United States–Pakistan Relations
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United States–Pakistan Relations

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Preface

The first U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Conference was held at the University of California, Berkeley, December 10–13, 1984. The conference, sponsored and funded by The Asia Foundation, had first been proposed by Dr. Haydn Williams, president of the foundation, as part of a series of ongoing bilateral conferences between the United States and several Asian countries. Both the American and Pakistani delegates are deeply appreciative of the foundation’s initiative and believe it has performed a major service to both countries.

The conference was hosted by the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, directed by Professor Robert A. Scalapino, and the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, headed by Brigadier Noor Husain. Delegates from both sides included prominent representatives from academic and research institutions, the Pakistan and U.S. governments, the economic and business communities, and the press in both countries. The papers presented by each side summarized the principal issues involved in various aspects of Pakistan-U.S. relations and presented concise but substantive analyses of their respective perceptions of the subject and the policy options available, thus providing an excellent basis for free-ranging and frank discussions and exchanges of viewpoints.

The sessions were organized along thematic lines and in the process most, but not all (e.g., cultural and intellectual), aspects of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship were covered in some detail. The first two sessions dealt with, first, specific aspects of the Pakistan-U.S. security relationship and, second, the congruity in or differences between Pakistani and American perceptions on broader security issues in southern Asia.

The third session focused on Pakistan-U.S. economic relations and, in particular, on the prospects for and obstacles to economic cooperation in several fields. There was, of course, some discussion of the problems in their current economic
relationship—e.g., U.S. textile quotas and Pakistani bureaucratic obstructions to coproduction ventures. But the primary emphasis was on the possibilities of a substantial expansion of economic relations in pragmatic and mutually beneficial terms. Economic aid and “North-South” economic relations were also analyzed in depth but again with an effort to project practical rather than optimal policies, both in the papers presented and in the discussion that followed.

The next session was devoted to an effort to analyze how domestic politics in both states impact on their policies toward each other as well as the influence this has on their perceptions of each other in terms of policy options. That the Pakistan-U.S. relationship is not an easy one on either side in this respect was clearly demonstrated in the discussion, as was the need for a clearer and better understanding of the social, political, and intellectual forces that underlie both political systems.

The last three sessions were concerned with the more specific aspects of Pakistani and American relations with the important powers and security issues in southern Asia—the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and the Soviet intervention, the West Asian states and the Iran-Iraq war and Arab-Israeli conflicts, and finally, India and the other South Asian states. What was evident from the vigorous dialogue that ensued was that there were both broad areas of agreement and of disagreement between Pakistan and the U.S. on policy issues in some of these fields but that the basic policy objectives of the two states were not that divergent except, possibly, on the Arab-Israeli issue. Both societies desired a stable and peaceful southern Asia where the principal focus of their foreign policy could shift from security to economic and political development. But it was also admitted rather reluctantly that this was not possible under present conditions. While it was generally accepted, for instance, that the Soviet Union’s role in the broader southern Asian region now tended to be destabilizing, differences were expressed among both the Pakistanis and the Americans on how this situation is best handled and the Soviets, in effect, neutralized as a disruptive force in the region. Also, the intricate ties in the Pakistan-U.S.-Indian relationships were discussed in some detail and with an impressive degree of objectivity and thoroughness, including a sincere effort to understand Indian views on the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. China’s helpful policies that encouraged stability and cooperation in South Asia were also noted.

Leo E. Rose
February 19, 1985
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I. SECURITY RELATIONS

1. Pakistan-U.S. Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issues

Noor A. Husain

BACKGROUND

Pakistan-U.S. security relations during the last thirty-seven years have been based as much on the geostrategic realities and compulsions of both the South and Southwest Asian region as on superpower globalism after World War II. Over the decades a popular misconception has developed that Pakistan-U.S. security relations were conceived around the 1950s. In fact, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first governor general, foresaw the urgent need to equip its armed forces in September 1947. It was then that Pakistan’s agreed share of defense stores was blocked by India in preparation for an armed conflict it had planned to inflict on the young state in October 1947 and “to smother Pakistan in its crib before it can get going on a practical basis.” Quaid-i-Azam was also aware of the historic threat from the Northwest. Stalin had questioned the very concept of Pakistan, and Moscow as early as 1946 had instigated Kabul to question the legality of the Durand Line, which had been reaffirmed as the international frontier by five successive Afghan regimes—in 1839, 1878, 1919, 1921, and 1930. Through a special emissary in September 1947, Quaid-i-Azam’s efforts to secure U.S. arms evoked little response from Washington. The State Department was still working on its appraisal of U.S. military, political, and economic interests in South Asia, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff were busy evolving a policy on U.S. assistance to other countries to protect its national security. Nevertheless, President Truman, in his message to the Quaid-i-Azam on Independence Day, had affirmed: “I wish to assure you that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America.”

approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 29, 1947, was under study. The report had stressed the strategic importance of the area "not only because of the existence of great oil resources and processing facilities, but also because it offers possibilities for direct contact with our ideological enemies." At about the same time Defense Secretary James Forrestal was deeply concerned about the Soviet threat to the oil-producing states of West Asia and had talked of the possibility of the emerging Arab-Israel conflict and its impact on "other parts of the world where U.S. interests were affected such as Egypt, Pakistan, and North Africa."

Secretary of State George Marshall, in a memorandum to President Truman on July 17, 1947, referring to Pakistan, said: "Pakistan, with a population of seventy million persons, will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world." Both Marshall and Forrestal—victorious leaders and strategists of World War II—were aware of the Soviet-German Accord of 1940, which had affirmed that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." While these policy evaluations and estimates were still being made in Washington and while Pakistan was struggling to cope with its overwhelming political, economic, and financial problems, setting up from scratch the administrative structure of a federal government and simultaneously organizing the armed forces from bits and pieces of the British-Indian army, Prime Minister Nehru flew the Indian army into Jammu and Kashmir—that was in October of 1947—on the pretext of repelling a tribal invasion (the "historical ghost"), but in fact to crush a popular uprising against the oppressive ruler in the areas of Poonch, Mirpur, and Bhimber and to get a stranglehold on what was the geostrategic crossroad of Central, South, and Southwest Asia. In December 1948, the Truman administration set up the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee which consisted of senior representatives of the State and Defense departments and the Economic Cooperation Administration.

The committee believed that, in the context of U.S. strategic plans, the geographical location and terrain of a country was an important military criterion for the identification of prospective recipients of aid. A few months later the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum dated March 24, 1949, highlighted the importance of "Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Karachi-Lahore area as vital for meeting the basic strategic objectives of the region." While these geostrategic evaluations were being made in the Departments of State and Defense, the first arms embargo, imposed on Pakistan (and India) on March 12, 1948, because of the Kashmir conflict, was lifted on March 29, 1949. Pakistan could thereby seek licenses to export items procurable from commercial sources in the United States or on transfer from third countries, such as ammunition, spare parts, and other items needed for lend-lease equipment acquired during World War II. In August 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had conceded,
with reference to China, that the situation was “beyond the control of the government of the United States.” On January 12, 1950, he stated that the United States would not defend Taiwan or South Korea against a communist invasion and excluded them from the defensive parameter of the United States. It was Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali’s visit to the United States in early 1950 that at last convinced the administration of the necessity of a security relationship in South Asia. Walter Lippmann noted: “Though Pakistan and America are far apart in space, though they are very different in their ways of life, each has great responsibilities for the peace and welfare of mankind which it cannot hope to meet fully without the advice and help of the other.”

The subsequent conflicts in Korea and Vietnam and the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a South Asia power—by militarily reasserting its historical sovereignty over Tibet and Sinkiang in 1950–51—resulted in a drastic reappraisal of U.S. policy toward South Asia. The National Security Council document no. 98/1 became the blueprint and set the keynote of a new foreign policy by asserting that “we must henceforth more frequently accept calculated risks in attacking the problems of South Asia.”

**ARMS SALES**

By February 1951 U.S. policymakers had recognized the strategic interests of the free world in South Asia by stating that the most effective military defense of South Asia would require strong flanks in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Therefore, an early build-up of Pakistani forces was “of primary importance,” to be assisted by providing military equipment to Pakistan. At this time Pakistan had only “thirteen tanks with about forty to fifty hours of engine life in them to face the Indian Army,” which was poised for an attack on Pakistan’s borders in 1950 and again in 1951. Some economic assistance provided to Pakistan in February 1952 as “defensive support” enabled it to replenish some of its stocks of ammunition and spare parts, which deterred Nehru from his adventure. It took six years from the first move for security ties to the election of World War II hero and grand strategist General Eisenhower as president before Pakistan’s geostrategic location at the crossroads of Central, South, and Southwest Asia was appreciated and an era of close U.S.-Pakistani security relationships was inaugurated. During Vice-President Nixon’s visit to Karachi in December 1952, General Ayub Khan briefed him that the Soviet Union would use “India as a cat’s paw for establishing a major presence in South Asia,” a prophecy that was to come true in 1971. Concluding his visit, Nixon declared on Radio Pakistan: “A strong independent Pakistan is an asset to the free world.” A “northern-tier” concept of collective security was being evolved by the Western powers as an “extension” of NATO. Ayub Khan was invited to Washington in October 1953 when the Eisenhower administration

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became convinced that it was to their mutual interests to provide military assistance and link Pakistan both in bilateral and collective security arrangements, first with the United States in May 1954 and then in SEATO in September 1954. Southeast Asia was still a priority because of Indochina. In September 1955 the Baghdad Pact (reconstituted as CENTO in 1958) came into being. A bilateral agreement of cooperation with the United States was signed in March 1959. It declared that the "government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan." President Ayub Khan assured the United States that "Pakistan will stand by you if you stand by Pakistan."

U.S. aid took many forms, ranging from overt military aid in the form of grants, military sales, and credits for purchases from commercial sources, to training in institutions for foreign military personnel. Grant aid was especially attractive; regarding training facilities, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara remarked: "It is beyond price to make friends of such men." During the period 1954 to 1965, the United States provided military grants assistance valued at $650 million, defense support assistance valued at $619 million, and cash or commercial basis purchases worth $55 million. Arms sales were at a peak from 1954 to 1961. As a result during the ten-year period 1955–65, Pakistan was able to forge a credible deterrence against India and Afghanistan by modernizing its armed forces—equipping about four infantry divisions and one and a half armored divisions and expanding and modernizing its coastal navy and small air force.

The effect of influential lobbies in the States hostile to Pakistan and superpower globalism began to be felt around 1959–60 in Pakistan-U.S. security relationships. First came a cut in the Military Assistance Program and then an effort to downgrade the importance of the Peshawar base by reducing its "rent." The victory in November 1960 elections of the Democratic party (which had "lost" China to the United States, according to some analysts, and was to "lose" Iran and Afghanistan in the 1970s) and President Kennedy’s efforts to "win" over "nonaligned" India resulted in a watershed in Pakistan-U.S. security relations. The India-China war of 1962, initiated by India to deny China its historical and geopolitical South Asian power status, rushed U.S. military aid to India, which nullified the effects of U.S. aid received by Pakistan and forced Pakistan to turn to its north Asian neighbor, China, to mend fences, first by demarcating the common 300-mile border and then by establishing an air link.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, in which, thanks to U.S. arms, the Pakistani air force achieved superiority and its ground forces halted the attackers, resulted in an arms embargo on both countries—by the United States on Pakistan and by the USSR on India. Although the USSR lifted the embargo within a week after the conflict began, the U.S. embargo continued until 1967 when it was partially lifted for the sale of some spare parts. Pakistan was thus forced to turn to China, which agreed to equip three newly raised Pakistani divisions and to provide tanks and MiG 19 aircraft (renamed F-6) for its air force and some fast patrol boats for its navy. Pakistan also turned to France for Mirages and submarines. In 1968 the Soviet Union offered Pakistan $30 million worth of guns, MI8 helicopters, and vehicles and even offered to develop Gwadar as a naval base! By 1969, under Indian pressure, when the draft of an
Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation was under consideration, the
Soviet Union stopped all military aid to Pakistan but offered to set up a steel mill at
Karachi. Earlier the United States and West Germany had rejected a steel mill project
in their feasibility reports.

After President Richard Nixon’s visit to Pakistan in August 1969 and conscious
of Soviet inroads into what had been an exclusive U.S. sphere of influence, the United
States offered to make a “one-time” exception and sell 300 armored personnel carriers
for $50 million. (The sale did not materialize for six years!) Meanwhile, in April 1971,
a full embargo was imposed again, until April 1972, when the sale of some nonlethal
items and spare parts was allowed. President Ford lifted the embargo in March 1975
when the delivery of the 300 armored personnel carriers promised in 1969 was
completed on a “cash-and-carry” basis. Meanwhile, during a whole decade, from
1965 to 1975, obsolescent U.S. weapons systems and equipment of 1950s vintage
were supplied to the Pakistani army, navy, and air force. The F-86, the mainstay of the
Pakistan air force, which had proved its worth in the 1965 combat with the Indian air
force (consisting of Indian, British, and Soviet aircraft), was largely grounded for
want of spare parts. In August 1976 when Pakistani pilots were testing French,
German, and British aircraft as possible replacements for the F-86, the United States
first offered to sell the A-7, then abruptly, under Indian pressure, withdrew the offer
and instead offered to sell the F-5, an inferior aircraft. As U.S.-supplied equipment
aged, so did the credibility of the United States in the minds of the Pakistani armed
forces and the people. Meanwhile, the USSR had become the major supplier of
military hardware both to India and Afghanistan, with which it was allied with treaties
of peace, friendship, and cooperation. Also during this period of embargoes, partial
embargoes, “one-time” exceptions, and then embargoes again on U.S. military aid to
Pakistan, India had implemented three five-year defense development plans and by
1977 had the third largest army, fifth largest air force, and eighth largest navy.

During the same period, the Afghan army and air force had been equipped and
modernized by the Soviet Union, and a large number of Afghan officers had been
trained in Soviet military institutions. The only major sale by the United States to
Pakistan in 1976, before the Arms Export Control Act went into effect, was for $37
million for two aged destroyers (to be modernized) and equally out-dated self-
propelled howitzers, torpedoes, and munitions. Finally, under pressure from various
lobbies in the State Department, Congress, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, and the Symington-Glenn Amendment of the Security Assistance Act of
1977, President Carter cut off all economic and military aid to Pakistan in July 1979, as
allegedly, it had been pursuing, since 1975, a nuclear option for military purposes.

Between 1953 and 1979 Pakistan received U.S. economic and military aid to the
tune of almost $6 billion. The crucial year of 1979 was when Soviet military
“advisers” moved into Kabul and tightened their grip on the Kabul regime in prepara-
tion for their air and ground assault six months later. From the Soviet perspective, U.S.
interests in South Asia at this time appeared as low as Taiwan and Korea had been in
1950 when they had been relegated outside the defensive parameter of the United
States. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 brought a sharp
verbal reaction from President Carter, who told Congress in January 1980 that "any attack by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The 1959 commitment to Pakistan was thus reconfirmed.

Both the USSR and Pakistan were aware that after fifteen years of U.S. embargoes, "cutoffs," bans, discrimination, and downgrading, in addition to a background of half-hearted commitment by the United States and Great Britain to CENTO, there were very few options open to the United States—except diplomatic! With that background Pakistan's cool reaction to President Carter's offer of $400 million is understandable. It was "not the quantity of aid but the quality of the U.S. commitment that was important." President Zia felt that the United States "wanted to give a little aid, let Pakistan burn its bridges to the Soviet Union for ever, and then leave it in the lurch." Some analysts commented that the United States "has foreign relations but no foreign policy." Former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka, Christopher Van Hollen, claims eight U.S. policies in South Asia alone since security relations were formalized with Pakistan in 1954. Therefore, Pakistan was unwilling to forge a relationship that was neither militarily formidable nor politically reassuring.

In 1981 a new era in U.S.-Pakistan security relations began as the Reagan administration realized that "somewhere, somehow, U.S. foreign policy will have to find a way of rewarding friends and penalizing opponents." The U.S. public appeared generally ready to support a policy of assertive competition with the Soviet Union; coercive diplomacy against Pakistan temporarily gave way to empathy: Pakistan appeared as "an essential anchor of the entire South West Asian region." The last dam in South and Southwest Asia against the Soviet tidal wave had to be held and strengthened in the interest of the free world! After almost fifteen years of neglect, a major shift came in U.S. arms sale policy toward Pakistan, in spite of Indian and other lobbies and pressure groups. After prolonged deliberations and a debate in their media, even Pakistani policymakers perceived: "We do believe in the determination of the new U.S. administration to strongly support the independence of Pakistan." The United States reconfirmed the 1959 agreement, which helped, to a degree, in both image and confidence building.

SECURITY CONCERNS

What is the nature and degree of threat that Pakistan faces, wedged in, as it is, between two members of the Indo-Soviet Treaty? India, in spite of Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact, confronts it with the latest Soviet military hardware in the world's fourth largest army, with 3,000 tanks including T-72s and T-80s, suitable only for use on

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10 James L. Buckley, Undersecretary of State, before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 16, 1981.

Pakistan's terrain; the fifth largest air force, with MiG 25s now and MiG 27s and MiG 29s (renamed MiG 31s) in coming years; and the eighth largest navy. Its indigenous armament industry is the largest among Third World noncommunist countries in value, volume, diversity of manufacture, and research and development. Between 1974 and 1984 there was a 200 percent increase in India's defense budget, to $6.8 billion. During the same period military modernization deals were concluded with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, West Germany, and France to the value of about $15 billion. The 1971 treaty made India gradually and imperceptibility a pillar of the Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security System; in 1979 by force of arms Afghanistan became the other pillar. India has tacitly acquiesced to the Soviet Union's occupation of South Asia's security zone, that is Afghanistan, thereby according the Soviet Union a South Asian power status to counterbalance China's. During the last two years India's annual Ministry of Defense reports single out Pakistan as a threat—it's no longer China!

In Afghanistan the Soviets have eight mechanized divisions and two air assault divisions (VDV), the 103rd and 105th, plus elements of the 104th, and four independent helicopter-borne air assault brigades. These back up nine Afghan infantry divisions, two mechanized divisions, two armored divisions, and five commando brigades, all being gradually reequipped and trained in combat. Another seven Soviet VDV divisions are available elsewhere in the USSR for rapid strategic moves. In recent years these VDV divisions have been given new strength as a unique operational group that can be transported to the deep rear of the enemy up to 3,000 kilometers in twenty-four hours to conduct military operations without counting on or linking up with ground forces. They are virtually self-contained and can conduct sustained independent operations in Baluchistan-type of terrain, as they did initially in Afghanistan and in the past in Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet border, Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. On October 8, in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, seven of these VDV divisions were placed on high alert. Backing up the ten Soviet divisions in Afghanistan are another four mechanized divisions, two tank divisions, one air assault division, and three artillery divisions in adjoining Central Asian republics bordering Afghanistan.

For a push toward either Iran or Pakistan, when the United States is militarily committed elsewhere in Asia, Europe, or Central America, the USSR has a total of about twenty-five divisions located in the North Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus, and Turkestan. In relative terms, the Soviet Union has a total of 75,000 airborne or air assault forces as compared with 25,000 from the United States. In Afghanistan the Soviets have, to a large degree, overcome geography by technology. From the Shindad air base in western Afghanistan, the Strait of Hormuz is only 500 miles, Socotra base 1,500 miles, Aden base 2,000 miles, and the Red Sea straits of Bab al Mandab a little over 2,000 miles. Comparatively, U.S. forces would have to overcome about 7,000 air miles and 10,000 nautical miles to reach these areas. In Southwest and South Asia Soviet forces presently would have a superior strategic orientation, which the United States may not be able to counter in a hurry. How will the whale confront the elephant? Pakistan has only about four divisions deployed along the 2,500-
kilometer western border of its North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, the latter being the exposed and vulnerable flank of both South and Southwest Asia.

The six-year U.S.-Pakistani package of $1.5 billion should provide Pakistan by 1986 with 100 M-48 tanks, 64 self-propelled guns of 155mm calibre, 40 self-propelled howitzers of 8-inch calibre, 75 towed howitzers of 155mm calibre, 1,005 TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) antitank missiles, and about 20 assault helicopters—if there are no major hitches. However, the overall increase in combat capability even after inducting all these weapon systems would be less than 5 percent. Even after inducting 100 M-48 tanks and the 40 F-16 aircrafts for $1.1 billion, Pakistan would still have about 200 obsolescent aircrafts that are no match for MiG 23s, MiG 25s, and SU 25s based on the ten airfields of Afghanistan, and 300 obsolescent Pakistani tanks to face T-72 tanks. Compare these figures with what NATO has for defense on a lesser front of 2,000 kilometers, against their World War II allies: 20 armored divisions, 27 mechanized divisions, 3 airborne divisions, 15,000 tanks, 8,000 antitank missiles, 11,000 artillery pieces, over 3,000 aircrafts, and 3,732 strategic and tactical nuclear-capable delivery vehicles! In December 1979 NATO asked the United States for another 108 Pershing IIs and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles to be deployed in Western Europe against a potential threat that has not materialized during the last forty years! The only zone where Soviet armed forces have been engaged in strength in active combat conditions since World War II has been along Pakistan’s 2,500-kilometer western border with Afghanistan. And only four understrength and ill-equipped Pakistani divisions are thinly stretched out facing them.

Therefore, in terms of ground forces, Pakistan requires at least another eight to ten full-strength divisions for Baluchistan, of which two should be armored and two mechanized. These could act as both a credible deterrence and a trip-wire force and have the capability of imposing at least a twenty-four-to-thirty-six-hour delay on any aggression from the north across the Durand Line in the NWFP or Baluchistan. They could also deal with the Soviet air assault divisions in the interior or flank of Baluchistan. The early replacement of the 200 obsolescent aircraft and 300 obsolescent tanks is also necessary and long overdue.

**BASES**

During the period 1941 to 1975, the United States had been directly involved in three major conflicts in East and Southeast Asia, yet the major overseas concentration of U.S. bases and ground forces has been in Europe where it has fought two world wars. Understandably, the ratio of U.S. ground forces in Europe as compared with the Asia-Pacific region has, since the 1950s, been two to three times as much, while the naval strength has been almost at par. In Asia, as Soviet strength has gradually increased, U.S. ground forces have decreased, but its bases and facilities have spread from East and Southeast Asia to the Afro-Asia Ocean (Diego Garcia) and the Arabian Sea and Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Oman.
In South Asia, in spite of offers of bases by Nehru, the founding father of nonalignment and neutrality in 1962 and his invitation to the U.S. air force and its Strategic Air Command to operate from Indian bases in a conflict situation against China, the U.S. desisted. Except for a monitoring base at Badaber and occasional use of the Peshawar air base in the 1960s by U.S. air force for surveillance and logistics, no bases were requested by the United States nor offered by Pakistan—until now. This is in spite of the hue and cry in the Indian and Soviet media in recent years on the issue of bases, as regarding the so-called "Islamic bomb"; both their efforts were part of coercive diplomacy and psychological warfare unleashed against Pakistan with a view to creating an antibase lobby inside both Pakistan and the United States. India has even attempted to make the issue of bases one of the many conditions of the so-called Soviet-type treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation draft offered by India in return for Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact!

Pakistan has reaffirmed that in spite of these two examples in South Asia of invitations by "nonaligned states" (India Afghanistan) to the superpowers to take over and operate under war conditions from bases on their soil (one not availed in 1962 and the other availed in 1979), Pakistan has neither offered nor has the United States asked for bases—this in spite of the fact that Soviet pilots have been flying MiG 25s from Indian air bases (one crashed in December 1981). However, Pakistan reserves the right, under Article 51 of the U.N. charter relating to right of individual and collective self-defense, to do what it considers necessary with its territory in this respect in the future and will not succumb to coercive diplomacy from its neighbors.

Purely on the merits of the case, the region of the NWFP and Baluchistan is presently so devoid of essential strategic infrastructure by way of airfields, lateral roads, ports, depots, etc., that the first priority for Pakistan is to develop these on an urgent basis (together with raising the additional eight to ten divisions mentioned earlier). Quetta is the only air base and Karachi the only port complex that would be operational in a conflict situation. On the other hand, for the last five years, the Soviets have been busy expanding and supplementing the infrastructure that they developed in Afghanistan in the 1960s.

Pakistan has the expertise but lacks the financial resources to develop the infrastructure in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Nor do Pakistanis expect U.S. troops to come and defend their territory and way of life. They need the tools and means; they can then do both the jobs themselves! While negotiations continue at Geneva, 3 million refugees, victims of migratory genocide, have fled to Pakistan. There are no indications that the Soviets plan to leave in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the haste with which the infrastructure is being developed inside Afghanistan—ten air bases already, and four more are under construction—indicates a prolonged if not a permanent presence. The Chinese may be right in predicting that the Soviets intend to wait only three to five years to digest Afghanistan and let the furor die down before it bites into Pakistan or Iran. The dozen air bases in Afghanistan would be ideal for air-lifting at least four to six air assault divisions simultaneously on Soviet Military Transport Aviation (MTA) and Aeroflot fleets of about 1,450 AN-22s, IL-76s, AN-12 Cubs, IL-62s, TU-154s, and IL-86s specialist cargo, long haul and wide-bodied
aircrafts. In the race to improve its strategic projection capability, Soviet strategic doctrine, equipment and airlift capability have already been successfully tested under wartime conditions in the region.

**NUCLEAR ISSUES**

Perhaps nothing causes more strategic hiccups in some neighboring countries of Pakistan, and even in certain quarters elsewhere, than Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program. The United States’ Atoms for Peace program supported Pakistan’s entry into the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 at Vienna and even backed up Pakistan’s election to the board of governors. Under CENTO, and SEATO, the United States helped train Pakistani scientists to run the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The misconceptions about Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are based on misinformation and exaggeration. The facility at Kanupp near Karachi is fully covered by IAEA safeguards and so far has been subjected to ninety-four inspections. It is equipped with the latest monitoring devices, including fuel bundle counters, which automatically record all fuel going in and out. Pinstech, near Islamabad, was acquired in 1974 with full public knowledge and is a laboratory-scale training facility. It is too small to produce any significant amount of plutonium even if operated for several decades. It is also under full IAEA safeguards. Kahuta is a modest-scale uranium-enrichment facility based on a light-water reactor geared entirely to meeting Pakistan’s future energy requirements. The rationale for Pinstech and Kahuta research and development is to achieve a degree of self-reliance in the nuclear fuel cycle. After Pakistan’s sad experience with the unilateral breach of trust by Canada and France, this enrichment research and development program is no more than an insurance against arbitrary stoppages in the supply of enriched uranium needed for Pakistan’s planned power reactors.

It has been estimated that even for a moderate growth rate in the economy (about 5 percent per year in gross domestic product) there will be a gap by the turn of the century of about 8,000 MW in the power-generation capacity, after making full use of Pakistan’s available hydro and domestic gas and oil and coal resources. Already Pakistan is spending 60 to 70 percent of its foreign exchange earnings on the import of oil. The comparative economics of electricity generation by nuclear power versus oil-fired plants is heavily in favor of the former. Unfortunately, the United States has adopted a nuclear policy which is seen as unilateral imposition of its self-defined values on the rest of the world, not very dissimilar from U.S.-China policies of the 1950s and 1960s, which resulted in the cutting off of economic aid to Pakistan when it established the first air link with China in 1964—described as a “major breach in free world solidarity” by Senator Wayne Morse. Six years later that very “breach” was utilized by the United States to establish a new global strategic equilibrium.

In the 1970s through policies of denial, control, persuasion, and cooperation,

reflected in the London Suppliers Group of 1974, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation of 1977, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, France was forced unilaterally to cancel the fully IAEA-safeguarded 1976 Chashma reprocessing plant deal in 1978. President Carter, in spite of events in Iran in 1978 and in Afghanistan in 1979, invoking the Symington-Glenn Amendment, cut off all economic and military assistance to Pakistan in July 1979, just when the whole of neighboring Southwest Asia was destabilized with conflicts involving over six states of the region and, indirectly, both the superpowers. Apart from being a land, air, and sea bridge between Asia, Europe, and North Africa, West Asia in geostrategic and economic terms is a vital region and is above all the spiritual center of the Islamic world. From time to time Pakistan has provided almost twenty military missions and training contingents to that region, becoming the Third World’s leading supplier of military manpower after Cuba, thereby augmenting the region’s stability and security. The arbitrary cutoff of all aid in 1979 on the nuclear issue was thus considered by Pakistan as “moral relativism,” which politicized the nuclear issue and created almost a national consensus within Pakistan.

Even with the restructuring of Pakistan-U.S. relations by the Reagan administration after the loss of the security zone of South Asia to the Soviets, the pressure on Pakistan has continued in spite of the fact that it has been constantly opposing both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its neighbor, India, which exploded the bomb in 1974 and since then has developed and acquired its delivery means and guidance system, alleged that Pakistan had exploded its first atom bomb in the Lop Nor desert of Chinese Sinkiang in June 1983. This false allegation was promptly rebutted by Pakistan and by Premier Zhao Ziyang during his visit to Washington in January 1984 when he declared: “We do not engage in nuclear proliferation, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.” Senator John Towers, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in a Senate debate affirmed that he was in a position to say that the F-16s supplied to Pakistan were not suitable for nuclear delivery.

Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan, during the thirty-ninth session of the U.N. General Assembly, on October 2, 1984, said:

Pakistan’s abiding commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is reflected in our unqualified support for disarmament measures advanced in the United Nations framework, our consistent pursuit for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia, our initiative for a joint declaration for nonacquisition of nuclear weapons by the regional states, our offer to our neighbor India for inspection of nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis as well as our preparedness to explore ways to keep our area free of nuclear weapons. As repeatedly offered by President Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan is committed and shall remain committed, not to develop nuclear weapons or allow their deployment on its soil.

Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA, after a visit to Pakistan in 1984, declared:

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14 Two Jaguar squadrons of the Indian air force in 1984 were reportedly practicing “flip-toss” bombing in the remote Leh air base using dummy nuclear bombs.
“Pakistan had a strong case for acquiring nuclear power, and its nuclear program was entirely peaceful in nature.”

On November 2, 1984, the State Department’s nuclear specialist, Ambassador Richard Kennedy, at a press briefing in Washington, D.C., while defending his policy of selective morality, said that “fears about Pakistan’s nuclear program are grossly exaggerated and [that] Pakistan was still a long way off from a nuclear weapons capability.” He also reaffirmed China’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, its joining the Atomic Energy Commission, and its undertaking to place its nuclear exports under IAEA safeguards. “We accept President Zia ul-Haq’s categorical statement that Pakistan’s nuclear program is devoted entirely to power generation,” Ambassador Kennedy said.  

In the final analysis, Pakistan was denied and missed the industrial revolution, and generations have suffered the present low standard of living; for the sake of the welfare and prosperity of its coming generations, it cannot afford to miss the nuclear revolution.

CONCLUSIONS

The initiative to forge Pakistan-U.S. security (and economic) relations was taken by Pakistan’s founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as early as September 1947. U.S. response at first was lukewarm because of involvement in other crises and conflict areas of Europe and Asia and the absence of a full perspective on the geostrategic importance of Pakistan and the region. Regional threats from India and threats from Soviet-inspired Kabul prompted Pakistan to seek a security relationship; the U.S. response was influenced by superpower globalism and regional relativism, with India in mind. Arms sales were at a peak between 1954 and 1961, which enabled Pakistan to modernize its armed forces and to forge a credible deterrence. Major ground and air violations from neighboring India sharply decreased. In 1962 Nehru provoked a conflict with China with three motives, that is, to deny China its traditional South Asian power status, to test the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral and multilateral relationship, and, if possible, to wean the United States away from Pakistan with the help of a sympathetic Democratic administration. He was partially successful in the last two motives. The divergence in the Pakistan-U.S. security relationship was first highlighted in 1962 when the United States rushed arms to India to equip about ten Indian mountain divisions. In 1965 conflicts over the disputed territories of Rann of Kutch and Jammu and Kashmir, U.S. arms were a decisive factor in Pakistan’s defense, but the conflicts were also the high watermark of the security relationships, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Coercive diplomacy and an arms ban thereafter forced Pakistan to look to China, the USSR, North Korea, France, and other countries for arms.

In 1971, treaty allies India and the Soviet Union tested what remained of their security relationship, with disastrous consequences for Pakistan, as the United States

15 Reported by PPI.
watched and "tilted" because it was heavily involved in Vietnam. The Indian pillar of Leonid Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System was firmly established, as SEATO and CENTO were allowed to wither away, and the U.S.-originated arms and equipment to Pakistan's armed forces became obsolescent in the late seventies. Within this geostrategic milieu of South and Southwest Asia, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the next logical move on the South Asian chessboard. Events in Iran were an excuse as much as the so-called "invitation." Since the time of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum in 1949, the most likely and dangerous had happened within only three decades! The second pillar of the Asian Collective Security System is now also firmly in position in the Hindukush. Pakistan's neighbors and their sympathizers may consider this as overringing the Soviet bell, but Pakistan has to face the facts. Ayub Khan's prediction to Vice-President Nixon in December 1952 came true in the 1970s.

On the issue of bases, the most noise is being made by Pakistan's neighbors whose past and present record of offering air bases for foreign planes and pilots is well known. Pakistan's priority must be to develop the necessary infrastructure in Baluchistan and the NWFP in order to be at least a match for what is being developed in Afghanistan, together with raising an additional eight to ten divisions and the replacement of its obsolescent aircraft and tanks.

U.S. policy toward Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program is unfortunately reminiscent of biased U.S. policy in the 1960s regarding the Pakistan-China relationship, which was seen in some quarters as a threat to free world solidarity and was subjected to coercive diplomacy. Only time will prove, as in the past, who was farsighted and right on this issue.

Some of Pakistan's hostile neighbors perceive it as lacking identity, as fragile and unstable, as weak like a Poland or a Finland. Some even doubt Pakistan's long-term survival and existence only because a Westminster type of political system has failed to take root in its soil. They forget that fifty-three out of 160 states have been under military rule during one time or another since 1945, and in 1983 about thirty were still under military rule. Pakistan faces a security situation that does not call for pessimism; it is neither unique nor new but of a different dimension from that of the past since it concerns a superpower that claims to have "liberated" thirteen European and Asian countries and 150 million people in World War II, that is militarily allied to its two hostile neighbors, and whose atheistic, militant ideology influences 1.5 billion people, or 35 percent of the human race!

The people of Pakistan belong to a country that is young, virile, and in its prime, proud of their past and determined in the present and for the future. While grappling with their teething troubles and evolving institutions suited to their genius and way of life, they have been baptized in four conflicts during the last thirty-seven years, and in 1971 they learned some costly lessons in crisis management. They are no longer starry-eyed idealists or security policy pussycats; they have been steadfast; and they do not belong to the thirty odd states that have switched sides since 1950, some more than once! The oscillations in Pakistan's relations with the United States have not been of its making.
If the United States and the free world seriously consider Pakistan a frontline state, let it be built up and treated as such in terms of military strength. There should be at least some semblance of rationale in relation to what has been militarily deployed against a similar but only a one-directional threat on a lesser front in Europe, as compared with the two-directional threat that Pakistan faces on much wider fronts. That would help narrow the strategic, technological, and credibility gaps and promote peace and stability in the region.
2. U.S.-Pakistan Security Relations

Stephen P. Cohen

OVERVIEW

Four special features of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship command our attention. They are rooted in the past and in the nature of the interests and states involved, but they are not immutable. I will discuss here these features, briefly survey the relationship in which they are embedded, and speculate on how they can be, where necessary, "managed" to serve the interests of not only the United States and Pakistan but other states with legitimate and vital interests at stake.

The four salient features of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship are its partial nature, its asymmetry, its noncongruence, and its perceptual distortion.

First, U.S.-Pakistan security relations are partial. For each state, there are other interests more important than their overlapping interests. In the case of the United States, the Soviet Union remains more important than Pakistan itself. For Pakistan, India remains the chief security threat, and this threat overshadows relations with both the United States and USSR. The overall U.S.-Pakistan security relationship is thus forever subject to buffeting by other relationships and events. The core joint interests between the two states do not and cannot resemble the core relationship between the United States and Britain, or even Pakistan and India (which are bound together in many ways by culture and geography and have a vital common interest in keeping outside states out of the South Asian region—although that interest is not often acknowledged).

Second, the security relations between the two states are asymmetrical. The relationship has been, and may remain, more important to Pakistan than to the United States. The latter's involvement in South Asia has been intermittent, and it can withdraw from the region with little loss. Pakistan cannot withdraw: its very survival is continuously at stake. Pakistan can be destroyed, the United States would only be inconvenienced.

Third, the security interests of the two states are noncongruent. For Pakistan, the United States represents an important source of weapons and political support,
useful in a whole range of diplomatic and military fronts. For the United States, it is Pakistan's position as a counter to the Soviet Union that makes it important. Yet each state has other important interests, which do not necessarily harmonize. Their views on the Middle East differ, and their attitudes toward India, toward nuclear proliferation, and toward "human rights" are often at variance. Until recently even their views toward the Soviet Union differed significantly.

Finally, the security relationship remains burdened by an extreme degree of distortion, misperception, misrepresentation, and stereotypes on both sides. Americans still see Pakistan as everything from a nation of "little brown brothers" staunchly defending the ramparts of the free world against communist onslaughts to a nation run by a crazed religious fanatic. Pakistanis see the United States as alternatively omnipotent and incompetent in its involvement in their own vital affairs. Perhaps the most chilling features of these stereotypes is their familiarity: most were present during the 1950s and 1960s, although there are signs of realism struggling to break through encrusted myth.

I have put the worst first and, having done so, wish to state quite firmly that relations between Pakistan and the United States are not doomed to a series of ups and downs, or highs and lows, or whatever other metaphor is applied. With careful attention, a stable relationship that enhances the security interests of both states without hurting the interests of each in other arenas (or even with other friendly states) can be evolved. I discuss here both common and conflicting interests and try to suggest ways in which such a stable relationship can develop. There is a sense of urgency to the problem: a number of future events are likely to place great strain on the relationship, and a few simple precautions can help ensure passage through difficult times.

SOME ANCIENT BUT MODERN HISTORY

While this chapter is concerned with contemporary Pakistan-U.S. relations, it is important to emphasize that the latest evolution of this relationship—stimulated by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and, somewhat earlier, concern about Pakistan's nuclear ambitions—takes place in the context of a long search for a satisfactory relationship on the part of both countries. The history of this search has been ably presented by a number of scholars and diplomats. Still, it is useful to be reminded that some of the underlying problems in the relationship are very old. They date back to the first weeks and months of Pakistan's independence and involve many of the same problems that are so important today: a threatening Soviet Union, Pakistan (and Indian) requests for arms, American concern with too-close identification with one or the other, and the existence of purely regional factors which bedeviled attempts to normalize relations between Pakistan and India and doomed attempts by the United

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1 For an excellent survey, see Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982). See also Sattar Baber, United States Aid to Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1974); and S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
states to have good relations with both.

It was India that first stressed the threatening nature of the Soviet Union to the United States and India that made the first request for military assistance from America. Even before independence, Nehru had suggested to American officials that India would like to receive assistance that the British could or would not provide. More specifically, his appointed ambassador, Asaf Ali, told American officials in Washington in February 1947 (six months before independence) that if India were to become strong, it would “become a bastion for the world against the great northern neighbor which now cast its shadow over two continents, Asia and Europe.” Other Indian officials were strongly anti-Soviet in their private contacts with the United States.

On October 3, 1947, India requested military aircraft to help move refugees. This was refused. Instead, the United States encouraged Pakistan and India to work out their refugee problem together and make a joint request for transport aircraft. Both India and Pakistan then made other requests. The Indians asked for several B-25 light bombers. This was denied because the United States had suspended military aid and sales to both India and Pakistan after fighting broke out in Kashmir. New Delhi continued to discuss further purchases and was even placed on the list of countries to receive restricted U.S. military information.

Meanwhile, Pakistan made a much larger request in October-November 1948, which would have supported a regular army of 100,000 troops, twelve fighter squadrons, 470 aircraft, and a navy of about thirty-five ships. Pakistan was then thinking of the United States as a primary source of military strength. This request was also denied. American officials had agreed that they should pursue American policy as a regional policy in coordination with the British. In an interagency analysis of the situation in April 1949 this policy was stated:

U.S. assistance which may be extended to the South Asian countries should be utilized as far as practicable as an instrument to effect cooperation within the region, and we should endeavor to guide any regional or Asian movement which may develop in the direction of constructive participation in U.N. activities.

As for the South Asian states and American strategic interests, the chief goal was to “prevent Soviet encroachment or domination,” to prevent Soviet access to resources or facilities in the region and

to develop, without commitment to military action on our part, a cooperative attitude in these countries which would facilitate obtaining the use of areas or facilities which might be required by the Western democracies...for operations against the U.S.S.R. in the event of war. ... With reference to Pakistan, to favor commercial arrangements which

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would in emergency, facilitate development for operational use of base facilities in the Karachi-Lahore area.  

American officials were quite aware of the problems associated with increased involvement in South Asia:

We may defeat our own purpose if by extending assistance to any one country in this area we alienate the firm friendship of one or more of the other South Asian powers. Certain of these countries, particularly India and Pakistan, do not yet enjoy good relations with one another. If U.S. assistance is made available to one the others will increase their pressure for comparable aid. In considering any program of assistance to the area, therefore, a regional approach is necessary. . . . On the other hand, India is the natural political and economic center of South Asia and aid given to the peripheral countries would have to be adapted to conditions in India.

Some of these conditions were altered in the years that followed. Almost all of the ingredients of later U.S. involvement and confusion in South Asia are here: the central concern with the Soviet Union, the interest in “base” facilities, the disinclination to commit American forces, the desire to see India and Pakistan work together on common strategic problems, the difficulty of handling wildly disparate requests for military equipment from the two states, especially when they were at war with each other, and the recognition of the obvious: India’s regional predominance.

Both India and Pakistan obtained support from other countries (especially China and the Soviet Union). Pakistan, with the help of Olaf Caroe, the British scholar, made a persuasive case as a key ally in the Middle East, opening the way for an extended aid program that nearly matched the 1947 request. India itself came under attack from China, and the U.S. estimate of the communist threat to South Asia waxed and waned, as did the requirement for bases. The single factor that has not changed, to the despair of generations of American policymakers, is the state of armed hostility between India and Pakistan. Every U.S. effort to bring these two states closer together has been unsuccessful. And every time the United States moved to support one or the other state (for good reasons or otherwise), there have been informed observers who have warned against the consequences. Such warnings were issued at the time Pakistan entered into the Baghdad Pact and signed bilateral defense agreements with the United States, when the United States “tilted” toward Pakistan during the 1971 civil war, and more recently when arms sales to Pakistan were renewed in 1981. But U.S. support to India after 1962 (and the cutoff of arms aid and sales to Pakistan in 1965) also came under criticism from those who (correctly) warned that this would merely alienate a friend and push Pakistan closer to other powers. The warnings of the 1949 State, Army, Navy, Air Force Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East (SANACC) were prophetic, although we must remember that the alternatives to a bad policy may sometimes be a worse one. This seems to have been the motto of the next thirty years

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4 Ibid., Appendix B, p. 28.
of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Again, the story has been ably told by others, and we need only recapitulate.

First, after some negotiation conducted during the waning years of the Truman administration, Pakistan entered into a series of multilateral and bilateral pacts with the United States and several American allies, most notably Turkey and Iran. This led to the provision of substantial amounts of military and economic assistance to Pakistan during the 1950s, a close political relationship, and the influence on Pakistani society (especially the military) of American ideas and practices.

Second, the relationship floundered during the late 1950s when the United States listened sympathetically to Indian concern over the looming Chinese threat. (In any case, Pakistan had begun to normalize its relations with the Soviets, assuring them that Pakistan’s participation in the U.S.-sponsored alliances was not directed against them.) When the United States provided emergency military assistance to India in 1963, Pakistan was angered, and this was one of the precipitating causes of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.

Third, the military assistance program to Pakistan was formally ended after 1965, replaced by a program offering spare parts and “defensive” weapons.⁵

Fourth, all such U.S. sales were banned when Pakistan attempted a military solution of its East Pakistan problem; arms sales to Pakistan, on a selected (defensive) basis were renewed in 1975, but Pakistan only received a small number of weapons.

Finally, all military sales and aid programs were again terminated in 1979 (by the Carter administration) when it was determined that Pakistan was working on a nuclear weapons program. When the Soviets poured into Afghanistan, Carter reversed his policy, offering Pakistan a small military sales program. Pakistan refused but accepted the Reagan administration’s larger economic and military offer, including the high-performance model of the F-16.

The formal basis for the current relationship is the 1959 agreement, as Pakistan withdrew from CENTO and SEATO in the early 1970s. The present relationship provides for American arms sales to Pakistan without any public promise of reciprocal support for particular U.S. foreign policy objectives, the provision of bases, or a U.S. presence in Pakistan. Further, there has been no public change in Pakistan’s position with regard to nuclear proliferation. The remainder of this chapter will deal with two of these critical issues: the provision of military equipment to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear intentions.

AMERICAN ARMS AND PAKISTANI POLICY

Arms transfers reveal a great deal about relations between countries. They are highly visible, they are related to vital national security interests, they are costly, they carry a heavy symbolic burden, they may intimate close political ties between key elite groups, and they can be bargaining “chips” in other disputes. In brief, they may

be—as in this case—very complex. I will therefore discuss issues surrounding current U.S. arms sales to Pakistan under nine different topics, grouped roughly into diplomatic, military, domestic, and economic categories.

**American Arms and Support for Pakistan**

From the Pakistani perspective the arms supply relationship with the United States has always carried with it political overtones central to the vital interests of Pakistan. Partly because of the excessive rhetoric associated with the relationship (especially in the 1950s), but largely because American arms enabled Pakistan to build a modern military force, the arms relationship was seen as historically central to the survival of Pakistan itself. This perception faded in the 1960s and 1970s when other states (especially China) supplied Pakistan with arms.

Because of this perception of centrality, there was an assumption that the United States would support Pakistan against its chief enemy, India, an assumption privately fostered by some American officials. Yet one administration after another has been at pains to emphasize that U.S. arms were meant for defense against the Soviet Union, not India. No American administration has wanted to be in a position of encouraging Pakistan against India, and Pakistanis have been understandably perplexed at the American half-support they have received.

However, would the United States support Pakistan in a crisis in which the Soviets were involved? Would the United States provide assistance to Pakistan—other than U.S. military units—should there be a new Indo-Pakistan war? Would such assistance be conditioned upon a defensive Pakistani strategy or the Indian initiation of such a conflict? These are questions we can raise for discussion, but cannot answer. Even the 1971 U.S. policy—in which Nixon provided limited military aid and substantial symbolic diplomatic support for Pakistan in exchange for Pakistan’s support of his opening to China—may not be relevant. We simply do not know what the American response would be, and those now responsible for such policy probably do not know either. Certainly, this ultimate uncertainty is recognized in Pakistan, which has been wary of dependency upon the United States and which has carefully avoided policies that would compromise future defense plans.

**Reciprocal Pakistani Obligations**

In the past, Pakistan allowed the United States to use its territory for two vital intelligence operations: the dispatch of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and the monitoring of Soviet missile and nuclear tests. The United States failed to get Pakistan to provide a surrogate expeditionary force, although Pakistan did (and does still) maintain training missions in a number of states friendly to the United States, especially in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Has Pakistan undertaken any new obligations after it entered into the new military relationship with the United States? Certainly, some in the government hoped that it would do so. The efforts of Henry Kissinger and later the Carter administration to extract Pakistani concessions in
exchange for U.S. weapons are also well documented (Pakistan had sought A-7 or equivalent aircraft, but the price was the suspension of the nuclear program).

The present situation seems to be one of tacit Pakistani agreement that it will not pursue certain policies (or pursue them as vigorously) while it is receiving American arms. Thus, Pakistan has softened its rhetoric on Israel, it may have stretched out the nuclear program, it has continued its policy with regard to a solution of the Afghan crisis, and it apparently tolerates the delivery of some weapons to the Afghan Mujahedeen. It is impossible to state that Pakistan would not have pursued such policies had there been no (or less) U.S. arms supplied, but the weight of formal and informal evidence indicates that U.S. arms have been a major contributing factor in Pakistani decisions on these issues.

Certainly, arms “aid” has its limits. It is not “aid” but purchases for hard currency. Some of these arms are very old, indeed. Pakistan has even refused concessional financing terms, preferring to pay cash or commercial rates rather than the lower amount offered to favored states and allies.

It may be that in the future one or both sides may decide that they can enhance their position by tougher bargaining or that they wish to expand the quid pro quo. Pakistan may make requests for additional sophisticated equipment. The September 1984 reports of a request for an AWACS capability are important because of the multiplier effect such an aircraft would have. Or Pakistan may seek assurances of noninterference with its nuclear program. Or it may seek a new treaty to formalize the relationship. On the other side, the United States may press for transit or intelligence facilities in connection with the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the Persian Gulf. Somewhat further off are potential requests for cooperation in the Strategic Defense Initiative, which would require advanced intelligence capabilities along the southern Soviet perimeter and possibly the local basing of directed energy systems (which could, theoretically, be extended to protect Pakistan itself, although the technological obstacles are practically insurmountable). Pakistan is also well located in terms of port and air access for U.S. strategic forces that might be based in the Indian Ocean. It need hardly be added that Pakistan may not accede to any of these requests unless the United States were to provide substantial new assistance or guarantees against Soviet, Indian, or joint pressure. Even then, Pakistan’s security is not likely to be materially enhanced over its current position.

The Practical Enhancement of Pakistan’s Military Strength

No other issue is more surrounded by myth and misinformation than the impact of American arms sales on Pakistan’s relative military power. The total amount of American weapons for Pakistan came to about forty F-16 aircraft (still being delivered), modernized M-48 tanks of 1950s vintage, a substantial number of helicopters equipped with tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles, some Harpoon SSMs, and a variety of miscellaneous equipment. Was this sufficient to pose a threat to India, as claimed by various Indian spokespersons? Critics of the arms program claim that the level of arms was too small to enable Pakistan to
withstand a Soviet attack, but big enough to threaten India. The Indian response has been particularly vehement, although India bitterly opposed even the lifting of an arms embargo in 1975. This was certainly no threat to it since by that time France and China had become Pakistan's major weapons supplier.

The truth probably lies somewhere between the critics of the arms program and some of its overconfident advocates, who portray Pakistan as a bastion against Soviet aggression. Indeed, we will probably never know whether U.S. arms have made a material military difference. To the degree that they enhance Pakistan's deterrent capabilities and to the degree that deterrence will continue to work, nothing will happen. Of course, nothing would have happened if India or the Soviet Union had not intended to attack under any circumstances, but we never will know that either.

The best one can conclude—after an examination of the relative balance of forces between India and Pakistan and a survey of the terrain and tactics of the USSR along the Durand Line—is that U.S. arms have made a marginal difference to the Indo-Pakistan balance and will have forced the Soviets to a somewhat higher level of effort should they decide to cross the Durand Line on the ground or in the air.

Taking the Indo-Pakistan military balance (or "balanced imbalance" as Richard Park and I once called it), it is clear that the two countries have reversed their strategies of the 1960s. Then it was Pakistan that had the more modern force and Pakistan that attacked in 1965, hoping to seize Kashmir and the diplomatic advantage. India fought a defensive war in 1965 and showed little interest in striking in the west in 1971. Its operations in East Pakistan were offensive, but there was little serious opposition, and India had seven months in which to plan and prepare while the Pakistan army was engaged in combatting Indian-supported guerrillas.

After the 1971 war the Pakistanis had to pull back, doctrinally if not geographically. However, the Indian armed services each embraced doctrines of "offensive defense," or even preemptive strikes, and concluded that the next war with Pakistan would be the last: Pakistan's major armed forces would be defeated once and for all, one way or another. The great national debate over the Jaguar in 1977-79 was in part a debate over this strategy.

However, India has never had a very large advantage in weapons or manpower over Pakistan. The requirement of a 3:1 advantage is pure myth since most wars have been won by attacking states that have had a numerical disadvantage vis-à-vis the defender. India's relative ratio of advantage has hovered around 1.5:1 or less in armor and about 2.5:1 in aircraft. India does have an advantage in terrain since Pakistan must defend a few fixed places (e.g., Lahore) and a long rail and road line that is

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7 This is evident by a careful reading of open-source Indian military publications, including the prestigious United Services of India (U.S.I.) Journal. For an analysis, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Security of South Asia (forthcoming).
vulnerable to Indian attack. In recent years, therefore, the Indian strategy has apparently been one of expanding the scope of any likely future war by attacking in Rajasthan and in Kashmir, hoping to spread out the Pakistani forces and exploit any gaps. Further, Pakistan does not have the military and industrial infrastructure of India, and it is much harder for arms shipments to reach Pakistan than India.

Thus, by the late 1970s, it was reasonable for India to look forward to the day when any Pakistani provocation could be met with instantaneous and crushing retaliation, while Pakistani forces could not reach or damage any vital Indian possessions. Indians openly discussed the desirability of a direct attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities or of launching a preemptive war to retake Kashmir. They looked forward to the prospect of a divided, weakened Pakistan, slipping into military decrepitude and shorn of its superpower supporter.

The renewed U.S. arms program has altered this situation. Pakistani armor has been modestly improved, its antitank capabilities enhanced, and it now possesses a retaliatory capability it did not have before, in the form of the F-16 aircraft. Further, if the F-16s were to be used in the air defense role, there is greater doubt now that the Indian air force would be able to maintain air superiority over Pakistani territory. All of this raises the costs of an Indian victory; it does not make it impossible. But this is precisely all Pakistan needs: it has been able, with U.S. help, to alter the cost-benefit ratio of Indian planners and thus perpetuate the regional status quo a little longer.

India’s response has been to spend and buy. New Delhi has entered into three major arms deals with the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, concentrating its purchases on high-performance aircraft, armor, and transport equipment. It has also purchased the Mirage 2000. However, since its equipment was already running down badly and some of its own designs have proven to be faulty, the Indian arms buying spree has not brought clear-cut superiority over Pakistan. It has, however, confronted the United States with the question of whether it wants to respond favorably to new Pakistani requests. The United States is a partner in an arms race of modest proportions, but one probably of greater psychological than military importance.

One new factor has further altered the military balance between India and Pakistan. After the occupation of the Golden Temple by the Indian army in June 1984, Sikhs have been disaffected, and there are many of them in all three Indian armed services. Further, the Indian Punjab remains under military control, its Sikh population still resentful; this might complicate future operations in the Punjab and even in Kashmir, since road and rail lines to that state run through the Punjab. These events have probably weakened the fighting capacity of the Indian armed forces more than Pakistan’s have been improved by new U.S. weapons.

As for Pakistan’s alleged incompetence should the Soviets increase pressure on the Durand Line, some simple facts are in order. The Soviet Union is unable to cope with a guerrilla force with its present level of forces (about 115,000, although recent

reports indicate an increase). It could not contemplate an invasion of Pakistan unless it increased its forces to at least a million men. It could engage in cross-border raids, air strikes against Mujahedeen targets, or even against Pakistani facilities, but none of this would be decisive in Afghanistan and might prove embarrassing (if its planes are shot down or if its Afghan pilots continue to defect). The only plausible Soviet military action against Pakistan will come when and if Pakistan is itself in turmoil. The extreme case would be during a period of civil rebellion, when Soviet forces were invited in by friendly dissident Baluch, Sindhi, Frontier, or even Punjabi groups. But this is the Armageddon scenario for Pakistan, not an immediate, pressing need. Right now, Pakistan's force disposition along the Durand Line is adequate to raise the level of any prospective Soviet incursion to the point where it would constitute a major international incident, and thus more likely. Further, it is easier for Pakistan to reinforce its troops along the Durand Line than it is for the Soviet Union to bring them from Soviet Central Asia, establish a forward base for them in Afghanistan, and have them move out from there. The British faced an identical problem in the 1930s and early 1940s and concluded that the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) could be defended with about the same number of troops as Pakistan presently stations there now.11

The militarily impossible scenario for Pakistan would involve some combination of Indian and Soviet pressure. This would be more than the present military infrastructure could cope with. Of course, it would activate formal and informal American commitments to Pakistan concerning communist aggression, but it might come at a moment when the United States was incapable of offering substantial support. Our view is that this scenario is less probable than others: for the Soviets it would not yield proportionate gain; for the Indians it would lead to an unsatisfactory realignment of South Asian borders.

Which Weapons for Pakistan?

We have several times alluded to offensive and defensive strategies and weapons of enhanced versus modest capabilities. The kind of weapon supplied to Pakistan and the use made of such weapons have been long-standing themes in the security relationship between the two states. It reached its most bizarre point when the United States would sell only “nonlethal” military equipment to Pakistan (after 1965)—trucks with hardpoints for machineguns were lethal; without them, they were non-lethal. Later, a distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons was introduced and still has some currency in Washington. This became linked with weapons that could be used against civilians versus those that were more suited for use against soldiers (armored personnel carriers, it seems, are particularly anticivilian to those who make this distinction).

More recently, in the mid-1970s, a major dispute arose over the sale of aircraft to Pakistan in exchange for the dismantling of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Pakistan asked for the A-7, a slow-flying attack bomber of limited capabilities. The United States, however, wanted to sell the F-5E, a simple but effective short-range multipurpose fighter. Eventually, neither was sold, but the debate was less about military qualities than symbolic imagery. The A-7 could be used to attack and bomb Indian targets (it could also be used as a tankkiller over Pakistani territory) and thus seemed to carry with it tacit U.S. agreement that such a role was legitimate for Pakistan. The Americans wanted a purely "defensive" plane, implying (especially to India) that it would not encourage an aggressive or offensive Pakistani strategy.

Two different aircraft filled exactly the same symbolic role in 1980-81, only in this case there was no nuclear quid pro quo. The Pakistan air force dismissed the A-7 as a flying junk heap and requested the F-16 (in part because Israel had used it to such great advantage in destroying the Iraqi reactor). Would the United States sell such a weapon to Pakistan? For the Pakistanis, this was a critical test of American support for them, for their offensive capability, and for their treatment as a state in almost the same category as Israel.

In going for the F-16, they turned down the offer of the F-5E's much improved successor, the F-5G (which Northrop renumbered F-20 to improve its image). This excellent aircraft, much cheaper than the F-16, could have been partially manufactured in Pakistan. Pakistan thus might have acquired a much larger number of F-20s than F-16s.\(^{12}\)

In both cases, the overall military virtues of the aircraft favored by Pakistan were only marginally better than the one they rejected, but their symbolic and political virtues were quite different. The change in Pakistan's political leverage before and after Afghanistan is vividly demonstrated by their failure in 1977 and success in 1981 in getting the plane they wanted.

No other weapon has raised so much controversy. There was some Indian and U.S. objection to the sale of the Harpoon SSM because of its total irrelevance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The Reagan administration has agreed to sell weapons without applying any strict test of "offensive" versus "defensive" or whether they are more appropriate to combatting Russians or Indians. In truth, most weapons are multipurpose and cannot be neatly categorized in this way. Further, enhancing capabilities against India may free resources and weapons for the northern front. But perhaps the question is badly overblown since the basic infrastructure of the Pakistan military is so weak that the addition of a number of advanced weapons—offensive or otherwise—is not going to make a big difference in case of a long war. At that point, the critical (and unknown) factor will be the ability of the United States or other friendly states to get spare parts, replacements, and arms and ammunition to Pakistan.

in the face of what is likely to be an energetic Indian blockade of Pakistan's single port.\footnote{An imaginative fictional analysis of the course of a new Indo-Pakistan war, including an Indian amphibious invasion attempt, is in Ravi Rikhye, \textit{The Fourth Round} (New Delhi: ABC, 1982). For an Indian navy analysis of the need for aggressive strategy, see K. R. Menon, "The Preemptive Naval Strike in Limited War," U.S.I. of India \textit{Journal}, Jan.--March 1978, pp. 46--54.}

**Arms and Influence: Pakistani Politics**

When two states of unequal size enter into an unequal military relationship, there are bound to be "political" problems, that is, one side will expect, and the other side will suspect, that influence will be packaged along with the hardware. This has long been debated in the Pakistan case. After the first contacts with the United States were made, some believed that Pakistan was unduly influenced because its own technical and bureaucratic infrastructure was so weak and had become excessively dependent upon the United States (we will examine this below when examining the influence of arms on the Pakistan military). More recently, a number of observers have accused the United States of using its arms (or the promise of arms) to penetrate and manipulate Pakistani politics and even its foreign policy. The most sensational of these accusations was by former Foreign Minister Bhutto himself, who claimed that the United States had worked through the Pakistan military to have him arrested so that the nuclear program would be terminated. This death-cell accusation, for which there is no evidence whatsoever, hangs like a cloud over U.S.-Pakistan relations.\footnote{Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, "If I am Assassinated..." (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).}

While it is true that Pakistan is more easily influenced by outsiders than are some other states, the linkage of arms and political influence is seriously exaggerated. During some genuine crises, such influence was minimal: Pakistan's involvement in Kutch and Kashmir in 1965, its attack on East Bengali dissidents in 1971, its initiation of a nuclear program, and the adoption of a tough line against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were all independent decisions. It could be said that the termination of the 1965 war was influenced by outsiders, and the promise of arms aid has extended the nuclear option a few more years, but these decisions were also in Pakistan's own interest.

Similarly, alleged U.S. influence on various opposition groups, a charge often heard during the Bhutto years, was a myth wholly manufactured in Pakistan. During much of this period American officials were carefully watched and their movements constrained, and they had no way to influence such disparate and diverse groups. In any case, arms supplies, or the promise of a military relationship, played no role in the relationship since the United States had decided upon a very low profile in Pakistan.

The curious and unanswerable question is why Pakistanis believe that the United States has so much influence over their political system. The answer probably lies more in the realm of self-image and perception than the realm of influence and inducement.
Arms and Influence: The Military

The degree to which arms influence the Pakistan military is a more critical and realistic question, although here also there is much encrusted myth.

An entire generation of Pakistan officers came to professional maturity under the tutelage of the U.S. military (from 1954 to about 1964). During this period substantial numbers of Pakistanis were sent to the United States for advanced military training, others served alongside Americans in CENTO and SEATO commands, many heard presentations by visiting U.S. military teams in their own advanced military schools where they were taught the latest in U.S. military doctrine, and Pakistan was provided with large quantities of U.S. equipment. There were even information programs in the Pakistan armed services run by the United States and designed to promulgate a U.S. view of the world and pro-Americanism.15

The relationship between the two military systems extended to the personal level. The Americans liked the Pakistanis because of the latter's frank and blunt ways, the Pakistanis liked the Americans not only because they had weapons to offer but because they were put in contact with the most modern military thought, and they too liked the open and friendly manner of their alliance partners.

However, the relationship was vulnerable. The Americans had plenty of “frank and blunt” friends and lost interest in and patience with South Asia. The dispatch of U.S. arms to India by the Kennedy administration was a blow. It was followed by the suspension of arms after 1965, a renewed embargo in 1971, and another one in 1979. Even if one does not count the now-forgotten suspension of arms sales in 1947, the United States has peremptorily cut off arms to Pakistan three times. These actions—justified or not—had a profound effect on the “American” generation of officers in the Pakistan military, shattering their image of the United States as a sympathetic friend. In turn, the officers who came to professional maturity during the 1950s and 1960s have tutored their juniors in the bitter lesson of U.S. duplicity. The result has been some degree of inoculation against a renewed attack of pro-Americanism within the Pakistan military. The level of American weaponry flowing to Pakistan is relatively modest, and Pakistanis have long since learned the virtues of self-reliance. The U.S. Information Service will not be allowed free access to the regimental messes. While personally cordial, Pakistani officers are properly wary about a too-close relationship with the United States. While I would disagree with many of them over the reasons why the old relationship broke down, their wariness is probably in the best interests of both sides.

Military Assistance and Self-Reliance

Pakistan's early strategy as an arms-aid recipient was to maximize its dependence upon the United States. Not only were the Americans supplying good weapons, but there was some feeling that this exclusive, dependent relationship would somehow

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15 See Cohen, Pakistan Army, pp. 55ff.
bind the Americans closer. "The most allied of allies" was the way it was put, which implied the most dependent of allies as well. This turned out to be a miscalculation by Pakistan. When India and Pakistan were treated alike in 1965 by the U.S. arms cutoff, it was Pakistan that suffered more than India, which had diversified its arms sources.

China became Pakistan's major arms supplier after 1967 and preached the virtues of self-reliance. However, it was not until 1972 that Pakistan began to address the problem seriously. Then, under Bhutto's encouragement, a major program of arms manufacturing was initiated. By 1979 Pakistan had become self-sufficient in small arms and explosives and had acquired the capability of rebuilding its 900-plus Chinese T-59 tanks and its French Mirage III/V aircraft. It had also learned how to adapt and combine weapons acquired from many foreign sources.

The prospects of renewed U.S. arms assistance thus presented an important choice to Pakistan: should it acquire off-the-shelf weapons of the most advanced design, or should it attempt to build up its own budding defense production infrastructure? In the case of aircraft the former path was chosen, and the F-16 was acquired. Pakistan probably made a long-term error in not opting for the self-manufacture of the F-20. As we have noted, prestige and symbolism took precedence over infrastructure building. Pakistan did not opt for the latest U.S. tanks, preferring the M-48 (which it could maintain in its own facilities) to the heavier and more complicated M-60.

However, there were several good reasons to buy off the shelf. The decision to purchase the F-16, the Harpoon, helicopters, and TOWs may reflect a political calculation. While any weapons purchases lead to dependence upon the supplier, it would have taken a longer time to establish a defense manufacturing capability for any of these systems. Further, Pakistan's industrial infrastructure is weak and underdeveloped, and defense production facilities would have still led to Pakistani dependence upon U.S. suppliers. Finally, the slogan of defense self-reliance is catchy, but few developing countries have been able to achieve it in any complex system (certainly not India). Still, the emphasis on off-the-shelf weapons may yet create problems for Pakistan, which appears to have wasted some of the 1972-80 investment in defense infrastructure.

U.S. Arms Assistance Politics

I have devoted most of my attention to the consequences of the new security relationship for Pakistan, but something must be said about the politics of this relationship in the United States itself.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was very difficult for a whole range of American groups to grasp the fact that the unthinkable had occurred. Pakistan's warnings about the Soviet threat had not been taken seriously for years; indeed, hardly any Pakistani books on strategy treated it seriously, and Pakistanis have been quite forthright in stating their overriding concern with India, although sometimes India is accused of being a Soviet surrogate.
Further, Pakistan-U.S. relations had just hit a low point. The United States had cut off arms that were being sold to Pakistan because of suspicions about Pakistan's nuclear program. There were also U.S. warnings about human rights violations in Pakistan. And Pakistan's feeble response to the burning of the U.S. Embassy alienated much of the professional foreign policy bureaucracy because there was evidence that President Zia could have responded but did not for fear of having enraged mobs turn against him.

This extreme neglect was soon transformed into close attention. Sensing that its position was likely to be even better if a conservative administration was elected, Pakistan was able to turn down the Carter offer. The more substantial Reagan offer was accepted but then became the subject of intense debate within the United States, a debate that continues.

The combination of a covert nuclear program, continued military rule, and collateral difficulties with India constitutes the core of U.S. opposition to further arms sales to Pakistan. Indeed, for some Americans (especially those in Congress), Pakistan's position on Afghanistan is irrelevant compared with these other issues. And, for others, Pakistan's position on Afghanistan is seen as a phony issue because they accuse Pakistan of failing to work sincerely toward a solution of the problem for fear of jeopardizing the flow of U.S. arms.

Some who are close to the negotiation process claim that the latter charge has no basis in fact. I cannot judge, but would tend to agree—the obstacle to a settlement of the Afghan problem lies in Kabul, Moscow, and the minds of the Mujahedeen, not Islamabad. Pakistan could bring “peace” to Afghanistan by turning its own guns against the Mujahedeen, but that would be an unspeakable act.

There is a core of truth in the charge of Senators Cranston, Pell, and others that Pakistan is “blackmailing” the United States. Pakistan is getting something it wants—U.S. military equipment—and it is doing something the United States wants—providing a haven for the Mujahedeen. It is also not doing something the United States does not want it to do—press forward with its nuclear program, and it may be doing something the United States would like it to do—liberalize and democratize its political system—but at a rate which does not satisfy all of its U.S. critics.

Pakistanis must view the entire policymaking process in the United States with amazement. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they were the outcasts of Washington; afterward they were besieged by friendly arms salesmen, politicians, generals, diplomats, journalists—and even scholars—each eager to hear and record or ease the tribulations of being a “frontline” state. The real Pakistani assessment was probably expressed by President Zia: the U.S. has foreign relations, but no foreign policy. No country that allowed so many special interest groups to have a policy veto could have a long-range policy. This is not quite accurate: the United States has many foreign policies, several in the executive branch, many more in Congress, others advocated by the press, by arms manufacturers, and various special interests such as the antiproliferation lobby and human rights groups. America’s “Pakistan policy” is at any moment the outcome of a political test of strength between some or all of these groups; informed Pakistanis are thus aware of the soft base on which the present policy rests and the possibility of ambush at every step in the process.
Nonetheless, there has been a remarkable consistency since the 1981 aid package was put together. That package was half-military and half-economic, and there is no suggestion on either side that the balance should change when the agreement expires in 1987. And other U.S. interests in Pakistan have emerged. The two states have worked closely on a common narcotics problem, which has recently attracted as much interest in Congress as the nuclear proliferation issue. Finally, expanded economic and personal ties between the two countries may further stabilize what has, historically, been an uncertain relationship. Given a degree of realism in both countries, it may be that the United States will yet evolve a single and sensible Pakistan policy.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

No security-related issue is of greater potential concern to both Pakistan and the United States than the former's potential as a nuclear weapons state. The conventional military relationship between the two is an interregnum, largely a function of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It may have had a temporary restraining effect on Pakistan's nuclear program, but the nuclear issue has a logic and dynamic of its own. Let us consider the issue from the Pakistani perspective first and then examine U.S. interests.

Pakistan's Motives

Any state of the size, military power, and administrative and political capacity of Pakistan would ordinarily be counted as a regional great power. Pakistan has the unfortunate luck of being surrounded by three megastates: India, China, and the USSR, which tells us something of the importance of relative power. But Pakistan is necessarily concerned about its survival as well as its security since some of its neighbors at least doubt the legitimacy of its present structure. And Pakistan is the only modern state to have been vivisected.

Pakistan's first incentive in acquiring a nuclear weapons program stems from this threatening strategic environment: it seeks to deter its neighbors—especially India—from exploiting internal weaknesses and using military force to split it apart once again. The same motive exists with regard to the Soviet Union. A nuclear Pakistan could threaten one or two major Central Asian cities should the USSR challenge Pakistan's existence. In this extreme case, Pakistan has the Israeli Masada model to emulate and need not actually acquire a weapon—but only be able to demonstrate that it could acquire a weapon on short notice—to make the deterrent work.

More provocatively, if Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapon before India, it could threaten the latter or seize disputed territory (e.g., Kashmir). Much has been made of this scenario by Indian strategists, but it is highly unrealistic. One suspects that Indians exaggerate the Pakistani "threat" to justify their own nuclear program, which is
considerably older than Pakistan’s. Indeed, India probably has the capacity to weaponize quickly, and any Pakistani “window” would not be open for long.

Third, Pakistan could use a nuclear weapon outside of South Asia—the so-called “Islamic bomb”—presumably in the Middle East. It is difficult to say much that is truthful about this option since there is so much misinformation in circulation, but it is very likely that Libya’s original encouragement to Pakistan was aimed in this direction. Certainly, Bhutto did speak and write of an “Islamic bomb.” Whether such a bomb would have been transferred to another state, or deployed in the Middle East, is pure speculation. Pakistanis deny that this is their objective, but enough doubt remains about future plans, intentions, and capabilities that outsiders can be reasonably concerned.

U.S. Perceptions and Interests

For the United States, the Pakistani priorities are reversed. Its concern is with the spread of nuclear weapons more than their confinement or use within South Asia. Pakistan is often seen as the most obvious stopping point in the movement toward generalized, global nuclear proliferation and is thus justifiably subjected to greater pressure than other states. The Pakistani bomb is (falsely) seen as the key to preventing Indian nuclear proliferation and as the critical link to preventing other near-nuclears (Argentina, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Iraq) from crossing the line to overt nuclear status.

Although Pakistanis may believe it to be the case, the U.S. motive is not merely to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of “natives,” although the fear of nuclear proliferation to unstable states does exist and is legitimate. The U.S. concern also stems from the simple calculation of the increase in instability should the world contain twenty, thirty, or more nuclear weapons states; only Kenneth Waltz argues that this would be a good thing. As Rodney Jones and others have pointed out, proliferation would create severe difficulties for the delicate balance of terror between the superpowers; the Chinese, French, and British systems already play a confusing role in determining equitable arms levels. Adding another tier of nuclear weapons states will hopelessly confuse the prospects for arms control.

Asymmetries and Solutions

The asymmetry between U.S. and Pakistani positions is clear. For Pakistan the bomb is insurance to prevent the final destruction of the state. Like Israel, Pakistan has a “never again” complex. The United States tends to ignore this persuasive argument,

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stressing the broader proliferation consequences of the Pakistani program. Pakistanis conclude that the United States does not care about their survival (or is guilty of selective caring); the United States suspects the worst of Pakistan’s motives.

As long as the conventional military relationship between the two states is continued, it is not likely that Pakistan will force the nuclear issue by testing or deploying a nuclear weapon. It could only do so at a moment of extreme national crisis and still hope to retain U.S. support. Policymakers in the Reagan administration are also reluctant to press Pakistan to conform to U.S. legislation or to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty lest they drive Pakistan into an overt nuclear program and lose whatever leverage they now have in the supply of conventional weapons. Yet the game cannot continue indefinitely. India has an interest in the outcome of the evolution of Pakistan’s program and may yet force the issue by resuming its own program. Would America then forgive a Pakistani nuclear program?

I do not believe that the region must go nuclear, or, if it does, that there will necessarily be a nuclear arms race, or that relations between India and Pakistan will break down, leading to war or nonnuclear attacks on nuclear facilities. All of these outcomes are possible, but equally possible would be a series of bilateral arrangements between the two states, managing their nuclear arms race in such a way as to terminate it or let it reach a stable plateau. Such an arrangement would be in the United States’ nonproliferation interests and need not prejudice a tough U.S. policy in areas where such toughness is appropriate and effective. However, in view of the domestic political complexities of the United States’ nonproliferation policy, such a view may be utopian.

CONCLUSION

I began this chapter by noting the difficulties associated with security-related issues in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. My analysis indicates that these obstacles are not shrinking: new technologies further complicate a relationship that is already heavily mortgaged to the behavior of unpredictable third parties.

While the relationship can theoretically be “managed” by a few individuals in each country, the burden of history indicates that the present situation is unusually calm. A shift in votes in the U.S. Congress, a softening of Soviet policy (or its hardening) in Afghanistan, an ambiguous Indian move, or renewed domestic turmoil in Pakistan could throw the present relationship into disarray.

My own view is that the situation is unusually promising and unusually threatening. It is promising in that Pakistan’s root strategic problems are not insoluble, although they do depend upon the enlightened self-interests of others, especially India. It is also promising in that I do not regard Pakistan as a crazy state or one destined for destruction or even dictatorship. It is thus possible for the United States to sustain a relationship with Pakistan, although Pakistanis might legitimately ask whether it is possible for them to sustain a relationship with a nation so unpredictable as the United States. One also notes the growth of an intelligent regionalism in South Asia, which may yet turn out to be the vehicle by which India can reach its legitimate
level of power and influence, yet which protects the interests of its smaller neighbors.

Balancing this, the whole South Asian region has edged closer to catastrophe. The introduction of nuclear weapons into the subcontinent would, in the absence of a framework of understanding, be a disaster. It would lead to unpredictable but almost all bad results. It certainly would not slow down the conventional arms race, which is taking up an increasing percentage of national budgets in India and Pakistan, as well as an increasing percent of skilled manpower and high technology. One must also note the painfully slow rate of normalization between India and Pakistan and the lack of civil discourse, especially on the Indian side. Indian statements give Pakistanis reasonable cause to believe that important Indian leaders still do not accept the legitimacy of their state, and certainly not the legitimacy of the present government. This is a problem that Americans should be aware of and, hopefully, influence.

I conclude with four suggestions concerning the management and direction of Pakistan-U.S. relations.

1. Avoid the grandiose. Pledges that no one can keep are dangerous. The relationship of the 1950s was partly based upon mutual delusion. This will not work now: Pakistanis are adept at seeing through U.S. exaggeration and false promises. They must restrain themselves from flattering susceptible Americans or from excessive ringing of the Soviet threat bell.

2. Agree to disagree. There must be a better awareness of which U.S.-Pakistan common concerns are common interests, which are truly important, and which are peripheral. The two nations’ policies are bound to diverge on some issues, but divergence may not be as great as some have imagined. The role of the State Department, the U.S. Information Service, and the Pakistani press is particularly important in explaining where and why U.S. policy does not overlap with Pakistan’s.

3. Develop a substantive link with other states that can affect or disrupt the U.S.-Pakistan connection. While this especially means India (which should not have a veto but a voice in U.S. arms sales to Pakistan), other countries might be consulted as well, just as Pakistan should be consulted in issues that affect its interests (e.g., U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Israel, and its role in the Indian Ocean). This takes time and effort. But, as in the case of NATO, what makes the relationship work is not a formal treaty but a process of consultation, which gives rise to a common strategic framework. This would involve annual or semiannual meetings at the official level (but not necessarily by the most senior policymakers) between concerned states with broadly shared interests. The grouping could change according to the issue.

4. Broaden contacts. Generals and strategists on both sides will identify and pursue common strategic interests, but this is not enough to sustain the relationship. Scholars, journalists, politicians, and others must come to know the other side much better. Nonofficial relations are too limited. This has to be better subsidized: few Americans are going to Pakistan. Conversely, many Pakistanis are abysmally ignorant of the United States, despite the larger number of Pakistanis residing there. Ties between universities and other educational and cultural institutions are especially weak. These nonofficial ties could be vastly improved for less than the cost of one F-16 and would do more to enhance Pakistan’s security.
Pakistan-U.S. relations have been both cooperative and conflictual. They have ranged all the way from indifference to intimacy to hostility. In recent years these relations have become warm again. The geopolitical realities and strategic compulsions tend to bring the two countries together, but divergences of perceptions and policies over a number of bilateral and international issues tend to pull them apart. It is therefore not surprising that the history of Pakistan-U.S. relationship has been a checkered one. The surprising thing is that the relationship has survived the stresses and the strains it has been through; even during the worst of times, the two governments, no matter who the incumbents were, have managed to retain at least a working relationship.

I do not propose to describe the history of Pakistan-U.S. relations. These have been subjected to a fairly close examination in recent years in both countries. Pakistanis have invariably noted the lack of durability and credibility in Washington's policies toward Pakistan. The Americans, on their part, have found the relationship exasperating. An eminent American analyst of South Asian affairs has called it a "tortured relationship."\(^1\)

The Pakistan-U.S. alliance relationship of the 1950s, though imminently satisfactory in the short run, proved counterproductive and disappointing for both in the long term. Far from containing the Soviets and the Chinese, the alliance relationship got caught in the competitive politics of India and Pakistan and paved the way for the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence in the subcontinent. Instead of improving, Pakistan's security environment worsened. The Kashmir and the Pashtoonistan problems remained unresolved, and Pakistan itself was dismembered in 1971.

The disappointments and misunderstandings of the 1960s were due mainly to unrealistic expectations of consistency and fidelity on both sides. Both Pakistan and

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the United States had entered the alliance relationship largely for self-serving reasons rather than mutually congruent objectives. Whereas the United States looked at the relationship from the global perspective of the East-West conflict and as one of many other peripheral ties, Pakistan looked at it from the regional perspective of its disputes with India and Afghanistan and as the anchor of its security, stability, and economic development. Pakistan was raised or lowered on the scale of U.S. priorities according to its perceived importance at any given time in the East-West conflict. Pakistan reviewed the fluctuations in U.S. policy from its own regional security perspective and tried to adjust its relations with other powers accordingly.

The deterioration in Pakistan-U.S. relations, which began with U.S. military aid to India in 1962, was greatly accelerated after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the subsequent warming of relations between Pakistan and China. For a brief period in the early 1970s it appeared that the trend might be reversed. But as the issues of nuclear technology and human rights were added to the problematic areas of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, the two countries virtually became antagonists. By 1979 Pakistan-U.S. relations had reached their nadir. Then in the closing days of 1979 the Soviet Union intervened militarily in the civil war in Afghanistan. This forced both Pakistan and the United States to reassess their positions and to review their mutual relationship. The two countries negotiated a six-year (1982–87), $3.2 billion military sales and economic aid package, whose nature and dimensions were spelled out in the joint U.S.-Pakistan statement of June 15, 1981. The United States also reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 bilateral agreement. This has become the basis of what is now called the “new relationship.”

Nothing will be more misleading than to think that present Pakistan-U.S. relations are a revival or reinvigoration of their past ties. The new relationship is an “aid-cum-sales relationship”; though the 1959 bilateral agreement between Pakistan and the United States is still in force, it is not an alliance relationship as this agreement is not binding on Congress and is hostage to public mood in America. The new relationship is more informal and flexible and does not require Pakistan to give bases to the United States. India’s much publicized fears on this account are unwarranted.

The new relationship is also not an “exclusive” relationship. The Washington connection is not the anchor of Pakistan’s security as it was in the 1950s. Pakistan’s membership and status in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its very close relations with China as well as its Muslim neighbors to the west are important components of its security architecture. The quantum of U.S. military sales to Pakistan cannot guarantee the security of Pakistan faced as it is with the presence of the other superpower on the western border and India’s vast and sophisticated arsenal on the eastern border. All that the new relationship can achieve is to bolster somewhat the confidence of Pakistan and to discourage an aggressor by raising the cost of aggression and by demonstrating that a security relationship exists between Pakistan and the United States, which it must take into account in its calculations. Testifying before the subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 16, 1981, James L. Buckley, undersecretary of state, stated: “The [military sales] program is so modest
that it is bound to disappoint those commentators who have expressed fears that our proposed sales to Pakistan will spark an arms race on the subcontinent.” Buckley pointed out that the well-trained and well-equipped Indian military establishment was decisively superior to that of Pakistan and would acquire a greater edge six years hence.

The “new relationship” is also likely to be more durable and credible than the old one, not only because it is more informal and flexible but because it is based on greater commonality of perceptions and interests. Both Pakistan and the United States realize that South Asia has been transformed from a bridge to a battleground. Today it is one of the prime areas of tension and turbulence that emanate from both within and without. Almost all the countries of the region are faced with internal upheavals of varying nature and intensity. This is disturbing enough, but the prospects of peace and stability in the region have further been complicated by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and an overall deterioration in East-West relations.

From the perspective of their own viewpoints, Pakistan and the United States have significant and mutual interests in Southwest Asia. Both need oil, but any disruption of Gulf oil supplies is likely to hurt Pakistan more because it has very limited alternate sources of energy at home and sources of supply abroad. The Gulf countries are important markets for goods and services for both Pakistan and the United States. In addition, Pakistan earns about $3 billion annually through its migrant workers in the Gulf—an amount that is crucial to Pakistan’s balance-of-payment situation. The governments of these countries are largely pro-West, and naturally the United States would like them to stay that way in order to maintain its global status quo of influence and power. For its part, Pakistan has common religious, cultural, and historical ties with the peoples of these countries and would look adversely upon any trend that was likely to weaken these ties. In fact, the concept of the Ummah (World Muslim Community) and its solidarity have been a driving force in Pakistan’s foreign policy. It has led Pakistan to support Muslim causes even when they are of no immediate concern to itself.

Southwest Asia is also important to Pakistan for military reasons. Pakistan has a weak defense capability, so it must rely on the support of its Muslim neighbors to the west to overcome this deficiency. Pakistan also has military links of varying size and significance with most countries of the Gulf.

To emphasize the mutual interests and objectives of Pakistan and the United States in Southwest Asia is not to deny the existence of serious divergences of perception between them. For example, Pakistan generally shares the perceptions of its Muslim neighbors to the west that Israeli expansionism is the basic cause of instability in the Middle East. Like them, it attributes Israeli intransigence and aggressiveness to uncritical U.S. support to Israel. U.S. scholars and statesmen, addressing Pakistani audiences, usually have to face hostile questions and comments on the Jewish lobby in the United States and its decisive impact on U.S. policies in the Middle East. The return of Arab territories, the status of Jerusalem, and the rights of
the Palestinian people are issues on which Pakistan and the United States have pursued divergent policies.

The two countries also differ in their perceptions of Iran. Pakistan has no quarrel with the Iranian revolution; in fact, it welcomes the triumph of Islamic fundamentalism there. The United States, on the other hand, has not overcome the trauma of the hostage crisis and is apprehensive about the impact of the Iranian revolution on the neighboring conservative Arab monarchies and sheikdoms.

These Pakistan-U.S. divergences of perceptions and policies in the general area of the Middle East, though they touch some very sensitive chords in both countries, have been managed with tact and understanding on both sides and have not proved stumbling blocks in the evolution of Pakistan-U.S. bilateral relations.

Any disruption or threat of disruption of peace, security, and stability in Southwest Asia cannot be viewed with anything but alarm by both Pakistan and the United States. The Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan constitute, in the eyes of both, such threats.

The Iran-Iraq war is painful to Pakistan as it violates the concept of the solidarity of the Ummah and is devastating for both belligerents. Its potential to escalate into a larger conflict, dragging in neighbors and inviting superpower intervention, is of concern to both Pakistan and the United States. Both have adopted a neutral stance, though Pakistan, as a member of the Ummah Peace Committee, is very active in its efforts to bring an end to the war. I believe these efforts have the sympathy, if not the active support, of the United States.

Pakistan and the United States also have a basic convergence of perceptions and policies on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, though there are divergences of shades and nuances. The Soviet intervention, coming as it did on the heels of the revolution in Iran, was looked upon by U.S. analysts in the foreign policy establishment and outside as the continuation of the Soviet geopolitical momentum of the 1970s. They regarded it as a springboard not only for Soviet hegemony in the region but for world domination. They drew attention to the Soviet Union's "historic and traditional" quest for influence in the Gulf and for warm-water ports in South Asia and regarded the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a new, significant, and alarming step in that direction. President Jimmy Carter called it "a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies" and warned against possible Soviet designs on Iran, Pakistan, and the Gulf. That the American perception has not changed is evident from an answer that Vice-President George Bush gave at a news conference in Pakistan in May 1984. He said that the Americans were very suspicious of Soviet objectives and that the Soviets could be thinking of making Afghanistan "a stepping stone."

Soviet political culture makes it very difficult for outsiders to scrutinize the minds of the leaders in the Kremlin and to determine the direction of their policies with

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3 Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), May 14, 1984.
any certainty. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan may have larger connotations, or it may be just a defensive move to immunize Central Asian republics from the "virus" of Islamic fundamentalism. Or it could simply be the egoistic response of a superpower to protect a client state, which also happens to be a neighbor without its realizing the dangers involved in such a move.

Public opinion in Pakistan is divided over the issue. There are those who accept the "stepping stone" thesis and those who reject it. The rejectionists maintain that U.S. security concerns in the Gulf are overrated and overstated. They point out that global domination is not a feasible proposition for either of the superpowers, who, in fact, are finding it difficult to manage their own backyards. Warm-water ports are no longer a critical need of the technologically advanced Soviet state. The various oil denial scenarios—such as embargoes, blockades, and interdiction of choke points—lack credibility because of the Soviet Union's self-sufficiency in oil and the negative cost-benefit ratio of such actions. They also draw attention to the current moderate Soviet policies in the Middle East and particularly in the Gulf where they have supported the right of free access to oil. The Soviet Union has generally resisted the temptation to fish in troubled waters. These arguments seem quite convincing, but what if the Soviets are able to consolidate their hold over Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union becomes an oil-deficit state in the future? Who can tell!

Even if the "stepping stone" thesis is rejected, it cannot be denied that the massive Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has upset the balance of power in a region of vital political, strategic, and economic interest to both Pakistan and the United States. In addition, apart from the legal and moral aspects of intervention, Pakistan is alarmed by the prospect that Afghanistan might lose its buffer status or that the Soviets might support Afghanistan's irredentist claims. Afghanistan has unilaterally repudiated the Durand Line, and since it is a land-locked country, it may seek an outlet to the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan has no bilateral disputes with the Soviet Union. The present tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations over Afghanistan are not of Pakistan's seeking. It cherishes its nonaligned status and does not wish to become involved in any way in the East-West conflict. Its response to the U.S. quest for "strategic consensus" has been negative. It does not envisage, either for itself or for the United States, the role of a policeman in the Gulf. It doubts the wisdom and efficacy of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (now called the Central Command) and believes that the defense of the Gulf should be the responsibility of the Gulf states. Despite these divergences, the mutual perception of a threat from the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has again made Pakistan a "strategic state" for the United States and the Washington connection important for Pakistan.

Both Pakistan and the United States are agreed that Soviet forces should withdraw from Afghanistan, that both the legitimate rights of the Afghan people and the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union be protected through a political settlement arrived at under U.N. auspices and guaranteed by all parties concerned, and that the 3 to 4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran be returned to their country.
with honor and in peace. The Soviet Union, it seems, is not averse to a political settlement provided that it is guaranteed the continuation of communist rule in Kabul. This would amount to transferring the Soviet burden to the guarantors of the political settlement. Why would they show such magnanimity? And how could such a settlement be imposed on the Afghan resistance?

The United States, on the other hand, wishes for a political settlement that would lead to complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and would guarantee the unadulterated exercise of the right of self-determination by the Afghan people. It expects the Soviet Union to accept this because no government in Kabul has ever acted or can afford to act against the interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, having committed its power and prestige to the protection of the 1978 revolution, is not likely to buy this argument. Pakistan basically agrees that there should be a representative government in Kabul, but it believes that the most realistic way to achieve this is through an evolutionary process in which Kabul could uphold the nominal continuity of the 1978 revolution. Since Kabul claims that the 1978 revolution is a national democratic revolution, such a transition should not be difficult.

Failing to secure a political settlement on its own terms, the Soviet Union seems determined to press the military solution. So far, the military cost of intervention has not been high, but the political cost has been, though it has failed to pressure the Soviet Union into accepting the political settlement offered by Pakistan and the United States and endorsed by the world community at-large. Probably only two things can make the Soviets change their mind: (1) the 120 nations that have consistently denounced Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan now match their words and votes with diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, or (2) the military cost of Soviet intervention be raised to unacceptable levels by giving full and open support to the Afghan resistance.

Any student of international politics knows that the first has never worked and the second is not feasible. The international community simply lacks the political will to make sanctions an effective policy tool; and the expansionist tendencies of one superpower can only be contained by the countervailing force of another superpower. It is doubtful whether the U.S. Congress and public opinion would permit any deeper U.S. commitment and involvement in far-away Afghanistan. President Ronald Reagan, now unconcerned about votes and lobbies, is likely to think more in terms of his place in history and would certainly move toward some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union on the vital issues of peace and arms control. He would not like to antagonize the Russians further by raising the military costs for them in Afghanistan.

Pakistan too has its constraints and compulsions. It cannot be enthusiastic for increased military aid to the Afghan resistance and an escalation of conflict in Afghanistan because if it sticks its neck out any further, it might be chopped off. U.S. security guarantees to Pakistan under the 1959 bilateral agreement are not binding on Congress and are hostage to public mood in America. Pakistan-U.S. interests converge, therefore, when seeking a political settlement of the Afghan problem, no matter how dim are the chances of success.
In a speech at Karachi in April 1982 the then U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Ronald Spiers, pinpointed "four vulnerabilities" in Pakistan-U.S. relations, namely, the "Indian factor," the nuclear issue, human rights, and narcotics.

Of these four vulnerabilities, narcotics has become a nonissue. The government of Pakistan has extended the fullest possible cooperation to the United States in the matter, and the United States has expressed complete satisfaction over the steps that Pakistan has taken to eradicate the cultivation of opium and the trafficking in drugs. According to a report in the New York Times: "American experts confirm that the cultivation of opium poppies in Pakistan has dropped from an estimated 80,000 acres to 9,000 acres since 1979 and the production of raw opium from an estimated 800 tons to 50 or 60 tons."^4

Drug trafficking from Pakistan is now mostly based on opium grown across the border in Afghanistan. Because of the disturbed nature of the border, it is not easy to stop the interchange of goods. Pakistan has now prescribed sever punishments for the production and distribution of narcotics. Pakistani laws are tougher and their enforcement stricter than in the United States. Investigations show that no full-dress trafficking network linked to the distribution system in the United States exists in Pakistan, and this makes the eradication prospects brighter.

The question of human rights in Pakistan may generate some heat in Congress and the U.S. news media from time to time, but the track record of the administration shows that human rights have seldom stood in the way of U.S. national interests. The Reagan administration in particular has downgraded them on the list of U.S. priorities. Its differentiation between "authoritarian governments" and "totalitarian governments" in defense of its policy on human rights is interesting but of limited validity since in most countries under authoritarian rule the alternative is not totalitarianism but national democracy. Hopefully, the holding of promised elections in Pakistan by March 1985 will remove this minor irritant in Pakistan-U.S. relations.

However, the nuclear issue and the "India factor" are matters which, if not handled wisely, could become problematic for Pakistan-U.S. relations. Basically, Pakistan fully supports the U.S. nonproliferation objectives in the region. It has done all it could do within the limits of its energy needs and security concerns to establish a nonproliferation regime in South Asia. It has striven to have the United Nations declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. It has vigorously pushed the idea that the states of the region agree to make South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. It has offered to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the other states in the region also agree to do so. It has invited India to institute joint inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. It accepts all the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. President Zia ul-Haq has declared ad infinitum that Pakistan's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, and Pakistan does not intend to make a bomb.

Ignoring all this, the media in the West have launched a massive misinformation campaign to malign Pakistan and distort its quest for nuclear technology. Venues and dates for the explosion of Pakistan's "Islamic bomb" have been forecast with un-

ashamed regularity. Libyan and other Arab financing has been alleged, and fears have been expressed that the nuclear technology, once acquired by Pakistan, would be transferred to these Arab countries. Sensational stories about a Pakistani scientist stealing the secrets of uranium enrichment and about Pakistan making clandestine purchases of vital parts in Europe and the United States have been played up. Even countries friendly to Pakistan and the United States such as Turkey and China have been dragged in and accused of secret collaboration with Pakistan. It has been suggested that Pakistan has already tested the “Islamic bomb” in Sinkiang.

Pakistan’s quest for nuclear technology makes sense from both economic and security points of view. The country faces a massive shortage of energy; it has one of the lowest per capita electricity consumption rates even by the standards of Third World countries. During the last two years a shortage of 582 MW led to nationwide load shedding, which, besides causing discomfort to people, had a crippling impact on industry, agriculture, and commerce. Pakistan’s existing capacity and projected development needs show a shortage of 10,000 MW. With limited potential of hydroelectric power and with scarce oil and coal resources, the only viable alternative is nuclear power.

India’s explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 added a new and significant dimension to the already adverse balance in conventional arms between India and Pakistan. A nuclear arms race in the subcontinent would be disastrous, but the way to prevent it is not to deny nuclear technology to Pakistan. As long as India knows that Pakistan too can carry out a peaceful nuclear explosion, it would deliberate very carefully before carrying out other explosions or embarking on a nuclear armament program. Nuclear technology in Pakistani hands will be a trump card to ensure a nonproliferation regime in South Asia. Pakistan will not play the card on its own because it knows that once played, it would lose its deterrent value. Devoid of a significant industrial and technological base and substantial economic resources, Pakistan will have to be very foolish indeed to engage India in a nuclear arms race.

U.S. nonproliferation policy has linked the issue of nuclear exports to the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by all recipients whether or not they are signatory to the NPT. The United States initiated the formation of the London Suppliers Group (LSG) to control the supply of sensitive nuclear items to potential proliferators. Its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (1978) has imposed a unilateral set of norms on nuclear commerce. All this has gradually cartelized nuclear commerce and institutionalized discrimination in the transfer of nuclear technology.

Pakistan looks upon U.S. nuclear diplomacy as selective and discriminatory toward the Third World in general and Pakistan in particular. While the Reagan administration has seen to it that India’s nuclear plans do not suffer for want of enriched uranium and spare parts for the Tarapur nuclear plant, it has set up all sorts of obstacles for Pakistan. The 1981 economic aid and military sales package is hostage to Pakistan’s good nuclear behavior as prescribed by Washington. In fact, the leverage that the package gives to Washington vis-à-vis Pakistan’s nuclear program has been an important consideration with U.S. policymakers. Pakistanis see a contradiction in the U.S. concern for Pakistan’s security and its efforts to deny it nuclear technology.
Security is not the function only of arms. Economic development and industrialization are important components of national power and hence of national security. U.S. nuclear diplomacy tends to ignore this aspect. However, Pakistan has agreed to a limitation of its options and has given guarantees at the highest level that it will not explode a nuclear device even for peaceful purposes. With President Reagan’s reelection, there is no immediate danger of the Pakistan-U.S. connection negotiated in 1981 becoming disjointed. But this does not mean that Pakistan will not face problems in the U.S. Congress or that the LSG countries will not continue to obstruct its program. The nuclear issue will continue to surface, but it is hoped that it will not become the centerpiece of Pakistan-U.S. relationship.

The U.S. attitude toward a regional framework of peace and security in South Asia has been rather ambivalent. Conceptually, there can be two possible approaches or models for peace and security in South Asia. One is the traditional balance-of-power approach, which regards peace and security to be a function of the equilibrium of power in a system that posits that weakness tempts aggression. The other is the Organski model where the dynamics of peace and security are provided by the preponderance of power in one state of the system. The weaker states have either to accept the protection and the diktat of the preponderant power or face the possibility of war, which they cannot hope to win. Thus, an environment conducive to peace and security is automatically created.

Conscious of India’s size, population, and potential, Indian policymakers have always perceived India as a major power. India’s role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 was a part of its major-power strategy. Today India is one of the top twelve industrial producers of the world, it has the fourth largest armed force, it has gate-crashed into the nuclear club, and it has launched satellites. Naturally, it expects the superpowers to accord it the status of a major power, and it expects its neighbors, particularly Pakistan, to acknowledge its preeminence in the region (Indians carefully avoid the words “dominance” and “hegemony”). India’s imperious tone toward Sri Lanka during the peak of the Sinhali-Tamil conflict and the assertion of its “Monroe Doctrine” in the region show which way the wind is blowing. One may note an interesting duality in India’s policy. While it follows a balance-of-power approach vis-à-vis China, it is not willing to allow its weaker neighbors to follow the same approach vis-à-vis itself.

In the 1950s and early 1960s the United States followed a balance-of-power approach toward the subcontinent. Militarily, it strengthened first Pakistan and then India. The U.S. purpose in both cases was to contain communism, but the increment of power first in Pakistan and then in India also helped to balance or imbalance them against each other (the perception being determined by which side of the fence one was sitting on).

In the 1970s, after détente and the dismemberment of Pakistan, the United States accepted the preponderance-of-power model. In May 1973 President Richard Nixon, in his foreign policy address to Congress, said that the United States was “prepared to treat India in accordance with its new status and responsibilities on the basis of
reciprocity." Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during his visit to New Delhi in October 1974, was more specific when he said that "the size and position of India gave it a special role of leadership in South Asia and world affairs." The 1976 Democratic party platform went so far as to state: "India has now achieved a considerable hegemony over the subcontinent... [and] future American policy should accept this fact."

The change in U.S. policy was as much a recognition of a growing reality as a stratagem to draw India away from the Soviet Union. Americans believed that once India became a dominant state in South Asia, even with Soviet arms, and was recognized as such, it would move away from the Soviet Union. Though after 1971 Pakistan ceased to be a complicating factor in Indo-U.S. relations, other factors such as the Sino-U.S. détente, India's nuclear explosion in 1974, and the U.S. base on Diego Garcia island kept these relations ruffled. The United States could not loosen the bonds of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation which, incidentally, runs its course until 1996.

The Reagan administration's approach to peace and security in South Asia seems to be complex, a curious mix of the balance-of-power and preponderance-of-power approaches. In response to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, it is strengthening Pakistan economically and militarily. When it comes to military aid to Pakistan, it is usually difficult to balance what Pakistan perceives as necessary and what India perceives as tolerable. The Indians usually look upon any increment in Pakistan's military strength as a roadblock to their aspirations in the region. A congressional study mission, which visited both India and Pakistan in October 1981, noted that "India's reaction to the proposed U.S. package is driven by its determination to maintain its position as the dominant power in the region."

At the same time, the Reagan administration refuses to regard India as a proxy of the Soviet Union or the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship as a military alliance. Its spokesmen both in Washington and Islamabad have made it very clear that the United States is not in the business of taking sides in the problems between India and Pakistan, which must be settled bilaterally. The Reagan administration has helped India to secure huge financial assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It has supplied enriched uranium to India and spare parts to its Tarapur nuclear plant. Although the United States has now discontinued the supply of enriched uranium, it has not placed any obstacles in India's way to obtain it from third parties. It has also offered to sell India sophisticated weapons worth a billion dollars or more. A high-powered Indian defense team visited the United States in October 1984, and

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7 Ibid.
some deals are reported to have been finalized.

Thus, the Reagan administration's policy in South Asia may be called an "integrated approach." One may see more of it as the second Reagan term proceeds. Senator Orrin Hatch (Rep., Utah), writing in the Washington Times, reported: "It is my understanding that the Reagan administration is on the verge of establishing a balanced American relationship with India and Pakistan for the first time in many years. This development would greatly decrease the opportunities for Soviet adventurism and mischief-making in South Asia for many years to come."¹⁰

This is an old American dream—to have the United States, India, and Pakistan on the same side of the fence. U.S. policy planners are hopeful of its success in the post—Indira Gandhi era. Several considerations justify their optimism.

1. Indira Gandhi had started a diversification of sources of arms for India to lessen her reliance on the Soviet Union. Americans expect the process to accelerate and the United States to join the list of Britain, France, and West Germany as suppliers of arms to India.

2. There is a large pro-U.S. economic lobby in India, and the United States has again replaced the Soviet Union as the leading trade partner of India.

3. Sino-Indian relations have improved and show prospects for further normalization. The economic ties between the two countries are fast expanding, and their trade has already touched the billion-dollar mark.

4. Indo-Pakistan relations, after two years of progress toward a détente, have in 1983-1984 undergone a marked deterioration. Some in Pakistan explain away these new tensions as the electoral need of the Congress party. Others see more sinister motives, particularly because New Delhi and Moscow called off the dialogue with Islamabad simultaneously. Though fears on one side and mistrust on the other persist, both Pakistan and India have shed a good deal of their historical baggage. The idea of an inexorable Hindu-Muslim conflict got eroded when the Janata government, comprising mostly diehard Hindus, pursued a policy of peace and understanding with Pakistan. Both countries now have strong lobbies that favor Indo-Pakistan détente. South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC), initiated in 1981, has made steady though slow progress. A South Asian summit is scheduled for 1985. The Simla agreement provides a realistic framework for the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes including Kashmir. The Zia ul-Haq government has launched what it calls a "peace offensive" against India, which includes the offers of a no-war pact and mutually agreed levels of forces. Pakistan's sharing of India's grief over the tragic death of its prime minister and Zia's unprecedented condolence visit to New Delhi have generated a lot of goodwill. If India responds positively to these overtures, it is possible that the peace process, suddenly broken off by India in July 1984, may be resumed after the December 1984 elections. If this happens, the growth of Indo-American ties might not adversely affect the Pakistan-U.S. relations as it did in the 1960s. Thoughtful Pakistanis still have reservations on the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, but they do not perceive India as a

¹⁰ Quoted in The Muslim (Islamabad), Nov. 8, 1984.
Soviet proxy. They also do not quarrel with India's size, power, and position, provided India treats its neighbors on terms of sovereign equality and respects their independence and integrity. They also realize that a security arrangement that includes India will be a better guarantee of peace and stability in the South Asian region and the world in general.

While sharing the optimism of the U.S. policy planners, one must not forget the difficulties in the way of Indo-U.S. relations. Would or could Rajiv Gandhi play Anwar Sadat? Would Americans be willing to transfer advance weapons to India on India's terms? How far would the United States be willing to go along with Indian aspirations in the region? Answers to these and other related questions are not easy to find and are not immediately forthcoming. India is too widely and too deeply involved, both in military and economic terms, with the Soviet Union to pull away easily. The best that the United States can hope for in the present circumstances is that India may be persuaded to establish a more balanced relationship with both Washington and Moscow. But if India agrees to distance itself from the Soviet Union, will it not ask for a comparable U.S. withdrawal from South Asia?

In addition to the four vulnerabilities examined above, there is a whole range of North-South issues on which Pakistan and U.S. perceptions not only differ but differ widely. Because of these divergences Pakistan votes more with the Soviet Union than with the United States in the United Nations and other international forums. Since these issues are of a global nature and are, therefore, discussed in large forums, confrontation is avoided, and Pakistan-U.S. bilateral relations are not adversely affected by them. What does affect these relations are unilateral economic restrictions and discriminations imposed by the United States on Pakistan's trade.

In short, in the past, the U.S. interest in Pakistan has been transient. Pakistan has been treated more as a strategic state than as a nation. Pakistan-U.S. relations have, therefore, fluctuated with the ebb and flow of the cold war. Talking of the new Pakistan-U.S. relationship at Lahore in May 1984, Vice-President Bush said that it transcended Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and that there was no question of Washington losing interest in Pakistan in the event of any settlement of the Afghan issue. Heartening as that assurance was, it cannot completely overcome Pakistan's feeling that a relationship based on mutuality of threat perceptions *alone* is not likely to endure. Pakistanis expect the United States to treat them as a nation and to share their economic aspirations and security concerns on a long-term basis. They do not wish the past to be a prelude to the future.

And it need not be. A more enduring relationship can be built on the basis of the major areas of policy congruence that have emerged between the two countries: opposition to Soviet intervention and its continued presence in Afghanistan; cooperative ties with China, Japan, the Gulf states, and Western European countries; and the desire for peace, stability, and cooperation in a South Asia free of nuclear weapons. U.S. economic policies toward the Third World and its uncritical support of Israel, on

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one hand, and its reluctance to support Pakistan’s quest for nuclear technology, on the other, could create problems for an enduring relationship, provided these divergences are not turned into quid pro quos.

John D. Stempel

It takes either a large ego or a great amount of geographic research to attempt the job of defining South Asia, let alone to trace the complex strands of U.S. security policy in the area. Ducking both issues, let us establish, for purposes of this discussion, that South Asia includes Egypt and the other east coast African states, Iran, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula states, Afghanistan, the Indian subcontinent, and the littoral countries of Southeast Asia.

Curiously, however, the Indian Ocean neighborhood is seldom viewed as a single entity. The American tendency is to focus on its northwest quadrant—making South Asia the Indian subcontinent plus Afghanistan—and to see the other littoral states with their metaphorical backs to it. Thus, Americans tend to think of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in a Southeast Asian context; Iran and the Gulf in a Southwest Asian context; South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Madagascar in an African one; and Australia as a Pacific power. Bureaucratically, that spans four bureaus in the State Department and three unified military commands.

Over the past decade and a half, U.S. security interests in South Asia as defined here have expanded and changed in ways that few would have thought possible. The British withdrawal from the Gulf, the Iranian revolution, an Indo-Pakistani war, the gradual emergence of energy access as a major Western strategic problem, and the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan have focused attention on this region and led to increased U.S. interest and involvement.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In 1969, many still believed power was basically bipolar—the United States and the Soviet Union were dominant. The West was just catching up with the political realities of the Sino-Soviet split. Washington still viewed the Vietnam War as a problem of Chinese and Soviet expansionism and was just beginning to realize that
Vietnam was crimping the United States' confidence and ability to act. Changed economic expectations stemming from the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks were still ahead.

The term diffusion of power has now become a cliché, but it has become fundamental to understanding today's world. U.S. and Western margins of advantage have declined, with a corresponding decrease in freedom of action to meet challenges and to correct mistakes.

The concept of power has also changed. We underestimated our economic power in the earlier period and have since learned something about the uses—and limits—of oil or wheat as political weapons or embargoed goods. The requirements for military power have changed as well. The world has seen the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons; the danger of further nuclear proliferation; the use of chemical weapons by Moscow, its surrogates, and others; and the emergence of terrorism as a tool of state policy.

The developments enable leaders whose power bases are quite—in traditional terms—weak to challenge and undermine American and other friendly interests. Libyan and Iranian terrorism are probably the best examples, but the war in the Falklands demonstrated that a NATO power operating at great distances against a less advanced nation can have considerable difficulty and be forced to mobilize at substantial cost an impressive array of advanced technology and military/economic assets in order to prevail.

While different kinds of power were being acquired by different actors, challenges were also becoming more complex. Increasingly the United States faces a gray area, neither war nor peace situations—the deterioration of friendly regimes, regional conflicts or insurgencies, externally fomented threats to friendly but vulnerable states, and the entire panoply of problems developing out of awakened nationalism or religious fundamentalism. These types of problems are not necessarily susceptible to traditional military solutions.

Some of these contingencies would threaten U.S. interests and require a range of U.S. responses—diplomatic, economic, and occasionally military—even if the Soviet Union were not a factor. Nevertheless, the Soviet military presence in the Third World has become more pervasive generally as the steady expansion of its forces for long-range intervention has broadened its options for supporting political goals abroad.

Around the Indian Ocean basin, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, and Vietnam brings closer the possibility of confrontation with U.S. or friendly forces. Moscow is not the root of all Third World problems or threats to U.S. interests, but the USSR or its surrogates can generate an impressive show of force to lean on or intimidate governments that already feel threatened by local or regional developments.

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH ASIA TODAY

As these changes have taken place, South Asia in particular has become a new focus of U.S. interest, beginning with the changing oil patterns of the seventies and
growing through the fall of the shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The upheavals of the seventies in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa dramatized the vulnerability of access to both Persian Gulf oil and to the sea lanes linking Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.

Critical Western interests in the Indian Ocean include obtaining Persian Gulf oil and the important strategic minerals, chrome, manganese, cobalt, and copper; trading with a quarter of the world's population, including three of its most populous states (Pakistan, Indonesia, and India); and countering Moscow's efforts to extend its influence and perhaps even acquire additional territory.

The result of this focus on the region has been a surge of activity to shore up the Western position in South Asia. The problem of access to Indian Ocean resources in fact encompasses five geopolitical centers: the Cape of Good Hope and Mozambique Channel; the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and Suez Canal; the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz; the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits; and Australia. While the focus here will be on the northernmost of those centers, it is nevertheless important to remember that U.S. planners have to keep in mind their broader concerns as well.

U.S. POLICIES

The focus of U.S. Indian Ocean policies are diplomatic and economic efforts to mitigate underlying sources of regional instability. U.S. and Western military activity in the region support these diplomatic efforts by encouraging friends and deterring potential troublemakers and by positioning the United States to use force if necessary without exacerbating local tensions or provoking even greater Soviet activism.

These considerations have contributed to a U.S. policy of limited peacetime military involvement. Although the Indian Ocean has become a third strategic theater, after Europe and the Pacific, it has focused mainly on the Gulf and on contingency access and prepositioning arrangements rather than on permanent bases because of political sensitivities to the U.S. presence. Given its strategic interests and the need to establish an effective capability for action, however, it will be a number of years before the United States has achieved the transformation necessary to fully meet the threat in this distant area.

An important beginning is underway. The United States has established a major new geographic unified command, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for the Persian Gulf area. Presently, a carrier battle group is deployed in the North Arabian Sea, and a marine amphibious unit (MAU) is periodically deployed afloat.

Some seventeen logistics ships near the island of Diego Garcia carry supplies for a heavily mechanized marine amphibious brigade and for early-arriving army and air force units. Navy land-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft have access to an expanding number of countries, and advanced warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft are deployed in Saudi Arabia in response to the current situation in the Gulf.

Through bilateral agreements with strategically placed countries, the United States has better access and improved prepositioning of equipment. CENTCOM and
the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) conduct routine peacetime exercises and deployments with interested regional states.

THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS

The United States works together with its regional friends and other allies to protect mutual interests. Within the Indian Ocean region, it has substantial military assistance programs with Pakistan and Egypt and smaller programs with Oman, Kenya, and Sudan, as well as substantial economic assistance programs with several of the countries. In fiscal year 1985, about 12 percent of the total amount of U.S. foreign aid will go to Indian Ocean littoral states (excluding Egypt), more than half of it in security assistance. This includes Economic Support Funds, which a recipient government can use for security purposes if it cares to. These programs are designed to improve our bilateral relations with regional states, enhance their own defense capabilities, encourage greater cooperation among them, and, ideally, reduce the requirement for U.S. forces.

U.S. engagement in the region does not take place in isolation from other Western powers. Britain and France have the most to contribute militarily and have long been active in the area. For years French ships constituted the largest Western military presence immediately adjacent to India. The British have kept a minor naval presence in the Indian Ocean region as well as maintained advisers and training personnel in several countries. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, NATO has slowly recognized the problem of threats to Western security outside its own geographic limits. Australia's modest naval deployments and development of its west coast facilities signal interest in regional stability, as do occasional naval deployments by other nations.

Even states elsewhere besides Western Europe are taking more responsibility for their—and the United States'—security interests. Saudi Arabia's economic and security assistance to its Gulf neighbors is another example. Economic assistance from Japan, once devoted almost entirely to promoting trade in East Asia, has expanded to encompass Southeast Asia and is distributed on more liberal terms. Japan has also been involved in mediation efforts between Iran and Iraq to end the war between those two countries.

ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Given resource constraints, the United States has made important strides in meeting its security commitment goals in South Asia. Overseas deployments have changed significantly, due in no small measure to the tripling of the number of nuclear-powered vessels in the U.S. navy since 1967. Now the emphasis is on flexibility and surge capability rather than on static commitments and rote patterns for battle group deployment. Between 1981 and 1990, the U.S. intertheater airlift capability will have increased by roughly 75 percent, and its ability to move outsized equipment by air will have more than doubled. Two U.S. army divisions are being
restructured as light divisions to improve the deployability of its forces to high threat areas on very short notice.

New instruments of defensive diplomacy are available. Where once the United States was usually limited to sending warships and marines, now an AWACS deployment—continuously in Saudi Arabia since 1980 and three times in 1983–84 in Egypt/Sudan—conveys a political signal of concern in addition to providing concrete help.

These are important adjustments to a more complex international security environment. It would be misleading, however, to assume that the United States is fully prepared either materially or psychologically for the growing number of gray-area situations where the threats to its interests are not immediate and unambiguous. This occurs when the Soviet role is disguised, the choices are a matter of picking the lesser of available evils, and/or the efficacy of using traditional military tools is uncertain.

**Force Structure**

A debate about the appropriate spectrum of military capabilities continues on whether the emphasis should be on the most advanced strategic and conventional forces that deter direct Soviet attack or on more innovative means for dealing with exported insurgency and state-sponsored terrorism. Obviously, the United States must keep up with the latest technology in order to counter traditional threats to itself and its principal allies and friends. Thus, even in a period of expanded defense budgets, resources will remain tight for lower-order contingencies and security assistance. However, if for that reason the United States thereby fails to meet gray-area threats, this kind of challenge will surely multiply.

**Type of Presence**

Another related question is what kind of U.S. military presence is desirable. Fixed forces in Western Europe, South Korea, and elsewhere act as deterrents in those areas. But what about less traditional areas of American interest, especially where the presence of U.S. forces conjure up distinct political liabilities for one party or another?

There are considerable advantages to having forces in place even in areas where there has been no permanent U.S. presence. Among the most obvious are the deterrent and confidence-building value of the visible commitment, becoming familiar with local conditions and the local forces, and the ability to react more rapidly to threats. Even (some would say especially) in the missile age, geography and preemptive positioning still count. The practical realities of time, distance, and ready resources affect choices for influencing a developing conflict.

However, a permanent U.S. presence can serve as a kind of tripwire, limiting its flexibility. Moreover, sometimes the presence of American forces exacerbates local tensions and fuels opposition to the very leaders and policies it means to support. In the tense Persian Gulf area in particular, many governments want the reassurance of
American military support, but they also want it to be “over the horizon,” out of sight until called upon.

**The Military Importance of Political Relations**

One way out of the above conundrum would be very expensive. It would mean continuing to increase the mobility and flexibility of U.S. forces, including improving further the ability of the air force to move quickly to set up in new areas (as it did in 1984 in Sudan), continuing the trend toward a lighter, more mobile army, and increasing the navy’s sealift and light combatant capability.

Perhaps the most realistic way to deal with a long-term U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean area would be to improve political, economic, and military relations with regional states. In addition to bilateral relations, the management of multilateral issues, such as freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean zone of peace proposal, will be a continuing factor in U.S. relations with regional states.

The United States and other Western powers have important assets in the Indian Ocean, especially compared with the Soviets. The economic resources of the West are very important for internal economic development around the littoral. The Soviets have offered little meaningful assistance for the region’s economic development and have even less appeal in most of the area as a political or social model. Their hope for influence lies primarily in exacerbating and exploiting grievances for which there are no apparent means of peaceful redress. U.S. maritime forces are concerned about control of such strategic choke points as the Hormuz, Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda straits. Soviet efforts in the general vicinity—Yemen, Ethiopia, the Seychelles—are not entirely coincidental, nor is the presence of twenty to twenty-five Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean.

The Western military presence is not insubstantial. The combined Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean is considerably larger than that of the Soviets. There are also traditional British and French links to certain states, specifically British advisers in the Gulf, and French forces at Réunion and Djibouti.

None of these advantages is uncomplicated. From the American perspective, close ties with some regional states adversely affect its ability to establish friendly relations with its adversaries. From the regional perspective, the same states that want Western capital and security assistance worry about the effect of Western influence on traditional values and about a possible return of domination by outside powers. Leaders who seek Western military assistance also worry that too visible a security link might inflame local xenophobia. Similarly, Western prepositioning meant for deterrence might be seen by neighboring countries as a move toward a permanent presence, and therefore be provocative.

**Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency**

These twin problems pose special difficulties for open political systems. There is justified dissatisfaction with the level of U.S. performance to counter the terrorist
threat. Perhaps the United States can learn from friendly states that have dealt successfully with this growing problem. At the present level of development, terrorists trained and supported by lawless nations can severely hamper or destroy the foreign policies of the United States and others with a minimal investment in explosives, special weapons, and vehicles. Innovative thinking in new technologies at the national level would help. Certainly the United States cannot allow funding for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to become a “poor relation” of the military budget process.

There is also an important political dimension to both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The U.S. government is currently thinking through some hard moral questions concerning how to combat terrorism and insurgency. Should it go beyond building stationary barriers and increasing guard forces to strike at the sources of terrorism? What form of retaliation, or even preemptive action, would be compatible with American values, acceptable to international opinion, and likely to be effective over the long term?

Military Assistance Issues

U.S. assistance is distributed to help other nations defend themselves. Basically the United States attempts to sell or provide weapons and munitions to friendly countries to meet their legitimate security needs. The problem is to do this without otherwise destabilizing an area or a situation in ways that lead to an arms race and greater insecurity for the nations concerned.

In addition to the obvious difficulties in obtaining adequate budgetary resources to meet all commitments, other problems arise. For example, debates over whether regional tensions originate in local situations or whether they are externally fomented by others often miss the point. Both factors are almost always present, with those exacerbating local tensions pressing the issue to the point of resorting to force as their only real prospect for gaining influence. Thus, there are likely to be other situations beyond Lebanon or Central America where the shield of security assistance or even the direct involvement of U.S. forces may be necessary to protect a reform or reconciliation process from outside sabotage and to give a government the confidence to make necessary domestic accommodations.

An important related issue for the United States is how it ensures that its security assistance and forces, if present, aid rather than impede the development of local self-reliance and are used only against external aggression, not for domestic repression. The answers are not all as easy as Grenada, as the United States learned in Vietnam and is learning in El Salvador.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Occasionally a complicating factor in U.S. military relationships can arise over the question of the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries that have peaceful nuclear energy programs. The United States opposes the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and believes that their possession tends to reduce overall security, especially for the country possessing them. Instead, the United States believes that a program of support that enhances a country’s sense of security helps remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. Such support also helps persuade such countries that the pursuit of such a capability is neither necessary nor in their own broader interests.

NATIONAL CONSENSUS

A final factor in U.S. security policy in South Asia, or anywhere else, is American public opinion. For the U.S. government to carry out a security policy that can command the respect of its adversaries as well as the confidence of its allies requires a basic national consensus on the general outlines of policy. Sometimes it is not easy to develop this consensus—the American body politic, speaking through its elected representatives in Congress, is not always ready to support rapidly the allocation of resources necessary to support sufficiently a given level of policy involvement.

The psychological dimension of the problem of supporting friends of the United States is important too. It is clearly easier for the United States, from both a political and practical standpoint, to deal with difficult conflicts in concert with friends and allies. Sometimes its friends, fearful that it will not honor a commitment unless it is explicit and direct, press solely for a U.S. commitment without involving others. It is easier for the United States to accept responsibility if it can share it.

Americans like to think of conflict as abnormal, something to be quickly and decisively ended; international troubles require conclusive solutions. This psychic need for quick, clear success sometimes undercuts the staying power needed for messy situations that can’t be solved, only marginally improved or prevented from getting worse.

Some think of force as an alternative to diplomacy, to be used only after the latter fails. In fact, the two elements are complementary. The ability and demonstrated will to use force are often essential ingredients of successful diplomacy. The challenge is how to create enough leverage to cause a determined opponent to back off.

U.S. ability to meet the new kinds of security threats in the gray areas is hampered by the difficulty of establishing consensus. Public support for a strong response to a clear danger to the United States or its major allies and friends or to protect American lives abroad is not really in question. The kinds of gray-area situations that cause difficulty are precisely those on which well-meaning people can disagree about the threat to American interests and about the proper means of response.

Vigorous and informed public debate and an active congressional role in carrying out U.S. foreign policy are important in its democracy. The United States has learned all too painfully that difficult foreign enterprises must be grounded in a clear public understanding and appreciation of the undertaking. On the other hand, the last few years have seen both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. govern-
ment grappling for the right formula for exercising prerogatives without damaging the national interest. The United States is continually engaged in a balancing act, trying not to erode the confidence of friends or to encourage adversaries to wait it out. It is helpful if its friends and allies understand that aspect of its political system, minimize their overreactions to temporary zigs and zags, and work together with U.S. policymakers to build the necessary consensus.

CONCLUSION

While the United States has not developed in the Indian Ocean the alliances and bases on which its security depends elsewhere, it still has important cards to play to protect its interests and those of its allies. It has sought to build up a network of close military relationships and access arrangements that can support both a peacetime presence plus military contingency operations, if those become necessary. This is in addition to developing the political, economic, and security resources required to meet regional needs.

The U.S. goal is to use these assets in strategies that effectively integrate a limited peacetime military presence with diplomatic and economic measures to improve its relations throughout the area, to bolster moderate governments in the region through security and economic assistance, to promote self-reliance and cooperation among regional states, and to discourage and thwart state-supported terrorism. The challenge is to build partnerships with like-minded states that are strong enough and effective enough to minimize the prospects of those who would shape affairs to their own liking either through aggression or intimidation. In the process, the United States must balance the needs of a free society with the requirements for consistency, flexibility, steadfastness, and decisiveness, a difficult task when dealing with a fast-changing and often dangerous world.
Economic relations between Pakistan and the United States have not attained the potential suggested by progress on other fronts. In fiscal year 1982-83 (ending June 30, 1983), the United States accounted for 6.0 percent of Pakistan's exports (behind Saudi Arabia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Japan); 9.7 percent of imports (behind Saudi Arabia and Japan); and 11.2 percent of gross aid receipts (roughly the same as Japan). The burden of past relations, however, was reflected in the fact that on June 30, 1983, the United States held 27.5 percent of Pakistan's nonmilitary medium and long-term external debt and received 22.6 cents of every dollar that Pakistan paid to service its nonmilitary debt. As a result, compared with Japan's 13.8 percent share in net aid flows to Pakistan, the United States, currently the second largest lender, contributed only 7.0 percent. (See Table 1.)

ISSUES IN AID

In the past, the United States had been the largest source of economic assistance to Pakistan. In the 1950s over two-thirds of economic assistance to Pakistan was from the United States; in the 1960s, this share had fallen to a little over one half, and during 1971-77, it was less that 15 percent. Put another way, as a share of total official development assistance (ODA) provided by the United States, net disbursement of aid to Pakistan fell from a high of 6.1 percent in 1965 to 3.1 percent in 1975 and was less than 1 percent in 1978 and in 1981. (See Table 2.)

At the time this paper was presented, the author was economic adviser/additional secretary to the government of Pakistan on leave from the World Bank. His views are his own and may not be attributed to the institutions or the officials of the institutions with which he was affiliated.
Until 1981, when a "new relationship" was established, Pakistan had been the sixth largest recipient of U.S. bilateral economic assistance. The bulk (around 40 percent) of this assistance (more than US$2 billion) had been in terms of food aid under US Public Law 480, about one-third was commodity assistance, and some one-fifth was project assistance (primarily for agriculture and infrastructure). Especially in the 1960s, this assistance enabled Pakistan to tide over difficulties of food shortages, provided needed raw materials, and supported major investments in infrastructure.

Under the new package, the declining trend in U.S. assistance to Pakistan has been reversed. The United States' motivation for the new package is admittedly political: in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is now the perception of the United States (shared naturally by Pakistan) that "a strong and independent Pakistan is in the mutual interest of the United States and Pakistan as well as the entire world." The volume and terms of the economic assistance package have been designed, therefore, to cushion the balance-of-payments impact of military sales at commercial terms (presently, much the same as in 1981, around 14 percent per annum). Both countries appear to be satisfied with the progressive development of the aid program.

The new program is designed to achieve four major mutually agreed economic objectives: (1) provision of substantial balance of payments support for a period in which major defense and economic investments are to take place; (2) assurance of stable and relatively fast disbursing capital flows to facilitate orderly planning over a longer time than usual for aid programs; (3) a commitment to an agreed list of high-priority investments that would contribute to long-term, self-sustaining economic growth in Pakistan; and (4) sectoral concentration of investments in two major areas: agriculture/irrigation and energy. The programs and projects that have been developed reflect these priorities. Some $300 million is programmed for agricultural

1 U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan started in 1951, was suspended in May 1977 (except for food aid under PL480), resumed briefly in 1978, was again suspended in April 1979, and resumed in October 1981 (U.S. fiscal year 1982) under the new five-year ($1,575 million) defense and six-year ($1,625 million) economic assistance package proposed by the United States. This assistance has been in the form of (1) technical assistance; (2) project assistance; (3) food aid (concessional loans for the import of surplus wheat and edible oil, under PL480) repayable in foreign exchange since 1971, at standard U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) loan terms—presently, annual interest of 2 percent for the first ten years, and 3 percent for the remaining thirty years); and (4) commodity aid (concessional loans for the import of industrial machinery and raw materials). Up to the end of the U.S. fiscal year 1984, Pakistan had received $6,750 million in total economic assistance from the United States, of which $2,246 million was in grants (including Indus Basin), and $733 million was repayable in rupees.

2 The phrase "new relationship" is from Buckley (1981).

3 Joint U.S.-Pakistan Statement, June 15, 1981. In a separate context, Pakistan's finance minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1984, pp. 35–36), arguing from verses of the Quran, has stated that a principle of Pakistan's foreign policy toward all nations, including India, is "to acquire adequate defensive strength as a guarantee for peace" (on the basis of Quran, viii:60). The two other principles that were cited are "to respond positively to peace overtures even when the enemy's real intention might be to deceive" (on the basis of Quran, viii:61,62) and not to let hate or enmity lead to wrong or unjust behavior (Quran, v:8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Group</th>
<th>Pakistan's Exports to</th>
<th>Pakistan's Imports from</th>
<th>Aid Receipts</th>
<th>Debt Servicing (\text{on June 30, 1983})</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gross^</td>
<td>Net^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC^</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>(—)</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
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### Table 1 (continued)

Selected Statistics on Pakistan's Economic Relations

1982–83

(%) Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Group</th>
<th>Pakistan’s Exports to</th>
<th>Pakistan’s Imports from</th>
<th>Aid Receipts Grossª</th>
<th>Aid Receipts Netª</th>
<th>Debt Servicingª</th>
<th>Debt Disbursed and Outstanding on June 30, 1983</th>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>18.6</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>$ Million</td>
<td>2,709.8</td>
<td>5,362.0</td>
<td>1,122.5</td>
<td>732.1</td>
<td>634.5</td>
<td>9,312.4</td>
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</table>


ª Disbursements.

ªª Disbursements minus principal repayments.

ªªª Principal plus interest payments.

ªª Organization of Islamic Conference.

ªªª Regional Cooperation for Development, now called Economic Cooperation Organization, ECO.

ªªªª Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

ªª Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Table 2
U.S. Share in Aid to Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>U.S. Aid Commitments ($ million)</th>
<th>U.S. Share in Total Aid Commitments to Pakistan (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951–60</td>
<td>964.9</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196–70</td>
<td>2,961.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–77</td>
<td>901.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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<td>1977–78</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td>1978–79</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979–80</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980–81</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981–82</td>
<td>173.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–83</td>
<td>309.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


commodities and equipment. Roughly half of this sum would finance imports of phosphatic fertilizers, not yet produced in Pakistan, and a sizable portion of heavy machinery to maintain irrigation canals. Some $300 million is for the import of vegetable oil for the manufacture of ghee. Another $90 million would support improvements in operations and maintenance of Pakistan's vast irrigation infrastructure in an effort to enhance efficiency and reduce recurring costs.

More than $52 million will finance modern heat recovery gas turbine generators at the Guddu power plant, which would significantly improve the efficiency of natural gas use in the power sector. The United States is also expected to participate in financing, to the extent of $125 million for 1986 and 1987, the proposed Lakhra coal-fired electric generation project at Jamshoro in Sind, the first large-scale exploitation of Pakistan's substantial lignite coal reserves for power generation.

Almost $94 million has been allocated to rural development projects in the more isolated and least developed regions of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), including the Makran division of Baluchistan and the tribal areas of the NWFP. This would include some $30 million for rural development and agricultural projects in areas that have traditionally produced opium poppies under the NWFP area development. It would help farmers make an economic adjustment to new crops as they comply with the government's enforcement of the national ban on poppy cultivation.

Finally, some $130 million is programmed in population and health, mainly for family planning services (both through the public sector and the private sector) and
malaria control (where some $45 million has been programmed for spray chemicals and technical assistance). In all, twenty-three programs and projects comprise the six-year, $1,625 million economic assistance package.

Major concerns, however, may emerge on each side. For Pakistan it is important that the agreed program of progressively increasing levels of economic assistance, shown in Table 3, be maintained. Second, Pakistan’s need for untied, quick-disbursing assistance—recognized by both parties—needs to be kept in view, not only in U.S. bilateral assistance but in the U.S. position in multilateral aid forums, especially the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium. Finally, in view of the well-established needs for foreign assistance in financing the high-priority Sixth Five-Year Plan (1982–88) projects, constructive attempts at increasing the net flow of foreign assistance could be made.

Table 3
Agreed Schedule of U.S. Economic Assistance ($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Fiscal Year (Ending Sept. 10)</th>
<th>Loan</th>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1,625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Buckley, 1981.

This increase in net flows could be brought about not only by fresh commitments but by debt relief. The United States is reported to have foregone India’s rupee debt

5 Among minor problems that could be solved, given political will, is the requirement by the United States that at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of commodities procured under the Agricultural Commodities and Equipment Agreement be transported to Pakistan on U.S.-owned ships. This often increases prices inclusive of cost, insurance, and freight very substantially and effectively reduces the amount of U.S. aid available to Pakistan.

6 Pakistan’s debt burden is sometimes exaggerated. According to the World Bank (1984, pp. 248–49), Pakistan’s external public debt at the end of 1982 was 31.5 percent of its GNP (compared with over 50 percent for seven low-income African countries, 41.8 percent for Sri Lanka, 52.8 percent for Egypt, 50.8 percent for Morocco, and 42.2 percent for Tunisia). Moreover, the bulk of this debt is at concessional terms. Similarly, at 9.2 percent of exports of goods and services, its debt service ratio is among the lowest in comparable countries of the world.
obligation under past PL480 loans; a similar concession to Pakistan would not seem out of place at this juncture. More significantly, however, net flows could be enhanced by U.S. support of an innovative approach to debt restructuring as an expeditious way of increasing net transfers rather than the traditional concept of debt relief as a last ditch attempt to salvage lost loans.

This would require a revision of some of the cherished dogmas of aid giving. First, the principle that debt relief should only be provided to countries on the brink of (or already in) default is long overdue for revision. There is no reason why debt relief should be provided only to those countries that have mismanaged their external commitments and denied to those who have managed their economies well. Anticipatory debt restructuring, like the long-resisted concept of anticipatory balance-of-payments support (which came to be called “structural adjustment loans” by the World Bank and “extended fund facility” by the International Monetary Fund—IMF), is an idea whose time may well have come.

It is important to realize that the concept of (anticipatory) debt restructuring is quite different from the classical conception of debt relief, in which the lender has no option but to postpone payments since the borrower simply does not have the money to repay. In refusing to consider debt relief until there is no option but to grant relief, the United States (and other lenders) can hardly be said to have a “policy” on debt relief (other than “take when you can, pay when you must”).

Anticipatory debt restructuring, on the other hand, can be a positive discretionary policy of enhancing net capital flows. Moreover, from a borrowing country’s viewpoint, one dollar of debt relief is worth substantially more than one dollar of tied aid. Once this difference is recognized, there is no reason why a program of anticipatory debt restructuring cannot be designed by the United States for selected countries and be processed through regular executive and legislative channels, as necessary.

A willingness to engage in anticipatory debt restructuring would also assuage one of the key concerns expressed by U.S. officials and scholars—the growing debt burden of the poor countries. With domestic compulsions in lending countries restricting the move away from an admittedly suboptimal policy of protectionism and with the rising debt burdens of the borrowing countries, anticipatory debt restructuring offers the only way to alleviate pressures on a selective basis. While this option is not available to multilateral institutions, there is no reason why a bilateral program cannot be developed to mutual advantage.

ISSUES IN TRADE

Unlike aid relations, trade relations between Pakistan and the United States, reflecting worldwide trends, have been beset with greater difficulties. It is here that the

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7 In 1973 the United States placed the amount of Indian rupees (18.037 million) due under Public Law 480 loans at the disposal of the Indian government for disbursement on development projects. Pakistan initiated a similar case in 1972 regarding its Public Law 480 rupee debt obligation of 2.694 million rupees. Deliberations between Pakistan and the United States continued inconclusively until 1979 and were suspended in 1980 when the case for debt rescheduling was being made.
trade policy of the United States, even making allowances for election year irrationalities, must bridge the growing gap between practice and preaching. In large part, there is a global aspect to it, dealt with as a North-South issue below, under which access to markets must at least be seen as an essential ingredient in any policy of global debt management, if older arguments for free trade seem less persuasive. But even in bilateral relations, the United States needs to set an example for the rest of the nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Pakistan's imports from the United States consistently exceed its earnings from exports to the United States and aid receipts put together. In addition, Pakistan has to meet its debt service obligations. This payments imbalance, in favor of the United States, which accumulates as debt, can be corrected either by enhanced aid flows or by increased access to U.S. markets. The economic logic could not be simpler. Yet the balance of political advantage within the United States (and other lending countries) consistently favors a case-by-case approach, which evades the real issues.

The main problem is textile trade, Pakistan's main manufactured export, which is governed by the Multifibre Arrangements (MFA). Under the MFA, Pakistan has signed a Bilateral Textile Agreement with the United States, which regulates Pakistani export of textile products through "aggregate limits" on exports. There is no reason why these aggregate limits cannot be substantially enhanced, if not eliminated altogether. In addition, the United States has resorted to notification of unilateral restraint against imports of some categories of textile products from Pakistan.

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8 As Pakistan's minister for finance, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1982), put it: "It is grossly unfair to insist that developing countries decontrol and liberalize while developed countries do precisely the reverse. A global liberalization in the world trade regime must be a pre-requisite for requiring such actions from developing nations. To carry conviction, it is only what is practiced at home that should be preached abroad."

9 Thus, during the five years ending 1982-83, for every dollar of U.S. aid disbursed, Pakistan imported over $5.97 worth of nonmilitary goods from the United States. The key imports are animal and vegetable oils, chemicals (mainly fertilizers), and machinery and transport equipment. Pakistan's exports consist mainly of textile products, although fish and fish preparations and medical instruments are becoming important.

10 In the 1950s, Western countries protected themselves primarily from Japanese textile exports by voluntary restraints. In 1961 and 1962 the Short-Term and Long-Term Arrangements Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA and LTA) were set up to exclude textile trade from the usual rules of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). In 1974, the LTA was replaced by the MFA. Article 3 of the MFA provides for unilateral action to limit textile imports; Article 4 allows bilateral agreements to limit trade. The GATT Textiles Committee and the Textile Surveillance Body (TSB) oversee the operations of MFA. Both are ineffectual. See World Bank (1981, p. 28). For an analysis of the negative impact of the MFA on both poor and rich countries, see World Bank (1984, p. 40): "The cost of preserving a job...[by] tariffs [for clothing and textiles alone] was estimated to be $426 million for the United States in 1977...[T]he cost of permanent [tariff] protection per job saved would be about $80,000 while the private benefit to the individual worker would be $5,600, a [cost/benefit] ratio of 14 to 1. In other words, a permanent policy of tariff protection would cost the United States $1 for every 7 cents gained by workers whose jobs were preserved."

11 Only cotton products are subject to quotas by the United States. (Items of more than 50 percent man-made fibers are free of any quota restrictions.) The restrictiveness of the aggregate limits may be illustrated by the fact that the 1984 aggregate limit of 230 million square yards equivalent was 84 percent full by the beginning of August 1984, and the government of Pakistan had to restrain exports. Removal of the aggregate limit has been sought by Pakistan but is rejected by the U.S. government.
Consultations between the two governments are in progress to resolve this issue. Abstractioning from the details of the many disagreements that have arisen between the two governments on textile trade, the point should be made that this is an area where possibilities exist for greater benefits to both parties through mutual cooperation. According to the World Bank (1981, p. 28), the U.S. government spends over one dollar to provide seven cents to each American textile worker, while imposing heavy costs on Pakistan (and other exporting countries). Studies have shown that the United States has successfully administered a Trade Adjustment Assistance program under which textile workers have been relocated in short periods (average, thirty-eight weeks for men, fifty weeks for women) to equal or higher-paying jobs. A more active adjustment program, with a time-bound schedule and monitorable targets, should be implemented, perhaps under the auspices of the World Bank or the IMF, in the interests of all parties.

The move toward a progressive elimination of inefficient trading practices in textiles should be supplemented by greater liberalization of preferential tariffs provided to poor countries through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The U.S. scheme of GSP covers some 2,900 products from 140 developing countries and territories. Despite rapid growth, the United States' GSP imports amounted to only $8.4 billion in 1981 or some 3 percent of total imports.

Pakistan's GSP exports to the United States have increased to $40.5 million in 1982-83, or some 17.4 percent of Pakistan's total exports. Even if allowances are made for the lack of familiarity of Pakistani exporters with a comparatively new scheme and for Pakistan's principal export products (textiles, apparel, footwear, etc.) lie outside the purview of the scheme, the rate of utilization of the scheme has been low. In addition to an overall expansion in the scheme, the following specific measures could help Pakistan's exports: (1) the list of products could be expanded to include items of interest to Pakistan; (2) problems resulting from technical features of the scheme (such as origin criteria, cumulative benefit of origin, etc.) should be reviewed to find ways to promote GSP exports; and (3) utilization of the scheme can be increased by U.S. authorities by providing technical assistance for familiarizing Pakistan's exporters with various aspects and procedures of the scheme.

NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES

Financial flows (aid), the associated issues of conditionality and debt relief, and trade—discussed above in a bilateral context—have also dominated the global debate.

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12 This issue was taken up by Pakistan with the GATT Textile Surveillance Body (TSB), which ruled in favor of Pakistan.

13 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established in pursuance of a resolution adopted at the Second Session of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1968. Under the system, some sixteen groups of countries (the EEC taken as one) grant preferential tariff treatment to imports from developing countries.

14 The main items that Pakistan would like to see included in the GSP scheme are floor coverings including carpets, gums, and resins; leather and leather products; footwear; textiles; terry towels; ready-made garments; cotton gloves; hosiery items; and fruit preparations.
on North-South issues. This debate has not affected bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States, even though in international forums the two countries have taken different positions on significant issues. Pakistan's position on North-South issues has been consistent with its membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, while the United States has adopted the least compromising approach among the OECD countries.

The failure of the dialogue on North-South issues reflects not only the divergent perceptions of the nature of global economic problems, but also the methodological difficulties of dealing with moral issues in a secular-rationalist framework. With the exception of the Nordic countries, most OECD countries, and especially the United States, have found it necessary to justify what are essentially moral propositions in terms of enlightened self-interest. Where this has not been possible, a hard-nosed pragmatic approach has been considered appropriate in multilateral forums, while concessions—if any—have been reserved for bilateral discussions.

To the South, it has been especially frustrating to find that the commitment to liberal democratic principles so ardently espoused within national boundaries—and to some extent across OECD countries—has been entirely abandoned in dealing with Afro-Asian nations. Thus, global negotiations in such one nation one vote forums as the United Nations and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have been anathema to the United States. Instead, its position has been that discussions (not negotiations) should take place in forums where proportional representation favors the rich countries.

The poor countries, on the other hand, have regarded North-South issues essentially as issues of global morality and of consistency between the lofty rhetoric of internationalism and the down-to-earth practice of discrimination. A truly free trade regime would cause difficulties for the poor countries, and a totally mercantilist order would severely impair their development prospects, but the worst of all possible worlds is when the rich countries pursue mercantilist policies while forcing a free trade regime upon the weakest of the poor countries, which are forced to seek conditional financial assistance.

The poor countries' case for a change in the rules of international commerce and finance rests primarily on the gross inequity in living standards across countries, which has been growing over time. According to 1982 World Bank figures (1984, pp. 218–19), we live in a world of over 4.5 billion people, with an average per capita income of over $2,550 per year. The Western industrial countries, accounting for about 15 percent of the world's population, claim some 75 percent of the world's output, while the developing countries, inhabited by 75 percent of the world's

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15 Thus, Donald T. Regan, then the U.S. treasury secretary, in describing U.S. agreement on the forthcoming discussions of development issues at the April 1985 meetings of the two advisory committees of the IMF and the World Bank, is reported to have stressed that it was a "proposition for a dialogue—not negotiations but a dialogue" (IMF, 1984, p. 308).

16 Bairoch (1977, p. 192) points out that "the divergence [between the Third World and the noncommunist advanced world] between per capita income or product, which was about 1:6 in 1900 (and 1:5 in 1860), [rose] to 1:7 in 1929, 1:8.5 in 1953 and 1:13 in 1970. . . . the divergence for 1980 will be larger still."
population, make do with only 22 percent of the world’s product. Of these, those with annual per capita gross national product (GNP) over $10,000, limited to only 12.5 percent of world’s population, claim 66 percent of the output. By contrast, the low-income countries contain about half the world’s population and make do with less than 6 percent of the world output; the poorest among them, accounting for over 5 percent of the world’s population, make do with well under 0.03 percent of world output.

More important, these inequalities have grown over time, and today the average per capita income of the industrialized countries is twenty-one times that of the developing countries and forty-nine times that of the low-income countries. Yet capital flows from the rich countries, especially concessional flows for low-income countries, continue to decline as a share of their GNP. In many of these countries, the rate of growth of per capita income have been negative for several years, and acute malnutrition and starvation have not been uncommon. While the principle of helping the poorest of the low-income countries has been accepted at all forums, actual progress has been slow.

There is a large and growing body of opinion that maintains that the structure of the world economy has changed irrevocably and that the growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s have become forever unattainable. Whatever the truth, Pakistan has taken the position that a system that allows the poorest of the world to accept declining levels of per capita incomes and consumption, in the midst of unparalleled prosperity in the developed countries, should be changed. With the increased dependence of the North on the markets of the South, not only moral principles but enlightened self-interest demands that the prospects of the poor be improved.

The actions required in the area of trade are well known. The impediment is essentially a lack of political will. It is by now recognized by all that a more liberal trade environment and measures of price and/or income stabilization for raw material exporters are thoroughly legitimate demands of the developing countries and of potential mutual advantage to all parties. The continued inability of the industrial countries to take rational action on agricultural protection and certain low-wage industries, which are of substantial mutual benefit to the rich and the poor countries, is a major blot on their verbal pronouncements on free trade. The Multifibre Arrangements and other trade agreements designed to transfer income from poor to rich cannot be consistent with global aspirations of equity and justice.

The most disturbing failure has been the inability of the industrial countries to maintain capital flows—commercial as well as noncommercial—at levels com-

17 According to the World Bank (1984, pp. 252–53), official development assistance (ODA) from OECD countries, as a ratio of their GNP, fell from 0.51 percent in 1960 to 0.36 percent in 1980 and was 0.37 percent in 1983. The comparable figures for the United States were 0.35 percent (1960) to 0.27 percent (1980) and 0.24 percent (1983). Net bilateral flows to low-income countries have declined even more precipitately.

18 The inability of the United States to contribute to the seventh replenishment of the International Development Association at earlier committed levels—and the consequent reduction in other contributions—is a case in point. There is also the feeling that the United States may have discouraged other OECD countries from participating in the proposed supplementary fund.
mensurate with the needs of the poor and middle-income countries. Official development assistance (ODA) flows in 1983 were below 1982 levels in nominal terms, and the outlook is not promising. This means that the trend of a declining ODA/GNP ratio, set in the 1970s, continues in the 1980s, despite repeated calls for a turnaround toward the 0.70 percent target set for the second development decade. This is unfortunate when we consider the pious rhetoric in which the commitment to principles of civilized behavior is expressed at every forum.

With declining concessional assistance, the rising deficits have been financed by debt on harder terms so that the debt service problem of the developing countries has increased substantially. It is clear that the full debt servicing obligations of the developing countries can be met for the rest of the decade only if consumption in these countries is reduced to a level close to or less than the minimum that will be acceptable to the bulk of the population. In such conditions, a policy of dealing with debt problems on a crisis basis, only at the twelfth hour, rewards only the spendthrift. The policy of not accommodating the better-managed economies, which anticipate debt difficulties a few years in advance, can hardly be in the interest of either the lender or the borrower.

While the tasks for industrial countries have been stressed, Pakistan has always emphasized that the developing countries should not be remiss in attending to their responsibilities. Despite the harsh external economic environment, a number of developing countries have made the heroic sacrifices that have been needed to register creditable progress.

In Pakistan, an annual rate of economic growth of over 6 percent was achieved during 1974–84, despite a cumulative decline in its terms of trade of around 14.6 percent; in net aid inflows, from $760 million (or 75 percent of disbursements) in 1974–75 to an estimated $92 million (or 9 percent of disbursements) in 1983–84; and the continued presence since 1979 of about 3 million Afghan refugees, requiring an estimated $600 million in 1984 for food and shelter alone. Pakistan has also finally put behind it the double-digit inflation that had dogged the economy since the 1970s and has reduced the rate of inflation to around 9 percent. With the sharp curtailment of domestic absorption that this has required, the balance of payments has also been strengthened, although pressures emerged in 1984 because of poor agricultural conditions in 1983-84. And yet discriminatory trade practices against Pakistan’s exports continue to grow, and net capital flows continue to diminish and are available at increasingly harder terms.

This is not a solitary example. There is abundant evidence that countries that have the administrative capacity and the will to make excellent progress are being deprived of reasonable support. For less fortunate countries, the consequences are even worse. The practical programs of action that are needed are not scarce. The Brandt Commission, reflecting a broad spectrum of representatives from rich and poor countries and consisting of practical people, not idealists, has issued its revised report, and yet the industrial countries have largely ignored its recommendations.

Pakistan’s view on North-South issues is not isolated. A leading analyst from the United States, W. W. Rostow (1978, p. 653), has concluded on the basis of several
decades of research and study that “industrial civilization—germinated in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, operationally launched in the 1780s, and now diffused in varying degree to all the countries—is now endangered, that the next quarter-century is of critical importance to the outcome, that neither physical-resources limitations nor economic problems pose insurmountable obstacles to fending off those dangers, but that quite substantial changes in politics and policy are required if the world economy is to get through to easier times.”

It is Pakistan’s hope that the international community will rise to this challenge and will restore the reliance on negotiated solutions to global problems, even in the face of adversity. The trading environment must be liberalized, and a responsible level of aid flow must be restored, especially to the poorest countries. Conditionality must be based on principles adhered to by all parties and should be sensitive to each country’s predicament. A more positive approach to debt relief must be adopted. The rich and the poor nations of the world must work to prevent limited national solutions.

CONCLUSION

The prospects for a strong and durable relationship, based on mutual respect and understanding, between Pakistan and the United States are bright. While outstanding issues in the aid relationship are satisfactory, with closer political relations, much more mutually advantageous trade relations could be established. In addition, the United States could attempt to ensure greater equity and rationalism in conditionality imposed by multilateral financial institutions and could review its position on anticipatory debt relief to Pakistan and other similarly placed countries. These measures could be supplemented by a more constructive attitude on other North-South issues, not as negotiable matters, but as a moral imperative.

Within the context of these overall observations, some specific suggestions have been offered in this paper, which are feasible and would contribute to strengthening bilateral relations. Three suggestions, which can be implemented in the short run, are: (1) the United States could consider foregoing (all or part of) Pakistan’s PL480 debt; (2) the United States could eliminate (or substantially enhance) the aggregate limit on Pakistan’s textile exports; and (3) the United States could take measures to enhance Pakistan’s use of the U.S. GSP scheme by expanding the list of goods, removing certain restraining technical features of the scheme, and providing technical assistance to educate Pakistani exporters in the intricacies of the U.S. GSP scheme. Two suggestions, which could be developed in the medium term, are: (1) the development of a new instrument of foreign assistance—anticipatory debt restructuring; and (2) the exploration of the possibility of establishing a “Textile Facility” with the IMF (or a similar fund with the World Bank) to finance an adjustment program in the United States (and other inefficient textile producers).
REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

From the start, political factors have dominated the overall U.S.-Pakistan relationship. At the same time, that relationship has also been dominated by misperceptions in each country concerning the extent to which the national interests of the two countries converged and where they diverged. As a result, the bilateral relationship has been characterized by peaks and troughs. When there has been a convergence of interests, the relationship has been virtually—and for much of its thirty-seven year existence in fact—an alliance. When there has been a divergence of interests, the very closeness of the previous ties has intensified the resultant estrangement.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship, at one of its lowest ebbs following the U.S. aid cutoff in early 1979, has evolved since the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan into what appears to be a rather more mature and flexible relationship than any of its predecessors. While the two countries are united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and share a number of other common interests, neither appears to expect the other automatically to share its views over a broad range of issues. Such reduced expectations give hope of a reduction in the frequency and intensity of disappointments.

This improved political relationship has coincided with improvements in the economic relationship, both in terms of trade and investment. It is my thesis that improved economic ties, particularly fixed private investments that cannot be as easily moved as government policies can be changed, may contribute to a greater stability in the overall relationship. By creating constituencies with a tangible stake in the continuance of a relationship in which business interests can prosper, private investment can help to preserve the improved bilateral relationship that attracted it in the first place.

From April 22 through 29, 1983, representatives of 26 American business firms were in Pakistan looking into investment opportunities as participants in an investment
mission organized by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC is the U.S. government agency chartered by Congress to promote American private investment in some 100 developing countries. Recently, OPIC contacted all of the firms which had participated in the mission to find out what investments can be expected to result from it. Only three investments have so far taken place, totaling $1.05 million. However, another eleven firms have a total of eighteen projects well under way, which they hope to implement in the near future. If in fact all of the anticipated investments take place, the total new investment in Pakistan resulting from the OPIC mission will amount to $532.5 million. This compares with the premission total of U.S. investment in Pakistan of $109 million.

**BILATERAL POLITICAL RELATIONS**

It is undoubtedly more than a coincidence that this surge in private American investment interest in Pakistan comes at a time of significant improvement in the bilateral political relationship. Just five years ago, that political relationship was in a trough: U.S. aid had been suspended in April 1979 over the issue of Pakistan’s apparent pursuit of a nuclear explosive capability, and on November 21, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was gutted by a Pakistani mob inflamed by false rumors of U.S. complicity in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Clearly, at that time no U.S. businessman would have considered Pakistan to be a promising place for investment.

However, a month later came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That transformed Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States. First the Carter and then the Reagan administrations worked to restructure the U.S.- Pakistani relationship. The initial Carter proposals were dismissed by Pakistani president General Zia ul-Haq as “peanuts.” Negotiations continued after the change in U.S. administration, both between the two governments and between the U.S. executive branch and Congress, where there was some reluctance to exempt Pakistan from legislative provisions banning aid to countries seeking nuclear explosive capabilities (the Symington and Glenn amendments).

**THE 1981 AID AGREEMENT**

In August 1981 came the announcement of the agreement of both governments to a $3.2 billion package of U.S. economic and military assistance over a six-year period. That sizable aid agreement catapulted Pakistan into third place among major U.S. aid recipients, after Israel and Egypt. The agreement confirmed the determination of the U.S. government to maintain close political ties with Pakistan in the face of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, despite reservations about the martial law regime and its nuclear policy.

The $3.2 billion package is half economic, half military. The $1.6 billion in economic assistance is oriented toward development, focusing on the Pakistani government’s development priority sectors of agriculture, energy, and social services and emphasizes balance of payments support. The program has a considerable
commodity component—PL480 (Public Law) edible oil, phosphatic fertilizer, agricultural equipment, insecticides, and contraceptives—and a large element of local currency financing for projects. During each of the first three years of the program, Pakistan fiscal years (PFY) 1982, 1983, and 1984, $50 million of the annual appropriation has been used for PL480 financing of edible oil imports. The non-PL480 component of the program has risen from $100 million in PFY 1982 to $200 million in PFY 1983 and $225 million in PFY 1984. Terms of the assistance are two-thirds grants and one-third concessional loans. The $1.6 billion military assistance component consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) guaranteed credits to be extended over five years beginning in PFY 1983. The major purchases by the Pakistani government utilizing these credits will be forty F-16 fighter aircraft.

PAKISTAN-U.S. TRADE

The axiom that trade follows the flag appears to be reflected in the economic relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The renewed close political relationship has coincided with a growth in both trade and in renewed U.S. private investment interest in Pakistan.

Over the past decade the U.S.-Pakistan trade pattern has consistently shown a substantial balance in favor of the United States, a pattern likely to persist. As Table 1 shows, bilateral trade between the two countries was not extensive in the mid-1970s but rose substantially in the late 1970s, a trend which accelerated in the 1980s except for a dip in 1981. In 1982, U.S. exports to Pakistan amounted to $700 million, composed primarily of machinery and transport equipment, animal and vegetable oils and fats, and industrial machinery and telecommunications equipment. Pakistani exports to the United States that same year totaled $181 million, consisting mainly of textiles, wearing apparel, animal and vegetable materials, and shellfish.

Table 1
U.S. Trade with Pakistan ($ millions)

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<tr>
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<th>Exports to Pakistan</th>
<th>Imports from Pakistan</th>
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<td>394</td>
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In terms of destinations for Pakistan’s export goods, the United States was in third place in PFY 1982, dropped to fifth place in PFY 1983, largely because of a sudden upsurge of Pakistani exports to Iran, but bounced back into second place in PFY 1984. From PFY 1982 to PFY 1983, the United States advanced from fourth to third place among the sources of Pakistan’s imports and, in PFY 1984, moved into second place with 11 percent behind Japan with 14 percent.

The Department of Commerce, in its May 1984 Foreign Economic Trends report on Pakistan, sees Pakistan as offering an expanding market for American goods and services, though with some change in the mix as the nature of the Pakistani market undergoes transformation. For instance, wheat and urea fertilizer, once significant U.S. exports to Pakistan, have been virtually eliminated by increased Pakistani production of these goods. Indeed, Pakistan’s wheat production has passed beyond the level of self-sufficiency: in PFY 1982, Pakistan exported 50,000 tons of wheat to Iran, and in February 1983 agreed to sell an additional 130,000 tons. However, Pakistan agriculture, despite the fact that the country has the largest irrigation system in the world, is heavily dependent on the weather. In normal years a substantial exporter of cotton, in 1984 Pakistan suffered from a combination of ill-timed rains and a pest infestation that devastated the cotton crop. As a result, as pointed out by the Commerce Department (presumably its Silver Lining Division), at least temporarily Pakistan presents a good market for sales of U.S. cotton and synthetic yarn.

Other trade opportunities in Pakistan identified by the Department of Commerce include edible oil; food processing equipment (including edible oil processing equipment); animal tallow; chemicals; phosphatic fertilizers; pharmaceuticals; metalworking and finishing machinery; machine tools; agricultural and irrigation equipment; chemical, cement, and fertilizer plants and equipment; natural gas purification processing, distribution, and pipeline equipment; computers and software; telecommunications and aviation equipment; construction and mining equipment (especially for coal); oil and gas field equipment (including pipes, pumps, and related equipment); and textile and leather machinery equipment.

Some of the increase in Pakistan’s exports to the United States also represents a change from past export patterns, a change induced in part by the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Under the GSP, customs duties may be reduced or eliminated on a range of imports into the United States from developing countries. Pakistan’s GSP exports have increased from $7.4 million in 1976 to $18.8 million in 1982. Pakistan has taken very efficient advantage of the GSP, being the thirty-fifth largest beneficiary of duty-free treatment out of 140 beneficiary countries. Pakistan’s GSP exports are concentrated on relatively few products—70 percent of GSP imports from Pakistan in 1982 were in two items: medical/surgical instruments ($7.4 million) and pen/pocket knives ($5.7 million).

U.S.-PAKISTAN TRADE PROBLEMS

From Pakistan’s viewpoint, its major trade problem with the United States is the American quota on textile imports. Textile manufacturing is Pakistan’s largest in-
dustry and its largest foreign exchange earner. Access to the U.S. market is vital to that industry's, and therefore Pakistan's, economic health. Pakistan is the United States' fourth largest cotton textile and apparel supplier and its seventh largest supplier of textiles and apparel of all types.

In a recent major review of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral agreement on textiles and textile products, Pakistan sought the removal of the aggregate limit on its textile exports to the United States, an increase in the specific limit on cotton gloves, and several lesser changes and clarifications of the agreement. Pakistan argued that it would use its entire allotted quota (the aggregate limit) by September 1984, leaving several of the specific limit quotas unfilled (since much of the overall quota would be used for goods not subject to specific limits but countable toward the aggregate). The U.S. delegation was unable to accommodate the major proposed changes and took the lesser ones under advisement.

The United States believes that Pakistan has an excellent overall agreement when compared with the United States' bilateral agreements with other major textile suppliers in terms of growth rate and categories subject to limits. Pakistan is permitted a growth rate for aggregate and specific limits of 7 percent whereas the few larger suppliers are limited to growth rates varying from 0.5 to 3 percent. Agreements with other suppliers set limits on wool, cotton, and man-made fiber whereas the U.S.-Pakistan agreement places limits only on cotton and imposes no restraints on shipments of products of which the chief weight and value are wool or synthetic fiber (except for a recently imposed limit on man-made fiber work gloves). Worldwide textile imports into the United States were up 24.9 percent from 1982 to 1983 while in the same period Pakistan's textile shipments to the United States rose by 26 percent. While the United States appreciates the importance of cotton textiles to Pakistan, Pakistan has, in fact, about the best deal available in an imperfect world with regard to the U.S. market.

While the United States has no complaints comparable with Pakistan's complaints over textiles in terms of impact on its economy, it does have a number of specific problems in the trade and investment area:

1. **Pakistani restrictions on imports.** While there are some signs that the Pakistani government is trying to liberalize its import system, there has to date been little concrete progress.

2. **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXVII negotiations.** Since the early 1970s when Pakistan modified its tariff schedule, the United States has been seeking compensation for those changes that adversely affected the United States. Negotiations on this item have been delayed on numerous occasions and are now pending in Geneva.

3. **Import valuation for customs purposes.** This is now done on a cost, insurance, and freight basis, which places such U.S. products as protein meals and vegetable oils at a competitive disadvantage. An invoice value basis would remove that disadvantage.

4. **The quasi-governmental Ghee Corporation's monopsony on imports of**
vegetable oils. U.S. vegetable oil exports to Pakistan would benefit if the Pakistani government allowed the private sector to import vegetable oils directly.

5. Disadvantageous circumstances under which U.S. banks operate in Pakistan. There are three of these: (1) the requirement that banks hold low-yield Pakistani government treasury bills as part of their reserves; (2) regulations allowing the government’s National Development Finance Corporation to act as a bank without being subject to the same restrictions as banks (e.g., reserve requirements, taxes); and (3) bad debts cannot be written off for up to ten to twelve years as cases go through a protracted legal process.

6. Slowness in settling disputes with U.S. firms. An example is the Hercules firm’s fertilizer joint venture. The 1972 devaluation of the rupee coupled with government-imposed ceilings on rates of return for the fertilizer industry reduced Hercules’ repatriable dollar-valued rate of return to unacceptable levels. A satisfactory resolution of the issue was finally agreed to by the Pakistani government, but not until 1983.

7. Arbitrary reassessment of tax liability for American President Lines, the only U.S. shipping firm offering scheduled service to Pakistan. Retroactive reassessment and placement in a higher tax bracket presents the line with a tax liability so large that it may have to suspend services to Pakistan.

8. Book piracy and difficulties in repatriating royalties. Pakistan has not taken effective steps to prevent book piracy, although it is a member of the Universal Copyright Convention. Even when publication agreements have been made with U.S. copyright holders, it has been difficult or impossible for them to secure legitimate repatriation of royalties. Under the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, a country’s ability to give effective protection to intellectual property must be considered when determining that country’s eligibility for certain benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences.

9. Overregulation and a sluggish bureaucracy. These lend themselves to abuse and tend to make bureaucratic processing a major factor of production.

10. Excise tax differential favoritism. This benefits local soft drink brands over U.S. brands and restricts the expansion of U.S. brand operations. This discrimination against products bearing U.S. labels would appear to be inconsistent with bilateral and international legal obligations to which the United States and Pakistan are parties. Early in 1984, one major U.S. soft drink firm made an effort on behalf of its Pakistani franchisee to have this situation corrected. The firm lobbied a variety of U.S. agencies to exert pressure on a high-level Pakistani delegation visiting Washington as well as pressing for a demarche on the subject to be made by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. The result is instructive for those who think that Pakistan’s dependence on the United States for aid gives the U.S. government leverage over the Pakistani government: the Pakistani government raised the tax on both foreign and local brands and increased the differential between them.

Both governments have shown an interest in devising institutional mechanisms for dealing with and hopefully resolving trade, business, and investment problems and
complaints such as those outlined above. In 1983, at the conclusion of President Zia’s state visit to the United States, it was announced that the two governments had agreed to establish a Joint Commission consisting of the Pakistani foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state, to meet at least once annually to review bilateral relations. As part of the joint commission structure, subcommissions have been established, including a joint economic and commercial subcommission, for the discussion of issues in those fields. That subcommission had its first meeting February 15–16, 1984, at which a range of issues was discussed and it was decided to establish another forum for discussion of these issues in between annual meetings of the subcommission. This latter group, consisting of officials of the Pakistani ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Industries and officials of the U.S. Embassy, meets from time to time as issues for discussion accumulate.

**DEBT RESCHEDULING**

One topic that has complicated the economic relations between the two governments is the Pakistani desire to have its debt burden eased by securing agreement from its main governmental creditors to reschedule its outstanding debts, that is, postpone scheduled repayments. At issue are loans outstanding from governments, not from private banks—Pakistan has always repaid its commercial debts on time and as a result has an excellent credit rating with the international banking community.

With some 50 percent of Pakistan’s official debt owed to the United States, the U.S. position on rescheduling has been key, with the other major creditor nations, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, prepared to follow the U.S. lead in this matter. As a general rule, the U.S. position on debt rescheduling is that it should not be undertaken unless the country requesting it is in imminent danger of default; otherwise, it represents a disguised form of foreign aid, which should properly take that form and proceed through the regular executive and legislative processes.

The Pakistani response has been that its ability to repay its debts on time requires better opportunities to earn foreign exchange (e.g., through lifting of the U.S. textile quota) or through increased foreign aid. Pakistan contends that, in fact, the concessional aid it is now receiving is reduced from that of a few years ago, but its debt burden has increased to the point where for every dollar it receives in aid, it has to pay back eighty cents to meet its debt repayment schedules. Pakistanis complain that the U.S. position penalizes countries that have managed their economies well enough to avoid being in imminent danger of default; for them to secure forgiveness, they must first sin.

In 1980, as an exceptional gesture at a time when Pakistan was sustaining the unusual burdens imposed on it by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but before agreement had been reached on a U.S. aid program for Pakistan, the United States agreed to reschedule some $160 million worth of debt repayments from January 1981 to July 1982, conditional on the negotiation by Pakistan of a Standby Agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF agreement was negotiated, and Pakistan’s other creditors followed the U.S. lead. Since then the United States has
made clear that the 1981–82 rescheduling was a unique and exceptional response to an unusual situation and that it had no intention of another departure from its previous policy on rescheduling.

U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN PAKISTAN

The total amount of direct U.S. private investment in Pakistan prior to the 1983 OPIC investment mission had remained virtually unchanged, at $109 million, since 1979. The largest investment of capital had been in the oil exploration sector, and the largest U.S. manufacturing enterprises were two urea fertilizer plants, the previously mentioned Hercules joint venture with the Dawood group, and an Exxon plant. Out of the then-total of twenty-three direct U.S. investments in Pakistan's industrial sector, thirteen were pharmaceutical investments.

It has been the announced policy of the government of President Zia ul-Haq to welcome foreign investment, particularly in industrial sectors involving sophisticated technology and in export-oriented and import-substitution industries. In general, the Zia government has been regarded as more favorable to private enterprise than the preceding Bhutto government, which carried out extensive nationalization of private Pakistani industrial concerns. The Zia government has brought the nationalization policy to a halt and has made some steps toward denationalization, albeit only a few of the previously nationalized industrial units have been returned to their former owners.

U.S. businesses operating in Pakistan have been encouraged by the more favorable attitude by the government toward business interests in general and toward foreign investment in particular. In addition to the problems outlined above, there is in the resident U.S. business community in Pakistan continued frustration with over-regulation, profit-inhibiting fixed rates of return, and general slowness in getting things done and decisions taken. Nonetheless, most U.S. firms find the government decision process and the attitudes at the highest levels of the bureaucracy noticeably improved. Several of the established U.S. pharmaceutical firms have expanded or plan to do so while others are moving from importing products for local sale to manufacturing in Pakistan.

THE OPIC INVESTMENT MISSION

While the renewed close U.S.-Pakistani relationship and the more favorable government attitude toward business and foreign investment were known in the business community in the United States in early 1983, that does not adequately explain the unexpectedly large turnout for the OPIC investment mission. From conversations with representatives of the twenty-six participating firms, it is clear that the following additional elements helped make the Pakistani investment climate attractive to those American executives:

1. Sound management of the economy by the Pakistani government. U.S. businessmen were impressed by the achievement of 6 percent growth rates since the beginning of the Zia government in 1977, by the country’s ability to keep its balance of
payments in equilibrium (though this was due largely to sizable inflows of expatriate workers’ remittances), and by the government’s realism in devaluing the rupee in 1982.

2. Fiscal and monetary conservatism. In accordance with an Extended Fund Facility arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, growth in the money supply was kept to 10.5 percent in PFY 1982, well under the growth rates of over 20 percent that had prevailed in previous years. The inflation rate was kept to 11.5 percent according to official figures. Although this statistic is based on a market basket weighted toward goods and services purchased by lower-income groups, it was nonetheless indicative of prudent management.

3. Relative political stability. This judgment was subject to caveats from some of the mission participants who recalled their conviction of the unshakable political stability existing in Iran under the shah. There were also some reservations about the lack of constitutional and institutional arrangements guaranteeing political continuity. Nonetheless, the dominant assessment was that the Zia government was likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

4. A sizable market. Pakistan has a population of over 90 million and, despite a per capita gross national product of under $400, a socioeconomic structure considered by businessmen to be conducive to favorable consumption patterns. In addition, the Pakistani market was perceived as including nearby Muslim countries to which products of Pakistan have favored access.

5. Good profit expectations and ability to repatriate profits and capital. Profit expectations, presumably through a business old-boy network, were in the 20 to 30 percent range. Pakistan’s historical record of permitting repatriation was known to be excellent.

6. Favorable labor situation. There were reservations about the continued applicability of labor legislation adopted during the Bhutto period, which was highly favorable to workers and detrimental to management (e.g., difficulty in firing unproductive or disruptive workers). This was offset by the highly competitive cost of labor and by the knowledge that good managers utilizing effective incentive schemes achieved excellent productivity rates from Pakistani workers. Additionally, the availability of trained Pakistanis at the middle and upper management levels and of Pakistani engineers (some of whom could be recruited from technologically advanced positions overseas to return to Pakistan) offered the prospect of economizing on the high costs of expatriates.

7. Guarantees against nationalization. Legislation strengthening foreign investment protection against uncompensated nationalization was passed by the Zia government in 1979. Even more encouraging was knowledge of the fact that, with one U.S. exception (American International Underwriters’ life insurance operation), foreign companies were spared from the extensive nationalizations carried out under President Bhutto.

8. Availability of solid prospective partners. Well known for entrepreneurial skill, Pakistani businessmen demonstrated their genuine interest in partnerships with U.S. businessmen by coming forward with close to 150 proposals for joint ventures in
a wide variety of fields. (Incidentally, while political uncertainties had apparently kept down private Pakistani investment in Pakistan in recent years, Pakistani investors seemed eager to invest in joint ventures with Americans, presumably in part because of the protection this might give them against future nationalizations.)

9. **Likely availability of financing.** There was some apprehension that the continued high demands on local banking resources by the large public sector industrial concerns might make it difficult for private sector firms to obtain local financing. This was offset by knowledge of the availability of fairly substantial financing from nearby Muslim sources with a preference for investing in Pakistan in both joint and three-way ventures.

10. **Availability of investment incentives.** Pakistan has a range of incentives to attract foreign investors, as do most countries in the area. While considered adequate by mission participants, there is some room for improvement to make them fully competitive. For example, most of Pakistan’s competitors for the foreign investment dollar allow tax holidays and customs exemptions for capital equipment required to start up new industrial plants wherever those plants are sited. Pakistan allows full exemption only for industrial plants established in economically backward areas (which, of course, are deficient in infrastructure).

The Pakistani scene also presented some disincentives to potential investors, which had to be balanced against its advantages before U.S. executives could take the decision to spend their company funds to participate in the mission.

1. **Infrastructural inadequacies** represented a negative factor to some, particularly inadequate supplies of power and water. At the same time, Pakistan also presented some uniquely favorable infrastructural conditions. In contrast to many ports around the world, Pakistan’s port facilities at Karachi and nearby Port Qassim are uncongested, well equipped, and linked to up-country markets by reasonably adequate rail and road systems, with plans under way for substantial further improvement of the latter.

2. **There was uncertainty about the effects on business of the Zia government’s Islamization program.** At the time of the mission, the general feeling among investors was that, as in the case of prohibition of alcoholic consumption, there would be exemptions for non-Muslim foreigners. With the scheduled entry into force of Islamic profit and loss sharing accounts in January 1985 and elimination of interest-bearing accounts, in foreign as well as domestic banks, this uncertainty is likely to increase, though tempered by knowledge of the fact that foreign non-Muslim business have survived in other countries with similar systems.

3. Probably the major disincentive was potential participants’ knowledge of excessive regulation and what they perceived as a bureaucratic maze, making it extremely expensive to do business in Pakistan, at least in terms of valuable time wasted (if not in terms of payments required to speed the process). The importance of this bureaucratic factor of production was one of the elements that made it attractive for potential investors to pursue investment possibilities by participating in the OPIC mission rather than proceeding on their own.

OPIC was in a position to inform potential participants that assurances had been
given at the ministerial level that mission participants would be given expeditious bureaucratic treatment. In fact, at a reception at the start of the mission given by President Zia, the president announced the formation of a special committee, consisting of the secretaries of the ministries of Finance and Industries, to review all projects generated during the mission and to give preliminary approval to acceptable projects before the mission's departure. He also announced that final approval of the projects would be given in four weeks.

Anxious to take advantage of these special arrangements, the mission participants worked intensively during the week-long mission, at the conclusion of which thirteen of the twenty-six firms announced twenty-two investment plans for projects that had been given preliminary approval by the special committee. An additional six firms indicated their intention to pursue investment opportunities in the near future.

It was clear to mission participants that the clock measuring the promised four-week period to final approval could not, of course, begin ticking on the day the mission concluded but would only start once negotiations between the United States and Pakistani firms had been completed and the pertinent documentation submitted to the special committee. In the ensuing months, negotiations between several of the U.S. participants and their Pakistani counterparts came to nothing, and the projects were shelved or abandoned. In one case, negotiations abandoned by one U.S. firm were picked up by another that had not participated in the mission. In other cases, U.S. firms that had been on the mission but, for competitive reasons, had made no announcements at its conclusion were subsequently found to have quite substantial projects under active consideration.

Not unexpectedly, the four-week final approval process did not work as speedily as had been hoped. Few if any of the projects received final approval four weeks after submission of all required documentation. Some were delayed when a change in personnel on the special committee created a temporary gap. Others required clearance in other parts of the bureaucracy before the committee could act. Even those that received relatively speedy approval from the committee found that the committee's "final approval" was by no means the end of the bureaucratic trail. Special committee approval did not carry with it, for instance, approval by the State Bank for the foreign exchange that might be required. It seems fairly clear that elements of the bureaucracy reasserted their power to regulate the speed with which projects traversed their turf. These elements seemed desirous of conveying the message that, in Pakistan, while the president may propose, it's the bureaucracy that disposes.

This is not to say that the special committee was not of value to OPIC mission participants. It gave them a pair of extremely powerful allies, motivated by a presidential mandate to do battle on their behalf. The special committee gave OPIC a point of contact at the center of the governmental power structure to present direct arguments on behalf of mission participants encountering obstacles. OPIC itself, having personal presidential support, was in a position to intervene directly on behalf of OPIC mission firms. While the reassertion of bureaucratic power did slow down progress on projects to something closer to a more normal subcontinental pace, the projects have nonetheless progressed at a speed that compares favorably with the implementation process in other developing nations.
One of the OPIC projects is still pending, unfortunately the largest and the one OPIC considers the jewel in the crown of the mission: a $250 million phosphate fertilizer joint venture between Agrico Chemical Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and a Pakistani firm. In the case of previous fertilizer investments by foreign firms, the Pakistani government has provided a guaranteed return on equity to compensate for the fact that the government fixes fertilizer prices. To attract foreign investors to such projects, particularly an investment of the magnitude of one-quarter of a billion dollars, the guaranteed return on equity must be fairly substantial. Agrico Chemical was given to understand that it would benefit from the same sort of arrangement as previous foreign investors in fertilizer projects had enjoyed. However, the Pakistani government has been rethinking its policies on subsidies in general and has yet to provide the guarantee which Agrico Chemical had been led to expect.

Should the Agrico Chemical project not be implemented, the additional total investment generated by the OPIC mission is still expected to amount to $282.5 million. Included in that total are the following: a $250,000 expansion of a chick-breeding facility to be followed by a $1.5 million integrated broiler project by Agro Associates of Hartford, Connecticut; a $200,000 Brink’s armored car service, which could be expanded considerably if a pending application by Brink’s for government bank business is approved; a $15 million Cargill seed research and production facility; three manufacturing facilities by Chemtex of New York: textured polyester yarn ($35 million), polypropylene film ($18 million), and rayon fiber ($50 million); a $1 million production of microbial plant growth stimulants by Cytozyme Labs of Salt Lake City; a $10 million manufacture of photovoltaic cells and solar-powered products by Chronar Corp. of Princeton, N.J.; and a $42 million tin plate manufacturing facility and a $30 million compressor facility by Seraphim, Saleem and Khella of New York. The balance of the $282.5 million consists of projects whose sponsors prefer no publicity at this time.

The OPIC investment mission is not, of course, the whole story of private U.S. investment in Pakistan. Several firms have been and are now looking into investment opportunities on their own, and, indeed, part of OPIC’s purpose in taking the mission was to attract the attention of the wider U.S. investing community to Pakistan as a land of investment opportunity. That wider community will undoubtedly be watching to see how implementation of the OPIC projects progresses and what the experience of doing business in Pakistan is for this new and varied crop of American investors. They will also be watching to see the practical consequences of Islamic banking and the extent to which the Pakistani government is prepared to proceed further in improving the investment climate. They will be particularly attentive to the implementation of the industrial policy statement issued by the Pakistani government in June 1984.

PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT

As was to be expected of a government that has been characterized by caution in the economic realm, that policy statement proposes no radical departures. However, it does reaffirm the government’s commitment to ease the regulatory burden on industry, move toward a more rational tax, tariff, and credit system, maintain labor peace, and
seek to overcome infrastructural obstacles. Among the elements in the statement likely to reassure potential investors are the following:

1. **Confirmation that the private sector is to have the major responsibility for future industrialization.** The specific goal adopted by the statement is to increase the share of the private sector in total industrial investment from 40 to 62 percent over a five-year period. While the statement also confirms that the public sector has come to stay in steel, fertilizer, cement, refining, petrochemicals, and automotive equipment, it states that these industries are not reserved exclusively to the public sector.

2. **Commitment to equalize conditions between the public and private sectors.** This includes equal access to financing.

3. **Commitment to reduce the present regulatory structure.** For instance, decisions on all sanctions required from the Investment Promotion Bureau (which include all projects involving foreign private investment) will be communicated to the sponsors within ninety days.

4. **Encouragement for the establishment of investment companies by the private sector.** This will enhance the flow of long-term capital to industry.

5. **Commitment to provide needed tax and tariff reform and rationalization.** This includes accelerated depreciation of investments.

6. **Undertaking to devote major resources to overcome infrastructural deficiencies.**

7. **Commitment to maintain peaceful labor relations.**

These represent fine-tuning of existing policies rather than major departures. They do not entirely accomplish the stated goal of the policy statement: "To remove any lingering doubts and uncertainty...." Nonetheless, they do result in improvements to the investment climate. While investors, both Pakistani and foreign, can undoubtedly suggest further measures that would make the investment climate still more attractive to them, they may also take some reassurance from the fact that the Pakistani government, rather than rushing into unfamiliar territory, is characteristically proceeding with all deliberate speed to test the ground at the margins of existing policy and practice.

**CONCLUSION**

The OPIC investment mission demonstrated that an improved bilateral political relationship coupled with favorable, even if not ideal, investment climate attributes can produce an upsurge in private American investment interest in Pakistan. Such business ties, representing relatively long-term investments, which, unlike government policies, cannot easily be shifted, represent an element of greater stability in the bilateral relationship and may help to perpetuate the improved relations that in part attracted them to Pakistan in the first place.
7. Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Potential for Economic Cooperation

A. Jamil Nishtar

The economy of Pakistan is essentially an agrarian one, as is evident from the following statistics: (1) the contribution of the agricultural sector, at 26.4 percent, is the single largest component of the gross domestic product; (2) as much as 72 percent of the population is still living in the countryside; (3) the largest single component of the labor force, at 52 percent, is agricultural labor; and (4) 70 percent of the exports are from the agricultural sector, directly or indirectly. Not only is Pakistan essentially an agricultural country, but it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. There is, however, a trend toward urbanization, and in the last twenty years the population in the rural areas has declined from 77.48 percent to 72 percent. This shift to urban areas has been slow because of the lack of a dynamic industrial sector.

A successful manufacturing sector can be based either on indigenous mineral resources or on the optimization of the skills of the population, but Pakistan does not have any significant mineral resources except for limestone and natural gas, and the literacy ratio is only 26 percent, an insubstantial "skill base." Thus, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future there will be the possibility of a really dynamic and expanding industrial sector that can absorb the surplus population from the rural areas. There is, of course, some growth in industry and a somewhat faster growth rate in the services sector, but not enough to absorb more than the present marginal shift of population from rural to urban areas. Therefore, a successful economy for Pakistan has to be based in the agricultural sector, which is essentially "small farm" agriculture. The average farm size is only twelve acres, and 91 percent of the farms in the country are less than twenty-five acres. Now let us examine whether successful small farm agriculture is at all possible and, if so, its prerequisites.

Holland and Japan are outstanding examples of countries with high-yielding small farm agriculture. Other countries, such as Egypt, Mexico, and Turkey, also have small farm agriculture but at a much higher level of productivity than Pakistan. In
terms of natural resources and the availability of land, water, and sunshine, Pakistan is as fortunately placed as any of these countries and much better than some of them, such as Holland. In fact, in terms of natural resource potential, Pakistan is perhaps among the ten most fortunate countries in the world with its vast irrigated Indus Valley agricultural plain. The ratio of irrigated land to total cultivated land in Pakistan is 73 percent; in the United States it is 11 percent, and in India 23 percent. Pakistan’s agricultural labor force, although illiterate, is hard-working and receptive to change. This was evident by the quick uptake in new high-yielding wheat and rice seeds coupled with chemical fertilizer, which led to the so-called Green Revolution in the late sixties and early seventies.

Thus, in terms of both natural and human resources, Pakistan has the potential for becoming a highly successful agricultural economy. What then is the reason why present crop yields are about one-third of that in a developed country? The answer, I submit, is technology. By technology I mean the entire gamut of mechanical technologies, such as farm machinery; of chemical technologies, such as fertilizer and pesticides; and of biological technologies, such as high-quality seeds. The availability of these technologies is at present extremely unsatisfactory. There is only a very rudimentary and marginal induction of modern agricultural technology in Pakistan, and the bulk of the agricultural sector is still carried on exactly as it was 2,500 years ago in the old Indus Valley civilization, the ruins of which were discovered at Moenjo Daro and Harappa in Pakistan.

The basic challenge in the agricultural sector is, therefore, the induction of a broad range of modern technology in an effective way. It is in the answer to this challenge that, in my view, there is a major potential for economic cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. Effective delivery of technology requires, first, that appropriate technology is available and, second, that it be disseminated to the farmer. At the present time, both these important activities are within the public sector framework. This system has turned out to be ineffective, as is evident from extremely low yields. My view is that this activity can become viable only if it is undertaken by dynamic private enterprise. For example, modern industrial marketing by manufacturers of agricultural implements, fertilizers, and pesticides would give a “push” toward modernization in the farming sector. Similarly, modern processing industries, such as dairy and food-processing plants, act as a “pull” factor toward the modernization of the farming sector when they are involved in a direct relationship with the producer-farmers whose product is purchased and processed by them. This push-and-pull effect by modern agribusiness’s corporate sector is, in my view, the only effective way of introducing modern technology in the farming sector in Pakistan.

The United States, especially California, is, of course, the dominant area in the world of agribusiness. Successful private sector agribusiness firms deal in almost every type of agricultural activities and are an important element of the U.S. agricultural sector. There is a logical potential for a significant and mutual economic relationship between U.S. agribusiness firms and the agricultural sector of Pakistan. This would not be, however, U.S. agribusiness in Pakistan in the form of a “plantation
agriculture.” That would be disastrous. In an essentially small farm country for foreign firms to have large land holdings is just not viable. Instead, the model I propose may be called a “corporate core” and “peripheral contractual farming system” or a “satellite farming system.” In this concept the processing unit acts as a core unit and enters into a direct relationship with the farmer both for input provision and for output purchase. Modern inputs such as good quality seeds and fertilizer are procured in bulk by the processing unit and delivered to its contractual farmers. At harvest time the production of the farmer is purchased, at reasonable prices, by the processing unit. The increased yields through provision of modern inputs ensure that both the farmer and the processing unit are the beneficiaries of this relationship. Because of higher yields, even at a stable price, his income is much higher. Similarly, in the case of a processing unit, it has the assurance of a regular, good-quality commodity supply at stable prices.

Similarly, in the case of the input providing agribusiness, if the sale of equipment or a commodity is accompanied by an effective after-sale extension service, then not only is the farmer benefited through better use of modern technology, but also the supplying unit benefits through the expansion of the market by demonstration of the effective yields’ increasing results of its particular product.

Thus, it would be possible to achieve a quantum jump in the production of the agricultural sector in Pakistan if there was large-scale effective induction of modern agribusiness in the country and if that agribusiness thereafter operated on the basis of the satellite farming concept of a contractual relationship between the company and the farmers. In fact, out of about fifty or so U.S. firms at present operating in Pakistan, there are about five in the field of agribusiness, and all of them are operating very successfully. In one of them, a company dealing with the processing of maize, the concept of satellite farming has, in fact, already been successfully introduced. There is no reason why similar operations cannot be undertaken by other U.S. agribusiness firms. What is required is an awareness and consciousness of this highly beneficial mutual relationship and thereafter institutional arrangements to facilitate contact between private U.S. agribusiness and private entrepreneurs in Pakistan. The Pakistan government’s industrial policy has already created a very favorable policy environment both by giving high priority to agribusiness as such and also by having very liberal provisions for foreign joint ventures in terms of repatriation of capital and profit. The missing link is a consciousness of the importance and the critical role of this relationship and the translation of this consciousness into action by both sides.

I have suggested an avenue of economic cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in which a unique complementarity is available and which, for Pakistan, is a critical element in any viable growth strategy. Although the economic relationship between any two countries is usually concerned with trade and other commercial issues, I think it is important to try to formulate a long-term strategy of relationship based on complementarity of resources and needs. For Pakistan, the advantage of this relationship is obvious, but it is also a relationship that will benefit not only individual private U.S. agribusiness companies (which have the possibility of successful joint ventures) but also the national interest of the United States. I am quite convinced that in the long run the basic interests of the United States in the developing world can be
served much more effectively by a dynamic and successful private enterprise economy than by any other element, such as various types of aid. In the foreseeable future the basic objective of a government in any developing country has to be the elimination of poverty, and poverty can ultimately be eliminated not by dole and dependence but by successful economic growth and employment opportunities. This aspect of such a relationship deserves a much higher priority than it has been accorded so far.

Another extremely important area of mutual benefit is agricultural research. Again, the United States is one of the leading countries in the world in this respect. A close relationship between the various agricultural research institutions in the United States and the agricultural research system in Pakistan would be especially productive. In the recent past there have been dramatic developments in the field of agricultural research, and it is now possible to compress developments that would have required decades into only a few years. Therefore, this is an extremely important area of transfer of knowledge and technology.

Transfer of knowledge and technology cannot be confined to single avenues such as corporate structure joint ventures or joint research programs. It has to be a much broader and multidimensional relationship. Perhaps the single most critical element in this relationship is the development of human capital. It is unfortunate that the developing countries have an image of the United States based essentially on Hollywood films. The general population in the developing countries is unaware of the originality, innovation, and persistent scientific efforts of the scholars in the laboratories of MIT, Berkeley, and other great universities. It is important that at least the educated elite of the developing countries should be given broader access to these great fountainheads of knowledge. While I am personally not in favor of undergraduate and graduate work by students from developing countries in a developed country as, in my view, it leads to disastrous cultural confusion, I firmly believe that postgraduate work in an institution of higher learning in a developed country is essential for the intellectual growth of a scholar from the developing world. Technology, in my view, is a heritage of mankind. Whenever someone has invented something new or found a new and efficient way of doing something old, it is important that this knowledge become available without much delay wherever in the world it can be of benefit. The best way for this is close, intimate, and regular contact among scholars of the concerned disciplines with the institutions of higher learning that are in the forefront of research and development in that particular field.

The development of human capital concerns both scientists and managers. It is only by upgrading the skills of this work force that genuine economic development is possible in a developing country. It can play a very important role in the economic relationship between the two countries. In the case of Pakistan and United States, this is again an area where a great deal of complementarity exists.

Thus, I see the economic relationship between the United States and Pakistan based not only on day-to-day factors of commercial advantage, but on a basic long-term strategy comprising the following three major elements: (1) induction of U.S. corporate agribusiness with the satellite farming concept; (2) a close relationship in research, particularly in agriculture; and (3) upgrading human capital. These may
seem to constitute a vague conceptual basis. I can, however, make it concrete by giving specific examples of various possible programs in the above three sectors.

In the case of agribusiness, there is immediate need for edible oil processing and fruit and vegetable processing industries. In research, there is tremendous need to upgrade maize production. In human capital, there is a vast need to train biotechnology scientists. There can be scores of similar examples in each of the above sectors offered by professional experts focusing on a narrow mandate in order to precisely define the areas of cooperation. What is important is that the conceptual framework be accepted: that it is in the interest of Pakistan to have a close economic relationship with the United States in order to benefit from its high level of technology of production, primarily in the field of agriculture, through contacts with private firms and institutions of higher learning. Similarly, it is in the interest of the United States that Pakistan have a dynamic and successful economy based on private enterprise and efficiently assimilated modern technology, for which the United States can be a major source of assistance. In my view, in the long term, it is on such a productive basis that lasting friendship between the two countries can be achieved.
III. Mutual Perceptions

8. Pakistan’s Perceptions of U.S. Domestic Politics

Shafqat Ali Shah

Since 1976, Pakistan has drawn considerable attention in U.S. domestic politics in one form or another. In his election campaign that year, Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter singled out Pakistan as a potential nuclear weapons producer and stated that if elected, he would try to stop Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Four years later, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan advocated strong U.S. military, political, and economic support for Pakistan in the wake of its emergence as a “frontline” state following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent Russian presence on Islamabad’s doorsteps, Pakistan’s nuclear program notwithstanding.

Again, in 1984, similar sentiments were expressed by the Democrats and Republicans during their presidential election campaigns. The Democratic party platform on foreign policy declared that “recognizing the strategic importance of Pakistan and the close relationship which exists between our two countries, a Democratic president would press to restore democracy and terminate its nuclear program.” On the other hand, the Republican party platform stated: “To preserve free Asia’s economic gains and enhance our security, we will continue economic and security assistance programs with the frontline states of Korea, Thailand, and Pakistan.”

To Pakistanis concerned with foreign affairs, these references are meaningful and not just election campaign rhetoric. In the recent past some of these pronouncements have been translated into policy. Witness the Carter administration’s April 1979 decision to suspend all U.S. assistance to Pakistan in retaliation for its alleged nuclear weapons program and the 1981 Reagan administration’s successful efforts in initiating the $3.2 billion U.S. aid package. More than ever before, Pakistanis

are acutely aware that U.S. domestic politics weigh heavily in the formulation of its foreign policy. In the case of Pakistan, this fact is vividly illustrated by the role Congress, the media, and interest groups have played, and continue to play, vis-à-vis Pakistan’s nuclear program and by the intense debates within these and other foreign policy constituents vis-à-vis the revival of Washington’s security relationship with Islamabad.

For Pakistan this realization is vital. In the earlier period of U.S.-Pakistan entente (1953–62), Pakistan suffered enormously when it overlooked the influence of domestic forces on U.S. policy toward Pakistan. A repetition of this error could prove costly for Islamabad in the 1980s when both countries have a critical stake in the revival of a U.S.-Pakistan entente. Although there is convergence of views between Islamabad and Washington on many aspects of the renewed U.S.-Pakistan security ties, two issues remain unresolved: Pakistan’s nuclear program and the nature of the United States’ ties with India.

These two issues have been pivotal in Pakistan-U. S. relations during the last two decades. Serious domestic constraints on both countries regarding establishing a fuller relationship stem from diverging perceptions of these factors. Stanley Hoffman’s observation that “in politics, perceptions dictate behavior and realities sometimes weigh less than belief, myths, and obsessions” has some relevance here. From Pakistan’s viewpoint, it has become essential to understand U.S. domestic politics and the structural changes that have occurred since Vietnam. Fifteen years ago, Henry Kissinger stated that “foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.” Today, this contention is greatly altered; in many areas U. S. domestic policy and politics appear to extend into foreign policy and often run parallel to it.

I address here two sets of questions: first, the nature of U.S. domestic politics and how this relates to U.S. policy toward Asia in general and to Southwest Asia and Pakistan specifically; second, the factors that have caused U.S. domestic forces, such as Congress and the media, to closely scrutinize and, to a degree, exercise their influence and control over the traditional role of the executive in foreign affairs. I will not focus on the decision-making process per se. The institutional role of the administrative apparatus such as the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council is well known; at the same time, the participation of the U.S. Congress in the decision-making process through various committees, particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, needs no elaboration. From the Pakistani perspective, the direction of those U.S. domestic forces that are primarily outside the established official formulators of U.S. foreign policy is of utmost concern.

**AMERICA’S GLOBAL ROLE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY**

The United States is, perhaps, one of the most misunderstood powers of the world. Its image in the international system has been at variance with its global

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aspirations and in turn with its foreign policy practices. It has advocated high ideals but has often ended up practicing power politics. It has oscillated between liberalism and conservatism at home and global commitments and selective involvements abroad. There is a mix of idealism and realism in its international behavior, as well as consistency and contradictions in its policies, which greatly confuses the world at large.

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower. It had clearly demonstrated its capabilities and power by fighting, and then winning, a global war with its enemies thousands of miles away from home, and it possessed the deadliest weapon ever known. To the outside world, the United States had the vitality, the will, and the wisdom to do wonders. It could decide the fate of old and new nations, and it was seen as the champion of world freedom and liberty.

Earlier, the United States had sponsored the principle of self-determination, and President Woodrow Wilson laid the foundations of the League of Nations, designed to end wars for all times. Once more it was the United States' driving force that established the league's successor, the United Nations. To colonized people, the United States appeared as a power that would help create a just and egalitarian world order.

In 1947, when the Truman doctrine was announced, it marked the formal initiation of the United States' global responsibilities. The doctrine carried a message deeper than the apparent U.S. interest in safeguarding Greece and Turkey from a possible communist takeover. President Harry Truman said: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." Thirteen years later, a similar message was heard during another Democratic president's inaugural speech. President John Kennedy said: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival of the success of liberty. This we pledge." President Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights as a central feature of U.S. foreign policy further suggested the continuity of American idealism. Carter elaborated on his philosophy: "Our country has been strongest and most effective when morality and a commitment to freedom and democracy have been most clearly emphasized in our foreign policy." He further stated that "the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundations for the exertion of American power and influence.

Paradoxical as it may sound, the United States has built extensive global alliance

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4 See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969) p. 222.
systems—NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS (two of these alliances, CENTO and SEATO, ended in the 1970s)—and has bilateral security arrangements with scores of countries. It has used force and military intervention in support of its security and political goals: Korea in 1950, Vietnam in 1963–75, Lebanon in 1958 and 1983–84, and Grenada in 1984. In the past, the United States distinguished in no uncertain way between friend and foe. For instance, in the mid-fifties many Americans saw nations in the international system as either with them or against them. John Foster Dulles had explicitly declared nonalignment immoral. With the changes in the international milieu, however, the United States stopped seeing the world in terms of black and white, and shades of gray came to be recognized. The Vietnam War and its aftereffects led the United States to recognize the limits of its power and to alter its world views.

Consequently, the United States sought accommodation through détente with its principal adversary, the Soviet Union. It accepted a former foe—China—as a friend and recognized its revitalized allies in Western Europe and Japan as equal partners. The polycentric character of the international system was duly acknowledged. And the paradigm of European power politics, as practiced in the last century, became the guideline of the U.S. approach to world politics during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger stewardship of foreign policy.

Critics have often confused the substance of U.S. foreign policy with its style. For instance, the containment of the Soviet power has been the most consistent element of U.S. foreign policy throughout the post–World War II period. The interpretation of this concept, however, has varied with each administration. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the military dimensions were emphasized. The Kennedy administration, confident of the United States’ nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, sought to contain the communist ideological thrust through strong socioeconomic development programs in the Third World. The Nixon-Ford presidencies attempted to define containment through power politics whereas Carter tried a unique method of international moral pressures and denial of material benefits—not just containment but a “rollback” of Soviet power from Afghanistan.

The Reagan administration’s response to the events in Southwest Asia suggests a revival of the original containment policy. Compare this approach with the Truman administration’s to the events in Asia in the early years of the cold war. The communist takeover of China in 1949 followed by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 was a serious setback for U.S. policy in the area. Prior to the invasion, the signals from Washington indicated that the Korean peninsula was of marginal importance to the United States. These developments triggered the United States’ direct response through the commitment of its military power under the U.N. umbrella.

Within the country, serious debate unfolded over two questions: who lost China? and who was responsible for North Korea’s invasion of the south? At the same time, efforts were increased to build alliance systems such as SEATO and CENTO to

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7 The Kennedy administration thought that the future of communism and democratic forces would be determined in the Third World, especially in Asia. The Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress were two of the programs designed to counter the communist thrust in the developing world.
prevent the repetition of such incidents; support for countries like Pakistan became essential, and expansion of U.S. military power became necessary.

Thirty years later, the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan saw a major reversal of U.S. power and influence. Prior to these events, the policymakers in Washington had adopted an ambivalent attitude toward Southwest Asia. Following the dramatic changes in the region, the United States expressed a willingness to commit its military power to defend its national interests. Once again, support for local allies such as Pakistan became necessary. Through the concept of a "strategic consensus," Washington sought a concerted effort with its principal regional allies to contain the Soviet challenge. Within the United States the debate on who lost Iran and who was responsible for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a familiar ring. Interestingly, in three decades the containment pendulum had swung from Korea in the Far East, via Vietnam in Southeast Asia, to Afghanistan in Southwest Asia. However, a serious question in the 1980s is whether this is a case of "falling dominoes."

The United States' involvement in Vietnam and its aftermath marks a turning point in its foreign policy. The U.S. global role can be easily compartmentalized into two phases, the pre-Vietnam and the post-Vietnam periods. This historical event caused a major shake-up in the United States' domestic structure, which subsequently led to a critical reexamination of its global posture. The specter of the "Vietnam syndrome" has lingered and for good reasons.

For over two decades since the end of World War II, the United States conducted its foreign relations on the basis of a sound domestic consensus. Hoffman suggests that at the time of Eisenhower's election in 1952, there emerged an "unbroken consensus around a policy for Western Europe that had been bipartisan for a long time and a policy for Asia and Eastern Europe," the superficial debate between those who defended containment and the champions of the rollback notwithstanding. This internal cohesion continued through Eisenhower's two terms in office. Congressional approval for military budgets came easy as did resolutions on Formosa, the Middle East, and the Tonkin Gulf—all "meant to show the resolution of America to defend the free world." Hoffman further argues that during the 1960 presidential election, there was not much difference in Nixon's and Kennedy's positions on foreign policy.

The overextension of the United States' role in Vietnam started the process of disintegration of this consensus. The breakup began with war protests and student

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8 See President Carter's famous speech to Congress following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In this address Carter pledged to use U.S. military force, if necessary, to defend American interests in the Persian Gulf. See text of President Carter's State of the Union address, in Special Report on Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Communication Agency, 1980). The concept of strategic consensus was initiated by the Reagan administration and designed to establish a constellation of America's regional allies—Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan—to cope with the challenges in Southwest Asia. It was also hoped that Saudi Arabia and Jordan would eventually join the group. However, this concept never materialized for a number of obvious reasons. See Christopher Joyner and Shafqat Ali Shah, "The Reagan Policy on 'Strategic Consensus' in the Middle East," Strategic Review, Vol. 9, no. 4 (Fall 1981).

9 Hoffman, Primacy or World Order, pp. 16–17.
demonstrations, criticism by intellectuals of the war, and the emergence of new groups such as the "new isolationists" and the "radical left." Some Americans voiced strong opposition over this extended global commitment and called for a return to a "fortress America" strategy. Presidential candidate Nixon stated in 1967: "Weary with war, disheartened with Allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crisis, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationists." The voice of the radical left came to be heard with disgust as the war magnified. This group argued that the United States was an expansionist power with imperial designs. Its physical security had never been threatened in the present century. It was the capitalistic interests that had led the United States to global involvement. The radical left went even further to suggest that the United States was responsible for the worldwide ills of hunger, suppression, and chaos. Much of its criticism was based on revisionist lines and did not gain much currency.

The frustrations of the Vietnam War made the extremists on the left and right argue for either a severe limitation of U.S. commitments or the adoption of a posture toward the world community strictly on the basis of narrow U.S. national interests. The war also had its impact on the realists, who controlled U.S. foreign policy. Their theory of using military force and intervention for influencing events had proved to be more costly than they had thought. The foreign policy establishment was seriously split. Within the Democratic party, criticism about President Johnson's handling of the war became louder as presidential candidates Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy made this a major election issue during the 1968 primaries. According to one commentator, less than a decade ago Americans had felt that they knew the answers to everything everywhere. Problems could always be solved; the impossible just took a little longer. But they came to realize that "the task of world leadership required more than a test of power. . . It demand[ed] the will to lead. And it [was] this peculiar and irreplaceable quality that the painful lessons of the 1960s [had] eroded in America." "The best and the brightest" had failed to conquer the "new frontiers" in Vietnam or to establish the "great society" at home. By the end of Johnson's term in office, there existed a large gap between the expectations of the American people and the political will to fulfill those expectations.

Richard Nixon came to office at a time when the nation had never been more divided since the Civil War. Since the depression never had any president been faced with a national crisis as Nixon was to confront. Elliot Richardson, undersecretary of state and an influential member of the Nixon administration, underscored the general sentiments when he stated: "Americans are disillusioned by rhetoric, bored with false

drama, and tired of exaggerated hopes and overblown undertakings. They are looking for stability, not adventurism.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, stability for the Nixon administration had meant a redefinition of America's global role, a role of selective involvements—not one of total withdrawal. Nixon had stated it clearly: "Our participation [in world politics] remains crucial. Because of the abundance of our resources and the strength of our technology, America's impact on the world remains enormous, whether by our action or by our inaction. Our awareness of the world is too keen, and our concern for peace too deep for us to remove the measure of stability which we have provided for the past twenty-five years."\textsuperscript{14}

The Nixon administration's fundamental task was to extricate the United States from its Vietnam quagmire. It wanted to end the war in Indochina and achieve "peace with honor" without hurting its commitments in other important regions such as Europe and the Far East. However, the achievement of this goal took longer than anticipated, causing the public to become more impatient at a time when there were already serious doubts about the Nixon administration's real intentions for wanting to get the United States out of Indochina. The Watergate crisis only confirmed some of the earlier suspicions of Nixon and his policies. The domestic forces that destroyed Johnson were the undoing of Nixon as well. With the fall of the "imperial presidency," the United States came to terms with itself.

Subsequently, the domestic convulsions caused by Vietnam were controlled, and vibrations of instability in the international system were contained. In the 1976 presidential campaign Carter's slogans for a "clean government" at home and an "open foreign policy" abroad appealed to voters enough to elect him president. Carter could pursue his "noble" goals such as human rights and nuclear nonproliferation because some of the difficult issues facing the United States had been resolved by the Nixon-Ford administrations.

On the international scene, the United States had stabilized its relations with the Soviet Union, including significant achievements in nuclear arms control through the SALT agreements; the status quo in Europe was formalized with the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accord, and the uneasy U.S.-European relations since the early sixties were once again warm and meaningful; China's legitimacy as a great power and its "entry" into the great powers league was duly recognized. The global strategic balance came to be separated from some of the regional conflicts, power configurations, and balances. America decentralized its global responsibilities through the Nixon doctrine among key regional allies such as Iran in the Gulf. In essence, the United States had altered its role of global commitments to selected commitments that were considered vital to its national interests.

**DOMESTIC FORCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. POLICY**

One of the most significant developments in the post-Vietnam and Watergate era was the emergence of certain forces from within the foreign policy establishment that


were extraordinarily powerful influences in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Traditionally, the vast foreign policy establishment has consisted of retired and future high officials, lawyers, business leaders, former military leaders presently in business, public relations experts, academics, and scientists, many of whom worked for or gave advice to the government. Equally important now was the role of the media. This is generally considered the rich and thick turf in which the roots of U.S. foreign policy are found. According to Gabriel Almond, there are four elite groups that “share in the process of policy initiation and formulation.” He defines these as follows:

1. **The Political Elites.** These include party leaders and those elected or appointed to high office. Members of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and key appointees in departments such as State and Defense and in the committees on foreign affairs in the Senate and House are representative of this group.

2. **The Bureaucratic or Administrative Elites.** This group consists of professionals of the executive establishment “who enjoy special powers by virtue of their interest in and familiarity and immediate contact with particular policy problems.”

3. **The Interest Elites.** These are representatives of the large number of private policy-oriented associations, “ranging from huge nationwide aggregations to local formulations and organized around aims and objectives which in their variety reflect the economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological complexity of American population.”

4. **The Communication Elites.** “The most obvious representatives [of the communication elites] are the owners, controllers, and active participants of the mass media—radio, press, and movies.” Almond argues that the rapid development and prominence of the mass media have somehow obscured the more intimate methods of communication in the formulation of popular attitudes: “Perhaps the most effective opinion leaders are the vast number of vocational, community, and institutional ‘notables,’ known and trusted men and women—clergymen and influential lay churchmen, club and fraternal order leaders, teachers and the like—with personal followings.”

All of the elites compete for the attention of various publics via the media of communication. Both in the case of Vietnam and Watergate, the media played a decisive role. The Vietnam War was lost at home when the media brought war from the jungles of Indochina to American living rooms. Similarly, Watergate happened because investigative reporters from the *Washington Post* pursued their subject relentlessly. The media have become watchdogs of public conduct in the United States. Traditionally, the executive counted on the support of the media, but since the late sixties that aspect has changed. Today, the American media have become a powerful instrument in U.S. politics—domestic and foreign.

In addition to the elite groups, three other elements have become extremely prominent and influential in U.S. foreign policymaking. These include Congress, interest groups (or lobbies), and academia. Congressional efforts to control the executive’s authority in foreign affairs stems basically from the Vietnam experience.

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15 Hoffman, *Primacy or World Order*, p. 17.
For instance, in 1965 through the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Congress authorized the president to commit U.S. forces in Vietnam. It was virtually a "blank check," and the Johnson administration overreached. Congressional leadership has been conscious of this "error" ever since and appears determined not to permit the executive to overextend its authority in the future. Indeed, its initiatives during the seventies and eighties testify to its growing assertiveness in U.S. foreign policy.

In 1970 the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was "repealed" by Congress. In 1973 the War Powers Act was enacted to restrict presidential authority to unilaterally commit American troops abroad. Arms sales to Turkey were embargoed by Congress in 1974 (causing significant tension in U.S.-Turkish relations) in retaliation for Turkey's invasion of Cyprus; that year Congress also refused to extend the "most favored nation" status in trade to the Soviet Union for its refusal to allow larger immigration of Soviet Jews. In 1975, Congress refused to sanction emergency military assistance to South Vietnam. Consequently, this decision expedited Saigon's fall to North Vietnam. The following year it prohibited expenditures to the CIA for strengthening anti-Marxist groups fighting in Angola. In 1976, a twenty-year-old proposal to control the intelligence community became a reality when Congress finally "established a permanent intelligence oversight committee to monitor the sprawling intelligence community," and legislation was passed in 1980 requiring the executive branch to give prior notice to the legislature for covert intelligence activities abroad.¹⁷

Congress was also instrumental in preventing President Carter's attempts in 1977–78 to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. The two Panama Canal treaties, negotiated for more than a decade under four administrations, were nearly torpedoed when certain reservations and conditions were laid down by Congress. Congress also demonstrated stiff opposition to President Carter's decision to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan in order to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China.¹⁸ This opposition was, however, because of the procedure adopted by the Carter administration: an upset Congress was informed hardly three hours before the recognition announcement.

The passing of other legislation, such as the International Security Assistance, the Arms Export Control Act (designed to improve upon the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act), and the Symington-Glenn Amendment in 1976, are proof of the direct interest of Congress in almost all major issues of U.S. foreign policy that included arms transfers to developing countries or nuclear nonproliferation.¹⁹

Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of the U.S. policymaking process is the role of lobbies. Almost every interest group has its lobby in Washington, and lobbying is permitted by law provided the lobbies are registered. It is not uncommon to find that big businesses, agriculture, ethnic groups, and industries have their interests pursued through their respective lobbies; nor is it unusual to find supporting lobbies for

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 395.
¹⁹ The Carter administration had encouraged greater congressional participation to control the sale of U.S. arms to developing countries and to prevent nuclear proliferation.
other countries. For instance, one hears of a pro-Greek lobby, a pro-Indian lobby, and, perhaps one of the most organized, funded, and influential lobbies, pro-Israeli lobby, which works under the umbrella organization of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The pressures these lobbies bring to bear upon the policymakers are phenomenal, and at times the outcome of major decisions is determined by the effective lobbying done by these interested parties. President Carter explicitly stated the force of these lobbies: "The B-1 bomber issue provides a case study of the difficulty in competing with powerful lobbyists, as well as with forces within Congress itself."\(^{20}\) His predecessor had gone through a similar experience during the 1976 Pakistan-U.S. quarrel over the nuclear issue. For instance, in the face of his opponents' mounting criticism of his administration's handling of the issue, President Ford "also found it necessary to somehow placate the fears within the India lobby, inside Congress and the State Department of another pro-Pakistan tilt in the making."\(^{21}\) Another case in point was the 1978 Carter administration's decision to sell arms to Saudi Arabia that included sixty F-15 fighter planes. One of the stiffest oppositions to this sale, primarily through lobbying, was witnessed in Washington. Indeed, Saudi-U.S. relations were at stake, and Carter had to use the full weight of his office to overcome the opponents of the sale.

Academics also share in influencing U.S. foreign policy. There is constant interaction between this intellectual reservoir and those who shape America's future at home and abroad. It is a common phenomenon to find people from universities participating actively in public life either as part-time consultants or in full-time key positions in foreign policymaking institutions such as the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council. Some of the highest policymakers and executives in the United States have come from academia. Among the most well-known are Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, the Rostow brothers, William Bundy, Jean Kirkpatrick, and numerous others who have held lower but no less important positions, such as assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, area desk officers, etc. Policymakers, after serving their tenures, often return to academic institutions; George Kennan, Dean Rusk, and Joseph Sisco are a few examples.

In addition, congressional aides are often fresh graduates of universities or research institutes and think tanks. Some of these established scholars and professors offer expert opinions not only to the executive branch but to Congress as well. Their testimony on critical issues in congressional hearings at times helps establish policy guidelines. Many government functionaries are encouraged in mid-career temporarily to join academic institutions to acquire "theoretical" knowledge that will complement their "real world" experience. Universities cater to the needs of the government functionaries by offering numerous special courses and programs to enlighten them, and the university community also learns from its experience.


U.S. DOMESTIC FORCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

From Pakistan's viewpoint it is the lack of adequate understanding in, and support from, Congress, academia, and the media that contributes to tensions in U.S.-Pakistan relations, the on-again, off-again support for Pakistan among various administrations notwithstanding. The critical aspect in this relationship has been the issue of security assistance to Pakistan, which has remained a controversial matter for thirty years. Let us examine the factors underlying this controversy.

The United States' preference for India over Pakistan became obvious when the Kennedy administration came to office in 1961. President Kennedy and his Democratic supporters had been critical of alliances established by the Eisenhower administration which they regarded as overemphasizing the military aspects of containment. In substance, the utility of alliances like CENTO and SEATO almost ceased to exist with the introduction of newer nuclear weapons systems and military doctrines. The reliance on the ICBMs and SLBMs as the backbone of U.S. strategic forces made bases in countries like Pakistan of secondary importance. Moreover, the Kennedy administration sought to contain communism in Asia through socioeconomic reforms. "India became the special favorite of American liberals, who saw in its commitment to democracy the foundation of a national partnership and in its hoped-for economic success the best refutation of communist claims to represent the wave of the future."22

Following the 1962 India-China war, the United States became even more sympathetic toward India. Massive U.S. emergency military aid was extended to New Delhi without adequate consultation with Pakistan, and the Kennedy administration made serious efforts to see that Pakistan did not open a second front against India during this conflict. Pakistan was piqued further when the United States did not use its leverage during the "crisis" to help resolve the Kashmir issue once and for all.23 Consequently, when Pakistan began its entente with China in 1963, the United States was angry. This was the first time a pro-Western power allied to the United States—at least theoretically—had "defected" to a major adversary. During and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, the Johnson administration's attitude toward Pakistan appeared to indicate that it was punishing Pakistan for its "cardinal sin" of befriending China. Ironically, six years later, it was Pakistan's help that made the United States' opening to China a reality.

In retrospect, while Pakistan was seeking close political-military links with the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, India was strengthening its economic, social, and cultural bonds with the United States. India capitalized on its idealistic notions of the world, especially when the United States "took at face value Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's claim to be neutral moral arbiter of world affairs."24 To most Americans, India was an ancient land with a rich cultural heritage; it was massive and fragile; it also happened to be the world's largest democracy. Some would argue that while the United States achieved its independence through use of force, India did it

23 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, pp. 15–18.
24 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 845.
through a unique method, the “nonviolence” movement. After independence India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and was admired for pursuing this course during the cold war years. Western writers depicted India as a mystery and a wonder. To students and scholars in the United States with curious minds and a will to conquer “new frontiers,” India had to be discovered. The proliferation of educational institutions and programs in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s saw India emerge as a major area of study, especially in regional studies programs related to Asia. Moreover, since China was closed, hordes of scholars, students, and tourists accepted the second-best choice, and India offered a rich turf in the fields of culture, history, sociology, economics, anthropology, art, and developmental politics. In the latter half of the 1960s disillusioned Western youths found India a haven where they could shed their “materialistic overtones and guilt” and rediscover a “simple, unadulterated, and more humane life.” Ironically, the fact is never acknowledged that Pakistan’s heritage is the same as India’s and that for nearly 500 years before independence the Muslims of the subcontinent, especially those who formed Pakistan, played a significant and prominent role in that land.

President Nixon’s election in 1968 was viewed by Pakistanis as a positive development that would reverse previous U.S.-Pakistan relations. His administration’s decision in 1970 to provide some $40 to $50 million worth of military equipment that included some 300 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and twenty aircraft to Pakistan was considered a step forward. High Pakistani officials felt further reassured when the Nixon administration sought Islamabad’s help to reopen U.S.-China relations. However, the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 brought home to Pakistan the reality that although Nixon and some of his administration officials were favorably inclined toward Pakistan, most Americans were not. The media carried stories about “Pakistan atrocities” against Bengalis and gave favorable coverage to the Bengali cause. Amnesty International aroused “the conscience of the world” as did other groups. The campaign against Pakistan extended beyond the political arena to social and cultural areas. Rock concerts and other social events were used to bring out anti-Pakistan feelings. A Pakistani national crisis had become an international issue.

The pro-India element in Congress and the administration openly demonstrated its resentment against Pakistan. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s national security adviser at the time, described the situation aptly: “India continued throughout [Nixon’s] first administration to enjoy a substantial constituency in Congress and within the U.S. government.” Indira Gandhi had not yet disillusioned Americans by her nuclear test and her assumption of authoritarian rule. Emotional ties with the world’s most populous democracy remained. Large annual aid appropriations were proposed by the administration and passed by Congress with little opposition. Between 1965 and 1971 India received $4.2 billion of U.S. economic aid, about $1.5 billion of it during the Nixon administration.

If India basked in congressional warmth and was subject to presidential indifference, Pakistan’s situation was exactly the reverse. Kissinger wrote:

Pakistan had never found the sympathy in America that India enjoyed, at least among
opinion-making groups. It did not represent principles with which Americans could identify as readily as with the “progressive” slogans and pacifist-sounding morality of the world’s largest democracy. Moreover, India was much larger and had four or five times the population of Pakistan. There were thus hard-headed reasons for the priorities attached to [America’s] relations with India.\(^{25}\)

The attitude of the State Department during the 1971 crisis is informative. Kissinger informs us that the State Department, without approval from the White House, imposed a new arms embargo on Pakistan. It prevented the Pentagon from delivering some $35 million worth of arms while leaving $5 million worth to trickle through the pipeline. “The State Department also began to throttle economic aid to Pakistan without White House clearance.”\(^{26}\)

A “new” truncated Pakistan, in the wake of the 1971 East Pakistan tragedy, sought American friendship for national reconstruction. However, two events in 1974 undermined this process. Nixon’s historical ouster as a consequence of Watergate and India’s nuclear explosion became major dilemmas for Pakistan in its pursuit of closer ties with the United States. In Nixon’s removal from office, Pakistan lost a true friend. The Indian nuclear explosion added new dimensions to Pakistan’s security concerns that were not fully appreciated in Washington. A revival of old tensions with greater implications was a logical result in the 1974–75 period.

Having suffered at the hands of India’s conventional military power in East Bengal, the idea of a nuclear India was a nightmare for Pakistan. In the absence of any meaningful Western nuclear guarantees against possible Indian nuclear blackmail, the Pakistani leadership at the time felt the necessity to consider the nuclear option.\(^{27}\) The visit of Pakistan’s prime minister to Washington in February 1975 was a disappointment. Although the Ford administration had lifted the ban on the sale of “lethal” weapons to South Asia on a case-by-case basis, the issue remained ambiguous regarding U.S. weapons sales to Pakistan. This ambiguity was a result of Washington’s belief that Pakistan was going nuclear, and it did not wish to “introduce potentially destabilizing conventional arms into the subcontinent.”\(^{28}\)

Two factors had probably exasperated the Pakistan-U.S. dilemma about the nuclear question. First, the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in the developing world acquired extraordinary importance on the U.S. domestic political scene in the 1970s. The energy crisis following the 1973 Arab oil embargo had sent chills around the international economies, and many countries felt the need to find alternative sources of energy. Nuclear energy appeared attractive to many developing countries as this source appeared relatively inexpensive in the long run. There was a surge in demand across the world to establish nuclear reactors. To the United States, the prospects were horrendous. Pakistan’s program appeared to be well advanced, and there were

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\(^{25}\) Ibid., pp. 848–49.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 854.

\(^{27}\) Tahir-Kheli, *United States and Pakistan*, pp. 119–22.

apprehensions of possible weapons production. Both the Republican and Democratic administrations thought that Pakistan had to be made a test case to demonstrate the seriousness of their nonproliferation objectives. Second, the Pakistani leader's rhetorical use of the term “Islamic bomb” was taken seriously in certain quarters. It was believed that since the Pakistani nuclear program was financed by Saudi Arabia and Libya, Islamabad might be obliged to provide the “bomb” to one of these two countries. Consequently, it was feared that if Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, these would be injected into the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From the Pakistani view, there was a touch of irony to the whole nuclear issue. The United States has never censured India, Israel, or South Africa for their nuclear programs, which are actually close to nuclear weapons production. In the case of Israel, it is generally believed that that country has possessed nuclear weapons since 1973. According to some accounts, these weapons were assembled during the 1973 October War when the tide of that conflict was dangerously against Israel. The United States' benign attitude toward the Indian nuclear program has puzzled Pakistanis. In fact, certain American decisions appeared to be supportive of the program. For instance, President Carter had lifted the ban, in June 1977, on shipments of highly enriched uranium to that country. Again in September 1980 the Carter administration managed to push through Congress the sale of some thirty-eight tons of enriched uranium to India. Pakistanis believe that “this was done with full knowledge of the evident fact that the building and stock-piling of nuclear weapons has continued in India . . . [Moreover] the seriousness of Carter's commitment to nonproliferation was . . . suspect because of serious and illogical discrepancies between the treatment meted out to India and Pakistan.”\(^{29}\) The American decision in April 1979 to cut off the already insignificant military and economic assistance (which was by now under $40 million), according to the Symington-Glenn Amendment, had further convinced Pakistan of American bias. Pakistanis were even more astonished by this decision especially when historical events had started to unfold in the region. Exactly one year earlier the coup in Afghanistan had laid the foundation for the Soviet takeover of that country, and in that period the revolution in Iran was in progress, eventually leading to the ousting of the pro-U.S. shah. The threats to U.S. influence and position in the area were becoming obvious as the ripple effects of the Iranian revolution extended into the Gulf and came to coincide with the already unpopular Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel in the Middle East. However, the taking of American hostages in Iran in November and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 altered the course of U.S. policy in Southwest Asia.

U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

Prior to these dramatic changes in the region, U.S. policy in South Asia had generally hurt and bewildered Pakistanis. This became most pronounced during the Carter presidency. In the past, though South Asia had been considered a low-priority

area in U.S. policy especially since 1960, Washington’s approach usually gave a semblance of “balance” in its handling of relations between India and Pakistan. President Carter became the first U.S. president to visit India and not touch Pakistan.

Officials in his administration began to talk of the region’s “new influentials.” In this context, the names of India and Iran were specifically mentioned. At the same time the peace process between Israel and Egypt was actively pursued. The assumption in Washington was that once the differences between these two countries were sorted out, an overall Middle East peace could be achieved. Israel and Egypt were two of the most powerful regional states, and cooperation between them would lay the foundation of a more comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It appears that the Carter administration regarded India, Iran, Israel, and Egypt as potential pillars of U.S. strategy in South and Southwest Asia.

By 1979, the Carter administration also played what some have called the “China card.” The visit of Chinese vice-chairman Deng Xiaoping to Washington in January of that year marked the beginning of a joint U.S.-China approach to major international issues, particularly in Asia. Two factors probably made it necessary for the Carter administration to play the China card. First, there was a strong demand within the United States formally to recognize China and to seek its cooperation in strengthening America’s position in the Western Pacific and also the cooperation of its friends such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the face of a growing Soviet military build-up. It was also believed that Vietnam’s aggressive behavior in Indochina would be checked. The Chinese had frequently argued for a continued U.S. military presence in the area, and they were more than receptive to the American overtures. Moreover, as Carter states: “One of the more interesting potential benefits of having China as a friend would be its ability to quietly sway some of the Third World countries with whom it was difficult for [the U.S.] to communicate.”

Second, the overall deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations contributed toward that step. To contain the Soviet Union in Asia, the Carter administration probably considered a formal alliance with China and India; however, the Chinese had reservations.

Indeed, U.S.-Soviet relations had started to turn sour in almost all areas. The prospects for future arms control, particularly SALT III, became bleak with continuing reservations in the United States about the Soviet Union’s noncompliance with the earlier agreements and its unabated development and deployment of newer weapons systems such as the SS20 missiles in Europe. Other weapons systems such as the Cruise and Pershing II missiles or the Backfire bombers have raised questions as to whether these are strategic or tactical weapons. The whole issue of nuclear arms control has reached a stage of confusion. Policymakers in Washington were skeptical about the Soviet Union’s adherence to any future arms control agreements. This concern was somewhat compounded by the loss of two U.S. electronic monitoring

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30 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 195.
31 Ibid., p. 205.
stations in Iran. It was recognized in the United States that such stations were necessary to complement other means, such as satellites, for verification of future arms control agreements.

The Soviet role in regional conflicts in Africa and Asia also caused concern in the United States. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union felt left out, and to Washington, Moscow appeared to play a spoiler's role. In Africa, the Soviets pursued aggressive policies throughout the 1970s; their conspicuous past, along with its Cuban and East German allies, in Angola and Ethiopia had made Western powers wary, while Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration in Southeast Asia cause serious alarm. At the same time, events in Nicaragua and El Salvador in Central America indicated Cuban and Soviet involvement.

The Soviet move into Afghanistan marked a turning point in U.S. strategy in general and toward Pakistan in particular. The earlier Carter-Brezhnev meeting in Vienna did not produce the desired results, and American policymakers were further convinced about the underlying tensions in Soviet-American relations. Moscow's venture into Afghanistan led Washington and other Western capitals to believe that this move was a prelude to a Soviet foothold on the Arabian Sea from where the Soviet Union could threaten Western interests in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. For America's energy-starved allies in Japan and Western Europe, this was a critical development as the Soviet's came closer to the vital Middle East petroleum reserves. The U.S. public's outrage was magnified by the taking of American hostages in Iran and the Carter administration's inability to do anything about their release. The failure of the U.S. military action in April 1980 to free these hostages further frustrated Americans and hurt their national pride. Demands for a more assertive U.S. global role and calls for strong leadership were openly voiced by the American people. A wave of conservatism reemerged on the U.S. domestic scene in striking contrast to the liberal wave of the 1960s. The decade of the seventies, in this context, can be regarded as a period of transition in which the United States experienced historic changes in its domestic policies and its global role.

A new impetus was added to the efforts already underway in the last year of the Carter administration to increase U.S. defense expenditures and to expand and deploy U.S. military power in Southwest Asia. Brzezinski notes: "It was the Carter administration that started increasing the defense budget in peacetime, and it is the Reagan administration that has greatly increased it since then." The foundation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was also laid in that period as were talks of a permanent U.S. Fifth Fleet and the search for additional bases in the area.

Responding to changing situations and changes in U.S. public opinion, the United States reversed its earlier policy toward Pakistan. The Carter administration's stand on nonproliferation was set aside in the case of Pakistan, and it was argued that America's national interests demanded open support for Islamabad, the latter's nuclear program notwithstanding. The shift in U.S. public opinion, particularly in the

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media and in academia, in favor of Pakistan was phenomenal. Officials openly described Pakistan as a new “frontline” state that needed support in face of Soviet aggression designs in Southwest Asia. Pakistan once again acquired importance in U.S. policy almost overnight. The significant shift in official Washington’s attitude toward Pakistan is reflected in the following statement:

On the one hand, the United States has long-standing and highly important nonproliferation interests and objectives which it is seeking to pursue in its nuclear relations with India and Pakistan. . . . On the other hand, long-term U.S. interests in maintaining stable political and security interests in Southwest Asia have been accentuated by the Soviet aggression and the need for a clear U.S. response to it. The United States has been seeking to revive and strengthen that country’s ability to defend its borders against Soviet incursions from Afghanistan.  

For the United States, Southwest Asia acquired a critical importance primarily for the reason that it forms the “Southern theater” of the huge Eurasian landmass, and it is a region where its policy and posture remain vulnerable. Brzezinski suggested that the Eurasian continent “represents the vortex of global power” and that “it is the American perspective that whoever dominates that Continent will determine the outcome of the American-Soviet competition and will emerge as the preponderant world power. Therefore, it has been and it remains American policy to ensure that no single hegemony emerges as the preponent, as the dominant force over that enormous landmass.” Fifteen years earlier Olaf Caroe, an eminent British diplomat-scholar, described the importance of this region when he said:

It will not be denied that of the regions of the globe where there is confrontation between totalitarian and free worlds, the largest in area and the most populous is in Asia—not in Europe. The absorption of South Asia in totalitarian systems would lay Africa open to further pressures and confine evolutionary political systems to the peninsula of Europe and of North America. This would be true whether the tide swept in from China, or from Russia, or from both. . . . The main forces of these pressures may fall not so much on the wings—not, that is, on Southeast Asia or the Middle East—but on the central position, the subcontinent of India and Pakistan. . . . The subcontinent is in a very real sense the centre of the free world. This is true whether one looks at the picture in geographic, political, strategic, or ideological terms. . . . If the centre collapses the wings are isolated.

In 1984 the “European theater” is stable. Soviet-American rivalry in that region has mellowed. The European peace movement, which threatened U.S.-European security ties when newer U.S. missiles (Pershing IIs) were being deployed, has proved ineffective. Indeed, the whole range of U.S.-European relations is growing, and

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35 Brzezinski, “United States Foreign Policy,” p. 28.
future prospects look even better. Similarly, the U.S. position in Asia, with the possible exception of Southwest Asia, appears equally good. East Asia has become the United States’ most important trading partner; Washington’s security posture in the region has also improved with the establishment of the U.S.-China entente. This holds true not only in East Asia, but also in Southeast Asia. It seems that relations with China have offered an opportunity to the United States, for the first time since the end of World War II, to extend its strategy beyond the Asian rimland to Asia’s mainland.

However, the situation in Southwest Asia remains precarious for U.S. policy. The Soviets are well entrenched in Afghanistan in spite of the determined and intense struggle by the Mujahedeen in that country. Neither Iran’s revolutionary fervor nor its opposition to the United States is over. At the same time, Iran’s four-year-old war with Iraq has sapped both countries of their national resources and energies, causing their positions to become uncertain in the future regional power configuration. The recent attacks on U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in Beirut demonstrate further the precarious nature of the U.S. position in Lebanon and that of the country itself. Washington’s relations with Cairo are not what they used to be under Sadat, and Israeli policies appear at times to hurt rather than help U.S. interests in the area. Traditional allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia are often frustrated by U.S. actions, and U.S. attempts to enlist India as a regional influence to share Washington’s responsibilities ended the day the Indian Congress party returned to power in 1980, and this situation has remained unchanged. In fact, India has refused to see the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same light as the United States. President Carter described the Indian stand when he said:

I was not always successful in encouraging other nations to condemn Soviet aggression. When Indira Ghandhi was reelected as prime minister of India I called . . . to ask for her cooperation regarding our hostages [in Iran] and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan . . . . It was obvious that she did not wish to discuss anything of substance. Within a few days, I learned why. The Indian representative’s speech in the United Nations was as strongly supportive of the Soviet invasion as those of Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. Even Cuba was more reticent in its praise than India.37

Subsequently, India became openly critical of U.S. policies in the region, particularly its support for Pakistan, including the renewed security relationship.

From the United States’ viewpoint, support for Pakistan became essential for four reasons. First, Washington came to regard Pakistan as a frontline state, perhaps in the tradition of Germany, Turkey, and Korea, and a potential stumbling block against any future Soviet expansion designs beyond Afghanistan. Second, to U.S. policy-makers, Pakistan is situated strategically so that Western powers can try to keep Russia in the Afghan “slaughterhouse.” In other words, Afghanistan could be the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. Third, Washington considers Pakistan’s strong connections in the Muslim world and the nonaligned countries beneficial for its diplomacy in those areas. This is a significant goal when analyzed in the context of the growing importance of

37 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 479.
“Islamic revivalism” in the international system. Finally, Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States could prove meaningful for the latter’s Gulf strategy.

The Reagan administration’s support for Pakistan has been in many ways unprecedented, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. However, in spite of the desire of both Washington and Islamabad to foster closer ties between the two countries, fundamental reservations on the nuclear issue and on the significance of India in U.S. policy have remained unabated. In 1981, when the debate on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan was underway, these two issues were its centerpiece.38

Even policymakers in Washington recognize the reality of these two issues. For instance, two senior State Department officials, while emphasizing the need to support Pakistan in light of Soviet moves in Southwest Asia, “added two caveats—at the same time we have informed the Government of Pakistan that we remain deeply committed to our nonproliferation policy, and we have expressed to Indian leaders our desire for good relations with India.”39 More recently, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, while visiting South Asia, reiterated the U.S. position in the region when he said that the United States desires to have the “very closest, most friendly and cooperative relationship with all countries of the region.”40 Pakistani apprehensions are increased when influential public opinion-makers continue to express certain doubts about the viability of U.S. policy toward Pakistan. In the words of one such individual: “A more effective American response to the Soviet presence in Kabul would be an Indian-centered South Asia policy designed to offset New Delhi’s dependence on Moscow.”41

Senator Alan Cranston’s recent efforts in the U.S. Senate to curb Pakistan’s nuclear program through tighter restrictions on U.S. military assistance alert Pakistanis about some of the strong undercurrents in the U.S. domestic scene that are not fully reconciled to the renewed U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. As a Pakistani observer states: “The nuclear issue may not be a stumbling block in day-to-day cooperation, but it has not disappeared as a question mark; American wariness has in fact increased.”42 A more optimistic note on the latest nuclear controversy was made


39 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, pp. 129–39.


41 Selig Harrison's comments made during a symposium on Asia and America in the 1980s, printed in Asia, May-June 1981.

by the Pakistan ambassador to the United States when he said that it is "an irritant that has surfaced in Pakistan-American relations but that would soon pass away without any adverse impact."

Pakistanis generally raise three questions. First, would the United States come to Pakistan's aid if it were threatened by a country other than the Soviet Union? The specific case in point is India, which has not been very positive toward Pakistan's sincere peace proposals. Since 1981, Pakistan has constantly extended its hand of friendship to India and has gone so far as seriously proposing a nonaggression pact. The existing regional environment makes it extremely vital for Pakistan to have a friendly, rather than hostile, neighbor to its east. India's bellicose attitude makes Pakistanis dubious of India's intention.

Second, what would be Pakistan's position if the United States and the Soviet Union decide to resolve the Afghanistan issue bilaterally through superpower negotiations? Subsequently, would the United States continue to perceive Pakistan's importance in the same light as it does today? Finally, in Pakistan, there are underlying concerns about U.S. policy in the Middle East, primarily in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of the major reasons for the unpopularity of U.S. policy is Washington's apparent insensitivity to the Palestinian problem and its inability to enforce a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue. Pakistan's strong bonds—economic, social, cultural, religious, political, and military—with many of the Middle Eastern countries, developed over a period of two decades, play a major role in determining its overall foreign policy posture. Any serious tensions in future Arab-American relations could have a spillover effect on U.S.-Pakistan ties. That in turn could undermine the prospects of cooperation between the two countries, particularly in sensitive areas like the Gulf. Can these be avoided?

CONCLUSION

It would not be unfair to suggest that U.S. diplomacy has matured since its watershed experience in Vietnam. It undertook its global responsibility at the end of World War II with great fervor and commitment to ensure that there were "no more Munchs." Its involvement in Vietnam was an overextension of that commitment. The painful lessons of that costly war triggered a serious soul-searching process within the United States about its future commitments. To many Americans, the demand for "no more Vietnams" meant a total withdrawal from global responsibilities. To others, particularly those who controlled the United States' future, it meant "no more overextension" of U.S. global commitments in the cause of universal ideals, but rather selective commitment in support of narrow U.S. national interests. Today, the demand for a strong American global leadership and "no more Irans or Afghanistans" confirms that interpretation.

U.S. maturity in global leadership is also evident in the fact that idealism and

realism exist side by side in U.S. foreign policy.\textsuperscript{44} Brzezinski elaborates the point well:

American foreign policy in a global sense is focused on the two central issues of our times—the problem of seeking more just and equitable social, economic, and political progress, problems which can be subsumed by the single word "development," and American foreign policy is also focused on the questions of war and peace, on the preservation in effect of the human race in the nuclear age, and on the difficult and complex problems of regional and strategic stability. Those issues can be subsumed by the single word, "security." Development and security are thus the foci of American global involvement.\textsuperscript{45}

After Vietnam, an equally significant development has been a greater awareness by the American people vis-à-vis the outside world and their country's role in it. Congress, with its control of the purse and the power of the veto, has been exercising its authority over the chief executive's foreign policy actions. The media continue to be a powerful instrument in U.S. politics, both at home and abroad and are fast overtaking the role of traditional opinion-makers, thus influencing major decisions.

In recent years, Pakistan has learned firsthand about the reality of the key role that institutions such as Congress, the media, and academia play in shaping U.S.-Pakistan relations. The experience since 1971 has been educative. Consequently, many Pakistanis recognize the fact that no matter how supportive a given administration is toward Pakistan, the support of these and other institutions is equally and, at times more, important for the smooth conduct of relations between the two countries. Indeed, it is in these areas that Pakistan needs to impress its position and explain its national interests.

Pakistan has become a major actor in the unfolding game of Southwest Asian power politics, which is the heart of the Eurasian continent and, thus, world politics. In the triangular struggle, Pakistan has the support of China and the United States, while the Soviet Union is trying to draw Pakistan away from its two rivals through a combination of diplomatic pressures, military threats, and offers of economic rewards. The Soviet moves appear compelling to some Pakistanis while others see a much greater advantage in being with the Sino-American group. Although the consensus among all shades of Pakistani public opinion is that China has been a true and tried friend, generally there are doubts expressed about U.S. friendship. Characteristically, the Pakistanis view countries as either their friends or not their friends; but as proud people, they react strongly when let down by their friends. Witness the earlier days of U.S.-Pakistan relations when Pakistanis felt proud to be considered "America's most allied ally in Asia" and the late President Ayub Khan's unequivocal assertion that when the chips were down, only the Pakistani people in Asia would stand by America.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} See President Reagan's address before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 6, 1984, printed in \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, May 1984.

\textsuperscript{45} Brzezinski, "United States Foreign Policy," p. 27.

The Pakistani reactions to U.S. policies toward Pakistan between 1963–79 need no elaboration. As a small power, Pakistan cannot afford the luxury of choosing friends and then changing them overnight. It is not for the United States to decide what kind of friendship it wishes to pursue with Pakistan. Washington has moved with maturity in recognizing some of the dilemmas presently confronting Pakistan. The six-year security arrangement between the United States and Pakistan covers primarily the military and economic dimensions, but it does not cover other vital aspects such as social, technical, educational, and cultural ones that would make this relationship more complete. Moreover, U.S. policymakers evaluate this relationship on a year-to-year basis, which makes it appear temporary and short term. Consequently, when the media coverage on Pakistan has negative connotations or there are efforts in Congress to alter the terms of this renewed relationship, Pakistanis get nervous. This nervousness is magnified even more in light of the fact that both these and other extrainternational forces do play a decisive role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Perhaps a major factor not fully appreciated in Washington is Pakistan’s geostrategic location in relation to the United States’ changing policy posture. It is true that Pakistan is both a South Asian and a Southwest Asian power and that both these regions are contiguous and overlapping. However, the United States expects Pakistan to play a major role in Southwest Asia, yet treats it as a South Asian power. That is, every American decision regarding Pakistan is tied to U.S. concerns about India, and with that factor in mind, Pakistan ends up being perceived as of secondary importance. No doubt Pakistan’s geography and history make it imperative for Islamabad to focus on South Asia, but this does not mean that Pakistan cannot alter its national priorities and exercise its policy options in a different direction. In fact, nothing would be better for Pakistan than establishing total peace with India, including the signing of a nonaggression pact, demilitarization of their border, and even a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. Then, Pakistan could focus its full attention on the Southwest Asia-Middle East region, an area where Pakistan has far greater stakes. U.S.-Pakistan relations could be more enduring and tangible if Washington perceived and treated Islamabad as an independent entity, not as its neighbor’s coattails.

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47 Pakistani policymakers are generally appreciative of the Reagan administration’s sensitivity in understanding Pakistan’s nonaligned status, its support of the Arab cause (particularly that of the Palestinian people), and Pakistan’s stand regarding Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States has officially denied making any demands on Pakistan for acquiring bases for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force.
It has been frequently observed that U.S. decision-makers and citizens alike stood at a comparative disadvantage with respect to knowledge of the world as the postwar era commenced, distant, as they were, from areas where nationalism was appearing from bud to full bloom and having had but limited experience as a colonial power. The case of Pakistan is no exception. Less than twenty years ago an analyst of the international relations of South Asia would comment in a much read book that “most Americans are vague even about the geography of Pakistan—all too often they think of it as part of India, or are surprised to learn that it is divided into two main parts, separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory—and they have only the foggiest notion of the circumstances which led to the creation and which form the raison d’être of America’s major Asian ally.”\(^1\) Much has happened since then, with Pakistan, united and truncated, making headlines and attracting serious, if perplexed, attention of decision-makers as the decade of the seventies commenced, and as it closed.

The above observation is given additional point by an encounter a decade-plus subsequent when an American professor in a course on the politics of South Asia at a major American university became perplexed during the first week of the course upon


feeling an uneasy sense of distance from his students or them from him—a sense of two activities abiding in a common arena attempting to engage one another but, like the reflections in Forester’s Marabar caves, never meeting regardless of nature’s efforts urging them but also inhibiting them from doing so. The professor toward week’s end was waiting at the bus stop, and as was his wont upon such occasions pondered the day’s perplexities and the morrow’s attractions, the troubling character of his class absorbing by far the greatest portion of his thoughts and his emotions. Entered a student from his class, also on his way between venues of study, who approached the professor with a certain diffidence and offered comments on how much he was learning and enjoying the course—indicating, as he did, that he had been fascinated to learn, among many exciting things, that there were so many Muslims in the state of Pakistan. The professor displayed his appreciation of the student’s interest, conducted a brief tutorial in his mild state of shock but welcome discovery, and immediately upon reaching his abode set about revamping his course.

The lack of public knowledge is also reflected in the comparatively under-developed state of scholarship about Pakistan, especially as compared with the richness that is displayed in the detailed monographic literature on Indian society and politics, both preindependence and post. American scholars have been attracted to the Indian nationalist movement, the “tall leadership” that itself attracted international attention, and by the Indian experience in instituting and maintaining a representative regime in a socioeconomic context which prevailing theories then and now could not easily accommodate nor predict. India encompassed practically everything that a social scientist would want to investigate and comprehend; it was the Third World in microcosm; from here the comparativist could generalize broadly, though too few have; and these sentiments are now being absorbed by a third and fourth generation of scholars. While the evidence is incomplete, what exists and the inferences which can be drawn from it suggests that foreign policy decision-makers with respect to Pakistan have had limited public information and analyses about the subject of their concern and have been placed in the position of learning from the briefs of partisan advocates with powerful interests at stake and from the learning that experience through involvement has necessitated and induced.  

CATEGORIES OF ANALYTIC CONCERN

A survey of the development of U.S. policy toward Pakistan suggests four categories of perspective and decision, which themselves constitute a useful framework for thinking about the impact of perceptions of domestic political concerns on U.S. decision processes and outcomes. What we may refer to as categories of analytic concern will constitute referents that we shall employ as we review development and change in U.S. perspective and policy toward Pakistan. The first category or referent

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let us call the **definition of strategic context**, by which I mean the geopolitical place of Pakistan in U.S. conceptions of its global interests. The second category let us refer to as **perception of strategic options**, by which I mean the function that Pakistan has been seen to play vis-à-vis the definition of strategic context. A third category, taking what a deep observer of Pakistan’s politics used in a different context,³ I suggest we term the “{wellsprings} of policy”, by which I mean those perceptions of Pakistan as a unit and the dynamics of the political forces that constitute the domestic context of policy decision. And a fourth category is **choice of policy alternatives**, by which I mean the instrumentalities employed to give strategic options and contexts effect.

The element of time is also critical since U.S. policy has taken different forms; the extent of involvement and association of the two states has known varying levels of intensity and depth, and each state has reacted to changes in its international contexts and to domestic compulsions and constraints with consequent change of policy choice. Critical factors in perception and action have changed, though after decline in intensity they have shown a proclivity to reappear. Indeed, the element of time activates the above analytic categories, which in early periods of the present case follow in sequence—both from minimalist to maximalist involvement and then from the latter to the former again.

We shall examine our concern with the relationship between domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy by dividing time into two dominant phases—that which encompassed the development of major military and economic assistance programs and that which, since the early sixties, has witnessed the progressive disengagement of the United States from its former close ally, its “most allied ally in Asia.” Each of these encompasses discernible subordinate sets of policy engagement, but they constitute linear elements of the general trend.⁴

**PHASE I: FROM MINIMALIST KNOWLEDGE TO MAXIMALIST INVOLVEMENT**

For the decade after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, U.S. global policy was predicated upon the assumption of Soviet policy being a continuation of continental Russian expansion as it was also buoyed by a common perception that the appeals of communism both reflected and constituted a form of public malignancy that could potentially disturb and destroy natural and benign body politiks. While the geopolitical significance of Pakistan was periodically acknowledged during the first few years of its independence, it did not absorb the attention of top decision-makers as

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⁴ E.g., the period from 1947–53 was one of nonalignment, though with major efforts to secure U.S. support, with the intensity of U.S. interest increasing after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. The aligned years from 1954–62 witnessed a new sensitivity to the virtues of closer ties with the People’s Republic of China. Likewise, U.S. involvement eroded, marked by the war of 1965 and 1971. For a good review of Pakistan foreign policy, see S. M. Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
did, for example, India, nor did the South Asian region as a whole reside in the consciousness of policymakers, who were far more concerned with Europe, the Middle East, Greece, Turkey, and ultimately China than areas made free by retreating colonial powers.5

Pakistan’s perceived potential as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence and control in the Middle East and South Asia was acknowledged by some U.S. policymakers and strongly asserted by Pakistan’s advocates. We know, for example, that Secretary of State George Marshall advised President Truman in 1947 that Pakistan was the world’s largest Muslim country and that it “occupies one of the most strategic areas in the world.”6 We also know that the American chargé d’affaires in Karachi in a memorandum to the secretary of state reporting on his meeting with the finance minister of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammed, who was to play a central role in forging Pakistan’s relations with the United States, that the latter had indicated that the burden of the defense of India had now fallen to Pakistan, that “Russia was watching India,” though he felt that Soviet ideology had little in common with Pakistan or other parts of the Islamic world.7 This sentiment was reaffirmed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in a meeting shortly thereafter with Marshall in 1948, as was an affirmation of Pakistan’s commitment to maintaining a stand against “communist infiltration.”8

The perception of a Soviet threat as it pertained to South Asia is also found in a review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which indicated that except for Pakistan the nations of South Asia had little value to the United States, the case of Pakistan, as with other countries of the area contiguous to the USSR, offering “the possibility of ideological

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5 The memoirs of major U.S. policymakers are nearly deplete of references to U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Dean Acheson, in his Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), refers to Liaquat Ali Khan once, but spends five pages on Nehru. The diaries of James Forrestal, architect of the Department of Defense, contain no reference to Pakistan; see James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951). A student of early U.S.-Pakistan relations, who interviewed President Truman, writes:

Among the men who mattered in the highest echelons of the American Government, there was hardly anyone with any sort of meaningful knowledge of or interest in Pakistan. The present researcher doubts whether President Truman would have been able to point to Pakistan on a world map without some coaching. Having spent three months at Independence, Missouri, in 1961, and having had several opportunities to talk with Mr. Truman, I became aware of the fact that the former President’s knowledge of South Asia was minimal. While Truman had some strange things to say in strong language concerning India and Nehru, his notions concerning Pakistan were exceedingly foggy. (M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–1958 [New Delhi: Radiant, 1982], p. 5).


7 Telegram from Charles W. Lewis to Secretary of State George Marshall, Jan. 1, 1948. In a similar appeal for assistance shortly after partition, Feroz Khan Noon, in a memorandum submitted to an American diplomatic official in Turkey and marked “very confidential,” observed: “The Mussalmans in Pakistan are against Communism. The Hindus have an ambassador in Moscow, Mrs. Pandit, who is the sister of the Hindu Prime Minister in Delhi, Mr. Nehru, and the Russians have got an ambassador in Delhi, the Hindu capital. We the Mussalmans of Pakistan have no ambassador in Moscow nor is there any Russian Ambassador in Karachi—our capital.” Quoted in Venkataramani, American Role in Pakistan, p. 24.

8 Telegram from George Marshall to acting secretary of state, Oct. 29, 1948.
and intelligence penetration.” In a Department of State policy statement on Pakistan July 1, 1951, it was noted that

Pakistan occupies the eastern and western flanks of one of the largest non-Communist areas of Asia. Eastern Pakistan lying next to Burma has attained new importance in relation to possible expansive tendencies of the Chinese People's Republic. This area, moreover, lying between Communist centers in India and Tibet, provides a potential underground base and channel for building the link between external and internal communism on the subcontinent. Western Pakistan inherited the primary responsibility for the defense of the Northwest Frontier, the traditional gateway for large-scale invasions of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.10

In more vivid fashion, the perception of a Soviet threat was asserted by Assistant Secretary of State George Allen in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations when he observed: “I do not pretend Pakistan is going to be attacked by Soviet Russia tomorrow or next week or next month. I hope it never is, but we have every reason to believe that Molotov's statement in 1940, made to Ribbentrop when Russia was still neutral, that the ambitions of the Soviet Union lay south to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, is a correct statement.”11

The obsession with an expansionist Soviet Union was present in U.S. considerations of South Asia from the outset of the postwar era and became more focused upon and germane to perceptions of Pakistan than to any other state of the region. Furthermore, Pakistan advocacy was at a minimum congruent with U.S. perceptions of the world, with advocacy extended in a manner to make Pakistan fit the categories that U.S. policymakers at the time judged essential to warrant unusual attention and largesse. Indeed, Ghulam Mohammed at one junction spoke of dealing with the Americans as a businessman, the implication being not only the dependability and fidelity of contracts but also the development of a relationship that would be mutually profitable and the presentation of goods in a manner that was congruent with the buyer's conception of needs.

Not only did there develop a symbiotic and mutually confirming set of perspectives about Soviet intentions—these matters being of greater strategic importance to the United States than to Pakistan—but there was a similar process of mutual confirmation with respect to the perception of a domestic communist threat, to infiltration, to leakage, to a malignant presence that had to be guarded against and effective immunological and suppressive measures devised to inhibit its epidemcity or arousal. In a letter to the secretary of state prior to Liaquat's first visit, the Pakistan ambassador to the United States, M. A. H. Ispahani, observed that “certain ideological and political trends have recently shown themselves more and more clearly in lands like Indonesia, Malay [sic], Burma and even India. Although this ideology

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10 Jain, ed., U.S.-South Asian Relations, p. 56.

is foreign to Islam and is not acceptable to Moslems, it nevertheless becomes necessary to guard against its inroads to Pakistan. This point does not require further elaboration.\(^\text{12}\)

The domestic communist threat was emphasized as well in the Department of State 1951 policy statement on Pakistan where it was noted that “Pakistan Communists were involved in an abortive plot to overthrow the present government and set up a military dictatorship on the Communist model.” And, again, in observing the drain that the defense of Kashmir placed on the national budget, it was observed that “we [the U.S.] should not be lulled into neglect by believing that since the ideologies of Islam and communism contain basic differences, there is no communist threat to Pakistan. We will be in a better position to combat communism when our own sympathy for Pakistan’s welfare finds more concrete expression.” With respect to growing sensitivity to domestic political forces, the report noted that threatening to Pakistan, though less obvious than communism, were the activities of “reactionary groups of landlords and uneducated religious leaders (mullahs) who oppose the present Western-minded government and favor a return to primitive Islamic principles.”\(^\text{13}\)

With the perception of strategic interest and need defined, the next concern to emerge from latency was the place of Pakistan in the satisfaction of security needs. This place was established in a rudimentary fashion with references to and preferences for Pakistan serving the same function that this area had in the days of empire. But this conception was soon to be broadened in a way early suggested by Ghulam Mohammed who, in late 1949, proposed that in order to bolster its defense against the Soviets, the United States needed to assist in the creation of “a bloc of nations even if held together only by a principle of religion, which bloc could be considered as a check to any ambitions of the USSR for further territorial expansion.”\(^\text{14}\) Indeed, Pakistan served as host to a series of meetings of representatives of Muslim states, though more for purposes of ideology and symbolism in state-building and to deny India access to these states and to carry support for its contacts against India than in any projected contests with the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China.\(^\text{15}\)

The creation of a bloc of Muslim states was proposed as a matter of mutual convenience between Pakistan and the United States, but for different reasons. While an important contribution to U.S. global strategy, it would be helpful to Pakistan in its contest with India, the principal concern of Pakistan acknowledged by would-be client and patron alike.\(^\text{16}\) This sentiment was captured in a memorandum from the chief of Near Eastern affairs in the Department of State to Ambassador-at-Large Jessup in September 1949. It stated:

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\(^\text{13}\) Jain, ed., *U.S.-South Asian Relations*, p. 57.

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., p. 25.


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Pakistan's endeavor to assume the leadership of a Middle East Muslim bloc is to create a counter force to what it believes to be the "Hindu imperialism" of the new Indian Republic. India has emerged from World War II as the strongest power in Asia. Its position of dominance will probably increase as its power potential is developed. We have no great assurance that India in the future will ally itself with us and we have some reason to believe that it might not. Pakistan, if given reasonable encouragement, might prove the more reliable friend.\(^7\)

U.S. diplomatic and consular officers extended strong support to the notion of Pakistan's playing a pivotal role in resistance to the expansion of the socialist states in a set of recommendations drawn up at a meeting in early 1951.

We should take every feasible military and political step to build up the strength of the western and eastern flanks of the South Asian area. For the short term, this can best be effected by increasing military strength in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey on the west, and in Indochina on the east. The United States military authorities should consider on an urgent basis the desirability of the United States entering into an early understanding with Pakistan, which would provide for equipping and building up Pakistan's military forces and insure the availability of Pakistani ground forces on the western flank at the outset of war. A similar understanding should be offered India if the latter is willing to accept the same commitments with regard to the utilization of its forces on the western flank or elsewhere. If a Middle Eastern pact should be developed which includes Iran, Pakistan should be offered membership.\(^8\)

These ideas of collective security, in which Pakistan would constitute a prophylactic intermediary serving as both pinion and buffer in the caging of northern bears and eastern dragons, initially took abortive form in the efforts to create a Middle East Command and a Middle East Defense Organization but assumed more permanent form in the creation of treaty relations among "northern-tier" states of Southeast Asia in 1954–55, ultimately resulting in the creation of the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan was perceived as constituting not only a buffer but as facilitating access to other Muslim states.\(^9\)

Following from the conception of strategic need and Pakistan's place in it, the initial policy calculations assumed Pakistan to be a stable unit or actor among other like units that could be arranged in strategic fashion for accomplishing security objectives. Little attention was given the domestic forces that impinged on foreign policymaking and upon the implementation of U.S. policy. Furthermore, there was initial reluctance on the part of the United States to assume the role of defense orchestrator and conflict manager in South Asia but rather a preference that the British continue to assume responsibility for these functions on behalf of the Western alliance. Indeed, it was preferred that Britain assume responsibility for the management and

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 23.
\(^8\) Jain, ed., U.S.-South Asian Relations, pp. 48–49.
\(^9\) What was not clearly understood, however, was that Pakistan's emphasis on Islamic ideology was at odds with the secular ideologies of the major Middle Eastern states, which, as in the case of Egypt, perceived Pakistan as in errant competition with its efforts to create a modernist coalition of Muslim states.
association of the interests of the sovereign successors to its empire and the interests of the West. The difficulties of involvement were made manifest by the Kashmir war, which prompted the cessation of all licenses for the export of military material to both India and Pakistan from March 12, 1948, to March 29, 1949. The conflict induced perplexity since it was incomprehensible, given what appeared marginal advantages in the face of substantial costs, to both adversaries, especially when contrasted with more momentous international conflicts that absorbed the energies of U.S. policymakers. Initial entreaties on the part of Pakistan for substantial aid were met with cool politeness rather than warm receptivity and cooperation.  

The choice of policy by which to achieve security needs developed incrementally and constituted a changing mix of a desire to provide for defense and to deny Soviet access through the development of Pakistani dependency upon them in the way of arms. One of the first clear statements of U.S. security needs was set forth in a memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff less than a week before the cancellation of the ban on arms aid to South Asia. It was observed therein that the Karachi-Lahore area might become of strategic importance since “in spite of tremendous logistics difficulties, this area might be required as a base for air operations against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas.” It was further argued that “domination of the area by the USSR would deny to us and make available to the USSR certain sources of raw materials and would threaten sea routes which are now relatively safe.” Given these considerations, the following “basic strategic objectives” were set forth by the Joint Chiefs:

1. Prevent Soviet enroachment or domination;
2. Prevent the USSR from obtaining military support or assistance from these nations either directly or through the use of their facilities;
3. Develop, without commitment to military action on our part, a cooperative attitude in these countries which would facilitate obtaining the use of areas or facilities which might be required by the Western democracies...for military operations against the USSR in the event of war; and
4. With reference to Pakistan, endeavor to make commercial arrangements which would, in emergency, facilitate development for operational use of base facilities in the Karachi-Lahore area.

The following summer a series of high-level Pakistani delegations visited the United States to discuss military and economic aid proposals that had been advanced during the first year after partition but which had not received the sympathetic hearing desired. The year was also highlighted by Liaquat’s positive response to the Soviet Union for the establishment of friendly relations, expressed by Liaquat’s visit to Moscow and the subsequent creation of formal diplomatic ties between Pakistan and the Soviet Union in 1950. During the summer months, the United States received in turn the Pakistan foreign secretary (June), the secretary of defense and a military

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20 See Venkataramani, American Role in Pakistan, chs. 1, 3.
mission (June-July), the minister of finance (September) and, later, the secretary
general and foreign minister (January 1950). 22

Furthermore, by the summer of 1949 it had become clear to officers of the U.S.
government that if Pakistan did not acquire military assistance from the United States,
it would seriously pursue the acquisition of assistance from other sources. Already in
late 1948 it had been reported that the Pakistanis had sought aid from "Soviet-
dominated Czechoslovakia." 23 In its policy statement on Pakistan dated April 3, 1950,
the Department of State indicated that U.S. policy was to assist Pakistan in satisfying
its requirements from the West and further indicated that the United States would "give
sympathetic consideration to applications by Pakistan for licenses to export supplies
procured from commercial sources." 24 A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
between the United States and Pakistan became effective December 15, 1950. After
the visits of Vice-President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles to Pakistan in 1953, a
Mutual Defense Agreement was signed between the two countries on May 19, 1954.
Prefatory to the agreement President Eisenhower indicated—as had previously the
National Security Council—that the United States was gravely concerned about the
defense of the Middle East and that Pakistan should be given special consideration for
military aid. 25 By the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, one decade later, the
United States had extended more than $670 million in direct transfers of military
material and nearly $700 million in security-supporting assistance while Pakistan had
spent approximately $35 million through the Foreign Military Sales Program. 26
During the 1950s U.S. aid to Pakistan comprised approximately 80 percent of
Pakistan's total foreign assistance, declining to 53 percent in the decade of the sixties,
and to 20 percent during the 1970s.

The initial motivation for forging a relationship between the United States and
Pakistan was reflected in Pakistan's overtures, prompted by necessities created by the
circumstances of partition. Pakistan became dependent upon the international system.
The large-scale human and economic dislocation of partition placed unusual burdens
on the new government. Perceived defense needs were great, given the fact that
 ordnance and stores remained in India and given Pakistan's sense of a hegemonic
impulse on the part of India. Pakistan was also prey to the agonies of impotence—to
an inability to effect the transfer to funds and material from India, which was to be its
share of the inheritance from the raj, and by an incapacity to arrange strategic
accessions of princely states. Decisiveness and effectiveness on the part of Pakistani
perceptions of a "Hindu" India to accomplish interests of state with facility in what
was perceived as zero-sum fashion with respect to Pakistan disturbed traditional
self-conceptions of Muslim supremacy in matters of statecraft and manipulation of

23 Ibid., p. 15.
24 Ibid., p. 30.
26 Ibid., p. 329.
power. The game of denying the “Hindu” Congress its ultimate objectives with respect to maintaining a “united” India and to exerting influence through the institutions of the raj all ended with partition. It was thus necessary to acquire surrogate patrons to provide assistance as well as to serve as a source of support, as a fulcrum, to be used in developing a strategy and sense of protection against India.

From the outset the advocates and makers of foreign and defense policy in Pakistan were principally administrators and military officers, with the exception of Liaquat Ali Khan, himself dependent upon bureaucrats as the Muslim League became the vehicle of provincial political groups as the memories of creation receded. With the assassination of Liaquat, Ghulam Mohammed became the focus of executive power—assuming the position of governor general, which had been used with such effectiveness by the Quaid-i-Azam in imposing central control over provincial affairs during the first year of independence. With the accession of Ghulam Mohammed, the capture of the top institutions of state by bureaucrats was nearly complete, and with his recall of Mohammed Ali Bogra as ambassador to the United States to succeed the dismissed Khawja Nazimmuddin as prime minister in 1953, with a cabinet already appointed to assist the new incumbent, the institution of executive-bureaucratic power was complete. It was disturbed, however, after the imposition of the governor general’s rule by the judgment of the Supreme Court that a return to a democratic regime would have to be effected as well as by the succession of prime ministers and members of the cabinet during the interim until the military coup and creation of a martial law regime in October 1958.27

It is clear from our analysis thus far that U.S. policy first focused upon Pakistan as a unitary actor, initially as a marginal one, but increasingly as the one most strategic to the satisfaction of the global security interests of the United States in the South Asian region, to the protection of interests in the Middle East, and to the arrangement of a defensive cordon around the socialist perimeter. U.S. policymakers during this phase were but marginally sensitive to domestic political issues and forces other than following the dictum that by inducing economic growth, political stability and liberal political preferences would flower. Not unexpectedly, policymakers were particularly responsive to bureaucratic and military interests and elites and to the advocacy that placed Pakistan cleanly and firmly in the category of states that could be useful to the United States in its policy of containment. Pakistan was thus seen principally as an instrumentality, as a means of protecting far more vital interests of the United States than Pakistan or the immediate region; primary were the defense of Middle Eastern oil, the acquisition of intelligence, the provision of military access in contingency planning for war, and the denial to socialist states of whatever resources, services, and strategic positioning that access or control could provide.

PHASE II: CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS AND MOVEMENT TOWARD DIENGAGEMENT

With the thaw in the cold war after the potentially deadly great power jousts of the early 1960s, the place of Pakistan in calculations of U.S. strategic interests diminished as well. The perception of the Soviets as inexorably impelled to move south was muted as efforts were made to seek areas of accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union and given the restraining function of increasing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. The place of principal antagonist and threat to the United States in definitions of strategic interest was assumed by the People's Republic of China, perceived to be inherently expansionist after the action in Tibet and tempted by borders and territorial claims that touched the entirety of Asia from Taiwan in the east to India and Pakistan in the west. U.S. policy toward Asian states, continental and insular alike, assumed as a powerful constant the interests and projected behavior of China, extended recognition or not. The role of China loomed large in the United States' major foreign policy dilemma of the 1960s—Vietnam; and it replaced the Soviet Union as the source of moral and ideological inspiration for revolutionary struggle with the mobilization of the social "periphery" in Third World states. The appeals of Mao were seen—as their consequences were held inimical and pernicious—in peasant-based movements whether in Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, or East Pakistan and India. U.S. policy in the 1960s was much more concerned with the future of Asia than it had been previously. Whereas the decade and a half after World War II revealed a primary concern with the restoration and security of Europe, the subsequent decade and a half revealed the same for noncommunist Asia.

With the lessening of manifest tension in U.S.-Soviet relations, there was a concomitant effort encouraged on the part of both powers to reach accommodation with states that had been outside the orbit of the other's influence prior to the change in international climate. This included overtures toward Pakistan from the Soviet Union as well as from China. In this changed global context the place of Pakistan in terms of U.S. strategic interests became less important, although its place as a showplace of capitalist development in Asia became magnified. Throughout the sixties, under the rubric of what appeared to be a stable quasi-representative regime, Pakistan was held to be a strikingly successful alternative to ideological appeals and proffered designs of socialist states. It provided evidence of developmental possibility in association with the West and through integration with the international capitalist economy. U.S. interest in thwarting what was perceived and feared to be Chinese aggrandizement in the Himalayas gave India a more pronounced place in U.S. security calculations than had ever been the case.28

Unlike the displacement of primary objects of threat that transpired in U.S.

28 Useful treatments of these issues are found in William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972); and Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan, and the Rise of China (New York: Walker, 1964).
perceptions of the world, Pakistan's security interests continued to revolve principally around India and became intensified in 1965, whether in anticipation or in consequence of conflict, in the case of the Rann of Kutch and the October war. Suspicion and a sense of threat were subsequently heightened by the Agarthala conspiracy case, in which a number of East Pakistani leaders, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, charismatic head of the Awami League, were accused of treasonable acts in collusion with India.\(^{29}\) Suspicions of India reached their apogee among military and West Pakistani political elites in 1971 and played an important role in preventing a negotiated solution between what had become de facto sovereignties in Pakistan—one east, one west—in March of that year.\(^{30}\)

While U.S. policymakers were aware of the importance of India in Pakistan's definition of its security interests, they became even more sensitive to domestic political issues after military and economic aid programs had progressed. It is of interest to note that even shortly before the 1958 coup, the Office of Intelligence Research expressed concern over the growing power of the military and the inimical impact that this might have on economic development in the country. It also judged the size of the military establishment as exceeding that necessitated by U.S. security interests but as a function of Pakistan's perception of its own. The report, "Pakistan's Current Economic Situation and Prospects," opined as follows:

Pakistan's main reason for devoting more than a quarter of its budget to defense, and seeking additional U.S. arms is not to protect the country against a Soviet or Chinese attack, for which Pakistani resources will never be sufficient, nor to maintain internal security, for which the present military establishment is excessive. Its chief purpose is to bolster Pakistan's position vis-à-vis India. Although every Pakistani increase in military expenditure has been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian military development, it may also be true that the Pakistani army has developed as a pressure group to the point that regardless of Indian movements, it might continue to have priority over economic development for appropriations. . . . What is required to mobilize Pakistani resources and utilize foreign aid effectively is a government that is strong and stable enough to carry out a consistent development program, sufficiently independent of certain landowning and industrial interest groups to insist on financial sacrifices and institutional reforms and politically skilled enough to reduce its large defense budget by improving relations with India.\(^{31}\)

After the military coup there developed an ambivalence in the perspectives of U.S. foreign policymakers, in part a function of differing bureaucratic lenses, but in

\(^{29}\) See Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), chs. 3, 5. The suspicions of Agarthala lingered over a decade after the fact. A chief government prosecutor as late as 1979 remained convinced that the evidence was valid and expressed angst that Mujibur had been released by Ayub for the purpose of attending the all-parties roundtable called to explore ways of quelling the 1968–69 disturbances; *Interview (Pakistan)*, April 1979.


\(^{31}\) Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, Intelligence Report no. 7706, May 15, 1958, in Jain, ed., *U.S.-South Asian Relations*, p. 150.
substantial measure a reflection of differing emphases on short-term versus long-term interests. Shortly after the coup, the Office of Intelligence Research suggested that the odds appeared to be against the military being successful where the politicians had failed and expressed concern about the development of provincial and class tensions in a military regime, particularly with respect to East Pakistan. Their report noted:

Only under a democratic system would East Pakistan, with its greater population, appear to be able to match the greater military and bureaucratic weight of West Pakistan. However, the prospect of prolonged suppression of political freedom under military domination would intensify the risk of such an increase in tension and discontent in East Pakistan as perhaps to jeopardize the unity of the two wings of the country.32

In a subsequent report, however, the National Security Council expressed satisfaction with the new regime, especially given perceptions of its greater efficiency, which provided for better administration of aid and easier relations in planning than did the shifting incumbencies of the previous order. In the report, entitled “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” the following observations were made:

The political instability which was characteristic of previous governments and seriously impeded the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in Pakistan has been replaced by a relatively stable martial law regime. For the short term, and given the intentions and capabilities of present leaders to implement much-needed reforms, the present political situation should be conducive to the furtherance of U.S. objectives. In view of the present stability, even though achieved by fiat, the problem has changed from one of short-term urgency, requiring us to reckon with individual politicians in one crisis after another, to one which allows us to take a longer-range view of Pakistan’s potential... because we recognize the potential benefits accruing at this juncture from a stable political situation.33

U.S. commitment to assisting the experiment in a well-managed basic democracy was reflected in the substantial augmentation in economic assistance extended subsequent to the military coup. While assistance jumped from $9 million in 1952 to $100 million in 1955, immediately after the imposition to government’s rule, and increased to approximately $150 million per year through 1958, it increased to over $260 million in 1959, not to decline below $237 million until after the 1965 war.34

U.S. policy changed dramatically in South Asia during the sixties, much to the surprise and hurt of Pakistani elites.35 The Sino-Indian border dispute induced the development of a military assistance relationship between the United States and India, the consequence of a conflict which Pakistani evaluation perceived as marginal at best, not requiring such military aid—aid which might ultimately be used against the United States’ principal Asian ally. The movement of the United States toward India was perceived as a movement away from Pakistan, which was prompted to pursue new routes of international support. With the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, arms aid was

32 Intelligence Report no. 7894, in ibid., p. 152.
33 National Security Council, Report no. 5909/1, Nov. 8, 1960, in ibid., p. 190.
34 Ibid., p. 329.
suspended to both states, the Pakistani argument being that this was a continuation of grossly unfair treatment given the fact that India had a long-standing and dependable arms supplier in the Soviet Union whereas the United States was the principal supplier to Pakistan. This suspension, lifted on a one-time basis in 1970 and reimposed in 1971, continued with respect to all lethal materiel until the 1981 agreement after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Change in policy was perceived, however, in a context of success—a stable Pakistani polity created after the 1958 military coup with a return to a centralized civilian regime under the constitution of 1962 with elite responsiveness to popular political demands as evidenced in the ultimate acceptance of rights as being fundamental and justiciable and in the legitimation of political competition in the electoral and legislative arenas through the creation of political parties. Thus, Pakistan was not only an Asian economic miracle; it was also perceived as a political success, if not a miracle, in its peacefully managed experiment in the democratization of an authoritarian regime. There was also confidence in Ayub as an able and responsible statesman, who not only evinced an ability to govern his own state but who was, as the De Gaulle of Asia, a model to be emulated, and a good friend, if not a willing client.

One of the major problems confronting both Pakistani and U.S. decision-makers in the development of policy has been what we might call the tragedy of national political and economic accounts. The explanation for such accounting is a reflection of power relationships within society and government, but this does not obviate the point being made. One of the notorious problems in the comparative analysis of development is that of data aggregation and the loss of variance that can be unknowingly caused thereby. The literature is replete with examples, as are the experiences of elites and regimes. Sovereignty and the idea of the nation with their emphasis on integration, unity, and monadic autonomy have become so powerful in both legal and everyday conceptions that they have come to serve as a blinder on the perspectives of scholarly inquiry as well as in both inter- and intrastate behavior. Comparativists customarily compare the politics of nation-states encompassing such widely varied units as India, Pakistan, and China, together with Guyana, Fiji, and Singapore. But just as such perspectives encourage the comparison of unlikes and induce misconceptions of the social realities of which unilike unlikes are composed with analytic results often ranging from methodological artifacts to disastrous inference, in the real world such distortions through aggregation left unattended can lead to outcomes that range from the tragedy of perpetual economic impoverishment and political impotence to that of internal war. These outcomes can obviously result even with disaggregated knowledge, but such knowledge is critical for wisely formulated policy.

The distortions of aggregation in Pakistani politics, existent through the halcyon days of cooperation, became much more pronounced during the sixties and influenced both Pakistan and U.S. perspectives in foreign policy. That power and influence in

matters of state were skewed in pre-1962 Pakistan was widely known as was the distribution of wealth and productive capacity. The problems of constitution making in the fifties was not so much a function of religious compulsion versus secular commitment as it was a function of the social distribution of power. While this distribution was manifest in relationships between all regions, it was most pronouncedly so in the case of East Pakistan and the West, especially the Punjab. The conflict not only reflected matters of domestic distributions of public power and private welfare, but the appropriate posture that Pakistan should assume in international affairs.

For West Pakistan, especially the Punjabi and refugee elites from India, Pakistan had an archenemy in the state of India and had an outstanding conflict in the case of Kashmir. For East Pakistani elites, particularly those regionalist elites that started to assume prominence and permanence after the 1954 East Bengal provincial elections, there did not exist an archenemy, and Kashmir was far away in both physical and emotional terms. Indeed, East Pakistanis perceived substantial regional economic benefit through trade with India, reflected in illegal trade that was curtailed several times through military operations. Kashmir was also increasingly perceived by the regional East Pakistani elite as a vehicle for the permanent skewing of national wealth to the western wing through military capitalization and pay. Both involved national assets that found their way primarily into the economies of the western wing, and the lack of concern in the 1965 war, when East Pakistan was for all practical purposes left defenseless and was momentarily cut off from the rest of the world, provided powerful additional incentive among Awami League elites for pursuing a reduction in regional tensions, curtailing defense expenditure, and, as set forth in the Six Points, developing a regional defense force.

Prior to the first coup, leaders of the Awami League and Krishak Sramik (United Front) were less attracted to an alliance with the United States and more inclined to pursue a policy of nonalignment much like Pakistan was to assume during the 1970s, and this preference continued among regionalist elites through the secession and creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Advocates of an alliance were those who controlled strategic positions of public authority, who had made and maintained close contact with their counterparts in Washington, who had submitted arguments that fit prevailing U.S. conceptions of the world and petitions that would provide resources necessary for Pakistan to play out its role in the furtherance of U.S. interests and also to ensure its own. U.S. policymakers were engaged with the prevailing view of that elite, West Pakistani and Indian in origin, which prevailed in national politics in Pakistan with the exception of Suhrawardy's brief and aborted tenure. While concern had been expressed about the exclusion of East Pakistan from power, a sentiment most pronounced in the Department of State, there is no indication that it influenced U.S. policy toward Pakistan. U.S. security policy and military assistance, which gave that policy effect, augmented regional inequalities, since the armed forces, most pronouncedly the army, were composed of Punjabi and Pathan troops, probably because the ancillary economies associated with the defense establishment were located in and

benefited the western wing.

As in the case of the defense services and military assistance, economic growth and assistance were thought about primarily in terms of aggregate growth through the first two Five-Year Plans (1955–65), with a major commitment in the third plan to favored distribution to East Pakistan in order to reduce unequal regional distributions of wealth and rates of growth, with the hope of achieving per capita equity on a regional basis by 1985. A commitment to growth with equity in the form of ideology and elite commitment was not translated into effective policy, and while it became a matter of concern to foreign aid donors, it did not have a powerful impact on the extension of aid. Indeed, matters of regional equity in economic development did not constitute a major concern in U.S. analyses of economic development during this period. Domestic perceptions of the unequal realities within the aggregated polity and economy were given violent expression in the form of an internal war in 1971.

The diminution of South Asia in U.S. security calculations during this period is most vividly illustrated by the Bangladesh war. Instead of perceiving Pakistan as a hard frontline state, it was seen as a trustworthy instrumentality to serve as a conduit in the realization of a principal strategic concern—the development of relations and a rapprochement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Both the state and its leaders were seen as instrumentalities for the pursuit of this dominant objective. During the course of preparation for the Kissinger and Nixon journeys to China, minimal attention was given the political turbulence in Pakistan, and while signals were intermittently made that the United States was leaning on Pakistan’s military government to hasten its transformation and reach an accommodation with the Awami League, the evidence available suggests minimal effort of the part of the United States in this regard. Indeed, in his reconstruction of this period and these events, Kissinger observes that the United States had accepted by mid-year the inevitability of the secession of East Pakistan, refers to the political ineptitude and mismanagement of Pakistan’s military governors, and suggests that the rationale for U.S. support to the Pakistan government was instrumental in the sense that it was designed to demonstrate to the Chinese and also to Middle Eastern states the U.S. commitment to its international contracts even in the face of great adversity.

Kissinger refers to the Bangladesh crisis as the most difficult of Nixon’s first

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term, not only in terms of its inconvenience at a time of momentous change in the United States’ Asia policy, but in terms of the division within the government, particularly between the Office of the President and the Department of State, as to what policy choices should be pursued, and the resultant difficulties in managing the implementation of policy emanating from the president. Perceptions of and judgments about the constellation of political conflict in Pakistan were generally shared, as were estimates of the ultimate outcome. Judgments of what could and should be done, however, differed radically and were a function of differing conceptions of U.S. strategic interests and arenas of domestic political responsiveness. For the executive office, strategic interest was defined in global terms whereas for the Department of State, which had not been privy to the preparations for the Kissinger and Nixon visits to China, strategic interest was defined in terms of the South Asia region and the consequences of protracted internal war in Pakistan on Indo-U.S. relations. A shared interest was avoidance of war. The policy preference of the executive office was to maintain public support for the Pakistan regime while encouraging political reform and accommodation; the policy preference of State was the exercise of public criticism and the exercise of severe sanctions to exact accommodation of the Awami League and create conditions that would ensure the return of refugees from East Pakistan in India. Referents of responsiveness were primarily existing and potential allies in the international arena for the executive office, the U.S. public and their representatives, and the values that charged their outrage in the case of the Department of State. This crisis and the tensions of its aftermath dissipated with the rapidity that the immediate crisis arose, and with the United States maintaining its antecedent position of disengagement during the Bhutto era.

PHASE III: WHAT NOW?

The secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh emphasized the tenuous sinews that often bind states, a concern for the maintenance of the integrity of West Pakistan being the principal priority for the United States during the course of the Bangladesh war. The integrity of Pakistan continues to be a primary security consideration in U.S. policy toward South Asia, the realities of decentralizing, if not fissiparous, tendencies being reflected in such diverse analyses and reflections as those of Selig Harrison and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.41

The infrastructure of political groups and the party system continue to reflect provincial divisions, a direction of change in political organization that commenced within a decade of independence. While a transprovincial coalition in Pakistan was fashioned by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, that coalition itself reflected fissures on provincial lines.

This tendency toward fragmentation in party and group organization has been further encouraged by the systemic dictate of Pakistan’s military regime. The conse-

quence of constraining dissent through censorship and political coalitions and, given the predominance of Punjabi representation in the major institutions of the Pakistan state, the military and the bureaucracy have perpetuated and intensified sentiment and political identities. Thus, the irony: support for the long-term continuity of a military regime makes increasingly problematic the creation of the conditions and voluntary institutions of public political expression necessary for the successful withdrawal of the military from politics and transfer of power to a representative regime.

Another issue demanding the attention of policymakers in the efforts of the military regime to create an Islamic state—the constitution of each successive regime—has encompassed a commitment to Islamic values as a standard in the legislation of public law, and political elites have found religious symbolism and expressions of religious intent in governance instrumental in the mobilization of political support. The military regime instituted in 1977 has been more seriously committed to the Islamization of society and the creation of an Islamic state designed to ensure that social goal than any previous regime. While value incongruities between different codes of Islamic law constitute difficult, if not intractable, puzzles to be resolved in Pakistan’s community of Islamic pluralism, the conflict between the voluntarist assumptions of legislation in a representative regime and the stipulative injunctions of a social moral order constitutes a major impediment to the democratization of the Pakistan regime. U.S. attention and involvement currently, as in the past, has been excited and maintained by the international strategic context. It is impossible to comprehend the 1981 arms deal without the presence of Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan. It is difficult to understand the initial response of the U.S. government as a matter of rational decision in any other terms, especially given the less than vigorous resistance that the U.S. government demonstrated at the time of Soviet involvements elsewhere. And presently, strategic consideration, as in the terminal stages of united Pakistan, masks concerns about domestic political development.

U.S. decision-makers have also become accustomed to dealing with a given set of elites in Pakistan; a succession of U.S. presidents and vice-presidents have found the candor of their counterparts in the military and administrative services of Pakistan refreshing. Such relationships have been perceived to be enhanced by centralized regimes. However, such a structure in relationships over time exacts major costs, especially when regimes change. With regime change, the hostilities that attend them may be transferred to extranational relationships.
INTRODUCTION

In the past, Pakistan-USSR relations have been influenced largely by each country’s perceptions of its antagonistic role in South and Southwest Asia. Two factors, in particular, have contributed to persistent crises in confidence, which have effectively prevented the evolution of a stable rapprochement. First has been the Soviet Union’s failure to appreciate Pakistan’s geopolitical interests and regional threat perceptions in the historical context of South Asian politics. The second factor relates to Pakistan’s total commitment to Western strategic planning in the “northern tier,” its participation in the anti-Soviet politico-military formation.

Pakistan’s post-Bangladesh diplomacy necessitated bilateralism as a pragmatic approach to balance its relations with the major powers, but a complex variety of factors made this policy unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the evolution of Indo-Soviet strategic cooperation, and the Sino-American rapprochement resulted in immense Soviet pressures on Pakistan to withdraw from the Sino-U.S. tangle. Pakistan’s response to Soviet initiatives directed at the formation of a political grouping on the southwest flank of China has been discouraging, which has kept political relations minimal during the past decade. Political developments in Afghanistan, the Soviet military intervention, and the 1981 Pakistan-U.S. package deal have severely complicated Pakistan’s relations with the USSR, which reflect the traditional antagonistic role perception syndrome. This essay attempts to examine the strategic goals and the role perceptions in Pakistan-USSR relations with specific reference to the Afghanistan crisis.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND ROLE PERCEPTIONS

Asymmetries of geophysical size, military power, and political purposes in the geopolitical milieu of South Asia have guided Pakistan’s strategic goal formation and
regional role perceptions. The structural imbalance in the security relations of South Asia and India's endeavors to assume a dominant security role in the region have perpetuated Pakistan's apprehensions about Indian intentions. It has been the centrality of the Indian threat that has dominated Pakistan's security policies, which are directed toward achieving a reasonable level of deterrence against India's preponderant military capabilities. The augmentation of Pakistan's defense infrastructure, which was extremely limited at the time of independence, was perceived as a prerequisite to an independent national role in South and Southwest Asia.

The resource constraints on the formation of an indigenous and self-reliant defense infrastructure against a militarily threatening and politically uncompromising India severely curtailed Pakistan's diplomatic options in the early years after independence. The U.S. containment policy and the relevance of Pakistan to the "northern-tier" concept on the southern flank of the Soviet Union offered Pakistan an opportunity to break the siege of isolation. A complex mix of dominant elite preferences and the centrality of the Indian threat perception influenced Pakistan's decision to commit itself to the U.S.-sponsored security arrangements in Southeast and West Asia. While Pakistan's participation in these alliance systems was largely motivated by its desire to enhance its defense capabilities in the context of South Asian realpolitik, it provoked Moscow's hostility as Pakistan's alignment was perceived as hostile to Soviet security interests.¹

The Soviet leaders considered Pakistan's concept of Muslim nationalism and its foreign policy orientation toward pan-Islamism incompatible with their ideological interests in the Middle East. The blending of Islamic ideology with a pro-Western tilt in Pakistan's foreign policy² was suspected by the Soviets as the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc among the Muslim countries.³ The hostile images of Pakistan's role in South and Southwest Asia as the proxy of "American imperialism" highly influenced the Soviet position on the Kashmir and Pashtoonistan issues.⁴ Lack of awareness of the historical forces and fears of Islamic revivalism prevented the Soviet leaders from adopting a pragmatic and realistic view of the evolution of Muslim nationalism in South Asia and of Islamic solidarity in the adjacent region of Southwest Asia. The Soviet perception of the creation of Pakistan and the transfer of power to its nationalist leadership was simple and unsophisticated, largely due to the Soviet preference to link national independence with socialist reconstruction.

The malevolent image of the nationalist leadership as the agent of Western imperialism was corrected in the post-Stalinist era when the doctrinal view of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa gave way to pragmatism in the Soviet Union's Third World policies. Cold war rivalries and U.S. containment policy forced

¹ Pravda, Dec. 2, 1953.
² For this perspective, see a debate in Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), June 1956, pp. 37–50.
⁴ Although the Soviet Union took a pro-Indian position on Kashmir during the U.N. discussion as early as Jan. 1952, the first political statement endorsing Indian claims on the disputed territory came in Dec. 1955 when Bulganin and Krushchev visited India; see International Affairs (Moscow), Jan. 1956, pp. 206–7.
the Soviet Union to revise its position on nonalignment, which reflected a decisive shift in Soviet policies toward potentially influential nonaligned countries. India, because of its geophysical characteristics and potential for a major security role in Asia, highly influenced Soviet perceptions of the South Asian geopolitical milieu. An unambiguous pro-India position on Kashmir was a deliberate attempt by the Soviet Union to pave the way for a broad-based cooperative relationship with nonaligned India. Pakistani leaders perceived Soviet strategic goals in South Asia and its unqualified support to India as hostile to their legitimate aspirations in the region. In fact the Soviet plunge into contentious Indo-Pakistani issues to gain a diplomatic edge complicated the process of South Asian normalization because the Soviet position on Kashmir eliminated any possibility of a settlement through the United Nations.

While Pakistan benefited from its participation in the Western alliance in terms of achieving a relatively modern defense infrastructure, it failed to obtain a strategic counterpart to the Indian threat because its allies preferred to adopt a neutral posture on its disputes with India. Adherence to the regional strategic moves of the Western bloc could not balance the Indian threat to Pakistan's security. The U.S. tilt toward India during the Sino-India border conflict of 1962 highly disillusioned Pakistan because of its impact on the South Asian balance of power. Meanwhile, the eruption of a Sino-Soviet rift, the end of the Sino-Indian entente cordiale, U.S. overtures toward India, and Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the Western alliance underlined the need for a basic reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's overtures toward China and its eagerness to open a political dialogue with the Soviet Union marked the shift in its policy from total commitment to flexible options.

Being fully aware of Pakistan's disenchantment with its Western allies and its geopolitical limitations, the Soviet Union considerably softened its attitude toward Pakistan in the 1960s. The Soviet policy focused on weakening Pakistan's pro-Western ties and on preventing its growing amity with China by giving ambiguous indications of a neutral position on India-Pakistan disputes. Pakistani leaders were receptive to Soviet overtures in order to rectify lopsidedness in their pro-Western policy and to seek a Soviet role in the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India. Within the general framework of bilateralism, General Muhammad Ayub Khan visited Moscow in April 1965 to initiate a dialogue on wide-ranging political and security issues relating to South Asia. Pakistan's continued participation in Western pacts, its operation of anti-Soviet surveillance bases on its territory, and its pro-China tilt were unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. Even Pakistan's indications of an intention to terminate foreign bases and move out of the defense pacts did not effect a desired change in the USSR's South Asian policy. However, the Soviet leaders at least began to talk to Pakistan on vital security issues, stressing the need for lessening tension in South Asia.

Refusing to learn from the U.S. failure in promoting Indo-Pakistan détente in pursuit of its larger strategic interests, the Soviets sought the same against the growing influence of China in Asia. A relatively neutral position during the 1965 war and a diplomatic role in the conclusion of the Tashkent declaration between India and Pakistan earned Moscow a unique political position in South Asia; but it did not last
very long for two reasons. First, Pakistan found Soviet policies in South Asia increasingly conditioned by Indian sensitivities, which frustrated its desire for parity. The isolation and neutralization of Pakistan have been the major objectives of Indian diplomacy and are central to its endeavors toward the acknowledgment of its status as a predominant power in the region. The recognition of India’s preeminent position implies deference to India’s regional interests by external powers. The Soviet security policy in South Asia has not only recognized India’s dominant position but has considerably enhanced its hegemonical potential by providing massive sophisticated weaponry on very attractive terms. The evolution of Indo-Soviet strategic cooperation in South and Southeast Asia makes it imperative for the Soviet Union to accommodate India’s regional aspirations. India’s relatively autonomous status and strategically better bargaining position have proved an effective leverage in seeking total Soviet support and firm commitments on the primacy of its regional interests. During the past decade the Soviet attitude toward Pakistan has been considerably guided by its special ties with India that have persistently influenced Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union.5

The second factor that has remained a constant irritant in Pakistani relations with the Soviet Union is its entente cordiale with China. The Sino-Soviet cold war in Asia brought "crude pressures" 6 on countries like Pakistan to cut off relations with Beijing and preferably to participate in an Asian collective security scheme7 aimed at containing China’s influence in the Soviet hinterlands. Pakistan’s attempts to explain its growing relations with China within the framework of its policy of bilateralism were rebuked by the Soviet Union. Pakistan’s bilateralism, especially in its quest for a balanced relationship with Beijing and Moscow, was viewed by the Soviet leaders as incompatible with their desires to prevent China’s entry into South Asian affairs. Moreover, Pakistan’s response to Soviet containment strategy against China under the guise of regional economic cooperation was discouraging.8 Although Pakistan desired to use its better ties with China as a leverage to obtain Soviet concessions on the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the acknowledgment of its parity with India, the limitation of Soviet military supplies to India, and military aid for itself, it has never considered participation in Soviet-inspired anti-China strategic moves favorable to Pakistan’s long-term security interests.

Pakistan’s attempts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union in order to obtain large-scale economic and military assistance failed primarily because of Soviet rigidity in seeking Pakistan’s neutrality and detachment from its traditional friends and allies. Pakistani leaders have never favored a Moscow-tilted neutrality in expectation of military aid beneficial to their political and security interests in South and Southwest Asia. The persistent Soviet annoyance with Pakistan’s China policy and the deteriorating political situation in East Pakistan in 1970 provided the Soviets with a

7 See International Affairs, no. 7, 1969.
8 Dawn (Karachi), July 11, 1969.
long-desired opportunity to develop strategic cooperation with India, which significantly contributed to the successful Indian intervention and dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971.

The post-Bangladesh diplomacy of Pakistan has reflected a greater awareness of its political instability in less integrated areas and apprehensions about Soviet support to subnational elements. Soviet policy on the issue of four nationalities and open option on assisting secessionist forces remained unchanged in the 1970s.\(^9\) Soviet diplomatic pressures on Pakistan significantly increased in an effort to compel it to follow the Indian precedent and to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. The Soviet leaders considered Pakistan's acceptance of the Brezhnev security system essential to their flexible attitude on subregionalism and the improvement in bilateral relations. Despite the lack of congruity in perceived interests, the rate of economic cooperation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union expanded significantly in the past decade, but it has remained far below the critical level to overflow into political relations.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan considerably altered Pakistan's security environment and significantly influenced its threat perceptions. The Soviet move into Afghanistan outflanked Pakistan's geopolitics by exacerbating its security dilemma on its western borders in addition to its traditional preoccupation with a militarily and politically uncompromising India.\(^10\) The fall of the shah and the Gulf conflict have neutralized Iran's traditionally supportive role of Pakistan's quest for security against Indo-Soviet collusion. The geopolitical momentum introduced by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and political developments in the Gulf region have produced an extraordinarily hostile geostrategic condition, which has the potential of besieging Pakistan and severely limiting its security options. The end of an Afghan buffer to Soviet military activism across the Hindu Kush and growing Indo-Soviet military cooperation have imposed geopolitical isolation on Pakistan. The development of a broad strategic consensus between India and the Soviet Union, given Pakistan's geopolitical limitations, would expose Pakistan's vulnerability to a combination of threats aimed at its acquiescence to Indo-Soviet regional interests.

The increasingly effective resistance in Afghanistan and growing Soviet impatience with its pacification campaigns pose potential risks to Pakistan's security along its western borders. India's failure to recognize the geostrategic unity of the South Asian region in the face of Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan has complicated security decision-making in Pakistan as its disposition of forces would require far greater

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\(^9\) When then Foreign Minister Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972, he was told: "If history were to repeat itself, we would take the same position [in the Bangladesh crisis] because we are convinced that it was correct" (*Pravda*, March 1972).

defense resources than currently available to devise a two-front strategy. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has strengthened the geopolitical view of Soviet objectives in Pakistan, reviving old fears of Russian domination. The Afghanistan crisis once again introduced strains in Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union. It is the vast divergence of security interests and perceived roles in relation to the situation in Afghanistan that has harmed their bilateral relations.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

While there is general consensus on the issue of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan among all segments of the bureaucratic and political elites in Pakistan, the perceptions of Soviet threats and approaches toward the solution of the Afghanistan crisis are considerably varied along ideological preferences. In the following analysis, three dominant categories of Soviet threat perceptions have been examined with specific reference to their implications for Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan strengthened an alarmist view of its grand geopolitical designs aiming at access to the warm-water ports in the northern zone of the Indian Ocean. Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan have tended to combine an expansionist perspective of the Soviet Union with an ideological threat to Pakistan’s national integrity. In the past these groups have been skeptical about Pakistan’s overtures toward the communist countries by widely publicizing Soviet colonization of Muslim states in Central Asia. They seem to have concluded that through economic and technical cooperation, the Soviet Union seeks political and ideological penetration in vital areas of national life, making pro-Soviet identification irreversible. In the past, these groups stressed caution and keeping one’s distance from the Soviet Union. The pro-Indian Soviet policies and the traditionally hostile attitude toward Pakistan have been effectively capitalized upon by the Pakistan right to project a Soviet threat. The Soviet military intervention and its suppression of the Afghan masses have considerably strengthened these groups in Pakistan.

Islamic fundamentalist groups hostile to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan advocate an active military role for Pakistan in providing arms, sanctuaries, and training to the Mujahdeen. Groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami have tended to view Afghan resistance in terms of an ideological conflict with communism. They argue that without sufficient military pressures from the Mujahdeen and international political support of the Afghan resistance, the Soviet Union will never contemplate a withdrawal from Afghanistan. These groups perceive a convergence of strategic

interests among Pakistan, the Mujahedeen, and the Western powers. Because of the perceived compatibility of strategic interests among such a combination of diverse forces, a common approach to the Soviet intervention has been stressed. Pakistan’s role in the outcome of the Afghan resistance has been considered crucial. Substantial commitments to the Afghan resistance would raise the cost of the Soviet presence, which would compel them to take a reasonable position on a political settlement.

This confrontationist approach appears to rest on false assumptions and speculative content. First, the ideological orientation of the resistance has great potential for mobilization, but at the same time it is responsible for divisions in the rank and file of resistance groups. The Islamic nationalist groups have resisted interference by the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami in the affairs of the resistance, which they claim has played a decisive role. Second, there is total lack of any strategic cooperation among the Mujahedeen, Pakistan, Muslim countries, and the West. Americans and West Europeans are rather allergic to any Islamic liberation struggles. Common disapproval of Soviet intervention or a common interest in seeking a Soviet withdrawal has not amounted to a strategic consensus. Finally, Pakistan’s defense potential and its vulnerable geostrategic position between traditionally hostile India and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan impose absolute limitations regarding its confrontational role in Afghanistan. Confrontation with the Soviet Union would be suicidal in the present situation.

A combination of regionalist politicians and narrow-based leftist groups has argued that the Soviet threat to Pakistan has been exaggerated for political reasons. The regionalist leftist point of view perceives a natural collusion between the military-bureaucratic elite and the Islamic fundamentalists led by the Jamaat-i-Islami because of their identical interests in shaping a new political order and leaning toward the West. The regionalist leftist groups have supported the Afghanistan revolution and have blamed the Pakistani authorities of collaborating with the Afghan feudals and mullahs for destabilizing the 1978 revolution. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from their point of view was defensive and posed no threat to Pakistan’s security.

The regionalist/leftist groups have advocated a neutral policy for Pakistan on the issue of Soviet intervention and suggest some form of accommodation with the Soviets as geopolitical realism because opposition to the strategic interests of a superpower would result in self-destruction. They have argued that Pakistan has destabilized the revolutionary process in Afghanistan by inciting rebellion and providing sanctuaries to the Mujahedeen. Pakistan’s perceived involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is considered by the regionalist/leftists as central to the Soviet intervention. From this perspective, Soviet intervention was largely defensive against the “Pakistan-backed” interference. These groups have opposed the Pakistani-U.S. package deal of 1981, perceiving it as a dangerous involvement in superpower rivalry.

It has been argued that Pakistan should not risk its future security by tying itself to the U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf. Similarly, they have warned against the higher risks of internationalizing the Afghan issue and leading the collective condemnation of the Third World against the Soviet Union.

In my view there are basic flaws in the premises of this perspective. First, there is a misplaced emphasis on Pakistan's role in stirring the mass revolt in Afghanistan. Given the magnitude of the Afghan uprising, it would be impossible for an external power to mobilize the masses on that scale, which the Soviet Union has found so difficult to pacify during the past five years. Second, Pakistan has not plunged into an alliance with the United States and has refused to grant bases, rejecting the idea of a regional "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union. Pakistan's declared policy that it "could never accept the principle of occupation of another country by force"\(^{15}\) reflects genuine fears of Soviet expansionism. Third, the resistance war in Afghanistan has expanded over the years and has grown complex with the involvement of diverse ideological and security interests. Pakistan can only marginally influence the conflict strategies of the Mujahedeen groups who have achieved significant capacity for autonomous decision making. Finally, a neutral position on the Afghanistan crisis for the purpose of appeasing Soviet strategic interests in the operative geopolitical environment of Pakistan would be a worse type of capitulation, making its present situation with the burden of 3 million refugees highly complex and its future role in the area completely uncertain.

The perceptions of the military regime, moderate politicians, and intellectuals have oscillated between a geopolitical view adopted by the Islamic fundamentalists and the capitulationist perspective reflected by the regionalist/leftist groups. The security elites in Pakistan have been considerably disturbed by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in terms of its long-term geopolitical implications. The mainstream view in Pakistan considers the Soviet Union a dynamic and expansionist power capable of exploiting political opportunities in adjacent areas. Soviet military intervention has not only destroyed the sovereign and nonaligned status of Muslim Afghanistan but has brought the USSR closer to Pakistan's dangerously exposed western borders where subnationalism has remained considerably strong until recently. Therefore, uninhibited use of the most sophisticated military power in the subjugation of the Afghan masses has invoked logical fears in Pakistan about Soviet expansionist designs in the region.

The Soviet threat perceptions have considerably altered Pakistan's diplomatic and security policies. Although Pakistan participated in the "northern-tier" strategic formation long ago, it has for the first time identified itself strongly with the U.S. and West European perception of a Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. Pakistan has highlighted its "backdoor" significance to the Persian Gulf security, demanding adequate attention to its weak strategic position in the face of a Soviet threat. While a Soviet military push toward Pakistan remains improbable at present, an unstable

\(^{15}\) *Dawn*, July 11, 1984.
political situation and a foreign-inspired secessionist movement in Baluchistan might provide the Soviets an opportunity to influence political developments in Pakistan.

Although Pakistan has played a leading role in condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Conference, it has preferred a political solution of the Afghanistan crisis. The Pakistani leadership has been careful to avoid the extremes of the confrontationist strategy of the Islamic fundamentalists and the capitulationist policy of the regionalist/leftist groups. Recognizing the proximity of the Soviet coercive potential and the limitations of its geopolitical system, Pakistan has adopted a pragmatic approach by involving itself in the U.N.-sponsored indirect Geneva talks for the peaceful solution of the Afghanistan crisis. Pakistani leaders have entered into the Geneva talks on the assumption that under some conditions the Soviets might be tempted to pull out their troops from Afghanistan, but at the same time they point out that Russian troops have never withdrawn easily wherever they have entered.16

A commitment to the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated political solution of the Afghanistan crisis has attained popular support in Pakistan since 1982.17 In view of the geopolitical constraints and absolute limitations of its defense capability, this is the only realistic option to seeking a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The major political parties in Pakistan have even taken a public stand in favor of the recognition of the Karmal regime and direct talks with Karmal to resolve the Afghan crisis.18 Although Pakistan has sought an “integrated” settlement on the basis of four principles—(1) withdrawal of foreign forces, (2) restoration of Afghan independence, (3) return of refugees, and (4) self-determination for the Afghan people—it would be “strategically irrational to oppose Moscow’s legitimate national interests to this or other areas of the world.”19 Because of inherent complexities in the Geneva process, the discussions have become stalled on the issue of international guarantees of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and a binding timeframe within which the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces. For practical reasons, these two issues have become interlinked. The Soviets are reluctant to announce a time table for a gradual pullout unless there are international guarantees.

Keeping in view the geopolitical dynamics of the Southwest Asian region and a long history of stable control at any cost in its traditional sphere of influence, the Soviet Union will not compromise its self-defined political and security interests in Afghanistan. The Soviet ideologues have argued that their forces intervened to help the “democratic forces” consolidate and secure revolutionary gains by emphasizing the legalistic aspects of an “invitation” from the “legitimate” government of Afghanistan. Although the ex post facto legitimation attempts seem superficial, their effectiveness would be ensured by the dialectics of power politics. Therefore, a political

16 President Zia’s speech at the tenth session of the Majlis-i-Shoora, Dawn, July 15, 1984.
settlement from the Soviet point of view must acknowledge the legitimacy of its interests in stabilizing a pro-Moscow regime in Kabul and in ensuring the neutralization of internal and external threats.

The Soviets have persistently accused Pakistan of interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and of waging an undeclared war against them. Pakistan has also been accused of providing sanctuaries to the Afghan rebels, allowing training activities for the counterrevolutionaries, and permitting the flow of weapons to the insurgents. The Soviets keep warning Pakistan against its alleged alliance with China and the United States, which is perceived as directed against the USSR’s legitimate role in the region. For its own part, Pakistan has made strenuous efforts to defuse the Afghan situation and to isolate its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union from their antagonistic interests and role perception in Afghanistan. Pakistan has responded cautiously to the Karmal-Soviet provocations on its borders. Frequent violations of Pakistani air space and bombardments inside its territory killing hundreds of people have not invoked a Pakistani response except formal protest notes. While not yielding to Soviet pressure to recognize the Karmal regime and disband the political organizations of the Mujahedeen based in the bordering areas, Pakistan has carefully avoided causing a serious rupture in its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

Pakistan and the Soviet Union have been able to insulate economic cooperation from their differences about the Afghanistan crisis. Pakistani leaders have even claimed that Pakistan enjoyed good relations with the Soviet Union with whom it has no bilateral problem. Pakistan has maintained a strong interest in Soviet economic and technical assistance. The Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan has amounted to 678.95 million rubles, including 440 million rubles for the Karachi steel mill, which is the biggest project of Pakistan-Soviet collaboration and is nearing completion. Soviet credits have been utilized for oil exploration, power generation, and the import/manufacture of tractors. Pakistan’s finance minister visited Moscow in December 1983, which resulted in several agreements relating to construction of a 630 MW thermal power plant at Multan at the cost of $227 million, the supply of two oil drilling rigs, construction of a prefabricated housing plant, and establishment of a metallurgical training center at the steel mill. Pakistan plans to continue to explore Soviet interest in various projects specified in the sixth five-year plan. The insulation of economic cooperation from mutually hostile attitudes in the Afghanistan situation has been the most striking element in Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations, which have considerably cooled off during the past five years. The political stalemate of Afghanistan, however, might prevent Soviet commitment to large-scale project aid.

Dawn, June 12, 1981.


See International Affairs, April 1980, p. 85.


CONCLUSION

Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have been largely determined by its relations with other states. Pakistan's participation in U.S.-led security systems and later its close relations with China considerably influenced the Soviet Union's South Asian policies. The intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia and the evolution of Indo-Soviet strategic cooperation had a definite impact on Pakistan-Soviet relations. The Soviet attempts to wean Pakistan away from the Sino-American influence have been perceived as a part of its neutralization strategy. Pakistan's endeavors to balance its relations with the Soviet Union under the framework of bilateralism have met with little success. The mutual perceptions of adversary roles have sharpened with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and effective Mujahedeen resistance with the influx of over 3 million refugees have significantly destabilized Pakistan's geopolitical environment. The perception of a Soviet threat on its western borders, in addition to the traditional dangers from India, and fears of Indo-Soviet collusion have severely constrained Pakistan's strategic options. Identical perceptions of the Soviet threat to the region and some convergence of security interests between Pakistan and the United States have revived the latter's interest in Pakistan's integrity. Although the U.S. economic assistance and military sales program has filled serious gaps in Pakistan's defense posture, it remains far below the required level of capability to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Pakistani leaders recognize the limitations of security relationship with the United States under the 1959 bilateral defense agreement. U.S. commitments are perceived as fuzzy, uncertain, and subject to American domestic political compulsions and changes in its global strategic priorities. By itself, Pakistan seriously lacks the required combination of diplomatic, political, and strategic forces to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Recognizing the severe limitations of its geostrategic system and the realism of Soviet power, Pakistan has attempted to defuse tension in Afghanistan and maintain a nonadversary relationship with the Soviet Union. Pakistani leaders have carefully avoided antagonizing the Soviets. While remaining uncompromising on the issue of recognizing the Karmal regime, Pakistan has pursued political options for the solution of the Afghanistan crisis. There is general consensus among all influential groups in Pakistan for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's sovereign and nonaligned status, and the extension of economic assistance to the refugees. However, different approaches have been advocated on how to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan and on how to restore the country's independence, leading to the repatriation of refugees.

Frequent violations of Pakistan's air space, the bombing of border areas, and the concentration of Karmal-Soviet forces along strategic points have caused considerable alarm in Islamabad. Soviet communications to Pakistan have been hostile, alleging its complicity in the freedom struggle of the Afghan Mujahedeen. They have frequently leveled charges of operating training camps, providing sanctuaries, and
facilitating arms supplies to the anti-Karmal forces. The Soviet threat posture has caused a total revision of Pakistan's strategic outlook, introducing uncertainties in bilateral relations.
11. U.S. Policy Toward the USSR: South Asian Issues

Richard P. Cronin

INTRODUCTION

The United States and the Soviet Union interact at two fundamentally different but nonetheless linked levels. The first concerns strategic weapons that pose a mortal threat to each other’s societies. The second concerns more traditional geostrategic rivalries. The two levels of interaction are primarily linked at key nodal points: Western Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia, where the dominance of one power or the other threatens to shift fundamentally the strategic balance.

The Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have tended to draw South Asia into nodal point rivalry. Nominally, the stakes remain primarily regional, not those classically identified as a “vital interest,” and thus constitute a modern variant of the “great game.” The game is nonetheless a most serious one. Afghanistan may, of itself, have limited strategic importance, but Pakistan’s importance to Western interests in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea is long-standing, as is India’s importance to the Indian Ocean and, indirectly, to the Sino-Soviet balance in Asia. Moreover, long-standing U.S. opposition to Soviet aggression ensures that a Soviet attack on Pakistan would be regarded as a major East-West crisis regardless of Pakistan’s relative strategic importance.

The most immediate risk for the United States is that the Soviet Union will, in time, become the security manager of South Asia by dominating Pakistan and excluding U.S. and Chinese influence. The USSR has continued to offer both the carrot and the stick to Pakistan in regard to the country’s policy of giving refuge to the Afghan Mujahedeen and in 1984 enhanced its military ties to India. It has positioned

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itself to take advantage of either a political or military collapse of the Khomeini regime in Iran.

India-Pakistan enmity may offer the best Soviet opportunity to neutralize Pakistan and expand Soviet influence. Given its friendship with India and its military position astride Pakistan’s northern border, the Soviet Union would be the main beneficiary of a new conflict. It would be well poised both to limit India’s advance by rationing supplies of expendable stores and simultaneously to pressure Pakistan toward the bargaining table by military threat while extending “protection” in return for a complaisant policy on Afghanistan.

The succession of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi may offer some possibility of reduced Soviet influence in New Delhi and a decrease in India-Pakistan tension. Certainly the Soviet media campaign to tar the United States with complicity in the assassination suggests concern in the USSR about the degree of influence Moscow may have in the future. At the same time, there are few if any incentives for New Delhi to downgrade substantially the Indo-Soviet relationship. While Indira Gandhi’s open suspicion of Pakistan and the United States complicated relations with both countries, few would argue that her policies were not in consonance with Indian interests as seen by the policymaking elite. Moreover, enduring factors such as the unsettled Kashmir issue, mutual concerns about interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and the nuclear activities of both countries are unlikely to change significantly for the better unless the leaders of both countries are prepared to seek more than cosmetic changes in their policies toward each other.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet threat to South Asia and the resultant involvement of the United States in support of Pakistan’s security will continue. The challenge for the United States will be to bolster Pakistan without contributing to India-Pakistan hostility, to persuade both countries to exercise restraint regarding their nuclear activities, and to leave no stone unturned to promote regional cooperation—ultimately the best bulwark against Soviet expansionism.

CONTRADICTORY THEMES IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE 1945

No study of U.S.-Soviet relations concerning South Asia should begin without reference to the larger sweep of superpower interaction since World War II. For Pakistan this issue has special importance since its national policy concerning the Afghanistan situation and its overall security posture must be heavily influenced by expectations regarding U.S.-Soviet relations.

Since 1945 the United States and the Soviet Union have interacted at two fundamentally different but linked levels. The first involves strategic weapons that pose a mortal threat to each other’s survival. The second level of interaction concerns traditional geostrategic rivalries. Both levels of interaction operate simultaneously and, often, in synergistic fashion.
Strategic Competition

The postwar era has seen an almost unrelenting competition for strategic nuclear advantage. At stake is not only national survival but the means to influence geostrategic competition. Strategic nuclear competition occasionally has been interrupted by efforts to achieve arms limitation agreements and to channel nuclear weapons development, as in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Agreement, and SALT. These agreements are pursued both to achieve greater stability and to prevent forms of competition that would be mutually disadvantageous.

Geostrategic Rivalry

Geostrategic competition reflects more traditional great-power rivalry but has also been affected by two modern phenomena: ideological competition and nuclear weapons. Alternative strategic theories have influenced U.S. policy at different points in time. The "globalist" approach sees the U.S.-Soviet relationship as the dominating issue in U.S. policy and subordinates most other interests to containing the Soviets militarily and opposing them ideologically on a worldwide basis. This approach was most apparent in the Dulles era, with its emphasis on alliance building around the periphery of the Soviet Union and ideological competition in the Third World.

A second approach gives primary attention to strategic nodal points—Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia—with reliance in other areas on pro-U.S. surrogates or "regional influentials." This approach was prevalent during the 1970s both as an offshoot of détente and the "Nixon doctrine" and in South Asia held sway until the fall of the shah. Some see a partial resurgence of this approach in the present security relationship with Pakistan.

A third view—which, it has been aptly noted, remains "global in precisely the same sense as the more traditional geopolitics of Kissinger or Dulles"—emphasises non-Soviet threats to U.S. interests such as nuclear proliferation, regional arms build-ups, and human rights violations. This view activated the early Carter administration, which combined the new globalism with an emphasis on Europe and Japan as the key areas of strategic interest and a reliance on regional influentials elsewhere. The results of that worldview—which essentially deemphasized the Soviet threat—included an abortive effort to scale down U.S. troop strength in South Korea, the negotiation of SALT II, the initiation of talks to limit naval forces in the Indian Ocean, liberalized Soviet access to U.S. technology and grain, and an emphasis—sometimes at the expense of other regional security interests—on measures against nuclear proliferation.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not erase these other threats to U.S. interests, such as were made manifest in the Iranian revolution. But the United States returned to the more traditional view that the USSR represented the most important

threat to U.S. interests, that the maintenance of a stable balance of power across all areas of potential conflict served U.S. interests and world peace, and that measures to combat the Soviet threat served, in many cases, to address other threats as well.

**Linkage**

Strategic nuclear and geostrategic competition have always been linked. U.S. nuclear superiority in the 1950s clearly influenced the policy of the United States to construct a credible alliance system along the periphery of the Soviet Union and China. The emergence of crude nuclear parity in the 1970s, coupled with the U.S. need for tacit Soviet and Chinese support for an "honorable" withdrawal from Vietnam, set the stage for the era of SALT and détente. Many would argue that the dawn of rough strategic nuclear equivalence, coupled with the post-Vietnam reluctance of the United States to risk foreign military involvements, encouraged new Soviet adventurism in Third World areas of potential strategic importance in the late 1970s such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

Linkage came to have a special meaning in the parlance of the U.S. strategic arms debate during the early 1970s. An underlying principle of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy for negotiations was that the arms agreements ought to be at least tacitly matched by Soviet cooperation elsewhere. Ideally, the linkage of arms negotiations with other steps would create a web of relationships that would channel Soviet energies into development rather than military expansionism. An alternative view, which holds that arms agreements are completely justifiable in their own right, is compelling in theory but has been burdened with the practical problem of gaining public support for arms agreements in the face of Soviet aggression. Thus, SALT II fell victim in the U.S. Senate to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

**SOUTH ASIA IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS**

**The Cold War Years**

Historically, South Asia has been a consistent but seldom active area of U.S.-Soviet competition. The seeds of the competition can be found in the World War II occupation of Iran by both the Soviet Union in the north and the Western allies in the south, and the emerging dependence of Europe and the United States on the oil of the Persian Gulf. The United States won the first rounds when it assisted in forcing the

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3 The treaty's chances were first marred by concern about Soviet expansionism in Africa and the fall of the shah of Iran, with the resultant loss of ICBM test monitoring capabilities.
Soviet withdrawal from Iran’s Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces in 1946, incorporated Turkey in the NATO alliance in 1952, restored the shah of Iran to power in 1953, brought Pakistan into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and sponsored the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization—CENTO) in 1955, which included Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. The fall of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 proved a setback but one that did not greatly benefit the Soviet Union. The United States further shored up its position in the region in 1959 when it concluded identical bilateral security agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

U.S.-Soviet Détente in South Asia: 1962–71

During the mid-1960s, the Sino-Soviet split and growing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia reduced South Asia as an area of U.S.-Soviet competition. Both the United States directly and the Soviets indirectly supported India in the 1962 border war with China. Both countries were committed to keeping the 1965 India-Pakistan war at the level of a regional conflict. The Soviets brokered a peace settlement at Tashkent with no indication of U.S. disapproval. Likewise, the United States showed no serious concern when, in the late 1960s, Moscow began to offer limited military aid to Pakistan in a bid to counter Beijing’s growing influence. The United States took comfort in the resounding failure of Brezhnev’s proposal for an Asian collective security pact.

For all practical purposes, the United States disengaged from South Asia during the mid-to-late 1960s. The reasons are varied. Much was explainable in terms of the deepening U.S. combat role in Vietnam. Much else was attributable to disillusionment with its alliance system in the region, including Pakistan’s short-sighted opposition to U.S. support of India in the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflicts, and Pakistan’s own friendship with China and its failures, as a SEATO ally, even rhetorically to support the United States in Vietnam.

The U.S. public and the Congress were especially disillusioned by the fact that India and Pakistan went to war in 1965 with U.S. arms for aims that had nothing to do with U.S. interests. Few Americans believed the war was necessary, and most who had knowledge of regional affairs saw Pakistan as having provoked if not initiated the conflict. One important aspect of this disengagement was a ten-year embargo on arms sales to the region with the exception of replacement items. India, never dependent on U.S. arms, became increasingly tied to Soviet arms whereas Pakistan looked to China and France.5

The U.S. disengagement, albeit moderated by massive food aid to India during 1967–68 and substantial economic aid to Pakistan, gave a relatively clear field to the Soviet Union. Moscow’s failure to make major gains owes more to the tenacious nationalism of South Asian countries and the limited ability of South Asian economies to utilize Soviet aid than to any action by the United States.

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The 1971 War

The signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty for peace and friendship and the subsequent war with Pakistan drew the United States back into South Asian affairs, though too late to affect significantly the outcome of the conflict. Despite shows of force by both superpowers, the United States still did not regard the conflict as primarily a U.S.-Soviet issue. Rather, it sought to warn India against any all-out attack to dismember Pakistan in the west and to protect the nascent opening to China—a critical factor in Nixon and Kissinger’s plans to get out of Vietnam—by demonstrating that the United States could be a reliable partner. The United States was only secondarily concerned about any increase in Soviet influence resulting from an Indian victory.

The United States Opt Out—1972–79

The relatively low level of concern about the Soviet role in the region continued to be reinforced by the American preoccupation with Vietnam, and, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the OPEC oil embargo, the Middle East. As part of his strategy for withdrawing from Vietnam, President Nixon propounded the “Nixon doctrine,” with its reliance on “regional influentials” to look after Western security in low-threat areas. In South Asia that role fell to the shah of Iran. With regard to the Soviet threat to the region, a senior Defense Department official noted that this concern

was paramount during the height of the cold war but with the gradual improvement in relations between the USSR and Iran and between the USSR and ourselves, the threat of Soviet overt military action against the sovereignty and independence of states in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula has lessened and is no longer a cause of immediate concern.6

The United States became a negligible factor in the region during the mid-1970s. It closed its AID mission in India in 1972 and turned a newly built residential complex in South Delhi over to the Indian government. It ceased to be a factor in Pakistan’s security save for a modest flow of spare parts. Following India’s 1974 nuclear test, Pakistan launched a diplomatic campaign for a relaxation of the American ban on exports of “lethal” arms to the region, but with only limited success. Although the United States agreed in February 1975 to consider cash sales on a case-by-case basis, as early as 1976 Pakistan’s efforts to acquire the A-7 light attack aircraft foundered on the shoals of its plan to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France.

In the late 1970s the Soviet threat to South Asia could not have been further from the minds of the Carter administration policymakers. In South Asia, the main perceived threats to U.S. interests and the main areas of policy initiatives were nuclear

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proliferation, soaring conventional arms sales, and human rights. The administration symbolically reinstated an $80 million aid program in India after the election of the Janata government in 1977, released a delayed shipment of fuel for the Tarapur power complex, and generally prepared to deputize India as the locally dominant power. As for Pakistan, the administration strongly disapproved of its nuclear activities and, later, the overthrow and execution of its elected leader. The United States canceled the pending sale of 110 A-7s—which had been promoted by the Defense Department but opposed by the State Department since the Ford administration.\(^7\)

Seeking to pressure Pakistan to cancel the pending contract for a French reprocessing facility, the Carter administration acted under the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Sec. 670) to suspend U.S. aid in August 1978. Aid was renewed in October of that year after the French backed out of the deal.\(^8\)

In response to evidence of Pakistan's acquisition of uranium-enrichment technology, the Carter administration suspended aid again in April 1979, this time under the 1977 Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Sec. 669), which prohibits aid to nonnuclear weapons states that acquired unsafeguarded nuclear-enrichment technology. The administration subsequently squared the circle by cutting off nuclear fuel shipments to India as was required under the terms of the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,\(^9\) thus foreclosing any possibility of effecting a realignment toward India or significantly undercutting Soviet influence.

**SOUTH ASIA IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE 1979**

The December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan upset both the personal assumptions of Carter administration principals about the willingness of the Soviet Union to use force against neighboring countries and specific calculations about U.S. interests in South Asia. Step by step, the invasion moved South Asia to the forefront of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Carter administration had taken a relatively sanguine view of the April 1978 Afghan coup. It consciously avoided characterizing the regime as "communist" to avoid invoking Section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act, thereby maintaining a


\(^8\) Thornton, "Between the Stools," p. 967.

\(^9\) The Carter administration had asked Congress, during consideration of the 1978 nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, not to structure the legislation so as to require the renegotiation of existing cooperation agreements such as the U.S.-India agreement on Tarapur. Congress rejected this advice, however, and made all exports subject to the revised requirement that a recipient country put all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards. Because India was regarded by many in Congress as a principal proliferation offender, there was little support for incorporating an exemption for existing fuel supply arrangements and strong sentiment that the act should run its course when, after the expiration of a two-year grace period, India had not agreed to full-scope safeguards. See Richard P. Cronin, "U.S. Uranium Fuel Exports to India: A Case Study," in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Congress and Foreign Policy—1980*, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 90–104.
small humanitarian-oriented aid program and, hopefully, some residual U.S. influence. Concern grew sharply after the kidnapping and killing of the U.S. ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs—himself a top Soviet specialist in the State Department—in a police shoot-out in which Soviet advisers played an active role. The administration announced a sharp cut in the existing $14 million a year aid program in February 1979, but aid was not cut entirely until August, after Congress passed legislation forbidding aid until the Afghan government officially apologized for Dubs’s death and promised to protect U.S. diplomats in the future.

The Carter administration became much more concerned about Soviet intentions toward Afghanistan in the summer of 1979 as the ranks of Soviet advisers and security troops grew rapidly. In August 1979 in a policy speech by national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the administration indirectly warned the Soviets of their growing intervention by pointedly noting U.S. restraint in Iran and stating: “We expect others similarly to abstain from intervention and from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply religious and nationally conscious peoples.” Neither Afghanistan nor the Soviet Union were mentioned by name, however. Concern continued to grow throughout the fall, especially after September when the Soviets had several thousand troops in place in Kabul. U.S. warnings to the Soviets increased following the airlift of Soviet armor forces to Bagram airfield on December 8–9, 1979.

Despite these omens, the Carter administration was deeply shaken by the December 27 invasion. The president sent Brezhnev a message on the hot line, warning that Soviet action was “a clear threat to the peace” that “could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations.” He urged the Soviets to draw back, lest the invasion “jeopardize the course of United States-Soviet relations throughout the world.” These warnings were to no avail, of course, with the inevitable consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Soviet invasion rapidly created a new consensus in the United States in favor of meeting Soviet challenges on a global basis—but especially in the Persian Gulf. The first step in defining this role was President Carter’s State of the Union message of January 23, 1980, in which he declared:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The swift and ruthless Soviet action revitalized, in the American mind, the rationale that had underlay the “northern-tier” alliance system of the 1950s. Within weeks the United States had not only elevated the security of the Persian Gulf to the

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11 Public Law 96–53, Sec. 505; 93 stat. 378 (incorporated as Sec. 620D, 22 U.S.C. 2374).
14 Ibid., p. 472.
16 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 473.
level of a vital interest but had also articulated a new geostrategic formulation known as “Southwest Asia,” with Pakistan as anchor of its eastern flank.

From the outset U.S. policymakers saw the invasion in the broader context of the situation in Poland and the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran. They were less concerned about an immediate Soviet advance beyond Afghanistan than at the precedent that this action represented and the opportunities that it provided regarding Iran and Pakistan should the Soviets consolidate their hold. Accordingly, the administration sought an across-the-board response that would deter further Soviet adventures, if not produce a withdrawal.

The Carter administration’s response contained both bilateral and multilateral steps. These included an attempt, only partially successful, to organize a worldwide embargo of grain sales and a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, as well as specific bilateral steps such as the termination of high-technology sales and exports of oil-drilling equipment, a reduction of fishing rights, and an indefinite postponement of cultural exchanges.

The administration attempted without success to insulate the Afghanistan issue from certain other vital areas of East-West interaction. It was only with great reluctance that the administration put the SALT II agreement on the shelf. The president withdrew the treaty from Senate floor consideration not to cancel it but to prevent its defeat. As late as March 1980 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told a meeting of the private Council on Foreign Relations that SALT II was neither a carrot nor a stick. Rather, he said: “It stands on its own merits as an integral part of our national security policy.” He went on to note that it was not in the U.S. “interest to forego its security advantages. Nor is it in our interest, during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations that has been built over more than two decades.”

Regional Aspects of the Initial U.S. Response

In response to the specific localized threat to U.S. interests posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration initiated a major reversal of policy. The most significant aspect was a transposing of priorities in South Asia. Almost immediately the administration moved toward repairing its ties with Pakistan. These had been deeply scarred by the November 1979 burning of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several cultural centers in response to false reports broadcast from Iran that the United States was somehow involved in the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca. The immediate aim was to prevent the further unraveling of Western interests along the southern periphery of the Soviet Union.

The effort to restore ties with Pakistan could only be achieved through a major reordering of the administration’s priorities, namely, the supercession of regional

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17 Ibid.
security over nonproliferation and, to a lesser extent, human rights concerns. This decision was made easier by the return of Indira Gandhi to power in India in national elections held in early January 1980. India’s pro-Soviet reaction drafted during the intervening week between the elections and the installation of the new government and its abstention on the first U.N. vote to condemn the invasion served notice that India could not be relied upon to lead any regional coalition against the Soviet move. Consequently, the United States had little choice but to look to Pakistan, which was in any event now on the front line of Soviet expansionism.

The immediate results of the policy change were disappointing. Both Brzezinski’s mission to Islamabad in February and Clark Clifford’s simultaneous mission to New Delhi achieved no significant result. Pakistan, in particular, was disappointed by the administration’s $400 million “peanuts” aid offer and put off by U.S. insistence on an immediate decision to accommodate the congressional budget cycle. President Zia had hoped for a stronger statement of support against all possible security threats, not conditioned by the requirements of U.S. constitutional processes, and an aid offer more in line with a multibillion dollar “wish list.”

Despite the rejection of the U.S. aid offer, the United States and Pakistan found it mutually advantageous to move toward closer political and security cooperation. According to press accounts, the Carter administration almost immediately began a limited covert program to supply the Afghan resistance forces with weapons to prevent the consolidation of the Soviet position. Meanwhile, Pakistan maneuvered astutely to organize a broad Islamic and Third World front against the Soviet occupation, thus ratifying and reinforcing a long-term move toward closer integration with the Gulf countries and the Non-Aligned Movement and achieving a certain insulation from any further Soviet aggression.

Reagan Administration’s Response

The Reagan administration, which took office in January 1981, undertook a much more ambitious restructuring of U.S. defense policy and security relationships in the region. The release of the hostages on the eve of the inauguration relieved a major constraint on U.S. policy in South Asia. The new administration initiated an ambitious return to globalism—a strategy that seemed to take its cue from an article by Paul Nitze in the fall 1980 issue of Foreign Affairs. Nitze, later to become the chief Reagan arms control negotiator, argued:

The principal task of the early 1980s must be to check, blunt and so far as possible, frustrate the integrated Soviet strategies while the energies of many nations similarly threatened have an opportunity to become mobilized and linked so as to reverse the currently adverse trends in the correlation of forces.

In his confirmation hearings, the new secretary of state, Alexander Haig,

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similarly called for a “consensus of like-minded peoples” to combat Soviet expansionism while Richard Burt, director of politico-military affairs at the State Department, defined in congressional testimony a strategic region including the Middle East, Turkey, the Horn of Africa, and Pakistan.

While the administration never achieved the most ambitious formulation of its strategic consensus, it made great strides in increasing the U.S. presence and influence in the region. Two steps taken during 1981 were especially significant. First, it went ahead with a Carter administration proposal to sell the E3-C AWACS and a F-15 range enhancement package to Saudi Arabia and narrowly beat back an effort to overturn the sale in Congress. Second, in September 1981, Undersecretary of State James Buckley went to Islamabad and completed negotiations on a $3.2 billion, six-year package of military and economic assistance to Pakistan.

The Pakistan agreement was especially important to the administration’s strategy in South Asia due to the country’s role in organizing Islamic and nonaligned opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan was the only country through which the United States could directly influence the situation in Afghanistan.

As in the case of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, the Pakistan package faced difficult hurdles in Congress. Opponents feared that the package, especially the sale of F-16 fighters, would be destabilizing to the India-Pakistan balance. The strongest opposition, however, derived from concern about Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Ultimately, Congress accepted the need for U.S. aid to Pakistan—despite misgivings about selling the F-16s—and seemed also to accept that the kind of nuclear guarantees that the United States desired could not be obtained. Congress did, however, attach conditions to its decision to waive the applicability of the Symington Amendment to Pakistan for a period of six years. Collateral revisions to the companion Glenn Amendment (sec. 670) required a cutoff of U.S. aid if Pakistan or any other non-weapons state transferred or acquired a nuclear weapon or detonated a nuclear device.

RESULTS OF U.S. POLICY

Some five years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it is possible to assess the results of U.S. policy in terms of broad American objectives. Although mixed, the

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overall achievements are impressive, especially given the special disadvantages of the United States in the region.

Achievements

The Soviet invasion came at a time when the United States could hardly have been more poorly positioned to respond. As of December 1979 the hostages remained in Iran, relations with Pakistan were at an all-time low, the United States and the West in general were perceived as being under great pressure from a rising wave of Islamic fundamentalism, and the newly achieved diplomatic ties with China were under stress over U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Some of the main achievements include the following:

1. **Strengthened Ties to Pakistan.** Although President Zia rejected the Carter administration’s initial $400 million “peanuts” offer of renewed aid, the two countries quickly drew closer together. Following eighteen months of hard bargaining, they agreed on a long-term package that addressed Pakistan’s perceived security needs. The administration managed to steer the program through a Congress that wished to support Pakistan because of the new Soviet threat but remained deeply troubled and divided over Islamabad’s nuclear activities. After a difficult first two years, the administration managed to build a growing public consensus behind the policy and—apart from continuing serious reservations about the nuclear issue—strong support for the full complement of aid.

These results were achieved without any compromise of Pakistan’s independence. Although U.S. military planners might wish for closer defense cooperation so that U.S. forces could more efficiently and expeditiously come to Pakistan’s defense, if necessary, both countries are fully agreed that there is no need and no political support for U.S. bases in the country. Pakistan has carried on its indirect negotiations with the Soviet Union for a political solution to the Afghanistan issue completely on its own initiative and has made its policy based on an independent judgment of where its interests lie—taking into account not only the views of the United States but also those of other important friends and allies, its judgment of Soviet capabilities and intentions, the views of the Afghan refugees and resistance groups, and the attitudes of the people of Pakistan.

2. **Renewed Confidence in U.S. Power and Commitment.** Notwithstanding considerable handicaps in the region, especially the U.S.-Israeli relationship, the last five years have witnessed growing confidence in the ability of the United States to play a stabilizing role. Resurgent American influence in the Gulf and Southwest Asia has survived major challenges to the U.S. image in the Islamic world, including the Israeli invasion of northern Lebanon and the ill-fated U.S. effort to play a stabilizing role in Beirut. The United States has demonstrated an ability to provide effective support of Saudi Arabia against the threat of Iranian air attacks, has improved relations with Iraq while remaining committed to the territorial integrity of Iran, and has played a steadying role in the crisis over Iranian and Iraqi attacks on shipping in the Persian
Gulf. In short, while the invasion of Afghanistan has greatly undermined the image of the Soviet Union in the Islamic world, the United States—except in the context of Arab-Israeli issues—has succeeded in identifying itself with the majority side of a significant Third World issue.

3. Ability to Influence Soviet Military Calculations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked a significant shift in U.S. military assets toward the Gulf and Indian Ocean. This includes enhanced logistical facilities in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya, as well as prepositioned ships at the U.S.-controlled base of Diego Garcia with equipment for a marine amphibious brigade. Enhanced air facilities at Diego Garcia can support the quick deployment of tactical fighters into the Arabian Sea littoral as well as the limited operation of B-52 bombers. The expanded naval facilities at the Indian Ocean island base can now support the operations of a two-carrier force in the western Indian Ocean. The United States' regular presence now averages about one and one-half carriers, more offensive power by far than the Soviets can deploy. While no overseas facilities can compensate completely for the distance of the United States from Southern Asia, there can be no doubt about the ability of the United States to support and reinforce its allies and friends in the region without a simultaneous requirement to reinforce NATO Europe. This is especially true for a security partner like Pakistan, which has large and efficient combat forces of its own.

4. Ability to Influence the Afghanistan Conflict. No final verdict can be rendered on the effectiveness of U.S. and other friendly support of the Afghan resistance forces in the absence of reliable public information. Presumably, leaked reports about U.S. support to the Mujahedeen are matched by complaints from the would-be recipients about insufficient support and the failure to supply effective antiaircraft weapons. Nonetheless, despite the suffering of the Afghan people and the resistance fighters, the Mujahedeen fight on and, it would appear, with increasing effectiveness. However inadequate may be Western, Islamic, and Chinese aid, the Mujahedeen could not sustain this struggle at the present scale without secure base areas in Pakistan and access to critical supplies of arms, ammunition, medicines, and food. That the Soviets appear no nearer their goal of consolidating their hold on the country after five years, despite a significant increase in their forces, speaks for itself.

Problem Areas

The U.S. response to the Soviet threat to South Asia has not been completely successful, even if one measures success in limited terms. Two problems seem especially significant: the continued absence of any kind of relations with Iran and the inability of the United States thus far effectively to address the diversionary and potentially dangerous India-Pakistan rivalry and the related problem of India and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.

Iran

Apart from Saudi Arabia, Iran remains the single most important country in
West Asia. A key American objective has been to prevent Iran from going the way of Afghanistan, reportedly even to the extent of contemplating military intervention in case of a Soviet attack. Thus far such a contingency has been prevented by the tenacity of the clerical regime in Iran and the incredible resilience of the Iranian people, even in the face of mounting war weariness and alienation. Thus far the United States has no demonstrable success in establishing ties with the Khomeini regime or mediating the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet Union has also had little success in extending its influence, thanks to the xenophobia of Iran’s rulers, their ideological hostility toward communism, their implacable opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and resentment at Moscow’s attempts to play both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. Nonetheless, the continuance of this unstable regime and the absence of any significant U.S. influence must be counted a liability.

India-Pakistan Rivalry and Nuclear Proliferation

Continued tension and suspicion between Pakistan and India must also be counted a serious obstacle to U.S. efforts to combat Soviet influence in the region. An India-Pakistan conflict, whether arising out of an Indian attack on Pakistan aimed at its nuclear facilities, a Pakistan-initiated conflict for some strategic real estate, or the result of mutual misperception and miscalculation, is the potential Achilles heel of the U.S. position in the region. The recent uproar over remarks by Ambassador Deane Hinton in a Lahore speech, in which he appeared to indicate U.S. backing for Pakistan in the event of Indian “aggression,” and a similar flurry in both capitals over reported U.S. concern about the possibility of an Indian preemptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities illustrate the dangers for the United States.

Continuing India-Pakistan enmity points up one of the fundamental weaknesses of the Southwest Asia concept. No amount of geographical legerdemain can remove Pakistan from South Asia or eliminate the zero-sum aspect of U.S. relations with the two countries. However unlikely—and the immediate likelihood would appear considerably less since the turmoil following Prime Minister Gandhi’s tragic assassination—a new India-Pakistan conflict would only benefit the Soviet Union. U.S. support of Pakistan in such a contingency would poison relations with India and would most likely fail to achieve its intended result, while neutrality would obviously jeopardize the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would be well poised to orchestrate a negotiated settlement, which would make it the security arbiter of the subcontinent for years to come.

Such a conflict is by no means preordained. Either country would undertake great risk in initiating open hostilities. Pakistan would certainly find itself without U.S. support were it to resort to aggression, while India would have to weigh the chances of U.S. intervention were it to attack Pakistan.

The question that must be answered is whether the United States has done all that it can to promote better India-Pakistan relations. This includes whether it has used all

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the influence possible to deter Pakistan's nuclear program, whether arms sales are calculated to avoid unnecessarily provoking India, and whether the United States has adequately engaged India in a dialogue—not only to frankly state U.S. interests and concerns but also to make cooperation more attractive than conflict. Regardless of whether India's perceptions are unrealistic or short-sighted, it is the responsibility of the United States to best secure its own interests. It remains the view of many South Asian analysts that in seeking to promote its security interests in the region, the Reagan administration has not taken advantage of all opportunities to ease Indian concerns or to increase U.S. influence in New Delhi.

PROSPECTS

Soviet Policy Toward South Asia

The Soviet Union has clearly found the Afghanistan situation a complicating factor in its policy toward South Asia. To a certain extent, concern about the reaction by Afghanistan's neighbors may have influenced its tactics toward the Afghan resistance, including lower than optimal troop levels and a still operative—albeit unpersuasive—effort to maintain the fiction of "fraternal assistance" to a beleaguered socialist government. Likewise, the reinstallation of the United States into the regional security equation has influenced Soviet policy toward the countries of South Asia.

The aim of Soviet policy may be taken to include the Sovietization of Afghanistan, the creation of pro-Soviet policies in Iran and Pakistan, the enhancement of Soviet influence in India, and, of course, the reduction of U.S. influence in the region.

Soviet Relations with Pakistan

The prospects for success of the present policy depend on the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the related effort to eliminate Pakistan as a factor in the equation. The Soviet Union has played a careful waiting game. On the one hand, its policy includes unsubtle verbal warnings about the consequences of supporting the resistance, a major intelligence effort to penetrate the resistance and destabilize Pakistan politically, and cross border air attacks on refugee and Afghan resistance centers. On the other hand, the Soviets seek to maintain the appearance of normal relations with Pakistan and to cultivate Pakistan through aid projects such as the recently completed Karachi steel complex. The Soviets seek to influence elite opinion in Pakistan through various means, including the offer to confirm the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the promotion, through the activities of academic figures such as Z. U. V. Gankovsky, of the notion that in the past the Soviet Union acted as a brake on Kabul's "Pashtoonistan" campaign.25

Realistically, the likelihood is that in the future the shoe is going to pinch even

more for Pakistan. The year 1984 saw a marked increase in the level and devastation of Soviet combat operations in Afghanistan and in border provocations against Pakistan. Arising out of different circumstances, Pakistan’s perception of the Indian threat has also increased.

Pakistan’s ability to resist Soviet pressures depends on a number of factors, both external and internal. These include its degree of confidence in the support of the United States and other friendly countries, including China, its calculations of the limits on Soviet pressure, its prioritization of its security concerns, and the play of domestic politics.

One limitation on Soviet pressure is the realization that while the Zia government’s Afghan policy may not be popular in important centers of antigovernment feeling, too heavy a hand could be counterproductive. To a certain extent discontent with the refugee burden is simply a convenient stick for an opposition which has regrettably few opportunities for expression. Its saliency as an issue is doubtful. Moreover, too much pressure from Moscow risks creating a nationalistic backlash. Even those identified with opposition sentiment understand that the government has been as forthcoming in its efforts to negotiate a settlement as is compatible with Pakistan’s interests and that absent a Soviet withdrawal—which is judged most unlikely—the refugees cannot be expected to return.26 In September 1984 the influential Urdu daily Nawa-e Waqt, which often represents the viewpoint of the Pakistan People’s party, editorialized that “The only course of action open to Pakistan is to persevere for a political solution to the Afghan question and to consolidate its defenses in case the Soviet Union prevails or decides to give up on the Afghan resistance and turn its attention toward Pakistan.”27

Soviet Relations with India

The succession of Rajiv Gandhi following his mother’s assassination could have a limited but still significant impact on Soviet-India relations. During the past year Moscow has revitalized its “special relationship” with India and negotiated the sale of its Mach 2.3 MiG 29 fighter, an unprecedented step since the aircraft is just now entering the Soviet inventory. The sharp deterioration of India-Pakistan relations during the summer of 1984 as well as the impending parliamentary elections required by January 1985, in which the “foreign hand” (i.e., the CIA) issue would be worked to maximum advantage, boded well for Indo-Soviet relations. Now, both the fact of Gandhi’s death and its circumstances tend to reduce the utility of India to Soviet policy. Provided Pakistan resists the temptation to fish in troubled waters and seizes the moment to reach new levels of understanding with New Delhi, the Indian threat could recede significantly.

The Soviets have been concerned for some time about the future of their relations with a Rajiv Gandhi administration. During his July 1983 visit to Moscow

Rajiv received lavish treatment, equivalent to that of a head of government or senior minister. Although the underlying economic and security motives for Indo-Soviet cooperation are not likely to change under Rajiv Gandhi or a coalition of opposition parties, the Soviet Union may have good reason for concern about the future. The Soviet press response to Indira Gandhi's assassination, which sought crudely to tar the United States with complicity, suggests not only typical opportunism but also concern about the degree of Moscow's influence with the new government. A fundamental Indian shift is unlikely, because of the underlying factors in India's reliance on Soviet support, but Moscow must nonetheless be concerned about the long-term impact of the situation in Afghanistan on the policies of the Rajiv Gandhi government.

U.S. Policy Toward South Asia

The future will likely bring difficult choices for U.S. policy toward South Asia. The security relationship with Pakistan almost certainly will undergo new challenges, both at home and in the region. As Pakistan comes under more pressure from the Soviet Union, it will seek new assurances and evidence of U.S. support. The United States and Pakistan will have to face the question of the future of their arms relationship and security cooperation after the completion of the six-year package in September 1987. Obviously, decisions on questions such as future aid and arms acquisitions must be reached substantially before that time.

Urgent issues will most likely arise as early as the spring of 1985. Aspects of Pakistan's policy have tended to undercut support for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship within the United States, and especially within Congress. Provocative remarks by Pakistan's nuclear scientists and the blatant violation of U.S. export laws by Pakistani nationals, widely presumed to be acting for the government, have created pressures in Congress to cut off or severely limit U.S. aid. Unless there is a change in Pakistan's policy, congressional opponents of nuclear proliferation are likely to make a serious fight for aid restrictions in 1985. With a reduced Republican majority in the Senate, it may be more difficult for the administration to contain these efforts.

Although U.S.-India relations may improve somewhat, there is almost no prospect of a fundamental realignment of relations in South Asia. Pakistan remains the key strategic terrain from a U.S. point of view, and India is not sufficiently important as a global actor to cause a U.S. shift in the interest of wider concerns. However, given the recent changes in India, the United States can be expected to devote more attention to both a U.S.-India and an India-Pakistan rapprochement. Ultimately, the fostering of closer ties among the countries of the region, either in the nascent South Asia Regional Forum or through other bilateral and multilateral ties, is the best insurance against Soviet domination.

U.S.-Soviet Relations Affecting South Asia

Although Pakistanis have from time to time questioned American staying

power, these doubts are based on a misreading of past U.S. relations with Pakistan. To the extent that the United States withdrew from the region, it was in response to a lowered perception of the Soviet threat and disillusionment with the U.S. alliance system in the region—especially the mismatch between U.S. and Pakistani objectives. There can be no question of a lowered perception of the Soviet threat, except in the most unlikely event of a Soviet withdrawal. Regrettably, the problem of differing U.S. and Pakistani objectives remains. But there is little that the United States can do to influence this problem, save for the important possibility that improved U.S. relations with India could, indirectly, reduce India-Pakistan tension.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a decisive impact on world perceptions. For the first time since the end of World War II, the Soviets occupied a country with military force. Nothing can change the resultant perceptions about the USSR except for a judicious withdrawal of Soviet forces.

While the United States may enter into future strategic arms discussions with the Soviet Union, it is most unlikely that these talks or resultant agreements would change U.S. perceptions of the Soviet threat to South Asia. The Reagan administration has served notice that linkage of arms control initiatives with Soviet behavior in other areas will depend on U.S. interests. But there is no plausible formula under which the United States would legitimize the Soviet position in the interest of some strategic or regional goal elsewhere. On the contrary, opposing Soviet expansionism across the spectrum is seen by the Reagan administration as the best means of achieving a strategic arms agreement. As Secretary of State George Shultz recently noted: "Over the longer term we must structure the bargaining environment to our advantage by modernizing our defenses, assisting our friends, and showing we are willing to defend our interests. In this way we give the Soviets more of a stake, in their own interest, in better relations with us across the board."

the United States will probably be a factor in South Asia for the foreseeable future. The only circumstances under which it would not be a factor would be in the event of complete Soviet success in consolidating its position in Afghanistan and in neutralizing Pakistan. That is the threat that activates U.S.-Pakistan relations and the one that will remain the basis for U.S. cooperation in the future.

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30 Ibid.
INTRODUCTION

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have been transformed so drastically in the last five years that it should appropriately be referred to as a very young field of study. One cannot deny the utility of consulting the existing literature concerning Pakistan and Afghan foreign policies or the internal processes of each society. But we should also be wary of misusing history. Relations have been transformed so fundamentally that we may be studying a phenomenon that if not new is at least qualitatively different from what had passed under this name in the past.

Pakistan-Afghan relations today are not merely the relations between two governments, nor even between two countries. There are at least four major elements that define the relationship in an elementary state-centric model, ignoring for a moment the broader context in which contemporary theorists analyze international relations. These four elements are: refugees, resistance, the regime in Kabul, and Russia, which has more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan.

Refugees number nearly 20 percent of the Afghan population; the resistance movement claims control over vast territories inside Afghanistan; the regime reigns over the state apparatus; and Russia cannot deny that it rules Afghanistan when more than 100,000 Soviet troops man the Afghan state apparatus.

In the face of such competing claimants to Afghanistan, it is baffling to speak of Pakistan-Afghan relations, but such is the contemporary situation, and we must attempt to bring some order out of this complexity.

In our search for orderly understanding we must look at these relations as a phenomenon quite distinct from the past, for though influenced by it, it is much more a major discontinuity with the past. This discontinuity must be emphasized because it is
sometimes overlooked by the rest of the world, although the actors in this phenomenon are experiencing it first hand. This discontinuity is so sharp that the government and people of Pakistan have drastically altered their perceptions of friends and foes in the region and globally, especially their perspectives on India, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Muslim world.

This discontinuity also has important implications for the internal dynamics of Pakistan. The North West Frontier Province (NWFP), known at home and abroad for its secessionist tendencies, demonstrates greater patriotism than any other part of the country. The "Pashtoonistan" issue, which during the last three decades has been a thorn in Pakistan-Afghan relations, has suddenly disappeared as an area of concern. In a matter of a few years, the former proponents of Pashtoonistan have become the "nativist" opponents of the Afghan refugees, while the Islamic opponents of Pashtoonistan appear to be the major champions of Afghan inroads into Pakistani territory.

It is from this perspective that we must understand the current state of the four factors mentioned above. Pakistan is involved in a singularly herculean task of dealing with all of them at once. I shall discuss each of them, explaining what they are and the way they relate to Pakistan. I will also explain the transformation in Pakistan's world view, as a result of these four elements, especially its relations with the United States, and wherever possible I will rely on empirical information drawn from surveys of the perceptions of the Pakistani population about the Afghan refugees and the Afghan regime and about the relations of Pakistan with the United States and the Soviet Union.

REFUGEES

There has been considerable speculation about the effects of 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It is undeniably an immense number. How and why has the local population tolerated such an unparalleled influx of refugees and sustained them for several years? Indeed the potential for friction between the refugees and the local population is often viewed as a volcano about to erupt.

Regarded empirically, the most interesting aspect is the lack of congruence between theory and expectations, on the one hand, and reality, on the other. The expected scenario was as follows. A nativist pressure will soon build up against the inflow of hundreds of thousands of refugees. The refugees will compete with the local population for the limited economic resources, including land, pasture, trade, and business. Despite shared cultural traits, the two populations are not identical; hence cultural and tribal difference will provide the ground for mutual conflagration. It will be fueled by the underlying economic conflict. The Soviets and the Afghan regime will be successful in infiltrating the ranks of the refugees. They will be instrumental in igniting a potential conflict. Many refugees will flock to the cities and become rootless and disorganized troublemakers. Crimes such as prostitution, drug abuse, and street violence will flourish.

This scenario was projected fairly early after the refugee influx and seemed, as it still does, perfectly plausible. Its validity had been demonstrated so clearly in other parts of the world, especially, the Middle East and Indochina. The historical bias of
analysts is so strong that I am often baffled at both Pakistani and foreign analysts who discuss the Afghan refugee issue in the light of this historically generated scenario, as if it was a reality that scarcely needs to be checked with empirical information.

The scenario may turn out to be true in the long run, but the fact is that it is not yet true, almost five years after the major influx began. Any sound analysis must begin, therefore, with an empirical verification of this scenario. Then we can identify the factors that are responsible for the scenario's not coming true and determine if it will happen in the future.

Public Attitudes on the Refugee Question

In a nationally representative survey conducted in April 1980, 87 percent of the respondents said the government of Pakistan must help the Afghan refugees. A follow-up question in the same survey educated the respondents about the possible political cost of supporting the Afghan refugees. This was an attempt to see if they would revise their views. Only 3 percent were reluctant to support the Afghan refugees when they were told that it could provoke Soviet hostility. This public opinion survey was repeated in 1982, 1983, and 1984, when there was a slight decline in public support for the Afghan refugees, but it still remained overwhelming. The public opinion survey also probed the willingness to give private help to the refugees: only 13 percent disapproved of helping them.1

It is significant that this high level of public support for the Afghan refugees was maintained despite the economic burden and the fear of infiltration by saboteurs. About two-thirds of the respondents believed that the refugees were an economic burden and about half feared infiltration by saboteurs. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

It is also noteworthy that while popular support for the Afghan refugees cuts across regional and political lines, support is less than unanimous among the elites. According to a survey of the national population, a majority of the supporters of all political parties support assistance to the refugees. This is not true, however, of the political and intellectual elites, which is evidenced by hostile political statements by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Pakistan National Party (PNP), occasionally joined in by Tehrik Istiqlal and even the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP). This hostility toward the refugees is also expressed in newspaper articles published by some intellectuals and former civil servants.2 One finds a discrepancy between the views of political leaders and their rank and file: 62

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1 The survey data reported in this paper are provided by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion and were gathered under the supervision of this author. These are nationally representative surveys conducted through in-person interviews with a sample of approximately 1,700 scientifically selected households located in 175 localities across the country. These localities include 100 villages and 75 urban blocs, and they were selected through a two-stage probability sampling technique. For results based on samples of this size, one can say with 95 percent confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects could be 3 percentage points in either direction.

2 Two prominent dissenters were Sajjad Haider, a former ambassador, and Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali, a former air force chief.
Table 1
Public Support for the Afghan Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan refugees must be supported by the Pakistan government</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan refugees must be supported by every Pakistani</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2
Public Apprehension About the Afghan Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan refugees are an economic burden on Pakistan’s economy</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan refugees are heavily infiltrated by saboteurs</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent of NDP and 61 percent of PPP voters\(^3\) believe the government should help the refugees, but their leaders take an active antirefugee position.

Whether the rank and file will persuade their leaders to shift their position or whether the leaders will sway the rank and file to their position may be a crucial issue in the future. It must be noted, however, that there has been a modest decline in public support of the Afghan refugees. This calls for caution by the government, which must not take steps that would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The recent steps to curtail refugee movement in cities such as Peshawar can have a more negative than positive influence on the harmony between the local population and the refugees.

RESISTANCE

The Afghan resistance is in many ways unique in its inability to capture the attention of the media. Most other contemporary resistance movements, for example, the Algerian, Vietnamese, and Palestinian, have been able to make use of global communication networks and modern image-making skills; they have managed to project an image that is perhaps even larger than the actual size of their struggle.

The scale of the Afghan resistance and its untiring continuity are often clouded by news about its factionalism and internal bickering. Its military activities are, however, one of the most remarkable in recent history. Its potency is validated by the fact that Soviet estimates about the pacification of Afghanistan are continuously altered.

The resistance is active in almost all the provinces and major urban centers. It is not a guerrilla movement, which commits sporadic acts of terrorism in order to keep itself in the world's attention and to keep its issue alive. Instead, the Afghan resistance is closer to a sustained national uprising. It is engaged in an active war with the Soviet-Karmal forces. Unlike several other liberation struggles where the problem is to provoke and mobilize the population through profound acts of courage and sacrifice, the Afghan resistance operates in an already mobilized population. Its problem is a gigantic enemy, not the mobilization of its own people. The geographical scope and the scale of the resistance activities can be judged from a monthly monitoring of the combat situations and losses incurred by the Soviet-Karmal forces.\(^4\)

Relationship with Pakistan

The Afghan resistance has enjoyed fairly good relations with the government of Pakistan. Except for a few instances in recent months when the government asked the resistance leaders to shift their headquarters out of Peshawar on grounds of security and crowding, there has rarely been any public expression of differences. Pakistan takes the position that it should play a passive role with regard to the internal dynamics

\(^3\) Those who intended to vote for NDP or PPP if there were elections.

\(^4\) For details, see Raja Ehsan Aziz et al., *Afghanistan Report* (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984). The report uses Kabul/Moscow and Mujahedeen sources to make its estimates.
and factionalism of the resistance. This policy, however, has led some to speculate that the government prefers to deal with a fragmented resistance rather than a unified front, which would enjoy international stature and greater obedience from the refugee population and which might constrain the freedom of action enjoyed by the Pakistani authorities.\(^5\)

The relationship of the resistance with nongovernmental groups in Pakistan has been fairly cordial with the exception of the NDP in the NWFP. The NDP has accused the resistance of playing a partisan role in favor of the Jamaat-i-Islami (a leading religious and political party) of Pakistan. There have been signs, however, that the NDP leadership, fearing loss of its Pashtoon constituency which is its only power base, will rethink its attitude toward the Afghan refugees and the resistance.

**REGIME**

The foremost demand of the Kabul regime from Pakistan is recognition. It is by all accounts a regime installed and controlled by the Soviet forces. Yet it maintains a facade of independence and an increasingly elaborate state structure. Its success in establishing an independent state structure is, however, more in form than in reality. A government, a party, armed forces, and professional and functional groups do exist, but without much substance or authority. The French government was successful in establishing the subservient nature of the Kabul regime by putting pressure on the Soviet Union and not Kabul to release the French journalist Jacques Abouchar.

Despite the subservient status of the Kabul regime, Moscow-Kabul circles have been successful in convincing an important section of the Pakistani political and intellectual leadership that the Karmal regime should be recognized. The PPP leadership has publicly supported recognition of the Karmal regime, as have the NDP, PNP, JUP and Tehrik Istiqlal leaders.

While the elite is divided on this question, common public opinion seems to go along with the government's position that the Karmal regime is not sufficiently independent of Soviet control; moreover, since the Organization of Islamic Conference has made the decision not to recognize the Kabul government, Pakistan must follow that policy. (See Table 3.)

The Afghan regime maintains indirect contact with Pakistan at the Geneva proximity talks. But Pakistan and the outside world consider it a forum for peace bargaining with the Soviet Union rather than with the Karmal regime. Pakistan is also the target of hostile propaganda by the Karmal regime, which actively promotes and supports whoever challenges President Zia. It supported the left-wing Movement for the Restoration of Democracy and the Islamic students, depending on who posed a threat to the Pakistani authorities. (See Table 4 for a content analysis of Kabul radio broadcasts.)

\(^5\) Henry S. Bradsher, "Afghanistan," *Washington Quarterly* 7(3) (Summer 1984):
Table 3
Should Pakistan Recognize the Present Government in Afghanistan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


RUSSIA

Like many other former colonies, Pakistan has been highly influenced by Western political and social culture. It inherited a state apparatus established by the British Empire. Its civil service and military have retained its colonial structure and socialization practices and still depend heavily upon Western training and finances. Its educational system is subservient to Western models through its language of instruction (English), information media, and Western-dominated higher learning and research. And its economy is heavily dependent on Western debts. Thus, with a highly penetrated bureaucracy, military, economy, and education, Pakistan is still passing through a neocolonial phase. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union also wants the same neocolonial rights.

In pursuing such equal rights in the areas of education, the economy, strategic capabilities, etc., the Soviet Union has presented both the stick and the carrot. It has made vague offers of large-scale economic and technical assistance as a carrot; and it has shown its muscle with air raids across the Pakistan-Afghan borders and by openly associating itself with internal dissidents in Pakistan.

According to informed observers, the Soviets are training several thousand Pakistani youth who were carefully recruited and covertly sent to Soviet educational institutions (estimates range between 2,000 and 5,000). They may be used as an instrument to challenge Pakistani authorities in the future. According to some observers, however, these Pakistani youth may be used by the Soviets as their loyal colonial service in Afghanistan, parallel to the Indian colonial officers in the British Empire.

The Pakistani government is being very cautious in dealing with the Soviet Union. It strives to maintain cordial bilateral relations, while demonstrating its determination to resist various Soviet pressures. Nevertheless, there is the loss of nerve and exhaustion among certain important segments of the elites, who advise making greater accommodation with the Soviet demands and who look toward the so-called “neutralization” and “Finlandization” solutions.

Pakistan's dilemma is that Soviet policies are pushing it toward greater reliance
Table 4
Content Analysis of Kabul Radio Broadcasts (1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August*</th>
<th>September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan as a lackey of the United States</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging hatred of the military and ridiculing President Zai ul-Haq</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting religion/separatist feelings in Pakistan and inciting trouble in tribal areas</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The milder tone in August is explained perhaps by the Geneva proximity talks on Afghanistan.
on the West. It would like to be more independent and self-reliant than it is today, but it seems unlikely that it will make much progress toward liberating itself from foreign dependence by acquiescing to the demands of one more giant.

TRANSFORMATION IN PAKISTAN’S WORLD VIEW

Attitudes Toward India

Pakistan is perhaps best recognized in international circles for its hostility toward India. It is a country that was carved out of India. It fought several wars with India: in 1948, 1965, and 1971. It sought Western help in its confrontation with India, and some believed that while it assumed an anticommunist posture, it was in fact strengthening itself militarily against India; the anticommunism, they said, was only a smokescreen. Pakistan’s relationship with India was considered the basis for its relations with the rest of the world. In short, it could be argued that the government and the public alike were obsessed with India.

While this portrait of Pakistan may have been true in the past, it is no longer valid. That is the significant discontinuity aspect of the post-Afghan crisis. The Indian threat has been overshadowed by the more imminent danger from the Soviet Union. The result is that a majority of Pakistanis in 1984 wanted their government to sign a no-war pact with India. Approximately 50 percent of the respondents in a national survey support a no-war pact with India, only 20 percent oppose such a pact, and 30 percent have no opinion on this vital question. (See Table 5.) These figures have remained within a small margin of fluctuation over the last four years since such surveys were conducted. Even though the fear of war with India increased sharply in 1984, it did not revive anti-India feelings in Pakistan. The people still retained their support for a no-war pact.

Those who feared that there was a very strong possibility of war with India rose from 12 percent (1983) to 21 percent (1984). (See Table 6.) But the percentage of those supporting a no-war pact with India declined by only 3 percent during the same period. (See Table 5.)

Similarly, widely reported communal riots between Hindus and Muslims caused only a modest and temporary change in the attitudes of Pakistanis. In October 1980 communal riots in Muradabad (India) were widely reported in the Pakistani press during the survey period. But support for a no-war pact declined by only 7 percent as compared with the previous survey, which was carried out during more normal circumstances. (See Table 5.)

There appears to be an enduring change in the public mind concerning India. It is my contention that this change was caused by the Afghan crisis and the strong apprehension that Pakistan could become a victim of Soviet expansionism. Pakistanis are now willing to come to an agreement with India because of the possible Soviet threat. Thus, when the government of Pakistan pursues a no-war pact with India, it does so with deeply felt public support.

We would be misreading the situation, however, if we believed that Pakistanis
Table 5
Should Pakistan Sign a No-War Pact with India?

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6
What Do You Think Are the Chances of War Between India and Pakistan?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some chance</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No chance</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


would be willing to dilute their separate identity vis-à-vis India. Corresponding with the willingness to make peace with India is a strong feeling of self-awareness and separate nationhood. Independence Day celebrations marking the creation of Pakistan as a separate homeland have been marked in recent years by unparalleled enthusiasm. It should be seen as a spontaneous response by the people in the wake of imminent threats to their survival and independence. Pakistanis are willing to make peace with India in order to preserve their independence, which should not be wrongly read as a willingness to give up their political identity. The slightest hint of political confederation with India, even in limited quarters, raises many eyebrows. Strategic cooperation is not acceptable at the price of sacrificing Pakistan’s separate political identity. After all, that is precisely what Pakistanis are trying to preserve, and it is for that purpose that they are willing to change their conception of friends and foes on the world scene.

Attitudes Toward Global Powers

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan made a significant impression on the Pakistani public. First, it convinced them that the Soviet Union was a stronger power than the United States. The subsequent inability of the Soviet Union to consolidate its power, however, led them to change their view. Second, the Afghan situation created a willingness among Pakistanis to seek military and economic assistance from the United States. Third, it reinforced a feeling of unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union. And, fourth, it strengthened Pakistani attitudes of fraternity with the Muslim world and its increasing identification with the non-aligned movement.

Perception of Soviet and U.S. Power

In October 1979, 34 percent of Pakistanis believed that the United States was a stronger power than the Soviet Union. This was a considerably higher number
compared with those who believed the Soviet Union was stronger—only 21 percent. Six months later, the situation had completely reversed. In a survey in April 1980, 31 percent thought the Soviets were stronger as opposed to only 26 percent who believed the Americans were stronger. The event that seems to be responsible for this change in attitudes was the intervention of the Soviet army in Afghanistan. In subsequent years U.S. prestige did not recover, but the Soviets did lose their enhanced prestige. While the perception of American power remained steady over the four years since 1980, Soviet prestige dipped to an even lower level than before its intervention in Afghanistan. (See Table 7.)

Table 7
Who Do You Think Is a Stronger Power, the United States or the Soviet Union?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal match</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Attitudes Toward U.S. Assistance

The U.S. military and economic aid agreement has enjoyed a fairly high degree of public support among all segments of the population. Between 1980 and 1984 60 percent have given their support, and less than 10 percent have opposed it. (See Table 8.)

It is difficult to conceive the high level of support in a population that highly values its nuclear program (82 percent of the respondents in a national survey fully agree that Pakistan should make a bomb) and that regards the Camp David Accord harmful to Muslim interests (47 percent thought Egyptian rapprochement with Israel was against the interest of Muslims, and only 11 percent thought it was not). The high level of support is also maintained despite the feeling that U.S. friendship is not credible and that Americans may not actually help Pakistan in time of need. The Pakistanis also feel let down because they believe that the USSR gives more dependable support to India. Despite these reservations, the Pakistani public is willing to go ahead and establish a major aid relationship with the United States because it feels strongly threatened by the Afghan situation.
Table 8
Do You Support or Oppose Pakistan's Economic and Military Aid Agreement with the United States?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is interesting to note that voters from the Muslim League and the three leading religious parties extend a higher than average level of support to the U.S. aid program, despite their strong opposition to U.S. culture and Western influence. (See Table 9.) This discrepancy indicates how much Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, unlike in Iran, is pragmatic in its foreign policy. Its support for military and economic collaboration with the United States is a direct outcome of its close identification with the Afghan resistance.

Table 9
Do You Support or Oppose Pakistan's Military and Economic Aid Agreement with the United States?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat Ulema Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat Ulema Islam</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan’s People’s party</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Unfriendly Image of Russia

The image of the Soviet Union among Pakistanis has suffered a setback as a result of its intervention in Afghanistan. In response to a question where the respondents had to choose between the Soviet Union or the United States as a friend, only 6 percent opted for the Soviet Union. This was in comparison with 42 percent who opted for the United States and 25 percent who preferred to stay neutral. (See Table 10.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pakistanis see the Soviet Union as a close ally of India, and they fear that if India were to attack Pakistan, it would be with Soviet assistance. Sixty-six percent expressed this view in a national survey in 1981. (See Table 11.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia will stand neutral</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pakistan and the Non-Aligned Movement

Pakistan's religious and cultural affinity with the Muslim world and the declining prestige of both the United States and the Soviet Union are responsible for its increasing drift toward the Muslim world and the Non-Aligned Movement. These trends have been strongly reinforced by the Afghan crisis.

Despite many reservations in intellectual circles, several surveys show that Saudi Arabia is the favorite country of Pakistanis, and an increasing number of them prefer to stay neutral rather than choose between the Soviet Union and the United States as a friend.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan-Afghan relations have undergone a fundamental transformation since December 1979. Pakistan is now dealing with a highly fractured Afghanistan, and its pursuit of a successful Afghan policy depends on its prudent handling of four interrelated factors as a whole, and not in isolation from one another—refugees, resistance, regime, and Russia.

The Afghan refugees have managed to establish remarkably peaceful and harmonious relations with the local population. But it is not a situation that can continue indefinitely. The peaceful absorption of 3 million refugees has been an exceptional event. It needs to be handled with utmost caution and foresight, with neither compacency about the possibilities of increasing conflict between the natives and the refugee population, nor zealous action to prevent conflicts that might result in self-fulfilling prophecies.

The Afghan resistance is engaged in an ongoing war of national liberation. It appears that the effective continuation of this resistance is the primary reason for the participation of Soviet-Karmal representatives in the negotiations in Geneva, which are seeking, \textit{inter alia}, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Moreover, the continuing resistance inside Afghanistan has prevented (or postponed) foreclosing options and acquiescence to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The linkage between the Afghan resistance and the prospects of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan through the U.N.-sponsored Geneva talks or any subsequent negotiating process deserves due appreciation.

The Afghan regime is perhaps the least relevant of the four elements in Afghanistan today. Installed by the Soviets and rejected by its own people, it has lost its identity and enjoys little legitimacy. Despite Soviet insistence to recognize the Kabul regime, Pakistan does not find any wisdom in dealing with an entity that is entirely subservient to the Soviet Union. Its recognition would only legitimize the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Undeniably, the Soviet Union is the last among the colonial powers. Through its actions over the last decade, it has bestowed fresh legitimacy to the use of overt military force in international diplomacy, a trend which other powers have been quick to emulate. As a result of Soviet advances, Pakistan finds itself sandwiched between
the undesirable legacy of its colonial past and an encroaching power, seeking what appears to be new colonial privileges.

In the face of these many challenges, Pakistan has acted courageously and pragmatically. It has withstood Soviet pressures that have often been orchestrated with similar pressures from India. It has also been pragmatic in seeking assistance from the United States and working in coordination with the West on the Afghan issue, at a time when it is facing tremendous internal and external impulses to relieve itself of its past political and economic penetration by the West. Pakistan has also acted rationally in reversing its stance toward India by adopting a more friendly position.

But will Pakistan be able to sustain Soviet harassment, the economic burden of the refugees, and internal doubts about its ability to escape the consequences of the policies of the two super-powers? Most Pakistanis, including this author, have faith that it will. But I must admit, it is a matter of faith.

To return to our discontinuity theme, we hope that the discontinuity in Pakistan-Afghan relations will become the basis for a new relationship between India and Pakistan. The Afghan crisis offers opportunities to harmonize Indo-Pakistan relations, should India choose to be more forthcoming. In the light of these realities, we also feel that U.S. policy in South Asia should be less constrained by India’s inaccurate projection of Pakistan as a threat to Indian security.
13. The United States and the War in Afghanistan

Zalmay Khalilzad

HISTORICAL SETTING

Prior to the 1978 communist coup and the subsequent Soviet invasion, the United States saw little for itself in Afghanistan. Developments there were perceived as having little effect on relative U.S. interests or power. Two additional elements helped shape the U.S. approach to Afghanistan during this period. The first was recognition that the Soviets had a greater interest in Afghanistan as well as greater power to affect things there. The second was that unfavorable developments would not take place in Afghanistan.

After World War II, there was a period when closer relations with the United States were actively desired by Afghanistan. Kabul expressed interest in a close political, economic, and military relationship with Washington. The anticipated British departure from the subcontinent had led the Afghan government to look to the United States to balance possible Soviet pressure and influence. In 1946, the Afghan prime minister, Shah Mahmoud, was quoted as saying that “America’s attitude is our salvation.” In 1948, according to U.S. State Department records:

Afghanistan urgently wants U.S. arms to maintain internal security. . . . Secondly, it wants U.S. arms to make a positive contribution in the event there is war with the Soviets. Properly armed and convinced of U.S. backing, Afghanistan could manage a delaying action in the passes of Hindu Kush which would be a contribution to the success of the armed forces of the West and might enable them to utilize bases which Pakistan and India might provide.

Similar efforts were made by the Afghans until 1953, but a military relationship

was not developed between Kabul and Washington for several reasons. First, U.S. policymakers tended to view Afghanistan with little or no strategic importance. Unlike some of the post-1979 discussions, Afghanistan was generally not seen as a possible barrier (or gateway) to Soviet access to the oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf. Second, it was calculated that in case of Soviet aggression, the United States would not in fact be able to project sufficient military power to such a remote country to protect it. A study by the Defense Department at the time concluded that Moscow could control Afghanistan "whenever the international situation so dictates." It warned Washington that any "overt, Western-sponsored opposition to communism" in Afghanistan "might precipitate a Soviet move to take control of the country."

Third, Washington feared that the Afghans might use U.S. weapons against Pakistan because of Kabul's territorial claims against Pakistan's Pashtoon and Baluch regions. Pakistan and Britain advised Washington against assisting Kabul militarily before the border conflict was resolved. Fourth, Washington assumed that the Afghan fear of the Soviet Union would prevent them from turning to Moscow for arms.

Washington was surprised when, in 1955, Kabul signed a $25 million arms deal with the Soviets. This development came about as the result of several factors. On the domestic level, Mohammad Daoud Khan's appointment as Afghanistan's prime minister was an important factor. As a member of the Afghan ruling elite at the time, Daoud held strong feelings on the issue of Pashtoonistan, Afghanistan's territorial demand against Pakistan. Daoud also wanted to build a strong state in Afghanistan to extend central control over local resistance. Both these issues necessitated the buildup of a strong military establishment. The U.S. decision to provide arms to Pakistan in 1954 and its refusal to do the same for Afghanistan alienated Daoud. Subsequent Pakistani membership in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact convinced him that the regional military balance was changing against Afghanistan, and he even suspected that the United States and Pakistan might be planning his overthrow. Meanwhile, the Soviets were seeking to persuade Daoud to accept Soviet military assistance.

It was this combination of Daoud's premiership, the Afghan-Pakistan dispute, U.S. assistance to Pakistan, and Washington's reluctance to provide military assistance to Afghanistan that afforded Moscow a significant opportunity for greater influence in Afghanistan. Had all these elements not been present, Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union might not have become as extensive as they did. The 1955 military assistance agreement led to a major escalation in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, further increasing the relative balance of interest there in Moscow's favor. Moscow became involved in Afghanistan's economic development projects and the building of roads, dams, and hydropower plants. It also began training large

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4 Leon Poullada reports that U.S. leaders had little patience with the Afghan case against Pakistan and considered it annoying; see his "Afghanistan and the U.S.: The Crucial Years," *Middle East Journal* 35(2) (Spring 1981).
numbers of Afghan officers, some of whom played important roles in subsequent military coups that moved Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union.  

Daoud's acceptance of Soviet arms led to U.S. worries about Afghanistan and an increase in U.S. interest there. This increased concern produced a phase of substantial U.S. economic involvement in Afghanistan. Between 1955–65, the United States provided Afghanistan with $350 million in economic assistance.  

Soviet aid for the same period was $552 million. Referring to the economic competition between the United States and the USSR in Afghanistan at this time, a U.S. reporter wrote:

> Russian and American advisers use the same teacups and telephones (both are in short supply in Afghan government offices) and lecture Afghans with equal vigor on the blessings of economic progress. At noontime, Russians, Americans and Afghans all queue up for G.I.-style hamburgers and chocolate pie at the chrome-lined Khyber Cafeteria, one of the showplaces of the Afghan capital.  

The United States made substantial investment in the Helmand Valley water project, built the large Kandahar international airport and several asphalt highways in eastern and southern Afghanistan, and became a principal source of outside support for the country's educational programs. Referring to the period of Soviet-U.S. "cordial competition" in 1955–65, J. C. Hurewitz called Afghanistan "a beneficiary of the cold war."  

The U.S. aid program aimed at preserving Afghanistan's buffer states by maintaining a significant Western presence in Afghanistan, denying Moscow a monopoly of influence there, and presenting the Afghans with the choice of a Western option in some areas.

However, whereas in the first decade after the Soviet-Afghan military agreement the U.S. economic assistance was substantial, it decreased in the second decade. Between 1965 and the 1978 communist coup, U.S. aid totaled $172.8 million, less than half the amount for the previous ten years. Soviet economic assistance for the same period was $713 million. The decrease in U.S. assistance coincided with several local and global developments. First were internal Afghan developments. At one level, the Afghan experiment in democracy, allowing greater freedom of the press and political activities, should have positively affected the U.S. attitude. The removal of Daoud was in part motivated by a desire to improve relations with Pakistan by deemphasizing the border dispute between the two countries. It appears that the king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, also feared increasing Soviet influence and wanted it reduced. Both these changes should have encouraged greater U.S. interest and assistance. Another domestic development that may have had a negative effect on the U.S.

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attitude toward aid was the inability of the Afghan political system to take appropriate advantage of the aid offered. During much of the “democratic period,” the regime suffered from internal paralysis and could not decide on many important projects proposed by outside donors. The U.S. Embassy doubted the commitment of the system to economic development. Some of the major past U.S. projects, the Helmand water project, in particular, had not been as successful as originally hoped and may have had a negative effect on U.S. attitudes toward further major commitments.

The decrease in U.S. assistance also coincided with a period of détente in superpower relations and with U.S. entanglement in Vietnam. It is possible that a decision was made to recognize—even more than had been the case in the immediate past—Moscow’s greater interest in Afghanistan and not to compete at the previous levels. During this period, U.S. interest in South Asia as a whole had declined. While expressing interest in Afghanistan’s independence and promoting better relations among Kabul, Iran, and Pakistan, Washington apparently went back to its pre-1955 analysis of the relative unimportance of Afghanistan to its overall interests and power. According to a 1971 policy assessment by the U.S. mission in Afghanistan: “For the United States, Afghanistan has at present limited direct interest: it is not an important trade partner. . . it is not an access route for U.S. trade with others, there are no treaty ties or defense commitments, and Afghanistan does not provide us with significant defense, intelligence or scientific facilities.” In a 1977 update, two additional reasons were added to this list: the lack of interest on the part of the U.S. private sector in investing in Afghanistan and a view of the country as “distant and primitive.”

While the Afghan government wanted a “large and visible U.S. presence to counter Soviet influence,” the U.S. Embassy saw the U.S. role differently. It argued that there “can be no question of taking counterbalance literally. In terms of proximity, historical importance, trade relations, military supply and training, or economic assistance the balance overwhelmingly weigh on the Soviet side.”

The difference in relative perceived interest was reflected in economic and military interactions with Afghanistan. By 1978 the USSR had provided more than $1.265 billion in economic aid and $1.250 billion in military assistance and held 75 percent of Afghanistan’s external debt. Although there had been little trade with the Soviets prior to the 1950s, in the 1970s the USSR had become Afghanistan’s largest trading partner. The Soviets also had between 3,000 and 5,000 technical and military advisers in the country and maintained a sizable intelligence presence. They also maintained tight control on military spare parts for the Afghans. All these factors

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further shifted the balance of interest in Afghanistan in the USSR's favor.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE 1978 COUP: PHASE I

Between the coup and the invasion, U.S. policy toward Afghanistan passed through two phases. The coup itself had come as a surprise to Washington. Immediately after the coup, there was some confusion in Washington about the political identity of the perpetrators of the coup. In an April 27 cable the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, while expressing uncertainty about those involved in President Daoud's overthrow, advised the State Department "against any premature conclusion that the new leaders are communists."14 In an April 28 message to various U.S. embassies, the State Department reflected the Kabul embassy's doubts by arguing that "fragmentary evidence suggests that they [the coup leaders] may be leftists and/or strongly Islamic nationalists."15

Even when the United States was more certain about what had happened, it did not regard the coup as having any important strategic or negative implications for U.S. interests and power, and its reaction was low-key. Washington hoped to have good relations with the new regime and conducted normal diplomatic relations with it. It maintained existing economic assistance programs and even hoped that the new regime would do a better job developing Afghanistan than had the previous Afghan rulers.

At the regional level, immediately after the coup, the United States sought to discourage Iran and Pakistan from following a hostile policy and from making "hasty moves" against Kabul's new rulers. Both Tehran and Islamabad were worried about the strategic implications of the turnover in Kabul. Both had warned the United States earlier about a possible communist takeover of Afghanistan and now believed that the coup was a major development in Afghanistan's being "irrevocably lost" to the USSR. Both wanted the United States to respond by strengthening Pakistan. They were uneasy about the U.S. policy of continuing to provide aid to Afghanistan in an effort to discourage Kabul from becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR. The shah had told the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, that "coddling" the new Afghan rulers would not change their policies.16 Nevertheless, the shah went along with U.S. policy, which, among other things, sought to encourage Afghanistan's neighbors "to take the lead in developing a network of cooperative relations."17

The Carter administration did not change its regional policy because of the coup. Relations with Pakistan were not improved. In fact, during the period, because of a dispute over Pakistani nuclear efforts, the United States was providing more aid to Afghanistan's communist government than to Pakistan. There is no evidence during

15 From the Secretary of State to various U.S. embassies (confidential), no. 108913, declassified 1981.
17 Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (secret), no. 304356/01, Dec. 1978, declassified 1981.
this period that the United States encouraged opposition to the Kabul regime. The administration also opposed efforts in Congress to cut off aid to Afghanistan because of Section 620(F) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which forbids aid to communist governments. It wanted to use aid to maintain contacts and influence in Kabul and to test the new nation's declared goal of maintaining Afghanistan's nonalignment. Privately, on many occasions, the United States encouraged the new Afghan rulers, especially Foreign Minister Hafizollah Amin, to adopt a less hostile public posture toward the United States to avoid provoking congressional pressure to cut off aid. Publicly, to justify the continuation of aid, it argued that it might not be fair to call the Khalqi regime communist and that the policies of the new government might not be discernable for some time. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul warned that the negative and "standoffish" attitude carried with it the danger of making Kabul "totally dependent and aligned" with the USSR. 18

THE UNITED STATES AND THE 1978 COUP: PHASE II

The first phase, which can be called an "engagement policy," ended with the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, on February 14, 1979. The ambassador's death under mysterious circumstances, which might even have involved the government in Kabul itself, speeded up a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan that was already underway and led to increasing disengagement from and hostility toward the Kabul government. Washington also began to show more cautious sympathy to the opponents of the regime whose number had increased significantly.

The assassination helped crystalize the view that U.S. policy was not working. There were several problems in U.S. relations with the new Afghan government dominated by the Khalqis. Kabul wanted a reduced U.S. presence in the country: it allowed a much smaller number of Peace Corps volunteers to serve in Afghanistan, had halted U.S. participation in a military training program, imposed restrictions in U.S. offices, limited the cultural exchange program between the two countries, and resisted many U.S. proposed projects. 19 The Khalqi regime moved Afghanistan very close to the Soviets. The massive violations of human rights by the Kabul government was an additional factor complicating relations between Afghanistan and the Carter administration. Also, despite repeated private urging by U.S. officials, the Khalqis maintained a very hostile attitude toward the United States on international issues and in international meetings. They also refused U.S. requests for an investigation into the circumstances of the death of Ambassador Dubs.

As one indication of its changed attitude, the United States began to see benefits in the internal security difficulties that the Khalqis were facing and began cautiously to

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encourage the opposition. According to former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council, on April 9, 1979, in opposition to the State Department, decided that Washington should “be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country’s independence.” Brzezinski’s memoirs do not provide any details of what concrete form this sympathy took. Based on available evidence, however, there is no indication, that a major effort to support the insurgents had begun.

It appears that the United States started a very small covert program in support of the opposition to communist rule in Afghanistan. For example, tapes of speeches by partisan leaders such as those by the head of the Iran-based Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Mohammad Assef Mohseni Qandahari, were smuggled into Afghanistan and distributed by Afghan agents of the CIA. The United States increased contact on the Afghan situation with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. Khalqi difficulties were given greater publicity, as was increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The United States did not send a new ambassador to Kabul and withdrew its dependents from Afghanistan, signaling its unhappiness with Kabul.

Publicly, the U.S. government maintained that it did not support the insurgents in their efforts to overthrow the Kabul regime. Privately, it saw advantages in an overthrow of the Khalqis. According to an August 1979 assessment by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul:

> On balance, however, our larger interests, especially given the DRA’s [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] extremely close ties to Moscow, this regime’s almost open hostility to the U.S., and the atmosphere of fear it has created throughout the country, would probably be served by the demise of the Taraki-Amin regime.

Insurgent efforts to get U.S. weapons, however, were unsuccessful; the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, for example, turned down the request for aid by the leaders of one of the principal insurgent groups, Ahmed Gailani, in May of 1979.

In short, the United States, although warning the USSR against intervention in Afghanistan and expressing concern about the increased Soviet presence, was not willing to take a major role in bringing about the overthrow of the Khalqi regime. Pakistan, which was a key country in affecting the prospects for the insurgents, remained under the U.S. aid embargo. The sources for the limited aid received by the insurgents during this period were Saudi Arabia, which gave the Afghans about $2 million, and Pakistan, which allowed Afghans to open offices, accepted Afghan refugees, and provided them with some weapons. Others providing some aid were a surprising combination: Libya, Iran, and Egypt.

23 Gailani deposited pieces of a MiG 21, supposedly shot down by his forces at the embassy to illustrate that the insurgents were capable of causing serious difficulties for the Kabul regime; see Documents of the Den of Espionage.
After overthrowing Taraki in September 1979, Foreign Minister Amin expressed interest in improving relations with the United States. He used several channels to signal this. He himself held an “amicable” and “relaxed” meeting with the U.S. chargé in Kabul. Afghan officials told Americans in Kabul that Amin “intends to improve Afghanistan’s bilateral relations with the U.S.”\(^{24}\) They reported that he was even considering “an official letter of apology over the February 14 death of Ambassador Dubs.” At the end of October the U.S. Embassy in Kabul concluded: “We have been receiving clear signals that the DRA seeks better relations with the U.S.”\(^{25}\)

Some progress was made in relations between the two countries. Washington had started a dialogue with Amin “as a means of exploring the possibilities for a less contentious relationship.” At Pakistan’s request, the United States waived Public Law 480 regulations to enable the export of 200 tons of wheat to Afghanistan.\(^{26}\)

Nevertheless, relations remained essentially hostile. The Dubs issue was not resolved, and the size of the embassy staff remained a problem. The United States was reluctant to improve relations with Amin because of Afghanistan’s continued close ties with the USSR, even though signs of strains in Amin’s relations with the Soviets were detected. The Carter administration was also troubled by Amin’s human rights record and his government’s loyalty to the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues such as Puerto Rico’s independence and withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Also, Amin’s rule lasted only some three months, not enough time for any sustained dialogue on changes in relations between him and the United States.

**THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET INVASION**

The Soviet invasion brought about what all the efforts of the Afghan governments in the 1960s and 1970s had failed to achieve, active U.S. interest. Although there were disagreements within the U.S. government over the appropriate U.S. response, the president decided to begin a major effort against the Soviets. Carter argued that “the implications” of Soviet action “could pose the most serious threat to world peace since the second world war.”\(^{27}\) The U.S. declarations gave the impression that the Soviets were a potential threat to vital U.S. interests and could tip the balance of power in oil-rich Southwest Asia against the West.

The idea of Afghanistan’s strategic prominence in relation to the Gulf, which had not surfaced in the preceding thirty years, stemmed in considerable measure from U.S. alarm at its weakness in the surrounding area. The Soviet move came after the overthrow of the shah, which dealt a devastating blow to the U.S. security framework for Southwest Asia. Iran, formerly an ally, had become very hostile to the United States and was humiliating Washington by holding U.S. diplomats as hostages.

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\(^{25}\) U.S. Embassy, Kabul, to the Secretary of State (confidential), no. 5842, Oct. 1979, in *ibid*.

\(^{26}\) Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad (confidential), no. 266391, Oct. 22, 1979, in *ibid*.

CENTO, conceived as a cordon sanitaire between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, had dissolved. Pakistan, once the United States’ “most allied ally” in Asia, had also become nonaligned, and relations between Washington and Islamabad had reached their lowest ebb because of a disagreement over Pakistan’s nuclear program.

In the aftermath of these developments, Washington believed there was a widespread perception of U.S. power in “disarray and retreat” in the region. Officials in the Carter administration worried that as a result of this perception key states in the region might conclude that they “should accommodate to the rising wave of Soviet influence and power before they themselves were swept away.” As a result of the Soviet move, it was feared that Pakistan might come to terms with the Soviets and that this might lead to further unpredictable and dangerous actions on the part of Iran.

Some U.S. officials also feared that American weakness in the area might encourage the Soviets to move against the region as a whole, with Afghanistan merely the first step. The real Soviet motives, it was argued, might be warm-water ports and even control over oil shipments from the Persian Gulf. It was believed that Soviet control of Afghanistan would increase their ability for power projections in the surrounding region. There were even fears that the invasion of Afghanistan could be part of a global Soviet challenge to U.S. interests and might have been at least in part motivated by that consideration. The Soviet action in Afghanistan was linked to other unfavorable developments involving Moscow—the 1978 coup in South Yemen and the Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa. The United States had demonstrated restraint in its response to these crises and to the Iranian revolution and the subsequent erratic developments there. The Soviet invasion, the first against a country that was not a member of the satellite empire, demonstrated that perhaps the United States’ restraint was not only not reciprocated but was apparently having the opposite effect, that is, encouraging the USSR to become more aggressive.

These perceptions and the belief that the United States had little capacity or willingness to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan shaped U.S. responses. The policy decided on by the Carter administration consisted of three elements.

The first was to make the occupation of Afghanistan politically costly for the Soviets. Washington itself increased political pressure against Moscow. It adopted a determined posture and high-key rhetoric against the Soviet Union. The United States was aware that it could not meet the Soviet threat in Afghanistan on its own terms, and this recognition produced much louder rhetoric. If the U.S. power position in the region had been different—for example, if the shah had still been in power—Washington’s rhetoric might well have been more low-key and its ability to punish Moscow in Afghanistan much higher.

A major political cost to the Soviets was the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter recalled the U.S. ambassador to Moscow and took a

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29 Ibid.
number of “punitive” measures including:

1. Suspending the opening of new consular offices by either side;
2. Deferring a number of economic and cultural exchanges under consideration;
3. Placing an embargo on the sale of 17 million tons of food grain to the Soviets;
4. Curtailing Moscow’s fishing privileges in U.S. waters;
5. Boycotting the Moscow Olympics; and
6. Suspending the consideration of the embattled SALT II treaty and the already moribund Indian Ocean arms control talks.

The United States also sought to encourage its allies and the Islamic countries to follow its lead in its political moves against the USSR. It hoped that the events in Afghanistan would cause a major deterioration of relations between the Islamic world and the Soviet Union.

The second element was to deter Soviet moves beyond Afghanistan and to discourage accommodation to the Soviets by countries in the area. In January 1980, the president declared what has come to be known as the Carter doctrine: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” The Persian Gulf was thus elevated to the level of Western Europe and East Asia as an area of vital interest to the United States. By engaging vital U.S. interests, Washington hoped to deter Soviet military moves against the region.

The United States also began an effort to shore up its military capabilities in Southwest Asia to provide some credibility to its declaratory policies, even though they fell far short of the ability to meet potential threats on their own terms. The U.S. military effort in the region had two elements: seeking a limited military presence in the area and increased capability for projecting U.S. forces in the region. A Rapid Deployment Force, which had been under consideration for some time, was established. By the end of the Carter administration the following steps had been taken to implement the program for increased U.S. power projection capability in this region:

1. Seven prepositioning ships with mechanized equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies were deployed in the Indian Ocean (at Diego Garcia);
2. Congress was reviewing an administration request to purchase eight fast roll-on, roll-off freight and troop carriers, which could reach the Suez Canal from the East Coast in eleven to twelve days;
3. Exercise deployments of small parts of the force to the region had taken place;
4. Deployment times to the region were reduced;
5. Reconnaissance flights by B-52s into the Indian Ocean region were initiated;
6. An Amphibious Ready Group, with an 11,800-marine detachment aboard was deployed in the region; and
7. Military access agreements were signed with a number of states in the region.

To prevent accommodations with the Soviets, the United States sought to
improve relations with a number of countries in the area, and especially Pakistan. President Carter called President Zia immediately after the Soviet invasion to offer support. A binding mutual defense treaty between Pakistan and the United States, sought by President Zia, was not signed because of U.S. reluctance. Reportedly the two countries also did not agree on the amount and type of U.S. aid. Still, Washington did reaffirm the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan defense agreement, and the U.S. aid embargo against Islamabad was, in effect, ended. Although Pakistan was included in the Defense Department’s maps of Southwest Asia, it was unclear whether the Carter doctrine applied to Pakistan or not.

The third element was to sustain resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan by starting a significant covert program in support of the Afghan partisans. Many in the administration probably believed that the Soviets would eventually win in Afghanistan; the question was when this would happen. To these officials, the idea of a covert aid program probably stemmed more from a desire to punish the Soviets than from any real expectation that an independent Afghanistan would emerge because of it. Others probably hoped that aid to the Afghans and other related steps might lead to a political compromise, leading to the Soviet withdrawal. Those who argued that the Soviets would seek and achieve victory believed that basic Soviet interests were involved in Afghanistan and that the Soviet capability and willingness to apply force there were considerable.

The program to help partisans was developed in coordination with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, and probably others. According to Carl Bernstein, in order to reduce the risk of Soviet retaliation and to control what was given to the Afghans, the Pakistanis, in their negotiations with the Carter administration on aid to the Afghans, sought the following restrictions: (1) that countries supplying weapons would give little or no publicity to their role; (2) that Pakistan would control the distribution of such weapons to the Afghans; (3) that the weapons given to the Afghans would move quickly across the border; (4) that the quantity of the weapons would be limited; (5) that the weapons for the Afghans would be largely of Soviet or East European origin; and (6) that Pakistan would also provide regular financial aid to the main partisan groups.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE AFGHAN WAR

The above structure of responses put in place by the Carter administration has been followed, with some changes, by the Reagan team. Although the perception of a possible immediate threat to the surrounding region from the Soviet move in Afghanistan has declined, efforts to increase U.S. power projection capability have continued. These efforts, however, have not been as energetic as the administration’s strategic nuclear modernization program. Carter’s Rapid Deployment Force became the U.S. Central Command on January 1, 1983, with responsibility for Southwest Asia. Efforts to gain an access agreement and permission to preposition material and

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equipment in key countries in area have continued. Several training exercises have been carried out. Facilities such as seaports and airports in several friendly countries have been or are being upgraded not only for national use but also for utilization by U.S. forces in times of crisis, even though their actual availability for U.S. use in such times is not certain. The army's 9th Infantry Division is being converted into a High Technology Light Division with an initial capacity by 1986. This division will be light enough to be airlifted into a distant theater for prompt combat action. It is expected that it will retain as much firing power as today's heavy armored forces. The army hopes to organize five such divisions in the future. The United States has also moved to establish an enduring command, control, communication and intelligence network for Southwest Asian contingencies.

Reagan has continued another important element of the Carter policy, namely, seeking improved relations with key states of the area. A five-year $3.2 billion economic aid and military sales agreement was signed with Pakistan, and security cooperation has also increased with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Sudan, Oman, and others. The emphasis on Israel in relation to Southwest Asian contingencies has been much greater than was the case under the Carter administration.

As far as political costs are concerned, the Reagan administration has continued Carter's policy; however, it has weakened some of its elements. Like the previous administration, Reagan's has sought to give publicity to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, hoping to negatively affect international, especially Islamic, public opinion against Moscow and to keep the Afghan issue alive. For example, it symbolically dedicated a shuttle flight to the Afghans, sponsored meetings on Afghanistan, gave regular briefings on the Afghan war to journalists through some U.S. embassies, and published extensive reports on the war in Afghanistan, including Soviet brutalities there and the use of chemical weapons. Recently it has emphasized gaining greater international presence for the Afghan resistance, hoping to further increase the political costs to the Soviets. The recent alliance among the principal Afghan partisan groups provides the possibility for more effective international presence for the Mujahedeen. Washington has also increased its assistance to the voluntary organizations providing humanitarian support inside Afghanistan. The hope hence is that fewer Afghans will leave the country, thus undermining the Soviet pacification strategy.

The United States has also declared that it supports a settlement of the Afghan conflict consistent with the U.N. General Assembly resolutions: Soviet withdrawal, reestablishment of Afghanistan's independent and nonaligned status, self-determination for the Afghans, and the return of the refugees. It has resisted moves to legitimize the Karmal regime and has discouraged others from doing so.

However, President Reagan has abandoned most sanctions against the Soviets that Carter had imposed. Thus, the current administration ended the grain embargo, and no significant international agreements with the Soviets are being delayed or prevented by the United States because of Afghanistan. The Soviets have sought to isolate Afghanistan from other issues. Their efforts are having increasing success.

The Reagan administration has continued another aspect of the Carter policy, providing indirect military support to the Afghan partisans. As in the past, the assistance program is carried out in coordination with several other states, especially Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China, among others. Since the aid program remains covert, one cannot be certain about the magnitude of the effort. Based on several press reports, it appears that the program has been enlarged significantly several times by the Reagan administration. The Soviets argue that Washington spent $300 million in support of the partisans during the first four years of the Afghan-Soviet war and planned to spend $130 million in 1984. The Washington Post reported that during fiscal year 1984, the United States was expected to spend about $250 million on the Afghan covert program.\(^{32}\) Reportedly, the United States has indirectly supplied non-U.S. bazookas, mortars, grenade launchers, mines, Kalashnikovs (AK-47), a few antiaircraft missiles, and money to the Afghans.

Despite this increase in support of the Afghan partisans, U.S. goals in the conflict remain essentially the same: to sustain the Afghan partisans for as long as possible, without having much confidence that the Soviets will accept a political settlement of the conflict consistent with U.N. resolutions.

**STRATEGIC IMPLICATION OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan profoundly affected the international situation. At a time when relations between the superpowers were already worsening, the invasion resulted in the worst crisis in relations between the superpowers since the Cuban missile crisis. As a result of the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan, previously nonaligned, is in danger of becoming part of the Soviet satellite empire. The Soviet invasion eliminated a buffer state, brought Soviet forces to the Pakistani border, and altered the geostrategic environment of Southwest Asia. The use of massive force by the Soviet Union against a nonaligned Islamic country the size of France also set a new precedent in an area outside its satellite empire and can increase significantly Soviet power projection capabilities against the surrounding region.

The question of how much strategic gain the Soviets can make from secure access to existing or potential Afghan military facilities and the implications for the United States has been a controversial one. Immediately after the Soviet move, many analysts, including several senior officials in the Carter administration, argued that the USSR had made significant gains in its ability massively to threaten Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf because of its invasion of Afghanistan. Some argued that this consideration was probably a major motivating factor for the Soviet action. There was widespread fear in official circles that the move against Kabul might even be followed by similar operations against neighboring countries. Over time this interpretation has become less fashionable and has been replaced by another extreme analysis, attributing no significant effect on relative Soviet ability for power projection to the Gulf. The

possibility that Afghanistan might be used for regional purposes is dismissed, and it is asserted that the Soviets already have bases closer to the Gulf than existing or potential bases in Afghanistan.

The expectation that Afghanistan was just the signal for concerted Soviet expansionism against neighboring areas was clearly exaggerated. Equally exaggerated, however, is the belief that the occupation of Afghanistan does not change the relative Soviet power projection capability. The invasion may not have been primarily motivated by this capability, but it is unlikely that Moscow is unaware of it. The confusion about the regional implications of relative Soviet capability is largely due to the fact that the occupation has different implications for different parts of the Gulf. The invasion has not changed the relative Soviet power capability as far as the upper Gulf (Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia) is concerned. Bases in Soviet Transcaucasia are closer to this region than existing or potential bases in Afghanistan. However, as Table 1 and 2 illustrate, bases in Afghanistan have improved Moscow's ability for projecting power to the lower Gulf and Arabian Sea, including the Strait of Hormuz, parts of Iran and Oman, and the whole of Pakistan. The closest Afghan bases are 300 kilometers nearer to Bandar Abbas, 650 kilometers nearer to Chah Bahar, and over 500 kilometers nearer to Muscat than the respectively closest Soviet bases, representing significant relative gains. Therefore, it is incorrect to argue that the occupation has had no effect on relative Soviet capability for power project beyond Afghanistan.

Table 1
Combat Radii of Aircraft in Soviet and Soviet Allies Service (kilometers)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Radius</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MiG 21</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG 23</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG 27 (D and J)</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG 25 (A and E)</td>
<td>1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-15</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-17</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-24</td>
<td>1,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAK-28</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There are various estimates for the combat radii of Soviet aircraft, some higher and some lower than the estimates here. The highest and lowest figures have been added and then divided by two on the rationale that the resulting figure is probably a more accurate reflection of Soviet capabilities than the two extremes.
Moving closer to these targets improves the Soviet position in several ways. First, some areas previously outside the range of Soviet tactical aircraft come within their range. Second, in the case of targets that are already within the range of Soviet aircraft, but are closer if attacked from bases in Afghanistan, reliable access would represent a real gain for the Soviets. The decrease in distance increases the combat capability of Soviet aircraft since there is a negative relation between the combat radius and payload of aircraft. From Afghan bases, Soviet aircraft can carry more weapons than they could from their own more distant facilities. Having facilities closer to target also increases the capability of the aircraft to spend a longer time in the combat area (combat loiter) and the chances of damaged aircraft to return to a friendly base for repair and recovery. Fighters based in Afghanistan also can accompany Soviet bombers based in the Soviet Union on longer flights to targets in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean than fighters based in the USSR. The Soviet bomber Backfire cannot make it to Diego Garcia when starting from inside the Soviet Union, but it does when staged through Kandahar or Shindand in Afghanistan.

The relative gain in the Soviet ability to project power to the lower Gulf increases its incentives not to withdraw and return Afghanistan to its nonaligned status. Should Moscow win in Afghanistan, it will also increase Soviet credibility by demonstrating that it supported its friends and stood firm in the face of pressure. Moscow would add a country the size of France to the Soviet satellite empire, and it can use it as a base for subverting neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

Given the relative power projection advantage that the USSR gains from its subjugation of Afghanistan, it would serve Western security interests if the Soviets would withdraw and Afghanistan was returned to its traditional buffer status. Soviet withdrawal would have many other benefits for the United States and the West. It would undermine the confidence of Soviet allies in its credibility. It might even encourage some Soviet clients to challenge Soviet domination. Moscow might also become more reluctant, as a result of its experience in Afghanistan, to use force against other countries because it would demonstrate that the West and its friends stood firm in the face of Soviet aggression and they succeeded. To bring about a Soviet withdrawal, the United States should be willing to accept a reasonable compromise that respects Soviet security interests. U.S. leaders have declared such a willingness. However, because of potential gains from a victory and losses from a withdrawal, Moscow will be very reluctant to agree to leave Afghanistan.

Of course, it is unclear what price the Soviets are willing to pay in Afghanistan in order to defeat the partisans. However, a Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously on Afghanistan is more likely if the political and military costs of the occupation increase rather than decrease. Afghanistan has the potential to become a serious Soviet vulnerability. At the military level the Soviets could remain involved in a costly and protracted war. Such an engagement would make it less likely that Moscow would use military force in other areas of the world. Soviet persistence in the military activities in Afghanistan provides both a justification and the time for the United States and its allies to increase their ability to project power in Southwest Asia in order to deter further Soviet moves in this region.
Table 2
Great Circle Distances from Existing Air Bases in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf Targets (kilometers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gulf Target</th>
<th>USSR Air Bases</th>
<th>Afghanistan Air Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kizyl Atrek</td>
<td>Nabit Dag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandar Abbas</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chah Bahar</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>2,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscat</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>2,306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) A possible location for a Soviet field inside the Soviet Union just North of Herat (35° 39'N; 62° 33'E).

\(^b\) An airfield exists in Farah, which at present can handle only helicopters. It can be expanded to accommodate other aircraft (32° 21'N; 62° 9'E).
The Soviet effort to force a nonaligned, Islamic, Third World country into its orbit at a time when many people in these areas believe that the age of colonial domination is over can affect relations between these countries and Moscow. It serves U.S. strategic interests to decrease the ties between the Soviets and the Third World countries. Afghanistan has become a source of ideological embarrassment to the Soviets in the Third World, and as the war continues and if the resistance becomes politically and militarily more effective, it can become even more so.

What might be the risks of increasing resistance? An important risk is that Moscow might retaliate by increasing military pressure against Pakistan. Given the magnitude of the problems they face in Afghanistan and the number of forces they have there, the Soviets are unlikely to seek a massive land invasion of Pakistan. Besides, even if they had more forces in Afghanistan, the USSR is likely to calculate that the military and political costs of such a move would be considerably higher than they have been in the case of Afghanistan. It might fear that an invasion of Pakistan could lead to a direct superpower conflict. If Pakistan-U.S. security relations become more intense, the consequences of Soviet actions against Pakistan on U.S.-Soviet relations will play an increasing role in Soviet calculations.

However, there are other risks to Pakistan short of outright massive invasion, such as increased air attacks against Afghan camps or even Pakistani targets if resistance pressure against the Soviets should mount. An intensification of the war could also lead to more Afghan refugees moving into Pakistan. Pakistan is able to manage small air incursions into its territory should it decide to do so. The West, along with China, the Persian Gulf states, and Japan, could help Pakistan improve its ability to deal with potential problems that it might face if there were a prudent escalation of the Afghan conflict. Already, in part, in order to increase Pakistan's self-confidence and defense capabilities, the United States has agreed to economic assistance and military sales. It has also heightened its security commitment to Pakistan against a possible Soviet attack by reaffirming its 1959 security agreement between the two countries. This commitment could be made less ambiguous. Recently the United States expedited the delivery of Sidewinder and Stinger missiles to Pakistan in an effort to increase its defense capabilities against a Soviet-controlled air invasion. The delivery of these weapons is also aimed at indicating to Moscow the U.S. resolve to assist Pakistan not to be intimidated by the Soviets. Washington has indicated directly to the Soviets that it takes Pakistan's security seriously. As part of a strategy to increase the effectiveness of the resistance and strengthen Pakistan's resolve, more assistance could be provided to Pakistan. Japan, which has substantial interests in Southwest Asia, could provide more economic assistance. At the military end, to discourage possible increased air attacks against Pakistan, the country's air defense could be further strengthened.

Rather than the Soviets attacking Pakistan, Islamabad fears two other scenarios. One is a joint Indian-Soviet attack; the second and more likely possibility is an Indian invasion encouraged and supported by Moscow. There are several reasons for this fear. First, the Soviet Union itself does not have enough forces in Afghanistan to mount such an operation against Pakistan. Should it decide to do so, it would take
several months to build sufficient strength, and this would provide ample warning for Pakistan and its friends to take countermeasures. India, on the other hand, has larger forces already deployed near the Pakistani border. New Delhi views Pakistan as the most important obstacle to its goal of regional hegemony. Third, it is argued, the Soviet Union is likely to support an Indian move against Pakistan because it could serve its purposes. Some Pakistanis believe that if Indian attacks began, the Soviet Union would tell Pakistan to stop supporting the Afghan resistance and recognize the Karmal government in exchange for Soviet "pressure" on India to "moderate" its policies toward Pakistan. Furthermore, a direct Soviet invasion might result in a confrontation with the West, which the Soviet Union wants to avoid. By contrast the Western response to an Indian attack on Pakistan is likely to be less vigorous, easily attributed to regional complexities and to the long-term conflict between the two regional rivals and not requiring much Western support. Should the Indians attack, the Pakistanis believe, their aim would be to destroy much of the Pakistani army and to take over Kashmir and the surrounding area, which separates Pakistan from its ally China, weakening Pakistan dramatically.

Despite Pakistani perceptions, the Indians are unlikely to attack Pakistan simply because of Soviet prodding. Although for reasons internal to the region India would like a weaker Pakistan, a massive move against Pakistan could have substantial risks for India. Many Indians regard their territorial distance from the Soviet Union as a security asset and believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the beginning of a strategic conflict of interest between New Delhi and Moscow in South Asia. Although New Delhi has not taken a strong public position against the Soviet invasion, the "Sovietization" of Afghanistan is a source of concern among many Indians. More important, an invasion of Pakistan aimed at severing the geographic links to South Asia and the Middle East that Pakistan provides for China might well lead to a Sino-Indian war. Defeating Pakistan would not be easy and Indo-U.S. and Indo-Arab relations would suffer seriously. All these factors might persuade India against invading Pakistan. However, for several reasons including nuclear competition, a conflict cannot be ruled out between the two countries. It serves Western interests to encourage improved Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Chinese relations. An intensification of Indo-Pakistan rivalry serves only the USSR's regional purposes.

**ASSESSMENT**

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion can be characterized as a failure because it did not deter the Soviet occupation of the country. However, the United States' approach to Afghanistan since then has been more successful, at least so far.

The resistance has been kept alive longer than many thought was feasible even though it is difficult to know how significant the U.S. contribution has been. Clearly, the U.S. efforts have been helpful. The Soviets have not won the war yet, the morale of the partisans remains high, the neighboring countries have not accommodated the Soviets but remain supportive of the U.S. approach to the conflict, and the war has not
spread. It is even possible that if the United States had made the kind of effort in Afghanistan and the region before 1979 that it has been making since the Soviet invasion, the invasion itself might have been deterred. Greater U.S. interest and involvement in Afghanistan and the region would have significantly increased the risks of intervention to the Soviets and might have discouraged their move altogether.

However, even the current approach toward the Afghan conflict has significant weaknesses and might fail over time, even if the United States does not change its objectives. The policy could fail for several reasons. First, it might fail because of Soviet successes in Afghanistan. Despite the recent intensification of the USSR’s military activities against the partisans, its strategy for winning the war remains a long-term one. Moscow has sought to turn the war into civil war by seeking to expand the size and increase the efficiency of the Afghan security forces—the armed forces, KHAD (Khedamat wa Atlaat Dawlati), militias, and border guards. The Soviets have also expanded the size of the ruling Communist party, the People’s Democratic party of Afghanistan, and have been hoping to contain factionalism within it. The Soviet-installed regime has encouraged the participation of tribal, religious, and ethnic leaders in state-run institutions. To cause problems for the resistance and win support for itself, Moscow has sought to intensify and exploit the many ethnic and tribal rivalries in Afghanistan. Moscow’s long-term program aims at bringing about important changes in Afghanistan’s economic and educational structures leading to the Sovietization of the country. Today large numbers of Afghans are receiving their higher education in the Soviet Union and Eastern Block countries. The Soviets are hoping that these Afghans will be more successful in managing the country. The political strategy has been based on a military policy that has become increasingly brutal. Increasing indiscriminate bombing, killing of women and children, interrupting food supplies, and occasionally deliberate massacres in areas of intense resistance are aimed at discouraging the population from supporting the resistance or forcing them to leave the country. Already some 4 million Afghans, representing almost a quarter of the population, have become refugees. Moscow believes that time is on its side because the relative costs of the war are so much greater for the Afghans than for the Soviets. So far these Soviet tactics have had mixed effects. Applied persistently and over a long period of time, they could worsen the relative position of the partisans, weakening the morale and determination of the Afghans and reducing the partisans to no more than a minor nuisance.

Second, U.S. policy could fail because the partisans might not be able to cope with the Soviet strategy. Although the guerrillas have had substantial achievements, resisting the Soviets longer than many expected, they face enormous problems. Unless these problems are overcome or at least reduced, the long-term prospects for the partisans will be dim. The partisans face three interactive categories of problems: those internal to their own organizations, those arising from Soviet tactics that we have already discussed, and those resulting from the policies of countries friendly to the resistance.

The biggest partisan problem has been the internal conflicts among the various groups and their resulting inability to acquire a significant international presence. Lack of unity and in-fighting among the partisans damage their standing with the
Afghan people. Lack of political coordination among the principal partisan groups has already had several political costs. A united movement would receive greater international attention and support. A politically more effective resistance could have increased the political costs of the occupation, such as the use of brutal military tactics. It could challenge the legitimacy of the Karmal government in forums such as the United Nations. Lack of unity makes it harder for others—including the Soviets—to negotiate with the resistance. A new alliance of all the major resistance groups has been recently established. If it can survive and grow in effectiveness, it can acquire a significant international role.

Besides political problems, the partisans suffer from organizational and military difficulties that could undermine their position over time. The organizational difficulties include communication problems, inability to provide social services to the people in the resistance-held areas, and lack of detailed economic and political programs to compete with the Soviets and their local allies. The partisans also have little capacity for propagating their views to the Afghan people, and they lack a significant educational program. The departure of a large number of Afghans from the country may result in the loss of an internal support system, which would cripple the resistance. There is little evidence that the partisans have developed a serious program to reverse or at least reduce significantly the tide of migration. At the military level, the resistance has shown enormous resilience. But here, too, there are serious problems. It continues to suffer from significant shortages of weapons—especially antiaircraft systems—mine detectors, training, and ammunition for heavy equipment. It also faces considerable problems in the area of transferring supplies to the fronts. The partisans have been unable to protect the civilians from Soviet bombing, and because of their political weakness, they have not been able to take advantage of it internationally by orchestrating international opposition to Soviet tactics.

Third, the Soviets could succeed because those countries that could assist the resistance might not do what is necessary to overcome its problems. Several countries can assist the partisans in increasing their effectiveness. These include Pakistan, Iran, the Islamic countries, China, and the United States and its allies. Among these the role of Pakistan is critical. It feels the most threatened by the developments in Afghanistan. A Soviet victory there would substantially increase Moscow’s ability to take advantage of Pakistan’s problems; a Soviet withdrawal would dramatically improve Pakistan’s security. The Afghan refugees, who are a source of concern to Pakistan, are more likely to return to Afghanistan if the Soviets withdraw than if Moscow consolidates its hold.

The Pakistani government believes that only an effective Afghan resistance movement can bring enough pressure on the Soviets to negotiate seriously. It has provided support for the partisans and the Afghan refugees and has allowed the resistance’s military capabilities to grow. However, it has followed this policy cautiously in the hope of avoiding increased Soviet pressure across the Pakistan-Afghan border. The Soviets, in turn have increased their pressures on Pakistan to bring about its abandonment of the resistance. Soviet commentaries on Pakistan have become more hostile, the war has been brought closer to the Pakistan border, and violations of Pakistani airspace have increased.
Should the current Pakistani government or its successor reduce support for the Afghan partisans, it will deal a devastating blow to the resistance. Many Pakistanis, including some of the major political parties, have declared that their country should stop supporting the Mujahedeen and negotiate directly with the Karmal regime. Moscow has pushed for a similar objective. Such a development implies recognizing the Karmal regime and abandoning the resistance to it. Such a recommendation could be made only based on limited-term interest calculations for Pakistan. Its long-term effect could be very dangerous for Pakistan. Abandoning the resistance would lead to the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan. Dealing directly with the Karmal regime is likely to be the first stop in this direction. But consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan will not be without important risks for Pakistan. After defeating the Afghans, the USSR’s ability to pressure and threaten Pakistan will increase dramatically. At present Soviet preoccupation with the Afghan partisans induces Moscow to follow a cautious policy toward Pakistan. The Afghan war also limits Soviet military options against Pakistan. Both these restraints would be removed after a Soviet military victory in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s many domestic problems are likely to be used as opportunities for spreading Soviet influence and power across the border.

A Soviet victory in Afghanistan could cause other problems for Pakistan as well. Surrounded by India and the Soviet Union, its ability to follow an independent foreign policy would be constrained. The Afghan refugees, who are very favorable toward Pakistan now, might become hostile if they perceive that Pakistan abandonment brought about their defeat. They are also less likely to go back to Afghanistan after the Soviets have become victorious. It is even possible that Pakistan’s abandonment of the partisans would strain Islamabad’s ties with several of its current friends including the United States.

It is not inevitable that the Soviets will be victorious in Afghanistan. Faced with increasing military and political costs, they might accept a reasonable political solution that meets their legitimate security interests and provides self-determination for the Afghans. It appears that under pressure from Congress, the Reagan administration is likely to increase its support for the Afghans. Whether or not Pakistan goes along with the policy of further increasing the resistance’s political and military effectiveness will be critical. Pakistan’s reactions will probably depend on how it perceives the implications of increased partisan effectiveness. Should Islamabad agree that such a development will increase the likelihood of a political settlement, it will probably go along. Equally important will be Pakistan’s calculations on whether increased resistance effectiveness could lead to its loss of control over the Afghan refugees and the partisans.

The Afghan resistance has done considerably better than many believed was possible. While faced with enormous problems, it also has considerable potential for growth. The prospects for the resistance depends on whether it can overcome the problems it faces. Some solutions depend on the Afghans themselves, others on the actions of regional powers and more distant powers. In the absence of such a strategy, time will be working for the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, should the partisans grow in political and military effectiveness and the Soviets see no significant prospects
for easy and successful escalations of the conflict—by threatening Pakistan, for example—Moscow might become seriously interested in a political settlement of the conflict. It is uncertain what might ultimately happen to the Soviet-Afghan war. However, whatever happens will have major implications not only for the Afghans but also for their neighbors, the Soviets, and their countervailing powers.
INTRODUCTION

Pakistan’s location along a potential minefield that stretches from Afghanistan in the northwest to Morocco in the southwest, coupled with the dramatic shifts in the geopolitical environment in its immediate neighborhood, have catapulted the country to a position of vital strategic importance. Wedged between Afghan resistance against the Soviet-backed Kabul regime in the north, the Iran-Iraq war now involving a region in the Gulf contiguous with Pakistan’s 400-mile-long coastline to the southwest, and an unpredictable India on its eastern border, Pakistan’s importance in the foreign policy of both superpowers as well as countries of the region cannot be overemphasized.

Five years of instability were generated by several disruptions in the established sociopolitical order in Pakistan’s immediate neighborhood—the coup d’état-generated revolution in Afghanistan, the Islamic revolution in Iran, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Iraq’s invasion of Iran, each with their respective geopolitical, ideological, and human factor fallout. None of these has shaken what many observers perceived to be a fragile regime in Pakistan. Regional instability was further compounded by political unrest in the Indian states bordering Pakistan, specifically the military operation of the Indian government against the minority Sikh community in East Punjab, with its grim consequences leading to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the massacre of over 2,000 Sikhs, and the dismissal of the popularly elected opposition party government of Farooq Abdullah in occupied Kashmir. It is therefore noteworthy that Pakistani policymakers have skillfully dealt with these difficult circumstances without endangering the country’s security.¹

I will focus here first on the historical evolution of Pakistan's relationship with West Asia, its attempts for Muslim unity, and in particular its development of ties with Iran and Turkey. Then I will deal with Pakistan's position vis-à-vis the Iran-Iraq war, its relations with Arab countries, and its role in mediation efforts. Finally, I will discuss Pakistan's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

PAKISTAN AND THE WEST ASIAN CONNECTION:
HISTORICAL BACKDROP

In order to understand Pakistan's position vis-à-vis the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is today a Muslim-Zionist conflict, it is first necessary to examine the relationship between Islam and foreign policy in Pakistan. It will also be helpful to examine the initial framework that provided military, political, and economic cooperation between Pakistan and the United States, on the one hand, and the West Asian states, on the other, under the aegis of the Anglo-American Baghdad Pact, including the reasons for Pakistan's joining the pact. In tracing the development of economic ties and their political potential among Pakistan and the West Asian states, I will discuss the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and its proposed successor, the Regional Economic Cooperation (REC), operative among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. The development of similar ties with other West Asian states, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, will be discussed later.

Ideology and Foreign Policy

Pakistan's neutral stand on the Iran-Iraq war, which it views as a fratricidal war between two Muslim states, and its avowedly pro-Arab stand in the Muslim-Zionist conflict, which it regards as a just struggle for a Palestinian homeland, are direct expressions of its ideology. Pakistan is "irrevocably committed" to the restoration of Jerusalem to Muslim sovereignty and to the "liberation of occupied Palestinian and Arab lands."2

Ever since its birth as a sovereign state in 1947, Pakistan has endeavored to forge closer ties among the Muslim countries with a view of developing economic cooperation and political cohesion on issues of vital importance to the Muslim world. In pursuit of this policy, Pakistan has come a long way: from facing outright hostility, ridicule, or suspicion by one Muslim state or another3 during the early fifties, to a position where in 1980 the Islamic foreign ministers conference decided to nominate Pakistan's president to address the thirty-fifth session of the U.N. General Assembly

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2 Inaugural address by President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq at the international seminar "Islamic Solidarity Is Essential for World Peace," held at Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami, Islamabad, Sept. 1984.
3 King Farooq of Egypt is reported to have ridiculed Pakistan's commitment to the Islamic cause by telling his courtiers: "Don't you know Islam was born on August 14, 1947?" See M. S. Agwani, "Pakistan and Pan-Islamism," in Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Indian Perspective, ed. K. Arif (Lahore: Vanguard, 1984), p. 292.
on behalf of the member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). For some observers this decision was a recognition of the services Pakistan had rendered for Muslim cohesion since its inception.\(^4\) It was the first time in U.N. history that a group of nations, on the basis of a common ideological bond, had singled out one of their members to articulate their views on a wide range of issues facing the Muslims and to express their political cohesion on matters such as the Palestinian issue and the Afghanistan problem.

Additionally, President Zia’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly in October 1980 reflected the fact that despite the twists and turns in Pakistan’s domestic scene, the country had followed a policy whose direction had been clearly spelled out by Liaquat Ali Khan, its first prime minister. Addressing an Islamic conference at Karachi in 1951, Ali Khan said:

> Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the subcontinent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries.\(^5\)

Ali Khan had also stated that Pakistan had only one ambition, “to serve Islam and humanity.”\(^6\)

### Attempts at Muslim Unity

Pakistan’s attempts to develop closer ties with Muslim countries and to bring them together on a common economic and political platform remained largely unproductive during the early fifties. Several reasons could be cited for this situation. In the geostrategic environment of post–World War II and the cold war era, some Muslim states were engaged in the struggle for political emancipation from colonialist control, while others were struggling against remnants of colonial rule and political manipulation, economic dependence, and internal despotism. In this struggle, the Islamic factor had been overshadowed by the struggle for national liberation and political and economic independence. Mossadaq’s Iran, Nasser’s Egypt, and the Algerian war of liberation illustrate this struggle at different levels.

Another reason for Pakistan’s inability to elicit a reciprocal response from other Muslim states in its Islamic overtures was the gap in the experiential background of Pakistani Muslims and their West Asian counterparts. For the Pakistani Muslim, Islam had come to represent greater political significance than among Muslims of West Asia because in undivided India, Muslims perceived themselves as a minority whose cultural identity and values were threatened by an aggressive Hindu majority. To

\(^4\) See *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), Oct. 1, 1980.
\(^6\) *Dawn* (Karachi), Nov. 16, 1949.
protect their identity as a Muslim nation as well as their cultural, economic, and political rights against the twin threat of Hindu hegemony and colonial control, Indian Muslims invoked Islam to forge unity among their ranks. Compared with the nationalist struggle of the Arabs in West Asia against colonial rule, the struggle of Indian Muslims for Pakistan was a twofold battle contemporaneously waged against external colonialism and internal hegemonism of a religious majority.

The threat perceptions of a Muslim state that had emerged from the throes of the partition of a subcontinent in 1947, therefore, were foreign to the nationalist and anti-imperialist movements of Mossadaq and Nasser. Indeed, India's projection of itself as a secular, nonaligned state proved more attractive to Egypt and most of the Arab world than did the Islamic factor of Pakistan. Moreover, the invocation of Islam as a political factor for forging closer ties among Muslim states was subject to misunderstandings: some Arab states suspected Pakistan of harboring leadership ambitions for the Islamic world, while others looked upon it as an imperialist ploy. Still others found Pakistan's stress on Islam as merely irritable: Turkey felt sufficiently uneasy by the frequent references to Islam by the Pakistani ambassador in Ankara to request that the ambassador be recalled on the grounds that his approach was "too religious" for the secular Turks and on the suspicion that he was encouraging "religious reactionaries in Turkey." Moreover, the rivalries and disputes among several Muslim states did not provide the climate that was necessary to bring them closer.

While Pakistan failed to make an Islamic breakthrough at the governmental level during the early years after its independence, it followed up this desire at a nongovernmental level by staging the Islamic World Congress at Karachi in 1949, with a sequel in 1951. It also hosted the first Islamic Economic Conference in 1949. The conference recommended the formation of a commonwealth of Islamic countries with the aim of bringing about economic cooperation, mutual exchange, and the expansion of knowledge. These conferences and many others that followed are indicators of Pakistan's persistent urge to identify itself with the Islamic world. Moreover, in the absence of a stable self-reliant economy, an industrial infrastructure, or a solid agricultural foundation and given its persistent security concerns and vulnerability to external military threats, there was little Pakistan could offer to other fledgling Muslim states in terms of development and mutual defense.

The Alliances and the West Asian Connection

In an era when superpower politics held sway, it is a matter of little surprise that the political and military ties that Pakistan did finally manage to develop with its West

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Asian neighbors—Iran, Turkey, and Iraq—became possible under the aegis of the United States and Britain in the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Pakistan's membership in this pact was in response to its security compulsions in a hostile environment that included Afghanistan in the northwest—with an eye on a sizable chunk of Pakistan—and India to the east, separated by a curtain of hostility and suspicion. The first article of the Baghdad Pact stated that the members "will cooperate for their security and defense." Besides serving as a palliative for Pakistan's security concerns, the pact broke ground for developing closer ties with Iran, Pakistan's physical link to West Asia, as well as Muslim Turkey and Iraq. Indeed, Pakistan endeavored to project its membership in the pact in terms of the security interests of the Islamic states. Within Pakistan, there was little difference of opinion between the orthodox ulema and the liberal statesmen when the pact was concluded. But the pact did cause embarrassment to Pakistan during the Suez crisis of 1956 when Britain and France entered the war on the side of Israel against Egypt. The four Muslim states of the pact, however, condemned the Israeli attack on Egypt, but they were unable to lodge a joint condemnation as members of the pact. Furthermore, the pact alienated Pakistan from most Arab states and even neutralized Pakistan's efforts to come closer to them despite the membership of Iraq, an Arab state.

The Baghdad Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq withdrew its membership following the 1958 coup that brought Abdul Karim Qassim to power in Baghdad. Meanwhile, Pakistan had also joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) primarily because of security concerns, for the eastern half of its territory was situated in the Bay of Bengal to the southeast, separated by over 1,500 kilometers of Indian territory. This was followed by Pakistan's signing of an agreement of cooperation with the United States in 1959, which augmented the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed between Pakistan and the United States in May 1954. Pakistan's reason for entering into security agreements involving U.S. military aid was vindicated when India under Nehru spurned General Muhammad Ayub Khan's offer for joint defense, an arrangement that would have virtually led to a no-war pact between Pakistan and its traditional enemy. However, the United States and Pakistan had widely divergent perceptions regarding the operational aspects of these agreements. It is true that there was a convergence of Western security interests in the region with Pakistan's security concern. But the underlying perceptions and motives that had brought about this convergence were wide apart. Pakistan's overriding concern in the fifties was its perception of the threat India posed to its survival whereas the West saw Pakistan mainly as a state vulnerable to Soviet expansionism.

**CENTO, RCD, and REC**

In 1962, when the United States began shipping arms to India following the

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Sino-Indian border dispute and gave explicit warning to Ayub Khan not to exploit the situation by launching a campaign in Kashmir, Pakistan had begun to reconsider its membership in CENTO and SEATO. The futility of CENTO as a security agreement for safeguarding concerns of the individual countries in the region became increasingly questionable in the years that followed. Relaxation of superpower tension in the cold war era had reduced the importance of CENTO, and Pakistan's experience of the impotence of the treaty during the 1965 war convinced Ayub Khan that CENTO had become an "anachronism." 

Turkey also experienced doubts regarding its membership, for both the United States and Britain had failed to support it in the Cyprus conflict in 1964. While the shah was spared the experience of being frustrated by the inertia of CENTO's Western members in the event of a military contingency, he felt unhappy by Pakistan's experience and shared its bitterness at having been let down by its Western allies during the 1965 war. Given this context, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey had begun to question the workability of CENTO regarding its political and military functions. Nevertheless, despite these disappointments, CENTO had laid the groundwork for institutionalized cooperation among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in economic and cultural sectors, with the possibility of political cooperation.

There were even speculations for establishing a West Asian confederation of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan after Ayub Khan revived the shah's 1958 proposal for such a union. But the proposal had to be dropped as both Iran and Pakistan sensed that the timing (1963–64) was unfavorable. Instead, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran followed the initiative by Ayub Khan, who was critical of the United States' acting as a "master" instead of a friend when it dictated terms against India, and formally founded the trilateral organization, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). The organization's formation was announced following a summit held between Ayub Khan, the shah, and General Gursel in Istanbul on July 22, 1964. The goals of RCD were national development and economic growth. For Ayub Khan, the RCD was a "landmark in the history of Islam." Its purpose was not merely to bring Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan closer but to pave the way for closer relations among all the Muslim countries from Morocco to Indonesia, "for the secret of Muslim survival lay in closer cooperation." The leadership of the opposition in Pakistan's National Assembly called the RCD "a step in the right direction" whereas another member of the assembly lauded the pact because it could help Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan "to get rid of the curse of CENTO."
Reaction to the RCD was also highly favorable in Tehran. Abdullah Riazi, speaker of the Iranian parliament (Majlis), said the RCD could help the development of member states as well as contribute to the cause of world peace. Iranian Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur, while speaking in Sanandaj, a capital city in Iran's Sunni Kurdistan province, hailed the Iran-Pakistan-Turkey decision of closer cooperation as a great political, social, economic, and cultural union of 150 million Muslims.22

While the political and defense potential of the RCD was not formally highlighted, there was a tacit popular understanding that this dimension was implicit in the pact. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister in Ayub Khan’s regime, pointed out three reasons that impelled Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to form the RCD: first, the West had attached greater importance to the nonaligned countries in respect to economic aid; second, a distinct trend toward regional cooperation had emerged in world politics; and, third, tension between the United States and the Soviet Union had eased, generating the hope that a new pattern of international relations would replace the old one.23 For Bhutto, therefore, the RCD was not to be an “adjunct to the CENTO.”24 It aimed at integrating production and infrastructural planning and, after the Izmir summit in 1976, resulted in a free trade pact in 1977.

While the RCD failed to accomplish many of its well-intentioned industrial and economic projects, it facilitated the flow of generous economic aid from the shah’s Iran to Pakistan. Between 1973–76, Iran committed aid totaling $805 million to Pakistan.25 Over $700 million of this amount had already been given to Pakistan by the time the Pahlavi regime began to crumble. Iran also played an important role in Pakistan’s security concerns by giving repeated assurances that it would not allow further dismemberment of West Pakistan. Thus, in addition to the moral and material support that Pakistan had received from the Arab states, “it was the shah’s Iran which balanced the power equation in the subcontinent by underwriting the security of Pakistan.”26

Iran’s concern for Pakistan’s security stemmed from its own apprehensions of possible Soviet and Indian threats by land and sea, a concern that was a possible offshoot of Iran’s own Russophobia born of a long history of Russian intervention in Iran, going back to Iran’s defeat by Russia in 1828. These apprehensions were exacerbated by the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1971 and the signing of a similar treaty between the Soviet Union and Iraq, with whom Iran had territorial disputes. Given this context, Iran was keen to augment Pakistan’s strength in order to ensure its own stability on the eastern flank.27

However, by the mid-seventies, economic and strategic considerations impelled Iran to overlook its differences in its perceptions of India. Iran made heavy economic

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24 Quoted in Chopra, “RCD,” p. 156.
25 “Will the RCD Make a Comeback?”
27 Ibid.
investments in India and entered into agreement for the long-term import of iron ore for its steel mill. Through these measures, Iran probably hoped to encourage India's reorientation toward the United States and to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union. India, nevertheless, remained ever fearful that the sophisticated weapons Iran was buying from the United States might be passed on to Pakistan.28

As for CENTO, its demise had become only a matter of time. In September 1978, General Zia remarked that CENTO had become only a treaty on paper "with no significance whatsoever, no teeth, no backing."29 As a product of the cold war, CENTO had become redundant in the era of détente between the superpowers. Four months after General Zia's statement, it was Iran that took the lead in leaving CENTO. Mir Fenderiski, foreign minister of Shapur Bakhtiar's government, formally announced Iran's withdrawal from CENTO in January 1979. Although Pakistan followed suit two months later, recommendations for Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO had been made at least a year earlier at the highest level in the Foreign Office.30

The point merely illustrates the contemporaneous development of mutual perceptions in Iran and Pakistan regarding the redundancy of CENTO and the need for developing an authentic regional framework for economic development, without too much emphasis on political and military trappings. For the moment, this appears to be the course of development in relations between Pakistan and Turkey, on the one hand, and revolutionary Iran, on the other. Revolutionary Iran has overcome its initial suspicion of the RCD as a cover for CIA activities in the region. After having rendered the organization inactive for almost five years, Iran has taken the lead in reviving it. This initiative has belied the hasty conclusions of some political observers who saw the RCD mainly as a "Pakistani diplomatic offensive" that had failed and which Pakistan was desperately trying to resuscitate.31 In fact, the proposal for a new name for the tripartite alliance—Regional Economic Cooperation (REC)—came from Iran.32 Although no specific meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries has yet been planned within the REC framework, the ministers have been meeting from time to time and, according to the Turkish foreign minister, "looked forward to an early take-off of the reactivated regional grouping."33 Mir Hussain Moussavi, the Iranian prime minister, has also stated that a revived RCD could become the context for unity and for expanding ties with Pakistan and Turkey and that he considered such a move "positive and healthy."34

28 Ibid.
29 Newsweek, Sept. 18, 1978. Quoted in Chaudhry (see n. 26).
30 Personal communication from Agha Shafi, Pakistan's former foreign minister, Islamabad, Oct. 1984.
31 Chopra, "RCD."
32 Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu's remarks in The Muslim (Islamabad), Oct. 24, 1984. The outgoing Turkish ambassador from Islamabad confirmed before his departure that it was finally agreed to call the RCD the Regional Economic Cooperation organization; see Dawn, Nov. 20, 1984.
Pakistan’s Geostrategic Identification

Pakistan’s relation with Iraq and its stand on the war needs to be viewed in the context of Pakistan’s relations with the Arab world, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The special relationship which Pakistan now enjoys with the GCC states has evolved steadily over the past thirteen years. Although Pakistan had hoped to forge closer ties with West Asian states ever since its inception, it was not until the dismemberment of its eastern wing by India in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh that this became possible. The breakup of Pakistan as a state with dual geostrategic concerns, both in West Asia and Southeast Asia, drastically altered the geopolitical environment of the region. The insecurity that was heaped upon what remained of Pakistan, as well as the fluid geopolitical conditions, spurred Pakistan into adopting a purposive and vigorous policy toward West Asia. The aim was to heal the shattered national morale bordering on an identity crisis as a Muslim state by forging close and meaningful relations with Muslim West Asia.

On December 20, 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, having taken over power from the army, spared no time in pursuing this objective. During his first month in office, Bhutto visited eight Muslim states in the Middle East. By the first week in June 1972, Bhutto had visited twenty-two Muslim states. The rapport Bhutto struck with the heads of most of these states in presenting Pakistan’s problems, the 1971 war, and its geopolitical fallout enlisted the empathy and support of many Muslim leaders. Pakistan’s success in hosting the second Islamic summit of the OIC in Lahore in 1974, which Pakistan chaired, was a development of historical importance for the country. It served a dual purpose, one internal, the other external. On the domestic front, the Islamic summit was a morale booster in the wake of the 1971 debacle, a reassurance to Pakistan’s national destiny and Islamic identity. On the external front, the conference was a confirmation of Pakistan’s entry into the mainstream of West Asia and a recognition of its geostrategic importance. The Lahore summit accelerated the growth of Pakistan’s relationship with the Muslim world, in particular Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

It would be misleading, however, to interpret Pakistan’s active role in the OIC in the years that followed as an attempt to gain leadership in the Islamic world. Historically, the Muslims of the landmass now constituting Pakistan have identified themselves with political causes of other Muslim states, a classical example being the Khilafat Movement in India (1919–24). Led by Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar, the Khilafat Movement was a demonstration of popular Muslim will against Britain and other European powers who imposed on Turkey after its defeat in World War I the

35 Chaudhry, “Pakistan’s Security.”
humiliating Treaty of Serves. The Khilafat Movement was a passionate protest against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the threat of dismemberment that Turkey itself faced as a nation-state. For the Muslims in India, who perceived themselves as a separate nation among the overwhelming Hindu majority, Ottoman Turkey had served as a focus of cultural and religious identity.

Viewed from this perspective, the Khilafat Movement was not an isolated outburst of emotional activism with anticolonial overtones generated among Indian Muslims by Turkey’s military defeat. It prepared the Indian Muslims for a political war for asserting their identity as a Muslim nation, leading to the birth of Pakistan. Given this context, the OIC is regarded by many Pakistanis as a significant phase in the process of achieving an international Islamic political forum, a process that has been going on for well over a century since Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, the nineteenth-century Muslim reformer and activist, began the movement for political unity among Muslims. This historical backdrop has enabled Pakistan to achieve one of the most important fundamentals of its foreign policy—the consolidation of relationships with Muslim countries in general and the countries of West Asia in particular.

In the present environment, while seeking closer political cooperation and economic links with the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan also favors a meaningful defense cooperation with them with the object of strengthening regional security. This approach is based on the view that direct superpower intervention in regional conflicts is a mechanistic approach that will not only fail to resolve the causes of tension but will also create a backlash of indigenous forces, as in the case of Lebanon and Afghanistan. Geopolitically, however, Pakistan is in the mainstream of the Gulf’s socioeconomic and security concerns, so much so that as President Zia said: “Pakistan considers itself part of the Gulf, though it is not a formal member of the Gulf.”

The geostrategic identification of Pakistan with West Asia has not been an overnight development, nor does it stem from the personal whims of the present regime. It has strong psychohistorical antecedents. For example, as recently as 1977 during the anti-Bhutto unrest by the opposition Pakistan National Alliance, it was Prime Minister Bhutto himself who took the initiative directly to involve friendly Islamic countries in Pakistan’s domestic crisis. Bhutto requested the Saudi and UAE ambassadors to mediate between his government and the opposition parties. That these mediation attempts were not viewed by the majority of Pakistanis as “meddling” in the internal affairs of the country demonstrates that as an ideological state with a powerful sense of Muslim identity, mediation by friendly Muslim states was not viewed as a threat to national identity. Reasons for this attitude and identification can be traced to the history of Islam in the subcontinent, the security concerns of the Muslims of the area, and the shaping of their perceptions over the centuries.

The Economic Factor

The convergence of the security interests of Pakistan and the West Asian states in the region's current geopolitical atmosphere, coupled with the cultural, historical, and religious affinity between Pakistan and West Asia, has also had its economic dividends.

Pakistan's exports to the OIC countries, in particular the GCC states, have increased remarkably since 1977. Exports to Iran after the revolution show a tremendous increase as well, so much so that in 1983–84, exports to Iran were expected to be higher than to any other Muslim state. As Table 1 indicates, Pakistan's exports in 1969–70 to the Gulf states, a year before its eastern half broke away as Bangladesh, amounted to 145.2 million rupees. Five years later, following the vigorous Pakistani campaign for developing economic ties with the Gulf states, these exports had undergone a tenfold increase, reaching 1,457 million rupees. Although imports from Gulf states had also increased remarkably during this period, the inflated figures of these exports were primarily due to the increase in oil prices. Exports to RCD countries jumped from 22.5 million rupees in 1969–70 to 769 million rupees in 1978, the year preceding the Islamic revolution. The remarkable increase in exports to the RCD countries after the revolution is primarily due to the export boom to Iran. Almost 90 percent of the over 6 billion rupees' worth of Pakistani exports to the RCD countries in 1983–84 were made to Iran. Iran's policy of giving preference to Pakistan and Turkey in trade has made the two countries Iran's major trade partners. For Pakistan, Iran has become its "principal trade partner" with exports from Pakistan expected to exceed $500 million in 1985.

Pakistan and the War

These exports, together with an estimated $3.5 billion of annual remittance from Pakistani manpower abroad, the bulk of which is mainly engaged in work in Arab states, have brought a remarkable increase in Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings. However, with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and its continuation, some political observers were convinced that the war would destroy this idyllic situation because Pakistan would be forced to enter the war on one side or the other, more probably on the side of the Arabs. It was generally felt that Pakistan's military presence, in the form of training personnel in the Arab states, would drag it into fighting on the side of the Arabs. Wedged between two warring Muslim camps racially split along the Arab-Persian (Ajam) lines placed Pakistan in a "terrible dilemma" because "if it fought Iran, it would have antagonised a neighbour which is Pakistan's only physical link with West Asia; and if it refused to fight Iran, West Asia would reject Pakistan because all of it, except Turkey and Iran, is Arab." However, after five years of the Iran-Iraq war

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Table 1
Pakistan's Trade with the Islamic World
(in million rupees)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Trade (Including the West and Eastern Bloc)</th>
<th>Organization of Islamic Conference</th>
<th>Gulf Cooperation Council</th>
<th>Regional Cooperation for Development</th>
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<td>Import</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983–84</td>
<td>36,555</td>
<td>73,777</td>
<td>15,056</td>
<td>22,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–83</td>
<td>34,442</td>
<td>68,151</td>
<td>14,057</td>
<td>22,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977–78</td>
<td>12,980</td>
<td>27,815</td>
<td>4,016</td>
<td>6,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–75</td>
<td>10,286</td>
<td>20,925</td>
<td>3,313</td>
<td>3,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–70</td>
<td>--</td>
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* Projections based on exports for the first three quarters of 1983–84.
without Pakistan’s choosing sides, the fallacy of the above reasoning is self-evident. While observing neutrality, Pakistan continues to enjoy good relations with both Iran and Iraq as well as the GCC states.

Additionally, Pakistan has been a conscientious and active element in mediation efforts for ending the conflict since the very first days of the war. As early as April 1980, well over five months before the outbreak of all-out war, Pakistan expressed grave concern over the escalation of border clashes between Iran and Iraq. An editorial in Pakistan’s largest English-language daily termed these clashes expressions of deep distrust and differences in ideology and outlook between the two belligerents. The editorial perceptively noted that in the climate generated by the extremist measures of the two states against each other, “it was not surprising that appeals to end the confrontation or accept mediation by a third party had fallen on deaf ears.” By September 16, 1980, Pakistan and other Islamic countries had volunteered to set up a team of foreign ministers to mediate in the escalating armed conflict between Iran and Iraq, with the aim of effecting an immediate cease-fire and negotiations between the two belligerents. On September 23, 1980, one day after full-scale war had broken out between the two countries, Pakistan supported the U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. President Zia then accepted the request by Islamic countries to attempt a negotiated settlement of the war. Before the war had entered its second week, President Zia led the Islamic Ummah Peace Committee to Tehran and Baghdad. However, after meeting Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, then president of Iran, President Zia remarked that Iran was still in a phase “where mediations lead to nothing.” Two days later, on October 1, 1980, while addressing the U.N. General Assembly on behalf of 900 million Muslims of the world, President Zia expressed grave concern about the continuation of the war and called for “strict neutrality and noninterference” in the internal affairs of the belligerents by “outside powers.”

After more than four years of war and the failure of the many peace initiatives by Islamic countries as well as by international bodies such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations, Iranian leaders have grown increasingly suspicious of the OIC Islamic Peace Committee. For example, when members of the committee convened in Jeddah in July 1984 to discuss ways to end the war, Iran called it a "committee for supporting Saddam," the Iraqi president.

To date, Iran remains suspicious of any mediation bid in the Gulf war since it feels that such bids are made to prevent Iran from winning the war. The Iranians do not trust any of the international bodies trying to mediate for a settlement—the OIC, the United Nations, and NAM—because none has taken principled positions, that is, as the Iranian argument goes, none of them has publicly condemned Iraq for its aggression against Iran or for initiating attacks on Gulf shipping and using chemical weapons. Moreover, relations between Iran and Pakistan, which were marked by an

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42 *Dawn*, April 18, 1980.
undercurrent of Iranian suspicions of Pakistan's presumed "American connection," have improved considerably because of diverse reasons. On the war issue, Iranian leaders are also reported to be appreciative of President Zia because Pakistan has demonstrated its neutrality in the war and has condemned the use of chemical weapons. Also, President Zia's refusal to become the head of Islamic Ummah Peace Committee after it was discredited by Iran is seen by Iranian leaders as a friendly gesture. This marks a radical departure from the earlier mistrust of the Iranians, who accused Pakistan of "false neutrality" in the war.

Pakistan's ability to steer past the pitfalls of partisan politics in the Iran-Iraq war can be attributed to several factors: its geostrategic location, its common border with Iran and strategic coastline to the Gulf, and its identity as a Muslim state that is non-Arab and non-Iranian, with a distinct identity of its own. Additionally, these factors have endowed the people of Pakistan with a distinct assimilative capacity, shaped by the experience of history of Islam in the subcontinent. On the war issue, not the invocation of sectarian differences (Shia Iran pitted against the Sunni Iraqi leadership), nor ideological arguments (the war between Islam and Baathist atheism), nor racial factors (Arabs versus Iranians) have moved Pakistan to shift its neutral stand.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Islamic Factor

The Iran-Iraq war has added another dimension to the problem of Palestine. This problem, which initially started off as a localized territorial dispute between the Zionists and the people they had displaced from Palestine, has generated a host of derivative conflicts: Arab versus Israel, the USSR versus the United States, the Third World versus the Western world. The Iranian revolution is now popularizing this conflict as one between Islam and Zionism. One of the stated objectives of the Iran-Iraq war, according to Iran, is the liberation of Jerusalem; the overthrow of the Baath regime in Iraq, Iraninan leaders argue, is only one step toward this end. To drive home this point, Iran has repeatedly stated that it has no designs on Iraq's territory, that its main struggle is against the Zionist occupation of Jerusalem. Aware of popular support for the Palestinian cause in Pakistan, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister who led the first high-powered Iranian delegation to Pakistan, urged upon all Muslim states to contribute "men and material" for a "joint Islamic force" to face "Zionist expansionism."

Given its preference for military measures rather than political dialogue in order

50 The Muslim, April 2, 1983.
51 The Muslim, May 5, 1982.
to solve the Palestine problem, Israel has transformed this issue from a localized territorial problem between Palestinians and Zionists into an Arab-Israeli conflict, with the religious content becoming increasingly acute over the last few years. The military defeat of the Arabs in 1967 and Israel's occupation of Arab lands, including Jerusalem, revered as a Holy City by Muslims, generated much resentment among Muslims. The desecration of Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 raised such a stormy reaction across Muslim lands that it led to the first Islamic summit in Rabat.

Attended by heads and representatives of twenty-five Muslim states in September 1969, the summit became institutionalized as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), with permanent headquarters based in Jeddah. Although composed of members with differing strategic concerns and often conflicting political ambitions, the OIC has been able to forge a unified stand on the two most important issues confronting the Muslim world: the Palestine problem and the presence of Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the OIC has made several attempts to effect a political settlement of the Iran-Iraq war, though without success.

The Palestine problem, however, continues to be the most burning issue facing the Muslim world as pointed out by Pakistan's president in his address to the World Muslim Congress held in Islamabad in September 1984. President Zia noted that despite international appeals and protests, Israel had continued its occupation of Jerusalem and the West Bank, violating international morality by forcibly altering "the spiritual, historical, and demographic character" of these areas. The Israeli leadership is apparently so deeply committed to retaining its hold on the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights that it appears to be immune to U.S. persuasion, Arab readiness, and Palestinian interest in a negotiated settlement. The systematic strengthening of Israel's political position since it signed a peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 has failed to induce Israel to agree to a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine problem.

**Camp David and Israel's Unchanged Assumptions**

The Camp David Accord was a major breakthrough for Israel in achieving political legitimacy. The accord served at least four objectives of Israel's strategy:

1. Israel's first de jure recognition by an Arab state;
2. Neutralizing Egypt, the most important and militarily powerful Arab state by shifting its position from one of confrontation to collaboration with Israel;
3. Bypassing the PLO and relegating the Palestinian quest for sovereignty to controlled autonomy; and
4. Preventing the Soviet Union from playing an active role in the Middle East. However, it appears that these political and security gains merely boosted Zionist hubris and launched Israel on a calculated course of belligerence and expansion. After Camp David, Israel transferred its capital to Jerusalem, laid claim to the occupied West Bank and Gaza on the basis of theological justification, annexed the Golan Heights, bombed the Baghdad nuclear reactor, and invaded Lebanon and occupied its southern region. Because these Israeli actions are generally regarded as enjoying tacit U.S. approval, they have generated more difficulties for those Muslim states that want
to retain political intimacy with Washington while affirming their support for the
Palestinians. President Mubarak of Egypt, for example, pointed out during his visit to
the United States in February 1984 that the United States' one-sided support of Israel
was making things "difficult" for him and other friends of the West.52 A month later,
King Hussain of Jordan, a potential victim of U.S. policy in the Middle East, stressed
that "within a year, any fragments of hope left of achieving a peaceful solution to the
Palestinian problem will be destroyed."53 This would happen, Hussain said, because
in formulating its Middle East policy, the United States was not free to move except
within the limits of what the Zionists and the state of Israel determined for it.

These statements remind one of Nuri al Said, the last prime minister of
monarchical Iraq, who wrote on July 1, 1958, that the United States, by its one-sided
support of Israel, jeopardized America’s friends in the area. Two weeks later, his body
and that of the Iraqi king were dragged through the streets of Baghdad. Also, Sadat’s
assassination became possible because Israel’s views on the West Bank, Gaza, and the
Golan Heights remained essentially unchanged despite the concessions Sadat had
made to Israel. While both Sadat and Carter regarded Camp David as a step toward a
comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and all its Arab neighbors, including
Palestinians, Prime Minister Begin continued to view the problem in a rigid Zionist
framework: there may be “autonomy for Arabs of Eretz Israel,” but they were to have
no right over the land where they were living. The West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan
Heights were parts of “Eretz Israel,” and there was no question of returning them to
Arab rule54 or giving them sovereignty as a Palestinian state.

Clearly, then, irrespective of the significant political gains Israel achieved since
1967 and the steady yet radical change in perceptions of the majority of Arabs and
Muslims regarding Israel’s reality as a sovereign political entity, there has been little
change in Israel’s attitude toward the Palestine problem. During the 1973 war, for
example, Israel’s sovereignty as a political entity was not questioned. President Sadat
of Egypt never called for the destruction of Israel. His objectives were limited to the
recovery of Arab lands and the rehabilitation of Arab pride lost in 1967.55

Another significant development has been the emergence of the general impres
sion that after well over fifteen years of armed struggle, the PLO, recognized as the
sole representative of the Palestinians, was coming round to accepting the Israeli
reality in the framework of the Fahd-Fez peace plans. The Fahd-Fez plans, while
endorsing the “inalienable right of the Palestinian people” to a sovereign state
comprising the West Bank and Gaza within the confines of the pre–June 1967
armistice lines, meant a radical departure from the stock Arab stance on the Palestinin
issue. Implicit in these plans was the recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign
entity alongside an Arab Palestinian state. As for Syria, by 1981 its confrontationalist

52 James E. Akins, “The Rise and the End of America’s Role in the Middle East,” speech delivered to the
Future Outlook for the International Business Environment, annual symposium, Dallas, Texas, April
1984.
54 Akins, “Rise and End of America’s Role.”
55 Ibid.
stance vis-à-vis Israel had also mellowed significantly. Syrian Information Minister Ahmed Iskander, in an interview with Edward Mortimer of the *London Times* in November 1981, had expressed his country’s readiness to accept the reality of Israel.\(^{56}\)

For its part, Israel spared little time in spurning these overtures for a political settlement of the issue because of its “elemental” commitment to retention of the occupied territories and its view of Arab and PLO moderation and the propagation of peace plans as a “far more serious threat than the empty bombast of Arab radicals.”\(^\text{57}\)

Perhaps the main reason for Israel’s refusal to come to terms with its Arab neighbors can be attributed to the fact that in spite of Arab readiness for a negotiated settlement, the basic assumptions underlying Israel’s political-military doctrine remain unchanged: the conviction that the central aim of Arab countries is to destroy the state of Israel.\(^\text{58}\) The persistence of this assumption indicates that Israeli policymakers are perhaps still hooked to the Zionist conviction that the Jewish people have a preordained “right” to establish a Jewish state in Palestine that should become, in the words of Theodore Herzl, the father of Zionism, a part of “the rampart of Europe against Asia...an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.”\(^\text{59}\) Given this perspective and its sociopolitical corollary, the apartheid of the Jewish people, Zionism has pursued a course of military expansion and political rigidity, which contrary to the evolutionary stream of human consciousness, are likely to lead to a destructive deadlock.

**Israel and Lebanon**

The Iran-Iraq war, by intensifying the differences in the Arab world since Camp David, gave Israel the opportune moment to strike into Lebanon with full military might. Despite Israeli success in evicting the PLO from Beirut, it has largely failed in achieving its security objectives. This could be attributed in part to the fact that the Israeli invasion stemmed from mechanistic calculations, perhaps similar to those prompting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: that the use of sheer force would impose stability in the region and ensure security for the aggressor.

For Israel, security meant the physical annihilation of the PLO, the neutralization of Lebanon, and the consolidation of a pro-Israeli government in Beirut. The invasion came despite eleven months of border tranquility, during which the PLO abided by the cease-fire agreement of July 1981. The overriding Israeli objective, however, was not the protection of its northern border, “but the destruction of the Palestinian sense of nationhood.” By breaking the will of Palestinians and demoralizing them, “Israel hoped to bring about their emigration,” easing the way for Jewish

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settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza. While Israel did not achieve its objective of politically destroying the PLO, it did succeed in sabotaging an impending U.S. peace initiative. On September 1, 1982, almost three months after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, President Reagan acknowledged that "the conflict in Lebanon preempted our efforts" to launch the next step in the peace process.

After the PLO was made to withdraw from Lebanon, Israel was naively optimistic that in view of the "new circumstances created by "Operational Peace for Galilee," peace between Israel and Lebanon had become a clear possibility. The Israeli assumption was that the PLO's defeat, its physical removal from Beirut, and its neutralization as a political and military factor in the area would be "an important contribution" to the Arab Israeli peace process.

There appears to be a fundamental error in this pattern of Israeli thinking insofar as Israel continues to view the PLO in static-mechanistic terms. The PLO represents a cause, and a popular one at that, shared not only by the Palestinians, the Arabs, and the Muslim world but also by the overwhelming majority of U.N. members. Moreover, the assumptions underlying the Israeli security perceptions are bound to create tension and conflict in the region. It is in this sense that the physical removal of the PLO from Beirut opened the way for the emergence and assertion of militant indigenous national and religious anti-Zionist forces.

Contrary to Israeli calculations, the removal of the PLO military-political threat did not create a vacuum in Lebanon or make Lebanon pliable to a political settlement on Israeli terms. It served as a trigger for unleashing nationalist forces. It helped to ignite militant consciousness and to accelerate the politicization of the indigenous forces that had been dormant. In doing so, Israel trapped itself and its ally, the United States, into a confrontation with religious and nationalist Lebanese forces on a scale no one could have predicted. Instead of intimidating the emergent political-military forces in Lebanon, Israel's invasion of Lebanon, its massive military presence in the country, and the concomitant U.S. military intervention challenged the Lebanese to take retaliatory action. It took only two "suicide bombs" to effect the withdrawal of the U.S. marines from Lebanon.

Because of its occupation, Israel has strengthened nationalist sentiment, which was elusive prior to the invasion. Israeli troops have lost many casualties to attacks carried out by the Lebanese, with whom the Israelis had never had any problem before. As increasing numbers of Lebanese become resentful of the Israeli occupation, Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karame expressed his pride at the resistance by the people of Lebanon against the Israeli occupation forces, a qualitative change in the internal environment of Lebanon, where resistance against Israeli occupation forces is becoming widespread and popular; in fact, Israel's attempts to raise and equip a pro-Israeli army on the lines of Haddad's army in South Lebanon to ensure Israel's

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60 Akins, "Rise and End of America's Role."
63 Muir, "Lebanon."
security interests is unlikely to succeed. While such an army would be able to play an auxiliary role in extending the duration of Israel’s occupation, it will crumble after Israel’s withdrawal, as did the South Vietnamese forces after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

**Israel and Islamic Reassertion**

A lesson to be learned from Lebanon is similar to the one taught by Iran: events can take shape and develop independently of the wishes of the superpowers. While U.S.-Israel calculations as well as those of the Arab states are made in terms of superpower considerations, events in Iran since 1979 and in Lebanon since 1984 demonstrate that there is much room for the eruption of authentic, indigenous forces in the region that could drastically alter the strategic balance.

What needs to be noted about these dramatic “Islamic eruptions”—the occupation of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, the assassination of Sadat, and the truck bombings in Beirut—is that they are not of a sporadic, cathartic nature but reflect a sustained effort on part of various political-religious groups across the Muslim world to effect superpower-free political transformation. In addition, even where the ruling order claims its legitimacy from Islam or even an “Islamic revolution” as in Iran, the strongest challenge to it is posed by an equally determined indigenous Islamic force, such as the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq.

These developments illustrate that there is—for lack of a more precise term—an “Islamic factor” that is seeking to alter the post–World War II status quo in the Middle East. Israel’s intransigence in accepting Arab formulas for a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem is the single most important element in eliciting the Islamic reassertion in West Asia.

**The Soviet Factor**

Given the popular nature of the demands the neo-Islamic movements are raising, their mass appeal is likely to grow and may become irresistible even for groups in the regimes now in power. The Soviet Union, because of its own perspective and claims to solidarity with radical and popular movements, may well find itself committed to these forces and their immediate political objectives. Such a possibility would exacerbate the existing polarization in West Asia still further.

The polarization of West Asia into a clear-cut Soviet-Arab-Muslim versus Israel-U.S. divide would seem to be in the interest of both Israel and the Soviet Union. Such a situation greatly advances Soviet influence and control in the region. By adhering to its inflexible policy, Israel is indeed pushing the area toward such a polarization. The United States is abetting Israel in this direction by its reactive

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66 *Arabia*. 
policies in West Asia. For example, it canceled the sale of stinger missiles to Jordan because of King Hussain’s remarks criticizing the United States and refused to sell these missiles to Kuwait, which feels vulnerable in the Iran-Iraq war. Given the present direction of events, Israel is likely to succeed in claiming the United States entirely to itself, a position that Israel has very nearly achieved. After all, “what better guarantee does Israel have for its own security than the total removal of the U.S. from the Arab world,” thereby demonstrating that only Israel is America’s friend in the Middle East.

However, such a development would not be in the interest of the Arabs, the United States, the Islamic world, the Non-Aligned Movement, or even the long-term interests of Israel. It would mean an unending era of high-level tension. A sign of hope, however, is the growing strength of the peace movement in Israel and of Arab moderates in and out of the PLO.

CONCLUSION

Since the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, Pakistan has regarded the Islamic revolution as a permanent reality in the region. Close ties with Iran are a strategic necessity for Pakistan. In geostrategic terms, Pakistan and Iran are viewed by the superpowers as a landmass acting as a barrier to expansionism. The occupation or political control of the area by one of the superpowers would decisively alter the power equilibrium between the two in the region and affect the global balance.

The Iran-Iraq war not only threatens the regional status quo but is likely to generate global seismic effects if it continues. It is generally felt that “tremendous pressure has been brought upon Pakistan by friendly countries to abandon its stance of neutrality and take a partisan position in support of Iraq.” However, Islamabad has successfully resisted this pressure. The war has been aptly described as a “test case in Pakistan’s foreign policy” since it involves its relationship not just with Iran but also with Saudi Arabia, other Arab states, as well as the United States.

However, keeping in view the historical and cultural ties that bind Pakistan to both Iran and Iraq, as well as its geostrategic imperatives, there seems to be little scope or sense in Pakistan’s altering its neutrality. Pakistan does not subscribe to the view that Iran, not Israel, poses the greater threat to the Muslim world, a view that is shared even by some of those supporting Iraq financially. UAE President Sheikh Zayed, for example, is on record as saying that “Israel, not Iran, is the main enemy of the Muslim world.” For Pakistan, Iran is not only a powerful Muslim country with a major role to play in regional and world politics and a trusted friend that gave diplomatic and military support to Pakistan during its wars against India in 1965 and 1971, but also

69 Hussain, “Foreign Policy of Pakistan,” p. 17.
70 Ibid.
Pakistan's overland link to West Asia. The necessity for forging closer ties between the two Muslim countries has been the policy of whichever government has been in power in Pakistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan's relationships with the Arab world, in particular with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are equally important. The spiritual and emotional bonds that have historically linked Pakistan with the Arabs have been accentuated by geopolitical and geostrategic considerations, economic interests, and cooperation in the field of defense. Given Pakistan's historical identification with Islam and the Arabs and its cultural affinity with Iran, it is a natural imperative to continue with its efforts for evolving a bridge of peace between the two belligerents.

While the United States has so far been able to distance itself from the Iran-Iraq war, it has yet to adopt a realistic approach toward the Palestine issue. Even if the United States and Israel are "bound together like no two other sovereign peoples" in a "strange and special relationship," as some American supporters of Israel claim, this should not lead to wholesale American support for everything that Israel does, especially when there appear to be differences among the Israelis themselves regarding the adverse long-term effects of their government's policies in the region.

Moreover, that there is a divergence in perception between the United States and Israel on the Palestine problem is indicated by Israel's rejection of the Reagan plan, which Yasser Arafat had described as having "some positive aspects." Both Israel and the United States need to realize that the Palestine problem in the 1980s is qualitatively different from what it was a few decades ago and that it is amenable to a diplomatic solution. But before this can be achieved, Israel must revise its assumption that the Arabs want the total annihilation of Israel as a political entity.

For this change in perception to occur, it is necessary for Israelis, as well as for Jews the world over, to lend their fullest possible support to the peace movement inside Israel. This is especially important because Israel considers the support of Jews throughout the world the only permanent and reliable source of support for the state. A change in perception on the part of the majority of this community could possibly effect a qualitative change in Israel's policy toward the Palestine problem. There are already signs that a positive change is in the offing among many Israelis who are beginning to realize that by emphasizing the apartheid of the Jewish people, Zionism "is giving rise to anti-Semitic passions which Zionists yearned to avoid." Martin Buber, the eminent Jewish philosopher, had alerted the Jewish community to the built-in limitations of Zionism, which as a "narrow nationalist form" was "restricted to the ingathering of exiles."

Even this "ingathering" could generate change and transformation. This can be illustrated by borrowing the concept of syntropy, used by some humanistic psycholo-

72 Handel, "Development of the Israeli.
gists. In a psychological sense, syntropy "is a complete system of ingathering, storing, transforming, and finally utilizing energy" in the personality dynamics of the individual. Extending this concept to the social milieu, in particular to the Israeli society, one could view the peace movement in Israel and the tendency toward a positive reappraisal of the Jewish perceptions of Arabs as indicative of a "transformation" following the primary stage of "ingathering of exiles."

The dynamics of this process is borne out by the fact that there is a growing awareness among Israelis that their "real goal should be to be at home in the Islamic environment and to become part of this area." Ezer Weizman, Israel's former defense minister, who made the above observation, also said that he was glad that 200,000 Israelis had visited Egypt since the peace treaty was signed, as they had found to their wonder that "those Egyptians are really nice people." What had kept the Israelis from doing their best to make friends with the Arabs, according to Weizman, was the Jewish "ghetto complex," the misgivings, the fears, and the paranoia carried over from the past. Also, former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's acknowledging that the "Palestinians are the determinate factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict" is another significant indicator of the positive trend taking shape within Israeli society. It is a heart-warming response to the forces of peace and moderation among the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.

For the Islamic world, in spite of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Palestine issue remains its most crucial problem. It is this problem that has become ingrained in the war objectives of the Iranian leaders at the present stage of the Iran-Iraq war. For revolutionary Iran, the way to the liberation of Jerusalem, the Holy land, passes through Baghdad. A solution of the Palestine problem that ensures Palestinian sovereignty and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the lands occupied by Israel during the 1967 war, while recognizing the sovereignty of Israel in its pre-1967 border, can form the basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such a settlement should significantly accelerate the termination of the Iran-Iraq war, as well as heal the fractured state of Lebanon. Alternately, the continuation of the war and an Iranian military victory would drastically alter the regional strategic balance. This in turn would introduce previously unforeseen elements and forces in the Arab-Israeli conflict, not the least of them being the expansion of fundamentalist extremism in the region, particularly in Lebanon where for the moment this tendency has been leashed by the nationalist-moderate forces.

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76 "We Don't Want Egypt to Be Isolated," interview with Ezer Weizman, Newsweek, Nov. 26, 1984, p. 52.
15. U.S. Policy Toward West Asia: The Iran-Iraq War and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Lawrence Ziring

THE UNITED STATES IN WEST ASIA

The United States seeks to play the peace-maker in West Asia. Although it acknowledges its strategic interests in the area, as well as its lack of neutrality, nevertheless, it emphasizes a role of honest broker between passionately antagonistic parties. This is especially pronounced in the Arab-Israeli conflict; it is not so evident in the case of the Iran-Iraq war. But it will be argued that Washington is no less determined to "resolve" the latter as it is to "tranquilize" the former. Moreover, a number of states in West Asia reinforce this U.S. perception of its role. For reasons that will be explained, they insist that the United States holds the key to peace in the Middle East. What is not understood, however, is that the U.S. perception and those of the regional states are usually at variance. It must be noted therefore that Washington's version of "peace" is not necessarily the same as those who want the Americans to press their efforts.

More profound confusion arises from the fact that whereas a number of states more or less prefer association with the United States, others in the area abhor U.S. interference. The latters' perception of the United States is influenced by a rejectionist philosophy, which characterizes Washington as the primary and most direct threat to the evolution of a new, unified, and powerful bloc of independent but intimately associated states. For these actors, U.S. actions are a continuation of pre–World War II British and French colonialism, its central purpose being to divide, undermine, and dominate the region. To that extent Israel becomes Washington's most significant weapon.

Moreover, the Arab rejectionists consist of the most secular-minded of all the Arab states. Although responsive to the demands of their spiritual life, their policies and operations are motivated by the mundane and profane. Status, acceptance, and
reconstruction are central to their quest. By contrast with the more traditional orders in Arabdom, they proudly proclaim their revolutionary purpose. From their vantage point, U.S. "peace-making" efforts aim at safeguarding both foreign and domestic "imperial" interests; and willing allies are found only among conservative regimes.

According to the rejectionists, those Arab states that court the favor of the United States are sustaining the Israeli "Trojan horse" and are betraying the independent and progressive development of the Arab nation. Thus, the United States' "peace-making" role becomes trapped between those promoting and those opposing the status quo. If it can be argued that the U.S. "peace-making" role is unrealistic and programmed to fail, does the United States also jeopardize its strategic interests in the region? In other words, to what extent does the one purpose affect the other, assuming Washington has long-term interest in West Asia and wishes to remain a major actor there?

The United States is a comparable newcomer to West Asia, having only minimal experience in the region prior to World War II. Since the war, however, it has been the most prominent outside actor and the most deeply committed to "managing" the area's complex affairs. U.S. naiveté has been attributed to a lack of historical wisdom. But perhaps it is even more a consequence of U.S. political culture and the near messianic commitment to make the world "right." Its entire pre-1940 experience in West Asia can be summed up in the work of the King-Crane Commission that was despatched to the region by President Woodrow Wilson when France and Britain differed over the drawing of boundaries between their respective mandates.

The commission was made responsible for ascertaining popular opinion in the region, and, surprisingly, it recommended that the United States assume the Syrian mandate. France, however, had already seized control of Syria, and Washington displayed no interest in the territory and did not wish to identify with the mandate system. The King-Crane Commission is best remembered, however, for its views on the Balfour Declaration and the Zionist demand for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. It rejected the Zionist claim as unrealistic and fraught with danger. The commission cited Arab hostility to the Balfour Declaration, which along with the mandate system denied them independent status. After the League of Nations formally approved the mandates for Britain and France and Britain publicized its intention to honor the Balfour Declaration "without prejudicing the rights of the Arab population," the commission's findings were ignored, and the United States' interest in West Asia centered on the acquisition of oil concessions. It studiously avoided political entanglements.

The rise of Hitler in Germany, his attack on European Jewry, and ultimately the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 brought renewed U.S. interest in the region's political life. Moreover, the shift of Zionist headquarters to the United States heightened American awareness of Jewish suffering at Nazi hands. Furthermore, Britain had begun to equivocate on the subject of a Zionist homeland in Palestine, and wartime efforts at placating the Arabs involved curtailing Jewish emigration. U.S.

opinion remained divided on the subject of a Jewish homeland, but sympathy was expressed for the refugees fleeing Hitler's tyranny. British motives were also suspect, and Washington visualized renewed efforts at empire building. The United States, for a host of reasons, not the least of which was its emphasis on decolonization, came to favor the idea of an independent homeland for the remnant of European Jewry. The American Jewish lobby also played an important role in dramatizing the plight of the refugees. Moreover, there was no more convincing evidence of need than the survivors of the Nazi extermination camps.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union pressured the United Nations to divide British Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Andrei Gromyko, the Kremlin spokesman, made an impassioned address citing the decimation of the Jewish people and the right of the survivors to live at peace in circumstances of their own design. In 1947 the United Nations approved a resolution calling for the division of the mandate into Arab and Jewish areas, and Britain began its final withdrawal.

The Arab states opposed the resolution but could not muster the votes to defeat the measure. The Arabs cited the conspiracy that had caused them to be divided and dominated following World War I. Although more capable of representing their interests after World War II, they were still a subject of exploitation. Arab pride continued to be ignored. The integrity of the Arab nation was again threatened. Thus, the Palestine question was essentially an Arab question; but because Jerusalem was located in Palestine, it was also a Muslim question. The fear persisted throughout the world of Islam that the Western powers were determined to hold the Holy Land. The Jewish state, therefore, was perceived as the handmaiden of anti-Muslim interests, a constant reminder of "Islam in danger." For the Arabs it was a humiliating reminder that their independence had not yet been realized.

**THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL**

Nations are seldom guided by altruism, but the United States believed it was engaged in a humanitarian endeavor when it promoted and gave de facto recognition to the new state of Israel in May 1948. Soviet motives have always been suspect given their volte-face in favor of the Arabs when it became apparent to Moscow that their entry into the Middle East was not by way of Israel. The Kremlin had granted de jure recognition to Tel Aviv before Washington believed it appropriate. But its subsequent decision to befriend the Arabs and condemn Zionist "imperialism" graphically illustrates the political character of Moscow's actions. The Soviet decision to support one side against the other contrasts with U.S. efforts to assist Israel in a hostile environment while simultaneously attempting to "tame" that environment. The United States has been as consistent a supporter of Israel as the Soviets have been anti-Zionist (the Soviets do not claim to be anti-Israel per se), but the former's policies have been made more complicated by the latter's posture, not vice versa.

U.S. investment in Arab oil fields and the Western world's dependence on the

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steady flow of crude oil from these installations became significant when the Arab-Israeli conflict was in its infancy. Continued aid to Israel therefore jeopardized those interests. Nevertheless, the United States persisted in its support for the Jewish state. Moreover, U.S. policymakers since the Kennedy years, and particularly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, began to see Israel as a significant military outpost in a region coveted by the Soviet Union.

Chastized by the United States, Nasser opened the door to the Soviet Union in 1955. In the 1956 Suez war, Nikita Khrushchev rattled his missiles in the faces of the British and French invaders of Egypt. Their sudden change of mind and retreat were attributed to the Soviet premier’s threat to use them. The United States pressured the Israelis to withdraw from the Sinai (Washington had also condemned the British-French action), but Moscow monopolized Arab gratitude. The coup in Baghdad in 1958 that destroyed the Hashemite monarchy was perceived to be pro-Soviet insofar as it eliminated the West’s primary Arab ally. Fearing a Soviet-inspired plot against the last Hashemite monarch in Jordan and witness to political instability in Lebanon, President Eisenhower ordered U.S. marines to Beirut. The U.S. action was interpreted in the Arab states as support for Israel and Israel’s “friends,” and Moscow reinforced the perception.

Egyptian-sponsored fedayeen attacks on Israel’s settlements took a mounting toll of Israeli lives in the 1960s. Moreover, after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, a U.N. emergency force took up positions in the peninsula, the most significant one at Sharm al-Shaykh overlooking the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. Egyptian control of the strategic point had earlier denied Israel use of the waterway and its only port south of the Suez Canal. When Nasser demanded the removal of the U.N. contingent and U.N. Secretary General U Thant hastily complied, the Israelis sensed an expanding conflict and the possibility of another war. Assuming the initiative, Israeli aircraft struck Egypt’s air force on the ground, virtually destroying it. Provided overwhelming advantage in the air, Israel’s ground forces entered the Sinai again and moved quickly to the Suez Canal. When Jordan and Syria entered the fray, they too suffered heavy losses. As a consequence of the latter campaigns, Israel occupied the Golan Heights in Syria, seized the West Bank from Jordan, and overran the Gaza strip. The Israeli victory was so complete and so rapid that the other Arab states did not have sufficient time to react.

The United States was accused of complicity, despite an Israeli attack on one of its Mediterranean-based electronic surveillance ships and the resulting heavy loss of American lives. In fact, many believed that the U.S. vessel had actually assisted Israeli aircraft and that they had combined forces with the Israelis to eliminate the Soviet-supplied Egyptian air force. No amount of denials could convince the Arabs that the United States had been neither involved nor consulted. Nevertheless, when the

4 See the article by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., a longtime U.S. diplomat in the Middle East, “Arabs, Israelis, and Americans: A Reconsideration,” Foreign Affairs 62(5):1194–1209.
5 Ibid., p. 1197.
dust of the Six-Day War had settled, Washington perceived Israel in a different light. No longer was it judged the weaker state in its contest with Arabdom. Israeli military prowess had been dramatically demonstrated, and the Defense Department urged upon the political decision-makers in Washington the view that Israel was a formidable ally in a vital region under constant threat from the Soviet Union.

The United States followed a two-track policy following the 1967 war. The first focused on Israeli military capability and the need to maintain it in a high degree of readiness. The second called upon Israelis and Arabs to reconcile their rival moral claims at the conference table. The United States assumed the role of “peace-maker” in earnest when President Nixon authorized his secretary of state, William Rogers, to impress upon all the parties that the United States would follow a course of “evenhandedness.” But while these negotiations went forward, limited warfare continued between Israel and Egypt. The death of Nasser and the rise of Sadat did nothing to reduce tension until suddenly in 1971 the new Egyptian president ordered the Soviets to curtail their military activities in the country, and many were ordered to leave Egypt. The no war, no peace condition persisted, however, with Sadat declaring that the year of decision was drawing near.

In 1973, to the surprise of the Israelis and the world, Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal to Israel-occupied Sinai and quickly overran Israel’s Bar Lev Line. The Yom Kippur or Ramadan War, however, did not produce an Arab victory. Although Syria joined in the fighting and almost regained control of the Golan Heights, the Israelis counterattacked on both fronts (Jordan remained neutral). Israeli troops crossed the Suez into Egypt proper, cutting off the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai. In the north, the Syrians were repulsed and the Golan reoccupied.

Concerned that the Israelis would move against Cairo on the one side and Damascus on the other, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene. President Nixon responded with a threat of his own, and U.S. armed forces were placed on alert. In the meantime, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s new secretary of state and national security adviser, moved into the diplomatic vacuum and began a one-man effort to gain a cease-fire and pullback of forces. The 1973 war and Kissinger’s diplomatic achievement were the openings Washington sought in prompting the belligerents to air their differences around the conference table.

Kissinger won the confidence of Sadat and arranged for a mutual withdrawal of forces, with Israel continuing to hold most of the Sinai. Later, a similar arrangement was entered into with Syria, but Israel remained in control of the Golan Heights.

Another element worked its way into the Arab-Israeli conflict as a consequence of the 1973 war. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia encouraged several other Arab oil producers (not Iraq) to embargo the supply of oil to the United States and European countries if they did not pressure the Israelis to return Arab territories seized in the 1967 war. Faisal also demanded an immediate solution of the Palestine question.

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6 See David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber & Faber, 1982).
Although the United States resisted such tactics, it realized that something had to be
done to prevent another outbreak of hostilities. Superpower confrontation had been
avoided, but it was feared another contest would increase the prospects for a wider
war.

The lifting of the embargo found the United States seriously engaged in
promoting an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Carter, however, carried
diplomacy further than any of his predecessors. Following Sadat’s surprise visit to
Jerusalem in 1977, Carter pressed the Egyptian and Israeli leaders for an interim
agreement. The Camp David Accord of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of
1979 were the result of these labors.® But the partial peace arrived at by the parties was
not what the other Arab states had desired from the United States. In fact, those states
encouraging a U.S. peace initiative, as those rejecting it, drew the same conclusion:
the United States had imposed upon the Arab and Muslim worlds, with Sadat’s active
complicity, an arrangement that weakened their resistance vis-à-vis Israel and denied
the Palestinians their right of self-determination.

In the Arab view, decisions related to coexistence with Israel should be theirs
alone. Safeguards should be something arranged between themselves and the Israelis
without U.S. interference. The Carter-mediated peace treaty between Sadat and
Menachem Begin was unacceptable on its face because in Arab eyes Egypt made all
the concessions and Israel yielded nothing. Although Sinai was returned to Egypt in
1982, they contend that the restrictions imposed upon Egyptian troop movements and
the presence of U.S. forces in the peninsula negated Cairo’s sovereignty over the
region. Moreover, the United States had surgically removed Egypt, the most impor-
tant Arab state, from the rank of frontline states facing Israel. Egypt’s acquiescence to
U.S. wishes and the no-more-war understanding with Israel also permitted the
redeployment of Israeli forces on the Syrian front and opened the way for Israel’s 1982
invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon.

**THE IRAN-IRAQ FACTOR**

The Iranian revolution of 1978–79 replaced a pro-Western shah with an anti-
American ayatollah and rearranged the politics of West Asia. Iran had been essentially
pro-Israeli and had provided much of that nation’s petroleum. Moreover, the expa-
sion of the U.S.-equipped and trained Iranian armed forces was viewed with consider-
able apprehension in the Arab nations, especially in Syria. After Sadat’s 1977 visit to
Jerusalem, Syria confronted a strengthened Israeli military machine while Iran’s
increasing capability raised a potential threat to Syria’s rear. Although Iraq and Iran
were more traditional foes, the two countries had entered a 1975 agreement, which
seemed to promise an era of diminishing rivalry. Moreover, Iraq’s 1972 treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union contributed to the growth of the Iraqi

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*Ziring, Middle East Political Dictionary, pp. 315–17.*
armed forces, and Iraq was said to possess the most formidable military establishment in the Arab world.9

Continuing tension between the two Baathist regimes, however, appeared to rule out Iraq’s support of Syria despite their common cause against Israel. Iraq was critical of Syria’s role in Lebanon, notably because Syria aided the Christian Phalange during the 1975–76 Lebanese civil war. Iraq interpreted the Syrian action as an overt act of aggression against the Palestinian people, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under Yasser Arafat’s command. Iraq concluded that Syria intended using the PLO for its own purposes. Iraqis did not have to be reminded that historic Syrian geopolitical interests not only cast a shadow over Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel (Palestine); it also claimed a considerable portion of northern Iraq, including the oil-rich region of Kirkuk and Mosul. Moreover, Syria was the home of the Baathist party, and it always looked with suspicion on the Iraqi “branch.”

The victory of the Shiite mullahs in Iran appeared to provide Syria with a new range of options. The Tehran government publicly severed its links with Israel and declared its intention actively to support the Palestinian struggle. The PLO was given possession of Israeli installations in Tehran, and the mullahs declared their immediate intention to send Iranian volunteers to Lebanon and Syria. Shiite ties also facilitated cooperation between Syria and Iran. What only a few weeks before had been perceived as a major enemy was quickly transformed into a quasi-ally.

Iraq, however, had reason to be concerned. Khomeini’s disciple in Iraq, Imam Mohammed Bakr Sadr, leader of the militant Shiite Al-Dawa, called upon his followers to take up the cause of the Iranian ayatollah and to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussain.10 Acts of sabotage and assassination followed while Iranian and Iraqi forces skirmished along their mutual frontier.

Iraq’s decision to strike across the Shatt al-Arab into Iranian Khuzistan (Arabistan) was aimed not only at sealing the border against Iranian Shiite terrorists; it was also meant to assist ethnic and religious groups opposed to the Khomeini revolution inside Iran. Iraq assumed it would find support among the Arab population of Khuzistan. It also believed the opposition to the mullah-dominated government would rally behind its forces. Neither happened, however. The Iranian navy struck Iraq’s oil export terminals at Khor Ummaya and Mina al-Bakr, destroying the facility and hence drastically reducing Iraq’s ability to export its petroleum. The major Iraqi port of Basra also was effectively blockaded, and Iraq’s economy suffered substantial losses.

The Iraqis needed a quick victory in Khuzistan, but when Iranian resistance stiffened, Iraq had second thoughts about committing additional frontline forces and weapons.11 Such hesitation was a signal to those in Iran who might have joined with the Iraqis that the risk was too great. Furthermore, Iranian Kurds, although in conflict

11 Ibid., p. 952.
with the Tehran government, had little reason to support the Iraqis who only a few years earlier had brutalized their brethren. Only the Mujahedeen Khalq, the secular, Marxist organization, appeared to side with Iraq. As a consequence of their terrorist attacks on the revolutionary leadership and now their perceived treasonous behavior, they were savagely hounded by the ayatollah's revolutionary guards, and thousands were allegedly killed. Thus, the Iraqi blitzkrieg fizzled, and Iranian territory previously lost to the invading force was retrieved. The mullahs drew from an almost limitless supply of young and old devotees, who enthusiastically embraced martyrdom. Iran, despite its many cleavages, basked in a new-found unity, and the long war of attrition with Iraq entered a new phase.

Saddam Hussain's publicized desire to settle the war through negotiation was repeatedly rebuffed by the mullahs. So too were the external peace-makers in the Muslim Conference, the Ummah Peace Committee, and the United Nations. Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that the war would end only when Saddam Hussain had been destroyed and the Iraqis agreed to pay Iran war reparations. Iraq therefore had no recourse but to continue the war, and in that effort it had the support of the conservative Arab states, that is, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union sought to mediate the Gulf war. Washington initially imposed an embargo on all weapons to Iran and Iraq and tried to block illicit sales by arms merchants. Nevertheless, weapons were made available to both sides. The Soviet Union, in spite of its treaty with Iraq, supplied Iran with a limited variety of arms. Such efforts apparently slowed, however, when the revolution turned against and destroyed the Tudeh party. Israel was also rumored to have secretly arranged the sale of arms to Iran even though the mullahs called for the destruction of the Jewish state. Arab sources have insisted that Israel feared neither Iraq nor Iran, but their protracted conflict served Israel's long-range interests. Arab observers in fact blamed the United States and Israel for the unending war between Iraq and Iran, noting their desire to "bleed" both countries. Moreover, given Iraq's growing dependence on French weapons, paid for by the conservative Arab states, the Syrians sensed Baghdad could rejoin the Western camp.

In the meantime Syria was unwilling or unable to alter its own course or reconcile differences with Iraq. The Soviet Union, however, increased military assistance to Iraq, while still permitting less lethal supplies to reach Iran.

The Soviet-North Yemen treaty of October 1984 also signified Moscow's inten-

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12 The Khomeini regime employs two institutions for administering counterterror. The Sepah-i-Pasadaran-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, or Islamic revolutionary guards, a large militia, is used against internal as well as external enemies. The Basij protects party leaders by crushing their opponents. Thousands are known to have been killed in shootouts or executed by firing squads. In 1982 Amnesty International estimated that 4,400 executions had been carried out. The Mujahedeen say this figure is far too low and that as many as 15,000 were killed in the same period. They also report that the regime holds 40,000 political prisoners. See Zalmay Khalilzad, Security in Southern Asia I—The Security of Southwest Asia (London: Gower Publishing Co., 1984), p. 45; and Iran Liberation (Mujahedeen Khalq), July 19, 1982, p. 9.
tion to keep an active hand in the extended area. Moreover, given Saudi and Jordanian dissatisfaction with Washington, Kremlin leaders believed they would look more favorably on Soviet entreaties. Speculation increased that the more conservative Arab states might gamble on moving toward a normalization of diplomatic relations with Moscow in return for Soviet guarantees of support against Israel, as well as pledges of noninterference in their domestic affairs. These actions in addition to renewed Kremlin interest in Arafat rankled the Syrians. Syrian President Hafez Assad’s journey to Moscow in mid-October 1984 underlined his personal concern. The Kremlin, however, seemed to lean toward modification of the Reagan proposal, which linked an independent Arab Palestine with Jordan. The central idea would be to force the U.S. administration to choose between its own plan (and “friendly” Arab states) and Israel, which had rejected the proposal. Arafat had already given his approval to a “federation” plan with Jordan. This incremental approach to the Palestine question brought the PLO leader close to defeat in the winter of 1983–84. Soviet support for the general idea, however, gave it and him new credibility.

The United States was hardly a passive observer. Like the Soviet Union it had to operate on several planes simultaneously. Its concern for international shipping in the Persian Gulf caused it to assemble a large naval flotilla near the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia also urged the United States to give direct support to Iraq in its war with Iran. Egypt did likewise. Moreover, the U.S. temptation to yield to these pressures was considerable, given the alleged Iranian link to the “Islamic Jihad,” the terrorist organization identified with the April 1983 destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the U.S. Marine Corps barracks (October 1983), and the U.S. Embassy annex (September 1984).

But U.S. analysts have also been examining signs of a possible shift toward more national goals inside Iran. Although the question remains who or what will succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, all indications point to cleavage in the ranks of the ruling clergy. The emergence of a moderate faction assisted by the bazaar merchants and enlisting remnants of the intelligentsia could spell a change in direction in Iranian policy. The export of revolution may become a lesser objective as Iranian leaders struggle with the country’s multidimensional problems. Moreover, a less belligerent

13 The Soviet-North Yemen treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Moscow on Oct. 10, 1984, by Konstantin Chernenko and Ali Abdullah Saleh. It was said to be somewhat different from the 1979 South Yemen and 1980 Syrian treaties in that it did not mention military aid. See Herald Tribune (International), Oct. 11, 1984.

14 Shireen T. Hunter, a deputy director of the Middle East Program in the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., is prominent in this small group. See the article/interview with Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, in Michael Dobbs, “Bani-Sadr Says Iran Activated Transition Plan,” Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1984. Bani-Sadr is quoted as saying: “[President Ali] Khomeinei is strictly an opportunist. He sided initially with the hardliners but then switched when it became clear that the moderates were winning. The hardliners do not see a future for themselves, which is why they are resorting to acts of sabotage. During my time it was the same. The leadership was agreed on a moderate course of sanction and the opposition came from the middle layers of the revolution. On that occasion [Ayatollah] Khomeini sided with the radicals.”
foreign policy could provide the United States with the opening necessary to rebuild a dialogue between the two countries. The so-called moderates are already acknowledged to have subdued their more extremist brethren on economic matters. They have also been credited with neutralizing radical, secular organizations, that is, the Tudeh party. Moreover, the Soviet Union is a minor actor in Iran today, in part, because the "moderates" may want to reopen lines to the West.

The visit to Tehran of the West German foreign minister in July 1984 was received with unusual enthusiasm in Tehran. Hans-Dietrich Genscher came away from his meetings with Iranian leaders with the optimistic view that Ayatollah Khomeini was seriously pondering a break in Iran's self-imposed isolation.

The question can be raised whether, and if so, how the United States might entertain "normal" relations with a future Iran? Americans must overcome some of the same emotional problems experienced by their Iranian counterparts. The United States has learned to hate Iran almost as much as the latter detests the former. The hostage crisis, the alleged acts of state-sponsored terrorism, and the violent excesses of the mullahs have seeped deep into the American psyche. If ever Tehran signals an interest in restoring communication with Washington, Americans would have great difficulty in responding affirmatively. But the point remains that the United States ought not to wait for a conciliatory gesture from Tehran.

Iran has been passing through a profound and wrenching experience. Even the Soviets describe the Iranian revolution as "genuine." Many Iranian institutions, workways, and cultural expressions have disappeared. Moreover, the revolution quickly passed to a thermidor phase. Revolutionaries in the vanguard of the struggle against the Pahlavis have become victims of the very conditions they created. From Bani-Sadr, Yazdi, and Ghotbzadeh to the Tudeh and Mujahedeen Khalq, the secular, generally Marxist, opposition has paid a high price for its peculiar form of zealotry. Elements of the Marxist opposition wait in Iraq and France, while the Pahlavi line holds to its refuge in Egypt and the United States. Anticipating the eventual collapse of the mullah-dominated system, they expect to return to the country and assume the reins of power.

Marxists, however, cannot be expected to associate with Americans. Their frustrations have deepened markedly in their contest with the mullahs. Their radicalization must be judged complete. The Soviet Union will continue to organize their ranks, sponsor their activities, and influence their choice of leaders. If the mullah-led government collapses, the Soviets will be in a position politically as well as logistically to assist a formal and total takeover of the country. Nor can Washington put much faith in the reemergence of the Iranian monarchy. The days of constitutional monarchy have passed. Neither the forces nor the network of sociopolitical relationships exists within the country to give it new life. The United States, therefore, must learn to work with the present government, adjust to its different lifestyle, and accept its eccentricities. Iranians will be challenged by even greater obstacles in approaching

15 Personal interviews conducted in Moscow, Nov. 1983.
the United States, but if the signs of moderation have been read accurately, even this must be deemed possible.

The United States ought to play the role of "peace-maker" in the war between Iran and Iraq. Washington realizes that Iraq possesses far more weaponry than Iran. Its air force is not only more numerous but superior to anything Iran can muster, fly, or maintain. The majority of Iraq's tanks and heavy artillery have not been used. Moreover, resupply is no problem for Iraq, given its many sources from Egypt to the Soviet Union and France. The United States can add little to this arsenal, and it should not. But it can begin to play the mediator in the Gulf war or at least encourage West Germany to enter that uncertain arena. Washington should seek a stable Iran, and it has no other real alternative but to encourage the mellowing of the present regime.

As with U.S. support for Israel, the Arab states will be infuriated by a U.S. approach to Iran. But if the purpose is to bring the Iran-Iraq war to a close, it is difficult to imagine this anger seriously damaging the U.S. role in West Asia. Moreover, a less revolutionary Iran would not only cease to be a threat to the traditional Arab states; it might also help reduce incidents of terrorism, ease the Lebanese situation, deflect Syria from its "grand design," and give Israel the opportunity to seriously confront the Palestine issue. Most important for the United States, if Iran is not converted into a military base, the Soviet Union might be discouraged from exploiting the country's domestic problems. Moreover, Iran will face a massive reconstruction job when its war with Iraq is terminated. With Iranian consent, the United States could assist that effort.

**THE CONTINUING CONFLICT**

At the outset, I hint that conflict is more serious than war. I also suggest that the Arab-Israeli conflict is more important to the United States than the Iran-Iraq war. I do not mean to imply that the one could or should be ignored in favor of the other. Indeed, the intertwining of events is an important focus of this analysis. The problems are interrelated; they influence and are influenced by an inordinate number of variables. But the point to be made is that the Gulf war, despite the intransigence of Iran, can and will be diplomatically concluded. That war remains an episode in the unfolding history of the region.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, however, involves a clash of civilizations and therefore represents a much broader and deeper set of issues. Contrasted with the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict involves properties of an extraterritorial nature. But,

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16 A report by David Black and Mark Hosenball in the *Sunday Times* (London), Oct. 14, 1984, described Britain's decision to provide Iran with additional frigates and BH-7 hovercraft and logistic support ships. By early 1985 the Iranian navy should have fourteen assault hovercraft and at least six landing ships capable of landing 3,000 fully equipped troops. The arms deals promised to maintain Iranian naval superiority, and it is said to have angered Iraq's friends in the Gulf states as well as Washington. Britain is a party to the embargo on the sale of military equipment to the Gulf states, and the transfer was considered a violation of that understanding. For Iraqi military superiority, however, see *The Military Balance 1984–85* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), pp. 61–63.
more important, it has released the most compelling forces for change in the region. An Israel at peace with its neighbors could mean a new era for all the people of West Asia. Clearly, they are neither ready for it, nor do they welcome its prospects.

Arabs still quote from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Jewish conspiracy is much on their minds. The argument is passionately presented that it is Israel's stated intention one day to establish dominion over all the lands from the Tigris-Euphrates to the Nile. Israeli aggressive actions are cited to illustrate and justify this Arab concern.

Israel's initial expansion from those sections of British Palestine (allocated to the Jewish state in the 1947 U.N. resolution) to the whole of that former mandate requires little further explanation. Moreover, the transformation of the West Bank into Judea and Samaria and the increasing number of Jewish settlements there can only be realized by displacing the Arab inhabitants of the region. Continued occupation of the Gaza strip and the annexation of Syria's Golan Heights are further evidence. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon and Israeli influence in the south of that country provide additional credence. The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is viewed with maximum skepticism, given Israel's perceived desire to draw water from the Litani River. Moreover, the private Lebanese Christian militia in the south cannot sustain itself in a Shiite zone without direct Israeli military support. Even the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai is treated with disdain. Controversy between Israel and Egypt about the continuing Israeli occupation of territory deemed to be part of Sinai raises questions about Israeli sincerity. Moreover, Arab projections of Israeli population growth point to a need for more living space; hence Israel is perceived as poised for further aggression.

Much of the evidence provided to describe Israeli expansion is on the record. Therefore, even if the framework or analytical structure is contrived or questionable, Israeli actions have reinforced the fears of Arabs that they are in substantial danger. Thus, on the one side, the Arabs publicize their desire to come to terms with Israel. In addition to the Reagan plan, the Arabs note the Soviet plan, the King Khalid plan, and the Fez plan as examples of the various packages open to the Israelis if their true desire is peace with the Arabs. The Arabs argue that only the Israelis have rejected each of these plans.

On the other side, however, with very minor exceptions, the Arabs still refuse to countenance the permanence of the Israeli state in West Asia. They still believe it to be an alien fabrication, with alien ideas, and an insatiable appetite for power and status. Arab pride cannot come to grips with this "foreign" entity in their midst. Its existence is a constant reminder of their past as well as present humiliation and degradation. Hence the Arabs teach their young to hate and preach perpetual conflict. "The Israelis may win one, two, three, four or more wars, but they cannot continue. Ultimately Arab power and ingenuity, as well as courage and sacrifice will prevail." This chilling message is the Arab formula for peace in the area. Nothing short of Israeli submission to the will and superiority of the Arab nation will suffice. Arab acceptance

of the peace plans cited above, therefore, is judged empty rhetoric, without signifi-
cance or validity by almost all Israelis.

Furthermore, if there is another Anwar el-Sadat in the Arab world, he has yet to
surface. In fact, the lesson of Sadat makes Arab leaders hesitate before engaging in
programs that are earmarked to destroy their credibility. Rivalries in the Arab world
are celebrated for their personal vendettas. Every leader is confronted by numerous
would-be leaders. Followers are fickle and subject to suasion, especially if it is
believed a leader has deviated from an established course. The Arab-Israeli conflict
has already spanned several generations. The conflict has created its own dynamics,
and leaders are compelled, irrespective of background or interest, erudition or in-
stinct, to replicate not innovate.

No one in West Asia expects a change in Arab perceptions or behavior in the
foreseeable future. There is also no possibility the Israelis will take the initiative and
back away from positions that they believe strengthen their defenses. They too have
learned to live with protracted conflict. Their energies, talents, and science focus on
the inevitability of struggle and the ongoing necessity of keeping the Arabs off
balance.

Finally, what can the United States do given this deadlock in West Asia? It has
already done much to help establish a balance of power between Israel and its
neighbors. Israeli strength is a consequence of U.S. military and economic assistance,
and it was that connection that caused Sadat to accept a negotiated settlement. Sadat
was forced to make concessions, as did the Israelis, but the outcome of their de-
liberations was a desire to avoid future warfare. The conflict, however, remained
unresolved. It would appear that future U.S. efforts must aim at ending other active
and/or latent wars. The end of conflict, it can be hypothesized, will result from the
cumulative effect of the numerous arrangements to deny war as an instrument of
national policy—thus, the need to terminate the Iran-Iraq war. As has been demon-
strated, it too is very much part of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Palestine-Arab question cannot be answered today by plans, no matter their
origin or sincerity. The latent war between Syria and Jordan, or Syria and Iraq, is as
important to the resolution of the Palestinian problem as getting Israel to accept an
independent, sovereign Palestinian state situated between itself and Jordan. No less
than the Arabs who describe Israel as the West’s “Trojan horse” in the Arab world, an
Arab Palestinian state is just as threatening when seen from the vantage point of Israel.
In the fluid conditions of West Asia, amid ever-shifting alliances, associations, and
fraternal orders, nothing is as permanent as conflict. If the Arabs truly believe in the
need for a Palestinian Arab nation-state, they should be able to adjust to the arrange-
ment of a region of Arab nation-states and one Israeli nation-state.

The United States can only persevere in the course that it established approxi-
mately two decades ago. Only Israel, from all the states of West Asia, is bound to the
United States, and only Israel is a predictable ally. Nevertheless, Washington must be
ever mindful that it is the master of its own foreign policy. It can never allow a lesser
power to commit it to a role that it has not chosen for itself or a situation that it has not
determined to be in its interest.
16. Pakistan’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

Talat A. Wizarat

The precepts on which the post–World War II political order was based have been under tremendous pressure, particularly since the beginning of the 1970s. Whereas this development has enhanced the importance of some states whose role in world affairs had been previously subdued, the other effect has been a transformation of established political norms into more radical ideologies.

My purpose here is to analyze the cumulative effect of these changes with particular reference to the emerging relationship among Pakistan, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and the United States. Since this relationship is the product of changes taking place in the strategic environment, an effort will be made to discover some of the elements that accompany this change.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The current sense of insecurity confronting Pakistan, the GCC states, and much of the Gulf area is attributable to the changes in the strategic environment at global and regional levels. The efforts of each state to promote its own security have often meant greater insecurity for its neighbors. In the absence of mutually acceptable political arrangements between regional states and the two superpowers, an increase in military spending has occurred. This is a reflection of the ineffectiveness or failure of the crisis management apparatus. The essence of the problem of insecurity is, therefore, not purely military in nature but can be explained partially in political terms.

Political Instability

Third World states generally suffer from the problem of political instability because of the absence of genuine political institutions and also of norms of behavior. While new political forces have been generated as a result of socioeconomic changes
Besides Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia formed the Tripartite Alliance in 1981, which also carries a joint defense clause.\(^1\) Egypt, Morocco, and Oman have signed agreements with the United States; the agreement with Egypt allows the United States the use of some bases. Oman has permitted the United States the use of Salalah and Masirah as staging bases. The agreement with Bahrain also allows the U.S. navy the right to use port facilities in that country. Great Britain has also concluded treaties taking place in each state, systems generally fail to incorporate them politically, resulting in the alienation of these new forces from the system. Herein lie the seeds of revolution. At least four states belonging to the Persian Gulf and its vicinity have experienced radical political changes in the last decade. South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan have opted for the socialist system whereas Iran has adopted Islamic fundamentalism as its ideology.

The three socialist states have aroused the apprehensions of their neighbors and the United States because of their close identification with the Soviet Union. There is also the feeling that all four states are ready to promote their ideologies through revolutionary means. Whatever their future holds as agents of change in their regions, at present their ability to promote radical ideologies is highly restricted because of conditions of civil war and other political and economic changes.

Regional Tension

The region has never really been free of tension, but now there is an increasing tendency for such tension to escalate into war. While the best-known example is the Iran-Iraq war, other crises are known to exist as well. At present, most of these are dormant; nevertheless, they do carry the seeds of war, especially in view of the absence of political institutions for resolving disputes. Since most states have the legacy of unresolved disputes with their neighbors, they have no option but to strengthen themselves militarily.

Superpower Involvement

As the inventory of major developments indicates (see below), the two superpowers have transmitted their rivalries to West and Central Asia. They have at times succeeded in using one regional state against the other in order to further their respective goals. There is another significant dimension to their roles: they serve as exporters of arms to regional states.

South Yemen has entered into treaty relations with Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. The USSR's navy has acquired the right to use the facilities at the port of Aden. Ethiopia and Afghanistan have treaties binding them to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the USSR justifies the presence of its troops in Afghanistan on the grounds that Moscow was legally bound to come to the assistance of Afghanistan in view of external interference in the internal affairs of that country.

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of friendship with Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in August 1971. In addition, Great Britain has supplied arms to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.\(^2\)

Some regional states have entered into treaties among themselves. The GCC came into being in May 1981, and it is in the process of developing a mutual defense structure, including a Rapid Deployment Force. The edifice of this relationship has been further strengthened by bilateral arrangements between members of the GCC and states outside the scope of the GCC. The following inventory lists the major developments or disputes of the region and its vicinity according to their relevance for Pakistan-GCC-U.S. relations.

1. The Iranian and Afghan revolutions (equally important for the tripartite relationship)
2. Iran-Iraq war
3. Pakistani-Afghan tension
4. Iranian-Afghan tension
5. North Yemen-South Yemen rivalry
6. The Ogaden conflict
7. The Mecca incident
8. Bahrain coup (charges of Iranian involvement)
9. Bombing incidents in Kuwait (charges of Iranian involvement)
10. Dhofar revolution (charges of South Yemen involvement on the side of revolutionaries and Pakistani and Iranian involvement on behalf of the government)
11. Bombing of cinema house in Peshawar (charges of Afghan involvement)

**Defense Expenditures**

The defense spending of states that now comprise the GCC registered an upward trend in the 1970s as a result of deterioration in their security environment but largely because of the availability of greater financial resources made possible by increased OPEC oil prices.

The GCC states have access to sophisticated defense equipment, and their defense preparedness has changed qualitatively as well as quantitatively. While on the whole their armed forces personnel are better trained than they were a few years back, they are not yet battle-tested, and this is a source of some concern to the policymakers of these countries.

Pakistan's defense spending was not curtailed even after the country lost half of its territory (formerly East Pakistan) because this loss served to heighten its feeling of insecurity. Recently, a defense modernization program has been undertaken by the government with the help of the United States.

Iran spent a great deal on defense under the shah. The subsequent revolutionary

\(^2\) Ibid.
government would have curtailed defense spending had it not been for the Iran-Iraq war. South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia have also been conscious of their security problems. However, in the case of the four states discussed above, it is not their defense expenditures that make them a threat in the perception of their neighbors, but rather their adherence to ideologies that are considered inimical to the ideological preferences of their neighbors (particularly the GCC states).

The conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis of the strategic environment is that the region is in the process of change. Domestic political change in many countries has thrown up new and dynamic forces that have, by and large, challenged the existing balance of power. The injection of superpower rivalry brings about an increase in regional tensions and is, in turn, made worse by them.

THE PAKISTAN-GCC EQUATION

As a result of the developments outlined above, many states have experienced a heightened sense of insecurity. The GCC states and Pakistan are in the category of those that consider themselves to have been adversely affected by the process of change. The religious and cultural affinity that ties Pakistan and the GCC states into a common bond is centuries old. In recent years this relationship has gained renewed strength, but it has also generated new complexities with the addition of new areas of interaction. The infusion of Pakistan’s technocrats, teachers, and laborers (both skilled and unskilled) have enabled the less populated GCC states to overcome the shortage of trained manpower to implement their modernization programs.

For their part, the GCC states have invested substantial sums of money in certain sectors that are considered crucial for Pakistan—fertilizers, petrochemicals, and arms. The economic sphere carries bright prospects for the future since Pakistan and the GCC countries have complementary economic interests. But in the final analysis, the factors that have brought Pakistan and the GCC nations together are their common threat perception and mutual commitment to the status quo. In order to achieve these common goals, the GCC countries and Pakistan have enhanced their military cooperation. There are three levels of this military relationship:

1. Ever since the early 1970s Pakistan has looked to the countries of West Asia (particularly Saudi Arabia) to intercede on its behalf with the United States for the supply of sophisticated weapons. This was necessary after the United States imposed embargoes on the sale of arms to Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

2. Pakistan has also depended on GCC states for financing its defense modernization program. In 1975 the United Arab Emirates funded the purchase of thirty-two Mirage V planes for the Pakistan air force at a cost of $330 million. An additional twenty-four other such planes were acquired for the United Arab Emirates.

3. The number of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia alone is 700,000; see Middle East Review, 1984, 10th ed., p. 40.

4. Iran also tried to influence the Nixon administration in favor of selling defense equipment to Pakistan.
air force, with the understanding that these would be made available to Pakistan should an emergency arise.\(^5\)

3. Pakistan has provided training facilities to the armed forces of the GCC countries. It has also contracted to station defense forces in some member countries. Saudi Arabia is believed to have 20,000 Pakistani troops; Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates have defense contingents from Pakistan as well.\(^6\)

Military cooperation between nations is meaningful only when it can be translated into clear policy goals. The political principles on which the foundation of military cooperation between GCC states and Pakistan rests are:

1. Mutual commitment to the status quo in the region. This includes preservation of national independence and continuation of existing political order in each country. Since the late 1960s, Pakistan has worked closely with the government of Oman, providing technicians and military personnel for the purpose of training Oman's defense forces for combat duty.\(^7\) This assistance held great value for Oman at that time in view of its unstable political situation.

2. Commitment to a reduction in superpower rivalry in the region.

Since the United States is committed to the preservation of the status quo in the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and the GCC states have looked to it for support. However, they are reluctant to become too closely identified with the United States because of its support for Israel. Besides, increasing U.S. involvement could invite a corresponding degree of increased Soviet involvement, thereby enhancing the risk of a world war.

Among the GCC countries and Pakistan there are common threat perceptions, an identity of views regarding strategy, and even the rudiments of a common vision of the future. For those who have wondered why Pakistan rather than any other state was selected by the GCC states for close military cooperation, these factors should serve as explanation. To suggest that Pakistan has assumed the role of a mercenary in the Middle East would be incorrect. Few other states can claim to have a closer identity of views regarding political developments in their region than exists between the GCC and Pakistan.

Two questions that are related to Pakistan’s role in the GCC states’ defense are crucial to the future of this relationship. The first is, what will be the role of Pakistani forces in case of an attack by a third party? Countries that have agreed to the stationing of Pakistani troops on their territories will naturally expect help in an emergency. However, some agreements stipulate that Pakistani forces will not fight against a country that is considered to be friendly to Pakistan. The second question is, what role will Pakistani forces be called upon to play in case of internal turmoil? Pakistan’s


\(^7\) Pakistan and Iran (under the shah) were accused of military involvement in suppressing the Dhofar revolution. This charge was denied by Pakistan.
commitment to the survival of friendly regimes is beyond doubt. Its forces will be involved in assisting government troops, especially if it can be established that some foreign government is orchestrating a movement to topple the government.

Pakistan-GCC military cooperation is important as it reduces the chances of active U.S. intervention in case of a threat to any traditional regime. The United States' military presence in the Gulf area during times of peace is provocative, but during times of crisis it carries the additional possibility of a major confrontation.8 Because of its location at the head of the Persian Gulf, as well as the fact that it is the most populated state in the Gulf region, Pakistan is uniquely situated to strengthen the defense of the region.9 The emerging friendly pattern of Pakistan-U.S. relations is a result of this realization on the part of the United States.

PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Prevailing U.S. perceptions regarding Pakistan were summed up by Ambassador Ronald Spiers in 1982: "Pakistan is a friendly, independent, developing country in an important strategic location. It is in a position to exert constructive leadership among an important group of nations."10 However, before proceeding with an analysis of existing Pakistan-U.S. relations or venturing to determine the prospects for the future, a look into the past is necessary. Pakistan-U.S. relations have followed a checkered course depending on the nature of the relationship between the two superpowers.

The post-1945 period was marked by two major political phenomena: (1) with decolonization (accelerated by World War II) a number of new states emerged; and (2) the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers. The relationship between them was one of competition at best and conflict at worst. Between these poles, there were various shades of tension, a pattern that was soon communicated to other parts of the world.

Both superpowers were constantly in search of opportunities to extend their influences. In the case of the United States, the search for allies in the developing world was geared toward the goal of containing communism. Pakistan joined two U.S.-sponsored defense alliances, CENTO and SEATO, in order to strengthen itself against aggression.

However, Pakistan’s participation in these alliances aroused the enmity of the Soviet Union without gaining unqualified U.S. support against all forms of aggression. In fact, there was a discrepancy in the perceptions of the two countries regarding the direction of threat. U.S. assurances of support were valid only in case of attack from a communist country. Pakistan, on the other hand, interpreted the defense treaties to guarantee U.S. support irrespective of the identity of the aggressor.

8 A Rapid Deployment Force was formed by the GCC states in Oct. 1984 in order to promote self-reliance. The Gulf states regard the security of the area to be primarily their responsibility.
10 Ronald I. Spiers, in a speech before the members of the Karachi Institute of Foreign Relations, April 20, 1982.
This assumption did not take into account the realities of domestic politics in the United States and its major foreign policy objectives. This point was brought home to the Pakistanis when the U.S. administration decided to support India by supplying it with modern weapons systems after the 1962 Sino-Indian clashes. This was the first major blow. The second came in 1965 when the United States imposed an arms embargo against both Pakistan and India. Since Pakistan was totally dependent on the United States for its supply of spare parts and modern weapons, it was the one really affected by this embargo. The frustration experienced by Pakistan was tremendous because in spite of the 1962 disappointment, Pakistan still regarded itself as an ally of the United States. Then came the 1971 war, and once again the United States cut off the supply of weapons to the South Asian subcontinent. The decision was reversed in 1975 after hectic diplomatic activity on the part of Pakistan and intercession by some friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Even after the supply of weapons to Pakistan was theoretically restored, differences continued to arise regarding the quantity and quality of arms. Pakistan's efforts to acquire 110 A-7 aircraft for its air force did not succeed because the United States regarded them as "offensive" aircraft and did not want to provide Pakistan with such a weapons system at that time. It agreed to sell F-5 fighters, but Pakistan did not show much interest as these did not meet its defense requirements.11

In 1979 once again the problem of aid to Pakistan came to the forefront. After some discussion and debate, the U.S. Congress decided to cut off economic aid and stop military sales to Pakistan under the Symington-Glenn Amendment.

India's sensitivity to the sale of weapons to Pakistan has had a bearing on U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Because of India's size and power, as well as domestic political considerations, most U.S. administrations have been reluctant to pursue a policy that might have the effect of incurring India's displeasure. To many Pakistanis this approach of successive U.S. administrations is tantamount to giving India a veto power over the supply of weapons to Pakistan.

Another area of discord in Pakistan-U.S. relations is the latter's opposition to Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program.12 In the past the United States has prevailed on France to cancel the sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The U.S. government is reported to have taken up the matter of Sino-Pakistan technological cooperation in the nuclear field. The policy of the United States is geared toward denying Pakistan access to nuclear technology.

Another area that has affected the nature and direction of Pakistan-U.S. relations is Pakistan's support of the Palestinian cause. Such North-South issues under certain circumstances could adversely affect Pakistan-U.S. relations, although their precise contribution is obscure.

The contradictions in Pakistan-U.S. relations caused considerable friction prior to December 1979. After the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan, Pakistan's

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12 An unpublished elite perceptions survey conducted by the author points to the importance attached to U.S. opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program. Of those surveyed, 72 percent regarded it to be the greatest hurdle in the development of Pakistan-U.S. relations.
status was changed to that of a “frontline” state not only in its own perception but also in that of the United States. Under the existing situation, Pakistan’s perception of the threat from the north is not confined to considerations of its own security but to that of the Gulf area as a whole. Afghan support for some ethnic groups in Pakistan and recent raids into border areas have confirmed Pakistani fears. The United States regards Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as a prelude to a move into the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES

The response of the United States has been conditioned by its perception of USSR intentions since the containment of Soviet influence in the Gulf area is first on the U.S. list of priorities. To achieve this end, it has promoted the concept of “strategic consensus” as an endeavor that will not only bring the United States and Israel on one platform but also institutionalize the relationship between them. The concept has aroused the interest of decision-makers in some of the regional countries, but few are ready to join the United States in this endeavor because of the inclusion of Israel. Therefore, the plan to bring regional states on one platform under the umbrella of the United States’ strategic concept has failed. The United States’ commitment to the preservation of the status quo should be seen in the context of its containment policy. It entails support for the existing political setup in the pro-Western states and the preservation of their national integrity.

Since 1973 when the Arab states resorted to an oil embargo against the United States for its extremely pro-Israel policy, the continuation of oil supplies has been adopted as an important goal of the United States. Although the United States is not entirely dependent on Gulf oil, its Western European and Japanese allies are vulnerable to such pressures. The recent U.S. preoccupation with the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (now named Central Command) is connected with the desire to ensure the survival of pro-Western regimes while at the same time it can be used to maintain the supply of oil and to keeping the sea lanes of commerce open. This provides the scenario under which the newly created U.S. forces might be used against regional states. This dimension of the U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf is not lost on regional states and is a subject of great concern to them.

PAKISTAN’S OPTIONS

Although the Reagan administration seems to be more sympathetically disposed toward Pakistan’s security concerns than many previous U.S. administrations, nevertheless the degree of its commitment remains in some doubt. This is because the interests of the United States in South Asia are only marginal, stemming from its concern for the Persian Gulf. As long as Pakistan is believed by the administration to have a role in the defense of the Persian Gulf area, it will continue to receive assistance in economic and political fields. But how long Pakistan can hope to enjoy this favorable treatment is not clear since there is a difference of opinion regarding Pakistan’s significance in the defense of the Gulf.
The ambiguity that shrouds this particular aspect of Pakistan-U.S. relations is considered desirable by some on the grounds that it is believed to have greater deterrence value. However, this argument makes sense only if one supposes a rather low-key U.S. response in support of Pakistan in case the latter is subjected to pressures by its neighbors.

Besides, the United States has been pursuing its national interest at times even at the expense of Pakistan. Its role in discouraging other states from cooperating with Pakistan in the development of nuclear technology has aroused concern in Pakistan. The United States has also been eager to improve its relations with India in order to gain greater foreign policy options. While the India lobby may not be as strong as it is sometimes believed to be by Pakistanis, nevertheless, it has been quite successful on certain occasions in the past. One can understand the anxiety caused by this feature if one remembers the nature of the relationship between Pakistan and India. In spite of Pakistan's present and past efforts to reduce tensions, the prospects of an early settlement do not seem very bright for the near future. Under these circumstances, what options does Pakistan have and how far can the government go in their realization? Pakistan's options are not as limited as is sometimes believed to be in Pakistan.

There is one limiting factor, however, which is applicable to other states as well, that is, that the option should carry as small a margin of risk as possible in return for moderate advantages. In other words, a policy that carries higher risks but also offers higher rewards would be less preferable than a policy that offers limited advantages in return for small costs.

News items emanating from India and the Soviet Union have often suggested that Pakistan has allowed or is in the process of allowing the United States military bases on its territory. The news has been equally strongly refuted by Pakistan. On June 15, 1981, Pakistan's foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan denied this, maintaining that Pakistan had not accepted any obligations that would weaken its commitment to the principles and purposes of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Conference. The U.S. under-secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology stated in his testimony before a congressional subcommittee on September 16, 1981, that the government of the United States recognized Pakistan's nonaligned status. The reasons for Pakistan's reluctance to accept U.S. or any other foreign bases on its territory are rather simple. It would militate against Pakistan's status as a nonaligned state. Providing bases to the United States, besides being inconsistent with the principles of nonalignment, would increase security risks for Pakistan. The U-2 incident and the consequent Soviet hostility are still fresh in the public mind.13

The idea of allowing foreign military bases on Pakistani territory has not been seriously entertained by any government in Pakistan since the 1960s. Neither is there any possibility of a revision of this policy in the future. However, the United States might approach Pakistan and other states for facilities for its Central Command forces even if the proposal for acquiring full-fledged military bases is ruled out. Such

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13 Ibid.; another important point to emerge from the survey is the general aversion to foreign bases on Pakistani territory. Of those surveyed, 68 percent opposed the idea, with only 2 percent supporting it.
facilities are needed to launch an attack in case of an emergency and also for storing weapons and other equipment. However, the idea of allowing facilities (as compared with bases) to foreign governments is no less dangerous a proposition, as governments might be tempted to adopt it as a compromise formula without seriously considering the degree of risk involved.

Another important area that deserves closer examination regards Pakistan's future role in the Afghanistan problem. Of three options, the first, that Pakistan can have a bilateral settlement with Afghanistan based on mutual recognition and non-interference in each other's affairs, would reduce the chances of conflict in the area and secure Pakistan (and Afghanistan) against external involvement in domestic politics. It would enable Pakistan to concentrate on the only real threat to its security—India. It would also pave the way for a more cordial Pakistan-USSR relationship. However, this policy might be considered to be contrary to the framework favored by the Organization of Islamic Conference. It could also complicate existing relations with Saudi Arabia, the People's Republic of China, and the United States. The Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan could also oppose the rapprochement with Afghanistan.

The second option would be to maintain limited involvement in Afghan affairs, to allow foreign governments to provide weapons and equipment to the Afghan guerrillas who operate from Pakistani territory without direct involvement of Pakistan's defense forces. Under this scenario the settlement, if at all, will have to be worked out under the aegis of the United Nations. This policy appears to be in conformity with the suggestions of the Organization of Islamic Conference since it does not envisage the recognition of the Afghan government. Although the chances of success for the Afghan guerrillas are slim, it could buy time for Pakistan. There are some obvious disadvantages, however. It is questionable how far Pakistan will be able to remain uninvolved in view of Afghan attacks on Pakistani territory: Even a limited response from Pakistan could involve it in a war with Afghanistan.

The third option would allow Pakistan to increase the flow of weapons to the Afghan guerrillas and allow them greater freedom to operate from Pakistani territory in the hope that increasing costs would motivate the Soviet government to pull its forces out of Afghanistan. This policy has an extremely limited possibility of success because of the USSR's ability to pay the price of its involvement, at least for the present and near future. On the other hand, it would increase the risk of war for Pakistan, which might be confronted by Afghanistan and possibly by the Soviet Union. India would continue to be a threat and might even decide to take advantage of Pakistan's predicaments.

The Pakistan-U.S. relationship carries both positive and negative dimensions. For the time being friendship with the United States (and the military sales program made possible by a common threat perception) seems to have enhanced Pakistan's sense of security. The economic assistance program has also evoked considerable

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14 It would apply to Afghanistan as well as Pakistan since each accuses the other of interference.
interest in Pakistan. On the negative side, it has increased Pakistan's dependence on the United States in the economic and military spheres. In the long run, it may also have the effect of curtailing Pakistan's foreign policy options.

Decision-makers in Pakistan must also realize that the existing atmosphere of understanding between Pakistan and the United States owes a great deal to the Afghan problem. If the two superpowers were to solve this problem between themselves without consulting with the regional actors, Pakistan's position would be weakened. Its present importance as a frontline state would be undermined, and it would be no longer in a position to count on U.S. support, particularly if the United States imposed another arms embargo against Pakistan. The present relationship between the two countries is marked by an apparent lack of stability. As such, Pakistan should pursue a foreign policy that will not reduce its options in the future.
VI. India and South Asia

17. Pakistan’s Relations with India and South Asia

Hamid H. Kizilbash

South Asia today consists of three large and four smaller states sharing a population of nearly a billion people. Most of the real estate of South Asia and more than 700 million of its inhabitants are in India. Bangladesh and Pakistan, each with over 80 million people, are dwarfed by India, although by world standards they are populous states. Sri Lanka and Nepal, with a population of around 14 million each, are South Asia’s small powers while Bhutan and Maldives, with a combined population of less than a million and a half, are the ministates.

Pakistan is an important member of the South Asian community, and its policies can, to a great extent, determine the politics of the region as well as the role this region will play in global affairs. We will focus here on the relations of Pakistan with India and the other members of the South Asian community. In analyzing these relations, it is hardly possible to ignore the role of the United States and the Soviet Union, especially insofar as the actions of the regional states are influenced by them.

Before embarking on a discussion of Pakistan’s relations with the various regional states, it may be useful to give a brief overview of the situation in the region. Thirty-eight years after achieving independence from colonial rule, the great majority of the people of South Asia live below the poverty line with no immediate prospect of being able to overcome their handicap. All the larger states of South Asia are faced with serious ethnic, religious, and political turmoil. In the recent past, ethnic, religious, and lingual groups of South Asia have been particularly active in northern Sri Lanka, Panjab, Assam, and Sind. This turmoil has a tendency to spill across the border from one South Asian State to another and can seriously affect the relations between them. Sri Lanka’s Tamil question involves India, Sikh agitation in Panjab has brought in Pakistan, and the situation in Assam became a matter of concern to Bangladesh. South Asian economies are being hit hard by rising energy costs and
declining immigration opportunities. The closing of employment opportunities overseas could become the cause of a serious upheaval at home. Although improved agricultural inputs have created the possibility of self-sufficiency in food, the high cost of industrial goods continues to cripple the ability of these states to undertake urgently needed economic development. Tensions resulting from the economic crises have been further heightened by the strategic location of South Asia, in the neighborhood of the two great powers and within easy reach of the sensitive oil resources of the Middle East. The war between Iran and Iraq as well as the downfall of the shah of Iran, although taking place on the periphery of South Asia, have had a significant impact on the region. The most important result has been that the subcontinent has come back into the strategic calculations of the United States, a fact that became even more firmly established after Soviet troops landed in Afghanistan. With the flow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and the intensification of the struggle between the resistance forces and the Kubul regime, both the superpowers seem to have developed an even greater interest in South Asia than they had in the past.

Domestic turmoil, economic difficulties, and an intensification of superpower rivalry in the region make South Asia one of the most delicately balanced subsystems in the international arena. The smallest change of circumstances could start a chain of events whose impact would be felt throughout the world. The consequences for member states of the region, both in terms of human lives and political and economic survival, could be much more drastic. The role each South Asian state plays in the immediate future may well determine whether there is to be any future at all. As the two states most able to do something about the future shape of events in the region, Pakistan and India carry a great burden of responsibility. In the following pages we first turn to a discussion of the causes of poor relations between Pakistan and India, including brief mention of the role of other South Asian states, followed by an analysis of the various options open to Pakistan in its future relations with India.

I

Pakistan’s relations with India are complex and difficult to understand because the conflicting perceptions on which these are based are not always clear. At the most basic and fundamental level, the whole relationship revolves around whether or not Pakistan can be a free agent as far as its external relations are concerned. India has two objections to Pakistan’s being a free agent. First, it takes Pakistan outside the sphere of influence of India, and, second, the politics which Pakistan follows as a free agent do not conform to India’s wishes. Secondarily, Pakistan’s relations with India have been affected by New Delhi’s desire to see its choice of social and political options also followed in Islamabad.

Between 1947 and the present, these two Indian objectives have been pursued in a variety of ways. The most consistent themes have been (1) opposition to Pakistan’s alliances with outside powers and (2) agitation against its efforts to acquire any defense capability. A consistent and subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) psycholog-
ecial campaign has been conducted by India in favor of such policies as secularism, electoral politics, and the Indian way of life and against the various choices Pakistan seemed to make.

**Pakistani Objectives and the Indian Response**

Pakistan has desired, more or less, three things in its relations with India: (1) amicable settlement of outstanding disputes without the use of force; (2) noninterference in internal affairs including the freedom to make mistakes and develop social and political institutions of its choice as recognized at Bundung and in the U.N. Charter; and (3) a South Asia free of the hegemony of any power from within or outside the region. These apparently noncontroversial objectives have not been easy to achieve partly because of Indian ambitions and partly because of the mistakes Pakistan has made. More than anything else, Pakistan’s relations with India have been based on a deep mistrust and fear, which neither side has been able to overcome and which have overshadowed the many positive efforts both sides have made from time to time.

One major cause of the misunderstanding is the question of alliances. Since India was a leading member of the nonaligned bloc, Pakistan’s membership in the SEATO and CENTO alliances was constantly criticized and held up as one of the main causes of poor relations between the two neighbors. Ironically enough, it was India who first found itself in need of allies during the 1962 war with China. After the debacle in that war, India moved to establish a powerful military machine which relied a great deal on the Soviet Union, a reliance that became enshrined in their friendship treaty of 1971. The extent of Soviet-Indian understanding seems certainly to have surpassed anything Pakistan was able to achieve with the United States at the height of their alliance. When Pakistan dropped out of the alliances, after the loss of its eastern province, and became a member of the nonaligned bloc, India made any acquisition of arms by Pakistan its main issue of agitation. Pakistan’s recent agreement to acquire F-16s from the United States is a good example of the new approach to achieve old objectives. The fact that both Pakistan and India are now nonaligned seems to have made little difference in their relations with each other. It would seem, therefore, that the real objection is not to the alignment or the defense purchases but to the fact that these can help Pakistan be a free agent. In that sense Pakistan can only hope to improve relations with India by becoming a dependent neighbor. We will examine this option later.

**Secularism and the Open Democratic Society**

There can be little doubt that among Third World countries India is a model of how to make democracy work. In spite of many difficulties, they have encouraged public participation and made representative institutions work. Pakistan, on the other hand, has failed to establish democratic institutions, although the people of Pakistan have sacrificed bravely in two popular movements to overthrow one-man rule and to establish the right of the opposition to be heard and given a fair deal. In what sense
have the differing experiences of the two countries affected their relations with each other and to what extent is democratic India really concerned with the nature of the governments with which it has to deal?

Clearly, there does not seem to be any particular aversion in India to dealing with all sorts of governments. India’s substantial relationship with the Soviet Union does not seem to reflect any concern about one-party rule. That Pakistan’s less than admirable record as far as political institutions are concerned should bring comment from India is not surprising. What is surprising is the extent to which this should have become an issue in the relations between the two countries. It seems that India wished to use this fact as a propaganda device to weaken Pakistan and despoil her image. Often, it was not the governments that were attacked, but the nation and its legitimacy. S. Chopra’s *Pakistan Foreign Policy* notes: “Pakistan, despite its meager resources, chronic political instability, and without having the benefit of legitimacy and crystallized traditions, has played a significant role in South and Southwest Asia.”¹ This kind of analysis seems to have held sway over the New Delhi decision-makers ever since 1947.

As far as secularism is concerned, the differences between India and Pakistan have sharpened as time has passed. The recent experience of the Sikhs in India and the long history of Hindu-Muslim riots suggest that although the Indian leadership may believe in it, secularism is yet to take hold among the masses. Pakistan’s religious orientation has given India a lot of trouble because it becomes the basis of a link between India’s Muslim minority and developments in Pakistan. In many quarters in India, it is felt that some kind of a loyalty or sympathy exists in the hearts of the Muslim people of India for Pakistan. Understandably, therefore, secularism has been emphasized in India, and Pakistan has been taken to task for not practicing it.

**Military Threat**

Both India and Pakistan have perceived the other as a threat, but only India has succeeded in using its military might to bring about the secession of a province of Pakistan. No one should underrate the impact of this fact on the nations of South Asia, for by one stroke the hollowness of India’s cries about the threat from Pakistan has been exposed and Pakistan’s so-called paranoia confirmed. The suggestion that the Yahya Khan government made many mistakes and that India was fulfilling a humanitarian obligation does not change the reality of Indian military intervention in the internal politics of a neighbor. In fact, developments in northern Sri Lanka have to be watched with care to see how the plight of the Tamils is being viewed in India. Sikkim’s experience and that of Goa are also reminders of the fact that India does use its military power to solve problems within South Asia. Pakistan has engaged in two wars with India, but after the creation of Bangladesh, even Indian sources readily admit that Pakistan no longer poses a military threat of a serious nature.

India’s military-industrial complex has been growing at an alarming rate, and

¹ See the Introduction in *Perspectives on Pakistan Foreign Policy*, ed. S. Chopra (Amritsar, 1983), p. i.
the setting up of a Defense Export Promotion Bureau suggests that it is in the process of becoming a dealer in arms like the other great powers. As a result of such developments, there is a growing feeling in Pakistan that nothing is as likely to determine the future of South Asia as the visible drive of India for great-power status and all that follows from it.

India's Drive for Great Power Status

Pakistan's relations with India, in fact with all South Asian states, are increasingly subject to India's strategy for becoming a great power. Let us review the process by which India is likely to become a great power and what that will mean for South Asia.

One of India's foremost intellectuals, K. Subrahmanyam, has alluded to India's aspiration as follows: "How should India—a country which is within the top twelve industrial producers of the world, has the fourth largest armed force, is a nuclear power, has launched satellites, and has the world's second largest population—be viewed by its neighbors and the international systems?"^2

It has been generally observed that the drive to acquire major-power status requires the demonstration of military and economic muscle, a readiness to seek new territories and markets and to establish an unchallenged sphere of influence within the neighborhood. Even a casual review of Indian policies and actions confirms that she is trying to follow this established pattern.

India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 was a major setback to its military reputation. In the ensuing confusion, Indian policymakers, who had lost no opportunity in condemning Pakistan for its alliance with the West, jumped unceremoniously into the lap of the same powers to save its skin. In the words of Stanley Wolpert: "Pentagon technicians and trainers started arriving with the new equipment, and by 1963 New Delhi had more U.S. brass than Islamabad-Pindi."^3 To help establish its self-confidence as a military power, India continued to seek military aid from the Soviet Union, and in August 1971 it entered into a twenty-year treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation. Taking advantage of Sino-Soviet differences and Western fears of communist expansion, India got aid from both and was ready in 1971 to assert its military preeminence in the subcontinent. The opportunity came with unfortunate domestic strife in Pakistan, India intervening to show off its newly acquired military muscle and to make certain that the second largest state in South Asia and the fifth largest in the world did not remain intact. Making much of a victory won over a beleaguered army fighting for an unpopular cause, India next moved to jettison all traditions of nonviolence and spirituality, seeking entry into the nuclear club by testing a small device in May 1974. What these actions of India have done is to increase Soviet

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involvement in South Asia, create a fear for territorial integrity among its neighbors, and launch the era of nuclear weapons on South Asian soil.

Building up the economic muscle has been a much more difficult task, although India has had almost uninterrupted support from the Western nations as well as the Soviet Union. The seriousness of an economic crisis and other factors led to a virtual collapse of the Indian political system and the declaration of a state of emergency in June 1975. To demonstrate that progress is being made and to counter the image of wretchedness and poverty that have come to be associated with India, funds have been poured into prestigious projects in the areas of electronics, space crafts, and ocean mining. Even here, substantial dependence on Soviet help is visible as evidenced in the fifteen-year economic and trade agreement signed during the Soviet president's visit in 1973. India's effort to develop economic muscle is going to mean that South Asian states will be under greater pressure to trade with India and to serve as markets for its products. It may also mean reduced opportunity for these states to try to develop their own industrial sector, unless regional coordination can be established. Already Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have found India ready to exert considerable pressure in favor of certain kinds of trade policies.

India's readiness to seek new territories and to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in South Asia is easily illustrated. In 1973, a domestic political crisis in the former kingdom of Sikkim was used by India to intervene militarily and politically, not just to settle the problems but to make Sikkim the twenty-second state of the Indian union in May 1975. Making South Asia an exclusive sphere of influence has been a more difficult objective. The traditional influence of Western powers in the region, U.S. success in winning Pakistan over as an ally, and subsequent Chinese involvement in the region have made India's task difficult. Policymakers in New Delhi were relieved when it became apparent that the United States was losing interest in the region because of the Vietnam debacle and more pressing demands elsewhere. Events after the Soviet move into Afghanistan and the renewal of U.S. interest in the region suggest that for the present India has to be content with sharing the South Asian sphere rather than having exclusive control over it.

As India desperately seeks to catch up militarily and economically with the great powers—an expensive and competitive race in which it has a long way to go—Pakistan continues to be a problem because of its commitment to a secondary but independent role in South Asia and its ability to build up its military strength. Relations between the two cannot be expected to settle until the post-1971 realism of Islamabad is matched by an equally serious reappraisal by New Delhi of its chances of imposing hegemony over South Asia. Only under such circumstances will Pakistan be able to get India's help in achieving the three objectives set forth above.

**Smaller South Asian Neighbors**

Pakistan's relations with the other nations in South Asia are becoming increasingly important as the region takes some first steps toward fulfilling its potential as a subsystem in global politics. First, all seven states share similar problems and are
at roughly the same state of development. Economic cooperation and coordination of development plans will be essential for achieving a breakthrough in dealing with the basic and urgent issues confronting all of them. The setting up of the South Asian Regional Cooperation is a much overdue recognition of this fact. Second, Pakistan’s dealings with India at the bilateral level tend to become embroiled in contentious side issues, and the participation of all seven states may increase the possibility of a positive dialogue and sharper focus on the real issues facing the people of South Asia. Third, the combined pressure of all the states of the subcontinent may not only help to contain India but also act as a deterrent to other great powers wishing to exploit South Asia.

Two tendencies have militated against the achievement of South Asian Regional Cooperation. First, member states have looked in different directions and beyond the region for the fulfillment of economic and political objectives, that is, Pakistan and Bangladesh toward the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Maldives toward Southeast Asia, and so on. This has prevented a South Asian identity from emerging and the population’s recognizing the geostrategic compulsions that tie their destinies together. Second, neither India, with its substantial industrial advance, nor any other South Asian nation has so far achieved the kind of breakthrough that could invite the attention of the other members and serve as a catalyst for regional mobilization. More technological assistance has been provided by India and Pakistan to countries outside the region than to one another, the Middle East and Iran being major examples.

Pakistan’s recent performance suggests that substantial importance is being given in Islamabad to enlarging the scope of relations with other South Asian states. Not only have relations with Bangladesh been normalized but almost every other state including little Maldives has been made a party to one kind of bilateral agreement or another. It remains to be seen whether Islamabad is in the process of establishing a substantial new approach toward the South Asian states or whether India’s difficulties at various fronts have generated only a temporary interest that is likely to pass. In either case, Islamabad cannot help but recognize the common experience that many neighbors have had with the policies of Delhi, and it would be surprising if policymakers in Islamabad do not make some use of it. Needless to say, although states like Nepal and Sri Lanka have welcomed the understanding and cooperation with Pakistan, they are conscious of the limitation of Pakistan’s position and the unavoidability of dealing with India.

II

We have sketched the basic nature of relations between Pakistan and India as well as the importance other South Asian states could acquire in it. So far, it appears that the various states of the region have failed to come together in ways that could create a climate of security, economic cooperation, and stable regional order. Three wars and numerous war scares between India and Pakistan, hostile relations between India and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, as well as a mistrust of the Indian design
have characterized a substantial part of the relations between these states. Let us now examine three possible choices Pakistan could adopt to improve the situation: (1) adopt a relationship of dependence on India including drastic reduction in relations with outside powers; (2) opt out of South Asia by seeking a greater relationship with the Gulf states and the Muslim bloc with the tacit support of the United States; and (3) help create an understanding among South Asian states, including India, that would allow cooperation on the European model without the hegemony of any state.

Before examining each of these choices separately, let us remind ourselves of some of the realities that are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. First, all the South Asian states including Pakistan have a strong aversion to hegemonistic politics and will staunchly safeguard their freedom of action. Second, although both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to agree on the importance of South Asia in general terms, the USSR has been willing to give more consistent attention and commit more effective resources to expand influence in the subcontinent. Third, India is the preponderant South Asian power and for the time being prefers to view the region as its exclusive sphere of influence. Fourth, states like individuals are creatures of habit and, except when shaken by catastrophic events, tend to stumble along familiar patterns of behavior. Finally, China has to be considered as having an important role in South Asia, not only because of its geographic presence but also because Indo-Soviet collaboration is a matter of concern to China.

Choice One

Although this is the least likely choice to be adopted by Pakistan, the regularity with which it resurfaces makes it important to examine. Many observers, including friends of Pakistan, feel that it would be best for everyone if India and Pakistan could come together and unite the region against threats from the outside. It is understood that this unity is to be achieved by Pakistan’s giving up policies that are the cause of conflict with India. There can be little doubt that this would involve Pakistan’s having to seclude itself from “annoying” relationships with the United States and China and, secondarily, also disengaging itself from the support of financially powerful Muslim states. Another outcome of such a policy would be to reduce Pakistan’s military and economic strength and, therefore, create a condition of dependence on India.

The vital fact to be understood about this option is that it will not permit a relationship of equality between India and Pakistan. What is described as an “understanding” between the two is actually a “dependence.” This would not only not be acceptable to Pakistan, but it would actually destabilize the region with repercussions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Since India is still in the process of becoming a great power and faces serious internal pressures from dissatisfied ethnic, religious, and lingual groups, the addition of new nations dependent on it for military and economic assistance could seriously jeopardize India’s ability to function and maintain control. It is also worth remembering that the very threat from the outside against which the two neighbors are supposed to unite—the USSR—is responsible for
arming India and is one of its most reliable allies. While it is true that the "dependence" option will be well received in India and by weakening Pakistan achieve one of India's main objectives, the effort will be wasted because even India admits that Pakistan does not pose a threat any longer.

Choice Two

For sometime now, Pakistan has been looking to its Western neighbors for greater economic cooperation. Muslim states, strengthened by the sharp rise in oil revenues after 1973, seemed the obvious choice for expanding relations. Pakistan's surplus skilled and unskilled labor found ready employment in the growing economies of the Gulf and, with their remittances, strengthened Pakistan's economy. The setting up of the Organization of Islamic Conference has provided Pakistan with a forum for mobilizing Muslim world opinion in favor of its policies and for participating in joint economic, social, and cultural projects undertaken by the Muslim states. After the fall of the shah of Iran, the United States has also looked with favor upon Pakistan's greater involvement in the Middle East. These and other facts have given rise to speculation that perhaps Pakistan is no longer a South Asian entity and that relations with India and the other South Asian states will increasingly get relegated to a secondary position in its foreign policy priorities. The so-called "Islamic resurgence" further substantiated this view.

Although the importance of certain Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia to Pakistan cannot be denied, the option of becoming a part of the Middle East is largely unrealistic. Aside from the difficulties created by geographic, lingual, and cultural constraints, it is also clear that the Arab states would not welcome it and that already a number of countries have tried to create confederations and failed. The most important fact, however, is that even the greatest amount of solidarity with the Muslim countries in the West cannot keep India from impinging on Pakistan's life as a nation. In fact, it is well known that India has competed favorably with Pakistan for economic projects in the Gulf and Arabia. At the same time, it should be pointed out that Pakistan has relied on its Muslim neighbors for various kinds of support, and this has decreased its dependence on others including the nations of South Asia. This is, however, not the same as a withdrawal from South Asia and cannot be seen as such.

Choice Three

The creation of a South Asian community on the pattern of Europe could prove to be a viable option for removing the strains in Pakistan's relations with India, except that the will to create it does not seem to exist yet. By providing for each member to be an equal partner, no matter what its size and strength, a community free of suspicion and mistrust could emerge. Experience with advantageous economic cooperation and the building up of representative regional institutions could also bring India out of its present hegemonistic frame of mind. While it may not guarantee against adventurism
by outside powers, it would certainly minimize such possibilities. This choice would differ from the first option because it would create mutual dependence among all the South Asian countries without making each dependent on India.

Unfortunately, the experience of South Asia Regional Cooperation suggests that the advantages have not yet become apparent and that although India has become increasingly better disposed, the kinds of issues being tackled fail to communicate a seriousness of purpose. Perhaps, the enthusiasm of the smaller members will carry it forward, but India’s perceptions must change if it is to really take off. Instead of the dominance that India seeks, it must be ready to be content with being the leading nation, something that the various leading nations of Europe learned after much destruction and death and that the two superpowers have yet to learn within their own spheres of influence. The prospects are therefore bleak for India to come to this realization soon.

In conclusion, what then will be the future shape of Pakistan’s relations with India and the rest of South Asia? Will it accept dependence on India or will it fight to maintain a position of equality and independence? What are the chances that India will rethink its role in South Asia and help create a South Asian community in which all seven can coexist with honor and advantage? The nearly 1 billion people of the subcontinent need food, better living conditions, and education. Relations based on hostility and conflict do not promote the prospects of their getting what they need. Pakistan’s present “peace offensive” and a refusal to be provoked suggest that it has learned some lessons from the past. It now remains to be seen whether India can learn from the lessons of the other great powers and their experience with the use of force.

For the present, South Asian nations in general and Pakistan in particular need the help of the international community to step back from the brink of disaster that another Indo-Pakistan war could bring.
18. U.S.-Indian Relations and South Asian Regional Issues

Thomas Perry Thornto

THE REGIONAL SETTING

My aim here, to explore the U.S. relationship with India in the context of South Asian regional issues, is both more and less than it seems. It is less because, with trivial exceptions, the regional context is in fact defined by the bilateral problems of India and Pakistan. The task is much broader, however, because there is no way to address the regional issues of South Asia outside of the setting of global and transregional concerns that affect all the actors. But it is with South Asia itself that I will begin.

Among the several subregions of the international system, South Asia is one of the best defined. In physical terms it is set off by a convincing combination of mountains, desert, ocean, and jungle; centuries and millenia of political and religious interaction, capped by the brief but effective unity imposed by the British raj, have shaped a common, if not always comfortable, past. While one can debate whether Burma and Afghanistan should be included (I would exclude the former and include the latter), there is little ambiguity possible when one refers to "the subcontinent." Had more statesmanship been shown by the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League in the 1930s and 1940s, "India" might well be a single entity today with only Sri Lanka and perhaps Nepal enjoying a degree of formal independence from the power center in New Delhi.

That moment of history is past, and the power configuration of South Asia is something quite different, but the system has not been greatly altered by the partition of 1947. Geography remains unchanged, and a sort of political unity has survived the withdrawal of the unifying colonial power, for regional systems can be determined by competition and conflict as well as cooperation. The continuing competition between

1 On regional formation and, esp., the role of conflict, see George Liska, States in Evolution (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), esp. pp. 78ff.
India and Pakistan has ensured that each focuses a great amount of attention on the other, while setting the terms on which outsiders deal with the region as an entity or with its individual members.

India's vast superiority over any other member of the subsystem or, indeed, over all of them in combination provides a core for the system much as the United States does in the northern part of the Western hemisphere. By almost any standards, India is a major power in its region and beyond. Yet its great power is not a key to unquestioned domination of the region, for the partition of the continent played a cruel game with both Pakistan and India. Undivided Pakistan was a significant power in its own right, and in any other part of the globe it would have dominated its region, with a population surpassed only by four other nations. Its tragedy was to have three of those four nations as immediate neighbors. India's tragedy was to have vast power but to find itself next to a nation that could not be compelled readily to accept Indian primacy. Pakistan's size and potential inevitably stirred hopes of competing with India, and in the bitterness of the partition, Pakistanis felt they had little choice but to resist a dominant Indian role in South Asia. Since Pakistan's strength was so far inferior to India's, however, it could not compete solely within the system. Against the background of a highly competitive global system, this combination of power factors was the fatal flaw that would open the subsystem to outside intrusion and sharply reduce the autonomy of India and Pakistan in dealing with the rest of the world.

Restiveness in the Ranks

A focus on South Asia as its primary policy framework was thus undesirable for Pakistan. Geographic removal is not feasible, and India shows no signs of weakening or breaking up, so the most hopeful alternative is a redefinition of the strategic situation. On the one hand, this involves Pakistan's oft-noted attempt to draw an "equalizer" (specifically the United States or China) into South Asian affairs from the global system. The Pakistani search for closer ties to the Muslim states (primarily in West Asia, but also Indonesia in the early 1960s) represented another kind of attempt to redefine the regional situation in ways that would place Pakistan in a different, more congenial regional context. Obviously Pakistan, like most other nations, does have multiple regional affiliations. It is uncontestably a West Asian, as well as a South Asian, nation, but any attempt to shift primary involvement in that direction is probably foredoomed. Aside from the realities of geography, the tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations draw Pakistan irresistibly back into the systemic interaction of South Asia, and it is easily within India's power to prevent Pakistan from wandering out of New Delhi's orbit. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto probably recognized this problem. His hope of putting the Kashmir issue aside was a means of improving relations with India; equally, however, it would have freed Pakistan of part of its South Asia preoccupation and assisted Bhutto's designs to relate his country to more promising transregional and global settings. Ultimately, however, Pakistan encounters a paradox in this policy. The key to gaining a degree of freedom is a broad rapproche-
ment with New Delhi. Accomplishing that, however, would greatly reduce Pakistan's incentives to break free of South Asia.

Efforts of the smaller South Asian states have been less dramatic. Sri Lanka's attempt at acceptance by ASEAN was primarily economic in motivation but also represented an attempt to find a context in which Sri Lanka would be more comfortable politically and gain some distance—psychological at least—from the overwhelming presence of its northern neighbor, Nepal, and to a lesser extent Bhutan, recognized early that a transregional alignment with China was only a theoretical option. Both of them have come to terms with the realities of geography but still seek to ameliorate these by maintaining a high international posture. This would seem to be the main use of Nepal's zone of peace proposal. Bangladesh also hoped to go outside South Asia to find international support, specifically in its dispute with India over the division of the Ganges waters. It failed, however, in the face of Indian insistence on bilateral dealings. The Dhaka government did not throw in the towel completely. It tried another approach—discussed later—that sought to reinforce, rather than splinter, the regional identity of South Asia.

India's Uncertain Trumpet

Since its earliest days, India has confronted the dilemma of whether it should play the role of the greatest among the least, or the least among the greatest, powers. It is not one of the superpowers that can virtually ignore the relationship between propinquity and concern. At the same time, however, India is not constrained, as is Pakistan, by the need to condition its policies primarily on the concerns of its immediate neighbors. Thus, while it has considerable choice about how it deals with the outside world, the geographic realities cannot be avoided. Schematically, one can portray India's range of activity as a series of concentric circles.

At the core is South Asia itself. As the dominant member, India seeks to maximize the cohesiveness of the system under its leadership both to provide a strong basis from which to operate on the larger stage and to minimize the opportunities for outside powers to intervene in South Asian affairs. This concern extends well beyond security matters to include culture and economics, but even in these areas the ultimate Indian concern is political. While Pakistan is the principal concern, India must also take a very active interest in the activities of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. Even a weak bordering state can, with the best of intentions, inflict heavy damage on the society and economy of its neighbors.\(^2\) India's "region," however, is not only South Asia. It has what I would call "transregional" interests in several nearby subregions. These can be described in various ways. Southeast and Southwest Asia are both important to India politically and economically, and their security problems could spill over into South Asia. A second region is the entire Indian Ocean basin, for India has

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historical ties, dating back to the British period, in East and Southern Africa and much more ancient relationships in the Indies. The name of the Indian Ocean is not accidental; India supplied the motive for Britain's imperial push all around its rim, and no government in New Delhi can fail to recall this. A third way of defining India's transregional context is by the term Asia. India is indisputably in Asia and has at times felt an Asian calling. But India is not the focus of Asia; indeed, the only thing that usefully defines the continent at all is the centrality of China.

China itself is a transregional as well as a past and perhaps future security problem for India. But China is more than this, for it also affects India as an element of the global equation. It can cause problems for India through its interactions with the two superpowers or in other subregions, especially Southeast Asia.

The outermost ring is the global scene where, as we have noted, India can both aspire to play a significant role in its own right and where, because of its vulnerabilities, it can become an object of competition between the superpowers.

In approaching its global dilemma, India developed the policy of nonalignment and has devoted a large part of its foreign policy efforts to it. In part, nonalignment has been an attempt to redefine the basis on which seats at the high table of international politics are allocated. While nonalignment and India's sporadic attempts to lead the Third World have not been wholly successful, India has for most of its history been able to play a global role that is disproportionate to its power capabilities. Beyond this, India sees itself as a city on the hill, a light to the nations, much as ancient Hebrews did and modern Americans still do. Pro forma modesty is rather more a characteristic of the Indian political approach, so there is less sustained rhetoric on the subject of global leadership in New Delhi than there is in Washington, but the Indian global urge shines through and is not without resonance abroad.

There is an inverse relationship between rhetoric and effort at the other end of the policy spectrum. Protestations of concern for the interests and welfare of its neighbors are the stuff of subcontinental piety, but India has been only modestly successful in tending its nearest garden and scarcely more so in convincing others of its benign intentions. There is little doubt that India does wish its neighbors well, for none but a small minority of Indian extremists is dissatisfied with the territorial status quo in South Asia, and unrest in neighboring countries can easily spill over into Indian politics. Relationships between big and small neighbors are almost always difficult—at least where there are minimum standards that prevent the larger neighbor from imposing its will unilaterally. But even granting many faults on the other side, New Delhi's ties to Kathmandu, Dhaka, and Colombo, not to mention Islamabad, are not a model of policymaking and implementation. India has yet to find a form of pre-eminence in South Asia that is distinguishable from a modified form of the raj, in which bordering states are permitted to keep their nominal independence but only as long as they shape their policies in consonance with Indian preferences. For India, then, the policy paradox is how to secure regional supporters without alienating them.

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3 On the shortcomings of Indian regional policy after 1971, see ibid., pp. 191–92.
through a heavy-handed display of leadership.

India’s failure to get its regional affairs in order has been costly not only in terms of its bilateral relations with neighboring states. These regional problems are diversions of Indian attention from fields of activity that might be more rewarding, and they sharply limit India’s ability to project its political influence on a broader stage. While the regional status quo is not dangerous to India on its own, it does provide the vulnerability by which outsiders can intervene intentionally or inadvertently. Given the absolute importance that India ascribes to excluding outside—especially superpower—influence from the subcontinent, failure to find an agreeable modus vivendi with its neighbors is probably New Delhi’s greatest policy failure.4

It is in the second of the three concentric circles where Indian policy has been ineffective to the point that many observers doubt that there is any coherent Indian policy concept for dealing with West and Southeast Asia and with China. The former two are extremely important to India for economic reasons, and China is a major security concern. Only with the Indian Ocean does India seem to have a convincingly—if veiled—security approach, as it strives for a situation in which the role of the superpowers’ navies would be minimized, leaving its own navy dominant.

Indian concern for Southeast and Southwest Asia has risen and fallen without discernible pattern. Nehru’s early attempts to form a sort of Asian consensus (which India would fail) caused China to become the focal point of interest in Asia, and the Afro-Asian-Latin American Third World was populated increasingly by nations far from India and with little respect for Indian leadership. Until the 1970s, India largely ignored its neighboring regions to the east and west, and they in turn were taken up with problems for which India could offer no assistance. The political and economic development of the ASEAN countries to the east and the sudden growth in concern for stable and affordable oil supplies from the West has served to focus Indian attention in recent years. In West Asia New Delhi has been modestly successful in pursuing its interests among the Arab and Persian oil producers, although it remains burdened by its stand on Afghanistan. Progress in the East has been less satisfying, however, for ASEAN looks elsewhere for friends and trading partners. The Indian gaffe in extending recognition to the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea has only served to increase the Southeast Asians’ disdain for Indian policy.

India’s Soviet tie is far from cost-free in its relation with the other nations of Asia and the Third World in general, nor is it without cost in India’s dealings with China. Of course, much of the reason for the strong Indo-Soviet tie is precisely their shared concern over China, and one can scarcely complain about the bitterness of effective medicine. As India seeks to normalize its relations with China, however, it is inhibited not only by its direct ties to Moscow but also by the policies that it has pursued toward Kampuchea and Afghanistan, both of which are high on China’s policy agenda.

Even New Delhi’s apparently purposeful approach to the Indian Ocean question

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4 Sashi Tharoor, *Reasons of State* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), p. 97 and passim, is sharply critical of India’s transregional policy failures and esp. Indira Gandhi’s failure to exert leadership within South Asia.
is only partially sound, for it fails to take into account the problems that will arise if the U.S. and Soviet navies leave the region. As the dominant power remaining, India will need to pursue adroit policies if it is not to arouse the suspicion and hostility of other littoral states—and there is no sign that India is developing a coherent policy for the entire Indian Ocean basin beyond its attempts to oust the great powers’ navies. Success could have a still greater cost, for it requires a generous estimate of Soviet goodwill to feel comfortable with an overwhelming Soviet presence across the Kyber Pass and no countervailing presence from the other superpower.

There is, of course, a final sphere of foreign policy, the purely bilateral, and in varying degrees India has bilateral relationships with all nations with whom it comes in contact. These go well beyond the scope of this chapter except for two cases. Pakistan has already been discussed to some extent since the Indo-Pakistani bilateral relationship is largely coincidental with the politics of the South Asian subsystem. The other key bilateral relationship is with the United States.

THE U.S. APPROACH TO SOUTH ASIA

As a global power, the United States has a different view of how the world is structured. This view has changed somewhat over time but is still based upon a bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union that frequently plays itself out in competition for influence in subregions. The United States prefers to deal with well-organized subregions that can handle their own internal problems, present no undue demands on it, permit it to pursue bilateral relations with individual members without alienating the others, withstand Soviet intrusions, and are at least benevolently neutral in its global competition with the Soviet Union. NATO and ASEAN are favorite models, although neither meets all of the criteria.

South Asia meets almost none of the criteria. The internal situation in the region is messy, and the India-Pakistan conflict not only forces the United States to make choices it would prefer to avoid but provides openings for Soviet involvement. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and even Bhutan have offered temptations for U.S. involvement in ways that would poison relations with India, although by and large, these have been resisted. South Asia also offers a classic demonstration of how difficult it is to maintain good relations with states that are hostile to each other. Neither Pakistan nor India finds it inconsistent to demand that the United States conduct relations with one on a strictly bilateral basis while pressing us to limit our ties to the other. As a result, it has been virtually impossible to carry on consistently constructive policies with either one.

Inconsistency is not the sole preserve of India and Pakistan, however, for the United States has its own ambivalences, misconceptions, and reservations about the South Asian system. First, the scholarly definitions that fit South Asia so well and define it as a discrete subregion are not the common parlance of U.S. decision-makers. Except in periods of extreme regional activity, South Asia does not appear as a conceptual unit when seen from Washington. To some extent the problem is mechanical. South Asia is on the other side of the world from the United States, which approaches it intellectually through either the prisms of global issues or the problems
of other subregions "on the way" to South Asia. Unlike India, the United States does not look outward from South Asia into a set of expanding concentric circles nor do U.S. interests in the region often force the country to focus the area on its own terms. South Asia appears to the United States frequently as an extension of some other set of problems. Both physically and intellectually, it is the intersection of Washington's outermost circles of concern.

The second difficulty lies in the policies that the United States has pursued toward South Asia. Sometimes for good reasons (and sometimes for bad), it has failed to do the things that would help South Asia become something more like out "model" region. An understanding of this requires a look back at the history of the relationship.5

The Evolution of Policy

U.S. initial contacts with South Asia were based on a minimum level of interests with a still more modest base of knowledge. South Asia needed little involvement, for unlike Indonesia, the decolonization process had run smoothly; unlike Europe, there was no immediate threat from the Soviet Union; unlike Latin America, there was no tradition of U.S. leadership. In systemic terms there was no interaction between the emerging rivalry between Washington and Moscow and the regional dispute between India and Pakistan. The two polarizations were not in phase; indeed, they worked on different planes. At this stage even the Kashmir dispute was approached on its merits rather than in terms of global interests or even of U.S. bilateral interest in India and Pakistan. When the Pakistanis approached Secretary of State George Marshall in 1948, pointing out the value of their country in the Middle East context, they were put off with the eminently "regionalist" advice to settle their problems with India.6

In these first years U.S. interests in South Asia were low, and neither the Americans nor the Soviets saw it as a field of contest. The former proposition would long remain a constant in U.S. policy, but the latter changed rapidly as the cold war spread beyond Eastern Europe. While South Asia was not a problem in itself, U.S. circles of concern began to move toward it. First came the idea of a "northern tier," growing out of the responsibilities that the United States assumed for Greece, Turkey, and Iran in the late 1940s. Although it was not inevitable that this structure would impinge on South Asia, this is precisely what happened in the early 1950s. A degree of natural affinity between Pakistan and its western neighbors was part of the reason; more important, however, was Washington's mechanical concept of containment that required a chain of contiguous allies around the perimeter of the Sino-Soviet bloc. At the same time, the United States' growing concerns with Southeast Asia called for an extension of the containment chain from the east. Here again, an undivided Pakistan provided the necessary link between the two circles of concern, although as late as


6 M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–1958 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1982), p. 60; other interesting material on the U.S. view of South Asia in systemic terms is on pp. 47, 102, and 111.
1953 the Eisenhower administration reportedly encouraged India to establish a “Monroe Doctrine” that would extend over Burma and Thailand. Although the United States saw no reason why this situation would harm the integrity of the South Asian subsystem (indeed, it probably never thought of the matter in those terms), this was inevitably what happened. And, of course, this was precisely Pakistan’s reason for entering the security arrangements, for it saw the U.S. connection as the badly needed equalizer for the imbalances in the South Asian system. Ultimately, if inadvertently, the United States came to share Pakistan’s preference for a splitting up of the South Asian system rather than for its unity and found itself at cross-purposes with India.7 Faced with U.S. economic moral and political support for Pakistan, in addition to generous arms aid, New Delhi turned to Moscow for assistance, and the two polarizations, global and regional, became locked into phase. In the process, the Soviets implicitly associated themselves with India’s preference for a tightly organized South Asia; for the time being, however, Moscow fostered the organizational principle of conflict, rather than cooperation, between India and Pakistan. Fortunately, the issues at stake within South Asia have been largely peripheral to the concerns of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the region has remained one of only indirect superpower confrontation. (Developments in the Afghan situation could, of course, change this.)

The Failed Attempt at Leadership

Realities, however, soon began to change. Containment in its mechanical form became less relevant; nonalignment established itself; new priorities arose with regard to economic development; and, most of all, China became an independent international actor sharply at odds with both the United States and India—and soon also the Soviet Union. The older concepts of “northern-tier,” Middle East, and Southeast Asian alliance systems—indeed, even bipolarity itself—became less compelling. South Asia as a unit fitted the new concepts much better, and India in particular became a prime focus of U.S. policy. While the relationship of the United States with Pakistan remained important (and grew after the signing of the bilateral agreement of 1959 that provided it with intelligence facilities in Pakistan), its value relative to India was slipping. The result was that U.S. ties to the two subcontinental powers became much more even. Whether through design or (more likely) not, this facilitated the U.S. effort to attain a leadership role in South Asia in the early 1960s. That role was possible only if the United States had fairly balanced relations with both India and Pakistan, and this, in turn, required that the two countries dampen their mutual hostility. Dispute settlement and evenhandedness became the priorities of the day as Washington played the role of regional security manager. The most successful step was the financing of the

7 Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London: Macmillan, 1951), sets forth a strategic concept in which Pakistan is related to West Asia and India is concerned with the Indian Ocean region. Durga Das, India from Curzon to Nehru and After (New York: John Day, 1970), p. 318, recounts a suggestion made in the early Dulles years that India should take security responsibilities in Southeast Asia; it is not clear what role it was to play vis-à-vis Pakistan.
Indus Waters project; others were less rewarding. The opportunity to support Indian security at the time of the 1962 Sino-Indian war balanced the U.S. security commitment to Pakistan, and the United States and Britain tried once more to settle the Kashmir problem. The U.S. role was facilitated by Moscow's failure to respond rapidly to India at its time of need and by the growing rapprochement between Pakistan and China that diluted the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. With the emergence of China as a fifth actor, the polarities of the 1950s were breaking down into a more traditional balance-of-power configuration. This provided the United States with much more flexibility in applying an evenhanded policy aimed at solving regional disputes, backed up by more authority than any other outside power could muster.

Even then, the apparent focus of the United States on South Asia was only partial. Much of the rationale of its concern had to do with China, a transregional or even global problem. In fact, President Kennedy apparently resurrected the idea of India's expanding its horizons to assume leadership in Southeast Asia—a suggestion obviously made with the Chinese threat in mind. Also, the apparent achievement of the United States in seizing leadership in the affairs of the subcontinent carried within it the seeds of its own collapse. After its initial shock, India was chary of too great a reliance on the United States, and the Soviet Union sought to recoup its position. Pakistan, for its part, was unimpressed with U.S. arguments about a Chinese threat to the subcontinent—much the same as India now reacts to U.S. arguments about the Afghan situation. The United States failed to effect a settlement of the Kashmir dispute as a means of uniting the subcontinent against outside threats; neither India nor Pakistan was sufficiently concerned about any external threat to make significant concessions on this vexed regional issue.

Regional realities also frustrated the U.S. attempt to become the principal source of military supply for India and thereby draw India into the U.S. security network. While there were other reasons impeding the establishment of an Indo-U.S. security relationship, Pakistani objections were probably the most intractable. Unwilling to give full support to either side in its regional quarrel, the United States could not get the full support of either in return. Nor, more ominously, could it restrain India and Pakistan in their dealings with each other.

The 1965 war represented a major failure of U.S. regional policy and brought an abrupt end to the United States' attempt to exercise regional security leadership. The mid- and late 1960s were a period of refocusing of U.S. attention much more broadly than in South Asia, but the effects were felt particularly sharply there. Americans were appalled by the use of U.S. weaponry on both sides of a senseless war, and for a variety of reasons, the Soviet Union was an acceptable mediator to almost all concerned parties. Thus, the United States suddenly withdrew from regional security management, leaving Alexei Kosygin to get matters back to the status quo ante. America

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8 M. C. Chagla, *Roses in December* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidhya Bhavan, 1974), pp. 290–91. Chagla was the ambassador to whom Kennedy made the proposal.

continued to shoulder a considerable economic burden in South Asia through the late
1960s but seemed to have lost interest in the region's political and security problems.
As its self-confidence increased, Moscow shifted its position away from conflict
and toward cooperation—under Soviet aegis—as the unifying principle for the South
Asian system. Its post-Tashkent attempts to exercise security and economic leadership
encountered much the same difficulties as had Washington's. Soviet attempts to
micromanage the Indian economy were even less well received; they were rebuffed
when they tried to mediate the many issues left over from Tashkent, and their arms
sales to Pakistan encountered vociferous Indian opposition. Without arms sales,
however, there was no prospect of weaning Pakistan away from China. The Soviets,
no less than we, encountered the hard realities of dealing with South Asia, and when
faced in 1971 with the tough decision to support the Indian war against Pakistan,
Moscow not surprisingly abandoned its impartiality rather than risk losing on both
sides as the United States had in 1965.10

Adjusting to Changing Realities
Less predictable was yet another sharp reversal of U.S. policy in 1971 and an
intense, if brief, reinvolvement in South Asia. U.S. interests did not appear to warrant
it, neither in terms of regional stability and security nor the much attenuated relation-
ship to Pakistan. As Henry Kissinger made abundantly clear in his memoirs, however,
the spasm of American activity in 1971 was motivated by considerations far removed
from South Asia.11 On the one hand, Washington was anxious to demonstrate to
Beijing that it was ready and willing to stand by friends—and the tattered friendship
with Pakistan provided a useful case for the demonstration. On the other hand, since
India had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, a stand would demonstrate
that the United States was prepared to be firm with Moscow and its presumed clients.
In both cases the aim was credibility, and in both cases the underlying objective was
building the triangular power relationship at the global level that was so vital to
Kissinger's plans. India and Pakistan happened to be the regional states involved; an
analogous conflict between, say, Peru and Chile would have served equally well. U.S.
policy in South Asia in 1971 was the ultimate globalization of regional affairs; the
regional states were virtual abstractions. As it happened, it was once again India that,
almost accidentally, got involved in the "wrong" side of the argument.
The 1971 war resulted in a nearly autonomous South Asia under Indian leader-
ship. Although Pakistan remained a significant power, it was no longer able to avoid
the fact of Indian primacy and accepted the Simla process with its emphasis on the
bilateral solution of disputes. During the 1970s, India began to show something of the
magnanimity expected of a regional dominant power and set about reordering the

10 Indo-Soviet relations in the late 1960s are covered by Robert Horn, Soviet Indian Relations (New York:
Praeger, 1982).
11 Henry Kissinger set forth his views in The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), ch. 21. A
telling criticism is provided by Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger,
external relations of the system in ways that would maximize autonomy. This involved sharply limiting the benefits that the Soviets hoped to gain from their support of India in 1971 and a countervailing opening to both Beijing and Washington. South Asia appeared to have turned a corner.

The U.S. policy spasm of 1971 was soon over. While relations with Pakistan developed smoothly, there was no suggestion of the United States’ involving itself in regional security affairs, and the bilateralism of the Simla agreement fitted well the U.S. preferences and capabilities of the time. The resumed low posture was now coupled with an acceptance of India’s importance in the terms India most wanted—as the leading power of the South Asian subsystem. A quarter-century after independence, Washington had apparently also turned a corner to come to terms with the realities of South Asia as a region on its own rather than as an expression of U.S. extraregional concerns. Although this was not a sufficient condition for a close Indo-U.S. relationship, it was undoubtedly a necessary one.

India took on added significance in the new economic context of the mid-1970s. As a large, moderate power, it could play a useful bridging role between the wilder demands of the Group of 77 and the desire of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries to fend off fundamental challenges to the international order. The oil crisis even enhanced U.S. interest in India. South Asia and the Indian Ocean region took on much more urgent, albeit indirect, importance as the United States discovered a vital interest in the neighborhood. The rapprochement between India and Iran suggested that India might have something to contribute to regional stability. New Delhi, for its part, also had to come to terms with the harsh post-1973 realities as its oil bill ballooned and resources to meet the challenge had to be sought in the West. Although (or perhaps because) the United States had terminated aid to India, there was now a foundation for a businesslike relationship between the two countries that suited India’s self-image and caused no problems for the United States’ global or regional concerns. This combination of lowered expectations combined with tangible shared interests led to a relationship that could absorb without great damage, on the one hand, an Indian nuclear test and Indira Gandhi’s imposition of the emergency, and, on the other, greatly increased U.S. activity in the Indian Ocean and the build-up of the facility at Diego Garcia.

This was an amazingly rosy situation when one considers the low state of Indo-U.S. relations in 1971. Prospects brightened further when in 1977 the electorates of both countries chose leaders who were committed to even more compatible global and regional policies. Jimmy Carter and Morarji Desai presented the most favorable constellation of leaders for the solidification of Indo-U.S. relations, and the situations in Sri Lanka (Jayawardene), Afghanistan (Daoud), and Bangladesh (Ziaur Rahman) were equally propitious for U.S. relations with South Asia. The sole exception was Pakistan where the new military government never found a basis of cooperation with the Carter administration. Even this promised to be a plus for Indo-U.S. relations,

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for Washington would not need to take Pakistani concerns so heavily into considera-
tion when dealing with India. The Carter administration made it abundantly clear that
it looked to India, the “regional influential” of South Asia, as the focus of its regional
policy. When Carter visited South Asia, it was not accidental that his only stop was in
New Delhi.

And yet the Carter-Desai period produced very little in the way of tangible
progress in Indo-U.S. relations. Part of the problem resulted from excessive ex-
pectations, and neither side was able to articulate clearly what it wanted from the other.
Regional problems played an important role. New Delhi was reluctant—perhaps
unable—to tell how it wanted Washington to relate to India’s regional policies. These
policies themselves were ambivalent. On the one hand, the Desai government was
relatively magnanimous in its dealings with neighbors, and most South Asians look
back nostalgically at the Janata years. If nothing else, it was demonstrated that Indian
policy is not completely flexible. On the other hand, New Delhi stuck firmly to a
policy of “beneficial” bilateralism rather than adopting a regional approach to solving
regional problems. The Desai government lacked the imagination to respond to the
major U.S. regional initiative of the period—Carter’s proposal for harnessing the
waters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra for the benefit of India, Bangladesh, and
Nepal. Neither Carter nor Desai was in office long enough to enlarge the modest
agenda of shared interests that provided only a very narrow base for developing the
bilateral relationship. The will was present and the rhetoric helpful, but the substance
remained elusive.

Indeed, cracks in the facade were visible early on. Most striking was the
intrusion of the nuclear issue, which not only poisoned the relationship but absorbed
the attentions of policymakers on both sides that could have been better directed
toward enlarging the basis for cooperation. Significantly, nonproliferation was not an
Indo-U.S. bilateral problem but yet another blow from the global into the bilateral
setting, for it is just as much a global issue for the United States as is containment of the
Soviet Union. The admittedly high value that the Carter administration placed on India
was not high enough to offset the presumed damage that concession to New Delhi
would have done to the U.S. global nonproliferation policy.

The Afghanistan Crisis

This period of promise in Indo-U.S. relations was short-lived, and much worse
befell it in the form of the same kinds of nonregional factors that had proved so harmful
in the past. In the global context détente unraveled under the pressure of Soviet and
Cuban activities in Africa so that by the latter part of his term, Carter’s policies had
begun to shift away from approaches supportive of close Indo-U.S. relations toward a

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14 Mansingh, India’s Search for Power, p. 261.
more traditional cold war tone. The transregional concern with the Persian Gulf that had offered hope for cooperation with India also turned toward a more traditional approach with the fall of Daoud and the shah. The Desai government, preoccupied with survival, offered no effective help, and after its fall in mid-1979 Indian foreign policy drifted without guidance. The intensification of relations between Washington and Beijing, partly in response to these changing trends, could not but raise apprehensions in New Delhi. The brief period of a U.S. focus on South Asia as an entity passed away about as quickly as the enthusiasm of the Kennedy era had, and Indo-U.S. relations were again the victim.

This time, however, there followed a heightened U.S. involvement more reminiscent of the 1950s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coming on top of an already high level transregional concern, made Southwest Asia a prime focus of U.S. policy and brought out much of the worst in the ways India and the United States deal with each other. Indian policy was moribund at the time of the invasion as the country was swept up in its election campaign. The United States responded with an activist initiative that defined the issue in overwhelming global terms with little concern for the regional implications, although the regional problem is primary, for the Soviet invasion and installation of a puppet regime in Kabul have breached both the political and strategic integrity of South Asia. The U.S. position was certainly understandable in light of Pakistan’s plight and India’s inactivity, but it greatly reduced the chances of a constructive response of regional leadership by the new government. Gandhi’s early responses were anything but constructive as she used the U.S. move toward Pakistan as an excuse for avoiding the profoundly troubling implications of the Soviet invasion for India and the region as a whole. India and the United States drifted apart in bitterness as global problems once again overwhelmed the potential for cooperation through a South Asian regional approach.

The coming of new regimes in both India and the United States, each suspicious of the other, opened the way for a repolarization of South Asia along lines that were familiar but in a much more dangerous setting. U.S. leaders spoke in terms of an “arc of crisis,” a “strategic consensus,” and “Southwest Asia” as the relevant policy framework and hastened to secure Pakistani cooperation with a large arms sales package. The idea of “South Asia” faded. Pakistan was conceptually moved again into Southwest Asia, and the new Central Command boundaries were drawn to include Pakistan but not India. As in the 1950s, Washington would have welcomed India into its strategic plans, but New Delhi’s failure to take an effective stand on Soviet aggression and U.S. efforts on behalf of Pakistan rendered the possibility moot. All in all, by 1981 the prospects for Indo-U.S. relations, under pressure from global, regional, and transregional factors, were exceedingly bleak.

If the U.S.-Indian relationship has not slid into disaster, it is in part because of changes in the United States, its outlook and its capabilities. The Reagan administration was careful to show understanding of Indian concerns even when it could not alter the substance of policy. In addition, Washington has learned over the years that India is no proxy of the Soviet Union and indeed poses the principal obstacle to Soviet
hegemony in South Asia. Finally, Washington was much more aware of the limitations on its own capabilities vis-à-vis South Asia. A more assiduous attempt at evenhandedness was required and more attention paid to damage limitation.

The principal restraint on the reglobalization of South Asia came from within the region itself. Pakistan had learned lessons in the intervening years: most important, that it cannot rival India and that neither the United States nor China is an adequate source of support. Islamabad made it clear from the very beginning of the U.S. reinvolvememt that while it welcomed support, it would not commit itself in ways that would risk a conflict with India or the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{15} India was also a much different nation from what it had been twenty-five years ago. It had gained experience on the international stage including, most importantly, the ability to manipulate its superpower patron, and it had much greater self-confidence about dealing with Pakistan militarily. Also, despite a very low public posture, New Delhi was deeply concerned about a Soviet presence in Afghanistan, which posed the greatest threat yet to Indian regional primacy. Another important part of Indian's learning experience had been in economics. While the Soviet Union provided some valuable assistance and India had made great strides itself, access to Western—especially U.S.—capital and technology remained critical for India's further development. Gandhi's visit to the United States in August 1982 was a strong signal that India, too, realized the importance of evenhandedness, even though the two countries continued to hold very different views on security matters, especially as these related to South Asia.

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Events since 1982 raise doubts whether the nations of South Asia and the superpowers have learned enough to do more than postpone a political and security disaster. Relations between India and the United States remain much more a hostage to the future than the means of determining it. While economic cooperation and personal links forged by Indian immigrants in the United States offer some long-term hope, whether there will be such a long term depends on broader factors. The first factor lurks in the background of any international situation—the danger of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would swamp, if not annihilate, all regional and bilateral concerns. Another relates to the wisdom of U.S. policy in all of its manifestations. The third, and most important for South Asia, is how the subsystem would manage itself, specifically how well it would be able to reduce the "pull" factor of regional discord and resultant vulnerability, no matter how hard the superpowers might "push" their interests in the region. The entire picture is beclouded by the great imponderables of the future Soviet role in Afghanistan and beyond, as well as the questionable future of Afghanistan itself under any conditions. The responsibilities of other actors such as the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are obviously critical to the future of South Asia.

\textsuperscript{15} For a detailed analysis of recent Pakistani policy, see W. Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan," \textit{Pacific Affairs} 57(2) (Summer 1984):284ff.
Realities—Persistent and Insistent

India has the greatest input of any of the actors, but its capabilities are not unlimited. Its goals of excluding the superpowers from the security affairs of South Asia proper and sharply reducing their influence in nearby regions are unattainable given Delhi’s present policies. The sharply divergent views over the nature of the Soviet threat in South Asia that the United States holds guarantees active U.S. support of Pakistan’s integrity. The United States—and even more the Soviet Union—will sail the Indian Ocean, meddle in the politics of the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, maintain bases in Southeast Asia, and participate in the South Asian power balance itself, as long as there are openings for them to do so. India cannot foreclose these openings unilaterally. It is also probably beyond India’s reach to unilaterally organize the security of the subcontinent and adjacent areas. In a crude military sense, India can impose its will on its immediate neighbors in South Asia, but the cost of doing so would be prohibitive. Only a Soviet protective shield would ensure India’s freedom of action, but the cost to India’s autonomy would be unacceptable.

The United States is even less able than India to organize South Asian security, and it has little incentive to try. In headier days, around 1960, when all things seemed possible for the United States, it failed because both India and Pakistan had outside options, and neither was willing to forego its priorities in favor of a U.S.-defined “larger interest.” In the meantime, Washington has learned to live with imperfections in the regional order of South Asia and elsewhere, concern about economic development has slacked, and both India and Pakistan have shown considerable skill in maintaining their independence. Some Indians like to think that the United States perceives a need to frustrate or contain growing Indian power, but that is hardly a serious consideration in Washington and is unlikely to become one for many years to come. More realistically, should South Asia become so badly divided and lacking in a focus of power that it became an open invitation to Soviet domination, the United States would have to consider making some attempt to straighten things out. Simply stating the requirement, however, shows the immense difficulty. First, short of restoring the raj, it is hard to see how any outside power could “straighten things out.” South Asia is a long distance from projecting military force against a competent adversary. If force were required, the outcome of a U.S.-Indian contest would be in question even if the United States was joined by Pakistan and China, and should the Soviet Union decide to support India, the task would probably be impossible.

Choices for the Future

The temptation remains strong to pursue a policy of defining South Asia out of

16 The Soviet Union obviously has a greater incentive and some important military advantages when compared with the United States, but the situation has probably moved beyond their capabilities as well.

17 An extreme statement of this position can be found in Baldev Raj Nayar’s chapters in John Mellor, ed., India: A Rising Middle Power (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979), together with a sensible rejoinder by William Barsd in the same volume.
existence, or at least out of relevance for U.S. policy. Attempts to organize Pakistan into some West Asian scheme have been a recurring theme, and on the basis of scanty but suggestive evidence there may have been a more or less conscious attempt to turn India eastward, both to support U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and to divert it from its concern with Pakistan. Attempts to organize Pakistan into some West Asian scheme have been a recurring theme, and on the basis of scanty but suggestive evidence there may have been a more or less conscious attempt to turn India eastward, both to support U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and to divert it from its concern with Pakistan. Southeast Asia has since resolutely turned away from any Indian connection, India has shown little interest eastward, and the United States now defines Asia politically as stopping somewhere around the Malacca Straits. (This has always been the practice of the State Department, and it is increasingly rare to find any mention of India or Pakistan in academic or popular works ostensibly dealing with “Asia.”) While there is more basis for moving Pakistan from South to West Asia, this, too, is a hopeless task. As long as India and Pakistan are primarily concerned with each other, South Asia will remain a political entity that neither we nor the Pakistanis can wish away. The price would be a reinsertion of a U.S. security presence into South Asia that could lead this time to irrevocable Indo-Soviet ties which would harm Pakistan’s interest no less than ours. The United States would not have succeeded in making South Asia irrelevant to its policy concerns; it would find that region to be one of the most critical areas of its competition with the Soviet Union. Neither does the United States have the option of ignoring South Asia; its transregional concerns are so closely intertwined that the region has become a reality that must be dealt with.

The United States, India, and, a fortiori, the other nations of South Asia have to make the best of a very difficult situation. A viable solution can come only from within South Asia itself through an arrangement that enables India and its neighbors to live on mutually acceptable terms and that defines the terms on which outsiders relate to the system. The primary responsibility is India’s not only because of its overwhelming power but also because India has the greatest interest in maintaining an integral South Asia. Given the realities of the situation, however, the other regional states have little choice but to cooperate in finding the best possible terms for living with their gigantic neighbor. The key demand on them is that they do not seek to draw outside powers into the affairs of South Asia. The closely related demand on India is that it behave intelligently and magnanimously toward its neighbors.

The interrelated problems of settling regional disputes and strengthening autonomy are not unique to South Asia. The Persian Gulf, Central America, and Southeast Asia are only three of the global subregions that have faced up to the choice between putting their own house in order or opening the door to superpower intervention. Prospects for success are determined by the fundamental dynamics of the given region, but organizational forms can be helpful, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Contadora powers, and ASEAN have been created by nations seeking to take charge of their own destiny. This kind of trend is particularly hopeful in the context of growing power among Third World nations and the ebbing of superpower influence.

South Asia has also begun to take steps toward organizing itself. The initiative

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18 See notes 7 and 8, above. It seems unlikely to me that U.S. policy was consistent enough to form a true pattern; more likely these suggestions were unrelated attempts to enlist India in the U.S. campaign against communist China.
of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) was taken by Bangladesh—a nation with its own set of problems with India but with little prospect of external assistance in solving them. In the last analysis, SARC will prosper or fall as a result of the success that India and Pakistan have in ordering their affairs. The trend since mid-1983 has been disappointing, but the existence of a regional mechanism, where none existed before, offers some hope. SARC is a very spindly reed, and its beginnings have been limited and halting, but it points the way toward a regional framework that could benefit all of South Asia, an alternative to the extremes of a new raj model or the dissolution of the region. In the short run, SARC has potential as a process that not only generates its own momentum but also provides a forum to keep India and Pakistan engaged in a constructive dialogue.\(^\text{19}\)

The future of South Asia does not lie in U.S. hands but depends on the South Asian nations themselves, although the policies of the Soviet Union will also be critical. But the United States is probably capable of frustrating South Asian autonomy if it pursues policies, whether consciously or unconsciously, that make it extremely difficult for Pakistan and India to play their essential roles. The United States would probably not consciously undermine South Asian cooperation, and it must take the time to focus on what South Asia is and what is at stake there if it is to reduce the chances of doing inadvertent harm. On a more positive note, U.S. policies can support South Asian states in their efforts. U.S. policies favoring regional cooperation should be unequivocal, and the United States should explicitly treat South Asia as a unit, not as a pile of building blocks to be used elsewhere. U.S. policies toward the individual states should be supportive and realistic.

This last point is both important and very difficult to implement. Some degree of U.S. involvement in the affairs of the individual South Asian nations—and the system as a whole—is desirable on both sides. As long as the "pull" elements exist within the region, there will inevitably be some kinds of U.S. involvement that some regional states will find intrusive. Wholehearted support of Indian objectives may buy goodwill in New Delhi, but India is not all of South Asia. The United States has traditional and important ties to Pakistan and other South Asian states. In the final analysis, it is up to the South Asian states themselves to decide jointly on what kind of external involvement they want. Until then, the U.S. policy challenge will be to balance its relations with Pakistan against the broader interest it has in an effective Indian leadership role in South Asia. The United States and China will continue to work closely with Pakistan, for a Pakistan that is dragooned into an Indian sphere of influence will be a source of continuing weakness and vulnerability in the system. A Pakistan that accepts its regional role with confidence is an essential ingredient of success, for India cannot organize South Asia unilaterally. These are matters that India has been slow in understanding and ambivalent in accepting. If, however, U.S. cooperation with

Pakistan, especially when seconded by China, is seen as anti-Indian collusion, the purpose will be defeated.

A cohesive South Asia could cause some problems for the United States, for one of the principles of the grouping would be to limit outside influences. The United States would, no doubt, have to forego hopes of drawing Pakistan, or other South Asian states, into its security arrangements. But since the grouping would also seek to exclude the much more imminent intrusiveness of the Soviet Union, the gain would more than offset the loss, and its continuing economic, cultural, and political attractiveness should guarantee the United States a strong position. The coolness of the Soviet Union toward SARC and Soviet attempts to discourage self-generated Indo-Pakistani rapprochement show that this point is not lost on them.

There could also be benefits for the United States elsewhere. A strong and united South Asia would be a potent factor of stability on the flank of the Persian Gulf, and its interest in stability there would complement ours. It would certainly be no less favorable than is the present situation in regard to other transregional concerns with China, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region in general. Here, too, the benefits would probably outweigh the losses by a comfortable margin.

Finally, it would go far toward solving the issue posed in the title of this chapter. A unified South Asia would remove the constant pressure that India and Pakistan each puts on U.S. bilateral dealings with the other. This, after all, has been the bane of U.S. policy in South Asia and especially of the U.S. relationship to India.

In sum, then, the task for both the United States and India—as well as Pakistan, the remaining South Asian states, and other external forces that wish South Asia well—is to learn to live with the often difficult reality of South Asia and to strengthen it. Attempts to find an escape in transregional and global alternatives have usually led to major policy setbacks for New Delhi and Washington (and, of course, for Islamabad as well). India’s failures to deal effectively with its regional problems have undermined both its ability to project influence into neighboring regions and its pretensions for a prominent global role. The U.S. projection of outside concerns into the South Asian setting has often proved disruptive for the nations involved and costly in terms of U.S. bilateral dealings with the regional states and its ability to draw on the strengths of South Asia in support of its broader concerns. The record is one that neither country can take pride in but one that provides rather clear guidance for the policies that two nations, each with grandiose pretentions, owes to the other and to those nations that are still less able to withstand the effects of U.S. failures.
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