quarter provided some form of financial assistance (Fryer, 1909).

American scholarships for Chinese students became central to long-term American cultural goals. The Boxer fund ultimately provided more than 2,000 scholarships and also funded and maintained Tsinghua College, later Tsinghua University. Funding from a second remission in 1924 created the China Foundation for Education and Culture, which, in addition to a host of other educational and scientific grants, provided an additional 400 awards for advanced scientific study. While these have always been the best known, the Boxer fellowships were not the only significant source of American financial support for Chinese students: The Rockefeller Foundation provided more than 600 grants between 1920 and 1949 and the China Medical Board (CMB) an additional several hundred. The continuing American emphasis on the natural sciences is reflected by the types of scholarships offered. The Americans, not the Chinese, first targeted the Boxer fellowships for science and engineering. Eighty percent of the Rockefeller grants were in the natural sciences, as were nearly all the CMB and China Foundation grants (China Foundation, Annual Reports; Rockefeller Foundation, Fellowship History File).

During World War II, the U.S. government again became active in promoting and funding the study of Chinese students in the United States. With the Boxer fellowships as legitimating precedents, the Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students, drawing from the President's Emergency Fund, supported 2,000 students. And between 1948 and 1955, the U.S. Congress authorized $10 million to provide scholarships for 3,641 Chinese students, nearly all of the Chinese students studying in the United States during that time. The majority of this latter group remained in the United States and, with U.S. government funding, went on to finish M.A.'s and Ph.D.'s, rapidly becoming absorbed into American colleges and university faculties. This was the origin of many of the ethnic Chinese who have
become integral parts of the American university community (Memo on Chinese Student Aid Program, 1949; International Educational Exchange Service, 1956; Committee on Education Interchange Policy, 1956).

During the forty years between the inauguration of the Boxer scholarships and the communist victory in China, American college and university involvement in modernizing China via education became institutionalized. The literature is replete with reports of American educational commissions to China, meetings of university leaders concerned about the problem of "returned students" in China, and emergency efforts to provide for stranded students during periods of severe inflation or wartime conditions. And during the nearly twenty-five years between 1949 and President Richard Nixon’s new opening to China, the impressive contributions of Chinese-American scholars was a constant reminder of an earlier era of cultural ties.

**Chinese Educational Exchanges**

This broad secularization of American commitment to Chinese education and the continuous availability of scholarships, coupled with a preference for the English language, were among the factors that encouraged an increasingly large number of Chinese students to study in the United States during the first half of the century. In retrospect, it is thus significant that China’s first educational mission abroad was not to Japan, as might have been expected, but to the United States. As part of the late Qing “self-strengthening” effort to defend China against Western military intrusion, approximately one hundred young Chinese students were sent to the Connecticut Valley in 1872. The rationale for the program, as outlined in a memorial to the throne, has a contemporary ring:

To establish arsenals for manufacturing and to open schools for instruction in China is just the beginning of the struggle to rise again. To go abroad for study, to gather ideas and the benefits of greater knowledge can produce far-reaching and great results. Westerners seek knowledge for actual use. If we Chinese wish to adopt their superior techniques and suddenly try to buy all their machines, not only is our power insufficient to do this, but also there is no way for us to master either the fundamental principles or the details of the profound ideas contained in these superior techniques, unless we have actually seen them and practiced with them for a long time. (Fairbank and Teng, 1970:92)

Less than ten years after it began, the mission was canceled and the Chinese students called home. The primary reasons were fear of acculturation, high costs, and failure to gain access to American defense technology—Chinese students were denied expected admission to Annapolis and West Point (Yung, 1909:177-78; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883:123; Consular Dispatches, Shanghai, 1872). These issues did not disappear in future years, but the technological and educational needs
of the country became overriding. Concern about deracination and liberal influences were usually shunted aside by the pragmatic need to train scientists and engineers abroad.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century and gaining momentum in the early twentieth century, China became the first modern nation to attempt to leapfrog domestic educational deficiencies by massive training abroad. The lure of America was not immediately apparent. Germany, England, and France were initially more responsive to Chinese educational missions, especially in providing access to naval arsenals and military training. With its geographical proximity and cultural affinities, Japan's educational influence greatly exceeded that of Europe and the United States during the first quarter of the century. During that period as many as 300,000 Chinese students went to Japan, ten times the number who studied in the United States prior to 1949.

Understanding the truncated nature of Japanese scientific and educational influence in the pre-1949 era—in spite of these numbers—helps to explain the growing importance of Sino-American educational links. It is impossible to calculate the political, military, and educational influence of returned students from Japan during the first quarter of the century. The Revolution of 1911 and the May 4th Movement were fueled by student activists returning from Japan, most of China's military leaders were trained in Japan, and China's early modern education system was modeled after Japan. Of those who went to Japan, however, the vast majority went for short sojourns and either were not enrolled in colleges and universities or never completed formal degrees. Japanese higher education itself was newly established and in the natural sciences and engineering remained highly dependent on Europe and the United States. Few higher degree programs existed. Most importantly, by the late 1920s Japan's military ambitions in China put an end to the appeal of foreign study in Japan. Consequently, Japanese higher educational influence slowly declined between 1930 and 1950, except in Manchuria, and was only residual upon the founding of the People's Republic of China (Jansen, 1975:149-58).

It still comes as a surprise to realize that more Chinese students graduated from American than Japanese universities prior to 1949. Of even more significance for the institutionalization of Western science and higher education in China was the fact that nearly twenty times as many Chinese received Ph.D.'s in America as in Japan. A distant second to the United States was Germany. Table 1 presents those figures.

Keeping in mind these statistics, one sees that the PRC's decision to send thousands of students to the West represents continuity, not a radical departure, in modern China's cultural policy. For over a century, with the sole exception of the period from 1967 to 1974, Chinese students have been studying abroad, frequently in large numbers. Today's numbers pale beside the tens of thousands who studied in Japan during the first decade of the century. And, given increased population and larger university enrollments,
Table 1. Foreign Degrees Received by Chinese Students, c. 1900–50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (years)</th>
<th>Number Awarded Degrees</th>
<th>Awarded Ph.D.’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (1850–1953)</td>
<td>13,797</td>
<td>2,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (1901–39)</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (1907–50)</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1907–50)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain (1911–49)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ey are of the same order of magnitude as during the late Republican period and the high tide of Soviet training in the mid-1950s (Filatov, 1976:72–81; Cheng, 1965:195–200).

Cultural continuity in China’s study abroad program transcends the numbers: The policy issues concerning overseas training remain remarkably similar. While policy debates may continue, they do so within the boundaries of a century’s experience. For the management of students abroad has always been a vexing problem, philosophically, diplomatically, and operationally. Official Chinese views of their outflow of students varied over time, but several issues remained fairly constant: the shifting emphasis between the practical sciences or Western culture, appropriate and effective political supervision, differential policies toward officially sponsored and self-supporting students, and ongoing concern over quality and expense.

Policies of the Republican era—from 1911 to 1949, when the bulk of China’s students studied in the West—illustrate some of these themes. After the establishment of the Republic in 1911, wholesale Westernization, for a brief moment, became a dominant motif. As China sought broad exposure to Western legal, political, and economic systems, technical and military training abroad was deemphasized. Provinces vied with municipalities and the central government in establishing scholarships to send young protégés abroad. Predictably, this generally laissez-faire and decentralized system of the early Republic was tightened under the Kuomintang, which promulgated numerous regulations concerning foreign study abroad. Criticism of the previously lax attitude became common, as reflected by the minister of education’s disquietude in 1932:

There has never been any limitation on students abroad. Even middle-school graduates are free to go abroad. There are no restrictions on age, academic qualifications, and subjects to study. . . . From now on, the sending of gov-
eminent scholars must be made more strict and confined to university graduates with two years of practical experience and to university instructors. The fields of study must also be specified by the ministry. (Wang, 1965:128)

Regulations concerning study abroad became increasingly more restrictive under the Kuomintang (KMT) during the 1930s and 1940s. Only experienced students and faculty in the natural sciences and engineering sciences were selected, and efforts were made to tighten government supervision over self-supporting and officially sponsored students alike. Not effectively implemented during the 1930s, these efforts reached their climax in the mid-forties, when all students and scholars studying abroad were required to attend a KMT indoctrination program. American university officials, preparing to receive increasingly large numbers of Chinese students as a symbol of support for "Free China," were outraged. They were especially disturbed by the official regulation requiring that "all the thoughts and deeds of self-supporting students residing abroad must absolutely be subject to the direction and control of the superintendent of students and the embassy. If their words are found to be contrary to the San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People) or their actions are irregular, they shall be immediately disqualified for study abroad and shall be summarily recalled to China." The New York Times editorialized that "American colleges and universities are becoming reluctant to admit more Chinese students until these rules have been removed. . . . American universities are greatly concerned with the issues involved, and are hoping that the regulations will be modified so as not to interfere with the standards of academic freedom considered so important in this country" (W. Fairbank, 1976:125, 127).

These issues were eventually resolved, but they illustrate the persistence of an uneasy tension: It has never been easy for an authoritarian Chinese government to accede to American university standards of academic freedom.

If it was difficult for the Chinese government to oversee political behavior, it was equally difficult to regulate fields of study. Although official scholarships frequently specified fields of emphasis, the widespread availability of American scholarships and private family funding mitigated against any national plan. Nonetheless, the disciplines pursued by Chinese students in America during the first half of the century indicate that the greatest emphasis was on engineering and the natural sciences—mirroring Chinese government priorities. The high percentage of Ph.D.'s in the natural sciences was a direct result of American research fellowships in those fields. Table 2 illustrates the general disciplines studied and the degrees received.

A careful study of the life of these Chinese students in America and their subsequent role in the United States, Taiwan, and China has yet to be made (Yieh, 1934; Kwoh, 1946). Although Western-trained individuals achieved prominence in political circles and dominated academic institutions, they were also widely caricatured during the 1920s and 1930s for their Western affectations, frequent unemployment, and divorce from the realities of
Chinese life. Rough estimates suggest that just less than half of those with American Ph.D.'s had returned to China by the early 1960s. We know enough about their careers to appreciate their individual scientific and educational accomplishments. It is difficult to conceive of modern science in China without their presence. In 1964, 77 percent of the board members and departmental standing committee members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences were Western-trained, and 55 percent had received their Ph.D.'s abroad. In the social sciences and humanities, the Western-trained cohort was much smaller. Despite the significant numbers who received Ph.D.'s abroad, it appears that a much smaller percentage returned to China, and few of these held leadership positions. Of the sixty-four members of the Chinese Academy of Science's Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences only 38 percent had any Western exposure (primarily in Japan), and only 20 percent had received Western Ph.D.'s (Cheng, 1965:218–63). This is at least one reason why recent Western social scientists and humanists visiting China have found so few intellectual connections.

In spite of the importance of individual accomplishments, the influence of these Western-trained individuals probably would have dissipated over time had not their return to China during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s coincided with the emergence of a professional Chinese scientific community and the indigenization of Western institutions of higher education. Understanding that American cultural activities in China contributed to this institutional development is key to understanding the long-term American legacy.

Table 2. Degrees Received by Chinese Students in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>B.A.'s (%)</th>
<th>Ph.D.'s (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural sciences</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes economics.

Institution-Building: The American Scientific and Educational Presence in China

The American educational presence in pre-1949 China has been the subject of much controversy, both in the United States and in China. Denigrated as "missionary" education in the United States and denounced in China as "aggressive cultural imperialism," the American scientific and educational role in China was far more diverse than has been widely recognized. It included over a score of American-managed institutions of higher education and specialized research institutes. Their model was a typical twentieth-century American education—liberal arts and the basic sciences. These institutions were perceived as a foreign presence, with many negative political ramifications. But the American presence also included extensive financial and professional support for distinctly Chinese educational and scientific facilities and was thus integrally related to the growing professionalization of the Chinese educational and scientific community.

The American vision of transforming China via American educational models has been a persistent one. In 1872 the U.S. House of Representatives was asked to use surplus Opium War (not Boxer) indemnity funds to establish an American college in China that would "operate to remove international misunderstandings and prejudices, aid in the scientific exploration and development of the natural resources of China, recommend American inventions, and open up new paths for American enterprise and new opportunities for the progress of China in modern civilization" (U.S. House of Representatives, Document no. 70). In the early twentieth century, efforts were made to establish a comprehensive secular college in China along the lines of the University of Chicago. These efforts failed. But Johns Hopkins via Peking Union Medical College, M.I.T. via Tsinghua College, Cornell via the University of Nanking, and the American liberal arts college concept via Yenching and others—all became viable institutional models during the Republican period.

This American institutional presence was nonetheless an intrusive one and served from the early 1920s on as the negative focus of a Chinese nationalism determined to rid the country of foreign-dominated institutions—especially in the cultural and economic spheres. That the prevailing American models of the period emphasized the basic sciences and liberal arts and appeared elitist in their standards intensified the Chinese reaction, which was dominated by a social revolution, not professional standards. The Republican era critique of American educational models was also stimulated by European influences, especially via the League of Nations. League educators from Europe advised the Chinese government to centralize scientific and educational planning, to adapt systems of "state science" and "state medicine"—institutional concepts at variance with the decentralized, highly individualistic American model of liberal education and basic scientific research (Duggan, 1933; Lucas, 1982). In spite of this troubled history even
during their heyday, American institutional concepts of science and education appear to have had a lasting influence in China. This is due primarily to the sinification process that took place prior to 1949, but an American institutional strategy also contributed to this indigenization.

But let’s first discuss sinification. The relative speed with which American-managed institutions were sinified was the result of Chinese governmental policies, not an American agenda. American attitudes throughout the period are well captured by the remarks of Roger Greene, vice-director of the Peking Union Medical College, in 1928:

We do, of course, encounter some ebullitions of national feeling and a tendency to be rather critical of proposed foreign appointments as against promotion of Chinese, but this has not been serious. A sufficient number of the Chinese staff are so interested in their work and in the welfare of the college that they are not disposed to press their nationalism too far. (Roger Greene to Nelson Johnson, May 17, 1928, Nelson Johnson Papers)

Such attitudes fueled, rather than stifled, Chinese nationalism and stiffened governmental regulations over foreign educational institutions. These regulations could be implemented because, in contrast to African or Asian nations under European colonial rule, a Western educational system was never imposed upon China (Bastid-Bruguière). The umbrella of extraterritoriality provided some insulation, but almost from the start foreign schools were subject to Chinese regulations. As a result, while all American colleges were foreign-dominated in the early 1920s, by the mid-1930s control had passed into Chinese hands. Even though funding remained in American hands, these institutions had Chinese presidents, Chinese faculty, and Chinese boards of trustees. Some even received Chinese governmental funding.

We know a fair amount about the sinification of institutions (Lutz, 1971; West, 1976; Bullock, 1980; Israel, 1982–83; Holden, 1964; St. John’s University, 1932). We know far less about the ways in which institutional concepts were adapted or changed by the Chinese faculty who inherited them. Many Chinese professors within these institutions were alumni who had further intensified their exposure to American educational norms through graduate study abroad. From the existing literature, one gains the impression that not only were institutional values transferred from the foreign to the Chinese faculty, but that the onset of the Sino-Japanese War fostered allegiance to an American educational ethos. During the war years, significant American private and government aid flowed to Western-educated Chinese intellectuals and Chinese educational institutions, which regrouped in southwest China. After the war, most of these institutions were reconstituted in their earlier images. Disbanded or amalgamated during the 1950s, an unmistakable legacy is frequently evident at their successor institutions in China today.

When viewed against the more ideological goals of their founders, all of these American institutions could be judged as failures. The Christian colleges did not “Christianize” China. Peking Union Medical College did
not “transform the scientific spirit of China.” Tsinghua College has not yet led to a “democratic China.” When viewed over time as American educational models, however, each has had a lasting influence.

The most underestimated have been the missionary colleges. The famous include Yenching University in Beijing, Lingnan University in Canton, and St. John’s University in Shanghai. But there were others, some smaller and more specialized, such as Ginling College for Women in Nanking and Boone Library School in Wuhan. The strong personalities of missionary founders, varying denominations, or local conditions contributed to their diversity. Each did include Bible and religion in their curricula, but as an educational model they represented the American liberal arts concept, with an unusual emphasis upon the natural sciences.

The secularization of American education in China is well reflected by a steady stream of funding to the missionary colleges from the Rockefeller Foundation, the China Medical Board, and the China Foundation for Education and Culture. These secular funding sources emphasized science, not religion or the liberal arts, affirming that the Christian colleges were an important institutional vehicle for Western science. Through them, as elsewhere, American science—particularly basic inductive science—put “its best foot forward.” Laboratories were upgraded and incentives for faculty research and advanced training provided. As a result of this infusion, the natural sciences accounted for a third of the instruction in the American colleges, exceeding in quantity and quality that offered in Chinese institutions.

It is not surprising, then, that many of China’s leading scientists received their undergraduate education in the Christian colleges. With their English and basic science training, many went abroad, returning to China as professors of science in their alma maters. Over time, most of the scientific faculty in the Christian colleges became Chinese and included some of the most distinguished scientists of their generation. The botany and genetics faculty at Yenching, the chemistry faculty at Lingnan, and the agricultural faculty at Nanking became among the best in the country.

Ironically, the Christian colleges appear to have been more successful in nurturing the basic sciences than they were in promoting the social sciences and humanities. Under American auspices in China, these fields were attenuated because the cultural, humanistic emphasis was primarily a Western one. Courses were typically on American civics or English literature, and the textbooks utilized were intended for an American audience. While this expanded knowledge about America itself, Western concepts of the humanities or social sciences were not integrated into the Chinese cultural experience. There were some important exceptions, such as at Yenching and Tsinghua. And the 1930s would see a new infusion of American foundation funding for the social sciences in China, especially economics and sociology. But the Western-inspired social sciences never achieved the same institutional base in China as did the natural sciences (Chiang).
As an institutional model, Tsinghua University has had a more lasting influence than the liberal arts college. Tsinghua College evolved out of the preparatory program for Chinese scholars receiving scholarships from the Boxer indemnity fellowships and was funded during the 1920s and 1930s by the investment return on this indemnity. Jointly managed by a Chinese and American board of directors, during the 1920s and 1930s Tsinghua was evolving into a comprehensive university along American lines. Under American-trained Chinese leadership, efforts were made to introduce related colleges of arts, sciences, law, and engineering, and Tsinghua was one of the first Chinese institutions to offer doctoral degrees. More graduates from Tsinghua studied in the United States than from any other Chinese university, and many became China’s leading scientists and engineers. During the 1930s and 1940s, this American university model was one among several which competed for national acceptance. During the 1950s it was rejected in favor of the Soviet pattern, which separated the pure from the applied sciences and research from education. Tsinghua was modified to reflect that formula, but its earlier manifestation retained a significant following. It was probably the inspiration behind the decision of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to establish a University of Science and Technology (today existing in Anhwei) in the late 1950s (Hayhoe, 1984b). And it is one model for China’s recent efforts to integrate the pure and applied sciences within a university system which includes both research and teaching functions.

In its day, Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) was perhaps regarded as the most isolated and elite of all of the American institutions, graduating only 313 students in its twenty-year history. But its summer seminars and graduate fellowship program brought a steady stream of Chinese and missionary biomedical faculty through its well-equipped laboratories. Its influence, too, ultimately transcended narrow institutional walls. Today, not only has PUMC regained its original name and identity, but the prestigious Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences is also a direct institutional descendant, five of China’s key medical colleges were founded by PUMC alumni, and the curricula and organization of Chinese medical colleges and hospitals continue to be influenced by the original “Johns Hopkins model” (PUMC Alumni, 1984).

If residual concepts of American science and education were embodied only in these original American institutions, it would be noteworthy, but perhaps not historically significant. What has made the American influence so durable is that it was not limited to these American-managed institutions. One obvious reason is the steady flow of alumni and returned students into national Chinese institutions of science and higher education. Forty percent of the alumni of the Christian colleges found careers in higher education. Many national Chinese universities were led by American-trained faculty, including Nankai University and National South-eastern University.
A second reason is less well known: In addition to helping American-managed institutions, American philanthropy sought to strengthen distinctly Chinese institutions, at first primarily in the natural sciences, but later in the social sciences as well. Two foundations alone, the China Medical Board and the China Foundation for Education and Culture, contributed over $15 million to one hundred different Chinese educational institutions—libraries, schools, and research institutes such as the Academia Sinica, the Fan Memorial Botany Institute, and the Geological Survey. Their decision, reached in the late 1920s, to concentrate resources primarily on Chinese rather than Westernized institutions significantly diffused the American scientific and educational model (Schneider, 1982:1217). These foundations were the most important, but they were not alone. Private philanthropists such as John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and smaller foundations such as the Millbank Memorial Fund targeted Chinese institutions ranging from Jimmy Yen's Mass Education Movement to the Peking Library for financial assistance (Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly Bulletin; Rockefeller Family Archives).

American connections to Chinese institutions of higher learning were more than just financial: These funds brought visiting faculty and American institutional relationships. With these grants went foundation surveys, recommendations, and conditions. Then, as now, these assessments were used to monitor the development of the institution and to prod it toward an implicitly American institutional pattern. Since American funds were rarely a large percentage of the funding, one cannot say that these Chinese organizations became dependent upon American largess, but one can say that many Chinese scientists and educators became skilled in American grantsmanship.

A national scientific research venture took shape, first by the establishment of scholarly societies, then by the organization of the Academia Sinica in 1928, finally by the creation of university research centres. If these organizations depended on foreign cooperation for their equipment and scientific documentation, they were by no means simply appendages to foreign institutions, but decided on their own programme of research. They knew how to create their own methods in certain fields and to gain results which subsequently contributed to foreign research. (Bastid-Brugiére, 1984:17)

This American emphasis upon institution-building occurred during a highly eclectic period in China. The American model by no means became the only one, and many returned Chinese scholars drew from a variety of Chinese and Western concepts to design distinctly Chinese institutions. One example is the Academia Sinica, which was modeled after the Kaiser Wilhelm Gessellschaft, the French Academie des Sciences and Louis Pasteur Institute, and the American National Research Council (Yang). With an additional overlay of Soviet influence, the Chinese Academy of Sciences is the successor, today embarking on reforms which again draw from the earlier American and European influence. The point here is not that an
undiluted American model persisted, but that American-inspired institutional concepts became deeply embedded in the Chinese scientific and educational milieu of pre-1949 China.

**Professionalizing Chinese Science: The American Role**

As it is evolving today, China’s scientific community is a highly professional one, which emphasizes scientific competence, publications, disciplinary societies, and national and international recognition (Suttmeier, 1984). While it exists in a close symbiotic relationship with the Chinese state and is thus not politically autonomous, recent reforms call for self-regulation, personal mobility, and some degree of research independence. American-trained scientists such as Zhou Peiyuan have been persistent advocates of an independent professional community:

> What the scientific and technological workers ask for is . . . to have greater right of speech and right of decision in the formulation of scientific research projects, the selection of scientific research personnel, the judgment of results in scientific research, the promotion of scientific and technological personnel . . . (Zhou, 1979:118)

The highly professional interaction between this Chinese community and its counterparts in the West since 1949 has been one of the most reassuring aspects of China’s new opening. At its best, this renewed relationship is professional and collegial, not politicized or paternalistic. The speed with which Chinese scientists, transcending political and cultural differences, have become an integral part of the world’s scientific community appears to be due to more than the commonality of a scientific language. There is a professional resonance which has roots in the pre-1949 era.

The development of modern Chinese professions has been little studied. Here, as in other areas of cultural interchange, the emergence of a Sino-Western synthesis needs to be explored. Traditional concepts of group behavior and organizations, scholarship, the relationship between the intellectual and the state, and premodern patterns of scientific communities have imparted uniquely Chinese characteristics. But the American and European contribution to the formation of a modern Chinese professional scientific community was an important one. It flourished in the many formal and informal binational exchanges that proliferated during the first half of the twentieth century. These collegial activities, many of them trans-Pacific in nature, conveyed a Western, especially American, style of scientific organization, research process, professionalization, popularization, and educational management to several successive generations of Chinese educators and scientists.

The flavor and scope of these activities is suggested by their range and diversity: editorial boards of scientific journals, boards of trustees of colleges and universities, membership in China-based scientific and educational societies, joint management of several foundations, and so forth.
At the beginning of the century, participation was primarily by foreign missionaries, but it increasingly became both more secular and more Chinese. By World War II, an extensive and professional Chinese scientific infrastructure was in place.

The proliferation of scientific societies and journals provide examples. By the mid-1930s there were scores of professional societies and over 200 scientific journals. Their evolution from foreign inception to Chinese management is illustrated by the *Chinese Medical Journal*, still China’s premier medical journal. It has been published almost without interruption since its first issue as the *Chinese Medical Missionary Journal* in 1887. By the late twenties, more than half of the articles were by Chinese, and the title was changed to reflect the broader constituency. The more influential *K’o-hsueh* (Science) and its sponsoring Science Society of China was always under Chinese management, but was founded in 1914 at Cornell University by Chinese students who took the American Association for the Advancement of Science and its *Science* as a model. Within their covers these two journals trace the proliferation of scientific societies during the 1920s and 1930s, which were modeled after their American counterparts—the Chinese Physiology Society, Botany Society, and Geology Society, among others. Frequently, but not always, Americans or Europeans were early participants, but leadership quickly passed to Chinese scientists, usually those who returned from study abroad.

Close collegial ties between Chinese and Westerners characterized these professional associations. Even as Chinese scientists took over the leadership and more journals were published in Chinese rather than in English, an orientation toward the West persisted. Peter Buck’s study *American Science and Modern China* concludes that the basic science orientation of these publications, coupled with the authors’ desire to impress their American and European colleagues, greatly limited their contribution to a modern scientific tradition relevant to China’s economic and industrial development (Buck, 1980:212–22). This is a harsh judgment. Further study discipline by discipline is required before such a conclusive assessment can be made. For example, Laurence Schneider’s review of genetics in Republican China portrays a discipline that was sensitive to Chinese agricultural needs as well as to international scientific acclaim. His view is that the American professional connection was a liberating one:

Chinese scientists became collaborators (as opposed to passive students) of leading Western geneticists and, on returning to China, continued to communicate and sometimes collaborate with them. This provided an important outside source of community and direction for genetics in China. . . . Chinese geneticists established new programs and created research institutions where none had existed before in China. . . . Whatever might be said about the “cultural imperialism” of American philanthropy, in China the Foundations’ central policy was to create an elite corps of science Ph.D.’s who would liberate Chinese education from resident Western educators and build a new asset of state-of-the-art science programs. (Schneider, 1984:4–5)
We clearly need to know more about the dynamics of the interaction between a Western concept of scientific community, the Chinese synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, the Soviet influence of the 1950s, and the Maoist injunction to be both “red” and “expert.” We can affirm that the scope and intensity of today’s interaction in science and education is related to a cultural history that transcends individuals and is manifest in professional and institutional affinities in both countries.

Conclusion

Science and education once again dominate cultural relations between the United States and China, but we should not presume that their role will be the same as in the past. Americans of the late twentieth century no longer see science as a medium for the American way. That view began to change in the 1930s and 1940s as an emphasis upon the social sciences and the humanities in international exchange programs supplanted the earlier blithe faith in the natural sciences. In 1941 John Fairbank reflected a more chilling view of science when he observed that science per se would not promote American values: “The Chinese can accept our technology as the Japanese did. Their absorption of modern science may not bring us together. It may merely give China the means of opposing us” (J. Fairbank, 1982:234).

With the onset of the cold war and subsequent political and intellectual tensions with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, preoccupation with reciprocity and concern about technology transfer have continued to erode our confidence in science as an appropriate vehicle for cultural relations. Even though we greeted China’s decision to send students abroad with enthusiasm, we have remained ambivalent about their stress on science and technology, seeking to offset it by scholarships for American studies, the social sciences, and humanities.

Along with more talk of reciprocity, there is also more concern with “mutual benefit,” a concept that would have surprised our early twentieth-century predecessors. Cultural relations in the pre-1949 era were primarily conceived of as a one-way street—knowledge flowed from America to China. A little-known clause in the 1860 Treaty of Nanking stipulated that American students had the right to study in Chinese educational institutions, but not many persisted. In the late 1940s the Fulbright program, first implemented in China, conceived of educational exchange as a balanced flow of Chinese and American scholars in each direction. In an increasingly interdependent world, this focus on mutuality holds great promise. The implementation, however, will not be easy. Some tension exists between a university tradition that embraced, without condition, the Chinese student in the first half of the century and a newer academic tradition that seeks
equality of scholarly opportunity in both societies. And as a Chinese scholarly community comes of age, a competitive rather than collegial American academic presence in China could become as divisive as a paternalistic one.

The greatest change, just on the horizon, is the scale of a potential new institutional relationship in science, education, and technology. Until recently, China's open-door policy excluded significant foreign participation in a new wave of institution-building. This is changing. As open laboratories, binational review commissions, and joint management of educational facilities becomes a reality, the fundamental nature of American participation in China's modernization will change. This will involve both the public and the private sector. To be sure, the U.S. government's role in scientific and technical exchanges already differs from the pre-World War II era, but thus far it has primarily fostered individual exchanges and discreet research projects. If changed Chinese policies coincide with an American political decision to allow technical assistance funding for China, the American governmental role in developing China's science and technology will escalate. Our earlier experience in institution-building is irrelevant for cooperation with a mature Chinese educational system, which must simultaneously solve problems of research, training, and economic production. The scale alone will require a new type of Sino-American scientific and educational cooperation.

This chapter describes some major themes in the pre-1949 cultural relationship and concludes with a few differences in the post-1949 relationship—from an American perspective. What is not addressed here and what is more important still are the changing Chinese perceptions of their century-long educational and scientific relationship with the United States. We can recognize that China's search for wealth and power will never be synonymous with promoting the American way. Nonetheless, appreciating that today's cultural relations are at least made possible by the legacy of an era once judged a failure provides some optimism for the future.

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While China Faced East: Chinese-American Cultural Relations, 1949–71

Warren I. Cohen

The story of cultural exchange between the United States and China, 1949–71, has three reasonably distinct chapters: first, the elimination of the American presence on the mainland and the virtually complete loss of cultural contact, 1949–51; second, the gradual transfer of programs to Hong Kong and Taiwan and their flowering there, and the enormous expansion of Chinese studies in the United States after 1952; and, third, a groping toward new exchanges with the mainland, beginning in the mid-1960s.

Elimination of the American Presence on the Chinese Mainland

Cultural contacts between the United States and China in the prewar era had depended largely on American missionaries in China and Chinese immigrants in the United States. Michael Hunt has discussed the subversive impact of both in his brilliant *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914.* On the eve of World War II the most important missionary contact in China was the network of Christian colleges. The trickle of Chinese still entering the United States was primarily graduate students.

During the war, many of the students and faculty of the Christian colleges retreated to the southwest with their government. When the war ended and the Japanese began to go home, preparations commenced for the reconstruction of the American-supported Christian colleges. Henry Luce flew to China to assess college needs. The Rockefeller Foundation-funded China Medical Board in New York prepared plans to reopen the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) and sent a team to Peiping. The government of the United States, a relative newcomer to cultural affairs, had begun programs during the war. Frank Ninkovich has traced the course of official involvement generally and Wilma Fairbank has written the history of official cultural relations with China in the 1940s. For our purposes we need only note that the Republic of China was the first nation to sign an agreement to implement the Educational Exchange Program, popularly known as the Fulbright program, in November 1947. Under a wide range of auspices, generally private, thousands of Chinese continued to study at American universities. With the war’s end, Americans and Chinese looked toward the gradual resumption of prewar ties and programs with the likelihood of a greater role for the American government.
It was soon apparent, however, that the Chinese had a civil war to fight. Moreover, by late 1948 it was clear that the Chinese communists, bitter about American support for the Kuomintang government, at best unsympathetic to Christianity, had become the dominant force in China. At the Christian colleges, at PUMC, at the home offices of these institutions, as well as in the American government, there was great apprehension about communist rule over China. But there was also hope—hope that the new Chinese government would conclude, as the Kuomintang had after its victory in the 1920s, that American-supported institutions of higher education served China’s interests—and should be allowed to continue their operations.

Early contacts with communist forces fanned these hopes. Between September 1948 and the end of 1949, all American-supported institutions in China came under communist control—without evidence of hostile intent on the part of the new authorities. Indeed, there were instances of what administrators perceived as “friendly concern” for the protection of buildings and equipment, instances of encouragement. At the PUMC and the Christian colleges, most leaders were persuaded that their schools could coexist with the communist government. If the Chinese would allow American cultural contacts to persist, the American government was eager to retain them. Dean Acheson, President Harry Truman’s secretary of state (1949–53), was seeking accommodation with the new regime in Beijing and indicated his hope that missionary and educational activities would continue. The United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia promised continued support to its colleges provided they were able to function in a manner consistent with Christian principles and practices. Complete administrative control by Chinese was easily acceptable. Many Americans had been willing to accept the passing of the torch much earlier.3

Nonetheless, many Westerners left China during 1949, threatened by civil war, revolution, and a regime that was doctrinally anti-Western and anti-Christian. Some Americans grew more hopeful, some despaired, and their relationship to China drifted undefined in cultural affairs as in political.

The outbreak of war in Korea was ominous, but even then Americans who remained in China and Chinese administrators at American-supported institutions retained hope—as did Secretary of State Acheson. Other events, unrelated to the war, narrowed expectations of the survival of the Christian colleges. The leaders of the PRC were more interested in vocational and professional training than in liberal arts—and were determined to assert their control over curriculum. Governmental policy toward religion left little if any scope for foreign missionaries. Finally, Chinese intervention in Korea shattered whatever hopes remained for maintaining Chinese-American cultural relations, for a continued American involvement in the PUMC, the Christian colleges, or any other cultural programs.

The “Resist America, Aid Korea Movement,” begun in November 1950, was a clear signal for all Chinese who hoped to survive to separate themselves from their American colleagues—and for the remaining Ameri-
cans to go home. Some, like Harriet Mills and Allyn and Adele Ricketts, Fulbright fellows in Beijing, waited too long. They spent years in prison, under sometimes barbarous conditions—as did countless Chinese—in the years that followed as the price for involvement in cultural relations. The Christian colleges received the proverbial kiss of death in a speech by Warren Austin, American ambassador to the United Nations, who, in November 1950, referred to them as evidence of American friendship for China. To Chinese authorities, the subversive nature of the colleges as bastions of American imperialism seemed more to the point. As Chinese and Americans killed each other on the battlefield in Korea, the American government froze Chinese assets in the United States and the Chinese government retaliated. Licenses were required to remit funds to China, and while these were sought by the United Board, they were not issued in time for the transfer of funds to be feasible. In January nationalization of the PUMC and the Christian colleges began. Viewed as evidence of cultural imperialism, of bourgeois ideology, the American-supported institutions came under attack. Higher education in China had to be rid of American influence, elitist curricula, and standards that impeded Chinese efforts to foster democratic education and failed to meet the needs of the Chinese people. Curricula shifted toward vocational and professional training, and Russian became more popular than English. An era had ended.

One striking feature of the century of cultural exchange that ended in 1951 was the emphasis on giving the Chinese what they needed to know about the West. Christian colleges in China, Chinese students in the United States, the PUMC, and USIA programs (at least in part) focused on providing the Chinese with American know-how—as in their way did the missionaries. Few American participants—and fewer among the general population—showed concern for what Americans needed to know about China. There was no great center of Chinese studies in the United States, and there were few American students in China. Most Chinese studies were sinological—stressing classical language and ancient history, not contemporary China. Programs and funds went one way—American money for the benefit of Chinese. Because few of these programs were of mutual benefit, all of them were open to the charge of cultural imperialism. Even the voluntary aspect of Chinese acceptance of what Americans gave was not sufficient to shield Americans from the charge. Nothing asked in return meant a vertical, hierarchical relationship, which the recipient came to resent and suspect. Altruism is probably the most suspect of human motives.

A second point worth remembering is the way in which Chinese participants especially, but Americans as well, suffered as a result of their involvement in cultural exchange. The Mills and Ricketts case and the thousands of Chinese whose contacts with Americans bought them grief in the antirightist campaigns and again in the Cultural Revolution should not be
forgotten; nor should the handful of China specialists whose message was
deemed intolerable by McCarthyites in the 1950s. Who indeed would dare
say it cannot happen again?

After the Fall: The Development of Programs in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and the United States

Although opportunity for work on the mainland had ceased to exist,
the United Board and several American foundations found other outlets for
their interests in cultural relations with China. One activity of immediate
concern was the provision of assistance to refugee Chinese intellectuals—
much of it conducted under the auspices of Congressman Walter Judd’s
organization. The Henry Luce and Ford foundations were among the con-
tributors to Judd’s effort. The United Board put aside funds sufficient to
operate the mainland colleges for two years, should the opportunity arise,
and focused its remaining budget on efforts to find jobs, fellowships, and
scholarships and to provide other services for refugees from the Christian
colleges and Chinese who sought to study at Christian colleges elsewhere in
Asia. In September 1951 it responded to the request of a group of Chinese
teachers and students who founded Chung Chi College in Hong Kong. Also
in late 1951, the United Board began thinking about the establishment of a
Christian college on Taiwan.5

Hong Kong and Taiwan were the two obvious magnets for Americans
who wanted to work in a Chinese cultural context. After losing access to
the mainland, missionaries began to drift to Taiwan in the 1950s. Oberlin
College and Princeton joined the United Board in the development of
Tunghai University in Taichung, Taiwan, and support was received for
Tunghai and Chung Chi from the Luce and Rockefeller foundations and
the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Yale-in-China, with a major grant from the
Ford Foundation, worked with New Asia College in Hong Kong. The Rock-
efeller Foundation gave several small grants to individuals and institutions
on Taiwan, including support for American studies at National Taiwan
University and research at the Institute of History and Philology of the
Academia Sinica. The Asia Foundation also gave a considerable number of
small grants to scholars and scholarly institutions on Taiwan for transla-
tions, bibliographic publications, library acquisitions, travel, and the publi-
cation of monographs in the humanities and social sciences. Throughout
the 1950s, the China Foundation gave four or five annual grants to
National Taiwan University. Curiously, the American government remained
inactive until a new agreement on educational exchanges was signed in
Taipei in late 1957. It is possible, however, that as revealed later, govern-
ment funds for cultural affairs were being channeled secretly through pri-
vate foundations, like the Asia Foundation.6
At home, the Luce Foundation gave generous support over an extended period to the China Institute in America—until the mid-1950s the only important commitment to reversing the flow of cultural information for teaching Americans about China. Other foundations, most notably Ford, gave small grants to Americans studying China. Again, the American government was curiously dormant.7

In the early 1950s, the development of cultural programs relating to China was hampered not only by limited access to Chinese culture areas, but also by the political climate at home, by McCarthyism. Policy toward China had been the focus of extraordinary controversy in the late 1940s. After Chinese intervention in Korea, Americans critical of Chiang Kai-shek and especially those sympathetic to the Chinese communists were victims of a wide range of harassment, including charges of treason. The McCarran committee’s investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations created problems for the Rockefeller Foundation. The Cox and more hostile Reese committee investigations of American foundations imposed caution on the foundations. Dean Rusk came close to being denied the presidency of the Rockefeller Foundation because of his association with Truman’s policy toward China, and the foundation never came back into Chinese affairs in a big way.8

If foundation executives seemed apprehensive and cautious in the early 1950s, they were no different from scholars or government officials concerned with China. Chinese affairs were a minefield amid the hysteria triggered by the Korean War. Discretion was certainly sensible. It was essential to be careful about the kinds of projects undertaken and the individuals supported.

McCarthy was finished by 1954, but there were plenty of little mccarthyites still around, and anxieties persisted for at least another decade. Nonetheless, the Ford Foundation jumped into the fray. Its leadership was committed to international projects and became intensely interested in Asia. The foundation set for its objectives the training of Americans for long-term involvement in the development of noncommunist Asia, the introduction of non-Western studies into American curricula, and the bringing to bear of expert resources on policy issues relating to Asia. In the last context, the foundation recognized a shortage of expert knowledge on contemporary China. Aware that the American government and other foundations were leery of taking initiatives regarding China, Ford leaders seized the nettle. “Know thy enemy” was a safe enough rationale for financing an enormous buildup of Chinese studies in the United States—and the Ford Foundation took on the task virtually alone.9

Beginning in 1955 with modest grants to programs on China at Stanford and the University of Chicago and major grants to Columbia and Harvard, Ford began to stimulate and underwrite the study of modern China. More than $700,000 was granted that year, primarily for research on the political evolution of modern China and its economy. Over the next fifteen years, the Ford Foundation invested approximately $30 million in
Chinese studies. Harvard and Columbia and the Universities of California (Berkeley), Michigan, and Washington were the major beneficiaries, as Ford executives kept an eye open to regional and ideological distribution. The University of Washington program was probably never equal to the other centers either in the quality of its faculty or students, but its leaders represented the faction in American Asian studies considered most sympathetic to Kuomintang China and could not be ignored. From coast to coast and across the spectrum of respectable political beliefs, the Ford Foundation facilitated efforts by academic specialists to assemble knowledge on modern China and to train a new generation of scholars. Foundation officials thought of their activity as "stockpiling" China experts for the inevitable day when they would be needed not only throughout American institutions of higher learning but by government and business as well.  

Several million dollars later, in 1959, the Ford Foundation concluded that the study of modern China in America was still lagging. Ford decided to push harder, and the bulk of the Ford funding was contributed in the decade that followed. From its initial experience, the foundation decided to focus its effort on four major research centers—Columbia, Harvard, and the Universities of California and Washington—in social science education and language training. A decision was made to develop a research base in Hong Kong. Optimistically, the foundation anticipated visits to the People's Republic of China and programs involving the PRC.

By 1959, the Ford Foundation had an important new partner in the funding of Chinese studies in the United States: the federal government. In 1958, prodded by Soviet successes in space, Congress appropriated large sums to improve the quality of American education. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 included provisions for supporting area studies centers and for language training fellowships. In the next decade the U.S. government provided approximately $15 million for Chinese studies, more than half of which went into language fellowships. In the 1960s, the Ford Foundation, the U.S. government, and American universities together spent more than $50 million to make possible the best scholarship on modern China in the world. John Lindbeck estimated that more than half the scholars working on China in 1970 had received their doctorates between 1960 and 1969. As the United States prepared for a new era in its relations with China, a new generation of China specialists was available, thanks primarily to the foresight of the leaders of the Ford Foundation.

The Ford conception of developing resources for the study of modern China was sufficiently broad to include grants to foreign centers in England, India, Japan, and Taiwan. Major grants were given to the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica, Taiwan, with a particular eye toward linking Chinese and American scholarship. An important grant to the Toyo Bunko in Tokyo was similarly designed to strengthen that facility and strengthen relations between Japanese and American specialists on China.
Other important facilities developed abroad for the training of American scholars were supported by the Carnegie Endowment and the Luce Foundation. Carnegie, Luce, and Ford helped with the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Study in Taipei where at least half of the current generation of specialists sharpened their language skills. Carnegie was the principal supporter of the Universities Research Center in Hong Kong, easily the most important resource on the People's Republic available to Americans in the 1960s and 1970s. With minimal external support, the Association of Asian Studies sponsored the Chinese Materials and Research Aid Service, where Robert Irlck held court in Taipei.14

Most of the money and energy put into the American study of China in the 1950s and 1960s was focused on the study of contemporary China by social scientists. At the Ford Foundation there was some concern that the foundation's programs had been too heavily weighted on modern China, that perhaps the pendulum had swung too far.15 Interest in traditional Chinese culture—literature and the arts—did not disappear, however. One of the most important series of events of the era involved Chinese art.

In 1933, the Chinese government had packed the greatest art treasures of China, the Palace Museum collection, and shipped them south from Peiping to keep them out of Japanese hands. Four more times over the next fifteen years those treasures were moved again until they were shipped to Taiwan in 1948 along with the art treasures of the Central Museum. These objects were kept stored in caves near Taichung until, in 1957, a grant from the Asia Foundation enabled the Chinese to build a small exhibition hall, in which a few of the objects could be displayed for the first time since 1932. The collection included those objects that had electrified art historians throughout the world when they were shown in the Burlington Exhibition in London in 1935. Never before had Westerners seen Chinese art objects of such quality. Shipped back from London in 1936, the Burlington collection had never been unpacked until it arrived in Taichung.16

Henry Luce and Wang Shih-chieh, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, decided in 1959 that an exhibition of Chinese art treasures from the Palace Museum collection should be sent to the United States. They were determined to make it a very important exhibition comparable to the great Japanese exhibition of 1953. With the help of Luce, his sister, Elizabeth Moore, and members of his staff, the nation's leading museums were easily enlisted. Small grants from the Luce Foundation and the Department of State facilitated the arrangements. And beginning in the spring of 1961, at the National Gallery in Washington, Americans across the country had the opportunity to see the greatest show of Chinese art ever exhibited in America.17

For the first time American scholars had an opportunity to see large numbers of major paintings by great Chinese masters. James Cahill has referred to heated discussions taking place in the galleries as painting after painting—and the attributions—shook the confidence of art historians and
curators across the country. Enormous controversy—and new interest—in Chinese painting ensued in the United States. A symposium of seminal importance raged in New York for two days in October 1962. With support from the Luce and Bollingen foundations and the John D. Rockefeller III Fund, Cahill organized a large photographic project at the Palace Museum, and the slides were deposited at the University of Michigan.18

In the years that followed, Cahill, Richard Edwards, Wen Fong, Laurence Sickman, and Michael Sullivan continued to fuel both the interest and the controversy with their exhibitions and writings. The opening in 1966 of the Avery Brundage Collection in San Francisco was another important milestone.

The Asia Foundation continued its assistance to the Palace Museum after it moved to splendid new headquarters in Taipei, funding both English and Chinese editions of its first catalog, "Illustrated Handbook on Chinese Cultural Art Treasures." Again in 1970 and 1971, the Asia Foundation gave modest support to the Palace Museum for an international symposium on Chinese painting and for a program in art history designed to train future curators.19

A significant two-way flow of exchanges developed during the 1950s and 1960s, highlighted by the resumption of the Fulbright program with the Republic of China in 1958. Between 1958 and 1971 several hundred Chinese and American scholars were exchanged under that program, primarily in the sciences. In addition, thousands of privately supported Chinese students went to the United States for graduate work, and hundreds of Chinese-born American professors combined teaching, research, and visits with relatives on Taiwan. Again, Chinese in America became a major conduit of Chinese culture as an overwhelming percentage of graduate students from Taiwan stayed and worked in the United States. John Lindbeck estimated that in advanced Chinese studies, more Chinese were trained in the United States in the 1960s than in all Chinese universities combined—and many stayed to enrich American understanding of China. American graduate students and researchers—Martin Wilbur suggests thousands—turned to Taiwan for their experience of China. Anthropologists and sociologists flocked there for field work, and others found the Academia Sinica, the Palace Museum, and the universities of Taiwan generally hospitable—especially if they or their mentors were well connected.20

One interesting pattern is revealed by the activities of Michigan State University (MSU). MSU had no tradition of involvement in China at the beginning of the 1950s. In the immediate post-World War II years, John Hannah, its new president, determined to extend its land-grant mission overseas to provide an international mission for the university and an international dimension for its curriculum. The ubiquitous Ford Foundation provided essential support. The university played a major role under the Agency for International Development (AID) with the College of Agriculture at National Taiwan University (NTU). MSU professors taught at NTU,
and NTU students and scholars worked at MSU. Paralleling these developments was the introduction of courses in Chinese history and language at MSU. By the early 1960s a Chinese language major was available, and courses on China were offered in anthropology and geography as well. When the American government chose to end AID support for Taiwan in 1964, Hannah decided the university would support an exchange program with NTU. Discussions with Ch’ien Shih-liang, president of NTU, led to an agreement for NTU to help MSU develop its Chinese studies program while MSU helped NTU with its American studies program. In the years that followed, NTU professors of Chinese philosophy, drama, history, anthropology, and economics taught or lectured at MSU—and MSU sent a steady flow of specialists in American history and literature.

The MSU-NTU program was linked to the Fulbright program in the late 1960s when MSU agreed to train four Fulbright-supported young NTU scholars who agreed to be retooled as Americanists. When Fulbright support ran out, MSU provided additional support, as did the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) as part of its Ford Foundation-funded American studies program. Two of these scholars received Ph.D.’s from MSU and are now the backbone of a very successful American studies program in Taiwan—not only at NTU but also with key roles in the Institute of American Culture of the Academia Sinica.

By 1971, MSU had expanded its Chinese studies offerings and was providing a very respectable program for undergraduates. Over a period of approximately two decades the university had gone from no courses on China to a program with components in language, history, anthropology, art, geography, political science, economics, agricultural economics, philosophy, and religion. And the university had a linkage with NTU, which provided a valuable connection for students and faculty who wanted to do research on Taiwan. In varying degrees, the MSU experience was duplicated in dozens of schools across the United States, reflecting the growing awareness of and interest in non-Western and especially Chinese culture in the 1950s and 1960s.

Institution-building on Taiwan and Hong Kong also continued through the 1960s, spearheaded as before by the activities of the United Board. The Rockefeller Foundation gave small grants to the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the Asia Foundation continued its steady contribution to a wide range of institutions on Taiwan. The Luce Foundation was active in both places, working primarily through the United Board. The United Board also succeeded in drawing Wellesley and Dartmouth colleges and Syracuse University faculty into its programs.

Two problems emerged in the 1960s. First, at Tunghai University, perhaps the jewel in postwar United Board operations, the tensions that had developed much earlier on the mainland between the Christian colleges and Chinese nationalism recurred. Jessie Lutz has noted that in Taiwan, in the 1950s and 1960s, Christianity was linked to anticommunism and a conserv-
ative approach to economic and social problems. The United Board readily accepted the trend toward Chinese control of the university but, through judicious use of financial aid, succeeded in retaining a liberal arts curriculum and a greater sense of a free intellectual community than existed elsewhere on the island. (I do not know if the climate changed significantly after Mei K’e-wang—former head of the police academy, once named by Jack Anderson as head of a Kuomintang hit squad in the United States and an MSU Ph.D.—became president). Second, the world discovered in 1967 that the CIA had been subsidizing a wide range of projects around the world, “laundering” its funds through private foundations and trusts. One of the foundations named was the Asia Foundation, and it was widely assumed that much if not all of that organization’s activity on Taiwan was conducted with CIA money. Subsequently, government support for Asia Foundation activities was provided openly through appropriations to the Department of State.22

In sum, despite the break in American relations with the Chinese mainland that began in 1951, cultural relations continued in the two decades that followed. American activity in China was conducted on a much smaller scale, best measured by the geographical diversification of United Board activities. But by the mid-1950s, the flow of graduate students and scholars between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States probably exceeded pre-1951 levels. Most striking about the 1950s and 1960s is the fact that most money and effort went into Americans learning about Chinese culture, a stunning reversal of the one-way flow of the previous one hundred years. Finally, without denigrating the importance of efforts and contributions of the other organizations mentioned, it must be noted that without the extraordinary contribution of the Ford Foundation, the history of that era would have been significantly different.

Reaching for Beijing

By the early 1960s, several executives of the Ford Foundation were anticipating opportunities for programs with or in the PRC. The foundation granted $450,000 to the Council on Foreign Relations for a ten-volume study of American relations with China, designed in part to prepare for a new relationship.23 McCarthyism was fading. Dulles was gone. Chinese rhetoric seemed less harsh, and there had been some contacts between Chinese and American scholars abroad, stimulating interest in more. In the 1960s a new administration in Washington might prove more flexible.

Similar thoughts had long stirred within the scholarly community. Pressures mounted for elimination of the barriers to the exchange of ideas with Chinese. Just as differential discriminatory trade policies toward the PRC and the Soviet Union had seemed senseless, there was little to justify stiffer discrimination against intellectual and cultural contacts with China than against the Soviets. In the early 1960s both the Joint Committee on
Contemporary China of the ACLS/Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the National Academy of Science (NAS) began stepped-up efforts to establish contacts with Chinese counterparts. Exploratory meetings funded by the Hazen Foundation led to agreement that the NAS would take the lead. In 1966 the Committee on Scholarly Communication with Mainland China (later the CSCPRC) was formed under the NAS with support from the Hazen Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. An effort was made in late 1966 to establish contacts through European scientists, but the moment could hardly have been less auspicious. In China the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was underway. Moreover, America’s war in Vietnam had caused widespread revulsion there and elsewhere. Contact with China would have to wait.24

Also in 1966 the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was formed, representing scholars and “interested citizens” with a broad range of viewpoints and committed to educating the American people about China. When it began its operations in 1967, it was the Ford Foundation again that provided the bulk of its funding with substantial assistance from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The Ford Foundation kept looking for a breakthrough, hoping it might come through discussions in third countries, keeping informed of the work of the Committee on Scholarly Communication, very pleased with the activities of the National Committee in the waning months of the Johnson administration—waiting, waiting for an opportunity. By late 1969, David Bell stressed the importance of the National Committee’s work in a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, then president of the Ford Foundation. There was a new president in the United States, a new situation in China. There was talk in Washington of “normalizing” relations with the PRC.25

In 1970 the National Committee, steered by Douglas Murray, its new program director, began to modify its mission from educating the public about China and reopening the national debate on policy to preparing for exchanges. In August 1970 Murray proposed a new seminar topic, “Problems of Negotiating with China.” The National Committee would help various segments of the American public consider “their mutual interests, priorities, and problems in opening channels of contact with the China mainland.” His board of directors liked the idea, and the committee moved rapidly to implement it.26

At last, in 1971, the Chinese signaled their readiness to begin a new era of relations with the United States with Zhou Enlai’s invitation to the American ping-pong team to China and his remarks to the team in Beijing. Quickly the National Committee stepped forward as a joint sponsor with the U.S. Table Tennis Association of the return visit by a Chinese team. At the same time, a letter went from the committee to Beijing “proposing exchanges in the scholarly field and suggesting that a delegation go to China to discuss exchanges.” Alex Eckstein, chairman of the committee,
suggested that one role it might play in the future was to prepare "special constituencies" for contacts with the Chinese—precisely the role Murray had foreseen earlier.27

By June 1971, the National Committee's metamorphosis was nearly complete. Murray informed the board of meetings to help coordinate exchanges with China and of workshops for those likely to become involved in exchanges. Although some members of the board thought the committee had served its purpose and might well disband, the prevailing view was Murray's: The committee would promote and coordinate educational cultural exchanges. Accordingly, its bylaws were changed. In the absence of any other organization so qualified, the National Committee would henceforth serve a "unique function" as the American equivalent of China's "nongovernmental" cultural organizations.28

Residual McCarthyism, Mao's belligerence, President John Kennedy's animosity toward the PRC, the war in Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution all combined to prevent American cultural contact with the Chinese mainland in the 1960s. Throughout the decade the American scholarly community and an interested public were primed for contacts that never came. Ironically, it took Richard Nixon to clear the way. His administration made it clear to executives of the Ford Foundation and many others that it would welcome serious private initiatives. Ford immediately put aside $250,000 and prepared to send staff members to China.29 When the time arrived, American scholars and others eager for cultural and educational ties were ready, with considerable gratitude due to the great private foundations that had financed the preparations.

Conclusion

There has been much wonder expressed at the rapidity with which Chinese-American cultural ties have been established since "normalization." Anyone familiar with the earlier record would not be terribly surprised. Some patterns, such as faculty exchanges and American support for faculty development at Chinese institutions of higher education, had evolved long before. Others had been developed in the post-World War II era in relations with Taiwan—and the rest of the world. Many lessons had been learned by the U.S. government, private foundations, universities, cultural organizations, and individual scholars. Most important, however, were the almost incredible buildup of resources and desire for exchange with China in the 1950s and 1960s and the preparations for renewed cultural ties undertaken in the late 1960s. Experts and funds were "stock-piled" by the foundations and the universities. The apparatus was in place. All that was needed was an end to political barriers.
Notes


4. Fenn, Ever New Horizons, p. 64.


Public Interest and Private Interest in Sino-American Exchanges: De Tocqueville's "Associations" in Action

Joyce K. Kallgren

"Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations. They are not commercial and industrial associations in which all take part but others of a thousand different types. . . . If they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form an association" (De Tocqueville, 1969:513).

American businessmen, missionaries, and students—both individually and as groups—have always played a role in Sino-American relations. Business people have wanted more trade, missionaries to save more souls, students to contribute to the "betterment" of life in China while traveling and studying. The targets of their organizational efforts have been diverse. Sometimes calls for action were directed to the U.S. State Department, such as the nineteenth-century petitions of the American business community in China for assistance in regularizing trade. Other groups thought the responsibilities for a course of action rested with the religious congregation or their governing boards. Missionaries were of two minds with respect to the appropriate role of their government vis-à-vis missionary safety. In the early twentieth century foundations and educational administrators considered themselves responsible for program development in China.

In the opening chapter, Frank Ninkovich has tried to explain the underlying historical rationale for both the initial role of the private sector and the shift in the late 1940s and early 1950s to government involvement. By the mid-1960s most observers of the American scene accepted the role of government in exchange programs. An intimate relationship between the private and public sector in the past thirty years is quite well illustrated in the American experience in the negotiating and sustaining of Soviet-American exchanges through periods of relative harmony and tranquility and more tumultuous moments of conflict.

The China experience is somewhat distinct from that of most other exchange programs both with countries outside of the socialist bloc as well as within it. Here the initiation and nurturing of a modest exchange effort was largely, though not exclusively, in the hands of "private associations"; that is, central to the development of relations between the United States and China in the mid-sixties and early seventies were the private interests of Americans, which are expressed in De Tocqueville's "associations."
These associations developed in a period when formal diplomatic relations did not exist between China and the United States. This accounts in part for the fact that the exchange organizations do not display some of the characteristics generally presumed by social scientists to be necessary for the success of single-interest groups. None of the three organizations studied here had the narrow agenda that is commonly attributed to the single-interest groups, nor did their bargaining strategies (when such existed) require a single issue. Yet they were successful in their own terms. Exchange programs sent people to China, received guests, and provided a climate of acceptance. What are the underlying themes of their success?

As shall be demonstrated shortly, the three organizations analyzed here developed an expertise in their self-defined tasks and an ongoing constituency. These two common features account for the major portion of their success. In addition, of course, the Chinese decision to move ahead with the exploration of improved relations made it imperative to find or develop some American counterparts. The international and domestic changes in Chinese priorities provided support for the existence and efforts of the organizations that I will examine.

The three American “associations” centrally involved in the conduct of Sino-American exchanges in the decade before normalization were the National Committee on U.S. Relations (hereafter the National Committee), the U.S.-China People’s Friendship Association (hereafter the Friendship Association), and the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China (the CSCPRC). In an era when no formal relations existed between the two countries, the ability to foster informal exchanges in a variety of educational and cultural fields was an all-important way of maintaining contact, hence the importance of the three groups. When relations were resumed, all three remained active. Therefore, how they have fared and what accounts for their fate are important facets that must be included in any analysis of relations between the United States and China, for the prenormalization period as well as since 1979.

It is important to explain my choice of these organizations. The National Committee is quite obvious. It was the first effective “association.” The CSCPRC is essential to any analysis of education and cultural exchange, the main themes of this book. What might be more problematic is the choice of the U.S.-China People’s Friendship Association. Some might argue that the National Council on U.S.-China Trade (hereafter the National Council) would have been more appropriate.

It is true that the National Council presents an interesting picture. Its emergence and growing role in the bilateral relations of the two countries is a story worth telling. Its development was based partially upon the need to establish an arm for addressing economic needs when the National Committee resources and staff were stretched to the limit. In addition, however, it was encouraged by both the private and public sectors to serve as a potential counterforce to the Friendship Association when it seemed to have a monop-
oly on visas to China. For the purposes of this chapter the National Council activities, at least in part, replicate the activities of the National Committee and portions of the work of the CSCPRC. The Friendship Association is *sui generis* and within the tradition of private interests in their basic and traditional form, relying as it has done on local groups.

Despite the contributions to the continuing dialogue between countries achieved by exchanges, none of these three associations had the administration of exchanges as their primary goal. Indeed, the National Committee did not include this activity in their initial statement of purpose. Was there no governmental organization ready and willing to take on the assignment? How did the purposes of the associations come to be redefined and what has followed from this redefinition?

To answer these questions, this chapter addresses the “private interests” of the three associations in the context of the American foreign policy decision to attempt to improve relations between the United States and China and then, after 1979, to expand ties between the two countries. The subject will be discussed in three parts. In the first part, the broad policy background—against which the exchange efforts developed—are set forth. While only briefly outlined, it is essential to sketch selected aspects of the process since there is a close relationship between formal negotiations and the exchanges. Canceled or altered programs, as well as ongoing public enthusiasm, often reflected the tenor of private diplomatic discussions. The second part of the chapter sets forth the private interests and goals of the three organizations and the means they employed to achieve their aims. The chapter concludes, in the third part, with a discussion of the shared characteristics and experiences of the “association.” It reflects on the manner in which the current status of an “association” has been linked to international developments, as well as internal politics in both the United States and China.

**Background**

From 1966 until the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, the overwhelming majority of exchanges, whether cultural, scholarly, or political, were facilitated by these organizations. Secretaries of state often spoke of the importance of exchanges (*New York Times*, April 19, 1971), but the government did not administer the programs. Yet certainly Washington was involved in funding, in arranging appointments and interviews, and in assisting with security. For the most part, these quasi-public, quasi-private organizations carried on the work, negotiated most aspects of the exchanges, even set the number of groups to be facilitated, and bore the responsibility for their programs. Of the more prominent and more visibly official efforts of the three, the National Committee and the CSCPRC were the key units.
It should be kept in mind that few if any of the American participants expected or assumed that the exchanges would be equal for both countries in number of groups or participants. In the days when travel to or from China of any sort was quite rare, as well as in the 1980s when people “come and go,” the term exchange may have precise meaning, but it also was used somewhat euphemistically to refer to a study tour in China.

When appropriate, the American associations were paired with their Chinese counterparts, such as the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (You Xie), the Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), the Chinese Science and Technology Association (PRCSTA). In the process of working out these exchanges between such groups, personal relationships developed, agreements on procedures were established, and ways of handling issues such as the granting of visas, formation of itineraries, and handling of luggage were created. The American groups were received by whichever unit the Chinese thought appropriate for the group’s purpose and status (e.g., congressional delegations were hosted by the CPIFA). Until the United States and China had developed political ties, concluded agreements, and finally normalized relations, the exchange associations provided public evidence of improving relations or bore the brunt of the occasional frosty period.

After normalization, and with new Chinese modernization priorities, exchanges expanded dramatically in number and scope; bilateral arrangements between U.S. governmental agencies and Chinese ministries were signed; the Fulbright program reemerged in China; universities and colleges suddenly began signing bilateral letters of intent to establish exchange programs; and the USIA (like its predecessor, the International Communication Agency) rushed into the exchange business. The CSCPRC consolidated its effort and stabilized and expanded its program initiated in the late 1970s. The National Committee reconsidered and redefined its mission; and the Friendship Association experienced a decline in that aspect of its national program that had derived from its unique access to Chinese visas. When travel and exchange opportunities diversified, the Friendship Association became oriented once again toward “friendship” programs.

It will become readily apparent below that the Friendship Association was the most political and perhaps most ambitious in its aims: “to build active and lasting friendship based on mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of China through both public education programs within the United States and cultural exchanges” (Murray, 1976:36). In contrast, the National Committee, a classical “association,” was more equivocal in its goals and first shifted its priorities from policy and education to managing exchanges; more recently, it has moved to a mix of exchange, education, and service. Finally, there is the CSCPRC—more focused in its purposes, more elitist in its constituency, and more powerful in its capabilities. The contrasting experiences of these
organizations illuminate the relationship between public and private interests, as well as both the constraints and unique contributions made by “associations” to the relations between the United States and China.

Exchanges did not follow the development of good relations, but rather were a bellwether of the state of relations. The process of reestablishing relations between the countries lasted for almost eight years. In that period of time no formal federal organization could have taken on the task. Instead, both sides pretended that the exchanges were organized by private organizations.

Once having taken on the exchanges either by choice, in the case of the National Committee, or by happenstance, in the case of the CSCPRC, these organizations developed two important characteristics for survival: a constituency and an expertise. Normalization in 1979 led to diversification of strategies and tasks, but since all three organizations were well established, they survived. The National Committee's survival has been in somewhat reduced circumstances. The CSCPRC, as a more solid bureaucratic organization, has been able to defend its prerogatives and “turf” in the rush that occurred to divide up the field. The Friendship Association, never limited by lack of interest, has been constrained by fears about its political stance and its financial resources to carry on two-way exchanges.

Why have the organizations survived past the period when they provided unique functions in lieu of governmental efforts? This question will be addressed in the final section, in an effort to delineate the special characteristics of de Tocqueville's “associations.”

**America’s China Policy**

No doubt American presidents intended to review national China policy when their political strength and the American domestic scene permitted the exercise of this option. But President Kennedy's intentions were postponed to his second term and thus never took place. President Johnson had no time to reconsider a policy for China once he became mired in the Vietnam War. Moreover, American choices were sharply restricted by the events of the Cultural Revolution, which, coupled with the withdrawal to China of its diplomatic personnel, made the argument for policy reconsideration difficult to sustain.

Thus, the opportunity and will to initiate a review of China policy did not combine until the presidency of Richard Nixon. The first intricate steps to reopen a dialogue occurred when President Nixon lifted the ban on travel to China. The Chinese extended an invitation to the American ping-pong team to visit for friendly matches. The American acceptance set the state for the return visit of the Chinese, which took place in March 1972. For his part, President Nixon had expressed an interest in visiting China. This publicly expressed wish, together with apparent Chinese interest in some form of renewed discussion, made it propitious for National Security Adviser
Kissinger to explore possibilities in secret meetings with Chinese representatives. (These matters are discussed at some length in the Kissinger volumes 1979, 1982.)

Choreographed with great care, the Nixon trip and the language of the resulting Shanghai Communiqué set the tone and terms for bilateral relations until the normalization agreements. The Chinese ping-pong team's visit to the United States provided public opportunities for some interaction, signaling a possible new era. Matters became easier to facilitate with the establishment of liaison offices in Beijing and Washington. The senior officials selected as leaders (Ambassador Huang Chen for China and Ambassador David K. Bruce for the United States) indicated the importance both sides attributed to this practical development. These offices then assisted exchanges until normalization was achieved in 1979, when embassies were opened.

In reviewing the history that precedes the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, it is important to keep in mind that throughout this period, China was not wholeheartedly committed to a policy of pursuing contacts with the American educational establishment. To be sure, in the early 1970s, Chinese colleges and universities had reopened, graduate training was resumed in the mid-1970s, and, after the death of Chairman Mao, there is evidence that internal policy regarding science, technology, and, to some extent, culture was being reconsidered. But none of the exchanges in the pre-1980 period occurred against the background of openness that has characterized recent years. This means, therefore, that the exchanges during the years 1971 to 1979 should be seen to represent foreign policy initiatives and only secondarily a concern with the intrinsic value of the exchange itself.

With the death of Chairman Mao, the downfall of the Gang of Four, the return to power of Deng Xiaoping, and the adoption of the policies of the Four Modernizations campaign, new considerations entered into Chinese exchanges for the Chinese—and thus inferentially for the Americans. In late 1978 and early 1979, the era of bilateral exchanges commenced. At the same time that national programs were being extended, students and scholars were received in the United States and China through the efforts of individual institutions. The programs surely profited from improved Chinese-American relations, but from the Chinese perspective exchanges were valued primarily not for foreign policy considerations but for their content and contribution to Chinese modernization, and hence for their concrete value to the Chinese participants.

Despite the growing importance of exchanges, they still became, from time to time, instruments for punishment. In the prenormalization period, programs were subject to cancellation or delay when either side determined that some decision or group member or proposed activity had unacceptable political overtones. After normalization this occurred less often. However, the Hu Na case is one example: The young Chinese tennis player defected
to the United States and was eventually granted political asylum. Chinese authorities registered their displeasure by canceling a number of planned exchanges; Americans traveling in China were reminded of Chinese objections. Nonetheless, the incident also demonstrated that exchanges were not to be treated haphazardly. Those canceled were selected carefully and seemed of low priority (Kallgren, 1984). The Chinese point was made, but with low cost.

Exchanges in the prenormalization period did serve symbolic purposes and even now, retain an element of this symbolism some years after normalization. At the same time, the increased importance assigned to the development of science and technology in China has resulted in a heightened value of exchanges. This fact has implications for the Chinese participants and for American organizations.

From the American side, the symbolism component has also declined. Exchanging units, whether they are departments, colleges, organizations, or research centers, have developed something of a vested interest in the programs they support. Policy differences between the two countries are now commonly resolved through means other than the cancellation of visits. In 1984, the American exchange associations found themselves in circumstances quite different from those that characterized their founding period, often with constituencies and participants different from those supporting their earlier efforts, and not infrequently with less power than they had had a decade before.

Private Interests and Goals: The Three Associations

The National Committee

De Tocqueville’s observation that “associations” were designed to “propagate some feeling by the encouragement of a great example” is quite aptly applied to the case of the National Committee. Those familiar with the development of China exchanges in the United States would quite likely consider this organization to be the most well known, senior to others, and certainly most centrally involved in facilitating the major exchanges with China of the early 1970s. Nonetheless, the National Committee was not established for this purpose.

The National Committee was established in 1966 to bring about a review of America’s China policy. It was composed of China scholars, a few political leaders and activists, together with individuals prominent in the labor movement. The time was ill-chosen since the Cultural Revolution broke out that same year, and thoughts of policy review were interspersed with reports of violence in China. Despite that fact, between 1966 and 1971 the National Committee carried on work that was essentially educational and aimed at American audiences. The American ping-pong team’s invitation to China, however, initiated a contact with National Committee staff
members that commenced the chain of events eventually bringing the National Committee to the forefront of the exchange effort in the prenormalization period.

The visit of the Chinese ping-pong team to the United States symbolized a new era in Chinese-American relations. It was a "media" event, with virtually every decision—as to program, travel, translation, as well as other more personal matters—scrutinized and interpreted for insights it might provide into Chinese-American relations. The trip also provided an opportunity for the Chinese visitors and the Chinese American community to begin reestablishing the links that had been largely severed in the post-1949 period. Since the arrangements for the visit were coordinated by the National Committee, working closely with the American Table Tennis Association, the resulting exposure gave the National Committee an opportunity to achieve prominence vis-à-vis the Chinese, the American media, and those planning subsequent exchanges. Funding and special services for the trip were provided by the government, foundations, and various corporate sponsors.

The trip was successful not only from the perspective of those who wished to heighten the visibility of China and its citizenry for the American public, but also as providing a head start for the National Committee on the complicated and touchy matter of managing exchanges. After this initiation, the National Committee's work and its yearly budget increased. Relations with Chinese counterpart personnel and organizations developed as both sides recognized the value of properly conducted exchange trips, together with the advantage of working with the same experienced individuals. The status of the National Committee rose.

Success brought its problems. Requests for National Committee participation in educational activities also increased as the American discussion of China policy grew. Obviously the first goal of the National Committee—review of policy—had been achieved. The next step was to discuss alternatives. Many of those who were members of the National Committee came increasingly to advocate normalized relations, with debate focused on how to bring this about and on what terms.

After 1972, therefore, two competing pressures coexisted: the requests for providing experienced escort service to visitors from and to China, together with claims on staff and members' time to participate in the China policy discussions underway in the American political and educational scene. Rather than try to meet both needs, the National Committee chose the first emphasis. In 1975, the leadership adopted a policy of stressing exchanges and moved away from its "educational" services to the American public and policymakers that had been provided in seminars, conferences, briefings, and similar activities customarily part of "association" activities. In retrospect, it is difficult to fault the decision, given the context at the time, but it set the National Committee on a very different path for the future.
The Asia Society assumed the educational activities formerly provided by the National Committee and assigned them to the newly organized China Council. The China Council recruited some National Committee members for their initial membership. It then vigorously encouraged city and regional China councils to provide educational programs. These local units, funded largely on their own with some national assistance and staffing, proceeded to develop programs on the arts, culture, and politics of China. There was interaction between the National Committee and the China Council, but the council took the responsibility for educational activities.

The choice of emphasis by the National Committee arguably may be linked to the development of the National Council on U.S.-China Trade as well. With good feelings between the United States and China, requests for National Committee assistance in matters of trade and commerce began to surface. To have retained an important role in this aspect of activities would have called for careful planning, a specialized recruitment drive, possibly a very different set of activities (and the staff to implement them). The National Committee did not take on this assignment. Instead, the National Council was established in 1973 as a separate organization. It soon developed its own set of activities, resources, publications programs, and clientele.

The work the National Committee did choose to perform has been carried out with a relatively small, relatively stable staff. There have been two presidents, Charles Yost and Arthur Rosen (who has announced his retirement in 1987). Douglas Murray served as the first vice president, succeeded by Jan Berris (whose account of the National Committee history follows this chapter). Several individuals have served as program assistants, with a turnover that reflects the growing possibilities of alternate employment after gaining experience in exchange work. It has been possible to draw upon various faculty and graduate students to assist in interpretation and other work. In the most recent years, the activities of the National Committee and, to some degree, the budget, have been stabilized. Moreover, lacking permanent funding, the staff has, wisely, remained small.

Yet the National Committee is composed of more than its small staff. In addition to a core work group, the committee members represent a broad slice of American opinion-makers and leaders, including representatives from academic, business, media, government, and volunteer organizations. From the early 434 members (Annual Report, 1973), the recruitment efforts of the National Committee staff have been designed not only to sustain the membership of those interested in China policy, but also to draw in a coterie of supporters who might provide assistance and service to visiting delegations. In 1983 membership was in the high 600s (Annual Report, 1982-83). The list of regular members is the base from which the board of directors is drawn; the board numbered forty-five in 1983. Most are from the northeast Washington triangle and have positions that enable them to provide assistance to the work of the committee. Other board of director
members confirm the status of the National Committee by their acceptance of membership; former President Ford doubtless serves in this capacity. Turnover is low.

In addition to the increase of members, National Committee growth has been reflected in budget increases. In 1972-73, the total income of the National Committee was $377,872; ten years later the figure was reported as $800,098; by 1986 it was over a million, but the percentage allocated to staff salaries remains very modest.

Equally important for an understanding of the work of the Committee is the source of funding. The role of the government in this matter has become decisive. This fact, together with the changes in the list of corporate sponsors, apparently indicates that (1) corporation and foundations continually reconsider the support they will provide to China activities, and in what form; and (2) the activities of the National Committee have been sustained by the decision of the U.S. government to use a private organization to provide assistance to special groups of Chinese. That work remains a key component of National Committee activities (Annual Report, 1983:12, 13).

These observations about National Committee activities are reflected in their newsletter. In the early and middle 1970s the publication recorded lists of Americans successful enough to arrange travel to China, together with reports on trips to and from China in which the National Committee played a central role (Notes, February 4, 1975). As exchanges multiplied, relations began to diversify: The lists disappeared, to be replaced by reports of Chinese official speeches to the National Committee, as well as new activities (Notes, Summer 1977:1, Spring 1978:3).

Since 1979, new ventures have been developed. When the Chinese began to send scholars abroad, the National Committee developed and now manages a series of "educational" programs to provide selected Chinese visitors with supplemental opportunities to learn about U.S. scholarship and research. In 1984 the National Committee recruited Chinese participants in short-term programs on American history, law, and society.

For Americans, the National Committee has long conducted annual travel trips to China for committee members and their friends. These trips are escorted by a member of the National Committee staff and, though expensive, are said to provide opportunities for experiences not commonly granted to those seeing China as tourists. In 1984 and presumably into the future, the National Committee has commenced an informal seminar between selected leaders from American and Chinese societies. The seminar includes those thought to be influential in foreign policy or in research on American life. The emphasis is not upon those directly involved in political decisions, but those presumably influential in decision-making.

In sum, the National Committee program is now composed of a core of services to the government and certain foundation-supported travel
groups, as well as a small education program aimed at Chinese. Indeed, while the work is service-oriented, with some educational components, the audience is primarily Chinese.

*The China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association*

The China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association stands in contrast to the National Committee. Though both wanted China policy changed, their ways of bringing this about were different. The Friendship Association is organized from the bottom up, and the initial chapters were political in their program. Its staff, largely volunteer and part time, is larger than the staff of the National Committee. It was and still is a mass organization. Finally, and quite important, the Friendship Association possessed, from the day of its inception, a Chinese counterpart—the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (You Xie). The assistance and support provided by the counterpart was of decisive importance for the Friendship Association’s growth and sustenance.

The Friendship Association is composed of small local chapters (sixty-three in 1985), the first of which were established in 1970 and 1971 in the West Coast cities of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, plus New York. The linking together of chapters occurred at a national meeting in 1974. Until the early 1980s the headquarters was in Los Angeles. After considerable discussion, in 1981 the office was moved to Washington, D.C., on the grounds that a greater impact would be made there.

Who joined the Friendship Association? What “truth”—“. . . to proclaim a truth . . .” (de Tocqueville)—brought them to expend the time and energy in this voluntary activity? The Friendship Association was begun by men and women who had been activists in the social and political struggles of the 1960s. They had been, and were, opponents of American foreign policy; some were socialists (which led to a ban on seeking financial support from corporations or foundations). Some were graduate students who had been and remained active in the alternative academic organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Many applauded and endorsed the revolutionary goals and policies of China. They intended to counter the erroneous information they saw presented about China and to see that the “real truth” was set forth. This goal led them to work for a new China-U.S. policy. Many were experienced organizers.

A second group was composed of a few Americans who had been long-time residents of China, who had been involved themselves in current U.S. foreign policy upon returning to the United States. The larger number of ordinary members were people with an interest in China derived from relatives or missionary ties. Some local counterparts of the American “establishment” saw the Friendship Association as a place to work for better relations. These people believed in people-to-people diplomacy.
The grass-roots operation of local chapters marked the Friendship Association as distinct from the other two organizations studied here. Each local unit, although autonomous, seems to have proceeded in a similar manner. They established a Friendship Association office. They initiated and carried on a program of speakers, initially those knowledgeable about China and acceptable to the group. In due course, returned visitors from China, together with Chinese visitors, were added. The local chapter frequently published a newsletter that reported local events plus some materials from China. There were modest dues ($15 per year in 1985), with scaled-down charges for the aged, students, and others with financial problems. The dues remained in the local chapter treasury except for a small sum sent to the national office and some monies used for publication costs. Each member received the local newsletter, the Friendship Association magazine *U.S.-China Review*, and might select one Chinese publication in English from a list of alternatives, including *Beijing Review, China Reconstruits*, and other more or less popular magazines.

In these characteristics the Friendship Association seems no different from many local or single-interest organizations. Since the dues were so minimal, how did the transition from a collection of small units to a relatively well-known organization come about? The answer involves three separate aspects of the association history and composition. First, the original organization possessed experienced and energetic organizers. Second, the counterpart structure provided an extremely scarce and valuable resource—contacts within China. Third, the resumption of U.S. China relations, together with the change in Chinese domestic priorities, made it much easier for the Friendship Association to engage people in its educational efforts.

We have already commented on its early activities. As a volunteer organization with aspirations for a national presence, this experienced staff was of critical importance. The second aspect, the scarce commodity of Chinese contacts and information, is of special interest. From the moment that U.S.-China relations began to change, Americans wanted to travel to China. In that sense President Nixon reflected his countrymen quite well. Americans of all economic backgrounds, representing all manner of political views—drawn from the scholarly community and the media, from businesses and foundations—all schemed to be among the first to enter China. The Chinese were hesitant and reluctant; at most, the conditions of the country and scarcity of resources for tourists seemed to dictate group travel.

From this insistence on group travel came the Friendship Association’s special expertise. You Xie had been working in this area for decades and was experienced (Passin, 1962:132). When the Friendship Association sent a delegation to China, the topic obviously arose (*People’s Daily*, November 20, 1972). You Xie arranged for an allocation of visas for the American counterpart. The Friendship Association handled the arrangements and selected the group members. It oriented them as it saw fit and profited from the travel charges.
Domestically, the Friendship Association apportioned the visas to its regional organizations; in the early years when the costs were lower, a few of these trips were saved for Friendship Association activists who had devoted their energies to the organization. For the remainder of the slots, the local staffs made the announcements, established criteria (which often included membership in the association), interviewed applicants, and selected those to participate. Though the number of annual travelers was small (in 1985 the allotment was 500), so interested were Americans that the opportunity to travel could easily be integrated into the Friendship Association programs. These domestic programs have always included lectures, movies, social events, cultural exhibits, work with cities (i.e., sister city relationships), and travel opportunities. The trips have remained competitive with tourist opportunities, involve orientation programs, and still seem to have a special quality that is emphasized in the literature. The national organization was, and is, dependent upon the resources that are derived from this portion of the Friendship Association activities.

The third aspect of the Friendship Association experience that contributed to its success is derived from the political changes in China and its treatment by the Friendship Association. Since the association had been based on an alliance—between political activists, whose major commitment was to set forth the value of Chinese revolutionary policies, and those who wanted better relations without much attention to the domestic priorities of the Chinese—events in China soon led to a major confrontation that threatened the Friendship Association.

In 1977–78, those ideologically committed to Maoist policies found themselves confronting an unacceptable situation in China. With the fall of the Gang of Four, the denial of its ideological premises, and the return of Deng Xiaoping to power, American activists perceived themselves as witnessing a Chinese counterrevolution. From a distance they could do nothing but call for debate in the Friendship Association chapters, with the clear intention of denouncing domestic Chinese developments. Those who had joined the Friendship Association because of a generalized interest in China, with perhaps some feeling for China derived from relatives or past experience, were clearly concerned about what might happen if the chapters engaged in wholesale criticism of the current policies of the country with whom they had a special relationship. Moreover, undoubtedly a number of Friendship Association members approved the new policies. Since the organization provided for considerable local freedom and autonomy, the struggle was fought out in some of the larger and more powerful of the chapters. In some cases the ideologues won.

At the 1978 annual meeting in San Francisco, a heated, lengthy, and acrimonious fight over bylaws was in fact a struggle over the direction of the Friendship Association. The majority of the delegates opposed those critical of current Chinese policies and eventually adopted a series of bylaw
changes that led to a withdrawal by the more activist members (some of whom were members of the Revolutionary Marxist party, which protested during the 1979 Deng visit). It seems reasonable to assume that had the critics been successful and remained within the Friendship Association, the visa allocations might have diminished or been cut off. The normalization celebrations in Washington, D.C., provided a moment of triumph when Chinese visitors congratulated the Friendship Association.

But then what? The Friendship Association was not bypassed by history. Their initial goal to provide information about China remained intact (and probably became much easier to carry out with the post-1979 politics). Their policy emphasis included presentation and support of many of the Chinese proposals for continued improvement of Sino-American relations. The chapter programs diversified when the exchange of student programs began to produce a number of Chinese visitors on American campuses. For these Chinese, the Friendship Association provided language tutoring, helped find housing, and organized dinners and social events.

The travel component of Friendship Association efforts now became two-way. As the Chinese became willing, indeed eager, to send representatives abroad, the Friendship Association included a small program of exchanges in their yearly discussions of travel arrangements. Chinese organizations nominated individuals to participate in short-term travel opportunities and in the longer-term opportunities for study. Because the Friendship Association is composed of local units, the arrangements provide for very modest costs and the opportunities for visitors to stay in local homes even for as long as a six-month stay. This portion of the program does not approach in size or cost the travel opportunities that their program depends upon, but it does inject a real element of exchange into the Friendship Association's program. Moreover, when seen in conjunction with the courtesies extended to visitors, it makes the "exchange" program of their efforts more substantive.

In the main the Friendship Association’s constituency remains primarily one of a local, volunteer nature. Its 1985 membership of 6,000 was a substantial drop from the maximum of 9,000 some years ago and shows the fragile nature of local units. In the post-1979 period, the national efforts of the association have taken on a new dimension. First, the long-time prohibition on seeking funds from the business community has been set aside to permit solicitation of support from organizations engaged in China trade. This decision is coupled with an effort to show a greater national presence. The Friendship Association now conducts a yearly two-day program on China, which the presence in Washington makes possible.

Both history and domestic American political changes have been relatively kind to the Friendship Association. While it may lose members because the controversy and conflict of China policy no longer draws so many supporters, the association’s travel program provides it with the nec-
essary basic financial support; the cellular organizational structure permits each chapter to function in an autonomous manner; and the association remains able to stress its central purpose of educating the American public.

Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China

When several aristocrats want to form an association they can easily do so. As each of them carries great weight in society, a very small number of associates may be enough. So, being few, it is easy to get to know and understand one another.

When aristocrats adopt a new idea or conceive a new sentiment, they lend it something of the conspicuous station they themselves occupy, and so the mass is bound to take notice of them and they easily influence the minds and hearts of those around them. (de Tocqueville, 1969:513)

The Friendship Association sees itself as a people-to-people organization. The National Committee has worked assiduously to develop connections and ties to the necessary, local organizations and people to carry forward its work. The CSCPRC has long been, and remains in the 1980s, a powerful association integrated into the seam of science organizations in the United States and thus is particularly well situated to advance its programs. It contrasts in terms of goals, staff, organizational cohesiveness, and financing with the other two private associations discussed above.

Like the National Association, the CSCPRC was established in 1966. Initially titled the Committee on Scholarly Communication with Mainland China, it was composed of China scholars together with the presidents of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Social Science Research Council. It included all prominent organizations of the academic world. Its purpose was to facilitate in some manner the exchange of scientific information and knowledge between Chinese science and the American scientific community.

For some years its efforts to establish contact, let alone support, with the Chinese scientific establishment was frustrated by the Cultural Revolution. Until 1971 it was sufficient to have a part-time staff person assigned to oversee any possible developments; occasional meetings, recalled one member, were made up of discussions about what one would do if it were possible to establish contacts with the Chinese.

An important, special aspect of the CSCPRC was that its connections with the Chinese Academy were facilitated through close personal relationships enjoyed by certain Chinese American scientists with the Chinese political and educational leadership (Kallgren, 1981). Events since normalization, and the current development of Chinese science, continue to demonstrate that American scientists of Chinese descent play an exceedingly important role in facilitating programs and progress in exchanges at all levels.
The housing of the CSCPRC in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the status of its staff as NAS employees have been an especially fortunate occurrence. The NAS has an extensive program of foreign exchanges and contacts. Scientists have long committed themselves to the universality of their work and the utility of scientific exchanges. It may well be that there was a legacy of respect for what little was known of Chinese science, despite the theories and priorities of the Cultural Revolution.

The Chinese interest in science is demonstrable even during the early post-Cultural Revolution days. For example, the People's Daily was used to highlight the visits of foreigners deemed important to China. The visits of U.S. scientists, both Chinese and non-Chinese, were consistently emphasized (e.g., People's Daily, July 2, 8, 10, 13, 1972). While the National Committee was addressing the matter of the ping-pong team and the Friendship Association chapters were still evolving, the CSCPRC took on the development of what are considered the premier educational exchanges. These developments were set in motion by the initial trip of a medical delegation from China to the United States and the return visits in 1973 of an American medical group and a CSCPRC delegation.

As with its counterpart the National Committee, CSCPRC programs were negotiated at two levels. Because exchanges were of symbolic as well as substantive importance in the initial phases of American-Chinese relations, they were discussed in the abstract at the highest diplomatic levels at the same time that the negotiations by a CSCPRC delegation were conducted over procedures, topics, membership, and related practical matters.

While it can be argued whether or not the initial month-long field visits that characterized the early phase of the CSCPRC were valued by the governments, there can be little doubt that they were valued by those who participated in them. Between 1972 and 1978, the CSCPRC assisted in a total of sixty-eight delegation visits. The terms of travel, the negotiated topics of study, and the number of participants all were the subjects of rather intense negotiation with an effort made by both sides to ensure a rough equality of effort and number. Program development is discussed at some length in a detailed report of the CSCPRC (Bullock, 1978), which set forth a careful and quite complete analysis of the exchange effort.

One important characteristic of these prenormalization efforts should be highlighted, namely, that the CSCPRC in membership was an alliance of scientists, humanists, and social scientists. Throughout the history of the organization there has been an effort to ensure that the social scientists and humanists would have some degree of participation in the total program. Moreover, because a review of the topics covered will show only a scant few delegations focused on the social sciences and humanities, the CSCPRC decision to assign a China scholar to each delegation to provide resource and background data provided the initial opportunity for many social scientists to see China. Until fairly recently this alliance remained intact.
None of the associations discussed here profited as much as did the CSCPRC from the domestic changes in China. The 1978 decision to send students abroad, and particularly to send substantial numbers to the United States, opened the possibilities for exchanges of information, of real collaboration between American and Chinese scientists. The growing numbers of American-trained Chinese scientists (as each year's cohort of scholars and students returned home) may well be an important contribution to this collaboration.

Given the goal of educating Chinese students and scholars in America, one might have expected the CSCPRC to have played a central role in facilitating the educational effort. They did not. President Carter is said to have endorsed American participation in placing Chinese students in the United States: He is also reported to have insisted on full payment. The Chinese reaction was to place individuals by themselves, without resort to a centralized agency. Undoubtedly, cost was a factor in this decision. Whether the outcome will be as helpful to the Chinese modernization efforts as other options will never be known. Nevertheless, the principle of exchange has had an important impact here. One result is that the CSCPRC array of programs—facilitating American students undertaking graduate study in Chinese universities, the year-long programs for advanced research, and the short-term lecturing and research programs—has been supplemented by a broad range of alternative possibilities for Chinese students that include virtually all major research universities in the United States in some formal or informal arrangements. (These are discussed in the Thurston-Maddox chapter.) Of this total offering of programs, the CSCPRC programs represent only a small portion of the effort.

Nonetheless, the CSCPRC programs remain of crucial importance, particularly for social scientists and humanists. The programs are also of value for Chinese visitors because the CSCPRC provides funding and introductions that assist the Chinese scholar. For the American scholar, particularly in the social sciences and humanities, an important benefit is the full funding available from the CSCPRC. This aspect of the program, together with the prestige and reputation of the CSCPRC in placement, has made its awards very desirable. Moreover, as a national organization, its successes and failures take on more importance. When a bilateral relationship between two universities encounters difficulties over a given matter, it is never easy to know whether they reflect local politics or national policy.

The CSCPRC has certainly confronted difficulties in carrying out its program, but its ability to resolve these difficulties lies in the fact that they must be addressed at the national level. Since the CSCPRC is, itself, closely connected to government and educational circles, it has the national connections to address the difficulties. Its committee members work at the highest levels of science, provide advice and consultation to government agencies, and interface with funding organizations and governmental personnel.
There is ambiguity in this degree of interaction between the science establishment and the government, which can be interpreted in a number of ways. Some will emphasize the autonomy of the CSCPRC and point to its NAS funding and even foundation support for selected activities as indicators of its independence from government. Others will emphasize the role of government monies in CSCPRC programs and point out that an academic advisor served in the American Embassy during 1979–81 as a government employee. A separate CSCPRC scholar/administrator now resides in Beijing and assists Americans. Success in the quasi-private activity requires Embassy cooperation and support. The present arrangement makes possible some independence in action that would be difficult to sustain if the CSCPRC representative were within the Embassy.

Simultaneous with picking a careful way in its relationship with the government, the CSCPRC has had to contend with the diversification of exchange programs in universities. Increased efforts for collaborative scholarship are all to the good, but the diversity does make it difficult to organize university support for CSCPRC efforts. The CSCPRC may organize meetings, and it can draw upon the collegial commitment of scholars who have worked with the CSCPRC over the years and perhaps even traveled to China through CSCPRC assistance. It can suggest and propose measures that are outside its programs, but it has neither the means nor the power to shape the nongovernmental programs that continue to emerge. Moreover, the growth of governmental bilateral agency-to-agency efforts, flowering in the aftermath of the Deng trip in 1979, are outside its purview.

In contrast to the staffs of the National Committee and the Friendship Association, many CSCPRC staffers are individuals who have completed dissertations and then sought employment outside of teaching positions. Their salaries and benefits reflect this educational background. The richness of the exchange program and the opportunity to work with the society they studied make their assignments attractive. As the programs have expanded, so has the staff and the related bureaucracy.

Since its expertise and constituency were critical in the CSCPRC’s early years, we must look closely at what has happened to these recently. The close relationship with the SSRC, ACLS, and NAS provided a wealth of experience when the CSCPRC was suddenly confronted with the necessity to establish a nationwide program for scholars to go to China. Drawing on the forms and experience of other foundations and award-giving institutions, the CSCPRC developed the procedures that now annually select scholars to visit China and process the programs of Chinese scholars visiting the United States.

The SCSPRC has continued to focus its efforts on its originally conceived goals, although obviously the manifestations of its interests have changed as programs have changed. Nonetheless, the CSCPRC works with intellectuals in China. What might not have been foreseen was the dramatic
change in Chinese domestic priorities that accompanied the Four Modernization programs, and the consequences for scientists and intellectuals. Universities regrouped; the value of science and its practitioners was upgraded. The 1980s domestic programs depend upon scientific expertise—and so the groups with whom the CSCPRC interacts have become more important in China. The expertise of the CSCPRC has become more valuable in the postnormalization period.

One casualty of this otherwise promising state of affairs has been the alliance among scientists, social scientists, and humanists. While the latter two groups of scholars profited from this coalition, in 1983 some moved into separate activities. Most prominent has been the establishment of a separate funding program for international relations, law, and economics. It is probably not possible to determine whether the decision grew out of the expressed frustrations of the foundations, which were constantly besieged for assistance, or from the emphasis that the Chinese leadership wished to place upon these three fields of work. Whatever the reasons, there now exists a separate program, separately funded, without a formal link to the CSCPRC. Some have argued that this independent program will not negatively affect the remaining social scientists and humanists who depend upon the support of the CSCPRC because changes have made China more hospitable to those outside the central scientific fields. After initial skepticism, evidence may prove them correct.

Setting aside this issue, the CSCPRC seems the most successful of the associations discussed here. This is not surprising in view of its ability to profit from its intimate relationship with and the legitimacy bestowed by the NAS; its close relationship with official Washington; its relatively generous funding and some degree of stability; and the growing approval, on both sides of the Pacific, of scientific exchanges with China. Within the comparatively narrow range of its charge, the CSCPRC therefore has proved the most effective.

The “Association” and U.S.-China Relations

Tracing the fate of these three organizations through normalization illuminates important aspects both about the nature of “associations” and about the state of relations between the two nations. Given the dramatic changes in these relations, we must ask how the associations have fared. What characteristics of the organizations themselves have contributed to the present state? What role have international and domestic events played?

Let us begin with the first question. Twenty years after its founding, the National Committee functions as an important service organization that facilitates exchanges in the cultural field together with those in the semiofficial political arena. It has returned, at least in part, to the education tasks it undertook almost twenty years ago. Most successful in achieving its goals has been the CSCPRC, which has command of a substantial
portion of the senior exchange efforts in the American and Chinese educational fields. Though limited in numbers by financial constraints, the CSCPRC's influence is substantial in the broader field of China exchanges. The Friendship Association now emphasizes the wide-ranging possibilities implicit in people-to-people diplomacy, though its national standing may be less prominent. There is considerable turnover in the organization; it has lost a third of its membership in a few years and has seen dramatic alterations in the number of chapters—hence its overall vitality is somewhat at risk. The organization itself is not in jeopardy, but rather its ambience: The sense of adventure, the defense of a noble cause, the struggle against odds that characterized much of the discussion of China policy into the 1980s cannot be sustained when the United States and China are considering the sale of weapons. This does not suggest that the organization will disappear, but rather that it may face a long period of decline.

Of the three organizations, there would seem to have been the least possibility of disbandment for the Friendship Association. Possibilities are wide-ranging, and cultural exchanges constitute only a fraction of the activities it has carried on since its establishment in the early 1970s. Though often locally based, the scope of personal interaction, from tours to picnics, movies, socials, and the like, is chronicled in the group's magazines and newsletters. Disbandment was surely an alternative of the National Committee in the mid-1970s when the Pye Committee (named for chairman Lucien Pye) recommended a change of course. Instead, the decision was to continue to perform a valuable service that could not easily have been transferred elsewhere. Policy review does not seem to have been an issue for the CSCPRC in the 1970s. Moreover, the nature of scholarly exchanges, with their link to modernization, was such that the momentum created by internal events in China was seized upon by the American educational circles. The CSCPRC was the lead organization in this process. Though other American educational organizations existed, it is difficult to imagine that the Council on International Educational Exchange, the Council on International Exchange of Scholars, or the American Council on Education would have been equipped or able to take on the job. Moreover, none of them presented the scientific credentials of the National Academy of Sciences with its clear counterpart in China.

Single-purpose organizations are of course subject to obsolescence. In all three cases presented here, the organizations developed an expertise, a special knowledge, that enhanced their work and permitted them to adjust to the changing circumstances of international relations. Nevertheless, neither the Friendship Association nor the National Committee has translated expertise into solid financial endowments.

Lacking funding, a second important characteristic of these organizations has played a definitive role in their survival: All three organizations have been supported by their special constituencies. Of the three, the National Committee worked with Chinese party officials, high-ranking
cadres, and highly visible political leaders—both as visitors to the United States and also within their Chinese organizations—and thus was in a position to establish the best credentials. Though the CPIFA obviously could have adjusted to the provision of assistance by an alternative American counterpart, the close and skillful efforts of the small staff at the National Committee constantly reinforced and personalized the nature of the relationship. In sum, the very size of the staff of the National Committee prevented an alienation of ties with the CPIFA. Such support would not resolve the National Committee’s financial difficulties, but it could be used to seek financial support from American groups and the American government. The National Committee, as an association, could continue.

With respect to the Friendship Association, the expectations were and remain quite different. Despite the fact that travel is a major source of financial support, the expertise here is not travel, but rather success in facilitating Sino-American relations. In that respect the Friendship Association, especially as it has functioned after 1978, has been successful. Moreover, its use of visas has maintained a close relationship with You Xie that has presumably proved profitable for both sides.

The matter of constituency with the CSCPRC reflects in part the large issue of relations with China. Within the United States the leaders of the CSCPRC have been prominent in American educational circles, in relations with the government, and in the basic field of science. This prominence has sustained the program of the CSCPRC. Since more or less adequate funding has been available, it has not been necessary to make the case for the CSCPRC at the expense of other programs.

The history of “association” in China’s exchange programs demonstrates that such organizations survive so long as they use their expertise to successfully retain either their original purpose or retain its appearance while shifting the substance of activities; so long as they can retain a constituency of some importance; and so long as the cost of sustaining their activities is not judged excessive in terms of the task at hand. While the mix of cost, constituency, and expertise is different in each of the three cases, they all demonstrate that it is the broader definitions of constituency and expertise, unique to each organization, that have permitted these “associations” to meet their goals in a convincing and cost-effective manner—and thus to survive and influence the changing realities of U.S.-China relations.

Notes

1. Herbert Passin (1962) discusses the Chinese methods and goals up to the early 1960s, but I know of no analysis of the past twenty years that provides comparable coverage.
2. Warren Cohen's chapter in this volume discusses the National Committee from the perspective of the end of the anti-Chinese period.

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The Evolution of Sino-American Exchanges: A View from the National Committee

Jan Carol Berris

Introduction

In April of 1971 the Chinese startled the world by inviting an American ping-pong team into "forbidden territory." Within a week fifteen American table tennis players and officials were on their way to China from Nagoya, Japan, where the invitation had been extended during an international tournament. Ping-pong diplomacy was in full swing.

To everyone's surprise, after more than twenty years of hostile relations between the two countries, exchanges quickly flourished. What began with ping-pong took on a momentum of its own so that by the mid- to late seventies there were more exchanges occurring between China and the United States—two countries that did not maintain diplomatic relations—than between China and any other country except Japan.

The Sino-American exchange relationship rapidly moved from ground zero (prior to 1971); to the ping-pong diplomacy period of high-profile events, during which the main purpose was to change hearts and minds (1971–73); to a brief hiatus in which exchanges were buffeted by political winds (1974–75); to a time when substance began to win out over form (1976–78); and finally, to the present era when the process has expanded and so matured that even an incident like the defection of the tennis player Hu Na slows down only the official program but does not affect the considerable activity in the private sector. Although no periodization is absolute, delineating these stages provides a useful starting point for looking at the evolution of Sino-American exchanges. The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations—a key player in the development of exchanges, an organization whose history reflects the evolution of Sino-American exchanges, and the organization with which the author is most familiar—is the focal point of this chapter.

The Evolution of Sino-American Exchanges

The Early Structure: 1966–71

The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was formed in 1966 by a coalition of civic leaders (several with Quaker roots), businessmen, and academics who were concerned that U.S.-China relations were frozen in the mutual hostility of the 1960s and that the American political climate was
not conducive to a dispassionate discussion of the issues. The objective was to stimulate and legitimize nonpartisan public discussion of American China policy through conferences, seminars, publications, and educational outreach programs. Its board and membership, carefully selected to represent the gamut of the political spectrum, included people with sharply differing views on China. The Committee's activities in the late 1960s in promoting public discussion around the United States have been credited with helping to create a climate that enabled acceptance of President Nixon's initiatives toward China. But its original mission of public education was altered dramatically by the events of April 1971.

Those American table tennis players who unexpectedly became part of history wanted to reciprocate. However, the U.S. Table Tennis Association, a small, loosely knit organization of ping-pong enthusiasts, lacked the administrative and financial resources and the knowledge of China necessary for undertaking such a project. The National Committee learned of the association's predicament and offered to cosponsor the Chinese team's visit, raising funds, coordinating with both the Chinese and American governments, and providing administrative structure and China "expertise." The offer was accepted and the resulting tour was a great success. A few months later officials of the PRC Mission to the UN (the only Chinese government representatives then in the United States) asked the National Committee to sponsor the American tour of the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe. Thus began the Committee's involvement in exchanges with China.

There were several reasons why the National Committee and its sister organization, the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), played such pivotal roles in the early days of exchanges. In the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, private agencies provided the only channels available for such activity. The sudden Chinese initiative left no time to create new institutions, and the two committees were already functioning. They had offices, organizational structures, funding (albeit for other activities), and a desire (National Committee) and a mandate (CSCPRC) to move into the exchange process. The membership of both committees included leaders in civic affairs, business, academia, and science, as well as former government officials or advisors. Men such as W. Michael Blumenthal and Ambassador Charles W. Yost (NCUSCR), and Dr. Frank Press (CSCPRC) chaired the committees during the early 1970s.

Given the dominance of extreme ideologues in China during the Cultural Revolution period, one would have expected the Chinese to insist on dealing with more radical, less "establishment-oriented" organizations, and to a certain extent they did, working with the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association, an organization set up to promote sympathetic understanding and support of the PRC and its policies. The Friendship Association provided an important vehicle for the involvement of Americans at the grass-roots level in China-related activities, primarily by sending
Americans to China (no Chinese delegations were sent to the United States under the Association's auspices until the late 1970s). On the other hand, the Chinese were looking for legitimacy and apparently believed it could best be achieved by dealing with respected public leaders. The American government, in its turn, was comfortable entrusting an important aspect of a delicately evolving relationship to organizations whose membership was known and trusted. There may also have been a belief that the nonpartisan and diverse views represented by the members of both committees might help minimize any potential political backlash resulting from a rapprochement with China. Thus, it is probably because of the prestige and influence of the membership of the two committees that both the Chinese and American governments chose to work with them.

Form over Substance: 1971–74

It has been argued elsewhere in this book that the early exchanges between China and the United States were primarily symbolic, that they represented "foreign policy initiatives and only secondarily a concern with the intrinsic value of the exchange itself" (Kallgren). Unquestionably, this was a period of form over substance as both sides sought to use exchanges to move the political relationship forward. While there was some concern over whether deeper, more nuanced, longer lasting contacts were developing between people and between organizations, it was primarily the image that counted.

The importance of the high-profile, spectacular exchanges, therefore, cannot be dismissed. It was essential to create a climate of acceptance, and the extravaganzas in the performing arts and sports certainly helped achieve this goal. They brought needed visibility at a time when people in both countries were unaccustomed to the idea of friendly human contact with a former adversary. With the McCarthy era and the Korean War barely two decades past, both sides needed to correct the distortion in the widely-held negative stereotypes. The image of America as a flabby, declining society was changed by the impressive display of American athletes winning event after event during the visit to China of the U.S. Track and Field Team. And Americans' perception of Chinese as unfeeling automatons was altered by a gymnastics competition at Madison Square Garden, during which the Chinese team's piano player came to the rescue of an American gymnast whose music tape broke just before her performance; with no rehearsal—in fact, without ever having seen her routine—the Chinese pianist enthusiastically improvised an accompaniment.

The theme of "friendship" so dramatically highlighted by the latter example was pervasive in this period and was constantly emphasized by both sides. During their visits the Chinese were inevitably asked what impressed them the most. The invariable answer was a refreshing confluence of diplomacy and truth—"the friendliness and generosity of the American people and their warm welcome to us."
While Americans are generally considered to be open and enthusiastic, the warm welcome was almost ensured by the personalities (and, most likely, careful coaching) of the Chinese who were chosen to represent their country. They were extraordinarily effective, multi-talented goodwill ambassadors. Each seemed to have been handpicked for his or her cheerful personality and ability to charm everyone in sight as well as for athletic or artistic talent. Not only could they play ping-pong or juggle twenty-five plates while standing on their left toe, but they could sing "Home on the Range" at the drop of a hat. Spectators who stayed on after the completion of the gymnastic competitions were treated to renditions of American folk tunes by the gymnasts, and the musicians who accompanied the Shenyang Acrobats serenaded the departing audiences with "Turkey in the Straw" played on traditional Chinese instruments.

Of course, the visibility of high-profile exchanges had negative aspects as well. Right-wing extremists threw dead rats at the Chinese ping-pong players from the stands of Cobo Hall in Detroit, religious fundamentalists carried picket signs comparing Mao and Hitler, and an unknown culprit exploded a tear-gas canister in the Chicago Opera House as the Shenyang Acrobats were performing. During the ping-pong matches at Maryland University's Cole Field House several protests came together at once. On one side of the stands sat Tricia Nixon, representing her father. Across the way sat about two hundred Taiwan sympathizers. Up in the bleachers sat a group of American college students. Throughout the games there was a tremendous cacophony as the Taiwanese loudly and persistently called for the Chinese team members to defect, while the American students, unhappy over President Nixon's resumption of the bombing of Haiphong Harbor, chanted "Nixon bombs Haiphong, Tricia watches ping-pong."

But whether to applaud or oppose, large crowds attended such events in both countries, thus meeting one of the major goals of the exchanges—to reach as many people as possible. Indeed, the National Committee and its early cosponsors (such as the U.S. Table Tennis Association and the New York City Center of Music and Drama) deliberately set low prices on tickets for performances and competitions both to ensure that costs would not prohibit anyone from attending and to assure large turn-outs. The objective in those days was exposure, not profit. Even when the National Committee sponsored smaller, professional exchanges, they tended to be projects that would draw large audiences or that had a potential ripple effect, such as delegations of journalists or education policy makers.

The initial exchanges received extensive media coverage and public attention. The ping-pong entourage traveled in two planes: one for the Chinese and American teams and accompanying personnel, the other for the press corps. All the major newspapers and news magazines were represented, and an ABC camera crew filmed the entire three-week tour. In addition, local press swelled the numbers of reporters, editors, cameramen,
and producers at each stop. Two American escorts worked full time coordinating press activities. Media interest remained high during this stage, achieving a level matched only by Deng Xiaoping’s American visit in February 1979.

The Americans were not the only ones caught up in the media frenzy. Two Chinese camera crews, one working on a TV documentary, the other on a film, accompanied the ping-pong team and the Shenyang Acrobats in 1972. Xinhua (New China News Agency) and other correspondents were legion. It was a heady experience indeed for this author to be greeted throughout China in 1973 with “Oh, I know you. You’re the one who was in the ping-pong documentary.”

Thus, while tens of thousands of Chinese and Americans attended the sports and performing events, hundreds of thousands more saw them on television or read about them in newspapers or magazines. This extensive media coverage and public attention were central to the key objective of this period: building popular support for the U.S.-PRC relationship.

**Political Pressures: 1974–75**

After the initial leap forward there was a sudden decrease in exchanges—the National Committee sponsored or helped facilitate eight exchanges in 1973 but only two in 1974 and two in 1975. This was a period of overt politicization of the exchange process, reflecting a major internal struggle in the Chinese leadership in which the U.S.-China relationship was an important weapon. American leaders may have been prepared to insulate the exchanges from the political problems between the two countries, but their Chinese counterparts saw exchanges as a way of pressuring America into greater movement on the political front. Americans who met with Chinese leaders at this time were often told that it was not convenient to broaden the exchange process until the American government altered its policies on the Taiwan issue.

Not only was the exchange process not broadened, but serious obstacles were placed in its path, primarily by the Chinese. The composition of American professional and academic delegations was challenged, raising the thorny issue of the sending side’s right to select its own delegation members and a country’s sovereign right to exclude anyone it chooses. Only a few weeks before the arrival of the first U.S. tour of a performing arts company, the Chinese government demanded that the song “We Will Surely Liberate Taiwan” be sung and its words printed in the playbill. At a time when the U.S. government still recognized Taiwan and when local officials (who would be featured at opening ceremonies in each locality) had to be mindful of the feelings of various constituents, this was viewed as an unwarranted intrusion of politics into a cultural event. Five months later, in a show of support for Third World countries championing Puerto Rican independence, the Chinese refused to issue a visa to the mayor of San Juan,
who was to be deputy leader of a delegation of American mayors. On each occasion both sides stuck to their “principles,” and the resulting confrontations led to the postponement of these projects. They were, in fact, undertaken later (the performing arts tour in 1978 and the mayors’ trip in 1979), but only after considerable expenditure of time and money and much irritation on both sides. It was later learned that the crisis over the performing arts tour had been deliberately created by Jiang Qing, who was, for a time, the dictator of cultural policy in China.

This was not the first intrusion into the exchange process by the widow of Mao Zedong. Indeed, it seems she was involved from the beginning. In 1973 the American Swimming and Diving Team was maneuvered into giving an impromptu exhibition in Beijing in addition to its two scheduled performances. When the accompanying escorts protested that the team was tired from a visit to the Great Wall, they were told that the performance had been requested by a very high official, and, indeed, the chairman of the Sports Commission attended. They were not told until later that the request came directly from Jiang Qing, who appeared incognito, wanting a “peek” at the Americans. It is assumed that she played a similar role during the visit of the Philadelphia Orchestra. In a command meeting immediately after a midnight arrival in Beijing, an exhausted Philadelphia Orchestra leadership was requested to change its program to include Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony (not in the orchestra’s repertoire at the time) rather than the Fifth, which had been rehearsed specifically for the China tour. The orchestra was told not to be concerned that they had no sheet music; indeed, the Chinese dusted off and flew up the Shanghai Orchestra’s scores of the Sixth Symphony and merged them with the equally dusty Beijing Orchestra scores to provide enough copies for the performers. While the Chinese were never specific about the reasons for the change, the sinologists accompanying the orchestra all agreed that the request likely came from Jiang Qing herself.

Neither the changes in schedules nor the intrusion of politics into cultural events seemed to effect the U.S. government’s policies, but they did affect the National Committee, resulting in a fundamental restructuring of the organization. There was growing concern at the Committee that its education and exchange programs were becoming increasingly incompatible and that the integrity of the educational programs could suffer as a result. The board, while agreeing that both functions remained vitally important, believed that the continuity of the Committee’s visible role in the exchange relationship was particularly desirable at that stage of U.S.-China relations. This assessment led to the decision to assist the Asia Society in developing a major new program to assure an effective nationwide educational program on China and U.S.-China relations in line with the National Committee’s past efforts. The Committee thus took a preemptive step to ensure that its education program did not become hostage to the political climate of the time.
Even the vaunted Chinese slogan of the first period, "friendship first, competition second," sometimes fell by the wayside during this second period of political pressure. During the 1975 Chinese Women's Basketball tour, one American team decided to take advantage of the spirit behind "friendship first." Videos of previous matches had shown the Chinese always stopping to help up opponents who tripped or to make certain that an opponent who had fouled them was all right. On orders of their coach, the American team members purposely committed more than the ordinary number of fouls, hoping to slow down the Chinese players. By half time, the Chinese had caught on to this tactic. From then on, if an American player suddenly tripped and fell, the Chinese player just jumped right over her and went on (usually) to make a basket. All pretense of friendship was dropped, and the spirit of competition led the way to a Chinese victory.

Substance over Form: 1976–78

It should not be assumed that the high-profile exchanges of the early periods were just media hype, designed only to "win friends and influence people." Another objective was to open communication, with emphasis on fostering enduring ties among professional colleagues and working toward eventual collaboration and joint projects in a range of fields. Whether it was mayors, molecular biologists, or volleyball players, each project included workshops, master classes, seminars, briefings—opportunities to exchange information. There was systematic exploration of and reporting on the academic and scientific topology of China. And all the exchanges were designed to introduce professional colleagues to one another and to encourage them to continue and expand the process of interchange on their own.

It was not until this period, however, that the seeds of the initial contacts began to bear fruit. Once introduced to each other through the auspices of the National Committee or the CSCPRC, professional associations began to establish independent relationships. The American Metals Society instituted a series of exchanges with its Chinese counterpart. The Chinese and American amateur basketball federations arranged matches among themselves, and soon even professional National Basketball Association teams were traveling to China. Chinese who met American colleagues during survey exchanges began to be invited to professional association meetings.

As the need for the "public relations" function of the high profile exchanges lessened, as other vehicles for performing arts and athletic exchanges were created, and as the opportunities for substantive interaction increased, the National Committee began to change its focus. While it had from the beginning sponsored professional exchanges, the emphasis had been on the high-profile activities. Now the Committee began to concentrate on bringing together groups of professional colleagues in less spectac-
ular but more substantive areas—international relations, governance, urban planning, economic management and development, communications, and education administration.

In addition to institutionalizing these relationships, these years saw a tentative move away from seeing exchanges as part of the political dynamic and toward accepting their intrinsic substantive and educational value. While the standard political slogans warning the United States of the menace of the “Polar Bear” and criticizing U.S. policy toward Taiwan were still espoused, delegation members tended to be more professional and less political.

Even the exchanges of this period, however, were mostly focused on observing and learning techniques, rather than on truly understanding the inner dynamics of the two societies. A group of Chinese mayors and municipal administrators spent most of their time in the United States lifting up manhole covers to look at underground cables instead of exploring the human aspects of city administration. And a delegation of young American political leaders who went to China seemed more concerned with shopping for saddles in Inner Mongolia than with discussing the political dynamics of an autonomous region. The constraints were primarily on the Chinese side. Vestiges of the Cultural Revolution were still strong enough to inhibit Chinese visitors to America from asking the more philosophical questions and from responding to such issues when raised by Americans in China.

**Broadening and Deepening: 1979—the Present**

Normalization and China’s “open door” policy gave rise to conditions in China that have had a great impact on the exchange process. It began to be broadened and deepened with respect to the areas and issues covered and the people and organizations involved. Shifts in the political relationship and, perhaps even more important, internal political shifts in China have been reflected in the way in which exchanges are perceived and conducted. The “Four Modernizations” course on which China has embarked has made it possible for both sides to engage in broad discussions and cooperative programs on issues related to China’s social agenda. Discussions no longer focus on the techniques alone, but on the values inherent in them. In a way, the Chinese have once again faced the old issue of *ti* (form) versus *yong* (function) and this time seem to have resolved it in favor of both.

The evolving freedom in China to focus on social issues and their impact was forcefully illustrated by a senior Chinese official’s response during a 1980 visit to the perennial question, “What are your impressions of America?” “Before coming to the United States,” he answered,

I had read and been told much about it—about the many social ills, the moral degeneration, the quest for money and power, the oppression of minorities. But now that I have seen your country with my own eyes, I can make more valid judgments. It is true that when I look at America I see many problems—the crime, the injustice, the wastefulness. But it is also true that
yours is a dynamic society that at least recognizes that such problems exist and, at many levels, is working to resolve them. Then I look at my own country, which I have always been told is following the correct path, and I see a society that is stagnant, that lacks the dynamism that I find in the United States, that is afraid even to consider making changes. And it makes me begin to question my values and assumptions.

Exchanges are not designed to convert the visitors to the hosts' social structure or way of thinking. But, as is clear from the above example, they can and do legitimately challenge both American and Chinese preconceptions about the other's society. A year after returning to China this official became the head of a major ministry. His American experiences were important in helping shape the decisions he made in his new position with respect to opening up to, access to, and treatment of the West.

When new issues have to be addressed and new relationships established, it helps to have those in authority lead the way. When governors, mayors, cabinet ministers, or other—to borrow a favorite Chinese phrase—"responsible persons" participate directly, the chances for institutionalizing or at least supporting similar opportunities for others are greatly increased. Thus the National Committee's continuing commitment over the years, grown even stronger during this period, has been to provide opportunities for the involvement of key policy makers. Normalization made it possible for Chinese government officials to visit the United States, and the National Committee facilitated many of those trips.

Postnormalization Changes in Sino-American Exchanges

Since normalization in 1979, a tremendous number of players have jumped onto the exchange bandwagon on both sides of the Pacific. In the early days there were only a few, well-defined exchange channels in each country. Americans interested in a particular aspect of Chinese life or society had a specific organization with which to work. The same was true for Chinese coming to the United States. Now a bewildering array of both long-established and newly formed organizations, encouraged by the success of the exchange relationship and by decentralization and the more relaxed atmosphere in China, are not only ready but eager to be involved in the exchange process. This is certainly a pattern more consistent with our pluralistic society and the way we customarily handle cultural exchanges with most other countries. But it brings with it much greater competition—for identifying and gaining access to the most influential bureaucracies or officials and then establishing guanxi (the all-important Chinese word meaning "relationship" or "connection") with the right group, and for a share of the decreasing funds available for such activities from both the public and private sectors.

Other striking changes between the pre- and postnormalization periods relate to the number of exchanges, the number of people involved, and how the balance has shifted. From the beginning, one of the American
aims was to strike a rough balance in the numbers of exchanges in each direction within the government-facilitated exchange packages (those run by the National Committee). While this was eventually accomplished, a great deal of activity took place outside the facilitated programs. Generally, it was China-bound. In 1971, even before the return visit of China's ping-pong team to the United States, several Americans, carefully selected by the Chinese, had visited the PRC. The numbers grew so rapidly that by the time diplomatic relations were normalized tens of thousands of Americans had been to China, either as tourists or as guests of one of the Chinese organizations authorized to host "foreign friends." Such was not the case for travel in the other direction. Fewer than 800 Chinese came to the United States before 1979; almost all of them were members of delegations or diplomatic personnel. Since the early 1980s, however, the Chinese have rushed through the "open door" in such numbers that more Chinese are now coming to the United States each week than came in each of the years between 1972 and 1978. The number of Chinese coming here still does not equal the 200,000 Americans visiting China annually, but most of the latter are tourists and businessmen. Comparing the numbers involved in exchanges of delegations, the situation is not nearly as asymmetrical as it once was, and in fact is probably weighted in favor of Chinese coming to the United States. (While it was once possible to keep an accurate record of the exchanges taking place and even to keep lists of people traveling to and fro, so much is going on in so many different quarters that it is now virtually impossible to keep track, and even the Chinese embassy and consulates in the United States are not aware of all the activity taking place).

The tremendous increase in the number of Chinese coming to the United States has created unprecedented problems. One is arranging general professional programming and hospitality. It used to be a fairly simple matter to set up appointments or briefings at any institution in the country. People were eager to make these contacts and learn more about their Chinese colleagues. Now, however, the tide of Chinese visitors has worn their hosts weary, especially in the popular cities of New York, Washington, D.C., Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, and even more so in the most prestigious institutions, government organizations, and corporations that the Chinese always want to visit. (It is only very recently that Chinese higher education delegations have not felt disappointed if their itineraries omitted the meccas of Harvard, MIT, Stanford, and the University of California, Berkeley.) Americans want to share in professional interchange, but there is just so much time one can devote to visitors. The problem is compounded both by familiarity (the Chinese are no longer new or a curiosity) and by the perception that there is often little tangible gain from endlessly gracious hospitality. The challenge, therefore, is to find places that have not been inundated by Chinese visitors and then to convince the Chinese that there are sound professional and personal reasons to deviate from their requested itinerary. Indeed, when virgin territory can be found—Heber Springs, Arkansas;
Tampa, Florida; Indianapolis, Indiana; Honesdale, Pennsylvania, all places few Chinese have visited—the quality of the program is enhanced, certainly on a personal level and often on the professional level, because the Americans are so much more interested. The hosts have not yet become jaded; they do not find it an imposition to show still another Chinese delegation through their school or factory or institution.

The same thing has undoubtedly happened in China, especially in the major coastal cities and at such prominent institutions as Beijing and Qinghua universities or the Shanghai No. 1 Machine Tool Factory. But there is at least one important difference. Most Chinese units and enterprises have “foreign affairs offices” designed to handle such visits. While a few American institutions and agencies have similar offices, they are neither as well staffed or as well funded.

**Funding the Programs**

Funding, or rather the lack of it, is the main problem resulting from the increase in bilateral traffic. Foundation grants and private contributions were the sole sources of income for the National Committee in its early years. After the successful conclusion of the table tennis project, the National Committee began receiving grants for exchanges from the U.S. government—at first from the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, then from the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) when that agency took over the bureau’s functions. This early funding was unrestricted, allowing the Committee to determine how the money would be allocated among its programs.

In the mid-1970s, other government agencies such as the Department of Education and the National Endowment for the Humanities began to provide support to the Committee, but such support was generally earmarked for specific projects. At about that time USIA funding also became project specific. Foundations, too, became increasingly reluctant to give general support. Some had been providing money for Chinese programs for several years and felt it time to move on to new areas; others had by then established their own programs with China to which they now allocated the bulk of their resources.

As the number of organizations involved in Sino-American exchanges grew, the government and, to a lesser extent, the foundations, came under pressure to spread the limited funding around. And in addition to the increased number of American institutions bidding for the same scarce resources, the Chinese themselves have recently entered the game. Foundations and even some U.S. government agencies now receive requests to fund exchange programs from Chinese institutions as well as from Chinese scholars currently residing in the United States.
A third source of funding has been the business community. In the late 1970s, as the Chinese "open door" policy increased possibilities for trade, American companies interested in developing business ties with China became a logical source for funding exchanges. Thus, the Coca-Cola Company, Gillette, Mobil, and Pan American Airways underwrote the Boston Symphony Orchestra's 1979 tour of China, the first major cultural exchange after normalization. Control Data helped underwrite the costs of the "Treasures of the Shanghai Museum" exhibition in 1984. As early optimistic hopes for booming China business prospects recede, however, corporate support for exchanges becomes increasingly difficult to obtain.

There is no foreseeable way to resolve the problem of funding; and the situation is likely to get worse rather than better as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget restrictions, inflation, and ever greater numbers of petitioners all take their toll.

Supporting the Programs

The exchange program, viewed from the perspective of fifteen years, has been an undisputed success, going far beyond what anyone would have predicted when those first American ping-pong players were invited to China. The rapid growth and size of the Sino-American connection and the continued emphasis it receives in both countries has been largely dependent on the enthusiasm and support of three key groups.

First, both the Chinese and American public are eager to expand the relationship. In his classic study Scratches on Our Mind, Harold Isaacs explored the love/hate relationship and the fascination China has always held for Americans. A more recent poll showed that along with winning the lottery and dining at the White House, visiting China is at the top of the average American wish list. Conversely, in China the United States is seen as the land of milk, honey, and high technology. With fewer government restrictions on travel and study abroad, America has become the magnet attracting most Chinese going overseas.

Second, the two governments view exchanges as an integral part of the Sino-American relationship. From the beginning, they have used exchanges to further the foreign policy objective of improving relations. Even though private organizations were responsible for implementing and administering all of the early exchanges, there was substantial government support. National Committee (and CSCPRC) projects were endorsed by both governments in periodic high-level consultations and were described as "government facilitated." These programs were provided with funding, security (at the insistence of the Chinese), and access to senior officials. Every major group during the first two periods, for example, was received at the White House. President Nixon greeted the ping-pong team in the Rose Garden and later watched the Wu Shu team perform there, gave a reception for the Shenyang Acrobats in the Blue Room, and spoke to the
Chinese journalists (the only journalists he met with during the darkening days of Watergate) in the Oval Office. President Ford met the basketball players. Were it not for this early cooperation, it is doubtful that the programs would have been as successful.

Once the relationship was normalized, the governments used official exchanges to stabilize it. The staying power of entrenched bureaucracies (both Chinese and American) is legendary; giving government agencies a major stake in the game helped to institutionalize the relationship more quickly. By June 1986 there were 27 bilateral agreements between Chinese and U.S. government agencies.

The third key area of support for the growth and continued emphasis on Sino-American exchanges comes from the private sector organizations that administer and implement them. The National Committee, one of the original organizations involved in the exchanges, has been discussed, and mention has been made of other agencies that began working on exchanges prior to normalization. But there are now scores of organizations running exchanges in the United States and China. Some have been set up specifically for that purpose (e.g., Columbia University's Center for U.S.-China Arts Exchange and its Educational Services Exchange with China); others have integrated exchanges with China into their ongoing programs (e.g., the Institute of International Education and People-to-People International). Some are nonprofit; others are not.

States/provinces and cities have entered into the process through the "sister" relationships. Aimed chiefly at helping to stimulate local trade with China, these relationships generally include a heavy dose of culture and education. The first state/province relationship agreement was signed between Ohio and Hubei in June 1983; that same year San Francisco and Shanghai became the first to sign sister-city agreements. There are now twenty-two state/province and thirty city relationships, with several more pending. More than fifty professional associations have academic or educational exchanges with the Chinese. International organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have made major commitments of funding and manpower to China that have greatly increased the exchange flow. Large numbers of educational institutions (universities, high schools, and even grade schools and summer camps) have set up exchange programs with China. Once established, these entities usually seek to keep the momentum going.

So many diverse elements in both China and America are engaged in the Sino-American exchange relationship that it is increasingly difficult to manipulate it for political purposes. The brouhaha over the defection of the young tennis player Hu Na is a good example. It occurred after the fall of the Gang of Four and after normalization of relations between the two countries. By that time both governments had signed an official cultural exchange agreement, and it was the governments that directly confronted
each other—although the National Committee, which was implementing some of the official exchange programs, was also caught up in the imbroglio. The Chinese were understandably angry that the teen-age girl had been given political asylum when she could have merely been granted permission to remain in the United States, yet they carefully modulated their reaction. Only the official exchanges that had been specified under the 1982-83 Implementing Accords of the U.S.-China Cultural Agreement were called off; the many other exchange activities taking place in the private sector were unaffected, including the 10,000 Chinese students who were at that time studying in America and the major art exhibition arranged between Shanghai and San Francisco.

The Future

There is little doubt that the current high level of exchange activity will continue. Three factors, however, limit an ever-increasing number. The first, already discussed, is funding.

Second is the issue of reciprocity and mutual benefit, terms the Chinese are fond of using. During the first three stages of exchanges, American participants frequently complained that while the Chinese were always eager to educate others about China (especially its successes), they never seemed to evince much interest in the United States. That was a phenomenon of the Cultural Revolution mentality. Today, the Chinese are intensely curious about everything American, yet they are often reluctant to get into specific detail about the way things work (or don't work) in China. A perception has developed in the United States that Americans go to China to teach, and Chinese come here to learn. American participants in bilateral conferences often come away disappointed that there has been relatively little truly candid exchange of views. This has become a serious problem affecting the exchange relationship, one that must be resolved if the process is to mature successfully. While the situation has improved greatly in recent years, the Chinese must become even more open and willing to provide genuine access to their society if they want to continue receiving such treatment from others. The Americans, on the other hand, must recognize that the problems they experience are often cultural, and take time to work through. Americans are apt to be outspoken about their problems; Chinese are not. In light of the experience of the Cultural Revolution and the uncertainty about the future course of present national policies, most Chinese are understandably uneasy about discussing their problems in depth.

The third factor inhibiting the growth of exchanges involves the Chinese shift away from the principle of self-reliance (stressed especially strongly during the Cultural Revolution) to the current posture that because China is "poor, backward, and developing," America (and other rich, industrialized nations) should be generous. This attitude takes many forms, for example, the expectation of scholarship grants and tuition waivers, free
access to American technology, or assessing exorbitant fees for services and facilities needed by foreigners in China. The Chinese must realize that in the long run it is counterproductive to "squeeze" foreigners wishing to bring a performing company to China or to make a film, set up a business, or invest money there.

Assuming these obstacles can be overcome, we can project a continuing increase in exchange activity, although unfortunately, the language barrier presents real constraints on a full flowering of exchanges. Many more projects will be based on local, ad hoc initiatives rather than on national programs, particularly if China maintains its current policy of decentralization. Individual internships rather than groups will likely make up a larger proportion of the activity. Many exchanges will be for longer periods and increasingly will involve professional dialogue as part of an ongoing process. At the same time, it will continue to be important to give senior officials, who do not have the luxury of spending a year or even a month away from their jobs, the opportunity to participate in survey exchanges to gain a better understanding of what is going on in the other country.

At present we are in a transitional stage in the relationship. By and large, the days are gone when Americans in China were stared at and followed by large numbers of people and Chinese were a curiosity in the United States. Television and documentary crews no longer routinely accompany delegations. Security personnel become involved only for the highest-level visitors. The process has become both more substantive and more routine. Chinese and Americans are not only looking at the structures and processes in each other's country, but are also exploring the concepts and values they embody. Yet we have not quite reached the stage where Sino-American exchanges are viewed in the same light as similar programs with other countries. Many people attended the recent performances of the Central Ballet Company of China not because they were balletomanes but because they were curious to see a group from China performing a basically Western art form.

Perhaps exchanges never will, or should, be valued just for their intrinsic worth. It can be argued that exchanges with China should always be given special treatment. The U.S.-China relationship is relatively stable at present, and exchanges contribute to that stability by building solid ties among leaders and professionals in a wide range of fields. But the political relationship is still fragile, and many uncertainties lie ahead: about China's future direction after Deng; about how to handle the results of American economic assistance to China, which may help create a major competitor in the world market; and about the consequences of America's contribution to China's military modernization. All of these are valid concerns, and all are areas in which exchanges can play an important role.
Notes

*The views expressed are those of the author, who has been a staff member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations since 1971. However, the comments and suggestions of several current and former colleagues at the National Committee were very valuable and greatly appreciated.

1. Like the National Committee, the CSCPRC was founded in 1966 (at that time it was called the Committee on Scholarly Exchanges with Mainland China). A joint venture of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Social Science Research Council, the CSCPRC had a specific mandate to explore and encourage scholarly and scientific exchange between the two countries. With its sponsorship of the September 1972 visit of a Chinese medical delegation, the CSCPRC began to assume the role for which it had been created.

American Philanthropy in Educational and Cultural Exchange with the People’s Republic of China

Francis X. Sutton

American International Philanthropic Traditions and Interests Since World War II

When the possibility of exchanges with the People’s Republic of China opened in the 1970s, the sprawling phenomenon of American philanthropy responded in ways that were characteristic and rooted in proud traditions. There was an eagerness to take part in something that had caught the American imagination and a confidence that philanthropy had something to contribute—indeed something quite important or even crucial. It was characteristic that relations with the PRC were not seen as a matter that should be left to governments. Government had its part to play, but much more needed to be done. Philanthropic enterprise in the 1970s was somewhat chastened by a reluctantly growing sense that the powers and responsibilities of government were increasing while its own powers were diminishing. But sufficient confidence and enthusiasm were left to launch or revive an array of efforts that in their totality have become an important part of American cultural and educational relations with the PRC.*

This confidence and enthusiasm did not rest on evidently massive resources. Tradition and the tax laws have continued to make the total output of American philanthropy impressive. But it is notorious that most of it goes to local and national causes and purposes with perhaps not more than 2 percent going to foreign parts or to international matters in the United States. The great bulk of American philanthropy continues to come through individual giving, which accounted for some $55.13 billion or 83 percent of the $66.82 billion that the American Association of Fund-Raising Council reported in 1983.¹ The contributions of foundations at $3.97 billion and of corporations at $3.20 billion are quite modest in comparison.

The fractions of these sums that find their way to international matters are difficult to trace and estimate. Churches and educational institutions in the United States take large shares of American giving, and some of these funds find their way to international purposes, either through support for the international interests of the churches, colleges, and universities in this country or their activities abroad. Even assessing the magnitude of philanthropic giving that is specifically directed to international matters is difficult. International purposes are lumped in the “other” cate-
gory in the annual tabulations. The amounts left over from churches, education, health, arts and humanities, social welfare, and "civic and public" for this residual category are quite large and vary substantially from year to year. The totals were $3.71 billion in 1981, $2.15 billion in 1982, and $2.96 billion in 1983. The authors of Giving USA grope for explanations in such special events as relief for earthquake victims in Southern Italy in 1981 and contributions for the Los Angeles Olympics in 1983. It seems likely that they exaggerate the scale of giving for international causes, but periodic outpourings of generosity for matters that catch the public attention seem in fact to be a regular and important feature of American international philanthropy.2

The interests of a few large foundations may give an impression of a special vocation for international matters among the endowed foundations, but in fact the number of foundations among the more than 22,000 in this country that have regular international programs is very small, as a glance at the subject interest section of The Foundation Directory will show. Indeed, the fraction of foundation giving that goes to international matters may be no larger than the fraction of individual giving, remembering, of course, that much of the latter is contributed through churches and educational and charitable organizations with both domestic and international purposes and interests. A reasonable guess at average recent levels of foundation international giving would be of the order of $100 million. Like individual givers, foundations are responsive to the shifting foci of public attention, which sometimes are strongly international and at others strongly domestic. No one keeps track of the overall amounts and percentages, but it seems unlikely that there are as large variations in foundation support for international matters as disasters and other phenomena produce for individual giving.3 Still, the deliberate aim of maintaining flexibility for response to new interests and objectives gives a potential for sizable spurts when situations like the opening in U.S.-Chinese relations or the current anxiety over nuclear war arise.

The rise of corporate philanthropy to totals comparable with foundation philanthropy seems not to have brought any major additions to international activities. Some corporate philanthropy follows the multinationals overseas, some of its support to education finds its way into international education, and the latter-day enthusiasm of business for culture has brought a surge of support that brings us great art shows, television programs, and other cultural delights from around the world. But, by and large, the maxim that charity begins at home has been at least as loyally maintained by corporate philanthropy as by the other forms of American philanthropy.

Whether the scale of American international philanthropy would justify confidence that it still has important functions or can aspire to large purposes thus may not be altogether clear. But it is clear that Americans have not had modest concepts of what private international effort might achieve.
Looking back to the nineteenth century in his recent presidential address to the Association of Asian Studies, Ainslie Embree reminded his listeners that Americans once thought that a few thousand Protestant missionaries might convert the Papists, Muslims, and Jews of the world in a quarter century. In the twentieth century, more secular but hardly less grand ambitions came along. Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910 in the "almost childlike" belief that international conflicts were caused by diplomatic misunderstandings, and the endowment, under the presidencies of Elihu Root and Nicholas Murray Butler, pioneered in the development of cultural exchanges as a means of strengthening international peace, cooperation, and universal values. Frank Ninkovich (one of the contributors to this volume), in his illuminating monograph *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, has described this remarkable faith in the efficacy of personal and cultural contacts, which the trauma of World War I further stimulated. In the prevailing views of the time, such contacts and exchanges were not the business of governments, but needed to be developed through private institutions and funding. (The establishment of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Institute of International Education were two products of this time and faith.)

Ninkovich found another grand aspiration of American philanthropy in the 1939 annual report of the Rockefeller Foundation, where Raymond Fosdick asserted that the object of American efforts in China was "to make over a medieval society in terms of modern knowledge." Later, when the Ford Foundation emerged in 1950 from its modest beginnings as a Michigan philanthropy, its trustees announced a vast agenda for the service of human welfare. Peace, democracy, economic development, education, and the understanding of human behavior were to be its concerns, and its first president, Paul Hoffman, saw to it that peace came first in importance while none of the rest was to be parochially American. The preservation of democracy in Europe and Asia, the lifting of backward nations out of poverty and ignorance, and the promotion of international understanding through large-scale exchanges and contacts were not too large objectives for the new Ford Foundation.

There is no doubt a certain feeling of grandeur that comes upon the trustees and officers of large foundations, but readiness for large objectives and aspirations has extended well beyond them. The visions of quite small and struggling organizations have been high and bright—bringing international tranquility from people-to-people encounters or new hope from inspiring pilot projects. Whether in splendid faith or mere presumption, American philanthropy has thought it could pursue grand objectives, and in the years after World War II it did so on an unprecedented scale. What was done in the 1950s and 1960s fell into patterns that were partly based on
established tradition and in part on the state of the postwar world. These patterns became the matrix out of which new ventures with and in the PRC developed after 1970.

Three or four broad areas of concerns have dominated the international interests of American philanthropy in these years. Compassion for misery and distress, whether chronic or acute, has been a basic theme, as it always must be in philanthropy, and led not only to charitable relief efforts, but infused actions and policies that addressed causes more than symptoms. The less directly eleemosynary international concerns of American philanthropy in these times came to focus on: (1) American capacity and strength, (2) the development of the poorer and more backward parts of the world, and (3) international understanding and order. The forms these concerns have taken were shaped by the times. In the years after World War II, the United States showed a curious mixture of self-assurance amid tremulous fears of war and anxiety over losing the "minds of men" in distant parts. The cold war quickly chilled the more extravagant hopes of international comity which American idealism and optimism had fostered, and the triumph of the Chinese communists brought alarms over the power and appeal of doctrines that seemed repulsively un-American. Hopes that a universal order might be assured through a strengthened United Nations were not quickly abandoned. The study group that set the programs and the purposes of the Ford Foundation thought that its most important activities in the service of peace had to have effect before 1955 when the U.N. Charter was scheduled for review, and the foundation sponsored a major study of disarmament that rested on a strengthened United Nations. But the fission of the world into "free" and communist parts forced a search for other means to assure the conditions of peace, and earnest explorations were undertaken to determine what these conditions were. The main ones seemed evident enough:

1. The power and importance of the United States required that it remain strong and be equipped with the means for playing a wise and leading role in international affairs.

2. There were frustrations and deprivations in the lives of peoples around the world that provoked conflicts and instability. What all these were and what their relative importance might be provided endless subjects for debate, but poverty and deprivation were clearly among them.

3. Some basis of mutual understanding among peoples from different nations had to underlie efforts at political accommodation among governments or the building of international institutions. Communication, contacts, and exchanges seemed essential to the avoidance of misunderstandings and the building of common purposes.
In each of these domains there were evident opportunities for private philanthropic effort and established traditions to build on. The isolation of mainland China after 1949 and the antipathies between the United States and the PRC meant that for many years the expression of these three concerns or themes was very lopsided, but the way each developed came to have powerful influence on what American philanthropy undertook after 1970.

American Philanthropy and American Competence vis-à-vis China and Other Parts of the World

The capacities of the United States to defend itself and maintain the strengths it needed to play a constructive and effective international role evidently depend on more than government itself can do. An enlightened citizenry is needed to support wise policy; trained expertise is needed for direct service in government and in other parts of the national life; and in a pluralistic society ideas and analysis of foreign affairs must not all be generated within the government itself.

In 1951, an enthusiastic foundation official thought “the development of United States capacities for constructive leadership or participation in the world community” so important that “no other course of action, not even blowing up the Kremlin, can, in my judgment, contribute as much to international peace and security.” A great array of efforts flowed from such enthusiasms within and outside the foundations. The Foreign Policy Association, World Affairs Councils, United Nations Association, and many more specialized citizens’ organizations were built up for the enlightenment of adults, while great exhortation and some action went into internationalizing education in the schools and colleges. Education projects were part of a broad spectrum of efforts shading in one direction into policy statements from experts and notables, and in another into the research of such organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Brookings Institution. Thus, in particular, the United Nations Association used foundation funding in 1966 for a panel on contemporary China under the chairmanship of Robert Roosa, which has been credited with some influence on national policy, and a Ford Foundation grant of $450,000 to the Council on Foreign Relations funded a series of ten volumes on U.S.-China policy.

A sense that there was inadequate national expertise and understanding on foreign parts, friendly and unfriendly, led to a great flowering of area studies in American universities and an impressive multiplication of the nation’s endowment with area experts, China scholars among them.

The support of this great expansion of international studies in the United States fell into patterns that are familiar in the more recent expansion of educational and cultural relations with China. A combination of private philanthropic, governmental, and university resources was used. Foundation and governmental support are fairly readily identified, then as
now. Ford was what Dean Rusk used to call the "fat boy in the canoe" with commitments approaching $300 million. Other foundation support was smaller but identifiable. Likewise the rise of U.S. government support through the National Defense Education Act that came after the Sputnik scare can be traced without much difficulty. What universities committed from resources over which they had some discretionary choice, or raised from other sources, is not less important for being harder to trace. Just as now a large fraction of the support of Chinese students and scholars in the United States comes from the universities that receive them, so did the general rise of international studies depend on resources from state legislatures, endowment income, annual giving, special gifts from individuals, and other miscellaneous sources that university administrations can draw on when they want to do something. Some of what the universities were able to do for themselves thus depended on various forms of philanthropy, but even without guessing at such contributions, it is clear that foundation support had a major role in the expansion of international studies.

A study for the 1967–68 academic year showed that thirty-six American universities received $58 million from external sources for international programs in that year, including $32 million from the federal government, $24.6 million from foundations (of which $21.3 million from Ford), and only $135,000 from business. Richard Lambert’s 1970 study, *Language and Area Studies Review*, also showed that some 44.3 percent of the area specialists in his sample of 2,760 had had fellowship support from the Ford Foundation. It is possible that support of China studies by the Ford Foundation was more considerable, relative to other sources, than it was for other parts of the world. John Lindbeck counted more than $23 million granted for China studies in the United States between 1959 and 1970, during which time support from the federal government amounted to about $15 million. Recollections of this large role of a single foundation no doubt continue to bolster confidence in the importance of philanthropy vis-à-vis China.

The original motivation of the Ford Foundation commitment to international studies was service of the national need for expertise. While a quasi-political sense of serving the national interested persisted, more generously intellectual and international sentiments were clearly present and seemed to grow in prominence. In 1954 China was perceived as a "powerful and hostile country." Later, in 1971, when Ford Foundation staff reviewed for their trustees what the foundation had been doing for the study of China, the rationale was put more intellectually:

China’s uniqueness as a remarkable historic repository of human experience and social laboratory whose traditional civilization and present society stand in striking contrast to our own is sufficient cause for continued interest. To ensure that our western-oriented educational system provides a balanced and comprehensive world view, it is essential to persist in the considerable efforts already underway to improve American education on China.
Against this strong background of commitment to building American competence in the understanding of China and diffusing it through American education, an eagerness for direct contacts would be expected. An emphasis on the contemporary world and direct experience of foreign parts had been features of the Ford programs. The Foreign Area Fellowship Program was specifically designed to provide extended periods "in the field," and it was seen as a serious limitation that such experience was not possible in some parts of the world. When it became possible, in the late 1950s, for American scholars to visit the Soviet Union and for Soviet scholars to come to the United States, the American universities quickly came forward with generous contributions to the costs of receiving the Soviet scholars, and the Ford Foundation committed between 1958 and 1970 some $2,650,000 to fund the costs of Americans going the other way. When the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) was put together out of the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants (IUCTG) and other exchange programs in 1969, the motivations of its principal funder, the Ford Foundation, were very strongly to secure "field" opportunities for American specialists on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There was no great joy in the formal exchange arrangements or with the heavy preference for science and technology that the Soviet and East European governments maintained. The rewards from the exchanges were sought primarily in the benefits they promised for American research and scholarship. On this basis, the funding of IREX remained the largest regular commitment in the Ford Foundation's budgets for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the 1970s. It persisted as the prime claimant through a period when falling budgets in the foundation and limited support for the fields from other sources brought great pressure and difficult choices to foundation staff responsible for these matters. The manifest national interest in knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brought only slow growth of federal funding for these exchanges, and the lag provoked impatience in the foundation. But repeated consultations and reviews brought persuasive arguments that IREX's programs should be sustained as the most critical need that the foundation could serve in Soviet and East European affairs.

Given such experience, it would have been anomalous if the Ford Foundation had remained quiescent when opportunities for American scholars to visit the PRC began to appear. By the mid-sixties, the Ford Foundation was clearly ready to move beyond the study of China in this country (and indeed, in a number of other countries in Europe and Asia where it had supported such study). A major review of all the foundation's programs in 1962 recommended that it "be prepared for the possibilities of future program developments involving Communist China"; from 1966, it lent its support to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and looked for possibilities of third-country specialists visiting China or of discussions with communist
Chinese in third countries.\textsuperscript{14} And in 1971 a readiness for direct exchanges was linked to the foundation's established interests:

Given the Foundation's considerable involvement in Chinese studies, its desire to encourage further the development and constructive use of the field's considerable resources, its general policy of encouraging the development of constructive international relations, and the apparent inadequacy of alternative funding, we hope to be able to respond quickly and flexibly when significant opportunities arise.\textsuperscript{15}

Opportunities did not develop quickly, as we all know. Efforts to secure visas for Ford Foundation staff to visit mainland China were ignored or rebuffed, and through the early 1970s the principal actions continued to be in support of China studies in the United States, though such support was clearly in a terminal phase, with "tie-off" endowment grants for major East Asian study centers and a wrestle with the complex problems of East Asian libraries as the principal business.

Funding the Committee on Scholarly Communication (CSCPCR) was a natural parallel to the funding of IREX described above. It was begun in 1974 and has to date amounted to $1,173,143. By March 1979, an internal Ford Foundation paper counted $10.6 million invested in China-related activities over the past decade, but the current rate had then fallen to about $500,000--$600,000. Very shortly thereafter, the opening of new opportunities led to increased appropriations and a set of new commitments running over $1 million a year. A small part of Ford's continuing support still goes to China studies in the United States not related to exchanges, but the great bulk of it is for exchanges of persons, conferences, and other forms of relationship with Chinese individuals and organizations.

The present pattern of Ford Foundation support clearly continues its early interest in strengthening American competence to understand China. But it serves other purposes as well. A review of the China program in March 1983 claimed that it had helped Americans (and others) to learn more about China and also helped the Chinese be better informed about other parts of the world and about matters that might be relevant to their development problems. The Ford Foundation has had strong interests in development and in international relations, and the opening of mainland China has made it possible to pursue these interests as well.

Has all this evolution been at the expense of China studies in the United States? Might it not have been better if the Ford Foundation had continued its older patterns of support in this country rather than joining in the excitement of China travels? Lambert's latest review of the state of language and area studies depicts a feeble state of funding for area research and such humbled expectations among the scholars that they seemed not to notice how low their aspirations had sunk.\textsuperscript{16} Lambert does not deal specifically with China or East Asia, and it is not apparent that either his study or any other has carefully assessed the state of research funding for this or other
areas. One fears that the general impression of decline in funding of international area research would be painfully confirmed if an exercise like the 1967 Education and World Affairs (EWA) survey reported above were now to be repeated (especially if comparisons were made in constant dollars!). But any such assessment for China would have to consider the relative returns from investment in exchanges and from support of activities in this country. It could very well be that the choice in favor of exchanges that the Ford Foundation encountered in its reviews of IREX would be as firmly made by those concerned with understanding China. But if the assessment went the other way, it might not have much effect on policy. The winding down of Ford Foundation support to China studies in the United States was part of a general move out of the support of international area studies in the United States, which began as long ago as 1966 and has shown no signs of basic reversal. The endowments which were left for chairs and centers and long-term capital support to the joint committees of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies continue to support China studies in the United States, and there are some new grants. But area studies have ceased to be a program category for the foundation. This programmatic change did not mean a departure from international interests but a shift toward the interests in development and international affairs which have long been prominent in the foundation's programs.

A general shift from international area studies toward investment in efforts on foreign policy, security, international economics, human rights, refugees, and other contemporary international problems was very marked in the foundation's commitments after the early 1970s. In 1972 the foundation committed about $11.5 million for international studies against about $3 million to international affairs and world problems. By 1979, international studies had fallen to $2.2 million while international relations had risen to $10.2 million. In the last five years (1977–81) in which international studies was maintained as a program rubric, $15.65 million were committed to it while international affairs had $43.79 million.

A major shift of this sort shows its effects very widely and certainly in China-related activities. When the Ford Foundation opened its own exchange program with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, international relations was one of three agreed fields for attention (along with law and economics). A series of actions, involving Chinese, Americans, and others, has followed, on such subjects as relations with the Soviet Union, U.S.-Asian economic relations, East Asian security, and East Asian economic issues. In 1984, a grant of $600,000 was made to support a new program of international relations studies with the PRC. Such activities depend on U.S. specialists on China, and like all studies of international affairs, their quality must depend on a strong base in knowledge of the area. But they are, of course, quite different from the normal research and scholarly activities of China or East Asian study centers. As Lambert has shown in his study of the publications of members of Title VI area study
centers, only minor fractions of their publications totals are devoted to policy-relevant matters—though the percentage for East Asian studies at 21.7 percent is relatively high. Foreign policy studies are sufficiently few that he complains: "By default, our foreign policy discourse tends to take place outside the language and area studies community." The Ford Foundation's shift toward international affairs thus tends to bring a somewhat different group of people into the projects it funds in relation to China. Some actions intended to improve American enlightenment on international affairs, such as support of an American Assembly in 1980 on "The China Factor," have been confined to the U.S. scene. But on the whole, the international relations emphasis in Ford's recent China activities has been to strengthen its move toward exchanges and interaction.

It is fortunate that as Ford's program shifted in the 1970s other foundations came into the support of Chinese studies. The most important has been the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, beginning in 1972 with its series of East Asian library grants and continuing with nearly $5 million in 1977 to match Ford's endowment grants to major university area centers. Since 1974, it has joined with Ford and the National Endowment for the Humanities as a major supporter of the SSRC-ACLS joint committees on studies of China, and a part of this funding is specifically for the participation of American scholars in conferences in China. Mellon does not make grants outside the United States and claims no international programs as such. Its president, John E. Sawyer, showing his colors as an economic historian, explained its rationale for the support of area studies as follows:

Both historical perspectives and changing circumstances have . . . entered into the Foundation's support of area studies—Asian, Canadian, Latin American, and Russian. In addition to the intrinsic interest of understanding other cultures, this program responds to the increased need for greater knowledge of other parts of the world as a guide to national and international policy. After more than a century of economic development focused inward on a new continent, the U.S. has once again become a major trading nation, as it had been on a far lesser scale in the first decades of the Republic. The percentage of the U.S. GNP derived from international trade has more than doubled since the 1950s, and one job in six in this country now depends on foreign trade. Thus, a contracting world economy would now seriously retard recovery at home. Given these realities, we can no longer afford the ignorance of other regions, societies, languages, and cultures that has marked much of our past.

Another foundation that has entered weightily into the support of area studies in the United States is the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, with its matching endowment grants for university international and area studies programs and its 1983 grant of $2,012,500 to support the International Doctoral Research Fellowship Program of the SSRC and ACLS, some fraction of which goes to Chinese studies. The Hewlett Foundation's interest in China has also been expressed in its support of the University of Michigan's Population Studies Center to enable it "to train foreign students and to extend the Center's work to the People's Republic of China."
These newer additions to the support of Chinese studies in the United States fall short of replacing the old abundance of the 1960s—it would take some $6 million annually in dollars of the early 1980s to replace in real terms the $2 million per annum that Ford committed to the China field in the 1960s. But, in a time of general decline, China has been less deprived than some other parts of the world.

Concerns for enlightened U.S. foreign policy appear in the actions of several foundations other than Ford. Some such support goes to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and other organizations concerned with foreign policy, and there has been a marked tendency to include Chinese in discussions and conferences. But there continues to be direct support of studies from the American side as, for example, in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s sponsorship of Selig S. Harrison’s study of China’s oil, Alexander Casella’s studies of China and Indochina, and Victor Li’s study of the consequences of *De-Recognizing Taiwan*.20

The possibilities of serving U.S. interests through better knowledge of foreign areas, exchanges with them, or developmental activities within them are confusingly varied and extensive. Even acts intended as plain benevolence may be argued as in some ultimate way serving a national interest. But there are significant differences for parts of the world that differ in power or sophistication. In some of the weaker and poorer parts of the world, development needs have largely dominated American attention. A kind of egalitarian, anthropological omnivorousness has made respectful attention to all cultures a motivating force in American international interests, and there has been great diffidence about treating some places and cultures as ones we should know and learn more from than others. But, unquestionably powerful, dangerous, or imposing places have won special attention. In the case of China, regard for a great civilization, curiosity about its degree of scientific and technological sophistication, and a rather confused perception of the country as “underdeveloped” yet having remarkable experiences and accomplishments have made it peculiarly difficult to distinguish service of the U.S. interest, charitable benevolence, developmental purpose, and plain curiosity. This obscure mixture of concerns has probably helped American philanthropy, hesitant for the most part to reach beyond U.S. interests and home needs, to enter into the business of educational and cultural exchange with China. But we shall be better able to assess the balance of concerns after looking at philanthropic interests in development and in international understanding.

**Development Interests in American Philanthropy**

Until someone sorts out the history of relief programs and we understand with more detachment what the significance of American missionary efforts have been, it will be difficult to say confidently what the dominant
interest of American international philanthropy has been. But I believe a good case can be made that it has normally been in what we have come to call “development.” It would perhaps offend many missionaries and their supporters to suggest that they have been engaged in “development,” but there is clearly a large commonality between the conceptions and endeavors of missionaries and modern developers. Both have thought they had something to bring from their own culture and society to far-off peoples that would be for these peoples’ good. They have sought to teach what they knew and believed in, and through example, demonstration, and institution-building they have tried to multiply their catechumens and “modernizers.” The decline of Western dominance has brought revulsions against religious proselytizing, and a secularizing West has had less stomach for it. Indeed, any form of cultural imposition has come under a kind of cloud of impropriety or worse. Since World War II, the ideologies of development and technical assistance made the propagation of ostensibly culture-free knowledge legitimate, preferably when it came along with the financial means for the ventures such knowledge might guide and as long as the receiving nation had ultimate authority. Missionary efforts came increasingly to emphasize health, education, and welfare, and foundation philanthropy brought modern knowledge within the rules and conceptions of the development ideology.

The Rockefeller Foundation came to the post-World War II development era with a long history of international activities in public health, and its great ventures in the Peking Union Medical College and rural reconstruction in China were pioneering ventures in the institution-building and development programming that it was to practice in several fields and many places from the 1940s to the present. The Ford Foundation in its formative months at Pasadena in 1951 debated how critically aid to the developing countries could serve the conditions of peace. Its first president, Paul Hoffman, had to deal with skeptics like George Kennan and Milton Katz, but he prevailed in launching the development programs that became the largest part of the Ford Foundation’s international activities. Other foundations also responded to the postwar enthusiasm for development; thus, for example, the dissolution of the British Empire in Africa and elsewhere gave the Carnegie Corporation the stimulus to reshape its Commonwealth program into an educational development program.

The fission of the postwar world gave a strongly political cast to development as a means of strengthening the “free world” against the competition and seductions of communism. The threat that India and other parts of Asia would follow in China’s red path was high in the motivations that made India a great focus of development assistance. But by the 1960s, development assistance, both public and private, had moved from its earlier service in the defense of democracy and the free world toward a more agnostic phase, accommodating military dictatorships and one-party states if they seemed to have what was politely called “a commitment to
development.” Needs to emphasize the neutral, technical character of development assistance and to avoid taints to the sovereignty of developing countries were strongly felt by the foundations as private bodies. The emphasis on transforming societies through the application of modern knowledge, which Raymond Fosdick, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, proclaimed in the 1930s, continued as a dominant characteristic of foundation policy and encouraged a detachment from political relations that were marked enough to permit active programs in countries which had broken diplomatic relationships with the United States.

This political agnosticism of foundation development assistance in the 1960s was undoubtedly important preparation for the resumption of development interests with the PRC. There were, however, strong resistances to engagement in development efforts with communist countries. Such efforts would have been impossible or unthinkable in the 1950s, but they became live questions in the 1960s with Eastern Europe. One recalls the Romanian ambassador to the United States, well equipped with figures on income per head and technical manpower needs, arguing that his country ought to be regarded as a developing country, and he and his counterparts from nearby countries ultimately won a limited response. The heavy engagement of the Ford Foundation with public and private management around the world in the 1960s led in particular into questions over the legitimacy of efforts to “modernize” management in communist countries. If Nasser’s Egypt, why not Tito’s Yugoslavia? As both the USSR and the Eastern European countries showed eagerness for American management science—and the latter were evidently seeking ways to loosen the grip of command economies—should not American foundations respond? Questions that were later to rise in dealing with the PRC thus had precedents and preparation in debates in offices and the board room of the Ford Foundation. The outcome was cautiously positive. Exchange of ideas and experience with the USSR took place, and joint projects were carried out in management and urban development in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania. The prevailing argument was very much in the rather technocratic style of the sixties—the introduction of management techniques from the West could carry a democratic spirit with them, and if they made these communist countries function better, the gains might be to the ultimate benefit of all, as indeed was hoped from economic development in Third World countries with unattractive political systems. That this “opening to the East” did not go farther than it did was less a consequence of doubts about its legitimacy or ultimate beneficial effects than of the pressure of other demands on Ford Foundation staff and financial resources. There was also some persisting difficulty in finding American specialists who were seriously interested in spending time on Eastern European projects. The sensitivity to denial of freedoms and human rights which rose sharply in the 1970s was not then a major deterrent.
When direct engagement with the PRC became possible toward the end of the 1970s, there was a strong persistence of development interests in major foundations. The bad capital markets and the inflation of the early seventies had gravely diminished the resources of many of them, but in the choices that retrenchment forced, development interests were protected and maintained as far as possible. Ford continued to run down its international studies support, withdrew from several better-off developing countries, and narrowed the fields of its development activity. Rockefeller began the rundown of its program for building universities of quality in the Third World but preserved much of its interest in health, population, and agriculture. In program interests and staff competence, these foundations were well poised in 1978 or 1979 to place development high in their fresh concerns with the PRC.

The opening of relations with China in 1979 brought back the Rockefeller Foundation along with a number of other American foundations with historic relations to China. As the Lampton et al. book may show, such trusts as the China Medical Board, the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, and the Trustees of Lingnan have returned to the support of institutions in China and provided funds for training and exchanges. In 1979, the Rockefeller Foundation, pursuing its population interests, undertook support of a new Institute of Developmental Biology in Beijing and has followed with a series of grants for research in China and fellowships for research in the United States, much of it related to gossypol, a cottonseed derivative developed by the Chinese as a male contraceptive. Other Rockefeller grants have been made to Chinese medical colleges for research in epidemiology and on schistosomiasis. It has also assisted Chinese agricultural scientists in maintaining relationships with the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, a relationship which dates back to 1974.22 Some of these Rockefeller efforts clearly transcend the development of China in their aims and potentials, as in the search for new contraceptives or the engagement of Chinese resources in the international effort to improve crop varieties and food production. But these efforts do serve for the building of Chinese competences and resources in fields important for its own development, and Rockefeller has not hesitated to engage in the support of institutions in China.

The Ford Foundation has also followed its interests in development in its relations with China, but with important differences. In 1979, it undertook to explore "possibilities of assisting the Chinese in their own processes of development and reform" and worked out an agreement with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for exchanges and collaboration in economics, which has been followed by a major conference in the United States and a workshop in Beijing on economic development. A little later, a program of exchanges in agricultural economics was worked out with the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, which has led to summer work-
shops in China, a visiting professor in China, and the training of Chinese scientists in the United States. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has also been helped to acquire foreign economic journals. This assistance and the training of Chinese fall within the normal practices of development cooperation, but the exchange relationship has been emphasized throughout, and the foundation has moved quite cautiously toward a development program in China in the patterns it has long followed elsewhere. It has been correspondingly slow to put an office or staff resident in China and to make grants to Chinese institutions for their development.

While the current level of annual funding of its China program at somewhat over $1 million makes the Ford Foundation one of the largest private funders of China-related matters, it may be asked why it has not entered more vigorously and extensively into development programs in China. Hesitancies of the sort mentioned above in connection with Eastern Europe seem to have been much less important than a sense of limited resources for the task. The rise of concerns over human rights in the 1970s led the foundation into a very active concern with this subject—it is indeed the largest single private supporter of human rights organizations and activities. Interest in this field and long-established concerns with law and social justice attracted it to collaborative activities with the Chinese in law, initially with the Academy of Social Sciences and subsequently more broadly with a 1983 grant of $535,000 through Columbia University. The disposition has thus been more to encourage Chinese efforts toward a strengthened rule of law rather than to hold back because of existing abuses of human rights there.

The opening of China came, unfortunately, at a time when the Ford Foundation was feeling a need to contract and reshape its programs. The diminution of the funds the foundation could devote to development had become very striking, and the management costs of existing overseas operations were troublesome. The average of program funds it committed for overseas development in the years 1977–81 was, in real terms, only about one-sixth of the annual commitments it made at the peak of its efforts in the mid-1960s. In such circumstances, and when a reduction of overseas staff and offices was taking place, there was little disposition to undertake a new venture that would have to be rather larger to be consequential in a country as big as China.

A very large part of the education and training Chinese from the PRC are now receiving in the United States should be regarded as development assistance, insofar as it is funded from American sources. Some part of the American funding is readily identifiable as coming from American foundations. But since a great part of the American funding comes through the 130 or so links of American colleges and universities with Chinese institutions, it would seem probable that there is an important channel for American philanthropy that is much harder to trace. Again, although the CSCPRC survey sheds some light on this obscurity, it seems probable that
the funding of trainees for China’s development is the largest role American philanthropy is now playing in educational and cultural relations with the PRC.

The Promotion of International Understanding

After the strengthening of American competences and the pursuit of development, a third preoccupation of American international philanthropy in the past decades has been the advancement of international understanding. Its roots lay in an American idealism which has been ill-disposed to accept the existence of irreconcilable conflicts of interest or intractable group loyalties. The same democratic faith that would make all human beings—of whatever origin—capable of modernization and development opens the way to their mutual understanding too. Expressions of this faith have taken various forms in the actions of American philanthropy—in the exchange of persons, in international conclaves, in the distribution of publications, and in the encouragement of international studies, American studies among them. Despite the growth of government programs under the demure label of “information and exchange” after World War II, very active programs continued to be supported by foundations and other branches of American philanthropy. When the Ford Foundation was launched in 1951, Paul Hoffman thought that a large-scale exchange of persons was necessary to international understanding and that promoting such exchange should be one of Ford’s program objectives. There were immediately many eager supplicants. The problems of giving some coherent shape and strategy to a program of exchanges quickly became evident, but Ford and other philanthropies persisted, mostly through seeking specific foci for their efforts or in the faith that helping nations meet at their tops was important. Some of the resulting actions have been concerned with particular areas—the Atlantic Community, Africa, or Asia; some have concentrated on professional groups such as journalists, scientists, or legislators. Confidence in the value of unofficial gatherings of notables, for example, in the Bilderburg conferences, the Atlantic Institute, or the Trilateral Commission, has prevailed in foundations. It has, however, been subject to democratic suspicions and doubts, and some philanthropy has favored “people-to-people” programs, farm youth exchanges, or work groups in distant villages. At least among the major foundations, there seems on the whole to have been a gradual and general decline in enthusiasm for exchanges, and the word has lost the appealing resonance it once had in their offices. While all sorts of exchanges and international gatherings continue to win funds, they typically face much skeptical scrutiny, and rejection rates are high.

The reasons for this decline seem to have been several. In comparison with development projects or research with a tangible written product, the value of international meetings and exchanges has often seemed uncertain
or tenuous. Kenneth Thompson, then vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation, argued in the late 1960s that international exchange needed "review and analysis":

The primary target of international cooperation has become . . . institution-building. The lesson of a century of experience in the business of international exchange is that educating individuals is not enough. Every public and private agency has its warehouse full of files recounting the melancholy experiences of individuals whose intellectual formation abroad left little to be desired but who, on returning, found scant outlet for their talents.24

Thompson wanted overseas development as Rockefeller was then doing it, giving fellowships for international study to be sure, but linking them to institutions back home. The populism of the late 1960s also eroded faith in "the establishment" and what it could achieve through exchanges of views in comfortable international settings. As for the larger masses, the rapid ascent in numbers of foreign students, the abundance of Americans able to spend their own or their family's money to study abroad, and the extraordinary general rise in the volume of international travel (the number of Americans traveling overseas rose from 1.6 million in 1960 to 8.2 million in 1980 while visitors to the United States increased from 2.3 million in 1970 to 7.7 million in 1980) made much deliberate effort at people-to-people contacts seem supererogation.

By the time opportunities for exchanges with the PRC opened, there was thus a somewhat reserved or disabused attitude among philanthropists about exchanges as such. Fellowships or training awards for study in this country continued to be a regular and important part of development assistance efforts, and the needs of serious American students and scholars continued to win support. But the notion that international understanding could be significantly advanced by exchanges had to be left as a kind of hoped-for fringe benefit, attached to more tangible results.

Against this background, it is more than a little remarkable that there should have been as much private treasure and effort forthcoming as there has been for exchanges with China. The explanation must in part lie in sober assessment of need and opportunity, but many such get only slow and niggardly responses. One must suspect there is no simple rational explanation for the enthusiastic interest in China that has appeared across American professions, business, education, and government. It has, of course, several precedents in recent history. Something of the sort attracted Americans to Europe and made them welcome European students here after the war. There was the great reception of Hungarian students in 1956 (strikingly warmer than that for Poles in 1982). And the independence of Africa brought a surge of movement to and from that continent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. When the attention of Americans is attracted in this way, philanthropy is seldom inattentive. It follows the public agenda closely, and its surge of interest in China after 1978 could be expected.
Whatever the critical reserve about funding exchanges that had grown up in American foundations by the 1970s, the underlying American faith in the importance of the nations and peoples of the world knowing one another clearly persisted. International experience had become banal for many parts of the world, and a cosmopolitan culture was penetrating to the back of beyond. But anxieties about the shallowness of mutual understanding regularly arise, and for parts of the world that were isolated for one or another reason, there was particular solicitude, as for example, much concern over Berlin, or the recurring anxieties over the "new generation" in Europe that does not know what the United States did in the war, or the Marshall Plan, or why NATO came into being. The closed world of the communist countries excited particular concern, and after 1957 very lopsided "exchange" programs were privately funded to give Poles, Hungarians, and Yugoslavs opportunities to know the wider world. A sense that Chinese from the PRC needed to know more than they did about the world outside was very strong and became a guiding objective in numerous foundation actions. The exchange program in international relations that Ford has had with China is by no means confined to U.S.-China relations but seeks to help the Chinese know Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the world, as well as more general features of the international scene. In the past year, several foundations have joined together in a program of exchanges in international relations that will put particular emphasis on opportunities for staff of China's principal institutes concerned with international affairs. (Ford funding of this initiative has been mentioned above; the Rockefeller Foundation has approved $300,000 for it, and other foundations have been engaged in the planning and may join in its funding.)

The distinction between serving American interests and serving international understanding is, of course, not a clear or firm one. A world order based on good mutual understanding is clearly in the American interest, and giving Americans a better appreciation of what lies beyond the national boundaries serves both American and wider interests. The Luce Scholars Program, for example, is proclaimed to have the purpose of improving understanding of Asia among Americans who are not specialists on Asia and whose development of a "broader world perspective" is thought to be important. There is a plausible case that American leaders in many walks of life have needed to know much more than they did about China after the long years of its and our efforts at isolating it. Travel to China thus could appear as better than mere tourism or junketing and a worthy object of philanthropic funds. A similar faith that exposing Chinese to the wider world will serve not only Chinese but the general international interest has strengthened the case for funding their visits, and not always to the United States.

Exchanges, conferences, and joint projects with a well-focused developmental or public or international affairs purpose have their presumed contri-
butions to international understanding mixed with more concrete purposes. Relations of a scholarly, scientific, or cultural sort likewise have mixtures of purpose, but with perhaps somewhat greater scope for intrinsic interests in promoting international cooperation and understanding. The very great interest of the PRC in getting abreast of world scientific programs, and staying there, is manifest, and American scientists have needed to pursue their subjects in Chinese settings to benefit from Chinese research. The relationship is now certainly asymmetrical in most subjects, and questions may arise, as they have over U.S.-Soviet exchanges, as to what the American side gains. Still, beyond present questions over who is now giving and who is taking, there are the beliefs that scientific inquiry is a universal enterprise in which all nations should share and that experience of this common enterprise will be a basis of mutual understanding and sympathy. Acceptance of intellectual inquiry as a common human enterprise is more readily found for the natural sciences than for the social sciences and the humanities, and we have had the rather worried report of the Humanities and Social Science Planning Commission about the difficulties in finding common ground with the Chinese in these fields. The commission recognized that American conceptions of independent research could be "an unwitting instrument of social change" but declared itself firmly against "technology transfer" or the service of "foreign policy" in favor of a contribution to "scholarly understanding of the world" in as much collaboration as might be feasible. The present relationship was realistically taken to be asymmetrical, and the objective set was not an instrumental one on either the Chinese or the American side but a less immediate and more universal objective, in which Chinese history and culture would become part of common understanding of societies and cultures everywhere.

The motivations of foundations such as Starr, MacArthur, and Ford, which have provided funding for exchanges under the CSCPRC, have commonly not been very explicit. A leaning toward the social sciences and humanities seems here and elsewhere to characterize private as compared with governmental funding. This preference may have something to do with expectations that there are greater prospects of promoting international understanding through these fields. Their relevance to the maintenance of American expertise on China is also obvious, and the habit of leaving funding of the natural sciences to the government probably also has contributed. The delicacy of explicitly asserting it muffles the thought that the social sciences and humanities help modern nations understand themselves and other nations, and thus contribute to a mutually sympathetic world. But it would be strange if such a conception and purpose were absent from foundation funders of exchanges in these fields. Artistic and cultural exchanges have a rather favored role when aims of mutual regard are salient, and they have taken a prominent place in American philanthropic support of exchanges with China. The Center for U.S.-China Arts Exchange has been a favored recipient, with grants from the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund, the Starr Foundation, and the Ford Foundation. The difficulties of balance between the stronger and weaker that afflict many exchange relationships seem to be more readily avoided amid the incommensurabilities of art and culture. The long-established Western regard for Chinese arts assures a comfortable basis of reciprocity in these matters and gives better promise of mutual respect than in fields where China appears "underdeveloped." Some of the foundations had long been concerned with the cultures of Asia and had appreciated the worth of cultural elements in their development programs. In this as in other respects, China exchanges have given them a new field for familiar endeavors.

Conclusion

If the perceptions in this chapter are reliable ones, American philanthropy has joined in the American excitement over a new era in relations with China with enthusiasm and a willingness to contemplate large purposes. It has continued efforts to strengthen American competences in understanding and dealing with China; it has devoted itself to training Chinese here, building institutions in China, and sending Americans there who might help in China's development; and it has sought ways to improve the international relations of China with the United States and other parts of the world. The remarkable surge of American interest in China has brought effort and funding from government, universities, professional and research organizations, private businesses and individuals, as well as from organized philanthropies. The variety of activities and the combinations of funding to go into them make it a bit difficult to discern the special role philanthropy may have. In no single respect does foundation-funding stand out so prominently in the present era as it did in the support of China studies in the 1960s; in development, the World Bank and other public funding dwarf the efforts of foundations. But even in development-related activities, there are fields in which the absence of foundation interest would leave serious gaps, and intellectual and professional resources in the United States would be left unutilized. The experience thus far shows that although substantial numbers of the Chinese students and scholars trained abroad in the past six years who have returned home may be underutilized because of a shortage of suitable facilities and work assignments, carefully selected exchange scholars return to important functions in the PRC, and important linkages are established in the sciences, arts, and the analysis of international relations. The ability of private philanthropy to play an important role in developing and sustaining national organizations on the American side and to establish relations with major institutions on the Chinese side has bolstered confidence that its efforts are more than well-meaning gestures. By selection and concentration, there have been results encouraging faith that efforts within the reach of private philanthropy matter even in the vastness and complexity of China and its relations with the wide world.
When compared with the attention given to other parts of the world, the China efforts of American philanthropy in the last years have been remarkably vigorous. Why they should have been so is a subject that needs to be studied in a field wider than philanthropy since so much of the country has shared the philanthropists’ enthusiasm. Historic links, the seductiveness of Chinese hosts, the seriousness and industry of Chinese students are all part of a story that goes much beyond the scope of this chapter. When opportunity came, American philanthropy joined in a national movement, reviving old interest and applying practices it had learned in earlier decades.

Even in a time of national enthusiasm, not much would have happened if there were not something left of the traditional confidence of American philanthropy that it can do important things toward large objectives. But large objectives normally take a long time to achieve, and we must hope that there will be staying power as novelty disappears and as the vicissitudes of U.S.-Chinese relations test our seriousness.

Notes

*Ed. note: Some of these developments are foreshadowed by Ninkovich.

1. Giving USA (New York, 1985), p. 6. Estimates for 1984 were up sharply to $61.55 billion in individual gifts out of a total of $74.25 billion.

2. Variations of more than $1 billion such as occurred between 1981 and 1982 seem too large to be traceable to international events and interests alone. But it has been reported recently that contributions of the American public to Ethiopian relief in November and December 1984 amounted to more than $40 million ("Two-Month U.S. Total to Help Ethiopians Reaches $40 Million," by Kathleen Teltsch, New York Times, January 1, 1985, pp. 1, 5). Such giving, if sustained over a year, would amount to more than $200 million. But it has been noted that the response to the Ethiopian famine was quite exceptional, being much larger than that to the Cambodian crisis in 1979 or the 1973 drought in Africa.

3. There is much misperception on the subject. It is, in particular, widely believed that the Ford Foundation has in recent years reduced the fraction of its commitments that go to international purposes whereas in fact they have been near or above the historic average of somewhat more than one-third.


6. Ibid., pp. 55 (and note), 197.


10. The authors remarked that “no effort was made to determine the amounts which the participating institutions spent on international programs out of their own funds. . . . It would have been highly desirable to show . . . the considerable inputs made by these 36 universities from their own resources. But no firm data were available” (A Crisis of Dollars: The Funding Threat to International Affairs in U.S. Higher Education [New York: Education and World Affairs, 1968], p. 65). A table on p. 46 gives details on sources of external funds. The quotation above is from p. 16. On p. 31 there is a guess that “the universities’ own contributions to international programs more than equal outside funding for this purpose.” Irwin T. Sanders, who directed this survey for Education and World Affairs, later collaborated with Jennifer C. Ward in a survey for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education of the international programs of American colleges and universities, Bridges to Understanding (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. xiii–285), but without further effort on this question. The only serious effort I know was one carried out at Princeton in the early 1970s that has not been made public but showed that international studies were a “deficit area” in the university’s finances.


14. Lindbeck’s study cited in note 12 was a report to the foundation and shows the prevailing motivations.


23. Average annual commitments, 1977–81, were about $23.9 million in current dollars, but only $11.1 million in 1967 dollars, whereas commitments for development programs peaked at $65.8 million in 1965, or $69.7 million in 1967 dollars.


Since the conclusion of World War II, American universities have enrolled and educated ever-increasing numbers of students from abroad. By academic year 1983-84, nearly 340,000 foreign students were registered in some 2,500 American universities and colleges. If present trends continue, that figure is expected to reach one million before the turn of the century.

Some who have studied American involvement in the education of foreign students have pointed out that "policies in U.S. universities concerning the admission, education, and social accommodation of foreign students vary from the comprehensive to the nonexistent, and programs, from the carefully designed and well administered to the ad hoc expedient." Other, even more critical, studies have argued that nearly four decades after foreigners began arriving on American campuses in ever-increasing numbers, the United States still has no national policy with respect to the education of foreign students and that university policies can be characterized "more by an absence of decision than by any distinctive pattern of decision making within or across institutions."

Chinese stopped coming to American colleges and universities just as students from other countries began arriving, and it was nearly thirty years before student exchanges once more became possible. The first long-term students and scholars from the People's Republic of China began arriving in the United States late in 1978. Viewed from the perspective of the overall population of China and compared to the number of students even from countries with much smaller populations, the number of Chinese students...
and scholars currently in the United States is small. But their number today exceeds even the highest predictions of 1978, with some 12,000 students and scholars currently studying and carrying out research in the United States, of whom approximately two-thirds are students.

Indeed, a number of truths that apply to policies with respect to foreign students as a whole hold in the particular case of Chinese students (and scholars) as well. Just as the United States has no national policy with respect to the education of foreign students in general, so—despite a variety of government-to-government agreements—there is no national policy with respect to the education of Chinese students in particular. Similarly, university policies with respect to the admission, education, and social accommodation of Chinese students range from a purist refusal to adapt regular procedures to accommodate the sometimes special circumstances of Chinese, to cooperation in administering tests designed especially to accommodate the Chinese, to continuing befuddlement and confusion over how to handle the increasing number of applications from China. Programs, even on campuses where there are numerous Chinese, also range from the nonexistent to those specially directed to the particular needs of students from China.

While many statements with respect to foreign students as a whole also hold true for Chinese students and scholars in particular, the Chinese case nonetheless remains distinctive—first, for the extent and depth of previous American involvement in Chinese education; second, for the amount of time and attention that have been lavished in recent years on the renewal, albeit with major and significant differences, of previous ties; and, third, for the variety of forms the new academic exchanges with China have produced. It would be difficult to conclude, as Craufurd Goodwin and Michael Nacht have with respect to the training of foreign students as a whole, that the renewal of academic ties between China and the United States has been characterized by anything resembling an "absence of decision." In fact, probably no other contingent of foreign students and scholars has been the subject of so many meetings, memos, conferences, delegations, recommendations, and reports as has the Chinese. Nonetheless, for all the publicity and enthusiasm that have surrounded the reinstitution of Sino-American academic exchanges, ultimate questions of why and to what purpose American institutions of higher learning have embarked once more on the education of large numbers of Chinese are only now beginning to be posed.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the variety of exchange programs that have developed in the wake of the reinstitution of substantive Sino-American academic exchanges in 1978; to attempt to explain how programs came to take the particular forms they have; and to inquire into the specific goals particular programs have been designed to fulfill and ask whether such programs really are serving the goals for which they were ostensibly designed. The concluding section raises some broader, more fun-
fundamental, questions about the purpose of the academic exchanges and of the role of American universities in them.

Background

Prior to 1949, several thousand of the best and the brightest of Chinese students were trained in American colleges and universities; American foundations had established, equipped, and administered universities and medical schools in China; and our institutions of higher learning had sent their own faculty and graduates to Chinese universities to teach, train, and otherwise cooperate in the modernization, "Westernization," and (often) Christian conversion of China. With the ascension to power of the Chinese Communist party and the turn toward the Soviet "model," academic relations ceased. In the thought reform of China's intellectuals in the early 1950s, the antirightist campaign of 1957, and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, many Chinese scholars who had been educated in the United States or who had had close ties with American educational endeavors in China suffered profoundly for those ties.

Largely through the encouragement of American scholars of China who recognized that hostility between the two countries could not continue indefinitely, and in recognition that science at its best transcends politics, portions of the American academic community began pursuing a renewal of scholarly ties with China well before any concrete indication that the two governments were prepared to foster those ties. In 1966, under the joint sponsorship of the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Social Science Research Council, a national, nongovernmental committee—the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC)—was established to explore the possibility of renewing scientific and technological exchanges between China and the United States and to encourage American governmental attitudes and practices supportive of scholarly interaction.7

In the early years, those efforts bore little fruit. But in 1973, following the initial breakthrough by President Nixon, and after further diplomatic negotiations at the highest levels of the Chinese and American governments, the CSCPRC reached agreement with the Chinese Scientific and Technical Association to begin a series of short-term visits by Chinese academic delegations to the United States and American academic delegations to China, with the CSCPRC serving as both the sponsoring agency of American delegations to China and as the hosting agency of Chinese delegations to the United States. Because the CSCPRC was a nongovernmental institution and the Chinese had declared full normalization of relations a precondition of government-sponsored academic exchanges, these delegations technically fell into the category of "people-to-people" diplomacy. In fact, however, the CSCPRC received a considerable amount of its funding
from the government and came quickly to serve both as a semiofficial agent of the U.S. government and as a sort of national level clearinghouse for the articulation of American academic, and particularly scientific, interests to China.®

In addition to the semiofficial delegations sponsored by the CSCPRC, there were hundreds of other delegations, tours, and individual or small group visits, which also served to pave the way for the reopening of substantive academic ties between China and the United States. Delegations sponsored by the CSCPRC’s American counterpart in public affairs, education, performing arts, and sports—the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR)—also came to be regarded as semiofficial and included a visit to China in 1974 by a number of American university presidents.® The U.S.-China People’s Friendship Association (USCPFA), established at the national level in 1974, boasted special ties to China, and many who could not fully subscribe to the USCPFA’s early uncritical view of Chinese politics nonetheless joined the organization for the opportunity to visit there. Chinese-American scholars in particular had special access to the PRC and were often able to travel there without the encumbrance of delegation or tour.® Many came to serve as informal communications links between academic institutions in China and the United States, at once informing and advising counterparts and academic administrators in China on the nature and complexities of the American academic community and working with American colleagues in preparing the way for an expansion in academic exchanges. Thus, well prior to the establishment of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations in January 1979, leading administrators and key faculty of numerous colleges and universities in the United States had visited China. Many had been willing victims of the special excesses of Chinese hospitality that served in unquantifiable measure to foster widespread enthusiasm for later breakthroughs in Sino-American academic exchanges.

In the uncertain period between the opening of liaison offices and the establishment of full diplomatic recognition, the numerous delegations, tours, and privately arranged visits, particularly (since they were far and away the more numerous) of Americans to China, served both to introduce Chinese and American academics involved to their respective counterparts and to provide some basic understanding of the “state of the national art” in the limited number of fields in which such exchanges occurred. But even in the case of the carefully negotiated semiofficial delegations, the short duration of the scholarly visits, the superficiality of exposure, the absence of any genuine research opportunities (and, more than likely, the disarray of many of China’s universities and research institutes) earned such exchanges the appellation of “scientific” (or academic) “tourism.” Even Chinese-American scholars, whose visits were often longer and more intense, rarely participated in substantive research. Underlying the excitement that accompanied the early opening up of China were increasing demands for genuinely substantive academic exchanges.
October 1978 was a watershed in post-1949 Sino-American academic relations. It was then that the announcement was made that China wanted to send some 500 to 700 students and scholars to American universities in academic year 1978-79 and that the United States, under the aegis of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China, would send some sixty students and scholars to China for long-term research. Beyond being a harbinger of the impending establishment of diplomatic relations, the significance of the announcement of October 1978 that the United States and China would shortly begin substantive academic exchanges was twofold.

First, the sending of hundreds of Chinese scholars and students to study and conduct research in American universities and of lesser numbers of American students and scholars to Chinese universities and research institutes represented a qualitative change in the nature of academic exchanges, permitting for the first time since before 1949 genuinely substantive, sustained, scholarly interaction. With Chinese scholars living, studying, and conducting research in the United States, and American scholars doing the same in China, sustained academic dialogue at last was possible.

Second, the terms of the new accord signaled a different and significant role for American universities. In the 1972-78 period, a number of universities had sent delegations to China but only Stanford University, just prior to the October 1978 announcement, had actually been able to work out concrete exchange agreements with a counterpart institution in China. With the agreement of October 1978, American universities were encouraged both to develop their own bilateral ties directly with Chinese academic institutions and to enter into exchange agreements with them, thus dramatically increasing the number of institutions and individuals, in both China and the United States, directly involved in academic exchanges.

With the advantage of hindsight, it is difficult to imagine that the role of American universities in the expanded, more substantive exchanges could have been different. But in the discussions surrounding the new exchanges, other possibilities were seriously weighed. Some who had been involved in academic exchanges with the Soviet Union had early argued in favor of a federation or league, centralized and controlled by a single administrative headquarters, to handle all academic relations with China; and the idea of a central “clearinghouse” that might serve as broker in the placement of Chinese students and scholars was considered a real possibility before actual implementing details of the October 1978 agreement were worked out. But the Chinese early expressed a preference for working directly with American universities rather than through any central agency, and the American government agreed. The issue of a possible centralization of the exchanges was thus quickly laid to rest.

The effect of this decision was a certain imbalance in the exchange relationship, with the CSCPRC charged with administering a national level program for sending students and scholars to China and numerous and
diverse American universities dealing directly with Chinese individuals and institutions in admitting students and scholars to their own programs. The effect of this imbalance was that the issue of reciprocity that had long troubled national level organizations involved in the exchanges became more intractable still.

Reciprocity is likely to become an issue in bilateral academic exchanges when the scholars of one country stand to accrue much greater advantages from the exchanges than the other, a situation which is likely to occur when there is either a great imbalance in the numbers of scholars being exchanged, in the types of access scholars are permitted, or in the nature of the national academic enterprise and therefore in what can be learned. Reciprocity has been a major issue in American exchange relations with communist and authoritarian countries, and some programs have aimed for absolute equality of opportunity, with elaborate formulas for x number of scholars to spend y number of man months in z institutions each way. Indeed, issues of reciprocity appear inevitable in any exchanges with countries where the free and easy access characteristic of American universities simply cannot be guaranteed. Committed to obtaining the best access in China for those sent there under its auspices, the CSCPRC is also the one organization that has consistently brought the issue of reciprocity to the fore. In the early years after normalization, the committee was successful in placing an academic adviser in Beijing, charged, among other things, with ensuring its scholars research access on a case-by-case basis. With responsibility for accepting Chinese in the United States so decentralized, however, the CSCPRC’s potential leverage in ameliorating the issue of reciprocity is weak. Rather, the committee has sought publicly to clarify the issue and to urge the American government, foundations, and universities to keep the goal of reciprocity “firmly in mind when negotiating agreements with Chinese institutions.”

University responses to the October 1978 announcement of expanded possibilities for academic exchanges with China ranged from the wildly enthusiastic to the complacently indifferent, with the dominant response tending to the side of enthusiasm. Three factors were major determinants in how universities responded to the opportunities for exchange and, consequently, in whether and what type of exchange program or programs any given university developed: (1) how key faculty and administrators potentially involved in such programs perceived China; (2) the availability of individuals to initiate and negotiate exchanges, the particular interests of
those involved, and the enthusiasm with which programs were imple-
mented; and (3) the nature of motivations for developing (or not develop-
ing) academic interchange with China.

The Nature of Perception

The contextual backdrop through which academic exchanges with
China have been initiated and developed is the variety of perceptions key
faculty and administrators hold of that country. Harold Isaacs's argument
that American perceptions of China have been not only varied but wildly
contradictory is by now a truism, a point convincingly made by the story
Stanley Karnow tells about Time magazine’s Henry Luce. "If you told him
that the Communist Chinese were successful," reports Karnow, "he
exploded that 'Communists can't do well.' If you told him the Communist
Chinese were doing badly, he exploded that 'Chinese can't do badly.' "

The value-laden lenses through which American academics perceive
China may be more sophisticated and less contradictory than those of the
educated public at large. But at least five different types of sometimes com-
peting, sometimes complementary, perceptions have had an influence on
whether and what types of exchanges American universities have established
with China. This variety of perceptions may in turn serve to reduce the
possibility of the development of a coherent, well-articulated set of goals
concerning this country's role in educating Chinese students and scholars.

China as a Communist Country. Surely the most dominant and persistent
perception of China for the past thirty-five years has been as a communist,
and therefore not entirely friendly, country. However modulated that view
may be by the belief that China is different from (and more benign than)
the Soviet Union, by the current government’s reformist tone, and by recent
internal confusion over the capacity of Marxism-Leninism to solve China’s
current problems, the perception of China as a communist nation—and the
wariness and suspicion that usually accompany it—are likely to persist.
Ironically, among some of this country’s smaller evangelical religious
colleges, the perception of China as communist propels an interest in
academic exchanges based on a strong missionary impulse. Other
universities, both state and private, must contend with legislators or board
members who continue, sometimes forcefully, to question the advisability
of training citizens from a nation they cannot regard as entirely
trustworthy, predictable, or friendly. From the perspective of China as a
communist state, the enthusiasm with which exchanges are sought might
well be tempered by concern over the issue of differential academic access
and therefore by a focus on issues of reciprocity, the problem of technology
transfer to a potentially hostile state, and a preoccupation with the question
of the permanence of the new, more reformist, regime and with who will be
Deng Xiaoping’s successor. At a minimum, the perception of China as a
communist nation can be expected to foster an appreciation of the
continued dependence of Chinese academics on policies of the state and a recognition of the difficulties Chinese scholars have faced before a government that has not always taken the pursuit of truth as paramount.

**China as an "Old Friend."** At the opposite end of the spectrum of affect but nonetheless a perception that often exists side by side with the view of China as a communist state is the perception of China, and the Chinese, as old friends. Despite the lengthy period of official hostility and the virtually complete cessation of contact, the bond of friendship from the days prior to 1949—when Americans and Chinese cooperated in education, economic development, medical care, religious pursuits, and the struggle against the Japanese—often not only remains but remains strong. Throughout the United States, administrators in colleges and universities have contacted, or been contacted by, the schools—now often transformed nearly beyond recognition—with which they once had ties. Read one such letter, dated January 1979, from the United States to China: “In the years before World War II [our two universities] enjoyed an especially close relationship... Now that our two countries have reestablished diplomatic ties, is it not time to reestablish our scholarly relations as well?” Many of the exchange programs that have sprung into existence since 1978 exist for no other reason than the revival of bonds of friendship. The reason Oberlin College now has ties with Shanxi Agricultural University and Taiyuan Engineering Institute is because these two institutions are the descendents in locality and faculty makeup of Oberlin’s former middle school, Ming Hsien, disbanded in 1951. The particularity of the Oberlin-Shanxi tie is replicated at numerous universities throughout the United States—Goshen College and Sichuan Teachers College and Yale and Hunan Medical College, for example.

The revival of old friendships is not only institutional but personal. Impetus for the establishment of exchange programs often derives from such serendipitous accidents as the fact that the dean of an American university and the vice president of a Chinese university were once college roommates, or the head of a Chinese delegation to the United States and the president of one of the universities it visits are classmates, or the former, and much respected, teacher of a university president was Chinese. When the personal ties are between Chinese-Americans and their former classmates, students, teachers, or friends, the opportunities for exchanges expand, and because so many of these old personal ties are stochastically distributed throughout American academia, exchange programs with China often turn up at surprising and unexpected places.

**China as an Untapped Market.** A still different way of perceiving China is as the world’s last great untapped market. While China’s market potential might ordinarily be thought to be the preoccupation of businessmen, some of this country’s colleges and universities, many fighting for their own financial survival, are not only becoming increasingly
involved in business but are becoming businesses themselves. At least one of the exchange relations worked out between American universities and Chinese institutions is quite frankly a business deal.

But there is also another sense in which China is the world’s last great untapped market—as a market for students. One reason American universities have come in recent years to play such an important role in educating foreign students is because, with the education of the postwar baby boom students now complete, the domestic pool of potential future students has markedly shrunk. For some colleges and universities, the opening up of China represents the last great potential expansion of the pool.

*China as a Developing Nation.* China may also be perceived, as China’s leaders would now have us perceive it, as a developing nation, in serious need of advanced education and technology and management skills for the successful pursuit of its goals. The perception of China as a developing country, and the belief that a “secure and strong” China is in the best interests of the United States, was a motivating factor in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Viewed as a developing country, China needs us more than we need China, and educational exchanges may be seen as a means of educating the next generation of China’s technical and managerial elite—the generation that will carry China into modernization and the twenty-first century. The almost missionary impulses of many American academics have generated a certain enthusiasm and sense of mission in the training of the next generation of China’s scientific elite. But few universities would want publicly to promulgate their role in that training. More conservative legislators and board members are wary not only of China as communist but of China as developing, too, fearing future effects on American industry of “too much” technology transfer to China in particular and Asia in general.

*China as a Great and Exotic Culture.* China may be perceived as a great culture. More importantly, China may be, and frequently is, perceived as exotic—even as a little bit magical. The perception of China as a great culture has led some academics to make a career of research on Chinese history, culture, philosophy, language, literature, society, and politics, and in many universities China scholars have been major actors in the drive to establish exchange agreements with China.

For non-China specialists, however, China, more than any other country in the world, remains an avocation, a perennial source of wonder and curiosity. It is a view the Chinese have taken care to perpetuate, with their invitations to leading administrators and key faculty in numerous American universities and the guarantee, once in China, of curtained limousines and wondrous sights, of sumptuous banquets with elaborate toasts and declarations of everlasting friendship. Repeatedly, the “exotica factor” is put forth as an explanation for the enthusiasm with which the
new academic exchanges with China were greeted, for the bending of the rules that getting new programs quickly in place frequently entailed, for the continuing interest otherwise jaded faculty and administrators take in China, for the special concessions made in particular to Chinese visiting scholars, and for the ability of yet another in a long line of Chinese delegations once again to draw busy faculty and academic administrators not just willing but eager to dine with Chinese about whom they know virtually nothing. Recalls one leading administrator of the early enthusiasm and rule-bending that surrounded his university’s exchange program, “It was an amazing phenomenon. I’ve been here for twenty-three years . . . and have never seen anything like this.”

Persistence of the exotica factor ensures continuing interest in exchanges with China even as those exchanges become routinized. But there is a less seemly side to the exotica factor as well. Even the most hard-nosed and unsentimental of academics sometimes, after a mere three-week visit, come to confuse their new love for China with understanding and knowledge. The number of instant experts created by whirlwind, meeting-packed, banquet-filled trips is unfortunately great, leading to conclusions and policy recommendations based often more on the infatuation of the moment than on a solid appraisal of reality. What is more, the instant and infatuated expert, often motivated by a desire to help, is also sometimes burdened by an exaggerated sense of his own importance, by an inflated sense of his own ability to change and therefore to help China—a phenomenon Jonathan Spence has noted with respect to earlier Western advisers to China. Infatuation, it must be presumed, generally gravitates closer to reality as the process of transforming recommendations into concrete programs progresses.

China as a Laboratory. Finally, China can be perceived as a potential laboratory for academic research. It has not been only American China specialists who have seen that country as an unexplored laboratory, but scientists as well—zoologists, botanists, biologists, cancer researchers, earthquake specialists, etc. For many, access to the Chinese laboratory offers the opportunity to open new frontiers of research.

The Availability of Individuals

Perceptions are held by individuals, and probably the most important single factor determining whether and what type of program any given university may institute with the Chinese is the availability, enthusiasm, and interests of individuals involved in initiating, negotiating, and implementing the exchanges.

Many, if not most, of the programs currently in place would probably not exist were it not for the enthusiasm and hard work of a small handful of individuals and their staffs. Often programs are the work of a single
individual. Certainly there would not be nearly so many excellent students of physics at universities throughout the United States without the exceptionally skilled leadership and work of Professor T. D. Lee at Columbia. The U.S.-China Arts Exchange owes its existence and success to Professor Chou Wen-chung. The Program in American Law for Chinese Scholars (PALS) exists because of Professor R. Randle Edwards and his assistants. The Port-of-Entry Program at Queensborough Community College, which provides Chinese scholars and graduate students with intensive English language training and orientation to American culture, daily life, and academic demands, was initiated through the efforts of the college’s president, Dr. Kurt R. Schmeller, and prospers through the dedication and efforts of those who teach in the program. These instances are not unique.

Only when university presidents or chancellors themselves have taken an active role in the establishment of particular programs, as in the case of Queensborough’s Port-of-Entry Program, is it possible comfortably to speak of “university response” to possibilities for academic interchange with China. Presidential-level support is extremely valuable in creating an environment in which exchanges can grow and flourish, and, as more than one faculty member involved in exchanges has pointed out, presidential intervention can “move mountains” when ordinary faculty are trapped in apparently immovable bureaucracies. In fact, university presidents and other top-level academic administrators are probably more deeply involved in exchanges with China than with any other foreign country. But universities are astoundingly decentralized entities, with different schools, divisions, departments, institutes, centers, programs, forums, faculty, and other diversely titled subunits pursuing widely different interests, frequently to the mutual ignorance of one another and sometimes in only barely peaceful coexistence. The variety of subunits within any given university often responded in markedly different ways to the possibility of academic exchanges with China. Moreover it is possible, and often happens, that one subunit of a university has a thriving exchange program with China while another subunit within the same university has none at all.

At the highest levels of the university bureaucracy, interest in exchanges with China tends to be broad, abstract, and not immediately translatable into concrete programs. Said one high-level administrator, “I personally believe in the value of intercultural exchange of all types, and consider it central to the function of a university. Increased contacts with the PRC are clearly in the interests of our students and faculty members.” Another spoke of the importance of exchanges with China in giving his university a less local, more international image.

But the real exchanges, the daily, face-to-face, substantive contact between Chinese and their American hosts, takes place at a lower level of the university hierarchy; and at this level, goals are articulated both differently and more concretely.
Within the highly decentralized structure of most universities, it is possible to identify a variety of different constituencies with sometimes markedly different interests (or disinterests) in academic interchange with China. At the broadest level, not surprisingly, are the distinctly different interests of the scientists, on the one hand, and the social scientists and humanists, on the other. Science divisions and the departments within them are the major and largest constituency of academic exchanges with China while social science and humanities divisions remain, in general, relatively less interested. For instance, at one university, the dean of the division that includes both arts and sciences, himself a social scientist, wrote to “interested parties” on the eve of the public announcement of the new possibilities for exchanges with China of the “low probability” that his college or its graduate programs in the arts and sciences “would want to absorb any significant numbers of [Chinese] students either in regular degree programs or as ‘exceptions’ of one kind or another.” “It seems clear,” he wrote, that our university “will not have any great interest in participating in a major way in the technological training of a large number of Chinese exchange students.” Three months thereafter, the head of the science programs of the same university wrote to similarly interested parties of his certainty that appropriately qualified Chinese students would be welcome to study in “almost all aspects of mathematics, physics, chemistry, mechanics, astronomy and astrophysics, life science, and medical science . . . [and] in many aspects of material science, atmospheric science, quantum electronics and semiconductor materials and devices, computer science, earth science, and environmental science.” That university now is participating in a major way in the technological training of a large number of Chinese students. The dean of the sciences division was simply far more interested in and enthusiastic about training Chinese than the dean of the school of arts and sciences. This case is probably not entirely atypical.

At a more concrete level, Chinese-Americans, most but not all of whom are in the sciences, are a major and distinct constituency in Sino-American academic exchanges and have, in many instances, been invaluable in nurturing those exchanges. Their position is an exceptionally delicate one. Some do not feel themselves fully assimilated into American society, retain a strong sense of loyalty and obligation to their motherland, and feel they have a special mission to help China—a phenomenon some have compared to the sentiments of the American-Jewish community toward Israel. On the one hand, their ties to the Chinese motherland have given them special access there. On the other, those ties have subjected them to special pressures. Chinese-American guanxi, or special ties, can, for instance, be invaluable in the establishment of academic exchanges, but guanxi can become a burden when invoked in requests for the placement of particular individuals.
Nor has their special role in the exchanges left Chinese-Americans immune from critics in the United States. Some Chinese-Americans themselves suggest that China's initial welcome to Chinese-American academics was too indiscriminate, enabling some of their Chinese-American colleagues who could not really "make it on their own without China" to exploit the China connection to their own ends. Similarly, some non-Chinese argue that Chinese faculty are using the new exchanges to "feather their nests," populating, or overpopulating, their laboratories with numerous visiting Chinese scholars and students.

American specialists of China, who are most often social scientists and humanists, have different interests in exchanges from both their brethren in the social sciences and humanities and their colleagues in the sciences and form thereby another distinct constituency. The new academic relationship with the mainland has been a particular boon to American scholars of China, as they are able for the first time in some thirty years actually to conduct research in the country of their specialization. As archives and libraries have opened to these scholars, and as Chinese society itself has become more accessible, current understanding of China has commensurately grown. But the interests of American China scholars are often different from, and sometimes in conflict with, other constituencies in university China exchanges. By their brethren and colleagues, China specialists are sometimes perceived as indulging in a certain degree of academic self-interest, pursuing exchanges with China for the purpose of "bartering"—attempting to ensure that acceptance of Chinese research scientists in the American university is in some way matched by the opportunity for American social scientists or humanists to do research at the Chinese university. As one scientist described the different interests between his culture and the China specialist subculture, "What we pure and applied scientists are looking for is quality. We want to keep out of bartering. . . . This is not the goal of [the China specialists]."

The number of nonspecialist social scientists and humanists actively involved in the pursuit of academic relations with China is sufficiently small that it is difficult to describe them as a separate constituency. Nonetheless, there are some social scientists and humanists who are actively involved in pursuing ties with China, and between them and their China-specialist brethren there is sometimes strain, if not outright conflict. Social scientists and humanists are sometimes wary of the China specialist's interests and uncomfortable with his motives, evincing a belief that China is too important to be left to the China specialists. To quote from one such social scientist:

I am convinced that the establishment of scholarly relations [with China] . . . might be better shared in large measure with non-China specialists. The non-specialists have no special investment in research on China and can address themselves objectively to more general matters of development of the social sciences. Their motives might also be less suspect by the Chinese. Further,
participants in any program could be drawn from a larger pool since they could be selected for their expertise rather than for their prior knowledge or interest in China.

Finally, language teachers, and particularly teachers of English as a second language and of Chinese, are yet another constituency in China exchanges. Teachers of English as a second language are welcoming and pressing exchanges for the opportunity to train bright, challenging students. A number of teachers of Chinese have worked to establish language training programs in China.

Beyond the obvious constituencies from which the individuals who actually initiate and implement programs with China are drawn are the fortuitous and accidental interests of individuals who do not readily fit the mold—a function, no doubt, of the exotica factor, leading to the initiation of sometimes strong and thriving programs at unexpected schools by individuals with no obvious, or even logical, reason to be interested in such exchanges.

Motivations

Through the variety of perceptions we hold of China and the variety of constituencies interested in scholarly communication can be filtered several types of motivations for instituting, or not instituting, exchange programs with China. From those motivations emerge a variety of means through which Chinese come to study and do research at universities in the United States.

High-Quality Students. By far the most frequent motivation for the new academic dialogue with China mentioned by faculty and administrators, particularly in the sciences, is the opportunity to train bright, highly motivated, hard-working, high-quality students, usually at the graduate level. China has the largest pool of untapped talent in the world, and if the best and the brightest of that country's graduate students do indeed come to the United States to study, those students can be expected to be absolutely top-notch. As the first batch of post-Cultural Revolution college graduates has arrived in the United States, initial fears about the quality of education at Chinese universities and the consequent necessity of admitting Chinese graduate students only on some type of special status have proved largely unfounded. With minimal information about the Chinese grading system, basic knowledge about which are the better universities, and a few contacts with faculty at those schools, most admissions officers and faculty feel confident of their ability to judge applications from Chinese students. In the case of physics, Professor T. D. Lee at Columbia has actually devised an examination, the equivalent of a first-year qualifying exam in physics but used as a substitute for the GRE, that is administered yearly in China to top physics students from major universities throughout the country. Following the examinations, a team of physicists from universities that cooperate in the program travel to China to interview those students with...
the better scores. On the basis of the scores and the interviews, university and student preferences are matched. The top physics students in many schools today—despite often serious language difficulties—are Chinese. In fact, in some science departments, non-Chinese students have begun to complain that their Chinese colleagues are so good that they are throwing off the curve. The example begun by Professor Lee in physics is now being emulated in a number of other disciplines as well, and these fields, too, are being enriched by similarly high-quality students from China.

Moreover, unlike the social sciences and humanities, the sciences often have a surfeit of money for research and teaching assistants and not enough qualified graduate students to fill those positions. As one professor of science at a major, but second-echelon, university said, “Eighty percent of graduate schools in this country are begging, scrounging around for capable graduate students. The money is there. They need the bodies. So the money we’re giving to Chinese students and scholars is this money, filling in the gap.”

Interesting enough, the quest for high-quality students in the sciences is not a motivation for the establishment of formal exchange programs. American universities have been able to attract high-quality students in the sciences without the institution of special programs. By far the majority of Chinese currently studying and doing research in the United States are graduate students in the sciences, here not because of programs particularly constructed to bring them but because, in the business-as-usual competition for graduate placement, they have ranked well. Because the primary attraction in scholarly interaction with China is the opportunity to train bright young graduate students who can be expected to make future contributions to their disciplines, the slightly extra, or different, effort necessary to place Chinese students is considered well spent. Indeed, many second-echelon universities are reporting welcome changes in the quality of their graduate students with the addition of students from China. Reports one faculty member who is currently training several graduate students from China and who ranks them at the top of their class, “Americans’ love affair with China continues. It is because the quality of students that come is so high. . . . If the quality were poor, it wouldn’t last. Basically, it’s because these kids come with the sole purpose of study. They do 100 percent—150 percent—of what they’re asked to do.” In terms of expanding the pool of potential students and attracting a new group of bright students, a major goal of the exchanges, at least in the sciences, is being met. Moreover, these goals are being met without the addition of new funds.

This does not, in the main, hold true for the social sciences and humanities. There are far fewer Chinese social scientists and humanists studying in the United States. From the Chinese side, this imbalance reflects the fact that China’s developmental priorities favor scientists and technicians, and fewer people are being or have been trained in the social sciences and humanities. Nor is the government spending its foreign
currency to send large numbers of social scientists and humanists, with the possible exception of English language teachers, abroad. From the American side, the expansion of academic exchanges does not seem to be providing faculty in the social sciences and humanities with a new pool of bright, enthusiastic, and highly motivated students. The social sciences and humanities in the United States are constrained financially, and compared to the sciences there are fewer pools of money waiting to be awarded bright young students from China. Moreover, the social sciences and humanities, to a far greater degree than the sciences, remain culture- and nation-bound, and judgments about the quality of potential Chinese students in these areas are difficult. A substantial portion of the social scientists and humanists now studying and doing research in the United States seem to be here because of programs specially designed to bring them here, and funding for such programs often comes from outside the universities, from such agencies as the Ford Foundation, the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, and the Henry Luce Foundation. Moreover, any major expansion in the number of Chinese social scientists and humanists in the United States is likely to depend on the institution of special programs and similarly special funding.

Service. A second motivation for academic interchange with China is a sense of service, sometimes even a sense of mission, of which three major types can be distinguished.

The first type of service is the type often provided by Chinese-American faculty in the United States. Both Caucasians and Chinese-Americans note the special ties Chinese-Americans have made in the exchanges, and the sense of mission so many Chinese-Americans have in training the next generations of Chinese students. One Chinese-American scholar phrased it quite simply: "My mission is to help China." Said another, "I have a special mission vis-à-vis China. My aim is to increase communication in [my discipline]. In a sense, there are certain things that I am in a better position to do than other people. The president of the [research society in his discipline in China] is a former student of mine. . . . I still have a special tie to China. With proper guidance, [my discipline in China] could do very well—could be at a level of other countries . . . by the turn of the century. . . . But somebody has to be willing to work. . . . Chinese-Americans are willing to make efforts to facilitate the relationship."

Chinese-Americans have indeed made sometimes heroic efforts to facilitate the relationship, and many programs would not exist today and far fewer Chinese students would be studying in the United States without those efforts. Moreover, those efforts have gone beyond the strictly academic to the more broadly human. Recalls one foreign student adviser of the role of the Chinese-American faculty on his campus at the inception of the exchanges,
That first group of Chinese was less mature, less certain. They needed lots of help, particularly out of the classroom. Most of them were hosted by Chinese-American faculty who were gentle, good to them. Those professors saw themselves as protectors, defenders, missionaries. My notion was that this was a group that was going to confront major problems—in English, adjusting, academic problems. But the Chinese faculty said, “You're unduly concerned. You don't have to worry. We'll make sure that they're taken care of.” . . . The American Chinese did a remarkable job.

To be sure, the demands on Chinese-American faculty have become so great that some have had to curtail the extent of help they give. Some are tired of being escorts for the multitude of delegations from China that visit their campuses; some claim that all the entertaining of visiting Chinese has become a personal financial strain; some are simply tired of being bombarded with so many letters from China and can no longer respond to all their mail. Many express no small irritation at the myriad of special requests to which they are subjected as a result of their special ties, and some insist therefore on the necessity not only of a routinization of the exchanges but of scrupulously fair and unambiguously straightforward admission procedures for students from China—procedures immune from any possibility of guanxi. If some are curtailing their efforts, however, the service provided by Chinese-American faculty remains a major force in the exchanges.

A second type of “service” is more difficult to specify because it is not usually openly articulated, but it is a theme that permeates discussion. Side by side with the perception of China as exotic and even a little bit magical is the goal of “making the Chinese more like us.” The great majority of administrators involved with students and scholars from China interpret their job not only as assisting the Chinese in becoming conversant with the American academic system but in assisting them to become acquainted with American culture and society as well. The second most frequently listed problem in the exchanges, just after difficulties with English, is the problem of culture shock. “These are people who have never been on a plane, never seen a vending machine,” said one administrator.

American students who come here know the ropes—they know how to register for courses, how to take a test. . . . But things we take for granted are mysteries to the Chinese—leases, housing deposits, food, crime, the idea of black people, white students who speak Chinese. Eventually . . . they have enough exposure to different things that their eyes are opened and they are curious. We have . . . students who are Americans and interested in China who help them—take them to eat pizza, to the polls, the police station. But the biggest thing is the problem of adjustment.

Some administrators and faculty express profound disappointment when Chinese not only do not adjust but do not assimilate into the American way of life. Said one, “I don’t know what they’re learning about our society. That’s the saddest thing.” Many administrators feel that the Chinese do not take advantage of the many programs and opportunities offered them, that they tend to live together in cheap apartments in bad

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and dangerous neighborhoods, speaking only Chinese and never fully learning English, working hard but rarely emerging into wider American society. Said one disappointed administrator, "The Chinese tend to hole up together in their apartments, study like mad, and then go home, missing 90 to 95 percent of what’s in America."

Underlying the concern of some administrators with introducing visiting Chinese to American culture lies the sometimes unspoken hope that familiarity with American culture will lead to assimilation into it. For many involved in assisting Chinese students in the United States, a major goal is not merely adjustment to American mores but a certain transfer of American values as well.

The goal of "making the Chinese more like us" is not confined to academic administrators charged with assisting visiting Chinese to adjust. The goal is expressed in sheer intellectual terms as well, particularly by some social scientists whose introduction to the Chinese academic scene is relatively recent. Scientists on the one hand and social scientists on the other differ on the underlying assumptions of their disciplines and how those disciplines relate to China. The scientists quietly assumed, without the necessity of articulating the assumption in the form of an argument, that science is by nature universal, that the truths which scientists seek to discover are not national but the same everywhere, that the structure as well as the nature of science is international. Social scientists, on the other hand, more often presented the same case not as a set of assumptions but as an argument to be made—that social science ought by nature to be universal, that the truths which social scientists seek to discover ought not to be national but the same everywhere, that the structure as well as the nature of social science ought to be international. These different assumptions led to very different conclusions about who was serving whom in the exchanges. The scientists seem to feel that the Chinese are doing science and scientists everywhere a service by emerging from their isolation and joining the international intellectual community. The social scientists more often seemed to feel that we are doing the Chinese a service by showing Chinese how social science should be done and "in helping Chinese scholarship to move in the direction of modern social science and to join the international intellectual community." Scientists seem more often to be motivated by the goal of attracting graduate students capable of making future contributions to their disciplines. Social scientists seem sometimes to be motivated by goals of "service" and making the Chinese social sciences more like ours.

If the sense of mission expressed by so many Chinese-Americans and the sense of service expressed by others have something of a missionary ring, some of the real old missionary ties between American universities and Chinese institutions have in fact been revived, and so have some of the old missionary principles. To be sure, the spread of the gospel and the conversion of China are no longer, overtly at least, a part of the Christian
mission in China, and some programs that in pre-Liberation times were devoted unabashedly and unself-consciously to service focus, in their revived state, on benefit to both sides of the exchanges. But some programs, such as the Mennonite’s China Education Exchange, remain frankly service-oriented.

The Mennonites have long had close ties to China, with over 1,900 millionaires there prior to 1949. Those ties were revived in 1980 when Goshen College and the Sichuan Bureau of Higher Education agreed that Goshen would send twenty students and two faculty members each year to spend four months at Sichuan Teachers College in Chengdu. While there, the students both study Chinese and teach English, and a primary requirement for participation in the program is being “willing and eager to learn from the Chinese and to work under Chinese supervision.” The four months in China count toward the Mennonites’ two-year service requirement, and the expressed hope of this and similar Mennonite endeavors in China is to contribute “to modified perceptions and universal mutual understanding . . . build bridges and expand the ‘circle of peace.’”

Goshen students have been remarkably well received in China, are often invited into people’s homes, and are able to travel widely.

The motivation of service in American academic relations with China does not translate easily into concrete programs. Indeed, the motivation of service exists alongside financial and political constraints that mediate against universities providing anything that might be construed as “foreign aid.” Chinese-Americans involved in actually providing so many services to Chinese students are concentrated in the sciences, and their sense of mission is largely fulfilled through the education of students who are here without necessity of special programs. Academic administrators whose job it is to service foreign students in general and Chinese in particular have generally risen with admirable devotion to the greater demands Chinese visitors make on their time, assisting their charges in everything from finding apartments, to opening checking accounts and balancing checkbooks, to bargain-basement clothes shopping, to how to operate vending machines. Countless man-hours of senior faculty time have been devoted to similar endeavors. But such time is spent and efforts made largely without the institution of special programs.

Nor, at the university level at least, has the aid social scientists are wont to proffer been translated into anything like full-scale programs. Chinese social scientists, far more than scientists, are here on foundation or other philanthropic funds, and while the training of social scientists currently taking place is likely to have a major effect on China’s future social sciences, the massive coordination and programming that would be necessary for an American-inspired transformation of the Chinese social sciences has simply not transpired.

Finally, while missionary schools are more comfortable with the concept of service than others, they, too, face financial constraints in the amount
of aid they can render. Goshen College, for instance, is able only to host an occasional visiting scholar from China, so the bulk of Mennonite service is through the English instruction their students provide in China.

Thus, the service American universities are able to provide remains largely informal and personal, outside any specially constituted program and without special funding—a fact that in no way diminishes the contributions many have made to visiting students from China but simply highlights the importance in academic interchange with China of the enthusiasm, devotion, and hard work of numerous individuals.

Mutual Benefit. A third motivation for exchanges with China is what might be described as mutual benefit—a motivation, in contrast to the previous two, that can often be ensured only through the institution of special exchange programs.

Again it is in the sciences where opportunities for research of mutual benefit to both China and the United States—and the advancement of knowledge as a whole—are best developed. Highly successful cooperative projects investigating the causation, epidemiology, prevention, and treatment of cancer continue at a number of different levels, promising major scientific breakthroughs. Cooperation between earthquake scientists in China and California has also been highly successful. Earthquakes in China and California are caused by movements from the same plate. In some projects, the weight of the benefits derived has been on the American side, and the success of such projects explains why many scientists bridle at the notion of "bartering." For some, the price of bartering is potential scientific advance.

Examples of social science programs based on mutual benefit are rarer, but the Program in American Law for Chinese Scholars (PALS) at Columbia University is one.

One perhaps unintended consequence of China's recent economic opening to the West is the necessity of a contingent of Chinese lawyers well versed in the intricacies of international business law. That China have such a group of lawyers is also decidedly in the interests of American lawyers whose task it is to sit at the same table with Chinese and iron out the details of agreements between Chinese agencies and American businesses. With a contingent of Chinese lawyers well versed in international business law, American and Chinese lawyers would have, to quote an administrator of the PALS program, "a common framework for discussing legal issues. They could sit at the same table getting more work done more quickly."

Thus, a number of New York law firms are now paying full expenses for one or more Chinese to spend a year in New York, the first four months of which are spent in course work at Columbia Law School, the remaining eight of which are spent receiving practical training at the host firm. The "students" hosted by the American law firms are already engaged in law-related work in Chinese ministries and trade organizations. They are
among the people who already share the table with American lawyers at business negotiations. Just as it is in the interest of the Chinese to receive such training, so is it in the long-term interests of American law firms doing business with China to provide it.

Indeed, it may well be argued that the primary beneficiaries of the PALS program are the Chinese first and American law firms second, with scant benefit accruing to Columbia. But if the goal of training bright and capable students expressed by so many scientists holds true for law school faculty as well, the opportunity to train the Chinese lawyers who will serve as primary negotiators with some of this country’s most prestigious law firms must be ample benefit indeed.

Academic Self-Interest. A fourth motivation for exchanges with China, and one that has led to the institution of reciprocal programs, is what might be called academic self-interest—a motivation that is reflected in many of the university-to-university agreements between Chinese and American institutions of higher learning. While the Chinese have often pursued these exchanges no less enthusiastically than the Americans, on the American side such agreements are often the result of a desire for concrete expressions of good will and a belief that without institution-to-institution agreements guaranteeing placement of American students and scholars in particular Chinese universities, the flow of traffic would be entirely one way, with thousands of Chinese coming to the United States and no Americans going to China. Often the guiding lights behind such university-to-university agreements are American scholars of China, anxious to ensure that they, their colleagues, and their students have certain access to Chinese research facilities. Read one letter from a China specialist to his dean, suggesting the institution of a bilateral, university-to-university exchange: “Without a bilateral agreement, we gain little by offering the Chinese our facilities. . . . With a bilateral agreement, we will be able to use the Chinese desire to study [here] as leverage to place our own students in Chinese university settings.”

Despite the fanfare that has often accompanied the announcement of these institution-to-institution agreements, not all of them have been equally successful, for a number of reasons. First, beyond vague statements to the effect of strengthening exchange and cooperation in teaching and scientific research between the respective universities, the purpose of such exchanges often seems to be reciprocity for reciprocity’s sake, without the obvious goal-oriented mutual benefit that other programs exemplify. Often, the Chinese university is interested in sending scientists to the United States while the American university is interested in sending social scientists or humanists to China. Were the Chinese university to have difficulty accepting the social scientist or humanist, few scientists in American universities would be willing to refuse a Chinese scientist in order to force Chinese acceptance of the social scientist or humanist. However
sympathetic American scientists and humanists, their greater commitment seems to be to the larger international scientific collectivity than to the specifically American intellectual community.

Second, far fewer American students and scholars have wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to study or conduct research in China than Chinese want to come to the United States. Many of those wanting to go to China have been accommodated by programs outside official university-to-university exchanges. The demand for reciprocal programs on the American side is thus relatively weak. Finally, the financial arrangements underlying such exchanges are often such that the exchange must be reciprocal: Without an American at the Chinese institution, no Chinese can come to the American institution. Many exchange programs, then, are relatively dormant, waiting for a revival of interest in order to be implemented.

Profit. A final motivation for the exchanges is economic. At one level, and for some universities, the admission of government-sponsored Chinese students to American universities can be seen as a means of both expanding the pool from which potential graduate students are drawn and of enhancing the university’s financial stability. To what extent some universities may have used the Chinese government sponsorship of its students to further their own financial stability is a question to which there are now no clear answers. But it is a question that deserves exploring.

At another level, a few programs, such as that of Hofstra University, seem motivated quite frankly by economic profit. In December 1984, Hofstra announced that it was “forming a corporation, headed by its top academic dean, to seek companies that want to market products or enter joint ventures in China.” Under terms of the agreement and using some of its own faculty members as paid consultants to the Hofstra-owned corporation, Hofstra will try to match China's technology needs with small and medium-sized American companies willing to sell China the types of technology that country is seeking. While Hofstra’s president has argued that this business agreement facilitates the academic goal of making direct contact with intellectual circles in China, the new corporation is also expected to net the university several million dollars. How successful the university corporation will in fact be remains to be seen. But the very establishment of such a corporation by a university represents a major departure from university norms.

Continuing Problems

Merely to raise the question of problems with the new exchanges is perhaps to exaggerate those problems. The dominant perception of students and scholars from China and of the new exchange relationship as a whole is positive. Yet problems do exist.
While the American goal of attracting and training top-quality students from China and China's current enthusiasm for sending students abroad seem at first to be consistent, there are important differences in purpose as well. A number of Chinese-American faculty currently involved in training students from the mainland spoke optimistically of the possibility of their disciplines in China attaining top international standards by the turn of the century. Many of them believe they have a role to play in helping China achieve that goal. But their ultimate goal was still less to train top-notch scholars for China than to train top-notch scholars for their disciplines. "If you mean is my sense of mission about training the next generation of Chinese scientists training them for China, no," responded one. "In the long run, the U.S. will benefit too, because some Chinese scholars will stay here. If they go back, they'll become the future scientific leaders of China. But either way, whether they stay here or go back, the world will benefit."

The Chinese goal in sending students abroad, at least as it is articulated publicly and at the highest levels, is more instrumental: Those trained abroad are expected to contribute in substantial ways to the modernization of China. Figures recently published by the Chinese, however, indicate that 70 percent of the 14,000 Chinese (both students and scholars) trained abroad in the past six years who have now returned home are "not being fully used because of a shortage of advanced facilities and unsuitable work assignments." The fact that the majority of returned Chinese scholars is not being fully utilized does not necessarily mean that they are not contributing to China's modernization. Equally as likely is the possibility that positions that would fully utilize their new skills are available only in more technologically advanced societies, that they have been trained beyond China's capacity to absorb them. A recent report on returned Chinese scientists, for instance, quotes a molecular biologist saying that he spends half his time "doing things that could be done by someone with a junior high school education." If this underutilization continues, however, China may have reason to reassess its policy of sending so many students and scholars abroad. On the one hand, the frustrations of those who return only to find themselves underutilized could propel a sort of creative tension and become a positive force for change. On the other, more and more Chinese who know their skills cannot be utilized in China may attempt not to return. And if those who do return and attempt to become a positive force for change are thwarted in their attempts by an entrenched and unsympathetic bureaucracy, the likely outcome for Chinese scholars and scholarship is not good.

At present, then, there is an imbalance, the implications of which are not yet fully manifest, between the nature of education the United States provides and the capacity of China to absorb American-educated scholars. It is highly unlikely that the American educational system will adapt in major ways to the particular needs of the Chinese. Not only do American universities want to remain at the cutting edge of research, but the funding
they receive, which in turn funds Chinese students, requires it. It is in China that the effects of this imbalance are likely to be played out, and Hu Yaobang himself has recently warned that "our modernization program will be hopeless if we fail to use such able people appropriately."^34

A second obvious inconsistency in American and Chinese goals is the question of whom to educate. Reference here has repeatedly been made to the American goal of training Chinese students, and those students have often been described as young and bright. In fact, a third of the some 12,000 Chinese currently studying and doing research in the United States are not students but visiting scholars. Visiting scholars have been received in the United States with considerably less enthusiasm than students.

Selection of visiting scholars is usually, of necessity, less rigorous than the selection of students, and visiting Chinese scholars are generally older than students. Many American faculty and administrators believe that visiting scholars have greater difficulties adjusting, both academically and in terms of daily life, than students. Many cite age as a major reason for the greater difficulties of adjustment among the scholars. Some visiting scholars are never able to solve even such basic problems of adjustment as food let alone to function comfortably in American academics and society. This has meant, generally speaking, that visiting scholars require greater assistance while here and, hence, have been more of a burden. Moreover, because of their age and problems of status, that burden often falls on their American counterparts—busy faculty members with neither the time, the inclination, nor the money to serve as constant escorts. Said one senior Chinese-American professor who had assumed this burden too often, "Visiting scholars are a pain in the neck. I am sick and tired of being an escort. . . . No more."

Academically, whatever their political stance during the Cultural Revolution (and their ranks include both persecutors and victims), most visiting scholars lost ten years of academic research. In some fields it may be possible, if not to make up that lost time, at least successfully to compensate. In many of the sciences, however, it is apparently nearly impossible ever to make up what was lost. As one mathematician pointed out, "As for older people now into their forties, they went through the terrible period. They are behind because they missed that long active period. Only the very most talented could ever make it up."

Thus, the enthusiasm with which students from China are welcomed is often not extended to visiting scholars as well. As one scientist pointed out, in order to convince a faculty member to support visiting scholars from China, ones to work together with him in his lab, faculty have to be persuaded that they will get more work for less money than with an American—a phenomenon that has led some Chinese to regard their work here as exploitation. Responded one Chinese-American scientist who has Chinese students working for him in his lab:
In order to convince a professor to support a visiting Chinese scholar in the sciences, you have to make it so he doesn’t cost as much as an American post-doc, and for that lower cost, he has to get 150 percent of the work. You could say it’s exploitation, but you could also say that the American post-doc has more experience, more exposure to the world of science. It’s a fair statement that visiting scholars from China are not yet up to par. So it’s reasonable. If they were being paid starvation wages, then that would be exploitation.

There is a final reason that visiting scholars are viewed with somewhat less enthusiasm, and that is a certain suspicion about their motives—although these suspicions are expressed more frequently with respect to scholars in the social sciences and humanities than in the sciences. Some people contend that some significant portion of visiting scholars are here not to study and do research but for the purpose of “gold-plating” (du jin)—a phenomenon not unlike the gold-plating of an earlier period in Sino-U.S. academic relations, which Qian Zhongshu satirizes in his Fortress Besieged. Promotions in many universities and research institutions in China are now contingent upon having spent a certain period, sometimes no longer than three months, of “study” abroad, and some visiting scholars are suspected of coming here merely to serve their time in order to be “gold-plated” upon return. Similarly, the Chinese government has offered visiting scholars (and students) a deal whereby for $1,500 in American currency, the so-called ba da jian, or “eight great items” (a color television set, a stereo, refrigerator, typewriter, washing machine and dryer, a camera, and either a bicycle or a sewing machine), will be waiting for them, duty-free, upon their return to China. There is a suspicion that some people are here for the less than scholarly purpose of saving for the “eight (now sometimes even the twelve) great items.”

Officially, China encourages visiting scholars to go abroad “to sharpen their skills or learn the latest techniques,” and surely that is what the vast majority of them do. But the primary attraction of visiting scholars in the sciences here is often their cheap labor, a view that is sometimes expressed far more cynically than the scientist quoted above, who argued that this cheap labor is not exploitation. Visiting scholars then are more often tolerated than they are welcomed, and, indeed, there has been a dramatic move in the composition of Chinese at American universities away from visiting scholars in favor of students. This shift, however, leaves China with potential conflict when the fully trained younger students return home only to be outranked by and subordinate to the gold-plated middle-aged scholars. The current problem of utilizing the skills of those trained abroad can only be heightened.

Finally, there is an obvious difference in American and Chinese goals with respect to the question of “making the Chinese more like us,” or what might more properly be called the question of assimilation. Although many administrators involved with Chinese students and scholars noted that over time Chinese are becoming increasingly receptive to opportunities for expo-
sure to American culture—participating in organized visits to museums, films, and historic sights—there was also universal agreement, based in many cases on impressions garnered through long-term contact with the Chinese embassy, that "the Chinese government doesn’t want too much assimilation." The campaign against spiritual pollution in the fall of 1983 only strengthened that view. "During the spiritual pollution campaign," related one administrator whose office had a continual stream of Chinese visitors while the interview was taking place, "the Chinese disappeared."

Faculty and administrators who have been around long enough to remember the Chinese who were on their campuses in the 1940s (and even the 1930s) see major differences in the degree of integration then and now. The level of English language skills, they report, is lower now, and Chinese visiting scholars in particular tend to stick together, keeping largely to themselves.

Indeed, in areas where there is a concentration of Chinese, there is remarkable organization by the Chinese government, with a leader, invariably a member of the party, selected by the embassy in Washington, regular meetings, and periodic visits by Chinese government officials. To be sure, as the Chinese themselves form self-help networks, the burden on already overworked faculty and administrators is commensurately relieved, and such networking no doubt serves also to render the effects of culture shock and its consequent homesickness less jarring. But the persistence of organization into groups, even so far away from home, also serves to mediate against assimilation, and Chinese who themselves want more opportunities for immersion in American culture do not speak charitably of their government’s propensity to organize.

Government policy is not the only factor mediating against assimilation. English language skills are certainly a major, perhaps the major, mediating factor. Many Chinese simply do not speak English well enough to meld comfortably into American society. Financial considerations are a factor as well. The Chinese government provides the scholars it supports with a living stipend of just over $5,000 a year, a sum which is below that which many universities would allow and one which troubles many academic administrators. Even at $5,000 a year, Chinese visiting scholars would be forced to live in especially humble circumstances. But for those who are also trying to save for the "eight or twelve great items" (or for a personal computer), the amount of money available is considerably less—not only prohibiting enjoyment of even the most simple extracurricular pursuits but reducing their acquaintance with American culture to the travails of large numbers of Chinese sharing run-down apartments in seedy and often dangerous neighborhoods.

Students and visiting scholars with support from American institutions are usually better off, but sometimes only marginally so. The policies on kickbacks to the Chinese government of money received from American institutions has evolved over time as both Chinese and Americans have
registered complaint. No longer, apparently, are Chinese required to return
to their government all, or even a percentage, of what they receive above
$5,000. The current policy requires students and scholars to remit to their
own work unit in American dollars the equivalent of their Chinese salaries
for the period they were in the United States. Rarely, then, do the finan-
cial circumstances of visiting Chinese allow them to live at a standard their
own ostensible status here would warrant. Rather than become assimilated
into the mainstream of American society, many become best acquainted
with its often unpleasant and sometimes dangerous fringes.

Disturbing though the failure to integrate into American society may
be, and difficult though their circumstances in the United States may
appear to us, one Chinese-American professor argued forcefully against
integration and assimilation. Those Chinese who return to China, he said,
"tend to have been 'ghettoized' during their stay here. For those who have
been integrated into American life, some know they cannot change China,
so they stay here. Others go back and experience great frustration. In some
ways, the less integration, the better."

His statement highlights the fundamental contradiction between the
goals of those in the United States who are most deeply involved in educat-
ing and servicing the Chinese and the realities of that education for the
Chinese who receive it. Our primary goal, most forcefully expressed by
scientists, is to offer the most talented Chinese the best education we can—
to train them fully at the cutting edge. Many people, particularly adminis-
trators involved in servicing the Chinese, but many faculty as well, hope,
moreover, that while they are here the Chinese will absorb our values, that
they will become more like us. And after they have been fully trained and
become more like us, many American academics expect them to return to
China where, it is assumed, they will become, as so many emphasized, the
leaders of China's next generation of scientific and technological elite and a
positive force for positive change. "Just the viewpoint they learn here helps
China modernize," said one faculty member with a number of Chinese
students. "Their viewpoint about Western life, about how research is
conducted—all this creates pressure on the government to change."

It is the assumption that returned Chinese students and scholars can
become a positive force for positive change that underlies much of the free-
floating enthusiasm with which so many are participating in their education
here. But it is this assumption above all that remains unexamined. It is in
the implications of our decision to participate in the education of China's
intellectual elite that there is an "absence of decision." What does it mean
that 70 percent of Chinese who have studied abroad are not being "fully
used"? How can a fully trained Chinese scholar who has absorbed even a
modicum of American values play in China a positive force for change?
What happens to those we have trained upon their return? Should Ameri-
can educators be concerned about what happens to Chinese upon their
return?
The dilemma of the returned Chinese student may well be the universal dilemma of the modernizing man, who must always, in necessary and fundamental ways, be marginal to the society he seeks to change. Lucian Pye, nearly twenty years ago, pointed to the difficulties of modernizing China while those in power were not modern men. Those difficulties are only marginally less severe today. Of some 40 million members of the Chinese Communist party, only 4 percent have a college education. Only 17.8 percent have a senior middle school education or above. To be sure, Deng Xiaoping and those closest to him are currently urging a policy of modernization by modern men. But the daily living and working lives of returned Chinese scholars—their "microrealities" in China—are controlled less by Deng Xiaoping and his close associates than by entrenched representatives of the 40 million who are not, by and large, modern men. That the contradiction between the modern, Western-educated, intellectual elite and the entrenched bureaucratic powers will lead inevitably to conflict is clear. What form that conflict may take is less easy to predict.

There are, perhaps, lessons we can learn from the past, for this is not the first time that we, and other Westerners, have sought to offer China our expertise. As Jonathan Spence so convincingly argues, the Chinese have invariably absorbed our techniques while discarding the ideological packages in which we have wrapped them. We have assumed that our ideological package and its contents cannot be separated, and the Chinese, forcefully, have argued that they can. We have tried but never converted China to our religion, our democracy, our humanism, our way of life.

It is now becoming clear, not from China itself but from other Chinese societies that are engaged in a successful process of modernization, that modernization involves neither a complete discarding of traditional values nor a wholesale adoption of those of the West. Rather, modernization has involved casting aside some of the old values and preserving others, adopting some Western values and discarding others. Surely, if China's own modernization is to succeed, such a synthesis, different still even from that of other Chinese societies, is necessary. The returned students and scholars who have been educated in the United States will inevitably be deeply involved in the unfolding of that synthesis. But if the past is any predictor of the future, they will be involved certainly in different ways from what we might expect and possibly in ways different from what we might want. For in participating in the education of the next generation of China's intellectual elite, we are participating in the initiation of a series of events that the Chinese hope will result in the modernization of their country but over which we ultimately have very little control. It was their inability to determine the outcome of events that they had been instrumental in setting in motion that most disappointed earlier generations of Westerners who had proffered their help to China. Our similar inability to determine the outcome is a certainty to which we would do well to adjust.
Notes

5. In 1983–84, for instance, there were nearly 22,000 students from Taiwan and more than 9,000 from Hong Kong here. See Institute of International Education, news release, September 5, 1984.
6. Ralph Clough lists a number of “objectives” of the academic exchange program as seen by the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the CSCPRC, but it is unclear whether these objectives can actually be termed “policy.” See Ralph N. Clough, A Review of the U.S.-China Exchange Programs (Washington, D.C.: International Communication Agency, 1981), pp. 6–7.
10. Ibid., pp. 34–37.
18. Jerry Falwell’s Liberty Baptist College, e.g., has a Chinese studying there.
19. As old ties are in fact reestablished, ironies abound. The same Shanxi official who was responsible in the early 1950s for dismantling Oberlin’s middle school was the one to push for a rekindling of the ties in the late 1970s.
21. There are significant exceptions to this argument. Inge Morath and Arthur Miller’s Chinese Encounters (New York: Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1979), e.g., is exceptionally perceptive and insightful.

23. We are grateful to John Hawkins for making this argument.


28. Ibid.


30. Ibid. Georgia Institute of Technology has instituted a similar arrangement, the potential profitability of which is not immediately clear. See *New York Times*, September 23, 1984.

31. Members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, however, recently warned the government "against any tendency of stressing economic development to the detriment of educational development." See *China Daily*, January 14, 1985.


34. Ibid.

35. The duty would ordinarily be 300 to 400 percent.


37. The stipend, tied to cost-of-living differences in various parts of the United States, differs from area to area. In Boston, it is $450 a month, and in many parts of the south it is $410 a month.

38. During a recent visit by educational officials from China to various universities in the United States, students and scholars were assured that such requirements had been dropped. However, some people, since that meeting, have received reminders from their work units that they owe the equivalent of their Chinese salary in American currency. Whether this is a case of a delay of central policy reaching the provinces or whether the earlier policy is still intact remains to be seen. It should be noted that the salary of a scholar visiting the United States continues in his absence to be paid his family.


U.S. Educational and Cultural Exchanges with India: An Asymmetrical Relationship

Ainslie T. Embree

The history of educational and cultural exchanges between India and the United States is a decidedly asymmetrical one. The pattern is so uneven in terms of impact, numbers, cost, and, above all, the purposes and intentions of the two countries that at times the rubric of "exchanges" seems more a euphemism to conceal differences than a useful descriptive title for an exchange program. The phrase "exchange program" implies mutuality, a functional mechanism whereby, in this case, an Indian scholar comes to the United States for the same purpose that an American goes to India, under arrangements that are similar for both sides. That this is not so is one of the most important features of Indo-U.S. cultural exchanges. While there are, of course, many other significant aspects of cultural exchange programs, this asymmetry has often been neglected when examining bi-national interaction, but in fact it impinges upon the programs at every point.

In any impressionistic survey of the cultural exchange programs between India and the United States, one is faced at once with the problem of selection; there have been so many programs that to mention all of them would be numbing. It will be more useful to note some broad categories of exchanges, with examples of prominent programs for each and with an emphasis on educational more than on cultural programs. (Much of the laborious work of identifying such programs has been done in a masterly fashion by C. S. Radhakrishnan [1983], who was for many years in charge of the U.S. Educational Foundation in India.)

Before turning to these categories, however, let me mention a few general points that are relevant to all varieties of Indo-U.S. exchanges. With one important exception, such exchanges were initiated after World War II. The exception is the existence in India since the mid-nineteenth century of educational institutions that were founded and supported by American churches. Some of these Christian colleges had considerable prestige, especially in the introduction of that peculiarly American institution, the women's college, but their influence was not comparable to American institutions in China. The Indian colleges were tied to the university system—modeled on the University of London—which was created in India during the late nineteenth century; thus, there was little scope for innovation or for introduction of specifically American patterns of education. Nor did the American church colleges encourage their graduates in large
numbers through scholarships to study in the United States. Instead, the prestige of English universities, especially the glamour of Oxford and Cambridge, attracted the overwhelming number of Indians who studied abroad before World War II. However, toward the end of the war, the government of India, recognizing the need for training Indians for the new era of independence, sent many young people to the United States for study and research, and some American teachers’ colleges enrolled a fairly large number of Indian students during the 1940s. The educational theories of John Dewey were attractive to many, and the many Ph.D.'s from Columbia Teachers' College bear witness to the hope of using Dewey’s ideas to transform Indian education.

The extraordinary growth of the system of higher education in India since independence is of central importance in looking at educational and cultural exchanges. One of the most pervasive stereotypes of India is that it is a country of overwhelming illiteracy and that the need for education, especially at higher levels, is an urgent priority. The fact is, however, that India has an immense number of college graduates, and far from there being an unsatisfied demand for the college-educated, there is a very serious problem resulting from the large numbers of unemployed college graduates. In 1947 there were nineteen universities in India with an enrollment of about 200,000 students and about 15,000 faculty members. At the present time, there are about 130 universities, with 3 million students and 200,000 faculty members, and 6,000 Ph.D.'s are awarded every year. No one would pretend that these 130 universities, with their thousands of small affiliated colleges, are centers of excellence, but even the poorest offer doctorates in many subjects, and at the best universities and institutes the standards are high. There are in fact few fields in which it is not possible to obtain training within India.

Nonetheless, while it is no longer necessary for Indians to go abroad to receive higher degrees, the desire to study abroad, especially in the United States, continues to grow. It is this persistent demand for American degrees and for an opportunity to study at American universities that is reflected in one of the most obvious of the asymmetries in Indo-U.S. educational exchange. There are probably about 12,000 Indians studying in the United States, mostly at the graduate level, but the number of Americans working for degrees in Indian universities is so small that there appears to be no official count. My guess is that there are now fewer than twenty, not counting those who have, in the official phrase, the marvelously evocative status of "casual students." This difference between the number of Americans and Indians enrolled in each other’s institutions seems to have an obvious explanation, one that I have heard given by Americans in India without any sense of how it sounds to Indians: Indians take degrees from American colleges because of their high quality, while it would be of no advantage to an American to take a degree from an Indian college. This may seem like an insignificant matter, but it is in fact an irritant to many
Indians who are proud of their intellectual achievements and see the lack of interest by Americans in obtaining Indian academic training (as distinct from doing research there) as one more sign of an arrogant assumption of superiority. Indian society is treated, they argue, as a laboratory for social science field work, while its universities are ignored. This is a note that runs through all discussion of American exchange programs.

The very number and variety of Indo-U.S. exchange programs makes it difficult to categorize them, but almost without exception they have been funded from U.S. sources, the major exception being those initiated in the last eight or nine years by the Indo-American subcommission. From the U.S. side, funds have come from private sources, mainly from foundations, and various government agencies. From the Indian side, when there has been some reciprocity, the sources have been almost wholly governmental.

A careful analysis of the activities of the foundations in India during the postwar years has not, as far as I know, been made in terms of mutual impact on the two societies. The general outlines are, of course, well known of the work of the most important of the foundations that have operated in India—the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford foundations. Asymmetry is the major characteristic of such programs since not only are the funds American but the direction and nature of the programs are derived from American initiatives. It is true that the foundations responded to Indian requests and that the programs were always approved by the Indian government, but one suspects that a close study would show how often pressures were applied and inducements offered to lead to the requests.

In the 1950s and 1960s the Rockefeller Foundation was particularly active in the support of agricultural programs in India, with emphasis on agricultural education, but it also gave support to university libraries and to a whole range of academic studies. Many Indian scholars came to the United States under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation, and a truly notable contribution to scholarship was made when the foundation sponsored the writer V. P. Menon, who had been constitutional adviser to the governor-general. Two of the most important books on the events surrounding partition by Menon, *The Transfer of Power* and *The Integration of the Indian States*, are unique monuments to Indo-U.S. cultural collaboration and exchange.

While one might have supposed that all such foundation activities would have been highly regarded in India, in fact they were not, and by the end of the 1960s they were beginning to be characterized in certain sections of the Indian press as glaring evidence of American cultural imperialism, the intention of which was the subversion of Indian culture. This charge was heard frequently in India, and we will return to it when looking at other aspects of cultural exchange. Such criticism may have influenced the decision of the Rockefeller Foundation to leave India; it certainly made its work less effective. For those watching from the sidelines, the whole episode had the marks of the classic paradigm of American involvement in
programs of cultural and social change. To help build up a university library would seem to be an impeccable form of assistance, but books are, after all, potent ideological weapons in the battle for men’s minds, and library programs aided by U.S. sources were often characterized as propaganda efforts. That these old charges are not forgotten was made clear in an article by an Indian academic in a Delhi paper, which speaks of how the Rockefeller field representative attempted his work of subversion by supporting music, philosophy, and linguistics, all at the behest of the CIA, his real masters. In the words of the writer, this man “ultimately disappeared,” but who, he asks, can forget “the infamous Asia Foundation, a CIA outfit,” which financed other institutions in India? He then proceeds to name some of them, for example, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, organized by Rajni Kothari, one of India’s most highly regarded political scientists; and the Gandhian Institute of Social Sciences, founded by Jaya Prakash Narayan, one of the great figures of the nationalist movement. The author concludes that while the foundation is gone, “the academics who fattened themselves on its money are still busy displaying their loyalty” (Mishra, 1984).

From the asymmetry of funding and control, we move to a more complex issue, one that remains central to all U.S. cultural exchanges with India, that is, the relationship between the motivation that guided American actions and their perception by Indians. In the late nineteenth century the problem was solved by America’s predecessors in good works in India, the British, with the phrase, “Not what they want, but what is good for them.” While that justification may be embedded in the American psyche, it will not do in a situation that emphasizes the mutuality of exchanges.

The Ford Foundation was the most important instrument of exchanges in the private sector in the decades after independence, but the bulk of its funding went to institution-building and to such immense programs as family planning. In these areas there was a transfer of ideas and values on a quite unprecedented scale, and any attempt to assess their impact on Indian society will be a fascinating and complex task—to be carried out by Indian social scientists at some future time. In addition to such programs, there was also large-scale funding of exchanges of academic personnel. Much of this appears to have been done on an ad hoc basis, that is, individual decisions were often made in India to send students abroad for graduate and postdoctoral work in the United States without institutionalized arrangements for selection. This was in rather sharp contrast to the programs that Ford financed to send American scholars to India, such as the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, which was very carefully organized and integrated into the American academic community. There were probably sound administrative or logistical reasons for this asymmetry, but it tended to perpetuate the image of a wealthy American organization operating independently of its Indian context. Perhaps this mode of operation was superior to any viable alternative in terms of results, but the fact
remains that a program of such great value to Indian academic life was not very closely integrated with it.

Part of the problem, of course, is that private American organizations operate in India in ways that inevitably recall the age of imperialism. One of the legacies of imperialism has been the possibility for foreign institutions’ establishing themselves in former dependencies in a way that would not be possible in countries with long traditions of self-rule. In the case of India and the United States, this was partly a function of the great resources of the United States, but beyond that was a sense that the United States had inherited the legacy of Great Britain and that it was its task to complete what had been done badly or that had been left unfinished. This was particularly relevant in the field of education, for American pedagogy and curricula seemed obviously superior to the apparent sterility of Indian education. It is fair to say that many Americans who went to India on educational exchange programs saw themselves as reformers, who expected their advice and guidance to be accepted with gratitude. There was, of course, much rhetoric about what would be gained through mutual understanding, but the sense of mission—that the United States should do something for the Indians—was part of the intellectual baggage.

However, to emphasize the American side of the equation in relation to this issue of seeing education in terms of programs of social change would be to overlook the importance of the Indian understanding of the function of education. In the nineteenth century, when the present system of higher education in India was founded, the government of India was clear in the articulation of its function: Education was intended for the moral and material improvement of the people of India. What this meant in terms of actual curricula and institutional structures varied in details, but basically it was perceived as related to the improvement of society. When the goals of higher education were reformulated after independence, there was, of course, a different climate of opinion, but the stated goals still appeared to be an understanding of the function of education in terms of social improvement. It was, for example, defined in these terms in the wide-ranging study of education known as the Kothari Report (Education Commission, 1966). The purpose of the Indian educational system, according to this report, was “to make it a powerful instrument of social, economic, and cultural transformation necessary for the realization of the national goals. For this purpose, education should be developed so as to increase productivity, achieve social and national integration, accelerate the process of modernization, and cultivate social, moral, and spiritual values.”

No one would pretend that this high-minded aim is congruent with reality, but it is of the utmost importance to the actual working of Indo-U.S. exchanges to recognize that it is on the basis of some such formula that Indian policymakers make judgments of the value of exchange programs. The key words in this definition are “national integration.” On one level, this gives great latitude for evaluating which programs are regarded as
useful, but on another it means many programs can be rejected as either not serving the process of national integration or as being positively harmful. As we shall see later, defining social utility in terms of the “social, economic, and cultural transformation” required for national integration is the basis on which visas for individual scholars are often refused.

When we turn to the second great category of exchange programs, those that were funded in whole or in part through U.S. government sources, a crucial factor in explaining both the size and the great number of academic programs between the United States and India is the existence of what used to be known as PL-480 rupees. These were enormous sums that accrued to the U.S. government account in India as a result of the law that made it possible for American grain to be purchased in Indian rupees. These rupees were not transferrable into American funds but had to be spent in India. Expenditures from these funds, as a result of long negotiations between the two governments, will cease in a few years, but it is important to stress that the great number of cultural and educational programs sponsored by American institutions in India during the last three decades have been overwhelmingly the product of the PL-480 blocked currency in India.

Among the great beneficiaries of the funds were about twenty American university libraries, along with the Library of Congress, which during the last two decades have had the opportunity to receive virtually every book printed in India in any of its numerous languages. In the history of cultural relations there can have been few such organized flows of printed material from one country to another. While librarians faced with the avalanche of material from India have been known to grumble that they have no conceivable need for pamphlets on bee-keeping in twenty Indian languages, nonetheless American libraries have been provided a unique resource. Here is another asymmetry, and one often noted with regret by Indians: There is nothing comparable by way of sending American books to India. In fact, there is no library in India where Indian books are so readily accessible as they are in these American university libraries.

Among American government agencies, the one that has the greatest involvement in cultural and educational exchanges with India is the United States Information Agency (USIA), which through various transformations inherited the activities of the cultural affairs branch of the State Department. Largely because of the availability of PL-480 monies—not because of a high priority given to India in American foreign relations—India had by far the largest number of exchanges of any non-European country, with the exception of Japan. About 4,000 Indian nationals came to the United States under various forms of U.S. academic grants, and 5,500 Americans went to India in the period from the signing of the first educational agreement under the Fulbright Act in 1950 up to 1984. Aside from academics, the USIA has a rather modest program of visits by artists of various kinds, with occasional splurges, such as the visit of the New York Philharmonic in 1984.
The largest number of two-way academic exchanges sponsored by the American government with India has taken place through the binational commission established in 1950. Known as the U.S. Educational Foundation in India, its funds come wholly from the American side for both Indian and American scholars. This is quite different from the pattern of exchanges with many European countries or Japan, where a significant part of the funding comes from the foreign governments. Some of the implications of this in terms of asymmetrical relations are suggested by a quick comparison of U.S. exchanges with Japan and India in 1981–82, a year for which figures are readily available (Board of Foreign Scholarships, 1982). In that year, under various programs operated by the U.S. Educational Foundation, India sent 82 persons to the United States, while 109 Americans went to India. The figures for Japan were 106 Japanese to the United States and 124 Americans to Japan. But the difference in source of funding is that nearly half of the money for the Japan-U.S. exchanges came from Japan, while all of it for the Indo-U.S. exchanges came from the United States.

Indians are inclined to point out, however, that this form of accounting is somewhat misleading because much of the U.S. contribution to the binational commission comes from PL-480 currency; therefore, they argue, the contributions do not really cost the United States anything. For their part, Americans sometimes argue that asymmetry also occurs because, while the U.S. Educational Foundation is wholly funded by the U.S. government, the Indians members have a disproportionate influence in decision-making. The Indian government will no longer grant a visa, for example, for an American director. Furthermore, the American members of the foundation are chosen largely from private American citizens who happen to be living in India or ex officio from USIA personnel; neither group necessarily has much experience with either Indian or American education, while the Indians are skilled educational bureaucrats appointed by the Ministry of Education. It should be noted that issues of this kind are seldom acknowledged in the public functioning of the exchange program but are very important in the effective establishment and implementation of policies.

Closely related to the exchange programs funded by the USIA are those supported by the U.S. Department of Education through PL-480 funds under the research and training programs, developed since 1962, of the Fulbright-Hays Act. They are also administered in India by the U.S. Educational Foundation, and they differ from what is known as the “regular” Fulbright program in that they are aimed at improving U.S. education in area studies and language training and are essentially one-way—from the United States to India. One exception is that the program provides for consultants to be brought from India to assist smaller colleges to improve their offerings on India. Group projects are a distinctive feature of the U.S. Department of Education programs as they provide for groups of students and faculty to go to India for summer seminars or for junior years abroad. Many hundreds of teachers from small colleges and high schools have gone
on these seminars to India, most of whom had no prior training in Indian studies, but the intention of the seminars was to broaden their understanding of another culture. These visits to India have sometimes been denounced by congressmen, apparently without any sense of irony, as "junkets," but many would defend them as useful and creative experiments in intercultural relations.

The Fulbright program was for many years the central mechanism for two-way academic exchanges between India and the United States, but in recent years there has been a dramatic falling off in the number of fellowships available under the Fulbright program for academic study. For some years after the program was established in 1950, about one hundred Indians a year came to the United States for study; in recent years there has been provision for only five or six fellowships for postdoctoral research and none at all for students to study for doctoral degrees. The most obvious reason for this decline in numbers is, of course, cuts in funding, but it is also related to a well-known phenomenon of exchange programs: the very high proportion of student and research scholars who do not return to India but who, in the official phrase, "adjust their visa status." The figures are not very precise, but it is estimated that nearly 80 percent stay longer than was originally intended. Not all of these remain permanently in the United States, but it has been estimated that nearly 50 percent did. This led to the familiar outcry about the "brain drain," and some years ago it was commonly said in India that U.S. exchange programs were deliberately designed to recruit the best brains of India, particularly scientists, for U.S. needs. A decline in academic jobs in this United States combined with stricter visa regulations has slowed this trend, but there is no question that the United States continues to have a tremendous attraction in terms of career opportunities for Indians. There are all sorts of complicated issues, and many people would argue that the free movement of scholars from one national entity to another is one of the beneficial results of exchange programs. The argument frequently heard from Americans that Indians should go back and help their own poor people does not come well from a nation of immigrants.

There has also been a very considerable decrease in the number of fellowships available under the Fulbright program for American scholars to go to India, although the statistics mask the actual decline by including a wide variety of short-time visitors, such as visiting speakers, under the categories of university lecturers. In the early years of the programs there were twenty to thirty Americans who went and held regular teaching positions for a year, but now there are rarely more than seven or eight, and they almost always are very much supernumeraries in the institutions where they teach. It is extremely difficult to fit an American academic into a regular classroom situation because of the nature of the curriculum and the peculiarities of the examination system, not to mention the problem of language. Aside from this, when the American lecturer program was introduced, a very important motivation for it—however unconscious it
may have been—was the attitude, already noticed as characterizing so much of the U.S. relationship with India, that it was bestowing a benefit upon Indian higher education by helping in the work of reform.

There is a very small program—one or two lecturers a year—of Indian professors teaching at American colleges, and they usually fit in easily. This asymmetry is duplicated in the case of research scholars. There are now only two or three fellowships for senior American research scholars and one or two for doctoral candidates under the Fulbright program, but, as is the case with the much larger research programs that will be noted later, these researchers function in the Indian setting quite independently from Indian academic life. Whether they are engaged in archival research or field work, they are only very loosely attached to Indian universities; American scholars have, on the whole, only very grudgingly been willing to accept the direction of Indian scholars in a university setting. The situation is, of course, entirely different for Indian research scholars who come to the United States, most of whom do library or laboratory research and are closely identified with the life of a university.

There are many other programs funded by the USIA through the U.S. Educational Foundation in India, including an extremely popular one that brings around fifty professionals to the East-West Center for periods of up to six weeks; there are also a few fellowships for doctoral work at the center. The Hubert H. Humphrey fellowship program is a relatively new one that brings young administrators, usually from government or state agencies, to the United States for a year to work in a variety of professional schools. Again it is wholly asymmetrical.

One of the most interesting and creative mechanisms established and maintained by the U.S. government for cultural exchange is the American Studies Research Center at Hyderabad. A student can do a respectable doctoral thesis there in American studies, and it attracts scholars not just from India but from all the countries of the subcontinent and Southeast Asia. The principal function of the center is to provide a basis for the popularization of American studies in colleges, and here again one sees the curious asymmetry of the Indo-U.S. relationship on the educational and cultural level. It also provides a source for much criticism of the function and purpose of American studies in India as instruments of propaganda.

The introduction of American studies of all kinds—in the form principally of literature and history—has been almost wholly financed by the U.S. government. It is fair to say that American studies have little prestige in the Indian academic world and exist rather precariously on American patronage. The exception to this is the encouragement in a few places, perhaps most notably at Delhi University, of the study of American literature.

In comparing American studies at Indian universities and Indian studies in American universities, one is struck by a number of incongruities and asymmetries. One is the much higher standard of scholarship of the work done in the United States on India. Books on India by American
political scientists, for example, are widely read in India, but there are very few Indians who are regarded as authorities in American scholarship. Another somewhat curious asymmetry is that in the United States, American scholars of India are, generally speaking, rather vocally and vociferously pro-Indian; they function, very often, as unpaid flacks for the Indian government and for Indian culture. In India, on the other hand, some of the better-known specialists on American life are vigorously anti-American, and very few could be found who would publicly support American policy if it conflicted with the policy of the Indian government. Most American specialists on India, for example, opposed the Nixon administration's famous tilt toward Pakistan; it would be hard to imagine Indian specialists on the United States publicly opposing their government's policy on American military aid to Pakistan.

As far as academic scholarship is concerned, the most important mechanism for providing American scholars with an opportunity to do research in India has undoubtedly been the American Institute of Indian Studies. It was founded in 1963, due largely to the initiative and enterprise of the late William Norman Brown, one of those great entrepreneurial scholars who did so much for the establishment of Asian studies in the United States, as a consortium of American universities with Indian studies programs. With support from a wide range of U.S. government agencies and private foundations, the institute has provided fellowships for dissertation research, postdoctoral work, and language study, and there are few in the field who do not acknowledge its assistance. Its centers in Delhi, Calcutta, Poona, and Madras have provided the basis for American scholars doing field research. The institute does not, however, have exchange programs that bring Indian scholars to the United States, although in actual practice it is probably true that the contacts established by American scholars while they are doing field work in India have been responsible for the most fruitful interaction between scholars in the two countries working on topics of mutual interest. A great many of the Indian scholars, for example, who come to the United States do so under private arrangements made with American Institute scholars in their particular fields. The institute has been responsible, moreover, for establishing an institution in India that has rendered very great service to Indian scholars and, indeed, to scholars from all over the world. This is the art and archaeology center at Varanasi, which has become the focus of some of the most interesting work being done in those fields, and it has supported a very large program of documentation of Indian art, including a vast survey of temple architecture.

Since much of this academic enterprise is now supported by grants in PL-480 rupees or, as it is now known, excess currency programs, the closing out of these funds poses difficult problems for the American Institute, as for all other cultural and exchange programs that have been dependent upon them. There is little indication that regular U.S. government appropriations or private financing will permit their continuance on the scale in
which they have operated during the past twenty-five years. And it would be quite unrealistic to suppose that the Indian government might become a major contributor to such academic exchange programs, for aside from the question of ability to pay, many of the programs noted are regarded as of minimal, if any, value to India, and many vocal elements among India’s elites regard some of them as detrimental to India’s best interests.

As one lists with a degree of satisfaction the achievements of American scholars in creating in the past thirty years, from a very minimal base, such an impressive array of academic exchanges between the United States and India, it would be pleasant to be able to record that the American initiative had always been appreciated by Indian intellectuals and the political community. That that has not been so is not surprising. Asymmetrical relationships of the kind that I have described are never, in the nature of things, very easy; and this is particularly so when the client is India, where the elites are conscious of their own abilities and the great achievements of their own culture but have an exceedingly complex relationship with the West that is caricatured rather than explained by the term “colonial.” Taking all this as a given, no matter who the patron might be in the client-patron equation, the fact that the patron is the United States has added many difficulties to the working out of academic and cultural exchanges.

The overarching factor can be identified as anti-Americanism, that staple emotion of the modern world, but the term oversimplifies and distorts actualities in the Indian situation. On the one hand, there is the undoubted and enormous attraction of American education and culture in terms of personal career goals and self-fulfillment; on the other, there is the very strong perception that American power as it expresses itself in international affairs is very often inimical to Indian national and international interests. This leads to a general questioning of American motives and actions, although not—it must always be stressed—to overt hostility to individual Americans. A very common reading of American activities is that they are meant to “destabilize” India. This was a term often used by the former prime minister, and it continues to be used by her son and successor; exactly what it meant is never made clear, but it can be used to cover many enterprises.

This reading of the Indo-American power relationship has expressed itself in a number of ways in the working out of programs of academic exchanges. On what may be called the vulgar level, American scholars are often accused in the newspapers and in the various legislative bodies of being agents of the CIA. In 1972, for example, Mrs. Gandhi made a much-publicized speech in which she said that CIA agents were coming to India in “the garb of scholars,” and she urged the people to remain on guard against such antinationalist activities (Gandhi, 1972). Although to the best of my knowledge no American scholar has ever been formally charged by the government of India with being a CIA agent, nonetheless, the accusation, however frivolously made, became part of the climate of opinion.
American scholars are insistently accused, for example, of being present in troubled areas or of writing about them, with a clear causal line being drawn between the scholar’s interest in such events as Hindu-Muslim riots and their occurrence. A writer in a well known Delhi paper recently drew attention to an incident of what he called “operation destabilization” carried out by the CIA and American scholars. One very well known political scientist had carried out a study of the relations between the indigenous people of Assam and the “outsiders” who had been coming into the troubled state. His researches, it is alleged, provided the blueprint for the agitation (Mishra, 1984).

A less strident criticism of Indo-American cultural exchange, but one that is both serious and interesting, is the one often referred to as “academic imperialism” (Saberwal, 1968). What is covered by this pejorative label is a series of issues that are common to many parts of the world but that are of peculiar concern to India. One has to do with the very openness of Indian society to the English-speaking world. This is, of course, a legacy of imperial power, but it is a feature of Indian society that is deeply cherished by Indian intellectuals, and it is fundamentally related to current democratic political practices. After 1947, the United States became the dominant external force in educational exchanges, and this impact was especially felt in the social sciences, which had not been much developed in India or were under the influence of English academic models that had been created before World War II. In political science, anthropology (or sociology, as it tends to be known in India), and economics, there was an eager response to new directions in all these fields by young Indian intellectuals. American scholars in return showed a creative interest in India, and much very important work was produced that became the basis for further teaching and research both in India and the United States. Precisely because of the prestige of American social science, thoughtful Indian scholars began in the late 1960s to raise the question of the relevance of much of this scholarship to Indian life. They suggested that there were very real dangers that the direction of the social sciences was being distorted by the methodologies and goals that, as artifacts of American society, were not only irrelevant to Indian needs, but were positively detrimental to the development of social sciences grounded in Indian society. Immediately related to this was the widespread acceptance of the argument that education should serve the process of national integration.

This sober analysis of the implication of American educational exchanges, especially at what many would regard its most creative level, that of shared research goals between the two countries, provided a responsible counterpoint to the accusations of journalists, politicians, and academics who had an ideological anti-American bias.

One cooperative venture that was at first welcomed by Indian academics, but which later came in for particular criticism as an example of American infiltration into the Indian educational process, was the Indian-American
textbook program begun in 1961 to provide American books at low cost to Indian students. The venture was largely subsidized by PL-480 rupees through the USIA, and the secretary of the Ministry of Education had a large measure of control. Over a thousand standard American college texts were published in the first ten years and sold at a quarter of their U.S. cost.

The attack on the project in the early 1970s was many-sided (Roy, 1973). It was said that Indian publishers who were not involved in the reprinting were being deprived of their market, while Indian scholars, who might have written books themselves, could not compete with American writers. Above all, it was argued that the books presented an American analysis of historical development and social processes. As critics of the textbook scheme put it, such key concepts for India as colonialism, revolution, change, power relations, and exploitation were either glossed over or ignored. The situation was compared to preindependence days, when all the textbooks were written from a British point of view. What was needed, it was not unreasonably argued, were textbooks that focused on Indian society, were oriented to Indian history, and looked for Indian solutions to problems. Here again an issue was being raised that I think must be taken seriously, as it has not been in our educational exchanges with India: Should American institutions try to relate themselves to the ongoing and dynamic process of change? Are we overstepping the bounds of scholarly intercourse and placing ourselves in an "imperial" mode? Rereading these criticisms, which I thought in the 1970s were the product of a misguided ideology, I am not sure that the critics were not correct. The textbook program gradually disappeared for all practical purposes in the late 1970s, but the whole episode would be worth a serious study in terms of motivations, perceptions, and effects.

While the more strident criticism of educational exchanges came from the political left, the academic interests of some American scholars attracted the attention of the right wing, especially when it seemed to imply criticism of Indian social customs. A somewhat amusing example was the outcry in the Uttar Pradesh legislature in 1979 against an American anthropologist who was alleged to have defamed Indian womanhood. The accusation was based on field research he had published ten years before on the well-known practice of polyandry among certain groups in the Himalayan region. And it is also fair to note that some scholars did exercise what a foundation official was fond of calling "their god-given right to make fools of themselves" by culturally and politically offensive practices, such as taking pictures of burning ghats or roaming about in sensitive military areas.

There were two main results of this questioning of the nature and functioning of educational exchanges. One had to do with more stringent restrictions on the granting of visas by the Indian government for academic research; the other was the creation of a new mechanism that would emphasize the mutuality of exchanges — the Indo-American subcommission on education and culture.
The visa issue as it developed after 1970 is not well known to the general academic community, but it became a central issue after 1970 for American scholars wishing to do serious academic research in India, especially in the social sciences. A number of broad areas were regarded as out of bounds, and while these were never really officially defined, it was recognized that visas would not be granted for study in certain geographic areas, such as border areas, or for investigation of such topics as tribal customs, communal or ethnic rivalries, or caste. On the whole, American scholars acknowledged the legitimacy of such restrictions, but persistent questions have been posed about their actual application. One charge is that the visa approval system is capricious and arbitrary, as well as frustrating in its slowness. Caliban seems to be at work, with one applicant getting a visa while someone with a very similar project is refused. The result has been, it is alleged, that many young scholars, especially in the social sciences, have abandoned the Indian field for areas where their research and their careers will not be threatened. That there has been a distinct falling off in both the quantity and quality of applicants for fellowships for study in India seems to be accepted by most people familiar with the situation, but that this is due to the Indian visa system is not at all clear. Current trends in American social science away from area studies may be an even more important factor.

But beyond the technicalities of the visa-granting system, a debate had developed among scholars in the Indian field over the challenge that the presuppositions behind the system offer to free academic exchange between the two countries. Put in the simplest terms, some scholars deeply involved in programs of academic exchange with India are convinced that social scientists engaged in research on contemporary India have difficulty in getting visas because the Indian government does not want research that is controversial, or that appears to evaluate the performance of officials at any level, or that will criticize government policies toward disadvantaged groups, such as untouchables or minorities. The counterargument made by other equally involved scholars is that India has a right as a sovereign power to set its own standards and that American scholars have no claim to demand easy access for research. The first group's reply is that India must be judged by the standards of other democratic countries and that in exchange programs with the United States it should observe the same degree of openness as the United States does toward free inquiry. If India has special reasons for not permitting research in some particular area, this should be frankly stated. What is involved, they argue, is a lack of mutual- ity, resulting in an asymmetry that defeats the end of scholarly inquiry.

It was to meet the criticisms and problems of the exchange programs that the new structure known as the Indo-American subcommission on education and culture was formed in 1973. Part of a larger binational agreement dealing with a range of concerns between the two countries, the subcommission clearly reflected the prevailing conviction in Indian official
circles that what was needed was more mutuality in exchanges and, in effect, more Indian control of content and direction.

From the Indian side, the membership of the commission and its financing were wholly in the control of the government; this reflected a fundamental position of the Indian officials that all exchanges should be government to government and that the greatest weakness of the existing arrangements was the large degree of private, nongovernmental control exercised by American groups, even when they received government funds. The Indians had worked out binational, government-to-government arrangements with almost all other countries, but Americans were intransigent in their commitment to academic free enterprise, not to mention academic wheeling and dealing. What the United States lacks, of course, and what most countries have, is a national ministry of education. The difference this simple structural fact makes in educational exchanges is fundamental and one that leads to endless irritation and misunderstanding. The expectation was that the subcommission would obviate some of these problems, but a balanced judgment as to whether it has accomplished this is difficult to make, as most knowledgeable observers, including this one, would probably admit to various biases.

All that can be attempted here is a very cursory glance at the three main kinds of exchanges that have been undertaken by the subcommission. One was to be a fellowship program; another was to be projects to be undertaken in both countries; and the third was to be cultural exchange. Unlike any of the other existing programs, both sides were to share in the funding and in the direction. In other words, it was a try at symmetry. It was also a very expensive program, with a per capita expenditure far exceeding that of any of the other existing exchange programs. Nor did the hoped-for symmetry really hold financially, for while the Indian government paid the stipends of the American participants, these were at the level of those of their Indian counterparts in India, and it was felt necessary for the American side to supplement them to bring them up to what was regarded as a more satisfactory standard for Americans.

From the beginning, the fellowship program was characterized from the Indian side by a very strong preference to send scientists, not social scientists or humanists, to the United States. From the American side, the longstanding Indian criticism that India was of interest only to social scientists as a laboratory or to humanists studying the classical tradition was responded to by a decision to favor scientists and scholars and others who were not Indian specialists. What this meant in practice was that those who received grants were almost always people who were not acquainted with Indian culture and who did not know Indian languages, which effectively excluded research scholars in Indian studies at American universities. Unlike other fellowship programs, therefore, the American participants have not contributed much to published research on India, nor are most of them involved in programs where their Indian experience could add substantially to the curriculum. The
general impression one gets is that the fellowship program did not do anything that the established programs could not have done better if the same resources had been made available to them.

A much more positive judgment can be made of the innovative and imaginative group projects that brought together skilled professionals for workshops and conferences in a wide range of activities, including museums, architecture, radio, television, and early childhood education. These were not regarded as one-way learning experiences, with the Americans purveying knowledge to the Indians; it was understood that all such projects were to be designed so that each side learned from the other. Because of the near-universality of English as a medium of communication among Indian professionals, this experiment probably worked better than it would have in any other non-Western country.

The third form of subcommission activity emphasized the exchange of aspects of each other’s culture that could have wide public participation. The culmination of these efforts was to be a Festival of America in India and a Festival of India in the United States. This last event, which took place in 1985–86, was planned to be one of the most intensive demonstrations of another culture ever to be staged in the United States. Major art exhibits at the Metropolitan Museum in New York, the National Gallery in Washington, the Boston Museum, and elsewhere were coordinated with symposia, conferences, and musical events. Coupled with the coincidental popular successes of the film about Gandhi, Passage to India, and The Jewel in the Crown, the artistic promises of the Festival of India have given new hope to those of us who have long looked with ill-concealed envy at the greater success of China in capturing the American imagination, and we have begun to dream of a future of filled classrooms and successful grant applications for exchange programs with India when PL-480 rupees will at last have ended.

From a rapid survey of educational and cultural exchanges with India, grounded largely in the admittedly biased experience of a participant-observer, no real conclusions can be drawn, only impressions, and even these are often made ambiguous by the contradictory signals of two complex societies. For sheer variety and size, U.S. exchange programs with India during the last thirty years are unmatched anywhere, except with some of the countries of Western Europe. To assess them in terms of impact is perhaps feasible, but it would be a monumental task that might fail to show much of the reality of personal fulfillment and social enrichment that in the end is their justifying purpose. I am not certain what is to be learned from the experience of Indo-U.S. exchanges during the last thirty years, but it has been, I am convinced, an important moment in the attempt to reach out across the boundaries of time and place. In the last scene in Passage to India—in Forster’s book, not Lean’s film—Fielding says to Aziz, ‘‘Why can’t we be friends now? It’s what I want. It’s what you want.’ But their horses swerved apart; they didn’t want it, nor did the
earth, the temple, the palace, nor the city: They said in their hundred voices, 'No, not yet,' and the sky said, 'No, not there'" (Forster, 1952:322). It is a dark ending for a search for understanding, but at least it suggests its possibility, which may be reason enough for continuing.

References

European-Chinese Relations in Education, Science, and Culture

Ruth Hayhoe

Introduction

Education, science, and culture cover a vast spectrum of cooperative activities. This analysis begins from agreements for educational cooperation, institutional links at various levels, and the movement of scholars and students between China and Europe. It notes the curricular areas that are favored and the kinds of educational and societal values being transmitted. Science and technology tend to be a major area of curricular emphasis in educational exchange. Outside the educational sphere, there are also arrangements for cooperation in scientific research, some associated with research institutes devoted to the pure sciences, others technologically oriented and closely linked to industrial and commercial institutions. Finally, there is the issue of culture. For someone innocent of anthropology, this immediately calls to mind cooperation in areas such as religion and fine arts, music, dance, drama, poetry, etc. While some attempt will be made to survey exchanges and cooperation in these areas, I would like to use the term in its wider and more fundamental sense of the shared values and beliefs that shape social life and social perspectives (Durkheim, 1964:79–80). The transfer of technological and scientific knowledge by young people returning to China after an intellectual formation within educational institutions which embody a particular European ethos of scholarship is part of a process of cultural transfer.

Cooperation in the fields of education, science, and culture is clearly dependent upon both political and economic relations. However, to say it is determined by political and economic exigencies would be going too far. There is a dynamic within educational and cultural cooperation which may elude the best intentions of politicians and produce results quite different from those expected. In China’s historical experience the successive waves of foreign educational influence more often preceded rather than followed periods of foreign political domination (Bastid-Bruguière, 1987). In the one instance when political and educational borrowing coincided, that of Soviet-Chinese cooperation during the fifties, it could be argued that the higher education patterns introduced owed as much to traditional European academic values as to new socialist ones and that the Cultural Revolution revolt against them contained an element of the justified repudiation of academic traditionalism as well as its more obvious political agenda (Hayhoe, 1984b).
Economic interaction is also clearly linked to cultural interaction. Still, the development of nonexploitative and mutually beneficial economic relations, such as those which characterized Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the fifties (Eckstein, 1977), holds no guarantee that a cultural backlash involving the repudiation of the cultural accoutrements of economic “progress” will not result. This is not intended as an alarmist statement, but as a plea that China’s present cooperation with the industrialized world in the areas of education, science, and culture should be viewed in its proper historical context, including both the Sino-Soviet experiments of the fifties and China’s preliberation interaction with the West.

The political and economic framework which supports present cultural interaction can be sketched briefly. In contrast to the United States, where political rapprochement with China began in the early seventies, European-Chinese political relations came to life in the early sixties (Wilson, 1973). Some European nations had recognized the People’s Republic of China in the fifties, but the French formal recognition in 1964, widely interpreted as a Gaullist bid for an independent Europe vis-à-vis the superpowers, marked a turning point (Domenach, 1982). The Chinese have since consistently spoken out for a strong and independent Europe, though their concern for European strength in face of Soviet social imperialism became even more strident in the early eighties than the former anti-American bias (Foreign Broadcast Information Services—hereafter cited as FBIS—Sept. 12, Dec. 16, 1980).

If Europe is important to China as part of the second world which must be encouraged to take a strong stand against superpower domination, China may have less political importance for Europe (Griffith, 1981). There are, however, strong economic attractions in China’s open-door policy, and the Europeans have not been slow to take advantage of these. A trade agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and China made originally in 1980 (Fung, 1980:147) was renegotiated in the autumn of 1984 amid conditions that support continued growth and development (FBIS, Sept. 28, 1984). Between 1978 and 1985 China’s imports grew from U.S. $9.8 billion to $42.3 billion, and the European share has ranged between 12 percent and 22 percent of this total, next only to Japan and the United States. Europe has also absorbed between 8 percent and 15 percent of China’s exports (Scherer, 1986; Wochenbericht 29, July 7, 1986).

Educational and scientific exchanges are likely to continue in these favorable political and economic conditions. The question of central interest to the comparativist, one that is a fundamentally evaluative one, is what sort of cultural contribution will be most helpful to China in the pursuit of its modernization goals. Europe and the United States present different possibilities, which might be evaluated within two distinctive ideological frameworks. The first, a linear view of modernization such as that provided by Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth*, might be called a vertical-historical approach and is one that spawned considerable debate in the
preliberation period. The second, which sees China’s cultural interaction with various nations of the industrialized world in terms of the dangers of cultural imperialism and cultural dependency, might be termed a horizontal-critical approach.

The Vertical-Historical Approach

Under the basic assumptions of the vertical-historical approach, China is seen as progressing along a modernization process essentially similar to that experienced by “advanced” industrialized nations. Educational and scientific exchange should make it possible to overcome obstacles to progress along this continuum and speed up China’s modernization. Cultural values transferred in the exchange process may either be an important stimulus to progress or serve to reinforce traditional aspects of Chinese culture which inhibit modernization.

While both Europe and the United States are part of the advanced capitalist world, with basic similarities in their economic and political structures, they have rather different cultural contributions to make. Europe shares China’s experience of possessing an ancient civilization and deep-rooted cultural traditions. China’s movement into the modern age has brought about a gradual cultural transformation, with some traditional values surviving, others consciously or unconsciously discarded. The empathy this provides with the Chinese experience is a commonly evoked theme for European, especially French, politicians when visiting China (Documents d’Actualité Internationales, 1980 and 1983).

In strong contrast to this sense of communality arising from parallel traditions of great sophistication and antiquity in Sino-European relations, the possibility of an American cultural contribution to Chinese development might be seen as a fresh wind, helping to blow away feudal values that present an obstacle to modernization. Many Chinese have perceived the United States as a country untrammled by ancient traditions, which was able to create a modern culture based on its scientific and industrial achievements. It is this which has given the American model its continuing attraction for China.

The contrasting possibilities of European and American educational patterns for China were the subject of lively debate in the preliberation period, with the main lines of argument proceeding within the terms sketched above (Becker, 1932; Duggan, 1933; Foster, 1936). In the conclusion of this chapter, I will ask whether this approach may not have some relevance today, when both European and American educational values and patterns are being introduced to China through educational and scientific exchange activities. It may be possible to identify educational patterns in the European and American experience which have the potential for supporting China’s modernization efforts and others which might be obstructive to modernization. A framework for evaluation could be created along these lines.
The Horizontal-Critical Approach

The horizontal-critical approach rejects the notion that the developing world can be assisted in “catching up” with the developed world along a linear continuum called “modernization.” The relationship between the developed and developing world is seen rather as a dialectical one, and it is argued that the culture of capitalism has largely homogenized the cultural distinctions noted above. China might then be viewed as a developing Third World country at risk of becoming locked into a pattern of dependency and domination in its cultural relations with the advanced capitalist world. This second perspective, drawn from dependency theorists, brings a different set of evaluative issues to the fore in the comparison of European-Chinese profiles of cultural cooperation and cultural transfer.

In most studies of cultural imperialism, economic imperialism is seen to perpetuate itself by the transfer of cultural values and educational patterns to the peripheral elite (Carnoy, 1978). These ensure their loyalty to the center and willingness to cooperate in the economic exploitation of their nation (McLean, 1983). More broadly based center-periphery analyses see political, social, and cultural systems as independently vulnerable to imperialistic influences, even in situations where economic exploitation does not exist. These may be of greater relevance to the Chinese case (Galtung, 1980).

The primary characteristics of imperialism, suggested by Johann Galtung, are exploitation, penetration, fragmentation, and marginalization. He illustrates these four characteristics of imperialism with reference to the practice of international social science research in a way which may have particular relevance to issues of educational exchange. He suggests that exploitation takes place through researchers in the center joining with those of the periphery’s center in a vertical division of labor, which exploits the raw social data available in the periphery for the theory-making and knowledge production of the center. Penetration takes place through researchers in the center recruiting an elite in the periphery, “getting under their skin” by winning them over to a particular perspective or theoretical approach and using them as allies in the exploitation of the raw data of the periphery and the enrichment of center theorizing. Fragmentation takes place through the separation of periphery researchers from one another and their allegiance to the center rather than to strengthening intellectual interaction among themselves and with other periphery countries. Marginalization takes place to the extent that periphery researchers are kept perpetually in a role of subordination as second-class researchers involved in processing data rather than in theory creation (Galtung, 1975).

In his schematization of goals for a new world order, Galtung sets forth the opposite values of equity, autonomy, solidarity, and participation. Three strategies which would promote these values are interestingly developed by Ali Mazrui (1978) in relation to the problems of the African university and its educational exchange with advanced capitalist countries. The strategy of
domestication calls for the strengthening of university curricular areas that reflect local culture and locally relevant scientific knowledge and that would provide a basis for equity and autonomy in international academic relations. The strategy of diversification suggests diversified links with numerous cultural and scientific "centers," including the Asian and Arabic worlds as well as the European and American, and a reflection of this in both curricular priorities and academic interaction. The strategy of counterpenetration intends the development of a strong and distinctive African university ethos, which in turn is able to make its contribution to the centers of the developed world and exert its influence over their further development.

This view of cultural autonomy must be close to what is intended by Chinese leaders in the stress they continually place on equality and mutual benefit in Chinese interaction with foreign countries (Xinhua News Agency—hereafter cited as XH—Jan. 3, May 24, June 1, 1984). What is of interest here is the question of how far China’s cultural interaction with specific European nations and with Europe in general is likely to promote cultural autonomy as against cultural imperialism. This question could also inform a comparative evaluation of European and American policies of educational exchange.

In subsequent sections of this chapter China’s educational, scientific, and cultural relations with major European nations are sketched, and some attempt is made at comparative evaluation. Then the main lines of the European approach are summarized and set in contrast with the conditions of Sino-American educational exchange.

Sino-German Cultural Interaction

Diplomatic relations between China and West Germany were established in 1972 (Brandi-Dohrn, 1980), and since then Germany has become China’s foremost trading partner within the European Economic Community. In recent years Germany has provided about 40 percent of China’s imports from Europe and has absorbed about 30 percent of China’s exports to Europe. Economic interests are thus of great importance.

The first agreement for cultural and educational cooperation between West Germany and China was signed in October 1977 for 1978–79 (Brandi-Dohrn, 1980), and it is renegotiated every two years. The Kulturtausch Program 1984–85 zwischen dem Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Volksrepublik China gives a very detailed picture of the scope of German-Chinese educational cooperation and the agencies through which it is administered and funded from the German side. The Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) provides scholarships for forty Chinese graduate students each year, with the stipulation that five must be in the social sciences, two in music, five in medicine, and one in law. It also arranges placement for up to 200 Chinese graduate students on Chinese government funding and makes provision for Chinese visiting scholars.
doing research and study in German institutions. In addition, the DAAD sends up to five long-term teachers of German and up to fifteen shorter-term German scientists and scholars to teach in Tongji University and Wuhan Medical College each year, as well as giving leadership support to Tongji College, which was established jointly by the Germans and Chinese as a center for preparing Chinese undergraduates and subsequently graduates for study in Germany.

While the DAAD is clearly the leading German agency responsible for the administration of cooperative programs with the Chinese, the cultural agreement also details arrangements for the organization and funding of scholarly interaction within the terms of university or institution-level agreements between over sixty German institutions of higher learning and their Chinese partners (Louven and Schädler). Discretionary funds are made available to German institutions for the initiation and implementation of various types of exchange in addition to specific provision for the movement of Chinese and German scholars and students both ways, mainly in the sciences. The cultural agreement also includes details of provision made for study in Germany by such foundations as the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Hanns Seidel Stiftung, and the Friederich Naumann Stiftung. Over 150 scholarships per year are provided by these organizations, which permit Chinese scholars to do graduate degrees or cooperative research in German institutions. Some of these foundations have a special area of emphasis. For example, the Hanns Seidel Foundation provides sixty scholarships per year, which are directed toward Chinese technicians and professionals in specific technological fields (FBIS, July 9, 1984). On a somewhat different academic level, provision is also made for the training of Chinese teachers of the newly developing higher technical colleges in German Fachhochschule and for the training of Chinese secondary school teachers of German.

The agreement also contains sections devoted to music, theater, and the arts, providing both for educational interaction in these areas and for the sending of performing artists both ways. Cooperation in the areas of television, film, and sport is provided as well. It is difficult to get exact figures, but there are probably 1,200 Chinese in Germany at any one time, the majority on long-term study and research programs and about 80 percent working in fields of natural sciences and technology (XH, Oct. 14, 1982). They are spread out in over forty institutions of higher learning and research centers, and as many as two-thirds are supported by the German government or German funding agencies. About 300 are working at the undergraduate level, representing a specially selected group sent by the Chinese from Tongji College in the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 to follow undergraduate programs in engineering and the applied sciences. Many of these will be completing their work in 1984-85, and no further undergraduates will be sent. The main group of students now are graduates of Chinese higher institutions who are pursuing higher degrees in Germany, and these
may reach 500 by 1985 (DAAD, Feb. 1982:7). The rest are visiting scholars, about 10 percent of whom also attain higher degrees (interview with Mr. Neumann, DAAD, April 30, 1984).

One area of scientific cooperation which has been strongly emphasized in Sino-German interaction is that of medicine. Here historical roots seem to have played a role, in that the German establishment of Tongji University as a school of medicine in 1907 was regarded by the Chinese as an important and valued contribution to modern Chinese medicine (Kreissler, 1983:63–125). In 1952 the now distinguished medical faculty of Tongji University was moved to Wuhan and became Wuhan Medical College. Germany is now involved in supporting medical research and training there both through cooperation with the universities of Essen, Heidelberg, and Saarland, and through direct grants such as a gift of one million marks by Volkswagen for the establishment of a medical sciences center (FBIS, April 20, 1981) and a gift from the International Hospital Company of Germany toward the building of a third hospital in association with the college (XH, Oct. 7, 1983). Cooperation in medical science takes place under an agreement signed between the Chinese and West German ministers of health and tends to have its focal point in Wuhan Medical College.

Cooperative research in the social sciences also has a place in Sino-German cultural interaction and is supported through the emphasis placed on it by such foundations as the Friederich Ebert Stiftung. It sponsored a seminar in Shanghai in March 1983 in cooperation with the Shanghai Institute for International Relations on the subject of the North-South dialogue and the new international economic order. The positions of China and Europe on this issue were presented by specialists from both sides, and lively discussions on the problems of the global economic order ensued (XH, March 31, 1983).

In addition to this lively educational interaction, which involves a strong emphasis on science and technology as cultural consumption rather than as economic investment, there is considerable scientific and technological cooperation that is more closely related to industrial and economic interaction. In 1978 a scientific and technological cooperation agreement was signed between the two governments, and a joint committee to oversee the implementation of the agreement had its fourth meeting recently in Beijing. The general areas of cooperation are in energy, agriculture, metallurgy, production technology, and transport. Since 1978 over thirty specific agreements have been signed for cooperation in satellite communications and data transmission, niobium-tantalum ore prospecting in Guangdong, technical transformation and improved management in enterprises, solar energy experiments, space technology and meteorite research, vanadium slag processing, iron ore concentration, coal liquidation, and coproduction of numerical control mining machines (FBIS, July 17, 1984; XH, July 11, 14, 1984). Clearly these areas of scientific research and cooperation are closely linked to economic interaction and the burgeoning of joint ventures
between the two countries. Both the German government and large corporations are giving support to this type of cooperation. For example, Volkswagen has recently set up a joint venture with the Chinese in Shanghai for the production of cars, and this has educational implications for Chinese workers and managers (XH, April 21, 1982). Also the German government is supporting the establishment of a management training center at the Baoshan Steel Works north of Shanghai in cooperation with the State Economic Commission and parallel to the American management training center at Dalian (XH, Aug. 22, 1984).

Two rather different types of scientific culture seem to be exercising an influence over Chinese involved in scientific cooperation with the Germans. The scientific spirit of the old German university, the pursuit of pure Wissenschaft for its own sake, is still a part of the ethos of the modern German university and harmonizes with aspects of the Soviet academic ethos embodied in Chinese comprehensive universities in 1952 (Chung Shih, 1953). On the other hand, much of the cooperation in the applied sciences is specifically linked to Western capitalist production techniques and the application of science to industrial development.

In concluding this survey of Sino-German educational and scientific experience, I’d like to offer a few reflections drawn from the two evaluative frameworks suggested earlier, the vertical-historical approach and the horizontal-critical approach. From the first perspective, Sino-German cooperation clearly has valuable lessons for the Chinese in terms of Germany’s gradual movement from science as cultural consumption and the university as an academic citadel (Ben-David, 1964) to greater academic flexibility and more creative links between science and industry—a process the Chinese are eager to promote in their own higher institutions at present. Chinese academic traditions had certain common values with the German scholarly tradition, which may account for the attractiveness of the German model to such scholars as Cai Yuanpei and its influence on Beijing University, also the appeal of the Soviet academic patterns adopted in 1952, which also had roots in the German tradition (Hayhoe, 1984b). Germany’s postwar adaptation of these patterns may therefore be of special significance in China’s present reform aspirations in higher education.

The second perspective draws attention to different issues. The remarkable support given by Germany to educational and scientific cooperation with the Chinese, which clearly exceeds that of any other European nation, is almost certainly linked with economic interests. The notion of cultural imperialism could therefore be taken as a starting point for an investigation into the nature and purpose of the cultural and scientific cooperation that is going on. One could ask how far the values of equity, autonomy, solidarity, and participation are exhibited in cultural and scientific interaction. Apparently the Chinese are satisfied on the first count and appreciate both the benefits of economic cooperation and the generous German funding for educational and scientific cooperation. But is there in
fact some ceding of cultural autonomy in the enthusiastic emulation of German management and production techniques? As for the issue of solidarity, a careful study would have to be done of Chinese patterns of involvement with Germany. Is there a concentration of activity in major centers, such as the east coast cities, which could exacerbate the already evident gaps between Chinese centers and the hinterland, or do these links contribute in any way to strengthening Chinese internal cooperation? In relation to the issue of participation, one would have to investigate how far Chinese scholars cooperating with Germans in scientific research are creatively involved in theory-making or operating exclusively at the subordinate level of processing data and applying theory to the Chinese situation.

On the positive side, some diffusion is being encouraged by the fact that many German Länder are developing their own special relations with Chinese provinces and organizing cooperative projects on this level (Louven and Schädler, 1986). The concentration of German teachers and scientists in the two institutions of Tongji University and Wuhan Medical College could be viewed in terms of cultural imperialism, yet a positive influence could also be argued. It may make possible genuine participatory research and scholarly interaction in locations where some familiarity with the German language and German academic culture gives the Chinese a critical insight into the German approach to science. Insofar as German science is presented in the broader context of German culture at Tongji, it should contribute to Chinese cultural autonomy.

The joint seminar on North-South relations noted above, which was funded by a German foundation, held in Shanghai, and included distinguished European and Chinese scholars, suggests at least a sensitivity to the issues which the dependency theory perspective calls attention to. Much more empirical research would be needed to see how far German cultural and scientific policy toward China is effectively promoting Chinese cultural autonomy.

Sino-French Cultural Interaction

Sino-French diplomatic relations were reestablished at the initiative of DeGaulle in 1964 and seem to be characterized by an emotive approach. Both sides like to resurrect the quotation made by a French nineteenth-century traveler that France is in essence the China of Europe, as China is in a sense the France of the Far East (Domenach, 1982; XH, May 30, 1984). Both sides are proud of the special links created by such communist leaders as Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, and Li Lisan, who were students in France during the twenties (Ch’en, 1979:166-68). The visit of Deng Yingchao, wife of Zhou Enlai, to Paris at the head of a Chinese parliamentary delegation in 1980, evoked a strong sense of the importance of these ties to both sides (FBIS, June 11-13, 1980). The French regard their role in assisting China’s diplomatic reentry into the family of nations.
since 1964 as a contribution to Chinese modernization, which is as important as the economic and technological contributions in which Germany and other Western nations have been more competitive than France (Domenach, 1982). French trading interests are nevertheless considerable, contributing 15.3 percent of China's European imports in 1983 and absorbing 15.8 percent of China's exports to Europe.

French-Chinese cultural and educational relations are organized within the terms of a cultural agreement, which is renegotiated every two years. The agreement, first made in 1965, was suspended from 1967 to 1973, when limited educational interaction, mainly in scientific fields, was resumed (Domenach, 1982:90–91). Since October 1979, a detailed cultural program has been negotiated every two years under the auspices of a joint committee of Chinese and French participants, which was set up in 1980 (XH, Oct. 1, 1983). Under this agreement there are at present about 750 Chinese students and scholars in France—110 at the undergraduate level, over 400 at the graduate level, and about 220–230 as visiting scholars. About 80 percent are following studies in the sciences, half of those in applied fields. The rest are in various fields of the social sciences and humanities. The French government provides scholarships for about one hundred Chinese scholars and students on these programs, partially in exchange for provision made on the Chinese side for up to sixty-five French students in China. In addition another twenty scholarships are provided by the Institut Franco-Chinois of Lyons, and other French foundations (interview with Shu Wenping, the Chinese Embassy in Paris, July 4, 1984). In contrast to Germany, the majority of Chinese in France are funded from the Chinese side, though the absence of tuition fees in both countries means a substantial advantage in comparison to Britain or North America. A further contrast lies in the fact that university-level links, which have been established between about twenty Chinese institutions and over thirty French ones, are less able to generate direct scholarly interaction than in the German case because of inadequate funding (XH, June 27, May 30, 1984).

The most significant French scholarly presence in China is found at Wuhan University under a rather unusual five-year agreement between this Chinese university and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was signed in February 1980 (XH, Jan. 27, 1984). Of the twenty to twenty-two teachers supported by the French government in China, a concentration of ten to fifteen in the areas of French language and literature, mathematics, and the sciences were to be located at Wuhan University and to participate in the teaching and research of mainstream university departments. The idea seems to have been less the preparation of Chinese for study in France (as in the German concentration at Tongji) than an integrated example of French literary and scientific culture present on a Chinese campus, where cooperative research and critical interaction would be possible (Hayhoe, 1985).
Scientific interaction between France and China is carried out under the terms of an agreement on science and technology signed in 1978 and renegotiated in 1984 (XH, April 5, 1984). Between 1981 and 1984, specific projects of scientific and technical cooperation grew from 59 to 133 (XH, May 30, 1984). The sensitive nature of some of these projects, both those under academic auspices and those linked to industrial concerns, may indicate a rather remarkable level of trust from the Chinese side. For example, a joint Sino-French geological team is working on a study of the geological structure and the formation and evolution of the upper mantle of the Himalayas in Tibet, the first cooperative project on this subject (FBIS, July 24, Aug. 7, 1980). On the commercial side, another interesting and sensitive joint scientific project is one for seismic prospecting in the Junggar Basin of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which is under the auspices of the General Geophysics Company of France (FBIS, May 26, 1981). Other areas of cooperative scientific research include medicine, where the French interest in certain theories and techniques of traditional Chinese medicine provides some mutuality (FBIS, April 2, 14, 1980), agriculture, where the focus includes animal husbandry and food processing (XH, June 30, July 14, 1984), and nuclear power, where a long-debated prospect of cooperation has finally been agreed upon (XH, June 4, 1984).

Another project of scientific cooperation, which seems to be unique in the French interaction with China, and more on the academic than the commercial side of science, is the establishment of a French scientific reading room in Beijing. It is situated in the Chinese Institute of Scientific and Technical Information, and its purpose is to make available the latest French scientific findings to the Chinese, “a dynamic place for Chinese and French scientists and engineers to make academic exchange” (XH, March 20, 1984).

On the social and cultural level there is also some interesting interaction going on. A French law commission from the French National Assembly was the first foreign delegation to be received by the recently established law committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (XH, July 19, 1984). In the area of religion, the visit of the French Cardinal Etchegary, Archbishop of Marseilles and chairman of the French Bishops Conference, in 1980 represented the highest level Roman Catholic present in China since relations with the Vatican were broken off in 1957 (FBIS, Feb. 29, March 5, 1980). Generally, cultural activities are highly valued from both sides and receive considerable press attention, such as the visit of a Beijing opera troupe to France (FBIS, June 6, 1980), a Chinese woodcuts exhibition in Paris (FBIS, March 3, 1981), and the visit of French conductor Jean Perisson to China (FBIS, June 10, 1980). The 1984–85 cultural agreement provides for the exchange of exhibitions of painting, calligraphy, film, and photography, including an exhibition of Chinese archaeological finds in France and one of French painting 1870–1920 in China (XH, Oct. 1, 1983).
While French trade with China lags behind that of Germany and French economic involvement in joint ventures has also made a slower start (FBIS, Jan. 9, 1980), a rather unique and emotive cross-cultural dynamic exists between the two countries.

From the vertical-historical perspective, France may have an even more attractive model of cultural transition in the modernization process than the German one. Aspects of the Confucian meritocratic ideal were absorbed (Teng, 1942) and used in the formation of a scientifically oriented elite capable of shaping what is now a modern socialist republic. From the horizontal-critical perspective, the possibilities of economic exploitation seem less likely than in the German case. Several areas of scientific cooperation hold promise of Chinese participation at a higher theoretical level. Also both the Wuhan project and the scientific reading room in Beijing indicate French sensitivity to the need for a holistic approach to scientific knowledge, which should enable the Chinese to gain a fundamental critical appreciation of French science rather than concentrate exclusively on particular technical areas which may be of interest.

Nevertheless, one might ask whether French management and productive practices, which are being introduced to the Chinese through such projects as the oil prospecting with the French company Totale (Ondict, 1984) are in any sense modified by France's present socialist administration or are as susceptible of transmitting the culture of capitalism as parallel German and American projects. Another aspect of French cultural involvement that might militate against Chinese solidarity and participation is the highly centralized organization of national life, which means much of the exchange focuses on main centers in France and China, and there are fewer possibilities for links between peripheries that would embrace a wider scope of participants on both sides.

Sino-British Cultural Interaction

Although China gained diplomatic recognition from the United Kingdom in 1950, diplomatic relations were not raised to the ambassadorial level until 1972 (Griffith, 1981:167). The most significant aspect of Sino-British political interaction relates to Hong Kong and arrangements for its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, a subject that lies beyond the scope of this chapter (XH, Oct. 3, 1984). Economically, England has a modest share in Sino-European trade, contributing 12–15 percent of China's European imports from 1978 to 1983 and absorbing 12–16 percent of its exports to Europe.

Sino-British cultural and educational relations take shape within an agreement between the two governments signed in November 1979, and scientific and technological relations are governed by a parallel agreement made in November 1978. Every two years a program of activities covering all three areas is renegotiated; comments in this chapter refer to the 1984–
program of exchanges (British Council, 1984b). The major British institution responsible for the coordination of exchanges is the British Council, whose role might be seen as parallel to that of the German DAAD. It provides twenty-five full scholarships a year for Chinese students and scholars in England in exchange for an equivalent number of British graduate students in China. It also assists in placing Chinese students in British academic institutions throughout the country.

Since 1983, the British government has made a particular effort to encourage Chinese study in England through the provision of 260 tuition-free places for them each year. General guidelines for curricular areas stipulate that the sixty places provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office give priority to the humanities and social sciences, particularly practical areas such as economics, law, management, project planning, international relations, education, English language and literature, library science, and urban planning. The 200 places provided through the Overseas Development Administration focus on such applied sciences as agriculture and fisheries, transport, mining, shipbuilding, offshore oil drilling, computer technology, and electronics (British Council, 1984a). A clear direction is thus given to curricular areas of practical importance where British educational provision may meet Chinese needs. In addition, a small number of scholarships is provided by other agencies, and short-term academic visits under the auspices of agreements between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the British Academy, also the Economic and Social Research Council, are given government support through the Academic Links Scheme. Special provision is also made for the support of direct institutional-level links between British and Chinese higher institutions.

Under these terms there are now about 700 to 800 Chinese students and scholars in England, a few at the undergraduate level, an increasing number pursuing graduate degrees, and a large contingent as visiting scholars (interview with Adrian Johnston, cultural officer in the British Embassy in Beijing, Sept. 16, 1985). Institution-level linkages have made possible very lively direct exchanges between British and Chinese institutions of higher learning, and the number of these linkages had grown to sixty-four by the autumn of 1985. The long-term British presence in China is concentrated on excellence in the training of English language teachers, and over twenty British Council-supported teachers work in small groups in foreign language institutes or university departments in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou. Special assistance is also given to English language teaching in China’s Television University. Apart from this, there is no specific center of British educational influence in China parallel to the French presence in Wuhan and the German one at Tongji in Shanghai.

Scientific cooperation between China and England is coordinated under general agreements between the Royal Society and the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences (Royal Society, 1980), also the China Association of Science and Technology (XH, Sept. 17, 1984), as well as more specific agreements such as one in meteorology between the British National Physical Laboratory and the State Bureau of Meteorology (FBIS, Sept. 5, 1980) and one in health cooperation between the two governments. British scientific and medical exhibitions have been held in China (FBIS, March 18, 1980), and numerous Chinese have been enabled to participate in scientific and technological symposia in England. Cooperative research takes place mainly through the presence of Chinese scientists as visiting scholars in British laboratories.

One rather significant area of Sino-British cooperation was the support given by the British Thompson Foundation to the starting of the first Chinese daily newspaper in English in 1981 (Britain-China, June 1982:10). The China Daily has subsequently developed a good reputation and opened up channels of information and comment to many foreign scholars and business people in China, as well as having some circulation overseas. Cultural interaction in music and the fine arts is also given strong support from both sides and widely reported in the press. The Great Britain–China center in London offers a public, nonpolitical forum for China-related cultural and scholarly activities. Its newsletter, Britain-China, has come out several times a year since 1974 and provides an interesting record of Sino-British interaction in education, science, and culture over the decade since its founding. In the area of religion there has also been considerable interaction between British and Chinese Christians, with the visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury to China in the fall of 1983 and the visit of a Chinese Protestant delegation to England a year earlier (Britain-China, Autumn-Winter 1982 and 1983).

From the vertical-historical perspective British moderation and Britain’s gentle pragmatism come across as an attractive model for Chinese seeking practical solutions to practical problems. While British educational patterns had very little influence on China historically (Foster, 1936), there are two modern British educational institutions which have been of particular interest to the Chinese, the Open University and the polytechnics. Experience drawn from these institutions has been of great importance in the third World Bank-supported educational project in China, which has assisted the development of the Television University network in China and also the establishment of seventeen new-style higher technical colleges. The international advisory panel which is advising on this project is coordinated from the British Council in London.

From the horizontal-critical perspective, Britain’s efforts to contribute to effective English language teaching in China, far from cultural imperialism, might be seen as a salutary antidote to the influence of American English, and the British contribution to the Chinese press and television noted above has been supportive of cultural autonomy.
China’s Cultural Relations with Other European Nations

While West Germany, France, and Britain play a dominant role in European-Chinese educational and scientific interaction, other European nations and regions also have considerable involvement. In this section details are provided on Italy, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, also brief information on Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland, which illustrate the parallel activities in each of these areas to those analyzed more fully for West Germany, France, and Britain.

Italy

Sino-Italian diplomatic relations were established in 1970 (FBIS, Nov. 7, 1980), and the visit of President Allesandro Pertini to China in September 1980 (FBIS, Sept. 18, 1980) indicated the importance Italians give to the development of strong relations with the Chinese. Italy has contributed between 9 percent and 15 percent of China’s European imports and absorbed 15 percent to 21 percent of China’s exports to Europe.

The importance placed on fostering good economic relations is seen in the two Sino-Italian three-year technical, financial, and economic cooperation programs, the second of which was signed in November 1983. These provide for considerable Italian financing of technology for various transport and energy-related modernization projects in southwest China (FBIS, Oct. 19, 1984). Sino-Italian joint ventures are being developed, including one based in Geneva (FBIS, March 3, 1981) and one based in Beijing, the Chinese International Package Leasing Company (FBIS, Nov. 30, 1984). The latter seems to have an interesting educational spinoff in the Sino-Italian Package Printing Training Center, which recently opened in Wuxi City. The Italian government supplied $2 million worth of teaching equipment and books, as well as sending five lecturers to teach in the center. The first group of fifty-one students has already begun a two-year course in theory and technology related to packages for China’s export produce (XH, Sept. 3, 1984).

Apart from this economically oriented educational item, there have been no new reports on educational cooperation between China and Italy except one made in 1978 indicating that China wished to send 300 students for higher study in Italy (FBIS, Sept. 1, 1978). Because of language difficulties, it seems unlikely that the number of scholars and students on long-term study in Italy has reached this figure. Chinese Ministry of Education sources give a figure of 143 students and scholars sent to Italy under their auspices up to 1984 (Huang, 1984). However, cultural cooperation has included the exchange of literary delegations (FBIS, Feb. 4, 1981) and the signing of a one-year protocol on literary and art exchange (FBIS, Nov. 26, 1980). An agreement for cooperation in the social sciences was signed between the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Italian National Research Committee (FBIS, June 6, 1980), which may have facilitated the
presence of a Chinese scholarly delegation from the Institute of Modern International Relations at an Italian symposium on inflation in January 1981 (FBIS, Feb. 3, 1981). Cultural cooperation has included the first Chinese stamp exhibition in Europe, held under the auspices of the Italy-China Economic and Cultural Exchange Association (FBIS, Nov. 6, 1980) and more recently cooperation in the making of a film entitled *The Last Emperor* (FBIS, Nov. 8, 1984).

One significant and well-developed feature of Sino-Italian relations seems to be the encouragement of strong regional ties. Considerable fanfare accompanied the agreements of Suzhou and Venice and of Nanjing and Florence to become sister cities (FBIS, Feb. 27, April 3, 1980), and an exploratory visit of a delegation from the Guangxi Autonomous Region People’s Congress to the island of Sicily may indicate an interest in cooperation between periphery areas of the two countries (FBIS, Dec. 4, 1980).

Scientific cooperation between China and Italy seems to be marked both by a basic economic interest and by some regional orientation. Energy development minutes were signed between the two countries in October 1984, promising an Italian government grant toward feasibility studies for seven major projects in southwest China, including energy and communications (XH, Oct. 8, 1984). A protocol on scientific cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was signed in May 1980, and two-year cooperation programs detailing joint activities have been signed subsequently within the terms of the protocol (FBIS, May 20, 1980, Oct. 10, 1984). Most recently a protocol has been signed for Sino-Italian cooperation in space technology (XH, March 12, 1984).

The Netherlands
Sino-Dutch diplomatic relations were first established in 1950 (FBIS, Oct. 28, 1980), then strengthened in 1972, and subsequently threatened by the Dutch decision to build submarines for Taiwan in the autumn of 1980. This political upset may have had some effect on economic relations, with China’s imports from the Netherlands dropping from over 6 percent to under 3 percent of the European total between 1980 and 1982, but recovering to 4.5 percent in 1983. The Netherlands absorbed between 6 percent and 10 percent of China’s exports to Europe between 1978 and 1983.

The establishment of a Netherlands-China Friendship Society in 1977 (XH, March 20, 1977; *Beijing Review*, May 13, 1977) deserves mention, as this type of organization in most European countries has played a considerable role in facilitating various types of cultural interaction. In most cases, perhaps with the exception of England’s Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding, these societies are apolitical, yet semiofficial in the way they promote cultural activities. Their role is similar to that of the Great Britain-China Center in London.
Educational cooperation between China and the Netherlands takes place within memoranda signed by the Dutch minister of education with the Chinese Ministry of Education and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in August 1980 (FBIS, Aug. 1, 1980). A Dutch source in the spring of that year reported that there were already twenty Chinese undergraduates in the Netherlands who had taken a nine-month crash program in the Dutch language, then remained in Delft to follow undergraduate studies in construction engineering (one), physics (one), aviation-space technology (one), naval architecture (two), informatics (four), civil engineering (five), and electrical engineering (six). In addition, there were ninety-four Chinese graduates following studies in applied scientific fields and making use of the English language in their research. Another sixty graduates were expected in 1981 (Bronkhurst, 1980:46–50). Since there have been no subsequent press reports on Chinese students in the Netherlands, no further updating of this information has been possible. It seems likely that there are between 100 and 200 Chinese scholars and students there at present (Huang, 1984).

Scientific cooperation takes place within agreements on economic and technological cooperation signed in October 1980, when Prime Minister Andreas van Agt visited China (FBIS, Oct. 31, 1980). This is largely practical and industry-related, as illustrated in the agricultural cooperation program (FBIS, Sept. 18, 1980) and the important role played by the Dutch-based electronics company, Philips. It organized an electronics exhibition in Wuhan in the spring of 1980 (FBIS, May 21, 1980), around the time that it was announced that ten Chinese telecommunications experts would be trained by Philips at their International Telecommunications Center (FBIS, May 14, 1980).

Finally a Sino-Dutch cultural cooperation agreement, signed in the autumn of 1980 (FBIS, Oct. 31, 1980), provides for cultural cooperation of various kinds. The first visit of a Dutch art group to China was that of the Netherlands Chamber Orchestra in May 1980 (FBIS, May 14, 1980).

Scandinavia

The visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang to Sweden, Denmark, and Norway in the autumn of 1984 occasioned an article in the Chinese journal Outlook celebrating the friendship between Scandinavia and China and the fact that Scandinavian countries had been among the first Western nations to accord diplomatic recognition to China after 1949 (FBIS, July 6, 1984). Scandinavian economic interests in China are modest, yet significant for these smaller economies, with Chinese imports from the region ranging between 3 percent and 8 percent in relation to the EEC total.

By far the largest Scandinavian trading partner, Sweden’s scientific and educational interaction with China clearly has a strong economic orientation. The first group of eighty Chinese students was sent to Sweden for technical training in the autumn of 1979, and on his visit to China in April
Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falltin offered places for another fifty Chinese students to be given technical training in Sweden (FBIS, April 14, 1981). Student and scholar exchanges seem to take place under a protocol of scientific and technical cooperation signed at the third session of the mixed Swedish-Chinese intergovernmental committee in October 1981 (FBIS, Oct. 22, 1981) and to be administered by the Swedish Institute, an organization similar in function to that of the British Council. Social science exchanges come under an agreement between the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Royal Swedish Academy for Literature, History, and Antiquities, and scientific cooperation takes place between the Royal Swedish Academies of Science and Engineering and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (FBIS, Oct. 22, 1981). By the summer of 1984 it was reported that 222 Chinese students and scholars had been sent to Sweden for higher studies through the Chinese Ministry of Education (Huang, 1984).

Apart from these research and education-related details, the available press reports have focused on the economic aspects of Swedish-Chinese relations: a standardization agreement under the Agreement on Industrial, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation between the PRC and Swedish governments (FBIS, June 5, 1981); the first joint venture between the two countries, a pharmaceutical firm in Wuxi City (XH, June 6, 1984); and activities related to the Sino-Swedish Trade Agreement of 1979 (XH, Oct. 16, 1984).

Danish-Chinese interaction has a similar economic emphasis, also involving educational and cultural activities. The first group of twenty Chinese students was sent to Denmark in 1979, and after a year of orientation in Danish senior middle schools, they proceeded to studies in the natural sciences in Danish higher institutes and universities (FBIS, Feb. 5, 1980). No further account of Chinese students and scholars in Denmark is available, but it is unlikely that the number has exceeded one hundred. An interesting new Sino-Danish educational project is the establishment of a biomedical postgraduate training center in Beijing under the terms of the agreement on biomedical cooperation between the Chinese and Danish governments in 1982 (XH, Aug. 20, 1984).

Other cultural interaction, such as the visit of a Chinese puppet theater to Denmark in June 1981 (FBIS, June 8, 1981), illustrates the important role played by the Denmark-China Friendship Society. One of its delegations to China was reportedly made up of “noted personalities from political, economic, cultural, and educational circles in Denmark” (FBIS, June 3, 1981), suggesting the semiofficial status of such societies in most European countries.

Scientific cooperation between China and Denmark focuses on practical, technical areas, not surprisingly with a strong agricultural orientation, as illustrated by the Danish land reclamation and agrotechnical industry exhibition held in Beijing in 1981 (FBIS, May 29, 1981). Other possibilities
of Sino-Danish technical cooperation relate to harbor and railway construction (FBIS, Oct. 9, 1984).

Sino-Norwegian educational and scientific cooperation also has a strong economic and technological orientation. By 1984, Chinese sources reported that 102 Chinese students and scholars had been sent to Norway under the Chinese Ministry of Education (Huang, 1984). The Norwegian government has also given financial and technological support for establishing the Beijing Institute of Software, opened in October 1983, at a branch institute of the Beijing Engineering University. The institute is jointly supported by the United Nations, the Trondheim Institute of Technology in Norway, and the Beijing Institute of Informatics for Management under the Chinese State Science and Technology Commission. It enrolls thirty to fifty students each year for a two-year course in high-level computer software (XH, Oct. 5, 1984). The possibility of a Norwegian missionary society establishing a new university in China, now under discussion, would be an interesting new development in educational cooperation (FBIS, July 19, 1985).

Other forms of cooperation between China and Norway take place under a ten-year Sino-Norwegian agreement on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation signed by Prime Minister Ovdar Nordli and Premier Zhao Ziyang in September 1980 (FBIS, Sept. 26, 1980). An important area of cooperation is in the field of shipbuilding; experts from the Norwegian Shipping Academy lectured in Shanghai in 1980 (FBIS, Nov. 14, 1980). Another area of technological cooperation is energy.

The first Sino-Finnish cultural cooperation agreement was signed in May 1980 (FBIS, May 6, 1980) and made possible such cultural activities as a Finnish graphic art exhibition in China in the spring of 1981 (FBIS, April 29, 1981). The new program for 1985–87, signed in October 1984, provides for a Chinese film retrospective exhibition in Finland and activities in China marking the one hundred twentieth anniversary of the birth of the composer Sibelius (FBIS, Oct. 25, 1984). The Finland-China Friendship Society also plays an important part in cultural interaction between the two nations (FBIS, April 16, 1980; XH, Oct. 2, 1984).

In concluding this overview of Sino-European interaction in education, science, and culture, a few added points on other European countries may be appropriate. The Belgian pattern of relations with China is quite similar to that of the Netherlands, and a reported 187 Chinese students and scholars had been sent to Belgium by the Ministry of Education up to the summer of 1984 (Huang, 1984). Austria and Switzerland, as neutral countries, have a somewhat different relationship to China from that of the European countries within NATO and/or the EEC, yet apparently the Chinese are increasingly positive toward their neutral status. Up to the summer of 1984, Austria had received 232 Chinese sent by the Ministry of Education, Switzerland 199 (Huang, 1984). Spain and Portugal are now also
increasingly receiving Chinese attention and interest, highlighted by the visit of President Li Xiannian to these two countries in the autumn of 1984 (FBIS, Nov. 14, 1984).

The European Approach to Cultural Relations with China

The European approach to cultural relations with China has several features which distinguish it from the American one. First, most interaction is centrally regulated, either through governmental or paragovernmental organizations such as the British Council and the DAAD or through national scientific and research institutions. Such university-level linkages as exist are usually coordinated on the basis of national policy as expressed in formal cultural and scientific agreements. This differs greatly from the American scene, where university-level linkages have been a prime mover in educational interaction and are little affected by attempts at national coordination. In the European case, even friendship societies, which are supposedly people-to-people organizations, have a role nearly as official as that of their Chinese counterparts. Probably the only exception is the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding in England, which is closer to its American counterpart.

A second point of difference from the United States is the evident way in which economic interest provided the leading motivation for cultural and educational interaction. This differs from the American scene where educationists and scholars allied with politicians and succeeded in gaining substantial intellectual benefits out of exchange arrangements. The European economic interest comes across clearly in the types of educational activity that are supported, with the stress on technical and practical areas common to many of them. On the other hand, Chinese access to higher degrees in theoretical fields in European countries, whether in the natural or social sciences, may be hampered by rigid academic regulations of various kinds and may require considerable preparation both in language skills and in intellectual orientation. The Germans seem to have done most to open the way for Chinese to do higher degrees through the orientation programs they provide both in China at Tongji University and in Germany. France and England are also relatively open, and recent British financial provision removes the barrier of excessively high fees for overseas students. There are nevertheless two rather distinctive types of scientific and educational philosophies emanating from Europe—a highly theoretical academic one, linked to the spirit of the traditional European university, and a much more practical, industrially oriented one, conveyed through the various technological training courses made available to the Chinese. This split is probably less a feature of American scientific activity, and the way in which it is gradually being modified in European academic life may be of special relevance to contemporary reforms in China's higher education system.
A third feature of European interaction with China, resulting from the rather formal and centralized nature of exchange programs, is the tendency to focus on major Chinese centers, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and a few other large cities, and the comparative underdevelopment of regional linkages between peripheral areas on both sides. This differs within different European countries and is in many cases the natural result of the small size of many European nations. Germany’s political organization as a federation of Länder provides ideal conditions for regional linkages such as those described above, but these are less common in the case of other European nations.

Comparative Reflections on European and American Cultural Influences on China

In this conclusion, I’d like to return to the two frameworks suggested at the beginning to see how far they might be useful for comparative reflection on the distinctive cultural contributions of Europe and the United States to China’s modernization. The first framework assumes a universal linear modernization process, suggesting that China is on a development path similar to that which each of the “developed” nations has already passed through. If this is accepted as the case, attention could then move to the cultural and educational complex which provided the context for economic modernization in each region and to the values belonging to it which might be suitably transferred to China.

In Sino-European educational relations it was suggested that a parallel experience of an ancient tradition makes possible some cultural empathy. Whereas there is always the danger that the spirit of European academicism could be transmitted in such a way as to combine with reactionary Confucian values, there are also useful exemplars of gradual change and adaptation to the demands of the industrial and postindustrial society. Institutions such as the German Technische Hochschule and Fachhochschule may embody an ethos of relevance to China’s situation. The experience of the Danish educator N.S.F. Grundtvig, whose attacks on academicism and the examination tradition anticipated those of China’s Cultural Revolution rhetoric by at least a century, and his success in developing folk high schools which modified Denmark’s educational patterns may be of significance for China (Thodberg and Thyssen, 1983). France’s postrevolution educational institutions, the Grandes Ecoles, which transformed aspects of the Confucian examination tradition for the service of modernity, are another example of European gradualism which might be of interest (Smith, 1982). Chinese interest in the British Open University and the polytechnics has also been discussed. This line of reflection would lead to some sort of evaluation of European-Chinese educational interaction that
focused on the sort of educational values and patterns that Chinese scholars and students are being exposed to while in Europe and their appropriateness to the contemporary Chinese educational situation.

The American experience has an appeal not too different now from that felt by Chinese educators in the twenties and thirties. There is a certain freshness about American pragmatism and the view of knowledge it has engendered which is most appealing. American patterns of higher education and research are exercising tremendous influence at present through the reinstatement of American-educated scientists and the many contemporary educational linkages. One must ask how far these values and patterns are suited to China's present situation, given the very different cultural backgrounds and levels of economic resources available for education (Orleans, 1982).

This vertical-historical approach might be refined in view of China's recent eclecticism, which has led to a mixed group of influences at various levels—the American teaching and research university in part of the higher education system, the German Fachhochschule or British polytechnic in another part, possibly other European models of the technical and vocational school at the secondary level. How, differentially, are these cultural influences supporting China's modernization, and how far are they being reinforced by the return of students and scholars from abroad?

For some, particularly those with a Marxist orientation, the above comparative argument might seem a frivolous one, in light of the fact that the United States and Europe share the culture of advanced capitalism, and economic developments have more or less homogenized original differences in cultural and educational tradition. Whether one sees this homogenization process as having mainly economic roots or links it to the superstructural activity of such international organizations as UNESCO and the World Bank, there is little doubt that cultural and educational differences among these nations are less pronounced now than half a century ago. Within a horizontal-critical approach, the focus of evaluative analysis might move from reflections on the different cultural contribution of each to China's development, to considerations of cultural imperialism and the question of which is more or less imperialistic in its cultural, educational, and scientific relations with the Chinese.

I'd like, therefore, in these final paragraphs to return to Galtung's delineation of cultural imperialism in terms of exploitation, penetration, fragmentation, and marginalization, and the opposite values of equity, autonomy, solidarity, and participation. It is too early to make a definitive evaluation of the European approach to China based on this framework, let alone a comparative evaluation of Europe and the United States, but these reflections may stimulate discussion on the possibility of such comparative
evaluation in the future. I'll limit myself to a few comments on the European case, taking a positive approach and commenting on features of European-Chinese interaction which might be linked to the values of equity, autonomy, solidarity, and participation.

One feature of European-Chinese interaction noted above has been the very clear and explicitly recognized economic motivation on the European side. Given that the Chinese are aware of this and able to ensure mutual economic benefit in the process, it seems closer to the value of equity than the American approach, where a specific political agenda is part of the intention of educational and scientific interaction with the Chinese: the wish to influence an emerging young leadership in China toward a favorable political disposition to the United States (Clough, 1981:7). The fact that there is less political benefit for Europe than for the United States in relations with China may be a distinction of importance with regard to possibilities of cultural imperialism.

A second notable feature of the European approach, particularly evident in the French and German cases, is some intention and effort to present science and technology within the context of a whole intellectual culture—countering a Chinese tendency to go for techniques and ignore their cultural and intellectual setting. German and French activities at Tongji and Wuhan universities illustrate this. While this sort of focal center could be seen as a form of penetration, it might also contribute to cultural autonomy. It should make possible a critical understanding of the intellectual culture essential to the kind of selective assimilation of Western knowledge which is part of Chinese policy.

Finally, the values of solidarity and participation. To examine these, one would have to investigate the nature of regional linkages, both those being created within China between centers and hinterland and between Chinese and foreign peripheries. Also one might want to look at the kind of role Chinese researchers play vis-à-vis international scholarly research activities and the balance between international, national, and local relevance in their research priorities. So far there is not enough information to answer these questions.

This chapter must therefore conclude in an open-ended way. A value-conscious and value-explicit analysis of cultural relations between China and the West is called for. If linear modernization theory underlies a particular approach, then that is an ideology which should be made explicit and its implications worked out logically. If the horizontal-critical approach is to be useful, its values must also be made explicit and its logical implications worked out. The academic community has yet to develop a firm framework within which cultural interaction between China and nations of the developed world can be analyzed.
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"From the great Jesuit scholars of the sixteenth century down to the best sinologists of today," Simon Leys (1983) has written with his characteristic eloquence, "we can see that there was never a more powerful antidote to the temptation of Western ethnocentrism than the study of Chinese civilization." Most of the time, he says, "the natural outcome of our study of China" is "admiration, wonderment, increased self-knowledge, relativization, and readjustment of one's own values, awareness of the limits of one's own civilization" (97–98). A distinguished Chinese American scholar whom I interviewed for a research project on U.S.-China relations was equally eloquent in his assessment of the importance to China of humanistic and social scientific study of the West:

People in China need intellectual stimulation after all that has gone on in the past decades. Once you begin to introduce them to the ideas of people like Montesquieu or John Stuart Mill—or for that matter, C. Wright Mills—you can't tell where these things will lead. . . . The conservatism that you see in worldwide politics is, one could say, a part of a single school of thought. The Islamic revolution, and so forth—these are all part of a reaction against the emptiness of Western secular society. The West is itself at a crossroads. If the Chinese could come up with a synthesis of some of the best elements in their tradition—even the revolutionary tradition of the Cultural Revolution—with some of the best ideas of the West, it would be an exciting thing and a great contribution to the world.¹

Most scholars in both China and the United States may wish that a renewal of exchanges in the humanities and social sciences will ultimately lead to the ends expressed in the above two statements. Yet when thinking realistically about their experiences with such exchanges over the past decade, most have reason to worry about whether such goals can ever be realized. Simon Leys (1983) himself has excoriated the shallowness and lack of integrity of much of Western writing about China over the past decade. One does not have to agree with his overall conclusions to admit that many of the examples of such shallowness and lack of integrity that he cites are indeed on the mark. And it is not at all clear that the Chinese will synthesize the best elements in Western culture and society with the best in their own. There are some serious thinkers, not only Western scholars but dissidents both inside and outside of the People's Republic, who fear that China
will synthesize the worst. Moreover, all of the best works of Western scholars of China were not sufficient to inoculate the minds of even sophisticated Americans from the contradictory stereotypes about China that Harold Isaacs (1958) brilliantly documented in his *Scratches on Our Minds*. And knowledge of America gained from Chinese scholarly contact with the West was no match for the crude xenophobic stereotypes which surfaced periodically during the history of the People's Republic.

What, then, are the obstacles that can keep the process of Sino-American scholarly exchanges in humanities and social sciences from realizing the best hopes of the participants in these exchanges? To answer this question adequately, we need a much better understanding than we have at present about how cross-cultural communication takes place, an issue tangled with philosophical, psychological, sociological, and political complications. As a modest first step toward such understanding, I will explore one of the strands of this puzzle—what I call the institutional strand.²

Specifically, I will analyze how scholarly research professions in the humanities and social sciences are organized in the United States and China—how they recruit, reward, and control their members, how they sustain themselves and expand their power and prerogatives—and I will explain the kinds of knowledge produced by members of these professions and the kind of values held by them in terms of these forms of organization. Finally, I will explain the vicissitudes of the past decade of scholarly communication between the United States and the People's Republic of China in terms of the interaction between the different institutional bases for scholarship in the two societies.

The Knowledge Professions in the United States and China

In the judgment of the 1982 report of the American Humanities and Social Sciences Planning Commission on "Research Opportunities in China" (Prewitt, 1982):

Establishing meaningful exchanges in the humanities and social sciences is greatly complicated by the lack of common understanding about the scholarly enterprises. Chinese and American scholars may use similar terms, "humanities" and "social sciences," but the intellectual premises, assumptions, purposes, and limitations—the "mind set"—invoked by these terms only partly translate across the cultural boundaries.(8)

The most basic differences in the meanings of these terms, the commission noted, concern the goals of the social sciences and the humanities. In China, scholarly enterprises are supposed to directly serve the "development goals articulated by national leaders" (8).³ In America (although the commission did not spell this out), the humanities and the social sciences are presumably "free professions," primarily serving the disinterested pursuit of knowledge in ways that the professions themselves define as appropriate.
Such is the dominant ideology of American professionals. In fact, of course, this ideology hides important aspects of reality. The contrast between Chinese and American scholarly professions is not a simple matter of dependence on or independence from their respective states. The American scholarly professions are very heavily dependent for funding and other resources on the U.S. government, and professionals solicit such funds by claiming that their work does indeed serve the interests of the government and of the large corporations that dominate the American economy. "Social science is supported," Prewitt, past president of the Social Science Research Council and the editor of the above-quoted commission report, puts it,

because power centers that control funds believe it will contribute to the well-being of the nation. More specifically, international scholarship and area studies are supported because it is thought that they contribute to the nation in its various relations with other sovereign states. In short, scholarship is part of the intellectual and organizational apparatus of foreign policy. (1984:89).

If anything, this is probably more true of Chinese studies than of many other kinds of area studies. The main differences between Chinese and American scholarly professions are thus to be found in the dynamics of their relationships to state efforts to control them rather than simply in freedom from or subordination to such control.

The links of American professions to the state are complex, largely informal, and subject to constant renegotiation. This gives a different shape to the experience of scholars who work within them than does the institutional structure of Chinese scholarship. As Prewitt (1984) writes, "There is much more to American international scholarship than its links to United States foreign policy, and those links in turn are loose ones, at the level of general, rather than operational, policy and through the informal back-and-forth flow of individuals rather than any structured, formal relations" (89).

Scholars in America feel freer than their Chinese counterparts to define their own research agendas because power to set the immediate goals of research—the most important questions to be studied, the major intellectual problems to be solved—comes from their peers in the various professional communities themselves rather than from government bureaucrats or corporate managers. Professionals are not, of course, disinterested in the effects of their scholarship on government policy and social change. They want to engage themselves in extra-academic institutions, particularly government, but on their own terms. It is, however, a constant struggle for American professionals to uphold the advantage in their terms of relationship with extra-academic institutions, particularly the government. After all, most of their research funding comes either from the government or from private foundations established by corporate elites and is therefore ultimately accountable to judgments made on nonacademic criteria. Whether given pro-
essions gain or lose institutional "strength"—which I define here in terms of ability to increase research budgets and expand academic programs while autonomously setting their own research agendas—vis-à-vis their patrons depends partly on internal factors under the collective control of the professionals themselves and partly on external factors constituted by social forces beyond the direct control of the professions.

The main thing the professions can do for themselves to increase their strength is to maintain discipline, solidarity, and high morale within their ranks. The chief way of doing this is to assure that members of the profession are primarily rewarded for devoting the major part of their energies to work which can only be performed and evaluated adequately within the professions themselves. Thus, the professions tend to put a premium on "basic research," which is driven by the quest to build upon and to revise accepted theories within the professional discipline itself rather than to meet practical needs defined by agents outside the profession. Professionals like to insist that relevant judgments—judgments that can affect the progress of a professional's career—about the quality of proposals to do such basic research and about the value of completed research projects can be made only by a scholar's professional peers. To the extent that a scholar appeals to the political utility or moral value of his or her work, the scholar opens the door to evaluations of the work by people outside of the professions. In the effort to conserve their strength, professionals will therefore tend to reject such criteria of evaluation and insist on criteria controlled by the professions themselves—expert understanding of the theoretical significance, logical consistency, and empirical validity of a peer's research. This is the basis for professionals' common insistence that their research is "value-free" (Bledstein, 1976; Haskell, 1977; Bellah et al., 1985).

If professions can succeed in monopolizing control over the criteria that determine the status of their members—and if they can offer significant rewards to those who achieve high status within their ranks while threatening with significant sanctions members who cannot or will not live up to professional standards—they can dominate their terms of engagement with external sponsors. But, due to forces beyond their direct control, the professions may not always be able to afford significant rewards and punishments for their successes and failures. They can do so only if their governmental and corporate sponsors are convinced that they need services that only the professions can provide. Thus, modern American professionals in the humanities and social sciences go to considerable effort to claim that modern political, economic, and social relations are so complicated that only their expert professional understanding of complicated causal relationships can provide adequate guidance for political, economic, and social policies. Whether the patrons of professional research accept this claim is dependent partly on the social psychology of public opinion and partly on the actual ability of professionals to deliver effective answers to actual problems experienced by the state and society. The effective strength
of the various scholarly professions has thus waxed and waned at various times in recent American history. American sociology, for instance, was rich in research money, social prestige, and self-confidence in the 1960s but has become relatively poor in these goods by the mid-1980s.

If in America the relationship between the social scientific and humanistic scholarly professions and their external political and social environment is best described as informal and dialectical, in China, on the other hand, the relationship seems somewhat more formal and static. In China, the terms of engagement between humanistic and social scientific scholarship and the government are more formally delimited and one-sidedly weighted in favor of the government. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), whose various institutes constitute the main organizations for carrying out basic research in the humanities as well as the social sciences, is a part of the Chinese government, the basic research component of the State Council in fact. Like all government units its mission is to carry out national projects under the state’s five-year plans. Even if research in such a unit is more free from direct Communist party control than in the past, an agency like CASS still has to make a much more explicit case than its professional counterparts in the United States that its projects are directly serving the needs of the state. Universities, the other major locus for research in the humanities and social sciences, are under the direct supervision of the Education Commission and, like CASS, must explicitly justify their work in terms of advancing China’s “four modernizations” (Rossi, 1985:12-13).

This direct and explicit subsumption of research and teaching by the state sustains distinctive standards for what constitutes good scholarly work. Good scholarship, first of all, is not value-free. Deborah Davis-Friedman (1979), one of the first American sociologists to go to China under the research scholar program negotiated in the process of the normalization of U.S.-China relations, reported that her “colleagues in China viewed themselves, and are viewed by others, as implementers of policy and many see their work as an integral part of completing the Chinese communist revolution. For them, ‘value-free, objective’ social science as it is pursued in the U.S. is an entirely alien enterprise” (3). And indeed when the Chinese Sociological Association held a major conference in Beijing in 1980, its members declared that the “ideological and moral education of young people should be given top priority in sociological research” (China Exchange News, 1980). Scholars throughout the Chinese humanities and social sciences will routinely make similar statements about the political and moral purposes of their work—statements that, for better or worse, probably sound unrealistic, naive, and just plain wrong to most secular American professional scholars.

Committing Chinese scholars to take moral and political stands through their work, the subsumption of Chinese scholarship into the state apparatus leaves them vulnerable to shifts in the official definition of what
constitutes a proper moral and political stance. Having suffered bitterly from shifts in political orthodoxy during the Maoist era, Chinese scholars have good reason to be very wary of what they say and what they publish. Protected by their "academic freedom," which is secured by the strength of their institutions, American scholars, on the other hand, can be bold to the point of recklessness and irresponsibility in their ability to make provocative statements on the basis of flimsy theories and scanty evidence about matters of grave national importance.

In fact, the competitive environment in which American scholars develop their careers encourages intellectual risk-taking and academic entrepreneurship. Successful American scholars often move from university to university or research center to research center in pursuit of more pay and status. The dynamism and fluidity of this environment contrasts with that in China, where scholars are assigned to work in research units where they usually are destined to spend their whole careers and where the progress of their careers and in the short run at least the stature of their scholarship are heavily determined by the judgments of their superiors in their work unit (Henderson and Cohen, 1984). To many American scholars, this Chinese scholarly environment can seem, as it did to the American Humanities and Social Science Planning Commission (Prewitt, 1982), "rigid, hierarchical, compartmentalized, and segmented" (89). Perhaps to the Chinese the American system seems amorphous and anarchic.

In any case, the differences between the conditions for advancing professional careers in China and the United States produce contrasting styles of research that are bound to lead to tensions when American and Chinese scholars collaborate in China. American scholars—especially young and ambitious ones—are usually under pressure quickly to publish original research done by themselves. Chinese scholars are not necessarily under the same time pressures, and they need to be more concerned than Americans would be about maintaining good personal relations with the scholars with whom they are immediately associated. A frequent theme in the reports of American scholars who have gone to work in Chinese settings is the need for "patience." One cannot rush in and out of Chinese research settings. If one is going to get anything worthwhile done, one has to take the time to cultivate good relations with Chinese sponsors and colleagues. But even if patience is one of an individual American scholar's personal virtues, that patience can be sorely tested by the need to participate in the race for success within his or her profession.

The ideals (if not always the realities) governing the distribution of success and failure in that race in America are meritocratic. The highest rewards of the discipline are supposed to go to scholars who produce creative research on the basis of their own intelligence and hard work, not simply to scholars who are lucky enough to have had the right connections with influential people. But in the "rigid, hierarchical, inbred, and segmented" institutional environment of China, research access has often
been very uneven and heavily dependent on one's good fortune of having the right connections with the right people. A smart, hard-working American scholar's whole project can be ruined if he or she happens to land in the wrong niche in Chinese academic life or fails to get along well with a key figure in his or her field. Besides being personally frustrating, this may indeed offend an American scholar's very sense of justice.

As in any sort of social scientific analysis, it is important to impart a sense of historical movement to the static pictures I have drawn of the contrasting institutional bases of humanistic and social scientific scholarship in the United States and China. At the beginning of their history, the American professions perhaps resembled the present-day Chinese professions in their political commitments and moral aspirations. Descended from ecclesiastical and civil traditions in Europe, the professions in early modern America were originally conceived of as institutions for morally grounding technical expertise and for sustaining among their practitioners a disciplined life of service to the public good (Bellah and Sullivan, 1986). The task of providing such moral grounding used to be associated especially with the humanities. By interpreting and transmitting the classics of a tradition, professors of the humanities sought to inculcate in their students a sense of what it would mean to live a good life. Throughout the twentieth century, as a result of the expansion of size, scope, and salience in everyday life of the modern state, together with the "disenchantment of the world" and the triumph of "technical rationality," the professions have been transformed into the institutional shape we have described above, vehicles for sustaining value-free technical expertise, based on science rather than morality. In the process, even the humanities have become devoted mainly to the implementation of scientific techniques for analyzing texts, decoding meanings, and the like.

With the vast expansion of China scholarship in America during the decades after World War II, members of that field moved faster, perhaps, than most scholars in the humanities and social sciences toward the definition of their work in terms of modern ideals of scientific expertise. Not only social scientists but leading specialists in the humanities have made an effort to portray themselves not simply as introducers to America of a great Asian tradition but as experts who could give government and business the technical information they needed to pursue their best interests with regard to China.

Older, morally grounded understandings of the professions have not completely disappeared, however. Vestiges of such understandings continue to sustain the dedication, the spirit of service, and the commitment to public purpose that many scholars still bring to their work. And as we shall see below, remnants of these older understandings are appealed to by American scholars critical of the mainstream of contemporary social scientific and humanistic research on China.
Although contemporary humanistic and social scientific scholarship in China has more in common with earlier Western conceptions of the "vocation" to learning than with the conception prevalent in America today, the contrast is not absolute. Chinese scholarship in the post-Mao era is indeed undergoing some movement toward the objective, independent, putatively value-free ideals of research prevalent in America. In a report on his conversations with historians in China in 1979, Frederic Wakeman (1980) noted the beginnings of this trend:

Historians in America are sometimes made to feel that their interest in the past is irrelevant to the present. That particular kind of philistinism does not exist in China, where the very opposite may be true. History has been all too relevant to contemporary political issues and intrigues during these last two decades, and many of the scholars we met during our visit confided to us that they had suffered precisely because of such presentism.

Historians in China today appear determined never to let this happen again. . . . Reacting strongly to the "Gang of Four," they call for a new toleration of different points of view and, above all, for the right to treat history "objectively and scientifically," instead of making it the handmaiden of politics.

Nevertheless, as Western historians whose own values and present concerns are mirrored in their research work, we discern a considerable distance between yingshe lishi [shadow history] and scholarship that recognizes subjective bias while continually striving for objectivity. At present, our colleagues in China speak of themselves as beginning to practice the latter, and we believe that there is much to learn from each other as they undertake that task. (15–16)

In recent years, there have been clear moves in all realms of scholarship toward such ideals of objectivity (Thurston and Parker, 1980). A constant theme in all of the reports published by American scholarly delegations in the humanities and social sciences that have visited China since 1978 is that "everywhere we found signs of renewed scholarly activity, of intellectual exuberance, and of academic vitality" (Wakeman, 1980). But research in China is still a long way from the mainstream ideals of the contemporary American social sciences and humanities. To be sure, Chinese scholars have in general been granted enough independence from the grip of Communist party control that they are not severely pressured to become mere ideologues or apparatchiks. Still, American scholars tend to criticize the work of their Chinese colleagues (usually nowadays in a mild and tactful manner) for being too concerned with advancing values and not enough with establishing and verifying theory.4

The different institutional bases for social scientific and humanistic scholarship in the United States and China thus lead scholars on both sides of the Pacific to different styles of research, and ultimately to different ways of thinking about the nature of their work. Perhaps these institutional incongruities can explain why Chinese and American humanists and social scientists—presumably among the most learned and cosmopolitan mem-

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bers of their respective societies—have sometimes had serious difficulties communicating with one another since the renewal of exchange relationships between their two countries. Let us see now if the story of the vicissitudes of U.S.-China scholarly exchanges in the past decade makes sense when told in terms of the institutional dynamics we have been analyzing.

**Exchanges in the Humanities and Social Sciences Since Normalization**

In 1978, American academics reacted with an enormous flurry of effort to the prospect that American specialists in the humanities and social sciences would once again, after thirty years of exclusion from the People’s Republic of China, be able to carry out research projects there. “It was like a tar pit,” recalls a major figure in one of the organizations funding American social scientific and humanistic research, as he described the forces suddenly pulling his time and energy into arranging for the initial stages of the American research presence in China. Today, he finds it somewhat difficult to understand why he and so many American academic leaders reacted with so much excitement and with such a sense of urgency to the opportunity to send research scholars to China. Perhaps, he muses, it had something to do with a “Pearl Buck syndrome,” an abiding sense of wonder, lodged deep within the American psyche, about the infinite subtleties of Chinese culture and society.

Perhaps, though, the excitement had as much to do with the position of China scholars within the current dynamics of American academic institutions. Some academic leaders, like the person quoted in the preceding paragraph, initially expressed doubts about the wisdom of committing so many academic resources into humanistic and social scientific research on China. But influential spokespersons for American China scholars argued forcefully that this was an historic opportunity for scholarship that should not be missed: There was a tremendous amount to be learned, and the new opportunities would revolutionize the China studies field. For the moment, China scholars had enough prestige in academic circles and enough influence in government that their arguments were able to sweep aside reservations. They had been able to make a convincing case that their government and their society vitally needed expertise that only they could provide.

Aided by millions of dollars in funding from the federal government and the major private foundations, Chinese studies had arisen from a tiny base on the margins of academic life to become a solidly established part of the American scholarly establishment in the decades following World War II (Lindbeck, 1971). With the renewal of political contact with China in the early 1970s, China scholars were being called to an unprecedented degree from the obscurity of their universities to travel in delegations to China with some of America’s most famous political and cultural figures, to give interviews in newspapers, to appear on television, and, most importantly,
to serve as consultants to the government and major corporations. They were playing a key role in some of the most important political events of the third quarter of the twentieth century. Trading on the prestige gained from making indispensible contributions to such important events, they were in a position to claim a larger share of economic resources available for basic research as well as larger shares of the energy of university presidents and foundation executives and of the attention of the media and American intellectuals. The period of time leading up to the normalization of U.S.-China relations gave American China scholars a rare opportunity to fulfill their quest for professional strength by making their patrons in government and the foundations expend considerable effort to advance the professionals’ own agenda of basic research.

In particular, American China scholars were in a position to push their government to expend a considerable amount of political capital in pressing the Chinese government to overcome its reluctance in accommodating the research plans of American social scientists and humanists. Leaders of the Chinese government were unenthusiastic about playing host to Americans wanting to do research in the humanities and social sciences. What the post-Mao regime was enthusiastic about was the opportunity to rebuild its science and technology research institutions by sending students in these fields to receive advanced training in the United States. But, in hard bargaining sessions, American negotiators firmly insisted that accepting American social scientists and humanists was a price that the Chinese had to pay for the opportunity to send their scientists to America.

It was not only Chinese government officials who were reluctant to open the doors to American social scientists and humanists. Chinese social scientists and humanists, just rebuilding their careers after the Cultural Revolution, had mixed feelings about the coming of their American colleagues. The Chinese scholars might learn from their American colleagues about some of the latest theories and methods in their disciplines—if the Americans were not so busy with their own research to take the time to teach them. But the visiting American scholars would take up resources—offices, spaces in libraries and archives, the services required for setting up field sites—that the Chinese scholars also needed to reestablish their fields. And there was always the possibility that the American scholars, unfamiliar with the minefields on the post-Cultural Revolution landscape, would set off controversies that could endanger the reconstitution of Chinese humanities and social science.5

The opportunity for American scholars to go to China was therefore a result, on the one hand, of the strength of China studies within American scholarly professions and, on the other hand, of the weakness of Chinese academic institutions. From the Chinese point of view, the exchange program was being used to overcome the weaknesses in its scientific and technological research capacities but was not immediately going to be of much
help in overcoming the weaknesses of its humanistic and social scientific research, and, indeed, may have even sacrificed indigenous social science and the humanities for the sake of progress in science and technology.

This situation placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the first several cohorts of American research scholars sent to China under the terms of the new exchange agreements. American China scholars had raised high expectations that the new access to Chinese archives and field research sites would revolutionize Chinese studies. The first cohorts of humanists and social scientists to go to China represented a fairly well-balanced mix of senior and junior scholars “chosen on the basis of their scholarly knowledge and the potential of their proposals for advancing knowledge in their respective fields” (China Exchange Newsletter, 1979). As applied at the time, these selection criteria emphasized the capacity of the scholars to advance the strength and autonomy of their American professions by contributing to the basic research agendas of those professions. In the process, they somewhat neglected consideration of the relevance of the proposed research to China’s perceived needs and of the appropriateness of the research to China’s current social context. Thus, for example, a scholar who played a central role in selecting the first American social scientists and humanists to go to China thinks it strange in retrospect that so many of the first researchers selected were male demographers, who proposed to go into Chinese villages and ask Chinese women intimate questions about their child-bearing plans.

Chosen to carry out projects that were congenial to the American scholarly professions but not necessarily congenial to the Chinese, the first cohorts of American humanists and social scientists to go to China were thus in a difficult position. They gained a great deal of prestige from being chosen, but it was a contingent prestige. Their professional mentors had held out the promise that they would make major contributions to their fields. If, apparently squandering their historic opportunities, they did not deliver on such promises, they could have a lot to lose. And the more junior scholars among them, with less of an already established reputation, perhaps had the most to lose. But, having accepted the presence of these Americans because they had to, not necessarily because they wanted to, government officials and academic colleagues on the Chinese side were not necessarily motivated to make an all-out effort to ensure the American scholars success in their ambitions.

In hindsight, therefore, it should not be surprising that many of the American scholars quickly experienced frustrations. Sometimes, publications they wanted to consult were labeled “restricted” (neibu), portions of archives were placed out of bounds, persons they wanted to interview were unavailable, field sites they wanted to visit were off-limits. Often, access to research materials depended heavily on one’s luck in establishing good personal relations with a network of people who for the time being happened to be in a position to help one; and failure to gain access came from one’s
misfortune at establishing good personal relations with people who hap-
pened to be at odds with those who currently controlled access. Research
went slower than the Americans had hoped, and real breakthroughs in
knowledge became elusive. Reports coming back to America often spoke of
the need for "patience" if one was going to do research in China. If the
institutional pressures of American academic life make patience hard for
any scholar, the high expectations initially raised for research in China
placed even greater strains on this virtue. Most of the first American
scholars were mature, cosmopolitan, flexible individuals, who could accept
such frustrations in good grace, especially if there seemed to be good rea-
sons for them. But not infrequently restrictions on access to desired
research materials seemed arbitrary and whimsical.

Given the institutional pressures put upon American scholars to make
important advances in the state of the art in their disciplines through their
research in China, and given the different priorities of Chinese government
and academic institutions, it was perhaps inevitable that conflicts would
arise between the two sides. By 1981, these conflicts had reached a crisis
point in the controversy over the fieldwork practices of Steven Mosher. A
graduate student in anthropology from Stanford, Mosher was a member of
the first group of American research scholars placed in China after normal-
ization. After spending part of 1979 and 1980 doing participant observa-
tion fieldwork in a Guangdong village, he published—originally in the
spring of 1981 in a magazine on Taiwan and later in an American scholarly
journal—a sensational article about how callously coercive some local Chi-
nese officials were being in enforcing family planning—compelling women
as much as eight months pregnant to have abortions and creating a climate
in which some parents felt pressured to practice infanticide on girls. For
their part, the Chinese authorities responsible for managing the exchange
program with the United States began to accuse Mosher, even before he
published his Taiwan article, of having engaged in serious improprieties
while conducting his research, including traveling to restricted areas of
China without a permit, illegally importing a van into China, and illegally
bringing out restricted documents. The Chinese eventually demanded that
Stanford University punish Mosher for these transgressions and eventually
cited the Mosher case as one reason to deny long-term fieldwork access to
anthropologists and sociologists seeking to study Chinese communities.6

What is of interest for our purposes here is not the details of the
Mosher case itself (which are still murky and some of which are still the
subject of litigation) but the institutional pressures that produced and exac-
erbated it. The competitiveness of the American professional world, cou-
pled with the relatively high stakes that had temporarily been established in
the China studies segment of that world, would inevitably encourage ambi-
tious scholars to push up against the limits established by the Chinese.
Mosher was obviously such a scholar, under pressure perhaps to deliver
significant findings more quickly than more established American social
scientists. In any case, when he pushed against the limits of what was acceptable conduct for a researcher in China, the Chinese were not in a position to have to budge.

By 1980, it was becoming clear to the Chinese that they did not have to tolerate a great amount of inconveniences from American scholars in the humanities and social sciences in return for sending their own natural scientists and engineers for training in the United States. The Chinese research scholars were in effect paying their own way in America. The research they were doing in American laboratories and the contributions they were making in seminars were in themselves valuable contributions to American science. American universities would welcome first-rate Chinese science students on their own merits even if none of their social scientists or humanists could go to China. The Chinese could afford to take a hard line against scholars like Mosher who tried to pursue avenues of research that were contrary to the interests of powerholders within the Chinese government.

The case of Steven Mosher was only the most visible and most heated of several imbroglios occasioned by the aspirations of American researchers in China in the early 1980s. In the late spring of 1981, Lisa Wicher, a graduate student from the University of Colorado who was doing research for a dissertation on agricultural economics while working as an English teacher in Beijing, was arrested, detained for several days, and expelled from the country for allegedly obtaining classified documents on the Chinese economy. Around the same time, Myron Cohen, a distinguished senior anthropologist from Columbia University, was denied permission to come to China to conduct an extended stay of village fieldwork that had been arranged during the preceding year. And articles in the Washington Post and New York Times reported that these problems were part of a general series of lesser conflicts between American scholars and their Chinese hosts.

Indeed, by early 1981, when complaints were just beginning to surface about Mosher’s activities, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was moving to put new restrictions on fieldwork access. Now it was no longer permissible to do the standard kind of fieldwork associated with American social anthropology and qualitative sociology, no longer possible for American scholars to carry out long-term, open-ended, independently formulated fieldwork projects on contemporary issues in basic level units. Now fieldwork visits to basic-level units were to be restricted to three weeks. Researchers had to present explicitly detailed research plans for approval and could not deviate from those plans while in the field. The kind of social scientific and humanistic research that was permitted was work on topics narrowly enough defined and clearly enough formulated to obviate the broaching of sensitive political issues. These restrictions have stayed in effect.

The 1982 report (Prewitt, 1982), Research Opportunities in China for American Humanists and Social Scientists, by a top-level commission of American social scientists and humanists who had visited China in 1981,
was somber in tone. "A gap exists between what the Commission believes an appropriate research presence in China should be and what the Chinese currently are willing and able to permit." To overcome this gap, the commission recommended neither "accommodation or confrontation," although various voices within the American scholarly community, in the press, and in Congress were advocating such courses of action. For the time being, rather, the commission counseled patient education and persistent negotiation. It vaguely warned that if this patient approach did not eventually work, more confrontational approaches might be warranted. But it concluded that "it would be premature to lose patience and to abandon the longer vision that guides our approach" (44-51).

But what was this longer vision? "The present academic exchange program is serving so many worthwhile goals," the commission wrote, "that it is not easy to identify a broader vision that might provide coherence to its many parts" (15). Having tried to identify such a vision, it finally concluded that it was primarily to "serve American scholarly interests" in providing a "scholarly understanding of the world—how we got to where we are, what are the limitations to which we must adjust, and what are the possibilities toward which we should reach." These interests would be served by establishing "a balanced research presence in China, a presence in which topics and researchers are selected on the basis of standard scholarly criteria." The most important of these criteria for evaluating a research proposal was "its intellectual merit in advancing a rigorous comprehension of China and in advancing a disciplined theory" (19).

However, by the early 1980s this vision of the role of the scholarly professions as autonomous pursuers of basic research dictated solely by scholarly criteria independent of external political pressures or nonprofessional public opinion was increasingly coming under attack in America, as the institutional base for American social scientific and humanistic scholarship began to lose some of its strength. The Reagan administration's budget cuts affected availability of research support for almost all social scientists and humanists. Mainstream professional scholars, those who dominated the major universities and well-established research centers, were under attack by conservative ideologues for being too "liberal." The position of China scholars was weakened along with that of their other colleagues. Although China scholars held their own in the era of constricting opportunities, they were no longer in a position, as they had been in the glory days of the late 1970s, to increase the strength of their institutions.

By becoming a highly visible symbol for a variety of groups within American society of what was wrong with the American scholarly professions, the Mosher case contributed to the weakening not only of China studies but of the social sciences and humanities in general. Unfortunately, not only for Mosher but also for Stanford University and for the larger community of American professional scholars, Mosher seems to have conducted himself in such a way that a good graduate school might have had
ample reason to censure him even if his publications had been politically inconsequential and even if the Chinese had never objected to his behavior. The Stanford anthropology department alleged, among other things, that he had lied to his dissertation committee about how he was doing his work and how he was spending his research funds, that he had manipulated local Chinese people into cooperating with him, and that he had inexcusably violated the confidentiality of some of his research subjects. This was unfortunate for Mosher because as the glare of controversy brought these transgressions to his mentors’ attention, he was faced with the prospect of expulsion from graduate school. Under the circumstances, it was unfortunate for Stanford in particular and for American academic institutions in general, because if Stanford did expel Mosher, the university would appear to be giving in to Chinese pressure to punish someone who had uncovered unpleasant truths about that society.

In 1983, after a lengthy internal investigation, the Stanford anthropology department did indeed expel Mosher, on grounds that it said could not be fully published out of respect for the privacy of certain people affected by Mosher’s actions. The expulsion was eventually upheld against Mosher’s appeals by recommendation of a committee appointed by the university president. Predictably perhaps, spokespersons for the political Right in America attacked Stanford’s action and defended Mosher, who had worked energetically to keep the media informed of his point of view. “We smelled a rat,” the Wall Street Journal editorialized in July of 1983, . . . It’s clear . . . a good part of the American social science establishment, fearful that research opportunities in China would otherwise be closed off, had joined in the stone throwing. . . . If Mr. Mosher had discovered forced abortions in South Africa or Chile, perhaps even violating local law in the process, he might have been given a medal of honor by the academic establishment. Unless Stanford can say more about just what Mr. Mosher did that was so outrageous, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was singled out for special moral scrutiny solely because his unpleasant truths were too shocking for his fellow academics to bear.

Finally, in 1985, when Mosher’s expulsion was upheld by Stanford’s president, the Wall Street Journal announced: “We worry about a more general intolerance on the part of what seems to be an increasingly enervated class of U.S. university intellectuals. Should these habits prevail, society will come to look elsewhere for new knowledge . . . .” (29). More surprisingly, some voices commonly associated with the political center and the Left also defended Mosher. The New York Times (1983) concluded “that Mr. Mosher deserved better. It would have been salutary if academic ranks had instead closed against a tyranny that aims to hide the truth and to impose its standards on a free university.” And The Nation (1983) published an article written by Jeffrey Lincoln, which concluded that the U.S. State Department, the Chinese government, and Stanford University had
“agreed, at least tacitly, on a common goal: the sacrifice of Steven Mosher to save the cultural exchange projects of the new China diplomacy” (31).

The attacks from a broad range of the American political spectrum against the Stanford decision to punish Mosher were implicit attacks on the autonomy of the American social scientific and humanistic scholarly professions. Outsiders were claiming to be better judges of an anthropologist’s work than insiders to the profession. Moreover, these claims implied a critique of one of the central devices used by American professionals to insulate themselves from nonprofessional interference—the assumption that their work is primarily driven by and must be held accountable for its contribution to scientific theories rather than extra-academic values. If the main job of the scholar was to gather reliable information that contributed to rigorous theories about social processes, as the most influential professional social scientists seem to believe, then Mosher’s work, sensationalistic and theoretically unsophisticated, was not very important (Diamond, 1985), certainly not important enough to forgive important lapses in professional ethics.

Most of the critics of the Stanford decision were willing to grant (without having access to the relevant facts) that Mosher may have committed various professional improprieties, but they were willing to forgive those in the light of what they considered to be the great value of his work. Mosher had exposed serious violations of human rights in at least one village in China. If the proper vocation of a social scientist or humanist was, as the right wing seemed to suggest, not simply to do basic research that was value-free and that advanced purely scholarly interests, but to provide the basis for judgment about the moral legitimacy of (Communist) regimes or if, as Jeffrey Lincoln suggested from a populist perspective in The Nation, it was to speak for the rights of ordinary people against the claims of the state, then Mosher’s work was a very important contribution to scholarship. Criticisms of how Stanford, and by extension the mainstream of the American scholarly community, handled the Mosher case were a small part of a larger set of criticisms, increasingly common in the 1980s, of the moral enervation of the American social sciences and humanities.

China studies in the early 1980s suffered somewhat not only from the general weakening of professional social sciences and humanities but also from a relative decline in the need for the services of China scholars, once U.S.-China relations began to become routine. (In the 1980s, experts on Japan were finding themselves more in demand, with larger student enrollments, more attention from the media, and more opportunities to consult for business and government.) China scholars were thus not in as strong a position as they had been in the late 1970s to vigorously pursue their interests for research access in China. They were forced perhaps to play a humbler role in the process of U.S.-China cross-cultural relations than they had envisioned on the eve of normalization.
That enforced humility may have led, however, to a more healthy long-term basis for academic exchange than the pride of the late 1970s. No longer in a strong position to ask their government to pressure the Chinese into accepting American social scientists and humanists as a quid pro quo for accepting China’s science and technology scholars into the United States, American China scholars now increasingly asked for a research presence in China in exchange for helping China’s own social scientists and humanists to develop their disciplines.

China now has good reason to welcome carefully selected American scholars because they can be beneficial to China’s own efforts to rebuild its own social sciences and humanities. Although the Chinese government has not invested large sums of money in sending its own social scientists and humanists to receive training in the United States, some such scholars can now come to America through the funding of American institutions like the Luce Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, and the Fulbright Program. Such American funding is not at all directly dependent on the satisfaction of American scholars with their research access to China—although if there were very widespread and vocal dissatisfaction, such funding could conceivably be affected. Often, too, Chinese humanists and social scientists can count on American colleagues, whom they have met and worked with when the Americans went to China, to arrange for opportunities to study in American universities. Finally, Chinese social scientists and humanists now welcome the opportunity to learn the latest techniques for data-gathering and analysis from collaboration with American colleagues visiting China. The worst nightmares of the American scholarly community in 1981, that China might close its doors to almost all meaningful social scientific and humanistic research by Americans, have not materialized. The flow of American social scientists and humanists across the Pacific has been steady and gradually increasing.

It is perhaps ironic, however, that an effect of many of the Chinese restrictions on research access has been to ensure that those American scholars who did come to China were people who fit closely the standard American professional ethos of scholarly detachment, narrow specialization, and scientific objectivity rather than the politically engaged, value-laden ethos of much of Chinese scholarship. Successful applicants to the exchange program sponsored by the CSCPRC have precisely and rather narrowly defined topics that stay away from larger questions of the moral basis of contemporary Chinese society and politics. William Lavelly (1982), a demographer reporting on his fieldwork in rural Sichuan in 1980-81 (just after the time that Steven Mosher was working in rural Guangdong), reports that his “greatest frustration was that, apart from . . . formal sessions with my entourage, there was no opportunity to meet peasants or to have any informal contact with them.” This did not render his kind of work impossible, however, because he was mainly interested in surveying
“issues of fact such as birth dates, educational levels, and child-bearing. Besides, survey research does not depend on interview depth as much as it depends on a kind of standardized superficiality.” Using this kind of “standardized superficiality,” Lavely was able to determine that the birth planning program in Shifang County of Sichuan Province had indeed been very successfully carried out. “On the other hand, the means used in the attainment of this success are a sensitive issue within China and hence not appropriate at this stage for investigation by foreigners” (4–5).

The areas of scholarship where cooperation proceeds most smoothly between Chinese and American scholars are those that involve exchanges of ideas about techniques of prediction and control. American economists seem well satisfied with their research access to China, and a vigorous group of Chinese economists has been coming to the United States to study (Ford Foundation, 1986). Even though most Chinese and American economists will disagree about whether a market economy or a state-planned economy is in the long run most efficient, they are both interested in this post-Mao era in finding ways to rationally predict the various consequences of particular policies in such a way as to control the general direction of economic behavior. Historians seem well satisfied with their research access also. Most reputable historians with clearly focused proposals to study anything other than contemporary history can have good access to available archives. Their basis for collaboration with their Chinese colleagues is not so much the broad interpretation of Chinese history, but the exchange of technical information: The Chinese can tell American scholars where to find certain archival materials, and the Americans can exchange ideas about the latest methods, for example, statistical analysis, for extracting information from historical data.

What these examples point to is that a steady and growing exchange of ideas between American and Chinese social scientists and humanists is possible in precisely those areas where the orientations of the institutional bases of their research overlap. The institutions for modern American social scientific and humanistic research are mainly oriented toward specialized, expert, “value-agnostic” explanations of human behavior. The monopolization of the capacity to develop such explanations gives the institutions for research some autonomy vis-à-vis the state and the large corporations that dominate the political economy, but it also attracts the necessary patronage of the state and large corporations by promising to provide those patrons with the means to manage the behavior of persons within their realms. The institutions for carrying out such social scientific and humanistic research in China are in general more directly under the control of the state and more explicitly committed to the political task of legitimating the government and its policies. Yet by emphasizing the need for expert technical knowledge, which can only be achieved by specialists devoted to basic research, they are gradually gaining some autonomy from direct control by nonexperts in the state and party, even as they promise
faithfully to offer the state and party the means to predict and control the behavior of China's population. This convergence provides a solid basis for communication between American and Chinese experts.

There are remnants of traditions within the American social sciences and humanities, however, that support the view, which we saw expressed by many of the nonprofessional critics of Stanford's decision to expel Steven Mosher, that the ultimate task of professional scholarship is not simply to predict behavior but to understand and articulate the meanings people share about justice, freedom, dignity, and responsibility—about, in short, the moral bases of a good society. Various professional scholars have recently published sharp critiques of American China scholarship for neglecting just this dimension. In their much discussed "Sinological Shadows," Ramon Myers and Thomas Metzger (1980) have accused China scholars of so bracketing the moral dimension of Chinese historical development as to give no guidance for a rational discussion of the legitimacy of the Chinese state and thus no basis for a rational discussion of the moral value of America's China policy. Myers and Metzger, of course, wish to raise this issue of moral interpretation in such a way as to argue that the Guomindang government of Taiwan is a better government than that of the People's Republic of China. But there have also been critiques of the moral sterility of China studies from the Left, notably the recent article by Robert Marks on "The State of the China Field, or, The China Field and the State" (1985). In line with many scholars associated with the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Marks argues that scholars with a Marxist understanding of history have been largely excluded from research in China and from the opportunity to enter into dialogue with their Marxist colleagues in China.

Both Marks, on the one hand, and Myers and Metzger, on the other, have been criticized by their academic peers for lack of logical rigor and empirical accuracy. Although many of these specific criticisms are valid in my view, there are nonetheless aspects of the rhetoric of these scholars which resonate with general concerns in American society that our major academic institutions are not facilitating a necessary public debate about what we must do to build a decent and just world in this day and age. The quotations with which I opened this chapter—expressing hopes for the possibility that humanistic and social scientific studies of China can lead Westerners to "increased self-knowledge . . . readjustment of one's own values, awareness of the limits of one's own civilization" and that corresponding studies of both the West and of their own society might lead the Chinese to a synthesis of the best aspects of technological development of the West with a moral alternative to the secular emptiness of Western society—echo such concerns.

Genuine dialogue about such issues has indeed resulted from some of the exchanges between Chinese and American humanists and social scientists over the past several years. "The most rewarding discovery for me
during my stay in China," writes Yi-tsi M. Feuerwerker (1982), who spent six months there in 1981 collecting material for a critical biography of Ding Ling,

was that we are all of us participants in an international intellectual community within which there can be genuine communication. . . . In the end I came away with a renewed respect for the universal commitment to intellectual endeavors, reassured and moved by the recognition of those bonds that linked us in spite of the yawning gulfs created by political restraints and history. (8)

But insight into common commitments and mutual intellectual bonds seems to happen most readily when, in the process of working together, American and Chinese scholars become friends, and temporarily forgetting about the specific tasks they must perform to further their careers, they informally reflect together about the larger meanings of their lives. Most often, though, they are too engrossed in doing their "real" work to systematically articulate and publish the insights thus gained, and the insights remain but a "feel" for one another's society that may, nonetheless, exert a subtle influence over their published research. Sometimes, however, they publish their reflections in nonscholarly memoirs, like Vera Schwartz's *Long Road Home: A China Journal* (1984) and Liu Zongren's *Two Years in the Melting Pot* (1984)—works which may in the end have at least as much value as their monographs. "In the end," writes Vera Schwartz, living in China "also invites us to know ourselves better, to bring that knowledge to bear on China's unfolding modernity" (24). Citizens of nations on both sides of the Pacific need constantly to reform their idea-producing institutions so that they will not simply produce reams of technical information but will genuinely facilitate the common acquisition of such wisdom.

Notes

1. This quote and all other quotes in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from twenty-six interviews I conducted in 1983-84 with American scholars, foundation executives, and government officials who had played important roles in establishing and managing cultural exchanges with China. I am deeply grateful to these interviewees, who shall remain anonymous, for giving me their time and for speaking candidly with me. This is the first part of a larger project, which will involve interviewing appropriate Chinese scholars and government officials about their views on U.S.-China cultural exchanges.

2. The sociologies of knowledge and of culture usually try to link ideas and other forms of symbolic expression to the political and economic interests of the social classes which produce and espouse them. I am suggesting that there are indeed such links, but that the links are indirect, mediated through the internal structure and dynamics of the institutions which produce various forms of culture.
and shaped by the particular forms of the relationships between those institutions and the wider society. More work has to be done analyzing the institutional bases for cultural expression if we are adequately to understand both the meaning of the symbols that make up a society's culture and the relationship between those symbols and the underlying social structure.

3. See also, Zhao Fusan (1985):

My American colleagues will note immediately that even the concept of social science is usually interpreted differently by our two countries, as the Chinese concept also includes philosophy, history, literature, languages, religion, law, international relations, and so on. Chinese social sciences cover a broader area than American social sciences and approximate in meaning Wilhelm Dilthey's Kulturwissenschaft. This serves to illustrate that even though each nation's development has in common some fundamental needs that raise questions of the same basic nature, the way in which nations respond to these questions is flavored by the unique features of each nation's and each people's economy, politics, history, culture, and psychology. Similarly, the social sciences developed as a response to these questions will inevitably contain the features and personality of the native country. The commonality of social science is that each nation's social science has its own individual character. Only after fully understanding this does social science exchange between nations acquire meaning and value.

4. This criticism no longer takes the form of an allegation that Chinese scholarship is rigid and dogmatic—it clearly is not—but that too much of Chinese scholarship works at the wrong levels of abstraction. Thus, American historians have suggested that many historiographical projects of their Chinese counterparts are too broad by American standards. Aiming at generating sweeping expositions of patterns of Chinese social history down through the centuries, such projects often produce large generalizations, which cannot be carefully grounded in clearly established facts. Such grand histories may be highly valued if the primary goal of a historian is to draw political and moral lessons from the unfolding of time, and historians who produce gracefully articulated histories like this may be forgiven imperfections in the empirical documentation for their work. If the main goal of historiography, on the other hand, is to provide 'objective, scientifically established facts,' historians who try to develop ideas that are too big for careful documentation will not be taken seriously by their professional peers (Thurston and Parker, 1980).

American scholars in other disciplines, like sociology, tend to suggest that their Chinese colleagues are doing research that is too narrowly focused, carrying out, for instance, analyses of "social problems" like juvenile delinquency that do not show the links between such problems and economic and political issues in the larger society. But the production of specific recommendations for solving what members of a government define as social problems may be highly valued by social scientists who see their work in terms of service to the state. If the goal of such social scientists is to arrive at basic theories of social organization which could be used as means to a wide variety of ends, then narrowly defined social problems analysis may be deemed relatively trivial by the mainstream of their profession (Rossi, 1985).

5. I am indebted to David Chu for much of the information in this paragraph.

7. Mosher was also vigorously defended from inside the academic professions by Irving Louis Horowitz (1983), who, in the tradition of C. Wright Mills, has often taken pride in opposing his profession's "establishment."

8. In Diamond's view, Mosher does not substantiate his views about the misery of life in rural China with much hard data, nor does he make any effort to show how typical were the abortion atrocities he mentions.

References


Introduction

During the height of protests against the war in Vietnam, radical American students were often heard urging the overthrow of "the system." Unfortunately, these radical voices reflected a profound misunderstanding of the American political genius. Before "the system" could be overthrown, it would first be necessary to find it!

The American political genius is discernible in the design and implementation of exchanges with China as well. In the first place, the "design" itself was minimal. Officials in the Carter administration had the objective of creating a web of relationships between China and the United States, but clearly, these officials were limited in using the power of the state to create them. The government could, itself, enter into exchanges with China, and, indeed, more than twenty executive agencies have by now entered into agreements with Chinese counterparts. Beyond that, the government could encourage exchanges outside of government by offering financial support (which it has done) and by making hortatory appeals to the private sector (which it has done also). Absent, however, has been the specification of qualitative and quantitative criteria which would mark a fully "designed" program.

In addition, the design has been only remotely related to the implementation. The enthusiastic responses of private individuals and institutions to opportunities for exchanges with China could not have been fully programmed in the design stage. Yet, these responses have yielded a multiplicity of exchange arrangements involving institutions of higher education, private companies, and newly emerged "exchange entrepreneurs," as well as those managed by government itself. The "web of relationships" has come into being; the genius lives!

The darker side of the pluralist genius for dispersing power and responsibility, of course, is sometimes characterized by ungovernability, a lack of accountability, and an inability to set and achieve collective ends. Pluralism's broad sanction to private behavior in the rational pursuit of private ends at times conflicts with the ability to pursue collective ends and compromises the achievement of goals which are collectively rational. Whether these problems of pluralism characterize U.S. participation in scientific exchanges with China is a question taken up in the final section of this chapter.
The American pluralist inheritance does characterize the U.S. approach to exchanges in science and engineering, with the result that the values and expectations associated with the program on the American side are quite diverse. It would be impossible to examine them in any detail in a chapter of this length. The following discussion, therefore, focuses predominantly on the Chinese experience; implications for the United States are explored in the concluding section.

At first glance, it would seem that China’s approach to exchanges is radically different from that of the United States. Although different groups in China may hold different attitudes toward the exchanges, as Thomas Fingar has argued, at the same time, China seemingly has the traditions and institutions both to centrally design and centrally coordinate the implementation of exchange programs. We can therefore speak more readily about the setting and achievement of collective values and expectations than we can about the U.S. side.

We should not assume from this, however, that on the Chinese side there is a high order of control over all aspects of the exchange program. An exchange experience as broad, as multifaceted, and as complex as the current one is both inherently uncontrollable and is a force working against certain forms of central control. Two of the more important questions about China’s participation in the exchanges are whether centralization can be maintained in the face of exchange-related forces for decentralization and pluralism, and if so, how.

Chinese Needs and Objectives

In ways that are rather uncommon to relations among nations, exchanges between the United States and China in science and technology have been particularly salient for the development of normal, relatively stable political and economic relations. On prima facie grounds, therefore, we would expect that there is something of considerable value to the two sides in the exchanges. To explicate what the value is to the Chinese side, it will be useful to reflect briefly on the origins of the program.

China’s interest in a new mode of relationship with the West, and particularly with the United States, came at about the same time that senior Chinese scientists, such as Zhou Peiyuan, were beginning to convince Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai that China’s research and higher education systems were suffering as a result of the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution and its subsequent “reforms.” With the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, a foundation for a new political relationship with the United States was laid. In an initial attempt to give substance to the new relationship, a program to exchange scientific personnel was initiated.

Although these early exchanges of scientific delegations were at times derogated as “scientific tourism,” they nevertheless offered Western scien-
ists opportunities to see the level of the Chinese scientific enterprise. More importantly, they gave the Chinese an exposure to Western scientific practice, an opportunity which they hadn’t had to any significant extent since the early years of the People’s Republic.

Clearly, in the years since 1949, the Chinese followed the achievements of Western science as reported in the scientific literature. However, they found it much harder to keep up with the many facets of, and rapid change in, the practice of science (including funding and research management, the relationship between research and advanced doctoral level education, the growth of interdisciplinary research and the consequent emergence of new fields, and the growth of new science-based industries). Most importantly, the revolution in the “technology of research” brought about by computers and rapid innovation in the field of scientific instruments was largely beyond the imaginings of most Chinese scientists and science policy officials.

For Western scientists visiting China during the 1970s, the failure of the instrumentation revolution to reach China was one of the most consistent and striking impressions of their visits. For the Chinese, there came the realization that China’s relative position in world science was now doubly threatened. Not only had Chinese science stagnated during the Cultural Revolution, but during the same period, the instrumentation revolution had occurred abroad, and the industrialized West had increased the tempo of its advance. The poignancy of this predicament increased during the mid-1970s. As Cultural Revolution themes were defended by the Gang of Four and their followers, the eye-opening science exchange process broadened to new fields and new participants.

Along with the need to learn about the Western technology of research, another major concern of the Chinese in the 1970s was the state of the technical manpower pool and the contributions the exchange program could make to it. China’s manpower needs can be thought of as having both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The appeal of exchange programs is at the point where the quantitative and the qualitative converge.

China’s “contingent” of science and technology (S&T) personnel, while small on a per capita basis, is, nevertheless, large in absolute terms. The Chinese report figures of from 6 to 7 million members of the contingent, of which some 330,000 are regarded as “researchers.” A number of problems exist with these numbers, however. We don’t really know what level of achievement is required for membership in the contingent, and, undoubtedly, the numbers include some with minimal higher education. We also don’t know in any great detail how manpower is employed. Thus, we cannot address with confidence such questions as the sectoral distribution of these personnel, nor the qualitative distribution by sector. For instance, it is often said that the defense sector has a disproportionate share of the total number of scientists and engineers—and of those of better quality—but it is quite difficult to quantify these propositions.
The value of the exchange program is not, however, in its contribution to the solution (in the short term) of the aggregate manpower problem. The key question about China's manpower needs for our purposes is, instead, whether the manpower pool has the resources to provide the Chinese scientific establishment with the leadership necessary for the achievement of the science and technology-related goals of the four modernizations. Such leadership traits would include the ability to conceive of and direct original research and to be able to supervise the work of students in China's newly instituted graduate programs.

There are good reasons to assume that a leadership vacuum exists. For instance, in 1980, only 9.6 percent of the faculty members of China's institutions of higher education (IHEs) held ranks as professors or associate professors. Similarly, low proportions of individuals in the upper ranks of research institutes ("researchers," "associate researchers") have also been noted; in one authoritative analysis of S&T manpower, only 58,700 individuals out of a total manpower pool of 5,714,000 were regarded as "senior" scientists and engineers. The value of exchange programs for the amelioration of China's manpower problems comes into sharper focus when viewed against this specific problem of academic leadership; a new leadership corps is essential for the modernization of China's research institutes and educational institutions, and there is no way that the 10,000–20,000 individuals needed for this task could be brought to leadership standards domestically in the same amount of time that the job will be done through overseas training.

In addition to manpower needs, China has what we might call research system needs. These include, but go beyond, the need to adopt new forms of research technology. As we have seen, one of the clear early motivations for sending scientists abroad was for them to learn about instrumentation and how it affects the nature of the scientific enterprise. However, as experience has been gained, the boundaries of "research technology" have expanded to include the relevant "organizational technologies" as well. Thus, the Chinese have come to understand "research system needs" as including the need for new forms of research funding, organization, and management. More recently, they have also begun to raise questions about the nature of scientific communities and the relationships between science and technology and modern legal systems.

When we reflect upon the relationships between the technology of research, narrowly conceived, and the broader organizational technologies which sustain it in the West, we can begin to see a new dimension of the importance of scientific exchange for China. We can also begin to perceive the difficulties China has of extracting the most out of the opportunities afforded by these exchanges.

We can appreciate these difficulties if we consider the more obvious institutional features of the modern technology of research. The "doing" of modern science in the West is unimaginable without a dynamic, techni-
cally progressive scientific instruments industry. The conditions of this industry’s technical progressiveness, in turn, presume a variety of institutional factors being in place.

The existence of special funds for equipment purchases (although not always up to the expectations of Western scientists), the existence of an established market for scientific instruments, and relatively easy communications between vendors of equipment and users are all conditions which exist in the West and contribute to rapid change in the technology of research. In addition, the technology of modern research seems to take for granted a high degree of institutional flexibility. This permits interdisciplinary cooperation characterized by relatively low “transaction costs” and a high tolerance for ad hoc organizational arrangements. These same conditions have not normally obtained in China’s highly bureaucratic, vertically organized science system.

The Chinese exchangee, therefore, cannot avoid being exposed to the “doing” of science in a broad sense and an image of modern science and technology as a systematic phenomenon. The Western research environment is part of a larger “sociotechnical system” involving complex, and seemingly dynamic, interactions among universities, business enterprises, and governments. Returning scientists have brought, and continue to bring, these images back with them. They have fueled the growth of China’s “science of science” (kexuexue research) community (which seeks to understand the dynamic relationships among research, production, and policy) and have stimulated interest in using the exchanges to learn more about these sociotechnical systems.

This “system learning” dimension of the exchanges takes on additional value in a context where China’s current leaders evidence fascination with “the new technological revolution” (NTR), a concept whose salience in China clearly grows out of experience with exchanges and the “new open-door” policy more generally. The lesson of the NTR for China’s leaders is that such science-based economic activities as those found in the computer, the electronics, and the biotechnology industries are the new bases of “wealth and power” in the world and that China’s escape from relative poverty and weakness is to found in participation in the NTR.

China’s political leaders, as well its scientists, engineers, and S&T policy officials rightly look to the above-mentioned Western sociotechnical systems for an explanation of the origins of the NTR. Fortunately for China, its policy of sending students and scholars abroad gives it highly valuable, if incomplete, access to some of the organizations involved in the systems’ dynamic interactions. The significance of this access is better appreciated if we recall that science and engineering exchanges are not limited to academic institutions, but also include exchanges between government agencies and between Chinese ministries and enterprises and American companies.
We saw that China's science had some clearly identifiable needs in the 1970s when exchanges began and that these needs shaped the values and expectations attached to the program. We will see, below, that there is evidence that these initially understood needs are being met by the program.

We have also seen that China's participation in exchanges has involved collective learning, which has altered the values and expectations brought to the program. New needs are perceived as a result of experience gained in the program during one time period, which comes to influence objectives for the next time period. I have argued that even as the initial objectives were being met, the Chinese came to a fuller understanding that it is often difficult to separate modern science from the technological and institutional environment that helps support it. While this realization has led to new objectives for exchanges, it has also had a major impact on Chinese thinking about their own technical institutions. The desire to capture fully the benefits of the exchanges and to effectuate the transfer of Western research technology added to the dissatisfaction with these technical institutions felt by many scientists and policymakers and reinforced the movement toward reforms in science and technology.

**The Reform Program**

The relationship between scientific exchanges and institutional reform in science and technology is not entirely unprecedented in twentieth-century China. As we know, academic exchanges were of considerable value to China in the early years of the People's Republic. From the beginning, the new regime had as a clear objective the development of an indigenous capability in scientific research and technological innovation. The prime human resources for these tasks were the few thousand scientists and engineers who had received advanced training in the West before 1949. These individuals after 1949 became the intellectual leaders of the regime's new academic and research institutions and, along with those who began returning in the late 1950s from study in the Soviet Union, played crucial roles in the often impressive achievements of Chinese S&T in the period 1949–65.

The experiences with student and scholar exchanges in both the pre- and post-1949 periods were accompanied by forms of institutional change or innovation. In the pre-1949 period, exchanges gave rise to new forms of professional organizations, such as the Science Society of China, and various disciplinary professional societies. After 1949, the sending of students and scholars to the Soviet Union was accompanied by a thorough overhaul of research and education, as well as economic, institutions in emulation of the Soviet Union.

The latter "reforms" of the 1950s are ironically the source of much of the dissatisfaction with scientific institutions in the 1980s. There is good reason to believe that the post-1949 policies and institutional arrangements constrained the returnees from making as full a contribution as they might
have. One way of looking at today’s reforms, therefore, is in terms of their effect on how well China can make use of the talents of the current generation of returnees. As implied above, the returnees are themselves forces for the very change which affects them.

Considerable attention has been given to defective policies and systemic weaknesses by Chinese policymakers in recent years, and this had led to a consensus that reforms should be directed toward the solution of two chronic problems of the research system. These are the problems of research not being linked effectively to production and of inadequacies in the training and utilization of technical personnel. A host of reform measures has been initiated relating to these and other problems. Many of these will affect returning students and scholars. Four in particular deserve our attention.

The first is the changing nature of the Chinese university. In the 1950s, Chinese institutions of higher education (IHEs) were reformed to more nearly resemble Soviet institutions. Contrary to the best judgments of China’s leading Western-trained scientists, the IHEs did not develop into centers of research and advanced training. Instead, these functions were to be performed by the Academy of Sciences, as in the Soviet system.

This fundamental institutional choice had two important consequences for Chinese science. First, it “locked” many of China’s better scientists into an institutional setting (the academy), which became increasingly bureaucratic and increasingly confused about its mission. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it diverted China’s limited number of Ph.D.-level scientists from what in retrospect should have been their main task—that of reproducing themselves and expanding their numbers.

In the post-Mao period, the role of the IHE is changing with the adoption of missions more like those of the great research universities of the West. Increasingly, universities (not the academy) are to be the main granter of advanced degrees, and the research role of IHEs is better established today than at any time since the founding of the People’s Republic. The supposed virtues of the Western university (everything from the breadth of its training to the new high-technology companies “spun off” by its faculties) have been publicly praised and held up as models for Chinese IHE reform. China is likely to reap greater long-term benefits from its exchange program if this trend in IHE development continues and if an appropriate number of returnees are placed in professional positions.

This latter “if” points to the second area of reform. For many years, the allocation of technical manpower has been approached through the use of central planning mechanisms. Once IHE graduates were placed, according to a plan administered by the Ministry of Education, it was very difficult for them to change jobs. This system, which was rationally to serve the nation’s needs, was by the late 1970s producing seriously irrational outcomes in the form of misallocations of technical talent. Some units, particularly those in the defense and heavy industry sectors, were overstuffed,
while others experienced serious shortages of technically trained personnel. Individuals were often assigned tasks which did not suit their training, and there were serious geographical imbalances as well. In response to these problems, the regime has gradually relaxed its strict insistence on centralized administrative allocations. A limited labor market is now tolerated, and it is easier—though still not easy—for individuals to change jobs.

The problems with manpower allocation and utilization and job mobility are tied to one of the most serious organizational problems facing Chinese science. This is the problem of the power of the work unit, or danwei, in Chinese society. Danwei leaders have in recent years often frustrated the intentions of national policies, including policies for more effective utilization of technical manpower. The danwei has also been a source of resistance to policies intended to upgrade the status of technical intellectuals and to rectify the anti-intellectual discriminatory policies of the past. In addition, danwei power has exacerbated the problems of scientific communication that are endemic in the vertically organized, Soviet-style system. Undermining the philosophy of "unitism" (danwei zhuyi) and the influence of the unit are two of the more important objectives of reform, objectives that will affect the realization of the promises of the exchange programs as well.

Reforms in the funding of research are also being tried. The two most notable approaches to this reform are the establishment of a Chinese National Foundation (inspired by the U.S. National Science Foundation) and a variety of experiments with contract research. The former opens up possibilities for the individual researcher to secure support from a source other than the operating budget of his/her unit. The latter is intended to make research units more responsive to the needs of production by making more of their revenues (in some cases, all) less dependent on annual appropriations from the state budget. Both reforms are intended to inject a greater sense of efficiency and competitiveness into the research environment. Both also work against the logic of the danwei concept.

The reform program, if it takes hold, should make the life of the Chinese scientist better and stimulate a more exciting research environment. This environment should be more conducive to utilizing the talents returning scientists will bring with them. The danger of the reform program for the full utilization of returnees is that in the short run many of the returning scientists may be drawn into the politics of reform as partisans. The Chinese reform literature indicates not only the existence of an anti-reform constituency (as we would expect), but also that among reformers, there are at least two types of reform agendas.

To simplify, these may be referred to as the Soviet-inspired and the Western-inspired reform programs. These share a concern with breaking from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, but the former (though clearly less influential) looks to reform experience in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the early 1960s for inspiration, while affirming the basic out-
lines of the Soviet model as introduced into China in the 1950s. It is likely that those returnees who become participants in the politics of reform will be more inclined to the Western-style reforms and will have to spend precious time defending them in what is likely to be a protracted trial-and-error process of mutual accommodation leading to a hybrid system.15

**Evidence of Effects and Impacts**

There is still much we don't know about the effects of exchanges on Chinese science. However, the extent of our ignorance has been partially reduced as a result of a recent study by Dr. Otto Schnepp, the former U.S. science attaché in Beijing. While admittedly limited in scope and not entirely consistent with some anecdotal accounts, Schnepp's findings are nevertheless suggestive and are in accord with my own impressions during visits to selected research institutes in January 1986. Relying on interviews with American scientists who hosted Chinese and interviews conducted in China with senior Chinese scientists and science policy officials, Schnepp has found evidence that the exchange program has been more effective and successful than many in the United States had expected. In particular, Schnepp’s findings indicate that the exchanges are having impacts on the types of systemic problems noted above.

1. *The technology of research.* As noted above, this was a serious problem for Chinese science due to its past international isolation at a time when a revolution in instrumentation was occurring in world science. Thus, one of the more important benefits of the exchanges has been the opportunity to become exposed to recent developments in the area of research technology.

According to Schnepp: "The exposure of a large number of Chinese scientists to world-level research, modern equipment and up-to-date research methods is considered a major contribution to Chinese science and technology."16 Schnepp goes on to report:

The scholars are believed to have acquired . . . familiarity with state-of-the-art science. They know what the latest research results in their fields are and understand the rationale and significance of the work. . . . The visiting scholars have, of course, acquired a considerable body of knowledge about and gained familiarity with equipment used in the modern laboratory, and they have learned a great deal about experimental techniques which are new to them. This knowledge is said to extend to the construction of specialized equipment required for some areas of research. The scientists also bring back with them familiarity with the use and applications of computers and are credited with making a significant contribution to the introduction of automated and computerized procedures in their environment.17

The fact that Chinese scientists who are returning to IHEs are doing so at a time when these institutions are receiving substantial assistance for equipment purchases from the World Bank reinforces significantly the transfer of modern research technology. The "machine-embodied" tech-
nology transferred under the World Bank program complements the "person-embodied" transfers from the exchanges, and the latter make it more likely that the former will be successful. 18

2. Academic leadership. We saw above that the legacy of the Cultural Revolution left a serious gap in the academic leadership ranks. Again Schneppe finds that the exchanges are ameliorating this condition.

A majority of the exchange scholars are given new responsibilities on their return, some becoming department heads or deputy heads while many more have been appointed group leaders (division heads and deputy heads at CAS institutes or research and teaching group heads at universities). 19

The fact that returnees are coming back to a system whose reforms have begun to open up pathways to upward mobility, and to the recruitment of individuals of proven technical competence to leadership positions, again extends the impact of the exchange program. It would be a mistake to assume that the path to academic leadership has now been cleared of all the obstacles imposed by untutored cadres whose influence is now in decline. Nevertheless, the growing number of younger, foreign-trained scientists in responsible positions is inescapable to the visitor to China's research institutes and is in marked contrast to the situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

3. Departmentalism. As we have seen, the Soviet system adopted by the Chinese in the 1950s had been characterized in both China and the Soviet Union by vertically organized research sectors. These patterns of organization have over the years inhibited intersectoral communication. In addition, the danwei phenomenon further discouraged easy scientific interchange between scientists in different units.

It is encouraging, therefore, that Schneppe has found evidence that returning scientists are bringing back with them the values of more liberal scientific communication practices and that these are being used to overcome sectoral obstacles. The returning scholars are without exception impressed with the importance of communication between scientists in their immediate environment as well as with those in other departments and beyond that in other institutes and universities. . . . the returning scholars have organized a large number of seminars within their research groups as well as topical seminars in which scientists interested in a given subject meet regularly even though they work in different institutions. 20

4. Impact on universities. As we have seen, a fundamental organizational issue facing Chinese science for thirty years has been the role of research in institutions of higher education. In the Soviet model, this role is played down in favor of a strong central academy. The Chinese now seem to be moving away from that model as a matter of reform policy. Schneppe's findings indicate that the exchange program is reinforcing this reform.

In addition, because university research was not emphasized in the past, resources for IHE research were always fewer than for other sectors. Faculty members thus had few positive incentives to undertake research
and, indeed, under conditions of scarcity, were confronted with disincentives. The establishment of a university research tradition, therefore, will require not only a more generous allocation of resources to the IHE sector, but will also require role models who represent the new institutional values. The first condition can be met with changes in national policy, but the second is more difficult to achieve by policy declaration. The exchange program, however, is an opportunity to economize on the time required to produce such role models.

At universities the opinion prevails that the returning scholars are imbued with the concept that research is important for raising their level of instruction, primarily in graduate courses but also in undergraduate teaching. Also, university faculty return with strong motivation to continue carrying on research projects and almost all succeed to get started within a year of their return.

Schnepp's findings also indicate that while the program has been quite successful in Chinese eyes, problems remain. The first is that there is still too high a proportion of individuals participating in the program who lack the preparation to make the most of the opportunity. The Chinese admit that in the early years of the program screening was more lax than it should have been, and although progress has been made, there is still room for further improvement.

A second potential problem is the continuing influence of the home unit on the individual exchangee. Units try to "program" the study abroad to accord with the individual's responsibilities under the unit's research plan. Under such circumstances, the unit will of course expect the exchangee to return to the unit upon completion of foreign study. Schnepp finds that although there is some reassigning now going on, most scientists do return to their home units. The more liberal personnel procedures now being tried as part of the reform package may alter this situation in the future. The fact that an increasing number of exchangees are going abroad directly upon graduation from university (thus, not having been assigned to a unit), is also an important development, the consequences of which are still unclear.

A third serious problem affecting the ability of the Chinese to extract the full benefits from the program is the support environment for research the scientist confronts upon returning to China. We have seen that change was needed within the research system and that Schnepp's findings indicate that the exchange program has been a positive force for change within the system. Yet, the system is not independent of an environment from which it receives sustaining resources. Of particular importance is the capability of the environment to supply equipment, quality reagents, and other supplies on a timely basis. The exchange program cannot directly effect change in this environment, yet the productivity and effectiveness of the returnees are strongly influenced by it. According to Schnepp, serious problems remain in this area.
Many interviewees held that there is a definite shortage of materials and reagents for research as compared to the availability in industrialized countries. Many chemicals, even though available locally, are not of sufficient purity to be used in research and much effort is invested in preparation and purification since substantial hurdles exist to making purchases abroad, quite apart from the inherent delays. In general, most professors and returned scholars agree that the facilities and supply channels are considerably less efficient than in the U.S. As a result, the time required to complete a given project is significantly longer, even though more manpower is available in China for auxiliary work such as the purification of materials.22

Studies of Soviet science have found that problems with the supply system for the support of research can influence the style and ethos of science, leading in the Soviet case to a tradition of theoretical science less dependent on an unreliable supply industry.23 Such a tradition is not what China seeks, and the full benefits of the exchange program will be lost if supply problems are not solved. Their solutions will be found, if they are to be found at all, in the reform of the domestic economy. What the exchange program does do is to create an additional source of demand for such reform.

The Technology Transfer Issue24

In the discussion above, the concept of “technology transfer” was used sparingly and was applied only to what I have called the technology of research. Commonly, scientific exchanges are considered to be distinct from instances of technology transfer. This common assumption, however, must be used with care in light of the inherent ambiguities of the concept of “technology transfer.”

Students of technology transfer, wishing to achieve specificity for the meaning of their core concept, often attempt to limit its meaning to the transplantation of a definable type of know-how from one environment to another. In this approach, efforts are made, understandably, to distinguish “technology transfer” from broader phenomena such as more general “knowledge transfer” or “cultural diffusion.”

Yet, empirical studies of technology transfer often indicate how elusive a concept know-how is and how difficult it is to separate know-how from broader organizational and cultural contexts. It is often helpful when confronted with this problem to consider the forms in which know-how, or technology, can “move.” Thus, distinctions are often made among “machine-embodied,” “paper-embodied,” and “person-embodied” technology. The first involves know-how “embodied” in a piece of production equipment or instrument. Paper embodiment usually refers to technical information contained in blueprints and plans and, at times, to technical journal and trade magazines.

In one sense, the transfer of a piece of equipment from one country to another can be thought of as a case of machine-embodied technology transfer. Experience has taught us to be cautious about this conclusion,
however, for two reasons. First, the inventory of unused or underused equipment in much of the Third World is testimony to the fact that the transfer of equipment is not always the same as the transfer of technology. The equipment being transferred may require managerial and other organizational arrangements and a supporting technological environment that simply do not exist in the recipient country. Without these contextual conditions, we may say that "artifact transfer" has occurred, but not technology transfer.

Apart from the contextual requirements, the second reason for being cautious about assuming that equipment transfer is the same as technology transfer is the absence of other actions—that is, the technology embodied in the machinery is inaccessible to the recipient. The machine is there to be used, but not fully to be understood. The know-how is, in effect, "black-boxed."

For this reason, sensible Third World technology transfer policies provide for the "other actions." These may include reverse engineering, extensive adaptive research and development (used widely by the Japanese at an earlier period), or the insistence that equipment sales be conditioned on the provision of some sort of training (as well as the sharing of the relevant paper-embodied technology). Chinese thinking about technology transfer, by the early 1980s, had come to recognize the importance of these "other actions," and as a result, its technology transfer priorities shifted from acquisition of the "eggs" to acquiring the "hen."

Overcoming the problems of providing the context for equipment transfers and those of "unlocking" the know-how embodied in machinery is facilitated by there being also transfers involving person-embodied technology. Humans can understand contexts and can intervene to change them; alternatively, when they understand the technology embodied in the machine, they can adapt it to contexts (factor endowments and resource availability, cultural and organizational styles) that are difficult to alter in the short run.

The scientific exchanges which are our focus here are probably best thought of as distinct from technology transfer. They lie somewhere in the uncharted terrain between equipment transfer and cultural diffusion. However, scientific exchanges clearly are related to technology transfer in a number of important ways. First, the technology of research, discussed above, to which the exchanges is exposed, is often in a derivative relationship to commercial technology; the mastery of the former can provide a purchase for the mastery of the latter.

Second, exchange experience provides a window on the operation of Western technical systems which can aid technology transfer. Knowledge gained through the use of such "windows" enhances understanding of the capabilities and reliability of different technologies. A returnee with such understanding is an asset to decision-making intended to achieve the proper fit between a technology and a need. The window also offers an opportunity to understand what I have called the contextual requirements of the technology.
Third, those returning from exchanges, through their contributions to China’s R&D and educational systems, are likely to become the nucleus of an enhanced national scientific and technical capability needed for the absorption and assimilation tasks required of any successful technology transfer effort. Finally, for some types of technology (e.g., for software engineering), the exchangees may be the very persons in which specific technologies are embodied.

Seeing exchanges in technology transfer terms is essential if we wish to assess the value of exchanges to China. What we see, however, depends somewhat on what we mean by the terms technology and technology transfer. If we take a constrained view of the meaning of technology, then we can say that in some cases returning scientists in their embodiment of know-how are instances of technology transfer. In this view, the exchange program as a whole would not be viewed as technology transfer, but it would be seen as contributing significantly to meeting the contextual requirements of successful transfers.

If, on the other hand, we see technology as more of a sociotechnical systemic phenomenon and technology transfer as lying more toward the cultural diffusion end of our spectrum, then the exchanges as a whole can be viewed as technology transfer. Either way, however, there is little doubt that in addition to the other values China attributes to exchanges, the exchanges also serve China’s intense quest for foreign technology.

**Implications for the United States**

The focus throughout this discussion has been on the values and expectations of the exchange program for China. This was in part because the highly pluralistic nature of the program on the American side makes the explication of the diverse values and expectations difficult. In addition, it is also fair to say that much of what the United States expects from the program, at the official level, is contingent on what happens in China. Rather than attempting a full explication of American values and expectations, it is more appropriate to conclude with an assessment of the implications of the program for the United States. To do so, a brief synopsis of official values and expectations is first necessary.

When the United States began the extensive programs of exchange with China in late 1978, it did so with a mixture of motives but with the primacy of political objectives. As Denis Simon’s chapter in this volume shows, U.S. officials believed that scientific exchanges would serve China’s announced modernization goals, and they therefore believed that they would be valued by the Chinese. As such, they could be used to advance the objectives of building closer political relations with China to offset what was perceived to be growing Soviet power. They could also be used as a way of establishing working relations with a new generation of Chinese leaders. More generally, through the establishment of a web of public and private
scientific, educational, cultural, and commercial relationships, there was the hope of binding the two countries together in ways that would not permit the easy rupturing of political relations.

Among the nonpolitical objectives was the desire to use scientific exchanges, especially those under the intergovernmental S&T cooperation agreement, to promote trade. It was also considered by officials of the Carter administration to be in the U.S. interest to aid China in meeting its energy and food needs, and exchanges were seen as instrumental to that purpose as well. Finally, there were diverse governmental and nongovernmental objectives in bringing China into the community of world scientific relations and scholarly interchange. The motivations here were both diffuse and specific, depending somewhat on the disciplines involved. Among the more specific were those held by American scientists who had interests in uniquely Chinese phenomena (in areas such as seismology and cancer epidemiology, for instance) and those held by China specialists in the social sciences and humanities who saw U.S. leverage in scientific exchanges as a resource to facilitate access to research in China.

When U.S. interests in the program are compared with what has been said above about Chinese expectations and experience, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, the program has succeeded in remarkable ways in aiding the conversion of a nonrelationship of mutual isolation and hostility into a normal, modern state-to-state relationship. This would not have been possible were it not the case that both sides believed their interests have been served by the program. The United States can confidently conclude that most of its initial objectives for the program are being met; the empirical record seems to support this conclusion.

The program's success has contributed to the mutually desirable objective of improving relations between the two countries. However, it is also influencing the direction of China's modernization policies toward a course which seems to be in the U.S. interest. When one considers the cardinal institutional reforms now being tried in China, the inspiration for many of them is unquestionably a product of the exposure to Western ways made possible by scientific exchange and the new open-door policy. These cardinal reforms in science include those mentioned above—changes in funding practices, a redefinition of the role of the university, and a relaxation of personnel allocation procedures. To these should be added the growing importance attached to scientific advisory mechanisms and technical consultancy services.

At the heart of all these changes is a redefinition of the role of the technical expert in Chinese society. This redefinition is by no means complete, and it is unlikely to be complete for some time. Instead, it is an ongoing process of reconciling party insistence on maintaining a monopoly on social control, with the functional requirements for the relative autonomy of technical personnel; of bridging the gaps among those embracing
the Maoist, the Soviet, and the Western traditions of how technical expertise, economic management, and political power should be interrelated.

As suggested above, the ultimate outcome is likely to be a hybrid of these traditions. But in the process of reconciliation, those adhering to the Western tradition of greater "subsystem autonomy," while in the minority, have a tactical advantage; the flaws in the other traditions are by now obvious to many in key positions. While the construction of a Western-style scientific community in China is unlikely, the ongoing infusion of Western-inspired scientific practices resulting from exchange programs will continue to define, as it already has, the agenda for institutional change in China's scientific research and higher education.

The fact that these changes are occurring is of considerable importance for the United States. Yet, there are profound uncertainties about the relationship between China's course and U.S. interests. First, although a Western-inspired program of reform may be on China's agenda, there are powerful historical reasons to expect that China will not choose that program without significant modifications. It is indeed difficult to predict which course China will follow, but it is certain that China will choose on the basis of its sense of its interests. Although there has been somewhat less coherence in China's conduct of exchanges than its formal institutions would lead us to expect, nevertheless, we see in the working out of the program on the Chinese side the articulation of program design and implementation with national objectives.

On the other hand, the United States may now be approaching the classical pluralist policy dilemma with regard to its interests in the program. Many of its initial objectives are being met, including the goal of developing diverse constituencies with a "stake" in good relations with China. This is part of the American pluralist genius. The cost of all this, however, may be the appearance of a kind of "tragedy of the commons" problem, in which private and public interests diverge. If the interests of diverse private constituencies are being served by exchanges with China, can we assume therefore that the "national interest" is also being served?

In the pluralist tradition, the answer is almost by definition affirmative. The questions which the United States must ask itself, now, however, are, first, whether the empirical record accords with this pluralist principle and, second, whether the pluralist genius embedded in the design and implementation of the exchange program contains within it the seeds of collective irrationality. At what point does Chinese exploitation (not necessarily consciously sinister or unfriendly) of the U.S. pluralist system for their collective ends lead to the loss of collective benefits and the imposition of collective costs on the United States?26

In answering this question, much depends on how the Chinese system evolves. Just as the early phase of the scientific exchange program reflected the main institutional features of the two societies, so will future phases. The details of that future on the Chinese side are difficult to predict in the
face of the remarkable changes now in course. It seems unlikely, however, that China will evolve into a liberal, “market-rational” society with institutions increasingly symmetrical with those of the United States.

An interesting, but still not widely discussed, possible course of development would be for China to evolve into a socialist version of the East Asian “plan-rational” or “developmental” state. Unlike China’s regional capitalist neighbors, in the Chinese version the means of production would still be socialized. But like them, and unlike Soviet-style “plan-ideological” systems (which China has been), market exchanges (rather than state planning) would serve to coordinate the economy and set all but strategic goals, and there would be extensive participation in international trade. Like other “plan-rational” systems, the state would set strategic goals (such as which industries should be favored), and these goals would be a function of a strategy of international competitiveness rooted in technology policies. In such a system, in short, the relationships between the state and science, technology, and the economy, while not the same as China’s capitalist East Asian neighbors, would be readily recognizable by them.

Were China to evolve into a “plan-rational” system of this type (and it has a long way to go before doing so), the evolution would be accompanied by the acquisition of notable scientific and technological capabilities. This acquisition will have been made possible in no small measure by the exchange program with the United States. U.S. support for exchanges thus may be helping to create another participant in the worldwide revival of the Handelspolitik tradition, the modern version of which sees the powers of the state used to foster scientific research and protect high-technology industries in the context of a market economy. This revival poses both threats to, and opportunities for, U.S. interests. If China is indeed likely to evolve into a distinctive “plan-rational” system, now is the time to begin to think about the opportunities.

At times, the United States seems to be poorly equipped at the governmental level to identify and seize such opportunities. To be better equipped would be to have policy-level monitoring of the kinds of exchange programs we have been considering here. It would also mean having organizational mechanisms for policy level, proactive initiatives to identify and capture “opportunities” to serve U.S. interests—whether scientific, commercial, or political—made possible by such exchange programs. In a world where science and technology are increasingly important factors in foreign affairs (as the U.S.-China relationship demonstrates so well), the United States is still groping toward an institutionalized, high-level mechanism for integrating international S&T issues with national policy. We should not be surprised, therefore, if China over the long run is more successful than the United States in realizing its objectives for exchanges in science and engineering.
Notes


3. This subject is explored in greater detail in Richard P. Suttmeier, "The Role of Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations," in Daniel H. Bays, ed., U.S.-China Trade Relations, 1983: Six Essays (Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1983), pp. 61–70.


6. Ibid., p. 29.


10. In October 1986, e.g., Wu Mingyu, vice-minister of the State Science and Technology Commission, led a delegation to Canada and the United States to study science, technology, and the legal system.


12. Forty-six percent of the natural science awards made by the state in 1982 went to IHEs, including four of the six first-class awards (Beijing Domestic Service, September 21, 1984, in JPRS–CST–84–034, October 29, 1984, p. 18).


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
26. This, it seems to me, is the theoretical question underlying Simon's discussion in ibid.
28. See ibid., p. 17.
Scientific Exchanges and Technology Transfer to China: The Policy Issues

Denis Fred Simon

Introduction

Science and technology have come to play an increasingly important role in foreign policy and world affairs (Sanders, 1983; Granger, 1979). This has been especially true in the case of America's evolving relations with the People's Republic of China. Since the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington in 1979, science and technology have become one of the cornerstones of the emerging Sino-U.S. relationship. In fact, both comparatively and historically speaking, it can be said that the role of science and technology in Sino-U.S. relations has been unique. In few, if any, of America's other bilateral relationships have science and technology been as significant in the forging of expanded diplomatic ties.

Yet, while science and technology have served to help fortify the Sino-U.S. relationship, they have also been a major area of controversy, disagreement, and unfulfilled expectations. This is especially true regarding the technology transfer aspects of Sino-U.S. science and technology (S&T) exchanges and commercial technology relations. On several occasions since formal diplomatic relations were established, prominent Chinese leaders have publicly chastised the United States for what they perceive as America's unwillingness to provide unencumbered access to Chinese scholars by U.S. education and research institutions or to transfer advanced technology to China. And, even though since 1981 U.S. controls on the export of advanced technology to China have been steadily and significantly relaxed, China has frequently expressed its displeasure over the pace of scientific exchanges and the composition of technology flows from the United States.

The rapid proliferation of science and technology contacts between the two countries raises a variety of critical questions about the role of science and technology in foreign policy and the extent to which advanced technology should be sold to China in the face of continued uncertainty surrounding the political dimensions of the Sino-U.S. relationship. In this regard, it is legitimate to ask whether rapidly expanding science and technology ties can, indeed, act as a catalyst in helping to strengthen those political ties. While the Chinese clearly believe that science and technology should take the lead and that better political relations will subsequently follow, others in the United States (including myself) believe that our political ties must first fall
into place to a greater extent than is now true before the transfer of technology can play the "integrating" role or have the shaping effect envisioned by many policymakers and sinologists in the United States.

This chapter will deal with four main questions regarding the role of science and technology in Sino-U.S. exchanges, highlighting a number of sensitive and often challenging questions—but unfortunately providing only skeletal answers in many cases to what promise to be continuing issues. The four areas are (1) the extent to which Sino-U.S. exchanges in the scientific and commercial technology areas are structured to provide China with the know-how most appropriate to resolving its numerous modernization problems; (2) the extent to which the United States is creating unfulfilled expectations on the Chinese side; (3) U.S. policies and practices with respect to the transfer of science and technology as compared with those of other countries, especially Japan; and (4) given the evolving nature of the Sino-U.S. political relationship, an appraisal of whether or not the United States has moved too rapidly in science and technology exchanges to the detriment of both U.S. interests and Chinese economic development.

**China’s S&T Modernization Objectives**

In order to appreciate the reasons for the salience of the science and technology questions in Beijing and Washington, it is essential to understand what has driven the strong interest in this issue on both sides. Interestingly, in spite of its more fluid domestic economic and political situation, China’s goals regarding the S&T exchanges and technology transfer have been relatively more tangible and straightforward than those of the United States. Moreover, in some respects they have also remained more limited.

One of the principal driving forces behind China’s desire to ease tensions with the United States was to gain access to U.S. educational institutions as well as American scientific, production, and managerial know-how (Suttmeier, 1980). In fact, there is good reason to believe that Deng Xiaoping was able to “sell” normalization to some of his more skeptical cohorts on the basis of the potential science and technology benefits. By training large numbers of Chinese students overseas and opening the door to foreign technology and expertise, the PRC leadership hoped to overcome its country’s technological backwardness and eventually close the “gap” between China and the industrialized nations (Orleans, 1980). Furthermore, in using foreign science and technology to strengthen their indigenous capabilities, Chinese leaders have hoped to harness their links with the United States and other nations to enhance their potential for greater self-reliance—a goal somewhat dissimilar to the U.S. objective of trying to use scientific exchanges and technology transfers to forge greater political interdependence (Baum, 1980).
More specifically, the imperatives of economic and military modernization have been the primary driving forces for many PRC policy initiatives since the post-Mao era began. In their efforts to raise industrial and agricultural output, improve the overall standard of living, and accommodate their country's national security interests, Chinese leaders have attached a special role to science and technology. China's leaders have indicated that at least one-half the gains toward achieving their stated goal of quadrupling the gross value of agricultural and industrial output by the year 2000 will have to come from increased application of science and technology. Accordingly, it is no accident, for example, that between 85 and 90 percent of the students China has sent to the United States for advanced training and study have been in the natural sciences, engineering, and medicine rather than in the humanities and social sciences (Lampton et al., 1986).

Within China, a whole series of new policy initiatives has been taken in order to strengthen the country's science and technology base. In March 1985, China's Central Committee announced the "Decision of the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System" (Xinhua, March 19, 1985). The document is a further affirmation of a range of policies designed to encourage the scientific community to ensure that research serves production and that applied research is given sufficient attention. Managerial reforms, a "contract system," and commercial technology markets have been introduced in order to make the transfer of research to production more efficient. Improved status has been accorded to scientific and technical personnel, with the goal of increasing the number of qualified personnel in positions of authority and responsibility as well as providing opportunities for greater job mobility. Financial incentives have also been expanded through an award system that grants financial prizes to S&T personnel who make significant contributions to the goal of S&T modernization (Simon, 1985).

Most critical, the Chinese have indicated their willingness to complement indigenous efforts by using foreign science and technology and allowing a significant degree of foreign participation in their economy and research and development (R&D) system (Simon, 1986). The decision to expand, in a significant fashion, the use of foreign science and technology represents, in some respects, a major revision of Chinese thinking. It reflects a new approach in terms of China's knowledge of the changing world situation and its calculation of benefits to be derived from collaboration with (as opposed to isolation from) key members of the world economy and technology system. In this respect, the present policy of an open door to foreign science and technology stands in sharp contrast to the autarkic policies of the past. It is not that the goal of self-reliance has been forgotten; China continues to attach great importance to achieving an increasing degree of technological self-reliance. Even today, China does not particularly like having to depend on other nations for technology since it
represents one of the only forms of leverage that outsiders have on the PRC. At the present time, however, the use of foreign science and technology are viewed as a means to more efficiently and effectively achieve this goal. This also helps to explain the Chinese insistence on continuing to diversify their S&T contacts, thereby avoiding becoming dependent on any one country (Ho and Huenemann, 1985).

The imperative of modernizing science and technology has become even more significant during the last few years because of what the Chinese view as the emergence of what Toffler has called the "third wave." In essence, Toffler describes what he sees as the onset of a new stage of the world industrial revolution in which there will be a qualitative change in the technical basis of economic advance. Specifically, Toffler points to four critical technologies: (1) microelectronics, (2) information science, (3) biotechnology, and (4) new materials (Toffler, 1980). By possessing strong indigenous capabilities in each of these areas, some countries will have a "head start" in responding to the future challenge of national development.

Interestingly, the issue of the "third wave" has become the focal point of a debate within China's top political, economic, and S&T circles (Huan Xiang, 1984). The debate has centered on whether or not China should forego concentration on development of some of the more traditional industries, attempt to leapfrog some development stages, and emphasize development of these four advanced technologies cited in Toffler's work. One school of thought has argued that unless China gives sufficient attention to these four areas, it will fall forever behind the rest of the industrialized world. Such a situation would clearly be politically unacceptable. In contrast, others have argued that part of China's previous problems in 1978-79 were due to the fact that people wanted to move too fast. From this perspective, the present stated goal of the regime, which is to attain the 1970s and 1980s technical levels of the West by 2000, is more practical and achievable.

The Chinese approach has been to move in both directions. On the one hand, traditional industries have not been ignored, basically because the Chinese cannot afford to shift their attention away from improving steel production, increasing energy output, and meeting the demands for larger quantities of basic goods from the population. Under a program called the "technical transformation of enterprises" administered by the State Economic Commission, funds are being made available for rehabilitating and renovating many of China's key industrial facilities (Li Boxi et al., 1985). On the other hand, major attention is being given to the four technologies of the "third wave." A national biotechnology center has been set up with an international advisory board made up of leading Chinese and foreign biologists, geneticists, etc. Several national conferences have been held to highlight the potential role of new materials. And efforts are now under way to create a nationwide S&T and economic information network through expanded use of computers and foreign data bases.
From a technology transfer perspective, the most significant aspect has been the attention accorded to the upgrading of electronics and computer technologies (Simon and Rehn, forthcoming). Based on reports coming out of the Chinese press and my own discussions with Chinese industrial and S&T officials, it is clear that electronics and computers are China’s number one S&T priority. According to Jiang Zemin, the current mayor of Shanghai (one of China’s leading electronics bases) and Minister of the Electronics Industry until summer 1985, electronics for the military application, computers, and large-scale integrated circuits are the three priorities of the industry. A special leading group under the State Council for electronics (headed by Vice-Premier Li Peng) has been established to coordinate national efforts to promote development of electronic components, consumer electronics, computers, software, and communications technology. China is also in the process of establishing its versions of the U.S. West Coast high-technology park (popularly known as silicon valley) in the vicinity of Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu province, and Beijing/Tianjin. These four sites are to serve as “technological hothouses” for stimulating indigenous innovation and attracting high-technology firms from abroad, according to interviews conducted by the author in Beijing and Shanghai in January and August 1986.

The inclusion of “electronics for the military” as one of the country’s major electronics priorities is not surprising. Given the attention attached to strategic weapons in China’s defense sector and the critical role that microelectronics and advanced computers play in this area, it is obvious that the military could significantly benefit from an infusion of state-of-the-art know-how. In addition, China’s conventional weapons capabilities, particularly in areas such as command, control, and communication, are also in need of technological modernization. In fact, even though the military has been the national leader in electronics and computers, its overall technical needs in this area still remain quite high.

The U.S. Perspective on Sino-U.S. S&T Exchanges

As the Sino-U.S. science and technology relationship has evolved over the last several years, there has continued to be a lack of unified consensus, especially in Washington, about what could realistically be expected and what might be the anticipated benefits for the United States from the growing S&T ties between the two countries. Gabriel Almond, in his seminal work The American People and Foreign Policy (1950), argues that in the realm of foreign policy, the U.S. populace tends to react more on the basis of mood and disposition than on the actual basis of factual information or analytic process. More often than not, this is exactly what has transpired in the case of Sino-U.S. science and technology relations. Since the arrival of then President Richard Nixon in China in 1972, the United States, in particular, has been in a “pro-China” mode, with each successive administration feeling
obliged to do more with China in the area of science and technology than its predecessors. As a result, the United States has tended to formulate science and technology policy on the basis of wishful thinking rather than careful analysis. Moreover, while China has viewed science and technology as a central feature of the relationship, it is safe to say that most U.S. policymakers, preoccupied with such matters as the global strategic triangle and "playing the China card," treat science and technology as mere "icing on the cake." This is most clearly reflected in the fact that funding has been a major constraint on the U.S. in terms of program activities and development. While expanded exchanges with China were being hailed as a positive development, it has been difficult for each of the U.S. government departments to obtain sufficient funding for carrying out various cooperative endeavors.

This inability to respect the true salience of science and technology in the context of Sino-U.S. relations reflected a deeper problem in the American foreign policy-making apparatus. As early as 1970, the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives began publishing a series of reports dealing with the role of S&T in U.S. foreign affairs, culminating in a 1976 study entitled *Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in an Age of Interdependence*. Among other things, the study questioned America's perspective and preparation for handling the complex task of linking foreign policy with science and technology (U.S. Congress, 1976). Similar types of concerns were expressed regarding the training of foreign service officers by the Department of State in other arenas. And, while the creation of the Bureau for Oceans, Environment, and Sciences (OES) in the Department of State in 1974 was a step in the right direction, there have continued to be reservations about the capacity of U.S. foreign policy to effectively capitalize upon America's scientific and technological eminence in world affairs.

This is not to suggest that since 1979 U.S. S&T policy toward China has been totally without rhyme or reason. The first official mission to China in mid-1978 had four main purposes: (1) to establish official S&T contacts, (2) to explain U.S. science and technology organization and policy, (3) to evaluate the status of PRC S&T capabilities, and (4) to explore possible areas of cooperation in S&T (*New York Times*, June 28, 1978). Nor is it implied that our expanded science and technology relations have not been mutually advantageous. The United States has viewed technology relations as a means to cement Sino-American political relations. Through the establishment of a broad range of ties involving substantial segments of the American and Chinese scientific and technical community, U.S. policymakers have hoped to create a variety of constituencies in both countries to support maintenance and expansion of friendly relations. Since the signing of the overarching bilateral S&T cooperation agreement in 1979, over twenty protocols have been signed for cooperation in a variety of scientific fields, including agricultural science, high-energy physics, transportation, and industrial management. While the principles of mutual benefit and
equality have been the underlying guidelines governing these interactions, in reality, such considerations have often been subordinated to the greater objective of forging expanded ties and consolidating existing ones (Suttmeier, 1981).

The United States has also viewed the science and technology exchanges with China as a means to advance American commercial interests (U.S. Congress, 1983). Dr. Frank Press, director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) at the White House, had initially hoped that various cooperative programs could provide the lubricant to facilitate the sale of equipment and technology by U.S. industry. Similarly, by training a whole cadre of Chinese managers, it was hoped that these individuals would be more inclined to favor U.S. products and ways of operating. Unfortunately, the United States has been less than successful in achieving these ends for a number of critical reasons. Some of the reasons have had to do with shifting Chinese modernization priorities and the decreasing availability of funds on the PRC side. Others have dealt with the historical legacy in the United States that, more often than not, has prevented close business-government cooperation in areas of trade and international business.

In many respects, the salience of science and technology in Sino-U.S. relations actually derives from a series of factors basically external to the bilateral relationship. Sino-U.S. S&T exchanges took on special significance during the late 1970s and early 1980s because Chinese demands for expanded contacts and a more forthcoming U.S. technology transfer policy occurred at a time when several technology-related issues had moved to center stage on the agenda of policymakers in Washington. Most significant was the concern with what some called the “hemorrhage” of U.S. technology abroad (Business Week, April 4, 1983). Specific concerns centered on the outflow of nonapproved technologies to the Soviet Union, though the issue of scientific and technical exchanges were also a focal point of attention (Carey and Carlucci, January 8, 1982). An unclassified CIA paper issued in 1982 and revised in 1985 indicated that Soviet clandestine acquisition of technology was widespread and focused on supporting Moscow’s advanced weapons programs. In addition, new questions about the interrelationship between national security and scientific communication, as well as the access granted to foreign students and the role of academic exchanges, emerged when Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, indicated at a meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) that perhaps tighter controls should be placed on cross-border flows of information in specific “sensitive areas” (National Academy of Sciences, 1982).

Concerns about science and technology exchanges were also compounded by a growing sense that somehow the United States was losing its economic and technological competitiveness. Concerns about the so-called threat from Japan did not help but further politicize science and technol-
ogy issues in both government and business. One *Business Week* article, for example, indicated that Japanese funding of research on U.S. campuses had become a key mechanism for gaining access to current state-of-the-art research in America's top universities (*Business Week*, September 24, 1984). Given the U.S. role in the 1950s in supporting Japan's economic development as well as the uncertainty that surrounded the Sino-U.S. relationship, the legacy of past policies reversals, and the many questions about the consequences of China's emergence in the world economy, it was not surprising to find the issues of scientific exchange with and technology transfer to China becoming caught up—in some circles—within the controversy within the United States over industrial policy and competitiveness. Moreover, in an era of increasing limits as far as budgets were concerned, various U.S. government organizations had to analyze more closely the tradeoffs between engaging in a program with a "developing country" such as China that might yield future benefits or using their funds for initiating an "exchange" with a country that was presently more of a technological equal to the United States and where the rewards might be more immediate and tangible.

Divisions on scientific exchange and technology transfer to China appeared between such organizations as the Committee on Exchange (COMEX), an interdepartmental working group responsible for overseeing the activities of visiting students and scholars to the United States, especially those from communist countries, and various academic institutions in the United States. In theory, COMEX was responsible for reviewing each visa request by a Chinese scholar for placement at an American university or research laboratory and each of the bilateral protocols signed between Washington and Beijing. COMEX, however, was plagued with the problem of how to treat China because on the one hand under existing legislation China was still a "communist" country subject to strict controls; yet on the other hand the White House through the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) sent signals within the various echelons of the U.S. government to treat China differently from the way it treated the Soviet Union. In addition, questions arose over whether or not COMEX could indeed deny access to any Chinese accepted by an American university to so-called open libraries, facilities, or even classes on technical subjects on U.S. campuses, especially if there was no classified research being done at these premises.

The most notable example involving COMEX dealt with the case of Qi Yulu, a visiting Chinese scholar at the University of Minnesota specializing in computer science and software development (National Academy of Sciences, 1982:171–81). Upon reviewing Qi's background and intended course of study in the United States in the fall of 1981, the Department of State, which assumed responsibility for visiting scholars as part of its visa-issuing responsibilities, "suggested" to the university that because of possible national security concerns "Qi be restricted from any access to unpublished or classified government-funded work." More significant,
however, was the recommendation that Qi’s program of study “emphasize course work with minimal involvement in applied research” and the suggestion that “there should be no access to the design, construction, or maintenance data relevant to individual items of computer hardware.” Finally, the Department of State also requested to be notified beforehand of any proposed visits by Qi to industrial or research facilities.

The president of the University of Minnesota, C. Peter Magrath, responded with a strongly worded letter that clearly stated “both in principle and in practice, the restrictions proposed in [the State Department’s] letter are inappropriate for an American University.” Citing the tradition of academic freedom and openness characteristic of U.S. higher education as well as his specific institution, Magrath basically refused to accept the proposed restriction on Qi’s activities. The Magrath response was echoed by many other U.S. academic institutions for similar reasons. In effect, the position taken by these universities reflected an implicit, if not explicit, rejection of prevailing export control regulations as applied to visiting scholars and students.

Divisions also arose over general technology transfer policy as well. In some cases, these divisions affected the exchanges since some of the equipment and scientific instrumentation that were needed for particular projects were considered controlled items from the perspective of existing export control legislation (U.S. Congress, 1983). The export control problems associated with the sale of LANDSAT to China reflected the prevailing differences over technology transfer. Many of these divisions, however, did not always follow along simple bureaucratic lines. For example, the Commerce Department, anxious to expand trade with China, saw S&T exchanges as a means to develop commercial ties—and thus was quite supportive of any program that could help expand U.S.-PRC economic ties. Yet, aside from its trade promotion responsibilities, Commerce was also responsible for administering export controls. As such, equipment and instrumentation that were destined for China as part of cooperative projects in such fields as high-energy physics, were frequently held back because of national security concerns (Bertsch and McIntyre, 1983).

Similar problems also emerged in the Pentagon, which, because of its role in the export control review process, frequently became both directly and indirectly involved in various aspects of the S&T exchange program. For example, some segments of the Department of Defense (DOD), which were anxious to “play the China card,” were willing at a very early point in the relationship to sell advanced equipment as well as possible dual-use and even military-related technologies in Beijing. In their view, the Soviet Union, not the United States, was China’s primary military concern. Other elements in DOD were more apprehensive and took the opposite view, claiming that China was too unpredictable and therefore not a good risk in terms of selling advanced technology (Solomon, 1981). Ironically, while during the 1978–81 period, opponents of selling advanced technology to
China were arguing that the Chinese were too weak to be used as a "card" against the Soviet Union (and thus the United States should not sell advanced technology), by 1982, this argument was used, in some cases, to justify expanded technology transfers on the premise that it really did not matter what we sold the Chinese because it would take a long time for them to digest and apply the technology (U.S. Congress, January 1982).

Of course, other factors and players were involved in the process of determining the type and level of science and technology that the United States should make available to China. The dictates of U.S. foreign policy were particularly important in this regard, with the State Department led by the Office of Chinese Affairs playing a major role. Since the Nixon administration, it has been U.S. policy to support, in both principle and in actions, China's efforts to modernize its economy. The underlying premise of U.S. policy has been a belief that a modernizing, economically advancing China would be more prone to a moderate foreign policy than a China beset with all sorts of developmental and political problems. Accordingly, while congressional legislation has until recently prevented the rendering of direct technical assistance through organizations such as the Agency for International Development (AID), the State Department through its encouragement of bilateral S&T cooperation, expanded education exchanges, and increased commercial contacts has spearheaded, for the most part, the attempt to help China remedy its economic problems.

Interestingly, not only has the effort to link China with U.S. organizations and segments of the American population been viewed as a bilateral goal, but it also has been seen as part of a larger attempt to make China increasingly "interdependent" with the industrialized world—thus lessening the likelihood that China would want to return to either the socialist bloc or its past policy of isolation. By tying China up with the West and Japan through an extensive web of trade, science and technology, and cultural relations, there has been a belief that Beijing would develop a vested interest in maintaining ties with the outside world. As such, irrespective of what political problems might emerge (such as Taiwan), it would be too costly for China to extricate itself from these relationships.

The work of some private and semiprivate organizations helped to complement this entire process. For example, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) saw China as an appropriate target in its efforts to depoliticize scientific communication and promote "scientific internationalism." Through its Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), the NAS played a significant role in arranging S&T contacts during the prerecognition period and institutionalizing those contacts in the postrecognition phase. An excellent documentary record of the NAS and the CSCPRC regarding their China S&T-related activities can be found in the China Exchange News, which started publication in the early 1970s. The CSCPRC is discussed more extensively in the chapter by Joyce Kallgren.
The CSCPRC became a key player in bridging the public-private gap during the early years of scientific exchanges. Many of these early S&T-related visits were not much more than "scientific tourism." After 1979, however, the CSCPRC played an important substantive role in helping the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the USIA bring about the formal exchange of visiting scholars and S&T delegations. The major problem encountered in these efforts remained much the same throughout the entire period, namely, that while the PRC had a preponderance of scientists and engineers who wanted to come to the United States, the American side was dominated by social scientists and humanists who wanted to learn more about Chinese society, politics, history, etc.

The Focus of Sino-U.S. Scientific Exchanges and Technology Relations

The Sino-U.S. S&T relationship has steadily evolved into a broad-based, multifaceted set of public and private contacts and programs (see Appendix). As noted, the United States and China have signed more than twenty separate protocols for cooperation in science and technology. Activities contained in these protocols are covered under an umbrella agreement signed between Washington and Beijing in 1979 and recently renewed during the exchange of visits between Premier Zhao Ziyang and President Ronald Reagan in 1984. The Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Sciences (OES) at the Department of State and China's State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) have been the implementing agencies—though over the last several years there has been a gradual decentralization of responsibility down toward the counterpart agencies involved in the respective government-to-government exchange and cooperation programs. In addition, there is a "joint commission" on science and technology responsible for overseeing the direction and scope of the S&T cooperation program. The meetings of the joint commission are aimed at addressing major issues of concern to both sides.

University-based contacts have also steadily expanded as many Chinese and American education institutions have developed sister-school relationships. Conferences dealing with science and social science topics have become a regular feature of the relationship as well, especially as the Chinese have come to realize (through these exchanges) that the setting and context in which science and technology activities are conducted may be just as important as the scientific and technical details. For example, the notion of developing a strong research base in the university, an idea that is extremely popular in China today but runs counter to the previous Soviet-inspired tendency to locate research in separate institutes, has come about in large part as a result of the sustained contact of Chinese educators and scholars with the American higher education system. The transfer of other institutional forms, including such concepts as a national science founda-
tion, venture technology, peer review procedures, etc., has been a major element in the bilateral science and technology relationship (*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 1984).

Through these exchanges and multiple cooperation agreements, a substantial quantity of information has flowed between the two countries. China has benefited from American expertise, but what is often ignored is the extent to which the U.S. scientific community has benefited from its interactions with China. Data gathered from China will aid in advancing the present state of knowledge and understanding in a number of important fields. The flow has largely been in favor of the Chinese. Given the different starting points of the two societies, it would be unreasonable to expect complete equality and access at this point in time, though the issue cannot be completely set aside. This factor has sometimes deterred American scientists from engaging in programs with a Chinese counterpart except in a select number of fields. Preliminary indications are, however, that as the modernization program proceeds and cooperation with foreigners is deemed to be more and more legitimate and less problematic from a political and logistical point of view, greater access will be provided—thus possibly enhancing China's attractiveness as a cooperative partner.

One of the major questions deriving from examination of the Sino-U.S. S&T exchange program has to do with the extent to which the transfer of know-how and experience has helped to meet Chinese needs and has shaped emerging Chinese attitudes and capabilities. It is clear that the opportunity to do collaborative research with American scientists is extremely attractive to the Chinese scientific community. At times, without overexaggerating the role of high-energy physics, Chinese scientists have looked to their American colleagues as a justification to continue with their basic research activities—even as they have been instructed by central authorities to ensure that research better serves production. The role of Chinese-American scientists takes on special significance in this context since they have played a very active role in S&T cooperation with China.

Based on statements by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leadership attaches great importance to the overseas Chinese scientific community. Prominent scientists such as T. D. Lee, Samuel Ting, Luke Yuan, and C. N. Yang have all acted as advisers to the Chinese scientific community and political leadership. In providing guidance and advice in the 1978–79 period, these high-energy physicists, intentionally or not, gave great prominence to China's own community of physicists. This prominence was reinforced by the fact that a Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement for cooperation in high-energy physics rapidly became seen by both sides as one of the showcase projects under the bilateral agreement. However, while the physics community in China had great interest and desire to build a 50-gev world-class accelerator—to bring them into the mainstream of international physics research—national development priorities dictated that such a pro-
ject was too extravagant, leading to a major rescaling of the project and the decision to build a more modest $+2/-2$ electron positron in its place.

The initial decision to emphasize high-energy physics is an example of how a U.S. "interest group" with a Chinese counterpart can lead some Chinese priorities in a questionable direction. There are numerous other examples where bilateral cooperation programs have directly responded to Chinese needs. The most successful cases have been in health sciences, metrology, science policy, and management training. The cooperative management training center in Dalian, for example, has become a model for the formation of similar training centers involving Japan, Sweden, Canada, West Germany, and Hong Kong. Chinese faculty have gradually replaced American faculty in the Dalian teaching program. And graduates from the Dalian program, such as Wang Zhaoguo, seem to be playing an influential role in their respective positions (Fischer, 1986).

Most critical, however, has been the transfer of "technology" that has occurred as a result of "learning by doing" in the same laboratories and research programs. As China's science and technology policies evolve, it is clear that they will have greatly benefited from interaction with American scientists and policymakers. The process whereby research is funded and evaluated in China has clearly been influenced by the model of the National Science Foundation. Peer review rather than political evaluation is now an accepted concept. And, as noted, the development of university-based research capabilities is another area where U.S. influence has been significant. Additionally, treatment of S&T personnel has also been shaped by American practices, especially in terms of promotion, the reward structure, and job mobility.

On the U.S. side, in some areas, the gains have also been substantial. One of the best examples is in agricultural science and pest control. The U.S. scientific community has benefited from access to Chinese soybean germ plasm and medicinal plants as well as in joint research on the gypsy moth—a growing problem for the northeastern United States. In other areas such as earthquake studies and oceanography, observation of the Chinese setting has provided greater insight into problems that currently occupy the attention of the U.S. scientific community. And, in the area of metrology, the effort to help China establish a national measurement system compatible with that of the United States may ultimately help to maximize trade and the receptivity to U.S. goods by minimizing the difference between the two countries in the measurement of various quantities of materials.

This is not to suggest that problems do not exist. There have been and remain many cultural, political, and national security-related obstacles to cooperation. Questions about the sharing of technical data have continued to be pervasive. Chinese participants are not clear on just how much leeway they have under the current so-called open-door policy to share data and related information with their U.S. counterparts. In addition, there is the issue of patent rights. Under the structure of the U.S. patent law, a patent
will be awarded to that individual(s) who makes the largest contribution toward a new invention, innovation, etc. While in principle, cooperative Sino-U.S. research is supposed to be on an equal basis, the fact remains that at times there has been a disproportionate share of work done by the American participant, with the implication that the Chinese might not have joint rights to the patent. The Chinese do not agree with this formula for both obvious political as well as substantive-technical reasons. The implementation of China's own patent law in April 1985 may help to alleviate some aspects of this problem.

When the S&T bilateral cooperation program evolved in its early stages, it was the American side that was the main originator of ideas for joint projects. As time has passed, the Chinese are now taking the initiative in proposing future projects. A major question is whether or not the United States should become involved in projects which it believes may be too far afield from the American perception of Chinese needs, especially given the general deemphasis on basic research. The United States cannot assume that the Chinese system has sufficient control to prevent peripheral projects from emerging and gaining momentum—by which time stopping them might damage the image or credibility of both sides. In other words, the rapid proliferation of activities and the numbers of persons on both sides involved has raised the question about how much "control" the non-Chinese side should have over Chinese scientific choices and technology priorities. Should our bilateral programs, for instance, be used for "technical engineering" in much the same way others would like to use cultural programs for "social engineering"? This seems to be the focus of the management and metrology programs. It remains to be seen whether normative ends sought by a partner are consistent with China's own intentions regarding technological independence and political autonomy.

The Issue of Unfulfilled Expectations

While Chinese leaders have been relatively satisfied with the pace of exchanges, except for some minor financial issues, their main criticisms have been directed at U.S. restrictions on the export of technology and equipment. In essence, the Chinese view the continued application of export controls and visa monitoring as a form of discrimination. Given the importance that Chinese leaders have increasingly attached to "technology," as opposed to pure science, and their "infatuation" with the Toffler perspective, it is not surprising for them to be pushing for higher levels of advanced equipment and know-how. And, in some cases, the needs on the Chinese side are there, especially in such areas as testing and measuring equipment, computers and related software for financial and inventory management, and precision machinery for improving product quality and standards.

Ironically, if one examines U.S. export policy toward China, approval of export licenses doubled from 1,508 in 1981 to 3,314 in 1983—and rose to
4,587 in 1984 and 8,593 in 1985, suggesting that the United States is, indeed, responding to Chinese requests (Office of Chinese Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce). (In the first eleven months of 1984, high technology trade grew to US$2.8 billion from US$1.1 billion in 1983.) In both mid-1983 and late 1985, major revisions were made in the existing controls on the sale of technology to the PRC. All changes were designed to not only broaden the types of equipment and technology that could be sold to China, but also to speed up the processing of applications requiring the issuance of export licenses. It should also be added that efforts were also underway to respond to Chinese needs in so-called sensitive areas through negotiation of possible programs under the S&T exchange agreement in industrial cooperation, which would include electronics, telecommunications, aeronautics, and hydraulic engineering.

Nonetheless, disagreements remain. One of the main causes of continued disagreement is the current U.S. push to control essential "technology and know-how," that is, the essential design information (as opposed to merely equipment) which China is emphasizing in its present technology acquisition program. One of China's major criticisms of its own past practices regarding technology import was that too much emphasis was given to purchasing hardware and whole plants and not enough to the acquisition of know-how and software (Simon, 1982). The issue of what is science versus technology and what aspects of technology the United States should restrict has been a major dilemma regarding the entire export control structure—one that has affected U.S. relations not only with China. The now-famous Bucy Report issued in 1976 by the Defense Science Board tried to clear up some of the critical distinctions by separating out know-how from equipment, distinguishing between "embodied" and "disembodied" technology, and focusing on basic versus so-called revolutionary technologies (Bucy, 1980-81; U.S. Congress, 1979b). Nonetheless, differences of opinion within and outside the U.S. government have not been settled. Thus, there is still no real clear-cut set of guidelines about making these determinations; nor are the existing regulations and list of controlled items able to keep pace with the rapidity of technological change and advancement in many fields (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985).

Were China's S&T needs merely civilian in nature, many of the export control problems of the past might have easily disappeared as bilateral relations grew closer. Aside from the specific needs of economic modernization, however, China's push for access to higher levels of technology appears to have been and still is coming from the imperatives of defense modernization as well (Tow and Segal, 1985). Production of obsolete defense plants and equipment has been curtailed in China, but the emphasis on defense R&D has been maintained and even enhanced in some areas. In order for Chinese weapons to keep pace with current scientific and technological advances in the West and the USSR, greater inputs of critical technologies are needed, especially in microelectronics, materials, and spe-
cial metals. The Chinese military has been told that by gradually strengthening its technical base now, it will be in a better position to move ahead in the future (Joffe and Segal, 1985). And, while Zhang Aiping, Minister of Defense and former head of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, has told the Chinese military that the availability of advanced foreign technology may be limited, he has encouraged them to use whatever is available (Zhang, 1985).

Two remaining reasons may also account for China's expressions of dissatisfaction. First, the push for greater access to U.S. science and technology may be part of China's own efforts to take advantage of a window of opportunity that now exists. The U.S. government wants Sino-U.S. relations to improve. The constant badgering of U.S. officials, corporate executives, and scholars by various Chinese may be part of an effort to use this as a form of bargaining leverage to force a more forthcoming policy. Second, the evidence that technology transfers are flowing more freely than ever before may suggest an information gap in the Chinese system, indicating that the leadership is hearing about all the problems but none of the "successful" cases. Given the fact that there have been some serious assimilation problems on the Chinese side, it may not be in the interest of anyone to publicize the arrival of equipment or know-how before it is set up and efficiently operating.

Currently, China is in the "V" category under the existing export guidelines. It is subject to the same treatment as U.S. allies except that six restricted areas have been spelled out for possible denial. Technologies that make a demonstrable contribution to nuclear weapons, nuclear delivery systems, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, intelligence gathering systems, and "power-projection" capabilities will be denied. A three-zone system had been established: green, yellow, and red. Seven categories of products were initially identified for inclusion in the green zone so as to facilitate approval by the Department of Commerce, the organization that administers the export control laws, and the Department of Defense. Under this revised system, many export control cases have been cleared up, and processing has been expedited. The problem is that the yellow zone has started to grow, especially as Chinese demands for higher technology have emerged—resulting in a situation where fewer and fewer of the items being proposed for sale to China are falling into the liberalized green zone. This seven-category system has been basically expanded to reflect the changes in twenty-seven categories of equipment and technology covered under the restrictions imposed by COCOM, the consortium of the United States, Japan, and Western European nations—a total of fifteen countries—that collectively oversees exports of high technology with military applications to communist countries. As will be indicated later, in effect, the seven-category classification has been superseded by the December 1985 COCOM changes.
Another problem has had to do with the relationship between U.S. export control laws and COCOM. While some delays remained on the U.S. side after the 1983 relaxation, more serious delays developed on the COCOM side—when for the first time U.S. controls were actually less restrictive than those of COCOM. This meant that in contrast to the past, it was the United States that was now in the position of asking for more “exceptions” and proposing more cases for clearance than most of the other COCOM members.

Each of the fifteen member nations was required to screen all relevant applications—a problem that was made complex by the fact that the respective members did not share a uniform code regarding their own national export control laws. Attempts to resolve differences with COCOM were made more difficult by the fact that many of the countries have viewed U.S. intentions with suspicion. The United States has been accused of introducing delays in COCOM in order to leak information to American firms; similar accusations have been made by the United States. The revision which took place in COCOM policy toward China in December 1985 has helped to alleviate some of these problems—thereby further facilitating the flow of technology and equipment to China.

In the future, however, additional problems are likely to appear despite sustained efforts to resolve remaining difficulties. Why is this so? A major dilemma arises because export control decisions are made on the basis of two considerations (which are not mutually exclusive): In some cases, decisions are based on the technology level; in other cases, they are made on the basis of the acceptability of the proposed end-user. If the end-user is clearly a military organization with involvement in any of the six areas, the application can be denied. Within China at the present time, there is a major movement under way to forge closer links between military and civilian units in order to use the strengths of the military to assist with economic modernization. Such cooperation took place before, but it was generally from the civilian sector to the military. At present, closer two-way cooperation may make it harder to differentiate acceptable from nonacceptable users—even within China’s scientific research system. In addition, given the diffuse nature of technology, it is difficult to “control” what is being transferred within China internally, especially since the Chinese have not offered any guarantees about domestic sharing of technology—keeping that option open as their right as a sovereign nation, although in principle, the Chinese have accepted “controls” on the transfer of U.S. technology to third countries.

Problems are also likely to occur because of reports about attempted clandestine acquisition of technology by China. This is especially true in the case of Hong Kong, which has now become a major funnel for the import of advanced technology into China. For example, a small semiconductor firm in San Jose, California, recently was convicted of selling US$4.0 million of unauthorized electronics manufacturing equipment to a
Hong Kong firm with direct links to the PRC (Daily Yomiuri, 1986). American corporate personnel report seeing items in China that have not yet been cleared for export. They then find out that Hong Kong was the vehicle through which the technology was obtained. Ultimately, as the number of Chinese trading organizations continues to proliferate, it will be increasingly difficult to control the flow of technology to China, even in restricted areas. For some, this may serve to reinforce the argument that all controls should be removed. Such a move—which would be hailed by China—would not alleviate the concerns about unauthorized acquisition and use.

**U.S. Policies in Comparative Perspective**

Earlier, it was suggested that the lure of the China market has been one of the driving forces behind the expansion of Sino-U.S. S&T exchanges. American industry has clearly set its sights on the market of one billion—even though many firms remain frustrated in their attempts to do business in China. Many complaints exist about China wanting access to U.S. technology, but not wanting to pay a fair price. The goal of policymakers to link U.S. activities in the government bilateral S&T cooperation programs with private sector efforts to expand commercial ties has yet to be achieved.

Based on some preliminary research conducted by Roy Grow at Carleton University (forthcoming), the work of one of my graduate students at MIT, and my own interviews with U.S. corporations interested in China, it is clear that the American approach to the China market has been substantially different from the approach of Japan (Simon and Engholm, 1987). For example, after the problems with the Baoshan steel mill, Japan reversed its strategy for the China market, choosing to pursue a strategy of “deep and broad penetration.” Rather than seeking involvement in numerous large, complex projects, many Japanese firms decided to tie into China’s program for the technical transformation of enterprises. Through this program, Japan has found an effective vehicle to assist China renovate its plant and equipment, improve quality control and scheduling, and increase productivity. Many of the “deals” involve sale of Japanese equipment and some technical assistance; the overall dollar value of each case may be relatively small, while the total number of cases has started to grow.

In many respects, Japanese firms have targeted Chinese industrial and technical needs at a much more appropriate level than have U.S. firms. And they have been more successful at linking their bilateral programs with their private-sector initiatives. Japanese trade with China is three times that of the PRC’s trade with the United States; trade in manufactured products, machinery, etc., continues to grow despite Chinese efforts to curtail large imports and to alleviate its large trade deficit with Japan. Of course, a number of reasons accounts for Japan’s commercial success and its ability to treat scientific cooperation as subordinate to its commercial interests in China. One reason may have to do with Japanese geographic proximity to China. Another may have more to do with clarity of strategy and purpose.
The Japanese seem to have a better grasp of Chinese needs and the best market opportunities in China.

In many respects, not only have Japanese firms mapped out a much clearer strategy for the China market, but so has the Japanese government at a national level (Lee, 1984). Japan is prepared to provide equipment and technology in return for access to China's natural resources and energy supplies. Japanese leaders have been certain to ensure that bilateral government-to-government cooperation is closely linked to the development of commercial ties. One important element in this program has been the financial one. Concessionary financing and credits have often been offered to help promote Japanese business interests. In fact, in May 1984, former vice-premier Fang Yi used the example of the well-functioning Sino-U.S. bilateral S&T cooperation to criticize Japan for its lack of interest in these programs. Instead, Fang Yi admonished his Japanese cohorts for being too focused on commercial opportunities.

Scientific Exchanges and Technology Transfer: Too Far Too Fast?

In view of China's growing importance as an actor in global and regional affairs, it is clear that the United States should play a major role in assisting China's modernization efforts, especially in the science and technology area. There would seem to be obvious economic and political payoffs. And somewhere down the line there even may be military benefits. Nonetheless, it remains uncertain whether or not U.S. policymakers really have thought through the full implications of the current set of S&T policies toward China. Nor have they been able to leverage China's strong interest in U.S. science and technology to America's political or commercial advantage.

Numerous studies of American foreign policy behavior have been produced over the last several decades, each one trying to discern what the appropriate objectives of U.S. foreign policy should be. In most of these studies, there is general agreement that any evolving relationship—whether it be in the form of an economic treaty or explicit military alliance—must be a function of American political, military, and economic interests. Arnold Wolfers, author of Discord and Collaboration (1962), has suggested that foreign policy goals fall into two basic categories: possession goals and milieu goals. The former refers to those values, rights, and interests specific to a particular nation-state; the latter are concerned with the environment in which a specific nation-state operates, including such factors as regional alignments and the economic development of other states. Similarly, Robert Osgood, in a book entitled Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (1953), says that foreign policy goals can be thought of in terms of self-interest versus national idealism. Whereas self-interest is concerned with the welfare of one's own nation-state, national idealism deals with those moral values and aims that transcend self-interest, such as peace, justice, freedom, and human rights.
The Sino-U.S. relationship in the area of science and technology can be viewed as a product of the interplay of several of the above factors. First, the growing relationship of the United States with China has been motivated by self-interest. For obvious reasons, the United States has been concerned with changing China's behavior toward itself and with how to use involvement with China to promote American economic prosperity (through trade), enhance its national capabilities (through access to critical raw materials), support its ideological preferences (free markets, open political systems, etc.), and protect its national political military interests in East Asia and other parts of the globe. Scientific intercourse and technology transfer with China are seen as the means to achieve these goals.

Second, the American relationship with China in the science and technology area has also been informed by a series of milieu goals. China's growing participation in East Asia and the world precludes, to some extent, a return to the simple bipolar politics of the cold war. Despite national preferences, the American web of relationships with China closely impacts on relations with Japan, Western Europe, the USSR, and the Third World. The issue of export control and COCOM illustrates the difficulty in balancing trade, national security, and political aspects of relations and somehow coordinating them with the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship in a positive fashion.

Third, the relationship with China has also been a product of the American penchant for national idealism. In many ways, U.S. attitudes toward China are conditioned by a sense of developmentalism and a perceived obligation to assist a billion people overcome their poverty. Ignoring history to some extent and assuming a high degree of malleability on the part of Chinese society, the preferred U.S. methodology has been to undertake social engineering in China through scientific and educational exchanges in order to usher in a series of Chinese leaders and related institutional structures supportive of the traditional Western system of international law and organization. Presumably, these individuals and institutions would commit China to behave according to accepted Western norms of international behavior. In other words, China would join the community of nations as an upstanding citizen and behave in a way consistent with preferred American values and norms.

The question remains whether the rapid expansion of Sino-U.S. S&T ties, together with S&T cooperation and related technology transfer, contributes to the achievement of all or any of the three types of goals specified above. In many respects, the existence of these multiple goals is merely a reflection of the fact that different groups within the United States have had different expectations regarding the evolving Sino-U.S. S&T relationship. As a result, many policies have been fraught with both major and minor contradictions. One one hand, it is said that a sophisticated, cooperative intelligence effort against the Soviet Union is located on China's northwest border; on the other hand, according to existing legislation the
United States cannot sell China various types of intelligence-gathering equipment or technology. One hand, the United States is willing to sell China arms and military equipment; on the other, existing congressional legislation has only recently allowed the bureaucracy to render aid to China’s economy—though there is presently little or no money in the budget for this purpose.

Chinese pressure for advanced American technology must be dealt with in terms of the broader Sino-U.S. political relationship. Possession of a greater sense of confidence regarding where China is going and its attitudes toward the United States would go a long way toward alleviating some of the doubts among those who are cautious about being too free with scientific and technological resources. Since achieving such a level of confidence may be difficult to attain, there is, in a sense, a more practical quid pro quo that is based on China’s own principles of mutual benefit, equality, and reciprocity. Some form of “compensation trade” might be appropriate. While one cannot expect science or technology-in-kind from China, one can secure a stronger commitment for cooperation in the international political sphere or a less public profile on China’s part when it disagrees with U.S. actions. After all, this was and still is, in large part, one of the basic premises of America’s rapprochement with the PRC. Of course, China is entitled to have its opinions, and maintaining its full independence is a fundamental principle of its foreign policy. Yet, over the long term, China cannot expect to reap all the benefits of being a friend of the United States and yet not bear some of the responsibility and obligation. This principle holds true whether speaking of the use of American scientific know-how and technology within its borders or the treatment of U.S. technology outside its borders.

The complexity of these issues is compounded by the fact that the United States is not the only nation affected by American policies on scientific cooperation and technology transfer to China. Obviously, most of the other industrialized nations are competing for a greater share of the China market. Chinese leaders have indicated that they will be willing to provide a share of their domestic market to those firms who provide technology not available in China. Competition may work to China’s advantage, and it is likely that Beijing will try to balance off the United States, Europe, Japan, and now the Soviet Union in an effort to negotiate the best arrangement on technology transfer. Scientific cooperation and exchanges, if effectively used, can go a long way toward enhancing the U.S. position in the competition.

The scope and thrust of S&T cooperation with the PRC has been an important component of the Sino-American relationship. The exchange of scientists and engineers as well as students in these areas, complemented by the movement of scientific and technical information and data between the two countries, has done much to promote better understanding and
enhance the potential for better political relations, but as one U.S. government official has remarked, "We have used science and technology as the carrot in our relations with China, but we have yet to use S&T as the stick."

Better management of S&T relations is also needed as well as better integration of S&T with the overall goals of U.S. foreign policy. The sheer number of personal contacts as well as public and private agencies combined with the diffusion of effort have made management a difficult task. When one adds in the limited funding available for many of these programs, it becomes clear why the S&T cooperative efforts have achieved only a small part of what they might have achieved with the right support.

In fact, bilateral S&T contacts have grown in such a manner that they have already become somewhat routinized, losing the special attraction that they held during their inception. This may be part of a process of maturation, though it may also be a product of the changing dynamics of the relationship. Whatever the cause, such a development would be highly unfortunate. If anything, the initial contacts between the two sides in science and technology have shown that the two countries have only touched the surface in terms of projects, data sharing, and mutual understanding. Let us hope that the missed opportunities of the past will not be repeated in the next phase of Sino-American political relations. This is true for both the makers of foreign policy as well as the members of the scientific and industrial community who have participated or will participate in any of the S&T exchange programs.
### List of Sino-U.S. S&T Agreements*

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<th>Extended</th>
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*The agreement on cooperation in nuclear energy, which was finalized in 1986, was signed as a memorandum of understanding outside the umbrella S&T cooperation agreement between the two countries.

**The LANDSAT agreement was originally signed in January 1980 but because of export control problems was not implemented until July 1985.

References


